
by

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Ph.D.
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TO MY HUSBAND AND CHILDREN
WITHOUT WHOSE CONSTANT ATTENTION
THIS THESIS WOULD HAVE BEEN
WRITTEN IN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS
ABSTRACT

Missionaries from Scotland first came to the Eastern Cape in 1821. From their strategic position on the frontier they exerted a potent influence, particularly after 1860 when Africans increasingly sought the education which the missionaries offered. Lovedale Institution, founded in 1841, gradually acquired a position of significance in the area. Under its second Principal, James Stewart, appointed in 1870, Lovedale attracted pupils from many parts of Southern Africa and commanded the respect of both black and white communities in the Cape. The purpose of this thesis is to explore in detail the attitudes of the Scottish missionaries, as exemplified by James Stewart and to assess the response of the African community in the Eastern Cape to these attitudes.

Emphasis on education was a special feature of Scottish missionary activity. In their view, Africans had a right to the best in education so that they could become literate, productive members of society. Political principles also followed from a basic belief in the brotherhood of man. Africans were entitled to equal justice before the law and, provided they had the requisite qualifications, were also entitled to exercise the vote and, in time, to be integrated as loyal members of society. The Constitutional Ordinance which had given the Cape a "colour-blind" franchise encouraged educated Africans to adopt these principles and to work within the framework of accommodationist politics.

The common cause made by missionaries and Africans in
political and educational matters was brought to an end before the turn of the century by the discovery of mineral wealth whose exploitation demanded an urbanised labour force and by the conflict between emergent Afrikaner nationalism and British imperialism, the opposing forces being reconciled only at the expense of the black population.

Missionary teaching had urged Africans to value education, to adopt European standards of civilisation and to accept the equality of all men in the eyes of God. By the late 19th Century, in the political and social arenas, these ideals were increasingly unattainable. African attempts to achieve power-sharing and equality in the ecclesiastical field, however, met with opposition from the men who had first inculcated the precepts and, disillusioned, many Africans seceded from established churches and formed independent sects. Both missionaries and Africans were victims of social and political change outwith their control but missionaries showed themselves unable to identify with the African aspirations they had engendered and also unable to liberate themselves from the prejudices and mores of their race and class. Despite these shortcomings Lovedale gave to many Africans their first experience of a common identity to counter the divisive tendency of tribal loyalties and established itself as a symbol, still potent, of academic excellence and racial harmony.
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ABBREVIATIONS

Cory MS  Refers to material in the Cory Library for Historical Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

F.M.C.  Foreign Mission Committee

LB  Letter Book

NLS  National Library of Scotland

PC  Private Collection

SP  Stewart Papers in the Library of the University of Cape Town

ST  Stewart Papers in the Rhodesian Archives

* Denotes correspondents of Stewart's of whom a brief biography appears in Appendix D.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years an attempt has been made, under the influence of developments in social anthropology and sociological research, to redirect South African historiography on the theme of the "interaction between peoples of diverse origin"¹ and, in view of the exaggerated ethno-centric approach of South African historiography in the past, this attempt is not only justified but overdue. Rightly, if not always successfully, writers who seek this reinterpretation aim to give historical weight to all groupings in South Africa, to evaluate more accurately the contribution of each to South Africa's past and to emphasise the interdependence of the many sections of the common society. Such writing is part of a broader trend which demands that historians should give due attention to man in all his relationships, to social and economic organisations, to voluntary associations and to patterns of group response, thereby minimising the importance previously accorded to personalities or the significance given to individual action. It is also part of a trend in Western historiography which feels compelled (for many reasons) to put into perspective the nature and extent of the 'European domination' of the world, and to make a critical reassessment of the methods and achievements of imperialism. In common, then, with those of other countries, some South African historiographers have at last recognised the maturity and complexity of black African societies and their varied reaction

to the spread of European influence and conquest and have also sought to uncover the existence and reality of an embryonic African nationalism. African societies have been credited not merely with a history before the advent of the European but with an active rather than a passive role in events since then. At the very least it has been acknowledged that,

"To write the history of the Colony without making full allowance for the great influence of the natives and native ideas...is to play the tragedy of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out..." 1

Such an approach inevitably challenges previous interpretations and has resulted in strong criticism of imperialism and imperialists and in a reappraisal of the rationale behind cherished notions of European pre-eminence. One must distinguish between the two, however. Already it is possible for many to steer a middle course between the excessive adulation of European (particularly British) imperialism in the 19th C. and the excessive condemnation of it in the 20th C. and to affirm that imperialism was a "necessary and valuable phenomenon". 2 Indeed, 19th C. imperialism sowed the seeds of its own destruction, training and educating an elite which eventually demanded political independence and freedom from white control with all its overtones of racialism and European superiority. Other forms of imperialism may be said to have supplanted that of Europeans in some independent countries. What is vital is that the control of white men should be seen

1. David D. Storomont, Journal, 1 June 1894, Cory MS 7492.  
to have been eliminated.

Whereas the foregoing is true of independent Africa, in South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa, the situation is obviously different. In South Africa, where European supremacy or the superiority of the white man is accepted as the keystone of power, recent historiography assumes a quality of defiance and political protest. Foreign imperialism may have been eliminated from South Africa but 'settler imperialism' is still very much alive and its reality completely overshadows any superficial similarity between the historical development of South Africa and that of the independent African countries. Whatever may be excavated of African nationalism of genuine white 'liberalism' in South Africa in the 19th century, the indisputable fact remains that South Africa is dominated by a white minority which has been entrenched in its power for over a hundred years.

South African governments have for many decades discouraged the proper interaction of social groups.

"The key social feature of this 'settler colonialism' - as compared with mere territorial exploitation by a distant metropolis - is the unique relationship of domination that develops from simultaneously living together and maintaining extreme social distance"

Interdependence, economic expediency and even economic exploitation have all been deliberately obstructed and indeed it could be argued that the South African common society rests not on "interaction between peoples of diverse origin" but on extra-economic means of coercion and on the "sheer habits

1. Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, p.2.
of obedience". This does not eliminate the existence of interaction, nor minimise its importance in history, but it suggests that interaction is controlled and directed in order to keep society moving in a pre-determined direction, in this instance for the maintenance of white superiority.

The original response of first the Khoisan groups and then the African tribes in the Cape to European infiltration was to wage war. The vastness of the territory and the relatively small European community meant that the less technologically expert could hold their own. It was the arrival of the imperial troops in the early 19th century, after the Cape became a British colony in 1802, that "tipped the balance in favour of the white man" and resulted, by mid-century, in the domination and subjection of the African chiefdoms. On the other hand, prior to imperial rule, nothing had been done by the Europeans to create an educated and articulate Christian élite among the Khoisan. The early years of British rule, however, coincided with the full flush of the Philanthropic movement in Britain. Missionaries arrived at the Cape, churches and schools were established within and beyond the bounds of the Colony. In accordance with the pattern later seen in other African countries, many missionaries became champions of the rights of the 'natives' but, despite initial successes, they were already too late. The settler community had established itself firmly prior to 1802, and it was not prepared to relinquish its rights either to a black majority or, as it transpired, to the imperial rule of Britain.

It was not the African but the Afrikaner whose nationhood was welded by the force of foreign domination.

There are two dominating features in the history of South Africa in the last century. The first is the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism. All other political developments at this time must be seen in relation to that because they were formed, shaped and moulded by its success. Those who supported imperialist, Cape liberal or 'pronative' views were motivated primarily by fear and hatred of the Boers, or in the case of Rhodes by a hard-headed assessment of their strength, yet none had the necessary cohesion and conviction to challenge Afrikanerdom. In South Africa, it is important to recognise, that it is the Afrikaner who can look back to the Boer Wars of 1881 and 1899 and interpret them as the first successful independent movements in Africa and to Vereeninging (1902) and the Treaty of Union (1910) as the first voluntary renunciations by Britain of imperial hegemony. The parallels are obvious (though it is dangerous to try to make them too consistent). The Afrikaner, it may be maintained, is, despite his white skin, politically a non-European. The members of the Afrikaner community have no other homeland. They face annihilation and disintegration, not deportation, if they should lose their power.

The second outstanding feature of the century was the economic revolution which occurred as a result of the discovery of gold and diamonds. Before 1867 the Cape had been a rather backward Colony.

"Sparsely-populated country largely engaged in pastoral farming and self-subsistence agriculture too poor to advance rapidly...and lacking any exploitable resources to attract foreign capital".  

1. Wilson and Thompson, op.cit., p. 4.
Now with the discovery of a diamond near the Orange River, "the rock on which the future of South Africa will be built", South Africa became a magnet to fortune-hunters and investors, to capitalists and industrialists. Mines, railways, shipyards, industries and towns with all their advantages and disadvantages, grew up in South Africa in the space of a few decades. In the riches at her disposal and in the advanced stage of her industrialisation, South Africa was suddenly far in advance of any other country in the Continent of Africa. All sections of the population were affected by this, most especially the Africans many of whom became 'urbanised' and 'detribalised' and thus found themselves not only depressed politically by the success of Afrikaner nationalism, but depressed economically into the position of a black proletariat by the overwhelming success of white capitalism. Although politics and business in South Africa are often curiously antipathetic (partly because they have been dominated by Afrikaans and English-speaking white groups respectively), in the long run mutual interests have always overcome hostility and combined to maintain the status quo.

This thesis must be seen in the context of these South African realities. In so far as it purports to reappraise missionary policy and to assess African response, it may be said to conform to current trends, describing interaction between diverse groups, possibly revealing an identifiable African nationalism. It must be admitted, however, that there is scant satisfaction to be gained from the charting of African nationalist movements in South Africa compared to that
which derives from similar studies in independent countries. The fact that Africans in South Africa fought wars of Resistance and formed sophisticated political organisations decades before such developments occurred in other African countries does little to lessen the frustration. To look for hope in this direction is to go on a wild-goose chase. Ultimately, as will be shown, this thesis is concerned with the nature of "liberal" frustration, with the onset of disillusion and with the collapse of protest. In positive terms it is concerned with the consequences for an articulate and committed group in the Cape of the triumph and success of Afrikaner nationalism.

For many African historians, South Africa is an ideological backwater and is therefore ignored or despised, (though in recent years attempts have been made by the African Studies Association to reverse this tendency). In terms of European politics such strictures and condemnation may well be justified. Nevertheless, it is a commonplace, often overlooked, that South Africa is part of the African continent, and that her political development is, and has been, regulated by that rather than by the fact of her historical connection with Europe. Her influence, past and present, especially in Central and East Africa, and the attraction of her wealth and power cannot be ignored because her racial policies are offensive and abhorrent. It could even be argued that, in some respects, South Africa may provide a proto-type, that the disillusion of those, both black and white in the Cape, who believed in justice, equal opportunity and racial harmony, was only the first example of an experience which will be repeated else-

Finally, missionaries who, in the past, were often extolled as saints, are often now vilified as lackeys of imperialism. In South Africa, as might be expected, they were and are often still despised as subvertors of the established order, agents of external forces whose ambition it was and is to upset the political and social balance in the country. The missionary contribution to the social revolution which took place throughout Africa in the 19th century has been, by any standards, considerable and their interaction with African societies and individuals emphatically requires reappraisal and objective reassessment. By its focus on one small, special, mixed community in South Africa, this thesis is an attempt at just such a reassessment.
CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE MISSION BEFORE 1870

a. James Stewart

James Stewart - Scot, missionary, teacher, explorer and imperialist was a product of his age, class and circumstances. His father was a Perthshire man who made his living as a cab owner in Edinburgh. His mother was of the Dudgeon family from Liberty Hall, near Haddington. Stewart's father became a tenant farmer at Pictstonhill, near Scone, when James was about 11 years old and the boy moved from the Royal High School to Perth Academy. In 1843 the 'Disruption' took place\(^1\) and Stewart's father was a leader of the Free Church party in the district. Stewart's mother died about this time, his father married again and his step-mother, Christina Stewart, with her piety, intelligence and ambition for James, exercised a powerful influence on his youth. This background of piety and ecclesiastical concern, education, labour on the land and financial stringency was fairly typical of the middle-class Scot of the early 19thC. Life was a struggle; progress was made by hard work and discipline; education was a privilege; money should not be an end in itself; honest toil with the hands was good for the soul. Such characteristics in James Stewart were echoed in many others of similar class and circumstances.

"...plain living and high thinking, common sense and idealism, worldly knowledge and spiritual absorption, 

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1. The secession of over 400 ministers from the Church of Scotland over the issue of State interference in Church affairs. The seceders formed the Free Church of Scotland.
were the ordinary atmosphere of a whole class of society and the result was a large outcrop of remarkable people". 1

As a result of severe financial losses Stewart's father was forced to give up the farm and return to his old occupation in Edinburgh in 1847. Stewart, who 'no longer had a penny to amuse himself with' had to go into business for three or four years. It was not until November 1850 that he was able to matriculate at Edinburgh University, supporting himself by tutoring and other part-time employment. In 1852 his uncle died and Stewart who was tutor to his young cousins moved with his widowed aunt to St. Andrews and transferred his studies to that University. Here he was at his most carefree:

"...that famous old city...associated in my mind with the commencement of many pleasant friendships; with days of quiet study; with nights of occasional entertainment in our own rough student and bachelor ways...."

In 1855 he went to New College, Edinburgh, where for the next four years he "was supposed to have received a theological education". 2 Stewart spent one summer vacation as an assistant in an English Presbyterian Church at Farley Alton, Staffordshire. The following summer, 1858, he visited North and South Germany and studied at Erlangen, Bavaria, while in 1859 he toured Italy, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland and France in the capacity of guide-companion to two young men. 3

By this time Stewart was twenty-eight years old with no firm ideas about his future employment. His biographer

1. Morning Post, 14 January 1909.
2. James Stewart, Personal notes. ST 13/2/1.
maintained that Stewart had resolved to become a missionary at the age of fifteen.¹ Much later in 1857 he was stimulated by reading David Livingstone's newly-published book Missionary Travels and Researches in Africa to focus his attention on that continent, but any commitment was severely circumscribed by his sense of duty and obligation to his stepmother. When, in October 1859, she was killed in a carriage accident, Stewart began to think more positively about missionary service.

"I had formed what no doubt was a rash resolution not to go abroad while she lived....This event removed my self-made difficulty and set me strangely free as I had then neither father nor mother, sister nor brother alive...." ²

There followed now the crucial years of Stewart's life. From the beginning of 1860 he was actively engaged in trying to persuade the Free Church to sponsor an expedition to Central Africa for the purpose of determining the opportunities for an educational and industrial mission there. When that attempt failed, he put his energies into assembling the New Central African Mission Committee, a privately financed body, formed for the express purpose of

"turning the discoveries of Dr. Livingstone to practical account for the great ends of the gospel...." ³

It was this body which was finally responsible for the departure of Stewart in 1861 to join Livingstone on the Zambezi. After 18 months spent exploring the Zambezi and Shire Rivers, Stewart returned a discouraging report to the Committee,

stating that he considered it unwise to establish a mission there at this stage. To the Cotton Suppliers Association of the Midlands who had supported him, he gave his opinion that the region had been over-rated as a potential source for their industry. The significance of this journey, however, lay in the changes in the position, status and attitudes of Stewart himself. No longer was he an unknown student, a probationer with a secure but unadventurous future. He had been with Livingstone; he had first-hand knowledge of Africa and Africans; he had been the intimate companion of men of influence, men like John Kirk* and Horace Waller*, who would be key-figures in the Anti-Slavery movement of the late 19thC, and prominent in the agitation for the introduction of British imperial power into Africa. He had also gained the respect of men of ecclesiastical and civic influence in Scotland and his prudence and realism in this venture meant that businessmen in the future were more ready to underwrite his enterprises. At another level, the journey had been a disaster. Stewart had been mentally and physically sickened by his experiences on the Zambezi, deeply disillusioned with Livingstone and financially impoverished. Yet Stewart could not concede failure and, ultimately, his restless desire to succeed where he had previously failed drove him back to Africa. He himself had closed the door to Central Africa and despite his attempts to reopen it, it remained closed until after Livingstone's death. For this reason, Stewart agreed to go to Lovedale, South Africa, as a missionary of the Free Church, with a private proviso that this would be a temporary post
until the way to Central Africa was unbarred.\(^1\)

It was perhaps in the organisation of his expedition that Stewart learned most however. His experience of the Foreign Mission Committee and their reluctance to back his enterprise made him critical of their unimaginative penny-pinching, a criticism which was often repeated in later years. Stewart also became adept at exploiting the peculiar 19thC. sensitivities of the rich, the Dundee and Glasgow businessmen who felt duty bound to plough back some of their profits into missionary or philanthropic enterprises. His fund-raising ability and his flair for organisation were to be used again and again, particularly for Livingstonia and Lovedale.

Stewart's marriage in 1866 to Mina Stephen, youngest daughter of Alexander Stephen, chairman of the famous ship-building concern, Stephen of Linthouse,\(^2\) further enhanced his business connections and resulted, directly and indirectly in the deployment of considerable sums towards Free Church missionary endeavours.

By 1870, therefore, when James Stewart became Principal of Lovedale Institution, he was already a figure of some consequence. He proceeded to use his talents and the position he had acquired to develop the Institution principle as a major arm of missionary policy in the Eastern Cape. Lovedale became a large and influential establishment because Stewart's ambition and energy propelled it in that direction.

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1. For this episode in Stewart's life see Chapter 4 in Bridglal Pachai, *Livingstone Man of Africa*.
2. Stewart and Mina Stephen married on 1 November 1866. They had seven children, 6 daughters and one son. Her brother, John Stephen, was the chief supporter of missionary enterprises, putting much money into Lovedale and Livingstonia. He was also a member of the Africa sub-Committee of the Free Church and sat on the board of the African Lakes Corporation.
b. Lovedale before 1870

Scots missionaries came to the Cape in 1821 under the auspices of the Glasgow Missionary Society. They settled in the Tyumie valley, an area of strategic importance. The valley itself was a direct line of approach northwards from either Grahamstown or the coast and was, therefore, constantly traversed by soldiers, traders and travellers. For the tribes evicted from the Colony by the government or displaced by other tribes and amassed, in the early years of the century, behind the line of this valley, it offered one of the few openings for attack in the whole Keiskamma frontier. The early history of the mission was, therefore, not surprisingly, largely determined by turbulent political events in the area. Though many mission stations remained beyond the bounds of the Colony, Lovedale itself was drawn into the district of Victoria East after the War of 1846–47. The boundary now was the Tyumie River itself so that Lovedale was very much in a 'frontier situation' geographically and politically. Conditions were further complicated by the fact that three times in the years from 1820 to 1857, thousands of Xhosa, particularly of the Ngqika and Gcaleka clans who had resisted government troops, were evicted from their old homelands as retribution and their territory occupied by Mfengu. This led to much jealousy and ill-feeling with long-term results for Lovedale and the Free Church mission.

1. The Glasgow Missionary Society was formed in 1796, a year after the formation of the London Missionary Society. Dr. John Love, after whom Lovedale was named, was the first secretary of the L.M.S. and after 1800, when he moved to Glasgow, he became Secretary and then President of the G.M.S.
In 1837 the missionaries had indicated to the Directors of the Glasgow Missionary Society that they felt the need for the establishment of a centre

"...for the training in the first instance of school masters and catechists from among the children of the Missionaries, and from among those of the Caffres for the upholding of Christ in this country when we are in our graves." 1

On May 7, 1839, it was agreed at a meeting of the Board that the site of the Seminary should be at Lovedale. The Institution was eventually opened on July 21, 1841, under the Principalship of the Rev. William Govan* who had been sent from Scotland for this purpose. On the opening day there were nine European pupils, all sons of missionaries, and eleven 'Native young men' from Christian homes. From the outset the Institution was inter-denominational, inter-tribal and inter-racial, though black and white ate at separate tables in the same dining room and slept in separate dormitories. Distinctions were also made in the matter of fees. Pupils, black and white, with Glasgow Missionary Society connections were educated and boarded free of charge; those from other denominations were charged, European non-boarders at the rate of £4 per annum and Africans an unspecified minimum. 2

Progress initially was slow. War broke out twice in 1846 and in 1850. The Government extended its power still further into the country occupied by the Xhosa and more magistrates were appointed, thus whittling away the power of the Chiefs. Behind the frontier line Sarili, Paramount Chief

of the Xhosas was still independent and behind him again lay
the Basutos, Tembus, Pondos and all other tribes inhabiting
the area up to the Natal border. The frontier was uneasy,
rumour was rife and panic spread swiftly. As a result of
tension and despair, a suicidal madness overcame the tribes
beyond the Colony. The Cattle-killing delusion of 1857
broke the spirit and cohesion of the Xhosa and the Tembu in
the Ciskei as no government assault had been able to do.

After 1857, Lovedale's progress was unimpeded by the
disasters of the previous 16 years. In 1855, Sir George Grey,
Governor of the Cape visited Lovedale and proposed that, in
addition to the academic training provided by the Institution,
a new Industrial department should be added, in which

"...Native young men should, under properly qualified
masters, be trained to the exercise of some of the
more useful mechanical arts, their literary as well
as their religious education to be carried on during
their apprenticeship in the evening." 2

Within a year a mason, a carpenter, a wagon-maker and a black¬
smith had been appointed and buildings for the trades
departments had been erected at a cost to the government of
£2,200. In 1861, printing and bookbinding were added to the
curriculum. This comprehensive education remained an out¬
standing feature of the instruction offered at Lovedale but

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1. Xhosa prophets, Mhlakaza and his niece Nongquase, announced
to the people that if they would kill all animals, except
dogs and horses, empty their corn-pits and leave their fields
untilled, on a specific day vast herds would arise from the
ground, crops would flourish and all the ancestral heroes
would rise from the dead to sweep unbelievers and White
oppressors into the sea. Despite efforts to prevent it,
these instructions were carried out in many areas on 16
February 1857, and an estimated 20,000 or 30,000 people
died of starvation and thousands of cattle were killed or
perished from hunger.

2. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 133.
the Industrial departments were to prove a serious drain on resources.

It should be noted that the Government, besides being involved in the establishment of industrial courses, also gave Lovedale a grant of £100 per annum at this time and offered £12 per annum salary to some native teachers. From the beginning therefore, the Government recognised the influence of places like Lovedale and was prepared to harness its civilising potential. At the same time Lovedale was drawn into politics through dependence on government grants, a fact of considerable importance as the century progressed and the government extended its control. By 1863, the total revenue of the Institution was about £2,000 of which fees and government grants constituted more than half. The revenue from fees in that year was about £650. The Foreign Mission Committee was responsible for the salaries of two European teachers, in addition to the salaries of the missionaries and a small sum towards the boarding of missionaries sons. Although the agricultural return was sizeable, the industrial departments, which represented a considerable outlay of capital, showed a loss. There were no endowments but considerable investment in land, held from the Crown which was added to over the next forty years and held in trust by the Institution. Even in the sixties Free Church property was valued at about £4,000.¹

William Govan's view of the Institution (which will be discussed in more detail) was of a small select establishment,

¹. Shepherd, op.cit., pp. 149-152. See also Chapter II.
tightly-controlled in its expansion. He struggled to make it viable without sacrificing quality and in 1846 he believed that the financial situation was hopeful. Nevertheless, he was keenly disappointed by lack of support and commented to Stewart,

"I do not blame the Committee...but the Church for its stinted liberality". ¹

Govan's achievement was that he established Lovedale as an educational centre of merit in the eyes of black and white in the Cape. Lovedale in this period remained an integral part of the Mission as a whole and for the missionaries who worked in other areas to extend the bounds of Free Church missionary activity, Lovedale represented the crown of their achievement in those early decades.

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¹ Govan to Stewart, 14 June 1864. S.P. 23 (iv).
c. African response before 1870

The Scottish mission and Lovedale Institution were a focal point of contact, interaction and intermingling on the Eastern Cape frontier. African response to the preaching and teaching of the early missionaries in the Tyumie district has parallels all over Africa and the details need not concern us. There was interest shown by the few, indifference or hostility by the many.

For the first 100 years of contact, wars of resistance were frequent. The many African chiefdoms sought to maintain their integrity, identity and independence in the face of concentrated European attack on diverse fronts. Traders, government agents, missionaries and soldiers all brought change in their wake and, after successive defeats, loss of freedom and restriction on land.

The few who were persuaded to accept the Christian faith took up residence on mission land and withdrew themselves from the jurisdiction of the chiefs. Stations of all denominations were organised initially in this way becoming, in addition, places of refuge for victims of witchcraft or other outcasts of the tribe. Missionaries in this respect were seen as rivals to the chief and their missions as a breach in the wall of defence against the European. Those Africans who became converts were branded as traitors by their kinsfolk. For their part the missionaries insisted that loyalty to the government should be the hallmark of those who had adopted the new life and converts who, in time of war, "went to the bush" were charged as renegades and usually banished from church or school.
This problem of loyalty, therefore, resulted in a deep cleavage, especially in the Eastern Cape, between the 'red' and the 'school Kaffir', that is between the pagan African, anointed with red clay and the educated Christian African in his European dress. The division also had a tribal element in that the Mfengu (refugee elements of other tribes) were more ready to accept Christian teaching and education than the Xhosa. According to Professor Monica Wilson

"this cleavage has been deeper and more persistent among the Xhosa-speaking than in any other country in Africa and its roots lie in the 100 years of war." 1

In the years before 1870, this question of allegiance was a constant problem for the Christian minority but so long as the power of the chiefs remained unbroken Christian defection from the tribe was not significant and in war the support of the educated African was usually neutralized. The Wars of Dispossession or Resistance in themselves are an indication of the strength of the opposition at a primary level. The frequent and dramatic appeals to witchcraft and to the shades of the ancestors were also a significant and integral part of the pagan reaction to the European threat. Only after the cattle-killing of 1857 when the power of the chiefs was hopelessly undermined and leadership had begun to pass to the educated minority, did the issue of loyalty become crucial.

With the failure of armed conflict, the new leaders attempted to acquire power through political channels. Between 1860 and 1880 the response of Africans to places like Lovedale

altered noticeably. Education became desirable as a means of advancement and social acceptance and often as a means of playing the European at his own game. There are definite indications that many Africans had reservations about the superiority of the white man and that their obedience or cooperation were calculated to produce maximum concessions. By the end of the century, however, it was apparent that this political expertise had not achieved the expected results. The educated African had not achieved social equality or political power in European terms and the gulf between the educated or school Kaffir and the pagan Red was as wide as ever. The power base of the new élite lay in the voters (a dwindling minority) not in the masses. This was the true weakness of African nationalism in South Africa if, indeed, in the South African context, such nationalism could be said to have existed.

In its relation to the black community, with which this thesis is concerned, the Institution was at once a source of support and assault. It defended unequivocally the right of Africans to educational opportunities, to the benefits of civilisation and, therefore, over a period of time, to their participation as equals in Cape society. At the same time it was a revolutionary instrument, committed openly to the destruction of the traditional society. Moreover, it could be argued that, by the training it offered, particularly in industrial skills and by preaching the 'gospel of work', it swelled the labour market and contributed to the increasing subservience of the black man in a political construction guaranteed to preserve white superiority. The motives of
missionaries in encouraging self-help, in extolling the virtue of labour were possibly, in the 19thC. context irreproachable, but they assumed the existence of a homogeneous society with sufficient mobility to allow an individual to 'make good' by his own efforts. In the heterogeneous and racially-divided society of the Cape, Lovedale, whatever its motives, could only equip a man to operate within prescribed limits. The possible exception to this was in the area of training for the ministry. General education might be brought more and more into line with government demands but the theological curriculum remained the preserve of the ecclesiastical institution. The test case for Lovedale, as for other missionary institutions, remained the theological graduate, his training, his prospects and the status accorded to him in theory and in practice. The theme of the 'native ministry', therefore, is constant in the analysis of missionary policy and African response and this thesis logically concludes with a discussion of the Ethiopian movement and its particular Free Church manifestation, the Mzimba case, which was a commentary and possibly a judgement on the policies of missionaries in South Africa.

In the Cape of the 19thC., missionary policy was faced with the problem of keeping several options open. There was, on the one hand, a stated aim of developing a 'native agency' leading to a 'native ministry' which, in turn, would lead to the establishment of an indigenous church. This aim, however, was constantly baulked by the fact that, by mid-century as had happened in West Africa, the 'idea of trusteeship gradually
replaced that of conversion'. In the Church, as in the wider social context, assimilation was replaced by Christian paternalism. At Lovedale there was a sharp dividing line between the assimilationist policies pursued in the early years and the more stratified policies pursued after 1870. African response to these changes was critical and hostile though Africans remained cooperative to the basic principle of the benefits of education. There was nothing clearly defined in this difference of opinion, however; both sides remained open to possibilities and preferred that the sharp edges of the debate should stay blurred. This curious flexibility was observed elsewhere in Africa. When definition came in South Africa in the form of class legislation and institutionalized discrimination both Africans and missionaries were unable to oppose it with conviction or with any hope of success.

CHAPTER II

MISSION POLICY AND LOVEDALE INSTITUTION: organisation, structure and finance.

It is essential to examine first the organisation of the Kaffrarian mission and to consider developments and changes in policy in this period. The basic structure and the implementation of policy obviously affected events within the Mission and, to some degree determined the influence which it exerted in society. For example, it is of crucial importance to note that, from 1843 until 1923, the Kaffrarian mission remained under the direct control of the Free Church (or from 1900 the United Free Church) in Scotland. Thus, though local Presbyterial courts existed in South Africa, namely Presbytery and Synod, the highest court, the General Assembly (and all the influential sub-committees), was convened only in Scotland. Directives on policy for the mission, though informed certainly by those on the spot, nevertheless issued from the Committee in Scotland and were not the products of an indigenous organisation. Moreover, although the Presbytery of Kaffraria could ordain Africans into the ministry, these men became at their ordination, ministers of the Free Church of Scotland. European missionaries were either sent out from Scotland or intending candidates went to Scotland for their Divinity course and were ordained in that country before returning to South Africa. Beyond the mission, Colonial Presbyterian congregations also retained this link with the Home Church Committees (until 1897), but Colonial and Missionary Churches were treated as separate entities and there was little or no co-operation other than at a
ministerial level.

All of this contrasted strongly with the organisation of most other missions in South Africa. Many of them were established, ordered and financed by Societies which were either autonomous bodies (C.M.S. or L.M.S.) or had very tenuous connections with the parent Church in Europe, (Wesleyans). Policy decisions by these bodies could therefore be made in South Africa which gave them more flexibility. Further, in the case of the Wesleyans and the Anglicans, for instance, no distinction was made between pastors of colonial churches and missionaries, both being expected to minister to either black or white. "Bishops and clergy in the various dioceses labour indifferently among white, coloured or black".\(^1\) In this way there was reasonably close identification between colonial and missionary interests, compared with the division between these two interests in the Presbyterian denomination.

Originally, of course, Scottish missionaries had come to South Africa under the auspices of the Glasgow Missionary Society. In 1837 the Voluntary controversy in Scotland\(^2\) led to a division in the Glasgow Missionary Society and the missionaries in South Africa were left to choose which section they would join. The Revds. Bennie, Ross and Laing and Mr. McDiarmid and Mr. Weir chose to work under the G.M.S.

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2. Voluntary Controversy in Scotland. The "Ten Years Conflict" by which the people were divided into those who supported a "State Church" and those who wished to be free from State Control.
adhering to the principles of the Church of Scotland, taking with them Lovedale, Burnshill and Pirie stations. Revds. Chalmers and Niven, with the stations Tyumie and Iqqibigha, joined the Glasgow African Missionary Society associated with the Relief Church. Six years later, in 1843, the Disruption resulted in the formation of the Free Church of Scotland and in the following year the G.M.S. handed over their missions and agents in Africa to the Foreign Mission Committee of that Church. In 1847, the Relief Church in Scotland united with the Secession Church, forming the United Presbyterian Church. The missionaries of the G.A.M.S. thus came under the aegis of the U.P.C. These two bodies continued to work side by side in the mission field, without friction but disunited. The U.P.C. mission was a much smaller concern, interest and interference from the Home Church was often minimal and, as a result, United Presbyterians showed much greater enthusiasm for Union with other Presbyterians. The Free Church mission, however, had been more or less incorporated into the Church in Scotland.

"Henceforth the Church as such had a direct interest in and a direct responsibility for its mission work in South Africa, in India and elsewhere." \(^1\)

As might be expected, the irony throughout this period was that, while the General Assembly remained the supreme court and F.M.C. Minutes continued to direct policy, the enthusiasm of the Church in Scotland for its interests and responsibilities in Africa was an extremely variable quality,

\(^1\) Du Plessis, op.cit., p. 188.
noticeably with respect to money. There was a hard core of those who, for a variety of reasons, were prepared to put their money on the table but characteristic of the majority were financial stringency, demands for retrenchment and reluctant giving.¹ In 1848, only four years after they had accepted the charge, the F.M.C. recommended the abandonment of the African mission because of a £2,400 deficit.² This recommendation was over-ruled by the urgent appeal of Dr. Macfarlan of Renfrew and the practical offer of financial help from wealthy supporters, which relieved the F.M.C. of that responsibility. This pattern was constantly repeated throughout the century. All the missionaries complained about the Church's "stinted liberality"³ and were yet curiously reluctant to sever the connection with the Free Church. The Church, on the other hand, ever-anxious to rid itself of financial burdens, attempted to achieve this first, through the encouragement of self-supporting congregations and an African ministry and later, when difficulties arose with this, through urging Union with other Presbyterian bodies in South Africa, especially, after 1897, the Presbyterian Church of South Africa. In other words, the Free Church accepted an organic connection with its missions only with reluctance and constantly worked to break this link; the missionaries, for reasons which we must attempt to uncover, though critical of the Church strongly opposed any attempt to lessen the ties and

² J. Lennox: Our Missions in South Africa, p. 32.
³ W. Govan to J. Stewart, 14 June 1864, SP 23(iv).
to indiginise their structure.

Prior to the late sixties, neither the parsimony of the Church nor the control vested in the F.M.C. had greatly affected the Kaffrarian Mission. Communications were very slow, distances in the Transkei were considerable, each mission station tended to be a small independent unit, intent on securing itself after the unsettling events of the forties and fifties.¹ Even Lovedale Institution was a small, select establishment admittedly suffering financial hardship but even then with the hope that fees, government grants and private contributions would soon enable it to dispense with the grudging assistance of the Home Church.² So long as the Mission remained in this state – small, solidly-based, expanding slowly without risk – the presence of the Free Church in Scotland was a very distant reality. Two events contributed materially to the acceleration of the pace and the transformation of objectives: the visit of Alexander Duff,* later Convener of the F.M.C. and the economic and industrial revolution in South Africa itself. Duff’s visit, his report and subsequent influence in the Committee, focussed attention on Kaffraria, in particular on Lovedale Seminary, shifted the emphasis in education and demanded accelerated growth in the Mission. The discovery of gold and diamonds, with all the consequences of that event, altered South African society and introduced political and economic factors which missionaries could not ignore and which Africans could not withstand.

¹. See Chapter 1.
². Goven to Stewart, 22 July 1863, Cory MS 9116.
a. General Policy

Mission Organisation before 1866.

The Free Church in 1844 accepted responsibility for Lovedale Seminary, Lovedale Mission, for Burnshill and for Pirie stations. There were eight European and seven African agents. In 1853, the Lovedale out-station of Macfarlan, became a station in its own right under the pastorate of Alexander McDiarmid. By 1859 there were approximately 1754 African Christians attached to the four main stations and out-stations, and the Institution had over 100 pupils with three academic staff members. After the cattle-killing of 1856, the land belonging to the Gcaleka-Xhosa between the Kei River and the Bashee was given to the Mfengu, 40,000 of whom emigrated to the Transkei from the Colony. Richard Ross decided to follow them, as there were many Christians among the Mfengu, so that by 1868 the Free Church interest had spread beyond the Kei in the establishment of Cunningham (Toleni) mission. The U.P. missionaries also expanded in this direction, setting up Paterson mission at Mbulu. At the same time, Tiyo Soga accepted an invitation from Sarili, the Paramount Chief, to establish a mission to the disinherited Gcalekas at Tutura.

The pattern then was to establish central stations in the district out of which grew subsidiary stations within a radius of about 6 or ten miles, each with its African evangelist who was also probably the teacher at the station school. The churches were organised by the formation of Kirk Sessions and Deacons Courts in the normal Presbyterian fashion. The Sessions dealt largely with questions of discipline and the Deacons Courts remit included the establishment of schools,
appointment and pay of teachers, the building of churches and the collection of money for the work of the church. Extension, into the Transkei for example, usually entailed the quarterly visitation of a missionary to encourage the African evangelist left there to build up and extend the church.

There was thus considerable local representation in Kirk Session and Deacons Court, and these in turn were represented at a more general level in the Presbytery of Kaffraria. The first Presbytery had been formed in 1824, consisting of a minister and elder from each station. This number was added to as the mission expanded, each missionary having an equal voice in Presbytery affairs. It was this Presbytery that had first suggested to the G.M.S. that a Seminary be established for the education of their own children and of those, European and African, prepared to continue their work as missionaries in the future. The management of this Seminary, its educational policy and its financial arrangement were all considered to be the responsibility and concern of the Presbytery.

"The work of the Seminary was something like that of a Theological Hall in relation to the Church. It looked for the missions to supply them with pupils and sent them back to work in the propagation of the Gospel. Its European pupils it sent out to complete their education elsewhere as doctors, lawyers, merchants and ministers.....Its aim was to train men for life and service." 1

Before 1866, one major policy decision heralded the expansion of Lovedale from this small, academic Institution, into a

1. D.D. Stormont, Cory MS 7514(c).
major educational establishment offering a diversity of opportunity. Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape, felt that African education was too academic and suggested that facilities should be created for industrial education, financial help to be provided by the government. Lovedale agreed to this scheme and soon offered training in wagon-making, blacksmithing, carpentry, building, printing and book-binding. In this way Lovedale, and other African Institutions in South Africa, broadened their approach and, without due appreciation of the consequences, involved themselves in expenditure greater than their income could underwrite. Of course, these industrial departments were intended to be self-supporting but, in fact, they involved the Institutions in heavy debt and therefore dependence on financial rescue.

The Minute of October 18, 1864

Duff's visit to the Kaffrarian mission in 1864 had convinced him that the mission required radical changes in organisation and in educational policy. In his opinion, the implementation of the latter (his primary objective) made a prerequisite of the former and so his first step, soon after his return to Scotland, was to convince the F.M.C. of the need for a directive on this matter. As Convener of the Committee and the only member with first-hand knowledge of the situation, his task was not difficult. The outcome was

1. See Appendix A.
2. See Chapter III.
this Minute of 18 October 1864.

"The Convener having drawn attention to the fact that at present all matters connected with the management of the mission in Caffraria devolve on the Presbytery and that much difficulty and confusion arise in consequence, submitted the following suggestions as calculated in his opinion to remove these and to bring the whole organisation of the mission into a healthy state." 1

Four proposals followed. First, that the Presbytery should in future confine itself to "the proper functions of a Presbytery". These functions were to be entirely ecclesiastical; matters of discipline, for instance, or of church organisation. Second, a Mission Council was introduced which consisted entirely of Europeans, as opposed to Presbytery whose composition was mixed. The motive here was that matters of General Policy should be determined by the missionaries only. The Mission Council in Kaffraria in those early years did not occupy the important position it later held, or which it enjoyed in other missions. Indeed, in 1881 the Mission Council in Kaffraria was disbanded and was only re-adopted, at the instigation of the F.M.C., in 1901. 2

Thirdly, Seminary affairs were to be taken out of the control of the Presbytery and placed under the direction of an Education Board. A member of this Board would also have Superintendence of all station schools. The Presbytery would be entitled to send a representative to the Education Board who would then report back to them. Fourthly, financial matters which had been in Govan's hands alone would become the charge of the Financial Board. Again, this

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 18 October 1864.
2. Lennox to Smith, 2 August 1901, NLS 7799.
Committee had an interrupted history. With regard to the Institution Stewart lost patience with the Financial Board, resigned in a temper in 1881, and the Board was disbanded. The mission stations nominated their own treasurer and Stewart, until his death, alone controlled the finances of the Institution. Finally, these four organisational arms of the Mission, it was suggested, should communicate with one another on matters of mutual concern and each would have direct access to the Home Committee, individually, on all points.

There was nothing in this Minute to excite immediately the opposition of the Kaffrarian Presbytery. Indeed, though they deferred the implementation of the resolutions in the Minute until Stewart should arrive at Lovedale, the Presbytery stated that the resolution "had met with general acceptance and would...be ultimately adopted." It was the second Minute of 27 October 1866, also brought by Stewart which, as will be shown, caused trouble and dissension in the Mission because of its demands for educational change. Yet the first Minute proposed radical departures in organisation, creating a structure potentially open to abuse. In itself it permitted a differentiation of function and control within the Mission, which allowed the Institution and the mission at large to develop independently. Even in conditions of harmony, rivalry between the two branches of the Mission, especially over deployment of finance, must have developed. Given instead the personal animosity present in the Kaffrarian

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 19 April 1881; 15 November 1881. Also Stewart to Stephen, 21 March 1881.
2. F.M.C. Minutes, 21 March 1865.
Mission, this organisational structure intensified the feud and made it impossible to heal the breach. Both sides retreated behind their respective bastions. The Presbytery had no right to discuss the Institution; the Education Board was not supposed to concern itself with the mission stations. There was no meeting place in which they could air their grievances openly and honestly. Instead these grievances were referred in private letters to the Secretary of the F.M.C., who could not sympathise with the dissension, yet who was powerless to resolve it.

This is one key to the desire of the missionaries to cling to the Free Church connection. Once cast loose on their own resources, the disharmony would have become all too apparent. As it was there was constant referral of all matters to Scotland and a consequent paralysis of will in South African itself. Moreover, as must be obvious, it was particularly undesirable that such a state of affairs should exist in South Africa where political pressure on missions and missionaries required a united policy. There can be little doubt that the slow growth of an African ministry and the non-appearance of an African Presbyterian Church - which in a sense would have posited the proto-type of an alternative society - was due to the lack of unanimity and leadership in the field, emasculated by feud, without the courage or the means to make unilateral decisions, yet, paradoxically, using this situation and the ultimate authority of the F.M.C. as an excuse for hesitation and inaction. In 1901, Richard Ross, who was one of the chief perpetrators of the personal
feud, observed that perhaps a mistake had been made in this re-organisation of the Mission.

"When the Presbytery of Kaffraria was asked to withdraw from the supervision of the Institution and leave it wholly to the Education Board and F.M.C., this was asked only for the time being. I think it is time to come back to the original relation to the Presbytery." 1

It is pure speculation, but it is difficult not to wonder what the history of the Free Church mission would have been if the original unity of the Mission had been maintained and Lovedale had remained an integral part of the whole, the responsibility and concern of all missionaries.

**Differentiation of Function**

From its inception, as has been suggested, the concept of the Institution had been of a teaching organisation, small, compact, centralized, an integral part of the mission as a whole. Now, as a consequence of the 1864 Minute, the Seminary, with its Education Board was rendered autonomous, directly responsible only to the Home Committee. It resembled a Medieval College or Community with its control of property, power of election and power of selection, except that, of course, the F.M.C. reserved all its functions as a corporation.

It is evident that Duff had been determined to break the Presbyterial monopoly of control in the mission because he saw clearly that it was a restraint on the development of the Institution into an influential agent for change. But demands for development also came from society at large. The growth of colonial towns, increasing industrialisation, the

altered circumstances of Africans and the policies of different governments inevitably brought about a transformation in the original concept of the Institution. It was not enough that it should offer classical education to a selected few; there were newer needs to be supplied, agricultural, industrial, as well as that of elementary education for the many. Mining centres, seaports and market towns required skilled labour which, at that time, only the Institutions had the facilities for training. Thus "trades were added to books, agriculture to book-binding, printing to book-selling, stock-rearing to sheep-shearing."\(^1\) The 1864 Minute therefore presented Lovedale Institution under Stewart with the opportunity for expansion and diversification which had already been begun under Goven with the acceptance of Grey's scheme for Industrial training. Stewart's plan, even in 1872, was that Lovedale might become "something little short of an African University where a number of excellent things from Agriculture to Theology might be taught."\(^2\)

Obviously, the primarily educational function of the Institution distinguished it from the evangelising function of the missionaries in the mission stations. Although Bible teaching was given, an Institution Church was established in 1881 and men were trained for the ministry, in general the Institution could have no proselytising function. Both Lovedale and later Blythswood were inter-denominational Institutions, receiving pupils from every Christian denomination. Lovedale, 

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1. Stormont, Cory MS 7514 (c)
2. Stewart to Duff, 24 August 1871, ST 13/3/1.
from the beginning, was inter-racial, educating a relatively high proportion of European boys and girls; and it was inter-tribal, drawing Africans from all parts of South Africa and beyond. Thus the nature of its work, the demands of changing society, the type of its pupils and the financial needs of its organisation differentiated the Institution from the Mission as a whole, with its primarily evangelical and educational functions. The danger that those in the "ivory tower" would dictate policy to those in the mission stations was never as potent as the danger that the financial demands of such Institutions would hamper the expansion and influence of the missions in the country and in the towns. Nevertheless, the clashes that developed between Institution and Mission in this period had their origin in the Presbytery's reassertion of its rights over against the Education Board (especially in the matter of Blythswood), and in the enormous drain on resources represented by the Institutions which inevitably limited the money available for conventional missionary work. In time, the Free Church was forced to try to restrain the Institutions which expanded so rapidly under the principle of differentiation of function.

The structure and financial policy of Lovedale will be considered below. In the meantime the policy of the F.M.C. with respect to the establishment and expansion of the Mission must be considered.

Establishment and expansion of the Mission

The principle laid down by Henry Venn in 1851 of a "Native Church under Native pastors upon a self-supporting
system"¹ had become generally accepted by mission bodies, including the Free Church of Scotland. In the Minute of 1866 which, as has been shown, formed the basis for policy in this period, it was noted that one sound reason for educating different types of Africans, as pastors, evangelists, readers, catechists and so on, was that African congregations could not all be expected to provide the higher salaries required for a pastor and must have other options open to them...." and to purely native means of support we must ultimately look." Further, this African pastorate, with its diversity of talents, must, as soon as was humanly possible, be placed in charge of African congregations, leaving the European missionary free to proceed to unchristianized regions.

"We are then temporarily to introduce the gospel; its outward maintenance and perpetuation must be left to the natives themselves. So soon therefore as native congregations are formed, the care of them ought as speedily as possible to be consigned to the native pastorate, and the general supervision of them to educated ministers - while the missionaries should be free to pass on to the regions beyond and pioneer the way for new native congregations to be in time delivered over to additional native pastors." ²

The principle of self-support in this instance was, of course, more accurately defined as independence from Scottish financial resources. There was no question of a self-supporting colony as had been tried elsewhere in Africa.³ Financial self-support, or independence, was difficult to achieve but, in Kaffraria, it was even more difficult to achieve independence from European missionaries - and this failure to implement the policy of the F.M.C. was a constant

². F.M.C. Minutes, 27 October 1866.
³. Stewart: Dawn in the Dark Continent, p. 147; 91.
bone of contention between the Committee and the missionaries. A third strand in the policy of the Free Church towards establishment and expansion was that of Union with other Presbyterian churches in South Africa. This could be justified ecclesiastically but was also a means of easing the seemingly-endless financial commitment for the Home Church and of rooting the African church more firmly in local soil. The fourth strand, which was closely entwined in the other three, was that of the geographical direction of the mission's expansion. Here again there was disagreement between the F.M.C. and those in the field but so long as the F.M.C. continued to supply both money and men they had some right to the deployment of these resources. An illustration of the four lines of policy being involved in the one situation can be given as early as 1879 when Richard Ross* suggested a new station in the Gatberg area.

"The true solution of this and other difficulties lies in the direction of such Union of the Presbyterian churches or missions in South Africa as will unite you more closely to the colonial churches and to each other. We are but foster parents here; you are doubtless looking forward to the time of your own independence - aided only and not directed by the Home Church." 1

Despite strong and consistent pleas from the F.M.C., the policies of self-support, self-propagation and of Union were only accepted in theory by the missionaries and, as time passed, it became clear that they had definite reasons for rejecting the principles as inapplicable to the South African situation. What were their reasons? And what

1. Smith to Richard Ross, 29 July 1879, NLS 7770.
were the consequences of the rejection of Free Church policy?

1870-1880

Although the main principles were re-iterated, there was no agitation in this period. This is understandable as in 1875 the first two African ministers were ordained and four Lovedale men went as evangelists to Livingstonia. There was some progress in the realm of financial self-support and if this was slow in coming the F.M.C., at this stage, felt that it was enough to re-emphasise their conviction that "the self-support of native churches and their ability to send the gospel abroad to their countrymen are the best proofs of missionary and spiritual success."¹ The relative dearth of African candidates for the ministry after 1875 could, to some extent, be accounted for by the imperfectly-developed theological education curriculum at Lovedale and the conflict in the Presbytery over its content.²

1880-1890

In this decade there was a decided increase in the pressure on the missionaries to implement the Church's policy. The first clear basis for Union between the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church missions in Kaffraria was produced in 1883 but failed to gain the undivided support of either body of missionaries. As the F.C. and the U.P. had much in common and had co-operated on previous occasions, it

1. Smith to Don, 24 September 1879, NLS 7770.
2. See Chapter III.
is difficult to see why they objected to formal unity. In an effort to persuade Stewart and others who had come out against Union at a preliminary conference in King Williams Town, the prospect of a Joint Theological Hall was made to seem more possible if Union was first effected. It would appear that there were two main objections to Union both in 1883 and later. First, the laity in 1883 had not been consulted which was contrary to Presbyterian practise. Secondly, independence from British support at every level was undesirable. The current state of the Anglican church in South Africa was cited as a warning as were the results of having Responsible Government in a country which had "more ambition than ability, more pretension than power." Union was rejected then because of the potential excuse it offered to the Home Churches for relinquishing their responsibilities. This last was denied as a "baseless rumour"; there was no question for many years of retiring from responsibility for the missions in South Africa. The rumour, however, was strongly believed and effectively destroyed any prospect of Union.

In 1885, the policy of the F.M.C. was again challenged in the question of the congregation at Burnshill. This matter arose again and again and became a test case, on both sides of, on the one hand, the willingness of the missionaries to implement F.M.C. policy and, on the other, of the sympathy

1. John Dewar to Stewart, 1 August 1883, 23 A(xi) SP.
2. Stewart to Smith, 17 January 1884, LB 4 SP.
3. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 7 January 1885, NLS 7797.
and understanding of the F.M.C. with the peculiar problems (as the missionaries understood it) of their South African mission. Burnshill station had been established in June 1830 and was, therefore, with Lovedale and Pirie, one of the three oldest established mission stations of the Free Church. It was only 12 miles from Lovedale and as Lovedale mission and Macfarlan had had African ministers since 1876, Burnshill was obviously the next place that should be transferred. The missionary in 1885 was William Stuart* who expressed his willingness to go to a new station at Tsolo (Qumbu) in the Transkei and suggested that Burnshill should be given to an African pastor.¹ The Presbytery of Kaffraria, however, strongly opposed this suggestion and indeed stated that it could take no responsibility for the consequences if this change was forced on them. Their reasons for this uncom‐promising attitude were that it was of the greatest importance that old stations should be maintained in full efficiency and that it was impossible for an African minister to cope with the situation at Burnshill in such a way that this efficiency would be maintained.

"There are stations the peculiar circumstances of which can only be known by those on the spot and Burnshill is such a station. The district is peopled partly by Kaffirs partly by Fingoes between whom there has been a very strong tribal antipathy....It is also hemmed in by other missionary bodies than the FC and there can be no doubt that the mere presence of a European missionary at Burnshill does much to preserve the place from aggression....Territorially our stations on this side of the Kei are at present continuous and this is no slight advantage in working them. To lose

Burnshill in whole or in part would destroy this continuity and break up our mission."

The Presbytery repeated their intention of encouraging the principle of self-support but voiced their concern that no more European missionaries were to come from Scotland.\(^1\) In the event, the F.M.C. gave in; James Macdonald\(^*\) (Blythswood) went to Tsolo, Stuart stayed at Burnshill and Edward Tsewu,\(^*\) ordained in 1884, was placed at Idutywa (Duffbank), a small and much less significant station. Presumably, had the F.M.C. directive been carried out, Tsewu would have gone to Macfarlan and Makiwane to Burnshill. In an attempt to mollify the F.M.C., the Presbytery agreed to persuade these congregation to contribute more towards the "support of the Gospel ordinance".\(^2\) The following years, 1886 and 1887, however, were years of drought, starvation and disease. In the circumstances, the F.M.C. had to make good the deficit in salaries caused by these disasters.\(^3\) Even for necessary repairs the Presbytery had to appeal to the F.M.C.\(^4\) as there was no local fund.

Despite adverse conditions, then, the F.M.C. again pressed the Presbytery on the question of self-support and the continuing authority of the European missionary. John Don\(^*\) as clerk of the Presbytery answered these queries, presumably with the agreement of other members of the Presbytery. His view was that if absolute self-support was achieved then that would imply that absolute self-government should follow.

\(^1\) Presbytery of Kaffraria, Minutes, 7 January 1885, NLS 7797.
\(^2\) F.M.C. Minutes, 17 March 1885.
\(^3\) Don to Smith, 29 July 1886, NLS 7797.
\(^4\) Don to Smith, 13 May 1887, NLS 7797.
"If liberality reached the point of native self-support and a claim for independence were made and admitted the evil would be greater than the good."

The reason for this was that African church members required stimulus and backing from above and could not be relied upon to operate successfully alone. The F.M.C. had suggested that the continuing weight of the European missionary probably checked the spontaneity of the Africans and gave them little chance to show what they were capable of. Don cautiously agreed that this might indeed be the case but added, firmly, that he suspected that any advantage gained would be "less than the risks incurred." On the other hand, if absolute independence was to be denied then there should be some representation within a larger Church body for these mission congregations so that they did not feel themselves to be confined territorially.¹ This was only the first of many statements from the Presbytery which discouraged any attempt to foster the absolute self-support and independence of an African Presbyterian Church in South Africa. The F.M.C. persistently urged the Presbytery to adopt these principles and, though they did not press them as strongly as they might, they cannot be held responsible for the failure of the policy in practise.

1890–1905

There were three features of this period which must be considered. First, the geographical direction in which the Mission should expand became a subject for debate. Second

¹. Don to Smith, 4 September 1886, NLS 7797.
the issue of Union was raised with renewed enthusiasm because of the formation of the South African Presbyterian Church. Third, as a result of these issues, the difference of opinion between the F.M.C. and the Mission, always below the surface, was brought into the open. Throughout these years, for various reasons, the level of African givings was extremely variable and the prospect of self-support seemed as remote as ever.

In 1889 Richard Ross had visited Pondoland with the intention of establishing a station there. The idea was that a station in West Pondoland would "form a fresh link in the chain of stations stretching towards Natal." This move obviously had considerable appeal for the missionaries already at work in the Transkei. At the same time, however, other missionaries like Don were pressing the F.M.C. to take up responsibilities in Johannesburg.

"It would be well to recognise the importance of Johannesburg from the first and take up a strong position there....Jo'burg is at present the van of South African advance and ought not to be neglected by our church. Our present congregations there - European and Native - may not be doing all they might do." 2

As a first exploratory move, the Presbytery sent Mpambani Mzimba to Johannesburg to lay the foundations of an African church. There were already several members of Kaffrarian churches in the town and Mzimba soon rallied a congregation who came "attracted by good singing" and who, during the service, were observed to be "eating, cooking, skinning sheep

1. Don to Smith, 23 February 1889, NLS 7797.
2. Don to Smith, 12 July 1890, NLS 7797.
heads, chopping, talking, laughing and playing." It was Mzimbas opinion that the European Presbyterian Church in Johannesburg would not be prepared to give much help and that the F.M.C. should buy land and pay a minister, paving the way for a very large African Presbyterian Church which could easily become self-supporting, "unless gold mining fails". In January 1891, Edward Tsewu was sent to Johannesburg, supported by the Presbytery of Kaffraria.

The Presbytery, however, continued to press the F.M.C. to accept responsibility for Johannesburg and to send a European missionary for Pondoland. The F.M.C., for their part, were hoping that the Transvaal Presbytery would step in and relieve them of financial responsibility for the church in Johannesburg. In 1892, however, that Presbytery not only declined to give money to the African church but would not give Tsewu a seat in Presbytery. The church therefore remained an extension of the Presbytery of Kaffraria, supervised by the Kirk Session of a sympathetic Johannesburg Congregation. The F.M.C. gave £10 per quarter but were threatening to stop this. The Presbytery, in Don's words, accused the F.M.C. of being unsympathetic, saying that they could not have neglected their people who had gone to Johannesburg and that Johannesburg should be "occupied in force if occupied at all."

Again the F.M.C. pressed the question on the Presbytery of their attitude towards an African ministry. The Presbytery

1. Mzimba to n.k. 4 July 1890, NLS 7797.
2. Tsewu to Smith, 31 January 1891, NLS 7797.
denied that it was "wedded to old forms or unwilling to face the modifications suited to changing circumstances", yet, as usual, they maintained that it would be "premature" to withdraw Europeans or to substitute Africans as missionary superintendents. Perhaps there should be a greater concentration on the education of African evangelists but this could lead to racial distinction in ecclesiastical position and educational qualifications between Europeans and Africans.¹ To read this correspondence is to feel that the Minutes of 1866 had fallen on very deaf ears.

In 1893 two Presbyteries were formed in Kaffraria, the Presbytery of the Transkei which covered the northern section and the Presbytery of Kaffraria which covered the southern half. These met once a year in Synod. It soon became clear that they represented differing views in many respects. However, at the first meeting of the Synod in 1894, it was agreed that a European missionary was more than ever required in Pondoland, now that "a new regime had been established there". Fifteen months later an opportunity arose of sending an African minister to Zoutpansberg in the Transvaal.

"A strong reason in my opinion for this step is that it keeps us on the line of northern development - the direction in which the great continent is being opened up". ²

The Presbytery of the Transkei communicated their opposition to this idea on the grounds that "men and native money were being expended in the far north". The Presbytery of Kaffraria were unanimously in favour of sending a man to the

¹. Don to Lindsay, 17 May 1892, NLS 7798.
². Don to Smith, 2 January 1891, NLS 7798.
Transvaal and claimed that the Transkei feared the diversion of funds from their own area and from Pondoland. "The Transkei deserves all that it gets and more; but it is now off the line and we must strengthen our hold elsewhere."\(^1\)

It was at this time, 1896-97, that Edward Tsewu and the Johannesburg congregation became involved in the Ethiopian movement.\(^2\) That affair, and the more disruptive Mzimba movement that followed it, initially hardened the attitude of the missionaries against the African ministry and any form of independence. The Presbytery of Kaffraria urged the F.M.C. to replace Tsewu with a European missionary and the Synod passed a resolution stating that the work in Johannesburg would be carried on most satisfactorily and efficiently by a European. This was the first time that missionary dissatisfaction with their African ministers had been made public and not surprisingly Mzimba dissented from the resolution and Makiwane wrote vehemently against it.\(^3\)

The F.M.C., however, continued to press for an African minister at Burnshill and at Pirie (before Mzimba seceded). Bryce Ross*, minister at Pirie, died in 1897 and the F.M.C. stated that they were under the impression that Ross had groomed Mpamba (now at Zoutpansberg) as his successor. Immediately there were denials of this from both Don and Brownlee Ross who said that an African minister at this station could do nothing but harm.\(^4\) Don expounded his views

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1. Don to Smith, 27 January 1896, NLS 7798.
2. See Chapter V.
3. Synod Minutes, 19 July 1897, NLS 7798.
4. Don to Smith, 14 March 1898, NLS 7798; B. Ross to Smith, 26 February 1898, NLS 7804.
at length, claiming that the F.M.C. policy of Europeans going to the front and Africans replacing them at the old stations was "based on a radical misunderstanding of the conditions existing in this country." It was impossible in Dons opinion to act on the assumption that "the native is really equal to the European".

"A native is not made fit to occupy the position of a missionary in charge of an old station with its schools, its finances and manifold relations to the European community and to the government by passing through the educational mill....When experience, proved character and conduct and considerable probation have marked a man out as fit for responsibility let him have his chance." 1

Burns, Hill, Pirie and Johannesburg continued to figure largely in correspondence. The new Convener in 1901 declared that the F.M.C. had no intention of departing from their original object "namely the founding of native churches and helping these to become self-supporting". For their part the Presbytery of Kaffraria continued to ask for more European missionaries to be sent from Scotland. Yekelo Mbali had been appointed to Johannesburg in 1898 but the F.M.C. refused to relieve the Presbytery of financial responsibility. Finally, in March 1902 the F.M.C. agreed to adopt the station but proceeded to appoint their own choice to the charge, a European. 2

The retiring Convener of the F.M.C., Dr. Lindsay, stated in 1901 that, of all Free Church missionaries, those in South Africa "do not seem to have grasped the idea of a Native Presbyterian Church." He rebuked them for having

1. Don to Smith, 14 March 1898, NLS 7798.
2. Lennox to Smith, 3 March 1902; Don to Smith, 13 December 1902, NLS 7799.
adopted a wrong system and of departing from the policy laid down by three Conveners. Naturally the missionaries denied that they had ever had any aim other than the establishment of a "self-supporting and self-governing native church" but in the light of correspondence over the years and of events in the Free Church mission, this denial is not very convincing. Mzimba's secession which, as has been shown elsewhere, was in many respects a judgement on missionary attitudes was, at first, taken as proof that Africans were indeed unstable and required supervision. Eventually, after 1905, it was admitted that there had been injustice and that the policy instituted many years before in the F.M.C. Minutes of 1866 should have been implemented more whole-heartedly. This decision must be understood in the South African context. There was no end to paternalism nor to domination.

Union

For many years, Union with other churches had appeared to offer the Foreign Mission Committee a possible, perhaps the only, solution to the intractable problems of their Mission in Kaffraria. The matter was never allowed to drop out of sight, even when the prospects seemed remote or when, as in 1883, there was an unfavourable reaction from those in the field. Excluding the Dutch Reformed Church there were three Presbyterian organisations in South Africa; the Free Church of Scotland, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland and

1. Lennox to Henderson, 24 May 1901, NLS 7799.
2. See Chapter V.
the Colonial Congregations of South Africa. The Free Church was divided into two Presbyteries (Kaffraria and Transkei) composed of fifteen congregations, five of them European, and one hundred and sixty-one outstations. The U.P. Church was also composed of two Presbyteries (Adelaide and Kaffraria U.P.) comprising thirteen congregations, four of them European.¹ In 1897 the thirty-four small Colonial congregations (European) came together finally to form the South African Presbyterian Church.

This union of South African churches in 1897, plus the fact that the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland were at that time discussing the possibility of their own re-union,² encouraged the F.M.C. to redouble their efforts to bring the Free Church mission into Union with the other Presbyterian bodies in South Africa. The union of F.C. and U.P. missions would be effected as a matter of course once the Home Churches had re-united; now the emphasis should be on a union of all Presbyterian bodies in South Africa, mission and colonial. The F.M.C. had been totally consistent. The Church in South Africa, African or European, must become self-supporting and self-governing.

Here, at last, was the perfect opportunity for the amalgamation of black and white in the same church and, at the same time, a shifting of the burden of responsibility, although the Free Church would have retained its property and have continued to contribute to the financial welfare of its original missions,

¹. Christian Express, 1896.
². This was carried through in 1900.
particularly of its two Institutions.

As a result of injunctions from Scotland, the Synod in Kaffraria proposed to place the whole question of Union formally before the congregations, "especially the native ones", in the form of a resolution:

"This Synod declares itself in favour of such a Union as shall include both the European and Mission churches in one Church, as they are now included in the Presbyteries of this Synod."

In other words, they were asking for complete Presbyterial equality of representation as was enjoyed in the Free Church mission Presbyteries. The congregations were given six months, during which time the Kirk Sessions were to discuss the matter and then place it before a congregational meeting when a decision would be made. If the returns were favourable then approach would be made to the S.A.P.C. and a basis for Union would be prepared.

The Minutes of the Presbytery of Kaffraria for January 1897 record, however, that the congregations of Love-dale, Burnshill and Macfarlan were not in favour of Union. Returns from the Pirie congregation were delayed but it was understood that they would be in line with the other three. One congregation (Macfarlan) included an account of all the questions that had been asked at the public meeting to show the level of concern which this issue of Union had aroused. The consensus of opinion was that Union was not wanted if it meant separation from the Church in Scotland. The reasons given were, first, that the African congregations would be thrown on their own resources and "we are still weak"; 2

1. Synod Minutes, 17 July 1896, NLS 7798.
2. Macfarlan returns, 8 January 1897, NLS 7798.
secondly, that the interest of the colonial churches in the condition of the Africans was not as strong as that of the Free Church - "They have done nothing to support and spread the gospel among the Natives"¹ and thirdly, the Free Church encouraged an African ministry - "we have ministers of our own people." "If the Home Church is not tired of us we, the natives, still wish to be governed by them".²

John Don, in communicating these returns, underlined the fact that the African congregations had been left to themselves to make this decision. They were totally "uninfluenced by the missionaries". If it had been otherwise, he thought they would have decided in favour of Union as the majority of missionaries wanted it.

"It is not difficult to understand why the natives should take up this attitude when left to themselves. They argue from political analogy. They have not benefitted by the transfer from the Queen to the Colony and would gladly return to live at peace under the aegis of the Crown. They fear a similar sequel and though they will accept their fate they are not going to be precipitated by their own vote." ³

This may have been an accurate judgement though, of course, all four congregations were in the Presbytery of Kaffraria. The returns, in the Presbytery of the Transkei in comparison were, initially, in favour of Union. As it was well-known that Stewart was against Union and that Richard and Brownlee Ross were in favour, the congregational decisions could also have reflected that difference of opinion.

¹. Lovedale returns, 25 December 1896, MLS 7798.
². Burnshill returns, 15 January 1897, NLS 7798.
³. Don to Young, 15 February 1897, NLS 7798.
On the other hand, to assume that these missionaries could have such overwhelming influence is to denigrate the ability of the African congregations to make their own decisions and in this instance it would appear that they had very definite views.

For instance, the Kaffrarian congregations realised that the returns from the Transkei, if in favour of Union, would weaken their own case. A meeting of office bearers from Lovedale, Pirie, Burnshill and Macfarlan was summoned and a letter was despatched from the Secretary and President of the meeting to African congregations in both Presbyteries.

"Now I see that, starting from the Lovedale congregation there is a strong movement hostile to Union among the natives. This has spread from the people of Lovedale, Pirie, Burnshill and Macfarlan and the office-bearers in these places have been communicating with our people and urging them to take the same line..." 1

As a direct result of this letter, the congregations of Duff, Main and Somerville retracted their original vote for Union. Of the five congregations of the Transkei Presbytery, only Cunningham and Ross remained in favour of Union as then proposed.

As a consequence of these returns the Synod of July 1897 passed a resolution stating that although Union was desirable it was not possible at this time "because of a want of acquiescence on the part of several of the Native congregations in both Presbyteries." The Synod also noted that there had been discussions amongst Europeans on the subject of the "native vote" in church courts should Union be effected. 2

1. Ross to Lindsay, 26 January 1897, NLS 7803.
2. Synod Minutes, 19 July 1897, NLS 7798.
noted shortly after this that, so far as they were concerned, there was no "race question" but Don felt that that was sweeping an unpleasant fact under the rug. "We know there is both on the side of the blacks and the whites. To shut the eyes to facts and say they do not exist is not a wise policy".¹

This, indeed, was the crux of the matter. All agreed that the Christian ideal was the setting up of a church in which European and African should have equal standing, in which an attempt should be made to overcome race feeling. There were those, however, who feared eventual domination by blacks and there were those who distrusted the good faith of the Colonial Presbyterians in agreeing to accept blacks on equal terms. Brownlee Ross* claimed that Stewart abstained from voting on Union in 1897 because he thought it should be made clear that "whites should rule". Richard Ross voted against Union in 1897 because he was afraid that "whites would rule".² This was not strictly fair to Stewart as later became apparent. Like Richard Ross he did not trust the colonists and claimed that whites themselves felt they "must rule" and that it would therefore be safer for blacks to stay out of such a Union.

For their part, the P.C.S.A. claimed that this race prejudice was all on the side of the Presbytery of Kaffraria and that in their church "the question has not been raised and does not exist." Don disputed this.

¹. Don to Lindsay, 24 January 1898, NLS 7798.  
². B. Ross to Lindsay, 26 July 1898, NLS 7798.
"It is the very absence of race prejudice on the part of the Kaffrarian Presbytery and their sympathy with the native people, their knowledge of the race prejudice existing among many of the European colonists in South Africa and their anxiety to preserve the rights and privileges of the native Christians in the face of such tendencies known to exist..."

Mzimbas secession served to reinforce this point of view. The unsettled state of the mission inhibited action but Mzimba himself stated that one of his reasons for seceding was that he had no wish to join Colonial Presbyterians and had decided instead to form an independent body. If Union was forced, perhaps every mission congregation would follow his example. Moreover, in an effort to bypass the difficulties the Synod of 1897 had made modifications to the basis of Union and had sent them to the Assembly of the P.C.S.A. but that body had ignored the recommendations and had refused to enter any proviso "safe-guarding native rights".1

Despite these statements and counter-statements, the two Presbyteries of the United Presbyterian Church, Kaffraria U.P. and Adelaide, formally entered the S.A.P.C. in 1898, leaving the Free Church Presbyteries on a limb, with many missionaries anxious to join the S.A.P.C. but without the unanimity which would have made immediate action possible. The Union effected in Scotland in 1900 and the formation of the United Free Presbyterian Church did not alter this state of affairs in South Africa.

Consequently, in this confusion the F.M.C. decided to act, to clarify their own position and to try to turn the

1. Don to Lindsay, January 1899, NLS 7798.
minds of some missionaries from the idea of forming a Presbyterian Church of purely African membership. The practise, noted at the beginning of this chapter, of maintaining Presbyteries of the Home Church whose churches were, therefore, branches of the Home Church, was declared to be the chief hindrance in their development and in their freedom to form any kind of Union with similar bodies in South Africa. It was also noted that this situation did not allow sufficient distinction to be made between the office of missionary and the office of pastor, something which had been emphasised in more recently formed missions. Therefore, it must be definite policy to strengthen the connection between missionaries and the Home Church, giving them equal status with ministers in Scotland; and at the same time, the way should be cleared for the organisation and independence of the African Church. For this reason, in 1901, Mission Councils were reintroduced.

These Mission Councils were composed entirely of Europeans and had the power of a Presbytery in all matters of discipline relating to European missionaries. At the same time, the Mission Presbyteries were not made Presbyteries of the United Free Church, but were Presbyteries of the Native Churches, with no formal connection with the Home Church. The missionary had a dual role, in some cases, as he could be a member of the Presbytery; but all missionaries were members of the Council and it was through this body alone that the Home Church and the missionaries were connected.

By 1902, therefore, with the formation of the Presbytery of Natal, there were in South Africa, three Mission Councils,
Kaffraria, Transkei and Natal. In the S.A.P.C. there were 77 congregations under 7 Presbyteries and one Presbytery included two African pastors and 9 missionaries, whose relation to their Home Church was unaltered by their membership of the S.A.P.C. There was also the Synod of Kaffraria, composed of two Presbyteries, formerly connected with the Free Church.

In 1904 Stewart published a pamphlet entitled "The South African Mission" in which he spoke strongly against Union, employing three main arguments. First, if missionaries remained responsible and their salaries were paid by the Home Church there would be no financial relief; second the S.A.P.C. was neither capable of nor interested in supporting missions; and thirdly, union would not last once there was an African majority.

"The fact is that Europeans who have settled as Cape colonists will not on any terms submit to be ecclesiastically ruled by the vote of a native majority."

His suggestion was that an African Church should be created to support, govern and reproduce itself, each congregation being responsible for itself.¹

His views were immediately repudiated by Ross, Matheson and Auld, missionaries of the Transkei, who accused him of "the barest and most unqualified congregationalism" and of suggesting the creation of a black and a white church which was "unscriptural and unspiritual". The Presbyterian Church should "witness against race and colour prejudice".²

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¹ Stewart Pamphlet: The South African Mission, 1904, NLS 7800.
² Reply to pamphlet, NLS 7800.
reply to this Stewart agreed that "theoretically...there should be one church and no colour line of division but that seems reserved for a day beyond our own." The only certain result of Union, he claimed, in a Church partly controlled in South Africa, partly from Scotland, would be "embarrassment, contention and disputes without number."¹

Extant correspondence indicates that Stewart had considerable support for his views. Despite that, however, the Africa Sub-Committee published their own pamphlet on the matter in which they made it quite clear that they could not declare themselves in favour of a policy of separate churches. To do so would have been a reversal of their previous policy of encouraging missionaries and congregations to unite with the S.A.P.C. "To follow the Christian ideal is the course most likely, if not to avert difficulties, to over come them." However, as it had been agreed to leave the decision finally with those in South Africa nothing would be done to inhibit freedom of action and no Presbyterian congregation would suffer as a result of a decision to remain apart from the South African Presbyterian Church.²

At this point, the activities of the "Wee Frees" and of Mzimbis people in South Africa, the question of the Inter-State Native College and, in 1905, the death of Stewart, caused this matter to be pushed aside. Although some Transkeian missionaries again attempted to join the S.A.P.C. and, indeed, their Synod passed a formal resolution, their congregations were not ultimately joined to the Colonial Church.

¹. Stewart's reply to Ross, Matheson and Auld, NLS 7800.
². The Question of Presbyterian Union in South Africa, May 1904, NLS 7800.
It was not until 1923 that this curious state of affairs was resolved by the formation of the Bantu Presbyterian Church, an independent and autonomous body, with 45 congregations and 48 missionaries and pastors, the majority of them African.¹ A close and friendly relation was maintained with the U.F. Church of Scotland and a loose federal relation with the S.A.P.C. Once again the missionaries, claiming superior understanding of the South African situation, had contrived to deflect the wider purpose of the Home Church and had foiled their efforts to introduce a policy which claimed to ignore racial difficulties. Experience in other denominations would seem to indicate that the Kaffrarian missionaries were correct in their gloomy predictions;² but ecclesiastical separate development in the political circumstances of South Africa since 1923 have not given much scope to the Bantu Presbyterian Church and it has not proved itself a particularly inspiring example to follow.

