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‘It is Difficult to Understand Rwandan History’:
Contested History of Ethnicity and Dynamics of Conflicts
in Rwanda during Revolution and Independence

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2013
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Signed:............................................................

Date:..............................................................
Abstract

This thesis explores the question of what factors shaped Rwandan ethnicity in the late 1950s and early 1960s; in particular, how and why was ethnicity transformed into ‘political tribalism’ in decolonising Rwanda?

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the subsequent post-genocide peace-building have drawn our attention to the problems of ethnicity and nationalism. While ethnicity and nationalism in Africa have been a matter of debate amongst the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist schools, it has become more or less accepted knowledge that ethnicity in Africa was constructed by dynamic interactions between Europeans and Africans in particular colonial contexts. This constructivist approach may have advanced our understanding of ethnicity in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda, but our perception of Rwandan ethnicity in the 1950s and 1960s has not benefited from this academic trend. Instead, the literature on this issue, most of which was written several decades ago, tends to take a primordialist approach towards the Rwandan Revolution and the ethnic conflict that emerged at the end of colonial period.

By theoretically adhering to a constructivist approach, and relying on John Lonsdale’s ‘political tribalism’ model in particular, the thesis argues that to take a nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach is essential, because primordial ethnic conflict was not the cause of the Revolution and other historical events, but the other way round. Ethnicity in Rwanda was not simply invented by the Europeans during the colonial period, nor was it so primordial that the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu was inevitable; in fact, several conflicts (and not always along ethnic boundaries) existed, and even some alternatives were suggested for ethnic cooperation. Ethnicity went through a dynamic transformation into ‘political tribalism’ through interactions between Rwandans and non-Rwandans, as well as through relationships amongst different groups of Rwandans. Various domestic factors – including intra-Tutsi leadership rivalry, the alliance among the political parties and the inter-ethnic power struggle – affected the process of the Revolution, and politicised ethnicity. External factors, such as factions within the Belgian administrations as well as the heated debates in the Cold War-era United Nations, also provided opportunities for Rwandan ethnicity to become politicised. Contingency, the mass movement of people, violence and the processes of revolution and decolonisation had a synergistic impact on the spread of ‘political tribalism’ over Rwanda. Primordial perceptions on ethnicity, as well as interpretations of the past, and visions for the future held by each actor, were factors that shaped ethnicity and forced the ethnic split into the foreground. In this sense, Rwandan ethnicity cannot simply be understood through the dichotomised debate of primordialists and constructivists. Rather, it was a more dynamic process of ethnic transformation with unaccomplished alternatives and inter/intra-group relationships, strongly bound by the historical and political contexts of the time. ‘Political tribalism’ and interpretations of the past have influenced and, even today, continue to influence post-colonial Rwandan politics.
Acknowledgements

I have been tremendously fortuned to have the following people who supported me in various ways to complete this PhD.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the scholarship from the Japan Student Service Organization (JASSO). Without this scholarship, I could not have carried out my PhD research in Edinburgh. Also, my thanks goes to Royal Historical Society’s funding for travel to conduct research outside the United Kingdom; for the research grant from the Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation to carry out research trips to Belgium and the United States, and for the PhD scholarship of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) to conduct fieldwork in Rwanda.

Next I would like to thank my supervisors. Dr Jude Murison has been really passionate and supportive to my research since I contacted her for the first time before applying for the PhD. Professor Paul Nugent always encouraged me to put Rwanda in a larger African context and recommended a wide range of literature drawn from his broad knowledge of the continent. I have been very fortunate to have them as my supervisors. Thank you very much for sparing me the time to patiently read my drafts many times. Also, Dr Francesca Locatelli and other Centre of African Studies staff have given me helpful advice at various stages during the course of researching and writing this PhD. Professor Crispin Bates and Dr. Aya Ikegame gave me valuable advice during the writing-up phase. Back in Japan, Professor Takahiko Tanaka in Waseda University has communicated to me the fascination and significance of studying international history. Without his supervision during my Masters degree, I might not have even thought of doing a PhD. Also, Drs Yongseok Kwon and Toshihiko Aono in Hitotsubashi University have given me the encouragement and support to do my PhD outside Japan. Thank you all very much.

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To survive PhD life, friendship is really important. I would like to thank all the friends I have made in the past several years; especially, allowing me to dispense the titles, thank you very much Elisabetta Spano, Shaun Ruysenaar, Maggie Dwyer, Namhla Matshanda, Caroline Valois, Grasian Mkondzongi, Chaeyeon Han, Tzu-Yuan Lin, Yuriko Matsumoto, Eri Yamazaki, Beginda Pakpahan, Hyunchul Kim and Yoko Narisada for their encouragement, interesting insights, comments and wonderful company. Also, Laura Mann was generous with her time in reading several drafts. Most of all, I deeply appreciate Chatthip Mick Chaichakan and Yu-Hsiang (Sean) Chen for being great flatmates and friends since our first year. Thank you. I would also like to extend my gratitude towards friends in Japan. In particular, I would like to thank Takehisa Masuko for both moral support and discussion on contemporary Rwanda; Takeshi Tamamura for his knowledge of the Belgian archives and the Congo; Masaki and Kyoko Sawa for their sincere friendship, and Hirofumi Takase for having broadened my horizons and inspired me a lot. Last but not least, I thank Il Ko from the bottom of my heart for constantly reminding me of both challenges and joys of understanding others.

My final thanks go to my parents Teruaki and Kyoko Tsuruta. What they have been providing me since I was born definitely has shaped my research interests. They also have morally and financially supported me in bringing this PhD to completion. Thank you very much. My future career may yet be uncertain, but at least, they can now be relieved that I am coming to the end of my extended life as a student.
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Abbreviations

AI: Affaires Indigènes
AMAE: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
A.G.M.Afr: Archives of the Society of Missionaries of Africa
APROSOMA: Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse
CAB: Archives de Cabinets Ministériels
CAURWA: Community of Indigenous Peoples of Rwanda
CDF: Central Decimal Files
CDP: Christian Democratic Party
CFPF: Central Foreign Policy Files
CSP: Conseil Supérieurs du Pays (~1960)
CSP: Conseil Spécial Provisoire (1960)
CUT: Comité de l’Unité Togolaise
DDRS: Declassified Documents Reference System
IRU: Archives relatives à l’émancipation du Ruanda-Urundi
MINAG: Papiers de Ganshof van des Mersch, Ministre charge des Affaires Générales en Afrique (mai-juin 1960)
MINALOC: Ministry of Local Government
MNC: Mouvement National Congolais
MOMOR: Mouvement Monarchistes Ruandaise
MRAC: Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale
MRND : Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
MSM: Mouvement Social Muhutu
MUR: Mouvement pour l’Union Ruandaise
NACP: National Archives at College Park
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUC: Opération des Nations Unis au Congo
PARMEHUTU: Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation des Bahutu
PRC: People’s Republic of China
RADER: Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandaise
RANU: Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RG: Record Group
ROC: Republic of China
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRWF: Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation
RWA: Archives du Ruanda, 1917-62
UMAR: Union des Masses Ruandaise
UN: United Nations
UNA: United Nations Archives
UNAR: Union Nationale Rwandaise
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UPC: Uganda People’s Congress
UPC: Union des Populations du Cameroun
UPRONA: Union pour le Progrès National
TANU: Tanganyika African National Union
TNA: The National Archives of the United Kingdom
Preface

As one of the prominent Africanist historians put it, historians cannot but project their insights, values, hopes and fears no matter where and when they interpret the past to narrate histories.\(^1\) Therefore, before starting the Chapter 1 as Introduction of the thesis, it may well be best to explain why I have become interested in and engaged in research on history, and Rwandan history in particular.

Once, a friend of mine asked me why it is important to study history if people disagree and fight over it. Being Thai and having studied in Japan for a while with his Chinese girlfriend, he asked me provocatively why don’t we just forget about history, look forward and enjoy our present life without arguing and criticising each other.\(^2\) In East Asia, this is still very much the case over Japanese colonisation of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula and wars against China and other Asian countries; even today, Japan has had problems with neighbouring countries over the border lines, the apologies for the past wrongdoings and history textbook revisions. At the time, I could not answer him persuasively since studying history is completely natural for me as a child interested in it and most of my friends in postgraduate schools also studied history. So, this question haunted me for some time to think how to convince other people the significance of learning history.

Historians have grappled with this question for a long time. Marc Bloch, one of the most important historians in the twentieth century who established the Annales School, was asked by his son: ‘Tell me, Daddy. What is the use of history?’ His History’s Craft was written, yet incomplete, as a sincere answer from a historian father to his son. He explained the legitimacy of history as follows:

When all is said and done, a single word, ‘understanding’ is the beacon light of our studies. Let us not say that the true historian is a stranger to emotion: he has that, at all events. ‘Understanding’ in all honesty, is a word pregnant with difficulties, but also with hope. Moreover, it is a friendly word. Even in action, we are far too prone to judge. It is so easy to denounce. We are never sufficiently understanding. Whoever differs from us- a foreigner or a political adversary- is almost inevitably considered evil. A little more understanding of people would be necessary merely for guidance, in the conflicts which are unavoidable; all the more to prevent them

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\(^2\) I thank Kunlawat Note Chittarat for this question.
while there is yet time. If history would only renounce its false archangelic airs, it would help us to cure this weakness. It includes a vast experience of human diversities, a continuous contact with men. Life, like science, has everything to gain from it, if only these contacts be friendly. ³

Even though he had been spending a difficult time as a Jewish Frenchman, joining the Resistance and eventually being shot during the German occupation of France, Bloch believed that learning history would enhance our better understanding of others towards a better world.

Understanding Rwandan history can provide us insights in considering several universal issues such as ethnicity and interpretation of the past. My encounter with Rwanda was by chance- I had to write a paper on an ethnic conflict in Africa during undergraduate and just chose Rwanda because the genocide in 1994 was famous; however, I have found similar universal problems of ethnicity, racism and colonialism between Rwanda and Japan/Asia. During the fieldwork, indeed, I recognised many similarities between Rwanda and Japan, particularly on the nature of people and society, and the parallels between post-genocide Rwanda and post-war Japan. Despite the uniqueness of Rwanda with the scale of 1994 genocide being one of the largest in the previous century, why Rwanda had to have such a massive number of victims and how we both Rwandans and non-Rwandans should, or could, understand the violent past and try to overcome it remain unanswered yet significant. As this thesis is about to explore shortly, I believe that the attempt to understand a Rwandan past has broader implications for the problems of ethnicity and dealing with the past.

### Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-15th century</td>
<td>The Nyiginya kingdom was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-1895</td>
<td>The reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri. The Nyiginya kingdom expanded its territory. The Gisaka kingdom was conquered by the Nyiginya kingdom (Around 1867). The north, northwest and west were also conquered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Gustav Adolf von Götzen arrived in Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-6</td>
<td>Kigeri Rwabugiri died. After the succession coup, Yuhi Musinga became the <em>Mwami</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td><em>Ruanda-Urundi</em> entered German East Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Belgians occupied Rwanda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>By Milner-Orts Agreement, Belgium obtained Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Rwanda officially became the League of Nations mandate under Belgium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td><em>Mwami</em> Musinga was dismissed by the Belgians. Mutara Rudahigwa was enthroned as new <em>Mwami</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Rwanda became the United Nation Trusteeship territory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Partial democratisation: CSP and other councils were set up.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>February CSP published ‘Mise au Point’.</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February | CSP was established.
---|---
April | RADER, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU formed the *Front Commune*.
May | The pre-election conference in Brussels.
June | The communal elections across Rwanda (through July).
July | The Belgian Congo achieved independence, falling apart to chaos. Kigeri left Rwanda, going into exile.
October | The Provisional Government and Council of Rwanda were founded. UNAR, RADER and APROSOMA formed another *Front Commune*.

1961 January | The Ostend Conference took place. National election was supposed to be held, but actually cancelled. *Coup d’état* in Gitarama established the Republic.
September | The postponed national election was held with the referendum on monarchy.
December | Belgians granted Rwanda internal autonomy.

1962 April | A conference was held in Addis Ababa to discuss the relationship between Rwanda and Burundi.
May | UNAR politicians joined the Kayibanda government.
July | Rwanda became independent.
August | The municipal elections were held.
Winter of 1963-64 | The largest *Inyenzi* attack and mass retaliation took place.

1965 October | National election was held. Rwanda became one-party state.

1973 October | The coup by the Juvenal Habyarimana and the Second Republic started.

1990 October | RPF invaded Rwanda and civil war started.
1994 April | The genocide began.
July | The genocide finished.
Figure 1: The Map of Rwanda

(http://intoreexpeditions.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/rwanda-map2.jpg)
Chapter 1

Introduction

Our analytical difficulty or, better, opportunity, lies in the fact that all three approaches [of primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism] are more convincing when used in combination rather than as alternatives. Ethnic groups acquire internal cohesion and a sense of distinctiveness from — but not inevitably opposed to — ‘others’, not so much in response to individual actors’ wills as by a quantum of countless acts of ideological negotiation, innovation, and rejection in which the symbolic and moral markers of a discursive tradition change, generally slowly, over time. Such socially constructed cohesion is available — on conditions — for instrumental use by social, political, or economic entrepreneurs. And the most persuasive image of solidarity that an entrepreneur can invoke is that ‘we’ are all brothers and sisters (and always have been), despite our social inequalities and personal rivalries. This readiness to be grouped into rival teams of common ‘blood’ appears to be a truly primordial human condition, against the complex grain of history — one recalls Renan’s advice that nations forget their history or get it wrong — and often against the apparent self-interest of team members, especially when invited to become cannon fodder.¹

On 8 November 2006, at the United Nations University in Tokyo, I attended a lecture entitled ‘Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Rwanda’, given by the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. During the lecture, President Kagame spoke quietly, but confidently, about the recovery of his country from the genocide in 1994. However, during the subsequent question time which was opened to the floor, one audience participant voiced criticism about the record of human rights violations committed by Kagame’s government. Angrily raising his voice, President Kagame gave us the following answer, which I still remember after many years:

I know it is not the best way. But there are no better ways to deal with problems in Rwanda. If you criticise me, you should provide alternatives. If you cannot do that, you should not criticise our efforts of trying to recover from the genocide.²

² Paul Kagame, ‘Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Rwanda’, lecture delivered at the United Nations University, 8 November 2006
This thesis is my attempt to seek an alternative way to understand Rwandan ethnicity and history, by examining the ways in which ethnicity became politicised at the end of 1950s and early 1960s, when Rwanda experienced significant political changes.

Historicising the Rwandan Genocide

My thesis begins by placing the genocide in Rwanda into a historical context. From April to July 1994, within a mere hundred days, between 500,000 and 1 million people had reportedly been murdered across the country. The main targets of the onslaught were the Tutsi.\(^3\) It would be fairer, however, to acknowledge that among those who were killed on the very first day of the genocide were Hutu politicians, including then Prime Minister Agathe Umilingiyimana; many Hutu civilians who were mistaken as Tutsi were also killed. While the tremendous destruction of human life during the 1994 genocide should not be trivialised, it should also be noted that many Hutus were killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) after the outbreak of the civil war in October 1990.\(^4\)

Figures for the number who died differ widely, and it could be argued that the figures people cite are connected with their political views on what happened in 1994. For instance, the current Rwandan government states that over 1 million lost their lives. Scholars have calculated more empirically: Alison Des Forges estimated 507,000 Tutsi victims (77 per cent of the Tutsi population at the time) and Gérard Prunier estimated between 800,000 and 850,000 (around 800,000 Tutsi and from 10–

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\(^2\) The Rwandan population consists of three different groups: Tutsi (12–14 per cent), Hutu (about 85 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent). I will not focus on the Twa even though they are said to be discriminated by both the Tutsi and the Hutu. For the Twa, see Jerome Lewis and Judy Knight, *The Twa of Rwanda: An Assessment of the Situation of the Twa and Promotion of Twa Rights in Post-War Rwanda* (Chadlington, UK: World Rainforest Movement and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1995). I deplore the atrocities committed during the genocide, but cannot detail them here. Thus see, for instance, African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1995); Jonathan Torgovnik, *Intended Consequences: Rwandan Children Born of Rape* (New York: Aperture, 2009), and Alexandre Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010).

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30,000 Hutu). When not only the genocide in 1994 but also violence committed by the RPF during and after the civil war, and thus taking a more critical stance towards the RPF government are included, Filip Reyntjens estimated that around 1.1 million people (600,000 Tutsis and 500,000 Hutus) died during and after the civil war and the genocide.\(^5\)

The genocide prompted countless journalists and academics to engage with the ‘Country of a Thousand Hills’, which had not previously received much attention. In direct contrast to the limited number of publications on Rwanda prior to 1994,\(^6\) a large amount of literature has been published since the genocide. By 2000, Danielle de Lame recognised that nearly 250 works were published between 1994 and 1999, which was double the number of publications in the previous ten years combined.\(^7\) Recently, François Lagarde published a massive bibliography on Rwanda, which lists publications between 1990 and 2011; more than 5,500 out of 7,116 have been categorised as subjects to be researched under the topic ‘Humanities and Law’.\(^8\)

The most extensive focus of the vast amount of literature in the post-genocidal period has been to explore the genocide: the process and actual damage,\(^9\) regional variations,\(^10\) the failure of international influences to take preventive measures, or in


the long run, stop the genocide, and the mentality of the perpetrators to show why they participated in the killings. As for the origins of the genocide, scholars have read and interpreted Rwandan history in an attempt to show how the more flexible and less socially significant pre-colonial ethnic category was stratified under Belgian rule since the 1920s, which fed into escalated violence during 1959 and 1964. The first inter-ethnic violence occurred in 1959, followed by the overthrow of the Tutsi king by a Hutu revolution in 1961, independence in 1962 and then a mass killing of the Tutsi citizens by the Hutu in the winter of 1963–64. According to those scholars, the post-colonial Hutu regime under the First Rwandan Republic adopted discriminatory policies towards the Tutsi. The Second Republic, under President Juvénal Habyarimana, relaxed discrimination in the 1970s; however, ethnic tension intensified from the critical years of the late 1980s when the economy declined and international pressure for democratisation increased. With the civil war that began with the invasion of the RPF from Uganda in October 1990, ethnic propaganda against the Tutsi intensified. Following the president’s fatal plane crash in April 1994, the genocide began.


13 There are two Republics in post-colonial Rwanda, each of which was represented by a Hutu president.


Recently, scholarly attention has gradually been shifting to post-genocide issues including justice, reconciliation and state-building. However, one of the scholarly gaps in post-genocide era lies in the lack of historical studies. Predominantly, the focus of post-genocide literature has been to describe the genocide and to explore its origin. Not many publications have been based on their original historical enquiry even though several books include ‘history’ in their titles or acknowledge the importance of examining the history. Its aim being to reveal the causes of the genocide, post-genocide literature tends to recycle pre-1994 works without adding new knowledge to the previous debates on ethnicity. As criticised by Villa Jefremovas as ‘reductionist tendency’, the post-genocide literature treats the history of ethnicity as a mere ‘background’ to the genocide rather than paying attention to its own dynamics. This tendency results in a linear and monolithic view of ethnic conflict. Those works were important in earlier post-genocide period; however, little research on history has been conducted with new data.

There are a few precious exceptions. Jan Vansina’s Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, published in 2004, examines the state-formation and social changes in pre-colonial Rwanda; it, however, is a re-publication of an original text published in 1962. The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History by Jean-Pierre Chrétien has made an important contribution by providing a broad history of the region over a long period, but this is more a synthesis of

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previous works rather than a new historical enquiry based on primary sources.\textsuperscript{21} With the exception of David Newbury’s quest for pre-colonial clan and ethnicity and colonial interaction and some on-going PhD research projects,\textsuperscript{22} there are still few works on Rwandan history since Timothy Longman pointed out this shortcoming in 2004.\textsuperscript{23}

There are several reasons why there is little research on Rwandan history in general, and on the period of Revolution and independence in particular. As I review later in this chapter, the main aim of the research conducted in the pre-genocide period was to understand the nature of ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda and its change during the colonial era. However, at the time, historical documents were not available and thus mainly anthropologists and political scientists conducted research based on fieldwork in Rwanda. If the genocide in 1994 had not happened, the academic trend of Rwandan studies might have shifted to the Revolutionary period and post-independent era in order to examine how ethnicity transformed during and after the Revolution. The genocide in 1994 attracted more researchers and journalists to Rwanda, whose publication can help us better understand Rwanda during and after genocide; however, it has left the period of the Revolution and independence underresearched and the question of ethnic transformation unanswered.

Recently, research on decolonisation and changes that occurred during the process on the African continent has increased. Since the 1990s, democratisation in many African countries has raised the stakes of citizenship and redefined ‘autochthons’ and nationhood.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, 2010 was the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of many African countries that had achieved independence in ‘the Year of Africa’ in 1960.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Jean-Pierre Chrétien, \textit{The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History} (New York: Zone Books, 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{23} Longman, ‘Placing’.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (eds) \textit{Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa} (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
These contexts urge us to revisit the late colonial years and decolonisation and to understand how post-colonial African countries were shaped and how ethnicity and nationhood were (re)constructed at the time.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, several on-going research projects aims at examining the process of decolonisation and its legacies onto post-colonial Africa.\textsuperscript{27} This current academic trend encourages historical inquiries on decolonising Rwanda.

Therefore, it is not only necessary and important but also timely to go back to history and examine why and how ethnicity became politicised in Rwanda when the country went through Revolution and independence.

Politicised Ethnicity and the Rwandan Revolution

Since this thesis tackles the question of politicised ethnicity in Rwanda, this section reviews several bodies of literature on ethnicity in Africa in general, and Rwanda in particular. The first part of the literature review looks at the debate on ethnicity in Africa, to introduce a constructivist approach to understand when, how and why ethnic groups become crystallised and politicised. The section then moves onto the historiography of Rwandan ethnicity and politics – first during the pre-colonial and colonial period, and then during the period of the 1950s and the 1960s – in order to formulate my research questions.

Ethnicity

The nature and origin of nation and ethnicity has long been a matter of debate. Even though studies on nationalism existed prior to the First World War, it was only after the Second World War, and in the 1960s in particular, that a great number of the key


studies emerged and the debate intensified. Influenced by post-war modernisation theories, modernists believed that the idea of nationhood was historically constructed in the modern period. However, different factors were stressed by various scholars. For instance, the economic factor was emphasised by Michael Hechter using the concept of ‘internal colonialism’.\(^{28}\) Political factors were examined by Jon Breuilly who regarded nationalism as a form of power,\(^ {29}\) by Paul Brass who examined the instrumental and manipulated nature of ethnicity,\(^ {30}\) and by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s famous ‘invention of tradition’.\(^ {31}\) Socio-cultural factors were discussed by Ernest Gellner who theorised the relationship between modernisation and industrialisation,\(^ {32}\) and by Benedict Anderson who showed how political community was/is ‘imagined’ through print media (that is, novels and newspapers).\(^ {33}\) Despite these different emphases, modernist scholars argued that nations were created in the modern period. The modernist approach flourished up to the early 1980s, particular in 1983 when Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm and Ranger published their seminal books.\(^ {34}\)

However, the modernist approach was criticised by primordialists who believed in the antiquity of nationhood. They claimed that the pre-modern long-standing *ethnie* would be the foundation of modern nationalism and nation states and thus criticised modernists for ignoring pre-modern ethnic ties and failing to explain why people held passions and affections for their own nation and ethnicity. The most famous scholar who stresses the role of pre-modern ethnic ties is Anthony Smith, who defines an ethnic group as ‘a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more

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elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites’. Smith then draws our attention to subjective elements in the formation of nations and the persistence of ethnic communities in comprehending the ‘inner worlds’ of ethnicity, especially how myths and symbols play a vital role in uniting people.\footnote{Anthony Smith, \textit{Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).}

Since the 1970s, ‘ethnicity’ started to become a more popular topic, influenced by the academic trends and social circumstances of the late 1960s;\footnote{Thomas Hylland Eriksen, \textit{Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives} (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 12, and Crawford Young, ‘Nationalism, Ethnicity and Class in Africa: A Retrospective’, \textit{Cahiers d’études Africaines} 26(103) (1986): 421–95.} constructivists began to follow in the footsteps of modernists and advanced the previous debates on nationalism and ethnicity. As Umut Özkirimli deduced, the modernist assumption was fundamentally correct and scholars should view primordial assumptions with a degree of scepticism.\footnote{Özkirimli, \textit{Theories of Nationalism}.} Even primordialist giant Smith has accepted the constructed nature of nationhood. Nevertheless, some scholars emphasise the importance of people’s perception because it enables us to understand why ethnicity and/or nationalism is enduring and appealing.\footnote{Roger Brubaker, \textit{Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 15.} Smith argues that the process of ‘ethno-symbolic reconstruction’ contains ‘the reselection, recombination and recodification of previously existing values, symbols, memories and the like’.\footnote{Smith, \textit{Nationalism}, Chapter 3.}

It is thus necessary to provide more empirical cases to analyse ‘the process and mechanisms through which what has been called the “political fiction” of the nation can crystallize, at certain moments’ in certain ways for certain reasons.\footnote{Frederick Cooper, \textit{Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History} (London: University of California Press, 2005), p. 63.} Here, a classical work of Frederik Barth is suggestive for several reasons. Interested in which boundaries between ethnic groups are forged and maintained, he argued in 1969 that the boundaries are constructed not by ethnic groups’ isolation and difference from one another, but rather by their interactions and similarities. Thus, he concluded that social processes of interaction and exclusion, and dichotomised ethnic images shaped ethnic groups and maintained their boundaries.\footnote{Fredrik Barth (ed.), \textit{Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference} (Oslo: Johansen & Nielsen Boktrykkeri, 1969), Introduction.}
constructivist nature of ethnicity, he can be categorised as a constructivist; his argument is still evocative as he provided the perspectives of dynamic interaction and interdependence between the ethnic groups and of other factors such as ecological and demographical factors. Influenced by these debates on nation and ethnicity, Africanist scholars have also examined the issue in Africa and attempted to go beyond the constructivist approach, which the next section scrutinises.

‘Political Tribalism’ and the Constructivist Approach

The debate on ethnicity in Africa has basically followed a similar, though slightly different, pattern. The concept of ethnicity has been a matter of debate between primordialists, instrumentalists (not modernists) and then constructivists. Primordialists emphasise the significance of primordial ties and ‘given’ common histories, ancestries, cultures and languages of certain groups of people, whereas constructivists regard ethnicity as ‘a historically specific and socially generated pattern of identity’ and emphasise ‘the subjective manipulability, flexibility and strategic quality of ethnicity’. In earlier colonial literature, the primordial view was dominant. According to Young, colonial administrators and anthropologists took ‘tribal Africa’ for granted. However, this primordial view was challenged after the 1950s. Particularly in the 1960s, scholars started to pay attention to politicised ethnicity with the assumption that ethnicity was instrumentally used by urban elites in social and political competitions. Those scholars tended to rely on the modernisation model or a progressive view of ethnicity, contemplating that ethnicity would be replaced by a national identity constructed by the elites; however, such a prediction soon turned out to be an illusion.

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In the 1970s, constructivist scholars started to argue that ethnic identity was created by colonial administration and missionaries; for example, John Iliffe wrote, ‘The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework.’ One of the most influential constructivist scholars in Africa is Terence Ranger, who together with Eric Hobsbawm extolled the concept of ‘the invention of tradition’. Ranger argued that British administrators ‘invented’ traditions in the sense that they set about to codify and promulgate customs that used to be more flexible. Due to the criticism that the ‘invention’ overstated colonial power and ability to control the African institutions and neglected African agency, Ranger later modified ‘invention’ to ‘imagination’, based on Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined’ community.

Another influential constructivist is John Lonsdale. Often together with Bruce Berman, Lonsdale criticised the instrumentalists for their premise of a deliberate strategy of the elite and emphasised the importance of looking at dynamism and contingencies. He differentiates ‘moral ethnicity’, an internal identity of individuals, from ‘political tribalism’, an externally politicised ethnicity, demonstrating the ways in which ‘moral ethnicity’ was historically constructed and degenerated into ‘political tribalism’ in Kenya. Since then, scholars have shown that the reality was not pure invention but more a construction built on a complex social relationship which existed in the pre-colonial period, and was articulated during the colonial era.

Following Lonsdale and other recent constructivist trends, this thesis takes an approach which can be viewed as a nuanced hybrid-constructivism. As upheld in the

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very beginning of this chapter, Lonsdale proclaimed the importance of combining the
primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist approaches. Thomas Spear also
summarises:

Ethnicity has endured for a long time, and it has its own integrity, structural
principles, transformative processes and histories….Ethnicity has, thus, been
continually reinterpreted and reconstructed over time in such a way as to appear
timeless and legitimate, and it has been deployed by contending parties in
complex processes of selectivity and representation that lay at the core of
people’s collective historical consciousness and struggles for power, meaning
and access to resources. Therefore, it is simultaneously constructed, primordial
and instrumental, and therein lies its essential problematic.49

These affirmations are somewhat concerned with the trend of nationalism studies
mentioned earlier. Presupposing the constructed nature of ethnicity and attempting to
reveal the processes of ethnic formation, the nuanced hybrid-approach enables us to
examine the dynamic process and contingencies of ethnic transformation that are
instrumentally exploited by elites and given a primordialistic face. As such, in order
to understand ethnicity in Africa, scholars must go beyond the primordialist/
instrumentalist/ constructivist debate; rather, it is important to maintain the bottom
line of constructivism, but also to consider the aspects of primordialism and
instrumentalism that do exist, by examining the interaction between European
agency and the older group identity that existed in pre-colonial Africa and showing
how ‘the contents of that imaginative package’ changed.50

Rwandan Ethnicity in the Pre-Colonial and Colonial Eras

The historiography on Rwanda shares the same constructivist trend, in particular,
ethnicity in the pre-colonial and early colonial period. The main focus of literature
published before 1994 was the analysis of ethnicity and political system in pre-
colonial Rwanda; it aimed at understanding who the Tutsi and Hutu were and what

49 Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’,
was the nature of their relationship. Briefly, the literature on Rwandan ethnicity has moved from a primordial approach that regards the differences between the two groups as essential, to a constructivist view that argues that ethnicity was socially constructed.\footnote{de Lame, ‘Plaidoyer’; Uvin, ‘Reading’ ;76; Newbury and Newbury, ‘A Catholic Mass’, and Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Revue critique des interprétations du conflit Rwandais (Butare: Université Nationale du Rwanda, 2000).}

When the Europeans arrived in Rwanda, they were equipped with a primordial view of looking at the country: that is, the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’, that civilisation in the Great Lakes of Africa was brought there by the Hamitic race moving southwards from Ethiopia.\footnote{Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 7, and Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 50. For the change of how the term meant, see Edith Sanders, ‘The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions’, Journal of African History 10(4) (1969): 521–32, and Nigel Eltringham, ‘“Invaders who have stolen the country”: The Hamitic Hypothesis, Race and the Rwandan Genocide’, Social Identities 12(4) (2006): 425–46.} Those Europeans who came to Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth century and adhering to the idea of the Hamitic Hypothesis regarded the Tutsi as belonging to the Hamitic race and the Hutu as Bantu-speaking ‘Negroes’. According to this hypothesis, the Tutsi and the Hutu were regarded as racially different groups who had lived in Rwanda starting from different periods. The ancestors of the Twa were seen as the first inhabitants of Rwanda, dating from as early as 2000 BC. They were hunter-gatherers, living in the forests. It was believed that Bantu-speaking peasants started to arrive in Rwanda around 1000 AD. The Bantu speakers, from whom the Hutu were descended, established several kingdoms by the fifteenth century. In the sixteenth century,\footnote{The literature written during the Tutsi reign dated it back to as early as the eleventh century to emphasise the Tutsi superiority and legitimise their rule. For example, Alexis Kagame pointed out the first Mwami was Gihanga whose reign was from 1091 to 1124: Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire du Rwanda (Butare: Éditions universitaires du Rwanda, 1972), p. 37. That is the reason why it is important to examine the chronology of dynasties: David Newbury, ‘Trick Cyclists? Recontextualizing Rwandan Dynastic Chronology’, History in Africa 21 (1994): 191–217.} the Hamitic dwellers around the Horn of Africa began moving southwards and ‘invaded’ Rwanda. One Hamitic Tutsi clan, the Nyiginya, established a kingdom and expanded their territory; by the time the Europeans reached Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth century, it was nearly equivalent in size to present-day Rwanda.\footnote{Examples of typical works influenced by the Hamitic Hypothesis are: Rojer Heremans, Introduction à l’histoire du Rwanda (Bruxelles: Editions A. De Boeck, 1973), and
Based on this colonial primordialist view, early scholars, whom I have termed ‘positive primordialists,’ naturally perceived the Tutsi and the Hutu as being racially different; the Hamitic pastoralist Tutsi was the ruler and the Bantu-speaking Hutu was the ruled. Moreover, those primordialists conceptualised ethnic group in terms of ‘caste’ as well and perceived that the Nyiginya kingdom was a ‘caste’ society, based on the hierarchy between the different races. Marcel d’Hertefelt summarised in 1964 that there were ‘deep cleavages of wealth, power, prestige, privileges, and rights’ resulted from the caste structure. 55

Those scholars favourably evaluated the hierarchy through their analysis of ubuhake, a patron-client relationship in which the client had to obey the orders of the patron and show loyalty; in return, the patron gave the client care, cattle and protection. Alexis Kagame, a Tutsi aristocrat and the most famous Rwandan historian, published numerous works on the court system and ubuhake. 56 Jacques Maquet, a Belgian anthropologist, also claimed that prior to the arrival of the Europeans, there already existed a hierarchy between the Tutsi and the Hutu, which he justified as the ‘premise of inequality’. 57 These scholars in the 1960s claimed that the hierarchical Rwandan society functioned well through ubuhake and that the hierarchy between the Tutsi and the Hutu was mutually beneficial. Furthermore, as was accepted by both Tutsi and Hutu, it was a stable system. 58 Belgian anthropologist Danielle de Lame judged that Maquet’s work had brought about ‘a vision of Rwanda as a homogeneous entity structured by castes held together by the institution of pastoral clientship’. 59 French historian Chrétien also noted that

56 Kagame, Un abrégé, p. 29. Despite the same name, this Kagame has no connection to the current president, Paul Kagame.
59 de Lame, A Hill, p. 7.
Maquet’s book had been ‘the bible of Rwandan studies for some twenty years’ since its French publication in 1954.  

The positive primordialists were to be challenged from two directions. The first wave of criticism came from the same primordialist group of scholars. On the one hand, these scholars agreed to use the term ‘caste’ to describe the Rwandan groups. American anthropologist Helen Codere explained in the 1960s the validity of the term ‘caste’ since the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa ‘were separated by endogamy, occupational specialization, and cultural differences. Since the three castes, the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa are racially distinct groups and marriages between members of the different castes were “extremely rare”’, their heights were distinctively different. However, sometimes the definition of each term is not clear and those terms were used interchangeably. For instance, Chrétien pointed out that Marcel d’Hertefelt ‘did not hesitate to comment on the “racial” origin of the “three castes”.’ Ethel Albert noted Rwanda had a ‘caste-like social system’ and that the Tutsi and the Hutu were ‘racial-caste’ groups, which would invite terminological confusion. On the other hand, those whom I have termed ‘negative primordialists’ gave more negative evaluations on the hierarchy. By criticising the positive arguments and the methodology of Maquet and others, Helen Codere showed the more coercive nature of ubuhake and revealed that the Hutu did not accept the hierarchy nor perceive the system as mutually beneficial. René Lemarchand understood Rwandan society in terms of ‘caste’ and ‘hegemony’, in which the Tutsi oppressed the Hutu. This line

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\(^{60}\) Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 26.  
\(^{62}\) Chrétien, Great Lakes, pp. 80–81.  
\(^{64}\) Kagame and Maquet conducted the interviews almost entirely with the Tutsi, whilst Codere interviewed the Hutu and the Twa as well as the Tutsi: Codere, ‘Power in Ruanda’, and *The Biography*.  
of argument later became the dominant ideology used to justify the Revolution and Hutu rule in post-colonial Rwanda.

Secondly, the positive primordialist view was challenged by constructivists. The structural functionalism in the 1960s which Maquet and others had employed received criticism because it could not account for the changes within Rwandan society, namely the Revolution in Rwanda. Moreover, the anthropological trend in the 1950s and the 1960s tended to make sense of things by fitting African systems into the knowledge they had of European experiences; notable among the literature on Rwanda are the frequent references to medieval European feudalism and the French Revolution. For instance, Codere described Rwanda’s monarchical system as ‘Byzantine politics’, and Gravel noted a hill was like ‘a manor of medieval continental Europe’. ‘Ancien régime’ and ‘jacquerie’ were often used to describe the Rwandan Revolution. Fitting Rwanda into a European pattern held the risk of simplifying the Rwandan situation.

Therefore, since the 1960s, constructivists, or what Kimonyo called ‘progressistes’, increasingly challenged the primordialist image of Rwandan hierarchy. The forerunner of this viewpoint was Jan Vansina. Based on archaeological evidence, he rejected the Hamitic Hypothesis; rather, he argued that people in central Rwanda engaged in three different activities (farming, cattle herding, and nomadic foraging) and that the differences in living standards emerged around the seventeenth century in accordance with these occupations, when people began distinguishing themselves from others. ‘Twa’ was the name given to the foragers in the forest; ‘Tutsi’ was the name for political elites among the herders, and ‘Hutu’ referred to the Tutsis’ servants. After the expansion of the Nyiginya kingdom, ‘Hutu’ evolved to mean ‘non-combatant’ and ‘Tutsi’ to mean ‘combatant’. Since most ‘non-combatants’ came from farmers and ‘combatants’ from herders, by the

69 Kimonyo, *Revue*. 
late nineteenth century, ‘Tutsi’ eventually applied to all herders, while ‘Hutu’ applied to all farmers. Claudine Vidal, another famous constructivist on Rwanda during the 1960s and the 1970s, drew our attention to the function of land and argued that the Tutsi and Hutu were similar to social classes and that concepts of ethnicity and race were created by the Europeans. Those scholars were assumed to have been influenced by Marxist debates on class struggle. Even though they disagreed over the role and impact of colonisation, the first generation of constructivists showed that ethnicity was historically constructed in Rwanda.

In the 1970s, ‘ethnicity’ rather than ‘caste’, ‘race’ and ‘class’ started to be employed to describe Rwandan society, as the ‘invention of tradition’ and constructivist arguments started to influence the debate around ethnicity. Now scholars started to pay attention to the role of the European powers and their interactions with Africans. These constructivists have occupied the middle ground between primordialists and the previous generation of constructivists; they argued that, prior to the late nineteenth century, the differences between the Tutsi and the Hutu had already existed in a socio-economic sense, but that rural inhabitants did not have any collective identity as ‘the Hutu’. Instead, as David Newbury noted, a person identified himself primarily in terms of clan. Under the German and Belgian colonial rule built upon the hierarchy of the Nyiginya kingdom, the Tutsi expanded their territory and reinforced their rule over the Hutu. Under this ‘dual colonialism’, the oppressed people, who had previously lacked group awareness, gradually came to see themselves as Hutu, a development which Catharine Newbury termed ‘the cohesion of oppression’. In this sense, ethnic construction was a joint collaboration

72 Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 27.
between the Tutsi leaders and their European counterparts during the colonial period, based on pre-colonial categories.

Hitherto, the nature of ethnicity in the pre-colonial period and the change that took place during colonial time had been discussed first by primordialists, who then gave way to constructivists. Earlier positive primordialist scholars such as Maquet understood Rwanda as a ‘caste’ society based on the ‘premise of inequality’ and argued that it was mutually beneficial. Negative primordialists such as Codere and Lemarchand challenged this view by showing that the hierarchy in pre-colonial Rwanda was problematic because it ignored the oppression against the Hutu. Vansina, Vidal, Catharine and David Newbury, and others criticised the primordialists and demonstrated how ethnicity had been constructed from pre-colonial distinctions and reinforced throughout the Belgian colonisation.

The genocide in 1994 gave an interesting but bizarre twist to the debate. As Chapter 6 of the thesis will discuss, the current RPF government takes a combination of a positive primordialist and an extreme constructivist approach on ethnicity: the Rwandans lived happily before the Europeans arrived, and thus it was the Europeans who were responsible for creating ethnicity and dividing groups of people. Rwandan contemporary scholars such as Paul Rutayisire and Déogratis Byanafashe have followed this official line. Relying on scholars such as Kagame, Maquet and d’Hertefelt for their visions of pre-colonial history, these scholars have used the concepts of ‘social capital’ and ‘nation’ to claim pre-colonial unity in Rwanda and its deterioration during the colonial period; according to Nzongola-Ntalaja, the Belgians ‘created the myth of Tutsi superiority and started to portray the Tutsi as alien with centuries-old enmity’. A shortcoming of this argument is that it discards, or at least does not appreciate, academic progress on the issue from the 1970s onwards, neglecting constructivists such as Vidal and Newbury. Many non-Rwandan journalists and scholars who entered Rwanda after the genocide tend to share this

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view as well, especially immediately after the genocide. For instance, Philip Gourevitch pointed to the ‘striking Rwandanness’ before the Europeans came, while Mahmood Mamdani concluded that the ancestors of present Rwandans belonged to a ‘single cultural community’. This image of a peaceful and single Rwandan nationhood in pre-colonial period led to an extreme constructivist assumption that ethnic conflict was ‘invented’ by the Europeans. The persistence of positive primordialism is what Vansina has warned to be ‘a legacy of Kagame’ and the pre-colonial harmony ‘romanticised’ by Maquet.

In light of this tendency, older scholars have repeatedly advocated for a more nuanced interpretation of history. Alison Des Forges, and Catharine and David Newbury argue that ethnic categories did exist but were flexible in pre-colonial Rwanda, and that the Europeans simplified what they saw in order to fit Rwandan realities into their ethnic assumptions and that the Tutsi leaders went along with the Europeans’ perceptions. Therefore, this thesis proceeds by engaging with Rwandan history through a nuanced hybrid-constructivist interpretation of ethnicity, reflecting the scholarly debates of the past half-century.

Was the Revolution Inevitable?

Literature on Rwandan history tends to focus on the colonial period as the most important period in shaping the ethnicity in Rwanda. However, the decolonisation period is as important as the colonial period, since the politics of the late 1950s and

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77 Uvin, ‘Reading’: 77.
79 For instance, Raymond Ntalindwa denounces the Belgian colonial rule as the reason for the emergence of ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu who, according to him, had happily coexisted before. His argument is so ideological that there are aspects and errors in the book that his scholarship into question: Raymond Ntalindwa, Toward an Interpretation of the Rwandan Conflict: A Historical Perspective (London: Blackworld Links Ltd., 1999).
80 Vansina, Antecedents, p. 4. Vidal also wrote that the works of Kagame were used to ‘struggle for power in ethnic terms’: Vidal, Sociologie, p. 61.
81 Pottier points out that Maquet has ‘romanticised’ the harmony of the pre-colonial past. Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 111.
the early 1960s represents a turning-point in the shaping of ethnic relations into a violent form. If colonisation in which the Europeans and the Africans had interacted changed ethnicity, decolonisation also must have done so, because the relationship between the Europeans and the Africans changed during this period as well. Bearing this in mind, this section looks at the historiography of ethnicity and politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s and argues that it is important to take the nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach in examining the ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity in the decolonisation period.

As with the debate on pre-colonial ethnicity and colonial transformation, there are two contested views on the causes of the Revolution. On the one hand, there is a claim that the Revolution was caused and manipulated by the European colonial administration and the Catholic Church; this view is strongly advocated by the current Rwandan government under the strange marriage of positive primordialism and extreme constructivism. On the other hand, the negative primordialist scholars pointed to the Hutu leadership and their mass grievances towards the Tutsi’s ‘internal colonialism’. Maquet modified his previous view of the ‘premise of inequality’ into the idea that the Hutu did not accept exploitation by the Tutsi and sought their long drawn-out for the chance of liberation; therefore, he argued, the hierarchy in Rwanda and the grievances of the Hutu caused the Revolution. Codere also claimed that the power relationship between the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu caused the Revolution: ‘revolution was neither inspired, created nor engineered by outsider forces.’ For these early scholars, the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu was the inevitable consequence of the nature of Rwanda’s stratified society.

Based on this primordialistic assumption, later scholars paid more attention to both the role of the Europeans and the agency of the Rwandans that brought about the Revolution. Cooperation between the Belgian colonial administration and the

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86 Codere, ‘Power in Ruanda’.
Tutsi leaders began to deteriorate in the late 1950s, when a new political movement commenced in Rwanda. The Church, which had previously sided with the Tutsi nobles, started to show more sympathy to the Hutu. Consequently, many Hutu elites received their education at missionary schools and thus maintained a close relationship with the Church. After finishing their education, many Hutu educated elites wanted to work in administrative jobs but found themselves discriminated against. This encouraged their dissatisfaction with the Tutsi system. However, the Tutsi leaders did not take the Hutus’ demands for social reforms seriously; the Tutsi leaders merely sought independence from Belgium and thus did not dare to change the political system. The political scene became more volatile; violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu broke out in November 1959. The shift of Belgian support at this stage aided the Hutu in their grasp for power. The Belgian government declared political reforms with the aim of carrying out local and national elections and establishing provisional government and an assembly towards achieving self-government. The path towards self-government and independence, however, was not smooth. The Belgians were criticised by the United Nations General Assembly from the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War and from Afro-Asian countries which denounced western colonialism altogether. On 28 January 1961, Hutu politicians declared the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. When Rwanda

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89 This is why the revolution was sometimes called ‘la révolution assistée’: Jean-Paul Harroy, *Rwanda: De la féodalité a la démocratie 1955–1962* (Bruxelles: Hayez, 1984), p. 292.


91 A consensus is that the Belgians supported this coup: Chrétien and Gahama, ‘Les options’, p. 237; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 192; Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 53–4; Jean R. Hubert, *La toussaint rwandaise et sa répression* (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences
gained independence in July 1962, several thousand Tutsi refugees who had escaped the violence beginning in 1959 remained in neighbouring countries. Some of them formed a military group and attacked Rwanda several times with the aim of overthrowing the Hutu regime and regaining power. The largest attack took place during the winter of 1963–64. They approached Kigali but the Rwandan National Army, trained by the Belgians, repulsed the attack; in retaliation, it is estimated that more than 10,000 Tutsi civilians were killed by the Hutu.

Therefore, the period of Revolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s was the time when the ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu became apparent and escalated. As shown above, the existing literature has identified the reasons why the Hutu obtained power by focusing on the rise of Hutu elites, the reactions of the Tutsi leaders, the policy shifts of both the Belgians and the Church, and the pressure of the United Nations. Lemarchand concluded that the feudal nature of Rwandan political system made it ‘virtually impossible’ for the Tutsi king and leaders to solve Rwanda’s ethnic problems. Consequently, according to Lemarchand, the conflict that emerged between the two groups was a logical and inevitable consequence and the Hutu had ‘no option but revolution’.

When comparing the literature on ethnicity in both Africa and pre-colonial/colonial Rwanda, it is notable that the literature on the Rwandan Revolution has remained in the primordialist domain and has not been updated with a constructivist approach. Due to the assumption that ethnicity had been constructed during the colonial period and that the Revolution was a consequence of the construction, scholars have not paid enough attention to the transformation of ethnicity in the decolonisation period. One of the most frequently cited studies on the Revolution is Lemarchand’s massive book, *Rwanda and Burundi*. While seminal and impressive with rich data, the book was constrained by the period in which it

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93 Like the genocide in 1994, the exact number of victims is unknown. Prunier attests ‘an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were slaughtered’ and Segal estimated there were between 10,000 and 14,000 victims: Prunier, *Rwandan Crisis*, p. 56, and Aaron Segal, *Massacre in Rwanda* (London: Fabian Society, 1964).


95 Ibid.
was written and thus did not examine the (re)construction of ethnicity. Another huge volume, Filip Reyntjens’ *Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda*, also treated ethnic conflict that was established in earlier colonial period as an independent variable of explaining political and legal changes in Rwanda. It is thus necessary to utilise the rich data provided by these books and to re-interpret the period of the Revolution from the constructivist approach. As a similar attempt was made by Chrétien, it is important to show that indeed, during the Revolution and decolonisation, both Rwandans and Europeans reproduced the colonial myth and Hamitic assumption and that they reconstructed ethnicity during that time.

Objectives, Focus and Research Questions

As reviewed in the previous section, it is important to take a nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach to examine the ethnic transformation in a political sense, or what can be called the ‘political tribalisation’ of Rwandan ethnicity, in the time of decolonisation. Thus, the main research question the thesis will answer is:

- What factors shaped Rwandan ethnicity in the late 1950s and early 1960s? More precisely, how and why was ethnicity transformed into ‘political tribalism’ in decolonising Rwanda?

This thesis examines history from its dual nature: dynamics and ‘performativity’. First, this thesis treats history as a dynamic process. As Stephen Ellis writes, the past is not just ‘the embryo of the present’, but it had its own momentum with ‘unfulfilled ambitions and disappointed hope, ideas that once seemed important but that did not actually result in outcomes that are still with us today’. Frederick Cooper also agrees that alternatives have existed in the past and that the historian ‘has to move backwards before moving forwards’ to put ‘process, choice, contingency, and explanation into the fore’. Therefore, examining alternative paths, suggestions and

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96 Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit*. He suggested that it is necessary to develop further research on the Revolution (p.235).
97 Chrétien, *Great Lakes*.
99 Frederick Cooper, ‘Africa’s Past and Africa’s Historians’, *Canadian Journal of African*
crossroads which were envisioned at the time, or which could have been taken, enables the thesis to shed light on the dynamic process of ethnic change. Another perspective is to look at intra-group relationships. While it is clearly important to examine the inter-group relations, it is also essential to examine intra-group relationship to understand the dynamics of the time. As James Fearon and David Laitin quantitatively show, ‘large-scale ethnic violence’ tends to be provoked ‘by elites, often motivated by intra-ethnic conflicts’.100

Taking these two factors into account, the thesis looks Rwandan ethnicity at the levels of local, national and international politics.101 Contrary to the previous literature which takes the approach of longue durée, this thesis examines a shorter period of analysis for the sake of deeper understanding. First, Rwandan party politics needs more analysis. While the existing literature has examined political parties in Rwanda, their analyses have not been in depth and the impacts on ethnicity have not been examined. Secondly, understanding the relationship between external actors and decolonisation is indispensable for the examination of ethnicity because Rwandan domestic politics is closely related to the issue of decolonisation and the colonial policies, which has not been studied deeply in the Rwandan case. Third, regional differences within Rwanda will be examined as well. The local dimension of the violence, the movement of people, regional diversity and ethnicity should all be further explored.

