THE EAST AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

BY

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
1974
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>EALB</td>
<td>East African Literature Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPH</td>
<td>East African Publishing House</td>
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<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAU</td>
<td>Kenya African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>Kenya Peoples Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Central Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KISA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Independent Schools Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>Oxford University Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNR</td>
<td>Tanganyika (Tanzania) Notes and Records</td>
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<td>TYL</td>
<td>TANU Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPH</td>
<td>Tanzania Publishing House</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARF</td>
<td>University Students African Revolutionary Front</td>
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THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH

IMAGE QUALITY POOR IN ORIGINAL

PhD Thesis Digitisation Project
ABSTRACT

This thesis sets out to examine the East African intellectual stratum in terms of its origins, institutional bases, membership, relations with government, party and society, cultural debates and socio-political thought, within the overall framework of colonialism, underdevelopment and persisting neo-colonial economic and cultural relations. It posits a definition of the intellectual which, by focussing on qualitative thought, cultural validation and social activism, takes into account not only the nature of the intellectual's thought and the structures and contexts in which it is articulated and disseminated, but his relationship with structures of discontent or dissent in society as well. It is argued that while East Africa possesses a certain cultural homogeneity which is the product of the subjection to the rule of a single colonial power, the development of inter-territorial institutions such as Makerere, and the diffusion of Swahili culture, different socio-economic and political systems in Kenya and Tanzania in particular have affected intellectual life deeply. The differences have affected not only intellectual debates about the nature, redefinition and role of institutions such as the press and universities, but thought about the nature of post-independence state and society as well. Universities, newspapers, journals, publishing houses and theatre are examined as employers of intellectual personnel, channels of articulation and dissemination, and the debate about their redefinition and role in the light of African traditions, European cultural domination, and development requirements is explored. The social backgrounds of intellectuals
are examined as a way of showing how thought, occupational choice, perceptions of role, and position in society have differed in terms of generation and to some extent country, and it is suggested that the wedge between pre- and post-independence generations is crucial in explaining the importance of different intellectual influences and ideological orientations. Many of the problems which complicate intellectual role definition are considered. Most have their roots in the changes wrought by colonialism, and include language, literacy, and cultural factors, the intellectual's position of marginality and lack of recognition in his own society, and the problem of relating to intellectual traditions. The debate about the nature of intellectual role is examined, and three strands which loosely correspond to cultural nationalist, scientific socialist, and individualistic positions are identified. Intellectual concerns with the recovery of initiative in history and cultural reassertion are examined, and an attempt is made to show how these concerns tend to underplay the importance of the colonial impact and the integration of African societies into the international capitalist system. The three major critical responses to cultural nationalism, African socialism and African humanism are examined, especially the Marxist critique which seeks to undermine the claims of African socialism and to establish the relevance and applicability of a flexible Marxist thought. In the final section of the thesis, intellectual interpretations of the post-independence situation are briefly examined, with a special emphasis being given to the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia.
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Preface

This study of The East African Intellectual Community developed out of an earlier study of African Literature and Politics which raised many interesting questions about the sociology of intellectuals and the analysis of the genesis and nature of African socio-political thought.

East Africa was chosen as the area of study for a number of reasons: first, as far as intellectual life and thought were concerned, it was relatively neglected; secondly, it was an area which, although it possessed a certain cultural homogeneity which had been developed by inter-territorial institutions such as Makerere and the diffusion of Swahili culture, possessed the potential for useful comparative analysis in terms of the differences between the socio-economic and political systems of Tanzania and Kenya in particular, and the way that they affected intellectual life; and thirdly, it was chosen because in the last few years especially, there has been considerable intellectual debate about the nature of East African states and societies and their future courses of development. This debate has gained impetus in Tanzania from the emergence of what may be termed a "radical intelligentsia" which has its intellectual roots in Marxism-Leninism rather than cultural nationalism.

In this thesis a great deal of attention has been given to the definition and socio-political role of the intellectual, partly because previous definitions of both the intellectual in general, and
the African intellectual in particular, have been unsatisfactory, and partly because in North America, and Europe to a lesser extent a similar process of redefinition has been underway, prompted principally by the Vietnam war and the drafting of intellectuals and academics into government work. Considerable emphasis has been given to the intellectual structures in which East African intellectual life occurs - schools, universities, newspapers, journals, publishing houses, theatres - partly because these institutions, as alien transplants which are still controlled in good measure from without, are being redefined by intellectuals to meet what they perceive to be Africa's needs, and partly because in so many studies, the intellectual is divorced from the types of intellectual structures in which his ideas are formed, articulated and disseminated.

It should be emphasized that the focus of the study is on East African intellectuals; Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Ugandans and not expatriate academics and intellectuals. This is not to deny the importance of expatriates in helping to shape the nature of intellectual life, and as agents for perpetuating a neo-colonial cultural situation, nor to overlook the importance of a number of European radicals, especially in Tanzania, in serving as catalysts for far-reaching debate. We may indeed learn far more about the nature of East African societies from the work of expatriates who often have advantages in terms of research funding and in the fact that they are not permanently tied to the countries they study, and hence, have to answer for their ideas and analyses.

A number of potentially interesting areas of analysis were not touched upon in this thesis, mainly for reasons of time and space. One neglected area, for instance, is the development of Swahili.
intellectual traditions in Tanzania, and how they tie in with the
growth of a Swahili political culture. A second neglected area is
that of the African-Asian intellectual and his particularly acute
problems. Another area which has only been briefly touched upon,
but never explored in any depth, is the emergence of earlier
intellectual traditions in East Africa and the nature of their impact,
if any, in contemporary intellectual life. In addition, the chapters
dealing with the nature of post-independence society were abbreviated
for reasons of time and space.

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Mr. C.D. Raab,
of the Department of Politics, Edinburgh University, under whose
supervision this thesis has been written. His patient assistance,
discussion, and friendship have been of immense value. I would also
like to thank Mr. C.A. Allen of the Centre of African Studies,
Edinburgh University, for his continuing interest, discussion, and
generous provision of material, as well as Dr. G.C.M. Mutiso and Mr.
C.L. Wanjala, both of the University of Nairobi, for their help and
interest. Mr. Juma Ali of the East African Literature Bureau in
Dar-es-Salaam helped arrange interviews and provided the use of
transport. I am extremely grateful to him. Thanks must also be
extended to all those East Africans who consented to be formally
interviewed and those, far too many to name, who I met in informal
circumstances and discussed various matters of some relevance to my
research. Finally, I would like to express my deep thanks to my
parents for their untiring and generous assistance and interest, and
to my wife Margaret for her patience, tolerance, and understanding.
This thesis contains no material published elsewhere, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis. The thesis is not, and has not been used for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and has not involved collaboration with any other person.

Signed

[Signature]
CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

One of the most outstanding features of so much scholarly analysis of modern African cultural nationalism, political thought and literature, and intellectual life in general has been the comparative neglect of East Africa. Such neglect, at least until recently, has been understandable. In West Africa, in contrast to East Africa, there has been a conspicuous modern intellectual tradition of some depth. Early West African contact with European culture, and the growth of urban centres in the coastal regions, led to rapid educational development and provided conditions favourable to the emergence of highly articulate men with pronounced literary inclinations. Names readily spring to mind – Africanus Horton, Bishop Crowther, Reversible Johnson, Edward Blyden, Bishop James Johnson, Herbert Macaulay, Henry Carr and Casely Hayford.

From the 1870s onwards a considerable body of historical, anthropological, sociological, political, and biographical literature was produced. An African nationalist press developed. It was in West Africa that the modern African literary awakening first took root: in Francophone Africa in the Parisian-based literary, cultural, and philosophical negritude movement of the 1940s and '50s; in English-speaking West Africa, and Nigeria in particular, in the late 1950s and early '60s.
In West Africa, social and political thought and intellectual life have been documented in some detail in works such as Robert July's *The Origins of Modern African Thought*; J.F.A. Ajayi's *Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891: The Making of a New Elite* and Ayandele's *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-1916. A Political and Social Analysis*. Claude Maouthier's *The Literature and Thought of Modern Africa: A Survey* provides a sweeping and superficial overview of modern African thought. This work includes some brief references to East African writing, but as a whole suffers from the failure of the author to provide a detailed and systematic analysis of the socio-political and historical setting of the literature and thought. There are also a number of autobiographical works, and biographies of men such as Edward Blyden and Africanus Horton. There is no intensive study of the intellectual community in any one West African state, although there does exist a collection of papers and discussions in a volume edited by J.T. Saunders and M. Dowaons, *The West African Intellectual Community*. The articles in this volume, however, have little empirical grounding. They are mainly

5. Two of the best known are Kwame Nkrumah's *Ghana* (1957) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo's *Awo* (1960).
speculative, being concerned principally with the ways in which a vital university system can be created. There is also a substantial and constantly expanding body of critical literature dealing with both French and English African writing.

Few East African studies have been directly concerned with intellectual life and the development of socio-political thought. A number of historians, including Iliffe, Lonsdale, and Ranger, have dealt with the development and movement of ideas, but often only in a peripheral way. Lionel Cliffe and John Saul in Tanzania have done much to clarify intellectual issues and to identify major sources of intellectual cleavage. Nyerere's thought has been extensively discussed. Ali Mazrui has frequently turned his attention to questions of language and culture and intellectual traditions. However, while the number of literary journals and books published over the last five years has increased remarkably, there is no monograph devoted solely to East African literature, and there is certainly no study of East


4. The latest of Mazrui's works to examine questions relating to language, literature, and intellectual and political life is *Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972).
African intellectual life. There have been a number of studies of the social backgrounds of social and political elites in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and studies of both secondary school and university students.¹

A number of developments have, during the last decade, made the analysis of the East African intellectual stratum and its thought an area of serious, if somewhat neglected, academic interest. Apart from the depth and diversity of the thought, there have been institutional developments, and especially the expansion of the universities, which have provided the institutional bases for intellectual life and outlets for the articulation and dissemination of intellectual ideas and works.

Makerere University was first established as a University College in 1962. It later became the foundation member of the University of East Africa which, inaugurated in 1963, had campuses at Makerere, 

Dar-es-Salaam, and Nairobi. Always subject to disintegrating pressures, the University broke up in 1970, and the three branches became autonomous national universities. During the 1950s and '60s the number of students attending both the domestic and foreign universities and higher educational institutions increased remarkably. In addition, there has been the growth of indigenous publishing houses such as the East African Publishing House, the East Africa Literature Bureau, the Tanzania Publishing House, and many smaller private publishers. The growth of indigenous publishing, and the increasing interest of United Kingdom publishing companies such as Heinemann, Longmans, and Oxford University Press, has led to a remarkable increase in the number of books - fiction, poetry, political, anthropological and sociological, critical, theological, children's and general - written by East Africans and published.

