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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I - SCOPE AND AIM OF THE STUDY
Social stratification makes a wide and profound impact upon other social institutions. Few are likely to challenge this assertion or to take serious objection to the notion that the pervasive influence of social class divisions extends into the religious realm. That social class and church participation, specifically, are significantly correlated is today a well-established empirical fact. In many western nations, research has yielded data showing that there is a generally stronger support of established religious bodies by the middle and upper classes than by the manual working classes. My limited data in Scotland concur with this well-known class differential in church involvement (which I will refer to in "shorthand" as the "church-class relationship"). This is certainly to the point, but it does not represent the primary raison d'être of the study.

Instead, specification and interpretation are the main targets of this modest research contribution. To indicate why and how the structure of working class life pulls away from church participation rather than stating the fact that it does so; to spell out why and how the church has apparently more relevance and importance for the middle class rather than to show that this is indeed the case. These are the implicit and motivating questions which engage the author in evaluating the data.

To confront these questions my instrument is, metaphorically, a microscope. I undertake to disaggregate the very large concepts, "social class" and "relationship to the church", breaking them down into smaller components of analysis. By this procedure it is hoped to isolate and specify some of the factors which contribute to the class disparities in church participation, to ferret out interpretive linkages, to designate intervening variables. It is to these links of casual chains connecting the system of stratification and the patterns of church involvement that I will turn in the concluding section of the thesis.
The study is an adventure in empirical exploration. Though there are relevant theoretical "models" (which I shall allude to shortly) I am not engaged in testing hypotheses yielded by existing literature but rather in generating hypotheses from within the study's own frame of reference. In fact, the tentative suggestions which emerge from the exploration are found to relate closely to familiar theoretical postulates. The point is that the methodology is not restricted to the verification of certain specific hypotheses; it is designed to allow for apparent relationships to manifest themselves without a priori regard for the position of these relationships within a given theoretical framework.

But what, after all, is the importance of, say, what proportion of working class persons occupy a church pew on Sunday morning compared with the number of middle class persons who do so? Even stated in this manner, the church-relationship disparities do carry some critical implications. The effort to investigate the intersection of two major institutional systems is more than an empirical game or an exercise in statistical gymnastics. The implications reach in several directions: to social class - the "independent variable"; to the church, with respect to her position in society, her effectiveness, the increasing or declining weight of her influence and to her role as an integrative or divisive agent in society; to individuals, in terms of their value systems, religious propensities and gravitation toward religious or secular contexts for the fulfillment of certain needs; and to the normative structure and cohesiveness of the society generally. These implications will not always be manifest in the discussion but they will have an underlying presence.

The first of these levels of implication, social class, comes in for rather intensive investigation as a topic on its own. One reason for this (a sufficient reason) is that social class is a non-static and complex independent variable which requires careful scrutiny if the subsequent correlations with church-related
variables and the resultant interpretations are to be meaningful. Furthermore, social class divisions and influences are of central importance in sociological research, an arena in which the fires of controversy rage. Suggest a classificatory system or explanatory system for the variations in prestige and economic power, and several "schools" are sure to lock horns in verbal battle. The research findings are applied to one of the current controversies regarding the alleged "bourgeoisement" of affluent sections of the British working class, and the data affirm the continuing importance and distinctiveness of the various status divisions. That social class proves to be a meaningful social fact rather than a mere abstraction of statistical aggregates is fundamental to the assumption that these divisions are determinants in religious behaviour.

Why social class? Are there not a number of factors - family life, religious training, particular churches and ministers confronted by the individual, prevalent attitudes in specific localities, to name a few - which are also forces influencing the religious involvement of the individual? Without a doubt. This study makes no pretense of accounting for all the variation in church participation and attitudes. But social class is one crucial determinant; no one can doubt its authentic significance in this and other areas of social behaviour.

Status assessing terms such as "upper working class" and "professional class" are today the property of common parlance. A spate of connotations are linked to such terms. To assume that a ubiquitous system of stratification exists in a society like Scotland (or Britain, more generally) - a legitimate assumption - is to suggest that it carries weight, that is provides one considerable influence in the lives of groups and individuals. A hierarchical arrangement of society, however unofficial, is a permeating force which can scarcely be extracted from the other influences. I am not assigning to social class exclusive importance in determining patterns of religious behaviour, but I am looking at it as one key influence that bears close scrutiny. The end result, in-so-far as the work is
successful, will be to enlarge in some small measure the current understanding of the multi-faceted church-class relationship; to establish tentative systems of explanation, at least with reference to Scottish society.

As for the empirical underpinning of the enquiry, three separate surveys of varying cogency are involved. One occupies centre stage, another plays a supporting role, the third makes a brief, supplementary appearance. Each is quite different, involving distinct questionnaires, groups of respondents and methods of administration. Also, they were conducted in three separate intervals from May, 1964 to January, 1966. The survey of over-arching prominence in the analysis involves ninety-two men (working class and middle class) in the small Prestonfield district of Edinburgh. The following chapter (Chapter II) will detail the methodology and contents of this survey.

Second in importance, though first chronologically, is a postal questionnaire sent to Commissioners to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in the Spring of 1964. Over five-hundred of these ministers and elders responded providing a useful profile of the social background, attitudes and church congregations of the leadership of the National Church. In Chapter IX, the data from this survey is penetrated with the findings comprising one part of the provisional interpretive system.

The third survey was administered in January, 1966 to over one-thousand pupils in six Edinburgh secondary schools of varying status compositions. Despite the large number of respondents, this survey was only partially designed to contribute to the present study and is, therefore, applicable at only a few points. However, several interesting findings are interjected into the discussion on "attitudinal" relationship to the church in Chapter VII. The fruitfulness of this project was also hampered by the fact that with a "captive audience" (school pupils) under the jurisdiction of the state, questions could only most obliquely
seek information on matters of religion, politics or social class.

In each of the surveys, stress was placed on subjective information - attitudes, values and perceptions. Especially in the Prestonfield enquiry, the effort was made to probe both social class factors and relationship to the church in some "depth". In the discussion, I will rely upon the insightful comments and succinctly expressed feelings of the respondents as well as upon the statistical distributions. Because the survey is not overly large - and after subdividing into status categories I am dealing with quite small groupings - it has seemed advisable to steer clear of the more complicated tests of significance and maintain a simpler level of statistical analysis. The statistical relationships can best be seen as clues and suggestions for interpretation rather than as empirical certainties.

It is also my intention to draw upon some of the related studies in other countries for the sake of comparison. These comparisons are interspersed throughout, making it possible to indicate which of the findings are disparate with other investigations and which appear to suggest common features manifesting themselves in other western countries. The most relevant comparative data come from research in societies sharing, to a large extent, the religious heritage of Scotland, especially England and America. French sociologists have also contributed a number of studies in the field of sociology of religion and will, at a few points, provide us with comparisons with a predominantly Roman Catholic society. The notable paucity of sociologically oriented studies of the Church in Scotland enhances the value of these relevant "outside" sources of data.

Although the empirical focus is a contemporary one, the effort to construct tentative explanations for the present church-class relationship necessitates the introduction of historical material. In Chapter VIII, it will be seen that since the early nineteenth century the appreciable working class abstention from the church has been very much in evidence. The historical sketch concentrates on the crucial period of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, for the events
and rapid social changes of this era left an indelible imprint on the position of the church in Scottish society. It will appear that in those days of social and economic upheaval the church lost much of her society-wide appeal and integrative power and became, rather, an institution reflecting the interests and values of the more prosperous urban classes. The historical data are also fruitful in that they bring into focus some of the key secular "alternatives" to the church for the working classes which will be further pursued in the interpretive suggestions of the final chapter (Chapter X).

To speak of the relationship of church and class in Scotland is to speak in rather sweeping terms and perhaps to imply a comprehensiveness which is realistically out of the reach of this study. In this regard the thesis title is not literal but hyperbolic. Under relentless pressure from the pragmatic considerations of empirical research, this "universe" is compressed in many ways.

For a start, the Edinburgh interviews do not include the complete spectrum of social status positions. The loftiest levels are absent, and rural categories are also excluded. However, the social sweep from several shades of manual status through a substantial non-manual distribution has fulfilled my hopes and has proven adequate for purposes of analysis.

In terms of sex, all of the empirical information is drawn from males (with the exception of girls answering the schools' questionnaire). In the case of the church leadership questionnaire this limitation was the inevitable consequence of the fact that the Church of Scotland, like most major religious organisations, is almost entirely male in the higher positions of control and policy making.

For the Edinburgh survey, the limitation to male respondents was a matter of choice. It eliminated a variable which would have complicated the analysis, especially with the relatively small numbers involved. And if one of the sexes were to be
precluded, it seemed best to leave out the females, who are less involved in the occupational milieu so central to the determination of social class. Besides, had the choice been reversed I could foresee the possibility of awkward complications arising in the interview situation.

Also, in regard to geographical spread, limitations were imposed by practicality. The church leadership survey draws from ministers and elders covering the entire face of Scotland; but the more central Prestonfield survey is confined to a single city, Edinburgh. Indeed, it is confined to a single microcosm within the city. As the next chapter will explain, this small district was chosen with consummate care, but it can hardly be said to "represent" the whole of Edinburgh, not to speak of the whole of Scotland.

In the church context, too, a good deal of narrowing of the field has been essential. The Church of Scotland, the hegemonic religious institution of the nation, is the main religious arena in the surveys and in the conclusions. The religious diversity that does obtain in Scotland, though interesting, must remain peripheral: the alternative and substantial Roman Catholic following, the established nonconformist denominations, the few vigorous sectarian groups, etc.

A further, if hesitant, limiting distinction can be made. This study is fundamentally concerned with people's relationship to the "church" rather than to "religion" in its full complexity. There is no effort to draw a rigid line between the two, which would probably be impossible and would certainly eliminate, ipso facto, some useful and pertinent information. But a great deal of private religious thought and behaviour will remain outside of the enquiry. Also, the scope of religious knowledge, while undoubtedly a revealing factor in religious life, is not measured. Many of these facets of religious experience are too indirectly a part of the institutional nexus of class and church to command attention.
Having seen the inevitable empirical limitations, what unique "place in the sun" does this enquiry occupy? What is its special character? I suggest that a combination of five features produces the distinctive amalgam of this research project.

First, the study represents, to my knowledge, the initial empirical investigation in Scotland of social class differences in relation to the church. This fact, in part, dictates the exploratory nature of the research. Though I find, as expected, that in basic outline the church-class configuration in Scotland is similar to that in England, France and elsewhere, this expectation is legitimately the object of empirical verification. Besides, Scotland has a religious tradition all her own and could certainly reveal some distinctive patterns.

Regarding this tradition, Scotland has earned the reputation (whatever its current validity) as a highly religious land. Since the reformation and the charismatic leadership of John Knox, she has been more dominantly Presbyterian in church organisation than any other country. Within the Presbyterian fold the Scottish church has a history of great disputation and vigorous convictions which have often been schismatic in effect. Though the Scottish church is not, in this thesis, the subject of internal investigation with regard to her theological systems, church polity or liturgy, it is acknowledged that the particular morphology of a given church makes some impact on her place and role within the structure of society. What examination of the church does present itself in this study constitutes rather the variegated perspectives on the church of the Prestonfield respondents and the information concerning the social contexts and attitudes of the church leadership.

Second, differential class relationship to the church is not confined to the contexts of church congregations as has been typical for the more systematic investigations within this area. Instead, non-participants as well as participants in the church are included in the sample (Chapter II will further elucidate
this strategy). Respondents were selected on the basis of geography of residence rather than on the basis of membership in a church congregation, thus allowing a wider analysis of the prevalent attitudes toward the church, an essential factor in the interpretive effort.

Third, a "dimensional" strategy is employed, i.e., a wide range of constituents of both class situation and church relationship are examined. Regarding the latter, Chapter VI will delve into the advantages for interpretation accruing from the distinction between church "involvement" (concrete participation) and church "attachment" (subjective ties with the church). In short, the analysis proceeds on the assumption that both class positions and relationship to the church are multi-factoral phenomena which should be assessed along several lines if the analysis is to pay optimum dividends. This is not to suggest, which would be both presumptuous and inaccurate, that anything approaching the whole range of factors and determinants of either phenomenon is explicated in this study.

Fourth, there is a modest comprehensiveness in the source material. Though the Prestonfield survey is the main bulwark supporting the analysis, the study is also illumined by two other original surveys and by historical data. The latter, I believe, is all too often ignored by empirical investigators, despite the fact that contemporary social patterns can scarcely be understood without tracing their historical rootage.

Fifth, the conclusions venture beyond the descriptive level into the realm of interpretation, albeit tentative and provisional interpretation. Indeed, it should be made perfectly clear that some of the suggested explanations for the prevalent church-class relationship carry beyond the boundaries of the definite findings of my research. Some liberty is taken in suggesting possible explanations
(particularly with regard to working class estrangement from the church) on the basis of clues and hints that are extracted from the data, in order to give something of a "completeness" to the research edifice, and perhaps also to point out some of the lacunae which I must bequeath to future research efforts.

In sum, the study may be paradigmatically described as: contemporary in focus, empirical in nature, exploratory in strategy, dimensional in approach, interpretive in purpose, and provisional in conclusions. I endeavour to maintain a reasonable balance between two maxims of sociological research which are not always easy to reconcile, namely, "stay close to the data" and "address larger theoretical issues". The foregoing description of this enquiry's prominent features suggests that while the former injunction is fundamental to the undertaking, I am also concerned within the study's position on the whole compass of sociology of religion, research and theory. For this reason it is well to designate briefly several main theoretical and empirical "models"; to sketch the "field" in which the present study is planted.

At least four emphases, each of which has born empirical fruit, may be distinguished. Two stem from Weber, one from Durkheim and one (which is, in fact, more pragmatic than theoretical) emerges from the concern of churchmen with the church's effectiveness within the various sections of the community.

The first Wevertian emphasis represents the crowning contribution of this most seminal theorist. Like other sociologists of his day (some of the "founding fathers" of the discipline) Weber was fascinated by the development of capitalistic society, more particularly with the peculiar "spirit of capitalism", and interested in uncovering the reason for its triumph over the "traditional" scheme. His formulations can be viewed as a struggle against the economic determinism of Marx which greatly infused the thought of his day. Weber suggests that the main spur which enabled the capitalistic world-view to emerge in the West (while it did not triumph in the East, despite, according to Weber, equally favourable material conditions) lay at an ideological level. It is from the religious
persuasions of the Puritan disciples of Calvin that Weber sees an ethic emerging which had as a consequence the alteration of the whole structure of economic norms and behaviour. According to Weber, the Protestants—particularly Calvinists—with their distinctive view of a personal "calling", provided the uniquely effective ideological leverage necessary to overcome the inertia of the traditional order. It was a world-view, ascetic enough to be undaunted, disciplined and uncompromising, worldly enough to come to grips with the fabric of material interaction. Thus Weber refers to this world-view as "worldly asceticism". For Weber, to find the key to the pervading metamorphosis in the thought-patterns and economic interactions of Western civilisation, one must look to the religious doctrines of a Reformation splinter group.¹

Investigators continue to follow Weber’s lead, describing religious beliefs and affiliations as affecting others types of behaviour rather than seeing these as entirely resulting from economic, social and psychological forces. Recently, for instance, Lenski has explored the many-sided effects of "the religious factor" in Detroit, identifying his study with Weber's formulation; he concludes that the religious tradition and community in which a person is ensconced does significantly affect other aspects of his life.² I sketch this weighty theoretical perspective

partly to manifest the reciprocal nature of religion's relationship to social and economic structures, and by so doing to elucidate the side of this relationship with which this study will not be crucially concerned. Indeed, to the extent that the data speak to the issue of the impact of religious commitment on other aspects of life, they reveal very little differential effect. In this monograph, the main focus, and the predominate "pull of the rope", is in the opposite direction, stressing the influence of the status position and social environment in shaping one's relationship to the church.

The second Weber-initiated theoretical model is the "church-sect dichotomy". Actually, the main credit for elaborating this distinction and extending the scope of its application belongs to Weber's student and friend, Ernst Troeltsch. Within this framework it is suggested that from the earliest stages of Christian history there has been a constant tension between "church" inclinations (represented by stable religious organisations accommodated to the secular order, high liturgy and "universal" in authority) and "sect" inclinations (distinguished by opposition to the secular scheme, communality and emotionality of form, ascetic discipline and voluntary membership). This "typology" has proved most germinal for research. Because sect-like religiosity is linked with lower status propensities while church-like religiosity is normally the province of higher status persons, this perspective is relevant to the present investigation. In the concluding chapter it will be reintroduced, further elaborated and related to the explanatory suggestions which emerge.

1. Yinger suggests this perspective on the alternative positions of religion in social change, for instance: "Religion is a part of a complex interactive system. On some particular issues and from the perspective of a given point in time, religious developments may be best understood as responses to fundamental changes in the social environment . . . .On another issue viewed again from a given point in time, religious development may be the dynamic factor". J. Milton Yinger, Sociology Looks at Religion, (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 40.
A third trenchant view of religion's role within society was pioneered by Durkheim. He underscored the integrative function of religion; the many specific forms of religion are all taken to be symbols of the group solidarity. Religion is purported to be a glorified "sacred" personification of society itself, a bulwark in support of the shared system of values and norms.\(^1\) The empirical fruit born of this hypothesis has been mainly in the anthropological studies of "primitive" societies.\(^2\) More recently, in a speculative vein, Herberg has argued that American religion, despite external diversification, currently serves to inculcate and make sacred the values incorporated in the "American way of life".\(^3\) Some of the Prestonfield findings point to a rather nebulous (and widespread) veneration of religion and the church (in the abstract but not in concrete manifestations) which may indicate that the church continues to be identified with unifying, "societal" values.

Finally, a number of researches have been motivated by "Religious Sociology" (as distinct from sociology of religion on the basis of a primary interest in employing the techniques of sociology for the benefit of the church). In Britain, the Sheffield study of Wickham (largely historical) typifies this interest.\(^4\) A number of French studies (which will be cited in Chapter VI) have been carried out in order to determine the church's relationship to the political and economic structures of the country. The particular shibboleth of this pragmatic approach is

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1. "..... and we have seen that this reality, which mythologies have represented under so many different forms, but which is the universal and eternal objective cause of these sensations sui generis out of which religious experience is made, is society". Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, (New York: Collier Books, 1961) p. 465.


concern with the notable estrangement of working classes from the churches. This concern, and the supportive data, relate the work of this "school" to the present research effort. However, in the French studies there has been something of a demographic preoccupation which has hindered the penetration of social dynamics.

The foregoing gives a brief outline of the predominate current conceptual approaches (and empirical studies) with respect to religion's place in society. It can be seen that the present enquiry is linked to these approaches at several points, a fact which carries the correct implication that the present study is essentially eclectic in its theoretical projections. This research represents an effort to explore a specific institutional relationship and, post facto, to relate the emergent findings to the panorama of theory; it does not set forth a set of theoretical presuppositions in advance and proceed to confront these with data.

In the sustained quest to make a durable alloy of empirical investigation and theory, this study, then, begins with the former (though, of course, with the various theoretical moorings in view). If the relevance of the above approaches is not often referred to in the thesis, this relevance is none-the-less implicit. The final chapter will articulate more directly my indebtedness to existing theoretical foundations in the field of sociology of religion.

Briefly then, here are the main sections into which the study divides. Part One comprises the present introductory chapter and the following chapter which explains the methodology, categorisations, and central data of the Prestonfield survey. Part Two (Chapters III, IV, V) takes a close look at several aspects of social class. In Part Three, the social class categories are related to dimensions of relationship to the church - in Chapter VI, to church participation, and in Chapter VII, to several "attitudinal" dimensions. In broad outline, exploration gives way to explanation in Part Four, in which historical dynamics (Chapter VIII), church leadership profile, (Chapter IX) and final interpretations and conclusions (Chapter X) are discussed.

A final word of introduction, let me speak about your own biases concerning
religion's niche in society. I do not profess detachment or an unbiased perspective, though, of course, my value judgements relevant to the subject have been submerged so far as possible. But no person can stand outside of his value system and speak from the lofty peak of complete objectivity. Often the colouring of values is implicit or disguised or merely ignored. However, I think it allows a better basis of judgement for both the investigator and those who judge his work if these considerations are made explicit. My own very strong interest in the church stems initially from a Christian view of life and thus the conviction that the church has a vital part to play in society. This is not to suggest that I am inclined to defend the church in her present torn and relatively impotent state; there is much I could wish exorcised from, and added to, the contemporary church. But I would claim, none-the-less, a commitment to what I believe the church should be and should represent in the world.

Needless-to-say, this commitment is coupled with the conviction that the church, as a part of the social world, is rightly the subject of the most intensive study by sociology as well as by other disciplines. It has often been pointed out that social sciences cannot answer the metaphysical questions about the church's theological validity since questions of "ultimate reality" lie outside the realm of social facts with which social sciences are concerned. However, whatever else she may be, the church is certainly a part of the realm of social reality.

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But I share with many others the belief that the church also embodies, however imperfectly in any actual circumstances, another type of reality that cannot be poured into a test tube, categorised on an IBM card, or explained by hereditary propensities. In other terms, I believe the church is inescapably paradoxical in nature; very much a part of the social world and open to the most careful scrutiny; also a vehicle, in many times and places, of God's intervention in human affairs. Obviously this enters the realm of belief, by definition outside the scope of scientific validation.

There is no reason, however, which such an ideological framework should disqualify one from studying the church as a sociologist. It is no more demanded of one that he be a-religious in order to investigate religion than that a person be a-political in order to examine political phenomena.

To be involved in sociological study is to absorb the values of competent research and theory. I do not find these values in conflict with my personal religious values. Indeed, I make every effort to steer clear of polemic or hortatory conclusions and to examine the facts at my disposal as a social scientist who is very much aware of being a novice and far from claiming all the answers.
CHAPTER II
INITIAL EXAMINATION OF PRESTONFIELD SURVEY

A. METHODOLOGY

1. SELECTION OF APPROACH.

2. SELECTION OF AREA.

3. PROCEDURES.
   a. Age variable.
   b. Pilot Survey.
   c. Selection of Respondents.
   d. The interviews.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREAS

1. POPULATION STRUCTURES.

2. HOUSING FACTORS.

3. RESIDENTIAL STABILITY AND CHURCH MEMBERSHIP.

C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DATA

1. SOCIAL CLASS CATEGORIES AND DISTRIBUTION.

2. CHURCH INVOLVEMENT PATTERNS.

3. AGE AND MARITAL STATUS.

D. SUMMARY.
As I have indicated in the Introduction, the empirical cornerstone of this study is a survey conducted in the Prestonfield district of Edinburgh during the first half of 1965. In this chapter I will try to bring to light in a preliminary way the main features of this survey in terms of methodology, population sampled and most salient statistical breakdowns of the data. My purpose in this discussion is, of course, to provide a basic picture of the character of the survey.

A. Methodology

1. Selection of the Approach

Initially, several alternative procedures were considered for pursuing church class relationship information in personal interviews. The alternative narrowed to a choice between two distinct approaches, each of which offered the promise of worthwhile data: first, starting with one or more churches and sampling the congregations across a fairly large class range; second, starting with a geographical area covering a fairly broad class range and sampling within that area without respect to church affiliation. Certain advantages would have accrued from either course. In particular, the first alternative would have shed light on the inter-relationship between social classes within a church congregation, and the effects of this sort of mutual sharing in the corporate life of a church on the demarcations of class found in the society at large.

In choosing the second, I had to curtail this interest for the sake of maximising others which seemed preferable in light of the study's purpose. One of the main factors in the decision to begin from a geographic base rather than a church base was a desire to include persons who are indifferent or hostile to the church and not involved in its functions. This was, in fact, a major desideratum. It seemed to me a more basic matter how the social
position and setting of the individual influences his attitudes toward the church and his participation in the church, than how such participation might effect his relationships within the confines of the church organization. It seemed of paramount importance to gather a broad cross-section of opinions about the church's value and position in contemporary society, rather than to deal only with those who evidence some definite commitment to the church.

Furthermore, I suspected, and subsequent investigations proved this to be the case, that it is a very difficult matter to find single churches which are composed of anything like a complete cross-section of statuses. The social class side of the question might have suffered, or been nearly buried, had the first procedure been adopted. It was also felt that by focusing on an area, with the desired class distribution, within a single parish, some insight into the intra-congregational class relationship might emerge, anyway. In explaining this decision, I am not trying to present a mere apologetic (which might be interpreted as a "sour grapes" technique) but to give a brief explanation of the weighing of considerations. All in all, the survey itself seemed to provide confirmation that the selected approach offered more comprehensive perspective for this particular study.

The "geographical approach" having been selected, a rather precise "ideal area" was outlined. If an area was to be suitable, I thought it should show these characteristics. The area should correspond with a parish boundary so that there would be a limiting of the church variable, i.e., so that the varying impact of different ministers and church organizations would not complicate the findings. The area should contain within it a distinct working class section and a distinct middle class section. The two social groups, under the
jurisdiction of a single major (Church of Scotland) church were to be residentially adjacent, but definitely separate. In this way the sub-sections, or class districts, would each provide a reasonably homogeneous population, and presumably, therefore, present more typical class-oriented patterns of behaviour. These were the major requirements and other considerations could have been compromised to assure their presence.

Returning for the moment to the first requirement, that of a single parish, it was assumed that this program could only be carried out most effectively if the social groups were in the region of the same church and with access, therefore, to the same religious organizations. Otherwise the variations of different churches, with the personalities of different ministers, could conceivably play a big part in any differences found. Needless-to-say this confinement only partially solves such problems because the backgrounds of the people sampled include differing origins. It may be argued that these prior variations in religious stimulations (of various churches and ministers) could account for some of the results. And we shall see that a surprising proportion retain attachment to the church of their youth even if they have moved some distance away. It could also be objected that in a parish encompassing both working and middle classes, the lower status groups would tend to "shy away" from the church more than they would within homogeneous working class parishes.

Perhaps the best summary answer to such plausible objections is that the findings of this survey with respect to the church-class relationship correspond roughly to the "expected", to the observations and statistical findings of comparable researches elsewhere. Without a very much larger study, covering a wide range of instances, it is simply not possible to eliminate all undesirable
variables. Nonetheless, this procedure seemed, and seems still, "post facto", to be a sound practical approach for obtaining a sizeable and coherent portion of data relevant to the major interests of this project.

2. Selection of Area.

Finding an approximation of such an "ideal area" was no mean task. In the Edinburgh parishes filling the need for class heterogeneity, some are overwhelmingly of one class and contain a very small representation of others. Other parishes are overbalanced toward certain limited occupational fields; and so forth. It was an arduous and frustrating journey that brought me finally to the small Prestonfield district on the south side of Edinburgh. In the Prestonfield area I found a remarkably discrete section still sufficiently within the city. As shown by the map (figure 1), it is bordered on three sides by natural boundaries, and on the fourth by a noticeable break in the buildings. Only at one end of the main artery, Dalkeith Road, which continues northward with no noticeable break corresponding to the change of parish, is the boundary particularly "unnatural". Lady Road is tangential but is useful pragmatically in that it provides some of the higher end of the social scale of the parish.

The "heart" of this sector is the second oldest council scheme in Edinburgh which was completed in 1933. This is the hard core working class part of the area. The surrounding collections of homes are inhabited by a population more or less middle class in composition, though the several groups of houses are of distinctly different styles. The majority are "flats" owned as a part of larger buildings, other houses are semi-detached bungalows and some are separate, and quite impressive, bungalows. The class lines are, as was hoped, nearly coterminous with the boundaries of these contiguous residential districts. As
a convenience, the residents of the council scheme will be referred to as the
"council group"; the surrounding territories as the "Dalkeith group" because
Dalkeith Road forms something of a connection link for these streets.

A smaller, supplementary survey - a continuation of the same survey - was
administered in a second area of Edinburgh upon completion of the Prestonfield
survey. A basically pragmatic consideration motivated this further interviewing -
the desire to enhance the statistical utility of the study by bringing the total
number of respondents up around one hundred. Personal limitations of time
necessitated selection of the second area "close to home" and the standards of
selection were somewhat less rigid. Instead of a two-class parish with residen-
tial segregation, as in Prestonfield, this second area (third area if we count
Prestonfield as two) is heterogeneous with respect to class but in a more integrated
way. This region, too, had advantages of certain "natural boundaries" though
not as fully as the Prestonfield region as shown in the map (figure 2).

This area (which will be called "Melville" after the main, linking street)
more or less bridges working class districts to the immediate east and northeast
and middle class districts to the immediate south and southwest. The composition
of the area reflects this "in-between" position with considerable intermixing of
occupations and statuses. It provides a smaller group of respondents than
either of the Prestonfield sections: "Melville" - 23 men; "council" - 34 men;
"Dalkeith" - 35 men. Also, though it is completely within a single parish, it
does not comprise the whole of the parish, by any means.¹

¹ Although, on the face of it, the area variable - particularly the
homogeneous via a via heterogeneous class groupings - is a promising
point of interest, in point of fact the small numbers in the "Melville"
district mean that after sub-division by class, little statistical value
remains, so, only in this chapter will area differences occupy attention;
thereafter the class groupings alone will serve as the fundamental in-
dependent variable.
3. Procedures.

a. Age variable

The age boundaries established were from twenty-one to seventy years. This requires little explanation as it eliminates the highest and lowest age groups - the men least likely to be enmeshed in permanent occupational situations, and those least likely to provide competent answers. In fact, several men just above the upper limit are included. The twenty-one minimum level was assured by the source of names, the Voters' Register, which, of course, includes only men of voting age. The maximum age level, seventy, was stated in the preliminary letter, and most men beyond this point made the fact known, as expected, at the initial personal contact. The few over seventy who were interviewed failed to say that they were over the limit and did not give it away by appearance. I thought it much too blunt to fire an immediate probe for age at all older respondents when first meeting them, and the question of precise age came along rather far into the interview. This really should present no difficulties, however, and the six men slightly above the prescribed limit are included in the analysis; analysis of several variables controlling for age has failed to reveal any significant variations for the over seventy men.

b. Pilot survey

Before launching into the Prestonfield survey, a small pilot survey, comprising only half a dozen interviews, was carried out in a newer Edinburgh Council scheme in the Liberton district. This enabled me to pretest the interview schedule and made some helpful revisions. None of these interviews are employed in the analysis or elsewhere alluded to in the thesis.

1. As with any Sampling Frame, certain imperfections are present in the use of the Voters' Register. For one thing there is an inevitable time lapse between the regular updating of lists and publication of the Register. This sample was drawn within days of the new Registers publication so that the time gap was kept to a minimum. For a discussion of other peculiarities of the Voters' Register for research purposes see: P.G. Gray, T. Cortlett and Pamela Frankland, "The Register of Electors as a Sampling Frame", Central Office of Information, Nov., 1958
Selection of respondents

Two rough guidelines were followed in selecting the sample. First, it was intended to obtain an approximately ten per cent sample of men in the areas. Second, it was also intended to keep an approximate balance between the class groupings in order to facilitate comparisons. Both goals were adequately achieved. The Dalkeith area has a bit higher proportion than the ten per cent guideline (eleven per cent), and the council and Melville areas fall a bit below (eight and seven per cent respectively).

The method of selection was simply to go through the streets of each section in the Voter's Register and include every tenth (in the case of Dalkeith every eighth) name on the list. This procedure assured the maximum geographical spread through each area. Replacements were also based on this consideration, and were only made where there was a gap of two or more names in a row on the same street. The personal time limitation precluded any replacement interviews in the Melville district.

TABLE II - 1 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COUNCIL</th>
<th>DALKEITH</th>
<th>MELVILLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INITIAL SAMPLE</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NOT INTERVIEWED</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASONS FOR FAILURE TO INTERVIEW</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away, out of town</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuinely tied up</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contact made after repeated attempts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to be interviewed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died or moved</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old or infirm</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPLACEMENTS INTERVIEWED</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INTERVIEWED</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FOR ALL THREE AREAS INTERVIEWED</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>OVERALL RESPONSE RATE</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. The interviews.

Making contact with the respondents by preliminary letter, then by a follow-up personal call to their home in order to set up a definite appointment, then fulfilling the appointment for an interview; this quite standard three-step procedure was carried out through a period of nearly five months, from February through June 1965. In general the response was extremely gratifying. The number of outright refusals was small (as shown in the table above) and I believe that other excuses from men actually contacted were nearly always sincere. Being from outside the country, as an American, did not seem to be a disadvantage and may often have been advantageous. I was not, therefore, identified with any segment of the British social system. With few exceptions, men from all groups were extremely courteous and gave the impression of "opening up" to a degree exceeding my expectations. The matter of rapport is much more crucial for the kind of interview I was undertaking than for less "open", less probing studies. When matters as delicate as a person's religious convictions are being explored (and recorded on a tape recorder) any large measure of suspicion or reluctance could render the interview futile.

For this reason, there was allowed as much "preliminary" conversation as satisfied the respondent and properly "set the stage". The fact that I am an American only two generations removed from Scotland, and that I lived in Scotland for a time as a boy, fairly often came out in these opening discussions, and seemed to be advantageous information that did not undercut the useful posture of an "outsider".

The actual interviews, too, varied considerably in length. The respondent was allowed to elaborate on any answers when he so wished. This was encouraged, in fact; the average length was about forty-five to fifty minutes, some ranging well over an hour, some completed in half an hour. In a large majority of cases
the man deliberately saw to it that the two of us were in a room alone, but quite often the wife was present. If any others were to be spectators as well, I postponed the interview until a less crowded atmosphere could be arranged. Many times the atmosphere was so friendly, in fact, that it was difficult to beg off having an extra (third or fourth) cup of coffee or tea. And, to my surprise, since nearly all of the interviews were in the evening, there was no noticeable competition from the ubiquitous television set — everyone seemed most willing to dispense with his favorite programs for a time.

I familiarized myself with the questions enough that I was able, after a short time, to dispense with notes through most of the interview, and simulate an "unstructured" conversation. Allowing this natural flow of discussion sometimes meant rearranging the order of questions. To my chagrin, it also meant that on occasion questions were inadvertently eliminated altogether, and their absence not discovered until the "play back" of the recording. However, this tended to occur randomly and fairly infrequently, and has only the most negligible effect on the results.1

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREAS


A thorough examination of the three areas in the survey required a look at the population structure and pattern of dwellings in each area. The graphs showing the population pyramids for each area concerned, and for Edinburgh as a whole show considerable distortions. It must be pointed out that these are not

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1. I toyed with the idea of trying to reproduce in quotations the accents and endearing colloquial usages of many of the respondents, e.g. "ain hoose" for own house, but decided that this embellishment is probably beyond the capabilities of my American ear. So, all of the comments will appear in rather straightforward English, even if this misses some of the richness of the original words.
altogether precise as each graph includes some household not in our chosen sections, an unavoidable result of a lack of direct correspondence between the boundaries of the survey areas and the boundaries of the Census Enumeration districts from which the information is derived. The correspondence is, however, reasonably close. These figures demonstrate very useful approximation to what the proportions (not total numbers) must be for the three districts.

These areas reflect an interesting distortion found in the graph for the entire city — the curious drop in numbers for ages between twenty-five and fifty for both sexes. The reduction is a bit more acute in the areas of our concern. In the Council area it will be noted that there is a large bulge for the age groups over fifty. This fact is mirrored in the number of men over seventy encountered in the initial sampling, and in the higher average age of the respondents from this group. It probably is due to two trends: first, the many persons who came from slum clearance projects in other parts of the city in the first years of the scheme's existence to remain to live out their years in these homes; second, couples moving elsewhere to establish their homes. This second trend is tied up with the fact of a limited availability of homes in an old council scheme such as this. The greatest drop-off in numbers in the twenty-five to twenty-nine age bracket bears this out. It may also be inferred from the relatively low numbers of small children in the Council area.

The Dalkeith district most nearly approximates the sex-age proportions for the city at large. There is a higher proportion of children than among the other two groups, and apparently more young families. This second interpretation may seem of dubious validity because of the very noticeable increase in numbers for the Melville area in the twenty to twenty-four age bracket. I'm quite sure another factor is responsible for this, however; the Melville area is quite close to the University, and provides "digs" for a spate of students.

FIGURE 3. EDINBURGH CITY POPULATION PYRAMID

Total number of persons - 464,462

Male
212,892

Female
251,570

0-4
1.21
2.28
3.03
3.35
3.17
3.18
3.00
3.13
3.27
3.34
4.08
3.57
4.11

0-4
1.37
1.57
2.22
2.76
3.26
3.72
3.92
3.11
3.28
3.40
3.18
3.14
3.66
3.66
3.87
3.38
3.91

0-4
1.37
1.57
2.22
2.76
3.26
3.72
3.92
3.11
3.28
3.40
3.18
3.14
3.66
3.66
3.87
3.38
3.91

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

AGE INTERVALS
Total number of persons - 1849

Newington Enumeration Districts 3, 4, 5

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

AGE INTERVAL
FIGURE 5. DALKEITH AREA

Total number of persons - 1194

Newington Enumeration Districts 2, 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Interval</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-14</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
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<td>1.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>80-84</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-89</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
FIGURE 6. MELVILLE AREA

Total number of persons 1635

Newington Enumeration Districts 28, 29, 30


PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

AGE INTERVALS
To a lesser extent this explains the bulge in the same age group for males of the Dalkeith area. The enormous dip in population in the Melville area in the forty to forty-four age category is an anomaly I cannot readily explain. Perhaps it is tied up with historical circumstances, but any suggestions would be speculative. The Melville district also shows a below average percentage of children.

The disparities encountered were carefully examined before choosing these areas for study. The concentration of old people in the Council area seemed the most serious drawback, but not serious enough to persuade me to bypass the area. The other advantages, already outlined, seemed to outweigh these negative considerations.

2. Housing factors.

Further insight into the living styles predominating in each area emerges from a look at the relationship of the populations to their dwellings. Below is a table showing the bases of occupancy in homes for the areas, again derived from the 1961 Census data, and thus including larger groups than those in our districts. This is particularly seen by the fact that the figures for the Council area include some non-council homes, which actually are within the Dalkeith area. Conversely the Dalkeith area includes a few of the Council homes, which are within the Council area. The Melville district numbers include more "outsiders" than either of the other two charts.

The intermediate nature of the Melville area is implied in the greater balance between owner-occupier and rented homes in this district. The variation in size of dwelling (shown by number of rooms to number of households) further confirms this heterogeneous pattern. It may be seen too, that there is a considerable variation in the person to rooms ratio. This ratio may be taken as one indicator of affluence and lifestyle. Only in the Council homes does the number of persons exceed the number of rooms; this, despite the large proportion of older people still living in Council homes after their families have gone to be "on their own".
### Table II - 2

**BASES OF HOUSE OCCUPANCY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council Area</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Rooms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupier</td>
<td>39 (6%)</td>
<td>121 (7%)</td>
<td>245 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation housing</td>
<td>596 (92%)</td>
<td>1,668 (91%)</td>
<td>1,578 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented (furnished or unfurnished) or occupied by reason of employment</td>
<td>14 (2%)</td>
<td>42 (2%)</td>
<td>41 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>659 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,831 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,864 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalkeith Area</td>
<td>321 (84%)</td>
<td>876 (74%)</td>
<td>1,282 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation housing</td>
<td>53 (12%)</td>
<td>154 (13%)</td>
<td>171 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented (furnished or unfurnished) or occupied by reason of employment</td>
<td>59 (14%)</td>
<td>156 (13%)</td>
<td>239 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>433 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,186 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,692 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melville Area</td>
<td>386 (62%)</td>
<td>1,009 (64%)</td>
<td>1,461 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented (furnished or unfurnished) or occupied by reason of employment</td>
<td>236 (38%)</td>
<td>561 (36%)</td>
<td>684 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>622 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,570 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,145 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Residential stability and church membership.

The general stability of these residential districts may be inferred from the statistics relating to length of residence in the present home. Table II - 3 exhibits the fact that only nineteen of the ninety-two respondents, or about
twenty-one per cent, have taken up their present residence within the past five years. Except for students living in temporary digs, there seems to be little transience of any of the groups. This was expected, and was thought beforehand to assure that virtually all of the persons conceiving themselves as affiliated with the Church of Scotland would perceive this affiliation in terms of the local parish church. To a surprising extent, this was not the case. No definite statistics are in hand on this phenomenon, as the area selection was thought to eliminate the need for asking the specific church attended. But, my impression is that a large proportion, perhaps even majorities, in each area, considered themselves still tied to "the church where my people were", or "where I went before I was married", or where "we know old Reverend So-and-so". This is true for both the involved in the church and the uninvolved. Apparently residential ties do not quickly alter church ties, even if such church ties are superficial. More significantly, perhaps, it is just because they are rather superficial. Though it is premature to bring forward a hypothesis at this point, I believe that this seeming reluctance to change one's membership in a specific church may tell a good deal about the prevailing subjective perceptions of church membership. There may be a certain aura of mystique about belonging to a church where one went to Sunday School in his early years, even if today that membership means little more in practical terms than a vague feeling of still being somehow attached to the church. It may, consciously or unconsciously, provide a continuity with one's own past and family past in religious terms.

Without doubt, much more matter-of-fact considerations contribute to this phenomenon as well. For those genuinely involved in a church not too distant from their present home, it is understandable that they would want to continue the relationship. The activities of the children in Sunday School and youth organizations, where they are already established, may often be important factors.
And, for those whose affiliation with the church is but a childhood memory or an annual pilgrimage for Easter Communion, it may simply not make any difference or be worth the bother to change churches. The question may never come up; it may never even seem to be a question. Besides, to become part of the local parish church would tend to create a sense of obligation for fulfilling more duties as a church member because of the necessary contact with the minister this step would entail; some people might prefer to avoid this.

My reasons for thinking that the emotional motivations of retaining a not-too-secure tie with the earlier church is a prominent part of the explanation which will become clearer when we examine in detail the structure of attitudes toward the church. But it is certainly noteworthy that parochial units and boundaries do not reflect residential stability. Perhaps the parish system of local church jurisdiction is simply an anachronism, important today only to officials of the church organization. I do not recall a single instance in which the word "parish" was used in answering questions in this survey. A number of authors have recently suggested that the parochial system is dying a natural death. For instance, Thompson concludes from a study of four Birmingham parishes, "The parishes are no longer meaningful social or neighbourhood units". 1 An American writer, Gibson Winter claims that, "The attempt to perpetuate the local parish or congregation as a basic unit of the Christian Church is doomed to failure....." 2 At any rate, in this survey the assumption that people would consistently relate themselves to the local church has proved inaccurate, but the fact of relative residential stability for our respondents is shown in Table II-3 below.

---


The Council district has the largest proportion of residents of over thirty
years duration — nine of the respondents (26%). This compares with six (7%)
for the Dalkeith district, and three (13%) for the Melville district. On the
whole the pattern of stability is quite similar for the three groups.

Not so similar are the previous districts of residence of the men in the
three areas. Many of the answers, specifying areas in Edinburgh, for instance,
were too imprecise for an interviewer not well acquainted with all parts of the
city. But, a definite pattern is quite evident none-the-less. About half of
the Council respondents alluded to their origins in "run-down" sections of the
town. One railroad porter who has been in the Council Estate for seven years
referred to his previous existence in a "tenement with a very bad atmosphere".
Others said they had previously lived in a "slum". Some talked of several
families sharing the same toilet, or of dangerously broken-down staircases
menacing the man returning home for a Saturday night's inbibing. A great many
were openly delighted with the amenities of their Council home, and the open
spaces between the buildings, though compared with newer schemes this one is not
impressive.
None of the Council respondents mentioned a person's origin outside the city of Edinburgh.¹

By contrast, about one-third of the Dalkeith men interviewed came from outside Edinburgh. A few more had spent some of their working lives elsewhere. Those from within Edinburgh came from a variety of districts. The Melville area again shows a pattern between the other two, with about one-fourth from poor sections and several from outside Edinburgh. All told, the Council respondents have had the least previous geographical mobility; the Dalkeith respondents the most; neither a great deal.

So, an elementary preliminary picture of the districts involved in the survey has emerged. The picture conforms adequately to the requirements established beforehand. The fact that the parochial demarcations do not indicate confinement of church ties is, perhaps, the least pleasing feature; but this carries important implications in itself which are of import in judging the general pattern of contemporary church attachment.

C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DATA

There are two basic sets of categories which will often be employed during the detailed analysis of the data: the objective social class divisions and the degree of involvement in the church. These essential categories deserve some definition, description and examination as part of this overview of the whole study.


It is now accepted methodology to choose occupation as the single most revealing objective criterion of social status. As Cole puts it, "If a single

¹. Two or three major slum clearance projects, in Leith and elsewhere, fed the earliest council schemes in Edinburgh. The influence of those roots may never have been entirely extirpated.
criterion is to be used, occupation is likely to be better than any other, where the purpose is to arrive at a rough estimate of the number of persons to be included in the various social classes. Many other facets of a person's position in the social hierarchy derive from this. At least, it is fairly safe to assume so. This, for the present time will be our procedure.

The other objective indicators most often employed are income and education. No question of income was asked in this survey. In the first place, enough "touchy" subjects were introduced without pushing into the personal financial realm as well. Furthermore, since I had information in advance suggesting the general types of jobs that would be encountered, it seemed that little would be added; the respondent's job would, with acceptable approximation, indicate his position on an earnings scale.

Information was obtained for education, and these data will be used as a test of the validity of our occupational class categories. In fact, the correlation is very satisfactory.

In using this summary factor of occupation, I am not thereby denying the importance of subjective factors. Nor, will such matter as the self-evaluation of the respondent, his "class-consciousness", or his social interactions be left


2. The evidence in America where it is often supposed that money "tells all" about a person is that income has very little meaning in stratification compared to occupation and education. See Demerath, op.cit., p.170 footnote.

3. Some useful articles dealing with objective criteria of social status are the following:


untouched. Status self-image is of central importance in revealing a person's understanding of his social position and class interests (in a Marxian sense). Later I will compare these separate "dimensions" of class as they illuminate our findings, and I will give a fuller definitive treatment to the concept of class as it is used in the thesis. In particular, the distinction between class and status is controversial and requires at least brief discussion. When this demarcation seems relevant, it should become apparent.

A scale of five occupational categories has been used for our initial categorization of occupational strata. The categories, from one to five are in order of increasing status. As the numbers are quite small, I will give a rather full picture of the job content of each category.

The first, (lowest) has fifteen respondents who are in the most menial positions. Seven are in janitorial or cleaning work, seven are labourers, one a shop assistant. Category two is the largest, numbering twenty-six. It is also fully manual in nature, but comprising skilled or semi-skilled jobs. There are sixteen in some sort of trade, of which eight described themselves as "engineers".


1. Indeed, inconsistencies of objective and subjective status, so called status-discrepancies, have received considerable attention from sociological investigators in recent years.

2. This may seem an eccentric departure from the more conventional procedure of including the highest-status persons in the first category and the lowest-status persons in the last (or highest numbered) category. Though it is a small matter, the explanation is that since the survey did not cover the whole gamut of status groups, in particular did not reach the high status professionals, industrialists, gentry, etc., it might have been misleading to number from top to bottom. Our highest status group would then have come first, but would not correspond to the first (or highest) category in most wider studies, e.g., census categorizations; by deliberately inverting the scale our lowest-status group is first, and corresponds fairly well to the lowest-status categories of other studies.
The others, not more than two per type of work are scattered through post office and railroad jobs, brewery work, driving, baking and machine operating. Unless additional insight is to be gained by separating the categories, these two groups will be joined together as a single working class category of forty-one respondents.

Category three totals seventeen men, and is rather non-descript. The jobs are "borderline", i.e. difficult to place in manual or non-manual diversions. To decide upon either upper-working or lower-middle class as the appropriate description seems to me arbitrary. Seven of these men are foremen; the majority, nine, are specialized technical jobs: three are on technical staffs of University departments, one installs high-voltage electrical fittings, one is a "trouble-shooter" for electro-medical equipment, and so forth. Another man has returned to school after years as an "engineer", and is studying for an eventual teaching degree. I have explored the possibility of lumping this group with two lower groups or two higher groups, and thus producing a more convenient two-class division; but this borderline group seems to defy dissolution. So, it will be left intact despite the small numbers, although the suspicion remains that the group as a separate entity may be an artifact of my own methodology.

Category four could receive the "lower-middle" class tag of common parlance. There are nineteen men in this group: six are clerical workers, five are in a supervisory capacity, two are policemen of minor rank, three insurance salesmen, and two shopkeepers. The fifth, and highest, status group, like category one, has fifteen respondents. All of the men in this group are solidly middle class in occupational positions. Four are managers, three are surveyors, two civil servants, two company executives, two scientists. One man is a company owner, and one was completing a University degree. Again, as with the two lowest status groups, the highest two will generally be combined to form a single middle class
There is a statistically useful symmetry. Taking the five-status level arrangement the numbers from the first to the fifth are, respectively: fifteen, twenty-six, seventeen, nineteen, and fifteen. Using the three-tiered class arrangement the numbers are: forty-one, seventeen and thirty-four from lowest to highest; and this is the arrangement which will generally be applied.

The middle class section is probably less representative than the working class. This is deduced from several considerations. First, considering dwellings, only six of this group live in a single unit, bungalow house. Our areas include few really large and impressive residences. Secondly, there is a virtually complete absence of what is often called the "professional class". Third, we shall later see in examining class identification that a large proportion of our middle class identify with the working class on the basis of their origins. There are, thus, many upwardly mobile in the group. The overall tone is "lower middle class" in this non-manual division. These qualifications should not attenuate the value of comparisons, but should of course, be made clear.

\[\text{category numbering thirty-four.}^1\]

1. Several investigators have pointed out that "middle class" is a less precise rubric than "working class". A vast array of occupations fall within the wide-ranging scope of the category. The boundaries are uncertain, the definitions variable. Says Cole, "The concept of middle class is exceedingly elusive by whatever route one approaches it." (Cole p.93) He lists five, presumably orthogonal, categories of occupations which may be included in Britain, and considers clerks and lower grades of industrial managers as doubtful inclusions (ibid. p.95). Hall and Jones found that of the five social groups asked to grade a specimen of twelve widely scattered occupations, a majority of at least one group voted each occupation as middle class. (John Hall and Caradog Jones, loc. cit.) Bonham finds the same confusion a bit exasperating, stressing that it is much easier to say what the middle class are not than to say what they are. Concluding that the middle class is roughly the "non-manual workers", he muses that "The middle class, so defined, covers a wide range of income from the ten thousand pound a year business director, down to the five pound a week canvasser. It includes ..., an almost complete gamut of social statuses". (John Bonham, The Middle Class Vote, (London: Faber and Faber) p. 39, 59. Centers meets the same conundrum in his American surveys. (See Richard Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes and Richard Centers, "Social Class, Occupation and Imputed Belief", American Journal of Sociology, (May 1953).
One immediate and most obvious test of these class divisions is the educational attainment levels within the groups. Table II - 4 gives the distributions. The third, and smallest column applies to men who left school early, but later did advanced training for a particular school. The other columns are self-evident.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table II - 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correlation of class and education is certainly substantial, and seems to justify confidence in our demarcations of status. This assertion may seem a bit tenuous in the light of the high number, nearly half, of the middle class group with very low educational attainment. But it is probably sufficiently accurate a reflection of the general situation if one takes into account the non-professional character of the group; it is in professional capacities that long specialised training is most essential. The Borderline group shows enough skewing toward higher education, without any entering the university or college division, to suggest the presumed social precariousness of this part of the sample, and help warrant its inclusion as a separate entity.

Table II - 5 gives the status distribution by the three areas, demonstrating the preponderately working class nature of the council district, preponderately middle class nature of the Dalkeith and the heterogeneous, "in-between" nature of
the smaller Melville group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II - 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL STATUS BY DISTRICTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalkeith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Church Involvement Patterns.

Several criteria have vied for prominence in studies relating to church involvement, or to religiosity generally. Among these are denominational preference, church attendance, relation to other church activities and church members, beliefs, importance of religious commitments to other aspects of life etc. Like occupation for determining social class, however, church attendance is usually taken as the best single indicator of a person's involvement in the church. At this point I will "follow suit" in using this convenient objective criterion. Later, other dimensions of attachment to church will be investigated which may be of equal importance in obtaining a comprehensive view of the existing church-class pattern.

In the Introduction I alluded to the general pattern of middle class dominance in the church, and in the previous chapter the historical roots of this prevailing situation were traced. Indeed, the fact that middle class persons are more frequent church attenders is today a well-founded axiom of western religious research.¹

¹ Detailed references of research in several societies will be provided in chapter six.
Since this pattern has been so generally discovered it might be necessary to refer to it as a "quasi-hypothesis" that this will hold true for our sample as well. We shall see below that the pattern does, in fact, hold true in this survey.

First, an explanation of the categories is in order. Again, the data seems to fit best into a triad arrangement: Regular, Marginal and Dormant. The second and third terms are borrowed from the four division classification scheme of Joseph Fichter who employed them in analysis of his studies in U.S. Catholic parishes. Our "Regular" category replaces his first two, "nuclear" and "modal", which make finer distinctions than desirable with the numbers comprising our sample.

The first and third categories are very straightforward. Regulars attend church quite frequently - according to their own statements at least once a month. The Dormants never or virtually never go to church. Some of these, of course, must "darker the door" of the church for a wedding or funeral; others may endure annual pilgrimage with a nagging wife. But they may all be accurately described as "uninvolved" with the church in terms of formal participation in its programmes. The second category is more complicated. It was first intended that "Marginals" would exclusively be men who go to church occasionally - several times a year. However, when first examined, there were only ten in the group on this basis, certainly too small for useful analysis. Five additional respondents were added who had been categorised in the initial detailed breakdown as, "those who attended for some time as adults, but not now". In fact, these all expressed some special complaint about the church; they are not merely passively disinterested but discontinued church practice because of some trauma or difficulty.

during their adult life. In this they contrast with the church history of the Dormants who described no adult involvement of any consequence. (Probably some of the Dormants have had a measure of involvement in the church earlier in their adult lives which they did not relate in the interview). Thus, the "Marginal" division is at worst an amorphous congeries, at best an ad hoc category which is legitimately separate. Whatever the ramifications of this particular division, it should not impair the sharper comparison of the two larger groups, Regulars and Dormants.

Another question is implicit in the term "Dormant". Are all of these individuals, in fact, inactive Members of a church? In part, the answer depends upon how rigorous the demands of "membership" are made. Certainly, all are under the stewardship of a parish. There is only a single exception to the rule that they have all been, at least, baptized in the church; most were married in the church; a large majority were in Sunday school as children. So, the word "dormant" seems quite appropriate. We will later see that most people, even those far removed from church participation, tend to retain some sense of attachment to the church. Table II - 6 below gives the comparison of the church involvement categories with the divisions of social class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II - 6</th>
<th>CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY SOCIAL STATUS LEVEL.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Table affirms the expected pattern. Approximately three times the proportion of middle class men than working class men are regular attendants at church services. But this is not the only striking feature. The numerically small Borderline group show an even greater adherence to formal worship than do the middle class men. Admittedly, with the minimal size of this group, it is tenuous to look beyond the vicissitudes of chance; a shift of only one man from the "regular" column would bring this section into line with the middle class group. However, there is no question that their high attendance rate is an impressive departure from the working class attendance patterns for persons so precarious above working class in status. This is the kind of finding which is bound to make a researcher feel frustrated in not having a very much larger sample at his disposal.

The minority of fourteen Catholics included in the above table adds a certain complication. Table II - 7 provides the same data but with this major religious factor taken into consideration by separating Catholics and Protestants. It will be seen that, although, overall, Catholics show a greater adherence to the church, the difference by class are in the same direction as for Protestants. We may, therefore, safely include them, since they comprise less than one-sixth of the total sample, in the analysis of the class-church relationship without significantly distorting the picture. When this difference of religious tradition makes an important difference in the results, it will be pointed out.

As we would expect, most of the Catholics are working class and at each class level they display more frequent church attendance than Protestants of the same status. But comparison of the Protestant division on Table II - 7 with the figures for the whole sample on Table II - 6, clearly shows that the "weighting" is of a very small magnitude. The fact that class has relatively the same effect
on both religious groups, in addition to the fact of the small number of Catholics, dictates the policy of ignoring the religious separation except when it has an appreciable effect on results.

**TABLE II - 7**

**CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY CLASS AND PROTESTANT - CATHOLIC DIVISION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Dormant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROTESTANTS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CATHOLICS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline &amp; Middle</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(NOTE: There are three borderline and three middle class Catholics, here combined because of the very small numbers)*

Of the seventy-eight Protestants, only ten described themselves as something other than Church of Scotland. Five of these are Episcopal; three are Congregationalists or Free Church members; one has recently been converted to the Christian Scientist organisation; and only one claims no church affiliation at all. With such small numbers, it is obviously pointless to make further sub-divisions. Besides, nothing stands out in the results to demand considerations
of non-Church of Scotland Protestants separately.¹

Using the secondary objective criterion of education, and comparing this with church attendance, the results are less clear-cut, but still significantly in the same direction. Table II - 8 informs us of this relationship. Similar trends have been found in both England and America.²

| CHURCH ATTENDANCE RATES BY EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT³ |
|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|
|          | No. educ. | Sr. Second | Jr. Second | College or Univ. | Total   |
|          | N        | beyond 16 | school    | later study    | Total   |
| Regular  | (24)     | 58        | 25        | 8             | 8       | 100%    |
| Marginal | (15)     | 87        | 13        | -             | -       | 100%    |
| Dormant  | (39)     | 77        | 13        | 5             | 5       | 100%    |
| Catholics| (16)     | 86        | 7         | 7             | -       | 100%    |
| Total    | (92)     | 75        | 15        | 5             | 4       | 100%    |

Consistent with expectations, too, are the distribution of residents of the three districts within the church attendance categories, knowing the class character of each district. Table II - 9 presents this data.

1. Even in the U.S., where denominational variety is a more salient part of the church's existence, Lenski found it unproductive to deal with separate denominational categories in his Detroit study. Lenski, op.cit.


3. Because of the small numbers in some of the educational categories Church attendance appears as the "independent variable" though this would more correctly be reversed. But this anomalous procedure still allows for the desired understanding of the data.
TABLE II - 9

CHURCH ATTENDANCE RATES BY DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Dormant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council (34)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalkeith (35)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melville (23)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (92)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Age and Marital Status.

The age scatter of our respondents shows a generally satisfactory balance. Only the youngest group (twenty to twenty-nine) is noticeably undersized. In part this is an artifact of the categories.¹ But the error is not enough to account entirely for the small numbers.

TABLE II - 10.

TOTAL RESPONDENTS BY AGE CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>21-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-69</th>
<th>70 or over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at these figures more closely, we see in Table II - 11 the age divisions by class; in Table II - 12, the age divisions by area; and in Table II - 13 the age divisions by church attendance.

¹ The respondents had to have turned twenty-one, and then have been placed on the Voters’ Register some time prior to the drawing of the sample. Allowing one year on the average (including time for publication of the list, etc.) this group is really restricted to about eight years compared to ten for the other age brackets.
Several features stand out from this breakdown. The surfeit of older men in the Council area was predictable from the population pyramid for the area, but the
concentration of younger men (below 40) in the Dalkeith area is greater than a fully-controlled sample would be in that region. Furthermore, this disparity is even greater on the occupational scale, fully 56% of the middle class group being under forty compared with 26% for the working class group. Conversely, 74% of the working class group are over forty, compared with 44% for the middle class men. These two scales (age-class and age-area) dovetail quite well, and certainly seem to give assurance that the raw class divisions are not much influenced by the intra-generational mobility. If this had been the case we would expect the relationship to be reversed, and the younger men to occupy lower positions on the class scale, in general. Instead of this obtaining, we might speculate that the Dalkeith region could be a temporary stopping off point for younger men who will later be able to move to even more desirable residential areas. For many of those interviewed in the area, my personal impression is that such could well be the case, but to prove it would go beyond the data at hand.

In order to see if age variation plays a notable part in differential church attendance associated with class, we need to correlate all three variables: age, class and church attendance. This is done in Table II -14, collapsing the age variation into two divisions - men under fifty and men fifty and over. The Table is also divided to show the correlation for all respondents and for Protestants alone.
TABLE II - 14

CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY CLASS AND AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDER 50</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>PROTESTANTS ONLY</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 &amp; OVER</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dormant</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The small variation found in the table really amounts to prima facie evidence that age differences are of little import in determining church attendance and do not, therefore, need to be rigorously controlled during the more precise analysis. The most salient fact which emerges is that Marginal church attendants tend, on the average, to be older than either Regulars or Dormants. Also, we could already have predicted, (when Catholics are included) the proportion of Regulars is slightly increased, but the effect is mainly within the sub-50 years division. Due to the higher concentration of middle class men in the younger group the proportion of Regulars, overall, is higher for this division. The very small numbers in some of the categories disallows further deductions. The age variable will seldom be brought into further discussions.
Table II - 15 shows the marital statuses of the respondents with respect to social class. This factor is introduced at this point because the marriage pattern, in the main, reflects the age differences. There is a higher concentration of men married less than ten years in the middle class group, and a higher concentration of men married more than thirty years in the working class group. No further insight proceeds from an examination of marital status cross-tabulated with church attendance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II - 15</th>
<th>MARITAL PATTERNS BY SOCIAL CLASS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years Married</td>
<td>N (0-9 10-19 20-29 30 or more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41) 7 19 22 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17) 12 35 24 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34) 35 18 21 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92) 18 22 22 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. SUMMARY

This brief overview of the methodology, geographical "universe" of the survey and central statistical data has been, on the whole, reassuring. The Prestonfield area in particular conforms to the "ideal" with adequate proximity; the supplementary Melville district maintains the class balance while expanding the sample. The class spread is as useful as could reasonably be expected given the number of respondents; and the church class relationship apparently follows the predicted pattern. Thus, the foundation seems to be adequate to sustain a substantial superstructure of more intense investigation.
PART TWO: SOCIAL CLASS

CHAPTER III - SOCIAL CLASS PERSPECTIVES

A. CONSIDERATION OF CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS.
   1. Conceptual Approach to Class.
   2. Question of Working Class "Embourgeoisement".

B. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES.
   2. "Future" Perspectives.
   3. Children and Training.
   4. Personal Values.
   5. Friendship Perspectives.
CHAPTER III - SOCIAL CLASS PERSPECTIVES

A recent headline in The Scotsman announced, "Fairfield men give go-ahead". The substance of the story is that, in an unprecedented move, the three thousand workers of a major Clydeside shipyard in danger of financial collapse, have agreed to relinquish their prized heritage of strikes, go-slow, overtime bans and other "restrictive practices" and to give complete allegiance to a new management of the company. Unique circumstances are involved in this decision undoubtedly: the men are interested in saving their jobs; the trade unions and Government (presently a Labour Government) will be in coalition with private investors in controlling the company; and a sort of Churchillian challenge has been given to the men to "put their backs into" a salvage operation crucial to the whole shipbuilding industry of the area.

None-the-less, trying to "read between the lines", it seems to me there is implied a tacit admission on the part of the shipyard workers, traditionally among the most socialistic workers in the country, of a large measure of responsibility for the plight of the firm. It also, I think, implies a major overhaul of attitudes unless the action is to be interpreted as purely expedient. Perhaps there has been a covert but increasing feeling on the part of many of the men that the terms of present-day management-Labour relations may no longer justifiably caricatured as the stereotyped "idle rich" oppressing the stereotyped "downtrodden". Perhaps below the surface of united action and outwardly expressed militancy there has been gnawing doubt about the role and contribution of the workers within industry. Perhaps the expedient of job-saving makes it socially legitimate for workers to disown work practices that, for an appreciable time, many have privately felt to be misused, unfair and debilitating.

This interpretation is offered because it fits in with an impression I often received in talking with my working-class respondents. Some of the viewpoints that were asserted in the interviews actually suggested that something like a sweeping revision of traditional workers' perspectives is being enacted. In recent elections all parties have made an emphasis on the need to put an end to the crippling restrictions on work within industry and to "underemployment" of personnel. There is currently a volume of discussion about industrial efficiency and obtaining "a full day's work for a full day's pay". The attitudes encountered in this survey may reflect a wider concern of workers with their own role and contribution. But I will return to this theme later in the chapter.

In the previous chapter the objective measures of social class have already come to light and we have seen how the respondents are distributed in the class scale. During the next three chapters I will endeavour to focus on the less objective elements of stratification; to take a close look at the social class side of the class-church relationship. On the face of it, this may appear to be a digression from the major concern of the thesis. However, there are three reasons which I feel justify the analysis of class data on its own.

First, the fact that the primary "raison d'etre" of the study is the interaction of two institutional systems - class and church - should not preclude elaboration of insights relative to one of the systems alone. Second, it is logical that before the effect of class ties (on church attachment) is investigated, the strength of class ties should be given attention. Thirdly, the

1. That is, the stereotype of "traditional workers" characterized by militancy, anti-capitalist fervour and solidarity, though there is some question whether this stereotype accounts for more than the vocal minority of British workers at any time.
"interpretive" focus of the study demands that specific components of the class situation be brought out. In other words, detailed examination of class - as the independent variable - is unavoidably relevant to a full exposition of the church-class relationship. It would be the height of banality to compare only the more straightforward objective criteria of class and church involvement and not to take into account the amalgam of ideological and attitudinal forces in both instances.

The strategy for the discussion of class - as it will be for the discussion of church attachment - is one of "disaggregate", endeavouring to get a more comprehensive grasp of the class situation by examining a range of subjective components. In this chapter, I will first deal with the conceptual framework of the class discussion and the major questions to which the data will speak within the separate realm of social class. Then some of the "social perspectives" and values emerging from the interviews will be explored preliminary to a discussion of "class-consciousness" and "life style" in the two succeeding chapters. There will be a good deal of overlapping of these three divisions of factors related to class but the classification serves the purpose of providing a useful structure for the present discussion.

