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What Is The Role Of The Third Sector In Implementing Resilience?

A Case Study Of Scottish Emergency Management 2008-10

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PhD Management
MSc (Research) Management
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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This Thesis presents ethnographic data collected through multi-sector, multi-level purposive sampling in a longitudinal qualitative case study between 2008 and 2010. A pilot study had discovered the changing role of government in building capacity for responses to civil emergencies, against a context of changing risks and resources for UK Emergency Management. The Thesis explored the increasing involvement of non-statutory agencies by focussing on the ‘Third Sector’: voluntary, charitable, faith, or community organisations and communities. The Thesis reports (1) the relationship between multi-organisational arrangements and resilience, (2) the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience, and (3) the role of the Third Sector in community resilience.

(1) The data suggested that the process of implementing resilience involved operationalising the resilience concept as a philosophy for Integrated Emergency Management [IEM], and consequent changes to the governance and organisation of Scottish and UK emergency management. The research linked the role of the Third Sector in resilience and community resilience to the dynamic between preparedness and response. It explored (2) the impact of implementing resilience on organising and organisations in the Third Sector, and (3) policy development and capacity-building for an emergent role in community resilience.

The Thesis makes a distinctive contribution to the discipline of Public Management. Firstly, the findings represent a novel empirical and theoretical contribution regarding the role of the Third Sector in community resilience and in the resilience paradigm of emergency management. This data is used to extend existing theory about the proactive role of Third Sector organisations in collaborative emergency management. Secondly, the Thesis argues that the meso-level of analysis is neglected in the emerging field of resilience studies. Network and collaboration theory in Public Management are used to make a novel theoretical contribution, describing the relationship between multi-organisational arrangements and the operationalisation of ‘resilient’ emergency management. Thirdly, the Thesis contributes to the study of collaborative emergency management from this longitudinal perspective. This data is used to extend our understanding of (a) the applicability of Public Management theory to this context and (b) the relevance of data from this context to theories of collaborative public management.
Dedicated to Dr Gaby Porter

Thanks to policy and practice members of the Scottish civil contingencies community for their contributions to this project.

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Part 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Section 1.1 Introducing this research project

“Simply put it is not possible to devise a solution to something unknown... Resilience building in this context is a process that recognises preparedness as an essential prerequisite to cope with increasing variability and extreme events and adjust to a different future... This requires a significant shift in political culture, a move to an enabling policy environment that actively encourages resilience building”.

(O’Brien 2008a:5)

Background
This research project was a response to increasing climatic variability.

When it began in 2008, potential impacts of failing to prepare for climate change could not be acknowledged for the political expediency of maintaining the status quo. Simultaneously, environmental groups and civil society were unable to begin a societal conversation about adaptation to climate change because of the focus on trying to raise awareness of the need for mitigation activity and promoting the necessary behavioural change in citizens of advanced economic nations. Investigating how to manage the uncertainties generated by a changing risk environment meant understanding institutional and social adaptation at the level of organisations, and how this interacted with policy, government, and governance. But social and environmental science was mired in descriptions of the systemic problems, comparisons with historical data, and what the philosophies of language might mean for our capacity to adapt.

The discipline of Public Management recommended itself, as the nexus between policy and practice. The policy context of emergency management seemed apt, following severe flooding in the UK during 2007, and its exposure of the need for risk awareness and community preparedness. Looking to the future, how was the emergency management sector preparing to manage the impacts of increasing climatic variability?
A real-world context

The UK is in a unique position in terms of planning for future emergencies given its historically low levels of risk. There is low risk awareness - our social responses are marked by a sense of 'the unexpected' (O'Brien 2008b). This contrasts with the context for emergency management in many other nations, either from developed nations that experience more frequent or more severe natural hazards (e.g. the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand), those more prone to the effects of natural hazards (e.g. the Netherlands) or developing nations where communities are expected to provide their own responses by virtue of geographical isolation or scarcity of government resource.

This Thesis considers the involvement of the 'Third Sector' - voluntary, charitable, faith organisations and communities - in Scottish emergency management. Official evaluations of flood responses in 2007 suggested that increasing the preparedness of communities would free up public services' resources to assist the most vulnerable in society in the event of an emergency in the UK (The Pitt Review 2008). A 2008 qualitative pilot study explored the role of community and voluntary organisations in Scottish flood response. It revealed an emergent policy agenda: "community resilience". It also revealed that involvement of the Third Sector in UK emergency management differed from its role in service delivery and policy implementation in other contexts.

In 2008, respondents from the Scottish ‘civil contingencies community’ spoke of policy change as a response to changing threats. Evolving implementation of policy, designed around the concept of ‘resilience’, had been accompanied by increasing “maturity” in the emergency management sector. Practitioners were engaged in a process of capacity building for new relationships and new ways of working. But what was the role of the Scottish and UK governments in policy implementation? And how did the process of policy implementation affect the delivery of emergency response as a public service?
Theoretical context: ‘collaborative emergency management’

Studies of emergency management in Public Management and Administration have documented the coordination of inter-organisational and cross-sector collaboration through networks (McEntire 2002; Moynihan 2005; Wise and McGuire 2009); with attendant issues of management (Moynihan 2007, 2009a; McGuire 2009) and performance (Kiefer and Montjoy 2006; Wise 2006; Boin and 't Hart 2010). Third Sector organisations are one type of actor in emergency response networks, with particular integration issues (Waugh and Streib 2006).

Previous empirical studies suggest effective emergency response is dependent on not only planning but preparedness activities, it is a "paradox":

"On one hand, emergency response requires meticulous organization and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous. Emergency managers have to innovate, adapt, and improvise because plans, regardless of how well done, seldom fit circumstances”.

(Waugh and Streib 2006:132)

Familiarity between agencies (contact or awareness) established prior to events increases the likelihood that multiple agencies will effectively cooperate and coordinate under crisis conditions by developing trust in relationships (Moynihan 2007; 2008; 2009; Brudney and Gazley 2009; Boin and 't Hart 2010). But if co-operation is dependent upon prior familiarity, this provides a barrier to the “emergent” involvement of ‘new’ actors in emergency response – whether ad-hoc actors in the operational, emergency phase, or non-traditional actors in the preparedness phase.

Emergency management has to contend not only with the problems of integration and inevitable emergence during the ‘crisis’ phase of events (see Drabek and McEntire 2002; 2003; Buck et al. 2006), but also with citizen and community ‘convergence’ (Quarantelli et al. 1983; Barsky et al. 2007). Organising and managing emergency response is thus evolving from ‘command and control’ to more flexible, adaptive, approaches (Wise 2006).
Contribution

This Thesis argues that previous studies of the involvement of non-statutory actors in emergency response, particularly those actors associated with the ‘Third’ (community or voluntary) sector, have neglected the process of capacity building. Most research designs utilise post-hoc evaluations of events (cf. Brudney and Gazley 2009), and abstract from these to make the connection between preparedness and response. This project instead explored the process of capacity building for future events: how preparedness enables response.

The topic of this Thesis extends from the 2008 pilot study. It explores the role of government in building capacity for responses to civil emergencies in the context of changing risks and resources for UK emergency management. The research project remained focussed on the role of the Third Sector, and examined this through the involvement of non-statutory organisations in existing networks of statutory (mandated) providers of emergency response.

This allowed the research project to move beyond scholarly and policy rhetoric about the benefits of Third Sector involvement in emergency response, and construct a case study in which to examine

• the longitudinal process by which this occurred, and
• structures and mechanisms used to build capacity for new relationships.

In the absence of prior empirical data about the role of the Third Sector in UK emergency response, an exploratory approach was used. Between 2008-2010, process insights were generated by sampling across scales, sectors, and time.

The case study investigates the operationalisation of “Community Resilience” as a concept and ‘resilience’ as the philosophy of UK emergency management through asking:

What Is The Role Of The Third Sector In Implementing Resilience?
The Thesis makes a unique contribution to the Public Management discipline:

• Firstly, the findings represent a novel empirical and theoretical contribution regarding the role of the Third Sector in community resilience and in the resilience paradigm of emergency management. This data is used to extend existing theory about the proactive role of Third Sector organisations in collaborative emergency management.

• Secondly, the Thesis argues that the meso-level of analysis is neglected in the emerging field of resilience studies. Network and collaboration theory in Public Management are used to make a novel theoretical contribution, describing the relationship between multi-organisational arrangements and the operationalisation of ‘resilient’ emergency management.

• Thirdly, the Thesis contributes to the study of collaborative emergency management from this longitudinal perspective. This data is used to extend our understanding of (a) the applicability of Public Management theory to this context and (b) the relevance of data from this context to theories of collaborative public management.

**Originality**

The secondary aims of the research project were to contribute to an emerging debate in theory, policy, and practice. In order to generate theory on a novel topic an ‘ideal type’ model was used. To collect data contemporaneously to policy implementation and development on this topic, the researcher acted reflexively to conduct a piece of ‘uninvited action research’ in a ‘closed network’, necessitating an increasingly ethnographic approach. The approach and findings were validated during the data collection, culminating in the researcher co-designing a policy development workshop involving relevant practitioners and Third Sector organisations. The challenges and benefits of this activity, its impacts - and its limitations - are critically evaluated throughout.
Section 1.2 Background: The Third Sector in Scotland

The ‘Third Sector’ includes voluntary, community, and faith organisations, alongside communities. The Third Sector in Scotland includes an estimated 45,000 voluntary organisations, approximately half of which are registered as charities. In 2011, their annual turnover was over £4.5bn (SCVO 2012).

The Third Sector in the UK has historically had a close relationship with social policy (Harris and Rochester 2001). Considering the post-war period, Young (2000) classifies the role of the Third Sector as ‘supplementary’ to the public service delivery functions of government following the establishment of the welfare state (:159). Deakin (1995) describes how reforms in response to the failings of social policy between 1945-1992 introduced partnerships between Government and the sector to public service delivery. Before post-1979 welfare reforms, partnerships had been predicated on a number of assumptions about the public sector, but a consensus for the legitimacy of collaborative working grew during the last two decades of the twentieth century (Diamond 2006:279). The language of ‘partnerships’ represented the increasingly close Government-Third Sector relationship after 1979 (Deakin 2001).

While ‘partnership’ rhetoric espouses the benefits of collaboration, it was economic rational choice theories (Hill 1997) that led to their emergence in the decentralised quasi-markets created by post-1979 public sector reforms. The Thatcher administration ‘rolled back’ “the frontiers of the State” through a maximum decentralisation of the state’s responsibilities for public service delivery, combined with tight centralised control over the mechanisms of policy-making and regulation (Deakin 1995:54). The emergence of welfare pluralism in this case was designed along market principles, fitting with its ideological grounding in public choice theory. For the voluntary sector this meant an increase in direct funding, dependent on engagement with the competitive tendering practices of quasi-markets within social services, power
struggles, and reductions in the intermediary function of its ‘natural partner’
Post-1979, Third Sector organisations were revitalised by the marketisation of
public service delivery and the relationship with Government in this period was
the failings of competitive tendering and a contract culture in this relationship,
and the later ‘Deakin Report’ (NCVO, 1996) was influential in shaping the policy
agenda of the post-1997 ‘New Labour’ period (Plowden 2003). Combining the
social values of the 1980s and 1990s (Bovaird and Loffler 2003), the ‘New
Labour’ administration elected in 1997 also conceived of a shrunken state with
devolved responsibility, but sought to transfer power to local agents of its
devolved processes. Scotland became a devolved administration in 1999.

In Scotland, the ‘partnership’ approach had assumed a normative dominance
since the 1990s as a ‘superior’ way to meet “the challenges of public sector
management and governance in Scottish cities and towns”, with a
complementary role for the Third Sector as a vehicle for rural development
(Carley 2006:250). Local government reform between 1997-2003 changed the
Government–Third Sector relationship again (Fyfe et al. 2006). Competitive
tendering was abolished and replaced by ‘Best Value’ as a regulatory
mechanism (Mackie 2005). A statutory duty was created to implement
community planning in partnership with citizens and civil society. Community
planning emphasised not only governance structures but also “processes and
behaviours”, requiring local authorities to facilitate participation appropriate to
local circumstances (letting them “evolve”), to ensure engagement with
mandatory’ Community Planning Partnerships’ [CPPs] (see Carley 2006).
Scottish CPPs and England’s ‘Local Strategic Partnerships’ [LSPs] (Johnson and
Osborne 2003; Wilson 2008) were designed to be the ‘partnership of
partnerships’ within the local area (OECD 2006), to reduce “partnership fatigue”
and overcome its persistent challenges (Carley 2006:256). This position, at the
centre of local government reform and the emerging paradigm of ‘community
governance’, was a unique opportunity for the Third Sector “to influence the direction and contents of local community services across a range of fields” (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002:57). The opportunity reflected the new status of the Third Sector, “surpassing its institutional standing in the postwar settlement” and borrowing from the governance regimes of other Western European nations (Bode 2006:350). Its role in local government was regulated in England by the Voluntary Sector Compact in 1998 and in Scotland by the revised Scottish Compact in 2004. The implementation of local compacts had been hampered by the mismatch between a neo-corporatist policy network and “independent organisational constituencies” still present at the local level (Osborne and McLaughlin 2004:576), “without action to maintain progress ‘momentum will be lost and confidence that the rhetoric of partnership can work in practice will ebb away’” (Carrington 2002:12-13; cited in Plowden 2003:425). Later policies marked a bifurcation of these agendas and a reduction in holism (Osborne and McLaughlin 2004). Partnerships seemed to be confined to the principal-agent relations of public service delivery rather than the principal-principal relationships seemingly offered by the potential for co-governance of public services. Unstable funding led Third Sector organisations [TSOs] to increasingly align with the probable direction of future policy as a strategy for organisational survival. This had dangers, related both to short-term changes in the policy environment (Harris 2001) and isomorphic tendencies associated with long-term funding (Osborne and McLaughlin 2004); instability privileged larger TSOs that could absorb shifts in policy direction.

The 2007 ‘Concordat’ between Scottish Government and local government “sets out the terms of a new relationship between the Scottish Government and local government, based on mutual respect and partnership” (Scottish Government and COSLA 2007). It was a regulatory mechanism enabling the further devolution of power to the local level. Single Outcome Agreements (SOAs) were designed as the contractual bind that supported progress at national level through improvement in outcomes at the local level. This related to the existing
Scottish Government National Performance Framework and ‘established corporate and community plan commitments’ (Improvement Service, 2008). Of the ‘localism’ principle embedded in the Concordat, Osborne et al. (2012) note that “while this principle was often supported by TSOs, the impact on TSOs in practice had been more problematic. Localism has meant the loss of central political control over the direction of services as each local authority has sought to meet the needs of local people” (2012:2). Their longitudinal survey of the Third Sector in Scotland, carried out between 2009-2012 (Osborne et al. 2012), gives a background context for this research project, a longitudinal study carried out during the same time period. Following cuts to public budgets (HM Treasury 2010, see Osborne and Kinder 2011), TSOs described the importance of partnership for both “meeting the challenges created by the policy and funding changes” and “accessing funding” by demonstrating ‘collaboration not competition’ (:3). However, funding cuts were increasing competition between TSOs (:3). This led to diversification strategies: “along with other activities such as organisational reviews and making cost savings to remain competitive, this indicates an increasingly ‘social enterprising’ approach to the management of TSOs” (:3); “many had or were making significant efforts to respond positively and pro-actively to the challenges presented by the changing funding and policy environment” (:1). These changes in the Scottish Third Sector between 2009-12 – “politics, policy, funding and organisational” were “likely to fundamentally alter the way in which services are delivered by TSOs in the future” (:3). Over the previous decade, growth in the sector had “significantly outstripped inflation due to factors such as increased public service delivery and housing stock transfers” (SCVO 2012:2). By 2012 the sector was still growing, but growth in larger organisations obscured struggles for smaller TSOs (:1).

Whilst establishing the background for this research project, a pilot study in 2008 found that none of the above processes had influenced the role of the Third Sector in Scottish emergency management. Instead, it was the result of historical ties and emerging needs, as the following chapters will reveal.
Chapter 2

Outline of the Literature Review

In Section 2.1, the Chapter begins with an overview of paradigms in Public Management. It introduces the ‘collaborative public management’ literature, and some of the debates about the definition and measurement of the collaboration concept. The theoretical roots of the concept are introduced along with its theorisation within the Public Management discipline.

Section 2.2 introduces networks as one type of multi-organisational arrangement in the broader trend toward increased inter-organisational working in public policy implementation and service delivery. It introduces the roots of network theory, reviews the contemporary network literature, and outlines the characteristics and dynamics of implementation networks.

Section 2.3 defines emergency management as the policy and public service delivery context for this research project. It reviews paradigms of emergency management, focusing on the policy philosophy of ‘resilience’ in the UK.

Section 2.4 reviews emergent literature on ‘collaborative emergency management’, briefly considering its roots before identifying dynamics and dimensions in these theories as they describe policy, practice, and profession.

The conclusion introduces Research Questions generated to address empirical and theoretical gaps identified by this literature survey.

None of these theories has been applied to Scottish emergency management, so this literature survey explores theories and dynamics that may be applicable in this research site, rather than empirical data, in contrast to a systematic review. The choice of topics was informed by a pilot study in 2008. It found that neither

- ['Dutch'] governance network theory, nor policy network theory, nor
- descriptions of the generic Third Sector role in public service delivery were applicable to this setting, a theme explored further in this Thesis (see Chapter 8). Consequently, this Chapter only considers policy implementation networks and the Third Sector in the policy context of emergency management.
Section 2.1.1 Paradigms of Public Management

The discipline of Public Management is founded on the ‘New Public Management’ (‘NPM’) paradigm of theory. This arose from three critiques of “the traditional Public Administration premise of the ‘politics–administration dichotomy’ (Svara 2008). The first of these queried the enactment of this dichotomy in practice (Vroom & Yetton 1973, Pressman 1975), the second presented a critique of public officials as primarily a self-serving elite that put their own needs above those of citizens (Cole & Caputo 1984) and the final one presented Public Administration as an inefficient and ineffective means by which to allocate public resources (Osborne & Gaebler 1993).

(Osborne, Radnor and Nasi 2013:4; see also Thomas 2012).

‘New Public Management’ was the term given to substantial Anglo-American public sector reform post-1979 (Pollitt 1990), which expanded into irreversible changes to the character of the state and its administration of public services. Its features were elaborated by Hood (1991; see also Ferlie et al. 1996), who “drew attention to the growth of a distinctly managerial, as opposed to administrative, approach to public services delivery” (Osborne et al. 2013:4). This type of public service reform occurred internationally over several decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), with varying forms and foci. Its constant feature was the importance of managers and managerial activities (Hughes 2003), thus creating a new focus on results and performance in public services (Hood 1991; Hughes 2003). It was also characterised by a shift to “the use of markets and competition as a means to allocate resources” and application of theories from private sector management (Osborne et al. 2013:5) to the public service context.

The “appropriateness of the managerial, as opposed to administrative and/or professional, model for public services delivery” remains a topic of debate within the discipline (2013:5). The appropriateness – or otherwise – of applying private sector management logics and techniques to this distinctive context was
also debated (see Schofield 2001; Mandell and Steelman 2003) and public sector management is now recognised in its own right. But Osborne et al. argue that “to an extent this debate about the legitimacy or otherwise of the NPM model has been overtaken by events”, being “subsumed” within “the reality” of fragmented states and societies (2013:5).

**Fragmentation**

A common theme in both Public Management and Public Administration theories is the ‘fragmentation’ of contemporary policy implementation; a shift from the ‘unitary state’ to “governing without government” (Rhodes 1996; 1997a) that occurred as a result of public sector reform. This can be conceptualised as decentralisation and marketisation, in the image of the United States as ‘fragmented and disarticulated’ (Frederickson 1999), the famous ‘hollow state’ (Peters and Pierre 1998; Milward and Provan 2000; 2003; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). The process of ‘hollowing out’ the role of government is also argued to have happened – although not to the same extent – elsewhere (Rhodes 1994; 1996). Osborne (2010) argued the resulting complexity of public service delivery exceeds the explanatory power of either type of theory; “beyond a situation where it can be understood by either” (a) the policy and administrative focus of Public Administration, or (b) the intra-organisational and managerial focus of ‘New’ Public Management”.

Service delivery involves negotiating fragmentation in a “pluralist environment” requiring “the governance of these relationships and processes” (adapted from Osborne 2010:1; citing Osborne 2006). For Osborne, governance is now “the dominant paradigm of public services delivery”. He argues that rather than just *creating the conditions* for inter-organisational governance (2010:7), public policy making, implementation, and service delivery take place within the ‘New Public Governance’ paradigm (2006). A new focus on “the governance of inter-organisational relationships and the efficacy of public service delivery systems, rather than organisations” (cf. Osborne et al. 2013) should replace prior focus on “administrative processes or intra-organisational management” (2010:1).
Section 2.1.2 Collaborative Public Management

Introduction
The inter-organisational nature of much contemporary public service delivery and policy implementation has been termed ‘Collaborative Public Management’. The term was popularised by North American scholars of inter-organisational relationships between agencies implementing public policy and delivering public services (e.g. Agranoff and McGuire 2003; McGuire 2006; Milward and Provan 2006; see Public Administration Review Special Issue, 2006). The term is “fraught with definitional as well as conceptual confusion amongst scholars” (McGuire and Silvia 2010:282). Agranoff and McGuire define it as:

“a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multiorganisational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organisations” (2003:4).

These inter-organisational and multi-organisational arrangements can be informal or formal and are “typically intersectoral, intergovernmental, and based functionally in a specific policy or policy area” (2010:282). Inter-organisational relationships can include:

• **Inter-sector** – e.g. public-private organisations.
• **Intra-sector** – e.g. public-public agencies.
• **Inter-governmental** – between levels of government, following Agranoff and McGuire (2003). This is a North American convention, because of the federal-state split, whereas the European literature also uses the term ‘intra-governmental’ to mean within government, but at different levels.

Whilst not under the ‘collaborative public management’ umbrella, the use of the term ‘collaborative’ as a proxy for ‘inter-organisational’ is also prevalent internationally. In the UK, both Huxham (1996; 2003; and Vangen 2000; 2005; and Vangen and Eden 2000) and Skelcher (and Sullivan 2008; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002) use the term to describe inter-organisational arrangements. Theories of ‘collaborative governance’ also use the term in this way.
'Collaborative public management’ can happen in any number of arrangements, and particular focus is often placed on the arrangements themselves. For example, partnerships in particular contexts (e.g. Nolte 2011) or between particular sets of actors, such as public-private partnerships (e.g. Osborne 2007) and government-non-profit partnerships (e.g. Gazley and Brudney 2007).

This Thesis will consider networks as one type of arrangement. ‘Network’ “is the descriptive term of choice” for ‘collaborative public management’ (McGuire and Silvia 2010:279) but it also has a rich history of its own as a concept, a distinct literature with more of a ‘European’ influence, and contains at least three bodies of theory (see Section 2.2).

The majority of literature in Public Management and Administration freely mixes the terminology – and theory – of collaboration, collaborative public management, networks, inter-organisational relationships, governance, collaborative governance, network governance, and governance networks. This has only recently been acknowledged in relation to the network concept (Isett et al. 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012), facilitating navigation of the field by researchers seeking precision in their use of concepts.

Some scholars have argued for greater conceptual clarity in the use of the term ‘collaboration’, both in the collaborative public management literature in general and network literature specifically (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Milward and Provan 2006; Brown and Keast 2003; Keast, Mandell, Brown 2006; Keast, Brown, Mandell 2007; Mandell and Keast 2008). In this literature, inter-organisational relationships are arrayed over a ‘continuum’ of collaboration. Whereas network “arrangements are concerned with the structural elements and process of linkage” (Keast 2003:21; Brown and Keast 2003).
What is collaboration in Public Management?
The term ‘collaboration’ has three uses in the Public Management literature.
The term describes (1) collaborative social relations (e.g. Thomson and Perry
2006) but also (2) any inter-organisational activity in collaborative public
management (e.g. Agranoff 2006), apparently without concern – see for
example the Special Issue of Public Administration Review (2006) from whence
those papers came. It also describes inter-sector collaborative relations: cross-
sector collaboration (3).

1. Collaborative social relations between organisations are defined by a
distinct set of characteristics to which a large body of scholarship is devoted.
These ‘integrative’ views of collaboration see it as a process "through which
parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore
their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited
vision of what is possible" (Gray 1989: 5), and build from that much-quoted
definition. Collaboration scholars sometimes also talk about it happening
through networks, which make them collaborative networks – this term
simply describing a structure in which collaborative relations can occur, as
one structure of inter-organisational arrangement (see Head 2008).

2. ‘Collaborative networks’ is also used in some (predominantly, North
American) literature to describe public service delivery networks that
involve a number of actors, as one structural arrangement of ‘collaborative
public management’ (e.g. Weber and Khademian 2008). ‘Collaborative public
management’ simply refers to any inter- or multi-organisational activity
within public management, organised in any structure:
“Clearly, there is no one best way to organize for collaboration… Smaller,
flatter structures such as networks may be best in one situation, whereas
a simple partnership between two actors may be best in another.
Researchers should also take great care when examining collaboration
and labeling the structures. Networks are the stated unit of analysis in
much of the recent empirical research, but the term is used, sometimes incorrectly, to describe many different collaborative configurations when task force or partnership would be a more accurate characterisation”. (McGuire 2006:36).

3. By contrast, a third term, the North American ‘cross-sector collaboration’, is used consistently among its scholars to indicate collaborative relationships among multi-sectoral actors that feature collaborative relations (see Crosby and Bryson 2005; Crosby, Bryson and Stone 2006). Theory generated from this context relates specifically to inter-sector collaborative relations.

Although the collaborative public management terminology can be misleading in terms of the relations between organisations, it is nevertheless a useful umbrella term for a wide variety of multi-organisational arrangements. These now characterise contemporary Public Management, in terms of the implementation of public policy and the work that managers do (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Osborne 2006; 2010; Osborne et al. 2013). Some of this activity takes place in networks (section 2.2), but not all. Much of the contemporary literature in Public Management is research on inter-organisational public service delivery and policy implementation in relation to particular arrangements, for example ‘partnerships’, which are also used as concepts. This literature is not included in this Thesis because these concepts are often theorised using ‘collaboration’ theory, which can be misleading (section 2.1.2). Networks have their own theoretical lineage, which is linked to ‘collaboration’ but differs in important ways (section 2.1.3).

However, the term collaborative public management is used in this Thesis because, despite its limitations, it has been used to describe similar trends in the policy context of emergency management (section 2.4).

The implications of these differing meanings of the term for measurement and the generation, use, and applicability of theory are considered further below.
Section 2.1.3 Measuring collaboration – concept or continuum?

The ‘collaborative’ continuum in collaborative public management
Considerable confusion is caused by multiple uses of ‘collaboration’ terminology. Mandell and Steelman (2003) tried to address this confusion by defining the characteristics of inter-organisational relationships, in an attempt to specify what was different about collaboration (Table 2.1).

Brown and Keast (2003) built upon this framework and compared it to the network literature, identifying the need to integrate existing knowledge about the phenomena of “working together” by identifying “parallel literature”, and arraying the different types of social relations as a continuum:

“Networking, networks and network structures represent structural aspects and cooperation, coordination and collaboration are the relationships between members of these arrangements”.

(Brown and Keast 2003:10)

The rapid development of theory in this field is evidenced by the fact that terminology used by both sets of authors has been rapidly superseded: ‘horizontal integration’ terminology has been rendered inadequate by evidence of the persistence of ‘vertical’ relationships (McGuire 2006; next sections). And the use of “network structures” in Brown and Keast (2003) as a term to describe collaborative relationships is confusing, when we now know networks are just a structure of multi-organisational arrangements arrayed on a plane of options. They had used Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) terminology, which described 5 types of interorganisational arrangements: (1) intermittent coordination, (2) temporary task force, (3) permanent or regular coordination, (4) coalition, (5) network structures (:209). We would now recognise ‘network structures’ as collaborative relations in networks: or ‘collaborative networks’ (Head 2008). And we would normally consider ‘inter-organisational arrangements’ to be any one of a number of specific structures (Agranoff 2006), either (1) bi-lateral (e.g.
contracts, interpersonal relationships), or (2) multi-lateral. Some relationships can be both bi- or multi-lateral (e.g. partnerships, agreements), whilst networks are always multi-lateral – “three or more organisations connected in ways that facilitate achievement of a common goal” (Provan, Fish and Sydow 2007:482).

In later uses of the ‘cooperative – coordinative – collaborative’ continuum, these ‘3Cs’ are used as sets of characteristics to describe differences in the intensity of relational processes that can exist between organisations in any multi-organisational arrangement, although the authors focus on networks as structures in which all the “3C” activities can take place (e.g. Table 2.2, below) (Keast et al. 2006; 2007; Mandell 2007; Mandell and Keast 2008). One defining characteristic that separates cooperation – coordination – collaboration is the duration of relationships. Collaborative relations are long-term because of the processes that enable them: “repetitive sequences” of negotiation, development, and execution of commitments (Thomson and Perry 2006:21).

Thomson and Perry (2006) extend Thomson’s original framework (2001) to similarly explain why collaboration is different from other types of relations:

“This definition suggests a higher-order level of collective action than cooperation or coordination. Although the extensive literature on collaboration is without agreement on terms - drawing as it does from a wide variety of perspectives, including inter-organizational relations (Alexander 1995; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Warren et al. 1975), networks (Alter and Hage 1993; O’Toole 1997; O’Toole, Meier, and Nicholson-Crotty 2005; Powell 1990), and the logic of collective action (Olson 1971; Ostrom 1990) - most scholars would agree that cooperation and collaboration differ in terms of their depth of interaction, integration, commitment, and complexity, with cooperation falling at the low end of the continuum and collaboration at the high end (Alter and Hage 1993; Himmelman 1996; Mattessich and Monsey 1992)” (2006:23).
Measuring collaboration: context matters

Despite these efforts at clarification, the term ‘collaborative’ continues to be used because of its simplicity as a measure of inter-organisational activity (McGuire and Silvia 2010:282). Additionally, although collaborative public management is “based functionally in a specific policy or policy area” (:282), the discipline has tended to apply theory context-blind until recently.

As a result, every study defines collaboration differently. This Thesis argues throughout that ‘context matters’ in the applicability of theory to empirical case studies. This is particularly the case when so much of the literature employs deductive reasoning to construct survey measures of collaboration. Failing to consider context has methodological impacts: the relevance and application of theory needs to be understood as being boundaryed by different contexts.

### Table 2.1 ‘Defining characteristics among interorganisational institutional innovations’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation of the Members</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the orientation of the members?</td>
<td>Reflects the degree to which the members view the problem from a shared or individual perspective of the problem (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1995). This has to do with members’ values and perceptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to goals</td>
<td>Refers to the commitment members feel to their own, individual Organizational goals or to overriding goals that all members share (Rogers and Whetten 1982).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are the members organized?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of linkages</td>
<td>Refers to the strength of linkages among members in a network and ranges from Mutual interdependence to complete independence (Thompson 1967). Mutually interdependent linkages will have common goals, decision rules, Shared tasks and resource commitments (Cigler 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth of effort</td>
<td>Refers to who is involved and the impact of their involvement. Membership can be narrow or comprehensive (Alter and Hage 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does the organizational entity hope to accomplish?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of purpose</td>
<td>Refers to the degree of complexity embodied in the problem addressed by the interorganizational arrangements. Purposes can range from information sharing to complicated joint problem solving (Aldrich 1979; Alter and Hage 1993; Cigler 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of effort</td>
<td>Refers to whether members are committed to maintaining the status quo or fostering systems change. <em>Degree of innovation varies according to extent of risk taking</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Mandell and Steelman 2003:206
If you cannot or do not take account of context, you misdiagnose process. For instance, would theories of conflict resolution be relevant in a utilitarian service delivery network amongst actors whose goals are aligned and who are involved in short-term cooperation mandated by legislation for instrumental purposes?

This is pertinent when generating data in a field in which theory has struggled to keep pace with rapid increases in interorganisational practices (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Bingham and O’Leary 2006; Isett et al. 2011). Concluding a ‘collaborative public management’ Special Issue (Public Administration Review 2006), Bingham and O’Leary (2006) noted that there had been “little explicit discussion” that collaboration would differ according to its place in the policy cycle (a mainstay of network theory):

“Collaboration is likely to take a different form and have different outcomes upstream in the process (identifying a policy problem and identifying possible approaches to solving it) compared to midstream in the policy process (identifying public preferences among possible choices, choosing among the possible approaches, and implementing policy). Collaboration may take still other forms and produce yet another set of outcomes when we look at downstream uses of collaboration to enforce policy. Context helps shape both process and outcome” (:166).

These definitional and contextual problems are evident not only in the papers of that special issue, but in its summary: moving between discussions of ‘deep’ relational collaboration and inter-organisational arrangements that Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) framework tells us do not involve the same processes.

These issues are still unresolved. Recent studies of collaboration in the policy and service delivery context of emergency management show the difficulty of constructing survey measures when ‘collaboration’ is used as a descriptive term without reference to process (e.g. Nolte et al. 2011). Robinson and Gaddis (2012) use disaster response to address the general problem of using surveys to measure collaborative partnership. They explain that,
“much of the early work on collaboration looked for whether relationships existed or not. This paralleled the literature’s early focus on whether networks existed, rather than on classifying types of networks” (:267, citing Robinson 2006).

Scholars “deliberately focused on low threshold measures to investigate the basic pre-conditions of collaboration” (:267). They contrast Agranoff and McGuire’s activity measures approach (2004) with that of Meier and O’Toole (2005), who measured frequency of contact, and “argued that early in the development of the quantitative literature, these basic pre-conditions are appropriate places to start measuring” (:267). Robinson and Gaddis design a survey to address Bingham and O’Leary’s (2006) critique that survey measures may indicate “parallel play” instead of “authentic” collaboration,

“This has left some to wonder if the quantitative studies are actually studying collaboration at all” (:257).

“Implicit” in these questions about “whether observed relationships represent real collaboration... is an understanding that relationships vary along a continuum” (:267). But despite their efforts to establish ‘threshold measures’ between cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, all that emerged was,

“From a basic research design perspective, the results of a study may depend on the definition of collaboration one chooses” (:270).

The implications were that not only should studies include diverse measures of collaboration, they should be developed “with specific policy domains in mind” (:270). Disaster networks are notoriously ‘ad hoc’, so it is difficult to distinguish ‘opportunity cost’ thresholds across time in this context (:268):

“Limiting collaborations to those relationships that persist across time would eliminate most disaster response relationships from consideration as collaborative” (:269).

Their conclusion on these “controversies of measurement” (:269) was that,

“In the presence of such disagreement over the definition of collaboration, there is little chance of reaching consensus on operational definitions. Employing advanced statistical techniques... can help prevent
us from making key mistakes in our operational measures – but these successes will be hollow without a breakthrough at the theoretical level. There cannot be an accumulation of knowledge based on careful measurement and appropriate statistical study of large-N samples without agreement on what collaboration actually looks like” (:267).

Table 2.2 Relational Terms ‘Differentiating Network Type and their Learning Focus’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Types</th>
<th>COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>COORDINATIVE</th>
<th>COLLABORATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low trust — unstable relations</td>
<td>Medium trust — based on prior relations</td>
<td>High trust — stable relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent communication flows</td>
<td>Structured communication flows</td>
<td>Thick communication flows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known information sharing</td>
<td>‘Project’ related and directed information sharing</td>
<td>Tactic information sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusting actions</td>
<td>Joint projects, joint funding, joint policy</td>
<td>Systems change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent/autonomous goals</td>
<td>Semi-independent goals</td>
<td>Dense interdependent relations and goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power remains with organisation</td>
<td>Power remains with organisations</td>
<td>Shared power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources — remain own</td>
<td>Shared resources around project</td>
<td>Pooled, collective resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment and accountability to own agency</td>
<td>Commitment and accountability to own agency and project</td>
<td>Commitment and accountability to the network first</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational time frame requirement — short term</td>
<td>Relational time frame medium term — often based on prior projects</td>
<td>Relational time frame requirement — long term 3-5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Keast & Brown, 2003; Keast et al 2007
Section 2.1.4 Theorising collaboration in Public Management

**Governance and Public Management**
In the Public Management discipline, governance “can be roughly described as ‘directed influence of social processes’” (Kickert et al. 1997:2). The term encompasses those “guidance mechanisms” connected to policy processes – deliberate or self-steering; involving all kinds of actors; not always performed by government. Governance can happen at the micro-level (organisations, actors, stakeholders), the meso-level (networks), or the macro-level (state or society) (Bevir and Rhodes 2003:49-51 citing Jessop 1995).
Public Management focuses on deliberate actions undertaken by public actors to influence societal or policy processes: “public management is governance, but not all governance is public management” (Kickert et al. 1997:2).

**Modes of governance in inter-organisational theory**
In 1994, Ring and Van de Ven described “a variety of motivations” for the rise of cooperative inter-organisational relationships ['IORs'] in the private sector, "previously these transactions often were concluded through either discrete market transactions or internal hierarchical arrangements (Friar and Harwich 1985; Powell 1987; Teece 1986). These IORs include strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, joint ventures, franchises, research consortia, and various forms of network organisations". (Ring and Van de Ven 1994:90)
In 1994, “most of the research to date” had focussed on (a) antecedent conditions or (b) the structural properties of IORs in comparison with other governance forms in two related, but distinct streams of research (:91):

1. using transaction cost or agency theory perspectives to compare “alternative transaction governance structures (e.g. markets, hierarchies and mixed modes)” in the disciplines of institutional economics (e.g. Williamson 1975), organisational sociology (e.g. Powell 1990); law (e.g. Macneil 1980) and management studies (e.g. Barney and Ouchi 1986).
(2) examining the environmental conditions and contingent factors that “explain the formation and structure of cooperative interorganisational relationships” (e.g. reviews by Aldrich & Whetten 1981; Galskiewicz 1985; Oliver 1990; Van de Ven 1976).


The second stream of research is considered below in light of its influence on policy network theories. First, we will attend to transaction governance structures in the context of their most frequent incarnation in our discipline: collaborative public management.

**Transaction governance in IORs: markets, hierarchies and networks**


Sociological research on network forms of organisation challenged two of Williamson's theoretical claims from transaction cost economics:

- that alternatives to markets and hierarchies are *hybrid* forms (Powell 1990)
- that distribution across the continuum has *pure* types prevailing over *mixed* forms (Granovetter 1985) (1998:58).

In these critiques, sociologists argued that “network forms of organization represented a unique alternative possessing its own logic” (Powell 1990) and this had “a number of distinct efficiency advantages not possessed by pure markets or pure hierarchies, and because of these efficiency advantages, network forms are quite prevalent (Bradach and Eccles 1989)” (1998:57-58).
Granovetter (1973) and Burt (2005) famously applied these theories in their concepts of social networks. Social networks, “involve “studied nodes linked by social relationships” (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden 1978) or recurring relationships (Nohria 1992), both within and outside organizations, for which there is an already developed rich tradition (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; White 1992)” (Agranoff 2006:56).

These theories continue to be relevant to studies of networks in Public Management (see McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012), particularly for the cross-sectional ‘social network analysis’ survey method, which is becoming increasingly popular (Isett et al. 2011).

Social network theorists were influential in generating understanding of ‘whole networks’ – the system of relationships between groups of organisations that characterise collaborative public management – and how to analyse their structure. This is in contrast to the analysis of patterns of ‘egocentric’ ties from one organisation outward that is more commonly found in Organisation Theory or Strategy research (Provan and Lemaire 2012:2). Agranoff argues that Public Management networks “should be distinguished from social networks” as they, “are in every sense, collaborative connections like social networks, although they not only comprise representatives of disparate organizations but also go beyond analytical modes. They are real-world public entities” (2006:56).

The movement in Organisational Sociology to identify benefits of network forms of organisation influenced theories of the governance of inter-organisational relationships in collaboration and network theory within Public Management. Theories of network governance in networks (de Bruijne and ten Heuvelhof 1997) in Public Management and Administration also have another origin, in Political Science, where exchange relations are considered as actor-level strategies (Klijn 2008a), and thus best theorised by exchange theories.
Interorganisational theory and policy networks

Klijn describes the emergence of interorganisational theory in the 1960s and 1970s as a new approach to Organisational Sociology, building on theories in Organisational Science (Klijn 1997:19). Theories of the organisation as machine were supplanted with attempts to take into account the relationship between organisations and their environment. In the dominant approach of systems theory, the organisation was conceptualised as an open system, with internal process determined by the environment. This developed into contingency theory, in which organisational survival is dependent on adaptation to its environment, and there is a relationship between the characteristics of both. In turn, inter-organisational theory saw the environment as being made up of organisations that have a relationship with the focal organisation. Relational patterns “exist and develop as a result of interdependency relations” and analysis focuses on these relations, the exchange of resources, or arrangements for coordination (Klijn 1997:20). This is what we would term ‘egocentric’ network analysis, focussing on relationships between one organisation and another (Provan and Lemaire 2012). Klijn describes resource dependency theory as the core of inter-organisation theory, with dependency and exchange the central aspect of relations between organisations (1997:21), but critiques the lack of consideration of the influence of norms and rules on interactions (1997:21). Where analysis considered implementation and “the problem of cooperation and coordination”, the influence of contingency theory continued in research into the relation between the nature of dependency and the nature of coordination, focussing on the formal structures of coordination – Klijn cites Thompson (1967) and Rogers and Whetten (1982) as examples (1997:22).

Interorganisational theory in collaborative relations

These theoretical lineages influenced collaborative relations theory. Thomson and Perry’s (2006) model (Figure 2.1) shows how the theories relate and what distinguishes collaborative relations as a collective action type.
If we look at this model from the perspective of the inter-organisational relations (IOR) literature we can see resource dependency is the rationale for collaboration, which through the process of the relationship between organisations generates a ‘transformative’ effect, leading to the achievement of goals, additional “value” and sustainable, self-monitoring collective action. These potential benefits need to offset the process ‘costs’ of collaboration Huxham (1996; 2003; and Vangen 2005; and Vangen and Eden 2000) in
building these relations and in the bargaining and negotiations needed for consensus-based self-governance. Thus the investment of

“material resources and ‘political’ capital in either a collaborative network, or an intensive participatory policy process, has potential costs as well as potential benefits. Collaborative networks generally have high transaction costs in terms of time, energy and commitment (Metcalfe et al. 2006: 30), so the benefits need to be substantial” (Head 2008:734-5).

The benefits of networks as a form of organising in transaction-cost theory (above) is often cited as a motivation for the establishment of networks. However, it is not the motive for collaborations, which have high transaction costs. These can be overcome, provided collaborative relations develop between organisations (right-hand column, Figure 2.1).

If collaborative relations are not present – or cannot develop – then the costs of collaboration will be higher than the benefits, hence the urgency of separating between collaborative relations and other forms of collective action. Despite this, these “added value” and self-governing benefits are often – incorrectly – claimed for ‘collaborations’ that do not feature collaborative relations.

The model above was a development of Thomson’s definition of collaboration (2001), which itself expanded Wood and Gray’s (1991) earlier definition,

“Collaboration is a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions” (cited Thomson and Perry 2006:30).

These are distinctively collaborative relations because the process is claimed to generate mutual benefit and involve shared norms. Shared norms can be developed through relational interactions but public collaborations are also often brought together by their shared problem definitions and complexity of purpose, with issues addressed by joint problem-solving (Mandell and Steelman 2003:206). In terms of mutual benefit, this derives from the IOR literature.
There, deeper ties between private firms were necessary to modify self-interested behaviour (Huxham 1996), derived from sociological critiques of economic theories of organisation (Podolny and Page 1998). Collaboration in Public Management is seen to have moved beyond these profit- or agency-oriented competitive benefits of ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham 1996) toward an understanding of mutual benefit (Thomson and Perry 2006:20).

**Rationales for collaboration**

The theoretical basis of collaborative relations in resource dependency and exchange theories explains why theories of collaboration emphasise mutuality, reciprocity, trust, shared norms, and voluntary membership and thus have pluralist, or neo-pluralist, assumptions. But exchange theory is a ‘special case’ of resource dependency theory that can only be used “where there is mutuality between the partners” (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008:754) and thus voluntary membership.

These concepts of ‘mutuality’ as a precondition and the generation of ‘mutual benefit’ as an outcome are often cited as a motive for collaboration but may not apply in all cases. So far, section 2.1 has avoided describing the circumstances in which collaborative relations or collaboration is appropriate, or its benefits. Much of the literature blends rationales which, due to the importance of context, may not be equally applicable across different policy contexts. As with the issue of definition and measurement, these inconsistent claims of benefits, motives, and rationales are problematic for generating and accumulating knowledge. Skelcher and Sullivan (2008) provide a solution in their identification of five distinct ‘performance domains’ for collaboration, outcomes and outputs desired by policy-makers in ‘collaboration’ “created to deliver public policy outputs and outcomes” (:754). This focus on the “causal model held by policy designers” (2008:752) is a type of ‘theory-driven evaluation’ (e.g. Chen 1990; Pawson and Tilley 1997), in contrast to metric- or measures-based evaluation (2008). It provides a template for distinguishing between rationales for collaboration. Its utility as a diagnostic tool will be discussed in section 3.4.3 and section 8.3.
Applicability of theory to collaborative public management

Although it may still be relevant to particular contexts, collaborative public management has moved beyond the founding theories of IOR and emerged as a distinct body of literature for inter-organisational and multi-organisational arrangements to deliver public policy. Applicability is tightly bounded:

“Managers today are involved in a variety of such arrangements that may be based on loosely formed vertical or traditional intergovernmental linkages, or more horizontal, collaborative strategies (Mandell 1990; Jennings and Krane 1994; Agranoff and McGuire 1998a, 1999). The form of the collaboration varies depending on the tasks to be implemented and the type of mechanisms used to accomplish these tasks. In all cases, however, these arrangements are not based on top–down authority that occurs within one organization. The literature on networks within organizations (e.g. virtual teams, network capacity within organizations, matrix organizations) are therefore not applicable.

Although these arrangements include coordinating types of mechanisms, they go beyond traditional definitions of coordination through hierarchies such as the matrix type of inter-organizational arrangements done by NASA in the 1960s (Jennings and Ewalt 1998). In addition, although they may include contracting types of arrangements, they go beyond any traditional market-based types of partnerships (i.e. arm’s-length transactions) that are only based on the enforcement of contracts. Nor are they just joint ventures of different hierarchical firms (e.g. supply/demand side chains). Finally, they are not just an overlay of traditional bureaucratic tasks, but rather they are seen as part of the core work of public sector managers (Agranoff and McGuire 1999, 2001b). These differences have been referred to as the difference between vertical and horizontal management (Agranoff and McGuire 1999).

(Mandell and Steelman 2003:202)

The vertical/horizontal split was later refined by McGuire (2006; section 2.2.4).
Section 2.2.1 Theorising networks

The conceptual roots of Public Management networks: policy networks

Policy network theory has had a powerful impact on the ways we think about collaboration and networks in Public Management and Administration. Kickert et al. define policy networks as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes” (1997:6). They describe the roots of the policy network approach in three separate theoretical backgrounds:

(1) interorganisational theory;
(2) concepts such as policy networks, sub-systems and communities;
(3) policy science – the policy process as complex interactions and uncertainty in information and outcomes (1997:6).

The emergence of policy network theories is described as a recognition of
(a) the limits of governmental steering, and
(b) of government interdependencies with other social actors

(Kickert et al. 1997:5; Klijn 2008a:305; Rhodes 1997b).

For Klijn, policy networks are an approach to governance that incorporates both the interactive nature of policy processes and their institutional context (1997:33), and thus “an attempt within policy science to analyse the relationship between process and context in policy making” (:14). In policy science, “concepts are developed to understand complex decision processes”, and attempts to incorporate the environment of policy processes into theory (:15) have historically included the rational actor, bounded rationality, and process models (:15-17). The policy network approach “takes up where the process approach leaves off”, focussing on the dynamics of policy-making as “an attempt to ‘contextualise’” it (:16). Policy network theory includes structuralist (e.g. Scharpf, 1978, in Rhodes 1981) and ‘games’ approaches (e.g. Crozier and Friedberg 1980) (1997:17-18). It also latterly incorporated intergovernmental theories emphasising the complexity of programme management and interaction networks (:18 citing Agranoff 1990; Mandell 1990).
These latter policy ‘implementation’ theories considered the process of programme execution:

“policy implementation turned out to be a complex endeavour (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973/1983) and multi-actor approaches were introduced” (Klijn 2008a:300).

Some implementation theorists advocated for a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the analysis of this through the range of actors in specific policy fields (e.g. Hjern and Porter 1981; Sabatier and Haanf 1985; Wamsley 1985) (cited in Klijn 1997:18), and attempts were made to “unify” top-down and bottom-up implementation perspectives (e.g. Sabatier & Mazmanian 1979; Hasenfeld & Brock 1991, cited in Keast and Mandell 2009:5).

Policy network theory has two additional and overlapping theoretical roots – policy communities (political science) and interorganisational theory (organisation science) – which strongly influenced policy science approaches (1997:18). Table 2.3 shows how Klijn maps the evolution of these source theories and their contribution to policy network theory.

| Table 2.3 Theoretical roots of policy networks (adapted from Klijn 1997:29) |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Organisation science                        | Policy science | Political science |
| Rational organisation                       | Rational actor | Pluralism       |
| Contingency approach                        | Bounded rationality | Agenda research |
| Interorganisational theory                  | Process model | Subsystems/ policy communities |
| Resource dependencies                       | Policy as multi-actor process | Policy as process in closed communities |
|                                               | Policy networks |                  |

Contemporary network theory is still rooted in – and blends – these theories (Mandell and Steelman 2003:201; Klijn 2008a; McGuire and Agranoff 2011), but this Thesis will argue policy network theory has limited applicability to public service delivery and implementation networks (cf. Provan and Lemaire 2012).
The advantages of networks in governance and organising

There are two interlinked explanations of the rise of networks in the practice of Public Management. These are thematically similar to Ring and Van de Ven’s classification of the literature on IORs as two parallel literatures (1994, above), and help us to locate contemporary network theory in Skelcher and Sullivan’s (2008) theoretical framework, updating their ‘policy network’ category. Theory accounts for the emergence of Public Management networks from:

1. their suitability for organising responses to complex problems (e.g. resource dependency theories).
2. their suitability as a mode of governance for exchange relations between organisations (e.g. transaction-cost theories).

The drivers were two, interlinked, narratives of change over the past 50 years:

1. The increasing complexity of the nature of problems public policy addresses.
2. Change in the governance of policy programmes: state to market to network.

1. The suitability of networks for organising responses to complex problems

This narrative links networks to complexity and uncertainty (e.g. Kickert et al. 1997) because their ‘horizontality’ makes them suitable for organising responses to complex problems, bringing together multiple actors who are interdependent on one another for their resolution (resource and exchange theory). Complexity has two aspects: (a) social complexity – the ‘social change thesis’ – and (b) problem complexity – intractable, or ‘wicked’ problems (e.g. McGuire 2006; Klijn 2008a). McGuire (2006) notes that while “the recent spate of attention” suggests the ‘newness’ of networks, there is “ample evidence” and a “rich history” to suggest collaborative public management has been practiced “for quite some time” (:34-5). The implementation literature on policy networks that arose from policy studies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Hjern and Porter 1981) describes a “complexity of joint action” arising from (a) the “multiplicity of participants and perspectives from all levels of government pursuing policy goals that... may be conflicting” and (b) structures operating with “different agencies and exercising considerable discretion in practice” (2006:34-5).
2. Change in the governance of policy programmes: state to market to network.

This literature describes the evolution in the organisation of public service delivery from bureaucracy (hierarchical organisation) to market (‘NPM’) to network. Here, changes in the way public services are delivered resulted from changes to policy implementation that resulted from the ‘failure’ (Salamon 1981) of ‘top-down’ policy programmes (Kickert et al. 1997:2) in the latter half of the 20th century. Marketisation was implemented as the governing logic for service delivery, with emphasis on broadening the range of providers, driven by rationales of reducing cost and/or increasing quality. Activities were regulated by economic ideologies (e.g. ‘efficiency’ in the UK). This was characterised as the ‘New Public Management’ paradigm in our discipline (Hood 1991; Ferlie et al. 1996; Hughes 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Thomas 2012). ‘Partnerships’ and ‘collaboration’ emerged to organise multiple organisations. Like them, networks had advantages over ‘hierarchy’ and ‘market’ forms of organising service delivery, by reducing transaction costs between agencies.

Scholars link these theses, presenting either a narrative of increased complexity leading to changes in governance to solve complex public policy problems (e.g. Keast et al. 2006), or changes to the governance of public services, that had to be modified as more complex problems were encountered (e.g. Mandell and Steelman 2003). Recent reviews have revised these advantages (section 2.2.4). Scholars’ founding literature depends on their conceptualisation of networks as:

- policy networks (e.g. decision-making) or
- public service delivery networks as a ‘structural description’ of collaborative public management or
- governance networks (decision-making and service delivery).

(Klijn 2008a; Isett et al. 2011)

Klijn (2008a) observes that in much network literature these types are blended into ‘governance networks’. Along with Kickert et al. (1997) he argues the shift to governance generally and network governance particularly joins the first two network types in theory and practice, creating the third (Isett et al. 2011:158).
The evolution of the network field in Public Management

Networks in the Public Management and Administration literature are defined relative to the purposes they serve (e.g. Mandell and Steelman 2003). Historically, attempts to review network research focussed on policy networks and defining alternative conceptions (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Klijn 1997). Because network studies have been “a variegated undertaking where a variety of phenomena are described in multiple ways” (Isett et al. 2011:160) this section is built on recent reviews, which might represent a ‘coming of age’ in the implementation network literature. However, even recent reviews reflect different conceptions of the term (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn 2008a; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). Isett et al. (2011) review the field: despite “rapid growth” of network studies, led initially by changes in practice (:159), “fundamental questions and challenges” remain unanswered (:160). Network processes remain largely opaque: “many aspects of network management and performance that are not well understood” (:163). This lack of clarity in terminology (cf. Klijn 2008a; McGuire and Agranoff 2011) makes the field “an amorphous set of studies that do not necessarily belong to a distinct intellectual tradition or even a clear understanding of what studies hang together as subsets of a broader tradition” (Isett et al. 2011:161). The existence of “diverse definitions” of the term – used “loosely” in the literature – is “perhaps the most fundamental issue that faces network scholars today”, which:

“can refer to many different things, including (but not limited to) a gathering of actors with (a) different levels of coupling who may or may not be cognizant of their “corporateness” which are (b) operationalized at various levels of analysis (individuals, organizations, etc.) using (c) multiple conceptual approaches and agendas (metaphor/organizing concept, method, utilitarianist) and (d) an array of static versus dynamic and agency-based notions” (Isett et al. 2011:161, Box 2.1).

This confusion of network terms and types is compounded by the existence of three distinct (and non-corresponding) traditions of ‘network’ literature, traditions which are often blended by network scholars (Box 2.2, cf. Klijn 1997).
As a community of scholars it has not been the practice to specify the grounding or bounding of each study in this wider network literature, “so there are few opportunities to determine whether findings are commensurate with one another and thus cumulative in their effect on the literature” (2011:158).

Scholars also frequently neglect to consider how the literature to which they refer relates specifically to the position of their case or cases within the policy cycle – compared to policy-making, policy implementation involves different actors in different structures with different relationships for different purposes (cf. Bingham and O’Leary 2006:166). ‘Policy networks’ are not always separated from ‘collaborative networks’. Further, ‘collaborative networks’ may not always be networks (Agranoff 2006; McGuire 2006) and network structures or not they might not be collaborative (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Brown and Keast 2003; Keast et al. 2007; Head 2008).

This Thesis uses the term ‘network’ in its formal, utilitarian sense. To avoid confusion, it prefers the terms ‘implementation’ or ‘public service delivery’ networks, rather than ‘collaborative’ networks.

**The operational limitations of networks**

Recent reviews have drawn together evidence of the limitations of networks for managers and overcoming them (e.g. Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Huxham and Vangen 2005), sometimes lost in the research effort to document the existence of collaborative public management (above). Provan and Lemaire (2012) cite: varied commitment to network goals; culture clash; loss of autonomy; coordination fatigue and costs; reduced accountability; and the complexity of management both within the network (Agranoff 2007) and of it (Provan and Kenis 2008) (:3). Alongside these challenges of ‘goal-oriented’ networks (below), McGuire and Agranoff (2011) add process costs and power asymmetries as operational limitations in networks (:267-9), challenging, “the collaborative interactive nirvana often associated with mutual accommodation, a sort of ‘hot tub’ mutuality atmosphere of interorganizational process” (:266).
Box 2.1 Three uses of the term ‘network’ in Public Management and Administration

1. “One way the term is generally used is as a metaphor or an organizing concept. Here we see studies that invoke a network conceptualization of a social phenomenon that may not necessarily have a structure or corporate entity that defines the network, but the network metaphor provides a useful and powerful way to understand what is going on in the social context under examination. This use raises the important and critical issue of whether the actors in an attributed network (meaning a group where the network paradigm is applied) must acknowledge and accept that they operate in a network for it to actually be a network. This approach is probably best typified by the research program of networks by Meier and O’Toole (e.g. Meier and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004) and much of the European and Asian networks literature.

2. A second way the term is used is to refer to the methods and methodological paradigm that surrounds networks, social network analysis. In this use, structure and the measurement of structural dynamics is the focus. Although most network scholars use some sort of network methodology in their studies, the ‘method’ approach is really focused on the development of tools, the refinement of measures, and the appropriateness of usage. Here, network structure is paramount to the meaning of those structures or the practical uses of those applications. Many of the articles found in the journal Social Networks would fall into this category, as well at the scholarship of the “Dutch School” (e.g. Snijders and Bosker 2000) who are pioneering many of the stochastic techniques that are emerging currently.

3. The third way that networks are used in the Public Administration literature is mainly utilitarian – as an approach or as a tool to understand public service provision. Here, networks are used to get something done, such as the service delivery networks studied by the ‘Provan school’ of scholars (Provan, Milward, and Isett 2002; Isett and Provan 2005; Huang and Provan 2007) and local collaborative governance as studied by the ‘Agranoff school’ (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 2003; Agranoff 2007) (and as extended by Feiock and his colleagues, particularly with their use of social network analysis [see, e.g., Feiock 2004, 2007; Feiock and Scholz 2009]). From these efforts, we have begun to understand how networks may deliver and create services in a coordinated way. However, most of these studies tend to focus on formal networks – those networks officially set up by some convening body where membership may either be coerced or have some compelling normative or resource incentives to participate – thereby leaving important classes of networks, emergent and informal, underexplored.

Source: adapted from Isett et al. (2011:161-2)
Box 2.2 Three traditions of network research

1. The oldest effort focuses on policy networks. Policy networks are a set of public agencies, legislative offices, and private sector organizations (including interests groups, corporations, nonprofits, etc.) that have an interest in public decisions within a particular area of policy because they are interdependent and thus have a “shared fate” (Laumann and Knoke 1987). The original conceptualization of policy networks concerned decision making about public resource allocation.

2. Networks focusing on the provision and production of collaborative goods and services are the second important stream of literature. Collaborative networks are collections of government agencies, nonprofits, and for-profits that work together to provide a public good, service, or “value” when a single public agency is unable to create the good or service on its own and/or the private sector is unable or unwilling to provide the goods or services in the desired quantities (cf. Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 2003; Mandell 2001; Nelson 2001; O’Toole 1997a). Collaborative networks carry out activities on behalf of the public. They may be formal and orchestrated by a public manager or they may be emergent, self-organizing, and ad hoc, with many variants in between.

3. The third stream of literature is on governance networks. Governance networks are entities that fuse collaborative public goods and service provision with collective policymaking—for instance, business improvement districts or some environmental mitigation efforts (Bogason and Musso 2006; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Rhodes 1997b; Sørensen and Torfing 2005). These networks focus on the coordination of organizations toward a common goal rather than the policies or products that the networks actually produce.

... However, until the recent work on governance, scholars pursued programs of research that fell broadly into either the policy or collaborative literature”.

Source: adapted from Isett et al. (2011:158)
Section 2.2.2 Implementation networks

Networks and the Policy Process: Implementation Networks

Bingham and O’Leary note that collaboration research often neglects its place in the policy process (2006:166), which is less the case with networks. Only governance networks blend policy-making and implementation, but the theory is commonly used (Klijn 2008a), and misapplied to implementation networks. The most recent literature recognises these ‘organisational service delivery networks’ as distinct from policy networks (2), instead being “whole, goal-directed networks” (Provan and Lemaire 2012).

Implementation networks are “utilitarian” conceptions, used as an approach or tool “to understand public service provision” in networks, with focus on formal networks in favour of emergent or informal types, though not excluding them from analysis (Issett et al. 2011:161-2). Over the past 15 years consensus has emerged about the characteristics of policy implementation networks:

- Defined in narrow and concrete objectives
- Functionally-specific
- Managed (across organisations)
- Goal-oriented (adapted from O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997:138)

Public services can be delivered by a multiplicity of actors and sectors - the ‘fragmentation’ spoken of earlier. Public service delivery can be funded or organised by ‘private’ actors (including non-profit organisations ['NPOs']) but in developed countries is most often funded by government. Formal public service delivery networks are likely to derive their mandate (and associated funding) from policy and policy implementation (which may or may not be encoded in legislation) and are thus goal-oriented (cf. Provan and Lemaire 2012).

This has likely implications for the centrality and role of governmental actors and institutions – a topic of much debate because it goes against the aforementioned decentralisation thesis, whether considered in positive terms
(governance) or negative terms (‘hollowing out’). The position of networks, “vis a vis the state (Rhodes 1997b; Sørensen and Torfing 2007) and the degree to which networks are displacing or replacing public administrative agencies” is a mainstay of the governance literature (McGuire and Agranoff 2011: 274). But McGuire and Agranoff argue that, whilst networks “have changed the way bureaucracy works” – as did markets – governments “not only retain critical powers and aspects of their core functions, but become actors in networks”, a matter of “‘jurisdictional integrity’ (Skelcher 2005) or the political and legal competence of a unit of government... the agency remains, but in an altered state of institutional design” (2011:275).

Even in early conceptions rooted in policy network theory, implementation networks were distinct from other policy networks. Like all networks, an implementation network “is the pattern of linkages traced between organisational actors who are in some way interdependent” (O'Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997:139). But “it is also a socially constructed vehicle for purposive action”. These networks are “intended to be used as instruments” for the mobilisation of actors to solve problems, as with organisations. Their image has symbolic value in representing differentiation and complexity in the actors that translate “policy intentions” through “measures and actions” to “the ‘level of the consumer’” (:139, emphasis added). Importantly for network dynamics, processes and outcomes:

“In this sense it represents the organisational infrastructure required for the application of policy instruments intended to bring about the changes in social behaviour or conditions sought by national policy makers” (O'Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997:139).

Whilst local-level networks may have other important goals – as well as those brought by member organisations – an ‘instrumental’ nature defines this type of network, and the Thesis argues the implications of this for practice and theory.
Section 2.2.3 Characteristics of implementation networks: context matters

The distinguishing characteristics of this type of network is important for the applicability of theory to empirical evidence. For instance, ‘interdependence’ here relates to functionally-differentiated roles; the processes of decision-making are not seeking consensus or bargaining, but rather coordination.

Whilst the network literature so far has been somewhat ‘context-blind’, more recent work suggests the importance of context in the formation of networks. Context affects network goals, institutional rules, and activities.

1. Goals shaped by purpose

“Empirical research has shown that the intended goals of networks vary according to network task and purpose (Alter and Hage 1993; Agranoff 2007)... effectiveness can be measured by the extent to which a network achieves its goals, whatever the goal is and however it has been formulated” (McGuire and Agranoff 2011:272).

The attainment of network goals is written about under the umbrella term of ‘performance’, but the literature contains significant gaps, and is usually approached using ‘process’ not ‘outcome’ measures (e.g. Koppenjan 2006; Public Management Review 2008; Kenis and Provan 2009; Provan and Lemaire 2012:6; Robinson and Gaddis 2012). Significantly, there is a gap on “the relationship between interorganisational network structures and activities and measures of effectiveness” (Milward and Provan 2000:414 cited 2011:272) that is still unresolved. One of the issues is whose assessment matters in considering ‘effectiveness’. Milward and Provan balance the needs of organisational and network “stakeholders” with those “clients the network must serve” (2000:422, cited 2011:274). But literature on networks’ power asymmetries (e.g. Klijn and Koppenjan 2006) or the instrumental/ institutional rationales influencing network formation or management (deBruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1997; Keast and Mandell 2009; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Rodriguez et al. 2007) emphasise the needs of all members, stakeholders, and beneficiaries are not valued equally.
2. Institutional rules

Service delivery networks are more likely to be formalised than other types of networks. The degree of formalisation relates to their closer relationship with institutions based on the purpose this type of network serves in carrying out policy. These network are context-specific by policy field (Isett et al. 2011:164):

“Networks are embedded in a specific policy context..... Formal networks arise from diverse institutional forms that subsist on diverse funding streams that carry differing regulations and rules for implementation. Networks are thus shaped and constrained by institutional rules as well as regulatory procedures and norms that are specific to the policy arena”.

This limits the “applicability” of studies from one context to another (:164). In governance networks, Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) describe ‘Interaction rules’ and ‘Arena rules’ (:145-6), concepts developed from Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) (:156). Network rules determine characteristics and are the mechanism by which power asymmetries influence processes inside networks: closedness; language; power and resource dependencies. These “rest on the product and identity rules of the network. This last dimension of power is usually referred to as mobilization of bias (Bachrach and Baratz 1962)” (2006:146-7).

Keast et al. (2006) argue that institutional design “provides an expanded terrain from which decision makers can design effective policy and program responses” (:10). Strategic choices by policy-makers can link design to outcomes, but new policies are often overlaid on top of existing initiatives: thus public managers negotiate “a crowded and even contested institutional arena, creating a sense of fragmentation which can prevent good policy and service outcomes” (:10).

3. Activities

Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) typology has been applied by McGuire (2006) and Keast et al. (2006) to describe the link between network contexts and processes inside them. It allows us to distinguish and describe what happens inside networks but avoid confusing this with the collaboration literature, with its emphasis on reciprocity, interdependency, and shared problem formulation.
Section 2.2.4 Network governance

How to conceptualise implementation networks? Firstly, how do these characteristics of implementation networks change over time? There are few longitudinal studies of networks (Mandell and Keast 2008:274) and "we face significant limitations in our knowledge of how networks perform over time" (Isett et al. 2011:163), although more is known about governance networks (Sorensen and Torfing 2007). There are constituent elements: the dynamics of emergence, evolution, and stability. Mandell and Keast (2008) develop Sydow’s four stages (2004): formation, stability, routinisation, and extension. Few studies document the end of networks.

Managing implementation networks

There are also varying levels of action and units of analysis. We began looking at network theories linked to the (macro-) concept of governance in which networks are situated. We have also encountered the ‘governance network’-type. But network governance is the management of processes within networks (which, confusingly, also happens within governance networks). De Bruijne and ten Heuvelhof (1997) define levels of action within networks and two distinct processes: network governance occurs at the operational level, and is the direct influencing of action (micro-level); network management occurs at the institutional level, and selects the instruments by which action can be effected at the operational level (meso-level). In the ‘Provan school’ management also happens at the operational level. There, public managers in networks have two basic roles: manager of a network or manager in a network (Provan and Lemaire 2012:5 citing Milward and Provan 2006).

One such ‘meso’ approach is O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe (1997), who offer evidence to argue that (a) managing implementation involves (b) various activities, (c) various levels, and (d) resources and constraints experienced by actors in these networks:
there is structural differentiation in networks at different levels of government and at different stages of the policy process: “implementation comprises managing across and through different functional subnetworks” (:140).

management activities occur and are different at different levels within network organisations, linked to participation in functional networks and level of hierarchy within network organisations.

national or higher (vertical) levels of decision-making affect local processes by making policy decisions that structure subsequent phases of decision-making and ‘delimit’ the action space for local problem-solving activities (alongside “the locally relevant constellation of political forces”).

“these decisions can be considered as network management actions that set conditions under which implementation games at the bottom will be constituted and played” (:144). The second source of influence is direct involvement in these ‘games’ (by choice or invitation) from organisations ‘below’, manipulating rules and conditions as variables, or negotiating for “mutually acceptable adaptations of policy programmes”. And finally, a complex “array of instruments and resources” in the environment of ‘street level bureaucrats’ (:144) – which, with constraints defined by policies – are “attached” to organisations across levels of government and sectors. Increasing the “potential problem-solving capacity” of networks by “adding participants during the assembly process” also “decreases the space within which bargaining spaces can be explored” because of the necessity for joint decision-making for “each piece of the problem-solving solution” and the interaction with the structure of policy instruments and with the decision-making process (:145).

Two sets of strategies can resolve these tensions: (1) ‘Voluntary Cooperation’, and (2) the ‘Mixed-motive and Multi-level’ set: 2a ‘bargaining and compromise’; 2b ‘changing perspectives’; 2c ‘changing the context’. Both require active intervention of managers (1997).
Networks and structure – vertical or horizontal?