Secondly, this thesis also pays attention to the ‘performativity’ of history. As Berber Bevernage suggests, history has a performative function aside from the ‘traditional functions of representing the past, of searching for the truth, and of generating the meaning’. Therefore, ‘the past is constantly urgently present as part of our everyday experience.’102 Moreover, as Jonathan Friedman has also stressed, ‘the

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past is always practiced in the present.’\textsuperscript{103} These scholars suggest how people’s perceptions of the past affect their action and view in the present, and vice versa.

There are two things that this thesis is not going to do. First, it is not going to use the term ‘identity’, despite the term’s frequent employment in ethnicity discussions. Rather, this thesis uses the term ‘identification’ if necessary, because, as Cooper writes, identification can specify the agent and enable us to examine the process of building ethnicity. Moreover, identification does not necessarily imply internal sameness, therefore the word is suitable for examining internal differences and dynamics.\textsuperscript{104} The other thing this thesis tries to avoid is the reproduction of ethnic discourse that it criticises. When anybody talks about ethnicity, there is a danger that dichotomies and stereotypes may be reproduced.\textsuperscript{105} It is thus important to avoid the dichotomised use of ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Hutu’; the thesis rather specifies who they were, ‘the Tutsi king’, ‘the Tutsi progressive leaders’, ‘the Hutu politicians’, and so on. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that ethnic conflict is not simply the result of ethnic difference, as Roger Brubaker reminds us: ‘ethnic conflict’ would be better termed ‘ethnicised or ethnically framed conflict’.\textsuperscript{106}

The thesis makes several important contributions. First, as detailed in the next section, this thesis has consulted a wide range of archival sources, some of which have not been explored in the existing literature on Rwanda.

Secondly, the thesis aims at activating further historical research by synthesising existing literature, filling gaps with the original sources and suggesting future research issues. There are several difficulties in conducting historical research on Rwanda. The title of the thesis, ‘It is difficult to understand Rwandan history’, echoes a statement that I was frequently told by the Rwandans during my fieldwork.


Indeed, there are several reasons to explain why this is the case. To begin with, the difficulty is attributed to the nature of Rwanda and its historiography: history is too intertwined with politics and ideology. As the following chapters will show, perceptions of history constructed the politics and ideology of Rwanda and in return, political events and ideologies shaped history. In this sense, it is not easy to tell history from myth and ideology. Moreover, the interpretation of history is strongly connected with one’s own political views and has divided scholars (especially before 1994) into ‘pro-Tutsi and pro-Hutu’, as Chrétien and Lemarchand have also noted with regards to the debate on Burundi in the 1980s.107 This tendency makes it more difficult to comprehend Rwandan history in a critical but nuanced way.

By challenging these difficulties, the thesis aims to contribute to the literature on Rwanda in the following ways. First of all, by scrutinising a body of pre-1994 literature in detail, the thesis updates and re-evaluates the literature in a present-day context. The current research environment has changed from that of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when scholars such as Lemarchand, Newbury and Reyntjens conducted their research: since the 1970s, research on ethnicity has progressed to go beyond primordialism and simpler constructivism; more documents have been declassified since the 1990s as many countries have a 30-years rule of declassification; and the genocide which took place in 1994 and the post-genocide politics urge us to re-examine the history of Rwanda. Therefore, it is important to revisit Rwandan history now. This thesis also problematises the decolonisation period in more detail and sheds light on the dynamics of ethnic transformation by focusing on multi-level conflicts.

Third, this study hopefully contributes to the broader debate on ethnicity. The detailed examination of Rwandan ethnicity during the Revolution and the decolonisation period suggests that the decolonisation period is as important as the colonial period to examine the transformation of ethnicity. The change (transformation) and continuity, or what Nugent calls ‘continuity-within-change’, from pre-colonial and colonial, to the post-colonial period were intertwined to

crystallise ethnic identification. In examining the ethnic transformation in the decolonisation period, it is important to take a nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach as the quotes of Lonsdale and Spear suggest. The approach is nuanced because the historical reality falls in between the primordialism and extreme constructivism; it is ‘hybrid’ because the thesis aims at combining the three approaches and showing how mixed they are. Rwandan ethnicity in the end of colonial period suggests that instrumentalist, primordialist and constructivist aspects all existed in Rwanda at the time.

Finally, this research has a social implication. As the recent cases of post-conflict reconciliation and justice in Africa show, rewriting history (or redefining what to remember and forget in new socio-political contexts) is important for national unity and reconciliation, especially after mass violence. However, this redefinition poses some problems. On the one hand, as John Nagle and Mary-Alice Clancy show us, it is not easy to deconstruct a previous version of ethnicity associated with past violence and replace it with a new one. On the other hand, the content of the new history and the way in which the narrative is assigned to people can be problematic. As Barbara Misztal noted, when memories are fixed and closed, there is a danger that alternative history-making may aggravate existing social, ethnic and religious conflicts, but when memories are more open-ended, their use can bring about cooperation and dialogue. These are the problems in post-genocide Rwanda as well. Therefore, it is significant to show the ways in which ethnicity is constructed and to suggest an alternative and more nuanced way of understanding history.

108 Nugent, ‘Putting the History Back into Ethnicity’:922. Also, Sandra Greene examined the ways in which some pre-colonial beliefs and practices were modified while others changed more dramatically in Anlo society in Ghana: Sandra Greene, Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and Memory in Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).
Methodology

In order to achieve the aims of the thesis as mentioned above, this section describes the methodology and sources which are used in this research; as stated earlier, this thesis draws on extensive archival documents and interviews.

Archives

One of the original features of this thesis is that I have consulted several archives all over the world, each of which I visited for a period from two weeks to two months: the National Archives in London (UK), the National Archives and Research Administration (NARA) in College Park (USA), the United Nations Archives in New York (USA), the African Archives in Brussels (Belgium), the Archives of Royal Museum of Central Africa in Tervuren (Belgium) and the White Fathers Archives in Rome (Italy).112

The reasons for consulting these various archives are manifold. First, Rwandan archival records are not available. During my fieldwork in Rwanda, I visited the District Offices of Ngoma and Kirehe in the Eastern Province and was allowed to enter their document storage rooms. In Kirehe, the oldest documents dated from 1995: a district officer told me that all documents before 1994 had been destroyed during the civil war and the genocide. In Ngoma District, more documents were extant, due to the fact that the District Capital (Kibungo) has been an administrative town since the colonial era. In a dusty storage room, I found a few files dating back to the 1960s; however, they were all receipts and accounting records. Other files from the 1970s onward were mostly concerned with agriculture, water and the budget, which have no relevance to this study. The National Archives of Rwanda seem to exist in Kigali since some Rwandan scholars have used these archives for their research.113 However, a Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) officer told me that the Rwandan government had been ‘kind enough’ to western scholars to

112 Also, only occasionally used are the documents stored in the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.
give them information, but that those researchers ‘distorted’ the information and wrote ‘wrong things’ about the government, so the Rwandan government believes it can no longer trust them. ‘That is why it’s almost impossible for you [me] to get access to the national archives,’ he said.\(^\text{114}\) Under these circumstances, it is indispensable for me to maximise all available non-Rwandan sources.

Amongst the non-Rwandan sources, first and foremost, the African Archives of Belgium in Brussels are a rich source of documents on Rwanda up to the end of colonial rule. Particularly, I consulted the telegrams, reports and letters between Rwanda and some copies of local newspapers in Rwanda during the late 1950s and early 1960s.\(^\text{115}\) The Archives of the Royal Museum of Central Africa in Tervuren hold private papers of former colonial officers, among which I consulted several boxes of the papers of Jean-Paul Harroy, the last governor-general of Ruanda-Urundi from 1955 to 1962.\(^\text{116}\) However, relying on exclusively Belgian sources is unwise, because of the possible danger of bias, as colonial documents were written by outsider Europeans and were intended to report the colonial situations to the metropolitan government. Therefore, even though colonial documents are one of the largest and most useful sources for writing African history, it is necessary to critically examine their content in order to determine their ‘authenticity and credibility’.\(^\text{117}\) To do so, other sources were needed to verify to what extent the Belgian sources are credible.

In this regard, other archives are precious sources of data. NARA in the United States contains a few thousand documents about the Rwandan political situation during the period. The officers in the US embassies in the Belgian Congo and Burundi sent intelligence information, minutes of meetings with Rwandan and

\(^{114}\) Conversation with a MINALOC officer, 20 December 2012. Chapter 6 details this post-genocide politics of history.


Belgian politicians, and copies of Kinyarwandan newspapers with English translations because they paid certain attention to Rwandan political circumstances in connection with the Congo Crisis and the discussions in the UN from the Cold War perspective. The British also paid attention to political progress in Rwanda due to the fact that Tanganyika and Uganda were neighbours of Rwanda and might be affected by the Rwandan situation. Therefore, the British embassies and consulates in Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika reported updated news and the meeting minutes with the politicians and refugees. Unlike Belgium, the US and the UK were not directly involved in Rwandan politics, which is perhaps one reason the British and American archives have not previously been used for research on Rwanda. Their documents, however, are useful sources to complement the Belgians’. In addition, the UN archives in New York hold the resolutions, reports, petitions and telegrams of the 1950s and 1960s. The UN documents are useful to understand the movement of refugees and the discussions within the UN. The White Fathers Archives in Rome also hold local newspapers, and diaries and letters written by missionaries in Rwanda. Those documents are particularly valuable when attempting to understand local politics and details. Thus, using multiple archival sources not only increases the credibility of this thesis, but also enables it to investigate the policies and perceptions of various actors on Rwanda.

In addition to the archival materials, several published collections of documents have been useful for understanding the perceptions and policies of both

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118 To consult online catalogues, visit <http://www.archives.gov/> (accessed 21 May 2013).
Rwandan and Belgian politicians during this period. Biography and autobiography have helped me to better understand the minds of various players. In this way, one original feature and contribution of this thesis is to gather written sources, archival materials in particular, from as wide a selection as possible, in order to examine the dynamic process of ethnic transformation in Rwanda.

Fieldwork in Rwanda

These extensive written documents were also complemented with interviews to gain ‘insight into people’s experiences, opinions, attitudes and feelings’. As Mwembu claims, the written document and memory are both important ‘in the reconstruction of what has gone before’. Interviews were thus conducted during three months of fieldwork in Rwanda during late 2011. The original reason for choosing the Eastern Province as a fieldwork site was that there would be a different regional identification present because a different kingdom had previously existed in this region. However, my initial expectation of finding a distinct regional identification there was not met, though the Eastern Province was still an interesting area to meet various kinds of people. I met not only those who were born and had lived there for

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126 As Chapter 2 will describe in detail, there was a kingdom called Gisaka in the Eastern Province up until the mid-nineteenth century. Some Belgian documents which I consulted before my fieldwork reported that the people in the Gisaka area had maintained a different regional identification apart from a Nyiginya (Rwandan) one. Therefore, I had expected to collect interesting stories there.
their entire lives but also those who had moved to this area due to the shortage of land in their native region before the genocide, and who came back to Rwanda after the genocide and settled down in the Eastern Province. Therefore, fieldwork in this region was worth conducting.

To conduct my research, I had to obtain research permission from the Ministry of Education. There is a heightened sensitivity over foreign researchers at the current time. The Rwandan government scrutinises foreign research projects very closely, especially if the topics relate to post-genocide reconciliation and rural life, and this adds constraints to the conditions for conducting fieldwork. For instance, Larissa Begley shares with us her fieldwork in Rwanda, during which she experienced government restrictions and also emotional struggle.127 In another example, Susan Thomson’s research permit and passport were confiscated after being warned by the government to stop her research.128

After carefully wording my research proposal and obtaining permission to conduct fieldwork, I asked for recommendations for an English-speaking translator to me in the Eastern Province. My translator and I asked residents to introduce the elderly people of the villages to us or to give us information about them. My translator then arranged the date and time of interviews, most of which were conducted in their households. At the beginning of the interview, I introduced myself, in poor Kinyarwanda, to relax them and then asked my translator to describe the purpose of the interview, explaining that I would like to listen to their life histories. We would begin the interview with sharing banana beer, a non-alcoholic beverage for social gatherings.

One notable advantage of my research project was that people were more relaxed speaking about the colonial period rather than the recent past of the civil war and genocide. Before the fieldwork, I was afraid of the possibility that I would not

find enough older people due to the shorter life expectancy in the country, and, even if I could find them, I worried that they might not trust me enough to speak honestly. My impression drawn from interviews and observations during fieldwork is that respondents found it much easier to talk about their personal histories of a more remote past than it was to talk about the civil war and genocide of the 1990s. Only one man initially objected to being interviewed about Rwandan history, wanting to know why this Japanese girl was interested in Rwandan history.\textsuperscript{129} However, most interviewees seemed very welcoming; some even mentioned that before the formal school system was introduced, young people listened to the wisdom of older people.\textsuperscript{130} Another old man repeatedly said: ‘What we don’t know [which I assume means that what he does not want to talk about] is the most recent war which happened in Rwanda [in the 1990s] but we know everything about before.’\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, my interviewees seemed happy that two young people (my translator and I) respected and listened to their experiences.

A possible explanation for this tendency can be attributed to the very reason that I did not ask my interviewees about ethnicity, the civil war and genocide in the beginning. Talking explicitly about ethnicity in contemporary Rwanda is troublesome since the Rwandan government has abolished ethnic categories and has banned their mention in public. Under these circumstances, for me, the most important principle when conducting an interview was not to bring up the issue of ethnicity myself; I just asked their life histories from the time they were born up to independence. However, many, if not all, interviewees gave their ethnic identities of their own accord. While we asked about their lives during the colonial period, they used the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ openly and in a few cases, they mentioned to which ethnicity they belonged. In those cases, I asked further questions about ethnicity. But if they did not mention it, I did not ask them.

I was faced with two ethical issues when building relationships with Rwandans. First, I wondered whether or not to pay my interviewees.\textsuperscript{132} Originally, I did not want

\textsuperscript{129} Interview with François, 10 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Gilbert, 15 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Isaac, 22 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{132} The same topic is explored in Luca Jourdan, ‘From Humanitarian to Anthropologist: Writing at the Margins of Ethnographic Research in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in
to impose cash between me and my interviewees, so I followed the advice from my supervisor to give soap or some other everyday commodities. I learned from my translator that it might be better to ask the interviewees after the interviews whether they had any need. After visiting rural areas of the Eastern Province, where it took me at least an hour on bumpy roads by motor bike from Kibungo, and seeing how poor ordinary rural Rwandans were, I tried to be flexible. One interviewee asked me to buy extra banana beer; another complained about his health, but he was too poor to buy health insurance and go to hospital, so I gave him the insurance fee. Another man asked me to accompany him to the market to buy food.\(^\text{133}\)

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Another crucial relationship was with the translator. The biggest weakness of my research project is that I am not able to speak Kinyarwanda and so I had to rely on a translator. Originally, I had two translators around my own age. André was a Tutsi born in Burundi who had returned to Rwanda in 1997, and Benoît, who was the son of a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother, was born and raised in north-eastern Rwanda.\(^\text{134}\) I tried both of them several times at the beginning, but I could not rely on André not only because he seemingly ‘translated’ more than the interviewees spoke but also because he did not respect my elderly interviewees and those who were born and raised in Rwanda. Therefore, after two interviews, I told him that I would not ask him to translate for me again, and after that, I only asked Benoît for translation. Since all the interviewees agreed for me to record their interviews, we did not take notes but just occasionally wrote down the names of people and particular Kinyarwandan vocabulary. After the interview, I transcribed the English translation and also wrote down whatever impression I got from the interviews into my field notes.\(^\text{135}\) Within a few days, I asked my translator to listen to the recordings and add to the transcription
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\(^{134}\) I assigned random French pseudonyms to my translators and interviewees for their confidentiality. See Appendix 7 for the list of interviewees.

\(^{135}\) I might have been over-cautious and unnerved by Susan Thomson’s account, but I wrote my field notes in Japanese so that if I lost them in situ, no one could read them. On how to protect data and research participants in a highly politicised situation, see Thomson, ‘“That is not what we authorised you to do …”’ and ‘Getting Close to Rwandans since the Genocide’. 
any information that he may have missed during the interview. Even though he had experience of translating with *muzungu* who belonged to aid organisations or worked as volunteers, Benoît was not used to participating in research, and thus he faced difficulties in the beginning. However, as we went through the interviews together, he became more comfortable working with me and showed his understanding of my research and gave me his opinions about it, which helped me to reshape my understanding of Rwanda and my research. Moreover, both my translator and I are not English-native speakers, so sometimes our transcription contains English grammatical mistakes and I also assume that the interview lacks some of the more nuanced details. In this sense, my interview data is imperfect; it is nevertheless invaluable to see the detailed life stories of ordinary people during the period this thesis examines.

Structure

The thesis is divided into broadly thematic chapters. This first chapter has introduced the thesis, reviewed relevant literature and discussed the framework and methodology of the research. Chapter 2 aims at answering the question of how ethnicity was constructed in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda. By detailing the state-formation of the Nyiginya kingdom in the pre-colonial period, European colonisation and ethnic transformation during that time, the chapter argues that ethnicity was not primordial nor solely invented by the Europeans. Rather, it was gradually constructed by the state-formation of the kingdom and articulated under colonial rule. However, it should be also noted that the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu had not become political or confrontational.

The following three chapters focus on the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 3 examines party politics, the Revolution and democratisation on a national level. By answering the question of how domestic factors politicised ethnicity, the chapter argues that various domestic factors – including intra-Tutsi leadership rivalry, the

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136 When I began research on Rwanda in the Master’s degree programme in 2005, I had a dichotomised view of the Tutsi as victim and the Hutu as the ‘bad guy’. However, as I continued in my research and talked with more people, including my translator, I have come to obtain a more balanced image of Rwanda.
alliance among the political parties and the inter-ethnic power struggle – affected the process of revolution and politicised ethnicity.

Chapter 4 looks at decolonisation, UN Trusteeship and the Cold War on the international level in order to analyse the exterior architecture of ethnicity and answer how international politics affected the domestic Rwandan politics. The chapter argues that external factors such as factions within the Belgian administration and the heated debates in the UN influenced by the Cold War provided opportunities for Rwandan ethnicity to become politicised.

Chapter 5 deals with violence, regional diversity and the movement of people on a local level, in order to shed light on the dynamic processes through which violence and ‘political tribalism’ spread all over Rwanda. The chapter argues that before the Revolution, regional difference was salient; however, contingency, movement of people, the spread of violence and the process of revolution and decolonisation had a synergistic impact on the spread of ‘political tribalism’ over Rwanda.

While the previous chapters examine the dynamics of history itself, Chapter 6 aims at examining how history is being ‘performed’ in Rwanda. By presenting the way in which the colonial, post-colonial and post-genocide Rwandan governments have narrated the past, the chapter attempts to show that politicised ethnicity and interpretations of the past have influenced and, even today, continue to influence post-colonial Rwanda.

The thesis concludes by restating the major themes discussed in this study and assesses the extent to which ethnicity changed during the Revolution and decolonisation. The conclusion also explores the significance of the thesis for broader debates on ethnicity and conflict in Africa in general, and Rwanda in particular.
Chapter 2
Constructing Ethnicity:
State-formation in Pre-colonial and Colonial Rwanda

The history of Rwanda is legendary and obscure … We have heard discussion of great migrants of Hamitic peoples who came from Abyssinia and Galla countries, who dispersed in a southwesterly direction with vast herds of long-horned cattle, and who conquered the lands between the lakes. But one can only determine with great difficulty, if even at all, if these changes occurred two hundred, five hundred, or one thousand years ago … Besides this ruling class is the great mass of the local population, the agriculturist Wahutu, a tribe of Bantu Negros who have been living here since time immemorial.¹

The colonial state imposed a tribal template upon its new domains, and developed its own identity codification, seeking simplification, regrouping apparently similar entities, and rewarding collaborating intermediaries.²

Introduction
This chapter examines the ways in which ethnicity was constructed in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda. It is necessary to show the significance of taking a nuanced constructivist approach when attempting to understand ethnicity during this period. Ethnicity and state-formation in the pre-colonial and colonial periods have received much scholarly attention and have inspired heated debate. As reviewed in the Introduction, earlier constructivists such as Terence Ranger criticised the primordialist approach on ethnicity and developed the ideas of ‘invention’, or ‘imagination’, of traditions and ‘tribes’ by the colonial administration and missionaries. Scholars such as John Lonsdale have produced works examining not only the formation of pre-colonial ‘we’-groupness, or what Lonsdale called ‘moral

ethnicity’, but also the articulation of ethnicity during the colonial period.  

Amongst those works are, for instance, David Newbury’s effort to show that clan differentiation and political centralisation on Ijwi Island in the Lake Kivu went hand-in-hand before colonisation, and a book edited by Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent which addresses the complicated nature of ethnicity in Ghana in order to go beyond the ‘invention’ argument.

As Chapter 1 summarised, the view on ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda is polarised between primordialists, mostly represented by Jacques Maquet, and constructivists, such as Jan Vansina and Claudine Vidal. Even outside academia, on the one hand, there is a negative primordialist view on pre-colonial ethnicity stating that the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu were long-lasting in pre-colonial Rwanda. For instance, immediately after the genocide began in April 1994, Anver Versi, in the British newspaper the Independent, wrote: ‘Although the Hutu form 85 per cent of the population of Rwanda, they had been virtual slaves of the cattle-rearing Tutsi who arrived in the “land of 1,000 hills” from the 15th century onwards.’ After the genocide, however, a completely opposite discourse emerged. As Chapter 6 will detail later, the current Rwandan government has been accepting the combination of positive primordialism and extreme constructivism that asserts that ethnic distinction existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, but that ethnicity was not important and the Rwandans formed a ‘nation’; it was the Europeans who brought ethnic conflict and divided the Rwandans.

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5 Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent (eds), Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).


7 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 3.
Contrary to these assumptions, relying on an examination of the existing literature, this chapter argues that ethnicity in Rwanda was rather gradually constructed by the state-formation of the Nyiginya kingdom and further articulated under German and Belgian colonial rules. By demonstrating so, this chapter aims at not only providing background information to understand subsequent chapters, but also showing that the Tutsi-Hutu relationship was not a simple one, but instead a historically constructed product. First, this chapter discusses pre-colonial Rwandan society and politics to show how the categories of Tutsi and Hutu became important along with the Nyiginya expansion. The chapter then moves to the colonial era to detail German and Belgian colonisation and its impacts on Rwandan statecraft and ethnicity. European colonisation simplified the situation and intensified and legitimised the rule of the kingdom, moulding ethnic differences into more rigid discrimination during the colonial period. By the mid-twentieth century, ethnicity had become a fixed and important category as state power became harsher and stronger.

Power, State-formation and Ethnicity in Pre-colonial Rwanda

This section explores the tensions of the state-formation process in which the Nyiginya kingdom expanded its territory, reinforced its rule over Rwanda and constructed ethnicity. Berman and Lonsdale differentiated state-building which they saw as ‘a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control’, from state-formation, which they described as ‘an historical process whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups’.  

It is widely known that there are three ethnic groups in Rwanda: the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa. Although contemporary analysis of ethnicity is used to explain identification, previously the clan was the more important social unit. The five largest clans comprised more than half of the Rwandan population: the Abasinga, Abasindi, Abazigaba, Abagesera, and Abanyiginya. Each clan had members from all three ethnic groups; but the proportion of each ethnic group varied from clan to clan.

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8 Berman and Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*, p. 5.
9 Chrétien, *Great Lakes*, pp. 90–91. ‘Aba’ in Kinyarwanda is a plural prefix denoting people; the singular form is ‘umu’.
clan. For instance, the Abazigaba clan was 93.64 per cent Hutu and 6.12 per cent Tutsi, while the Abasinga clan was 86.23 per cent Hutu and 13.62 per cent Tutsi, and the Abanyiginya clan was 40 per cent of Tutsi. It is reasonable to think that the multi-ethnic character of the clans emerged from the process by which power had been expanding from Central Rwanda.

The Nyiginya kingdom, which was to expand its territory over Rwanda, was originally established in Central Rwanda (Nduga) by one of the biggest clans, the Abanyiginya (Figure 2). The date of establishment, however, has been contested among scholars. According to David Newbury, the first Rwandan king was Ruganzu Bwimba, who, according to Alexis Kagame, ruled around 1312–1345, whereas Vansina estimated around 1458–82. The earlier territory of the Nyiginya kingdom was smaller than present-day Rwanda; by around 1700, the territory of the Nyiginya kingdom only covered about 14 per cent of the post-colonial Rwandan territory. The power of the Nyiginya kingdom was not consistent; the further one travelled from Central Rwanda, the less influence was exerted from the centre of the kingdom and more autonomy to be found. The Nyiginya kingdom was not very strong and was surrounded by other kingdoms. These kingdoms occasionally allied with each other to attack another kingdom in an attempt to seize territory. For instance, the Gisaka kingdom in the east made two ‘marriage alliances’ with the Nyiginya kingdom; but at other times, Gisaka fought against Nyiginya.

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13 Jan Vansina, ‘Historical Tales (Ibiteekerezo) and the History of Rwanda’, History in Africa 27 (2000): 413.
The Nyiginya kingdom started to expand its territory along with the formation of hierarchical state power. According to Catharine Newbury, the expansion of the territory and the increase of the power of the Nyiginya kingdom could be attributed to the development of military power, the ideology of Mwami worship and the establishment of the political hierarchy. The king, the Mwami, was at the top of the hierarchy, reigning with ‘absolute power’. He was Rwanda itself, regarded as a sacred being sent by Imana (God). Gérard Prunier relates that when Gustav Adolf Von Götzen, the first European to reach Rwanda, met Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri and shook hands, the Rwandans were frightened not only because a stranger had touched the holy body of the Mwami, but he had also shaken the Mwami’s body. Since the Mwami was considered to represent Rwanda itself, they were afraid of earthquakes.

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16 Newbury, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda’: 264, Figure 4.
caused by Von Götzen shaking his hand.\textsuperscript{19} The \textit{Mwami}'s authority was represented by a sacred drum, the \textit{Kalinga}.\textsuperscript{20}

Even though the \textit{Mwami} was said to possess absolute power, there were others immediately below him in the hierarchy. First, he needed a queen-mother to ‘share the royal prerogative’ and a group of Tutsi, the \textit{Abiiru}, who upheld the secret rules and traditions of the court and possessed the power to decide the next king.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, there were three kinds of chiefs, dealing respectively with cattle, land and people: (a) \textit{batware b’ubutaka} (chiefs of the landholding), (b) \textit{batware b’ingabo} (chiefs of men) and (c) \textit{batware b’inka} (chiefs of the pastures). Under these chiefs were countless sub-chiefs who were in charge of each hill. Not all the sub-chiefs were Tutsi; some chiefs of the land were Hutu.\textsuperscript{22} Even though Rwanda was a relatively centralised state, this did not mean that all Tutsi nobles blindly followed the king. For instance, there were many cases in which the Tutsi nobles fought against \textit{Mwami} Musinga.\textsuperscript{23}

The hierarchy of the kingdom was based on several social institutions; one of the most important was the patron-client relationship called \textit{ubuhake}. It was a contract between a client/vassal (\textit{umugarugu}), who was inferior in terms of social status, and a patron/overlord (\textit{shebuya}), who was superior; the client constructed the patron’s hut, cut timber and served him in return for protection and aid from the patron. \textit{Ubugake} could exist between Tutsi and Tutsi, or between Tutsi and Hutu, with different meanings attached to the relationship:

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{20} ‘Kalinga was decorated with the testicles of slain enemies and to dare revolt against the King was not only an outrage but a sacrilege’: Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{21} Queen-mother was chosen among the wives of \textit{Mwami} in order to support the heir of \textit{Mwami}. She did not have to be the biological mother of the heir. Maquet, \textit{Premise}, pp. 126–7.


\end{flushright}
For a Hutu, [ubuhake] involved at least a year of full-time servitude doing physical and menial work followed by years of part-time service at corvée labour of two days out of five, later on, one day of seven. A Hutu’s tasks included the heavy work of cultivating, burden-bearing, carrying the overlord of members of his house in litters, etc. A Tutsi vassal did not perform heavy physical work, although a Tutsi’s tasks could be the same menial ones that Hutu also performed, the rule being that the more distinguished and rich the Tutsi establishment concerned the more likely it was that the vassals who were body-servants and servants in charge of child-tending, beer preparation and other domestic tasks would also be Tutsi. Poorer Tutsi might also be cowherds like Hutu so that there was an additional similarity between some Tutsi and the Hutu as vassals. [T]here were a few Hutu overlords who had Hutu vassals themselves. *Ubuhake* should, however, be viewed as a wide range of customary exactions and rewards in which the Tutsi in general had all the favour and advantage, since they were not only vassals but also overlords at the same time … a Hutu’s cow or two were easily recalled by an overlord who wished to flee with his moveable property or just as easily confiscated by those in power who wished to punish his overlord by confiscating all his cows including those he had assigned to his vassals. *Ubuhake* was, therefore, an economic-political institution for the Tutsi who received its major economic benefits and made use of its political possibilities. For the Hutu it was an economic institution without political uses or benefits.²⁴

Besides *ubuhake*, there were other institutions of land tenure: *ubukonde* was land cleared by individuals or inherited by descendants, while *igikingi* was land granted by the *Mwami* and the court. As explained below, *ubukonde* was gradually replaced by *igikingi* as the kingdom expanded and the power of the chiefs in the region increased.²⁵

During the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri from 1860 to 1895, a strong army was established to conquer the neighbouring kingdoms. The way in which the chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed was based on favour. Around twenty chiefs and sub-chiefs of the Abanyiginya Tutsi, dispatched by the central court, began to impose control over the region, which brought about a ‘greater social stratification’.²⁶ To legitimise the hierarchy of the kingdom and Tutsi supremacy, several myths of Rwanda’s origins were told, for example:

According to a dynastic poem entitled ‘The Story of the Origins’, the history of Rwanda begins with the reign of Kigwa, who descended from heaven and sired three sons – Gatwa, Gahutu and Gatutsi. To choose his successor Kigwa

²⁴ Codere, *Biography*, pp. 18–19.
²⁶ Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’: 19.
decided to entrust each of his sons with a pot of milk to watch over during the night. When dawn came it turned out that Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had gone to sleep and split his milk; only the watchful Gatutsi had stayed up through the night to keep guard over his milk. To Kigwa this was conclusive evidence that Gatutsi should be his successor and be forever free of menial tasks. Gahutu was to be his serf. As for Gatwa, who showed himself so utterly unreliable, his station in society was to be that of a pariah.27

However, the expansion of the Nyiginya kingdom and its interactions between local polities were varied in each region. The expansion of the kingdom and the change of the previous land-tenure system into a more exploitative form resulted in the differentiation of the Tutsi and the Hutu in the south-west. According to Catharine Newbury who conducted her fieldwork in Kinyaga, south-western Rwanda, ‘cattle-oriented groups with links to the central Rwandan court’ were referred to as ‘Tuutsi [sic]’. The practice of ubuhake was introduced to Kinyaga during Rwabugiri’s reign; local leaders who had previously enjoyed a high degree of autonomy were put under the authority of the chiefs appointed by the Mwami. The older, ubukonde, form of land tenure was replaced by igikingi and the chiefs extended control over most of the hills by using ubuhake and igikingi.28

In the east, clan differences remained more important than ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, the kingdom of Gisaka was another Tutsi dynasty and a strong rival of the Nyiginya kingdom until the mid-nineteenth century.29 Gisaka had fought against the Nyiginya kingdom; therefore, the people of Gisaka had ‘a strong sense of their own identity and developed an enduring tradition of cultural autonomy from central Rwanda’.30 Eventually, Gisaka was conquered by the Nyiginya kingdom in the late nineteenth century, probably around 1867.31 After conquest, Nyiginya chiefs were sent from Central Rwanda to control Gisaka. One of my interviewees in Eastern Province told me that his great-grandfather was one of the chiefs sent to Gisaka at the time: ‘My great grandfather was Kanuma. After Gisaka was conquered by Rwanda

28 Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’.
30 Newbury, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda’: 264.
around 1850–52, the court of Nyanza sent chiefs to Gisaka. At the time, Gisaka people felt reprisals from Rwanda.\footnote{32 Interview with Nicolas, 6 December 2011.}

The court also extended power to the north and the north-west, but there the reactions against the Nyiginya expansion were more intense due to ‘strong local solidarities’.\footnote{33 Newbury, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda’: 262.} In the north, there were several decentralised Hutu principalities.\footnote{34 Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, pp. 19–20, and David Newbury, ‘Editor’s Introduction: Situating the Rwandan Court at the Time of Musinga’s Accession to Power,’ in \textit{Defeat}, Des Forges, pp. xxiii–xxxvi.} The influence of the Nyiginya kingdom was not sufficient; since the practice of \textit{ubuhake} had not previously existed in the region, the imposition of court rule through \textit{ubuhake} did not go smoothly.\footnote{35 Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, p. 29.} The expansion of the Nyiginya kingdom thus generated local resistance and the chiefs sent during Rwabugiri’s reign found it difficult to impose taxation.\footnote{36 Danielle de Lame, \textit{A Hill among a Thousand: Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), p. 45.} The meaning of the word \textit{bahinza}, which originally meant ‘independent men’ and referred to Hutu polities in the north-west, changed to imply that someone was a ‘rebel’ or a ‘traitor’, as the region was incorporated under the \textit{Mwami}’s power.\footnote{37 Codere, \textit{Biography}, p. 18.} The resistance persisted during the nineteenth century up to the 1920s when the court even had to ask the Europeans for modern weapons to suppress the opposition in the north.\footnote{38 Newbury, ‘Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda’, and Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, pp. 58–61.} Even in the 1940s, a Catholic father who stayed in Rwaza mission in Ruhengeri testified that ‘in the north, Hutu opposed to the authority which was exclusively Tutsi.’\footnote{39 ‘Quelques souvenirs vécus au Rwanda’, by Reuresse, 12 December 1996, \textit{Témoignages de confrères sur l’histoire du Rwanda 1950–1960}, Archives of the Society of Missionaries of Africa (hereinafter A.G.M.Afr.), Rome (my translation).}

As such, pre-colonial Rwanda was characterised by the tensions between the Nyiginya kingdom and its peripheries. The regions in Rwanda were quite diverse in terms of socio-political systems and their relationship with the kingdom. As Frederik Barth argued, the movement of people was important to shape ethnic boundaries;\footnote{40 Fredrik Barth (ed.), \textit{Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference} (Oslo: Johansen & Nielsen Boktrykkeri, 1969), Introduction.} basically the conquest by, and domination of, the Nyiginya kingdom by sending
chiefs from the court shaped the boundary between the chiefs and local people. During this process of the central court’s power consolidation in the peripheries, forced labour (uburetwa) was introduced, land contract (igikingi) replaced the previous form of land tenure (ubukonde), and the client-patron system (ubuhake) was introduced and became more unequal. During this ‘colonisation’ by the Nyiginya kingdom, Hutu identification emerged among local population in the form of differentiating themselves from the Nyiginya Tutsi chiefs who had been sent from the centre. This was the Rwanda which the Europeans ‘discovered’ in the end of nineteenth century.

The ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’, German Colonisation and the Formation of the Rwandan State

This section will attempt to illustrate the ways in which the already existing ethnicity was articulated and hardened through European colonisation: in particular, how the policies derived from European perceptions of Rwandan politics, ethnicity and history, and their interactions with the Rwandans, further shaped ethnic construction. Even though the German period of colonisation was not very long compared to the Belgian period which followed, the influence the Germans had on Rwanda was not insubstantial by means of introducing the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ and supporting the Nyiginya kingdom.

One of the most important legacies of colonisation was that the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ was brought to Rwanda. The Royal Geographical Society in London carried out expeditions between the mid-1850s and the late 1860s, when Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke were sent to search for the source of the Nile. Speke claimed that the civilisation of the Great Lakes in Africa was brought by the Hamitic race coming southwards from Ethiopia; Speke based his claim on the following passage from the book of Genesis:

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42 Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’, and *idem*, *Cohesion of Oppression*.
The sons of Noah who came out of the ark were Shem, and Ham, and Japheth: Ham was the father of Canaan. These three were the sons of Noah, and their descendants spread over the whole earth. Noah, who was the first tiller of the soil, planted a vineyard. He drank so much of the wine that he became drunk and lay naked inside his tent. Ham, father of Canaan, saw his father naked, and went out and told his two brothers. Shem and Japheth took a cloak, put it on their shoulders and walking backwards, and covered their father’s naked body. They kept their faces averted, so that they did not see his nakedness. When Noah woke from his drunkenness, and learnt what his young son had done to him, he said: ‘Cursed is Canaan. Most servile of Slaves shall he be to his brothers.’

However, according to Prunier, it was Sir Harry Johnston, the first British administrator of the Uganda Protectorate, that linked ‘the initial Speke theory and the late nineteenth century intellectual fantasies’ by claiming that the kingdoms were founded by ‘pastoral invaders’.

According to this hypothesis, the Tutsi and the Hutu were regarded as racially different groups who started to inhabit Rwanda in different periods. The ancestors of the Twa were regarded as the first inhabitants of Rwanda, dating from as early as 2000 BC. They were hunter-gatherers, living in the forests. Around 1000 AD, Bantu-speaking peasants were said to have arrived in Rwanda. By the fifteenth century, the Bantu speakers, from whom the Hutu are descended, had established several kingdoms. In the sixteenth century, the Hamitic dwellers around the Horn of Africa began moving southwards, and ‘invaded’ Rwanda and established the kingdom.

This was the Rwanda ‘found’ by the Germans in the end of the nineteenth century. In 1894, a German count, Gustav Adolf von Götzen, arrived in Rwanda from the eastern border. The initial German intention of visiting Rwanda was to

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secure the borders shared with British Uganda and Belgian Congo. When he entered Rwanda, von Götzen, who later became governor of German East Africa, noted:

The history of Rwanda is legendary and obscure … We have heard discussion of great migrations of Hamitic peoples who came from Abyssinia and Galla countries, who dispersed in a southwesterly direction with vast herds of long-horned cattle, and who conquered the lands between the lakes. But one can only determine with great difficulty, if even at all, if these changes occurred two hundred, five hundred, or one thousand years ago … Besides this ruling class is the great mass of the local population, the agriculturist Wahutu, a tribe of Bantu Negros who have been living here since time immemorial.\footnote{Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 71.}

In March 1897, the Nyiginya court accepted the German flag and the Germans established a residency in Kigali in 1907, where Richard Kandt became the first Resident. A compromise was signed in 1900 to settle the Rusizi-Kivu border between German Ruanda and the Belgian Congo. In 1910, a conference was organised in Brussels to fix the borders among British Uganda, German East Africa and the Belgian Congo; as a result, the Germans and the Nyiginya kingdom had to cede some regions to Congo.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 214–20.}

The perceptions that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and that Rwanda was a centralised kingdom of the Tutsi affected the German policy of indirect rule after Rwanda became the German colony of Ruanda-Urundi in 1899. Usually, indirect rule was adopted due to the administrative and financial burden posed by the alternative of direct rule, and also due to the consideration of ‘the free will of the people’.\footnote{Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, Journal of African History 44(1) (2003): 8.} The reasons why the Germans adopted indirect rule were similar: first, Germans thought the Nyiginya kingdom in Rwanda was effectively centralised; that is, if they had abolished the role of the Mwami or forced him to retire, they might have received a huge protest and resistance from local people. Furthermore, there were not enough administrative officers in German East Africa, which was expanded with the acquisition of Rwanda. For these reasons, the Germans decided that indirect rule was more efficient.\footnote{Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 48–9.}
Colonisation benefited the Nyiginya leaders, since it corresponded with the period when the kingdom faced several internal problems. With the death of Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri in 1895, turbulence began over his succession. A wife of Rwabugiri and the Queen Mother, Kanjogera, was supposed to support the young son-in-law and heir of Rwabugiri, Rutarindwa; instead, she and her brother, Kabare, carried out a coup, killing Rutarindwa and replacing him with her biological son, Musinga, as the new Mwami. Moreover, those peripheries conquered by Rwabugiri rejected the rule of the Rwandan court after his death. It meant that the court had to deal with the problem of consolidating its power in the peripheries, as well as with its own internal power struggles. The Resident in Kigali, Richard Kandt, decided to support and reinforce Musinga’s power, respecting the monarchy’s symbols and discouraging all subversion. With German support, Musinga suppressed several riots challenging his rule. For instance, in 1901, Rukura, claiming that he was the descendent of the Gisaka kingdom, led an independence movement against the Rwandan chiefs. Musinga asked for German intervention and a military expedition was conducted in May–June 1901 to ‘re-establish order’.

The arrival of Catholic missionaries – the White Fathers – complicated the relationship between the Rwandans and the Europeans. The White Fathers had come to Rwanda from the east, establishing a missionary post in Save in southern Rwanda at the turn of the twentieth century, followed by missions in Zaza in the south-east, Nyundo and Rwaza in the north-west and Mibirizi in the south-west; all of these were located in peripheries because the kingdom did not want the missionaries to establish churches near the central court in Nyanza. Actually, the relationships among the Nyiginya court, the local population and the missionaries differed from region to region. For instance, whereas in Rwaza, the Fathers used central authority to settle conflicts with the regional peasants, in Zaza (Gisaka), the people asked the

52 Des Forges, Defeat.
53 Newbury, ‘Editor’s Introduction’.
54 Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 253.
56 Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 248.
local priests to protect them from the demands of the new Nyiginya chiefs. Thus the missionaries sympathised with and took the side of the Gisaka people against their chiefs.  

In 1914, when the First World War broke out in Europe, the battle between the Germans and the Allies was carried out in Africa as well. Near Rwanda, the Germans attacked the Belgian troops stationed in the Lake Kivu region, which triggered the battle between the Germans and the Belgians. Together, the Belgians and the British defeated the Germans, and German rule in Rwanda came to an end in 1916. Though the Germans did not colonise Rwanda for very long, they were influential in that they brought the Hamitic Hypothesis into Rwanda and that, under German colonisation, the Nyiginya kingdom expanded its territory and extended its power.

Modernising Rwanda, Constructing Ethnicity

This section examines Belgian colonial rule, which has often been criticised of creating the ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Here, I propose that the Belgian policy of ‘modernising’ Rwanda resulted in the consolidation of Nyiginya power and the articulation of the already existing ethnic groups into more discriminatory and systematic categories, rather than simply inventing the ethnic groups from a vacuum. However, it is also important to remember here that Tutsi-Hutu relationship was not yet confrontational; rather, it was the internal rivalry amongst Tutsi leaders which was more remarkable at this time.

After German defeat in the First World War and the post-war establishment of the League of Nations, Britain and Belgium inherited the former German colonies; Ruanda-Urundi came under Belgian mandate in 1924. Negotiations with Britain did not go well; the Belgians gained what they had not originally wanted and furthermore, had to compromise to cede some territories to the British. According to Roger Louis, the Belgians originally did not want to acquire Ruanda-Urundi; instead, they wanted access to the Atlantic Ocean and the Congo River, and had planned to

59 Strictly speaking, Belgian rule was not ‘colonial’, since Rwanda was put under the mandate of international organisations. This thesis, nevertheless, uses the term ‘colonial’ to describe the Belgian period because (1) its nature was quasi-colonial, (2) the period was correspondent with colonisation in other parts of Africa, and (3) existing literature have used the term as well.
use the previously Belgian-occupied German territories as ‘a pawn to obtain the southern bank of the Congo River from Portugal’. The British, on the other hand, made a claim that eastern Rwanda should belong to Tanganyika rather than to Rwanda, due to its historical connections; their underlying objective was to obtain formerly German Tanganyika and eastern Rwanda for the British Cape-to-Cairo railway scheme. On 12 May 1919, Pierre Orts, a Belgian ambassador, and Lord Milner, a British colonial minister, began negotiations in Paris. The Belgians submitted the following requests for swapping the territories: first, the former German colonies that Belgium occupied (including Rwanda) would become British territory; instead, Belgium would obtain a part of Portuguese Congo; and Portugal would obtain a part of German territories from Britain as a compensation of their giving territory to Belgium. However, the Belgian attempt failed and the former German East Africa was divided between Britain and Belgium. Belgium was given Ruanda-Urundi and Britain obtained Tanganyika and eastern part of Rwanda (Gisaka). A campaign for the return of Gisaka to Rwanda was mounted by Mwami Musinga with the support of missionaries such as Father Léon Classe; Gisaka was eventually returned to Rwanda in December 1923.

The cession of Gisaka to Britain had an impact on both Gisaka and other regions in Rwanda, since the country was not yet internally coherent even at the beginning of the Belgian mandate. When the British moved into Gisaka in March 1922, they refused to accept the rule of Mwami Musinga; instead, the British established an autonomous administration independent from Musinga and appointed their own administrative chiefs, often those who had associations with the Gisaka kingdom. This was because the British thought the Nyiginya kingdom was not a legitimate power, since ‘the British found the local people flocking to them, as potential protectors against the exactions of the Nyiginya chiefs.’ Indeed, the

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62 Louis, Ruanda-Urundi.
63 Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 263.
64 Newbury, ‘The “Rwakayihura” famine’.
conquest and migration of Nyiginya chiefs actually contributed to maintaining Gisakan identification as a manifestation of opposition against the Rwandan court.66 A testimony of a Gisakan Tutsi elite interviewed by the Belgians in 1959 supports these points:

For several centuries, Rwanda and Gisaka had been allies, and at other times adversaries, over provinces in between them. Gisaka was truly a country with an historical language, consciously different from Rwanda or Urundi or other countries. When a Munyagisaka [Gisakan person] leaves his region, he would say ‘I’m going to Rwanda’ … Now, the grand chiefs are Banyarwanda; the majority of sub-chiefs are Banyarwanda. In Gisaka, the rich today are Munyarwanda, the poor is Munyagisaka … To solve the problems of Gisaka, it is necessary to recognise that Gisaka is a completely different country. Gisaka should be managed by the territorial administration of Kibungo [a territory in the east], assisted by Munyagisaka, and prepare for the future federation of Rwanda-Urundi-Gisaka. If Rwanda can demand its emancipation from Belgium, Gisaka also can demand the same from Rwanda.67

Moreover, the changes in European power and the secession of Gisaka inspired other regions to escape from the Nyiginya rule. In Kinyaga (in the south-west), some local elites thought they could use this opportunity to get rid of the Nyiginya chiefs.68 Therefore, even though the king Musinga protested to the Belgian king Albert I that the Europeans wanted to divide his country and children,69 Rwanda had not yet been established as coherent country.

The Belgians adopted the indirect rule policy in order to minimise administrative cost and to rule efficiently, thus incorporating Ruanda-Urundi into the colonial administration of the Belgian Congo. In 1925, Pierre Ryckmans, the first Belgian Resident in Burundi, explained the rationale of indirect rule as follows:

Legitimacy is more powerful than violence. The only smoothly functioning organ between us and the masses is the legitimate chiefs. They alone, because

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66 Newbury, ‘The “Rwakayihura” famine’. Even in 1957, a Belgian territorial Administrator reported that the British influence over the region had been notable: ‘Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi: Manifestations indigènes en région Gisaka (Lettre No. 1394/CONF.2/02/P. du 6-6-1957 de monsieur l’administrateur du territoire de Kibungu)’, 11 June 1957, Affaires Indigènes (hereinafter AI) 4379, Archives Africaines (hereinafter AA), Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Bruxelles, Belgium (hereinafter AMAE).
69 Chrétien, Great Lakes, pp. 261–2.
they are legitimate, can induce acceptance of necessary innovations … The presence of the king, the only one capable of conferring a legal, customary investiture upon a candidate of our choice, makes it possible for us to go forward without running the risk of being faced with a fatal impasse, without having to make an impossible choice between a rebellious legitimacy and an impotent submission … It is therefore not because of a pure love for tradition or local colour that we keep the native kings. Let their powers be curtailed if necessary, but let no one challenge their existence and outward prestige.70

The Belgian Congo was structured into provinces, districts and territories led by governors, commissioners and local administrators respectively. The colonial structure was highly centralised, dominated by the Ministry of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in Brussels and then by the Governor General of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi (Gouverneur Général du Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi) in Léopoldville.71 Ruanda-Urundi was put under the authority of Governor General of Ruanda-Urundi (Gouverneur Général du Ruanda-Urundi) in Usumbura. While the Rwandan hierarchy of Mwami, chiefs and sub-chiefs was maintained, the Belgian administration was set up in parallel: a Resident (Résident) was set up in Kigali and Territorial Administrators (Administrateur de Territoire) was created in each territory: Ruhengeri, Biumba, Gisenyi, Kigali, Kibungo, Shangugu, Nyanza, Gitarama, Kibuye and Astrida (Figure 3).72

72 After independence, the spelling of ‘Biumba’ was changed to ‘Byumba’, and ‘Shangugu’ to ‘Cyangugu’. ‘Astrida’ was renamed ‘Butare’ after independence and recently renamed yet again as ‘Huye’.
The Belgians introduced reforms to ‘modernise’ the country; however, these reforms restructured Rwandan society into a more repressive environment. The reforms were carried out under the Resident Georges Mortehan and the Governor-General of Ruanda-Urundi Charles Voisin to modernise the ‘traditional’ administrative systems. First, Belgium combined the roles of the three chiefs – that is, the chiefs of men, of cattle and of land – into one, in the belief that the dispersion of administrative power was neither efficient nor modern. As a result, the numbers of chiefs and sub-chiefs decreased from 65 chiefs and 1,043 sub-chiefs in 1933 to 45 chiefs and 559 sub-chiefs in 1959. Also, Hutu sub-chiefs were also replaced by

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74 Ibid, p. 123.
Tutsi ones, based on the Hamitic assumption.\textsuperscript{75} As a result, in 1959, 43 out of 45 chiefs over the country and 549 out of 559 sub-chiefs were Tutsi.\textsuperscript{76} Secondly, the Belgians tried to limit the practice of \textit{ubureetwa} (forced labour) because they thought that it needed to be modernised from its traditional form; therefore, the Belgians announced that each adult man could be constrained to do only a prescribed number of days of \textit{ubureetwa} service per year. This change, ironically, gave the opportunity to the chiefs and sub-chiefs to exploit their power more through \textit{ubuhake}, which was now expanded to the peripheries where \textit{ubuhake} had not existed before.\textsuperscript{77} With the introduction of a head tax in 1917, the local chiefs who were assigned to collect tax exploited people for their own benefits. Thus the Belgian ‘reforms’ restructured the Rwandan society into a more oppressive one.\textsuperscript{78} Several interviewees gave accounts on the oppressive nature of Rwandan society at the time. Gilbert, old man in Rukumberi, explained that the main problem when he was young was that the chiefs used to beat people with a stick (\textit{ikiboko}): when Hutu children had to serve food, or carried burdens for Tutsi children, they would be beaten eight times if they did not obey.\textsuperscript{79} Jean, originally from Astrida (Butare), recalled:

What was worrying at that time was the way they used to summon people. If you refused to come, they would beat you. This was something which was very hard for us at that time. There were Tutsis forming lines and when the Hutus came, they started to select people. Everyone selected the number he wanted to work for him……The Tutsis took a whole hill and then they said, ‘This is my hill. I will use this hill to look after my cows and graze them.’ If Hutus got goats and the goats went to that hill, they [Tutsis] caught them and beat them.\textsuperscript{80}

The memory of being beaten was accompanied by mentions of \textit{ubuhake}. Those who said they were Tutsi did not mention \textit{ubuhake} or talk about it badly.\textsuperscript{81} For instance, Alice explained that the king and chiefs made the people do work called \textit{iperi}, which

\textsuperscript{75} Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{76} Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, p. 27; Chrétien, \textit{Great Lakes}, p. 271, and Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{77} Chrétien, \textit{Great Lakes}, p. 271, and Newbury, ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’: 23.
\textsuperscript{78} Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, pp. 26–30.
\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Gilbert, 15 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Jean, 22 November 2011.
can be considered as *umuganda* today. According to her, the king gave sweet potatoes to those who came to work but punished those who did not come. She explained that ‘if you made a mistake, then they used the sticks to beat you.’ Her description made it seem that the work for the king and chiefs was considered to be ‘the proper thing to do’ and if you did not follow their orders, it was your fault, and you deserved to be beaten. Henri gave a more nuanced explanation of *ubuhake*:

> Some say it’s bad and other people said it’s good because it was like school where people came and met. Someone who was not intelligent or had no skill at the time could get some knowledge from the leaders at that time, but others refused and stayed home. Sometimes they got beaten. *Ubuhake* was voluntary, not a forced activity. [It] was [in our] culture because every child had to go in order to get something from *ubuhake*. Someone who did not want *ubuhake* was called *igicucu* [stupid] because it was thought that if you went to work for other people, you could gain some knowledge from them. It existed before. It depended on the choice of people who went to *ubuhake*. For instance, you could choose to have cows before you started work. It depended on what you wanted before making an *ubuhake* contract. If you wanted a cow, you had to work for two years. Even white people used poor people to work for them. Poor people worked for rich people to get something.