A. CONSIDERATION OF CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS

1. Conceptual Approach to Class.

To speak of social class in any penetrating sense is to invariably connote both objective factors (e.g. social environment, material conditions and life chances) and subjective factors (e.g. class identification, sense of belongingness and perceptions of class "interests"). As long as purely objective measures - such as occupation, education and income - are evoked, it is most accurate to say that status categories or gradations are being examined. In a sense, these pertain to the system - or systems - of stratification but are not necessarily tied up with the phenomenon of social class.
As Parsons, Marshall, Van Heek, and others have pointed out, a good many separate measures of status can be identified and parceled out for separate examination. The individual may fall at different levels on different scales measuring various indicators. Or as Max Weber put it in his pioneering work, an individual's class position (for Weber as Marx, economic in nature) may be relatively higher or lower than his status position (related to his prestige and honour in the community).

But class, as we are specifying the term, is not the statistical synthesis of a number of shrewdly assessed objective factors. True, the categories evolved may be virtually coterminous with the lines of class division; but this only attests to the worth of a system of gradations as an indicator of class membership. It does not entirely grasp the substance of social class. Class is, to put the matter simply, something more than a combining or averaging out of several schemes of gradation. There is an essential communal or integrative element, though present in varying degrees.


3. P. Van Heek, "Some Introductory Remarks on Social Mobility and Class Structure", ibid. p. 129-143. He notes several value-hierarchies of stratification: 1. politico-economic; 2. social classes (life styles, consciousness); 3. prestige aggregates; 4. status groups; 5. elites.


To use an analogy which must not be pushed too far, a personality is not, in a substantive sense, the same as a personality profile — the results of a number of personality tests. No matter how good the tests, and how many, there is a unity and internal coherence in personality itself, which is something "more".

To employ an elementary distinction, social classes are more than "categories"; they are "groups" or "quasi-groups". That is, they involve a degree (varying extensively to be sure) of subjective identification and participation. Classes have "interests"; prestige levels may not have. Classes have a certain corporate existence embodying "styles of life". Classes have continuity and (in a Durkheimian sense) norms not reducible to the individuals involved at a certain point in time. In short, "class" implies the element of "commonality" which "stratum" does not.

This is not to deny the wide disparities in perception of class, or to imply that there are acknowledged, articulated, and mutually shared values and goals among all those in a given class situation. Even Marx, with his rigid and deterministic view of class, found it necessary to distinguish between the objective and predetermined interests of a class and the subjective realization of these interests, stressing the need for the Proletariat to apprehend the meaning of their subservient class situation. The point is that a social class as a viable entity in a social system, embodies, consciously or unconsciously, common "ideologies" and "attitude systems" — in the terminology of Talcott Parsons. There are endogenous orientations which produce a degree of class integration.


Dahrendorf makes a useful summary of the distinction between class and stratum, adopting a noticeably Marxian perspective: "By stratum I shall understand a category of persons who occupy a similar position on a hierarchical scale of certain situational characteristics such as income, prestige, style of life. "Classes" are interest groupings emerging from certain structural conditions which operate as such, and affect structure changes."¹

T.H. Marshall makes an illuminating contribution when he says, "We think of class as a group of people. But we can also think of "class" as a force or mechanism that operates to produce certain attitudes", and further, "The institution of class teaches members of society to notice some differences and ignore others when arranging people in order of social merit ... a class system notices, and even emphasised, certain forms of inequality and uses these as a barrier to divide the classes. With respect to the points thus selected for attention members of the same class are — or believe they are — identical".²

Several salutory emphases are here made by Marshall which underscore points I am trying to establish for our discussion concerning the meaning of social class as distinct from "stratum" and social status. First, class is not merely a statistical aggregate, but a social force; second, class is not a mere echo of one or more sets of status differentiations; third, there is an element of perceived mutuality, whereby members of a class perceive major divisions and adopt identifications with the situation and interests of their own class.


Of course, classes, like societies themselves, go through processes of change; they are not static and inflexible. And, the various objectively assessible factors of stratification, such as income, may play a leading role in social class changes. But, the significant demarcation between class and prestige hierarchies remains. For one thing, as Ossowski stresses it is essential to include in a viable definition of social class the factor or relationship between classes within a system of stratification. To define class in terms of status hierarchies alone fails to explicate the important element of class interaction which is vital to the meaning of class-consciousness and "solidarity".

This kind of rudimentary definitive operation should probably be unnecessary. But, as central as the subject of stratification is to the discipline of Sociology there is a bewildering inconsistency in terms and concepts. Partly this is due to selected emphasis in different societies. For instance, American sociologists are more prone to deal with multiple dimensions of stratification and to see the system of stratification in terms of continuums rather than distinct divisions. British sociologists, on the other hand, tend to stress the triad division of working class, middle class and upper class as constituting viable and distinct social entities. Some would restrict the meaning of class to a Marxian understanding: the dichotomy between the owners of the means of production and those who must sell their


2. Zweig notes that class structures are presented in different designs, according to the preconceptions of different cultures, and ideas prevalent in given eras or strata. These design pre-requisites are linked to the whole style of life of the country. Zweig lists these as prevailing designs in several major western countries: U.S.S.R. - Monistic, France and Italy - dualistic, Great Britain - trinitarian, U.S. - Pluralistic, Ferdinand Zweig, "The Theory of Social Classes" Kyklos, 1958, p. 190.
wage-labour to these owners. Others think it is futile to suggest a distinction between class and status.

No simple solution is available, either by an eclectic technique or by adopting a "widely accepted" framework. The investigator must adopt the perspective that seems most theoretically satisfying and empirically useful. My own perspective is to see class as connoting more than status, embodying in addition the crucial elements of class-consciousness, life style, values and social attitudes. This perspective comprises a Weberian emphasis on the multifactorial nature of stratification. It stresses, as well, the insight of Sorokin that the several dimensions of class coalesce to produce "multi-bonded" groups which have genuine corporate existence.  

The danger of adopting such a definitive approach is considerable. There is the tacit assumption that the non-objective factors of class will be demonstrable from the data of the study concerned. One of the major contributions of this class section of the thesis is the confirmation, broadly speaking, of this definition. This confirmation is, in fact, a major purpose of the exploration of the next three chapters.

2. Question of Working Class Embourgeoisement.

Before entering into the examination of class data, a further problem demands our attention. A considerable controversy has raged over the alleged "embourgeoisement" of the British working class. On the one hand, it is asserted that the rising standard of living of workers, greater security provided by the welfare state and reduction of conspicuous differences in consumption, have virtually erased the line of demarcation between manual and non-manual status. On the other hand, it is claimed with equal vehemence that these progressive transformations have occurred only within the boundaries of continuing class divisions; that cultural and associational factors prevent manual workers from truly "becoming middle class", despite greater equality of income.

Ferdinand Zweig has been interpreted generally as talking the former stand
on the basis of his descriptions of workers' lives in the South of England.

Working class life finds itself on the move towards new middle-class
values and middle-class existence ... the change can only be described
as a deep transformation of values ... this is, perhaps, the most
significant development ... for him to loosen the sense of identity
with his own class, to which he is bound no longer by the links of common
hardship, hardships and injustice, and the constant class to arms in
class warfare.

Butler and Rose, in an analysis of voting in the 1959 election, taking the
same line, conclude that, "traditional working class attitudes had been eroded
by the steady growth of prosperity". Therefore, many manual workers are at
least, "on the threshold of the middle class". It is even in vogue nowadays
for middle-class persons to comment ruefully, "these bricklayers (or joiners
etc.) are better off than we are". The really intriguing question is, however,
does this mean that such middle-class persons accept as social equals these
they describe as financial equals? And at this point the horns are looked in
verbal battle.

One sort of refutation ventured in opposition to the "embourgeoisement"
theme is put forward by Richard F. Hamilton. He claims that gross figures
used to compare manual and non-manual incomes are deceptive because: female
heads of households are included in the "white collar" division; career
patterns are not demonstrated and many white collar men move into higher brackets
during their working lives; and non-manual "foremen" are included with "workers".
He, therefore, questions the statistics showing a "blurring" of social class
lines because of higher median manual income than sales and clerical incomes.
"The modal or typical characteristics of the groups are not as they have been
represented in recent literature".

1. Ferdinand Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society: Family Life and

2. N.E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959,

3. Richard F. Hamilton, "Income Difference Between Skilled and White Collar
Perhaps the most articulate exponent of the view that class lines remain in tact is David Lockwood. He gives full due to the reduction in financial disparities between the classes: "The war and post-war situation brought about a substantial narrowing of the income differential between manual and non-manual work. Thus the process of equalization of rewards for blackcoated and manual work has been achieved by the economic improvement of the working class, rather than by the sinking of the non-manual worker into the ranks of the proletariat".¹

But to these undeniable economic facts - of vast improvement in the relative economic position of workers if not complete parity with middle class incomes - Lockwood gives a very different interpretation, and adds some other telling considerations. In a study of "blackcoated" (or clerical) workers, who are conventionally accorded a "lower middle class" level, despite very equivalent remuneration compared with skilled (and very semi-skilled) workers, Lockwood demonstrated a continuing separation from manual workers in terms of class identification, work environment, opportunities for advancement, and lifestyle. Clerks, on the whole, cling tenaciously to "middle class" membership, and reject identification with manual workers, even if these workers are their financial equals. Among the factors Lockwood emphasises as maintaining the social distance of clerks from workers are, "a much greater degree of job security" than manual workers, "superior chances of rising to managerial and supervisory positions", "non-pecuniary advantages of office work - its cleanliness, comfort, tempo, hours, holidays".²

Nor, to continue Lockwood's argument further, does the continued feeling of distance between manual and non-manual groups derive solely from the "pretentiousness" of the office worker. Manual workers, too, feel the separation and

² ibid, p.1.
reject those in the office, 'being dressed up to go to work', 'having it cushy', 'being bosses' men', etc. Whatever rationalization may be involved in this denigration of the clerk's job, it is possible for Lockwood to summarise, "When the working man says of the office worker that 'he is no better than us', he, by no means, implies that 'he is one of us'." The "work situation" (as distinct from the "market situation" — the rubric for income patterns in Lockwood's terminology) weighs heavily in favour of working class identification. "Both in the factory, and the labour market, the outstanding features of the work situation of modern wage-labour are, on the one hand, the physical separation and social estrangement of management and workers, and, on the other, the physical concentration and social identification of the workers themselves". So vital is this cleavage that "the whole atmosphere of the productive unit is conducive to impersonal antagonism", and "effectively inculcated in the worker" a sense of class division.  

To Lockwood these forces — "consciousness of a division of interest between employer and employee" and the corollary "consciousness of a community of interests among employees" — are the very essence of working class consciousness, and are not greatly attenuated by shrinking of income differential per se. In a later essay, written in collaboration with John H. Goldthorpe, Lockwood says that standard of living must be put along side two other aspects of class in assessing the potential assimilation of manual workers into the middle-class: namely, "normative" and "relational" aspects (i.e. the values and norms of behaviour; and the network of personal relationships between members of the two classes). On the "relational" side they stress the "marked degree of status

1. ibid, p.131.
2. ibid, p.205.
3. ibid, p.206.
4. ibid, p.208.
segregation in housing, in informal neighbourhood relations, in friendship groups, in the membership of local clubs, societies and so on ... the division between manual and non-manual workers and their families has proved to be one of the most salient. 1

If not a great enlargement of the middle-class by inclusion of workers who have achieved virtual or actual economic parity with many segments of the middle-class, then what do these economic phenomena herald for the social structure? Lockwood and Goldthorpe suggest that they should be viewed "rather as a far-reaching adaptation and development of the traditional working class way of life under greatly altered economic and physical conditions." 2 Additional relevant passages could be introduced, but the foregoing are sufficient to show the lines of battle, to appreciate the two sides of the polemic.

Three of the Papers submitted to the Third World Congress of Sociology are pertinent to the question of a continuing or declining fissure of British society. Brennan of Glasgow approaches this focal topic of the position of the working class in contemporary British society from a slightly different tack. He interprets long range changes of working class identity and mass action in terms of an internal metamorphosis of a distinct and self-conscious protest group into a less separate and less distinct segment of today's social system.

"Looked at widely it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the working class has risen from the position of being regarded as one of the raw materials of industry to that of a class, at least, capable of being a ruling class".

An important part of working class culture is what is usually called 'the working class movement', a movement combining many features which have shifted in importance,


2. ibid, p.141.
and relative position, as the composition and values of the working class itself have changed. Although some parts of the movement, like the trade unions, for example, are now more powerful than ever, the loss of autonomy of the individual and the small groups in the working class has led to the surrender of those working class values associated with an independent social movement. One might say that important features of the movement have disappeared, and in so far as these features were features of the working class itself, it too, has lost some of its distinctive character.

Two American sociologists, evaluating the structural changes in U.S. society in recent years, provide usefully comparative, if not entirely parallel, interpretations of class divisions in industrialised western nations. Firstly, Jessie Bernard promulgates the notion of "an economy of abundance" substituting for the traditional "economy of scarcity" which she believes makes an enormous difference in modern economic and social systems. She promotes the perspective of those who see class lines blurring, and the working class riding sybaritic waves onto the beach of middle class life.

The history of industrialised societies does seem to in the direction of a 'classless' society, but not by way of the route predicted by Marx. Social scientists no longer find the concepts 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' useful in analysing industrial societies. But if we think, instead of a 'middle class', the evidence in all the advanced nations points squarely to its expansion at the expense of both the upper and the lower classes.

In income, in education, in occupation, and in consumption patterns, then, the differences among people in industrialised societies are becoming attenuated.

An economy of abundance, in brief, is quite different from an economy of scarcity; it cannot operate if there are too many have-nots. It creates haves and have-mores, rather than haves and have-nots.

Abundance, in brief, with its powerful drive toward equality alters not only the principle of class organization, but also the issues which divide classes.

The 'proletariat' has not absorbed the middle class, but rather the other way round.

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One wonders if two dangerous generalisations are not present in the above statements. First, we meet again the tendency to assume rather facilely, that as soon as two classes have about the same number of coins in their pockets they become indistinguishable in every way, and, therefore, become united into a single, prosperous class. Second, as is more clear elsewhere in the essay, there is an apparent tendency to generalise from the American social scene to all "industrialised societies", (which is not to admit that the analysis is correct even for the U.S.). Kurt Mayer, indeed, stresses differences between the consciousness of class on the opposite sides of the Atlantic. "The sharp disparity between the objective reality of twentieth century American class structure and the national mentality (an "everyone is middle class" ideology) is one of the most important contrasts between American and European systems of stratification, and poses many fascinating problems."

Mayer goes on to outline the ways in which the facts of social life in the U.S. are again coming into line with the predominant ideology of a "middle class country". He explains several trends within working class life - each with its counterpart to a greater or lesser extent in British life - which he sees as bringing together fact and myth. One is the lessening of insecurity of wage-labour, long a scourge of the worker's life (not to speak of any meagre savings he may have accumulated), which the established power of trade unions has brought about. Another trend lies in the industrial changes which take the sting out of the invidious notion "that manual work is degrading because it is 'dirty'". Three, there is the spread of "middle class patterns of consumption". Four, and for Mayer very central, there is increased opportunity for educational

achievement by working class children. Obviously, these trends are social forces of great magnitude. But what they now mean for the class structure, and will mean in the future, is problematic and disputable.

Quite clearly, as I have gone to some lengths to demonstrate, different interpretations can be placed on the "improvements" in the economic situation of the working class. The controversy has been elaborated in the foregoing discussion because it is very relevant to our concerns in chapters II to IV. Do the responses of the men in this study point to a "fusion" of classes, socially and culturally as well as financially, or do they point to the continuation of clear lines of separation? My conceptual treatment of social class, elaborated earlier, would certainly seem to commit me to Lockwood's point of view, that cultural and integrative elements of class are forces not easily attenuated by rapid financial changes alone. On this theoretical basis then, I would postulate that the "subjective" components of class to be examined

1. It should be made clear that this survey was not initially designed for the purpose of testing the "embourgeoisement" thesis. For instance, Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt carried out an intensive study of Luton workers whose high average incomes and geographical mobility were assumed to predispose them especially to embourgeoisement. (The findings of this research were reported in a preliminary way in a paper, "The Affluent Worker" presented to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Cambridge, on the 3rd September, 1965). They conclude that, even among these very affluent workers, there is little substantiation for the notions that manual workers are either merging with the middle class or are endeavouring to do so. Workers in the Prestonfield study, on the other hand, were not chosen as ideal "candidates" for embourgeoisement and were not carefully examined in terms of various indicators of financial well-being. However, I would judge from the fact that the majority of them are "skilled workers" and from observations of their homes and - in many cases - their cars, that they are at least "average" workers income-wise and are probably quite typical of Scottish urban workers as a whole. In other words, to the extent that the "workers becoming middle class" hypothesis is tested by this study, it is tested with regard to an "average" rather than an especially affluent group of workers.
will reflect significant, prevailing social class differences. More specifically, it is expected that there will be found notable class variations in "social perspectives", in "class-consciousness" and in the factors associated with the term "life style". This hypothesis, taking the accumulative impact of the various measures, will be confirmed by the following data.

Indeed, the hypothesis is vindicated least by the assorted indicators of "social perspectives" which will occupy our attention in the remainder of this chapter. The strands of data included under this rather imprecise rubric are, in a sense, preliminary to the major pursuits of class-consciousness and "life-style" information in chapters three and four. Opinions of a more general, society-wide nature - perhaps less class oriented - will be explored in this introductory exploration of social class data.

B. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

Within this section one-half of the twenty-four "projective" questions employed in the interview are examined. These were "sentence-completion" phrases, simulating the technique made popular by psychoanalysis, designed to elicit unguarded opinions. Though these completely "open" queries present obvious difficulty in coding and analysis it was hoped that they would produce unembellished attitudes from below the surface of conventional expressions and cliches. In a large measure, I believe this objective was achieved, though a few of the phrases, as it turned out, merely called forth hackneyed commonplace. The remaining twelve "projective" questions will be scattered through the thesis as they are pertinent to a variety of themes, but will always be identified by the term "projective". Even within the present sections a number of topics
loosely joined by the above heading will be parcelled out for analysis.


The first of these "projective" phrases to be examined elicited from the working class respondents some responses which - as suggested at the beginning of the chapter - appeared at first surprising. In this case, the "lead in" phrase was, "Generally, the people who are to blame for industrial strikes are .." The surprise arises out of the uniform condemnation of workers and unions which is even more pronounced and sweeping among the working-class men than among the middle class men. The range of responses have been collapsed into five categories: workers and trade unions; hot heads and agitators; employers and "strikes justified"; both sides and "poor communications"; and Communists. The results appear in Table II - 1.

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1. My personal reaction to some of the profiles of response on these items - especially working class responses - is reflected to some extent in the interpretations. As an observer who was able to subjectively assimilate the "tone" and "mood" of remarks as well as to record the words used in conveying opinions, I found myself developing a "hunch" that the working class respondents were uncovering personal attitudes which are both cogent and at variance with the "accepted" workers' point of view. The concrete data can be interpreted as supporting this impression at a number of points and I will, therefore, consider them in this manner. But I want to record the fact that other interpretations - and qualifications - than those which I advance could be attached to the data. Indeed, the line of interpretation which I take on the "economic perspectives" questions is not really the most convenient one for it is somewhat "at odds" with findings presented in the next two chapters; this line is taken simply because I think it is probably valid.
The prevailing opinion is expressed succinctly, and in virtually the same words, by a police sergeant and a joiner. The former said, "the worker is his own worst enemy"; the latter put it, "your worst enemy is your own mates". Within each class grouping trade unions or workers are held responsible for strikes at least three times as often as are employers. Furthermore, it may be inferred that "hot heads", "agitators" and "communists" are also workers - this was my impression - and combining these categories with the "trade unions, workers" category makes it clear that the total blame-assessment falls overwhelmingly to
the side of the workers. It may be argued that workers are naturally blamed in the sense that they are the ones who actually go out on strike. However, the incomplete statement was carefully worded to elicit a naming of those "to blame" rather than those who "cause" or "start" the strikes.

It is interesting that the workers themselves are less specific in their self-condemnation, preferring to speak in general terms of "workers" or "trade union" rather than specifying the irresponsibles among the workers, as is done most frequently among the borderline and middle groups. This would seem to affirm the idea that workers are attributing responsibility to a collectivity of which they are a part rather than to certain types of workers detached from themselves.

Within the same basic realm of attitudes, consider the answers to the "projective" statement: "People who get ahead financially usually do so because ..." Here, again, we encounter, in the first place, a striking uniformity among the different levels, and secondly, evidence of a very "unsocialistic" viewpoint among the working class men. The variety of responses are collapsed into four categories shown in Table III - 2.

1. Two qualifications should be made to the interpretation of these findings: unfortunately the question does not distinguish between "official" and "wildcat" strikes and I have no way of knowing whether respondents were assuming one or the other forms of protest in their responses or were taking "strikes" as a uniform phenomenon; also, it is possible that workers who "blame" trade unions or workers, have in mind not themselves but other "workers" such as shop stewards. My own impression is that there was a definite implication of "self-condemnation".
TABLE III - 2

WHY PEOPLE GET AHEAD FINANCIALLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Connection</th>
<th>Clever</th>
<th>Ambitious</th>
<th>Unscrupulous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>start rich</td>
<td>work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>lucky</td>
<td>hard</td>
<td>ability</td>
<td>frugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(38) 16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(18) 11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(40) 15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(96) 15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An engineer in a brewery said, illustrating the first category ("luck-connections"), "Much of it is pure luck; many may be semi-literate". Another replied, "This free mason business has a lot to do with it". A working man showed his admiration for those who "get ahead" (second category in table), "Bags of guts, that's what it takes". The "ambition" division includes such comments as, "They have a fixed and narrow aim in life". Those who deprecated the ethical practices of the successful did so in terms like these of a retired clerk of works who said, "These people tread on everybody getting there; nothing stands in their way".

Though this is the second largest grouping of answers, it is a distant second to the men who speak well of those who "get ahead financially".

Note that, in line with responses to the previous "projection", workers' assessment of the financially successful is slightly more complimentary than that of the middle class group. The Borderline men are least condemnatory in their evaluation. Indeed, there is more questioning of the ethical significance of financial achievement by the middle class group than by the others. Of course, it is possible that these results are influenced to some extent by differential class understanding of the term "getting ahead financially".

None-the-less, we would not expect to find this apparent sanctification of
the system by workers because a possible implication of such a view is that those who fail to reach the financial heights are themselves to blame. It is psychologically more plausible that those of relatively low status should condemn the system as unfair and "weighted" and thus rationalize their own position. It is one of the tenets of socialist doctrine — and we shall later see that there is a typical working class loyalty to the Labour Party — that opportunity needs to be leveled and hereditary advantages minimized, and that these distortions obtain in capitalistic systems. So, it would seem that either the workers believe the levelling of opportunity has been accomplished and they, therefore, accept their own positions economically as "failure" in fair competition, or else see themselves as having "opted out" of the struggle for monetary accrualment in favor of a less competitive existence.¹

Another possible explanation is that "social perspectives" may exist at different levels, i.e., in varying contexts within the cognitive framework of a single individual, so that, while maintaining a nebulous respect for the system "in the large" and for those in high places within the system, the person may view his own position in terms of gross inequity of opportunity. The possibility of inconsistency in the "general" (or societal) level of social perspectives and the "personal" (or local) level will appear again in this monograph as one of the theoretical threads that emerge.²

¹. One of Merton's "modes of individual adaption" may have application, that of "ritualism". "It involves the abandoning or scaling down of the lofty cultural goals of great pecuniary success and rapid social mobility to the point where one's aspirations can be satisfied. But though one rejects the cultural obligation to attempt to "get ahead in the world", though one draws in one's horizons, one continues to abide almost compulsively by institutional norms." In other words, the system is accepted without corroding self respect. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1957), p.p.149-150.

². Relevant though not directly comparable is a Gallup survey in England in which "as many as 3 in 5 of the sample (59%) said that to be successful you have to be dishonest on some occasions." Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., Television and Religion, (University of London Press, 1964) p.76.
A Detroit survey by L. Nuecker found that seventy per cent of the respondents said that people who had got ahead did so because of personal ability. He concluded, "The belief in the prevalence of individual opportunities is diffused among Americans ..."¹ But even in America this contradiction between acceptance of the system (and admiration of the successful) and disaffection with one's own opportunities is apparent. Berger in a survey of suburban dwelling workers, comments, "Horatio Alger" and 'rags to riches' are phrases which can no longer be uttered with a straight face; their usage is now almost exclusively ironic or derisive".² This question will be left for the time being without venturing a conclusive interpretation. It may fall into a pattern of cumulative evidence that will form an intelligible mosaic. Let us turn our attention to another projective statement which is roughly the converse of the previous: "The people who do not get good enough pay ..." The "sympathetic" category on the Table includes answers like, "they should get more", "it's unfortunate", "they need to get a minimum level", etc. The "workers" category contains some more specific descriptions like "workers in public industries", "lower workers", "most workers", and similar. The "own responsibility" responses are mainly along the line of "they don't earn it", and "they have themselves to blame". Table III-3 shows the distribution of replies.³

¹ Werner Lundecker, "Class Crystalization and Social Consciousness", American Sociological Review, April 1963
³ The variety of replies evidence the fact that the question was dealt with at different levels of conceptualisation: some specify the persons who are underpaid; others express an attitude toward such individuals. However, it may be significant that workers more often than the other groups manifest the former level of conceptualisation, denoting those who receive too little pay.
TABLE III - 3

PEOPLE WHO DON'T GET ENOUGH PAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sympathetic</th>
<th>Working men</th>
<th>Own responsibility</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here a somewhat more predictable class pattern comes to the fore, though there is still a considerable degree of similarity in attitude across class lines. A more paternalistic approach is evident with the middle class men; another policeman explained,

If they got better wages, they wouldn't spend it on the right things anyway, so they're just as well off.

A rather successful mechanical engineer with an electronics firm said, bluntly,

These are people who are not prepared to do something for themselves; they've just sat back and waited.

But as the table indicates, many of the middle class respondents were "sympathetic". This could be an instance of what Lenski says in a summary of some of his survey date in Detroit, "The higher the status of an individual, the greater the probability that he will take a humanitarian stand on impersonal political issues, but the less the probability that he will take a humanitarian stand so far as personal relationships are concerned." At least, it is striking that among the middle class men equal numbers make sympathetic statements and accusatory statements.

1. Lenski, op.cit p.317.
A substantial minority of the working class men also take an accusatory line toward the "underpaid". This would seem to be the logical counterpart of answers to the previously considered question which attributed desirable traits to the financial successful. And, of course, among the majority who said simply that workers received too little pay, it is plausible that many would have laid this fact to the workers' own actions or lack of actions.

One wonders if the statement of Chinoy, applying to the American working class, and related to his own study of automobile workers, might not have some applicability, "The tradition of opportunity imposes heavy burdens upon workers who must repeatedly reconcile desire, stimulated from diverse sources, with the realities of working-class life. Since each individual is assigned full responsibility for his economic fate, failure can be due only to limited ability or defects in character -- lack of ambition or determination or initiative, for example -- and not the absence of opportunity. Self-regard and self-esteem are challenged by this assumption, that failure to rise from the level of wage labour is 'one's own fault'."¹

It is precisely because of the debilitating effect of accepting such a view of success and failure in financial terms, that we would have expected the workers to "attack" the system and the successful in these projective answers, and thus lay the blame elsewhere. But, they have not, in the main, done so.² The kind of "devaluation" and debunking of financial success found frequently among lower status persons is articulated by Burns. "In their own sector of society and increasingly as they get older and hardened to their class position, success must

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2. Chinoy's workers, it should be said, also "do not explain their failure to rise in terms of forces beyond their control". ibid, p.124.
be devalued as improper, as bought by sycophancy, by cheating or at best by chance".\(^1\) It is possible that these projective statements have caught the workers so "off guard" that they have gone below the surface of their systems of rationalisations, and that below the surface they actually see the success system with a middle class perspective? Do these responses provide some verification for the notion of McCrae that where there are different ideologies in a society, the dominant conception will be that of the dominant class -- in western societies the Bourgeoisie?\(^2\)

A further link in this chain of "social perspectives" is provided by the answers to the question, "Which would you say is more important in getting ahead, ability or having the right connections?" Many did not opt singularly for one or the other, but still emphasised one of the two choices; these are included with those who did make outright choices. The "even" category is reserved for those who quite pointedly said that the two were of equal importance. Table III - 4 gives the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Connections</th>
<th>Even</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ability is, obviously, the majority choice of each group, most overwhelmingly so among the borderline status men. But, the workers see "connections" as predominating nearly as often. This is more in line with the notion that workers see success in terms other than personal ability, but does not correspond very well with the previous "projections" on those who get ahead financially. But, this was a direct question which might have made a difference. The "connections" answers may be a conditioned response — a rather hackneyed and familiar line.

Some repeated the well-known,

It is not what you know, but who you know,

and versions of

If you have the right connections you can get anywhere.

A plumber said,

You must have luck. You need a wee push. Some with ability don't get ahead; some without do because of connections.

Some added optimism to their view, like the labourer who said,

It still takes connections, but I like to think that in the future this will change.

Others personalised the question. A linotype apprentice answered,

Connections — too much depends on what school you went to. I just went to a junior secondary school. I couldn't compete with someone who went to a fee-paying school.

A young man working with his father in a successful business said,

In technical subjects, ability counts. Old school ties play a big part in other businesses.

An insurance salesman noted that,

The average working man's son must be brilliant and outstanding to get a chance with an employer.

Still within the general realm of perspectives on the nation's economic affair, another projective statement given was, "The high cost of living is caused by ... " This statement quite clearly makes the assumption that the cost
of living is "high", and this assumption was challenged by only one respondent, a physicist for the government, who maintained that in "real terms" the cost of living was at quite an acceptable level. But, since this is an assumption which I correctly believed would echo popular opinion (and popular complaint) I hoped it would elicit further insight into the respondents' opinions of responsibility for economic difficulties. Several kinds of replies are categorised in Table III - 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III - 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH COST OF LIVING CAUSED BY ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, as in the case of blame-assessment for industrial strikes, the overall result shows a higher assessment of blame to the workers in their demands for higher wages. This is equally the case for middle class and working class men. However, the answers are to an extent along class lines. Workers blame management and "financeers" more often than the other groups, though not "in mass" by any means. They also point a finger at the "government" quite frequently, as do the borderline men. During the time of the survey the Labour Government was in its early months of power, but the Conservatives had recently concluded a thirteen year tenure. So, if there is a class "angle" in accusing the government (and not just a sort of unspecified feeling that the government is the culprit whenever something is seen as "out of whack") then it is more likely that the Conservative
regime is in mind, rather than the recently elected Labour administration. Perhaps, the most significant feature is the continuing reluctance of workers to follow a stringently "class-conscious" line and to hold the higher status realms responsible for economic problems.

Two final projections included under the "economic attitudes" rubric are not directly economic in nature but carry definite economic implications. One of these was introduced by the words, "one of the things I think is unfair in Britain ..." A full one-third of the responses named taxation or one of the welfare schemes as unfair. The second most frequent type of criticism applied to class divisions, "discrimination" or unfairness in education, and these seemed logically added together in a single category. There was a particularly large array of answers which made categorisation difficult. Table III - 6 shows the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III - 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE THING UNFAIR IN BRITAIN ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not surprising to find a higher proportion of criticism of taxation and welfare programmes by middle class men for they bear a greater tax load and receive relatively less of the welfare benefits. Besides, middle-class persons are more likely to feel that welfare programmes lead to laziness and unproductiveness.
These sorts of feelings are fostered by announcements like that of Lord Robens, Chairman of the National Coal Board, that "the incidence of absenteeism in his industry had risen about two per cent each time the National Insurance benefits had been raised." However, it is surprising to find the higher middle class proportion of answers naming class discrimination and inequality of education as unfair. The numbers involved do not allow for major elaboration of this finding, but are enough to suggest a considerable awareness of the operation and effects of class distinctions. What is really more striking is the relative absence of such criticisms on the part of workers, though this does follow the pattern of general acceptance of the social structure which has been apparent in the previous questions.

For the borderline group this is a more prominent area of "unfairness", perhaps testifying to a greater sensitivity to discrimination due to their position at the intersection of middle and working classes.

Several of the answers illustrate the sort of criticisms being leveled. A taxi driver felt the pinch in a very specific way. He answered, "taxes on whisky, cigarettes and beer". It could be that much of the unhappiness with taxes and welfare programmes is based on the purely personal appraisal that too much money is taken from the wage packet or salary, rather than a reasoned rejection of the expenditures of the government. Several men took a more ideological line such as the maintenance man who said, "the values -- pop singers getting so much more than doctors -- and things like that". One of the "class" denunciations is voiced by a young business executive, "a law for the rich and a law for the poor".

Look at another "projective" approach to social perspectives: "The men who have an easy time of it ..." This phrasing allowed unfortunately, for two distinct kinds of answers, those saying who have an "easy time", and those saying something about such men. Most respondents gave the latter twist in completing the sentence. Of those who said "who" these men were, virtually all suggested the

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"wealthy", "high-born", "those born with a silver spoon in their mouths", and the like. This tack was taken most notably by the borderline men, which is in line with their relatively high emphasis of "class" unfairness in the previously considered question.

Approximately equal proportions of middle class and working class respondents saw "luck" as the primary factor. But, in the other two main categories of answers we meet a stark contrast. The middle class men emphasise that such men are "bored" and "not so happy", or "have problems of their own"; in other words in terms of the effect of such a life on the person himself. The workers on the other hand, strongly emphasise the worthlessness of such men in such terms as "they should work", "they're lazy", "it's not deserved", "they're dishonest", etc. Table III - 7 gives the full results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wealthy</th>
<th>Lucky</th>
<th>Bored</th>
<th>Idle</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One suspects that the contrast in these two categories hints at a definite difference in value systems. The middle class men seem to value useful work (assuming this to be the converse of having an "easy time") in regard to its "fulfillment" of the individual than as a social responsibility which it is immoral to shirk. This finding may bear some relationship to the finding of Kohn that "working class parents value qualities that assure respectability", while, in contrast
middle class parents value the development of internal standards of conduct. This is a much discussed and disputed problem. But, in the framework of such an interpretation, the point is that middle class men see such an "easy time" as a violation of standards of conduct which are internalized, and thus, disillusioning in a personal way. Workers, instead, see such living as "not respectable" and socially evil because it does not include the basic pre-requisite of a "job" to do.

2. "Future" Perspectives.

Two questions, direct rather than "projective", ask the respondent to assess the future into which children of today are growing. The first was phrased, "Do you feel that there is much opportunity for children of working men to get ahead or not?" The answers were overwhelmingly optimistic. Special stress was laid by many upon educational opportunity, especially by the borderline men with whom this came out in a majority of cases. It may indicate again a keen perception of status by these men, in this instance an appreciation of education as the key factor in vertical mobility. Another interesting result is a rather large minority of working men who stressed that job opportunity depends entirely upon the child himself.

This question provoked some of the most lucid and penetrating responses of the interviews. Some of the connotations evident in many of the replies are impossible to capture in numerical comparisons alone. For instance, some of the workers who were affirmative in their assessment of opportunities for working men's children in a general way, still envisioned limitations compared with other sections of the community. These answers tell the story.

Yes, there is thorough education; but it's much harder for children of working men. They have smaller homes and the kids don't have separate rooms for studying; there's always too much activity going on.

Yes, if they get the education; but they still don't get the education in the ordinary secondary school.

They need to show ability quick, before eleven, and if not, there's not much opportunity.

Yes, if a man wants to sacrifice to put his kid through. Of course, sometimes, no matter what you do, you can't get them to stay after fifteen.

Chances are better, definitely, but not as good as if you have money.

A number of respondents above working class status showed remarkable acuity in pin-pointing some of the limitations inherent in working class life which affects the workingman's children in their likelihood of advancement. The terminology used is not sociological, but it is humbling to note that not all social insight is reserved for the sociologist. Here are some of the replies.

No, I really don't. You need a higher education. The average working man can't afford to keep his child in school for that long. If a boy leaves school at fifteen, labouring or something, then that's the end of his opportunity.

No, not in Edinburgh. This is a very class-conscious city. If you go to a good school, you're in.

No, in working class areas the classes in schools are too big, and there is a shortage of teachers, so they don't get a good enough education.

It really depends on the ability and training of the parents. In most cases they want their kids to leave school early and go to work. It's a dead-end.

No, because they're from people who have set mechanical jobs, and don't provide any incentive.

A policeman had taken special interest in a boy from a bad home; he illustrated his answers with the story of this boy.

No, because of the limitation of home environment; there is no encouragement at all. I had the chance to help this boy who had flunked his school exams and had got into all sorts of trouble. I got to know him, took him with me places, and was able to give him some new goals. Now, he's in one of the best schools in Scotland and is at the very top in studies. But his parents don't care a bit. I try to keep in touch with him, and ask him how it's going and keep pushing him along. I keep thinking, too, if no one had taken an interest he would have amounted to nothing even though he's a very bright boy. Now he's well on his way.

These are a vocal minority. Several other non-manual respondents demonstrate the prevailing trend in affirming opportunity.
In Edinburgh there's not so much, but there is in industrial areas; especially in trades there's a much better opportunity, today, than we got.

I think there is, actually. I think the barrier between working man and, so-called, upper class is breaking down — certainly in the science field.

Yes, more. There's not the class distinction there used to be. Today a clever person can get to a good school.

A few answered in a personal way, like these two middle class respondents.

Yes, I'm one. My father drove a lorry.

Yes, there's every chance. I'm from a working class background was sent to a grammar school, and there was introduced to a new world which I liked. But, they couldn't do any more for me.

The full results are numerically represented in Table III - 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III - 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN OF WORKING MEN?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lenski asked his respondents virtually the same question in Detroit. Within the white Protestant religious division, seventy-three per cent of the middle class said that workingmen's sons have a good chance for advancing as opposed to sixty-two per cent for the working class. Similar comparisons were found for the other ethnic religious groups. If the "depends on the child" replies are taken as

1. Lenski, op. cit., p. 104.
mitigating a fully affirmative reaction, then our results tend in the same direction, which is the direction we would expect. The borderline men are overwhelmingly affirmative, without a single direct "no" answer. They were also one-sided in giving "ability" the edge over "right connections" as favourable to advancement. With such small numbers, apparent significance of these differences may be chimeric, of course, and they seem to contradict, on the surface of them, the high awareness of status factors evidenced by the Borderline respondents on other questions.

The working class group has a lower proportion of definitely affirmative responses (combining "yes" and "yes - education") and although the divergence is not overly persuasive, the workers probably reflect, to this extent, their own life experience in discerning less opportunity. The working class group has, of course, experienced less vertical social mobility in comparison with the other status groups. However, it is not easy to reconcile this tendency with the very strong emphasis on the admirable personal qualities of those who "get ahead financially". There may be slightly different points of view at work. Those who succeed are "given their due" and acknowledged, by and large, as capable and hard working. But, as for the means and likelihood of advancement from a lower position, restrictions are perceived by about half of the workers. To oversimplify this interpretation: if you make it, you are probably deserving; if you don't, you may not have had a fair "go".

The other "future" query is more slanted toward an appraisal of the future itself. "Would you say that children today have a wonderful future to look forward to or not?" Again, the working class is less sanguine in its assessment with over half of the men in this group failing to say "yes" directly. The same is true, in a less pronounced way, with the borderline group. In fact, the totals show a little less than half straightforward affirmative replies overall. Indeed, the "stand-out" feature of this question was the noticeably unenthusiastic view of the
future. Whether a melancholy outlook is deeply felt, or just a sort of philosophical affection, is hard to fathom. My own impression was that many, perhaps a majority, have genuine doubts concerning what the state of things will be in the years ahead.

Some of these doubts rested in an appraisal of the children themselves,

Oh, the future is good, but many neglect it. They're only interested in amusement.

Another man commented,

The trouble is the children are spoiled, but I blame the parents. Children today have no respect for anyone; they're just full of cheek. Kids who mix with this type have no chance.

But this kind of answer is more amusing than enlightening. The "younger generation" are often reckless, ungrateful, and incapable of holding on to the hard earned values they inherit, in the eyes of those who remember the past and their own youth in terms of pristine goodness.

More serious objections were suggested by some men pertaining to the internal affairs of the nation. One soliloquised,

No, there's not too much opportunity — too much control by government and scientists, etc., and besides, everybody's out to do in everybody else.

Protested another,

I'm doubtful about this. They could have; but the automation problem worries me. Everyone should learn two jobs, just to be sure.

A working man evidenced class-consciousness in his reply,

Yes, if the Labour Government continues going all out to educate the future generation. Some foundations, like Heriots, were started to help poor people of Edinburgh, but now they're all fee paying. It's terribly unfair.

The greatest volume and intensity of concern centered around the international scene, however; the world situation was often viewed with forboding. A few of the replies illustrate this revealing "prophetic" outlook:

Barring war — and we must forget this, or we're done now, for good.

Well, that brings in the bomb, doesn't it — in the past you didn't worry about the future in a dreadful way, but you do now.
Not particularly. Maybe in the educational field. But with what is going on in the world I'm not too optimistic about the future.

It's hard to say; you don't know what the future is going to be. I suppose the prospects are better --- barring war.

Yes, provided the world stays at peace. If someone gets stupid and gets something going, then civilisation as we know it is finished, I'm afraid.

No, the world is upside down. There's no security now.

TABLE III - 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children Have a Wonderful Future?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No, world situation</th>
<th>No other</th>
<th>Depends on children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I don't wish to be deliberately overlooking the nearly one-half of the men who unequivocally saw the future as bright for today's children, but the recurring theme that struck me forcibly was this pre-occupation with the disastrous possibilities of the future. One wishes he had some comparative researches to go on to reduce guesswork in trying to evaluate this pessimism. A very rough, "shot in the dark" hypothesis might be that Britons have been rather negatively conditioned to the future during the post-war era. Britain no longer "rules the waves", nor the colonies, nor, to a large extent, her own destiny. This cannot have escaped the notice of the populace. Victory in the World Wars was of a pyrrhic sort, won only at great cost economically, and perhaps, psychologically. Politicians and
others constantly fulminate against the sluggishness of the economy compared with other European nations. "Security" is a major shibboleth of the past twenty years, and those old enough to remember the thirties and forties fear both the convulsion of another military holocaust with the stakes unimaginably high, and the penurious hardship of another depression. As a visitor to this land, one senses a certain lack of buoyancy in the "national mentality". I am not concluding that Britains of all classes are joined in a mournful threnody as they look into the future, but only that a surprising degree of apprehension is evident.

3. Children and Training.

A question pertaining to the "upbringing" of children was borrowed from Lenski for purposes of comparison, namely, "while we are speaking of children, would you please look at this card. If you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as most important for a child to learn to prepare him for life?" First, second and third choices were requested from this list:

1. to obey
2. to be well liked or popular
3. to think for himself
4. to work hard
5. to help others when they need help

Table III - 10 shows the variety of answers for the first two selections.

---

1. Of course, I am assuming that similar pessimism would not be unearthed in other western societies, but lacking evidence, this can only be an assumption.
TABLE III - 10

IMPORTANT FOR CHILDREN TO LEARN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Obey</th>
<th>Be Popular</th>
<th>Think for self</th>
<th>Work Hard</th>
<th>Help others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our data presents considerable contrast to that of Lenski's. The general preference for "intellectual autonomy" as the most desirable of these traits to be instilled obtained for nearly half of his respondents, and for slightly over half for ours. But by class, he found great differences: conspicuously, our class groups are very similar throughout. Lenski found among Detroitors that commitment to intellectual autonomy increased regularly with status, and he, therefore, linked his results with vertical mobility. For the "white Protestant" ethno-religious group, the percentage making this choice were: lower working, 48%; upper working, 66%; lower middle 72%; and upper middle, 90%.


For our Edinburgh sample, this question has proved to provide far less significant differences with respect to class. But, of course, lack of difference in response is sometimes as meaningful as differences. Whereas, in the American study, obedience vied strongly for first place among the lower status respondents, here intellectual autonomy is a value apparently shared throughout the social echelons, with obedience uniformly running a distant second. Two results do stand out in the second choice table. The majority of "help others" responses by workers may indicate some continued adherence to the traditional working class values of "mateyness" and "neighbourliness" though we shall see in dealing with "life style" that commitment to these values has apparently declined in some areas. Also, the relatively high percentage of "work hard" answers by the borderline group may bespeak a stronger emphasis on striving for upward mobility by these in a rather precarious social position.

Another aspect of children's preparation for life is that of formal education. The differential evaluation of education associated with social class membership has been the subject of several studies. The findings have consistently linked higher status with higher valuation of education. Unfortunately, our only directly pertinent question was a projective one and was notably unsuccessful. The words used were, "Getting an education", and virtually all respondents finished the statement in terms of the essential nature and great importance of education. Either this indicates an abstract commitment to the value of education that might not be matched by a practical commitment in many cases; or an equally strong valuation throughout the strata in our survey; or simply that the statement, as phrased, could call forth nothing else. It does not, regretably, bring into focus the matter of "deferred gratification" which is of paramount importance in making the most of educational opportunity.

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4. Personal Values.

Venturing further with the logical assumption that social position and life situations find their counterpart in a particular system of values and social perspective, two value questions of a very general nature were asked, both within the "projective" section: "The most important part of a man's life..." and "The most important thing in life...". These were separated by several other questions, and sometimes it was remarked that I was repeating myself, but generally they seemed to be accepted as distinct questions.

The first, regarding the "most important part" of life, elicited two different sorts of answers. About a fourth of the men named a particular time in life, almost entirely childhood, youth or young adulthood. Of the others, who referred to a "value" in life, a majority, quite evenly spread through the class groups, mentioned family, home, or marriage, in some manner. Of the remainder, a far larger proportion of workers alluded to "health" or "happiness" (33% compared with 15% and 17% for the border and middle groups). The border and middle groups more frequently named "a man's work" or "his accomplishments" (15% for middle, 12% for border, and 7% for working). Only twenty-one respondents are within these two answer categories, but it does seem to hint at a difference in emphasis, with the borderline group sharing the middle class stress on accomplishment. For working class men, life is apparently fulfilled in a more passive mood.

Where there are notable differences in the answers to the "one of the most important things in life" statement the borderline group is found on the side of the middle class group. This is true for a higher percentage denoting character traits like honesty, decency, "doing your part", and kindness; and a lower percentage of responses naming happiness or contentment. Table III - 11 shows the main categories of answers.
TABLE III - 11

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS IN LIFE...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>happiness</th>
<th>health</th>
<th>security</th>
<th>family</th>
<th>character</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary differentiation of response lies in the greater middle class and Borderline emphasis on character traits. This would seem to reaffirm the earlier finding that middle class persons lay greater stress on internalised standards rather than social respectability.

5. Friendship Perspectives.

Finally, three "projections" roughly related to the values of friendship will be introduced and briefly analysed. The first, "To me a real friend is someone who ..." brought forth standardised cliches in the main. About seventy per cent of the men in all, and over eighty per cent of the middle class men, uttered some version of "sticks by", "is constant", "is a friend in need", etc. The only other stress is found among the workers and borderliners, accounting for about thirty per cent of their answers. This is an emphasis on the "social" factors of friendship: mutuality of interests, sharing of problems and closeness of fellowship and could be seen as reiterating the "matey" inclination.

A related projective statement proved more insightful: "The best way to be of help to others..." Three main categories of responses emerge: those who simply complete the sentence with phrases like, "help them" or "do what you can"; those which stress the possession of certain ingratiating character traits (e.g. "be
reliable", "be considerate", "be cheerful", etc.; and those which focus on sympathetic or empathetic actions, such as "put yourself in their place", "try to be understanding", and so forth. As table III - 12 shows, the middle class respondents again place high value on character with forty per cent of their answers falling in this division. The Borderline men most frequently stress a sympathetic relationship. The working class division is weighted toward the largest grouping of "simplistic" answers.

**TABLE III - 12**

**THE BEST WAY TO HELP OTHERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Help in need</th>
<th>Character traits</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III - 13 contains figures for the main types of answers to another projective statement relating to interpersonal relationships, "The way to have people think well of you ..." Here the character stress is only slightly more evident among the middle class, but they more often suggest that it is most important to "be natural", "be yourself" or "be straight". The workers and border groups most often opted for some version of "treat them well". Sociability again was mainly a workers' emphasis, though a fairly low percentage in all cases.
TABLE III - 13

THE WAY TO HAVE PEOPLE THINK WELL OF YOU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Treat them well</th>
<th>Character traits</th>
<th>Be natural</th>
<th>Sociable</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Summary of "Social Perspectives".

Perhaps the most salient result of this analysis of "social perspectives" is the limited variation of opinions for the different status levels. In general, the economic and social scheme is apprehended quite similarly throughout the class hierarchy. There is a definite tendency to see national economic woes as the responsibility of workers; there is a rather large volume of criticism of the tax and welfare structure; there is a startling note of melancholy when the men are asked to gaze into their crystal balls and prognosticate the future; there is a consistent emphasis on "intellectual autonomy" for children and a uniform stress on the importance of education. Occupational success is seen as within the reach of workingmen's children and ability as sufficient to make it a reality.

All of this holds true with particular strength for the middle-class respondents, who also place relatively high emphasis on admirable character traits. The Borderline men in almost all cases are close on their heels in announcing these perspectives. Working class respondents, though varying notably at a few points, are surprisingly often found voicing the same views. They do, however, bring to bear some consciousness of lower status in a more restrained optimism about the opportunity for workingmen's children to "get ahead" and about the sufficiency of
ability vis a vis "having the proper connections". They lay more stress on sociability in interpersonal relations which falls in line with the traditional life style of workers, romanticised by Hoggart, and empirically examined by Young & Wilmott - though not without some romanticising inclination as well.

What is really most startling, though, is that workers largely seem to place themselves under the obloquy of economic irresponsibility. They place the blame for strikes squarely on their own shoulders, and also see the cost of living shooting upwards because of their own demands. Moreover, they have primarily panegyric and praise for those who have climbed to the top of the financial ladder, where quite obviously, they are not perched themselves. So, again we are reminded of the Glasgow shipyard, and the acceptance by several thousand workers of the most stringent restrictions on their hard-earned "sacred" rights. I would suggest that there is a growing undercurrent of conviction among workers in Britain that their own power is becoming a paralysis; there "security" a strangulation of industry; that many of their "walk outs" and "wildcat strikes" are trivial and debilitating; that their demands are frequently unmatched by industriousness. The impression is strong that serious qualms exist today in the workers' minds about the virtues of their own movement and the fullness of their contribution. Certainly it is plausible on the basis of these scanty data.

In the next chapter, data will be examined more straightforwardly connected with "class-consciousness". It will then be possible to say more assuredly whether the flashes of light from these "social perspectives" are very directly related to the class situation or are perspectives relatively independent of such influences. In any case, the expressions of perspectives and values, in themselves, have proved interesting and revealing. But the next two chapters will allow us to "come to grips" more directly with the question of working class "embourgeoisement".

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CHAPTER IV - CLASS-CONSCIOUSNESS

A. CLASS-IDENTIFICATION (SELF-PLACEMENT).

1. Implications of Class Self-Placement.
2. Self-Placement Findings.
3. Frames of Reference.

B. WORK ATTITUDES.

1. Important Values in Work.
2. Trade Union Attitudes.
3. Work Aspirations.
4. Summary of Work Attitudes.

C. POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.

1. Voting Patterns.
2. Voting Explanations
3. Fathers' Political Support
4. "Projective" Political Opinions

D. SUMMARY.
According to Richard Centers, "An individual's strength of membership feeling in a social class, either in itself or as an index of some more fundamental determinant, is widely involved in his response to his social world". An individual's values and perspectives do not take root and develop without a nourishing soil. The ingredients of the soil are to a large measure contributed by the social situation. Part and parcel with the social situation is involvement in particular social groups which occupy given positions within the social structure. A degree of comprehension of one's belongingness to a particular milieu and comprehension of the relative position of that social environment compared with other major social environments in the society is bound to develop. Thus, such awareness of social position and membership - "class-consciousness" or "class-identity" - is of crucial importance in translating the fact of one's social situation into behaviour and attitudes which seem appropriate.

Most of the sociological concern about class-consciousness has centered around the working classes. No doubt this, in part, reflects the Marxian legacy. To Marx the understanding by the Proletariat of their class "interests" and the resultant militant agitation for revolution was the crux of bringing in the new era - and, of course, bringing down the bosses of the old Capitalistic era. Naturally, higher classes are also imbued with this "sense of class" but it is assumed that class-consciousness at higher levels is likely to be conservative. The main threat to the existing social structure virtually always resides in the lower echelons for the class-consciousness at these levels is often revolutionary. Metaphorically, those riding in the first class cabins and eating at the captain's table are not likely to want to "rock the boat"; those peering out of the portholes down below just might.


2. In the Detroit Metropolitan Area, Landecker found class crystallisation particularly strong on the highest status level and weak at both the intermediate (and contrary to expectations) and the lowest levels. Werner S. Landecker, "Class Crystallisation and its Urban Pattern", *Social Research*, Autumn 1960.
So the explosive possibilities of working class consciousness receive most attention from students of society and social change.

Richard Hoggart has elegantly expressed his observations of the internal coherance and class-consciousness of British working class life. His grasp of the feelings engendered, writing as an "insider" is worth repeating at some length.

Presumably most groups gain some of their strength from their exclusiveness, from a sense of people outside who are not "us". [In working class life] this strength arises partly from a feeling that the world outside is strange and often unhelpful, that is, has most of the counters stacked on its side, that to meet it on its own terms is difficult. One may call this ... the world of the "them". "Them" is a composite figure ... the world of the "them" is the world of the bosses ... "them" may be, as occasion required, anyone from the classes outside other than the few individuals from those classes whom the working people know as individuals ... To the very poor especially, they compose a shadowy but numerous and powerful group affecting their lives at almost every point; the world is divided into "them" and "us" ... The "them/us" attitudes seem to me strongest in those over thirty-five, those with memories of unemployment in the thirties, and of all the "them"s" of those days. Younger people, even if they are not active in the unions, here inherit a different atmosphere from that their father grew up in: at least, the atmosphere has a different emotional temperature... At bottom the division is still there and little changed in its sharpness ... 1

This view of a sustained and little diminished consciousness of class, is directly contradicted by Zweig. His view of the "new worker" is that,

Old slogans, old loyalties tend to leave him cold. The class struggle interests him less and less, the idea of the working class as an oppressed or an exploited class or the romanticised idea of the working class as foremost in the struggle for progress and social justice, is fading from his mind ... Class divisions are no longer marked out by hostility and segregation. They are still there, but class feelings are less active and less virulent. Also the ethos of class solidarity, of group movement, seems to be weakened ... 2

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To be sure, it can be argued that Hoggart and Zweig are looking at altogether different groups of workers. The matter of "life style" is brought to attention; clearly the working class resident of a new and spacious council scheme may have a very different perception of class divisions than the resident of a dilapidated and over-crowded tenement in the centre of a bustling city. The style of life factor will follow class-consciousness in our discussion, occupying the next chapter.

But, for the moment, it is worth illuminating the fact that the question, posed earlier of the "embourgeoisement" of the working class is crucially tied up with the question of class-consciousness. In the "traditional view", the worker is painfully aware of poverty, propertylessness, and powerlessness in the industrial scheme of things. He is deeply aware of his own "community" and the succour of "togetherness" in the sharing of deprivation; and he is prone to hostility against those he sees as his oppressors. This comes reasonably close to Hoggart's statements. The "new working class" view, as illustrated by Zweig, sees the evenessence of class exclusiveness, militancy and solidarity, mainly because the worker is aware of being a full-fledged, responsible member of a materially enriched society.

But the matter of class solidarity is not based entirely on working class attitudes. As Lockwood and Goldthorpe have emphasised, for the working and middle classes to become merged in any meaningful sense (going beyond equalisation of incomes) there must be social "acceptance" of workers on the part of those higher up the scale as well as working class elevation. There must be a weakening of middle-class consciousness as well as a weakening of working-class consciousness, especially in terms of social exclusiveness.¹

¹ Such potential alterations in middle-class attitudes are seen as pre-requisite to the absorption of workers into the Bourgeoisie but not as sufficient in themselves.
And there must develop a commitment to the same values and life style which is most likely to occur where there is a considerable amount of cordial interaction. Lockwood and Goldthorpe believe it is visionary to see such developments at the present time.¹

Our survey data on class-consciousness decidedly confronts the question of working-class embourgeoisement and the parallel issue of the validity of our class definition with its stress on "commonality". Class-consciousness will be examined along three lines: the matter of class identification (self-placement); work attitudes and aspirations; and political commitments and opinions. On the basis of my conceptual stance and concurrence with the position of Lockwood and Goldthorpe, the natural expectation is that there will be found significant disparities in response with respect to class, and that these variations will accumulatively testify to the retention of a "sense of class" and awareness of class divisions.

A. CLASS IDENTIFICATION (SELF-PLACEMENT)

1. Implications of Class Self-Placement.

Robert Merton has elaborated in his "Reference Group Theory" the importance of an individual's identification with certain groups upon his behaviour? If all identification derived automatically from the groups in which a person is observably a participant, prediction of conduct and attitude would be much simplified. But, a person may take as point of reference groups to which he aspires, and therefore, adopt not only a conscious identification with these groups, but values and perspectives he perceives embodied in these groups as well. Therefore, a considerable insight is gained in knowing the identification an individual chooses in terms of social class.

Of course, it does not follow inevitably that the class named when one is asked to place himself by social class is his major status reference group. He

1. Lockwood and Goldthorpe, op.cit., p.
2. Merton, op. cit., Chapters VIII and IX.
may give what he considers the "appropriate" answer even if his aspirations or personal contacts lead him to "refer" himself, in actuality, to different groups. Class self-placement is none-the-less one useful indicator of a person's "reference" system.

One complication in analysing responses for "subjective class" is the variety of ways in which people conceive of the lines of social class division. In order to make comparisons the assumption must be made that people share a similar "frame of reference", otherwise the meaning of the comparative placements is greatly attenuated. F.M. Martin in a 1950 study in Greenwich and Hertford, found glaring discrepancies in the frames of reference adopted by various respondents when they were asked to describe the type of occupations within the different classes. However, the discrepancies follow fairly regular configurations according to Martin's findings. The discrepancy most germane to our own data is his finding that those in non-manual occupations who consider themselves "working class" tend to define working class with extreme breadth, voicing the "everyone who works for a living" type of perspective. Middle class persons who identify with the middle class tend to define working class more narrowly and precisely. Not only do descriptions of class membership differ in terms of where the lines of demarcation are drawn on an occupational basis, but in some cases the occupational criterion is replaced by criteria of character, education, income or standard of living. Though this is an instructive caveat which is all too often ignored, our respondents were asked to explain the basis of their self-placement and their replies should enable us to reduce the difficulties presented by varying frames of reference.


2. But this is a complex area, and I would not pretend that all of the conceptual variations impinging on the responses have been exhumed. In particular we do not know fully how the respondents conceive of the shape of the class system and where they draw the lines of demarcation between the classes.
2. Self-Placement Findings.

The question put to each of the respondents was, "If someone should ask you what social class you belong to, what would you say?" In the few cases in which the respondent was stymied by the "open-ended"-ness of the query the choice of "working, middle or upper" was added; in each of these cases the individual then conclusively placed himself within the ranks of the working class. A further, very small, minority deviated from the typical "working class" and "middle class" descriptions. Four said either that there "are no classes" or "I don't believe in classes", and thus exempted themselves from any placement. There was one "labouring class" description and a single "professional class" description. No one said "lower" or "upper" class. All others chose either working or middle class, a few of the latter specifying "lower middle class". In fact, two-thirds of the total number applied to themselves the term "working class". The table below makes a finer distinction than usual, going back to the original five occupational divisions. These are identified as Working\(^1\) and Working\(^2\); Middle\(^1\) and Middle\(^2\) as well as Borderline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS SELF-PLACEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Totals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the close similarity with middle class respondents on the values and perspectives questions, it is striking that the Borderline group identify with the working class almost as consistently as do the working class men themselves. And we have shown that, overall, there is an educational and occupational advantage for the Borderline men over working class men. This is one of two salient features. The other - and most significant - is the fairly even split within the middle class between working class and middle-class self-placement. Even in the second solidly middle-class group, one third of the respondents call themselves "working class". Indeed, this self-placement separation of the middle-class portion of the sample proves to be most meaningful.

3. Frames of Reference.

The follow-up question, requesting men to explain why they described themselves as they did, brings to light information which adds in interpreting the results. It was clear, for one thing, that those men classified as middle class who identified themselves with the working class, did so on different bases than the men classified as middle who described themselves as middle. In the latter case, the explanations of middle class membership revolved about three considerations: position, income and style of life (involving descriptions of leisure activity, etc). About sixty per cent of the "consistent" middle class responded along these lines. This contrasts with the "discrepant" middle class who stressed family background and the fact of "not putting on any airs", or something of similar connotation. There were also four in this group who evidenced a real struggle in making this self-placement, finally opting for a working class description, but with obvious difficulty. If these three types of reaction are combined, they account for over sixty per cent of the descriptions for the objectively middle class men who identify themselves with the working class.
These fourteen "discrepant" middle class respondents most acutely illustrate a curious phenomenon, that of seeming reluctance and embarrassment in adopting other than a working class identification. "Working class" seemed to be the only comfortable answer. One detected a feeling of being thought "pretentious" in choosing a middle class placement. This notable predilection for working-class self-placement presents a complete contrast with some similar survey questions asked in the United States where as many as eighty-eight per cent of a cross-section sample have identified themselves as "middle class". 1

Indeed, gross inconsistencies are found among the investigations of class-consciousness. Even in America, where the "middle class ideology" is highly publicised, other studies - notably those of Centers, 2 Hollingshead, 3 and Murphy and Morris 4 have demonstrated considerable status-awareness and high proportions of working class identification. In Britain, too, wide variations have been discovered in various surveys, but it has been "standard" to find a higher proportion of working class "upgrading" to middle class self-placement than middle class "downgrading" to working class identification. 5 In a Derby study, among


5. G.D.H. Cole, Studies in Class Structure, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955) p. 79. He quotes 1948 B.I.P.O. Poll in which there were actually more middle class self-placements than working class overall. F.M. Martin, op. cit., P. Willmott and M. Young, Family and Class In A London Suburb, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 115. 34% and 45% (on two separate questions) of working class respondents chose middle class identity. An exception which is directly in line with the Prestonfield findings is expounded by Peter Willmott. He found in a study in the solidly working class council estate of Dagenham (East London) that only 13% of the workers called themselves middle class. Peter Willmott, The Evolution of a Community, (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1963) p. 102.
those classified by the interviewer as middle class (as distinct from "upper middle") only seventeen per cent called themselves working class, five per cent abstained from making a self-placement, and the remaining seventy-eight per cent included themselves in branches of the middle class category.¹

So, our findings are really somewhat "out of step". Instead of the more typical variations in working class identification, there is overwhelming consistency of workers in making a working class self-placement. By contrast, within the middle class are found the notable difference in self-placement in this survey. This is, no doubt, in part a reminder of the general "lower middle class" rather than "professional class" nature of the group; and the fact that a high proportion of them have been upwardly mobile out of the working class. Even so, the strong tendency to select working-class placement where there is any doubt, and even when doubt would not be expected, is anomalous.

The explanations for working class placement predominating within the lowest stratum centre around money and position. Two-thirds of the working class men selecting working-class identity answered along one of these two lines. There seems to be no doubt among those who are objectively working class, and even among those bordering on middle class status, that they are squarely within the ranks of the working class.

The main question which emerges, then, is "why do so many men of middle class status identify themselves with the working class?" The focus of explanations has provided us with part of the answer: the emphasis on family (of origin) status

rather than present position, the deliberate shunning of social aggrandisement and the conspicuous hesitance prior to making the "safe" answer. Further insight into the frames of reference leading to these results is available from an analysis of three other variables: father's occupation, education and age. The "split" in middle class identity is found to correlate highly with each of the three factors. The first table below shows the father's major work on the basis of our objective status divisions for the entire sample. The second table examines father's occupation for middle class respondents alone, controlling by the division in class self-placement.

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**TABLE IV - 2**

**FATHER'S MAJOR OCCUPATION BY SOCIAL CLASS**
(by numbered status categories, lowest to highest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**TABLE IV - 3**

**FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY SELF-PLACEMENT OF MIDDLE CLASS MEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>objective status</th>
<th>class identification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>working</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: There is only one borderline father in these groups, and he is included within the middle class category.)
This second distribution table brings into yet clearer focus the crucial importance of family background in determining working class identification. In numerical terms, all but one of the "discrepant" middle class respondents are sons of working class fathers. This finding is congruent with that of Martin who concludes, "... those who have been mobile out of the manual working group (are) particularly likely to claim membership of the working class". And in our middle class group, about seventy per cent are but one generation removed from manual positions. In another study, dealing specifically with a number of working class children who had "made good" through the educational system and gone on to prestigious positions, it was found that only fifty-eight per cent described themselves as "middle class" despite obvious affluence and advanced education. The authors quote one of their school teacher respondents as saying, "We are working class, you've got to be what your parents are". Others described themselves as "disenfranchised" or "classless" because of the inconsistency between their parents' status and their own. Thus it seems that in Britain class identifications are sharply tinted with hereditary colouring.

The two other factors highly correlated with this subjective cleavage are definitely related to each other as well. In terms of age, 74\% of the middle class men under forty years identify with the middle class while 26\% identify with the working class. But for men forty or over, only 36\% place themselves in the middle class while the remaining 64\% place themselves in the working class. It may be worth mentioning, with respect to age, that all of the thirteen working class and borderline respondents over fifty years, without exception, identify with the working class; there is a minority of eight under fifty within these

1. Martin, op. cit., p. 58.

status groups who diverge from working class self-placement. So there is an evident tendency throughout the class range for younger men to include themselves within the middle class. Superficially, this would seem to "open the door" slightly to the "embourgeoisement" thesis, for if the trend toward greater identification with the middle class among younger men is substantiated, it could be interpreted as lending support to this conception. But I have already noted that more is required than the adoption of a certain class label for workers to be assimilated in the middle class.

As for the educational achievement within the middle class and its correlation with class self-placement, we find that of those middle class men with a senior secondary education or beyond, 75% are "consistent" and 25% are "discrepant". On the other hand, only 33% of the respondents who are objectively middle class but have less than a senior secondary school education are "consistent" while the other 62% are "discrepant". All four of the men in the sample with University training, as well as the one with College training, identify with the middle class. Curiously, however, all five of the borderline group (nearly one-third) who have had schooling beyond age sixteen identified with the working class. This is a peculiarly difficult group to assess.