'Vertical' and 'horizontal' can refer to

1. Relationships at particular levels of organizational or system hierarchy
Agranoff and McGuire (2003) refer to “the vertical/horizontal matrix of intergovernmental network management” (1402), where ‘vertical’ simply means inter-governmental layers across hierarchical scales of government (e.g. federal; state; region) and ‘horizontal’ means relationships at the same level of government (e.g. between a city government, non-governmental organisations, and other city governments)(1404). The use of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ for these authors means ‘ties across levels of government’, in reference to the intergovernmental literature (McGuire 2010).

2. the governance of relationships (management style and organisation)
Conversely, policy and governance network approaches use these terms to distinguish those network types by the ‘horizontality’ of their ties, in which every actor – from whichever sector – has influence, in contrast to hierarchical modes of organising (e.g. deBruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1997).

3. the structures of multi-organisational ties
The defining feature of Public Management networks is the multi-organisational structure of ‘whole’ networks (3). Other disciplines (such as Organisation Theory) emphasise ‘egocentric’ ties in networks, from an organisation outward, or look at ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ ties (Provan and Lemaire 2012). Indeed, from a purely structural perspective, “the trichotomy among market, hierarchy, and network forms of organization is a false one” as these two “pure” types of organisation can be represented with “the basic network analysis constructs of nodes and ties (Laumann 1991)” (Podolny and Page 1998:59).

Governance modes: hierarchy

Although he helped to define it, McGuire later questioned the “either/or proclamation” used to separate hierarchical from networked service delivery (2006:36). The distinction had been used to distinguish between administering policy implementation through ‘networked’ arrangements versus traditional
‘hierarchies’ of organisations (in bureaucratic modes) (known as ‘horizontal’ vs ‘vertical’ integration, e.g. Brown and Keast 2003). Oft-quoted studies by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Kenis (2005), present evidence to suggest “blending of the two management approaches”, and elaborate more effective types of network governance than “completely flat, self-organizing” networks:

“the presence of a lead organization, acting as system controller or facilitator... can reduce the complexity of self-governance and enhance the legitimacy of a network” (McGuire 2006:36).

The existence of a “network administrative organisation” to steer activity meant structurally ‘horizontal’ (multiorganisational) networks could be governed hierarchically through ‘centralised network governance’ modes (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Kenis 2005; 2008; see also Moynihan 2009).

Evidence from the policy context of emergency management (Moynihan 2008) suggested “portrayals of stark differences between hierarchies and networks rest on overstated ideal types... governance structures can usefully exist between these two types” (:206). In addition, a number of ‘instruments’ can be used to manage horizontal networks (de Bruijne and ten Heuvelhof 1997), or mixed modes of governance can be selected by policy designers within ‘crowded’ policy domains (Keast et al. 2006). The key point is ‘horizontally’ governed networks will require different types of mechanisms – or instruments – to effect action than networks in which governmental actors have ‘vertical’ authority with which to apply instruments of governance or management (de Bruijne and ten Heuvelhof 1997; Kickert et al. 1997). At issue is the degree of control actors have over instruments and the governance logics driving their use, or whether this is prescribed by policy, institutions, history, or task.

Some argue that networks are institutionalised during their evolution: routines and norms are established and the structure begins to resemble an organisation in its own right in its degree of formalisation, specialisation, and coordination (McGuire 2006:137, citing Bardach 1998; Thatcher 2004; Imperial 2005). Networks that begin to resemble “inchoate” hierarchies over time (McGuire
2006:137), can be problematic if this contrasts with values attached to the degree of ‘horizontalism’ – i.e. whether it is important that networks are a distinctive form of governance from hierarchy with unique characteristics, or whether they are merely an alternative organizing structure for any type of collective action or purpose. Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) extend the observation that networks institutionalise as they evolve to argue networks are institutions (:143). From this perspective institutions, as the “social infrastructure of our behavior”, provide stability through “fixed rules, norms and agreements”, and thus reduce the transaction costs of collective behaviour, give it meaning, and allow collective action problems to be solved. Because they are “formed by the interaction of actors in the past... they enable interactions, provide stability and certainty and form the basis on which actors’ trust may be founded. At the same time they serve to ‘codify’ previous (unequal) power relations, of common opinions and permitted discussions and may thus obstruct or hamper reforms (March and Olson 1989; Ostrom 1990)” (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006:143-144).

**Conclusion – limits of networks**

Unlike policy network theory, these networks are not necessarily ‘horizontal’. Service delivery networks have latterly been seen as exhibiting evidence of limited ‘horizontalism’ and elements of hierarchical governance in their degree of decentralization and the role of the steering actor (Provan and Milward 1995; McGuire 2006; Provan and Kenis 2005; 2008; Moynihan 2008; 2009; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). This has influenced claims of the ‘advantages’ of networks in complex scenarios: “these issues are expected to continue to be the traditional turf of government agencies and their interlocutors” (McGuire and Agranoff 2011:281). Revising earlier claims, Provan and Lemaire state it is not “how complex the problem being addressed, but how routine and predictable” (2012:3-4). Even for nonroutine tasks; “it is not clear when a network should be used and when a bureaucracy or alternative form of hierarchy would be best. Because of the costs of working in and through a network” using it for all tasks is “both highly inefficient and ineffective” (:3-4).
**Section 2.3.1 Approaches to studying emergencies, crises, and disasters**

**Terminology and Definitions**

It is challenging to define ‘what is a disaster?’: the term is still contested (Quarantelli 1998; Perry and Quarantelli 2005; JCCM 2006) although it has been studied in its own discipline of Disaster Sociology for 50 years or more (Tierney 2007). Technical definitions separate ‘catastrophes’, ‘disasters’, and ‘emergencies’ by scale, scope, and magnitude. These events are not ‘crises’, although they include an emergency or crisis phase, and may escalate into crises (Alexander 1991). Boin and McConnell (2007) compare these dimensions of the four concepts (Box 2.3). In contrast to ‘crisis’ events, the term ‘crisis management’ is used to denote organisational responses to crises, and the study of them (de Bruijne et al. 2010), which is how it will be used in this Thesis.

In Public Management, Van Wart and Kapucu offer their own variant of this typology (2011:496), which links emergency and disaster management. The authors note that organisational ‘crisis’ can also affect emergency management agencies when responding to large events (497). Thus crisis management can occur in any organisation, but emergency management is planned responses to events that only happens in organisations and systems of organisations engaged in emergency management practice.

There are many approaches to researching the multidisciplinary topic of emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes. Disasters are studied across many disciplines including geography, engineering, and urban planning; and social science disciplines such as public administration, sociology, economics, political science, anthropology, and psychology (McEntire et al. 2002:269). Crisis and emergency management are studied across the organisation and management disciplines, as well as in their own discipline (de Bruijne et al. 2010).

Alexander uses regularities across the wide array of disciplines that make up ‘disaster studies’ to propose common ‘continua, dichotomies, and polychotomies’ between the topics studied (1991:214; Table 2.4, below).
Box 2.3 Defining Emergency, Crisis, Disaster, and Catastrophe

“Emergencies are “unforeseen but predictable, narrow-scope incidents that regularly occur” (Perry and Lindell, 2006: 29). These events are delineated in time and space. As they are knowable and follow fairly predictable patterns, emergency services can train and prepare for these events. Emergencies can be tragedies for those involved, but have no wider consequences and can usually be brought rapidly to a closure...

Crises are of a different magnitude and character. A crisis may be defined as “a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks that legitimises the pre-existing socio-political order” (‘t Hart, 1993: 39). It entails a threat to the core values of a system or the functioning of life-sustaining systems, which must be urgently dealt with under conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal et al. 2001) ...

[Disaster] is, of course, yet another contested term (Perry and Quarantelli, 2005), but it tends not to be used in reference to extreme situations where life, property and infrastructure remain intact. To label a situation in terms of disaster implies loss of life and severe, long-term damage to property and infrastructures. A disaster, in other words, is a ‘crisis with a bad ending’ (Boin, 2005: 163) ...

Some disasters are clearly in a league of their own: we refer to these as catastrophes. In some respects, the difference between a disaster and a catastrophe is merely semantic. Moreover, it is affected by cultural dispositions (what is a disaster in one country may be perceived as catastrophic in others). Nevertheless, catastrophes are at the furthest end of the scale in terms of the language we use to describe threatening events and their (potential) consequences. A catastrophe is defined as an ‘event that is believed to have a very low probability of materializing but... However unlikely, a catastrophe can happen any day, as demonstrated by the Asian tsunami and the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina...

Catastrophes caused by infrastructural breakdowns have yet to emerge. They fall in the category of ‘future crises’ (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort, 2001) and ‘worst cases’ (Clarke, 2005)”.

As a 'technocentric' approach, crisis management is built upon systems theory: the causes of crisis are 'systems failures', at whatever level. The variety of levels includes:

- whole-system (macro level)
- system artefacts e.g. critical infrastructures (e.g. Boin and McConnell 2007a)
- actor or organisation (micro level) e.g. organisational preparedness ('High Reliability Organisations'), individual and group decision-making (e.g. Crighton et al. 2009) or cognitive strategies.

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Table 2.4 'Continua, Dichotomies and Polychotomies in Disaster Studies'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continua in hazards and disasters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>events:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anthropogenic disaster ↔ natural disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sudden impact disaster ↔ creeping disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short-term aftermath ↔ long-term aftermath (restoration) (reconstruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>scientific organization:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technocentric approach ↔ ecocentric approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural hazards ↔ environmental geology (social science) (natural science)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>attitudes and approaches:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symbiosis with environment ↔ parasitism (exploitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risk amplification ↔ risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimizer ↔ satisficer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation ↔ laissez faire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fatalism ↔ activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental determinism ↔ probabilism ↔ possibilism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dichotomies and polychotomies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>recurrence interval for most disasters [10^{-1}–10^{5} years] time-scale of geological events [10^{9}–10^{10} years]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prediction warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simple impact [earthquake]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptation adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structural mitigation [retrofitting of buildings] non-structural mitigation [insurance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alexander (1991:214)
The level of analysis in crisis management is often the dynamic between the macro and micro levels, for example actor-level decision-making within an environment of situational risk.

In this view, increasing *organisational* capabilities, or ‘dynamic capabilities’, means expanding the range of scenarios for which you plan, the redundancy within your systems, and their ability to 'bounce-back' to ‘normal’. Increasing *institutional* capabilities,

“requires effort to get systemic feedback on the likely shape that catastrophe would assume (including injuries, traumatic stress), supported by worst case simulations... In essence, society needs to feel ‘fear’ before the requisite forces can be galvanized”

(Boin and McConnell 2007:3, reviewing LaPorte 2007).

But risk management has its limits (Boin and McConnell 2007:52). Tierney notes that neither risk theorists nor those who study “risks and accidents in complex technological systems” have taken account of empirical and theoretical social science research into natural disasters (2007:519). Social science has investigated what happens when socio-technical systems ‘fail’ or are not present in the first place. The remainder of this chapter will explore these insights and the Public Management and Administration research that has built upon them.

**The history of emergency management research**

Drabek (2004) reviews theories helpful for understanding the practice of emergency management, but notes that a theory of emergency management does not yet exist. He distinguishes between normative theories, which specify the actions managers ought to take, broad perspectives that reflect substantive theories, micro theories that have been verified, and ‘embryonic’ theories.
**Roots in disaster sociology**

Much of the literature produced by Public Management/Administration scholars on disasters or emergency response draws from the Disaster Sociology tradition, with which it shares the analysis of organisational or collective behaviour. Within this is “an abundance of perspectives, frameworks, and broad theoretical orientations” that reflect substantive theory (Drabek 2004).

Disaster Sociology has its roots in publicly-funded endeavours to understand “organisational and emergent behaviour during and immediately following disasters” (Tierney 2007:505). When the Disaster Research Centre [DRC] was founded in 1963 the research interests of its founders – Quarantelli (collective behaviour), Dynes and Haas (organisational research) – were institutionalised. Disaster Sociology also drew from the ‘natural hazards perspective' developed by Gilbert White, originally a Geographer. When his Natural Hazards Centre opened in 1976 the research focus was “human and societal adjustments to natural hazards”. Research spanned “the entire hazard cycle”, training graduate students from across the social sciences (Tierney 2007:505-6). Much of our understanding of the characteristics and ‘natural laws’ of disasters stems from these founding works (see Alexander 1991).

These research centres dominated the field in funding, knowledge transfer, and training future scholars; Quarantelli, Dynes, and White “set the parameters of mainstream research”,

“Research was guided either implicitly or explicitly by systems concepts. Disasters were seen as consensus crises that suppressed social conflict... having their root causes in societal actions (or nonactions) that limit options for adjusting to environmental extremes... the field focussed on describing and categorising social behaviours and processes that are common to disaster events and on identifying best practices for managing hazards and disasters... Despite extended arguments challenging their validity and usefulness (see papers in Quarantelli 1998;
Perry & Quarantelli 2005), realist and event-based perspectives continue to dominate the field” (Tierney 2007:506).

Tierney argues the evolution of Disaster Sociology has been both shaped and limited by these perspectives: the field has “resisted change over time” due to “the strong consensus that built up among core researchers”; its “inbred” nature; and its neglect of theoretical developments in wider sociology due to its applied focus (2007:506).

In recent years, interest in disaster management has seen an upsurge in the Public Management and Administration discipline, particularly in the North American literature (see Special Issues of Public Administration Review 2002; 2006; 2007). This followed ‘9/11’, and then 'Hurricane Katrina', defining events (Waugh 2011) now codified as symbols of either catastrophic disaster and terrorist threat or administrative failure and socio-economic vulnerabilities respectively.

A recent survey of disaster research in the [North American] social sciences identified three groups of researchers: core, “career” researchers; researchers who make periodic contributions but generally work in other areas; and episodic contributions from scholars, “typically as a consequence of disasters that affect the geographic areas in which they work” (National Research Council 2006 cited in Tierney 2007:504).

Emergency management

Recent reviews have established 'emergency management' as a distinct field, heavily influenced by Disaster Sociology,

“With a few exceptions, public administration scholars were late in joining the disaster research community” (Waugh 2011:211).

Waugh indicates that sociological approaches have dominated “the broader social science disaster research community”, with a focus on applied research:
“This context is important for an understanding of the public administration literature because the methodological foundation... has generally come from the sociologists. Fieldwork has been a mainstay (Stallings 2006; Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes 2007). Case studies are common although they have become much more theory- and data-driven” (Waugh 2011:211).

Comfort, Waugh, and Cigler (2012) argue that the history of the field can be traced to a 1984 workshop between the United States Government’s Federal Emergency Management Agency ['FEMA'] and the National Association of Schools of Public Administration and Affairs ['NASPAA']. Outputs from this workshop can be found in a Special Issue of Public Administration Review, (1985). The workshop identified five issues:

1. Interorganisational coordination and collaboration
2. Interoperability in communications
3. An ‘integrated approach’ to threats to national security and from natural hazards
4. Response and recovery in catastrophic disasters
5. Continuing vulnerability of communities, and ‘enabling’ them to "become more resilient by reducing risk before hazardous events occurred”.

(adapted from Comfort et al. 2012:546)

Contextual data collected in this research site suggested that these issues still preoccupy emergency managers.

The field has since been sustained by the relevance of its outputs: supported by research grants (Waugh 2011) and promoted as part of the professionalisation of emergency management in the United States (:210; 211).

It contains many ‘threads’ of research (:212), a number of which can be woven together under the theme of ‘organising emergency management’.
Section 2.3.2 Organising emergency management

The design and structure of emergency management
Organising emergency management refers to the design of policies and the structures of response. Implementation will be considered in section 2.4.

Un-organised responses
Responses to catastrophe
Much of the recent research in emergency management within Public Management and Administration has been triggered by ‘catastrophic’ events in the U.S. These highlight issues of emergence (Drabek and McEntire 2002) in response to the scale of events (Wachtendorf 2004), or ‘failures’ in government provision and critique of policy responses (see PAR symposia 2002; 2007). These ‘catastrophic’ events are large-scale, high-impact emergencies. They are a specific type of event, which is hard to research due to its unpredictability and the chaos of the response. Their theoretical value and interest for researchers stems from the breakdown of planned structures and systems. Lessons from ‘catastrophic’ events are not necessarily relevant to other studies of emergency management, because they rely on ad hoc responses. They are of limited applicability to this Thesis because of this emphasis on the ‘non-routine’ and ‘un’-organised aspects of emergency response.

Humanitarian responses
Likewise, lessons drawn from studies of ‘international’ responses, which involve specialist humanitarian agencies, by their nature take place in a context of ‘un’-organised emergency responses, as humanitarian agencies only become involved when the capacities of governments have been exceeded. This may be because of the excessive scope or magnitude of an event (e.g. Indian Ocean tsunami 2004), the multiplier effect between hazards (e.g. Japanese earthquake 2011), the occurrence of successive events (e.g. Haiti 2010 - Nolte et al. 2012), or
events’ sheer unpredictability (all of the above). They might have also been diminished or absent before the event. The fact that these events occur in the context of an absence of government and the emergency management infrastructure that would usually be in place is hardly or only briefly acknowledged by these scholars, but this severely limits the applicability of their findings to other emergencies. The findings of these studies are only included in this literature survey under this proviso, although the theoretical bases of these research projects may be included.

**Policy design, response structures, and the management of emergencies**

The majority of North American emergency management research is grounded in a discussion of policy and describes consequently the organisation of emergency response. Implicitly, this formality defines the sector: the activities of Emergency Management are legislated for and its organisation is statutorily-mandated. Practice follows principles and philosophies that are bound into policy, legislation, and implementation. In design terms, the National Incident Management System ['NIMS'] in the U.S,

> “provides guidance to agencies at all level of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organisations for working together on the four phases of emergency management” (McGuire and Silvia 2010:280).

The National Response Framework ['NRF'] builds on this and “provides a clear endorsement of the idea of locally led coordination in emergency management... but implementing such principles on the ground is still a work in progress (Kettl 2007)” (McGuire and Schneck 2010:204):

> “the questions of “how collaborative?” and “with whom” continue to permeate the design of emergency management directives in Washington, D.C ... the NRF and the NIMS are formal attempts to “sort out” intergovernmental and intersectoral collaboration for natural and man-made disasters” (McGuire and Silvia 2010:280).

Section 2.4 expands on the implementation, mechanisms, and use of this policy.
The organisation of emergency management in the UK

Civil defence, civil protection, and civil contingencies

Similarly to Waugh (2011), O’Brien and Read (2005) describe the origins of UK contemporary practice in the ‘civil defence’ paradigm, which followed the 1946 Civil Defence Act after WWII.

Despite legislation in 1986 (Civil Defence in Peacetime Act) and reviews in 1989 and 1991, the UK emergency management system ['UKEM'] remained divided into separate, central government departments. Departments acted as lead coordinators with Local Authorities and emergency services responsible for planning and operations (2005:354, citing Smith 2003).

Beckett (2000) identified the ‘Millennium Bug’ as the [non]-event that made UK Government aware of its inability to direct activities at a local level, feeling constrained by the lack of formal powers to require information or action (2005:354). This was reinforced by other events – flooding and a fuel blockade – described by the Deputy PM as “a wake up call for UK emergency management”. By February 2001, a policy review process had been initiated by the Home Office, and by July 2001, responsibility had transferred to the new ‘Civil Contingencies Secretariat’ within the Cabinet Office.

O’Brien and Read (2005) describe “wholesale” changes to the legislative base of civil protection,

“The Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 (HMSO, 2004) clears outdated legislation, re-defines emergencies, clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities of all participatory organisations, introduces a mandatory regime for responders and replaces the previous outdated system for emergency powers” (:356).

The” new regime” of UKEM – now termed ”civil contingencies” – adopted ‘resilience’ as its philosophy:

“Resilience requires that the capacity of governance structures, civil society, communities and individuals to both mitigate and adapt and adjust to both current and future hazards” (:356).

The Cabinet Office would use an “audit”, named the ‘Capabilities Programme’,
“to ensure that there is capacity to respond effectively and efficiently” (2005:356). By 2005 the UK Government had mapped out and implemented a legislative and capacity building programme under the banner of UK Resilience (UK Resilience, 2005) (:354).

Resilience and UKEM

However, at the point of implementation, the authors concluded that “The focus of the UK resilience is very much about institutional resilience as opposed to a holistic approach. In reality, the promotion of resilience stops at the level of local responders and no meaningful effort is being to promote the wider resilience agenda. This, in the longer term, could be problematic” (:359).

Standardisation in organising emergency management: ‘comprehensive’ emergency management

There are four main activities associated with emergency management (McLoughlin 1985; Comfort 1988, Rosenthal, ’t Hart and Charles 1989), often described in terms of ‘phases’ or a ‘cycle’ of activities:

1. prevention,  
2. planning,  
3. response, and  
4. recovery.

Or, its more contemporary variation,

1. mitigation,  
2. preparedness,  
3. response, and  
4. recovery (Waugh 2009).

These have been adopted as part of the ‘comprehensive emergency management’ approach, sometimes also known as “Integrated Emergency Management’ or ‘IEM’ because it is an integrative philosophy that links these

For this reason it is also known as the ‘all-hazards’ approach. The ‘all-hazards’ or ‘multihazards’ approach’, and its four activities, are a shared international framework for the practice of emergency management, linked to its increasingly ‘professionalised’ nature,

“Professional emergency managers assume that their role involves the all-hazards approach, all stakeholders, all four phases or functions, and all impacts” (Waugh 2011:205).

In the UK and thus in Scotland, this all-hazards approach is known as ‘Integrated Emergency Management’ ['IEM'] (Scottish Executive 2006),

"Under IEM both preparation and response to emergencies should focus on the effects of events rather than their causes" (:5).

Because of the increased focus on risk management, and the very limited responsibilities for mitigation of these risks, the UKEM cycle has 5 stages:

1. Assessment
2. Prevention
3. Preparedness
4. Response

IEM in UKEM standardises leadership, objectives, and basic management structures. Planning – both within organisations and integrated with “local joint arrangements for co-ordination and response” – is based on common features (“roles, responsibilities and management structures”) that facilitate:

• the development of multi-agency emergency plans
• the response to unforeseen events
• the extendibility of the planned response to events of a scale that is unforeseen (2006:8).

**Differentiation in organising emergency management: ‘threat’ and risk**

Whilst ‘integrated’ or ‘comprehensive’ emergency management is a shared international framework that has existed for over 30 years, the events of September 11, 2001 [‘9/11’] stimulated a new emphasis on security and the ‘war on terror’ in the US, with the creation of the Department for Homeland Security. Scholars considered this a retrogressive step (McEntire et al. 2002; Public Administration Review 2002) that impacted negatively on the coherence of emergency management in the 2000s (Public Administration Review 2007). The emphasis on security put a halt to FEMA’s “golden age” in the 1990s, and the focus shifted to response, then shifted back again following Katrina,

> “restoring the nation’s capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters, as well as terrorism-related events, has been a federal priority since Hurricane Katrina in 2005” (Waugh 2011:206-7).

These examples are US-specific, and whilst 9/11 “accelerated” legislative change in UKEM (O’Brien and Read 2005:354), the same shifts did not follow Katrina, although the July 7 bombings [‘7/7’] and the Pitt Review both had significant impacts in very different ways (below). O’Brien (2006) focuses on the changes wrought by increasing ‘securitisation’ (e.g. Bankoff 2001),

> “Terrorism, repugnant though it is, seems to have transfixed the government in the United Kingdom. There is now a danger that civil protection in Britain and other developed countries will simply focus on fortifying against such attacks. Such a focus could lead to the sacrifice of approaches that promote a more resilient society that is able to respond to, and cope with, a range of threats” (:63-4).
A similar argument is advanced by O’Brien and Read (2005), but the focus is on legislative change. They question the extent to which the local [operational] level of disaster response has been affected by the new legislation: was the UK Government “undermining the concept of resilience” by focusing on particular areas (:356)? The locus of much emergency management and response is local, “It is critical to emphasize that all disasters are local events... [that]... take place within the geography of, or... produce consequences within one or more local governments... Thus all planning and response begins with local capabilities and resources that later may be supplemented by extra-community capabilities and resources” (Perry 2005:406).

But O’Brien and Read note the Capabilities Programme of 2003 (which preceded legislative change) had an economic and military focus, citing the influence of 9/11 and terrorism on the development of a command structure that creates tensions between:

1. the local level of response – based on collaboration and
2. the central government response - which tends towards a ‘command and control’ model (2005:358).

They argue that the ethos of civil protection could be undermined by centralism (citing Alexander 2002) and the ‘command and control’ model will dominate in times of crisis (2005:358).

Beyond this centralised-decentralised tension, and its relationship to the philosophies governing emergency management, is a new set of concerns, also linked to contemporary events, and potentially redefining our understanding. Scholars are beginning to conceptualise the future in terms of either transboundary crises or ‘catastrophic breakdowns’ of Critical Infrastructures ['CI'] (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001; O’Brien 2006; Boin and McConnell 2007; Boin and Rhinard 2008; Birkland 2009; Boin 2009; Lagadec 200; Comfort et al. 2010b; Rose and Kustra 2013).

These arise from both the highly complex nature of contemporary threats (e.g. pandemic, terrorism, climate change), and the globalised, interlinked,
international nature of modern society (via air and sea travel, the internet, and telecommunications e.g. 24-hour news).

‘Trans-system social ruptures’ (TSSRs), a term introduced by Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin (2006), where national systems are the unit of analysis, “reach beyond societal boundaries and disrupt multiple social systems. In such cases, impacts extend across national political boundaries, spread quickly, and initially have no known central or clear point of origin. They potentially impact a large number of people, produce an exceptional level of emergent behavior, and do not lend themselves to local-level solutions” (Wachtendorf 2009:380).

In this literature, the emphasis is on the ‘hypercomplex’ conditions of post-postmodernity:

“Crises in the twenty-first century differ—structurally—from those we had to deal with in the last century. Crises of the twentieth century were traditionally defined and handled as a combination of “threat, urgency, and uncertainty”. Today, crises are better described in terms of a destruction of vital references and a dynamic of systemic implosions. If crises were once a type of severe, dynamic accident, they are now the essential mode of life in our hypercomplex systems. These transboundary crises mark a watershed between mind-sets and tools of the past, and the new strategic landscape that we are now in” (Lagadec 2009:473).

This “shift in possible adversity” will impact upon “political-administrative elites” and ‘spur’ a new research agenda (Boin 2009:367).

But whilst this Thesis considers the context of increasingly climatic variability, or climate change, it does not do so through this lens. Climatic variability, although characterised by increased extreme weather events, is a ‘slow onset’ or ‘creeping’ crisis, and is thus – theoretically – possible to adapt to, although to do so entails changes to the governance and practice of emergency management (O’Brien 2006; 2008b). It is this process that is the background to this Thesis.
Section 2.3.3 Resilience as a new paradigm of emergency management

Defining resilience in emergency management

Resilience provides a counter-weight to the limits of crisis and emergency management; an acknowledgement, as the sector matures, that hazards often cannot be prevented and crisis management will have its limits (Boin and McConnell 2007), itself being subject to a number of failure points (deBruijn et al. 2010) along with multiple interactions with complex environments and the embedded vulnerabilities of societies (McEntire and Myers 2004) under the uncertain and complex conditions of crisis situations (e.g. Comfort et al. 2001). Boin, Comfort, and Demchak (2010) describe four theoretical perspectives on resilience metaphor, at various developmental stages (:11):

1. resilience studies “ideas on how to conceptualise resilience... inspired by biological-systems and complexity theory... with a good sense of how resilience functions in complex systems” (interdisciplinary; emerging).
2. crisis and disaster research has “paid little attention to the topic”, but the discipline “helps us explain why resilience is crucial”: consistently showing " there is very little administrators can do during the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe... disaster plans do not work, communication fails, and command-and control doctrines backfire”.
3. policy and organisation theory (mature field) – and “especially the nexus between the two disciplines” – suggest the possibilities/constraints of building resilience into social systems in terms of the decision-making [policy] agenda and [organisational] cultures that enhance or sustain it.
4. performance in sociotechnical systems (interdisciplinary) – “the transition from perception to action at individual, group, organisational, and systemic scales of operation to develop “metrics of resilience in actual environments exposed to risk” (:12).

(adapted from Boin et al. 2010:11-12)

Despite acknowledging the importance of management (2) and policy implementation (3), the meso scale of analysis is neglected in these theories.
De Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten (2010, same volume) helpfully identify the
disciplinary roots of these theoretical approaches. The concept has differing
meanings in the fields of psychology (of the individual) and ecology (the system;
contrasted with ‘engineering’ conceptions), along with social science
approaches including organisation and management sciences, the safety
sciences, disaster and crisis management, and sociotechnical systems (14-30).
We can speculate that preoccupation with the influence of the macro on the
micro in socio-technical studies of resilience derives from those scholars or
conceptualisations with roots in risk and crisis management.
This Thesis is concerned with meso-level (inter-organisational) theory, not
- micro-level theory – with organisations (e.g. HROs; safety science) or
  actors as the unit of analysis (e.g decision-making)
- nor macro-level theory – e.g. societal risk, socio-technical approaches
  that link micro-macro units of analysis e.g. (situational awareness).

(adapted from de Bruijne et al. 2010)

Seeing only multiples of the ‘organisational’ in multi-organisational responses,
or the cognition of individual actors in community responses, socio-technical
perspectives underplay evidence from Disaster Sociology and Public
Administration, where meso-level multi-organisational coordination provides
‘emergent’ responses at the edge of failing plans or collapsing infrastructures.

Within disaster and crisis management, “some consider the resilience concept
part of a new paradigm of disaster and crisis management (Manyena 2006;
McEntire 2001; McEntire et al. 2002)” and as an underpinning of holistic risk
management (O’Brien et al. 2006:71), but “clear guidance as to how resilience
can be promoted and resilience remains a conceptual construct” (de Bruijne et
al. 2010:28).
Comfort et al. (2010b) suggest their socio-technical approach resolves this, and
represents a “paradigmatic change” (281-3), although “we realise that the
available knowledge is still too limited to guide institutional design efforts”.
Section 2.3.4 reviews conceptualisations of the term that are relevant to the UK.
Section 2.3.4 Resilience in UK emergency management

Resilience forms the policy context of this research project. The UK is a frontrunner in the adoption of the theory of resilience in the practice of emergency management, and embedded it into new legislation enacted in 2004 – the Civil Contingencies Act (O’Brien and Read 2005). What was less clear was how the term was conceptualised or how to operationalise the concept in the implementation of the Act.

Policy guidance was designed to evolve, both at the Scottish level (Scottish Executive 2006) and UK level, through the Cabinet Office ‘Capabilities Programme’ (2005: 256; 257-8). Emergency management is an evolutionary practice, with an iterative cycle of learning from previous responses and response evaluations incorporated into the next phase of planning and preparedness activities (Boin and t’Hart 2010; Waugh 2011).

Resilience as process and outcome

Many definitions of resilience in emergency management focus on emergency response as an outcome, particularly those social-technical approaches that consider responses a methodological ‘test’ of the ‘performance’ of system design (Comfort et al. 2010a). Others emphasise the process itself, in terms of changes to governance and organising (O’Brien 2006; et al. 2006; 2008b; below).

“Resilience as a concept is increasingly used within the emergency management community as a metaphor both to describe

• responses of those affected as well as

• responding systems (Manyena 2006). A resilient system responds and adjusts in ways that does not harm or jeopardise function”

(adapted from O’Brien 2008b:237).

The previous section hinted at alternative definitions of the term (following Holling 1973): ‘engineering’ – bounce-back (the capacity to recover), or ‘ecological’ – bounce-back and adapt each time (adaptive capacity).
This Thesis surmises that process aspects of resilience – creating ‘capacities’ for resilient outcomes during events – must differ depending on which of the outcomes is emphasised.

**Resilience as the capacity to respond and recover**

According to de Bruijne et al. (2010), these distinctions are present in crisis and disaster management studies:

- Between reliability (protective shielding) and resilience (ability to bounce back if the shielding fails) (de Bruijne et al. 2010:26).
- Between ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ resilience (:26), with reactive approaches “strengthening the status quo”. In comparison, “one that develops proactive resilience accepts the inevitability of change and tries to create a system that is capable of adapting to new conditions and imperatives” (citing Klein, Nichols and Thomalla 2003:39).

Crisis and disaster management studies, then, along with the ecology, and organisation and management literature (:26), emphasise the proactive approach, which de Bruijne et al. state “links the resilience concept firmly to adaptation and management” or ‘adaptive management’ (Wise 2006) (:26). But this is not the overall approach of the discipline, due to debates in the literature as to the relationship between anticipation and resilience (Comfort 1999) (:26):

- Whether emergencies are conceived of as either predictable or defined by unexpectedness (:27)
- Whether crisis and disaster management includes prevention and/or mitigation of hazards. Reactivity and ‘resistance’ are associated with the ‘traditional practice’ of emergency management (command-and-control) (Manyena 2006:438), traditional goals (i.e. the minimisation of losses and damages, and thus ‘resistance’, e.g. McEntire et al. 2002:269) and the recovery from crisis (e.g. Vale and Campanella 2005) (:27).
- The fallibility of centralised crisis management, through responders, which requires not just planning but operational resilience (citing McConnell and Drennan 2006:60) (2010:28).
The socio-technical approach is focused on design solutions to create resilient systems, and types of ‘capacity’ in systems. Where this comes up against inevitable ‘emergence’ in responses to events (section 2.4), the solution is the self-reliance of communities – ‘resilient communities’ and ‘societal resilience’ (Boin and McConnell 2007; Comfort et al. 2010b). Here, localism is emphasised. de Bruijne et al. (2010) cite disaster management research on catastrophic events (e.g. Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003). The capacity “to adjust to ‘normal’ or anticipated stresses and strains and to adapt to sudden shocks and extraordinary demands” (Tierney 2003) is evident in “the capacity to mitigate the effects of disasters [that] may be found at the decentralised, local level”. Some conceive of this as “non-linear, adaptive response” (citing Rose 2004:308) (2010:27). The emphases mirror those of a socio-technical approach:

1. **Change in the focus of policy**

Following the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe, there have been ‘efforts’ to ‘shift’ “disaster management from a focus on protecting critical infrastructure toward the creation of ‘resilient communities’” (citing O'Rourke 2007:25; Paton and Johnston 2001; 2006) (de Bruijne et al. 2010:28).

2. **Resilience as a property of systems**

This concept “acknowledges the use of local knowledge and experimentation and flexibility to deal with local circumstances” (28),

“the resilience of a community is an overarching attribute that reflects the degree of community preparedness and the ability to respond to and recover from a disaster” (citing Godschalk 2003; O'Rourke 2007:25; cf. Paton 2006:9-10; Vale and Campanella 2005) (28)

3. **That can be enabled by information**

In these ‘catastrophic’ events, “the capacity of resilience in disaster management shifts radically to the local level (i.e. groups of people or communities)” with “a trusted source of information” their most important asset (citing Longstaff 2005) (27).
In this view, adaptation occurs when responses exceed plans, as in ‘catastrophic’ events, but happens within the response, during the ‘crisis’ phase of an emergency in which the limits of provision are evident and,

"the quality of response critically depends on the capacity to enhance improvisation, coordination, flexibility, endurance - qualities we typically associate with resilience" (Boin et al. 2010:11).

‘Preparedness’, or anticipation (Comfort 2009), is facilitated by risk awareness in communities. ‘Capacities’ are emphasised because resilience is the analytical “flip side of vulnerability” or disaster risk reduction (de Bruijne et al. 2010:13, citing cf. Handmer and Dovers 1996:487; Manyena 2006:439-43). Although they note there is "an alternative view" (:285, footnote, citing Folke 2006; Gallopin 2006; Brand and Jax 2007, below).

**Multi-organisational arrangements in resilient responses and recovery**
In ‘engineering’ approaches resilience is the ‘effectiveness’ of response systems.

Thus Boin and t’Hart (2010) link the effective organisation and management of emergency response networks to the attainment of ‘resilience’ as an outcome. Bringing together the crisis management and emergency management literature, they recognise the importance of the ‘meso’ level of analysis, clarifying that whilst High Reliability Theory [HRT] is very popular, using High Reliability Organisation [HRO] characteristics "as a normative model for crisis response organizations (that do not have high-risk technologies)" is flawed:

"they are a set of heuristically powerful principles, but not a golden standard that can just be copied from one type of challenge (major accident prevention) to another (crisis preparedness and response) and from the relative simplicity of the one focal, hierarchical organization to the fuzzy complexity of emergency response networks" (2010:365).

In studying this "fuzzy complexity", Boin and ’t Hart believe too much emphasis has been placed on formal, structural, aspects (2010:367). As an alternative to ‘prescribing’ a form of crisis management able to deal with increasing threats
they provide “a select set of administrative principles that have served policy-makers well in organising and managing a crisis response network (2010:367). Boin and McConnell (2007) identify strategies for – and barriers to – enhanced ‘societal resilience’ in the case of ‘catastrophic breakdown’ of Critical Infrastructures [CIs] (54-7). Complementing the ‘resilience’ of systems, “we can enhance administrative and societal capacities to cope under such conditions by introducing a complementary strategy: promotion of resilience” as the ability to ‘bounce-back’ (citing Wildavsky 1988; Longstaff 2005) (:54).

**Resilience as the capacity to respond and adapt**

Social-ecological approaches combine response systems with adaptive capacity, conceiving of resilience as “a societal characteristic, not just of the emergency management function” (O’Brien 2008b:237). Some scholars of Disaster Risk Reduction (O’Brien 2006; 2008b) and crisis management (Smith 2009) have suggested that ‘ecological’ uses are more appropriate than ‘engineering’ conceptions due to the changing nature of risk and emergencies in the UK,

> “Sociotechnical systems, for example, do not behave in the same way as ‘engineered’ systems. The introduction of agents (as operators, owners, users or even victims of the system) brings with it multiple opportunities for emergence. The ability of the system to bounce back is also often severely constrained in practice”

(Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 2009:7)

Similarly, O’Brien & Read (2005) critique narrow interpretations of resilience in the CCA legislation – policy has changed, but needs to change more:

> “The focus of the UK resilience is very much about institutional resilience as opposed to a holistic approach. In reality, the promotion of resilience stops at the level of local responders and no meaningful effort is being to promote the wider resilience agenda” (:359; O’Brien 2006; 2008b).

This suggests the policy concept has roots in engineering not ecology, and is thus still focused on stable-state dynamics and the goal of a return to normality.
In contrast, ecological approaches focus on adaptive capacity (cf. de Bruijine et al., 2010:19), because ecology as a discipline is based on the idea of dynamic equilibrium, in which stability fluctuates around ‘attractors’, within thresholds, over which it will ‘tip over’ – a ‘regime shift’ – around a different set (Walker, Holling, Carpenter and Kinzig 2004; Folke 2006).

Further insight into the process of Resilience Management (e.g Berkes and Folke 1998) and adaptive capacity can be gleaned from Systems Ecology, and the emergent multi-disciplinary literature exploring social adaptations to climatic change.

This literature:

• critiques the resilience concept itself (Nadasdy 2007),
• considers evolutionary systemic links between resilience and adaptation (following Walker et al. 2004),
• enacted through relations occurring across a number of governance scales (following Gunderson & Holling 2002), and
• the organisational and institutional mechanisms that enable effective responses to risks associated with the consequences of climatic change (e.g. Adger 2003; Pelling, High, Dearing, and Smith 2007).

Both literatures emphasise the importance of linked governance and management systems – adaptive (co-) management and adaptive (co-) governance (Armitage et al 2007a; Armitage et al. 2007b; Folke et al. 2005).

**Governance and organising for response and adaptation**

In the ‘ecological’ view, resilience “has its focus on resources and adaptive capacity and acts as a counter, or antidote, to vulnerability” (O’Brien et al. 2006 cited 2008b:236). It is a process of incremental adaptation, and the desired outcome is proactive adaptation to threats, if enabled by governance and management.

Three processes could enable this outcome in UK emergency management:
1. Participatory

Across ‘management’ and ‘governance’ activities in the above literatures, the process of social learning and learning at the organisational scale is emphasised as the key enabler of managing uncertainty and complexity. Thus these are participatory approaches, emphasising heterogeneity between actors.

In this mode, the ESRC-funded Rapid Climate Change Project ['RCC'] established a theoretical and methodological framework for the assessment of institutional constraints that shape adaptive behaviour in the UK, refined with the UK’s rural sector (http://www.rcc.rures.net/). The research drew on the ‘new institutionalism’ and systems theory literature, and specifically examines the role of social capital (Pelling 2003; Pelling & High 2005) and social/organisational learning (High and Pelling 2003). An overview of the project post-completion considered the relational spaces of organisations for social learning and adaptive capacity (Pelling et al. 2008).

That project linked the need for adaptive capacity to the nature of threats, with one of the issues being the lack of a comparable evidence base for climate change, in contrast to the suitability of the engineering approach “where the determination of risk is undertaken on a firm basis of the a priori evidence of earlier failures” (Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith, 2009:7).

O’Brien summarises (Table 2.5) this risk-management approach in the governance of UK emergency management ['UKEM']:

“The hierarchical top-down approach characterised in [Table 2.5] is an effective approach for events that do not exceed societal expectations and norms... Response systems should be designed as self-adaptive socio-technical systems to aid learning and adaptation (Comfort and Sungu, 2001)... Learning acts to enhance organisational resilience”


However, he notes that,

“where events exceed expectations, such as the unprecedented floods in the UK of 2007... then there is danger that this institutional focus may be an insufficient response, particularly for extreme events” (2008b:234).
2. Requiring changes in governance

O’Brien echoes the argument put forward by Boin and McConnell (2007):

“To manage in such conditions requires both a resilient response function and a resilient society. This requires a shift in the characteristics of emergency management from an internal focus to one that promotes both societal resilience and public preparedness” (:234).

For O’Brien, this is not just societal risk awareness, but societal adaptation,

“Adaptation as a risk reduction response to the disruptive climate events implies purposeful actions aimed at enabling communities to withstand and cope with adverse events. This process embeds resilience” (:236).

3. For which the emergency management system is responsible

O’Brien elaborates an ‘ideal model’ of UKEM governance to “shift... the characteristics of UK emergency management”, linking bottom-up and top-down governance strategies at multiple levels (:238, Table 2.6).

Like Birkland (2010, on policy learning) and the RCC project, he emphasises social learning – distinguishing between ‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning – not only in the governance (2008b:234, Table 2.6) but also the practice of emergency management. This requires not only communication and awareness-raising (McEntire and Myers 2004; cf. Boin and McConnell 2007) but also,
“the active involvement of the emergency services to assimilate and coordinate perspectives and needs derived from community consultation and providing the information and resources to sustain empowerment, self-help and resilience (Paton and Johnston, 2001)... an active and outward process (Ballantyne et al., 2000). In terms of public trust the response function of emergency management is an obvious lead agency” (2008b:239).

Table 2.6 Contrasting Characteristics of UK Emergency Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current characteristic</th>
<th>New characteristic</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolated event</td>
<td>Increasing common events and extremes</td>
<td>Climate driven events increasingly common or “normal”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk not normal</td>
<td>Risk assessment with the public</td>
<td>Risk reduction is realised through governance hence not normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techno-legal</td>
<td>More comprehensive framework to empower locally</td>
<td>Combination of hard measures such a flood defences and soft measures such as increased awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td>Operated throughout communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low accountability</td>
<td>Open and accountable</td>
<td>Ongoing dialogues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post event planning</td>
<td>Pre and post planning</td>
<td>Open processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo restored</td>
<td>Adjusting to new realities</td>
<td>Recognition that shifts and changes are unavoidable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O'Brien 2008b:240

This model was used as an ‘ideal type’ was used to diagnose the findings from this Thesis (section 8.2).
Section 2.4.1 Collaborative emergency management

Collaborative Emergency Management
The majority of studies of emergency management within the disciplines of Public Administration and Public Management originate in the United States. Empirical case studies of emergency responses all over the world can be found in the specialist journals of the field – Disasters (UK), Disaster Prevention and Management (UK), the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, and the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management (Netherlands) (cf. Nolte and Boenigk 2011:1386; Comfort et al. 2012:548). Many of these journals have either a technical focus or consider not only emergency response but the ‘prevention’ or ‘mitigation’ paradigms, such as ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’ or ‘Vulnerabilities’. The journal ‘Disasters’ is sponsored by the UK’s Overseas Development Institute [ODI] and thus has an emphasis on ‘humanitarian’ aspects of response.

Few of those empirical case studies are considered in this literature review. Its focus, to inform this exploratory research project, is on transferable theory and the principles of organising inter-organisational (‘collaborative’) emergency management and operational emergency response networks.

Recent case studies have elaborated the role of ‘collaborative’ multi-agency working in effective emergency management (Waugh and Streib 2006), its coordination through networks (McEntire 2002; Moynihan 2005a; 2005b; Wise and McGuire 2009), and the consequent issues for management (McGuire 2009; Moynihan 2007, 2009a), and performance (Boin and 't Hart 2010; Kiefer and Montjoy 2006; Wise 2006). Wise and McGuire go so far as to say,

“Multiorganisational networks have become the primary vehicle through which disaster policy is designed and administered” (2009:721).

Although the arrangements and processes differ, collaborative emergency management is considered here alongside operational response networks because they are governed by the same rationales and dynamics.
The rationale for ‘collaboration’ in emergency response

In emergency response, the range of demands plus the ‘crisis’ conditions (Comfort 1999) are commonly perceived to be more than one organisation could manage (Waugh and Streib 2006; Moynihan 2005b; Wise 2006; Comfort 2007; Wise and McGuire 2009; Waugh 2009; 2011; Boin and t’Hart 2010). From this literature, we can discern three intertwined rationales for collaboration in this context, a combination of problem severity (demand), uncertainty (‘wicked problem’), and interdependency (resources). Emergency management differs from other service delivery contexts because “service demand escalates tremendously when a major disaster strikes”. Additionally, “communities become vulnerable when their internal capacity is permitted to atrophy and outside resources are unavailable” (Waugh and Streib 2006:133). Thus, the involvement of other agencies is dependent on their “surge capacity” (Boin and t’Hart 2010). There are socio-technical ways to conceptualise these problems (section 2.3), but this Thesis focuses on policy and implementation aspects of systems, governance and organising, as opposed to their design.

As noted in Section 2.3.2, policy design affects the organisation of emergency management. In the U.S., the Federal Emergency Management Agency [‘FEMA’] was transformed by ‘New Public Management’. The driver for embedding collaboration into policy mechanisms seems to have been resource dependency,

“In the 1980s, FEMA officials measured outputs... In the 1990s, saving lives and reducing property losses, as well as customer satisfaction, were the results that FEMA pursued. The achievement of those results necessitated partnerships and broader collaboration because FEMA had neither the authority nor the resources to achieve the desired results on its own (see Waugh 1999). Little has changed since the 1990s” (2006:138).

However, these mechanisms are in tension with the organisation of emergency management, which has traditionally been centralised and hierarchical (below),

“Despite arguments about the disarticulated state, the basic legal and normative structure remains intact. This makes collaboration much more challenging in emergency management than in other public arenas” (:138).
The problem of terminology

Although this chapter has so far been critical of the use of ‘collaborative public management’ terminology, it is useful as an organising device to capture the range of research on inter-organisational arrangements and relationships in emergency management.

‘Collaborative emergency management’, as it is termed, suffers from the same imprecision in use and ‘incoherence’ of terminology as the inter-organisational literature in Public Management in general. As a rapidly growing emergent literature, norms are developing about how collaborative emergency management is theorised and researched. Currently, a number of concepts and boundaries are mixed and blended.

What follows in this section is an attempt to add clarity, but is by no means a systematic review of the literature. The literature has developed very rapidly during the period of this Thesis, so a literature review conducted now would reveal a different field to the one that shaped the research project reported here. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to update the pertinent literature and highlight the key aspects here.

As we saw in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the term collaborative public management conceals differences in relational processes. So, too, does the term collaborative emergency management. Like the broader literature, the principle critique of this field is the use of ‘collaborative’ as a proxy for ‘inter-organisational’. This makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between types of structures and relations in empirical case studies. Nolte et al. (2012) make a similar point, citing Keast et al. (2007):

“Collaboration requires more organizational embeddedness than coordination; coordination requires more intensity than cooperation. Yet, some researchers and practitioners seem to use the terms interchangeably to describe and evaluate inter-organizational relationships after disaster” (e.g. Drabek and McEntire 2002; Gazley 2010) (:2-3).
Collaboration, coordination, or cooperation in emergency management?

McGuire (2006) uses emergency response networks as an example of implementation networks in collaborative emergency management. McGuire distinguishes between

- highly formalised and lasting arrangements, such as a network that is either encouraged (Schneider et al. 2003) or prescribed (O'Toole 1996; Radin et al. 1996) by law.
- formal collaborative ties form within specific policy areas.
- informal, emergent, and short-term coordination

(adapted from 2006:35).

In the last category he cites Drabek and McEntire’s work on emergence in disaster response (2002). According to McGuire, emergency management fits two categories within the Mandell and Steelman (2003) framework:

- intermittent coordination: ‘disaster response’ is classified as “one area in which coordination is intermittent”
- permanent or regular coordination: an “example of regular coordination can be found in emergency management planning and preparedness”, “Such coordination occurs when multiple organizations agree to engage in a limited activity in order to achieve a specific purpose or purposes through a formal arrangement. Membership in this arrangement “is delineated strictly and restricted so that there is stable coordination” (2003). Resource exchange is more extensive than in the first two arrangements, but the risk is minimal” (McGuire 2006:35).

Crucially then, response relations might be short-term, but preparedness is a planned activity. Neither feature collaborative relations. Comfort (1999; et al. 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007), also emphasises coordination rather than collaboration, although from a different perspective. Despite this, much of the recent literature in this context is framed with collaborative theory or uses collaboration theory to interpret empirical data from emergency responses. Those studies are excluded from this literature review as misapplied theory that has not accounted for the specificity of this context (see section 2.4.4).
Section 2.4.2 Dynamics of collaborative emergency management

Relations and time

Robinson and Gaddis (2012), attempting to establish distinctions between the cooperation-coordination-collaboration continuum in this setting, conclude,

“the image of postdisaster collaboration clearly depends on what one means by collaboration and how much one distinguishes collaboration from cooperation or coordination” (:266).

One issue for the measurement of relationships is the issue of an “underlying opportunity cost continuum” between these three types of collective action, which is often portrayed as dependent upon time,

“In disaster situations, commitment of resources is often for only a limited time. The commitment may be intense—but it is not likely to last very long. This makes strict threshold requirements related to the age of the relationship inappropriate for disaster situations” (:268).

This “raises the possibility” of “different thresholds for distinguishing collaboration from coordination” in this setting (:270).

Relations and governance

The distinctiveness of inter-organisational relations in this context not only relates to their short duration, but also their mobilisation within urgent conditions, and how this relates to their governance. McGuire notes Moynihan’s (2005b) study of “the formation and management of a task force charged with limiting and eliminating” a disease outbreak in California:

“The task force operated much like the collaborative arrangement described by Mandell and Steelman (2003), but it did so within the context of a top-down incident command system. The emergency response network was coordinated hierarchically, suggesting the existence of a “hierarchical network” (2006:36-7 citing Moynihan 2005b).

Later work by Moynihan emphasised that it was the network maintained between events that facilitated the operation of a multi-organisational hierarchy
**Relations and preparedness**

Waugh and Streib speak of the "paradox" of modern emergency management: "On one hand, emergency response requires meticulous organization and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous. Emergency managers have to innovate, adapt, and improvise because plans, regardless of how well done, seldom fit circumstances" (2006:132).

Some emphasise that adaptiveness and improvisation are enabled by networks as structurally more adaptive than highly formalised hierachical structures (e.g. Comfort 1999; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; Tierney and Trainor 2004; Wachtendorf 2004). But others emphasise prior contact between responders. Emergency management systems “thrive on stable staffing and low turnover, stable funding, and routinised protocols” (Gazley 2012:12). This is distinct from the ‘emergence’ in disaster responses long-documented by the discipline of...
Disaster Sociology. It is the enabling of response through the planned and formalised activities of preparedness, a crucial dynamic in emergency management, the practice of preparing for and responding to emergencies. Just as the demands of emergency response cannot be met without preparedness, neither can the demands of coordinating during responses, which depends on trust developed between individuals and agencies before events (Moynihan 2005b; 2007; 2008; 2009; Kapucu 2006). The absence of trust can potentially lead to "parallel" multi-agency activity (Boin and 't Hart 2010:367). In post-9/11 interviews reported in Kapucu and Van Wart (2006) “disaster responders identified lack of communication and trust as barriers to a more effective response” (cited Gazley 2012:10). Gazley gives evidence of the importance of local-level joint planning between response agencies – ‘statutory responders’ in the UK terminology – with voluntary organisations (Brudney and Gazley 2009), and between community organisations (2012), also noting Waugh’s evidence that joint planning between local governments and community agencies can also increase citizen trust in the quality of the governmental response (Waugh 2000):10.

The literature emphasises that these multi-organisational emergency responses must be prepared for (Waugh and Streib 2006; Wise 2006; Wise and McGuire 2009; Moynihan 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008; 2009; Gazley and Brudney 2009; Waugh 2009; 2011). But despite being embedded in policy design in the U.S., Wise and McGuire indicate that a lack of integration between agencies persists at the planning stage of emergency management (2009:723). The emphasis on post-hoc studies of response within the field means less research has examined proactive planning and preparedness, the efficacy of these activities, or the process of including other organisations in them (McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010:124-5).

**Relations and mechanisms**

Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 reviewed some of the recent critiques of the governance of emergency management in the United States, related to failures in response...
to Hurricane Katrina and the reorganisation of FEMA into the ‘Department of Homeland Security’ following 9/11. It also noted the mechanisms for collaborative emergency management in the United States - the National Incident Management System, and its tool, Incident Command Systems (Waugh 2009). These are mandated but have experienced implementation issues, also evidenced in Katrina (Waugh 2009; McGuire and Silvia 2010; McGuire and Schneck 2010). Moynihan’s later work considered how the mechanism of ‘Incident Command Systems’ were enabled by (2008) or affected by (2009) these network aspects of response. The mechanisms of Incident Management Systems ['IMS'] and Incident Command Systems ['ICS'] are useful because as ‘normative’ theories, alongside ‘comprehensive emergency management’ and the ‘all-hazards’ approach, they reveal how emergency management ‘ought’ to function (Drabek 2004). Some of these organising principles are international and are thus a useful tool for cross-local or cross-national comparisons, assisting in the transferability of research findings.

Incident Management Systems [IMS] are a tool for “marshalling pre-identified and pre-assembled resources to respond to an emergency or disaster” (Perry, 2003:405). The aims of IMS are to “rationalise and organise responders while simultaneously enabling the assimilation of pre-planned resources into the response” (Perry, 2003:406). IMS are a “flexible structure” that is “function based rather than agency or responder-identity based” (Perry, 2003:408).

During the evolution of IMS particular organisations or organisational groupings have established IMS as an aid to cooperation (2003:406), in addition to jurisdictional or legislative arrangements.

Critical to the success of IMS are ICS (Waugh 2009), which operate as an inter-organisational hierarchy, using centralised command to manage a network of multiple organizations (Moynihan 2008:206).

ICS are the subject of Moynihan’s work (2007; 2008; 2009). He notes that ICS have not been the focus of much social science research (2007:1 citing Bigley and Roberts 2001:1295), despite new legislation that mandates their use (:1).
Moynihan identifies the ICS as an “intriguing example of governance” (2007:1; 2009), “a structural innovation that suggests the possibility of mixing hierarchical and network modes of coordination” (:2). The ICS is an innovative policy tool, but the case of a disease outbreak “highlights” that it overlooks, “contingencies critical to the success of this tool, such as the interaction of critical crisis factors (the experience of responders, the length of the crisis, and the diversity of the network) and management factors (standard operating procedures [SOPs], trust, and shared mental models)” (2008:602).

The ICS demonstrates “sophisticated (if implicit) rationales that break through or ignore highly stylized ideal types” (2008:223). However, “The policy framing of the ICS overemphasizes hierarchy, and underestimates supplementary modes of coordination... and more generally neglects the network components of the ICS” (2008:224).

Moynihan’s analysis instead emphasised these ‘contingent’ aspects related to the event. In 2009, the effects of the network on the ICS are again emphasised, this time suggesting “that it is better understood as a highly centralised mode of network governance, designed to coordinate interdependent responders under urgent conditions” (2009:896). When understood through the frame of network governance “the ICS tells us a good deal about the functioning of ‘problem-solving’ networks created to resolve pressing tasks (Milward and Provan 2006) and about how centralised network governance forms operate amid crisis conditions” (2009:913).

Similarly, the ICS could be seen as a mechanism “through which coordination can begin to emerge in disaster environments rather than an organizing system... Official organizations which have established mutual trust and have experience working together may greatly benefit from these organizing principles” although, in disaster events, emergence must also be accounted for: “the mistake, however, is when the principles come to form a set of action scripts” (Wachtendorf, 2011, citing Buck et al. 2006).
**Collaboration and emergency managers in operational responses**

Recent literature has identified collaboration as changing the nature of the emergency management profession (McGuire 2009; McGuire et al. 2010; Boin and t’Hart 2010; Waugh 2011). For Waugh and Streib “Collaboration is the way professional emergency managers get the job done” (2006:138).

But managerial styles have been the focus of Disaster Sociologists for many decades. Critique of the ‘command and control’ managerial style formed part of the wider critique of the ‘bureaucratic approach’ to disaster management within Disaster Sociology, which hinged on the tension between different models for understanding and responding to unplanned, emergent behaviour (via policy measures) during disaster response. The command and control model assumes that chaos follows disaster events: it seeks to create order through structured, centralised, planned responses with rigid roles and hierarchy (Drabek and McEntire 2003:106). Weaknesses were identified in the ‘command and control’ model (Dynes 1983; 1994:148; Quarantelli 1986:9) relating to its failure to incorporate research that ‘discredited’ “disaster myths” and studies on actual behaviour during the emergency phase of disaster (Neal and Phillips 1995:333) (Drabek and McEntire 2003:106). Disaster Sociologists have consistently advocated more flexible, adaptive, approaches than ‘command and control’ (Wise 2006) that can accommodate inevitable emergence during the ‘crisis’ phase of events (see Buck et al. 2006; Drabek and McEntire 2002; 2003; Wachtendorf 2011) and ‘convergence’ by citizens and communities (Barsky et al. 2007; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; Quarantelli et al. 1983).

The alternative management style proposed by sociologists recognised that disasters foster emergent norms (Neal and Phillips, 1995:329) and that,

- emergence is not an aberration (Wenger, 1992:10-12)
- emergent behaviour cannot be stopped (Neal and Phillips, 1995:334)
- the public should be viewed as a resource (Mileti, 1989:66) and not a liability (Wenger, 1992:10-12)

(adapted from Drabek and McEntire 2003:107).
2.4.3 The role of the Third Sector in Collaborative Emergency Management

This Thesis builds on an earlier pilot study investigating the role of Third Sector organisations in the provision of emergency response services in Scotland. The term Third Sector was used to capture both the range of organisational types (voluntary, charitable, community and faith groups and organisations) and their active role as a distinct ‘sector’ within service provision. Other terms - ‘voluntary sector’, ‘non-profits’, and ‘non-governmental organisations’ - all have specific meanings about the constitution of organisations, whereas ‘Third Sector’ is a catch-all term.

The role of the Third Sector in emergency response and recovery

Humanitarian agencies play a central role in responding to disasters across the globe. In less economically developed nations [LED Cs] the resources and expertise of international humanitarian assistance organisations and volunteers is valuable in the provision of disaster response (e.g. UNHCR, 2007). Empirical evidence from case studies of disaster response in other nations indicate that there are also roles for other Third Sector organisations and communities in disaster response (e.g. Kano, Seigel and Bourke, 2005; Coate, Handmer and Choong, 2006; Pardasani, 2006; Warner and Ore, 2006; Osei, 2007).

Nolte and Boenigk (2011) summarise recent research on the involvement of the Third Sector in humanitarian responses, and where involvement is problematic they link this to coordination problems between multiple agencies. We know from Waugh (2000) that non-profit organisations face challenges in their involvement in emergency response, and changing attitudes towards recognising the contribution that the sector can make (Waugh and Streib 2006).
The distinction between the planned activities of emergency management and the unplanned aspects of operational response to the ‘crisis’ phase of events becomes critical when conceptualising emergency response networks. Due to the influence of the Disaster Sociology literature, and the greater frequency of ‘extreme’ events in North America, much of the literature stresses the role of the Third Sector at the ‘edge’ of planned responses.

**The Third Sector and the ‘unplanned’ response: emergence and convergence**

**Emergence**

One of the concepts useful in understanding a possible role for the Third Sector - and how it is affected by events - is emergence. The concept of emergence originated in the Disaster Research Centre at Ohio State University, where four typologies emerged from studies of organisations involved in disasters:

1. established (regular tasks, old structures)
2. expanding (regular tasks, new structures)
3. extending (non-regular tasks, old structures)
4. and emergent (non-regular tasks, new structures)

(Quarantelli 1966; Dynes 1970)

These typologies provided a useful analytical device that stimulated further sociological research (Britton, 1988:366) and additional hypotheses about organisational behaviour in disasters, and have since been updated (Drabek and McEntire 2003:98, 100-1). Drabek and McEntire (2003) update previous ‘synthesizing works’ on the concept (:98). Emergent phenomena include both behaviour and organisations. Emergent organisations are,

“citizens who work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters but whose organisation has not yet become institutionalised” (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985).
These groups are not necessarily new but organisations whose structures, functions or relations have changed before, during, or after a disaster (Quarantelli 1996:56), (2003: 100).

Individuals and groups “participating in emergent systems” include disaster victims, volunteers, emergency workers, churches, businesses, government agencies and other concerned or curious parties (including researchers) (Drabek and McEntire 2003:99). Emergency organisations can also include all the same types of organisations found in emergency response, for example search and rescue, damage assessment, operations and coordinating groups (2003:99). In addition to the activities of these groups and organisations are the activities of individuals (or communities of individuals) participating in emergent systems. These include collecting resources, providing shelter, providing emotional support, and a variety of other services for disaster victims (Wenger 1992:3, cited 2003:99). An earlier literature review by Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) found emergence among citizens occurs at different times in different disaster scenarios (Drabek, 1987).

The Third Sector and emergence

According to Dynes’ (1970) typology, emergence can be read as the “unplanned” or spontaneous response. A Third Sector organisation involved in disaster response might be considered emergent if it were

a) providing response without pre-planning

b) providing a role in response other than that for which it had planned.

In this Thesis, affected communities responding to disasters are part of the Third Sector, and may include Third Sector organisations that have previously had no involvement in either emergency response or public service delivery. Third Sector organisations providing disaster response are as likely to exhibit established, expanding, extending and emergent behaviour in disaster response as any other organisation (Quarantelli 1966; Dynes 1970; Drabek and McEntire 2003:98). In addition, new organisations may arise from emergent behaviour by individuals, interest groups, and affected communities. An excellent case study
of emergent organisations and their subsequent contribution to civil society can be found in responses to the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji [Kobe] earthquake in Japan (see Shaw and Goda 2004; Imada 2003; Nagakawa 2003; Tatsuki 2000).

Evidence from the research literature finds emergent phenomena most likely to occur when

1. demands are not met by existing organisations (Auf der Heide 1989:71)
2. traditional tasks and structures are insufficient or inappropriate (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985:98)
3. the community feels it necessary to respond or resolve their crisis situation (Wenger 1992:9)


For emergence to be positively related to a role for new or existing Third Sector organisations they would have to contain the supplementary and innovative capacity to respond under these conditions.

For example, Boin and t’Hart characterise the Third Sector (e.g. Red Cross, Salvation Army) in Dynes’ (1970) typology as ‘expanding’ organisations, with crisis response as a key component of their activity, and a large (‘dormant’) bank of volunteers to meet that commitment. These organisations,

"perform support roles for the established organisations [e.g. emergency services] but may also provide public services in their own right. Their performance stands or falls with their ability to maintain their 'surge capacity', both quantitatively and qualitatively"

(Boin and 't Hart 2010:364).

Empirical data from Disaster Sociology indicates that this capacity does exist:

- The resources and expertise inherent within TSOs are valuable assets for communities (Kapucu 2007b; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2001),
• TSOs can act as philanthropic networks in the emergency phase of disasters (Seessel 2002; Kapucu 2007b:556).
• TSOs may also have a role in directing or absorbing the activities of convergent volunteers.

The most frequent emergent role for the Third Sector is the provision of the ‘ad-hoc’ response before or instead of that provided by formal response organisations, as observed in both developing and developed countries (Raphael 1986, cited in Shaw and Goda 2004:17). In this ad hoc role, “Nongovernmental organizations will respond with or without government approval. Volunteers will arrive with or without an invitation. First responders will self-deploy. This type of convergence behavior is inevitable. Better integration of nongovernmental organizations into federal, state, and local disaster relief operations is the best approach, as recommended by the White House’s review of the Katrina response (Townsend 2006), but this will not be easy to achieve” (Waugh and Streib 2006:138).

Managing convergence
This arrival of human and material resources after a disaster is termed convergence. The phenomenon of convergence often follows a major disaster. Barsky et al. (2007) acknowledge that “what to do with volunteers is still a largely an unresolved issue in the management of emergencies” (506).

Convergence can be beneficial to the speed or effectiveness of a disaster response (Dynes 1994; Mileti 1989; Auf der Heide 1989; Stallings and Quarantelli 1985). However, convergence is challenging in terms of:

• logistics (Wenger et al. 1987:21);
• the abundance of volunteers, who might overwhelm response coordinators (Scawthorn and Wenger 1990:2,4; Auf der Heide 1989:113, 11; Wenger 1989:6; Quarantelli 1986:9);
• media demands which might divert efforts of Emergency Managers (Wenger et al. 1987:41)
• the division of tasks and jurisdictional boundaries (Drabek 1985; Wenger 1992:5)

(adapted from Drabek and McEntire 2003:100)

Barsky et al. (2007) cite three studies regarding the types of activities volunteers can undertake in response. These include basic tasks and providing aid and shelter (Wenger, 1991); organising systems to manage donated commodities from the public (Aguirre et al. 1995); bringing abilities that do not exist in sufficient quantities in the existing response organisations, being close enough to areas to provide immediate assistance, and providing the flexibility needed for organisations confronting rapidly changing conditions (Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2004:2) (cited Barsky et al. 2007:496).

These assets come in addition to those provided by Third Sector organisations as described above, and to the affected communities of ‘lay people’ themselves, who can have the potential to provide alternative sources of assistance (e.g. Kano et al., 2005).

‘Personal convergers’ (volunteers) can be sorted into a five-part typology (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957; 2007:496). The fifth, the ‘helpers’, range from

• professional, technically trained formal emergency responders,
• to the partially trained, and
• to untrained but well-meaning individuals (Barsky et al. 2007:496).

The research is based on qualitative evidence from managers and staff of US Urban Search and Rescue Teams (‘US&R’). The initial reaction of formal responders is to exclude volunteers (following Wenger 1992). The formation of
an “effective site perimeter” (excluding volunteers) is the “most efficient regulatory mechanism” for managing self-responders (Barsky et al., 2007:505). Strategies for managing volunteers that were involved in response were either:

(a) assigning roles to volunteers where they were being helpful without risk of harming themselves or other responders or

(b) assigning roles based on existing specialist skills (2007:505).

Crucially Barsky et al. identify a power dynamic between mandated, official, or statutory response agents (individuals or organisations) and those seen as ‘unofficial’ volunteers,

“The power effect increases as the hours after impact pass and control over the site is re-established by the authorities responding to disasters” (2007:496).

The management of the voluntary response – organisational or individual – in the emergency phase of disaster is dependent upon the leadership of the Emergency Manager, who Barsky et al. note will also be engaged with the formal, planned, response (2007:505).
The role of the Third Sector in planning and preparedness

Unlike the UK, the United States has a high frequency of ‘extreme’ events. As a result, it has a better-developed infrastructure for emergency response and a more comprehensive approach to community and Third Sector involvement, with local networks of community preparedness:

“Neighborhood and community programs have to stand on their own because assistance may not arrive for hours or days” (Waugh and Streib 2006:133).

The number of Third Sector organisations is large enough to stimulate “umbrella” organisations, the largest of which is ‘National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster’ (‘NVOAD’) (Waugh and Streib 2006:134). This acts as “a coalition that provides a platform for its 105 member organisations”, who provide services themselves (Kapucu, Yuldashev and Feldheim 2011:88-9). A large number and range of faith organisations have also been involved in emergencies since as early as 1992 (2006:134). However, “Although integration might facilitate the co-optation of nongovernmental organizations (O’Toole and Meier 2004), it is likely that some differences cannot be smoothed over. Goal conflicts are common, as is distrust” (2006: 138-9)

Moreover, cultural interoperability problems “are major impediments to the effective coordination of disaster relief operations (Waugh 2003, 2004)”, “when organizational cultures vary so greatly”:

“Conflicts between the organizational cultures of groups such as [TSOs] and those of hierarchical governmental organizations, particularly law enforcement and the military, are legend in disaster relief organizations”...