**African Response to Missionary attitudes in ecclesiastical affairs**

Such response has already been noted in the examples given of mission policy. The outstanding question remains, however, as to why, if Africans could effectively oppose Union, they did not, throughout the years, insist on a more radical approach to the establishment of an African ministry. After all the strength of the Presbyterian system should have

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² Africans in the Methodist Church, for example, have found it difficult to achieve equal status with Europeans.
lain in the equal lay representation, resulting, as in "Nyassaland" for example, in a majority of Africans in Presbytery. Without being able to provide statistical evidence this would not seem to have been the case in Kaffraria due to the existence of Lovedale. There was admittedly, from 1881, no exclusively European Mission Council and Presbytery was the controlling body for the Mission but Lovedale had several ordained missionaries on the staff, all of them entitled to a seat in Presbytery. As they had no parishes and therefore no elders, this would account for a majority of Europeans in Presbytery. In addition to this, however, in African eyes there was not only status in having a European missionary for a congregation, there was also no need to pay him as his salary automatically came from Scotland. The European majority in Presbytery had failed to establish a central Sustentation fund, to which all congregations would have contributed, for the payment of ministers which, in itself, would have made an African pastorate a more attractive proposition. Because of this omission and the relative poverty of African congregations, there was undoubtedly a willingness on the part of African members of Presbytery to support the missionary viewpoint as to whether an African or a European should be sent to a vacant charge. It was only later, when discriminatory restrictions were openly advocated by missionaries that, for example, Mzimba was provoked into independent action. Finally, it must be assumed that the African opposition to Union was successful in its outcome because it was a view shared by influential
Original Station at Tyumie

Original Seminary from Fort Hare
European missionaries. These speculations are re-inforced by the contrast afforded by the Presbytery of the Transkei, created in 1893. The eldership in Transkeian congregations had always played a more decisive and independent role. This is what might be expected from an area in which the Mfengu since 1870 had been encouraged to take responsibility in local affairs, and from missionaries like the Rosses who had relied on an educated eldership to maintain enormous parishes. In their own Presbytery, the influence of African elders, even without a majority, is evident in decisions made.

b. **Lovedale: its structure and organisation**

Lovedale was, undeniably, an impressive achievement. From a small academic establishment it grew, in thirty years, into a comprehensive educational institution, offering industrial, agricultural and medical training, in addition to the Normal School and teacher training classes for the many and advanced Higher and Theological education for the few. It had its own telegraph office, printing press, bookshop, church, carpentry and brick-making, waggon-building and horse-shoeing centres. Holding, at its 19thC. peak, anything between 600 and 800 people, it was a village in its own right. In appearance Lovedale was, and still is, a remarkable collection of well-structured buildings, approached by avenues lined with trees, mainly oaks and Australian wattles, planted at the instigation of the missionaries. By 1887, Lovedale had 22 buildings, including missionaries houses
and dormitories; by 1902 there were over 30 buildings whose central feature was the large central school building, "the largest of its kind used for missionary and educational purposes in South Africa".\textsuperscript{1} The Dining Hall for boys held more than 350 pupils; the Library contained over 7,000 volumes. A short distance from the Boys Institution there was a Girl's School with its own dormitories and Dining Hall. By 1888, Lovedale had educated or given industrial training to more than 500 African women.\textsuperscript{2} The whole site was surrounded by farm land much of it owned by Lovedale.

The number of staff varied from year to year, though the average was about 20 European members. Missionary personnel came normally from Scotland, laymen might be recruited in South Africa. A.C. Fairlie, in charge of printing and bookbinding, J.M. Fisher, manager of the bookstore, John Grey, head of the waggon-making department and George McGillivray head of the carpentry section, worked at Lovedale for 32, 21, 27 and 40 years respectively. Other long-serving members were Alexander and Mrs. Geddes,* in charge of the Boarding House (29 years), J.A. Bennie* (21), John Knox Bokwe* (27), W.J.B. Moir* (24), A.W. Roberts* (37) and Andrew Smith* (20). There were many others who, although their period of service may have been shorter, nevertheless managed to make an impression on Lovedale. Although the Institution could never claim to be over-staffed and there were times when unfortunate appointments were made, there

\textsuperscript{1} Stewart, Lovedale, South Africa, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{2} Stewart, Lovedale Past and Present, p. 534.
was a continuity about the staff, most of them also well-qualified, which was of benefit to Lovedale. Africans were employed as supervised assistants, mainly in the Industrial departments, though Elijah Makiwane* taught at Lovedale for a short time. In general, however, no African was considered to be adequately qualified for a post at Lovedale.

Even with a loyal and conscientious staff, however, it is obvious that the running of this complex enterprise depended considerably on the energy and determination of one man - James Stewart. His personality dominated Lovedale for 38 years. By nature authoritarian, he controlled every aspect of Lovedale's life. For the most part he had the indefatigable zest and enthusiasm which enabled him not only to govern and legislate for Lovedale but also to participate in innumerable public activities which in themselves brought Lovedale into prominence and gave it unique standing in the Colony and in missionary circles. It was only towards the end of his life, when heart trouble reduced his physical strength that Stewart's control slipped and his authority degenerated to autocracy at times. Even in his heyday Stewart admitted that

"The superintendence of all that work...is enough to take the strength of the strongest and would require more tact and patience and temper than I possess to manage quite successfully..." 1

Though it was true that his temper was fierce and his patience often short - his diaries are peppered with self-admonition and reminders that "the ancient heroes were illustrious, for

1. Stewart to Stephen, 6 March 1882, SP LB4b.
being benign and not blustrous"¹ - yet it is apparent that he commanded respect and admiration, even from those who had suffered from his sarcastic tongue. The impression is that he won the affection of very few - Horace Waller, Durant Philip,* John Stephen* and John Knox Bokwe among them - but for most of his colleagues he was a somewhat awe-inspiring character of legendary ability and achievement.

"Lovedale is Dr. Stewart's magnum opus....He made Lovedale. His thumb-mark is everywhere in that great centre of native life. Its catholicity, its versatility, its open door and its open mind are from him....No Institution in Africa has lived so fully and so constantly in the fierce light of criticism - from both Europeans and Natives - as Lovedale. It would be too much to say that it had disposed of that criticism, but it has at least won the respect of all fair-minded observers. Few men have been less dogmatic in regard to method than Dr. Stewart. He wanted only the best.... He desired above all to keep Lovedale abreast of the times in educational and industrial methods." ²

Structurally, then, Lovedale was a pyramid with Stewart at the apex. There was little power-sharing. When Stewart was away from Lovedale, his absence was felt particularly at the level of the management of affairs. No other member of staff had his control or his knowledge and the consequence of his absence was usually financial insolvency and laxness of discipline. Inevitably, when his hold weakened under ill-health and depression, the vultures gathered and there was much unpleasant in-fighting at Lovedale to wrest power from Stewart or to succeed him when he died. When James Henderson was appointed to Lovedale in 1906, he was asked to investigate allegations, doubted by the F.M.C., that there had been

¹. Diaries, passim, SP.
trouble of this kind at Lovedale.

"I have seen the correspondence of the situation.... From the facts before me I cannot take your view.... I have had to face what was an organised opposition to my predecessor which on the testimony of the best friends of the Institution was ruining its character and its work."

Lovedale was no stranger to jealousy, gossip and back-biting. Small inbred communities are peculiarly susceptible to conflict and missionary institutions were no exception. Stewart's personal aloofness and authority - and support from his contemporaries on the staff - kept these petty quarrels and differences private. The weaknesses in the structure were only revealed when this authority relaxed and the philosophy and method of the old-style missionary was openly questioned by the succeeding generation.

**Organisation of Lovedale students**

Classes for all Lovedale students began at 9 a.m. each day. Apprentices went to their workshops and pursued the three Rs after work at evening classes. All pupils who were not indentured to a trade were expected to muster for manual work in the fields or in the gardens and grounds. They worked in companies under a captain for two hours every day, three on Saturday. There was a Head Captain who was paid a few shillings per week. Rules regarding the muster were only relaxed at examination times when some afternoons were left free. All the roads running through Lovedale were maintained by the pupils. The Girls School employed no

1. Henderson to Smith, 4 June 1906, NLS 7801.
servant labour. Instead the pupils themselves performed all domestic duties there. Those girls who were in the academic classes were also expected to acquire the domestic skills of cooking, washing and sewing and, like the boys, performed some outdoor maintenance of paths and gardens. Girls under industrial training specialized in laundry and sewing, taking in work from the neighbourhood.¹

Most pupils were boarders, a small percentage of these being European. European and African sat in the same class room but the dormitories were separate and there were also distinctions in the dining room. Three meals a day were served and the type of food served depended on the fees paid. Table 1 consisted of European boys and young men, Table 2 was the teachers table, Table 3 was for the sons of chiefs and others, Table 4 for the rank and file. In 1901, fees varied from £45 per annum for Table 1 to £10 per annum for Table 4. The staple diet for Table 4 was crushed maize with meat, milk, fat and vegetables every third or fourth day. Tables 1, 2 and 3 had meat more often. Those who acted as waiters, usually from the fourth table, were allowed bread and tea along with their crushed maize.² These dietary arrangements did to some extent reflect custom and preference – there were Africans, for example who sat at the teachers table – and the separation was also a serving convenience. Although Lovedale was technically inter-racial, social mixing was a reality only at the upper end of the financial or academic scale.

¹ Stewart, Lovedale, South Africa, pp. 73 and 92.
The care and management of a large boarding school requires considerable organisational expertise. When the pupils come from widely-differing backgrounds and when many were in their late teens and early twenties, some even married, then the problems are increased. Matters of discipline were usually not publicised but they included breaking of indenture agreements, theft, sexual transgressions (there were several girls who had to leave because of pregnancy and one or two hasty marriages), reverting to heathen custom, particularly the abakweta,¹ and general misconduct, all of which left the student liable for instant dismissal. When an apprentice finished his course, he was given a sum of money (kept over the years from his wages) and a grant of £10 to buy tools to set himself up in his chosen trade. In one celebrated instance, where the apprentice had not completed his full time, Lovedale did not pay him the full amount. He, Cornelius Njoli, then sued Stewart for the amount of money due, lost his case in the Resident Magistrates Court, then appealed successfully to the Eastern Districts Court. That court in upholding Njoli's appeal, pointed to his undoubted chicanery but maintained that he was legally within his rights and that Lovedale must alter the requirements of its indentures accordingly.² Another pupil in the same year brought a charge of assault against the master carpenter and the Principal of Lovedale which was dismissed and apologised for but not before the student had written a letter to the North British Daily Mail in which he attempted

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¹ Abakweta - initiation rites of circumcision.
² Christian Express, December 1880.
a comparison between Lovedale and Blantyre, at that time suffering the consequences of a flogging incident. There is no evidence of the use of corporal punishment at Lovedale - though a cuff about the ears was presumably not uncommon.

Of the 1,520 male pupils listed in Lovedale Past and Present 33 had been dismissed or discharged and 15 had relapsed into heathenism. Prior to 1879, all disciplinary offences had been in the hands of the Education Board but Stewart began to feel that the discipline was too harsh and that it would help if the students administered some of it themselves. He therefore wrote to the "students, apprentices and pupils at Lovedale", stating that they would be allowed to set up a small court for the trial of minor offences, under the chairmanship of John Knox Bokwe. There is no mention of the activities of this court but ten years later there was some indication that disciplinary arrangements were unsatisfactory.

"One thing which strikes me as necessary is the re-establishment of the Native Courts and the employment of secret agents to be paid as before. Some object to this, amongst others Mr. Geddes. I think the objectors are entirely wrong. We cannot do in a community such as ours without an Information Department and without something corresponding to a Police - however we may dislike it. I have never been in love with the Vigilance Committee - it may do well enough after things are found out - but what we need, chiefly to attend to is to find out things in time."

1. Christian Express, October 1880. See also Appendix B.
2. Lovedale Past and Present, p. 534.
3. Stewart to Students etc. 12 November 1878, SP 23 B(iii); Stewart to Moir, 12 November 1878, SP 23 B(i).
4. Stewart to Moir, 17 December 1890, SP 23 B(i).
It is impossible to know whether or not any one incident had caused Stewart to make these comments to Moir but order, however necessary, imposed by these methods was not conducive to harmony or trust within the Institution.

There is no evidence, however, of the establishment of Native courts, nor of the appointment of informers. D.D. Stormont\(^1\) in his journal hinted darkly at the moral disease at Lovedale but his comments seemed to be aimed at a case of pregnancy and to quarrels amongst the staff.\(^1\) The only "student revolt" which occurred during this period of Stewart's Principalship took place in November 1900 - when Stewart was in Scotland. Complaints were made about the food, particularly about the lack of fat in the diet, meetings were called, spokesmen were appointed and threats were made to boycott meals and work parties unless immediate improvements were made. About 100 boys refused meals and downed tools in the muster. (Apprentices were not involved). A.W. Roberts would have adopted a lenient approach but the Education Board, backed by the Boarding Master, Mr. Geddes, insisted on a strong line, expelling all ring-leaders. 50 boys left in sympathy but most returned, except those from Sheshegu.\(^2\) Geddes admitted that the meals had been below standard but claimed that the quality of maize was poor and sheep were both expensive and of low standard. He offered various substitutes (such as sugar and porridge) which the majority accepted. He implied to Stewart that this revolt had deeper causes but mentioned

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1. Stormont Journal, Cory MS 7482.
2. Sheshegu was a centre of trouble for Lovedale at this time. These students were quite possibly affected by the unrest caused by Mzimbas movement whose local headquarters were at Sheshegu. See Chapter V.
specifically only late meals and over-crowded dormitories. It was his opinion that Roberts' discipline was too lax - "he is afraid of the boys and they know it". The consequence was that "undesirables", particularly a number who had been thrown out of other Institutions, fomented trouble. They had timed their revolt to coincide with the visit of the Inspector, Dr. Reim, in the hope that he would support them. Roberts "open door" policy (as he described it) and leniency doubtless contrasted with Stewart's uncompromising methods but Roberts did not have the force of personality to make his more lenient approach appear as anything other than weakness.¹ Stewart, on the other hand, despite a certain ruthlessness which was unattractive to many, held Lovedale steady, with remarkably little incident, for the simple reason that he was, to students and staff, larger than life.

A Medical Mission

From its inception, the Kaffrarian mission had offered medical care of a basic kind, although none of the early missionaries was medically qualified. James Stewart had been so convinced by his experience in Central Africa in 1862 of the value of such training that he had delayed his departure to Lovedale for 3 years in order to complete his medical degree at Glasgow University. He was the first Presbyterian missionary in South Africa to be so qualified, but with all his other duties there was a limit to the amount of time he could spend in the treatment of the sick. Jane Waterston* who travelled with the Stewarts in 1867 to head

¹. An account of this revolt can be found in Geddes to Stewart, 2 November 1900, and Roberts to Stewart, 3 November, 1900. Cory MSS 9138 and 9133.
the new Girls Institution at Lovedale, had trained as a nurse under the famous Professor Lister at Glasgow. A talented, high-spirited girl, with strong views on women's rights, she decided after 6 years at Lovedale to study medicine and was, therefore, one of the first students at the London Medical School for Women. In 1879, having qualified as a doctor LRCP (Ireland), she decided to join Laws at Livingstonia, engaging with the Committee for five years. She was the first woman medical missionary in Africa – and, in her own words, was regarded as a witch. However, difficult conditions, loneliness and the unfortunate trouble at Blantyre (plus the fact that she and Laws heartily disliked one another), caused her to suggest to Stewart that she should return to Lovedale. Stewart immediately tried to establish a medical centre on modest lines which "Dr. Jane" could run and by the time she arrived in Lovedale in July 1880, a Dispensary had been set up.

"She is a good doctor quite of the modern school or style and very enthusiastic" 2

With much sickness in the country, Dr. Waterston was soon fully employed and making a name for herself in the district. Stewart approached the F.M.C. with the proposal that a medical mission proper should be established – but this was turned down. Moreover, because Dr. Jane had resigned from Livingstonia, although she had gone to Lovedale, the Committee struck her name off the missionary register and obliged her to refund her passage money. Stewart remonstrated with the Committee

1. From a private paper written by Allan Waterston.
2. Stewart to Stephen, 17 August 1880 SP LB 4b.
but Dr. Jane had repaid half the money before they declined the rest. As a result of this treatment she would not accept any payment from the Home Church, received only £30 from Institution funds, and supported herself by private practise after Dispensary hours. When there was a failure in the family fortunes in Scotland she decided, at the age of 38, that the time had come to provide more adequately for herself and moved from Lovedale to Cape Town where she practised for the next 49 years.1

"The loss will be very considerable to the native people residing in Victoria East....Up to the end of December last year the number of visits paid to the Dispensary by patients was 7,036. Of these 4,014 were new cases....The fees paid (for medicines only) were £328.3.0." 2

Dr. Waterston's assistant, Govan Koboka, a Lovedalian who had trained as a dresser and dispenser at Grey's Hospital, Port Elizabeth, continued the work on a more restricted scale after Jane Waterston had left.3

The great need for medical training and help which had been revealed by those few years of the Dispensary's activities, was the impulse behind John Stephen's generous offer of £1000 for ten years to establish a medical school and small hospital in connection with Lovedale. Although Stewart had his reservations about this scheme, as will be shown below, and although the Committee had discouraged previous medical school plans, now that they were not in any way financially liable they began to show more interest. A

1. Stewart to Stephen, 18 September 1882 SP LB 4b.
2. Christian Express, September 1883.
3. Lovedale Past and Present, p. 117.
Dr. Stirling was selected as a good candidate to begin this
new venture and he was sent to South Africa to investigate
the possibilities.

"The foundation must be a good large dispensary and
an hospital in which the native students will see the
actual treatment of disease with their own eyes and
have to deal with it with their own hands and assist
in its treatment - one year of such training will do
more than 4 years theoretical dealing with disease and
medicine from books." 1

Stewart's enthusiasm was obvious as was Dr. Stirlings' when he
reported to the Committee in July 1884. The hospital of
20 beds and the medical school were to be conducted by a body
of Trustees, financed by a special endowment donated by
John Stephen. 2

At this point, however, the financial problems which
constantly beset Lovedale, a difference of opinion between
Stewart and the Committee and the economic circumstances in
the Cape as a consequence of most severe drought, put an
effective stop to these enthusiastic plans.

"We are barely able to hold the ground we have - it
does not seem very wise to be extending our
responsibilities. Lovedale has been carried on... only by the aid of friends from without - chiefly
two men of whom you yourself are one. That being
so the attitude of the Committee, Ladies Society
and Dr. Dale being such as to preclude hope from any
of these three quarters, you can see that hesitation
about this big piece of work is comprehensible." 3

The plan was never allowed to drop completely from
sight. In 1892 the Lovedale Education Board formally
proposed the founding of a medical school and a hospital at
Lovedale. 4 When the Hospital was at last on the drawing

2. F.M.C. Minutes, 22 July 1884.
board, money for the project was raised largely through the efforts of a member of the Lovedale staff, D.A. Hunter.* A special fund to honour Queen Victoria’s Jubilee had been amassed from African taxes and when £1000 was given from this fund to the Hospital project, it was agreed to call it the Victoria Hospital. This building, which had been in the minds of Stewart and Stephen for so many decades, was opened by Sir Gordon Sprigg in 1893. Unfortunately the War and a lack of funds caused the Hospital to be closed almost immediately until 1902. The Hospital was in need of a new superintendent and Stewart, in Scotland at the time, made a good choice in Dr. Neil Macvicar whom he had met on board ship as Macvicar returned from Blantyre, having lost his job there because of "doctrinal difficulties".1 Stewart, however, had no hesitation in appointing Macvicar and the Victoria Hospital, whose realisation had taken so many years, began its career of service and education.

c. **Lovedale: Finance**

The financial state of Lovedale before Stewart arrived was not at all healthy. Govan had not attempted to hide this from Stewart nor from the F.M.C. The debt at the end of 1864 amounted to £2,300, which did not include arrears in some Industrial departments, these being met by the Government.

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The value of the Lovedale property and buildings was considerable but the sources of ready money were limited and there was no capital endowment.\(^1\) What sources were available? 1) Fees from pupils. These had recently been introduced by Govan but were mainly levied from Europeans and, as the numbers were small, the total in 1863 was about £725. In 1865 it was £649.\(^2\) 2) Government grants. In Govan's time the grant was small - about £100 per annum. There were hopes, however, that this would be increased by Langham Dale\(^*\) to approximately £600. 3) Help from the Free Church. The F.M.C. was responsible for only the salaries of Govan himself and one other teacher on the staff. 4) The Industrial departments. These, in general, ran at a loss or barely broke even.\(^3\) To offset the variable prospect offered by these sources of revenue, Govan initiated a scheme of land purchase as an endowment for the Institution. The largest single item was a 1700 acre farm at Debe Nek\(^*\) out of a total purchase of more than 3000 acres. It is obvious that he had no support from the Home Committee in this venture and that much of the purchase money came from his own pocket. In 1870 when Govan retired he made a statement to the effect that these lands should provide sufficient endowment for Lovedale. The educational policy changes finally introduced in 1870, however, entailed considerable expansion in the number of pupils with the concomitant need for more staff and more accommodation. The increase in

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1. Govan to Stewart, 9 March 1864; 30 November 1865, SP 23(iv).
2. Shepherd: Lovedale, p. 150.
fees, now drawn from all pupils, was still not enough to cover the greatly-increased costs. Unless Lovedale's endowment was soundly based, or unless there was a generous capital contribution from Scotland, it is apparent that there would be a constant battle to make expenditure tally with income. This, indeed, was to be the outstanding feature of the Institutions history from 1870 to 1905.

As might have been anticipated the endowment of Lovedale Institution from the profits derived from the farms Govan had bought was quite inadequate to deal with changing circumstances. In 1872 Stewart furnished the Committee with a detailed statement, supported by colonial valuators, claiming that there never would be "any such complete endowment as the Committee have been led to expect". Although Stewart continued Govan's policy and added to Lovedale land holdings, there was no other attempt to place capital at Lovedale's disposal. This, in view of expansion, was a grave mistake. The result was a hand-to-mouth existence which depended largely on the ability of the Principal to attract private donations and which could be upset by circumstances such as drought which reduced the revenue from fees, or by government changes which could bring about a reduction in the grant.

Following the change in education policy, numbers at Lovedale increased rapidly. In 1871 the revenue from fees had risen to £100 from Africans. In 1872 Stewart made the first of many appeals to the Committee for a grant towards new buildings, "rendered necessary by the large increase in

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 16 January 1872,
the numbers of native pupils."¹ Mrs. Stewart had been to London and had successfully raised £560. This, plus £1000 from the Committee, was expected to cover the cost of extension. At the same time, Stewart asked for more staff, the current number being inadequate to deal with the large influx. In the Lovedale report for 1873, it was noted that the total given by the F.M.C. to the support of Lovedale, was £400, representing Stewart's salary and the salary of Andrew Smith. It was suggested that the F.M.C. should increase its financial contribution. Also in 1873, Stewart made the first appeal to the Colony for money and received a total of £1500.² The bulk of this money came from Europeans.

The F.M.C., at the recommendation of the Standing Sub Committee, had agreed to provide £1000 for buildings. Less than a year later, however, Stewart realised that this was an inadequate sum to deal with rising costs and decided to go in person to Edinburgh to put Lovedale's case to the Committee. (Thus it was that he found himself in Britain for the funeral of David Livingstone.) Stewart explained that the rise in cost of materials and wages necessitated further expenditure on the planned buildings. Of the Colonists £1500, £500 had already been spent on alterations and repairs. This left £2000 when, in fact, £5000 was required. Again the Committee agreed to meet this demand. With regard to the annual sum given to Lovedale (which had been increased slightly to £665), it was agreed that the

¹ F.M.C. Minutes, 21 April, 1874.
² Kaffir Express, September 1873.
Committee should undertake to pay all European agents, a total per annum of £1000. It was observed that the Institution was maintained at an annual cost of approximately £3500 and that the Committee would therefore now be responsible for 2/7ths of this. The remaining 5/7ths would come from fees and government grants and would therefore be provided at Lovedale itself. The problem, as we have seen, is that fees and government grants were by no means constant.  

Other circumstances must also be taken into account. Stewart himself had raised the issue of a memorial to Livingstone. The result was the foundation of Livingstonia mission and Stewart spent much of his time in Scotland in 1874-75 raising private money for this venture. More pertinent for Lovedale's financial future, however, had been the earlier suggestion of another Free Church Institution in the Transkei, primarily to serve the Mfengu population in that area. The enthusiasm of the Mfengu themselves for this proposed Blythswood Institution resulted in the collection of £1450, a considerable sum when compared with the small sum contributed to Africans for Lovedale or even to the total from the Colony. In recognition of this effort, the F.M.C. granted £500 to the Blythswood building fund and, despite other commitments, Stewart raised the rest of the money required. It was also at his suggestion that the Rev. James Macdonald was appointed as first Principal for the new Institution, a suggestion which Stewart was later to regret. Blythswood was seen, at this stage, as a "Branch of

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 20 May 1874.
2. So named after the local Magistrate, Captain Matthew Blyth.* This new Institution was 120 miles from Lovedale and was designed primarily to educate the many Mfengu who had been granted land in this area.
the Lovedale Institution", providing good elementary education and acting as a feeder for Lovedale. Trouble arose when this status was not only questioned but contravened and, naturally, the controversy was aggravated by financial considerations. Which Institution deserved to be given most money from the Home Committee?

In 1876 Stewart left Lovedale for Livingstonia. Rev. John Buchanan was left in charge of Lovedale. Building at both Blythswood and Lovedale was subject to a number of interruptions during Stewart’s absence, notably on account of the war of 1877-78.\footnote{1} The Mfengu had demanded a larger building than that originally planned and had raised a further £1500 to meet the costs. The completed section of the Institution had been opened. In the meantime, Macdonald had made several requests to the Committee for financial aid and had begun to move beyond the proposed plans for Blythswood, suggesting a Girl’s Institution and various industrial departments. All this was communicated to Stewart at Livingstonia and he was plainly convinced that various members of the Presbytery were behind these attempts of Macdonald to make Blythswood independent of Lovedale.

"Macdonald is plunging ahead in the Transkei in such a way that we shall all be in difficulties if he is not stopped. He has evidently been getting some tutoring from members of the Presbytery...and this added to his own flightiness has started him off on a course of his own, independent of Lovedale, instead of remaining as he should have done as a branch of Lovedale for some years at least. I have made up my mind to tell him...that he must act according to the original agreement and while a good deal of liberty it gives him in the matters of finance and jurisdiction generally, as to undertaking new schemes he must act along with the Board at Lovedale..." \footnote{2}

\footnote{1} See Chapter IV,
\footnote{2} Stewart to Mina Stewart, 24 December 1877, ST 13/3/1.
Stewart's misgivings were well-founded. Over the next five years the Presbytery, at the instigation of the Rosses who worked in the Transkei, did attempt to separate Blythswood from Lovedale so that they could reassert control over one of the Mission Institutions. Stewart, for his part, clung on grimly to the original agreement, though it was, in fact, impossible for one man to supervise both establishments. This matter had to be resolved by a visit from two Deputies from Scotland whose report provided the necessary grounds for Committee action.

In 1878, however, when Stewart returned from Livingstonia, he found Lovedale's finances in an unfortunate state. Indeed, whenever Stewart left Lovedale for a considerable period financial difficulties arose, mainly due to the fact that although there was a Financial Board (to 1881) only he fully understood the system. Having visited Lovedale and having observed the state of affairs early in 1878, Stewart decided to go once more to Scotland. Of the £5000 collected in 1875, £1000 had been loaned to Blythswood and other sums amounting to £700 or £800 had been borrowed from the Building Fund. The new building had been begun but, as already observed, progress was slow and intermittent and costs had again risen. Stewart estimated that another £5000 was required, asked the Committee for £3000 and undertook to raise the remainder from friends.  

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 18 June 1878.
2. Stewart to John Bennie, 18 September 1879 SP 23B(iii).
because of this but when his colleagues pleaded for his return to Lovedale he maintained that the big extension of work in Africa was due to people like himself going to Scotland and "breaking through the fixed forms" of office work by appealing in person for changes in policy.1

Meantime the matter of Blythswood was being pressed on the Committee from the Presbytery and from Stewart and James Macdonald, who had come back to Scotland while Blythswood was occupied by government troops. Stewart had recommended that Blythswood should adhere more strictly to its role as a Branch Institution, that it should develop slowly giving education to a limited standard and severely curtailing industrial expansion. These suggestions were agreed to by the Education Board before Stewart left Lovedale. On learning of this paper, the Presbytery despatched a Memorandum opposing these recommendations on the grounds that Blythswood was 120 miles from Lovedale and could therefore develop independently, up to a certain standard, without in any sense coming into competition with Lovedale.

The F.M.C. in consideration of these papers, dismissed the idea of rivalry between the two Institutions, but, in effect, reasserted the principles laid down in the Minute of October 1864 which, although Blythswood had not then been in existence, allowed for the management of Institutions by the Education Board. They upheld Stewart's view that Blythswood should grow slowly, sending its more able pupils to Lovedale and pointed out that Industrial departments

1. Stewart to Moir, 12 November 1878 SP 23B(i).
involved pecuniary responsibility so that these must begin in a small way, aiming to be self-supporting. Finally, in a veiled rebuke, they called the attention of the Presbytery to the section of the 1864 Minute which clearly laid down the remit of each court or Board in the Mission.¹

Stewart foresaw the consequences of having two major Institutions within a radius of 120 miles and was determined to persuade the F.M.C. to his point of view. On the other hand, he was aware that he personally could not be responsible for both Institutions and that this matter would have to be resolved in the future. He was convinced, however, that the Presbytery must not be allowed to reassert its frustrated influence over Blythswood, just as the Presbytery had made every effort to withdraw Blythswood from Stewart's jurisdiction. Stewart expressed his viewpoint forcibly to Captain Blyth:—

"In reality it is an attempt on the part of what is called the Presbytery but which chiefly means R.R., B.R. and C.B. to wrest the direction of Blythswood out of our hands at Lovedale....to attempt a curriculum of education that would require six or more men at once to be effective....and to commit us to another £5000 of expenditure immediately....and finally to place the whole management of Blythswood under a section of that blessed Presbytery...." ²

Blyth agreed completely with Stewart in this matter, noting that Blythswood had always been intended as a Branch Institution and that the plan proposed by "certain ministers and an elder in K.W.T." would narrow the usefulness of

¹ F.M.C. Minutes, 19 November 1878.
² Stewart to Blyth, 24 November 1878, ST 13/3/1. The people referred to by initial are Richard Ross, Bryce Ross and Charles Brownlee.
Blythswood, "place it entirely in sectarian hands... and utterly defeat the object originally intended."\(^1\)

Stewart arrived in Lovedale in June 1879 determined to tighten up the organisation of the workshops to render them more efficient.\(^2\) He had collected money from all over the country to make up the £2000 on which the F.M.C. grant of £3000 was contingent.\(^3\) A month after his arrival, however, he again noted in his diary that the Building fund was not enough and that £1572 was still due. In addition to this the Blythswood debt amounted to £2000, a sum for which Macdonald refused to take any responsibility. Besides the serious deficits in the Building fund, the General Account of the Institution, used for running costs, had suffered a severe set-back during the war of 1877-78. In 1878 the number of pupils had fallen from 380 in 1877 to 300, but by 1879 this had increased to 470, the highest number in the Institution since 1870, with the exception of the year 1876 when there had been 499 pupils. The amount from fees had fallen drastically, however. From 499 pupils in 1876 the total revenue had been £1665; from 470 pupils the revenue was only £732 in 1879.\(^4\) Moreover these years and those immediately following were, for political reasons, definitely unfavourable to African education and threats were made to cut the government grant. Small wonder that Stewart, working against a background of political troubles in the

\(^1\) Blyth to Stewart, 8 January 1879, SP 25B.
\(^2\) Diary, 9 May 1879; 16 June 1879.
\(^3\) List of subscribers, 24 January 1879, ST 13/3/1.
\(^4\) Christian Express, January 1897.
Cape and impending disaster in Blantyre was pessimistic about the future of Lovedale. Financial considerations apart, Stewart felt that Lovedale had been too harsh in its discipline and that the pupils must be given some "present and future interest in the place". Lovedale was not what it was and for this he was as much to blame as anybody but something must be done to meet "the necessities of native education."¹

Though Macdonald was once more in charge at Blythswood, it was left to Stewart to deal with the Institutions debt. He decided to make representations to the Mfengu and, as before, they rose to the occasion, clearing the debt and making their total contribution to the cost, £4,500. For this reason alone, wrote Stewart, Blythswood must succeed.² There can be little doubt that the success of this money-raising effort had been due to the Native Committee of 12 Headmen, a Committee which Macdonald attempted to ignore but which Stewart and Elyth were prepared to encourage. Despite his weak personal position, Macdonald complained that the Native Committee and Stewart's supervision were infringing his rights as a member of Presbytery and he continued to stir up trouble through private lobbying of Presbytery and Education Board members. Finally, he was transferred to another station but the damage had been done and Stewart, who felt that unfair charges had been levied against him and not refuted, was not keen to let the matter rest. The F.M.C. Secretary rebuked Stewart for his want of "Christ-like

1. Stewart to Moir, 24 January 1879, SP 23B(i).
2. Report on Blythswood, 30 December 1879, SP. 25A.
charity" especially as his views had the support of the Committee. This was the start of a period of poor communication between Stewart and the Committee, with Stewart becoming more and more convinced that the Presbytery in Kaffraria and the Committee in Edinburgh were determined to squeeze him out of Lovedale.

The Eighties.

Stewart received some small encouragement in his financial dilemma in the early eighties. Lovedale was becoming well-known and, partly through Stewart's articles in the Christian Express, popular with several wealthy liberal business men in the Cape. In one week in March, 1881, Stewart received £500 from J.J. Irvine and a munificent gift of £3,000 from D.P. Woods.1 At the same time, his brother-in-law who had been consistently generous to Lovedale over the years, made his first offer of £1000 per annum for ten years to establish a medical mission at Lovedale.2 In other respects, however, Stewart's problems continued. The private correspondence which Macdonald had conducted with the Education Board came to light, Stewart had to dismiss two members of staff for incompetence and the F.M.C. expressed their dissatisfaction with Lovedale's financial statement. Because the troubles with Blythswood remained unresolved, it was agreed that a Deputation would be sent to the Cape to inquire

1. Stewart Diary, 13 March 1881; 21 March 1881; See also Dawn in the Dark Continent for a complete list of Lovedale's major benefactors, p. 194.

2. Stephen to Stewart, 27 March 1881, SP 27A(iii). See section entitled Medical Mission in this chapter.
into the whole subject of the Kaffrarian Mission. The Deputies report was placed before the Committee in November 1881. The recommendations were that the affairs of Blythswood should be separated from Lovedale and that, for the time being, the Headmaster and the local Native Committee should be in direct communication with the F.M.C. It was also proposed that there should be Girls' schools established there and at Pirie, that the industrial departments should be increased, and that a new Institution should be established in Natal. In other words, all that Stewart had fought to prevent, and that the F.M.C. had concurred with, was about to be reversed. Stewart maintained that he did not object to the separation of Blythswood from Lovedale but that had he known such radical changes were in the wind, he would have been more outspoken in his claims for Lovedale.¹

As a consequence of this report, and also of the offer to start a medical mission, Stewart wrote several interesting letters to John Stephen, describing the organisation of Lovedale and the financial claims upon it.

"Lovedale for a missionary institution is a large place. It continues to grow in spite of every effort to limit it, even raising the fees for the fourth time....It begins educationally with the native school, in fact with the ABC, runs on through school education of three years to something like an arts course of three years also and ends with a small class of theology....Industrially it carries one as far as capital will admit. The trades of carpentry, waggon-making, blacksmithing, printing, book-binding and a book stall for the sale chiefly of Kaffir books and also of all English school books required in our own or similar institutions in the frontier of the Colony. There is also a Girls School....a large farm....the periodical monthly.... telegraph office". ²

¹ Stewart to Stephen, 26 December 1881, SP LB4b.
² Stewart to Stephen, 6 March 1882, SP LB4b.
Stewart, in this letter, was trying to persuade Stephen that Lovedale could not at this stage cope with a medical mission. It cost an estimated £10,000 or £12,000 to keep Lovedale each year but where was the money to come from? Fees were increased to £1473 in 1881 and then to £2000 in 1882. The government grant was now about £2,700 per annum. What Lovedale needed, in Stewart's view was a period of consolidation after 10 or 12 years of expansion so that the various demands on the Institution for preachers, or teachers, or carpenters could be met.

"We will go on laying the foundations broad and deep for more and more of this work and as time goes on and those who come after us will be able to carry on what has been begun and the work will be secured and will repay the expenditure by its permanency instead of being as so many stations are, interesting ruins, remains of things that have passed away, fragments of stone reared by creatures of clay." 2

Only in this way would it be possible to fulfil Stewart's over-riding ambition to see Lovedale as a "Native University".

A few months after this was written, it was apparent that Stewart had had time to digest the deputies report and that he had become aware that his plans for Lovedale were not shared by the Home Committee. There followed a series of bitter exchanges, privately between George Smith* and Stewart, but openly in memoranda between Stewart and the Committee. Briefly, Stewart felt betrayed. Not only had the F.M.C. reversed the decision about Blythswood's management which, he said, would be disliked by the Native Committee and by Dr. Dale but they had agreed to a plan for expansion

1. Lovedale Past and Present, p. xii.
2. Stewart to Stephen, 6 March 1882, SP LB4b.
which involved great expense when they could not even fulfill their obligations to the one Institution which was a proven success. Girls schools, industrial departments and a new Institution at Impolweni in Natal, were all very well if funds were available to support these. As it was there did not seem to be the funds to support existing projects, far less to embark on new ones.

"...the Free Church might be content...with two such Institutions as Lovedale and Blythswood, one of them the most notable in the land and before doing anything to still further strain the funds of the mission, it might be well to inquire into the condition and stability of these Institutions and...to bend every effort for a time towards consolidation rather than extension...." 1

Stewart realised that he was in a difficult position, advocating no further extension in missionary work - but was so incensed by the change in direction that he was not prepared to trim his opinions. This was "the old story of missionary management, measuring the work by what they begin not by what they complete." 2

The Home Committee, for their part, had, it would seem, been warned by the Deputies, that there was severe disunity within the Kaffrarian mission and that the management of Blythswood was one area over which differences of opinion became inflamed. Some effort must be made to minimise the authority of Lovedale and to reassert the unity of missionary purpose. Moreover Lovedale Institution absorbed a disproportionate amount of money, (a matter on which other missionaries had keen opinions); perhaps, therefore, it should be curtailed.

1. Stewart to Smith, 26 September 1882, SP LB4.
in its expansion and money from the F.M.C. more evenly distributed. As with the Minutes of 1864 and 1866, more tact might have been shown in the implementation of change. The Deputies could have consulted Stewart (though they presumably feared his opposition); certainly explanations were due about the Committees reverse decision on Blythswood. Stewart claimed that he no longer had their trust and confidence and without these he would be as well to resign. His vehement and lengthy criticisms, however, left the F.M.C. little alternative but to reply to his accusations. Contrary to Stewart's claim, they maintained, he had their full support and admiration but, for example, recent staff failures had been his fault as he had selected the men in question and financial difficulties were chiefly due to poorly-kept accounts which inevitably resulted in over-expenditure. As for the modest proposals for expansion, no funds for these would come from the F.M.C., but would be raised by the Deputies in their appeal to the various Presbyteries. One man gave £300 for the Girl's School at Pirie.¹ There this particular issue rested but, although Stewart could be faulted for his Lovedale bias and his suspicious nature, it was clear that the Home Committee was unwilling to face its responsibilities for this enormous Institution and that they left it to Stewart to "go on from year to year fighting on and looking to God for help."²

One other method appeared to offer the Committee a possible solution to the problems of its Kaffrarian mission.

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 20 March 1883, Cory MS PR 2005(b).
This was Union with other Presbyterian churches in South Africa. From 1883 there was a fairly constant effort to have some form of this Union implemented, with remarkably little success. Again the missionaries were divided on this issue, the Rosses in favour and Stewart opposed. The latter view had most support, however, as the general climate was against separation from close British connections. Imperial fervour was running high and militated against even the church becoming responsible for its local affairs. As these were also years of bad drought and, consequently poor congregational givings, there was a decided dread of too much financial responsibility.\(^1\) At Lovedale, however, proposals were made for a Joint Theological faculty where it was hoped that other denominations, who sent their students to Lovedale, would contribute a member of staff and his salary. This had only limited success as the L.M.S. alone agreed to the terms and appointed T. Durant Philip.

Lovedale continued to wrestle with debt. The Building Fund was £3500 short, of which £1000 was still owed from Blythswood. The Committee agreed to clear this and also asked Stewart to sell the Debe Nek farm in an attempt to make up the deficit. Over the next few months, £500 was raised locally and White of Overtoun gave £1000, which left a total of £1000 still outstanding.\(^2\) Stewart decided to ask for separation from Alice municipality and thereby save tax money.\(^3\) Plans for a medical school were still being

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1. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 2 April 1884, Cory MS 9040.
2. F.M.C. Minutes, 17 July 1883.
3. See Chapter IV.
pressed but the scheme did not materialise until a much later date.

By 1885, economic conditions were desperate. Famine and drought, mortality among cattle and depreciation in the value of wool and livestock, plus increased taxation, all had their effect.¹ With 380 pupils Lovedales revenue from fees in 1885 was £954; with 436 in 1886, the total income from fees was only £620. In 1886, John and Eliza Stephen visited Lovedale. In October he reported to the Committee in Edinburgh that government grants to Lovedale had been reduced by £500, that there was no sale for the Debe Nek farm, that the debt on the Building fund was now £1200 and that other debts of £2050 brought the total to £3250. There was an immediate attack on Lovedale in Committee, led by Melville who had been one of the Deputies in 1881. He thought highly of Lovedale, he said, but it was a "sink for money". Stephen accused him in turn of having raised £10,000 in 1882 for "new objects that were not wanted". Stephen then undertook to raise £2050, if the Committee would clear the £1200. "They must see and grant you the necessary relief". Reluctantly, the Committee decided not to give but to lend the money at 1% (which would save 7%), using the Debe Nek farm as security.²

This was only an interim measure, however. Bad economic conditions continued and the Committee gave £150 to compensate for loss in government grants in 1887. The

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1. Weir to Smith, 5 March 1886, NLS 7797.
2. F.M.C. Minutes, 19 October 1886. Also Stephen to Stewart, 20 October 1886, ST 13/3/1.
dispute between Alice and Lovedale was resolved but at considerable cost to Lovedale of £497, the Committee again paying £250 towards that. J.J. Irvine, one of Lovedale's benefactors died in 1887, and under his will, money was bequeathed to Lovedale, though not as much as Stewart had hoped. Dr. Lindsay, Convener of the F.M.C., wrote to Stewart:

"My great difficulty in regard to Lovedale is its magnitude. This is a difficulty that of course is to the credit of the Lovedale missionaries - of yourself in particular - but what's to your credit is none the less our difficulty i.e. money a drop in the bucket...."

1889 witnessed considerable improvement. The Debe Nek farm was sold and the Irvine money was being paid over. The harvest was good and fees in 1889 increased to £1667 from £1081 in the previous year (with respectively 534 and 498 pupils); in 1890 this figure rose to £2014 but with 740 pupils.

"Results of this year are exceedingly satisfactory. No year in the past approaches it for fulness of results all round - largest numbers, largest fees, largest number of certificates of all kinds, 49 in all, more communicants, more candidates."

The Nineties

This favourable ending to a difficult decade made it possible for Stewart to leave Lovedale in 1890 actually free of debt. Stewart had been asked by Sir William McKinnon and A.L. Bruce to establish a mission in East Africa,

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 19 April 1887.
2. Lindsay to Stewart, 25 March 1887, NLS 7772.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 10 May 1889, PC.
4. Stewart Diary, 16 December 1889.
financed by the British East Africa Company. Stewart had made a private resolution that, before he undertook this mission, he would leave Lovedale's finances in good order, preferably with a small surplus. He knew that the Committees feeling was that the finance of Lovedale was "a hopeless slough which swallows up every successive amount of help that is sent - and is never apparently any better." In a letter to his wife he described his efforts to leave things in good order.

"There will be no debts except those of the current month or quarter....All salaries due for the past quarter and those payable at the beginning of this will be paid. Of the £1200 loan granted a short time ago to the Building Fund by the F.M.C., £1000 has already been paid....With all the debts on the General Account paid up to the present month and week ....I shall in addition be able to hand over a clear balance of at least £500 to Mr. Moir to carry him on for the next 6 weeks, while there are still many accounts due to the Institution to come in and the govt. grant is 6 or 8 weeks from now."

His object in all this had been threefold. First, to prevent the Committee from saying that he had gone to East Africa and left the place in debt. Second, to deal fairly with those who were carrying on at Lovedale in his absence. Thirdly, to free himself from any responsibility for debt if, and when, he should return. "Twice over I have come back to Lovedale only to be saddled with a debt enormous each time.... This will not happen again."  

Apart from a six-week visit in September 1892, Stewart was absent from Lovedale from May 1890 until December 1894, almost five years. In 1890 he had raised money in Scotland

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 17 April 1890, PC.
for the Building Fund\(^1\) and on his return to South Africa in 1892, Cecil Rhodes had given him £250 for the same purpose.\(^2\) From past experience, however, it was unreasonably optimistic to expect that Lovedale would remain free of debt for that period of time and, indeed, by April 1894 a "serious deficit" in the General Account was reported by Stewart to the F.M.C. The Committee authorised a grant of £1200, with the proviso that no money should be expended on new undertakings without absolute necessity. This was sent to the Education Board as Stewart was still in Scotland.\(^3\)

In 1895 it was noted that Stewart had left Lovedale in 1890 with a balance of £600 and that the total deficit of £3,801.3.7. had been incurred in his absence. Lindsay sent his sympathy to Stewart that "you should have to face again a state of matters caused largely by the faults of others."\(^4\) By 1896, however, the debt had been reduced to £1615.10.11, mainly by Stewart's own efforts. The Committee, thanking him for his clear accounts, were sure now that the deficits were caused by the working of the farm, by the continual expansion of Lovedale and by their own insufficient annual grant. By a process of retrenchment the deficit was reduced by £1000 in 1897 to £615.10.11, but a cut in government grants in this year actually increased expenditure.\(^5\)

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1. Overtoun to Stewart, 4 March 1891, ST 13/3/3.
2. Stewart Diary, 17 August 1892, See also Dawn in the Dark Continent, p. 194.
3. F.M.C. Minutes, 17 April 1894.
4. Lindsay to Stewart, 21 June 1895, SP 18.
5. F.M.C. Minutes, 17 March 1896; 16 March 1897.
Despite the "care and control" shown in the accounts, Dr. Muir's new educational measures upset Lovedale's very shaky balance. These measures included an attempt to prevent Europeans from sitting the same elementary teaching examinations as Africans. The result was that there was a considerable drop in European students at Lovedale and a consequent loss of revenue. Stewart stated that when he left in 1890 the income from European boarders was £1067 and that by 1897 it was nil.\(^1\) To add to these problems there was a severe outbreak of rinderpest in the Colony in 1897 which, in the following years, had the usual effect on fees, as well as the effect on political and social life which will be discussed in a later chapter.\(^2\) Stewart's willingness to do as the Committee asked and to cut back expenditure would appear to have been wasted effort.

"I am sorry that I ever left home in 1890 and I look back to these wasted years. I see no reason why I should carry a burden of debt to the last days of my life, merely to make a splendid inheritance for the man who comes after me...."\(^3\)

The observable difference in this decade was that Stewart once more enjoyed the confidence and approval of the Committee. Their sympathies were with him in matters of finance and in his general management of Lovedale which had been criticised by some members of staff.

"The Committee place on record their admiration of the way in which Dr. Stewart has set himself to overcome...difficulties. The full confidence they have in the well-tried experience of Dr. Stewart

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1. Stewart to Lindsay, 3 December 1897, SP LB4. Lovedale continued to have European pupils though the number dropped.

2. See Chapter IV.

3. Stewart to Lindsay, 3 December 1897, SP LB4.
warrants them in expressing their cordial approval of the measures which he proposes to take and the changes which he is making in the administration of certain departments of the work at Lovedale...."

In 1898, Stewart had the satisfaction of receiving £6000 for bursaries from a bequest by the late Andrew Smith, former Lovedale teacher, and of seeing the opening of the new Victoria Hospital. The grant was again raised in 1900 but, with such large commitments, there was no prospect of a dramatic improvement in Lovedale's finances without radical measures.

Summary

It is against a background of thirty years of unremitting and unrewarding financial struggle, the inevitable debts, the appeals to friends (which Stewart did not relish), the fluctuating fees and grants and the meagre interest and sympathy of the Committee, that one must study Stewart's achievement. In 1896 there were 889 African pupils at Lovedale, representing more than fourteen tribes and more than seven denominations. These are remarkable statistics for an educational establishment in South Africa in the 19th Century. The curriculum covered was extensive and varied, offering academic as well as non-academic courses. The provision and maintenance of facilities to house and teach such numbers of pupils could not be done on a small budget, yet that was what Stewart was expected to do. Lovedale was built on the sand of inadequate capital and for this the Church in Scotland must be held chiefly responsible as it was

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 15 January 1898.
at their recommendation that Lovedale expanded in the seventies, necessitating expenditure and investment for the future. Yet it is easy to see that the amount of money absorbed by Lovedale was resented by other missionaries, struggling with small salaries and resources and that, desirably, some balance should be sought so that harmony could prevail. The peculiar personal differences in the Kaffrarian mission aggravated these resentments. There was also an uneasy balance between the missionaries' independence of action and the interference of the Home Committee which resulted in indecisiveness on the part of the latter until it was too late. Finally, there was no scope for direct African interest in Lovedale management; there were no Africans on the teaching staff and never more than two on the Board.\(^1\) Fees, of course, were a major source of revenue but Africans showed little willingness to contribute to Lovedale's finances in any other respect.

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1. Elijah Makiwane did teach at Lovedale for a short time in the late 1870's. Africans were employed as assistant instructors in some Industrial Departments.
CHAPTER III

EDUCATIONAL POLICY

As has been suggested, until the late 1860's, the Kaffrarian mission remained a small concern. Although educational and evangelical functions were distinct, the mission operated as a unity in its internal affairs and in its relation with the Foreign Mission Committee of the Church. The Presbytery, consisting of European missionaries and African elders, controlled both the working of Lovedale and the development and growth of mission stations in the field. Moreover, as was indicated above and as will be shown in greater detail later, educational policy at Lovedale was motivated by definitely assimilationist principles and concentrated deliberately on the production of an African elite. After 1867, there was a definite change in policy with regard to the organisation of the Mission as a whole and with respect to the education provided at the Institution. First, the control of the educational and evangelical activities of the mission was vested in different authorities, a differentiation of function which resulted in growth but also produced friction. Secondly, an educational policy was adopted which was definitely opposed to the policy pursued by Govan in the first 30 years of the Institution's life and which was so strongly considered by him to be wrong that he resigned. These developments both had their origin in the visit paid to the Kaffrarian mission by Dr. Alexander Duff* in 1864 and both were implemented by James Stewart after his acceptance of a post at Lovedale in 1867. The controversy
between Stewart and Govan offers a dramatic illustration of the question of assimilation or conversion versus Christian paternalism or trusteeship and also forms the background to Stewart's thirty years of educational work in the Cape.

a. The Seventies and Eighties

Duff, Govan and Stewart

On his return journey to Scotland from Central Africa in 1863, Stewart visited the Free Church stations in Kaffraria at the request of the Foreign Mission Committee.¹ His visit, in the winter months of July and August, was comparatively brief, however he managed to meet not only missionaries and government agents but also chiefs and people, including the great Sarili, Paramount of the Ngqikas. Stewart himself made a favourable impression on the personnel of Lovedale. Stewart's visit to Kaffraria was followed, almost immediately, by that of a more distinguished churchman, Dr. Alexander Duff. Duff was returning to Scotland, on the grounds of ill-health, after 34 years missionary service in India. During that time he had taken a leading part in the development of an educational policy for India and had tried to implement his personal plan

"...to use Christian education, carried eventually to the highest level and given through the medium of English as the great instrument of assault upon Hinduism...." ²

On the announcement of his retiral from India Duff had been offered the post of Convener of the Foreign Mission Committee

¹. F.M.C. Minutes, 18 March 1862.
of the Free Church of Scotland and for the next 14 years, until his death in 1878, he used this influential position to enforce a policy born of his personal experience in Calcutta.

Duff's visit to the Kaffrarian mission at this time was therefore of immense significance.

"The experience he gained in this short tour was invaluable to him as responsible head henceforth of the Missions of the Free Church and his policy of extending the work of the mission in Africa was largely based on what he saw on this tour." 1

Duff, aged 57, with years of experience and authority behind him, had several well-developed theories about missionary practice and particularly about educational policy which he was now determined to disseminate throughout the Church's mission fields. He had fought a long hard battle in India for the recognition of English as the medium for higher education. With Macaulay he believed that

"what the Greek and Latin were to the contemporaries of More and Ascham, our tongue is to the people of India..." 2

This did not mean that he had a repressive attitude to the vernacular. On the contrary, such languages were incorporated into his system but it excited him to feel that

"an Indian lingua franca has made possible a common Indian consciousness and that consciousness has been filled with the great thoughts of the political pioneers of the West".

His insistence on the sacredness of all truth, besides giving him a fundamental tolerance for fresh studies in the

1. Paton, op.cit., p. 179.
2. Paton, op.cit., p. 98.
classroom, meant that he regarded education as the heart of the missionaries' purpose. Christianity was the centre of all truth,

"the explanation of the scattered fragments of the world's learning, the key to all mysteries, the consummation of all knowledge..." 1

therefore the Bible was diligently taught, not as a missionary afterthought, but as an integral part of the school's curriculum. In his speech to the General Assembly of 1835 Duff insisted that to spread Western education divorced from religion of any kind was

"purely destructive in its efforts and must necessarily produce a generation of educated men in whom the foundations of good life have been destroyed..." 2

Piety without learning resulted in fanaticism, learning without piety produced frigid indifference. The ideal educational system, therefore, would impose a strict intellectual discipline but at the same time make earnest appeals to the heart and conscience. It was these presuppositions which formed the basis of Duff's report on the Kaffrarian mission and, more especially on the Lovedale Seminary and it was with these methods as his yardstick that he planned radical changes in Kaffraria.

Stewart's report, which was printed as a series of articles in the Free Church Monthly Record and was submitted before Duff arrived in Scotland, dealt with the details of his inspection of the Mission and made practical recommendations. His criticisms were aimed largely at the lack of

funds for Kaffraria and the fact that so few missionaries had been home on furlough that there was a tendency to feel themselves forgotten. He considered that the quality of education at Lovedale was excellent but that its influence amongst the natives was limited. Progress was too slow but the remedy for that, in Stewart's view, was to inject more money into the system.

"On the present system the progress of the Institution must be exceedingly slow. It receives no grants...it draws only three very small salaries...On this meagre financial diet it cannot show signs of lusty strength ....To set matters in an efficient state, some labour, some investigation of the whole subject connected with the chances of success educationally and a very small additional expenditure would be necessary...." 1

Duff's report2 was obviously more far-reaching than this and aimed at a radical change of course at Lovedale. His opinion with respect to the Seminary was simply that it was not a missionary Institution. It was a colonial school like any other colonial school, working towards the same general ends. Lovedale offered a classical education of a high standard to an almost equal number of Europeans and Africans with the emphasis on Latin, Greek and Mathematics, the teaching of English taking a secondary place. Duff's experiences in India had convinced him that an ordinary secular education with the addition of a period of Biblical instruction was not Christian education; if 'Christianity was the centre of all truth', this truth should pervade all instruction. He was committed to making use of higher education as a missionary instrument and determined that that

1. Free Church of Scotland Monthly Record, September 1864.  
2. I have been unable to trace this report.
higher education should be given through the medium of English. His visit to Lovedale had convinced him that the Institutions present course must be halted immediately and re-set as soon as possible along more missionary lines.

Duff and Stewart had never met. They did so in August 1864 and thereafter developed an affectionate relationship and an influential collaboration. Duff realised that a committed agent in Kaffraria was essential to the implementation of his reforms and it was with this in mind that he set out to convince Stewart that he should accept a call to missionary service in the Free Church. The Committee accepted Duff's judgement on the Kaffrarian mission and supported his approach to Stewart.

"...having heard Dr. Duff's explanation of the present position and prospects of the Kaffrarian mission, the Committee requested Dr. Duff to take up the matter, to correspond with Mr. Stewart and to submit to the Committee any resolution in the subject which he would propose for their adoption and authorised the Convener to make Mr. Stewart aware of their willingness to send him out..." 1

Stewart, on his own admission, had not, until he met Duff, been aware of any urgent need to restructure Lovedale's educational policy. It is open to doubt whether Stewart ever accepted Duff's philosophy wholeheartedly, but he was obviously persuaded by Duff that changes at Lovedale were necessary and that he could carry them out.

"All the brethren there know you, respect you, love you and trust you. You could, therefore, hopefully under God, carry out all the reforms which occupied our mutual concourse and which I doubt not the Committee here would back with all the weight of its authority." 2

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 9 August 1864.
2. Duff to Stewart, 15 October 1864, ST 13/3/1.
Years later Stewart wrote to Duff from Lovedale,

"When you returned from Africa in 1864, after seeing you I discovered that I had formed too favourable an opinion of the state of matters here. Your experience put me right. On the offer of the Committee I was willing to come to Lovedale for a few years to see if the mission could not be reformed - I have no other word - and all the papers sent home justify that word." 1

Meanwhile, William Govan and other missionaries in Kaffraria, who had seen in Stewart a potential colleague, wrote to him constantly, leaving him in no doubt that there was a place for him in the Seminary whenever he wanted it. Unaware of Duff's schemes for the Mission, they sought to attract Stewart to Lovedale, thereby adding their pleas to Duff's persuasive voice.

"You must be aware," wrote Govan, "that it is from the Colony that the influence is to go forth that is to Christianize and civilise South Africa. And I venture to think that here in the Colony and the Lovedale Seminary there is a reasonable prospect that you may exert an influence as potent and as extensive as you could do in any position in which you could be placed." 2

Stewart's initial resistance to these entreaties stemmed from his hankering after Central Africa as the area for his endeavours. Genuine motive, coupled with the need to redeem his previous failure, 3 prompted Stewart's thinking on this matter for the next decade. A return journey to the Zambezi in 1864 was dependent on two things; first the encouragement of David Livingstone and second the co-operation and support of the Free Church. In search of the former, Stewart made an attempt to re-establish 1. Stewart to Duff, 19 February 1869, ST 13/3/1.
2. Govan to Stewart, 14 March 1864, SP 23(iv).
himself with Livingstone and to remove some of the sources of disaffection between them but it soon became clear that Livingstone would not entertain the idea of a journey based on the pattern of the Zambezi expedition of 1858-1863.\textsuperscript{1}

Convinced, finally, of Livingstone's negative attitude and assured that the Free Church would not countenance a return to Central Africa, Stewart succumbed to pressure and in December 1864 accepted the invitation of the Free Church to go to Lovedale.

His acceptance of the post was by no means unconditional. As both Govan and Duff were anxious to secure his services, Stewart was in a position to negotiate terms of contract. Govan had offered to give up part of his salary (he had private means and no children) but Stewart felt that this was unsatisfactory and that the F.M.C. should be responsible for his salary. He informed Duff that whereas he was quite willing to work he did not care for the thought of being 'pinched on every hand for the most ordinary means of living'. He had no private means, nor any expectation of any, and he frankly 'dreaded the thought of £175 per annum for life..."\textsuperscript{2}

This petition, coupled with Govan's strong claim for an all-round increase in salaries, resulted in all ordained missionaries in Kaffraria securing an increase of £25 per annum. Typically, Duff urged Stewart to accept the call to Lovedale before the Committee raised the salaries as "it would look better".\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Livingstone to Stewart, 7 October 1864, ST 1/1.
\textsuperscript{2} Stewart to Duff, 18 August 1864, ST 13/3/1.
\textsuperscript{3} Duff to Stewart, 19 October 1864, ST 13/3/1.
Despite these concessions, Stewart had definite reservations about the suitability of the job itself, and privately resolved to put a time limit of four years on his stay at Lovedale.\(^1\) He delayed his departure from Scotland for 18 months while he completed his medical degree with the firm intention of becoming better equipped for the lesser-known regions of Africa. On November 1, 1866, he married Mina Stephen and on December 7, they sailed for Cape Town, accompanied by Miss Jane Waterston, appointed to the charge of the newly-formed Female Seminary at Lovedale.\(^2\)

Two factors should be noted. First, for Stewart the decision to go to Lovedale was a choice of second-best. There can be no doubt that he would have preferred to go to Central Africa to pioneer, to explore rather than to join an established mission. Second, he went under Duff's aegis, to give effect to Duff's plan and, with the authority of the Foreign Mission Committee, to enforce certain reforms which Duff, at least, must have known would meet with profound opposition from the missionary personnel at that time in Kaffraria.

**Duff's Reforms and their consequences**

As has been seen, in Duff's view, Lovedale, though by no means exclusively academic, concentrated its energies on producing a secular standard of excellence which, so far as the Africans were concerned, could only mean that the spread

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1. Stewart to Duff, 19 February 1869, ST 13/3/1.
2. Langham Dale to Stewart, 17 February 1864. The Government was prepared to give £50 towards the support of a female teacher.
of Christianity and the civilising influence of European culture and thought would take generations to penetrate far beyond the boundaries of the Seminary. The keystone of his projected educational reforms was that English should be regarded as the sole classic language of the Seminary because the "teaching of Latin and Greek, especially in the case of natives, seems unnecessary". This was the challenge to the assimilationist claim that Latin and Greek were essential 'in the case of natives', because Africans and Europeans must have the same education to equip them for the same society. Formal expression was given to these and other recommendations in the Minutes of the F.M.C. dated 18 October 1864 and 27 October 1866. (See Appendix A). Copies of these Minutes were given to Stewart prior to his departure for South Africa. The contents of the earlier Minute had already been communicated to Kaffraria but it had been decided to take no formal action until Stewart arrived to convey the wishes of the Committee in person.

The Minute of October 18, 1864.

The first Minute, although primarily ecclesiastical in content was, nevertheless, fundamental to the re-ordering of the general policy of the Mission and of the administration of the Seminary itself. The Presbytery of Kaffraria had been in existence since 1824 and its members had been largely responsible for the establishment of the Seminary in 1841. A small Presbytery of strong-willed active men, operating at a distance from the care and concern of the F.M.C., it had wielded considerable influence in its own sphere of mission,
particularly with regard to the direction of the Seminary. Duff, whose visit to Kaffraria was the first sign of official interest in the Mission, was quick to observe the unusual extent of the Presbytery's influence. The Minute therefore, specifically stated that because much difficulty and confusion arose from the fact that all matters connected with the management of the Mission devolved on the Presbytery, the Presbytery must henceforth "restrict itself to the proper function of a Presbytery". To ensure the break-up of this Presbyterial monopoly, a Mission Council, a Finance Board and an Education Board were established to be responsible for these several functions.¹ This move was not welcomed by the Presbytery in 1867 but, because they were more conscious of the threat in the second Minute, this first was given effect without delay at the Presbytery meeting of 24 January 1867.

The Minute of 27 October 1866

The stumbling block in this second injunction of the F.M.C. was undoubtedly clause 2 and as early as January 1867 the Presbytery of Kaffraria minuted the following resolution:

"Presbytery having as recommended in Minute 7.10.66 no. 2, fully reconsidered the subject of the curriculum to be taught in the Seminary, came to the conclusion that the Latin and Greek classes should continue to be taught in that Institution but that English as a classic shall henceforth be taught to a greater extent than hitherto it has been possible to teach it". ²

¹. See Chapter II.
². Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 24 January 1867, Cory MS 9040.
This tactful statement scarcely reflected the intensity of feeling aroused by the Committee's suggestion that Latin and Greek should become secondary subjects. It was merely the first salvo in a battle to defend the educational system of Lovedale, its motive and its intention. Govan asserted that if the system of education was framed so as to attract European students it was so done in the interests of the Africans. He was convinced that this method could only result in the "elevation of the Natives...and the... establishment of Christianity among them."¹

In 1868, on instruction from the Committee, both Govan and Stewart drew up papers which re-appraised the curriculum at Lovedale. Govan's attitude was clear.

"It is desirable", he wrote, "that Natives should be enabled to take their place alongside Europeans not only in the office of the ministry, but also in the various positions in society, secular as well as ecclesiastical".

He maintained that education was the only way in which Africans could overcome their social disadvantages; the education offered, therefore, must be the same as that pursued by Europeans so that they could prepare for the same examinations. For this reason he believed that the higher education of a few was "of even more importance than the elementary education of the many".² Govan's resolute adherence to those ideas did not lessen under pressure from Duff. He was a true exponent of the 'principle of conversion', a missionary of the old school, and could not

¹. Govan to Stewart, 7 January 1871, SP 23(iv).
². Shepherd, op.cit., p. 156.
agree 'to carry out this principle of working'. Govan and Stewart had no quarrel as to the organisation and structure of the Seminary but they disagreed strongly on the motives behind African education and the principles upon which such education was based.

Where Govan aimed to train an African élite who could compete on equal terms with Europeans in any sphere of life, Stewart, in accordance with the wishes of the Committee, aimed to provide instruction specially tailored to African needs, with the particular object of producing African teachers and preachers. This did not imply that there was to be no other form of training. On the contrary, anybody would be welcome, African or European, but they would have to accept the prime object of the schools curriculum and be prepared to work within it. In avoiding a specifically classical education, Stewart admitted that much would be lost that would be generally useful or even desirable but claimed that the needs of heathen Africa were such that missionaries would have to concentrate their efforts.

"The difficulty of regulating our course, by that prescribed for the Government examinations is simply that it takes us too far out of our way for our special purpose. For example, a much larger amount of attention must be given to the study of three languages - Latin, Greek and some modern language, French, German or Dutch - than we can well spare, or than is at all necessary for these native lads. We have enough to do to make them masters of one language and that by far the most important and useful of them, namely English, without adding the other three."

The Committee in Scotland discussed and debated these

1. Govan to Stewart, 7 July 1869, SP 23 (iv).
papers for several months. Duff as Convener gave his personal résumé of the documents and in his summary made it clear which viewpoint he favoured. He observed that Govan had stated the ultimate object of the Institution to be 'the evangelisation of the Kaffir race' and as they and the Europeans were so intermingled in society it was essential that they should be placed 'on an equal footing' in the matter of education. The result of this, in Duff's words, was that

"Mr. Govan's policy is to conform the Seminary to the Colonial system of education, implying as this does, the teaching of Latin and Greek to Kaffir youth, while at the same time they know comparatively little of English and that as Colonists are mainly desirous that their children should receive a good European education with the view of passing the Govt exams for civil and official appointments, the result is that the Seminary has hitherto been little more than a secular Grammar school and the Christian missionary element in it has not had the prominence which ought to be looked for in a Missionary Institution".

Stewart, on the other hand, declared Duff, would accommodate the system to the "wants of the Kaffirs", leaving it open to the children of colonists to take advantage of it if they so wished. Duff was forced to admit, however, that Stewart's modus operandi did not seem calculated sufficiently to produce the result aimed at, and indeed there was doubt about whether or not it differed essentially from the policy pursued by Mr. Govan. Duff suggested, therefore, that the Cape government should be asked to take the initiative and introduce a system to the Cape similar to that which he, Duff, had been instrumental in securing for India.

"The Convener is of the opinion that the Missionary Institution in India in which a systematic course of Christian instruction is uninterruptedy carried
on from the first, simultaneously with the ordinary branches of a superior education in English and the Vernacular form the best model for the Lovedale Seminary and he suggested the extreme desirableness of memorializing the Cape government for the introduction of a similar system for the Kaffir population to that which prevailed in India." 1

In other words, he was proposing that the Cape Colonial government should introduce a two-tier system of education which regarded Latin and Greek as the classical languages upon which European youths would be examined, while English would be regarded as the classical language for African students. Duff's educational proposals would appear to have depended, to an alarming extent, on the complete reorganisation of Cape education.

Under the incontrovertible influence of Dr. Duff, the Committee recorded its approval of the policy indicated by Dr. Stewart, claiming that they had no doubt that the "alterations" they had sanctioned would increase the efficiency of the Institution as a missionary and educational establishment and would, moreover, ultimately put Lovedale on the "same level with the Indian Institutions of the Church".2

The arrival of the formal Minute expressing this decision of the Committee in favour of Stewart's policy put the Kaffrarian mission in an uproar. Govan declared that he was being asked to guide the Seminary in an unacceptable direction. He was prepared to resign rather than see his principles compromised. The other missionaries gave unanimous support to this view and, in addition, expressed their

1. F.M.C. Minutes, 19 January 1869.
2. Many of the members of the Africa sub-Committee were obsessed by India - using their experience there as a basis for African mission policy, with unfortunate consequences.
resentment at the charge that the Institution had been run as a "common school" and not as a missionary establishment. They tried, without success, to prove that the changes would not only contravene the original intentions of the Directors of the Glasgow Missionary Society but that they would disqualify the Seminary from further claims to government grants. Stewart alone was left to justify the Committee's decision in the face of outrage, antagonism and personal abuse. Extreme positions were adopted by both sides and animosity grew. Divisions arose which affected the Mission in Kaffraria and split the Home Committee. Every major issue that confronted the Mission in the 35 years of Stewart's Principalship of the Seminary was coloured by this personal hostility.

In the meeting of the Education Board at which he tendered his resignation, Govan declared that he regarded the decision of the Committee as putting an extinguisher on the efforts he had made for the last twenty years to "place Africans on an equality with Europeans" and forecast that the decision would close the doors of European churches against Africans since they would be receiving a different and lower education. The controversy was, at first, confined to the missionaries but the debate did not cease and a decade later educated Africans, especially those educated under the original system, repeated Govan's arguments and accused Stewart and Lovedale of offering a down-graded, colour-conscious education.

1. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 6 October 1869, Cory MS 9040.
2. Stewart to Duff, 11 May 1869, ST 13/3/1.
Background

This matter has been described in some detail because it is illuminating and instructive both as an event and as part of the continuing debate on the content and purpose of African education. It was not an isolated event. In other parts of Africa, different approaches to African education were being discussed and implemented. After 1870, departures from the assimilationist policies of the early 19th Century definitely accelerated. The shift in emphasis from identity to differentiation, from assimilation to trusteeship, had begun in West Africa where in the 1840's complaints had been levelled against the policy of educational assimilation. The question immediately posed is why did this change in attitude occur? There is obviously no simple answer to this but it is possible to isolate certain motivating factors which then provide a framework for the change in attitude. "New trends in Western thought brought new emphases".1 These trends which affected policy in West Africa, also came to influence policy in the Cape.

1) For example, the general background of increased cultural chauvinism and the increased desire for British intervention was common to both parts of the Continent. Stewart was certainly conscious of a superior civilisation which he had to bestow on Africans. The British, he declared, have been "the greatest and most successful colonizers the world has ever seen, since the days of Imperial Rome"2 and although Stewart strongly believed that

2. The Christian Express, October 1880.
such superiority brought certain duties and responsibilities, the mere assumption of superiority and privilege automatically characterized the African as inferior, to a greater or lesser degree.

2) The question of direct British intervention became increasingly important in the Cape after 1865. In that year the Cape took over British Kaffraria, the first African chiefdom to be annexed to the Colony and brought under its government. This process of territorial annexation was completed in 1894 when the Mpondo chiefdom was taken over. In 1872 the Cape was granted Responsible government and, in accordance with its policy of delegating responsibility to self-governing colonies, Britain handed over the Sotho kingdom which she had annexed in 1869. The inability of the Cape to manage those African chiefdoms encouraged missionaries and others to plead with Britain to recognise her trusteeship obligations in those areas and to administer them directly. As the political situation of Africans worsened, there was even an appeal to Britain to rescind Responsible Government on the grounds that the Cape was refusing to act responsibly towards its African dependents.

3) In the Cape, the new peaceful conditions were interpreted by missionaries and humanitarians as offering increased opportunities for the education, civilisation and conversion of Africans. Although, however, there was no intention of denying those benefits to Africans nor their rights to land, to political status and to justice before the law, as defeated people, in the face of the might and achievements of the British Empire, they appeared to have lost the right to be accorded equality as a race. Guided
by the New Testament most missionaries recognised the spiritual equality of all men but the fruits of such a spirit, they maintained, must be evidenced in good works, progress, loyalty and modesty. In the arrogance of their judgement, missionaries, not surprisingly began to resent the claim of Africans to be "as good as" Europeans and found themselves drawn, therefore, into a hostile position based on race. The ambivalence and inconsistency of missionary witness resulted in their being used as whipping boys by both black and white in the Cape.

4) Finally, the transference from identity to differentiation in policy was undoubtedly quickened in the Cape by the discovery of diamonds and the consequent transformation of the economy. Mining towns, seaports and other industrial centres required labour and Africans were inevitably cast in the role of an urban proletariat. The demand for labour meant a demand for a certain type of basic education and considerable pressure from Europeans to prevent too many Africans from being educated out of the labour force altogether.

The Classical Debate

It is evident that the subtle and gradual change in the assumptions underlying educational policy was accelerated by the shifts which occurred in British attitudes to their territorial acquisitions and to the people who inhabited these regions. In this context, it is vital to recognise that the debate about classical or literary education cannot, in South Africa, be seen simply in terms of the relative merits
of a classical as opposed to a modern education, but must be understood in terms of an attitude towards Africans themselves, their education and their future place in Cape society.

The arguments of both Duff and Stewart in support of the content of education were eminently reasonable. Neither had any overt intention of debasing the education offered at Lovedale to Africans and, in this respect, both thought they were acting in the best interests of the students. Duff, for instance, genuinely subscribed to the opinion that a purely secular education was unbalanced and that a good general education and sound Christian instruction should go hand in hand.

"The problem that is set before our missionaries employed in the Institution for daily solution is how to give a secular education to their pupils as shall enable them to compete on favourable terms with their rivals and at the same time so to pervade that education with the spirit of the Gospel and so to superadd to it a large amount of religious instruction and so to try to bear upon the hearts of the students a strong influence of evangelical earnestness as that, by God's grace, many of them may be converted." 1

It was Duff's conviction that it was impossible either to drop out of competition with secular education or to diminish the prominence of the religious and evangelistic elements. Somehow a balance must be maintained between the two.