To sum up concerning the "split identity" of the middle class group; the working class identifiers tend to be older men from working class homes, with little education, who, while working their way into higher status positions have retained a sense of working class belonging. In contrast, the middle class identifiers tend to be younger men from middle class - or upper working class - homes, who have been well educated and have thus been able to start out in relatively high status jobs.

Nothing so vividly expresses the thought patterns contributing to these statistical distributions as the words of some of the respondents themselves.
Starting with the largest group, the working class men who identify with the working class, we find many who explain mainly in terms of their work or financial position. (This one illustrates the technique of making the class distinction less invidious by vastly enlarging the ranks of the working class).

I'm working class, that's definite. In my opinion anybody who works, no matter what they do, are working class.

Replied others:

Working class; we live from week to week sort of style. Sometimes a man's taste is richer than his fortune; that's me.

Other workers thought more along the lines of "life style":

I'm working class -- my earnings for a start and also my way of life comes into it.

Working class -- I haven't put on any airs. I've been in that line all along.

Definitely working class; can't get out of the rut. If I won money on the pools I would still keep my own life.

Awareness of discrimination is evident in some of the workers' replies,

I'm working class but I know I'm as good as the next man, and that's what counts.

In the older generation, people in the upper class looked down on the working class.

The one Communist respondent quoted the party line,

Working class, because of my relationship to the means of production.

One of the few workers who placed himself in the middle class said,

Middle, I suppose -- where I live, the kind of job I have; but I don't really believe in class distinction; it's snobbery.

The other workers or borderline men who "upgraded" themselves in this way are represented by these statements,

Middle, I guess; only the 'up top' are really classed.

Middle -- not well off, not poor. I'm just a happy medium and very happy. (Later he referred to himself as a 'working man').

I'm middle. I've never been without or short of anything. I'm on the t'phone and I had a professional decorating job in my home. You won't see anything like this in council schemes. (He lived in the
Middle, or let's say, coming up to middle. The reason is money; you can't live in this locality and buy property without where-with-all.

There is evidence in these remarks of class awareness and, in some instances, striving for vertical mobility.

The most significant group in this survey are the middle class "self-deprecators". Some of these also broaden the working class base,

Working -- I would include teachers or any who work for others.

Middle class have people under their supervision.

There's no middle class any more -- only lower and upper. White collar workers get no better pay than labourers.

Others demonstrate the fear of status "climbing",

Working class, I loathe and detest the term middle class; the implications are all wrong.

I'm working class. I have no great social aspirations or anything like that.

Britain's very strong on class distinctions, Edinburgh especially - 'east windy and west endy', you know.

The largest proportion of these alluded to their backgrounds as the determinant of their class.

Definitely working class; probably because I had a working class education. Most of this was my own fault. I had the chance to go to senior secondary school, but I persuaded my parents to let me go to the junior secondary because I wanted a technical education.

(After great hesitation) It's between working and middle; I came from the working class.

I'm working class because my father worked all his life.

Working class because I was brought up in the working class, though the lower working class might consider me middle class.

Among the "consistent" middle class respondents some very interesting observations were made illustrating the predominant focus on position and "life style".

Middle, only one thing makes social class and that's money, unfortunately, how much you have or earn. If you get a bigger house you get into a higher class.
I detest the phrase, but middle class because of my area of residence.

I'd say lower middle — dress, school, friends, recreations, cultural interests — these things tell the story.

This is a sore point. I suppose, perhaps unconsciously, there is a desire to be middle class.

Lower middle class because of my intellectual outlook on life.

Middle class — probably what ninety-nine per cent of people would say. A middle class person in my mind is a suburbanite who drives a small and unpretentious car and is content to come home in the evening and do some work in the garden.

Lower middle class. But are there really social classes today? I don't really believe in class distinctions; people of different walks of life can be attracted to each other.

It's clear that even those who describe themselves as middle class generally do so with some embarrassment. The pervading tone is "anti-class distinctions". Five men did not go beyond stressing their disbelief in class or opposition to such distinctions. Such a pervading avoidance of "status seeking" as we have noted, is, to my knowledge, unparalleled by the findings of other investigations. It is probably best explained by the fact that the majority of our middle class respondents have been upwardly mobile from working class families of origin.

B. WORK ATTITUDES.

1. Important Values in Work.

Our exploration of class-consciousness turns now to values related to work.

An appropriate question from Lenski was put to the respondents in this manner:

Please look at this card. If you had to make a choice which of the things listed there would you say is most important to you in a job? (then) Which comes next?

The five choices were:

1) high income
2) no danger of losing the job
3) working hours are short; lots of free time
4) chances for advancement
5) the work is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment
Both in Lenski's Detroit study and in this smaller Edinburgh study, the fifth alternative predominated as the first selection. This was true for nearly half of Lenski's respondents and exactly half of ours — forty-six of ninety-two. He further discovered that the preference for this choice regularly increased with status, so that in the "lower working class" only one-third ranked this alternative first, while three-fourths of the "upper middle" did so. The relationship is not quite as neat in our findings, but decidedly in the same direction. Sixty-one per cent of the middle class men opted for this alternative as their first choice. They were joined by sixty-five per cent of the border-liners, while only thirty-four per cent of the workers made this their first choice.

Lenski interprets, indeed devised, this alternative as embodying a valuation for the intrinsic reward of work — the inner-motivated, personally fulfilling nature of work — as opposed to the value of the extrinsic reward of work embodied in the first alternative of "high income". The main point for Lenski is that this value characterises the "protestant ethic" emphasised by Max Weber and its counterpart, "the spirit of capitalism". He interprets the proportionately higher selection of this value by higher status persons as indicating greater commitment to these values consistent with his predictions. In short, work is highly regarded, not so much for what accrues from it, but as a value in its own right whose primary reward is the satisfaction of working constructively.

Our own findings are similar, but the question of derivation of this value need not be so specifically interpreted. It would be plausible to argue, for instance, that this is not an indicator of ideological orientation so much as

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1. Lenski, op. cit., p.89.

a reflection of the type of work in which one is involved. The more creative a job, and the more responsibility it entails to see that things are accomplished, the more it might be expected to be intrinsically rewarding. If this alternative hypothesis were valid, the above value would derive mainly from the level and type of work rather than the value — internalized before hand — leading to high status.

In either case, the finding reminds one of responses to the "projective" question on "the men who have an easy time of it" where it was found that such men were more pitied as bored and unhappy by the middle class respondents than condemned as lazy or unduly privileged. It is clearly believed by middle class men that work should be more than financially profitable; it should also be making a valuable contribution, and thus providing a personal satisfaction.

Since two choices were made, the results are shown parsimoniously by combining all of the choices within a single Table; thus "N" refers to the combined number of choices for each class division.

<p>| TABLE IV - 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MOST IMPORTANT IN WORK | (combined two selections) | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>short hours</th>
<th>advancement</th>
<th>accomplishment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two alternatives which are most directly in line with the (non-financial) goals of the Labour movement - especially as they have been carried forward by the trade unions - are job security and short work hours. We would, therefore, expect a higher frequency of choice for these alternatives by the working class men than by those of higher status. This expectation is, in fact, confirmed.

For the working class men the value of security ranks just behind the "accomplishment" response. Combining the security and short work hours selections, we find that there is roughly twice the proportion of working class choices for these "Labour oriented" values than borderline or middle class choices. The value of job security in particular, is deeply engrained in workers, and those old enough to remember the troubled time of the thirties were prone to muse over the penury of the past and the fear of finding oneself without a job. And, although each class group makes the strongest single emphasis on "accomplishment", workers are least often within this column. I suspect that this alternative has a certain automatic attractiveness; it may commend itself quite readily to all status groups because it seems to provide a dignifying, non-pecuniary rationale for work, and furthermore, may express a value that is actually very widespread.

But, relatively speaking, working class men do stress the instrumental nature of work, thinking in terms of the necessity of maintaining a job rather than the potentiality of advancement or accomplishment. These feelings echo the observations

1. Chayney reports that "the automobile workers in this investigation are actually more interested in security than in traditional patterns of advancement". op.cit., p.124-125.

2. Coldthorpe (et al) discovered in Luton that virtually all workers, excepting some of the most skilled, saw their work primarily in "extrinsic" way and as necessitating tolerance of certain forms of deprivation regarding the "intrinsic" values accompanying work. op. cit. ("British Association" paper) p. 9.
of Hoggart that, "jobs are spread around horizontally, not vertically; life is not seen as a climb, nor work as the main interest in it ... the man on the next bench is not regarded as an actual or potential competitor. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, the strong emotional hold of the 'go slow, don't put the other man out of a job' attitude." Katherine Archibald found the same sort of "solidarity" value among part-time shipyard workers in the U.S. as well, in conjunction with devaluation of striving for advancement and keen suspicion of those who too actively pursued it.

The borderline group are especially low in preference for high income and especially high in valuing advancement. The latter could be taken as a logical expression of placement at the border of middle class status. Lenski found his "lower middle class" highest on "advancement". The security emphasis reduces with increase in status, as would be expected. Over all, the results indicate differences in work values congruent with our expectations for class-consciousness.

Analysing the answers in terms of the "split identity" of the middle class men, the most notable disparity which emerges is a twenty-one per cent selection of "high income" for the middle class identifiers versus a seven per cent selection of this value by the working class identifiers. The meaning of this is not particularly clear; it might reflect the more prosperous origins of the men placing themselves in the middle class. In the other choices there is little to distinguish the two groups. There is also evidence in these responses of the genuineness of the middle class identification for the few working and middle class men who "upgrade" themselves. All of their first selections fall within the "accomplishment", "advancement", and "income" alternatives, mostly within the first.

1. Hoggart, op. cit., p.70.

2. Trade Union Attitudes.

We turn now to trade union involvement and attitudes as a measure of class-consciousness, particularly working class-consciousness. The union in a sense epitomises the desires of the working class, traditionally, for greater security from the vicissitudes of the industrial market and whims of autocratic employers, and for increasing wages and improved factory conditions. The union has carried the battle, and has given the worker the power collectively which he so drastically lacked individually. It has, therefore, been recipient of working class allegiance. The more prosperous classes have been more prone to see the struggle for security and shorter hours as indicative of lethargy and unworthiness.

This indicator is actually included in a question on organisational participation in general, and is not as adequate as I could now wish. In particular, I rue the fact that only union members were asked to express opinions on the value of the union. As only seven of the middle class men are in any kind or organisation they described as a "union" the middle class attitudes to unions are not thoroughly illuminated.

In regard to the working class, of whom over three-fourths are union members, our anti-embourgeoisement vantage points lead us, naturally to expect reasonably strong commitment to the unions and commendation for their efforts. Goldthorpe concludes from the Luton study of "affluent" workers that, "Our research provides no indication that affluence diminished the degree of workers' attachment to unionism - though it may well be important in changing the meaning of this adherence ... in relation to the core issues of their employment - wages and conditions of service - and at shop level in particular, they clearly recognised the practical importance of the union and of union strength".  

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1. Goldthorpe (et al) op. cit. (British Association paper) p.15.
Table IV - 5 manifests the fundamental agreement of our working class findings with the Luton findings and, therefore, confirmation of the predicted inclination. The "definite value" category includes only those who quite clearly expressed a high evaluation of their union; those in the "little value" category indicated that the union had some limited value or else were passive in response to the question; the "critical" men definitely pilloried the union organisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% union members</th>
<th>N (members)</th>
<th>definite value</th>
<th>little value</th>
<th>critical</th>
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<tr>
<td>Working</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>20 (7)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53 (49)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also within the "definite value" column are men actively involved in union affairs, but there were only four of these, totally. In fact, despite the high valuation of the union by workers, the organisation seemed to be in the main, "taken for granted". Few indicated that they attended union meetings except most infrequently. But in terms of commitment to the worth of the union and reliance on its contribution to their weal, the workers demonstrate sustained identity with the working class and its needs. As I have said, this would seem to refute that part of the "embourgeoisement" thesis which assumes attenuation of working class traditional value system caused by financial improvement. In an American study of auto workers, Kornhauser points out that, "it is possible for wage earners to experience vast social and economic gains and yet remain steadfastly union-oriented in their political opinions."

Though the numbers involved are small, it is noteworthy that a minority of middle class and borderline union members suggest a definite value to the organisation. It is also interesting that all of the five middle class men who claim to be union members identified with the working class.

Most commonly, the workers' union eulogisms followed the "unions fight your battles for you" line. For instance, a panel-beater said,

The union is definitely valuable. The working man must have the union, otherwise it would be "do as you're told, or get out.

But others, while recognising the necessity of the union evidence some of the qualms about workers' mass action we found in the answers to the projective question regarding industrial strikes. For instance, a general foreman for a building firm said,

The union is the worker's only permit to work. Sometimes you're made to come out, and maybe you don't want to; but sometimes it does you a lot of good.

A worker in a printing works admitted,

Sometimes we get out of line, but the union is necessary for the working man because you may have nine good employers and one bad -- then you need the union.

A building caretaker took the opposite view of the union's worth, saying -

I'm opposed to all trade unions. I don't think any union is of much value to anyone; they lose everything you gain by coming out on strike.

3. Work Aspirations.

Another area of exploration of works attitudes with application to class-consciousness included two questions on job aspirations. One concerns past aspirations, the other concerns aspirations for the future. The former question was expressed, "was there any time in the past when you wish you had gone into some other work?" (if so, "what was it?"); the other asked, "Do you think you might ever go into some other kind of work?" (if so "what?" and "What are the chances that you will?").
The latter question can be dealt with quite summarily since the results "bear no fruit" when the age factor is introduced. The large majority of answers for all groups were in the negative; for the working class group the "too old" type of reply was especially frequent.

The other question approaches work attitudes by way of what might be called "retrospective aspiration". In a sense, it is an indication of job satisfaction for the question asks if the interviewee now wishes he had done something else at sometime in the past. We would, of course, expect that present job satisfaction and the fulfillment or frustration of past aspirations are closely related.

Again, the largest reaction, in general, was "no" or some variation such as "no choice" or "not with my education". As these further implications may be involved in straight "no" answers, though not expressed, it is difficult to make the distinction with precision. Both the working class and middle class groups responded in these ways in about forty per cent of the cases compared with the much higher figure of sixty-nine per cent of the borderline men. For a good many who stressed the "no choice" factor, the memory of the depression hung heavy. For instance, a warehouse worker said,

This isn't what I wanted to do; it's bad money for the amount of work. I took the job during the depression. It's soul destroying to be idle as I was for two whole years. When you can't work you lose your confidence and become afraid to even ask for work.

Not all of those who expressed disappointment referred to a higher status job, though. For example, a worker in a paper mill said he wished he'd done something else without specifying what, and stressed,

I only wanted to be an ordinary worker though; I never wanted to be more than that.

However, it was more commonly the middle class respondents who stated a wish that they had entered another type of work which was not higher in status than the one they hold presently. This type of response obtained in forty-two
per cent of the middle class answers compared with twelve per cent of the
borderline answers and sixteen per cent of the working class answers. On the
contrary, the working class men who expressed a retrospective desire for other
work preponderantly named a higher position or having "a business of my own".
This occurred in forty-three per cent of their responses, in nineteen per cent
of the borderline responses, and fifteen per cent of the middle class responses.¹

So, in each of the status divisions a different type of answer was given
by the largest proportion of men. For the borderliners, over two-thirds
indicated no desire (or at least no opportunity which would have rendered a
previous desire realistic) for a job other than their present one. It may be
recalled that the borderline division was maintained independently, partly
because it is composed of quite a few unusual positions of technical sort. My
personal impression was that most were genuinely fascinated with their work.
So, this may well be a finding that has no wider application.

A rather high proportion of the middle class men wish they had gone in
for something else at some point along the way, but it seems to be a question of
particular types of work rather than status level of the work. When the self-
placement variable is brought to bear, however, little unanimity remains. Fully
half of the "consistently" middle class answer negatively, expressing no regrets,
and those who wish they had directed their working lives differently almost all
mentioned work of approximately the same status.

¹. Of course, when preference is expressed for another job - whether higher
or lower in status than the one held - it may be a matter of interest rather than
aspiration. Working class regret in not achieving more desirable positions may
stem from either of these two motivations or - most likely - a combination of the
two. For instance, Goldthorpe (et al) found that many Luton workers preferred
their previous jobs (on "intrinsic" grounds) but remained in their present
positions because of "the high level of pay which could be earned". In these
cases, work preference coincided with matters of interest but was actually at
loggerheads with monetary aspiration. Goldthorpe, op. cit. (British Association
Paper) p.10.
The "discrepant" middle class — who are, on the whole, upwardly mobile men — show much less satisfaction; all but about twenty per cent express the wish that they had gone into "greener pastures". Studies on vertical mobility may be seen as congruent with this finding. Merton says, "A generally high rate of mobility induces excessive hopes and expectations among members of the group".1

In answer to another relevant question, "Is there much chance for advancement in your present job?", both borderline and middle class men are extremely ebullient. Seventy per cent of the latter expressed optimism and sixty-five per cent of the former, in manifest contrast to the working class respondents of whom only twelve per cent said they felt their chances for advancement were good or reasonable.2

The workers were generally quite gloomy about their prospects for getting on any further. Said an engineer in a brewery:

There's absolutely no opportunity; you're in that line and that's it.

Several used the phrase "dead end job" in referring to their own work situation. Compare these attitudes with the buoyancy of the insurance salesman who exclaimed,

There's definitely chances to get ahead; it depends entirely on the individual. That's one of the beauties of it. I'm not dependent on other for promotion; its all up to me personally.

The high degree of worker's disillusionment in having ended up in jobs not of their preference echoes a finding of Martin in his Greenwich-Hertford study in which only fifty per cent of the working class-identifying manual workers were in the job of their original choice, compared with sixty two per cent and sixty-five per cent for his two highest status groups.3

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2. It will be noted that I am interspersing the subject of social mobility rather than dealing with it in a systematic way. As mobility was not a primary concern in designing the survey, whatever data involves the mobility question is being interjected where it is relevant to other topics.

The matter of working class aspiration is really more complicated if we reflect upon these limited findings in light of other investigations. Our working men have eschewed aspiration for future work advancement and now perceive their present work as the "end of the line". No doubt this is a realistic appraisal, but, looking back they generally express regret they did not get farther up the ladder, even though relative contentment and apathy have set in and taken the cutting edge off the frustration. So, it matters whether judgement is based on aspirations for the future or muted aspirations for the past. Form and Geschwender have delved into the aspirational dynamics of American workers and come to the conclusion that, "There is some evidence that workers are quickly desocialised from the aspirational complex learned in school, for aspirations are related to reality soon after full-time entry into the world of work. Those who perceive a rigid stratification system may be more satisfied with their lot than those who perceive a mobile social system in which they are limited in their mobility". A similar observation is made by Knupfer, "The low level of aspiration just described cannot, of course, be regarded entirely as a handicap. It performs a useful service in making life tolerable for the low status person". Berger also reports a lack of optimism in "getting ahead" by California auto workers.

Our findings are really quite compatible with these other studies when we consider the acceptance by our workers of their present lot as permanent and their scaling down of future aspirations to conform to the reality of this permanence. But, what does stand in relief most acutely is the fact that the workers are still deeply aware of past aspirations which have long ago been


relinquished; they vividly remember the exasperations of circumstance, the wrong decisions and the missed opportunities which helped to "seal their fate". In other words, these men have not engaged in a process of self-delusion whereby the present is rationalised by eliminating the memory of past aspiration. There exists a peculiar dual-consciousness. The present station in life is accepted with reasonable contentment because it is passable and, in any case, there is no plausible alternative. But the awareness of deeper disappointment remains, though it probably resides "sub rosa" most of the time.

4. Summary of Work Attitudes.

In summation of work attitudes then, in the broad compass for which I have used the term, we find that the working class section of our sample evidence commitment to the trade union, with some reservation, and to the values of security and short hours of work which represent the traditional worker's quest. They know they are "set" in their present position and have reconciled themselves to this, but not without pangs of regret for what might have been. Borderline men express remarkable satisfaction with their work and optimism about potential advance; they share with the middle class men commitment to the values of advancement opportunities and the "feeling of accomplishment" in their work. Middle class men are especially strong in emphasising the intrinsic rewards of work; they too perceive personal opportunity for advancement, but are split by class identification in satisfaction with their present lot. The men who identify with the middle class tend to be satisfied; those who identify with the working class tend to be dis-satisfied. These dispositions are seen as reflecting a
sense of social class position, and the variations are as would be expected with respect to a sustained importance of class divisions. Curiously, the borderline men generally show a middle class strain in their work attitudes despite nearly unanimous self-placement in the working class.

C. POLITICAL COMMITMENTS

The focus of concern shifts now to the third major section of the chapter, an examination of political attitudes and preferences, in order to see what bearing these have on the issue of class-consciousness. Five questions relate to political matters: two simply request the name of the political party supported by the respondent and the name of the party supported by his father; the others are extracted from the projective section and elicit expression of opinion regarding the "leaders of the Conservative party", "the Labour government" and "the people who should have more say in running the country".

On the basis of well-developed class identity our expectation would naturally be strong working class support for the Labour party and middle class support for the Conservative party. Knowing the large proportion of working class backgrounds and working class self-placements among our middle class men, however, we have reason to anticipate a more tenuous relationship between this group and Conservative party preference. Traditionally, the class-party alliance is at the heart of voting patterns in Britain. Bonham, for instance says, "The distinction between the manual wage class and the rest is more than a mere classification".
"It dominates the attitudes of most electors, of all classes, to their party choice".1

1. Voting Patterns.

Indeed, we find that our expectations based on the assumption of these traditional lines of partisan preference prove to be largely confirmed. Table IV - 6 demonstrates an over-all Labour preference greater than the national average by a few percentage points, likewise for the Liberal party, while there is Conservative party preference about fifteen per cent below the national average. It is well substantiated, though, that the female vote is more Conservative than the male vote. By dealing only with males we would, therefore, expect a somewhat sub-average Conservative vote, though it would not be as diminished if our sample extended to higher statuses. Nonetheless, the directional lines of preference are class oriented without question. As these interviews were conducted within a few months after the 1964 General Election and the respondents were asked directly whom they voted for (or for the few who didn't cast a ballot, whom they would have voted for if they'd voted) we may expect the results to be a very accurate reflection of actual voting.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Working</td>
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<td>70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NOTE: The one Communist supporter is not included; there were no Scottish Nationalist Party preferences).

1. Bonham, op. cit., p.70.
Without question, the social class dispositions in voting predicted from traditional alliances are in evidence. The Labour party vote descends regularly with increase in status while the Conservative party vote correlates positively with status. The Liberal vote is less clearly related with class but is surprisingly substantial overall. The borderline section, in accordance with their marginal status, divides its vote almost evenly between Labour and non-Labour.

Students of politics in America have also found meaningful class-party correlations, with workers tending toward the Democrats and higher status persons toward the Republicans. But the correlation is less pronounced than in the British class-party profile. In particular, the American working class is less cohesive in its Democratic vote than is the British working class in its Labour support. Historically, of course, the Labour party has specifically carried the banner of the Labour movement, by whom it was spawned, and has promulgated socialist ideologies. The Democratic party in the U.S. has never been as clearly, or as far, to the "left" of the political spectrum.

2. Voting Explanations

Respondents were further interrogated about the reasons for their political commitments. Despite the wide possible range of replies, two general types were

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1. A study of voting intention in Greenwich in 1955 discovered very similar patterns, with the exception of a much lower Liberal vote. Among the "average" on a socio-economic status scale there was a twenty-four per cent intention to vote Labour compared with a sixty-nine per cent Labour intention among the "below average". Benny and his associates are led to conclude, "... of the factors we have studied the one most strongly associated with differences in vote is social class". Mark Benny, A.P. Gray and R.H. Pear, How People Vote: A Study of Electoral Behaviour in Greenwich, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956) p.168. Also, it is notable that the "affluent" workers of Luton reported casting 80% of their votes to Labour in the 1959 election. Goldthorpe, op.cit. (British Assoc. Paper) p.23. Willmott found in a pre-war working class council estate - Dagenham - in East London that 88% of the men had voted Labour in 1955; Peter Willmott, op.cit. p.107

by far the most frequent - Labour voters acclaiming their party as the voice for the working man, and Tory voters praising the superiority of policy of their party's leaders. The first emphasis is epitomised by the Labour supporters below:

Conservatives are for the upper class; Labour for the working class.

The Labour party to me is another union, the man behind me who will help me. A man who is a working man needs working class men behind him to help him. I can't see a Tory helping a working class man.

The Tories look after people who have it; Labour looks after those who don't have it.

Labour represents the working class; you must vote for the party who will work for your class.

I don't agree with everything, but I vote for Labour regularly because they're the only party for the working class men.

People in the working class support Labour.

You can't do anything else if you're a working man; you must vote Labour.

Other workers expressed reasons involving other Labour party advantages.

I've always been a Socialist. I'd like to see more public ownership -- can't ever see the Conservatives doing it.

Listen, I experienced the 'bad old days' and I've seen a lot of advances for workers by the Labour governments.

To the Tories this part of the country is a wilderness. Labour may push industry up here.

I'm a member of the Labour party organisation. They're the honest party -- do their utmost to give a fair deal.

The pro-Conservative emphasis on policy by middle class and borderline Conservatives is depicted by these comments:

I always vote Tory because of foreign policy. Labour has a lot of good things, but if your foreign policy is all wrong, eventually it's going to catch up with you.

I'm very anti-communist and I think Labour is just about one step away from it.

I think the Tories express their policies better. I have no faith in Labour at all.

My pet hate is nationalisation.
The last Labour government was a failure. There are more brains and better policies in the Conservative party.

The Conservatives believe in private enterprise and people working for themselves. Socialism leads to laziness and dependence.

I always vote Conservative; they give the individual freedom which I don't feel the Labour party does. I feel they can do something for everybody.

The Conservative leaders are business people and they have the know-how to do the most for the country.

So not only in terms of distribution of votes, but also in terms of explanations for the choices, there appears to be somewhat greater class solidarity for the working class respondents than for middle class men. Benney (et al) found the class interest theme equally stressed by both classes. He finds that approximately ninety per cent in each case feel that their party (middle class ... Conservatives, and working class ... Labour) will do the best job for their own class. He says, "It is clear that most of our informants voted for what they considered their class interests".¹ For Bonham's enquiry, eighty-seven per cent of Labour voters "justified it in terms of 'the working class', 'the underdog', ..."²

But, there is of course, a substantial minority of exceptions from the worker-Labour combination. Many of these who fail to "close ranks" behind the Labour candidate are disallusioned former supporters like the gardener who said,

I've always been a Labour man, and active in the Labour movement; but the tail came to wag the dog. By pushing for wages all the time they were hurting the lowest man.

A Labourer reported,

I used to be very staunchly Labour, but now I feel the party lacks reliable men. Wilson is a one man horse race.

Another Labour man turned Conservative obviously voted mainly against Labour rather than for the Conservatives. He replied,

For one thing I'm against nationalisation. The Labour man, when he gets in power, tries to do everything at one time - too fast. They don't do one job at a time like they should.

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¹ Benney, op. cit., p.121, 6.
² Bonham, op. cit., p.72.
A printing plant worker also doubted the capabilities of the Labour party leadership, but his "deferential" point of view was unusual:

Maybe it's hero worship. You need men of education to represent you at the top. Working men are good at working, but don't have the experience.

One is reminded by these comments of the observations recorded from a study of working class families in the North of England,

Many of the Conservative voters felt isolated ... they were out of touch with the neighbours, the yard, the street ... the Conservative voter had an immense respect for men trained at the major public schools, and a large belief in the claims of business men to be able to run the country.

The "renegades" in the other direction — middle class men who cast their ballot for Labour — similarly are prone to do so on an anti-Conservative rather than pro-Labour basis. Says a bus dispatch manager,

I don't agree with everything, such as nationalisation, but I can't go for the Tories. Their leaders are made by the accident of birth.

A humanitarian society inspector retorted,

The Tories to me are something terrible, possibly because of being brought up in the thirties.

A young business executive admitted that he and his father had both recently switched to Labour, saying,

In my very layman's mind, in recent years the Conservatives have made a real botch of it and left the country in a bad financial mess. Labour has a policy of tightening belts, and in the long run the country will be better off.

There were also a number of men who, while willingly informing me of their recent voting choice, also indicated that they had little interest or confidence in the whole business of politics. The majority of these were working men, composing a minority of very unenthusiastic Labour supporters who merely "go along with the crowd". American studies have also found more voting indifference among low status persons and it is well known that working classes in Britain have a lower turnout at the polls. The "makes no difference" theme is voiced by

several "weak" Labour voters,

I usually vote Labour but not always. Politics in this country appears to be the lesser of two evils -- I think that both parties are a mixture of both. My own voting, I think, is mainly an indoctrination from when I was young.

It really makes no difference; there's just nothing else to do but vote Labour. But, it puts no more money in my pocket or anybody else's.

I was brought up in a Labour district. Labour is just the best of two evils -- politics are all tricky.

A postal delivery man delivered a most amusing, animated description of a Scottish Labour party leader in London.

There's nothing good for the working man but a revolution that will change the whole system. But, I'm no Communist, mind you. Scotsmen go south as leaders, get a few 'bob' in their pockets, and forget they're Scotsmen. Ramsey MacDonald became "one of them". MacDonald said he'd stop all of the flag waving business and guards at Buckingham Palace when he went down to London. But you're either out or in, and they put a sword at his side and a cockadood hat on his head, and that was that. He was bought over.

The Liberal party ran a surprisingly strong third in the preferences of the interviewees. Liberal voters often seemed to have opted for a third choice because of disaffection with both major parties. My impression is that most would have gone toward the Conservatives if forced to a two-party choice. Said a civil servant,

Both big parties are too set in their ways; and the Liberals have better ideas for local government.

A primary teacher reported,

I sympathise with the Liberals because they have a less entrenched outlook. They're ready to try new methods.

Coming back to the crucial middle class self-placement cleavage, we find this demarcation extremely revealing in the political realm. There is only one Labour party voter among the nineteen "consistent" middle class men, but twelve Conservative voters and five Liberals. In contrast, a slight majority of the
"discrepant" middle class vote for Labour - 53% - in addition to 40% Conservative voters and seven per cent Liberal voters. We may conclude, then, that the self-assessed middle class men are as solidly partisan as the self-assessed working class men. Where the objective and subjective indices of class conflict, the result is complete split* voting. Knowing the prevalent working class origins of the "discrepant" middle class men, it is interesting to find a close parallel in the Jackson and Marsden study of middle class children from working class homes, in which exactly fifty per cent voted Conservative. This represented a sixteen per cent increase over their parents, but shows the substantial retention of family voting patterns regardless of personal experience of mobility.1

In the U.S. as well self-perception of class has been found by Eulau to get to the crux of the matter of voting.2 The more deeply we probe the dynamics of voting, the more assuredly class-laden it becomes. The "consistent" working class vote consistently Labour; the "consistent" middle class vote even more consistently Conservative. Only the groups who are balanced precariously on the class tightrope, either because of their own perceptions or because of the marginal nature of their objective status - namely the "discrepant" middle class men and the borderline men - distribute their vote with equity.

1. Jackson, op. cit., 174. The finding is also congruent with Bonham's discovery that among lower levels of middle class (and our working class identifiers could be accurately described as such) just over half voted Conservative, compared with much larger proportions in the higher reaches of the middle class. Benney (et al) too, found that self-assignment by class made considerable difference in determining the voting patterns within different strata.

3. Fathers' Political Support.

When we compare the votes of the fathers of the respondents with their own, we find the overall Labour - non-Labour breakdown remarkably unchanged. But this is not because the father-son preferences are static within the separate status categories. Only the working class section demonstrates a consistent Labour priority for fathers and sons. Fathers of middle class men are much more often Labour supporters than their sons; conversely borderline fathers are much less often Labour supporters than their sons. The middle class inter-generational variation in voting is more explicable than the borderline shift. We noted earlier that there were a rather large number of middle class men who hailed from working class homes. It is, unfortunately, futile to pursue the borderline anomaly given the small numbers involved.

Another factor which possibly contributes to the results is the nearly one-fifth who could not recall their father's political leaning; the majority of these cases are within the working class group.

| TABLE IV - 7 |
| FATHER'S VOTING PREFERENCE |

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<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the father-son variations noted above, there is still a marked contrast between the working class section and the other groups; the known fathers' preferences of the workers are Labour in nearly three-fourths of the cases compared with well below one-half for the other status groups. It is again illuminating to consider the middle class self-placement separation. Fully two-thirds of the known fathers' preferences for the working class identifiers are Labour compared with less than one-third of the "consistent" middle class fathers. Obviously, family origin and subjective class identification are extremely powerful predictors of partisan preference.

4. Projective Political Opinions.

Of the three "projective" questions related to politics, the most oblique and unspecific was introduced with the phrase, "The people who should have more say in running the country..." Nearly half of the answers - and the great majority of working class answers - followed the general line of, "the people themselves", "the common people", "the workers", etc. Within the Borderline and middle class groups such replies shared "top billing" with an emphasis on "people who are qualified" or "those who are trained for it". This finding corresponds with the above tendencies in explaining Labour and Conservative preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV - 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE PEOPLE WHO SHOULD HAVE MORE SAY IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>People, workers</th>
<th>Business Men</th>
<th>Qualified Women</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A more direct test is applied to the political pattern findings by introducing two more concrete projections. The replies to, "the Labour government ...", though diverse, can be summarised in three main categories: first, those simply stating their support or praising the government or saying that it is worthy of "having a run for it"; second, those stressing the difficulty of the job facing the government with some sympathy; third, the various negative replied ranging from, "they try to push to fast" to "they're a bunch of crooks". The distributions within these columns are given in Table IV - 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV - 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Good, worthy</th>
<th>Trying hard</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>?</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result is something less than striking. In particular, the working class men show considerable restraint in their confidence of the government. This seems to give additional confirmation to the impression that many working class men vote Labour out of habit and a feeling of having "no choice", but are not outgoing, enthusiastic champions of the party. Certainly, the bringing in of a Labour regime is not viewed as a panacea for the ills of the country, even by its traditional supporters. The working class "negative" opinions appear to be, to a considerable extent, attributable to the non-labour working class men, for the opinions expressed in answers to this query follow actual voting lines very closely. The self-placement variable carries weight in the projection as
well: seventy-two per cent of the "consistent" middle class are critical but only seven per cent of the "discrepant" middle class.

Finally, we come to the expressions of opinions about "the leaders of the Conservative party ..." Here we encounter an even greater variety of answers — and a large number of "no answers" — which prove difficult to categorise on a pro or con basis. The "rich" column speaks for itself; the "upper" column includes such epithets as "snobs", "capitalists", "employers", etc. The "good" column refers to answers like "reliable men" and "sincere men". The "ability" column is composed of men answering in terms of good education, training, and experience. The "negative" column includes both mildly critical remarks and bitter invective.

<p>| TABLE IV - 10 |
| LEADERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY ... |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Rich</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the difficulties in analysing this table is the various connotations which could be derived from the first two categories. Many of the statements were definitely derogatory, implying power by birth or avarice; others may be purely descriptive without any such derogatory meaning. So, leaving these aside we see in the last three columns a relatively class-coloured configuration. In particular, there is a strong middle class emphasis on the ability and training of Conservative leaders and a low proportion of outright criticism. Only
twenty-four per cent of the working class respondents fall within one of the complimentary categories. The negative responses are mainly attributable to Labour voters, thirty-six per cent of the Labour men so replying in contrast to twenty-one per cent of the Liberals and thirteen per cent of the Conservatives.

D. SUMMARY

To briefly recapitulate, we have seen unmistakable signs of class-oriented attitudes and behaviour for each general area of class-consciousness under scrutiny. If we trim off the rough edges for the sake of clarity, four distinct patterns of subjective class involvement are visible.

The first pattern undermines the alleged working class loss of identity. On all measures - self-placement, union and work values, aspirations and assessment of personal opportunity, and political commitments - we have seen a self-conscious, self-interested internalisation of a working class world-view. There is little doubt among the majority of working men that they have their own clearly marked "place in the sun". In "ideal type", the worker feels he is confined to his work level for life; he feels strongly that he shares with others of similar station certain interests for improving his lot; and he believes that the best hope for the advancement of these interests resides in the unions and Labour party, though his support of these bodies is not altogether enthusiastic.

The second and third patterns represent the objective middle class, fissured by class self-placement. Those identifying themselves with the middle class provide a consistent contrast to the values and opinions of the worker. In "ideal type", the "consistent" middle class man is young and well-educated, reared in a fairly prosperous home, values work on the basis of importance, but also on the basis of its remuneration; he is satisfied with his work, sees much opportunity for further advancement but plans to move up within his present field of endeavour.

The "discrepant" middle class man hails from a working class home and believes himself still a "common man" with no pretensions of higher status. He is somewhat
older and essentially unhappy with the work in which he finds himself. He values especially chances for advancement. His father was a Labour supporter but his own vote is indeterminate - he is pulled in several directions.

The fourth pattern is least tailored to "ideal" personification; this is the borderline man. He considers himself a working class man but views his work through middle class eyes. He is peculiarly unpredictable in voting, being not too keen on either major party. He is genuinely delighted with his work.

The most important conclusion which emerges from this investigation is that there is a definite relationship between objective status and the measures of "class-consciousness" which have been employed. Though a remarkable degree of inter-class agreement appeared in the previous chapter for more general "social perspectives", measurable variations in class orientations and values are manifest when the respondents are confronted with questions more specifically pertinent to class identification.
CHAPTER V - STYLE OF LIFE

A. LIFE STYLE RESEARCH

B. PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS
   1. Friendship "Contexts"
   2. Activities with Friends
   3. Council Estate Living

C. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
   1. Organisational Involvement
   2. Use of the Pub
   3. Leisure Time Pursuits

D. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
   1. Family Size
   2. Working Wives
   3. Children's Education
   4. Language Barriers

E. SOCIAL CLASS CONCLUSIONS
Two of the men living in the Prestonfield Council estate declare familiar opinions about neighbourliness. Said a post office worker,

I'm a person who keeps himself to himself. The children drop over weekends, but that's enough for me.

A grocery storeman in a hospital avowed,

I don't believe in going to a friend's house; it's all gossiping. Like Coronation Street.

Within the Council area this was the prevailing mood - a social fact which could not escape the notice of an outsider. The home is a personal cloister not to be infringed upon except in emergency; the next door neighbour is due a friendly nod and, perhaps, a passing comment on the meteorological state of things, but very likely no more than this. The gregariousness and "open door" policy romanticised by Hoggart and others is not to be found; instead, strangely muted and taciturn relationships prevail.

A. LIFE STYLE RESEARCH

Without really intending to do so, I have encountered a phenomenon which has received attention from several investigators in recent years. The new Council estates dotting the landscapes of British cities, swallowing up masses of working people who have been disgorged from over-crowded, central city districts, have remarkably altered the traditional "life style" of the urban working class.

Jackson and Marsden are ready to conclude that, "a national programme of Council estates changes England in a very short time, and again it is more than the landscape that is changed; it is the fineness or crudity of social life.¹ It is not, therefore, possible to speak of "the working class life style" as if it were a seamless whole, easily captured in stereotype. In fact that may never have been

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¹ Jackson and Marsden, op. cit., p.223.
realistic; but certainly the difference between "old" districts where it is reputed that communality was king and neighbourliness was necessitated by overpowering proximity, and the pre-war and post-war council estates where the "distance" factor (both in special and social terms) is usually conspicuous - that difference is too great to allow for smoothed-out generalities.

Since the Prestonfield council scheme provides the bulk of our working class respondents and therefore the main representation of working class life in our study, it is unavoidable that some of the spate of studies dealing with municipal housing estates be taken into account. Indeed, it could be accurately said that in recent years the focal phenomenon for the study of "life style" in Britain has been the effects on working class existence of the massive movements to the outlying housing schemes. And this is probably for good reason. The diaspora from old and depriving haunts of the central city in the years between the wars - and since the second war - and the social effects of this migration, have made a permanent impact on the forms of interrelationship among the people.

But this is not to suggest that the volume of empirical work - and nonempirical - has resulted in uniformity of conclusions. The field is a remarkably fragmented one; contradictory findings abound; unified theory is only beginning to emerge. Nor, indeed, do I desire to plunge into an effort at disentangling or integrating the postures of the variegated literature. Rather, I wish to allude to the main lines of research and findings and to make clear the standing of the Prestonfield estate within the whole panorama of British working class districts, and then to proceed to analysis of the life style data of our own study. Though we encounter the phenomenon of working class migration, and though it is directly pertinent to the "embourgeoisement" question, it is not - in itself - of such overwhelming importance to the overall purpose of this study that I would be justified in becoming embroiled in the nuances of controversy or preoccupied with the intricacies of the extensive comparative literature.
Three distinct types of working class districts - each the object of some research efforts - are distinguishable: the "old", crowded "traditional" districts; the pre-war council estates - many of which answered the need for "slum-clearance" housing; and the post-war estates which are on the whole graced by better amenities and now populated by younger families than are the older estates. As well as the numerous descriptions of particular types of areas, several authors have advanced comparative treatments of "old" and "new" districts. The Prestonfield estate was a product of the early 'thirties and thus fits into the second grouping of the classification. Interestingly, much less work has been done within the older estates than within either the "traditional" districts or the post-war municipal schemes. This partial lacuna is regrettable since the older schemes have the advantage of time and may help answer some of the currently indeterminate questions about the long-range inclinations of living patterns of "uprooted" working class families.


2. P. Willmott, The Evolution of a Community, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); and a study of an Edinburgh estate, Wardieburn, which will be detailed later in the chapter - the materials are unpublished.


Willmott says in the Introduction to his study of the pre-war Essex estate of Dagenham, in regard to the recent studies of the newer schemes, "But these surveys all suffer from limitations, and one, above all, is crucial: time is left out. Most of the estates were new when they were studied, so that some important questions have remained unanswered. Are the isolation from kin and aloofness from neighbours part of a new way of life altogether or are they merely transitional? What social patterns evolve on the housing estates when place and people have had time to settle down: how do they then compare with the 'transitional' communities?" These questions are equally pertinent and applicable to the Prestonfield district, but the answers are not always the same as for Dagenham, as we will see.

Josephine Klein has recently made a herculean - and sophisticated - attempt to bring together all the loose strings of life style data and give a certain cohesion and theoretical shape to the whole. She covers the extant literature very comprehensively and ferrets out what appear to her to be general trends. As she has conveniently provided schematically the conceptual outline of her discussion it may be well to reproduce the list of changes she elaborates by way of "setting the stage" for our own discussion:

from a close-knit family network to a more loose-knit one;
from a community-centered existence to greater individuation;
from a community-centered existence to a more home-centered one;
from a community-centered existence to greater participation in associational life;
from a segregated conjugal role-relationship to greater partnership in marriage;
from traditional occupational choice to social mobility;
from status-assent to status-dissent;
from ascriptive values to achievement values;
from financial stringency to greater affluence;
from an emphasis on the breadwinner to emphasis on the child.


2. ibid, p.221.
First, it should be pointed out that these trends are deduced almost entirely from a comparison of "old" districts with post-war estates. Though she inserts the sometimes contradictory Dagenham findings from time to time, these are in essence asserted to be irrelevant to the primary lines of working class transformation. She dismisses the notion of Willmott that the settled patterns of a pre-war scheme may be a precursor of what will eventually transpire in the newer estates on the grounds that the period of adjustment in the older estates came to an end prior to "other changes - conscription and war, affluence and mass-media ..."¹ If Klein is correct in this assertion, then Prestonfield, like Dagenham, represents a phenomenon sui generis. In fact, there is a good deal of correspondence between the older estates and newer estates on many features. This will be made clear from the use of Young and Willmott's well-known study in East London as a source of comparison at some points in our discussion.

A number of the issues dealt with by Klein will be avoided altogether. Not only is the applicability of our findings to the changes in the post-war schemes somewhat suspect, but the changes themselves are much less clear-cut than Klein's outline above suggests. For instance, after a lengthy review of the various findings regarding working class efforts to develop forms of formal association in the new settings, Klein finally refers to "the relative failure of associational life in the new area".² What emerges as the most concrete and consistent feature of life in the municipal housing estates is that of increased family-centeredness and all that goes along with nuclear family compactness: interest in the home, closer relationship of father to children, increased sharing of conjugal roles, etc. On this point the Prestonfield findings are perfectly "in tune" with those from all other estates which have been empirically investigated. This feature will furnish a primary focus.

Furthermore our findings simply do not relate to some of the questions, such as subtle variations in aspirational systems and gradations of "respectability"

¹. ibid, p.222.
². ibid, p.283
among the council residents. And it is possible to summarise the network of recent studies by saying that, although there are great contrasts between the different council estates in certain aspects of life style, there are continuing distinct lines of contrast with middle class life: less formal association, more use of the pub, heavy reliance on kinship ties and cordiality with mates. I will, therefore, emphasise the gross differences in life style between the class groups rather than attempt to tease out the intra-class variations which are, in any case, less well illuminated by the data.

In short, the strategy of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive review or an integrative endeavour with respect to the realm of pertinent - and often fascinating - material available on life style. It is rather to expound the rather limited data from the Prestonfield study as it speaks to the issues of embourgeoisement and class "commonality" about which our entire class discussion revolves. The preceding sketch of the field is intended to provide an understanding of the context of the data in terms of the whole field of life style studies, and to show why only a few other researches are selected for purposes of comparison.

Specifically, the focus of the chapter is three-fold: informal interactive systems, formal associational patterns, and structure of family life. Though the topics tend to overlap considerably, for the purposes of separating and analysing the components, the discussion will proceed under three headings: "personal friendships", "social participation", and "family life". The matter of the unique features of council estate life will be included within the first section concerning networks of personal friendships.

**B. PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS**

I enquired about personal friendships along three lines: the "context" of friendships - in what relation the friends stand to respondent; the occupations
of friends - their status compared to that of the respondent: and, the type of activities engaged in with friends. The second query served mainly to confirm the anticipated consistency of status among friends; few respondents named persons significantly higher or lower than themselves. The other two matters, however, are quite revealing, demonstrating clear class variations.

1. Friendship "Contexts".

Respondents were asked, "Outside of work, with whom do you have most contact - would it be men from work, people in the neighbourhood, relatives, or just whom?"¹ As the label suggests, Table V - 1 includes only answers which seemed to indicate main sources of friends. "Own family" replies are tabulated only in the cases in which this was the only context of interaction mentioned.

<p>| TABLE V - 1 |
| MAIN SOURCES OF FRIENDS |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>own family</th>
<th>relatives</th>
<th>neighbourhood</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>previous residence</th>
<th>organis. school</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significantly, the highest proportion of middle class answers refer to friends in organisations or from school; these are contexts which were not directly

¹. The term "friend" was avoided in the question because of possible variation in understanding and usage of the term at different social levels which was suggested to me by persons at the University who had previously conducted surveys in areas in Edinburgh.
suggested by the wording of the question, and would seem, therefore, to be especially reliable answers. My impression was that some of the working class men who alluded to neighbourhood or work friends were responding to a feeling of obligation to name some context of friendship outside the home and named one of the alternatives provided by the question itself. In some of these cases, the "intensity" of friendship may be low and the amount of interaction limited. On the whole, the borderline "work" responses and middle class "organisation" responses seemed to constitute far more meaningful relationships.

Controlling the middle class by the self-placement factor makes virtually no difference, so the middle class group is considered as a whole. As the high incidence of friendships derived from associational involvement will appear again when we consider "social participation", comment on this finding will be reserved until that stage of the analysis has been reached. However, the low proportion of borderline men enjoying friendships within an associational context is perplexing; we shall see that organisational participation for this group is twice as high as for the working class. It is, of course, conceivable that a person may be contacted in more than one context. Where this is true, the more basic context and initial point of contact (such as the work situation) may naturally be named. Indeed, the "work-centeredness" of this group is further suggested by the high number of friends declared in this context.

2. Activities with Friends.

When the follow up question requested the type of activities engaged in with the persons already named, the reaction was often that of a blank stare or confused stammering. At all levels, many respondents were not able to declare concrete forms of activity with their friends. This was far more often the case for the working class men of whom less than half named a specific activity. For those who did, "going to the pub" was claimed in sixty-one per cent of the cases,
There was only a single mention of mutual visiting and a few references to cinema-going or other recreation.

For the borderline men, the activities reported tended overwhelmingly to "visiting", this choice accounting for eighty-six per cent of the cases. The middle class men were also fairly high on visiting, naming this in forty-five per cent of the instances; they also emphasised recreational pursuits with friends, mentioning these in thirty-four per cent of the cases in which an activity was actually stated.¹

From this information, contrasts in "style of life" immediately become apparent. It is particularly noteworthy that only about one-fifth of the working class men alluded to friendships within the neighbourhood. I think even this figure tends to exaggerate the degree of neighbourliness. Several of the neighbours indicated as friends were, in fact, known prior to moving to the council estate. Others were but casual acquaintances who were named because they represented the most intimate relationship enjoyed, even though this was still at a rather formal stage. Many directly stressed the individualisation of life within the estate, the fact that families make a rule of keeping to themselves. As an observer who was present in the area almost constantly for several weeks, I can attest to the extreme paucity of visible inter-relationships such as conversations around the entrance of a "stair" or neighbours going in and out of each other's homes.

3. Council Estate Living.

The ramifications of the above friendship patterns go beyond that sphere alone. Again observation and recollection can substitute for more detailed statistical data. Within the council, no less assuredly than in the other areas, the home and immediate family provide the main locus of living. Ensconced within the thin walls of the estate tenement flats, entertained by the television, undisturbed by those 'round about, the Council scheme dwellers live either in defensiveness
or in self-sufficiency. Though this estate had been standing for thirty years, with many of the original settlers still present, there was no evidence, by way of observation or interviewees descriptions, of a renewal of former patterns of "mateyness" and gregariousness.

There are several possible interpretations of this phenomenon. It may be considered a transitional stage in upward mobility—a repudiation of the old forms of interaction not yet replaced by middle class patterns of associational activity, home entertaining, etc. The increased "home-centeredness" of the husband, in particular, could be made to argue for such a trend, a trend which would support the idea of working class "embaroissement". But it is also plausible to see the conversion from extroverted neighbourliness to muted, introverted living as a direct result of the ecological differences in the new environment, without an undermining of other features of working class life style. The latter perspective seems to me more in line with the other data pertaining to life style.

Among the several parallel investigations, the most directly comparable is a study made in recent years by the University of Edinburgh Social Environment Research Unit of the Wardieburn council estate which was constructed at about the same time as the Prestonfield estate and populated initially by resettlers from demolition-doomed areas of Leith. One of the "working papers" of this study described the environmental origins of the "displaced persons" who were relocated by the Corporation.

Number thirteen Harehills Place, with which I am well acquainted, would fit comfortably into a medium sized Victorian terraced house of three public rooms, four main bedrooms and the 'usual offices'. Yet it houses twelve families totaling at the present time about thirty individuals; and in its hey-day there must have been at least twice that number. 1

Discussing the implication of such crowded quarters, the report continues—

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Thus, severe spatial restrictions can result in deprivation of opportunities for defence against basic anxieties, as well as one very important field for ego expansion.\footnote{Ibid, p.5.}

None-the-less, the present council residents tended to eulogise this former environment because of the "esprit de corps" and communality of life in the face of common hardship.\footnote{Ibid, p.8.} Life in its most intimate details, was public, or at least it was private only in so far as furtiveness was consistent and successful. The report stresses,

More often the daily struggle to maintain order that goes on behind the door is only that door's thickness away from the public eye.

The autobiographical insights of Hoggart in a North of England city give fuller and applicable description.

To a visitor they are understandably depressing; these massed proletarian area; street after regular street of shoddily uniform houses intersected by a dark pattern of ginnels and snickets (alleyways) and courts; mean, squalid and in a permanent half-fog; a study in shades of dirty-gray, without greeness or the blueness of sky; degrees darker than the north or west of the town, than the 'better end'.\footnote{Richard Hoggart, \textit{The Uses of Literacy}, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957) p.52.} But the life was not outwardly so depressing, where affability replaced amenities; one knows practically everybody with an intimacy of detail ... This is an extremely local life.

But, if the inhabitants of such areas are inured against the effects of deprivation, they are not so inured against the effects of change, and are singularly unprepared for it.

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1. Ibid, p.5.

2. It may be significant for both the Wardieburn and Prestonfield council estates that most of the original residents did not come to the estates voluntarily but were compelled to move because of demolition prospects.


It is because for all ages such a life can have a peculiarly gripping wholeness, that after twenty-five it can be difficult for a working class person either to move into another kind of area or even another area of the same kind. We all know of working class people's difficulties in settling into the new council house estates.¹

Returning to the Wardieburn study for confirmation of this impression, it is reported that ninety per cent of those interviewed said they "keep themselves to themselves". Fully eighty per cent volunteered the information that they "don't go into each other's houses".² Virtually everyone decried the unfriendliness of the new environment and absence of mutual aid, but continued to contribute to that atmosphere by their own actions. The report concludes that the migrants to the council estate intensified a ritual of distance-keeping. Life was a masterpiece of "mutual coexistence" seldom interrupted by relationships more intimate than conventions or politeness demanded.³

One of the most popular sociological contributions in Britain in recent years documents the difficult re-orientation facing the central city tenement district migrant to a council estate. Young and Willmott compared the social patterns of a group of families in an old area of East London, Bethnal Green, to their counterparts who had resettled in the London council estate of Greenwich. Their description of the effect of the migration is in keeping with the findings for Wardieburn and Prestonfield. People often used the same familiar saying, "keep themselves to themselves", mainly in judgement of the present neighbours. These excerpts condense their observations -

¹. ibid, p.59.
². "Resettlement", op. cit., p.16.
³. ibid, p.16, 17.
Their new neighbours are strangers, drawn from every part of the East End, and they are, as we have seen, treated with reserve. In point of services, neighbours do not make up for kin ... Even where relations have not been severed, there is little of the mateyness so characteristic of Bethnal Green ...

At Greenaleigh they neither share long residence with their fellow tenants nor as a rule have kin to serve as bridges between the family and the wider community. These two vital interlocked conditions of friendliness are missing, and their absence goes far to explain the attitude we have illustrated... the number of people per acre at Greenaleigh (is) only one-fifty what it is in Bethnal Green -- and low density does not encourage sociability.¹

Zweig found the same "closed-door" existence, remarking that "visiting is in the main, discouraged", but did not focus on the fact, stressing this rather as evidence for a new home-centeredness and thus, middle class values in the ascendancy among council estate dwellers.² The most relevant American exploration is a study by Berger of auto workers relocated in a spacious suburb, the main difference being that they were able to purchase the homes into which they moved; he, too, comments on the infrequency of visiting and the concentration of social activities within the home and immediate family. Discussing the "way of life" of the residents in this improved environment, Berger notes that, "a massed-produced tract suburb, rapidly occupied, has little chance to develop gradually a neighbourhood character of its own."³

Cohen and Hodges describe "lower blue collar" conditions of life in the U.S. similarly to Hoggart, suggesting that roughly equivalent patterns of existence hold true for run-down areas in America and Britain, and thereby completing the convergence of style of life trends involved in a move to less-cramped, more comfortable, but unfamiliar environments. They conclude that low status persons

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¹ Young and Willmott, op. cit., p.147, 149, 150, 153.
³ Berger, op. cit., p.13, 69.
adapt to the powerlessness and deprivation of their lives by building social networks that can function as "mutual insurance schemes". These relationships are diffused, particularistic, durable and reciprocal, with heavy dependence on extended kinship and neighbouring relationships.¹

Merton sets such phenomena within the theoretical mould of the reference group, stressing the difficulty of change from one group to another, "... initial exposure to the new group is most apt to involve an intensification of old ties ..."² This was evident from the men and even more from the wives living in the Prestonfield council scheme in conversation extraneous to the actual interview. Even if the contacts are, of necessity, infrequent many of the really emotionally-tinged friendships were maintained with individuals from the by-gone era in an old district of mutual upbringing. Many still said they "belong" to the old area even when many years had intervened. There was an evident lack of conscious identification with the council house neighbours. Though the previous chapter has revealed a continuing working class-consciousness, this consciousness may well be less concrete in terms of identification with a particular group of people. Lipset and Bendix list "ecological change by housing developments" as a crucial variable in class-consciousness.³

Though the scope of the Prestonfield survey does not allow me to elucidate very fully the contrast between "old-style" working class districts and the newer council areas, one of the Melville district streets, a crowded cul-de-sac hemmed in by industrial plants, did in a partial way illustrate the contrast. The numbers involved are not enough to make a statistically noticeable difference for the Melville area, and for this reason no control by area has been shown. But I noticed on this street appreciably more activity outside the confines of

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² Merton, op. cit., p.273.
the home — women chatting at the foot of the stair, a wife shouting unmuffled oaths at her husband as he raced off to the late shift, children crowding the pavement with soccer and hop-scotch games, etc. It was on this little street that I felt particularly conspicuous walking along with my briefcase; and it was with some embarrassment that I wove my way through the unconcealed stares of the people outside to reach a certain address. The atmosphere here was different; one felt that the street was alive and was part of the entity of a miniature community. At least this single microcosm provided a hint of the "old" pattern of neighbourliness so missing at the scene of the council house scheme.

The other pre-war estate of Dagenham is described by Willmott in very different terms that those depicting life in Prestonfield, Wardieburn or the newer estates. He sees a notable resurgence of "traditional" forms of relationship after the passage of some years: "Most people at Dagenham regard the other residents as 'friendly'. And most people have got 'friends' on the estate in the sense that other people, living nearby come into their homes. In these two ways Dagenham is certainly a more sociable place than Greensleigh." In his conclusion, Willmott says that, "Local extended families, which hold such a central place in the older districts, have grown up in almost identical form on the estate, and so have local networks of neighbours ..." In explaining the renewed communal configuration of life, he declares that ecological considerations are the major determinants; those living in the 'banjos'; densely populated cul-de-sacs, are most inclined to intensive neighbourliness. Dagenham's apparent uniqueness in this respect may be explicable on the basis of the relative compactness of its housing, if Willmott has drawn the right conclusion. In fact, he states this very fact quite plainly in comparing Bethnal Green to Dagenham. "If my interpretation is incorrect, were it not for the spread-out character of so much of the estate's housing, there would be even closer similarities between the

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1. Willmott, op. cit. 64.
2. ibid. p. 409
3. ibid. p. 52
social life of Dagenham and of the East End. 1

Prestonfield unquestionably resembles Wardieburn and the newer estates in the prevalence of "distant" relationships. Passage of time has not tempered the restricted patterns of interaction; it has only - so it seems - made more rigid the social reticence and established this as the normative form of life for later entrants into the district. Klein insightfully suggests that such "keep to yourself" dispositions may derive from norm conflicts among the migrants who come to the new estates.

To complain that the neighbours are 'stuck up' may be translated as meaning that when you say good-day to them, as is customary in the society from which you came, they do not return the greeting for fear that you will drop in on them, because they will interpret it as an overture to further interaction. In a traditional society, minute cues may serve to indicate the behaviour expected of one another. When norms differ, cues are not recognised. 2

Most of the people do not have the necessary social skills to deliberately pursue new social relationships, and instead, may comfort themselves with the assurance that it is not themselves, but the others in the neighbourhood, who are 'cold'.

But the paucity of neighbourhood interaction is really only one side of the coin; the other side is the dominant alternative - increased home centeredness. The husband may still "pop off to the pub for a pint" in the evening but the chances are his visit will be short, and he is far more likely to forego this masculine diversion for the sake of family and television.

Klein points to both television and increased financial well-being as helping to bring husbands and wives closer together; "When man and wife discuss

1. ibid, p.83.
the way they shall spend money, the fact that they talk together is not the least of the benefits more spending money confers. Parallel to this the fact that television keeps the husband from the pub is not the only benefit T.V. confers. Like purchases for the home, television provides a talking-point for husbands and wives who have not learned the arts of conjugal conversation in their parental homes.\(^1\) Marriage in these surroundings is more companionate, to be sure, and the relationship between man and children is less stern and more affectionate.

Says the Wardieburn (Edinburgh) report about the shifting image of the husband, "In brief the trend is from a kind of hollow Jehovah to a home-centered handyman who plays with the children."\(^2\) New pride in the home is evident, a private pride, to be enjoyed rather than displayed. The home is a cherished cloister in which life is centered.

On the surface, as I've suggested, one might be led to infer an adoption of middle class style of family life. To a limited extent this would be a valid inference. But our evidence in its totality does not support the "embourgeoisement" thesis in regard to living patterns. This is rather an internal revolution - a modification of working class life, a super-imposition of new values and patterns set in motion by drastic ecological changes as well as financial and residential improvements. But the revolution is not accompanied by adoption of other middle class patterns such as extensive associational involvement, mutual entertainment, more sophisticated forms of entertainments or increased interaction with persons of higher status. Berger in describing the changes wrought by the move to suburbia of the workers in his California survey could be speaking for the situation receiving our attention.

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1. ibid, p.295.
Social mobility characteristically occurs when an occupational advance or a rise in income permits the mobile family to move out of its social milieu into one more in keeping with its aspirations and its new economic status. In the case under consideration this has not happened. Instead, a whole stratum has collectively raised its standard of living simply by buying new homes in the suburbs. The nature of the stratum itself, however, remains largely unchanged. And at a later stage he concludes, "but these 'gains' are collective gains, and as such, they do not so much constitute evidence of individual social mobility as they do the mobility of an entire stratum".  

In short, we have reason to see a genuine change in working class lifestyle in one key way which gives it a resemblance to the middle class, family-centered, configuration. "Home-centeredness" has been referred to as a middle class characteristic by a number of investigators. Willmott and Young found almost obsessional, fetish-like commitment to every detail of home amenity in a study of a London suburb. Burns well summarised the general view of sociologists: "The family in the middle classes is truly the basic social unit". But this characteristic can no longer be considered the exclusive province of the middle class. With the break-up of old style, crowded, communal, gregarious working class communities, and the improvement in home environment and the accompanying pride in the home, this is becoming an increasing feature of working class life, grafted into the other central patterns and values. As we analyse other aspects of life style, there will be mounting evidence that this is an internal metamorphosis rather than an emulation of middle class forms of living.

C. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Participation in organisations, visiting the pub and engaging in leisure time activities are three aspects of life style dealt with under the rubric

2. ibid, p.93.
3. Willmott and Young, Family and Class in a London Suburb.
"social participation". Class variations of significance are discovered, serving to substantiate the assertion that the working class retain life style patterns distinct from those of higher status groups.

1. Organisational Involvement.

More detailed confirmation of this distinctiveness is provided by the answers to the question on involvement in organisations. The question was used to elicit facts about union membership as well as other formal groups, but here the extra-union involvements will be considered separately. The number of organisational relationships varies tremendously, and inversely, with social status. The ratios of number of men to total number of organisational commitments is as follows for each class grouping: working class, 3:1; borderline, 1:5:1; middle class, 1:1:2. In other words, the middle class men average more than one organisation each, the working class men only one organisation for every three men, and the borderline group almost directly midway between the two larger groups.

Breaking this data down into separate categories of organisations, we find the only appreciable number of working class formal involvements under the rubric, "fraternal", still accounting for only seventeen per cent of the men in this division. The organisations alluded to were the Freemasons, the Buffaloes (which a taxi driver described as a "working man's Freemasons") and a working men's club nearby. The borderline men are most keen on "religious" groups such as Boys' Brigade and on "sports" or "recreational organisations" such as golf clubs and bowling clubs. The middle class men disclose an even higher proportion of involvements in sports organisations. They also show a large proportion in the third column which includes "cultural groups" like drama clubs, "service" organisations and "professional" societies. These three forms of involvement are lumped together as they are pertinent to the middle class men almost exclusively.
TABLE V - 2

PARTICIPATION IN ORGANISATIONS (OTHER THAN TRADE UNIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N (organiz.)</th>
<th>Fraternal</th>
<th>Sports etc.</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low working class participation and high middle class participation in formal organisations are well-established generalities of life style in Britain and elsewhere. Clearly, our findings are compatible with this pattern. In Dagenham, only eleven per cent of the working class council estate residents reported having attended a club or organisation in the month prior to being interviewed. Eighty-four per cent said they belonged to no such organisation. Says Willmott, "Compared with the middle-class suburb of Woodford, clubs and the like play a small part in people's lives at Dagenham." Similar results have emerged from research in Derby, in Banbury, and in a county town in the Home Counties. Stressing the same phenomenon, Lenski says,

The only formal associations which have managed to win the active participation of any significant proportion of working class people seem to be the churches, the unions and in some countries, working men's political parties and clubs. On the whole, working people have limited their voluntary social relationships to those of an informal, primary type much more than the middle class. In particular, they have limited such relationships to those built on the foundation of kinship.

2. Cauter and Downham, op. cit., p.66.
5. Lenski, op. cit., p.49.
Carol Slater notes that in the lowest socio-economic classes in America, women are likely to stress concrete household tasks and see themselves exclusively in the domestic role. In the same vein, Mayer reports,

'Joining', then, is more prevalent among members of the middle and the upper classes than elsewhere in the class structure. This does not mean, of course, that working class people live in social isolation. The active social life of most working class persons is largely confined to informal leisure time activities that take place in intimate cliques, made up primarily of relatives.

These American results coincide with the findings of British sociologists, underscoring the generality of this phenomenon. Many other American researches have pointed to the same social disparities.

2. Use of the Pub.

On the basis of the descriptions of "traditional" working class areas, I felt that the pub might still represent a working class alternative of the informal, personal variety, and might provide an arena of camaraderie occupying much the same place in the working man's life as the formal association do in the life of middle class persons. So, respondents were asked how frequently they visit the pub - in general rather than for a specified period of time - and whether to the "local" or to a pub elsewhere in town. The results support the hypothesis, as Table V - 3 indicates. As the middle class self-placement separation seemed important in the results, the middle class group is divided on this basis, the working class identifiers denoted (Mo-Wc) and the middle class identifiers denoted (Mo-Mc).