Effective collaboration requires both cultural sensitivity and a common language” (2006:134).

In the US, at the local level “collaboration has always been a necessary skill because of the reliance on voluntarism and community involvement”, “Volunteer firebrigades were organized to protect colonial communities more than two centuries ago, and most American communities still rely on volunteer fire departments. The American Red Cross and the
Salvation Army are still the principal sources of assistance to disaster victims” (2006:132).

Waugh and Streib note that the first decade of the 21st century saw a reduction in the capacity of the US government to work with the Third Sector,

“Effective utilization of nongovernmental resources is a problem following terrorist attacks because the agencies that are supposed to take the lead role are often unfamiliar with the networks that respond to large natural disasters and unused to communicating openly and collaborating closely with nongovernmental actors (Waugh 2003)”

(Waugh and Streib 2006:137).

They reiterate the importance of management styles:

“Greater capacity for command and control is not synonymous with greater capacity for collaboration” (2006:137).

When the research was designed, little empirical information existed about the planned involvement of Third Sector organisations in responses. This was incomplete: much of it was generated from situations when government services were absent or unavailable, for instance in ‘catastrophic’ disasters (e.g. Kapucu 2006; 2007a; 2007b; and Van Wart 2006; Kapucu 2009) or humanitarian crises (above). Empirical research from the Disaster Sociology tradition focussed on ‘emergent’ activity outside of planned or organised responses. Empirical examples from extreme events were not relevant to this Thesis because they differ from routine events typically experienced in the UK,

"In extreme events, standard procedures cannot be followed; such events require a dynamic system to adapt to unanticipated and rapidly changing conditions” (Kapucu 2006: 211).

No data or theory existed on the involvement of Third Sector organisations in resilience as a policy paradigm. However, general principles about the relationship between preparedness and response were drawn out.
Kapucu (2006) used communication as a measure of coordination (:216-217) following Comfort 1999, a socio-technical approach not taken by this Thesis. However, his data from 9/11 supports the importance of prior contact (cf. Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; Tierney and Trainor 2004; Wachtendorf 2004). Following earlier terrorist bombing, preparedness activities "yielded benefits", "A surprisingly coordinated response system, composed of several hundred organizations (public, private, nonprofit) and individuals, and very little direct oversight by any organization, was established within hours of the attack... they made use of lines of communication, information resources and social networks that were already established. They understood and trusted each other, an arrangement that facilitated not only the dissemination of information but also the mobilization and commitment of available resources" (2006:217). Kapucu concludes that “public-nonprofit partnerships”, “can play an important role in bridging the critical gap in service delivery that in emergencies is not met by public organizations” (:217). 9/11 was significant for “the manner in which those agencies interacted with, and obtained support from, non-crisis organizations and from residents in the impact area”. This “active involvement” of extra-local organisations and volunteers enhanced “local capabilities” (:218). He stresses that “ongoing collaboration raises trust” (:217). Kapucu (2007b) describes how these inter-organisational networks are utilised to both solve emergent problems and effectively mobilise community resources (:552), but how the Third Sector can be hampered in this by a lack of prior involvement in response operations or previous communication between disaster response agencies and local non-profit organisations (:555). While the ad hoc response is important, ideally inter-sectoral collaborative efforts toward disaster response are based on the recognition of key interdependencies and planned and exercised for as part of the ‘preparedness’ element of the emergency management cycle (Kapucu 2007b:552). Kapucu indicates that the resources and expertise inherent within Third Sector
organisations are valuable assets for communities, and that the contribution they make to society as a whole (2006) together with their utility as philanthropic networks (Seessel, 2002), suggests that it is viable for them to become part of the service infrastructure (2007b: 556).

The crucial factor in this formalised role would be a commitment to both build the sector’s organisational capacity and include it as part of the response and recovery process (2007b:556).

Kapucu (2007b) found that identification of gaps in the formal response can provide a role for the Third Sector prior to a disaster, facilitating the development of effective inter-organisational networks.

This relies upon,

• previous communication between disaster response agencies and local Third Sector organisations [TSOs] (:555);
• the recognition of key interdependencies;
• and planning and exercising as part of the ‘preparedness’ element of the emergency management cycle (:552).

However, given the evidence of the hierarchical ‘command and control’ tendency within emergency management (above) we might expect resistance to the involvement of these non-expert actors.

Formal roles for Third Sector organisations in emergency response networks, then, are related to involvement in other phases of the ‘comprehensive’ emergency management cycle, particularly in planning and preparedness. This is a novel role for the Third Sector, versus the more usual role in recovery and the supplementary role in response. It is also a neglected aspect of the literature on the Third Sector role in collaborative emergency management (cf. Brudney and Gazley 2009; Nolte and Boenigk 2011). Moynihan’s findings are important to this Thesis because he identifies the most critical period for fostering relationships as between crises, when the structure of relationships “looks more like” a network and less like a hierarchy (2007:2).
Kapucu’s data (2007b) combined with Moynihan’s theory (2007) suggests a planned role for the Third Sector depends on good network management between events, regardless of the managerial style of operational emergency response. The (2008) pilot study for this Thesis similarly found planned capacity-building relationships prior to events that suggested Third Sector engagement at the strategic and tactical level is critical for the its role in the planned response to events at the operational level. At that point, formal roles for the Third Sector were not well conceptualised. There was a particular empirical gap about how preparedness might enable a Third Sector role in response. Thus, in this research project, the links between the activities of preparedness and response were explored.

Communities and preparedness – community resilience?
“Following extreme events, individuals have a desire to help and respond through a number of channels: as members of existing voluntary or community organisations (VCOs), as members of voluntary or community organisations formed in response to the events, or as individuals” (Kapucu 2007b:551, citing Waugh 2000; Comfort 1999; Dynes and Tierney 1994). As antecedents, “communities that have strong working relationships on a daily basis will function better in disaster situations. Trust is crucial in the uncertain situations caused by an extreme event” (Kapucu 2006:209).
In other parts of the emergency management cycle, various approaches consider the role of the community (McEntire and Myers 2004). Most scholarship emphasises community risk reduction, particularly in societies where there are multiple pre-existing vulnerabilities and limited government provision of human services and disaster relief assistance. Indeed, the relationship between communities and disasters is central to the development of the three disaster management paradigms - resistance, resilience, and sustainable hazards mitigation - as described by McEntire et al. (2002).
For Disaster Sociologists, emergence is positively related to a role for communities to respond dependent on the other factors that favour emergence:

- blame assignment (Neal, 1984)
- socio-economic status of the participants (Wenger, 1992:4)
- lack of planning (Scawthorn and Wenger, 1990:3)
- perception of an emergency situation
- supportive social climate
- relevant pre-crisis social relationships
- availability of specific resources
- degree of planning before and experience in previous disasters (Quarantelli, 1996:60-3)


The evidence from extreme events emphasises this role of previous events in strengthening community capacity.

- “The involvement of nongovernmental actors builds the capacity of communities to deal with future disasters. The disaster experience can speed recovery and make communities more resilient when disaster strikes again” (Waugh and Streib 2006:133).
- “Public-nonprofit partnership is not simply an administrative matter... Public involvement in partnerships is a capacity building exercise that helps create a more resilient community” (Kapucu 2006:215).

Kapucu also notes the impact of the partnership process, encouraging:

- collective action and capacity building,
- more effective decision making and implementation,
- and more community involvement and commitment to the success of the policies and programmes (adapted from 2006:215)
Similarly, Tierney and Trainor (2004) found that the network form of organisation and emergent networks “contributes to organisational and community resilience in a number of ways”:

- Redundancy - both replicative (compensating for resources lost in disaster) and generative (e.g. information transfer and novel problem-solving strategies).
- Mobilising resources
- Rapid response to disaster-generated demands due to diversity, decentralization, and lack of formal restrictions on actions

(Adapted from 2004:168).

They focus on emergence – which “some communities are likely much more able than others to capitalize on... and hence are more resilient in the face of disasters” (Tierney and Trainor, 2004:169) – and suggest pre-event indicators of community capability to manage it (Tierney and Trainor 2004:168-9).

At the community-level, amongst the multiple definitions of resilience we find the common notion of community capacity, and community capabilities, whether realised as adaptive capacity or ‘bounce-back-a-ility’ (O’Brien 2008b; deBruijn et al. 2010; Demiroz and Khoza 2011; Manyena et al. 2011).

**Recent literature**

The empirical gap about the influence of the relationship between preparedness and response on the Third Sector role has recently been partially addressed by Brudney and Gazley (2009; McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010) and Nolte (2011; 2012). Both research projects conducted quantitative analysis of survey data and report contexts very different from that of the UK: county emergency management in North America and humanitarian response agencies in Haiti, respectively.
Nolte and Boenigk (2011) conducted a systematic review of ‘partnership’ between governments and non-profits in disaster response – Implicitly, data from planned (formal) roles for the Third Sector (:1386) [Table 2.7, below]. They found “key factors for organizations working in such partnerships”, “like experience, communication, and common norms (Shaw 2003; Kapucu 2006a; Gazley 2008; Alexander and Nank 2009; Celik and Corbacioglu 2010)”. (2011:1386).

Nolte and Boenigk (2011) constructed a deductive model from a literature review that generated, “seven main input dimensions for public–nonprofit partnerships: communication, coordination, mutuality, common norms, trust, experience, and sympathy” (:1390).

Previous critique stressing the importance of context suggests that a systematic review of ‘partnership’ literature that includes other policy contexts may not produce results relevant for emergency management. Nolte and Boenigk also do not address the fact that their particular context – international humanitarian agencies – does not represent ‘planned’ responses to events by government, as have been described in this literature review, as international humanitarian agencies are only present when government responses have been overwhelmed, and are thus a type of emergence (below).

Brudney and Gazley (2009) found that US county emergency manager’s “perception of preparedness was positively associated with the frequency with which voluntary organizations participated in emergency planning” (Gazley 2012:13).

The authors emphasize “an analytic distinction between routine and non-routine NGO organizations and proactively engaging in joint planning and preparedness efforts with NGOs [that] will help county emergency managers better prepare and plan for future emergencies and disasters” (Kapucu 2009: 341-2).
In more recent work, Gazley critiques traditional ‘supplementary’ roles for Third Sector organisations, focussing on the ‘National Disaster Recovery Framework’,

"In one specific example, the NDRF describes the nonprofit role as supplementary to government efforts: to “fill gaps where government authority and resources cannot be applied”... Only some private sector agencies will be comfortable with this “supplementary” philosophy”

(Gazley 2012:3-4).

Kapucu et al. (2011) consider the role of the American Red Cross and organisations of the NVOAD in more depth, noting “there has never been a study to verify their role in the emergency management process” (:90).

Although they could not contribute to the research design, the results of these projects complement the findings from this Thesis. Chapter 8 will consider how this research project complements and extends those analyses.

Unless stated otherwise, none of this recent literature addresses the empirical and theoretical gaps identified in the next section (2.4.4) or gaps in the research methods identified in chapter 3.
Researching the role of the Third Sector in collaborative emergency response and response networks.

From their systematic literature review, Nolte and Boenigk argue that, "few studies focus on the relevant results of public–nonprofit partnerships or link partnership inputs to its outputs and outcomes (Provan and Milward 1995). Further insights are needed to distinguish effective disaster response systems from ineffective ones... (Boin 2005)" (2011:1386).

This Thesis argues that effectiveness is more than a matter of matching quantitative inputs against outputs. De Bruijne et al. emphasise that, "notions of resilience in all the disciplines share an emphasis on the ability of the object under study (human systems) to "bounce back from a disturbance, rather than some output variable" (2010:30).

This suggests that when evaluating the success of partnerships and the ‘effectiveness’ of outcomes in human systems that aim for ‘resilience’, a process-based approach is more appropriate than an output focus: "resilience is a long term process. It is the outcome of an institutionalised approach that accepts surprise as an inevitable event whose magnitude and rippling consequences can be anticipated through knowledge, emerging tools, consensual social collaboration, and preparations to be flexibly innovative. Far from a fix-it-and-forget-it approach, enduring resilience is a balancing act between risk and resources, between vulnerabilities and escalating or unmanageable catastrophe" (Comfort et al. 2010b:273).

This validates (retrospectively) the approach of this research project, which used a longitudinal research design to explore capacity building for increased involvement of Third Sector organisations in the delivery of Scottish emergency response, under a policy philosophy in which an ‘effective’ response is a ‘resilient’ response.
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<td><strong>Partnership Structure</strong></td>
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(c): conceptual paper that does not include an empirical study  
(a): anecdotal paper that does not include an empirical study  
(e): empirical paper that does include a qualitative/quantitative study
Conclusion: the relationship between emergency management and Public Management research

Emergency management research has evolved from its roots (Waugh 2011; Comfort et al. 2012). Much contemporary research into emergency management comes from Public Management scholars who also publish in the wider discipline, with this as a service delivery context of choice (e.g. Cigler; Gazley; Kapucu; McGuire; Moynihan), alongside ‘career’ researchers (e.g. Boin; Comfort; Waugh) and crisis management researchers (e.g. de Bruijne; van Eeten). But the experience of emergencies also attracts local scholars (section 2.3.1), who bring their own perspectives to the analysis of events. The relationship between the discipline and field is evolving.

The applicability of Public Management theory to this context

Because events in the environment of organisations or communities are always unique in some respects, as are responses to them, they continue to fascinate researchers. Efforts for understanding and explanation are dominated by deductive tendencies, in which models are constructed from the theoretical and empirical literature. Because of these deductive tendencies, inaccurate conceptualisations of the processes at work have significant methodological consequences. Thus it is currently not unusual to encounter case studies with well-constructed, valid descriptions of events based on rich data, but with inaccurate or incomplete explanations. We return to this topic in section 8.4.

Conflating crisis, disaster, and emergency management

Emergency management, unlike other public service delivery contexts, seems to lack boundary conditions for the applicability of theory. We can speculate this relates to its blurred roots with crisis management (organisational unit of analysis) and disaster studies (emphasising impacts on communities and spontaneous responses).
These are distinctive fields (Boin and McConnell 2007; Van Wart and Kapucu 2011), as indicated above (section 2.3.1) and neatly summarised by Nolte et al.: “Crisis management refers to the management of unforeseen events, while emergency management refers to the planned management of and for emergencies” (2012:3). Authors who only reference disaster or crisis management literature neglect both the distinctive professions and the phased practices of ‘comprehensive’ emergency management, thus underplaying their significance (e.g. Nordegraaf and Newman 2011).

As an analogy, given the popularity of Health research, it would be unlikely that a study of paramedics and the journey of a critical care patient would use theories developed in participatory, preventive, community health programmes, or the complex inter-organisational governance of a Primary Care Trust would be analysed with process models developed in a single nursing home.

_Underplaying the ‘publicness’ of emergency management_

Because of disaster studies (which incorporate all affected organisations or communities), and crisis management (which can happen in any organisation) there is also a tendency to apply generic organisational theory to the study of emergencies (e.g. Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2006; Kapucu and Grayev 2012). This risks neglecting not only emergency management as a distinctive context for service delivery but also its inherent ‘publicness’. The study of networks in Public Management is now sufficiently well-developed as to be distinct from counterparts in organisational theory (Mandell and Steelman 2003), and emergency management scholars need to attend more closely to the ‘publicness’ of inter-organisational activity in this context.

_Underplaying the context-specificity of the ‘emergency’ phase_

It may not be possible to adequately theorise inter-organisational activity in operational disaster responses using theory generated from non-crisis settings in or outside of Public Management.
For instance, Kapucu (citing Comfort 1999) warns that most of the concepts introduced to explain ‘public non-profit partnerships’ in routine social relations do not explain relations in “the dynamic environments of emergencies” that differ from routine events in four ways:

1. critical and timely information requirements
2. high levels of uncertainty
3. pose a significant test for public, private, and non-profit sector organisations
4. require intense coordination among multiple agencies to achieve shared goals.

(Comfort 1999 cited in Kapucu 2007b:552)

The relevance of data from this context to theory in Public Management

Empirical data gathered in the context of emergency management is used by some scholars to draw conclusions about collaboration or networks in the broader discipline and practice of Public Management (McGuire 2009; McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010; McGuire and Silvia 2010; Moynihan 2009; Gazley 2012).

In terms of collaboration, McGuire and Silvia (2010),

“use emergency management as the context within which to examine the general determinants of intergovernmental collaboration”,

arguing that as collaboration exists and varies in extent, this context can be used as “a test case for multiple hypotheses derived from the management literature” (:280).

Later, they revise this claim, saying: “there may be contextual differences between emergency management and other government functions that future research could investigate” (:287).

This is expanded by McGuire, Brudney and Gazley (2010):

“Emergency management has all the ingredients, complexities, and challenges of networked and collaborative public management – but also
some distinct circumstances given the interest of government, the non-profit sector, and private sector in making emergency management more effective” (125)

This Thesis investigates both the contextual and process aspects of emergency management (see chapter 3), and uses the findings to develop understanding of the relevance of sector-specific empirical data to the Public Management discipline (section 8.4).

Regarding emergency response networks, Moynihan’s research (2005b; 2007; 2008; 2009) on their hierarchical aspects, generated in this context, has been widely cited as relevant for network theory in Public Management (in McGuire 2006:36-37; Provan and Kenis 2008:230; O’Leary et al. 2009:11; Isett et al. 2011:163; Provan and Lemaire 2012:7; Robinson and Gaddis 2012:258), as has his emphasis on the importance of trust. The research also made the link between preparedness and response in emergency management networks (2005b; 2008; 2009), and this is cited in recent studies of networks in the same context (Cigler 2007; Brudney and Gazley 2009; McGuire 2009; Wise and McGuire 2009; Nolte et al. 2012).

Much of the work cited above was only published after the research had been designed and the data collected. With the exception of Kapucu (2006; 2007b), who emphasised limits to applicability regarding the Third Sector, and Moynihan (2005b; 2007; 2008) who proposed the potential relevance of findings from emergency response networks, the research was conducted with a degree of uncertainty as to this relationship. Because of their specificity, those were the studies drawn upon to identify relevant theoretical and empirical gaps.

Because the conceptual framework was linked to measures and the research design, it is discussed in Section 3.1.
**Addressing empirical and theoretical gaps in the research literature**

a) The literature survey in 2008 and 2009 revealed:

1. Following Kapucu (2006; 2007b), an empirical gap on the planned and pro-active role of the Third Sector in UK emergency response.
2. Following Kapucu (2006; 2007b) and Moynihan (2009), an empirical gap on how the relationship between preparedness and response affected the Third Sector role in UK emergency management.
3. A theoretical and empirical gap on the relationship between the planned Third Sector role and the philosophy of resilience. Particularly, theory regarding the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing and operationalising resilience as a policy philosophy.

b) In order to address these gaps and understand the role of the Third Sector in implementing resilience, the researcher would also have to address empirical and theoretical gaps around UK emergency management:

3. A theoretical and empirical gap on the relationship between the implementation of resilience as a policy philosophy and collaborative emergency management.
c) Added to this, significant uncertainties were generated by gaps in the ‘network’ and ‘collaboration’ literature at that time, and by the Pilot Study findings, as to:

1. The applicability of Public Management theory to the context of emergency management, and
2. The relevance of empirical data generated in the context of emergency management to inter-organisational theory in Public Management.

Research Questions

The primary goal of the study was to investigate the role of the Third Sector in implementing resilience (a), but in order to do this the empirical gap regarding collaborative emergency management in the UK (b) would need to be addressed. This is reflected in the scope of the research questions:

• **RQ1**
  What is the relationship between multi-agency working and resilience? Why?

• **RQ2**
  What is the role of the Third Sector in implementing resilience? How is this organised?

• **RQ3**
  What is the role of the Third Sector in community resilience?

Chapter 3 describes the impacts of uncertainties in the literature on the research design (c). Chapter 8 evaluates to what extent the Findings provide insight into the relationship between Public Management and emergency management theory (c), in terms of the applicability of theory to this context (section 8.3) and the relevance of data from this context (section 8.4).
Chapter 3
Methodology
Section 3.1 Concepts and Research Strategies: Introduction

There are four traditions in which concepts are used in the social sciences:

1. Ontological - establishing the main features of social reality.
2. Operationalising – specifying and measuring concepts.
3. Sensitising – refining an initial flexible concept during the research.

The choice of research strategy influences the way concepts are used, although they can be used in more than one way in a research project (Blaikie 2000:140). Public Management research does not deal in ‘ontological theory’, rather it, “is a subject poised – sometimes awkwardly – between empirical social science and deontology, the study of what ought to be” (Hood 2011:321).

Operationalisation “transforms theoretical language into empirical concepts” (:133), and specifies measurement procedures and indicators that will represent those concepts “in the real world” (Babbie 1992 cited 2000:137). In deductive strategies, “hypotheses are deduced from a theory, and the concepts in a hypothesis are measured in order to test whether or not a hypothesised relationship exists” (:140). Variables are the focus of research activity, because they represent ‘observable contrasts’ between different values of concepts (Stinchcombe 1968:2-9) (:134). Inductive strategies also employ operationalisation, alongside or instead of sensitisation to the same concepts.

In operationalising concepts, the researcher selects and defines relevant concepts prior to their investigation (:130). Only deductive and inductive research strategies use concepts in this way (:128). In the abductive strategy, by contrast, concepts and definitions may derive from ‘lay people’ [practitioners], “by a process of abstraction during the course of the research”, becoming more relevant for their purpose in the research (:136). “The research itself is a process in which meanings of concepts are developed” (:137). Abductive strategies use either ‘sensitising’ or ‘hermeneutic’ traditions (:140); generating concepts ‘bottom-up’ rather than from conceptual schemes (:139). Section 3.1 describes how uncertainties in core concepts determined the research strategy.
Section 3.1.1 The influence of the pilot study on research design

Was there a role for the Third Sector in Scottish emergency response?

A 2008 pilot study highlighted a number of changes within the Scottish emergency management sector, operating over a variety of scales (Moran 2008). The changes were felt by the small sample to impact primarily on:

(1) Increased incentives for collaboration due to increased resource needs associated with the management of increasing uncertainty and complexity within organisations’ environments. In particular, respondents indicated that managing the consequences of climatic change would significantly exceed extant system capacities. Increased collaboration challenged a traditional professional culture of secrecy, expertise, and exclusive membership.

(2) The need for better knowledge management through increased knowledge transfer and best practice models. This was a change from previous localised, competitive knowledge management practices. New online mechanisms were utilised for this (e.g ScoRDS website; UK Resilience 2005).

(3) Changing learning practices due to the above factors. Expressed pro-actively in production of learning materials and ‘training and exercising’ (T&E), and reactively through evaluation. Building on iterative cycles of learning and policy change following events is a feature of Emergency Management.

(4) Systemic reorganisation to implement new policies. The Civil Contingencies Act [2004] [‘CCA’] was the driver for systemic change. There was a process of implementing the concepts of ‘resilience’ and ‘community resilience’. The Pitt Review [2008], implementation of the Flood Risk Management (Scotland) Act [2009] and the concept of ‘sustainable flood risk management’ were occurring in parallel as mitigation and prevention were the responsibility of other sectors.

(5) Policy implementation (of the CCA) had driven the formalisation of and capacity-building within multi-agency relationships. There had been changes to the structural organisation of the sector. In terms of Third Sector involvement, the number and size of previously small liaison networks at the local level (within a hierarchy) was increasing. Managing this required new skills.
The major limitation of the pilot study was that this data came from interviews with a small sample of respondents. Further data collection was needed to confirm the nature of these processes and their systemic impacts. This required methodologies that allowed participants to identify and discuss processes that may not operate visibly, but are experienced as ‘change’ (realism, section 3.2).

The pilot study revealed that formally designated response organisations in the Scottish Emergency Management system – ‘Category 1 and 2 Responders’ (Scottish Executive 2006) – did collaborate with and had established relational capital with a number of organisations outside the formal system. In terms of managing relationships with these stakeholders, the pilot study indicated that systemic norms regarding trust, expertise, and professional power determined the quality of what were consequently asymmetric relational interactions. The pilot study suggested that in ‘operational’-level networks Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers played a vital role in ‘gatekeeping’ activities.

With respect to the Third Sector, document analysis of the Civil Contingencies Act [2004] revealed a preference for long-term, contractual relationships where Third Sector organisations [‘TSOs’] had supportive functions based on expertise e.g. search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, catering. This varied locally, but relationships tended to be replicated nationally due to the preference for working with large, nationally syndicated organisations (e.g. Red Cross; WRVS). As indicated above, increasing resource needs stimulated shifting modes of governance to enable the sector to draw on a greater range of stakeholders. TSOs needed representation at the ‘tactical’ level of planning and training, as well as the ‘operational’ level; but this depended on ‘strategic’-level leadership.

The lack of access to or membership of networks by stakeholders, and the lack of mechanisms for collaboration, suggested neither ‘policy’ nor ‘governance network’ theories were applicable to cross-sector collaboration in the setting.
Section 3.1.2 Conceptualising and operationalising resilience 2008-12

Defining resilience: conceptual gaps
The pilot study also revealed that Scottish civil contingencies community actors linked the ‘resilience’ philosophy to formalisation and improvement in the practices of ‘multi-agency’ working. How could this be conceptualised?
The recent volume edited by Comfort, Boin, and Demchak (2010a) helpfully reviews the resilience concept and its relationship to the practice of emergency management. Unfortunately this was not available when the research was designed. Instead the researcher consulted a range of inter-disciplinary theory, summarised by Boin et al. (2010) and de Bruijne et al. (2010) (section 2.3.3-4).
Within social sciences approaches (at macro and micro, but not meso scales), conceptual gaps in crisis and disaster research remained in 2010, including:

- Clear guidance on how resilience can be promoted.
- Resilience remained a conceptual construct.
- There was debate about the concept, and further “refinements and elaborations of the term are to be expected” (citing O'Rourke 2007:25).
- “Resilience has not been converted into an operational tool for policy and management purposes”.
- The definition of the term was so broad “as to render it meaningless” (citing Klein et al. 2003:41-2).
- “Resilience has become an umbrella concept for a range of system attributes that are deemed desirable”.
- Confusion arising from this had led to claims that the concept is unsuited to social systems (instead of physical items); and is too vague for use in disaster risk reduction (citing Manyena 2006).

(adapted from de Bruijne et al. 2010:26-28)

This useful analysis was not available during research design, but the literature review had identified a need to explore the meaning and measures of resilience in this research setting, recommending an exploratory strategy for data collection.
**Measuring resilience: analytical gaps**

Just collecting *descriptive* data in this research setting would contribute empirically to this emergent ‘new paradigm’ of emergency management (Comfort et al. 2010b), although the Thesis also sought to generate empirical *understanding* about the process of implementation, thus generating a theoretical contribution about this and the operationalisation of the concept.

**Defining units of analysis for resilience in emergency management**

An inductive approach to the process of implementing resilience, would require it to be defined as a measurable concept, and operationalised at the meso-level. A deductive approach would have then created variables to measure it.

But in 2008 the basic concept was ill-defined, in any discipline (section 2.3.3-4).

As in 2008, in 2010 even the basic units of analysis were unknown:

- The identification of resilience: characteristics or observable features of systems (as opposed to recognition of the absence of resilience).
- Antecedents and processes: the origin and development of resilient systems (organisations; cities). What process or processes is resilience an outcome of? Can it be engineered, or does it evolve?
- Outcomes: what are the potential consequences of resilience or resilient systems? Whilst a ‘desirable characteristic of social systems’, does it also have costs, a protective [concealing] function, normative implications?

(adapted from Boin, Comfort, and Demchak 2010:9-10)

How to measure this concept? Even the meaning of ‘resilience’ was not stable (following the SES distinction between ecological vs. engineering definitions – see below).

In 2008 the only available application of resilience to emergency management policy design was O’Brien’s analysis of resilience in UKEM policy (and Read 2005; 2006; et al. 2006; 2008b).
Implementing ‘ecological’ conceptions of resilience in policy

From the emergent ‘resilience studies’ perspective (Boin et al. 2010), O’Brien’s contributions applied socio-ecological systems [SES] definitions of resilience, contrasting meanings between ecological and engineering conceptions of the term to suggest possibilities for implementing resilience philosophy in UKEM.

But, as in 2008, de Bruijne et al. indicate that in 2010 there were still significant gaps in knowledge about those concepts in the social-ecological literature:

- Progress in the empirical domain had “lagged”.
- “Research on social-ecological resilience is still in the explorative phase (Folke 2006)”.
- “Exactly how institutions and incentives should be designed to sustain and enhance resilience remains unknown (Berkes, Colding and Folke 2003a)”.
- There had been little attention to find operational indicators (Carpenter et al. 2001:765).
- There is no consensus on how to define or operationalise the concept (Klein, Nicholls, and Thomalla 2003:39).
- Most studies have used it as a metaphor or theoretical construct (Carpenter et al. 2001:767).

(adapted from de Bruijne et al. 2010:21)

Exploring a conceptual model for resilience as adaptive capacity in UKEM

The researcher tried to build a conceptual model using the characteristics of O’Brien’s ‘ideal type’ of UKEM governance as hypotheses (2008b, section 2.3.4).

The main block to operationalising the concept of resilience as adaptive capacity in an emergency management system was establishing that the emergency management sector was an adaptive – in the sense of dynamic - system, rather than a rule-bound system containing adaptive mechanisms that facilitated incremental change in response to events.

- One strategy investigated was whether theory could be operationalised by applying systems theory to the emergency management sector and adopting a Complex Adaptive Systems ['CAS'] framework for analysis. CAS had been
applied in Public Management, but only in a socio-technical, not socio-ecological sense (e.g. Klijn 2008b; Furneaux et al. 2009).

- The pilot study revealed not enough was known about meso-level characteristics to apply and model a secondary set of characteristics (e.g. resilience or adaptive capacity), and relate those to performance.

The empirical and theoretical gaps that emerged around the model during the research design suggested abandoning efforts to construct a conceptual model, and instead simply exploring the process of operationalising resilience. The setting offered the advantage of access – over time – to a system in which resilience was being operationalised as an emergency management policy and its management, and implemented through multi-organisational arrangements. This is thus the ‘revelatory’ category of case study in Yin’s typology (versus ‘critical’, ‘unique’, or ‘extreme’ cases (Yin 1994:40)).

Social learning as a mechanism for O’Brien’s ‘ideal type’ was used as a tool to diagnose and facilitate thinking about community resilience (section 8.3).

This section has reviewed some of the challenges of conceptualising and operationalising the concept of resilience,

“Conceptualisation is the refinement and specification of abstract concepts, and operationalisation is the development of specific research procedures (operations) that will result in empirical observations in the real world” (Babbie 1992:137, cited Blaikie 2000:134).

After exploring multiple sources of theory and different conceptualisations, the researcher decided that operationalisation was not possible as the resilience concept was not sufficiently well-defined, suggesting sensitisation be used, in which the concept could be defined by practitioners. How did this affect the purpose of the Thesis? Those empirical and theoretical gaps discovered around:

- the meaning and measures of resilience in policy in this setting
- the organisation of Scottish emergency response
- the role of the Third Sector in either

suggested an exploratory research design should be adopted in this case study.
Section 3.1.3 Researching collaboration and network processes in the context of emergency management

Investigating resilience in the process of implementation

The meaning of resilience within its implementation in this setting

Due to gaps in the literature around the meaning and measurement of resilience (Boin, Comfort, and Demchak 2010:9-10), a sensitisation approach to concepts was adopted. But did practitioners define it as a process, or as an outcome? Cognitive piloting of the research design revealed that during 2008-10 not only scholars but practitioners were developing their understandings of this concept, its definition, and its measurement. Consulting in early 2010 with policy-makers who had designed the implementation guidance for the Civil Contingencies Act legislation in Scotland (Scottish Executive 2006) revealed it was not yet clear to them by what methods resilience should be ‘measured’, its success evaluated, or what indicators might be used, despite having defined it as a policy goal. This confirmed that building a measure for this study or defining an outcome was unlikely to produce accurate results, but also suggested the concept was operating only as a desired outcome in this setting, so would not be ‘observable’. Instead, it seemed to make sense to measure the processes that practitioners identified as important in attaining this policy goal. Processes of either,

1. Implementing and operationalising the resilience concept, following research linking the governance of emergency management to its organisation (Moynihan 2008; Waugh 2009; Wise and McGuire 2009);
2. Capacity-building for resilience outcomes, mapping back from problem definition, to desired outcomes, to activities to build capacity for those.

By letting practitioners define these processes and activities themselves, their sense-making about the concept became part of the data collected for the study, enabling a secondary analysis that looked for patterns in different definitions of ‘resilience’ (i.e. did it differ between governments; hierarchical levels; sectors?). But how could process antecedents, characteristics, or outcomes be measured?
Researching resilience as an antecedent, process, or outcome?
Beyond defining its meaning in this sector, the primary struggle in 2008 was operationalising resilience as a concept at the meso-level. This has not been resolved since – few of the authors in the Comfort et al. volume (2010a) specifically link inter-organisational emergency response networks and the process of collaboration within them to the resilience concept, beyond the importance of generic socio-technical measures such as emergence, leadership, inter-operability, or communication in emergency response (Boin et al. 2001:11). So was ‘resilient’ emergency response just ‘effective’ responses?

Emergency response as an outcome measure
At the conclusion of their symposium on collaboration (Public Administration Review 2006), Bingham and O’Leary discuss the outcomes of collaboration, a theme echoed by McGuire and Agranoff (2011). They classify that volume’s case studies of emergency management (Waugh and Streib 2006, multiple cases) and response (Kiefer and Montjoy 2006, single case) as representing outcomes: how collaboration can either “succeed” or “fail” (Bingham and O’Leary 2006:165).

What is it about the characteristics and outcomes of a ‘resilient’ emergency management system that is different from those of an ‘effective’ system?
This is not yet defined. The Comfort et al. (2010a) volume provides valid design solutions for ‘effectiveness’ and thus socio-technical resilience of operational responses. Its focus is ‘catastrophic’ or non-routine events that emphasise surprise, system failure, and that communities will, at first, be ‘on their own’. This is an ‘engineering’ version of resilience (de Bruijne et al. 2010), meaning the ability to recover, not the ‘ecological’ sense of an ability recover and adapt. In contrast, this Thesis examined a different set of outcomes than ‘effective’ operational responses, instead investigating the proactive evolution of the governance of an emergency management system to changing threats, seeking to avoid surprise, failure, and emergence. The unit of analysis was defined as the system itself, encompassing organisations in preparedness as well as response
Generic multi-organisational response structures were investigated instead of ‘catastrophic’ events, as this researcher had hypothesised that ‘routine’ responses would also need to adapt to changing threats, as routine events themselves were taking on characteristics of non-routine events, for example due to increasing climatic variability.

Though they define and measure resilience differently, both approaches imply that effective responses to new threats are indicators of resilience. This suggests that resilience as an outcome can be measured using operational emergency responses as quasi-experimental ‘tests’ of effective design solutions (e.g. Comfort et al. 2010a), or adaptiveness as an outcome of policy implementation processes and their impact on the governance and organisation of emergency management (Moynihan 2008; McGuire and Wise 2009; Waugh 2009).

Investigating governance requires a non-cross-sectional research design. Bingham and O’Leary conclude that Kiefer and Montjoy’s case study of emergency response,

"points out that collaborative public management networks, like environmental and public policy consensus-building processes, must be assessed over time and through longitudinal research. It is not a “case” but a new governance structure” (Bingham and O’Leary 2006:165).

Fortunately, this researcher had access to a case study of the implementation of resilience through multi-organisational arrangements, involving both changes to governance and to the organisation of Scottish emergency management. Thus empirical data would describe the operationalisation of resilience in policy and its management, with measures and indicators from the practitioners’ point of view [RQ1]. It would also describe the implementation of resilience through multi-organisational arrangements, to generate empirical understanding of the process of implementing the concept [RQ2]. Finally it would explore policy development and capacity-building for resilience as an outcome [RQ3]. RQ2 & RQ3 would specifically consider Third Sector organisations and processes.
Researching multi-agency arrangements in this context

Policy implementation is investigated here through the contemporary multi-organisational arrangements that define it (Osborne 2006; 2010) rather than traditional approaches to implementation (e.g. Schofield 2001; Hill and Hupe 2003). The organisation of emergency management was important in operationalising policy and changing its governance (Moynihan 2008; Wise and McGuire; Waugh 2009; McGuire and Schneck 2010). But Moynihan’s work also emphasised the importance of interpersonal capital, developed through networks (2008; 2009). Data on structural arrangements and their mechanisms needed to be collected, but processes within these networks would also merit attention. These ‘software’ factors were identified by Boin and t’Hart (2010) as key to “effectiveness”.

Researching collaborative processes

In collaboration research it is common and not considered problematic to mix qualitative and quantitative designs, aiming for ‘complete’ descriptions. Solely-quantitative studies are unusual, but qualitative case studies are often found.

Survey designs

Deductive, cross-sectional survey research designs are currently very popular. In collaborative public management research, ‘collaboration’ is still used as a measure of activities in surveys of multi-organisational arrangements because of the problems of disaggregating this term into process measures (McGuire and Silvia 2010), despite efforts to better-define process in multi-organisational arrangements (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Mandell and Keast 2008) e.g. as cooperation, coordination, and collaboration (Keast 2003; Keast et al. 2007). This trend continues in emergency management research (McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010; cf. Nolte et al. 2012). Collaboration research has shifted “from early attempts to prove [its] existence” to current assessments of performance in terms of either ‘effectiveness’ or outcomes (Robinson and Gaddis 2012:256). Research into the dynamics of emergency response networks “parallels these
trends” (:257). Critiques of survey research focus on whether measures indicate “parallel play’ rather than authentic collaboration...this has left some to wonder if the quantitative studies are actually studying collaboration at all” (:257). These measurement problems “are all the more acute” in disaster research because, “it is not at all clear what collaboration looks like (or should look like) in disaster situations” (2012:257-8).

*Case Study designs*
This research employed the more traditional qualitative case study method. In single-case studies, the focus is often on the arrangement itself – a meso-level of analysis – which forms the focus and the boundary of the study, as it does here. Comparative case studies are a type of survey method that is not considered here e.g. Considine, Lewis and Alexander (2009) blend quantitative SNA with qualitative narrative case studies, giving an unacknowledged retrospective longitudinal perspective (ontology and epistemology unspecified).

*Multiple cases*
It is well-established in Public Management to generate theory on process in networks and collaboration based on analysis across multiple cases (Skelcher and Sullivan 2002; Mandell and Steelman 2003; Huxham and Vangen 2005). These works represent a synthesis of data collected ‘over the years’ (2002:226-7; 2005:31) of conducting qualitative, applied (practice-based or practice-relevant) research, in various research projects funded by government departments, think-tanks (2002), or action research projects (2002; 2005). Where this is specified, the authors note the use of “plural methodologies within a largely ethnographic tradition” (Skelcher and Sullivan 2002:226; also Huxham and Vangen 2005:31-3). Huxham and Vangen sit at the ‘interpretive’ end of the ethnographic spectrum, focussed on practitioner (agent) perceptions (:31-3), whilst Sullivan and Skelcher’s work is focussed on policy programmes or concepts and their material artifacts, with an evaluative or exploratory aim (more ‘structural’ – see below) (:226-7). The agentic, manager-level focus is
used when the aim is to open ‘the black box’ to report collaborative process from the perspective of practitioners (e.g. Agranoff 2006). Other stakeholder perspectives are also valuable (Gazley 2010; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). Unlike this Thesis, all of the above authors use an ‘interdisciplinary approach’ to theory (2002:226), blending Public Management theories with Organisational Theory (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Considine et al. 2009); organisational sociology (2002); and political science (2003; 2002).

**Researching processes in network arrangements**

Recent reviews of the network field identify still-unresolved issues in the most basic aspects of network research, creating empirical and theoretical gaps (Isett et al. 2011; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). Under each are the pragmatic research design decisions made in light of those uncertainties.

1. **Better specification of network types**

Without specification of network types the field is “amorphous”. This is a study of policy implementation networks in the emergency management sector, with involved service delivery organisations from within the sector and without it.

2. **Consideration of Units of Analysis**

The field has debated what is the most appropriate meso-unit of analysis, whether the whole network itself or its sub-units (Isett et al. 2011:161-2). The concern for ‘whole network’ analysis comes from the lack of systematic studies of networks, which hinder comparative analysis but also “our ability to understand just how the whole functions separately from its parts” (:162); recent reviews agree that systematic studies are needed but not on how. This is especially pertinent for the network type of “whole, goal-directed service delivery networks” (Provan and Lemaire 2012). In Public Management, whole-network [SNA] analysis “shifts the focus from the ties that an actor has (an egocentric micro approach) and focuses instead on all of the ties among a set of actors”, thus it shows present and absent ties within a set, and the “extent”
[pattern] of ‘collaboration’ (2012:3). “In this approach, “not only bilateral dyadic ties, but also the multilateral relations that define a whole network” are investigated (:3). This case study combined ‘holistic’ and ‘embedded’ units of analysis to generate insight (Yin 1994:41; de Vaus 2001:220-1). Whilst it is a ‘holistic’ case study of a whole system, purposive sampling was used to generate within-case iteration and validation between the ‘embedded’ units, in a process of data triangulation (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009:59). This is consistent with the theory-building purposes of the abductive data collection strategy, and the chosen ethnographic method (Blaikie 2010:90-92; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:3-4, below). Although a ‘whole-network’ SNA was not practicable in this setting (section 3.3.3), within the ‘holistic’ frame of Scottish emergency management, the research sampled from the ‘whole network’ of Third Sector involvement, and sub-units at different geographic scales and hierarchical levels within that (section 3.3.4). The sampling unit was organisations involved in this ‘whole network’, whether formally or not, consistent with a meso-level analysis.

3. Dynamic accounts of networks

Isett et al. describe current studies as focussed on static networks, neglecting potential changes in social structures over time (2011:167-8). Whilst dynamic studies have increased (Robinson and Gaddis 2012), they have focused on performance (PMR 2008), and the field still lacks longitudinal accounts or an understanding of network evolution (Mandell and Keast 2008:724). This is especially acute in emergency management research, which is dominated by post-hoc analysis of events.

This Thesis sought to generate understanding of the evolution of the ‘whole network’ of Third Sector involvement, but could only conduct cross-sectional observations of sub-networks within that, due to access restrictions. Analysis will thus describe network development using primary and secondary data.
Section 3.1.4 Linking Theory, Concepts, and Research Strategy

The previous three sections have described how the choice to use sensitisation rather than operationalisation of concepts, and the selection of an exploratory design, arose from

- uncertainties in meaning and measurement of concepts in this setting
- combined with theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature.

Operationalisation was not used because, at the time of writing, none of the concepts it employed were judged to be sufficiently well-defined in this setting as to be measurable. Thus the meaning of

- ‘resilience’, and
- ‘community resilience’
- ‘network’ and
- ‘collaboration’ in this setting

would all be developed during and as a result of this research process.

According to Blaikie’s description of available research strategies (2000:128-182) (section 3.1.1), the choice of sensitisation and the purpose of exploration meant that inductive or abductive strategies could be used. Inductive strategies can utilise ‘operationalising’ or ‘sensitising’ concepts, and abductive strategies can use ‘sensitising’ or ‘hermeneutic’ concepts. Inductive approaches in either tradition use concepts derived from theory, which may not match practitioners’ meanings. Both inductive and abductive strategies can be used for the purpose of empirical exploration and description, but only the latter can answer ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions (Blaikie 2010:107) and generate understanding, making it suitable for theory-building (:105). Thus, the Thesis combines the inductive and abductive strategies, employing the ‘sensitising’ tradition in both strategies: concepts began as loosely-defined. This was not the ‘hermeneutic’ version of the abductive strategy because although the language of practitioners was used to help define concepts during the research, their “ultimate meaning” was based on researcher decision-making (2000:138). A ‘hermeneutic’ process, by contrast, exclusively defines concepts ‘bottom-up’.
Linking research strategies to research questions

First, RQ1 necessitated an inductive strategy “to establish descriptions of characteristics and patterns” (Blaikie 2010:86). This generated data – and researcher understanding – to approach RQ2 and RQ3, more complex undertakings given the gaps identified in the literature (section 2.4.4):

- **RQ1: What is the relationship between multi-agency working and resilience? Why?**
- **RQ2: What is the role of the Third Sector in implementing resilience? How is this organised?**
- **RQ3: What is the role of the Third Sector in community resilience?**

Research strategies are logics that can be implemented through any research design (Blaikie 2010:106) but are determined by the purpose of the research project (:104). An abductive strategy can answer “why?” questions by generating understanding, rather than causal explanations that require a variables-based analysis (:107). Both abductive and inductive strategies can be used to answer “what?” questions, with the former usually doing so through ‘idealist’ ontologies (:104), although Blaikie notes there is no reason why ‘subtle realist’ ontologies could not be used, as is the case here (2010:85; :96). “How” questions are “a complex type of description” (:105; :80) and the term is only used here to mean “in what ways...”.

These research questions were also designed to map onto analytical differences between three types of organisations within this sector that had been discovered during the pilot study:

- **RQ1** focusses on policy, and the prescribed inter-organisational, intra-sector relationships within the formal emergency management sector.
- **RQ2** explores cross-sector inter-organisational relationships with other providers of service delivery – Third Sector organisations - and their relationships with one another.
- **RQ3** looks at the issues around cross-sector relationships with communities, which comprise a mix of other types of organisations (e.g. faith; community; private businesses) and individuals.
Linking Research Strategy and Questions to Contributions

The inductive-abductive strategy provides a link between the pilot study and the Thesis, as different phases of an iterative research process to produce both description and understanding of observed phenomena (2010:89) and thus address empirical and theoretical gaps in the literature (section 2.4.4).

In this case an inductive strategy was chosen for RQ1 because of the need to collect empirical data about the general characteristics and patterns of emergency management networks in this case. This need was identified from:

- the empirical gap around inter-organisational networks in UKEM
- the inapplicability of descriptions of the Third Sector role in providing services that had been generated from other public service contexts, as discovered during the exploratory pilot study.

Once that general descriptive data was obtained, the role of the Third Sector in these networks could then be explored, in a progression of the abductive strategy. Thus data collection and analysis needed to address RQ1 utilised selected well-generalised concepts in the literature such as ‘policy implementation’, ‘networks’, and ‘collaboration’ (Blaikie 2010:137-8).

This is not a deductive design, it does not seek to test theory; rather inductive designs seek to collect data with reference to prior concepts but without influence from a priori hypotheses (Blaikie 2010: Yin 1994; de Vaus 2010).

The inductive strategy is used here to address gap (b) in the literature (section 2.4.4) by generating generalisable insights in order to:

- make a novel empirical contribution regarding the operationalisation of resilience as an emergency management policy and its implementation at the meso-level of analysis.
- contribute empirical data from Scotland and UKEM to existing theory about collaborative emergency management.
- extend theory about the process of ‘collaboration’ in this context.
Abductive strategies differ from deduction or induction because they,

“seek to present descriptions and understanding that reflect the social actors’ points of view, rather than entirely the researchers’ point of view”

(Blaikie 2010:91; 79-109).

An abductive strategy seeks to know the world of participants as they construct it, and thus fits well with the realist ontology, constructivist epistemology, and ethnographic methods that were used in this research design (next sections).

The abductive strategy is used here to address gap (a) in the literature and thus:

• make a novel empirical and theoretical contribution by exploring the role of the Third Sector in ‘resilience’ as the ‘new paradigm’ (Comfort et al. 2010a) of emergency management.

• contribute empirical data from Scotland and UKEM to existing theory about Third Sector organisations in collaborative emergency management.

A mixed strategy, such as this inductive-abductive strategy, is appropriate when the purpose of data collection or the research questions demand it (Blaikie 2010:107). Other combinations include inductive-deductive strategies, such as the cyclical model of theory construction and testing (Wallace 1971; 1983; de Vaus 1995 cited Blakie 2010:158) or to explore phenomena before hypotheses can be constructed or concepts selected (Yin 1994).

Describing this case as employing an inductive-abductive strategy may be meaningless to some Public Management scholars, who would just describe it as ‘inductive’ as opposed to ‘deductive’, as they would characterise it as ‘interpretive’ as opposed to ‘positivist’ (Haverland and Yanow 2012, above). In fact, the abductive strategy is sometimes described as an inductive strategy (Blaikie 2007:181), but this is incorrect, as only the abductive strategy uses an iterative data analysis strategy in which “data and theoretical ideas are played off against one another in a developmental and creative process” (:181) in order to build theory (see section 3.4).
Section 3.2 Epistemology and Ontology: Introduction

Section 3.2 describes the selection of ontology and epistemology in this study. It also describes the critical role that reflexivity played in this research design. Despite his “selective” selection of sub-categories (Locke 2007), Blaikie’s diagram [Figure 3.1] helpfully shows the link between research questions, strategies, and paradigms (2010:81); their categories; and progression through decision-making. Options selected for this Thesis are highlighted in bold.

**Figure 3.1 'Research Strategies and Paradigms' (adapted from Blaikie 2010:81)**
The purpose of the research design influenced the selection of research strategy, choice of concepts for the study, and its ontology and epistemology. We have so far explored the influence of the setting on the research design, but not the influence of the researcher. Attention must be given to positionality – the researchers’ purposes relative to the data: why did this research not adopt a subjective, political stance towards this topic?

For instance, this researcher could have begun with a normative stance that ‘participatory’ processes of community planning were essential to attaining community resilience, an ‘activist’ perspective promoted by the report “Exploring Community Resilience In Times Of Rapid Change” (Wilding 2011). The research could have adopted an ‘emancipatory’ discursive epistemology, exposing the power differentials between statutory emergency response services – with legitimacy, expertise, and resources - and flood-affected communities as recipients of those services.

An interpretive approach could have been used to survey residents and gather perceptions of ‘implementation gaps’ and service failures, for example perceived failures to respond adequately or quickly enough to flooding; or the withdrawal of ‘emergency’ services after the initial phase of flooding, leaving communities to deal with recovery for which there were inadequate statutory provisions, opaque governance processes, and inbuilt power asymmetries (such as needing specialist legal advice to assist in reclaiming monies from insurance companies for extreme weather events, and living in temporary accommodation for over 12 months until claims are agreed).

Many research projects such as this exist but, beyond a great story, would not have contributed to theory. Based on the pilot study, the researcher reasoned that this normative, community-centric position would have limited the collection of relevant social scientific data, because:

- Focussing on past events would have allowed practitioners to disqualify accounts of any implementation gaps found because they would be able
to say that they had already addressed these service ‘failures’ as part of after-event evaluations built into the emergency management cycle. Unless nature provided experimental conditions in which a flood of the same magnitude occurred in the same place without any interim improvements to community preparedness, it would not be possible to demonstrate that their evaluation and learning processes had failed to improve service provision.

• If the same pattern were to be repeated across multiple communities then it would be possible to say that there appeared to be generic ‘gaps’ in the provision of response and recovery services to communities affected by extreme weather (evidence from UK and Scottish experiences in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 would seem to support this).

However, it would also be possible for statutory response providers to say that at-risk communities are responsible for their own preparedness and that failings in service provision were generated by increased need resulting from inadequate preparedness and ‘over-reliance’ on services.

• This pattern would allow an empirical observation to be made about communities’ risk perception and how it was failing to adapt to evidence of increasing climatic variability – anthropogenic or otherwise – and the needed revisions to public perceptions of ‘normal’ weather patterns and ‘expected’ events and their impacts. But this observation would inadvertently support the practitioner narrative about ‘over-reliance’.

• The data gathered for this Thesis suggests that research would find that communities’ inherent preparedness makes a difference, and that community preparedness is contingent on local circumstances, such as recognition of inherent environmental vulnerability and the existence of community leaders who can coordinate local awareness-raising and activities. This would not help us to understand what governments could do at national levels to facilitate community preparedness: it would be locally-contingent and thus relativist.
• The research could have advocated for Third Sector organisations as 'underdogs', representing community interests as opposed to those public services that had failed to protect them. If the Thesis promoted increasing the role of the Third Sector per se and they were in fact unable to meet the coordination demands of specialist service provision in conditions of high uncertainty where time, skill, resources and experience are of critical importance, then responses could be impeded and lives could be lost. That would only confirm the appropriateness of existing patterns of provision, and reinforce practitioner prejudices against 'doing things differently'.

In contrast, this Thesis explores:
• why statutory providers perceive Third Sector organisations to be unsuitable for service delivery,
• what the demands of those circumstances are,
• what challenges that poses for Third Sector involvement,
• how Third Sector organisations have responded to that, and
• what would motivate them to do so; which is a theoretical contribution.

Responses from practitioners and policy-makers needed to be elicited in order to make that theoretical contribution. They would have been unlikely to contribute to the research if the frame were a normative promotion of the Third Sector role in light of failed responses by statutory agencies and government. They would also have been unlikely to contribute to an evaluative study, which claimed to impose some outside expert view on their practices in light of a normative commitment (e.g. participation) that might be completely inappropriate to this public service delivery context. They would be likely to contribute that information to a developmental study, such as this one, that aimed to contribute to practitioner learning and the development of policy implementation in order to address problems identified by practitioners themselves, and thus improve future responses. That was the position adopted for this Thesis.
This chapter has so far established the research design of this Thesis as a longitudinal case study, seeking to generate description and understanding using a mixed inductive-abductive strategy. The influences and design were complex, so ontology and epistemology were consulted for clarity, not density.

Ontology and epistemology must be consistent with the methods chosen by the researcher, although they do not determine the method. Data for any design can be collected with any method, but the research design sets out the logic for the enquiry (de Vaus 2001:9). In this case, the choice of methods was determined by the research setting and participants, as described below: SNA methods were rejected in favour of qualitative, ethnographic methods (section 3.3.4). Because this research uses the meanings of practitioners to generate analytical concepts from the data, it seemed to be ‘interpretive’. Interpretive designs are subjective, they focus on actor-level interpretations of social reality, and thus employ a hermeneutic approach to concepts. Although some versions of the abductive strategy do employ hermeneutics, this researcher decided instead upon sensitisation to pre-existing concepts, so that the meaning of those concepts could evolve-in-use during the research. Thus the question of whether the methodology of this Thesis was ‘interpretive’ or ‘realist’ vexed this researcher during the initial research design, throughout data collection, and particularly during data analysis, until completion.

The problem lay in the differing meaning of ‘interpretive’ in organisational research versus social science research.

In organisational research, ‘interpretive’ is used as a contrast to the dominant ‘functionalist’ mode of enquiry (Morgan 1990; Clegg 1994) in Burrell and Morgan’s ‘four paradigm framework’ [Table 3.1]. These paradigms are ‘theoretical perspectives’, providing “a particular language, a conceptual
framework, or collection of ‘theoretical’ and related propositions, within which society and social life can be described and explained” (Blaikie 2000:160); each must be discounted before researchers choose a position (Morgan 1990). The modes have distinct methodologies and goals (Gioia and Pitre 1990:591) and employ different analytic procedures, with different outputs (:593).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Radical Humanist</th>
<th>Radical Structuralist</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Change</td>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Functionalist</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979; 1985)*

Public Management is a type of organisational research, but does not appear to be characterised by a paradigm (e.g. Hood 2011), and nor do its related fields (e.g. Calnan and Ferlie 2003). Indeed, not a great deal of attention is paid to methodology in the discipline. There is no meta-theory (Turner 1991) or paradigm (Freidrichs 1970; Kuhn 1970; Krausz and Miller 1974) into which researchers are socialised; no ‘theoriticians’ theory’ (all cited Blaikie 2000:161). Much Public Management research has pragmatic aims, concerned with theory but also with its ‘relevance’ to practitioners. Public Administration, by contrast, is much more positivistic (e.g. Haverland and Yanow 2012).

In terms of organisational and Public Administration research, this Thesis clearly fits within the ‘interpretive’ category, in its approach to data collection (Haverland and Yanow 2012) and analysis (Gioia and Pitre 1990). But in social science terms, it could not be considered ‘interpretive’, because it seeks to uncover an *objective* reality beneath practitioners’ lived experiences, and is thus ‘realist’, assuming that a reality exists beyond actors’ constructions of it, and assuming that research “can reveal a reality concealed from ordinary members of society” (Travers 2001:11).
Further confusion is added because, although methods are independent of methodologies, there is a pervasive tendency to conflate ‘qualitative’ methods with ‘interpretive’ methodologies. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2009) explain that some disciplines, such as Anthropology, use the terms,

“interchangeably, because qualitative methods still, in practice, include interpretive ontological and epistemological presuppositions” (:57).

The authors contrast this with organisation studies, where qualitative research can also mean objectivist-realist approaches that are informed by positivist ontologies and epistemologies (:57). As described below, this study takes the more contemporary blended approach of a realist-objectivist ontology that allows space for a constructivist and reflexive epistemology, harking back to ethnographic ‘naturalism’ (following Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).

Added to this was a recognition of the structure-agency debate in social science, concerning the causality underlying social action. The structure-agency debate considers the action-theoretical link and the choice between methodological holism (structure e.g. functionalism; ‘classic’ Management theory) or methodological individualism (agency e.g. ethnomethodology; Economics) that is central in the social sciences (Heath 2011).

A true ‘interpretive’ approach would privilege agency, via actor-level insights (Travers 2001), but in studying applied social sciences like public policy and public management one must accept some level of shared reality, and shared structures of reality, although not discounting the influence of social constructivism (Byrne 2011). This suggests that a mixed approach to the structure-agency debate is appropriate, one that sees human behaviour as both influenced by and influencing structure (consistent with Giddens’ (1984) concept of structuration). This is also consistent with the meso level of analysis, which is influenced by both micro (agentic) and macro (structural) processes and their co-constitutive nature. A similar blended approach to structure-agency is used by Skelcher and Sullivan (2008).
In terms of observing structure-agency, Clegg (1994) suggests that within organisational research, organisational practices can be seen as, “an analytical strategy for those writers who seek to transcend the traditional division between objectivism and subjectivism in the human social sciences” (:34). ‘Practices’ integrate both ‘objective structures’ and ‘subjective meanings’, because social practice entails engaging in actions understood in and through the concepts that inform them (e.g. strategies; policy) (:34) These are not necessarily ‘elitist’ strategies, they concern the goal-oriented action of individuals, including informal modes of organising.

Usually the ontology and epistemology of each research strategy determine the stance of the researcher, in that both deductive and inductive strategies demand ‘objectivity’ from the researcher in order to produce generalisations (although modern versions of these strategies recognise that complete detachment is impossible) (Blaikie 2010:106). Conversely, the reflexive nature of the abductive strategy – and the reflexivity it demands – mean it can be used from either an objective, ‘naturalistic’ position ((3), below) or a range of subjective positions (Blaikie 2010:107) – and thus either ‘realist’ or ‘interpretivist’ ontologies (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, below). The researcher stance in this case study confirmed it was objectivist. Stances can be conceptualised as ‘outside expert’, ‘inside learner’, or ‘reflective partner’/ conscientiser (Blaikie 2007). These can be elaborated into six positions toward data collection (Blaikie 2010):

1. Detached observer
2. Empathetic observer
3. Faithful reporter
4. Mediator of languages
5. Reflective partner
6. Dialogic facilitator.

Stances also describe the relationship between researcher and researched: the first two stances seek objectivity, and in the first three the researcher is ‘expert’;
the 4th (Interpretivist) and 5th positions reject detachment and emphasise the subjectivity of knowledge, with the 5th concerning emancipation and the 6th a postmodern view that combines stances (4) & (5) but seeks ‘polyphony’ (:50-2).

In this research project, the stance adopted was that of the ‘faithful reporter’, which developed from stance (2) (2010:51). In this stance, the researcher still seeks ‘objectivity’ but it is the least detached of the objective positions. This stance seeks to present social actors’ point of view, allowing participants to ‘speak for themselves’ by “immersing” themselves in actors’ settings, being sensitive to its nature and conducting research there, describing what happens and how actors perceive it (:51). A crucial aspect of the ‘faithful reporter’ position is that actors must be able to recognise themselves and others in its descriptions. This position comes from the ethnographic tradition of ‘naturalism’ (:51).

Those subjective stances which might be used in the abductive strategy (stances (4), (5), and (6)) are open to charges of ‘relativism’ in the findings they generate, with less concern for generating new social scientific knowledge in favour of reporting the lived experience. Whilst the relevance of knowledge produced by the abductive strategy is bound in time and space, this “degree of relativity... does not invalidate the social research enterprise” (Blaikie 2010:107).

Critique of Blaikie has suggested that these categories are not exhaustive and can be confusing (Locke 2007), so to confirm that this research does have an ‘objectivist’, rather than a ‘subjectivist’ stance (and thus a ‘realist’ and not ‘interpretive’ ontology), further reading was done on ethnographic methodologies and from authors cited by Blaikie as having found “a middle position” (:107) between scientific knowledge and relativism (next section).
Section 3.2.3 Ethnographic methods and methodologies

Hammersley and Atkinson argue that far from the dichotomy between ‘positivist’ (objective) and ‘interpretive’ (subjective) epistemologies - and thus between quantitative and qualitative methods, as is often portrayed - the distinction between ‘realist’ and ‘interpretivist’ ontologies is whether the researcher *themselves* is objective, or subjective (2007:1-19).

From an ethnographic perspective, ‘naturalism’ in ethnographic enquiry is, like positivism, ‘objectivist’ – both paradigms derive from the natural sciences (:7; :10); both seek to understand social phenomena as objects existing independently from the researcher (:10). But their "joint concern with eliminating the effects of the researcher on the data" is realised through different means: positivism standardises research procedures, whereas for naturalism the solution is “getting into direct contact with the social world”, to varying degrees (2007:15).

‘Naturalism’ had evolved from critiques of the ‘subjective’ nature of ethnography in the mid-20th Century, drawing as it did from the ‘interpretive’ paradigms of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and [classic] hermeneutics among others (:7), the last of which shifted during the 20th Century to emphasises constructionism by the researcher (:12).

As the ethnographic tradition evolved, ‘naturalism’ and ‘realism’ were critiqued on the basis of the tension between ‘objectivism’ and,

"the constructionism and cultural relativism that shape their understanding of the of the perspectives and behaviour of the people they study" (2007:10).

The rejection of positivism from the 1950s and 60s onwards meant that some also rejected realism (:11), as natural science moved from a methodological model to an object of sociological study, bringing this tension between naturalism and constructionism to a head (:12).
For Hammersley and Atkinson this constructivism and relativism is compatible with realism as long as it is not applied to the ethnographic research itself (:10).

‘Objectivist’ perspectives claim superior validity to subjective positions and see political and practical commitments as threats to validity (:10), thus critiques of ‘naturalism’ in ethnography questioned ‘realism’ and instead promoted ‘political’ (emancipatory) approaches to ethnography (2007:10-15).

Anti-realist critique came from post-modernist and post-structuralist theories developed from 20th Century European philosophers, such as Derrida and Foucault (:12), who highlighted the constructed nature of reality and multiplexity of perspectives, in highly relativist perspectives. In addition, critical theory and post-structuralist perspectives emphasised the importance of social change (:13), although there were differing opinions about whether the goals of change should be greater research impact or emancipation (:14).

But ‘naturalism’, and its realist ontology, was not invalidated by these critiques. Modern ethnography is not necessarily ‘interpretivist’. Rather, within ethnography there exists a spectrum of ontologies (Gains 2011). Gains notes that ethnographic method has been used previously to powerful effect in Public Administration and Management research, for example by Heclo and Wildavsky 1979 (2011:157). However ethnographic methodologies are problematic because whilst they all share a constructivist perspective – with actors’ understandings affecting their behaviour – “there are different ontological stances about the degree to which it is possible to think of and therefore research an external reality beyond that constructed by shared meanings” (Gains 2011:160 citing Schatz 2009:4).

These stances can be summarised as (1) realist, (2) interpretivist, and (3) post- modern with, respectively, a concern to (1) capture generalisable insights; (2) problematise meaning-making of the researcher; and (3) problematise generalizability (Kubik 2009:37, cited Gains 2011:160).
Gains’ identification of shared constructivist perspectives in ethnographic epistemologies thus form “a continuum” from method (realist epistemology) through ‘interpretivism’ to ‘post-structural/post-modern ontologies’ (e.g. Hay 2011 same volume) (:161).

This Thesis uses ethnographic methods as part of a ‘realist’ ontology, having, “great advantages over most other conventional scientific methods as a way of getting at cause-effect relations” (Tilly 2006:410 cited Gains 2011:161).

Gains (:161) notes that ‘this end of the spectrum’ ['objectivism'] has been called ‘neo-positivist’ (Schatz 2009:12), ‘positivist-qualitative’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006:xviii) and ‘modern empiricism’ (Rhodes 2005:5; Gains notes his inconsistency along the spectrum) (:161-2), although as argued above, ethnographic ‘naturalism’ and ‘positivism' have different ways of seeking observer ‘detachment’.

Despite these critiques, and the desire of interpretivists and post-structuralists/modernists to avoid determinism (:162), a ‘realist’ approach to ethnography as a ‘way of knowing’ is adopted here because of the influence of institutions in Public Management settings (policy, legislation), and the aim to use exploration of Third Sector roles to expose the assumptions underlying structures – and structural processes – in this setting.

From the realist (“constructivist modern empiricist” :162) perspective, “the danger of an anti-foundational approach is in ignoring the material realities and relatively fixed structural processes underpinning social and political life” (:162).

An interpretive approach “lacks acknowledgement of the institutional context within-which situated actors interpret their worlds” (Hay 2011:167-182 cited Gains 2011:162). The 'situatedness' of actors is essential to the analysis of process (Pettigrew 1992; Van de Ven 1992) and to 'embeddedness' in the case study design (Yin 1994). Thus realism offers not only a resolution of the structure-agency debate but an insight into the interplay between these factors.
Example: ontology and epistemology in [policy] network governance

Gains’ continuum was a contribution to ongoing epistemological debate on network governance, picked up recently in the journal ‘Public Administration’. That issue assessed the legacy of [outgoing editor] Rod Rhodes’ network theory of governance: a highly influential policy network approach. Marsh, Rhodes’ one-time collaborator, describes their divergence in epistemology and ontology, with Rhodes pursuing ethnographic ‘interpretivism’ whilst Marsh offers critical realism as an alternative (2011). Marsh gives an in-depth treatment of Rhodes’ evolution from institutionalist to interpretivist (2011:32). The critique centres on what he sees as Rhodes’ false dichotomy: characterising the ‘Westminster’ and ‘differentiated polity model’ of British politics as opposites generated by positivism/ ‘modern empiricism’ and interpretivism, and the unresolved tension this generates about whether network governance is an empirical fact or a narrative (2011:33; :43; :46). For Marsh, this downplays (or ignores (:42)) the critical realist perspective and two alternative approaches to British politics (and network governance) it has generated: either his own ‘asymmetric power model’ (with Richards and Smith 2002; 2003; and Anulla 2005) or Fawcett’s ‘metagovernance’ approach (2009), building on Jessop’s earlier work (2003; 2004; 2005). The different models arise in part from epistemological differences based on the existence of “an extra-discursive realm” (:43). This difference in ontology “can’t be resolved empirically; you cannot ‘prove’ your ontological positions. Rather, it [the existence of a reality – here, path dependency – beyond subjective agentic dilemmas and agents’ responses] needs to be examined empirically” (:43, citing Hay 2007). He argues robustly in defence of critical realism as more than ‘modern empiricism’ (40; 42; 46): that it is not deterministic (:41), and neither does the ‘asymmetric power model’ – nor he – ‘reify institutions or structures” (:42). Marsh sees dualities between the material and the ideational, institutions and ideas, and structure and agency (:41-2), thus his model is an example of that blended view of structure-agency that characterises realism – “it is rooted in the idea that structures and institutions constrain and facilitate, but do not determine, agent’s actions” (:41).
Section 3.2.4 Applied or basic? Uninvited action research

**Applied or basic?**

Public Management is an applied discipline, undertaking both ‘basic’ (theoretical problems, theory-oriented, knowledge for understanding) and ‘applied’ research (practical problems, policy-oriented, knowledge for action) (Blaikie 2010:49). In practice, most social research combines the two modes, and may do so at different stages in the research (:50). The defining feature of ‘applied’ research is that the problem has been defined by someone other than the researcher, for example a commissioning agency (:50): “applied researchers are more pragmatic and change-oriented and generally have to pursue goals set by others” (:49).

These definitions set up a duality that is problematic for researchers. In this case, research tackled a practice-generated problem, and used co-design with practitioners, as a tool to secure access to the participants and the research setting. However, this was not ‘invited’ – and thus not ‘applied’ – research, and this distinction threw up interesting issues throughout the project. The question of whether or not this constituted an action research project was also problematic. It was not, but contained many features of such a project.