It was striking that Hutu interviewees gave me completely different accounts. Isaac defined *ubuhake* as ‘the way Tutsis picked Hutus to farm for them for a whole month without working for yourself’. According to him, Hutus spent long hours cooking, making fences and farming for the Tutsis; as a result, they missed the opportunity to cultivate their own crops and thus remained poor. Simply put, he said, ‘rich people dominated the poor ones by *ubuhake*.’ Louis also defined *ubuhake* as slavery: ‘the Hutus were cultivating for the Tutsis and did not get any money from the Tutsis.’

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82 *Umuganda* is community work that everybody is obliged to carry out on the last Saturday of every month. She did not mention *iperi* as *ubuhake*, but I assume so from the context.
83 Interview with Alice, 3 November 2011.
84 Second interview with Henri, 11 December 2011. Academically, *ubuhake* is considered not voluntary but obligatory.
85 Second interview with Isaac, 5 December 2011.
86 Interview with Louis, 28 November 2011. Interesting contrast is that, in Codere’s work, some Hutu spoke positively about *ubuhake*. A man testified that he himself had asked his Tutsi master for *ubuhake*; another man showed his gratitude for *ubuhake* work, and a woman remembered her Tutsi master as being kind. Therefore, my Hutu interviewees’ accounts are much more radical and negative versions of the Tutsis’ oppression of the Hutu. It may be because the post-independence Revolutionary ideology of negative primordialism reinforced
Under Belgian colonisation, the intensifying power of the Mwami’s court affected people’s sense of identification. As the Rwandan court was tightening its administrative control over people, local resistance continued through the 1920s in the peripheral regions. Their opposition took various forms, including open rebellion. Under this ‘dual colonialism’ by the Europeans and the Tutsi court, the oppressed Hutu, who had lacked collective awareness as Hutu, gradually came to see themselves as such, a development that Catharine Newbury has named ‘the cohesion of oppression’. After the introduction of identity cards in the early 1930s, differences between Tutsi and Hutu became even more rigid and discriminatory.

Even though ethnicity was fixed around this period, it nevertheless does not mean that ethnic distribution was even, over all of Rwanda. It is important to note that the nature and the degree of ethnicity were different across the country. The national average of ethnic composition in 1959 meant that the Tutsi comprised slightly over 16 per cent of the population, with the Hutu slightly less than 83 per cent and the Twa under 1 per cent. However, Tutsi percentages varied from region to region: 5.62 per cent in Gisenyi, 8.37 per cent in Ruhengeri, 12.67 per cent in Biumba, 12.79 per cent in Kigali, 15.77 per cent in Kibungo, 19.34 per cent in Nyanza, 22.08 per cent in Shangugu, 22.97 per cent in Astrida and 30.71 per cent in Kibuye. As previously explained, in the north and the west where Hutu polities had existed and were opposed to the Nyiginya power consolidation, the ethnic fault-line was drawn between the local people as Hutu and the Nyiginya chiefs as Tutsi; while

the image of Hutu autochthony and victimhood during the colonial period, and then further reinforced as a sense of bitterness and critique of present-day RPF dominance where all Hutu should feel negative about their ethnicity. Codere, The Biography, interviews 28, 32 and 42. After all, as Anita Kasabova said: ‘We remember some things rather than others because they stand in a sense-making relation of antecedent and consequent.’ Anita Kasabova, ‘Memory, Memorials, and Commemoration’, History and Theory 47(3) (2008):338. Further research on memory is needed.

87 Newbury, Cohesion of Oppression.
88 Codere, Biography, p. 13, and Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, Ruanda-Urundi: Geography and History (Brussels: Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information, 1960), p. 37. Even though there was no huge difference of income between Hutu and ordinary Tutsi (who comprised at least 90 per cent of all Tutsi) as Chrétien emphasises, the percentage is still important to remember when we look at the pattern of violence later in Chapter 5: Chrétien, Great Lakes, p. 285.
in the east where Gisaka leaders were also Tutsi, ethnicity was not as important as clan difference.\(^{89}\)

*Mwami* Musinga was an obstacle to Belgian modernisation. He had sided with the Germans against the Belgians during the First World War, and refused conversion to Christianity and cooperation with the Belgians. As a result, in 1931, the Belgian colonial administration expelled him from Rwanda and enthroned a new *Mwami* Mutara Rudahigwa, a son of Musinga. The Belgian administration chose Rudahigwa because the administration wanted a new *Mwami* who was young and more open towards western culture. This young *Mwami* obeyed the Belgians and the relationship between the Belgians and the Tutsi rulers became more settled.\(^{90}\)

As explored later in Chapter 4, the post-Second World War Trusteeship of the United Nations pressured Belgium to ‘democratise’ Rwanda, which resulted in disappointment for the Tutsi leaders. After several resolutions demanding the political democratisation of Rwanda were adopted in the UN General Assembly,\(^{91}\) Belgium reluctantly introduced some reforms. On 14 July 1952, as a partial democratisation, a decree was announced to set the representative councils on each administrative level: Sub-chiefdom Councils (*Conseils de Sous-Chefferie*) for sub chiefs, Chiefdom Councils (*Conseils de Chefferie*) for chiefs, Territorial Councils (*Conseils de Territoire*) for territories, and a Superior Council of the Country (*Conseil Supérieurs du Pays*: CSP) for national level.\(^{92}\) First, electoral colleges were selected for each sub-chiefdom from the sub-chiefs; then, the sub-chief councils were formed by the popular vote of the electoral colleges; the chief councils were chosen from the sub-chief council members; territorial councils were selected from the chief council members; and a CSP of 32 members plus the *Mwami* was formed from the selected members of the territorial councils (Figure 4).

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\(^{89}\) These regional differences of ethnic composition are important to remember as Chapter 5 details regional difference of violence in 1959.


\(^{91}\) For the documents related to the UN Trusteeship system, see Appendix 1.

Several problems arose from this reform. First, these institutions were just advisory organs and thus could not give impact on policy-making. As a result, it did not satisfy the Tutsi leaders, who started to demand a transfer of power from the Belgians to themselves. As a result, the relationship between the Belgian colonial administration and the Tutsi leaders grew tense. The case of the nomination of Muhikira as a chief clearly illustrates this. In 1957, Muhikira was nominated head of the chiefdom of Bashumba-Nyakare in the territory of Astrida by the Mwami; in 1958, this nomination was approved by Belgian Governor General Jean-Paul Harroy.

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93 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, p. 187.
94 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 81–3.
On 23 June 1959, however, his nomination was cancelled by the Belgian administration because he was judged to have ‘contributed to racial hatred and became a trouble element’ and therefore the Resident of Rwanda decided not to approve Muhikira’s position. However, at this point, the Belgians considered that, even though the king was seeking the transfer of power, his attitude was not so anti-Belgian.

More significant was the rivalry among the Tutsi leaders in the CSP, especially between Mwami Rudahigwa and the ‘progressive’ Tutsi leaders such as Prosper Bwanakweri. Belgian documents report that in 1955, the relationship between the Mwami and Bwanakweri worsened over the issue of economic and budget integration with the Belgian Congo: the former preferred to retain Rwandan autonomy from the Congo and the latter preferred stronger integration. The king thus wanted to eliminate Bwanakweri in order to gain greater control in the CSP, but Bwanakweri ‘enjoyed a great prestige and support among chiefs, évolués and Kabgayi [missionaries]’. Indeed, at this point, the Belgian administrators saw Bwanakweri as an ‘excellent collaborator’.

The establishment of the councils in 1952 also disappointed a few of the Hutu elites, because the Hutu had minimal representation in the higher councils; however, the Tutsi leaders and the Hutu elites were not yet so confrontational at this time. The Hutu leaders had high expectations regarding the reforms. However, most of the councils’ seats were occupied by Tutsis. By 1959, out of 1,100 sub-chief councils’ members, 1,050 were Tutsis (95.5 per cent), with only 50 Hutus (4.5 per cent); there were 81 Tutsis and 1 Hutu occupying 82 chief council seats; 125 Tutsi and 30 Hutus in the territorial councils, and 31 Tutsis and only 2 Hutu in the CSP. Thereafter, those who were disappointed by the 1952 reforms started to participate in political activism, beginning in the mid-1950s. For example, Anastase Makuza, the first Hutu who received higher education in the Belgian Congo, returned to Rwanda in 1955.

95 He was known to be associated with anti-Belgian leaders. ‘Lettre de Muhikira à le ministre du Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi’, 15 Octobre 1959; ‘Recours Muhikira Eugène ex-chef au Ruanda’, 4 November 1959, and ‘de Harroy à le ministre du Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi’, 11 December 1959, all in AI4373, AMAE (my translation).
96 ‘Note sur la situation politique au Ruanda’, May 1955, AI4372, AMAE.
97 Ibid (my translation). An interviewee of Codere also reported that Mwami saw Bwanakweri as his enemy: Codere, Biography, p. 131.
98 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 82.
Having finished his administrative studies at university, he sought a post in one of the administration and research centres, where the posts were all occupied by Tutsis. He ended up with being employed as a typist. Lemarchand concluded that the dissatisfaction and complaints of those elites like Makuza later pushed them to join the political movement.  

Conclusion
This chapter has explained the ways in which the state-formation in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda constructed and further articulated ethnicity. We should take a nuanced constructivist approach to understand ethnicity during this period, because neither primordialist nor extreme constructivist approaches are relevant: ethnicity was not primordial, nor was it solely invented by the Europeans. Pre-colonial Rwanda was not free from oppression and violence. Internal factions were active amongst the Tutsi nobles in their power struggles. The Nyiginya kingdom also engaged in struggles with neighbouring kingdoms with a view to expand its territory. The kingdom, however, was not able to control the peripheral regions, even in the early colonial period, because of the tensions that existed between the core of the kingdom and the peripheries; these territorial tensions were linked with the internal frictions amongst the Tutsi chiefs and nobles.

Far from being an instrumental and invented concept, the interactions between the Europeans and the Rwandans exacerbated an already extant ‘moral ethnicity’. Mwami Yuhi Musinga and other Tutsi nobles tried to exploit and play the European powers to extend and consolidate their rule. While the Europeans affected the power balance among the Rwandans, they also introduced the concept of the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ to Rwanda. Therefore, as Catharine Newbury has summarised, the Rwandan hierarchy was not a European invention, but the Europeans encouraged further ‘hierarchialization’ and ‘bureaucratization’ of the existing power structure.  

In this sense, Rwanda was not a unique case in Africa where ‘the colonial state imposed a tribal template upon its new domains, and developed its own identity codification, seeking simplification, regrouping apparently similar entities, and

99 Ibid, p. 139.
100 Newbury, ‘Colonialism, Ethnicity and Rural Political Protest’: 258.
rewarding collaborating intermediaries.’ ¹⁰¹ The period of the Revolution and decolonisation which is to be examined in the following chapters is another important conjuncture in reconstructing ethnicity in Africa.

¹⁰¹ Young, ‘Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship’, p. 250.
Chapter 3

Politicising Ethnicity:
Party Politics, Revolution and Democratisation

The past time will never return. You lost your time not to work for you and your children; all you want will never return. Democracy has begun in Rwanda and no one can reject it.¹

The situation is really bad for us. Delaying the elections to an unknown date, the UN leaves the liberal camp to the hands of the Mwami to re-establish the regime of terror. We are not at all the candidate of martyrs! A certain fraction of people is likely to fall again under the coup of Tutsi. We don’t trust the fairness of UN delegations. They make an arrangement so that the elections are held when the conditions are most favourable to UNAR. You are the only person whom we can trust. We want to organise a big coup which will convince Usumbura and Brussels that the games are done and for that we need your help.²

Introduction

This chapter examines the question of what factors contributed to the polarisation of political parties that divided the parties into the ethnic line and brought about the politicisation of ethnicity in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Putting it precisely, how was the ‘interior architecture’ of ethnic groups constructed and how did ethnicity become ‘political tribalism’? As reviewed in the Introduction, John Lonsdale has described the ‘interior architecture’ of ethnic groups as the domestic structure of those who make up an ethnic group to be belonged to, compared with the ‘exterior architecture’ in which colonial officers and other external actors shape the boundaries of ethnic groups.³ Analysing the history of the Mau Mau in Kenya, Berman and Lonsdale showed that uprisings, revolutions and the transformation of ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’ had taken place through the dynamic intertwining of various political and organisational factors.⁴

¹ Imvaho, no. 5, 15 March 1960, AI 4368, AA, AMAE (my translation).
³ The ‘exterior architecture’ will be examined in Chapter 4.
⁴ Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa (London:
As well as Kenya, revolution and other political changes comprised an important part of East African politics in the 1960s. Revolution is a political process in which public dissatisfaction with the old regime triggers a quick change of ruling group ‘in the name of, but also by means of’ the majority population, through disseminating a particular ideology of revolution and the use of violence.  

Democratisation is the process of introducing democracy in which free and fair elections are contested among political parties with mass participation; some political scientists attest that the transitional process to democracy, particularly in the post-Cold War period, ‘often give[s] rise to warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflict’. The underlying assumption here is the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, that is, that ethnic/national violence is often brought about not from ancient hatred or ‘popular rivalries’, but from the politically instrumentalised manipulation by the elites. Historically, in Burundi, the nationalist and royalist party, Union Pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) competed against the Christian Democracy Party (CDP); UPRONA won the legislative election and formed an autonomous government under the Tutsi King Mwambutsa in 1961; however, the government was overthrown and the monarchy was abolished in 1966. As for Uganda, the Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) competed for power; the latter won the election with the support of the Buganda party (Kabaka Yekka) and Milton Obote became prime minister for an independent Uganda. The UPC, however, betrayed the Buganda later; the royal palace was attacked and the king went to exile in 1966. As such, political changes took place in several East African countries in the 1960s, in which violence and politicisation of ethnicity often featured.

In Rwanda, as Chapter 1 summarised, the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s consisted of democratisation and the Revolution, in which ethnicity became politicised and violent. The period from 1957 to 1966 witnessed the establishment of political parties, the first inter-ethnic violence in 1959 which is referred as muyaga.

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([a] strong but variable wind, with unpredictable destructive gusts),\(^8\) the overthrow of the Mwami by a Hutu coup d’état in 1961, independence in 1962, a mass killing of the Tutsi citizens by the Hutu in the winter of 1963–64 and the establishment of one-party rule by 1965–66. The existing literature tends to regard the Revolution as inevitably stemming from the Tutsi–Hutu ethnic conflict constructed during the colonial period; moreover, though the literature has studied political parties in Rwanda, the nature of, and the relationship among, the political parties needs further analysis.

This chapter thus argues that the ethnic split did not cause the Revolution, but the other way round; various domestic factors affected the processes of the Revolution and the generation of ‘political tribalism’. There were also other dynamics, such as intra-Tutsi rivalry and a radical–moderate split. However, responses of Tutsi leadership to the moderate demands of reforms by the Hutu elites, different interests and priorities on types and timings of democratisation and decolonisation, the victory of PARMEHUTU, fluid and fragile relationships amongst the political parties, intra-party factions, opportunistic strategies, weak moderate influences and the imminence of independence all pushed the Tutsi–Hutu split to the fore. As such, the rivalry amongst the Tutsi leaders before the Revolution converged with ethnic politicisation and polarisation, eliminating Tutsi political representation and leaving the rivalry amongst the Hutu leaders to post-colonial Rwanda. By arguing so, this chapter aims at not only providing a more detailed account of the party politics and the Revolution in Rwanda, but also at modifying the primordialistic assumption that the Revolution and the ethnic split were somewhat inevitable, by showing the importance of looking at both inter-/intra-ethnic relationship and alternatives which could have been taken at the time.

First, this chapter looks at the infancy of party politics, answering how and why political movements started; what they originally demanded for, and what were their political affiliations. The chapter then moves on to the turbulent period of the Revolution to examine the mixed rivalry and alliance among the parties; the failed alternatives of proposing the federation, the constitutional monarchy and power

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sharing; democracy as legitimising doctrine of the Revolution, and the intensified and politicised ethnic narratives. The final section will see the elimination of Tutsi opposition and the shift to intra-Hutu rivalry and the establishment of the Revolutionary ideology in post-colonial Rwanda.

Intra-Tutsi Conflict and the Naissance of Political Parties

This section looks at the beginning of party politics to demonstrate that there were dynamics of conflict different from the ethnic one: the conflict took place not between the Tutsi and the Hutu leaders but amongst the Tutsi leaders over power and socio-political systems; also, the relationships between Tutsi traditional leaders and the Belgian administration had begun to deteriorate. The Mwami and the Tutsi Abiiru did not take seriously the inequality between the Tutsi and the Hutu; instead, they focused on the inequality between the Europeans and the Rwandans and therefore demanded early transfer of power from the Belgians. To the contrary, the Tutsi ‘progressive’ leaders demanded the reforms of socio-political systems; therefore, they had conflicting views and interests with the Mwami and other Tutsi traditional leaders. Meanwhile, missionary school-educated Hutu leaders began to emerge and tried to bring attention to the inequality between Tutsi and Hutu. However, these Hutu leaders did not attack the monarchy aggressively, nor were they confrontational towards all the Tutsi. The situation started to become tense with the death of Mwami Mutara Rudahigwa, who had exercised a somewhat unifying power among the Rwandans. His death aggravated the tension between the Belgian administration and the Abiiru, who organised political demonstrations. Political parties were established, and the relationship between the Tutsi elites and the Belgian administration worsened. The political environment of Rwanda had thus become unstable by the end of October 1959.

As briefly mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, the Tutsi leaders divided into traditionalists and ‘progressive’ leaders. Representing the former, Mwami Mutara Rudahigwa and the Tutsi nobles around him (the Abiiru) were mostly concerned about their relationship with Belgium. When the Tutsi aristocrats belonging to the Conseil Supérieur du Pay (CSP) published a ‘Mise au Point’ in February 1957, they

\footnote{As explained at the end of Chapter 2, the CSP was the advisory organ established by the}
demanded the transfer of power from the Belgian Trusteeship administration in order to train Rwandans immediately to prepare for self-government, to enlarge and develop secondary education and higher education to prepare the elite for the administration, and to eliminate the discrimination between white and black. The ‘Mise au Point’, however, was not yet an appeal to part company with the Belgians nor did it exhibit a confrontational attitude. Rather, because the Tutsi leaders were still planning to collaborate with the Belgian administration, the Belgians therefore thought the Rwandans’ demands were modest and even held up the possibility that the document had been written by Europeans due to its ‘good command of French’.

The view held by the *Mwami* and the *Abiiru* on ethnicity was similar to that of the positive primordialists and extreme constructivists; they acknowledged the ethnic difference between Tutsi and Hutu, but they did not regard it as problematic. On 17 and 18 May 1958 in Nyanza, the Tutsi *Abiiru* announced: ‘There is no brotherhood between the Tutsi and the Hutu. Rwanda had been a country dominated by the Tutsi for a long time. Therefore, focusing on the ethnic problem was the plot by foreigners who wanted to divide Rwanda.’ On 12 June, the *Mwami* also declared that there was no problem of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda; ‘the current Rwanda is Rwanda as it has been and should be.’ According to him, it is the ‘enemies of the country’ and the Europeans that tried to spread the propaganda of ethnic confrontation and divide the country. Considering the ethnic division was brought by the Europeans, the *Mwami* decided to abolish the distinction of Hutu and Tutsi from official documents. Even though his decision was never acted upon, these announcements showed that the Tutsi traditional rulers did admit but decided to ignore the existence of ethnic discrimination.

11 ‘Note pour monsieur le ministère’, 14 August 1957, AI4377, AA, AMAE (my translation).  
Several Tutsi ‘progressive’ leaders criticised the *Mwami* and the Tutsi traditional leaders and claimed that the inequality between Tutsi and Hutu should be recognised; these leaders were Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs who had received European education at missionary schools – the one in Astrida in particular – and they tended to have more progressive ideas of social equality and democracy. For instance, Prosper Bwanakweri wrote many articles to draw attention to ‘profound poverty’ in Rwanda.\(^\text{14}\) A Tutsi clergy, Mgr A. Bigirimwami, also admitted that the problem of inequality existed in Rwanda.\(^\text{15}\) Furthermore, Ndazaro Lazare emphasised the importance of political reforms, including the separation of judicial power from executive power, and the introduction of elections for chiefs, in order to reduce the chiefs’ abuse of power.\(^\text{16}\) Those claims were supported by some Belgian settlers in Rwanda: Albert Maus claimed that only the Tutsi were represented in the CSP, and that the Hutu should be allowed to join as well.\(^\text{17}\) These people regarded the ‘problem’ in Rwanda as the inequality between the two groups generated from the abuse of power by Tutsi chiefs and the discrimination against the Hutu. Therefore, the urgent issue recognised by those people was to improve the status of the Hutu through reforms. Since ‘self-government’ would result in the reinforcement of Tutsis’ exploitation of the Hutu, they did not want self-government for the foreseeable future, let alone independence.

In addition to producing Tutsi progressive leaders educated in the missionary schools, the role of the Catholic Church in the Revolution was critical, since the Church had become the seedbed of the Hutu elites. In the post-war period, a new generation of missionaries arrived in Rwanda; they, especially those of Flemish origin, felt sympathy towards the Hutu masses. André Perraudin, the Swiss Bishop of Kabgayi since 1955, was the most influential. Since the Hutu students who graduated from missionary school could not get jobs in administrational posts, the Church


\(^{16}\) Ndazaro Lazare, ‘Note à l’intention de monsieur Forgeur’, 06 January 1959, AI4370, AA, AMAE. Lazare was born in Kibungo in 1920, studied in Groupe Scolaire in Astrida and worked for the Belgian administration in Usumbura and Kigali.

provided opportunities for them. For instance, Aloys Munyangaju, a Hutu born in Butare in 1924, finished Petit Séminaire in Kabygai and studied philosophy for three years at Grand Séminaire in Nyakibanda and one year in Belgium. As editor of Soma, a journal written both in French and Kinyarwanda, he condemned the discrimination in Rwandan society and the abuse of power by the Tutsi chiefs. Born in Gitarama in 1924, Grégoire Kayibanda also graduated from missionary school, became editor of the journal Kinyamateka with the support of Bishop Perraudin, while Habyarimana Gitera, born in Astrida (Butare) in 1920, finished his education at Grand Séminaire in Nyakibanda and worked with the White Fathers there.

As such, the view of the Tutsi progressive elites and some Europeans were shared by, or influenced, the Hutu missionary-educated elites, who also began to demand social reform. On 24 March 1957, reacting against the ‘Mise au Point’, nine Hutu elites published their ‘Note on the Social Aspect of Indigenous Racial Problems in Rwanda’ (Note sur l’aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda); usually known as the Bahutu Manifesto, the document was one of the most important political statements in Rwandan history. Those elites condemned the discrimination against the Hutu by the Tutsi in Rwandan society: political discrimination through the monopoly of power and social discrimination through the monopoly of education. To solve these problems, the Manifesto proposed to abolish forced labour, encourage freedom of expression, codify customary law and incorporate the Hutu into Rwandan politics. Simply put, they demanded the promotion of Hutus as equal citizens of Rwanda.

Amongst these Hutu elites, Kayibanda and Gitera were the most important figures to establish incipient political organisations. The Belgians regarded

20 However, Longman reminds us of the fact that Perraudin did not support the Hutu elites blindly. He later replaced Kayibanda as editor of Kinyamateka with a moderate Tutsi, Justin Kalibwami: Longman, Christianity, p. 74.
Kayibanda as very intelligent, and was thus expected to ‘be a future chief of Hutu movement’, while Gitera was seen as courageous but unrealistic and ‘too unstable to become a true constructive Hutu leader’. While Gitera tends to be regarded as a populist, Gitera himself thought Kayibanda was too modest. Both of them established political organisations in their home town, but they were not influential beyond the regions at this point. Kayibanda established the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) in June 1957. The party stated its goals to be social and economic progress, promotion of education and the political participation of Hutus. In November, Gitera founded the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA). APROSOMA, whose influence was around Astrida (Butare), demanded the democratisation of the traditional system as represented by the royal drum (Kalinga) and the abolition of privilege and discrimination based on ‘caste’. Catharine Newbury recognised APROSOMA as a moderate party; however, indeed, APROSOMA was more active in criticising Tutsi rule than PARMEHUTU.

Both the Tutsi and Hutu leaders proposed political reforms; it is especially important to note here that at this point, the Hutu elites were not promoting revolution or violence, but simply political reforms. As detailed later in Chapter 4, since Belgium saw the necessity of revising its policies on Rwanda, a Working Group was established on 16 April 1959 to investigate political and social conditions. The Working Group, comprised of three Belgian politicians, visited Rwanda from 22 April and held hearings with a number of Rwandans. The CSP, which was dominated by Tutsi leaders, suggested that the form of future government should be a

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25 Ibid.
26 She wrote that moderates from both Tutsi and Hutu (APROSOMA and RADER) attempted to ‘downplay ethnicity and make an appeal to the “common people”’: Catharine Newbury, ‘Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda’, Africa Today 45(1) (1998): 13.
27 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, p. 254. For the origins of PARMEHUTU, see below in this chapter.
constitutional monarchy and then proceed on to internal autonomy. Hutu leaders such as Munyangaju emphasised the importance of reforms. Moreover, one of the (very few) Hutu members of the CSP, Anastase Makuza, also recommended that the only way to democratise the country was to introduce a constitutional monarchy. He also stressed the importance of distinguishing the Tutsi chiefs from ordinary Tutsi people (‘petite Tutsi’) and the Mwami in order to solve the problem peacefully. Based on these suggestions, the Working Group submitted a report proposing political reforms in which a constitutional monarchy should be established and in which the Mwami should ‘reign but not govern’.

Interview data supports the argument that the constitutional monarchy could have been a less violent option for post-colonial Rwanda as everybody who participated in the interviews remembered Rudahigwa favourably. Emmanuel remembers Rudahigwa as follows:

When he visited this area, he used to give the right [of way] to the cows and he [would pick] a way to walk and the cows followed him. When he stopped, he put the stick to where he stopped and that is the hill of cows where the cows might wander everywhere and no one was allowed to stop the cows walking and eating grass everywhere. The king, Rudahigwa, provided the hill of the cows. When there was a problem that neighbours did not let your cows pass through, you should let the king know and he came, took the stick and went in front of the cows. He then told the people who looked after the cows and then they scattered the cows and all the places where the cows scattered were identified as the hills for cows and nobody was allowed to forbid the cows from walking there.

30 Anastase Makuza, ‘Plaidoyer pour une solution pacifique du problème Hutu-Tutsi’, 24 April 1959, Archives du Ruanda, 1917–62 (hereinafter RWA), pp. 80–82, AA, AMAE. Anastase Makuza was born in Astrida (Butare) in 1927. After four years of study at Lovanium (Kisantu), he obtained a diploma of administrative, judiciary, economic and social science. He was nominated territorial agent in 1955–58 in Kibuye and Shangugu, and in charge of administrative functions at the Residence of Ruanda 1958–60. Nominated a member of CSP, he represented PARMEHUTU and had influence on Hutu elites.
31 Ibid.
33 Interview with Emmanuel, 8 November 2011.
Another interesting anecdote came from Louis. He explained how fair Rudahigwa was:

One Hutu tried to kill a buffalo by using a spear. The Hutu shot the spear at the buffalo and the buffalo ran away. Then the buffalo met the king, the king shot the buffalo by using the gun. The king called all the chiefs and sub-chiefs to decide whether it was the king or the Hutu who killed the buffalo. When the chiefs and sub-chiefs came, they met the king and the king asked them, ‘So, according to you, who killed this buffalo?’ The king told the Hutu in a low voice, ‘Keep on insisting. I want to know how these leaders are going to decide.’ Chiefs and sub-chiefs decided that the buffalo was for the king, and the king also called judges in Nyanza and they came and said the buffalo was for the king. The king decided to kick out all the leaders who judged so and nominated new ones because they took the wrong decision. Someone who shot first is the one to take the animal. If someone shoots the animal and it does not die, then if the second one shot it and the animal died, they gave the front legs and back to the first person.  

Another episode was presented by Jean, who explained how the king solved a land dispute:

Rudahigwa visited me at my house because there was a conflict with the chief called Rutamu. He wanted to destroy the house of Manyembwa. Manyembwa was given the land by the king and Rutamu wanted to have Manyembwa’s land and Manyembwa went to the court and they corrupted Manyembwa and they said, ‘Rutamu was right.’ Then, he went to Territoire but they did not solve his problem. Manyembwa went to Rudahigwa’s office. This Manyembwa is my brother and we were very close, he was my neighbour. Rutamu was the brother-in-law of the king and the king came to solve the problem. He came to Manyembwa’s house and then he listened to Manyembwa and after that, he went to Rutamu’s house and he said, ‘Rutamu, what you are doing is not right, this land is for Manyembwa.’ The king visited the land and he came to Manyembwa’s house.  

Others stated that Rudahigwa was such a good king that he abolished ubuhake and decided to share cows between Hutu and Tutsis. Louis stated, ‘When [a] Tutsi had ten cows, he was obliged to give five cows to [a] Hutu. Also, Rudahigwa also decided if [a] Tutsi wanted [a] Hutu to farm for him, [the] Tutsi had to pay [him] some amount.’ This positive impression of the king implies that the monarchy

34 Interview with Louis, 28 November 2011.
35 Interview with Jean, 22 November 2011.
36 Interview with Louis, 28 November 2011. This point was also stated in the second
could have been the basis for unity in post-colonial Rwanda and that establishing a constitutional monarchy could, therefore, have directed Rwanda to a less violent path.

The sudden death of the king and coronation of a new king provoked the Rwandans to become much more politically active. On 25 July 1959, Mwami Mutara Rudahigwa, who had ruled Rwanda since 1931, died suddenly in Usumbura, Burundi, after attending a cinema and receiving an antibiotic injection from a physician. The true reason for his sudden demise is still unknown, though Reyntjens suspected that it was probably an accident, rather than suicide or poisoning by the Belgians.\(^{37}\) J. Lahaya, a Belgian principal commissioner of Sûreté, also reported:

> Actually, it confirms that Mutara went to see Dr. Vyncke [for treatment] for venereal disease from which he suffered. His general condition was deficient as a result of alcoholism. For several weeks, I received various information that the Mwami was in a serious condition.\(^{38}\)

However, many Rwandans believed, or at least had heard, the rumour that Mutara was poisoned by the Belgians.\(^{39}\) For instance, Charles said that Rudahigwa demanded independence, for which ‘the Belgians killed him.’\(^{40}\) Henri even told me that Harroy asked Rudahigwa if he wanted to be shot with a gun or not, and the king replied that he did not want to be shot; therefore, ‘they gave him poisoned beer and he died.’\(^{41}\)

Suspicions about the Belgians prompted the Abiiru and the Tutsi traditional leaders to take independent action to nominate the new king, which worsened the relationship between the Tutsi leaders and the Belgian administration. On 27 July, three possible candidates were listed to succeed Rudahigwa: Rwigemera, Robert Subika and Jean-Baptiste Ndhindurwa, all of whom were sons of Mwami Yuhi

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\(^{37}\) Reyntjens, *Pouvoir et droit*, p. 239.


\(^{39}\) According to Lemarchand, not a small number of Rwandans believed that Mwami was assassinated by the Belgians. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 156. The rumour was reported to the Belgians as well: J. Dens, ‘Rapport relatif aux répercussions causées parmi les Banyarwanda émigrés en Uganda par la mort du Mwami Mutara’, 20 August 1959, A4372/23, AA, AMAE.

\(^{40}\) Interview with Charles, 5 November 2011.

\(^{41}\) Interview with Henri, 11 December 2011.
Musinga, who had been ousted by Belgian administration in 1931. The Abiiru rejected Rwigemera and Subika because they had been hostile to Rudahigwa, and had more progressive ideas.\textsuperscript{42} Documents sent to Harroy testified that Alexis Kagame said that Rudahigwa had previously chosen Ndahindurwa as his successor.\textsuperscript{43} On 28 July, when the funeral took place, the Abiiru declared that the 21-year-old half-brother of Mutara became the new Mwami Kigeri Ndahindurwa. According to the memoir of the last Governor General of Ruanda-Urundi Jean-Paul Harroy, the Belgian administration accepted Ndahindurwa because he was regarded as a ‘calm youth’, but was offended by the fact that the Abiiru had not consulted the Belgians.\textsuperscript{44}

The tension between the Belgians and the Abiiru encouraged the latter to form a political party and to pursue their goals more actively. The anti-Belgian Abiiru founded the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) in September 1959. They expressed their support for the constitutional monarchy, as well as demanding internal autonomy by 1960 and independence by 1962.\textsuperscript{45} UNAR obtained support from Tutsi traditional leaders as well as from a small number of rich Hutu; however, the party was criticised by the Tutsi progressive leaders and the Europeans. For instance, Perraudin and Bigirumwami wrote a letter to accuse UNAR of being ‘communists’.\textsuperscript{46} UNAR’s influence was nationwide; they organised their first meeting in Kigali, in which approximately 2,000 people participated and several other meetings in Astrida (Butare) and Gitarama.\textsuperscript{47}

In reaction to the establishment of UNAR, the Tutsi progressive leaders went into action as well. On 14 September, Prosper Bwanakweri and other moderate Tutsi

\textsuperscript{42} Reyntjens, Pouvoir et Droit, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{43} Secrét. Décès Mutara. Evénements du Ruanda (Le commissaire principal de la sûreté. J. Lahaye’), 3 August 1959, Box 7, Harroy Papers, MRAC.
\textsuperscript{45} ‘Manifeste du parti politique “Abashyirahamwe B’Urwanda” (Union National Ruandaise)’, 13 September 1959, Rwanda politique, pp. 95–101.
\textsuperscript{46} Interestingly, the president of the UNAR, François Rukeba, was not Tutsi; his father was Congolese and he was classified as Hutu. Lemarchand pointed out the reasons behind his joining the UNAR were the friendship with Musinga and the bad experiences he had had with the Belgians, both of which made him adopt an anti-Belgian attitude: Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{47} ‘Manifeste du parti politique “Abashyirahamwe B’Urwanda” (Union National Ruandaise)’, and ‘L’administration et les partis politique du Ruanda’, 24 October 1959, Box 7, Harroy Papers, MRAC.
leaders established Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandaise (RADER) in Kigali. Their manifesto identified themselves as a party wanting to achieve ‘the government of the people by the people for the people’ (le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple et pour le peuple). To achieve their objectives, the manifesto suggested a set of reforms including the introduction of general elections, the codification of customs and the democratisation of education. With regards to decolonisation, they demanded self-government by 1964 and independence by 1968. Compared to UNAR, RADER’s goals were more modest and it was a more democracy-oriented party. RADER was a mainly Tutsi party and, according to Prunier, the Hutu masses did not trust the party and it was accused of being too close to the Belgian administration.

The heated political climate also affected Hutu leaders. On 9 October, Kayibanda reorganised MSM into the Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU). Their manifesto strongly stated that the only way for Rwanda to move towards development was to abolish ‘the colonisation of the black by the black’ (la colonisation du noir par le noir), that is, the colonisation of the Hutu by the Tutsi. PARMEHUTU supported the principle of constitutional monarchy because it would favour ‘the advent of the democracy pursued by the Hutu’ and stated it should take five to seven years to achieve democracy and independence.

Compared to the former body of the MSM, PARMEHUTU came to voice the ethnic problem more actively than before. However, they still thought that democratisation through reforms would solve the problems of discrimination and their demands were not as aggressive as they later claimed. The party gained support in Gitarama (central) and Ruhengeri (north).

49 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 48.
50 Later, PARMEHUTU changed its name into MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Rwandaise) – PARMEHUTU. However, in this thesis, I use PARMEHUTU in order to avoid confusion.
52 Harroy’s memoir also suggests that PARMEHUTU did not clearly identify themselves being against the Tutsi in 1959: Harroy, Rwanda, p. 286.
53 There are several reasons why PARMEHUTU obtained support in these regions: first, because Gitarama is Kayibanda’s hometown. Secondly, in Central Rwanda where the power of Tutsi rule was stronger, the grievances of Hutu must have grown, and, as for Ruhengeri, it was predominantly a Hutu region. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 2, the Hutu
At this point, APROSOMA was recognised as the greater rival of UNAR than PARMEHUTU, and was criticised with nationalistic narratives. For instance, in June 1959, a pamphlet criticising APROSOMA was distributed. The unknown author called themselves ‘Warrior-defenders of Rwanda’ (*les Guerriers-défenseurs du Ruanda*), condemned APROSOMA and Gitera as the ‘enemy of Rwanda’ and urged readers to unite for the sake of the country.\(^54\) Also, in October, it was reported that a sub-chief in Kibuye was beaten by a group of people because of his APROSOMA membership.\(^55\)

The Belgian trusteeship administration restricted political activity, which further fuelled the anger of UNAR. On 10 October, Governor General Harroy banned political meetings due to an escalation of political tension and punished three Tutsi chiefs for organising meetings the previous month. UNAR strongly opposed this punishment. On 16 October, the three chiefs complained to Harroy that their punishment was unfair. Also, on 17 October, around 200–300 UNAR supporters joined in a demonstration in Kigali to assert that freedom of expression was guaranteed by the UN Charter and they criticised their treatment by the administration.\(^56\)

As such, by the end of October 1959, the political landscape of Rwanda had become unstable. It had started with rivalry between Tutsi traditional and progressive leaders, and expanded when a small number of educated Hutu leaders demanded the reforms of political and social inequalities, though they had not yet considered revolution. However, after *Mwami* Rudahigwa died and the disagreements between the Belgian Trusteeship administration and the Tutsi traditional leaders became apparent, political parties were established and tension began to rise rapidly.\(^57\)

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\(^55\) ‘Note remise à monsieur le vice-gouverneur général, gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi à Usumbura et commune au Mwami du Ruanda, par une délégation du Rassemblement Démocratique Ruandais—GRAVE SITUATION POLITIQUE AU RUANDA—Terrorisme’, 27 October 1959, AI4379, AA, AMAE.


\(^57\) See Appendix 5 and 6 for political parties and politicians.
‘It is Democracy that Defeated Feudalism’: The Revolution and the Emergence of ‘Political Tribalism’

This section illustrates the complex relationship of the political parties in Rwanda. By exploring the beginnings of the Revolution, the inter-ethnic cooperation and shuffling of political party alliances in 1960, the coup d’état and national elections in 1961, this section examines how the cooperation among the Hutu and Tutsi parties was replaced by ethnic polarisation and ‘political tribalisation’, how PARMEHUTU gained political legitimacy through the Revolution, and how ‘reconciliation’ and other alternatives failed and the Revolution finished as it did. Up to mid-1960, there was some room for ethnic cooperation and different paths were suggested, among which were the ideas of constitutional monarchy and federation. Even though it did not last long, the establishment of the Conseil Spécial Provisoire and several changes of party coalition in 1960 suggest that the relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu parties was not yet rigid nor simply following the ethnic line. The different attitudes towards monarchy and the timings of elections, however, were at stake. The uncertainty and insecurity for the future, the attitude of the Mwami and UNAR, and the overwhelming victory of PARMEHUTU in elections narrowed the paths that Rwanda could have taken and gradually polarised the parties along ethnic lines.

The Beginning of the Revolution and Cooperation among the Parties

It is often said that the Revolution began with violence in November 1959. The violence between Tutsi and Hutu was triggered by an attack on a Hutu leader by a young Tutsi group. As detailed later in Chapter 5 on local dimensions of the violence, on 1 November 1959, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the very few Hutu sub-chiefs in Rwanda, was attacked by UNAR supporters on his way back from Gitarama. The rumour of Mbonyumutwa’s death triggered retaliation from Hutus in Gitarama. The violence spread from central Rwanda to the north, the north-west and the south. At the same time, Tutsi armed groups killed Hutu politicians as well, especially in the south and the central regions where the power of the Tutsi was stronger than in

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58 Born in 1921 in Nyanza, Mbonyumutwa was regarded by the Belgians as one of the most popular leaders of the Hutu social movement: Imvaho, no. 5, 31 May 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
other regions. Interestingly, those Hutus who set fire to the huts of the Tutsi believed that the order was given by Mwami Kigeri. Since they believed that the young Mwami was manipulated by UNAR against his will, they did not doubt that the Mwami gave them the command to fire the huts of the Tutsi UNAR chiefs to release the Mwami from the chiefs’ influences.\textsuperscript{59} This suggests that the Mwami still possessed a certain amount of influence over ordinary Rwandans at this point.

As the turmoil spread across the country, Harroy summoned Colonel Bem Guy Logiest and his paratroops of the Force Publique from the Belgian Congo in order to restore public order in Rwanda. Within two weeks, the turmoil seemed to cease. After all, more than 900 Tutsis and 300 Hutus had been arrested, more than 300 people had died and the violence had produced more than 7,000 refugees in neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{60}

It was at this very moment that the Belgian government announced a plan of political reform, based on the Working Group report. On 10 November 1959, the Minister of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, August de Schryver, announced a political reform plan for Rwanda which would introduce communal elections, establish constitutional monarchy and prepare for self-government, based on the Working Group report. According to the reform plan, sub-chiefdoms were enlarged and integrated into a new unit – the commune; there would be communal elections in early 1960 to nominate the burgomasters for the communes and the Mwami would become a constitutional monarchy.\textsuperscript{61} By democratising the political systems, the Belgians wanted to solve the problem of inequality about which the Tutsi progressive leaders and the Hutu elites complained, and also to ‘africanise’ the administrative structure as the Tutsi traditional leaders demanded.

Logiest, appointed as Resident Special, took further action and decided to support the Hutu leaders based on his personal sympathy towards the Hutu population and politicians, especially Kayibanda. In his memoir, he described Kayibanda as a ‘generous and sincere man’ and the Tutsi leaders as ‘violent

\textsuperscript{59} Harroy, Rwanda, p. 303, and Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{60} Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 167–72, and Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{61} The burgomaster is the head of each commune: ‘La déclaration gouvernementale du 10 novembre 1959 sur la politique de la Belgique au Rwanda-Burundi’, 10 November 1959, Rwanda politique, pp. 160–67.
oppressors’. He banned all political meetings and replaced the Tutsi chiefs, who had left their territories during the turmoil, with Hutu ones. Logiest expected it was highly possible for UNAR to win the coming communal elections, since the majority of Rwandans were ‘still caught up in feudal tradition’. Therefore, he assumed that the most important thing that the Belgian administration should do was to avoid any situation where UNAR might win the elections and Rwanda would become anti-Belgian. This view was clearly stated in his speech on 11 January 1960:

What is our goal? It is to accelerate the politicisation of Ruanda … Not only do we want elections but we want everybody to be aware of this. People must go to the polls in full freedom and in full political awareness. Thus we must undertake an action in favour of the Hutu, who live in a state of ignorance and under oppressive influences. By virtue of the situation we are obliged to take sides. We cannot stay neutral and sit on the fence.

RADER, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU welcomed the Belgian announcement of democratisation. They criticised UNAR for causing violence in previous November and suggested that the Mwami distance himself from UNAR, which implies that the other three parties still respected the monarchy. Furthermore, the three parties were afraid that early independence from Belgium would give the Tutsi traditional leaders legitimacy to monopolise political power; therefore, they demanded delaying movement towards independence in order to prioritise democratisation.

However, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU were further considering the possibility of dividing the country into two – a Tutsi zone ruled by the Mwami and a Hutu zone by the president – in order to constitute a federation. Seeing Rwanda as ‘two nations in a single state’, Kayibanda stated:

Considering that the establishment of the Hutu and Tutsi zones is the last resort to avoid the destruction of the Kingdom of Rwanda; considering that the political form of federating the territories where one part is under Tutsi regime

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62 Logiest, Mission, pp. 45 and 51 (my translation).
63 Ibid, p. 76 (my translation).
64 Ibid, pp. 76–7.
67 ‘Proposition faites par l’Aprosoma à M. Logiest’, RWA76, AA, AMAE.
and the other is Hutu is the only solution which can overcome the Hamitic conquest and promote social and economic growth of the people with universal suffrage and democratisation: The country should be given a federal organisation. It should grant internal autonomy to 10 territories (Decentralisation).  

Further evidence is also seen in a telegram sent by the Japanese Embassy in Brussels to Tokyo, which reported that APROSOMA wanted to divide the country into a Hutu zone and a Tutsi one. This suggestion is important, first because it shows that the Hutu politicians did not have the intention of abolishing the monarchy at this point, and secondly because it is assumed that they thought violence could not be contained if the Tutsi and the Hutu lived cheek by jowl. It seems that the Hutu politicians thought the violence and conflict was primordial and not reconcilable; by contrast, as Chapter 5 will detail, the violence was not systematic, but spontaneous. The problem was that the Hutu politicians only partially recognised the reality; nor did they consider the actual methods of how to divide the country, which is why the suggestion did not materialise.

By contrast, UNAR leaders, especially those in exile, criticised the Belgians for destabilising Rwanda. Michel Rwagasana, secretary-general of UNAR, submitted a petition to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, claiming that the Belgian government supported the Hutu and demanding that a UN special committee should be established and visit Rwanda to investigate the trouble in November and to prepare the country for self-government by 1960 and independence by 1962. UNAR exiles in Dar-es-Salaam also criticised the Belgian decision to reform the political system. They claimed that the Belgians rather should set a timetable for movement towards independence as soon as possible.

The violence in November 1959 has come to be regarded as the beginning of the Revolution; however, the Revolution was not perceived as such at this stage and the rivalry among the parties was still fluid and less confrontational. It is also often

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69 Telegram from Brussels to Tokyo, 11 December 1959, microfilm A’-0275 ‘Belgian Internal Politics and International Relations’, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo.
70 Telegram from NY to FO, 26 November 1959, UN15121/11, FO371/145281, The National Archives of the UK (hereinafter TNA).
assumed that the Revolution was facilitated by Belgian support; as detailed later in Chapter 4, however, the Belgian government did not initially support the Hutu so decisively. The Belgians initiated the reforms based on the Working Group Report, which had expected the continuation of Tutsi rule at the time of the hearings; the violence and turmoil in November revealed the dissatisfaction of the Hutu against the Tutsi chiefs and it made the Belgian government wonder ‘which horse to ride’ even though Logiest in Rwanda was more determined to support the Hutu leaders.\(^{72}\)

Moreover, UNAR still had greater influence than the other parties, as it actively appealed to the UN Trusteeship Council and held meetings inside Rwanda. Logiest’s January 1960 statement, cited above, also suggested that the influence of the *Mwami* and UNAR were still strong. Furthermore, the other parties did not condemn the Tutsi as a whole; they did not criticise the *Mwami* and ordinary Tutsis, but mainly the UNAR and the chiefs. Therefore, despite the sporadic violence that took place in November 1959, the political parties were still ready to cooperate in preparation for the coming local elections.

Indeed, in the early 1960, we can see cooperation amongst the four parties. As a first step towards autonomy, Harroy established the *Conseil Spécial Provisoire* (CSP) on 4 February 1960.\(^{73}\) The Council was composed of eight politicians, two representing each party. Its purpose was to discuss the problems in Rwanda and to advise the Belgians. The members were Étienne Karema and François-Xavier Ncogozabahizi from UNAR, Dominique Mbonyumutwa and Anastase Makuza from PARMEHUTU, Aloys Munyangaju and Isidore NzyeYimana from APROSOMA and Lazare Ndazaro and Étienne Rwigemera from RADER.\(^{74}\) It should be noted that those in the CSP were quite moderate leaders. For instance, inside PARMEHUTU, Kayibanda was more hard-line and less experienced than Makuza and Mbonyumutwa who seemed relatively modest and had previous political experience.

\(^{72}\) Incoming telegram from New York to Secretary of State, 5 February 1960, 350/2-560, Box 573, Central Decimal Files (hereinafter CDF) 1950-63, Record Group (hereinafter RG) 59, National Archives at College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).

\(^{73}\) The abbreviation is same with *Conseil Supérieur du Pays*, but the CSP established at this time is different from the previous CSP.

\(^{74}\) ‘La création du conseil spécial provisoire’, *Rwanda politique*, p. 207
with the administration. Equally, in APROSOMA, while Gitera was more extreme, Munyangaju was more experienced, and held more moderate opinions.

The CSP was able to have a consensus on the future of Rwanda first because CSP members were relatively moderate and secondly because the parties still shared interests for their common future. On 23 March, the CSP sent a proposal to Mwami Kigeri to pacify the country by establishing a constitutional monarchy and a cabinet composed of four representatives from each party to supervise the Mwami’s actions. This proposal would benefit all parties. For instance, UNAR considered that the constitutional monarchy was the way to demonstrate the democratisation of the Tutsi ‘feudalism’ whilst maintaining the monarchy. For PARMEHUTU, the constitutional monarchy would break the ‘feudal’ system and promote the status of the Hutu. Therefore, up to this time, all the parties still allowed some space for compromise.