2. Mayer, op. cit., p.44.

The last column includes men who indicated that their drinking is done in a club or hotel bar or at home rather than in a pub; the other grouping should be adequately self-explanatory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE V - 3</th>
<th>FREQUENCY AND LOCATION OF PUB VISITING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo-Wc</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo-Mo</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixty-one per cent of the working class men report frequent visits to the pub, either local or elsewhere. My impression is that many of the "elsewhere" answers illustrate the previously described nostalgia for "old haunts" where the individual previously lived and still meets old "mates". Only twenty-nine per cent of this lowest stratum said they never or seldom go to the pub. The question was not put to the respondents so as to delve into drinking patterns in general; and the large numbers of "seldom or never" answers over all probably do not represent, in the main, an anti-drinking persuasion, but merely the fact that these do not often go out somewhere for social drinking. For this reason, the final column probably understates the number who sometimes engage in home drinking. Cauter and Downham likewise reported that "working-class people are very much more likely to be regular visitors to the pub going at least once a week".¹

¹ Cauter and Downham, op. cit., p.94.
Bearing in mind the decline in gregariousness and neighbourhood sociability, it is noteworthy to find a high working class retention of the pub-going custom. Indeed, as many as one-fifth go to the trouble of travelling out of the neighbourhood to "have a couple pints" with old friends. A brewery engineer remarked,

The pubs here are okay, but I prefer up town. I still have my 'local' pub where I grew up and that's where I usually go.

The different attitudes surrounding social drinking are evident in the borderline and middle class groups. A general foreman said,

There are enough pubs around here, but not enough places to take the wife. I like to go up town somewhere where I feel the wife can go along and make an evening of it.

There are two pubs within the Prestonfield area, neither within the council scheme but both bordering it. One is quite new and stylish, with a large parking lot to cater to "through traffic" on a major road out of the city, but is generally less busy. The other is on Dalkeith Road, across the street from the fringe of the scheme and is packed out every night, mainly with men from the council houses. It is to this pub that the following middle class men were referring in these remarks.

The pub here is too tough; I drink at home.

No, I don't use the local pub; it's filled with a rough lot from the scheme.

I don't frequent the pub because it's frequented by hooks, crooks, and comic singers from the area across here {the scheme} who are really bad.

Digressing to make an obvious comment, these remarks certainly illustrate the feelings which keep a social curtain drawn between the classes. Some middle class men still announce disapproval at the socialising style of working class men. Barriers to social intercourse are still obvious, even if decried.

1. Again, Dagenham proves to be contradictory on this measure but it may be related to the limited availability of pubs. "In fact, there are relatively few pubs on the estate. Bethnal Green has a pub for every 600 people, Woodford one for every 2,500 and Dagenham one for every 10,000". Only 28% of the men in Dagenham reported making a visit to the pub within the previous month. Willmott, op.cit., p.87.
The middle class self-placement factor comes into prominence again on this question even though it made no difference for organisational activity. Close to a third of the "discrepant" men use the local pub, but none of the "consistent" middle class men. None of the "discrepant" volunteered information about drinking in more sophisticated surroundings such as a hotel, while this category of answer was volunteered by a fourth of the "consistent" middle class respondents. Apparently the men who still consider themselves working class are able to "feel at home" in a working class atmosphere, or perhaps they wish to reinforce their deliberate renunciation of pretentiousness. The middle class identifiers are quite willing to deny association with "rough" elements in the "local".

Our data does not speak to the matter of trends in pub-going for men who have come to the council from an "old style" central city district. But, I have no doubt the conclusions of Young and Willmott (regarding men in the Greenleigh council scheme from the old Bethnal Green area) would hold true.

The majority of men (twenty-six out of thirty-nine) said they had reduced their spending on drinking and smoking after going to the estate. Generally speaking, the money saved came into the home instead.

Despite this qualification, the pub is still predominately a working class "institution" and helps fill the social vacuum in the kind of unstructured, casual atmosphere that the working class man finds congenial. The borderline men are most akin to the "discrepant" middle class men and are particularly high in claiming little or no use of the pub.

3. Leisure Time Pursuits.

Another approach to the complex of social activity is made by the question, "What sort of things do you like to do in your leisure time"? Since no predetermined categories were employed, the answers to this query proved extremely

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1. Young and Willmott, op. cit., p.145.
difficult to code and analyse. A large variety of responses were given (thirty-three) and my efforts to reduce these to a workable number of groupings for analysis has not, in my own opinion, been altogether successful. But, some general tendencies are evident, tendencies compatible with the previous findings. Over all, the borderline group mentions slightly the greatest number of leisure pursuits, the middle class group is just behind, and the working class group mention by far the fewest, proportionately. But, there is room for deception in this fact since the frequency of participation in an activity was not asked, but merely the sort of activities preferred. The reason for this is that I was mainly concerned with discovering the types of leisure pursuits valued by the different groups, irrespective of how often these were enjoyed in practice. The latter aspect is greatly influenced by family stage, marital status, finances and other factors, of course. But, taken in conjunction with the organisational involvement variable, one may infer that these responses also indicate the less frequent "outside" leisure pursuits for the working class man. This was found to be the case in Derby by Carter and Downham,¹ and was the impression that I obtained here.

There is an admitted "ad homness" about the four main classifications of leisure activity which have been devised. The first is called "relaxation" and includes a wide variety of activities — T.V., cinema, walking, bowling, gardening, reading, dancing, snooker and a few more. The second is called "passive recreations" and refers to pub-going as well as "following" football, horses, greyhounds, wrestling and boxing. These are, then, other than pub-going, mainly "spectator sports" and are associated with the working class. The third classification is called "active recreations" and covers a wide range of pursuits including golf, fishing, hunting, swimming, tennis, skiing, mountaineering, etc.

¹. Carter and Downham, op. cit., p.65.
The fourth grouping is called very roughly "cultural, social and service". Within its scope fall photography, theatre, Boys' Brigade and Boy Scout leadership, home entertaining, motoring and others.

About one-tenth of the men gave no indication of a leisure pursuit at all. The rest gave at least one preference, some as many as three or four. Table V - 4 combines the first and second choice (where there are second choices).

<p>| TABLE V - 4 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEISURE ACTIVITY PREFERENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As suggested, the "passive recreations" are predominately selected by working class men, particularly visiting the pub and watching football matches. Pear and others have pointed out the important part played by football in the life of working class men. Only the "Relaxation" category is apparently uninfluenced by class dispositions, but if the various activities included were singled out, more variation would certainly appear. For instance, nearly all of the "cinema" replies were by working class men, which is consistent with the statistics for England and Wales presented by Carr-Saunders and his associates.2


The borderline and middle class men (to a lesser extent) both frequently allude to "active" recreations, most often to golfing. But, for the middle class men, the dominant type of activities stressed and highly valued is the "mixed bag" of non-sports pursuits described (fourth column) above. The borderline group is least concentrated in specific categories, but is, as usual, more weighted toward middle class interests. My impression is that the "magic box" with its perpetual panorama of entertainment, the television, is most dominant in the lives of the working class families. It requires least effort, money and social pressure and is a substantial substitute for more active pursuits.

The class implications of leisure preferences are made more manifest when we control the middle class choices by social class self-placement. For the first-mentioned leisure pursuit preference the "consistent" middle class respondents select one of the activities in the last category (cultural, etc.) twice as frequently as the "discrepant" middle class men. The higher average age for the "discrepant" men could account for this in part, but the disparity is consistent with previous findings. The men who identify themselves with the working class are less removed from working class values on most measures. All of the men with college or University educations make their initial leisure choice within this latter classification, further underscoring the social contrasts.

So, throughout the range of social participation examined - organisations, pub-going and leisure preference - there has been mounting evidence that life styles of middle class and working class men are generally distinct. In these terms, at least, little merging of classes is evident, though it is, of course, true that social separations are less than iron-clad. But it is not possible on the basis of these findings to concur with the statement of Johnson concerning Britain's "social evolution" that,
Art and amusements became 'popular' in the quantitative sense of the word, with the result that all sections of the community tended to do the same things. Modernism produced a new type of working class man and woman whose ambition seemed to be social equality with the trading and black-coated classes.

D. FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS

Finally, it remains for us to catch at least a panoramic view of some of the salient features of family structure uncovered by our interviews for in these, too, we find signs of class variation in life style. Of course, the family has previously been introduced to the discussion with regard to the centripetal forces in working class life producing greater companionship between husband and wife and greater commitment to the home as the focal point of family activity. In the main, this is the direct result of a major change in the role of the husband. Young and Willmott describe the old image and the new role of the working class husband,

... the notion still survives that the working class man is a sort of absentee husband, sharing with his wife neither the responsibility nor affection, partner only of the bed. Such a view is in the tradition of research into working class family life.2

Whatever happened in the past, the younger husband of today does not consider that the children belong exclusively to his wife's sphere of work, or that he can abandon them to her (and her mother) while he takes his comfort in the male atmosphere of the pub. He now shares responsibility for the number of children, as well as for their welfare after they are born.3

1. Family Size.

The reference to the number of children introduces a measure of family structure which was sought for in the interviews. Marsh has pointed out that in

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2. Willmott and Young, op. cit., p.19; see also Hoggart, op. cit., esp. p,p.48-51; E. Slater and N. Woodhides, Patterns of Marriage, (London: Cassal, 1951); F. Henriques and G. Slaughter, Coal is Our Life: Analysis of a Yorkshire Mining Community, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoods, 1956).
3. ibid, p.21.
England and Wales since the beginning of this century there has been a large-scale revolution in family size and planning. The revolution began with the higher classes, who first reduced the number of children systematically, but has gradually spread through the social structure, with small families becoming normative for the whole population.¹ Wrong also notes the continued narrowing of difference in family size, but stresses that manual workers' families are still measurably larger on the average. The lowest fertility is found among the lowest non-manual groups.² The latter fact may accompany high aspiration for upward mobility among these lowest fringes of the middle class. Lenski has indicated that in America there is a correlation between increased family size and reduced educational opportunity, which tends to perpetuate working class status.³

Within our own study, the variations in "family stage" make comparisons difficult without sub-dividing the groups to the point where the size of the sub-samples become miniscule. Most of our working class families are "complete" families, but few of the middle class families are complete. This is evident in the comparative ratios of children over seventeen years to children below six years for each class division. They are 4:3:1 for working class, 2:1 for borderline and 7:1 for middle class. Many of the middle class couples are quite young, just getting their families under way.⁴ But, taking the borderline and middle groups combined, there are nearly as many men over fifty years of age as there are within the working class group. Despite this, six of the seven men who report having more than three children are working class. Furthermore, there are nearly

³ Lenski, op. cit., p. 243.
⁴ The age factor has not often been brought to attention because it has had little or no effect on other measures.
as many working class families with three children as with two, which is not the case in the other division. So, whatever the present trend - which is, no doubt, a convergence of family size patterns - the larger family tendency of the working class is still visible for our respondents.

2. Working Wives.

Another family variable associated with life style is that of "working wives". About forty per cent of the wives of our respondents are employed in some capacity, part-time or full-time. For the working class group, all but two of the working wives are employed in a manual job, and all but two of these work on a part-time basis. Most do part-time cleaning working in private residences, hospitals or hotels. By contrast, the largest number of middle class working wives are engaged in full time non-manual work, largely secretarial and office work. There are only two middle class wives who do work of a manual nature, both on a part-time basis. Only a third of the borderline wives do any work outside the home, and with only a single exception this is non-manual work.

Within the middle class, the self-placement distinction comes to the fore once again. A slight majority of the "consistent" middle class wives work (it will be recalled that these men were, on the average, quite young and married for only a short time) and all of these are in non-manual positions. Only a third of the "discrepant" middle class wives work and half of these are in manual positions. It is also of interest that a number of working class men volunteered the fact that although their wives are free from outside employment now, they had worked sometime during their married life. Only a fifth had done no work since marriage. Only one middle class man whose wife was not working alluded to previous work since their marriage.

The general conclusion reached is that for the working class families, it may be deemed necessary at various points throughout life for the wife to go out and bring in some extra money cleaning or performing some other manual task, perhaps a couple of days per week. For the middle class wives, full-time office
work is frequently engaged in prior to the family reaching the stage where this is no longer convenient. Such work may again be taken up after the children are grown, but only if it is desired in order to help keep busy and enable additional purchases: not as a matter of necessity. A few insist on keeping active in work outside the home, even with children. For instance, a supervisor with two young children remarked,

My wife? Oh, she's a 'career girl' ... has spells when she must go out. She's just starting in a catering business ... says she prefers to work than to take care of the children.

This is, of course, exceptional.

3. Children's Education.

Some information was ascertained concerning the schooling previously received or presently being received by the children of the respondents. The variations in family stage limits the feasible scope of analysis and only the most summary statements will be given. The clearest - and most predictable - feature is the greater advancement of middle class children over the other groups in education, with no variation on the basis of the class self-placement variable. Over half of the middle class families with children of school age or above have at least one offspring attending a "fee-paying" school presently or one who has in the past attended senior secondary school or above. Only a handful of working class children received anything but the standard minimum training.

Statistically the borderline group looks much the same as the working class group on this measure, but among the younger men there is indication of greater educational aspirations. Two of these men illustrate the feelings of hostility to the prospect of their children attending the local Junior Secondary school,

James Clark.

My one girl is going to Sciennes School now, I tried to get her into Gillespie's but wasn't able to. I hope she'll be able to get to Boroughmuir after Sciennes. I will not let her go to James Clark; I'm definite about that.
Another man with two little boys, one just coming up to school age said,

I don't know what to do about the boy's schooling; whether to put him in the local school and hope he wins a place in a good school later or to buy him into a good school now. It's a real problem.

Those men who had children who had "got on" were very proud to recite their accomplishments. A baker who lived in the council estate spoke with irrepressible paternal joy as he told of the whereabouts and work of his six married children, two of whom were "doing very well" in Canada and one was a broadcaster for the BBC.

The question of the son's work most often had to be in terms of aspirations, and sometimes hypothetical (if there were no boys in the family). There was a noticeable reluctance to prescribe what the son ought to be. A motor mechanic with two teenage boys said,

Well, you've got to fit the boys according to their individual abilities. I've got them both into apprentice ships now, and I think they'll be happy.

Said a supervisor for a cash register firm who had two very young (pre-school) boys,

Nothing is preconceived about the future, I hope to get a glimmering of what they ought to do as time goes by. I would never dictate.

Though few would state specific jobs they would like to see their children attain, this reluctance was not synonymous with low aspiration. A technician said,

It's too difficult to say what I'd like the boy to be. I'd like to see him getting on, naturally.

Civil Service jobs seem to represent feasible opportunities for advancement and most often (along with the general term, "trade") were spoken of as aspirations for boys. An electrician with two boys in school replied,

I wouldn't like to see them in dungarees as tradesmen. I'd rather see them in Civil Service, but don't think they'll make it.
A carton-maker retorted simply, "Civil Service, that's the job today".

The foregoing indicators of life style in family life serve to further accentuate the contrasts by class. In short working class families tend to have more children who are afforded generally minimal educations. The wives of these families continuously or "off and on" through their married lives contribute to the family budget with part-time manual work. The middle class families are consistently kept small and in a majority of cases the children are provided educations which will assure then non-manual positions. The wives who work are usually full-time office workers, most often early in marriage, continuing with pre-marriage work until family responsibilities militate against further employment. It has not been possible to examine carefully aspirations for children. However, it is evident that most men want to leave the specific choice to the children, but are anxious to see them attain good positions consistent with their own frame of reference (that is "trades" for children of workingmen, non-manual jobs with advancement possibilities for the others).

4. Language Barriers.

Before leaving the area of life style a somewhat parenthetical issue welcomes attention at this point because it is especially pertinent to education, and will serve to lay the groundwork for additional considerations later in the thesis. This final word about the amalgam of life style relates to the constraining context of language and values which so often blunt the possibilities of
social mobility through the educational system for working class children. The main vehicle of upward mobility is, without question, education. But there is by no means an equal possibility of catching a long ride on this vehicle for different segments of the community. Many have pointed out the different values placed on formal education by various social classes. There is more to this than a depreciation of education by working class persons and a glorification of education by middle class persons. For even where an abstract commitment to the worth and necessity of educational success is present in a working class family, the whole informal value structure of the environment may militate against success. Models to emulate are not in abundance — incentive is not usually provided; peers are taking jobs at fifteen or sixteen and bringing home enough money to enjoy themselves and make desired purchases; the very sense of obligation to strive for higher position may be untenable. So few working class children are able to claw their way through the morass of environmental traps and "make a go of it" in school. Lockwood gives body to this knowledge when he shows that forty-five per cent of children of clerks get places in grammar schools as opposed to seventeen per cent of children from homes of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers.

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2. Lockwood, op. cit., p.129.
Basil Bernstein has, in recent years, approached this phenomenon from a linguistic standpoint. He has ingeniously articulated the variations in modes of speech for different classes, showing how linguistic restrictions and inability to use a "formal" language undercuts the educational efforts of working class children. In contrast to the syntactical variety, theoretical attitudes and perceptual capacity of a middle class "formal" language (which dominates the schools, quite obviously) the "lower working class" has a mode of speech "distinguished by the rigidity of the syntax and the limited and restricted use of structural possibilities for sentence organisation". This very restricted and predictable form of communication Bernstein calls a "public language". He asserts that "a middle class child learns both these linguistic modes and uses them according to the social context, whereas a lower working class child is restricted to a public language". The difficulties in mastering the raw materials of education are implied in that. The working class child has to translate and thus mediate middle class language structure through the logically simpler language structure of his own class to make it personally meaningful ... Where he cannot make this translation he fails to understand, and is left puzzled.


4. ibid, 293.
The middle class child has been socialised to adhere to the value system of school and teachers, and is conditioned to respond appropriately to the language structure of communication. The working class child, on the other hand, is not well-pre-disposed for the authority structure of school, the future oriented value system or the modes of speech. His grammatically simple, limited language is strained to the breaking point by the need to formulate ideas and relationships precisely. Furthermore, the language forms he possesses tend to maximise identification with a local group who share an understanding of these forms and to minimise identification with more remote segments of society.

All this is by the way of very condensed paraphrase of Bernstein's thought. It deserves a brief mention, though, because the recognition of intra-society linguistic barriers has major relevance to the subjects we have been discussing, and to subjects which will occupy our attention in the remainder of the thesis. As long as such analytically distinct language forms exist, this can only serve to reinforce class-consciousness and distinct life styles. Of course, Bernstein refers in particular to "lower working class"; this theory would seem to hold true to a lesser extent where working class families do not live in such close-knit sub-cultures. But, the barrier is a force to be reckoned with, not only by educators, but also by sociologists of stratification and by leaders within other institutions where the tacit assumption of unhindered communication is made. We will later suggest that this has application to the Church. No less than the schools, the Church communicates its liturgy and message in a "formal" language, perhaps even further removed from the comfortable "public" language of the local working class groups. It is, therefore, very plausible that this linguistic aspect of life style may have direct relevance to the patterns of church involvement. Such a possibility provides one bridge to the next section of the thesis.
E. Social Class Conclusions.

Now we have reached a major point of transition. The window of our investigation has so far been opened to the panorama of social class; we will hereafter see the steeples of the churches dotting the social horizon. But, first a brief look backward is in order so as to draw together the strings of conclusion concerning the rather lengthy discussion on social class.

While indicators of class-consciousness and life style have manifested the continuance of class separateness and solidarity, thus putting to rest the myth of working class "embourgeoisement", the initially explored social attitudes demonstrated the peaceful nature of current class divisions. The working class does not, on the whole, exercise the tendency to condemn the system and thereby cushion the fact of their own low position. In fact, they often have harsh words for workers and unions, and good words for the financially successful.

Obviously the cutting edge has been dulled from the past history of working class militancy; the proletarian muscle-man tearing down the vested powers by the exertion of every sinew is with us no more. How has this come to be? As already suggested, workers are today rather substantial stockholders in the firm of British society. The privileges and securities of the welfare state have put into history the worst catalogue of misery and deprivation. The great power of the Labour party and Trade Unions has not only given enormous bargaining power and leverage to the worker, but also symptoms of the disillusionment of power. Many are unsure that the power is being well exercised, and for the right ends, and with a long enough view.

Yet class divisions have neither disappeared nor do they seem to be disappearing. Class orientations are still major characteristics of the social scene, colouring
the lives and values and activities of individuals, helping shape the systems of commitments, reflecting the boundaries of economic interest and social belongingness. What is gone - or, at any rate, dissipating - is the kind of hostile confrontation of classes, the invidious sting of conspicuously great disparities in power and prestige which marked the early years of the century and the whole of the previous century. There is today mutual distance and distinctiveness of classes without noticeable rancour. Class has sustained meaning but not a high degree of militancy. Class groups are aware of their own interests but do not display irascibility in their efforts to promote these interests.

Working class men, for instance, do not often speak in revolutionary terms. The present system and structure is, by and large, taken for granted. The working class cling to the Labour party and the Trade Unions as those who are waving the workers' banner; but the clinging seems partly from habit and perhaps a bit tenuous. Workers have a stake in the present scheme of things; they are no longer disenfranchised politically, economically or socially. People do not usually throw bricks at the buildings of which they are part owners. In short, the working class is not in penury, in political or social exile or condemned to the infamy of inherited limitation - nor are they middle class.

Middle class persons maintain a separate style of social activity and want it to stay that way; but they are reluctant to verbally attack the working class or even to describe themselves as middle class for fear of pretentiousness. They do not oppose the improvement of the working class, are not blatant in displaying financial advantages - but they do not welcome any merging of classes which would disturb the social separateness they enjoy.

Within this framework of understanding, it can be said that the definition of social class presented at the outset of the discussion - stressing subjective apprehension and identity, and mutuality of interests, values and behaviour -
(this definition) has been most fully substantiated by two groups: the working class section and the "consistent" middle class (who are middle class both by objective criteria and by self-identification). Throughout the spectrum of life style and class-consciousness measures, these two sections, comprising about two-thirds of the sample, show meaningful and consistent attachment to their respective classes and strong contrast with each other.

The other one-third of the sample is comprised of the borderline and "ificere-pant" middle class respondents. Their class identity and solidarity is tenuous. they are subject to cross-pressures of class, either by way of precariousness of status or by way of conflict between background and present occupational status. On the whole, their attitudes tend to strain in a middle class direction but the influence of working class origins or milieu is still manifest in their behaviour. In part the social unsureness and inconsistency of these groups may be no more than the unavoidable side-effects of first generation social mobility, destined to disappear with their children.

The "embourgeoisement" theme, as a major explanation of social class trends is rejected on the basis of our data. The phenomenon most nearly approximating "embourgeoisement" in life style is the increasing home-centeredness of the working class man. But this transformation seems to be more a response to ecological stimulus than an endogenous social change. It does not appear to stem primarily from middle class aspirations or middle class emulation, nor is it accompanied by adoption of other middle class styles and ideas which would make it part of an overall pattern. I feel justified, therefore, in dealing with the status divisions as meaningful class groups which carry the implications of class influence suggested by my conceptual framework. This will be the procedure as class is put alongside the dimensions of church attachment in the remainder of the thesis.
PART THREE: CHURCH-CLASS CONFIGURATION

CHAPTER VI
CLASS VARIATION IN CHURCH PARTICIPATION

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGY.

B. GENERAL PATTERNS OF CHURCH MEMBERSHIP & ATTENDANCE.

C. DIFFERENTIAL CLASS INVOLVEMENT.
   1. Review of Western Societies.
   2. Prestonfield Attendance Patterns.
   3. Other Measures of Church Involvement.
   4. Church-going of Personal Acquaintances.

D. AGE AND SEX FACTORS IN CHURCH INVOLVEMENT.
   1. Church Attendance and Age.
   2. Husbands and Wives Comparison.
   3. Church Activities of Children.

E. CHURCH BACKGROUND.

F. SUMMARY.
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF STRATEGY

Relationship to the church is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon which is exhaustively depicted by the descriptions, "goes to church" or "does not go to church". Following the strategy of "disaggregating" that was to some extent employed with regard to social class, in this chapter and the next I will engage in breaking down the gross concept of "church relationship" to a number of more specific dimensions. The operational assumption is that one's relationship to the church may be along various lines, covert as well as overt. The behavioural indices of participation in the formal programme of the church do not comprehensively denote an individual’s possible ties to the church; they reveal only a part of the story, albeit unquestionably a fundamental part. But there are an array of other meaningful criteria which may contribute to the complete mosaic of church-relationship. One’s whole attitudinal posture toward the church may be equally important: elements of perception of the church’s leadership, of her value to the individual and to the community; appraisal of church services, ideological commitment to the norms and doctrines presented by the church (or lack of commitment), etc. - these ought to be taken into account in the interest of a comprehensive appraisal of where the individual stand vis a vis the church.

In speaking of the disaggregated aspects of relationship to the church, several terms will be variously employed: dimensions, components, elements, constituents. The terms "involvement" and "participation" will be reserved for the overt elements of concrete activity connected with the church. These do not seem appropriate terms of the spectrum of attitudinal dimensions which do not necessarily connote direct participation. Instead, for these more subjective components the label "attachment" will be used. Thus "involvement " and "participation" on the one hand, and "attachment" on the other, may be viewed as
sub-species of the inclusive, overall term "relationship" to the church.

The general purpose of this particular approach is to get beneath the gross facts of the church-class relationship and try to ascertain some of the forces working to produce the overall configuration. For instance, it is vital to understand whether working-class absence (relatively) is due to ideological rejection of the church's teaching, negative perception of the church's "image", distaste for the particular forms of liturgy and communication, feelings of social distance from the active membership, plain disinterest borne of a secularised view of life, or some combination of these or other factors. Likewise, a similar set of questions could be advanced regarding the greater middle class church involvement. I feel that only this more "probing" technique, delving into the "behind-the-scenes" aspects, can lead to fruitful interpretation of the church involvement pattern. Even apart from the question of interpretation, these dimensions, as segments of the whole phenomenon of commitment to religious institutions (or lack of commitment) seem fundamental to the question of description alone.

On the whole, sociological investigations of religious behaviour have confined themselves to measuring degree of involvement in terms of overt church participation. What differentiation of KIND of involvement has been undertaken has been mainly along the lines of the church-sect dichotomy. This may be viewed as one sort of "dimensional" conceptualisation of religious practice. Recently, for instance, Demerath has employed this "typology" outside the usual context of a discussion of different kinds of religious institutions and instead used it as a basis of his discussion of differential participation - both degree and content - within the same religious organisation. He has shown that within congregations of major

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1. Demarath, op. cit.
American denominations, some members have a "sect-like" type of involvement (emphasising the emotional satisfactions and communal interaction) and some members have a "church-like" type of involvement (stressing observance of liturgical forms and formal requirements of church attendance). He found that, by and large, within each distinct religious body there is a correspondence of "sect-like" involvement to lower status groups and "church-like" involvement to higher status groups. His analysis is clearly a useful advance in disaggregating the concept of church involvement.

Joseph Fichter has established a scheme of classification of types of involvement in the Roman Catholic Church based on studies in Catholic parishes in the U.S.\(^1\) His main concern is degree of participation in the formal programme of the parish church. He classifies aggregates of parishioners ("nuclear", "modal", "marginal" and "dormant") on the basis of several explicit behavioural indices. His emphasis on the differing responses by these various types of parishioners to the secular pressures of other commitments is enlightening. However, he fails to carry the investigation thoroughly into the realms of attitude and value orientation and thus provides little inspiration for this study.

Other important efforts to distinguish motivations and types of religious (rather than specifically church) experience have stemmed from a psychological frame of reference. The classic example is William James' "Varieties of Religious Experience" initially presented in his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh around the turn of the century.\(^2\)

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1. Fichter, op. cit.

His brilliant portrait of the "healthy-minded" who faces the world with a sanguine air, unhindered by a deep sense of sinfulness and concerned chiefly with maximising temporal happiness, and of the "sick soul" who is morbidly concerned with the profundity of sinfulness and desirous of a radical, supernatural transformation of human nature, are classic stereotypes of religious experience.

More recently Michael Argyle has examined the psychological dynamics giving rise to forms of religious behaviour and has considered also social factors impinging on it. However, the main thrust of these outstanding studies is to focus on the individual and his psychological propensities leading to particular expressions of religion. They are thus of minor usefulness in formulating a sociological system of classification.

The most notable "dimensional" paradigms for conceptualising and researching religious experience have been developed by Glock and Fukyama. Glock asserts,

A first and obvious requirement if religious commitment is to be comprehensively assessed is to establish the different ways in which individuals can be religious. With some few exceptions, past research has curiously avoided this fundamental question. Investigators have tended to focus upon one or another of the diverse manifestations of religiosity and to ignore all others.

Glock proposes that there are several distinct dimensions of religious experience which should be systematically separated for analysis: his "experiential" dimension refers to the emotional and perceptual content of religious life; he gives the label "ideological" to the belief system adhered to by an individual; the "ritualistic" dimension encompasses religious practices such as worship, prayer and participation in certain religious activities; for the aspects of religious

1. Argyle, op. cit.
cognition and grasp of religious information Glock uses the term "intellectual"; and fifthly, a dimension sui generis is the "consequential" which is inclusive of the secular effects of religious belief, practice, etc. "These dimensions, it is proposed, provide a frame of reference for studying religion and assessing religiosity".¹

It is clear that this scheme incorporates some basic, now traditional, distinctions in the field of sociology of religion. The distinction between "ideological" and "ritualistic" echoes Durkheim's fundamental dichotomy of "rites and "beliefs".² The "consequential" dimension could be viewed as expressing one phenomenon elaborated by Weber - the effect of religious ideology upon the economic and social facets of life. The "experiential" connotes the distinctions in the "tone" of religious activity which are crucial to the church-sect dichotomy.

Fukyama has devised a similar analytical scheme to that of Glock's with the difference that is is applied specifically to church involvement rather than religiosity in a more general sense. His terminology is also disparate with Glock's. He distinguishes these four types of religiosity: "cultic" (akin to "ritualistic"); "cognitive" (similar to "intellectual"), "creedal" (parallel to "ideological") and devotional (roughly the same as "experiential" in Glock's system). Without reviewing his findings in detail, suffice it to say that his conclusions and main contribution closely parallel Demarath's church-sect findings.

This brief review elucidates the on-going development of this sort of analytical "attack" upon the variations in religious experience and church commitment. However, virtually all systematic "dimensional" investigations of the church-class

¹. Glock and Stark, op. cit., p.21.

relationship have taken as their research context a particular church body (or church bodies). In a departure from this conventional pattern I have selected respondents from a community at large with no preliminary account taken of their religious affiliations. The advantage accruing from this procedure is that, within the dimensional structure employed, it is possible to assess the "attachment" to religious institutions for those who have no overt church ties as well as for those who are involved in a church congregation. In other words, "differential attachment" to the church is discernable for a wide range of individuals - within the church and outside of the church - not only "differential involvement" of church members.

Clearly, use of the term "church attachment" to describe the wider set of dispositions toward the church on the part of those outside the pale of institutional religion bears some explanation. It is related to the remark of Yinger that one of the most relevant questions for sociology of religion is, "What does it mean to belong to the church?"\(^1\) In a country like Scotland this is an especially perplexing question; I propose in dealing with this query that it is especially pertinent to examine various aspects of ideology and attitudes associated with the church from a more inclusive base than the active membership. To begin with, a nominal attachment to the church is assumed for most everyone. There is an Established Church with a parochial system covering every particle of land. And even among the non-participants in church, virtually all have a network of contacts with the church throughout their lives. The church, whatever her concrete influence, is an ubiquitous institution, an inescapable part of the "landscape". She projects herself into the whole structure of society. Therefore, virtually everyone is bound to have a

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constellation of values and perceptions and attitudes related to the church.

Some of the inevitable points of confrontation or engagement with the church outside of direct involvement are these.

1) The church has an immense "physical presence" - buildings, bells, men in clerical attire, etc., which cannot escape notice.

2) The church promulgates her teachings to all young people: to most of them through Sunday school or church-related clubs, but to all of them through the compulsory religious instruction of the schools.

3) The church manifests herself prominently through the mass-media; certain amounts of time are allocated on television and radio, for instance, which make contact with nearly everyone at one time or another.

4) The church conventionally plays a central role in "key events" of life; she sanctifies birth with the sacrament of baptism, marriage with a religiously coloured wedding ceremony, and death with a funeral service conducted by a cleric, etc.

5) The church maintains a system of contact with people in certain "special circumstances" such as those in hospital or in the forces, through the medium of Chaplains.

6) The church is widely represented - however unofficially - by the large number of church participants. Everyone must encounter church-goers in some way: observing people making their way to church - at the very least, conversing with people who are within the church, or enjoying a friendship relationship with church people and deriving some impression of what difference the fact of church going makes or does not make.

In other words, everyone occupying a "normal" position in society is bound to be accosted by the church, to be forced to "size up" the church, to "take the measure" of her many times. A well-formulated or merely scattered and fragmented attitudinal system related to the church is an invariable part of the cognitive framework of individuals within a society like Scotland. And even among those outside the church, because of the various "bonds" that may exist - and those enumerated above or often the bonds of a family histories which associate them with the church - many may consider themselves linked to the church in a very real
way, no matter what constitutes their religious practice. Clearly then, there are innumerable possible combinations of attitudinal dispositions and degrees of involvement in the church. It is perfectly plausible that a favourable attitudinal disposition toward the church may coexist with non-participation. The opposite may hold true in some cases. It will become clear in the course of our analysis that other factors and influences than attitudes and ideological commitments also help determine one's church involvement; the whole network of social interaction is profoundly important as is the very mundane matter of ingrained habit patterns. But the inevitable formation of a set of dispositions toward the church may be of central importance outside of the relationship these dispositions bear currently to one's level of church participation. The subjective structure may predispose one to change in patterns of involvement or non-involvement given certain precipitating events. For instance, one favourable disposed to the church but not involved in her programme may readily become a practicing church member if stimulated by close contact with a regular church-goer. Contrariwise, a life-long church-goer who is harbouring critical attitudes to the church may be disposed to break with the pattern of attendance if he changes residence. The configuration of attitudes may also make a significant difference in transmitting religious ideas to children and thus affect church attachment (and even church participation) for the next generation. Finally, these subjective factors of relationship to the church help create the larger "image" of the church in society; they both reflect and help determine the degree to which religious institutions are cherished and enshrined and thus indirectly contribute to shaping the future of the church. So I feel that the application of the term "attachment" to this wider context, and the implementation of this dimensional analysis for the larger system of dispositions toward the church, is justified by the church's ubiquitous institutional position and is certainly relevant to comprehension of the church-class
relationship. We know and shall shortly demonstrate that there is a measurable, systematic variation in church participation associated with social class. The question to which our empirical strategy speaks is, are the differences in participation based upon or accompanied by differential "attachment" through the links of attitudes and evaluations? In order to make headway in answering this question, in developing a system of explanation for class differences in church involvement, it is necessary to "analyse" in the most straightforward sense: to parcel out, separate factors and make distinctions within the whole realm of church related attitudes. Concretely, this analysis will be undertaken with two goals in mind; to find the crucial points of variation in subjective relationship to the church with respect to class - i.e., to see what components "make the difference", and secondarily, to build up a more complete picture of the church's societal "image" - in what esteem she is held and what are the elements of common perspective concerning the church from different social vantage points.

The next chapter (Chapter VII) will "come to grips" with the attitudinal factors. Admittedly "attitudinal" is being employed as a rather elastic rubric to encompass a large range of constituents. This rubric and others which will be employed are to be considered as conveniences and as inclusive rather than precise descriptions of the contents of each section. In the remainder of the present chapter I will give further and more detailed treatment to the behavioural measures of church involvement - "cultic" or "ritualistic" factors in the nomenclature of Fukyama and Glock - than required by the brief over-view of data in Chapter II. Comparison will be made with other western societies both for church attendance in general and for differential attendance by social class. In addition to indices of present church participation, the religious backgrounds of the Prestonfield respondents will be explored and related to the class categories.
Before delving into the crucial class variations in church participation, it may be useful to sketch, parenthetically, the overall "drawing power" of the Scottish church in comparison with English and American churches. According to figures compiled by John Highe, the Church of Scotland notably dominates the Protestant membership of Scotland. Approximately fifty-eight per cent of Scottish adults are church members (and Highe estimates that the number of "adherents", would swell this figure to about seventy per cent); over thirty-six per cent of all adults are members of the Established Church, about seven per cent are within other Protestant denominations, and the remainder (over fourteen per cent) are Roman Catholics. By comparison, in England and Wales, the Church of England claims just under twenty-three per cent of the adult population. Even the Church of Scotland's thirty-six per cent represents a decided decline from over forty-six per cent of the population in 1901.

However, the Church of Scotland fares much more poorly than other Protestant denominations in Scotland in getting membership into the pews on Sundays. Highe estimates from available data that an average Sunday turn-out embraces 12.7% of the country's adult population for the Established Church or about 34% of her own membership. Many of the smaller denominations claim average Sunday attendances accounting for over half of their adult membership; this is true also for the Roman Catholic Church. For all of the churches in Scotland, the estimated average Sunday attendance is about 26% of the adult population. But not all of these persons

2. loc. cit.
3. ibid, p.145.
5. ibid, p.60.
are steady in attendance, of course, and Highet suggests a "maximum number of regular attenders of about 20% of the population".  In 1950, one quarter of the adult population attended at least one Church of Scotland service during the year; this figure naturally includes the very infrequent attenders, those making the Easter and Christmas "pilgrimages".

Since the Prestonfield respondents do not represent anything like a random sample of the national population it is both futile and misleading to compare the overall attendance figures for the sample to these national averages. In the first place, the status distribution does not even roughly correspond to the national average since the purpose was to sample approximately equal manual and non-manual aggregates. Suffice it to say, without entering the rather tedious - and tenuous - mathematics involved, that if the status factors and projections from the reported attendance patterns are taken into account, it seems that the Prestonfield sample is roughly typical of the average national patterns. The only real object of interjecting this point is to assure the reader that the opposite is not the case - that the Prestonfield sample does not appear to be an anomalous or a-typical instance.

There are an array of surveys, scientific and otherwise, which contribute to the overall impression that the average church attendance in England is somewhat lower than in Scotland. Indeed, for Britain in general, churchmen have been regularly decrying the church's loss of hold over the people for many years. S.H. Mayor has compared the religious situation in Britain today with that of Greek religion in the period when the "Olympic Pantheon, though still the official cult, ceased to command the personal devotion of the people". Wickam indicated that it is especially the middle classes which have loosened their ties with the church in this century and explains that "the religious faith of the middle classes had always


weaker than its impressive expression suggested".1

Rather than discussing in detail the particular surveys dealing with church attendance in England (or in Britain generally) and the methodology and scope of each of these, the summary Table VI - 1 below reports a number of relevant data.

<table>
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<th>Investigator</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>% Attendance</th>
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<td>G.B.</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>G.B.</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.I.P.O.2</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>G.B.</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>12.8 (R.C. est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowntree3</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>York</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowntree3</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>High Wycombe</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorer4</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>G.B.</td>
<td>15.0 (postal response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caunter5 Downham</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>13.0 (once a wk. or more)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>&quot;Huddingdon&quot;</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>&quot;Thornby&quot;</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>15.0 (approx.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup Poll8</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup Poll8</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., Television and Religion, (University of London Press, 1964)
In fact, the locations of these surveys and variable techniques of gathering data make them far from uniform for purposes of comparison. Rowntree, for instance, actually counted persons in attendance at services, but some individuals no doubt attended more than one service, thus increasing the percentage unrealistically. Nonetheless, the overall impression favours an estimated national average Sunday church attendance of around twelve to fourteen per cent. Argyle shows that this is a decided decrease from the percentage around the turn of the century.1 Gallup poll recently found that "the rate of church-going is particularly low in the Church of England: only 13 per cent of those who call themselves Church of England claim to go to church most Sundays".2

In at least one major western nation, primarily Protestant, the church attendance decline on the early part of the century has been reversed since the Second World War — this in the United States. Between 1940 and 1962, church membership increased from 49% of the total population to over 63%.3 During the same period, Gallup found that the average weekly church attendance rose from 37% to 46% of the adult population.4 Similarly, Lazerwitz' research in the U.S. indicated that in 1957, 45% of the adults attended church "regularly" and another 21% attended "often".5 So, on the basis of the church attendance criterion, the American churches are much more vigorously supported than the British churches, and instead of losing ground have surged forward in the post-war era.

Whether the American situation carries important implications for the British churches or not is a matter of dispute which I shall not try to resolve. One could

4. ibid, p.75.
interpret the renewed strength of American churches since the war as but a temporary reversal of the general western trend of institutional religious decline in the twentieth century. Alternatively, it could be viewed as an early illustration of church resurgence which is destined to be replicated in other societies. The latter possibility receives provisional support from Scottish statistics. Hightet points out that there was an increase of about three per cent in church membership in Scotland between 1947 and 1959, and he believes that this minor increase bespeaks a genuine gain by the churches.¹

C. DIFFERENTIAL CLASS "INvolVEMENT" IN THE CHURCH

1. Review of Western Societies.

In the Introduction, I ventured the generalisation, without at that point providing documentation, that the established churches in western countries are largely identified with the middle classes. In the next few pages I shall try to show the validity of this generalisation by sketching some of the major findings in a number of locales. We shall see that for the three focal nations of this sketch, middle class church dominance is probably most complete in France, very evident but somewhat less dramatic in Britain and less true of America but still prevalent.

As for Britain, Wickam has said, "The extent of working class estrangement is still insufficiently realised inside the churches, partly because the churches do not ask embarrassing sociological questions, and also, perhaps, because we have grown accustomed to the situation ..."² Cauter and Downham report from Derby that, "...the middle class are relatively much more active in all matters connected with the church. While it would certainly not be true to say that the churches are a

---


class organisation, their membership does show a bias towards the middle class. In his study of four Birmingham congregations, Thompson found similar class connotations and concluded that, "the congregations reflected rather than reconciled social divisions". Richard Taylor conducted a nation wide canvassing of the Church's new "strategies" in the industrial structure of today; he reports that, "There are already signs that some churches are beginning to reap a harvest of the new affluent middle class, for whom attendance at Sunday worship may confirm their social respectability". Statistically, Argyle shows evidence from 1947 and 1950 national surveys that middle class persons are several percentage points higher in weekly attendance than working class persons. In both a primary working class council estate and in a primary middle class suburb, Willmott found that twice the proportion of "white collar" persons reported having attended church, than working class persons, within the previous month.

In post war France a considerable body of literature in religious sociology has accumulated. A number of very sophisticated researches have been mounted, often by sociologically trained clerics, with the primary goal of making more effective the church's efforts to reclaim the vast "lost" segments of the population. They have found the urban working class not only unengaged in church activities but often intractably hostile to the church. The French workers have apparently accepted anti-clerical ideologies, such as Communism, to a far greater extent than is the case in Britain or the U.S. The loss of contact between the Church and the poorer groups has led to some daring and controversial experiments such as the "worker-priest" movement in which priests have taken manual jobs along side workers

3. Taylor, op. cit., p.15.
in factories on a full time basis.¹

Michonneau, parish priest in the working class Sacre' Cour de Colombes district of Paris, speaks of the French working class as a "pagan proletariat".² He found only 5% of the district practicing Catholics and ruefully concludes that "The mentality of their surrounding completely conquers them after a few years of factory work, or even office work ... in our days, religion has vanished from the hearts of people, they consider it as something outworn, dead".³ Boulard has summarised in a single volume the findings of the French investigators of religious practice. He recites, for instance, the findings in a parish of the diocese of Blois:

The smallholders, considering the low level of the whole region, maintain a fair level of practice. The wives of tradesmen and artisans have a high level with almost 50% practice. Almost all the professional people make their Easter Communion; retired women do to a large extent; but farm workers hardly at all, and none of the industrial workers."⁴

Boulard concludes that in urban areas, social structure is largely the determining factor in religious observance. "Social groups today are clearly the most powerful influences".⁵ Boulard also quotes the salient points of Abbe' Daniel's studies in Paris, which noted the same pattern, "The number of workers

3. ibid, p. p. 2, 5.
5. ibid, p. 51.
who practice is very small, A whole social milieu is cut off from the Church... On the other hand the lower middle class, clerks and officials, are predominant in the churches.¹

Emile Pin's research in a Lyon parish furnishes similar evidence.² He finds that the whole cultural existence and life-style of the urban Proletariat militate against Catholic Church participation. Having reviewed the personal, informal, superstition-laden sub-culture of this group, Pin concludes: "Urban Catholicism appears remote, theoretical, impersonal and ineffectual. We might say that it is involved in all those aspects of urban life which are beyond the intellectual and practical grasp of the proletarian".³ Isambert has postulated three factors as explanations of the French workers' religious estrangement: (1) workers identify Church with those in economic control; (2) the working class is, by reason of its social and economic position, virtually ostracised from the larger society; (3) the working class sees in the religion preached to it merely a reflection of its own weaknesses.⁴

Isambert has also brought together existing evidence from other European societies to demonstrate the same prevailing socio-religious patterns.⁵ In Belgium there is higher overall church involvement but approximately the same ratios.⁶

³. ibid., p.404 translated in Schneider, op.cit., p.416.
⁵. Francois-Andre' Isambert, Christianisme et Classes Ouvrières, (Casterman, 1961) translated and condensed in Schneider, op.cit., p.p.400
⁶. ibid., p.400.
A study in a Viennese Catholic parish found the lowest rate of church attendance among workers.\(^1\) In Tilburg, Netherlands, despite very high proportions of religious observance, there were more religious abstainers in the working class.\(^2\) Isambert discusses the possible use of the term "sociological law" to describe this socio-religious configuration so uniformly in the pattern uncovered.

In the United States, the patterns are not quite so straightforward. Overall membership and attendance rates, though tending in the same direction, are not as variant for different status levels as in the European countries cited.\(^3\) The variegated denominational structure of the country, with its tradition of unlimited religious pluralism, has provided fertile soil for the growth of lower-status sectarian groups. So the class differences in religion tend to appear between religious organisations rather than within religious organisations. The "loss" of the working class has thus been mainly a loss by the established churches rather than a loss to the Church in an inclusive sense. Yinger, for instance, says regarding the urban influx of workers, "The established city churches are ill-equipped to help him adjust to this new situation because most of them are accommodated to the middle and upper classes in their form of worship, type of sermon, and group organisation."\(^4\) It is to the long-standing churches that Winter is referring when he says, "The churches have had notable successes in the growing suburbs; they have suffered dismal failures in the central areas of the metropolis."\(^5\)

\(^1\) loc. cit.

\(^2\) ibid., p.401.

\(^3\) Argyle, op.cit., p.131, notes 1955 Gallup Poll in which 50% of white collar workers reported weekly attendance compared with 44% of manual workers.

\(^4\) Yinger, op.cit., p.22.

Though the entire American society is relatively "religious" - at least in terms of the amount of church activity and participation - individual churches tend to be very homogeneous socially. Winter says that, "The Church is now a reflection of the economic ladder", and says that change in church membership often accompanies social mobility.¹ The older churches are associated with the higher class groups in the same manner as we have noted in European societies, and according to Winter this is not primarily a matter of geographical exclusiveness: "The cleavage between old-line Protestantism and the working class was created by social rather than physical distance".²

However, even when qualification is made for the unique nature of religious differentiation associated with class in America, it still holds true that middle class persons are somewhat more active in the churches in general. Lenski found in Detroit that middle class - white - protestants attended church more often than working class - white - Protestants by about eleven percentage points.³ Laserwitz in another recent study concluded that both white collar workers and farmers attended church significantly more often than blue collar workers.⁴ Numerous other studies over the past twenty-five years testify to the same general features.⁵

1. ibid., p.77.
2. ibid., p45.
It is, therefore, possible to conclude from an overview of studies in Western societies that there are general, outstanding features of the church-class relationship which are not completely attenuated by the unique features of the various societies. Most salient, and for our purposes, most important for comparison, is the appreciably lower degree of church participation for the working classes than for the middle classes. Both in countries with relatively low overall church participation - such as France or England - and in countries with relatively high religious practice - such as the U.S. or Belgium - the same class ratios are found, roughly speaking. Our own class-church findings, to bring the discussion back from the telescopic to the microscopic, are seen in this larger context to reflect a far-flung, general, and important phenomenon of modern socio-religious life.

2. Prestonfield Attendance Patterns.

There have been several intervening chapters since the correspondence between the class groupings and church attendance was first demonstrated (in Chapter II). Therefore, it seems advisable to review these data and the contents of the attendance categories at this point. Those given the "Regular" label go to church frequently, at least once a month; "Marginals" either attend occasionally - several times a year - or else have discontinued the church attendance practice at some time as adults; "Dormants" go to church very seldom or - in the main - do not go at all.

Only seventeen per cent of the working class men reported "regular" attendance compared with fifty-nine per cent for the Borderline group and thirty-four for the middle class. As I remarked earlier, it is interesting that in addition to the basic contrast between working class and middle class attendance patterns, we find

1. Since the Dagenham Council Estate referred to earlier had many features in common with the Prestonfield Estate, the findings on church attendance there provide an interesting comparison: only 10% reported having been at church in the previous month and 80% said they never go to church. Willmott, Evolution of A Community, p.86
an especially high proportion of "regular" borderline attenders. Of course, as
I have often cautioned, this group is very small in number and thus has minimal
statistical reliability. It may, however, reflect a genuine tendency to religious
activism on the part of individuals poised precariously between clearly manual and
clearly middle class positions. In his analysis of American church attendance
data, Demerath found a similar phenomenon. He concludes, "Church attendance
seems to have greater appeal for the highly discrepant who are working status in
their overall vertical rank." This may be a kind of overcompensation. Their
high discrepancy defines them as persons with some claim to high status. Their
church attendance may be a way of staking this claim deeper." Without detailing
the distinctions, it should be said that Demerath's "discrepant" working class,
here referred to, is not perfectly parallel to our "borderline" grouping, but the
positions are similarly enough "intermediate" in status to justify the suggestion
of parallel religious motivations.

Knowing the significant effect of class self-placement in regard to social
class indicators, there was some prior reason to believe that this class identifica-
tion factor might be related to rates of church attendance as well. However, I
found that controlling the class-church attendance correlation by this subjective
index of class made virtually no difference in the results. The most notable
feature of this procedure is that "discrepant" middle class men tend more often to
have a "marginal" relationship to the church; but they also have nearly as high a
proportion of "regulars" as do the "consistent" middle class men. The fact that
the distinction is not particularly meaningful for religious behaviour allows us to
dispose with this additional class variable throughout this chapter and the next;
it is likewise found to have little bearing on measures of church "attachment".

1. This refers to his multiple-criteria system of classification.

2. Demarath, op.cit., p.164.
I will deal with the class collectivities as complete units, though when the presence of Catholics in these categories has a significant impact on the results, this will be pointed out, and the Catholics will then be separated for a closer examination in comparison with the much larger number of Protestants.

The reason for occasionally stressing this religious distinction is simply that commitment to an alternative - and minority - religious tradition may sometimes prove more meaningful than the fact of one's class orientation.

Two of the men who attend the Catholic Church regularly had not come into that church by upbringing but had previously been in a Protestant church. They proclaim two forms of reaction against Protestant churches:

The children were raised as Protestants. I went to the Methodist Church with my wife while I was courting her and for a while after we were married. But to me the atmosphere just wasn't right -- I couldn't get the same feeling. It seemed like the minister was the kind Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer would want, putting on a show -- too dramatic, you know. Now I go to the Roman Catholic Church every Sunday, and most mornings, even though I have to go by myself.

I changed my religion to Roman Catholic ten years ago. I saw so many empty Protestant churches, and so much narrowness that I got fed up. I was impressed by the dedication of the Roman Catholics and became interested. I started going and felt it was what I wanted. I'm very regular now. I think it's to discipline myself.

Most of the Protestant, as well as Catholic, church-goers referred to a life-long pattern of church going, perhaps with some slackening during the early adult years. A policeman reported for instance:

I had to go when I was young, but kept going. The idea that if you're forced to go when young, you'll stop going when you can make up your own mind, isn't true in my case. I think it becomes a regular part of your life that you don't want to stop.

A few men had developed a strong relationship to the Church sometime during their adult years; these seemed to take their church activity with unusual seriousness. A "white collar" worker explained his religious experience:

I joined the Church at sixteen, but didn't go very often; it just didn't mean much to me. I think, though, that deep down I know there was something in it, and some day it might come out -- but, 'not now please' was my attitude. My wife is actually responsible for bringing me back to church, and now I'm very much involved and really very happy about it.
Many men who reported going to church very infrequently or not at all nonetheless expressed high regard for the Church. A curious sort of divided perspective comes to the fore in these comments -- the combining of a nebulous, though sincere, admiration for the Church with a personal disinterest in participating in her affairs. Often this is coupled with some indication that the person considers himself negligent and wrong in absenting himself from the Church. Several respondents illustrate this type of reply.

(Bookmaker's clerk)
I've never been in church since I was married. Going to church is a way of life. I'm not against it, by any means, but nobody can change your way of life. If I went to church I'd be a hypocrite.

(baker)
I haven't been to church for years, though I should go, I know. But backing horses and things like that puts me against going -- you can't bet on horses and go to church; it just wouldn't be right. Of course, it's partly an excuse, too.

(postal deliverer)
I don't go, but it's just laziness. I do say my prayers every day of my life.

(storeman)
I don't go now - just laziness. I respect the Church though I don't go and haven't been since my youth. It's a bad thing; I admit that, I fell away after about seventeen

(engineer)
I'm afraid I don't go to church. I'm not against it or anything. I believe in God and that; I just don't go out of my way to show it. But, I'll tell you this, every working man I've ever known -- they talk about like you've got to meet your Maker before you go like.

Some men revealed interesting views of the church's function, assuming it exists to inculcate certain basic ideas rather than to provide a particular form of fellowship or continual religious inspiration. Such an impression is deducible from the comment of a plumber:

I go about once a month, but don't really feel it's necessary now. I heard plenty as a child. I should know the fundamentals by now.

There were also a variety of negative reactions to the Church. A few men had
encountered some particularly bitter experiences which turned them forever against the Church. A retired clerk of works related this scene:

I don't go, but can't say I'm proud of it, mind you. I always went regularly until coming to Edinburgh. Here I went to a church straight away where they had paid seats, but I didn't know at the time. The usher came and told me I would have to change to another seat. I've never been back. It was the most un-Christian thing in the world. I've never been back.

Others had come home from wartime experience with sober qualms about the actions and teachings of the Church:

(gardener)

In the First World War I saw things contrary to Christian teaching — just didn't fit in. It had an effect on me. Why should I shoot that man on the other side of the trench; I don't even know him? Oh, I do go maybe once or twice a year; but somehow the war put me off the Church.

(mason)

No, I don't go now; I quit after the war. I got sick of the Church through the last war when they began saying that the Lord was on our side. Staunch church-goers, elders, etc., are the most un-Christian people in the world. The heads of the Church could stop war, but instead the poor people have to suffer.

In some cases, unfavourable impressions of the Church were given as explanation for not attending:

(warehouse packer)

I do go occasionally, but as a boy I always went to church. It was a mining town and everybody went, even if they were half dressed. Today it's a fashion show, and puts a lot of people off going.

(motor mechanic)

No, I'm too young for this now; it's something you need when you think you're going to die.

(clerk)

I went to church till I was twenty-four, then quit. There was too much politics. And I'm also against missionary work; one religion hasn't got an advantage over others. I didn't like the sermons either, for that matter.

Some rejections of the Church focused on unhappy relationships with ministers or impressions of ministers. Three respondents typify these reactions:
(civil servant)
I don't think much of the Church today. I've come away from
the Church. I'm a non-believer in the Church, but I'm a
believer in my Maker. I came up against this bucky old minister
who was only a careerist. I've done more good for the Kirk, and
helped more lads get on their feet than that minister, I'll tell
you. People put their money in the Church, and the Church sits
with its millions, and what does it do with it? The Church and
the ministers should do more really to help people.

(engineer)
I seldom go now; I used to go occasionally but seem to have
fallen out of it. I saw several things when I was lying in
hospital that weren't Christian - like a minister who was there
who wasn't interested in the patients. I still believe in God
and everything, but I don't often go to church.

(electrician)
No, I never go now. The minister has never once approached me
to go to the church. And the people at church don't talk to
you; they all go into little groups after the service and don't
act as if you were there.

Taylor tells of interviewing a tool-maker in Birmingham who, like this last
respondent above, found the church people unwelcoming. This is a most common
complaint, even from many who do attend frequently. The tool-maker quoted as
saying:

I tried going to the local parish church. I didn't get much there,
but I stuck it for twelve months. The people there were not my
sort; they were mainly what I would call pre-war middle class.
The vicar used to shake hands with me after the service, but I just
as well might not have been there for all the notice the people took
of me.

We shall later see (Chapter VII) that the common, and accurate, perception
of the Church as primarily middle class in composition, acts as one of the barriers
to working class participation, and serves to intensify the feeling of "not fitting
in" for those working families who may venture to church occasionally, but are not
long-standing members. We shall also have occasion to consider more systematically
the different types of explanations for church-going and non-church-going within the

p.63.
At this point I will note, however, that it is an interesting commentary on the ambiguous position of the Church that many people who do not go, appear to feel the need to justify their abstention, or excuse it. People seldom express rejection of the church on an ideological plane or express their abstention as a casual matter. Even disinterest in the church tends to be a sort of meaningful disinterest rather than a casual detachment. The issue is assumed to have importance and is dealt with in a thoughtful manner almost invariably.

3. Other Measures of Church Involvement.

Supplementary to the church attendance criterion are three measures of religious behaviour which may be said to assess "intensity" of church involvement. The first measure concerns participation in church activities other than going to church services. Several men hold positions as elders or other church officers; several others work with youth organisations such as Boy's Brigade. In all, twelve men from the sample, or thirteen per cent, reported some form of additional participation in the programme of the church. Table VI - 2 shows that the proportion of such participation, either considered for the sample totally, or for the "regular" church attenders alone, is weighted in the same direction by class as is church attendance -- a much higher proportion for "borderline" and middle class than for working class, with a slightly higher figure for the borderline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI - 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER CHURCH ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quite obviously, a big jump from working class rates of "extra Sunday morning" church involvement is evident for those just above working class status. The second half of the table shows that this is not a mere appertenance of the church attendance findings; even among regular church-goers the difference is apparent. It may be postulated that in socially "mixed" congregations, the positions of leadership are normally held by the better educated and more "respected" members. That impression certainly finds substantiation within our sample.

One may also suggest that middle class dominance of church leadership positions may not be simply a result of greater middle class church activity generally, but may also serve as a cause of working class estrangement from the Church. The nineteenth century church, as we will later see (Chapter VIII) did assuredly identify herself with middle class control and middle class values to the point of contributing to this historical alienation of the working classes. In Chapter IX an analysis of the Church Leadership Survey will enable a more sustained consideration of this possibility.

A second indicator of "intensity" of church involvement concerns the respondents' relationship to the minister. Each was interrogated thusly: "Do you know, personally, the local minister, or any other minister? In case of affirmative replies, it was further asked, "Does he visit you at home?" Table VI - 3 shows that the same general class pattern obtains; the Protestant workers report the least "close" relationship with clergymen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI - 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO MINISTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes (visits home)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>little acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only in past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only in the working class is there reported a less than 50% incidence of present acquaintance (of any degree) with a minister. Indeed, this figure includes some who are simply visited by the minister occasionally as a part of his "rounds" of the parish or know him in a capacity outside the church. This is clear from the fact that 23% of the "dormants" are included in the first row as well as 53% of the "Marginals". Fully 80% of the "Regulars" are found in this category.

The final "intensity" measure of church involvement is a less direct indicator. Respondents were asked if they "ever discussed religion" and if they do "with whom?". This may be taken to indicate religious behaviour rather than church-connected behaviour. It is included, I think usefully, because it may point to the impact of religious commitment in extra-church contexts. Many who report that they never discuss religion, emphasised a definite policy of avoiding the subject. "I never discuss politics or religion", seems to be a common cliche'. These are included in the first row "never". In the second row are "yes" or "occasionally" answers which did not receive further elaboration. The third and fourth rows indicate the main contexts of such discussion for the cases where it was mentioned - "work" or "family or friends". The final row contains those suggesting that their only discussion of religious topics were arguments, usually along the lines of Protestant-Catholic dispute.
TABLE VI - 4.

**DISCUSSIONS OF RELIGION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never (or avoid subject)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes or occasionally</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at work</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family or friends</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arguments only</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One working class man (warehouse worker) who attends the church in his old area of town indicated that he engages in discussions about religion with his "mates" at work: "Oh yes, we talk about it at work. They know I go to church. Many say, "I know I should go". On the whole, though, the interviewees report a high degree of reticence about religion in their day to day affairs. Discounting the "argue" answers, only in the middle class section do we find that over half the men ever discuss religion. Overall, fifty-six per cent of the men say they never discuss religion; this fact, I think stands out most forcefully. This would seem, even more than church attendance rates, to express the secular tone of contemporary life.

In terms of class variation, this is one indicator of religious activity which shows a consistent positive correlation, the middle class men exceeding the borderline men in religious discussions. Compared to the 61% for the middle class, the borderline group has a 49% rate of discussions and the working class only 33%.

Three working-class men elucidate the "negative" responses.
(non-attending working man)
The subject does come up at work occasionally, but I cut it right now. I won't discuss religion.

(frequently-attending working man)
No, you can't discuss on the Bible. Who can say whether it's right or not. The Church is there to keep order, like the courts.

(non-attending working man)
No, it's too deep a subject. I might say the wrong thing.

Consideration of these three additional measures of church involvement have served to substantiate and reinforce the class patterns for church attendance.

In short, we may conclude that church-related behaviour is much more common, and more intense, for borderline and middle class Protestants than for working class Protestants.

4. Church-going of Personal Acquaintances.

Indirect appraisal of class involvement in the church is possible to some extent from answers to two questions about the church-going propensities of persons with whom the respondents are in contact: "Do any of the people you know personally go to church?" and "Are any of the men you contact in your work church-goers?" The first query may have been phrased in too general a manner to thoroughly illuminate class differences. None-the-less, what minor variation there is falls in the expected direction with somewhat fewer working class respondents reporting acquaintance with church-goers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACQUAINTANCE WITH CHURCH-GOERS</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As for the church-going patterns of friends at work, middle class interviewees report considerably greater incidence than either working class or borderline men. In fact, the latter two groups have almost identical proportions of "yes" and "no" answers. For the borderline men this is notably divergent from their previous results, suggesting that their work environments may be more like those of the workers than like those of the middle class respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, (few, some, many)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no (or Catholics only)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. AGE AND SEX FACTORS IN CHURCH INVOLVEMENT

1. Church Attendance and Age.

In Chapter II it was demonstrated that the age variable does not significantly affect the correlation of social class and church attendance. However, age does make an impact on the overall pattern of church attendance and, therefore, deserves parenthetical examination at this point. It has been often noted that religious activity tends to slacken during the young adult years when concern with career and
family are dominant, and tends to increase again toward middle age. Lazerwitz found in his U.S. study that Protestant parents become more active in church when their children reach the age of involvement in Sunday School and church. Table VI - 7 manifests the fact that, in Prestonfield, respondents in their thirties are much more frequently dormant than those in any other age category. This corresponds closely to the finding of Abbé Daniel in France that, "Between the ages of thirty and forty there is an almost universal break in religious practice. This is the period of life when people are struggling to make their way in the world, and when many acute moral problems of family life are raised."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Dormant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-29</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 &amp; over</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It might seem anomalous that this early adult nadir of religious practice is not evident among men in their twenties. The fact is though, that the twenties age

2. Lazerwitz, op. cit.,
group is particularly small in our sample and very heavily weighted to middle class men who are not yet raising a family; so it is much less representative of the whole community than are the other categories. There is also an evident dip in regular attendance for the men in their fifties, but they have an unusually high proportion of marginals and an average proportion of dormants. The really significant drop-off considering both regulars and marginals is in the thirties, confirming the trends found elsewhere. An insurance underwriter in his forties typifies the pattern. He said concerning his church attendance,

I go regularly now, I guess it's the ordinary Scottish formula -- go to church when you're young, then quit and nothing to it. Then you get married and have some experiences and have children and feel they should have training in religion. And first thing you know you're involved again, and you still, perhaps, wonder if there's much in it.

2. Husbands and Wives Comparison.

The respondents were asked to state how the church attendance of their wives compared with their own. In only five cases did men indicate that their wives attended less often than they (two of these were Catholics), but no less than twenty-seven said that their wives went to church more often. Nearly all of these latter replies suggested a habit of regular attendance for the wives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working (35)</th>
<th>Border (15)</th>
<th>Middle (30)</th>
<th>Total (80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More often</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less often</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is quite apparent that our sample indicates conformity to the common pattern of greater female church activity. This finding has emerged uniformly in studies of church participation. In York, for instance, Rowntree and Lavers found that 60% of the Anglican church attenders were females. In visiting forty-seven homes on one street in Glasgow in a "lower middle class" district, Vincent found that few of the men attend church, but "most of the women" do attend. He interprets the religious interest of the wives in this way: "Many of the women stated implicitly or explicitly that they were now more [sic] "respectable" (middle class) they took an interest in their church, which was absent in their early married years when they lived elsewhere in more 'working class' districts of Glasgow". He quotes one woman interviewee as saying, "Somehow it seems more natural to go to church here". This explanation is compatible with the notion that women tend to be more status-conscious than men. Church activity, associated as it is with middle class life style, would thus be an indication of status-striving.

Most investigators, however, have interpreted this notable, and nearly universal, sex difference in church-going in terms of the contrasting roles of males and females in society. Lenski, in explaining why, in Indianapolis, 60% more women than men have "much religious interest", says that the more competitive job world of men is less compatible with religious ethics than the predominately domestic role of women. Pickering does not examine his North of England data on this basis nor develop these implications. But, it is possible to draw such an inference from his analysis of expressed reasons for decreased church attendance among church members who at some point discontinued church-going practice. By far the most frequent explanation, accounting for over one-third of the total,

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1. For instance, Jackson and Marsden, op. cit., p. 38.
2. Rowntree, op. cit., p. 344.
involved the distraction of work commitments. And, of course, this would logically be a male explanation in most cases. Pichter finds the same sort of variation in a Southern U.S. parish, especially for those over thirty years of age. He likewise suggests that religious roles are more compatible with other female roles in society than with other male roles, particularly occupational roles.