Where Duff was at fault was in his method of implementing change which was both underhand and dishonest, and in his insistence on an immediate radical alteration which

1. Duff's report to the General Assembly, 1869, p. 39.
was clearly unpalatable to the missionaries and to the government. Langham Dale, Superintendent of Cape Education, to whom Stewart showed the documents and the decision of the Committee, displayed sympathy with the problem. He agreed with Duff that Lovedale was not "just another colonial school" and that it should, as a missionary Institution, "pay special regard to missionary objects". Nevertheless, Duff's proposal of a two-tier system which established English as the classical language for the Xhosa-speaking was plainly not acceptable. Not only was Duff naive in thinking that such a change would be easily introduced but he was sufficiently set on having his own way to offer no alternative when the modus operandi failed. Dale underlined the consequences of this when he expressed his "regret" that Lovedale had been set on an independent course, "different from the system present in the Colony".¹ Duff's major fault was to remove Lovedale, at one stroke, from the mainstream of education in the Cape. He in fact anticipated by many years the Cape governments own decision to separate African from European education.

Stewart, who paid lip-service to Duff's ideas on missionary education, was more strongly influenced by utilitarian arguments. Education should be shaped to meet the requirements of the individual or the community. His stated aim was to give "a scientific and practical education - to combine instruction with the power to apply it".² He could not see the point of teaching Latin and Greek to "Native

¹ Stewart to Duff, 26 April 1869, ST 13/3/1.
² Kaffir Express, January 1871.
lads...many of whom were likely to be grooms and day labourers". He argued vehemently, and consistently throughout his career, that a classical education could be "useless and hurtful" instead of conveying the anticipated benefits. Moreover, it was, in Stewart's opinion, essential to educate the many, not to concentrate on the few.

"We are not here to nurse a few exotic plants or produce a few prodigies of Christian civilisation while the mass of the people are left in their ignorance."  

It was only by educating the many that the few who would take full advantage of higher education would be discovered.

Stewart could also reasonably claim that the issue at Lovedale was, in part, a reflection of the controversy within English education as a whole as by 1870 there were indications of a change in approach to education along the lines suggested. In those years the conception of a liberal education became greatly modified. A general education with a classical core was to be gradually replaced by a general education which gave equal weight to arts and sciences and in which an attempt was made to break down the antithesis between the two cultures. The logical outcome of this was that English studies would replace classical as the mainspring of the curriculum. The hostility with which the old missionaries greeted the changes at Lovedale would, as Stewart suggested, have been echoed in many a school in Britain where classicalism was firmly rooted. Again Langham Dale was prepared to concede that in the

struggle between science and language to be accepted as the "staple of education", the former, in time, would win. Nevertheless he pointed out that South Africa was firmly bound by the "conservative system" followed at Oxford and Cambridge because their aim was to prepare young men for "going Home". They would therefore have to adhere to that system until "the Universities begin to move".

Together Stewart and Duff clearly felt that in opposing these educational changes the missionaries were flying in the face of reason and common sense. Lovedale was a missionary Institution, under obligation to concentrate its attention on Africans. Europeans would not be discouraged but the primary function of Lovedale was missionary education of Africans and policy must be directed to that end. The Free Church public, commented Stewart acidly,

"did not care a straw about the education of colonial boys....they neither collected nor expended money for that purpose..."

1. Stewart to Duff, 23 June 1869, ST 13/3/1.

This being the case, their reason for introducing a different curriculum was simply that the learning of Latin and Greek imposed an unnecessary burden on Africans who had neither the time nor the inclination to go beyond a certain standard. Such students should concentrate on the acquisition of knowledge or skills which would enable them to make a valuable contribution to African society. They did not deny the importance of higher education, nor did they intend to lower the standard of the training for the ministry but there...
was a "diversity of gifts" which must be utilised for the evangelisation of the community. The Institution, therefore, required to be more broadly based and to have a wider appeal.

In every society education is potentially a political and ideological tool. In a stratified society like South Africa, this potential is fully exploited and education is used to suppress, to separate or to confirm superiority. Edgar Brookes in his book *The History of Native Policy in South Africa*, developed the theme that the three possible emphases in political and social policy towards Africans are identity, subordination or differentiation and that these three approaches have constantly jostled with one another for dominance. There were few areas, as Brookes observed, where the three lines of policy were "brought out in as sharp relief as in the sphere of education".\(^1\) The arguments turned on the content of the curriculum but in fact they aimed at controlling the distribution or redistribution of power in the society.

An institution such as Lovedale whose aim was to educate Africans to a comparatively high standard and whose achievements in the 19th Century could compare favourably with those of any school in the Cape, was naturally an object of interest, a target for criticism and, for some the embodiment of an ideal. There was a complex pattern of response from the Europeans in the Cape, mirrored in newspaper articles

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in the national press and the provincial papers, many of whom took a keen interest in the annual Lovedale reports, regarding this as an opportunity for printing their own views on educational policy. In 1870, Stewart began the *Kaffir Express*, a journal which was primarily intended to be an educational visual aid but which also provided the editor with a platform from which to counter his opponents and acknowledge his friends. There was a Xhosa-language edition of this paper, *Isigidimi Sama-Xhosa*, which carried its own articles as well as a resumé of those in the English-language section. Later, in 1884, the first independent African newspaper, *Imvo Zabantzundu*, entered the lists and, from its own standpoint, challenged Lovedale and its Principal, particularly on issues of politics and education. This network of newspapers provided an interesting commentary on Lovedale, besides illustrating the response of Europeans and Africans to the educational and political philosophy of the Institution.

a. European response

The response to Lovedale amongst Europeans varied from those who criticised it because they were constantly opposed to any education for Africans, to those who, subscribing to a policy of identity, sent their own children there. There was a persistent challenge from colonists who claimed that the "educated Kaffir" was a danger to society and that the heathen "Red" was more biddable, less opinionated and more hard-working. Stewart had nothing but contempt for
THE STUDENT CLASS  circa 1872
those who maintained that

"natives should not be educated: that it is no use trying to educate them: that they are injured rather than improved by education: that if they are to receive any education at all, it should be in such small quantity - and of so elementary a nature - that it can do them no harm and just as little good..."

This was one area in the whole discussion of African education in which Stewart was entirely sure of his own ground. Although he argued from reason that an educated man could be employed more usefully and given more responsibility, he also stated unequivocally that,

"Every man, whatever be his colour, has an equal right to education. For if skin pigment, or rather the absence of it, be the ground on which men are to be, or not to be, educated, then three-fourths of the human race are consigned to brutal ignorance..."[1]

There was a distinction between the reactionary group and those who approved of African education but wished to see the content restricted to basic literacy. In times of stress, however, the hostile and the suspicious joined forces, both groups concluding that Institutions such as Lovedale bred upstart, "disloyal Natives". This was especially obvious in the years 1877-1882 when, (as will be shown in a later chapter), political events led many to believe that a "racial war" was imminent. The Somerset and Bedford Courant voiced these fears.

"It is impossible to estimate the value of the conversion of such men as old Kama or Tiyo Soga but a mass of educated heathens is a source of danger to the Colony. The education they have received enables them to forge passes and act as spies and their industrial training enables them to repair gunlocks and manufacture assegais."[2]

1. The Christian Express, January 1880.
2. The Somerset and Bedford Courant, 30 January 1878.
The Queenstown Free Press openly blamed the type of education offered for this state of affairs.

"The crying evil of the Colony is the want of good and trustworthy natives - not elegant...coloured Greek scholars, nor abstruse mathematicians either of the Amakosa, Amapondo, Tembu, Fingo or any other tribe. Let such men be taught reading, writing and arithmetic (and) principles of religion...but on the other hand let the supply of First Class classics and native wranglers be limited. Let us have more and better native labourers, tradesmen, servants and fewer profound scholars". 1

The Port Elizabeth Telegraph in a scurrilous article on Lovedale stated flippantly that

"We always considered the Kaffir mind eminently calculated to appreciate Algebra. The continuity of thought and the concentration of ideas necessary to hunt our old friends x and y in their mysterious dodges among figures...would we should have thought have been peculiarly attractive to the subtle brain of the children of the AmaXhosa." 2

Lovedale, in this respect, was under constant attack for "impacting head knowledge" to Africans, thus enabling them to wage war against the Colony under the leadership and inspiration of those who had received higher education, those "educated or surpliced ruffians" who "more than counter-balanced any visible good that ever resulted from the labours of the Lovedale preachers and teachers". 3 By far the largest number of colonists would seem to have occupied this somewhat hysterical position. Eventually the distinction between those who wished to subordinate and those who wished to differentiate became blurred and

1. The Queenstown Free Press, 16 February 1877.
2. The Port Elizabeth Telegraph, 20 January 1883.
3. The Eastern Star, 7 June 1878.
differentiation in educational content became increasingly used as an instrument of subordination in matters social, economic and political.

It is important to recognise that Lovedale, as the most successful Institution devoted to the education of Africans south of the Sahara, engaged the attention of a wide range of European interests in the Cape and in Britain. It was almost impossible for Stewart to ignore the many pressures which were brought to bear on him in an attempt to influence policy at Lovedale.

"We cannot prepare preachers in large enough numbers to satisfy the Free Church Committee, we cannot prepare teachers in large enough numbers to satisfy our own missionaries and the Education Department... and we cannot prepare wagon-makers and carpenters and blacksmiths and printers to satisfy the colonists and meet half the requests that are sent to us for such men....We cannot do all that varied work in sufficient quantity to satisfy each of these classes who want their special sort of men but we...are doing a little bit of it."

In addition to these demands from those who at least appreciated that Lovedale was attempting a useful task there were the demands from

"...thousands in the Colony who say teach them to read and write and nothing else, or as tens of thousands say, teach these 'niggers' (that is their word) to work, and nothing else."

Steering a careful course between all those diverse interests and the uncertainties which they produced, Stewart insisted that his purpose for Lovedale was to lay its foundations broad and deep so that "the work will be secured". Lovedale must be rooted in the soil, it must have "inalienable rights to all the land" on which it stood. There must be no question of its becoming a heap of interesting ruins, "remains
of things that have passed away, fragments of stone reared by creatures of clay. Stewart knew very well that "the white man eats up the black from the Cape to Natal", but could not foresee, or refused to concede, that the "inalienable right" of Lovedale to its land would prove no guarantee against determined predators.

For this purpose, however, two things were essential; money and political security. To gain either Stewart required the approval of influential, sympathetic Europeans in the Colony. Fund-raisers must produce a realistic, practical programme as well as an appeal to the philanthropic emotions of those who genuinely seek to 'do good' with their profits. Stewart spelled out his ambitions for Lovedale and inspired many, notably John Stephen, D.P. Woods, Lord Overtoun, William Dunn and J.J. Irvine to give generously for buildings, bursaries and other capital expenditure. Most of these men accepted that Stewart would make creative use of their gifts but to others Stewart felt compelled to make constant apologia for the system. He entertained visitors, curious about this educational prototype, extolled Lovedale's curriculum, drew attention to the compulsory manual work, held musical evenings at which African girls would sing the melodramatic songs of the Victorian drawing-room and, in general, attempted to establish the respectability and viability of the Institution. His enterprising work, Lovedale Past and Present, published in 1888, was a comprehensive account of Lovedale pupils from 1842 to 1888 whose aim was to show how successful these students had been and, in particular, how few had
reverted to heathenism, this being one of the chief criticisms of sceptical colonists. To attract both sympathy and money, Stewart believed that it was essential to adapt Lovedale to the needs of the community, to produce skilled workmen, honest clerks and reliable female domestic servants as well as a proportion of African ministers and teachers.

Stewart also considered, however, that this was the correct course to follow in the interests of the Africans themselves. "If we are not in too big a hurry (Lovedale) may become a Native University yet." To concentrate on that would, nevertheless, be madness.

"The exotic you have tended so carefully may, to your intense disgust, turn out, when it blooms, to be a weed....You only get your diamond of great beauty by digging and washing several cartloads of rubbish." 1

Thus, Lovedale would carry on an extensive system of varied education which would cover everything "from ABC to theology, from farming to printing", pruning where necessary, offering a practical modern education without the time-consuming, "sysiphus-like toil" which had been devoted, in the past, to the teaching of Latin and Greek.

Lovedale received money from well-to-do, liberal business men in Scotland and the Cape, from the Church and from the government, but the total acceptance of the Cape Parliament was never won, though Stewart battled to achieve this. Lovedale's fortunes veered with the political wind and the security necessary for the consolidation of this ambitious educational enterprise remained a "will-o'-the-wisp". In Stewart's life-time educational grants were

drastically cut and he witnessed the insidious erosion of African political and social rights which inevitably affected the aims and purposes of education. The possibilities inherent in Stewart's schemes were circumscribed at all times by monolithic prejudice.

"...unfortunately there are many legislators who think educating the natives is positively wrong, that the more ignorant they are, the more subservient they will be and that it is a danger to the state to educate the native and make him a political power. This is really the unfortunate position in which I often felt myself placed - one section of representatives objected to money being spent upon the natives because, as they said, no adequate results can be shown, another and larger section object because they fear the results and the more satisfactory from our point of view these can be shown to be, the greater evil say they is being done with political prospects of Europeans in this country. They maintain the white man should own the land - and the duty of the native is to provide the labour at the lowest possible price - an Africa for the white Africans...."

This most interesting letter from J.J. Irvine, business man, Member of the Legislative Assembly for King Williams Town, benefactor of Lovedale, perfectly illustrates the dilemma in which Stewart found himself. His twistings and turnings to make Lovedale and its education acceptable to Colonists, though understandable, were pointless. The more successful Lovedale was in producing intelligent, educated, civilised artisans or professional men, the more the Colonists feared the consequences for their own political future. Education was a political issue. Its content and its purpose could change society only in a direction of which the legislators approved. Irvine's logical conclusion was, therefore, that the Africans must exercise their right to vote, that

1. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 18 October 1883, SP 31A.
they must assert their political power before it was too late. "There is no middle course, the time has passed for compromise". A year later, in 1884, the African voters in the district of Victoria East had returned their first representative to the Cape Parliament. There was still hope.


"In 1870, Lovedale was put about on a new course; with the wind and not against it, it flew off on a career of wonderful prosperity attaining its greatest force in 1876...." 1

Thus Stewart described the early years of his Principalship and the results of the changes which had been introduced in the organisation of the Institution and the content of its curriculum. The response of Africans in the years 1870-1884 are difficult to assess and have to be deduced from the number of facts available. Isigidimi SamaXhosa, the Xhosa-language newspaper published by the Lovedale Press, was "highly respected and trusted by the literate section of the Africans", but even at that time when it was most acceptable to its readers, Isigidimi was under surveillance from the missionaries and would have hesitated to print anything which was unflattering to Lovedale. With the African population as with the European, however, the watershed was reached in the years 1877 to 1880, beginning with the War of Nqhayechibi. During those years Africans began to look at Lovedale more objectively. The newspaper Imvo Zabantsundu which first appeared in 1884 and which was the

1. Stewart to Smith, 26 September 1882, SP LB4b.
first independent African voice, gave formal expression to long-term criticisms of Lovedale's education and politics. From this time, a section of African response is more readily documented.

Stewart's assessment of Lovedale's prosperity was not merely subjective and did reflect African response to the new educational opportunities. Peaceful conditions meant that their desire for education could be encouraged and the fact that so many were willing to pay fees indicated that a money economy had been widely accepted not only in the Colony but in other parts of South Africa from which Lovedale drew its pupils. In 1871 there were 150 pupils paying a total of £200 in fees; by 1876 there were 499 pupils and fees for that year amounted to £1665.

From the beginning the mission schools had numbered girls amongst its pupils. The Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee of 1866 therefore, included instructions for the establishment of a Girl's Institution under the direction of Miss Jane Waterston who sailed to the Cape with Dr. and Mrs. Stewart. By 1868 this seminary had 10 girl boarders; in 1873 this number had risen to 66 female boarders. In the entrance examinations for 1871, two girls, one the sister of Tiyo Soga, headed the list.1 There was an Industrial department for Girls where they were taught "household work, sewing, washing, dressing and cutting". These girls received their general education in the evenings, similar to those arrangements made for the apprentices in other industrial departments. This course 1. *Kaffir Express*, March 1871.
lasted two years and the girls were paid 4 shillings per month and free board. The girls in the Education Department also received domestic training though they were intending to become teachers. No servants were kept in the Girl's Institution. It can be seen, then, that the girls appreciated the new educational arrangements at Lovedale and that "the disparity between the education of men and women, which has been so marked in East, Central and West Africa, never emerged."¹ Lovedale aimed to reach into African homes by educating girls, to enable women to find better domestic and teaching jobs, and to provide suitable wives for African ministers and teachers.

There are further indications of Lovedale's success and acceptability. In 1872 Stewart received an appeal from a section of the Mfengu tribe through their magistrate, Captain Blyth, to build a "child of Lovedale" in their part of the Transkei. Stewart was not initially enthusiastic as he felt that Lovedale was far from secure and that money and fees would be diverted to the new enterprise. Under pressure, he suggested to Blyth that the Mfengu should be asked to contribute a basic £1000 before any work was begun. The Mfengu, however, had already shown a strong sense of responsibility and an ability to co-operate in self-help schemes. They had raised money which they had then administered themselves, in order to build roads in the territory and they had been amongst the first to adopt the idea of an Agricultural Show, with prize money for exhibits and demonstrations of improved methods. It was without much difficulty

then that the Mfengu levied 5/- from each man, raising £1450 for the new Institution in three months. This fund was administered by twelve headmen who acted as legal trustees, with two missionaries, one as Secretary, the other as Treasurer. For various reasons, the building of the Institution was delayed. By June 1876 the Mfengu had decided that a larger building was required and gave another £1500 to that end. The building was opened on the 25th July, 1877, but promptly found itself in the thick of the War which was fought mainly in the Transkei. The new Institution, called Blythswood after the Magistrate, was commandeered by troops, barricaded, loop-holed and fenced by earth-works. On account of this closure and because of mission wrangles and personal animosities amongst the missionaries, there was a debt of £1600 still outstanding when Blythswood re-opened in February 1879. Again the Mfengu rose to the occasion and cleared the debt, making their total contribution to Blythswood from 1873 to 1879, £4500. The establishment of Blythswood is sufficient indication of the Africans desire for education and of his willingness to pay for it.\(^1\)

In other ways at this time, Lovedale was living up to the expectations of the African community. In 1875 the first two African ministers of the Free Church were ordained. Mpambani Mzimba was appointed minister of the Lovedale Native Congregation and Elijah Makiwane was appointed to Macfarlan. Money was raised from the Colony in 1873, there was a

\(^1\) See Chapter II.
substantial grant from the Foreign Mission Committee, new buildings were started at Lovedale, more staff were appointed to cope with the increased numbers. In 1875, Stewart, in Scotland, suggested the foundation of Livingstonia in Central Africa as a memorial to David Livingstone. When Stewart left Lovedale a year later to go to the newly-established mission he took with him 4 Lovedale boys as evangelists. Their influence was spreading. Lovedale would be a bye-word in Southern Africa, symbol of optimism for the future of Africans.

"While in the Transkei I saw more than I had ever done before how the people are ready for education at the present moment... From one end of Fingoland to the other the cry is 'Mfundu, mfundo'. Wherever there is a good teacher I found that the school was full and regularly attended even by red Kaffir boys. ....The thirst for education is now so strong...."

The War of 1877-78, the Disarmament Act and the Gun War of 1880 and the Zulu War completely shattered this mood of optimism and inevitable progress. The hostility to Christianity, to European civilisation and to education which would seem to have been in abeyance in the previous decade, asserted itself with renewed vigour in this last desperate war against dispossession. Nor was it only the uneducated, the tribal loyalists or the heathen who were in rebellion. The intellectuals may not have taken up arms but they showed their disaffection in other ways. Isigidimi was accused of siding with the whites, hardly any of the leading writers had a good word to say for it and in 1886 it ceased publication. Naturally, Isigidimi was associated with Lovedale

1. Makiwane to Stewart, 11 June 1874, SP 23A(xi).
and that, coupled with Lovedale's attitude to refugees and to students who 'went to the bush' during the war caused many to doubt the Institutions good faith and ability to defend humanitarian principles. Stewart was not in the Cape during the War and after the Disarmament Act and the policy of 'vigour'\textsuperscript{1} he and other missionaries, notably Mabille\textsuperscript{*} of Basutoland, wrote many outspoken articles against increasing discrimination. Yet, willing as the African onlooker was to acknowledge this championship, the reservations which both these men shared about their African pupils was perhaps more obvious and more significant.

"I am fully of your opinion," wrote Mabille to Stewart, "that the greater number of educated young men give disappointment and a very few satisfaction ....The best friends of the Native must not look for much present success." \textsuperscript{2}

The challenge was finally made through \textit{Imvo} in comments pertaining to a speech made by Stewart to the Lovedale Literary Society entitled "The Experiment of Native Education". The issue was the well-worn subject of classical education.

In his long speech of May 1884 Stewart outlined his philosophy of education, its nature and its purpose. The truly educated man was the one who, be he waggon-maker or lawyer, was "fitted for the position he occupies...(whose) will has been strengthened by discipline." What then were the causes which obstructed Native Education? First, a misplaced emphasis on the part of the missionaries on unsuitable methods and materials. He admitted that he had

\textsuperscript{1} See Chapter IV.
\textsuperscript{2} Mabille to Stewart, 19 June 1884, SP 23A(xii).
changed his own mind on this matter over the years but that he had always considered Latin unnecessary for "promiscuous classes of native lads". Customary opinion in this regard had vanquished common sense. Such teaching was given in the hope that Africans who received such opportunities would rise, but in retrospect there were only "efforts wasted, education travestied, hopes disappointed and expectations unfulfilled".

Secondly, the Africans themselves had mistaken notions as to what constituted a useful education.

"With little or no accurate knowledge of either English or Kaffir grammar, many are anxious to go on to the study of Latin or Greek; and he who opposes this is regarded with unfriendly feeling as defrauding the native of his rights and unduly relegating him to an inferior education...."

Stewart maintained that there was only one idea behind this whole controversy and that was "the equality of race". In a vehement tirade Stewart demanded to know on what grounds such equality could be asserted. What single thing had been done which could permit the Kaffir race to say that they were as good as "their white neighbours"? Admittedly, there were certain God given rights by which all men, whatever their colour, were in a real sense equal but equality of race in this context meant capacity for self-government and the power to advance in the arts of civilisation. These spurious ideas of equality, said Stewart, were the notions of the so-called Educated Native young men not of the older men who realised that

"By labour not by Latin, by the Gospel and not by Greek you will rise."  

1. The Christian Express, June 1884.
For Stewart to speak thus strongly and openly is the best possible indication of the ferment of social and political activity amongst educated Africans in those years. He knew only too well that his statement that results at Lovedale had been less than expected would be pounced upon and used by those who were hostile to African education and indeed Imvo lost no time in denouncing the address as an "indiscretion" which had made an impression hard to remove. The establishment of Native Associations for educational and political purposes, the success of the Victoria East election, the birth of Imvo (to some extent in opposition to Isigidimi) and the demand for equal educational opportunities alarmed Stewart more than the encroachment on African rights which was being openly advocated by an increasing section of the Colonists. Stewart did not really subscribe to the latter views but he was prepared to risk being mistaken for a partizan rather than stand with the Africans in their last-ditch fight for equal rights. He chose to define the issue solely in terms of the content of education and refused to come to grips with the underlying nature of the struggle, though he was better aware than most of its existence. It was for this reason that Africans, particularly the educated leaders, could no longer trust Lovedale and Stewart to act or speak in their best interests.

Stewart did attempt to retrieve the situation, making what amounted to an apology in the April leader of the Christian Express.

"We sincerely regret if anything now said shall be regarded as arising from an unwillingness to see
enjoying the same advantages as those of the white race..." 1

*Imvo* countered with an article which demanded to know what positive evil classics had produced amongst Africans trained at Lovedale. Why, they asked, should classics produce evil among Africans and not among Europeans?

"While we do not charge the Lovedale organ with prejudice against colour - we fail to see why the Native student only is shut out from subjects required by the public examining bodies." 2

In the following month an *Imvo* correspondent, "Lovedalian," accused Stewart of the weakness of great men to act "ultra vires" or to say things which they ought not to have said. "Suppressio veri et suggestio falsi". "Lovedalian" listed all the alumni of Lovedale who had been educated under the old system, giving their occupations to show how successful they had been. A system which produced law agents, pastors, medical assistants, clerks, teachers and interpreters surely could not be said to have failed. 3

Stewart replied that he had no intention of putting obstacles in the way of any pupil acquiring any language, living or dead, if the pupil chose to take the trouble to learn it and to pay for the cost of the teaching. Lovedale however was not able to expend time and energy in this direction. His advice to *Imvo* was to tell its readership that the life and death question of the African people was not classics, nor even politics - but industry. 4

2. *Imvo*, 4 May 1885.
3. *Imvo*, 6 June 1885.
The Editor of Imvo had the last word. Pointing out that he had been trained to give great deference to the opinions of the Editor of the Christian Express "even when we had the misfortune to differ from them", he nevertheless stated quite bluntly that the issue at stake was whether "conscience had a colour and quality of work a hue". All that Africans wanted was a fair field and no favour.¹

Although Stewart had spoken "with no uncertain sound on the question of drawing the line at mere colour", the impression remained in the African community that discrimination operated at Lovedale. That the classics issue had not died after this debate is evidenced by Stewart himself in an article on education written in 1900 where he referred to the strong desire, "almost amounting to a craze", for Latin and Greek. There can be little doubt that the impulse which sent many Africans to America for their education at the end of the century arose from the fact that differentiation in education was practised. Certainly Mpambani Mzimba, the leader of the Independent movement from the Free Church in 1893 was well-known for his often expressed view that Latin and Greek were essential ingredients for a complete education.

Africans in West Africa also demanded that classics should be included in the curriculum but their arguments were more sophisticated. Edward Blyden, for example, wanted to go back to the uncontaminated sources of the Greek and Latin languages and literatures because, in avoiding the study of modern Western civilisation, the African educational

¹. Imvo, 19 August 1885.
system could be freed from the "despotic Europeanizing influences which had warped and crushed the negro mind". From the classics the African could draw "nourishment" without "race poison".¹

In contrast to this, Africans in South Africa wanted classical teaching, not because they wished to escape Westernization but because they wished to become thoroughly Westernized. "They expected equality to follow as a matter of course once Africa attained required standards of education and civilisation".² Their ultimate aim was to participate as equals in a common society. To achieve this for himself and his fellow-countrymen, the educated African was prepared to play the European game, to accommodate himself to European politics and European educational systems, factors of importance in the consideration of African nationalism in the late 19th Century.

b. The Nineties

In the last decade of the century, educational policy at Lovedale was largely determined by Government edict and not by private initiative. In earlier days the Colony had been too poor, or too indifferent, to pay for education. By 1891, however, Government expenditure on education had increased to £147,000 from the £23,000 spent in 1870. By 1894, this had increased again to £173,000. Of this sum, undenominational schools received £50,000; mission schools, 

². H. Adam (editor), South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, p.145.
mainly for coloureds and indigent whites, received £24,000. The sum given to African industrial institutions was £6,900.¹ The chief architect of the new expansionist policy was Dr. Thomas Muir who succeeded Sir Langham Dale in 1892. Muir was under considerable pressure to improve facilities for Afrikaaner children and for children in country districts, the parents of such children being strongly of the opinion that Africans often enjoyed better educational opportunities than they did. Muir, who was sympathetic to these demands and whose views, moreover, reflected the increasing determination of politicians to restrict African rights, not only reduced grants to African institutions but introduced examination requirements which favoured Europeans. A process of this kind led gradually but inexorably, to two distinct educational standards, one for whites, one for blacks, and ultimately to the Bantu Education Act of 1954.

Nevertheless, changes were overdue. Less than 1% of the population, black and white, reached Standard 6 (the last year of the Primary School), an indication also of the limited qualifications of most teachers. Muir, therefore, introduced a new 3-year course for pupil teachers in 1894, which entailed grafting a varied Normal School course into existing establishments. This made considerable demands upon the resources of Institutions, even in Lovedale where a Normal School training already operated. In the first examination there was a high failure rate which caused adverse comment. The language requirements also favoured

¹. The Christian Express, June 1895.
Europeans as only in Third year could pupils pass in Xhosa and Sesuto.

"I fear satisfaction is being given to the Dutch party who cannot brook the passing of so many Native teachers." 1

On the other hand, as Dr. Lindsay pointed out to Stewart, Muir may not have been motivated by hostility to Missionary methods but merely by practical considerations. The Government would continue to support the production of African teachers and artisans but would no longer give grants for unspecified purposes or for general education. With this, Lindsay had a certain sympathy as the diversified, expensive nature of the Lovedale curriculum gave him considerable anxiety. 2

Whatever Muir's motives, he was rapidly cast in the role of antagonist by African institutional staff, an image which Muir did little to dispel in the next few years.

"Dr. Muir is the teachers master not their father and friend like Dr. Dale....I fear Maths is a food which does not feed that side of man's nature (i.e. sympathy). And Dr. Muir has become more bone than flesh in its pursuit." 3

In 1896, Muir introduced a measure which further threatened the policy and principles practised at Lovedale. Without reason or explanation, it was laid down that no white student should be allowed to compete for a teachers certificate in the 1st year of the Normal course. As there had been no formal notification of this, Lovedale entered 155 candidates for the examination, 14 of them Europeans.

1. Henry Dyke to Stewart, 2 January 1895, SP 23A(xi).
2. Lindsay to Stewart, 7 January 1897, ST 13/3/1.
3. Moir to Stewart, 22 January 1895, SP 23A(vi).
When these European candidates appeared they were ejected from the Hall by the Inspector.

As Stewart pointed out, this involved a radical change in the method followed at Lovedale for over 50 years. The number of Europeans at Lovedale was small but their influence was enormous. The high standard of education given at Lovedale must, in some measure, be attributed to the presence of European pupils in the student body though Africans took full advantage of the standard offered. To exclude Europeans from participating in this examination struck a severe blow at the multi-racial foundation of the Lovedale system. Stewart voiced his suspicions that this measure had been promoted by those "who have always been unfriendly to Native education." He himself could see no other reason for the proposals. "If it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change." ¹ In addition to this, the reduction of the grant by about £300,² merely appeared to underline Muir's hostility to African Institutions and to Lovedale in particular. Muir referred to this, and to complaints about his policy, in a speech at a public ceremony in Mowbray. Lovedale had nothing to complain of, he declared, and until they had, they had "better keep quiet."³

Between 1897 and 1905 the question of government grants remained a thorny issue with an increase granted in 1900, only to be threatened from a different angle in 1903.⁴ It became increasingly obvious that Muir wished Lovedale to

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1. The Christian Express, January 1897.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 2 March 1897, PC.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 3 May 1897, PC.
4. Lennox to Smith, 1 August 1903, NLS 7800.
restrict itself to the production of teachers and that he
was not prepared to give Government money towards to
Institution to provide a general, higher education for
Africans. He was not alone in this. Again and again the
question of the employment or usefulness of Africans was
raised with respect to their education. The issues of
land and labour and the anguish aroused by the anomalous
inadequacy of the labour supply led, inevitably to an
attack by Europeans on bookish education for Africans.

In a pamphlet published in 1900 entitled On Native
Education - South Africa, Stewart stated that he agreed with
the principle that "education in any country should be shaped
so far to meet the requirements of the individual or community
or people to whom such education is given." If this was the
case then the greatest need for Africans was a good practical,
industrial and elementary education. Stewart used this
apparent concurrence with colonial opinion on African
education to point out that if this was what the Cape wanted
then the Government must be prepared to pay for it. Instead
of reducing grants to African institutions, Government must
be prepared to back the need for industrial education with
large sums of money. Furthermore, if such Africans were
trained in large numbers, they must be guaranteed employment
and not denied such employment by colonial workmen. Having
said this, Stewart reiterated his belief that industrial and
agricultural training must be accompanied by a literary
and general education to Standard 4.

"The right lines of native education are then that it
should be - 1) largely industrial, with a good general
education up to at least Standard IV; 2) with a
Normal course of training for three years for a more limited class to afford the supply of qualified teachers for native village schools; 3) with opportunity under certain financial limitations for a much smaller class to go as far as matriculation; and 4) further, to any extent they may choose to go at their own expense, and on the same terms and privileges as Europeans. This last may be justified on the theory that education proceeds from above downwards, not from below upwards. A small educated class stimulates the ambition of those below...." 1

Although Stewart remained as caustic as ever about the attitude of Africans to manual labour and their desire for "getting knowledge" in their search for educational equality, he was equally caustic about the Colonial attitude to African education and the desire of many white men to imprison the African within an educational straitjacket. Though he upheld the need for a practical, industrial-type education for Africans, he would not concede that they should have no more than that, nor that Institutions existed solely for the purpose of providing African labour for Europeans.

"Many desire to utilize the black man solely and wholly for their own interests and they are angry at the missionary who objects to this undiluted personal selfishness serving itself under the cloak of some pretended economic reason. The day of slavery is past with its degradation both of master and slave. Forced labour, fraudulent payments are neither wise nor just. The sooner it is recognised that intelligent native labour can only be had by the growth of intelligence and a plentiful supply of such labour by the creation of new wants, the better for all concerned. To utilize the native in the interests of selfish employers, or for political purposes so as to secure party votes, is more than immoral." 2

In spite of such sentiments, however, Lovedale was in a cleft stick. The wider powers of the Education Department

2. The Christian Express, October 1895.
James Stewart and party before leaving for Nyasaland

Executive Board of Interstate College 1907-1914

**Back Row:** Cr. Mamba, Cr. Lehana, Mr. Gasa, Mr. Bud Mbelle, Mr. J. T. Jabavu, Rev. J. Knox Bokwe, Rev. Isaac Wauchope, Mr. J. P. Mapikela.

**Second Row:** Mr. N. O. Thompson, Sir Chas. Crewe, Sir Walter Stanford, Rt. Hon. J. W. Sauer, Rev. J. Henderson.

**In front:** Mr. K. A. Hobart Houghton, Dr. Neil Macvicar (1907)
and the rising cost of education meant that the Institution depended for its existence on government money. If it wished to remain a viable concern, it could criticize but it could not pursue an independent course of action.

c. **The Inter-State Native College**

From the beginning of his Principalship Stewart had consistently advocated that Lovedale should, in time, become an African University. This ideal could be attributed in part to his personal ambition, to his desire to be instrumental in such a foundation, but it was not unmixed with the conviction that Africans were entitled to such higher education, not, as we have seen, a generally-held belief. As time passed, the financial problems of Lovedale and the political mood of the country seemed to militate more and more against any prospect of such advanced education for Africans. However, in the first years of the new century, Stewart found that the idea was receiving sympathetic attention from influential government officials and the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903–05 positively recommended the establishment of a "central Native College or similar institution." What had caused this change of

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1. This section deals only with the early planning stages of the Inter-State Native College as these are depicted in the Stewart Papers.

2. "That a central Native College or similar institution be established, and aided by the various states, for the training of native teachers and in order to afford opportunities for higher education to Native students." (paragraph 342 c).
attitude? Why had it come at a time when the Education Department seemed bent on restricting African educational opportunities?

The evidence given at the Native Affairs Commission and other opinions indicate that the Ethiopian Movement was the chief reason for interest in the scheme on the part of Europeans. It had become obvious that Africans who felt that limits were being placed on their educational achievements were not prepared to accept this without question but were going to Negro Colleges in America, such as Hampton or Tuskegee, where they could complete their studies. Stewart himself visited Tuskegee in 1903 and described his visit in his evidence before the S.A.N.A.C. He had "found several who had been at Lovedale" and had indeed been impressed by what he had seen there and by Booker T. Washington himself. "You have got the right end of a very tangled line," he wrote, "or rather are sowing seed the full harvest of which you will not live to see - but it will go on reproducing itself - after your work is over." Washington's book, *Up From Slavery*, must have been one of the most widely-read books at this time amongst those in South Africa interested in African affairs. Nevertheless,

1. see Chapter V.
3. Stewart to Booker T. Washington, 30 October 1903, Congress Papers 277 (I am indebted to Dr. Hunt Davies for this information).
Despite approval of Tuskegee and other similar institutions, it was generally felt that Africans who went to America or who came under the influence of visiting Americans were being exposed to undesirable political and social ideas and it was with the view of preventing this that the suggestion of providing higher education in South Africa for Africans received encouragement.

At first glance it might appear as if the proposals for such a college were in contrast to the policy of the Education Department. Dr. Muir, however, in his evidence before the S.A.N.A.C., stated that he had no objection to higher education for Africans provided they were prepared to pay for it themselves. Furthermore, it should be noted that the proposals were in keeping with the general trend towards separate institutions for Africans. Stewart may originally have thought of Lovedale as a multi-racial University just as it had been a multi-racial school, but there was no mention of this now. In his evidence he stated bluntly that he did not think that "there is any great advantage in mixing the two races".

Early in 1904, Lord Milner, who was greatly interested in the scheme, appointed E.B. Sargant as his personal adviser and asked him to inquire into the practicability of the proposed College. There were, at this stage, four broad problems to be resolved. First, where should the

2. S.A.N.A.C., Vol. IV, para. 44.934. But note that there were Europeans in the first batch of students at Fort Hare. Shepherd, _op.cit._, p. 287.
College be sited? At Lovedale or elsewhere? Second, who would support the scheme financially? Should all the States be asked to contribute? What part should be played by the missionary bodies, especially by the Free Church? How much should Africans themselves be asked to contribute? Thirdly, in connection with this, in which body would control of the College be vested? Fourthly, what type of curriculum should be offered?

In May 1904, before he visited Lovedale, Sargant wrote to Stewart outlining his tentative thoughts on African education and about the present plan. He felt that the whole of South Africa should face the problem and that unless the four states were prepared to participate things might as well be left in their "present patchwork". He subscribed to the view that African education should be dealt with separately from European as the problems were distinct and, also, that the new organisation should be capable of growth "so as to embrace the whole native population in South Africa and we must not be afraid to call in the aid of the best of their own people or even of the American negro trained at Tuskegee or Mt Hampton for example." ¹

After a week at Lovedale, Sargant wrote much more fully on the matter to Lord Milner. He had become more aware of the determination of Africans to acquire education if it was not provided for them and recognised the political danger of "negro propagandists" who, in his opinion, were "innoculating the better educated natives with the virus of

¹. Sargant to Stewart, 17 May 1904, SP 27A(ii).
racial prejudice and hatred." He had made a point of seeing Mzimba who had surprised him by supporting the scheme and by his advocacy of Lovedale as the most desirable site for the College. Sargant now saw the function of an inter-State, inter-Church College as 1) providing a common educational policy throughout South Africa, 2) giving a focus to the educational and mission work of the churches, 3) giving the opportunity for educational experiment and 4) "to head off" political trouble.

Sargant gave several reasons for selecting Lovedale as the ideal site for the new Institution. It was the oldest of its kind, it was already inter-tribal and inter-denominational, drawing students from all over the country, it already offered a higher standard of education than any other similar institution, it had pioneered industrial education, it had shown its vitality by spawning Blythswood "the child of Lovedale", the Christian Express had made it a centre of educational and missionary information and finally, the Africans themselves, even the leaders of separatist movements, thought of Lovedale as the most important African institution. Set against these advantages were the problems of finance and control. Money came from fees, government grants and church grants; this would have to be altered. Control was vested in the United Free Church but at present they were trying to shift this on to the Colonial Presbyterian Church, something to which Stewart was opposed.¹

¹. See Chapter II. But assurances were not lacking that the United Free Church had no intention of handing over Lovedale to the S.A.P.C. Stephen to Stewart, 17 January 1903, SP 23A(xi); Overtoun to Stewart, 25 February 1904, SP 23A(xi).
The Education Department also exercised some control over Lovedale not always sympathetically, the feeling being that it acted "in the direction of discouraging all experiment in regard to the best kind of education for the native."

Finally, control was exercised by Stewart himself, through his unrivalled experience, personality and unique position. "He upholds the native interests where they clash with the interests of the Home Mission, or with those of the Colonial Government, in a way that no future Principal could hope to do."

Sargant, who himself had a reputation as an autocrat, commented that after Stewart retired there "must be less of a dictatorship and more of constitutional machinery", especially in the matter of giving educated Africans a voice in the management of the Institution.

Sargant advised Milner that the property at Lovedale was of considerable value, about £40,000 or £50,000. If the United Free Church were to sell this they would rightly demand a fair price but it was his contention that they should plough back most of that money into providing a model boarding establishment and mission offices, into scholarships for about 100 Presbyterian students and into theological training for those who wanted it. Eventually he hoped that other churches would do the same and that this centralizing agency would reduce some of the wastage which resulted from the overlapping of missionary enterprise in South Africa. The Constitution of the new College would provide for representatives of these churches to sit on the Board of Management.
Finally, with regard to curriculum, Sargant stated that the backbone of the College would be a training institution for teachers with a Demonstration School. Religious instruction and manual training would also be given but there would be opportunities for higher education courses for those who wanted them. Sargant had also discussed these suggestions with A.K. Soga who was full of enthusiasm for Booker T. Washington's model and favoured the idea of Lovedale being transformed into a federal institution.¹

In July 1904 Stewart, as President of the 1st General Missionary Conference, went to Johannesburg. At the Conference he raised the issue of the desirability of an inter-State, inter-Church College for Africans but it was after the Conference that discussion on the issue really took place when Stewart stayed at Sunnyside with Lord Milner.

"...the question is very big - the whole subject of native education - which is but a section of a bigger subject, the Native Question. This has never yet been taken up wholly, only a little bit now and again; something about a Pass Law or a Hut Tax or walking on the pavement - or similar bits of it or a Glen Grey Act....All this meant time and work and I grudge both - and ask myself why I came here at all. The Lovedale matter seems too big and shapeless at present and to involve a greater change than will be easily practicable unless they are disposed to spend a good deal of money...." ²

Stewart's tone was wearied and unenthusiastic. His heart-trouble was by this time seriously impeding his activity and Sargant quite misjudged the situation when he told Milner that Stewart still had the energy to carry out the

¹. Sargant to Milner, 24 June 1904, SP 27E(i).
². Stewart to Mina Stewart, 22 July 1904; 24 July 1904, PC.
re-organisation of Lovedale.¹

Moreover an unexpected obstacle had arisen in the shape of "WeeFreeism" and, after the judgement given by the House of Lords, Sargant and his colleagues had to consider whether or not to negotiate with the Legal Free Church.² Sargant suggested that Stewart should write to the Free Church outlining the situation, stating that if Lovedale did not grasp this opportunity then it must cease to occupy the premier position that it occupied at present as, in effect, an Inter-State Institution.³ There is no evidence that Stewart wrote this letter but Hobart Houghton, commissioned to negotiate in Scotland with the Church bodies there, certainly informed both the United Free Church and the Legal Freees of the current state of the project and the suggestion that the purchase money for Lovedale should go towards the financing of a Presbyterian hostel.⁴

At this point James Weir who was also in Edinburgh was asked to represent the United Free Church in negotiations with the Governments in South Africa but he later declared that he preferred to act in the interests of the Africans. Walter Rubusana who was in Britain at the time drew up a list of all interested and influential Africans in the four states and Weir announced his intention of calling a conference in King Williams Town.⁵ "Apparently Mr. Weir takes the same

¹. See Note 1, page 152.
². See Chapter V.
³. Sargant to Stewart, n.d. but 1904, SP 27A(ii).
⁴. Houghton to Stewart, 20 May 1905, SP 27A(i).
⁵. Houghton to Stewart, 9 August 1905, SP 27A(i).
view as we do about the necessity of the natives showing their hand and backing up the scheme."

Opposition to the scheme, or at least to the idea that Lovedale should become the new College, now appeared from two different directions. W.A. Roberts and A.F. Cowan both Lovedale teachers repudiated the scheme and, for this reason, Stewart appointed Lennox as Acting-Principal when, by right, the post should have gone to Roberts. From Cape Town Dr. Muir hinted that he wished Lovedale to become a Government training school for teachers and that he was not convinced that a College was necessary. It was decided to enlist the help of Dr. Jameson, then Prime Minister of the Cape, and of Lord Selborne, the new High Commissioner. Such prominent men, in addition to prominent Africans, would surely convince those opposed that the College was essential.

It was at this crucial point, in September 1905, that Stewart became too weak in health to participate further in the negotiations. He asked that his successor should be in sympathy with the Inter-State college scheme and

1. Sargant to Stewart, 31 August 1905, SP 27A(ii).
2. Stewart to Smith, 30 October 1905; Smith to Lennox, 8 December 1905.
3. Lennox to Smith, 23 July 1905; Weir to Doctor ? 8 August, 1905; Mina Stewart to Smith, 18 September 1905, NLS 7801. Muir had tried a counter-proposal of a Native Training Institution at Queenstown. Weir maintained that the "Colony was not in sympathy with the Higher Education of the Natives of South Africa."
4. Mina Stewart to Smith, 18 September 1905; Neil Macvicar to Smith, 24 September 1905, SP 27A(iii).
added that he wished "that strength had been given to me to have seen Lovedale established on the broader lines that have been in view." ¹ In October, the Christian Express leader dealt with the need for an advance in African higher education... "the first indication in the press of action upon the N.A.C.'s recommendations in the matter of a central Institution." ² In November a statement about the proposal was issued in Stewart's name which largely echoed the earlier suggestions made by Sargant with respect to Church hostels and to the establishment of a more representative administrative body, drawn from government, mission and African sources. He urged that Africans should themselves raise the purchase money for Lovedale and that the four governments should guarantee the annual maintenance of the College. This new College was not to be only a training school for teachers, however.

"...unless a course is framed capable of development to a standard equivalent to a degree course at a British University and in time justifying the conferring on students of a degree, this College will not fulfill the expectations of the Natives or check the exodus to America." ³

A week after Stewart's death in December 1905, an Inter-States Convention of Africans was held at Lovedale to discuss the College scheme.

"A unique gathering - 150 delegates assembled, representing every South African tribe and every denomination. There was absolute unanimity in the desire for education and for increased facilities to obtain it....Mr. Weir proved an excellent chairman... at least £50,000 should be raised." ⁴

¹ Stewart to Smith, 18 September 1905, Cory MS 3020.
² W.E. Stanford to Stewart, 10 October 1905, SP 27A(iii).
³ Shepherd, op.cit., p. 277.
⁴ Lennox to Smith, 31 December 1905, NLS 7801.
In fact, despite enthusiasm and offers of money and support, the College was not opened until 1916. In the interim, the question of the position of Lovedale, which had pre-occupied Stewart, had been nullified by the adoption of the nearby Fort Hare site as more suited to the new Institution. Nevertheless, the influence of Stewart and Sargant remained in the essential features of Fort Hare in its origins, one College for South Africa, the participation of all the governments and the erection of hostels by all leading churches and missionary societies. Even the Fort Hare site had been purchased by Stewart initially and was given by the United Free Church as part of their donation to the College scheme.¹

**African Response**

The main feature of African response to the European missionary in this decade is that it was critical and questioning. Even amongst those who did not secede from the Church - the primary expression of African unrest - there was a demand for forward movement and an impatience with unwarranted constraint. However, there was also a widening division of opinion in African circles, broadly between those who supported Jabavu and those who supported Rubusana and A.K. Soga and this, coupled with the increase in anti-African legislation, to a great extent nullified the effectiveness of African agitation. The exception to this was in the field of education. It has already been noted that many Africans

were unhappy and dissatisfied with their educational opportunities and, consequently, were looking elsewhere for higher education. This went on throughout the Nineties when it was estimated that about 100 Africans went to the United States for further education. In August 1901, Izwi Labantu, noted that Mzimba and Damane were about to depart for America taking with them pupils for Lincoln and Tuskegee. The editor added:-

"We hope that more of our young men will emulate their example, and that every year will see a larger number proceeding to England and America for the education that is denied them in this country." 2

This editorial caused vehement reaction in the Christian Express whose editor observed caustically that not one of the pupils going to America with Mzimba had passed beyond Standard VI and that they could therefore scarcely be said to have exhausted the facilities offered in various institutions in South Africa. "During the past ten years only 18 natives entered the Matriculation and 75 the School Higher classes at Lovedale". It was conceded however, by John Don, that it should be possible for Africans to acquire education to degree standard at a missionary institution and that as money was essential in order to provide this facility, government grants for higher education should be increased. Behind this statement was the knowledge that Tengo Jabavu's son, D.D.T. Jabavu, had just been refused entry to Dale College. 3

2. The Christian Express, September 1901.
3. The Christian Express, October 1901.
Two years later *Imvo* recorded that Mzimba was again in the Eastern Province arranging for young men to go to America, "for such education as is refused or indifferently given in this the country of their birth." This comment again impelled vigorous response from *The Christian Express*. Did the editor of *Imvo* or, for that matter, Mr. Mzimba himself, really feel ashamed of their education in the presence of the average American Negro? Such modesty and self-deprecation was indeed to be commended! Surely the Editors of *Imvo* and *Izwi* would be better employed in drawing up a satisfactory educational scheme than in destructively criticising the one in existence. The only conclusion possible was that this exodus to America was motivated by the craze for Latin and Greek studies which were not taught in the Institutions.  

Neither the African excuse of insufficient higher education, nor the European explanation of a desire for classical studies, were really at the root of the preference for an American education. The African had become aware, though he could not admit to it openly, of a social and political structure which appeared to offer more than his own; the European decried this, condemning the atmosphere of racial animosity, because he for his part could not openly admit that South African attitudes cause dissatisfaction with educational facilities.

There was sufficient fear amongst Europeans of American influence, however, to produce the Inter-State Native College scheme, as already demonstrated. Both Mzimba and Soga in

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reply to Sargant's questions gave their support to the scheme, though there were problems in bringing about a united African front to this proposal. ¹ ²

Imvo consistently advocated the establishment of the College until the idea finally came to maturity. ²

Although certainly there were reservations about the education offered at Lovedale, Africans would generally defend the Institution against any attack from outside agency. One could almost typify it as being part of the family, so that although its alumni past and present knew its weaknesses better than anybody else and were therefore best able to criticise it, if it was undermined by strangers, Lovedalians presented a united front. For example, Imvo was the first newspaper to attack Muir's decision not to allow European students to sit the same examination as Africans in the 1st year of teacher training. ³ It should also be noted that, despite all the questioning of Lovedale's curriculum and methods, numbers of applicants increased. In 1896 there were 889 pupils who paid a total of £2,559 in fees, the highest since the Institution began. ⁴

With respect to education, as with the Church and politics, the African response to missionary attitudes was ambivalent. These European agencies offered so much which Africans both appreciated and acknowledged, but problems arose when attempts were made to indiginize the Institutions,

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1. Weir to Mina Stewart, 15 October 1905, SP 27A(iii).
2. Roux, op.cit., p. 77.
3. The Christian Express, January 1897.
4. The Christian Express, January 1897.
to use what they had learned to transmute their own African experience within the European framework. The reluctance of Europeans to give freely and without reservation hardened into an impenetrable and frustrating barrier of prejudice and segregation which Africans found it impossible to overcome.

d. Towards an African Ministry

It can certainly be argued that the test case for a Missionary Institution in South Africa was the African theological graduate, his training, his prospects and the status accorded to him, in theory and in practise. This was also the point at which the activities of the Institution and of the Mission stations coincided; it was the area of mutual concern for both the Presbytery and the Education Board. In the Free Church mission, Lovedale provided the education but it was the Presbytery who employed the graduates. The curriculum for theological education was therefore, to some extent, dependent on the standards for ordination demanded by the Presbytery. In theory, the role of the Institution was largely passive; it accepted the scholars, guided them through the required courses and handed them over to the Presbytery for deployment. In practise, most of the Institution masters were also members of Presbytery and could therefore exercise their influence in both capacities.

The crucial underlying question for all European missionaries was whether or not they were in earnest about their desire to establish self-supporting African congregations,
whether or not they would accept African ministers as equals and would, therefore, promote wholeheartedly the propagation of the Gospel through African agency. In this matter, the Foreign Mission Committee had given unequivocal directives. In the Minute of the F.M.C. 27 October 1866, brought to Kaffraria by Stewart, the ground rules for the establishment and increase of an African ministry were laid down. Despite disagreement on method, the missionaries attempted to implement this policy and with some success in the period 1867-1876. Thereafter, their enthusiasm began to wane and from the late eighties they became openly hostile to the insistence of the F.M.C. that European pastors should give place to Africans in certain congregations. The intransigence of the European missionaries ultimately produced a reaction from the African ministers themselves. Failure to encourage an African pastorate must be seen as one of the causes of Mzimba's secession from the Free Church in 1898. ¹

The Minute of 1866

In Section 6 of this Minute, the Foreign Mission Committee made its policy on a "Native Ministry" quite clear.² The 'Native Ministry' should be diversified in character and should include men whose educational standards ranged from that of the minister, with his full theological training, to the Reader who was, perhaps, barely a lesson beyond his illiterate listeners. The reasons for this are plainly 

¹ See Chapter V.
² See Appendix A.
stated. First, a wide range of educational possibilities would result in the more rapid achievement of a comprehensive African pastorate covering a wide geographical area (always a problem in South Africa) and equipped to perform a multiplicity of functions. Second, it could not be expected that African congregations could afford to provide the salary due to fully-trained ministers, except in a few instances. If, therefore the Churches were to become self-supporting, they must be able to employ people whose demands were more modest. The net result in both cases would be that the pastoral and financial responsibility of the Mission would pass gradually out of the hands of Europeans and into the hands of Africans. The F.M.C. was categorical on this point and, especially in the area of financial responsibility, made a consistent effort to force the churches to become self-supporting. It can be seen, therefore, that the question of finance, of who paid whom, was intimately bound up with the question of authority and the missionaries were well aware that "absolute self-support would imply absolute self-government".1

The first African ministers in the Free Church mission

The first tentative steps towards an African ministry were taken in the early years of Stewart's Principalship of Lovedale. Although Lovedale had been in existence since 1842 it had produced no African clergy, the most famous African pastor of these early years, Tiyo Soga, having had

1. Don to Smith, 4 September 1886, NLS 7797.
his University and theological education entirely in Scotland. The Minute of 1866 attempted, as has been shown, to place a more missionary emphasis on a curriculum which the F.M.C. considered to be too secular and to widen the educational net to include pupils with a wider range of ability. The expectation was that the new course would produce more workers for the Church itself and would contribute more positively to the propagation of the Gospel. It was no accident then that the first moves to train African ministers began at Lovedale after Duff's visit and the arrival of Stewart to implement the changes demanded by the F.M.C.

In a speech to the 1869 Missionary Conference in King Williams Town, Stewart explained his attitude. He had no doubts about the importance of an African ministry. The most natural teachers of men of any race or nation were men of the same race, language and colour. This he believed, not from any prejudice, for "amongst us missionaries of the Cross all distinctions of race and colour are supposed to be, or ought to be, obliterated", but because there was no surer sign of the vitality of any truth than "the production of its own apostles and missionaries". Besides this, there was the vast continent of Africa to the north, large areas of which were often fatally unhealthy for Europeans, where the work of maintaining the Gospel could depend on "the existence of a native agency". Stewart, therefore, thought it right that those in the Southern part of the Continent should be responsible for training such agents. On the principle of

1. The Kaffrarian Watchman, 1 February 1869.
helping those who help themselves, he emphasised that Missionary societies in Britain would be more enthusiastic about helping African churches if they could demonstrate a strong impulse towards self-support. The future of the African race was assured: "Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands unto God".

If all this was accepted, the issue then was one of education. What was the best course to follow? "The point to be aimed at here is neither to under or over-educate." Stewart proposed a six year course similar to the one pursued in Scotland, with three years of Arts followed by three years of divinity. He conceded that there would have to be Latin and Greek for these students but that more time should be spent on Natural and Physical Science as being the direction "in which enquiry at the present day is chiefly extending". The reason for this comprehensive course was that the people would judge the ministerial class by these first products. Moreover, the first African pastors would inevitably "enter on charges that have enjoyed the ministrations of European missionaries".

On the question of status, Stewart, as a good Presbyterian, could see no reason why all ordained ministers should not have the same status even though they had not the same qualifications. On the subject of remuneration, however, Stewart was not so egalitarian. Basing his opinion on the way in which the matter was dealt with in Scotland, he pointed out that the minister of a country charge earned considerably less than his counterpart in the city. If African ministers were to prove capable of holding important
positions then they should be eligible for the highest salary but, initially, this was unlikely. More significantly, Stewart accepted that in South Africa "no native receives the same salary for the same work". This was regrettable, he felt, but did not suggest that the Church should do other than fall in with accepted practise. If African ministers were paid the same as Europeans then one of the strongest reasons for having an African ministry at all would disappear — namely "its supposed smaller cost".

From 1869 to 1872, Stewart struggled to introduce a theological course into Lovedale. Without such a course, Lovedale was like "a house without a roof". The Presbytery, however, with the Govan-Stewart controversy still rankling in their minds, opposed every attempt by Stewart to introduce a new course and declared that they would consider nothing unless it were "sent down to us by the Assembly". For three years theological education was at a standstill. Finally, Stewart drew up a curriculum, presented it to the F.M.C. and pointed out that its future rested with them. He asked the F.M.C. to give specific authority to the Presbytery to take students on trial for license so that the Presbytery would no longer have any excuse. "We cannot expect young men to go on with a course and then be told by their own church that they cannot be licensed."  

The curriculum proposed by Stewart was "substantially the same as at home", prominence being given to Systematic Theology, Church History and the study of the English Bible.

1. Stewart to Duff, 8 June 1871, ST 13/3/1.
2. Stewart to Duff, 29 October 1872, ST 13/3/1.
The first year of study was devoted to these three subjects, the second introduced Greek and Hebrew and the third year concentrated on Apologetics, Pastoral Theology and Homiletics. The F.M.C. approved of this scheme and the Secretary wrote about it enthusiastically.

"To me it appears to strike a happy medium between the stereotyped requirement of our own church and the too low standard that has sometimes been accepted in mission fields. The Committee are very thankful that there is so near a prospect of having native preachers and ministers." 2

With characteristic caution Smith emphasised that license did not carry with it any obligation on the Committee at Home nor on the Mission itself to employ these men. Nevertheless, the hope was that such ministers would gradually relieve the Europeans and then the F.M.C. could cut the grants made to each congregation.

As a result of these representations the first theological class was established with four members, Elijah Makiwane, Mpambani Mzimba, James van Rooyen* and James Scott.*

"Through this long and trying range of study in literature, philosophy, languages and divinity the First Theological Class toiled...." 3

At the end of this course both Mzimba and Makiwane were brought before the Presbytery of Kaffraria. They were examined on Scottish Church History, 1744 to 1843, the Presbytery was satisfied and permission was obtained from the F.M.C. to take both men on trial for license. Each candidate had to prepare a sermon, a lecture and a Homily on a given text in addition to submitting, in English, a Greek and Hebrew

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1. Stewart to Duff, 29 October 1872, ST 13/3/1.
2. Smith to Stewart, 24 December 1872, NLS 7770.
3. Lovedale Past and Present, p. 163.
exegesis. 1 Three months later, after examination in Divinity, Chronology, Church History, Greek and Hebrew, the two young men were solemnly licensed and addressed with reference to the work of the ministry and to the fact that they were the first native African students to be approved by the Free Church of Scotland. 2 Eight months then passed before either was called to a congregation.

Once more it was at Stewart's instigation that charges were found for both African candidates. The minister of Lovedale Native Congregation, Mr. Robertson, was a hopelessly inefficient missionary whose influence was proving detrimental to the progress of this, the oldest and strongest African congregation. Stewart, backed by other missionaries, proposed that Robertson should be transferred to a new station in the Transkei (Idutywa), thereby leaving the Lovedale charge vacant for either Mzimba or Makiwane. Further he suggested that the congregation be asked to provide £50 towards the pastors salary, the F.M.C. to provide a further £50 and a house. In this way the principle of self-support would be initiated.

These proposals were adopted, Robertson was transferred, W.J.B. Moir was appointed to fill the vacancy and the congregation was instructed to give a call, in due course, to one of the African ministers. At the beginning of 1875, however, the minister of Macfarlan, a church about ten miles from Lovedale, had died, leaving another charge to be filled. Some members of Presbytery immediately suggested that the two

1. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 5 January 1875, Cory MS 9040.
2. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 7 April 1875, Cory MS 9040.
congregations should be united and placed under a European missionary with an African colleague to assist him. Stewart opposed this strongly.

"I do not understand the views of some of the members of the Presbytery on the question of getting native ministers placed in these congregations. The young men are in point of moral and Christian attainments out of all sight superior to any native ministers in South Africa and I think to some ministers of some denominations who have half trained them - and yet the whole has been a steady struggle to get them acknowledged..." 1

Lovedale Congregation was also divided in its willingness to accept an African minister. As the senior congregation they maintained that they were entitled to a white missionary and not to an untried African probationer. 2 A section of the Congregation proposed, therefore, that Mr. Moir should be permanently appointed. Moir, who shared Stewart's views, declined but even on the day of placing the call to Mzimba there was still a party in favour of Moir and it was only by "care and management" that the call to Mzimba was unanimously signed and a split in the congregation thereby avoided.

"Here were two young men of irreproachable character and good sense and piety and better education than some European ministers of some denominations in the Colony - both ready to take native churches and we were, by delay, every day drifting into the position of having to place a European or divide the congregation. You know I suppose that native congregations think their dignity a little touched by the descent from a white to a black pastor - at least the unwise party think so."

Mpambani Mzimba was duly ordained on 23 December 1875. The following year Elijah Makiwane was called to Macfarlan. This incident illustrates, however, the difficulties facing the establishment of an African ministry. Stewart had

1. Stewart to Murray Mitchell, 18 November 1875, ST 13/3/1.
2. Livingstone Mzimba, Ubom Bomfi, p. 21.
unwaveringly supported the view that to have placed European missionaries over those two congregations would have been "utter stultification to all our work at Lovedale - and to all our promises to the home people about a native ministry." If this principle had been consistently upheld then the history of Free Church missions might have been very different. As it was, lack of courage and divisions of opinion led to the cautious maintenance of the status quo, reinforced by a changing social climate.

1875-1876 was the high-water mark of good will and good intentions from Europeans towards an African ministry and on their side Africans were eager to train as propagators of the Gospel in South Africa and beyond. Tiyo Soga had died tragically in 1871 but there were two ordained men from other denominations at work in South Africa who had received their training at Lovedale. Gwayi Tyamzashe was the pastor of the Kimberley Native Congregation and James van Rooyen was ordained at Kruisfontein in 1876. These, with Mpambani Mzimba and Elijah Makiwane, constituted a fair record for approximately four years of effort. James Scott, from Natal, had spent a year in the Theological class before going to Scotland to complete his training. Already further down the school were John and David Msikinya, Timothy van Rooyen and Edward Tsewu, all destined for the ministry. Some were forced for financial reasons to teach for several years before returning to Lovedale for their theological course. Some earned money at Lovedale itself. William Koyi; for example,

1. Stewart to Murray Mitchell, 28 December 1875, ST 13/3/1.
2. Lovedale Past and Present, p. 371.
was in sole charge of the afternoons work in the fields and grounds when about 150 students turned out to do two hours manual work in accordance with the Institution's requirements.

The Livingstonia Evangelists

Stewart's journey to the newly-established Livingstonia mission in 1876 provided an opportunity to test the enthusiasm of African Christians. These first evangelists must be seen therefore as part of the total plan for an African ministry. William Koyi was one of four selected from fourteen who volunteered to go with Stewart and the second party to Livingstonia. Those who offered to go included Mzimba, Makiwane and the Msikinya cousins but in addition to Koyi those chosen were Shadrach Mgunana,* Mapas Ntintili* and Isaac William Wauchope.* Koyi, Mgunana and Wauchope were teachers, Ntintili, a wagon-maker, went as a missionary artisan. Mgunana came from the United Presbyterian church at Mgwaři.

"Tiyo Soga belonged to Emgwali and was the first native minister of the gospel to his countrymen, while Shadrach is the first native evangelist who has given himself to preach - to a foreign people." 1

"Shaddy" described by Stewart as the "most useful and cheerful of the Lovedale party" appeared to have been regarded affectionately by all. By July 1877 he was dead, however, having succumbed to the fever of Cape Maclear. Prior to that, in December 1876, Isaac William Wauchope had become physically and mentally sick to the point where Laws had had to take him to the coast and put him on a ship for South Africa.

1. J. Cumming to Stewart, 15 June 1876, ST 13/3/1.
He later recovered, found employment as an interpreter in Port Elizabeth and was subsequently ordained as a minister of the Free Church.\textsuperscript{1} His "madness" was not allowed to pass unnoticed by those who were hostile to Livingstonia or to Stewart, nor did it help the cause of an African ministry. Mapas Ntintili, having fallen foul of Laws, returned to the Cape after four years, taught in the Transkei and then became an evangelist at Malan (U.P.). Only William Koyi of the original number remained to work faithfully and consistently until his death from fever in 1887. Stewart described him as "the human agent largely used by God in opening the way for the Gospel among the Angoni".\textsuperscript{2} Koyi made every effort by letter and by personal exhortation when he visited Lovedale to persuade others to join him. The people were kind and friendly, he urged, and their language was so similar that there was no problem with communication. "It will be a great day when the native Christians of South Africa will willingly undertake the work up here and give up their lives to come and teach their countrymen at Lake Nyassa."\textsuperscript{3}

This hope was never to be realised. Such a group did not leave Lovedale again and all efforts to persuade Africans to go to Central Africa were without success. The enthusiastic response in 1876 from Lovedale and Healdtown\textsuperscript{4} to the call to evangelise Africa was never matched thereafter. There were several reasons for this. First, the death of

\textsuperscript{1} Lovedale Past and Present, p. 379.
\textsuperscript{2} Stewart, Dawn in the Dark Continent, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{3} Lovedale Past and Present, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{4} Wesleyan Educational Institution.
Shadrach and the illness of Isaac Williams made a profound impression. Coupled with the deaths of European missionaries, notably Dr. Black, this raised the question of the suitability of the site at Cape Maclear. Stewart who, for a variety of personal reasons, was strongly prejudiced against the site, announced in 1880 that he would not allow Koyi and Ntintili to return until the mission had been moved elsewhere. ¹ Koyi and Mapas were at Lovedale on leave, holding meetings and attempting to recruit but "there was not the same enthusiasm as formerly". ² Secondly, in 1880, there was considerable anxiety and distress over the "Blantyre Affair". ³ At the time that this affair was being widely publicized Stewart was being pressed on all sides for "Native Agents for Livingstonia". He had returned to Lovedale from Scotland in June 1879 to find Laws visiting Lovedale, making a strong plea for more African evangelists. It is possible that he heard rumours of the Blantyre matter while at Lovedale but if so he divulged nothing to Stewart and even later refused to discuss the affair with him frankly, saying that reports had been exaggerated. ⁴ Stewart heard the news shortly after Laws' departure and feared immediately for Mapas whom he considered to be in great danger.

Thirdly, it would seem, that there was a problem with the Presbytery of Kaffraria who showed extreme reluctance to sanction Mzimba's going to central Africa, though they acknowledged the importance of the mission "in words and vague

¹ Stewart to Malan, 25 August 1880, SP 23A(v).
² Stewart to Laws, 31 May 1880, SP LB4b.
³ See Appendix B.
⁴ Laws to Stewart, 22 September 1879, ST 13/3/1.
generalities". Mzimba did not press the matter, perhaps because his congregation was reluctant to see him go. ¹

Undaunted, William Koyi, now married, returned to "Angoniland" in August 1881.

Two years later in 1883, fresh recruits went to the Nyassa region but this time two of them were from Blantyre, Kagasso Sasuze* and Joseph Bismarck.* The other, George Williams,* was from the London Missionary Society. Stewart pointed out to Laws that though Blantyre had sent 6 students to Lovedale, there had been none so far from Livingstonia.

The Free Church missions in the Colony were also, in his opinion, sending an inadequate supply of the right kind of men.

"We have our faults no doubt but willingness to work for that end viz. supporting native evangelists is not one of them....So far as I know black men are not more anxious to be missionaries than white ones. I believe I have laid my finger on one of the weakest points of the Free Church or rather of the Presbyterian missions in this country....As you speak plainly, so do I in self-defence. Other churches get the benefit of Lovedale - our own mission very little." ²

The Theological Curriculum 1883

The decline in the number of evangelists prepared to go north can be attributed to the various influences of the failures, deaths and disasters which accompanied the early years of the Nyassa Missions. It was also true, however, that the type of training required by the Presbytery for this task was too extensive. Few students considered themselves able to undergo the long course, particularly if they did not wish to become fully-fledged ministers.


2. Stewart to Laws, 20 October 1883, SP LB4b.
Stewart had had in the past his full share of Presbyterian pride in the educational attainments of Free Church ministers. When Mzimba and Makiwane were licensed, he considered them to be "out of all sight superior to any native ministers in South Africa."\(^1\) Lovedale staff were inclined to indulge in indirect jibes at the Wesleyans who "count their native preachers and evangelists by the hundreds"\(^2\) and to take pride in the selective educational standards of the Free Church. The decline in candidates for the ministry and for posts as evangelists caused Stewart to realise, however, that the "diversity of gifts" mentioned by the Minute of 1866 must indeed be matched by a "diversity of operations" which in turn demanded diversity of grades in theological education. He had already accepted that the education of the many was more important than the education of the few.

"We shall never educate a native ministry by merely selecting a few for education. We shall never leave behind us Christian churches...if the bulk of the members is allowed to remain ignorant, unintelligent and poor...."\(^3\)

Despite contempt for the Wesleyans there was something to be said at this stage for numbers, for the encouragement of the many rather than the cossetting of the few.

It was with this in mind, with particular application to the training of preachers and evangelists that Stewart gave notice to the Presbytery in April 1880 of a "motion on the subject of theological education in this country." For three years this motion and the proposed curriculum would seem to have become submerged in the customary battle between

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1. Stewart to Murray Mitchell, 18 November 1875, ST 13/3/1.
2. Andrew Smith to Stewart, 21 July 1877, SP 23A(x).
Stewart and those who disagreed with him on the Presbytery. Mzimba, in a letter to Bryce Ross, recommended that the motion be treated very cautiously. Theological education at that time was in a "sad state" and there were many who blamed the Presbytery for this on the grounds that the members of Presbytery had opposed the theological class from the outset. If there was found to be any truth in these allegations, especially as they applied particularly to Bryce Ross, then that would get back to the F.M.C. and Stewart would be exonerated completely. This letter is a pathetic illustration of the opposition and hostility to Stewart and of the stranglehold which personal animosities had on the effectiveness of the mission.

After three years, however, Stewart submitted his proposed new curriculum. The outline course included the study of the Bible, Biblical Theology and Church History in the first year; Bible, Systematic Theology, History of Missions and General Education in the Second Year; and Pastoral Theology, Church History and General Subjects in the Third Year. The most noticeable omission in this shortened course was the study of Latin, Greek and Hebrew and it was this omission and the concentration instead on English which caused, as in the past, the furore among Free Church members.

"In the above course Latin, Greek and Hebrew are not given as hitherto. Latin can be taken alongside the course of theology by any who are anxious or able for it - but it is not included in the course itself, nor are the other two languages. The reasons for this proposal to simplify the course of training for native preachers are the following; the impatience of the young men themselves before a long course of study is

1. Mzimba to Bryce Ross, 16 April 1880, Cory MS 8494.
finished; and the fact that for the congregations to which they are to minister, a course shared exactly on the Home model is not necessary. Experience has shown that a more limited range of subjects and a thorough study of what is undertaken would be more advantageous to the majority of natives at their present stage of advancement than a multiplicity of subjects imperfectly studied. Other denominations in this country make the training of their preachers still more simple..."

The F.M.C. approved these changes for the education of African pastors, though they reserved their judgement in the case of application to Europeans. They tentatively however observed that a course of study different from that in operation in Scotland might be more beneficial for students wishing to work in "the native and Colonial fields of South Africa".¹

In addition to this change in the curriculum, Stewart had also proposed to the F.M.C. that there should be a joint Theological Faculty at Lovedale consisting of Free Church, United Presbyterian, London Missionary Society and Congregational Union representatives providing Professors in different disciplines. The F.M.C. approved this wholeheartedly as they were always in favour of cooperation between Churches and of any devolution of financial responsibility. The Minute of the F.M.C. and the proposal to create a joint Theological Faculty were duly placed before the Presbytery in July 1883. Writing to Laws citing reasons for the dearth of evangelists, Stewart had pointed to the demands of the course, "chugging its slow length along at great cost to us with the dead weight of Latin and Greek and Hebrew." Now there was some sign of a change.

¹. F.M.C. Minutes, 17 July 1883.
Optimistically he declared that this obstacle "is now at an end by the fiat of the F.M.C." but added cautiously that the dictate would "almost certainly be resisted at next meeting of Presbytery".  

His caution was justified. In the January meeting of Presbytery a motion was proposed that this new course was "not sufficient for ordination". In the discussion Mzimba and Makiwane both insisted that pastors should be taught Greek and Hebrew. The Presbytery therefore rejected the simple curriculum but declared itself willing to assist, superintend and test subsequent studies to be superimposed by them on the basic training. There was to be no lowering of standards.

So the simpler course was introduced into Lovedale on the understanding that when the students graduated they would have to undergo further language training at the hands of the Presbytery if they wished to proceed to ordination.

"If the Presbytery wishes to give them Greek and Hebrew...we can offer no objection whatsoever provided they do so at their own cost - of time and labour and money; we shall not object if they add Arabic and Syriac and Chaldaic in addition to the first two but we shall not go on as we have done in the last 12 years, sacrificing both money and health in the effort to carry on the Home Course in all its detail."

The result of the Presbytery's strictures was that in the class of ten enrolled to take the new simplified course there was not a single Free Church student. There was little point in undertaking this course if much time had to be spent thereafter in language learning. Stewart was not

2. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 16 January 1884, Cory MS 9040.
unnaturally critical of the approach of the Presbytery. It should be their business, he wrote to Smith, to select possible candidates for the evangelist course and send them to Lovedale not to put obstacles in the way of procuring any candidates at all.

"It is our work at Lovedale to train those sent not to procure them from the F.C. stations....Do not say "this is simply one of Stewart's statements". You ask about evangelists and I inform you on the prospect as regulated by the supply. If we could follow the plan of simplicity, common sense and co-operation we should have a better state of things on this whole business."¹

At a meeting held in Trinity Church, Grahamstown at the end of September 1884, the Free Church, the United Presbyterian and the Congregational Union met to discuss the matter of theological training and the formation of a joint Theological Board at Lovedale. The L.M.S. declined to attend. Because the U.P. and the F.C. could not agree on a basis for the Union of their two churches the U.P. declined to appoint a theological professor to Lovedale although they continued to send their students there.² Consequently, only the Congregational appointed a Professor and also contributed to the financial cost of the course. The man appointed was T. Durant Philip, son of the famous missionary, John Philip. He worked at Lovedale from 1885 to 1895 and became a close, personal friend of Stewart's. In essence, however, Stewart's ideal of a theological faculty had been abandoned due to lack of co-operation and dearth of funds.