However, there were a number of issues upon which the parties disagreed, and were the cause for discontent among the CSP members, with UNAR on one side of the debate, and APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU and RADER on the other, though this division did not follow the ethnic line. The first disagreement was on the timing of communal elections. At the end of March 1960, the UN Visiting Mission visited Rwanda to hold hearings to investigate the causes of the violence in November 1959. This presented a good chance for the political parties to make appeals and claims to the Mission. As the Visiting Mission travelled around Rwanda, they saw UNAR supporters raising banners proclaiming ‘Immediate independence’ and ‘Long live the UN’, while other parties’ supporters carried banners demanding ‘Down with the feudal regime, democracy first, long live Belgium’ and ‘Long live democracy’. Seeing these different opinions, the Visiting Mission thus felt the necessity of promoting ‘national reconciliation’ among the Rwandans. Before leaving Rwanda,

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75 Telegram from Leopoldville to Tokyo, 29 December 1960, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo.
77 ‘Premiers conclusions de la réunion des partis politiques tenue le 23 mars 1960’, 23 March 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE.
78 This point is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
the UN Visiting Mission announced that the communal elections, which had originally been scheduled for June, should be postponed due to the need for national reconciliation before the elections. While UNAR said it should be postponed until August due to the lack of preparation, the other three parties expressed their wish to carry out democratisation as originally scheduled.

The second disagreement between UNAR and the other three parties was on the issues of amnesty for those who had been arrested for violence in November 1959 and UN commitment. All the parties, with the exception of UNAR expressed concerns that amnesty might disturb public order in Rwanda, whilst UNAR demanded amnesty since many of those arrested were UNAR members. Also, while UNAR preferred to have the supervision of the UN since they regarded the UN as anti-Belgium, the other three parties were reluctant to welcome the organisation. The final point of disagreement was on the future role of the king. On 23 April, Kigeri rejected the CSP’s request to establish a constitutional monarchy and cabinet. This rejection greatly disappointed the Hutu and ‘progressive’ Tutsi leaders. As a result, cooperation among the parties dissolved, and RADER, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU announced their intention to form the Front Commune on 30 April, and cooperation among all the political parties came to an end. However, the Front Commune was not internally united; for example, the degree of criticism and hostility against the monarchy was varied. While PARMEHUTU demonstrated their preference towards a republic, that is, abolition of the monarchy, RADER wanted to maintain the monarchy but depose Kigeri on the grounds that, while the monarchy was a suitable system for Rwanda, Kigeri was not suitable as the Mwami. Ndazaro, one of RADER’s leaders, stated that a new Mwami should be enthroned after shifting to the constitutional monarchy and Bwanakweri suggested a dual referendum should be held on the Mwami: the first for the monarchy itself, and the second for Kigeri as Mwami.

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84 ‘Appel du “Parmehutu” nouvellement dénommé: “Mouvement Démocratique
Around this time, the Belgians began to consider the removal of the Mwami. On 16 February 1960, the Belgian newspaper La Cité published an unsigned article stating that the removal of Kigeri was ‘under active consideration by the Belgian Government’, because Harroy suspected that Kigeri was personally involved in the violence in 1959 and had fomented public unrest. In May, British officers reported to London that the Belgians were considering the removal of the Mwami but were worried that the majority of Rwandans would not accept it. Therefore, though the Belgians had begun to consider the removal of Mwami Kigeri due to his behaviour, they were wary of the Rwandans’ reactions if they did so.

Confronted by the Front Commune, UNAR formed an alliance with smaller regional parties which supported the monarchy: Union des Masses Ruandaise (UMAR), Mouvement pour l’Union Ruandaise (MUR) based in Shangugu, and Kisenyi-based Mouvement Monarchist Ruandaise (MOMOR). They demanded that the Mwami should be supported by a representative council of all parties. The Mwami himself sent a letter to Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian Prime Minister, emphasising that he would be willing to build a government and take an active role in politics.

‘National reconciliation’, which was supposed to be the cooperation of all the political parties under the Mwami, was discussed at the pre-election conference in Brussels at the end of May 1960. The conference agreed to expand the mandate of the CSP and to establish a constitutional monarchy in order to restore cooperation among the parties, to review those who were arrested for the violence in November 1959 and to encourage mass participation in the coming elections. However, not only was UNAR absent from the conference but the party also announced a boycott of the elections because, the party stated, the election procedure was against the will

Résident à tous les anti-colonialistes du monde’, 8 May 1960; ‘Interview de D. Ndazaro (Rader)’, 2 June 1960, both in Rwanda politique, pp. 247–54, and from Bwanakweri to Schryver, 8 June 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE.
85 Foreign Service Despatch from Amembassy, Brussels to the Department of State, Washington, ‘Subject: Possible Removal of Mwami of Ruanda’, 16 February 1960, 778.00/2-1660, Box 2026, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
86 From Leopoldville to FO, JB1016/15, FO371/146656, TNA.
88 ‘From Kigeri to the Prime Minister of Belgium’, 17 July 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE.
89 See Chapter 4 for the Belgian dilemma related to this.
90 ‘Conclusions du colloque restreint’, Rwanda politique, p. 262.
of the UN.\textsuperscript{91} UNAR further tried to disrupt the electoral campaign despite the conference agreeing that those who discouraged people from voting in the elections should be punished. According to the report written by the Belgian election monitors, UNAR supporters, personally or collectively, armed themselves and threatened people with revenge if they participated in the elections.

Some Tutsi progressive leaders became concerned about the creeping ethnic polarisation and predicted further violence. Bwanakweri stated that democracy was not the rule of power but the rule of law and that reconciliation would still be possible through democratisation. ‘Listen to my voice while there is still time’, he said.\textsuperscript{92} One Tutsi chief, Alexis Karekezi, in Buriza, Kigali, also spoke to his Tutsi people:

\begin{quote}
The past time will never return. You lost your time not to work for you and your children; all you want will never return. Democracy has begun in Rwanda and no one can reject it.\textsuperscript{93}
\end{quote}

As this chapter discusses below, the result of the communal elections would bring about what these moderates feared: escalating violence all over Rwanda.

The Communal Elections and Their Impact

The communal elections that took place in June and July 1960 were more significant than the following national election in 1961 in the sense that they revealed that while PARMEHUTU had not gained control of all the country at this point, the elections directly and indirectly shaped the paths of the king and the political parties, narrowing the alternatives and bringing about PARMEHUTU’s dominance. Beginning on 25 June 1960, local elections were held in Rwanda. Voting rights were only extended to men over the age of 21, who had either Ruanda or Urundi citizenship, were Congolese/Belgians who had lived in Rwanda for more than two years, or were foreigners who had lived in Rwanda for more than ten years. Voters

\textsuperscript{92} From Bwanakweri to de Schryver, 8 June 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE (my translation).
\textsuperscript{93} Imvaho, no. 5, 15 March 1960, AI 4368, AA, AMAE (my translation).
received an election form with a list of five candidates, from which they could select one name. The illiterate would receive the assistance of a scribe.

The voting results as reported by the Belgian election monitors indicated that the political space was not completely occupied by PARMEHUTU. First, the influence of UNAR was still strong enough to deter people from voting. The national voting rate average was 78.2 per cent (377,568 men) out of a registered 482,722 (Table 1). Considering the fact that UNAR had urged people to boycott the elections while the other three parties had encouraged voting and that nearly one-fifth of those eligible did not vote, it can be said that UNAR was still influential. This is supported by a close examination of voting rates in each region. Voting rates were high in the regions where PARMEHUTU held strong influence, such as Ruhengeri in the north and Gitarama in the central, but the region where UNAR was based (Nyanza) had a much lower percentage (57.4 per cent), with the lowest around 30 per cent in Kibungo. These results suggest that even though PARMEHUTU gained the largest share of votes, the influence of UNAR was still noticeable.

Furthermore, the result shows that the other three parties gained certain votes in some regions. The national average of the PARMEHUTU seats was 70.4 per cent while UNAR, RADER and APROSOMA gained respectively, 1.7 per cent, 6.6 per cent and 7.4 per cent. While PARMEHUTU gained nearly all seats in Ruhengeri and Biumba and most seats in Gitarama and Gisenyi, Astrida was the only region where APROSOMA overwhelmed PARMEHUTU because the region was the heart of APROSOMA’s support and thus held more influence than PARMEHUTU. Due to their liberal ideas and membership, RADER had certain influence in Kigali, where the party obtained 89 seats. In Kibungo, UNAR and RADER gained 39 and 38 seats respectively, while PARMEHUTU gained 160. Finally, in Shangugu,

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94 Chapter 5 will explore the reasons for this.
Table 1: The Result of Communal Elections in June/July 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Voting rate (%)</th>
<th>UNAR</th>
<th>RADER</th>
<th>APROSOMA</th>
<th>PARMEHUTU</th>
<th>PARMEHUTU-APROSOMA cartel</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruhengeri</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biumba</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitarama</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisenyi</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibuye</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangaugu</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrida</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibungu</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>209</strong></td>
<td><strong>233</strong></td>
<td><strong>2201</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
<td><strong>207</strong></td>
<td><strong>3125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA built a coalition, and gained 190 seats. Indeed, PARMEHUTU won the elections, but there was still no guarantee that they would win again in the national election.

The result and implementation of the communal elections had both direct and indirect impacts on the monarchy and party relationships. First, it had now become

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95 The total figure of the elections is from ‘Note pour monsieur le chef de cabinet. Elections communales au Ruanda. Rapport Brossel-Halleux-Schumitz’, 23 September 1960, AI4369, AA, AMAE. Other figures on each territory are from ‘Elections communales 1960’ files on each Territory, AI4368, AA, AMAE. This explains why sometimes there are marginal errors in total numbers. Prunier uses different figures for PARMEHUTU (2390) and others (237): Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 51. He takes these figures from Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 181, where he cited the figures from ‘Résultats des élections communales au Rwanda’, Rwanda politique, p. 272. There are slight differences between my figures and his, but still the overall analysis of the communal elections below is relevant. Reyntjens also cites the same figure for total number of seats. Reyntjens: Pouvoir et droit, p. 283.

96 There are several cases in which the winning party in the first election lost the second one, such as Uganda and Burundi.
more difficult to uphold and pursue the realisation of constitutional monarchy after Mwami Kigeri Ndadhirwa left the country. On 24 June, just a few days before the communal elections took place, Kigeri told Harroy his concerns for the security of his family and himself. Kigeri feared bands of Hutus in Astrida, Gitarama and Nyanza would march on Nyanza to ‘celebrate the liberation from Tutsi rule’. On 30 June, he left for Leopoldville to attend the independence ceremony of the Belgian Congo. He never returned to Rwanda after that. The most likely reason for his remaining abroad was insecurity inside Rwanda. However, his meetings with UNAR exiles in Congo, Urundi, Uganda and Tanganyika who had earlier fled the country, and his fund-raising efforts suggested that he was preparing to return to Rwanda with stronger support.

He dreamt that the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the Congolese army would drive out the Belgians and ‘punish’ the Hutu leaders; once the Belgian trusteeship was deposed, he and other Tutsi exiles would be able to return to the country with the UN’s support. Therefore, he regarded his exile as a temporary solution to protect his security and to prepare for returning to Rwanda from abroad.

However, the exile of the Mwami gave the Belgians and anti-monarchists good justification to discard the idea of constitutional monarchy and dethrone him. The Belgians and the Hutu politicians tried to spread the image that the Mwami had ‘abandoned’ Rwanda and that he could no longer be the legitimate ruler. The idea of abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic became stronger among the Hutu parties. They, however, did not want to do so alone, for fear of being disregarded by the traditional power-holders; they demanded that the Belgians help them. On the other hand, the Belgians did not want to ‘get their hands dirty’

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid, and ‘Telegram from UNAR to RésiGne [Resident General], President of the Election Commission and RésiSpe [Resident Special]’, 26 August 1960, AJ4369, AA, AMAE. UNAR and the king were said to have ties with Patrice Lumumba in Congo, possibly sharing the same anti-Belgian sentiment and policy. The king seemed to think that the UN was anti-Belgian as well; therefore, the UN and the Congo under Lumumba’s leadership could have helped him to oust the Belgians and regain his power.
101 ‘À M. le ministre des affaires Africaines par APROSOMA’, 06 October 1960, RWA76, AA, AMAE.
either. The reason why the Belgians wanted to eliminate the *Mwami* was that ‘the *Mwami* Kigeri was becoming more and more a Lumumba [in] that he was seeking the aid of the Communists such as China, and incidentally, that he was anti-Belgian.’

Thus the Belgians covertly undermined the *Mwami*’s prestige and influence. On 17 October 1960, the Belgian Minister of African Affairs, Harold d’Aspremont-Lynden, announced the establishment of a Provisional Government and Council of Rwanda. Asserting that the Revolution in Rwanda was now over and that Rwanda had ‘entered a new phase of its evolution’, he declared that since the *Mwami* had been absent from Rwanda for more than three months, he could not remain the head of state. The Minister also announced the timetable for independence: a national election would be held under UN observation in the second week of January 1961, to build a proper government, to which domestic autonomy would be granted.

On 26 October, the Provisional Government and the Council were established. The Provisional Government consisted of eight ministers assisted by *Secrétaires d’États*; if a minister was Rwandan, then the secretary should be Belgian and vice versa (Table 2). The Council was comprised of 48 members from the major parties: 31 PARMEHUTU, nine RADER, seven APROSOMA and one from the Twa party. With the establishment of the Council, the CSP was dissolved. Upon the establishment of the Provisional Government, Kayibanda declared that ‘it is democracy that has defeated feudalism.’ Most important for PARMEHUTU was their dominance of power in the Provisional Government. On the other hand, the other three parties began to worry about the ‘dictatorship’ of PARMEHUTU. All of them, however, seemed to understand that it was crucial for them to win the national election scheduled in January 1961. Concerned about PARMEHUTU’s dominance,

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102 Telegrams from Brussels to SS, 12 August1960, 778.00/8-1260, and 14 September 1960, 778.00/9-1460, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG 59, NACP.
103 Foreign Service Despatch from Amconsulate Elizabethville: analysis of RU political situation, 12 October 1960, 778.00/10-1260, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
Table 2: The Composition of Provisional Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Secretary of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prime Minister: Kayibanda</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grégoire Kayibanda</td>
<td>Isidore Nzeyimana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>APROSOMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interior</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Rwasibo</td>
<td>Charles Lees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastase Makuza</td>
<td>Franciscus Ackerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert Bovy</td>
<td>Claver Ndahayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcisse Sekerere</td>
<td>Marcel Holsters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown affiliation</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balthazar Bicamumpaka</td>
<td>Arthur Dubois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph de Man</td>
<td>Augustine Ndayambaje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>APROSOMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaddée Gatimbanyi</td>
<td>Emmanuel de Jamblinne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown affiliation</td>
<td>de Deux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown affiliation</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaspar Cyimana</td>
<td>Jacques Dens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative Secretary of National Defence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbonyumutwa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative Secretary for External Relations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rusingizandekwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Munyangajju</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APROSOMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNAR and the other parties pushed an anti-PARMEHUTU and anti-Belgium line. At the end of October, Kigeri wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General stating that he strongly protested against the establishment of the Provisional Government.

because ‘the communal elections were made up by the Belgians.’ APROSOMA, RADER and UNAR thus formed another Front Commune in November to stand against the PARMEHUTU ‘dictatorship’. However, the alliance of the three parties was not strong enough, nor were the parties internally coherent enough to stop PARMEHUTU. As early as June 1960, friction within RADER was reported, where Ndazaro and Bwanakweri disagreed over the issue of the monarchy. While Bwanakweri reportedly held the view that the Tutsi should give up their minority rule and that they should be ready for the abolition of the monarchy, Ndazaro still supported the monarchy. Ndazaro thus dismissed Bwanakweri from his post as president of RADER though the latter refused to accept dismissal. Therefore, the change of leadership from Bwanakweri to Ndazaro could explain why RADER, which had previously formed the Front Commune with the Hutu parties, now approached the monarchist UNAR in July. Even though RADER had originally sided with PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA due to their shared criticism of the non-democratic Mwami and the UNAR, they seemingly had concerns about the anti-Tutsi attitude provoked by PARMEHUTU. With PARMEHUTU’s victory in the communal elections, RADER expressed its concern for the PARMEHUTU ‘dictatorship’. On 1 October 1960, RADER admitted that they had made ‘mistakes’, which had ‘destroyed Tutsi unity’, and changed their opinion that political problems should only be discussed after the Belgians had left the country.

Therefore, the political views of UNAR and of RADER began to coincide, which ran along ethnic lines: on 9 October, UNAR criticised the impartiality of the Belgian administration on the return of refugees and the Mwami, as well as freedom of expression. On the same day, RADER pointed out that the prestige of the

109 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 189.
112 Harroy, Rwanda, p. 380 (my translation).
113 ‘Mémorandum de l’audience accordée à Kigali le 9 octobre 1960 à M. Rutsindintwarane,
Mwami was still high and that it had been the Belgians’ fault not to allow him to return to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{115} Also, in the United Nations General Assembly, the leaders of UNAR and RADER claimed that the Rwandans loved the Mwami and that he was necessary for national unity. They too criticised the Belgians for not allowing him to return.\textsuperscript{116}

APROSOMA’s position was rather ambiguous because of the party’s opportunistic and inconsistent nature. Easing their previously aggressive attitudes towards Tutsi rule, Gitera and Munyangaju stated that as long as the Tutsi accepted democracy and the Tutsis’ minority status, APROSOMA would be ready to cooperate with the Tutsi parties to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{117} APROSOMA criticised PARMEHUTU as a ‘dictatorship’ even though they shared PARMEHUTU’s view of being against the Mwami’s return.\textsuperscript{118} At another time, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU demanded immediate national elections and independence at the earliest possible date.\textsuperscript{119} As it stood, the changing attitude towards the monarchy and PARMEHUTU’s overwhelming victory in the communal elections in the summer of 1960 reshuffled the party coalition.

The Coup d’État of Gitarama and the End of the Revolution

As the timing of the communal elections brought about the dissolution of the first Front Commune, the timing of the national election polarised the parties along ethnic


\textsuperscript{117} ‘Mémorandum sur l’audience accordée à Kigali le 9 octobre 1960 à MM. Munyangaju et Nzeyimana, membres du conseil spécial provisoire et du parti Aprosoma’, Rwanda politique, pp. 310–11.


\textsuperscript{119} Telegram from PARMEHUTU, 9 July 1960, IRU1598; Telegram from APROSOMA to Harroy and Logiest, 04 August 1960, RWA76, and Telegram from ASPROSOMA in Astrida, 19 August 1960, IRU1598, all AA, AMAE.
lines. Rwagasana of UNAR and Bwanakweri of RADER demanded that the national
election scheduled for January 1960 be postponed for several reasons: first, the local
elections held in June–July were so unjust that they should be held again. After the
re-elections, the legislative election should be postponed until another Round Table
conference could be held. By contrast, PARMEHUTU members such as Anastase
Makuza thought it impossible to postpone the legislative election and that it should
be held on 15 January 1961 because postponement would hamper the
democratisation of Rwanda.\footnote{Ibid.} As detailed later, in Chapter 4, the timing of the
legislative election generated heated debate in the UN in late 1960. In the end, the
UN passed Resolution 1514 on 14 December 1960, which demanded that the
Belgians organise a conference for bringing about ‘national harmony’ and that the
election be postponed. In early January, the Belgian government in Brussels
announced the postponement of the Rwandan national election.

Infuriated by this decision, Hutu politicians resorted to direct action. In the
morning of 28 January 1961, burgomasters, who had been elected by the communal
elections, were summoned to Gitarama by the Provisional Minister of Interior,
Rwasibo (PARMEHUTU).\footnote{Harroy estimated the figure of 2,873 burgomasters: Harroy, \textit{Rwanda}, p. 411.} Lemarchand wrote, ‘Since the early hours of the
morning dozens of trucks, coming from every corner of the country, arrived at to
their final destination.’\footnote{Lemarchand estimated the number of burgomasters was 3,125: Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, p. 192.} The people around Gitarama also assembled.\footnote{‘Communiqué officiel concernant la réunion de Gitarama’, 28 January 1961, \textit{Rwanda politique}, pp. 384–6.} When the
meeting started at noon, Rwasibo cast the following questions:

\begin{quote}
What solution will be given to the question of \textit{Mwami} Kigeri?
Who elected the members of the Provisional Government?
When will we leave the Provisional Government?
Kalinga, the \textit{Abiiru} and the feudal organisation kept the people in the country
unhappy. Should these institutions be dissolved in order to establish
democracy?\footnote{Ibid. Originally these announcements were spoken in Kinyarwanda and translated into French by Kayibanda (my translation).}
\end{quote}
Following this meeting, Gitera (APROSOMA), yet again switching the side, declared that the reign of Kigeri Ndahindurwa had come to an end. He introduced a national flag and declared the birth of a republic, which meant that the conflict had now converged along ethnic lines. Rwasibo then moved on to the selection of the president of the Republic. Dominique Mbonyumutwa was elected president; he nominated Kayibanda to form a government (Table 3). Compared to the Provisional Government, the number of ministers representing PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA did not change; however, different politicians were appointed to the ministries of social affairs and refugees, of technical affairs, of economic affairs, of external affairs and of national defence. The ‘big guns’ of PARMEHUTU, such as Kayibanda, Rwasibo, Bicamumpaka, Cyimana and Makuza, maintained their posts.125 At the same time, 44 politicians were elected as members of the National Assembly, none of whom was a Tutsi. The coup closed with an announcement from the president, declaring that Rwanda would now become ‘a democratic republic’.126

Table 3: The Composition of Rwandan Government127

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister: Kayibanda</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Secretary of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Grégoire Kayibanda</td>
<td>Isidore Nzyimana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>APROSOMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Jean-Baptiste Rwasibo</td>
<td>Charles Lees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
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<td>Franciscus Ackerman</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Hubert Bovy</td>
<td>Claver Ndhayayo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>Narcisse Sekerere</td>
<td>Marcel Holsters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown affiliation</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125 I do not have answers to explain this change, but it can be hypothesised that those ministries such as external and technical affairs seem not so important since the Belgians still held the control over those fields.
127 Ibid.
The impetus for the coup stemmed from the fear of losing momentum. The Hutu leaders, and the PARMEHUTU politicians in particular, wanted to hold the national election on time in order to secure their victory in the communal elections and their temporal power in Provisional Government. In this sense, the nature of the coup was pre-emptive: its goal was to stop the return of the Mwami and to establish Hutu rule as a fait accompli, because the Hutu population was thought to still respect the Mwami.\(^{128}\) Logiest revealed in his memoir that Kayibanda had visited him on 25 January, a few days before the coup. He stated to Logiest:

> The situation is really bad for us. Delaying the elections to an unknown date, the UN leaves the liberal camp to the hands of the Mwami to re-establish the regime of terror. We are not at all the candidate of martyrs! A certain fraction of people is likely to fall again under the coup of Tutsi. We don’t trust the fairness of UN delegations. They make an arrangement so that the elections are held when the conditions are most favourable to UNAR. You are the only person whom we can trust. We want to organise a big coup which will convince

\(^{128}\) ‘Outgoing telegram from American consulate general Usumbura to Secstate Washington’, 11 February 1961, Burundi Box 1, RG84 Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NACP.
Belgian involvement in the coup has always been suspected. Indeed, the local Trusteeship administrators supported the idea to carry out a coup; first because some of them, and Logiest in particular, had sympathy towards the Hutu, and secondly, as Chapter 4 explores, the local administration did not agree with Brussels which had decided to postpone the national election. Third, as explained earlier, since the Belgians did not want to get their hands dirty in order to eliminate the *Mwami*, the coup posed a good opportunity for them as well. However, they could not overtly help the Hutu politicians. Therefore, when Kayibanda visited Logiest, Logiest replied that he could not support a *coup d’état* since it would be a hostile act against the UN, but he felt sympathy for the ‘idea to liberate people’. Thus, he would feign ignorance and would offer passive support by means of logistics, such as transportation and stage venues. Indeed, fascinatingly, I found in the archives of Ngoma District the letter from Rwasibo to the Territorial Administrator in Kibungo submitting a receipt for the burgomasters’ transportation to visit Gitarama. This points to the high possibility that the Belgian local administrators having known about the coup in advance. However, it should be also noted here that it is not precisely correct to say that Belgium unanimously supported the coup, since some Belgian ministers seemingly were not aware of the possibility of a coup, or at least they had some disagreement with the local administration.

As explored later in Chapter 4, due to this *coup d’état* and the alleged involvement of the Belgian administration, from March to April 1961, the Rwandan ethnic problem became a topic of intensive discussion in the UN and the Resolution 1605 on the future of Ruanda-Urundi was adopted. Based on Resolution 1605, which requested amnesty for prisoners, Harroy announced that amnesty had been granted to those who had been arrested between 1 October 1959 and 1 April 1961. The UN

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130 Ibid, p. 190 (my translation). Of course, we must consider that since the document quoted is Logiest’s autobiography, he would write to place himself in the best light.
132 See Chapter 4 for further details on the factions among the Belgians.
133 Foreign Service Despatch from Amconsul Usumbura, ‘Suspension of Usumbura
Special Commission on Ruanda-Urundi established by Resolution 1605 arrived in Rwanda to monitor the amnesty. From July onwards, more than 2,000 were released and many UNAR leaders returned home. The Commission announced that it was satisfied with the progress.

Along with this amnesty, on 4 August, Harroy announced on Radio Usumbura that national elections and a referendum on the Rwandan Mwami would be held on 25 September. All parties began election campaigns. Since the majority of the population, especially women, were illiterate, the national election adopted the system of colour voting: voters were instructed to select red for PARMEHUTU, green for APROSOMA, blue for RADER and white for UNAR, brown for a monarchy and black for a republic. Around 1,330,000 people registered to vote and more than 225 polling stations were established across the country. As Chapter 5 explains the escalation of local violence later, UNAR tried to gain support by threatening and killing the Hutu population. PARMEHUTU also told people to ‘put black [for a republic] in the ballot box and brown [for a monarchy] for the pit on the street’.

The opportunistic Gitera of APROSOMA again tried to counter PARMEHUTU by means of a rapprochement with UNAR and the Mwami before the national election. As previously mentioned, UNAR, RADER and APROSOMA formed the second Front Commune to fight together against PARMEHUTU in October 1960. The American consulate in Usumbura reported that some extremist UNAR exiles, such as Rutera, were planning to resort to force and were thus opposed to working together with RADER and APROSOMA. Therefore, only RADER and APROSOMA tried to join together against PARMEHUTU. However, failing to

Communal Council’, 13 June 1961, 778.00/6-1361, Box 2927, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
136 UN General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annex, A/4994/Add.1, and Harroy, Rwanda, p. 464. The diplomatic effort of the Belgian government to recover the trust from the UN is detailed in Chapter 4.
137 Harroy, Rwanda, pp. 470–71 (my translation).
138 Outgoing telegram from amconsul Usumbura to Secstate Washington, 31 July 1961, Burundi Box 1, RG84, NACP.
achieve unity, APROSOMA opportunistically joined the coup in January 1961. But on 23 July, Gitera sent a mission to Mwami Kigeri in Dar-es-Salaam asking him to return as constitutional monarch under a new name. This was an attempt to bring the Mwami under Gitera’s control and prevent PARMEHUTU from gaining more power in the national election.\(^{139}\)

The national election was finally held on 25 September 1961. In each polling station, voters were asked for their registration, received envelopes for the elections, voted and were stamped when they had voted. The total number of voters was around 1,250,000, which constituted 95 per cent of registered adults. The result was another massive victory for PARMEHUTU: out of 44 seats in the Legislative Assembly, PARMEHUTU won 35 seats (974,239 votes, 80 per cent), UNAR seven seats (211,929 votes, 15 per cent), and APROSOMA two seats. RADER only obtained 4,000 votes, and therefore did not win any seats. Rugira (PARMEHUTU) was chosen to be president of the Assembly, and Munyangaju (APROSOMA) as the vice-president. Kayibanda was elected president of the Republic. The referendum on the Mwami abolished the monarchy with more than 1 million voting for a republic while the total of royalist votes was no more than 250,000.\(^{140}\)

In this way, 1961 represented another turning-point for Rwanda. With the national election and referendum over, the Revolution was now ended too; PARMEHUTU rule had been established and the monarchy had officially been abolished. The only choices for the UNAR leaders were to either accept reality and compromise with PARMEHUTU, or to overthrow the Hutu regime by any means. The exiles in neighbouring countries, calling themselves Inyenzi (‘cockroaches’), armed themselves and, in secret, crossed the border. However, some UNAR leaders who had remained in Rwanda started to compromise for the sake of ‘national reconciliation’, with encouragement from the UN.\(^{141}\)

As PARMEHUTU’s consolidation of power proceeded, the division inside UNAR became more notable in 1962. Inyenzi attacks occasionally occurred and in

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\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) Harroy, Rwanda, pp. 471–2 and 475.

reprisal, some hundreds of Tutsi were killed across Rwanda.\textsuperscript{142} Harroy pointed out that UNAR supporters did not disarm themselves; instead they received support and weapons from ‘Moscow and Cairo’.\textsuperscript{143} However, inside Rwanda, UNAR leaders, Rwagasana in particular, had approached PARMEHUTU. On 8 February 1962, the Kayibanda government and UNAR agreed, with strong encouragement from the UN, that two UNAR politicians would join the government. On 18 May, Kayibanda appointed two UNAR leaders: Xavier Ncogozabahizi as Minister of Health and Etienne Afrika as Minister of Cattle-Breeding. Kayibanda claimed that ‘the racial divide in Rwanda was overcome by PARMEHUTU and the government.’\textsuperscript{144} Rwagasana, representing the view of the domestic UNAR, agreed to say that UNAR should not be regarded as the opposition but as a partner. ‘Together’, he stated, ‘we will build the Rwandese nation.’\textsuperscript{145} From the viewpoint of Kayibanda and the Rwandan government, the most important thing at the time was to display a semblance of ‘power-sharing’ to the UN, so that the General Assembly would soon grant Rwanda its independence.\textsuperscript{146} For domestic UNAR politicians, it was assumed that by joining the government, the party would survive, and await the chance of recovering power.

In June, \textit{Inyenzi} planned a major attack; according to a report from Uganda, those exiles who had fled to Tanganyika, Congo and Uganda were planning a military overthrow of the Hutu government.\textsuperscript{147} This would be their ‘last chance’ to regain power before independence. Considering the insecure situation in Rwanda, the Belgian administration insisted that Rwanda would need Belgian troops to counter the \textit{Inyenzi} attacks since the Rwandan Army was only sufficiently trained to maintain public order. Therefore, the main concern had now shifted to how to convince the UN General Assembly to let Belgian troops stay in Rwanda even after

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Harroy, \textit{Rwanda}, p. 480.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibid, p. 477 (my translation). The relationship between UNAR and Eastern Bloc will be examined more in Chapter 4 and local violence in Chapter 5.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Usumbura to FO, 22 May 1962, JB1015/40, FO371/161794, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{146} ‘The Ruanda-Urundi Situation, Basic Elements’, 8 June 1962, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereinafter DDRS).
\item \textsuperscript{147} Uganda to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 June1962, JBR1015/35, FO371/161794, TNA.
\end{itemize}
independence. After a long and heated debate in the General Assembly regarding Resolution 1746, Rwanda had gained independence; the ‘winner-takes-all struggle for power’ was now over, leaving the ethnic problem unsolved. On 1 July 1962, Rwanda celebrated its independence from Belgian trusteeship. During the ceremony, the President of the newly independent Republic, Grégoire Kayibanda, celebrated and wished for a bright future for the country.

This long section of this chapter has detailed the ways in which the complex relationship of the political parties had changed during the Revolution and ended up with the polarisation and politicisation of ethnicity. There were several alternative paths Rwanda could have taken – such as constitutional monarchy and the establishment of a federation consisting of a Tutsi-led zone and a Hutu-led zone – in order to avoid revolution and the escalation of violence. However, the different attitudes towards monarchy and the timings of elections, the chance for obtaining power, internal factionalism, and the stances taken by the UNAR exiles and the Mwami all played their parts in narrowing down the alternatives and polarising the political parties along ethnic lines as they escalated their ethnic ideologies. The country was now officially emancipated from colonial rule, but not freed from ethnic conflict.

The End of Party Politics and the Hutu Opposition Within
This last section looks at post-independence Rwanda and explains how Tutsi leaders who had remained in Rwanda disappeared, and how Rwanda became a one-party state. Furthermore, this section will show why PARMEHUTU should not be viewed as monolithic, because the party actually contained an internal opposition within the party, and Kayibanda attempted to consolidate his power in various ways.

Several techniques, both violent and non-violent, were employed to silence the opposition both within and outside the government. In February 1963, Kayibanda

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148 Usumbura to FO, JBR 1015/6, FO371/161793, TNA.
149 ‘The Ruanda-Urundi Situation, Basic Elements in [summary of political situation, including dominance of the Rwanda Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation Hutu and Burundi Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès National; racial tensions; political organisation; economy; agriculture. Discussion of status of native and Belgian security forces, Belgian aid to Rwanda and Burundi, and the Rwandan refugee problem]’, 8 June 1962, DDRS.
conducted a cabinet reshuffle which reduced the number of ministers, resulting in the elimination of the two Tutsi ministers who had joined the government before independence. The ostensible reason provided by the government for the reshuffle was to reduce government expense and to achieve better organisation. The hidden purpose, however, was the elimination of the UNAR ministers from the government. By so doing, the president decreased the likelihood of any attack on the government before the communal elections, which were planned for June.\textsuperscript{151}

Kayibanda took further steps to enhance his influence; in June 1963, he submitted his resignation to the Legislative Assembly. Kayibanda explained that he had not been elected by a presidential election, but had been appointed by the coup government in 1961. His position, therefore he concluded, was not ‘constitutional’. The Assembly met on 12 June to consider his resignation, declaring that the reasons for his resignation were invalid, due to the fact that the constitution had not yet been promulgated in 1961.\textsuperscript{152} According to US telegrams, Kayibanda’s real intentions were to enhance his influence over both PARMEHUTU and the government, where some politicians had taken up opposition to him, for example, the Minister of Defence and Party Secretary General Mulindahaci and the Minister of Justice Anastase Makuza. In particular, the American Embassy in Kigali reported that the president would like to get rid of Makuza, who was one of the ‘most versatile and better educated’ ministers in his cabinet.\textsuperscript{153} Two possible scenarios could have been foreseen by the president, the telegrams continued, both of which would end up with enhancing his own personal prestige. If the resignation had been accepted and a general election was called, Kayibanda would almost certainly have received an overwhelming popular support and it would have enabled him to slough off any

\textsuperscript{151} Airgram from American Embassy Kigali to Department of State, ‘Changes in the Cabinet of Rwanda’, 17 February 1963, Box 4028, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963 (hereinafter CFPF 1963), RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{152} Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 11 June 1963, and Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 13 June 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{153} Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 11 June 1963, and Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 13 June 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
undesired ministers. Another scenario, which actually did take place, required the Legislative Assembly to confirm his leadership.154

Another tactic by the government to obstruct opposition was seen on the occasion of the elections. In early June 1963, the government declared its intention to hold municipal elections. In theory, under the law, electoral campaigning could start only three weeks prior to the election; in reality, PARMEHUTU campaigned for much longer. One obstacle which opposition parties had to face was the registration of candidates. However, it was just two days before the closing time for filing the lists when this detail was announced. UNAR complained that some UNAR lists were deliberately rejected, while PARMEHUTU lists were accepted even after the registration period was over. UNAR managed to submit 17 electoral lists in Kigali, Gitarama and Butare on 4 July.155

The government also deliberately made it difficult for opposition parties, especially UNAR, to hold meetings even during the legally permitted campaign period, by placing the authority for granting permission in the hands of the Hutu prefects. Even if permission was granted, the Hutu authorities would often campaign in the area prior to the date of a UNAR rally, telling the people not to attend the UNAR meeting. There were several serious incidents such as arson, home wrecking, the slaughter of livestock, and personal assaults and woundings, particularly in Gitarama, Kibuye and Kigali.156

Voting for the municipal elections began on Sunday, 18 August 1963. Voters had to cast votes for lists of local communal counsellors and to vote for the local burgomasters. Voting for the counsellor was by colour: red for PARMEHUTU, white for UNAR and green for APROSOMA.157 Voters placed a slip of paper of their colour choice in an envelope and deposited this in the ballot box. Upon leaving the polling area, the voter’s registration card was stamped to show that he had voted. In more than 100 of the 141 communes, there were only red lists available, that is, the

154 Airgram from Amembassy KIGALI to Department of State, “‘Resignation’ of President Kayibanda’, 22 June 1963, Box 4028, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, RG59, NACP.
155 ‘Declaration of the UNAR about the communal elections’, 23 July 1963, and ‘Challenge to Democracy!! (UNAR UNITE)’, n.d., both in Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
156 The Communal Elections in Rwanda, August 1963, Airgram from American Embassy Kigali to Department of State, 31 August 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
157 RADER did not win in the legislative election in 1961, therefore, no longer had any influence.
PARMEHUTU list, as the opposition parties had not managed to put up any candidates or had been unable to meet the government’s conditions for registration. As a result, PARMEHUTU won 1112 seats out of 1138, UNAR 24 and APROSOMA 2.\textsuperscript{158} PARMEHUTU polled nearly 98 per cent of the total vote, capturing all the votes in seven of the ten prefectures.\textsuperscript{159}

After the election, Kayibanda reorganised the government in order to expel some PARMEHUTU ministers who had opposed him. On 9 September 1963, the president of the Legislative Assembly, Rugira, was forced to resign in connection to alleged election irregularities at Nyanza. Rugira had supported an Assembly deputy Utumabahutu for burgomaster in Nyanza, despite the fact that the electoral rule stated that Assembly deputies were ineligible for local elections. The President of the National Assembly was replaced by Minister of Justice Makuza; the Minister of Justice role was filled by Habamenshi, and Mpakaniye was nominated new Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{160} An official of the Foreign Office of Rwanda told an US Embassy officer that Utumabahutu was really ‘a camouflaged UNAR man’ and that PARMEHUTU had no use for him. Moreover, given Rwanda's presidential type of government, the role of the Assembly was relatively small and that is assumedly why Kayibanda wanted to nominate Makuza as the President of Assembly.\textsuperscript{161}

The Kayibanda regime also had to face a physical threat from the Inyenzi. On the night of 20–21 December 1963, a group of armed exiles in Burundi entered Rwanda from the border around Bugesera.\textsuperscript{162} They progressed to Nyabarongo, 25 km away from Kigali, where two members of the Garde Nationale were killed.\textsuperscript{163} This

\textsuperscript{158} ‘Voting of Communal Elections Began’, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{159} Airgram from American Embassy Kigali to Department of State, ‘On Transmittal of Results of Communal Elections in Rwanda, August 1963’, 16 December 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{160} Incoming telegram from Kigali to Secstate WashDC, 12 September 1963, and Airgram from American Embassy Kigali, ‘Discussion with President Kayibanda’, 20 September 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{161} Airgram from Amembassy KIGALI, ‘Recent Rwandan government changes’, 21 September 1963, and To Secretary of State from The Embassy of Rwanda in Washington, 6 November 1963, both in Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
\textsuperscript{162} Bugesera is currently a district of Eastern Province and its capital is Ntarama: ‘Background Note to Correspondents on the situation in Rwanda and Burundi’, 5 February 1964, Rwanda/Burundi-press, S-0238-0002-09, UNA.
\textsuperscript{163} ‘Télégramme d’état a U Thant de cabinet du president’, 23 January 1964, Rwanda/Burundi-Rwanda Republic, S0238-0002-11, UNA.
incursion silenced the opposition and the moderate parties that had remained in Rwanda. Almost immediately after the attack, the following Tutsi leaders were seized and taken to Ruhengeri for execution on 23 December: Editor Thaddée Mpilikanyi, UNAR deputy in the National Assembly Michel Rwagasore, UNAR president Joseph Rutsindinytwarane, UNAR secretary Louis Ndahiro, former minister in the first Kayibanda government Etienne Afrika and Bwanakweri from RADER. *Unite*, the fortnightly journal of UNAR, was banned from publication.\(^{164}\) Moderate politicians were also killed.\(^{165}\) Not only politicians, but also ordinary Tutsis, were victims. Following this attack, a retaliatory massacre took place in several parts of Rwanda. In Gikongoro, there were mass slaughters on 25 and 26 December.\(^{166}\) The number of victims is contested; but it is estimated that at least 10,000, reasonably about 18,000, Tutsis were killed by angry Hutus.\(^{167}\) One Burundian minister estimated the figure at 20–25,000.\(^{168}\)

The international community suspected that the Kayibanda government ordered the killings. Vatican Radio denounced the deaths as ‘the most terrible genocide since the Holocaust’.\(^{169}\) In Switzerland, public opinion was aroused over the killings in Rwanda and the Swiss government was questioned over their assistance programme. Hans-Karl Frey, Swiss Special Adviser to President Kayibanda, demanded that Kayibanda state accurately what had happened in Rwanda and to show ‘some humanitarian gesture for the remaining Tutsis in the country’ and threatening that unless Kayibanda obeyed this demand, Swiss aid would be withdrawn.\(^{170}\)

\(^{164}\) Airgram from Amembassy Kigali to Department of State, ‘On Demise of Opposition Newsheet Unite’, 14 March 1965, POL12-3, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
\(^{165}\) Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 223.
\(^{166}\) ‘Swiss Committee for Unicef’, 18 January 1964, Rwanda-Burundi-High Commissioner for Refugees, S0238-0003-03, UNA.
\(^{167}\) Ten thousand is the number given by Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 224, and the figure of 18,000 came from Libre Belgique, ‘Le gouvernement de Kigali serait impuissant a contenir la vague anti-Tutsi’, 26 January 1964, Archives of Kabgayi, A.G.M.Af.
\(^{168}\) Airgram from Brussels, ‘Burundi vice Prime Minister accuses Rwanda government’, 11 March 1964, POL15-1, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
\(^{169}\) Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p. 224.
However, so far, after examining archival documents, it appears that the Rwandan government did not involve itself in the killing of ordinary people; rather the massacre took place in areas over which the government had less control due to lack of forces or communication. In such areas, a ‘popular militia’ took reprisals on Tutsi populations as a result of the Inyenzi raids, which had provoked fear and panic.¹⁷¹ Makuza made a trip to Europe to oppose the charge of genocide, stating that around 3,000 Tutsi ‘terrorists’ had massacred people resisting to the Inyenzi attacks. Under such circumstances, he justified, the reaction of the Hutu population was inevitable, for the Tutsi living in the area had given support to terrorists.¹⁷²

After the Inyenzi attacks and the elimination of the opposition parties, an election for Legislative Assembly was held in October 1965. Campaigning consisted mostly of personal appearances – Kayibanda was also reported to have made speeches in almost all Prefectures. During the campaign, interestingly, Kayibanda and other politicians did not have many words for ethnic propaganda. The US Embassy reported that even though the President referred to ‘cockroachism’, the tone sounded less aggressive than before. This account suggests that, if true, Kayibanda was now less worried about the country’s security after they had drawn a halt to the Inyenzi attacks while at the same time, there was no need to voice anti-Tutsi appeals, for the simple reason that there were no Tutsi parties left. Kayibanda, the only candidate for president, was re-elected with approximately 97 per cent of the vote and all the 48 newly elected members of the National Assembly were PARMEHUTU. APROSOMA which had previously won seats since 1961, lost completely, due to their failure to nominate candidates for this election.¹⁷³ Thus, Rwanda had now officially become a one-party state.

Kayibanda seemingly hoped to exploit the victory of re-election to oust certain ministers yet again.¹⁷⁴ The main victims of the purge were the former Minister of

¹⁷¹ ‘UN Press Services: The situation in Rwanda and Burundi’, 3 March 1964, Rwanda/Burundi-press, S0238-0002-09, UNA.
¹⁷² Airgram from Amembassy Brussels to Department of State, ‘February 27 Press Conference by President of Rwanda national Assembly’, 3 March 1964, POL15-4, CFPF 1964–66, RG59, NACP.
¹⁷³ Airgram from Amembassy Kigali to Department of State, ‘Election in Rwanda’, 10 November 1965, POL12-3, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
¹⁷⁴ Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 28 September 1965, POL14, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
Interior Jean-Baptiste Rwasibo in spite of an overwhelming victory at the polls, Minister of the National Guard Calliope Mulindahaci and former Minister of Justice Callixte Habamenshi. The British Ambassador to Rwanda, John S. Bennet suggested that the suspected excuse behind this reorganisation was that no marriages with either Tutsi, Congolese, or European women could be entered into by government officials and that the excluded politicians were those who had spouses in this category.

Despite his efforts to decrease the number of his opponents, the opposition did not surrender and Kayibanda continued to receive criticism from within the party. Some documents suggest that the President was concerned over his recent loss of popularity in PARMEHUTU. In early September 1966, two of Kayibanda’s European advisers noted that they had discussed with him the problem of his declining popularity. On 5 July 1966, a delegation of PARMEHUTU and government officials led by Makuza approached Kayibanda with the request to hold a Party Congress soon. Kayibanda received the group very politely, listened to their proposals and authorised them to organise a Party Congress at the earliest possible date.

On 23 October 1966, the national congress of PARMEHUTU was opened. Kayibanda remarked on the increasing ‘lack of vitality’ in the party. He also pointed out that it was now no longer sufficient for a politician to accuse his opponents of ‘being pro-Tutsi’, but that hard work, honesty and loyalty to the basic principles of the revolution should be a more important criteria. The PARMEHUTU government of Rwanda looked stable from the outside as the US predicted no

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175 Airgram from Amembassy KIGALI to Department of State, ‘Increasing Factionalism in the PARMEHUTU’, 26 January 1966, POL14, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
176 Airgram from Amembassy KIGALI to Department of State, ‘Explanation for Recent Rwandan Government Personnel Shift’, 17 February 1966, POL15-4, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP. However, this was a pretext for eliminating the opposition since Kayibanda himself was said to have a Tutsi wife.
177 Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 20 September 1966, POL12-3, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
178 Incoming Telegram from Kigali, 14 October 1966, POL12-3, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
179 Incoming Telegram from Kigali, 10 July 1966, POL13-6, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
180 Incoming Telegram from Kigali, 29 October 1966, POL15, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
political change would happen in the coming years.\textsuperscript{181} Internal discord, however, still existed, paving the way towards the end of First Republic.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the process of ethnic politicisation and polarisation in the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. It has argued that the ethnicity articulated in the earlier colonial period did not cause the Revolution and the ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity; rather, the complicated, fluid and dynamic party politics and the Revolution (as a step towards democratisation) reconstructed already existing ethnicity into a more politicised and polarised form. The political parties did not confront each other from the beginning. The demand of Hutu politicians was the promotion of Hutu people through reforms and they tried to avoid revolution; they also tried to persuade people to distinguish chiefs who were abusing their power, from poorer, ordinary Tutsis and the Mwami. It was the Mwami and the Tutsi progressive leaders who had initially antagonised each other.

Between 1959 and 1962, there was some space for cooperation and different paths were suggested, among which were proposals concerning constitutional monarchy and federation within regions of Rwanda. The establishment of the Conseil Spécial Provisoire and several changes of party coalition in 1960, even though it did not last long, showed that the boundaries between Tutsi and Hutu parties were not that rigid. The different attitudes towards monarchy and the timings of the elections, however, were at stake. Each party had different interests and priorities on the type and timing of democratisation and decolonisation. As Berman argues for ethnicity in Africa, ‘a world of increasing flux, uncertainty, and conflict’ made ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’.\textsuperscript{182} The uncertainty and insecurity about the future, the attitude of the Mwami and UNAR and the overwhelming victory of PARMEHUTU in elections all narrowed the paths Rwanda could have taken. Moreover, even though some moderates called for democracy based on mutual respect between Tutsi and Hutu, the overwhelming victory of PARMEHUTU in communal elections in 1960, the national election and referendum on Mwami in 1961,

\textsuperscript{181} Incoming Telegram from Kigali, 29 October 1966, POL15, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
and the elections in post-independent period all justified PARMEHUTU rule. In that sense, the act of introducing electoral democracy ironically produced and justified an undemocratic situation and violence in Rwanda. Once independence had been achieved in 1962, PARMEHUTU silenced the other parties and tried to reduce opposition within the party itself. Therefore, the rivalry among the Tutsi leaders and elites gave way to the rivalries amongst the Hutu leaders. Whereas Rwanda shares similarities with Burundi and Uganda, such as the abolition of the monarchy and the post-independence consolidation of one-party rule and dictatorship, Rwandan party politics are interesting in the sense that they were more complicated and relatively fluid, the result of which was the Revolution, and a politicised and polarised ethnicity.