If this line of interpretation is correct, then it is particularly salient that the male-female disparity is greatest among the working class. It would seem to follow that this especial disparity is a consequence of the working class male role system being more uncongenial to religious practice via a vis the working class female role-system than is the middle class male role-system in comparison with the middle class female role-system. Indeed, attitudinal indices which will be introduced in the next chapter seem to support the hypothesis that working class males are especially subject to social pressures which militate against church-going.

3. Church Activities of Children.

Respondents were further requested to explain the religious practice of their children. A major drawback to the data gathered on this variable is the wide age variations of the children involved, from small toddlers to married adults with families of their own. The common pattern of early Sunday school attendance and adult discontinuation of church-going means that a primarily school child cannot be readily compared with a young person beyond school age. None-the-less, the data presented in the table below shows a variation by class in the same direction as that for the respondents themselves. The "regular" row includes offspring who go to church services, Sunday school, or youth organisation meetings frequently. The "marginals" attend occasionally or attended formerly but have discontinued. The "varies" category applied to families where at least one child attends and at least one does not. My recollection is that in almost all such cases, the female children were the ones who were involved in church activities.

1. Pickering, op. cit.,
There is, in these statistics, a rough indication that church activity patterns are being passed on to the next generation with approximately the same social class tendencies. This impression is reinforced by the fact that 64% of the men who attend regularly reported that their children are enmeshed in church activities. The Dormant men reported such a pattern in 41% of the cases and the Marginals in a surprisingly low 8% of the cases, but with a high proportion of "varies" - 32%. Interestingly, the latter figure creates the impression that a "marginal" relationship to the church is reflected in the offspring of these respondents.¹

E. CHURCH BACKGROUND

In this, the last division of the chapter, I shall examine data revealing the chronological roots of the church involvement dispositions associated with class. Several items related to the early religious background and training of

¹ Knowing the Roman Catholic emphasis on religious education for children, it is not surprising that the Catholic church-going tradition is carried on overwhelmingly in the younger generation - 88% report that their children are "Regular" participants.
the respondents will be explored. It will be seen that - as could be expected - overall class patterns of church involvement of male adults are largely predictable from parental church involvement and personal involvement in youth.

Parental habits of church-going, first of all, are reported to vary in accordance with status in the direction that is now familiar. However, I have the suspicion that there is some tendency to exaggerate the frequency of parents attendance; forty-six per cent of the parents are said to be (or have been) regular attenders, plus another thirty-eight per cent of mothers alone. It may be that the mechanism of recollection tends to make of any degree of parental church involvement an habitual pattern. For if these figures are taken at face value, we are forced to conclude that there has been a monumental drop-off in church attendance during the last generation. To be sure, it is reasonable to assume a somewhat higher rate of attendance for the previous generation since there was a decline in overall attendance rates between 1900 and 1950. But, on the basis of these reports, combining inferences for both mothers and fathers, it would appear that about two-thirds of the parents were regular church-goers. And, as figures for fathers' job status depicted (Chapter IV) the large majority of the parents were working class urbanites - the class least active in the church since the Industrial Revolution. But with this caveat presented, it is still possible to use the data fruitfully; presumably the distortion would be fairly uniform throughout the social scale. The categories in Table VI - 10 should be quite self explanatory; but I should point out that, in addition to the "mainly mother" responses there were also two "mainly father" responses which have been inserted into the rather amorphous "occasionally or slackened" collectivity for the sake of simplicity.

TABLE VI - 10

CHURCH ATTENDANCE OF PARENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular (both)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother mainly</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally or slackened</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never or seldom</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, the female-male contrast is reported as similar to the ratio for the present generation. Apparently the differential expectations of religious behaviour connected with sex have been in existence for some time.

It is also notable that the manual - non-manual contrast in church attendance is greater for the respondents themselves than it is for the parents of the two groups (combining borderline and middle class). For the interviewees themselves there is nearly a four times greater incidence of regular church attendance among the non-manual men. The parents of the non-manual men, on the other hand, are reported as having a rate of regular church attendance less than 50% in excess of that for the parents of the manual workers. This may be taken to mean that parental religious practice, though certainly influential, does not sufficiently account for the present social class variations in church attendance.

I asked each respondent if he had been baptised, and (if married) if he had been wed in the church or by a clergyman. Affirmative responses were the rule for both of the queries to such an extent that it is not necessary to tabulate the results. Only seven men had not been baptised, of whom four were working class.
Fourteen had not been married in the Church or by a minister, but there was no significant differentiation by social class. It is still generally believed among all social groups, that the Church should be used for these functions, that these performances add a certain sanctity to life and, eventually, to marriage, which is valued. We may deduce from this another indication that people who abstain from church attendance have not usually rejected the Church completely. People want the Church to "carry on", even if they consider it irrelevant to their normal pattern of life.

The next background question involves the religious training of the respondents in their early years. They were asked if they received any religious training when they were young, what this consisted of, and, if necessary, specifically whether or not they went to Sunday school or church. The differences by class are larger for this measure than for parental church involvement. Almost all of the men had been introduced to the Church in some manner during their early years, but many did not attend the church services in addition to Sunday school.

Combining the knowledge gathered from this and other questions, it seems safe to assert that those who have been sent to Sunday school only, (but not church services) are most likely to discontinue association with the Church after they leave school. The only column in the table that may require explanation is the one titled "forced to go". In this small minority of cases the men laid emphasis on the fact that they had been compelled by their parents to attend church or Sunday school.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church services</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday school &amp; youth group</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced to go</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this instance the presence of several Catholics within the working class section makes a significant difference since 86% of the Catholic men report attendance at church services as youths. If Catholics are removed from the class groups the contrasts for Protestants alone are much greater; only 9% of the workers are then within the "church services" row compared with 64% of the borderline men and 30% of the middle class men. Since the vast majority of Scottish young people of all classes have some contact with the church through Sunday school or youth organisation the variations in participation in the actual worship services of the church seems to be most directly linked to the establishment of an adult church-going custom. However, even this link is not too strong as we can see from the fact that while 59% of those who are now "Regulars" attended church services as young people, 31% of the Dormants and Marginals (combined) also report this sort of church background. This measure seems a less clear indicator of present patterns than the next item, but did engender several revealing remarks by men who are not now active in the Church.

(insurance clerk)
I went to Sunday school as a boy but there was too much 'God is up there', too much mysticism.

(factory worker)
I went to the Roman Catholic Church till I found I could make a shilling for myself. Then I was inclined to get the shilling and forget the church.

(shop fitter)
I went to Sunday school till I got sick of the whole thing; I didn't see the sense of it.

(engineer now engaged in advanced education for teaching)
Yes, I was in the Band of Hope and the Youth Fellowship, but not from a religious impulse I can assure you. At the time the minister tried to translate the Bible literally, which I couldn't swallow. I've nothing against religion though; I think it's necessary. But even now, twenty years later, I turn on the T.V. and hear the same sermons to the word. The Church seems to be static. And the Church seems to twist things — things incompatible such as going for money, money, money and backing war. Surely you must be a Christian pacifist in light of the founder of Christianity.

The final question pertaining to church involvement in the early years provides
the most accurate "predictive" measure for present patterns. This is the question, "After you left school, did the friends that you went around with attend church or not?" The first row, "yes", included unqualified "yes" answers as well as responses like "most of them did". The second row applied to situations in which the friends attended church occasionally or attended youth organisation activities only. In the third row the men suggested that only their Roman Catholic friends attended or that they are unsure. The final row includes straight "no" answers and "very seldom" answers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI - 12</th>
<th>CHURCH ATTENDANCE OF FRIENDS AFTER LEAVING SCHOOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organisation or occasional</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C. only or unsure</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No or seldom</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first place, we can deduce from a comparison of this table and the last, that there is a large drop-off in church activity after leaving school. Thompson, in his study of Birmingham parishes notes a similar, "mass exodus of elementary school children from the churches upon the completion of Sunday school". 1

Pickering also points out in his study of two North of England towns, that nine out of ten children are regular in church or Sunday school as children, but most do not carry this involvement into adulthood. The adolescent years seem to be crucial in determining life-patterns of church-going or abstention.

We are here confronted with the very powerful effect of the church-involvement patterns of the adolescent peer group on adult church participation. Only 7% of those whose after-school friends did not go to church are now regular attenders themselves whereas 21% are now "marginals" and 72% are presently "Dormant". Thus the church activity of post-school friends is seen to be a remarkably accurate predictive indicator of long-range attendance patterns. Clearly the social milieu makes a great impact on religious behaviour by the time a young person is leaving the world of school for the world of work.

F. SUMMARY

In this chapter I have shown from the Prestonfield data a strong positive correlation of status and rates of church involvement which reflect a wider phenomenon, regularly found in western societies. Additional measures of church involvement were found to correlate with social class in roughly the same manner. It was also noted that the age and sex trends in church attendance found elsewhere are paralleled in our sample. Finally, it has been demonstrated that present church involvement is predictable with a fairly high degree of accuracy from parental patterns of church activity, early training in the church, and especially from church activity of friends after leaving school. In terms of concrete behaviour associated with the church it is now clear that manual workers show a definite

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post-childhood pattern of considerably less church involvement than non-manual workers (including Borderline men). This chapter has furnished both an opportunity for fairly detailed analysis of church-related behaviour and a framework for exploration of attitudinal dimensions in the subsequent chapter.
CHAPTER VII - ATTITUDINAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHURCH

A. RELIGIOUS PROFESSION.
   1. Explanations of Religious Practice.
   3. Doctrinal Positions.

B. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CHURCH.
   1. Church's Value.
   2. Church's Effectiveness.

C. APPRAISAL OF SPECIFIC CHURCH REPRESENTATIONS.
   1. Ministers.
   2. Church-Goers.
   3. Church "Programme".

D. SUMMARY.
As earlier suggested, the realm of attitudes, as the term is being used in this chapter, is very encompassing, including several non-behavioral dimensions of relationship to the church. A number of measures pertaining to church "attachment" (as distinct from church participation) will be investigated. As also previously suggested, the purpose of exploring these subjective dimensions is to discover and spotlight: one, the amalgam of class variations and similarities in church attachment, including the overall "image" of the contemporary church; and two, the crucial points of differentiation in attitudes which seem to be significantly related to the notable class contrasts in church participation.

In fact, it will be seen that the most interesting feature of the overall structure of attitudes toward the church is the appreciable similarity found throughout the social strata. To a significant degree, the results will warrant the conclusion that ideological and attitudinal postures associated with class groupings are not mainly responsible for the wide disparities in church involvement. But a few salient class contrasts emerge which provide important clues to these involvement disparities. The clues that come to light will not only be emphasized in this chapter but will be followed up at a later point as part of a system of interpretation.¹

Three broad areas of "attitudes" are investigated as central to church "attachment": Religious profession (a very elastic label for fundamentally ideological postures in regard to religion); general assessment of the church; and

¹. In the course of the present chapter, the reader may well wonder why there is not a concentrated development of "multi-variate analysis" to disclose differences between churchgoers and church abstainers within the class groups. The answer is two-fold. First, the necessary sub-dividing leaves us with groupings too small in number for statistical utility. Only the middle class includes aggregates of more than ten men within both the "Regular" and "Dormant" categories. The second reason is that even middle class sub-division by church attendance fails to prove meaningful. In the few instances where the contrast is of a fairly large magnitude, this fact will be pointed out. But, on the whole, it is true to say that significant differences in response on particular items is accounted for either by class or by church attendance variations singularly. But analysis of the data controlling by church practice within the class groups proves neither very feasible or very fruitful.
attitudes toward specific representations of the church. Data from the survey of six Edinburgh secondary schools - briefly described in the Introduction - is applicable at several points in the discussion and such relevant findings will be brought to bear on the analysis.

A. RELIGIOUS PROFESSIO

1. Explanations of Religious Practice.

Immediately following the question on church attendance, respondents were asked to select from a printed card the major reasons for their pattern of church participation. Each respondent was presented one of the two cards, according to their stated pattern of attendance - the "reasons for going" card to those who described themselves as at least fairly regular attenders (including a few marginals), and the "reasons for not going" card to the Dormants and most of the Marginals.¹

These alternative reasons for attending church were provided to the rather regular church-goers.

(1) Because I've always gone.
(2) To meet my friends.
(3) Family or friends expect it.
(4) To worship God or pray.
(5) God expects it.
(6) To hear sermon.
(7) To learn how to be a better person.
(8) Makes me feel better.
(9) Other (specify)

¹ The former list was adapted from Lenski's Detroit survey. Lenski, op. cit., p. 383. No definite limit was set on the number of possible choices, but the majority gave one or two choices.
Two alternatives dominated the selection—(4) "To worship God or pray", and (7) "To learn how to be a better person". Since the alternatives fall into quite natural groupings I have combined into three single categories the first three alternatives, the second three alternatives, and alternatives seven and eight. Table VII - 1 gives the combined totals for respondents making one or two selections: the handful of third choices are ignored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REASONS FOR ATTENDING CHURCH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always gone, family, friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship, pray, God, sermons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be better person, feel better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is fairly equal stress on "spiritual" motivations (depicted in the second row) and "self improvement" (third row) with little emphasis on the force of custom or pressure from family or friends. But clearly the tendencies are quite uniform across class lines.

Nine alternatives were also given to those who reported never or very infrequently occupying a church pew as possible reasons for their behaviour:
(1) I don't believe in God.
(2) Church people are hypocrites.
(3) Don't have time to go.
(4) Don't get anything from it.
(5) Feel "out of place" in church.
(6) Don't like sermons.
(7) Can be just as good a person without going.
(8) Family or friends don't expect it.
(9) Other (specify).

It is not convenient to collapse these alternatives into as few columns. However, four alternatives each received less than 10% of the total responses and are combined under "miscellaneous". This rubric encompasses: (1) "Don't believe", with only four total answers, of which three were middle class; (3) "No time", with nine choices; (5) "Out of place", with six choices, of whom five were working class; and three "just lazy" answers which did not appear as an alternative on the card. Figures for the remaining alternatives appear in Table VII - 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Not Attending Church</th>
<th>Working N</th>
<th>Border N</th>
<th>Middle N</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypocrites</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't like sermons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get nothing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just as good without</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most prominent contrast in response is found in the "get nothing" row; 29% of the middle class responses are found there as opposed to only 9% of the working class responses. This may indicate that middle class men who are not involved in the Church more often feel they have a critical appraisal of the Church and found her wanting. The slightly higher proportion of criticism of sermons argues in the same direction.

Overall the most frequent choice - and especially for workers - is "can be just as good a person without going". My impression was that this alternative was often seized upon as convenient justification (or rationalisation, depending on one's point of view) for not going to church. In fact, I often had the feeling that without the list of alternatives, which provided some ready-made answers, many men might have been at a loss to say why they don't attend. An insurance salesman, for instance, said,

There's no real reason. Frankly, I've just drifted.

A surveyor added the terse comment,

There's more good and more charity outside the church than inside.

But, a great many are simply disaffected with the Church with no particular consciousness of reasons.\(^1\) Thompson has expressed well this common situation by referring to a factory foreman who was formerly active in the Church: "he remains unshaken in his convictions, yet now possesses only the most tenuous connections with the Church and a sense of bewilderment at his own defection". Wickham has put it this way, "Significantly, the British workman wants to justify and excuse himself for his separation from the Church. He wants to explain that 'you can be a Christian without going to a church'".\(^2\)

\(^1\) Gallup asked persons in England who had discontinued church-going the reasons for their defection. Four of the six "main answers" accounted for 38% of the total: "just lost the habit" (16%); "found the services boring" and "uninteresting" (9); "No point in going" (8%); and "prefer to stay at home and watch T.V." (5%). Social Surveys, Television and Religion, p.58.

\(^2\) Thompson, op. cit., p.12.

\(^3\) E.R. Wickham, "Worker-Priests in Britain", in Schneider, op. cit., p.424.
As I mentioned above, only four men explicitly indicated a doctrinal rejection of the Church — a disbelief in God. And these choices were more in the nature of puzzlement and provisional agnosticism than of the militant "village atheist" type. It will become more clear during the course of the chapter that non-church-goers overwhelmingly retain a vague sense of respect for what they consider the basic teachings of the Church. The Church has not been rejected on the plane of belief — in fact, the Church has not been forth-rightly rejected at all by very many. It is simply not important enough to many people to motivate actual church activity.

Hightet points out that in a poll taken by the Glasgow Evening News, many people who were non-attenders did not attempt to criticise the Church, but merely declared themselves "not interested".\(^1\) Herberg emphasised the same perspective among unchurched American Protestants: "These people are not anti-church; on the contrary, they identify themselves religiously and often think of themselves as Church members".\(^2\) So, it is rather a lack of ability to attract, rather than a marked tendency to repel, that restricts the church's contact with the majority of people. In fact, "Just as good without ..." and "get nothing" may be two versions of the same tacit meaning — "I don't know why; but I'm just not interested".

Respondents were further asked, "Would you say that you consider yourself a religious person or not?" Regretably, this query was not a part of the original interview schedule, but was added after a number of interviews had been completed. For this reason, nearly one-third of the men are absent from the figures on this measure; most of those missing are working class men because the Council Estate was first visited. Table VII - 3 shows the distribution of answers along a continuum broken into four separate divisions.


TABLE VII - 3

CONSIDER SELF RELIGIOUS?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, there is an exactly even division between the first two type of answers (basically affirmative) and the second two types of answers (basically negative). The borderline and middle class groups are virtually identical in distribution, but the working class group answer in the negative much more often - two thirds of the time. Such a response is quite in line with the church-attendance patterns though not so much in line with doctrinal commitments, as we shall see. It may be that having just explained their church-going habits, the men tended to take this as the assumed criterion of religiosity.

Two non-manual men who declared themselves not religious expressed interesting points of view.

(policeman)
I'm coming to a definite non-belief in a supernatural being. Belief in the supernatural has helped some people, but has done more harm than good. It will die out as nations grow up.

(supervisor)
I think of a religious person as someone who goes around praying all the time.

Several men who do not go to Church but declared themselves "religious"
reveal various understandings of the term.

(engineer)  
I believe in Christianity -- not as strong as I once was -- but now more in the practical side. Helping people -- I reckon this is Christianity.

(porter)  
Depends how you look at it. I say my prayers at night -- that's the main thing.

(surveyor)  
Depends on what you mean. I believe in God, feel I'm a fairly good-living person; but I feel I can get on just as well by myself without going to Church.

(insurance salesman)  
I've taken an interest in several religions, Buddhism for instance. The grounding is always there. I think there's a certain fear of God inherent in most of us.

These comments clearly illustrate the fact that unchurched men, if they declare themselves religious, are not adopting an "associational" criterion but a "devotional" or humanitarian one. It is perfectly natural that men who do not go to church but have not rejected the teachings of the church would deem themselves religious on a non-associational basis, if at all.

Another Lenski-devised question was employed to determine the main sources of religious influence. This may be seen as an indirect, supplementary aspect of one's explanation of his religious practice. Each respondent was asked, "Which of the people or things on this card have had the greatest influence on your religious beliefs?" and was provided a card with these alternatives:

(1) Friends
(2) Teachers
(3) Wife or children
(4) Parents
(5) Ministers or Priests
(6) Books
(7) T.V. or Radio

The final two alternatives have been collapsed into a single row; all the others appear separately in Table VII - 4. Second choices (occurring in about one-half the cases) are combined with all first selections to create a single

---

TABLE VII - 4

MAIN INFLUENCES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books, T.V., Radio</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the seven alternatives, over one-third of the total number of choices went for "wife or children". My recollection is that this selection, in fact, virtually always referred to the wife, and it has been denoted in this way in the Table. Only the working class array of answers notably minimises this alternative. The working class group also has the lowest incidence of "parents" selections. For these two sorts of "family" alternatives, taken together, the working class shows 37% compared to the Borderline's 57% and the middle class's 63%. This may be taken to mean that working class male religiosity is relatively less under the influence of family (both family of "orientation" and family of "procreation") than is middle class male religiosity. The religious dispositions of working class men - at least with respect to beliefs - appear to derive less from these immediate personal sources than from the general "carriers of culture" such as teachers and television.
Two rather different but related projective questions are included under this rubric which, though it does not perfectly describe the questions, seems to come adequately close. The words used to engender "open" responses were: "A Christian is ..." and "My opinion of religious belief ..." Needless to say, there was a very diversified array of reactions.

As to the definition of what "a Christian is", the majority saw it in terms of basic character traits or simply "being good" rather than in doctrinal terms. Several interviewees illustrate the variety of responses, from the most vague to the most specific.

("Dormant" surveyor)  
Could be anybody -- a gentleman.

("Dormant" advanced student)  
One who sees no wrong or evil, is tolerant to everyone.

("Regular" general foreman)  
It's hard to say what a Christian is. Supposed to be someone who does no wrong, but everyone does.

("Dormant" factory worker)  
I would say I'm a Christian, but I'm not a holy man. Christianity is a good thing; men have died for it.

("Marginal" plumbing foreman)  
Must live as Christ would live -- not just speak of it.

("Dormant" geologist)  
Somebody who believes in Christ and follows His teachings. In the accepted sense someone who is unselfish without pretending to be a Christian.

Evidently there is little consensus as to the specific characteristics of behaviour or belief which qualifies a person for the title, "Christian". However, there is consensus that the title is a rather exalted one, manifesting some sort of general goodness. Indeed, to many the term "Christian", appeared to be synonymous with "good person". One may interpret this as a secularised definition.
TABLE VII - 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A CHRISTIAN IS</th>
<th>Working N (40)</th>
<th>Border N (17)</th>
<th>Middle N (33)</th>
<th>Total N (90)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>believes in God, Christ etc.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(general) believes, goes to church</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good person</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific character traits (integrity, helps people, etc.)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative opinion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class contrasts are minimal, centering not on the issue of whether or not to be a "Christian" is commendable but rather centering on the degree of specification in the commendations. In short, workers tend to be less concrete in ascribing "goodness" to Christians than are middle class men and especially border-line men. Negative reactions constitute only a small residue throughout the class groupings; and these reactions seem to stem more from a poor impression of those who are "supposed to be Christians" rather than of "ideal" Christians: "It's hard to find one", "They're not in the church", "There's no such thing", etc. It is also clear that few men think of a Christian as one who performs certain religious "duties", such as going to Church.

"My opinion of religious belief ..." brought forth a scatter of replies some-
what more variant with respect to class. Considerable combining of separate answers has been required to produce a table with six categories.

TABLE VII - 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPINION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N (41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high opinion</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&quot;essential&quot;, &quot;necessary&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High but contingent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. &quot;good if lived&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal belief expressed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant (e.g. &quot;fine for those who want it&quot;)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (skepticism, no interest, etc.)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers, with respect to class, can be seen to correlate quite strongly with church involvement patterns though the fact that one-fourth of the workers are in the "no answer" row exaggerates the contrast to some extent. Combining the first two types of answers - both suggesting a high evaluation of religious belief - the respective percentages by class groups are: working - 29%; borderline - 42%; and middle class - 53%. Within the categories of church attendance the distribution is: Dormant - 27%; Marginal - 60%; and Regular - 52%. On the other hand, the

1. Those who made no verbal answer are in this instance included in the table in contrast to the usual procedure. On this question they represented a sizeable proportion of the working class responses. In fact, on most questions pertaining to religious values and attitudes the majority of the "no answers" are working class, though this will not always appear in the tables. In itself, such relatively higher expression of ignorance or lack of opinion epitomises the greater vagueness about religion in the working class.
working class is especially high on negative responses or no response - a combined total of 41% compared with 12% for borderline and 21% for middle class. Gallup found in England that 47% of the "lower class" think Religion "is largely old fashioned and out of date" in contrast to 41% of the "upper social class".

Though the small variation is in the same direction, this is, overall, a far more condemnatory view of religion than is taken by our respondents.

Even allowing for the variations, it is true that (ignoring the "no responses") the vast majority of all groups express opinions favourable to the holding of religious belief. None of the class groups express depreciatory views of religious belief in as many as one-fifth of their answers. Thus, we find further evidence of acceptance of religion at an abstract level, despite great variations in personal practice. As Mayor puts it, "Open challenge to Christianity is not strong ... It is customary to say that the prevailing attitude is indifference to religion associated with naive hedonism ... Religion of a sort is almost universal in Britain today; it is church-going and active participation which have failed. Zweig concludes from his interviews with English working class men: "The overwhelming majority were believers in one way or another; only a small minority were non-believers or agnostics. However, the nature of their belief was, in many cases, very vague and groping". Pickering also noted a superficiality of religious beliefs in England, using these phrases: "Belief did not appear to motivate practice," and "dogmatic assertions are of little importance".

Many of the comments following depict the tone of "blandness" surrounding the matter of religious belief. Gone are the strong feelings and controversies so much a part of Scottish history. Belief is not denounced, but it is viewed, on the whole, unemotionally, and with a strong measure of tolerance. The prevailing opinion is, "everyone should believe, but it doesn't matter what they

1. Social Surveys, op. cit., p. 44.
2. Mayor, op. cit.
believe, so long as it helps them". Wickham has insightfully expressed the situation: "There is a deeper secularism than is often apparent in a nation that has always shrunk from the apellation 'atheist' and has no knowledge of a philosophico-agnosticism. But, the stain of the Churches runs widely over British society if thinly, even into groups that have been historically estranged from the church." In short, there is neither inflamed opposition to the church or impassioned ardor in her behalf. Vague respect, rather than religious excitement, is the prevailing tone of church valuation. The respondents tell this story most eloquently themselves.

("Regular" medical scientist)
Essential, one must have some belief, even if it isn't specifically religious.

("Dormant" salesman)
A person should have a belief whether it conforms to any church or just to his own code of behaviour.

("Dormant" geologist)
I don't, personally, believe in most religious life. But, it does help most people in crises, and keeps people from getting more dishonest and worse. Crime has increased since religion declined.

("Regular" plumber)
A man must believe something — and he must live it. If he does there's nothing wrong with him, no matter what his convictions.

("Regular" caretaker)
It just means to be a good citizen and do no one any harm.

("Regular" tailor)
Everyone should be taught religion at school and Sunday school, then think for themselves.

("Regular" proof reader)
I'd be very sorry to see it come about — that there wouldn't be a church. As to what belief, everyone should have their own thoughts on that; I have no axe to grind.

("Dormant" electrician)
It's all just a story. Everyone should believe what they like.

("Dormant" advanced student)
It's all right for people who want it; seems to give a purpose for those who need it — if you like, a therapy.

1. Wickham, in Schneider, op. cit., p. 424.
Frankly, it doesn't bother me if they want to believe or not.

I'm not against it. If a person believes, good enough.

While these replies demonstrate this prevalent tone - casual, undogmatic acceptance of "belief" -- a few others evidenced some personal struggles of belief.

I get doubts at times, but deep down we know that there is a basic religion in each of us.

You don't want to think that when you die that's the end.

Two other men illustrate the minority of negative reactions.

It's all business, not belief at all. In a full church, not more than six or seven are there for the proper reason -- most are there from habit, some because the boss goes, some women to show off a new hat or something -- but the proper reason is to worship God.

It's just plain fear, that's all.

3. Doctrinal Positions.

Religious belief comes under scrutiny now in a more specific manner. The final part of the interview schedule consisted of a series of statements introduced in this way.

I'm going to read to you a number of statements and ask you to say whether you agree or disagree with each one. There is no correct answer; it's only your own opinion that counts. You'll probably find that you agree with some of the statements and disagree with others.

Five of the statements (which will be referred to as "propositions") from this series will be considered as indicative of doctrinal commitments - as suggesting degree of dogmatism or tolerance, orthodoxy or liberalism.

A general lack of intolerance is deducible from the overwhelmingly affirmative responses to the first statement, which read, "The Christian way is only one of
many ways of knowing God; it is not the only way”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHRISTIAN WAY NOT ONLY WAY TO KNOW GOD</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (or unsure)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catholics, as a separate group, disagree with the proposition in over one-third of the cases, considerably more often than any of the class groups in the table. In all likelihood this is due to the Roman Catholic doctrine of "the true church" and the emphasis on the necessity of proper sacramental liaison with God: in fact, that two-thirds of the Catholics should agree is perhaps surprising.

That over four-fifths, overall, should decline to assert that Christianity has the exclusive way to God is persuasive evidence of religious tolerance and absence of dogmatism. Evidently, today's common religious world view is a far cry from the "fire and brimstone" emphasis of previous eras when any persons not under the cloak of the Christian Church were widely thought to be "eternally damned". This finding is quite in tune with the responses to the projective question on religious belief considered above - the conspicuous lack of concern with specific beliefs.

None-the-less, we immediately confront an equally strong affirmation of a traditional, keystone Christian doctrine when we examine responses to the statement: "Jesus was not merely a good teacher; he was also God's only son". All Catholics
agreed; only about a fifth disagreed for the whole sample with a very uniform spread by class.¹

TABLE VII - 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle²</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (or unsure)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to compare these answers to another doctrinal statement with a particularly "fundamentalist" slant: "The Bible is the Word of God, and everything it says is completely true". There is a much more even division of opinion on this proposition with the majority refusing to accept it. The third row in Table VII - 9 is comprised of the small minority who suggested that the Bible is "good" but were unsure whether they would affirm the entire proposition.

¹. Gallup found in England that 55% of the men and 72% of the women interviewed believe that Christ was the Son of God. Social Surveys, op. cit., p.47.

². Middle class "Dormants" had only a 42% agreement, much lower than any other class-church involvement grouping.
On the basis of this proposition it appears that the middle class respondents are least "orthodox" despite their relatively high incidence of church involvement. But the general impression from the last two items is that, while a proposition central to traditional Christianity, the Divinity of Christ, commands general adherence, more narrow views such as the "inerrancy of the Bible" are considered optional.

The last two statements contributing to this section are of a different sort than the previous three. Particular doctrines are not put forward for acceptance or rejection, but rather the value of beliefs is put alongside other values. This is particularly true of the statement, "Living a good life is more important than having any particular religious beliefs". Overall, two-thirds of the men considered the statement correct.
Again there is striking similarity in response across class lines. Middle class men put slightly more emphasis on the importance of beliefs vis a vis "living a good life". The high proportion of affirmative replies by workers may also be interpreted as suggesting that living a good life is not dependent upon church-going. Gallup found in England that "only 6 per cent ... directly attribute good behaviour to their religion").¹ This and previous results (e.g. "A Christian is ..." - good person, etc.) also indicate that religion is as highly valued for ethical reasons as for doctrinal. Mayor refers to "the common assumption of religion as an ethical code").² However, the more active one is in church the more likely he is to dispute the proposition, giving stress to "having particular beliefs". Fewer Regulars accepted the statements than Marginals or Dormants (58%, 75% and 74% respectively).

"Christians ought to try to influence other people to think the way they do", the other proposition, in a sense places Christian belief system over against norms of tolerance and avoiding inflammatory subjects. Only one-third straightforwardly

2. Mayor, op. cit.
agree; another one-sixth proclaimed it essential to influence unobtrusively, "by your life", etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Only by life (no pressure)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again there is remarkable class uniformity with two-thirds of the men failing to agree directly. This, in itself, suggests the powerful influence of the norm of tolerance. We return to the importance of this value which was brought to attention by the general rejection of "the Christian way" as an exclusive approach to God, and by the prevalent tone of responses for "opinions of religious belief". In his most fascinating volume, *The Secular City* an American theologian, Harvey Cox, has developed the theme of secularism's impact on religious belief. He says,

Secularisation simply bypasses and undercuts religion and goes on to other things. It has relativised religious world views and thus rendered them innocuous ... It has convinced the believer that he could be wrong, and persuaded the devotee that there are more important things than dying for the faith ... Pluralism and tolerance are the children of secularisation.

Schneider and Sanford have shown from an examination of American religious "inspirational" literature sampled over seventy-five years that there has been a decline in eschatological themes and a pronounced present emphasis on "salvation in the world". They see in this evidence of the impact of secularisation.

In general, furthermore, there appears to be an acceptance of a basic, minimum system of Christian doctrine, but willing detachment from traditional, controversial doctrines (such as Biblical inerrancy) which are offensive to some modern world views. An American study of college students found that both the religious and the unreligious believe in a similar "common cultural morality". Argyle reports a study of Y.M.C.A. members by Ross (1950) in which it was found that their belief was a kind of "passive acceptance".

It is a major theme of Herberg's classical American essay that exclusive doctrinal positions — even for major Catholics, Protestants, and Jewish divisions — are giving way to a common cultural religion exalting "the American way of life". And Lenski said that, among Protestants in Detroit the same appeared to be true; "A transcendental faith is gradually being transformed into a cultural faith".

Our data suggests, tentatively, that much the same phenomenon may be occurring in Scotland (or in Britain as a whole). Thompson, in his Birmingham study, for instance, speaks of "the lack of a distinctive ideology". He says that other values of church members are for the most part drawn from other secular groups in which they have membership ... The appeal of the Church rests on social compatibility, rather than doctrinal conviction. Whether secularism's advances are seen as an encroachment on the ideological provinces of religion or as beneficial contributions to the climate of a complex, scientific age, there can be little doubt that these advances have whittled down the dogmatic religious values of the past. Nor is this phenomenon restricted to any one social class. Our data shows little variation in orthodoxy by class; if anything, working class men, who are least active in church, are a bit more prone to acceptance of orthodox doctrines.

3. Herberg, op. cit.,
5. Thompson, op. cit., p. 85.
Clearly, therefore, degree of commitment to religious beliefs does not thoroughly account for differences in religious practice.


Respondents were asked to apply one of four degrees of disapproval (always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong, or never wrong) to four types of behaviour: moderate drinking, heavy drinking, gambling, divorce. On the first, moderate drinking, only 13\% overall declared the behaviour "always or usually wrong", but there is considerable contrast between the "sometimes wrong" and "never wrong" distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPINION OF MODERATE DRINKING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>always or usually wrong</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes wrong</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>never wrong</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Working class men are most lenient toward moderate drinking; the borderline men have the most reservation (taking "sometimes wrong" as indicating some degree of reservation) and the middle class men are quite near the overall averages though more often declaring definite condemnation (always or usually wrong). "Heavy drinking" received very uniform disapproval, only seven men choosing other than the "always wrong" alternative. Apparently then, as long as drink is used properly

1. adapted from Lenski, op. cit., p. 389.
and controlled, it is almost unanimously approved. Nor does church attendance seem to affect opinion; controlled drinking is not considered a "spiritual" matter. There seems to be little strong anti-alcohol fervour such as captivated many around the turn of the century.

Opinion on the moral correctness of gambling presents quite a different picture. All but four individuals found it at least "sometimes wrong" and over half declared it at least "usually wrong".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 13</th>
<th>OPINIONS ON GAMBLING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>always wrong</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>usually wrong</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes or never wrong</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again the borderline group takes a stance far more condemnatory than the other divisions. Working class and middle class respondents are quite similar in their answers. However, the proportion of "always wrong" replies increases with degree of church association: 23% for Dormants, 33% for Marginals and 42% for Regulars.

Finally, opinions on the propriety of divorce are examined with a good deal more variation occurring.
Middle class men are easily the most lenient on this moral issue but there are no notable variations in opinion with respect to church attendance rates. Not surprisingly, considering the official Roman Catholic disapproval of divorce, 69% of the Catholics voice the "always wrong" alternative.

By way of brief recapitulation of this section on "Religious profession", we may conclude that variations of belief are not responsible for church participation differences in terms of class. An overall picture emerges showing: church attendance based mainly on spiritual motivations, church abstention based upon what may be called simple disinterest rather than upon reasoned rejection of the church; quite general agreement on the value of "religious belief" in the abstract and on being "Christian"; a high degree of doctrinal tolerance; acceptance of traditional Christian Theistic belief; low level of dogmatism and moderate leniency on questions of moral behaviour.

B. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CHURCH

We turn now to evaluations of the church "in the large", in terms of how she is perceived as a whole entity rather than how specific aspects of the church are viewed. 

1. During the course of the interviews, the men were given no hint that the survey bore a particular relationship to the church and religious information until after the twenty-four projective questions had been presented.
This overall assessment is elucidated along two lines: the church's fundamental "value"; and her "effectiveness" with respect to her ability to engage the commitment of individuals.

1. Church's Value.

Three projective questions and one proposition (calling for agreement or dissent) are relevant to the perceptions of the church's worth. For the first projection, the initiating phrase was, "The word, 'church', makes me think of ..." The wide spectrum of answers is focused into the six columns of Table VII - 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(general) God, Christ, religion</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(specific) Sunday, worship, ch. building or service</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal (e.g. &quot;I should go&quot;)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (&quot;hypocrites&quot;, &quot;unthinking people&quot;)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (youth, fellowship, etc.)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the type of answers accounting for the largest proportion of answers - and quite equally by class - are the references to God, Christ or religion. It

(Cont) In this way it was hoped to maximise the "unstructured" nature of these items, and to assure as "uncoloured" responses as possible.
seems surprising that less than one-fifth of the respondents are found within the second row, suggesting particular activities (worship service), time (Sunday) or location (church building) associated with the church. However, there is a significant variation by social class and the variation is in the direction predictable from patterns of church involvement. Middle class and Borderline men name a specific aspect of the church about three times as frequently as do working class men. By contrast, workers more often express the feeling that they are remiss in not going to church (row four). Centers found that both working class and middle class persons declared that people do not take religion seriously enough even though his workers—like ours—attended church less often than the middle class respondents.\footnote{Centers, \textit{op. cit.}, p.145.}

My general impression from the replies is that an appreciable vagueness surrounds the idea—"church." I have already pointed out that many non-attenders are without a definite explanation for absence from the church. Much of what has so far been brought to light in this chapter tellingly suggests that the church is an "accepted" part of life not often viewed with rancour; but she often seems to be quite remote and vague. This is not, in the main, an age of inflamed religious passion, of bitter doctrinal controversy or of intensity of feeling about the church. The word, church, elicits few concrete images; people tend to be very mild in their expressions. Two men said the word, church, brought to mind only "weddings". It is also cogent that only one man thought of a minister. Indeed, the most articulate group were the minority of 12% who came forth with critical remarks. For instance:—

("Dormant" scientist)

A narrow kind of life not applicable to the present day.
("Dormant" mechanic)
Could make me very angry. I'm very much against it. I'm not just not religious, I'm against it. I think it's the cause of all wars and always will be.

("Dormant" railway worker)
Money collectors.

A related - and more direct - projection was, "The value of the church ..."

Most people indicated that the church does have some value though the appraisals are quite varied, or course. A "no answer" row is incorporated in Table VII - 16 because it includes one-fifth of the workers, a not insignificant fact.

---

**TABLE VII - 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE OF THE CHURCH ...</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential, great</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mild) some value, O.K.,</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gives unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific value (e.g. &quot;help&quot;, &quot;peace&quot;, &quot;uplifting&quot;)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No value, little, outdated</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining the last two rows ("no value", etc. or "no answer") we see that a substantial number of working class and middle class men are without definite plaudits for the church's value, 46% and 38% respectively. These may not, of course, connote complete rejection of the church.

However, nearly two-thirds of the sample overall suggest that the church does have a positive value (first three rows). The incidence of positive replies seem to be related to church-going patterns by class: working class - 53%, borderline - 68%, and middle class - 63%. Looked at directly in terms of church-going rates,
the corresponding figures are: Dormants - 46%, Marginals - 67%, and Regulars - 75%.
The pattern is logical, to be sure, but it is interesting that as many as one-fourth of
the regular church-goers have not come forth with commendable appraisals of the
church's worth. Even those attributing to the church moderate value were often
very restrained. Gallup's recent findings in England are relevant: "Nineteen out
of every 20 people interviewed (95%) thought that you can lead a good and useful
life even if you do not go to church. Only 2% thought that you did have to go to
church for this to be the case, while 2% were undecided".1

Our discussion at this point is further informed by findings that emerged
from the survey of six secondary schools in Edinburgh. The pupils, 1,110 in all,
were asked to rank six activities (from one to six) "according to how important they
are":

- Watching an interesting T.V. programme.
- Learning about something new.
- Helping to make something.
- Taking part in a favourite sport.
- Going to Church.
- Reading a good book.

Outside of the one Catholic school, "going to church" consistently ranked
(on the average) in the bottom half of the continuum. Girls tended to consider
the church slightly more important but not to such an extent that this factor
deserves elaboration. Figuring the results in a very simple way, giving inverted
numerical values for each ranking (i.e. 1 for sixth choice, 2 for fifth choice ...
6 for first choice) we can compare the mean scores for this one item in the list to
the mean score for all rankings combined (3.5). The schools are classified in
four types, primarily on the basis of the general status composition of the pupils.
Other than the one Catholic school, the schools are mainly Protestant in composition.

one Catholic school (low-status) - (N-218) - 4.7 (mean score)
two low status schools - (N-307) - 3.1
two medium status schools - (N-384) - 3.0
one high status school-all boys - (M-212) - 2.5

I cannot readily explain why the ranking of "going to church" should decrease with status, since those from higher status homes probably receive more emphasis on this practice, generally speaking. However, the ranking does not measure importance of church-going in "absolute" terms but only in relation to several other forms of behaviour. Therefore, obviously, differential class valuation of other activities - those listed as well as activities not listed - would have to be investigated in order to thoroughly explain this apparent anomaly. I shall not venture such a painstaking investigation but wish only to stress the very moderate importance placed on church-going by these secondary school students overall.

Indeed, an "open-ended" question given to the pupils suggests that religious matters are not prominent in the value systems of the young people at all. The question, "The two most important things in life are;" was followed by four open lines in which each value could be described. Taking the first choices only (the second choices follow the same pattern) we find that a very small proportion of the reported values related to religious matters. Including all such selections - religion, God, Christ, faith, going to church - only the Catholic school pupils name a religious value in more than 10% of the cases (13%). For the other low-status schools the figure is 1%; for the middle status schools, 5%; and for the high status school, 3%. One is bound to think that this apparent disinterest in church and religion does not augur well for the church in the decades ahead, though many intervening factors affect adult religious practice; predictions are notoriously dangerous.

Returning to the answers to the "value of the church" projection in the Prestonfield survey, those who minimised the church's value did so in a number of ways, including these illustrations.
(two middle class "Regulars")

It's too much of a leaning post to some.

The church has its place; no higher than that.

(two working class "Dormants")

It's losing its value now — people who go, go because their people have gone before them. It's the done thing.

I don't know much about the church; I'm not interested.

Among those who declared the church essential are these two working class men.

To everybody the Church should be first.

The Church is needed. We all need it someday. You need a minister even if you don't go to church.

Several others who expressed rather high valuations of the Church make it clear that they feel many others do not share such a valuation.

Inestimable value — even to those who ignore it or scoff at it — that person calls the Church when he really needs it.

It should not be underestimated. Must be 100% to get real value — 5% or 50% not much good. People think they're okay if they go for christening or marriage — make the church a convenience.

Greater today than people realise.

The Church has a lot to offer. Some of the younger ones, instead of going to the picture houses, should go to church — they'd learn more.

One of the most notable voids in the array of responses is the almost complete absense of stress on communal aspects of church life — fellowship, belonging to close-knit group, etc. Whatever values are conceived as embodies in the Church, there is little notice taken of corporate belongingness. Only two borderline men mentioned "fellowship" as one of the values of the Church (categorised under "Miscellaneous"). Richter similarly pointed out the limited recognition of this
value among many U.S. Catholic parishioners: "a consciousness of 'family membership' in the parish appears to be present only in the nuclear parishioners and those of long residence".\(^1\) Likewise, Pin concludes that, "Parishes function more as administrative centers than as effective groups, or at least, so it seems at first sight".\(^2\)

Somewhat in contrast, Nash and Berger in an American study found that those joining Protestant churches were seeking to maximise basically secular values including, especially, familiarism and belonging.\(^3\)

It may be of paramount significance that our respondents - and other measures later in the chapter - will underscore this interpretation - apparently do not see such communal values embodied in the church. Tom Allan, who organised a church campaign to canvass his working class parish in Glasgow, noted that the visitors found little antagonism, a good deal of "bland indifference" and a considerable amount of interest on the part of people who said they really wanted to be part of the church but had never been personally contacted in her behalf.\(^4\)

Thompson says on one Birmingham church: "The church was not seen as a fellowship; nor was fellowship regarded as integral to the process of worship".\(^5\) Taylor says that, "There is indeed a widely diffused sense amongst all kinds of people that the survival of the church is important, but this expression of conviction is rarely articulated in a manner which provides a social justification for the church."\(^6\) Vincent, in his small Glasgow survey found that, although "no man

\(^1\) Fichter, op. cit., p.190.
\(^2\) Pin, in Schneider, op. cit., 412.
\(^3\) Dennison Nash and Peter Berger, "Church Commitment in an American Suburb: An Analysis of the Decision to Join", Archives de Sociologie de Religions, 1962, p.p.105-120.
\(^5\) Thompson, op. cit., p.14.
criticised the churches or was antagonistic to them", they felt the church irrelevant because "the churches could offer no specific guidance, or help in their daily lives". 1 To apply Toennies' popular distinction, though the church is thought to be worthwhile, it provides mainly an "associational" involvement, without enough opportunity for "communal" involvement to translate the abstract acceptance into concrete church-orientated activity.

Respondents were asked what they consider the "ideal" value of the church by the projection, "What I think the church ought to do for people .." The reactions further support the notion that there is a widespread feeling that the church falls short on provision of communal values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change from present</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare, help people</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make closer contact</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide social activities, modernise, attract</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (e.g. &quot;discontinue&quot;)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About one-fifth, especially concentrated in the middle class, mention the church's need to serve people in terms of welfare (row two). In fact, one of the "propositions" ("The church should not bother about social welfare") evoked an overwhelmingly negative response (only four exceptions), conclusively indicating

that people feel such service is part of the church work. Keith-Lucas, in an American appraisal of the church's welfare works, says that, "There are people who believe that social welfare problems are none of the church's business." Few in Britain seem to hold to that persuasion; there is near-unanimity that welfare is a legitimate province of the church.

Gallup asked, in the English survey, "Should churches be mainly concerned with the spiritual life of the individual, or should they express their views on day-to-day social questions?" Despite the fact that this question seems to embody a false dichotomy, it is noteworthy that over three-fifths chose the second alternative.

At the opposite extremes are minorities who feel that either the church is fully carrying out her task (row one) or feel that she should "close up shop" altogether (row five). The former finds most support from middle class men; the latter from working class men. But the majority, 53% overall, fall into the third and fourth categories, primarily emphasising a need for the church to relate herself more intimately and more communally with people. Working class and borderline men make this stress especially, 60% and 75% respectively. This is in line with Demarath's finding that communal, sect-like religiosity is mainly a working class propensity, while middle class persons prefer more formalised, church-like involvement.

In the working class case, a conflict between this "ideal" view of more informal relationships within the church and a feeling that this desideratum is actually lacking may be a weighty factor in the large-scale working class abstention. (This possibility will be taken up in more detail in Chapter X). Several working class and borderline men illustrate by their answers the belief that the church should strive for a more "down-to-earth" liaison with people.

Take greater interest in the working side of life. Get to know people.

3. Demarath, op. cit.
Come more into contact with them. There's no sense of contact between church and public.

Go out and do more instead of being behind closed doors. Draw people in.

Cut out the clanishness. You must get dressed up for church, have best suit of clothes on on yafre looked down upon. The church needs to be more open.

In a different way a "proposition" probes perception of the church's value: "It is more important how you treat your fellow man than whether or not you attend church". The overwhelmingly majority (80%) were in agreement. Catholic respondents provide something of an exception, splitting their answers evenly between agreement and disagreement, thus testifying to the Catholic Church's emphasis on performing the religious duty of attending mass. In general, it may be said that the ethical value of treating others properly is taken to be an injunction with priority over performing the religious duty of church-going. Of course, maintaining proper relationships to others may be viewed as response to one sort of religious injunction, but the fact that the ethical, "practical", non-ritualistic aspect takes precedent is cogent. Church-going is evidently not seen as pre-requisite to good inter-personal relationships.

2. Church's Effectiveness.

We now turn to an examination of three questions which elicit an appraisal of the effectiveness of the church in general. (Later in the chapter other concrete indications of the impact of the church's operation will emerge and will supplement this section.) First of all, "Would you say the church today, on the whole, is gaining ground or losing ground?" requested, very straightforwardly, opinions about the current fortunes of the church. The prevalent feeling is that the church is decidedly waning; many seem ready to write the epitaphs for institutional religion. Overall, four-fifths say the church is losing ground. It has already been pointed out that there is some scanty evidence that the tide has been
turned, and of course, the church may prove more durable than the prophecies of those who see her impending doom allow. But it cannot be comforting to the leaders of organised religion that people so overwhelmingly believe the church to be on the way to oblivion.

### TABLE VII - 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHURCH GAINING OR LOSING GROUND?</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even, balanced</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing (or R.C. only gaining)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gallup found in England that "for every person who thinks that the influence of religion is increasing (22%) there are nearly three people who think it is decreasing (63%)." If religion is taken to mean the Church, then our findings reveal an even less sanguine view. However, a few added to their doom-saying the thought that religion itself is not slipping into the grave with her institutional embodiment — the Church. A "Dormant" porter said, for instance,

Many people, like ourselves, don't go. Church is losing as far as getting members, but Christianity is not failing; almost everybody has that Christian feeling down within them.

Church-goers (Regulars) were not quite so gloomy about the future of the Church as non-church goers. But even those who have, in a sense, staked a claim in the on-going operation of the Church, over two-thirds assert that the Church is losing ground.

---

Since men far more often than women abstain from church involvement respondents were asked to explain this aspect of the church's ineffectiveness with the projective question, "The reason why more men don't go to church ..." Though there is a wide variety of responses, when they have been collapsed into a few categories, the class groups are seen to be in general agreement.

**TABLE VII - 19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not interested, get nothing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy, distractions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too busy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church is for women</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't believe, hypocrisy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Working men more frequently suggest that men are too busy to go to church, often making reference to Sunday work. Middle class men have the highest frequency of answers suggesting that men have rejected the church on an ideological plane. I think the best summary of the profile of response, however, is that to men church-going is simply not a high priority; it is not viewed as a necessary corollary to religious belief and, often, not even as a desirable one. Several main categories of response are manifest in the excerpts.

1. This point of view is expressed by 41% of the "Dormant" middleclass men, but by only 9% of the middle class "Regulars".
Not Interested. Get Nothing

("Marginal" joiner)
They're just not drawn to the church.

("Regular" caretaker)
They aren't up against the church; they just can't be bothered.

("Dormant" electrician)
Because the church doesn't offer them anything.

("Dormant" bus dispatcher)
Minister must bring it better, it's too mournful, should be gayer.

Lazy, distractions.

("Dormant" lavatory attendant)
Drink too much on Saturday night.

("Regular" building foreman)
Quite a few work Sunday; others think their neighbours will laugh at them.

("Dormant" porter)
They have a funny feeling they'll be seen sneaking into church by their mates, and will have to explain on Monday.

("Regular" policeman)
They're out all week and want to stay in on Sunday; women are in all week and want to get out on Sunday.

("Dormant" panel-beater)
Not disbelief - I think laziness is the biggest part of it.

Don't Believe. Hypocrisy

("Dormant" architect)
Experience of war and hypocrisy have deterred many.

("Dormant" advance student)
People are more cynical and materialistic; science has something to do with it.

Church is for Women

("Marginal" office worker)
Because it's a sissy's game.

("Dormant" mason)
Men haven't got the sentimentality that women have.

("Regular" technician)
Probably they think it's feminine; you know, all right for women but not for men.
A less direct effort to assess opinions of the church's ability to gain the commitment of people was based on the "proposition", "The church demands too little of people". Nearly half are in agreement, indicating that many believe the church requires too little involvement, while another eleven per cent waver between agreement and disagreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE CHURCH DEMANDS TOO LITTLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Borderline men most often say that the church should provide a more demanding programme; working class respondents most often take the opposite point of view. As this suggests, incidence of agreement shows a slight increase with church attendance rates, a most interesting finding. Apparently those closest to the church are most convinced that she does not motivate a deep enough commitment. In three of the four Birmingham parishes he studied, Thompson found the same perception that the church is undemanding: "Except in the case of a small minority the church was not seen as an institution which made demands upon its membership". 1 Again, "To all but a minority, the church was an important institution, but not one which placed them under any kind of obligation". 2

1. Thompson, op. cit., p.35.
2. ibid, p.62.
This "general assessment of the church" can be very briefly summarised by saying that the church has created a general impression of mild - rather nebulous - value combined with decided ineffectiveness. Those on the lower end of the social scale particularly imply that the church fails to win their adherence by her failure to sustain a congenial, communal atmosphere for interaction. Men are seen as essentially disinterested in the church, and the church is overwhelmingly viewed as sliding downhill.

C. APPRAISAL OF SPECIFIC CHURCH REPRESENTATIONS

More concrete reasons for the predominant perspective on church - her current incapacity to gain and sustain commitment - are elucidated by an exploration of attitudes concerning three specific "representations" of the church - ministers, church-goers, and church "programme". It will become clear that these major manifestation of institutional religion are not accorded an appraisal as complimentary as that accorded the church "in the large".

1. Ministers.

Lenski says that the "power" of the clergy derives, in the first instance, from the "attitude of the laity, and their respect for the office".1 The Gallup survey in England, previously alluded to, found that men who direct the work of the church are generally well thought of and are considered to be labouring under a difficult task with salutary motives, but with little reward.2 Fichter, in his U.S. Catholic study, thought it of significance that the laity thinks more highly of priests than priests do of themselves.3 Our own data, however, tend to underscore an attenuation of the esteem in which ministers of religion are held. There

is, in replies to questions about ministers, considerable reservation about their capabilities and their orientation to modern life. Despite many commendatory reactions, the overall impression is that ministers have been stripped of much of their once hallowed image.

I will first explore the attitudes to ministers as persons, then look at the views of their relationship to people. The former line of investigation revolves about reactions to two questions which appeared at different points in the interview. One was contained in the projective section: "A typical church minister today ..." The other was a straightforward question encompassed by a number of other church-related queries: "What kind of men would you say ministers are generally?" The latter evoked less critical reactions on the whole and is summarised first, in Table VII - 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTERS ARE WHAT KIND OF MEN?</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, effective</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary (&quot;some good, some bad&quot;)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (dull, &quot;not with it&quot;, &quot;just a job&quot;)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer or unsure</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workers reveal their general remoteness from ministers with a high incidence of "no opinion" - nearly one-third of their replies.¹

¹. Catholics, as a separate group, are found far more often expressing commendation for the clergy than any of the class groupings, nearly two-thirds of their replies falling into row one.
But they are, in answer to this question, less critical of ministers than borderline or middle class men - the latter in particular. Within the middle class division there is a significant division of opinion between "Regulars" and "Dormants"; only 15% of the "Regulars" are in the "negative" row compared with 55% of the "Dormants". Indeed, other indicators point to the fact that middle class men who are outside the church tend to take a far more critical view of her than any other sales-church involvement grouping.

Some of the answers commending ministers demonstrate a distinction between the ministers themselves and the position in which they function. This distinction is depicted in the replies of two supervisors:

Some of them are very good. Almost flogging a dead horse though now.

Sincere men, do their best; but they're too constrained by the traditional forms of the church.

The "ordinary" descriptions (second row) are exemplified by those respondents who are neither very critical nor very laudatory.

("Dormant" supervisors)
Like other jobs. They are a cross-section, some sincere, others not.
Just like any other business; and that's what it is - business.

("Dormant" salesman)
Sincere, but too cautious. They're afraid to be critical.

("Regular" technical worker)
Some are delightful and are Christians in the deepest sense; others emasculate any crowd of people. They have this sort of Music Hall voice, etc.

("Regular" businessman)
Some ministers are very difficult to talk to; ours is easy to talk to. They're educated men -- have to be. It used to be considered a cushy job -- perhaps middle class people who didn't know the people who need the Church most, the lower class people who don't understand it as well. I think this is changing today.

Several other interview excerpts demonstrate the type of reservations and doubts about ministers which apparently abound.

("Regular" technician)
They are God-fearing men who are keen to do God's work. However, they're a bit off the beam -- too old fashioned, I'm afraid. The Church of Scotland is rotten with tradition.
"Dormant" advanced student

I suppose on the whole they're pretty good and decent men; but they're sort of airy and fairy and out of touch.

Moving to the closely related projective query, "A typical church minister today ..." it becomes clearer that the image of the minister, in stereotype, is somewhat tarnished. In this case, only a minority, perhaps one-third including the more complimentary "miscellaneous" answers, respond with any degree of commendation. Probably this indicator, being "projective" and without preliminary announcement, captured a more accurate, "off guard" reaction. There is also a subtle difference between the previous question and this one in "tone": "what kind of men?" tends to elicit statements about the personal character of ministers while "A typical church minister..." evokes appraisal of the professional capability and general "image" projected by ministers. This distinction, I think, in part, accounts for the far more critical answers. TABLE VII - 22 divides the negative reactions into those stressing the drabness of ministers (row three) and those impugning to them bad motives or hypocrisy (row four).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A TYPICAL CHURCH MINISTER ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, devoted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying, hard job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dull, unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derogatory (insincere, hypocrite, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once again, workers stand in relief in that they are less critical and more apt not to have an answer (in one-fourth the cases). And their criticisms are more apt to focus on the "drabness" of ministers (row three) than are those of the borderline or middle class men, whose negative replies usually tend toward definite derogation.

Overall, it is the telling negative tone which stands out very vividly. The image of the "typical" minister is deprecated not only by all classes, but also by all church involvement categories in at least one-third of the instances. Combining the two negative rows, the proportions by church attendance groups are: Regulars - 38%; Marginals - 60%; Dormants - 36%. Nearly all of the "no answer" reactions are Dormants, accounting for 28% of their responses. The very high proportion of negative answers by Marginals probably confirms the fact that these are mainly men who have some connection with the Church, but are particularly dissatisfied with her at present.

Some of the men expressed rather mild criticism, perhaps trying to give the minister "his due":

("Regular" office worker)
   Less bigoted than ten to fifteen years back.

("Marginal" office worker)
   He tries to be with it, but never quite succeeds.

("Dormant" clerk)
   Friendly and gushing - not all sincere.

("Regular" engineer)
   They feel if you come to church that's enough, and don't concern themselves with your spiritual life.

("Regular" policeman)
   They don't do too badly except for not bringing young people into the Church, which they must do.

Others were less restrained in their negative opinions.

("Marginal" maintenance man)
   Dry, stuffy person.
("Dormant" mason) Needs to be re-educated in Christianity.

("Dormant" civil servant) Hopeless. He's a financeer, his heart isn't in it.

("Dormant" railway worker) Hasn't a clue what goes on.

("Dormant" warehouse worker) Many ministers you can't get close to; it's like they're looking down on you. The Catholic priests I've met are friendly and natural; never had this with a Protestant minister.

("Marginal" technician) Mealy-mouthed hypocrite.

There is some scattered evidence that this sort of disparagement of the minister is widespread in Britain today. Vincent concludes from his series of informal interviews in Glasgow that, "There was a widespread view that although the ministers concerned were pious, hard-working men of good intent who cared deeply for their fellow man and society, their background and way of life made it difficult for them to be an integral part of society and fully realise the mission of the churches in society ... All in all, the public image of the minister -- no matter how hard working -- appears to be that of a man educated in his own sphere, but with no wide role to play in society. He is a man who conducts services and provides certain rites ... at important stages of life ..."¹ Even this view of the minister's limited impact is more salutory than many of our respondents' comments have allowed.

Rowntree and Lavers also found direct criticism of ministers. They say that "just a job" is a common stricture and conclude that there has been "a real decline in the esteem in which Protestant ministers of religion are held". They report the same distinction, which is notable in our survey, between opinion of "the Church" and opinion of ministers -- "The Church is generally regarded with tolerance and indifference and with little or none of the hostility which ... the clergy so often evoke".² Thompson, found in Birmingham serious doubts about the position of clergy-

¹ Vincent, op. cit., p.3.
men. "Most members of the congregation had no clear idea of the role of the vicar ... The office of vicar carried little authority, even in the spiritual sphere. To many of the congregation there was little that he could do .... The position and role of the clergy have become ambiguous and uncertain". ¹ It is interesting that, while the majority of Gallup's interviewees in England reported a high level of respect for ministers, there was indication that ministers were seen as "behind the times". Forty-eight per cent said that the clergy are slow to accept new ideas, 37% said they are not, and 15% did not feel qualified to give an answer. ²

Pupils in the six Edinburgh secondary schools were asked to rank (from one to six) these six occupations, "according to the value of each job":

Joiner
Medical Doctor
Independent Shopkeeper
Trade Union Official
Industrial Manager
Church Minister

"Church Minister" was ranked a good deal higher by the Catholic school pupils than by any other group of pupils, but other than this, the variations by school (as well as by sex) were minimum. The mean ranking for church minister (3.6) was almost exactly on the overall mean score (3.5) which means that ministers were, on the average, ranked right in the middle of the six occupations. Specifically, medical doctor was easily in first place in the average ranking, followed by "Industrial Manager", also substantially ahead of "Church Minister". The clerical occupation was just third in the ranking, slightly ahead of "Trade Union Official". "Independent Shopkeeper" and "Joiner" ranked fourth and fifth, respectively, well below the other four occupations.

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1. Thompson, op. cit., p. 90.
2. Social Surveys, op. cit., p. 70.
This must be construed as something of a downgrading of ministers by the younger generation. "Church Minister" was ranked first only one-eighth as often as "Medical Doctor" and outside the Catholic school less than one-sixteenth as often. Apart from the one Catholic school, "Church Minister" was ranked first less than one-half as frequently as "Industrial Manager". These are the only two other positions listed which, on the basis of training and responsibility, one would have thought comparable to the clergy, and each is considered of more "value" than the minister by secondary school pupils.

Gallup's respondents in England, by contrast, gave a slight edge to ministers over doctors as the person with the greatest influence for good, 31% naming ministers and 32% naming doctors. Perhaps the different phrasing is partly responsible for the contrasts or perhaps the difference in perspective between the two generations is the main factor.

If the latter possibility is valid, it persuasively argues that the church is losing her potential adherants of the years ahead.

We turn now from a consideration of attitudes to ministers as persons and as typifying a certain type of individual, to consideration of their relationship to people. Two related questions - one direct, one a "proposition" - prove quite revealing. The first, "Who would you think most ministers are closest to, most friendly with?" elicited a large array of answers which especially emphasise "closeness" to members of the church congregation.
TABLE VII - 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregation</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old, infirm</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (Professionals, wealthy, etc.)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workers most often assert that ministers are closest to those higher up the social ladder (row five) but also most often declare them closest to their congregations in general. Since workers are not, on the whole, within the church, but are aware (as we shall see) that middle class persons frequently are, it may be concluded from these two sorts of answers that workers view ministers as not close to themselves. Tom Allan, a famous Scottish minister, asserts this "distance" between ministers and working class, from the "other side", and the side of the minister: "While I find it comparatively easy to mix with the professional and middle class people of my parish and speak to them of the Faith, I find it expressly hard to establish the same relationship among what are called the working classes, although I was brought up in a working class home .... We are strangers to our own people".  

1. Allan, op. cit., p. 106.
Michonneau, in France, speaks of priests being ensconced in a separate culture, surrounded by those who understand the particular forms of thought and speech; not really like the parishioners but more middle class than anything else. In a similar vein, Gustafson says "A ... factor that frequently determines what the minister does, more than he is aware of, is the class ideology of his community. In very subtle ways the minister tends to assume not only the external habits, but also the values that are prevalent in his community, particularly if his congregations tend to be single-class in character."2

Unchurched workers most often described ministers as closest to higher status persons; several typify the disapprobation of such remarks:

Sometimes they're out for rich people; try to get on the right side of these people.

I think it's the middle class more than anything. I don't think they have much time for the ordinary working class people.

Some are closer to the better class. This is not so with our minister; everybody's the same with him.

People with money. When a working man goes into church, it's 'cheerio'; if I drove in with a Rolls Royce, they'd meet me and show me to the front seat.

Someone who's buttering them up - just a lot of nonsense; there wouldn't be any ministers if they didn't get a free house.

Another point of interest from TABLE VII - 23 is that those groups who have the highest rates of church involvement (Borderline and middle class) tend often to specify that ministers are closest to church leaders rather than simply the congregation. Only one worker makes this distinction, which could be taken as a further indication of the general remoteness of workers from the church. In all, 54% of the sample opined that ministers are closest to members or leaders in their church congregations. Often, such statements were not motivated by a favourable attitude, as the comments of these two men illustrate.

1. Ward, op. cit.,
("Dormant" mason)
Their own people; they ought to go out and look for sinners.

("Dormant" electrical fitting installer)
Their own church-goers, they don't seem to expand; they don't come to grips with everyday things in life.

Complimentary information is supplied by responses to the proposition: "Ministers are very closely in touch with people". Only borderline men expressed agreement in the majority of cases; working class and middle class men tend toward the negative somewhat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINISTERS ARE CLOSE TO PEOPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people, church members or leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be or unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Catholics, as a separate group, see their priests as "close to people" to a greater extent than do Protestants regarding their ministers, answering in the affirmative in nearly two-thirds of the cases. Regulars agree with the proposition twice as frequently as Dormants, indicating that the perception of "closeness" between ministers and people increases with rates of church attendance. In general, however, the fact that only one-third of the respondents make a clear-cut affirmation of the statement adds substantiation to the impression that people largely believe ministers to be "distant" and out of touch. But with respect to the major class division (working and middle class) differences are minimal.
Though we found no torrent of attack on the church herself, ministers have been the recipients of such a volley. When Taylor refers to the "aloofness of the professional clergy from the life and work of ordinary people",1 he puts his finger on a perspective shared by many of all social levels in this survey. A large portion of men have raised questions about the effectiveness, motives and interpersonal relationships of clergymen.

2. Church-goers.

In several ways I tried to bring forth from the respondents the views that abound concerning church-goers in order to discover what sort of stereotype is attached to the type of person so identified. To begin with a major distinction, interviewees were asked, "Do you think that people who go to the church regularly are mainly working class or middle class, or what?" Since "middle class" replies predominated to a great extent, this category is further sub-divided to bring to light some of the explanations incorporated in the replies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even or unsure</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pretention (e.g., &quot;done thing&quot;)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working class absent</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no explanation</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three fifths of the sample declare that church-goers are mainly middle class while less than one fifth say they are mainly working class. The most salient class variations in response are found in the reasons for answering "middle class". Workers tend not to give an explanation; borderline men note the absence of workers from the church, and interestingly, middle class men tend to impugn the motives of middle class church-goers by saying that their behaviour is insincere or pretentious. They malign the motives of middle class church involvement with such epithets as "It's a show", "put on", "phoney", etc.