1. Stewart to Smith, 24 March 1884, SP LB4.
2. Stewart to John Stephen, 31 October 1884, SP LB4; an account of the meeting is given in Cory MS 23-25 September.

The unwillingness of some Free Church missionaries to lower their standards of theological training was a prime factor in the decline in the number of candidates for the Free Church ministry. The theological class from 1885 stumbled along, sometimes with only one member (1892), sometimes with six (1895). The entrance qualification remained a Cape Matriculation pass but this was not rigidly adhered to. With this in mind it was reasonable that a knowledge of classical language should not be considered an indispensable requirement for ordination but the Presbytery remained adamant and there were no ordinations for many years. As late as 1897, Bryce Ross proposed to Synod that no probationer should be ordained unless he had some knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew.¹ It was certainly paradoxical that the imposition of a superior standard of education by the Church should be as restrictive as the imposition of a lower standard by the Government. Both made it increasingly impossible for the African, however well educated, to rise above a certain level of employment and remuneration.

On the other hand, the insistence on English as a medium of instruction and as the classical language, was not necessarily more productive of good than the old insistence on Hebrew and Greek. It could be argued, and often was, especially by the Rosses, that these languages had more "affinity with their own Kaffir language than English had."² Philip compared the practise of making English the medium for

¹. Presbytery of Transkei Minutes, 7 April 1897.
instruction with that of the universal use of Latin by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, claiming that Africans spoke a somewhat "monkish English".\footnote{1. The Christian Express, August 1895.} It was claimed that English was invaluable to a trained man in his relations with the wider South African community but Philip also suggested that it was a pity that the instructors in the Institutions had not a sound knowledge of the vernacular. In November 1889, Stewart wrote in his diary that for the first time he had acted as his own interpreter and yet he was more skilled than most in his use of the vernacular.\footnote{2. Stewart Diary, 13 November 1889.} Certainly in the matter of the less highly educated workers such as catechists and evangelists, insistence on English was a handicap as serious as the insistence on Classics. One missionary complained to the F.M.C. that when he raised the question of training for evangelists they invariably suggested that he should send his people to Lovedale. But there, he said, the medium is English and "some of our best men for evangelistic work know nothing of English."\footnote{3. Doig Young to Lindsay, u.d. 1896, NLS 7803.} In 1892 an attempt was made to establish an evangelists class but there were no "suitable candidates" and so missionaries in the various stations continued to select and train their own.\footnote{4. Stewart Diary, 12 September 1892.}

After 1883 no South African missionaries went to Livingstonia. George Williams who had gone with Sasuze and Bismarck in that year did not live up to Laws expectations and he was sent back to South Africa with the firm suggestion that he should not return.

"For the work in the hills we need good teachers and evangelists and seeing that only one new recruit has
come up from Kaffraria since 1876, we cannot look to that quarter for all the help we require. Indeed now, though not discouraging any who may volunteer to come up, I cannot urge as I have done in the past, the seeking of young men from the South." 1

On the more positive side, Laws visited Lovedale in 1891 and brought "four youths from Bandawe to be educated", one of whom was a protege of William Koyi. 2 In that same year Stewart set off for East Africa to establish what came to be known as the Kibwezi Mission. Although he took with him John Bikwa, a waggon driver from Lovedale, he took no trained evangelists. 3 When he outlined the plan before leaving, he explained that volunteers might be asked to go there "to do as Koyi and Shadrach did on Lake Nyassa"; but just as Kibwezi did not become the second Lovedale it was intended to be, so there was never any opportunity to repeat the experiment of the South African evangelists.

European Attitudes to African ministers from 1883

Besides the reluctance to ordain inadequately qualified men after 1885, there were decided changes in attitude on the part of the European missionaries to the already-established, and presumably equal, African brethren in the Presbytery of Kaffraria. Prior to this there had been a cautious enthusiasm for a self-supporting church with an African pastorate, for a society where both black and white would be equal before the law and where the African could, as he progressed, share equal opportunities with Europeans. The missionaries were

1. Laws to Stewart, 21 August, 1888, ST 13/3/1.
2. Robert Johnston to Stewart, 16 December 1891, SP 23A(x).
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 1 January 1892, P.C.
often eager to point out that some elements in colonial society could, with benefit, study the sober and industrious habits of educated Africans. The philosophy of gradual assimilation was not sufficient, however, to withstand the onslaught of political change in the South Africa of the eighties, and because they were insufficiently convinced of their own views, the missionaries tended, chameleon-like, to take on the colour of surrounding opinion. The growth of Afrikaner nationalism, the response of British imperialism and the emergence of legalised discrimination, form the framework within which the Free Church twisted and rationalised its motives in an attempt to account for its downright refusal to relinquish congregations to experienced African ministers. This did not mean that missionaries were not prepared to defend African rights, to protest against insults to individuals, to risk the indictment of "political parson" for opposition to government legislation or even to face imprisonment for attacking calculated colonial injustice.  

The change in attitude was due to the more subtle shortcomings of a liberalism which could appreciate the theoretical rights of Africans but was not prepared to uphold in actuality, where it most affected them personally, the equality of all men.

With the prospect of the establishment of a joint Theological faculty, George Smith took the opportunity of writing to Makiwane and Mzimba suggesting that this was a fit time for them to induce "the most hopeful of your young

1. See Chapter V.
people to study for the church...either as catechists or ministers." At the same time he wrote to Bryce Ross hinting that he had for too long refused to adopt an "episcopal" rôle and that if he would only do so, then "the native pastorate and people will have fair play." Makiwane's reply was frank.

"In this country we have not only the difficulty of inducing young men but we find that the political conditions of the country are against us and that this force intensified and has been more so than ever during the last three or four years." 3

The policy of the F.M.C., however, consistent from the Minute of 1866, was that "native ministers" should occupy established churches, thereby releasing Europeans to form new stations. In the eighties, Burnshill Mission, about ten miles from Lovedale was the centre of discussion with the suggestion that the incumbent, William Stuart, should go north to Tsolo in the Transkei. In the nineties, it was the missionary unwillingness to place Africans in Johannesburg and West Pondoland that aggravated the controversy.

In 1885, when the question of Burnshill arose, the Presbytery refused to place an African pastor there on the grounds that the peculiar circumstances of the station, "known only to those on the spot", did not commend such a move. This familiar excuse was amplified by the statement that the district was tribally divided between Xhosa and Mfengu and that it was hemmed in by other denominations anxious to proselytise. The presence of a European

1. Smith to Makiwane; Smith to Mzimba, 3 December 1884, NLS 7772.
2. Smith to Bryce Ross, 26 December 1883, NLS 7772.
3. Makiwane to Smith, 5 February 1885, NLS 7797.
missionary was therefore "indispensable".¹

A year later, in 1886, there were sharp queries from the F.M.C. about African self-support and the role of the missionary. John Don who, as clerk of the Presbytery may be held to have represented general opinion, delivered a firm reply.

"Absolute self-support would imply absolute self-government....If liberality reached the point of native self-support and a claim for independence was made and admitted, the evil would be greater than the good. I do not think the native churches possess men capable of guiding, governing, and successfully developing a churches work if thrown entirely upon themselves. They need stimulus suggestions and backing from a level above themselves."²

To the Committees suggestion that the constant presence of missionaries must inhibit the spontaneity of African churches, Don could only advise that, though there might be some truth in the idea, the advantages gained from leaving them to their own devices would be far less than "the risks incurred".

In 1885 Edward Tsewu had been ordained. In 1888 it was proposed by the F.M.C. that he should go to Duff (Idutywa) an established station in the Transkei, to relieve the European missionary. Don wrote frankly that they were reluctant to do this because, although he was sincere and earnest, Tsewu showed "want of energy". "There is a sluggishness and inertia about our native brethren that militates against them."³ This was the ecclesiastical translation of the familiar South African phrase - "lazy, good-for-nothing Kaffir".

1. Don to Smith, 2 April 1885, NLS 7797.
2. Don to Smith, 4 September 1886, NLS 7797.
3. Don to Smith, 19 May 1888, NLS 7797.
The deposition of Edward Tsewu, after the break-up of his Johannesburg congregation in 1897, brought this distrust into the open.\footnote{1}{See Chapter V.} The Synod put on record its conviction that an African minister could not cope alone with this situation and that the work could only be carried on satisfactorily by a European missionary. This declaration confirmed the worst fears of the African pastors and was directly instrumental in Mzimba's decision to secede. The fact that the European missionaries discounted African reaction only served to show the extent of polarisation of understanding that existed within the mission. Again Don was blunt in his letter to the F.M.C.

"We are entering upon a state of things in the missions of this country which I remember the beginning of in Bengal 25 years ago - the claim for real equality between European and Native brethren in every respect... but we cannot afford to act upon the assumption that the native is really equal to the European. There is something lacking which explains our clinging to a European agency....(Natives) are at their best as assistants or as ministers working under the surveillance of Europeans...in fact they need a Bishop over them not a Presbytery." \footnote{2}{Don to Smith, 24 January 1898, NLS 7798.}

The failure of Tsewu and matters arising from Mzimba's secession shortly after had the effect of bringing the F.M.C. into line with the Synods thinking, at least temporarily. Not for several years was it possible for some missionaries and some of the Home Committee to take a cool look at the situation and see in their own inconsistencies the root of dissatisfaction in their African colleagues. Only after the Mzimba affair had dragged its weary length for eight years through the life and work of the mission were some members
of the United Free Church willing to admit, in part, their mistakes and to try to show that they had learned from the experience.

"The Committee would welcome your personal opinion as to the policy instituted 40 years ago in the instructions given to Dr. Stewart and the Presbytery as to ordained native appointments. When the Mzimba case began many, notably Dr. Lindsay, felt that you on the spot and we here should have carried out the policy more quickly to do justice to the Church and to the Lovedale theological school and to Presbyterianism. This may not be the best time to do justice to our Kaffir ministers to reward the loyal and to anticipate in the best way, more disloyalty."¹

Summary

With respect to the encouragement of an African pastorate, the Foreign Mission Committee, in theory, presented a consistent, honest approach. It proved unable, however, to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the missionaries in Kaffraria to execute the plan. There were three reasons why the attempt of the Free Church mission to produce a team of preachers and evangelists was almost a complete failure. First, as Presbyterians they set too high a standard in education for the ministry. This showed a lack of flexibility, a desire to import a Scottish standard of excellence into the African situation which was totally unrealistic and which, at one level, had little to do with the controversy between assimilation and differentiation. When it came to the dissemination of the Gospel by African agency, the many were preferable to the few. Secondly, this adherence to standards

¹. Smith to Henderson, 27 July 1906, NLS 7779.
was too closely bound up with the personal animosities which corroded the mission and with the conflict of interest which was felt to exist between Lovedale and the mission in general. There is certainly evidence that greater cooperation between Stewart and the Rosses might have transformed the atmosphere in Presbytery and expedited many decisions which were opposed and delayed until they lost their effectiveness. It is not too much to say that the absence of personality conflict and a positive approach towards the production of a multi-faceted African ministry before 1885, would have resulted in more effective missionary work and in a more firmly-rooted African church. This, in itself, is an indictment on the mission. Thirdly, the constant excuses made to the F.M.C. illustrated how infected the missionaries became by the mores of white South African society. Much can be said about the pressures of colonial society which were real enough, about the inescapability of legislation to which all had to conform, about the disillusion caused by secessionism which was hard to accept after a life's work - but when all has been said in defence, it still remains true that the attitude of the Free Church missionaries to their African pastors, co-Presbyters and intending candidates for the ministry, was indefensible and irredeemably suspect. The brief glimpses of genuine concern shown, for instance, by Stewart in the seventies, were thoroughly extinguished by petty considerations. The missionaries demanded too much of others, not enough of themselves and ultimately made the cardinal error of equating convenient, compromising custom with predestination, genetic inheritance and divine decree.
NATIVE LAWS COMMISSION 1883.
Front row: R. Stanford; J. Ayliff; Sir J. Barry; Hon. J. Uppington; James Stewart; John Noble
Second Row: J. Chalmers; Tshuka; Teto; Dashe; Secretary.

DR. JANE WATERSTON
CHAPTER IV

STEWART, LOVEDALE AND CAPE POLITICS

a. 1870-1885

Background

In the late seventies and early eighties of the Nineteenth Century a new political awareness and new forms of political action developed in the Cape Colony of South Africa. This quickening of interest was common to all sections of the population, to black and white. For example, the year 1879 saw the formation of the Afrikaner Bond, and its amalgamation in 1885 with the Boer Farmers Association of the Western Cape1 made the Bond the first and most powerful political party in the country. In 1882 the Native Educational Association was founded and all over the Cape organisations of a similar nature were being formed by Africans, many of them less structured, but showing evidence of African interest in formal politics. These examples highlight the outstanding characteristic of political activity in the Cape, namely, that it had both black and white exponents, both groups being prepared to make their challenge and defend their rights within a constitutional framework. The Cape had, by the Ordinance of 1854, adopted the much-vaunted 'colour-blind' franchise, perhaps more colour-blind in theory than in practise but nevertheless entitling Africans and Coloureds, as well as Dutch and English-speaking South Africans, to the vote. This state of affairs was in strong contrast to that existing in other South African states where the franchise was strictly limited to

Europeans. Moreover, in 1872, the Cape had been granted Responsible Government in the hope that the Cape would form the lynch-pin in a Confederation of South African states. Confederation did not succeed but Responsible Government remained, giving the Cape increased freedom for internal political action.

In the years before 1879 interest in Parliament was sluggish and the English-speaking South Africans went unchallenged in their monopoly of Parliamentary power. With the emergence of a lively interest in political prospects on the part of both Dutch and African, English-speaking politicians and their supporters had to re-examine their positions and manoeuvre with skill in order to hold their ground. Again, technically outside these wrangles, the Imperial power with its vested interests at different times in the Transvaal, Natal, Basutoland and Bechuanaland, impinged on and interfered with Cape politics. Most Afrikaners and many other white South Africans objected vehemently to the Imperial presence in the country and the constant threat of its expansion; others, both black and white, welcomed it and even actively encouraged it.

In this plural society with its complexity of interests it soon became obvious that no party or section could stand on its own and that the way in which a man might vote was determined by many factors. Most issues had elements which were pro- or anti-Imperialist, pro- or anti-Boer, pro- or anti-Native, a situation further confused by additional pressures from the important liquor lobby, powerful farming interests and wealthy mining concerns. Although it appears
that politics in the Cape in this period was dominated by a succession of English-speaking Prime Ministers, by a majority of English-speaking members of Parliament, by English Governors and Colonial Secretaries, in fact not one Cape ministry from 1883 could have been elected or maintained in office without the cooperation of the Afrikaner Bond and many English-speaking "liberals" owed their seats to the judicious casting of the African vote, especially in the Eastern Province constituencies.¹

It might be asked why, when the working machinery in the Cape had been at their disposal, Afrikaners had shown so little interest in politics? What factors influenced them to take up political activity at this time? In the case of the African population the same questions can be posed. The answer to these lies broadly in the cataclysmic events, political and economic, of this period which affected all sections, initiating radical change in the structure and direction of South African society. The control and profits from roads, railways, shipping, trade, commerce, building, food production and land excited enormous interest and caused much conflict. The need to settle South Africa's internal political difficulties was made urgent by the presence of prospective wealth and the desperate need for an organised labour force. In the 1880's the options for all classes of Cape society appeared open and each group naturally wished to control the options in the interests of its own people. With the disappearance of unlimited land there was no longer any escape either for the Boer or the African, both of whom had, in the past, evaded confrontation.

Political events

In April 1877 the Imperial Government annexed the Transvaal on the understanding that the predominantly Boer population would be allowed to keep their own customs and institutions.¹ That this compact was not kept meant that for the next four years there were increasingly discontented rumblings from the Transvaal. This additional Afrikaner grievance was to have immense significance for the history of South Africa.

In the same year, the Cape Parliament passed a Bill to annex the territory of Griqualand West (though this Bill was not actually implemented for another three years). Generally speaking, the Cape was not anxious to accept responsibility for any native territories beyond the Kei River, although, in 1871, they had reluctantly agreed to annex Basutoland in the hope that from her central position she would help to pacify tribes in surrounding districts. Outside the Colony, therefore, in the Transkeian territories, the Chiefdoms were still supposedly independent; the Gcaleka, the Ngqika, the Ndlambe (all Xhosa), the Thambu and the Mpondo. Within the Colony itself the Mfengu had long been regarded as the special proteges of the Government and they owned land there, paid taxes and sent their children to school. But there was no hard and fast division: Mfengu lived across the Kei just as Ngqika lived in the Colony and many Transkeian Africans, armed with their passes, came to the Colony to look for work. Similarly, there were whites who lived across the Kei, mainly

¹. This section is based on Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., Chapters V and VI; and on Eric Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 366ff.
missionaries, traders and adventurers, often holding positions of importance with the Chiefs and in different ways introducing a new form of life. Certainly there were British agents with some tribes but, at this time, they had very little power.

Viewed from the Cape this system, or lack of it, was unsatisfactory. The tribes had been pushed further back after each successive war; their land had been confiscated, their people often dispersed, famine was a constant threat and poverty was a way of life and yet, it seemed to the Colonist, that from all these disasters, the tribal system re-emerged, resilient and lawless. When war broke out once again in 1877 and for eighteen months threatened to involve every frontier community, when the Cape defence forces were shown to be hopelessly inadequate and the whole operation cost thousands of pounds, the time seemed ripe for a new policy and those who favoured the extension of Colonial power began to promote this object. Their reasons were varied: some wanted land, some wanted labour, some wanted a market, especially for brandy, but all, even those who, because they were favourably disposed towards Africans would have frowned on exploiting them, all wished to see the power of the Chiefs curtailed because they believed that the greatest barrier to peace and to the progress of Civilisation was the stranglehold the Chiefs had on the lives and loyalty of their people.

The Governor of the Cape, newly arrived in 1877, was Sir Bartle Frere,* a man in favour of firm government of the tribes in place of what he considered had been the
"substitution of the gun-runner and the canteen-keeper for the English magistrate". He therefore encouraged the Prime Minister of the Cape, Gordon Sprigg, to make a general settlement in 1878, which would involve the extension of European control into those Transkeian areas. Accordingly, in 1878, the government passed the Peace Preservation Act, known as the Disarmament Act, by which they hoped to deprive all Africans of their weapons of war and to pave the way for magisterial power in place of that of the Chiefs. This measure and the attempts to implement it produced violent hostility, particularly from the Zulu and Sotho nations, but in varying degrees from all the tribes in the Transkei and Griqualand. There were also many whites in the Colony, Natal and Basutoland who openly denounced the Act on the grounds that it was wrong to disarm only blacks and particularly wrong to make no distinction between those who had been loyal to the government and those who had been in rebellion in 1877-78.

While disarmament was being carried out in the Ciskei among the Mfengu and the Nqikgquka, Bartle Frere set off for Natal hoping to quell the mounting discontent of the Zulus over land disputes. If he could bring peace to that part of South Africa, he might still persuade the Cape, who were afraid of the Zulus, to adopt the plan for Confederation which Frere was under Colonial Office instructions to implement. In December of 1878 he delivered an ultimatum to Cetshwayo, Paramount Chief of the Zulus, about the land dispute and the enforcement of the Disarmament Act in Zululand, as it was being applied in the Cape.

Meantime, in the Transvaal, the situation was steadily worsening. In May 1878 Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert had set off for Downing Street with strong petitions against the annexation of the Transvaal and though they received promises of self-government from Hicks-Beach, when these again showed little sign of being implemented, the Transvaalers, in despair, pledged themselves on January 12 1879 to regain their lost independence.

On the previous day, January 11 1879, the ultimatum to Cetshwayo had expired and Sir Frederic Thesiger, later Lord Chelmsford, fresh from his triumphs in the Cape War 1877-78, had led four columns into Zululand. Eleven days later the Zulu impis inflicted the most crushing defeat the British army had experienced since the Crimean War, at the battle of Isandhlwana. The censuring of Frere in March by an embarrassed British government and the savage revenge of the British troops on the Zulu army at Ulundi in July could not repair the damage to British prestige.

Almost immediately the effects of Isandhlwana began to make themselves felt. Morosi, a southern Sotho chief, refused to comply with the Disarmament Act, walled himself up on a mountain early in 1879 and was not dislodged until November when his fortress was captured and he was killed. Magistrates of experience, like Captain Blyth and Walter Stanford noticed much unrest among the people and expressed the hope that Isandhlwana would not lead to a war of the races. Stanford explicitly maintained that "a conspiracy

1. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
2. Frederic Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Lord Chelmsford.
3. The rebellion of the Chief Morosi in the Quithing district was extremely difficult to subdue.
to rise against the government began."¹

Sprigg, nothing daunted, held a Pitso² with the Sotho in Basutoland announcing disarmament and a hut tax. In the following April 1880, the Proclamation was issued requiring all Sotho to hand in their arms. After months of tension the Cape Colony, in October 1880, found itself once more at War not only with the Ba-Sotho but with the tribes in their immediate neighbourhood. In the district of Gumbu, near Umtata, a magistrate, Hamilton Hope, was coolly murdered with two of his aides by Umhlontlo, a Mpondo chief, who was probably trying to break through to Basutoland, to make common cause with the Ba-Sotho in what was now known as the "Gun War". Stanford recorded Umhlontlos words to other chiefs that all magistrates were to be killed - as representatives of the Government, they had to suffer. Mpambani Mzimba visiting Idutywa from Lovedale, reported that "every mans mouth was full of news" and that rumours flew thick and fast that all magistrates, traders and Fingoes had been killed. "The natives want to get rid of the magistrate because of the promiscuous use of the lash, rigid laws and the gun business".³

With the Basutoland Rebellion, as it was termed in the Cape, in full swing and the Cape troops fully occupied there or in the Drakensberg-Bashee area, the Transvaalers decided to take advantage of the chaos, marshalled their forces on December 16 1880 and proceeded to inflict a surprise defeat

¹ Walter Stanford, Reminiscences (edited J.W. MacQuarrie), Vol. I, p. 104
² Council with the Ba-Sotho chiefs and people.
³ Mzimba to R. Ross, 11 November 1880, Cory MS 8497.
on an inadequately-armed British column at Bronkhorstspruit. The crowning event, however, and the one of most far-reaching significance was the defeat on January 16 of General Colley at Majuba Hill.

"The success of Transvaal arms filled the Colonial Afrikaner with immense pride of race and stirred up his profound contempt for the arrogant and unimaginative diplomacy of the Imperial authorities." 1

The nationalistic pride spread to Afrikaners beyond the bounds of the Transvaal, even to those Afrikaners in the Cape who respected the Imperial flag and had little admiration for Transvaalers. This was reflected in the Congress held at Richmond in 1883 where the Bond and the Farmers Association gave their approval to a Constitution which stated that

"The Bond knows no nationality of any kind save that of Afrikaners, and considers as belonging to it everybody of whatever origin, who aims at the welfare of South Africa."

They further proclaimed as their object

"...the formation of a South African nationality through the nurturing of true patriotism as the preparation for the achievement of the final destiny." 2

The challenge to British hegemony had been thrown down.

"The watchword of 'Zuid Afrika voor de Africanders'", observed a noted English-speaking lawyer, "is perfectly natural. It has as its foundation national unity and patriotism and the English have no right to take exception to it except on the ground that as this is a British colony the intrusion of a foreign or alien element into our life is not permissible." 3

With the Pretoria Convention 1881 and the restoration of independence to the Transvaal the Imperial power was greatly

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1. Davenport, op.cit., p. 74.
2. Davenport, op.cit., p. 66. The more controversial words of the Transvaal constitution, including 'a United South Africa under its own flag' were not adopted.
3. J. Rose-Innes to Stewart, 11 October 1887, SP 31A.
diminished. The Afrikaner star was in the ascendent. Even before Majuba the Bond had entered the Cape political scenes with élan and had gained one-third of the Parliamentary seats in the election of 1879.

Africans

In their struggle for political rights and independence of action, Africans received no such psychological uplift as Majuba Hill, despite the moral victory of the Ba-Sotho in having the Disarmament Proclamation withdrawn and having their country transferred to the protection of the British government in 1884. If the Gcaleka and the Ngqika had been in a position to rally with the Mpondo events might have taken a different turn but they were weakened by two factors. First, the after-effects of the War of 1877-78 prevented them from taking advantage of the unrest in 1880. Second, there was little mutual trust between the tribes and any potential unity was more often undermined by division within the ranks than by external foes.

"...all the natives have the same grievance but then they have no confidence in each other and especially they dont think that they shall succeed." 1

The fate of Umhlontlo is a case in point. His efforts to spread revolt was foiled, not by Cape troops, but by Zibi, chief of the AmaHlubi, also Mpondo but loyal to the government. He "fooled Umhlontlo" and was named as the "foiler of the mighty elephant."2

1. Mzimba to R. Ross, 11 November 1880, Cory MS 8497.
2. See Footnote 1, p. 221.
It is significant that Ncanywa Zibi had been a Lovedale pupil and that his two sons, Alfred and Patrick, were students at Lovedale in the period from 1877 to 1884. The loyalties of the educated African at this time were definitely and almost without exception to the British Crown. War as an instrument of change had been shown to be futile. The new approach would be one of co-operation and political action. The division between the "School" and the "Red Kaffir" in this matter was by no means clear-cut but with the erosion of the power of the chiefs, leadership fell to the educated African minority and tactics became Parliamentary rather than military. To achieve any political success, however, Africans were dependent on the assistance and, to some extent, the leadership of sympathetic whites. Thus there was no successful parallel, amongst Africans, to the formation of the Afrikaner Bond, which was inspired by a self-respecting nationalism with strong support from the common people.

Cape Liberals

As a consequence of changing circumstances in the country a small number of English-speaking radical members of the Legislative Assembly banded together as a group - not a party - of Independents, known sometimes as Cape Liberals. The group, at this time, was not so much affected by the emergence of Afrikaner Bondism as that they were totally alienated by the Sprigg administration with its policy of "vigour" in native legislation and policy. They deplored the Ba-Sotho war and

openly encouraged a British protectorate there. They objected to the "irritating, repressive and suspicion-creating policy"\(^1\) which the Sprigg government pursued after the War, to the Disarmament Act, the Pass Laws, the Vagrancy and Branding Acts, all of them aimed at subjecting the African to more stringent European control. In the eyes of the Liberals this legislation was not only unjust but foolish, in that it failed to distinguish between loyal and disloyal, educated and uneducated, civilised and uncivilised, and in so doing bred resentment and provoked unrest in the country. Reluctantly, this group of men decided that they could not in all conscience vote with the Government, and found themselves more in sympathy with the Bond members and their leader Mr. Hofmeyr\(^2\) who, although in favour of a vigorous 'Native policy', disliked the Disarmament Act and the Ba-Sotho War because of the trouble they caused. One consequence of Sprigg's policy therefore was that it upset the balance of power between English and Dutch in the Legislative Assembly and paved the way for Bond predominance. Electoral support for the Independents came chiefly from Cape Town and from Eastern Province liberals but to offset white hostility in certain constituencies Independent candidates relied for their seats on the African vote. Thus the uneasy alliance between the politically-conscious Africans and the white Liberal independent came into being. Their aim was to hold the balance of power between the two extremes in the country and thus promote a more equitable society, but events, and

\(^1\) The Christian Express, February 1880.

\(^2\) Jan Hofmeyr, 1845-1909, noted Afrikaner journalist, editor and politician. Leader of the Afrikaner Bond.
the inescapable identity of white interests, ultimately rendered this impossible.

Missionaries

The 'political missionary' has been a source of irritation to the average South African colonist from the beginning of the 19th Century to the present day. For over 150 years, often acting as liaison between black and white or as spokesman for African interests, missionaries of all denominations have sought to draw the attention of South African governments, British Parliaments and other international bodies to the inequities of the social and political system in South Africa. The most controversial of these was John Philip but the list included many others, Robert Moffat, David Livingstone, William Shaw, François Coillard, Alphonse Mabille and James Stewart. Men like those who believed it to be their Christian duty to fight political evils with political weapons were severely criticised by fellow churchmen and missionaries who opted for a more conventional approach, by statesmen and politicians who thought of them as troublemakers and by the majority of colonists who held the view that the missionaries' job was to teach religion and make converts amongst the Africans, to maintain peace or a steady labour flow and not to cause disturbance.

The political missionary in the Cape of the 19th Century was not only suspect because of his attitudes to 'native policy' but also in many instances because it was felt that he posed a threat to the independence of the State. The tenuous hold which the Cape felt that it had on independence
can only be understood in the light of events in the Afrikaaner Republic. The Imperial government had annexed those territories with impunity, on grounds of internal dissension and anarchy. There was little to prevent them doing the same in the Cape, given adequate motive. Those who favoured the policy of 'Colonialism', the complete self-dependence of the Colony,¹ were naturally hostile to missionaries who used their influence with British government officials and Church leaders, in an attempt particularly to bring 'native territories' under the authority of British justice. Thus the confusion between loyalty to Christ and loyalty to the British Crown which undoubtedly existed in the minds of many missionaries made them suspect, not only to Africans as subverters of African tribal allegiance, but to Colonists as traitors to the cause of a growing South African nationalism.

It is important to recognise that this concept of 'Colonialism' in the 1880's appealed to the Afrikaans-speaking and to many English-speaking Colonists in the Cape. In contrast with the Transvaal Boers, the Cape Afrikaner was content to accept the Imperial connection with all that that entailed but, having been granted self-government, he maintained that the Cape should carry out its full responsibilities in all matters of internal administration, including the problem of the 'native territories'. This was the policy of Hofmeyr and the Bond; it was also subscribed to by Cape Liberals like John X. Merriman* and J.W. Sauer.*

At first outwith the Colony then after 1846 brought within its bounds, Lovedale stood in the frontier between

the black and white areas of the Cape. For this reason it could not remain detached from Cape politics. In the early years war had dominated the district and much of Lovedale's history had been determined by conflicts and disasters. The 'native problem' in those days was one of safe-guarding the military frontier and, as such, had been largely left to Imperial responsibility. In 1870, when Stewart became Principal of Lovedale, the 'native question' was being transformed from a frontier problem into a problem of internal administration and therefore being converted from 'an Imperial into a South African problem'.

The granting of Responsible Government in 1872, the more peaceful conditions on the frontier and the tentative extension of Colonial authority to African chiefdoms, changed the political climate and entailed, not without a struggle, the gradual elimination of the Imperial factor. Stewart, however, and many others like him, did not wish to see the elimination of the Imperial factor. Lovedale faced two ways; into the Colony and beyond the Kei. Those who resided in the Cape had potential means of affecting their society through the democratic process; but many at Lovedale came from beyond the Kei and it was over these areas that many wished to see Cape authority restrained because they feared that, if given free rein, the Colonists would exploit and oppress the tribes. Political motivation here was strictly anti-'Colonial' and pro-Imperialist. It was pro-African only in the sense that it believed Imperial white rule was more beneficial than

Colonial white rule. Again, therefore, it offended emerging South African 'colonialism' and eventually undercut, by confusion, early stirrings of black nationalism.

Stewart, Lovedale and Cape Politics

It is against this background that the political attitudes and interests of James Stewart and Lovedale Institution must be investigated and their importance assessed. One must first distinguish between the political actions of an individual and the political involvement of an Institution. The Institution, which included people of widely-differing viewpoints, nevertheless represented something novel in South African society and from this it drew its political significance. Not only was it racially-mixed, educating both black and white, but it was tribally-mixed, offering students the opportunity to cross cultural frontiers and to discover their common interests. Lovedale had a symbolic importance, particularly for Africans and, though its symbolic importance far outran its actual achievements or even its intentions, in this sense Lovedale, as an Institution, could be said to have wielded political influence.¹ This impression was disseminated and found practical expression through what could justifiably be called the Lovedale 'old-boy network' in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere. Many of those most active in initiating organisations, addressing meetings, encouraging voter registration were African graduates of Lovedale. The opportunity for higher education at

¹. It would seem that Lovedale still has this symbol significance for Africans (rather like an African Iona).
Lovedale meant that its graduates were often found in positions of influence. It was not uncommon to find an African clerk or interpreter at the Magistrates Court, in the service of the European magistrate, both of them graduates of Lovedale.¹

It was also on the basis of Lovedale's importance that James Stewart, as its Principal, was able to speak with authority on social and political affairs. His advice was asked for, by Europeans, as one who "knew the natives", his opinion was respected because of his experience at Lovedale even by those who regarded the 'novelty' of Lovedale as potentially dangerous. It is evident, however, that African politics and opinion attempted to move in an independent groove and that, in the mid-eighties, they made a conscious distinction between Stewart and Lovedale, between the attitudes of the individual and the significance, to them, of the Institution. Stewart's influence carried most weight amongst the white, sympathetic, mission-interested people of Scotland and South Africa. His most powerful weapon was the Lovedale newspaper which he founded in 1870 as the Kaffir Express, re-named in 1876 the Christian Express.²

Originally the paper consisted of eight pages, four in English, four in Xhosa. After 1873 it was decided to separate

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¹ When Lovedale Past and Present was published in 1888 there were 14 European graduates of Lovedale employed as magistrates and 49 Africans employed as clerks or interpreters, a job also held by 9 Europeans. William Seti was assistant clerk and Interpreter to R.J. Dick of King Williams Town; Myaso Kivit held the same post in W.T. Brownlee's office in Qumbu but there were many others.

the two and thus the Xhosa-language newspaper Isigidimi SamaXhosa came into being. This paper had its own editor, employed by Lovedale, but it was closely monitored by Stewart and political material was not encouraged. Despite this, Isigidimi stood high in the estimation of the literate section of the Africans in the early years of its existence. After the 1877-78 War, however, Isigidimi went into decline and its place was taken in 1884 by the first independent African newspaper, Imvo Zabantsundu. Its first editor was John Tengo Jabavu* who had previously edited Isigidimi. For the remainder of the century Jabavu and Imvo exercised an enormous influence on African voters. He and Stewart, through the editorial columns of their respective newspapers, were frequently in opposition over education and the thorny problem of political allegiance. These newspapers, therefore, in addition to private letters and articles of Stewart's, are the chief sources of information about the political attitudes of Stewart and other missionaries and about the response of the African community.

The War of 1877-78

The 1877-78 War and its aftermath represented for Stewart, as it did for so many, a political water-shed. Prior to this Stewart had been content to support the government of the day and had made it his duty to encourage others to do the same. He took no part in formal politics, even claiming with some pride that he had never voted, and he carefully refrained from using the Christian Express as a political platform.
"I take an interest though not an active part in political matters - for the reason that I think missionaries should not too much concern themselves in these matters or appear too prominently - nesutor ultra etc!" 1

Lovedale, however, was not without political attitudes.

1) As has already been stated Lovedale students were expected to be loyal to the government and in times of war students returning 'to the bush' were considered a disgrace and were instantly expelled. 2) As an educational institution Lovedale was also not without vested interests in government, and in the matter of grants relied on a majority in the Legislative Assembly being sympathetic to 'native education'. In the constituency of Victoria East, therefore, Lovedale quite openly befriended one local Member of the Legislative Assembly (M.L.A.), Mr. David Watson, and were hostile to his opponent, Mr. George Brown. The latter was, in fact, elected in 1879, spoke out against government grants and made strong criticism of Lovedale. 3) There was also from 1819 an increasingly bitter feud between Lovedale and the municipality of Alice which Lovedale attempted to resolve by gaining their separation from Alice. This required an act of Parliament and local M.L.A.'s sympathetic to Lovedale who would urge such a bill through the Assembly.

The War of 1877 was the outcome of continuous unrest on the frontier, aggravated by severe drought. It began with skirmishes between the Gcaleka-Xhosa and the Mfengu but

2. Langham Dale to Stewart, 28 August 1879, SP 27A(iii).
soon included other Xhosa clans, such as the Ngqika and the Ndlambe. Some confined themselves to attacks on the Mfengu but there were also raids on Europeans which resulted in counter-attacks by the Colonial forces. By November 1877, however, all seemed subdued and the usual process of claiming fines in cattle and land from the antagonists began. But the matter was not settled so easily. Many of the Xhosa resented the fines and the demand for their arms and some who had previously been loyal decided to rebel. The colonial forces were totally inadequate to deal with a renewed rising so that there was considerable panic on the frontier when hostilities broke out anew and it seemed as though all Xhosa peoples would rally to the cause under their Chiefs, Sarile and Sandille. In February 1878, the Xhosa were defeated at Kentani by Colonial troops backed by Imperial forces, Mfengu and loyal Thembu. Sarile escaped beyond the Kei and there he and other chiefs rallied their forces, though by now they were severely hampered by lack of ammunition and scarcity of food. Lt. General Thesiger (Lord Chelmsford) systematically scoured the Xhosa retreats, killing men and taking women and children prisoner. Many of the Xhosa leaders were killed, including Sandille, and finally in June, after months of ruthless suppression a government amnesty was proclaimed.

Throughout this war Stewart was either in Central Africa (at Livingstonia) or in Scotland and was therefore only indirectly involved. His position as Principal of Lovedale

1. Sarile (Kreli), Paramount Chief of the Xhosa. Sandille, Chief of the Ngqika, whose son, Bisset, was at Lovedale at this time.
was occupied by John Buchanan* of Natal, well-intentioned but an easily-excited hypochondriac. Two examples will be given of Lovedale's attitude in this frontier conflict which will illustrate its loyalties and the various ways in which its members became implicated in such disputes.

1) When frontier war broke out, farmers and residents in the area became anxious and many of them abandoned their farms and property. Mr. Watson, M.L.A. for Victoria East who had a farm in the district first asked Buchanan if he could store his furniture at Lovedale and then in 1878 when the war moved west of the Kei, he and his wife deserted 'Llangollen' and became guests of the Buchanans at Lovedale. The chief impetus for this move was the murder of a man called Murray on their farm. The Watsons were convinced that this murder, the theft of their cattle and the burning of property in the district could all be charged to Chief Oba and his clan, a branch of the Rarabe. Oba, known as Ngonyama (the Lion), had had a distinguished career in the War of 1850-52 and it was generally agreed that if Oba joined the rebellion in 1877 then masses of the Xhosa people would follow him. The Civil Commissioner, Percy Nightingale*, assisted by G.M. Theal* who was at that time on the Lovedale staff, decided to appeal to Oba to remain loyal and to guarantee his lands and cattle in return. Nightingale and Theal had some success with this and Oba's people did not join the rebels. The presence of Oba in the district however, and his defence by Theal and Nightingale alarmed and

1. Victoria East was the electoral district in which Lovedale stood. There were more African voters in it than in any other Eastern Province constituency.
disgusted the Watsons and other farmers.

"Mr. Nightingale and Mr. Theal have induced Oba to come to Alice with a number of his people, professedly loyal, they are receiving rations from the government and are to be located at Aberdeen... we think it is one of the most unwise heartless moves that could possibly be..." 1

Impressed by the 'losses and trials of our good friends the Watsons', John Buchanan supported their point of view and wrote to the Governor appealing for the expulsion of Oba and his tribe.

"I have depicted the terrible evils resulting from the presence of such a vile horde amongst respectable civilised people...and I have not scrupled to let Mr. Ashley (one of the Governor's secretaries now) know a great many things about Mr. Nightingale and Mr. Theal which I think ought to be known for the country's good. My letter was a strictly private and confidential one but I felt bound as a solemn duty before God, to make known things as they are and indicate hidden evils to Mr. A, so that H.E. and those about him may be put upon their guard...." 2

However private and confidential Buchanan's letter, it is evident that, in such a small community, actions of this kind did not remain undetected and Nightingale and Theal were outraged by Lovedale's partizanship. When Stewart arrived in Lovedale in January 1878 on his way to Scotland from Livingstonia, both sides insisted that he hear their report, though Nightingale refused to come to Lovedale because Watson was in residence. Stewart, it would seem, took refuge in silence, a silence which Buchanan interpreted as approval, and Nightingale as criticism. In May, Nightingale went on leave and from Sidmouth wrote to Stewart, still in Scotland:

1. Mrs. Watson to Mina Stewart, 15 April 1873, PC.
2. John Buchanan to Mina Stewart, 21 January 1878, PC.
"The long and the short of it is this that Lovedale instead of preserving a strict neutrality and minding its own legitimate business submitted to outside influence and lent itself to the unscrupulous political party which was largely responsible for the troubles that have lately afflicted that blighted locale, the home and birthplace of immeasurable falsehood, rascality and deceit. You know this as well as I do but I do not expect you to admit it as you are as you say, very much given to holding your tongue. There is however a time to speak and a time to keep silent and I think that had you spoken at a time when you kept silent, you might have restrained or counter-acted a good deal of mischief that was done in your absence. Instead of that it seemed to me and to others that you tacitly endorsed proceedings that were in my opinion open to reprehension....I have felt and still do feel that Lovedale injured me and disappointed me in a manner not easily to be forgotten..." 1

Arriving from Livingstonia, exhausted and drained from malaria, Stewart had certainly formed no clear judgement on the issue which was dividing Lovedale. He was inclined to support Buchanan for the sake of peace and because he was indebted to him. In time, however, Stewart came to agree with Nightingale that the war, which the Xhosa in January 1873 had no chance of winning, was being fanned and encouraged by Europeans who wished to profit from a wholesale insurrection. They did not wish to pacify Oba but to alienate him, in the belief that his adherence to the rebellion would keep it alive and thereby increase the opportunity for land, cattle and labour when defeat inevitably came. Those who were "goading the Kaffirs" were also making use of the Institution for their own purposes.2

Lovedale's position during the war was also attacked from a very different angle. In May 1873 several men from

1. P. Nightingale to Stewart, 30 December 1878, SP 23A(xiv).
2. P. Nightingale to Stewart, 17 December 1878, SP 23A(xiv).
Lovedale Mission station (as distinct from the Institution, though at least two had been educated at Lovedale), departed 'to the bush'. This information was sent to Stewart by John Knox Bokwe whose own uncle had joined the rebels.¹

In the same month, in a skirmish at Isidengi, Dukwana, one of Sandille's bodyguard was killed. He and his family had all been at Lovedale. These and other instances caused the Eastern Star, a vehement opponent of Lovedale Institution to launch an attack against educated, Christian Africans.

"The evil of imparting head knowledge which has been turned against us in aiding rebellious tribes to wage war against the Colony by such educated or surpliced ruffians as Edmund Sandille and Dukwana, the preaching warrior of Mgwali, has more than counter-balanced any visible good that ever resulted from the labours of the Lovedale preachers and teachers....An Institution which is supplying educated recruits every day to the ranks of the enemy should be closed for the present."²

This attack was not without irony as, far from encouraging Africans to join their chiefs in rebellion, Lovedale (in common with all missionary establishments) insisted on loyalty to the "great and glorious British nation" and praised those "now or formerly connected with Lovedale" who fought "on the right side".³ In Lovedale Past and Present nine students are mentioned as having joined the rebels, twenty-one as having fought for the Government forces, not one of whom was actually a student at the time of the war. The rebels were Ngqika, the Government supporters mainly Mfengu, as was to be expected from those traditionally loyal. Although the attack of the Eastern Star was patently ill-founded,

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² The Eastern Star, 7 June 1878.
³ Lovedale Past and Present, p. 274.
the missionaries were disturbed by the "incessant allegations that educated Kaffirs from Lovedale were found among the rebels" because they felt that education and missionary work would be blamed for the rebellion and that the government would hamper their activities amongst the Xhosa.¹

One small result of the War was more sympathy for the Xhosa from missionaries who previously had been biased in favour of the loyal Mfengu.

"'Tis sad to think of the poor Kaffir...the tales of suffering through hunger, sickness and exposure are harrowing and add to this the tales of horrid cruelty committed by unprincipled whites and blacks. The Kaffir character has been much admired. They have showed a great deal of true heroism....Many (I myself was) were inclined to think badly of the Kaffirs at first but when one hears of the cruel barbarity of the Fingoes one ceases to blame the exasperated Kaffir...." ²

When the Lovedale station rebels were tried for sedition, Lovedale assisted a successful plea for clemency for one man due to be hanged. The Presbytery of Kaffraria indicated its concern about the plight of political prisoners who had been taken to Cape Town and particularly about the numbers of children who were in the hands of the 'Fingoes and Volunteers' and who were subsequently "apprenticed" under dubious conditions.³

1878 - 1883 Disarmament and the Gun War

The War of 1877-78 was the last of the old-style Frontier wars. The 'native question', as stated previously,

¹. Waller to Stewart, 12 February 1878, PC.
². W.J.B. Moir to Stewart, 15 July 1878, SP 23A(iii).
³. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 3 July 1878, Cory MS 9040.
was in the process of being converted from 'an Imperial into a South African problem'. This became apparent in 1878 when the war was followed by a demand for a vigorous native policy which would bring the tribes firmly to heel. In the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere, Africans were afraid of new ideas which threatened 'to sweep away the idle, sensuous elysium of Kaffirdom', therefore they 'must be governed not left to their own devices'. Under the Sprigg administration Ngqika farms were broken up, magistracies were established in many areas and that 'ill-advised Disarmament Act' was promulgated and first applied to the Ciskei, to the Colonial Mfengu and the Ngqika.

This policy of 'vigour' was precisely what had been feared by those, like Stewart, who dreaded the increase of Colonial power, but they could not shut their eyes to the fact that the Imperial representative, Sir Bartle Frere, also encouraged this policy of repression and had to concede, however reluctantly, that Frere's actions had precipitated the disaster at Isandhlwana. Frere was censured and recalled by Disraeli's government in May 1879 but the policy of 'vigour' proceeded undeterred with new Pass Laws, Vagrancy and Branding Acts passed by Sprigg's government.

Stewart's change of mind on political affairs and his own obligations in that area are clearly documented. He was a personal friend of Sir Bartle's (due in part to their mutual acquaintance with David Livingstone) and during the Natal crisis Stewart sent messages from Scotland to the

1. Bartle Frere to Herbert, 18 March 1878, Quoted by Martineau, op.cit., p. 221-4
Governor offering his sympathy and support. He even considered that he ought to have sent a letter to the Queen, expressing this point of view. Back in Lovedale on receipt of a congratulatory telegram from Frere, Stewart replied with sympathy "in the anxieties of the present time" and stated his unwavering belief that

"Your Excellency will yet under God...bring all to a successful and beneficial issue".

In view of Stewart's conservative respect for authority and the establishment, it is perhaps the more remarkable that within six months of this telegram he had openly confessed to a change of attitude which placed him firmly with the opposition. In February 1880 he wrote candidly to Frere,

"Much as I wished to follow Mr. Sprigg, I wish to state to Your Excellency that I cannot, in common with many of my missionary brethren, do so any further. I do not now refer to the war either Kaffir or Zulu - wars have been and will be again and to throw the cause of blame on Your Excellency...seems to me unjust. What grieves and pains me is the general tendency and repressive character of the native policy which has been followed since the war."

Prior to this, however, Stewart had taken a much more significant step in deciding to use his position as Editor of the Express to make his personal political statement and to allow other writers access to a political platform. It can only be deduced that first-hand experience of the situation, after years away from the Cape, added to opinion from missionaries such as Mabille in Basutoland, magistrates like

1. Stewart to Lady Frere, 5 March 1879, SP LB4b.
2. Stewart Diary, 5 May 1879.
3. Stewart to Bartle Frere, July 1879, Telegram PC.
4. Stewart to Bartle Frere, 4 February 1880, SP LB4b.
Matthew Blyth in the Transkei, or his close friend J.J. Irvine, M.L.A. for King Williams Town, caused Stewart to make this uncharacteristic decision and risk being charged with the crime of "negrophilism." One example of emotional pressure was contained in a letter from fellow-missionary Henry Kayser:

"Do we fear being called 'political missionaries', 'negrophilists', 'stirrers up of the natives'...that we can stand by and see injustice and class legislation practised with impunity and not a word of protest and warning against a policy which is now bringing about that (fast) which only existed in the imagination of those who wished for war; viz., namely a combination of all the natives...Fingoess, Kaffirs, Basutos everywhere are fraternising and having their eyes opened that their interests are one and their weakness, their jealousies and tribal animosities...are fast giving way...I feel indignant at the silence. Protest at the mischief the Sprigg ministry or rather policy is doing. The Express ought to take a more decided stand..."

To this letter Stewart merely replied that he did indeed regard the Disarmament Act as 'a fearful mistake' but shortly after, in February 1880, he published the first in a series of six articles entitled 'Her Majesty's Subjects' which appeared in the Christian Express throughout 1880. The key issue, as can be seen also from Kayser's letter was that of loyalty, its nature and its proper reward. Stewart's objection to Sprigg's policy was, briefly, that it did nothing to foster loyalty in the Africans and that injustice and "class legislation" quite understandably, caused them to take up rebellious attitudes. All loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen were entitled to equal justice before the law. Loyal Africans had believed this and lived in the understanding that their principles would be honoured.

1. The Christian Express, February 1880.
2. Henry Kayser to Stewart, 18 August 1879, SP 25A(x).
3. Stewart to Kayser, 10 September 1879, SP LB4b.
"While they were indulging in this belief, or in this dream... down came three successive acts, each of which struck at the roots of the privilege they enjoyed as British subjects, and as a consequence struck equally at the roots of loyalty which secured them by firm but invisible bonds to the rule of our Queen. Now such wholesale and undiscriminating legislation which swept all before it on the ground of colour, and paid no attention to character and previous history and none to individual rights, was legislation that in no way tended to foster loyalty and promote the peace of the country. It was hardly possible to touch the native people of this country at more susceptible points than those which interfered with their cattle, their individual liberty within reasonable limits and the sudden demand for arms of those who had all along been most loyal to us.... Further they have seen a large portion of their land pass into the possession of the white man; they have had to deliver up their arms under a ruinous penalty for retention; they have seen the miseries of war afflicting those who have refused to give them up.... Repression is not government and yet it is the most that has been tried with those people." 1

Throughout 1880 and 1881, Stewart continued to write in this vein, articles which, as he said, were 'quite under-coloured' 2 but which earned him a reputation in South Africa and in Britain as a champion of 'Native rights'. Many Express leaders were reprinted in the local and National press with editorial comment which ranged from cautiously favourable to scurrilously antagonistic. The Pass Law and Vagrancy Act, which required all black men to give proof of their intentions when travelling, if stopped, hit with peculiar force those who considered themselves educated and civilised members of the Cape community. Both Elijah Makiwane and Mpambani Mzimba were charged and temporarily imprisoned under the Vagrancy Act in the course of their pastoral duties. As exemplary - and loyal - graduates of Lovedale, the Express was vehement

1. The Christian Express, March 1881.
in their defence.

Rebellion against the Disarmament Act which had broken out in the Transkei and East Griqualand was successfully crushed by April 1881 but the final outrage at this time was war between the Cape and the Ba-Sotho - "war with the disgrace of no good reason". Sprigg's policy wrote Stewart is "to crush the natives and to dispossess them of their land and cattle".  

1 'Native Affairs' had become a matter of party politics with rival politicians such as Gordon Sprigg and J.W. Sauer 'playing to the gallery'. It was Stewart's contention, shared by others, that

"...the Native Question is not a political question - that is, it is not essentially, and justly so; and ought never to be made merely a matter of political party strife...." 2

The solution in this crisis lay with the Imperial government. Stewart sent copies of the Christian Express to friends of influence in Britain, Fowell Buxton for example, asking that its articles should be given publicity and requesting that pressure be brought to bear on the Imperial government to interfere directly in the Ba-Sotho conflict.

"Unless we can bring pressure to bear from home, Mr. Sprigg will carry the day and by Victory and Farms please the colonists and get a piece of revolting injustice lauded to the skies in certain colonial papers and by a colonial majority." 3

"Nothing" wrote old Robert Moffat in his retirement, "can save the Basuto but British interference." 4

Stewart's concern for the Ba-Sotho was fed by information from the Paris Evangelical missionaries, most of whom

1. Stewart to John Stephen, 1 September 1880, SP LB4b.
2. The Christian Express, September 1880.
4. Robert Moffat to Captain Stretch (passed on to Stewart), 26 November 1880, SP 23A(xi).
were personal friends. The Christian Express published letters from Alphonse Mabille, for instance, which caused uproar in some Cape papers against 'political missionaries' who should be 'put down' by the government. Mabille had refused to print the Disarmament Proclamation at Morija and had made quite clear to the government his disapproval of their policy. On these grounds he refused to adopt the aggressive attitude of the Cape government.

In addition, however, Stewart was involved in Cape affairs at a less polemical level. J.M. Orpen, Governor's Agent in Basutoland from 1881, corresponded with Stewart in this critical period, conveying at length his ideas on land tenure, African government, native laws of inheritance and polygamy. Orpen proposed Stewart as a member of the Native Laws and Customs Commission which began its findings in 1881, submitting them in 1883. This Commission sat, therefore, during the vital period when the seizure of African territory after the war was being considered and implemented. Orpen felt that the Commission had the opportunity to discuss the vital question of the day - "to whom does the land belong?" - to reduce the heat engendered by such a topic in the Colony and to advise the Home Government so that it could act promptly to obtain a fair judgement.

"I lay these my ideas before you because you have position and influence and ability and means of diffusing ideas here and in England and I hope they will aid you to advise...the Home Government how they may carry out their declared intentions of moderating heat...if they wait till our Parliament meets and Govt. and members and the Opposition perhaps have compromised themselves it will be too late..."

1. The Christian Express, January 1880.
In May 1881 the Sprigg ministry was replaced by that of Thomas Scanlen, which raised hopes for a settlement amongst the anti-Spriggites in the country. Their action in Basutoland was more bizarre, however, than Orpen could have anticipated. After trying to play off the Chiefs against the people (Merrimans solution) and to create confidence (Orpens solution), the Government in a desperate attempt to gain a dignified settlement decided to employ General 'Chinese' Gordon. It is difficult to see what they expected him to achieve as they had little intention of accepting his recommendations. Gordon's solution was to govern the 'natives' through their own men of influence and to sweep away 'a great many of the present officials from the Transkei' and other areas. This report appealed to men like Irvine and Solomon but was anathema to the average member of the Legislative Assembly. Gordon, also, from having thought Orpen a 'just kind gentleman' eventually wrote to Stewart that "The Basuto question will never be finished until Orpen leaves". Gordon and Stewart had a mutual friend in the Rev. Horace Waller and it was presumably because of this that Stewart and Gordon met, though there is no definite indication that Gordon came to Lovedale.

Gordon's view that the 'native question' was a 'comparatively simple one' was not shared by the Scanlen

2. C.E. Gordon to Stewart, 7 October 1882, PC.
3. C.E. Gordon to Stewart, 20 July 1882, PC.
government who proceeded after this to shelve their responsibilities in Basutoland, repealed the Disarmament Act and petitioned Britain to take over the small country which, in a sense, had successfully defied them. Reluctantly the Gladstone ministry agreed; British rule was restored in 1884. With this shift in power there was an immediate upsurge of hope amongst pro-Imperialists that the Transkei would also come under direct British rule.

"...this poor little country has more ambition than ability and more pretention than power and these are the men who will be readiest to take the power you may give them and when they have played ducks and drakes of the interests committed to their care they will want your help to put things right and restore them to working order..." 1

This hope was not to be realised. Instead the suggestion from Scanlen that the Imperial government should take over the Transkei provided the necessary catalyst for the 'Colonialists' to swallow their differences and swing into action. Upington, Hofmeyr and Sprigg formed a coalition which defeated Scanlen at the general election and the Transkei continued to be administered by the Cape. This demonstration of the power of the Bond vote and the mutual 'Colonial' interest of Afrikans and English-speaking whites accounted, to some extent, for the increased participation of Africans and their white sympathisers (from whatever motive) in the 1884 election. The 'native question' had indeed been transformed from 'an Imperial into a South African problem'.

1. Stewart to G. Smith, 17 January 1884, SP LB4b.
African Response 1877-1883.

Documentary evidence for African response in this period is not extensive and consideration of it must to some extent be based on inference. An interesting series of articles by the late A.C. Jordan\(^1\) are illuminating, especially about the role of *Isigidimi SamaXhosa* in the educated community. Although this paper, produced at Lovedale, was under Xhosa editorship, Stewart did keep a watchful eye on its editorial content and did not encourage the publication of political opinion in it any more than he did in the Christian Express prior to 1879. For the first few years this did not seem to matter.

"In the first few years of its life 1871-78, *Isigidimi* was highly respected and trusted by the literate section of Africans. Politicians, ministers of religion and lovers of general cultural progress paid tribute to it in prose and poetry."\(^2\)

After 1878, however, with the 'War of Ngayecibi' and Sprigg's post-war settlement, the tension which existed in the African community began to be reflected in the paper through its contributors. There can be no doubt that for Africans too this period was a political water-shed and that they were stirred to action and to the expression of opinion in a way which had not occurred before. Ideally, *Isigidimi* should have provided a ready-made vehicle for the discussion of vital issues and the expression of differing opinions. The most debated issue however, as in the white community, was that of loyalty and as a missionary journal *Isigidimi* found

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2. A.C. Jordan, *op.cit.*
itself with no option but to adhere to the missionary line.

"In Isigidi, the whole struggle of 1877-81, including therefore the Zulu and the Gun war, was made to appear to the Xhosa reader as a struggle between Heathendom represented by 'utshaba' the enemy, and Christendom, represented by our troops, the troops of Victoria Child of the Beautiful. Those Africans who were defending their land against white invaders were cast as villains and opposition to annexation and white domination was made to appear as 'hostility to the Word'."

It must be assumed that most Africans did accept the missionary definition of loyalty as loyalty to British interests. Despite the criticisms of the Colonial press few Lovedale graduates joined the forces in rebellion against the Government. African Christian intellectuals were 'effectively neutralized' during the fighting. P.J. Mzimba, writing from Idutywa in 1880, observed that he 'had confidence' in the Xhosa chiefs and the Mfengu of the district that they "would not join the enemy".

The correspondence columns of Isigidi, however, do indicate that there were stirrings of opposition amongst the African 'elite' and that the falling readership of Isigidi was attributed by some to the fact that the paper had ceased to be the 'Messenger' of the black people.

"The younger intellectuals say they can never make out the true nationality of Isigidi. Isigidi never takes a clear stand on political matters. It sides with the whites for whenever a writer voices the feelings of the blacks, Isigidi immediately makes him understand that he is on the side of the enemy."

The same writer, Hadi 'Harp of the Nation', gave further evidence of the tension in attitudes in a poem written at the time of the Gin War. Addressing the Ba-Sotho in their

1. A.C. Jordan, op.cit.
2. Mzimba to R. Ross, 11 November 1880, Cory MS 8497.
struggle, he urged,

"Awake rock-rabbits of the Mountains of the Night
She darts out her tongue to the very skies
That rabbit-snake with female breasts
Who suckled and fostered the trusty Fingoes
Thereafter to eat them alive."

It is a far cry from Victoria, Child of the Beautiful to
'that rabbit-snake' and a good indication of the depth of
disillusion in the African community.

That Isigidimi published such opinions as Hadi's was
due perhaps to Stewart's pre-occupation with his own concerns
and subsequent lack of watchfulness and to the appointment
as Editor in 1881 of John Tengo Jabavu. For example, a
letter to Stewart in 1882 complained of the 'political
tendency' of Isigidimi and Stewart, conscious that he had
been insufficiently vigilant, replied

"This day I proceeded to eviscerate a very political
article and in the process cleared out a great deal
of Mr. Sprigg, Sir Bartle etc. whose names were
remarkably conspicuous. I counsel the new man or
editor, who is to do most of the work, to moderation
- and to peace and good will between black and white."

In 1884 an article of Hadi's was banned for being 'too hostile
to British rule'. It became increasingly clear that
Isigidimi was not to be permitted to exercise any independent
political function. Early in 1884, John A. Chalmers*
erstwhile colleague of Tiyo Soga at Mgwali, wrote to Stewart
that he was 'disgusted' with Isigidimi.

"It was far too political and more Wesleyan than I
could wish. I do wish the Editor would have that
conceit knocked out of him of introducing Latin and
English so extensively. I must say that it is

1. A.C. Jordan, op.cit.
2. Stewart to Green, 18 July 1882, SP LB4b.
sadly falling off and too Jabavu-ish for my taste. I
know that there is wide-spread dissatisfaction
concerning it." 1

Tengo Jabavu was, however, no rebel. He was the prime
African exponent of accommodationist politics, declaring from
the outset his intention to educate his people "to attain
their rights under the Queen's sway." 2 Born in 1860, Jabavu
received his earlier education at Healdtown where he gained
the Government Teacher's Certificate of Competency and after¬
wards took honours. From there he went to the Wesleyan
Mission School at Somerset East where he taught for five
years (1876-81). He continued his studies privately and
also gained journalistic experience as a regular contributor,
"Our Own Native Correspondent", to the Cape Argus, edited
then by Saul Solomon." His political comment did not pass
unchallenged, however, by his Methodist superiors and Jabavu
was forced to apologise.

"That I did the other day promise to you to abstain
from contributing political articles to Colonial
newspapers is quite true; that I made a similar
promise to the Rev. G. Chapman of Healdtown is equally
true, but I must confess...that the impulses of my mind
influenced me...to overlook...the verbal promise I made
to you....And now as I have heard plainly that the
church to which I have the honour to belong repudiates
any views on the questions of the day, I'd sooner
scatter to the four winds any political creed I own,
than see the ties which bind me to her severed. I
will in future refrain from contributing anything on
practical politics...." 3

In 1881, Jabavu decided to study for Matriculation at Lovedale,
the only Institution which offered facilities for this course.

1. J.A. Chalmers to Stewart, 24 January 1884, SP 23A(x).
2. Jabavu to Chesson, 13 May 1881, Quoted by A.P. Walshe,
"The Origins of African Political Consciousness in South
(He passed in July 1883). In April Stewart noted in his diary:

"Jabavu called. Made offer to him of *Isigidimi* at £60 or £70 - to pay £20 board".  

*Isigidimi* may have eventually proved restrictive to Jabavu, "an irksome handicap to one whose ambition or bent of mind was to be a politician" - but there can be little doubt that it provided him with editorial experience at a time when Africans were becoming increasingly interested in Cape politics. Jabavu himself greeted the fall of the Sprigg government with relief just as Mzimba had earlier commented on the fall of Disraeli.

"Will not that be a happy change when the Liberals take the government of affairs in the Imperial Parliament and allow Lord Beaconsfield to rest?"

Their hopes rose with the coming of General Gordon and the annexation of Basutoland by Britain but did not appreciate the extent to which Scanlen co-operated with the Bond. By 1883 in fact the Bond was showing its hand more clearly. The Cradock congress had merged the rival Afrikaner movements of Hofmeyr and S.J. du Toit and Congress declarations had caused Cape 'liberal' whites to voice the fear that educational grants would be withheld and that disenfranchisement of 'native' voters would follow if the Bond became a majority in Parliament. Josiah Slater,* editor of the Grahamstown Journal asked whether or not "natives should seek separate representatives in Parliament so as to protect themselves?"

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1. Stewart Diary, 15 April 1879. In fact he received £80.
3. Mzimba to Ross, 22 March 1880, Cory MS 8493.
4. J. Slater to Stewart, 5 October 1882, SP 31A.
J.J. Irvine gave expression to the dilemma facing African voters.

"I feel the time has fully arrived when every legitimate effort should be made to increase the political power of the natives by having them fully registered...right use is not being made of the means available when a constituency such as Victoria East is represented by two men who...are the most bitter opponents of native progress. Surely such a constituency is entitled...to return at least one representative who could rise above feeling and prejudice and advocate justice in our dealings with all classes of the Queens subjects. Mr. Solomon told me that he thought it was absolutely necessary that the natives should exercise their political privileges...if they were not to sink into the position of serfs. Parliament and government recognise nothing but political power...The time has passed for compromise..." 1

By 1882 the African vote 'though less than 10% of the Cape common roll' was becoming a factor of political influence, partly because the balance between English and Afrikaner, particularly in rural areas, had changed. Moreover the haphazard approach to elections which had characterized the years before 1880 had begun to give way to more sophisticated and organised electioneering. Candidates were selected more carefully, registration was scrutinized and constituencies were more assiduously courted by their would-be representatives. In 1882 the first "Native Educational Association" was formed whose members according to Sir Langham Dale,

"...keep themselves abreast of the colonial questions of the day and publish their criticisms on men and measures..." 2

Using Isigidimi and the Native Educational Association, therefore, Jabavu encouraged the formation of united African opposition to the growing Bond influence. In 1883 he

1. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 18 October 1883, SP 31.
2. The Christian Express, March 1883.
considered standing for election himself\(^1\) but instead made the crucial decision to support a sympathetic European candidate on the grounds that it was in the best interests of the country "to strengthen the English and the party of right and justice in the House".\(^2\) Systematic registration of qualified Africans followed in several constituencies and in the district of Victoria East, African voters were also counselled to use only one of their two votes. The decision to support James Rose Innes\(^*\) was obviously preceded by an invitation to Innes to stand in a field of seven other candidates. Innes, in his *Autobiography* stated that his brother Richard, an attorney in King Williams Town, suggested the Victoria East constituency to him.\(^3\) It is possible that Richard Rose Innes himself received the original idea from J.J. Irvine, as J. Rose Innes was Irvine's brother-in-law by marriage.\(^4\) Certainly Innes accepted nomination less than two months before the polling date and as late as mid December he had no knowledge of the stance Jabavu would take in the contest and in which direction he would influence African votes.

The most significant feature, therefore, which emerges in this period is that although the attitudes of white 'liberal' missionaries and of the educated African 'élite' in the Lovedale area were very similar - both wanting to

1. Stewart to Sauer, 11 December 1883, SP LB4b.
2. *Invo*, 30 March 1887.
see an end to repressive policies and a barrier raised in the path of Afrikaner expansion - their motives were widely different and inherently contradictory. For instance at a time when the Christian Express was at its most outspoken and courageous, Isigidimi was losing all credibility among the most articulate section of the African community. Publishing comparatively frank anti-Government material in the Express, Stewart could yet "eviscerate" Isigidimi when it did the same. Of course African ministers were not exempt from the generally-held opinion that pastors of whatever denomination should not enter the political arena. Yet, having printed and agreed with Mabille's plea - "Am I to be gagged because I am a missionary?" - was it so impossible to extent to African ministers the right to express political opinion? Unfortunately, there were few missionaries who could appreciate the logic of the words of Henry Kayser in a paper given to the Missionary Conference of 1880:

"Are Christians of other nationalities living in a country not their own looked upon as criminal when thy refuse to take up arms against their own people, or when they sympathise with the success and defeats of their countrymen? If they had voluntarily taken letters of naturalisation I could understand their being treated as rebels. The question resolves itself into this - Does allegiance to Christ necessarily involve allegiance to Queen Victoria?" 1

One reason for the success of Christianity amongst the Ba-Sotho - and perhaps for the success of resistance - was, in Kayser's words, that they had been "served by Christian men of a foreign nation" who taught Christian truth with no imperial overtones so that no division arose between the heathen and the Christian African with respect to loyalty

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1. The Christian Express, August 1880.
and patriotism. If it was the 'Imperial factor' which made men like Stewart suspect to white South African exponents of 'Colonialism', it was also that which drove a wedge of suspicion and doubt between most British missionaries and politically-conscious Africans, often trained in their own Institutions. Even in the 1880's when Africans of Jabavu's stamp professed loyalty to the Crown, they did so as a means to an end, not as an end for its own sake. When this tradition that 'all their political blessings came from Queen Victoria' would seem to be ill-founded, Africans moved camp, only to find that the solidarity of white interests was stronger than any attempts they might make to hold the balance of power.

b. 1884-1895

Political background

Events in the year 1884 foreshadowed dramatic changes within South Africa itself and in the African continent as a whole, particularly in its relationship with the European powers. In August 1884 Germany proclaimed a protectorate over Namaqua-Damaraland, having run up the German flag at Angra Pequena in the previous year. The virtual monopoly which Britain had exercised in Southern Africa was at an end. After this the affairs of South Africa became the subject of international debate and diplomacy. Reluctantly Britain realised that she must either defend her territories by
extension of her authority or she must abdicate and leave Africa to others.

This became immediately apparent. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 which had been drawn up after the War of 1881, had forbidden the Transvaal to extend its borders.¹ This injunction was ignored by the Boer farmers with their ever-pressing need for land. In 1881 they trekked into Zululand and in 1882, on the western flank of the Transvaal, formed the small republics of Stellaland and Goshen, independent but relying on the Transvaal for protection. These republics encroached on land occupied by Coloured and African chiefs; they also effectively blocked the road to the north - the Missionaries Road - which had been seen from the early 19th Century as the gateway to the hinterland.

Gladstone's Liberal Government had been elected in 1880 partly on an undertaking to 'curtail Imperial responsibilities' and was therefore prepared to make every effort to conciliate the Boers in an attempt to promote an atmosphere in which the various independent states in South Africa could resolve their differences and bring about, unaided, some form of Union. This policy was to prove totally unattainable in the face of pressure from many sources, each with highly divergent motivations. First, the presence of the Germans on the South African scene impelled those Liberals who were also Imperialists to demand that Britain should protect the Road to the North and her potential interests in Central Africa. Secondly there were those, especially

¹ Walker, op.cit., p. 386.
the British in South Africa, who were positively hostile to any extension of Boer influence, for patriotic or 'humanitarian' reasons, and who wished to see the Transvaal restrained and Afrikaner nationalism given a smark rebuke. Again, in the Cape, Scanlen, the Prime Minister, had no desire to extent Colonial authority over African territories, passed Basutoland thankfully to the Imperial power and would have gone on to encourage a similar take-over in those areas of Bechuanaland west of the Transvaal. This latter policy, however, was anathema to the Cape Colonialists who wished to restrain not only the Germans and the Transvaal but also the Imperial government in order to clear the way for expansion under the aegis of the Cape. The most powerful exponent of this policy was Cecil John Rhodes. In the midst of these many interests, inspired by national pride and by a desire for an independent outlet to the sea, the Transvaal alone was prepared to defy the Imperial power.

Bechuanaland.

In May 1884, Scanlen resigned, ostensibly over import regulations but in fact because of opposition to his 'little Cape' policy. Thomas Upington, the new Prime Minister immediately threatened to annexe South-West Africa but his

1. That is to say those who wished to protect the Africans and their land from European interference.
2. Cecil John Rhodes, 1853-1902. One of the most significant personalities of this period. See Lockhart and Wodehouse, Rhodes.
efforts to pressure London were in vain and the German Protectorate of that area was proclaimed. The Deputy Commissioner for the ill-defined territory West of the Transvaal, Rev. John Mackenzie,* did his best to resolve the conflict between African chiefs and Boer settlers but he was considered by his enemies to be too ardent an imperialist and was replaced by Cecil Rhodes who, as has been indicated, wished colonial and not British writ to run in Bechuanaland. Rhodes, however, had little success with the conciliation of the small republics; Goshen was declared to be a Transvaal protectorate and for the first time, Rhodes found himself in direct confrontation with Paul Kruger.

The hoisting of the Vierkleur in Goshen signalled the end of British indifference to German protectorates and Transvaal expansion. Bechuanaland was seen to be no longer merely a trade route but a crucial link between the Transvaal with its uncertain allegiances and the African possession of another major European power. The Liberal government dispatched an expedition under Sir Charles Warren "to remove free-booters, restore order, respect African claims and hold Bechuanaland pending further orders."¹ In 1885 the area south of the Molopo River was annexed as the Crown colony of British Bechuanaland (later handed to the Cape). North of the Molopo, the area now known as Botswana became the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Here the Tswana chiefs retained considerable powers over their subjects as they did in Basutoland.

¹. Thompson and Wilson, op.cit., p. 274.
The Radical-Imperialist alliance was now bent on pushing Gladstone's government into an extension of British rule in South Africa. In 1884 the Imperial government annexed St. Lucia Bay "in the interests of Natal". In 1885 a Protectorate was declared, under the threat of German intervention, over the coasts of East and West Pondololand. Lord Salisbury's Conservative government pursued the same policy after 1886. In 1887 Great Britain annexed the remains of Zululand, recognising President Meyer and his land-locked New Republic as a sop to the Afrikaners.

The Cape too, first under Upington, then under Sprigg, joined in the scramble for territory, annexing the Transkeian territories of Gcalekaland and Tembuland and taking over Walvis Bay from the British. In a series of complicated manoeuvres the Cape government coerced the Mpondo into recognising Cape control of Port St. Johns and of the Transkei Road.

Mashonaland and Matabeleland

Blocked to the West, the Transvaal attempted to expand northwards. In 1887 Lobengula, successor to Mzilikazi, put his mark to a treaty which stated that he was an ally of the Republic and that he would admit a Republican consul. This prepared the way for eventual Transvaal control of the territory beyond the Limpopo. Horrified by this development, Cecil Rhodes promptly took the matter up with Sir Hercules Robinson¹ and demanded that a protectorate be declared over Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Robinson instead instructed Sir Sidney Shippard² to communicate with his assistant,

1. Sir Hercules Robinson, 1824-1897. Governor of the Cape from 1881-1889 and from 1895-1897.
John Smith Moffat,\textsuperscript{1} at that time actually with Lobengula, urging him to persuade the King to make a treaty in favour of Great Britain's exclusive rights in his territory. The Moffat treaty of 1888 gave the High Commissioner control over treaty-making and concession-granting powers.

In the same year, following diplomatic intervention by Shippard, the agents of Rhodes namely Rudd, Thompson and Maguire, obtained an exclusive concession over minerals and metals in Lobengula's dominions. Rhodes then persuaded the British Government to issue a Royal Charter of Incorporation for his British South Africa Company and in 1890 the Company pioneers occupied Mashonaland. In this way Kruger was cut off from expansion to the north and the first steps were taken in the acquisition of what would become "Rhodesia."

"By the start of 1887, the vacant spaces on the coast from the Orange River estuary round to Delagoa Bay had been filled; a wedge had been driven between the Germans of South West Africa and the Boers of Kruger's Republic; the road to the north had been secured; and the way was open for Britain, through the agency of Cecil Rhodes, to stake her claims up to and even beyond the Zambezi."

The East Coast

Kruger's remaining option was to gain access to the East Coast but political control of a port was denied to him after his refusal to enter a Customs Union with the Cape. Despite this Kruger made use of the railway to Delagoa Bay (1889) in order to avoid British territory and the high customs levies associated with Natal and the Cape.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] John Smith Moffat, 1835-1918, Resident Magistrate at Taung, 1885-1887.
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In effect by 1895 the Transvaal was land-locked and at the mercy of the Imperial power and of Rhodes' ambitions for northwards expansion and political confederation. The transforming feature of this situation was the discovery in 1886 of the "greatest gold mines of all history".