Combined with the East African publishing "boom" has been a sprouting of literary and intellectual journals, only a few of which serve as mouthpieces for particular intellectual and political groupings. Among these journals are Busara (formerly Nexus), the East Africa Journal, Ghala (the literary edition of the East Africa Journal), Zuka, The Journal of Literature and Society, Transition, Mawazo (formerly the Makerere Journal), dhana (formerly Penpoint), The African Review, Taamuli, Umma (formerly Darlite), Maji Maji and Cheche. Most have been university-based. All
have, to varying degrees, been concerned with the major cultural, socio-economic, and political issues confronting contemporary Africa.

There are strong grounds for regarding East Africa as a basic unit for the study of intellectual life. In spite of the fact that East Africa is dismantling its inherited regional economic institutions, and has dropped all serious discussion of political federation, there is evidence, some of it quite rudimentary, that East Africa has moved toward greater cultural integration. The educated of East Africa have made use of, and had access to, basically the same tertiary level educational institutions. Before the establishment of universities in Kenya and Tanzania, Makerere University College provided education for generations of Kenyans and Tanzanians. Table I, although limited to a two year period, indicates the extent of Makerere's East African role.

1. The dissolution of the Currency Board was the first stage in this dismantling process. However, the major step so far has been the break-up of the East African Income Tax Department in mid 1973, and other strains have been evident in East African Airways, the East African Posts and Telecommunications network, and East African Railways. The whole problem has been exacerbated by the fact that markedly different development ideologies have been emerging in the three states. See Njehu Gatabaki, "Disintegrating Community", Sunday Post, June 17th, 1973, p.5.

2. The Uganda coup of January 1971, when Milton Obote was deposed and replaced by General Idi Amin, undoubtedly was the final nail in the coffin of political federation. Tanzania's refusal to recognize Amin's Government, and the unsuccessful guerrilla attack on Uganda from Tanzanian bases, have made the likelihood of political federation extremely remote. Without these two factors it would still be so. Fundamental political differences, openly manifested at the ideological level, have been given structural bases. As a result, any sort of federation would be nominal at best.
TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At Makerere College</th>
<th>In U.S.A.</th>
<th>At U.K. universities</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1953-59</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>1959-60</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>30-90</td>
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<td><strong>Kenya</strong></td>
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<td>1958-59</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>1959-60</td>
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<td><strong>Tanganyika</strong></td>
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<td>1958-59</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>26</td>
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Many of the Tanzanian and Kenyan intellectuals discussed in this work studied at Makerere. Mobility between the three countries was facilitated further by the creation of the now defunct University of East Africa. Publishing houses, especially the East African Publishing House and the East African Literature Bureau, have also contributed to cultural integration. Staffed by nationals from the three countries, they publish material by East African writers (and others) in both English and vernacular languages. East

African literary and intellectual journals cater for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan contributors, and focus their attention principally on East African cultural, economic, political and social questions.\(^1\) There have been regionally conceived books such as \textit{Zamani: A Survey of East African History},\(^2\) as well as regionally shared broadcasting, notably the programme promoted by the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs. In addition, there have been region-wide seminars and conferences such as those organized by the East African Academy. The annual East African Social Science Research Conferences bring together large numbers of academics.\(^3\) On a smaller scale, interaction occurs when members of the Literature Departments at the universities meet in conference to discuss teaching methods and curricula. Many East African students come into contact with each other whilst attending European and North American universities where they often belonged.

\(^1\) Many of the contributors write for more than one of the journals. For instance, those who write for the Makerere-based Mawazo (Oculi, Mohiddin), also contribute to the Nairobi-based East Africa Journal. The specifically literary journals — Zuka, Busara, Nexus, and Shela rely to an important extent on a basic "pool" of writers.


\(^3\) It is noticeable at these conferences that national differences are pronounced. The Tanzanians emerge as the most ideologically predisposed, and in fundamental opposition to the scope-oriented, quantitative, behaviourist research which emanates from Kenya and Uganda. The differences also emerge strongly in attitudes to literature. There tends to be a headlong clash between the aestheticism of Makerere, and the socio-political consciousness of the Tanzanians.
to African student organisations. These contacts have sometimes been maintained upon return to East Africa. Admittedly, most of these contacts have been instruments of cultural integration and intellectual unity only at a high level of literacy. But there are other media of cultural dissemination at the grassroots. The Swahili language is the most important of these. For instance, Tanzania radio and popular Swahili music has a considerable audience in Kenya. Three Swahili popular papers published in Kenya, Baraza, Afrikaervo, and Taifa Tanzania, enjoy a substantial circulation in Tanzania. And even as the lingua franca for bodies such as football teams, Swahili helps draw people into a wider cultural universe.\(^1\)

While the above factors contribute to the unity of East African intellectual life, historical, cultural, socio-economic, and political differences provide a basis for comparative analysis. In the case of Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, there are important differences between the socio-economic and political systems which have their roots in the varying degrees of penetration of the capitalist system, and the way in which the structure of the Kenyan economy was greatly affected by the settler nature of Kenyan society. In spite of the much publicised and essentially hollow Sessional Paper Number 10 on African Socialism (1965), Kenya is committed to capitalist, or rather state capitalist development. Private foreign investment is encouraged, and combined in an inherently

contradictory way, with the rapid extension of African participation in capital ownership and management. While there is state ownership and control of certain sectors of the economy, this is used as a basis of support, especially through state-financed corporations, for private investment, capital accumulation, and development. Tanzania, on the other hand, is committed to a socialist model of development. Rural socialist transformation through ujamaa vijijini, and state ownership of enterprises, are viewed as key elements of this development. While both Tanzania and Kenya are single-party states—under the control of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) respectively, state structures and party organization and role differ considerably. The Tanzanian emphasis on rural socialist transformation through ujamaa vijijini necessitates the development of structures, both governmental and party, at the grassroots level which will facilitate the mobilization of people for development purposes. By way of contrast, in Kenya, where development is not guided by any coherent, systematically formulated socialist ideology, party organization has

1. Constitutionally, there is no reason why only one party should exist in Kenya, but the turbulent history of the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) clearly demonstrates that the KANU Government will do all in its power, both legal and illegal, to make the existence of another party impossible.

2. This is not to deny that Kenya has a ruling ideology. In the African situation, the researcher should exercise caution when referring to ideologies. There is a pronounced tendency for writers to construct systematic ideologies from a few policy statements made by African leaders, and to exaggerate the systematization of ideologies. For a discussion of this tendency see Christopher Clapham, "The Context of African Political Thought", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.8, No.1 (1970), pp.1-13.
withered, and is certainly not viewed as a major mass mobilization agency. These socio-economic and political differences, and ruling class attitudes towards national development, have an important bearing on the nature of intellectual activity, and help to determine not only the issues but the limits of debate as well. They have also influenced the nature and socio-political role of the press, universities, and publishing houses, and the ways in which intellectuals have viewed their political role and actually behaved.

In addition to the above-mentioned, but by no means exhaustive reasons for the study of East African intellectual life, and for regarding East Africa as a single and internally varied and contrasted arena of analysis, there is the situation of African underdevelopment and dependence which gives East African intellectual problems a much broader dimension. This situation is not identical in all African states. Interactions between predominant external economic, political, and cultural forces and internally generated ones, have been complex and subject to variations and different intensities, and have occurred at different stages of historical development. While this situation has evoked basically the same types of intellectual concerns, conflicts, and dilemmas, intellectual response to, and analysis of this situation has demonstrated a considerable diversity. Responses reflect not

only the complexity and nature of the specific local situation, but the intensity and nature of external intellectual influences. The presence, for instance, of a number of Marxist or neo-Marxist expatriate academics in Tanzania, helped generate particular types of approaches to the analysis of underdevelopment which distinguish much of Tanzanian intellectual life from that of Kenya. Thus two of the major concerns of this thesis are to examine how East African intellectual interpretations of underdevelopment and neocolonialism vary, especially on a national basis, and to see the types of solutions which East African intellectuals propose for what they perceive as the major problems of post-independence East African states.

It should not be overlooked that present East African intellectual activity is part of a wider, and historically deeper, ideological and intellectual reconstruction which has been in motion, at least in West Africa, since the second half of the 19th century. Successive generations of educated Africans have been concerned with the question of how to adapt European thought systems and technology to the African context while maintaining continuity with the past, and preserving a distinct African societal and cultural identity. Manifestations of this are to be found in various expressions of cultural nationalism; in the recreation and reinterpretation of African history; in the literary and philosophical ngritude movement; and in various doctrines of syncretic socialism. Much of contemporary intellectual work has its roots in these earlier responses and developments
and certain striking parallels, often spanning a period of a century, are evident. Increasngly, however, analysis of problems which stem from continuing relations of dependence with the advanced capitalist states—economc, political, and cultural problems, and especially that which takes place within a Marxist or neo-Marxist framework, has done much to sever the links with the earlier intellectual responses.

During the 1950s and '60s, political scientists and sociologists who derived their fundamental theoretical orientations from what may loosely be termed structural-functionalism, placed prime stress on "anachronistic social structures", an overwhelming residue of "traditional" factors, cultural pluralism, ethnic diversity, and an elite-mass gap as major obstacles to national integration and hence development and nation-building. They did not view underdevelopment, as writers such as Andre Gunder Frank,

1. For instance, Okot p'Bitek's cultural nationalist concerns are not so terribly far removed from those of Edward Blyden.


Keith Griffin, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, and Arrighi and Saul subsequently did, as part of a dynamic process historically located, as Furtado argues, in the penetration of pre-capitalist societies by the expansion of capitalism from the countries of its origins. Working from a number of a priori, and often doubtful assumptions about the nature of traditional societies and the nature of change, most failed to adequately situate questions of cultural and ethnic diversity within a dynamic economic and political setting. Most certainly ignored the international dimensions of the problems — the ways in which external forces impinge upon, and interact with internal factors to produce new types of internal relationships. Focus on issues of ethnic diversity, "tribalism" or local and regional nationalism, only develops significant explanatory or analytical power when viewed


within the overall framework of underdevelopment. The very nature of the relations between diverse ethnic and cultural groupings, and the types of conflicts which have arisen in this situation, has been altered by divisive colonial policies, the uneven penetration of the capitalist system, and the uneven distribution of economic, political, and social resources.

The political boundaries of new African states correspond rather imperfectly to any pre-existing ethnic-cultural unity. The "balkanization" of African societies by European colonial powers ensured that artificial boundaries both divided peoples and, as was more often the case, clumped people together without regard for ethnic, cultural or political considerations. African states achieved independence in most cases without a long, transforming struggle. They did not have, as the new nations of Eastern Europe had, decades if not centuries of rationalistic, ethnic-cultural activity which led to a high degree of cultural consolidation and integration. African political independence was achieved far in advance of such unification around a common set of 'national' behaviour and myths.