The "workers don't go" type of explanations are typified in these excerpts from the interviews.

("Dormant" labourer)
Middle class and upper class. The working class has more of a struggle to live — no time to think about church and that. The middle class have no worries, they just go to church, like.

("Regular" technician)
Middle class. The working man probably feels it's soft; he doesn't need it. He gets on okay, slogging away, getting ten 'quid' a week; and he may work on Sunday.

("Marginal" linotype apprentice)
Middle. Working class go out and drink Saturday night, sleep in Sunday morning — the Corporation housing scheme type.

("Regular" dispensing chemist)
Definitely middle. In the depression era workers got out of the pattern — hadn't good clothes and too proud to go. They haven't gone back, and have more distractions now.

("Regular" postal worker)
Working class have the wrong idea — that they're as well carrying on without going to church. I've heard it said hundreds of times, 'I'm just as good as him and he goes to church'.

Several men illustrate the disparagement of middle class motives in church going.

("Dormant" publican)
Middle. Pomp, to give folk an impression.

("Regular" inspector)
Middle class in general. They're better educated to understand. Often it's socially the thing to do — to go to church — though they haven't an idea what's going on. It's a different thing to go to church and to be a Christian.
Middle class. They principally handle the government of the Church. The Kirk Session are all middle class; they’re fighting for position.

Middle class are the best church-goers. They are striving to retain respectability in the eyes of the community; lower classes just don’t care.

Middle class. They take it more to heart — not the church itself — but they like to be seen there, like it known that they go there.

Our church is definitely more middle class, but I wouldn’t say they’re all Christians. It’s more the ‘done thing’, fixed into the pattern of life.

Quite obviously, there is by no means unanimous opinion that church-going proceeds from meritorious motives, or that those who go to church are thus made better people. Highet claims that many Scottish persons give as a reason for their church abstention, "Look what these church folk are like; can you blame us?..." It is commonly said by non-church folk (and about themselves, by some Christians) that the members of Scotland’s churches today are just as fond of material possessions, of flaunting observable insignia of social class and social status, as are non-Christians "

The same rather extensive array of deprecations appear in answer to the projection, "The people who go to church regularly ..." Not all reactions are negative, of course, as the table portrays, but a significant proportion are.

1. Highet, (Scottish Churches) op. cit., p.166.
Only about one-third, overall, definitely extol the persons who regularly attend church (first two rows). Again, middle class men are found to be more critical than workers, despite their higher rate of church attendance. Indeed, Regular and Marginal church-goers contribute a higher proportion of derogations than Dormants (38%, 53% and 26%, respectively). Apparently those closest to the church have the most suspicion about the motives and benefits of church involvement.

The closely related propositions, "Not all people who go to church are necessarily religious; and some people who do not go to church may be religious" engendered overwhelming agreement, only six persons taking exception to the statement. Church going seems to be taken lightly by most people whether or not they personally engage in the practice. A non-attender tersely replied that church-goers are "harmless". Some of the uncomplimentary attitudes are expressed in these remarks.

1. The Catholic proportion exceeds this considerably, with about one-half of their replies indicating approbation.
2. It is interesting to recall that, earlier in the chapter, 86% of the regular church-goers gave as the reasons for their own attendance either "spiritual" motives or desire for self-improvement.
("Marginal" technical worker)
  Often hypocritical. Reserve Christianity for four walls of a building; once outside they shed it like an overcoat.

("Marginal" warehouse worker)
  There's more business done there than anywhere; people use the church to set up jobs and the like. After coming out they get together in little groups - that's business.

("Regular" plumbing foreman)
  I've been a far better man with no church connections than most men in the church.

("Dormant" engineer)
  Some go because they've got to; some for the sake of a red face.

Further evidence that most people do not see church attendance as a means to a better life is found in answers to the question, "Do you think there is any noticeable difference between those who go to church and those who do not?" This was actually a follow-up question given only to those who answered affirmatively in regard to having personal acquaintances who were church-goers (discussed in chapter VI); thus, with the elimination of those who said "no" to the preliminary question, and the fact that this query was unfortunately overlooked rather often, there are fewer respondents included in the table than usual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over 70% of the men included in the table reported noticing either no difference or a negative difference in church-goers vis a vis other people. On this measure, "Regulars" were much more disposed to declare "favourable" differences in church goers, nearly one-half of them answering in this way; virtually no Marginals or Dormants replied in the same way. Apparently only those with a similar church-going orientation claim to discern the salutary effects of this practice, or perhaps they feel obligated to declare such a difference. At any rate, those outside the church overwhelmingly assert that church-goers are not particularly different than others.

Gallup found in England that only 13% of the members of the Church of England thought that church-goers lead a better life; non-conformists had a figure of 24%; Roman Catholics 33%. Observations made by Thompson in Birmingham parishes point to the same undistinctiveness of church people: "There was little apparent awareness on the part of the congregation of any difference in practice between the values and behaviour of those outside the church and those inside". And again, "The values of church members are, for the most part, drawn from the other secular groups in which they have membership. In general, this means that the ways of correct behaviour and values are one or other of the species of middle class values, exalted by their association with the church".

A final question very indirectly reveals attitudes, not only about church goers, but also about church-going itself. Though it was stated hypothetically, this query was obviously answerable from personal experience for many: "Do you think there might be some men who may go to church sometimes but wouldn't want other men to know this?"

1. Social Surveys, op. cit., p.54.
2. Thompson, op. cit. 37.
3. ibid, p.84.
Table VII - 28 contains three varieties of affirmative answers: those stressing embarrassment, self-consciousness, shyness, etc., as motivation for such reticence (row one); unelaborated "yes" answers (row two); and equivocal affirmations - "perhaps", "might be some", etc. (row three).

TABLE VII - 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHURCH-GOERS MIGHT NOT WANT IT KNOWN?</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, self-conscious</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, no explanation</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibly, unsure</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, know none, etc.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only within the middle class group do a majority doubt the existence of such clandestine church attendance; only one-third of the working class and borderline men deny the possibility. This contrast may carry important implications. It was previously noted, when examining church background (chapter VI), that working class men seem to be especially under the influence of their work and social comrades as regards religious matters. That two-thirds should suggest that men might be unwilling to disclose the fact of going to church, largely because of the social consequences feared, is certainly supportive of such a hypothesis. It also introduces a postulate which I will further elaborate in chapter X: namely, that middle class men live a more compartmentalised existence than working class men; that middle class male milieux are more variegated in overt behaviour and permit
male religious roles alongside of other social roles with minimal conflict. Working class milieux, on the other hand, especially the work milieu, tend to be unsympathetic to religious roles, however distinct from the work and social situation they may be.

Along with self-conscious embarrassment in facing these at work who may be apt to ridicule -- or at least are feared because of this possibility -- there is another apparent feeling which tends to produce a "tight-lipped" approach to church attendance, namely, a sense that if one is known to go to church, he is put on a pedestal and scrutinised to see if his behaviour conforms to what is expected of a "religious" person. There is an uncomfortable sense of being "on trial" before the sceptical work associated who apply extra-stringent standards to the church-goer and are very willing to conclude, "Ha, he's no different from the rest of us". Such a feeling is illustrated by two regular church-goers, both in non-manual positions.

Yes, that's the trouble with men in Scotland; men don't want it to be known. They think they have to be real good all the time or people will say they are hypocrites.

That's quite possible. I find that people who know I go to church are always 'taking the mickey' a bit. I'm an ordinary block with them -- probably drink and swear and tell jokes as much as the rest -- and some may say, 'what a cheek', he goes to church'. So some people may not let others know because they may think they're hypocrites.

Many more men describe the feeling of social ostracism and pressure which both militates against revealing a practice of church attendance and initiating the practice in the first place. Several excerpts typify this mood.

("Dormant" engineer)

Yes, I have found this on occasion; some men are afraid of being scoffed at, called goody-goody, and holy-holy, etc.

("Regular" book binder)

Yes, that's right, sort of ashamed. Some would go if they know no one was watching.
("Dormant" publican)  
Yes, definitely. They're frightened they're made to look stupid.  
Some folk belittle people who go to church.

("Regular" inspector)  
Yes, a lot; I've been guilty of that myself. They sort of look at you as if you're queer - 'He goes to church; there must be something wrong with him'.

Before leaving the discussion of church-goers - and the attitudes they evoke - as representatives of the church, a parenthetical point calls for brief mention. The impression has emerged quite decidedly from this section as well as from questions regarding the church-going of acquaintances in the previous chapter, that extremely few of the respondents' close personal relationships either were initiated within the church or have the church "fellowship" as a major context of interaction. It appears that few of those who go to church develop close personal ties with other members of the congregation. Nor does there appear to be a feeling that church members ought to draw their friends into the corporate church body.

Church-going is taken to be an individual option, a personal custom or performance, with few ramifications for personal friendships. Needless-to-say there are exceptions to this impression, and it is probably true that church women more commonly than men involve themselves in vigorous groups connected with the church. But even when within-church ties are formed, these seem to seldom carry into social contacts outside the church. Thompson notes a similar pattern in Birmingham: "Relatively few church members were on mutual visiting terms with other members". ¹ It is of interest to contrast this non-intimate tone with the report that Winter makes of an American study which sampled new church members in Pittsburgh. It was found that the majority of these new "recruits" had initially entered the church through contact with persons already members. ² Conversely, in some very vigorous churches, mutual membership is the basis of friendships which

¹. Thompson, op. cit.  
extend far beyond the walls of the church. In our case though this information was not specifically called for in the interviews, it is unmistakeably clear that such church-based friendships, or friendship based church memberships, are almost totally absent. In short, this reiterates my earlier conclusion that the church tends currently to operate mainly as an "associational" organisation rather than a "communal", corporate body.

3. Church Programme.

A final manifestation of the church which elicits a revealing commentary on the prevailing attitudes toward the church is what I refer to as her "programme", consisting of church services and other church-related activities. With the question - "What would you say in general are your impressions of church services" - I probed the feelings about church services specifically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPRESSIONS OF CHURCH SERVICES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(general) good, fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(specific) peaceful, enjoy music, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;some good - some bad&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative (e.g. &quot;drab&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for the fact that Borderline respondents tend more toward the positive side in their impressions of church services, the class categories are remarkably similar in distributing their replies. Actually the proportions of approbation (first two rows) in the working class and middle class groups are boosted by the
minority of Catholic men, who declare favourable impressions in four-fifths of the cases. If Catholics are removed from the table, working class proportion of complimentary reactions reduces from 56% to 25%, middle class from 37% to 26%. Thus for Protestants alone, in the two main class categories, the impressions are, on the whole, not particularly favourable. And although regular attenders are less critical, they also evidence appreciable dissatisfaction. For the "drab", "negative" column the scores are, by church involvement categories: Regulars - 38%, Marginals - 53%, Dormants - 47%. As usual, middle class Dormants are the most critical, with 58% of their responses falling in the negative column.

In the Edinburgh secondary schools survey, pupils were asked to rank the same six activities discussed earlier (in terms of importance), the second time "according to how interesting they are". It will be recalled that the list of activities was comprised of: "Watching an interesting T.V. programme", "learning about something new", "helping to make something", "taking part in a favourite sport", "going to church" and "reading a good book". One activity fared by far the poorest in the ranking - "going to church". Catholic school pupils ranked this alternative first in 14% of the cases, sixth (last) in 40% of the cases. To the pupils of the other five schools, "going to church" seemed even less enjoyable. Only 4% ranked this choice first, 61% ranked it sixth, with very little difference between the various schools. The pupils did not attribute to "going to church" too much importance; but it is certain that they think it an uninteresting experience.

Returning to our Prestonfield respondents, those who expressed favourable impressions of church services often referred to the personal feelings created in the atmosphere of church. A Regular plumbing foreman said,

There's a different feeling in church; you feel more humble and contrite. It may be a throwback to my childhood days, I don't know.

A very small minority made a point of extolling the effect of the sermons. For
instance, a Regular young executive replied,

No matter what it's about the sermon seems to speak deeply
to me, whenupon I shake in my boots. I'm very impressed with
most services.

Many of the negative answers indicated a serious breakdown in communication,
as if a great gorge separates the pulpit from the pew. Though the object of his
remark is the Church of England, Earle has captured the impression I often
received from the men in our sample: "Why are most of the churches in this
country so lacking in appeal to the man-in-the-street, so cold in their approach
to him that he is nervous even of entering their buildings? Stylised worship
might account for his absence from services ... The teaching of the Established
Church, its social life (where it exists), and its discipline seem to answer almost
no need of the twentieth-century citizen who doesn't happen to have grown up in it".

Several of the respondents echo this reaction.

("Marginal" garage attendant)
Very drear; there's no hold over the congregation. The same theme
is repeated over and over; it just rambles on.

("Regular" civil servant)
Need more practical application to everyday situations. Sometimes
I have the funny feeling that we're getting a lecture for the sake
of other ministers in the audience. He should give everyday examples.
Usually I come out thinking a bit, but by the end of the day have
forgotten what it's all about.

("Dormant" engineer)
I know I'm going to hear the same services as twenty years ago and
I'm never disappointed.

("Dormant" engineer)
Some sermons are dull. Our minister preaches far above you; I
can't understand what he's talking about.

("Marginal" railway worker)

The sermons are long, drawn out, and it's the same week by week.
He's looking at a book, not addressing the congregation; it's a weekly habit. You know what you're going to hear; you're never disappointed.
We had an exchange minister for a summer and what a difference! He put life into his sermons. You forgot you were in church. He had everyone looking and wanting more. But why don't they draw you to the Church. There's nothing to bring me to church. And they should stay away from this sing-song as if we're all doomed. It it's a nice day no body bothers.

Compatible with the previous result is the finding that most men in our sample agree with the proposition that "The Church is too formal".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE CHURCH IS TOO FORMAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree or unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yinger says that for religion to remain vital, "There is constant need for shuffling off of accidental and outworn religious beliefs and practices - the traditional elements - in order that the intrinsic elements may flourish". If the attitudes of a majority of this sample are typical, it appears that the church may be suffering the consequences of a failure to "purge" and revamp her services.

On this measure, as on many other, class groups are approximately in agreement.

If many are dis-satisfied with the church as she is, and critical of her present operation, then what changes would they suggest to eliminate the deficiencies?

In order to determine the answers to this question, two queries were included in the

survey. These were: "Do you think there are any changes which the church might make in order to be more attractive to people? (If so, what?); and, "In some places ministers are meeting with small groups of people in homes so that they can discuss life and religion together in an informal way; what do you think of that idea?" Taking the latter, more specific item first, the results appear in Table VII - 31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHURCH PEOPLE MEETING IN INFORMAL GROUPS</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definite support</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserved approval (e.g. &quot;good for some&quot;)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, there is quite uniform commendation for this idea. The effect of this affirmation - and indeed, on the whole, the idea met with enthusiasm - of the suggestion for a "down-to-earth", informal, intimate forum of discussion about religious matters, is to reinforce the earlier conclusion that many persons detect a lack of provision of communal values in the church today. Many of the answers laid stress on the fact that this more intimate context of interaction would allow members of the congregation to "get to know each other".

It seems that only a small minority of the church's membership are deeply engrossed in her operation. Yinger has pointed out that the church is unlike some other organisations which operate efficiently with the active participation of a
small core of individuals: "This is not true of religious organisations: to accomplish their goals ordinarily required the active co-operation of the whole range of membership".\textsuperscript{1} Smith points out that there needs to be a thorough examination of the "group" with regard to religious organisations.\textsuperscript{2} From a study in a small town Mormon church in America, Photiadis concluded that, "Today's churches, besides initiating the system of ritual-belief, initiate an additional system - that of interaction or participation and attachment to the church group. This would, in turn, suggest that the introduction of secular activities into the American churches could have contributed considerably to their success and survival."\textsuperscript{3}

Since we have found that class variation in church participation is not associated with notable variation in adherence to certain doctrinal beliefs nor with notable class variation in attitudes to ministers or church goers, there is reason to suggest that the attraction of the church (or lack of attraction) as a "group", as a corporate framework, may be a crucial determinant. Pickering concluded from his study in England, "People's movements both toward and away from the church are largely associated with movements of non-rational, non-theological kind".\textsuperscript{4} In chapter X, I will further elaborate the hypothesis that a conflict exists between the middle class-oriented, associational, character of the church, and working class disposition for informal, communal, milieu.

Closely related to the above interpretation is the fact that a number of respondents commented that small discussion groups would be beneficial in bringing the teachings of the church down to a more practical level. In reference to American religion, but with applicability to our own concern, is a passage by Glock

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1. ibid, p.178.
  \item 2. William C. Smith, "The group and the Church", \textit{Sociology and Social Research} 1957, pp.349-353.
  \item 4. Pickering, op. cit.
\end{itemize}
and Stark concerning the church's effectiveness in inculcating norms and values: "they are major themes of much that is talked and written about. But the level of abstraction at which the topic pursued has the consequence of leaving to other sources the final say in determining everyday norms and values". 1

Finally, taking up the "open-ended" suggestions for changes within the church, we find a most interesting variety of responses, which serves to underscore points which have already been made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VII - 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUGGESTED CHANGES TO MAKE CHURCH MORE ATTRACTIVE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As is, change impossible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sermons or doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brighter, livelier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social activities, closer contact of ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should change (not the church)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About two-thirds of the respondents feel the church would be well advised to make some alterations, but there is a vast array of solutions offered. The middle class profile of replies stands in relief in that over one-half (54%) of these men discern no need of change within the church herself (rows one and five). Only about one-fifth of the workers express this point of view, thus providing a major class contrast which corresponds to the differential incidence of church participa-

This finding may be further adduced as evidence that the rather austere and formalised mood of the church's programme is uncongenial to working class persons; 60% of the working class respondents suggest that a brighter, livelier, more communal or more intimate atmosphere within the church would enhance her "attractiveness". Borderline men too, clamour for a more socially-oriented mode of operation.

These results suggest the cultural estrangement of working class persons from the formal and liturgical processes of worship prevalent in the church. For the less compartmentalised, less culturally variegated existence (and narrower frame of reference) of working class men, the forms and format of the church seem to be particularly uninviting. Similarly in France (where the gulf is even wider than in Britain) Pin concludes, that "A gulf is opened between the proletariat and urban Catholicism primarily through the agency of words, of gestures, of attitudes and of cultural dimensions, customs and modes of feeling". Church services are conducted, essentially, in the formalised language style familiar to the middle classes - with the added complication of an esoteric theological terminology. That the communication which proceeds from the pulpit is bewildering or merely "dull" to the working class man oftentimes is consistent with Bernstein's formulations (reviewed in chapter V) concerning linguistic barriers in education. A few working class and borderline respondents epitomise these feelings:

Make it gayer; the melancholy service is too old-fashioned. It should be more like Negroes who enjoy their religion.

Ministers should come out in the open and speak of something besides Jesus Christ and St. Paul and the Gospel and all that. If they'd speak about the common life and the world - maybe a story - I think it would be far better.

More audience participation. Open pulpits to laymen. It might show how much the minister knows, and it would bring fresh air into the services. The minister, like all professional people, gets stale, gives forth with the time-honoured message to all and sundry.

Singing is difficult. They give you hymns you don't know and you try to chime in with all these dreary voices, and it's no good.

1. Pin, in Schneider, op. cit., p. 417.
In this chapter a number of "attitudinal" dimensions of church "attachment" have been explored: explanations for religious behaviour, doctrinal positions, moral convictions, views of the church's value and effectiveness in general, and more concrete views on ministers, church-goers and the church "programme" as major representations of the church. What has emerged from this exploration is a large degree of similarity in attitudes between the class groupings and a few salient class contrasts which provide clues to the interpretation of differential class participation in the church.

Overall, we have discovered that there is a much higher degree of commitment to the church - and to religion in general - in the abstract than in attitudes toward the conspicuous manifestations of the church (ministers, church-goers, church services). Religion received respectful deference with regard to its general "value" and in terms of minimal doctrinal commitments. Few are anti-church or anti-religion on an ideological plane. In-so-far as the church and her ideological system represent the general value system (and moral norms) of society - a sort of social norm writ large, or writ in religious symbols - she is the recipient of the expressed commitment and reverence of the large majority. But when particular expressions of the church are brought before the bar of opinion, only a minority come forth with similar eulogisms. This curious separation between abstract appraisal of the church and attitudes directly pertinent to the institutional operation of the church seems to me a significantly revealing commentary on the position of the church in contemporant society. In concrete terms, the majority of all classes feel that the church is less inviting and less inspiring than it ought to be; and most feel that constructive changes could be initiated. In particular, services could be enlived, the church could be more outgoing in overtures to people, and above all, she could provide a social base of fellowship.
The clues to differential class participation in the church which emerge can be summarised in three statements. First, working class abstention may be a consequence of a "communal void" in the church and the uncongenial formalised atmosphere. Second, within working class occupational and social milieux, strong pressures militate against church-going; the male working class role-system seems to be bound up with values unfavourable to overt religious practice. Third, it is plausible that many workers are repelled by the general perception that the church is middle class oriented and middle class dominated.

Despite these important clues, it seems to me that differences in church "attachment" have not conclusively accounted for the very large class differences in church participation. Therefore, in Part IV of the thesis, the clues will be taken up further. In chapter IX the middle class nature of the church will be explored, using as source material the Church Leaders survey. In chapter X, among other topics, I will discuss the consequences of contrasts in disposition to the church inherent in the "character" of the different classes. In addition a sketch of some of the historical forces which contributed to the present church-class configuration (chapter VIII) will give added "depth" to the interpretation of this phenomenon.
PART FOUR: INTERPRETATIONS

CHAPTER VIII - HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CHURCH-CLASS RELATIONSHIP

A. EXTENT OF WORKING CLASS ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE CHURCH.

B. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORCES AS CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES.
   1. Review of Economic and Political Setting.
   2. Disruption of Social Structure.
   3. Working Class "Alienation".

C. FAILURE OF THE CHURCH WITH URBAN PROLETARIAT.
   1. Inability to Adapt to Urban Situation.
   2. Ideological Bias.
   3. Middle Class Character.

D. EFFORTS OF THE CHURCH TO "RECLAIM" WORKERS.
   2. Evangelism.
   3. Pacification.
   4. Sectarianism.
   5. Summary of Church "Outreach".

E. CHURCH INVOLVEMENT IN LABOUR MOVEMENT.

F. SUMMARY.
Past eras tend to be remembered in stereotypes which emphasise qualities not so evident in the present. So it is that the Victorian era is remembered as a paragon age of moral probity, sobriety and religious faithfulness. But this picture has major flaws. Only the middle classes fit the description at all, and not altogether uniformly at that. In particular, the assumption of an equal intensity of religious feeling across class lines must be dispensed with immediately.

The vast working classes, swarming into the proletarian dungeons of the grand and degrading cities of Britain in this golden age of Capitalism, simply did not go to church. Great stone churches, which make a mockery of today's attendances, were built by the hundreds. But these were monuments to the satisfaction of the middle classes with their own virtues and to the conviction that God, Himself, was ushering in the age of machines which benefitted them so greatly. We shall see that the churches were not open doors of worship to the whole of the community.

Schneider has said that, "The entire phenomenon of working class alienation from the church has a historical background that should not be neglected, for its neglect could only impoverish sociological wisdom on the whole subject". For this reason, the present chapter is directed at the historical events of the 19th century which are of crucial importance in understanding the contemporary church-class relationship. And the "event" that stands out against all others is the overwhelming estrangement of the working classes from the church in the new and difficult urban environment. To understand the class fissure of today's church it is absolutely prerequisite to appreciate some of the historical forces impinging upon the church and upon the various sections of the community in the early period of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation.

In fact, it is convenient for explanatory purposes - though perhaps somewhat arbitrary - to distinguish between these two momentous movements - (urbanisation

---

and industrialisation) which radically rearranged the whole structure of life. Both undoubtedly contributed to the class division in relationship to the church in the 19th century. Urbanisation had the consequence of disrupting the old and stable pattern of rural life. This meant a morphological and normative transition of such magnitude that it recast the whole structure of social relations, creating a new density of persons, a new impersonality in economic behaviour and new forms of social solidarity in the cities. The church was very much a part of the old order - indeed, she was its cornerstone - providing the structure of norms, the symbols of meaning and unity and one of the primary instruments of social control. We will see that, although the church was allied to the middle classes in the cities and enjoyed their relatively strong commitment, she was no longer the key-stone of the whole social arch, no longer the glue of a well-boundaried social order, and for the working classes in the cities - the "masses" - she was largely outside the realm of day-to-day existence.

But not only in the massive migration to the cities do we find a key to working class absence from the church. It is true that, in a sense, the urban wage-labourers left the church behind in the villages and fields of a former way of life. It is also true that the new economic order based upon the factory system, capital accumulation and the other accoutrements of industrialisation, resulted in a deep social class division. The religious fissure can be viewed as one expression of the wider cleavage between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat emerging in the new urban context. This deep cleavage marked a departure from the close spatial proximity of the classes - however distinct they were in power and privilege - in pre-industrial society. The rigid social separation bore its fruit, not only in distinct residential districts and, in Marxian terminology, distinctly different relationship to the means of production, but also in the loss
of the church's claim to be the heritage of the whole community, and in a growing callousness to human misery, which was mainly - and for the first time - out of the immediate view of those who could do something about it.

In taking account of the impact of both the disruption of the social structure in which the church was anchored (urbanisation) and of the new economic configuration with its strenuous distinction between capitalists and wage-labourers (capitalistic industrialisation), it is obvious that I am drawing upon the familiar theoretical formulations of several of the "founding fathers" of Sociology, especially of Durkheim and Marx. Indeed, not only these "authorities" but Toennies and Weber as well can be interpreted as providing theoretical guidelines for the historical explanations here ventured in summary form. It is not my intention to engage in a polemical effort aimed at vindicating the formulations of one or the other of these major theorists, but rather to use pragmatically and eclectically the insights of each which are relevant to the narrow purpose of the chapter at various points.

Durkheim's classical suggestions include the notion that religion is the symbol of group solidarity, the hallowed manifestation of the norms and values of the society itself. But with the "dynamic density" of population increase and compactness, and the resultant transition from "mechanical solidarity" - based on likeness and commonality - to "organic solidarity" - based on differentiation of function and interdependence - the centrality of religion recedes. This formulation has application to the break-up of the church-dominated rural social structure, the normative disruption caused by migrations to the city, and the supplanting of religious norms and solidarity with new forms stemming from economic forces and spatial proximity. Likewise, Toennies distinction between "Gemeinschaft" (community) relationships - prevalent in rural cultures - and "gesellschaft"

(associational) relationships - predominating in urban cultures,\(^1\) and the ramifications of the transition from one to the other, is reflected in the massive scale of urbanisation in this period.

Marx, of course, lays great stress on the open or latent conflict between capitalists and Proletariat in the industrial scheme, and on the subservience of ideology to the material interests of the classes.\(^2\) There is ample evidence that the class divisions of the 19th century were reflected in the various institutions of society, including religious institutions. And it is clear that working class gravitation to economic instruments for improvement (e.g. trade unions) and movement away from a middle class coloured church, was impelled to a large extent by the sharing of economic deprivations. On the other side, the middle class alliance with the church, the religious sanctification of extreme individualism and enormous disparities in wealth, the impugning of moral ineptitude and unworthiness to the poverty-stricken - all of this closely relates to Weber's descriptions of the Calvinistic ethic of "worldly asceticism" which in its later stages saw pursuit of wealth as a divine calling.\(^3\)

In limiting the historical inquiry to the crucial phenomenon of working class estrangement from the church, it is necessary to ignore many other important features of the 19th century socio-religious configuration. I will only incidentally deal with the very large subject of middle class religion in this period, e.g., the reasons why the church was able to occupy an important compartment in the lives of

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1. Ferdinand Toennies, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft)*, (New York: The American Book Company, 1940)
the "well-to-do" while she was virtually excluded from working class life. The internal changes in the church and vicissitudes of her "fortunes" in general, likewise, will be mentioned only in passing, though these are noteworthy. For instance, particular schisms and denominational alterations through this period undoubtedly played a role in shaping the legacy of today's church.¹ There is evidence of a strong resurgence of church attendance and church building in the later decades of the nineteenth century.² Since the turn of the century, and especially since the Great War, there has been a general decline in religious observance, with the middle classes and the rural sections of the community to some extent following belatedly in the train of the urban Proletariat.³

But these trends and internal religious "events", while of some relevance, would expand the scope of this analysis beyond the restricted focus I have set. Indeed, the whole amalgam of forces - social, economic, political, and religious - were so complex in this period of history, and have been so thoroughly elucidated by various authors, that there are numerous opportunities for being diverted into fascinating side-issues. Thus the narrowness of the analysis is self-imposed.

Nor is there claimed any kind of finality or comprehensiveness to the suggested interpretations which follows.

My strategy is to provide - as one fundamental level of explanation for the present church-class relationship - a provisional outline of some of the forces contributing to the conclusive loss of the working classes to the church in the previous century. Establishing the fact that present generations of working

³. E.R. Wickham, Church and People in an Industrial City, (London, SCM Press, 1961) 166, 171, 212. Wickham has produced evidence for this common observation.
people have inherited a cultural tradition in which the church was at best marginal is probably a sufficient goal for the chapter in light of the contemporary focus on the thesis as a whole. The effort to describe, not only the outlines of this widely known abstention of urban working classes from formal religion, but the dynamics producing this phenomenon as well, derives from a desire to make more complete and satisfactory the provisional interpretive system of the thesis.

We shall see, as I've already suggested, that the factors contributing to the religious estrangement of the working classes were rooted in several soils: the disruption of the structure of life in which the church was anchored due to massive migrations and rapid social change; the economic division by classes deriving from capitalistic industrialisation and the reflection of this division in the church; the conditions of life of the "masses" in overcrowded homes and oppressive factories which fragmented the family and led to new forms of protest and solidarity; and the ideological perspectives of the church which were largely absorbed from the ascendant urban classes and militated against making effective overtures to the working classes.

In the first section I will present a limited amount of evidence simply to verify the assertion that the urban working classes were extensively outside of the pale of institutional religion in the 19th century. Sections (B) and (C) will undertake an examination of some of the causes of this estrangement - one from the side of the economic and social forces, and the other from the side of the church, taking note of her failure to engage the commitment of workers in the cities. Section (D) will point out some of the efforts of the church to "reclaim" the working classes and the very limited successes of these efforts, and Section (E) will look at the church's equivocal involvement in the labour movement.

A. EXTENT OF WORKING CLASS ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE CHURCH

The common assumption that working class religious disinterest is a product of the 20th century is patently inaccurate. As T. Ralph Morton says, "We often
say that in recent years the working man of Scotland has given up the church. It would be far more true to say that he had never been in it". 1 Inglis, referring to the same assumption of a uniform religious fervour in Victorian England, refutes the idea by saying that,

The authors of such hypotheses do not realise that in the case of the working classes, any recent decline in attendance at worship has only accentuated a pattern that was clear long before 1900. In the modern urban environment, the act of worship did not become customary among most working class people. 2

Though writers throughout the 19th century showed some awareness of working class religious alienation, and middle class church dominance, by the turn of the century churchmen were forced to acknowledge the apparently irretrievable loss to the Church of the lower status groups. By this stage, it appeared that the church was faced with a fixed and intractable pattern of working class abstention from worship. No longer could it be viewed, as it was naively viewed by some throughout the century, as a temporary symptom of social unrest, easily amenable to energetic overtures by the church. In 1893, Macleod writes that,

There is in every city and town in this country whole sections of the community, embracing a large proportion of the labouring classes as well as the very poor, to whom it would make little practical difference were we tomorrow to close every church in the land. It would also be no exaggeration were the words 'Social Inequality' written over the doors of the vast majority of our Protestant churches, so exclusively do they seem to be reserved for people who are 'better off', or those who can appear there in 'Sunday clothes'. 3

In 1910 a Labour Party Member of Parliament and influential participant in the Christian Socialist movement, Arthur Henderson, said simply, "we have to admit there is an estrangement ... between a great percentage of the masses of the people and organised Christianity". 4 Wickham announces as one of the major conclusions of his study in Sheffield, but pertaining to the whole of Britain, "From the emer-
gence of the industrial town in the eighteenth century, the working class, the labouring poor, the common people, as a class, substantially, as adults, have been outside the churches. The industrial working class culture pattern has evolved lacking a tradition of the practice of religion". 1 He also uses the terms, "alienation", "gulf between the churches and the common people", and "general estrangement", in describing this phenomenon. 2 Haw wrote in 1906, "the great mass .... remain either antagonistic to modern religious teaching or indifferent to it". And further, "Modern Christianity is no doubt a trump card in the hands of the wealthy classes". 3

It should not be thought that the excluded inner-city "masses" were anti-religion or opposed to Christian teachings. Few adopted outright agnostic or atheistic systems of thought. Indeed, there was general retention of nebulous beliefs in the basic tenets of the Christian faith, at least as far as there was knowledge of these. Lansbury wrote during the First World War, "The people are not, and never have been, actively hostile to religion, but the organisations for the spread of religion have failed, and are still failing, to get any sort of hold on the common people, who do not oppose or accept religion, but remain completely indifferent". 4 Campbell makes a similar appraisal in 1912, "The ordinary working man is not hostile to Christianity; he just lets it alone, because it seems to have nothing to do with his life". 5 The working classes were simply committed to an unconscious secularism; they were not iconoclastic about religion itself, but they found the particular forms of religion represented by the churches unpalatable, without practical value, and peripheral to the urban way of life.

2. ibid, p.p. 85, 105.
James Johnston and Robert Milne both attempted to describe statistically the absence of working class people from the churches during the mid-Victorian age, using contemporary church records and limited surveys. They concur in the conclusion that about one-third of the population of Scottish cities never attended church services taking for granted, that the abstainers are working class people. Huntington quotes a fellow churchman who had worked among people in two poor districts of an English city on behalf of the Church of England; the churchman exclaimed with consternation that among over seven hundred families contacted, not one person would even promise to attend a church service. Wickham cites a Sheffield "enquiry" in the 1840's which indicated that less than one in twenty working class families was in the practice of attending either a church or a chapel.

It therefore appears conclusive that the social and religious forces of the nineteenth century combined to produce a thorough-going disinclination of working classes, toward church participation. Abstention from the church was near complete. By the end of the century it had become clear to even the most "missionary minded" of the middle class church people that the socio-economic cleavage between the classes was reflected in the patterns of class involvement in the church. And these lines of religious separation had hardened; the situation was visibly beyond easy amelioration. The sub-culture which had developed among the industrial proletariat in the crowded environment of factories and tenements, precluded involvement or interest in the church. The church, no longer in its leadership alone, but in virtually her entire composition, was a middle class church. All efforts to reverse the trend had come to naught.

2. Huntington, op. cit., p. 129.
This working class religious abstention was not confined to Scotland. It was equally evident in England, and, indeed, in all of the rapidly industrialising western societies. Similar social dynamics to these in Britain were operating in the cities of the United States, and we would, therefore, expect that the result was very much the same. This is precisely the case, as Herberg points out: "Between the Protestant church as it came to be constituted toward the end of the century and the urban, industrial masses, a gulf had arisen which was to grow wider with time."^1 Yinger cites the results of a questionnaire presented in the Workmen's Advocate in 1887. "In reply to the question, "How large a percentage of the artisan classes are regular attendants at any church?" the responses for Protestants varied between one half of one per cent and ten per cent ... In the main ranks of the church, the workingman was certainly not finding a place that suited him". So the Scottish workers' response to the church (or non-response) was a single instance of a wider phenomenon in nations undergoing the cataclysmic changes of rapid urbanisation.

B. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORCES AS CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES

1. Review of Economic and Political Setting.

Before taking up the linkage between social change, conditions of life and working class religious abstention, it seems worthwhile to give a very compressed review of some of the relevant economic and political features of the period. These features are actually very familiar: the amazingly urbanisation with vast hordes of families pouring in from the countryside to operate the machines of the new factories; the quickening pace of industrial expansion producing both wealth and pollution; the multiform efforts of the working classes to redress the inequalities and find for themselves a brighter place in the sun."^3

Regarding the pace of urbanisation, its staggering rapidity is demonstrated by the fact that Glasgow trebled in size between 1801 and 1831 (from 77,385 to 202,426). By 1851, Scotland's largest city had grown to 344,986, a nearly fivefold increase from the turn of the century. During the same half-century, Edinburgh burgeoned from 90,768 to 208,477, a mild increase compared with Glasgow, but in absolute terms, quite enormous for such a span of time. Aberdeen and Dundee both trebled their population in this same period. In part, the fires of urban expansion were fueled by an unprecedented population growth in the country as a whole. From 1801 to 1851 the population of Scotland increased from 1,608,000 to 2,888,742. Similarly in England and Wales, five million inhabitants were added between 1801 and 1831.

The conglomeration of workers in the cities and the development of instruments of protest and solidarity among these workers are also germane to the following analysis. The early trade unions with substantial leverage and strength came into being around 1830. A flurry of revolutionary movements followed, such as the Chartist agitation which failed to bring to political power the sub-bourgeois reaches of society. By mid-century workers had ceased to look longingly toward

2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Loc. cit.
6. W.H. Warwick, Labour in Scotland: A Short History of the Scottish Working Class Movement, (Scottish Secretariat, Dec. 31, 1949) p. 4. Several major organisations came into being around this time - for carpenters, masons, bricklayers, and cabinet-makers - as did the first efforts at joint organisation of workers in different industries.
7. ibid, p. 6; Cole, op. cit., Vol. 11, p.11.
the abandoned fields of the countryside and had reconciled themselves to the ineluctable permanence of their urban situation. In the words of Cole,

A new generation arose, born amid the smoke and noise and filth of the spreading factory towns, and accepting wage-labour at the machine as its appointed lot. The call of the fields had grown fainter; the clanking and puffing of the engines had deadened their ears. They had grown only too prepared to accept the new order as inevitable, and to make the best of it.¹

Though workers made vocal, and sometimes vandalic, demands for improvement, through most of the century they won only scanty and grudging ground. They were kicking against the pricks of inveterate refusal of employers to deal with combined workers' organisations. Government, too, refused to assert more than token responsibility for conditions inside or outside the factory. For instance, Johnston writes that in 1851,

Captain Kinaird, the Factory Inspector, whose fourteenth half-yearly report is almost ludicrous in its pro-capitalist bias, informed the government that 'the Trade Unions are a great social evil ... strikes for wages can never lead to any good, for though Masters may be made to listen to reason, they will never be found yielding to coercion'.²

Some improvement in the workers' lot was evident in the mid-Victorian years, 1850-1880. The fruits of prolonged industrial growth and economic well-being in the country trickled down to the workers. Commissions established by Parliament and local municipalities helped uncover some of the appalling facts of inner-urban deterioration, and thereby contributed in small measure to alleviation of the worst effects of overcrowding and undernourishment.³ Acts of Parliament reduced the working day and attenuated the servile suffering of women and children in the factories.⁴ But the improvements were relatively minor, and even these were to be

³ R.F. Wearmouth, Methodism and the Struggle of the Working Classes, 1850-1900, (Leister: Edgar Backus, 1054) Section I.
undermined by the "Great Depression" in the last two decades of the century, which
left many thousands out of work and in destitution.

It was at this time that doctrines of Socialism came into prominence. Working-
men now sought for more than inching improvements within the existing power struc-
ture, but for radical reconstruction of society along lines presaged by European
Socialists. The growing self-consciousness of workers led gradually to the
formation of the Labour party as the standard-bearer of their cause. Trade unions
gained momentum, won recognition and exerted increasing leverage in the economic
sphere. By the turn of the century, changes that were to lead eventually to
present economic and political arrangements had begun along a wide front: sub-
sidence of the dragooning tactics by employers, awakening of a general "social
consciousness", retreat from the extreme individualism of the 19th century, realisa-
tion of the need to protect the "underdog", and provision of greater social
balance. The supreme optimism of the Victorians was lashed into submission by
the holocaust of military conflict; and the death knell of "pure Capitalism" was
sounded by the inter-war economic collapse.

This brief, parenthetical, sketch draws us nearer to the present than is
required by the focus of the chapter. It is important to extract from this review
the fact that the cries of poverty from the industrial proletariat fell mainly on
deaf ears throughout the nineteenth century; their desires to rise above the
squalor of their oppressed factory and home conditions were for the most part
muffled. It is also cogent that the immense social change from the stability of
agrarian life to the insecurity, density and dependence of wage-labour in the
urban factories engendered new forms of solidarity and new values of existence.
Long before the fabric of social and economic life had settled into a relatively
stable pattern and the worst conditions produced by the new industrial order had
been ameliorated, a new normative structure had developed among the working classes which, in the main, excluded the overt practice of religion.

2. Disruption of Social Structure.

Although the class separation and antagonisms of the emerging urban environment will be seen as barricades against the resumption of church control over the lower echelons in the new structure - suggesting a Marxian framework - the initial disorientation toward the church on the part of the uprooted migrants was brought about by the shaking of the foundations of the traditional social order - suggesting a Durkheimian framework. Both of these perspectives are essential to our understanding. Structural disarray of the old order can be viewed as the prior cause (since movement from the old environment to the new typically preceded the impact of industrialised existence) although, of course, the processes were simultaneous and interwoven.

Taking an oversimplified look at the predominat rural social structure, we note a rather fixed institutional system, which had as its core the church. The presence of the church was ubiquitous; her enforcement of norms and dissemination of religious symbols was thoroughly effectual. She served an integrative function and provided the pervading philosophy of life for the whole community. The parochial system was genuinely compatible with the stability, unity and relative self-sufficiency of the basic geographical entities - rural townships with their surrounding farming areas. The ritual life of the church gave a context for the primary physical "coming together" of the whole community. She was also the main vehicle of humanitarian action, through which suffering was alleviated. The minister was - along with the Lord or Duke - the most auspicious and revered figure in the parish, exercising authorities which in practice went far beyond the spiritual sphere. Few questioned the authority or necessity of the church; religious practice was not so much an option to the individual as an essential, accepted facet
of community life.

In describing a rural "Borders" parish as it was constituted around the turn of the 20th century, Littlejohn illuminates the features of this type of social structure. Apparently, in this district, the traditional order remained in tact until this century, but now had undergone changes reducing the church to peripheral importance in the community. But in "Westrigg" in the borders of Scotland some 60 years or more ago,

only the very old and the sick did not appear in Church on Sunday, the rest walking up to six miles to attend. The social organisation of the parish was displayed in the seating arrangements in the main church ... most parishioners considered it an honour to be elected an elder. The minister was regarded with utmost respect and could rebuke persons for lapses of piety ... In the course of his duties he played an important part in integrating the parish ... The Sabbath was then truly a holy day during which taboos were laid upon many of the weekday profane activities, taboos which impressed the sacredness of the day upon all.

But the integration of this well defined network of social relationship was destined to change, and for many thousands it came to an end when the countryside disgorged large numbers of inhabitants to the early 19th century cities. Cole reports that the processes of economic change,

tore up by the roots old social relationships and institutions which had seemed to be firmly established. It destroyed the old life of the village, and created the problem of the factory town. And, last but not least, it created the modern wage-earning class - the proletariat which, nominally free, can live only by selling its labour for a wage.

It cannot be overemphasised that the web of the church's extensive power was firmly attached to the rural parochial system. Institutional religion was deeply interwoven into the fabric of the pre-industrial order. We will later take a closer look at the inability and indisposition of the church to adapt with sufficient alacrity to the new world of the industrial city. At this point, however, it is

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2. Ibid, pp. 50-51.
the impact of the structural and normative disruption of the traditional system, upon the "uprooted" themselves that I wish to underscore. The result was a classical instance of "anomic", of extreme disorientation. For those who came to man the machines of the noisome factories and crowd the tenements of the inner-cities, the old norms and forms of interactions were no longer relevant. The new life was a bewildering aberration from all that was familiar and uncomplicated and well-comprehended. New commitments and perspectives had to be forged under the pressure of adversity and deprivation. In particular, the church was not an established ministry in this new environment, was not at the apex of the social order, was not an integrative force to give a cohesiveness to life.

Though it incorporated a rigid pyramid of social ranks, the rural structure was organised basically along geographical lines. The local community constituted a unified cultural entity, often coterminous with the boundaries of the parish. By contrast, the urban, industrial structure had as its central division the economic demarcation of social classes. Other systems of differentiation were secondary to this. The implications of this shift from community-based structure of society (reflected in the parochial system) to a class based structure (deriving from the major owner-labourer economic demarcation) are very great. Because the networks of unity and commonality were economic rather than community-based, the emerging ideological perspectives and symbols of solidarity, and the forms of united action were also along economic lines rather than religious.

Speaking of the early background of the industrial revolution, Tawney says,

in the eighteenth century both the State and the Church abdicated that part of their sphere which had consisted in the maintenance of a common body of social ethics; what was left was the repression of a class, not the discipline of a nation .... And the Church was even more remote from the daily life of mankind than the State. Philanthropy abounded; but religion, once the greatest social force, had become a thing as private and individual as the estate of the squire or the working clothes of the labourer. 

So the first great blow to the church's position, to her control over all levels of society, came with the undermining of the traditional order of community unity. The thousands who were torn from the moorings of familiar surroundings and social patterns found themselves without the sense of a unified community, and without the old sense of obligatory religious practice. The whole framework of behaviour and relationships in which the church (along with her symbols, value and hallowed personages) was suddenly rendered obsolete by entrance into the centers of population and production. The breakneck-paced metamorphosis of life for the lower echelons who flocked to fill the menial positions of the urban factories, veritably left the church behind in the fondly remembered setting of a by-gone life. The fragmentation and social distance of a brutal, inchoate industrial structure made irrelevant the integrated, simpler way of life in which the church was so vital. Structural upheaval dethroned the institution at the pinnacle of the outmoded system - the church - and left her to attach herself to the rising star of the middle classes in the cities.

1. It may well be asked, if the social changes inherent in urbanisation had such a lethal effect on the church, why did not the urban middle classes also lose their commitment to this institution? The question is a penetrating one and to answer it satisfactorily would require delving into a number of facets of the emerging class separation. Rather than going into the matter in detail, I will put forward four suggested differences between the working and middle classes which may be fundamental to the differential class involvement in the church in the 19th century cities. (1) The middle classes were built upon a nucleus of tradesmen, artisans and small capitalists who were already in the towns prior to the great influx. This stratum, though it absorbed many who "made good" from the ranks of the proletariat, was not over-run by the uprooted migrants. This "merchant class" upon which the industrial capitalist class was largely built, was already imbued with the religious-ideological value system I will later describe. In other words, the seeds of church-commitment were implanted in the inchoate urban middle classes although they were not implanted in the normative system of the urban working classes. (2) The middle classes were able to keep their economic and religious roles integral. On their side of industrial organisation there was a sense of enterprise and creativity and "worldly asceticism" interpretable as part of one's "calling". For workers, economic life was purely motivated by desire for maximisation of wages and allowed for little intrusion of "higher" values. (3) The middle classes did not undergo the fragmentation of the family which we will see reduced the working class family's capability for incalculating religious values. (4) The church in the urban areas adapted itself to the middle classes; she was remade in the image of the prosperous. As we shall see, the leadership of the church was, as it has usually been, from the higher strata and thus was more amenable to the economic orientation and values of these groups.
3. Working Class "Alienation"

The world of the industrial working families of the past century was a very restricted, and in many ways, debilitating world. The physical and social features of this environment made an enormous impact on the new structure of life and had the practical consequence of giving rise to secular rather than religious forms of solidarity and instruments of collective action. Wickham speaks mildly when he refers to the working class life situation as the "cultural isolation of the masses".¹ For the workers, it was a life with few redeeming features; people were constantly face to face with misery, with disease, with filth, and with cruelty. Rowntree and Lavers say that, "In the nineteenth century ... there was a long story of brutality ... It was a century of exploitation of women ... It was a century of poverty ... It was a century, too, of destitution ... Despite the glories of the Victorians, it was probably a thoroughly disagreeable century for all except the eminent, learned and well-to-do".²

In using the term "alienation" to refer to the conditions of the labouring classes, I am using a word which through popularisation has captured a number of varied meanings: isolation, anomie, meaninglessness, and (for Marx) lack of work satisfaction due to loss of independence, variety and creativity. Taken together, these various understandings accurately describe the situation of the urban proletariat in this period.

At this juncture it should be made clear that I disclaim any suggestion that there is a direct or ineluctable link between deprivation and estrangement from religion. Nor is there any a priori connection between religious practice and a particular level in the social hierarchy. The relationship of religion and the social stratification is indeterminate, depending upon the particular shape of the

¹. Wickham, op. cit., p. 158.
². Rowntree and Lavers, op. cit., p. 368.
society and particular forms of religion, besides many other factors germane to specific situations. In contrast to developments in the 19th century, it has often occurred throughout the history of the Christian church that the poor, the miserable and the outcast have been among the most deeply reliant on the succour of religion. Niebuhr describes the regular recrudescences of the "churches of the disinherited".\(^1\) The companionship of disease and ever-visible death has often been a great spur to a religious faith which looks beyond the pale of death for an assured glory on "the other side".

Other religious movements of the oppressed have been "millenial" in nature, finding the reversal of present positions in the cataclysm of a new order in which they will enjoy the material bliss of an Utopian existence. Worsley has described, how in the islands of Melanesia after the intrusion of the white man and the break-down of the accustomed social and economic conditions, there was an outbreak of "Cargo cults". In these cults and the frenzied activities accompanying them the natives sought for a new way of life - either imminent or distant - which would restore the independence and unity of their life-patterns.\(^2\)

In a more general vein, Worsley indicates the type of persons usually converted to "activist Millenarian movements":

But it is amongst people who feel themselves to be oppressed and who are longing for deliverance that they have particularly welcomed ... Millenarian beliefs have recurred again and again throughout history, despite failures, disappointments, and repression, precisely because they make such a strong appeal to the oppressed, the disinherited and the wretched".\(^3\)

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Many times in the Western world, the lower classes have found themselves repulsed by the sober liturgies of upper-class high-churchmanship and have evolved emotional, communal alternative forms of religion to satisfy their special needs.

So I am not asserting that irreligion necessarily follows from poverty or from disintegration of familiar forms of life. What I suggest is that in the particular circumstances of urbanisation and industrialisation in the previous century, and with the particular "bent" of the church in this period, the working classes gravitated away from the church and toward secular alternatives.

Conditions of life for the workers—both in home and in the factories—were appalling by any modern standard. To begin with housing conditions, the descriptions of crowding and squalor from contemporaneous sources can only evoke revulsions. The process by which the working class residential areas became sorely overcrowded is not so difficult to fathom given the enormous numerical increase in urban populations. Mechie describes the process in this way:

As the people seeking employment crowded into the towns, the well-to-do deserted the older parts and built themselves new dwellings in the outskirts. The old houses with their room divided and sometimes subdivided became the refuge of the newcomers; and, ere long, as the influx continued, the courts and gardens which had provided air and light in the former times were built over, and even cellars were brought into use as dwelling places.¹

The result of this compressing of humanity into inadequate and unhygienic quarters is described by a Scottish churchman, John Pirie, writing in 1871:

No one can penetrate far into the wynds and closes of the Canongate and Cowgate and not speedily ascertain that one most outstanding barrier in the way of any kind of reform, physical or moral, is the miserable house-accommodation of the people ...²

² John Pirie, The Lapsed With Suggestions as to the best means of Raising Them (Edinburgh: John MacLaren, 1871) p. 9.
He is describing the older sections of Edinburgh and continues with a more specific description:

Let us ascend one of those stairs, leading to the abodes of some forty or fifty families. The stair is dark, damp, and slippy with heaps of ashes and other filth lying in corners. Each flat branches out into passages, right and left, leading to congeries of dens, some of them fourteen feet by ten, with scarce any light. Think now of the family of nine, ten, and sometimes twelve, and in a few instances more than one family, doomed to dwell day and night, to eat, drink, lie down, sleep and rise up and perhaps perform all their domestic duties, in an appartment smaller than an ordinary dressing closet.¹

A few years later, another Scottish churchman, Robert Milne wrote:

So injurious to health are the conditions of existence of those inhabiting many of the more wretched localities, that, but for the fact of their being replenished by some above that are every now and then sinking in the social scale, their population would sensibly diminish.²

An historian, Thomas Johnston, provides a more precise statistical picture: in 1861, thirty-four per cent of all families in Scotland, over a quarter-million lived in a single room with only one window; another eight thousand families lived in single rooms without the benefit of a window. He says that the "Wynds of Glasgow are said to be the most unhealthy places in Europe".³ Smith in his study of "Social Criticism" in the Scottish church agrees that conditions prevalent in Scotland were unusually severe; he writes,

It is difficult to exaggerate the appalling conditions under which great masses of Scottish people had to live in the industrial towns throughout the last century. Contemporary sources make it clear that conditions were far worse in Scotland than anywhere else in Europe. English reformers, so long familiar with the worst slums of England, were horrified at the sights they saw in Scotland, especially in Glasgow.⁴

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¹ ibid, p. 9.
³ Johnston, op. cit., p. 281.
Contemporary reports in England, describing squalor and domestic degradation no less foreign to the modern eye, show that Scottish conditions must have been unthinkable, indeed, if they exceeded these for crowded misery. Wearmouth quotes from "Reports on Lodging Houses Act" of 1853 and 1857 which relate to sections of London:

The evils existing in the lodging houses of the poor were beyond description. Crowded and filthy, without water or ventilation, without the least regard to cleanliness or decency, they were hotbeds of disease, misery and crime. (In one room fourteen feet by fourteen in Church Lane, St. Giles, were found) 'no less than thirty-seven men, women and children, all lying together on the floor like beasts'. (One of the visitors described it) 'scarcely possible to describe the filthy condition of houses, the loathsome bed filled with vermin, the surroundings which caused fever to be rarely absent!'

Hayward reports that even after the first World War, a child born in one of the slum-districts of east London had only one-fourth to one-third the chance of reaching adulthood as children born in the well-to-do districts, and even if he reached adulthood, enjoyed a much shorter life expectancy. The boy introduced to life in such an environment (living in a one room abode) on the average "loses about four inches in height and some eleven pounds in weight by comparison with the average boy reared in a four room house in a more salubrious suburb".

Returning to the Scottish situation, it is pointed out by Brotherston that disease did, in fact, flourish in the central cities of the early industrial age. Though from mid-seventeenth century there had been a gradual improvement in health and decline in the death rate till 1820, "Thereafter, as destitution and disease increased in the rapidly expanding industrial areas, the death rate began to rise.

2. Brotherston indicates that in mid-century one-half of the middle class lived to 51 1/2 years of age; one-half of the artisans and labourers "had died out by age 17 1/2". The increases in the death rate were confined to working class districts. J.H.F. Brotherston, Observations on the Early Health Movement in Scotland, (London: H.K. Lewis & Co., 1962) p. 43-45.
again in all the major urban centers. From 1825 to 1835 the death rate in Glasgow rose from one person in every forty-one of the total population to one in thirty-one, reaching a peak of one in nineteen in 1847, at the height of the "hungry forties." Not only were people packed inhumanely into dilapidated and filth-ridden quarters, but they were inadequately nourished and given over to extreme immoderation in drinking. Public health authorities, such as they were, had not yet begun to cope with the spread of disease.

As Smith emphasises, the deterioration of inner-city areas surrounding the factories was heightened by abandonment of these areas by the more prosperous — both in terms of residence and in human concern. In Edinburgh, he suggests, the building of North Bridge early in the century and New Town on its South side, provided a means of escape from the crowded "closes" around High Street.

North Bridge in Edinburgh forms an outward and visible sign of the social and psychological division of the community and nation caused by the industrial revolution ... the old areas (Canongate and Grassmarket) presented ... by 1830 ... all the signs of the deplorable but familiar pattern of the nineteenth century industrial towns - the working class slum area.

But for the "masses" there was no escape from the smoke, noise and filth. As ever larger numbers poured into the already bulging districts, the horrible catalogue of poverty and misery: In tenements and hovels, several persons often share one corner of straw if there was no bed; open dung-heaps provoked nauseable olfactory offenses and helped spread the germs; lack of light and ventilation made the inner surroundings thoroughly oppressive and dim.

Nor were the factories havens of sanitation or safety. Not only men, but women and children as well were conscripted or attracted into the factories, there

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to sweat through long and torturous days of labour in most unsatisfactory environments. Until 1833, it was typical for labourers to spend thirteen to sixteen hours per day on the job. The Factory Act of 1833 reduced the maximum legal work-day to twelve hours, and in 1847, further legislation put the ceiling at ten hours per day.¹

The exploitation of children which abounded is probably the most sordid page in the history of early industrialism. Cole speaks of the employment of children who had fallen into the hands of Poor Law authorities - the so-called "parish apprentices"; these, he says, lived "virtually as bond-slaves of the factory owner".² Commonly the children were beaten and normally they were decidedly undernourished. Sherrif Watson of Aberdeen, the founder of industrial schools, was quoted in the Glasgow Herald in 1850 as describing the working class children of this era as "dwarfish in body and mind ... puny, piggy, feeble, deformed creatures".³ Johnston summarises the disastrous panorama of this existence:

A plethora of labourers, cottars from the soil, hand-craftsmen from villages, driven to the little, overcrowded, bleak and cheerless hovels, hastily erected around the factory walls; compelled to sell their toil in foul and filthy working conditions, and for the barest pittance; from dawn to sunset bullied and oppressed, the last ounce taken from their bodies by scarcely less oppressive overseers; hunger, misery, dirt; no sanitary or factory regulations; no machinery fenced; their children killed off like flies, and they themselves emaciated, consumptive and without hope.⁴

It hardly need be added that there was in these conditions a monumental breakdown of the home. Life was fragmented; the former solidarity of the home was utterly destroyed. In the countryside and villages, the family had operated as the primary economic unit; it was now atomised by economic functions. It was also disrupted by the fact that the habitations were viciously uninviting and squalid. The dark hovels, cramped and without privacy, focal points of destitution, were not conducive to a high order of family living.⁵

¹. ibid., p.47.
⁴. ibid., p.271.
⁵. Promiscuity and illegitimacy were very common; in 1866 over 10% of all children born alive in Scotland were registered as illegitimate, the highest
The church no longer served as a context for the inculcation of societal values; specifically, it ceased to perpetuate religious ideals and the habits of religious practice. Generally, when religion is absent from the home, it does not take root in the lives of individuals. The breakdown of the family among the urban working classes is, therefore, a major factor in the discontinuity of church participation.

The deplorable conditions of life of the working classes may have linked to church abstention in other, quite direct ways. Many of the slum-inhabitants did not possess clothes which they felt were suitable for attending the predominately middle class churches. Smith suggests that the poorest groups of workers were excluded by their appearance and their very low status as well as by the fact that their needs and thinking were too different from the middle class church-goers.

For the better paid workers, Smith stresses as barriers to church-going, the "social irrelevance of most contemporary Christianity and church life and the anti-working class bias of most clergy and influential laymen." 1


The church was not without competitors in the inner-city ghettos. Other values, movements, and forms of behaviour were available to fill the vacuum left by religion. Two alternatives stand out in particular; the labour movement and vice. The first may seem the more obvious, but the stupours of drunkenness also served as an escape from the coarseness of life: the need to "escape" into a more pleasant world has often been met by the succour of religious emotion.

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No doubt the most significant institutional alternative to the church was
the inchoate structure of working class mass-action, the Labour movement. Cole
points out that there had previously been organisations of working people:

But until nearly the end of the eighteenth century these bodies seem to have
had little contact with one another, and little consciousness of a
community of view and interest. The sense of unity came only when the
Industrial Revolution began to form all the workers in the common mould
of the wage-system. The Industrial Revolution gave birth to the Labour
Movement.¹

The problems confronting the city slum-dwellers were starkly economic and
political in nature, and the instruments evolved for coping with these problems, too,
were economic and political. This is not to say that there was no "religious"
element in the protests of the Trade Unions, and later, the Labour party. Indeed,
some have interpreted these instruments of betterment as constituting a quasi-
religious movement, engaging energies which otherwise would have been directed at
spiritual goals.

I have already alluded to the fact that in previous centuries, the disinherited,
excluded or estranged from extant religious organisations, had turned to impassioned
sectarian movements which offered communal intensity and supra-mundane solutions
to worldly problems.² By turning from the "world" and its institutions the poor
and oppressed establish new systems of value in which personal holiness is rewarded
rather than material success. But the sects, by channelling the energies of the
committed from the lower strata, and by inculcating discipline and enterprise,
usually become the vehicles of worldly success and thereby provide, in the long run,
worldly solutions as well as "other-worldly". Niebuhr speaks of, "the story of
the religiously neglected poor, who fashion a new type of Christianity which
corresponds to their distinctive needs, who rise in the economic scale under the
influence of religious discipline ..."³ This was the story of Methodism a century

3. ibid, 28.
earlier. But we shall see that neither Methodism nor the newer sectarian movements were able to galvanise the dormant religious desires of the urban "masses" sufficiently to take on major importance in the 19th century.

It is of primary significance that secularised versions of sectarianism, rather than spiritualised forms, won the allegiance of the industrial working classes. Again, Niebuhr expresses this alternative:

Whenever Christianity has become the religion of the fortunate and cultured and has grown philosophical, abstract, formal, and ethically harmless in the process, the lower strata of society find themselves religiously expatriated by a faith which neither meets their psychological needs nor sets forth an appealing ethical ideal. In such a situation the right leader finds little difficulty in launching a new movement which will, as a rule, give rise to a new denomination. When, however, the religious leader does not appear the religion remains bound in the forms of middle-class culture, the secularisation of the masses and the transfer of their religious fervour to secular movements, which hold some promise of salvation from the evils that afflict them, is the probable result.

This passage is perhaps not applicable in every detail, but if accurately depicts the sort of "secularised sectarianism" which became pre-eminent in the last century. Perhaps because they were further removed from the dominance of religious symbols and values, than earlier sectarians, the urban factory workers occupied themselves with a direct confrontation of economic woes by secular means. Perhaps commitment to the developing trade unions and other workers' organisations, and the solidarity engendered by these, insulated Proletarians from the overtures of established and sectarian forms of religion alike. It was, in fact, later in the century that a religious mantle was thrown over the foment of working class protest. Yinger says, "Christian socialism was largely a sectarian movement." Hoffer makes much the same point. So, the spate of efforts and organisations, known inclusively as the Labour Movement, provided a major alternative to the Church for the commitments of the working class.

The other type of behaviour which may be viewed as "alternative" to the church was the widespread resorting to vice. Drunkenness and prostitution were rampant. The former, especially, represented a grave social problem in the slum areas. The rigours of the life - the noisy, toilsome factories, the dingy abodes, the dark, littered streets - these could be escaped, at least temporarily, with cheap alcohol. Not only men, but women, and children not fully grown, were prey to the most debilitating mastery of immoderation. Having succumbed to an inveterate pattern of vice, drink and depravity were often the main goals of existence.

There was a dire absence of constructive alternative provisions for recreation and diversion. And alcohol was both cheap and abundant. Mechies notes that spirits sold for about three shillings for an English gallon in retail. Whisky had become a popular drink outside of the upper social circles just in the late eighteenth century and became the staple article for consumption in Scottish drinking-houses. Ferguson reports that "Dr. Girdner, newly appointed Medical Officer of Health of the city (Glasgow) was convinced that habitual overcrowding was highly conducive to a craving for alcoholic stimulants, due in many cases not merely to bad habits or examples, or to proximity of spirit shops, but to want of such natural stimulants as derived from domestic comfort".

The magnitude of the drink problem is made most vivid by the statistics regarding the number of drink-establishments in 1833. In Edinburgh there was one spirit dealer for every fifteen families; in Glasgow, one for every fourteen families. Mechies says that at this time "it was estimated that the quantity of spirits consumed in Scotland was 23 pints yearly per head of population, as compared with 13 pints in Ireland and 7 in England". Huntington quotes a contemporary eye-witness account of just one Scottish slum district, "In part of one

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1. Mechies, op. cit., p. 82.
2. Thomas Ferguson, op. cit., p. 69.
3. Mechies, op. cit., p. 84.
4. loc. cit.
street, forming a chord of the circle, there are thirty-seven public houses and beer shops; and from the single point, not an intersection of streets, fourteen can be seen. From the earliest years, in such an environment, children were victims of cruel human degeneracy, all too often falling prey to excesses them¬selves (or to the severe neglect of their parents) before reaching the age of maturity.

To describe the urban working class life as "secular" may be a satisfactory way of summarising the "alternatives" to religion and at the same time summarising the entire discussion of the economic and social causes of working class church abstention. If not on the level of belief, then certainly in practice, the life of the urban proletariat was thoroughly irreligious. The first generations of industrial workers shaped an essentially secular outlook on life which for the most part disregarded the church and her teachings.

We have seen some of the powerful economic and social forces which led to this state of affairs. The church-permeated, unified structure of rural life was disordered by the process of rapid urbanisation. The uprooted were literally stripped from the moorings of all that was familiar and valued, including the integrative, normative value of religion. The new urban environment was not only bewilderingly different but also impersonal, crowded, cruel and squalid. The focus of work was utterly economic; the family was fragmented by the demands of the factory and the character of domestic habitations. All of this tended to propel the industrial poor toward secular instruments of protest and economic improvement and toward secular emotional releases and forms of "escape" from the starkness of existence.

It may also be important that there was a meagre presence of nature and natural

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symbols which in the countryside had been associated with the religious dimension of life. Nor had the church herself penetrated the inner-city working class ghettos to a degree sufficient to re-establish the priority of religious symbols and values. Of course, this latter fact is tied in with the actions (or lack of action) and attitudes of the church. The discussion in the remainder of the chapter will revolve about this other side of the question, which is also vital to the analysis of working class religious abstention.