183 This suggests parallel similarities with the situation at the end of 1980s and the early 1990s, when Rwanda had to accept democratisation due to external pressures.
Chapter 4
Internationalising Ethnicity:
The UN, the Cold War and the Decolonisation of Rwanda

Strongly cowered by its allies, Belgium was afraid of, I believe, displeasing the allies again by not following, at least to some extent, the UN recommendations. And yet, I assume that these allies would have had perhaps a different attitude if they were told the details of the problems. They would have better understood that Ruanda-Urundi was a pawn for the West. I say correctly a pawn: not a queen, not a rook, but isn’t it with pawns that one wins the games? ¹

Introduction

This chapter examines the ways in which international factors contributed to the Rwandan domestic party politics that were examined in Chapter 3. How was the ‘exterior architecture’ of Rwandan ethnicity shaped and how did external factors affect the ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity in Rwanda during decolonisation? In sum, the ‘exterior architecture’ provided opportunities and frameworks that influenced the contested political relationships of ethnic groups. ²

The process of colonisation was a mutual interaction between Europeans and Africans, in which a colonial state power was formed, changing the existing pre-colonial group relationships. The process of decolonisation was another important conjuncture where post-colonial states were formed and ethnicity reconstructed. Indeed, scholars have shown that decolonisation, and British decolonisation in particular, was a dynamic process of renegotiating the relationship between colonial states and African ‘collaborators’ to shape post-colonial settings. ³

² Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa (London: James Currey, 1992), especially Part V.
³ Paul Nugent, Africa Since Independence (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Chapter 1; Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), and Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and L. J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States, 1918–1975 (London:
There are two sets of important questions with which the literature on decolonisation has been dealing. The first is the questions of the role of the United Nations in decolonisation processes, and Trusteeship Council in particular: to what extent was the UN a driving force of decolonisation and to what extent was decolonisation of Trusteeship territories manipulated by the Trusteeship administrations? It is perceived that the UN influenced decolonisation processes of Trust territories. For instance, in British Tanganyika, while Governor Richard Turnbull expected independence around 1970, the victory of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in the elections in 1960 pushed the UN to grant full independence in 1961. In Burundi under the Belgian mandate, a nationalist and royalist party, the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) won the UN-supervised national election in 1961; the UN conducted a detailed investigation when the UPRONA leader and then Prime Minister Louis Rwagasore was assassinated, with the suspicion of Belgian involvement. French Cameroon was a rather exceptionally violent example among the Trusteeship territories: a nationalist party, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), demanded the UN Trusteeship Council grant the country’s independence and reunification with its British counterpart. As the repression from the French administration was increasing, the UPC deployed violent guerrilla tactics against the French administration, but failed to gain power. A characteristic shared by those cases is that the African leaders in those Trusteeship territories all recognised the importance of the UN, using the UN to criticise the colonial administration and achieve their objectives.4

Another important question regarding decolonisation was the impact of the Cold War. The peak of decolonisation in Africa corresponded to the heyday of the Cold War, and thus it had complex historical interactions. Both Western and Eastern

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4 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), Chapter 5; Nugent, Africa Since Independence, Chapter 1, and Thomas, Moore and Butler, Crises of Empire.
Blocs had an important role in decolonisation processes as the Cold War rivals offered differing models of development – liberal capitalism and state socialism – to new post-colonial states. Both sides also intervened, or attempted to intervene, in liberation struggles, and both contributed to the establishment of repressive regimes. In the UN, the Eastern Bloc and Afro-Asian countries criticised the Western Bloc and supported the anti-colonial (nationalist) movements, whereas the Western Bloc tried to establish pro-Western leaders in the territories to avoid Soviet penetration.5

These international contexts of the Trusteeship and the Cold War need to be considered in order to understand ethnic transformation in Rwanda. The existing literature has paid most attention to the Belgians’ policies on Rwanda and their relationships with the UN. According to the literature, the Belgians did not consider decolonisation as an immediate option for their colonies; they were annoyed by the Tutsi traditional leaders who started to demand the transfer of power in the late 1950s and as a result, shifted their support to the Hutu elites. That is the reason why the Revolution is often called an ‘assisted Revolution’.6 The UN did not approve of this ‘administratively-controlled’ Revolution and passed several resolutions criticising Belgium.7 However, the UN could not stop the Belgians supporting the Hutu and, as a result, the Belgians ‘lost Burundi but kept Rwanda’: they established a favourable Hutu regime in Rwanda but failed to do so in Burundi where the anti-Belgian UPRONA gained power.8 As for the Cold War, some researchers have mentioned that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other communist or anti-Western countries supported UNAR in various ways.9 However, the influence of the

9 For instance, Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, p. 47.
UN, the Belgians’ policies and the influence of the Cold War on Rwandan decolonisation need to be more closely scrutinised since the party politics and politicised ethnicity explored in Chapter 3 cannot be fully understood without being placed in an international context.

Therefore, this chapter examines the international context, or the ‘exterior architecture’, that politicised Rwandan ethnicity. The chapter argues that the international environment helped to shape ethnicity by providing ‘opportunities’ for Rwandan ethnicity to become politicised. The chapter first explains Belgian policies and the relationship between Belgium and the UN before 1960 to show that up until then, the Belgians had not considered the issue of Rwandan decolonisation, nor did Rwanda attract international attention. The chapter then examines the internationalisation of the Rwandan ethnic conflict: factions within the Belgian administration, the impact of the debates in the UN shaped by the Cold War rivalry and the perception of the actors on ethnicity. The final section looks at the post-colonial efforts by the Rwandan government to maximise international aid by balancing – or pretending to balance – the Cold War rivalries and to consolidate PARMEHUTU’s rule.

‘Sacred Trust’ and Belgian Policies on Rwanda before 1960

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Belgians did not consider the decolonisation of Rwanda to be an issue at the time, though they did implement a partial democratisation by establishing the representative councils in 1952 and announcing plans for political reform in 1959. Moreover, even though they expressed irritation at the Tutsi traditional leaders who were demanding independence, the Belgians still did not know with whom they could align in Rwanda. The UN Trusteeship Council recommended several times that Belgium should implement measures for self-government and/or independence as stipulated in the Trusteeship Agreement, but the Council was not zealous in pressuring the Belgians. Therefore, as Chapter 3 has explained, the political movements were not operative in Rwanda until the autumn of 1959, the relationship between Belgium and the UN was not confrontational, and Rwanda did not receive much international attention until 1960.

The trusteeship system which emerged from the negotiations of the post-Second World War international order imposed certain restrictions on colonial
powers and encouraged them to improve political, economic and social conditions in the Trusteeship Territories.\textsuperscript{10} With the foundation of the United Nations, the mandate of the League of Nations was transferred to the Trusteeship Council in the United Nations in 1945.\textsuperscript{11} Michael Callahan argued that Chapter 11 of the UN Charter regarding the UN member states accepted ‘as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories’.\textsuperscript{12} Article 76 of the Charter further defines the basic objectives of the Trusteeship as:

\begin{quote}
To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.
\end{quote}

That is to say, the Trusteeship Council took charge of guiding the trusteeship territories to achieve ‘progressive development towards self-government or independence’.\textsuperscript{13} The Council examined the reports submitted by the administering countries, accepted petitions from the people in the territories and sent Visiting Missions to the Trusteeship Territories. The Council also summarised their discussions and reported to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which dealt with decolonisation in general. The Committee examined the reports and drafted Resolutions, which were then adopted by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the nature of trusteeship, the UN Trusteeship Council did not affect Rwandan politics until the 1960s, because up until then Rwanda was not a major focus of the Council.\textsuperscript{15} When the Visiting Mission came to Ruanda-Urundi for the first time in 1947, the Mission was ‘shocked by the inequalities in Rwandan social and political structures’ and demanded that the Belgian authorities ‘democratize the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{11} The Council consisted of trusteeship administering countries, members of the Security Council, and other member states ‘elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly’: Article 86 (see Appendix I for the relevant articles of the UN Charter).
\item\textsuperscript{12} Callahan, \textit{A Sacred Trust}, p. 193, and UN Charter, Article 73.
\item\textsuperscript{13} Article 76 b.
\item\textsuperscript{14} Article 87.
\end{itemize}
whole political structure as far as possible and as speedily as circumstances permit’.\textsuperscript{16} They also tried to convince the Rwandans and the Burundians to maintain the political union of Ruanda-Urundi and to attempt to gain independence as a single entity for fear of ‘African Balkanisation’.\textsuperscript{17} However, the Trusteeship Council did not criticise Belgium, nor did the Council put pressure on the Belgians, in part because up until 1960, the Trusteeship Council and the United Nations itself did not have a great number of colonised countries as members. Therefore, the attitude of the UN towards Belgium was not as harsh as it became later.

Thus the Belgians did not change their policies nor did they consider self-determination for Ruanda-Urundi at this point; actually, the Belgians in the post-war period pursued reforms in order to maintain their rule. Robert Schumit, Belgian Resident in Burundi, justified this position by noting that they would not consider democratisation in the near future because political progress would bring social chaos; he also reserved the possibility of reforms until the colonies’ inhabitants could understand the significance of democracy and its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{18} However, as discussed in Chapter 2, Belgium reluctantly introduced some reforms. On 14 July 1952, representative councils were established at sub-chief, chief, territorial and state levels in order to ‘democratise’ the country. Independence for the colonies, however, was out of the question. In 1956, when Belgian scholar A.J.J. van Bilsen published a plan for Congolese independence in 30 years, Belgian public criticised him as irresponsible and ‘the dangerous enemy of Belgium’.\textsuperscript{19} Pierre Ryckmans, who served as Governor General of Belgian Congo and later served as a Belgian representative in the United Nations, contributed an article to the American journal, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, to legitimise the presence of Belgians in Africa.\textsuperscript{20} The Governor General of Ruanda-Urundi Jean-Paul Harroy also responded to a rumour of abandoning the trusteeship


\textsuperscript{19} Harroy, \textit{Rwanda}, p. 258 (my translation).

by saying that ‘we are not preparing for abdication of the legislative, administrative and jurisdictional powers assigned to Belgium’.\(^{21}\) As such, the Belgians expected the independence of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi within several decades; this explains why tensions started to emerge between the Tutsi traditional leaders, who announced the ‘Mise au Point’,\(^{22}\) and the Belgian administration, from the mid-1950s onwards.

The Trusteeship Council was not harsh to the Belgians; rather the Visiting Mission acknowledged the effort of the Belgian government in the area of political and economic development to a certain extent, while failing to change its policies. The Mission appreciated the establishment of councils on each administrative level in 1952. However, UN Resolution 1064, adopted on 26 February 1957, still recommended that Belgium should ‘take the necessary measures to ensure’ that Ruanda-Urundi would head towards ‘self-government or independence at an early date’.\(^{23}\) Nevertheless, there were not many petitions or discussions in the UN, and other countries were not yet interested in Rwanda. Indeed, there was no separate resolution on Rwanda, whereas several resolutions were adopted for other African Trusteeship territories.\(^{24}\)

It was not pressure from the UN but rather political progress in the Belgian Congo that pushed the Belgian government to reconsider their policy on Rwanda. As mentioned earlier, the Belgians did not consider the possibility of granting independence to its colonies in the near future. However, in the mid-1950s, political movements emerged in the Belgian Congo, demanding independence. In 1958, a Belgian Working Group was established in the Belgian Senate to investigate the conditions in the Congo; their final report recommended accelerating political reforms towards an autonomous Congo in association with Belgium.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{21}\) From the Japanese Consulate in Leopoldville to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, 2 June 1956, micro-film A’-0275, ‘Belgian Internal Political and International Relations’, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo (my translation).

\(^{22}\) See Chapter 3 about this document.

\(^{23}\) General Assembly, ‘Attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories’, A/RES/1064(XI), 26 February 1957 (see Appendix 4).

\(^{24}\) For instance, during the same session, Resolutions 1044(XI) and 1045(XI) were adopted for British Togoland; 1046(XI) for French Togoland; 1065(XI) for British Tanganyika; 1067(XI) for French Cameroon and 1068(XI) for Italian Somaliland. This suggests that Rwanda did not receive attention in the Trusteeship Council.

the Working Group report, riots took place in Leopoldville in January 1959. Reminded of ‘the nightmare of an Algerian-type war’, the Belgian King Baudouin and the government announced that Belgium would soon grant Congo its independence, in order to bring an end to the riots. As such, in April 1959, the Belgian government established another Working Group to examine the politico-social problems in Ruanda-Urundi in an attempt to restructure Belgian policy. As explained in Chapter 3, the Working Group heard the voices of both Tutsi and Hutu leaders, who had demanded the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and a report was submitted to the Belgian Senate.

The conclusion drawn from the Working Group’s report was that the domestic problem of inequality between the Tutsi and the Hutu could be resolved by democratising the political and social systems. The Working Group suggested that the political development to determine its own destiny was necessary because political progress under Trusteeship was an obligation of the administering country. To achieve these objectives, the report suggested that ‘progressive autonomy’ (autonomie progressive) and a constitutional monarchy should be established.

Furthermore, the Working Group suggested future relationships among Rwanda, Congo and Belgium. The Working Group did not consider the termination of Trusteeship in the near future; rather, the Belgians seemed confident that if they allowed the Rwandans to choose either independence or maintaining the relationship with Belgium, the Rwandans would choose the latter option. A federation or confederation with Burundi was planned, due to historical and political differences between Rwanda and Burundi; this was despite the fact that the UN had encouraged the formation of a single independent country of Ruanda-Burundi, for fear of African Balkanisation. Moreover, the establishment of an association with Belgium and Congo was suggested. Beginning in 1952, a ‘Belgian-Congolese Community’, which would be united under the Belgian monarchy as a symbol of the colonial association,

26 Hargreaves, Decolonization, p. 182.
was mentioned several times by the Belgian politicians and by King Baudouin himself.\textsuperscript{30} As the British embassy reported to London, the Belgians were planning to link the Trust territory to Belgium and Congo ‘in a sort of Commonwealth’. The British, however, had more realistic views about African decolonisation and predicted that this plan would be too difficult to implement due to the fact that the ‘sands are running out’ in Africa.\textsuperscript{31}

Yet the Belgians did not grasp the imminence of the political changes and of decolonisation; they still wanted to maintain their influence in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Rwandan domestic politics became destabilised after the death of Mutara Rudahigwa and the establishment of the political parties. On 10 November 1959, the Belgian government announced a plan of political reform, based on the Working Group report, in order to deal with the problem of domestic inequality. Due to the violence in November 1959, the UN began to increase its interest in Rwanda. Two resolutions were passed in the General Assembly, the first requesting Belgium to propose ‘timetables and targets for the attainment of independence’ and consider the plans of political reforms in detail, and the second demanding that the Trusteeship Council send a Visiting Mission to Rwanda in early 1960 to investigate ‘the conditions and causes of the recent disturbances in the Territory’.\textsuperscript{32} However, the Belgian administration did not yet want to fix a date for independence. On 18 November 1959, G. Grosjean, a colonial adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny that the Belgian representatives to the UN were opposed to setting a timetable for the independence of Ruanda-Urundi because the idea was fundamentally against the policies of the Belgian government which wanted to maintain Ruanda-Urundi in association with the Congo.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, until 1960, the Belgians still did not want to specify the date for, or even consider the idea of, Rwandan independence. They

\textsuperscript{30} Vanthemsche, \textit{Belgium}, pp. 54–87.
\textsuperscript{31} Outward Saving Telegram from FO to Brussels, 24 June 1959, UN15121/1, and Telegram from British Consulate General in Usumbura to FO, 22 August 1959, UN15121/4, both in FO371/145281, TNA.
\textsuperscript{32} UN General Assembly, ‘Attainment of Self-government or Independence by Trust Territories’, A/RES/1413(XIV), and ‘Plans for Political Reforms for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi’, A/RES/1419(XIV), both 05 December 1959 (see Appendix 4).
thought the problem of inequality between the Tutsi and the Hutu would be solved by gradual democratisation. Though at this point the UN was not confrontational in its attitude towards Belgium, the UN constantly recommended that the Belgians take measures to prepare for self-government and/or independence, which is why the Belgians began to take their distance from the Tutsi traditional leaders, but were unsure with whom to collaborate. However, the ‘wind of change’ came in 1960 when Belgium had to accept Congolese independence and suffered from severe international criticism, which propelled the Rwandan conflict onto the international stage.

‘A Pawn for the West’: The Internationalisation of Rwandan Ethnic Conflict

This section examines how international politics began to affect Rwanda and how Rwandan party politics discussed in the previous chapter became internationalised, as more external actors became involved, as the discussions in the UN intensified and as the ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity escalated. The internal factions within the Belgian administration, the debates in the United Nations and Cold War rivalry were all intertwined in contributing to the accelerating polarisation and politicisation of Rwandan ethnicity. The period 1960–62 is divided into three stages: the change in Belgian policy in early 1960, the deterioration of Belgium’s international reputation and the escalation of ethnic conflict from late 1960 to early 1961, and Belgium’s efforts to recover international status, and Rwanda’s accession to independence, between mid-1961 and mid-1962.

The Change of Belgian Policy

There has been a near-consensus in the literature on Rwanda that since the Belgians did not want Rwandan independence, they supported Hutu politicians who prioritised Hutu liberation from the Tutsi above decolonisation from Belgium. Indeed, as explained earlier, the Belgians started democratisation towards self-government at the very end of the 1950s; however, they envisioned a commonwealth-type association of Ruanda-Urundi, the Congo and Belgium. A good number of archive documents point to the conclusion that it is necessary to modify such a simplistic explanation of Belgian policies. As this section illustrates, the Belgians had to
reconsider their policies on Rwanda after the Congo’s sudden accession to independence. Therefore, the Belgians decided to opt for Rwandan independence as well. However, the Belgians did not yet know with whom they could collaborate to bring about independence. Moreover, since Rwanda was a Trusteeship Territory, the Belgians had to negotiate its decolonisation with the UN. Thus began the internationalisation of the Rwandan conflict.

The decision to grant independence to the Congo was taken at the Round Table Conference in Brussels in January 1960. By the end of 1959, the Belgian government had still expected ‘a maximum of four years’ until Congolese independence. The Congolese politicians, who had been previously divided, formed a *Front Commune* to put pressure on the Belgians; on 27 January 1960, the Belgians had to announce that the Belgian Congo would become independent on 30 June.

The independence of the Congo turned Rwanda into an excessive burden for Belgium. After Congolese independence became inevitable in January 1960, the Belgian government started to consider how soon independence of the Trusteeship territory could be brought to fruition, for the administration of the Trusteeship was connected to that of Belgian Congo and the Belgians did not want to bear the burden only for Ruanda-Urundi. A Cabinet document from February 1960 stated that:

> Belgium should not want that its mandate of trusteeship over RU will continue for a few more years. The independence of Congo has influenced this. The independence of Congo can justify that Belgium is now thinking of accelerating

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[the process of] the emancipation of RU and taking certain measures to achieve this.\textsuperscript{36}

According to a telegram reporting the conversation between the British UN representative and his Belgian counterpart, the Belgians wanted to terminate the Trusteeship as soon as possible because they could no longer afford the cost and responsibility of maintaining Ruanda-Urundi.\textsuperscript{37} The British Embassy in Brussels also reported that as late as March 1960, the Belgians wanted to be relieved of the financial burden of Ruanda-Urundi as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{38} Also, de Schryver, Minister of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi stated that the Belgians were not ready for carrying the burden alone.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, Pierson Dixon, the British representative to the UN, revealed that his Belgian counterpart said Belgium would not continue the Trusteeship after June 1960 unless the UN politically and economically supported the territory.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, the ordinary budget for 1955 was 731 million francs against an expenditure of 759 million francs, leaving a deficit of 28 million,\textsuperscript{41} indicating how the sudden decision regarding Congolese independence turned Rwanda into an economic burden.

However, because Rwanda was a Trusteeship Territory, the Belgians were caught between their own national interests of decolonising in a manner and at a time to their best advantage, and the international pressure and concerns they had to consider, especially their relationship with the UN. As explained in Chapter 3, on 31 March 1960, the Visiting Mission recommended postponing the local elections scheduled for June 1960 because they thought ‘national reconciliation’ was necessary prior to elections. The Belgians had ambivalent feelings regarding the Visiting Mission. On the one hand, the Belgians wanted to maintain a good relationship with the UN because they expected the UN to share some responsibility

\textsuperscript{36} ‘Quelques idées qui se sont dégagées des réunions des Ministres les 10/12 février 1960’, 12 February 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE (my translation).
\textsuperscript{37} New York to FO, 18 March 1960, JB1016/6, FO371/1456655, TNA.
\textsuperscript{38} Brussels to FO, 19 March 1960, JB1016/4, FO371/146655, TNA.
\textsuperscript{39} New York to FO, 21 March 1960, JB1016/7, FO371/146655, TNA.
\textsuperscript{40} New York to FO, 16 March 1960, JB1016/8, FO371/146655, TNA.
\textsuperscript{41} J.R. Cotton, \textit{Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi: Economy and Commercial Conditions in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi} (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956), p. 47. Even in the Congo, Belgians was ‘on the verge of bankruptcy’. That is partially why Raymond Scheyven was appointed as a special minister for economic and financial affairs in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi: Hoskyns, \textit{Congo Since Independence}, pp. 20–21.
for Rwandan democratisation and independence. Furthermore, if the Belgians ignored the recommendations of the Visiting Mission and carried out local elections as scheduled, the Belgians would receive a ‘serious backlash’ from the UN and international public opinion. On the other hand, the Belgians did not want to spend excessive time on Rwanda when Congo, a much more important territory for them, needed more time to prepare for its independence.42

The Belgians decided to decolonise Rwanda in such a way to maintain a good relationship with the Rwandans. In order to achieve this, they needed to remove the anti-Belgian influence of the Mwami and UNAR. In April and May 1960, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, the Belgians started to consider the removal of the Mwami in order to guarantee the victory of Hutu parties in the elections. Logiest assumed the possibility that Kigeri Ndahindurwa would become an obstacle to the Belgian administration by going into exile and acting ‘as if they were the victims of Belgian colonialism’.43 In this case, Logiest was afraid of the possibility that most Hutu citizens would follow the Mwami because, according to him, Rwandans were still ‘caught in feudalism’.44 The Belgians also thought it highly possible that UNAR would win the communal elections due to the party’s organisational discipline and its influence over people, a victory which the Belgian administration wanted to avoid by any means. The Belgian government finally decided on the timing of the local elections. On 28 April, they announced that a conference for national reconciliation would take place in May and local elections would take place in June as scheduled; another conference would be held in October with the goal of implementing decolonisation in two years’ time.45

Belgium’s Deteriorating Reputation and the Escalation of Ethnic Conflict

Congolese independence, followed by the Congo state of Katanga’s declaration of secession and the subsequent civil war, were all affected by the Cold War ideological rivalries between the Eastern and Western Blocs; these events influenced the debates

42 ‘Mémorandum concernant le réunion du 22 Avril 1960 présidée par M. Le ministre de Schryver’, 22 Avril 1960, IRU 1598, AA, AMAE.
43 Logiest, Mission, pp. 65–7 (my translation).
44 Ibid, p. 76.
45 Harroy, Rwanda, p. 354.
on Rwanda in the UN and thus the process of the Revolution inside Rwanda. After the Round Table Conference in January 1960, elections to the provincial assemblies and to the National Chamber were held in May to prepare for Congolese independence. Patrice Lumumba’s nationalist party, the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) won the parliamentary elections, and Congo was declared independent with Lumumba serving as Prime Minister. However, the relationships among political parties and leaders were not coherent. A mutiny demanding Africanisation of the *Force Publique* started within one week after independence, and turmoil and violence ensued. Making things worse, the state of Katanga declared its independence from the Congo on 11 July. As the UN discussed the emergency, the problem here was that UN membership had been shifting away from the influence of the Western colonial powers, as a result of Cold War rivalries and world-wide decolonisation.\(^{46}\) In 1946, there were only nine Asian and four African UN member states out of a total of 51; by 1958, the number had increased to 22 Asian and nine African states out of 81. The year 1960 was called ‘the Year of Africa’, when 16 newly independent countries joined the UN.\(^{47}\) As a group, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, India and Indonesia took the hardest line in their criticism of Western states and support for Lumumba; another group, consisting of Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Nigeria, Somali and Togo cautiously held more distance from Lumumba while still basically aligning with the first group. Another group, of primarily francophone countries such as Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Haut Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Madagascar, were not as critical of Belgium.\(^{48}\)

This atmosphere in the UN was not comfortable for the Belgians. Belgium and the Western Bloc countries concluded that it was the ill-prepared and hasty emancipation process that had brought about the crisis in the Congo; therefore, they

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\(^{46}\) From the 1950s to the 1960s, the UN was seen as ‘most effective means to pursue Cold War ideological rivalry’. Moreover, the American and Western policy-makers were afraid of Soviet penetration on African soil because they wanted to keep the Cold War out of Africa: Kent, *America*, pp. 13–20 and 189–90.


thought that Rwanda should not gain its independence before an administrative foundation was ‘prepared and well in operation’ to avoid ‘another Congo’. Hutu politicians also thought that the chaos in Congo was caused by the rush for independence; they understood that early independence would not solve domestic problems. Therefore, they reinforced their demand that, instead of hurrying towards independence, the democratisation of Rwanda should be prioritised, to solve the Tutsi–Hutu problem, especially as it manifested itself during the local elections in July 1960.

On the other hand, Tutsi traditional leaders and the Eastern Bloc states interpreted the chaos in Congo as the result of Belgian colonialism. The Soviet bloc and the radical group of newly independent Afro-Asian countries in the UN regarded Belgium as the source of problem: that Belgian colonial rule had created a fragile nation state and had chosen African ‘yes-men’ through whom the Belgians could exercise influence even after independence. The Tutsi leaders thought that the Congolese crisis was brought about due to the Belgian (neo)colonialism and military intervention, and that the independence of Congo was not ‘true independence’. Thus they took an instrumentalist and extreme constructivist stance in understanding the Rwandan situation at the time. According to them, the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu was fabricated by the Belgians who wanted to use it instrumentally to maximise their interests and maintain influence over Rwanda. Therefore, those actors ignored the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi and thought the Hutu leaders as ‘puppets’ of the Belgians. The Tutsi traditional leaders particularly expected that once the Belgians were chased away by the UN, ‘the Hutu who resisted against UNAR and the Mwami’ would be punished; thus the anti-Belgian countries demanded early independence and complete withdrawal of Belgian troops from Rwanda before independence.

Though they had regarded Rwanda as an economic burden only a few months before, the Belgians now viewed it as important than before and wanted to maintain good relations. On 22 August, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny said that due

49 New York to FO, 19 October 1960, JB1016/34 FO371/146657, TNA.
to Katanga’s proximity, Belgium had an increased interest in staying in Ruanda-Urundi in order to station their troops there. However, public opinion in Belgium was increasingly turning against the Trusteeship, preferring that the UN send ‘a body of permanent observers’ to Ruanda-Urundi. Thus, Wigny concluded that it would be in Belgium’s interest to internationalise the problem of Ruanda-Urundi, that is, discuss it in the General Assembly of the UN, though this turned out to have negative implications for Belgium later. 51

After considering the ‘lesson of Congo’, that is, that Congo had fallen into chaos due to faulty preparation for independence, as well as Rwanda’s increasing significance, the Belgian government released a detailed plan for Rwandan decolonisation. On 12 September 1960, after the July communal elections, the Belgian newspaper Libre Belgique published an article titled ‘Planned independence of Ruanda-Urundi in early 1962’, announcing the timetable for decolonisation: the establishment of Provisional Government and Assembly based on the result of local elections in June–July 1960; a conference to discuss national reconciliation around December 1960; a national election in January 1961; granting internal autonomy after the national election in 1961, and independence in early 1962. 52 As planned, on 17 October 1960, Harold d’Aspremont-Lynden, who had replaced de Schryver as Minister of African Affairs, announced the establishment of a Provisional Government and Assembly based on the result of local elections, as detailed in Chapter 3. He summarised Rwandan political progress since 1959: ‘Rwanda experienced political and social crisis. Since the Revolution is over, Rwanda has now reached a new stage of its evolution.’ 53 The next step was to carry out the legislative elections under UN observation in January 1961 and establish internal autonomy based on the results of the legislative elections. 54

Though Belgium wanted to cooperate with the UN for the early and planned independence of Rwanda, its relationship with the UN had worsened after the Congo

51 Mémorandum de la réunion générale tenue chez mons les ministres le lundi’, 22 August 1960, CAB3763, AA, AMAE (my translation).
52 Brussels to FO, 27 September 1960, JB1016/28, FO371/146656, TNA.
54 ‘Ordonnance législative no 221/275 du 18 octobre 1960 établissant au Rwanda un conseil et gouvernement provisoire’, Rwanda politique, pp. 319–21, and Brussels to FO, 27 October 1960, JB1016/37, FO371/146657, TNA.
Crisis. For instance, the Belgians received criticism in the Fourth Committee of General Assembly as implementing ‘the worst kind of colonialism’. Asian countries and a number of newly independent African countries were particularly suspicious of Belgium and thought that the Belgians oppressed the Tutsi, who were conducting a liberation struggle in Rwanda. Therefore, since the Belgians had received a ‘hard knock’ from the Congo, they wanted to avoid the same situation happening again with Ruanda-Urundi, which is why Alfred Claeys-Bouwaert, a Belgian representative to the UN, emphasised his country’s efforts at democratising Rwanda since 1952.

As the timing of the legislative election polarised the Rwandan parties along ethnic lines, the timing of the legislative election ignited a heated debate in the Fourth Committee, beginning with the petitions of the Rwandan leaders. Louis Rwagasana of UNAR and Prosper Bwanakweri of RADER demanded the postponement of the January 1961 national election for several reasons: first, the local elections held in June–July 1960 were so unjust that they should be redone, and after that, the legislative election should be postponed until the Round Table Conference was held. By contrast, PARMEHUTU members such as Anastase Makuza thought it impossible to postpone the legislative election and it should be carried out when scheduled, on 15 January 1961, because to postpone the election would hamper the democratisation of Rwanda.

Many of the Afro-Asian countries and the Eastern Bloc supported the postponement of the national election because their anti-colonial tendency let them to support UNAR. Therefore, they suggested postponing the election until March at earliest. The Belgians were against such a long delay: they could have compromised if the proposed delay was up to a month. They claimed first that PARMEHUTU had won the communal elections and therefore legitimately represented the Rwandan masses, and secondly, that the rainy season would start from late February thereby

56 Brussels to FO, 23 August 1960, JB1016/22, FO371/146656, TNA.
57 UNGA, Fifteenth Session, Fourth Committee, the Report of the Fourth Committee (A/4672), 19 December 1960.
58 A famous resolution to promote decolonisation was adopted in the General Assembly around the same timing: ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people’, A/RES/1514(XV), 14 December 1960. See Appendix 4 for the full text.
making it very difficult to carry out the election after March; third, public order might well deteriorate if the election was postponed, and finally, that in order for Rwanda to gain independence in 1962 as proposed earlier, it was necessary to establish the autonomous government as soon as possible.  

A draft of a resolution calling for a delay to the election was submitted by Yugoslavia and some Afro-Asian countries, reflecting the wishes of UNAR, that the election should be postponed until May or June. The Belgian Representatives were seeking for a compromise on the election date: if it was possible to postpone the elections no later than mid-February, they would have voted for the Resolution; but if not, they had to abstain or vote against the resolution because they could not compromise any further. After intensive discussions, the date of election was slightly modified from May or June to the date decided in 15th session at March, implying that the elections should be postponed, at least until March. The Belgians could not accept this date, but the resolution was adopted in the Fourth Committee with 47 affirmative votes, eight dissenting votes and 17 abstentions. The resolution was passed to the General Assembly, where the Belgians were again faced with harsh criticism, and the resolution was adopted as Resolution 1579 with 61 affirmations, 9 objections and 23 abstentions. Moreover, a separate resolution, 1580, on the Mwami was adopted: the Belgians were strongly criticised, as to ‘note with regret’ that they had ‘arbitrarily suspected the powers of the Mwami of Ruanda’ and had not ‘allowed him to return to Ruanda to resume his duties as Mwami’. Therefore, Resolution 1580 requested the Belgians to facilitate the Mwami’s return

59 New York to FO, 04/12/1960, JB2292/1, FO371/146800, TNA.
60 The countries which drafted the resolution were Afghanistan, Iraq, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, El Salvador and Jordan: UNGA, Fifteenth Session, Fourth Committee, the Report of the Fourth Committee (A/4672), 19 December 1960, and New York to FO, 14 December 1960, JB2292/4, FO371/146800, TNA.
61 New York to FO, 16 December 1960, JB2292/7, and New York to FO, no. 1619, 14 December 1960, JB2292/3, FO371/146800, TNA.
62 Against were Belgium, France, Britain, Australia, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and South Africa.
63 ‘Question of the future of Rwanda-Urundi’, A/RES/1579. The countries voting ‘for’ were Asian countries with the exceptions of Republic of China and Japan, African countries, the Eastern Bloc countries such as Soviet Union and all the Latin American countries. Those against were those eight countries which were already against in the Fourth Commission plus Luxembourg. Abstentions included the US, Canada, Austria, Italy, Turkey among others: UN General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Fourth Committee, 1092nd meeting (A/C.4/SR.1092), 19 December 1960. See Appendix 4 for the full text of the resolution.
and then hold a referendum on the monarchy. The UN Commission for Ruanda-Urundi was established immediately and Max Dorsinville (Haiti) was appointed as President of the Commission with Majid Rahnema (Iran) and Ernest Gassou (Togo) were named as other members of the Commission.

The Belgian government was divided over the timing of the national election between those who prioritised African issues and therefore wanted to keep up the pace of decolonisation, and those who represented the Cold War diplomatic interests and thus want to appeal internationally that Belgium was willing to accept the Resolutions. In early January 1961, a conference was held in Ostend, Belgium, to discuss the timing of the national election, as authorised by Resolution 1579. Harroy and other local administrators in Ruanda-Urundi and the Minister of African Affairs did not want to accept the resolution because it would undermine the authority of the Belgian local administration in Rwanda. On 24 December 1960, after Resolution 1579 had been adopted, Minister of African Affairs d’Aspremont-Lynden stated that ‘if the conference received a significant number of votes for conducting the elections on 28 January [as scheduled], I can give the green light to the elections without referral back through the council of cabinet: I have received the power from there and I will use it.’ Since the Hutu leaders wanted to refuse to attend the conference, Harroy asked d’Aspremont-Lynden: ‘Can I therefore give them my word that if they come to Ostend and a good majority of them vote for maintaining the elections [as scheduled], are the elections to take place on 28 January?’ The answer from d’Aspremont-Lynden was in the affirmative. As such, for the local Belgian administration and the Ministry of African Affairs, which wanted to hasten political progress and decolonisation, it would be a good chance to both appeal to the UN while at the same time keeping to the pace of planned decolonisation. The conference agreed to carry out the elections on time because the majority of the participants were both Belgians and Hutu politicians.

64 ‘Question of the Mwami’, A/RES/1580(XV), 20 Dec 1960 (Appendix 4).
65 Since this is a significant quote, I include here the original French text: ‘Si le colloque recueille un vote significant en faveur d’élections le 28 janvier, je puis donner le feu vert à ces élections sans repasser par le conseil de cabinet: j’en ai reçu le pouvoir et j’en userai’. Harroy, Rwanda, p. 401 (my translation). The council of cabinet consisted of ministers; therefore, this quote suggested that he did not mind ignoring other ministries.
66 Ibid.
However, after the Ostend Conference, the Belgian government suddenly announced that the national election would be postponed. In my research for this thesis, I could not find any Belgian documents to explain the reason for this. However, according to other available sources, it seems that those Belgian government officials who prioritised Cold War international issues over African issues decided to press for postponing the election, on the basis that their relationship with their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies was more crucial. Indeed, it seems that the decision to postpone the elections was taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Wigny, who wanted to placate NATO allies, against the wishes of the Ministry of African Affairs. The American Embassy in Brussels reported that ‘Wigny is worried about UN reaction.’67 The American Embassy in Paris also sent a telegram reporting on a NATO meeting:

In general France felt Belgium should give full consideration to UN aspect. UK has very similar views with US and France and had problems in defying UNGA. Netherlands: similar to France-US-UK. Greece doubted UNGA resolution could be reversed without provoking strong Afro-Asian reaction and also felt West should avoid another defeat in UN on this type issue. Denmark felt it would not be advisable to act contrary to UN resolution.68

That is supported by an interview article in a journal, *Pourquoi Pas?* in which Harroy answered:

Strongly cowered by its allies, Belgium was afraid of, I believe, displeasing the allies again by not following, at least to some extent, the UN recommendations. And yet, I assume that these allies would have had perhaps a different attitude if they were told the details of the problems. They would have better understood that Ruanda-Urundi was a pawn for the West. I say correctly a pawn: not a queen, not a rook, but isn’t it with pawns that one wins the games? 69

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67 From Brussels to the SS, 17 January 1961, 778.00/1-1761, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP. Vanthemsche pointed out that Wigny was one of the moderate ministers in the Belgian government to consider international opinion: Vanthemsche, *Belgium*, p. 97.

68 From Paris to the SS, 17 January 1960, 778.00/1-1761, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.

Thus the Ministry of African Affairs and local administration did not regard Rwanda as important in the context of Cold War geopolitics and therefore wanted to proceed with decolonisation no matter how severe the criticism they would receive internationally, whereas the Foreign Minister regarded Rwanda from the Cold War perspective, in which Belgium needed to avoid any further international criticism. As a result, as detailed in Chapter 3, Hutu leaders staged the *coup d’état* in Gitarama on 28 January 1961, angry with the Belgians’ position, as well as fearful of losing the momentum towards decolonisation. In this sense, Rwandan internal politics was affected by external political disaccord between the Belgians, the NATO powers and the UN.

**Figure 5: The Internationalisation of Rwandan Conflict**
How, then, did the Belgian government deal with the coup d’état? If Belgium wanted to improve their relationship with the UN and avoid further criticism, the Belgians should have denounced the coup and not recognised the new government. In that case, public order in Rwanda might have deteriorated against the Belgians and independence would have been delayed. On the other hand, if the Belgians recognised the coup government, they could have eased dissatisfaction among Rwandan politicians over the delay of the legislative elections and continued along the path to independence. In this case, however, criticism from the UN would surely have increased. On 1 February, the Belgian government announced that they recognised the government established by the coup, ‘in order not to run the risk of provoking chaos and disorder, we should not oppress by force the will of peaceful people.’

The Belgians then acceded internal autonomy to the new government.

As expected, criticism from the UN became louder. The UN Ruanda-Urundi Commission had been established by Resolution 1579 on 20 December 1960. While the Commission attended the Ostend Conference, they demanded the Belgians to follow the Resolution. The Commission disliked the Belgians’ attitude during the Conference because the latter tried to reduce the Commission’s influence. Also, they felt that the Belgian local administration in Rwanda was not supportive at all. Due to the fact that the Conference was held so soon after the passing of Resolution 1579, the Commission also had the impression that the conference was neither well-prepared nor was it of any practical value. Though the Commission welcomed the Belgian government’s declaration to delay the elections, they were disappointed by the uncooperative attitudes of the Belgian local administration when the Commission visited Usumbura from 28 January. For instance, the Commission criticised the local government officials that they were not informed about the Hutu coup for several days. They also refused to visit Rwanda because it might be regarded as ‘recognition’ of the coup government. The UN Commission strongly criticised the

72 Ibid, pp. 16–18.
coup as illegal. They stated: ‘a kind of racial dictatorship was established in Rwanda. The progress of the past 18 months consisted of shifting from one oppressive system to another. Extremist ideas are rewarded and the Tutsi minority are facing oppression. The political circumstance in Rwanda, in general, is unstable.’

Belgian diplomatic efforts at postponing the national election were thus cancelled out by the coup; rather, their efforts further invited so much criticism that even their NATO allies could not defend the Belgians. As mentioned previously, the Belgians had postponed the national elections due to fears of worsening their relationship with the UN and pressure from NATO allies. There was, however, a strong suspicion in the UN that the Belgian government had been involved in the coup – it was assumed that it would hardly be possible to carry out the coup without being noticed by the Trusteeship administration. Moreover, Belgium’s rapid acknowledgement of the coup government further supported suspicions of Belgian involvement. Thus, the UN Commission harshly criticised both the coup and Belgian government.

Thus the UN Fourth Committee’s discussions, which resumed in March, supported UNAR, criticising the Belgian government and their Hutu collaborators. Rwandan leaders submitted many petitions. The Tutsi UNAR leaders, such as Rwagasana, and Rutera, a representative of Mwami Kigeri, criticised Belgium’s policies, vehemently demanding the immediate termination of the Trusteeship. They also criticised the Republic established by the coup d’etat in January, labelling it a ‘challenge against the UN resolutions’. On the other hand, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU leaders jointly prepared a petition, which legitimised the coup and the establishment of the republic as ‘democratic’ acts, to combat ‘feudalism’ and ‘colonialism’. Despite the fact that more African countries had by then joined the UN, those countries focused exclusively on European colonialism in Africa, and seemingly, they did not understand the Tutsi–Hutu relationship. Thus, discussion in the UN regarding Rwanda was mostly supportive of UNAR, further driving together the local Belgian administration and the PARMEHUTU.

73 Ibid, p. 20.
74 Ibid.
The Belgians also failed to compromise on another resolution. On 10 April 1961, Yugoslavia and 24 other countries submitted a draft resolution, demanding a ‘broad-based caretaker government’ in Rwanda, which implies that they denied the legitimacy of the coup d’état government and that a transitional government including UNAR members should be established until the legislative election was held. The Belgians expressed strong disagreement for this draft resolution, for it was almost impossible for them to accept it. On 12 April, this draft resolution was passed with 81 affirmations, with Belgium being the sole objector, and abstentions from France, Spain and Portugal. The Belgians stated that they would consider a compromise. On 18 April, Walter Loridan, a Belgian Representative to the UN, told his British counterpart, Andrew Cohen, that Foreign Minister Wigny had instructed him not to object but abstain on the resolution’s vote if the criticism towards Belgium was deleted from the Preamble and if many ‘friends’ would also abstain. However, similar to the draft resolution, Resolution 1605 was adopted without any revision and a majority vote, with only objection from Belgium and abstentions from France, Portugal and Spain. As such, this time the Belgians had attempted to show a compromising attitude in order to ease the intensifying criticism from the UN after the coup, but their effort failed and they became even more isolated in the UN.

As explored in Chapter 3, the period of 1960–61 was important for Rwandan party politics, when the cooperation among the parties dissolved – first, UNAR versus the anti-UNAR Common Front, and then PARMEHUTU and the anti-PARMEHUTU Common Front – with the coup finally dividing the political parties.

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76 Among them were the US, Norway, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Cuba, Nigeria, Ghana, India and other Afro-Asian countries: New York to FO, 10 April 1961, JBR2291/5, FO371/155132, TNA.
77 Ibid.
78 New York to FO, 10 April 1961, JBR2291/6, FO371/155132, TNA.
79 New York to FO, 18 April 1961, JBR2291/9, FO371/155132, TNA.
80 The text of the resolution was clearly anti-Belgian. For instance, the Preamble contained ‘Regretting the failure of the Administering Authority to implement fully and effectively the terms of resolution 1579(XV), the resistance to such implementation by the local representative of the Administering Authority in Ruanda-Urundi and their failure to co-operate fully and effectively with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi; Regretting the de facto recognition by the Administering Authority of governmental bodies in Ruanda which were established by irregular and unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative of all segments of the population in the absence of free and fair elections on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage, as envisaged in resolution 1579 (XV)’: ‘Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi’, A/RES/1605 (XV) (Appendix 4).
along ethnic lines. As this section has shown, Congolese independence, Belgian policy changes and the heated debates in the UN had an influence over the actions of Rwandan politicians. In this sense, conflict within the UN and the Cold War policies affected the course of the Revolution and party politics in Rwanda, contributing to ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity.

Recovering International Status, Achieving Rwandan Independence

This section examines the Belgians’ effort to restore their international standing and achieve the ‘successful’ independence for Rwanda, despite the ongoing polarisation and politicisation of ethnicity. On 25 April 1961, a new Belgian government was formed by Théodore Lefèvre. For the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Ruanda-Urundi, Paul-Henri Spaak, it was imperative that Belgium break out of its international isolation. 81 As an experienced politician on international politics, Spaak had a different view on Resolution 1605 from the local Trusteeship administration. Harroy and Logiest had rejected the idea of adhering to Resolution 1605 because it was impossible to implement, and also because they thought Belgium should honour their responsibility for the Trusteeship territory rather than protect themselves from international criticism; Spaak, however, took the view that Rwanda was not worth risking Belgium’s international reputation and he aimed to improve his country’s relationship with the UN. He considered the example of British Cameroon smoothly separating into Nigeria and Cameroon; if elections were to be properly supervised by the UN, criticism towards Belgium would die down. 82 Indeed, the new Belgian government considered recalling Harroy as a gesture towards taking responsibility for the coup and appealing to the UN; the idea did not finally materialise because the government could not ‘entrust the critical final year [of decolonisation] to an inexperienced new appointee’. 83 Instead of recalling Harroy, the new government

81 The fact that he served concurrently the two ministers suggests that the international affair and that of Ruanda-Urundi were connected and should be reconciled.
82 Harroy, Rwanda, pp. 447–9; Logiest, Mission, p. 193, and from New York to SS, 4 May 1961, 778.00/5-461, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
83 From Brussels to SS, 20 April 1961, 778.00/4-2061, and outgoing telegram from amconsul usumbura to secstate Washington, 25 May 1961, 778.00/5-2561, both in Box 2027 CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
decided to exert more control over the Belgian local administration. On 17 May, the new Belgian government decided to accept and implement Resolution 1605 unconditionally and to send Spaak’s personal representative to Rwanda. Spaak nominated Georges Carlier to be his envoy, and explained his reason for this: ‘in order to maintain our relationship with the UN Commission members, it is necessary to explain [to them] every issue, such as black [Rwandan] politicians, the Belgian administration, and the politics I am pursuing.’ However, the local administration did not like Spaak’s policy on Rwanda.

Due to Spaak’s efforts, the Belgian government was able to recover the trust of the UN and the national election was held in September 1961, resulting in the overwhelming victory of PARMEHUTU and confirming the Republic’s status. Satisfied with the election result and their improving relationship with the UN, the Belgians accelerated preparations for decolonisation. Spaak invited members of the governments of Rwanda and Burundi to Brussels in order to discuss internal autonomy and impending independence. In early December, the Rwandan government, led by Kayibanda, arrived in Brussels and negotiations commenced. According to the British Consulate in Usumbura, Spaak’s plan consisted of two major points: to change the Governor General, and to leave the Belgian local administrative service, including the military, as a form of technical assistance. These plans seemingly emerged from the idea that the Belgians would enact a gradual withdrawal from Rwanda, an indicator that they had learned their lesson from the Congo debacle. The Belgian government and Rwandan governments signed the Brussels Agreement, which was based on Spaak’s formula, on 21 December. First, internal autonomy was granted. Spaak admitted that in Rwanda and Burundi, ‘internal autonomy was completed along with the line of Trusteeship agreement.’ Secondly, Belgium would reduce its power, maintained the control over foreign affairs, territorial security, finance and public order. The Belgian military would no

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84 From NY to SS, 2 May 1961, 778.00/5-261, Box 2027, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
86 Outgoing telegram from amconsul usumbura to secstate Washington, 10 August 1961, Burundi Box 1, RG 84, NACP.
87 Harroy, Rwanda, pp. 490–93.
88 Usumbura to FO, 11 December 1961, FO371/155116, TNA.
longer conduct their activity in Rwanda without permission from the Rwandan government. The Garde Territorial now officially belonged to the Rwandan government. \(^\text{89}\) Regarding finance, the Belgians would supervise financial matters, based on Rwandan government’s planning. Third, they agreed to separate discussions regarding the union of Rwanda and Burundi, which was a demand of the UN. \(^\text{90}\) Finally, the position of High Commissioner replaced that of Governor General. Logiest was appointed High Commissioner and Harroy left Rwanda in January 1962. \(^\text{91}\)

After these developments, the major focus in the UN turned to the relationship between Rwanda and Burundi. On 10 January 1962, the Russia’s UN representative criticised Belgium, complaining that the decolonisation of Rwanda and Burundi as two separate states violated the Trusteeship Agreement and past resolutions. Other countries were also concerned about the ‘balkanisation of Africa’, suspecting Belgian of neo-colonialist intentions. As in the other Trusteeship territories of Togo and Cameroon, where the integration of British and French administrations were integral, the UN was unwilling to see the separation of Ruanda and Burundi. \(^\text{92}\) In April 1962, a conference was held in Addis Ababa to discuss the relationship between Rwanda and Burundi. Beside the UN Commission, President Kayibanda and Financial Minister Gaspard Cyimana led the discussion. The UN Commission on Ruanda-Urundi explained again the significance of the union of Ruanda-Urundi, which was necessary first, because it did not make sense to have separate states, taking into account their historical and geographical background, and secondly, because both countries’ economic vulnerability might attract neo-colonialism under the disguise of technical assistance, therefore cooperation between the two countries meant more efficient engagement with economic and financial problems. In addition, centralised federation would facilitate cooperation, and would be advantageous for joint foreign policies. The Rwandan government, however, denied the possibility of political union with Burundi that it was impossible to politically cooperate with Burundi.


\(^{90}\) Ibid.

\(^{91}\) Usumbura to FO, 28 December 1961, JBR1015/4, FO371/161793, TNA.

\(^{92}\) New York to FO, 12 January 1962, JBR1015/8, FO371/161793, TNA.
where the *Mwami* still prevailed. The Rwandan government, however, wanted to give a good impression to the UN commission in order to assure independence. Therefore, they saw the advantage to agree upon only economic union, because both governments could not come to an agreement on political union. Economic union was to address currency, customs, coffee and scientific research.93

Another concern of the UN’s at the time was ethnic reconciliation. The UN was concerned that PARMEHUTU had monopolised the Rwandan government and since no reconciliation had yet been achieved, the UN set up a reconciliation meeting between the Rwandan government and UNAR in February 1962 in New York. Those attending discussed the issue of the possibility of UNAR participating in Rwandan politics and the issue of refugees. As mentioned in Chapter 3, they agreed that the Rwandan government would provide two ministry posts to UNAR politicians and would encourage refugees to return home. On 27 June, UN Resolution 1746, which approved Rwandan independence, was adopted with 93 affirmative votes, no objections and 13 abstentions.94 In this way, the Republic of Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium.

To sum up, up to 1959, the Belgians did not consider the idea of Rwandan independence; rather, they envisaged an association with Congo and Belgium. Congolese independence in 1960, however, changed the situation and Belgium decided to decolonise Rwanda by 1962. Based on their ‘lessons from Congo’, the Belgians had to establish domestic autonomous government by democratisation before independence. However, the relationship between Belgium and the United Nations worsened. Belgium had wanted to cooperate with the UN over Rwanda. However, the Congo Crisis, the ideological confrontations of the Cold War and the inclusion of newly independent Afro-Asian countries in the UN led the way to adoption of Resolution 1579 which criticised Belgium harshly and constrained Belgian decolonisation plans. In order for Belgium to smooth the road to independence for Rwanda, a cooperative relationship with UN was a necessary precondition. Therefore, after April 1961, the Belgian government managed to improve its relationship with the UN, despite the complaints from the local Belgian

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93 Addis Ababa to FO, 20 April 1962, JBR1015/26, FO371/161794, TNA.
administration. Rwanda achieved independence with greater facility than in the Congo where the Belgians could not find collaborators before independence, or in Burundi, where an anti-Belgian government was firmly established. Belgium was able to maintain a good relationship with Rwanda, but the price was the escalation of ethnic polarisation among the political parties and the birth of post-colonial Rwanda where ‘political tribalism’ was reinforced.