This duality between invited/proactive practice-relevant research is problematic for researchers who pursue research designs where a practice-relevant problem is proactively defined and explored by the researcher. In this case study, the researcher consulted with participants to study an emerging issue that they defined as being relevant in the mid-range future. During the longitudinal project, the issue became increasingly pressing, and the researcher was increasingly able to intervene in the evolving process and facilitate deeper consideration of the future impacts of current decisions. This was similar to the ‘emergent action research’ project described by Marshak and Heracleous (2005), in which inductive insight evolves from the combination of practice-relevant research, iterations with theory, and change in the research setting.
These are not just definitional issues – whether a project is basic or applied will affect its ontology and epistemology because of the tendency of commissioners to seek ‘functionalist’ outputs (Morgan 1990), and the influence of purpose on which research strategy is adopted – deductive, inductive, abductive or retroductive (above). It also affects the analysis of the data – methods such as Huxham’s ‘Research Oriented Action Research’ framework are designed for use in that setting only (e.g. Huxham and Vangen 2005; Huxham and Hibbert 2011).

**Engaged research**

These issues may perhaps be resolved with the use of the terminology of ‘engaged research’. This is a concept that has similarities with the ethnographic method of Participant Observation and the research designs of action research (e.g. Eden and Huxham 1996) or ‘Mode 2’ research (Tranfield and Starkey 1998) (Beech, Hibbert, MacIntosh and Mclnnes 2009:196-7) – both research designs intended for application in the Management discipline as well as outside of it. Engaged research has similarities with all three approaches (:197-8),

"Engaged Research can therefore be conceived as an effort to co-produce knowledge in which both researchers and practitioners seek to improve things in the workplace while simultaneously marshalling and producing formal and informal knowledge" (Beech et al. 2009:198).

The topic of ‘Mode 2’ and ‘engaged research’ continues to be current for UK Management researchers (see Pettigrew 2011; Hodgkinson and Starkey 2011; Bartunek 2011 in recent BJM volume). They offer the potential to cross the “double hurdle” of ‘rigour and relevance’ (Pettigrew 1995; 1997), particularly pertinent given the current focus on research ‘impacts’.

Hodgkinson and Starkey describe ‘Mode 2’ research as having been designed to be “both theory-sensitive and practice-led”, countering the dangers of (a) “epistemic drift” or (b) “academic fundamentalism” (2011:356). They offer the critical realist approach as a contemporary resolution of these issues (:362-5).
Critical realism in organisation studies

Critical realism seems to be a problematic concept within Organisation Theory. In the broader social sciences it is understood as a combination of an objectivist ontology with a social constructionist epistemology (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007) that overcomes the limitations of both realist enquiry and relativist explanation. The previous sections have elaborated a critical realist position that takes a blended approach to the structure-agency debate that is commensurate with structuration theory (Marsh 2011). Critical realist ethnographies are enabled by reflexivity in the research process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, Chapter 1) and valid according to the criteria of organisational ethnography (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009). They employ ethnographic methods but reject ethnographic methodologies, which are interpretivist in the social science sense of subjective ontologies (Gains 2011).

In organisation studies, both Fleetwood (2005) and Reed (1997) have expanded upon the ‘stratified ontology’ of critical realism, that combines realist ontology with social constructionist epistemology. Reed (1997) “supports a critical realist position as providing a layered or stratified social ontology on which a more structurally robust and inclusive explanations of organizational phenomena can be constructed” (:21). But the discipline has not, thus far, been able to appreciate this stratified ontology, despite attempts to clarify this (Fleetwood 2005), and Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) provide numerous examples of misinterpretation.

On the whole, the literature has failed to appreciate the difference between social constructionism as an epistemology or as part of a subjective ontology. It is still possible to find descriptions of social constructionism as an ontology (not epistemology). There are also descriptions that treat the critical realist and realist positions as interchangeable, setting these two approaches up in a dualism with social constructionism that does not and could not exist (e.g. Newton, Deetz and Reed 2011). When a significant and more sophisticated
debate exists within the broader social science canon, descriptions of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ variants of social constructionism are neither helpful nor accurate, and neither are attempts to create endless new conceptual frameworks of social constructionism (e.g. Cunliffe 2008). As a result of these misleading contributions and methodological confusion (see Fleetwood 2005), the ‘linguistic turn’ in Organisation Theory appears to have ‘turned’ all the way to wholly subjectivist ontologies, and missed the halfway position offered by critical realism.

Access and Elites
The adoption of an ‘engaged’ approach suited the purpose of this research design but was also driven by access needs.
A knowledge manager within the Scottish Government set conditions of access to civil servants, specifying that their accounts were not to be ‘deconstructed’ nor subject to discourse analysis, and a critical realist perspective should be adopted. For the sake of equality, discourse analysis was not applied to Third Sector participants, excluding valuable interpretive research tools.

Co-Design
As referred to briefly in section 3.1, cognitive piloting was used with three ‘gatekeeper’ participants throughout the study to determine what method would generate the best data in this setting. The three ‘gatekeepers’ were all in strategic capacity-building roles: at the regional, practice level; in the policy implementation development agency; and in a bridge role between the Scottish Government and the Third Sector. In response to their feedback, the initial research design changed significantly. Two of the participants were consulted again during the research design, one extensively, as new avenues for exploration appeared. The research design changed again several times during the research. Rejected designs included survey questionnaires (too time-consuming), social network analysis (too intrusive; not enlightening), proposed action research projects (too complex to negotiate between this and academic
role), structured interviews (too intrusive; standardised access not possible); comparative case study designs (standardised access not possible; too complex), comparative observation (too intrusive; consent not given). Although efforts were made to minimise its negative impact, exploring these options with several potential participants generated some confusion and distrust of the researcher. Ironically, adopting a theory-led deductive design, rather than a data-led project, would have seemed more professional to participants although it would not have yielded the same depth of insight. This approach generated data that made the most of a rapidly developing agenda, but was resource-intensive for the researcher in remaining vigilant about emerging opportunities and chasing them. It involved careful negotiation of research paradigms to maintain consistency between the research aims and gathering the best data to address the research question. It also necessitated continual revisions and reporting of the research design.

**Sensitivity to theory**

The sensitivity of the researcher to conceptual issues in theory led to some research design decisions that also confused participants. For instance, during the research project there was a ‘swine flu pandemic’ (an outbreak of the H1N1 Virus, specifically). Although fascinating in itself, the crisis response was not the right place to generate data about longitudinal capacity-building. Nor was the response to a medical pandemic – necessarily involving only specialist agencies, in combination with media engagement and ‘warning and informing’ the public - the right place to generate understanding of how Third Sector organisations and communities were routinely becoming more involved in emergency management. By definition, this was a response that would exclude people. Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, access to a politically sensitive active response was likely to be problematic and would yield limited insight from participants, if not be downright disruptive by making additional demands during a crisis. However, the decision not to take advantage of this case study as it happened clearly baffled some participants (see Chapter 9).
Interventions

The research began with a desire to intervene in policy development around the resilience concept, based on the ‘ideal-type’ model of adaptive capacity generated by systemic change (O’Brien 2008b), following Burns (2007). It quickly became apparent that this ‘space’ was not available within the system under study, and in fact the agenda of Third Sector involvement lay in the mid-to long-range future for this policy area, offering a different type of opportunity for intervention. The researcher thus became progressively more involved in policy development on this emerging agenda until she was able to co-design and co-facilitate a workshop for 60 members of the relevant policy and practitioner organisations. There, she also took the opportunity offered by a ‘roving microphone’ in the audience to steer group discussions on to challenging or hidden topics, in order to facilitate deeper discussions. Just getting access to the event took 8 months of negotiation, and insistence (see Chapter 7).

Uninvited Action Research

The researcher coined the term ‘uninvited action research’ as a defence of her approach, the relative impacts of which are evaluated in Chapter 9. It comprises:

• Identifying an emerging strategic issue and exploring key concepts theoretically. Demonstrating (a) up to date, (b) technical, knowledge of policies to practitioners to generate legitimacy and gain trust.

• Co-designing research with participants based on their future information needs. Attending seminars to access emergent strategic thinking, as actors at this level were not accessible. Using this thinking to challenge proposed policy development during conversational interactions with participants.

• Negotiating and brokering increasing access to bridge-points and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to garner their thoughts and discover which agendas they were pursuing and how. Brokering links between actors in some cases.

• Using legitimacy and trust to increasingly question and test policy ideas.

• Eventually gaining access to policy development and receiving validation from practitioners and scholars of the validity of this topic and approach.
Section 3.3.1 Reflexivity

It has been argued that ethnographic methods and the abductive strategy require both constructivist perspectives (Gains 2011:160) and reflexivity (Blaikie 2010:107) – characteristics usually associated with interpretivism. But, both of these authors advance realism as an ontological option: why is this so? For this researcher, the argument advanced by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) provided a welcome resolution to the ‘realist/’interpretivist’ distinction, by arguing that reflexivity is the tool by which realist ontologies can be used alongside constructivist epistemologies (14-19).

This is expanded upon here because reflexivity represents the investment of this researcher into the research process that occurred, which determined the quality, breadth and depth of the findings and their impact on the setting.

Reflexivity recognises that researchers are part of the social world they study, “a rejection of the idea that social research is, or can be, carried out in some autonomous realm that is insulated from wider society and from the particular biography of the researcher, in such a way that its findings can be unaffected by social processes and personal characteristics” (2007:15).

This is based on the idea that reflexivity is part of “everyday social practices”; from the ethnomethodologists view it is how social actors make their actions and the social world meaningful to themselves (Blaikie 2010:53). Giddens incorporated ‘reflexive monitoring’ into structuration theory, as “the active monitoring of the ongoing flow of social life”, monitoring of the self and others at the level of individual, but also social and physical aspects of context (1984:5, cited 2010:53). For ethnographers, social scientists’ creation of new knowledge must involve the same process of constructing and maintaining social worlds; the social researcher will draw on “the same skills that social actors use to make their activities intelligible” (2010:53, citing Giddens 1976:157-61).
We usually associate the concept of reflexivity with post-positivist epistemologies, and particularly with ethnographic methods. It formed the basis of critiques of positivism and naturalism in ethnography because it entails a rejection of objectivists’ actions to “eliminate” the effects of the researcher on the researched (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:14-19),

“By turning him or her either, in one case, into an automaton or, in the other, into a neutral vessel of cultural experience. However, searches for empirical bedrock of this kind are futile; all data involve presuppositions (Hanson 1958)” (2007:15).

Post-positivist critiques imply that acknowledging reflexivity involves taking a ‘subjectivist’ stance (i.e interpretivism, critical theory, post-structuralism, post-modernism). But Hammersley and Atkinson argue that a recognition of researcher reflexivity does not undermine a commitment to ‘realism’ (:16-17), although it does mean that some, though not all, ideas of positivism and naturalism have to be abandoned (:15),

“we do not see reflexivity as undermining researchers’ commitment to realism. In our view it only undermines naïve forms of realism which assume that knowledge must be based on some absolutely secure foundation... there is no way in which we can escape the social world in order to study it. Fortunately, though, this is not necessary from a realist point of view” (:15-16).

As we saw above, positivist approaches have always claimed validity on the basis of its objectivity, and interpretivists have always rejected these claims of validity by arguing the ‘situatedness’ of research produced, which leads to objectivists charging them with ‘relativism’.

Hammersley and Atkinson show how reflexivity allows us to address validity

• Whilst acknowledging that research is an active process, and thus that findings and data are constructed, this “does not automatically imply that they do not and cannot represent social phenomena”.
Neither does acknowledging our effect on the ‘researched’ mean that “the validity of our findings is restricted to the data elicitation situations on which we relied” (2007:16).

Instead, the authors propose,

“Once we abandon the idea that the social character of research can be standardised out or avoided by becoming a ‘fly on the wall’ or a ‘full participant’, the role of the researcher as an active participant in the research process becomes clear. As has long been recognised by ethnographers, he or she is the research instrument par excellence” (2007:17).

The role of reflexivity in this research design
The argument presented above perfectly encapsulates, in retrospect, this researcher’s approach to data collection.

Having accommodated participants’ professional demands in the emergent design, respected their professional status in bounding the scope of investigation within a ‘critical realist’ (not interpretive) frame, and adopted ethnographic methods in order to better access a unique professional culture in small ‘closed networks’, the researcher still had to ensure that the core influence on decision-making was a concern for the social scientific data produced, and the best data, given the circumstances.

Recognising that the longitudinal design gave the opportunity to develop relationships with participants, and capitalising on the legitimacy inferred by participants from her institution and status as a professional researcher, the researcher decided to take an ‘uninvited action research’ approach (section 3.2). Participants had framed a mid- to long-range issue that needed to be addressed, which was the identification of mechanisms and processes to build community resilience, and exploration of the Third Sector’s role in this. But from the pilot study – and comparisons between the research setting and descriptions of
networks in other settings from Public Management theory – it was clear that there were a set of implicit rules governing membership and activities within networks, which would constrain any actions taken towards these goals. From an opportunistic perspective, that meant the case study was a potential site for an intervention by the researcher, in order to identify ‘gaps’ in current actions that would hinder the attainment of ‘resilience’ through those processes. But, as this was ‘uninvited’, the researcher would first have to

- develop a thorough understanding of the research setting
- establish the validity of that knowledge by testing it with participants
- establish the relevance of her conceptual framework
- make interventions where there were decisions or processes that would affect outcomes according to the conceptual framework.

To do this, acknowledging positionality and purposes would be crucial. Actions had to be about the generation of better data, making a unique contribution to theory, and being normatively neutral in order to do so (see section 3.2.1).

The objectivist, realist approach did not negate the adoption of ethnographic method, on the contrary, it exploited it: participant-observation incorporated peoples’ responses to the researcher, and how these varied over time in the research process:

“We can minimise reactivity and/or monitor it. But we can also exploit it: how people respond to the presence of the researcher may be as informative as how they react to other situations” (2007:16).

Taking this exploratory approach was risky for a novice researcher, and was dependent on the cultivation of a reflexive self-awareness, the constant exercise of ‘active reflexivity’ in sensitivity to the setting, and in recording researcher reflections and examples of ‘active reflexivity’ as a source of data,

“…the researcher should constantly take stock of their actions and their role in the research process and subject these to the same critical scrutiny as the rest of their ‘data’” (Mason 2002:7 cited Blaikie 2010:53).
Section 3.3.2 Reliability and validity in ethnographic research

Reliability and validity in case study designs

For Yin, a single-case design is appropriate “under several circumstances”:

1. *The critical-case* – meeting all the conditions for testing a “well-formulated” theory (to confirm, challenge, test) (:38).
2. *An extreme or unique case* – when a theory exists but is rare, providing more data on this and any related phenomenon (:39).
3. *The revelatory case* – when access gives the opportunity to observe and analyse a previously inaccessible phenomenon, even though the phenomenon may be a common occurrence (:40).

For each of these, the researcher must take care “to minimise the chances of misrepresentation and to maximise the access” in order to avoid the “potential vulnerability of the single-case design” in not providing the expected data (:41).

The circumstances that recommended a single-case study design for this project were related to access, best fitting the ‘revelatory’ category of case. This was because the small sample size of Scottish emergency management as a national system (next section) offered the chance to collect in-depth, qualitative, longitudinal data about process at the level of the system and sub-units.

Yin presents four types of case study designs in a 2x2 matrix [Table 3.2]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>single-case designs</th>
<th>multiple-case designs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>holistic</em> (single unit of analysis)</td>
<td>single-case (holistic) designs</td>
<td>multiple-case (holistic) designs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>embedded</em> (multiple units of analysis)</td>
<td>single-case (embedded) designs</td>
<td>multiple-case (embedded) designs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Yin 1994:39
This was a ‘holistic’ case study design of the overall emergency management system with multiple ‘embedded’ sub-units (Yin 1994:41; de Vaus 2001:220-221). Yin describes the risk that an embedded research design may over-attend to the sub-units of analysis and fail to return to the larger (systemic) unit of analysis (1994:44). As “the original phenomenon of interest”, this then becomes “the context and not the target of the study” (:44). The research questions have been explicitly framed to avoid such a danger - RQ1 looks at process at the level of the whole system in implementing policy change; RQ2 examines, in detail, the multiple processes this entails, and RQ3 synthesises both in a diagnostic mode.

Reliability and validity in qualitative case study designs
Reliability and validity ‘test’ the logic of the research design (Yin 1994:32). The terms can refer to both the design and the measures of a study (de Vaus 2001:29). The concern for validity and reliability means that “design work” is about the conduct, not just the planning, of a case study (Yin 1994:34). Yin (1994:33) describes how case studies can meet these criteria [Table 3.3].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four Design Tests</th>
<th>Case study tactic</th>
<th>Phase of research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct validity – correct operational measures for the concepts being studied</td>
<td>1. Use multiple sources</td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Establish chain of evidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Key informants review report</td>
<td>Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal validity – establishing a causal relationship in which x leads to y (explanatory only)</td>
<td>1. Do pattern-matching</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Do explanation-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Do time-series analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External validity – domain to which study findings can be generalised</td>
<td>1. Use replication logic in multiple case studies (n/a)</td>
<td>Research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability – operations of a study can be repeated, to produce the same results</td>
<td>1. Use case study protocol</td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Develop case study database</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Yin 1994:33
This research project cannot apply many of these criteria – it does not use variables nor explanation-building nor replication. Of the types of validity considered by Yin (1994:30-33), only the ‘construct validity’ and ‘reliability’ tactics could be employed, as part of data collection (below). Beyond defining the case, neither de Vaus (2001) nor Yin (1994) were relevant to this study, due to their positivist approach to analysis and theory-building (noted by Blaikie 2010; Haverland and Yanow 2012 respectively), inapplicable to this exploratory case using interpretive analysis (Gioia and Pitre 1990).

It is often claimed that quantitative and qualitative research designs differ on the basis of their criteria for validity and reliability. Qualitative case studies face “a common objection” that, whilst high in ‘internal validity’, or ‘truthfulness’, accounts produced this way lack external validity, i.e. generalisability (Calnan and Ferlie 2003:191). However, this miscasts ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ as research paradigms, instead of different types of methods (Blaikie 2007:272).

Research paradigms do vary in their criteria, on the basis of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ and thus on the ‘representativeness’ of data and the influence of the researcher (section 3.2). For instance Travers (2001), writing from an Interpretive social science perspective, considers the ‘realist’ approach adopted by this study as a ‘positivist’ style of ethnography (citing Hammersley 1991), because of the concern for reliability and representativeness, versus the Interpretive position (:10). But although this was a realist case study it was not positivist because of the abductive strategy that was adopted. What determined the applicable standards of reliability and validity was the use of concepts to sensitise the researcher rather than to operationalise into measures, and the purpose of building understanding rather than building explanation.

The processes of explanation-building and theory-building are often used interchangeably by scholars and in the literature but the latter does not require a variables-based analysis, and is thus more appropriate for this exploratory study. This Thesis does not employ Calnan and Ferlie’s (2003) strategies to increase its external validity, because it makes no claims to generate ‘universal’
explanatory theory. Instead it is an exploratory case study, seeking only to generate understanding and description through abduction (Blaikie 2010), so it employed alternative tactics:

- **Internal validity** was the purpose of this research design, data collection, and analysis, which uses participants’ meanings, multi-sector multi-level sampling, and iteration to build theory in an abductive strategy (section 3.4).

- Theory-building itself can be used as a source of increased **external validity**, when it is used “as an additive explanation of what has been observed” (Calnan and Ferlie 2003:188, citing Pawson and Tilly 1997).

In order to enhance generalisability - in the softer, qualitative sense of transferability (2003:190) - the contingency of the findings can be reduced by (a) specifying the context – in terms of time and space dimensions (:191), (b) being reflexive in acknowledging the role of the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:16-17 – as above), and (c) specifying network types and units of analysis (Isett et al. 2011, Chapter 2; section 3.1).

- Calnan and Ferlie (2003) describe context as one important determinant of **construct validity** in process research. For process researchers, “context always matters”, not as a residual, but a part of the analysis (:190). They cite Pawson and Tilly’s (1997) suggestion that mechanisms work differently in different contexts and produce different outcomes (:190). Similarly, the ontological assumptions of an abductive strategy require the recognition of time and space limitations (Blaikie 2007:261, section 3.3.3).

- **Reliability** is more complex. It was the researcher, in that time and place, who generated the data that is reported here, but the data that is reported should represent participants’ accounts and meanings, and has been verified with them to ensure its accuracy. Thus, if the researcher has done a good job in representing the research site, the data is reliable, if not replicable.
Reliability and validity in organisational ethnographic research

Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2009) recognise (like Travers (2001), above) that ‘ethnographic’ research contains fundamentally different paradigms within it, and propose alternative criteria for judging the reliability and validity of organisational ethnographic research, designed to be relevant for both social science paradigms:

- Interpretive – constructivist-interpretive
- Qualitative – objectivist-realist.

They suggest readers are likely to holistically assess research by six of the most commonly used and referenced (Schwartz-Shea 2006) “methodologically appropriate” ‘evaluative criteria’, not only in the manuscript, but in the methods and substance of the research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009:59).

This researcher believes that these criteria have been addressed by this research design, the way it was conducted, and the way it has been written up:

1. **A thickly descriptive manuscript**
   “a nuanced portrait of the cultural layers that inform the researchers’ interpretation of interactions and events” (2009:60; section 3.2.1; 3.3; 3.4) with,
   - sufficient detail, relevant to the research question and supporting claims
   - imparting the specificity of the social, political, and organisational context
   - based on situation-specific judgements of relevant detail, when the reader is less familiar with the setting than the researcher.

2. **Demonstrating reflexivity about the researchers’ roles in the field**
   - The ‘positionality’ affecting research questions and interactions, plus access to sites and persons, and the kinds of data co-generated (:60; section 3.2).
   - This cannot be assessed *a priori* and texts must document how researcher presence, persona, and location affected the data co-generated (:60; section 3.3; 3.4; Chapter 9).
3. **Triangulation of evidentiary sources in planning and fieldwork**
   - Multiple-methods of accessing data, multiple data sources, multiple-sites, or multiple-researchers (section 3.2.3 and 3.3.4).
   - An account of how it brings to light both corroboration/refutation and inconsistencies/conflict in findings (:61; Chapter 4-7; Chapter 8).

4. **Detailed audit recording of deviations from the original research design**
   “Changes in processes and steps used in the conduct of the research” “in response to situational realities” – commonplace in ethnographic research.
   Making transparent links between researcher decisions, evidence generated, inferences drawn, and evidence of audit (section 3.2.4; Chapter 3).

5. **The use of negative case analysis or sense-making technique**
   e.g extreme cases; outliers; surprises; rival explanations; or member-checking; and ‘peer debriefing’ of a preliminary analysis (:77). “A technique of reflective enquiry” to prevent settling too quickly on a pattern/ answer/ interpretation, consciously searching for challenge or negation, as active enquiry into own “meaning-making processes” (:61) (section 3.4; Chapter 7; Chapter 9).

6. **Member checking of textwork drafts.**
   “informants’ accounts should neither be endorsed nor disregarded: they need to be analysed” (Atkinson et al. 2003:194), with neither ‘getting-it-right’ from members’ perspective or the researchers’ assessment of ‘goodness’ suggesting the existence of an objective reality (:62; section 9.2).
Section 3.3.3 Research setting

Spatial characteristics of the research setting

The majority of previous studies of network management in emergency response have been generated from American case studies with very large sample (‘n’) sizes. The geographical scale, magnitude of events, and affected populations tend to be much greater than the Scottish case.

Scotland is a country of approximately 5.2 million people\(^1\), with a landmass of 78,772 km\(^2\) (30,414 sq mi)\(^2\). For comparison, this is larger than most US counties, or county-equivalents, which have an average population of 100,000 people and a landmass of 1,610 km\(^2\) (622 sq mi)\(^3\). As a geographic unit it is closer to the size of a US State – the closest equivalents to the landmass of Scotland are the States of South Carolina (82,932 km\(^2\) or 32,020 sq mi) or West Virginia (62,755 km\(^2\) or 24,229 sq mi). Scotland has a population density of 64 people/km\(^2\) (167.5/sq mi)\(^4\), slightly more densely populated than South Carolina (60/km\(^2\)) and closer in density to the State of Georgia (65.4/km\(^2\)), but well above the US average of 34 people/km\(^2\) (88/sq mi)\(^5\).

Less than 6% of the landmass of Scotland is urbanised\(^6\), but the population is highly urbanised, with 82% living in settlements of 3,000 people or more\(^7\), the majority of whom (approximately 70%\(^8\)) live in the densely-populated Central Lowlands\(^9\). By contrast, almost half of the land area is defined as very remote rural areas (those with a population of less than 3,000), with only 3% of the

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\(^6\) Office for National Statistics, County Profiles – Key Statistics – Scotland, August 2012 (as above).


\(^8\) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demography_of_Scotland, citing GROS.

population\textsuperscript{10}. Scotland has the lowest population density of the countries in the United Kingdom. England has a much higher population density than the U.S. and many European countries. Including Wales, it has twice the landmass of Scotland but more than ten times as many people – approximately 56.2 million\textsuperscript{11}.

**Characteristics of the research site and sample**

*Research site - policy process research*

This research occurs at the ‘meso’-level of analysis, identified by the policy network tradition (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Jessop 1995) linking actor or agency-based ‘micro-level’ analysis (e.g. interpretation; bargaining; decision-making) and ‘macro-level’ processes (such as power or political regimes). At the meso scale, the unit of analysis is inter-organisational. Schofield’s literature review (2001) suggests policy implementation research in Political Science and Public Administration has traditionally been motivated by one of four purposes:

1. Explaining policy success or failure
2. The predictability of the policy outcomes
3. Normative policy and policy design recommendations

Although the fourth category (e.g. Hjern and Scharpf 1978; Hjern 1992; 1995 and Blomqvist 1991 cited 2001:248) has influenced network research in Public Management (Klijn 2008a), Public Administration research into policy implementation – and the models and themes it has generated – have favoured ‘policy promises’ over ‘policy products’ (citing Brodkin 1990), and important themes have been neglected in the literature:

1. Knowledge, learning and capacity

\textsuperscript{10}Office for National Statistics, County Profiles – Key Statistics – Scotland, August 2012 (as above).
2. Processes of implementation
3. The role of actors and agents
4. Bureaucratic discretion

(adapted from Schofield 2001:253).

This trend was remedied by implementation studies within the Public Management discipline (sections 2.1; 2.2). Implementation studies allow for “ambiguity” and “irresolution” “without necessarily viewing these as policy ‘failure’, as more rationalist approaches would” (2001:257; see Haverland and Yanow 2012 for more on positivism in Public Administration).

As noted above, this research project rejected approaches from the policy studies literature, after the pilot study revealed policy network theory was inapplicable in this setting. However, it is important to situate the research site within the ‘levels’ of analysis in implementation studies, an ongoing debate in the field which has focussed on the ‘top-down’ or bottom-up’ issue (Schofield 2001), and inadequately addressed the ‘multi-layer problem’ (Hill and Hupe 2003). The layers of analysis are considered further and illustrated below.

Research sample - researching the role of the state in implementation networks

This research has been influenced by the evidence of hierarchical networks in emergency management (Moynihan 2005; 2007; 2008; 2009) and the role of hierarchy in the governance of public service delivery networks more generally (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Kenis 2008; Provan and Lemaire 2012). Government is central in the processes being investigated - capacity-building and policy-development – so this appears to be a top-down study. Added to this, positionality and access requirements demanded engagement with government rather than taking a local or community-based approach (section 3.2.1; section 3.3.1). 'Top-down’ approaches have been critiqued on the basis of their rationalist approach, focussing on policy design and not on discretion of local implementers (Schofield 2001:251). This research – and the majority of research in the Public Management discipline – clearly has more in common with 'bottom-up’ approaches, focussed on local implementers, the nature of
policy problems (not their solutions), and seeking “to describe networks of implementation” (:251). Schofield notes that more recent literature has combined the two approaches (:252), but that both neglect issues of access and the practicalities of elite research (:251).

Analysis of the role of the state in the policy process requires, “a fusion of institutional theory with an awareness of core elites and the roles of policy networks and communities” (Hill 1997:97). This research sampled mostly from policy and public service ‘elites’, although the Scottish civil service is smaller and more open to research and researchers than its Whitehall (English) equivalent. Elite research requires specific strategies (Peabody et al. 1990), to both concede to participants’ professional demands and respond to their professional skills. For instance, interviews are likely to take place at their discretion, probably in their own workplace, and the participants will be familiar with the interview process, and may be hostile or recalcitrant on certain topics, requiring flexibility from the researcher (Puwar 1997).

Although this was an implementation study, ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980) were not formally sampled by this research design. Although that was the intention, the futures-oriented topic and the need to gather cross-local (not locally-adaptive) data confined the sample to national (Scottish) and regional-level strategic actors, with validation and insight gathered informally from local-level actors. ‘Practitioners’ in this study refers to emergency planning professionals employed in local authorities or public agencies. Participants would be more likely to consider ‘practitioners’ to be frontline staff working in public agencies that respond to emergencies, such as Fire and Rescue or the Ambulance Service. However, the sample only included actors involved in inter-organisational emergency management activity at any level, and did not seek out an alternative view or perspective from these non-involved ‘frontline staff’.

The data collection sampled from the national emergency management system in Scotland (see section 5.2). This was the set of involved organisations indicated by participants, based on statutory duties and arrangements mandated by the UK’s Civil Contingencies Act (2004) legislation, and its implementation in Scotland.
Temporal characteristics of the research setting

_A longitudinal case study - the use of time in the research design_

Exploring proactive capacity-building requires a longitudinal design. The data collection followed various processes and units of analysis over time, including individuals, certain organisations, and particular mechanisms and concepts which participants identified as influencing the involvement of the Third Sector in Scottish emergency response. A set of 'gatekeepers' were sampled on several occasions to gain insight on the policy development process and confirm the suitability and validity of the emergent research design. The purpose of the longitudinal research design here was to:

1. _Describe a pattern of change_
   - How policy was developing around capacity building activities in Scottish emergency response.

2. _Establish a temporal order of implementation events_
   Through triangulating the accounts of participants across different types of data and presenting the findings longitudinally.

3. _Establish developmental effects_
   Tracking the same issue over the time period surveyed and observing how it changed.

4. _Establish historical effects_
   By asking participants to describe the past in relation to the present situation being surveyed.

(adapted from de Vaus 2010:114).

_Longitudinal designs in process research_

The research design sought to break with the trend for post-hoc emergency response case studies in emergency management research and practice.
Post-hoc case studies neglect pro-active capacity-building before events, so a prospective, futures-oriented design was chosen instead. Retrospective designs are also limited by,

"the obvious problems associated with loss of evidence, reconstruction of the past in light of the present, and mistaking the sequence in which events occurred" (de Vaus 2001:228).

Post-hoc analysis of events often has an evaluative purpose, and the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ criteria introduce incentives for organisations to present themselves in a positive light. This prospective design thus had an additional benefit, in avoiding organisational bias, which might additionally reflect institutional cultures or power asymmetries.

Rather than evaluate past responses, participants were asked to identify current processes and to consider how these would impact on the future effectiveness of response. This was linked to the future threat of increasing climatic variability. However, most participants described current and future activity in reference to the past. Their perceptions of policy development were historically situated in policy implementation up to the period of the research project. Thus, this design includes both policy implementation and policy development, and both retrospective and prospective data (de Vaus 2001:113-14). The retrospective data was important in ‘situating’ the research as part of an ongoing process (Pettigrew 1992; Van de Ven 1992). This ‘situatedness’ lends the study ‘ecological’ validity (Lee 1999:152).

*Now* designs in implementation research

The prospective research design “has the obvious advantage of enabling the investigator to look at events as they occur rather than relying on partial and reconstructed accounts”. However, the “time and resources required…. can severely limit the number and range of cases that can be studied” (de Vaus 2001:228). As understanding was the purpose of this case study, replicability was required neither for validity nor insight. Although the heterogeneity of the
sample did allow for different perspectives on these processes, sub-units were not used as multiple cases for replication, which Yin (1994) cautions against. Brewerton and Millward (2001:53) identify several other disadvantages of case studies that examine events and processes as they happen:

1. **Difficulties of interpretation**, which have been reduced here by the use of practitioner meanings in the abductive approach, and member-checking.

2. **Getting caught in minutiae – losing clarity; the difficulty of data analysis.** This was an issue (see section 3.4) but sampling across multiple sectors and levels, and across time, assisted in revealing common themes. The minutiae is used as a source of insight in the data analysis.

3. **Losing impartiality through involvement.** The issue of ‘co-option’ is considered in Chapter 9 but was avoided here through the adoption of a critical stance, an interventionist style of engagement (next section), the constant exercise of ‘active reflexivity’, and the concern for theory.

4. **The ‘now’ design produces locally-specific data that cannot be generalised.** The use of a national and regional-level sample reduces the ‘localness’ of the data, and because the Scottish system is based on the generic principles of ‘integrated emergency management’, the processes and activities at the various stages can be assumed to have relevance for other systems internationally that are designed using these principles.

5. **Project participants may feel under intense scrutiny being researched [whilst a process is developing].** This was an issue for this research project, hence the avoidance of an evaluative or prescriptive design, and the focus on activities for future, not current, ‘effectiveness’. The political salience of ‘effective’ emergency response suggests that this would be a sensitive topic from any temporal perspective, but a futures-oriented design at least encourages participants to reflect and speak openly about what could be done or done differently.

Ward and Jones (1999) expand the impact of (5) and the ‘political-temporal contingency’ of researching political elites. Citing McDowell (1992:213, and her
debate with Schoenberger), the authors suggest sensitivity to this requires critical realism enabled by personal reflexivity – the ontology of this study. The ‘situatedness’ of ‘elite’ research is crucial in terms of *when* it takes place, “And how the processes shaping the context of the interview affect the exchange of knowledge... access to a set of elites engaged in the implementation of public policy is conditioned by the politics of time and the geographical complexities of place” (304).

The authors present evidence from their context – local governance – to suggest access and positionality will be “conditioned through a series of political-temporal nexuses”, reflecting the strategic importance of the material: interviewees’ “guarded’ response is likely to coincide with politically sensitive moments in the process” (309). They stress the importance of contingency to the research project, and that more mature policy processes will be “easier to infiltrate” than newer processes where “inter-organisational” and “inter-elite” processes ‘fluctuate’ “around a constant state of (dis)equilibrium” (309).

In this research design, those fluctuations were an advantage, generating data about the process of policy development around the concepts being investigated. However, the ‘now’ design made it more challenging to negotiate access. Getting good data from participants also required the researcher to keep track of an emerging agenda from which she was excluded, requiring considerable ingenuity, the use of a range of research sources, the establishment of trusting relationships to facilitate open dialogue, and the cultivation of an ‘insider’ role.

The timing of research in this policy context also relates to what emergencies occur during the research process and how that affects the data collected. The emergencies that participants indicated were affecting them during the research period are summarised in Figure 3.2, and put in the context of past and future threats. The effects of these emergencies on the research site are discussed further in the data itself, and the impact on the research process is analysed in Chapter 9.
**Figure 3.2 Emergencies affecting the research process**

**Timescale**

The timescale was determined by the time available for the research project and its preceding pilot study (produced as part of a research qualification). Data collection for the pilot study took place between May and August 2008. For this project, it resumed again in July 2009 and completed at the end of October 2010. Data collection was discontinuous during that time (i.e. not every day or every week). The time points at which data was collected were distributed unevenly: periodic data collection took advantage of events and opportunities arising within the sample. The data collection did not follow pre-planned interventions but did take note of how ‘naturally-occurring’ events impacted on the case participants.

Multiple data collection points allow the researcher to:

- Examine long and short term effects
- Track when changes occur
- Plot the ‘shape’ of any change
- Identify factors that precede any change (or non-change)

(adapted from de Vaus 2001:119).
3.3.4 Data Collection

Validity and Reliability in Data Collection

Yin (1994) proposes three principles to make the data collection process “as explicit as possible” (:100). The specific suggestions are positivist and deductive and thus not relevant, but the principles are sound and have been adapted here.

Principle 1: Use Multiple Sources Of Evidence

Case studies offer the opportunity and often the need to use multiple sources of evidence (1994:91), they inherently deal “with a wide range of evidence” (:92). Patton (1987) distinguishes four types of triangulation:

1. Of data sources (data triangulation)
2. Among different evaluators (investigator triangulation)
3. Of perspectives on the same data set (theory triangulation) and
4. Of methods (methodological triangulation)

(Yin 1994:92).

Data triangulation relates to convergent lines of enquiry, in the “corroboratory mode” of evidence (:92). Lines of enquiry may be nonconvergent, if different data sources have been used to examine different facts, creating separate substudies (:92-3) or new lines of enquiry to be tested with the abductive strategy (Blaikie 2007). This is a risk for this research project, as the research questions have different aims (“why”; “how”; “what”) and foci. The research questions are constructs for data analysis, and do not reflect

- The conduct of the data collection, in which all research questions were simultaneously investigated with all participants, although their different perspectives meant they responded to each in varying degrees.
- Data analysis, which was occurring contemporaneously to data collection, using the whole dataset to generate themes and substantive relationships.

Convergent data sources address construct validity by providing “multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin 1994:92) – this is the original meaning of triangulation (Webb 1966, cited Blaikie 2007:263).
None of the three other types of triangulation were relevant here:

- Due to the importance of researcher reflexivity and positionality in this particular longitudinal ethnographic case study the second type of triangulation was not used during this research project. However, something close to it was approximated by presenting the findings for discussion amongst academic peers at conferences, and amongst participating practitioners at a seminar and in a written report of findings.

- Theory triangulation is used in explanation-building, as a form of pattern-matching (deductive reasoning) or through the explanation of a phenomenon by applying different theoretical lenses. This was not an explanatory project but did iteratively apply theory as part of theory-building to improve understanding (Gioia and Pitre 1990, section 3.4).

- Methodological triangulation is often flawed because the combination of alternative research paradigms into multi-method approaches (e.g. Langley et al. 2003, Huxham 2003, cited by Calnan and Ferlie 2003:190) takes a naïve approach to ontological differences (Blaikie 2007:270). The search for precision in convergent results produced by different methods is problematic for abductivists using data from different social actors or groups, because divergence does not represent bias in method. It may represent different constructions of reality, just as convergence might represent a consensus on one social construction of reality (2007:266). Bias and validity do not mean the same in the abductive versus deductive or inductive research strategies, because it allows for multiple realities and the accounts it produces are relative in time and space (2007:268).

**Principle 2: Create a Case Study Database**

This principle seeks to increase the reliability of the entire case by separating

1. The data or evidentiary base from
2. The report of the investigator (Yin 1994:94-95).

In this Thesis, the findings are separated from their diagnosis and discussion, allowing independent conclusions to be drawn about the analysis (section 3.4).
In terms of replicability, another researcher could in principle examine the data collected in this case study as all of the primary data (recordings, notes, documents etc.) were logged, in line with Van de Ven’s (1992) recommendations. However, reflexivity tells us that whilst the data would corroborate the study’s findings, they\textsuperscript{12} would also reflect the researcher’s positionality and the way in which data were collected and constructed.

**Principle 3: Maintain a Chain of Evidence**

This principle seeks to increase reliability by allowing an external observer “to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions” - in either direction (1994:98). The research log documented a complete record of all the data collected in this study, which was then synthesised in the analysis. Yin’s other recommendations reveal the limiting effect of deductive designs: the openness and flexibility in this research design was only possible because of this researcher’s ‘active reflexivity’ and constant awareness of research design and method issues discussed in this chapter, not because decisions had been made and codified on a piece of paper,

“Frequently, qualitative researchers have a very limited idea of where they should start, how they should proceed, and where they expect to end up. They have to accept opportunities where they open up and they will want to follow leads as they occur. They see research as a learning process and themselves as the measuring (data-absorbing) instrument. They will want to allow concepts, ideas and theories to evolve and they will resist imposing both pre-conceived ideas on everyday reality and closure on emerging understanding. Qualitative data gathering is messy and unpredictable and seems to require researchers who can tolerate ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty and lack of control”

(Blakie 2007:243).

\textsuperscript{12} The term ‘data’ is used in the grammatically correct plural if possible. See ‘Data are or data is?’ [http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jul/16/data-plural-singular](http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jul/16/data-plural-singular), 8\textsuperscript{th} July 2012.
Researching Collaboration and Networks: Research Methods

How the research setting influenced the choice of methods

Although this was an ethnographic case study, the validity of the findings could have been enhanced by introducing methodological triangulation (Yin 1994:91-92, citing Patton 1987; Blaikie 2000), in the form of (1) survey or (2) SNA (Social Network Analysis) methods.

(1) In piloting the research design with participants between July-November 2009, the researcher was strongly advised against administering a survey given the existing demands of policy implementation, and the burden of measurement already being requested by Scottish and UK Government (Chapter 5). Against these competing demands on practitioner time, an academic survey would have low priority and thus was unlikely to get a statistically significant response rate.

(2) A SNA could have been produced to illustrate the relationships that had been sampled by other methods (e.g. Nolte and Boegink 2011) or to compare two cross-sectional surveys to show evolution and change over time – e.g. Kapucu 2009; Comfort, Oh and Ertan 2009; Kapucu et al. 2011; Oh 2012 – all reporting research into ‘catastrophic’ events. This project did not employ SNA methods:

a. The sample size of organisations was small enough that participants could describe structures and membership without constructing a SNA. Unlike in the USA, where n=500+ organisations might respond to one event (e.g. Tierney and Trainor 2004; Comfort, Oh and Ertan 2009), n=5 might respond in Scotland.

b. Following the pilot study, the research design rejected local-level data as being too contingent on local resilience/vulnerability effects to generate a generalisable contribution. Responses to specific events were not sampled.

c. SNAs of generic structures for planning and response would only have revealed prescribed structures and membership of networks and would not have revealed any other unplanned process at work - e.g. emergence.
d. The research design was seeking to understand the process of capacity-building for resilience at various levels. Practitioners indicated that this process was not occurring yet, but would in the future. One limitation of taking a futures-oriented perspective was that you cannot sample a network that does not exist yet.

e. Structural aspects of current networks would not necessarily indicate structures of future networks convened for different purposes with different actors.

Survey and SNA methods have a number of shared limitations, primarily that ‘counting’ of relationships reveals nothing about processes within networks, which is crucial to understanding the types of relationships (Keast 2003; et al. 2007). The construction of process measures in surveys of emergency management networks is deemed challenging (McGuire and Silvia 2010) although it has recently been attempted (Nolte and Boegink 2011). The construction of process models in surveys is dependent on deductive reasoning and assumptions about the applicability of Public Management theory to emergency management contexts. There is a risk that assumptions used to build conceptual models can misdiagnose processes and lead to inaccurate explanations (see section 8.3).

A second disadvantage is their ‘static’, versus ‘dynamic’ nature. As ‘static’ measures, neither can capture dynamics. Even though comparison of cross-sectional samples (above) can describe change over time, they cannot generate understanding of it. This is important because time is a crucial factor in emergency management networks:

a) Moynihan’s evidence suggests that preparedness activities enable emergency response networks (2007; 2008; 2009), but static measures can only evaluate the antecedents or outcomes of this dynamic.

b) Existing theories of ‘collaboration’ (e.g. Thomson and Perry 2006; Mandell and Steelman 2003) argue time is a determining factor in the extent of collaboration and thus the appropriate descriptions of
relationships. Robinson and Gaddis (2012) have suggested this is a problematic threshold measure in this policy context as emergency responses rely on ad hoc cooperation, but also that relations can be misdiagnosed without understanding what activities occur over time.

Thirdly, although they illustrate differential positions within the network, SNA methods cannot sample individuals, organisations, or types of organisations that are excluded from the network sample. For example, what groups are not present in emergency response, given the evidence of the difficulty of managing coordination with the Third Sector and/or emergence or convergence?

Ethnographic methods were selected instead because they offer the advantages of (a) access to the ‘lived worlds’ of practitioners and (b) the collection of data in a way which is non-obtrusive and not burdensome to participants. The decision to reject SNA and survey methods created the opportunity to address the empirical gap about process in collaborative emergency management and response networks that their dominance has created through their:

1. Focus on post-hoc case studies of events, suitable to evaluative purposes, describing outcomes but neglecting antecedents and process.
2. Focus on cross-sectional surveys at the expense of longitudinal data.
3. Focus on who is involved, rather than the rationales for involvement or exclusion.

This Thesis argues that previous studies of the involvement of non-statutory actors in emergency response, particularly those actors associated with the ‘Third’ (community or voluntary) sector, have neglected the process of capacity building as a result of these methods.

Instead, the focus on Third Sector involvement in this design was used to expose some of the implicit assumptions and reasoning behind the establishment of network structures and the mechanisms used to manage the different structures. This single case study utilised a dynamic design, sampling longitudinally across time, and thus linking between preparedness and response activities. The
longitudinal design allowed an exploration of how these assumptions then influenced network processes. By considering preparedness, the focus was on responses to future events, not responses to past events. The ‘now’ design explored the characteristics of these networks as they evolved, and situated this in actors’ historical accounts and explanations.

This Thesis attempted to identify the membership of networks by looking at ‘who’ (what organisations) was represented in structures, and differences in that representation across geographic and hierarchical scales, as above. It also asked participants to identify which organisations were:

- involved,
- not involved, and
- excluded from both EM and ER structures, and why.

To validate the reasons offered by participants, and to gain an ‘outsider’ perspective and thus generate other possible reasons for their exclusion, representatives of some of these organisations or groups were sampled at various stages in the research design.

**Sampling and methods**

At the outset of data collection the units of analysis were:

- the longitudinal process of Third Sector involvement, and
- the structures and mechanisms used to build capacity for new relationships.

Measures needed to be specified in order to collect data, and gatekeeper-participants were consulted to find out what ‘networks’ and ‘collaboration’ meant in this context, in line with the abductive strategy (Blaikie 2010) and open-ended ethnographic methods (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). These definitions emerged from practitioner accounts:

- ‘structures’ – formal arrangements for the management of emergency management [EM] and response [ER], as prescribed by the UK Civil

- ‘mechanisms’ – governance and management of these structures.

In this way, practitioners’ meanings determined how the data was collected.

The structural organisation of emergency management had two dimensions:

- **Hierarchical management structures** were mandated by policy and operated across national, to regional, to local geographic scales.

- **Activities** within structural arrangements and relationships also operated across levels, separated into either strategic, tactical, or operational activities. These did not correspond to geographical scales, i.e. strategic activity also happened at the regional and local level, operational managers could be at the national scale.

These two scales defined the ‘sample set’ and sampling strategy employed for internal validation.

**Heterogeneity**

Used alongside a critical realist perspective, ethnographic methods allowed exploration of these structures, mechanisms, and processes, and so assisted with the purpose of generating understanding. Data collection utilised a variety of ethnographic methods and selectively sampled across:

- Geographical and hierarchical scales
- Sectors
- At different points in time.

The goal of collecting such a range of data from such a range of sources was to achieve data triangulation (above; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009).

**Primary data collection methods included:**

- Observation of practitioner conferences and seminars (3) (omitted)
- Participant observation of various network meetings and AGMs of the Emergency Planning Society (2) (omitted)
- Interviews
• Formal, structured
• Joint
• Semi-structured
• Unstructured
• Conversational
  • A focus group with practitioners and policy-makers (Seminar, Chapter 7)
  • Analysis of a set of focus groups with practitioners and policy-makers
  • A short survey of collaboration preferences at the Seminar (Chapter 7)
  • Workshopping seminar design and results with policy-makers

This was supported by secondary data:
• Policy analysis – of the implementation documents for legislation
• Document analysis of a range of documentation
  o Policy development documents
  o Publicity materials - brochures, advertising, leaflets, pamphlets, booklets, magazines, conference packs, websites etc.
  o Reports, reviews, and their summaries.

These were corroborated by:
• A ‘negative case’ interview with another non-statutory agency (omitted)
• Interviews with 2 UK EPOs to enquire into professionalisation in UKEM
• Corroboration with parallel research projects on this topic in this site.

At the heart of the use of methods was attention to maximise the quality of data collected and adapt and respond appropriately to the research setting.

Reflexivity demanded that the research approach changed with each data collection event. One of the challenging aspects of this emergent research design and the purpose of exploration and understanding is that the researcher had to be confident with each one of these methods and that it could be applied professionally to create valid and reliable data. The researcher’s background assisted with the ability to be responsive to the setting. Following 3 years as a social science undergraduate and freelance work as a professional researcher she undertook MSc research training at an ESRC accredited institution. In order to understand the advantages and disadvantages of these methods, and how
they should be used, relevant qualitative social science research methods texts were accessed (e.g. Waddington 1994; Bryman 2004; 2008; Gilbert 2001; Lee 1999) alongside organisational research texts (e.g. Brewerton and Millward 2001). Specific texts were also consulted for the use of methods within this particular research site, to familiarise the researcher with possible challenges and how they could be overcome. For instance, close attention was paid to the political nature of official documents and their purposes (Brown and Duguid 1996), based on interpretive analysis (Wright 2002; Coole 2005). Along with guidance on elite interviews in the UK (Peabody et al. 1990; Puwar 1997), the use of interviews to collect process data was considered (Van de Ven 1992; Pettigrew 1992; Knight and Pye 2007). Knight and Pye reflect on the utility of informal interviewing and the benefits of collecting participants’ perceptions and interpretations when researching process in networks. They also suggest repeated interactions to improve understanding of the relationship between processes and outcomes (:176-177): all three techniques were used here.

The purpose of the researcher influenced the use of data collection tools. Despite being understanding of her ‘outsider’ status to this traditionally ‘closed’ network, participants in this setting expected mastery of both theory and developing policy, along with professional conduct. The researcher also had to be ‘savvy’ to ongoing change in order to make the most of interviews and generate data that would not be quickly superseded. Additional data collected for this purpose has been omitted (above) but informed the analysis. This generated a knowledge base that could be drawn on for a more ‘active’, interventionist style of data collection, often achieved by encouraging and then utilising respondents’ own critical reflection. Exploration and understanding were facilitated by challenging and questioning the emergent thinking of participants. Most sections in the findings chapters are introduced with a more detailed comment on the particular methods used to collect that data. Analysing such a range of data was challenging, particularly as the researcher had avoided standardising the data collection format (e.g. by using an interview schedule) in order not to restrict insights from each participants’ unique perspective.
**Sampling and recruitment**

Previous sections have established the need for opportunism in this exploratory, emergent research design. But sampling was not random (nor ‘representative’); it was selective, and purposive. In 2008, respondents were initially selected using snowballing from a ‘gatekeeper’, ‘PQ’, in the Scottish Resilience Development Service (a Government agency), via the Knowledge Exchange Manager in the Scottish Government. In 2009 PQ again directed the researcher toward individuals active in Third Sector involvement. From those contacts further contacts were requested, and on occasion introductions were made on behalf of the researcher. Further recruitment also employed self-selection (increasing depth of insight from interested parties) and by sampling from events targeted at particular groups (increasing breadth of the sample). The researcher attended practitioner networking events and took every opportunity to engage other attendees in conversation. She also pursued several lines of possible research design, cultivated relationships with participants during data collection, and was ‘mentored’ by one participant in particular, who led to better access to the field through the generation of mutual knowledge benefits (Chapter 7). Reputation was an important determinant of access - this was a small circle of respondents, and several times participants from one method would unintentionally be present for another – e.g. interviewees attending seminars. Risks to the confidentiality of participants were addressed by maintaining anonymity in transcripts, and participants were able to request to speak off the record or not to be directly quoted. They were able to request to see copies of the findings once they were included, but anonymity and the time-lapse between collection and publication neutralised the importance of this.

**Sample**

The two most crucial aspects of this research design were:

(a) sampling from the whole network of actors related to Third Sector involvement, across geographic and hierarchical scales (Figure 3.3)

(b) targeting ‘bridge points’ in networks as sources of insight (Figure 3.4).
(a) Implementation research frequently draws on the concept of the ‘whole network’ (see Provan, Fish and Sydow 2007; Isett et al. 2011; Provan and Kenis 2012). A ‘whole network’ sample typically utilises SNA methods and seeks ‘completeness’ of ties between participants. Clearly ethnographic methods cannot achieve this coverage, but the sampling strategy did seek to understand processes at the various levels and in the various sectors of this ‘whole network’. Figure 3.3 shows how data was collected across geographic and hierarchical levels across time, in a multi-sector, multi-level process design.

Figure 3.3 Sampling map across time

(b) Combining participant intelligence and theory, ‘bridge points’ between sectors in multi-organisational arrangements were located, identified, and sampled. These participants improved data quality and depth of process insight by looking across different sectors simultaneously. Figure 3.4 (next page) shows the balance between statutory and Third Sector participants in the sample, their multiple roles, and the array across hierarchical levels, plus methods and validation. The newly-created roles and arrangements indicate evolving policy.
### Figure 3.4 Sampling and validation across sectors from a ‘whole network’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statutory Actors - and method of sampling</th>
<th>Statutory Management Hierarchy</th>
<th>Non-Statutory Actors - and method of sampling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview with Policy Lead in Community Resilience Unit, Cabinet Office</td>
<td>n/a - only major incident involvement</td>
<td>Interview with UK Head of Resilience at a 'big 6' TSO; RABs-VS member; VSCFP member (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a - confidential</td>
<td><strong>National - Scottish Government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interview with Audit Scotland about ‘Improving Civil Contingencies’ Report (2009)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant observation of 3rd meeting</td>
<td><strong>National - RABs - Strategic Group &amp; Sub-Groups</strong></td>
<td>Interview with Scottish Representative of the Met Office, a UK-wide non-TSO non-statutory agency (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings with new policy leads to analyse Seminar data</td>
<td><strong>National - RABs - Voluntary Sector Sub-Group</strong></td>
<td>n/a - no TSO representation until after data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with 1 of 2 BRAs (2010)</td>
<td><strong>BRA</strong></td>
<td>Involvement in policy development Seminar via BRC (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with Training and Exercising Coordinator in SECG, organiser of SECG Voluntary Agencies Awareness Seminar 2009</td>
<td><strong>Regional - Strategic Coordinating Group</strong></td>
<td>Interview &amp; mentoring with SR secondees to BRC; RABs-VS Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of SECG-Voluntary Agencies Functional Group 2nd meeting; thematic analysis of SECG-VAFG documentation</td>
<td><strong>Regional - Strategic Coordinating Group - Working Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with 2 early-career English EPOs</td>
<td><strong>Local Authority - Emergency Planning Officers (EPOs)</strong></td>
<td>Interview with Convenor of SECG-VS Group; Operation Manager at BRC; Document analysis of selected BRC publications (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Analysis of Pitt Review Findings (2007)</td>
<td><strong>Local Operational Response - Community-level</strong></td>
<td>Interview with specialist Scottish TSO who had surveyed EPOs (2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Validation &amp; method of validation - by equivalent levels</td>
<td><strong>Validation &amp; method of validation - by equivalent levels</strong></td>
<td>Interview with <strong>Nationale Flood Forum</strong> representative (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of presentations by senior staff from Cabinet Office &amp; other statutory organisations at Conferences</td>
<td><strong>Contextual analysis of VSCFP (2009) documentation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with ScoRDS (2008)</td>
<td><strong>Contextual analysis of ‘Improving Civil Contingencies’ Report</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation on Seminar design with 2xBRAs + 2xSR Community Resilience policy staff</td>
<td><strong>National - RABs - Voluntary Sector Sub-Group</strong></td>
<td>Thematic analysis of selected recent Met Office brochures; Presentations by senior staff from non-statutory organisations at Conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple informal conversations with UK &amp; Scottish EPOs at 6 conferences and networking events</td>
<td><strong>National - Scottish Resilience</strong> (division within SG Justice DG)</td>
<td>Thematic analysis of formal documentation from 3 RABs(VS) meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual media coverage of formal responses to events</td>
<td><strong>Local Authority - Emergency Planning Officers (EPOs)</strong></td>
<td>Co-design, facilitate, analyse Seminar with BRC secondees (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Local Operational Response - Community-level</strong></td>
<td>Interview with a second SR secondee to MRCoS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- capacity-building roles or networks - initiated by Scottish Government during 2008-10
- capacity-building roles or networks - initiated by organisations during 2008-10
- blank spaces left where no data to show gaps in ‘whole network’ - and reason
- most interviews focus on individuals with multiple roles/influence; most roles are new
- where ‘selected’ documents are analysed, they are documents provided by participants as evidence
Section 3.4.1 Data reduction

Digitisation

The decision was made to digitise the data due to:

1. the large quantity of data in different formats
2. the lack of a systematic approach to content when it had been collected
3. the concern for rigour (both validity and reliability).

1. Transcription

The first stage in data reduction was transcription of the audio recordings and of written notes made at the various primary data collection events. It was hoped that digitisation would assist in reducing the volume of data, streamlining it across the multiple formats in which it was collected. Audio recordings, observation notes, presentations, and researcher reflections could be transcribed into text, as could the content of some digital versions of PDFs. In the ‘pragmatic’ discipline of Management, the complexity of validity issues associated with transcription can be addressed by asking “what type of transcription is useful for my research?; has too much, insufficient, minimal or no change in meaning been made?”, and by seeking ‘no change’ (Lee 1999:89).

2. Manual coding

In the interpretive paradigm of organisational research, “analysis begins during data collection”. Manual coding procedures are used “to discern patterns” “so that descriptive codes, categories, taxonomies, or interpretive schemes that are adequate at the level of meaning of the informants can be established” (Gioia and Pitre 1990:588).

By digitising then manually coding all the data, themes could be generated from the data, and these themes enabled the multiple discrete data types and sources to be compared, contrasted, and synthesised. This is ‘thematic’ coding, versus content analysis (Krippendorf 2004). Qualitative ‘thematic analysis’ differs from quantitative ‘content analysis’, which involves counting the occurrence of
particular words or phrases, better suited to a quantitative or deductive type of study (e.g. Van de Ven 1992). Synthesising the data by theme assisted in data collection and theory-building, and also in the construction of the case study as a whole, by organising the multiple lines of enquiry and phases of data collection into a longitudinal narrative.

3. **NVivo**

The computer programme NVivo (Version 8) was used to assist in the cataloguing of data. Inputting and coding data into NVivo provides a record of the data analysis process that can be accessed independently at any date after analysis. NVivo and other qualitative software programmes also reveal the decisions made during the coding process, and can thus be used to detect bias or misrepresentation if suspected. The tracing of the process enhances reliability, because it increases the chances that data would be coded the same way or that categories of codes would be grouped together by another researcher. This overcomes some of the limitations of being a solo researcher (i.e. not cross-verifying coding). And the limitations of the research design: if spatial and temporal ‘situatedness’ prevent the replication of data collection, at least data analysis can be replicated. Replication is particularly enhanced by the ‘memos’ or notes facility, which allows procedures to be logged and dated. In terms of validity, the programme facilitates the manual coding procedure, in which themes are generated from the data, rather than being imposed by the researcher. Cases were constructed from the full set of primary and secondary data collected for each topic. Each data collection event continued to be treated as unique and discrete. Transcribed primary data was reunited with secondary data such as printed documentation from conferences, brochures, or policy documents given to the researcher by interviewees. This was manually coded according to themes arising from the data into themes, and all themes were incorporated into composites, either as ‘sets’ of themes or hierarchies of ‘free nodes’ – ‘tree nodes’. The initial selection of data was based on those micro case studies that had clearly emerged from the data collection period.
Micro-cases that were constructed from the data input into NVivo can be seen in Table 3.4, below. Note was made of analysis carried out in the research log.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.4 Thematic Analysis in NVivo and Micro-Case Studies Constructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Type</strong></td>
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</table>

*later subsumed into the main analysis

During the process of data reduction, several things became apparent about using NVivo in this way:

- Firstly, the process of inputting, analysing, and especially exporting and reconstructing the data was extremely time-consuming but yielded no further insight than could be gleaned from the data itself (no additive value). Although NVivo8 was provided and promoted as qualitative analysis software, the difficulty of exporting the data back out of the programme (node by node into .html pages) revealed its design was more suitable for quantitative content analysis than qualitative thematic analysis. These issues were addressed in subsequent versions.

- Secondly, as discussed above, this method of data analysis seems to assume passivity on the part of the researcher. It assumes that no analysis of primary data has taken place during data collection events or subsequently; that the researcher was not responding to data in the moment of collection (e.g. conference, meeting, interview), extracting
themes from content and using them to stretch and deepen further the data collected during that event. This creative, responsive, reflexive, facilitative method of analysis and reflection had already taken place during the data collection, as part of the interpretive approach.

- Third, subsequently thematically analysing the same data was only a reconstruction of what had already taken place during the event, with the added implication that the significance of the original data had already been superseded by further insight. Additionally, breaking up the data this way on occasion reduced the significance of the content, by reducing it from its context as part of a conversation or document.
- The fourth issue was the laboriousness of replicating the researcher’s analysis with this tool solely to document the analysis process – on one occasion it took 9 days to input and analyse sources that had only taken the researcher 1 hour to review and evaluate their significance.

On reflection, data reduction using NVivo was not contributing to the analysis process. This technique was replaced with manual construction of micro-case studies (Table 3.5). In most cases, the data had to be brought back out of NVivo and the primary sources used alone, as the secondary data did not add value to the primary sources when their content was taken out of context.

| Table 3.5 Micro-Case Studies Not Constructed Using NVivo |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Source Type** | **Capacity** |
| Capacity-Building Micro Case: Scottish Resilience Secondments | primary |
| Capacity-Building Micro-Case: the RABS (VS) Scottish Voluntary Sector Community Resilience Seminar | primary |
| Network Micro-Case: the EPS Scottish Branch [not used] | primary |
| Capacity-Building Micro-Case: the RABS-VS/BRC Scoping Study | primary and secondary |
Data analysis in the interpretive paradigm and abductive strategy

Case study research can be written up using either linear analysis, chronological structuring, or theory-building (Brewerton and Millward 2001:56). This was a theory-building case study, because it was exploratory and abductive. Most literature offering data analysis procedures for theory-building uses grounded theory, an inductive explanation-building model, based upon operationalised measures (e.g. Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Strauss 1987; Yin 1994). But the abductive strategy only uses sensitisation to concepts.

In data analysis,

“There is as yet no clearly articulated method for using the pure version of the abductive research strategy” (Blaikie 2000:241).

Blaikie (2007:181) defines the abductive strategy by its ‘iterative’ process of collection and reflection:

“Abduction is a process by means of which the researcher assembles lay accounts of the phenomenon in question, with all their gaps and deficiencies, and, in an iterative manner, begins to construct their own account... it involves the researcher in alternating periods of immersion in the relevant social world, and periods of withdrawal for reflection and analysis” (Blaikie 2007:181).

This iterative process of data analysis is similar to that in the interpretive paradigm of organisational research, beginning in data collection,

“thereafter, analysis, theory generation, and further data collection go hand in hand...the theory generation process is typically iterative, cyclical, and nonlinear. Through this process, tentative speculations about organizational structuring processes are confirmed or disconfirmed by further consultation with informants”

(Gioia and Pitre 1990:588, next section).

This type of research is usually called ‘inductive’ - as opposed to deductive - although if variables are not used it would be classified as ‘abductive’ in the
social sciences. Blaikie describes the relationship between research and theory in the abductive process as uniquely “intimately intertwined”:

“data and theoretical ideas are played off against one another in a developmental and creative process... research becomes a dialogue between data and theory mediated by the researcher” (2007:181).

Data analysis and theory-building happen simultaneously, and longitudinally.

In the search for specific theory-building procedures, network and collaboration studies in Public Management provide a wealth of examples of inter-organisational research, but the paucity of ‘dynamic’ network accounts (Bingham and O’Leary 2006; Isett et al. 2011) and the confusion over measures (Robinson and Gaddis 2012) as well as opacity about methodologies and pluralism in paradigms (Hood 2011) make it very difficult for a researcher to use the field as a guide to data analysis. The work of Huxham (and Eden 2006; and Hibbert 2011) is an exception, but could not be used here (next section).

Within this and other fields of Public Management there are multiple methodologies and approaches to the collection and analysis of process data (e.g. Calnan and Ferlie 2003). Much of this analysis is located and communicated at the organisational level, with organisations as the unit of analysis, even in studies of inter-organisational arrangements,

“Whilst we may be used to reading narratives in which the focal actor is an individual, a group or an organisation in a network, decentred network narratives are less common” (Knight and Pye 2007:178).

**Data analysis strategies**

With few recommended data analysis procedures beyond data reduction processes such as ‘coding’ (Blaikie 2000:237-241) or visualisation (Miles and Hubermann 1994) the researcher had to find her own way. The choice of strategy for data analysis is affected by decision-making at the research design stage (Yin 1994), most pertinently, which ‘paradigm’ of organisation research a case study sits within (e.g. Gioia and Pitre 1990; Haverland and Yanow 2012). But it is also affected by the type of data that emerges from data collection.
For process data, the communication of research findings relies on data reconstruction after analysis, based on a particular analytic strategy. Knight and Pye (2007) used Langley (1999) as a guide to the “seven strategies for sense-making” that can assist in the reconstruction of process data (178). However, this researcher found that Langley’s work was more suited for studying a process (in an organisation), but not ‘process’ in general, commensurate with its links to other ‘strategic development’-type process research (e.g. Pettigrew 1992; Van de Ven 1992). It nevertheless provided guidance in a scant field.

To make sense of what process data was emerging from the data-driven design, the researcher returned to Langley’s strategies again and again during the research project to attempt to diagnose the data (Table 3.6). When writing up the research, it emerged that the ‘narrative’ and ‘temporal bracketing’ strategies were most suited to both communicating and analysing this data. Combining strategies in this way was retrospectively validated by the discovery that Knight and Pye, too, had used this combination (2007:178). But their suitability was only discovered after much trial-and-error in analysing the data using Langley’s ‘seven strategies’ (Table 3.6). The ‘quantification’ and ‘visual mapping’ strategies were difficult to apply to the multiple processes in the dataset, originating in and driven by multiple units of analysis, as opposed to one organisation. ‘Grounded theory’ strategies rely heavily on the generation of explanation through hypotheses, not judged to appropriate for this exploratory case. Similarly the ‘synthetic strategy’ approach was inapplicable when the process data had purposefully been sampled from different perspectives.

The inapplicability of these perspectives relate to the aims of this research project: its search to generate understanding from qualitative data. Huxham and Hibbert describe similar purposes for their ‘Interpretive Clustering Approach’[‘ICA’] method of data analysis,

“It does not involve the generation of synthetic explanatory variables (Langley 1999) but it does, nevertheless, aim to provide purchase on the reasons underlying the experienced world” (2011:276).
One of Langley’s strategies – ‘alternate templates’ – has so far been absent. This strategy, which she attributes to Allison (1971) but which has been used extensively since,

"provides a powerful means of deriving insight from a single rich case because the different theoretical interpretations provide the base for comparison needed (Lee 1989; Yin 1994)... Overall, this strategy combines both richness and theoretical parsimony (simplicity) by decomposing the problem” (1999:699).

Yet, it is designed to be used deductively - analysing data within each theoretical frame as it is collected, as part of the research design - producing “accurate”, generalisable, but incomplete and separate accounts:

“Qualitative nuances are represented through the alternative explanations, and theoretical clarity is maintained by keeping the different theoretical lenses separate.... Almost inevitably, each explanation taken alone is relevant but insufficient. Yet, any theory that attempted to integrate the different perspectives would tend to become unwieldy and aesthetically unsatisfying” (1999:699).

The more usual applications of this analysis technique to be found in positivist approaches to qualitative data, such as pattern-matching (e.g. Yin 1994; Lee 1998; de Vaus 2001; cf. Haverland and Yanow 2012), and in inductive approaches that iterate between inductive and deductive cycles of theorising from the data (Wallace 1971, cited in Blaikie 2000:157-159).

In contrast to these theory-led approaches to data analysis, this Thesis had used the ‘abductive’ approach. The analysis procedure in this approach is similar to that used in ‘grounded theory’, but by contrast does not start from well-defined concepts, rather concepts are defined through their use by participants, and categorisation of data is driven by the data itself (next section).
Table 3.6 ‘Seven Strategies for Sensemaking’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Key Anchor Points</th>
<th>Specific Data Needs</th>
<th>Dimensions (Weick)</th>
<th>Form of Sensemaking</th>
<th>Patterns, Mechanisms, and Generality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrative strategy</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Events, outcomes</td>
<td>High on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantification</td>
<td>Events, categories</td>
<td>Events, orders</td>
<td>Low on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate templates strategy</td>
<td>Events, units of study</td>
<td>Complex events, orders, and outcomes.</td>
<td>Moderate levels of accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>Moderate levels of accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided theory</td>
<td>Events, orders</td>
<td>Events, outcomes</td>
<td>Low on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual mapping</td>
<td>Events, orders</td>
<td>Events, outcomes</td>
<td>Low on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal mapping</td>
<td>Events, orders</td>
<td>Events, outcomes</td>
<td>Low on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic strategy</td>
<td>Processes, products</td>
<td>Events, orders</td>
<td>Low on accuracy, process, and generality.</td>
<td>High simplicity, high potential for surface level individual-level processes.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Langley (1999:696)
Theory-building from inter-organisational process data has been explored within Public Management. Huxham's elaboration of analysis procedures is especially helpful (Eden and Huxham 1996; Huxham and Hibbert 2011). This researcher pursued a 'similar but different' strategy, because Huxham’s work is deeply interpretivist and thus agent-based (2011; Huxham, Vangen, and Eden 2000; Huxham and Hibbert 2005; Sims, Huxham, and Beech 2009), though the 'ICA' procedure can be used to generate insights about structural characteristics of interorganisational arrangements at the meso and even macro levels (e.g. Huxham et al. 2000).