It has sometimes been argued that in the pre-independence period, the cultural diversity and absence of a common nation-wide ethnic and cultural identity did not present as grave a problem.

1. This is not meant to suggest that local, microcosmic studies should be abandoned, or justified in a cumbersome way by reference to broader theory. One of the major faults with Frank's work is that it concentrates on metropole-satellite relations, and the development of international structures, to the neglect of any detailed analysis of the nature of the domestic situation in the satellite. Samir Amin provides a welcome antidote to Frank in the sense that he focusses his attention on the detailed analysis of relations within a satellite or dependent economy.
Goertz, for instance, has noted that

Colonial governments, like the aristocratic governments of pre-modern Europe in whose image they were fashioned, are aloof and unresponsive; they stand outside the societies they rule, and act upon them arbitrarily, unevenly, and unsystematically.¹

A temporary consensus of diverse groups (nationalities if you like) was facilitated by the fact that the basic cleavage lay between the European who controlled the state structure and the subject local population.² This view, however, is highly misleading and underestimates the impact of divisive colonial administrative policies (which were far from aloof and unresponsive) on the emergence of national, rather than local or regional, political organizations. In Kenya, where nationally oriented African political activity was prohibited by the Emergency, nationalist organization was forced to develop, at least for a considerable time before independence, on a local basis. When national movements emerged in the form of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), and the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), very real differences existed over constitutional questions and the distribution of power in the new state. Composed largely of representatives of the smaller groups, KADU under the leadership of Ronald Ngala, was fearful of the possible dominance of the


Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia, and opted for a federal system of
government which would protect local and regional interests and
allow for a greater diffusion of power.¹

The imminence and attainment of political independence gave
rise to the problem of which cultural and linguistic groups were
to dominate within the state once power was transferred by the
colonial power to the Africans. Control of the state apparatus
was obviously crucial in terms of the access to, and distribution
of scarce resources. It was often the only stable path to
economic advancement. Larger groups, and those which had initially
educational and hence economic and occupational advantages, were
clearly in a better position than others. The new ruling classes
were in many instances composed disproportionately of represent-
atives from certain privileged ethnic groupings - groups which,
through their possession of advantages stemming from the uneven
impact of economic, social, and educational change, were in a
position to occupy key bureaucratic and political posts. Within
the dominant ethnic groups, of course, there was considerable
stratification. More recent writing on "Mau Mau" in Kenya, for
example, suggests that the struggle was at least in part a civil
war between those Kikuyu - a nascent landed gentry - who had

¹. Cherry Gertsol, The Politics of Independent Kenya (Nairobi:
E.A.P.I., 1970), Chapters 1 and 2.
benefited in economic and educational terms from collaboration with the colonial administration and mission societies, and a largely landless group which had been effectively dispossessed by colonial land policy and patterns of settler agricultural production.¹ And within the ruling class, as for example again in Kenya, there was often an intra-class rivalry (or competition between elites) with political leaders utilizing ethnic support for class purposes.

Universal political participation and what Geertz calls the "thrusting of a modern political consciousness upon the mass of a still largely unmodernized population" ² exacerbated the problems. New African states have to confront simultaneously a set of cumulative and complex crises of underdevelopment and legitimacy that in many Western nations were dealt with one at a time. Before a sense of common national identity has been created, and before viable national political structures and institutions have been established, attentive and representative structures must absorb the demands of social groups "which neither identify with the nation-state nor accept its institutional setting".³ When this

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is combined with the pressing need to raise the living standards of the masses (some groups have in real terms suffered a decline in living standards since independence) the problem becomes more acute. For, as Lofchie argues

a political culture stressing welfare norms tends to precede even the early phase of industrialization in Africa, (and) widespread demands for social services arise before the economy has generated sufficient resources to meet these demands. Since the publicly declared values of political leadership frequently reflect welfare aspects of the political culture, the polity is placed in a position of failing to achieve its own goals.

In Kenya, the government's stress on "Harambee" self-help projects, and in Tanzania the policy of self-reliance, may be viewed, at least partly, as attempts to shift welfare norms from the centre to locally based structures and locally generated resources.

It is often assumed that it is amongst those with advanced western education that we find the emergence of some national consensus about values, institutions, and policies. However, it is false to suppose that the western educated - referred to in most development literature as the elite,\(^1\) sheds completely its attachment to tribal and ethnic authority and cultural patterns.

According to Elizabeth Colson

it has been the school man, the intellectual, who has been most eager to advance his own language and culture and who has seen himself as vulnerable to any

1. Ibid.

2. A brief outline of this literature is to be found in McGowan and Dolland, pp.12-21.
advantages given to the language and culture of other groups within the country.  

And with reference to the responsiveness and attentiveness of the new political institutions, Colson adds that it "is the political leaders' need for self-expression that lies behind the mobilisation of tribes and the manifestation of tribalism in contemporary Africa".  

The colonialism that had destroyed indigenous institutions was incapable of establishing viable new ones, and it was in fact "incompatible with any preparation for self-government". Many nationalists failed to appreciate this fact. Of course, as Leonard Barnes points out

How could the groups of nationalist agitators who had pushed their way forward to African self-politics, be expected to see that it would be fatal to try to run a liberated Africa with the organization and methods of colonialism?  

The assumption throughout all the independence negotiations with the colonial powers, and especially in British Africa, was that the new African systems should follow the metropolitan models. Anything other than these would at the time have been regarded by both sides as an inferior substitute. The colonial powers had little else to offer.


2. Ibid.


The African political leaders had no idea what else to claim, or what re-designing to undertake. They were not political scientists, and had never given a thought to the question of how a modern African state ought to differ from a modern European state. There was no one to whom they could turn for honest and competent advice. 1

Colonialism "emphasised the approval of the governors rather than the consent of the governed", and its European personnel "acted on the assumption that they themselves could only be replaced by an indigenous elite which had enjoyed a political education similar to their own". 2 The British attempt to create social institutions based on those of Britain, and to create Africans and Africa in the image of Britain, is clearly conveyed in the frank writings of the late Sir Philip Mitchell, a British colonial governor of considerable experience. Commenting on British colonial policy in East Africa, he said

What we have set our hands to here is the establishment of a civilised state in which the values and standards of Britain, in which everyone, whatever his origins, has an interest and a part. 3

Colonial administrations, apart from creating a class of African administrators who would perpetuate European values, and maintain the imposed system were, at least in East Africa, concerned to create a class of property-owning Africans who could be relied upon to maintain and safeguard and perpetuate the emerging liberal

1. Ibid., p.26
society in its economic aspect.\textsuperscript{1} This was clearly the idea behind land consolidation in Kenya. For instance, in his recommendation for land consolidation schemes in Kenya, R.J.M. Swynnerton, who was at that time a senior agricultural officer, said:

In future, if these recommendations are accepted ... energetic or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country.\textsuperscript{2}

Further, in East Africa in particular, the extension of the franchise, or admission to the European implemented system, was calculated by the colonial power which set the standards. Thus, the first people to acquire the franchise and the right to rule themselves were the British or European colonialists; then the Indians got the right to vote; then the Arabs; and finally the Africans. But with the Africans it was not a straight-forward and simple matter, and a number of tests were devised — property qualifications, income qualifications, educational qualifications — to ensure that the African was in tune with the new system, and to ensure that the new system did not fall into the hands of the masses. In the later 1950s a senior British Colonial Office official, Sir Andrew Cohen, had explained that nationalist movements were bound to grow stronger, and therefore "the intelligent thing is for governments to recognize this early, and by skilfull

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anticipation to try and guide the energies of the nationalists into constructive channels"; and this was remaining "friendly to the Western world". Independence, or what Patrice Lumumba termed "juridical independence", was granted on the basis of the continuation of the colonially created system, and not on its destruction. Decolonization became a move to "shore up 'stabilizing' forces", a "bargaining process with co-operative African elites", occurring "within the largely unaltered framework of the colonial system".

Newly independent African states thus inherited a political and administrative machinery which was based on a combination of values derived from the British, or European, and not the African experience. The inherited structures were scarcely conducive to the profound social and economic transformation demanded by African conditions.

One of the basic underlying assumptions of so much development theory is that the surmounting of the obstacles in the path of development, and the rate of that development, will depend to a large extent on the role played by the Western-educated elites - upon their size and their levels of education and training, and upon "the ability of their members to analyze the problems facing their countries". They face a task which seems peculiar to

3. First, pp.49 & 57-58.
the developing nations of the 20th century. Whereas in 19th century Western Europe it was the craftsman and small entrepreneur who promoted industrial development, in Africa the task has devolved on the university graduate with his generally ill-suited liberal education. The transfer of western technology (often encouraged by the technocratic products of American universities in particular) and the activities of multi-national corporations and their subsidiaries in transferring Western consumption tastes with their particular technologies, has successfully hampered or destroyed the technologically innovative behaviour of local manufacturers, except perhaps at the level of the "informal sector" of the economy. But the effectiveness of the elites in providing direction in national development, and in modifying the behaviour of all members of society, is dependent upon the combination of many intractable problems. The effectiveness depends on the ability to analyse African problems, redefine European and African values, develop viable political structures, formulate ideologies which are capable of providing impetus, meaning, and direction to national development efforts, and above all, on world economic structures.

Incumbent political elite attempts to guide value change - as with Kaunda's Zambian humanism and Nyerere's ujamaa, depend for their success, partly on the cohesion or integration of the ruling class, but more crucially on the development of structures which facilitate the use of power, and enable the mobilization of people
at all levels of society. As yet, many African leaders have not settled their choice of socio-economic and political systems for their countries. Most African states have simply continued with the system inherited from the colonial regimes, and many attempts at ideological reconstruction, including doctrines of African socialism, have lacked foundation and viability in the context of African reality. Ideologies of anti-colonialism have lacked viability. It is hard for a nationalist regime to continue to use anti-colonialism as its ideology for social transformation once it has evicted the external enemy. This is especially the case when one considers that most nationalist doctrines lacked detailed prescriptions for economic and political reconstruction. To be viable as an ideology, Zartman argues, "anti-colonialism would have to be able to keep the faith, identify the enemy, and indicate the long path to the millennium after the colonial ruler has been expelled." Nevertheless, doctrines of anti-colonialism have been converted into anti-neo-colonialist doctrines. In Uganda anti-neocolonialism has been used as the rationale for the nationalization of Asian and British owned interests. In Kenya, as Leys points out, the rhetoric of economic nationalism forms part of the national ideology, and as such is anti-neocolonialist, even if the economic policies pursued by the government are basically supportive of persisting neo-colonialist relations.