The Origin of ‘Aiding Violence’?
This section aims to take a brief look at the diplomatic effort of the Kayibanda government in the early post-independence period to examine the continuity from decolonisation as well as the implications of how diplomacy affected the post-colonial consolidation of PARMEHUTU power discussed in Chapter 3. In short, the post-colonial Rwandan government tried to exploit Cold War rivalries in order to gain more aid and support for their regime, which would lead to what Peter Uvin labelled ‘aiding violence’. 95

The American and Belgian policies on post-colonial Rwanda were rooted in the Cold War environment. The Cuban Crisis in late 1962 pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. Moreover, since 1955 when the Bandung Conference had taken place, 96 the Western bloc had sought partisans and allies in the developing countries and worried that newly independent African countries might favour the Eastern, communist, Bloc or take a neutral position. 97 In the African Great Lakes region, the main concerns for the US and Belgium were not Rwanda, but Congo and Burundi. They wanted to avoid ‘another Congo’ because they believed that instability invited communist involvement. The US was also concerned that Burundi was taking the side of the ‘neutralists’, and was particularly concerned about the ‘dangers of Sino-Soviet presence in Burundi’ because the relationship between Burundi and Belgium

95 By analysing what ‘development’ meant to Rwanda and answering why Rwanda, which to international development agencies had seemed so peaceful, suddenly fell into chaos, Peter Uvin argues that the international aid organisations reinforced the government’s power and indirectly ‘aided’ the ethnic discrimination and violence: Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998).
96 The Bandung Conference, the first transcontinental meeting for Afro-Asian countries, was held in Indonesia in 1955. It signalled the rise of the ‘Third World’ countries, such as India and Indonesia.
97 Westad, Global Cold War, and Bradley, ‘Decolonization’.
was not a friendly one. On the other hand, in the US’s view, Rwanda was not so important due to its good relationship with Belgium which had been established during decolonisation; therefore, the US wanted Belgium to take initial responsibility, including financial responsibility for Rwanda, and did not immediately make particular aid projects available for Rwanda. Expectation regarding US commitment, however, was high among the Rwandan government. The Rwandan Ambassador to the US expressed the view that:

The happiness of the Rwandan people counts on the US with great hope and trust. No doubt that the Rwandan ideal falls within the framework of the US’s principal aims of ensuring freedom, human progress, and cooperation amongst nations in order to strengthen peace throughout the world.

After reviewing the performances of Rwanda in the UN, US leaders were satisfied that Rwanda was on their side, for example, in the vote against the entry of People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the UN, and in supporting American action against Cuba. The US gave the Rwandan government an airplane as aid because the gift of such a plane ‘would have very great propaganda value’ and stand as ‘a vivid symbol of the interest of the US in the welfare of Rwanda’ in spite of the airplane’s relatively cheap price. However, the US did not inform Rwanda about exactly what aid projects they could expect on the pretext that aid policy towards Rwanda had not yet been decided in Washington. In the end, the actual amount of aid from the US was not high: for the fiscal year of 1963, Rwanda received less than $1 million.

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98 Telegram from Bujumbura to Department, 11 December 1962, and Telegram from Bujumbura to Secretary of State, both in Box 1, Bujumbura Consulate General, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG84, NACP.
99 ‘Burundi: Year-End Assessment of Problems and Prospects (CA-5115, November 8, 1962)’, Amlegation Usumbura to Department of State, Box 1, Bujumbura Consulate General, RG84, NACP.
100 ‘Presentation of the Credentials by Rwandan Ambassador Mpakaniye’, Memorandum for Mr. Kenneth O’Donnell the White House, Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
101 ‘Rwandan Request for US Gift of Aircraft for Use of President Kayibanda’, Airgram from Amembassy Kigali to Department of State, Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
102 ‘Discussion with President Kayibanda’, Airgram from Amembassy Kigali to Department of State, 16 May 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
President Kayibanda and the Rwandan ambassador to the US had repeated their requests for possible US aid. The US’s response, however, was that aid projects for Rwanda were still under ‘active consideration’ and that the Bureau of African Affairs was following the matter ‘with interest’. Since the US was not so forthcoming in responding to Rwanda’s request for aid, the Rwandan government began to seek assistance from the West’s Cold War rival, despite the fact that the USSR supported UNAR in the pre-independence UN discussions. Soviet Charge d’Affaires Alexey Agafonov initiated several private talks with President Kayibanda for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Radio Rwanda reported on 24 November 1963 that a communiqué had been signed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Rwandan Foreign Minister Lazare Mpakaniye in order to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Also, Rwanda tried to disturb the US by approaching the ‘neutral’ Third World camp. At the 1963 May Day celebrations, President Kayibanda announced that Rwanda has opted for the ‘third way’, rejecting both ‘capitalistic exploitation and communist suffocation’.

The Rwandan government’s attempt at constructing a better international position was influenced by the Tutsi refugees. As explained in Chapter 3, the Tutsi refugee *Inyenzi* attacked Rwanda in December 1963, which led to retaliation in the form of the extermination of the remaining Tutsi politicians inside Rwanda and the massacre of Tutsi citizens. After the killing of Tutsis and the mass exodus of Tutsi refugees, Rwandan officials were obliged to justify their country’s situation, to ensure that international assistance was maintained. The retaliation against the Tutsi

104 Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
105 ‘Rwandan Ambassador’s Call on Assistant Secretary Williams’, Memorandum of Conversation (Menne Williams, Lazare Mpakaniye, Edward Bryant), 22 August 1963, Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
106 Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 21 July 1963; Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 16 September 1963; Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 8 October 1963; Incoming Telegram from KIGALI to Secretary of State, 31 October 1963, and Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 5 November 1963, all in Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
107 ‘Rwandan-Soviet Agreement to Establish Diplomatic Relations’, Airgram from American Embassy in Kigali to Department of State, 30 November 1963, and ‘Establishment of Rwandan-Soviet Relations’, Airgram from American Embassy in Kigali to Department of State, 7 December 1963, both in Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
108 Airgram from American Embassy in Kigali to Department of State on President Kayibanda’s speech of May 1, 1963, 17 June 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
population inside Rwanda was perceived by foreign countries to have been carried out under government order. Vatican Radio reported that it was ‘the most terrible genocide since the Holocaust’. Swiss public opinion was aroused over the slaughter in Rwanda and the Swiss government was questioned about whether to continue their assistance programme. Hans-Karl Frey, Swiss Special Adviser to President Kayibanda, demanded him to give an accurate account of what had happened in Rwanda and to show ‘some humanitarian gesture directed toward the remaining Tutsis in the country’. If Kayibanda did not concede to this request, Swiss aid would be withdrawn. Therefore, Anastase Makuza travelled to Europe in an attempt to clear the Rwandan government of the charge of genocide and to restore the government’s image. Makuza denounced the Inyenzi’s accusation that all those in the attacked area who resisted ‘the terrorists’ were massacred.

In an extension of their manipulation of the US–Soviet Cold War rivalry, the PARMEHUTU government even attempted to use the connection between PRC and the Inyenzi to extract further aid. In March 1964, Rwandan Information Minister Froduald Minani informed an officer of Republic of China (ROC) that he planned to visit Beijing ‘to attempt to dissuade CHICOMs [Chinese Communists] from assisting Inyenzi terrorists’. Minani further added that insufficient support from the US compelled Rwanda to ‘have interaction with others with whom we do not wish to have interactions’. Thus he asked the ROC officer ‘as a friend of the American Ambassador’ to seek further assistance for Rwanda. As such, the proposal to visit to PRC was a balancing act to extract more aid by even exploiting the Inyenzi–China relationship.

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111 Airgram from Amembassy Brussels to Department of State on February 27, Press Conference by President of Rwanda National Assembly, 3 March 1964, POL 15-4, CFPF, 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
112 Incoming Telegram from KIGALI, 20 March 1964, and Incoming Telegram from Amembassy Taipei, 23 March 1964, both in POL7, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
113 Ibid.
114 Incoming Telegram from Taipei, 26 March 1964, and ‘Possible trip to Communist China by Rwanda Minister of Information’, Airgram from Amembassy Kigali to Department of State, 4 April 1964, both in POL7, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
Furthermore, in mid-1965, the Rwandan government shifted – or pretended to shift – from its former pro-Western position to a more ‘non-aligned’ policy. This was because they had not been able to obtain as much aid as they envisaged from the West, so they hoped to be more successful in extracting funds from the other side of the Cold War camp. To do so, however, Rwanda would need to display a non-Western attitude. Minister of Information Martin Uzamugura commented that the Rwandan government ‘must feed, clothe and teach three million people. Leaning too far to one side has caused bad blood.’ As a result, in July 1965, the Rwandan government established diplomatic relations with Poland and Romania and announced implicitly that the Soviet Bloc had offered economic aid.115

Faced with this situation, the US Embassy in Kigali offered to provide some technical assistance, characterised by short-term and ‘high visibility’ projects, such as the construction of asphalt roads, stadium, cultural centres and government buildings; this would not pose any great difficulty due to the Rwandan economy’s size being ‘so low that forms of technical assistance which would not attract the slightest attention elsewhere have extraordinary impact here, and the beneficial results more immediately felt’.116

In this way, the ‘smooth’ process of Rwanda’s decolonisation ironically deprived the country of its importance in the region, due to the good relationship between Rwanda and Belgium.117 The US, from whom Rwanda had demanded more aid, was not eager to contribute to the country’s development. Furthermore, the retaliation taking place inside Rwanda after the Inyenzi attacks had endangered Rwandan international reputation. In order to both repair Rwanda’s reputation and extract more aid, the Kayibanda government tried to, or pretended to, approach to both communists and ‘neutralists’. As detailed in Chapter 3, PARMEHUTU consolidated power during this period and contributed to further ethnic

116 ‘Politico-economic Summary,’ Airgram from Amembassy KIGALI to Department of State, 03 February 1965; Incoming Telegram from Kigali to Secretary of State, 16 July 1965, and Incoming Telegram from Kigali, 13 August 1965, all in POL7, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
117 From the Belgian point of view, Rwandan decolonisation was smooth and successful, compared to that of Burundi.
discrimination. Even though further research is needed, in the efforts of post-colonial Rwandan government, we can see the seeds of the problematic relationship between Rwanda and international aid, where international aid supported the consolidation of the government’s rule and contributed to ethnic discrimination, which Peter Uvin had labelled ‘aiding violence’.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the international factors concerning Rwandan decolonisation and its impact on party politics and the Revolution: external factors such as factions with the Belgian administration, the independence of other African countries and the heated debates in the United Nations influenced by the Cold War provided opportunities for Rwandan ethnicity to become politicised. The decolonisation of Rwanda was a process in which the Belgians negotiated with both Rwandans and the UN. The Belgians decided to decolonise Rwanda after Congolese independence became inevitable in early 1960, which why the Belgians needed to find ‘collaborators’ to negotiate a more convenient form of decolonisation. The PARMEHUTU leaders were the most likely candidates, in this sense. Therefore, while Belgian decolonisation is often regarded as ‘too little, too late’ for Congo, they prepared more for Rwandan decolonisation and were successful in maintaining their good relationship with post-colonial Rwanda. However, due to the fact that Rwanda was a UN Trusteeship territory, Belgium had to convince the General Assembly to grant independence to Rwanda in the manner preferred by the UN.

The UN and the Cold War relationships affected Rwandan conflict and ethnicity in various ways. Actually, the UN did not force the Belgians to decolonise Rwanda. What determined the Belgians to change their policies on Rwanda were political developments in the Congo. The proposed association among Ruanda-Urundi, Congo and Belgium rested on the underlying presumption that the Congo maintained a good relationship with Belgium. After Congolese independence became inevitable in 1960, therefore, the Belgians decided to decolonise Rwanda. In this sense, the pressure from the UN was not the factor to influence Belgian decision.

The UN’s role was to affect the timing and manner of decolonisation rather than the impulse of Belgian policy changes; the Cold War contributed to the polarisation of ethnicity in this sense. The combination of Cold War ideological and
military rivalries, with the entry of a number of newly independent African states to the organisation, meant that the UN became a heated forum for debate on Rwanda. Eastern Bloc states and many new UN members supported the Tutsi nationalist UNAR in their criticisms of colonialism, while, on the other hand, Western Bloc states were obliged to balance their support for the Belgian position favouring the Hutu leadership with a need to distance themselves from colonialist interests. The UN was therefore not unanimous in terms of Rwandan decolonisation; rather, their attitude towards the Rwandan problem derived from the Cold War context as well as their own members’ national interests.

This provided the Rwandan leaders an opportunity for exploitation. PARMEHUTU made use of support from Belgium and justified their rule by appealing to democracy and self-rule, which were the main concepts of Trusteeship. Meanwhile, Tutsi leaders criticised the Belgians and appealed to the Afro-Asian countries and the Eastern Bloc; later, Tutsi refugees tried to recapture power in Rwanda and invaded the country with Chinese support. This affected the relationships of the political parties and contributed first to their polarisation and then to the escalation of politicised ethnicity in Rwanda.

It means that the Belgian government in Brussels did not hold the grip of the process of decolonisation. Many UN member states criticised Belgium, calling into question the country’s international reputation; they also interrupted the Belgian plan of decolonisation. Moreover, the government in Brussels failed to control the local Trusteeship administration, as local administrators supported the coup, accelerating the Revolution and bringing the Belgian government into further disrepute. In this way, the UN, the Cold War and decolonisation all contributed to worsen the ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Even though the process of revolution was primarily initiated by the Rwandans, as examined in Chapter 3, the international environment surely affected the timing and manner of decolonisation, which complicated the domestic situation and resulted in deepening ethnic divisions. This paved the way for post-colonial Rwanda to consolidate under Hutu rule as the PARMEHUTU government enjoyed, to a certain extent, the benefits from exploiting Cold War rivalries. As such, domestic party politics were intertwined with international politics, transforming ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’.
Chapter 5
Igniting Ethnicity:
Violence, Regional Diversity and People

The order came from someone higher up, like [Habyarimana] Gitera and [Grégoire] Kayibanda. They made speeches [saying things like] ‘Intozi zishoborwa n’umuriro’ (Ants can be set on fire). They had meetings and decided what they wanted to do. The higher-ups said that the Tutsi would come and beat and kill them, so the Hutus decided to attack first.¹

We have had our home destroyed and after it happened, I was beaten for four days and left for dead. They said they had nothing against me except the fact that I was a Tutsi.²

Introduction

This chapter examines the ways in which the politicised ethnicity discussed in the previous chapters materialised as violence at the local level and its effect on people, and attempts to answer the question of what contributed to the emergence and escalation of violence and ‘political tribalism’ on the local level. The following two perspectives are important when considering this question. First, as Fredrik Barth pointed out, it is not isolation but interactions between ethnic groups that constantly draw and re-draw ethnic boundaries; variables such as ecology, population density, land, politics, ethnic composition and the movement of people are important in this regard.³ Secondly, it is important to note that violence is not homogeneous all over the country. As Crawford Young and John Lonsdale remind scholars of regional variations of ethnicity and violence in Africa,⁴ indeed, focusing on the regional level enables us to better understand the process of ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity.

The themes of regional variation, movement of people and violence are common in literature on Rwanda. For instance, there are several important works that

¹ Interview with Isaac, 22 November 2011.
focus on ethnicity and power in a particular region in Rwanda. Moreover, the mobility of people, in particular refugees, is a key theme in understanding the history of Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. Regional violence in the 1950s and the 1960s has been recorded, but in a rather limited fashion; thus it is necessary to synthesise and develop the literature with aids of archival materials.

This chapter focuses on the regional level to analyse the prevailing of violence during the Revolution and decolonisation that have been detailed in previous chapters with the aim of examining how violence spread all over Rwanda through time, and how it affected the population in general and ethnicity in particular. The chapter first draws our attention to the regional diversity of people and ethnicity before the Revolution and argues that before then, regional difference was more salient. However, by exploring the violence in 1959, demographic change caused by the violence, the process of revolution on the local level and the Inyenzi attacks and retaliation against the Tutsi, this chapter concludes that contingency, movement of people, spread of violence and the process of revolution had a synergistic impact on the spread of ‘political tribalism’ over Rwanda, homogenising the domestic Tutsi and crystallising the ethnic boundary, upon which post-colonial Rwanda was built.

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Regional Diversity before 1959

This section briefly looks at the regional settings before 1959 from the aspects of ecology, population density, land dispute, politics and ethnicity. First, ecological features and population density were diverse across the country. The eastern part of Rwanda was dry grassland with less rainfall. Suffering from famine, this region was sparsely populated.\(^9\) Contrarily, the north (west) region was a mountainous volcanic area with rich soil and considerable rainfall; therefore, the region sustained a large population.\(^10\) On the territorial level, one statistic in 1957 indicates that the highest population density in Rwanda was 457.55 people per square mile in Ruhengeri, followed by 410.96 in Astrida, 340.70 in Kibuye, 340.33 in Nyanza, 239.55 in Gisenyi, 223.47 in Kigali, 205.44 in Biumba, 188.76 in Shangugu and 81.71 in Kibungo.\(^11\) In the early 1950s, Pierre Gourou also calculated the population density in the sub-chiefdoms in each territory: the highest population density was the Ndorwa sub-chiefdom in Ruhengeri in the north (546 habitants per square kilometres), followed by sub-chiefdoms in north, central and south Rwanda, while the lowest was 3.3 habitants per km\(^2\) in Rukaryi, Kigali.\(^12\)

Related to ecology and population density but also shaped by historical backgrounds, land had been a matter of importance among people in many, if not all, regions in Rwanda. As Chapter 2 has detailed, the Nyiginya kingdom in Central Rwanda was surrounded by many other kingdoms. As the Nyiginya kingdom expanded its territory, a Hutu collective identification emerged in the kingdom’s outlying areas amongst the local population, in the form of differentiating themselves from the Nyiginya Tutsi chiefs dispatched from central power. The significance of land tenure increased as the Nyiginya kingdom expanded its territory. By the end of

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\(^9\) Leurquin suggested that areas of low population density were where famine took place frequently: Philippe Leurquin, *Le niveau de vie des populations rurales du Ruanda-Urundi* (Louvain: Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales, 1960), p. 38.
\(^11\) The total population in Rwanda was 2,452,737 and the average population density was 241.13 per square mile: Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, *Ruanda-Urundi: Geography and History* (Brussels: Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, 1960), p. 36.
\(^12\) Pierre Gourou, *La densité de la population au Ruanda-Urundi: Esquisse d’une étude géographique* (Bruxelles: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1952), p. 17. The national average in 1955 was 277 people per square mile, which is equivalent to 106 per square kilometre.
the nineteenth century, the *ubukonde* system (land acquired through inheritance) had been replaced by *igikingi* (land granted by the *Mwami* or his representative), first in Central Rwanda and later in the south, south-west and west. Thus land ownership had become more important and court rule more oppressive in those regions. This point can be illustrated by both archival materials and the interviews I conducted in Rwanda. In July 1959, Joseph Habyarimana Gitera, leader of APROSOMA, reported to the Governor General Jean-Paul Harroy that the problem of *igikingi* in southern Rwanda during the dry season might lead to serious conflicts.\(^{13}\) Furthermore, those interviewees who were originally from the west and the south frequently mentioned the problem related to the land. For instance, Henri, currently living in Kibungo, but originally from Kibuye, explained the land problem:

I often had conflicts over land and I used to go to Rukali [Nyanza, court of the king] to solve my problem. When the low-level [officials] did not solve your problems, you went to a higher level. I went to the court of the king because people wanted to take my land by force. We did not have lawyers, but when we had serious problems, we used to go to the king. It was very difficult to approach him. It seems I was lucky. When you were speaking the truth, your problem would be solved immediately. The king sent people who came and settled the disputes among people.\(^{14}\)

Contrarily, land ownership seemed less important in the east; first, as mentioned above, frequent famines caused from drought and dry land in the east resulted in a lower population density. Furthermore, as Chapter 2 detailed, the eastern kingdom of Gisaka had been conquered and absorbed into Rwanda in the mid-nineteenth century, though the region continued to resist the rule of the central court. The region was even ceded to Britain for a while in the 1920s as a consequence of post-First World War negotiations. Therefore, it is possible that *igikingi* and other Nyiginya systems were not so prominent in the east. Indeed, those interviewees who were born in the east did not consider land issues very important when I specifically asked about them. Instead, they talked more about cattle they owned and problems with wild animals;


\(^{14}\) Interview with Henri, 17 November 2011. He is an ex-refugee who returned from Uganda in 1997 and has been living in Kibungo since that time.
according to the interviewees, the area was covered by forest and few people lived there at the time because ‘there were many buffaloes.’ As such, high population density and land were the main issues in all of Rwanda but the eastern region.

As Barth argued that movement of people was important when mapping the ethnic boundary, basically the conquest and domination of the Nyiginya kingdom shaped the boundary between the chiefs and local people. By the end of the 1950s, the lowest percentage of Tutsis was 5.62 per cent in Gisenyi, followed by 8.37 per cent in Ruhengeri while in the west, south and east, they were more populous (Table 4). As Chrétien emphasises, there was no huge difference of income between Hutus and ordinary Tutsis (who made up 90 per cent of the Tutsi population), the proportion of Tutsis in each region is still important to remember when we look at the later pattern of violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Population Density and Percentage of Tutsi Population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population density (per square mile)</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruhengeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisenyi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kigali</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Astrida</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kibuye</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biumba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shangugu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kibungo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As such, Rwanda was fairly heterogeneous in terms of ecology, population, land, politics and ethnicity. Therefore, it is not sensible to think that the nature of ethnicity and conflict was identical everywhere in Rwanda; rather, the timing and cause of the

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15 Interviews with Emmanuel, 8 November 2011, and with Louis, 28 November 2011.
18 See footnotes 11 and 16 above.
violence was different from region to region and from period to period, which this chapter is about to explore next.

Violence and the First Exodus in 1959

This section examines the violence in 1959 for two reasons. It is first important to note that the violence did not take place simultaneously across the country; rather, it occurred unevenly due to the regional differences discussed above. Some regions experienced heavy violence while other places were not so affected by it. Moreover, violence in 1959 and the subsequent exodus of the Tutsi refugees were important factors in delineating more clearly the ethnic line between Tutsi and Hutu in the later stage of the Revolution.

It is often noted that the initial violence between the Tutsi and Hutu started in November 1959. The spark was ignited in Gitarama, birthplace of Grégoire Kayibanda and the focus of Hutu discontent, due to the strong influence of the court. 19 As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, on 1 November 1959, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the very few Hutu sub-chiefs in Rwanda, was attacked by UNAR supporters on the way back from mass in Gitarama. Quoting the account of Mbonyumutwa himself:

On the day of Toussaint [All Saints’ Day], I went out to visit my daughter, a student in Byimana; then, I went to greet the priests in the parish; there were many people; I did not feel comfortable, so I left there; I noticed that I was followed by about ten young Tutsi who rushed to surround me. I freed myself from thrusts and kicks and escaped to a house where I asked for a machete, but I was not chased. In the afternoon, people in Gitarama who learnt how the thing went came to see me there. In the evening, I went to complain it to a nearby Administrator, who told me it was unimportant and that there was nothing to do. Coming back to my sub-chiefdom, people were surprised to see me still alive; they said, two [Tutsi] sub-chiefs in Ndiza had told them that their Hutu sub-chief [Mbonyumutwa] was killed. When I learnt this, I confirmed that the previous day people truly wanted to kill me. 20

Rumours of Mbonyumutwa’s death triggered violence on both sides. On 3 November, the Hutu citizens in Gitarama massed together and attacked UNAR supporters and

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19 Newbury, Cohesion of Oppression, p. 211.
Tutsi chiefs. However, armed Tutsis also attacked Hutu leaders, particularly APROSOMA leaders, since the party was regarded as more dangerous than PARMEHUTU. Take, for example, J.B. Sagahutu, one of the educated Hutu elites and a monitor of a missionary school at the time. In Nyanza, he was stopped by an armed group, assaulted and ‘stripped of what he was carrying. His clothes were ripped to shreds.’ Later, he was brought into the Royal Palace in Nyanza and the crowd shouted: ‘Kill him! Aprosoma!’ An account from Mathias Semwaga also reveals how the Hutu leaders were attacked:

I saw that sub-chief Matabaro was armed. Rumanzi was armed with a knife (serpette) and tried to attack me… I tried to avoid him and was told ‘We won’t kill you before you tell us where to find Gitera.’ I received a violent blow to my head with a lance. I replied: ‘I don’t work for the government, I don’t work for Gitera – it’s for the progress of the country that I work for the Hutu movement and progress.’ …During my captive in the Mwami’s palace, we had nothing to eat, no water to drink.

Thus, in the Central Rwandan area of Nyanza and Gitarama where the Mwami’s influence was strong and Hutu discontent very high, the violence was two-way: the Tutsi chiefs targeted the Hutu political leaders for elimination and the Hutu masses mainly attacked Tutsi chiefs.

According to Lemarchand, ‘violence spread like wildfire through the entire country’; however, according to the archival documents, it seems it did not spread through the ‘entire country’ but predominantly towards the north and the west where the density of the Hutu population was high, while the south and east remained calm for the time being (Figure 6). For instance, the missionary diary left an entry: ‘the movement [of violence] is heard wherever the Hutu are numerous, except in the South and in the Territory of Biumba.’ On 4 November, the violence reached Gisenyi (in the north-west): in the chiefdom of Kingogo, nearly all the Tutsi homes

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21 *Imvaho* no. 7, 15 April 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
23 *Imvaho* no. 8, 30 April 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE (my translation).

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were burned. In Ruhengeri (in the north), the violence was so extreme that a huge number of people took sanctuary in the churches. A missionary writes:

We arrived at the Nemba Mission, where the situation is very sad. They have at least 500 refugees. A sub-chief who tried to defend himself was killed. The Abbé Supérieur believes that all the Tutsis must leave the country because there will be no way that the two races can co-exist in the future.

Figure 6: The Map of Violence and Movement of People

The violence spreading from the centre to the north and the north-west in the first week of November was sporadic, rather than systematically synchronised. In the north, north-west and west, the influence of the Mwami was not as strong because in those regions, the influence of PARMEHUTU was quite powerful. A PARMEHUTU leader explained his party’s organisation to a missionary:

27 ‘Communication No. 1 du résident militaire du Ruanda’, 23 November 1959, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
A committee consists of a president, a secretary, and so on. The committee of the territory is linked to the central committee in Kabgayi. The organisation in the territory of Gisenyi is almost equally developed, as well as the territory of Gitarama. We are working at the moment to extend the movement to other territories where propaganda is necessary, in Nyanza and Astrida. We already are lagging behind in the territories of Kigali, Kibungo, Biumba, Kibuye and Shangugu.30

Furthermore, whilst Tutsi traditional leaders – more specifically UNAR leaders – attacked and killed Hutu politicians, the main acts of violence committed by Hutu peasants were burning and looting huts and expelling Tutsi chiefs from the territories, rather than killing them. A missionary testified that men with axes were sweeping over the hills, cutting down banana trees and coffee plantations, burning Tutsi huts and killing cattle.31 Lemarchand and Newbury also describe the waves of violence:

Incendiaries set off in groups of ten. Armed with matches and paraffin, which the indigenous inhabitants use in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses they passed on their way and set fire to them. On their way they would enlist other incendiaries to follow the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, would give up and return home. Thus, day after day, fires spread from hill to hill.

Generally speaking the incendiaries, which were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them. The most serious incidents involving tragic wounding and death occurred when the Tutsi were determined to fight back, or when there were clashes with the forces of order.32

Other regions remained peaceful for the moment. For instance, Astrida (in the south) was not yet affected by the violence.33 Given its ecology, population density and land shortage, Astrida could have had violence from the beginning. The mission in Astrida left diaries testifying that there were rumours about the ‘troubles’ in the centre and the north of Rwanda; after these rumours started to circulate, a curfew was announced, but still ‘all seemed tranquil’ until 7 November.34 Indeed, in the

31 St. John, Breath of Life, p. 201.
32 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 163, and Newbury, Cohesion, p. 195.
33 An interesting similarity between the violence which took place in 1959 and the 1994 genocide is that there was no violence in Astrida/Butare in the beginning of 1994. André Guichaoua’s Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du genocide a Butare (Paris: Karthala, 2005) examines why and how people in Butare tried to resist the genocide for a while.
beginning of November, the local Belgian administration gathered political leaders to ask them to remain calm and ‘not to participate in unrest’. On 8 November, however, an armed group from Nyanza (central region) attacked the APROSOMA leader Mukwiye Polepole in Gikongoro (in the south) and violence ensued.

Eastern Rwanda was not affected by violence; Catharine Newbury has posited several possible explanations for this. First, she pointed out that while high population density and shortage of land became the reasons for violence in other regions, the lower population density in the east meant there was less violence. Secondly, she assumed that eastern Rwanda’s population had a relatively higher proportion of Tutsi, compared with the predominantly Hutu north and west, leading her to conclude that in the north and west, Tutsis easily became the target for violence. Third, she suggested that while ‘cohesion’ among the Hutu was strong in other regions, the ties among the Hutus in the east was weaker, due to labour migration to neighbouring countries.

It is possible to amend Newbury’s hypotheses. This chapter supports her first reason because, as mentioned earlier, the connections between population density and land disputes can be supported with archival source and interviews. However, her other two hypotheses need to be reconsidered. With regards to the percentage of the Tutsi affecting the occurrence of violence, actually the east did not have the highest percentage of Tutsi population in the country, so the percentage of the Tutsi alone cannot be the reason for the lack of violence. Astrida and Nyanza were higher as well but had earlier violence. Moreover, rather than arguing that cohesion among the Hutu was weaker in the east, I would suggest the possibility that ethnicity itself was not yet so important in the east. As explained in Chapter 2, the inhabitants of Gisaka disliked the rule of the Rwandan (Nyiginya) kingdom, even though the ruling class was Tutsi in both kingdoms. In May 1957, many decades after Gisaka was ‘conquered’ by the Rwandan kingdom, around 10,000 local people participated in a protest to dismiss the local authorities and replace them with Abanyagisaka. In

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35 Imvaho no. 4, 29 February 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE (my translation).
36 Ibid.
37 Newbury quoted the percentage of Tutsi in the Territory of Kibungo as 15.9 per cent: Newbury, Cohesion of Oppression, pp. 212 and 290.
38 ‘Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi. Objet: Incidents a Kibungu’, 7 August 1957, and ‘Note pour monsieur le ministre. Objet: Incidents a Kibungu’, 9 September 1957, both in AI 4379, AA,
addition, in Kibungo, a political party, with both Tutsi and Hutu members, was established, which demanded Gisaka autonomy from Rwanda.\textsuperscript{39} This party rejected the monarchy as well as the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi, because ‘all the inhabitants of Gisaka, Hutu and Tutsi alike, are victims of the injustices [of Nyiginya rule].’\textsuperscript{40} This evidence suggests that in the east, regional identification was stronger than an ethnic one, which may offer a partial explanation for the lack of violence in the area.

By December 1959, calm had been somewhat restored in Rwanda. The notable change after November was the massive power shift from Tutsi to Hutu in the centre, the north and the west, while there was no change at all in the east. Table 5 below is the summary of sub-chiefs in each region. Before November 1959, the number of Hutu sub-chiefs was only 10 out of 559 (1 per cent) in all of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{41} However, by February 1960, of 543 sub-chieftdoms, 39 were vacant, 284 had Tutsi sub-chiefs, 218 had Hutu sub-chiefs and 2 had Swahilis.\textsuperscript{42} Those Tutsi sub-chiefs who had been replaced by Hutus had been killed or arrested, or had escaped.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, Hutu temporary sub-chiefs were chosen by the Belgians to serve until the local elections was held in June 1960.\textsuperscript{44} Regionally speaking, as this table clearly shows, in the north (Ruhengeri), centre (Gitarama) and north-west (Gisenyi) where violence was particularly intense, the percentages of Hutu replacing the Tutsi sub-chiefs were high, whereas there was no change in the east (Kibungo) and fewer in the south-west (Shangugu) and the north-east (Biumba). Reyntjens cited a UN document for the number of sub-chiefs in March 1960: there were 217 Tutsi sub-chiefs and 297 Hutu sub-chiefs out of 531 seats.\textsuperscript{45} Thus on a local level, a major shift in power had taken place.

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\textsuperscript{39} Sûreté 17-5-1960, Usumbura, No.0570/404/BI/304, 17 May 1960, MINAG 2819, AMAE.


\textsuperscript{41} Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Imvaho} no. 3, 15 February 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.

\textsuperscript{43} According to Prunier, around three-quarters (919 people) of the arrested (1231 people) were Tutsi: Prunier, \textit{Rwanda Crisis}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{44} Lemarchand, \textit{Rwanda and Burundi}, p. 173.

### Table 5: The Number and Percentage of Sub-Chiefs after 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Hutu sub-chiefs after 1959</th>
<th>Tutsi sub-chiefs after 1959</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruhengeri</td>
<td>68 (99%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>69 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisenyi</td>
<td>37 (75%)</td>
<td>12 (25%)</td>
<td>49 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitarama</td>
<td>35 (67%)</td>
<td>17 (33%)</td>
<td>52 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>20 (35%)</td>
<td>37 (64%)</td>
<td>57 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>19 (34%)</td>
<td>37 (66%)</td>
<td>56 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrida</td>
<td>21 (33.3%)</td>
<td>42 (66.6%)</td>
<td>63 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibuye</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
<td>18 (72%)</td>
<td>25 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biumba</td>
<td>7 (14%)</td>
<td>43 (86%)</td>
<td>50 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangugu</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>36 (90%)</td>
<td>40 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibungo</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>218 (43%)</td>
<td>284 (56%)</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demography accounted for another significant change after 1959. The Belgian administration transferred internal refugees from the north, north-west and the centre to the east due to the relatively calmer conditions and more land available for cultivation. On 26 November, the Resident of Rwanda and Territorial Administrator of Ruhengeri visited the churches which were sheltering refugees and announced the decision to transfer the refugees to Nyamata (Bugesera) in the south-east.47 One of the documents I consulted in Rwanda offered this explanation for the Belgians’ decision: Nyamata and Rukumberi (the western part of Gisaka) were uninhabitable due to the presence of tsetse fly, whose bite causes the deadly sleeping sickness; thus the Belgians decided to transfer the Tutsi refugees there, against their will, in order to exterminate them.48 However, the Belgian administration did not have such a despicable motivation for the refugees’ relocation; actually, since the mid-1950s, the Belgians had been trying to develop Bugesera in order to utilise the land.49

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46 *Imvaho* no. 3, 15 February 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
47 From Van Hoof to Volker, 5 December 1959, 727117, A.G.M.Afr., and ‘Communication no. 3 du resident militaire du Ruanda’, 10 December 1959, Archives de l’évêché de Kabgayi, A.G.M.Afr. (the latter document was also found in AI4368, AA, AMAE).
By the end of January 1960, there were nearly 5,000 refugees in Nyamata, most of who had been transferred from Ruhengeri but also from Gitarama, Astrida and Gisenyi.\(^{50}\) Some of my interviewees confirmed this: Gilbert, who was born and grew up in Rukumberi said: ‘It’s hard to know exactly where they came from, but they told us [they came from] Nduga [central] and Ruhengeri [north].’\(^{51}\) Alice also mentioned:

> You know, there were a lot of people who came from out of Kibungo [east] and they come to Kibungo and they come in Rukumberi and stay there. The people of Rukumberi, they came here as refugees, because they were thinking that people may come to kill them even though they were in Rukumberi. When they came from different areas like Butare, there were no people in Rukumberi originally from there.\(^{52}\)

So far, this section has examined the violence as it took place in late 1959. It began in Central Rwanda, triggered by the UNAR members’ attack on the PARMEHUTU sub-chief; in retaliation, Hutu masses torched the huts of Tutsi chiefs. In this sense, the violence at this point was a somewhat mutual political act. But when violence spilled over to the north and the north-west, it occurred for different reasons: besides the population density and land shortage, while violence occurred due to the discontent of Hutu under *strong* court influence in Central Rwanda, it was the discontent of Hutu under *weaker* Tutsi influence in the north and north-west. Moreover, at this stage, other regions, especially the east, did not experience violence. But as a result of the violence, the political landscape started to change in Rwanda and the resettlement of internal refugees also started to alter the east’s demography. The suggestion of a federation, as mentioned in Chapter 3, was seemingly based on this situation, since the idea allocated Eastern Rwanda as ‘Tutsi land’. As the Revolution progressed, the flow of refugees and PARMEHUTU’s increasing power contributed to the Tutsis’ homogenisation and crystallised the Tutsi/Hutu cleavage, as the next section details.

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\(^{50}\) *Imvaho*, no. 2, 31 January 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.

\(^{51}\) Interview with Gilbert, 21 November 2011.

\(^{52}\) Interview with Alice, 3 November 2011.
‘Ants Can Be Set on Fire’:

Igniting Ethnicity and Homogenising the Domestic Tutsi

As discussed earlier, the violence in 1959 was uneven, with the centre, north and north-west more violent than the south and east. However, as the Revolution proceeded, the violence became more intense, and occurred with greater frequency, which produced a further flow of refugees. At the same time, the dichotomised ethnic ideology of PARMEHUTU and their victory in the elections strengthened the divisions between the Tutsi and the Hutu all over Rwanda.

As Chapter 3 has discussed, the Rwandan political parties negotiated their political future in the Conseil Spécial Provisoire in early 1960; however, cooperation among the parties had collapsed in the spring when the Mwami rejected the CSP’s proposal, bringing about the first Front Commune of APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU and RADER against UNAR. As the country approached the local elections in June 1960, violence occurred again across the country, expanding to the west, the north-east and the south. In March, Hutu peasants in Biumba (north-east) expelled the Tutsi and looted their homes. In May, several huts, including that of a former chief, were burned and cattle were slaughtered in Kibuye (west). In the south, outbreaks of violence took place in Astrida due to conflict between UNAR and APROSOMA. In Gikongoro, starting in January, a thousand huts were destroyed by fire, most of which belonged to Tutsi.

Previously, in central regions where Tutsi leaders were still strong, they attacked Hutu politicians as well. In Nyanza, some incidents were caused by the Tutsi. At the same time, the main target of violence from the Hutu mass was the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs. Therefore, violence was mainly taken place among political leaders. However, ordinary people came to be the targets for violence. A missionary in the north-west left an account of a refugee in their church: ‘We have had our home destroyed and after it happened, I was beaten for four days and left for

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53 Imvaho no. 5, 15 March 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
54 ‘No. 0570/427/BL.313’, 23 May 1960, MINAG2819, AA, AMAE.
55 ‘Réunion des partis politiques à Astrida’, 13 April 1960, Rétrospective 1-2, APROSOMA, pp. 95–6, and from Léopoldville to Secretary of State [in Washington], 778.00/4-1660, Box 2026, CDF 1950-63, RG59, NACP.
56 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 109.
dead. They said they had nothing against me except the fact that I was a Tutsi.’
Moreover, Isaac’s account illustrated how Hutu masses came to regard the whole
group of Tutsi as less than human, as Hutu leaders urged their followers to do so.
Isaac explained how the burning of Tutsi houses was organised in his birthplace near
Astrida:

The order came from higher authority, like [Habyarimana] Gitera and
[Grégoire] Kayibanda. They made speeches [saying things like] ‘Intozizishoborwa n’umuriro’ (Ants can be set on fire). They had meetings and
decided what they wanted to do. The higher-ups said that the Tutsi would come
and beat and kill them, so the Hutus decided to attack first.

The widening and escalating violence generated another mass exodus. Missionaries
testified that their churches became havens for refugees because ‘the Tutsi refugees
knew that the church was not the enemy of the Hutu.’ In Ruhengeri (north),
thousands of people became internal refugees. In Biumba (north-east), not only did
hundreds of people escape to the missions, but they also fled the country towards
Uganda. Approximately 3,000 people escaped to the churches in Gisagara and
Mugombwa near Astrida (south). After a while, some refugees returned home,
while others preferred to move to the safer areas of eastern and south-eastern
Rwanda. Consequently, the number of refugees reached over 8,200 in Nyamata and
2,300 in Kibungo (east) before 1961. Gilbert recalled:

Rwagasana [the chief of the area at that time] told his people in Rukumberi to
cut down the forest in order to allow them [the refugees] to build their houses
… It’s hard to know exactly where they came from, but they told us they came
from Gikongoro or Butare [south]. But they were richer than us, and had money.
They used to buy our land slowly and sometimes you left the land. They called

58 As detailed in Chapter 3, they were the most famous Hutu leaders leading APROSOMA
and PARMEHUTU respectively.
59 Interview with Isaac, 22 November 2011.
60 St. John, *Breath of Life*, p. 203.
61 From Van Hoof to Volker, 10 January 1960, 727126, A.G.M.Afr.
62 *Imvaho* no. 5, 15 March 1960, AI4368, and A. /Cab.6 (Sûreté) 21/27 March 1960,
MINAG2819, both in AA, AMAE.
63 *Imvaho* no. 8, 30 April 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
64 Rudipress, 1 April 1961, Archives of Kabgayi, A.G.M.Afr.
As detailed in Chapter 3, the local elections were held throughout Rwanda during the summer of 1960. The election campaign mobilised various kinds of people on the local level. Using Kinyaga, Shangugu (south-west) as an example, Catharine Newbury pointed out that many kinds of people were involved in the campaign: truck drivers or traders would mobilise people; while court clerks, schoolteachers and catechists – that is, those who had access to communication tools – would write and distribute circulars and print out party membership cards. They organised meetings and planned strategies for the coming elections. It is thus not difficult to imagine that, on a local level, the atmosphere must have been tense and unstable.

The result of the local elections suggests that the east was not yet engulfed by a wave of violence and Revolution. As the previous section detailed, population density, land shortage and historical background were closely related to the outbreak of violence. Moreover, as Catharine Newbury suggests, land issues and the previous relationship between chiefs and people affected the result of local elections. In Ruhengeri (north) and Gitarama (central) where violence was already intense, the voting rate was highest (95.1 per cent). This central area was the heart of the Kingdom, where the socio-political systems of igikingi and ubuhake were quite oppressive; the Hutu population thus had grievances with the Tutsi leaders and the high voting rate suggests that the population had been looking forward to the elections as a way of implementing change. As a result, PARMEHUTU gained the most votes in these regions.

Contrarily, the east was different with regards to both voting rates and winning parties. The voting rate in Kibungo was the lowest in the country (29.2 per cent). Kibungo was recognised as a ‘conservative’ area, and after UNAR announced the

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65 Two interviews with Gilbert, 15 and 21 November 2011.
68 The descriptions in the document – that Kibungo was a ‘conservative’ area and that the influence of UNAR was strong – seem to contradict my previous analysis that ethnicity was not as important as the clan differences of Nyiginya and Gisaka in the east. A possible explanation for this contradiction is that, even though Gisakan people were opposed to Nyiginya rule, the influence of Tutsi traditional leaders enhanced and tightened their control
party’s boycott of the election, abstention became more common even among the Hutu peasants. 69 Furthermore, in fact, UNAR had more candidates in Kibungo than in any other region before the decision to boycott. Even after UNAR boycotted the elections, UNAR and RADER gained a relatively high percentage of votes in Kibungo: UNAR and RADER obtained 39 and 38 seats out of 270 communal councils, while PARMEHUTU won 160, which is 14.4 per cent, 14 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. 70 This is very different from the results in other regions. Pierre Gravel, who did his fieldwork during 1960–61 in eastern Rwanda, is quoted here at length because it shows how elections took place in the east:

The Parmehutu, which had not even bothered to designate candidates in such a conservative area [Kibungo], upon hearing this news [the UNAR boycott], rushed in to select anybody who was willing to run as a candidate. They felt that they could be sure of victory, if they had no opposition. There was a young Hutu who shall be called Ijeri. Ijeri was a monitor in the first year of the local elementary school. He had come to Remera [a commune in Kibungo] 2 years previously. At the time the political parties were ‘invented’, Ijeri bought a card in the UNAR party. When this party boycotted the elections, he registered himself – as a Tutsi – as an independent candidate. After the elections, when it became obvious that the tide had turned, Ijeri became violently pro PARMEHUTU. In the Commune of Remera, 215 persons voted out of a possible 1,939 eligible voters. Not a single person from the Hill of Remera voted in the elections, not even Ijeri. Two candidates who seem to have been from Shanda [a hill] had earned more votes than Ijeri. These men were offered the position of mayor, but they both refused to serve at all. The administrator of the Territory then offered the position to the ex-chieftain who had had votes in spite of the fact that his Party had not voted. He also refused, because he knew that his own people would boycott him if he accepted. The position of mayor then fell to Ijeri. 71

This statement illustrates that how fluid and impromptu the political situation was on the local level and how political affiliation did not necessarily match with ethnic identification.

70 Imvaho no. 14, 15 July 1960, AI4368, AA, AMAE.
71 Gravel, Remera, pp. 186–97.
However, after the local elections, the political tide of the Revolution in which PARMEHUTU was seizing power made their ideology more potent even in the east. After achieving victory in the local elections in 1960, PARMEHUTU occupied a majority position in the Provisional Government and Assembly. Alarmed by PARMEHUTU’s ‘dictatorship’, APROSOMA, RADER and UNAR formed the second Front Commune and complained to the UN that the Belgians had arbitrarily and unjustly supported PARMEHUTU in the local elections. The anti-colonial atmosphere in the UN, which was influenced by Cold War rivalries, the decolonisation of many African and Asian countries, and the ongoing chaos in the Congo, supported the claims of UNAR and other parties and passed a resolution to demand the delay of the legislative election scheduled for January 1961. This internationalisation of Rwandan party politics perturbed PARMEHUTU’s leaders and also annoyed the local Belgian administration and the Ministry of African Affairs, which had wanted to proceed to a rapid and uncomplicated democratisation and decolonisation of Rwanda. As a result, PARMEHUTU consolidated its power by staging a coup d’état in Gitarama on 28 January 1961. However, since it was displeased by the coup, the United Nations demanded the Belgian administration to give amnesty to those who had been arrested (mainly Tutsi leaders) and to conduct a legislative election in September 1961. Meanwhile, PARMEHUTU expanded its influence all over the country and actively spread ethnic propaganda in a bid to win the upcoming election.

Let us look at an example of the violence that took place in the run-up to the legislative election. According to a missionary in Kigali, a rumour spread towards the end of July 1961 that Anastase Makuza, one of PARMEHUTU’s most important members and then Minister of Justice, had been attacked, which became a pretext for violence. Destruction, looting and assaults were labelled ‘work’ (travail, gukora) and the roads were described as being full of ‘workers’.72 The administration made no proper intervention to stop the ‘work’ as the homes of UNAR members were looted, hospitals overflowed with the wounded and a huge number of people escaped to the churches. One missionary recounted the experience of encountering the ‘workers’

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72 It is worth noting that similar language during the 1994 genocide, for example, the massacres were referred to as ‘cutting the grass’.
armed with sticks on a road: ‘they say: “We hunt all refugees of the commune.”’ Asked whether the mayor agreed [to this], they answer: “Aradutegeka be? Twe twitegeka Ni!” (Does he command us? It’s we [who] command!).’ Within one week, the number refugees had increased to over 6,000 and many of them had to sleep outside the church. In November, after the election, the prefect of Kigali agreed with the mayors that the refugees should return home, but none of the refugees would do so. After failing to persuade the refugees to return home, the prefect arrived with soldiers, who fired upon the refugees. Four were killed and ‘a dozen’ seriously wounded. On the following day, the soldiers came again and the refugees finally agreed to return home.73

The uncertainty before and after the election and political opportunism also brought violence to the east, which had previously been relatively peaceful. The violence was

… largely a question of local power conflicts. Those who were elected or nominated to positions as chiefs and burgomasters in 1961, owing to the insecurity which they felt in their new positions and their fear of the continuing influence of the old leaders and their sympathisers in the community, resorted to violent measures to rid themselves of all possible foci of opposition. Once the outbreaks of violence had started in a few districts, within a week of the elections, panic spread to other areas, and the lawless elements in the community were encouraged to profit from the situation, to loot, and to drive out those whose houses and land they could later occupy.74

In Rwamagana, UNAR members were said to have killed the sub-prefect and a PARMEHUTU member named Kajangwe. One Rwandan student has described this incident in his thesis as a conspiracy between PARMEHUTU and the Belgian administration to ‘bring ethnic conflict to peaceful eastern Rwanda’.75 Another

73 30 and 31 July, 1–7, 13, 15 and 31 August, 1, 15 and 30 September, 1, 2, 5–8, 11–13, 23, 25 and 26 October, and November (day not mentioned) 1961, Diaire Kigali, A.G.M.Afr. (my translation).
75 Placide Abimana, “Nyirakabuga Therese, sous-chef de Vumwe de 1932 a 1960”, thesis submitted to INATEK, 2011 (my translation). Also, a Tutsi returnee whose grandfather was chief at the time gave the same testimony: Interview with Nicolas in Kibungo, 6 December 2011. The missionary diary did not mention it as conspiracy but just commented that ‘again, first Tutsi killed Hutus and afterwards Hutu gained “the upper hand”’: from Van Hoof to Volker, 23 September 1961, 727359, A.G.M.Afr. (my translation).
example was Nyirakabuga Therese, one of the rare female chiefs in Rwanda. As an ex-concubine of Mwami Musinga, she was appointed chief in Vumwe. After Kajangwe was killed, PARMEHUTU started to attack Tutsis. Nyirakabuga Therese left her home on 7 September 1961; on 9 September, the rumour spread that she had gone into exile, leaving behind her possessions. Thus, an estimated 200 people came to loot her belongings (tables, doors, bed, and so on) and food. In Remera, according to Gravel, the violence was not a sudden occurrence. The previously mentioned Ijeri gradually alienated the Tutsi by, for example, arresting them for holding ‘illegal meetings’, when the ‘meeting’ was simply three Tutsis drinking together. At the same time, Ijeri pressured the Hutu into buying PARMEHUTU membership cards by telling them that they could profit by signing up; otherwise, they would pay the consequence of not doing so. To obtain his favours, people brought him gifts of beer. Finally, he fired all the Tutsi who held positions with the administration.

Due to this violence, a few thousand Tutsi political leaders and citizens escaped to the church in addition to the refugees who had already been transferred from other regions to Nyamata and Rukumberi. Alice explained it as follows:

So, we left the place our homes and went to the church as refugees. All our wealth, we left it behind. When the Hutus came to kill the Tutsis, they hesitated to throw their spears into the Church of God, but if someone was found outside of the Zaza [missionary] compounds, they killed them [the Tutsis].

Even though the majority of them eventually returned home, some people, especially former chiefs, did not want to go back, and instead sought asylum in Tanganyika or Uganda.

Thus the period 1960–62 changed the pattern of ethnicity in Rwanda. Violence occurred not only more frequently but also it escalated from looting/burning and other damage to property, to out-and-out murder of not only official figures, but also ordinary people. This pattern of violence had spread throughout the country, which produced further internal refugees on the local level. Second, as the Revolution

76 Abimana, ‘Nyirakabuga Therese’.
77 Gravel, Remera, pp. 186–97.
79 Interview with Alice, 3 November 2011.
preceded, demographic changes, and PARMEHUTU’s increasing power and ethnicisation consolidated division by ethnicity all over Rwanda, even in the east. The consolidation of Hutu rule brought the internal violence to an end, but the cause of the violence now moved to the Rwanda’s neighbours.