The British colonies shared responsibility, to a great extent, for the financial weakness of the Republics. Rivalry between the Cape and Natal and internal dissension between the ports of Port Elizabeth and Cape Town or East London and Port Elizabeth rendered inoperable any attempt to introduce untramelled trade into South Africa which would benefit all states and every section of the community. After 1886, however, the Transvaal, "the most stagnant of colonial regions", experienced fundamental change. In 1884 it was barely solvent, by 1887 its revenue approached that of Natal and by 1889 its revenue of £1,500,000 was not far short of the revenue of the Cape.¹ Every state was affected favourably by the importing of foreign capital and increased credit. Trade, capital, immigration; urbanisation, slums and exploitation; the industrial revolution with its universal fellow-travellers came to South Africa. The centre of gravity switched from Cape Town or Port Elizabeth to Johannesburg.

In this period, therefore, the change in policy on the part of the Imperial government was matched by a dramatic shift in the economic balance of power. Kruger and the Transvaalers realised that gold gave them a financial basis from which to have their revenge on the previously more

prosperous colonies and from which to throw down a challenge to the Imperial power for ultimate control in South Africa. Union in South Africa, which appeared to most men desirable for the sake of prosperity, was not obtainable by peaceful means in the face of intense disagreement and distrust over minerals, railways, tariffs, languages and races.

"The need for a South African government which could over-ride the particularism of the States and Colonies and adjust their economic differences was patent but the only semblance of any such authority was that of the High Commissioner....Wide extension of European control in South Africa was plainly about to take place. Assuming that this extension was to be British, was it to be carried out by the Colonial or Imperial authorities?" 1

One of the many political attractions of Cecil Rhodes to his contemporaries was his apparent ability to bring widely-differing groups of men to a mutual understanding. There was hope that he could engineer a union of South African interests, under colonial auspices without imperial intervention. His failure to achieve this led directly to the Jameson Raid of 1895 - an attempt to resolve the impasse and frustration which led eventually to full scale war.

The Cape

Narrowing the focus to the Cape Colony, it is evident that events elsewhere in Southern Africa and changes in Imperial attitudes affected internal politics.

Economically, the Colony could not remain uninfluenced by new-found mineral wealth in the Cape and in the Transvaal. There was an urgent need for better communications, more

1. E. Walker, Lord De Villiers and His Times, p. 198.
housing, more sophisticated social legislation and increased food production. Miles of railroad were built, ports were enlarged, the volume of trade increased and the standard of living improved. The very rapid process of urbanization brought the problems common to industrial revolutions, exacerbated, in this instance, by inherent cultural tensions as people from many races and nationalities were attracted to the towns. The fact that most towns were the creation of foreign immigrants, mainly British, meant that for the Afrikaner and the African the city was "dominated by a culture and language different from his own".\(^1\) All the common coinage of modern racial conflict was, therefore, present in the cities from the beginning. Competition between white and black for jobs, resulting in white pressure for preferential treatment; the migrant labour system which saw the African as a temporary member and not an integral part of the urban community; unequal wage structure; compound living and social segregation; and in Johannesburg discriminatory legislation which, as early as 1896, meant the wearing of a badge on the arm for Africans and exclusion from using the pavements.\(^2\) Africans had been allowed free-hold rights in the mid 19th Century in Uitenage and Grahamstown for example but, although advantage was taken of this, the 'Migrant labour' image predominated, many African workers in fact returning to their rural homes at regular intervals.\(^3\)

At the time of mineral discovery most areas in South Africa were simply self-sufficient; by 1899 the country was

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2. Mzimba to Stewart, 1 August 1896, SP 31A.
importing many basic food-stuffs in large quantities. The farmers it would seem could not cope with the increase in population but the railways gave foreign merchants access to the interior, often snatching the market from the local producer. The boom in the economy, however, while it brought increased prosperity to the rural communities was not sufficient at this stage to offset the natural hazards which had afflicted Cape agriculture for generations. Drought, horse sickness, locusts, phylloxera, redwater fever, scab and rinderpest destroyed crops and live-stock. Price fluctuations in ostrich feathers and wool entailed tremendous variations in annual incomes. The outstanding problem, shared by all regions, was labour shortage which, coupled with land shortage, remained an economic anomaly in a land which appeared to be plentifully supplied with both. European attitudes to Africans in both the agricultural and industrial sectors were increasingly shaped by the acute labour shortage which gave rise particularly to criticism of 'over-educated' Africans.

Politically, with Cecil Rhodes as a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly and, after 1890, as Prime Minister, it is scarcely surprising that the Colony reflected the wider issues of the period. Rhodes' vision of "painting the map red" from Cape to Cairo was dependent on a peaceful, prosperous Cape and, if possible, a confederation of South African states. His political allegiances were based on this assumption and he manipulated Cape politics to this end. Rhodes' all-pervasive influence determined the political allegiances of other men, black and white, in the Cape. It is no exaggeration to say that men were either for or against Rhodes and that
there were few who maintained an independent middle-ground with any consistency or success.

"To every public man in South Africa during the nineties the question must be put, 'What think ye of Rhodes?'...Men could love him or they could hate him. Many in their time did both. The one thing no man could do was to ignore him. For in those days Rhodes was politics." 1

In the early eighties Rhodes had disapproved of the Disarmament Act and of Sprigg's policies in Basutoland. He had, therefore, supported Scanlen in the motion which ousted Sprigg in 1881. Shortly after, Rhodes became aware of the Transvaalers designs on the "Missionary Road" and, in the interests of his own ambitions in the north, pressed Scanlen to take some action to forestall them. Scanlen, in contrast, was at that time trying to abdicate Cape responsibility for "Native territories" to the Imperial government and Rhodes then realised that there was scant similarity in their aims and principles. Thus, as was observed by James Rose Innes, "One of the interesting features of political life during 1884-1888 was the gradual movement of Rhodes away from Scanlen towards Hofmeyr." 2

The election of 1884 had resulted in a significant success for the Afrikaner Bond who thereafter numbered almost half the House. 3 Lack of agreement on the part of the English-speaking politicians who were still in the majority meant, however, that the Bond could hold the balance of power if it chose. Scanlen's proposal to hand over the Transkeian territories to Britain was never actually brought before the

2. Innes, op.cit., p. 58.
House but he was defeated on a "minor matter connected with phylloxera", forced by a Sprigg-Hofmeyr coalition to give place to Thomas Upington as Prime Minister. The real issue was that of the extent of Imperial interference over against the claims of the Colonialists. The achievements of the Bond in 1884 undoubtedly weighted the scales in favour of the latter, though the mood of the country on this matter was destined to fluctuate frequently for the rest of the century. Hofmeyr had been asked if he would form a ministry but refused (as he did consistently until he retired), preferring to be the power behind successive ministries and, in his own words, "to avoid raising the racial issue".¹

Gradually, after initial distrust, Rhodes and Hofmeyr came to appreciate that they could make common cause with each other and that their respective political aims were most likely to be realised through mutual assistance and friendship. The burden of the pact was that Rhodes would defend Protection in the Cape (Hofmeyr's chief supporters were farmers and wine-growers) in return for Hofmeyr's undertaking not to block northern expansion. This, in effect, meant that Hofmeyr and the Bond would not link up with their fellow Afrikaners in the Transvaal.² Nothing could more clearly illustrate the difference between the Cape and the Transvaal Afrikaners, a difference which was based, to a large extent, on Hofmeyr's belief in the benefits of the British flag, provided the right of the Cape to control its own people and policies was upheld. With this Cecil Rhodes was in agreement.

¹ Davenport, op.cit., p. 90.
² Lockhart and Wodehouse, op.cit., p. 86.
Apart from his irritation with the indecisiveness of the British government, he was aware that undue Imperial interference would alienate the Dutch element and make confederation impossible.

The upsurge of Afrikaner political power after 1884 became immediately apparent to contemporary observers in the Cape but the extent of Rhodes' complicity with Hofmeyr and of his agreement with Bond attitudes to African policy was for long a matter of conjecture. Rhodes' ambitions in the north gave him the semblance of an imperialist where he was, in fact, a colonialist. There was also an extreme reluctance on the part of some to recognise that such a remarkable Englishman was prepared to sacrifice African political and social rights for the sake of English-Afrikaner unity and his dreams of confederation at any price.

"It is Rhodes-cum-Dutch at every point and you have some idea what the Dutch attitude is. For himself he sympathises with the Dutch point of view more than ours though he would not be cruel to them (Africans) or treat them otherwise than with a contemptuous fairness as an inferior race who are useful and who must be well treated if you want to use them. But for political reasons he panders to Dutch prejudice (which is often passionate) and at least makes these native-haters believe that he will give them their way, despite Exeter Hall." 1

The spectrum of opinion in the Cape at this time covered a wide range from extreme Bondsmen to English-speaking Jingos, from those who were "not averse to the northern extension of Transvaal influence" to those who welcomed any sign of increased British intervention, such as the Warren expedition. All, in their various ways, had in mind the

1. Don to Smith, 21 October 1895, NLS 7798.
ideal of a united South Africa – the question remained, how and under whose auspices?

Legislation

The period 1884–1895 also witnessed a considerable increase in legislation placing restrictions on African participation in politics. The emergence of the Afrikaner Bond and the end of the English monopoly in Cape politics placed a premium on the African vote which Africans became determined to exploit. Registration of African voters, especially in frontier districts, proceeded rapidly. However, the section of the population which was openly hostile to Africans was by now well represented in Parliament. Others, less vehement, were nevertheless uneasy about the increase in African voters, fearing, in some cases, that it might aid the Bond. Others, like Rhodes, saw the Cape 'colour-blind' franchise as an insuperable obstacle to any form of Union in South Africa and felt that the Cape must come into line with the "northern tradition". Some abuses in connection with registration gave the government an opportunity to introduce the Registration Bill in 1887 which disallowed communal tenure as a qualification for the franchise and thereby promptly disqualified a substantial proportion of African voters. In the same year the "Hofmeyr Act" was passed granting exemption from certain laws to registered African voters and paradoxically, therefore, providing a spur to registration. Finally, in this year, the Transkeian Representation Bill extended the

1. Sir James Rose Innes Selected Correspondence, edited by Harrison Wright, p. 18.
2. The proportion of voters disqualified was about 33%, most of them Africans, though, of course, some Coloured and European voters were also affected.
amended franchise to the newly-acquired Transkeian territories. These measures which were part of the Bond programme were, nonetheless, passed by a majority of English-speaking ministers of the Crown "who have at all times placed themselves at the disposal of the Bond...for the purpose of carrying measures which in their own heart of hearts they must disapprove". The result of this legislation was that European sympathisers with Africans were confused as to the proper exercise of their vote or opinion. Moreover, the elite status of African voters in the Cape was emphasised, setting them apart from unenfranchised Africans in the Cape and elsewhere. In 1892, complaints that 'blanket Kaffirs' were still being registered led to the passing of the Franchise and Ballot Act which raised the property qualification and introduced an educational test, again noticeably limiting the number of African voters. This Act, unlike those of 1887, received the support of Liberals such as Innes, Sauer and Merriman, indicating a radical change in attitude which was reflected in the country at large. Further legislation under Rhodes administration, such as the Glen Grey Act 1894, paved the way for his projected "one native policy in South Africa", each new enactment calling forth an indecisive response from those sections of society supposedly dedicated to the defence of African rights.

The Eastern Cape

The simultaneous emergence of a powerful Afrikaner

1. Wright, op.cit., p. 87.
2. Thompson and Wilson, op.cit., p. 428.
party and of a group of politically-conscious Africans produced an inevitable conflict, particularly in the Eastern Cape. For decades the frontier had been the scene of battles and skirmishes between Europeans and Africans; now this antagonism was transferred to the hustings. As the area with the highest proportion of registered African voters, the frontier province of the Colony was again the district most affected by these developments. Europeans in the Eastern Cape were, in general, hostile to Africans; English and Afrikaners sharing a frontier mentality in this respect which had developed over the years. Nevertheless the European group was divided particularly on Imperial issues but also by intense localism within the province which expressed itself in rivalry between the ports of East London and Port Elizabeth or in mutual suspicion between Grahamstown and King Williams Town or East London.¹ Faced with the strength of the Afrikaner Bond, some English-speaking politicians standing for Eastern Province constituencies came to realise that their success could depend on the casting of the African vote and therefore pursued it. The Bond, who themselves courted African voters, were nevertheless aware that the African vote would normally be cast against them. Thus they recommended a policy of limiting that vote as much as possible, preferably on lines which would not affect the support given to their candidates by Coloured voters in the Western Cape. Between those 'liberals' on the one hand and the unequivocal Bond members on the other there was a wide

¹ cf. Wright, op. cit., pp. 72, 76.
range of political commitment, especially amongst English-speaking politicians. There were those who gave varying support to the 'liberals' and to African interests; there were those whose first loyalty was to frontier farmers and others who defended urban constituency interests especially with regard to railways; some like Sir Gordon Sprigg allied with the Bond for the sake of European unity and power; others, noticeably James Sivewright,\(^1\) became prominent English-speaking members of the Bond itself. Again, there were Afrikaners who were not Bondsmen but who acted independently. Finally, with the introduction of the Rhodes factor into Cape politics, these various allegiances shifted as men were divided from one another in support of, or in opposition to, Rhodes' policies and legislation. Not surprisingly, no easily identified English-speaking party emerged in the Cape until the late nineties.

**Lovedale**

Lovedale in this period, even more perhaps than in previous decades, stood at the centre of political activity. Not only had the Institution been responsible for the education of most of those Africans who had assumed political leadership but it also stood in the constituency of Victoria East, an area with a majority of Africans many of them sufficiently affluent (on account of their education) to be eligible for registration. The political attitudes of missionaries were determined, in part, by their vested interest

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in this African élite and, in part, by their devotion to Imperial interests and lack of sympathy with Colonial ambitions. They became outspokenly anti-Bond, though they were puzzled by the Rhodes-Bond alliance and eventually, after its collapse, divided into Rhodes or Bond supporters. The attitudes of Africans, as will be seen, followed the same pattern, informed as they were by missionary principles of action. Despite minor disagreements, then, the African voters and the missionaries were united in their opposition to "anti-Native legislation", in their belief in imperial justice and in their hope for imperial interference.

In the years 1884-1890, Stewart was constantly involved in Cape politics through the columns of the Christian Express or in private negotiations. In 1890, however, he left South Africa to found a mission in East Africa and his political concerns became those of the Imperial East Africa Company, though even there he could not escape the influence of Rhodes. On Stewart's return to the Cape in 1894 he found a rapidly-transforming political situation with old alliances breaking up and racial attitudes intensifying. Dispirited by his experiences on the Kibwezi and with diminished physical vigour, Stewart was unable to fight off disillusion and frustration in every aspect of his missionary work.

1884 Election in Victoria East

The Eastern constituencies where the casting of the African vote was a key issue from 1884 to the end of the

1. See Appendix C.
century, were Aliwal North, Fort Beaufort, Griqualand East, Queenstown, Tembuland, King Williams Town, Wodehouse and Victoria East. The list of candidates for Victoria East in 1884 was, in the words of one observer, "little short of legion". They were J.H. Bezuidenhout (Dutch), B.D. Godlonton, Stephen Johnson, James Rose-Innes, Charles A. Nesbitt, David Watson and William Young. The contest was ultimately between Johnson, Innes, Watson and Bezuidenhout, the remaining three polling only 19% of the vote between them. It is interesting to note that there were 13 polling stations in the district and that each of these was manned by supporters of the candidates urging voters to cast in favour of their man. There was no Ballot box so that progress in the voting could be announced at regular intervals throughout the day. Two candidates would be elected and each voter had two votes. The total number of votes cast was 709. Innes and Johnson topped the poll with 182 and 143 respectively and were duly elected members of the Legislative Assembly.

These figures give little indication of the extent of organisation which had gone into this result. The African vote, representing at this time about 15% of the electorate or a little over a hundred voters, had, for the first time been fully exploited, primarily through a decision of the Native Educational Association that Africans would use only one vote for their chosen candidate, Rose Innes, thereby

2. Young was a farmer from Port Alfred; Godlonton a business man from Port Elizabeth and the son of the well-known editor of the Grahamstown Journal; David Watson was a local farmer and friendly towards Lovedale; Johnson was a supporter of Sprigg.
avoiding confusion and the possibility that Innes would lose on a split ticket. Mzimba, Jabavu and Makiwane had all occupied strategic posts throughout the district to see that the plan was successfully executed.\(^1\)

It is difficult to judge the extent to which Stewart and Lovedale were involved in this election. Such activity in 1884, as in subsequent elections, was definitely pursued in secret. It was, however, to Stewart that Irvine had written suggesting Innes as a candidate.\(^2\) With Innes' reputation as a Scanlen supporter this proposal was a natural corollary to Irvine's previously stated opinion that Victoria East should return at least one candidate who would "advocate justice in our dealings with all classes of the Queens subjects."\(^3\) Irvine asked Stewart if Lovedale would be prepared to support Innes or if it had already "pledged itself to Johnson."\(^4\) This query indicates that Lovedale's support was an important factor in elections and that pledges, official or unofficial, were made. It seems unlikely, however, that Lovedale would have pledged itself to Johnson in preference to Watson as Johnson was opposed to the Scanlen administration. This remark may be a reference to second choice and support for Watson have been assumed by Irvine.

James Rose Innes, who was not present on polling day, wrote to Stewart shortly afterwards thanking him for his

2. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 9 November 1883, SP 31A.
3. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 18 October 1883, SP 31A.
4. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 9 November 1883, SP 31A.
interest and for the hospitality given to his brother Richard, adding that it was "to the natives' vote that I owe my success." Having been elected by them, however, he was apprehensive about his possible failure to live up to their expectations that he would "do something". He therefore appealed to Stewart for "any suggestions with reference to native and other matters". Richard Rose Innes who wrote in similar vein, was more explicit about Lovedale's participation in the campaign.

"Thank you for sympathy and wise counsel. With the exception of the sympathy we received at Lovedale I may say from the outset that it was an uphill fight against local prejudice and stubborn and resolute hostility. We owe our success to the indirect assistance we received from Lovedale and the staunch solidity of the Native vote....My only regret is that Mr. Watson should be supplanted by a man like Johnson...." Stewart's sympathetic encouragement of Innes' candidature remained a matter of conjecture beyond a small, discreet circle. Rumours in a Cape Town newspaper of Stewart's involvement were denied by David Watson himself who claimed that Stewart was as ignorant of such intrigues as "the eagle that flew in the Natives own country". Jabavu also denied that missionary influence had had anything to do with the outcome of the election.

As can be deduced from Richard Innes' letter to Stewart, the majority of Europeans in Victoria East had not appreciated his brother's success. Many disliked Innes because he was a Scanlen supporter and indeed went further than Scanlen in

1. J. Rose Innes to Stewart, 9 March 1884, SP 31A.
2. Richard Rose Innes to Stewart u.d. 1884, SP 31A.
3. The Alice Times, 29 February 1884.
his views on free trade, taxation, the future of the Transkeian territories and African policy in general. Innes was also suspect as a "carpet-bagger" from Cape Town who could not be expected to show much understanding of Eastern province affairs. Stephen Johnson represented opposite opinion being a Spriggite and a member of the Eastern party, elected by farmers and the Bond, but as a Grahamstown man he was also suspect. This was sufficient for the Alice Times to declare that Victoria East had been disenfranchised as neither elected member could be said to represent local interests. The election of Johnson had repercussions for Lovedale. Later in 1884 Stewart attempted to have Lovedale separated from the Alice municipality on the grounds that Lovedale was being taxed unfairly for amenities which they did not receive. Stewart was offering a lump sum and land in exchange for Lovedale's independence. He spent almost four weeks in Cape Town trying to persuade members of the government to intervene directly. This involved discussions with Sprigg, Upington, Ayliff and de Wet, who turned down Stewart's plea but offered to take the matter to Parliament.

"They want to get the question into Parliament and delay it a year....or in other words they are afraid to offend the Dutch party and the Jingos...for Alice is one of the Jingo places on the frontier....The whole thing is reducable to a sentence - Stephen Johnson has a vote for the support of the present ministry; the Jingos of Cape Town dont differ from the Jingos of Alice. The unwisdom of J.T. Jabavu and Mzimba in ousting Mr. Watson is now apparent...."

2. Jacobus Albertus de Wet, 1840-1911, Secretary for Native Affairs 1884-1890. J. Ayliff, Colonial Secretary.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 15 July 1884, PC.
It is clear, however, especially from the recently-published book of Innes' correspondence, that Victoria East had given his first seat to one of the most outstanding and honest politicians of the century. The Africans and liberal Europeans had found a staunch and consistent champion. From the point of view of his constituency, however, the suspicions of the Alice Times were well-founded. Innes was not prepared to uphold local interests for the sake of political expediency. Thus, as Harrison Wright observes,

"...by 1888 he had achieved an enviable reputation in the Colony for integrity and an unenviable one in the division for neglecting the interests of his constituency." 1

In 1888, however, Innes was returned for the Cape division which was more congenial to him in its more cosmopolitan outlook but he retained close connections with the Eastern Cape primarily through his brother and through correspondence with many public figures, notably Tengo Jabavu.

Stewart's encounter with the new Upington ministry confirmed his opinion that "Dutch influence is paramount and British influence is on the decrease." For this state of affairs he blamed "Gladstona's miserable tinkering at the Foreign Office" 2 and Upington and Sprigg for having "sold themselves to the country for office". After Scanlen's failure to have the Transkei transferred to Imperial protection, his defeat and consequent establishment of an Upington-Bond ministry, Stewart concluded that "the prospects of the natives were never blacker than they are at present." 3

1. Wright, op.cit., p. 18.
2. Stewart to John Stephen, 3 September 1884, SP LB4b.
Empire League

The growing uneasiness about the "Afrikander party as it gradually unfolds itself",¹ found expression by the end of 1884 in the formation of the Empire League. At the instigation of J.A. Chalmers, Judge Shippard, the Grahamstown organiser of the League, sent Stewart an outline of the League's principles and constitution. According to Shippard, he and Cecil Rhodes had discussed the possibility of such an organisation ten years before when they had both been in Griqualand West. Now the formation of the Imperial Federation League in Britain² had given the necessary impetus to the establishment of a similar League in the Cape. Rhodes claimed that Graham Bower was "really the author of the Empire League";³ they included James Leonard⁴ and Innes in their discussions and Innes was pressed, rather unwillingly, into becoming the Leagues first Secretary.⁵ Shippard wrote to Stewart,

"The principles and objects are briefly as follows:
1. Faithful and true allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen.
2. Imperial unity.
3. Home Rule of local self-government with federal union.
4. Representation of all parts of the Empire in the Imperial parliament or in an Imperial council in London.
5. The admission of all British subjects without distinction of race, creed or politics into the society pledged to support these principles and to promote these objects."

Shippard went on to observe that in the Cape Colony

"...we aim at attracting into the society the leading Colonists of Dutch extraction and practically swamp

1. The Christian Express, May 1884
5. Wright, op.cit., p. 36.
the Afrikanders Bond and ultimately reuniting the Orange and Transvaal states under the Imperial flag."

Shippard also felt strongly that Africans should be admitted to the "benefits of the movement", the best way of doing this being left to the judgement of those who, like Stewart "have a thorough, practical knowledge of the native question." The Judge also remarked that he was concerned about the actions of John Mackenzie in Bechuanaland, actions which he feared might weaken "the adherence of Imperial federation". He asked Stewart, therefore, if he would consider using his influence with Mackenzie to persuade him to adopt a more moderate course.¹

The League had considerable success at first, partly because of the "Bechuanaland controversy", partly because its original aims and intentions were broad-based and appealed to moderates. It did, in fact, attract an African following.² However, it was taken over by those for whom it was an "anti-Bond idea" and thus, according to Innes, "all the most jingo spirit in the country was called into play".³ The result was that the League failed to draw any Bondsmen or Sprigg-ites and it also quickly lost the support of moderate men. Without money or leadership the League collapsed. The time had not yet arrived for a clear-cut division on racial (i.e. Afrikaner-British) lines despite the uneasiness of co-operation. Moreover the "humanitarian imperialists" who looked for "justice for the natives" were encouraged by developments in British politics. J.J. Irvine, who had resigned his seat and

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1. Sidney Shippard to Stewart, 30 October 1884, SP 23A(xiv).
2. Imvo, 22 December 1884; 20 April 1885.
3. Wright, op.cit., p. 36.
gone to England for a few months, described to Stewart how Mr. Chamberlain had stated in the "clearest and most emphatic manner" that England's obligations to Africa would be upheld.

"Lord Derby has stated in equally clear terms that England is determined to hold her present position in South Africa....The position taken up by the Imperial government will strengthen the hands of moderate fair dealing section of the colonists and... make clear to the leaders of the Afrikander party that England will not relinquish her legitimate control on SA affairs....One cannot help feeling that no nation we yet know of has done or will do what England has to protect weak, insignificant native tribes to whom she has given her word...." 1

Don versus Pelser 1885

In January 1885, a Burghersdorp farmer, Johannes Pelser, shot and killed an African on his farm. In his deposition before the magistrate Pelser justified his action on the grounds of self-defence. The magistrate, in doubt as to whether Pelser should be indicted for murder or culpable homicide, sent the record of this preliminary examination to the Solicitor General on 28 January 1885. The prisoner was remanded on bail until 11 February 1885. On 31 January the Solicitor General, (Sir) Andries Maasdorp 2 instructed the Magistrate to commit Pelser on a charge of culpable homicide. Several days later the Attorney General - who was also the Premier of the Cape, Thomas Upington - inquired by telegram about the case. Maasdorp replied that the magistrate had been given instructions to commit Pelser. On 11 February, Pelser altered his deposition, saying that his revolver had gone off accidentally. No further evidence was submitted.

1. J.J. Irvine to Stewart, 16 November 1884, SP 31A.
On 16 February the Solicitor General telegraphed Upington that "on seeing examination as completed, have declined to prosecute".  

The following month, on 24 March, the Cape Mercury, a liberal newspaper published in King Williams Town, included an article entitled "Justice and Party politics" which commented on the fact that the Government had declined to prosecute Pelser. Various newspapers made reference to the case and letters appeared from private individuals. On 14 April the Mercury published a letter from Rev. John Don, minister of the Free Church in 'King' and clerk of the Presbytery of Kaffraria, which observed that there had been a miscarriage of justice implicit in the non-committal of Pelser.

"I am reluctantly compelled to come to the conclusion that your statements are true;...that our rulers have been influenced by political instead of such legal considerations as are alone applicable to the case. It may be safely assumed that if a white man had been the victim, the murderer would not have been left untried and unpunished....It would seem that in the district of Burghersdorp that if a Dutchman shoots a Kaffir, the crime must be overlooked, Government refuses to do its duty and the conscience of the whole community is offended....Is nothing more to be said or done?....Pelser...himself admits a criminal act, whether murder or manslaughter, which ought to be tried by judge and jury in open court, instead of settled off-hand by Solicitor General or Attorney General in a hole and corner fashion.

I am a member of the community which has to bear the responsibility, in the last resort of its governments acts, and a minister of a religion which knows no distinction of race, caste, class or colour; and my conscience refuses to put up silently with this offence...."

In May, this letter, "which we heartily agree with", was

1. Stewart to Smith, 11 September 1885, NLS 7797, Stewart sent Smith a résumé of the case as it had developed to this point.

2. The Christian Express, May 1885.
reprinted in the *Christian Express*, Innes asked questions in Parliament but Maasdorp took the entire responsibility of not prosecuting Pelser, leaving Upington unassailable.\(^1\)

Then in July, Pelser brought a criminal prosecution for libel against Don, "the general belief being that he was instigated thereto". Don's opinion was that "Pelser thinks the time has come to rehabilitate himself by punishing me."\(^2\)

Several missionaries wholeheartedly supported Don - "Dr. Stewart, Bryce Ross, and Chalmers think and feel with me in this matter".\(^3\)

Richard Rose Innes and Richard P. Solomon\(^4\) acted as his legal counsel. Don decided to plead "justification", though his counsel urged him to plead that the letter was "written without malice".\(^5\)

In the months from July to November when the trial took place in Grahamstown, several interesting comments on the nature of the trial were communicated to George Smith of the F.M.C. by Don and Stewart, and attempts were made by Don, Stewart and William Hay\(^*\) (brother of the Mercury's editor) to gain support and financial aid for Don through the British press, the Aborigines Society and the Free Church of Scotland.

According to Stewart, on 11 February, the day Pelser altered his deposition, the mayor of Burghersdorp had written to the Secretary General indicating that there was "very considerable excitement in the district" and that he antici-

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1. Wright, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
2. Don to Smith, 4 July 1885, NLS 7797.
3. Don to Smith, 10 August 1885, NLS 7797.
4. Richard P. Solomon, 1850-1913. An able lawyer who finished his career as Union High Commissioner in London.
pated "very serious excitement" when the case was brought to trial. Stewart claimed that the district was largely under the influence of the Bond and that the government was apprehensive about the outcome of such a trial and, therefore, sought to prevent it.

"There is nothing very surprising in this case as a result of the dominance of Africanderism - and the power of self-government given to a country before it is fit to use it." 1

Don was convinced throughout that his trial was not a private affair, that it was a political trial and, therefore, a "public indeed a national question." He informed Smith that Upington, "an Irishman of very questionable loyalty to the British crown", would stop at nothing to foster the feud between Dutch and English, thereby increasing his majority and his power. With the country in a depressed state there was a great deal of sheep and cattle stealing and, in consequence much "Kaffir shooting". None of these "Kaffir shooters" was ever brought to trial, Don claimed, and thus "we are teaching the natives to under-value human life".

"Government, powerful by the Dutch vote, is trying to throttle independent public opinion especially of a kind which favours the right of the native to equal justice. This very prosecution is an instrument of terrorism...not a newspaper venture to speak out". 2

Freedom of the press had been hardly won in the Cape and in the climate of 1885, newspapers could expect to be attacked. There were indications in fact, that the Upington government would have been prepared to drop the case against

1. Stewart to Smith, 11 September 1885, NLS 7797.
2. Don to Smith, 10 August 1885, NLS 7797.
Don but that they were tempted to continue by the prospect of crushing the *Cape Mercury*. By September, Don felt himself 'humiliated' by adverse comments in newspapers and outraged by public opinion in the Colony.

"It is bad enough to have such a state of feeling in the country as puts a difference between black and white. But that those with whom the administration of justice rests should pander to that feeling is intolerable." 1

There was, however, support from Britain for Don. "He has behaved nobly, if injudiciously," was Smith's opinion. The Foreign Mission Committee, after receiving the Presbytery's minutes on Don's case, fought on his behalf before the trial and opened a subscription list which realised about £500. William Hay wrote to Professors Blaikie and Rainy, influential figures in the Free Church and to his friend Charles Gordon of Douglas. He hesitated, however, to write to Chesson of the A.P.S. because he felt that the support of the A.P.S. might stir up adverse feeling in the Colony. Nor did he feel that he could ask Chesson himself for money as he had learned that "his weakness is great men".

"...if you asked him for a donation you would secure a vote for £5; if a Duke wrote he would ask his Committee for £20. I could not get a penny from him." 2

George Smith wrote to Stanley at the Colonial Office in October but received the reply that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was unable to interfere in any matter connected with the administration of justice at the Cape.

The trial took place on 12 to 16 November. According

1. Don to Hay, 5 September 1885, NLS 7797.
2. Hay to Professor Blaikie, 14 August 1885, NLS 7797.
to Stewart, Pelser made a very poor appearance. Don was not placed in the dock but was accommodated in a seat behind his counsel, Solomon.

"Ross, Chalmers, Weir, Peacock and myself in the same bench as his supports! Bryce and myself as his co-Presbyters giving him the nearest 'bashing' in the fight. Though Don is the accused, the parties really on their trial are Pelser and the Solicitor General – the first for the deed and the second for the failure to bring him to justice. I can hardly think that Don will be condemned". 1

In the event, Solomon and Innes proved such masterly counsels that Don was acquitted, after an anxious wait in which one member of the jury, who had been heard to boast of "shooting niggers in America", had stood out for three hours against the rest. With an unabashed volte face, the Press of the country eulogised Don and money was collected by sympathetic colonists. "The Lord Reigneth", intoned Smith in a jubilant telegram from Edinburgh. 2 (Nor could he resist passing comment on a similar case which he had had to fight in India.) Hay observed that Don was "the most popular man in South Africa", King Williams Town presented him with a special address signed by 800 names, telegrams were sent from all over the Colony, including one from the "Lovers of justice at Burghersdorp" and Africans congregated to express their gratitude, a formal speech being delivered by Tengo Jabavu. 3

Don's popularity was running high; Upington barely concealed his anger at the publicity which the case had received in the Cape and in Britain; the case against Hay

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 11/12 November 1885, PC.
2. Smith to Don, 11 December 1885, NLS 7772.
3. The Christian Express, December 1885.
of the Mercury was dropped. However, despite these victories, Pelser was still at large and likely to go unpunished and the high officials still occupied their places "notwithstanding the remarks of the Court and the animadversions of the Press."¹ The most significant effects of the case were felt by those men who had made a public stance in defence of principle and in the much less easily definable area of human relationships, particularly the sensitive relationship between black and white in the Eastern Cape.

African response, 1884-1886

a. Imvo ZabaNtsundu

John Tengo Jabavu resigned as editor of Isigidi in May 1884.² As his three year contract did not expire until September of that year, it can be assumed that this resignation was hastened because of Jabavu’s frustration with the non-political character of Isigidi. In later years, he rarely missed the opportunity of passing provocative comment on Isigidi’s restricted function.³ Jabavu’s abilities as an Editor could not be denied, however, and the group of men behind Rose Innes who had most cause to be grateful to Jabavu’s electioneering skill, decided to establish an African newspaper with its office in King Williams Town and with Jabavu as its editor.⁴ Jabavu accepted this

¹. Don to Smith, 11 December 1885, NLS 7797.
². James Stewart Diary, 29 May 1884, "Got Jabavu’s resignation at 2".
³. cf. Imvo, 2 February 1885; 9 March 1887.
⁴. These men were James Weir, Frederick Dyer, Julius Jameson—all merchants in King Williams Town. Weir was an elder in the Free Church and a member of Presbytery. He later
position as Editor of Imvo ZabaNtsundu or Native Opinion. In a letter to Chesson of the A.P.S., Jabavu declared that he intended to "create rather than to meet a want" and that he wished to "open the eyes of the natives to their rights".¹ There are indications that he also saw the new paper as a possible platform from which to aim at missions and missionaries. The first issue, supposed to have been published on October 27, was stopped by the promoters because it treated missionaries "after a free-lance fashion". This led to a show-down between Jabavu and the managerial board, the former announcing that he was "not their tool" and that he must be "free to conduct the paper as he liked".² This demand presumably arose from his previous experience with Stewart and Isigidi, but, in this case, a compromise was reached and the first issue of Imvo appeared on 3 November 1884.

Contd.) took a leading part in establishing the Inter-State Native College. Frederick Dyer of Dyer and Dyer was MLA for KWT from 1884-86. Julius Jameson, the brother of Leander Starr Jameson (of the Jameson Raid), had preceded his brother to SA and had sent home the diamond which had encouraged "Dr. Jim" to emigrate. Julius worked for the firm of J.J. Irvine and married Irvin's daughter Letitia. Their daughter, Kate Jameson, married a cousin and is still living in Bulawayo, Rhodesia. The others who supported Imvo were Richard Solomon and Richard Rose Innes, lawyers and the Hay brothers, George and William, founders and editors of the Cape Mercury published in KWT. Solomon and William Hay also became members of the Cape Parliament. All these men were strong defenders of African rights in the Cape.

1. Jabavu to Chesson, 18 August 1884, Quoted by A.P. Walshe, op.cit.
2. Charles Green to Stewart, 27 October 1884, SP 31A.
For the next decade Jabavu's criticism of missionaries was muted but it is still evident that he considered it essential that Imvos independence should be recognised and that Africans should defend their ability to speak and act for themselves. This, Jabavu felt, entailed a break away from the "well-known missionary and magisterial props" which, admittedly, "have been and still are so valuable to our people." For this reason, Imvo was regarded by some with suspicion as "the organ of those lawless spirits who will not be controlled by Missionary or Europeans influence". Others recognised that there was room for both Isigidimi and Imvo and that the latter was "professedly political" which the former "could not well be". Imvo supported the campaign for the registration of African voters, hailed the formation of the Native Educational Association and encouraged all other attempts at political association amongst Africans.

b. Native Educational Association

This Association was "perhaps the first society launched among and by the natives themselves." Its date of origin is uncertain, having been begun either late in 1882 or early in 1883. It was sufficiently well-publicised for Sir Langham Dale to write a letter, printed in the Christian Express, suggesting ways in which the new Association could prove its devotion to education and to the virtues of self-help. If the N.E.A. was the first, it was certainly not

1. Imvo, 26 January 1884.
2. Imvo, 2 February, 1884.
3. Imvo, 26 January 1885.
the only society to be formed by Africans at this time. In his presidential address to a new literary society formed in Kimberley, Rev. Gwayi Tyamzashe listed the many benefit societies controlled by "coloured people" which existed in that mining town. Their own society, he suggested, had been modelled on the Lovedale Literary Society which had been so successful for the past sixteen years but it differed in that it had been 

"...started by the natives themselves independent of any European assistance. This shows that the Natives here and in the Old Colony are now beginning to awake out of their slumber of many years. The Imbumba Society of Port Elizabeth with all its various branches, the Native Educational Association, and many other Mutual Improvement and Benefit Societies show the present feeling of the more enlightened natives in the Colony." 1

The first President of the Native Educational Society in the Cape was another theological graduate of Lovedale, Elijah Makiwane. In his speeches, reported in Imvo, there is the same evidence of desire to acknowledge the benefits of missionary and European assistance, at the same time asserting the ambition of Africans to do without that help and "to reach a stage in which he himself will give help". 2 The rising generation of Africans no longer believed that every European was ipso facto a superior being. In Makiwane's words there was a "growing recognition of the fact that a missionary is not infallible". 3

Both missionaries and Africans had become increasingly involved in formal politics since 1880. Little distinction between them was made by those who viewed the situation from the outside. Even those with insight were inclined to

2. Imvo, 2 February 1885.
3. Imvo, 26 January 1885.
credit the European with having more influence and greater political acumen. Indeed, the fear of the average European voter was that some Europeans, especially missionaries, wielded too much influence and that they were responsible for the casting of the "blanket vote" in such a way that Liberal members were returned to the Legislative Assembly. This charge was laid in connection with the outcome of the 1884 election in Victoria East. The implication of "mindlessness" on the part of the African voter was too much for Jabavu who printed a vehement denial of any missionary influence at all in 1884 and a full report of all the discussions, meetings and decisions participated in by African voters in Victoria East. He extolled the thoroughness of African political education, received by many in the mkundla, and claimed that it was superior to that of many Europeans whose education in these matters had not been called in question.

"All this," Jabavu stated, "was done without the influence of these dreaded influential missionary wire-pullers; and as the discussions were very free, it will appear that the Native voters deserve to be called 'independent electors'." 1

There was no question here of Jabavu calming the fears of those who had not liked the election of Rose Innes or who attacked "missionary influence" because they were not themselves in a position to exercise such influence. Jabavu was defending the independence and intelligence of the African voter against the allegation that they had been or could be manipulated by anybody, especially missionaries.

1. Imvo, 27 May, 1885.
Organisational problems

There are several references in *Imvo* at this time to the activities of Nehemiah Tile, usually credited with being the fore-runner of the Secessionist movement in the Cape.\(^1\) Tile was a Wesleyan minister who resigned his charge after having been "bitten by the political tarantula." His break-away from orthodoxy was definitely caused by his championship of the rights of Chiefs and people. There was, therefore, considerable difference between Tile and men like Jabavu and Makiwane. Tile wished to remove magistrates from Tembuland and re-establish the Chiefs. Makiwane and Jabavu were determined to exercise political power within the European framework. *Imvo* commented sympathetically on Tile's problems but, not surprisingly, observed that Tile was unlikely to be able to deal with the "intricacies of diplomacy", particularly as he appeared to have the intention of "revolutionising the government of the extra-colonial territories."\(^2\)

Differences in approach hampered all African attempts at effective organisation in this period. These differences were based on denominational distinctions and on tribal origins and on what Makiwane warned were "other petty causes of jealousy", such as suspicion and conflict based on past grievances. This was obviously particularly true in rural areas where such distinctions were maintained and existing patterns were only gradually disturbed. An inter-denominational, inter-tribal institution such as Lovedale suffered occasional disturbances as a result of tribal factions coming into conflict. Education and Christianity did contribute

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2. *Imvo*, 26 January 1885.
to the establishment of a broader African unity but most noticeably in an urban, industrial context.¹

**Imperial Loyalty**

Despite their strivings after independence, loyalty to Queen and Empire remained a deeply-rooted principle of African political life, a fact which brought African aspirations closely into line with missionary attitudes. Appeals were made for Imperial intervention and such petitions produced some effective African organisation.

"If we were to express the genuine feeling of our people as a whole they would exceedingly rejoice if...the government now obtaining in South Africa were swept away tomorrow and the direct sway of Her Majesty's government put in their place". ²

The decision to found an Empire League gained immediate support from the African population. Enthusiastic meetings were held in many districts, proclaiming loyalty, approval of General Warren's actions in Bechuanaland, desire for Imperial government in the Transkeian territories and the suggestion that the Cape Colony should revert to pre-Responsible government days.³ There was a sensation when an Amabele chieftain, Mbovane Mbandla, was threatened with dismissal for taking part in such meetings. In this case, *Imvo* and its readership were on the side of the Chief as he had been exercising his "legitimate rights as a free citizen of a Great Empire", and had been acting in the interests of his people's welfare. There was an outcry in the Colonial press

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¹ Thompson and Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 433.
² *Imvo*, 22 December 1884.
³ *Imvo*, 20 April 1885.
but even after a sympathetic investigation Mbandla's dismissal was upheld. Innes asked questions in the House, somewhat half-heartedly, as although he felt that the government was not justified in dismissing Mbandla for the alleged cause, he had no very high opinion of Mbandla and claimed that he had been guilty of "other grave acts of misconduct". Mbandla was eventually re-instated without pay in 1887.

Pelser Case 1885

The Pelser case could be said to have represented an emotional high-water mark in the relations between missionaries and Africans in the Eastern Cape, heralding a period when they made common cause against the power of Rhodes and the Bond. Don's acquittal was the occasion for expressions of sympathy with missionaries and identification with their attitudes.

In his public address to Don after the trial Jabavu proclaimed,

"We are grateful to think that in these days when prejudice seems to be getting the upper hand over justice and good government, you have been the means of rousing the spirit of fair play which has won and achieved Empires that last...This...has allayed our suspicions as to the soundness of the system of government; it has subdued our excitement and alarm, which had reached their utmost tension, and it has grounded and re-established the faith of the wavering, who had begun to fear that even religion itself was but a political dodge intended to weaken the minds of men into submission."

In the enthusiasm of the moment, Jabavu even named his baby son Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu.  

1. Imvo, 27 April 1885; Wright, op.cit., pp. 39, 45.  
2. The Christian Express, December 1885.  
3. To become Professor D.D.T. Jabavu, one of the noted men of his day.
At this time, therefore, Stewart could express the view that

"Their cause is ours; they are our natural allies in resisting the disloyal anti-English, retrograde influences which are rampant in South Africa..." 1

The Bond was the common enemy. Stewart defined the activities of the 'Dutch party' as being "anti-English...and anti-native so far as educational, social and political rights are concerned." 2  Imvo, in turn, advised its leaders to vote for no-one in a Parliamentary election who was "in any way connected with the Africander Bond" as all Africans were the natural enemies of that party. 3 Other newspapers commented on the similarity between the Christian Express and Imvo.

"The Christian Express hates the ministry of Mr. Upington and so does the Native paper Imvo. Both papers would do all they could to thwart the Cabinet even, we fear, if in doing so they induced their proteges to take up arms, which would mean, as they ought to know, rushing to their own destruction."

In the same column it was suggested that Africans acted on Stewart's advice as "his sympathies with the natives are well-known" and his "animosity to the present government is more than suspected." 4

As has already been suggested, however, this identity of concern must not obscure divergence in motive. Stewart's attitudes were undoubtedly based on a consistent dislike of "Dutch" policies, a dislike which was motivated by his fervent patriotism and belief in British justice. The

2. The Christian Express.
3. Imvo, 27 April 1885.
4. The Eastern Star, quoted in the Christian Express, December 1886.
ultimate crime in Stewart's eyes was to be "anti-English" and the increasing attachment of English-speaking people in South Africa to "Dutch" policies signified, to him, complete degradation. His disgust with Sprigg and Upington was total. They had been prepared to do the bidding of the Bond and "to sell the natives for the price of office."¹ For Stewart there was no alternative but to uphold African rights according to the law and he expected that Africans equally would understand where their best interests lay and vote accordingly. If he saw that the African vote in the Eastern province kept some liberal independents in office he did not openly use that argument for franchise retention, though, obviously, people like Stewart feared the African vote less than they feared the vote of the Afrikaner. Right or wrong, Stewart and other missionaries consistently defended principles over against individuals at this time and, therefore, found themselves at odds with liberal members of Parliament who felt forced to compromise. Yet neither the missionaries nor the liberal Parliamentarians were prepared to consider an African majority, even in the long term. If the missionaries appear to be more principled this was only true so long as Africans were united with them in pressing for the re-introduction of British-type rule, British ascendancy in South Africa.

Jabavu, as previously noted, was a life-long supporter of European ascendancy in Cape politics with Africans playing a significant but secondary rôle. Those who opposed his

¹ Stewart to John Stephen, 31 October 1884, SP LB4b.
views were, at this time, an inarticulate minority. In the eighties, Jabavu's politics were generally in agreement with those of Stewart.

"History shows unmistakably that the votes of the natives have been used discreetly in the best interest of the country and of civilisation and that they have steadily and consistently been employed to strengthen the English or the party of right and justice in the House." 1

1886-1892

In this period Africans and missionaries worked side by side to encourage their liberal representatives in Parliament to oppose the determined legislative onslaught of Rhodes and the Bond.

Liquor Legislation

Liquor legislation was one of the political issues on which missionaries and Africans were in general agreement. Those, like Jabavu, who were strictly teetotal and those, like Stewart, who were not, were nevertheless united in their condemnation of the sale of alcohol to Africans. For many years missionaries had opposed the proliferation of canteens in frontier areas of the Colony but with little success. Across the boundary, the Transkeian areas were free from the sale of brandy but for those who wanted to purchase "fire-water" it was comparatively easy to visit a Government-licensed canteen in the Colony. To offset the influence of canteens, missionaries and others organised Temperance Societies which

1. Imvo, 30 March 1887.
had considerable membership in border towns like Alice. It is interesting to note that this weakness for drink, which was no respecter of persons, resulted in Societies where black and white worked together for their common object.¹

The vine, however, was one of the Cape’s staple agricultural products and much of the wine and brandy industry was in the hands of the Western Cape Farmers, many of them Afrikaners. Jan Hofmeyr’s Boeren Beschermings Vereniging (Farmers Protection Association) was originally an association of brandy producers and, indeed, Hofmeyr made his initial entry into politics when he organised the Association in opposition to an excise tax on brandy imposed by Sprigg after the war of 1877. By the mid-eighties, the B.B.V. had expanded to include other concerns and had become known as the Afrikaner Bond. The acute depression of the years from 1882 and the high tariffs operating in other South African states caused the Bond to use its increasing influence in Parliament for the protection of Cape farmers. Missionary fervour about new liquor legislation must be seen, therefore, not only as part of a Band-of-Hope morality but in the political light of Bond interests in the brandy and wine business.

As late as March 1884, before the resignation of the Scanlen ministry, Proclamation 68 had prohibited the sale of drink in several African areas in the Colony as well as in the Transkeian territories. This was a direct consequence of the recommendations contained in the Native Laws Commission

¹. The Kaffir Express, April 1871.
report of 1883. Thereafter the missionaries made every effort to extend this prohibition as far as possible. Stewart wrote to Scanlen stating that restrictions were having an excellent effect. Percy Nightingale, now Civil Commissioner in Cape Town, had been closely connected with the Act and hoped to see its provisions extended. His information was that those Africans who were outside the restricted area were "quite jealous of those within the prescribed territory". Africans should therefore be encouraged to petition the government for this advantage.

"Mr. Innes will be with you soon," he wrote to Stewart, and will no doubt orate. I wish he would allude in terms of approval to this subject and so draw forth an expression of native opinion which could be published."¹ The United Missionary Conference sent their own petition to Innes "praying that a law might be passed rendering it illegal to sell drink to any native within the Colony." Innes, who favoured restriction, consented to present the petition but told Stewart privately that he considered it impractical.

"Unless you can exclude liquor altogether from a whole territory, nothing can be done; once allow drink to enter a district and natives will have it, and they will get it too as long as it pays unprincipled men to transgress the law."²

Innes went on to say that the problem of liquor restriction was, in his opinion, one of the strongest arguments for keeping Africans in "black colonies". Once an area was even partly occupied by Europeans it was not possible to implement any form of prohibition.²

In 1885, however, the Government initiated a reversal of the previous policy, issuing a Proclamation which permitted

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1. P. Nightingale to Stewart 29 August 1884, SP 31(e).
2. Innes to Stewart, 16 April 1884, SP 31.
the sale of drink in the Transkeian territories, under certain conditions. There were protests from every district in the territory. Stewart sent telegrams, Chalmers attacked Upington and Tudhope, 1 Captain Blyth saw the Governor, Sprigg and de Wet, criticised the Proclamation and urged them in future to allow Africans to discuss and express their opinion on any measures introduced by government before they became law. 2 Blyth was particularly upset by Section 5 which stated that Chiefs, Petty chiefs and Councillors should "be allowed to purchase what they liked", a suggestion which the Government claimed came from Blyth himself. Representations against this section were also sent from the African community and, when the section was altered, Imvo claimed victory as a result of their petitions. 3

It had become evident, however, that there was "no sufficient security" against the growth of the drink traffic. The following year the excise on brandy was repealed and, by the end of 1887, Proclamation 68 of 1884 had been withdrawn. The Presbytery of Kaffraria felt constrained to place on record "the consternation and shame" with which it regarded this action of the government. Despite the protest of the African peoples in those areas, the government had passed a measure that facilitated, indeed practically forced on them "a traffic which is demoralizing and destroying them." 4 These words are not over-emotive when compared with statements made about "alcohol and the Native" on political platforms and in

1. J. Chalmers to Stewart, 31 December 1885, SP 31(e).
2. Blyth to Stewart, 1 January 1886, SP 31(e).
3. Imvo, July 1886.
4. Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes, 5 October 1887, Cory MS 9040.
Many appeals for support were made from the Cape to the Colonial Office, to the Aborigines Protection Society and to the Foreign Mission Committees of various denominations. "In common with others in London, we are fighting the liquor traffic question," wrote George Smith. The outlook, however, was gloomy.

"Strong in the support of the Afrikaner Bond, they can afford to disregard opinion here, especially when, in the present instance, the wine farmers and the brandy distillers of the West are the persons whose interests are being consulted...It is an illustration of what is implied in the administration of native territories by the Colony. You can never be secure against attempts made to oppress or destroy the people by the party who foolishly think it to be for their interest to do so...." 2

It could be argued, of course, that to deprive an African of the right to drink was an infringement of his liberty quite as damaging as the free choice to buy liquor in his own area, just as appeals for prohibition could be said to have given Innes a supportive reason for "Bantustans" where free trade in liquor could claim to treat black and white alike. The moral anomalies of Cape politics left much scope for self-justification, provided effective camouflage for unworthy motives and confused the honest man who was apparently faced with a choice between two evils. The barometer of the liberal conscience is often quite unreadable at times when determined action is a necessity. Despite rousing calls to protest in the face of impending disaster and certain shame, for the majority of liberals in the Cape the disaster was

1. Smith to Stewart, 9 June 1886, NLS 7753.
2. Don to Smith, 11 December 1885, NLS 7797.
that "the native hue of resolution was sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought."

The Franchise.

From 1886 the protagonists of franchise revision began to gain ground. So long as the African vote represented an indiscernible fraction of the whole, the Cape franchise was likely to remain untouched. Two events contributed substantially to the change in this situation. 1) The Cape acquired the Transkeian territories thereby adding a large number of potential African voters to the population of the Colony. 2) The Registration periods of late 1884 and late 1886 had led to a significant increase in the percentage of African voters in constituencies such as King Williams Town, Queenstown and Victoria East. African voters in these areas in 1882 had represented respectively 22%, 10% and 14%. By 1886 these figures had risen to 39%, 47% and 51%. Africans and Europeans, English and Afrikaans, had all contributed to this increase having "recruited strenuously" to place qualified Africans (and in the Western Cape, Coloureds) on the roll.

The attitude of the Bond to the Cape franchise has been thoroughly documented by T.R.H. Davenport in his book The Afrikander Bond. With their traditional platteland attitudes it was to be expected that the Bond would seek to reduce the "political power of the non-white people". First, however, although they acted on the assumption that

the African vote would be cast against them, Bondsmen were aware that this was not automatically true of the Coloured vote. There could not, therefore, be an imposition of a hard and fast colour bar in a revision of the franchise. Second, the balance of power between the Bond and their opponents was sufficiently delicate for an outright attack on the franchise to have been suicidal. The result was that

"Bond congresses devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of raising the qualifications for electors in such a way as to exclude Africans from the vote in practice without appearing to do so in theory."  

From 1882, with the tremendous acceleration in African political activity, this issue became crucial. Registration proceeded apace but there were irregularities on both sides which gave an excuse for an investigation of the franchise regulations. The incorporation of the Transkeian territories raised the scare-mongering cry of "blanket Kaffirs" swamping the Register. It was at this point that their basic fear of the black electorate pushed the two sides of white opinion in the House into a compromise Bill altering the franchise of the Cape.

The first piece of legislation aimed to change the property qualifications, for Africans only, in the Transkeian territories in order to reduce the likelihood of a large increase in African voting strength. This Bill met with such opposition that Upington was forced to discard it. The Bill was defeated at the third reading on the basis of

1. Davenport, op.cit., p. 121.
an amendment proposed by Douglass\textsuperscript{1} and agreed to by Innes, "to the effect that no native should be entitled to vote by reason of occupying ground on tribal tenure."\textsuperscript{2}

The following year Sprigg, Prime Minister yet again, introduced the Registration Bill, the basis of which was the amendment proposed by the Opposition in 1886. That is to say, the Bill denied the franchise to those whose qualifications were based on communally or tribally owned property. Innes and others felt that as purely tribal tenure was not a qualification in any case, this Bill was unnecessary. Moreover by expressly defining the nature of tenure qualifications, "grey areas" which were held neither by tribal nor by individual title were in danger of becoming disenfranchised. For example, in a native reserve there were Africans of all tribes, with no Chief, each occupying ground, many over a long period having built fine houses and established gardens but, technically, without individual tenure.

"The alleged object of the Bill was to revise the lists in conformity with the Constitutional Ordinance. The Opposition disputed the Government construction of that Ordinance and declared that the Bill would disenfranchise large numbers of Natives legally enrolled. The fact that the representatives of the districts concerned sat for the most part on the Opposition benches inflamed the controversy."\textsuperscript{3}

It has been noted by Fatima Meer that the liberal protest was largely a protest against the "institutionalization of racial laws rather than against racialism itself, which it accepted as a convention."\textsuperscript{4} Where this may be true, it should not

\textsuperscript{1} Arthur Douglass, 1843-1903. Successful ostrich farmer. MLA for Grahamstown 1884-1903.
\textsuperscript{2} Wright, op.cit., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{3} Innes, op.cit., p. 74.
\textsuperscript{4} Heribert Adam, op.cit., p. 124.
blind us to the importance of such protest, even if only against institutionalization. These men, on the whole, were gradualists who nevertheless firmly believed in maintaining the flexibility of such laws as the Constitution Ordinance so that where doubt existed (as with tribal tenure) it operated in favour of the Africans. They were prepared to oppose tooth and nail any legislation which removed the possibility of change and improvement.

Sauer, Innes, Merriman and other independents voted against the Registration Bill, but the Bond supported the government and the Bill passed. Innes maintained that, with the exception of Cecil Rhodes, no leading member of the House actually advocated a colour or racial franchise bar. Despite this, there were many who believed, with some justification, that Rhodes was well supported in his view that Africans were a subject race and should be governed as such; that to refuse them electoral privileges was doing them no wrong.¹ This uncompromising attitude embarrassed the Government who wanted the matter stated more ambiguously.

"Some Dutch and English members avow exultingly and unblushingly, though somewhat inconveniently for the Government, that they support the measure because they see in it a step towards the issue which they consider indispensable — that the Natives in the Colony be treated as a subject and inferior race on the principles followed in the neighbouring Dutch Republics. Then the Federation of those with the Colony will be brought about at the cost of the political status of the Native people and also I fear of both English honour and influence in the Colony. ²

Urgent appeals for immediate Imperial intervention were

1. Innes, op.cit., p. 75.
2. Don to Smith, 16 July 1887, NLS 7797.
made to the Crown, particularly by Africans. The Imperial government was called upon to take a stand on the grounds that the new legislation contravened the *spirit* of the 1853 Ordinance and that failure to intervene would result in the handing over of a "fine people to the tender mercies of their enemies".¹ But Innes, with characteristic caution, observed that even if it so desired the Imperial government could not very well intervene and that the solution must be found within the context of the Cape's independence, by returning men of "intelligence and true patriotism" at the next General Election. Here indeed, was where missionaries and politicians parted company. Stewart would happily have invoked the direct interference of the British government because he felt that the Cape had proved itself unfit for self-rule. Innes made his view clear in a letter to Jabavu:

"I do not think that it is a good thing for the Native cause that appeals should constantly be made by natives, and by friends of natives, for interference from England, either on the part of the Home government, or on the part of any irresponsible society; and much as I deprecate the registration Act, I honestly consider it a lesser evil than an infringement of the rights of home rule which we enjoy....I earnestly hope that no deputation will visit England to agitate the question." ²

Despite Innes' admonition, Jabavu wrote to Chesson of the A.P.S. urging him to see that the Crown did not approve this Bill which introduced "a distinction between white and black in South Africa".³ Meetings were held in many districts. At Port Elizabeth a mass meeting resolved to send a petition to the Queen. In country areas the Native Vigilance

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1. Don to Smith, 17 September 1887, NLS 7797.
3. Walshe, *op.cit.*
Committee stirred up interest in the issue. At a conference in King Williams Town in October over 100 Africans attended, representing many areas and resolved to meet again in the future in order to "look into questions vitally affecting their rights as British subjects". By that time, however, the Parliamentary Voters Registration Bill had passed into law, Sir Hercules Robinson having ratified the Bill, in Imvo's opinion, with unseemly haste before an appeal could be made. Imvo saw its role as that of

"...a native journal of the native races...almost alone and single-handed fighting the battle of the Constitutional rights of the Queen in a perilous crisis for the Colony and against the assaults of adventurers and enemies of British interests in South Africa."

The Registration Bill passed its third reading on July 8. A Transkeian Representation Bill based on this Act was introduced giving Griqualand East and Tembuland one member each. This became law on 8 August. Thus the fear of being swamped by the Transkeian vote was allayed. However, despite the fact that the number of registered voters struck off the roll, most of them African, was high, about 30,000 or approximately 33%, this reduction made no difference to the outcome of the 1888 election in the Eastern Province constituencies previously noted. The influence of the Bond in those constituencies did not increase, a fact which inevitably led to the agitation for further franchise reform.

These two Acts were followed by the Native Registered Voters Relief Bill, a measure introduced by Hofmeyr which gave exemption to African voters from the Native Pass Law,

1. Imvo, 12 October 1887.
2. Imvo, 27 July 1887.
the Location Act and the Liquor Act, on the grounds that such class legislation should not apply to those who were entitled to vote. This was an adroit move which took the fancy of a large section of African voters and became a principle of Bond policy but to the liberal independents it was an embarrassment. The latter saw it as an attempt solely to circumvent prohibition and thus to increase the market for Western Province brandy. It meant that in areas such as East London, where there was only one African voter, prohibition could not be enforced because in the Government's view, so long as even one man could buy drink there was no point in prohibiting it to the rest. Hofmeyr's view was that "If a native ought not to be allowed to have liquor.... then he certainly ought not to be allowed to vote." 1 C.H. Hutton* introduced an amendment which he told Stewart the government could hardly resist "if they have one spark of sincerity left unextinguished", but the Bill passed with the majority of the opposition voting against it and then having to explain to their African constituents why they had done so. For, as Edward Roux points out, this Act was considered to be a "boon to Native voters", often described as the "Magna Carta of Natives in the Cape". 2 It can, however, be fairly claimed that such privileges drove a wedge between the African voting élite and the un-enfranchised masses, a situation which proved one of the most insuperable obstacles to the success of any African nationalist organisation.

1. The Christian Express, November 1887.
2. Edward Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 60.
The Pass Bill

Despite the passing of the 'Hofmeyr Act', the Sprigg government next declared their intention of introducing a more effective Pass Law which would apply to registered voters as well as to unenfranchised Africans. In June 1889 Stewart was convinced that this Bill would pass and, therefore, made an impassioned plea for justice in that month's Christian Express.

"Is it then a crime for a Native to live in the land where he was born, and which was his before it was ours, and is he to be liable to criminal penalties for the non-possessio of a document whose value is merely arbitrary?....It is said that a need for such a law exists. What is the proof of such a need...?" Missionaries of all denominations petitioned the government against the Bill. This had to be done by wire in order to reach the government before they had pushed the Bill through its preliminary stages. Stewart stated that many such measures had passed the second reading "before those chiefly concerned are aware of their introduction". Meetings of Africans were held in every district, petitions flew through the telegraph wires and a special deputation of Makiwane and Jabavu ("those apostles of metaphysical nonsense") waited on the Prime Minister in Cape Town. The Pass Bill was withdrawn. The mutual concern of missionaries and Africans for the outcome of this protest is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that on their return from Cape Town, Jabavu and Makiwane spent the night at Lovedale and breakfasted there the following morning presumably discussing their triumph with Bokwe, Mzimba and Stewart.

1. The Christian Express, June 1889.
2. The Christian Express, July 1889.
3. Stewart Diary, 4/5 July 1889.
Jabavu's dictates on political allegiance and involvement were by no means unchallenged. In 1886 Mpambani Mzimba caused a tremendous storm by his recommendation in a lecture to Lovedale students that Africans should not participate in politics. His advice was a result of his reading of George Washington Williams' *History of the Negro Race in America* in which he learned of the disillusion with political action among the Negro community in the Southern States after the collapse of Reconstruction.

"Let the experience of Africans in America give warning in time to Africans in Africa to let politics alone at present. Let us be content to be ruled by colonists. Let us only have to do with politics in order to encourage those white men who desire to give us schools and books."

Mzimba declared himself to be in agreement with Williams' belief that race prejudice would give way before the influence of character, education and wealth. This sort of statement was seized upon by Colonial newspapers some of whom jubilantly observed that they could "scarcely believe their eyes that the reverend gentleman can have given the natives such good advice". Even Sir Gordon Sprigg made favourable comment. Jabavu was outraged. He reminded Mzimba through the columns of *Imvo* that Africans in America had been slaves within living memory of the present generation whereas "Africans in Africa were found by colonists so deeply rivetted by political problems that they could not afford time to attend to anything else." Besides that, the withdrawal of Africans from politics would result in the collapse of English influence and "the

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1. Quoted by P.J. Mzimba in his talk to the Lovedale Literary Society in November 1886.
eternal ascendancy of Dutch and Dutch notions.¹ Mzimba had supported the candidacy of Innes in 1884 and had participated in the registration of African voters in Victoria East. Whether or not he was brought to heel in this matter of withdrawal from political action is difficult to determine. He was, of course, almost immediately proved right in his contention that Africans would be forced out of politics, by the introduction of the franchise legislation.

The 1888 Election

This election was bound to be of interest in view of the legislation of the previous Parliament. In the Eastern Cape, the railway issue and the development of the ports, inflamed controversy between "King" and East London versus Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. Innes declined to stand again for Victoria East but took a keen interest in the frontier elections, preparations for which were described in detail by his brother.² To Jabavu Innes wrote that he considered the election to be a test one but that he had confidence in the steadfastness and incorruptibility of the African vote. Hopefully they would "stick to their guns". However, although in most cases the marginal constituencies returned an English-speaking independent as expected, there were two exceptions. Griqualand East returned James Sivewright, a Bondsman, but Jabavu maintained that he had not been elected by Bondsmen "who are as extinct as a dodo in East Griqualand" but principally by the votes of Africans. The only explanation Jabavu could offer was that these voters

1. Imvo, 21 January 1887.
2. Wright, op.cit., pp. 73-77.
had been persuaded to vote in this way "by their white neighbours under all sorts of pretences".\(^1\) Again in "King" itself another leading African had ranged himself against Jabavu. Rev. Charles Pamla\(^2\) had visited the Prime Minister in January 1888 and had been roundly criticised by Imvo for so doing on the grounds that he would be "trotted out" to show that "the superior class of natives" were friendly towards Bondsmen and that the English argument that the Bond was opposed to the advancement of Africans would be shown thereby to be "fallacious, one-sided and misleading."\(^3\) Pamla adhered to his policy, however, as a result of which Richard Solomon lost his seat to Frederick Schermbrucker, 60 Africans including Pamla having voted for the latter.\(^4\)

There is no record of any participation by Lovedale in this election. This could be accounted for in part by Stewart's absence in Scotland for three or four months, when he took Mrs. Stewart home to recuperate from an illness. However, from 1888, Stewart's attention was directed more towards events in 'Nyassaland' and in East Africa. His concern for the A.L.C. and his long-standing interest in Livingstonia and Blantyre caused him to view with alarm the claims of the Portuguese in the Zambezi region.\(^5\) Three successive leaders

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1. **Imvo**, 30 May 1888.
5. Inter alia, Stewart to Stephen, 19 July 1888, ST 13/3/1; Stewart to Mina Stewart, 13 April 1889 PC; ALBruce, 25 April 1889 ST 13/3/1; Smith to Stewart, 10 April 1889, NLS 7773.
in the Christian Express were devoted to the Partition of Africa. Then in September 1889, A.L. Bruce wrote to Stewart suggesting that he should go to East Africa to found a "new Lovedale", the expedition to be financed by the Imperial East Africa Company. Because of this connection, Stewart tended to see Rhodes in terms of his northern enterprises, as distinct from his Machiavellian Cape politics.

"About Rhodes' effort and success I need not tell you that I am heartily glad of any movement that tends in any way to secure British supremacy in Africa."  

Cecil J. Rhodes

On those who remained in the Cape, however, Cecil Rhodes began to exert enormous political influence. His large fortune and business ventures gave him power, his personality impinged on every aspect of public life. In 1890 he became Prime Minister for the first time and, in an effort to unite the divergent forces in Parliament, included Bondsmen, such as Sivewright in his cabinet and also Independents, Sauer, Merriman and Innes. This ministry, as might be expected, held together for less than three years. The ostensible cause of the split was the Logan contract, but it is evident that such a mixture of opposing viewpoints could not long remain an effective government.

1. The Christian Express, April, May, June 1888.
2. Stewart to Bruce, 8 October 1889, SP 23A(xi).
3. James Douglas Logan was a railway caterer and friend of James Sivewright to whom Sivewright granted the monopoly of selling refreshments at all stations for ten years. As a result of this crisis, Rhodes resigned and reformed his ministry in 1893, without Sauer, Innes and Merriman.
Franchise and Ballot Act 1892

The entente between Rhodes and Hofmeyr, which had come about before the fall of the Sprigg government, made it likely that, among other issues, the matter of the African franchise would again be raised in Parliament. The 1887 legislation may have reduced the number of Africans voting but it had not secured more seats for the Bond. The Registration period of late 1891, held under threat of new legislation, had witnessed several abuses which, as previously, called forth opposition to the African vote. Moreover the 1891 Census, however inaccurate had drawn attention to the numerical inadequacy of the Europeans who were outnumbered two to one by Africans alone.

"Ever since the results of the Census were made known, the atmosphere has been saturated with suggestions from leading statesmen relating to the extermination of the African race in South Africa."

The Bond congress of 1891 came out in favour of a multiple-voting system which would give more votes to men of property and education but, in the long run, it was decided to raise the occupation requirement from £25 to £75 and to introduce a simple educational test. This Bill represented a personal crisis most especially for Innes who was committed "to leaving the colour free franchise untouched". First,

2. The figures quoted in the official handbook for 1893 were - Europeans 376,987; Malays 13,907; Hottentots 50,338; Fingos 229,680; Kaffirs 608,456; Mixed 247,856; Total 1,527,224.
3. Imvo, 6 June 1891.
however, he was a member of the Cabinet and did not wish to embarrass his Prime Minister and colleagues. Second, and this was an argument which was to be used again and again by South African liberals, he was convinced that the Bill would be passed and that he should, therefore, work to produce the least harmful Bill possible in the circumstances; that is to say, he would vote for it provided certain conditions were met. In contrast to Innes, Sauer and Merriman were generally in favour of an educational test and were prepared to accept a compromise for the sake of staying in office because they refused to leave the field open for Sprigg and the extreme Bond. Yet, as Innes observed,

"Unless we make a stand soon, we shall not know where consistently and logically to stop...." 1

If Innes was perplexed, Jabavu was even more in a dilemma. He had undertaken to support policies not men, yet he could not detach himself from Sauer, Merriman, Innes and other independents. Their support of the 1892 Bill forced Jabavu into explaining away their action, leaving himself open to the charge that Imvo was just a mouthpiece for the Rhodes ministry and did not "reflect Native opinion". Edward Roux has given a fair account of Jabavu's increasing ambivalence and of the unhappy directions in which his loyalty led him, 2 but Jabavu, like others, was subject to a complexity of pressures, not least of which was unwarranted optimism about the political future of Africans in the Cape.

2. Roux, op.cit., Chapter VII passim.
c. Lovedale, Land and Labour.

The Transkei and the Ciskei were the two areas of influence and interest of the Free Church missions in the Eastern Cape. The Transkei was almost entirely African in population; the Ciskei was a patchwork of black and white settlements. Land tenure amongst Africans in the Cape was almost entirely communal, though there was some individual tenure in the reserves. There were no restrictions upon purchase of land by Africans outside the reserves if they could afford it.

Throughout the 19th Century, however, the dominating influence on the social organisation of African societies was the gradual subjection of independent African chiefdoms to white control and the encroachment upon their land-holdings of white farmers anxious to expand. The significance and importance of property-holding, true of both European and African societies, meant that deprivation of land and the eventual restriction of purchase caused more unrest and dissaffection amongst Africans than any other legislation. This complex and thorny problem, the ownership and occupation of land was, and still is, the most important single issue in the country.

"The Native Question is admitted to be the most important and difficult question of the day in this Colony. But it seems as if it were impossible for us to learn the first elementary truth of that question - namely that the land difficulty lies at the bottom of all our troubles, and that while we ignore this and act on the aquisitive and annexing principle, and keep constantly dispossessing the Natives - all other efforts of education, Native Commission, New Codes and legislation in various forms will be but barren and hopeless to produce contentment and peace. Let us cease everlastingly absorbing
land and the Natives will not be quite so difficult to deal with...." 1

In the 19th Century 'rebellion' was the ready excuse for the deportation of Africans beyond a certain boundary-line and the subsequent occupation by Europeans, or 'loyal' Africans, of the land vacated. Cattle-stealing, a frontier hazard, was another ready pretext for the confiscation of land. Missionaries, without condoning theft or unwarranted hostilities, were uneasy about the implications of this policy.

"On the general matter of native land...we must allow them some place on which to live...yet the tendency is in the other direction as you see...I am not an apologist for those who steal cattle but such difficulties should be dealt with by an efficient police - not by absolutely dispossessing the native." 2

This theme with variations was repeated throughout the century, especially in the columns of The Christian Express where there were frequent comments on the unwisdom of dispossession and the immorality of land rewards to predatory Europeans. Though there was little clear development of missionary policy on the matter of land allocation, in general they favoured individual holding of land and the inalienable right of Africans to African land. Thus a man would take a pride in what was his own and put time and effort into its maintenance, knowing that it could be handed down to his descendants. The Native Laws and Customs Commission of 1883, of which Stewart was a member, recommended that individual tenure should be substituted for tribal tenure where a majority were in favour and that "native grants of

1. The Christian Express, May 1884.
2. Stewart to Slater, 19 September 1882, SP LB4b.
land be inalienable and unsaleable except to native purchasers." At the United Missionary Conference of that year Stewart urged delegates to recommend to their Business Committee that the Commissions resolutions should be supported and also to pressure the Government to extend the powers of the Land Board and to reduce the cost of land transfer.

"...there is a tide always rising and just eating native land bit by bit, and bye and bye the natives would be in this condition that they would not have place for a hut. If someone would introduce a good Land Act....it would be a most useful piece of legislation." 1

Justice must be done, then, though for missionaries and for sympathetic officials, it must be done not only for its own sake but for the practical benefits to both black and white. Loyalty must be secured and no man would give this in exchange for repression. There was also the point, made by Orpen to Stewart, that Africans were cheap producers and that white farmers would turn the small holdings into "barren sheep walks", an observation reminiscent of the Enclosure movement and the Highland Clearances.

"We should create a desert and call it peace....They are great and cheap producers and their being swept away would make every industry in the Colony suffer - the Diamond fields especially...and if you take away homes and hope from them you will get no good labour from them but make them for ever a sore and a canker in the body politic...." 2

Attitudes in local land issues spilled over into wider national politics. The fate of the Transkei and Basutoland had concerned the missionaries in the early eighties. In

1. The Christian Express, August 1883.
2. Orpen to Stewart, 3 January 1881, SP 31.
1886 it was the turn of Pondoland to come under attack from Europeans and, therefore, to arouse the protests of missionaries and other sympathisers.

Stewart and Mpondo politics 1886-1887

Between 1870 and 1898 the Cape government pursued a consistent and implacable policy of bringing the independent African chiefdoms under Cape rule. The Mpondo chiefdom, which was one of the last to succumb, had originally been one of the largest chiefdoms in the area. However, in 1863 East Griqualand had been created from its territory and in 1868 an internal dispute had caused a split, East Pondoland coming under the rule of Mqikela, West Pondoland under that of Ndamase. The tribes in Griqualand East, chiefly Bhaca, Xesibe and Mpondomise, asked for British protection because of border unrest with the Mpondo. A Magistrate was, therefore, appointed in 1873 and in 1879 East Griqualand was annexed to the Cape. White farmers moved in and the Government used its influence to support the local tribes against the Mpondo. The chief concern of the Cape Government was that the large Eastern Mpondo chiefdom would provide easy access along its coastline for foreign interference. In 1878, Nqiliso, son of Ndamase, sold Port St. Johns to Britain and the Cape Government used this as a lever against Mqikela - he must recognise the sale, allow roads to be built through his territory, stop border troubles with East Griqualand and acknowledge the independence of the Bhaca and Xesibe.
Mqikela’s chief councillor, Mhlangaso, was the real ruler of the Mpondo and he was determined to resist these demands and to keep the chiefdom independent. To this end he negotiated with Natal and also with German concession-hunters. Consequently, Britain proclaimed a protectorate over the entire coastline in 1885 and in 1886 the Cape government armed the Bhaca and Xesibe, sent Walter Stanford to demand concessions from Mhlangaso and threatened war. These events resulted in protests from Stewart and a personal appeal to Mhlangaso.