The failure of many incumbent political elites to produce fundamental change stems from a number of factors: the Western-type educational background of elite members and their value-orientations; colonially inherited structures which help to create and maintain a privileged elite which benefits from the maintenance of existing structures; colonially-created institutions which have manifested a palpable unsuitability for developmental purposes, and require re-examination and reconstruction in the light of new national objectives; a decolonization process which remains unreal to the extent that African states remain economically and ideologically dependent on the advanced industrial nations of the West, and subject to the strong influence, if not control, of external forces. The inability of incumbent political elites to come to grips with the major problems confronting African societies, to break the relations of dependence, to bring about fundamental socio-economic and political transformation, has given rise to widespread disillusionment and dissatisfaction,¹ and to renewed intellectual debate and conflict. Intellectual attention has been focussed increasingly on the social, economic, political and cultural ills of the post-Independence situation. Many African intellectuals are seeking meaningful ways of relating the African past to the present and future, some clear perspective and sense of direction that would function as a binding and integrative force, and enable Africa's peoples to act in concert to deal effectively with the momentous economic and social problems.

A familiar phase in the development of radical mass and nationalist movements is the purging or subjugation of left-wing intellectuals and radicals by the leadership after its attainment of power. This radicalism is viewed by the leadership as a far more dangerous threat when it has an organizational base, especially a base within the ruling party. This was the case in Guinea for a short time after Independence, in Senegal, and to some extent in Kenya where the incumbent elite was prepared to endanger the Kenyan African National Union's party organization in order to defeat radical and dissident elements. While in many cases active dissidents and radicals are subjugated and purged from ruling parties, they are still to be found within the ruling parties of many African states, where often there develops a combination of radical intellectuals, youth wings and trade unions.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s in many African states, including Tanzania and Uganda, the outflow of students was no longer so exclusively towards the West, and this change in orientation marked the point of entry for Marxist elements and ideologies into the political scene. In Uganda, for instance, the leader of the newly emergent radical intelligentsia was for a time the Indian educated John Kakonge, a former Secretary-General of the Uganda People's Congress and Minister for Economic Development and Planning.

While significant groups of radical nationalist intellectuals and radical dissenters are small, and remain politically weak, they nevertheless continue to exercise, or at least attempt to exercise, an important influence over students and the younger generation of politicians. Dissenting intellectuals attempt to attach themselves to the structures of dissent, or disaffected groups which have been thrown up by the imposition of, and struggle for control of, new political structures, and by the uneven impact of colonialism and the capitalist economic system, and the sources of strain and dislocation produced by uneven economic and social changes. In Kenya, the dissenting radicals of Oginga Odinga's Kenyan Peoples' Union, attempted to make their electorate the urban unemployed and the landless peasantry.

The post-Independence phase is usually one of selective consolidation and institutionalization. Some institutions, often never firmly established in the pre-independence period, are allowed to atrophy and die-legislatures and political parties primarily because, as in Kenya, they are no longer required to serve ruling class ends. Other institutions, including the executive, the upper echelons of the civil service, and especially the provincial administration, the military and the police, are strengthened. There is generally administrative or bureaucratic

1. Ruth First points out that more than other institutions, "the armies of Africa were set in the colonial pattern". (p.73). It is largely by the "design of external forces" that the military has disproportionate power inside systems characterised by their weakness (Ibid., p.426).
class domination, and the largely effective political emasculation of declassé and dissenting intellectuals who enjoyed favour only during the struggle to dislodge the colonial powers.

Bureaucratic domination is, as Riggs argues, principally a legacy of uneven colonial impact.

The colonial administration itself created a bureaucratic apparatus not subject to political control within the dependent territory, so that administrative institutions proliferated while political structures remained embryonic and largely extra-legal, hence unable to relate themselves effectively to control over the bureaucracy.1

The bureaucratic class normally has a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo, and the types of structures and relationships which they inherited from the colonial power. Ruth First refers somewhat caustically to this inheritance.

As members of the imported oligarchy left, Africans stepped in to fill their jobs, play their roles, inherit their rates of pay and their privileges, and assume their attitudes, in particular the conviction that the educated in power have a divine right to rule and prosper.2

The basic salary structure of the independent African states remained as a colonial heritage, and as Africans entered the civil service, they assumed the basic salaries attached to the posts.3

The social inequality which stems from the maintenance of these

2. First, p.65.
inherited structures, and which is expressed in inequalities of income and power, is, as Amin shows, sometimes viewed by economists as a "positive" or even "necessary" stage of development.\(^1\) However, the actual consequence of such a policy is to reinforce the position of "parasitic social groups incapable of promoting the accelerated development which they claim to want".\(^2\) And these groups are certainly incapable of generating the ideological and cultural renewal deemed necessary for profound social transformation.

Obviously, by following writers such as Fanon and Pirst too uncritically, one can underestimate the extent to which bureaucratic "inheritance elites" are capable of producing changes or modifications, if only as part of the consolidation of their positions. For instance, in Tanzania at the time of independence, a good deal of economic power was in the hands of the Asian "commercial bourgeoisie" which "could be considered a subordinate partner of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the latter being the ruling class in the real sense of the word".\(^3\) The Tanganyikan African petty-bourgeoisie which assumed political power at the time of independence had been unable, in contrast to its counterpart in Kenya, to develop deep economic roots in the colonial economy.\(^4\)

While this meant that a situation of the separation of power and property existed, it also meant that the "ruling group" within the

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2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., p.57.
petty-bourgeoisie had a much freer hand than did its counterpart in Kenya. Using its control of the state apparatus and radical state intervention in the economy, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (the ruling section of the petty-bourgeoisie) was able to modify its relations with international capitalism and strike a "decisive blow against the commercial bourgeoisie", which lacked effective political weapons. The radical state intervention thus made possible the consolidation of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie while producing structural change.²

In societies where there are few opportunities for capital accumulation and economic advancement outside the public sector, and where capital investment is a risky business in the face of formidable competition from foreign governments, companies, and investors, an administrative career, perhaps even more than a political career, marks the way to economic security, prosperity, and prestige.³ It is little wonder that politicians and members of the bureaucratic class should look askance at radical intellectual dissidents and the prospects of those types of socio-economic and political change which would almost certainly threaten

1. Ibid., p.75.
2. Ibid.
3. For instance, Joel Barkan’s survey of Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan students, “What makes the East African Student run?” indicates that most respondents were concerned with job security rather than power or status. About 1/3rd of the respondents, with only a slight national variation, opted for teaching. About 1/5th opted for the civil service. Only 1/5 considered politics.
their privileged social and economic positions. In relation to this, Lloyd points out that in Nigeria before the military coup in 1966, elite criticism of government focussed, at least in the press, on bad roads and the failure of electricity supplies, rather than on more sensitive issues such as freedom of speech, academic freedom, and the accuracy of the census. Military coups, unless the coup happens to be one of reform, as in Egypt, pose less of a threat to the elites, as First argues, because "common to most military regimes installed by coup d'etat, is a civil service-military axis in which armies have the physical power to conserve the regime, while the civil service wields effective executive power in the state".

The African middle classes do not at present represent a structure of socio-political dissent, even though in the colonial period they tended to be at least superficially a radical force concerned with the overthrow of colonial rule. Pluralist and democratic elitist theorists, among them S.M. Lipset and R.A. Dahl, view the middle class as the keystone of stability in modern politics. However, a number of developmental theorists, including Samuel Huntington, have stressed the role of the urban

2. First, p. 66.
middle classes in fostering radical change and acting as revolutionary agents. According to Huntington:

The revolutionary class in most modernizing societies is, of course, the middle class. Here is the principal source of urban opposition to government. It is this group whose political attitudes and values dominate the politics of the cities.¹

Clearly, Huntington's point has much greater application to the Latin American and Asian situations than to Africa. The radicalism of the Bengalese middle classes in India, for instance, may be explained in good part by low rates of pay and promotion in overcrowded professional occupations, and chronic unemployment of university graduates. Throughout most of Africa, however, the pressure on the middle classes has not as yet been anywhere near as intense.

In Africa, the advent of independence and the increase in the size of the middle classes through the expansion of bureaucracy and its Africanization, encouraged middle class conservatism and support for the status quo. In their relatively privileged position, the business, professional, and bureaucratic segments of the middle class are already much less prone to radicalism, opposition, and revolution than the disaffected intelligentsia from within its ranks. It has been argued in a conspicuously reactionary way in the Indian case that the disgruntled intellectuals

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compose the cadres of the less responsible political parties, who make up the narrower entourage of demagogues, and who become leaders of millenarian and messianic movements, all of which may, when the opportunity is ripe, threaten political stability.¹

The integration of many intellectuals into party and governmental structures during the 1960s has not prevented the disaffection of the intelligentsia, even though, as in Kenya, the disaffection may be expressed in the maintenance of a certain life-style rather than in more overt political opposition.

Clearly, in Africa, and indeed the Third World in general, the rate of economic development has not kept pace with the growth of the public sector. This lag has serious implications. With the drastically increased numbers of secondary school leavers and university graduates on the labour market, generally seeking jobs within a public sector increasingly unable to provide sufficient occupational opportunities, the potential for the disaffection of the educated is bound to grow. In most African states, the incumbents of senior administrative office are generally still young, having been the first educated Africans to take advantage of the opening up of the civil service ranks with the advent of independence. A younger, often formally better trained, generation of educated is faced with a slightly older generation entrenched in bureaucratic office, and who see no precise limit to

their tenure.\textsuperscript{1} The glut in university graduates (except in states such as Tanzania where university manpower requirements are meticulously assessed),\textsuperscript{2} the reduced growth rate of government bureaucracy and increasing intensity of conflicts within it, are combined with very few opportunities for movement into alternative spheres of activity (the private sector)\textsuperscript{3} in a way which increases the likelihood of the emergence of large and dissident educated groups.

Sociologists and political scientists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the supposedly vital role of elites in promoting economic and political development in the African context. Many studies have been made of elite values and perceptions, and underlying much of the analysis has been the pronounced, if somewhat surprising, assumption, that it is what the elites say rather than how they behave, which is important for future development.

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] For the Tanzanian situation see McGowan and Boland, pp.50-52, 129. "We can expect little age-caused retirement from the Tanzanian elite. With an average age of 40 in 1967 this elite has another 20-25 years of ruling potential. The entry of Tanzanians born after 1940 will thus largely be based upon the growth in the absolute size of the elite generated out of meaningful economic development or out of wasteful co-optation of younger elements into the Government payrolls." - p.52.
\item[3.] The problem is complicated in states such as Tanzania by the concentration on the development of the public sector. Using 1965 data, McGowan and Boland (p.43) estimated that about 74\% of the 7,144 individual Tanzanians who made \$600 or more worked in the public sector of the economy while the remaining 26\% were in the private sector.
\end{itemize}
social, economic and political developments. To an important extent sociologists and political scientists have fallen for the rhetoric of African politicians, and undoubtedly they have been assisted down this stray path by Western commentators who have ascribed far too prominent a role to intellectuals during the nationalist struggle. Henry Bienen points out that

We cannot use as the crucial factors by which we differentiate systems images of the systems which parties and leaders themselves put forward. These images and variables we must consider. It cannot be taken for granted that explicit ideologies in African states have any relevance beyond what a few people do and say.