The second reason why Huxham’s ‘ICA’ procedure was not used is because it is intrinsically linked to an interventionist style of action research – the ‘RO-AR’ approach (2011). Because of lack of clarity about the status of this ‘uninvited action research’ project (section 3.2.4), the researcher was unable to use analysis techniques designed for action research data.

Theory-building within this research project involved two phases of activity. These are similar to those that characterising ‘interpretive’ organisational research in Haverland and Yanow (2012) and Gioia and Pitre (1990).

1) The first phase, during data collection, involved making sense of emergent findings from the exploratory data. This involved identifying themes and trying to understand emerging patterns in the data collected, then consulting theory and the literature for a matching description and a possible explanation of the data. The purpose of this was to iteratively conceptualise the findings then further interrogate participants to validate and improve the researcher’s understanding of the case in a reflexive process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). The best characterisation of this is in the data analysis approach described by Gioia and Pitre (1990, Figure 3.5), but this only became clear after the fact, as
‘interpretive’ analysis has a different meaning in the social science literature than the organisational literature, and considerable effort had been expended establishing that the study was not ‘interpretivist’ in that sense, but ‘realist’ (see Section 3.2).

![Figure 3.5 'Paradigm Comparison of steps toward theory-building'](source: Gioia and Pitre (1990:593))

2) Through this coding analysis and then ‘diagnosis’ of the data, the researcher seeks to builds understanding (1990:591, Figure 3.6). Using the results of diagnosis allows empirical data to extending existing theory and adding empirical data to it. (Chapter 8, sections 8.1 and 8.2). But there was
a further story to tell: this iterative analysis was important in both developing insights and assessing the significance of the empirical data to theory. This argument is developed in Chapter 8, as the substantive ‘Discussion’ of the findings. During the diagnostic process, the researcher discovered underlying assumptions of existing theories that, if addressed, could improve future applications of theory to data collected within this specific policy implementation and service delivery context. (sections 8.3 and 8.4).

Generating theory from the data was extremely challenging given the gaps in knowledge about the Third Sector and resilience in emergency management identified thus far, and gaps in theory that became apparent during the analysis, including current “measurement controversies” in collaboration (Robinson and Gaddis 2012) and definitional problems in the “amorphous” network research field (Isett et al. 2011).

**Figure 3.6 ‘Paradigm differences affecting theory building’**

![Figure 3.6 Paradigm differences affecting theory building](source: Gioia and Pitre (1990:593))
Diagnostic data analysis

In theory-building, the researcher needed to diagnose patterns identified in the data as clearly and simply as possible. Whilst a wide range of literature was consulted iteratively throughout the research project (Chapter 2), certain frameworks became particularly useful in diagnosing findings as they emerged. Of these, the Keast et al. (2007) framework and its antecedents (Brown and Keast 2003; Keast et al. 2006) were very useful in identifying relations between organisations, as opposed to just the existence of relationships or structures. Also useful for adding clarity about relations was Head (2008), whose definition of truly ‘collaborative networks’ helped in navigating the tendency of North American scholars to use that terminology to describe any network structure.

In the latter phase of the research project, the researcher had the opportunity to collect focus group and survey data from participants due to her involvement in the design of a policy development seminar (Chapter 7). She decided to explore practitioner preferences for relations between different sectors, and whether they expected those preferences to change in the future (section 7.3). To do this, the Mandell and Steelman (2003) framework was used. The researcher was aware of the limitations of its terminology, discussed in section 2.1. But the framework has advantages in being based upon explicit theoretical bases and delineating clearly between relationships, arraying them on a continuum of intensity across multiple characteristics. Its categories are also flexible across any type of multi-organisational arrangement. The results and a reflection on the success of this exercise can be found in section 7.3.

Following data analysis, the researcher used Skelcher and Sullivan’s framework (2008, Table 3.8), not to diagnose the findings during data collection, but to identify the logics of collaboration in this case (section 8.3).
Writing up ethnographic research

There was little guidance on how to write up a qualitative, realist ethnographic text. Organisational ethnographic texts still draw heavily on the anthropological tradition, or the political imperatives of the interpretivist turn, and thus their writing style is unsuitable for producing a realist ethnographic account (as versus narrative accounts).

An acknowledgement of this, and exception, comes in Schwartz-Shea and Yanow’s (2009) chapter on trust in the researcher-reader relationship (:58). They consider writing as method, anticipating evaluation of the ‘textwork’ (writing) phase that follows the ‘fieldwork’ (collection) and ‘deskwork’ (analysis) phases (2009:56).

The “crafting of a persuasive manuscript” is often “conflated with the analytic stage” and thus neglected, but the authors argue for written accounts to incorporate “textual elements” that address reader evaluations and thus persuade of textual trustworthiness.

Their evaluative criteria and writing strategies are applicable to both

- ‘interpretive’ - constructivist-interpretive, and
- ‘qualitative’ - objectivist-realist

approaches to ethnographic research. And can thus be used by realist ethnographers like this researcher (2009:57).

Although acknowledging that “researcher-writers” are likely to build evaluative criteria into their projects from research design to its conduct and completion (2009:58), the authors note that “reader-reviewers” may be implicitly or explicitly hostile to ethnographic research because of doubts about its “testability”, asking: “what makes this ethnographic account trustworthy?” (:59). Trustworthiness is especially central to acts that build on research, such as action research, and ‘engaged’ research – thus doubly important for this project and its endeavours. Trustworthiness is demonstrated by addressing the evaluative criteria outlined in section 3.3.2.
Data reconstruction

The data reported in Chapters 4-7 has been noted verbatim, transcribed into digital transcripts and thematically analysed before being written into digestible accounts (previous sections). The data represents three techniques of data analysis and reconstruction:

1. Manual thematic analysis, into accounts and micro-cases.
3. Summaries
   - of conversations between groups of practitioners,
   - of presentations by policy-makers and practitioners,
   - of one-to-one interviews.

Most sections are preceded by a ‘comment on the method’, which will introduce the method of data analysis and reconstruction. While most of the recorded data was manually thematically analysed, the summaries of conversations preserve the flow of the original conversation or presentation. These are included to show the flow of ideas, and the links that participants themselves made between these concepts. Clearly the intentions – and thus content – differs between presentations from keynote speakers at conferences (public and recorded) or group discussions in informal networks (private and confidential). But both represent attempts by practitioners and policy-makers to communicate their responses to policy agendas amongst an audience of peers.

This layout was chosen as a result of lack of guidance about integrating such a range of data together into one narrative. Having strived for a significant period of time to try and ‘standardise’ the data and its presentation, these reconstructions were a pragmatic choice that turned out to improve upon ‘standardised’ datasets. The ‘situatedness’ of the data is included to reflect both its richness and range, the strengths non-standardisation. The importance of this ‘situatedness’ became apparent during the analysis process (section 9.3).
Part 2 Overview

Findings Chapters

Chapter 4  Introduction to Scottish emergency management

Chapter 5  RQ1 – Implementing Resilience: what is the relationship between multi-agency arrangements and resilience?

Chapter 6  RQ2 – What is the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience? How is this organised?

Chapter 7  RQ3 – What is the role of the Third Sector in community resilience?

Postscript  Update on evolution in the sector

Chapter 8  Discussion

Chapter 9  Conclusion

References

Appendices
Guide to the Findings Chapters

The Findings chapters are shorter and have fewer sub-sections than the rest of the Thesis. There are four chapters, each with a distinct focus. At the foot of the coverpage for each Chapter is a short introduction to its contents.

The momentum and detail of the analysis builds gradually through Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 4 contextualises the themes explored in subsequent sections. The chapters broadly represent different phases of data collection (Table 4.1). The phases are not evenly spaced because they responded to a developing agenda whose momentum fluctuated. They were also dependent on access.

| Table 4.1 Focus of Findings chapters and corresponding phases of data collection |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| **Chapter 4**                  | Introduction to Scottish emergency management. |
| **Topic**                      | Reviews implementation activities up to the pilot study in 2008. |
| **Time period sampled**        | December 2009 - January 2010 |
| **Chapter 5**                  | RQ1 – Implementing Resilience: what is the relationship between multi-agency arrangements and resilience? |
| **Topic**                      | Primarily April-June 2010, 'bookended' by perspectives that link the beginning (Nov 2009) and end (Oct 2010) of data collection. |
| **Time period sampled**        | April 2010, then responses at the end of data collection in October 2010 |
| **Chapter 6**                  | RQ2 – What is the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience? How is this organised? |
| **Postscript**                 | Update on evolution in the sector. |
| **Topic**                      | Overview of October 2010 – May 2012 |

Table 4.2 (overleaf) summarises the methods used to generate the findings within each Chapter, but does not include details of each data collection event. Each Chapter reports its data longitudinally, giving a sense of both the process of implementation and the research project itself. Sub-sections are then divided by their level of analysis. For example, Chapter 6 reports its data at the national > regional > organisational levels of analysis.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 conclude with Analysis sections, synthesising their themes. The analysis remains separate from the data, but interprets the significance of patterns that were diagnosed using existing theory during the data collection. This aims to preserve the essential split between data and the researchers’ interpretation of it (see e.g. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009). The analysis illustrates how the data collected within this case study relate to existing theory in the fields of network and collaboration studies. By keeping these sections separate, readers can judge whether this analysis fits with their own interpretations of the data that has been presented within each of the Chapters.

Following the implementation process sampled by the researcher, with subsequent comment on the significance of the findings, allows the reader to experience the excitement of the researcher, through coming to understand the practitioners’ world, and the progressive exploration of the research questions.

The Findings Chapters are presented in this way to support comprehension, to locate the relevance of this empirical data to the field, and to gradually build the complexity of the argument before the Discussion chapter. Positioning analysis at the end of Chapters 5-7 reduces the need to replicate data in the discussion.

The text retains some of the dialect and expressions of the speaker, giving a flavour of the interaction and also the Scottish context. Acronyms are a feature of the sector and are widely used. The text reflects practitioner use of acronyms, which often happens without explanation. For the reader, definitions of acronyms are added [in brackets].

Respondents have been anonymised to varying degrees within the data to prevent a breach of confidentiality (see section 9.2). Names have been replaced by unrelated initials, which also makes the text easier to read as these anonymous identities are repeated numerous times. Data sources are included in the text using brackets with italic text stating [source, and date], as so.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Introduction to Scottish emergency management</th>
<th>Methods used [and in what order]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Devolved UK Emergency Management</td>
<td>Document analysis - policy document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Pilot Study: What is the Third Sector role in Scottish emergency response?</td>
<td>Interviews - 11 SG; public agency, and TSO staff in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 RQ1 – Implementing Resilience: what is the relationship between multi-agency arrangements and resilience?</td>
<td>Document analysis - legislation, websites and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Implementing resilience: how did it affect organising emergency management?</td>
<td>Document analysis and interviews with Audit Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Implementing resilience: what was the effect on multi-agency working?</td>
<td>Interview with Cabinet Office representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Implementing and developing Community Resilience: Scotland</td>
<td>Interviews with 2 SG staff - national &amp; regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Implementing and developing Community Resilience: UK</td>
<td>Document analysis - policy; guidance; internal documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Implementing Resilience and governance: operationalising resilience as a policy philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 RQ2 – What is the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience? How is this organised?</td>
<td>For Chapter 6 - all supported by document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Organising resilience: the national perspective</td>
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Chapter 4

Introduction to Scottish emergency management

Chapter 4 sets the context for themes presented in subsequent Chapters.

Section 4.1 introduces emergency management in Scotland, as a devolved region in the United Kingdom. It introduces key legislation, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which established a new legislative framework for civil protection across the UK. This section reviews pertinent aspects of ‘Preparing Scotland’, the implementation document for the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) in Scotland, setting the legislative context for this case study.

Section 4.2 reproduces findings from a 2008 pilot study that influenced the research design and data collection for this project. It presents selected data on the evolution of Scottish emergency management and implementation activity between 2005-2008, setting the historical context for this case study.
Emergency Management in Scotland, a devolved administration in the UK

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ['CCA'] established a new legislative framework for civil protection across the UK. The Contingency Planning (Scotland) Regulations 2005 describe how the provisions of the UK Act are to be implemented in Scotland. Part 1 of the Act imposes new duties on public sector and other relevant organisations to ensure that effective arrangements are in place for planning for, responding to and recovering from emergencies, and for the continued delivery of services in the event of disruption. Part 2 of the Act deals specifically with emergency powers and relates to matters reserved to the UK Parliament. Areas of ‘reserved responsibility’ include organisations such as British Transport Police, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, UK government, and the private and voluntary sectors (Audit Scotland 2009, Summary 313).

‘Preparing Scotland’ is the implementation document for the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) in Scotland, published by Scottish Resilience, a part of the Scottish Government14 (legally still referred to as ‘the Scottish Executive’ at UK level):

- “Preparing Scotland provides a framework for civil protection within which the contingency plans of the emergency services, local authorities, health services, government departments and other statutory, commercial and voluntary organisations at local, Scottish and UK level can be prepared. Its purpose is to support preparation and effective response to emergencies that may occur in Scotland.

- The guidance seeks to establish generic arrangements as a basis for meaningful preparation within a framework which will ensure effective management and co-ordination of response to all emergencies regardless of their scale or impact. It is also the place in which formal guidance on the Contingency Planning (Scotland) Regulations 2005, made under the Civil

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Contingencies Act 2004 is published.

- The document offers guidance on basic principles which may be tailored to suit local conditions. It is not intended to be an operations manual but to establish good practice based on lessons learned from planning for, and dealing with, major emergencies at all levels. Over time Preparing Scotland will develop as a repository for good practice and the promotion of continuous improvement.

- Preparing Scotland is designed to reflect a management process that will address preparation for emergencies from the identification of a risk to the return to normality. It is a living document that can adapt readily to changing circumstances. It allows for the rapid integration of arrangements to deal with new hazards and threats and any significant lessons identified in exercises or response to emergencies.

- The guidance contains programmes for development of Scottish resilience and civil protection. The programmes include training, exercising, promotion of national initiatives and research. Development of the programmes will be guided by stakeholders. The structures described for preparation and response will allow for harmonisation of effort by all of those with a part to play” (2006:2)

Regulatory guidance on statutory duties for organisations in Scotland can be found in Chapter 2 of the ‘Preparing Scotland’ guidance,

- “This Section of Preparing Scotland accompanies Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (“the Act”) and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (“the Regulations”). It is guidance to which the organisations covered by the Act must have regard and failure to do so may result in court proceedings being brought against them.1 The purpose of the Act, Regulations and Preparing Scotland is to provide a framework for Scotland's contribution to UK civil protection in the 21st century.

- This guidance applies in Scotland. Separate legislation with supporting guidance recognises local conditions in England, Wales and Northern
Ireland. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Ministers, certain general responders have functions in Scotland (the Health and Safety Executive, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the British Transport Police) and are subject to separate regulations and guidance issued by UK Ministers.

- This guidance will support individuals and organisations with a role to play in civil protection and, in particular, will advise those organisations subject to duties under the Act. Those duties relate to preparing for response to emergencies. (Separate guidance on response and recovery are covered elsewhere in Preparing Scotland and that guidance does not have the same statutory duty of compliance” (2006 Chapter 2:1).

As a result of these devolved powers, “the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, within their competencies, play a full role in response to an emergency. Their role will depend on two things: whether the incident affects Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland; and whether the response to the emergency includes activity within the competence of the administration. This is true even for terrorism-related emergencies (e.g. whilst national security is a reserved matter, the emergency services and NHS in Scotland are the responsibility of the Scottish Executive and the investigation and prosecution of crime, including terrorist crime, is a devolved responsibility of the Lord Advocate). The devolved administrations will mirror many of the tasks of the UK-level crisis mechanisms, as well as fulfilling the same tasks as the English regional structures. In every case, the precise balance of activity will depend on the competence of the devolved administration involved (i.e. the terms of their devolution settlement) and the nature of the incident. In areas of reserved responsibility, The UK Government Lead Department will lead the response in the devolved areas, working closely with the relevant devolved administration” (CONOPS, 200515).

“Management of activity in response should be based on day to day roles. However, the need for rapid decision making and co-ordination across a number and range of organisations may require the establishment of crisis management structures. Those structures may be planned at a local level through Strategic Co-ordinating Groups, for Scotland through the work of the Scottish Emergency Co-ordinating Committee and for the UK through the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat”. (‘Preparing Scotland’ 2006:7).

Responding agencies are defined by functions16 “The Act requires Category 1 responders to take up their duties by reference to their functions. “Functions are defined as “any power or duty whether conferred by virtue of an enactment or otherwise17”. The reference covers statutory duties and discretionary powers, as well as common law powers that relate to the business of the responder”... A main purpose of the legislation is to require Category 1 responders to prepare to perform their functions as far as necessary or desirable to respond to an emergency18” (2006 Chapter 2:4).

Legislation distinguishes between Category 1 and Category 2 responders:

- Category 1 responders “are the main organisations involved in most emergencies at the local level”.
- Category 2 responders “are likely to be heavily involved in particular types of emergencies. They are generally subject to regulatory regimes that require them to plan for emergencies and therefore their duties under the Act are limited” (2006 Chapter 2:4).

In Scotland, Category 1 responders include: local authorities; emergency services (Police; Fire Service; Scottish Ambulance Service); a Health Board [NHS Scotland]; the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Category 2 responders include: Utilities companies (e.g. electricity, gas, Scottish Water); Transport (railway, airport, and harbour operators); other Health agencies19.

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16 Section 2(1)(c) and (d)
17 Section 18(1)
18 Sections 2(1)(c) and (d)
Pilot Study: What is the Third Sector role in Scottish emergency response?

This section reproduces the findings of an unpublished pilot study – ‘Is there a role for the Scottish Third Sector in the provision of disaster response?’ (Moran 2008) – that influenced the research design and data collection for this project. The following text and diagrams represent themes generated from inductive qualitative data collection during the pilot study. Definitions are based on document analysis of ‘Preparing Scotland’ (2006), the Scottish implementation document for the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). Tables 4.3-4.6 and Figures 4.1-2 synthesise themes emerging from interview data, based on 11 interviews of selected stakeholders with a perspective on the Third Sector role in responses to the 2007 floods (Table 4.3), carried out May-August 2008.

Table 4.3 2008 Pilot Study Respondents and Organisational Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee 1</th>
<th>Policy Officer, Third Sector Division, Scottish Government.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, Geography, University of Dundee; co-author 'Exploring the Social Impacts of Flooding and Flood Risk in Scotland', Scottish Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 3</td>
<td>Information and Resource Manager, ScoRDS [Scottish Resilience Development Service] ‘PQ’ in the subsequent research project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 4</td>
<td>Policy Officer, SCVO [Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 5</td>
<td>Freshwater Policy Officer, RSPB [Royal Society for the Protection of Birds] Scotland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
<td>Policy Lead, Flooding Policy Team, Scottish Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 7</td>
<td>CEO, CRISIS (trauma counselling; <a href="http://www.crisiscounselling.co.uk">http://www.crisiscounselling.co.uk</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 8 &amp; 9</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Manager and Communications and Customer Services Manager, Scottish Environment Protection Agency [SEPA].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 10</td>
<td>Regional Operations Manager, WRVS Scotland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 11</td>
<td>Consultant and Board Member, National Flood Forum/Scottish Flood Forum.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

What is the role of the Third Sector in Scottish emergency response?

The civil contingencies community uses the term ‘voluntary sector’ to describe the range of activities we would usually associate with the Third Sector. The
Civil Contingencies Act (2004) does not stipulate a role for the voluntary sector. However, statutory responders are aware of the mandate in Preparing Scotland: “In performing its duties to plan for emergencies each Category 1 responder must have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations that are relevant in response to an emergency” Relevant activities are those employed in preventing, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects or taking other action in connection with an emergency, regardless of any other activity of the voluntary organisation” (2006 Chapter 2:30, emphases added throughout).

“It is expected that organisations not specifically captured by the Act”, for example, the voluntary sector, “will be fully involved with local responders dependent on local circumstances” (2006 Chapter 2:9). Preparing Scotland separates the voluntary and community responses. The role of TSOs is supplementary (2006 Chapter 1:7; :16), but the voluntary sector is assumed to have specific resources (2006 Chapter 3:88; :87; :104) and relational capacities (3:94; :98). This role is distinct from that of statutory responders, who bear responsibility for emergency planning and response (3:85), although “Category 2 responders, others involved with the Strategic Coordinating Group and voluntary organisations should be included at all stages of planning arrangements” (Chapter 2:23).

The concepts of community resilience (2006 Chapter 3:105-6), networks (3:23; :108; :110), and partnerships (3:3; :5; :111) are evoked to describe learning and the relationship between statutory responders and Third Sector actors, although governance mechanisms are less clear. Preparing Scotland is designed on the basis of subsidiarity (2006 Chapter 1:10). But “the majority of the voluntary sectors’ work will take place at operational level” (84), possibly isolating them from tactical and strategic-level processes. Preparing Scotland states it is desirable and necessary to include the voluntary sector in the planning processes for response -with some representation within local authority planning procedures and SCG sub-groups - especially regarding co-operation, multi-agency working, and training (2006 Chapter 1:2; Chapter 2:9; 20 Regulation 17, Civil Contingencies Act (2004).
This is not mandatory: “It is expected that the voluntary sector will be involved in all aspects of emergency planning insofar as they wish to be involved” (Chapter 2:31). This clause may have been designed to prevent guidance being burdensome on TSOs, or it may reflect cultural norms around exclusion of non-statutory actors.

Effective integration is dependent on prior relationships (3:84, italics added): “for effective integration of voluntary sector activity there needs to be an agreed approach in preparation and in response. The arrangements and plans need to suit local circumstances and be understood by all partners”.

Table 4.4 outlines ‘Preparing Scotland’s conceptions of the voluntary sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Established’ organisations</th>
<th>Provide a range of services e.g. British Red Cross Society, Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS), the Salvation Army, and St Andrew’s Ambulance.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain organisations</td>
<td>e.g. (a) search and rescue organisations, such as the British Cave Rescue Council (BCRC), coastguard response teams (HM Coastguard’s Auxiliary branch), the Mountain Rescue Council (MRC), the RNLI, the International Rescue Corps (IRC), search and rescue dog teams (SARDA); (b) groups of doctors, such as the British Association for Immediate Care Schemes (BASICS); (c) voluntary radio operators, such as the Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET); (d) non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and (e) organisations which specialise in providing emotional support and counselling, e.g. Cruse Bereavement Care and the Samaritans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contribute specialist skills in various types of activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual volunteers</td>
<td>Have particular skills but are not necessarily in recognised voluntary organisations e.g. interpreters or representatives of the faith communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support in generic areas</td>
<td>e.g. welfare; social and psychological aftercare; medical and first aid support; search and rescue; transport; communications.</td>
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Table 4.5 connects this analysis of secondary data with insights gained through primary data collection to generate a preliminary conceptualisation of the possible roles of the Third Sector in Scottish emergency response. Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Table 4.6 outline themes emerging from interviews.

1) Engaging through the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) (SCG in Scotland)
2) Establishing a voluntary sector sub-group of the LRF (SCG)
3) Building bilateral links based on functions
4) Building bilateral links based on capabilities (2010:6).

In 2008, individual ‘voluntary sector organisations’ had established bilateral relationships with individual statutory response agencies at all levels (national-regional-local) and some local authorities (models 3 and 4). Bilateral relationships were based on contracts, or ‘retainers’, on a pay-per-use basis. These were mainly for support functions e.g. providing catering to the emergency services whilst they responded to events. Several SCGs had ‘voluntary sector sub-groups’ (model 2). By 2010, all SCGs did (Section 6.2).
**Time:** Contrary to theory that identifies the ad-hoc role of the Third Sector (Kapucu, 2007) the greatest need for a Scottish Third Sector role was identified as the long-term recovery. E.g. the aftermath of flooding “goes on for a lifetime” (Interviewee 11, 2008). Lack of awareness of this issue, even in recent policy (see Pitt Review) means a lack of formal provision.

**Skills:** Emergency Planners were unaware of skills gaps and the Third Sector capacity to fill them. Volunteers can be more than just “ladies who do buns” (Interviewee 7, 2008).

**Scale:** International events and climate change create an unchallenged discourse of increasing threat. 2007 floods as a ‘wake up call’: “All of a sudden it’s been realized that they will have to rely on volunteers because they just haven’t got the staff” (Interviewee 10). Lack of expertise in UK regarding events of this scale and frequency (Interviewee 11) (2008).

**Implementation Gaps**

**Figure 4.1 What processes might contribute to a changing role for the Third Sector in emergency response?**

**Changes in the Emergency Management Sector**

**Organisational Development:** The sector is relatively youthful but maturity creates more opportunity for collaboration “as a 12 year old kid we’ve started to understand we’ve got legs and arms and we’re starting to understand we’ve got a brain” (Interviewee 8&9, 2008).

**Event-Related Learning**

External events are relevant to the development of sectoral norms: the sector has a history of turning learning into practice e.g. lessons from the aftermath of the Birmingham bombing led to the establishment of BCM (Interviewee 8&9, 2008).

2012 Olympics (London, England) and 2014 Commonwealth Games (Glasgow, Scotland) are a critical mass moment for sectoral crossover. New positions being created within Scottish Government to bring emergency management and the third sector together; presents huge opportunities to increase and expand the role of the Third Sector in emergency response (including disasters) over the next few years.

**Sector is changing:** respondents differed in their views. More implementation activity appeared to happen at the tactical rather than strategic level – crucial for Third Sector engagement (RQ1, 2008). Devolution injected more power into the whole process (anon. 2008). Development activity, best practice and knowledge transfer increasing (Interviewee 3, 2008).

“they are just learning as they go along, even at a high level” (anon.). The sector and its documentation evolve in a constant learning cycle, with evaluation of every event an opportunity for improvements in planning. Informal learning happens between practitioners across the UK. In the past, formal learning was limited by institutional practices: “very little learning; no sharing; no noting; no best practice” (anon.).
**Figure 4.2**
*Capacity of the Third Sector to perform its role in emergency response*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Cooperation within the Third Sector</th>
<th>1. Recruitment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little evidence of attempts by Scottish TSOs to build identity or sectoral capacity outside of that mandated by their role as set out by ‘Preparing Scotland’. When asked about collaboration or regular contact with other TSOs, Interviewee 10 identified only those organisations identified by ‘Preparing Scotland’ (the ‘existing’ organisations in RQ1). This collaboration was at the tactical level. Regular meetings only occurred if organised by local authorities. The TSOs depended on them to organise these approximately every 6 months; even then other stakeholders are present. These meetings are part of the duty to meet the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). Interviewee 11 gave operational examples that cooperation between Third Sector organisations is the key attribute to coordinating an emergent response. Central to this is the ability of the voluntary sector to work together – you can’t bring organisations together “if they come in with their own badges” e.g. “get the church to leave their bibles at home”. “If there’s one lesson to learn it’s the importance of establishing protocol between all [TSOs], especially around the sharing of confidential data”. One mechanism to facilitate this is regular [e.g. fortnightly] meetings to discuss activity, improvements, inter-agency communication, and - crucially – which organisation could help with what activities.</td>
<td>Lack of marketing strategy: novelty of emergency response offers unique opportunity for organisations to recruit new profile of volunteers. But processes need updating e.g. in WRVS recruitment happens within pool of existing volunteers (aging; not replenished) (Interviewee 10).</td>
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Attitudes to voluntarism: (1) why should I get involved? (2) statutory authorities and the government will do it. In addition social change erodes the traditional recruiting base of housewives looking for activities during school hours – and children of working mums are often cared for by grandparents, taking out two generations of potential volunteers. High turnover due to aging volunteers means skills, expertise [and capacity] lost too (Interviewee 10). |

Inconsistency makes it harder to build and retain capacity: “It is difficult for people to grasp that they won’t be needed all the time”. It is resource extensive to maintain contact: people lose interest, and need retraining (Interviewee 10, 2008). Humanitarian staff work overseas due to little demand for their skills in the UK, leaving a skills gap (Interviewee 7, 2008). |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2. Capacity Building</th>
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<tr>
<td>Statutory responders will need to call on TSOs for resources but are not building relationships. TSOs want involvement: “we don’t want just to be used”. TSOs wanted to be part of the planning process rather than “a token bum on a seat” (I7, 2008).</td>
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Operationally Third Sector actors might be perceived as ‘getting in the way’ of response by “handing out cups of tea”. Tactically, local authority Emergency Planners may have a historic distrust of TSOs, out of step with Third Sector professionalisation (Interviewee 7, 2008). |

Interviewee 11 believes that in one sense any TSO can provide disaster response, provided they have the funding. Response organisations may run as social enterprises: e.g. WRVS use retainer with statutory agents to provide disaster response activities (Interviewee 10); CRISIS use emergency response income to pay for their community counselling services (Interviewee 7). Lack of funding may hamper upscaling of Third Sector role in disaster response – TSOs lack capacity to suddenly increase funding (Interviewee 10). Evidence from the 2007 Hull flood response suggests that for emergent TSOs, a lack of funds may mean a lack of capacity to respond (Interviewee 11). An ideal model might be to manage emergent donations using an intermediary organisation to assess what response TSOs could offer, liaising with an independent funding council to administer funds (Interviewee 11, 2008). |
"We need to change how this process works" (Interviewee 7, 2008). Lack of leadership from Scottish Government, outside of keeping up to date with legislative change. Core to this was the uneven spread of resources. Need for a directive from the highest possible level, perhaps through ScoRDS or the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to say: "the way we see new [responses to] major incidents [is]... every major incident response team needs x specialisms - where will you source them from?" (Interviewee 7). Interviewee 4 indicated the importance of intermediaries in liaison between statutory and Third Sector organisations; Interviewee 7 envisions statutory agencies acting on this through the CVS, a pre-existing voluntary sector network that already contains the expertise "to find what for who and where". Searching by specialism would make it very easy to locate reserves of un-utilised provision. (2008). "Networking is critical to real integrated services". Statutory agencies are still in a mindset of who they can use rather than who they can collaborate with: "It’s not always about money, it’s about utilising networks – that’s how the social economy is thriving...If we are involved from the beginning, [they] can access voluntary sector expertise for free – but if you come late you have to pay" (Interviewee 7).

**Table 4.6 Third Sector Perspectives on Critical Factors for Collaboration (2008)**

| Strategic activities | "We need to change how this process works" (Interviewee 7, 2008). Lack of leadership from Scottish Government, outside of keeping up to date with legislative change. Core to this was the uneven spread of resources. Need for a directive from the highest possible level, perhaps through ScoRDS or the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to say: "the way we see new [responses to] major incidents [is]... every major incident response team needs x specialisms - where will you source them from?" (Interviewee 7). Interviewee 4 indicated the importance of intermediaries in liaison between statutory and Third Sector organisations; Interviewee 7 envisions statutory agencies acting on this through the CVS, a pre-existing voluntary sector network that already contains the expertise “to find what for who and where”. Searching by specialism would make it very easy to locate reserves of un-utilised provision. (2008). "Networking is critical to real integrated services". Statutory agencies are still in a mindset of who they can use rather than who they can collaborate with: “It’s not always about money, it’s about utilising networks – that’s how the social economy is thriving...If we are involved from the beginning, [they] can access voluntary sector expertise for free – but if you come late you have to pay” (Interviewee 7). |
| Tactical activities | Representation: "at the right level to make changes" (Anon., 2008). The CCA is designed on the basis of subsidiarity: the “lowest practical” level for control of response to emergency, and the “highest necessary” for coordination and support of local activity (Preparing Scotland 2006 1:10). The legislation requires effective representation of response agencies at local meetings, placing a heavy burden on statutory responders. There are ways to cooperate more efficiently: at the National Emergency Media Forum organisations tackle issues of cross-cultural communications with attendees (Interviewee 9). TSOs are represented as one of the working groups in each Strategic Coordinating Group. ‘Voluntary Sector Organisation’ meetings discuss general issues, TSOs don’t meet emergency services unless issue-specific. These meetings are held at the discretion of the local authority and not all have a Voluntary Group meeting. Interviewee 7 was not from an “established organisation” and thus not represented at these working group meetings - described how after a major fire the local Emergency Planning Officer [EPO] called up and said “can we call on you?”. She consented but took no action, and when challenged by a member of her staff revealed that they were only contacted so the EPO could attend the emergency briefing and say he had called on them, “if we were going to provide this service, we would have been at the meeting” (2008). Awareness: Local authority Emergency Planners [EPOs] were perceived to be resistant to TSOs due to a lack of awareness of professionalism within the sector, but “that’s a lot of stuff you’re shutting the door on”. Statutory responders “need to be pro-active...don’t just call us when the bomb goes off”. Many EPOs know the TSOs in the CCA (2004) verbatim – but when they do identify other Third Sector organisations it is “chaotic”, citing “defunct organisations and even the rotary club” as sources of response capability (Interviewee 7). |
| Operational activities | Disaster sites are exclusive based on discourses of expertise “a big square that you cannot access unless you have a specific assigned role” (Interviewee 7, 2008). Training and exercising [T&E] there was a perception that EPs felt “TSOs just get in the way” (Interviewee 7, 2008). All respondents felt T&E was central to an effective response. TSOs are not Category 1 or 2 responders thus only occasionally present, dependent on topic and scenario. The importance of individuals, and networks as mechanisms for knowledge transfer within and between organisations was highlighted, and the sector relies on the effectiveness of ‘cascading’: “How these individuals disseminate learning to their organisations or sector is up to them” (Interviewee 3). |
Chapter 5  
RQ1

Implementing Resilience: what is the relationship between multi-agency arrangements and resilience?

Chapter 4 established the legislative and historical context (2005-2008). Chapter 5 reveals the policy context for this implementation Case Study. It examines the relationship between implementing resilience and the governance of UK emergency management, linking this to the operationalisation of resilience as a policy philosophy.

Chapter 5 focuses on policy implementation in Scotland, describing how the implementation of resilience has affected the way that Scottish emergency management is organised. It then explores the nature of the relationship between resilience and multi-agency working in Scottish emergency management, and how this has affected multi-agency arrangements. The latter half of the Chapter explores the Community Resilience concept, and how this was developing (differently) at Scottish and UK levels. The analysis identifies:

- Structures for effective multi-agency working, in legislation and
- Processes for more effective multi-agency working, in implementation.
Section 5.1 Implementing resilience: organising emergency management

According to ‘Preparing Scotland’, “resilience is built around several key activities…. this cycle – assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery – is at the heart of resilience…complemented by review of plans and arrangements based on experience of emergencies and exercises” (2006:2).

Organising Scottish emergency management


‘Scottish Resilience’

The current Division had been formed in 2008 but “Scottish Resilience, it’s a historic thing”: the Directorate had evolved from “Police, Fire and Civil Defence” through incremental change to the present arrangement, with 130 staff, 50% attached to the Fire and Rescue Service and 50% engaged in civil contingencies activity, which included a range of distinct workstreams in ‘Units’ (Figure 5.1). Staff included civil servants, secondees, and contractors, due to the specialised topic. “This is a long term development and delivery programme, so it’s slightly different from some [policy] areas”. Scottish Government civil servants are policy generalists, and placements rotate frequently, posts were short: “a year to 18 months, people would come and move on. It’s 2 to 3 years now, which is much more recent”. This meant “turnover within Government is faster than the turnover outside”, in public agencies. “That has problems for continuity and understanding”, but in civil contingencies, “[people] actually know each other to some extent, so that helps… it also helps when things go wrong and you need a very close working network of people who are familiar with what needs to be done… so that’s quite an important aspect”. Updates (role; name; contacts) to the Division ‘Organisation Chart’ were periodically circulated to stakeholders.
Scottish Resilience included policy and “delivery” roles, “we’re a funny mixture because we’re something in-between”. They produced ‘Preparing Scotland’ (2006), the implementation document for the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) ['CCA'] legislation in Scotland. Their work included involvement in emergencies and large scale events (e.g. G8; G20; and NATO meetings held in Scotland), producing guidance, directing resources to local responders, and “anything from papers, guidance, seminars, to putting money into development projects, training, exercising, and leadership development and... the willing to strengthen these networks and peoples’ capabilities to do whatever their job is at these different levels”. “...So we’re not just developing policy, we also have to help develop Scottish resilience”.

The Division’s briefing document ['Scottish Resilience Overview 2009-10’], set the “long-term context for the work of Scottish Resilience”:

“Although Scotland is a relatively stable and prosperous country we have in recent years experienced (or nearly experienced) several major emergencies which have threatened human health and our economy and way of life. Scotland is now better prepared to cope with emergencies as a result of a vast amount of
multi-agency planning, training and exercising in recent years and the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act; but there is much more to do in a joined up way to ensure that Scotland is as well prepared as possible to deal with a major emergency arising from any of the 4 main threats we have identified: i.e. terrorism, pandemic flu (with which we are coping at present), utility failure (including fuel shortages), and extreme weather”.

“The wider context for our work is likely to remain uncertain beyond the current financial year; the only certainties seem to be that the risks will not go away and that public expenditure will become even tighter. This will require all public sector organisations to look creatively at ways of getting more from less”. Scottish Resilience “works with a wide variety of agencies across the public, private and voluntary sectors reflecting the fact that resilience is ultimately everyone’s responsibility”. It was focussed on delivery,

“We provide practical support to the frontline agencies that deliver fire and rescue services and emergency planning and response, as well as advice to Ministers and colleagues across the Scottish Government”.

“The desired outcome we are seeking to achieve is that:

Scotland is as prepared as possible to deal with the consequences of any national or local emergency because responder agencies and the Scottish Government are:
preparing together effectively on the basis of a clear view of risks; have a good understanding of what capability is available locally and nationally; are using resources flexibly, pragmatically and efficiently; are ensuring individuals and teams are trained, exercised and evaluated adequately; and are promoting resilience across the public, private and voluntary sectors” (emphasis in original).

“The creation of the Pandemic Flu Co-ordination Team... reflects the priority attached by the Government to tackling the current flu pandemic and managing its consequences” The team had been created from the “Resilience Capabilities and Emergency Response Unit (the latter has been suspended but will be reformed once the pandemic is over)” and would “remain in existence for as long as necessary and will expand and contract as circumstances change”.
**Policy Change**

“The Government’s feeling pre-2004, the Civil Contingencies Act, was that things were best handled at a local level. And of course the breaking point came with a number of emergencies which impacted at a national level ...[Government] was assuming things were best done at a local level, which is more or less true most of the time, but when it came to these really big things, something more and better needed to be done, hence the development of the Civil Contingencies Act, and this proactive approach which is the resilience framework cycle, which... basically consists of a risks and impacts assessment [producing “not targets”], and then looking at capabilities against that assessment, saying, ‘well, here’s what we could be faced with, what are our capabilities to deal with this, where are the gaps?’”. In Scottish Resilience “we’re looking at a system for how would we measure where we are, how would we collect information to say this is where we are as a country... how are we managing, how are our processes developing, where do we need to target our resources to best effect? Of course that’s about to become a rather more important measure”, due to “hefty cuts to public service budgets”. The “resilience framework” involved local responders and Scottish Government. “Although the Civil Contingencies Act, and we’re working beyond the limitations of that, is focused on local responders and the Government doesn’t usually legislate against itself, it’s well recognised at UK and Scottish Government level that Government needs to do the same sorts of things [as responders]. Not exactly the same because it doesn’t have the same role, but it needs to look at risk assessment at Scottish national level, and impacts, and its own capabilities in terms of what its role is, and how to measure its own preparedness, so these things are done in parallel across the board... We are not measuring [regional Strategic Coordinating Groups’ (‘SCGs’)] performance in order to point to them and say, ‘you’re not good at this,’ or, ‘this is bad!’ We want honesty; we want honest and straightforward answers... we try to make clear this is a two-way process, and our interest is to make things better, to improve resilience, to help them develop. So it’s not an audit, but it is a measurement and its purpose is to help focus resources in the right place”.

‘IN’ had joined five years before as “the ‘build team’ for the Civil Contingencies Act”, working alongside others on ‘Preparing Scotland’ and “really also to help folk in here set something better up to work across Scottish Government and provide a centre here which would meet the requirements of ministers... over the five years there’s been a lot of work, a lot of development at Scottish Government level, and with the SCGs. And the SCGs weren’t brand new; there were groups that co-existed through all of this in Scotland. So it wasn’t something completely out of the blue, but it was a better development of some of the structures that were here already. So it’s not something alien that landed... it was less well coordinated, I mean everyone had their roles, the emergency and health services and local authorities all had their roles, and they were to some extent audited. But as I say, there wasn’t the same lead from Government and where this was all going. And as I say, that was the big change, this development of a framework cycle, a guidance, specific duties. Not everyone agreed that it was necessarily to make these various duties... And now, this is five, six years on, there’s a process of looking at all of this and saying, ‘well, what worked and what didn’t, and where are we going with this?’” The Cabinet Office ‘Civil Contingencies Act Enhancements Programme’ was reviewing “some of the duties they’ve got, and certainly how the guidance is structured. Was that really the best way to do this, if not, we’ll change it”. Drawing parallels with Heath and Safety legislation (1974), this was a “long term project” that would develop “along the way... the message is not, ‘this is how it’s to be done, and if it isn’t working it’s your fault for not doing it.’ It’s very much a dialogue [but]... somebody’s got to decide where it’s going and what generally is the best approach”, which was the purpose of current activity. It would take “another four or five years for this all to become well established”.

Coordination across boundaries
The Division had networks of contacts across different functions in Scottish Government, related to responding to emergencies. Government worked with ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’, but not ‘operational’ activities, which happened inside
organisations – strategic, tactical, and operational activities did not map onto national, regional, and local levels. “We do a lot of work where we go and help liaison people with their meetings [at SCG level]... [staff were] partly information gathering and a link into the ongoing emergency coordination process”. At tactical [SCG] level, “there would be one multi-agency tactical group” supported by specialist functional groups, “what we’re quite keen to do... is to expand the network, not directly with Scottish Government, but encourage the people who are working at a tactical level to expand their networks”, “to give you an example, the traditional role of a local authority emergency planning officer was to write plans for various things that a local authority did and how it would coordinate. And [we said] we’d like to see that role develop more as a project manager for resilience. So the people who are developing arrangements, writing plans, preparing for emergencies, are more likely to be the service managers, people like that, who are directly familiar and professionally qualified in a role [e.g. social work]... They’re what I call functional managers”.

Scotland had 32 local authorities (for 5 million people, restructured during the Thatcher administration), making coordination challenging [due to overlap]. Some processes lacked “joined-upness” between local authorities and other public agencies, particularly due to fragmentation in public service delivery, where private contractors might still rely on public provision of business continuity arrangements in emergencies (e.g. evacuating the elderly from their care homes). Coordination was imperative: “a lot of the time everybody copes at a local level, but when it’s really big it starts to fall apart because you can’t borrow resources from somebody else because theirs are being used to deal with the same thing... So [responses to] Foot and Mouth, focused on animal health and they say ‘we’re in charge,’ and you say, ‘what, you’re in charge of looking after the educational needs of kids isolated on farms? You’re in charge of social work looking after the mental health and welfare, or health?... it needs an enormous combined effort.... functional management by the people who know what their job is, it needs to be joined up and they need to be supported”.
Section 5.2 Implementing resilience: the effect on multi-agency working

Regulatory guidance on ‘co-operation’ in ‘Preparing Scotland’ states:

- “Category 1 and Category 2 responders must co-operate locally.
- Local co-operation takes two forms. Responders must co-operate individually with other responders and jointly through a Strategic Co-ordinating Group.
- The Strategic Co-ordinating Group involves all local Category 1 and 2 responders. The Group has a role in both preparation and response to emergencies. All local responders must be effectively represented at meetings of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. Category 2 responders have the right to attend if desired and must attend if requested. Responders not covered by the Act have a role in the Groups’ activities.
- Each Strategic Co-ordinating Group should agree its remit and nominate a Chair and Secretary. It must meet at least every six months.
- Local responders may co-operate with others outside their local resilience area.
- Other forms of co-operation are permitted. They include agreeing joint arrangements for discharge of functions and nominating “lead responders” to act on behalf of others (‘Summary’, 2006 Chapter 2:9).

In Chapter 3, ‘Good Practice Guidance’, Section 2 is “guidance that should assist responders to develop sound local partnerships of all who have a part to play in preparing for effective response to emergencies”.

- “The partnerships will be founded on the Strategic Co-ordinating Groups established by the Civil Contingencies Act. However, given the significant part that can be played by the voluntary sector and others, the partnerships may also embrace a wider group of organisations at the appropriate level. For example, WRVS and the Red Cross may work with local authority social services and others in sub-groups preparing to open rest centres and deal with the needs of displaced people, and local businesses may work with the emergency services regarding evacuation plans for a shopping centre.”
• Co-operation will be improved if all partners have an open and supportive approach to their work. Successful response to emergencies in Scotland has demonstrated that joint working and support can resolve very difficult problems that fall across organisational boundaries. Large scale events have shown that single organisations acting alone cannot resolve the myriad of problems caused by what might, at first sight, appear to be relatively simple emergencies caused by a single source” (2006 Chapter 3:3).

Structurally, “the SCG [Strategic Coordinating Group] lies at the centre of the formal co-operation process at local level. The SCG works alongside other elements of the multi agency planning framework at the local and central government levels. However, the framework is generally not a hierarchy. The SCG is not subordinate to central government, information and support should flow in both directions”. “Membership of the SCG is required for Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act”. (2006 Chapter 3:4).

Figure 5.2 is taken from ‘Preparing Scotland’ and “describes, in outline, the structures that support preparation for emergencies in Scotland. It demonstrates the linkages between the various elements that contribute to resilience and preparation of emergency arrangements in Scotland. The structure reflects that established for responding to emergencies. Its purpose is to enhance Scottish emergency arrangements and promote consistency and integration at all levels” (2006 Chapter 1:29).

Why, and how, is resilience linked to multi-agency working?

Multi-agency working as a proxy for resilience

In August 2009, Audit Scotland published an audit of the civil contingencies sector in Scotland: ‘Improving civil contingencies planning’ (2009a). The report was an evaluation of the implementation of CCA legislation, and its evolution:

“4. This study looked at what progress has been made since the Act was passed, assessed the pace of change and identified ways in which improvements can be made. Implementation of the Act is ongoing, and we recognise that some of its provisions have not yet been fully implemented or matured…” Data collection was much more comprehensive than this project:

“7. In carrying out this study we collected information through a survey of 64 Category 1 responders,
as well as Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) coordinators; interviews with SCG chairs and coordinators and representatives of relevant organisations; focus groups with NHS and local authority emergency planning officers; observation of meetings, training events and exercises; and a review of relevant documentation.

The goal of legislation was resilience, and in the audit effective multi-agency working was used to measure the implementation of the Act, and thus resilience:

“5. The emphasis of our study was on the requirement under the Act for organisations to work together. We examined co-operation between key stakeholders generally, as well as specifically in relation to risk assessment, emergency and business continuity planning, training and exercising, and learning lessons. We also looked at the resources and financial and performance management processes that support these activities. This was a better tool to evaluate implementation than other approaches, such as measuring preparedness:

“6. We did not look at how individual emergencies have been dealt with or make judgements on the level of preparedness of any individual organisation, sector or Scotland as a whole” (2009a:3).

Figure 5.2 ‘Outline structure for coordination in preparing for response in Scotland’

Source: ‘Preparing Scotland’ 2005:31
Audit Scotland: key messages (2009b) – with selected detail:

1. Overall, key organisations work well together, particularly through their Strategic Coordinating Groups, but barriers to joint working exist (2009b:1).

2. The Scottish Government has taken an active role in implementing the Act but this increased priority has placed greater demands on local responders (2).

3. Governance and accountability arrangements for multi-agency working in civil contingencies planning are unclear (:3).

4. All SCGs have published a Community Risk Register but these have made a limited contribution to informing civil contingencies planning at a local or national level (:3).

5. Most Category 1 responders have a generic emergency plan in place and have been involved in developing multi-agency arrangements for their SCG area. However, planning for business continuity management and recovery are not as well developed (:4).

6. Complex training and exercising requirements place significant demands on local responders, making participation and effective coordination difficult (:4).

7. Lessons from incidents and exercises are not shared widely or systematically put into practice (:4).
   - 44. Wider and more systematic distribution [of lessons] could increase the value of exercises, promote consistency among responders and contribute to improving resilience in Scotland (:6).

8. There is no clear information on how much is spent on civil contingencies planning across Scotland (:5).

9. There is potential for more collaboration between organisations to increase capacity and make more effective use of resources (:5).
   - 50. Dealing with and recovering from emergencies can place significant demands on the financial, human and physical resources of individual organisations. Mutual aid agreements formally set out the arrangements between organisations to provide each other with assistance through the provision of additional resources during and after an emergency (:5).

10. The emergency services have formal mutual aid arrangements in place, but these are less developed in other sectors and at SCG level. Most local authority mutual aid arrangements across Scotland are reactive and informal and may not be reliable. (2009b:5).

Relevant aspects of the “overall picture” of implementation up to 2008-9 were:

12. “Overall, the Act has reinforced multi-agency working, with organisations generally cooperating well and making progress towards meeting their main duties under the Act. However, further improvements could be made and the pace of change accelerated in certain areas.

13. The Act introduced a new approach to civil contingencies planning. These new arrangements emphasise the need for flexible and adaptable arrangements to support an effective response to disruptive events that affect our communities. This is a more holistic approach than that taken traditionally. Instead of emergency planning being an isolated activity,
it should be part of a wider process, embedded across organisations. Although progress has been made, traditional aspects of civil contingencies planning – such as response arrangements – still tend to dominate activity. So far, less attention has been given to arrangements that ensure the continued delivery of services to local people and the effective recovery of communities after an incident.

14. Improved joint working between agencies in the public, private and voluntary sectors was a key aim of the Act and this is an area where progress is being made, particularly through the eight SCGs. However, as with multi-agency working across the public sector more generally, we found a number of issues that limit its effectiveness. These include limited joint working across geographic boundaries, different approaches to information sharing, and difficulties in ensuring effective representation at SCG level.

15. The arrangements for civil contingencies planning are increasingly complex, involving a range of organisations, procedures and processes. There is a lack of clarity about some roles, leadership and accountabilities and this carries a risk of confusion, duplication or omission...

16. The Scottish Government has been active in supporting multi-agency working and the implementation of the Act in Scotland. However, at a local level, organisations can find it difficult to keep pace with the demands placed on them. It is important that the Scottish Government fully considers local delivery and capacity issues when initiating new developments” (2009a:4). Presenting the findings at an Emergency Planning conference (September 2009) and in an interview with the researcher (November 2009), Auditors emphasised that many of these joint-working issues were generic to public service delivery.

The ‘Regional Resilience Adviser’ role

In January 2010, the researcher interviewed ‘HY’, appointed in July 2009 to a newly-created role by Scottish Resilience, to work between national-level and regional-level structures, in this case between Scottish Government and the ‘Strathclyde’ SCG, known as ‘Strathclyde Emergencies Co-ordination Group’ [SECG] (see section 6.2). His role – ‘Regional Resilience Advisor’ – had an equivalent in the ‘Grampian’ SCG, ‘AN’, who started “a couple of months earlier”. He was “not quite sure of the genesis of it but I think the Government felt that there was a need just to have somebody co-ordinating all this work that was going on”. His role description included: “to lead at a strategic level the development and implementation of plans for improving resilience across the Strathclyde area”.

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This included “overseeing the business of the Strathclyde Emergencies Co-ordination Group (SECG) and the effective management of the work of the SECG Project Managers and Training & Exercise Co-ordinator, assisting in the response to a major incident, and liaison with the Scottish Government on the national resilience programme” [internal document]. He felt there was a degree of caution around his role from the SECG ‘Tactical’ Group (see section 6.2), “because they’re the ones who have to do the work and they’re the ones who do have that repository of expertise...the only way to get over that is just build up a relationship of trust and that takes time”.

Q: Was the balance of activity ‘shifting upward’ within Scottish emergency management? “I’m two thirds of the way through [consulting with Category 1 and 2 responders in SECG] and at both strategic and tactical level one of the areas there’s absolute unanimity is the Government are asking too much of us”. Part of his role was “we need to convince people that in actual fact working together for the greater good will have a positive bounce back effect on you in that you’ll now have access to potentially greater resources or expertise”, “People in charge of really busy local authorities which almost all of ours are, you know, they’ve got a lot of daily pressures. If I say to the chief executive what keeps you awake at night, it’s no resilience, you know, it’s budget, it’s child protection and it’s issues like that, they’re the ones that if it goes horribly wrong it goes horribly wrong so you’ve got to just work away at keeping the resilience message up there and to a greater or lesser degree we’re successful at that”.

Q: Partnership working at the tactical and strategic levels...within the region you think that’s fairly effective? “I think that could be improved... it’s just down to the sheer size of the place, whilst it’s an advantage it’s also a challenge”. Part of the RRA role was to revisit SCG structures, and based on local consultation “I’ll start to change the way we do business slightly... we don’t need to pull it down and start again but there are things we could do more effectively”.
Implementation structures

“There’s always going to be a tension between local empowerment and maintaining sufficient central control so that those local components can join together in times of crisis beyond the scale of one locality or beyond the capacity of that one locality to cope with it on its own... it’s much, much easier if the system you’re using are the same, to do that. If you just let people go off into completely localised empowered, empowerment kind of environments then you’ll get a hundred and one different ways of doing it”.

“The danger is of pushing everything into the local level. While subsidiarity is a key concept in civil contingencies nevertheless so too is the concept of mutual aid and mutual support both from Government and from within SCGs... the sole reason [SCGs exist] is so that you can co-ordinate the activities with different agents. If everyone is off on adventures of their own with different structures then that becomes more difficult so a degree of central control is able to say well no you can’t do it that way, do it this way, why, because that way if you and the SCG next to you need to work together then your structures are the same and it’s relatively simple [if not] you’ll be able to work together but it’ll be clunky and it’ll take a lot longer”.

However, this did not extend to amalgamating local-level response arrangements to the regional level. ‘HY’ had consulted on sharing one office, “one of the chief executives said, pretty accurately I have to say, well it would probably make us good at dealing with the really big emergencies, better at that, but we’d be much poorer at small emergencies and to be honest you can go a generation and not get a really huge emergency, you know, whereas you can set your watch by it you’re going to get a small local one at some point within the year... you want something done, effectively you want it done right now. That local context makes that work because they know who to go to, a big centralised unit would take a long time to work up that kind of level of local knowledge”.

Neither should the SECG disaggregate to a more local level: “when they push us to co-ordinate why would you disaggregate?” SECG was very large, all SCGs differed, “and yet they are the foundation for coordinating resilience”.
“Geography is important with the issues about people. How many people have you got... frankly if a meteorite lands on St Kilda [island] then it’s a bit of a blow if you’re a gannet [bird] but it’s not a disaster. If it lands in George Square [Glasgow] ten thousand people will be killed in a second, that’s a disaster. So it’s about people. There’s only five million people up here [Scotland] so we are on that [UK] scale a region... if Scotland was part of England it would be a [region] whatever you do don’t call Scotland a region. Are you English?” I am. “Aye, so don’t call Scotland a region... it does have that edge of being a national Government”.

‘HY’ was tasked with considering the impact of the ‘shared services’ agenda: “gathering a ferocious head of steam and driven by a financial imperative”, “it is just pure and simply about rationalisation”. Q: Do you think civil contingencies will be protected from cuts to a certain extent?“There’s not a great deal of fat there to be trimmed off, you might make one person redundant: in most councils that’s 50% of your workforce [Emergency Planning Officers] gone, so you’ve not saved a great deal of money but you’ve put a fair old dent in your capability and your capacity and [local authority] Chief Executives like to know that when somebody’s JCB fractures a gas main in Main Street... it looks joined up and these people all get a relatively good bit of service that’s facilitated by an experienced EPO going out and knowing who to phone... to get it done... That kind of on the ground real-time resilience issue, it’s not sexy, it’s not saving the world, but is it keeping the citizens of that local authority area protected, kept warm, kept a roof over their head, kept satisfied, and in the end that’s what we’re here for, it’s no about planes dropping out the sky or a meteorite hitting us, it’s about those kind of small emergencies. So if I’m a chief executive and I’m thinking that and I’m thinking what am I going to save here, forty five thousand pound a year, phew, let’s no bother... the downside of that is actually there’s no the same financial imperative to share services. So it’s actually quite a hard sell when you’re saying... I think it would be a really good idea if you could join your two together... and they’re just thinking I’m no saving any money, when I pick up the phone now I get somebody I don’t know... I don’t want to do that”.
Civil contingencies had not historically been subject to privatisation to the same degree as other public services in the UK: “if you dig down deep enough into civil contingencies you get to a layer in the silt where it becomes civil protection, which is saving us all from when nuclear missiles come raining over the eastern block [Cold War-era]... your civil defence is not naturally something you’d want to privatise.... no-one’s got a hundred people working in an office dealing with civil protection, civil contingencies, resilience, call it what you like, so there was never a great commercial impetus to privatise them to save them money... the push isn’t great because there’s no that many of them and the pull isn’t great because the Chief Executive still liked to have that wee bit of a grip because they know that if you get an emergency seriously wrong then that’s you featured on the front page of the local press and your name’s mud.... all because you evacuated a street and it took you six hours to realise maybe we’ll just put them in a hotel. Got an EPO there, been there, done that, got the t-shirt, EPO turns up and says well there’s too many people here, it’s freezing cold we’re no going to put them in a hall, let’s put them in a hotel, everybody’s happy, it’s done in half an hour, and your council’s great. Why would you privatise that?”

HY was trying to embed more capacity-building work to be shared between local authority joint working groups, “the downside for them is it takes somebody external to them exercising a bit of authority over them to say you’ll do that and you’ll do this, that would be me, but I have no formal authority over the group, it’s co-ordination through consensus...So I’ve got to build up a relationship of trust and a working relationship with the key individuals at a tactical level so that when I look them in the eye and say honest you’ll get something out of this if you do this for us they’ll believe me. I’ll be frank we’re not there yet. I could go down the line of going to the strategic group and saying give me the authority to do X, give me the authority to do Y... I would rather convince folk that it’s in their own interest than start going to their boss and saying please write and tell him to do that”
Section 5.3 Implementing and developing Community Resilience: Scotland

Comment on the method

How did implementing Community Resilience differ from arrangements for resilience? Why did the concept need policy development and capacity building? Interviewing respondent ‘DN’ (section 6.3) in November 2009, flooding was the “topic of the moment”. “Nobody came’–type quotes” were indicative of “a dependency culture”. Scottish policy development around the concept was being led by the newly-created Regional Resilience Adviser ['RRA'] posts, who would carry out projects, the first of which were defining community resilience and the link to education, respectively (RABS (VS) 1st meeting, November 2009).

The Cabinet Office would run a public policy consultation on Community Resilience during 2010, reporting at the end of the year. DN perceived that approaches diverged between the UK and Scotland, contrasting a “new culture” within Cabinet Office – that Government should “no longer drive the issue” but would “set the direction of travel” – with the Scottish “guidance push, influencing through SCGs and community groups”. “The issue is at a philosophical level, not an official level”, there was “no disagreement” between England and Scotland. Cabinet Office had a “relaxed attitude to divergence” but if policy differed it should be “based on evidence, not [political] governance”. The topic was “too important for politicking or protectionism”, although Scotland spoke with the “voice of devolution”: it would incorporate guidance, but might need to differ. Scottish Government was still “directly accountable, particularly in a blame culture”. DN identified key figures – ‘IW’ (next section), ‘IN’ (section 5.1) and ‘HY’ (section 5.2) – who were interviewed between December 2009-January 2010, to understand Scottish and UK approaches.

Defining Scottish Community Resilience

DN felt “community resilience is an interesting one, because of course there’s going to be quite a tension there between what you might call self-help, and what people’s expectations are of the cavalry racing over the hill to rescue them” [in emergencies].
“Community Resilience I would say to some extent is the least developed part of our work. If you say the larger network is with the people of Scotland... that kind of engagement is really quite difficult, and wouldn’t be done directly by Scottish Government, but it would be something done through local responders, local agencies, public services, and various conversations held with people at the sharp end”. Like others, he cited the Fire and Rescue Service as exemplifying effective engagement from responders: “Back in the [19]70s they spent a lot of time sitting around in fire stations waiting to be called out to a fire. Then it developed into... going out into the community and changing things... So in a way they’ve reduced their own original business: there are fewer domestic and industrial fires now than there used to be”.

In mainstream public service delivery, “there’s a whole programme at a community level, with local authorities, there are community safety partnerships [and community planning], and that’s an area we haven’t really developed the resilience agenda around... there’s a whole area of work needs to be done because there are single outcome agreements ['SOAs’] the arrangement [between Scottish Government and local authorities] which means all ring-fencing for funding has been removed... we haven’t developed the resilience side of that; the first set of negotiations and the first [SOA] agreements have been set up without much input on resilience and community safety at the level of dealing with emergencies”. This was due to pressures of “how do we feed the beast in terms of information gathering, feeding things to ministers, trying to deal with things nationally, and have some continuity in our day-to-day work?”

HY gave background to his task: “It’s part of my job [to] do projects for the Scottish Government. And one of my projects, or really the only project I’ve got just now, mainly because of the size of it, is community resilience. [The brief was] ‘I want you and [AN] to look at community resilience for us, just to get a feel for it’. So it’s quite open-ended... it wasn’t a very specific, ‘I want you to do this, this and this with community resilience and off you go and report back’... And one of the reasons for that, I think, is if, for instance, you Google community resilience, you’ll get about thirty different definitions and the first things you open mean many different things to many different people”.
“If you don’t actually agree on what you’re even talking about it’s hard to build strategy and policy on the back of that”. “There’s an acceptance that maybe Government can’t be the answer to everything”. “It’s not community resilience, it’s just a name that they picked up... it is an idea whose time has come, I would say. There is a great deal of interest in the concept at Government level, both UK and Scottish Government level... There is an acknowledgement that society has become, perhaps, a bit more atomised. There’s maybe been a loosening, not a breaking but a loosening, of the links that tie us together traditionally... So how do we replicate those links where people would pull together at times of, for instance, severe weather? In addition, I think it’s fair to say the Government foresees significant challenges over the horizon and that horizon might be five, ten, twenty years... Everyone’s pretty unanimous: the weather’s going to get worse... against that background of increasing level of threat... twenty years down the line the living environment in the UK could be that bit more challenging. And it depends which experts you speak to how challenging they feel that environment’s going to get”. “Of the four UK main planning assumptions, probably severe weather’s the one with the most capacity for long term change. Terrorism is a threat but we’ve been there... Society didn’t really change”. Whether or not predicted ‘climate change’ occurred, there would be benefits of preparing for it: “anything that fosters community spirit is de facto a good thing... I think there are enough benefits that it’s worth doing and if it turns out it’s another ‘millennium bug’ type thing... then okay so what, so we're now a bit readier if something big goes bang or switches off”. “I have heard it said... the Mad Max brigade... think society will probably break and it will be a Hobbesian free for all. I mean, it’s going to get a bit rainier, that’s the Scotland we’re used to”. He described New Zealand’s ‘Get Ready, Get Thru’ [television] campaign, “brutally honest that during disaster, you expect the Government to come and help you. 'Well I’m here to tell you', says the guy, 'that the Government might not be able to help you right away and the responsibility’s yours to help yourself... it’s quite punchy, it’s quite, ‘Wow!’... Wouldn’t have thought a government would have the bottle to say that message but New Zealand... they
don’t lack bottle so they’ve just gone and done it. However, we need to remember context... We can’t lose sight of the fact that they live in a far richer risk environment [earthquakes]... they have more likelihood of [emergencies]”.

In ‘Preparing Scotland’ [guidance] preparation is based on the subsidiarity principal, “it is bottom up, so you’re not moving to a completely new paradigm here... you manage it as close to a local perspective as you can and you only go as high as you need to”. Based on his research, ‘HY’ conceptualised ‘engineering’ and ‘ecological’ conceptions of resilience. It was “the ability of communities to sustain stress, and thereafter with the support of external agencies... to resume either normal or what you might call the new normality... There are people who will say, ‘the sign of success is that everything goes back to the way it was’ and that’s not really how society works. Society goes back to the way it is or goes back to the way it was but with X having happened, so we’re all slightly different and the new normality now reflects that change... That’s not necessarily a bad thing, it can be an improvement, but to wish for that reactionary - in the purest sense of the word - vision that you’re going to go back... just isn’t how society is”. “The key is getting a common definition and if the definition that we work towards is a resilient local community bouncing back... to something resembling an acceptable level of change... in Kintyre or somewhere, well in fact normality for them is quite often the power goes off or the road is shut because it’s flooded or there’s been a landslip... whereas if we’re saying to folk in Easterhouse ‘you need to have a generator somewhere in the house and you need to stock up 140 bottles of water’ they’ll look at you as if you’re mad... that’s a new normality that’s moved so far out of the old paradigm that you have failed or the challenge has been so great, that we just need to accept that’s the new normality”. “It will always mean some different nuance through that prism of the locality that you’re in. If you’re in the Isle of Gigha... your state of normality is quite different from somebody that stays just off Byres Road [Glasgow; both Strathclyde SCG]... where it’s a calamity if you can’t get a latte within five minutes, whereas... a big deal in Gigha is... [e.g.] ferries being affected, that’s their lifeline to the world”.

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Section 5.4 Implementing and developing Community Resilience: UK

‘IW’ of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat’s Community Resilience Unit (UK Government) kindly met the researcher on his day off, suggesting a pub by the Thames. This was facilitated by introductions from DN. They had met when DN attended the VSCPF in November 2009 for RABS (VS) (section 6.1).

Defining UK Community Resilience – Interview with ‘IW’, Cabinet Office

“The key thing there is the communities are self selecting in all of this, so the community doesn’t have a definition, it has some parameters, if you like, as opposed to an actual definition, it’s whatever people choose”. Communities of place, interest, and community practitioners were easy to locate. A fourth, “the community of circumstances... is impossible to reach before an emergency, because they don’t exist, and impossible to know what it’s going to look like for an emergency... those first three groups can work to become more prepared, either as individuals or as groups, to support that fourth group when it occurs”.

“In terms of what community resilience is, its very difficult to put a, sort of, tick box next to it, but I think there’s some straightforward principles... a community that’s aware of the risks, aware of their vulnerabilities to the risks, aware of their own vulnerabilities”, and that vulnerability was dynamic. It depended on another sort of knowledge: skills and using them safely, for example 4x4s can drive through flooded streets, chainsaw licence-holders could clear felled trees, “recognising it’s almost a social responsibility to be able to say, ‘I can stand up and help the community’”. This enabling approach avoided “unnecessary danger”: ”there’s an acceptance of risk and that’s very difficult for the ‘authorities’ to deal with, including Government, because it’s letting go of the natural control which is still, to an extent, necessary when dealing with emergencies of all kinds”. The solution was “working in concert with the emergency services. It’s absolutely vital”. “The only way Community Resilience efforts” would ever “be recognised” or “work to their maximum potential”,

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“is if those individuals and groups within their communities put the olive branch out to the Fire Brigade or the Police or the Local Authority and ensure that they are interlinked and those plans are interwoven together so that when the river banks burst and five villages are flooded, the Police know that the three [villages] with emergency response teams are going to be fine and they can focus on the other two. Without that interaction and without that relationship that’s built before something happens, community resilience will never work to its full potential and can and has, in some cases, caused some very serious tensions between the authorities and the community groups”.

**Changes in governance**

“What are we, as Government, doing to try and build and enhance and empower that to continue? Our approach is based very much on the enabling and empowering side of things, there is... no compulsion within Government for us to do any sort of directing or compelling of any community to get involved in community resilient activities... this is about self selection”, there was “no desire” to mandate it, now or in the future, Some wanted them to “restart the Civil Defence Force” but “it’s completely irrelevant for the society in which we live, it’s not about people walking around in high vis jackets all the time”. Civil contingencies is ‘apolitical’: “what the population expects its Government to do”.

Guidance “has to complEment the great work that’s already been done locally” by communities, local authorities, emergency services, and the voluntary sector. To, “take all the good practice we’ve seen and dilute that down into a base level set of [documents, tools and frameworks]... to an extent there is an appetite for ‘the official Government position’ on what we recommend... a lot of people value that endorsement of their work [and] look to Government for answers and reassurance... [But] people are going to use these tools in different ways and we want them to use them in different ways because communities can only determine themselves how best they can use those things for their own needs”.
“You don’t need to reinvent the wheel... and that’s a very difficult message for Government to put across in terms of policy delivery because it’s not about doing what the Government says, it’s about doing what you think is right”. This frustrated Civil Servants, who could identify “the right thing to do” but “on the other hand” communities need to decide “what’s best for themselves... [that’s] certainly our approach, we’re trying to mark ourselves out as doing this differently and it’s about empowering people”. “A lot of it is going to be very much adhoc”. It was a “real challenge” for Government to “accept that you [put work into this and]... just let it out there and see what happens”. This was “very difficult to measure”, “this isn't going to be statistics driven because we’re not going to compel anyone to do it, for us, the big challenge is how we measure this and...improvement”, “resilience building is a long term thing”, “compliance and measurement is very difficult once you get out to that community level”.