Mhlangaso Faku, grandson of Faku, Paramount Chief of the Mpondo, had been brought to Lovedale in 1872 by Mrs. May Jenkins, "Queen of the Pondos." He was accompanied by his three brothers. Mhlangaso was about 30 years old when he began his education. He remained at Lovedale for about two years, made satisfactory progress and was a "great influence for good." He married Victoria, daughter of Sandile, the Nqgika chief, she having been educated at Peelton. It was this personal acquaintanceship with Mhlangaso that caused Stewart to attempt to intercede with him.

On November 8 1886, with troops mustering on the Mpondo border, Stewart sent the following telegram to Mhlangaso.

"As your old friend, I strongly advise you to endure anything just now rather than let fighting begin. Restrain your men. Keep within Pondo territories. Don’t fire a shot on Baca or Xesibe on Colonial territory. Wait. Don’t fight, nor allow your men out of Pondo boundary." 1

Earlier on 1 November, in the Christian Express editorial

1. Cape Mercury, 4 January 1887. This newspaper published an account of Stewart’s part in negotiations with Mhlangaso. The telegrams are given in greater detail by the Mercury than by Stanford in his Reminiscences.
entitled "Land and Loot", Stewart had given a full account of his thinking on the Mpondo issue. He objected to a war at all but particularly to the form of war which it seemed the Government was about to countenance, "not by a regular but by an irregular force, who are to be paid out of plunder". Stewart was genuinely concerned that a burgher force would be sent in with carte blanche to compensate themselves for their trouble with "land and loot". If this happened then such a force would draw in its wake "a horde of Bacas, Xesibes, Fingoes and others who would complete the desolation and like the carrion kites of war pick the carcase to the bones." Of the 150,000 or so Mpondo men, women and children, Stewart claimed that not more than a tenth, if that, desired to fight. "What have these 15,000 Pondos done that we should subject them to such miseries?" 1

It is apparent from this and from further correspondence that Stewart and others feared that the Mpondo were being drawn into a trap, that they had only to start a fight on the border and their country would immediately be over-run.

"No native is safe now who has any land to lose. The Colony knows nothing of the merits of the case. They only know that the Pondos are said to be a trouble-some people and that the sooner they get their quietus the better....'Who are the Pondos? is a frequent question. Then comes the answer - a lot of idle, fat lazy fellows who do not know how to occupy their spare time. Let them be brought to their senses and scattered over the Colony and put to service among the Boers and let them learn there to be quiet and work. You are the only one who can influence Umhlangaso, Do your best to get him to save his people and country." 2

1. The Christian Express, November 1886.
2. Chalmers to Stewart, 15 November 1886, SP 31A.
Evidently in reply to a telegram from Mhlengaso, Stewart wired with a further suggestion. 

"Very glad to know your views and that the desire of the Paramount Chief and yourself is to avoid fighting and to secure lasting peace. My advice very strongly is to send pacific reply to Cape government and ask for Imperial Protectorate." 1

At this juncture, Walter Stanford, who was hoping to negotiate with Mhlengaso, began to think that Stewart might upset his considered plans, Stewart having sent his telegrams via Stanford from courtesy. Stanford, therefore, wired a reply to the effect that the troops in the area were for defensive purposes only and that Stewart would be well to support the policy of bringing Mhlengaso to an amicable settlement. "Umhlengaso by no means guileless patriot is playing game of his own." Stewart immediately wired back to Stanford that he was relieved to hear that there was no forward movement of the troops and that he could communicate his support for the plan to Mhlengaso. 2

Stewart was not entirely satisfied, however, and continued to press the issue of an Imperial Commission with Mhlengaso.

"Let me again urge you, in the strongest way to agree to terms proposed by Cape Government unless they are quite unreasonable. Do this in order to get force disbanded and danger of present war removed. After that get a Commission. Cape Government will not give that probably. If so, apply for Imperial Commission." 3

Stewart backed this with a letter to Sir Powell Buxton asking him to approach the Colonial Secretary in this matter, out-

1. The Cape Mercury, 4 January 1887.
3. The Cape Mercury, 4 January 1887.
lining Stewart's fears and asking for British concern and action. Buxton replied,

"I believe the Colonial Office has good intentions but is under all governments far too ready to yield to the pressure of the predatory classes in S. Africa..." 1

A week later he wrote again to Stewart assuring that the Colonial Secretary had been duly informed of Stewart's concern but that he understood that an agreement had been reached between the Cape Government and the Mpondo. In any case, Stewart must be satisfied with the Colonial Secretary's assurance that a "land and loot policy" would not be countenanced by the Cape ministry. 2

It was true that a treaty had been signed by Mhlangaso and Stanford on 9 December 1886. For Stewart, however, the matter was not yet over. On 6 January 1887, Prime Minister Sprigg, at a banquet in Grahamstown made a critical reference to Stewart's actions. This was but a mild echo of a virulent attack which had appeared in the Eastern Star in which it was suggested that Stewart should be deported for his interference in political matters. Stewart was defended by the Cape Mercury in an editorial and that paper also gave Stewart space to publish in his own defence the gist of the telegrams sent to Mhlangaso.

"To what penal settlement is that unfortunate "head of a Colonial Missionary Institution" to be sent to expiate his crime of having advised the Pöndos at all hazards to keep the peace and preserve for themselves their own lands, cattle and lives and also save the Colony from a needless and unjustifiable war?" 3

Stanford also came to Stewart's defence, informing Sprigg

1. Fowell Buxton to Stewart, 23 December 1886, SP 31A.
2. Fowell Buxton to Stewart, 30 December 1886, SP 31A.
3. The Cape Mercury, 4 January 1887.
that Stewart's telegrams to Mhlangaso and the advice they contained had "in no way conflicted with the views of the government or the interests of the country".\(^1\) This is repeated in the account of the incident in Stanford's \textit{Reminiscences}. There were many others who wrote to Stewart, congratulating him for the stand he had taken and deploiring the strictures in the \textit{Star} and the censure of the Prime Minister. George Smith with typical naive effusion congratulated Stewart himself "on preventing, under God, a Pondo war."\(^2\)

\textbf{Labour}

Justice born of pragmatism which typified the missionary attitude to African land-holding also exemplified their attitude to African labour. Missionaries were of the Protestant mould, preaching the gospel of work, deploiring laziness and fecklessness in a man, whatever his colour. The most tolerant of missionaries found this Victorian conviction particularly hard to overcome and most of them were shocked by the Africans insouciant attitude to physical labour. At the same time, their emphasis on education and its virtues, meant that missionaries often found themselves at loggerheads with Colonists who maintained that the untutored 'Red' made a better workman or servant than an African who had had a basic education.

\(^1\) Stanford to Stewart, 22 January 1887, SP 31A.
\(^2\) Smith to Stewart, 9 March 1887, NLS 7753.
The Glen Grey Act 1894.

This Act - Rhodes' so-called Bill for Africa - focussed attention on the dual problem of land and labour in the Cape. The land and labour was, as has been said, a consistent undercurrent in the history of South Africa and in the class legislation pertaining to Africans, Coloureds and 'poor Whites'. In the view of most Europeans, particularly after 1870, Africans ought to form a pool of labour from which industry could benefit, an opinion which cut right across the alternative view of Africans as self-supporting peasant farmers, skilled workmen or educated men with professional qualifications. The problem of labour was closely correlated with that of land. With industrialisation the need for labour rose sharply and the drift of men to the towns created a need for labour in the country. At the same time it was becoming obvious that it was not possible for every man to own land and that for those who could not the only means of livelihood was to work for those who did.

The Glen Grey Act, which dealt with a specific area of the Ciskei, but was later extended to other districts, was a compromise between both viewpoints. Individual tenure with quit-rent was made compulsory in Glen Grey, with better guarantees than normal against alienation, but with only a very small lot of 4 morgen allocated to each person. To satisfy those looking for African labour, a labour tax was proposed which was aimed at forcing the landless to seek work outside their own district. It was this labour tax which gave rise to vehement opposition. 1894 had been a bad year
with severe drought, falling wool prices in some districts, unprecedented infant mortality. The prospect of increased taxes in these circumstances caused many "to talk of leaving the country, not for work, but permanently". The injustice of the tax resulted in meetings, petitions and a more generalised feeling of resentment and disloyalty than had come from the Franchise legislation, because it affected more people. Moreover Glen Grey was occupied in part by Mfengu who felt that this Act, and the manner of its introduction, was a poor return for their consistent loyalty in the past.

"...the Labour tax has certainly done more than anything else during the last thirty years to make the Natives dread and distrust the Government. Never before have Gaikas and Fingoes been found really united. This tax however has united them because they feel that it is thoroughly unjust and that it may only be the first of a series of measures as unjust if not more so." 2

Missionaries, although they approved of the introduction of quit-rent, were seemingly agreed in their opposition to the labour tax and to the manner in which the Act had been introduced. The Christian Express urged that attempts should immediately be begun to have the Act amended. Stewart, who had just returned from Kibwezi, attacked Rhodes unreservedly.

"If that notable Englishman who is the chief or sole author of that Bill and who, unlike the Colossus of his own name bestrides not a narrow sea but a vast Continent, would carry out a simple, clear and just Native policy more in accordance with the English sense of right and justice...he would be less harrassed than he probably is. He would have fewer difficulties and be less in bonds....No legislation is sound that does not recognise the equality of all men before the law, or that interferes with the natural rights and personal liberties of individual men, no matter how black they may be - black as Erebus itself...." 3

1. J. Maclaren to Stewart, 22 December 1894, SP23A(xi).
2. The Christian Express, July 1895 (Article by Brownlee Ross).
3. The Christian Express, March 1895.
A few months later, Stewart analysed the missionary attitude to the labour problem. Missionaries taught their people, both black and white, the necessity and dignity of labour but their aim was not to supply the market with grooms or ploughmen but to preach the Gospel. On the other hand missionaries could often use their hands as well as their heads and the skills they possessed they passed on to their pupils because it enabled them to become independent and more civilised. Those who used the African for their own interests and were prepared to force his labour and underpay that labour were "neither wise nor just". The better educated a man was, the more useful did he become to his employer. Besides education increased a man's wants and his desire for a more sophisticated standard of living and this could only be of benefit to manufacturers, business men and farmers. "To utilise the native in the interests of selfish employers, or for political purposes so as to secure party votes, is worse than immoral."¹

**African employment**

In his analysis of the Lovedale register, Stewart in *Lovedale Past and Present*, lists a wide variety of occupations pursued by Lovedale graduates. There was a considerable number of ministers, evangelists, teachers, law-agents and interpreters; there were skilled artisans, printers, bookbinders, carpenters, waggon-makers and blacksmiths; there were policemen and minor civil servants; but there were many

¹ *The Christian Express*, October 1895.
peasant farmers working their own land, shop owners and traders, and transport operators with an independent business. *The Christian Express* in 1896 noted the existence of an entirely African-run Co-operative store association in Port Elizabeth and the projected establishment of another similar company. The same article noted that two Lovedale alumni were running Ikaya Labantsundu or African hotels. Only lack of capital and experience prevented more Africans from becoming successful traders and entrepreneurs.¹

**Summary**

In this decade, the prize of political power for Africans who were qualified to exercise it, often seemed to be within their grasp, despite successive attempts to remove that prize beyond reach. For the educated élite there was still hope of change and because of that they were caught in the nexus of accommodation and compromise which characterized much liberal activity in the Cape.

"They believed that their problem was one of appealing to the Christian and liberal conscience inherent in white men and of raising the living standards of Africans to accord with white values. They expected equality to follow as a matter of course once Africans attained required standards of education and civilisation." ²

With this attitude, from their own angle, the missionaries would have agreed and, indeed, one is inclined to believe that it was a direct borrowing from original missionary teaching. Education, civilisation and the proper

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exercise of political power were still regarded as the key to upward social mobility and acceptance. On this basis, missionaries joined issue with all opponents of African political and social rights. At the very least, self-interest should encourage a government to act benevolently. At best, it was their paternalistic duty to encourage the growth and development of those placed in their charge. Their problem undoubtedly was Rhodes.

"He is very much of a puzzle. It is difficult to say whether he is playing into the hands of the Dutchmen or whether he is using them as tools, to further his own ends for the present that is, whether he is at heart loyal to imperial interests, or whether he has a day-dream of a United States of South Africa with a 'first President' also in view...six and half a dozen. If he really leans to the Dutch side the outlook for the natives is a bad one." 1

So long as these remained internal problems, with local issues at stake, missionaries were prepared to be severe in their criticism of Rhodes and his "native policy" as one which would "eliminate the native element from politics and compel the native people to be content with practical servitude". 2

But the Jameson Raid and the consequent re-assertion of Imperial power in South Africa upset the pattern of political allegiance amongst missionaries as amongst others in the Cape.

Finally, can it be deduced that these political manoeuverings were regarded with scant interest by the mass of the African people? Jabavu stated that at the conference held in King Williams Town in 1887 to oppose the Franchise Bill - "Land clause 17 worried them more than disenfranchisement". 3

It has already been noted that the Glen Grey Act produced more

1. Stewart to W.J.B. Moir, 8 June 1894, SP 23B(1).
2. Don to Smith, 15 April 1895, NLS 7798.
3. Imvo, 12 October 1887.
feelings of dissatisfaction than previous discriminatory legislation. Blue Books for 1894 were full of reports from magistrates of all districts claiming that there were few signs of progress amongst the people and moreover that there were indications of retrogression and relapse into barbarism. Some observers blamed brandy for this and the increase in canteens, others blamed drought and disease.

By the Glen Grey Act District Councils had been set up in Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo and the inhabitants of these areas deprived of the Colonial vote. Two of the districts concerned refused at first to nominate for the new Councils and the people maintained that they had been sold by their headmen.\(^1\) Did these protests indicate dissatisfaction with headmen, magistrates or disenfranchisement? To what extent were Africans engaged in Cape politics aware of this malaise and did it affect their actions? Why was there no revolt? Was the success of Ethiopianism, which spread so rapidly in the years 1886-1902, based on this resentment of the masses or on the different resentments of the élite?

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1. J. Maclaren to Stewart, 22 December 1894, SP 23A(xi).
d. 1896-1905

Political Background

The complexities of this period cannot concern us here. In brief, however, it became clear to Rhodes that his objective (which had been Carnarvon's) of a British South African Federation was in danger of being lost through the growth in power and autonomy of the Transvaal. Time, or lack of it, became the most significant factor in decision-making. Rhodes made up his mind to force the Transvaal into economic federation through a coup in the Republic which would oust Kruger and allow the British High Commissioner to intervene. Rhodes, therefore, encouraged the replacement of Sir Henry Loch, a noted Imperialist who was suspicious of Rhodes, by Sir Hercules Robinson as British High Commissioner. Robinson and Rhodes had worked together before and Robinson favoured Rhodes policy of 'colonialism'. Robinson, Chamberlain and Graham Bower all knew about the uitlander plot and Rhodes' hand in it, but it was left to Leander Starr Jameson to instigate the Raid with an inadequate force of men and an ill sense of timing. The result for Rhodes' ambitions was unmitigated disaster.

The predominance of Chamberlain in Salisbury's cabinet and his exaggerated reactions to the South African situation, were important factors in the denouement towards war in 1899. The Imperial factor, as embodied in Sir Alfred Milner, re-entered South Africa to fill the uncomfortable gap created by the Raid.

"The Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner jointly carried Britain into a war with the Afrikaner
Republics. Milner inflated the jingo forces and blocked the moderating forces inside South Africa and presented Chamberlain with arguments for intervention...." 1

This war, which ended in 1902 with the Treaty of Vereeniging and a nominal British victory, had been fought to establish British supremacy in South Africa. This, Milner believed, could be achieved first by increasing the number of British immigrants and second, by denationalizing the Afrikaners. After that, a self-governing white community could develop, the aim of both parties in the British government where its Empire was concerned. In fact, however, the period from the Raid to Union gave an enormous impetus to Afrikaner nationalism, not only in the Republics but in the Colonies. Although the period to 1906 appears as the heyday of imperialism, the British public were having second thoughts about their imperial attitudes (a Liberal government replaced the Unionist government in 1905) and, moreover, the Afrikaners had begun to recover from defeat and also in 1905 formed Het Volk, a movement which advocated full self-government for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.

In all this, two dominant impressions emerge. First, the legacy of bitterness and suspicion left by the war destroyed for many generations the prospect of moderation and co-operation between Afrikaner and British in South Africa. Second, the real losers in the war, were the Africans as, inevitably, attempts were made to "reconcile the whites over the body of the blacks."2 Milner and the

Imperialists, British liberals with their pro-Boer sympathies, English-speaking colonists and Transvaal Afrikaners - whatever divided these different groups they were basically united in their approach to 'native policy' and were prepared to sacrifice human rights for the sake of white supremacy in South Africa. The ends in view were the same; only the means differed.

The Cape 1896-1905

In the Cape, the most immediate political consequence of the Raid was the disbanding of the Rhodes-Bond alliance. Rhodes Cabinet had been shaken in 1893 with the resignation of Sauer, Innes and Merriman, a move whose main impetus was Sivewright's Logan contract but, in terms of political realities was something which had been pending for many months. In May 1894 Sauer had become leader of the Opposition. This caused splintering within the opposition group and some members, particularly from the Frontier districts became known as "Progressives". At the time of the 1893 elections the Opposition was, therefore, divided between those, like Innes, who disapproved of the Rhodes-Bond alliance (though supporting his northern policy) and those like Brabant,¹ who found Rhodes personally acceptable and were only selectively critical of his colonial policies.

Hofmeyr had retired from Parliament in 1895. The Raid a few months later effected a complete break between Rhodes and most of the Bond members. Hofmeyr was convinced that

¹. (Sir) Edward Yewd Brabant, 1839-1914. MLA for East London. Attempted to launch the formal Progressive party in 1893 but this was abortive. Soldier, farmer and politician. See Wright, op.cit., passim.
Rhodes should resign.¹ Rhodes did resign but continued to exercise political influence and, to a great extent, his presence dictated political allegiance. The problem indeed became more acute after the Raid. Could one support the Uitlanders and therefore the British presence in South Africa without in one way or another supporting Rhodes? Could one effectively oppose Rhodes without associating with the Bond? There were few men who felt themselves able to follow a moderate, middle way between that Scylla and Charibdis. Merriman and Sauer chose the latter course and drifted closer to the Bond. Others established the South African League (on 27 May 1896), which explicitly opposed the Bond and sympathised with Rhodes. Innes, who became leader of the opposition in the same month had members of the League and members of his own South African Political Association (formed May 1895) under his aegis. However, with his personal antipathy to Rhodes he consistently refused any formal association with the imperialistic League. In February 1897 the League decided to create an official political party - the Progressives.

"I am simply amazed," wrote Innes to Jahavu,"when I see the state of feelings on the Frontier; people seem to think that Mr. Rhodes, after heartily sympathising and co-operating with the Bond for ten years, has at length found salvation and that he will now appear in a new role as the leader of a great progressive party....I believe that in his heart the views of the (Dutch) party upon all matters of domestic legislation are congenial to him...." ²

This polarisation of feeling in the country and an open split on racial lines resulted in a bitterly contested

¹ Davenport, op.cit., pp. 163-164.
² Wright, op.cit., p. 194.
election in 1898. The Bond won a narrow victory after both sides had fought a dishonest campaign - "the smile of fortune, perhaps on the relatively cleaner campaign"¹ and on 17 October 1898 W.P. Schreiner² formed a ministry. The main task of this government, as Davenport has stated, was to preserve the status of the Cape as a self-governing Colony in the face of threats to that status before and after the outbreak of war and to use their influence on the side of peace.³ Their attempts to ward off the conflict were blocked, however, by the determination of Milner and Chamberlain. Rhodes too, who was now operating without restraint, undoubtedly used his money and his control of the Argus group of newspapers to stir up hysteria against the Transvaal. It was not without reason that Merriman should compare Ireland and South Africa.

"A majority of English people out here, with whom I am sorry to see Lord Salisbury agrees, is in favour of pushing matters to the extremity and...they wish to set the English up as the 'governing race' in South Africa - in fact to repeat the policy of 'the pale' in Ireland. This is a fatal policy foredoomed to failure but at what cost of tears and misery! Two facts should never be forgotten. The Dutch are in the majority in South Africa. Unless you suspend free institutions the majority will govern ....Recollect also that the Dutch are landowners, permanent citizens while the English are shop-keepers ...who are not South African born and do not intend to make South Africa their home." ⁴

2. William Philip Schreiner, 1857-1919. Premier of the Cape, October 1898–June 1900. Originally an admirer of Rhodes and an opponent of African rights, he later became a champion of African interests and was one of two politicians to oppose Union because it restricted the colour-free franchise.
Whatever can be charged against the Transvaal and its policies, the consistent refusal of the British authorities to play a moderating game did result in an upsurge of anti-British feeling in the Cape amongst those, particularly, though not entirely, Afrikaners, who, until the outbreak of war, had been content to live as a self-governing community under the British flag.

Schreiner’s war cabinet was forced to deal with successive crises. Issues such as martial law, the annexation of the Republics, the punishment of Cape rebels and their disenfranchisement caused enormous tension in Parliament. Public opinion in the Cape became more vociferous, less conciliatory and more divided between Loyalists and pro-Boers. In June 1900 Schreiner resigned and once again, for the fourth and last time, Sir Gordon Sprigg became Prime Minister. His cabinet contained Innes as Attorney General. In March 1902, Cecil Rhodes died, in May the War came to an end.

After the War, while Milner and his 'kindergarten' ruled the Republics as crown colonies, the Cape continued to reflect the mood of high Imperialism. Largely as a result of disenfranchisement of the Cape rebels, the election of 1904 returned the Progressive party to power with, by a curious paradox, Leander Starr Jameson as Prime Minister. Despite their victory at the polls, however, the Progressives success was short-lived. South Africa had already entered a new phase of development. Gold and diamonds had formed the basis of Rhodes' power, given the Transvaal the courage to assert its independence and had impelled the British government to
intervene in internal affairs, even to the point of war. In the post-war period, economic wealth, its management and ownership became the over-riding concern and Union became essential for the control and distribution of that wealth.

Racial disharmony between Europeans, which had been present from the beginning of the century, had by 1899 become inflamed beyond reason. Yet, even under conditions of war it was possible to foresee that mutual interest in power, wealth and survival would prove stronger than these racial antipathies. There were those who maintained that Europeans should unite in conscious opposition to their common enemy — "the black man".1

Africans in this period reacted differently to political pressures. Jabavu and his followers attached themselves to the Bond, others preferred Rhodes and the Progressives. But others again decided to make a clean break with Europeans, at least ecclesiastically. This movement, Ethiopianism, undoubtedly had wider political implications and can be seen as a protest against European domination and class legislation. As will be shown however, it was too 'denominational' to cause real concern to any power structure other than that of the missionaries.

Anti-African legislation in this period was chiefly concerned with education. Sir Langham Dales successor, Thomas Muir, introduced new measures, grants were cut and new examination requirements were instituted which seriously affected places like Lovedale where education was still

given on an inter-racial basis. The Cape School Board Act of 1905 also enforced segregation in the public schools. After the war, two developments had considerable impact. The Native Affairs Commission of 1904 made recommendations, particularly about the franchise, which illustrated how opinions had altered since the Commission of 1883. The movement in favour of a "Native University" gained momentum in part as a consequence of Ethiopianism and the concern felt about the influence of American Universities on the growing number of Africans who went to the States for their higher education.

The Jameson Raid

The reaction of missionaries to the Jameson Raid repeated the pattern of response in the country at large. Polarisation of opinion and the compulsion to adopt party labels aggravated personal conflicts in the Free Church mission. Prior to 1896 it had been possible for politically-minded missionaries to form judgments on individual issues and often to pursue an independent course of action. Now, increasingly, the rigid strictures of party allegiance pushed men into defensive positions. Locked in their definition of "right", they had little room for flexibility. This, in a small way, not only reflected the trend in the Cape but also in Britain. Increased participation through the spread of the franchise resulted in tighter political organisation.

1. See Chapter III.
"The days of loose affiliations, when the Commons was an impressionable body of men capable of being swayed by oratorical prima donnas to preserve or overthrow governments, were numbered."  

So far as the Mission was concerned, these changes occurred over a period when internal crises demanded careful and sensitive decisions. Instead, emotions and opinions previously controlled, erupted under pressure. Political, educational and ecclesiastical developments in this period cannot accurately be considered as separate entities. Each affected the other in a complex pattern of interaction. For example, the dominating question of Union in the Presbyterian church had strong political overtones as had the new educational policy of Dr. Muir. Most significantly, the Ethiopian movement focussed the frustration of many Africans on those most vulnerable to, though not necessarily responsible for, their unrest. Under these circumstances, the whole question of the purpose and achievement of missionary enterprise was subjected to bewildered, and often pessimistic, scrutiny. For all those who were pursued by those problems, war was at once a calamity and a tremendous relief but, after it was all over, the same issues remained to plague them.

The Election of 1898

The Sprigg government was defeated on the issue of a Redistribution Bill, and after a motion of no-confidence, resigned in June 1898. After the Jameson Raid other events had contributed to the alignment of parties. A crisis in British relations with the Transvaal in 1897 had caused the

2. See Chapter II.
Bond, supported by Merriman and Schreiner to move a resolution declaring that war would be disastrous. Innes voted with them also and then resigned as leader of the opposition. Stewart happened to be in Cape Town at the time and observed with dismay the trend of thought in the House.

"The ministry had a very narrow squeak for their ministerial life on Friday night....Innes and Solomon voted with Merriman who might very well be called headman. I give up those Afrikanders i.e. those men born in this country. They do not seem able to see things.

The majority of one would have put in a Bond ministry—and the first thing they would have done would have been to send home a protest to Chamberlain against sending any troops to South Africa. Te Water wanted this done as it is—i.e. to keep the C.C. so bare of troops that when the ultimatum comes from the Home Ministry to Kruger—if war does break out the Transvaal could annex the Cape and certain Basuto land—while the British troops were on the water and Harcourt and Labouchere would do as Gladstone did—say the thing is done—let it be and we should then have a Dutch Republic." 1

Matters came to a head in 1898. Milner* made a provocative speech at Graaff-Reinet in March, whose substance was echoed by Rhodes several days later in his first speech since his return to the Colony that month. Thus he cut his connections with the Bond and set about establishing the Progressive party as a party of strength and purpose. He even brought out an experienced election agent from Britain to help organize the party.2

"To convert it into the spearhead of British influence at the Cape, and to make Rhodes its leader, was the task undertaken by a few energetic figures at the Cape of whom Garrett, the editor of the Cape Times was among the foremost." 3

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 3 May 1897, PC.
Immediate success in the Council elections gave the Progressives confidence. Sprigg who had wavered in his alliance with the Bond, especially since the return of Rhodes, came out in favour of Redistribution and moved even closer to the Progressives. Innes remained an Independent but supported selected Progressive candidates. Merriman however, dropped his Independent status and he and Sauer united with Schreiner and the Bond to form the South African Party.

**African attitudes**

Jabavu, meanwhile, in support of Merriman and Sauer, found himself moving closer to the Bond. His argument at this time was that not only Merriman and Sauer but also Hay, Solomon Molteno and others had voted for Schreiner's no-confidence motion. In July 1898 he wrote to Hofmeyr,

"...these gentlemen are old friends of mine and of our people. I know they have sided with your people because they feel they have been wronged...you could do so much for the cause by co-operating with our people in the constituencies where there are Dutch, English and Native voters, neither of which section can command a majority."

Jabavu, however, though disillusioned with Rhodes, would have preferred Innes as leader and Prime Minister and, in company with others who felt the same, urged Innes to fight for this. Innes re-iterated the impossibility of his ever joining the Bond or even of supporting his former colleagues who did, and stated firmly that he thought Jabavu too should have drawn

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a 'finer line' between himself and the Bond.

"I think it is a great pity that in supporting your friends you should have managed to identify yourself to such an extent with the Bond party. It may be that you were forced in that direction as time went on; but the result is unfortunate. A really liberal Native policy will never come from the Bond - that is perfectly certain."  

Similar reaction appeared elsewhere, often expressed more immoderately.

"We see no possible way in which Imvo's action can be excused. The party to which he has gone over is the traditional opponent of Native freedom citizenship and education. Their action in Parliament has always been hostile and contumacious towards the natives;...It is to English love of freedom, fairness and kindness that the Cape natives owe every advantage they this day enjoy. How then is it possible for natives honestly to be found fighting in the Bond ranks, against their benefactors and against the welfare of their own race?..."  

As for Stewart, he was incensed beyond reason by Jabavu's open advocacy of the Bond, accusing him of being a "political Nonquase".

"The Imvo we believe has hitherto been conducted with judgment and ability. But its change to the side of a party which is not British in its ideas and aims, is entirely inexplicable and inexcusable. We, therefore, wash our hands of Mr. J. Tengo Jabavu and all his doings in this connection and regret beyond expression the infatuation which has led him to take the side he has taken."  

The row which developed between Imvo and the Express and their respective supporters will be dealt with in greater detail below. Meanwhile, it must be observed that Stewart's own political stance was regarded by many as being "inexplicable and inexcusable" and that it was his 'infatuation' with the

2. The Christian Express, August 1898.
3. The Christian Express, August 1898.
"British" which led him to take the side he did during the election campaign.

Again, however, Jabavu and *Imvo* were not the sole representatives of African opinion. The newspaper *Izwi Labantu* was edited in Queenstown by G.W. Tyamzashe assisted by A.K. Soga.¹ Rhodes had founded the newspaper in the Progressive interest² but seemed to leave the editors a certain freedom.

"We have decided to cast in our lot with the Progressives but in doing so have not pledged ourselves to Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Innes or Sir Gordon.... Immaterial who among the Progressives is in power... we are prepared to support it in preference to the Bond." ³

Another who supported the Progressives, and of whom Jabavu was, therefore, severely critical, was Walter Rubusana, the noted L.M.S. missionary at Peelton.⁴ Isaac Williams Wauchope, minister at Fort Beaufort, described himself as a member of the League and one who "owes all I am and may yet become to the teaching of English and the study of English Literature". Wauchope could not understand any African who chose to take the side of the Boer against the British.⁵

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¹ G.W. Tyamzashe, one of the Tyamzashe family who attended Lovedale. He was the first editor of *Izwi Labantu*, though this is generally overlooked as A.K. Soga became more prominent. A.K. Soga was a member of the well-known Soga family. He joined *Izwi Labantu* in 1899 as chief editor.

² Merriman Papers, p. 308, Note 130.

³ G.W. Tyamzashe to Stewart, 6 July 1898, Cory MS 5438.

⁴ Walter Rubusana was brought up by L.M.S. missionaries at Peelton. Came to Lovedale in 1876, gained a certificate in elementary education with Honours in 1878. After a brief period as a teacher at Peelton, he returned to Lovedale, graduating from the Theological class in 1882. He became politically active, finally standing in 1910 for the predominantly African constituency of Thembuland in the Provincial Council Elections. He won, despite strong opposition from Jabavu. Jabavu committed his "crowning folly" by standing against Rubusana in 1914, thus splitting the African vote and allowing the seat to go to a white man. cf. Roux, op.cit., Chapter VII.

⁵ The Christian Express, September 1896.
Stewart, Lovedale and the election in Victoria East

The question in Victoria East was whether or not the electorate would adhere to the 'Innes line' and return a moderate Progressive or whether they would go all out for Rhodes and return a member of the League. The two candidates contesting were William Hay and Edmund Garrett.* Innes, although he deplored the fact that Hay had voted for the no-confidence motion, supported his candidacy to Stewart on the grounds that he had liberal views and that it seemed to him of the greatest importance that "we should have honest moderate men of progressive views in the New House".1 Jabavu also supported Hay as one of his 'old friends'. Hay's record as a "pro-Native" was fairly sound but he was not well liked. "His unpopularity is always a factor to reckon with and he is a crooked cantankerous fellow".2 Edmund Garrett also had enemies but as Editor of the Cape Times and a former colleague and close friend of Milner, he had considerable influence. Innes wrote of him that he knew of no newcomer to the Cape who, without official position, "exerted so great an influence on affairs in so short a time".3 Garrett was an ardent Imperialist, an apologist for the Jameson Raid, an enthusiastic advocate of the Progressive party with Rhodes as its leader. Garrett was obviously able and intelligent but opinionated and none too scrupulous. "A beastly fellow - an hysterical jackass brimful of venom and conceit", wrote

1. Innes to Stewart, 27 June 1898, SP 31A.
3. Innes, op.cit., p. 115.
Merriman. Richard Rose Innes thought him an ass, and James Laing described him as a "political cheap-jack." Sometime in 1898, (the letter is undated), Stewart received a cryptic note from Rhodes.

"I know that you rightly abstain from politics but if you are considering the question I hope you will think of Garrett who is a good Englishman." 3

Stewart had met Rhodes in London and in Cape Town, had hoped to persuade him to give money to Lovedale but had been disappointed in the amount, and had regarded him with intense suspicion on account of his pro-Bond politics. Times had changed, however, and Stewart had apparently joined the ranks of those who believed that the leopard could change its spots or, more likely, he was prepared to go to any lengths to defend British hegemony in South Africa. It is not possible to be sure but it may have been as a consequence of this note that Stewart received a letter from Garrett, scribbled in pencil, a letter which was in reply to a communication which Garrett had had from Stewart.

"Many thanks for your kind invitation to Lovedale, received through Dr. Waterston. Any house will do - and do well! I don't want to seem to infect Lovedale with the taint of party politics, so perhaps had better curtail my visit more than I could wish. But I should be sorry to go to Alice without carrying out a wish formed before I dreamed of Victoria East or any other constituency. I am making for Peddie via Grahamstown; Peddie League having nominated me provisionally and Alice Dr. Kelbe*; meeting at Peddie on Friday. I propose then to work up to Alice, possibly via King, where some of my luggage has been sent on; and I will wire you well in advance. At the moment ignorant as I am of what I may have to do and

2. Wright, op.cit., p. 171.
3. Cecil Rhodes to Stewart, u.d. PC.
4. Stewart Diary, 17 August 1892; Stewart to Mina Stewart, 23 December 1899, PC.
where go, I cannot say very accurately. "The folk have to inspect us and decide between us I suppose."

A few days after this was written, William Hay in Cape Town also decided to write to Stewart, beginning in a semi-humorous vein.

"I find Mr. Garrett is up at Victoria East, and Sir Gordon is to visit you soon. If they were insurance agents I should be alarmed lest they took your risks away from me, because Insurance is my 'bread and butter', but politics is a 'dish of bitter herbs'."

He went on to explain his recent stand in favour of the no-confidence motion, assuring Stewart that if his speeches had been fairly reported then Stewart would have had no difficulty in understanding his attitude. He was in complete agreement with Stewart about Schreiner but maintained that he had not joined Schreiner or the Bond. He continued,

"I do not believe that any one of the Colony — or any leaders of any parties — want to change the flag or the British connection, and Spriggs flag-flapping is as absurd as the Dean of Cape Town's, for I suppose you know that one Sunday afternoon he took the Union Jack into the pulpit and waved it over his head! The fact is that Sprigg has lost for the time the Bond vote, and he has now to try and get — what is impossible — a solid, promptly controlled English vote."

Hay concluded with apologies for dragging Stewart 'into the mud of politics', but was anxious that Stewart should understand his position. His anxiety may indicate that Stewart was expected to wield a certain amount of influence in the forthcoming election.²

While Stewart worked in secret, Jabavu openly declared support for Hay and furiously attacked Garrett for his suggestion that Imvo was trying to "inspan the natives with the Bond". It was observed that Garrett was receiving

1. Garrett to Stewart, 5 July 1898, PC.
support from Jane Waterston on the grounds that he was "straight", and that "my Native friends will be safe in your hands". Garrett knew that the African vote would go to Hay, if Jabavu's influence remained strong.

"The natives, however, will all plump for Hay", he wrote to Stewart. "It is I know disappointing for you but there is much allowance to be made. I simply scathed Tengo whom I rode and caught at Shishegu (sic) yesterday but I could see the natives swallowed him. His lies were incredible. "Innes had been sent away from Victoria East by the English". "The English had been doing things against the natives". "He had worked for Innes here at his first election. Lovedale was against Innes. That was why he had had to leave Lovedale and go to KWT".

These reports fanned the resentment and disgust which Stewart felt for Jabavu and for all Africans who had turned against the English in politics. His bitter disappointment must lie at the base of his radical support of Garrett, though it is difficult to extricate that emotion from his ardent imperialism. In the August and September issues of the *Express*, Stewart gave vent to his fury.

"Though the *Imvo* says it does not support the Bond if it supports those whose action makes the Bond a possible power in the country, with a doubtful issue as to which policy is to prevail, the difference is not worth considering....The question we assure Mr. Jabavu...is this:— It is not a question of the Glen Grey act...nor of Mr. Rhodes nor of Mr. Anyone Else; nor is it even the Native Question....But it is this:— Whether over Her Majesty's possessions in Southern Africa the flag that shall continue to wave shall be Her Majesty's flag or some other..."

After Jabavu's speech at Sheshegu, which Garrett had outlined, Stewart wrote disclaiming all connection between missionary teaching and the views which Jabavu had been propounding. Jabavu's denunciation of the English was described as a

1. *Imvo*, 20 July 1898.
2. Garrett to Stewart, u.d. SP 31A.
shameless perversion of the truth and his reasons for leaving Lovedale as 'pure invention'.

"On the general question we would remind him of one thing he has forgotten: That it is English ideas and the English sense of duty which have made him and Mr. Knox Bokwe what they are today. If they think it fit to denounce such men and such ideas, we can assure them it does not matter. Englishmen we hope, will still continue to do their duty, So long as they do this, they are absolutely safe." 1

Whatever the merits or demerits of Stewart's political attitudes, his personal hurt is evident, particularly in the reference to John Knox Bokwe who had been his close friend and confidant for many years. Bokwe had left the Lovedale office to join Jabavu in 1896. Stewart had understood his need for a change in circumstances and had not stood in his way.2 He had not expected, however, that John Knox would wholeheartedly approve of Jabavu's politics and work for William Hay during this election. Knox left Imvo in 1900 to become pastor of Ugie congregation and his relationship with the Stewarts was restored.3

Imvo, however, was not daunted by these rebukes and, indeed, Stewart's language beside that of Jabavu's appears tolerant and relatively mild.

"The extracts show the sources and inspiration of the Christian scribe; and the result will surprise nobody among the initiated in politics for a more extreme flag-flapper and rabid anti-Dutch one could not desire. The wonder is how such a combination of race pride, race-hatred and all uncharitableness can dwell in a Christian bosom. "The whole Empire is in danger". We simply dismiss the idea with a smile....If the writer remains long enough in the political sphere - into which he has very injudiciously ventured - he will learn that it is a very foolish

1. The Christian Express, September 1898.
2. Stewart to J. Weir, 28 September 1897, SP LB4b.
3. John Knox Bokwe to Mina Stewart, 1 March 1917, PC.
thing to "wash ones hands" of persons over passing elections, misunderstandings and misrepresentations. The Editor of this Journal was "washed" by Lovedale before, because while editor of the Isigidiimi he had contrived to get Mr. Rose Innes into Parliament when Mr. D. Watson, a personal friend of the Institution was let out....Participation of Lovedale in politics in the interests of the Natives we have never objected to....Party politics pro-Sprigg and the League and contra Dutch as a race and contra champions of right and justice - strongly condemned as unwarranted and unwarrantable."

Nothing could more clearly illustrate the irrational impasse in which relations between some missionaries and some Africans had become immured. Unfortunately, the quarrel widened beyond the respective editors of Imvo and the Express. Africans wrote in support of Stewart, missionaries wrote in agreement with Jabavu. Imvo, with great satisfaction, printed the comments of Brownlee Ross, placing against the views of the Express, the "product of the young, vigorous brain of one who does mission work right in native territory."

Ross claimed that he was at a loss to see how smart men like A.K. Soga and other educated Africans could be carried away by the "flag-wagging, anti-Dutch crusade of the League". He himself supported Molteno, in the hope of lessening Rhodes' power. Other missionaries considered Jabavu's actions to be quite consistent. W. Stuart of Burnshill thought that he was true to his convictions which was more than could be said for a great many Europeans. D.D. Stormont, a teacher at Lovedale, was also in agreement with Jabavu.

Despite all Jabavu's efforts in Victoria East, Garrett

1. Imvo, 17 August 1898.
2. Imvo, 17 August 1898.
3. Stuart to Stormont, 23 August 1898, Cory MS 5438.
was elected and Hay lost his seat. Ingle, the returning officer, reckoned that Garrett had received only 10 Dutch and 20 African votes, in which case his support was overwhelmingly from the English and German population. Jabavu, therefore, had successfully persuaded the Africans to vote for his candidate but their vote had not been sufficient to return him. In Garrett's opinion, the chief credit for his success should be given to Jane Waterston.

"Being 'in' I could find it easy to be magnanimous as regards the natives voting against me but I cannot get over their facile desertion of Tamplin. No rancour, make allowance, but sentiment no! Tengo and his Sheshegu friends have killed that for me. I shall have a straight talk to Sheshegu if it costs me their votes for ever. To some extent we have broken the "Boss of the Blacks" idea in all the native constituencies but if he can turn 90% of the Fingos round to the Bond in VE, he will always be worthy of his hire whatever it may be.

Victory good. People ready to fete Miss Waterston's share in it. As for Lovedales share I see snarls in Invo but nothing to get hold of....Your own help was happily of the kind that foils inquisition ....I shall never forget how you personally found time and thought for our struggle when going through the heaviest weather yourself." 1

Stewart's involvement in the election was not as discreet as he thought, however. Garrett remained on the watch in case "the question of your taking sides comes up". 2 Stormont, who liked to know what was going on and made obscure observations in his journal, learned from Richard Rose-Innes (who sided with Jabavu), that Garrett and Tamplin had been "in Miss Barnes house as guests during the election", and also that the articles in the Express had made a most unfortunate impression, likely to do "harm in the future". 3 Mud-slinging

1. Garrett to Stewart, 3 September 1898, SP 31A.
2. Garrett to Stewart, 18 September 1898, SP 31A.
was an accepted political exercise at election times, but in this case the undercurrent of feeling made it difficult to forget the jibes and accusations.

The actual outcome of the election, a marginal victory for the Bond, was soon to be of academic interest only, in the light of succeeding events. Stewart's 'heavy weather', which Garrett mentioned was doubtless a reference to increased anxiety over the Mzimba affair and the litigation pending on the whole question. The end of that law suit was barely in sight when the South African war broke out. Meanwhile Stewart had been elected Moderator of the Free Church and having discharged his duties in Edinburgh in May 1899, he set said for America to attend a Presbyterian Conference. He returned to the Cape in December 1899 on a ship bearing 1000 Lancashire Fusiliers preparing to be "exposed to the bullets of the treacherous Boers."\(^1\)

The War 1899-1902

Given Stewart's political convictions, his attitudes during the South African War were entirely predictable. He was frankly pro-Imperialist and vehemently anti-Kruger and the Transvaal Boers. As Moderator of the Free Church of Scotland from May 1899 until May 1900, his views were accorded wide publicity when he visited Edinburgh. Interviews, articles and correspondence were printed by the British Weekly, the North British Mail, the Scotsman and the Aberdeen Journal and reprinted by the Pall Mall Gazette, the Yorkshire Post.

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 5 December 1899, PC.
the *Newcastle Journal* and the *Glasgow Herald*. Many were critical of Stewart on the grounds that he was backing up the war jingoes, but Stewart re-iterated his view that the fundamental principles of government were at stake and that, therefore, Chamberlain and Milner were the great hopes for South Africa.

Stewart was also a delegate to the 7th General Council of the Han-Presbyterian Alliance held in New York in September, 1899. This was just before war broke out so that again his views were widely canvassed by American newspapers. To the New York Tribune Stewart expressed the hope that the sympathies of the United States would go with the Government which sought to "secure liberty and freedom for all, without regard to nationality, colour or creed", but he observed to his wife that "most of the newspapers are unfriendly to us."  

Stewart was not unsympathetic to the Cape Afrikaners whom he described as kind and loyal, nor was it his style to express himself in highly coloured, emotional terms. Some of his correspondents, however, were not so restrained. G.D. Mathews, Secretary of the Alliance of Reformed Churches wrote,

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1. The *British Weekly* article appeared 19 October 1899. Reprints and letters appeared throughout October and November. Stewart kept all these cuttings and noted in his diary that they should be used as a stimulus to future efforts. 8 April 1901.
2. The *New York Tribune* article appeared 24 September 1899. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 29 September 1899, PC.
3. The *Christian Express*, December, 1899.
"Of course my judgment and sympathies are out and out against the Boers...while I deeply deplore as we all do the war yet it had to come and now has to be ended, even with, if need be the annihilation I would almost say the extermination of the Transvaal Boers....For many a day there will be conspiracies and intrigue and disloyalty, yet in the end it will all come right and we shall have lifted the Dutch people in spite of themselves out of their invincible conceit and self-containedness and brought them up to the plane of 20th Century and Christianity." 1

George Smith of the F.M.C. was another who was convinced of the "utter righteousness of our action", and wrote to Cape missionaries, even to those who did not share his politics, exhorting them to avoid "the evil actions of ministers and...missionaries who have encouraged the Boers...sacrificing the Kaffirs." He looked forward to the day when South Africa would be wholly British - "a glorious land enjoying British liberty and light for all." 2 Whether or not Stewart found those men "uncomfortable bed-fellows" the fact remained that his own utterances supported the Jingo or Imperialist party. Brownlee Ross, who took a pro-Boer line, declared that he was saddened by Stewart's attitudes but that "his utter aversion to Gladstone and all his works explains this to one who knows him." 3

Throughout the war, Stewart was in and out of South Africa. In May 1900 he was back in Scotland to hand over the Moderatorship to his successor. In his diary he noted that there was "unavoidable war discussion in Assembly" and that Dr. Henderson, Dr. Whyte and Dr. Rainy, who did not agree with him, were "standing stiff as pillars." 4

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1. G.D. Matthews to Stewart, 23 November 1899, SP 31A.
2. Smith to Bruce, 1 December 1899, NLS 7762; Smith to Brownlee Ross, 27 December 1900, NLS 7777.
3. Brownlee Ross to n.k. 26 January 1900, NLS 7804.
4. Stewart Diary, 29 May 1900.
dragged on, tension in the Cape mounted and the division between Loyals and pro-Boers became accentuated. In 1899 there had been anxiety at Lovedale arising from "disloyalty in the neighbourhood" and the fear of serious trouble should a Boer commando come over the Katberg. Those fears were not realised. In 1901, however, when Stewart was still in Scotland, he received a cabled request from Sir Henry Stockenstrom, Military Commander for the district, for the use of Stewart's house at Lovedale. Word quickly followed that the Boers had reached Fort Beaufort, 20 miles from Lovedale, and that the troops had left Alice to intercept them, leaving volunteers to guard the town. There was concern about Lovedale's large stores or that panic would seize the pupils and they would rebel. Others hoped that the Boers who had a reputation for having a "wholesome dread of natives", would be deterred from Lovedale by the presence there of 300 of them. In fact, the Boers were turned back and war came no closer to Lovedale.

Brownlee Ross, Stormont and other missionaries who entertained pro-Boer sentiments, were primarily concerned about injustice to Cape Afrikaners. Rumours of a Dutch conspiracy were groundless, people in Britain had been "gulled by a gang of capitalists" into believing the worst. Such men were vehemently anti-Rhodes but not therefore pro-Kruger. They were in sympathy with the Conciliation movement which played such a large part in keeping the "truce of God" in the Cape. Ross was in close touch with Dutch

1. Stewart to Smith, 25 February 1901, NLS 7799.
2. Annie Geddes to Mina Stewart, 14 March 1901, PC.
Reformed Church ministers and maintained that their influence over their people was such that, had they chosen to use it against the British, only Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and East London would have been held by the British against a combination of Colonists and Transvaalers.

"I am amazed that more men at home do not realize that the SA Dutch are not of the same stuff as the Egyptian Fellaheen. As a class they are cases of arrested development or rather one-sided development. The circumstances which arrested their development in the line of polish, progress, in wideness of view etc., while doing so made the development of the fundamental characteristics of their Teutonic ancestry go on more strongly than ever. However, if it comes to "down with the Bond", the Dutch language and break the Africander down, I fear there will be far more surprises in store than the war has ever provided....Whatever the SA Dutch have lost, they have rather saved and developed than lost the spirit and toughness of their ancestors." 1

Africans and the War

To begin with there was considerable apprehension amongst Europeans that Africans would use the opportunity presented by the war to create trouble and regain power.

"The black man is waiting to take sides with the strongest." 2 Some felt that if the Ba-Sotho remained quiet, other tribes would not grow restive. 3 In Natal, the Zulus were closely watched, but even the Transvaal Africans who had, supposedly, more cause to revolt, remained relatively undisturbed throughout the war. Cattle-thieving undoubtedly took place and there were also reports that the Ba-Sotho were reaping Boer crops in the Orange Free State. 4 These incidents were not likely to be controlled, however, as the Border patrols

1. Brownlee Ross to Smith, 8 April 1901, NLS 7803.
2. Merriman to Bryce, 18 December 1899, Merriman Papers, Vol. 3, p. 120.
3. Erskine to Smith, 27 October 1899, NLS 7804.
4. See note 2 above.
were Native Police recruited from the Transkei.

The Blue Books on Native Affairs for 1900 give indications of the effect of the War on Africans in rural areas. There was keen interest in the progress of the War and support for the Imperial side was forthcoming from Nqiliso (Mpondo), Dalindyebo (Thembu) and Lindinxwa (Gcaleka). According to Major Henry Elliot, military commander of the Transkeian territories, Dalindyebo, was appointed Chief of Native Intelligence and kept him informed of the "actions and feelings of every tribe." African volunteers were stationed in various parts of the Transkei, some were involved in skirmishes with Boer commandos. Elliot also claimed that there were "agents and emissaries from the enemy" working amongst all the tribes and that any chief or headman of influence was visited by these agents with the object of inducing internal disturbances that would embarrass the Cape government.

The closing of the Transvaal labour markets posed a serious threat to Africans dependent on these sources for a livelihood. There was however a demand for labour from the military authorities and numbers of Africans were engaged in transport and baggage trains or in other capacities near the camps of the British and Colonial forces. A letter to Mrs. Stewart from a Lovedale boy working in Port Elizabeth gives an example of this type of employment.

"Hora joined the War and was serving in the Ammunition column so he was through all the fighting up to

1. (Sir) Henry Elliot. Chief magistrate for the Transkei.
Johannesburg and so he has just returned about 2 weeks ago and he often gets excited when he begins to relate some of the dangers that he has encountered, however I am very glad to say that he came back safely."

According to Liliso there were five other Lovedale boys at the front and at least one of them, Gudru, was rumoured to have died from enteric fever at Bloemfontein.¹

In February 1901, in the Transvaal, the African minister of the Zoutpansberg congregation was imprisoned for two months after the Boers had occupied the area. There seems to have been very little justification for their action (in this as in other similar cases the motive was reputedly "protective") and it caused considerable outrage amongst the Free Church clergy who had the pleasure of hearing Mpambas personal description of his ordeal at the Synod meeting in King Williams Town in August.

"...the members of the United Free Church of Scotland will be rather painfully surprised to learn that their native pastor in the Transvaal was regarded by the Dutch Commissioner for Native Affairs as a dangerous person, one who under the guise of a 'predikant' was simply a spy." ²

If Africans in rural areas were content to be neutral or to act as volunteers in defence of Imperial interests, Jabavu, through Imvo pursued a defiantly pro-Boer line. The paper was full of quotations from the Manchester Guardian and other liberal papers.³ This stance was quite consistent with his Bond alignment and coincided with the political attitudes of Merriman and Sauer. In August 1901, however, when severe measures were introduced to the Cape in other

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1. Bayan Liliso to Mina Stewart, 10 August 1900, PC.
2. Hamilton to the Editor of The Scotsman, 19 June 1901, NLS 7804.
spheres, *Imvo* (in common with other opposition papers) was closed down and did not resume publication until October 1902. In taking this approach, Jabavu apparently lost some European support.

"Some two months ago Mr. Weir and Mr. Innes who have long supported Jabavu threw him overboard on account of his disloyal utterances. They published a letter in the Mercury washing their hands of him. Lord also did the same. Jabavu now threatens Lord with an action for £1000. It is said that Malcomess is at the back of J. and perhaps some members of the Bond for whom J. has so great a love."  

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**The Post War Period - Stewart's last years**

In 1902 Stewart was again in Scotland, this time to give the Duff Lectures, later published as *Dawn In the Dark Continent*. During his stay he discussed the future of Lovedale with the Foreign Mission Committee and, as usual, managed to raise money to help finance his plans for steam power in the Printing Department, for extension of buildings and possibly for electric light. He was acutely aware of the need for reconstruction at Lovedale and in 1903 travelled to Tuskegee simply to see Booker T. Washington and to study his methods. Returning to South Africa at the beginning of 1904, he presided over the first South African Missionary Conference at Johannesburg in July. After the Conference he stayed on to discuss the proposals for an Inter-State

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1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 24 February 1900, PC. Mention made of William Satterley Lord, a supporter of African rights. Malcomess was a prominent King Williams Town business man, of German origin.

2. The Christian Express, Memorial Issue, 1906. See also Chapter III.
Main Educational Building before the fire of 1923.

High School

View of Lovedale Hospital
Native College. At this point Lovedale was seen as the possible nucleus for such a college. All these plans received a dramatic set-back, however, when the House of Lords decision in the case of the Free Church versus the United Free Church threatened all future development and left even the ownership of Lovedale open to question.\(^1\) Ill and severely depressed by this additional blow, Stewart still gave evidence in person at the Native Affairs Commission in Cape Town in November 1904. In February 1905 he had to return to Cape Town in his capacity as a Member of the Association of Heads of Native Institutions. This Association had planned a deputation to Dr. Muir to discuss maintenance grants and the Education Bill. "It is not the journey itself but the business I dread".\(^2\) Stewart was then 74 years old and his heart trouble which had recurred periodically since 1894 was now acute, accentuated possibly by the anxieties and disappointments of the previous six years. By May 1905 he was confined to his room though he continued to correspond with those interested in the Inter-State Native College plan. In September he wrote to Smith urging that a qualified man be sent as his successor. Before that decision had been made, Stewart died on Thursday, 21 December 1905.

There is no evidence that Stewart again dabbled in party politics. During 1904 when the General Election returned the Progressives with Jameson as Prime Minister, Stewart was preoccupied with matters concerning Lovedale —

1. See Chapter V.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 8 February 1905, PC.
with the Inter-State Native College, with the unresolved question of Church Union and with the lingering effects of the Mzimba case. Nevertheless all these affairs necessitated discussions and correspondence with politicians and men in power, Lord Milner, E.B. Sargent*, W. Stanford and, through intermediaries, Jameson and Lord Selborne. Higher education for Africans had become a political matter, a question to be resolved - and in Stewart's view financed - by the State. Ethiopianism, with its criticisms of South African education for Africans, had made this provision a matter of urgency. "Natives are going to America to get higher education". It was to plead for an Inter-State Native College that Stewart, despite his physical weakness, decided to attend the Native Affairs Commission hearing in Cape Town.

"You will be the best judge whether you should appear before the Commission in person. There is no man whose views on the Native Question would be of greater authority." 1

The Native Affairs Commission 1903-1904

This Commission, in many respects, provides a suitable commentary on this section of the thesis. Those who appeared before it to give evidence included Stewart, D. Hunter, W. Roberts, D. Stormont, William Stuart and Dr. Jane Waterston, all of them connected in some way with Lovedale. Educated African opinion was represented by J.T. Jabavu, P.J. Mzimba, E. Mamba, J.B. Mama and others whilst Chiefs and Headmen were also called to give their views. Those who could not attend

1. Milner to Stewart, 17 October 1904, PC.
but who sent in written replies to a questionnaire included Brownlee Ross, James Maclaren, J.S. Moffat and W.A. Soga. Questions ranged over land tenure, legal codes, marriage and inheritance, education, church affiliations and the exercise of the Parliamentary franchise. The Commission, it should be noted, met under the cloud of Ethiopianism and most witnesses were asked about the effect of the movement on their area.

The Franchise

The prospect of the closer Union of the South African states brought the question of the Cape franchise to the forefront of South African politics. For many years it had been seen as a potential obstacle to Union, most Colonists recognising that the Afrikaner Republics would not voluntarily adopt the Cape franchise. The S.A.N.A.C. had a special duty to investigate the working of the Cape franchise and to make recommendations for the future. The Commissioners view that the present franchise posed a threat to the future was accepted in varying degrees by most witnesses. On the other hand, the majority praised the intelligence and perspicacity with which Africans exercised their privilege and those who wished to see the vote withdrawn from Africans were in a small minority. The consensus of opinion was that the vote was their moral right as British citizens and on the proven ground of "no taxation without

representation" - but that some form of modification was desirable, either by raising the qualifications or by introducing a parallel system of voting for Africans. The final report of the Commission proposed that there should be separate voters lists for Africans and separate candidates and that no African should vote in the election of any candidate for whom a European had the right to vote. Three motives influenced this suggestion. First, the desire to maintain European ascendancy despite the eventual numerical superiority of Africans and Coloured voters. Second, the example of the 1898 election (instanced by several witnesses), with its bitter conflict between black and white, particularly in those constituencies where the African vote was a potent factor. Thirdly, the threat of Ethiopianism and the consequent obligation felt to give some recognition to the increasing number of educated, civilised Africans. If they could choose their own candidates, there was nothing to prevent them sending a black man to Parliament to represent their own interests. Even Jabavu was in favour of Africans voting in this way to avoid trouble at the polls. It was presumably with the new system in mind that he declared himself a supporter of "manhood suffrage".1 These proposals were not, of course, implemented and matters remained as before until the National Convention of 1910 and the steady, relentless withdrawal thereafter, of the African and Coloured franchise.

African Political Activity 1894-1905

Several interesting facets of African political activity are reported in this period and it is apparent that a curiously complicated situation had developed. Three stands are discernible: 1) the participatory politics of the educated elite involved in Colonial-national issues; 2) the Divisional politics of those living in rural areas where European systems were being grafted on to tribal structures; 3) the tribal politics of the traditionalists, the patriots who remained detached from European politics. Did these three strands intersect at any point or did they pursue their individual courses regardless of any common factor?

1. In dealing with missionary attitudes and African response in politics we have obviously been primarily concerned with the political attitudes of those who offered education to Africans and the response of those Africans who had accepted, and been transformed by, that education. Although, as we have seen, both groups pursued differing objectives, the means which they employed were substantially the same. Africans like Jabavu, Makiwane, Soga and Rubusana were committed to a pattern of political action which included all the familiar trappings of electioneering and which inevitably made them subject to European developments in party politics. Thus by 1898, and more noticeably in 1904 and 1908, African allegiance was divided between the Progressive Party and the South African Party but there was little or no evidence of any distinct African grouping based on African interests.
2. Away from the towns, in the rural areas, there was considerable political activity at a local level. It had begun in the 1870's when Captain Blyth had encouraged the Mfengu people to tax themselves and then to make their own decisions as to how the money should be spent. Roads, bridges and other improvements were made, followed by the building of Blythswood Institution with £4,000 of Mfengu money. The Native Committee of Blythswood functioned successfully "with a good number of Fingo headmen". In 1888 Elijah Makiwane suggested that in the towns and locations there should be a committee of Africans under the town council, "to increase the number of those who have some responsibility."¹ In 1894 a considerable measure of local self-government was granted by the Glen Grey Act and extended by the end of the century through the Ciskei and seven districts of the Transkei. At this local level, however, there was tension between those who were educated but had no inherited base of power and the chiefs and headmen who were traditional leaders but often had little education and sometimes actively discouraged education and Christianity. One attempt to deal with this was found in the Vigilance Associations and the Native Congress. A witness at the Native Affairs Commission described their purpose.

"We found that this country was ruled by the less enlightened natives. I mean Chiefs and Headmen. Most of the Headmen were less enlightened than the ordinary man. At any rate in almost every location you will find a man who is more intelligent than the Headman who has been better educated; and the interests of education and general progress have been neglected because these Headmen are not able to give us assistance

¹ Imvo, 19 July 1888.
in that direction. And so we found that we should establish an Association which would both help the Natives in the district, and teach the Natives a little more of politics, a little more of agriculture, a little more of farming...."

Despite this organised attempt to influence Chiefs and Headmen, it should be noticed that there was no desire to supplant them if they had an inherited right to the position. The people, in the view of this witness, would have followed the hereditary Chief.

The Transkeian Native Congress had no connections with the Cape Colony Native Congress which apparently drew its following largely from townspeople. The Transkeian body felt that the Colonial body would have little sympathy with its rural needs and that any link between them would entail an unnecessary dispersal of funds. Similar sentiment was expressed about the General Council for the Transkei which held its first meeting in Umtata in January 1904. This Council was composed of representatives of the District Councils but it seemed to be generally felt that such a combination was undesirable, making matters unduly complex and diverting money. This Council system had undoubtedly been "locked into" the magisterial system in the Transkei and decision-making remained in the hands of white civil servants. At this stage it was despised by intellectuals and no attempt was made to utilize a potentially useful system to further their own ends.

There were links between the participatory politics of the elite and the local politics of the uneducated.

Headmen for instance were useful agents in providing an audience for itinerant politicians and often took the chair at such election meetings.\(^1\) It is apparent, however, that the educated Africans had broken into the traditional structure and were taken seriously by Chiefs and Headmen, rather than that the latter per se were considered to wield any undue influence in the superior reaches of accommodationist politics. One witness before the S.A.N.A.C. stated that his father had been a 'common man' and agreed that it was his education that now placed him in a better position than was held by men 'higher in the tribe' than he was.\(^2\)

3. Though it is generally agreed that the power of the Chiefs and Headmen had declined by 1900, in some respects they still exercised authority. Missionaries in remote areas wishing to set up stations required land and the verbal patronage of the Chief. "It is a good thing to go to Church if the Chief and the Headman have agreed to receive the missionary".\(^3\) Brownlee Ross maintained that Headmen exploited the sectarian jealousies in the Churches, changing from one church to another for the sake of material advantage and 'putting pressure on Christian people to do the same'.\(^3\) There can be little doubt that an important factor in the spread of the secessionist churches was the lead given, from whatever motive, by several influential Headmen. There

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3. Matheson to Smith, 27 April 1894, NLS 7802.
was, too, considerable respect for the status of the Chiefs amongst educated Africans.

"I saw old Tshuka....I asked him if he had seen Ngqika. You would have been struck, Dr. Stewart, to see the glow in the old man's face. Tshuka is a patriotic man and I had asked him of his proudest days, far gone with no hope of their coming back ever for his descendants. "Nabona eluda", he said. I saw him dancing. A thousand thoughts as a flash of lightening seemed to thrill his body, blood and soul." 1

There is some evidence that the uneducated turned away deliberately from the political world of the European. Asked whether or not they would try to qualify their sons for the franchise, several Mfengu replied "Will the member ask Government to give us money and lands?" On being told that he would not they remarked - "then there is nothing else we want." 2

Tribal Differences

A significant feature of African political activity is the dominance of tribal interests which, with the three levels of involvement mentioned, strongly militated against any unified, national movement. In the early days of culture contact the Mfengu were the chief beneficiaries of European civilisation. Already broken up by Tshaka, they lived in fear of the powerful Ama-Xhosa tribes, the Mpondo, the Thembu and the Gcaleka. They therefore accepted the protection of the Cape government and fought for them, as British citizens, in frontier wars, often gaining territory captured from the

1. Adolphus Bottomman to Stewart, 10 March 1902, SP 23A(vii).
2. See note 4, p. 339 above.
defeated Xhosa. Naturally, they were the first to be educated, to receive missionaries, to be organised into locations, to form Councils, to be taxed, to be enfranchised. It was amongst the Mfengu that political activity was most successful and it was from their number that the outstanding exponents of participatory politics emerged, Jabavu and Makiwane notable examples.

Forced to choose in 1898, the Mfengu, on the whole, gave their support to the Liberal-Bond alliance, later called the South African Party. The Xhosa, however, gave their votes to the Progressive Party. In this division there would seem to be both an ethnic conflict, based on unresolved grievances and a generation conflict between old and new style politics. What is not clear, however, is why the Mfengu themselves turned against their previous patrons, the British, and gave their allegiance to the Bond whose record in African affairs was so distinctly unpromising.

There would appear to have been several conflicting factors at work. The first was a definite wave of anti-British feeling amongst the Mfengu. Brownlee Ross was convinced that freedom from the fear of the Xhosa had resulted in the absence of motive to retain the favour of the government, just as they felt it no longer necessary to retain the favour of the missionaries.

"Spoiled by help from Government, help from Institutions, help from missionaries, they have waxed far too fast and are now kicking in a way calculated to give us all a very great deal of trouble." 1

Violet R. Markham in a curious book "New Era in South Africa"

1. See note 4, p. 339 above.
stated more specifically that "anti-British feeling was stronger amongst the Fingoes than among any other race in South Africa". In other words there was a desire amongst the Mfengu to cast off the old masters and to prove that they were capable of making their own decisions.

Trapido maintains that, paradoxical as it seems, the Mfengu voters had stronger links with the traditionally-based peasantry because many of them had come from that class themselves in the days before the Acts of 1887 and 1892 had restricted voters privileges to the better educated more affluent section of the population. The Xhosa, on the other hand, being more recently enfranchised, did not have these connections with the landed peasantry and tended to place themselves over against the traditional leaders, particularly Mfengu headmen who collaborated with the Government.

This link between the traditional and the modern could explain the rapid spread of the African Presbyterian Church, this particular breakaway body being composed chiefly of Mfengu. It was also, logically, anti-missionary and, by association, anti-British. Yet even here there was an anomaly. Mzimba and his followers did not renounce participatory politics. One of Mzimba's assistants, J. Jolobe, wrote to John X. Merriman that "it is well to remark to you that the minister and members of the said Church are strong and staunch supporters of the South African party all over."¹ Yet, to confuse the issue further, Jabavu was

¹ Trapido, *op.cit.*, p. 91.
strongly opposed to Ethiopianism and disapproved of Mzimbas move, whilst Makiwane remained true to the "established" church even though his voting habits were not disclosed.

Tribal differences provided one possible factor in determining African voting patterns but, obviously, no coherent pattern emerged and there was, if anything, a positive feeling against any para-local organisation which might have helped to overcome mistrust and misunderstanding. Moreover, because of the geographical situation of the missionary Institutions and the restricted nature of higher education curricula, Africans could practise the professions for which they were trained in rural communities or small towns where tribal backgrounds remained common knowledge and were not obscured as they were in industrialized areas. Most importantly, all politically active Africans offered an accommodationist, elitist platform, whatever their party affiliation. In brief, their commitment to Western civilisation and politics, their alienation from the masses and their inability to create a non-tribal society, made it impossible for this educated group to inspire a national movement. In the planning stages of the Inter-State Native College conflict between the African groups was very evident. One observer commented that he felt confident that this scheme would act as a catalyst; "the natives will sink tribal and political differences and unite in a forward movement..."¹ This educational enterprise did, in some measure, succeed but for other gradual and constitutional change, time had run out.

¹. James Weir to Mina Stewart, 15 October 1905, SP 27A(iii).
CHAPTER V
MZIMBA AND THE SECESSION MOVEMENT FROM THE FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND IN THE CAPE

Introduction

An account of the secession from the Free Church of Scotland mission, led by P.J. Mzimba, brings this thesis to a conclusion. In a remarkable way, the many strands which composed the work of the Free Church missionaries and the response of the Africans who came under their influence, are drawn together and interwoven in a consideration of this example of Ethiopianism. 1) With regard to Education, Mzimba represented success and achievement. He had made use to the fullest extent of the best which the missionaries had to offer. He was also however, critical of Lovedale's education system and often disagreed with his fellow members of the Education Board. 2) With regard to Ecclesiastical matters, Mzimba enjoyed the equality accorded to any minister in the Presbyterian structure. He was one of the first of a projected line of "native ministers" who, it was hoped, would eventually Christianize their own people. He was also one of the victims of the failure of the Free Church to implement this as whole-heartedly in practise as they planned it in theory. 3) With regard to Politics, Mzimba responded as a member of the educated élite to the call to adopt the responsibilities of British citizenship within the established order. He also however, questioned the wisdom of accommodationist politics and put forward a case for a more distinctively African approach. 4) At a personal level, within the mission, he was closer to the Ross faction and,
though recognising Stewart's authority and influence, criticised his methods and provoked opposition to him within committees. 5) Lastly, he enjoyed the benefits of acceptance by white society and actively sought to be included in it. Yet his ties with traditional African society were strong and he identified himself with his Mfengu compatriots and, to a lesser extent, with the cause of black men throughout South Africa. In the end he tried to become a leader in African society without relinquishing his rights in European society, exemplifying therefore, the plight of all educated Africans, the new elite, who were thus uncomfortably situated between the two worlds.

Mpambani Jeremiah Mzimba

Mpambani Mzimba was an Mfengu, a member, therefore, of an African tribe which in the mid-years of the 19th Century was regarded as law-abiding and loyal to the government. They had sustained a strong interest in education and 'civilisation' and when a large settlement of Mfengu was made near Lovedale after the war of Mlanjeni, the Seminary found in them a fruitful source of converts and pupils. Mzimbas mother, a Dube girl, had come under Christian influence and had learned to read and write while she was in domestic service in Somerset East. After her marriage to

1. 'Dube' here would seem to indicate the district from which she came, although it could also be the family name. As there was more than one branch of the Dube family it is unlikely that she was related to J.L. Dube.
Ntibane Mzimba she converted him to Christianity and also taught him to read and write. Early in their marriage the Mzimba family moved to the Alice district and in 1852, when Mpambani was two years old, husband, wife and child were all baptized by the Rev. James Laing. Ntibane had been attending the Seminary and in 1853 he was appointed teacher at Sheshegu, an outstation of Lovedale. He was ordained a deacon of the Lovedale Native congregation. Later the family moved to Ngcwazi (Middledrift) in the parish of Burnshill, where Ntibane was principal of Mkhubiso and a deacon of the Burnshill congregation. After a short period as a scripture reader in the Transkei, Ntibane returned to Ngcwazi in 1868. The last years of his life from 1884 were spent as a Catechist at Qumbu, north of Umtata, in Griqualand East.

Mpambani and his brothers and sisters came, therefore, from an educationally privileged home.¹ In their early years the children were taught by their father but when they moved to Burnshill their teachers were old Lovedale boys of standing in the community. The minister of the Burnshill congregation at that time was James Laing, a saintly, dedicated missionary who wielded lasting influence and who "won the affection of the native people".² It is interesting to note that Burnshill and Sheshegu had a reputation for unrest and dispute. Both these places and Qumbu figured later in Mzimbas secession movement due perhaps to his family connections there.

1. Three brothers were educated at Lovedale. See Lovedale Past and Present, p. 253.
2. James Laing, missionary at Burnshill, Born 1803; died 1872. See Kaffir Express.
In 1860, Mpambani entered Lovedale College. William Govan was then the Principal. Because, at ten, he was younger than most boys in the school, he was placed in the care of Richard Ross who was then minister of the Lovedale Congregation. Later, when Ross moved to Toleni (Cunningham) in the Transkei, the connection with Mzimba remained, and, undoubtedly, the friendship with the Ross family was one of the strongest influences in Mzimbas life. Mzimba completed his secondary school education in 1865 and in May of that year he was indentured as an apprentice to the Printing Department. The manager was Robert Stocks, first master printer at Lovedale, and with him also Mzimba formed a close friendship. His apprenticeship complete, he worked in the Post Office for a year 1871-72. In 1870, however, he had announced his intention of studying for the ministry, "under the influence of Dr. Stewart," had been allowed to attend classes part-time and then in 1872 had joined the selective few in the Students Class. The process of his theological education has been described elsewhere. In 1875, he received a call to the Lovedale Congregation and was duly ordained by Bryce Ross in December.

For fifteen formative years Mzimba had been intimately connected with the Institution. The multi-racial character of the College enabled him to make friends with students of all races and as a Senior in the Seminary he was given opportunities of leadership and positions of influence. When he married in 1876 his marriage received attention in many

1. See Chapter III.
Cape newspapers. This was not merely on account of his being one of the few African ministers at that time but because the wedding took place in a white Presbyterian Church in Cape Town, conducted by Mr. Russell, the minister.

Mzimba's best man was James Scott, a fellow theological student, later Principal of Impolweni College in Natal. The bride was Martha Booi Kwatsha of Burnshill and her bridesmaid was Tause Soga (niece of Rev. Tiyo Soga) of Mgwali. Both girls had been amongst the first to be educated in the Female Seminary at Lovedale, both going to Glasgow between 1874 and 1876 to complete their education. Finally, in this remarkable group, the bride had been given away by the Honourable Charles Brownlee, Secretary for Native Affairs, who entertained the guests at his home after the ceremony.

Sources

There are several sources for information on Mzimba, his ministry and his secession. His son, Livingstone Ntibane Mzimba, wrote his father's biography Ubom Bomfi, a book which concentrated on the schism of 1898 and, as was the custom, presented an uncritical account of the subject. In the Stewart Papers and in the Lovedale material kept in the Cory Library there are several letters written by Mzimba before 1898. Presbytery records, the Free Church Monthly, private correspondence and newspapers, especially Imvo and the Christian Express give accounts of Mzimba's

activities while he was still a minister of the Free Church. The secession itself is well documented and copiously analysed, particularly by D. D. Stormont who was appointed interim Moderator of the Lovedale Native Congregation in 1898 and who studied the whole movement exhaustively.\(^1\) Other sources provide considerable contemporary comment on the Ethiopian movement in general and on Mzimba's special contribution to that movement.