This sort of pitfall is evident in James Scarritt's study of political elite values in Zambia.

The values of the political elite are important for the political system not only because they control elite behaviour, but also because they indicate the direction in which the elite will attempt to modify the values and behaviour of all members of the society.

And Raymond Hopkins in his *Political Roles in a New State* states that

The attitudes and expectations of the Tanzanian political elite form the political culture within which modern politics, to a large extent, is carried on.

However, after focussing his attention on Tanzanian political elite perceptions and expectations of role, Hopkins suggests in his concluding passages that in the post-Independence political situation

a third weakness (in modern Tanzanian political culture) is discontinuity and possibly incongruence in the attitudes and expectations of the nonelite relative to those of the elite. The elite political culture and the structure it shapes among the elite in Tanzania may not be congruent with the "parochial" political culture that characterizes the attitudes and sentiments of most Tanzanians, who live in rural and quite traditional ways.

Thus, one feels disposed to ask: Why spend so much time examining the attitudes and values of the elite when they are unlikely to have much impact on the broader society? Analysis of elites usually falls into a crude dichotomic model in which elites are contrasted with an amorphous, undifferentiated conglomerate of poor, powerless, and illiterate people - the masses.

As Kitching has demonstrated at some length, the notion of ruling elite and elite developed in the works of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels has been perverted, and stretched in an often unrecognizable way to include bureaucratic sub-elites, commercial elites, and even elites of urban factory workers. While some British and American writers have been prepared to recognize the existence of

1. Ibid.
a ruling class,\textsuperscript{1} they have, when faced with the remaining 90\% or so of the population, had major doubts about the relevance of class analysis and categorisation. Many writers will admit that the grossest inequalities do exist in Africa.

but it is generally asserted that they have not led to the formation of self-conscious strata, which fact makes class analysis otiose. In short, the central objection to the use of the concept of class in tropical Africa depends on a tacit acceptance of the supposedly Marxist view that classes must be in class conflict, produced by class consciousness before this form of analysis can be of use.\textsuperscript{2}

Political scientists have also, until recently, generally ignored "elite" linkage with "sub-elites" and the "masses". This was partly the concern of Staniland's reconsideration of centre-periphery relations which showed how F.G. Bailey's concept of phased encapsulation,\textsuperscript{3} and the concept of cumulative inequality suggested by Myrdal,\textsuperscript{4} could be used to shed some light on the development and nature of centre-periphery relations in African societies.\textsuperscript{5} Clearly, one has to examine how groups at the periphery, through a response to their relative influence or deprivation, have evolved distinct structures in their relations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Lloyd, for instance, considers the problem of class analysis and whether there is a ruling class, but tentatively opts for an elite-mass terminology and analysis. "Introduction".
\item \textsuperscript{2} Kitching, \textit{pp.327-28}.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Staniland, "The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations", \textit{pp.622-27}.
\end{itemize}
with the national level. The outcome of "elite" initiatives for change will depend on the nature of the structures which evolve, and how groups at the periphery perceive centrally-derived initiatives. The types of structures which evolve will depend, for instance, on the extent to which members of the "elite" or ruling class are able to manipulate ethnic-tribal support for class purposes. Indeed, certain groups (e.g. the Kikuyu in Kenya) become a ruling class farm which can be preferentially cultivated in return for continued support of the centre.

Apart from overlooking the nature of the linkages between elites and other groups, and the possible emergence of interstitial or intercalary roles which broke and mediate between different social formations, political scientists have shown a pronounced tendency to brush over the disparities between stated, explicit values, and the actual behaviour of the "elite". While "development" or "modernization" may be the goal of political leaders and elites in general, it does little to explain a good deal of political phenomena. As one writer has pointed out,

"modernization as an ideology ... provides some manipulable symbols regarding power, and preserves a primary role for the elite, who aim to control the course and the effects of modernization, and whose position is supported by their authorship and use of the symbols."¹

Intellectuals are often viewed as a group within the educated elite that has played a key role in modernizing developing societies. Shils, for example, adopts the view that it is the intellectuals as a group who represent the cultural and moral basis of a modernized community. Intellectuals are for him the critical mediators between "tradition" and "modernity", and are in a strategic position as agents of social change. The intellectual elite provides the basic orientations for the society, serves as a force in the forging of new attitudes among the population, and introduces the basic Western ideologies that will serve as guidelines in the determination of public policy.² In similar vein, Friedmann views the intellectuals as playing a major part in economic transformation. He asserts that decisions of public policy which are instrumental in effecting basic changes are subject to considerable influence by intellectuals. It is they who largely "define the problems, formulate the goals, and indicate the alternative means for attaining intermediate objectives".³

¹. Raab, p.224.


In the post-Independence period, it is certainly not clear what the effect of intellectuals, or for that matter any other group, may be. Economic, educational, and socio-cultural changes have produced great discontinuities in social communication without necessarily developing a new pattern of integration. The patterns of integration which emerge, may be complex and flexible, and the creature of individuals and groups which are given little prominence in the literature. Most writers on development have found little difficulty in regarding the elite and intellectuals as a modernizing force "generating new norms of functional relevance to innovation and in general serving to create patterns of motivation that were not present in traditionally oriented societies". To glibly accept such a view, however, is to overlook the importance of at least two major objections. Firstly, this view overlooks Amin's point that the structural location of "elites" normally renders them incapable of generating the cultural and ideological renewal necessary for profound social transformation. And secondly, this view posits a superficial definition of modernization which is derived from a selective analysis of "Western complex systems", and which normally assumes that colonial rule provided both the institutional and value basis for modernization.

4. Almond & Coleman, p. 16.
Members of elites do possess "modern" and "innovative" values only if we accept that modernization relates to change within existing, colonially inherited structures, rather than to the severing of relations of dependence and fundamental structural change. Undoubtedly filtering processes do allow for the gradual diffusion of intellectual values, but the nature of this downward and horizontal transmission is virtually impossible to assess. Little is known about the channels of communication through which the values of the elite and intellectuals permeate to disparate and dispersed groups. Intellectuals, as Apter suggests, were probably more important as major agents of change in the period of transition "from a clearly traditional system to a modern one". If we ignore the rigid division Apter makes between the untenable notions of tradition and modernity, intellectual effect probably reached its apogee in the early years of colonial rule, and later during the struggle for national independence when intellectuals were able to attach themselves to major structures of dissent. In other words, intellectuals had their greatest impact, not as intellectuals per se, but rather as politicians who threw themselves into party and electoral work.

Somewhat ironically, while intellectuals played a major role in bringing about juridical independence, they have left no deep-rooted, continuing intellectual heritage which helps shape the course of national development, and which impinges upon the

consciousness of younger intellectuals and politicians.\(^1\)

Admittedly, the earlier generations of intellectuals in West Africa have to some extent left a viable intellectual heritage which can be drawn upon and extended by contemporary intellectuals. In East Africa the situation is markedly different. Relatively late European colonisation and its concomitantly late development of educational institutions, has ensured that the modern intellectual culture is of limited depth. Apart from Swahili writers, and a few Islamic coastal reformers,\(^2\) it is difficult to find more than a handful of intellectuals of any stature who produced any body of written work at least before the onset of the 1960s. But with the possible exception of states such as Tanzania, the post-Independence political culture of African states has not been the creature of intellectuals.

1. Intellectuals, especially those who have been integrated into the incumbent elite, probably influence the determination of public policy, if only in an inconspicuous way. Most English-speaking, university-educated intellectuals, focus their attention on a relatively small and educated group situation in the capital or the main provincial centres. The discontinuities in social communication, fostered by language and literacy differences, and by the marginality and powerlessness of the intelligentsia, ensure that the intellectual who has been integrated into the incumbent elite may have an important influence on the determination of policy at the national level, but his broader effect and influence is much more difficult to ascertain. Public policy does not always affect society.

The prominence of Western-educated intellectuals in nationalist struggles tends to obscure the fact that African states, as previously argued, began the era of independence with socio-political structures bequeathed by the colonial powers, and with elites which had successfully demonstrated their ability to absorb the values of their colonial predecessors. As "inheritance elites" they generally showed a willingness and ability to work the political system in accordance with the value assumptions of the home country (metropolitan power), while at the same time maintaining a posture of increasing dissociation from the colonial regime. Whereas in Latin America the constitution and polity of Spain and Portugal were almost completely rejected, and the "rationalist prescriptions emerging from revolutionary France" adopted as the new model, in Anglophone and Francophone Africa the model was invariably that of the colonial power.

1. According to J.P. Nettl, "the notion of 'inheritance' is intended to convey a special socio-political situation as defined by the participants. It serves primarily as a lead into the particular situational pattern from which many of the developmental values, structures and processes arise, and which largely sets the manner of their evolution. As such it has cultural connotations: the inheritance situation acts as a common socialization process into the international system for ex-colonies and by derivation for many developing countries. The concept of inheritance is based on the assumption of a multi-faceted but dominant reference group relationship between ex-colonies and imperialist countries, real or postulated, arising from an analogy with the legal inheritance of a benefit.

More specifically, inheritance refers to the orientation and actions of an elite expecting and preparing to take over from its predecessors. The most common and 'purest' type of inheritance is the attainment of independence by colonies, but social revolution and even substantial reform often carry inheritance aspects in their situation" - J.P. Nettl, Political Mobilization. A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp.35-36.

2. Ibid., p.207.
The unsuitability of the inherited institutions and values was not followed by any profound intellectual redefinition or reconstruction. Admittedly, intellectuals and politicians formulated various doctrines of African socialism, and elusive notions of negritude and the African Personality, but these have not been readily transferable to the transformation of socio-political structures for developmental purposes. Those African intellectuals who were conscious of the need to reconstruct socio-political structures and values were often isolated within the nationalist movements, and ultimately excluded from power.