The *Inyenzi* and the Remaining Refugee Problem

This section briefly explains how the pattern of violence changed and how the problem of the Tutsi refugees remained unsolved. PARMEHUTU’s victory in the legislative election of September 1961 and independence in July 1962 brought Tutsi rule to an end. Satisfied with the situation, the Hutu masses stopped their attacks on the Tutsis, while those Tutsis who remained in Rwanda seemed to accept the regime change. Therefore, the violence after 1962 was mostly triggered by *Inyenzi* attacks from outside Rwanda’s borders, which was answered with retaliation from the Hutu masses, even further reinforcing the Tutsi/Hutu dichotomy.

Most of the refugees were Tutsis who supported UNAR and the *Mwami*. Rachel Van der Meeren estimated that from 1959 to 1963, around 120,000 refugees were living in neighbouring countries. Many of them escaped Rwanda after the national election in 1961: by the end of 1961, 5,000 had gone to Tanzania, 40,000 to Burundi, 30,000 to Uganda and 60,000 to Kivu, staying in 24 refugee camps. The majority of the refugees were actually not leaders or privileged people. For instance, in the refugee camp in Karagwe (Tanganyika) in 1963, only 4 per cent of the refugees were sub-chiefs, 1 per cent qualified primary school teachers, 9 per cent low-grade technical assistants, 10 per cent moderately wealthy cattle owners, but the remaining 75 per cent were not socially, politically, or economically powerful.

Even though they supported the basic principles of the monarchy and UNAR, the refugees were not a united group, nor was there a consensus for a plan of action. On the one hand, the militant wing represented by François Rukeba insisted that they should resort to violence to return to Rwanda since PARMEHUTU’s victory was due

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to Belgian support; therefore, after Rwanda gained independence, it would not be difficult for UNAR to return to Rwanda. On the other hand, the pacifists amongst the refugees were afraid that if they staged violent attacks on Rwandan soil it might undermine the Mwami, whom they believed should be the leader of all Rwandans. They assumed that the majority of Rwandans would still respect the Mwami and welcome his return, which they believed was indispensable for the reconciliation and reunification of the country. Thus, though the pacifists shared the militants’ view that post-Belgian withdrawal, the Rwandan people would welcome the return of the Mwami, they did not accept the use of violence to achieve their goal.\(^{84}\)

Even before independence, the militant refugees in Uganda tried to return to Rwanda in a bid to regain power. From January to March 1962, they attacked northeastern Rwanda: in March, they killed a local Hutu leader and his family, which triggered violence against local Tutsis. As the pacifists feared, around 600 were killed as a reprisal.\(^{85}\) Even immediately after independence in July 1962, an armed group of refugees attacked, leading the prefect of Biumba to evacuate the population and forbid all movement within 3 km of the Ugandan border, between Karena and Kakitumba.\(^{86}\)

The Inyenzi escalated their attacks on Rwanda again before Christmas 1963, resulting in a massive number of victims. During the night of 20–21 December 1963, a group of armed exiles entered Rwanda from Burundi near Bugesera.\(^{87}\) They managed to come within 25 km of Kigali. Two members of the Garde Nationale were killed,\(^{88}\) and a curfew was announced after the Inyenzi attacks.\(^{89}\) Following this attack, retaliatory massacres took place in several parts of Rwanda. The number of victims is contested, but it is estimated that anywhere from 10,000 to 18,000 Tutsis

\(^{84}\) Ibid, and Van der Meeren, ‘Three Decades’, p. 257.
\(^{85}\) From Van Hoof to Volker, 3 April 1962, 727291; from Van Hoof to Volker, 14 May 1962, 727276, A.G.M.Afr., and ‘fight between the Hutus and Tutsi’, 1 July 1962, S0238-0006-04, UNA.
\(^{86}\) ‘Terrorist Attacks’, 5 July 1962, S0238-0006-04, UNA.
\(^{87}\) Bugesera is currently a district of Eastern Province and its capital is Ntarama. ‘Background Note to Correspondents on the situation in Rwanda and Burundi’, 5 February 1964, Rwanda/Burundi-press, S0238-0002-09, UNA.
\(^{88}\) ‘Télégramme d'état a U Thant de cabinet du president’, 23 January 1964, Rwanda/Burundi-Rwanda Republic, S0238-0002-11, UNA.
were killed by the angry Hutus. According to Segal, there were some protests within Rwanda. On 1 January 1964, the Swiss Bishop André Perraudin and three Rwandan bishops (one Hutu and two Tutsi) condemned both the invasion and the violent reprisals. But the Rwandan government denounced the Inyenzi ‘terrorism’, publishing an official bulletin with several photographs showing the violence of the ‘feudalist Tutsi’ and propagandising that all refugees were Inyenzi. The massacres of late December 1963 were the worst mass killings in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide and established a pattern for future violence: that attacks from outside Rwanda would be paid for with the lives of those Tutsi still living in Rwanda.

The massacres resulted in another flow of refugees. The number of people who fled from Rwanda after late December 1963 amounted to over 10,000. What to do with them had become the primary concern for the actors involved, while their incentives for, and definitions of, ‘solving’ the refugee problem were various. The Government of Rwanda was insistent that immediate and effective measures be taken to curtail and control the activities of the ‘agitators’ and that refugee camps be kept under the close supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). PARMEHUTU leader Kayibanda advocated giving greater support to the UNHCR in handling the refugees and the refugee camps, so that in future the UNHCR could play a more effective role in preventing refugees from leaving the camps and marching to the borders as Inyenzi.

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90 The figure of 10,000 is from Aaron Segal, *Massacre in Rwanda* (London: Fabian Society, 1964), p. 15, while the figure of 18,000 is from Libre Belgique, ‘Le gouvernement de Kigali serait impuissant a contenir la vague anti-Tutsi’, 26 January 1964, Archives of Kabgayi, A.G.M.Afr. An even higher figure of 20–25,000 was made by a Burundese minister: ‘Burundi vice Prime Minister accuses Rwanda government’, Airgram from Brussels, 11 March 1964, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
92 ‘To Bunche from Lucas’, 6 March 1964, S0238-0006-10, UNA.
93 ‘UN Press Services: The situation in Rwanda and Burundi’, 3 March 1964, S0238-0002-03, UNA.
94 ‘Transmittal of translation of text of Newsweek correspondents Interview with President Kayibanda’, Airgram from Amembassy Kigali, 15 February 1964, CFPF 1964-66, RG59, NACP.
However, the UNHCR saw their role as being ‘purely humanitarian and non-political’, and was concerned that their intentions would be misunderstood. Based on this principle, UNHCR agreed with the Rwandan government that their first task should be to tighten border controls, because they were worried about links between Rwandese refugees and Congolese anti-governmental rebels led by Pierre Mulele. In addition, it appeared to the UNHCR that militant UNAR leader-in-exile Rukeba had gathered together young men from the camps in Tanganyika and sent them to the Lake Kivu region of Rwanda/Congo border. However, the UNHCR also noted that envisaging an organised voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees would be ‘most impractical and unrealistic’. Therefore, they began to establish resettlement projects. The first project provided for the temporary care of 13,000 refugees in the Murore area of Burundi, about 20 km from the Rwandese border; subsequently, an estimated 10,000 refugees with their cattle would be transferred to Tanganyika by truck and boat, and finally the remaining 3,000 refugees and their cattle would be moved to the already existing Kigamba settlement in Burundi.

The Burundian government led by the Tutsi king and politicians had been demanding that the refugees should be removed from Burundi because there was not sufficient land for the refugees, and also because the government feared an increase in border incidents. That is, the refugees were not welcome because they were regarded as an economic burden, a political danger and a societal rival. On the contrary, Tanganyika agreed to receive 10,000 Rwandan refugees from Burundi. However, the Mwami Kigeri upset the relationship between Rwanda and its neighbours. Based in Kampala, Uganda, the Mwami often crossed the border to enter

97 ‘Personal and Confidential to Bunch’, 18 June 1964, S0238-0006-10, UNA.
98 ‘From Dorsinville to Bunche’, 24 March 1964, S0238-0003-03, and ‘To Bunche from Lucas’, 6 March 1964, S0238-0006-10, both in UNA.
99 ‘Cable’, 6 April 1964, S0238-0003-02, UNA.
100 ‘Personal and Confidential to Bunch’, 18 June 1964, and ‘Confidential to the High Commissioner, J. Cuenod from regional Representative of the UNHCR on Resettlement of Tanganyika-attitude of the Burundi Government and of refugees’, 22 June 1964, both in Rwanda-Burundi-border, S0238-0006-10, UNA.
101 ‘1964 Programme – new projects for the settlement of approximately 20,000 refugees from Rwanda’, 10 April 1964, and ‘UN Press Services: Tanganyika to Accept 10,000 Refugees from Rwanda’, 22 May 1964, both in S0238-0003-03, UNA.
Tanganyika. The Tanganyikan government offered the explanation that his movements were for the purpose of encouraging Tutsi refugees to cooperate with the resettlement programme. However, the *Mwami* did not seem to have this explanation in mind on his travels; rather, some Tutsi refugees at Ngara camp became so troublesome that Tanganyika government sternly warned the refugees that ‘law and order will prevail.’ A Tanganyikan government spokesman announced that *Mwami* Kigeri had been granted permission to reside in Tanganyika. The spokesman was reported by the local press to have stated that Tanganyika regarded the *Mwami* as a refugee in the same category as other political refugees.

In reality, the refugees were further divided into factions not only due to their differing attitudes towards Rwanda, but also due to leadership problems and jealousy among them, mainly based on territorial differences. Yeld noted that the refugees from Nyanza and Astrida did not regard those from Gisaka as ‘true’ Rwandans and harboured jealousy towards them because the Gisakan refugees had arrived earlier at the camp and occupied most of the camp positions, such as store-keepers and clerks. As such, the refugees were divided and the neighbouring host governments and the UNHCR did not have a concrete plan for solving problem.

Under these circumstances, some solutions were suggested. For instance, Rebero, a special emissary of the *Mwami*’s, attempted to create an *Association sociale des refugees rwandais*, whose ultimate goal was to return to Rwanda. To achieve this, he claimed, the Association would like first to promote a ‘*climat de confiance*’ between the refugees and PARMEHUTU. This in turn required that there be no further attacks on Rwanda by the refugees. Once peaceful conditions were ensured, the next step would be to establish contact with the Republic in order to discuss detailed conditions of return and to obtain definite guarantees for those monarchists who wanted to return to Rwanda. After their return, new elections would

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102 Incoming Telegram from Kampala to Secretary of State, 8 March 1963, Box 4028, CFP Files 1963, RG59, NACP.
103 Incoming Telegram from Dar-es-Salaam, 12 March 1963, Box 4029, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
104 ‘Mwami Kigeri V Given Permission to Reside in Tanganyika’, Airgram from American Embassy Dar Es Salaam to Department of State, 24 October 1963, Box 4028, CFPF 1963, RG59, NACP.
take place and the future regime would be established based on the result of these elections, which would have to be accepted beforehand by the whole population.\footnote{‘Confidential to the High Commissioner, J. Cuenod from regional Representative of the UNHCR on Resettlement of Tanganyika – attitude of the Burundi Government and of refugees’, 22 June 1964, Rwanda-Burundi-border, S0238-0006-10, UNA.}

Another solution suggested by non-Rwandans was the federalisation of Rwanda, reserving part of Rwanda to the Tutsi and endowing it with some political status. Whereas the federation proposal by Kayibanda and Gitera in 1959 had not been not concrete (Chapter 3), the suggestion this time was more realistic. This time, federation would involve two tasks: the regrouping of the Tutsi remaining in Rwanda on the one hand, and the return of the exiles on the other. The proposed area for a ‘Tutsi territory’ was in the north-east of the country around Muhazi Lake and the Kagera National Park in Kibungo and Biumba Prefecture, due to the fact that these regions were not overcrowded. Kibungo territory had only a population density of 31.55 inhabitants per square km, while in Biumba, the average density was 19.32 compared to Ruhengeri (176.66), Kibuye (131.62), and Nyanza (131.40). In addition, more than one-eighth (55,000) of total number of Tutsis in Rwanda (390,000) were already living in the area due to the transfer of internal refugees.\footnote{‘To U Thant from Jules Wolf’, 14 July 1964, Rwanda-Tutsi refugees 1964, S0279-0019-08, UNA.} The other solution suggested was to offer the Tutsi the rights guaranteed by Rwanda and its neighbouring states. Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika would take part in a treaty which would guarantee the rights of the Tutsi minority, such as the liberty of taking personal possessions and effects, protecting the migrants’ immovable property and repressing the guilty of racial incidents.\footnote{Ibid.}

But, as we know from history, none of these solutions were actively contemplated or carried out because ‘solving the refugee problem’ meant different things to the different protagonists and no one but the Inyenzi themselves had very much time or concern for the refugees.

Conclusion

To restate the main argument of this thesis, the Rwandan Revolution, violence and ethnic conflict were not inevitable. The previous chapters have examined the ways in
which various domestic and international factors affected the process of Revolution and ‘political tribalisation’ of ethnicity. This chapter has shown the process by which politicised and polarised ethnicity spread over Rwanda – the violence caused by population density, land issues and the discontent of the Hutus against the Tutsi chiefs, as well as the struggle amongst the political parties, their ideologies and demographic changes.

Violence and ethnic conflict on the local level were regionally diverse. First, the violence was more severe in the centre and north, while the south and east were not as affected in the beginning. In the early 1960s, the progress of the Revolution and the movement of people who had escaped from the violent regions to the east and the south-east changed Rwanda’s political and demographic landscape. Moreover, as Chapter 3 illustrated, Hutu politicians, especially PARMEHUTU leaders, reinterpreted their history to claim that Hutus were the ‘true’ Rwandans and that the Tutsi had come from other parts of Africa and had colonised Rwanda, thus Hutu ethnic ideology manifested itself as the anti-Tutsi struggle. As such, politics, dichotomisation of ethnicity, violence and movement of people actually deformed the boundary among the regions, homogenised the difference among the domestic Tutsi in different regions, and shaped and reinforced the Tutsi–Hutu divide. Furthermore, the nature of violence escalated from property damage to massacre. After PARMEHUTU’s victory was consolidated, internal violence was somewhat reduced; but then Inyenzi attacks from outside Rwandan borders triggered further internal retributive violence, which further strengthened both PARMEHUTU’s ideology and divisions between Tutsi and Hutu.

As Chapter 3 concluded, in post-colonial Rwanda, as the divide between Tutsi and Hutu became more solid, the differences amongst the Hutus themselves became an issue. The rivalry between northern and southern Hutu leaders emerged: Grégoire Kayibanda, the first President of the Republic of Rwanda, favoured the ‘Gitarama group’, which nurtured the discontented northern Hutu politicians and led to the coup d’état by Juvénal Habyarimana in 1973. 109 He first attempted to discourage ‘political tribalism’ – instead he made all Rwandans join the newly established party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), with the

goal of achieving national unity and development. However, this gradually gave way to ethnic propaganda starting in the late 1980s, as Rwanda began to suffer both economically and politically.

Rwanda had had a good reputation amongst international donors. As Chapter 4 mentioned, the international community had provided aid to support the post-colonial Hutu regimes. However, in the 1980s, when the Rwandan economy stagnated, the donors started to demand democratisation as a condition for providing aid, which affected the country’s political situation. Another important factor in the post-colonial period was the refugees in neighbouring countries. Especially, in Uganda, a group of Tutsi refugees founded the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation (RRWF) in 1979, later renamed the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1980 and then the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. As the RPF, they started a war against the Rwandan National Army in October 1990.\(^\text{110}\)

Finally, post-colonial Rwandan society saw more social interaction among different people. For instance, the Rwandans started to live more with people from different regions. For example, during the 1970s, Hutu farmers moved to the east from other regions in order to gain land.\(^\text{111}\) Indeed, two of my interviewees came from Astrida (Butare) due to the land shortage there. One of them explained:

\begin{quote}
I came here when Kayibanda was President. We encountered elephants and leopards. When I came here, this area was covered by forest and the chief here governed only 40 people. I immigrated to this area to acquire a big tract of land for farming. My brother was already here and I had wanted to come to Mugesera, but my father told me I had to wait until his death. My brother had told that it is a nice area. You know, I was very strong and I journeyed here on foot. I cut down trees and started planting bananas and sorghum.\(^\text{112}\)
\end{quote}

Therefore, starting in the 1960s, more and more people, both Tutsi internal refugees and Hutu land-seekers, moved from other regions to the east where previously there had not been a substantial population. In addition, there was an increase in intermarriage between Tutsis and Hutus.

\(^{112}\) Second interview with Jean, 5 December 2011.
These strands became interwoven in the early 1990s. When the civil war broke out in October 1990, ethnic propaganda escalated. In the north and then the east, violence reappeared in several ways. The international community held conferences in Arusha (Tanzania) in an attempt to negotiate a ceasefire, which was agreed in 1993. However, on 6 April 1994, the airplane carrying the Rwandan President Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down; while those responsible for the attack is the subject of dispute, the immediate violent response of the anti-Tutsi *Interahamwe* initiated the Rwandan genocide and the ceasefire was broken. The terrible events of the Rwandan Genocide have been addressed elsewhere;\(^ {113}\) in Chapter 6, I look at the performativity of history and examine how ‘political tribalism’ and interpretation of the past have influenced and, even today, continue to influence post-colonial Rwandan politics.

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\(^ {113}\) As reviewed in the Introduction, there are a number of good research documents on the 1994 genocide.
Chapter 6
Remembering Ethnicity:
Politicised Ethnicity in Post-colonial Rwanda

[W]ho controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.¹

Power is history and history is power. ²

Introduction
As Anthony Smith and many others point out, shared histories and memories are crucial factors in constructing ethnicity and nationhood.³ A country’s ‘official history’ has always been rewritten and exploited by those in power. Historians have warned that governments exploit history in order to justify their rule and to silence dissenting voices.⁴ Terence Ranger, the seasoned Africanist historian, draws our attention to the mobilisation of ‘patriotic history’ in Zimbabwe, in an attempt to revive revolutionary values and legitimise Mugabe’s regime through television, press, youth camps, history textbooks and speeches. ‘Patriotic history’ is problematic in that it silences all other narratives.⁵ As George Orwell wrote in 1949: ‘who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.’⁶ These official histories are displayed and reproduced through what Pierre Nora has called lieux de mémoire (sites of memory). For instance, archives, museums,

² Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, p.148.
⁶ Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 97.
commemorations and textbooks are *lieux de mémoire*, constructed by governments in order to establish particular ways of remembering.

As emphasised through this entire thesis, the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s is important not only because ethnicity had changed dramatically through the period of the Revolution and independence, but also because the period has been interpreted by both Tutsi and Hutu leaders to legitimatise their rules. Rwandan history and ethnicity are too intertwined to examine separately. The interpretation of history by power-holders constructed a certain form of ethnicity and this ethnicity reinforced a certain type of interpretation of history. As a former Rwandan government minister, in exile in Switzerland, simply put it: ‘Power is history and history is power.’

This chapter scrutinises the ways of remembering ethnicity, which were transformed during the period that previous chapters have examined. By contextualising the history of the 1950s and 1960s within post-colonial Rwandan society, this chapter argues that ‘political tribalism’ and the interpretations of the past have affected post-colonial Rwanda in various ways. First, the chapter briefly reviews the historical narratives developed by the Belgians and the Tutsi traditional leaders during the late colonial period. Then, the chapter discusses the historical narrative of post-colonial Hutu governments to show the continuation of the ethnic ideology of the Revolution. The chapter proceeds to the ideology propagated during the genocide, which was grounded on the ethnic ideology of the Revolution. It then examines post-genocide attempts at historical revisionism and nation-building by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government to argue that the official history told by the RPF has reverted to their precedents in late colonial period.

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Positive Primordialist Image of Pre-colonial Rwanda: Colonial Period

This section briefly examines the relationship between history and ethnicity in pre-1994 Rwanda to show the continuation of primordialistic ethnic ideology from the colonial to the post-colonial period and its consequences.

As explored in Chapter 2, the Europeans perceived pre-colonial ethnicity in Rwanda in certain ways. The assumption of the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ – that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and that Rwanda was a centralised kingdom of the Tutsi – affected the European policy of indirect rule. In particular, the Belgians helped the Nyiginya kingdom to consolidate its power over Rwanda, placing Tutsi chiefs from the central court in positions of power over predominantly Hutu-populated areas. Under this ‘cohesion of oppression’, Hutu consciousness was shaped and the Tutsi leaders came to believe that they were superior to the Hutu.

Based on the Hamitic Hypothesis, the Tutsi king and chiefs held views that did not problematise the inequality between the Tutsi and the Hutu, but rather legitimatised the Tutsi rule. What they claimed was that the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were all Rwandans, and that they had lived peacefully under the king’s rule before colonisation; the colonisers divided Rwandans into different ethnic groups, and thus the Rwandans should be united under the leadership of the king in order to achieve independence from the Europeans. For instance, on 12 June 1958, Mutara Rudahigwa announced that there was no problem between the Tutsi and the Hutu, and that he wanted to abolish ethnic categories to unite Rwandans in order to achieve independence. Moreover, in October 1960, Isidore Rwubusisi, who obtained a diploma in a Belgian university, also claimed that three ethnic groups had lived peacefully for five hundred years but that the Belgians changed it. As such, the Tutsi traditional leaders did not regard the Tutsi-Hutu relationship as problematic but rather demanded transfer of power from the Belgians to the Tutsi leadership.

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10 From Brussels to Department of State, 21 October 1960, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files, Congo 1960-Jan1963 (A UPA Collection from Lexis Nexis).
Negative Primordialist Image of Rwanda: From Revolution to Genocide

This perception of history and the construction of ethnicity led to political change and produced a politicised ethnicity at the end of the colonial period, as Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examined. The Catholic fathers and the Rwandans with more progressive ideas- both Tutsi and Hutu elite- presented a different interpretation of history, opposing the Tutsi-centric view. Their claim was, however, not so radical in the beginning. For instance, the Bahutu Manifesto published by nine Hutu elites in March 1957 claimed that Rwanda was colonised by the Hamitic Tutsi and condemned the rule by the minority foreign Tutsi on the majority autochthon Hutu; in order to change this situation, the Manifesto suggested abolishing forced labour, encouraging the freedom of speech and codifying custom law.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, some Hutu elites suggested distinguishing Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs, who were criticised for their abuse of power, from ordinary petite Tutsi and the king.\textsuperscript{12} However, as detailed in Chapter 3, the Hutu leaders became radicalised and ended up taking a negative primordialistic view and claiming that the Tutsi were foreigners and not authentic Rwandans and that, since the Hutu were so oppressed by the Tutsi, they needed to liberate themselves by means of revolution. In October 1960, Kayibanda declared that democracy of majority Hutu defeated feudalism of minority Tutsi.\textsuperscript{13}

The Inyenzi attacks on Rwanda at the end of 1963 and early 1964 did not achieve their goals but rather gave more legitimacy to this negative primordialist claim. Kayibanda and other Hutu politicians claimed more strongly that the alien Tutsi wanted to invade and re-establish their rule again, emphasising the dichotomy of aggressive feudalist Tutsi and democratic Hutu.\textsuperscript{14}

In contrast, when he overthrew Kayibanda and became president in 1973 under the Second Republic, Juvenal Habyarimana did not emphasise ethnic ideology as


\textsuperscript{12} Anastase Makuza, ‘Plaidoyer pour une solution pacifique du problème Hutu-Tutsi’, 24 April 1959, pp.80–82, RWA, AA,MAAE.


\textsuperscript{14} ‘Mémorandum concernant les Evénements de Décembre-Janvier au Rwanda, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères’, 18 February 1964,S0238-0002-05, United Nations Archives ; Airgram from Kigali on New Year’s Message of President Kayibanda, 30 January 1965,POL15-1, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1964-66, RG 59, National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).
much as Kayibanda had done. Indeed, Danielle de Lame, who carried out her fieldwork from 1988 to 1990, recalled that “Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are all first names; Rwandan is our family name” was the popular slogan under the Second Republic. However, President Habyarimana gradually changed his stance, finally declaring that only Hutus were true Rwandans, while Tutsis were ‘foreign bourgeois’. Educational content and practices contributed to the distribution of this ethnic ideology, which was spread before and during the genocide.

As detailed by Chrétien, media played an important role in agitating people during the genocide. In addition to *Kinyamateka* that was founded in the colonial period, some journals were established, one of which was *Kangura* which became famous for its hate speech against the Tutsi. These journals interpreted the history of Rwanda based on the Hamitic Hypothesis. For instance, an article published in *Kangura* in November 1990 explained the history of Rwanda as follows:

In the history of Rwanda, those who arrived first are the Twa (Pydmoïdes) who devoted themselves to hunting and gathering, and then Hutu (Bantu) have arrived. Hutu who cleared the forest to cultivate and have established a social organisation, and finally came the Tutsi … Why we want to change our history? Who would have the right to change the country’s history?

This interpretation of history led to emphasising the importance of 1959 Revolution. An article titled ‘historique’ published in January 1991 justified the violence carried out by the Hutu masses during the Revolution as ‘legitimate defence’ against

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‘arrogant Tutsi’.

Moreover, Donat Murego, one of the main ideologues of Hutu Power, explained in April 1994 that 1959 Revolution was the fight against the double colonialism and feudalism. These articles reminded readers of the *Inyenzi* attacks in the early 1960s to provoke the ethnic hatred among the Hutu masses; *Kangura* published a declaration that Anastase Makuza, then-president of the National Assembly, delivered in April 1964 to denounce *Inyenzi* attacks. By doing so, the authors of these articles wanted to connect *Inyenzi* with RPF and to propagate the ethnic hatred.

A number of government officials that had ruled under the Second Republic went into exile in Europe after the RPF won the civil war and seized power in 1994. Their views still reflected the primordialist view of ethnicity: for example, one official declared ‘westerners did not invent Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – these terms had their own meaning in our language’ and that 1959 was ‘an end to the dual oppression of the colonist and the Tutsi elite’. As such, the official histories narrated by the pre-genocide Hutu regimes inherited the primordial understanding of history and ethnicity in Rwanda, legitimising their rule and resulting in the huge loss of human lives in the early 1990s.

Rewriting History, Restoring Pre-colonial ‘National Unity’ after 1994

In late October 1994, in the aftermath of the genocide, Rwandans from various backgrounds gathered in Kigali to discuss how to rebuild their country. When they drifted into a discussion of history, all agreed that the history of Rwanda should be rewritten. Introducing this episode, Alison Des Forges suggested that the process of rewriting the past should be achieved by ‘preserving it [the faulty version of the past], examining its distortions, understanding them and – one hopes – learning from them’. After the 1994 genocide, the RPF government began to rewrite Rwanda’s history. They justified this activity by arguing that the previous version of Rwandan history had been used for genocidal propaganda. While the post-colonial negative

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primordialist Hutu governments had highlighted the continuity of pre-colonial and colonial Tutsi hegemony and naturally called the event in 1959 a ‘Revolution’ with positive connotations of overthrowing the Tutsi feudal monarchy in order to justify their action, the RPF regime took a combination of positive primordialism and extreme constructivism, emphasising pre-colonial ‘national unity’ and the ‘invention’ of ethnicity under Europeans during the colonial period. The current regime regards it not as a ‘Revolution’ but as the first case of ‘genocide against the Tutsi’. They explain that the event of 1959 was caused by the manipulations of the Europeans ‘who wanted to guarantee their continued influence even after formal independence’.

The most meticulously detailed official history narrated by the Rwandan government, ‘The Unity of Rwandans’ was published in 1999 and states:

The truth from history is that before the Colonial period, i.e. before the year 1900, that Catholic Missionaries began to live in our country, in which there was strong unity between Rwandans: no ethinical war took place between them before that year … That unity was for all Rwandans: Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. They were making up all together what our ancestors called ‘The King’s People.’ All of them also knew they were Rwandans, that Rwanda was their country … In a few words, before the White People's arrival, all Rwandans had unity which was based on one King and patriotism, spoke the same language, had the same culture, the same belief and tried hard to be in peace and live together, completing each other in their daily needs …

As such, the current official history narrates that pre-colonial Rwanda was peaceful and free from ethnic conflict because Rwandans were more strongly affiliated to their clans and kingdom than to ethnic groups; ethnic divisions were ‘invented’ during the colonial period as ‘the Germans weakened the power of monarchy and the Belgians further damaged it.’

26 Ibid. Several authors have analysed the government’s version of history with the connection to the reconstruction and reconciliation after the genocide. See, for instance, Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 3; Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwa, ‘Memory and Violence in Postgenocide Rwanda’, in States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa, Edna Bay and Donald Donham (eds) (London: University of Virginia Press, 2006), pp. 236–60, and Eltringham, Accounting for Horror, Chapter 6.
The current Rwandan government employs various lieux de mémoire to disseminate its official history. Interestingly, the national archives have not played a role in this dissemination in Rwanda itself, while the archives have had an important impact on national master-narratives, nation-building and memory production in other countries.\textsuperscript{27} Although further analysis is needed, it can be assumed that lack of funding, inadequate resources and suspicion towards scholars, foreigners in particular, can explain the limited role of archives in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{28}

Moreover, normally, education plays an important role in disseminating a country’s official history among the people; however, the teaching of Rwanda’s history in its schools has been non-existent for a long time. As early as the autumn of 1994, RPF leaders began to consider the rewriting of history books ‘as a first priority’.\textsuperscript{29} First of all, the government abolished the former history curriculum and banned history classes in schools because ‘modern national history is potentially too divisive to be taught in a society emerging from decades of ethnic hatred, distrust and prejudice.’ History, therefore, has not been officially taught in schools for more than a decade.\textsuperscript{30}

Since 2001, Sarah W. Freedman and other scholars have been funded by US institutions to rewrite Rwanda’s history curriculum in collaboration with Rwandan scholars such as Déogratis Byanafashe and Paul Rutayisire. Freedman and others have noted that there were tensions between the different goals in teaching history. On the one hand, the government wants to promote ‘national unity’ by teaching a single official history; on the other hand, it is necessary to ‘evaluate historical

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\textsuperscript{29} Jefremovas, ‘Contested Identities’.

\textsuperscript{30} Hodgkin, ‘Reconciliation’, and Walker-Keleher, ‘Reconceptualizing’. Buckley-Zistel mentions that in some schools, both African and world history are taught and sometimes Rwandan history is taught, though the sensitive topics of history and ethnicity are omitted. However, there have been no ‘official history’ classes at schools: Buckley-Zistel, ‘Nation, Narration, Unification?’.
sources and evidence through embracing so-called modern Western teachings’ in order to raise modern citizens.\textsuperscript{31} The curriculum finally published in 2006 made it a priority to promote a single official history, heavily relying on the works of Kagame and Maquet and attempting to put more emphasis on clan society, pre-colonial ‘unity’ and assigning responsibility for the 1994 genocide to the Belgians and the Hutu politicians in the post-independence period.\textsuperscript{32}

The Rwandan government has other ways to teach its history to its people. Education camps (\textit{Ingando}) have been used by politicians, university students, returned refugees and released prisoners to teach the government’s version of Rwandan history. The Minister of Local Administration, Good Governance, Social Affairs and Community Development (MINALOC), Musoni Protais, explained to a conference in 2007 that the \textit{Ingando} camps were:

\begin{quote}
... solidarity camps, seeking to demystify and break down barriers between people by freeing free expression; at first used to help reintegrate refugees and former combatants returning to Rwanda, later extended to include government officials and students candidates to higher education, aiming at better internalizing ideas of unity and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Indeed, some research participants in Freedman’s project in 2000–02 recounted that they were taught in the \textit{Ingando} camps that Rwandans lived ‘on good terms before colonization’.\textsuperscript{34} However, according to Susan Thomson who actually experienced an \textit{Ingando} camp, history was simplified to the claim that ‘hatred that Hutu have for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] The National Curriculum Development Centre, the Republic of Rwanda, \textit{The Teaching of History of Rwanda: A Participatory Approach for Secondary Schools in Rwanda, a Reference Book for the Teacher} (Kigali: The Regents of the University of California, 2006).
\item[34] Freedman et al., ‘Confronting the Past’, p. 255.
\end{footnotes}
Tutsi is “the root of the Rwandan disease [of genocide]”. In addition to the Ingando camps, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) has organised civil education programmes such as sport events and song competitions to distribute the official interpretation of history.

Genocide memorials are other useful tools for the imparting of official history. A pamphlet published by the Genocide Memorial in Kigali (the most important memorial in the country), states:

We are one people. We speak one language. We have one history. In recent times, though, genocide has cast a dark shadow over our lives and torn us apart. This chapter is a bitter part of our lives, but one we must remember for those we lost, and for the sake of the future … The primary identity of all Rwandans was originally associated with eighteen different clans. The categories Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were socio-economic classifications within the clans, which could change with personal circumstances. Under colonial rule, the distinctions were made racial, particularly with the introduction of the identity card in 1932. In creating these distinctions, the colonial power identified anyone with ten cows in 1932 as Tutsi and anyone with less than ten cows as Hutu, and this also applied to his descendants. We had lived in peace for many centuries, but now the divide between us begun …

With regards to the period of the Revolution and independence, it states:

In 1959, King Rudahigwa died. Thereafter massacres of Tutsi were organised. Many thousands of Tutsi were killed, others fled to neighbouring states for refuge. In 1961 we had elections. The first government’s Prime Minister was Grégoire Kayibanda, founder of the Parmehutu, a party for the emancipation of the Hutu. A year later, Rwanda gained independence. Rwanda became a highly centralised, repressive state with a single-party system. The regime was

36 Buckley-Zistel, ‘Nation, Narration, Unification?’: 46.
38 Text from pamphlet purchased in the Memorial: Kigali Memorial Centre, Jenoside (2004), pp. 8–9. The Genocide Memorial in Kigali was created by the Aegis (a charity organisation based in the UK and the US) in collaboration with NURC for ‘the pursuit of memory through justice, dignified memorials and universal education’. So, in a way, the memorialisation of the 1990 genocide is an international project <http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php/What-we-do/what-we-do.html> (accessed 26 May 2013).
characterised by the persecution and ethnic cleansing of Tutsis … Over 700,000 Tutsis were exiled from our country between 1959–1973 as a result of the ethnic cleansing encouraged by the Belgian colonialists. The refugees were prevented from returning, despite many peaceful efforts to do so.  

The exhibition inside the more recent Genocide Memorial in Murambi (in southern Rwanda) also reflects the government’s interpretation of history.

For centuries before the arrival of the European colonial powers to Africa, Rwandans were essentially one people. There was no armed conflict between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa social groups … King Yuhi Musinga fought those changes [the Belgian reforms] and was finally deported outside of Rwanda. His son, Mutara, also struggled unsuccessfully against colonial efforts to divide Rwandans … After his untimely death in 1959 Hutu intellectual leaders seized power in what was called the Hutu Revolution … [the] Mise au Point was a memorandum requesting more inclusive system of governing. In response to this document, colonial authorities and some Catholic Church leaders encouraged a group of nine Hutu leaders to draft the ‘Bahutu manifesto’. It portrayed [the] Tutsi as obstacles to the development of [the] Hutu. In November 1959, Hutu extremists initiated a campaign against the Tutsi known as the ‘1959 Revolution’ … Cross-border attacks by the refugee Tutsi army served as a pretext for the persecution of Tutsi within Rwanda. 1963 December, more than 15,000 Tutsi were killed and Inyenzi became the notion of ‘internal enemy’ to refer to all Tutsi.  

Their history focuses on the sufferings of the Tutsis and does not accommodate Hutu victims. However, there are slight differences in emphasis: while the memorial in Kigali does not provide a detailed description of Rwandan history to visitors, the one in Murambi does. Moreover, the latter makes more radical claims than the former. This may be attributed to the political trend in Rwanda as the RPF becomes more and more rigid in its historical interpretation.

In this way, the Rwandan government has monopolised the process of knowledge construction and history-making because ‘there is only one truth’ which,

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39 Jenoside, pp. 11–12.
40 The Genocide Museum in Murambi, visited 12 October 2011. I later spoke talked with a university lecturer and member of Ibuka (a survivors’ organisation), who said that he joined the project of setting the interior exhibition in Murambi which was completed in 2011.
41 For instance, the one in Murambi does not explain actually how the violence in November 1959 started. As Chapters 3 and 5 detailed, it was the Tutsi UNAR supporters who acted violently first.
42 While the memorial in Kigali is regarded the national memorial, the one in Murambi provides more regionally specific accounts of the genocide.
they believe, belongs to them.\textsuperscript{43} It is understandable for them to do so for the sake of ‘national unity’ after the tragedy, but this version of history is, indeed, another ‘patriotic history’ of the powerful.

The current version of official history is a patchwork of the positive primordialist and constructivist works of many decades ago. The most frequently cited historians in the official documents are the Tutsi Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame and the Belgian anthropologist Jacques Maquet, both of whose works were published in the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{44} Based on the Hamitic Hypothesis, these positive primordialists claimed that the Tutsi and the Hutu were racially different, but that the socio-political system of pre-colonial Rwanda had been beneficial for both groups. ‘The Unity of Rwandans’, however, ignored research findings since the 1970s, especially the constructivist perspective. In fact, as the Introduction and Chapter 2 have detailed, since the 1960s, researchers have cast serious doubts on Kagame’s and Maquet’s scholarship and have shown that differences between Hutu and Tutsi became more distinct as the Nyiginya kingdom extended its power over peripheral regions, even in the pre-colonial period. The exception to this is Catharine Newbury; but the Rwandan government exploits her seminal book for the sake of supporting their claim that the Europeans created ethnicity, ignoring the fact that her work also detailed ethnic transformation before colonial rule. Thus the current Rwandan government grafts the positive primordialist understanding of the pre-colonial period represented by Kagame and Maquet onto the constructivist view of looking at the colonial change, as argued by Newbury.

Supporting the official history is a ‘purist’ perception of history and ethnicity among the RPF’s leaders, a number of whom are former refugees or descendants of those who left Rwanda from the end of 1950s to the 1970s. Employing Liisa Malkki’s wonderful study on Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, it is possible to assume that the Tutsi ex-refugees maintained their ‘mythico-history’ and a sense of

\textsuperscript{43} Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth’: 29, and Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{44} I was frequently told during my fieldwork that if I wanted to study Rwandan history, I must read Kagame’s works because ‘he is the most famous Rwandan historian.’ For his life story, see Claudine Vidal, ‘Alexis Kagame entre memoire et histoire’, History in Africa 15 (1988): 493–504, and \textit{idem}, Sociologie des passions: Côte-d’Ivoire, Rwanda (Paris: Karthala, 1991), Chapter 2.
‘purity’ during their experiences as refugees.\textsuperscript{45} It is also natural for them to see continuity in their history during which the Tutsi has always been suffering.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, the high-ranking officials in the RPF may still have held the primordial perception towards Rwandan ethnicity and history. However, assumedly, they did not publicly display this perception because Rwanda needed post-conflict nation-building. Indeed, in 2000, President Paul Kagame gave his own view on Rwandan history:

The genocide has a long history, if you know a bit of what happened in 1959 alone. There was civil strife which led to many refugees moving out of the country in the hundreds of thousands, and tens of thousands of people being killed. More or less, the genocide started around that time. There had been other genocides in 1963, 1967, 1973 and 1993 … It has been taking place for quite a long period. A section of our population has always been targeted by the government and its forces. Huge sections of the population were wiped out from different parts of our country. This had been going on for over thirty years.\textsuperscript{47}

Problematically, some parts of the official history do not match the history unearthed from archival materials discussed in previous chapters. Chapter 3 argued that the Hutu and Tutsi political parties during the Revolution and decolonisation were not in direct opposition with each other at the beginning; instead the relationship between them was quite complicated and fluid. Today, the RPF government has portrayed this relationship as a black-or-white conflict between UNAR and PARMEHUTU, in order to place blame on the Europeans for manipulating Hutu politicians, bringing about the Revolution and the massacres of Tutsis, which in turn produced a mass exodus of refugees and paved the way for the 1994 genocide. The ‘Unity’ document states:

Even though the Mise au Point and Bahutu Manifesto shared certain views on the reforms of Rwanda, after 1959, PARMEHUTU managed to promote [the]

Hutu by means of excluding the Tutsi and it used ethnicity as a pretext of gripping power; Colonel Logiest and Catholic Church supported them.48

Another variance between the official government narrative and the historical record is the differing evaluation of Mutara Rudahigwa, the Mwami who ruled the country from 1931 to 1959. The present Rwandan government acknowledges that he was ‘very conciliatory to Europeans’ when he was enthroned with their assistance, but changed his attitude and initiated democratisation and independence in the 1950s:

Rudahigwa was worried that the people of Rwanda had accepted the European view of Tutsi and Hutu as two separate races. These ethnic divisions were also taught in schools and written on government documents such as identity cards. He asked that the terms ‘Mututsi’, ‘Muhutu’, and ‘Mutwa’ be removed from these documents. He said that all citizens should see themselves as Rwandans.49

The image that emerges from the historical record, however, suggests that he had ignored the inequality between Tutsi and Hutu, and attempted to deny ethnic differences in order to maintain Tutsi domination.

Moreover, the RPF government emphasises the responsibility for ethnic conflict lies with the Belgians, for dividing Rwandans and manipulating the Hutu leaders. However, as Chapter 4 has examined, the Belgians had wanted to maintain their influence over Congo and Ruanda-Urundi for as long as possible; but after Congolese independence became inevitable in early 1960, the Belgians decided to gradually decolonise Rwanda in a way that would help them to sustain a good relationship with the country. Therefore, they supported the Hutu in their efforts to progress Rwanda’s decolonisation in a timely and friendly manner. Furthermore, as Chapter 5 has revealed, many Tutsi leaders and supporters also committed violence during the Revolution, and the Inyenzi attacked Rwanda in the early 1960s despite the fact that they had recognised the possibility of retaliation towards the domestic Tutsi. It is not surprising that the government does not mention these facts nor does so in a cursory manner. Therefore, the official history enhances the pre-colonial past and glorifies the Tutsi leaders’ initiatives, while neglecting their wrongdoings.

48 ‘The Unity of Rwandans’.
With regards to the fluidity between the Tutsi and the Hutu, the Rwandan government claims that if a Hutu acquired ten cows, he could become Tutsi and vice versa because ethnic difference was only a social category that classified people based on wealth. A RPF commander said: ‘If you have more than 10 cows you can become a Tutsi…Hutu simply means “servant” in our language. Somebody with lots of cows has the right to have servants. Tutsi just means rich.’ Hintjens wrote that it was the Belgians who ‘so despaired of being able to distinguish Batutsi from Bahutu’ that they decided that any man with more than ten cows should be Tutsi and those who possessed less than ten cows should be regarded as Hutu.

Conclusion
This chapter has explained the official histories narrated by post-colonial and post-genocide governments. Bringing in ideas from previous chapters that have examined the history of the Revolution and independence, this chapter has argued that the content of official history changed after the genocide and that the ‘patriotic history’ narrated by the RPF government has simplified the past, ignored the wrongdoings committed by the Tutsi and rewritten historical narratives in such a way as so to emphasise the victim status of the Tutsi, stigmatise all Hutu and legitimise the RPF’s rule, employing various lieux de mémoire.

50 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, pp. 118–19, originally from the Guardian, 3 May 1994.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

Even though the government says there is no ethnic difference, still I can feel that the Tutsi feel superior to the Hutu. Suppressing people by power cannot solve the problems. Something happened in Rwanda almost every 20 years, in 1959, 1973 and 1994 because power cannot solve the fundamental problems of ethnicity and society. Something may happen in the near future.¹

More history than ever is today being revised or invented by people who do not want the real past, but only a past that suits their purpose. The defence of history by its professionals is today more urgent than ever, not least in politics … While the daily affairs of humanity are today conducted by the criteria of problem-solving technology, to which history is almost irrelevant, history has become more central to our understanding of the world today than ever before.²

Ethnic conflict in Rwanda, which led to the catastrophic genocide of 1994, tends to be explained in extreme ways. For the positive primordialists and extreme constructivists, the conflict took place because the European colonisation ‘invented’ ethnic categories and divided the Rwandans who had previously lived peacefully together; to the negative primordialists, the cause of the conflict was the ‘tribal hatred’ that the Tutsi and the Hutu had had for each other over several centuries. These divergent interpretations can also be found with regard to the Revolution in the 1950s and the 1960s. On the one hand, the negative primordialists claimed that the grievances of the Hutu erupted and escalated into the Revolution. On the other, the positive primordialists and extreme constructivists claim that the Revolution was caused by the manipulation of the Hutu leaders by the Europeans. The constructivist approach has been taken to advance our understandings of ethnicity in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda: it is more or less established that ethnicity in Rwanda was constructed by the dynamic interactions between the Europeans and the Rwandans in particular pre-colonial and colonial contexts. However, Rwandan ethnicity in the 1950s and 1960s has not benefited from this academic perspective. Rather, as summarised above, the literature on the Revolution, most of which was written several decades ago by Maquet, Codere and Lemarchand tends to take a primordialist

¹ Discussion with a Hutu woman in Kigali, 22 December 2011.
approach towards the Revolution and somewhat regarded the conflict emerging at the end of colonial period as inevitably escalating from the ethnic conflict established in the earlier stage of colonisation.

Relying on John Lonsdale’s suggestion that it is necessary to combine the three approaches to examine ethnicity, this thesis has aimed at taking a nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach to understand the ways in which ethnicity became ‘political tribalism’ in decolonising Rwanda. The approach is nuanced because the historical reality falls in between primordialism and extreme constructivism; it is ‘hybrid’ because the thesis aims at combining the three approaches. The thesis has argued that primordial ethnic conflict did not cause the Revolution and other historical events, but the other way round, because ethnicity in Rwanda was not simply invented by the Europeans during the colonial period, nor was it so primordial that the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu was inevitable. Ethnicity was reconstructed at the end of colonial period by various factors, and primordialistic perceptions of actors and contingencies served, not intentionally but more rather consequently, to achieve goals of the actors, that is, the Hutu politicians and the Belgians in particular.

In Rwanda, ethnicity was constructed and articulated during pre-colonial Nyiginya expansion and European colonial rule. During that time, internal friction was notable amongst the Tutsi nobles in power struggle. Moreover, the Nyiginya kingdom was not able to control the peripheral regions even in the early colonial period, which, linked with the internal frictions of the Tutsi chiefs/nobles, exacerbated the tension existing between the core of the kingdom and the peripheries. The interactions between the Europeans and the Rwandans were quite complicated as the Mwami and other nobles tried to exploit and play the European power to extend their powers; meanwhile, the European colonial administration and the missionaries also exploited the situation. Ethnicity was constructed in these contexts. Pre-colonial Rwanda was not free from oppression and violence; the Nyiginya kingdom had many confrontations with neighbouring kingdoms to expand their territories. Furthermore, it is true that the Europeans affected the power balance among the Rwandans and introduced the ethnic/racial concept into Rwanda. The Rwandans, however, especially Yuhi Musinga and other Tutsi leaders, exploited the European influences to expand and consolidate their power.
By consulting a wide range of archival sources, the thesis has shown that even during the time of the Revolution, which has been perceived by the existing literature as an inescapable consequence of ethnic discord between the two groups, conflict was not inevitable, for several factions (which were not necessarily divided on ethnic lines) existed and even some alternatives were suggested for ethnic cooperation. Actually, there was a dynamic transformation of ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’ through interactions between the Rwandans and non-Rwandans, as well as through relationships among different groups of Rwandans. Particularly, the thesis has paid attention to not only inter-group relations but also intra-group factions.

The thesis has demonstrated that ethnic conflict was not an independent variable to the Revolution; rather, various domestic factors including intra-Tutsi leadership rivalry, the alliance among the political parties and the inter-ethnic power struggle affected the process of the Revolution and the resultant politicised ethnicity. The political parties (especially UNAR and PARMEHUTU) did not confront each other from the beginning; rather, cooperation among Hutu and Tutsi parties existed for a while. The parties became polarised along ethnic lines for various reasons such as disagreement among the parties over the issue of the constitutional monarchy and what form the new country would take, the introduction of elections, fear for an uncertain future and Belgian support. Further research is needed to reveal the internal organisations of the political parties and the profiles of the politicians; nonetheless, the thesis has shown in detail the complicated nature of Rwandan party politics and the ways in which ethnicity became politicised in domestic politics.

International environments played a very important role in politicising Rwandan ethnicity. External factors such as friction within the Belgian administrations and the heated debates in the United Nations influenced by the Cold War provided opportunities for Rwandan ethnicity to become politicised. Even though the process of revolution was primarily initiated by the Rwandans, the international environment surely affected the timing and course of independence, which made the domestic situation more complicated and resulted in reinforcing the ethnic conflict. While it may be necessary to examine more carefully the politics within the Western, Eastern and Third World blocs and their interactions in the Cold
War context, still the thesis has re-examined the role of Belgium and the United Nations on Rwanda.

The thesis has also looked at the ways in which ‘political tribalism’ appeared and affected people’s lives at the local level. Contingency, movement of people, violence and the processes of revolution and decolonisation had a synergistic impact on the spread of ‘political tribalism’ over Rwanda. Before the Revolution, regional difference within the Tutsi was salient; however, the Revolution made ethnicity the most important category in Rwanda. Even though regional differences among Hutus remained in post-colonial Rwanda, the Tutsi became a more homogenised group and the boundary between the Tutsi and Hutu became stronger and encounters between the two groups more violent. It should be noted that more research is needed in order to investigate both the refugees’ politics in neighbouring countries and the local dynamics of ‘political tribalisation’; nevertheless, the thesis has detailed the ways in which violence spread all over Rwanda and how it affected people.

In this way, Rwandan ethnicity cannot simply be understood through the dichotomised debate of primordialists and constructivists. Rather, it was a more dynamic process of ethnic transformation with unaccomplished alternatives and inter-/intra-group relationships, strongly bound by historical and political contexts of the time. The primordial perception of Rwandan ethnicity shared among the Rwandans and non-Rwandans played a role in transforming ethnicity as they took actions based on the perception and misperception of the reality. Since it was a period of rapid political change, Tutsi and Hutu politicians had both expectations as well as anxieties about the future. Together with primordial perceptions on ethnicity, interpretations of the past and visions for the future held by each actor, the multiple factors shaped ethnicity and pushed the ethnic split into the foreground. It was thus not a linear but more dynamic process of ethnic transformation with unaccomplished alternatives and inter-/intra-group relationships. The ethnic difference became politicised and violent, the Tutsi became stigmatised and homogenised, and the Hutu became a more ‘legitimate’ group to rule.