**Early Career**

As a Presbyterian minister, Mzimba enjoyed Presbyterian parity which entitled him to equal voting rights in Presbytery and Synod and a strong voice in all church committees. As one of only two African ministers in the Free Church in the decade 1875-1884, it was obvious that he would be given considerable responsibility. He was the first African to be ordained to a Free Church charge and Lovedale Native Church was a relatively influential position. His sphere of pastoral activity was not limited to the Lovedale congregation, however. From time to time, Mzimba was required to assist in churches in the Transkei, either alone, or as a temporary colleague to a man like Richard Ross of Cunningham, constantly over-worked by his enormous parish. In these varied situations Mzimba acted with a self-confidence which made him the automatic choice for the interim pastorate of the new and delicate Native Church in Johannesburg. He

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\(^1\) David Stormont papers in the Cory Library, MS 7514.
remained there throughout 1891 when he was relieved by Edward Tsewu, recently ordained to this city church. Thereafter it was decided to send Mzimba as one representative of the Presbytery of Kaffraria to the Jubilee Assembly of the Free Church in Edinburgh in 1893.

Much earlier in 1881 it had also been suggested that Mzimba should go to Livingstonia for a short time, primarily to set a good example to others. According to his biographer, Mzimba's work was such a success that his congregation refused to let him go.¹ Stewart, however, blamed the Presbytery.

"The fair prospect of Mzimba going to Livingstonia for three years is fairly wrecked in the Presbytery. I thought I was listening to a Moderate Presbytery of 100 years ago. That is to say from the most missionarized region on the face of the earth, namely South Africa, they refuse to let one go to the west of Lake Nyassa, where there is not a single missionary, nor a single Bible, church or school."²

A year later Mzimba raised the issue again, this time with the intention of going without the Presbytery's support. However, as Stewart commented to Laws, Mzimba "feebly and wrongly, I think, changed his mind."³

Another important post filled by Mzimba was that of Presbytery representative on the Education Board. When Mission Councils were abolished in 1881 the Education Board became the sole management committee of Lovedale Institution. Thus the Presbytery lost its influence over Institution affairs though it continued to send a representative to act as liaison between the two bodies. Mzimba acted in this

2. James Stewart to John Stephen, 14 June 1881, SP LB4b.
important capacity for many years.

"In Church courts he naturally became the spokesman where native interests required to be expressed by a native. His influence began to be gradually felt beyond his own congregation. In debate he was not powerful but he was persistent. For years he contended for a high standard for the native ministry; a ministry that would command the respect of Europeans as well as of the native people. He was devoted to the Free Church and promoted its interests in every way."  

Mzimba and Stewart.

Mzimba's personality is elusive. It is apparent, however, that, though he was not a good preacher, nor was he intellectually outstanding, yet he was acknowledged as a natural leader by both Europeans and Africans. It would seem also that he relished ecclesiastical politics and found them more congenial than secular politics, an area in which he did not exert his authority. If Elijah Makiwane's judgement is to be believed, Mzimba was also sensitive and emotional, conscious of his success and status, ambitious for himself and for his people and therefore frustrated by the limitations imposed by missionary policy.

"...he had one great feeling in a leader which I believe is not generally known. He keenly felt what he believed to be a slight either on himself or on his people and often could neither eat nor sleep after a meeting of the Education Board or Presbytery. I call this a weakness because it not only soured him but had the effect of exaggerating wrongs."

Prior to 1898 the relationship between Stewart and Mzimba was, so far as can be ascertained, characterized by cool suspicion without explicit hostility. Basically similar

2. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 87.
in personality, there was perhaps little chance that they would develop understanding. Both men were status-conscious, ambitious, dogmatic and quick to take offence, both "exaggerated wrongs" and thus distorted perspective. Both would appear to have had considerable personal charm, appeal and influence which won friends but also made enemies. In Lovedale's narrow community, tension was a constant undercurrent as it was in the uneasy relationship between Lovedale and the rest of the mission. On many occasions when these divisions came to the surface it was perhaps inevitable that Stewart and Mzimba should find themselves on opposing sides, particularly in view of Mzimba's long-standing and close friendship with the Ross family. There can be no doubt that Mzimba connived with Ross behind Stewart's back, especially in the undying debate over classical education for Africans.

"I wish the various members of Presbytery to be very careful about the motion Dr. S. gave notice of. I think it should be tabled before discussing it and let it lie for three months. Theological education at present is in a sad state and almost a failure... The Presbytery is to be saddled with the failure of this class since it is supposed that the members of it have done all they could to oppose it and especially Mr. B. Ross. Now if it turns out during the discussion that there is something to lay hold of in this, that shall go direct to the Foreign Mission Committee. Dr. S. escapes the blame. The next point suppose the first fails is that the Presbytery should have a good share also in the failure... I may be wrong in all this - but I fear this is the aim and object of that motion. I write in confidence." 1

Again, over the thorny question of Blythswood and its relation to the Mission, it was Mzimba who, as Presbytery representative on the Education Board, engineered the opposition to Stewart's plans for that Institution and

1. P.J. Mzimba to Rev. Bryce Ross, 16 April 1880, Cory MS 8494.
joined those who, for reasons of their own, supported James Macdonald.¹ When trouble arose at the Girl's Institution and the relation of its Headmistress to the Institution as a whole, Mzimba again appeared to use his influence to bring Stewart's authority in question.

"Mzimba is a character with mystery and unexplainable and it would be no wonder if he had had a great deal to do one way or the other -as chief adviser and so on - to influence his friend Miss MacR...." ²

In these and many other even more minor matters, Mzimba would appear to have opposed Stewart deliberately.

For his part Stewart, though conscious of Mzimba's significance as the first ordained African minister, was unenthusiastic, especially in comparison with his praise of Makiwane. He described Mzimba's intellectual ability as fair and his attainments tolerably extensive but at 'no point equal' to those of Makiwane.³ Stewart's request for the establishment of a congregation within the Institution may have stemmed from his distrust of Mzimba's influence on Lovedale pupils - though he had observed that this was not as strong as it used to be.⁴ Stewart could not fail to have been aware of Mzimba's attitudes but, as he made no comment upon them, it must be assumed that they were not unduly abrasive and that Stewart did not consider them to be threatening. In summary, though there was little liking

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¹ James Macdonald was the controversial Principal of Blythswood at the time when the question of the management of Blythswood was being hotly contested. The Transkei missionaries wished to have more say and to keep Lovedale and especially Stewart out of Blythswood affairs. As Macdonald grossly mismanaged things, it was difficult to defend him.

² John Knox Bokwe to Stewart, 12 August 1878, SP 26.

³ Stewart to Healy (Freeman's Aid Society) 20 January 1874, SP LB4.

⁴ Stewart to Don, 3 September 1880, SP LB4b.
between the two men, this need never have become overt. Though Stewart chose to look on Mzimba's schism as a personal insult, it would seem that such animosity was a very secondary factor in Mzimba's decision to leave the Free Church.

a. Causes of Secession

It has been assumed by most historians of the Ethiopian movement that Mzimba's secession was the direct result of his visit to Scotland in 1893 as the Presbytery representative at the Jubilee Assembly of the Free Church; by his acquisition there of money to finance a new building for the Lovedale Native church; and by his acceptance in Scotland on equal social terms with white men.¹ There is an obvious parallel between Mzimba's experience and that of James Dwane who visited England and collected funds for his own work prior to his secession from the Wesleyan Church in 1894.² In both cases it was stated that these ministers felt that they were not given freedom to administer the funds as they saw fit and that too many restrictions were placed upon them by the European missionaries in charge. There can be no doubt that money and property were precipitating factors in the quarrel between the Free Church mission and Mzimba. Furthermore, the attempt to establish claims to possession of money and property resulted in legal action right to the Supreme Court. Concomitant bitterness permanently alienated the contestants. Nevertheless property and money issues were merely the 'occasion and excuse'. As always there is a

1. Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (O.U.P. 1948) p. 42. See also the Christian Express, October 1903 and D.D. Stormont MS.
2. Sundkler, op.cit., p. 40. Also articles by Bridgman and Jacottet in the Christian Express.
background of facts and circumstances which led to the breaking point and which must therefore be investigated.

Visit to Scotland and the Building Fund

At the Presbytery meeting of 3 February 1893 Mzimba was appointed as representative at the General Assembly due to take place in May. On his arrival in Edinburgh Mzimba wrote to George Smith enclosing a minute from the Deacons Court of the Lovedale Native Church authorising Mzimba to raise funds in Scotland for the building of a new church for that congregation. Mzimba asked Smith to agree to this course of action.

"Despite demands in this Jubilee year could you authorize me to solicit help or otherwise help me to get money to rebuild." 1

Of the £2000 required the congregation, chiefly the womens organisation, had already raised £600. Over the next few months Mzimba tried throughout Scotland to raise the necessary money but by September he was still £930 short of the required £1400. At this point, Robert Howie, minister of Govan Parish Church, "master-statistician", Convener of the Assembly's committee on Home Missions and a close friend of James Stewart, launched an appeal on Mzimba's behalf.

"Pambani J. Mzimba is a splendid specimen of what the grace of God can produce in the African race. For ability, manliness, geniality, preaching power and evangelistic zeal he is surpassed by few of the ministers of the Home Church....By his instructive and impressive addresses, he has given a great impulse to the cause of Foreign Missions."

1. Mzimba to Smith, 29 May 1893, NLS 7798.
Howie then gave a list of the subscribers who had contributed £255 in all, the remaining £215 having come from church door collections. It was essential that £930 should be raised in the next three weeks as the Lovedale congregation needed their pastor and besides Mzimba "could not face the cold". ¹

It would appear that about £600 was forthcoming as a result of Howie's appeal but a year later Smith informed Mzimba that he was to receive £272.10.2. from the Jubilee Fund and that "this should complete your new church." ² In May 1895, therefore, a total of £1277.16.0. was remitted to James Weir, Treasurer of the Free Church, of which Mzimba was to receive £1186.18.10.

"As the bulk of this remittance is to complete the collection for Mr. Mzimba's church, will it trouble you to inform the Rev. J.D. Don that you have received those large sums, for the Presbytery controls their administration. Mr. Don might then communicate with Mr. Mzimba and all would be in order." ³

Mzimba thus had a sum of £2000 to draw on, of which approximately £1500 had come from Scotland and had been remitted to Mr. Weir. According to Stewart, it was one of Mzimba's grievances that the money had not been given to him directly but this was common practice on the part of the F.M.C. and, as can be seen from Smith's letter, control by the Presbytery was automatic. Money raised by individual missionaries on furlough, contributions sent by Home congregations to aid specific projects or mission stations, annual benefits or leaflet rights were always jealously guarded by

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¹ Robert Howie, 29 September 1893, NLS 7798.
² Smith to Mzimba, 19 October 1894, NLS 7776.
³ Smith to Weir, 29 March 1895, NLS 7759.
men who operated on a tight budget and had many demands on their slim resources. Mzimba's anxiety was certainly not without precedent. It does not appear, however, that there was ever any question of this sum being dispersed or swallowed up in the general fund but the restrictions placed upon its administration gave rise to much misunderstanding.

Delays in building and objections by other missionaries to the chosen site and to the plans were grievances which were given prominence by Mzimba's biographer. The old building was in a dangerous state of disrepair and it was feared that it would collapse. There was therefore some urgency about the new building which the congregation felt was not being taken seriously. Three sites were considered before it was finally agreed to build upon the site of the demolished church. The architectural plans also met with opposition. The congregation was convinced that the missionaries thought the proposed building was "too beautiful for Africans".¹ Stewart claimed that the Presbytery refused to sanction the plans because the church would cost more than the £2,200 which they had in hand. However, a further £400 was raised and permission to build was given.² Building had begun on the old site and extended foundations had been laid when the Rev. John Lennox*, interim Moderator for the Lovedale Church, raised objections about the allligning of certain trenches. Without consulting the congregation and without seeing the site the Treasurer and Secretary of the Presbytery sent a telegram instructing the builders to act

1. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 61.
2. James Stewart, Pamphlet, p. 5.
on Lennox's suggestion. In Mzimba's list of reasons for resigning he also stated that Lennox objected to the church being so near the street as it "was going to look ugly".  

In all this detail, what has become most apparent is the suspicion and mistrust with which Africans regarded the motives of European missionaries. D.D. Stormont, who took a close interest in the Ethiopian movement, recorded in his journal an account, received at second-hand, of Mr. Mzimba's preaching on this subject.

"He (Mzimba) has been to Scotland and has met ladies and gentlemen there who have given money and subscriptions for the black men of South Africa. These people have never given one penny for the white missionaries, but they have given all for the black men. Now the white missionaries come to this country and get salaries paid from the funds raised for the black men. This is wrong. They are using money that is not their's.... He says that these men preach equality, but when it comes to giving him the money that the ladies and gentlemen subscribe for the black men, the doctrine is gone from. He is made to feel that he must get his salary from his congregation and not from the fund that these white men use for themselves. When the natives did not know better, they kept silent about it, but he has been to Scotland and has discovered the dishonesty of the white missionaries."  

Stormont commented that this was nothing new - that indeed such opinions had been "common property for years in other forms among the natives". This was doubtless true, just as it must also have been the case that Mzimba had encountered the incompetence and intransigence of the Presbytery before and might have done so in this instance without resigning, had it not been for the pervasive influence of "Ethiopianism" spreading from other churches from other parts of South Africa.

1. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 58.
2. Stormont, Cory MS 7514.
Edward Tsewu and the Johannesburg Native Church

Direct influence on Mzimba by the leading figures in the Ethiopian movement is almost entirely a matter of conjecture. However, a concrete example of secession which Mzimba witnessed is afforded by the case of Edward Tsewu and his resignation from the Free Church Native Congregation in Johannesburg. Curiously, this event received scant mention in missionary correspondence although it was the first African secession from the Free Church.

In 1890 Mzimba had been sent to the city for six months, appointed temporarily to assess the work and the size of the existing congregation, many of whom were young men from the Eastern Province who had gone to work in the mines. As a consequence of this, Edward Tsewu, a contemporary of Mzimbas, former assistant to the missionary at Burnshill, was called to the charge.¹ The congregation was beset by difficulties from the beginning; it was exposed to all the pressures of the city, to anti-African legislation and discrimination, to inter-tribal conflict and the instability of migrant labour. Because the Presbytery of the Transvaal would not give Tsewu an equal place in that court, the Presbytery of Kaffraria retained responsibility for the church in Johannesburg but such remote control proved ineffective in view of the magnitude of the problem.

This secession is not well-documented.² It appears,

1. E. Tsewu to Smith, 31 January 1891.
2. Stormont makes vague reference to it but the bulk of the evidence is in the letters of Mzimba to Stewart, the Presbytery and Synod records and Tsewu's pamphlet in his own defence.
however, that there was considerable inter-tribal conflict - Mzimba mentioned that the "Zulu left in a body" and that he would find it difficult to influence the "Kaffir section". There was also dissension over the use of a church built by Tsewu himself in an African location, away from the city. Tsewu monitored the use of this church and office bearers had instructions to lock the door against those who were not considered to be Tsewu's supporters. Perhaps because of money spent on this building there were accusations that examination of Tsewu's accounts revealed discrepancies.

Considering his previous interest in the congregation and his familiarity with its structure, it was natural that Mzimba should be sent to Johannesburg to take pastoral charge while the case was under investigation. Members of the congregation in opposition to Tsewu and his office bearers had laid various accusations against them before the Presbytery of Kaffraria meeting at Burnshill in November 1895. The Presbytery had proposed a change of church to which Tsewu would not agree and he, in his turn, had laid before the Presbytery a petition from his supporters begging that he should be left in Johannesburg. By the time Mzimba arrived in Johannesburg the membership of the church had been reduced from about 400 to 100.

"...the congregation practically does not exist. Mr. Tsewu represented I think that there was a membership of 400. I fear that there is not even 100 now. They have joined the Independent or Ethiopian churches....Ever since the Burnshill meeting the work of separating themselves has been going on...."

1. Mzimba to Stewart, 12 August 1896, UCT SP 30A(i).
2. Stormont, Cory MS 7514.
3. Mzimba to Stewart, 12 August 1896, SP 30A(i).
A Commission was set up with Stewart as Chairman and this met in Johannesburg for three weeks during September and October 1896. A report was then laid before the Presbytery in December and Tsewu was cited to appear at King Williams Town on 22 February 1897. When he failed to present himself the Presbytery felt compelled to libel him.

"...for deceitfulness and actual lying, cooking of reports, doubtful action in pecuniary matters unconstitutional and tyrannical action towards office bearers and people and insistent defiance of the Presbytery." 2

Tsewu then appealed to the Synod but, despite some support from the Presbytery of the Transkei, the Synod confirmed the findings of the Presbytery of Kaffraria and deposed him. 3 As a result Tsewu, who claimed he had resigned before the deposition order, established the Independent Native Presbyterian Church Open for Reunion.

Tsewu was so incensed by his treatment at the hands of the Commission that he published a ten-page pamphlet in his own defence. It was a bitter indictment of James Stewart whom he held responsible both for the way in which he had handled the Commission and for the report which he had presented to the Presbytery.

"I painfully and emphatically say before the Christian world that Dr. James Stewart of Lovedale, having the power both as Chairman of the Commission and reporter to the Presbytery, did purposefully, wilfully and spitefully prejudice my case and was biased....The way in which Dr. Stewart, whom I have known for 26 years tried to blacken me, not only as a Christian minister but in his utmost endeavour to make my future usefulness nothing in his paper The Christian Express - I ask you is it worth all that?..." 4

1. The Christian Express, August 1897.
2. Don to Smith, 12 April 1897, NLS 7798.
3. Don to Smith, 16 August 1897, NLS 7798.
4. Tsewu Pamphlet, NLS 7798.
Nor did Mzimba escape castigation. Tsewu scornfully referred to the "unchristianlike act of Mr. Mzimba" in asking people to forward their grievances about him and also in taking lodgings with people whom Mzimba knew had made charges against him.

At no point, it should be noted, did Mzimba condone Tsewu's actions nor did he express any approval of those who had seceded. It is plain, however, that his experiences of conditions in Johannesburg forced Mzimba into a sharper definition of his own attitudes which, in turn, made him more ready to resort to resignation. The proper response of a Presbyterian minister faced with trouble in a congregation (this is demonstrated by Makiwane), was to take the matter through the courts of the church for resolution, meanwhile applying discipline and restraint in an attempt to hold the people together. This was Stewart's approach and Mzimba concurred with it in Tsewu's case. At the same time, however, Mzimba had gained some understanding of the underlying pressures and had had personal experience of the 'indignities' suffered by Africans in the Transvaal where, in contrast to the Cape, Africans were scarcely protected by the law and the police were 'exceedingly harsh and cruel'. This treatment, Mzimba maintained, was "uniting the native and has increased the Ethiopian church".

"If the harshness continues God knows what good will come of it. I do know myself and do not want to predict the future. This I know that the natives are exceedingly restless just now in these parts. They do not intend to fight against any government but they have become more interested in education and religion than they have ever been before."

1. Mzimba to Stewart, 1 September 1896, UCT SP 30A(i).
The question now, certainly for Mzimba, was whether or not the European missionaries, for their part, would show any comparable insight or even awareness that the issue required very careful handling. Would the Synod simply under-write the Presbytery's decision to libel Tsewu, push the matter aside as an unfortunate interlude and begin afresh with a new African pastor? Or would they proceed to libel Tsewu and, in the light of events, sadly assume that they could not trust an African with such a responsible appointment and replace him with a European? This was the test of the missionary doctrine of equality and of the strength of their resolve that Africa should be evangelised by her own people.

It is significant that the Free Church should fail so miserably to meet this test. In the immediate past, as has been seen, the record of the mission in opposing discriminatory legislation had been fair, but they could not make a positive stance for equality within their own ecclesiastical domain. The Synod, meeting on 19 July 1897, passed the following resolution:

"Owing to the variety of races and tribal jealousies and especially owing to the harsh treatment of the natives at Johannesburg, and the disabilities under which a native minister labours because of that treatment, the work there will be carried on most efficiently and satisfactorily by a European missionary...."

From this resolution Mr. Mzimba, alone of the Synod members present, not surprisingly, dissented. (Elijah Makiwane was not at the meeting). The following year in giving his

1. Synod Minutes, 17 July 1897, NLS 7798.
reasons for secession, after listing all the complications associated with the building of the new church, he finally stated -

"All this adds to the hurt I had received at the East London Synod where it was decided that the Free Church congregation of Johannesburg was not fit to be served by African ministers and that only whites could do so. All the whites supported this and I was the only one who opposed the racially discriminatory decision. The Rev. Mr. Makiwane who was not present at the Synod was very hurt when he heard of the decision and said that that was the third time a decision was made expressing the unworthiness of a minister on the grounds of colour...." 1

This issue is a local example of the shift from assimilation to differentiation in black-white relationships which took place in other parts of Africa in the late 19th Century, but which was most exaggerated in South Africa. John Don claimed that Mzimba was wrong in thinking that the missionaries had allowed "Tsewu's failure to prejudice us unduly against native agency" and yet he himself wrote to Lindsay

"...we cannot afford to act upon the assumption that the native is really equal to the European....I have been notoriously a friend, if you will, a partizan of the native ministry, but have sorrowfully modified some of my earlier ideas owing to larger experience and more intimate knowledge. They are at their best as assistants or as ministers working under the surveillance of Europeans..." 2

Bengt Sundkler's assessment that "neither No Equality nor Equal Opportunity in themselves lead to secession" is appropriate here.

"The problem arises when the more repressive view tacitly or openly becomes dominating in churches which in principle are equalitarian or liberal but

1. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 58.
2. Don to Lindsay, 24 January 1898, NLS 7798.
which, by 'practical necessity', i.e. consideration for the race-conscious white membership of a particular church - have to conform to a general segregation policy within the church."

It must have come home to Mzimba very strongly that the African ministry was doomed to play second fiddle to leading Europeans. The prospect of a self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating African church was as remote as it had ever been. It was this realisation on the part of Mzimba and other African ministers that was one of the root causes of those early secessions. It can be variously defined according to the view-point of the writer. "Some personal disagreement with a European missionary formed the original rift within the lute"; 2 "the frayed pride and thwarted ambition of a handful of enraged native ministers"; 3 or, in Mzimba's own words, "our experience is that the missionaries of the Free Church are at present unable to understand the South African native or to work with him." 4

Not all Africans agreed with Mzimba, however.

Jabavu, predictably, was not very happy with the outcome of the Johannesburg affair. In September, he printed a letter from John Don which openly accused Mzimba of committing a grave error of judgement in his protest against the decision of the Synod. In October, however, the controversy was extended by Makiwane who wrote to Imvo announcing his dissent from the Synod resolution to send to Scotland for a European minister for the Johannesburg congregation.

2. W.M. Cameron "The Ethiopian Movement and the Order of Ethiopia", The East and West, 1904.
Jabavu commented mildly that he was sure that the majority implied "no reflection on native ministers". Tsewu's pamphlet written in self-defence called forth stronger opposition from Jabavu.

"Mr. Tsewu has, we fear, fallen a victim to the spirit of the day, the rage for sects, neither one thing nor another which bodes no good, except to confound confusion among our people. We have protested again and again against this as detrimental to the spread of true Christianity among the Africans, tending to impede the peaceful progress of the Natives." 2

Jabavu continued to oppose secessionist movements, bemoaned the effects of Bishop Turners visit in 1896 and roundly condemned Mzimba's resignation. 3

b. Underlying Motivation

Mzimba's secession can be described as the response of some Africans to the attitudes of Free Church missionaries, attitudes which became explicit in the issues arising out of Tsewu's deposition and the building of the Lovedale Native Church. Distrust and suspicion had always been present but were suddenly justified by events. Other factors had their effect in producing a climate of opinion in which such a secession could take place. Some of these have been dealt with at length elsewhere in this thesis but must be briefly examined in this context.

1. Imvo, 14 October 1897.
2. Imvo, 9 December 1897.
3. Imvo, e.g. 5 May 1898.
The recommendation from the F.M.C. that the mission congregations should unite with the South African Presbyterian Church had met with forceful and articulate opposition from several African congregations. Mzimba and his followers later testified that the Minute of the F.M.C. urging Union had caused them to decide "instead of joining with the Colonial presbyteries to form themselves into an independent body". This may have been true for some who feared the consequences of Union. It is more probable, however, that discussions over Union brought dissatisfaction to the surface and that Mzimba's movement subsequently offered an alternative to those who had become aware of their need for such an alternative.

Political unrest

This has been described in detail elsewhere. There was considerable political tension in the Cape at this period with the hardening of political parties under the influence of Cecil Rhodes. The gradual erosion of African rights may have caused some who had previously placed their hopes in accommodationist politics to look elsewhere for the relief of their frustration. Doubtless they saw in this particular assertion of black independence a protest against the European political world which they had learned to distrust. Mzimba himself had not been tempted by

1. See Chapter II.
2. Don to Lindsay, January 1899, NLS 7798.
3. See Chapter IV.
politics and had declared openly in previous years that he considered political activity unsuitable for Africans at the present time. There is no reason to suppose that he had changed his mind. Jabavu and other Africans who were committed to co-operation, however, were vehemently opposed to movements like Mzimba's because in their opinion, they aroused unnecessary enmity between black and white. Just as Imvo had criticised Mzimba's stance on the Synod's decision about the Johannesburg charge, so the paper passed censure on Mzimba's resignation.

"The circumstances of the whole case are to be deplored and it is with unfeigned pain we are compelled to record so disastrous a chapter in the history of African missions. The Race Movement...is helping to fan the present rage for race exclusiveness of a people as yet incompetent of managing their own affairs without the sympathy and nurture of their white friends." 1

In this regard, it is all the more curious to note that by 1903 John Jolobe, a minister of Mzimba's African Presbyterian Church, could write to John X. Merriman -

"It is well to remark to you that the Ministers and members of the said church are strong and staunch supporters of the South African party all over." 2

The motive behind the development of such party allegiance would seem to have been the desire for official recognition and indeed it was John X. Merriman's government which, in 1908, finally accorded Mzimba the status which, in divers ways, he had sought for so long.

1. Imvo, 5 May 1898.
Traditional Politics

There is little evidence that Mzimba's adherents were attempting to make their mark on colonial politics. On the other hand there is some evidence that the hereditary chiefs and those active in traditional politics were hoping to exploit the new movement for their own ends. It was Stormont's opinion that the political element in "these troubles" arose from changes in African society and that if, as was proposed, the government were to appoint future headmen on the basis of merit rather than heredity then this would "give a deadly blow to the men who are scheming for power through the church".¹

The mission station at Macfarlan felt the full force of the "unfortunate, sudden and unaccountable split" and strenuous efforts were made to persuade Makiwane and his congregation to follow the lead given by Lovedale. On the pretext that titles to Mission lands were not made to their satisfaction, the headman, Mbovane Mbandla, and his followers, threatened to leave the Free Church. Shortly after, he, a deacon and four elders asked to be given their certificates. Macfarlan Kirk Session refused to give the certificates until the matter had been submitted to Presbytery but the seceders proceeded to organise their own church. Those who remained with Makiwane were asked to declare themselves and Mbovane appointed men to visit those people and to put pressure on them to change their minds. On 16 July 1899, Mzimba came to "dispense the Lord's Supper....and to admit into the Church

¹ Stormont, Cory MS 7514.
by baptism those who were presented."¹ Makiwane, in his letter to Presbytery, claimed that the whole affair had nothing to do with titles to land and that steps had been taken to "join the Sheshegu movement" before the matter of titles was raised.

"It should also be added that the people in the Macfarlan district would not have joined this movement if it had not been for the chief who is much dreaded by his tribe."

Two years later Robert Young, Secretary of the F.M.C., visited the Cape to collect material for his history of the Free Church mission in South Africa. He persuaded Makiwane to list his objections to the Ethiopian movement, based on his experience of the methods and activities of the seceders.

"1) It starts with breaking up in the most heartless fashion the work which has been carried on by the mission to which the leaders of the movement belong.

2) In all cases it starts with ignoring and disregarding absolutely all existing church courts.

3) It sets up the native against the European and fosters ill-feeling in the native mind towards the European.

4) It gives power to parties who have very little to do with spiritual things to speak in the name of the Church and in some places (Macfarlan included) it is giving rise to a movement the result of which would be to have no Deacons Court or Kirk Session and no superintendence by the Presbytery but to leave church matters in the hands of a body which is elected by the headmen;

5) It encourages division among Natives....Each headman is, by the very nature of the movement, encouraged to act independently of others...."

Makiwane took his Presbyterianism seriously. In a pamphlet purporting to answer the question Why Have You Remained? Makiwane gave as his fundamental reason the fact that Mzimba had deliberately by-passed the democratic procedures open to him if he wished to resolve a dispute. Furthermore, the new

¹ E. Makiwane to the Presbytery of Kaffraria.
Church only paid lip-service to Presbyterianism; Presbytery and Synod had no deciding voice and the headman and his adherents were seemingly elevated in their place. "It is like a minister who obeys the dictation of an elder."

These comments of Makiwane are supported from a very different quarter, by V.H. Markham in her rather bizarre book **New Era in South Africa** where she claimed that

"Religious propaganda became popular among native headmen....so notorious did this split become that the Secretary for Native Affairs in Cape Colony was forced to interfere and warn the chiefs that, however desirable spiritual advancement might be, the Government could not permit coercion to be exercised in order to achieve such ends." ¹

There is one further example which, although the secession was from the Baptist Church in Idutywa, also affected the Free Church mission (Duff) by attracting 30 members from that congregation. In the opinion of Thomson, the minister, the movement from the Baptist church was largely political and had been instigated by a son of the late Chief Sigidi "whose aim was to assert and if possible to maintain his title to chieftainship". ²

It can be deduced, therefore, that some headmen saw the possibility of their rather shaky authority being underpinned by adopting leadership in the new churches; others, already Christian, may have wanted to draw the church away from European influence and bring it into the orbit of traditional African life, thereby increasing their own power. For his part Mzimba, and others like him, though he did not

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¹ V.H. Markham: *New Era in South Africa*, p. 181.
² Thomson to Smith, 3 October 1900, NLS 7804.
discard the necessity for an ordained ministry, was naturally inclined to use the influence of sympathetic headmen to gain a wider following among the Christian people in the area. Whether by this means the new movements extended their appeal to the non-Christian Africans is difficult to determine. European observers of Mzimba's secession claimed that he "poached", or shamelessly proselytised from established mission churches and, therefore, made no new converts.

Tribal Loyalty

The element of tribal loyalty was obviously closely associated with the issue of traditional politics. At Macfarlan, those of Mbovane's tribe who had not joined Mzimba were urged to do so on the grounds that as their chief had taken the step it would be disloyal on their part not to follow him. Makiwane's "disloyalty" was the excuse used to appoint Mzimba minister of the secession church in his place. Mzimba was himself Mfengu and, though his church was by no means tribally exclusive, initially his support came overwhelmingly from members of his own tribe. Not all Mfengu were sympathetic to Mzimba (e.g. Jabavu and Bokwe), nor were all Mzimbaites Mfengu, but there was undoubtedly a strong tribal element in the movement. Those who left Lovedale Native Congregation and the dissidents at Macfarlan, Burnshill and Pirie were reportedly Mfengu.

"Whatever rare individual exceptions there may be, those who have adhered to him are Fingoes and those who have remained loyal to the Free Church mission are Kaffirs....Mr. Mzimba is a Fingo and so far as I know all his followers are...." 2

1. Makiwane to the Presbytery.
2. James Stewart, Pamphlet, p. 2.
This observation of Stewart's was also that of D.D. Stormont in his paper to the F.M.C., outlining his progress as interim moderator of the split congregation.

"The spirit of anti-tribal bitterness has shown itself in various ways. Fingo and Kaffir have taken sides - the Kaffirs to a man standing by the missionaries, a few Fingoes nobly and bravely with great sacrifice to themselves keeping by the missionary, while the majority of the Fingoes have followed without knowledge but from racial feeling those who have left the mission." ¹

The possible importance of tribal differences in determining political allegiance has been noted in a previous chapter.² There it was also observed that the Mfengu, traditionally supporters of the Government, had, since 1893 or 1894, shown signs of restlessness and of casting off this long-standing alliance.

"In the past it is said the Fingo got most assistance both from Colonist and missionary because he was the Kaffirs slave; but now the Fingo is restless under the white man's rule. Be this as it may, the fact is that the outstations which have seceded are Fingo villages."

Stormont claimed that it was a well-known fact in South Africa that a man could not rule Mfengu and Xhosa together "unless he himself be the child of a Government or a Church". He reported a conversation with a group of heathen Xhosa who maintained that they would have nothing more to do with Mzimba now that he was "no longer a child of the missionaries". The reason behind this was, in Stormont's view, that the Xhosa did not recognise a "Fingo as a Fingo, but only as a child of the missionary when he comes amongst them".³

¹ Stormont, Cory MS 7514.
² See Chapter IV.
³ Stormont, Cory MS. 7512.
constant undercurrent of tribal feeling occasionally welled to the surface, resulting in, for example, "bloodshed after grave conflict between groups of boys in the compounds" of Johannesburg. Xhosa - Mfengu hostility also gave Free Church missionaries an excuse for demanding a European pastor for a mission such as Burnshill where tribal feeling was intense.¹ This, of course, in turn, gave rise to the African contention that the 'native ministry' was discouraged.

Money

Another contributory factor to the impulse for secession was one of money or wealth. Mzimba was convinced that he should "get the money as his salary which is given to the white missionaries", and that he should be able to live in the same kind of house. Discrepancy in salary was obviously a sore point when African pastors were expected to do the same work as Europeans and yet were paid on a lower scale.

"They did more or less the same work as the European missionaries and accomplished in their own opinion often more than the others. In spite of this, their salaries were very small in comparison with the white mission worker, for it was expected that they should not rise much above the position of the coloured people in their mode of living." ²

The significant factor was the sense of grievance about the inequality rather than the money itself, for it is doubtful if Mzimba enjoyed an increased salary as an independent minister.

It is possible, as Stormont suggested, that there were relatively wealthy Africans who, on the basis of their

¹. Stormont, Cory MS 10,697.
². Stormont, Cory, MS 7512.
wealth (as opposed to good character) expected to be accorded social rank in the mission Church. If such a person were denied this rank, he would be more likely to encourage and participate in secession.

**Education**

Mzimba's adherence to Goven-Ross principles of education has been noted before. Those principles definitely played an important part in the development of Mzimba's attitudes, not least because from the outset he was in some way critical of Lovedale. Though he had no quarrel with the Education he himself had enjoyed, even under Stewart, he continued to criticise the departure from a straight classical education for all Africans. Education was more important, he stressed, than politics, in the African bid for social recognition by Europeans.

In addition, in these years from 1894, the reactionary character of the Department of Education was beginning to make itself felt. One of the listed objections of the Burnshill congregation to the proposed Union with the SAPC was that the proposal came at a time when

"the government of the country and men of considerable influence seem bent on lessening the educational advantages which natives have...." 1

At the same time there was growing interest in Africa on the part of black Americans and, therefore, increased awareness amongst Africans of the similarities and the differences in

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the circumstances of black Americans. The thoughts of many Africans, particularly with regard to education, turned to the United States, and to the possibilities available for higher education at Negro Colleges. Even before the heyday of the Ethiopian movement there were several Africans who had availed themselves of these opportunities. Izwi Labantu stated that "South African natives had to go to America for the education denied them in their own country". ¹ Certainly it was true that it was becoming more and more difficult for Africans to diversify in education. Lovedale was the only Institution that offered higher education as such; other missionary colleges were confined to teacher training. Thus, in his evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission 1904, Enoch Mamba stated that he would send his four sons to America because he did not want them all to become "underpaid school teachers". ²

Mzimba encouraged students to go to America and attempted to arrange places for them at Lincoln or Tuskegee. In March 1899 he wrote to Mrs. Satterfield of Scotia Seminary, North Carolina, saying that he had heard through somebody at Lincoln that she would educate African girls. He pointed out that they were too poor to pay for either their passage or their education and that, because white people in South Africa were opposed to Africans going to America, they could not send letters of recommendation. "Who

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1. Izwi Labantu, 27 August 1901. Quoted in Christian Express for September 1901.
2. S.A.N.A.C. 1904 Vol. II Para. 14, 240
can help Africans but Africans in America?".  

Mzimba's son was among the first group to go to Lincoln where they were accepted "sympathetically and without charging the normal fees." Mzimba himself travelled to America in 1902, taking with him several students. When Stewart visited Tuskegee in 1903 he observed that he found several students there who had been at Lovedale.

"The classes they were attending and the subjects taught did not seem higher or much in advance of those they had left. On asking them what brought them to America the reply was 'Oh, Mr. Mzimba brought us here'. The education question thus runs into the Ethiopian question...."

White South Africans were extremely suspicious of the kind of education Africans received in Negro Colleges and considered that, and the visits of American blacks to South Africa, to be a pernicious influence. It was largely on the basis of their fears that an enormous impetus was given to the plans for a University for Africans in South Africa.

Theology and the Bible

"Doctrinal controversies and theological questions are for the future....some day the new church must be confronted with them." This opinion of Livingstone Mzimba was borne out by events. Theology as an intellectual exercise was not a feature of Mzimba's movement. Stewart felt that there was a danger that Christianity would become "mixed up with the superstitions and beliefs of the

1. Mzimba to Mrs. Satterfield, 16 March 1899, SP 30A(1).
2. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 77.
4. See Chapter III.
5. J. Dexter Taylor, Christianity and the Natives of South Africa, p. 93.
heathenism of the land". He definitely feared syncretism but in this respect Mzimba's church would seem to have been pointedly orthodox. However, there were attempts to emphasise and re-interpret passages of the Bible, which may have compelled some to secede and which certainly gave credence to the stance taken by the seceders.

Stormont instructed the remnant of the Lovedale congregation that they were not to use those who had left as illustrations or texts in sermons. This method, he wrote, was not followed by the seceders.

"We have furnished them with texts; the white missionary has had his descent traced from Esau, while the seceders have had their vanity gratified by being named and naming themselves "the Israelites who were spoiling the Egyptians". 2

Isaac Wauchope who remained within the Free Church observed to Stewart that the new movement was a delusion and that the only way to deal with it was to expose the dangerous utterances of the "apostles of Cush".

"There are hints that the white minister has not been faithful in representing God's word to us - and that from impure motives. e.g. Mary was black - hence the flight into Egypt - hence Simon carrying the cross...." 3

Another writer insisted that the 'tried and respected missionaries' were being accused of concealing the truth and keeping back some of the Scriptures.

"Those hidden truths, Scripture and rights are now being given to the people. The new prophets have also discovered that the AmaXhosa are related to King David through Uriah's wife Bathsheba who was an UmIosakazi - a female Kaffir...." 4

1. Free Church Record, April 1899.
2. Stormont, Cory MS 7512.
3. I. Wauchope to James Stewart, 21 April 1898, SP 30A(i).
4. D. Macdonald to Smith, 8 January 1898, NLS 7798.
New interpretations of the Bible were often traced to the 'Voice of Missions', the newspaper of the American Methodist Episcopal Church edited by Bishop Turner. This paper enjoyed considerable vogue in South Africa at this time and week after week "discussions upon Cush filled the columns of native newspapers."¹ The significance of these Biblical speculations was that people took them seriously and though some white missionaries might describe them as 'delusion' and 'insolence', they could not afford to overlook their influence. Brownlee Ross took steps to prevent disaffection among his elders by giving them a concentrated course in Scottish church history!²

c. Events

**Mzimba's Secession**

Mzimba resigned on 6 April 1898. There was no official reaction on the part of the Foreign Mission Committee. The matter was not raised in Committee until 29 September 1898 and no resolution was passed until 27 July of the following year. It was left entirely to the local Presbytery to decide on a course of action in this delicate affair.

"On 6 April 1898 I tendered my resignation as minister of the Lovedale Congregation. For days the Presbytery considered and discussed the reasons for my resignation. From the 15th-21st the matter was discussed. The meeting of the Session, that of the Deacons and the meeting of the congregation were informed of my intention. On the 27th and 28th the meeting of the Deacons and that of the congregation decided by a big

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¹ Stormont, Cory MS 7512.
² B. Ross tc Lindsay, 30 August 1898, NLS 7804.
majority that the reasons I had given justified my resignation and agreed that I should be released."

In addition to declaring his independence and the formation of his African Presbyterian Church, Mzimba claimed the possession of certain church buildings, of Kirk Session and Deacons Court Records and of the marriage registers. He also kept firm hold of a considerable sum of money which was part of the fund collected for the new Lovedale church. Mzimba's biographer states that, immediately after the Presbytery meeting, the Treasurer of the Deacons Court went to the bank and withdrew all the money that had been raised by the congregation. Stewart, in his pamphlet on the Mzimba affair, submitted to the F.M.C., recorded a higher sum, assuming that about £1000 had been raised by the congregation in South Africa.

"The amount of money for which Mr. Mzimba refused to account was over £1300 and the value of the buildings he seized and kept possession of would amount to as much, or a total of £2,600."  

The property referred to were the churches at Sheshegu and Gaga which Stormont, as interim Moderator, twice attempted to enter but was debarred by Mzimba's followers. Stewart felt strongly that it was not possible for the members of the Presbytery to sit still and see the property of the Free Church dishonestly made away with, "and the work which was begun before Mr. Mzimba was born, hopelessly wrecked." Makiwane gave this as a strong reason for refusing to join the dissenters.

2. J. Stewart, Pamphlet, p. 5.
4. J. Stewart, Pamphlet, p. 5.
"When the Lovedale congregation decided to break away from the Free Church it took away Church property. I was so ashamed that I did not know where to hide myself. According to the way I was brought up - and I have carefully considered the history of the Free Church - I know that no member of the Free Church can take away Free Church property when he decides to leave the Church." 1

Claims to the Gaga and Sheshegu churches were not made until late September, six months after Mzimba's resignation. In those six months Mzimba had been in other parts of the Cape, trying to raise support and hoping, no doubt, that matters in Alice would resolve themselves favourably so that he could return. His chief problems were that he could claim no official recognition as a minister of an established church and he possessed no buildings in which his followers could meet. D.D. Stormont was appointed minister in charge of the Lovedale Native Church in August and that congregation successfully reorganised itself. Those who had left the church in their support of Mzimba asked him to come back, giving him "full powers to establish a church", and occupying Gaga and Sheshegu to provide him with a base of operations. In November Mzimba published an open letter to the Christian community and the new church was then consolidated at a meeting of its Presbytery at Gaga, followed by a Synod at Sheshegu on 27 December 1898. 3

If Mzimba and his adherents had not laid claim to property or to money then the secession would have been debated and discussed, perhaps even occasioned considerable anxiety, but it would not have raised the issues which led

2. Mzimba: To the Christian Public of the Free Church, see L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 71. Also Stormont papers MS 7492.
3. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 73.
to Supreme Court action. In the circumstances, however, the Presbytery was determined to uphold its rights in the matter of property and funds and so proceeded to take the case to law.

"The Free Church Presbytery really fought, not only its own battle but that of other missions as to property and at considerable cost. This has not been sufficiently taken into account by some in the home country. There could have been no objection to the formation of an independent native church. The sole question was as to property belonging to the Missionary Society at home and as to the motive and spirit of the movement." 1

The Foreign Mission Committee remained uninvolved, though they expressed sympathy unofficially with several missionaries and replied to Mzimba's lengthy letter 2 in a "spirit of tenderness and equity." 3 This same spirit informed the pastoral letter, written at the suggestion of the elders of Cunningham congregation, and distributed to all mission churches at the beginning of December. 4 The pious hope that Mzimba would return to the fold was not to be realised, however. Nor could the missionaries dismiss the question of Free Church property. The Titles to the property were applied for by the Presbytery on 19 January 1899, and the services of Richard Rose-Innes and Thomas Hutton were requested as legal advisers. 5

2. I have been unable to trace this letter.
3. Free Church Record, 1898.
4. Smith to Lennox; Smith to Stuart; Smith to Brownlee Ross, 2 December 1898, NLS 7777.
Supreme Court Action

The case was before the Supreme Court in January and February 1899. There were two suits relating solely to the property of the mission. The first, Stewart and Others versus Mzimba and Others, was settled by "making absolute a rule, with costs, restraining the latter from using certain churches." Possession, in this case, did not bring a favourable judgement.

"If I could give (the respondents) any advice, independent of the law, it would be this, that it would be better for them not to waste any further money upon litigation, because the prima facie case against them is so strong...." 1

A second action between the Deacons Court of the Lovedale Native Congregation and Mzimba was brought in on 28 February 1899, seeking the restoration of all Kirk Session and Deacons Court books, marriage registers etc. and a sum of £1350 which Mzimba or Kala, the Treasurer, allegedly removed from the Alice Bank. The Court, as might be expected, gave judgement for the plaintiffs with costs. Mzimba was held responsible for £388 and Kala, described by the Cape Argus as 'his sphinx-like henchman', was ordered to return £973.

By July 1899 four stone churches had been recovered, Mzimba had paid £388 and his agent had paid £189 towards costs. Kala had not repaid the £973 for which he was responsible nor had any of the documents referred to been returned. For this reason it was decided in October to bring a further action - Deacons Court versus Mzimba, Kala and Sihawu - on the grounds of contempt of court. To the

1. Christian Express, March 1899, p. 56; Free Church Record, April 1899.
consternation of Rose-Innes and Hutton, this application was refused. "We cannot adequately express to you our disgust at the way in which the court is assisting the natives in this manner." The proposed action also caused quarrelling and division among the African people, many of whom felt that the books should be returned. Mketile, one of Mzimba's supporters, admitted that he had the books but refused to hand them over. In this deadlock, Mketiles house was burned down and the books and registers therefore destroyed.

"The case is irrecoverable now. It would be a waste of money to go further...I recommend that we do nothing more - but pay our account for the last case. A hut burned down, papers burned....Fine story! Without a criminal action against a good many of them - Kala and others - we shall not get back that £900. The Committee will not, I think, approve or sanction a criminal action - and we must therefore leave Mzimba and his party - not to the Supreme Court of Cape Town - but to that of the Moral Government Above." Thus Stewart wryly dismissed a case which had cost the Mission much in money and time but more in loyalty and trust from their African parishioners. This was a case which had aroused intense interest. With unconscious irony, one newspaper declared that there had been nothing comparable since the Pelser case.

"You can form but little idea of the intense feeling and how this fact is commented upon and interpreted by the natives interested in the issue and intently watching the litigation proceedings...." Though both cases had gone against Mzimba, there was no way in which the judges orders could be enforced, so that final

1. Innes and Hutton to Stewart, 13 October 1899, U.C.T. SP 30.
2. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 68.
3. J. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 19 December 1899, P.C.
5. R. Rose-Innes to J. Rose Innes, 19 October 1899, SP 30A(1).
restitution was never made. The total expenses in the case amounted to £1,200 but as there was a good harvest in 1899, this debt was paid off within a year. At this stage, the outbreak of war diverted attention from unresolvable local matters. Mzimba made no further claim to Free Church property until the dissension between the United Free Church and the "Wee Frees" gave him another chance to press the rights of the African Presbyterian Church.

d. The Nature and Progress of the New Church

From the Constitution of the new Church it can be seen that Mzimba did not institute any radical departures from the Presbyterian original. Liturgically (I no.3) there was the adoption of the Methodist and Moravian prayer books but for the rest no significant changes were made. The importance of Mzimba's church lay not in its organisation but in its independence. This independence was demonstrated in its name which has been variously translated as the "Presbyterian Church of Africans" or the "Presbyterian Church of Africa". There is certainly a qualitative difference in those translations but the important thing is the use of the word "Africa" or "African", words deliberately avoided by Monkone, for example, who substituted the word "Ethiopian" to eliminate misunderstanding.

What did Mzimba

1. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 69.
understand by this? Can anything be learned about his aims and intentions from the name of his new Church?

For some time, as has been mentioned, there was no official recognition of Mzimba's withdrawal from the Free Church. Mzimba had earlier expressed the hope that he might "feel free to seek help" from the missionaries, envisaging perhaps an African Order within the Presbyterian Church, similar to that which James Dwane was to create in the Episcopalian Communion with the Order of Ethiopia. It soon became clear, however, that no such cooperation was to be forthcoming and in November of 1898 Mzimba published a letter of intent to set up an independent organisation, whose constitution was published in December. His letter explains his basic motives.

"It has become clear to me that the black man in Africa must stand on his own in religious matters just as people do in other countries. He must not be continually dependent on the white man. He has long been dependent on the white man but now the time has come when, if the word of God is to expand in this land, he must cease being dependent on others. The time has now come when the black man must be self-confident as the white man is. This is a God-given duty which we must follow. God has given to the black Christian this duty of self-dependence. I am convinced that in the Presbyterian Church I am the one who should particularly pioneer this way of self-reliance and independence. I am the first African minister to follow in the steps of the late Rev. Tiyo Soga".

There followed a list of reasons for leaving the Free Church and then exhortations not to be afraid of having the courage of their convictions. The missionaries after all had always declared that they wished Africans to have self-sustaining congregations. This secession movement was simply a realisation of the desire of the missionaries that Africans
would have "self-standing congregations".

"The Word of God is to be advanced by us Africans to Africans who are still in darkness. We will be unable to take it to the heart of Africa unless we stand by ourselves. 'Do not be afraid, be strong. Jehovah will fight for you." 1

Charges that Mzimba's church was based on a tribal division, that its members did not Christianize the heathen but drew people from established congregations, or that the motives of its supporters were, variously, political, financial or status-seeking, can all, as has been shown, be sustained. This must not, however, detract from the genuine assertion of independence for its own sake.

"For some years past a feeling had been growing among some native ministers and others that the time had come when the native church should be freed from all European control and that a large and comprehensive African church should be formed by throwing together all existing denominations. While this church would not recognise any sectarian differences in creed or organisation, it would so far recognise race differences." 2

The implication here is that an independent church would transcend denominational barriers and tribal differences but that it would be African as opposed to European. Independence was based on national identity. Mzimba appealed quite openly to a patriotic spirit. At a meeting in the Macfarlan district, he preached to the people, saying that the "night had passed and the morning had come and that it behoved the sons of Africa to bestir themselves and take their place." 3

Writing to America, he claimed that "Africans have been asleep for generations; they are just awakening from that

1. See footnote 2, p. 381.
2. Free Church Record, August 1899.
3. Makiwane to Presbytery of Kaffraria.
This appeal was successful. The Church expanded, congregations were established beyond the Cape and Mzimba was joined by members of other tribes and other denominations. This was, therefore, in embryo, a national political movement with tremendous potential.

"Religion and politics are inextricably mixed up in all history, and when a body of aborigines, who have assimilated certain civilising influences, determine to break from all European control and evolve their own church organisation, no great perspecuity is required to perceive the ultimate political and social consequences of such a movement." 2

Politically, this potential was never realised in the ways anticipated by, or more accurately feared by, contemporary observers. Stormont's opinion was that African ministers did not exercise any influence on their own without the backing of Europeans.

"A mission field in the hands of natives, imperfectly educated, and embued with native ideas and prejudices, and especially of native justice will not be such a strong power to overcome as that same field in the hands of European missionaries. In no rebellion has the native minister spoken out...." 3

This was an unfair, prejudiced judgement. In the event, however, Mzimba's church and the Ethiopian movement at large, only exerted indirect political pressure. It was, on the one hand, too accommodationist and intent on respectability, and on the other too fissiparous and self-indulgent, to accumulate real power. This is not to belittle its importance. Independent churches then, as now, provided an important outlet for the emotions of a dominated people and

1. See footnote 1, p. 377.
2. See footnote 4, p. 384.
3. Stormont Journal, 14 October 1899, MS.
a sense of identity for those who were increasingly deprived of human dignity. In that sense it has been a religious movement, philosophical and spiritual – which may yet be the pre-requisite for a truly African answer to the problems and injustices of apartheid and white supremacy.

The Progress of the New Church

It was a strong contention of the missionaries that secessionist bodies included the dissidents and the misfits, the ignorant and the idle, all the restless and dissatisfied elements of native society. Examples were legion of the type of man who had been admitted or who had been ordained, usually one who had failed Standard Three at Lovedale or had been expelled for some misdemeanour. How true was this? We have demonstrated that membership of Mzimba's church was drawn from several groups – members of his own (somewhat disaffected) tribe, people who were influenced by political considerations or people who feared the consequences if their church was to be amalgamated with the Colonial body, people who were conscious of the disparity between the equality preached by the missionaries and the inequality practised or supported by the same men, people who had been educated to a level of proficiency only to find advancement denied and opportunity a pipe-dream...people, therefore, who for one reason or another agreed that the only available solution to their problems was to strike out on their own, to explore, even in a limited way, what it meant to think in
terms of "Africa for Africans". The movement undoubtedly appealed to those who could not adapt to European dictates and, therefore, had a broader base in African society than orthodox churches; doubtless it also attracted restless elements who sometimes mis-directed the original purpose of the more conventional leadership.

A reputation for the indiscriminate ordination of under-educated men of undesirable character adhered strongly to the Ethiopian Movement after the visit of Bishop Turner.¹ Benjamin Kumalo, Simon Sinamela and Henry Niekerk were three examples of new 'ministers' who had been at Lovedale and whose ordination evinced scorn on the part of those who had known their record at the Institution.² Mzimba, however, set too much store by an educated ministry to compromise his Free Church heritage in this regard. He attracted ordained ministers from other denominations, the Reverends Gqamane, Masiko and Buchanan (about whom nothing is known) and Rev. Solomon Matolo, a Congregational pastor who had attended Lovedale. He also attracted men who ought to have been ordained long ago by their Churches, or who feared that they would have to wait years before missionaries would consider them fit for ordination. An example of the first was John Sibiya, an elder of the Free Church in Natal. The Natal Mission, comprising four congregations, had no Presbytery and therefore no power to ordain. The mission

¹. Bishop Turner of the A.M.E.C. whose visit to South Africa in 1897 scandalized conventional missionaries because of the rapidity with which he established churches and ordained men. They were also offended by his enthusiastic, colourful speeches, full of inaccuracies.
². John Knox Bokwe to Stormont, 25 April 1898, Cory MS.
had African teachers and evangelists who were thus without means of advancement in the church, a situation which led inevitably to frustration and dissatisfaction. Sibiya, "a good preacher and beloved by his people", 1 was ripe for a movement such as Mzimba's. He travelled to the Cape with one elder, was duly ordained, returned to Natal and took 150 communicants with him into the Presbyterian Church of Africa. Between October 1898 and November 1899, the African church movement spread rapidly through Natal affecting every mission of the Free Church. 2 Examples of the second type of person were William Bottoman and Reuben Damane, both of whom were in the last year of their theological course at Lovedale, both of whom joined Mzimba's church. Within 6 months Bottoman was in charge of the congregation in Port Elizabeth and Damane similarly employed at Gumbu.

"The actions of the European missionaries are keenly watched by some of our people. You see for instance that none of my fellow-students have been ordained as yet. The question is why? Ontong has started business in Kimberley....The native mind suspects the action of their native brethren...." 3

At least in this respect the Free Church showed signs of learning a lesson. In 1899, Joseph Dambuza, the writer of the letter above and the Matshikwe brothers, Ndongo and Petwell, who along with Andries Ontong had graduated in 1895, were finally ordained by the Presbytery of Kaffraria. It is obvious that neither Damane nor Bottoman wished to wait four years for their official reception into the ranks

1. Dalzell to Lindsay, 21 September 1898, Natal Papers, NLS, 4392.
2. See Natal Papers passim. NLS, 4392.
3. J. Dambuza to D. Stormont, 25 June 1898, Cory MS 5438.
of the clergy.

Of the rank and file of the congregations little is known. There were teachers and evangelists, carpenters and waggon-makers and, most probably, a large number of women.¹ Some had been educated at Lovedale, some had only attended village school, others presumably had no education at all. Adherents came from Lovedale, Sheshegu, Gaga, Burnshill, Idutywa and Macfarlan but also from as far away as Qumbu, Port Elizabeth and Mafeking. Indeed it is most interesting to note that breakaway congregations had already been formed from the last three missions, predating Mzimba's secession. All had been led by elders, all were now waiting to be provided with an ordained minister. Of the five elders mentioned in connection with the Qumbu church, four had been educated at Lovedale.

"Thus the first Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Africa met with only two ministers (Mzimba and Rev. C. Kupe) and six congregations. At the end of the Assembly there were six ministers and seven congregations." ²

By 1902, Mzimba claimed that his church had a membership of 6,500 with 20,000 adherents. There were twelve ministers in charge of churches in Cape Colony, Rhodesia, Orange River Colony, Transvaal and Natal. Membership was drawn from the Moravian, Anglican, Methodist, Congregational and Presbyterian Churches.

"This particular aspect was a remarkable development because when compared with the Ethiopians who broke away from the Methodists, the new church attracted greater attention and a wider membership than did the Ethiopians. This new church, therefore, united

¹ Mzimba to Smith, 29 May 1893, NLS 7789, Note also attention paid to the further education of girls.
² L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 74.
in itself people who came from a variety of denominations... Other tribes also joined and even Coloureds..." 1

In 1902, Stewart claimed for the United Free Church of Scotland in South African mission, a membership of 16,044 with 8,182 adherents.2 Allowing for some discrepancy in these figures, it is still remarkable that the African Presbyterian Church in four years should have a membership equivalent to a third of the membership of an old-established Mission Church.

Mzimba travelled widely establishing new congregations. Immediately after his resignation he went to Mafeking.3 A month later he was reported to be in Qumbu "encouraging dissidents... and probably tampering with all and sundry up there."4 In August there were reports that he was making strong efforts to raise a following in the Transkei and "though he has not yet touched Cunningham, yet we hear that he has got a footing and a certain following in the neighbouring missions, both U.P. and F.C."5 This possibly referred to Patterson (U.P.) and to Duff (F.C.) though Duff was split in 1899 by the inroads of the American Baptists.6 Later in the year, Mzimba returned to Lovedale, to Sheshegu where, as has been noted, the Church was duly constituted.

In April 1899 Mzimba returned to Qumbu, where he held meetings and raised money to defray his court expenses. He left Reuben Damane in charge of the Qumbu congregation.

1. L. Mzimba, op.cit., p. 77.
4. W.J.B. Moir to J. Stewart, 14 May 1898, SP 23A.
5. B. Ross to Lindsay, 30 August 1898, NLS 7804.
6. Thomson to Smith, 7 August 1899, NLS 7804.
From Cumbu he went to Esidwadweni, an outstation of Rainy mission. His plan was to establish a mission there in the charge of Alex Mbewu, former evangelist at Rainy, brother-in-law of Bottoman. Mbewu had recently resigned to join Mzimba and hoped that the latter would ordain him. A visit had been paid to Nqwiliso, chief of the Mpondos, to persuade him to grant land for a mission; a counter visit was paid some days later by a deputation from the established mission, begging the chief not to break up the mission by allowing the new church in the area. After this Mzimba left Pondoland and travelled to Mount Frere and Mount Ayliff in the north east, site of Gillespie Mission (U.P.) and very close to the borders of Natal.¹

Little is known of Mzimba's activities from mid 1899 to 1901 the period of the South African war. By March 1900 he had returned to Alice and there is evidence that he was encountering greater difficulties than he had anticipated when he resigned from the Free Church. He outlined his grievances in a letter to Harriette Colenso, written to her because she like her father, had "nobly, persistently, under most trying circumstances taken up the cause of my countrymen in Natal". First, the ministers of the P.C.A. were not allowed by the government to officiate in marriages. Secondly, government grants given to schools had been withdrawn. According to Mzimba the school at Gaga had had 15 pupils under the Free Church and had received a grant; now there were 180 pupils and no grant was allowed. Yet the parents

¹ Erskine to Smith, 1 May 1899, NLS 7804.
of the children in the 8 schools connected with the P.C.A. paid quitrent and so were legally entitled to government aid in education. Thirdly, the government had implied that their teachings were contrary to the teaching of the recognised churches when in fact they did not "propose to do anything new in religion but to follow the teachings of the Bible and our missionaries, with this difference that we be self-supporting." There was, finally, no truth in the allegation that members of the church were disloyal.

"Our people have gone to the front to assist the Imperial government as drivers and leaders of mule wagons and ox wagons. And hundreds have gone in gangs of a hundred, or two hundred each time and even three hundred whenever labourers are required in the Military Depot. Chiefs, office bearers and teachers are now working in the Military Depot. Our prayer and hope is that the Imperial government take over the political control of all the South African states for the sake of colonists and also for the sake of thousands of Africans who are not represented in the Colonial Parliaments."

Miss Colenso replied sympathetically and sent Mzimba some literature but she also observed that she was "getting to believe more and more" that Africans must help themselves and that they were capable of so doing. Mzimba stated that he wished she had explained this remark more fully but there is no evidence of a further reply. He also maintained that he had been totally taken aback by the strong opposition and persecution" to which they had been subjected by the missionaries. He had expected them to be surprised and perhaps to have "given the movement the cold shoulder" but not to have shown such hostility. He hinted,

1. Mzimba to Harriette Colenso, 13 March 1900, Colenso Collection.
in reply to a question from Miss Colenso, that Jabavu, like most intelligent Africans, sympathised with the movement but not openly. Few of his members, however, qualified for voting rights so they had little potential influence.  

These letters are interesting, revealing the practical difficulties which faced ministers of independent churches and the distress caused by establishment opposition. The marriage problem was partly resolved by the magistrate performing the civil ceremony and the minister the religious ceremony though this did not satisfy Mzimba. By 1902 Government contributions to schools in the Alice area had been restarted. Port Elizabeth schools had had the grant renewed in 1901.  

From the report of the Native Affairs Commission in 1904 it is apparent that many Europeans felt that "Ethiopianism" could best be held in check by refusing independent churches official recognition.

Before the end of the war Mzimba had departed for America with seventeen companions, at least ten of whom were prospective students. They left the Cape in late October, arrived in Southampton, then travelled on to Liverpool. Here Mzimba left Damane in charge of the party and proceeded alone to Edinburgh. David Stormont was also in Edinburgh on furlough and sent a report to Lovedale.

"Mr. Mzimba landed at Southampton, came on to Liverpool where the funds almost gave out, left his 17 folks with Damane and came on by night to Edinburgh. He met one or two folks - whose names figured in the under-

1. Mzimba to Harriette Colenso, 18 May 1900, Colenso Collection.
current of the case with us - and was advised not to visit the offices because of the opposition against him. He saw the Scotsman's articles on his action and...went off after one day to Liverpool for America."  

Natal

The history of Free Church missions in Natal is totally different to that of the Free Church in the Cape. Nevertheless, in common with other established missions in many parts of South Africa, it too experienced secession from about 1898.

"In northern Natal the Free Church of Scotland has experienced serious trouble. The purchase by natives of thousands of acres in open competition with Europeans, thus perhaps giving a sense of superiority, the exemption of many from native law, tribal politics, questions of discipline and consequent friction with missionaries, were all contributing causes to the schism. This "Uhlanga Church" (the National Church) is charged with preaching political independence and abetting the Boers during the war; some of its leaders are described as drunken and immoral, and quarrelling and internal dissensions are rife."  

Letters from the Natal missionaries to the F.M.C. at this time discussed the danger of secession in relation to the question of Union with the Presbyterian Church of South Africa. As has been mentioned, there was no Mission Presbytery, an ill-advised situation which the missionaries wished to rectify. On request, however, the directive of

1. D. Stormont to Lennox, 6 December 1901, Cory MS 6533.
2. Natal's policy towards its African population was very different from that in the Cape and this obviously affected Free Church custom and policy. Educated Africans had privileges but few exercised the franchise. In the Cape, Africans referred to "Natal influence" meaning the subordination of Africans, an influence which they felt was spreading to the Cape. See Makiwane in the Christian Express, August 1911.
3. Christian Express, October 1903.
the F.M.C. was that the mission congregations should seek to join their local S.A.P.C. Presbyteries. The Natal missionaries objected.

"The whole feeling of Europeans and I may also add of natives is such that it is a great mistake to force both into one Church; however theoretically correct it is unworkable. One result will certainly be, should pressure be put on the native churches, that a large number will join purely native churches.... Some of these churches are determined to throw off all white interference and be entirely independent. Any action of the Committee, or of the missionaries, which may appear to be forcing our native congregations into the Presbyterian Church of South Africa, will probably strengthen this movement, which though it has good points is premature and also dangerous as many of those who lead are ignorant and presumptuous." 1

Rejection of Union did not, however, forestall secession. Within months the missionaries were face to face with the problem, particularly at Kalabasi and at Gordon Memorial Mission. James Dewar wrote long, and often hysterical, letters to the F.M.C. describing the situation at Kalabasi. At first, a local chief, who had been expelled from the Wesleyan Church, had attracted a following, partly because of his influential position but also because he had had a revelation that "drunkards were admitted into heaven". Dewar was also concerned about his evangelist who had been agitating for an increase in salary.

"He has £16 p.a. and a free house and land from Mr. Scott while he is a partner in a company buying 2000 acres of land and he has no children." 2

The first real schism occurred at Gordon Memorial, however, when John Sibiya left to join Mzimba, despite eleventh hour attempts by Dr. Dalzell, the missionary, to

1. James Scott to Smith, January 1898, Natal Papers, NLS 4392.
2. J. Dewar to Smith, 13 July 1898, Natal Papers, NLS 4392.
have him ordained to the Free Church ministry.\(^1\) By March 1899 those who had left with Sibiya had extended their influence to Kalabasi and had claimed the allegiance of Dewar's evangelist, "a source of annoyance". In Natal, evangelists obviously took the initiative as, before 1898, there were no ordained men. Dewar maintained that there was "a revolt of evangelists" and that those in his mission had threatened to kill him and the people who stayed with him in the Free Church. Later they closed the church, burned it down, and "called in the witch doctor" to overcome his opposition.\(^2\) Meanwhile two local men had been ordained by a former member of the Free Church who had been expelled for "bigamy and wife desertion". Then the evangelist at the outstation of Hlatikulu, Thomas Sibisi, was ordained, refused to leave his house which was the property of the Free Church and, moreover, "embezzled our collections."

"This man, Sibisi, has seceded with some members and he has allied himself with all the outcasts and renegades of the district and is terrorizing over my people who are not yet free from the superstition of heathenism. Many follow him from fear alone." \(^3\)

It was through Sibiya and Sibisi that Mzimba's church extended its influence into Natal. There is no evidence, however, that Mzimba himself travelled there until after the South African War.

Natal, particularly in the north, was the scene of much of the war action and was considerably disrupted by it. One consequence of this war atmosphere was that suspicion was

1. Dalzell to Lindsay, 21 September 1898, Natal Papers NLS 4392.
2. Dewar to Smith, 2 April 1909, Natal Papers, NLS 4392.
rife (far more so than in the Cape) about the political activities and the loyalty or disloyalty of secessionist groups. Indeed, as can be seen, the reaction and counter-reaction to the movement in Natal was far more extreme and flamboyant than the relatively restrained response of those in the Cape. "Ethiopianism" became seriously tainted with sedition - not always proven.

"...although there is a substratum of truth there is I think a considerable amount of exaggeration, I mean on the political side of the question. As far as I am aware Johannes Zondi 1 is the only man who has been preaching sedition, he unfortunately started from one of our stations, the G.M.W. and for a long time showed a letter of recommendation from Dr. Dalzell which was used I daresay long after Dr. D. disapproved of his doings.

While on furlough one of my office bearers was ordained and became leader of what is called the Zion Church. I suppose he will probably unite with Thomas Sibisi who seems to have connected himself with Mzimba. Isaac Calwyza the man I refer to got only some 4 or 5 men here to follow him and I think about the same number of Mr. Bruce's have joined him in forming the Zion Church." 2

The writer of this letter, Rev. James Scott, missionary farmer at Impolweni, had been a Lovedale contemporary of Mzimba's and his personal friend. 3 Though Scott had expressed his reservations about independent movements, he later became outspoken in their favour, to the chagrin of most other missionaries, particularly those whose congregations were decimated by secession. At a public meeting in Cape Town in July 1899, Scott claimed that:

"He was not at all surprised at what Mr. Mzimba had done, that the missionaries here are accustomed to treat the natives in such a fashion that had he been a Kaffir he would have acted like Mzimba."

1. Johannes Zondi leader of the Cushites or Blind Johannies. He was gaol'd in 1898 and deported in 1901. See Shula Marks, op.cit., p. 65.


This opinion incensed the Kaffrarian missionaries - "Judge¬
ment from Natal?"¹

In Natal, Scott's attitude constantly annoyed Dewar
because the seceders used Scott's name as supporting them
and "he has done nothing to counteract it."² Thus, when
Mzimba came to Natal in July 1902 he found himself at the
centre of an internal missionary row, all of which became
public during the meeting of the Natal Missionary Conference.
Mzimba was invited to address this conference (Scott was
Secretary), but several members, notably Dr. Dewar, objected
on the grounds that Mzimba had been responsible for so much
trouble in the Cape and Natal missions. The Conference
instead should repudiate "Uhlanga" movements; it stood
well with the government and, as the Government was suspicious
of these movements, the Conference would lose its influence
if it gave them its support.

Scott took the opposite view. The Conference should
hear what Mzimba had to say for himself. "He was a man of
ability and the question was what he was working for."
Scott's own belief was that Mzimba had been "badgered by his
brethren of Kaffraria until he resigned". He went further
and implied that there was very strong feeling against Dewar
in his own church and that there was the possibility of a
petition from members requesting that Dewar should be with¬
drawn from the work.³

When Mzimba finally rose to address the Conference,
Dewar left the hall. Mzimba's speech, however, was brief,

¹. See footnote 1, p. 398.
². Don to Lindsay, 26 July 1899, NLS 7798.
³. Dewar to Smith, 2 April 1902, Natal Papers, NLS, 4392.
factual and unexceptionable. His church members were "realising the aim that they should be self-supporting" and they were all "anxious to try their hand at the work and see what they could do".¹

Dewar was furious both that he had been over-ruled and that Scott had publicly expressed such insinuations against him. He hotly denied that any petition had been drawn up from within his church though such a petition against Dewar was sent to the F.M.C. from secessionists led by Bryant Cele. It was Scott, said Dewar, who had urged Cele and others to draw up that petition.

"...you will see that Mr. Scott deliberately went out of his way and joined hands with him (Mzimba) publicly, expressed his sympathy with him, saying that the church at home was in Mzimba's favour and against our missionaries in Cape Colony. His action in this matter will strengthen the hands of the seceders and undo all that we have been doing for the last 10 years with regard to them. Besides the statement about me shows that he is in communication with the disaffected in my district and as you can easily understand his attitude is encouraging them. DO SOMETHING." ²

Despite the mildness of his speech, it is scarcely surprising that, in such an atmosphere, charges of sedition and race-hatred were made against Mzimba. Sibiya, too, was accused of race-hatred; he had already been under police surveillance during the South African war.³ There was no proof, however, merely opinions. Harriet Colenso wrote to Mzimba:

"At the Missionary Conference one speaker...said that Uhlanga is a society for natives in Natal which refuses to admit a white face to its meetings. There may be such a society, I do not know. But your and

¹. Account of the meeting of the Natal Missionary Conference, 11 July 1902, Natal Papers, NLS, 4392.
². Dewar to Henderson, 18 July 1902, Natal Papers, NLS, 4392.
³. Shula Marks, op.cit., p. 179.
John Sibiya's relations with Mr. Scott and even with me show sufficiently that your 'movement' is not one similar to this."

Three years later, Mzimba was described as a "violently anti-white crusader" and Sibiya as a "dangerous propagandist".1 Rumour had it that Mzimba was heading a religious revolt in Natal.2 For a time he was certainly banned from entering that Colony.3 Shula Marks has indicated that such charges could not be proven against Mzimba and Sibiya, but Moses Mbele, who had been ordained by Mzimba, accompanied the rebel forces of Bambatha into the Nakandla forest in 1906 and, though Sibiya may not have preached insurrection, in his absence Makanda and Mjongo may have done. In the earlier troubles over the Poll Tax which led to the declaration of martial law, "the group under Makande and Mjongo were all members of the Presbyterian Church of Africa."4

It is evident that, in Natal, Mzimba's church had a far more political aspect than it had in the Cape and that, from his subsequent statements, Mzimba would seem to have found political associations more of an embarrassment than an asset. His somewhat naive declaration to the Native Affairs Commission in November 1903 that "ours is purely a religious matter and arose out of religious difficulties" was an instance of this desire to dissociate himself from political movements.5

Nevertheless, as will be seen, the second wave of

1. Shula Marks, op.cit., p. 178.
secession which affected the Cape Missions in 1905-06 was much more disruptive than that of 1898-99. Mzimba's activities in 1905 were undoubtedly tied up with events in Scotland and the claims to mission property made by the "Wee Frees". Perhaps, however, there was also a link between the discontent in the Cape missions and the "violent and volcanic outburst of anti-missionary hatred" in Natal in those years and the participation of some separatist church members in the Bambatha rebellion.

The "Wee Frees".

In 1900 the Free Church of Scotland and the United Church combined to form the United Free Church of Scotland.\(^1\) In the ranks of the Free Church, however, there were a few dissenters from this decision, mainly Highland ministers and elders with rather narrow views. These "Wee Frees" as they were contumaciously called, claimed possession of the entire heritage of the Disruption, but their minority claim was initially treated with scant seriousness by the confident majority. The "Wee Frees", however, took the issue to court, first to the Court of Session where two judgments were given against them in August 1901 and in July 1902. The dissentients then took the case to the House of Lords. Judgement was given on 1 August 1904 and by a majority of 5 to 2 the Lords awarded the "Wee Frees" control of the "heritage of the Disruption" - millions of pounds, properties including colleges, mission buildings

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and over 1000 churches and manses. "The impossibility of enforcing and carrying out such a judgement was apparent from the first" but the now "legal Free Church", despite its small size, announced its refusal to compromise and many ministers and congregations, for example, were turned out of their buildings while the Assembly Hall and New College were taken over by the Legal Frees. The next step was Government intervention and a Royal Commission was established to investigate the case. The findings of the Commission, published in April 1905, declared that, whatever the legal niceties involved, only the United Free Church was in a position to fulfil the purposes of the trust. The House of Lords decision was in effect reversed. An executive commission then re-apportioned property and funds.

Cape missions and the "Wee Frees"

The legal wrangle with the "Wee Frees" did not begin to affect the Cape missions until late in 1904. By then it had become obvious that mission property was seriously faced with the prospect of a change in ownership. Of these properties Lovedale was the biggest prize, one estimate being that it was worth "£40,000 as a going concern". George Smith declared that, whatever else, "we desire to retain Lovedale" and evidence was given before the Royal Commission to this effect. The matter was further complicated by the scheme, then under consideration of an Inter-

1. E.B. Sargeant to Lord Milner, 24 June 1904, SP 27E(1).
2. Smith to Lennox, 24 February 1905, NLS 7801.
State Native College. The findings of the Native Affairs Commission recommending the establishment of such a college had given urgency to the proposal. In 1904, however, a central feature of the scheme was that Lovedale Institution should be constitutionally re-moulded to form the core of the new college. This suggestion was later discarded in favour of a fresh start on the Fort Hare lands but, at this stage, when legal questions were still unresolved, the future ownership of Lovedale was obviously a crucial factor.