The post-Independence political cultures of most African states, have thus hardly been the creatures of intellectuals. They have been shaped largely by other forces: international economic structures, the colonial powers which laid the foundations of the basic modern socio-political and administrative framework and determined the state boundaries; ethnic and cultural factors which have been modified by uneven economic and educational change and the struggle for the control of the state apparatus; the military; politicians, especially national level ones; and, upper echelon administrators. Ostensibly, they have not been moulded by intellectuals, many of whom have spent the post-Independence period in isolated positions of marginality and impotence. Contemporary

1. In the case of the United States the British constitution was not adopted in detail, although most of the efforts at constitution-making involved attempts to "improve on the spirit of the British system rather than provide a completely dissociative approach". Ibid. Nevertheless, the post-revolutionary culture was the creature of intellectuals whose leadership provided the basis of a civic culture that has in broad outline been sustained to the present time. See S. H. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp.66-74, 90-93.
East African intellectuals, and African intellectuals in general, have a background of political activism and opposition. But now they operate in systems which have little patience with dissenting voices. Because party structures are either non-existent or undeveloped, the intellectual is denied one important arena for the articulation and attachment of his ideas. As a palliative he may, of course, act as a government adviser or "expert". But the limits of his intellectual concern, imposed by institutional arrangements and incumbent elite socio-political values, reduce and stifle the critical, qualitative dimension of his thought and restrict its scope.

This extended reference to studies of elite perceptions and values, and to the part played by intellectuals in promoting socio-political change, is offered primarily as a caution against placing too much weight on the values and perceptions of East African intellectuals - something Shils, Friedmann, and other writers on intellectuals and elites do. Barrington Moore provides what is an apt warning against this tendency, even for those studies which focus on social structure, and the articulation of its values by intellectuals.

The intellectuals as such can do little politically unless they attach themselves to a massive form of discontent. The discontented intellectual with his soul searchings has attracted attention wholly out of proportion to his political importance, partly because these searchings leave behind them written records and also because those who write history are themselves intellectuals.¹

While intellectuals are important as interpreters of social reality, definers of value-systems, and in providing form and direction to the alienative tendencies which exist within society, they are important precisely to the extent that they can attach themselves and their idea-structures to socio-political structures of dissent. Hence, any systematic analysis of an intellectual community or stratum must take into account, not only the structure of the community, and the formulation, articulation, and diffusion of ideas by intellectuals, but also the relations of that community or stratum (or at least segments within it) to other socio-political structures.

A great many studies of intellectuals and their thought concentrate on a prominent few who supposedly represent or typify the dominant intellectual trends in a particular period of time. Such a concentration, however, raises a number of difficulties with regard to the total intellectual activity of the age. The combined factors of the written evidence of the past, the social moulding and acceptance of ideas, and their structural encapsulation in movements or schools, place barriers in the path of the scholar who wishes to move beyond "acknowledged" major figures and thought systems, and to explore the tremendous depth and diversity of cultural or intellectual activity which exists within any one

1. This is particularly true of studies of modern Chinese intellectuals. Michael Geaster, for instance, says in the Preface to his study, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911, The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969): "I have selected a small number for discussion. I chose them because taken together they represent the dominant trends in the thinking of the time." p.vii.
society at a particular time. Clearly, one of the major problems for the scholar at this stage of African development is to indicate with any certainty the major direction of growth of socio-political ideas, and their social moulding and acceptability. The advantage, is that it is possible to avoid the undue concentration on intellectuals who, and ideas which, have proven dominant and acceptable in a particular context. In the Tanzanian case, for instance, most writers have focussed their attention on Eyreare's thought, and especially the ideology of ujamaa. This is readily understandable given that ujamaa embodies a good deal of the socialist ideology which gives direction to social transformation in Tanzania. Nevertheless, there are extensive commentaries upon, and interpretations of, ujamaa and Tanzanian socialism by other intellectuals, and there is now a not inconsiderable body of neo-Marxist thought concerned with the analysis of the neo-colonial state, the nature of Tanzanian society, and future patterns of struggle and development. This, however, does not mean that the scholar should suspend critical judgment and indiscriminately allocate equal value to all ideas. Qualitative evaluations, as with literary criticism, are essential.

The concentration on an over-exclusive stratum of intellectuals, and the focus on the few dominant systems of thought, can be avoided if the researcher directs some of his analysis to the structure of the intellectual stratum. The institutional system

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1. One of the great virtues of E.P. Thompson's monumental work, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963) is that it does move away from the "great" intellectual figures to explore in meticulous detail the development and dissemination of ideas among what may be termed working class intellectual activists. See Chapter 16 in particular.
of the stratum centres, of course, around the university. Other institutions - publishing houses, journals, reviews and newspapers, bookshops, libraries, theatres, and museums, all form part of the institutional structure. Within this formal structure, intellectual social interaction occurs, and networks and clusters form. Obviously, a profound understanding of the composition and structure of the stratum, and of the thought of its members will only be achieved through an examination of the informal bases of intellectual association, and clique and cluster formation.

Apart from the analysis of the structure of the intellectual stratum, this study's major concern is to provide an analysis of the intellectual's social and political thought, and cultural perceptions. These perceptions are important to the extent that they develop the alternative tendencies within society and form counter-ideologies, interpret the experience of colonialism and independence, supply meaning and continuity to the changes that have occurred in African societies, and provide possible solutions to a multiplicity of crises and problems which have their roots in the neo-colonial state of dependence and underdevelopment.

While the major focus of this study is the post-independence situation, obviously a great deal of attention has to be given to the pre-independence period. Many of the contemporary intellectual and political conflicts are explicable only in terms of the nature of pre-colonial African societies and cultures, the colonial experience, and the conflicts it gave rise to. It is clearly
necessary to consider the intellectual's perception of the past, for his interpretation of the nature of pre-colonial African society and the colonial situation, will have an important bearing on his analysis of the post-independence situation, and the types of alternatives and solutions he envisages. Some assessment of the usefulness or validity of what the intellectual says concerning the African past would have to be attempted, especially if such interpretation is at the core of the types of solutions to African problems offered by him.
CHAPTER II

Towards a Definition of the African Intellectual

Introduction: The Definition of the Intellectual

The history of political activism of African intellectuals, and their prominence in nationalist movements, raises many doubts about the usefulness, applicability, and validity of those definitions of the intellectual which stress the critically detached, uninvolved nature of his social and political roles. There has been until recently throughout much of Africa a unity of intellectual and political life which stemmed from the nature of the colonial situation and the demands of the nationalist struggle. Nationalist movements were characterised by the close relations of literature, journalism, and politics, and intellectual life in general. Indeed, as Goran Hyden notes, "writers, journalists, and lawyers had played an almost insignificant role in non-political contexts before independence".¹ It was the recognition of this which enabled Kaunda to define the intellectual as "essentially an engaged man applying modern knowledge and training to political purposes. He is anyone who has a level of modern education beyond that of the mass of people and who is prepared to become politically involved."²

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Historically, the socio-political role of the intellectual has not been one of critical detachment and disengagement, although writers such as Benda,\(^1\) Aron,\(^2\) Parsons,\(^3\) and Shils,\(^4\) on the basis of their normative prescriptions and concern with differentiation of roles, would suggest otherwise. Parallels may be drawn between the activism of African intellectuals and intellectuals during the French Revolution, the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary intellectuals in Russia, the Slavophils and Narodniki, the nationalist intellectuals of Italy and Poland, and Marxist and "committed" intellectuals in general. Yet, in spite of abundant historical evidence, and the often intense activism of African intellectuals, most North American and European writers have shown a marked reluctance to build into the definition of intellectual any notion of activism. This is surprising considering that a good deal of modernization literature views the intellectual as playing a key role as a political nationalist, and as an initiator and agent of change and "modernization". There is often the


underlying assumption that activism, especially if of a revolutionary and hence non-civil nature, amounts to an aberration of role. This attitude has deep historical antecedents: de Tocqueville deploring the success which intellectuals attained in inciting the most vulgar classes to revolution in the mid 19th century; Benda condemning the "trahison des clercs"; and Shilo looking with some trepidation at a disagreeable-looking Third World at which he "preaches humaneness and civility for all those within it who can read, write, and rule by virtue of their education." The view that the intellectual is not a social or political activist, or that activism is not one of his defining qualities, tends to be predominant in those societies, the United States and Britain for instance, characterized by "structural stability" and the supposed absence of fundamental ideological cleavages. It is also a view held by those who, entrenched in an intellectual or political establishment, feel threatened by counter-ideologies and intellectual activism.

In this study, the African intellectual (and for that matter intellectuals elsewhere) is defined by a triple set of dimensions. Firstly, he is defined by a certain type of thinking, qualitative thinking, or the redefinition of social reality, which bears a


potential, if not actual, relationship to socio-structural dissent. Qualitative ideas are predicated upon the assumption that they are capable of social implementation. Moreover, they generally have universality. Though they are identified with a particular social collectivity or set of institutions, the ideas do not express any particular interest, but rather relate the bearer of the idea or ideology with a type of society, or indeed, all societies as a whole. Furthermore, the intellectual's thought is distinguished from that of "intellect workers" and "mental technocrats" by its concern with the "entire historical process". This concern is "not a tangential interest but permeates this thought and significantly affects his work". As Baran points out, this concern does not mean that in his daily activity the intellectual is fully engaged in the study of all historical development: "what it does mean is that the intellectual is systematically seeking to relate whatever specific area he may be working on to other aspects of human existence." It is the effort to interconnect things which constitutes one of the intellectual's outstanding characteristics.

1. There are intellectuals such as Georges Sorel who remain independent, isolated, solitary thinkers. Sorel made little effort to actively influence (at least in the sense of participation) any social or political group. And yet he was a universalistic, qualitative thinker, whose ideas were predicated on the assumption that they could be put into effect in society.


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.
Intellectuals generalize specific discontent into demands for fundamental social transformation. Intellectual dissent becomes universalistic and absolutist in its dimensions. However, the universality of the ideas should not obscure the fact that the intellectual is also concerned with specific programmatic demands reflecting the grievances of one or another social formation. Often the intellectual, having worked out universal demands, looks for specific issues to champion, thereby concretizing his thought in social reality. For instance, an African intellectual may identify with the urban labouring class, and relate their grievances to a demand for drastic change and the creation of a particular type of society. At the same time he will support claims for minimum wage laws, and condemn sub-standard housing with exorbitant rents. Such specific, programmatic concern is not, however, the essence of intellectual concern. The ideas must have a form of validation, or cultural base, in that they are ultimately concerned with the quality of life in general. This is the aspect stressed by Shils when he suggests in pompous, overblown language that "intellectuals have an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society".¹

The second dimension of the definition posited in this study, the notion of a culturally validated profession, stipulates the arena of idea-articulation, as well as the type of audience.

¹ Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers", p.5.
The intellectual must be someone qualified, and accepted as qualified, to speak on matters of cultural concern. Some writers, including Lipset and Shils, have enumerated certain recognised professions in society that qualify automatically — theologians, writers, journalists, academics, artists — but it is preferable, as Nettl argues, to focus not so much on profession as what the person concerned "professes" — in other words the self-conscious pre-occupation with cultural matters.¹ This latter approach has the distinct advantage of surpassing the idea of profession, and as such is subject to variation through time and space.