‘IW’ didn’t perceive the CCA was driving Community Resilience, nor was the Pitt Review. 2007 floods “directly influenced” Pitt which “influenced that part of the National Security Strategy” but “not as simply as” events > recommendation > strategy document > policy area. “The thought ‘there is something more that can be done here’ had been “going around for a while” but needed “small ‘p’ political will”, an “official kick”... the Pitt Review, the National Security Strategy... that’s where you see the birth of the feeling that, actually, this has to be done slightly differently”. Experienced colleagues recalled two elderly women on the same street who had drowned in Carlisle’s 2005 floods because “no one helped” or “checked on them”. “We say in Whitehall we are policy driven but we need to base any policy on evidence... that’s why we’ve gone out and consulted widely with the people who are doing it on the ground to see what use our support and help will be... from all the evidence we’ve gathered that’s the right way to go... that decision has been made within the department, in consultation with other departments, but most importantly in consultation with the people this affects”. “It’s not challenging the [existing] model because we think it’s wrong [but] because the alternative model we’re putting out... is right for this area of policy”.
The perception was the majority of the population “aren’t doing anything like this”, giving “reassurance that we’re doing the right thing by setting up these tools and frameworks because it’s not going to replace what’s out there, it’s going to hopefully open up these issues to a huge range of people who haven’t seen them before and haven’t had the chance or opportunity to be engaged”.

“One of the key principles for community resilience is not to create new bureaucracy, but allow people to use those existing networks and piggyback, or ‘mainstream’ is the term we’re using, community resilient activities into there”, “all these things already exist... Ready made networks provide support... resources... the framework onto which people can safety and comfortably incorporate something new, i.e. preparedness, into what already happens”.

Cabinet Office were looking at: (a) individual and household resilience, (b) community resilience, (c) corporate resilience [omitted], (d) “what role for practitioners... and this is where the established voluntary sector and Third Sector comes in” [below]. (a) Individual and personal resilience was “the bedrock of any resilient community”. Encouraging personal resilience had been tried by the ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ leaflet [issued after 9/11]. Now they would “give people a set of tools, ideas, guidelines” to become more aware of the impacts of risk, and how to prepare: “we’re not going to focus exclusively on certain risks”. These “very complex, sometimes frightening, sometimes difficult messages” would be “borne down” to simple messages about preparedness and “managing those expectations”. “We’re absolutely not planning on reprinting a leaflet and sending it to five million homes”: online content would be renewed and made downloadable, for use by individuals or “community champions”.

(b) Cabinet Office were preparing guidance, with templates for household and community plans, “aimed at those community leaders, those champions within the community”, which could be “anyone” with an interest, not necessarily “a councillor”, “a head teacher”.... “I want to do this in my community, what do I do with it? How do I do it? What do I need to know?... Who do I phone?”
**The Third Sector role**

“As Government aimed at responders, i.e. Government agencies, we need to tie in community resilience to the existing and future expectations of work that they’ll do. So at the moment there’s a duty, for example, to warn and inform the public about risks in their area and it’s very much linked but not within that scope, so it’s about trying to get people to understand the value of educating and the value of promoting working with and not doing to, in terms of communities. That will also need to cover the voluntary and Third Sector and this idea of mainstreaming comes in. Now, obviously, the Red Cross, WRVS, do this already, they do workshops on personal resilience, WRVS have their emergency services teams that are there to support people, and historically these organisations have done a lot of preparedness work. WRVS used to have a scheme [the ‘1 in 5’ Cold War talks (ZA, October 2010)]... which, to me, is a fantastic example of the sort of thing we want people to do now... It’s about building on top of what you already have in terms of these existing networks and the voluntary sector and the Third Sector... Both ends of that: you’ve got these huge big national charities, but, also, you’ve got these very small charities, community volunteering schemes... and we’ve got to make sure that we address the needs of all of those groups...

[The voluntary sector role] can be promoting, it can be mainstreaming these ideas together, it can be providing this support network. I think some communities do and will do this on their own without any support from any organisation, and they’ll do it well. Some communities will need a lot of extra support, they’ll need a framework, they’ll need the reassurance that actually, if they don’t feel confident enough to do it themselves, here’s someone from WRVS, Red Cross, or whatever organisation it is, who can [say] ‘we think this is probably the way to do it’... the key to all these guidance documents is... people can do it themselves but other people can say take them [and offer best practice examples].
**Motivation and recruitment**

“This is why we certainly wouldn’t compel a voluntary organisation to do something, they can choose themselves if they can see the benefits and I think the benefits are if you are serving a community directly then you improve the resilience of the organisation, of your community... So that’s the motivation for those large organisations, it’s their core function and it’s really just in addition to what they do already. From a financial point of view, WRVSs, Red Crosses, have a huge amount of financial contracts with Local Authorities, delivering meals on wheels or providing support... as with any commercial actor, to be able to say ‘we do these core services but we also do all this serving our community and enhancing the service we provide to you on this level’... you know, take a Local Authority, ‘you have a duty to warn and inform people, well, we do your meals on wheels but we could also do these personal resilience workshops at the same time, that’s actually ticking your box”.

*Q: For free?* “Not necessarily free, although they hope for free, but this arrangement needs to be made at a local level”. *Q: so it’s an added value?* “Yeah, absolutely, probably fairly naïve really but you would hope that the majority of people who chose to work in a charity or Third Sector do have a somewhat altruistic string somewhere and will want to actually do a bit to genuinely help people... that’s where the voluntary and Third Sector can really add huge amounts of value to this”.

Chapter 7 reviews how the agenda developed in Scotland and describes capacity-building and policy development around the Third Sector role.
The relationship between implementing resilience and governance: operationalising resilience as a policy philosophy

**Operationalising resilience**

Implementing the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) involved a formalisation of existing structures and new duties for responders. Correspondingly, there had been policy development activity to produce guidance on the implementation of the Act. This was subject to periodic review and revision, and in light of events and evolution in the sector. The regional tier was important in implementation, because it coordinated local-level activities, and provided a liaison point with Scottish Government. Its activities, and attendance at its meetings, were mandated by legislation. Because of differences in scale, at UK-level, SCGs were not equivalent to the ‘Regional Resilience Forums’ (later abolished in 2010) but to ‘Local Resilience Forums’ [in Police Force areas21].

In guidance, implementing resilience involved formalising the activities of ‘Integrated Emergency Management’. Measuring performance on resilience had needed new tools. Measurement linked risk-capability-preparedness within the ‘Resilience Framework Cycle’22. This performance measurement was intended to be developmental, and was administered as self-assessment at regional level. The approach of Scottish Government was enabling regional and local activity. There was a perceived need to support the sector with unfamiliar duties and processes: guidance included defining the conduct of cooperative and coordinative processes at the regional level. Participants spoke of the sector’s ‘maturity’. The establishment of the ‘Scottish Resilience Development Service’ recognised the need for capacity-building to enable cultural change (‘PQ’, 2008).

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For practitioners, there had been perceived increases in activity at, and demands from, ‘the centre’ [Scottish Government]. The researcher attended and observed a number of conferences and ‘Emergency Planning Society’ events between 2009-10, to gain an understanding of impacts on practitioners. At UK-level it was observed there was hostility towards Cabinet Office implementation activities. This was not present at Scottish level, but concerns were expressed – publicly and privately – about Scottish Government’s expectations of the local- and regional-level, and impacts on practitioner workloads of meeting increased demands for reporting. Audit Scotland’s findings reflected these (section 5.2).

The findings suggest that at this place and time, in this policy context of emergency management, resilience as a policy concept was understood as effective multi-agency working, through formal inter-organisational and multi-organisational arrangements and relationships. This addresses the significant gap in the literature about how resilience can be conceptualised (Comfort et al. 2010a; 2010b; de Bruijne et al. 2010). It was also uncertain which processes resilience was an outcome of (Boin et al. 2010). The emergent approaches to measuring resilience within policy implementation – linked to risk and capabilities – indicate that resilience as an outcome was understood as the extent to which the response capabilities of formal response agencies match the risks they anticipate, based on localised risk assessment. In terms of the ‘planning and preparedness’ aspects of the ‘Integrated Emergency Management’ cycle, the ‘Audit Scotland’ Report indicated that resilience was an outcome of processes of effective joint working. Joint working, in this sector, involved cooperation and coordination activities. Effective joint working appeared from the data to be a combination of both structures and processes. The data suggested that structures for effective multi-agency working had been mandated in legislation. Processes for more effective multi-agency working were being enabled by the Scottish Government’s role in implementation, facilitating regional processes by the production of guidance. They were also developing over time in new arrangements as they ‘bedded in’.
**Operationalising the Community Resilience concept**

Whilst precise definitions were developing, Community Resilience was understood within the sector as being an issue of “self-help”. There was a “dependency culture” in the UK, an expectation of being “rescued” by the “cavalry”, and this needed to be tackled, although it was not politically expedient to articulate service limits (Government didn’t have the “bottle”).

The implementation of Community Resilience did seem to necessitate changes to the governance of UK emergency management (UKEM), at both UK and Scottish levels. However, these changes were not the same.

As noted by DN (November 2009), Scottish efforts were being led by Scottish Resilience as part of the CCA implementation process, and involved capacity-building activities, such as creating the roles of ‘Regional Resilience Advisors’ and commissioning them to research (a) definitions of the concept, and (b) long-term processes by which it might be embedded. Those activities indicate what an early stage the concept was at in UKEM when data collection began in 2009.

At UK-level, the Cabinet Office approach represented change to UKEM but also the role of Government in governing. The implication was that operationalising this concept would not involve Government coming forward to citizens, acting to bridge the gap between service providers and service users. Instead, “enabling” Community Resilience was envisaged as encouraging citizens to come forward and “self-select”. Citizens were now responsible for bridging the gap between formal service provision and community vulnerabilities. This was dependent on pre-arranged involvement based on prior contact. The key quote that revealed the onus of this was “if those individuals and groups within their communities put the olive branch out to the Fire Brigade or the Police or the Local Authority and ensure that they are interlinked and those plans are interwoven together...”. In contrast, all the other data in this study, plus the literature, indicated traditional cultures of Emergency Planning and the sector were prejudiced against involving new actors, and lacked any mechanisms to engage with communities. There were no changes to the organisation of UKEM – contact details were published but neither structures nor roles changed.
Chapter 6
RQ2

What is the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience?
How is this organised?

Chapter 4 established the legislative and historical context (2005-2008) and Chapter 5 revealed the policy context for this implementation Case Study. **Chapter 6** moves on to examine the Third Sector role. It presents data collected on the impact of implementing resilience on organising and organisations in the Third Sector. The Chapter explores increasing Third Sector involvement. This relates to both the planned role, and the relationship between preparedness and response. The Chapter progresses through different scales of analysis, offering a national (Scottish) perspective, a regional perspective, and an organisational perspective – from the outside in, then the inside out.
Comment on the method

This section is based on secondary data from the 1st and 2nd meetings of the ‘Resilience Advisory Board Scotland (Voluntary Sector) Sub-Group’ ['RABS (VS)']. The establishment of RABS (VS) by Scottish Resilience represented a formalisation of the ‘voluntary sector’ agenda at the strategic level of policy implementation and development in Scotland. The 1st (November 2009) and 2nd (April 2010) RABS (VS) meetings represented important stages in the formation of the network, and were also a source of insight into policy processes happening within and without Scottish Resilience. The secondary data included summary ‘minutes’ circulated to members after each meeting and, where appropriate, documents associated with agenda items. These documents were forwarded to the researcher by ‘DN’, the BRC secondee. The content was compiled, analysed using thematic coding in NVivo, and reconstructed.

This data is complemented by a brief note of the researchers’ attendance at the RABS (VS) 3rd meeting in October 2010, compiled from written observations of process and content. The meeting was conducted under ‘Chatham House Rules’ (section 9.2) so comments were non-attributable and are anonymised here.

On a methodological note, this data demonstrates the value of negotiating access to ‘hidden’ processes, and attending to the details therein. This secondary data refuted a number of the researcher’s inferences from other data, including primary data gathered during the 3rd meeting, correcting inferences and assumptions about key individuals on which they had been based. There is a normative tendency in Third Sector ['TS'] research that results from a perceived power imbalance with government. It also added historical data – valuable antecedents that explained current membership – and interpersonal data – revealing who pursued a widening of the membership, and how.
The formation of the RABS (VS) network

At the first meeting,
“The Chair emphasised the important contribution the voluntary sector already makes to Scotland’s resilience and the potential for greater engagement through the creation of this Group”.

He emphasised, “it was both important to tease out national issues of interest to the voluntary sector and examine how we can improve working together”.

It was to be a strategic-level group, to “identify, discuss and recommend solutions and best practice to common issues in Scotland”. And, “working within the wider emergency response framework, as appropriate, it will advise how these issues should be taken forward strategically at a national level”. It would, “bring together voluntary organisations and key stakeholders and identify, develop and maximise the sector’s contribution to Scottish emergency response arrangements”.

In attendance were invited strategic representatives of Third Sector organisations, the two RRAs, the Scottish Government’s Head of Division (Chair), and the Scottish Government’s two secondees (Co-Secretaries). Introductions were made at the beginning of every meeting (1st-3rd). The minutes were circulated ‘for information’ to SCG Coordinators and the UK-level Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (‘VSCPF’) representation. The Chair, “asked members to circulate the meeting notes within their own and affiliated organisations to ensure the maximum profile and benefit can be achieved for this work”.

The group would undertake capacity-building activities, assisting with “research or capability projects that contribute to multi-agency resilience”. Members were invited to comment on “proposed work topics”, “As the Group is the national link between the voluntary sector, central government, and statutory authorities at a national level it was agreed that a scoping/mapping exercise would help establish to some degree the extent of
current VS [voluntary sector] engagement in emergency response across Scotland”.
This would “enhance existing good practice” and “suggest access to the VS in Scotland”. Scottish Resilience would fund “a PhD level research project” (originally to be carried out by this researcher; see section 7.2), managed by the British Red Cross to “capture the extent of the existing Scottish voluntary sector offer and how it can support overall emergency response arrangements”. BRC would “liaise, and consult, with RABS (VS), SCGs and the VS”, including previous relevant research. ‘KNA’ later described ‘DN’s role at RABS (VS) as in a “quasi-governmental capacity with a foot in the voluntary sector and a foot in the government” whilst KNA was the “member” representing BRC (April 2010).

There was also consideration of, “how to participate in and contribute to community resilience in Scotland... it was agreed this was an ideal opportunity to discuss, shape and progress community resilience in Scotland although a clearer definition of what is meant by ‘Community Resilience’ is critical to progress. The key being to provide communities, and individuals, with the skills, resources and structures which will allow a degree of self-sufficiency”.

There would be “a Scottish Voluntary Sector Seminar in June 2010 with a focus on Community Resilience”, coordinated by the Co-Secretary (‘DN’). At the 2nd meeting, DN reported on planning for the Seminar, and its structure and content were revised based on group input and agreement (see section 7.2).

As a mechanism for regulating the network, the draft “Terms of Reference” ['TOR'] were introduced: “the purpose of this document is to establish the TOR, membership and procedural matters for RABS (VS)”. It was “recognised membership may change as the group and Scotland’s voluntary sector evolves”. The wording of the text was amended very slightly in November 2009, and again at the second meeting in April 2010, so that “all members of RABS (VS), and not just the Category 1 responders, should be able to nominate people to sit on the
Group”. It would also be revisited after the Scoping Study, to “ensure that it properly reflected any lessons on how the voluntary sector could engage more effectively at both local and national level”.

The RABS (VS) network “considered opportunities for representation on other emergency planning and response forums”. RABS (VS) would “monitor the work of the VSCPF for good practice”. At UK level the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum [‘VSCPF’], established in 2006, was “a grouping for voluntary organisations that have a civil protection role…supported by a small Working Party” (Cabinet Office, 2010). The first step to bridge with this strategic forum in England was to send a representative – ‘DN’ – who “reported back” in April, with the meeting note circulated as an agenda item. Attendance had benefits for “networking” and to “catch up” with Cabinet Office [policy implementation] workstreams. The VSCPF “tended to cascade information” and “differed” from “the Scottish approach, which was generally more dynamic and inclusive” (which could result from either its smaller size or difference in attitude).

In terms of Third Sector involvement, in November 2009 the group discussed:

- “the need to incorporate lessons identified from ‘reviews’, ‘reports’, and ‘lessons’ from emergency events e.g. Doncaster and Gloucester floods (UK).
- the need to identify possible funding streams available to communities and voluntary organisations [from mainstream public service delivery]... which can directly and indirectly benefit resilience.
- the need to identify suitable training courses, both for staff and volunteers.
- that the emergency services have rightful concerns about dealing with smaller organisations due to claimed competence and liability should damage/injury occur.
- the need to highlight the lessons identified from [capacity-building] events such as the recent ‘Voluntary Agencies Awareness Seminar’ (next section) and forthcoming (Renfrewshire) ‘Cost Recovery’ workshop.
that due to the number and variety of voluntary organisations it is difficult to be fully sighted on all VS capabilities in Scotland.

that there are concerns about the qualifications, competency and disclosure necessary for voluntary work”.

Emphasis has been added on common themes that made up an identifiable narrative of barriers to TSO involvement amongst actors from both sectors.

The Chair concluded the first meeting “by emphasising the unique and priceless contribution the voluntary sector makes to Scotland’s resilience” (italics added).

At the second meeting, a ScoRDS representative outlined “training and exercising projects which were of interest to the Group”. Upcoming multi-agency exercises were introduced “for information as there was no formal voluntary sector involvement in the exercises at this stage”. She also presented available training and CPD opportunities, including the ‘Professional Development Award for Resilience’ ['PDA'] and the ‘Integrated Emergency Management in Scotland’ introductory workshop ['IEM Workshop'], which, though designed for “Category 1 and 2 responders”, “was also open to voluntary organisations which perform an emergency role alongside those organisations”. At the meeting of the regional SECG 'Voluntary Agencies Functional Group' in May 2010 (next section), KNA urged TSOs to take up these opportunities, as the BRC were able administer to Scottish Resilience funding for their attendance. Informal conversations (KNA, April 2010) had revealed that by that point, three BRC staff were signed up for the PDA and, one BRC staffmember had helped to design the IEM workshop. They were ahead of the agenda not only because of these strategic links, but because of their resources, enabling things as simple as having enough staff who were paid so they didn’t have another job and could therefore attend daytime meetings and pay travel expenses, unlike other TSOs (DN, April 2010).

At the 3rd meeting, Scottish Resilience were thanked for their funding of places, “symbolic” of their interest in this agenda. A UK-level representative of a TSO confirmed that in England central government did not fund Third Sector places on training, although ‘Local Resilience Forums’ [in Police Force areas] did.
Participant observation of the 3rd meeting of RABS (VS)
The researcher attended the third meeting to receive feedback on the Seminar outcomes (sections 7.2-4). The focus was on contributing. A ‘Community Resilience’ policy lead and officer had been appointed during the Spring of 2010, and the policy lead opened the meeting by good-naturedly asking for “more contribution”, as the last meeting was “too polite”. At the end, the Chair ‘promised’ to act on feedback: “we want to make these meetings worthwhile for everyone”. He thanked everyone not for attending but for their contribution.

The same themes from the 1st and 2nd meetings were present in the 3rd:

(1) The ‘Terms Of Reference’ had been “updated in light of ongoing work”, and would “be kept under review”. In terms of membership, it was confirmed that “the point of group” was to disseminate its materials [minutes etc.] “more widely” because of the “selective membership” and “small numbers” of representation. It was felt that all the ‘big players’ “wanting to do strategic and tactical thinking” were represented. The Group could include visiting and temporary membership, so it “was not necessarily static”. The secretariat to the Group was “not a monopoly”.

A VS representative advocated for the membership of ‘trauma recovery’ groups, who all had “very different working styles but similar skills”. It emerged that they had been invited “originally”, but did not feel they were ready. Now, personnel changes meant they might be, and the Group was keen to communicate with them, even if they did not become members.

(2) Training and Exercising was still an issue, with a representative of a statutory organisation highlighting operational responses, and comparing their Emergency Planning arrangements to the voluntary sector, where “there’s a need for leadership but the VS don’t want it”. He felt there was “a lack of training and exercising “despite its importance for statutory agencies”.

A VS representative responded that there is a difficulty of one ‘template’ for the VS role – should it be “lead agency or generic recovery?” This was “different for each locale”, and “branding” was the big problem. He gave the example of the
Carlisle floods [UK], where everyone “left their badges at the door” and worked together “under one banner”, sharing leadership between all organisations. They “badged it as a neutral, multi-agency operation”, in contrast to the Morpeth floods, where some organisations that had unique skills “worked under their own banner and as part of multi-agency arrangements”. Others agreed. It was noted that volunteers responding to emergencies “are qualified to work” under the plans established by each TSO. Some were surprised by the flexibility of local authorities [in enabling the VS role], noting that each sees ‘the system’ of operational responses “very differently”.

It was noted that there was “a need to develop better of training and exercising because of greater and increasing awareness of response” (italics added). The ‘Care for People’ guidance was again cited as a “stimulant” for this awareness. The statutory agency representative noted that “recovery is never a part of training and exercising”, but someone chipped in that “recovery guidance is being proofread downstairs [in the Scottish Government building] as we speak”, and another added that SCGs had recovery training during 2010, linked to that guidance, supported by an interjection that the SCG-level was where guidance was activated. The statutory actor reiterated that his point was training and exercising “is a well-described problem but it doesn’t have a well-described solution”, to laughter from the table. A VS representative suggested that an exercise in recovery “would really bring focus to the VS”.

3) The structure of the group would change, maintaining the bi-annual meetings, but adding an annual conference “to disseminate [policy] work that is ongoing”. Sub-groups for specific interests were suggested, to meet more frequently. The bridge-point of attendance at the VSCPF had been institutionalised, and the policy lead would now attend, instead of the secondees (as part of the transition from capacity-building on this agenda to its mainstreaming *(DN, April 2010; October 2010)*). The policy lead was also meeting more regularly with the Cabinet Office and had arranged more regular communication *(‘MI’, July 2012)*. Humorously, “anyone with an axe to grind” was invited to get in touch.
Section 6.2 Organising resilience: the regional perspective

Comment on the method
This section reports participant observation of a ‘voluntary sector working group’ in the largest Scottish Police Force [SCG] region. It begins with interviews about the working group with three individuals at the strategic level, active in increasing Third Sector involvement, and all working in the same SCG region. Both types of primary data were supported by analysis of secondary documents.

The SECG and Voluntary Agencies
The ‘Strathclyde Emergencies Coordination Group’ ['SECG'] had been a multi-agency partnership since 1987, and was later formalised as the SCG for Strathclyde “as required by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004” (SECG 2008:1). It was established “to maintain a formal partnership as an aid to planning for the effective management of response to emergencies within the Strathclyde area” (2008:5). The SECG had been restructured, with a multi-agency ‘Tactical Group’ on which all statutory agencies were represented (2008:5-7) and ‘Sub-Groups’ to “undertake specific work streams” (:7). Under that level, 6 ‘Local Working Groups’ were “responsible for ensuring the progression of strategic policies, training events and exercises” and the progression of emergency planning (:7) (Figure 6.1). There were 3 ‘Functional Groups’, created 2008-9, focused on shared activities and sectors: ‘Transport’; ‘Training & Exercising’; the ‘Voluntary Agencies’ Functional Group ['VAFG']. SECG had been the first SCG to have a ‘voluntary sector working group’ (formerly at local-level). In November 2009, the researcher interviewed the SECG ‘Training & Exercising Coordinator’, ‘QH’, about a ‘Voluntary Agencies Awareness Seminar’ she had organised in May 2009. Her role, alongside two SCG ‘Project Managers’ (coordinators), was “to carry out work on behalf of the SECG and act as a central liaison point between the group and the Scottish Government” (:7). The SECG was based at the ‘Pitt Street’ Strathclyde Police HQ, Glasgow, and we met there in the ‘Command Room’ used in emergencies (subsequently taken over by Counter Terrorism).
Scottish Government had sponsored a ‘Voluntary Agencies Awareness’ ['VAA'] Seminar in May 2009, in recognition of SECG’s ‘best practice’, with over 100 attendees from statutory responders and the voluntary sector. QH stressed that ‘voluntary sector’ ['VS'] involvement in emergency response was in a formative stage, “finding its feet”. However, learning and recommendations about how to progress this agenda from the 2009 Seminar had not been utilised in designing its 2010 successor. And VS involvement had to be developed “in an already complex environment that is fast-moving and changing”. There was cultural “divergence” between positive attitudes at the (regional) SCG-level and those at the (local authority) Emergency Planning Officer level, although “scepticism” about the Third Sector “might be multi-levelled”. ‘Preparing Scotland’ (2006) defined roles for voluntary agencies, but within the sector there were potential roles that were “less obvious” and organisations “not often included”. QH felt “voluntary and community resilience” were a “gap” within Scottish emergency management. But before other organisations, such as the CVS (Council for Voluntary Service) were approached to coordinate greater involvement of the voluntary sector, it was important to establish both existing voluntary agencies’
(a) capability and (b) availability and analyse statutory providers’ capabilities. Once gaps (between these) were established, coordinating (“overarching”) bodies (such as the CVS, or Chambers of Commerce) could be approached for how they might be ‘filled’. If linked together in this process, inefficiencies could be identified, momentum generated, and improvements made. Within TSOs, new procedures such as cost recovery (recouping expenditure after emergency responses) were significant, “big things” to manage. The SECG ‘Voluntary Agencies Functional Group’ allows “thoughts to be shared” between ‘voluntary agencies’ on these issues. The VAFG meetings “chair themselves”, and representatives acted as Chairs and Deputy Chairs. This was partly “to try and prevent cancellations” from attendees. The SCG ‘shied away’ from a secretariat role: they were seeking empowerment for the functional groups. The SCG ‘Project Manager’ sat on the functional groups so recommendations were taken forward by the SCG. By May 2010 QH had become Project Manager for the SECG.

**SCG voluntary sector working groups**

Although not explored by this Thesis, it is worth noting that each SCG had a slightly different model for their voluntary sector working group at that time. These SCG sub-groups had previously existed “at the bequest/request of local authorities”. In the 2008 pilot study, coverage had been inconsistent. By April 2010, this was “changing”: “the Scottish Government wants voluntary sector sub-groups”, at the SCG-level, organised by SCGs: 7 or 8 (of a possible 8) were now “up and running” (‘DN’). Learning about how to manage these non-mandated networks was being shared informally between SCG Groups, where there were ties between individuals or individuals sat on more than one Group. One of these models was piloted with attendees at a later policy development Seminar (sections 7.2-4). In that model, the British Red Cross [‘BRC’] acted as lead agency and took responsibility for the ‘call-out’ of other TSOs in the region during an emergency, as well as representing them at SCG-level. One participant saw this as a “poisoned chalice”: all were agreed it might not work in all regions.
The British Red Cross and the SECG

Conversations with ‘KNA’ and ‘DN’ took place in April 2010. KNA was the VAFG Chair at the time, and gave valuable insight on that role and its relationship with his role in the British Red Cross [*BRC*]. DN, Co-Secretary of RABS (VS) and organising a national ‘voluntary sector’ Seminar in June 2010, commented on KNA’s role and the strategic significance of BRC involvement in the VAFG.

‘KNA’ was one of four British Red Cross [*BRC*] Operations Directors within Scotland, who “run the business on a day-to-day basis”. He was lead BRC Operations Director for emergency response in Scotland. His responsibilities included “the link with our tactical group in London” and “some” elements of “future strategy”. He was Chair of a “Territorial Implementation Group”, with typical good humour confiding: “it’s called that because the acronym is ‘TIGER’ and it sounds good”. This Group was “way beyond implementing emergency response... it coordinates all of the facets of our emergency response, and where appropriate will make a link with international”. “Because of that” he had been “having conversations with the Scottish Government that go back three and a half years now... about what we might do to bring the voluntary sector into a better-understood position as far as statutory responders were concerned”.

Scottish Government recognised BRC could “play a useful role in Scotland”. KNA was the Audit Scotland Report’s ‘voluntary sector representative’, and sat on the ‘RABS Audit Scotland’ Group, a “time-limited group set up with some fairly senior [Government] folk” to give “strategic perspective” on implementation, “a little blue skies thinking”, asking: “what should resilience look like in Scotland in 10 years’ time?”: “I was asked to go on it because I’d contributed previously and a lot of what we’re saying chimes with what they want to hear”.

The SECG had first established the ‘Transport Functional Group’, then the ‘VS’ Group, encountering “the limitations of the voluntary sector”: individuals frequently change roles, have other commitments, and are sometimes there “just as volunteers”. “You’re never quite sure who’s going to turn up on the day”,
“I would say the British Red Cross as an organisation is different to that and we do have quite a lot of capacity. We invest enormously in emergency response nationally, and internationally: it is our raison d’etre, our primary raison d’etre as an organisation. And [I have] 30 staff who run my operational area, so there is a degree of assuredness there that there isn’t in the same way with other organisations. And that’s not said in a boastful sense, it’s the reality of where we are”.

This was also “where we are technically” as an ‘auxiliary to Government’ (Red Cross organisations are part-funded by national Governments [not expanded]): “it gives us the opportunity to play a more prominent role, and that’s what we’ve been doing... there isn’t anybody else who would even frankly come close to being able to take over that. Not only a planning role, but actually contributing to research [and] a better understanding of what’s going on in Scotland... that’s what we’re capable of doing”.

However, the “starting point for engagement, to deliver stuff locally will be in most cases with local authorities”. Although strategic capacity-building was important, “you’ve gotta get that balance right. So if I’m called out to go to the Glasgow airport attack, as we were, it’s [named EPO] down at [named local authority]”. He had “relationships with 10 local authorities in my operational area... all the stuff that happens locally, that’s important”. Attitudes to voluntary agencies vary between local authorities, “a combination of the culture of the local authority and the views of the individual Emergency Planning Officer”,

“EPOs are changing, they are different, they’re very much in the Emergency Planning Society mould now of thinking, broadly-based, high competency expectations... there’s still some [more stereotypical] ones around... borne out of civil defence in a cold war context, and they haven’t moved on much from that. And there’s a few who’ve just been moved around within the council [local authority] and ended up within emergency planning because there wasn’t another job for them. They tell you that as well. I don’t bother with them much, because you’re not going to get very far”.
EPOs were “all sort of coming along, some of them kicking and screaming”. The VAFG had a “good role to play in setting a common approach to this”. They could provide feedback to the SECG Tactical and Strategic Groups, with examples of engagement with the VS and examples of local authorities “dragging their feet”.

“If you give them a little bit of a kick from time to time... that might help”,

“So you’ve got to know how to play the game as well. And I’ve made no secret about as Chair of the Strathclyde [VS] Group that that’s what I intend to do. To open doors for us, wherever we can”.

As the Scottish Resilience secondee to the British Red Cross (section 6.3), DN gave the context behind KNA’s involvement in the VAFG. KNA had been “very concerned” about Chairing the group, because of reservations about BRC “dominating the process”. Organisationally, the BRC “wanted to lead, but not to dominate”. This internal concern caused “tension”: whilst its “size meant it would dominate” VS involvement, the BRC “didn’t want to alienate the rest of the voluntary sector”. There was also tension because BRC was “supposed to be impartial”, but “sometimes wants to advocate for the sector”. He described BRC as being at the “shoegazing teenager” stage as an organisation, similar to SEPA’s 2008 description of their evolution in implementing policy as a “12 year-old”. DN had encouraged KNA to Chair the group: it “needed an engine, with a vision, to drive this process forward”, “if we [BRC] don’t do it, no-one will do it”. The BRC was chosen because it was “paid [by Government] to do that” and other organisations “can’t take on the administration”. “If a challenger [organisation] comes along [for the Chair]” BRC “will hand it over to them”. But the implication was other organisations couldn’t compete. Only WRVS was a similar size, if it “re-organises and resources then...”. For now, BRC were “the only game in town: (a) part of the voluntary sector, (b) national (Scotland; and UK), (c) the organisation pays people to do this job”. This was strikingly similar to KNA’s separate description of the organisation an hour earlier. “If challenged, BRC will back off”. But “no other” TSOs were “talking about resilience and community resilience”. The BRC was a “strategic partner” for Government – both benefitted.
SECG Voluntary Agencies Functional Group

Minutes of the previous (2nd) SECG VAFG meeting, in November 2009, record members as “satisfied with the current level of voluntary sector representation”. It was agreed that the Group would be “open to new members”, “subject to the size of the Group being manageable”. KNA had asked members to “promote and recommend membership to voluntary agencies not currently represented who were in a position to contribute to civil contingencies planning”. The SECG Project Manager agreed to routinely update the Group on SCG activities. A VAFG member was invited to sit on the SECG T&E Sub-Group.

In Terms of Reference [TOR] approved at the 2nd meeting, the VAFG was to: “bring together voluntary organisations with a view to maximising the sector’s contribution to civil contingency planning and emergency response activities within the SECG”.

As “part of the SECG planning structure” the VAFG would
• “At as the focus for liaison...”
• “Identify, discuss, and develop solutions in response to common...issues”
• ”Provide advice” on how “issues should be taken forward” and “promote good practice with statutory partners”
• “Share information about roles and capability and foster partnership working between voluntary agencies”
• “Coordinate voluntary agency representation on other SECG Groups as required. This will routinely cover Local Working Groups” [LWGs] (where involvement was “inconsistent”, despite guidance, and a template was required (2nd meeting)).
• “Promote opportunities for voluntary agencies to engage in training and exercising with statutory responders” (adapted from TOR, emphasis added). The Group would “maintain links” with RABS (VS) through the Secretariat of the SECG, “providing a focus for consultation on emergency response issues”.

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Membership “may evolve in future to reflect the changing nature of the voluntary sector in Scotland”. Additionally, the Group may “invite or co-opt individuals and/or organisations which it considers would facilitate achievement of its remit”. The Chair and Secretariat would be “found from within the Group, nominated and agreed by members”, and reviewed at the end of 2010 [the formative phase] and “every two years thereafter”. They would meet twice yearly, and, “to ensure transparency and accountability”, the Group would report to the SECG Secretariat after each meeting, as well as conducting an annual “review of business”.

**At participant observation of the SECG Voluntary Agencies Functional Group 3rd Meeting, in May 2010,** low attendance revealed “not a great response”. This was taken as representative of an attitude of complacency from voluntary organisations themselves: “how do we get from 17 people at Pitt Street [2nd meeting] to 3 people [other than QH and KNA] here?” Despite seeing it as “just a snapshot, we don’t want to be too disheartened”, KNA asked “Do we need to do anything different? How do we make this relevant so we are not wasting time?” In terms of membership, there should be a “minimum representation of certain organisations” but others “can attend, feel welcome, be cited on minutes, and have the opportunity to attend T&E”, with “an understanding that they won’t be able to attend every meeting”. The 2009 Seminar organised by QH had challenged these attitudes, but momentum had dropped afterwards – although “national picked it up again”. It was felt that “[Joining up] is what we need to focus on”, across thematic groups at SCG-level. However, if VS [voluntary sector] representatives don’t attend these meeings “we are all tainted by that”.

**Levels of representation and engagement**

Following the 2nd meeting, VS representation at LWGs was “more consistent”, and “each now had VS membership”, which rotated between five large organisations. KNA was “fairly happy with how it’s going across the piste”. It
was noted the existence of LWGs was “peculiar to Strathclyde”, because its size necessitated a sub-division of the main Tactical Group that would exist elsewhere. In discussion, it was felt LWGs benefitted from VS representation, and the VS benefitted by “keeping aware of what’s happening locally”. But this model of representation was questioned: “is information cascaded up, down, and out [to other TSOs]?” VS representatives responded: “that doesn’t happen”. It was stressed that the VS needed, “a central point of contact that all VS representatives can feed in and out of...a person who can represent all VS agencies, not just their own or themselves”. Whilst this did happen “in Glasgow” (due to interpersonal relationships between VS staff), it was “not understood everywhere”. Someone asked whether, if the representative agency was not BRC (represented by KNA), “are these mechanisms even set up to feed back?” KNA stated that BRC had these internal mechanisms established “irrespective” of representation at groups, due to “a [prior] relationship with local representation”. QH questioned at “what level?” representation happened. Others were concerned about “two-tier representation” at both LWG and SCG-level – should the VAFG represent the VS at LWG-level? KNA described a distinct local culture for each of the LWGs, based on past relationships and current individuals. These local cultures affected attitudes towards the VS, but it was important not to mandate representation: “I don’t want them to have a VS partner there because they’re told to, I want them to see that it adds value”.

In sum, whilst continuing “to press LWGs to engage effectively”, “that might not be the mechanism for sharing information across the sector – that’s what this [SCG-level Group] might be”. KNA was asked: “are you comfortable that community links are set up to make that happen?” He felt it was the “ongoing role of the Chair to keep spotting [seeking] new people”. He was asked: “what is the way forward?” He felt, “maybe look at RABS (VS)”, which presented “a more encouraging picture than we see in Strathclyde”. “Looking from the Scottish level [national]”, RABS (VS) assumes that SCGs “have visibility of the voluntary sector [in their region]”, but SCGs only “have visibility on some organisations”.
KNA was “genuinely enthused by what’s happening at RABS level”, citing ‘QA’ and ‘DN’ s secondments, and the Scoping Study [capacity-building activities] as “things that will take us a little down the road... and sometimes a lot down the road”. UK-level policy development (“down South”) was cited: “because of the density of [emergency] events they are now beginning to develop a way of working: ‘community engagement’” (emphasis added). “We do things differently in Scotland”, but “despite different structures there are lessons to be learned”.

Engaging ‘voluntary’ organisations in planning and preparedness activities

The LWG agenda item stimulated off-agenda discussion. QH felt emergency response activities were “sorted out” but “planning and preparedness needs more work”. KNA stated “we want organisations to be involved but the extent of organisations that can be involved is limited” (emphasis added); it needed to “reach equilibrium”. QH said “it could be better than it is”, a VS member replied “that’s an understatement”. Acknowledging “how hard” KNA had worked, he still felt that while TSOs “talk the talk” [low] attendance [at the 3rd meeting] showed the difficulty of bringing in new agencies. Currently, agencies were involved in emergency response because of the “reputation that we have and who we are”. But “smaller organisations that don’t have kudos are still left out of the picture”, and he ‘criticised’ “the system” because they were “not seen in the same way”. KNA felt TSOs “need to be able to deliver what it says on the tin”. Later, illustrative evidence from a recent exercise was offered, when the SCG had asked for 4 VS partners to engage with an exercise, “and one of the organisations said ‘it’s on a Tuesday. No, we don’t do Tuesdays’.” Another participant asked “can I speak from the voluntary sector?” (although previous speakers represented TSOs). [Smaller] organisations wanted to be in groups but lacked infrastructure and funding. KNA noted that “[central] Government recognised the value” of organisations like ‘Mountain Rescue’ ['MRC’] and wanted to increase their involvement: “bring them closer to the body of the kirk [church]”; “make them more relevant and access that”. A VS member interjected: “but how? I’ve never been in an organisation where people don’t
turn up for meetings”. Addressing ‘MT’, another attendee, KNA felt the challenge was more in reaching “organisations like yours” [local-level groups - note that ‘local’-level included a city with 500,000+ people]. MT felt the problem was with “the ‘we’re all right Jack’ group of organisations, who have relationships directly with Category 1s and long-established [contracts]”. Others agreed this was true for two groups of organisations, those with a national focus: “RNLI [Royal National Lifeboat Institution], ‘Mountain Rescue’; or other local groups that have such a good relationship [with statutory organisations] that they don’t need to be involved in planning”. This was a “problem because the VS is to blame for this situation”. Organisations like BRC were “trying to involve the VS in a correct and proper manner”, but involvement in planning and preparedness was problematic because TSOs were traditionally responsive: “its only after events that we start sticking our heads over the parapet and saying we should be involved”, and may not have the capabilities or “mindset: when we do get the right to come to the party that we do walk the walk”.

So far, there had been agreement across the data collected for this project that urban areas were less resilient than rural areas, which had a greater awareness of their vulnerabilities and thus a greater level of preparedness. In contrast, the Group’s experiences suggested the regionality of VS involvement. From his membership of coordination groups representing BRC, KNA felt some SCGs were more “engaged” than others: “generally, the further away from Glasgow, the less joined up you are”. QH was surprised: this was “interesting given the geography” [rural; isolated]. KNA felt it was “different with each SCG.

Engagement on a multi-agency basis and with voluntary agencies evolved differently in each place. There isn’t a ‘generic SCG model’”. From her view across the SECG, QH felt there were “more commonalities at Cat 1 levels [between Category 1 statutory response organisations] than with SCGs [at regional level]”. It was agreed that “a variety of SCGs have the same problem of getting people engaged on a multi-agency basis”. SCGs differed in size and geography, creating an equivalency problem in comparing cultures.
Regulating new organisations and convergence in emergency response

There was a “problem in relation to convergence”. People were self-selecting: “it’s just something we’ve got used to”. TSO volunteers and “the public react to things on the news”: “it’s really unhelpful”. VS members gave anecdotal evidence, citing increased competition in emergency response from “professional emergency services” [profit-making providers], who “just turned up”. Traditional agreements were being overridden – such as “only using search dogs” from particular MRC groups – “you can’t make Fire Masters comply with [established agreements]”. Although in 2008 new VS agencies found ‘the cordon’ – established by statutory responders around an emergency response site to control access – to be a barrier to involvement, in convergence cases it was useful. Could the SCG “organise a license or an entity – ‘this organisation is recognised for these things’ – to get inside the barrier [cordon]?” QH felt this was a “difficulty”: [as the coordinating body] the SECG Secretariat “don’t have any power over Cat 1’s”. Instead of regulating statutory responders, a possible solution was to regulate new agencies. For example, in Tayside, the TOR for the VS Group had agreed ‘Criteria for new organisations providing services’. This was “very helpful”, “a very good start point to what we are looking for”. [The SCG] could “put these simple structures in place”: organisations “won’t be recognised unless they’ve been through this process and met these criteria”. When new VS agencies approached statutory responders or tried to “attract” their attention, it would be useful to say “this is a group you’d need to be members of, this is criteria you need to meet”, and work through those. This was a shared problem in Scottish emergency management: other SCG [Tactical] Groups had agreed similar criteria. “Increased awareness” of organisations was one finding of the May 2009 ‘VAA’ Seminar, “then you can say we’d prefer you didn’t just turn up”. Others perceived need for a “directory or matrix of organisations who are legitimate and are engaged. Then we can turn people away”. The VAA Seminar had recommended this, but it had not been used [yet]. However, in recovery activities, BRC’s experience was “organisations that will never be on this list [of responders]” e.g. luncheon clubs “become fundamental in community cohesion”.


Section 6.3 Strategic Secondments: perspectives from secondees to TSOs

Comment on the method

The researcher had access to secondary data on strategic change within the British Red Cross [‘BRC’], facilitated by ‘DN’, seconded from Scottish Resilience during the period of data collection (2009-2011). DN acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ for this research project, seeing “mutual benefit” in the researcher’s involvement. He arranged attendance at the RABS (VS) Seminar and RABS (VS) 3rd meeting, and made introductions to individuals in his professional network - in the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat’s Community Resilience Unit (in November 2009) and Scottish Resilience (May 2010). The secondary data was offered to give the researcher insight into processes in BRC that would make it, “a ‘market leader’ to organisations that wish to capitalise on opportunities for Third Sector organisations arising from changing government policy” (July 2009).

The researcher judged that including this data – promoting the BRC’s multiple roles in response; and details of the secondment workplan (November 2009) – would unbalance the range of contributions represented within this research project, and legitimise the BRC’s perspective of their organisation as “the only game in town”. As outlined in this chapter and the next, there were sensitivities about competition between Third Sector organisations [‘TSOs’], and the ‘dominance’ of the BRC as a ‘preferential’ Third Sector provider of emergency response services. Thus, DN’s contribution here describes the context in which another secondment to a Third Sector organisation began, a year after his own. These two interviewees shared the role of ‘Secretary’ in the newly-established RABS (VS) Sub-Group. As Co-Secretaries, they administered the group and its ‘Minutes’ [record] of meetings. Their secondments not only evidenced strategic capacity-building with Third Sector organisations, their intersection with this new network also made them sources of information on policy development activity and the strategic direction of the various ‘agendas’ in play.
**Secondee 1: ‘DN’, the British Red Cross**

DN’s seconded role was ‘Emergency Response Development Officer’ for the British Red Cross’s ‘Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man’ territory (although role and remit expanded considerably during the secondment). In this second meeting with the researcher he validated her research approach: “everyone in the field is aware that emergency response is built on relationships and mutual aid. Bad relationships lead to bad responses... The system is only as strong as the human element”.

**Policy implementation and development**

The model for organising emergency response “has to fit the lowest common denominator” with harmony between “people, time, objectives, and circumstances”. This is situated within the sector’s “maturity” and “structural ability”. As such, policy development and implementation had to “go forward on the basis of roles”, “you can’t wait for the right people - it would never happen”. We met in November 2009. The 1st RABS (VS) meeting had been held that month, and DN had attended the Cabinet Office’s ‘Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum’ in London, so at this point he had a broad – personal – view of UK and Scottish arrangements from both Scottish Government and Third Sector perspectives. The conversation began at the Audit Scotland ‘Improving Civil Contingencies Planning’ Report, published a few months before. The results were “not a surprise to most people”, and he felt they had not adequately contextualised the origins of the CCA legislation [terrorism]. Their recommendations “had not been prescriptive because they didn’t want to add complexity”: the sector was already “overwhelmed [by change]”. From his perspective, the CCA had been in place for 5 years, and had represented a “significant change in direction”, with new “legislative requirements” for Category 1 responders. Supporting evidence from the SEPA representatives in 2008, he felt the sector was “only now looking outwards”. Therefore the voluntary sector had an opportunity to “have their presence seen”; to be “appreciated”, and “integrated”, in a continuation of the “critical mass moment”
for the Third Sector that had been described in 2008. Updating the researcher on progress since her pilot study, “delays” caused by responding to pandemic flu meant policy was “not saying anything new” between 2008-9. Activities in 2009, including the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies ‘Enhancements’ programme, represented incremental change – this was “CCA 2.5, not CCA 3.0” – “an evolutionary change for people, layering new elements” onto existing guidance. In terms of “evolution”, although the focus of CCA implementation so far had been “preparedness and resilience”, he felt there was, in 2009, a renewed focus on “response and recovery” [in light of events].

The Third Sector role
Organisations needed to define “gaps” in service provision in their “offer”, but “the problem is the voluntary sector approach to it” – their role “will have to be defined more than [the sector] would wish it to be”, based on:
- the best fit for everyone else
- tied into a particular form of work:

“that’s the way response has developed”

But the civil contingencies community “doesn’t know how to define the role that it needs fitted”, although the Third Sector did have “a role in recovery – a defined role”. This “role” and their “position in the team” had to be based on “functional specialisation” – also emphasised by ‘QA’, below. From his point of view, Third Sector organisations needed to “identify gaps, fill gaps, build relationships and experience” and then engage with the appropriate mechanisms, “MOUs; MAAs” ['Memorandums of Understandings’ or ‘Mutual Aid Agreements’ between agencies].

The “problem” with Third Sector involvement was “reputational from the Third Sector side, and hostility from the Category 1 side”. At that time, “everything is emergency response-related, that’s a cultural issue”, but there would be “the same cultural change within the BRC over the next few years. This is what the whole [emergency management] system will do over the next few years”.

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Third Sector organisations in this sector were stratified – a common pattern in Scottish and UK public service delivery – with a small number of large “top-level” organisations, and other “intermediary [level]” organisations who could “not get round the table” (this stratification would reappear as an output of the RABS (VS) Scoping Study, section 7.2). To become emergency response service providers, Third Sector organisations would need “money, resources and a collective desire to go there”. But that motivation “has to be strong enough”.

By April 2010 it had become apparent that the significant organisational change effort with which DN had become involved exceeded the 18-month secondment, and negotiations were underway to extend it for another year.

Secondee 2: ‘QA’, at the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland

The organisation
From April 2010, QA was seconded with the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland [‘MRCofS’, often referred to as ‘Mountain Rescue’]. This would “never be a national organisation”: it was “locally adapted”. The organisation was “led by people with big personalities”: “passionate, with huge enthusiasm and commitment [and needed to be] because of the nature of the task”. The MRCofS was made up of ‘Mountain Rescue Committees [MRCs] - 21 separate charities, and two organisations without charitable status.

Volunteers were “emergency responders” – they could attend a scene “within the hour”. “Usually” local authorities and public services “provide that response”, with voluntary sector organisations “for the next bit”, and “recovery”. Alongside the British Red Cross, ‘Mountain Rescue’ were the “only” voluntary sector “responder organisation”, although BRC ‘dealt’ “with the parts that perhaps do not have such tight timescales”. MRCs had “close relationships with the Police and SCGs”, but there were questions over “what mechanisms” were best for “regulating the relationship” with the Police.
**Capacity-building requires relationship-building**

The interview took place in July 2010, 3 months into an 18-month secondment. The “government dream” was that the secondment would assist the organisation so that “it does the job and coordinates as well”, “not just providing volunteers but also coordinating action”: so generating a “double benefit” from the governments’ point of view. Scottish Government was taking a “gentle touch” approach – if there was too much [intervention] from government “it might kill the volunteer spirit”.

QA's task was to produce a strategic business plan, and to “check it works for them”: “not just another government glossy”. He described the briefing process for his role, which was led by the organisation [MRCofS], who identified their need as not only the plan but “someone to pull it together”. The initial meetings had been about “building trust” so they knew he was “not going to take a tangent”. He said the MRCofS Executive Committee had “made a comment that changed the way we worked together”. They had felt they were “going to the government for help”. QA had told them that they were “giving far more than [they were] getting back”. He used the analogy that there was “no such thing as a free lunch – but they are providing lunch”.

For QA, relationships were all about “people and personality”. “Partnerships are largely driven by personality”: “it’s easy for government and others to forget that it is people that make the world go round”. When asked whether his own background in the ‘services’ [Armed Forces] helped him to integrate, QA replied that, in those organisations, “because the hierarchy is overt, it leads to a focus on capability. It removes the status element”. Status became “more important when unspoken”, in “power” and “authority”. He expanded on this from his Armed Forces experiences, describing how “trust and reliability are important”, increasing the “chance of [operational] success”. QA offered that the reason why he liked working with the voluntary sector was that it was about “convincing people, rather than directing people” – he “enjoyed this so much” because it was “not hierarchical”.

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After his meetings with the MRCofS he would be “going round the MRCs when he had something to say”. He needed the “substance for credibility”, so he was “not just shaking hands”. The business plan would be sent out to the MRCs twice and redrafted twice – he had “to sell it to them”, he was “in the selling business”. The final test would be a public meeting, a charity meeting, “so anyone from the public could turn up”. He had just attended a similar meeting in April and “observed” that “people speak strongly, they are passionate and they care”; they were “really emphatic in language”. At the April meeting he was reminded of their democratic, consensual process. It had made him “appreciate that this is an organisation that works professionally”: “democracy and accountability within an organisation are both healthy”.

When asked by the researcher whether his role and proposals represented a “fundamental change” for the organisation, QA responded that whilst the charity regulator [OSCR] dealt with the financial side of the organisations, his role was “organisational development”. This had been on an “ad hoc basis until now”, and this had been “successful”. But,

“the people we [Scottish Resilience] work with are becoming increasingly strategic in the way they work. Strategic responders want to know more about the organisation. We can’t use the word ‘standards’, that is a 4-letter word. So ‘good practice’ replaces it”.

With ‘standards’, he felt the voluntary sector would ask; “Who are the inspectors? What right do they have to inspect us?”. QA’s preference was for the organisation to have “agreed core basic deliverables”, “easy things that we can all sign up to, core capabilities”: “the Police need that to anticipate the contribution of volunteers” and to create an “Asset Register” of “additional capabilities”.

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**Capabilities and ‘Assurance’**

From the conversation it was apparent there was a paradox between localised or functional specialisation, and capabilities and assurance. Localised specialisations included “unique skills or resources” within each local team, such as the Glencoe MRC, who had “[water-based] rescue craft because of the size of lochs [lakes] there, and 6 divers”. The Police, for instance, would probably like to use “all this capability”, but would need to know “what good practice those divers are working to”. The “Police need to know their baseline qualifications, not just in water rescue, but lots of other niche capabilities that voluntary sector organisations work to”. These are “legal requirements.

Voluntary sector organisations say they are not subject to the Health and Safety at Work Act but the Police Constable has a duty under that Act to apply the same degree of safety to anyone working under their command”. There was, therefore, a “need to follow legislation as good practice” even if not bound by it. These same issues of certification and liability had been picked up by both WRVS representatives in interview. “Assurances” were identified as both a barrier to TS involvement and a mechanism that could enable it by WI (Scottish Resilience) at the RABS (VS) Seminar (sections 7.3-4) and KNA (BRC) in interview. It was also present as a ‘barrier’ to greater Third Sector involvement in the RABS (VS) Scoping Study (Section 7.2). ‘Assurance’ had three aspects:

1. the capabilities of volunteers themselves and (a) adequate and (b) up to date accreditation for those capabilities;

2. professionalisation within Third Sector organisations that could contribute to (a) the attainment and maintenance of these ‘standards’ in volunteers, and (b) the ability to work alongside statutory response organisations;

3. the issue of liability during emergencies, which, because of a legal technicality, is borne by whichever agency invites another to join the response effort.

Interestingly, during informal conversations over lunch at the EPS AGM in November 2009, discussions of the attempted terrorist attack on Glasgow
Airport (2007) revealed that statutory agencies also perceived the focus of the sector had shifted “from compliance to assurance”.

**Collaboration mechanisms**

In terms of regulating relationships between statutory responders and voluntary sector organisations, relationships “should have MOUs [Memorandums of Understanding]” but “at the moment it is all informal”, “even though the Police are liable when they deploy MRCs” (emphasis in original). For example, within one region there were 12 MRCs: “do you negotiate a different MOU with each?” when there is “no governance?”. QA would suggest MOUs were signed off by MRCofS Executive Committee “on behalf of” member organisations [MRCs]. His perception was that the voluntary sector were “suspicious of MOUs”. But he felt “by not capturing the good work [in relationships] and writing it down they are doing themselves a disservice”. He felt agencies should be “prouder of capturing and publicising good news [and formalising it]”.

QA explained the popularity of MOUs in the civil contingencies sector. He described not being able to use the word “agreement” because that was a legal term, requiring approval from a local authority elected official. This partnership terminology was “not appropriate for the sector”, and the language of “partnership agreements” had to be changed for applications regarding the delivery of emergency response services: “we can’t have ‘partnerships’ or ‘service level agreements’”. MOUs are used because they could be “signed off at a much lower level”. QA knew this because he had previously been employed with ScoRDS [the Scottish Resilience Development Service]. His job had been to write the “MOUs between the Scottish Government and SCGs”. Even when the Scottish Government itself was “content” that relationships were “exactly the same”, there still had to be an MOU and this still had to be “signed off”: they were “fundamental to what goes on”, and the “language is very important”.

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Resources

In terms of funding, there was acknowledgement that “sometimes organisations need a small amount of money to get kick-started”. This was investment as a catalyst: the MRCs “triple government funding with fundraising”.

Referring to competition between Third Sector organisations, “the law of the jungle applies – they need to sustain themselves, or they won’t survive”. For instance, the argument was often made that representatives of organisations couldn’t attend meetings without travel and subsistence funds (RABS (VS) Seminar, June 2010), but “if that organisation can’t provide that level of support then they can’t be involved in response”. This issue of resources as enabling or preventing the involvement of Third Sector organisations in the civil contingencies system had been raised at the RABS (VS) Seminar and by BRC and the SECG VAFG. QA validated this: voluntary sector organisations needed to be “efficient businesses” able to “support their own volunteers” and, when operationally involved in emergency responses, “they need the financial resources to take that hit themselves. Even with ‘cost recovery’ they still need to take half the hit”.

The timing of this interview, in July 2010, represented an important turning point for the sector. QA referred to “the financial pressure faced by services”, following cuts to public budgets announced after a new UK administration was formed following elections in May 2010. Given that it was “unlikely we [would] return to that level of public spending”, “the whole range of public service delivery would take a hit”. The voluntary sector would be “increasingly asked to help [fill the gap in public service provision]”. When the researcher enquired what the Third Sector’s motivation for this expanded role in emergency response would be, QA perceived it to be about “status and recognition, not resources”. Responses to the RABS (VS) Scoping Study and Seminar suggested this perception was shared between statutory providers.
Section 6.4 Impacting organisations? Micro-Case Study: WRVS

Comment on the method
This case was constructed from transcriptions of written notes and audio recordings of interviews with employees of WRVS ['Womens’ Royal Voluntary Services']. The first interview happened over coffee in July 2008 with an operational manager for a Scottish region, on the subject of 2007’s flood responses. The second, over lunch, was with a UK-level WRVS executive, after working together at the RABS (VS) Seminar. The cross-section mixes units of analysis to illustrate different aspects of ‘the business’ for managers in WRVS, from delivery to strategic issues.

Interview with regional WRVS ‘Emergency Services Manager’
The participant was a new recruit and brought an ‘outsider’ perspective, giving insight into what Third Sector organisations and personnel newly-involved in Scottish emergency response would encounter. For instance, “jargon-oriented” conversations and the use of specific terminology such as ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’ command. Her role involved carrying out tasks and building contacts.

In a “call-out”: in 2008, a Category 1 statutory response agency representative would contact the Emergency Services Manager in WRVS. They “assess” event magnitude. If the event was bigger than they could “cope” with by themselves, they call on the Emergency Services Coordinators, who mobilise each area’s “many volunteers”, organised in teams with team leaders.

Recruitment for emergency response activities happened from within the ‘pool’ of existing volunteers, whose main work for the WRVS involved hospitals and communities. It was harder to recruit younger volunteers. “People think:
(1) why should I get involved?
(2) statutory authorities and the government will do it”.


WRVS had “retainers” with Category 1 response agencies, including local authorities, Fire and Rescue, and Police. This involved ‘supplementary activities’ such as providing food and drink to attending operational staff from those agencies. Each “retainer” had a value of approximately £3,000 p.a. Agreements guaranteed “24/7” response, with Category 1 organisations only charged for stock used, at cost price (no profit margin). There were no staff costs. If the WRVS were “called out” by an organisation without a retainer they were charged per item. Without retainers the WRVS “can’t guarantee to help” and help “costs more”. Costs were met by the people the WRVS was serving to - generally the Police or Fire and Rescue at an incident site. If they were serving local people the local authority would pay, and might provide food for WRVS to serve. In 2008, only one Scottish local authority WRVS worked with did not have a ‘retainer’ in place. By contrast, amongst the emergency services only one Scottish Police Force and one Fire and Rescue Service had a retainer.

‘Voluntary Group’ meetings in local authorities were part of duties to meet the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). Meetings only occurred if they were organised by local authorities, emphasising the “if”, although not all the local authorities that WRVS had retainers with held meetings. If regular, meetings occurred every 6 months and were attended by other stakeholders or shared between local authority areas, having benefits for scheduling and strategic coordination.

In meetings everyone was speaking about the “voluntary sector” but “are not sure what it is and what capacity is available”. Local authorities overestimated the capacity of TSOs in providing response: [there was] “a huge danger that if something big happens we will come unstuck”...“It is the nature of the voluntary sector that we don’t like to say no”...“It is only when we come to the crunch and those services are not available that this becomes problematic”. She felt an equal partner round the table at local authority emergency planning meetings but Category 1 agencies still had primacy: “at the end of the day I only do what I’m told [corrected herself] asked to do, if I feel we have the capacity to do it”.
“All of a sudden it’s been realised that [statutory responders] will have to rely on volunteers because they just haven’t got the staff”. In 2007 floods, there were 12-13 rest centres, running for 2-3 weeks: “local authorities can’t staff them on their own even with the best will in the world”, “the 2007 floods were an ‘oops’ moment”. The respondent felt local authorities were looking for other sources of volunteers and WRVS had been asked “who do you think?...”; on the assumption they had a network.

The respondent noted her organisation didn’t tend to have meetings with emergency services unless there were specific things to discuss. E.g. Training & Exercising procedures were “in flux”: Category 1 responders “haven’t grasped” they need to include the ‘voluntary sector’, “[it’s like] trying to push water uphill to try and get them to include us”. This was locally variable. Was Training & Exercising important to effective collaboration? “The key thing is that when we go to the scene of something at 2am on a Sunday morning I’m not walking around trying to find who the contact is, because I know them”. Familiarity led to “picking up” key information such as locate command cars: “[I go to] the one with the light flashing because that’s where the command and control point is”, something she “would never know if I didn’t go to the meetings”.

**Interview with Head of Resilience and Recovery, WRVS (UK)**

**Third Sector involvement: background to legislative duties**

Every Category 1 respondent surveyed by this project and 2010’s RABS (VS) Scoping Study spontaneously cited their legislative duty to “have regard to” activities of the voluntary sector. Once TSOs were “written in” to legislation WRVS felt “the need to up our game to make sure that we are doing what they want us to do. But in actual fact we were probably doing it anyway”, and had been running training “long before civil contingencies came in”. ZA described the process behind TSOs being “written in” the CCA. In Scotland this meant:
“a Scottish Category 1 responder must have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations which carry on activities -
(a) in the area in which the functions of that Scottish Category 1 responder are exercisable; and
(b) which are relevant in an emergency” (HMSO:9).

The Third Sector had not been mentioned within the draft Civil Contingencies Act (2004) legislation. During the consultation period, WRVS had given evidence in Parliament “to say, you need it to be written in somehow. Obviously we didn’t want the statutory duty, and that’s when the ‘have regard to’ bit came in”. Alongside them was the Salvation Army, St John’s Ambulance, and British Red Cross, who together “kicked up a bit of a fuss”. Notably, these are the organisations mentioned in implementation guidance accompanying the legislation and in the “Big 6” referred to consistently by practitioners as Third Sector emergency response providers.

After these organisations were invited to attend the Joint Parliamentary Committee [Members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords], a debate arose as to whether some should be given a statutory duty when others would “clearly” not be able to fulfil it. While the Third Sector organisations didn’t agree with becoming statutory providers, they did all agree that they should be in the legislation, motivated by access to core funding. Meetings at executive level between these organisations preceded their appearance at the Joint Parliamentary Committee. Organisations were asked many questions, such as “didn’t we agree with the definition of an emergency” [tone: hostile]. At that point, “we weren’t treated as professionals... but I think we are now”.

This resulted from “the work we did around the time of the [CCA] but also a lot to do with the efforts we’ve made since then to make sure that everybody does step up on their book”. In addition, awareness of litigation within the whole Third Sector “has made every organisation more conscious of the fact that they need to be more professional... whether you’re one man and a dog or an enormous organisation”.

Third Sector organisations in community resilience

The respondent described recent restructuring related to resilience, and “synergy between everything that WRVS is doing as an organisation”. The aim was to use training created by the respondent to create a large number of ‘Community Resilience Volunteers’ [CRVs] within the organisation to assist (a) with other WRVS Services (b) within their communities, “‘Community resilience’ has always been there, but it drifted back a bit in the last 20 years. Now we are trying to achieve it in the WRVS”.

The ambition was to train 80% of their 50,000 volunteers as CRVs by 2013-14. ZA’s department historically developed emergency response and recovery training. This included locally-specific “awareness” courses for volunteers and theory/practice scenario-based training for volunteer Team Leaders. In 95% of the courses WRVS “delivered, both internally and externally, it was better not to have them accredited”, because that required specifying content, but “most local authorities didn’t want that. They wanted it adapted to their plans, how they worked”. In volunteer emergency response training, “you have a core piece of information and then locality-specific information” because “every [local authority] area runs its emergencies in a slightly different way”, “So, we decided with the [policy] change from purely emergency response to more the community resilience side of things, what we needed to do was come up with a module that was not scaring people by saying ‘we want you to be 24/7 365-days-a-year on-call volunteers. We want you to be trained to be something more useful on an ad hoc basis, in addition to what you do already’. And that’s when we started developing the community resilience [training course]”. This was part of ongoing training, an incentive for getting local volunteers together, “it’s a bit of fun almost... not saying ‘you must learn to do resilience’”.

For example, volunteers worked together to develop personal plans: “don’t think about what you do in everyday life for WRVS, think about your own community, think about what they might need”.

British Red Cross, too, were responding to emergent policy development: “if Community Resilience emerges as a substantial workstream in Scotland, there
are masses of opportunities for the voluntary sector to become engaged and involved”. They anticipated all “confusion” about Community Resilience [policy activity] “should be resolved before the end of 2010”. The organisation would plan and contribute to consultation “which, we’re desperate at the end of the day, will chime with everything else, and we don’t end up with something completely different, so there’s an alignment issue in that” (KNA April 2010).

**Severe weather and operationalising Community Resilience**
The first interview occurred in the shadow of 2007’s floods and the second after two successive unusually cold winters (2008; 2009), posing problems for infrastructure across the UK. Awareness of community risks and vulnerabilities, “disappears very quickly off people’s radar... People were rushing around saying ‘oh, I could’ve driven my 4x4’ [car]. Some of the people who offered [you] wouldn’t let them take the daily paper in their 4x4, they are such bad drivers. Which of course is then one of the problems, this is what the local authorities were saying: to actually entrust an elderly person going to hospital in it, do you or don’t you? If it had been a community resilience thing then that man with the 4x4 would be offering to take his neighbour to hospital and would do it as a good neighbour”.

Q: *Is liability the difference between somebody offering, and being asked?*
“Because people were having difficulty getting Meals on Wheels out in certain areas, we were putting out appeals over the local radio. To comply with legislation it needed to be one of our volunteers taking the meals, because you couldn’t have Mr X and his 4x4 knocking on the door and scaring the life out of someone who was expecting ‘Millie’ from the WRVS. So, what we were after was somebody who would drive a 4x4, and take our volunteer, and the meal, to where it had to go”.

The Director of People “put out a short email with questions you needed to ask before using a particular driver”. Drivers weren’t “CRB checked”, but staff were.
Increasing Third Sector involvement

In Scottish emergency management Third Sector organisations had a planned, not emergent role in emergency response (section 2.4.3). Prior contact enabled this role (Kapucu 2006; 2007b; Moynihan 2009; Brudney and Gazley 2009). The data suggested three inputs were increasing Third Sector involvement. Two were internal to the civil contingencies sector, the third was external.

1. Coordination Groups

The establishment of regional-level ‘voluntary sector’ working groups and then RABS (VS) were recognised by Third Sector participants to be significant. They (a) represented a formalisation and progression of the Third Sector’s agenda to increase their own involvement, which had been uncovered during the 2008 pilot study. These Groups also (b) put the mechanisms in place to engender the prior contact that could enable this. These were ‘information sharing’, rather than operational networks (Agranoff 2006). However, evidence from Third Sector respondents (at SECG VAFG meeting) suggested they were also being included in local-level Emergency Planning activities (meetings; Training & Exercising) where response arrangements were being made (although invitations would have varied by locality and by Third Sector organisation).

2. Individuals

Data from all respondents suggested that ‘bridging points’ between statutory responders and the Third Sector were crucial in enabling change and building capacity. This was true both between agencies and within coordination mechanisms. Individuals also had the capacity to act as barriers. For example, at the local level, there was variable engagement from EPOs, and also particular local-level cultures which could affect the involvement of existing Third Sector organisations and the potential for the involvement of others (‘KNA’ April 2010). Certain individuals had progressed Third Sector involvement through their initiative and constant promotion of both the agenda as a whole and individual organisations, particularly less well-known organisations. Within the Scottish
sector, ‘QH’ and ‘KNA’ were examples of two such individuals, oft-cited by participants in this project, and representing statutory and Third Sector positions. At UK-level, ‘ZA’ was also well-known, and later became Co-Secretary of RABS (VS) (‘IG’ May 2012). We would recognise these within the literature as ‘boundary spanners’ (Williams 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; McGuire 2006; Moynihan 2007:36; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn 2010; Edelenbos, Van Buuren and Klijn 2012).

The value of individuals in effecting change was also recognised in the two capacity-building secondments of ‘DN’ and ‘QA’, bringing the two ‘professional’ Third Sector service providers “closer to the body of the kirk”. Secondments are a strategy for building collaborative capacity (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). At the community level, EPOs would be future bridging points (see section 7.4).