C. FAILURE OF THE CHURCH WITH URBAN PROLETARIAT

It is common to associate revolutions with the disprivileged, with those who, as underlings, are interested in overthrowing the scheme of things and establishing a new order. But the Industrial Revolution was given its main impetus by a class who had already gained a large measure of influence and affluence, the merchant class of the towns. And this was a class deeply imbued with religion - largely the religion fashioned by the reformation. As Hoffer puts it,

Another English revolution by the rich occurred at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. It was the Industrial Revolution. The breathtaking potentialities of mechanisation set the minds of manufacturers and merchants on fire. They began a revolution as extreme and radical as ever inflamed the minds of sectarians, and in a relatively short time these respectable, Godfearing citizens changed the face of England beyond recognition."

From the beginning of Industrialisation on a large scale and the swelling of British cities, there was a strikingly close link between religious enthusiasm and economic power. The church in Scotland - to direct attention to our specific concern - was largely controlled, financed and patronised by the class which was in the ascendancy. With a heritage of Calvinism, many members of this class had a deeply inculcated sense that worldly activity and success were part of their spiritual duty. The wealth-accumulating entrepreneurs of expanding capitalism were deeply committed to the ideals of individualism and self-help. Little sympathy was extended to those at the foot of the economic ladder for they were

assumed to have it in their power to "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps", and if they could not, they merely adduced convincing evidence of their own ineptitude and supineness. In piping this tune, the church headed the parade and waved the banner, vesting with spiritual authority the notion that those who succumbed to destitution merely reaped the fruit of moral laxity.

We shall see that the whole posture of the church exacerbated the working class disinclination to religious practice brought about by the forces already outlined. This posture identified her with the prosperous and disqualified her from effective ministrations to the industrial poor. The doctrine, "repent from your sins and all will be well" sounded resoundingly hollow to those who were suffering the disorientation of a social earthquake and could see no way out of the vicious cycle of poverty, disease and early death.

In this section of the chapter it is my purpose to show that the ramifications of this basic embrace of institutional religion and the triumphant class of the new industrial order were very great indeed; that from this fact - no less than the structural re-arrangement of society and the impact of industrialism of the urban proletariat - derived the estrangement of working classes from the church. The church's orientation and value system in the 19th century played a basic part in creating the socio-religious cleavage.

However, before taking up the importance of the church's ideological antagonism toward the working classes, I will speak to another, prior aspect of the church's failure: her structural and ideological incapacity to adapt to the urban situation in the earliest part of the century, when the leadership of the church was still looking back to the ideal order of rural society. We will then look more closely at the perspectives of the church (adopted from the urban middle class) which were alien to the workers, and then at middle class character of the church.
1. Inability to adapt to Urban Situation.

"The church cherished the old rural type of ordered society because ... she sincerely believed that it formed part of the divinely - ordained structure of society". ¹ The parish system, corresponding to the geographical arrangement of stable communities, was so entrenched and so long in operation that it seemed to most churchmen the only logical and effectual deployment of the resources and influence of the church. With the very great increase in the size of towns and the concomitant compactness, diversity and mobility, the church was faced with a crisis of magnitude. The instinctive reaction was to transplant the parochial system into the centers of population. Many religious leaders believed that they could re-introduce the paternalistic, church-guided rural system into the cities; they were convinced this was the appropriate means for bringing the separate classes jointly under the guidance of the church again. Smith says, "after half of a century of rapid industrial development which transformed the whole basis of social and economic life, the church remained convinced that the ideals and values of agrarian society were as valid as ever in the new situation ... the church’s social teaching became, therefore, increasingly irrelevant as industrialism progressed". ²

The frame of mind here described predominated in the early part of the 19th century inside the church. Control of the church was still with those absorbed in the traditional order. The church was abysmally unaware of the profundity and implications of the changes which were so rapidly taking place. Her whole structure was not only challenged by the urbanisation but was inapplicable to industrial society. All her struggles to attain in the cities the social control and veneration she enjoyed in rural society were futile. Her institutional rigidity - which is hardly surprising considering her long-standing pre-eminence - prevented the kind of rapid and strategic adjustments that might have (hypothetically) re-established a similar institutional position in the cities.

¹. Smith, op. cit., p.124.
². Ibid., p. 119.
Until 1833— which covers crucial years in which patterns of urban life were formed — the Church of Scotland was controlled by the rural-oriented "Moderates". In that year the "Evangelicals", with the assistance of the rising middle classes, won out in the internal politics of the church.¹ This change of leadership makes a change in the effort to provide enough churches for the urban populations. Through 1833, very few churches were built; then began a flurry of construction and between 1834 and 1838 no fewer than 180 new edifices were opened. Says Smith, "Noble as this effort was, it came 30 years too late. By the middle of the 1830's great numbers of the industrial masses had been without any church connection for years".²

Not only did the church react too late to population movements with respect to the provision of church buildings, but when the buildings were finally available, an invidious system of pew rentals effectively excluded most of the lower groups in society. Parliament would not endow these new churches and so the church leaders turned to the device of renting seats to support the ministers. Since the seat charges were on a sliding scale, one's place in church was invariably a reflection of his economic status. This system could only serve to accentuate class divisions and class resentments.

The labouring poor, who could seldom afford to pay seat rents had to bear the social stigma of accepting free seats or stay away. It is not surprising that the more independent and self respecting of them chose the latter. Certainly the system of seat renting played no small part in the alienation of the industrial lower classes from the church.³

Another internal political conflict in the Church of Scotland around mid-century had the consequence of diverting attention from the growing class schism

1. ibid, p. 35.
2. ibid, p. 36.
in the church and from the peculiar needs of the new urban working class. This was the "Disruption", in which the church was completely rent in two over the issue of "establishment". Over one-third of the church of Scotland ministers, including many of the most powerful, left the Established church on the principle of complete freedom of the church from secular authority. The dissenters joined together to form the Free Church. The enormous reconsolidation that was necessitated on both sides tended to turn the separate churches in on themselves while they put in order the new organisational frameworks and continued the polemic to justify the divergent positions in the controversy.

All the while, the glaring absence of the lower echelons of the cities became more clear. The church had missed any opportunity that was available for maintaining a tradition of religious practice among the industrial labourers during the difficult transition from countryside to city. But, not only the insufficiency of the church response to the change, but as I shall further detail, the enormous anti-working class bias she absorbed, sealed the irretrievable loss of this massive section of the community.

2. Ideological Bias.

Wickham speaks accurately when he refers to the "sociological imprisonment of the churches" during the nineteenth century.¹ During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the churches in Scotland, in the whole of Britain, drunk deeply at the springs of individualism and "laissez-faire" economics. The leadership and middle class congregations of the churches were ebullient in their conviction that God had given his unqualified benediction to the new capitalistic order. Whatever the side effects of their own prosperity, such as poverty and veritable slave labour in the factories, these were but trifling ills (for which the victims themselves were to blame anyway) in a marvelously healthy world. Greenslade, in

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¹ Wickham, op. cit., p. 161.
his excellent short survey of the churches' historical relationship to the social realm says that, "the theme of submission to an existing social order was shockingly overworked".\(^1\)

How thoroughly inculcated in the mind of the churches was the extreme individualism of the era is clear from the statement of Whately, a Professor of Political Economy who was later to be an Archbishop in the Church of England, "It is curious to observe, how, through a wise and beneficient Providence, men thus do the greatest service to the public when they are thinking of nothing but their own gain".\(^2\)

Church leaders of renown showed themselves to be great disciples of Mills, Ricardo and Smith in sanctifying the motive of competitive and unrestrained avarice. The greatest Scottish churchman of the century, Thomas Chalmers, was vehement in his defense of the present hierarchical structure; he held staunchly to the doctrine that economic forces and conditions should not be tampered with but left to the uninhibited operation of natural forces: "We would, in short, raise no positive apparatus whatever for the direct object of meeting and alleviating the ills of poverty".\(^3\)

It was at this time that the "Protestant Ethic" and the "Spirit of Capitalism" were virtually synonymous; but the latter, the economic ideology, was at the forefront, and the theological formulations followed in its train. Tawney's personification of "The Puritan" is a most accurate description of the nineteenth century churchman, but with a reduction in the degree of piety the latter case:

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2. ibid, p.106.
Convinced that character is all and circumstances nothing, he sees in poverty of those who fall by the way, not a misfortune to be pitied and relieved, but a moral failing to be condemned, and in riches, not an object of suspicion -- though like other gifts they may be abused -- but the blessing which rewards the triumph of energy and will.

Armed with the assurance that the structure of society was God-ordained, that the pursuit of gain and possession of wealth were not only acceptable but of spiritual value, and that the underlings in the scheme of things could, with enough zeal and character, successfully climb the ladder of success -- the churches of the day put to rest all grave and difficult social troubles with simplistic pronouncements. The pathological ills of the inner-city districts were almost casually dismissed with the fiat-like statements about the sinfulness and depravity of the inhabitants of the areas.

Wickham writes,

A serious aspect of the lack of sensitivity to the secular world, and ultimately traceable to theological narrowness, was the tendency of the churches to reduce complex social problems to a matter of personal morality. It still persists, a dangerous heresy among Christians. Inevitably the social habits of the working class, as the massive group outside all the churches in which the social problems were most glaring, were the easiest targets for the darts of evangelical moralism.

This is not to suggest that the churches were altogether unconcerned that their particular programme of religion should fail to take root among the poor. At times the activity and discussion were quite intense. But all of the approaches were guided by the intoxicant of individualistic and pietistic solutions; the church could not for a moment extricate herself from this ideological orientation and apprehend the defects of the social structure itself. No less than the economist, banker or industrialist of the day, church leaders believed that all problems were


2. Wickham, op. cit., p. 194.
remediable within the existing boundaries of the social system. Indeed, the "mind of the church" was thoroughly saturated with the values of these ideological pace-setters. Therefore, as will be elaborated later, the religious apathy of the working classes, of special import to the churches, was dealt with on bases compatible with these individualistic notions. Harper explains that "whenever social problems are named in, say, Church Conferences or Assemblies, there is no more common argument used than this:

*Preach the gospel, and you will do all that is required; preach it to the individual and social questions will solve themselves. This is generally offered, and one must add, is generally accepted as a final argument."

Weber said that, "religion provides the theodicy of good fortune for those who are fortunate." This "theodicy of good fortune" carried particular force within religious communities in the Calvinist tradition. It was the conviction that God had forordained the salvation, enterprise and success of those who achieved affluence - it was evidence of his blessing. On the other hand, the poor and disprivileged suffered because of their odiousness in the eyes of God. Their misery was no less destined of God as condemnation for sin. Equipped with such a doctrine, churchmen could divorce economic activity and possession of wealth from any social responsibility. Consequently, there was an unprecedented lack of concern for the bottom layers of society. Janet Glover has recently written that despite the conspicuous contrast of prosperity and abject poverty,

The church as a whole was timid about being involved in political controversy, its members reluctant to face the terrible problem of wealth and its proper use by Christians .... The evil effects of the all too frequent divorce in the life of prominent Christians between individual piety and economic and political action have still a baneful influence on the religious situation in Scotland.

3. Loc. cit.
So the church found itself in a position of being curiously well-equipped to tolerate severe fissuring of society and utter destitution for hundreds of thousands. Having allowed the norms of individualism to erase all traces of the struggle for social justice, the church could be content, in the words of Morton, "to condemn popular protest and to equate poverty with sin."\(^1\) Aware that people were suffering - people for whom the church claimed moral and spiritual stewardship - the church could insulate itself with the understanding that the suffering was individual and the causes, too, were individual. According to Dunnet, this frame of mind was sustained even into the inter-war depression era. Writing at that time, he says, "Many of our church people, aware of the conditions in which our less fortunate fellow citizens had had to live, have excused their indifference and neglect by stating that slums are created not so much by overcrowding or defective buildings as by the habits of the people themselves".\(^2\)

This complacency of the churches, and its counterpart, the disapproval of other than moralistic remedies for social ills, was no less evident in England and America than in Scotland. Writes Inglis,

> For most of the nineteenth century, Englishmen looked at poverty and found it morally tolerable because their eyes were trained by evangelical religion and political economy. A preacher would spend his life surrounded by the squalor of a manufacturing town without feeling any twinge of socially radical sentiment, when he believed that many poor people were suffering for their own sins, and that the plight of the rest was the result of spiritual ordinances which it would be impious to question and economic laws which it was foolish to resist.\(^3\)

Regarding the nineteenth century religious scene in America, Demerath says, "Who can wonder that the lower classes should have retreated from Protestant

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1. Morton, op. cit., p. 68.
services when the prominent minister Henry Ward Beecher advised workers to rest content on a dollar a day for a family of eight since, 'water costs nothing; and a man who cannot live on bread is not fit to live'.¹ henry may indicates that 'in 1876 protestantism presented a massive, almost unbroken front in its defense of the status quo'.² The leaders of American Protestant opinion, like their counterparts in Britain, were paralysed in relating the Church to the working classes, by an ideologically engendered apathy. Writes May:

The conventional clerical view of society was deeply entwined with his theology. Just as a sinful man could not debate the justice of eternal punishment, he was not permitted to criticise the laws by which God governed society. Neither salvation nor social well-being could be attained by human schemes. Poverty, like sin, was part of the structure of the universe.'³

Yinger quoted the advise of the "Congregationalist" during the strikes of 1877:

'Bring on then the troops - the armed police - in overwhelming numbers, bring out the Gatling guns. Let there be no fooling with blank cartridges. But let the mob know, everywhere, that for it to stand one moment after it has been ordered by proper authorities to disperse, will be to be shot down in its tracks ....'⁴

The "spirit of the times" proved a straightjacket, which, having been donned by the church, rendered her incapable of comprehending the true nature of urban poverty or directing her social efforts constructively. The "mind of the church" was the mind of the upper strata. The church had no independent base of "social criticism" for she was utterly enamored with the extreme individualistic ethics which dominated the era. Her whole perspective on the conditions of misery and

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3. ibid, p. 83.
oppression abounding in the cities nullified sincere concern for the downtrodden. Her pronouncements on social issues could only antagonise the working classes against the church.

3. Middle Class Character.

By underscoring the fact that the church adopted a fully middle class style and value system I am, clearly, not so much examining a new theme, as stressing the logical conclusion arising out of the above description of the church's economic and social outlook. The church, in the 19th century, emerged as a near-perfect personification of the class whose ideology she absorbed, the developing and self-confident middle class. Winter makes this very clear: "The identification of Christianity with the middle and upper classes occurred in recent centuries in Western Europe. This seems to be the primary factor in the decline of Christian churches in Sweden, England and France." We have seen that the American churches evidenced to a large extent the same general subservience to the better-off. Yinger says, "The failure of American churches to make an adequate place for the common labourer is demonstrated by the vast decline in religious enthusiasm among the working class during the latter part of the nineteenth century."

Morton explains the orientation of the Scottish church at this time:

It was church life which met the needs of the class which set the pace and thinking of the church, the rapidly expanding middle class .... Christian stewardship -- the responsible use by the individual of his money -- was the Christian virtue. And the Church was essentially the Church of those who had something to steward.

1. It should be said, to be perfectly fair to the church, that there were notable exceptions to this predominate indisposition to deal with the very great problems encountered by the industrial poor. Mechle has described at length the contribution of some clerics and concerned laymen to the early endeavors of social reform in education, housing reform, etc. The point is perhaps somewhat overstated for the sake of emphasis. I am less concerned with developing the subtle variations of social action within the church than presenting the general picture and the overall effects with regard to the religious estrangement of the working classes. See Mechle, op. cit.


The Church, no doubt in part unconsciously, capitulated completely to the ascendancy class who were able to endow her programme and were eager to enjoy her blessing. The Church, therefore, wholeheartedly adapted herself to this prosperous constituency—shared their values, spoke their language and trumpeted their successes. Inglis quotes a leading Congregationalist minister who said in 1852, "We regard it as a significant and cheering fact, that we number in our ranks so large a proportion of the middle classes of this country, the backbone and sinew of its strength and probity, of its intelligence, and industry." Like ancient Rome, which, having conquered Greece, was in turn hellenized by her captive, the Church in winning the up-and-coming classes, became the spokesman for their cause.

In fact, it was not only the values of middle classes that the Church and ministers shares, but their affluence and social status as well. The clergy were drawn from the more prosperous strata and were dependent upon the continuance of gross inequality. Smith points out that many ministers were receiving in the 1830's and 1840's, stipends of six hundred pounds and more, the equivalent of several times that amount today, and certainly enabling them to enjoy the material luxuries of life. He believes that, "from their comfortable position among the privileged classes within the established order of society, the clergy found it impossible to seriously question either the basis or the presuppositions of that order."

For the well-to-do, the Church had praise, congratulations, and the injunction to use the fruits of their enterprise wisely. For the masses of poverty-stricken, the Church could only advise that they remain content in their appointed lot, and warn them of the disastrous consequences of any disruption in the present structure.

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1. Inglis, op. cit., p. 100.
2. Smith, 58, 59.
That the destitute and underprivileged victims of the manufacturing cities recoiled from such short-sighted, unsympathetic pronouncements is perfectly understandable. Stated brilliantly by Smith:

How strange such social teachings must have sounded to the masses of Scottish people living in the crowded industrial towns in the thirties and forties; how anachronistic; how irrelevant .... It is not difficult to understand the revulsion they must have felt for much of the supposedly Christian teaching proclaimed from the pulpits across the land; nor why some believed they must, in faithfulness to Christianity as they understood it, leave a Church which preached contentment to the poor, and hallowed and sanctified an arbitrary and unjust social arrangement.¹

This middle-class oriented clergy were neither able, nor indeed, particularly anxious, to speak the language of the lower orders. George Haw writes that, "The churches have ceased to speak the language of the people. Work-people view ministers as men who are ecclesiastically minded, and the ecclesiastical mind work-people never have been able to understand".² The whole ministerial thought-pattern militated for inclusion of the middle class in the Church and exclusion of the working class; any other result would have been surprising. Throughout the century the clergy were, "little more than chaplains in the central fortress of power, wealth and privilege, who not only failed to champion the causes associated with the oppressed and underprivileged but were among the most heated opponents".³

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1. ibid, p. 66.
D. EFFORTS OF THE CHURCH TO "RECLAIM" WORKERS

The churches did launch various endeavors designed to win back lost ground in the inner cities. The church literature of the day is replete with suggestions and reports; most of the energy was wasted, however, complying with the epigram, "too little, too late". The efforts were generally superficial, failing to take into the account the deep-seeded disintegration of working class life.


"Outreach" efforts were, in the first place, hampered by the cherished presupposition that personal piety and morality were the sole cures for social maladjustments. Outside the realm of individualistic religion, the main attempts at religious reconciliation were charitable. The "handouts" were, on the whole, gratefully - if reluctantly - accepted, but they were readily interpreted as condensation and a way of smoothing the conscience of the wealthy without really altering the financial structure. Working people could easily ascertain that the gifts alleviating some of the severest suffering meant only the receiving of pity, not the receiving of prosperity. As Morton says, "The work of the church on behalf of those who remained 'down town' was philanthropy". ¹

It is observed by Johnston that in the late 1840's, when a majority of working people in Dunfermline contracted Typhus and the disease began to spread beyond the working class ghettos, the other classes became concerned and recognised, "That something more drastic was required than the special diet of 'humiliation and prayer' which the church hurriedly organised". ² But the "something more drastic" was exactly what the church was not prepared to provide or to urge upon civil authorities through these decades. Cole alludes to the "failure of the church to present any social gospel". ³

In 1910, Harper mourns the fact that church endeavours among working people were paralysed by her commitment to current religious and economic conceptions. He says that "the confession must be made that until within recent years the Church, as such, and in her corporate capacity, has stood apart from the ethico-economic problems of the day". The belatedness of enlightened concern is clear from the statement of Harper regarding the renewed social efforts of the Church of Scotland in the first decade of the twentieth century. "The work is as yet tentative, and not large in volume. It can be described in a few sentences. The General Assembly of 1908, in response to an earnest appeal made by many clergymen and laymen, who are interested in social questions, instructed its committee on 'Life and Work' to make an investigation of these questions".

A few years later, Fleming also describes it as a "confession" that the Church for so long failed to see the material nature of the social and "spiritual" problem in the cities and to direct her efforts more comprehensively, "But it must be confessed that the conscience of the Church has only slowly awakened to the social evils aggravated by modern industrialism, and to the material remedies that have had to be applied to make the spiritual cure complete". Indeed, around the end of the century there was a growing realisation among churchmen that the working classes were outside the pale of the church's influence, not necessarily because of innate depravity, but largely because of the blindness of institutional religion in assessing the situation and operating effectively among the oppressed classes.

2. Evangelism.

Another type of "outreach" effort, which was given the support of some Scottish church leaders, was the "Revival" movement in the second half of the

2. ibid., p. 20.
century. Several eloquent "evangelists", most notably the American Dwight L. Moody, toured Britain and drew vast crowds preaching a traditional and individualistic message of repentance from sin and personal conversion. The consequence of these "campaigns" was the establishment of several permanent mission churches (such as Carubers Close Mission in Edinburgh) in the centers of Scottish cities.¹

By and large, churchmen applauded the apparent effectiveness of these evangelistic missions which reinforced the prevalent conviction that effective "preaching the gospel" would solve the problem of the "lost masses". However, the end result, from the standpoint of the church's desire to bring working classes into the church, may have been to further inhibit more fruitful, socially oriented, pursuits. There had been in existence throughout the century agencies which were operated by the established churches as mission stations for the slum inhabitants. These had failed to excite the interest of the poor because their invitations did not penetrate the social conditions and promise genuine transformations in the life-situation. As Wickham puts it, these missions in the slums, "predominantly aimed at their spiritual salvation".²

Restriction of the emphasis of the church's "evangelistic" campaigns to "personal salvation" unquestionably militated against a close scrutiny of the social and economic system which was at the root of working class disinterest in the church. Even the philanthropic zeal may have, knowingly or otherwise, been a "line of defence" against social or economic changes. The preaching was vigorous, but was too doctrinal, abstract and bound up with "middle class morality" to motivate many working class persons. The pronouncements and personalistic panaceas of churchmen failed to illicit workers' commitment to the church, not only because they failed to reach deeply enough into the actual life situation

¹ Fleming, op. cit., p.162.
² Wickham, op. cit., p.154.
of the poor, but also because churchmen failed to realise their own social aloofness and anti-working class biases.

2. Pacification.

Some of the dealings of the church, or leading churchmen, with the poor were even less salutary. These took the form of religiously-tinged opiates. Promotion of the doctrine that God had ordained the wide social disparities concealed blatantly self-interested motives of preserving the power and prestige structure that favoured the church's patrons. For instance, William Blackie penned a very popular book, *Better Days for Working People*, which combined pseudo-Christian platitudes and anti-revolutionary social thought. The status quo was so cleverly defended in his advice to workers, that employers in Glasgow actually had a cheap workers' edition printed and distributed in the factories. In the book, Blackie argues that the structure of society is good and beneficial; that it is ordained and ineluctable that workers should live in dire poverty; that coercive tactics like collective bargaining were morally and pragmatically wrong; that it is workers' primary duty to "be content with such things as ye have"; and that the hope of a better life resides in the fact that a few workers will rise above their class by applying lessons of frugality and industry learned from the middle class. He explains the purpose and tactic of these notions.

We don't wish to make them dissatisfied, or to awaken or inflame their jealousy towards those who are better off. We don't wish to see them in such luxury as shall tempt them to forget that they are but 'strangers and pilgrims here'. We don't wish their life so changed that it shall no longer furnish that noble spur to industry, and that inestimable training in habits of self-denial and regularity which are among the highest fruits of a life of labour.¹

When religion was used as a device to quiet (open or latent) turmoil among the underprivileged, it was understandably spurned by them. Guthrie, who was instrumental in forming schools for poor children (in itself forward-looking and commendable) described his rationale for the proposal with the same mixture of utilitarian religious and defensive class-interest; he warns that the higher classes must arm themselves against the poor, because they will be overthrown, "unless measures are employed to change the habits of this class and arrest its formidable advances". They must be Christianised, he argues, in order to become loyal citizens and to respect the property, privileges and freedom of others. "We must learn that the Bible is the cheapest, and in every way, the best instrument of government". According to Smith, "In opposition to the growing democratic sentiment and widespread demands for more liberal institutions ... all branches of the church, but particularly the established and Free churches, tended to stress only one aspect of Biblical teaching - the Christian duty of accepting the existing social order".

4. Sectarianism.

What inroads were made by religious organisations during the period were primarily made by sectarian groups. In the latter years of the century, the Salvation Army, in particular, managed to gain a foothold in the run-down sections of cities. Initially, the zealous efforts of William Booth, the founder and early promoter of the movement, were entirely directed toward" winning the souls" of the "lost sheep" of the slums. He said, "You don't need to mix up any other ingredients with the heavenly remedy". But a perceptive man as well as dedicated, Booth, before long, sounded very much like a socialist, fulminating against the dreadful conditions which made intemperance and misery an inevitable part of the worker's existence.

2. Ibid., p. 75.
3. Inglis, op. cit.
"He turned to social reform because he became convinced that poverty itself was a grave impediment to salvation". He came to realise, that to penetrate the slums, religion must come to grips with temporal conditions of life, and not rest its case with the future glories of the hereafter or the presumed equation of virtue and worldly success. The followers of the Army also had the advantage of being conspicuously unrepresentative of the conventional branches of the Church—marching through the streets in their uniforms, blaring out lively songs with brass instruments, and speaking the language of the people. They managed to identify with the plight of the slum inhabitants and to express down-to-earth involvement in their circumstances. But considering the potential numbers of "converted" in the areas of their mission, the Salvation Army’s successes were limited as well.

The Methodist Church, which in the eighteenth century England had come into prominence with a grass-roots movement among the lower orders of society, was not able to successfully appeal to the industrial workers of the nineteenth century. Huntington writes in 1871, "The successors of Wesley and Whitfield are now content, not with supplementing the labours of the Church by being pioneers, so to speak, for the parochial clergy, by missionary exertions directed specially to the recovery of the lost, but with addressing middle class people who can afford to pay for their pews". But one of the splinter Methodist groups, disaffected with the mother church, the Primitive Methodist Church, made appreciable headway among the working class, especially in English cities. "There can be no doubt that Primitive Methodism embraced more of the artisan class than any other church in the second half of the century".

Short-lived "Labour Churches" which "played down" Christian dogma and "played up" socialist dogma, gained a swarm of adherents in the last decade of the century but died out in a few years. Even the Mormons, who were just migrating to the

1. ibid, p. 195.
western part of America in mid-century, were able to proselyte with some success in the areas where anybody who could offer hope was welcome. Other sectarianists offered their assorted doctrines to the poor with varying degrees of success.

Considering the massive numbers unconnected with any church, the total effects of sectarian overtures to the working class were rather negligible. Indeed, in contrast with other periods when the social cleavage was immense and the lower strata estranged from the religious organisations of the privileged, the response to zealous religious movements springing from within the working class was not great. In previous centuries, such situations — though not altogether parallel, of course — had galvanised new fervour and new churches which provided the succour and opportunity for emotional release demanded by the rigours of life. It was in the fires of just such eras of turmoil that "churches of the disinherited" were forged in earlier times.

In America, as hordes poured into the flourishing new industrial cities, these too, as in Britain, felt ostracised by the cold, established churches. But their response was, among other things, the spontaneous development of a spate of lower class religious groups. These were emotional, other-worldly, fundamentalist, and fully adapted to the need of the uprooted urbanites for a community of hope within the environment of despair. Yinger informs us that, "In the costly churches, the poorer classes felt alienated. As a result, many new "holiness" churches began to appear — at least twenty-five holiness bodies came into existence between 1880 and 1926".2

A key point of comparison between the British and American scenes is the fact that during the same years alluded to by Yinger, in Britain the socialist movement was gaining momentum and capturing the energies and aspirations of working people. To be sure, there was simultaneous with the American sectarian recrudescence, a substantial American Labour movement, as well. But this movement, was

1. Huntington, op. cit., p. 137.
less radical than its British counterpart; only on its fringes was there agitation for a wholesale restructuring of the economic system; only its relatively small "left wing" directed their actions toward a socialistic paradise of the future. The American Labour movement was far less all-absorbing than the British; it had to share the spotlight with the non-secular, other-worldly means of succour - the lower class sects.

In contrast to America, the British sects never really "got off the ground". They were among the alternatives to the formalised religion of the established churches which working people had spurned, but in general, they fared poorly in competition with the other alternatives, in particular the Labour movement. Workers preferred to hitch themselves to the rising star of projected future economic order than to the disciplines of sectarian religion, to the future glories of the hereafter, or to a millenial paradise on earth of which they would be the spiritual heirs.

5. Summary of Church "Outreach".

Strangely enough, there was an abysmal lack of insight into the reasons for the working class rejection of the Church's outreach efforts. Most churchmen failed to understand their own true motives and rationalisations or the underlying reasons for working class abstention from the church. Few were able to rise above the pious moralism and invidious individualism and comprehend the church's dominating prejudices and misconceptions. One remarkable "voice crying in the wilderness" was an unidentified contributor to the Free Church Magazine in 1850. He showed unusual, "prophetic" grasp of the attitudes of the poor toward the misguided efforts of the church:

To them the Christian church rather appears an institution kept up for the benefit of an order of men - the clergy - or for the administration of certain services, in which the wealthy and middle classes somehow feel and interest and for the benefit of the poor ... they do not find her profession of regard to the comfort and welfare of the working man sufficiently borne out by her ordinary procedure."

A final illustration of the futility of the church's ministrations to the poor depicts several of the aspects that have been brought out, especially the superficiality of the message presented and the tacit middle-classness of the religion offered. The setting is the appalling and squalid Wynds of Glasgow, where the Free Church established a work among the destitute slum-dwellers. Though, "accounts of ministers who worker in the Wynds reveal a frightening picture of unbelievable misery, poverty and degradation among the people",¹ the ministers and lay workers never seemed to question the assumption that the attempt to change the spiritual condition of the people was a sufficient solution. In fact, physical destitution was consistently attributed to the moral failing of the victims.

Furthermore, the representatives of the church in the district were blind to the middle class orientation of the campaign. As Smith writes, "the Christian middle classes were bringing the poorer classes not only the Gospel, but a whole new way of life - a middle class way of life .... If the poor were to be fully 'Christianised' they had not only to accept the Gospel, but middle class morality and respectability as well".² In other words, the church's desire to recapture the allegiance of the uprooted poor in the industrial cities was thwarted by her own narrowness, blindness and ideological attachment to the higher strata. Whether efforts stemmed from evangelistic sincerity or class self interest they were doomed to failure by the church's whole structure and orientation.

Two salient features of the majority of church endeavours have recurrently appeared in our discussion: the colouring of the Christianity offered with class connotations and particular economic values, and the intransigent commitment to purely moralistic and evangelistic measures. The rejection of such efforts by the crowded inner-city inhabitants was overwhelming; allowing for scattered enclaves of sectarian success and revivalistic enthusiasm, it was almost total.

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¹ ibid, p.268.
² ibid, p.
Another important facet of the church’s relationship to the working classes was her dealings with the various forms and goals of the Labour Movement. I have already made mention of the fact that this movement, which provided a vehicle of secular remedies for the ills of the industrial workers’ life, may be seen as an alternative "religious" commitment. Further evidence to this effect will be forthcoming. I will also try to show that the church’s predominate posture toward such collective action was antagonistic, serving to further erect a wall of separation between herself and the lower strata. It will also be made clear that in the latter part of the century, a substantial number of churchmen endeavoured to "baptise" the movement under the auspices of "Christian socialism" and "the social gospel". But, it will appear that, although this religious intervention was significant both for the church and for the character of the movement, it did not result in a reconciliation of church and working class.

The removal of the church’s influence from the workers who crowded into the nineteenth century cities meant the loss of a major bulwark of norms and solidarity in their lives. We have seen that this void was partly filled by the efforts for materialistic solutions. The Labour movement gained momentum through the century as workers grew in the assurance that they could, by their own determination, produce a more equitable distribution of material goods. While the poorer classes were struggling in the new and frustrating environment, they were also striving to overcome a deep sense of social inferiority and to produce means of nullifying the powers arrayed against them. For most of the century the trade unions fought uphill battles with relatively few victories. Other working class institutions, like the Co-operative societies and Friendly societies, helped in a small measure to produce solidarity and independence in the working classes. But it was in the last decades of the century that the various movements and ideas coalesced under militant socialistic doctrines — partly borrowed from the Continent — and the movement began to come to fruition.
In the latter part of the century, too, there was appreciable unrest in the church regarding her middle class posture. Many made conscious efforts to identify with the aspirations of the Labour movement and to harness the energies of the church in its support. But even when such modified thinking emerged it represented minority opinion in the church; and throughout nearly all the decades of the century the church was a staunch ally of the ruling classes. The prevailing mood of the church was reactionary; by and large, she sanctified the crushing of Labour agitation and clearly cast her lot with the "have" vis-à-vis the "have nots".

Even when it was evident that workers were adamant in their demands for greater economic and political power, the church fought hand in hand with employers and Conservative politicians to preserve the existing order. Smith says that the church was "still more concerned with defending existing rights than abolishing existing wrongs. The sins she denounced were mostly those against good order and private property rather than those committed against a suffering and exploited humanity".\(^1\) He concludes that even "the most progressive and liberal churchmen failed to see how weighted was the system in which workers had little power with which to balance the power possessed by employers. They opposed all trade union agitation and industrial unrest and thus, perhaps unwittingly, made themselves tools in the hands of the possessing classes".\(^2\)

Lansbury claimed that all he remembered of the church's attitudes to labour demands "are sermons and articles written by learned Divines telling the workers to moderate their demand, and to give up using such terrible methods as those of the strike".\(^3\) He says the reason for the silence or opposition of the clergymen was that, "The money for maintaining churches and chapels comes very largely from rich men and women who benefit materially because of bad social conditions".\(^4\) One

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1. ibid., p. 277.
2. ibid., p. 281.
3. Lansbury, op. cit., p. 96.
4. ibid., p. 100.
of the pioneers of the British socialist movement, Keir Hardie, who was also an active churchman, claimed that many labour men had been driven out of the church by the unsympathetic attitude of the church toward the labour movement.  

There was often a bitter feeling directed at the church, that by the nature of her history and proclaimed mission in the world, she ought to have been in the forefront of the struggle for justice and eradication of poverty, but had habitually failed in her duty.  Just after the turn of the century, Haw writes, "today Labour feels that whatever social emancipation it has won has been not only without the churches, but often enough in spite of the churches."  He puts the case very bluntly, "The church to them is the enemy of Labour."  Years earlier Huntington reports the same feeling of workers that they had been abandoned by the church in their legitimate demands.  "Rightly or wrongly, too, the church herself was regarded as the enemy of freedom and the defender of abuses, and as setting herself against the education and enfranchisement of the people."  Inglis suggests that in England ministers directly "participated in suppressing radicalism."  

The anti-Labour disposition of the church intensified her unattractiveness to the workers.  The church was viewed, not only as a part of another culture, but as an antagonist against the workers' culture as well.  Thus, it was particularly the most thoughtful workers who deliberately surplanted allegiance to the Church with allegiance to the Trade Unions.  Wickham says that the movement, "certainly led many of the very cream and elite of the working class away from the churches, or, to be more precise, from the chapels."  A sort of "either-or" proposition was posed by the incompatibility of working class desire to improve their lot and the church's sustained advice to be content with their present position.  Richard Niebuhr says that one of the main reasons for the secular direction taken by the American Labour movement was the "absence of an effective social idealism within any of the Christian churches."  

2. Haw, op. cit., p. 16.  
3. ibid., p. 28.  
5. Inglis, op. cit., p. 8.  
Around the turn of the century, in Britain as elsewhere, there was an appreciable break in the church's line of defence against the demands of workers. A new and radical outlook emerged within the churches. The Labour movement found itself with articulate allies within organised religion as well as outside of it. This was the hey-day of the "Social Gospel". Though not without opposition from the more traditional voices, a considerable number of respected churchmen came to proclaim Christianity as a basically social doctrine concerned with bringing an end to inequality and ushering in a "millenium" of social harmony, justice and material bliss for all. Many of the early socialist leaders in the country were delighted to identify their programme with the teachings of Christ. Jesus and the Apostles were reinterpreted as social reformers of the first order: the essence of Christian faith was now the elimination of social and economic barriers and the fulfillment of social bliss in the here-and-now.

R.J. Campbell, one of the clergymen converted to the promulgation of Socialist doctrine wrote, "the practical end which alone could justify the existence of churches is the realisation of the Kingdom of God, which only means the reconstruction of society on a basis of mutual helpfulness instead of strife and competition". Describing his own re-enlightenment, he writes,

The realisation that this other-worldliness was totally absent from primitive Christian thought forced me, like so many others, upon what was practically the Socialist position without any first-hand acquaintance with the Socialist movement itself. I now regard Socialism as the practical expression of Christian ethics and the evangel of Jesus.

Smith reports that,

The dominant type of Socialism in Scotland was marked by a high moral and spiritual tone and was neither Marxist or anti-Christian ... not surprisingly though, it did tend to be anti-clerical and critical of the institutional church's past and present Social passivity, her subservience to the privileged classes, and her acceptance of Capitalism.

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2. Campbell, op. cit., p. 7
3. ibid., p. 9
The leaders of the "Christian Socialism" crusade were convinced they were helping to bring the churches back to their basic responsibility as well as implementing the goals of labour agitation. Said John Hodge, an early Labour M.P., "I venture to say that the uprising of the Labour Party has given to the churches ... their lost ideal so far as Christianity is concerned ... The churches for years back had their eyes cast so much upon heaven that they had all but forgotten earth".¹ Keir Hardie remarked that, "the impetus which drove me first of all into the Labour movement, and the inspiration which has carried me on to it, has been derived more from the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, than from all other sources combined".²

Many consider it significant that the British Socialist movement derived some of its impetus from Christian teaching and religious leaders. Greenslade makes this assessment, "In contrast with continental Socialism, the British Labour movement grew up within, rather than in opposition to, the Christian tradition, a fact of overwhelming importance in the life of the nation".³ Clergymen who had been won over to the cause of the Labour movement often spoke of "bringing the Kingdom" as the main task of the church and clearly indicated that this "Kingdom" was to be a utopia based on social equality and material abundance.⁴ Indeed, the ministers of the "social gospel" persuasion believed that the church had for many centuries obfuscated her mission to improve life in this world by concern with the life to come.

Of course, the "social awakening" in the church included many shades of political and economic opinion, from the most radical programme to mild sermons about "love for our fellow men". The main point is that the church's fortress in defence of the existing structure crumbled at a number of points; many within

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¹ Hardie, op. cit., p.15.
² ibid., p. 49.
³ Greenslade, op. cit., p.117.
⁴ Hayward, op. cit., p.11.
the church acknowledged the one-sidedness of her social and economic position and openly called for revision. Having accepted the worst products of the industrial age - the slums, poverty, depressions and general degradation of the working class - for a century, as but minor flaws in a beneficient system, individual church leaders were finally calling into question the presuppositions and practical expressions of the system.

But the question which naturally arises out of this discussion is, what were the practical effects of the church's baptism of working class ideals and struggles? For one thing, the British movement influenced the similar recovery of social idealism in America. Herberg writes, "But the most significant effort of American Protestantism to meet the challenge of the new America was the "Social Gospel" and the social action agencies that went along with it. The Christian Socialist movement, originating in England, had begun to make some impression on certain sections of American Protestantism." Furthermore, the expression of these radical ideas in religious terms had the effect of hastening reform with a minimum of violence and revolutionary sentiment. No doubt, too, the sympathy of prominent churchmen for the workers' cause went some way in alleviating the rift between the churches and working class.

However, the end result of the alliance of ministers and the Labour movement was by no means a wholesale inclusion of workers in the church. In the long run, the Labour movement was to become more purely secular and workers were to continue to keep their distance from institutional religion. Workers were only united to the church within the limited boundaries of this alliance for working class improvement. "Social Gospel" and "Christian Socialism" may have helped stem the alienation of workers from the church, and were certainly influential in giving the Labour movement greater respectability and social acceptance; but they did not appreciably alter the pattern of involvement in the formal programme of the church.

Probably the major reason for the minimal impact on workers' church involvement was the fact that most ministers and churchmen were not enlisted in the crusade. These ideas never represented more than a small minority opinion in Scotland. "The majority of churchmen ... claimed that Christianity and Socialism were irreconcilable ... and held most firmly to the old individualism." Keir Hardie, the Scottish "Christian Socialist" denounced the anti-Labour sentiments of most clergymen and blamed this for workers' disinterest in the church:

The whole tendency of the church's teaching is toward the assumption that the working man is an inferior creation who stands in need of being elevated ... make the application of Christianity to present day life a reality, and none will support it with more zeal than the workers.

Therefore, it was the Labour movement which gained ground from the scattered support of certain clergymen and influential laymen; the church did not reap a harvest of working class participation. In the final analysis, taking a comprehensive view, the church's posture was little changed and the socio-religious cleavage was little attenuated.

As Smith concludes:

However, although ... there were numerous signs of a change in the attitude of many churchmen toward organised working classes in this period, it must not be supposed that within the space of a few years, the whole church had completely abandoned her former antagonism towards the working class movements and suddenly became vigorously pro-Labour in her outlook ... there was ample evidence in contemporary sources of continuing influence of the older views ... it should not be surprising that a strong middle class bias against the articulate, socially and politically aroused element of the working classes still found a place in representative church circles.

F. SUMMARY

We have seen that the early years of urbanisation and industrialisation established a self-sustaining separation between the church and the working class. Whatever have been the vicissitudes of church participation in the intervening

years, the near-complete estrangement of industrial workers from the church in the nineteenth century is of primary significance for our investigation of the present-day church-class relationship in Scotland.

A complex amalgam of forces combined to produce this socio-religious fissure. The initiating cause appears to be the structural and normative disruption of the rural society in which the church was deeply rooted. Not only were great numbers disgorged from this familiar setting, but the church lacked the foresight or flexibility to transfer her institutional centrality to the inner-city districts. She was never able to function as an integrative, normative force among the crowded masses in the factory centers. The conditions produced by early industrialism further removed the working classes from the religious view of life predominant in the countryside. Instead, the new values, movements and means of succour which emerged were thoroughly secular. The deep class divisions and the wide social gulf of the industrial cities was reflected in the patterns of religious behaviour. In short, both rapid social change and differential class conditions in the industrial areas were motivating factors in producing this working class religious abstention.

The attitudes and operation of the church also provide clues to working class irreligion. In the burgeoning industrial cities the church plainly identified herself with the values and aspirations of the prosperous elements. Her efforts to attract the oppressed factory labourers was aimed almost exclusively at what she considered spiritual and moral laxity, and failed to take serious account of the social and material barrenness of their existence. The church was, therefore, viewed by most workers as both irrelevant to practical life and hostile to their desire for economic betterment. Belated social concern expressed in the "Social Gospel" and "Christian socialism" at the end of the century failed to significantly alter the pattern of working class non-involvement in the church, but did make some contribution to the cause of the Labour movement. However, only a minority of
churchmen were able to detach themselves from their middle class orientation and anti-Labour biases. It may finally be concluded that the cultural pattern of life among the urban working classes which were established in this era, for the most part, excluded the practice of institutional religion. Today's roughly similar configuration of class involvement in the church is in a large part a legacy of the nineteenth century.
CHAPTER IX - CHURCH LEADERSHIP PROFILE

A. EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE.

B. THE SAMPLE.

C. SOCIAL - POLITICAL CHARACTER OF CHURCH LEADERSHIP.

D. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHURCHES REPRESENTED.
   1. Church Influence.
   2. Church Composition by Class.
   3. Clergy - Laity Relationship.
   4. Social Contact Among Church Members.

E. OPINIONS REGARDING CHURCH'S POSITION AND STRENGTH.
   1. Social Action of the Church.
   2. Opinions on Contemporary Relevance of the Church.

F. OPINIONS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

E. SUMMARY.
A. EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE

Another pillar supporting the interpretive structure is built by data from the survey of Commissioners to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in the Spring of 1964. The focus of this chapter is the social orientation and attitudes of this selected segment of the leadership of the National Church. In bringing these data into consideration, my basic purpose is to discover any available clues to the class differences in church participation from the backgrounds and perspectives of these prominent representatives of the church. The expectation, naturally, on the basis of the foregoing historical survey and the present-day church involvement patterns which have been observed, is a strong middle class orientation. The exploration which follows confirms this expectation, providing an imposing suggestion that the church maintains a "built-in" middle class bias.

A secondary, complimentary, purpose, is to catch a glimpse of the "mind" of the church concerning contemporary social, economic and religious issues. Such a glimpse should make a useful addition to our understanding of the church’s stance in relation to the wider panorama of social institutions and events.

Rather than giving a detailed treatment to the data of this survey, an overview of the material will be compressed into one short chapter. Four areas of information will be summarised and tabulated: the social background of clergy and elders (and present occupational status of the elders); the assessment and observations of the leaders concerning their own churches; opinions about the church in her action and relationship to people generally; and opinions about an array of social and economic questions.

B. THE SAMPLE

Preliminary to delving into the four areas of survey data, let me make clear the nature of the sample and survey procedures. Prior to the annual convention of the Church’s central legislative body, The General Assembly, a questionnaire was
sent by post to nearly all of the appointed Commissioners. One half of the Commissioners are ministers, each of whom attends the Assembly once every four years. The other half is composed of elders, who are appointed by their local Presbyteries (regional bodies of elders and ministers which carry authority in matters of church policy and government). A representative cross-section of ministers is commissioned each year, but the elders are rather untypical since availability is one paramount consideration in their selection. It is appreciated by officials of the church, and was stated to me by some of these, that the elders commissioned tend to be preponderantly older men, many of whom are retired. (Considering the availability factor, the question was posed to each of the elders among the Commissioners: "Was your ability to 'get away' the overriding consideration?" Nearly one-half, forty-six per cent, responded in the affirmative, testifying to the centrality of this matter).

Of the 1,300 questionnaires distributed, 520 were returned, a return rate of forty per cent. In addition, a number of letters came in (about forty) with a variety of explanations for not returning the questionnaire. Though church officials commented (on the basis of their experience) that the response was extremely good, especially for ministers, two unfortunate factors no doubt held it down somewhat. First, the list of Commissioners was not available until about a fortnight prior to the Assembly. Since I wanted to provide the respondents with the questionnaire before the Assembly (with its possible effects on their opinions) the forms were then immediately sent out. All but a small minority of the completed questionnaires were returned before the Assembly opened, but had there been longer before the event and less distraction in preparation for it (the Church sent each Commissioner a number of preparatory materials) the response rate might well have been increased. Secondly, lack of funds and the oncoming of the holiday season disallowed follow-up letters. Had follow-up been feasible, it would likely have elicited further responses, and would also have provided better means of controlling any self-selection distortions.
Perhaps the most important clue to the lines of any such distortion of the sample is deducible from letters of those men who explained their option to leave the questionnaire unanswered. A number of these very pointedly criticised the whole venture of sociological penetration of the church. To be sure, the majority of comments appended to the completed forms were kind and encouraging, as were some of the letters suggesting that the sender for some reason felt unable to give assistance. But a substantial number, who it may be assumed represent the views of many more who made no reply, indicated definite opposition to my quest for information. I think it is legitimate to assume that the Commissioners who react very negatively to an inquiry about the church - which is certainly no more "personal" or probing than the familiar public opinion surveys by major organisations - are of a more "reactionary" sort than those who willingly comply. If this is the case, then it may well be that the respondents represent a more "liberal" segment of church leadership than the non-respondents. The tone of this vocal opposition is dramatised by the excerpts from letters given anonymously below.

I find the enclosed a perplexing document, which I have made no effort to fill in but please note: ... if you really desire answers to the personal questions in Section I, 14-23, I suggest you will find most, if not all, of them in 'Who's Who' ... The fact that I am a member of the Conservative Party covers most if not all the questions in Section III.

I am glad that you are aware of your presumption in asking ministers (or elders for that matter), to reply to questions of a very personal nature. I would not, however, impute impertinence to your questionnaire so much as irrelevance ... It would be more scholarly - though admittedly might entail more research on your own part - to study the Church's official reports ... in order to get a worthwhile statement on the Church's attitude to such community and political matters ...

I am instructed by -------- to say that he cannot accede to your request that he should complete your form, as he is not in the habit of disclosing his private affairs or opinions to outside sources. He also wishes me to say that as an Elder of the Church of Scotland for some years standing, he does not think it a part of an Elder's duty to answer such questions as you use ...
I regard your questionnaire as a quite unwarranted intrusion. I consider that you should never have been provided with the list of Commissioners to the General Assembly for this purpose. We are not interested in the politics or status of our membership in the fellowship of the Church. The "Loaded Questions" of Section III are especially dangerous, and if members of Commission are misguided enough to comply with your request I dread to think what a distorted picture you may eventually present.

I have not got time to complete a questionnaire which is largely pointless.

Rubbish.

Any minister of the Church of Scotland who has time to complete this taradiddle is taking money under false pretences. America may be brainwashed into a form filling existence. We are not. And we know that statistics can prove anything even what is known to be untrue.

Never in my life have I received a questionnaire of this nature, and no-one has any right to interfere with one's private life. I have never experienced rudeness like this, and that stands for my elder as well as for myself. Answers to questions like these can never be of any value to anybody, and God help the Church whose leaders have no more to do than send out a questionnaire of this nature to men who are trying to do their level best both for the Church and for the community in which they reside.

Another Commissioner who did complete the form appended this comment, "I am afraid this enquiry is not being well received by some ministers according to conversations I have heard". Quite an understatement! The fact that such negative dispositions toward the survey is one substantiated reason for non-response, is worth bearing in mind as it tends to suggest that the stance of non-respondents may be even more conservative than that of the respondents, for whom, of course, we have definite information.

In terms of the age distribution of the sample, we can see from the age profiles in Table IX - 1 below, that while ministers are scattered over a quite "Natural" age curve for such a professional group, with the modal point within the 50-59 age bracket, the elders are predictably concentrated in the higher age brackets over one-half falling in the above 60 years brackets.
### TABLE IX - 1.

**AGE PROFILES OF COMMISSIONERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>sub-40</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-69</th>
<th>70+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>(257)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>(241)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(498)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: total 'N' will always add up to less than 520, the number of returned questionnaires, due to a number of partially completed forms).

A very rough demarcation is made with regard to community size in Table IX - 2 below using a Rural-urban dichotomy. "Urban" includes men from the "four cities" of Scotland - Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen; plus a small additional number from major satellite towns; "rural" refers to all others regardless of county, proximity to an urban area or size of town.

### TABLE IX - 2

**RURAL - URBAN DISTRIBUTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>(241)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>(231)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(472)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. SOCIAL - POLITICAL CHARACTER OF CHURCH LEADERSHIP.

Information was obtained regarding the occupational statuses and educational attainment of the elders which is tabulated below (Tables IX - 3 and IX - 4).
Obviously, there is no point in relating similar information for ministers who, with few exceptions, have University and Seminary training. The data reveals the expected high status character of the elders and their concomitant above average educational profile.

Because of the anticipated "weighting" of the status distribution to non-manual positions, the classification system was tailored to demonstrate the gradations of middle class more precisely than it shows the gradations of manual occupations. A single "working class" category contains all levels of manual status whereas non-manual is broken down into "Upper" (combined here with Upper Middle, since only 4% of the elders are allocated this highest status); "Upper Middle"; "Middle"; and "Lower Middle" classes. The basic contents of the class groupings are: "Upper and Upper Middle" - higher professionals, civil servants, government officials, company owners, directors or high officials and substantial land owners; "Middle" - teachers, managers and lesser officials, lower professionals and independent farmers; "Lower Middle" - clerical and office workers, shopkeepers, salesmen and foremen. Regretably, a number of the elders indicated that they were retired without stating their pre-retirement occupational positions. These are included in the final column of Table IX - 3. Where retired elders provided information as to the position held before retirement they have been included in one of the status categories.
TABLE IX - 3  
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF ELDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Upper and Upper Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Working (Manual)</th>
<th>Retired</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(238)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IX - 4  
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF ELDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum Secondary education</th>
<th>Advanced Secondary education</th>
<th>Teacher's College or other specialised advanced training</th>
<th>University degree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(206)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly we may conclude from these data that the elders appointed Commissioners preponderently middle class, comply with expectations. The next step in examining social orientation takes us back to the previous generation - the social backgrounds of clergy as well as elders which are presented by the following tabulation of fathers' occupations. It will be noticed that, on the average, ministers hail from even higher status homes than do the elders. On this, and several following measures, a further urban-rural breakdown is included. What little difference is made by this demarcation suggests slightly higher status origins for the "rural" church leaders.
### TABLE IX - 5

**OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF COMMISSIONERS' FATHERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Upper &amp; Upper Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINISTERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(137)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(230)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDERS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(211)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-third of the urban elders are from working class homes, the highest incidence of lower status background for any of the groups. Over four-fifths of the ministers overall, and exactly three-fourths of the elders, are from non-manual parentage. It has been pointed out in several societies that ministers are normally attracted from relatively high status homes. For instance, Lenski states that, "If our sample was at all representative, the white Protestant ministers of Detroit are disproportionately recruited from middle class homes".

The same situation almost certainly obtains in the Church of England. Leslie Paul reviews data showing that "the diocesan bishop is well connected and the family into which he is born is probably either clerical or professional".¹

Consistent with the prevalently middle class origins are the data on political affiliation. The assumed Tory inclination of non-manual persons is evident. There is also an appreciable Liberal preference, especially among the ministers where a greater number vote Liberal than vote for the Labour party. Less than one fifth of the Commissioners, overall, say they usually vote for the Labour party. This is a striking confirmation of the absence of working class identification on the part of church leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IX - 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministers:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elders:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflecting the Liberal strength in the northern rural areas of Scotland, there are higher proportions of Liberal choices among both ministers and elders from

from rural sections. The most Labour oriented group are the urban elders who, as we have noted, more often than the other groups come from working class homes. None-the-less, overall, elders have even fewer Labour party choices than do ministers and an appreciably higher proportion of Conservative party selections (72% to 59%). What is most significant for class differentiation in church participation is the decided non-Labour bias of the church leaders.

A further indicator of social orientation is in the form of a question concerning "closest personal friendships". Specifically, the question called for the occupations of the four persons in the community, excluding relatives, with whom the respondent enjoyed the "closest personal relationship", and whether or not each of these persons was a member of the respondent's church congregation. Answers to the first part of the query, the class base of friendship, are given in Table IX - 7. All of the replies (reported occupations of friends) are combined into a single table IX - 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>Upper Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(248)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(395)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(643)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(330)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(397)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(727)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, this table supports the observation of a notable middle class orientation of church leaders, demonstrating the fact that this orientation is not confined to class backgrounds and political commitments but, as would be expected, it is also clearly at work in selection of personal friends. Such a non-working-class context of intimate relationships would certainly tend to reinforce the basic middle class "belongingness" of the clergy and lay leaders, and the natural middle class bias accompanying such a frame of reference. Being enmeshed in the life of the church, as these church leaders clearly are, does not appear to stimulate close personal ties across class lines. In other words, the church does not seem to create effective liaisons between class sections of the community, at least so far as intimate relationships are concerned. A point of marked interest is that urban ministers sustain friendships, on the whole, farthest removed from the working class, even though many of the ministers have parishes within rather homogeneous working class districts.

Turning to the question of whether these friends are among the members of the respondents' own church congregation, two points especially stand out in Table IX - 8. First, ministers are more likely than elders to be close to fellow church members. Second, among both ministers and elders, the rural sections report a higher proportion of friends within their own churches.
TABLE IX - 8

PROPORTION OF CLOSEST FRIENDS IN OWN CHURCH CONGREGATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Friends Mentioned</th>
<th>% in own Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(399)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(699)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(331)</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(442)</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(743)</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: the numbers in this table do not correspond with those in IX - 7 because some respondents answered only the second part of the question but gave no occupations).

It is, I think, particularly notable that urban elders, who we may assume are among the most absorbed in church activities and relationships, report less than half of their closest local friendships within the church congregation. This would seem to add some support to the conclusion that the urban church provides a very limited context of communal belongingness. None-the-less, the overall figure (sixty per cent of closest friends are church members) it is undoubtedly far higher than would be the case for people other than ministers and leading laymen.

The foregoing data thoroughly confirms the expected middle class bias of ministers and elders. The men in this sample are overwhelmingly middle class in family background, education and personal friendships and are over eighty per cent non-Labour in political commitment. Such a decisive class bias is bound to make an impression on the style and "drawing-power" of the church. The whole operation of the church, and method of presenting her message, is undoubtedly coloured by this
"well-to-do" orientation of her top-level leadership. Clock and Stark refer to American surveys that show the governing bodies to be far higher in status composition than the congregations they represent. The conclusion drawn is apt for our study, "The Church more than most other institutions in society, is committed to serve everyone without regard to sex, age, economic position, race, or ethnic group membership... It would seem that the relative exclusion of certain groups from church government can only serve to reduce the church's capacity to follow out its commitment in practice".  

D. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHURCHES REPRESENTED

A series of questions were included which requested information about the churches represented by the respondents: their influence on the membership and community, the class composition of their congregations and Sessions (Boards of Elders), and the amount of contact between members of the same class and different classes.

1. Church Influence.

A scale of five choices from "very strong" to "very weak" was given to the men pertaining to the church's influence on her membership and on the community at large. So few "very weak" replies resulted that these are included with the "weak" answers in both cases. First, Table IX - 9 presents opinions of the influence of the respondents' churches on their own congregations.

TABLE IX - 9

REPORTED CHURCH INFLUENCE ON THE CONGREGATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>very strong</th>
<th>strong</th>
<th>moderate</th>
<th>weak</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rural elders are a bit more prone to see the church as maintaining a merely "weak" influence of her membership. Otherwise the patterns of response are quite similar, with nearly two-thirds of the total opting for the "moderate" label.

The community as a whole is seen as less under the influence of the church than the church congregation, which is hardly surprising. "Moderate" is again the majority choice and there is on this measure considerable consistency between the various groupings.
TABLE IX - 10

REPORTED CHURCH INFLUENCE ON THE "COMMUNITY"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>very strong</th>
<th>strong</th>
<th>moderate</th>
<th>weak</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(135)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(221)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(127)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(221)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Church Composition by Class.

Information relevant to the differential class involvement in the church for the whole of Scotland was elicited by the question, "Which of the following would you say describes the compositions of your church congregation?" Four alternatives were provided: "mainly manual working class"; "mainly middle and professional class" "quite evenly manual working and middle class" and "don't know". Excluding the very few "don't know" replies, the results appear in Table IX - 11.
### TABLE IX - 11

**SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF CHURCH CONGREGATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministers:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elders:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Superficially, it may seem that the proportion of "mainly working class" selections is strikingly high, that the report thereby contradicts the previous finding of greater incidence of middle class than working class church participation. But the results are found to be compatible with the general phenomenon of middle class over-representation in the church when three further considerations are brought to bear on the data. First, the table shows that for both ministers and elders there is reported a closer balance between working class and middle class churches in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Working class abstention from the church is thought of primarily as an urban phenomenon, though not entirely so. A very crude statistical operation brings out the difference. If for the sake of discovering a rough ratio of working class to middle class participation in church congregations, we assume exactly equal proportions for the "quite even" selections
and completely one-class congregations for the "mainly" working class or middle class selections, and further assume that all congregations are the same size (or average out in this way), then we deduce these ratios: (Working class to middle class) rural - 2 to 1; urban - 11 to 9; and total - 3 to 2.

Second, to make these ratios really meaningful, we need to relate them to the proportions of working class and middle class persons in the Scottish population as a whole. Analysis of the 1951 Census data shows that the country is, in fact, something like four-fifths working class on the basis of the Registrar General's system of classification. Taking all grades of "wage earners" - 61% of the total male population were classified (Classes III, IV, and V) as what we may term "working class". Even if we allow for some swelling of the ranks of non-manual workers due to structural economic changes in the past fifteen years, and if we assume that some of the most highly skilled within the Registrar General's system may be accorded a "middle class" label, we would still find a ratio of working class to middle class something in the order of three to one. On this basis, it is clear that, relative to the class proportions in the population, workers are greatly under-represented in the churches, especially in the urban churches. (Even though there is considerable room for inexactitude in this procedure, the likely distortions could not seriously attenuate the conclusions).

In fact, a third consideration introduces evidence that informs us of an even larger proportion of middle class church participation than the above figures reveal. I have controlled the reported class composition of congregations by the reported average Sunday morning attendance of the churches. The result is a significant positive correlation of congregational size and middle class incidence of participation. Estimating ratios by the same method outlined above, we find for congregations of under 200 average Sunday morning attendance, a nearly 5 to 2 predominance of working class persons; for congregations 200 or over in Sunday
morning attendance the ratio of working class to middle class persons is just over 5 to 4. Furthermore, for the very largest churches, those with at least 400 present on Sunday morning, the "mainly middle class" churches actually outnumber the "mainly working class" churches.

The impact of this differential class composition of large and small churches is of great magnitude when we note that nearly half again as many churches are described as having 200 or more in attendance on Sunday mornings than those described as attracting fewer than this number. Taking into account both of these factors - church attendance ratios by class vis a vis class ratios for the whole population and the pattern of increased middle class representation in larger churches - we may conclude that the reports of the church leaders consistent with the class configuration obtaining in Prestonfield and in western societies generally.

Respondents were also asked to describe the class composition of the "church session" by choosing from the same alternatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IX - 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF CHURCH SESSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an over ten per cent shift to "mainly middle class" in ascribing status to Sessions vis a vis congregations, with a continuing higher middle class
proportion in the reports of urban ministers and elders than in the reports of rural churchmen. Interestingly, the elders "weight" their replies toward "middle class" to a far greater extent than do the ministers. And in terms of the "church size" variable the greater middle class representation in large churches compared with those under 200 in attendance is even more noticeable within the Sessions than within the whole congregations. So the lay leadership of the church is described as higher status than the congregations which they represent. Even so, the elders as a whole in the churches described are far more heterogeneous in class than are the elders in the sample. The Commissioner-elders are tacitly admitting that they are, overall, untypically high in status.

3. Clergy - Laity Relationship.

Five alternatives, ranging from "intimate" to "hostile" were provided as possible answers to the question: "Which of the following best describes the relationship between ministry and laity in your church?" No one selected the "hostile" alternative and very few the "distant" choice, so the latter is combined with "formal" answers in the table, Table IX - 13. The majority throughout, in fact, select the most moderate answer, "Quite close".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IX - 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MINISTRY &amp; LAITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most interesting feature of this profile of responses is that elders, on the average, do not see the clergy-laity relationship as nearly so close as ministers see it. Nearly one fourth of the elders describe this relationship as "formal" or "distant"; only 7% of the ministers do so. It is a particularly meaningful disparity when we consider that these elders are bound to be among the closest to the ministers of any in the congregations. Surely the answers for less-involved segments of the congregations would be far more at variance with the ministers' replies. We may recall, for instance, that most of the men in the Prestonfield sample did not think that ministers are usually "closely in touch with people" (Chapter VII). The striking optimism of ministers in describing the relationship seems to indicate a failure to appreciate the "distance" felt by a great many who are active participants in the church, and overwhelmingly by those who are not active in the church.

4. Social Contact Among Church Members.

A series of four questions were designed to elicit an appraisal of the "communal" strength of the churches represented. The first half of this series of questions - the first two questions - was presented in this manner:

Among the members of your church from the same social class, how much contact would you say there is:
(a) in social activities connected with the church?
(b) in social activities not connected with the church?

The same format was then repeated with the words "different social classes" substituted for "the same social class". First, Table IX - 14 relates the figures for church connected activities.
TABLE IX - 14
CONTACT BETWEEN MEMBERS IN CHURCH-CONNECTED ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same Class</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>great deal</th>
<th>occasional</th>
<th>little</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(131)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(220)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(221)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Classes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(127)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(206)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>(214)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the relationships between minister and members, clergymen tend to be extremely optimistic about the relationships between member and member, perhaps unrealistically so; they consistently describe a greater measure of inter-member contact than do the elders. Predictably, members of different classes are seen as enjoying less social activity - even church-connected activity - than socially similar members. Notably, only one-fourth of the elders say there is a "great deal" of church-connected activity.
Of course, there is a general reduction in frequency of contact described when we turn to inter-member social contact outside the church.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IX - 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTACT BETWEEN MEMBERS OUTSIDE THE CHURCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ministers' inclination to report appreciable more contact between members than do elders appears again in regard to activities outside the church. But a salient urban-rural variation also comes to the fore. Throughout, members of non-city churches are described as enjoying more mutual contact outside the church.
in comparison with urban church members. The disparity is of a high magnitude when members of different classes are under consideration. Extremely few ministers or elders of urban churches say there is "a great deal" of contact between members from different classes outside the church. This observation gives additional, and substantial, support to the suggestion that churches do not act as communal settings in which heterogeneous social groups are drawn into close personal relationships. Whatever heterogeneity of urban church congregations obtains, is confined to the church itself; it does not provide the basis for outside-the-church ties or personal friendships.

E. OPINIONS REGARDING CHURCH'S POSITION & STRENGTH

The final section of the questionnaire consisted of a series of eighteen propositions related to issues of religious, social and economic importance. Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of support or opposition to these propositions by selecting one of five alternatives: "strongly support", "support", "don't know", "oppose" and "strongly oppose". The several relevant areas of questions were not separated, but rather questions were thoroughly interspersed. Propositions pertaining to the church, for purposes of analysis, are divided into those involving the social action of the church and those involving the church's relevance to individuals today. Henceforth, I will dispense with the urban-rural dichotomy as it has generally minor effect on the following profiles of opinion.

1. Social Action of the Church.

Responses to three propositions concerning the church's social action and pronouncements are summarised in tabular form below. "Don't know" selections are eliminated from the breakdown and for simplification only the percentage of supportive answers (combining both degrees of support) are given in each instance.
TABLE IX - 16
OPINIONS ON CHURCH'S SOCIAL ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The church has not demonstrated sufficient concern for the temporal conditions of people (economic situation, working conditions, etc)&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The church should not make official pronouncements on political and economic questions&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Social welfare should form a major part of the church's task in spreading the gospel&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variation between ministers and elders is not appreciable on the first and third propositions. As Prestonfield respondents have already shown, the church is preponderantly seen as an institution which should concern herself with matters of social welfare; ministers and elders are about evenly divided over the question of whether this responsibility has been sufficiently carried out. Elders are a good deal more likely to say that the church should avoid making "official" pronouncements on non-religious questions, however.