The concept of ethnicity was deployed instrumentally in Rwanda but it was not intentional consequence. On the one hand, the Tutsi leaders (the traditional ones in particular) and the anti-colonialist countries in the UN took an instrumentalist and
extreme constructivist stance in understanding the Rwandan situation at the time. According to them, the conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu was invented by the Belgians who wanted to use it instrumentally to maximise their interests and maintain influence over Rwanda. Therefore, those actors ignored the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi and thought of the Hutu leaders as ‘puppets’ of the Belgians. However, as the thesis has shown, the conflict was not simply invented by the Europeans; its origins were based in the pre-colonial power dynamics of Nyiginya expansion, articulated during the colonial rule and politicised through the dynamic interactions of various Rwandans. Nevertheless, an instrumentalistic understanding of ethnicity holds relevance because ethnicity functioned as an instrument to gather adherents to one side or the other, and the end result was violence. What is important to understand here is that the Hutu leaders and the Belgians who had a negative primordialistic perception of Rwandan ethnicity did not intentionally manipulate ethnicity. It seems that the Hutu leaders believed that they truly needed liberation from Tutsi ‘colonialism’ and that the Belgian local administration genuinely believed that their actions were just. Therefore, the instrumental nature of ethnicity that the Tutsi leaders and the anti-colonialist countries criticised emerged during the political turmoil of democratisation and decolonisation as an unintentional consequence.

This instrumental use of ethnicity became stronger and more consciously exploited during the post-colonial period since the Revolution and decolonisation became the antecedent and set the pattern of an ethnicity-based ideology and violence. The thesis has shown that ‘political tribalism’ and the interpretations of the past have influenced post-colonial Rwandan politics, up to the present day. Both the post-colonial and post-genocide governments have advanced their own ‘patriotic histories’ that selectively promote past events to remember via various lieux de mémoire. Further research is needed to detail the memories of ordinary people and the relationship between memories and official histories. For instance, research conducted by Lyndsay Hilker has shown that young people in Kigali do not have strong ethnic patterns of remembering the past. Differences in memory are rather based on generation (whether or not they received education prior to the genocide), previous experiences and current situations. Moreover, as Eltringham pointed out,

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3 Lyndsay McLean Hilker, ‘Young Rwandans’ Narratives of the Past (and Present)’, in
age, gender, urban/rural residency, regional provenance, class/occupation, the experience of exile and ethnicity are all factors that affect memories.\(^4\) With regards to the relationship between memories and official histories, the interviewees and focus groups conducted by Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwa initially explained Rwandan history along government lines; but as the conversations continued, some began to cast doubt on the government’s version of their history.\(^5\) Trine Eide also points out the parallel nature of private memory: ‘In a society with strong oral traditions of storytelling’ like Rwanda’s, ‘private histories run alongside and compete with the rewritten official history of the violent past.’\(^6\) Thus, while the Rwandan government has been trying to impose its rewritten official history, many Rwandans are aware of the manipulated and exploitative nature of that history, suggesting a cleavage between official and private understandings of past events. This body of research on the politics of memory is valuable in the sense that it advances our understanding of how people have tried to make sense of the history of ethnic conflict and to cope with the current situation. It is thus necessary to conduct research examining the relationships among the history unearthed from archival documents, official histories narrated by power-holders and the memories of ordinary people.

Notwithstanding all the shortcomings of this thesis that have been mentioned above, it has made several original contributions. Unfortunately, due to the limited time I had in Belgium, I was not able to access as much of the available sources in the African Archives in Brussels as I would have liked. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the importance of the archives and research material that I have drawn for this thesis.

Consulting such a wide range of archival documents has enabled me to provide detailed accounts on the period and to re-evaluate the existing literature. In particular, the thesis has shown that even in the decolonisation period, it is important to take a

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\(^5\) Longman and Rutagengwa, ‘Memory and Violence’.

nuanced hybrid-constructivist approach rather than the primordialist and extreme
constructivist interpretations, which can be somewhat simplistic. In this sense, the
thesis has followed the footsteps of Des Forges, Newbury and other constructivist
scholars on the pre-colonial and colonial period.

The thesis emphasises that the period of the end of colonialism is another
important conjuncture in examining ethnicity. While the thesis has focused on the
transformation of ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’, it may be worth summarising the
continuities from the pre-colonial and early colonial period to that of decolonisation
and the post-colonial period. First, factions within each ethnic group can be found in
all pre-colonial, colonial, decolonising and post-colonial Rwanda. As Des Forges
skilfully illustrated, the power struggle amongst the Tutsi leaders existed in pre-
colonial Rwanda. The thesis has also shown that even at the end of the 1950s, the
Tutsi king and traditional leaders were at odds with more progressive Tutsi leaders.
In post-colonial Rwanda, Hutu rivalry between those from the south and the north
ignited the conflict from which the Second Republic was established. Even today,
there is growing friction within the RPF. Therefore, intra-group power struggles have
always been a characteristic of Rwandan politics.

Secondly, a notable continuity from the colonial period to the present is that
Rwandan history has been shaped by politics on multiple levels. Again, Des Forges
detailed the dynamic interactions between the Rwandans and the European
administrators and missionaries. By detailing the politics on international, national
and local levels, this thesis has demonstrated that the interactions of politics on these
levels transformed ethnicity into ‘political tribalism’. This tendency of complicated
relationships on various levels continued in post-colonial Rwanda, accounting for the
conditions which led to the 1994 genocide. Even today, Rwanda’s international
relations with its immediate neighbours and developed countries (donor countries in
particular) are intertwined with Rwandan domestic politics and local dynamics in
shaping the country.

Third, the primordial perception of ethnicity in Rwanda, namely the Hamitic
Hypothesis, survived long after the end of colonial rule; indeed, the meme of the
Hamitic Hypothesis was reinforced by the Revolution, again contributing to the
ideological foundation of the 1994 genocide. Furthermore, the violence during the
The decolonisation period became an antecedent to the pattern of violence in the post-colonial period, that is, attacks from outside Rwanda triggered sweeping domestic violence. All these implications suggest that the decolonisation period is crucially important in understanding Rwandan history.

The following two issues need further investigation in the future. On the one hand, it is necessary to pay more attention to the refugees in neighbouring countries, for the attacks by those refugees in the 1960s and the fact that they had to remain in exile until the 1990s have affected Rwandan politics and ethnicity. Further research is needed to understand the ways in which those refugees escaped to the neighbouring countries, the conditions they stayed there, the dynamic interactions among the international, national and local politics, and the ‘mythico-history’ and perception of ethnicity that the refugees have had. On the other hand, the local dynamics of ‘political tribalisation’ in eastern Rwanda needs further investigation since eastern Rwanda is an interesting region to see non-ethnic identification, the articulation of ethnicity and movement of people. Thus it is important to examine the ways in which Gisaka identification was replaced by the ethnic one and in which Rwandans from various background settled down in the east and the impacts on local ethnic dynamics.

Stepping back from Rwanda, this thesis makes a contribution to the debate on ethnicity, providing an example of a dynamic (re)construction of ethnicity. By doing so, the thesis supports the points made by Lonsdale that all three aspects – primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist – should be taken into consideration in examining ethnic construction. The thesis has argued that ethnicity in Rwanda does not support the dichotomy of primordialist or constructivist approach. The reality lies between them. Moreover, the thesis suggests that the work of Barth holds relevance in understanding ethnicity. As he argued that the boundaries between ethnic groups are forged by the interactions and interdependence that they have, the thesis has shown that it is important to historicise contemporary ethnic conflicts and focus on the various dynamics and factors that have shaped the conflicts in order to understand the ways in which ethnic groups have been constructed and reconstructed.

Last but not least, the thesis has suggested a change in our perception of the Revolution and decolonisation period from being an inevitable outburst of primordial
distress to a dynamic process of ethnic transformation. At the beginning of this thesis, I introduced the statement of President Kagame demanding that his government’s detractors provide ‘alternatives’, not just criticism. The thesis has provided an alternative way of looking at history, a history that is far more complicated and dynamic than the past and present ‘patriotic histories’ have claimed. By demonstrating so, the thesis would first like to draw attention to the instrumental feature of ethnicity and the role of the interpretation of history. As suggested by Eric Hobsbawm, ‘more history than ever is today being revised or invented by people who do not want the real past, but only a past that suits their purpose’; this holds not only in Rwanda but in other countries as well. In these circumstances, historical research should reveal the instrumental and arbitrary features of interpretations of history and ethnicity by empirically conducting research. Secondly, the thesis would like to warn of the hazards of taking an extreme approach – be it primordialism and constructivism – to understand ethnicity and its function in history. We should question a singular and simplistic interpretation of history.

Some scholars have begun to warn about the possibility of future violence. For example, Reyntjens points out that the manipulation of history has brought about structural violence in Rwanda, which is ‘still invisible to outsiders’ but is surely growing. The international project worker with whom Beckley-Zistel spoke described Rwanda as a ‘time bomb’. Elisabeth King also warns:

The exclusion of certain memories of violence is unlikely to lead to meaningful peace building in Rwanda. Many Rwandans’ memories are inconsistent with public ones and there is friction between state discourses and personal narratives … By acknowledging only a select category of memories of violence, the government is failing to address and challenge the social cleavages and exclusion that characterized Rwanda’s past and may be, moreover, fostering exclusion and social cleavages in the present … This sense of exclusion could help lay the foundations for future intergroup conflict.

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7 Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth’: 33.
8 Buckley-Zistel, ‘Nation, Narration, Unification?’: 48.
Near the very end of my stay in Rwanda, I was talking with a middle-aged Hutu woman in Kigali. A surprisingly open person, she said:

   Even though the government says there is no ethnic difference, still I can feel that the Tutsi feel superior to the Hutu. Suppressing people by power cannot solve the problems. Something happened in Rwanda almost every 20 years, in 1959, 1973 and 1994 because power cannot solve the fundamental problems of ethnicity and society. Something may happen in the near future.\(^\text{10}\)

   How should history be narrated under such circumstances and how can historical inquires contribute to encourage the understanding of others and move forward to a more peaceful world? What is needed is to try to acknowledge and understand the existence of these diverse interpretations of the past, pay heed to the complicated ways in which ethnicity has been historically constructed, seek for alternatives and try to embrace ethnic differences. The thesis hopes to serve as a springboard for dialogue to do so.

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\(^\text{10}\) Discussion with a Hutu woman in Kigali, 22 December 2011.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Extract of the Charter of the United Nations related to Trusteeship

Article 1:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

CHAPTER XI: DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.

CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.
CHAPTER XIII: THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
   a. those Members administering trust territories;
   b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
   c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
   b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
   c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
   d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
Appendix 2: Une Mise au Point (extract)²

Au seuil de son mandate, le Conseil supérieur du pays désire faire la mise au point suivante.

Dans la conjoncture politique, économique et sociale que traverse notre Pays, il est des questions qu’il faut aborder en toute franchise et des problèmes pour lesquels il faut à tout prix rompre avec l’habituelle politique du silence qui, hélas n’a été que trop pratiquée jusqu’à présent.

Le Belçique, en acceptant la tutelle de notre pays s’est assignée une lourde mais noble tâche dont elle s’est toujours acquittée fidèlement. Les bénéficiaires de ses efforts civilisateurs lui resteront reconnaisants de tant de sollicitude. Nous ne relaterons point les domaines dans lesquels elle s’est concrétisée; les faits et les réalisations sont plus éloquents.

Nous pourrions retracer les étapes parcourues avec succès mais nous préférons nous tourner vers l’avenir. A ce sujet tout observateur averti se rend compte que cet avenir exigera aussi bien de la part des tuteurs que des pupilles un ensemble de qualités impliquant une volonté dévouée, souvent désintéressée et un équilibre d’esprit favorable à une mutuelle compréhension.

Le Ruanda est arrivé à un stade qui peut être comparé à celui de l’éducation d’un enfant qu’on appelle en notre langue ‘Ilera libi’ c’est –à-dire au ‘stade de l’âge ingrat’. Nous constatons actuellement l’existence d’un malaise qui résulte de problèmes qui se posent de plus en plus impérieusement et nous tenons à préciser certains d’entre eux. Les laisser plus longtemps sous le boisseau, alors qu’ils appelant une solution urgente, serait compromettre les intérêts du Ruanda qui doivent être intimement lies a ceux de la Belgique.

L’autonomie est l’aboutissement normal de la tutelle, ceci est une vérité indéniable. Cette idée provoque chez certains une appréhension entrainant la méfiance à l’égard de ceux qui manifestant ces aspirations. N’est-ce pas mal comprendre le problème car si l’émancipation est l’inéluctable, elle n’est pas nécessairement catastrophique; au contraire elle peut être une source d’enrichissement, mutuel a divers points de vue.

Il serait malaisé de préciser dès à présent l’époque où cette autonomie pourra nous être accordée, mais notre souhait est que l’ores et déjà on nous y prépare.

Cette préparation dans notre esprit doit se concrétiser dans les problèmes de:

a) L’Enseignement
b) Une participation plus étendue au Gouvernement de notre Pays.
c) Une politique économico-sociale mieux orientée
d) L’atténuation des préjugés de couleur.

A. ENSEIGNEMENT:

Ce point est d’une importance capital car il conditionne tous les autres. Sans l’instruction l’émancipation devient un rêve utopique et tous les efforts dans d’autres domaines seraient des coups d’épée dans l’eau. En jettent un coup d’œil en arrière nous constatons, non sans amertume, que l’enseignement a été négligé sous certains ??(angles) ou plutôt a été mal oriente. L’instruction de la masse a été seule poussée, c’est pour cette raison que nous ne parlerons pas des écoles primaires quoiqu’en ce qui les concerne certaines lacunes peuvent être relevées quant au programme qui n’est pas encore complet. La formation d’instituteurs d’élite laisse encore à désirer, alors que c’est sur eux que repose toute la formation de la masse. Il faut donc de bonnes écoles normales confiées à des spécialistes, en renforçant la qualité de celles déjà existantes.

Nos remarques visent surtout l’enseignement secondaire et supérieur. …

En plus de ce qui précède et en vue de favoriser le développement du Pays nous insistons sur la nécessité d’études techniques beaucoup plus poussées.

Le problème de la création d’une Université au Ruanda est celui qui nous tient le plus à Coeur car il répond aux aspirations profondes de tout le Pays qui consentira aux plus lourds sacrifices pour l’obtenir. …

Nous comprenons le nombre et la complexité des problèmes qui se posent, mais la recherche d’une solution justifie les efforts à entreprendre dans ce domaine.

Car, si nous sommes animés d’un même souci de progresser rapidement vers l’émancipation, il faut utiliser les moyens qui s’imposent. Le souci du Gouvernement pour la solution de ce problème nous sera une garantie de sa sollicitude à notre égard et nous redonnera la confiance un moment ébranlée par des mesures désavantageuses que nous avons subis en matière d’enseignement. …

B. Une participation plus étendue au Gouvernement de notre pays:

Pour faire de l’Administration indirecte, il faut être deux et deux qui collaborent. Il est temps de repenser cette vérité énoncée par Mr. Ryckmans, notre ancien Gouverneur General, elle est plus actuelle que jamais. La collaboration ne peut exister que si le Gouvernement autochtone du pays est efficace, bien constitué et nanti de responsabilités réelles. Si l’on admet que l’élite actuelle n’est pas encore à même de mener seule sa barque politique ne possédant pas encore une habileté administrative suffisante il faut admettre cependant que l’art de gouverner s’acquiert et que c’est en marchant d’abord à quatre pattes que les petits enfants apprennent à se tenir sur leurs jambes; il est temps de faire faire aux éléments d’élite, l’apprentissage à la gérance de leurs propres affaires. Le Gouvernement autochtone, devrait être coordonné pour que son ensemble avec le Gouvernement belge ne présente pas comme, c’est le cas maintenant, l’aspect d’une pyramide incomplète, incomplète parce que le Mwami qui est à la tête du Gouvernement indigène n’a pas de services créés pour l’aider dans l’Administration du Pays. Cette situation n’est ni costumière ni de conception administrative occidentale. Il faudrait de toute urgence combler cette lacune par l’instauration de services au CAIP comme le vœu en a été exprimé par le Conseil supérieur du pays en ses 5e et 9e sessions. C’est de nouveau Mr. Ryckmans qui a dit que la responsabilité améliore les bons, l’irresponsabilité ne rend pas les mauvais moins nocifs, il n’y a qu’un moyen de les empêcher de nuire: les éliminer. …

Entre les institutions politiques autochtones et les organisations similaires du Gouvernement belge, comme entre les deux administrations elles-mêmes, il devrait s’établir une franche collaboration. Nous constatons actuellement qu’elles sont plutôt juxtaposées; que les échanges de vue pour la réalisation du bien commun sont inexistants. Les Conseils sont souvent regardés comme des organes de récrimination et des foyers d’oppositions au Gouvernement tutélaire. Les agents indigènes de son administration locale rencontrent souvent des difficultés de service quand ils font partie de ces conseils, ce qui incite les plus prudents à les éviter.

Notre souhait est qu’il y ait un ensemble plus harmonieux se concrétisant par une meilleure collaboration des conseils et des Administrations vers le progrès rapide du Pays. Etant donné que dans ce domaine comme dans tout autre, le point déterminant est le budget, il serait urgent que la participation du Gouvernement dans les payements de cadre administrative indigène soit augmentée afin que la Caisse du pays ne soit pas désavantagée. …

C. Une Politique Economico-Sociale Mieux Orientée

L’économie et les conditions matérielles ont également un rôle prépondérant à jouer dans la marche vers le progrès. Celles de notre pays sont toujours présentées sous un aspect si sombres que nous en convenons, mais qu’il est des possibilités de subsistance et d’expansion, c’est aussi vrai. Il est
en tous cas dans une situation qui pose des problèmes ardus dans le domaine économique. Certains préconisent comme solution la fédération avec le C.B. et même quelques-uns la prônent comme étant la seule salutaire pour nous. Elle ne peut être rejetée a priori, mais c’est un problème qui doit êtreurement étudié, et pas unilatéralement. Or, jusqu’ici, il faut le dire, la fédération Congo-Ruanda-Urundi nous a été présentée par la Presse sous un jour qui nous la rend, on ne peut plus suspecte pour deux raisons:

-On nous en a montré les avantages mais les inconvénients ont été soigneusement passés sous silence. Peut-on imaginer, si peu rompu à ces problèmes que l’on soit, qu’il y ait tout à gagner et point de sacrifices à consentir. Nous ne désirons pas être précipités par les promoteurs de cette thèse dans une organisation dont nous ne comprenons ni la portée ni le fonctionnement.

- Devons-nous ajouter qu’à nos yeux jusqu’ici le Congo ne présentait aucun attrait tant au point de vue politique qu’au point de vue social et culturel, pour que l’on adhère au système fédéral dont il est le pivot.

- Nous souhaitions quant à cette question, que la formation de vrais chefs, le progrès politique, aillent assez rapidement pour permettre l’éclosion d’une saine opinion qui orienterait mieux le choix d’un avenir politique et économique. Il est hors de doute que le choix tomberait sur le C.B. au moment où il pourrait offrir la meilleure solution possible au problème de cet avenir. La question doit donc être plus sûrement étudiée et un franc échange de vues admis. …

D. L’Atténuation des préjugés de couleur.

Une question essentielle qui se pose maintenant dans notre pays est sans conteste celle de relations humaines entre blancs et noirs. Le thème est souvent repris et largement diffuse par tous ceux qui se soucient de l’avenir des territoires belges d’outre-mer. …

-Il existe encore une discrimination politique prévoyant un statut du cadre indigène distinct de celui réservé aux Blancs, avec une différence tellement accentuée que l’Européen de l’échelon le plus bas, l’Agent territorial, est de loin supérieur à l’africain du grade le plus élevé, l’Agent territorial adjoint grade que d’ailleurs aucun africain dépendant de la Belgique n’est parvenu à atteindre jusqu’à présent.

- Jusqu’à ces derniers temps on objectait que cet écart était motivé par le manqué de formation et l’insuffisance de rendement du personnel africain. Des cas spécifiques sont venus démentir cette affirmation, car des éléments de valeur ayant fait plus d’études que les Agents territoriaux leur sont néanmoins hiérarchiquement subordonnés et l’écart entre leurs traitements respectifs, ne semble plus justifié. Il est aisé de se rendre compte que cette politique qui ferme toutes les portes aux intellectuels autochtones est incompatible avec le but trace par le Roi-Social: la création d’une communauté belgo-congolaise, belgo-ruando-urundienne, ou si l’on préfère d’une Fédération Belge souveraine, car communauté ou fédération suppose égalité.

- La forme la plus dangereuse de ségrégation est la discrimination législative, parce qu’elle pose une barrière infranchissable qui s’oppose à toute heureuse initiative des cœurs généreux- il y en a et contrecarre toute espèce de compromis, même désiré par la conscience générale, car la loi, malheureusement, ne change pas aussi vite que l’opinion. La législation coloniale belge ne contient pas de lois fondamentales discriminatoires si ce n’est celles favorables aux communautés africaines; Cependant cet esprit se retrouve dans des mesures d’exécution qui sont plus nombreuses qu’on ne le pense.

- Le grand problème qui se pose aujourd’hui dans notre pays à travers les relations humaines est celui de la justice sociale. En vue d’une meilleure entente, d’une collaboration plus intime, un rapprochement entre noir et européen s’impose. Or, il se trouve que ceux qui parmi nous ont le plus d’atouts pour opérer ce rapprochement, se buttent à une barrière d’ordre économique jusqu’ici infranchie. Je veux parler de ceux qui ont reçu la formation requise pour être les interlocuteurs valables qui ne peuvent atteindre l’égalité matérielle sans laquelle les relations se limitent aux
rencontres professionnelles et aux échanges de vue purement platoniques à l’ occasion de journées d’études ou de tous autres rapports intellectuels qui exigent continuellement un effort unilatéral de la part des représentants de la catégorie européenne…. 

-Pour porter remède à cette situation, des plus déplorables, des institutions antidiscriminatoires ont été envisages…. 

Conclusion

De ce qui précède il appert que l’élaboration d’un plan d’organisation coordonne entre la Belgique tutélaire et notre pays s’impose comme une nécessité. Le plan aurait le double avantage de nous montrer par quelles voies nous sommes conduits, dissiperait donc la méfiance et nous permettrait de faire connaître nos aspirations quant à l’avenir de notre pays. La composition d’une organisation devait élaborer et coordonner l’exécution de ce plan ne peut être des maintenant déterminée, il faut d’abord de longs échanges de vue entre les autorités compétentes, mais l’essentiel est qu’elle soit interraciale pour concrétiser l’ “Union” qui est l’étoile éclairant nos pas vers le but ultime de nos efforts: “Le progrès dans la véritable acceptation du mot.”
Appendix 3: Bahutu Manifesto (extract)

Le Manifeste des Bahutu: Note sur l’aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda

24 Mars 1957

Des rumeurs seront déjà parvenues à l’autorité du Gouvernement par la presse et peut-être aussi par la parole au sujet de la situation actuelle des relations muhutu-mututsi au Ruanda. Inconscientes ou non, elles touchent un problème qui nous paraît grave, problème qui pourrait déparer ou peut-être même un jour torpiller l’œuvre si grandiose que la Belgique réalise au Ruanda. Le problème racial est sans doute d’ordre intérieur mais qu’est-ce qui reste intérieur ou local à l’âge où le monde en arrive? Comment peut-il rester caché au moment où les complications politiques indigènes et européennes semblent s’affronter? Aux complications politiques, sociales et économiques s’ajoute l’élément race dont l’aigreur semble s’accentuer de plus en plus. En effet, par le canal de la culture, les avantages de la civilisation actuelle semblent se diriger carrément d’un cote,- le cote mututsi- préparant ainsi plus de difficultés dans l’avenir que ce qu’on se plait à appeler aujourd’hui ‘les problèmes qui divisent’. Il ne servirait en effet a rien de durable de solutionner le problème mututsi-belge si l’on laisse le problème fondamental mututsi-muhutu.

C’est à ce problème que nous voulons contribuer à apporter quelques éclaircissements. Il nous a paru constructif d’en montrer en quelques mots les réalités angoissantes à l’Autorité Tutéulaire qui est ici pour toute la population et non pour une caste qui représente à peine 14% des habitants.

La situation actuelle provient en grande partie de l’état créé par l’ancienne structure politico-sociale du Ruanda, en particulier le buhake, et de l’application à fond et généralisée de l’administration indirecte, ainsi que par la disparition de certaines institutions sociales anciennes qui ont été effaces sans qu’on ait permis à des institutions modernes, occidentaux correspondantes de s’établir et de compenser. Aussi serions-nous heureux de voir s’établir rapidement le syndicalisme aidé et encourager la formation d’une classe moyenne forte. La peur, le complexe d’infériorité et le besoin “atavique” d’un tuteur, attribués à l’essence du Muhutu, si tant est vrai qu’ils sont une réalité, sont des séquelles du système feudal. A supposer leur réalité, la civilisation qu’apportent les Belges n’aurait réalisé grande chose, s’il n’était fait des efforts positives pour lever effectivement ces obstacles à l’émancipation du Ruanda intégral.…

II. En Quoi Consiste le Problème Racial Indigène?

D’aucuns se sont demande s’il s’agit-là d’un conflit social ou d’un conflit racial. Nous pensons que c’est de la littérature. Dans la réalité des choses et dans les réflexions des gens, il est l’un et l’autre. On pourrait cependant le préciser: le problème est avant tout un problème de monopole politique dont dispose une race, le mututsi; monopole politique qui, étant donné l’ensemble des structures actuelles déviant un monopole économique et social; monopole politique, économique et social qui, vu les sélections de facto dans l’Enseignement, parvient à être un monopole culturel, au grand désespoir des Bahutu qui se voient condamnés à rester d’éternels manœuvres subalternes, et pis encore, après une indépendance éventuelle qu’ils auront aidé à conquérir sans savoir ce qu’ils font. Le buhake est sans doute supprème, mais il est mieux remplace par ce monopole total qui, en grande partie, occasionne les abus dont la population se plaint.

- Monopole politique.

- Monopole économique et social.

- Monopole culturel

III. Proposition de Solutions Immédiates

Quelques solutions peuvent être présentées et dont l’efficacité n’est possible que si le système politique et social actuel du pays change profondément et assez rapidement.

1) La première solution est un ‘esprit’. Qu’on abandonne la pensée que les élites ruandaises ne se trouvent que dans les rangs hamites…

2) Aux points de vue économique et social.- Nous voulons que des institutions soient créées pour aider les efforts de la population Muhutu handicaps par une administration indigène, qui semble vouloir voir le Muhutu rester dans l’indigence et donc dans l’impossibilité de réclamer l’exercice effectif de ses droits dans son pays. Nous proposons:

1. La suppression des corvées…
2. La reconnaissance légale de la propriété foncière individuelle…
3. Un Fonds de crédit rural…
4. L’union économique de l’Afrique belge et de la métropole…
5. La liberté d’expression…

3) Au point de vue politique.- Si nous sommes d’accord que l’administration mututsi actuelle participé de plus en plus au gouvernement du pays, nous person pourtant mettre en garde contre une méthode qui tout en tendant à la suppression du colonialisme blanc-noir, laisserait un colonialisme pire du hamite sur le Muhutu. Il faut à la base aplanir les difficultés qui pourraient provenir du monopole hamite sur les autres races habitant, plus nombreuses et plus anciennement, dans le pays. Nous désirons à cet effet:

1. Que lois et coutumes soient codifiées.
2. Que soit réalisée effectivement la promotion des Bahutu aux fonctions publiques (chefferies, sous-chefferies, juges).
3. Que les fonctions publiques indigènes puissant avoir une période, passée laquelle, les gens pourraient élire un autre ou réélire le sortant s’il a donné satisfaction.
4. Le retrait des chefs de province des Conseils de chefferie.
5. La composition du Conseil supérieur du pays par les députations de chefferie: chaque chefferie déléguant un nombre proportionnel à celui de ses contribuables, sans exclure les Européens qui auraient fixer définitivement leur demeure dans la chefferie.

4) Au point de vue Instruction- Les prétextes ne manquent pas bien entendu, et certains ne sont pas dépourvus de tout fondement: ils profitent d’un système favorisant systématiquement l’avancement politique et économique du hamite.

1. Nous voulons que l’enseignement soit particulièrement surveille.
2. Que l’octroi des bourses d’études (dont une bonne partie est de provenance des impôts de la population en grande partie Muhutu) soit surveille par le Gouvernement tutélaire, de façon que la non plus les Bahutu ne soient pas le tremplin d’un monopole qui les tienne éternellement dans une infériorité sociale et politique insupportable.
3. Quant à l’enseignement supérieur, nous pensons que les Etablissements se trouvant dans l’Afrique belge suffisent, mais qu’il faut y faire admettre le plus grand nombre possible, sans s’opposer toutefois à ce qu’il y ait des éléments très capables qui suivent des spécialités dans les universités métropolitaines.

En résumé, nous voulons la promotion intégrale et collective du Muhutu; les intéressés y travaillent déjà, dans les délais que peuvent leur laisser les corvées diverses. Mais nous réclamons aussi une action d’en haut positive et plus décide. La Belgique a fait beaucoup plus dans ce sens, il faut le reconnaître, mais il ne faut pas que son humanité s’arrête sur la route. Ce n’est pas que nous veillions un piétinement sur place: nous sommes d’accord que le Conseil Supérieur Tutsi puisse participer progressivement et plus effectivement aux affaires du pays; mais plus fortement encore, nous réclamons du Gouvernement tutélaire et de l’Administration tutsi qu’une action plus positive et sans tergiversations soit menée pour l’émancipation économique et politique du Muhuta de la remorque hamite traditionnelle ...

Les gens ne sont d’ailleurs pas sans s’être rendu compte de l’appui de l’administration indirecte au monopole mututsi. Aussi pour mieux surveiller ce monopole de race, nous nous opposons énergiquement, du moins pour le moment, à la suppression dans les pièces d’identité officielles ou privées des mentions ‘muhutu’, ‘mututsi’, ‘mutwa’. Leur suppression risqué de favoriser encore avantage la sélection en la voilant et en empêchant la loi statistique de pouvoir établir la vérité des faits. Personne n’a dit d’ailleurs que c’est le nom qui ennuie le Muhuta; ce sont les privilèges d’un monopole favorise, lequel risqué de réduire la majorité de la population dans une infériorité systématique et une sous-existence immémorée.

C’est une volonté constructive et un sain désir de collaboration qui nous a poussés à projeter une lumière de plus sur un problème si grave devant les yeux de qui aime authentiquement ce pays; problème dans lequel les responsabilités de la tutrice Belgique ne sont que trop engagés. Ce n’est pas du tout en révolutionnaires (dans le mauvais sens du mot) mais en collaborateurs conscients de notre devoir social que nous avons tenu à mettre en garde les autorités contre les dangers que présentera sûrement tôt ou tard le maintien en fait- même simplement d’une façon négative- d’un monopole raciste sur le Ruanda. Quelques voix du peuple ont déjà signalé cette anomalie; la résistance passive, encore dans l’attente de l’intervention du Blanc tuteur, risqué de s’approfondir devant les abus d’un monopole qui n’est plus accepte; qu’elle serve d’ores et déjà d’un signe.

Les Autorités voudront donc voir dans cette brève note, en quelque sorte systématisées, les courants d’idées et les désirs concrets d’un peuple auquel nous appartenons, avec lequel nous partageons la vie et les refoulements opérés par une atmosphère tendant à obscurir la voie à une véritable démocratisation du pays; celle-ci, envisage par la généreuse Belgique est vivement souhaitée par la population avide d’une atmosphère politico-sociale viable et favorable à l’initiative et au travail pour un mieux-être et pour la promotion intégrale et collective du peuple.

(Se) Maximilien NIYONZIMA                        Godefroid SENTAMA
Grégoire KAYIBANDA                              Silvestre MUNYAMBONERA
Claver NDAHAYO                                  Joseph SIBOMANA
Isidore NZEYIMANA                                Joseph HABYARIMANA
Calliope MULINDAHAHABI.
Appendix 4: UN Resolutions on Rwanda

A/RES/1064(XI). 26/02/1957

Attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories

The General Assembly,

Taking into account that, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System is the progressive development of the populations of Trust Territories towards self-government or independence,

Taking into account that, under General Assembly resolution 289 A (IV) of 21 November 1949, the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration is to attain complete independence by 1960, and that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1044 (X) of 13 December 1956, the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration is to attain independence in 1957 through union with an independent Gold Coast,

Recalling that the General Assembly, in its resolution 558 (VI) of 18 January 1952, invited the Administering Authority of each Trust Territory to determine the period of time in which it was expected that the Trust Territory concerned should attain self-government or independence, and also taking into account that this question has been repeatedly discussed at subsequent session of the General Assembly,

Attaching great importance to the fixing of definite time-limits for the termination of trusteeship in Trust Territories and for the granting of self-government or independence to the peoples of these Territories,

1. Recommends that the Administering Authorities take the necessary measures to ensure that the Trust Territories of Tanganyika, the Cameroons under British administration, the Cameroons under French administration, Togoland under French administration and Ruanda-Urundi achieve self-government or independence at an early date;
2. Invites the Administering Authorities to estimate the period of time required for the attainment of self-government or independence by all Trust Territories, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 558 (VI) of 18 January 1952 and the present resolution;
3. Invites the Administering Authorities to submit appropriate information to the Trusteeship Council at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions on the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 above;
4. Requests the Trusteeship Council to report to the General Assembly at its twelfth session on the progress made in implementing the present resolution.
A/RES/1413(XIV). 05/12/1959

Attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories

The General Assembly,

Considering that the basic objective of the International Trusteeship System under the Charter of the United Nations is the progressive development of the inhabitants of Trust Territories towards self-government or independence,

Recalling its resolutions 558 (VI) of 18 January 1952, 1064 (XI) of 26 February 1957, 1207 (XII) of 13 December 1957 and 1274 (XIII) of 5 December 1958,

Noting with satisfaction that the dates for the attainment of independence of Togoland under French administration, the Cameroons under French administration and Somaliland under Italian administration have already been set,

Noting further that the time-table proposed by the Administering authority provides for the attainment of independence by Western Samoa under New Zealand administration in the course of 1961, and that processes leading to the termination of trusteeship over the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration in 1961 have already been set in motion,

Believing that the formulation of plans and targets in advance can assist in the acceleration of the progress of the inhabitants of Trust Territories towards independence,

Considering therefore that at this stage it is both necessary and desirable to foresee the course of developments leading to the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in the near future,

Having examined part I, chapter V, of the report of the Trusteeship Council,

1. Requests the Administering Authorities concerned to propose, after consultation with the representatives of the inhabitants, for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifteenth session, time-tables and targets for the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in the near future;

2. Invites the Administering Authorities concerned to formulate, in respect of the remaining Trust Territories, early successive intermediate targets and dates in the fields of political, economic, social and educational development so as to create, as soon as possible, favourable conditions for the attainment of self-government or independence;

3. Requests the Trusteeship Council, in its examination of the annual reports submitted by the Administering Authorities and in formulating the terms of reference of the 1960 visiting mission to Trust Territories in Africa, to keep in view the provisions of the present resolution.
A/RES/1419(XIV). 05/12/1959

Plans of political reforms for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi

The General Assembly,

Having taken note of the statement of the Administering Authority concerning the political reforms envisaged for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration,

Having taken note of the petitions and communications dealing with the recent outbreak of violence in the Territory,

Having taken note also of the statement of the Administering Authority on the incidents leading to the outbreak of violence which have resulted in the sending of troops to the Territory,

Having heard the views of the petitioners,

1. Draws the attention of the Trusteeship Council to the statements of the petitioners on the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;

2. Requests the Trusteeship Council to consider in detail the plans of political reforms envisaged for the Territory by the Administering Authority and to include the Council’s observations and recommendations on the plans in its report to the General Assembly at its fifteenth session, taking into account the provisions of Assembly resolution 1413 (XIV) on the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories;

3. Further requests the Trusteeship Council to dispatch its 1960 visiting mission to Trust Territories in East Africa early in 1960 so as to make it possible for the mission to report to the Council, at its twenty-sixth session, on the conditions and causes of the recent disturbances in the Territory.
Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

And to this end

Declares that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
A/RES/1579 (XV) 20 December 1960

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi

The General Assembly,

Having received the reports of the Trusteeship council and of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi called for under General Assembly resolution 1419 (XIV) of 5 December 1959,

Noting from the report of the Trusteeship Council that it is the Administering Authority’s intention to hold early in 1961 elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and under the supervision of the United Nations, for the purpose of constituting national assemblies of Ruanda and Urundi,

Noting further the statement of the Administering Authority that the elections are scheduled to begin on 15 January 1961, and its invitation to the United Nations to send a mission to Ruanda-Urundi about 15 December 1960 to see the actual implementation of the arrangements for the elections, such as the composition of the electoral rolls, the course of the election campaign and the organization of the poll,

Being conscious of its responsibility to ensure that the supervision of the elections by the United Nations is effective, and that the elections, which will furnish the basis for the Territory’s independence, are held in proper conditions so that their results are completely free of doubt or dispute,

Having heard the views of the petitioners belonging to various political parties and groups of Ruanda-Urundi,

1. Considers that the necessary conditions and atmosphere must be brought about expeditiously to ensure that the legislative elections, which will lead to the establishment of national democratic institutions and furnish the basis for the national independence of Ruanda-Urundi in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, take place in an atmosphere of peace and harmony;

2. Urges the Administering Authority to implement immediately measures of full and unconditional amnesty and to abolish the emergency regime so as to enable political workers and leaders who are in exile or imprisoned in the Territory to resume normal, democratic political activity before the elections;

3. Considers that the expeditious return and rehabilitation of thousands of victims of recent disturbances in Ruanda who were compelled to take refuge away from their homes in Ruanda or abroad will assist the process of reconciliation, and urges the Administering Authority and the local authorities concerned to adopt all possible means to that end;

4. Recommends that a conference fully representative of political parties, attended by United Nations observers, should be held early in 1961, before the elections, in order to compose the differences between the parties and to bring about national harmony;

5. Appeals to all parties and political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi to exert their efforts to achieve an atmosphere of understanding, peace and harmony for the good of their Territory and people as a whole on the eve of independence;

6. Calls upon the Administering Authority to refrain from using the Territory as a base, whether for internal or external purposes, for the accumulation of arms or armed forces not strictly required for the purpose of maintaining public order in the Territory;
7. Recommends that the elections scheduled to be held in January 1961 should be postponed to a date to be decided on at the resumed fifteen session of the General Assembly in the light of the recommendations of the Commission referred to in paragraph 8 below, so that, in addition to the fulfilment of the purpose of the preceding paragraphs of the present resolution, the arrangements for the elections can be completed under the supervision of the United Nations;

8. Decides to set up a United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, composed of three members, who will be assisted by observers and staff to be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Commission;

9. Requests the Commission to proceed immediately to Ruanda-Urundi to perform the following tasks on behalf of the United Nations;

(a) To supervise the elections to be held in Ruanda-Urundi in 1961 on the basis of direct, universal adult suffrage, and the preparatory measures preceding them, such as the compilation of the electoral rolls, the conduct of the election campaign and the organization of a system of balloting which will ensure complete secrecy;

(b) To follow the progress of events in the Territory before and after the elections, to lend its advice and assistance, as appropriate, with a view to advancing peace and harmony in Ruanda-Urundi, and to report to the Trusteeship Council or the General Assembly, as necessary;

10. Requests the Commission to submit an interim report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly as its resumed fifteenth session;

11. Endorses the observation of the Trusteeship Council that, in view of the essential community of interests and the facts of history and geography, the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the evolution of a single, united and composite State, with such arrangements for the internal autonomy of Ruanda and Burundi as may be agreed upon by their representatives.
Question of the Mwami

The General Assembly,

Considering that a division of opinion has arisen in Ruanda-Urundi with regard to the institution of monarchy and with regard to the person of the present Mwami of Ruanda,

Considering further that such a situation poses a constitutional question of far-reaching importance which should be settled in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people of the Territory,

Noting that, on several occasions, the Mwami has stated his desire to be a democratic and constitutional sovereign,

Noting further that the Mwami of Ruanda, in a memorandum to the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, has accepted the idea of a referendum to decide this question,

Having perused the statement of the Mwami to the Fourth Committee,

1. Note with regret that the Administering Authority has arbitrarily suspended the powers of the Mwami of Ruanda and has not allowed him to return to Ruanda to resume his duties as Mwami;

2. Requests the Administering Authority to revoke the measures adopted by it to suspend the powers of the Mwami, and to facilitate his return to Ruanda to enable him to function as Mwami pending the ascertainment of the wishes of the people on this question;

3. Decides that a referendum should be held under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi established under General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV) of 20 December 1960, in order to ascertain the wishes of the people concerning the institution of the Mwami, and if necessary, the present Mwami of Ruanda;

4. Requests the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, after studying the situation of the spot, to submit to the General Assembly, at its resumed fifteenth session, recommendations concerning the timing of the referendum and the question to be put therein.
A/RES/1605(XV), 21 April 1961

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the general Assembly’s Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,

Recalling its resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) of 20 December 1960 concerning the future of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi,

Having received the interim report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed under resolution 1579(XV),

Regretting the failure of the Administering Authority to implement fully and effectively the terms of resolution 1579(XV), the resistance to such implementation by the local representative of the Administering Authority in Ruanda-Urundi and their failure to co-operate fully and effectively with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi,

Regretting the de facto recognition by the Administering Authority of governmental bodies in Ruanda which were established by irregular and unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative of all segments of the population in the absence of free and fair elections on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage, as envisaged in resolution 1579 (XV),

Regretting also the setting up of governmental bodies in Urundi on the basis of communal elections, contrary to the assurances given by the Administering Authority that communal elections were purely administrative and had no political character,

Noting the several statements of the representatives of the Administering Authority conveying assurances that it will co-operate fully with the United Nations in Ruanda-Urundi,

Having heard the views of the petitioners from Ruanda-Urundi,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi for their conscientious discharge of the duties entrusted to them under General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV);

2. Calls upon the Government of Belgium as the Administering Authority to ensure that the provisions of resolution 1579 (XV) are fully implemented by its representatives in Ruanda-Urundi before the legislative elections;

3. Recognizes that the Government of Belgium is alone responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and accountable to the United Nations, and that its responsibilities as Administering Authority cannot in any way be abdicated to local political bodies and leaders until after appropriate democratic institutions have been set up and the Trusteeship Agreement has been terminated, all with the approval of the United Nations;

4. Considers it necessary that, pending the establishment of popular governments on the basis of the legislative elections to be held in 1961, broad-based caretaker governments be constituted immediately in both parts of the Trust Territory to attend to current affairs of administration and to act in strict conformity with the obligations of the Administering Authority for the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly;
5. Declares that it is clearly the obligation and the responsibility of the Administering Authority to create the necessary conditions and atmosphere for the proper conduct of the national elections and not to permit any local authorities to impede the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

6. Decides that the referendum on the question of the Mwami, contemplated in resolution 1580 (XV), and the legislative elections in Ruanda-Urundi should be held in the month of August 1961 on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage, under the supervision of the United Nations, and that these be organized by the Administering Authority in full consultation with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the actual dates to be fixed, after mutual consultation, in the light of the prevailing circumstances;

7. Decides further that the questions to be put at the referendum on the question of the Mwami in Ruanda should be the following:

   “1. Do you wish to retain the institution of the Mwami in Ruanda?

   “2. If so, do you wish Kigeli V to continue as the Mwami of Ruanda?”;

8. Requests the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, composed of three members elected by the General Assembly on 20 December 1960, hereafter to be designated United Nations Commissioners, to return to Ruanda-Urundi at the earliest possible time to assist and advise the Administering Authority in the full and proper implementation of resolution 1579 (XV) and the present resolution, and to perform the other tasks entrusted to it;

9. Noting the information given by the representative of the Administering Authority concerning measures of amnesty already implemented, and recommends that:

   (a) Full and unconditional amnesty, as envisaged in resolution 1579 (XV), be immediately granted by the Administering Authority;

   (b) The few remaining cases which, in the Administering Authority’s view, are guilty of “very grave crimes” be examined by a Special Commission composed of the representatives of three Member States to be elected by the General Assembly, with a view to securing their release from prison or return from abroad in the full implementation of the Assembly’s recommendation concerning amnesty not later than two months before the national elections;

10. Notes the observations contained in paragraphs 199-203 of the interim report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and calls upon the Administering Authority to observe strictly its international obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement;

11. Requests the Administering Authority to ensure that the material conditions essential to the successful discharge by the United Nations Commissioners of their responsibilities, such as housing, office space, travel facilities, information and the free use of official broadcasting facilities are provided, and that the local authorities co-operate fully with them;

12. Requests the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session;

13. Decides to maintain this item on the agenda of the present session, without closing the debate thereon, and authorizes the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, in the event that the performance of its duties is hindered through deliberate obstruction or lack of the requisite co-operation from any quarter, to return to United Nations Headquarters and request the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the Assembly immediately to consider further measures essential to the discharge of the United Nations obligations with respect to the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;
14. *Calls upon* the Administering Authority to rescind Legislative Order No.221/296 of 25 October 1960, so as to ensure that there is no unwarranted interference with the exercise of public freedom and that no persons may be removed or detailed without recourse to due process of law;

15. *Reiterates* its conviction that the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that Territory to independence as a single, united and composite State;

16. *Considers* that the full implementation of all the provisions of the present resolution will enable the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to consider the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the earliest possible date.
The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1743(XVI) of 23 February 1962 and the other resolutions on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi, as well as its resolution 63 (I) of 13 December 1946,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed under paragraph 2 of resolution 1743 (XV),

Noting that the efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda-Urundi did not succeed,

Welcoming the Agreement on Economic Union concluded between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at the Conference at Addis Ababa held under the auspices of the Commission,

Taking into account the fact that the bulk of the Administering Authority’s forces still remain the Territory notwithstanding the objective, stated in paragraph 3(e) of resolution 1743 (XVI), of securing the rapid withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces before independence,

Expressing its satisfaction at the favourable trends towards reconciliation noted by the Commission in its report, in particular, in Rwanda, the participation in the Government of two members of the Opposition,

Having heard the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and the petitioners,

Recalling the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples embodied in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Taking note of the desire of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to attain independence as separate States on 1 July 1962, the date envisaged in paragraph 7 of resolution 1743 (XVI),

Taking into account the declaration by the Government of Burundi that from the date of the proclamation of independence it will not agree to the presence of foreign troops on its soil, and the declaration by the Government of Rwanda that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement will make illegal the presence of Belgian troops in the territory of the Republic,

Noting the declaration of the Administering Authority that it will withdraw its forces from Rwanda and Burundi in accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly and the Governments concerned,

Recalling that after independence Rwanda and Burundi will enjoy sovereign rights,

Bearing in mind the needs which will confront Rwanda and Burundi in all fields when they accede to independence,

Recalling its resolution 1415 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on assistance to territories emerging from a trust status and to newly independent States,

1. Expresses its warm appreciation to the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, 1962, for the way it has performed its tasks;
2. Decides, in agreement with the Administering Authority, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946 in respect of Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July 1962, on which date Rwanda and Burundi shall emerge as two independent and sovereign States;

3. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw and evacuate its forces still remaining in Rwanda and Burundi, and that, as of 1 July 1962, the Belgian troops in process of evacuation will no longer have any role to play and that the evacuation must be completed by 1 August 1962, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi;’

4. Requests the Secretary-General to send immediately to Rwanda and Burundi a representative together with a team of experts whose functions shall be:

(a) To supervise the withdrawal and evacuation of Belgian forces in accordance with this resolution;

(b) To help the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to secure the implementation of the Agreement on Economic Union reached between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at Addis Ababa on 19 April 1962;

(c ) To study, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in the light of the recommendations made by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the need for technical and economic assistance in Rwanda and Burundi, so as to enable the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon, together with his recommendation, to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session;

(d) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the organization of their administrative cadres and other related matters;

(e) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the development and training of internal security forces;

5. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1735 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 on foreseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1962, to enter into commitments not exceeding $2 million for the purpose of such emergency measures as may be required to ensure the continuation of essential services in the two countries, pending the consideration by the General Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 4(c) above;

6. Requests the United Nations Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board and other United Nations bodies, as well as the specialized agencies, to give special consideration to the needs of Rwanda and Burundi;

7. Expresses the hope that all Member States of the United Nations will render such technical and economic assistance as they can to the new States of Rwanda and Burundi;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the implementation of this resolution;

9. Recommends that, after the proclamation of independence on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi should be admitted as Members of the United Nations under Article 4 of the Charter.
### Appendix 5: Main Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Main leaders</th>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Region of Influence</th>
<th>Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APROSOMA</td>
<td>Joseph Habyarimana</td>
<td>November 1957</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Hutu radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gitera</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Munyangaju</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM(PARMEHUTU)</td>
<td>Grégoire Kayibanda</td>
<td>October 1959</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Hutu moderates (originally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>F. Rukeba</td>
<td>September 1959</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Tutsi conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Rwagasana</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively all over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Reberho</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Kayihura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Mungarulire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADER</td>
<td>P. Bwanakweri</td>
<td>October 1959</td>
<td>Kigali</td>
<td>Tutsi progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Ndazaro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Rwigemera</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Politicians and Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN SG (NY)</th>
<th>Foreign Affairs (Brussels)</th>
<th>Min of Colonies (Brussels)</th>
<th>Govonor General (Usumbura)</th>
<th>Resident of Rwanda (Kigali)</th>
<th>Head of Rwanda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dag Hammarskjöld</td>
<td>Paul-Henri Spaak</td>
<td>Pierre Wigny</td>
<td>Léo Pétillon</td>
<td>Georges Sandrart</td>
<td>Mutara Rudahigwa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | | | | | |
| André Dequae | Alfred Claës Boïnaert | | | | |

| | | | | | |
| Alfred Claës Boïnaert | Jean-Paul Harroy | | | | |

| | | | | | |
| Pierre Wigny | Léo Pétillon (1958) | Ministere du Congo Belge et du RU | | | |
| (1958-1961) | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
| U Thant | Paul-Henri Spaak | Maurice Van Hemelrijk | | | |

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### Appendix 7: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Place of Interviews</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Mugesera (born there)</td>
<td>03/11/2011</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernedette</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Mugesera (born there)</td>
<td>03/11/2011</td>
<td>unknown (younger than 90)</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Nyarubuye (born there)</td>
<td>05/11/2011</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Nyarubuye (born in the west and came here in 1995)</td>
<td>05/11/2011</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kazo (born there)</td>
<td>08/11/2011</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mugesera (born there)</td>
<td>10/11/2011</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Rukumberi (born there)</td>
<td>15/11/2011</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kibungo (born in Kibuye, he went into exile in the 1960s. He returned to Rwanda after the genocide and moved to Kibungo)</td>
<td>17/11/2011</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Jarama (born in Butare)</td>
<td>22/11/2011 05/12/2011</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Jarama (born in Butare)</td>
<td>22/11/2011 05/12/2011</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>H</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louis</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mutenderi (born there)</td>
<td>28/11/2011</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maurice</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mutenderi (born there)</td>
<td>28/11/2011</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kibungo (born there)</td>
<td>06/12/2011</td>
<td>62</td>
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