This study of necessity focuses on those who have professed a concern with cultural matters and who have been sufficiently disposed to communicate that concern in writing, teaching, or any other method. Nevertheless the question of cultural validation is a crucial one, especially given Africa's state of continuing cultural dependence. There is the problem of deciding who validates a cultural concern. Do fellow intellectuals? Is it the government or incumbent elite? Is cultural validation accredited by the dominant cultural norms and values in a particular society? If the latter is the case, validation assumes rather subtle and complex forms when a particular society and its cultural norms and values are in a state of fairly rapid flux, as throughout most of Africa. Or is validation and recognition in

East Africa given by overseas intellectual counterparts from dominant cultures, conferences, and publishing houses?

The question of cultural validation may become an integral part of conflict between entrenched, institutionalised intellectuals, and dissenting, challenging intellectuals. It is also affected by changing concepts of who is an intellectual in a particular society. This is illustrated most fittingly by the case of the radical natural scientists in Britain during the 1930s; a time when the respective guardians of political and cultural welfare had little use for natural scientists.¹

The comparative neglect of the radical scientists in later intellectual histories, and an almost exclusive concentration on the young poets of the "Auden Group", stemmed from a misplaced equation of intellectuals with the literati, the writers. To an important extent, commentators such as Stuart Samuels have accepted without doubt the poets and writers characterisations of themselves as intellectuals.² They have overlooked, or been ignorant of the fact that during the 1930s and '40s, scientists such as Julian Huxley, J.B. Bernal, Joseph Needham, Lancelot Hogben, and J.B.S. Haldane had pronounced and often remarkable literary predispositions which were manifested, not only in serious academic works, but in


² See for example the autobiographies of Christopher Isherwood, C. Day Lewis, and Stephen Spender.
the publication of simple introductory works on science and its social responsibility, and in the columns of the Daily Worker. Their later neglect by so many commentators on the British intellectual scene of the 1930s and 40s was the result of the conflation of intellectual and writer. This was reinforced by the changed nature of the scientific community, both national and international, the renewed predominance of particularistic as opposed to qualitative thinking, and the changed social and political position of the natural scientist, whose demands had been largely met by the end of the 1940s.

The third dimension of the definition of intellectual adopted here is intimately linked with and a correlate of, the concept of qualitative thought: an activist socio-political role. Both NettI and Edgar Morin suggest socio-political role but this is misleading simply because postures of detachment and uninvolve/ment represent a social role. What they really mean is praxis, which is not simply designated by active physical participation in social or revolutionary movements. It is manifested in any activity—journalism, writing, lecturing, teaching, aimed at altering the consciousness of others, and producing change in the nature of the society.

1. Works which tend to be guilty of this include Stuart Samuel, "English Intellectuals and Politics in the 1930s", in Rieff, pp.196-247, Neal Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals (London, 1959), Julian Symons, The Thirties: A Dream Revalued (London, 1960), and the autobiographies of writers such as Christopher Isherwood, Stephen Spender and C. Day Lewis.

2. Worsley, pp.244-47.
The Critique of Definitions of the Intellectual in Underdeveloped Societies

The definition posited in this study stands in strong contrast, and moves beyond, those definitions of the intellectuals and intelligentsia in former colonial societies which have focussed on the criterion of an "advanced modern education". Shils has regarded as intellectuals, at least in first approximation, "all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it".¹ The intellectual community is constituted of members of occupations and professions such as journalism, law, the civil service, teaching (particularly college and university, but also secondary school teaching) and medicine. University and other tertiary level students, as incipient intellectuals, also belong. Friedmann adopts a similar vocationally-oriented definition. He surprisingly suggests that Michelet description of intellectuals as those who are "vocationally concerned with things of the mind" is too restrictive when applied to developing countries. He uses the term to refer "quite generally to the educated minority" which includes "doctors, lawyers, engineers, economists, and military officers and such semi-professionals as poets, philosophers, and politicians".²


It is generally pointed out that such a definition would be quite inadequate in an advanced industrial society. Thus Raymond Aron argues:

The qualifications required in order to earn the title of intellectual grow higher as the number of non-manual workers increases — in other words, they are proportionate to economic development. In backward countries any university graduate passes for an intellectual.¹

The central thrust of Aron’s argument is that while the intellectual community, or the number of university graduates, remains comparatively small in proportion to the rest of the population, there does not exist the urgent need to worry about a more discriminating definition which takes into account internal differentiation within the educated community.

Another writer, Klaus Mehnert, suggests that to be classed as an intellectual the African must have been in contact with a modern intellectual culture which “carries with it a partial transformation of the self and a changed relationship to the authority of the dead and the living”.² The modern intellectual has felt the impact of Western civilization or outside ideas and has been drawn into the vortex of conflicting ideas. He has experienced most probably “internal conflict between allegiance to traditional cultures and the influence of the modern West”. Traditional intellectuals are usually excluded from membership of the modern


intellectual community. According to Mehnert

No man, no matter how learned, is classified as a member of the intelligentsia if he has retained his identity with his national background — if, for example, he is a theologian of the traditional religion, a performer in the traditional theatre, a teacher of the traditional wisdom, or an artist, poet or musician of the traditional style. As long as he remains integrated in his society and accepts the values of that society as his own, he is likely to remain essentially a conservative without that revolutionary spark; under this definition, would class him as a member of the intelligentsia. 1

The distinction Mehnert makes between traditional and modern intellectuals should be approached with some caution. It could be said that both traditional and modern intellectuals have experienced tension and conflict. The traditional intellectual has in many instances been drawn into the vortex of conflicting ideas. When he perceives a threat to his traditional status and value system, the traditional intellectual will passionately reaffirm the importance of traditional culture and values. His thought will involve the re-affirmation of what he perceives to be the central or core values of the traditional system of thought, although the re-affirmation will involve some rearrangement of the significance and interrelationship of components within the traditional structure. It is important to note in relation to this point that in Tanzania, it has been the traditional Swahili poet, rather than the modern literary intellectual, who has been

1. Ibid.
better integrated into the national system. Tanzania's policy of 'ujamaa' has extolled at the national level the values the Swahili poet has emphasized at the communal level. This has allowed the traditional poet to accommodate himself within the new system fairly easily. Swahili poets were vocal during the struggle for independence, and have "praised the Arusha Declaration and the policy of ujamaa'. 1

The definitions of the intellectual in the African and Third World contexts which focus on "advanced modern education" and an "internal conflict between allegiance to traditional cultures and the influence of the modern West" have many limitations. Firstly, there is a much greater need for discrimination. It is doubtful whether Shils' definition of intellectuals in underdeveloped countries even sufficed before the increasing differentiation in, and growth in size of, the educated community. It is extremely doubtful if all university graduates in Africa - or anywhere else for that matter - automatically become intellectuals. A university education is generally regarded as a prerequisite for an intellectual career, but a university graduate is not ipsofacto an intellectual. Schumpeter was at pains to indicate that "intellectuals cannot be simply defined as the sum total of all the people who have had a higher education" for "that would obliterate the most important features of the type". 2 And another major limitation with definitions based on "advanced modern education" and "contact


with a modern intellectual culture" is that they have obfuscated the important distinctions between intellectuals, the intelligentsia, and what I shall term the mental technocracy.¹

Ali Mazrui's discussion does not carry us much further. He suggests that the intellectual possesses "the capacity to be fascinated by ideas"² but does not adequately differentiate between types of ideas and the social contexts in which they are formulated and articulated. There is little discussion of intellectual socio-political role. In his fivefold classification of African intellectuals he points out that the ideas which are of "most immediate interest to the political intellectual are inevitably those which concern the polity, the behaviour of man as a political animal, and the intellectual basis of political and administrative organization".³ Apart from this, the classification of general, political, literary, academic, and artistic intellectuals is a vocational one.

The classification does, however, have value. It enables us to identify the emergence of what appear to be distinct types of intellectuals at certain stages of African socio-political and

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1. See below, p. 102.


3. Ibid.
historical development. Difficulties nevertheless arise. For instance, the distinction between political and literary intellectuals is bound to be blurred. Many political figures such as Azikiwe, Nkrumah, Kenyatta and Nyerere have possessed a marked literary bent. Writers such as Chinua Achebe, Ayi Kwei Armah, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Okot p'Bitek have been vitally concerned with political ideas in their work. Further difficulties are evident. Should we regard political essayists (such as those who write for the Daily News) as literary intellectuals if they devote more attention to writing political articles than to other types of political activity? On Mazrui's criteria they could belong to either. Like most vocationally oriented schemes, Mazrui's classification is inherently indiscriminate. It is capable of considerable expansion. Why not religious and scientific intellectuals? Why not break the academic category down into historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists? We are ultimately left grappling with an elusive, slippery beast which defies all attempts to pin it down.

1. Mazrui's classification could be viewed in a more revealing light, especially if we start from the initial assumption that intellectuals are concerned with the formulation and articulation of qualitative ideas, regardless of whether they work in academia, politics, journalism, and government administration. Ideas are structured, articulated, and disseminated in different socio-political and historical settings. Formulation, articulation, and dissemination of ideas will depend not only on intellectual, literary, and political traditions, but on the occupation of their creators and articulators, and the nature of the forces at work in the socio-political setting. Methods or forms of dissemination will depend on occupational context, tradition, and whether the existing socio-economic and political relations encourage or inhibit the expression of certain socio-political ideas and their social attachment.
Some Definitions of the Intellectual and their Limitations

There is quite a substantial body of literature dealing with intellectuals, men of ideas, the sociology of knowledge, and a growing body of work in the history and philosophy of science concerned with the creation and diffusion of scientific knowledge. Reading much of this material, one is soon struck by the basic failure of writers to define and delineate the object of analysis in such a way as to allow for rigorous comparative analysis. Some writers approach the problem by focussing on men who have had ideas — "men of ideas" — or else attempt to identify and discuss a sociologically meaningful stratum of intellectuals. With the latter approach, the societal context predominates, obfuscating the distinction between ideas as opposed to the social context of those who articulate them. The focus on an over inclusive stratum of men of ideas often leads simply to description and a "sort of anecdotal form of historical sociology". It often gives rise to untenable dichotomies — men of ideas as opposed to men of action, intellectuals against bureaucrats — which have to be qualified repeatedly in the light of so many historical exceptions — the Reformation, French Revolution, and Marxism.

Those writers with an obviously sociological perspective concentrate on role definition, and contrast with other roles.

Talcott Parsons views the intellectual as being basically concerned with the articulation of cultural symbols, and predictably sees an increasing institutional differentiation and specialization in such articulation. Dahrendorf finds the precursor of the modern intellectual in the "fool" or "court jester" who enjoyed both a social and critical detachment.