2. Opinions on Contemporary Relevance of the Church.

The five propositions tabulated below are less focused in theme but can all be seen to relate to the above rubric. The penultimate statement about the effect of internal divisions in the church is, perhaps, sui generis, but certainly pertinent to the church's impact in society.
TABLE IX - 17

OPINIONS ON CHURCH'S RELEVANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Ministers (N)</th>
<th>% Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The church today is identified by most people too much with social tradition&quot;</td>
<td>(223)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(195)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ministers are generally too aloof from the lives of lay people&quot;.</td>
<td>(229)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(211)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Most workers consider the church and her message to be quite irrelevant to their situations&quot;.</td>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(199)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Social and economic differences between members have seriously hindered the unity and brotherhood of the church&quot;.</td>
<td>(222)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(212)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Church people today, in general, are becoming more secular and materialistic&quot;.</td>
<td>(225)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(214)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some interesting prima facie contradictions appear when we examine the patterns of response to these propositions, even though there is a remarkable degree of agreement between ministers and elders. In the first place, the majority agree that the church is too much identified with social tradition and that she is considered irrelevant by most workers. On the other hand, the majority declare that ministers are not too aloof and that the "unity and brotherhood" of the Church has not been seriously hindered by socio-economic divisions. Of course, there is substantial minority disagreement with the majority opinion on all of these issues. None-the-less, the prevailing opinions do not seem to present a consistent perspective. Apparently, these church leaders are aware that the church's image is somewhat deficient, especially among working class persons, but they do not attribute this deficiency, in the main, to clerical distance or social differences. In contrast with the church leaders, our Prestonfield data suggests
agreement with all of these propositions. It is plausible that those who are in positions of institutional responsibility would be less willing to express severe criticisms of the institution than those with looser connections. Or it may be that social bias and social distance operate in such subtle ways as to be hidden from those who are deeply enmeshed in the organisational structure of the church.

**F. OPINIONS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS**

The final area of analysis comprises a number of the propositions expressing viewpoints on social, economic, and political issues. I have classified these according to a rough "conservative" - "radical" dichotomy. These terms are employed, not in the sense of direct connection with British political parties but as revealing general propensity for traditionalism and "status quo" (conservative) or preference for altering the existing structure of society (radical). The distinction, though useful for heuristic purposes, will be seen to imperfectly encompass the various propositions.

Two groups of propositions will be considered in order: those expressing an essentially "conservative" or "right wing" point of view and those expressing an essentially "radical" or "liberal" sentiment. On the basis of the preponderantly high status and Tory leanings of both ministers and elders, it is natural to expect a higher measure of support for the "conservative" than for the "radical" propositions. In fact, though the opinions do strain in this direction, the contrast is not as great as might be anticipated.

The three "conservative" propositions below are mainly economic in nature but have social and political ramifications as well. The tabulated results reveal a notably stronger conservative stance on the part of elders than on the part of ministers.
TABLE IX - 18
PROPOSITIONS WITH CONSERVATIVE BIAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Ministers (N)</th>
<th>Elders (N)</th>
<th>% Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The biggest obstacle to economic expansion is too high wage demands&quot;.</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;It would likely prove dangerous to individual liberty to nationalise more of the nation's industries&quot;.</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Trade unions today wield too much power&quot;.</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The natural expectation of high support for conservative ideas on the part of those high-status church leaders is confirmed very convincingly for the elders but not particularly convincingly for the ministers. Averaging the combined support for the three propositions, the resulting percentages are: ministers - 59% and elders - 71%. The ministers' average support is diminished by an almost evenly divided opinion on the first proposition concerning "too high wage demands".

Three propositions are considered as presenting a "radical" case, perhaps more properly a "liberal" case for the ideas are not extremely radical; they do not call for any thorough-going restructuring of economic power but rather for "egalitarian" modifications in the present system. While both groups (ministers and elders) are less supportive of these statements than of the conservative statements, the difference between the two groups is insignificant.
TABLE IX - 19
PROPOSITIONS WITH RADICAL BIAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Government should control land prices and use the nation's land for the general welfare&quot;.</td>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>(202)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>(212)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Industrial monopolies and high profit margins are greatly responsible for the country's economic woes&quot;.</td>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>(207)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public boarding school is an outmoded institution which is in opposition to the principles of democracy&quot;.</td>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>(209)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>(201)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By combining the support for the three statements we find that there is an average support of 55% by the ministers and 52% by the elders. It is especially interesting - and on the face of it, anomalous - that the first two propositions receive majority support by both groups as these are not only mildly radical in tone but are in line with Labour party doctrine. Only the statement condemning the "public school" is, on the whole, opposed. Among this group of church leaders, then, who are generally middle class and pro-Tory, there seems to coexist a relatively strong support for conservative ideas (in the case of the ministers, a less definite leaning) and a less extensive but considerable support for mildly radical ideas. Clearly, of course, the two sets of propositions are not diametrically in opposition and may be logically adhered to within a single rational - though, perhaps, unusual - ideological system. But the result does seem to partially attenuate the very conservative image presented by the social and political character of the churchmen.

On the one question of "privilege", that pertaining to the "public school", the ministers are, for the only time, found to the "right" of the elders. Remembering that the class origins of the clergy were even higher than those of the
elders, and that the ministers are even better educated as a group, it is very probable that a higher proportion of them attended a "public school". Thus ministers may be especially tending to defend their own backgrounds and training in opposing the deprecation of this institution. It is, of course, possible that the wording of the question "overstates the case" and fails to receive the support of some who are personally not in favour of the continuance of public schools but base their opposition on other grounds than those set forth in this statement.

I think it is true to suggest that the overall effect of these economic propositions has been to reveal a spectrum of opinion less singularly "right wing" than would be implied by the social status and political commitments of the respondents. For the elders though, more than for the ministers, some leaning to the conservative side on significant issues is apparent.

G. SUMMARY

In brief, this "wide-lens" overview of data from the survey of Church of Scotland Commissioners, has, on the whole coincided with the data from the smaller (and entirely different) Prestonfield study. And it has provided a major link in the interpretive chain of this investigation, for it has given unmistakable proof to the notion that the National Church is, in terms of leadership, middle class oriented and directed. If the sample is at all typical - and with a few reservations it is almost certainly quite representative - then it is obvious that ministers and leading elders are disproportionately - indeed, overwhelmingly - recruited from higher status sections of the community. In education, in family background, in political persuasion, in personal friendships and in occupational position, the sample is definitely middle class in character.

Urban churches are declared to enjoy less contact among members than rural churches, being almost totally without such contact for members of different classes in social activities outside the church. I have on several occasions alluded to the fact that the urban church does not, apparently, provide a communal
context in which social relationships are created which would not normally be created outside the church. It is however, most interesting that the respondents do not believe that the evident social differences have had a detrimental effect on the "unity and brotherhood" of the church. But they do, in the main, accept the fact that workers consider the church tied to social tradition.

On social and economic issues, great diversity of opinion appears, with a greater non-radical bent on the part of elders than on the part of ministers. But I have noted that there is some reason to believe that the most trenchantly reactionary Commissioners have opted to leave the questionnaire unanswered.
CHAPTER X - INTERPRETIVE SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. PRELIMINARY REVIEW.

B. DIFFERENTIAL CLASS DISPOSITIONS TO THE CHURCH.
   1. Compatibility with Church.
   2. The Church-Sect Dichotomy.

C. "FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVES" TO THE CHURCH.

D. GENERALISED RESPECT FOR THE CHURCH.

E. CONCLUSIONS.
A. PRELIMINARY REVIEW

This final chapter plays a unique and composite role. It may be said to serve three distinct purposes: to complete the provisional interpretive scheme; to pull together "loose strings" from previous chapters; and to provide a summation of the conclusions which emerge from the thesis as a whole.

In particular, I am concerned with furnishing tentative comprehension (beyond what has already been ventured) of the contrast between wide class dissimilarities in church involvement and wide class similarities in church "attachment" (attitudes, etc). The expectation that social class groupings would prove to be meaningful and distinct, carrying wide implications in values, commitments and behaviour, was confirmed. It was further confirmed that - as likewise anticipated - these social demarcations are reflected in church participation (church participation increasing with status). But class divisions have not proven to be strongly associated with differences in the profiles of attitudes and beliefs pertaining to the church.

However, the attitudinal dimensions were not altogether barren of explanatory value. Some clues emerge, which, taken in conjunction with differences in social class dispositions on non-religious issues, contribute to the construction of provisional interpretive hypotheses for variations in church-going. In short, these accumulated findings have accomplished two things: they demonstrated the genuine contrast in religious behaviour between working and middle classes, and they pointed to the need for explanations (of church involvement variations) which go beyond the concrete findings of the main empirical research, the Prestonfield survey.

I have already introduced two additional sources of "explanatory" material. One obvious and productive source was historical data. The historical investigation made it plain that present-day social lines of division in religious institutions represent continuations (roughly) of a general pattern existing for a number of generations. The rootage of this socio-religious cleavage is in the historical
processes of urbanisation and industrialisation, and in the social disintegration, restructuring and emergent social divisions linked with these momentous social changes.

Returning to a contemporary source, to inform the study of the shape and orientation of the church's current leadership, I examined data from the survey of Church of Scotland ministers and elders. Analysis of this survey showed that the National Church is manifestly biased toward the middle class on the very straightforward basis of the status composition of her leadership. The policy makers and "mood-makers" of the church are grounded in the higher social ranks. They, therefore, provide the church unavoidably with a certain built-in class "character" which inevitably permeates (not, of course, without the modification of other influences) in values, programme and appeal of the church. Whatever "ideal" social heterogeneity the church would like to manifest, the fact is the church confronts a crisis of narrow social identification.

Let us look at this dilemma a bit more closely. The church claims a spiritual stewardship over the entire community. Since the middle ages, in fact, she has been organised on the assumption that all persons are within her fold and comply with her authority. But, as we have seen, this assumption has long since ceased to correspond to the real situation. To be sure, the church is still the most heterogeneous institution - taking the whole of her membership - but there is now nothing automatic or compulsory about participation in her life. Abstention is optional - a quite viable option - and this option is exercised unequally by various social groups. Thus the church is forced with the need to "win" the commitment of individuals and groups, to attract them, to vie with other institutions and sources of values for their involvement. It will no longer suffice to ring the church bells on Sunday morning, open the doors, don clerical attire, and wait for the flood of parishioners to fill the sanctuary. (Parenthetically, it often appears that many churchmen see little need to go beyond the routine "open
the doors and wait" policy).

In undertaking this modern "missionary" task, the church is faced with one crucial problem (among others). On the one hand, she is confronted with the widest possible range of persons and need: in age-distribution, education, social situation, sex, value-system, etc. On the other hand, she must operate with the encumbrances of limited manpower and limited organisational flexibility. Especially in one minister parishes (the large majority) the minister is beleaguered with a bewildering scope of responsibility from administrative duties to home and hospital visitation to the reflective needs of sermon preparation. Unless laymen are to be well-trained and imaginatively employed, it is simply out of the question for individual churches to provide a really diversified programme with a wide range of appeals, except perhaps in some unusually large parishes. (The desirability of generally more diversified church programmes is disputed and the possible contents problematic). And since the lay leaders tend to be oriented toward the more educated and better-off, it is doubtful to what extent they could aid in broadening the social base of the church's appeal.

In short, the church, faced with the formidable task of enlisting - rather than taking for granted - the commitment of individuals from various social groups and strata, also finds herself with the practical necessity of restricting the range of her programme and social appeal. Because she is middle class dominated and thus especially sensitive to middle class needs and desires, the restriction must almost certainly work in one direction. There is a very strong tendency to orient the programme and make the main appeal to the middle class section of the community; this happens without conscious realisation often times. The result, of course, is to sustain or accelerate the status homogeneity of the congregations. The middle class bias is further enhanced by the fact that positions of leadership usually go the best qualified on extra-religious bases: education, degree of responsibility in occupational position, etc. This would seem to serve to intensify the involve-
Assume the church defines her task in contemporary society in terms like these: to provide a religious context of commitment and interaction for persons of all social positions, to give them a transcendental dimension to life and to inculcate in them a Christian moral and ethical system. To accomplish such a task the church must be able to motivate the commitment and satisfy the needs of persons from all backgrounds and in all social environments. But the critical question - for the church far more than for this study - is whether such a comprehensive structure of influence is conceivable given the continuing localised parochial organisation of the church and the middle class domination of the church (if indeed the whole pattern of life and "philosophy of life" today will permit such a central influence by the church).

This circuitous sketch of findings and problems brings us to the basic undertakings of this chapter. The first of these undertakings, which focuses a number of the data from the thesis, comprises a confrontation of class "character" - the differences in way of life, needs, comprehension, organisational dispositions, etc - with the "character" of the church - membership, mode of operation, liturgy, position vis a vis the wider society, etc. From this confrontation, I will postulate critical contrasts in class compatibility with the church as explanations for differential class involvement in the church. It is, of course, assumed that social differentiations imply variations in religious dispositions. The extent to which these variant dispositions are satisfied by the church should be one determinant of the disparities in participation.

It should be reiterated that the suggestions that follow, while motivated by the research data, go beyond the clear findings in order to construct provisional postulates of interpretation. These suggestions do not masquerade as iron-clad conclusions or validated hypothesis. In section (A) the question of class contrasts in compatibility with the church will be addressed, using the familiar "church-sect dichotomy" as a relevant theoretical mould. Section (B) probes the realm of "functional alternatives" to the church, an issue which logically
follows from working class indisposition toward the main religious institutions. The object of interpretive speculation in section (C) will be the curious residue of vague reverence for the church which was found to be diffused through all the strata (Chapter VII) and to be in tension with the high incidence of criticism of concrete representations of the church. Section (D) will serve to conclude both the chapter and text of the entire thesis.

B. DIFFERENTIAL CLASS DISPOSITIONS TO THE CHURCH

1. Contrasts in compatibility with Church.

Before re-introducing the "church-sect dichotomy" and applying this conceptualisation to disparate class dispositions toward the Scottish church, let me review three discernible levels of class "compatibility" (and incompatibility) with the church as she is currently represented. Our data have pointed to contrasts in the prevalent role-systems of the two main classes, and to class contrasts in predominate forms of interaction. These contrasts, which seem to impinge upon church involvement patterns, will be briefly reviewed; then suggestions, less well anchored in the empirical data, will be advanced concerning the effects of class disparities in "comprehension" on church participation.

First, regarding role-systems, working class males seem to define their roles in terms which are especially uncongenial to the formal practice of religion. This impression distills from several findings. Workers reported a very high incidence of discontinuation of religious practice (for both themselves and their post-school friends) at the time they began working. They also evinced a much higher degree of reticence about religious topics than middle class respondents.

1. The curious Borderline status group is not considered in the discussion of interpretations as I am trying to "round off" the conclusions and underscore major class contrasts. The rather unpredictable and diminutive intermediate grouping may be borne in mind as reflecting characteristics of persons "in-between" the major status divisions who do not fit well either middle class or working class stereotypes.
And, perhaps most revealingly, they often suggested that some men wouldn't want it known if they went to church because they would fear the ridicule that might result and the danger of being scrutinised to discover behaviour viewed as inconsistent with church-going. By contrast, middle class men suggest very little sense of social disapproval in church-going. This does not appear to be a serious issue in shaping their patterns of religious practice.

Does the foregoing really indicate anything more than the tautological suggestion that working class men are not inclined to go to church because they are not church-goers? I think there is much more involved in the role contrasts than this. Increased home-centeredness notwithstanding, working class role-systems seems to incorporate (to a fairly large extent) these traits: toughness, profanity, shunning of pretentiousness and keeping one's distance from other social groups. By contrast, middle class role-systems appear to maximise sophistication, variety and concern with social propriety. (These suggestions, of course, are based on impressions as much as on data and draw the widest possible contrast in order to make the point clear).

Church-going, I suggest, does not "fit" the typical working class role interpretation without appreciable tension, whereas the practice fits with little tension (and may sometimes be motivated by) middle class role interpretations. For many working class men there is decided uneasiness and awkwardness with regard to religious matters. The whole atmosphere of the occupational milieu - the style and topics of conversation, the ideal "self-image" projected, the way of looking at life - seems to keep religion at arm's length, as a very private concern or something to be avoided altogether.

On the matter of interactional differences associated with class, our data confirmed the familiar tendency of workers to shy away from associational involvements and instead to confine their interpersonal relationships to more informal, uncomplicated situations. By contrast, middle class life is more highly compart-
mentalised, maintaining a varied network of informal and formal contexts of interaction. As a part of this compartmentalisation, middle class persons often relate themselves to the church, seeing the church as one of several forms of associational involvement which provides certain specific values in roughly the same manner as a golf club, charitable organisation or professional society may provide other specific values. But working class life, relatively, is homogeneous and confined to immediate, familiar and casual contexts. Informal fellowship with workmates, easy intermingling with kinfolk, unbothered evenings in the home, the casual "roughness" of the pub or football match: these are far more natural aspects of male working class life. Participation in the church (which is formal and associational) is relatively unnatural and uncomfortable.

We have noted that in previous eras when rural patterns of life prevailed, the church was a vital part of the solidarity and "wholeness" of life in the local community. Today the church may be viewed as one optional voluntary organisation among many; she is not vital to integrating the "communities" of modern life. Thus the development of compartmentalisation, of segmentalised satisfaction of various needs and desires, is something of a precondition to church involvement. This style of life is unquestionably more characteristic of the middle class than of the working class, and, therefore, the church more readily occupies one "compartment" in the lives of middle class persons.

Thirdly, on a more speculative plane, it is plausible that the degree of compatibility between class "frameworks of comprehension" and the church's mode of communication has an effect on church involvement. As an institution vying with others for the participation of individuals from various social situations, the church's ability to communicate effectively, to express herself relevantly, is critical.

People today are not so grounded in religious symbols and theological ideas that they necessarily comprehend and appreciate the sermons and services of the
church. By and large the church communicates her message, abstractly, liturgically and in a highly educated language. There is considerable uncertainty regarding her relevance and effectiveness in speaking to an industrialised, secular age in general. But in-so-far as she is well-comprehended, this is far more likely to be the case with the more educated. The "language" of the church is far more akin to managerial or professional styles of communication than to working class styles.

Earlier I cited the theories of Bernstein (Chapter V). He suggests that the educational system is especially oriented to the language and comprehension of those from middle class homes. To my knowledge there has been little empirical verification of this fact; there are many who question the validity of Bernstein's formulations. None-the-less, there would seem to be a significant germ of truth in the idea that in both the educational and religious realms the "language" and values which are taken for granted are manifestly influenced by the fact that those in positions to communicate the respective bodies of knowledge are preponderantly middle class and highly educated. Working class persons certainly have less formal education, are probably, on the whole, more confined in their use and comprehension of words and in their frame of reference and more reliant upon colloquial usages. As a result, they are less likely to understand and find meaningful the language of the church.¹

In short, it is suggested that the abstract, indirect, theological forms of communication employed by the church are far more compatible with the middle class framework of comprehension than with the working class framework of comprehension.

¹ The question may arise from this, then why is there a reasonably high incidence of working class participation in the Catholic church? Part of the answer may be that catholics receive a better grounding in their religion. Also the Catholic style of worship incorporates rote recitation of familiar passages, has lesser reliance on sermons but more on symbolism and is, therefore, probably better comprehended by working class persons than is the Protestant service.
In presenting her "message", the church is not only restricted by traditional theological language and forms and by the dubious (tacit) assumption that parishioners share an understanding of the religious knowledge presented, but she is also constrained by her middle-classness to direct her communication to middle class persons. The conflict of church communication and working class comprehension which results, may operate subtly, but it probably contributes to working class religious estrangement.

Nor is it simply a question of words and forms of worship. It is also a question of relevance. Sermons are geared to middle class parishioners because ministers are more "in tune" with the needs, conflicts and values of middle class persons. Few church leaders are in a position (or make an effort) to understand working class life. What is relevant to the businessman in terms of, say, practical ethical behaviour, may have little application to the man on the shop floor. I suggest that the church "talks over the head" of most workers not only because of the sophistication and esoteric nature of her language but because ministers - to the extent that they make the church's message practical at all - tend to direct themselves to matters germane to middle class persons but foreign to workers.

None of the above suggestions are conceived as singly sufficient to explain the class differences in church involvement; they are seen as several contributory aspects. In essence, they indicate that church has a middle class "character" and thus makes its most effective appeal to middle class persons. Neither is class "character" as dichotomised as the above suggestions indicate. Role interpretations, structures of interaction and frameworks of comprehension may all be viewed as polarites. The point is that in each case the church's structure, forms and presentation are more congruent with the middle class end of the continuum.

2. The Church-Sect Dichotomy.

The importance of differential religious dispositions associated with class
and the differential class compatibility of religious institutions brings us to the "church-sect dichotomy". This is one of the major "typologies" in sociology of religion. It has been used in explaining many variations in religious organisation. The proposition can be simply stated: lower status persons tend to "feel" their religion; higher status persons tend to "do" their religion. Taking another point of view, in Demerath's words the churchlike parishioner is "segmentally" involved in his religion; sectlike parishioners are "organically" involved.¹

Of course, these "thumbnail" summations greatly simplify the total church-sect conceptual framework. Weber first expressed the contrast, referring to different principles of membership and authority in religious institutions. A "Church" he says, is "a community organised by officials into an institution to bestow gifts of grace".² In the initial sense a "church" is an established body, accomodated to the state, claiming a generalised authority over the whole community, and entered into involuntarily, that is (usually) by means of baptism as a child. In contrast, Weber refers to a "sect" as "a voluntary organisation of only those who, according to the principle, are religiously and morally qualified".³ In other words, a person joins a sect on the basis of "conversion", committing himself to a certain demanding discipline of life.⁴

Troeltch took the lead from Weber and greatly extended the elaboration of these two different forms of religious commitment and organisation, along with a third type of "mysticism", which has generally been ignored in the succeeding waves of scholarship. One of Troeltch's most incisive summations of the church-sect

¹ Demerath, op. cit., p. 66.
² Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 288.
³ ibid, p. 306.
The church is that type of organisation which is overwhelmingly conservative, which to a certain extent accepts the secular order, and dominates the masses; in principle, therefore, it is universal, i.e., it desires to cover the whole life of humanity. The sects, on the other hand, are comparatively small groups; they aspire after personal inward perfection, and they aim at a direct personal fellowship between the members of the group.

In its external relations the church accepts and compromises with the secular order. It accepts a position as one institution among many. It maintains a large following, and usually, the official favour of secular authorities. The sect, in contrast, either escapes the secular world as much as possible or fights against it actively; in either case it sees the "world" as an antagonist in a spiritual battle and constantly urges its adherents to refuse capitulation.

Demarath well summarizes the distinctions in internal relationships:

Internally, the church has a professional leadership, a relatively impersonal fellowship, and lax criteria for membership. It stresses the sacraments and ritualistic religion. In sharp contrast, the sect's leadership is charismatic and non-professional. Its founder is typically a religious eccentric in the eyes of the church, and his successors in authority are drawn from the ranks of the congregation. Further, the sect's membership standards are stringent and include conversion and signs of salvation. The fellowship is an exclusive moral community and charged with intimacy. Spontaneity replaces ritual; personal testimony is valued more highly than any sacrament.

As with all "ideal types" it is unlikely that any actual religious organisation perfectly typifies either the "church" or the "sect" description. But the distinction is a meaningful one. As Troeltch has shown, from the earliest days of the Christian church, there have been sect-like tendencies and church-like tendencies pulling against each other and, along with other factors, producing various configurations of religious groups. Troeltch believed that the original Christian teaching included both sect-like and church-like elements, thus providing inspiration and justification for both sorts of organizations throughout Christian history.

1. Troeltch, op. cit., p. 331.
Churches, as the above descriptions imply, are dominated by the prominent and powerful members of the society. Churches are inherently conservative and linked with vested interests. They, therefore, stand always in danger of failing to accommodate sufficiently the lower ranks of the society. Indeed, it is usually when the lower strata come to feel uncomfortable and religiously unsatisfied, and perhaps unwelcome, in the established churches that sectarian movements erupt. Usually under some charismatic leader, the sectarian movement takes hold among the underprivileged, offering, at a spiritual level, compensation for the material and status deprivations of life. The sect absorbs the energies of its members, requiring their total commitment. It is not one group among others but the main context of fellowship, intimacy and emotional satisfaction. In place of the austerity and grandeur of church-like, worship, the sect reverberates with emotion, revels in simple and dynamic views of life, and has all the intense solidarity of a company of soldiers escaping from the enemy. The sect is deeply communal and personal.

The application of this model to the Scottish situation is obvious. The Church of Scotland is assuredly church-like on most criteria (though not without variations within the church). The other main Protestant religious bodies in Scotland strain in the same direction to varying degrees, i.e., other Presbyterian bodies, Episcopal church, Baptist, Methodist, Congregationalist, etc. Thus working class absence from the church is a not untypical instance of withdrawal from church-like bodies by the lower status groups throughout the centuries of Christian history. But an important distinction is that, in this instance, withdrawal from the church (which we have seen occurred over a century ago) has not been a prelude to, or accompaniment of, the emergence of sectarian groups. By and

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1. Indeed, as the above list suggests, groups that have originated as sectarian outbursts of the poor, tend over a few generations to become "institutionalised", to be upgraded in their status composition, to increasingly accommodate themselves to the secular world and the other religious organisations. This pattern of internal transformation has been stressed by Nieburh. Niebuhr, Op. cit.,
large it has meant a loosening of the ties with all organised religion.

It was pointed out in Chapter VI that one of Demerath's commendable contributions was his application of this dichotomy (or polarity) to variations in religiosity within single religious groups (rather than between separate religious groups). He shows from a substantial American survey that within churches of several main denominations, low-status persons tend to have a "sect-like" form of involvement while high-status persons tend to have a "church-like" involvement. This carries the important implication that if a religious organisation provides for a wide variation in activities and forms of commitment, it may be able to satisfy reasonably well the needs of both high-status and low-status persons. It is at least conceivable that a basically church-like body may accommodate sectarian inclinations to an extent allowing for a wide social range of involvement.

There is little reason to believe that the churches in Scotland normally fulfill this dual-role, satisfying the propensities of both church-inclined and sect-inclined individuals. One of the central characteristics of the sect is its provision of a "community" which serves to shield the individual from the unfavourable comparisons of the "outside" world and to instil an intimate solidarity. But it was discovered in Chapter VII, that persons of all social ranks - but particularly working class and borderline men - are acutely aware of a communal "void" in the church. The church leaders survey data (though incorporating the views of those most deeply absorbed in the work of the church) did not dispel this impression. The church does not represent or offer an intimate moral community. She does not seem to foster friendships or to provide a locus of fellowship for existing friendships. In other words, this one key sect-like feature, the religious "community", is not in evidence. Since working class persons are especially inclined toward sect-like, communal forms of involvement, there is little in the structure of the church to ingratiate her with this stratum. In more sweeping terms, communality, solidarity, fellowship, emotionality, compensatory systems of status to replace the secular criteria of success - all of this (sect-like religiosity) is relatively
absent. Working class individuals are likewise absent.

It is not suggested that because the church-like (formal and undemanding) nature of the church in Scotland is incongruent with working class needs and dispositions, it necessarily follows that the church is effectively holding the commitment of middle class persons. The church faces other problems as well, like the disturbing question of whether her anachronistic parochial deployment can meet the needs of a complex, non-localised society. But what is being suggested at this point is that our various sources of data have manifested the "church-like" nature of the main Scottish churches and the failure of these churches to provide the "communal" forms of involvement associated with the religious dispositions of lower status persons. In short, there are barriers cutting the working class off from the church. The church's type of leadership, forms of worship, distant relationships, associational character, may all be interpreted as barriers to working class involvement in the church.

If workers have withdrawn from a church-like form essentially unsuitable to their needs and dispositions, then the church-sect model would suggest a flourishing of the alternative form, sectarian religion. But as we have seen, this contingency has not arisen to a significant degree. Thus we are confronted with an obvious question, why have lower status persons in urban Scotland not developed (except peripherally) sectarian religious groups which incorporate the values lacking in the church-like bodies?

C. "FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVES" TO THE CHURCH

In addressing the question posed above, it may be useful to make one further note regarding the church-sect conceptualisation, in order to clearly designate the particular needs which are satisfied by the sectarian organisation. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, it can be said that the sect provides two major values: "salvation" and "community". Leaving aside the theological implications, the former has meant a process of transvaluation whereby the future glories which are the inheritance of the redeemed are superimposed on the deprivation and
dispossession of the present world. Thus, the salvation is fundamentally a salvation from the present world. The second basic provision of the sect has already been underscored, the cloistered "community" which satisfied emotional needs and maintains solidarity.

With this classification of sectarian values in mind, we return to the question of why working class repulsion from the major churches has not been the precursor of widespread sectarian fervour. It is now almost trite to say that people may have "religious" commitments to organisations and ideologies which do not profess to be religious in the conventional sense. A very large array of entities have been labeled "functional alternatives", to religion: political extremism, trade unions, extended family, nationalism, communism, science, "gangs", business firms, etc. Whether these can be referred to accurately as "religions" themselves depends on the broadness or narrowness of one's definition of religion. But this issue is not at stake. What matters for our discussion is that energies which would otherwise be channeled into religious organisations (in the narrower sense) may be directed instead into various "secular" alternatives.

1. Merton has succinctly expressed the general concept of "functional alternatives" ... we must set forth as a major theorem of functional analysis, just as the same item may have multiple functions, so may the same function be diversely fulfilled by alternative items ... in contrast to this implied concept of indispensable cultural forms (institutions, standardised practices, belief systems, etc.), there is, then, the concept of functional alternatives, or functional equivalents, or functional substitutes. Merton, op. cit., p. 33-37.

2. See, for instance, Demerath, op. cit., p. 25; and Yinger, Sociology Looks at Religion, op. cit., p. 121.

3. Having made clear the theoretical "model" now employed let me make the disclaimer that I am not adopting a full-fledged functionalist stance or committing myself to functionalism as an adequate theoretical approach to sociological data. Within the sociologists theoretical arsenal, functional analysis is one very useful weapon; it has definite heuristic and explanatory value. But it also has critical limitations. Perhaps most crucially, functionalist theory is strained by the need to account for other than reasonably static social facts - the severe tensions and changes which occur within cultural systems. So, the adoption of this functionalist terminology and assumption, is based upon its apparent applicability to the particular explanation ventured, not as an A priori attachment to functionalist theory as a whole.
In this instance, we are concerned with the possibility that lower status groups upon withdrawing from church-like institutions may not be moved to generate sect-like havens of religious comfort geared to their own dispositions. Under certain circumstances (the specification of these circumstances offers a useful realm of empirical study) alternatives may arise which provide different forms of "salvation" and "community". The historical sketch (Chapter VIII) has already informed us of this occurrence. Under the peculiar pressures, conditions and economic arrangements of the 19th century, working class dissatisfaction strained toward secular rather than religious solutions. Niebuhr notes that since the eighteenth century and the rise of Methodism, there has been no major recrudescence of religions of the dispossessed.¹ This perception is clearly apt for Britain and European countries, but is less applicable to the U.S., where sectarian groups generated by deprivation have continued to proliferate in the 20th century.²

No alternative working class solution has received more attention than the various facets of the "Labour Movement" - radical politics and trade unionism in the main. Argyle examined the postulate that religion is a response to deprivation by looking at religious practice at different stages in the "trade cycle". He found little correlation between economic depression and religion, except in the case of the smaller sects. But Argyle is aware that deprivation may elicit other

1. Niebuhr, op. cit.
2. Why have sectarian movements continued to spring to life in the U.S., (and radical political commitment has failed to manifest itself on a large scale) in contrast with European societies? The prevalence of fundamentalism in America, especially in the South and Midwest, may have something to do with it. It may be a consequence, rather than a cause, of the relative absence of left-wing politics. Perhaps the traditional "middle class" ideologies and continued conviction that any individual could achieve success (whatever the realities of the situation) have tended to direct dissatisfaction into organisations which were less threatening to the existing social structure. And, some contribution may have been made by the "pluralism" and voluntarism of American religion in general; it may be more natural for new "denominations" to take root in such a soil.
reactions: "It seems that there are two opposed types of response to economic and social status deprivation - an other-worldly fantasy response, and a left-wing political action response."¹

Lipset suggests that "Direct connections between the social roots of political and of religious extremism have been observed in a number of countries".² He points to events in Russia, Sweden, Finland and Holland, which indicate that left-wing political fervour and fundamentalist religious fervour are strong in the same areas; or one may replace the other as the focal commitment of the same group of people. He says, "The point here is that rigid fundamentalism and dogmatism are linked to the same underlying characteristics, attitudes, and predispositions which find another outlet in allegiance to extremist political movements".³ Demerath makes a similar point, "Indeed, an inherent religious quality may help to explain the lower-class penchant for extremist politics in general".⁴

Glock and Stark have taken a close look at data in several societies which reveal the close correlation of church abstention and left-wing political sentiments. They underscore the differing goals of religious groups and politically revolutionary groups. The former dictate acceptance of the order of society, rearranging the system of values so that heavenly rewards and paradise to come are of more worth than earthly prosperity. The latter, in sharp contrast, offer to restructure things here and now, to make more equitable the distribution of earthly goods and powers, to make life in this world worthwhile.⁵ Religion typically bids the lower strata to comply with existing institutions; radical politics motivates a desire to replace those institutions.

¹ Argyle, op. cit., p. 148.
² Lipset, Political Man (op. cit.) p. 107.
³ Ibid, p. 108.
⁴ Demerath, op. cit., p. 201.
⁵ Glock and Stark, op. cit., p. 190-91.
Remembering that sectarianism aimed at "salvation" from the present world, we may say that radicalism aims at "salvation" within the present world. Or to use the terms of Glock in another paper, frustration may be resolved on a religious plane, in which case religion is a "compensation"; or it may be resolved on a secular plane, in which case the goal is a "remedy". But it required no stretch of the imagination to see how these two disparate forms relate to the need of the dispossessed and frustrated for "salvation".

Using Gallup Poll survey data of 1957, Glock and Stark show that in Britain, Labour Party supporters attend church only about one-half as often as Tory supporters. They suggest that the two major British political parties represent quite opposite positions, the Tory party being the party of the status quo and Labour being the party of change. "Tory and Labour are predominantly class-based and represent conflicting attitudes toward existing arrangements for distributing power, status and economic well-being". "Thus radical politics, perhaps functioning as an alternative outlet for feelings of status deprivation, do seem to provide a key to understanding the low church attendance of the lower classes".

Whether the wide contrast in goals and political ideals of the two major British parties announced by Glock and Stark are justified by current policies and proclamations is dubious. One could reasonably interpret contemporary political moods and events as indicating increasingly similar points of view for the two parties. They both are committed to the multidimensional facets of the welfare state, coexistent public and private sectors in the economy, and the use of governmental leverage in influencing economic activity. None-the-less, on an historical basis, the contrast is a valid one and there is a basic continuity of the class-based

3. ibid., p. 94.
4. ibid., p. 195.
adherence to both parties.

The working class in Prestonfield reported strong Labour support (Chapter IV) along with low incidence of church attendance; (Chapter VI), so the Party-Church involvement relationship should be along the lines found by Gallup. Table X - 1 confirms this expectation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY VOTE</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
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(Note: the one Communist and two "no preference" are excluded).

In addition, it was found (Chapter IV) that working class men are largely committed to trade unions, a fact normally related to left-wing inclinations. In the Gallup survey, it was found that lower status persons were more likely than those from higher positions to describe politics as more important than religion. Glock and Stark conclude:

Thus we have isolated an important link between radical politics and religious apathy; Radicals are more inclined than conservatives to see politics as the more relevant answer to their status difficulties. In summary, lower-class preference of this-world solutions associated with radical politics accounts for a considerable portion of the class differences in church attendance.

In the more complicated political contexts of France and the Netherlands, the same fundamental relationship obtains; the more the political party, the less its

1. ibid., p. 197.
members involve themselves in religious organisations. For instance, in France, only three per cent of the Communists report attendance at Mass within the previous two to three weeks, while sixty per cent of the Independents and fifty-six per cent of the Gaullists had attended recently.¹

I am inclined to think that the casual links in this interpretive chain are less direct than the above data indicates (on the surface). I doubt that nowadays in Britain there is extensive eschewing of religion (or of religious practice per se) for the sake of involvement in radical, this-world solutions to discontentment. Rather, I suggest that this facet of the "functional alternative" theme is primarily (though not exclusively) of historical relevance. In the crucial years of religious alienation in the 19th century, the withdrawal (or repulsion) of working classes from the church coincided with the emergence of politically radical, secular solutions. Thus the deep frustrations and deprivations, which might have fueled either the fires of sectarianism or the fires of radical political agitation, in fact, were channeled into the latter course. That the same relationship of commitment to a leftist party (Labour) and religious abstention is still a strong one, is not surprising. Both of these patterns have for generations been solidly imbedded in working class culture. And, as we have noted, the "church-like" nature of the church serves to reinforce rather than to reverse this abstention.

I stress that the "dynamic" of this religious "alternative" is of greater historical than contemporary importance because in the Prestonfield analysis there have been hints that radical passions have receded among working class men. In Chapter III, the examination of "social perspectives" informed us that workers seem reasonably content with the existing arrangements of society; they express little sentiment which would be construed as "radical" in the sense of desiring serious changes in the basic socio-economic order. And while workers report a definite retention of ties with the Labour Party and trade unions, they do not describe this

¹ ibid., p. 207.
support in terms of crusading zeal. (Of course, a crisis in industrial relations, such as a strike, is apt to kindle more intense fervour). In most cases, the left-wing commitments appeared to be strikingly non-militant.

This all seems to argue that the Labour movement, viewed as a functional alternative to the church, is more an historical legacy (and decidedly meaningful in this way) than a powerful sect-like force today. As the lot of the working class has improved, the need for a radical "salvation" is probably felt to a far lesser extent. None-the-less the several facets of the Labour Movement may still serve to some extent as a religious alternative in that they provide a certain value orientation and a vehicle of commitment.

What about the other major area of value attributed to the lower status sect, the intimate "community"? Is it possible to identify secular alternatives to the close-knit corporate interaction which has often been associated with religious groups? No doubt in more militant days the radical action solutions of the working class absorbed individuals in this intense, intimate way. This seems to be far less the case today. But one might suggest that there are several other working class loci of close personal relationships which may be interpreted as alternatives to sectarian religion. For the working class male, one would be the familiar coterie of "mates" who share feelings of solidarity and loyalty as they gather in the pub, go to football matches or enjoy a comfortable, colloquial fellowship. However, these sorts of cliques, while they do exist, seem to be declining in importance also, giving way to the growing importance of the home and family. Again, the extended family may offer a substitute "religious" form of corporate belongingness and fellowship; this might be especially true with regard to working class female kinship networks. Likewise in this same broad sense, groups of workmates in a shop or factory may enjoy the kind of mutual involvement of personalities which functions as a source of communal values.
These thoughts do not exhaust the possibilities. Further research is needed to specify and classify the various alternative sources of satisfactions traditionally fulfilled by religious groups. As I have suggested, such research could be linked to the question of what conditions and predispositions strain toward satisfactions within religious group contexts and which strain toward secular "alternatives".

And it should be made clear at this point that the Labour Movements and other entities I have referred to in this section do not have to be seen in this perspective, do not have to be considered "alternatives" or "substitutes" to religion. Quite obviously, they can be viewed in terms of their own developments, functions, consequences, etc., with no reference to religion or the church at all. My point is that religion has often been the vehicle of "salvation" and "community" and there is, with respect to these values, correlation between the decline in resort to religion and increase in resort to secular devices. What I have been concerned with is why the working class since the 19th century has not found salvation or community, in response to frustration and deprivation, in either established or sectarian religious groups. In looking for specific answers to this specific question it seems fruitful to think of the Labour Movement, etc, as supplying values, which have in other situations been supplied by religious organisations. From this perspective it seems legitimate to refer to the secular sources of these values as "alternatives" to religion. The perspective is clearly productive in interpreting working class indisposition toward the church.

D. GENERALISED RESPECT FOR THE CHURCH

Working class estrangement from the church, which I have been seeking to interpret, would seem to imply the workers hold a far less favourable view of the churches than those higher up the social ladder. This seemingly logical assumption proved to be largely untrue, as Chapter VII revealed. There we encountered a curious ambivalence in attitude toward the church on the part of all of the class
groupings; this inconsistency in attitudes might be labelled the "respect - criticism syndrome". A very widely diffused sense of vague reverence for the church and for "religious belief" seems to be coupled with a great deal of practical disenchantment with the church and disapproval for her leaders, active participants and programme. In most cases this generalised respect for the church is not linked with church participation. The anomalous nature of this "syndrome" begs for some explanation, at least at a speculative level. The speculations which I shall venture might suggest another area of useful research.

One of the oft-discussed and central ideas in the study of religion is that religion plays a role in integrating and unifying society, that it serves as a focal symbol of the solidarity of the group. This Durkeheimian approach to religion was earlier mentioned (Chapter VIII) with regard to the localised social structure of pre-industrial society. More recently, for instance, Hoult has suggested that this "functional theory of religion" is the most generally applicable explanation, regardless of time or culture.\(^1\) It seems to me, however, that those who attempt to fit all religious phenomena into this single conceptualisation are often forced to gloss over or distort the fact that religion may also play a very divisive role and has many times been more a source of tension than of harmony. Stress on the integrative function of religion derived initially from the study of pre-literate societies. None-the-less, this theoretical perspective has, without a doubt, some applicability in more "advanced" societies as well.

The applicability was especially clear with respect to the stable, rural, arrangement in Scotland which prevailed before the momentous changes wrought by industrialisation and urbanisation. But this was a world in which the local group was the primary social entity; today's world is far from localised. Indeed it is rather perplexing that the church continues to operate in terms of localised parishes which bear little relationship to the prevalent patterns of human interaction. Today the same individual, in an urban context, may spread his activities over a wide area and with widely differing groups of people. He may reside in one

locale, work in another, go into a third for recreation, visit relatives or friends elsewhere, and so on. The church clearly does not symbolise this sort of interactive pattern or serve to integrate, in a local way, this form of life.

But the diffused respect for the church (abstractly) may reveal an integrative function at a different level. The church, whatever her current ability to provide a dynamic source of influence, is a part of the cultural tradition. She is one of the "constants" in a changing world, a familiar (if impersonal) edifice on the social horizon. We saw in Chapter VII that people generally have a non-theological view of the church's value and of what a Christian is. Rather, religion seems for most to be tied up with basic ethical norms. The standards of right behaviour are seen as "Christian" but not as "doctrinal". The basic tone of religious perspectives is undogmatic and tolerant. The church, then, may be enshrined in the same way as the Crown or the parliamentary system are the recipients of general veneration. She may be part of a shared system of "societal" values which, though basic and important, have little perceived relevance for day-to-day living. The accolades given the church "in the large" may be more akin to feelings of patriotism than to feelings of local group solidarity.

A slightly different possibility also presents itself. It is plausible that the church is associated not so much with British society in general as with Scotland as a distinct entity. One of the central aspects of Scotland's individual cultural tradition (separate from the rest of Great Britain) is her religious tradition. Not uncommonly the Church of Scotland General Assembly is referred to as "Scotland's Parliament". If the church, therefore, symbolises the continuity of Scotland's cultural uniqueness and unity, it would account for the uniform attitude of respect. The question is really, then, whether this distant veneration of religion is linked to the values and norms of Scotland's quasi-autonomous society or of the larger structure of British society. It is a question I am unable to resolve.
In America recently, a similar point of view has emerged. Herberg has suggested that the various American religious groups are all sub-species of a general cultural "religion" glorifying the "American way of life".¹ He notes the reduction in doctrinal antagonisms and the lessening importance of which particular denominational tradition a person identifies with. But it is nearly obligatory that one is identified with some form of religion because secularised, undogmatic religion points to the worth of the society as a whole. Lenski, with a more empirical base, says, "Detroit Protestantism seems in some danger of becoming what Richard Niebuhr and others have referred to as a 'cultural religion'. That is to say, it is in danger of becoming a religion which has lost its transcendental character".² Lenski feels that from the point of view of the religious forms referred to this is an ominous trend, "We might add that the pages of history are replete with the ruins of cultural religions which have had the misfortune of subsequently encountering transcendental religions".³

Without passing judgement on this much disputed perspective on American religion, it is interesting to draw a parallel between these purported elements of a "cultural religion" in America and the suggestions of a similar phenomenon which have emerged from the interviews in a Scottish city. Of course, even if we assume that the parallel is meaningful, there is a major contrast. In America, the church (to the extent the notion is accurate) actively inculcates and reinforces the cultural norms because a large proportion of Americans are regular participants in the churches. In Scotland - again assuming the validity of the speculation - the church is more a passive segment of the fairly remote societal value system shared by those involved in the church and those who are not. In short, the church does not so much support or provide the normative system of society as represent a segment of it. This is another approach to the distinction between

¹. Berger, op. cit.
². Lenski, op. cit., p. 60.
³. Loc. cit.
church "involvement" and church "attachment". Most people may feel themselves "attached" to the church in a remote way because they see the church as one of the fundamental institutions in society, even though they are not directly motivated by her in everyday values and behaviour, and even though at the level of concrete appraisal, they see the church as antiquated and irrelevant.

Let me take up the latter side of this hypotheses, the idea that the church does not carry much weight in the practical and immediate affairs of life. A number of the data in Chapter VII pointed in this direction. Perhaps most significantly (in the long run), religious values and church-going appeared to be very low priorities with the Protestant secondary school pupils. Furthermore the young people indicated that going to church is a singularly uninteresting activity. The Prestonfield men reported detecting very little difference between those who attend church and those who do not, and they were virtually unanimous in suggesting that church-going is less important than how one treats his fellow men.

Again, American writers have brought an indictment against the church on this same score. Berger suggests that, despite wide interest in the church, religion has little impact on other aspects of life. He denounces the American church for failing to exercise a "prophetic" mission within the society but rather being content to put her stamp of approval on the dominant secular values. Glock and Stark suggest that, "Looking at American society as a whole, however, organised religion at present is neither a prominent witness to its own value system nor a major focal point around which ultimate commitments to norms, values and beliefs are formed".

I suggest that these passages have equal relevance to the Scottish situation (and to the British situation generally). In Britain the church has much less direct contact with the population, and the contact she does maintain seems to be peripheral to the main pursuits of life. Probably her communication of values and

beliefs is even more abstract than that of the American church. All of this would seem to hold true throughout the social strata. The differences in terms of class is, of course, that more middle class persons engage themselves associatively in the church. They participate in the church formally as one of a number of compartments in their lives. But we have seen little to suggest that this makes a profound difference in values or behaviour outside the church. For those in the middle class, as we have noted, the church is somewhat less "distant" than for those in the working class; middle class persons are more decisive in praising or rejecting the church on the level of her concrete representation. But the cultural history of the middle class does not include the dramatic break with the church that occurred within the working class; the continuance of overt religious practice is more often an "expected" segment of life in this stratum.

Unless we regard the generalised respect for the church in the abstract as part of the societal value system at a fairly remote level, it is difficult to explain why this respect varies little by social class or by church attendance rates. It seems to have little connection with the attitudes to the church as she is directly represented in society. Especially with regard to the working class, who evince both an historical and contemporary estrangement from institutional religion, it is otherwise a most perplexing ideological phenomenon.

But this raises a further question: by what means has the working class retained (or developed) this distant but favourable view of the church when for generations its members have been largely outside of the church? Again I must yield the conclusive solution of this enigma to further research - probably historical research. A few factors which are possibly contributors are these: the working class tradition of deference (the institution of Royalty, for instance, though also "distant" and representing values seemingly incompatible with the working class struggle for a more egalitarian society, has also apparently continued to receive the general deference of the working class); the relative conservatism of the British working class (in comparison with continental countries); the very
minimal eruption of avowed anti-religious feelings; the maintenance of a tradition of minimal ritual involvement in the church (weddings etc.); and the universal (if superficial) religious grounding in the educational system. Or, taking the view that respect for the church is related to Scottish rather than British society; the underlying Scottish patriotism vis a vis England may be largely responsible. Whatever the amalgam of specific contributors, a vague feeling of veneration for the church— as part of the valued sub-structure of society— appears to pervade the whole of the social pyramid. This nebulous expression of the church's worth stands in curious— but, I think, explicable— juxtaposition with a very strong indictment of the church's leadership, effectiveness and "attractiveness", which is quite evenly suggested by both middle class and working class men.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The entire chapter has, I trust, served to summarise the thesis, so I will not unduly belabour the final recapitulation. The analysis of empirical survey data from the Prestonfield district of Edinburgh has suggested that social classes, while exhibiting little conflict, are distinct in their prevalent views of life, in their sense of class belonging and class interests, and in their styles of life. On the basis of these findings I rejected the hypothesis of working class "bourgeoisement"— at least with reference to this presumably typical (rather than unusually affluent) group of working class men. Likewise I suggested that the conceptualisation of class, in which classes are seen as joined by bonds of commonality and perceived belongingness rather than as mere aggregates on the basis of objective criteria, was confirmed by the findings.

These real and meaningful differences in social class were found to be significantly reflected in patterns of church involvement. In accord with findings throughout the western world, the workers are much less frequently active participants in the church than middle class men. However, examination of a
number of measures pertinent to several dimensions of "attitudes" suggested
that subjective "attachment" to the church is not notably affected by social class
position. Thus the variations in attitudinal relationship to the church proved
insufficient to account for the wide class disparities in church involvement, but
did provide some useful clues which were reintroduced in the provisional inter-
pretations of this final chapter.

A reasonably comprehensive interpretive understanding of the current class-
church relationship demanded a tracing of the historical roots of the socio-
religious cleavage in the nineteenth century. Church-involvement has never been
an established practice in the urban working class culture. Instead, secular
alternatives to the church have absorbed the energies and commitments of workers
from the outset of the urban industrial age. Furthermore, the fact of middle
class dominance of the church - a fact which was sharply apparent from the church
leaders survey, from the historical sketch and from the perception of Prestonfield
respondents - serves to alienate working class persons from the predominately
"church-like" religious organisations.

The findings of this study, if accurately interpreted, do not augur well for
the church. Though institutional religion is sacrosanct at an abstract level -
perhaps as a generalised but nebulous segment of the shared societal value system -
it does not, on the whole, present itself effectively, relevantly or attractively
in more concrete terms. Major representations of the church - ministers, church-
goers and the church "programme" are at the receiving end of a strong volley of
deprecation, and the invective proceeds quite equally from both middle class and
working class men. The church appears to exist as one associational body among
many - an optional, undemanding and rather passive forum of involvement. But from
this I would not feel justified or safe in donning the garb of the prophet and
foretelling the impending fortunes of the church. Perhaps (to conclude on a
valuational note) I have too much confidence in the church's resiliency and contri-
butution to human life to speak as a prophet of gloom.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

PRESTONFIELD INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

(As a relatively "unstructured" interview, there was some variation in the wording of questions and explanations. The following gives the "standard", minimum wording).

I. (Neighbourhood)

1. First of all, let me ask you about the neighbourhood here; are you quite happy with it or not?
   Why is that?

2. How long have you lived in this location?
   Where did you live before that?
   Do you "belong to" Edinburgh or did you originally come from somewhere else?

3. What about the facilities in the area, for instance the shops and the pubs; how are these?
   Do you ever go to the pubs yourself?
   (if needed) Is it one of the local pubs you go to, or somewhere else?

4. What sort of activities do you enjoy in your leisure time?

5. If you had the time and money so that you could do anything you wanted, what do you think you would do?

II. (Friendships and Organizations)

1. Outside of work, with whom do you have most contact—would it be men from work, people in the neighbourhood, relatives, or just whom?

2. Could you tell me just what sort of work these people do?

3. Where do you most often see them? Where do you normally get together?
   (if needed) What sort of things do you do together?

4. Are they in any groups or organizations that you are in?

5. This brings up another question; do you happen to belong to any groups or organizations yourself? For instance, are you a member of a union, a social group or a society of some sort—any sort of group at all?
About how much time would you say you spend on this?

Do you feel (the union, etc.) is of much value to you or not?

Do you hold any positions in (the group) or have you done so in the past?

III. (Personal Information)

1. Now, about your work—would you explain specifically what you do?

2. How long have had this job? And before that, what work did you do?

3. How do you feel about your present work; are you happy with it?

4. Do you feel there is much chance to get ahead in this sort of work or not?

5. Do you think you might ever go into some other kind of work?

   (if yes)

   What would this likely be?

   What are the chances that you will make this change?

6. Was there any time in the past when you wish you had gone into some other work?

   (if yes)

   What was it?

7. There is much discussion these days about opportunities for jobs. Do you feel there is much opportunity for children of working men to get ahead or not?

8. In getting ahead, would you say it is more important to have ability or to have the right connections?

9. Please look at this card. If you had to make a choice which of the things listed there would you say is most important to you in a job?

   Card A

   (1) high income
   (2) no danger of losing job
   (3) working hours are short; lots of free time
   (4) chances for advancement
   (5) the work is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Which comes next?
10. Do you remember what age you were when you left school?
   What schools did you go to?

11. And would you mind giving me your present age?

12. (if not obvious)
   Now, let's see, are you married or single—or perhaps, divorced or widowed?
   (if fairly obvious)
   And, of course, you're married, right?
   (if married)
   How long have you been married?

13. Do you have any children?
   How many children do you have?
   What are their ages?

14. (if old enough)
   What schools do they (he, she) attend now?
   (if out of school)
   What sort of work are they (he, she) in?
   (if younger)
   What sort of work would you like to see them (him, her) go into after they're (he's, she's) out of school?

15. While we are speaking of children, would you please look at another card. If you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important for a child to learn to prepare him for life?

   Card B

   (1) to obey
   (2) to be well liked or popular
   (3) to think for himself
   (4) to work hard
   (5) to help others when they need help

   Which would be your second choice? And third?

16. Do you think that children today have a wonderful future to look forward to or not?

17. Do your parents also live in Edinburgh?
   (if not)
   Could you tell me where they live (or lived)?
   (if in Edinburgh)
   Were they born in Edinburgh, or did they come from somewhere else originally?
18. What sort of work is (or was) your father in?
   How long has he been (or was he) in this work?
   Before that?

19. Does your wife do any work outside the home?
   (if not)
   Has she done so any time since you were married?
   (if yes)
   What sort of work? Full time or part time?
   For how long has she been working

20. If someone should ask you what social class you belong to, what would you say?
   Why would you say it is that you are in that class? What determines the social class you are in?

21. Did you vote in the last general election?
   Would you mind telling me what party you voted for?
   Do you regularly support that party?
   Why is that?

22. Did your father also support the (Conservative, Labour, Liberal) party?

IV. (Projective Questions)

Now I'd like us to do something a bit different. I will read to you a number of sentences which are incomplete. The idea is for you to complete the sentence with whatever comes to your mind first. Don't ponder over them, or worry about making a good sentence; but whatever comes into your mind first, that will be fine. I'm sure you'll get the idea when we do it. All right, here's the first.....

1. To me a real friend is someone who.....

2. If I had a lot more money I would.....

3. The men who have an easy time of it.....

4. The work, church, makes me think of.....

5. Most leaders of the Conservative party.....

6. Generally, the people who are to blame for industrial strikes.....

7. What I think the church ought to do for people.....
8. The people who should have more say in running the country.
9. A Christian is...
10. The best way to be of help to others.
11. People who get ahead financially usually do so because.
12. Most people who go to church regularly
14. The most important part of a man's life.
15. Getting an education.
16. A typical church minister today.
17. One of the things that I think is unfair in Britain.
18. One of the most important things in life.
20. The way to have people think well of you.
21. The reason why more men don't go to church.
22. The high cost of living is caused by.
23. My opinion of religious belief.
24. The people who do not get good enough pay.

V. (Relationship to the Church)

As you have probably gathered from these incomplete statements, one of the things I am particularly interested in is what people think of the church and what relationship they have with the church. So, I would like to ask you a few things about your own experience with the church; like, for instance.

1. When you were young, did you receive any religious training?
   Was this in the Church of Scotland, or some other church?

   (if needed)
   Did you go to the Sunday school?
   What about church services; were you taken to these when you were young?

2. Did your parents attend church?

   (if needed)
   Can you remember about how often they went?
3. Do you remember if the friends you went around with after leaving school went to church or not?

4. Were you baptized in the church?

5. (if married)
   Were you married in the church or by a minister?

6. Do you ever attend church nowadays?
   (if yes)
   On the whole, about how often do you attend?

7. Has this been the case for a long time?
   Was there any definite time when you started (or quit)?

8. (if attends)
   Do you take part in any other activities or organizations in the church besides going to the worship services?
   Do you hold any offices, or have you some time in the past?

9. In your own family, do you ever have the custom of saying a prayer before meals?

10. (for those who attend church frequently)
    Would you look at this list please, and pick you any of the statements which help to explain why you do go to church.

    Card C

    (1) because I've always gone
    (2) to meet my friends
    (3) family or friends expect it
    (4) to worship God or pray
    (5) God expects it
    (6) to hear sermon
    (7) to learn how to be a better person
    (8) makes me feel better
    (9) other (specify)

11. (for those who seldom or never attend church)
    Would you look at this list please, and pick out any of the statements which help to explain why you do not go to church?

    Card D

    (1) I don't believe in God
    (2) church people are hypocrites
    (3) don't have any time to go
    (4) don't get anything from it
    (5) feel "out of place" in church
    (6) don't like sermons
    (7) can be just as good a person without going
    (8) family or friends don't expect it
    (9) other (specify)
12. Would you say that you consider yourself a religious person or not?

13. What about your wife—does she go to church about as often as you go, more often, less often, or what?

   (if she attends)
   Does she take part in any activities or organizations other than going to the worship services?

14. Do your children go to the church?

   (if young)
   Do you suppose they will go to church when they are adults or not?

15. Do you know, personally, the local minister, or any other minister?

   (if yes)
   Does he visit you at home?

16. What sort of people do you suppose most ministers are closest to?

   Do you think this is good or not?

17. And what kind of men would you say ministers are generally?

18. Do any of the people you know, personally, go to church?

   Do you think there is any noticeable difference between those who go to church and those who do not?

19. Are any of the men you contact in your work church-goers?

20. Do you think there might be some men who may go to church sometimes but wouldn't want other men to know this?

   (if yes)
   Why do you think they would feel this way?

21. Do you ever discuss religion with anyone?

   (if needed)
   With whom, mainly?

   (if not)
   Why not?

22. When you go to church (or, if non-attender, "Whenever you have gone to church") do you feel quite comfortable, or out of place, or how?

   What would you say, in general, are your impressions of church services?

23. Would you say that the church today, on the whole, is gaining ground or losing ground?
24. Do you think there are any changes which the church might make in order to be more attractive to people?

(if yes)
What exactly do you have in mind?

25. In some places ministers are meeting with small groups of people in homes so that they can discuss life and religion together in an informal way; what do you think of that idea?

26. Do you think that people who go to church regularly are mainly working class or middle class or what?

Why do you think this is the case?
Do you think the church tends to take sides at all in politics?

27. Do you think that your religious beliefs have ever affected your political beliefs?

What about the reverse—have your political beliefs ever affected your religious beliefs?

28. Which of the persons or things on this card has had the greatest influence on your religious beliefs? Select more than one if you wish.

Card E

(1) friends
(2) teachers
(3) wife or children
(4) parents
(5) minister (or priest)
(6) books
(7) t.v. or radio

29. I'm going to show you one more card which has four choices printed on it:

Card F.

(1) always wrong
(2) usually wrong
(3) sometimes wrong
(4) never wrong

Now I'd like you to apply these choices to four different things, in order to explain how you feel about them. First of all, would you say that moderate drinking is always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong or never wrong?

Which choice applies to heavy drinking?
Which applies to gambling?
Which applies to divorce?
VI. (Values - Beliefs)

Finally, I'm going to read you a number of statements and ask you to say whether you agree or disagree with each one. There is no correct answer; it's only your own opinion that counts. You'll probably find that you agree with some and disagree with others.

1. A person's own happiness should be his main concern.

2. Ministers are mainly interested in getting more people into their church services.

3. The Christian way is only one of many ways of knowing God; it is not the only way.

4. Living a good life is more important than having any particular religious beliefs.

5. Christians ought to try to influence other people to think the way they do.

6. Ministers are very closely in touch with people.

7. The church should not bother about social welfare.

8. The Bible is the Word of God and everything it says is completely true.

9. Not all people who go to church are necessarily religious and some people who do not go to church may be religious.

10. It is more important how you treat your fellow man than whether or not you attend church.

11. Jesus was not merely a good teacher; He was also God's only Son.

12. The church demands too little of people.

13. The church is too formal.
I. FACTS AND FIGURES

1. You are a Minister ________ an Elder ________

2. Location of your Church (town or country) ________

3. Estimated membership ________

4. Estimated Sunday morning attendance (average) ________

5. How many does your Kirk Session number? ________
   How many are retired? ________ How many do you estimate are under 40? ________

MINISTERS ONLY

6. How long have you been a Minister? ________

7. How long have you been in your present parish? ________

8. How many parishes have you been in previously? ________

9. At what age did you receive ordination? ________

ELDERS ONLY

10. How long have you been in your present church? ________

11. How long have you been an elder? ________

12. What is your present occupation? ________

13. Regarding your appointment as a Commissioner to the General Assembly:
   (a) Was your ability to "get away" the overriding consideration? ________
   (b) Have you been a Commissioner previously? ________
   (c) About what proportion of your Kirk Session has been Commissioners? ________
BOTH MINISTERS AND ELDERS

14. Please state your age_________

15. Are you married?_________ If so, for how long?_________

16. Your father's occupation?_________

17. Was your father a member of the Church of Scotland?_________

Was he a member of another church?_________

18. Was your mother a member of the Church of Scotland?_________

Was she a member of another church?_________

19. Was your father a minister?_________ an elder?_________

Some other church position?_________

20. How many brothers and sisters do you have?_________

21. For which political party do you usually vote?

Conservative___ Labour___ Liberal___ Scottish Nationalist___ None or other___

22. Please list the educational institutions you have attended since age 11 and any degrees or diplomas you have earned:

______________________________________________________________________________

23. What organizations (other than the Church) are you a member of and what offices have you held in these organizations (such as social, political, unions, etc.)

______________________________________________________________________________

II. ABOUT YOUR CHURCH

1. How would you describe the influence of your church on its membership in general:

   very strong___ strong___ moderate___ weak___ very weak___

2. How would you describe the influence of your church on the community:

   very strong___ strong___ moderate___ weak___ very weak___
3. Please think of four persons (excluding relatives) in your community with whom you enjoy the closest personal friendship. (It would be helpful to list their initials: ______ ______ ______)

Now list the occupation of each and state whether each is a member of your church congregation.

(a) ____________________ In your ___ (b) ____________________ In your Church?

(c) ____________________ (b) ____________________

4. Which of the following would you say describes the composition of your church congregation?

mainly manual working class____  mainly middle and professional class____

quite equally manual and middle class____  don't know____

5. Which of the following would you say best describes the composition of your Kirk Session?

mainly manual working class____  mainly middle and professional class____

quite equally manual and middle class____  don't know____

6. Which of the following best describes the relationship between ministry and laity in your church?

intimate____  quite close____  formal____  distant____  hostile____

7. Among members of your church from the same social class, how much contact would you say there is:

(a) in social activities connected with the church?

great deal____  occasional____  little____  v. little____  don't know____

(b) in social activities not connected with the church?

great deal____  occasional____  little____  v. little____  don't know____

8. Among members of your church from different social classes, how much contact would you say there is:

(a) in social activities connected with the church?

great deal____  occasional____  little____  v. little____  don't know____

(b) in social activities not connected with the church?

great deal____  occasional____  little____  v. little____  don't know____
III. PLEASE TICK ONE OF THE FIVE RESPONSES FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS. TICK THE ONE WHICH BEST DEMONSTRATES YOUR OWN OPINION.

1. The biggest obstacle to economic expansion is too high wage demands.  
   strongly support _____ support _____ don't know _____ oppose _____ strongly oppose _____

   (All of the remaining propositions were followed in the questionnaire with the same series of five alternative responses)

2. The church today is identified by most people too much with social tradition.

3. The Government should control land prices and use the nation's land for the general welfare.

4. The church has not demonstrated sufficient concern for the temporal condition of people (economic situation, working conditions, etc.)

5. It would likely prove dangerous to individual liberty to nationalize more of the nation's industries.

6. Ministers are generally too aloof from the lives of the lay people.

7. Britain should spend more to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent.

8. Most workers consider the church and its message to be quite irrelevant to their situation.

9. Industrial monopolies and high profit margins are greatly responsible for the country's economic troubles.

10. Social and economic differences between members have seriously hindered the unity and brotherhood of the church.

11. The problems of depressed areas and unemployment reflect a failure by the government to influence industrial activity for the public good.

12. Church people today in general are becoming more secular and materialistic.

13. Trade unions today wield too much power.

14. The church should not make official pronouncements on political and economic questions.

15. Employers should have to help pay for retraining men whom they replace through automation.

16. Social welfare should form a major part of the church's task in spreading the Gospel.

17. The public boarding school is an outmoded institution which is in opposition to principles of democracy.
18. The opportunities and advantages presented by a person's family and upbringing are usually more important than personal initiative and ability in determining his career success.
APPENDIX C

PERTINENT QUESTIONS FROM SCHOOL'S QUESTIONNAIRE

The two most important things in life are:

(1) __________________________

(2) __________________________

D. Below are listed six different jobs. On the spaces to the left please number the jobs from (1) to (6) according to the value of each job. Make the job with the most value number (1) and the job with the next most value number (2) and so forth.

_________ Joiner
_________ Medical doctor
_________ Independent shopkeeper
_________ Trade union official
_________ Industrial manager
_________ Church minister

E. Below are listed six different kinds of activity. In the spaces to the left please number the activities according to how important they are. List from (1) to (6) beginning with (1) as the most important, (2) as next most important and so forth.

_________ Watching an interesting t.v. programme
_________ Learning about something new
_________ Helping to make something
_________ Taking part in a favourite sport
_________ Going to church
_________ Reading a good book

F. Below are listed the same six activities. This time please number the activities from (1) to (6) according to how interesting they are, beginning with number (1) as the most interesting, (2) as next most interesting and so forth.

(Above list, as in (E.) repeated again)
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