3. **External drivers**

During that time, attitudes towards the admission of new agencies “to the mix” of emergency response were also changing as result of other factors. These included:

- Professionalisation within the emergency management sector (*observed by the researcher at conferences and Emergency Planning Society events; alluded to by KNA, April 2010*), which was building a narrative around ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’ as ‘core competencies’ of the newly-defined ‘profession’.

- Sector maturity, as agencies’ familiarity with new emergency management arrangements created by policy change freed up resources to start to consider other aspects of coordination. This was often discussed using a stability or mobility analogy, perhaps because these were developmental processes: “working out we’ve got arms and legs” (*SEPA, 2008*) “finding its feet” (*QH’, 2010*), “dragging their feet” (*KNA, 2010*).

- Awareness of resource gaps, particularly around ‘recovery’ activities, that arose from experiences of emergencies. This stimulated both local-level action by statutory responders – to widen their resource base – and policy activity – in the development and publication of new guidance (e.g. ‘Care for People’ guidance, *RABS (VS) October 2010*).
Chapter 7

RQ3

What is the role of the Third Sector in community resilience?

Chapter 7 is the final Findings Chapter and in many ways synthesises the themes of the previous three. It presents data collected on policy development and capacity-building for community resilience, focusing on the role of the Third Sector.

The Chapter begins with a composite of data, presenting a Scottish perspective on the Community Resilience concept from both Government and the Third Sector, complemented by data from the UK context.

The remainder of the Chapter tracks policy development activity during 2010. These processes, and their outputs, are analysed to assess the current and prospective Third Sector role in Community Resilience. The Chapter concludes with a short Postscript that updates the Case Study and validates its findings.
Section 7.1 The role of the Third Sector in Community Resilience

Comment on the method

This section is a composite of thematically-analysed data from multiple sources. The analysis seeks to give the Scottish perspective from both Government and the Third Sector. It includes extracts of interviewees already introduced. These represent a ‘before’ moment in policy development: ‘before’ interim and final results of the RABS (VS)-commissioned Scoping Study (section 7.2) and Seminar (sections 7.3-4). Conversations with DN and KNA occurred on the same day, with two people working together on the same issues, based in the same organisation, both members of RABS (VS), and active in the development of the ‘voluntary sector’ agenda. They are not ‘representative’, however, they were able to interpret the significance of policy development activity until June 2010.

In RABS (VS), the November 2009 (1st) meeting had agreed it “was an ideal opportunity to discuss, shape and progress community resilience in Scotland”, and members had been invited to send evidence to the RRAs. The April 2010 (2nd) meeting were introduced to the new Scottish definition of Community Resilience, developed by ‘AN’. A “recent meeting with Scottish Resilience officials” had “agreed to adapt the UK definition for inclusion in ‘Preparing Scotland’ as follows: “Communities and individuals harnessing resources and expertise to help themselves prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies in a way that complements ‘the response of the emergency services’ [later changed to ‘the work of emergency responders’, covering more activity]”. ‘AN’ “noted that there was work to do in developing ideas and strategies for how communities could help themselves during emergencies. Further community awareness-raising was required, which was more likely to succeed if there was a local champion who could drive the process. The June seminar would be useful in identifying good practice, barriers, etc. but it was important to get across that this was not about cost-cutting – “more about better and smarter use of resources”. At a ‘Scottish Emergency Planning’ conference in September 2009, observed by the
researcher, the then Head of the Cabinet Office ‘Civil Contingencies Secretariat’ also stressed Community Resilience was “not about cutting costs”. At the 2\textsuperscript{nd} RABS (VS) meeting ‘MI’, new Head of the Community Resilience Unit, “outlined some of the key workstreams which would be important in building community resilience across Scotland – which would be a joint challenge for government, the voluntary sector and wider communities as a whole”. “The aim was to support and encourage efforts within communities by:

- identifying what works well and sharing/promoting it;
- educating, communicating and providing access to resources and information; and
- working with a wide range of groups to ensure that collective efforts made a real difference on the ground.

“Developments such as the mapping exercise, the resilience seminar and the new Ready Scotland website would be crucial in taking this work forward. He also highlighted the secondments... which were helping to ensure that the partnerships and links necessary for progressing this agenda were being put in place. The role of RABS (VS) in taking forward this area of work would be critical – both for the expertise that its members could offer and the links to the wider sector and communities that they could provide”.

\textbf{In April 2010, KNA} felt the Scottish Resilience ‘Community Resilience Unit’ would ‘take over’ from the RRAs, “the first pilots”. It would give “a broader sense of community resilience as an idea”: “Scotland will want to have its own character”. The agenda had “potential”, related to “the smallness and autonomy of the Scottish Government” but “just big enough that there is the economy of scale to make strategic decisions”. It was “an idea waiting to happen”. The difference between 60 million (England) and 5 million (Scotland) inhabitants made coordination and structure “much easier” (e.g. RABS (VS) and SCGs). It was “resource-efficient”, with only a “few extra posts needed at some level”.
There were 2 “schools of thought” on Scottish Community Resilience: (1) Government had disempowered communities though cutting local resources and centralisation, reducing their capacity to act [negative] (2) the number of volunteers were “evidence of willingness to engage”, but volunteers needed organising, and educating [positive]. Examples of Third Sector involvement included, he thought, a pilot “Rapid Response” ‘social services alarm system’ in which BRC volunteers act as nominated ‘family and friends’ ‘keyholders’, contributing to the social services agenda by keeping people out of the [institutional] system for longer. He also cited community ‘First Responder’ schemes with Scottish Ambulance, and First Aid programmes delivered with St Andrews Ambulance. As an organisation, BRC saw First Aid as a “community resilience building block”, achieving two things: (a) the skills and knowledge to save a life “before the ambulance gets there” [reactive], and (b) promoting “the ‘propensity to act’, to step forward and do something” [proactive capacity].

‘Community First Responder’ schemes, “an American idea”, was here “entirely related” not to population density but to the statutory responders’ need to meet performance management targets on on Ambulance response times – 75% of ‘Category A’ calls had to be met within 8 minutes, across Scotland.

If Community Resilience “emerges as a substantial workstream in Scotland”, BRC would use it “as a catalyst for extending our reach out into communities”, by (a) “directly delivering capability”, or (b) “by coordinating capability”, either by “entering into partnerships” or coordinating “completely new organisations that aren’t on the civil contingencies radar” but “come into play” during emergencies: “somebody has to coordinate it. Is the statutory sector going to coordinate that? Or are they gonna say ‘no you, voluntary sector, you know what you’re doing. Somebody take the lead for this, somebody take the lead for that’. And the Red Cross wouldn’t take the lead for everything…”

This role for TSOs – as ‘channels’ for convergence, directing emergent activity in affected communities and smaller TSOs – was hypothesised in 2008 when the findings of the pilot study were conceptualised with theory (see Chapter 4).
KNA asked, “what role does Government play? Is it forward-leaning, and controlling, or is it backward leaning, and more coordinating? And that’s politically very difficult, because when there wasn’t enough grit [salt for icy roads] in the winter, people criticise Government, and say ‘what are you doing about it?’ But actually the coordination of grit is better done locally, by local authorities working in partnership with each other and the suppliers, because they know day-to-day what the problems are”. He felt that England was “stuck with the CCA structures...some of those are working well, but some of them are not”. Scotland was “not only... ahead of the game in our thinking... but in terms of what the start-state might be in order to take this forward... Scotland’s actually done its own thing, and by and large has now gathered a bit of momentum across the piste. And Government definitely has a role in that”.

DN, also in April 2010, asked “how to you engage with stakeholders and get a democratic mandate?” He spoke of “feeding in from the bottom up” and described the consultation logic that “any policy should be negotiated, not hierarchical”. This rhetoric, increasingly isomorphic with generic public service delivery, had been entirely absent until this point. Civil contingencies appeared to be ‘mainstreaming’ their agenda through alignment with existing programmes of government.

[Lack of] familiarity between responders and community groups was a “cultural issue” in local authorities. He, too, saw the voluntary sector as “the channel to communities”. This was not just an issue for community groups, the voluntary sector “need to go out there and connect”, “engage with local communities”, “influencing the influencers”: “local level leadership holds the ‘vision for communities’”.

He also saw the establishment of the ‘Civil Contingencies Unit’ as significant. He had “stepped back” from this work and noted the agenda went from “no-one working on this” to 2 researchers, 2 staff at Scottish Government, and 2 RRAs.
In October 2010, when ‘ZA’ from WRVS was interviewed, she felt definitions of Community Resilience were important, “I find if you aren’t careful, community resilience sounds too statutory… some of the definitions that they have out there, it sounds too much blue light service, local authority specific but... true community resilience is wider than that... the definition is almost too prescriptive really. It’s fine in itself but it needs an added explanation when you’re talking to people about it... then it’s ‘yeah, we do that already!’ ‘exactly, yes you do’”. “We’ve got to get the community resilience bit away from the ‘blue-lighty’ bit... if people can’t separate it in their minds, then they will still think that [emergency services] should be doing it... that it’s somebody else’s job”. Community Resilience was “so much a concept” but “definitions are not the whole picture”. It also involved “attitudes of mind...individuals and their relations to family and friends; wider community. Some communities just have embedded capability”.

Following spending cuts (HM Treasury 2010) “certainly in England we’re looking at a lot of resilience thinking... suddenly you become a more frontline player in something, whereas you might have been what we all call the ‘nice to have’ bit for a local authority... in fact you’re not the ‘nice to have’ bit, you’re the ‘absolutely crucial’ to have bit, because the person in the local authority, or whatever organisation actually, is no longer there... you can’t just stop looking after the elderly... people have a statutory duty to do it... the obvious people are going to be the Third Sector”. One solution to the need for extra service provision had been the opportunity offered by bringing businesses into community resilience. There had been a rise in employer-sponsored volunteering specifically linked to emergencies – which also overcame the organisations’ problem of employees lacking willingness to commit to regular volunteering. During extreme winter weather in 2009 some businesses offered to assist: companies get the “feel-good” factor but some prior planning [by agencies] was “definitely required before these arrangements can feel good for everybody”, including prior training.
She also noted the recent appearance of guidance on clearing snow from footpaths on ‘DirectGov’ [the UK Government website]. The guidance said “do it with the good of your heart and do it to the best of your ability” [sic]. Individuals had been reluctant to clear paths [instead of local authorities] due to liability, fearing litigation in case of accidents, “a dreadful way to have to think, isn’t it?”

Third Sector involvement and organisations’ contribution to Community Resilience was being compromised by the recession, reducing Government spending but also donations from the public. It was also increasing competition: whilst the Third Sector was competitive (internally too) this was not comparable to the ‘outside world’. For example, due to marketisation of public service delivery, hospitals now operated as businesses, trying to maximize profit from their ‘footprint’. WRVS’s niche service offerings – e.g. hospital shops – were being targeted by profit-making enterprises trying to increase market share, sometimes doubling the rental bid offered by WRVS, “just to outbid them”, even if it meant running that business at a loss. Previously, WRVS paid no rent for hospital shops in return for donating a percentage of income. It had been recognised WRVS added value and whole process support: doing pro-active work [in communities] that reduced hospital admissions, and offering patient support afterwards. Profits from shops were used to fund additional services within hospitals, for example ward visits. Now, “commercial organisations are even competing for ‘Meals on Wheels’!” Marketisation “ignores that ‘voluntary’ services always provide a variety of other functions”. The interviewer was sceptical, but ZA argued her point: “when a WRVS staff member provides ‘Meals on Wheels’ they take a glance around to ensure that everything is ok [e.g. no burning candles]”. This was often vulnerable peoples’ only contact with a “safety net” (particularly as additional functions of public services would be reduced following budget cuts), “these services replace the loss left by the general decline in ‘community’ in the UK”... “a casualty of the time pressures of “modern day life”. “It’s just awful... And you think, what if I hadn’t turned up? What if a volunteer hadn’t been here and nobody had come?”
Section 7.2 Knowledge exchange: RABS (VS) Scoping Study and Seminar

RABS (VS) commissioned a Scoping Study of the role of the Third Sector in Scottish emergency management (RABS (VS) November 2009; RRA, January 2010; KNA, April 2010). The mapping should:

- not duplicate, but incorporate existing efforts to capture VS support,
- assist SCGs and Category 1 and 2 responders to understand the different types of support available from the VS,
- identify critical gatekeepers for VS capability,
- include “where possible issues of governance/ liability/ support/ structures” (adapted from November 2009).

This researcher was negotiating with DN to carry this out, until it was decided the data was confidential, and could not be used for this research project. A paid intern was commissioned by the British Red Cross ['BRC'] to carry out the study, managed by DN. The final report (Naismith 2010) was entitled: ‘The Contribution Of The Voluntary Sector To Emergency Response And Recovery In Scotland: Current Scope, Future Potential And Barriers’.

The research design was a cross-sectional survey of Scotland's civil contingencies sector, sampling statutory and Third Sector agencies between January-June 2010. It utilised several methods (adapted from Naismith 2010):

- Online 'Voluntary Questionnaire’ – ‘snowballed’ and publicised through the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations [SCVO] website.
- Interviews with ‘Category 1’ responders from 4 SCGs – representing a mix of urban & rural; North & South Scotland; and areas with one or several Local Authorities. Response rate: 17 of possible 22.
- Interviews with individuals representing Third Sector organisations from those who self-selected in answering the online questionnaire and were mentioned in Category 1 interviews. Response rate: 18 of 19.

The researcher and intern met in March 2010 to scrutinise the Scoping Study research design, increasing its validity. Access to both datasets and comparison of findings throughout Spring 2010 increased the reliability of both studies.
Thanks to serendipity (Bryman 1988:10; Burns 2007), the researcher turned up at BRC HQ one day in April 2010 to a meeting that had been rescheduled. DN offered to have an informal conversation, and it became apparent that the sector and research site was changing. Meetings of the RABS (VS) sub-group would now welcome guest speakers – the researcher had earlier been told she would “never” be able to attend. Similarly, the research data was no longer confidential, as it would “be in the public domain within the year”. As a result, the researcher was invited to assist the author of the Scoping Study to analyse her findings over two days in May 2010. The Scoping Study would inform the design of the planned RABS (VS) ‘Voluntary Sector Seminar’ (DN, November 2009), and findings would be introduced to stimulate a discussion (DN, April 2010). The researcher insisted that it was “imperative” she attend this event, having previously been disallowed. She could attend, but she would “be a ‘ghost’”, and would “not be noted in the minutes or attendee list” (DN).

By May, however, the agenda had developed again. The Seminar had been renamed, strengthening its ‘Community Resilience’ theme, with the morning taken up with discussions led by the two ‘Regional Resilience Advisors’ ['RRAs'] (see also RABS (VS) April 2010). This researcher and the BRC intern spent two days at BRC HQ workshopping the Scoping Study data and comparing findings from their differing research designs. They used these analyses to design an afternoon session at the Seminar, a data gathering workshop that could inform both research projects. DN managed this process, and the researcher negotiated with him to be a facilitator at one of the tables of attendees that would act as focus groups for the various rounds of data collection during the day. On several occasions KNA (based at BRC HQ) visited, to update on SCG and local area initiatives in being discussed in confidential policy development. At May’s SECG VAFG 3rd meeting, the 42 respondents to the mapping exercise were described as “all the usual suspects” and some “we don’t know of”. RABS (VS) were “trying to round up” more [VS] attendees for the Seminar: there was a “national will to gather up more organisations and put them in the shop window”.

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‘Voluntary Sector Groupings’

Diversity amongst voluntary organisations involved in emergency response and recovery parallels that within the whole sector. DN had informally identified three ‘strata’ of ‘voluntary sector’ organisations (November 2009; reiterated by KNA April 2010), Categorising these organisations into three groups improves understanding of their characteristics, potential role, and barriers they face. In June 2010 the researchers compared their findings in order to identify which variables could classify membership (Table 7.1) and thus define characteristics of these groups from the data (Figure 7.1). This conceptualisation sought to remove hierarchy implicit in informal descriptions of these groups as “big guys”; “wannabees”; and “the rest of the VS that isn’t engaging and won’t engage”.

| Table 7.1 Variables determining membership of ‘groups’ of TSOs involved in Scottish emergency response |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Length of time                    | Scale (service scope or community)              | Activity                          | Capability (resources)           |
| Involvement in emergency response | - Group 1&2: national/regional                  | - emergency response is a core activity. | - Ability to participate in T&E; trained staff |
| Relationship with statutory agencies. | - Group 3: local place-or issue- specific community; | - emergency response is not a core activity. | - Access to technical equipment and or skills (e.g. 4x4s; counsellors). |

Figure 7.1 Typology of Third Sector organisations in Scottish emergency response

- **Group 1**
  - emergency response organisations
  - regional/national
  - established relationships with statutory bodies

- **Group 2**
  - emergency response organisations
  - regional/national
  - newly established relationships with statutory bodies

- **Group 3**
  - core activities do not include emergency response
  - local/specific interest group

Source: adapted from Naismith 2010:14
Groups 1 and 2 are the same type of organisations. Their core activities include emergency response and/or recovery. They have capabilities such as technical or trauma counselling expertise, and volunteers and staff are trained for emergency response and/or recovery. They are mostly regional or national. They differ depending on the length of time organisations have (a) been involved in emergency response, and (b) had working relationships with statutory agencies. Group 1 organisations have long-standing relationships with statutory bodies. Group 2 have more recently become involved, or are in the process of trying to establish relationships. An evolutionary model best described this process (Figure 7.2).

Group 3 organisations are different in form and function: their core activities do not include emergency response or recovery. These organisations are mostly local, or represent the interests of a specific group or community. A lifecycle model best represented their periodic involvement (Figure 7.2).

When presented at the Seminar, strategic policy and practice actors responded positively to these groups and their characteristics, finding the model useful.

Naismith (2010:29-34) identified specific barriers to the involvement of each group and how these affected the Scoping Study, which received a low response rate, to the disappointment of some policy and practice stakeholders. This researcher interpreted the response rate as evidence of the lack of a clear motivation for TSOs to become increasingly involved, and thus low awareness.
Section 7.3 Design and results of the RABS (VS) Seminar

Designing Workshop 2

After meeting in May to design the afternoon session, ‘Workshop 2’, the proposed format went through several iterations, being revised by Scottish Resilience, the RRAs, DN and KNA. On June 1st the researcher, the intern, the two RRAs, and ‘MI’ and ‘WK’ from the newly-established Scottish Resilience Community Resilience Unit met at Strathclyde Police HQ, Pitt St. DN had stepped back from Seminar organisation once the Community Resilience Unit was set up. During the meeting Seminar content was negotiated, revised, and refined. The two researchers found their proposed content was considered too complex and too theoretical. At every stage the use of theory had to be scaled back, a reminder of the formative stage in Third Sector involvement, and in language and understanding around it. They argued against questions that had entirely instrumental purposes, or a sole focus on Community Resilience. The final outline and questions (Annex 1) represent a mutually-beneficial compromise.

Interactions during the Seminar

The researcher took several actions to ensure the integrity of the data. The first was to seek advice from an experienced facilitator and revise the facilitators’ guidance for the day, to ensure it contained clear purpose, a developmental attitude, and that data collection and capture was standardised (Annex 1).

There were 7 facilitators across 7 tables of 8 people each, so guidelines were valuable in ensuring generation of input and consistency of output. The second action involved making interventions on the day: using the plenary sessions and a microphone to steer discussions toward neglected topics such as convergence.

Shared analysis of the Seminar data

Following the Seminar, the researcher met at the Scottish Government with ‘PQ’ from ScoRDS (coincidentally the first ‘gatekeeper’ in 2008), MI, and WK, to discuss findings and agree a shared approach to analysing the dataset.
The two researchers split the analysis of Workshop 2, typing up raw data recorded on participants’ proforma sheets and from written notes by scribes. They communicated by email about themes emerging from the data, and met in person to discuss and agree coding for the dataset under each question. The full dataset for Questions 1, 2a and 2b is not included here as it was incorporated into the RABS (VS) Scoping Study, its intended output. For those questions, content was arranged under six themes that had emerged from data:

- Relationships between organisations
- Local variation
- Role of local authority
- At SCG level
- Interaction with formal system
- Voluntary Sector.

Raw data was presented to Scottish Resilience under these themes, along with supplementary charts and diagrams spontaneously produced at various tables during the Seminar and recorded by scribes. This full dataset was lightly edited by Scottish Resilience to create a report that was circulated to the RABS (VS) Sub-Group and presented at their 3rd meeting in October 2010 (also attended by the researcher). It should be noted the researcher only gained access to both meetings – to arrange the data analysis and to present the findings – because the Scoping Study intern was otherwise engaged, and she offered to deputise.

**Participant Observation of the ‘RABS (VS) Scottish Voluntary Sector Community Resilience Seminar’, June 2010, Perth, Scotland.**

**Comment on the method**

The researcher used the role of facilitator and scribe to turn her table into a focus group, collecting in-depth data on responses to Workshop 2, both content and process. The facilitator role included other formal tasks as set out in Annex
1. She had introduced the research project informally to her table, and during the morning KNA had invited her to introduce the project to the whole Seminar. Data from participant observation of this proxy focus group is included here to illustrate the range of responses and offer a ‘snapshot’ of the realities of these relationships for practitioners. The verbatim transcript of these responses to Questions 1, 2a, and 2b, was given to Scottish Resilience to accompany the composite dataset. Other scribes also recorded additional data, in varying depth.

Names of participants have been anonymised but organisational information can be found in Table 7.2. Participants had been pre-assigned to particular tables by the Seminar organisers (RABS (VS) Secretariat) to generate a mix of insights from different sectors (Annex 1), and a guide was included in the delegate pack. Table 7.2 records individuals that spoke during group discussions, rather than the pre-assigned table members, as the composition adapted to absentees and late substitutions of participants.

Participants represented individuals active in Third Sector involvement. WN had earlier presented her MSc-level community resilience research project. TA and ZA were experienced professionals in senior management positions. KN was ex-Royal Air Force and ‘Chief Pilot’ for his sub-unit of a new TSO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Representing</th>
<th>RABS (VS) Attendee?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KN</td>
<td>Skywatch Civil Air Patrol</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Scottish Resilience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>St Andrews Ambulance Association</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WN</td>
<td>xx Emergency Planning Unit [local authority; shared service; statutory responder]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>WRVS</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 1: “What could your organisation do more of (or differently) to contribute to community resilience?”

ZA spoke of restructuring in the WRVS, leading to more of a “local focus, with decentralised leadership and responsibilities”, organised into smaller geographical areas. The benefit was combining emergency response with “all the other services that [WRVS] run locally”: “one person has access to all the resources within the organisation”, and this allows a “larger tranche of volunteers and all their different specialist skills” to be involved. The driver was recognition that it was “better for local authorities to have ‘one point of contact’ and the organisation’s consciousness of the community resilience “agenda” – “we have bought into it” (see Section 6.4 for an interview prompted by this).

WN, a local authority Emergency Planning Officer [EPO], described local authorities’ ability to expand their role as “constrained” by budgetary decreases after ‘ringfencing’ was removed [Concordat between the Scottish Government and local government (Scottish Government 2007)], leaving no specific budget for Emergency Planning. Despite lack of finances they could be creative in supporting TSOs in other ways, e.g. by “communicating why the voluntary sector is so valuable”, “keeping the interest going for volunteers” and “funding travel expenses”. The small cost of these measures was an advantage.

KN described his “informal organisation” who “wanted to do more, of more. Doing more, more seriously”, particularly by adding expertise. Only constituted in April 2010, the organisation had 250 people in total, and their legal status was a “community interest company, for fundraising” and was “very centralised with regional activity”. They targeted promotional visits “towards high risk areas – where needs are high or resources are absent”. KN emphasised the “value of working together with Category 1 responders” on “doesn’t matter what”, to build relationships. This meant events, “not formal, analytical exercises”, “even if the event is routine, boring”. TA described St Andrews Ambulance, who “assist laterally”, “it’s all training”. They have an ‘Emergency Awareness Course’ for all volunteers, who were “very well versed in First Aid”, and had just reviewed training activities: “volunteers are always keen to learn”.

Question 2: ‘What can we do to support you and your organisation to contribute to community resilience?’

2a: “How effective are the existing working relationships between voluntary bodies, responder agencies and communities in relation to resilience?”

“The simple answer is: ‘brilliant, and appalling’”. Category 1 organisations were “hugely different”. This was attributed to “politics, morale, competition with other providers, and asset control”. There were differences “across the country as well”, “looking at joint working groups”: “in some agencies they are working excellently together and in others just not”. This was attributed to “personality”, “resistance to change or integration, which may well be historical”, and differences between agencies based on “stereotypes” – the TSO representative “had to change his attitude too”. Practitioners felt “the biggest thing that could come from this [Seminar] is improving working relationships”. From Scottish Resilience, MI, moving between tables, addressed this: “the government doesn’t want to direct activity, but can identify what kind of behaviours are required”. The first behaviour was “not assuming you can do without anyone’s help”. Maintaining relationships was “a continual process”. WN advised TSOs to “approach through the SCG [level]”, “there is very strong support locally”. MI, responding to comments about a particular ‘resistant’ Category 1 organisation, said they “would be more likely to take on [KN’s TSO] if they came with endorsement”. He stressed the role of “assurances”. WN said KN’s TSO “responded well to [local authority] criteria” and she was “more open to new organisations” as a result. The Seminar was perceived as sign of “a cultural change”: “4-5 years ago we wouldn’t be here”, “the biggest plus is sitting round a table”. MI felt it unfortunate that cultural change was happening “at the same time as pulling the plug” [on funding, as a result of the Comprehensive Spending Review]. But, he said, “we would still need [these relationships]: strategic responders are not flexible enough”. All agreed [financial] cuts put the focus “purely on cost”. For example, ZA cited Boscastle floods, where helicopters “saved 180 people; in a few years we won’t have them”. For KN, “we see the financial climate as being a big opportunity for us” because of this emerging gap.
2b: “How can we enhance voluntary sector involvement in relation to resilience?” ZA contrasted the ‘Voluntary Sector Sub-Group’ model in Scottish SCGs to the Regional Resilience Forums model in England, where one person [representing ‘voluntary sector’ organisations] attended Regional Resilience Groups. The “success of [this model] depends so much on who that single point of contact is and how they share back with other organisations”. The point of contact must also avoid becoming “power hungry”. She stated “in some cases it worked well, in others [the position] went to the ‘big 6’ [organisations] and not to smaller organisations”. TA said in the SECG [VAFG] “we want others; voluntary sector organisations are there that we need to know about, there’s a big network that we need to reach”. For ZA, success depended on “who and what feedback”, emphasising “two way communication” [between coordination groups and TSOs], with “input from smaller organisations”. Turning to WN, an EPO, she said “you are very key”. WN responded that [her region] did involve TSOs, “but only the well-known ones”. She described “it is about personality, and we don’t know how to get around that”. She gave the example of a TSO who “we wouldn’t have chosen even if we did know about them. At the time we were desperate so took them. While we would like [another TSO], we are conscious that agencies have finite resources (and other jobs and responsibilities) for getting together face to face”. For ZA this was further evidence of there being “no ‘one size fits all’ solution”. She indicated the scale of those ‘face to face’ commitments: “3 years ago, there were 3 Emergency Service Managers in Scotland. And they sat on 53 Groups. That person needs to be robust; capable; well-respected”. When asked by the researcher how you build capacity for that within the organisation, ZA said “that [capacity to coordinate] is the difference between WRVS and other organisations who don’t have a paid position to do this”. Representatives of British Red Cross often made a similar point. It seemed having the resources to participate in coordination put them ‘round the table’, at lots of ‘tables’ [coordination groups]. WN suggested “certain things could be led by the voluntary sector itself”, such as “skills swaps” between agencies, creating “all-round better capability for response” [subject to inter-agency competition].
**Participant feedback**

The Seminar concluded with a short whole-group plenary, seeking participant feedback. The RRAs and Scottish Resilience representative [‘MI’] sat separately at the front of the room in a ‘panel’ format, though MI had circulated during workshops. Participants felt “there needs to be a lot of work done on what exists”. It was suggested Scottish Resilience could “maybe focus on co-ordination, getting that right, rather than huge projects”. They felt it more productive to “examine and reinforce what we have”: “is it more staff we need, or using what we’ve got?” The local character of relationships was also emphasised: “the more we can do at the Scotland-wide level and regional level is going to be important”. A statutory representative asked “what do we need to make these relationships work effectively, not to be prescriptive?” The answer was “flexibility”; MI acknowledged this needed “definition... a policy challenge”.

TSO participants advocated networking: “it is our job and our duty to get together and to get organised. To see what people do and what’s going on”, mooting an online forum. A TSO attendee spontaneously thanked the organisers and evaluated this Seminar’s significance in the process of CCA implementation: “this shows that the CCA is now working and getting down to our level”.

**Researcher evaluation of the workshops**

Observations of Workshop 2 suggested it was a successful data-gathering exercise. Researcher’s notes recorded “good rapport, very active input” and “questions reaching people at the right point and right moment in time [in policy development]”. The transcript didn’t capture researcher-initiated conversations with the ‘RRA’ and Cabinet Office representative [IW] interviewed previously. These were useful opportunities to informally test thinking on topics emerging from whole-group discussions (e.g. convergence), their significance, and how they related to forthcoming work programmes at the strategic level. The Seminar also revealed the high proportion of attendees already encountered by the researcher during her project, validating the purposive sampling technique and ‘whole-network’ approach to data collection.
A Survey of Practitioner Preferences for Collaboration

Comment on the method: theory-driven data collection in Workshop 2

The researcher designed a survey (see Annex 1:8-9) to explore preferences for collaboration amongst participants. Mandell and Steelman’s interorganisational ‘innovations’ typology (2003: 203-4) was selected as a diagnostic tool because of its detailed descriptions of characteristics and applicability to any type of network or arrangement (Table 7.3). The typologies were used to explore preferences for current and future collaboration, within- and cross-sector.

Table 7.3 ‘Types of interorganizational institutional innovations and their functional characteristics’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem orientation:</th>
<th>Commitment to goals:</th>
<th>Intensity of linkages:</th>
<th>Breadth of effort:</th>
<th>Complexity of purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared vs. Individual</td>
<td>Common vs. Separate</td>
<td>Loose vs. Tight</td>
<td>Narrow vs. Comprehensive</td>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent coordination</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Separate</td>
<td>Weak links Independence</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary task force</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Separate or Common</td>
<td>Weak to strong links Independence to mutual interdependence</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent or regular coordination</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Separate or Common</td>
<td>Weak to strong links Mutual interdependence</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Separate or Common</td>
<td>Strong links Mutual interdependence</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network structures</td>
<td>Shared</td>
<td>Common</td>
<td>Strong links Mutual interdependence</td>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

- ^ Shared by background, value systems and perceptions of interorganizational arrangement members.
- ^ Program rationale.
- ^ Degree of dependence or interdependence.
- ^ Member perceptions and trust influence who is included in the formation and continuation of the arrangement.
- ^ Can range from sharing or exchange of resources to joint problem solving.

Source: adapted from Mandell and Steelman (2003:209).

The ‘taskforce’ category was excluded in this context of planned inter-agency working. Emergency responses have in the past been classified as ‘temporary task forces’ (Moynihan 2008; 2009) but in this case that would only be appropriate in ‘emergent’ responses creating new, time-limited structures. The final column ‘Scope of effort: Status quo vs. Systems change’ was omitted from Table 7.3; only “network structures” aimed for ‘systems change’ (2003:9).
Question 3: “What does your organisation need to build and maintain relationships that will strengthen Community Resilience?”

Q.3.1 “asks you to prioritise the type of support that you or your organisation would need if you were to increase the number or range of Voluntary Sector Organisations you work with, with a view to increasing resilience”.

Q.3.1.1 Please indicate whether, in the future, you anticipate increasing the **number** or **range** of Voluntary Sector Organisations that you work with (in relation to emergency response)? [circle all that apply]. Please give a reason for your answer.

| Table 7.4 RABS (VS) Seminar: participant responses to Q.3.1.1 |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|
|                 | VS | STAT | AGENTS | SCGs | LA | Govt. | Not specified |
| **Total number** | 30 | 11   | 3       | 3    | 2   | 3      |
| Number who wanted to increase engagement with voluntary organisations | 22 | 9    |         |      |     |        |
| Both (range & number) | 8  | 6    | 1       | 1    | 2   | 2      |
| Number | 5  | 1    | 1       |      |     |        |
| Range | 9  | 2    | 1 | 1 | | |
| Neither (range or number) | 5  |     |         |      |     |        |
| Neither (range or number), with comment | 3  | 2    | 2       |      |     |        |

In Scottish Resilience’s ‘Summary of Findings’ (presented at the 3rd RABS (VS) Meeting): “This table shows that the majority of voluntary organisations and the majority of local authorities and government representatives would like to increase the number and/or range of agencies they work with. Only 1 of the 3 SCGs who responded said that they would like to increase the range and the number. SCGs that did not want to increase range or number wrote,

- “need to assess current capability and benchmark existing resilience. How can we look to improve something if we don’t know enough about it” and
- “need to spend time working better with the number and range that we already have!”
3.1.2 “If you were to become more involved in preparing for, responding to and/or recovering from emergencies, please rank the areas where you or your organisation [delete as applicable] would require more support by priority”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rank</th>
<th>Voluntary Sector</th>
<th>rank</th>
<th>Statutory Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>General information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guidance</td>
<td>= 2</td>
<td>Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>General Information</td>
<td>= 2</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>= 3</td>
<td>Local networks/contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Local information</td>
<td>= 3</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= 6</td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Local information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= 6</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Local Networks/Contacts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nine categories, including ‘Other [please specify]’ were offered.

highest priority = 1 lowest priority = 8

This question, which asked respondents to rank in order of priority what they needed most to move forwards, revealed the differing concerns of voluntary and statutory sector agencies in increasing the involvement of the Third Sector.

Q.3.2 Ideal working relationships

Q.3.2.1 Please describe your organisation [delete as appropriate]: I represent a statutory agency/voluntary sector organisation/another type of organisation.

Q.3.2.2 If personnel, time, and resources were unlimited what would best describe your organisation’s ideal working relationships with other voluntary and statutory organisations engaged in preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies? Please use the tables below to describe the type of relationship and feel free to add any detailed comments about working relationships/arrangements.

The number of attendees did not represent a statistically significant sample, but the results indicate key stakeholders’ opinions.
Tables 7.6 A-D reveal the distribution of respondents and are shaded as a % of the total number of respondents for each sector, for illustrative purposes:

- white = no response or only 1 response
- yellow = under 25%
- blue = 25-50%
- pink = 50% or over (to the nearest number below e.g 50% of 11 = 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.6A Ideal working relationships</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: Voluntary Sector With Voluntary Sector [respondent set of 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent or regular coordination</td>
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<td>Coalitions</td>
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<td>Networks</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 7.6B Ideal working relationships</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B: Voluntary Sector With Statutory Agencies [respondent set of 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permanent or regular coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
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There was a very slightly decreasing trend for preferred working relationships ‘across’ time. There was a stronger trend in preferences for types of relationships. Voluntary sector agencies most preferred ‘permanent or regular coordination’ (one or two times more popular). They wanted more ‘intermittent coordination’, ‘Now’, but hardly any over the long-term, perhaps reflecting a desire to become increasingly involved as soon as possible. The preference for more intense relationships in ‘coalitions’ or ‘networks’ was lower and waned slightly over time, perhaps reflecting the desire to have the niche capability per VS organisation represented in formal coordination, but to also minimise transaction costs (time; resource; infrastructure), which had so far been consistently noted as a barrier to VS engagement.
Statutory agencies consistently wanted more ‘permanent or regular coordination’ with the voluntary sector than with other statutory agencies. Overall, they preferred relationships with the voluntary sector more than the statutory sector, perhaps reflecting the desire to increase voluntary sector involvement, and that they would already be working with relevant statutory agencies following CCA implementation. Their preferences for ‘intermittent coordination’ were the same for both sectors, and it was only desirable immediately, not medium- or long-term. In relationships with the voluntary sector, there was a slight trend for preferred increasing intensity of relationships over time (the pink shaded area moves toward the bottom right hand side of table).

The efficacy of this survey was limited not only by the small sample but the way it was administered – definitions of the relationship types had been prepared to display to attendees, but the slides were never shown. No-one requested more information on these categories, and they responded based on assumptions of meaning, not Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) definitions. Furthermore, most ‘statutory’ respondents were in fact policy actors – did responses reflect the individual’s own organisation? Or what they desired for statutory agencies?
Q.3.3 What action will you take now? "If you could take any action now to increase the involvement of the Voluntary Sector in local resilience/response activity what would it be & why? Are you going to do it? I would/will... Because...
If you are not going to do this, what is preventing you?...

The researchers thematically coded the full dataset into a set of categories. Scottish Resilience (October 2010) reduced that content to a relevant summary:

For voluntary organisations the answers were summarised as:

- **Communication** – e.g. contacting local EPOs, improving communication between organisations, meeting other organisations.
- **Capability/Engagement** – e.g. more involvement in exercises.
- **Resources** – e.g. increasing availability of search and rescue dogs.
- **Partnerships** – e.g. establishing relationships with all statutory bodies, work with other voluntary agencies.
- **Continue engaging**
- **Organisational** – e.g. ensure all WRVS services are coordinated.

What is preventing them from doing so? (a) it is the responsibility of statutory agencies, (b) organisational problems/ barriers (c) volunteer nature of work.

For statutory agencies the answers were summarised as:

- **Capabilities** – e.g. ensure there is an awareness of capabilities of voluntary sector, form a clear link with Voluntary Action Coordinator.
- **Communication** – e.g. ensure lines of communication between VS and statutory agencies remain open; information is clear.
- **Information** – e.g. try to influence Scottish Government to do more benchmarking and research before it embarks on Community Resilience programme.
- **Representation** – e.g. ensure better representation of voluntary organisations in policy work.
- **Regulate relationships** – e.g. establish constitution, remit and membership of local 'Care for People’ Group, renew and ensure all relevant multi-agency training continues to circulate to VS Groups.

'Multi-agency working’ prevented this, i.e. needing authorisation from partners.
Feedback at the RABS (VS) 3rd Meeting

Outputs from the full day of workshops at June’s Seminar had been synthesised and circulated to RABS (VS) members ahead of the 3rd meeting, in October 2010. Scottish Resilience’s ‘Community Resilience Unit’, which had so galvanised the agenda, was still led by ‘MI’ but his Policy Advisor, ‘WK’, had retired and been replaced by ‘IG’. IG was recruited from the Government’s ‘Communities’ Division and had an academic, rather than military or emergency services background. This had made a tangible difference to the tone and content of written materials, and to language used around the concept of Community Resilience.

IG summarised the findings using a PowerPoint presentation. It represented a “credible empirical base”, and he thanked the researchers for “pulling it together”. He felt there was “good news” about organisations involved and wanting to do more. The ‘Voluntary Sector Groupings’ [section 7.2] were mentioned as “key”. The Seminar also provided evidence to support anecdotal evidence that the Third Sector were more involved in some [SCG] areas than others. In terms of Question 1, ‘What could organisations do differently?’, different sets of actions were offered by the voluntary sector, Category 1s, at SCG-level, and at Government level [themes developed by the researchers]. IG had spent the summer extending the findings by collecting local case study data.

Discussion of another Agenda item, ‘Community Resilience – Future Priorities’, indicated the significance of the Seminar for the development of this concept. Workshop 1 had focussed on Community Resilience, presenting the definition developed by ‘AN’ [the Regional Resilience Advisor]. Attendees’ responses were “positive”, but identified “the need for a more concise strapline e.g. ‘helping us to help you’”. The policy team updated RABS (VS) on their workplan, circulated as a draft consultation document to the policy community. The emergent policy goal was to “increase awareness and the propensity to act” [in communities].
The policy team considered “What have we done so far? What’s the potential in working with these networks of organisations?” They had been developing the ‘Ready Scotland’ website (an online resource of ‘preparedness’ information). A new ‘Ready Winter’ section was launching, with information on individual preparedness for severe weather. Guidance was based on weather experienced in 2009. They were “hoping this is not bolting the stable door after the horse has gone” [Winter 2010 turned out to be one of the coldest ever recorded in the UK].

The policy team’s “workplan” had a ‘Vision for Resilient Communities’ as an overall aim, developed with IG. This was “fairly high level [generic]”, and they hoped everyone could “take away” what they as individuals “can do on that”. They were “keen on more mapping”, for the purpose of intelligence-gathering and “visibility, appreciation, and sharing of good work”. “Large organisations” would then need to “work out how to take that down to regional and local level”.

In “Our View”, the policy team perceived a role for the private sector, related to preparedness but also response. They saw the “role for Government as promoting this”, but acknowledged “some may see it as ‘getting in bed with the devil’”. The initiatives presented related more to philanthropy than commercial interest, for example asking supermarkets to display ‘Ready Winter’ messaging alongside products for severe weather (e.g. shovels, de-icers), benefitting both.

The perception was “people aren’t going to create new groups to do this work unless they’ve suffered emergency events”. They were “not sure” this approach was “right”, but it was their “best attempt” to increase awareness: “how far can central Government take this?” “Some things, Government can’t do” and more intervention “may be needed for specific high-risk services”. They developed an outcomes model based on “if this all worked, what would that mean [for these groups]?”. These were “not drawing straight causal links from activity to these outcomes, but it sets an aim” [the Scottish Government has an outcomes-based approach to public policy goals]. They asked RABS (VS): “how do we develop the approach further in partnership with yourselves?”, wondering, “how best to line up resources as effectively as possible in this group and others?”. 
Commenting on the proposals, attendees picked up different aspects. One felt there was “little localised awareness, despite impending climate change”. In areas where there was a threat, it created a ‘tipping point’, where communities discovered “what works, and what works for this hazard will work for others”. Another felt there was “opposition in the current [political] climate to promote individuals’ role in their resilience”. He was in favour of ‘putting it’ to the ‘general public’ that they had “a responsibility to prepare”. A third felt policy development documents would benefit from “broadening the base with examples”, such as ‘first responder’ schemes in St Andrews First Aid and the British Heart Foundation. For the Community Resilience concept, “evidence seems to be useful”. A fourth felt there was value in the Government producing information or statements about what [statutory responders do for victims of emergencies, and boundaries to this] to prevent replication of effort across the country [to establish that], “helpful for volunteers as well”. Sandbags was a good example of this. It would “be better if all the [local authorities] said ‘you’re not getting them’” from the start, but there was “political motive” to distribute them [knowing there were not enough], then say ‘we’ve done our best’. Bounding service provision was “politically difficult” but “part of being mature [realistic]”.

In terms of Government intervention, “left to their own devices”, areas that developed Community Resilience would be areas that suffered [emergencies] or those with strong personalities [individuals] or time [to invest]. Scottish Government was “modelling [preparedness] best practice” in localities [to share with others]. Links to the ‘Big Society’ concept (emerging from UK Government) were acknowledged, but it was “not mentioned at all” in Scottish Community Resilience policy development. ‘Big Society’ was “quite condescending to those who take action already” but “this agenda isn’t as condescending because it demonstrates the link to the self-interest of individuals”. This “theme” related to “maximising voluntary capacity in preparedness”. Government could only facilitate this, “if it tells people to volunteer they have two responses: (1) ‘TSOs should be doing this’ (2) ‘where’s the money for this?’”
Postscript: The Third Sector in Community Resilience 2010-12

Data collection finished on 25th October 2010, after the interview with ‘ZA’ and attendance at the RABS (VS) 3rd meeting. The ‘Comprehensive Spending Review’ (HM Treasury 2010) had just been published, announcing significant reductions in public services budgets. Scottish Government reduced staff by offering severance packages and not filling vacant posts, increasing workloads for remaining staff. In 2011, plans were announced to merge emergency services into single forces, the ‘Police Service of Scotland’ and a ‘Scottish Fire and Rescue Service’. The impact this would have on the organisation of Scottish civil contingencies into 8 SCGs would not be clear until Spring 2013, when new management structures were in place. This point also represented the ‘crest of a wave’ for Community Resilience policy development. Shortly afterwards, the Cabinet Office presented results from its 2010 policy consultation, but was then restructured by the new administration. The ‘Community Resilience Unit’ in Scottish Resilience continued with policy development, implementing some actions proposed during the Seminar, such as a commissioned survey of public preparedness (with BRC), and a new public-facing web resource, branded as ‘Ready Scotland’. A prolonged ‘severe weather’ event was experienced over Winter 2010-11, an example of new climatic extremes, globally and in the UK. Infrastructure, especially Airports and roads, experienced severe disruption. The challenges of responding to extreme weather increased awareness of civil contingencies. The structure and leadership of Scottish Resilience also changed. The ‘Scottish Government Voluntary Sector Community Resilience Seminar’ was now annual. Its 3rd event was hosted at Scottish Government Edinburgh offices.

25 ‘Community Resilience’ [online] now merged into ‘Big Society’ programme within Cabinet Office
27 [online].
In May 2012, the researcher invited ‘IG’ to meet informally to ‘catch-up’ on progress in Community Resilience operationalisation and implementation. He brought a suite of recent policy documents, including pilot online resources linked to schools’ ‘Curriculum for Excellence’, produced for resilience education. According to the ‘Community Resilience Unit’ ‘2012/13 Plan’, “the role of the Unit is to promote Community Resilience across Scotland, defined as:

“Communities and individuals harnessing resources and expertise to help themselves prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies, in a way that complements the work of emergency responders”.

Communities may be of many types and individuals will be part of several at one time. As well as local “geographic” communities, people may be linked by common circumstances or needs, their work, family, faith or culture etc. all of which may motivate them towards resilience”...

“Our ‘Vision for Resilient Communities’ sets out the ideal position that we would like to reach. Work towards that significant culture change is likely to require a concerted, long-term effort”. The Unit work programme had ‘4 key aims’:

(1) “Improve understanding - of how to build community resilience amongst policy makers and practitioners”...(2) “Increase awareness – of the need for all communities to be resilient and of the steps they can take to prepare for and respond to emergencies”... (3) “Encourage uptake of resilience measures and activities across communities”... (4) “Support effective liaison and policy development” of guidance; with SCGs; as “sponsor contact for the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland” [adapted]. The Unit was leading on ‘Community Assets and Empowerment’ in their Directorate, a ‘Key Delivery Challenge’ for Scottish Government 2011-16, by “empowering people to take responsibility for their own safety”. Draft guidance on ‘Building Community Resilience’ had just gone out for stakeholder consultation, with ‘principles’ and ‘good practice’ case studies. ‘IG’ showed the researcher a ‘Resilient Communities Plan’ developed at ‘Community Council’ level in partnership with response organisations. Not SCGs but local authorities led on Community Resilience, which “worked well at the community development level”, “happening quickest” after events, led by EPOs.
Capacity-Building for Community Resilience

Chapter 7 shows how quickly the ‘Community Resilience’ agenda developed in Scotland. In November 2009 (at the 1st RABS (VS) meeting), it was a tentative shared sense of the need for a “self-help” attitude, in light of the limited resources of statutory providers. By October 2010 it was a Unit, workplan, ‘vision’, and public web resource, supported by an evidence base (the RABS (VS) Seminar (‘IG’, October 2010)). Chapter 7 also documents the evolution of a distinctively Scottish definition of the concept within civil contingencies, an agreed divergence from the UK definition. However, the researcher believes what was more significant was the definition of the policy goal (in October 2010) as “increase awareness and the propensity to act”. This was a move away from the ‘organised’ approach taken by Scottish Resilience thus far, in which ‘established’ Third Sector organisations were conduits for translating policy ‘down’ to communities, and organising activity there. The decision to pursue individual awareness instead of using organisations as conduits was conceptualised as ‘alongside’ statutory emergency response provision.

Yet, in the Scottish model there was still a role for Government intervention – not just enabling – so that Community Resilience did not only develop in areas that had been affected by emergencies, or where it was driven by individuals or certain types of communities with time (and resources) to invest (RABS (VS) 3rd meeting). Scottish Resilience did later publish details of local areas’ arrangements on the ‘Ready Scotland’ website, as a tool or mechanism to enable community involvement (‘IG’, May 2012), consistent with the Cabinet Office model (‘IW’, December 2009). This was perhaps the result of increasing alignment that occurred between Scottish Resilience and the Cabinet Office following establishment of the Scottish ‘Community Resilience Unit’, with the introduction of more frequent, and regular, meetings between them (‘MI’, July 2010). This ‘promotional’ role for Government was accompanied by the introduction of private-sector organisations as new ‘partners’ in this agenda.
What was the Third Sector role in Community Resilience?

Following analysis of the RABS (VS) Seminar, the researcher produced commentary to accompany the final version of the RABS (VS) Scoping Study (Naismith 2010), circulated to policy respondents (in August 2010). The report’s expression was flawed (see section 9.2) but the analysis proposed there should be clarity, and separation, between Third Sector involvement in Community Resilience and its contribution to the provision of emergency response. She conceptualised these two roles as separate, based on data gathered during the research project. The two roles corresponded with the conceptualisation of three ‘Groups’ of Third Sector organisations involved in Scottish emergency management that had been developed by comparing this research project and the Scoping Study (section 7.2; Naismith 2010).

Footnotes reproduce informal comments on this part of the document from ‘IG’, of the Scottish Government’s ‘Community Resilience Unit’ (in September 2010), which improved her analysis. These were the only comments, suggesting that otherwise this analysis was an accurate portrayal of these different roles.

Third Sector involvement in Community Resilience

The ‘Community Resilience’ role saw the Third Sector as a localised resource for ad hoc response, but primarily recovery. It emphasised the sector’s strengths in its proximity to its community of interest, relevant to Group 3 in the typology.

- The researcher surmised that maximising the contribution from the Third Sector in this role would involve appropriately resourcing a ‘bridge point’ with time and skills to coordinate and manage a diverse local network. This would be the node at which the Third Sector interacted with the formal emergency management system, without having to adopt its rules and norms, or acquire specialised skills. At that level, what built capacity was familiarity between representatives of local Category 1 and 2 responders, as well as familiarity and cooperative relationships between local Third Sector
organisations. She proposed that investing in the provision of this bridge point – at the local-level of Emergency Planning Officers ['EPOs'] – was the extent of investment needed to operationalise this Third Sector resource. This was dependent on whether the ‘bridge point’ was “equipped with the skills and ability to transfer learning in both directions and to facilitate mutuality, neutrality, and trust amongst all organisations”.

- It had been suggested in policy development that a Third Sector organisation might act as this bridge point, but this was judged to invite tensions regarding inter-organisational politics and accountability.

- The role for policy was creating the means by which information could flow both “top-down” and “bottom-up”; and ensuring that this information was properly read, processed, understood, and acted upon at the appropriate level. Online resources were proposed as a cheap, fast solution to this.

The researcher suggested that “pragmatically, a further interim solution to the implementation of Community Resilience can be found whilst capacity is being built”. She suggested parallels with existing policy and practice efforts directed towards greater community capital or participation. Some rural localities did involve ‘community council’ members in emergency planning. She suggested a ‘bridge’ point to existing networks would reduce the need for the emergency management sector to culturally adjust to working with new organisations, “whilst still capitalising on the capabilities offered by these networks” (differing from the Cabinet Office model because these were not ‘communities of interest’ but existing Scottish policy efforts to engage with communities in public service delivery). Emergency response resources should not be “diverted to replicating lessons learnt about multi-agency working that have been learnt within other policy areas who are more advanced in their transition toward this governance mode”, citing similarities to other sectors identified by Audit Scotland (2009a).

In May 2012, meetings were beginning with existing Scottish ‘community planning partnerships’ on this topic. EPOs had become the bridge point to communities producing ‘community emergency plans’ but had not needed extra training (‘IG’) (examples at www.readyscotland.org/my-community/).
Third Sector contribution to the provision of emergency response

The second role for the Third Sector viewed it as delivery partner for supporting functions in emergency response and the organisation and/or provision of recovery. This role was planned, and pro-active. Third Sector organisations [TSOs] would become a source of specialised capability to meet resource gaps in existing or future service delivery. These were Group 1 and 2 in the typology.

- This role was best suited to organisations for whom emergency response was part of their core organisational purpose, or organisations who possessed specialist skills that were integral and/or transferable to emergency response.

- Involvement depended to some extent on the entrepreneurialism of each organisation, which needed to promote these capabilities and assume responsibility for the provision and maintenance of recruitment and training for adequate numbers of staff.

- This was dependent on TSOs having financial resources to make outlays whilst responding to emergencies, with the attendant risk that full cost recovery may not be possible “(especially in the current fiscal climate)”

- Data suggested organisations that benefitted most were those who were willing, and able, to make significant organisational investments to align with current UKEM or Scottish policy. The investment might be in training or organisational restructuring, but the purpose was organisations taking responsibility for maximising the ease with which formal responders could coordinate with them.

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28 IG had earlier in the report taken issue with the attribution of motive for increasing the role of TSOs in Scottish emergency response as “explicitly to fill extant resource gaps” (5). Here he referred to his earlier ‘additionality’ point, which had been: “I’m not sure I agree with this. Yes, that’s one aspect of the push for community resilience, but really, it’s a bit simplistic. It’s also about additionality, identifying places where the voluntary sector can add value, where there’s mutual benefit and where the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts”.

From the researchers’ perspective, this articulation of ‘additionality’ resulted from the expert background of IG as a policy professional who had previously worked in the ‘Communities’ division of the Scottish Government. It was also part of the change in discourse around the role of the Third Sector during 2010, noted in ‘Analysis: Chapter 6’ and explored in section 8.1.

29 This was noted as “a legitimate focus for policy”.

o Relationships with these types of TSOs were:
  • established within UK and Scottish emergency management,
  • regulated inter-organisationally by a number of mechanisms (e.g. MOUs) and
  • coordinated through strategic and tactical regional groups at the SCG tier, with some strategic national representation.

o These TSOs might also be employed in emergency response and recovery as conduits or managers of other TSOs or other types of community activity (e.g. spontaneous convergence; less tightly-networked or informal organisations).

**Would this increase resilience?**

In the ‘engineering’ sense of resilience, with its focus on 'bounce-back-a-ility' and the ‘return to normal’, increasing the role of professionalised Third Sector organisations,

• expands the functional niches that are filled by response organisations by adding additional types of services (e.g. providers of rest centres.).

• broadens the resource base – both material resources (e.g. boats; vehicles; food; first aid supplies) and human resources (trained volunteers; paid staff).

• increases the geographic range of service provision (e.g. Mountain Rescue; the British Red Cross partnership with Scottish Ambulance Service).

This increases the stability and ‘flex’ of the system, by increasing the resource base and thus increasing its potential to adapt to changes in the location, type, or magnitude of emergencies. However, in the ‘ecological’ sense, these activities would not have increased resilience. This is because the processes of participation, co-management, or co-governance portrayed as enablers of ‘resilience as adaptive capacity’ in the Systems Ecology/resilience studies literature (section 2.3.4) were not found in the Scottish civil contingencies sector. Hence the suggestion of ‘bridge points’ across cultures (section 8.2).
**2012 Postscript**

The 2012 postscript is significant. The later subsumation of UK Cabinet Office Community Resilience activities into the ‘Big Society’ concept supports the researcher’s analysis of the UK approach as putting responsibilities on citizens to bridge the gaps left by limits to institutional provision (Analysis, Chapter 5). However, cuts to public budgets (HM Treasury 2010) reframed Community Resilience into a context of not only limits to institutional provision, but institutional retreat. This can be seen in the data from ‘QA’ and ‘ZN’ who both spoke of Third Sector organisations’ increasing role in filling gaps left by the decreasing ability of statutory agencies to provide ‘frontline’ services.

Similarly significantly, the same restructure of the Cabinet Office downgraded the status of civil contingencies activities, to become one element of ‘National Security’, a trend that received much negative commentary when it occurred in the United States (see Special Issues, Public Administration Review 2002; 2007; Kiefer and Montjoy 2006; Waugh and Streib 2006; Wise 2006; Waugh 2009; Wise and McGuire 2009; McGuire and Schneck 2010; Waugh 2011).

Both activities were instigated by the new administration elected in the UK in May 2010. In retrospect, this research project became a historical case study as soon as the UK administration changed. This is because it documents an era when budgets for public services were no longer increasing (and thus experiencing ‘real terms’ cuts, due to inflation), but before budget reductions. However, the increase in Scottish policy development around Community Resilience documented within Chapter 7 continues, and increased following emergencies subsequently experienced (‘IG’, May 2012) and as the sector has ‘matured’ (‘IN’, January 2010). The continuance of the RABS (VS) Seminar, and the RABS (VS) and ‘voluntary sector working group’ networks, indicates the significance of processes that were begun during, and sampled by, this project. Similarly, efforts to provide an evidence base for Community Resilience activity continue, and the agenda is evolving in new directions (‘IG’, May 2012).
Chapter 8
Discussion
Chapter 8

Introduction to the Discussion Chapter

This chapter returns to gaps in the research literature identified after the literature review (section 2.4.4). The first half reviews empirical findings and develops provisional explanations based on interpretation of the data.

a) The literature survey in 2008 and 2009 had revealed:


5. Following Kapucu (2006; 2007b) and Moynihan (2009), an empirical gap on how the relationship between preparedness and response affected the Third Sector role in UK emergency management.

6. A theoretical and empirical gap on the relationship between the planned Third Sector role and the philosophy of resilience. Particularly, theory regarding the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing and operationalising resilience as a policy philosophy.

Chapter 6 presented data collected on the impact of implementing resilience on organising and organisations in the Third Sector. This was related to both the planned role, and the relationship between preparedness and response.

Chapter 7 presented data collected on policy development and capacity-building for community resilience.

Both chapters generated empirical evidence about the role of Third Sector organisations in implementing resilience. Section 8.1 will review the data to further distinguish these two roles, based on the longitudinal perspective:

- Implementing resilience:
  - The impact on organising; the impact on organisations
- Capacity-building for Community Resilience:
  - In Third Sector organisations; in policy development activities.
In order to understand the role of the Third Sector in implementing resilience, the researcher also had to address empirical and theoretical gaps around UK emergency management:


6. A theoretical and empirical gap on the relationship between the implementation of resilience as a policy philosophy and collaborative emergency management.

**Chapter 5** presented data collected on the relationship between implementing resilience and the governance of UK emergency management, linked to the operationalisation of resilience as a policy philosophy. The data indicated that at this place and time, in this context of emergency management, resilience was understood as effective multi-agency working, through inter-organisational and multi-organisational arrangements and relationships. From this it delineated

- Structures for effective multi-agency working, in legislation and
- Processes for more effective multi-agency working, in implementation.

**Section 8.2** draws together this data and uses Boin and t’Hart’s summary of international research on ‘organising for emergency management’ (2010) to describe the characteristics of multi-organisational arrangements and relations in this setting in terms of ‘effectiveness’ – and how this relates to resilience.

It concludes by returning to O’Brien’s ‘ideal type’ (2008b) in order to explore what was learnt about the meaning of these concepts, and implications of this.
The latter half of Chapter 8 will evaluate whether the findings provided insight into the relationship between Public Management and emergency management theory. These findings are generalisable outside of the research site, based on the shared international frameworks for organising emergency management.

c) The research design was influenced by gaps in ‘network’ and ‘collaboration’ literature at that time, and by Pilot Study findings, generating uncertainty about:

3. The applicability of Public Management theory to the context of emergency management, and

4. The relevance of empirical data generated in the context of emergency management to inter-organisational theory in Public Management.

Section 8.3 will analyse the data to propose the arrangements found in this case represent particular collaboration and network types, with particular purposes. It evaluates the findings using Skelcher and Sullivan’s (2008) framework of theoretical ‘performance domains’. The proposition is extended to suggest implications for the applicability of Public Management theory to the context of emergency management. The section argues for context-specificity in the application of network and collaboration theory, suggesting that the characteristics of networks in this setting might preclude the use of ‘governance network’, ‘cross-sector collaboration’, or collaborative relations theories.

Section 8.4 builds upon this, to explore whether empirical data generated in this context can help us to understand networks and collaboration in Public Management theory. This section argues what recent literature (McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012) acknowledges: that policy implementation and public service delivery are often non-plural, mandated (non-voluntary; non-reciprocal) activities designed for instrumental purposes, suggesting these network types are not best theorised using concepts based on pluralist assumptions. The Emergency Management context is argued to represent an ‘extreme’ example of these types of network, due to the influence of hierarchy on their organisation and operation (Moynihan 2008; 2009).
Section 8.1 What was the Third Sector role in implementing resilience?

Third Sector organisations in Scottish emergency management

*The impact of implementing resilience on organising*

It is notable that purpose differed between the coordination mechanisms sampled by this project (Chapter 6). Whilst the purpose at the regional-level was ‘sharing’ and thus ‘resolving’ “issues” experienced by agencies, the purpose at national-level was increasing the involvement and contribution of the sector. Partly, this was because one network was at ‘tactical’ level, the other ‘strategic’. However, the proportion of Third Sector membership at the regional-level was higher than at the strategic level. Limited representation was acknowledged by the RABS (VS) Group, but was said to be due to Third Sector organisations judging themselves not ready to participate (2nd meeting). At regional-level their membership struggle was about attendance and contribution to the group, and reasons for this were discussed (SECG VAFG 3rd meeting). It is possible that the purpose of these groups – building capacity for future coordination – was not strong enough to offset the transaction costs of participation for attendants. This may be a neglected paradox of the need for prior contact between agencies before emergencies occur, more relevant in countries like the UK, where risks are increasing but public awareness is not. Resources clearly determined the ability to participate in coordination activities. That theme was apparent from both statutory and Third Sector respondents, and referenced as the key enabler by the organisations that did have resources, and a barrier for those that did not. There were frequent assertions that the reason ‘established’ organisations (‘Preparing Scotland’, 2006) could play a role in emergency management was because they were specifically resourced to do so (the “big players” mentioned at the RABS (VS) 3rd meeting). Resources were both financial (paid staff) and organisational (enough staff). These organisations – listed in implementation guidance, and so often listed by practitioners – were often referred to as the “Big 6”. An unpublished survey by the ‘CRISIS’ CEO (2008) revealed that when asked to identify ‘voluntary’ organisations most EPOs could only list the “Big 6”.
The impact of implementing resilience on organisations

“Big 6” organisations had a financial incentive to maintain existing preferential relationships. As a result, they were investing in either expanding their functional niches (e.g. British Red Cross ['BRC'] providing services on behalf of the Scottish Ambulance Service – Category 1 responders) or more effectively filling their niche (e.g. restructuring WRVS local representatives and retraining volunteers). The evidence from BRC and WRVS – the biggest of the “Big 6” organisations – was consistent in suggesting that alignment was necessary in order to play the role of professional service providers. This was related to the specific requirements for risk management within this sector, which combine with the particular capability requirements of mobilising resources under crisis conditions (Waugh and Streib 2006; Kapucu 2006; 2007b), and their ‘surge capacity’ (Boin and ’t Hart 2010:364). These requirements were captured in the emphasis on involvement being dependent upon ‘assurance’ from organisations and a need for more assurance from the sector (KNA, April 2010; MI, June 2010). These organisations were quite explicit about these “alignment issue[s]”, the consequent need to stay engaged with policy development in order to anticipate the direction of policy evolution, and how their organisation might anticipate those needs and then be able to meet them (e.g. Community Resilience, next page). They had high awareness of funders’ expectations of professionalism. For example, British Red Cross had a structured project management approach of ‘programming’ their work (developed with SOLAR, at the University of the West of England). All projects were underpinned by a needs analysis > outcomes > evaluation. This was necessary because of “accountability”, to meet “funders’ expectations”. Every project was “standardised” against this. Goals were “defined by communication with commissioners”. The “language” of this approach had to be used organisationally [to embed it] (KNA, April 2010).

Taken together, data from BRC and WRVS appears to be evidence of these Third Sector organisations’ ‘institutional isomorphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Ashworth et al. 2009). It also suggests there were isomorphic pressures from the emergency management sector (section 8.3).
What was the role of the Third Sector in Community Resilience?
The Third Sector role in Community Resilience was emergent between 2008-10.

**Capacity-building in Third Sector Organisations**
At the UK-level, BRC and WRVS were pursuing the concept of Community Resilience as organisational strategy. For BRC in Scotland, it was about growth:

“as a catalyst for extending our reach out into communities”, by (a)
“directly delivering capability”, or (b) “by coordinating capability”, either by “entering into partnerships” or coordinating “completely new organisations that aren’t on the civil contingencies radar” but “come into play” during emergencies: “somebody has to coordinate it”.

For WRVS, it was about (a) enhancing the service offering within an increasingly competitive market, by training more volunteers, and (b) using the concept – alongside experiences of emergencies, or scenario-based training – as a ‘hook’ to enable both retention of existing volunteers and recruitment of new ones.

These addressed the marketing, retention and recruitment issues WRVS was responding to in 2008 (*Interviewee 10*).

ZA’s impromptu comment at the RABS (VS) Seminar was also significant (section 7.3). WRVS previously had 3 Emergency Service Managers in Scotland (when their emergency response activities had been organised separately from other ‘mainstream’ service provision, before restructuring), one of whom was 2008’s interviewee. These 3 individuals between them sat on “53 groups” [coordinating mechanisms]. This reveals the complexity of Scottish civil contingencies planning arrangements (*noted by Audit Scotland, 2009*). For ‘ZA’, it was significant in the demands it placed on those individuals [impact on the organisation], and the impact of what type of individuals were representing the organisation [impact of the organisation]. This supports the analysis of the importance of individuals and their brokering abilities for progressing Third Sector involvement (Analysis: Chapter 6). It also supports the evidence that involvement of Third Sector organisations was dependent upon having sufficient resources to coordinate.
**Capacity-building in policy development activities and formal coordination mechanisms**

The issue of Third Sector involvement in Community Resilience was framed with a notably instrumental purpose (deBruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1997; O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Keast and Mandell 2009). Third Sector organisations ['TSOs'] were ‘instruments’ for the attainment of policy goals. Their increasing involvement in both preparedness and response was for the purpose of attaining these goals and better-coordinating that role (rather than, for example, having TSOs there to represent the voices of affected communities). An exception to this trend was ‘Interviewee 11’ from the 2008 study, who at that time belonged to the English ‘National Flood Forum’, an organisation representing community-level experiences of flood emergencies[^30]. In 2008, he was invited by Scottish Resilience to establish the same type of organisation in Scotland, and attended the Seminar and 3rd RABS (VS) meeting in that guise. Yet the content of his presentation at the 3rd RABS (VS) meeting (*October 2010*) was much the same as the argument made to the researcher two years earlier (*August 2008*), suggesting awareness of – and progress on – the needs of affected communities in Scotland were slow to develop.

The purpose of both the Scoping Study and Seminar was increasing “the contribution” of the Third Sector. Negotiating the content of Workshop 2 with the Community Resilience Unit and the two RRAs (‘WK’, ‘MI’, ‘HY’, ‘AN’) in June 2010, content of group discussions (Question 1 and 2) and the survey (Question 3) were amended to reflect these instrumental purposes. Whilst the researchers argued against this, it was clear that better coordinating and increasing involvement in service provision – including the role in Community Resilience – was the purpose (section 7.2-3). Framing it as a “contribution” puts the focus on the role of Third Sector organisations in the formal provision of services, which does represent a move away from their traditional “supplementary role” (*Preparing Scotland* 2006 Chapter 1:7; :16), uncovered in 2008 as the perception of TSOs as “ladies who do buns”. However, this instrumentalism

indicates the persistence of traditional attitudes noted in 2008, “statutory agencies are still in a mindset of who they can use rather than who they can collaborate with” (both, Interviewee 7). In service provision, Third Sector organisations occupied “functional niches” (‘QA, July 2010) based on their role as ‘established’ service providers or repositories of ‘specialist skills’ (‘Preparing Scotland’ 2006 Chapter 3:185). Convergence was still unwelcome and difficult to manage, for both sectors (SECG VAFG; Seminar).

The explanation for why Third Sector organisations would seek to make this contribution seemed to be that Third Sector organisations had to resist the push from the civil contingencies sector toward their role being primarily ‘recovery’ activities of the Integrated Emergency Management [‘IEM’] cycle (e.g. ‘Care for People’ guidance). They had to gain access to the earlier, ‘preparedness’ stages of the IEM cycle where they were able to generate relationships that would allow their involvement in ‘response’, by establishing prior contact with responders e.g. ‘Training & Exercising’ and familiarity with individuals that would get them ‘under the cordon’ (SECG VAFG, May 2010) (cf. Kapucu 2006; Brudney and Gazley 2009). In doing so, involved TSOs had to build relational capital on the basis of themselves being ‘expert’, professional service providers with resources in terms of niche capabilities, and access to trained volunteers, sometimes leading to competition between organisations (e.g. BRC as “the only game in town”). Historical links between Government and these organisations prevented alignment from causing them an ‘identity crisis’. The significant resource inputs required to gain involvement would likely to discourage other TSOs from seeking to expand their activities in the civil contingencies sector.

This is self-perpetuating: so-called ‘motivated’ TSOs (Group 2 in Naismith 2010’s classifications, section 7.2) and those with event-related interest in involvement (Group 3) would have to engage with Community Resilience activities, where mechanisms were less well-developed, thus making involvement less likely.