The issue of property had been at the root of Mzimba's secession and of the Supreme Court actions which followed it. Now once again possession of lands and buildings was open to question and, doubtless, Mzimba saw in this a chance to reassert his claim and to give his church a firm and reputable connection. After the House of Lords judgement in favour of the "Wee Frees" he entered into correspondence with them.

"Mr. Houghton, whom I saw last night tells me that Mzimba has approached that Church (Free Church) with a view to his entering into the possession of the buildings connected with the Free Church mission work in Kaffraria. This is a bold move on the part of your former pupil and ally, and shows him to be a man of considerable resource and of even less loyalty than I had expected. How far he will succeed in hoodwinking the able but comparatively uninformed handful of Free Church ministers I cannot guess. Mr. Houghton tells me that you or your Synod has sent home a clear explanation of the position out here."  

The suggestion was made that The Presbyterian Church of Africa had applied for Union with the Legal Free Church. This, however, was firmly denied with the statement that the Church

1. See Chapter III.
3. Hobart Houghton - member of Lovedale staff.
had no wish, nor was it prepared, to identify with any other church. The correspondence that had taken place had been between Mr. Mzimba and the Free Church and raised the issues, which had been communicated to the old Free Church in 1899, of houses, lands and Mzimba's rights as a marriage officer. The correspondence that had taken place had been between Mr. Mzimba and the Free Church and raised the issues, which had been communicated to the old Free Church in 1899, of houses, lands and Mzimba's rights as a marriage officer.1

It was April 1905 before the Royal Commission report was published and from then until the end of 1906 there were considerable delays in implementing the Churches (Scotland) Act. "The weary process of claim and counter-claim went on for many months before the end was reached".2 Meantime, in this climate of uncertainty, Mzimba's followers asserted everywhere that property would pass into the hands of the Legal Free Church and that "they, the Mzimbaites, were to have the use and possession of it."3

The result of this claim was described by one missionary as "the great Secession" of 1905-06. The congregation in Somerville was reduced from 600 to 225; that of Idutywa fell from 300 to 120. Burnshill was affected and also Pirie with its eight outstations.

"The native agitation which claims kin with the "Free Church" has passed over the mission, with the result that the people of Knox have severed their connection with the mission and sections of the community in other stations have also declared themselves "Free Church". 4

The Legal Free Church had laid claim to Lovedale. It was not surprising, then, that after Stewart's death in December

1. The Christian Express, February 1905. The suggestion had been made by Mr. Hay Thorburn in a letter to the Times.
2. Fleming, op.cit., p. 78.
3. Lennox to Smith, 17 February 1906, NLS 7801.
4. Mission Station report from Pirie, Cory MS.
1905, it should be commonly accepted by Mzimba's followers that "Lovedale will pass into their hands and that Mzimba will yet be Principal of Lovedale."¹

So high were their expectations that, when the Free Church did finally withdraw its claims to mission property, Mzimba and others wrote petitions claiming that this decision had "greatly and most seriously injured the feelings of the natives concerned."² In June 1906 Mzimba and Damane travelled again to Scotland to plead their case and, indeed, the "Wee Frees" continued to write letters to the Executive Commission claiming "congregations like the recusants at Esidwadweni".³ However, by this time, James Henderson, Stewart's successor, could suggest hopefully that "the worst appears to be past" and from Somerville, which had been most acutely affected, it was reported that several secessionists had returned.⁴

There is no evidence that Mzimba was motivated by anything more than the desire for ecclesiastical respectability. The considered judgement of John Lennox was that:

"....Mzimba has been making one more desperate effort to rehabilitate himself...he has been discredited in this country. The government has refused to recognise him as a marriage officer etc. He hoped to be recognised by the Free Church and if he became a recognised minister of a church of good standing he would recover the privileges he had forfeited. Fair deal. Mr. Mzimba would give the FC numbers of native members and would receive the recognition he desires. FC would give recognition and in return receive a good right to claim property and lands." ⁵

2. Lennox to Smith, 17 February 1906, NLS 7801.
3. Lennox to Smith, 5 March 1906, NLS 7801.
4. Henderson to Smith, 4 June 1906, NLS 7801.
5. Lennox to Smith, 17 February 1906, NLS 7801.
This would seem to be borne out by the letter which Mzimba wrote to the Prime Minister of Natal in 1908, claiming that his independent church harboured,

"...no opposition to the white race as such. Our experience is that the missionaries of the United Free Church are at present unable to understand the South African native or work with him. In the meantime we are anxious to work for the welfare of our people..." 1

It has been seen, however, that there were members of the P.C.A. in Natal whose political ambitions were more advanced than Mzimba's. Likewise, in the Cape, is it credible that such large numbers as seceded in 1906 did so solely on the grounds of potential respectability or the possession of property? There is certainly no evidence of any connection between these disturbances and the rebellion in Natal but Africans in both Colonies would seem to have shared a common experience in those years of profound discontent and anti-white feeling which became articulated in different ways.

e. Ethiopianism

The movement known as Ethiopianism has been well-documented, defined and analysed by contemporaries. In the period 1882-1928, the "classical period of Ethiopianism" articles, particularly in missionary journals such as the Christian Express, were frequent, papers were given at Missionary Conferences, two Native Affairs Commissions dealt exhaustively with the subject and from all missionaries at

1. Shula Marks, op.cit., p. 179.
some point in those years, letters to their Home Boards contained reference to this movement as it affected their special area. Nor was this output confined to white missionaries and colonists. Secessionists and African clergy who retained their connection with the old missions also gave evidence before the Commissions, wrote letters or analysed the phenomenon in the columns of African as well as European newspapers.

"Ethiopianism" is strictly confined to history; the secessionism of the post-classical period, the proliferation of churches and Christian sects in South Africa, although of socio-religious interest, bears only a superficial resemblance to the parent impulse. By 1928 the term "Ethiopian Movement" had been replaced by the term "Separatist Churches". Ethiopianism was seen as a threat to the white man; Separatism is a feature of African church life, regrettable but not dangerous to authority. By 1928, in the eyes of white South Africans, the danger had passed. The classical period was over. Indeed the wheel had come full circle for in its origins, Ethiopian was merely a descriptive word given to a particular church. Within a few years, however, it had become a movement with wider, and more menacing implications. Why did this change occur? And what truth was there in the charges levelled against the Ethiopian movement?

The Ethiopian Church of that name was constituted in Pretoria in November 1892. There had been earlier secessionist groups, the most outstanding being that formed by Tile in Thembuland, a breakaway from the Wesleyans, and that instigated by a young white missionary, Winter, a breakaway from the Berlin Society in the Transvaal. In 1890 an ordained evangelist of the S.P.C.K., J.W. Kenyane, seceded in Pretoria when his bishop was absent in England and formed an independent African congregation. Two years later also in Pretoria, Mangena Mako Mokono, an ordained assistant of the Wesleyan Church, separated from his society and founded an African church, which he named the Ethiopian Church.

"He chose this name that he might avoid the word African, which might lead to misunderstanding because the term Africander - African - was taken by the whites born in South Africa as their own particular title. Ethiopian was recognised by him and the Black Christians as a Biblical term (Acts 8:27). He wished he said to be free from the imported Christianity of the European and urged his followers to work for the raising of their race."

This Church soon attracted others, many of them Wesleyan preachers, among them James Dwane who, because of his ability and personality soon became prominent in the movement. At an Ethiopian Church Conference held in Pretoria in 1896, three delegates were appointed to visit the United States.

1. The following observations are based on the paper on Ethiopianism in Stormont's collection and the articles by Bridgman in the Christian Express, October 1903, and November 1903.

2. James Dwane. A Wesleyan minister who broke away to join Monkone. Rapidly rose to eminence in the movement and went to America to negotiate with the A.M.E.C. Later broke away from the Ethiopian Church and joined the Church of England in a semi-independent fashion as the leader of the Order of Ethiopia. See Sundkler, op.cit., pp. 39ff.
to discuss the possible affiliation of the Ethiopian Church with the American Methodist Episcopal Church, a Negro Church constituted in 1816. According to Edward Roux, the decision to communicate with the A.M.E.C. was taken as a result of correspondence between Mokone and Charlotte Manye, an African girl who was being educated at Wilberforce College.¹ If this is true, then the connection was a curious offshoot of the tour made in Britain in 1891 by the Lovedale Choir. Charlotte Manye, who was a member of that choir, had apparently not returned to Lovedale in 1892, but had gone instead to Wilberforce at the suggestion of W.B. Derrick, Missionary Secretary of the A.M.E.C.² Of the three delegates chosen in 1896 only Dwane managed to raise his passage money and so travelled alone to America. He was given an enthusiastic reception and made many frank speeches which were brought to the attention of South Africans through their newspapers. Dwane returned in 1897 with the title of General Superintendent and a promise of formal incorporation into the A.M.E.C. when Bishop Turner came to South Africa in the following year. There were those within the Ethiopian Church who considered Dwane's title a breach of faith with Makone who was the original leader of the movement.

Dwane and Mokone, however, proceeded to publicize their church in preparation for Turner's arrival. A conference was held in the Transvaal after which the Church was given official recognition by the Transvaal government. Thereafter, Dwane and Mokone travelled to the Cape, held meetings

1. Roux, op.cit., p. 81.
2. The Christian Express, December 1901.
in King Williams Town, East London and Cape Town and, in April 1897, held a conference at Lesseytown near Queenstown, in the Eastern Cape. An interview with Dwane was reported in the Cape Argus.

"...Mr. Dwane stated that since his return from America he had succeeded in completely organising the African branch of this church, i.e. the American Methodist Episcopal Church, and now only awaited the advent of one of the American bishops through whom it was hoped formally to establish it. He, Mr. Dwane, had travelled through the Colony, the Free State and the Transvaal, and the church had been officially recognised by the Government of both Republics." 1

It was the proposed connection with the A.M.E.C. that first raised the suspicion and animosity of the established missionaries, causing them to focus on the possible trouble which could result from this new movement.

"Had it been true to its name and its original profession as a genuine product of South African native growth, and had it shown itself to be a missionary church ready to work in districts as yet unevangelized, it might have called forth some sympathy...Instead...this Ethiopian church seems to have resolved itself into an agency for importing another denomination into the South African mission field." 2

This suspicion was increased with the arrival of Bishop Turner in March 1898 and the simultaneous arrival of the Rev. J. Buchanan of the Negro Missionary Society representing the Negro Baptist Churches of America.

"We have certainly divisions and denominations enough in the South African missionary field without importing two entirely new ones at the present time; and anything that tends still further to split up the native churches into smaller sections is greatly to be regretted...."

Further than this, these new denominations had not broken new ground, Buchanan especially having chosen to settle in

1. The Christian Express, April 1897.
2. Ibid.
the region of the Keiskamma and Chumie rivers, where missions had been in existence for generations. This charge of 'missionary raiding' was followed by the charge of indiscriminate ordination. The Presbyterians with their emphasis on education felt particularly strongly about the latter. Finally they were accused of stirring up and fostering race hatred instead of true independence and eventual self-reliance.¹

The Bishop was given an enthusiastic reception in Cape Town and elsewhere, including Pretoria, Johannesburg and Queenstown. During his short visit it was reported that 6,400 new members had joined the Ethiopian church and 65 pastors had been ordained. There was the possibility that American money would finance a Seminary to be built near Queenstown for which the Bishop reportedly purchased 5 acres of land. Dwane was ordained by Turner to be Mission Bishop of South Africa but this ordination was not ratified by his fellow Bishops. Turner also founded a paper The Voice of Missions which was distributed in South Africa and had considerable influence. Finally in May 1900 the General Conference of the A.M.E.C. at Columbus, Ohio, constituted South Africa the 14th Episcopal District, appointed the Rev. Dr. Levi J. Coppin its first resident Bishop and voted money for the establishment of a College.²

Before this, in 1899, James Dwane had taken the unexpected step of seceding from the Ethiopian Church and

¹. The Christian Express, April 1898.
². Stormont, Cory MS 10,697.
returning to the Anglican fold, on the understanding that he and his followers would be granted semi-independent status as the Order of Ethiopia.

"But to me the most startling lay in one sentence in the Imvo to the effect that the Rev. J.M. Dwane was going to join the Anglican church. Now the Imvo is generally correct in its news. This piece of news is most astounding if true. After all the troubles and the quarrellings as well as the specious promises of the past four years, made in America and elsewhere to join the Anglican church!...." 1

Informed men continued to make a distinction between the original Ethiopian church and the wider use of the word to describe all schismatic bodies. Outlining the trend towards ecclesiastical independence, contemporary writers tended to use the phrase "African Church Movement" or "Native Church Movement" and to confine "Ethiopian" to Monkone's foundation of Dwane's Order. Nevertheless, the features of the new denomination were obvious; it was Black and it was Independent. Increasingly, therefore, any church which shared those characteristics came to be labelled "Ethiopian". This is apparent from the evidence given at the S.A.N.A.C. and from the report of the first General Missionary Conference in Johannesburg in 1904. This conference met "under the cloud of the Ethiopian invasion". A paper read by the Rev. R. Bridgeman entitled The Ethiopian Movement and Other Independent Factions Characterized by a National Spirit, and which was widely-read, used "Ethiopianism" and "Ethiopian" as general terms which did not require explanation. 2

If the use of the word had been generalised, the

2. See Christian Express, October and November 1903.
meaning of the word had also been expanded. When Mzimba appeared before the S.A.N.A.C. in 1903 he made it quite clear that his movement had no connection with the "Ethiopian movement" and that his movement was quite non-political. 1 Political overtones had, of course, been present in the movement from the outset.

"A new tendency had appeared - to use political and national influences for the establishment of new denominations...and this has crystallized itself at length in the Ethiopian Church". 2

By 1903, however, the political intentions of the secessionists were by many held to be dominant and central to the movement, the religious motives secondary and peripheral. Sedition and disloyalty became firmly associated with Ethiopianism in some quarters.

There were several reasons for this change and, in some respects, the missionaries were themselves responsible for the fear with which Ethiopianism was regarded by white colonists. Their personal experience of secession often embittered them and made them openly hostile to the new churches. They were contemptuous and scathing about the standards of morality and education which were both reputed to be low in independent groups and thus cast doubt on the religious quality of the movement, implying that it must have a different motivation. The introduction of an American Negro element into South Africa was seen as a source of disloyalty, the Americans encouraging the Africans to rebel.

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2. J. Stewart, Free Church Record, April 1899.
"The bulk of the native people are loyal to the British government and will probably remain so, if certain irrepressible agitators in church and state would leave them alone. From the first, in this Ethiopian movement there has been a good deal of the American negro. His presence in South Africa will not, it may be feared, tend to its peace and harmony. The great problem of the future is how Briton and the Boer and Black may live in peace, in mutual help and for mutual advantage in South Africa. It is doubtful if the American Negro will help to the successful solution of that problem." 1

That editorial in the Express was written during the South African War. The multiplicity of emotions engendered by this war, the bitterness and the guilt which remained after 1902, created an atmosphere in which the activities of Africans were viewed with distrust. "Ethiopian" as used in these circumstances did not discriminate between those engaged in religious activities and those involved in political associations, even those, like Jabavu, who were vehemently against independent churches. An example of this was to be found in Neame's article in the Empire Review, where the author accused the Native Affairs Commission of minimising the threat in the movement.

"No liberty more quickly degenerated into license than the liberty of a black church; and when it is found to be tinged with what some people do not hesitate to label sedition, no excuse is needed to deal with it with sternness." 2

Sternness, as has been indicated, was the method adopted by the Natal Government. A Natal delegate to the Inter-Colonial Customs Conference at Bloemfontein in March 1903 proposed that concerted action be taken by all South African territories against Ethiopianism. 3 Natal had

1. The Christian Express, December 1901.
2. See footnote 2, p. 403.
3. Shula Marks, op.cit., p. 76.
already shown its intention of dealing severely with Independent Church movements by being the only state to bar members of the A.M.E.C. and by branding Mzimba as a "virulently anti-white crusader" before naming him as a prohibited immigrant. They followed this up by refusing to recognise African ministers and, wherever possible, hounding the Uhlanga movement.

In the Cape, in general, the missionaries favoured recognition for fear of "driving the movement underground". Stewart stated that he was anxious to avoid the "idea of intolerance or persecution" and the conclusion of the Native Affairs Commission was that "so long as it remains un-associated with mischievous political tendencies...any measure capable of being regarded as religious persecution should be avoided." The Cape feared, in other words that any oppression on the part of government would result in much greater co-operation between Africans and so the "spectre" of an African uprising would become a reality.

"The anti-black tirades in press and on platform on one hand and the anti-white agitation on the other may some day be the furnace, the vacillating, blundering policies of governments may provide the hammer, and the struggle for racial supremacy may be the forge on which the aboriginal tribes shall be welded."

Ethiopianism as a treasonable movement was, it would appear, largely the creation of the colonists, the product of their own fear and insecurity. Much of the elaboration was due to ignorance. The element of separateness, of secrecy, of alienation in those churches which was only natural, gave rise to wild speculation about their purpose.

2. Christian Express, November 1903.
and invention of fact based on unreasonable inference. John Buchan's *Prester John* is a good example of a fictitious account of such extreme white response to Ethiopianism. The monolithic ignorance of the white man in South Africa about the way of life of the black man, which was (and is) a direct consequence of his belief in his own superiority, precluded trust and understanding. What is not understood is feared, and what is feared must be eradicated.

"Now it is feared that the native possessed of this (political) genius and already estranged from the European in religion is but a step removed from organised resistance in matters social and political. To what extent even now Ethiopianism may be the cover for such propaganda we have no means of knowing.... The political trend of this movement is not so much intentional as inevitable because of the mold in which the native mind and character have been cast. ....It means that the unrest abroad is not so much incidental as constitutional." 1

The fact remained that Ethiopianism was an African movement which did embrace many nationalities and many points of view and found sympathy even amongst those who would not openly give support. There was an emphasis on equality which to the European was distasteful and alarming. There were even those who claimed superiority for the black man. The Rand Daily Mail quoted one writer as saying that "coloured people were more courageous and more daring than white men", giving as an example the success of the Japanese in their war with the Russians in 1904.2 It became a question, therefore, not so much of proven truth in the allegations against Ethiopianism but of what people believed to be true.

Mzimba and the Ethiopian Movement

Mzimba's connections with other secessionist bodies is again almost entirely a matter of conjecture. As Christopher Saunders suggests it is not impossible that Mzimba might have had first-hand experience of Tile's Thembu church during his lengthy periods of residence in the Transkei in the 1830's.¹ Certainly he would have been informed about it, if only from the pages of Imvo. It is unlikely, however, that it exerted any great influence on him at the time, though it may have contributed to his thinking on the whole question of independence.

What is more probable is that during his stay in Johannesburg in 1896, Mzimba came into close contact with the leaders of the Ethiopian Church, Mokone and Dwane. No mention of this is made in his correspondence with Stewart about the situation in Tsewu's church but it was Stewart's opinion that Dwane had influenced Mzimba.

"The only explanation that can be offered as to his strange career during the past year is this - that seeing an Ethiopian church started by his friend, Mr. Dwane, entirely free from the control of white men, and which church he was probably asked to join and did not, he was seized by the ambition to found a new and separate church of his own." ²

Certainly, it must have been the case that, along with all the other considerations that led Mzimba to resign, awareness of Dwane's visit to America, the formal connection with the A.M.E.C. and Bishop Turner's success in South Africa must all have helped to convince Mzimba that the time was ripe for such a move. He may even have attended the

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¹ Christopher Saunders: op.cit., p. 567.
² J. Stewart, Pamphlet, p.5.
conference in Queenstown held by Dwane and Mokone in April 1897.

David Stormont, in his private journal, suggested that Mzimba had approached the Ethiopian church for 'incorporation of some sort'. Under pressure from the Supreme Court decisions it is possible that Mzimba felt the need for support but amalgamation of this kind is not the hallmark of these secessionist movements. On the contrary, they were independent of the white man but also independent of each other. If Mzimba before the Native Affairs Commission disowned all links with the Ethiopian Church, Dwane, now a member of the Anglican Order of Ethiopia, fiercely denounced the A.M.E.C. in South Africa as deliberately seditious and made it equally clear that those who linked his name with Mzimba's, particularly in Natal, were utterly mistaken.

Ethiopianism, whatever its manifestation, was a phenomenon experienced throughout South Africa at this time. The motivations and objectives of each secessionist group were very similar. Nevertheless, the leader of each group seemed to be intent on guiding and directing his particular movement, a feature which perhaps they shared with the Early Church. Dwane and Mzimba may have provided mutual encouragement and example but there was never any question of amalgamation.

2. S.A.N.A.C. Evidence of James Dwane, Vol. II. Para. 9775
3. I Corinthians 5:12.
f. **Missionary Attitudes to Mzimba's Secession.**

As has already been indicated, most Free Church missionaries were at first cautious, perhaps surprised, by Mzimba's action; later hostility and bitterness characterized their attitude; and, finally, when the seeming danger had passed, they began to show more charitable understanding. The *Christian Express* from 1896 had kept its readers informed about the progress of the Ethiopian Church and comment on the "new movement" had been considerable. There was perhaps a suggestion in all this that that sort of thing could not happen within Presbyterianism.

"...our mission was of all others, the one which was considered to deal most generously, justly and fairly with native ministers and office-bearers, giving them an equal place in all church courts with their European brethren." ¹

When Mzimba announced his intention of resigning there were some, like Brownlee Ross, who took the matter at its face value. The disagreement between Mzimba and Lennox, he claimed, had been mishandled by the Presbytery, forcing Mzimba into a corner. If Mzimba had been allowed to resign quietly then the Presbytery of the Transkei could have given him a call and the issue would have been satisfactorily resolved.²

Others, like W.J.B. Moir of Blythswood, had more insight and questioned not only what lay beneath the surface of Mzimba's decision but where the missionaries themselves had gone astray. Moreover he was prepared to regard the movement with some tolerance.

¹. Don to Lindsay, 26 July 1899, NLS 7798.
². B. Ross, to n.k. 29 May, 1898, NLS 7804.
"If a section want to act for themselves up to the point of independence let us not fight with them but faithfully give them the benefit of our experience in warning and let them go out with our blessing."  

Dundas Erskine, missionary at Somerville, was also prepared to approach the movement optimistically.

"It is not all evil. When a boy gives his father a blow he can have this consolation at least; my boy must be growing otherwise he could not have done it. There are signs of ill-directed life and strength in this movement. Like every individual Christian, the Kaffir Church must work out its own salvation."  

Much heart-searching went on amongst the missionaries. D.D. Stormont collected a great deal of information and added observations of his own in his private journals until he became an acknowledged authority on the subject. Much of this material is prejudiced and inaccurate but it provides an insight into contemporary thought on Ethiopianism and the missionaries awareness of its complexity. Stewart also indicated this in his report to the F.M.C. about Lovedale Native Congregation.

"The origin of the movement is somewhat complex. The agitation for independence on the one hand and the advocacy of native rights on the other, have had something to do with it; while some blame must attach to the failure of the Church to exemplify in practise the unity of the races in Christ Jesus."  

The Foreign Mission Committee managed to sustain an optimistic stance. Issuing a pastoral letter they obviously hoped to act in the rôle of mediator. This approach was based on:

1. See Moir to Stewart, 15 April 1898 SP 25A; Moir to Stormont, 7 May 1898, Cory MS.  
2. Erskine to Smith, 1 May 1899, NLS 7804.  
3. See C.B. Simonds to Stormont, 21 September 1903, Cory MS 7536; Stanford to Stormont, 22 October 1902, Cory MS 7526.  


on the prospect that practical considerations would "open the hearts of the seceders to penitence and return" and even on the expectation that the schism would not be permanent "in spite of necessary legal action as to property". It was with great reluctance that they finally ratified Mzimba's resignation. There were also those on the spot who felt sure that the secessionists would learn from experience and that the majority would return to the fold.

"The first thing that will probably sober them will be the realisation of the fact that all the property is untouchable and unclaimable and they will have to begin from the ground there." 2

Others again recognised that the movement would not break up so easily and that, in some form or another, it had come to stay. Steps must therefore be taken to ensure that some of the ecclesiastical grievances were removed. Only this can account for the increase in African ordinations and also for the urgency with which Stewart and many others tackled the problem of Higher Education for Africans.

Had there been any possibility of re-union - and that is doubtful - it was finally removed by the events of the next few years, events which altered the attitudes of both sides. The Supreme Court Action, the entry of the A.M.E.C. into South Africa, the bitter political climate in the Cape during the 1898 election, the South African War and after that the legal wrangle with the Wee Frees, hardened missionary opinion and rendered reconciliation impossible.

1. Smith to Lennox, 2 December 1898, NLS 7777.
2. Moir to Stewart, 15 April 1898, SP 25A.
"The effect of this method is to create a Cave of Adullam, for the restless and dissatisfied, and to weaken the discipline of other churches. Nominally a church movement it contains a strong, perhaps dangerous political element....Its aim seems to be some kind of ecclesiastical Home Rule and it has done nothing but mischief." 1

It was not possible for older missionaries to view "disorder, division and even destruction" within the mission with any equanimity. Though they might have admitted that their own methods had not been faultless, they could not condone the methods of the seceders. This, in the Free Church, was even more true after 1904 when it seemed that Mzimba and his followers were motivated by opportunism alone to assist the Legal Free Church.

Men like Stewart regarded Mzimba's secession as a personal affront.

"He was never the same afterwards. That bitter time left a scar upon his heart that I believe he felt each day until he died." 2

Only after he and others had passed from the scene was it possible for the Mission to re-assess the situation with some detachment. By then too the wave of secessionism of 1906 had receded. Mzimba's church would remain but so too would the U.F. mission. Thus James Henderson*, Stewart's successor, made it policy to "do justice to our Kaffir ministers, to reward the loyal and to anticipate in the best way more disloyalty."3 With the passing of time and the lessening of apprehension (partly due to increased government control), younger missionaries could afford to take a more broad-minded look at the problems of African Christians.

1. Stewart, op.cit., p. 131; p. 185.
2. Wells, op.cit., p. 296.
"The fact that we offer the native church the finest product of our thinking and experience while at the same time we remove from them the discipline of thinking out these great questions in relation to their own national life, retards rather than stimulates thought and mental activity in the region of the great truths of our religion....They must take responsibilitiess...must exercise their own inventiveness and devise plans...they must cast themselves on the future in faith."  

Yet here, as in the society at large, the emphasis was increasingly on differentiation and the old ideal of assimilation, even in the long term, was no longer held to be possible, except by a few. By a curious twist of history, the 19th Century missionaries and their attitudes, for all their undoubted authoritarian inconsistencies, can be regarded in retrospect as more enlightened in their approach to African society. Indeed it is arguable that Mzimba's movement was both a judgement on reluctant Free Church policies and a justification of the freedom, courage and integrity which missionaries, in spite of themselves had exemplified.

Summary

Mpambani Jeremiah Mzimba died on 25 June 1911, aged 61. Little is known of him after 1906, apart from the fact that his rights as a marriage officer were granted and that the P.C.A. achieved official recognition in 1908. In August 1911 the Christian Express published an obituary of Mzimba written by his old friend and colleague with whom he

had so often been compared, Elijah Makiwane.

"...by his charming personality and by being recognised as standing for native rights he became a great power and came to be recognised even in political circles as a man to be considered....I regard the movement he headed not so much as the formation of a native church as a protest against the treatment of Natives which regards the Native merely from his commercial value; and further that I regard his methods as having created greater difficulties than he removed....Possibly the movement he headed carried him further than he intended in starting. The cry of the movement was fitted to draw to him men of strong but low character, men who could not appreciate his high aims; who joined him for some personal profit or grievance....To have guided such a following so diverse in character and aims, on ground so extensive, is surely the lot of few men...."

Like the Reformers before him, Mzimba had begun with genuinely ecclesiastical grievances but political possibilities were always present in such protest, in some cases so interwoven that the two could not be isolated. Indeed there is a plurality of motive and objective in all movements which frustrates attempts to compartmentalize them. Mzimba may have tried to dissociate himself from "Ethiopianism" because it, rightly or wrongly, had become linked with sedition. Nevertheless, Mzimba's movement was part of that wider movement and, though its particular manifestation may have been ecclesiastical, still its basic impulse was protest. It was the measure of this protest that the Presbyterian Church of Africa was able to unite people of different tribes and denominations, to incorporate some of the old with the new, to give its members a sense of purpose, and to share in the growing awareness of national identity which gives to Ethiopianism the right to be called the "first Bantu mass

1. The Christian Express, August 1911.
movement on truly national lines."\(^1\)

Certainly, at that time, by virtue of their composition, the African Presbyterian Church and others like it were the only truly African organisations of significance. Unlike the African politicians they sought, initially, no compromise with the system. In their tentative efforts at self-government and self-support, in their gropings, however unsuccessful, after an African national church, in their desire for self-determination, in their largely peaceful efforts to bring about a social revolution— in all these respects it is the African Church Movement at the turn of the century that must be seen as the agent of modernization in the institutionalized aspects of African national consciousness. It has been said that the "ideal nationalist movement consists of bringing together the urge...to modernize institutions with an upsurge of mass enthusiasm."\(^2\) In its early stages Mzimba's movement had that potential, combining as it did the innovative ideas and inspiration of educated Africans with the emotional support of ordinary people. Europeans accused Ethiopians of being reactionary, of hankering after a tribal past and pointed to this as their greatest weakness. In fact, it could be maintained that the weakness of leaders like Mzimba was that they could not disassociate themselves from their doctrinal inheritance, that the establishment of their church was more important than its adaptation to the needs of the people. They were

\(^1\) Roux, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

prepared to sacrifice mass support for the sake of acknowledgement and acceptance in the white man's structure. Because of this the mainstream of African nationalism was divided into multiple, individualistic secessions on the one hand, and on the other into political organisations which were out of touch with the mass of the people.
CONCLUSION

In the introduction it was claimed that this thesis would attempt a reappraisal of missionary attitudes and the response which these attitudes evoked in African society. The focus has been on one small community in the Eastern Cape Province, narrowed even further to an exceptional educational establishment in that area. Attitudes have been mainly exemplified by the work and writings of one notable missionary and response characterized by the actions and writings of a minority of articulate Africans.

Given the hagiographical comments of the past, the not-infrequent vilifications of the present and the prevailing suspicion in South Africa of missionaries and the Church, it is perhaps inevitable that an attempt at reappraisal of missionary attitudes should lead to a central position. Missionaries were neither as good nor as bad as they have been depicted. While they were agents of change they were also victims of change and could not, in common with the majority of men, foresee the consequences even of their best intentions. They were children of their generation, products of their Victorian, imperialist background with the world-view which such moulding imposed. The influence of Victorian Scotland, with its special characteristics, can be seen reflected in the attitudes of Free Church missionaries. There were few who managed to rise above these natural handicaps, few whose imagination could so overcome contemporary prejudice and mores as to commend to their fellows the adoption of
alternatives. The most telling criticism of missionaries is that they preached a gospel of liberation and were not themselves liberated. All specific criticisms stem from this. They imprisoned Christianity within the confines of Victorian rectitude, equated salvation with civilisation and allegiance to Christ with allegiance to Queen Victoria. They taught that all men were brothers but had neither the insight nor the humility to accept their own teaching. When it came to decisive action in defense of their most cherished beliefs, the majority would cling to class or ethnic standards at the expense of ideals.

If this is an accurate delineation of missionaries, then Stewart was a typical example. This thesis has been to a great extent biographical as it has relied on Stewart's activities and writings for much of its source material. To read James Wells' biography of Stewart, the In Memoriam issue of The Christian Express, or comments from some contemporaries, is to see Stewart as super-human if not saintly. On the other hand, the majority of those who have written about the Zambezi expedition of 1858-63 or about the establishment of Livingstonia or Kibwezi missions, have portrayed Stewart as an ambitious, ruthless and often petty self-seeker with little insight and less charity. Stewart, it would seem, did indeed reveal the less attractive aspects of his character most sharply when he was away from Lovedale and away from his home. Driven by ambition to go to Central Africa in 1876 and again to East Africa in 1891, he tried, in both instances, to do too much too quickly and his impatient, cavalier and authoritarian
traits of character were highlighted in such circumstances. It has been possible, however, without being blind to such deficiencies, to see in the Stewart of Lovedale a more sympathetic personality. Ambition and autocracy were not concealed there, any more than they were in John Mackenzie or Eugene Casalis or Robert Laws, but they were to some extent held in check by the presence of colleagues whom he respected and a wife whom he admired, and the longer time span allowed full credit to be given to his tireless energy, his business acumen, his enthusiasm, his flashes of courage and real sympathy with the African underdog. Particularly in the 1880's through his outspoken articles in The Christian Express, his advocacy of the best in education for Africans and his support for a well-trained African ministry, Stewart appears as unusually able to equate his ideals with practical action and to confirm his words with deeds.

In the 1890's, however, after Stewart's return from Kibwezi, these ideals were repeatedly sacrificed or, at best, wearily defended. Reasons can be found. His health was deteriorating and his energy was sapped by travel and fund-raising, the financial position of Lovedale was perilous and insidious attacks were being made on the Institution by the Education Department. Indeed, the political and social atmosphere of the Cape which resulted from the influence of Cecil Rhodes and the rise of an urban economy with all that that entailed for the African population, made Stewart, as it made so many, a victim of change which he could not control or withstand. For most missionaries, however, in their own particular sphere of influence, the change which they could
not accept was one which they themselves had engendered, namely, the emergence of a self-conscious, well-educated, politically-aware and independent group of Africans who challenged missionaries, not in their basic philosophical or theological assumptions, but to a share of power and decision-making. For Stewart, Jabavu's decision to support the Bond in 1898 and Mzimba's decision to seek independence were equally-bewildering consequences of policies and teachings which he, more than most perhaps, had unfailingly advocated. He continued to support plans for African higher education but, in most other areas he was totally confused as to the proper approach, made several errors of judgement and took refuge in authoritarianism. Not surprisingly, although it was denied, Stewart would seem to have been conscious at the end of his life, of disillusion and failure in his work.

His achievement lay in the size and impact of Lovedale. In a remote and economically underdeveloped area of the Cape, Stewart had been responsible for an Institution which commanded attention, first because of the solidity and appearance of its buildings and secondly for the number of pupils it educated, from all over southern Africa, to a high academic standard. This resulted in widespread influence which could not be equalled by any similar establishment. There can be little doubt that Africans were proud of Lovedale and, as has been noted before, it was as important for its representation of an ideal or a goal as for anything which it actually achieved.
It has been said many times that African response to missionary teaching was, for the most part, negative, even dismissive. Certainly, if the criterion is to be the number of converts, members of European denominations, then the majority, in the 19th Century, remained unevangelised. (Indeed, although it is now claimed that there is an African Christian majority, many of these are members of Independent Churches). This thesis, however, has been concerned with influence rather than with measurable statistics and has attempted to assess the response of Africans to the total impact of missionary teaching which included the political, educational and social attitudes demonstrated and taught by missionaries. Educational excellence was the hallmark of Free Church missionary activity in the Eastern Cape. Obviously these missionaries hoped to produce educated Africans who were also Christians but at no time did they reserve educational benefits for those who subscribed to Christian belief. No more could they justifiably deny political and social rights to those who had been, in their eyes, civilised by education. Educated Africans responded to this basic teaching by accepting that they would, in due course, be assimilated as equals into European society.

The educational emphasis of Presbyterian missions resulted inevitably in the creation of a small, select, top-dressing of articulate Africans. In the second half of the century, as a consequence of contact with western values, the pre-literate African society was prepared to accord status to those with education, and the restricted power of
the chiefs offered such men potential leadership opportunities. They chose, understandably, to aim for acceptance through the acquisition of civilised standards (as defined by Europeans) and the proper exercise of political power. The lack of overt objection to the creation of Europeanized Africans contrasts strongly with the writings of West Africans, such as Blyden and Johnson, who favoured specifically African institutions and dreamed dreams of a future when Africans would stand in their own right, making their distinctive contribution to world culture. In the Cape of the seventies and eighties, however, the military defeat of the Chiefdoms on the one hand and the apparently-inviolable constitutional right to the franchise for the suitably-qualified on the other, seemed to indicate a course of action which would qualify as many people as possible to vote and thus to play their part in Cape society. At this period, therefore, there was an identity of interest between those Africans and those missionaries who genuinely subscribed to the possibility of a shared society.

In retrospect such hope seems both vain and ill-judged. The success of Afrikaner nationalism and the encouragement thus given to white supremacist attitudes spelled death in the long run to accommodationist politics. Thus, before the educated, elitist leadership could be harnessed to the uneducated, disenfranchised African masses the more powerful groundswell of white South African nationalism had interrupted the process, transfixing embryonic African nationalism, suspending its development so that, even now, there is no obvious way for this nationalism to come to
fruition. The educated minority found themselves in an uncomfortable limbo, neither African nor European, only tenuously supported by white "liberals", themselves disillusioned by prevailing political practice.

The one attempt to move away from European-dominated institutions and to assert some independence of action can be seen in the Secessionist movements or Ethiopianism. Even then, it would appear, that indiginisation did not go much beyond exclusive black membership but that in itself was significant enough to engender fear in the white population. These movements, too, were a direct response to missionary teaching, though not generally acknowledged as such. Where was the equality that they had been promised by the teaching of the Gospel? If it could not be found within the Church then the only possible course was to move out.

The response of Africans to missionary attitudes throughout this period was, as has been shown, generally positive and co-operative, though capable of being critical and independent where basic aims were felt to be in conflict. Distrust increased only as the ambivalence and inherent contradictions in missionary attitudes were revealed by events and as those Africans who had accepted missionary teaching found themselves to be, after all, isolated and powerless. The fact that missionaries betrayed their principles or that Africans found themselves in an impasse from which they could not reverse did not, however, entirely nullify the beneficial effects of such Institutions as Lovedale. At the very least Lovedale had, by example, placed an emphasis on unity and had given to many Africans
a common identity to counter the divisive effect of purely tribal loyalties. The educated Christian community was able to obscure the difference between Xhosa and Mfengu, between Zulu and Ba-Sotho. Nevertheless, it remained the tragedy of Africans in the Cape that they had been offered so much, only to have it all withdrawn when they had accepted the offer in good faith. Political gradualism which had seemed to offer the fair prospect of a common society could not stand against the rapidity of economic change, the tyranny of urbanisation and the need of whites to fortify their racial superiority through anti-African legislation.
APPENDIX A. The Minutes of the Foreign Mission Committee of the Free Church of Scotland
a) October 1864  b) October 1866

Minute of October 1864

The Convener having drawn attention to the fact that at present all matters connected with the management of the mission in Kaffraria devolve on the Presbytery and that much difficulty and confusion arise in consequence, submitted the following suggestions as calculated in his opinion to remove these and bring the whole organisation of the mission into a healthy state, viz:

1) That the Presbytery henceforth restrict itself to the proper functions of a Presbytery.

2) That the ordained European missionaries reared in the Colony or sent from this country be constituted into a Missionary Council for the regulation of the general affairs of the Mission.

3) That the ordained missionary in charge of the Seminary and a representative appointed by the Presbytery be constituted into an Educational Board to regulate the course of instruction in the Seminary and subordinate schools etc., and that a member of this Board shall be charged with the superintendence of said subordinate schools with a view to securing their thorough efficiency.

4) That a Financial Board should be established for the regulation of the pecuniary affairs of the Mission.

5) That these several bodies should communicate with each other on the points that fall within their respective provinces and all these directly to the Home Committee on all points requiring the approval or confirmation of the latter.

Minute of 27 October 1866

On 27 October 1866 the previous minute of 18 October 1864 was read at a meeting of the Foreign Mission
Committee and the Convener stated that the recommendations embodied therein had remained in abeyance until now, it being the desire of the Committee that Dr. Stewart, whose departure had been delayed beyond the time originally contemplated, should go out charged with the views of the Committee with regard to them as well as with any further instructions which may be likely to conduce to the prosperity of the Kaffrarian missions.

The additional instructions were as follows:-

1) The Financial Board to have 2 missionaries and 2 or 3 laymen friends of the Mission though not necessarily connected with it.

2) English should, as in India, be regarded as the sole classic language of the Seminary; and as the teaching of Latin and Greek especially in the case of natives seems unnecessary, the whole subject should be reconsidered and a report sent home as to the best way in which the suggestion can be carried out. At the same time it is important that in the case of candidates for the higher grade of the Christian ministry so much of Greek and Hebrew should be studied as will enable them to consult the original Scriptures.

3) As much time as possible should be devoted to the teaching of religion. Thus the Seminary may become increasingly an essentially missionary Institution.

4) Legal basis of many properties to be secured to the Free Church.

5) Farm and industrial agents should be paid from the proceeds of these departments.

6) With regard to the qualifications of native agents for the propagation and maintenance of the Gospel whether in India or in Africa, the deliberate judgement of the Committee is that these should be of a diversified character. Everywhere there is a demand for a small class of thoroughly educated labourers - men so far initiated into literature, science and philosophy, as to be capable of grappling with the perplexing questions which have been raised in connection with the bearing of these
themes on the Evidences and Doctrines of our most Holy Faith - men duly conversant with the great system of Revealed truth as a comprehensive whole - men capable of expounding and exhibiting its different parts in their mutual relationships and due proportions, as well as vindicating them when assailed, whether by avowed enemies or mistaken friends. It is therefore desirable that the educational machinery of the Central Seminary should be so organised as ultimately to train up a few Native Christian men of the highest order of attainment.

But God has given a diversity of gifts...there may be and ought to be a diversity of operations in the mission field...there is ample room for a variety of subordinate agents. There may be a class of Readers who can do little else than read portions of the Scriptures to the wholly illiterate. There may be a somewhat higher class of purely vernacular Catechists....There may be a higher class still of Anglo-Vernacular Catechists, whose attainments may be equivalent to those of an ordinary licensed preacher of the Gospel. In the training of these classes respectively the Seminary may be so organised as to render effective aid. Ordained ministers and pastors already in charge of considerable districts with several scattered congregations might employ labourers of these different grades and systematically superintend their labours. A class of men may then be raised up who, though destitute of classical and scientific educations may be endowed with such gifts and graces as to constitute an effective native pastorate for the rural districts.

On another score, even that of the cost of support, it must be obvious that such a class of labourers is absolutely needed...it would be impossible from purely native sources to expect means for maintaining ministers of higher order...and to purely native means of support we must ultimately look.

We are then temporarily to introduce the Gospel; its outward maintenance and perpetuation must be left to the natives themselves. So soon therefore as native congregations are formed, the care of them ought as speedily as possible to be consigned to the native pastorate and the general supervision of them to educated native ministers - while the missionaries should be free to pass on to the regions beyond and pioneer the way for new native congregations to be in time delivered over to additional native pastors.

7) The standard of education should be gradually raised by the adoption of a higher standard for the entrance examination.
APPENDIX B. Stewart and the "Blantyre Affair" 1880.

There were certain unresolved problems in connection with the organisation and status of remote mission stations, such as Livingstonia and Blantyre, which inevitably gave rise to lack of control and misapplication of authority. In the Lake area and the Shire Highlands where both the internal and external slave trade flourished, the missionaries were obviously strongly tempted to establish places of refuge, thereby adopting a specifically political stance vis-à-vis other chieftains in the neighbourhood. The adoption of such attitudes, in turn, led potentially to the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction in such embryonic theocratic states.

As Dr. Andrew Ross has shown in his thesis,¹ there was a basic difference in policy between the missions of Livingstonia and Blantyre. Instructions given to the Livingstonia missionaries, drawn up by Stewart, were of a missionary nature; instructions given to the Blantyre missionaries were specifically related to the establishment of a British "colony". This did not mean that the Livingstonia missionaries were immune to the idea of a "place of refuge". Stewart, in 1877, claimed that five different parties of fugitives had wanted to stay at Livingstonia, that they therefore had 60 or 70 to feed until the gardens of these dependents began to yield, but that

at least they had "taken a start as an anti-slavery centre and a city of refuge for the oppressed".\(^1\)

It was in the crucial matter of the exercise of power over these adherents, however, that the Blantyre policy of a self-governing colony led to disaster. Floggings for various offences were administered at both missions and were evidently considered to be a "schoolboy punishment"\(^2\) — in moderation. At Blantyre, however, where perhaps the calibre of the missionary left something to be desired and where there was confusion as to tactics and responsibility,\(^3\) flogging was more than once taken to extremes and in 1878 a man who had murdered his wife was executed. All this came to light by means of a pamphlet published by A. Chirnside\(^4\) which stirred up much trouble and alarm but which at least resulted in a proper discussion in both Home Committees of this crucial matter of civil and criminal regulations.

Although these severe floggings and the execution took place in 1878, it is not until July 1879 that Stewart mentions his concern about a report that "they have flogged a native to death" and his anxiety for Mapas Ntintili, the Lovedale evangelist who had in fact apprehended the murderer and for whom Stewart feared repercussions, if it was not already too late. This belated acquisition of knowledge is made all the more curious on account of the fact that

\(^{1}\) Stewart to Mina Stewart, ST 13/3/1, 10 February 1877.
\(^{2}\) Stewart to Macrae, ST 13/3/1, 5 January 1880.
\(^{3}\) Ross, op.cit.
Dr. Laws had spent the month of June in Lovedale and had apparently said nothing to Stewart about these events. Stewart wrote privately that he did not blame himself in the least for want of judgement, foresight or caution but that he did feel guilty about his "unworthy feelings" of judgement of others.¹ When he taxed Laws about his reticence, Laws replied that the whole thing had been given in its worst light by Moir in order to deter the Portuguese from coming to Blantyre.² This again is curious in the light of the fact that in July 1878, a year previously, Laws had written to Stewart from Blantyre, asking him for some kind of ruling on these thorny issues.

"In the event of a murder taking place within our boundary am I to have the man hanged if proved guilty or what? Those are serious questions and I think both Blantyre and Livingstonia Committees should be made aware of what may have to be settled in a hurry someday if they give us no instructions on the subject."³ Stewart evidently made no reply to this as 6 months later Laws wrote to one of the Livingstonia Committee, after the Blantyre execution, again asking for guidance.

"I wrote to Dr. Stewart some months ago asking him to bring the matter before the Committee as to whether in such a case we were to take the power of Life and Death into our hands on such a culprit being captured, or if not what we were to do. I have not yet heard. The Committee should share responsibility."⁴

At least one member of the Livingstonia Committee had toyed with the idea of a missionary layman being recognised "by the natives in their magistrate"⁵ but this had not been officially recommended let alone implemented. Now that the

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¹ Stewart, Diary, 30 June 1879; 2 July 1879.
² Laws to Stewart, 22 September 1879, ST 13/3/1.
³ Laws to Stewart, 20 July 1878.
⁴ Laws to Main, Livingstonia Papers, 3 January 1879, NLS.
⁵ Smith to Stewart, 25 June 1878.
remote possibility of capital punishment had become a
dreadful reality, and even before the publication of
Chirnside's pamphlet, the Livingstonia Committee hurried to
find out exactly what instructions had been given to their
missionaries and what the basic policy was towards offenders,
be they thieves or murderers. Both Stewart and Laws were
asked to send in reports on "any regulation oral or written
for the administration of justice and order among the
natives who claim our protection." ¹ It was with some self-
righteousness that Smith wrote to Dr. Macrae of the
Established Church Committee,

"The sub-Committee think that I should inform you
generally that Dr. Stewart would prohibit flogging
and all more severe punishments of native offenders,
confining the actions of the missionaries to the
deportation of murderers, handing them over...to the
chief or if the chief declined, turn them adrift in
some distant part of the country." ²

Stewart reiterated this opinion to Dr. Macrae, partly
to enable the Established Church committee to draw up
instructions for its missionaries, partly in self-defence
as his name had appeared in connection with the Blantyre
affair in a letter to the Glasgow Herald. It was perhaps
these allegations which led Stewart to adopt a position of
total innocence.

"I have never approved of flogging and in 15 years
among the natives of South Africa have not only
never had recourse to it, but have invariably
prevented it, even though urged by others to permit
it to be done....My view would be that no mission
should take the power of life and death into its
hands but rather hand over the culprit to their own
chiefs if they have them; or deport them out of the
country if they have none." ³

¹. Smith to Laws, 13 November 1879, NLS 7771.
². Smith to Macrae, 26 November 1879, NLS 7771.
³. Stewart to Macrae, 5 January 1880, ST 13/3/1.
After the publication of Chirnsides pamphlet and the consequent publicity which the Blantyre affair received, Stewart printed a statement in the Christian Express\(^1\) in which he outlined the events and also sought to exonerate himself from any connection with the affair. This article produced some forthright comments from the outspoken Horace Waller who, while agreeing that Stewart’s name should never have been mentioned in association with "these unmerciful thrashings", nevertheless suggested that Stewart was protesting too much against all forms of corporal punishment in the attempt to establish his own innocence. Waller claimed that he used a switch "albeit a very tiny one" on his own children and that he had been beaten more than once at school and "probably deserved it more". Now the accepted virtue of this discipline was to be denied.

"Just because a parcel of fever-flavoured boys playing at missionaries and men-of-wars now lose their heads and do disgracefully cruel things with shamboks and I know not what else, the good old rule of "spare the rod and spoil the child" is to be looked upon as if it had been discovered for the first time amongst the archives of the Spanish Inquisition. Why should you make so much of never having given a boy, or for the matter of that a man, a discreet whipping?....Depend upon it Stewart, you are all over-doing it and to your cost some day."

What concerned Waller, of course, as it concerned Chirnside, was that alternative punishments "set up to suit subscribers at home", were often even less desirable for the transgressor. Banishment from the mission station, said Waller, meant that the crime of "passing that man into a slave-stick" would be laid at the door of the mission station. He

\(^1\text{Christian Express, May 1861.}\)
quoted Livingstone in support of this contention that thrashing was the lesser of two evils, claiming that some of the Makololo and an "Arab scoundrel at Mocambique" had been given a thrashing that would have made "all Exeter Hall weep". In reply to this, Stewart rather stiffly agreed that Waller was right in theory, and that he had Solomon on his side, but that in practice the use of the rod for Africans could not be entrusted to the average person and that it was precisely the "fever-flavoured boys" who managed to bring the whole cause into discredit.

Meanwhile the Established Church Assembly debated the issue and Chirnside's pamphlet excited attention in Scotland and in the Cape Colony. To the disgust of the Free Church missionaries and committee members, the official reports made frequent mention of the Free Church and implied that they had been guilty of the same sort of behaviour. "They are trying to make us as bad as themselves and to blame us as the introducers of the flogging system and other atrocities". This they felt was poor return for all the services rendered by the Livingstonia Missionaries to the missionaries at Blantyre when the latter had been so desperate as to call for help from Stewart and Laws. For much of this they were inclined to blame Riddell and Johnston who had been "too much made the tool of the Established Church".

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1. Waller to Stewart, 16 June 1881, PC.
2. Stewart to Waller, 25 July 1881, SP LB4b.
3. Stewart to John Stephen, 6 April 1881, SP LB4b.
4. Smith to Stewart, 2 June 1880, NLS 7771.
It was also held that Dr. Macrae had deliberately proposed a policy of Civil Government and a Minute of the F.M.C. stated categorically that they "did not consider Livingstonia a Colony but a mission with internal regulations based on the British law which you all carry with you."\(^1\)

Finally, whereas Stewart was perhaps not as aloof from accepted practise in the matter of punishment as he claimed to be, it can be safely asserted that he neither condoned nor was party to the events at Blantyre, nor to similar excesses at Livingstonia. The reason for associating him with the affair at all would seem to stem from the understandable confusion caused by the presence, first at Livingstonia then at Blantyre, of James Stewart C.E., a cousin of Dr. Stewart of Lovedale. The latter maintained a loyal family silence over the involvement of the former in these events but to John Stephen he remarked that "my cousin made a great mistake in ever lowering himself to that process (of flogging)\(^2\) and when the possibility of his cousin's becoming a Consul was raised Stewart supported the suggestion but said that "he must be cautioned privately to deal gently with the natives and never to raise his hand to them personally."\(^3\) Stewart C.E. himself denied that he had had any direct hand in the flogging or that he and Laws had condoned the execution but he had certainly had knowledge of some of George Fenwick's less-savoury practices,\(^4\) but if Dr. Stewart is to be believed that it

1. Smith to Laws, 3 June 1880, NLS 7771.
2. Stewart to John Stephen, 6 April 1881, SP LB4b.
4. Stewart C.E. to Smith, Livingstonia Papers, 10 January 1881; 7 March 1881, NLS.
would seem that his cousin was more involved than he thought it politic to admit. Having given evidence in Scotland, Stewart C.E. returned to Blantyre but died suddenly at the end of 1883. James Stewart commented - "For many reasons I have felt his death more than one usually feels about those related as cousins." ¹

(It is interesting to note that from the outset Stewart was full of praise for Henderson, both for the selection of the most excellent site and for seeking to remedy the situation at Blantyre "with the most entire disregard to his own status". ² Stewart wrote to Henderson in 1879 to express his pleasure that Henderson was returning to Blantyre and suggesting that he should implement a new policy towards Africans. ³ Henderson replied, however, that he did not feel suitable for the country and, on a depressed note ended - "I saw the flogging and shooting which I had better not seen." ⁴)

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1. Stewart to Smith, 31 December 1883, SP LB4.
2. Stewart to Duff, Livingstonia Papers, 21 December 1876, NLS.
APPENDIX C. Stewart's Journey to East Africa and the establishment of a mission at Kibwezi. An account taken mainly from private correspondence with his wife.

[Brian Mackintosh in his thesis, The Scottish Mission in Kenya 1891-1923, gives a full account of the early years of the Kibwezi Mission, revealing Stewart in a most unflattering light. This short appendix does not contest that criticism but documents Stewart's own painful awareness of his shortcomings and failure at Kibwezi.]

The Imperial East Africa Company had received its Charter in 1888.1 William McKinnon, the Chairman of this company was a "Scottish merchant, ultra-religious and interested in missionaries as well as trade."2 As a consequence of McKinnon's missionary concern, the Company decided to establish a mission in its East African territories. Stewart was asked to lead and organise the expedition, select the site for the mission and "to commence in a small way a Lovedale in East Africa adapted of course to the requirements of the region."3 The suggestion was made in a letter from A.L. Bruce received by Stewart in September 1889 and on which he registered this comment - "A.L. Bruce's letter! What may yet come of that."4 Stewart was then nearly 59 years old and might have been expected to refuse this offer but his initial response was enthusiastic.

1. Imperial British East Africa Company.
2. Ensor, op.cit., p. 189.
3. Bruce to Stewart, 14 July 1890, ST 13/3/2.
4. Stewart Diary, 29 July 1889.
"About the proposal you are good enough to make with the information only from your letter let me say now that such a piece of work would be entirely after my own heart. I have had it twice to do before at Livingstonia and Blythswood but as I am a man under authority I could hardly promise absolutely that I would do it. I would have to consult my superiors and also know how they would look at this interruption to my continuance here. I hope to be home early next year and during my furlough and after hearing the Company proposal more fully I might, if all goes well and nothing unforeseen occurred to prevent me, proceed to Mombassa and see how the land lies and report to the Company. No time is lost by a well-matured plan and a clear conception of what is to be attempted both as to the scale, whether large or small, and other contingencies which might ultimately affect success."  

The Foreign Mission Committee duly agreed to release Stewart for this expedition, though the Free Church had no part in it. It had been decided that the mission should be "industrial, educational, religious and medical", but that the Committee of 4 or 5 should be a lay committee with no official church representation. In his explanatory letter to those in charge at Lovedale Stewart claimed that he had not looked for this work but that "it sought me". Moreover, when £10,000 had been raised and offered for the purpose, it required "consideration and strong reason to refuse". In the more difficult task of explaining the new venture to his wife, Stewart assured her that he was not running away because the task happened to appeal to him. "It wrings my heart to think of leaving you and the little ones." 

This sentiment recurred persistently in Stewart's letters from East Africa and was doubtless a factor in his early departure from the mission - a move which he later regretted.

1. Stewart to Bruce, 4 October 1889, SP LB4b.  
2. Bruce to Stewart, 14 July 1890, ST 13/3/2.  
4. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 2 November 1890, PC.
For the first few months of 1891 Stewart was occupied in Britain collecting supplies and helpers for the expedition. The original aim had been to site the mission at Machakos but Stewart was disturbed by reports, from Kirk amongst others, of trouble in that area and had his doubts about a settlement there even before leaving for Africa.¹

Stewart visited Lovedale in June 1891 before departing in July for Mombassa via Delagoa Bay, Beira, Quillimane, Chilva, Mozambique and Zanzibar. Quillimane stirred memories of his first visit there 27 years previously at the close of his unhappy experience with Livingstone's Zambezi expedition.² At Zanzibar Stewart met the infamous Tippoo Tib and declared that that gentleman was not at all the "repulsive demon which his photographs...had always made me regard him."³

At Zanzibar Stewart's problems began. Porters to make up the caravan to the interior were in short supply due to considerable demand. The Company's administrator at Zanzibar, Mr. Piggott, was not very helpful and Stewart was forced to leave for Mombassa without any porters. He made arrangements for 150 men to follow in the steamer Juba and hoped to have all the loads sorted in time for their arrival. However, if he did not have porters he did have horses, "or rather 2 ponies bought at little over £20 a piece". These were for his personal use, as a precautionary measure. Hopefully they would survive the assault of the

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 8 May 1891, PC.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 21 July 1891, PC.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 9 August 1891, PC.
tsetse fly.¹

At Mombassa Stewart met with the rest of the expedition who had travelled ahead of him. The Company's first choice had been Robert Unwin Moffat, son of John Smith Moffat of Taungs, who had been asked to go as medical missionary by Mackinnon.² Stewart had had a hand in the selection of Thomas Greig and Thomas Watson. The former knew "something of many things from machinery to the growing of coffee, sugar and tea" but was a "grumbler" and an "inveterate talker".³ Watson was aged 32, a carpenter and a theological student with "no false pride in him".⁴ Another member of the party was Abdool Rahman, a "converted Mohammedan" who had been at Glasgow University for two years as the protégé of William Mackinnon. He went to East Africa as assistant teacher and linguist.⁵ There is little information about the other European in the party, Linton, except that in Stewart's opinion he and Watson proved in the early days to be the most useful members. "Greig and Rahman are ornamental rather than useful."⁶

Stewart arrived in Mombasa on August 18. A month later he was still waiting for porters from Zanzibar but had, by other means, acquired 150 men on full pay and rations, under the jurisdiction of 4 askasi. The men were paid 10 rupees a month and a food allowance of 2½d per day. The control

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1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 17 August 1891, PC.
2. Bruce to Stewart, 8 November 1891, ST 13/3/2.
3. Stewart to Bruce, 23 April 1891, ST 13/3/2.
4. Stewart to Bruce, 27 April 1891, ST 13/3/2.
5. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 8 May 1891, PC.
6. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 29 August 1891, PC.
and management of a caravan of men required skill and expertise. Stewart declared that his was to be a "missionary caravan if I can make it so" but even before they left Mombassa the camp had had 6 deserters, 4 of whom had been caught and handcuffed for running away with 3 months pay without having done any work.

"You may believe I have no heart for that kind of baseness but it has to be done otherwise all would run away....I have no taste for putting men in handcuffs."  

Later, on the first leg of their journey, a man died of dysentery and Stewart observed that the common view of such an event was that "it was only a native that was dead", but, he added, the real truth about caravan work was not known and he would have "many queer and sad stories to tell about the work."  

Stewart was worried about the caravan and concerned also about renewed reports of trouble in the Machakos area. The district officer at Machakos, G.C. Leith, had been responsible for burning villages and levying heavy fines, "apparently about cutting a tree and paying four yards of cloth for it." In Stewart's view the country was far more unsettled than he had been led to believe and this naturally affected the prospects of the mission. One consequence of this anxiety was that Stewart hired another European assistant. George Wilson had been an employee of the company but had been dismissed for his part in a disturbance at Dagonetti. Stewart, however, was impressed

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 21 September 1891, PC.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 14 September 1891, PC.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 19 September 1891, PC.
4. Stewart to Bruce, 14 September 1891, ST 13/3/2.
by Wilson's knowledge of caravan work and was convinced that the Company had been too harsh in their judgement. As Wilson had "none of that prejudice that so many have" with missionary work, Stewart decided, with Piggott's consent, to hire him as second in command of the caravan. 1

After weeks of delay the caravan of about 250 finally left Mombassa on 19th September. Eight days later they were at Taro, 55 miles west of Mombassa, and Stewart's problems were increasing. Wilson was doing well and had the camp under control, Watson and Linton pulled their weight but Greig, for whose appointment Stewart admitted responsibility, was "childish from conceit" and Rahman was "not accustomed to work". Moreover Moffat had become moody and sullen and although he worked hard and possessed sound judgement, it transpired that he had religious difficulties which Stewart, although sympathetic, felt made him unfit to be Head of the mission when the time came for Stewart to leave. 2

The Caravan wound its way through the Taro desert, where water became a serious problem and where 9 out of 10 trees were armed with "formidable thorns". Stewart became more and more doubtful about the Company's prospects of building a railway, a doubt which was apparently shared by a majority in the House of Commons who turned down the request for money to survey the proposed railway route. 3

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 14 September 1819, PC.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 27 September 1891; Stewart to Bruce, 27 September 1891, ST 13/3/2.
By mid-October the expedition had arrived at Kibwezi where, to Stewart's relief, the African people gave them an invitation "to stay and build". The local chief, Kilundu, and the Wa-Kamba people in the district offered them a choice of sites with water and timber to hand. Stewart was attracted by the people and by the site and by the fact that it was nearer to the coast than Machakos and would therefore cost less in caravan fees. "Every load of 60 lbs to Machakos costs 36 rupees or £2.16".\(^1\) Moreover he was tempted to settle down as soon as possible so that the mission could be established before tempers became too frayed and relations between black and white worsened.

Before taking the final decision, however, Stewart and Wilson leaving the rest at Kibwezi, made the journey to Machakos to compare conditions. They found Machakos "healthy, cool and pleasant" but with a scarcity of water and timber which would make industrial work difficult and with the recent disturbances in the area still rankling with the people. In Stewart's view Kibwezi was the most accessible and safest in case of disturbance or "of the Company retreating to the coast." The possibility was, however, that there could be stations at both places in the course of time so they made approaches to the people in the Machakos area.

"We meet with the headmen, explain at length that we are not the Company's caravan, have not come for ivory or trading but for other purposes - to teach the Wakamba

\(^1\) Stewart to Mina Stewart, 19 October 1891, PC.
to read and write and make things - and about Mlunγu or God whom they seem to recognise in a vague way. We give a present and invite them to send 3 or 4 men to the Kibwezi to see for themselves, come back and report." 1

Stewart rode on horseback to Machakos and back to Kibwezi - a novelty which attracted crowds of people. Back at Kibwezi, Wilson and Stewart found both Greig and Linton suffering from dysentery. 2 However, work began on the site. Men were sent back to the coast to fetch loads left behind and also to collect more wire, beads and cloth "because here the people are still in that period." Some of the labour force was discharge, the rest were employed cutting wood in readiness for the building programme. Meantime the party lived in tents, each with a grass house attached but there had been a great deal of rain and the health of all had suffered. Greig was dangerously ill and was causing Stewart and Moffat much anxiety. On Friday 18 December 1891, he died. "His death was as his life - not very satisfactory to those about him...His general condition of body and his great want of care had to do mainly with the sad result." 3

By mid-January 1892 Stewart was satisfied that the mission was "fairly started" with every prospect of success. Buildings with verandahs had been erected which the WaKamba examined with great interest. One or two miles of road had been constructed, gardens with potatoes or peas had

1. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 12 November 1891, PC.
2. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 21 November 1891, PC.
3. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 22 December 1891, PC.
been planted. A church had been built and regular services introduced. The people came very readily for medical attention. Oxen, which Stewart hoped would relieve the women of work in the fields, had been introduced and trained by John Bikwa who had come from Lovedale with Stewart. Finally, two small schools had been established so that the characteristic pattern of preaching and teaching had been begun and a new type of settlement had been made in WaKamba country.¹

The one major problem was that of a successor to Stewart who was still determined to leave Kibwezi at the first available opportunity. He had promised his wife that he would merely settle the party in a healthy region and then leave them to explore the surrounding area for a better site if necessary, to acquire the language and to gain the confidence of the people. While he admitted that he would like to explore further, he swore that "Victoria Nyanza nor Kilimanjaro nor Kenia will tempt me."² It had been apparent for some time, however, that Moffat neither wished to head the mission nor was particularly suited to the task. Stewart hoped that Wilson would provide the energy and that Watson would continue to give good service and that Moffat as head would act as "a sort of weight.... I hope not altogether dead weight."³ Late in 1891 Moffat had written to Bruce indicating that he was thinking of resigning and re-entering the service of the I.B.E.A.C. but Bruce had pointed out that he would merely be returning to a style of life which had made him unhappy before and

¹. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 22 December 1891; 1 January 1892; 16 January 1892; 29 January 1892, PC.
². Stewart to Mina Stewart, 9 August 1891; 20 October 1891, PC.
³. Stewart to Mina Stewart, 16 January 1892, PC.
from which he had wished to escape."\(^1\) The result was that when Stewart left in March 1892, Moffat had agreed to stay on in charge of the mission. Stewart wrote him a critical letter stating bluntly that he would have to improve his ways if he was to make a success of the job and a letter from Wilson later indicated that these pointed remarks had had some effect as Moffat had "grasped the reins" and acquired quite a burst of energy."\(^2\)

It is difficult to say exactly why Stewart was so adversely affected by his experience on this expedition and yet he later referred to it as "the poison of my life".\(^3\) He arrived in Scotland in mid 1892 after visiting Cairo and Alexandria and it was after seeing Sir William McKinnon on his yacht at Lochranza that the doubts began to be expressed.

"There was no fiasco complete or partial, large or small, and yet I am quite unhappy. How is all this to be explained." \(^4\)

For the remainder of this year his diary refers over and over again to his dissatisfaction and to his lack of attention to duty. He was sure now that he should have stayed longer and that his fears about a settlement near Machakos were not justified. The implication throughout is that if he had not put his personal life before his duty he would have stayed longer in East Africa, possibly moved the mission to Machakos when conditions there had improved and have made it unnecessary for Moffat to assume the

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1. Bruce to Moffat, 26 January 1892, ST 13/3/2.
2. Stewart to Moffat, 4 March 1892; Wilson to Stewart, 21 March 1892, ST 13/3/2.
4. Stewart Diary, 3 July, 1892.
leadership. At the very least he should have returned to East Africa after his visit to Scotland. "That wretched creature Moffat" loomed large in this self-castigation though Stewart would not appear to have treated him harshly but had merely been intolerant of his doubts and lack of enthusiasm.

The passing of time did not diminish his regrets. Moffat had left as predicted at the end of 1892, Rahman had been dismissed for cheating with the stores and by 1897 it was being suggested that the site of the mission should be moved to Machakos or Kikuyu as the country was safe and the new railway would link the interior with the coast. Stewart maintained that he was not upset by this. After all both Lovedale and Livingstonia had been moved from their first sites. Still, his choice of Kibwezi had been misguided and he had been too influenced by reports of trouble and by his own unwillingness to wait and see if matters would improve. "It is quite clear" he wrote in 1897 "that I got confused as to what my duty was".

"Like many another man since the world began I failed where I thought myself strongest. May you never have from any piece of work you undertake anything approaching to the self-dissatisfaction and self-recrimination which I have experienced in looking back on the work of that mission." 1

When Stewart gave his Duff lectures in 1902, lectures which gave a comprehensive survey of foreign missions in Africa, no reference was made to Kibwezi or to the new site of the mission.

APPENDIX D. Biographical notes on individuals with whom Stewart corresponded.


John BUCHANAN  Born 1921. Missionary in Natal. Acting Principal of Lovedale while Stewart was absent at Livingstonia. 1876-77. Retired 1880.


(Sir) Langham DALE  1826-1898. Second Superintendent - General of Education in the Cape.

John Davidson DON  1833/34 - 1903. Missionary in India before becoming Free Church minister in King Williams Town, 1877. Clerk of the Presbytery of Kaffraria for many years.

(Sir) Bartle FRERE 1815-1884. Cape Governor and High Commissioner for South Africa 1877-1880. His distinguished career as an "Imperial servant" was ruined by the Zulu War.


Alexander GEDDES Boarding Master at Lovedale 1878-1907. He and his wife, Annie, who was Boarding Mistress, were influential figures at Lovedale during this period.


William GOVAN 1804-1875. First Principal of Lovedale Institution from 1841 to 1870. Succeeded by James Stewart.


James HENDERSON 1867-1930. Third Principal of Lovedale in succession to James Stewart 1906-1930.


John Tengo JABAVU 1859-1921. Influential African editor of Imvo Zabantsundu and a leading political figure in the Cape.

Henry KAYSER L.M.S. missionary at Knapp's hope and one of several Kaysers who attended Lovedale.

(Sir) John KIRK Born 1832. Member of Livingstone's Zambezi Expedition 1858-1863. Met Stewart in that connection. Became Consul-General in Zanzibar.

William KOYI 1846-1888. Came to Lovedale in 1871 after working as a waggon-driver and a wool-washer. Offered to go to Livingstonia in 1876 and remained there as a hard-working and influential evangelist.


Thomas Martin LINDSAY Born 1842. Professor of Church History, Glasgow. Convener of F.M.C. from 1886-1900.

James MACDONALD 1847-1918. First Principal of Blythswood. Author of Religion and Myth and Light in Africa.

(Sir) William MCKINNON 1823-1893. Established a successful trading company in India. Formed the I.B.E.A.C. in 1888. Suggested the Mission there and influenced its development.


Elijah MAKIWANE Born 1850. One of the first African ministers of the Free Church. Minister at Macfarlan Church. First President of the Native Educational Association.


Shadrach MGUNANA 1853-1877. Came to Lovedale from Mgwali in 1869. Volunteered for Livingstonia in 1876 but died of fever after one year.

(Sir) Alfred MILNER 1854-1925. Governor and High Commissioner 1897-1901. Personal friend of Stewart's.

William John Bonar MOIR 1846-1904. Teacher at Lovedale 1873-1897. Minister of the Alice Presbyterian Church, acting editor of The Christian Express and acting-Principal of Lovedale during Stewart's absences. Principal of Blythswood 1897-1904.

Mpambani Jeremiah MZIMBA 1850-1911. With Elijah Makiwane one of the first African ministers of the Free Church. Minister of Lovedale Native Congregation until 1898 when he broke away from the Free Church and established the independent African Presbyterian Church.


Alfred Mapas NTINTILI Born 1848. Volunteered for Livingstonia in 1876 and worked there until 1880.

Thomas Durant PHILIP 1819-1900. Son of John Philip, missionary. T.D.P. was missionary at Hankey, L.M.S. station. Appointed to Lovedale staff in 1884. Retired 1895.


Kagaso SAZUZE Born at Kongone at the mouth of the Zambezi. Taught at Blantyre by Mapas Ntintili and came to Lovedale in 1878. Returned with Joseph Bismarck in 1883.

Jacobus Wilhelmus SAUER 1850-1913. MLA for Aliwal North and George. Held various cabinet posts. Friend and Political ally of Merriman and Innes.


Andrew SMITH Teacher in College Department, Lovedale from 1867-1887. Bequeathed £5,000 for bursaries. Died 1898.

George SMITH Spent more than 20 years in India before becoming Secretary of the Foreign Mission Committee in 1879. Died 1910.

Saul SOLOMON 1817-1892. Foremost protector of African rights and interests in the Cape Parliament to 1883 when he retired because of failing health and went to England. His son, Saul, went to Lovedale. Later became a Judge of the Supreme Court.

John Gordon SPRIGG 1830-1913. Successful farmer. MLA for East London from 1869. Four times Prime Minister of the Cape.


George McCall THEAL 1837-1919. Teacher and Printer at Lovedale 1871-77. Noted South African historian. His son was sent to Lovedale.


James Vanderkemp VAN ROOYEN. He and his brother, Timothy, were both graduates of Lovedale and amongst the first Africans to be ordained to African congregations. Their sister married William Koyi.

Jane WATERSTON  1843–1932. Came to Lovedale with the Stewarts in 1867 in charge of the Female Seminary. Later qualified as a doctor. Went to Livingstonia and then again to Lovedale. From 1883 in private practice in Cape Town. Ardent imperialist.
1. **Primary Sources**
   A. Manuscript, non-published or unprinted materials.
   B. Published materials of primary importance.
      1. Newspapers
      2. Periodicals
      3. Pamphlets
      4. Books

2. **Secondary Sources**
   A. Articles
   B. Books
   C. Theses.
1. Primary Sources

A. Manuscript Material

1. Stewart Papers in the Library of the University of Cape Town. Correspondence, diaries and pamphlets which refer primarily to Stewart's activities in the Cape. These have been classified and sorted into bundles.

2. Stewart Papers in the Rhodesian Archives, Salisbury. These were bequeathed by the family to the Archives because they dealt mainly with Stewart's journeys to Central and East Africa. In fact, on examination, a surprising amount of Lovedale material was found in these papers.

3. Stewart Papers in the possession of Mrs. Mina Lennox Gordon, grand-daughter of Stewart. These included letters from Stewart's step-mother and from his wife which the family preferred to keep.

4. Church of Scotland collection housed in the Cory Library for Historical Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, C.P. These papers were transferred from Lovedale in 1961 on the understanding that they would be made accessible to bona fide research students of any race group. They include missionary correspondence, articles and papers in both English and Xhosa, pictorial material and Presbytery Minutes.

5. David Stormont papers also housed in the Cory Library. These papers were invaluable for the information they provided about the effect of the Ethiopian Movement on Lovedale Institution. Besides the memoranda analysing the causes of secession and the detailed account of his attempts, as interim Moderator, to resolve the conflict in the Lovedale Native Church, Stormont preserved published statements by Mzimba and Makiwane.

6. The Free Church of Scotland a. The letter books of the Convener and Secretary of the Free Church and the collected letters of Free Church missionaries for this period are to be found in the National Library of Scotland.

           b. The Minute books of the Foreign Mission Committee are still retained by the Church of Scotland at 121 George Street, Edinburgh.

7. The Kirk Session Minutes and Deacons Court Minutes of the Somerville, Burnshill and Rainy congregations were all found in the possession of the present incumbents of these charges. They were borrowed and returned. Somerville records also contained some minutes of the Presbytery of the Transkei. In view of their historical interest these records should be transferred to a Library for safe-keeping.
B. Published Material

1. Newspapers
   - The Alice Times
   - The Cape Mercury
   - Imvo ZabaneTsundu
   - The Scotsman

2. Periodicals
   - The Kaffir Express 1870-1876.
   - The Christian Express 1876-1922.
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   - The Free Church of Scotland Home and Foreign Mission Record

3. Pamphlets and Reports

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