Cross-referencing this data with recent studies on the planned Third Sector role (Kapucu et al. 2011; Gazley 2012; Nolte et al. 2012) will establish whether instrumentalism is a feature of Third Sector involvement across contexts.
Section 8.2 Resilience and effectiveness


Analysis of the Audit Scotland Report, ‘Preparing Scotland’ (2006), and the interview with ‘IN’ (January 2010) suggested that ‘operationalising resilience’ as a concept in this policy context involved organising the system along the principles of Integrated Emergency Management (‘IEM’), and creating formal arrangements for effective joint working between agencies in the delivery of those activities (‘Preparing Scotland’). Implementation activity, by Government and at regional and local levels of coordination, sought to increase the effectiveness of joint working through the activities of these coordination mechanisms (‘IN’). Further increasing the effectiveness of joint working could be achieved by further development of these arrangements (Audit Scotland).

The implication of this is that empirical data from this case study addresses the gap in the literature about the ‘meso-level’ of resilience (identified in sections 2.3.3 and 3.1.2), because in this research site ‘resilience’ is understood as a meso-level process.

In order to gain further understanding of this, the researcher analysed the empirical data using a framework that suggested characteristics of ‘effective emergency response networks’, to gain understanding of whether – and how – organising emergency management with the goal of ‘resilience’ differed from organising emergency management with the goal of ‘effectiveness’.

Boin and t’Hart’s (2010) framework is used because their characteristics are generated from a review of international research, that delineates effectively
between crisis and disaster management theory, and implicitly incorporates the resilience concept (Comfort, Boin, and Demchak 2010). Boin and ’t Hart (2010) identify generic ‘administrative principles’ for organising emergency management, based on acknowledgement of the limits of crisis management systems. They emphasise the importance of inter-organisational relationships:

- “Our first assumption is that the oft-observed importance of ‘hardware’ (formal structures; technical equipment; legal frameworks) is overrated. It distracts attention from the often more salient and cost-effective, yet less symbolically powerful ‘software’ factors (leadership, training, network building, organisational culture)”
- "Secondly, we propose that it is not formal structure but the quality of communication, coordination and collaboration within, across and beyond emergency services that matter most in shaping the quality of crisis responses” (2010:367).

Boin and ’t Hart indicate that research has produced overlapping conditions and mechanisms for effective networked responses (2010:366).

**Effective response networks**


In Scottish emergency management after the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) [‘CCA’] the mechanism for planned, tactical coordination between agencies was joint working groups at the regional-level and some local-levels. Where operational coordination between agencies at the local, response level was regulated the mechanism was contracts between agencies (e.g Mutual Aid Agreements). Contracts were voluntary, and their use at the local-level was
variable. Horizontal arrangements between statutory response agencies at this local-level have traditionally been informal (*Audit Scotland 2009 - section 5.2*). In this case study, UK emergency management policy and its implementation mandated the common purpose - and expectations of how to achieve that - by linking attainment of resilience to effective cooperation and coordination (*'Preparing Scotland' 2006*). Multi-agency network arrangements were created by the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) ['CCA'] legislation. At the Scottish level, these networks were the regional-level Strategic Coordinating Groups ['SCGs']. Membership of, and effective representation at, the regional-level of coordination was mandatory for ‘Category 1’ and ‘Category 2’ statutory responders, according to duties laid down in the CCA (*'Preparing Scotland' 2006 Chapter 3:4; section 5.2*).

This research project did not sample from response networks but evidence from the research site suggests operational coordination between statutory response agencies is less problematic in Scotland due to the small size of response networks, pre-defined arrangements for ‘lead responders’ (*'Preparing Scotland' 2006*) and subsidiarity in hierarchical arrangements across levels of government. Contextual data suggested that where coordination problems arose, interpersonal familiarity was used to resolve them. Thus, ‘command’-type mechanisms were less important in this setting as response networks would typically involve a small number of organisations, more usually N=5 than the N=500+ found in emergency responses in other settings, such as North American responses to disasters (e.g. Comfort, Oh, and Ertan 2009).

In this case study the implementation of ‘resilience’ impacted the coordination of emergency response because it necessitated a formalisation of previously-localised or informal multi-agency arrangements (‘IN’), and mandated the coordination of preparedness activities. It is possible that responding to future or non-routine threats would create more interdependency between agencies. This expectation, plus awareness that limits to statutory resources would also create more interdependency, was the basis of capacity-building.

As part of the evolution of implementation, non-mandated networks were emerging at national, regional, and local levels (e.g. Functional Groups in the SECG). The example sampled by this study was ‘voluntary sector working groups’. At regional-level, they complemented or replaced those networks that had traditionally existed at the local-level, at the ‘behest’ of local authorities. Regional-level arrangements with the voluntary sector had been allowed to evolve voluntarily on this same model, but in 2010 Scottish Government intervened to ensure each region had a Group, seeking consistency across the 8 SCGs (‘DN, April 2010). The purpose of these networks was capacity-building for anticipated interdependencies. But incentivisation, then coercion, was needed to stimulate the formation of these groups. The need for intervention suggests that in this setting the need for coordination to meet future [not current] threats was not a sufficient motive to offset the transaction costs of creating and participating in these groups. High transaction costs of additional coordination, without being motivated by observable interdependencies or generating resource benefits, poses challenges for proactive capacity-building for the management of future threats, particularly regarding the inclusion of new actors. Transaction costs with new actors are higher, particularly when actors are not institutionally-aligned, or are ‘non-expert’, e.g. representatives of communities or citizen groups. In this case, new actors – novel, non-traditional, or in new roles – were Third Sector organisations. Third Sector representatives perceived that new actors or actors in new settings could quickly undermine the whole sector by behaving ‘unprofessionally’ or competing with one another (SECG VAFG, May 2010). The creation of capacity-building networks could also be seen as attempts to reduce ‘politics’ between these organisations, suggested by the importance of who attends coordination groups on behalf of the Third Sector [individuals]; whom they represent [their organisation or the sector?]; who they cascade information to [or don’t, due to competition] (VAFG; Seminar).
Condition 3. “The right organisations are part of the response network”...
“Inclusive membership relative to the tasks at hand presupposes a sensible
determination of what configuration of organisations... is needed and what
arrangements between them provide the cost effective relationships to
perform a needed function (2010:366)”.

Unlike other policy contexts in the UK, emergency management was exempt
from the 'collaborative push' (Keast and Mandell 2011) that began with New
Public Management and has dominated public service policy rhetoric since.
Until very recently, heterogeneity of involved actors was not, in itself, sought or
considered positive. However, ‘partnership’ terminology increased within the
sector during the period of data collection, as part of evolution in the
implementation of resilience as a policy concept, and its link with multi-agency
working (as codified by 'Preparing Scotland' 2006; Audit Scotland Report 2009).
The case study suggested that the creation of mandated and non-mandated
networks for multi-agency coordination was driven by resource dependencies
that were limited to the competent provision of functional specialisms (by
‘professional’, accredited organisations with proven capabilities). It was not
driven by a ‘normative’ goal of collaborative relations: there was a general lack
of rhetoric. In new networks created for information-sharing, not coordination
(e.g RABS (VS); SECG VAFG), recruitment and purpose were expressed with
some of the language of collaboration - ‘partnerships’, ‘forum’, ‘representation’.
Refreshingly, without the rhetoric of collaboration, practitioners would
emphasise that they were happy to expand membership of networks, but only
to a manageable size. It was recognised that the time and resource burdens of
‘decision-making by consensus’ made it prudent to include only the necessary
organisations. The limit to ‘who’ sat around the table was thus transaction costs.

Condition 4. “Finally, interpersonal trust between key representatives of
different units is a crucial asset in the event of a major crisis, as a source of
‘short cuts’ and an informal coordination mechanism” (2010:366).
The case study supported the importance of pre-existing relationships between
response agencies (Moynihan 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008; 2009). This enabled both emergency responses, and the involvement of new agencies. Analysing across the findings, and including informal, contextual data, trust in this setting was a mixture of proven response capability and agency reputation. Trust was located (a) at individual level, generated by previous experience of working together in real or simulated events, or (b) at the inter-organisational level, generated by participation in 'institutionalising' activities, such as formalised planning and preparedness. Further, ethnographic observation indicated that Scottish emergency management operated on the basis of informal interpersonal relationships as an enabler alongside statutorily mandated coordination mechanisms. Its importance was recognised by practitioners in all sectors, who would attend training courses partly to get to know other trainees. Mandated networks were recognised as necessary for functional coordination between agencies and the limitation of risk within that. However, observation suggested that when groups at the regional and local level were left to organise and run themselves, practitioners still chose to introduce risk management mechanisms to regulate relationships. Informal coordination did not ‘subvert’ formal coordination, but replicated it. For instance, even when (formal) networks had no formal planning or reporting duty (e.g. the purpose was information sharing), and were not statutorily mandated, network formation often involved the negotiation of joint ‘terms of reference’ (‘TOR’s) and ‘memorandums of understanding’ (‘MOU’s). That coordinative activities were voluntarily rule-bound suggests that culturally there was both a reliance on procedure and high awareness of the limitation of risk. It also suggests rules were an institutionalising, 'norming' mechanism. In another example, Third Sector organisations used and enforced formal contracts with statutory response agencies when playing supplementary (non-expert) roles in response. Even though contracts varied by jurisdiction and organisation, their fiscal and reputational value as risk management tools, as well as their symbolic value as tools of professional organisations, meant they were retained even when TSOs joined local response networks as 'expert' providers in their own right.
Resilience and effectiveness

The literature review contrasted two approaches to resilience: as the capacity to respond and recover (‘engineering’ approaches) or the capacity to respond and adapt (‘ecological’ approaches) (sections 2.3.3-4).

In the ‘resilience’ paradigm of emergency management, the meaning was ill-defined. The socio-technical approach was focussed on design solutions to create resilient systems (e.g. Comfort et al. 2010 volume). Resilience was an outcome, associated with effectiveness (Boin and t’Hart 2010).

O’Brien (and Read 2005; 2006; et al. 2006; 2008b) emphasised process aspects of resilience, related to governance and organising in UK emergency management ['UKEM'], and how they might change (2008b). O’Brien contrasted ‘current’ and ‘new’ characteristics of UKEM (see section 2.3.4), outlining an ideal type based on participatory processes, in an operationalisation of socio-ecological approaches. ‘New’ UKEM required “active involvement of the emergency services” at the community level and thus change to its governance (2008b: 239-40, see table overleaf), but UK resilience was “very much about institutional resilience as opposed to a holistic approach” (and Read 2005:359).

Despite efforts to mobilise and locate that ‘ideal type’ in this project, the findings suggest UKEM in Scotland was focussed on institutional resilience, within both policy implementation and its evolution. This was resilience as the capacity to ‘respond and recover’, based in ‘measurable’ competencies and capabilities (Chapter 5). That type of “hierarchical top-down approach” is appropriate and “effective” “for events that do not exceed societal expectations and norms” (2008b:233-4). Learning is the mechanism to enhance organisational resilience in that model, and was cited as a barrier to the development of resilience in the Audit Scotland survey and in interviews with ‘QH’ and ‘PQ’ (2009).

The Community Resilience concept was clearly different: a theme emphasised by the presentation of data in Chapters 4-7. But conceptualisations of it were still based on the sector’s traditional culture, even when seemingly involving radical shifts in governance. The term was interpreted as a way to reduce reliance on public services, rather than a way to understand community needs.
Table 2.6 is repeated here in order to compare the findings to O’Brien’s ‘ideal type’ (2008b). His argument was based upon increasing “climate events”, and emergencies caused by increased climatic variability were a feature of this research project. This had not led to ‘risk assessment with the public’. Instead of a “risk reduction response” (:236), Scottish Resilience adopted a risk promotion response, communicating risk and promoting preparedness. “Increased awareness” (:234) is a feature of “techno-legal” change (Table 2.6). However, by 2010 the civil contingencies sector had not become “outward”-facing (:239), nor involved in participatory processes. New networks had been created, but for instrumental purposes, and sought to expand established relationships or established types of relationships. Governance had changed, certainly, and the system was much more transparent: emergency management was no longer a sector defined by its secretive ‘civil defence’ past. Yet new governance was not “distributed”, and nor was it more “accountable”; there was no sense of a ‘democratic’ underpinning (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008). Its processes were not being opened up for public involvement. The key to diagnosing this was the absence of proposed mechanisms for social learning, the crucial enabler in O’Brien’s socio-ecological model (2008b:234). Heterogeneity of providers was resource-driven, and limited in scope given the constraints to new organisations and expanding networks described above. By 2012, events experienced at local-level were increasing “active involvement” by EPOs and community awareness.
Section 8.3 Collaborative emergency management?

What were the characteristics of ‘collaboration’ in this case?

There was limited evidence of collaborative relations in this case (following Keast et al. 2007). Apart from coordinative preparedness and cooperative responses, there were few activities that indicated the existence of collaborative relations, such as sharing staff (Robinson and Gaddis 2012). However, there were examples of horizontal collaboration occurring within functional niches, where one type of organisation was voluntarily sharing resources with another of the same type. For example, several local authorities co-located their Emergency Planning Officers [EPOs] (3-4 people). This created a ‘shared service’ between local authorities, reducing administrative and transaction costs (‘HY’ had described shared services as rationalisation in January 2010). In ‘shared service’ arrangements between organisations, they are working jointly across administrative boundaries where they share geographical ties, i.e. when several sub-units of one system came together to share offices and processes such as preparing plans, with the purpose of reducing duplication. There were three of these shared services in Scotland by the end of data collection in 2010 (RABS (VS) Seminar, June 2010). Thus, ‘true’ collaborative relations were present – in terms of joint resources and joint problem-solving (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Robinson and Gaddis 2012) – but instrumental in nature.

Collaborative relations may also emerge in the future at the local level, in efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience of communities by integration with formal response providers. This is outside of the traditional role of formal actors at this level and is currently dependent upon demand from communities themselves (demand cannot be created by the formal system), which is said to be dependent on raised risk awareness. Anecdotal evidence suggested this followed experience of an emergency and its highlighting of vulnerabilities. The Scottish Government had tried to generate a motivation for collaboration by ‘promoting’ risk through marketing campaigns, in order to raise awareness of the need for preparedness, but this was still dependent on communities.
What were the characteristics of emergency response networks in this case?
The research project sampled preparedness activities in networks of emergency response organisations, not operational response networks. These networks were not ‘emergent’ or ‘ad-hoc’; they were constituted for the purpose of building capacity in intra-sector and cross-sector inter-organisational relationships, to enable more effective joint working in the future. This joint working was coordinative during planning and preparation, and cooperative during responses, with each provider filling a functional niche. The factor which constrained membership were commonly explained by both sectors as (a) avoidance of transaction costs of “consensus”-based decision-making, by limiting number and range of actors ‘round the table’; (b) the persistence of ‘traditional’ cultures, based on perceptions of organisations as ‘outside’ close-knit and closed networks. However, there appeared to be further [tacit] conditions for membership, which broadly can be grouped under ‘expertise’ and ‘reputation’ as signifiers for legitimacy. Demonstrating ‘professionalisation’ was a short-cut to these signifiers if the organisation had not been able to ‘prove’ itself through involvement in responses, either because it was adding a new role to its service offering, it was a newly-involved organisation, or it was prevented from demonstrating legitimacy by its lack of legitimacy for involvement (e.g. traditional exclusion of TSOs from ‘Training & Exercising’ because they might “get in the way” (2008)). In non-mandated (voluntary) networks, the goal was to increase the range and number of resources, in the context of increasing magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events (and other threats), interacting with static and decreasing budgets for emergency response providers. The process was pro-active capacity-building to facilitate the involvement of increasingly heterogeneous service providers, not the ‘emergent’ cooperation found in systems that have failed to increase their adaptive capacity to threats (e.g. Katrina), or experience threats that are beyond what could have been known and prepared for (e.g. September 11th).
Discussion: context matters

Sections 8.1-2 described the specific ways in which the Third Sector role, and concepts of resilience and Community Resilience, were understood in this case study in that time and place. The data captured evolution in the sector, after implementation of legislation in 2005, and policy development that followed. In retrospect, the case study documents the process of network formation. The process of network formation is poorly understood for implementation networks (Mandell and Keast 2008; Isett et al. 2011; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). This is significant because of the influence of antecedents on network processes, noted in section 2.1.2 and 2.2.3-4 as ‘context matters’. The impact of antecedents on process and ultimately outcomes in networks is currently only partially conceptualised, and under a range of terminology. Some of its importance may be captured in emphasis on the importance of context (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Bingham and O’Leary 2006). Recent literature suggests that of the 3 network types (policy; ‘governance’; implementation), service delivery networks in particular are shaped by their policy contexts (Isett et al. 2011). It may also be captured in the literature linking purpose to network activities (e.g. Agranoff 2006) or goal-setting and goal-attainment - “effectiveness” (e.g. Provan and Milward 2001; Special Issue Public Management Review 2008; Kenis and Provan 2009; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). Keast and Mandell have attempted to argue ‘the impact of underpinnings on outcomes’ (2009, below) but there are significant gaps in our understanding.

This section seeks to analyse how, and why, the logics of governance in this site that were uncovered by data analysis affected network formation and evolution. Because the data documents (a) the formative stages of networks that were (b) formed in a changing risk environment, it could be argued these logics are not transferable to other contexts where collaborative emergency management is more established e.g. North America. An alternative interpretation is that in these formative stages the logics of collaboration in the sector – usually obscured by politics of post-hoc analyses or policy rhetoric – were exposed.
**Rationales for collaboration**

In the ‘collaboration’ literature, Skelcher and Sullivan (2008) utilise ‘theory-driven evaluation’ methods (Chen 1990; Pawson and Tilly 1997) to uncover the rationales of collaboration embedded in policy design. Institutional design as a ‘strategic choice’ has been portrayed as involving the selection of governance modes (Keast et al. 2006; 2007), but the Skelcher and Sullivan approach (2008) arrays into five dimensions the range of purposes or benefits of collaboration that policymakers might implicitly be seeking in designing multi-organisational arrangements (Table 8.1). Their clarity is valuable. The five dimensions are used here as a device to assess and arrange insights generated by ‘diagnostic’ data analysis during the research process (section 3.4.2-3).

![Table 8.1 'Performance domains and schools of theory'](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance domain</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Relevant theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Does the collaboration meet democratic principles?</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td>Does the collaboration establish connections between separate entities?</td>
<td>Exchange theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Is the collaboration synergistic?</td>
<td>Power-dependency theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Does the collaboration achieve its goals?</td>
<td>Institutional theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Is the collaboration sustainable over time?</td>
<td>Discourse theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Skelcher and Sullivan (2008:754)

This assisted in conceptualising how the logics of governing resilience implementation and the development of the Community Resilience concept had affected multi-organisational arrangements in the case.

1. **Democracy**

‘Collaboratives are seldom designed on the basis of ‘representative’ democracy, although ‘stakeholder’ or ‘participative’ versions may be present” (2008:765). The approaches to ‘community resilience’ outlined in Chapters 5 and 7, and analysed in section 8.2, indicate that ‘stakeholder’ or ‘participation’ approaches were not part of the conceptualisation or construction of this issue as a “problem” of over-reliance on government service provision and low risk awareness amongst the public. Apart from the acknowledged implementation
gap around the “Recovery’ phase of the IEM cycle, participants never constructed ‘collaboration’ as solving a “problem” of government needing to improve or enhance services for communities or involving them in their ‘co-production’ or co-management’, as is so often the case in contemporary public service delivery. Neither - the use of O’Brien’s (2008) ‘ideal-type model’ revealed - was it a “problem” of stakeholder management, as you would find in natural resource management within the ‘mitigation’ and ‘prevention’ elements of the IEM cycle. Nor was it an issue of “efficiency” in public spending, as suggested by the Audit Scotland report findings in 2009. Instead, policy development was about fostering self-reliance and enabling self-help, at both the UK and Scottish levels. There was not seen to be a role for statutory response agencies (including local authorities) to engage with communities to effect this.

2. Coordination

Resource interdependency between organisations is usually the rationale for multi-agency emergency response provided by scholars. Emergency response is defined by the range of demands plus the crisis conditions. These are ‘more than one organisation can manage’ (Comfort 1999; Moynihan 2005b; Waugh and Streib 2006; Wise 2006; Comfort 2007; Wise and McGuire 2009; Waugh 2009; Boin and t’Hart 2010; Waugh 2011).

But the perception of interdependencies between emergency response organisations is misleading for theorists of emergency management in Public Management and Administration, because it suggests that organisations are collaborating. ‘Interdependence’ is a feature of collaboration, but not in the less-intense relations of cooperation or coordination, where agencies’ independence and autonomy is retained. In Mandell and Steelman (2003) all the coordinative arrangements are ‘interdependent’, but in later conceptions we see recognition that interdependency is only a feature of collaborative relations (see Table 2.2; Mandell, Keast and Brown 2009:14).

This process perspective on the organisation of Scottish emergency
management instead suggested that in preparedness activities agencies were cooperating and coordinating to achieve the goals of the response (‘Preparing Scotland’ 2006). It also suggested that agencies operated within functionally-delineated niches within a functionally-delineated hierarchy (Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Schedule 1) (cf. Perry 2003). In ‘routine’ (i.e. not catastrophic) response activities, they would be operating alongside one another, but would not be sharing resources.

The concept of interdependency is based upon social exchange theory (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006; Gazley and Brudney 2007; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008). Social exchange theory is a ‘special case’ of resource dependency theory (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008) developed by Levine and White (1962) for situations where “scarcity of resources motivated a pattern of voluntary cooperation or exchange between organisations to help realise system-wide goals” (2008:757). Skelcher and Sullivan describe exchange as dependent upon the degree of consensus between organisations (“goals, functions, ideologies, cultures, and customers”); the motivation to exchange is internal and voluntary, “choosing to interact” based on perceptions of “mutual benefits or gains from interacting”. This occurs within a framework of “mutual respect for the ‘organisational domain’ of each partner” (2008:757). It is dependent on the notion that mutual benefit will arise from collaborative relationships. It “presupposes a positive sum game in which there is relative equity in the distribution of resources and no one actor dominates” (:758). In this case study of emergency management, the existence of relationships between emergency response agencies in multi-agency arrangements at the regional-level was mandated by legislation. These are thus non-voluntary and non-reciprocal ties. This suggests that social exchange theory, and the concept of interdependence, is not the motivating factor for these relationships and should not be applied to mandated inter-organisational relationships. In order to define or describe these relationships as examples of collaborative relations, voluntary and reciprocal activities would have to be undertaken within or without these arrangements in addition to those mandated by legislation.
3. Transformation

Transformative theories conceptualise the benefits of collaboration as generating “synergistic benefits” (2008:760). Institutional theory defines the “factors that support or constrain the development of collaborative capacity” (:760). These claims are familiar from concepts of ‘collaborative advantage’ (e.g. Huxham and Vangen 2005) and collaborative capacity-building, very recently being applied to the Third Sector in emergency management (e.g. Demiroz and Khosa 2011; Gazley 2012). It only began to be apparent in the research site in ‘IG’’s advocacy for the “additionality” generated by Third Sector involvement (Analysis: Chapter 7). Transformative aspects of collaboration include the collaborative capacity of particular individuals (Williams 2002, cited 2008:759), already referred to in discussion of ‘boundary spanners’ (Analysis: Chapter 6).

They also reference the power of ‘myths’ or symbols’ in the “institutional environment (:759, citing Clegg 1990; Meyer and Rowan 1991; Scott 1991) and ideas of legitimacy (above, this section), “the legitimacy afforded to organisations that adapt to the dominant ‘template’ is accompanied by access to greater resources, thus helping to secure the organisation’s existence (Lowndes 1996)” (:760). This perspective “draws attention to the importance of institutional factors in generating a normative environment for collaboration”, including ‘coercive’, ‘mimetic’, and ‘normative’ isomorphism (:760).

Isomorphism was mentioned in section 8.1, as the notion of ‘alignment’ or ‘moving towards’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Whilst Skelcher and Sullivan’s analysis attends to the dimensions of support or resistance, and the possibility of “path-breaking behaviour” (:760), the relevance of institutional theory to this case is those isomorphic processes that are enabling the involvement of new, non-statutory actors – here, organisations from the Third Sector. Skelcher and Sullivan identify the ways in which DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) three analytical (not empirical) “mechanisms for institutional isomorphism” are relevant to collaboration:

- Coercive – external pressures forcing conformity
- Normative – professionalisation generating shared values that are reinforced through networks
- Mimetic – uncertainty generating mimicry of successful peers.

Coercive isomorphism is “the role of resources in stimulating change... particularly relevant in contexts where collaborations are externally sponsored and sanctioned” (:760). These are the “isomorphic pressures’ referred to in section 8.1 (Ashworth et al. 2009), evident in the desire of statutory responders to have registers of ‘approved’ organisations, training codified by certificates or qualifications, and prior relationships with TSOs, all captured by the “assurances” narrative. Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) would describe this as a context that is governed by ‘rules’: these are highly institutionalised networks, and these ‘rules’ persist even when networks are (a) voluntarily created at (b) decentralised levels (section 8.1). Normative isomorphism was found here in liability and risk management notions linked to “assurance”, but could also be seen simply in discussions about participation in coordinating mechanisms and the need for TSOs to (a) be able to participate (b) participate in the right places. The onus was on the sector to demonstrate its own legitimacy and ‘capabilities’.

Increased collaboration was linked to the ‘professionalisation’ narrative for both sectors. For statutory organisations it was about changing norms and thus bringing practices closer to the desired policy ideal, whilst for Third Sector organisations it demonstrated their changed status as ‘professionalised’ public service agencies. Mimetic isomorphism was less clear here. There was a recognition that TSOs were different and would not all be able to adopt the same levels of professionalism as the “big 6”, and this was an advantage for those that could. The desire for professionalisation in TSOs that was being sought by the secondments was limited to BRC and the MRCoS because they were the "only professionalised" service providers. However, the way that participants conceptualised the typology of ‘Voluntary Sector Groupings’ (section 7.2, Table 7.1, Figure 7.1) in both their development and after the Seminar was of ‘Group 2’ organisations as “wannabees” that would emulate the path to greater involvement that had been established over time by ‘Group 1’. 
4. *Policy*

Skelcher and Sullivan use policy network theory to theorise the achievement of policy goals through collaboration (2008:761-2). We would probably revise this according to arguments presented in Chapter 2: that implementation happens in a specific network type; and these service delivery networks have particular characteristics compared to other network types, based on their goal-oriented purposes. From this perspective, policy networks cannot explain the achievement of goals because they are not the networks through which policy is implemented. Similarly, the authors cite governance network theorists and their attention to the role of managers in networks (e.g. Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Whilst there were numerous examples of network management and steering within the dataset – not least Scottish Government as network managers in both “process management” and “network constitution” roles (2008:762) – it was problematic to conceptualise these processes using governance network theory. For them, “the development of collaborations as mechanisms for interactive forms of governance gives a new salience to this literature” (:762), but in this case study networks did not have democratic goals (see dimension 1, above).

The logic of governance and collaboration was not driven by participatory goals (section 8.2), nor were Third Sector organisations involved as stakeholders – instead they were involved for instrumental purposes (section 8.1). Diagnosing this depended on attention to the nature of processes – using, questioning of interviewees, observation, and document analysis. At the heart of it was the lack of dialogic process, in reality or rhetoric: these were not ‘bargaining’ processes, they were based on consensus between actors. As such, policy network theories had little relevance here. And, because governance networks are founded on policy network theory and blend policy-making and policy-implementation, neither could these networks be described as governance networks. Literature on implementation networks, based in inter-organisational theory, did describe the processes found in these networks – having been recognised by policy network theorists as being narrowly-defined, functionally-specific, managed across organisations, and goal-oriented (O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997:138).
5. **Sustainability**

Taken together, the above factors describe how the relationship between Government and the Third Sector was formed from existing institutions and naturalised within them. Without current interdependencies between actors the mobilisation of coordination was dependent on the construction of a shared ‘discourse’ within the sector, which linked coordination to effectiveness and future interdependencies. This was just beginning within the time period sampled, and may yet develop ‘empty signifiers’ such as ‘partnership’:

“hegemonic because it has become the taken-for-granted way of undertaking public governance, in opposition to ‘out-of-date’ public bureaucracies... it temporarily naturalises collaboratives as the dominant institutional arrangement for developing and delivering public policy” (2008:763).

These discourses neutralise collective action problems, in acknowledgement of “social contestation” (:762). But in this case study capacity-building for future interdependencies was based upon “the institutionalisation of rules” in defining appropriate mechanisms for coordination. The need to enforce these rules supported analysis of the lack of current inter dependence between actors. The effectiveness of this “legitimate coercion” (Scott, 1987:502, cited Ashworth et al. 2009:167) was dependent on the high degree of consensus between actors across sectors about goals and appropriate governance.

**Implications for theories of collaborative emergency management**

The corresponding sections of the literature review (sections 2.4.1-2) were critical of the ‘collaboration’ concept in this setting, presenting evidence that relations could more accurately be understood as coordinative (Comfort 1999; et al. 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007; Moynihan 2005b; McGuire 2006; Robinson and Gaddis 2012) but are more frequently being termed collaborative (cf, Nolte et al. 2012). The lack of process insight is due to the dominance of post-hoc research methodologies in this setting (McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010:124-5). This
project generated insight both from novel methodologies and exploring the role of marginal actors to expose implicit rationales of collaboration in the sector. If the analysis above is correct, it suggests current conceptualisations of this sector are flawed, and based on assumptions that may not be applicable within this particular context. This is especially important because the field is rapidly increasing in popularity, and norms are developing about the use of theory. For instance, cross-sector collaboration theory (e.g. Nolte et al. 2012) or governance network theory (Moynihan 2009) are being referenced. In contrast, this analysis of the characteristics of inter-organisational relations in this sector suggests that theories based on pluralism are not applicable (Klijn and Skelcher 2007). Where relations are mandated they are non-voluntary and non-reciprocal, so using social exchange theories to explain motivations or performance is incorrect, as these are not voluntary ties. Similarly, applications of social network theories that are based on informal connections should take into account the occasionally mandatory and often formal nature of inter-organisational coordination in this setting. Social network theories based on exchange theory, whereby the heterogeneity of social ties brings benefits for information sharing or access to resources should note the strong bias against heterogeneity deriving from the ‘institutional’ nature of these networks. And finally, assumptions that networks have some ‘other’ goal than the reduction of transactions costs – i.e. that they have a normative bias (or explicit goals) in favour of increasing ‘participation’ or ‘involving stakeholders’ – are not borne out by this analysis, which instead supports the ‘utilitarian’ view, that networks ‘get things done’ (Isett et al. 2011) as the ‘instruments of policy’ (O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997) in this setting.

Based on this analysis, context-blind applications of theory to this context are problematic for the generation of knowledge. Not only do they fail to account for the ‘planned’ cycle of activities in this context (IEM), or the ‘publicness’ of emergency management networks and collaboration (section 2.4.4), but the analysis suggests they also fail to take into account the distinctive, rule-bound and highly institutionalised nature of both relations and arrangements.
Section 8.4 Hierarchical networks: the relevance of data from this context

Hierarchy, power, and instrumentalism in networks

Moynihan’s research on the hierarchical aspects of network governance in emergency management (2005b; 2008; 2009) has been widely cited as relevant for Public Management networks in other contexts (e.g. McGuire 2006; Provan and Kenis 2008; O’Leary et al. 2009; Isett et al. 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012; Robinson and Gaddis 2012). So too has the work of Provan and Milward (1995) and Kenis and Provan (2005; Provan and Kenis 2008) on ‘lead organisations’. The concept of a ‘network administrative organisation’ to steer activity meant that structurally ‘horizontal’ (multiorganisational) networks could be governed hierarchically through ‘centralised network governance’ modes (see Moynihan 2009). Moynihan argued that ‘network’ and ‘hierarchy’ were conceived in the literature as ‘overstated ideal types’. More recent evidence suggests that service delivery networks – now recognised as “whole” goal-directed networks (Provan and Lemaire 2012) – are likely to exhibit more features of hierarchy and less of collaboration. The findings from this case study supported the ‘hierarchical’ aspects of networks between statutory agencies in the setting of emergency management. The case study focused on preparedness for response rather than response itself, and in this context hierarchy was present in the mandating (by statutory duty) of coordination in preparedness, rather than the command of cooperation in response. Mandated/non-mandated networks were highlighted throughout to alert us to the role of government in implementation. Mandated networks are useful short-term but do not self-sustain (vs. emergent types):

“While a top-down mandate to form and/or be involved in a network, typically through control of funding, can provide a powerful incentive for organizations to attempt to work together, this approach may be best suited to situations in which coordinated effort is essential and such effort might only evolve slowly, if at all, without efforts of a key government agency or funder. Examples might include networks addressing a major public health issue or a disaster response” (2012:4).
Power in networks

Resource dependencies are conceptualized as power asymmetries in the literature (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). According to Rhodes (1997b), power asymmetries and dependencies provide the motivation for membership of networks, but constrain and undermine the ‘horizontal’ governance of relationships, as ‘dominant coalitions’ exercise their power to control the means of exchange (though the use of instruments) (cited McGuire and Agranoff 2011:267). The critique of networks as ‘undemocratic’ in this sense is based on the theories and contexts of policy networks (Klijn 2008a). It is likely that implementation and service delivery networks exhibit more ‘vertical’ characteristics due to the shared purpose of actors in achieving policy goals, the central role of governmental actors, and regulatory constraints. This explains the ‘utilitarian’ use of the term ‘network’ in this literature, in which networks ‘do things’ (Isett et al. 2011), rather than being concepts or metaphors for ‘shared’ action. In the UK, much of the literature on Third Sector or voluntary organisations’ involvement in public service delivery makes reference to these power asymmetries, wherein Third Sector organisations are dependent upon funding provided by public service agencies, and contractually bound to the conditions of service provision that accompany them (e.g Osborne and McLaughlin 2004) – features of relationships which have persisted while policy rhetorics changed from ‘NPM’ to ‘governance’ because they are embedded in the power relations that exist between sectors – Government and the Third Sector.

The role of government in networks has been debated (section 2.2.2). As an extension of marketisation and the fragmentation of service delivery, networks were initially seen to be evidence of a ‘receding state’ - the “governing without government” thesis (Rhodes 1996; Peters and Pierre 1998) or ‘strategic government’, with varying degrees of control over public service delivery - “steering not rowing” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). These perspectives have been disproved by evidence of the persistence of bureaucracy, with networks becoming an additional tool of government (McGuire and Agranoff 2011).
What are the implications of hierarchical, mandated, networks?

Based on the evidence, it is reasonable to expect that much 'collaboration' in emergency management – and perhaps other spheres of contemporary public service delivery – fits better within descriptions of mandated networks and their drivers (e.g. Rodriguez et al. 2007, cited by McGuire and Agranoff 2011) than with the logics of participatory governance that have influenced governance network theories (Klijn 2008a), and from which 'governance' derives its normative stance (Andresani and Ferlie 2006). The findings from this case study of Scottish emergency management contradict pluralist assumptions – greater heterogeneity was not linked to the attainment of greater 'democracy'; accountability was not a driver. Membership was non-plural – limited membership is a recognised advantage in goal-driven networks (Isett et al. 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). This Thesis thus argues that 'Dutch School' 'governance network' theories are rendered inapplicable to emergency management by the assumptions they make regarding the plurality of policy systems and the participatory goals of collaborative efforts. In the 'Dutch' school of network governance, the concept of 'governance networks' is influenced by the Netherlands' constitutional mandate for consensus-based politics, which is absent elsewhere (Klijn and Skelcher 2007:594). The analysis cautions against context-blind application of those theories outside of the very specific national and policy contexts in which they were generated. Klijn and Skelcher note that based on data from the UK, theorists have critiqued the notion of pluralism and emphasised power in networks, while in the [U.S] literature on service delivery/implementation networks "the relation between governance networks and representational democracy is not problematized at all" (2007:588). In their model, these would be 'Instrumental' networks. The findings also fit with Keast and Mandell’s descriptions of ‘Instrumental’ and ‘Institutional’-type networks (2009), where networks are convened for a purpose, and collective action within them achieves aims other than the inclusion of heterogeneous actors. These network governance styles emphasise institutional elements of networks, enforced through the mechanism of rules (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006).
Practitioner responses suggest that this was:

- partly a function of the persistence of traditional cultures within and between the agencies of emergency response
- partly a necessary assurance and risk-management mechanism in this sector’s transition towards shared services and closer multi-agency coordination. This transition is signalled by capacity building in preparedness through greater information sharing and joint planning, and in emergency response by increasing the functional niches available to non-traditional actors.
- partly related to the nature of emergency response as a politically and legally sensitive policy sphere, delivered by organisations whose purpose is to maximise performance and minimise liable losses through the control and management of risk, and for whom trust – reputational and interpersonal – is the key enabler of in-crisis improvisations and responses to emergence.

One interpretation of the data generated within this case study is that the lack of rhetoric around collaboration in UK emergency management and its historical marginalisation as a sector – exempt so far from either ‘NPM’-type or ‘NPG’-type processes in Public Management – allowed observation of rationales for collaboration and mechanisms in networks that revealed much about patterns and logics underlying action. Multi-organisational working in this sector is clearly very specific (above): emergency management is not a suitable “test case for multiple hypotheses derived from the management literature” (McGuire and Silvia 2010:280). However, these hierarchical, instrumental mechanisms and logics could also be taken to represent an ‘extreme case’ of the contemporary governance of service delivery networks, and an ‘extreme case’ of this network type. In the quest for theories of ‘effective’ multi-organisational management (Mandell and Steelman 2008; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012) emergency management provides models of effective organising – as long as achieving goals by hierarchy, institutions, and instruments is unproblematic.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Section 9.1 Evaluating the contribution

Empirical and theoretical contribution

The initial scope of this research project was overambitious – to address empirical and theoretical gaps in two distinct bodies of literature. What was not apparent from the pilot study or the literature survey was how extensive gaps in the literature were. Table 9.1 (next page) conceptualises the contributions of this Thesis. The areas shaded in grey represent known gaps at the beginning of the project. The full area of the table represents conceptual work which had to be done in order to address those gaps using data from this research site. Had the scale of the project been apparent from the outset, it would not have been begun – attempting such a task as a novice researcher is not recommended. However, understanding was accomplished, to some degree. Readers will agree that the explanation offered in Chapter 8 was brief and very condensed: the scope demanded it be satisfying but space demanded it be concise. Future analysis will seek to develop each explanation in more depth. A further limit on the explanations developed was that most of these conceptualisations remain at the forefront of advancing knowledge within the Public Management and Administration discipline. It is anticipated that a fuller understanding will only be generated over time, through interactions with this community of scholars, and by giving each area of theory more space to explore the data’s significance. Nevertheless, as outlined in Table 9.1, this research project makes a significant contribution to our understanding of both the Third Sector in emergency management and the ‘resilience’ paradigm of emergency management. It is the researchers’ belief that these contributions are directly attributable to the purpose of understanding adopted in this research project (versus concept-led explanation); the abductive, ethnographic, longitudinal approach to data collection; and the use of an ‘interpretive’ data analysis strategy (see Chapter 3).

One legacy of working at the ‘edge’ of existing theory was the analysis process itself generated insights regarding emergency management theories and their interaction with Public Management theories, itself a significant contribution.
### Table 9.1 Contributions to understanding generated by this research project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaps in the literature</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Discoveries &amp; contributions</th>
<th>Conceptualised as Resilience</th>
<th>Community Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Third Sector in UK emergency management (2008 pilot study)</td>
<td>Specific theory: supported generated (section 8.1)</td>
<td>Data did support importance of a planned role for Third Sector organisations.</td>
<td>Generated understanding of why the planned role is preferred vs. emergent role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience concept in UK emergency management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Third Sector experience did support the importance of prior agency involvement in preparedness activity; and how it enabled response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generic theory: supported extended (section 8.2)</td>
<td>Did not support change in UKEM (O’Brien 2008), Socio-technical, 'engineering' definition.</td>
<td>Did not support ‘ideal type’ (O’Brien 2008) that it was best-managed through participatory governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience concept in UK emergency management</td>
<td>Empirical: longitudinal perspective</td>
<td>Implementing resilience concept: policy implementation then policy development (Chapter 5).</td>
<td>Implementing ‘Community Resilience’ concept: policy development then policy implementation (Chapter 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Theory: extended (section 8.2)</td>
<td>Did not support change in UKEM (O’Brien 2008), Socio-technical, ‘engineering’ definition.</td>
<td>Did not support ‘ideal type’ (O’Brien 2008) that it was best-managed through participatory governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of collaborative EM</td>
<td>Theory: extended</td>
<td>Logics of collaboration; What this means for the theorisation of collaborative emergency management.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance EM &gt; PM</td>
<td>Relevance of EM to Collaborative PM</td>
<td>Clarity: Specific context</td>
<td>Did not support EM as a “test case” for Collaborative Public Management.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevance of EM to network concept</td>
<td>Clarity: Specific network type</td>
<td>Did support role of hierarchy in EM networks; but in UK less to do with ‘command’ process and more with ‘mandate’ to coordinate in a network.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shaded areas represent gaps that were apparent from the original literature survey*
Section 9.2 Reflections on the research process

The role of reflexivity in data collection

The successful use of research tools to gather data in this project was reliant on reflexivity by the researcher. The choice of methods needed to adapt to circumstances. And this depended on being prepared enough to conduct impromptu interviews, validate emergent understanding during brief and informal conversations, attend to – and remember – the detail of interactions and, most importantly, to keep the data and its analysis in mind at all times in order to assess significance of new data, and whether it developed different themes or interactions between them. It also included having the confidence to adopt a quite interventionist style of interaction, testing the researcher’s own understanding but also teasing out contributions on themes from participants, relative to their own expertise, experiences, and understanding. This, in turn, depended on understanding what role each respondent played within the emergent agenda, which itself depended on maintaining good relationships with respondents, and intelligence-gathering at networking events such as Emergency Planning Society meetings, and conferences. Intelligence gathering also involved awareness of different roles researchers can adopt, such as citizen (for web research), academic (for invited events), friend (for confidences), naive (for explanations), novice (for help). The researcher hopes the quality of data attests to skillful use of available tools. Certainly, the constraints on researching this topic in this setting were considerable, and required resourcefulness on the part of the researcher, complemented by the exercise of either determination or deference as appropriate. The researcher also benefitted considerably from the kindnesses, tolerance, assistance, interest, and commitment shown to her by participants. Compared to administering a survey or interview schedule, this process was intensive and demanding. The data collection could not be compressed into days or weeks, and every event flooded the researcher with a volume of qualitative data – recorded in various ways – whose merit had to be judged and somehow captured.
There were limitations to this method. Philosophically, no claim of objectivity could be made (although this does not reduce validity – see section 3.2). Practically, there was no standardisation between data. Thematic analysis, allowing comparability between disparate circumstances and content, obscured the significance of the ‘situatedness’ of data, and had to be undone (next section). In terms of data quality, reviewing transcripts it was apparent there were occasions where researcher interventions actually interrupted insightful contributions being made by participants, or disrupted their chain of thought.

**Access – secrets and security**

Incomplete access to data is a feature of contemporaneous process research within the Civil Service and closed-membership networks. This poses immense challenges for researchers trying to track and respond to developments as they occur. The research project turned this to its advantage, by using public sources where available, and hence becoming more aware of what was – and was not – in the public domain, and what was available to interested citizens as opposed to institutionally-legitimated professional researchers. Beyond that, the analysis relied on participants to supply the researcher with secondary data, which often happened during or following interviews. This included: printed copies of publicity material (various formats), printed copies of internal [limited circulation] documents, promotional DVDs, log-in codes for limited-access websites, email attachments (e.g. agenda items with meeting notes), and email correspondence forwarded to the researcher. Participants also recommended policy and guidance documentation, helping to pre-sort the huge volume of data and identify specific documents influencing various policy development processes. These helpful actions became a relative measure of the researcher’s acceptance into the civil contingencies community, and of trust built up with individual participants. Access to these documents came with responsibilities:

- During ‘Knowledge Exchange’ training and activities, the researcher was introduced to the Government Protective Marking System [GPMS], which
operates across the UK civil service [Annex 2]. Documents are classified into five levels of protection – *top secret; secret; confidential; restricted; protect* – depending on content, and based on the data with highest sensitivity.

- During data collection the researcher was protected by participants, only being exposed to documents protectively marked “restricted” or “protect”. The nature of emergency management activities – particularly emergency planning – and the historic legacy of the ‘civil defence’ paradigm mean a higher proportion of this sector’s documentation is covered by the GPMS than would be the case with other sectors. Many participants themselves would not be exposed to documentation above the “restrict” level, in accordance with civil service grades, and dependent on specific roles.

- In 2009 the researcher had to provide evidence of Disclosure Scotland certification (lack of criminal record) before being given access to the ScoRDS intranet. As part of a later ESRC Student Internship in the Scottish Government Strategy Unit (completed during 2011) she ‘signed’ the Official Secrets Act (1989), in effect a reminder of being bound by its provisions during the period of exposure to protectively-marked documents31.

The ‘Chatham House Rule’ was invoked by the Chair at the majority of meetings and networks where participants were invited to speak freely, meaning, "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed"32.

With the consent of the Chair, the researcher took notes, on the understanding that observations would be non-verbatim and non-attributable in the analysis. The reconstructed analysis for these events is written up as an “enhanced ethnography” (Humphreys and Watson 2009:43), as indicated in Table 9.2. Enhanced ethnographies are “an account of events occurring within the

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investigation of a single case which uses the presentational techniques of the novelist” in the descriptive narrative (:43). “Truth claims” are akin to a naturalist ethnography “in correspondence terms: this is as close as I can get to a straight “witness-statement” report of what happened” (:43), but enhanced cases are manipulated to conceal the identity of contributors or precise content of contributions [Table 9.2].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant observation, with written notes, used at:</th>
<th>Relevance of ‘enhanced ethnography’</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPS AGM &amp; Study Day (November 2009 &amp; September 2010)</td>
<td>Supported data analysis</td>
<td>Not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPS/UKCiP Study Day (December 2009)</td>
<td>Supported data analysis</td>
<td>Not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECG-VAFG 3rd Meeting (May 2010)</td>
<td>Micro-Case for RQ2; informed RQ3.</td>
<td>Section 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABS (VS) 3rd Meeting (October 2010)</td>
<td>Micro-Case for RQ2; informed RQ3.</td>
<td>Section 6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Positionality - reflection on ‘not being co-opted’**

Reliance on practitioners for access to data in this project increased the chances of the researcher becoming ‘aligned’ with participants and policy development; she was advised not to ‘be co-opted’ into their agenda. The project was also criticised by scholars for its ‘top-down’ approach to what some considered ‘governance networks’. The ‘political turn’ in research methodologies suggests that if the researcher had pursued ‘bottom-up’, rather than ‘elite’ research, this would have been viewed positively as a critical/ emancipatory stance, on a normative basis. But there did not seem to be merit in reproducing tensions between affected communities – for whom ‘better responses’ meant more resources – with attitudes amongst certain practitioners – for whom ‘better responses’ meant self-help for communities with government enabling them to become self-sufficient. Arguably, aligning with neither agenda, nor exploiting this conflict for data, reduced the impact of this research on practice. But quasi-neutrality increased the theoretical significance of the project.
Section 9.3 Hard work or hard working? Evaluating the methodology

**Situatedness**

During data analysis the importance of context became apparent. A composite thematic analysis was rejected because the ‘situatedness’ of data was central to its meaning, even without the use of interpretive analysis. The ‘writing’ process revealed the importance of creating an account that would stimulate readers’ own interpretations of the data as they read. The researcher had to undo much already-completed analysis in order to recreate the data collection situations as they were experienced, recognising the value of inviting readers to draw and develop their own conclusions. This prompts the reader to judge the adequacy of the researcher’s analysis in comparison to their own (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009), validating it or stimulating debate. ‘Situatedness’ depended on:

- **Audience** e.g. RABS (VS) meetings were held under ‘Chatham House Rules’, but Minutes were designed for circulation through organisations.
- **Purpose**, linked to organisational representation i.e. why a person spoke to a particular other person on a particular topic in a particular forum.
- **Sector/sectors** represented by respondent plus how they identify with sector e.g champion for; employee of; experienced in; recruited to, etc.

In policy implementation studies, those generic qualitative criteria are joined by:

- **Space as level** in the national system [hierarchy] of organisations
  - Local; Regional; National (at 2 levels in this case: Scottish and UK).
- **Time** in relation to (a) stage of policy development or, (b) developmental stage of forum e.g. 1\(^{st}\)/3\(^{rd}\) meeting; Scoping Study.

This case suggests policy research in the context of emergency management has particular ‘political-temporal contingencies’ (Ward and Jones 1999) related to emergencies/events that occur before, during, or after research. Here, Pandemic Flu slowed implementation and policy development to an observable pace, that picked up after H1N1. After data collection, the policy process accelerated after events occurred, raising awareness. Type of emergency affects process: H1N1 responses were limited to functionally-specialist providers (none Third Sector).
**Critical realism and impact**

Many of the recent sources drawn on in Chapter 3 advocated for the use of critical realist approaches to generate impact, in Public Administration (e.g. Marsh 2011), Management (e.g. Hodgkinson and Starkey 2011) and Public Management (e.g. Skelcher and Sullivan 2008), as well as in the social sciences (Ward and Jones 1999; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). However, the researcher found that the goal of critical realist enquiry – to uncover patterns behind participants’ own meanings – limited the impact of the data by limiting its relevance to them. For example, the researcher was careful to produce an Interim Report (27 pages) for participants and policy development actors following the RABS (VS) Seminar. This sought validity from actors, based on whether they could recognise themselves in the account offered, the core tenet of validity in realist ethnographic (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Gains 2011), abductive (Blaikie 2000; 2007; 2010), and interpretive (Gioia and Pitre 1990; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2009) approaches. The paper had other goals: to comment on policy development and make recommendations (section 8.1). In those other goals, it failed. Familiarity with the format of policy advice papers, developed later, indicate that Interim Report was flawed in both message and medium. Nonetheless, there was little response, save generous comments on expression (from ‘DN’) and content (from ‘IG’), amending presumptions to generate greater insight. This revealed a paradox: accurate, valid interpretations of critical realist data were of no value to practitioners, who saw it as just repeating what they already knew (DN). Whilst the researcher went to every effort to make this data relevant for policy development, it was not recognised as a critical reflection because it was (a) not invited and (b) not institutionally-framed, i.e. as part of an output from a shared research project. The researcher understood participants would have preferred the researcher’s outputs to be in an evaluative or prescriptive mode, although they had made it clear gathering data for that output would have been impossible and unwelcome. ‘Policy recommendations’ were used in the Interim Report to demonstrate value, but falsely intimated an evaluative perspective.
Thus, the conclusions of this project lacked impact, although the research process was impactful, both in designing and analysing the RABS (VS) Seminar, and in acting as ‘critical friend’ to a completely novel, evolving policy agenda. Reflecting on this process in 2012, the researcher contacted ‘IG’. He began their meeting by saying what he had liked so much about the way the researcher approached this project, compared to other academics, was (a) working so closely with the policy team and (b) having such a good knowledge of policy. He had found the Interim Report a ‘great’ [positive not magnitude] “contribution to our thinking”. 18 months after the report, two areas of policy development the researcher had highlighted as problematic were still resolving themselves: EPOs role in liaison with communities, and alternative models for VS coordination at SCG level. Trends she had identified were playing out: the analysis was valid.

The researcher took the opportunity of working within Scottish Government (2011-12), in a team of Management-grade staff, to gather their views on the research process. In a reflective ‘Action Learning Set’ she asked what could have been done to make the research more impactful. They offered valuable insights, primarily (a) why would policy areas expose developing policies to ‘outside’ scrutiny? (b) why would uninvited research be welcomed? The significant factor seemed to be the novelty of the topic, and its political sensitivity.

From working in the Government, the researcher came to understand how the culture of the sampled Directorate had constrained data collection, the exchange of ideas, and the impact of findings. Pertinent issues were internal ownership of the work, and legitimacy of the outputs. She also came to understand that the conceptualisation of ‘resilience’ had been happening much higher in the organisational hierarchy, in conversations between DGs, Directors, or Deputy Directors, to which the researcher would never have had access. Strikingly, with ‘insider’ access at that time, and a ‘corporate’ purpose and client, it only took 48 hours to access and compile an in-depth analysis of the organisation’s response to the H1N1 ‘Pandemic Flu’ emergency that had occurred during data collection, including a tour of the pivotal ‘SGoRR’ (‘Scottish Government Resilience Room’).
**Hard work, or hard working?**

The researcher felt she couldn’t have done more to appease the requirements of both the theoretical and practitioner community, but others who trod more established methodological paths – the functionalist evaluation, the interpretive account of change – would be more persuasive because their products were more tangible. It was hard to combat the fear that this ‘hard work’ would not be hard working in terms of impact: that the effort she had expended – to elaborate critical realist philosophy in relation to ethnography; of conviction in the pursuit of the engaged ‘uninvited action research’ approach; to explore and understand in a vacuum of theory, with measures or methods unable to be lifted from the mire of imprecise disciplinary terminology – may have been wasted. Achieving impact in this project was important because of the demands of contemporaneous research on the individual researcher. It necessitates a close working relationship be forged with participants to be able to follow unfolding but confidential policy processes, as well as keeping abreast with vast quantities of information and guidance constantly being produced and updated during the research period. Participants expected the researcher to be as well informed as they were, despite this being a traditionally ‘closed’ network. They were understanding of her ‘outsider’ status, but the researcher still had to be ‘savvy’ to ongoing change in order to make the most of interviews and generate data that would not become immediately outdated. These demands – knowledge, relationship brokering, and savvy – in an unfamiliar policy sphere, as a novice researcher, required an immersive and committed approach to data collection, maintained over time. It also required a high tolerance for uncertainty in the data itself, and the process. Prescience can be a disadvantage: strategic [futures] research is promoted within and beyond the Academy, but achieving impact with this approach seems to challenge both researchers and the researched.

Despite this, it was beyond doubt that the purpose of this methodology – seeking understanding, as opposed to explanation – was absolutely critical to the significance of the theoretical and empirical contributions of this project.
Section 9.4 Suggestions for future research and researchers

Theoretically, research on the topic of resilience and Community Resilience has become much easier in recent years as the concept has become better-defined (e.g. Wise and McGuire 2009; Comfort et al. 2010). Similarly, the coalescence of literature around the term ‘collaborative emergency management’ (e.g. McGuire, Brudney and Gazley 2010; Robinson and Gaddis 2012) will make it easier for future researchers to locate and make theoretical contributions. In the network literature, recent papers make significant contributions to using and understanding the network concept, and expand the theoretical basis of goal-oriented public service delivery networks (e.g. Kenis and Provan 2009; Isett et al. 2011; McGuire and Agranoff 2011; Provan and Lemaire 2012). Collaboration, too, will overcome its conceptual challenges (e.g. Skelcher and Sullivan 2008).

This research project suggests researchers in all four burgeoning fields must attend to context and specificity in using and applying theory if ‘good science’ is to be generated. In the research setting of emergency management, future research could consider further the motivation of Third Sector organisations to become involved in service provision within this public service delivery context: something which policymakers and practitioners in this case study had misunderstood, and was not adequately addressed by the data either. There is also scope for long-term longitudinal studies of how professionalisation in the emergency management sector is affecting attitudes toward communities and the Third Sector. The data from this case study suggested an increasing ‘mainstreaming’ of civil contingencies activities, aligning with other functions of Government, and it will be interesting to see whether logics of ‘accountability’ or ‘participation’ begin to appear in guidance or practice.

In this particular research site, UK emergency management, and the devolved administration of Scotland, there is an emerging research gap around impacts of amalgamation in the emergency services – Police and Fire & Rescue – on civil contingencies arrangements. This will be unknown until mid-2013, when the potential impacts of possible constitutional change will also become clearer.
Appendices
Annex 1 RABS (VS) Community Resilience Seminar Facilitators Brief
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE SEMINAR – 16 JUNE – FACILITATORS BRIEF

Facilitators
XX (Scottish Resilience); XX (Scottish Resilience); XX (Scottish Resilience); XX (Scottish Resilience)
QA (Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland)
DN (British Red Cross)
CM (Centre for Public Services Research, University of Edinburgh Business School)

Make-up of Groups
There will be 7 groups of approximately 10 for the 2 workshops. Each group will have a mix of statutory, private and voluntary sector representatives. You will sit with your group during the morning presentations and facilitate the same group for both of the afternoon workshops (which run 1300-1400 and 1415-1515, with a coffee break in the middle).

General
In addition to the specific role you will have during each workshop (outlined in more detail on the pages that follow) some general roles of the facilitator are
• ensure everyone contributes – hopefully this will happen naturally, but you may need to manage the dynamics of your group if it contains particularly quiet (or noisy) delegates! You should also encourage people to build on others’ contributions
• keep the session running to time, ensuring the main questions are discussed. There will no doubt be more ground to cover than there is time so you need to remind delegates of that.
• ensure that the answer sheets are completed by the scribe – rather than asking the designated scribe to take general notes for each session there will be specific “answer sheets” produce to capture the main discussion/findings of each group in relation to each question. This should cut down on the amount of unnecessary scribbling for the scribe and focus the report back; and
• note the main discussion points from your point of view. You are not expected to be the scribe for the group (you will ensure one is designated for each workshop and might want to identify 2 “volunteers” for the role ahead of lunch, to save time during the workshops themselves). Although there will be a formal scribe there may be some key points/particularly good ideas/suggestions made during the discussions – where that is the case it would be helpful if you could capture these as a backup to the answer sheets that the scribe will complete.
• Feedback after the event if appropriate – you may have a ‘sense’ of something that we need to consider, or to do differently in the future – if so, please capture this and let us know.
• Please note that all facilitators will be asked to meet at 1245 (at the top table) for a 5 minute pre-brief ahead of the workshops: questions can be asked then or feel free to speak to WK or MI ahead of the event.
Workshop 1

“Community involvement in dealing with emergencies: successes and barriers”

This workshop will be introduced by AT. WN will spend 10 minutes outlining a good practice example and what made it successful. After that the groups will be allocated 2 questions and will have 15 minutes to discuss and record their answers to each. By way of introduction you should:

- **introduce yourself** as facilitator for the group (for both this and the second workshop);

- **identify a volunteer to act as scribe** (if not already done) – who will complete the pro formas supplied for each session (these will make clear what is to be captured so the scribe does not need to take copious/general notes)

- **ask for a volunteer who would be willing to briefly report back** (in plenary) on either one of the good practice examples (if you are in group 1-4) or one of the barriers (if you are in group 5-7) for a max of 2 minutes (if no volunteers, facilitator can report back as a last resort).

Having done this you should:

- **Allow the group 15 minutes to discuss Question 1:** “What are best examples of raising community awareness and readiness that you are aware of, and how was their effectiveness measured?” During that 15 minutes you should ensure that the group captures at least 3 good examples (and a contact name next to each so that they can be followed up) on the template provided for the session, which the scribe will complete (nb – these templates will be available in hard copy on the day – if ready before then we will send you a copy for info).

- After approximately 15 minutes you should **ensure that the group discussion moves on from Question 1 to Question 2:** “What are barriers to raising community awareness and readiness and what could be done to remove these barriers?” Once more you should ensure that the group captures at least 3 examples (and a contact name next to each) on the template provided.

- The workshop will conclude with a 20 minute **feedback session** in which each group will be asked to share one of their examples: **Groups 1-4** will feed back on Question 1 (successes and how they were measured) for 10 minutes and groups 5-7 will feed back on Question 2 (barriers and how these could be overcome). Each group should have at least 3 examples for each question – and should feed back on the strongest one.

- **Upon conclusion of this workshop we break for coffee.**
Workshop 2 - **Next steps: how can the voluntary sector further engage in preparing for and responding to emergencies?**

This workshop will be briefly introduced by [BRC intern]. MI will help guide groups through the overall process, with facilitators ensuring that the key questions are tackled and points captured at each table. After both XX and MI have made brief introductory remarks you will manage the process at your table. If a scribe is yet to be identified for this workshop you will need to do so now. There is no formal need to identify a “reporter back” from this workshop, as we will allow general remarks during the final short plenary (which follows this workshop).

**Question 1:** “What could your organisation do more of (or differently) to contribute to community resilience?”

- This question is deliberately open and should be used to get discussion going around what new or different things the organisations present might wish to become involved in under the broad banner of Community Resilience. You might want to kick off discussion by reminding delegates of what they have already heard today and whether, in view of that, they might consider new or different approaches/activities. **You should allow the group around 15 minutes to discuss this question.** Should discussion run dry you could prompt delegates by asking them:
  - What new things they might do/new collaborations they could make?
  - Whether they might do things differently or with different organisations in future?
  - Whether there is anything they might stop doing or do less of?

- The scribe will have a notes sheet to capture the main points of discussion under this question, a copy of which is attached for information at annex A (hard copies will be made available on the day).

**Question 2:** We will have around 30 minutes to explore the issue of “What more can be done to support voluntary organisations to contribute to community resilience”. This will be split into 2 questions looking (firstly) at **how the groups represented currently engage with each other in resilience activity** and (secondly) **how voluntary sector engagement and involvement could be enhanced.**

Before moving onto question 2a a slide will be shown and MI will say a few words about the range of different engagement mechanisms/structures currently out there. **Your table will then have around 15 minutes to consider the following question**

**Question 2a:** “How effective are the existing working relationships between voluntary bodies, responder agencies and communities in relation to resilience?”

This session should allow representatives of both the voluntary and statutory sectors at each table to explain how they currently “link in” to formal or informal partnerships/agreements that deliver resilience related activity and whether those arrangements work or could be improved upon. Some prompting questions you may wish to use if required are:

- **What arrangements are in place already? Where do you use these?**
- **Which forms of engagement (formal or informal) are effective at present?**
- **What types of links with other people/organisations do you need/want?**
• What are the benefits/drawbacks of the current approach?
• What kind of support do you need from other parts of the system?

The scribe will have a notes sheet to capture the main points of discussion under question 2a, a copy of which is attached for information at annex B (hard copies will be made available on the day).

After 10-15 minutes the slide on show will change and MI will speak briefly about the approach being taken by Central SCG, which is piloting a Voluntary Sector Co-ordinating Group which nominates a single point of contact to represent the voluntary sector on the SCG tactical group. This model seeks to give the voluntary sector a united front and allows them to be involved in all the main SCG workstreams. Your table will then have around 15 minutes to consider the following question

**Question 2b: How can we enhance voluntary sector involvement in relation to resilience?**

This should build on the last question and allow delegates to consider what sort of working arrangements and forms of engagement would allow the voluntary sector and responder agencies/SCGs to work together in the most effective way. Some prompting questions you may wish to use if required are:

- Would the Central SCG model work for your organisation/area?
- Is this model only good at certain stages – e.g. planning, response, recovery – or would it help in all scenarios?
- Are there any other models/working arrangements you are aware of?
- What assistance/support would you need if you were to become more involved?

The scribe will have a notes sheet to capture the main points of discussion under question 2a, a copy of which is attached for information at annex C.

**Question 3: “What does your organisation need to build and maintain relationships that will strengthen Community Resilience?”**

Having discussed 3 quite detailed questions the final 10-15 minutes of this workshop will be used to capture some views from everyone around the table about the needs of organisations if they are to further contribute to resilience work, how they would like to work together on this and what action they plan to take (if any) as a consequence of this workshop.

You should invite every delegate at the table to complete the pro forma (even the now exhausted scribe!) Hard copies will be on the table, but a copy (for your reference) is attached at annex D. Completion of the pro forma will give delegates a chance to have their say in how the process and agenda should be taken forward.

Around 10 minutes will be available for this purpose. If it takes less time at your table feel free to facilitate further discussion. If any delegate has burning issues that they want to report back to the entire seminar, you should make clear that there will be an opportunity to make those points in the final plenary and ensure that they have written them in the pro forma. Pro formas and scribes notes should be collected and passed to WK.

Thanks in advance for your help and please contact either WK or MI ahead of the event if any aspect of the brief is unclear.
WORKSHOP 2 – QUESTION 1

“What could your organisation do more of (or differently) to contribute to community resilience?”

TABLE NUMBER:

SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED
(please detail below – continue on separate sheet if required)
WORKSHOP 2 – QUESTION 2a

Theme - What more can be done to support voluntary organisations to contribute to community resilience?

Question 2a

*How effective are the existing working relationships in this field and how could they be improved? Consider*

• How the groups represented at your table currently engage with others in resilience activity?
• How effective are those working relationships? How could they be improved?
• What kind of support do you need from other parts of the system?

TABLE NUMBER:

SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED
(please detail below – continue on separate sheet if required)
WORKSHOP 2 – QUESTION 2b

Theme - What more can be done to support voluntary organisations to contribute to community resilience?

Question 2b

*How can we enhance voluntary sector involvement in relation to resilience? Consider:*
  * Would the Central SCG model work for your organisation/area?
  * Is this model only good at certain stages – e.g. planning, response, recovery – or would it help in all scenarios?
  * Are there any other models/working arrangements you are aware of?
  * What assistance/support would you need if you were to become more involved?

SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED

(please detail below – continue on separate sheet if required)
WORKSHOP 2 – QUESTION 3 - “What does your organisation need to build and maintain relationships that will strengthen Community Resilience?”

3.1 Please complete this pro forma and hand it to the facilitator. It asks you to prioritise the type of support that you or your organisation would need if you were to increase the number or range of Voluntary Sector Organisations you work with, with a view to increasing resilience.

3.1.1 Firstly, please indicate whether, in the future, you anticipate increasing number or range of Voluntary Sector Organisations that you work with (in relation to emergency response)? [circle all that apply]

Please give a reason for your answer:

3.1.2 If you were to become more involved in preparing for, responding to and/or recovering from emergencies, please rank the areas where you or your organisation [delete as applicable] would require more support by priority:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I/we would need more/better</th>
<th>Numbered by priority (1-8)</th>
<th>Comments?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Networks/Contacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other [please specify]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = highest priority 8 = lowest priority
3.2 Ideal working relationships

3.2.1 Please describe your organisation [delete as appropriate]:
- I represent a statutory agency
- I represent a voluntary sector organisation
- I represent another type of organisation [please specify]

3.2.2 If personnel, time, and resources were unlimited what would best describe your organisation’s ideal working relationships with other voluntary and statutory organisations engaged in preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies? Please use the tables below to describe the type of relationship and feel free to add any detailed comments about working relationships/arrangements.

Diagram 3.2.3 Ideal working relationships with Voluntary Sector Organisations [definitions are on the overhead] please tick or comment in box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Now</th>
<th>In 1 year</th>
<th>in 5 years</th>
<th>in 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram 3.2.4 Ideal working relationships with Statutory Agencies [definitions are on the overhead] please tick or comment in box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Now</th>
<th>In 1 year</th>
<th>in 5 years</th>
<th>in 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Final Question:

3.3 What action will you take now?
If you could take any action now to increase the involvement of the Voluntary Sector in local resilience/response activity what would it be & why? Are you going to do it?

I would/will

Because

If you are not going to do this, what is preventing you?

Please leave details of your name, role and organisation below if you wish.
## Annex 2 Government Protective Marking System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessing TOP SECRET assets:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>threaten directly the internal stability of the United Kingdom or friendly countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead directly to widespread loss of life;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause exceptionally grave damage to the effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the continuing effectiveness of extremely valuable security or intelligence operations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause exceptionally grave damage to relations with friendly governments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause severe long-term damage to the United Kingdom economy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessing SECRET assets:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>raise international tension;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to damage seriously relations with friendly governments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threaten life directly, or seriously prejudice public order, or individual security or liberty;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the continuing effectiveness of highly valuable security or intelligence operations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause substantial material damage to national finances or economic and commercial interests.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessing CONFIDENTIAL assets:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>materially damage diplomatic relations (i.e. cause formal protest or other sanction);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prejudice individual security or liberty;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause damage to the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness of valuable security or intelligence operations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work substantially against national finances or economic and commercial interests;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>substantially to undermine the financial viability of major organisations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impede the investigation or facilitate the commission of serious crime;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impede seriously the development or operation of major government policies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shut down or otherwise substantially disrupt significant national operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessing RESTRICTED assets:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>affect diplomatic relations adversely;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause substantial distress to individuals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause financial loss or loss of earning potential or to facilitate improper gain or advantage for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individuals or companies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prejudice the investigation or facilitate the commission of crime;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impede the effective development or operation of government policies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to breach statutory restrictions on disclosure of information;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disadvantage government in commercial or policy negotiations with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undermine the proper management of the public sector and its operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessing PROTECT (Sub-national security marking) assets:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cause distress to individuals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breach statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause financial loss or loss of earning potential, or to facilitate improper gain;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfair advantage for individuals or companies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prejudice the investigation or facilitate the commission of crime;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disadvantage government in commercial or policy negotiations with others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://protectivemarking.co.uk/images/downloads/gpms.pdf](http://protectivemarking.co.uk/images/downloads/gpms.pdf)
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