The power of the fool lies in his freedom with respect to the hierarchy of the social order, that is, he speaks from outside as well as from inside it. The fool belongs to the social order and yet does not commit himself to it. He can without fear even speak uncomfortable truths about it.

Like Hansen, and especially Hofstadter, Dahrendorf views "playfulness" as attendant to the intellectual function. For Hofstadter, the intellectual was indeed "a person for whom thinking fulfills at once the function of work and play". Following Schumpeter, who argued that the intellectual does not have "direct responsibility for practical affairs", Hofstadter sees the element of playfulness in intellectual truth stemming from a lack of "the important mooring of responsibility (and also, of course, of power)".

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However, inherent in Dahrendorf's treatment of the intellectual is a weakness which is characteristic of those who stress the detached, relatively uninhibited, unattached "mirror of conscience", "free-floating" nature of the intellectual role; this is the very real contradiction between the supposedly free, unattached nature of intellectuals as a social role, and the often engage, attached nature of the ideas they articulate. Conflict between ideas in most socio-political settings have struck some structural echo. Ideas thrust into the socio-political arena seek social attachment for their diffusion. There will always be a socio-structural base for rival definitions of social reality, and the outcome of the rivalry will certainly be affected, if not determined, by the development of this base. The contradiction between the supposed unattached nature of the intellectual social role and the attached, engage, nature of the ideas they articulate, becomes even more marked in the African, indeed the Third World context, where intellectuals have been so actively prominent in nationalist and revolutionary socio-political movements. The Third World experience also clearly undermines the rather glib distinction which some Western writers have made been men of action and intellectuals, and of the assumption, made even by Schumpeter, that the intellectual does not have "direct responsibility for practical affairs''.

1. Schumpeter, p.147.
Of course, the distinction is not always a descriptive one. Aron and Benda, for instance, build normative prescriptions into their definitions. Benda insisted on the opposition of mind to ideology, or the rejection of praxis. The "clerks" are all those whose activity essentially
is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or a metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: "My kingdom is not of this world." 1

His Betrayal of the Intellectuals contains a virulent attack on the French and German nationalist ideologies, which amounts to a defence of intellectual disinterestedness. The thrust of his criticism is brought out in the following passage.

We have to admit that the 'clerks' now exercise political passions with all the characteristics of passion -- the tendency to action, the thirst for immediate results, the exclusive preoccupation with the desired end, the scorn for argument, the excess, the hatred, the fixed ideas. 2

Nevertheless, the distinction between men of ideas and men of action is not to be dismissed because of its inherent normative prescription. The distinction, as it affects role expectation and the extent that intellectuals internalise such norms, is obviously an important one. As we shall subsequently see, African intellectuals are fully aware of the dichotomy, and their rejection of it is based on its demonstrable irrelevance, both in historical and current need terms, to the African situation.

2. Ibid., p.32.
Many writers have sought their definitions of intellectual in terms of broad intellectual function. Goran Hyden defines an intellectual as "any man with a defined system of values and the capacity to command influence on the general trends of change in society by mastering oral or written means of persuasion", while Jacques Barzan focuses on those who "consciously and methodically employ the mind". Other, like S.M. Lipset, have focused on what intellectuals do. Lipset has grouped under the term all those "who create, distribute, and apply culture, that is the symbolic world of man including art, science, and religion". For Reinhold Niebuhr, intellectuals are "the more articulate members of the community, more particularly those who are professionally or vocationally articulate, in church and school, in journalism and the arts". These descriptions draw attention to two basic qualities of the intellectual: first, his ability to articulate, to communicate with words; and, second, his ability to manipulate symbols, and to develop systems of ideas. The intellectual experiences the need, and possesses the ability to "perceive, experience, and express in words". Schumpeter described

3. Lipset, Political Man, p.311.
intellectuals as "people who wield the power of the spoken and written word".1 The intellectual deals with anxieties by turning them into words, propositions, statements, which he then works on and manipulates. Of necessity, this study focusses on intellectuals who have propagated their thoughts, whether by writing, teaching, or any other method. What Hyden's definition brings out is that the intellectual structures, or endeavours to structure his thought in such a way that it becomes capable of social attachment and application.

The limitations of these definitions are all too apparent, especially for anyone concerned with rigorous comparative analysis. There is the problem of the delimitation of the field. Lipset's definition, for instance, is capable of almost unlimited extension. Lipset attempts to restrict it by enumerating certain culturally validated professions which are presumably concerned with the "symbolic world of man" - writers, journalists, academics, theologians, scientists, philosophers, artists. In an important sense, however, most people, if not all, are concerned with the creation, distribution, and application of culture although, admittedly, most are not consciously preoccupied with this task. Far less discriminating is Bensun's definition.

Many writers, including Parsons, Shils, and Coser, suggest that the intellectual articulates general ideas about Man, Society, Nature and the Cosmos. According to Shils, the intellectual feels

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1. Schumpeter, p.147.
the need "to be in cognitive, moral and appreciative contact with
the most general or "essential" features of man, society, nature
and the cosmos".\(^1\) Intellectuals exhibit "an unusual sensitivity
to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of
their universe, and the rules which govern their society".\(^2\) For
Parsons, the intellectual is

a person who, though as a member of a society in
the nature of the case he performs a complex of
social roles, is in his principal role capacity
expected - an expectation normally shared by
himself - to put cultural considerations above
social in defining the commitment by virtue of
which his primary role and position are
significant as contributions to valued outcomes
of his action.\(^3\)

Parsons draws a distinction between cultural and social concerns
which is central to his definition of the intellectual with his
"unattached" social role. Cultural systems are for Parsons
"organized about the patterning of meaning in symbolic systems"
while social systems are "organized about the exigencies of inter-
action among acting units, both individual persons and collective
units".\(^4\) The cultural field is the most important locus of
universalistic standards in the whole realm of action, and the
intellectual develops a more or less "pure" commitment to cultural
over societal commitments and functions. Similarly, Goser argues
that the intellectual's concern goes beyond the concrete and

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1. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some
Perspectives for Comparative Analysis", Comparative Studies in
2. Ibid.
3. Parsons, p.4.
4. Ibid., p.3.
immediate to "penetrate a more general realm of meanings and values". The intellectual is concerned with the core values of society.

The distinction made by Parsons between cultural and social systems, while perhaps defensible in analytic terms, lacks foundation in empirical reality principally because it overlooks the Marxist point, reformulated by Mannheim and Berger and Luckmann, that competing and conflicting ideas find grounding in social reality. This is not to deny that intellectuals might well internalize values relating to the distinction between cultural and societal systems. Intellectuals, as for instance many of those in Britain during the 1920s, are often socially expected to, and see themselves as having, a commitment to the cultural rather than the social domain. But the defence, preservation, changing, and implementation of core values makes almost imperative a recourse to political engagement or activism – hence the activism of Hindu intellectuals.

The above definitions share the common assumption that the intellectual is generally relatively detached from the concrete and immediate, and that he is not normally embroiled in the turmoil of social and political activity. Also characteristic of these definitions is the notion of culturally validated professions,

2. See Stuart Samuels, "English Intellectuals and Politics in the 1930s", in Rieff, pp.213-63.
although Coser, when commenting on Lipset's definition, is careful to indicate that not all "academic men are intellectuals, nor are all members of the professions".¹

The Intellectual as a Qualitative Thinker

To the views that intellectuals are members of skill-groups culturally validated as "intellectual", and intellectuals are individuals who articulate general ideas about Man, Society, Nature and the Cosmos, two writers in particular, J.P. Nettl and Edgar Morin, add the notion of a socio-political role as one integral to the practice of being an intellectual.²

Nettl developed an approach to the study of intellectuals which, by transcending to some extent the idiosyncrasies of specific historical situations and social contexts, came to terms with the problem of finding a definition sufficiently precise to allow for meaningful and rigorous comparative analysis. The initial assumption made by Nettl, and one crucial for his whole approach, is that ideas can be differentially classified, and that it is this "differentiation that ultimately governs role and social contexts".³ The relevant types of ideas produced are divided

into dimensions "that focus on the relationship of new ideas to
the existing stock of knowledge they seek to effect, and go on
from there to that manner as well as structured channels through
which they become diffused". These dimensions are respectively
labelled quality and scope.

According to Nettl, central to qualitative thought is the
acceptance or rejection of the axio-normative
(or value and norm) structures of given systems
of thought, a rearrangement of the significance
and interrelationship of known components. Qualitative thought is concerned with the rearrangement of an
accepted hierarchy of components. On the other hand, scope refers
to "the broadening of the area of discussion through the addition
of genuinely new or at least newly relevant knowledge". The
difference between these two analytical categories of ideas and
systems of thought is certainly not absolute. Scientific
discovery, at least initially, and indeed any discovery of the
genuinely new or newly relevant, is always particular and limited
in scope. Kuhn points out that "though the scientist's concern
with nature may be global in its extent, the problems on which he
works must be problems of detail". Qualitative ideas, or ideas
and systems of ideas concerned with the "rearrangement of an

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pp.67-68.
3. Ibid., p.68.
4. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
accepted hierarchy of components are already by definition much broader and more universal. Any systematic formulation of social ideas, for instance, must of necessity cover a broad area of interrelationships."\(^1\)

While Nettl's distinction between qualitative ideas and ideas of scope, and the ramifications of such a distinction, add a new dimension to the discussion of intellectuals, the actual notion of qualitative ideas or dissent is present in a number of other writers' formulations. It is to be found in Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* where a distinction is made between ideologies in the narrow sense, being the attitudes of ruling groups that were intensively interest bound, and utopias, being the thought systems of "oppressed groups ... intellectually ... strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society."\(^2\) The notion of the intellectual as a counter-ideologist is also to be found, even in Shils work, and in Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality*. For instance Shils in his discussion of intra-intellectual alienation or dissensus, refers to the intellectual's acceptance or rejection of the central values or components of given systems of thought. According to Shils, "it is the rejection by intellectuals of the inherited and prevailing values of those intellectuals who are already incorporated in ongoing social institutions" which is central to the tension

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which exists between intellectuals and governments.¹ He adds:

This intra-intellectual alienation or dissensus is a crucial part of the heritage of any society. Furthermore it supplies the important function of moulding and guiding the alienative tendencies which exist in any society. It provides an alternative pattern of integration for their own society.²

In this passage, Shils, apart from dealing with the notion of qualitative dissent also, as Nettl has been concerned to do, relates idea-structures to socio-political structures of dissent. And Berger and Luckmann define the intellectual as a "counter-expert in the business of defining reality",³ and that this involves a redefinition of "knowledge vis-à-vis the "official" lore".⁴ The intellectual has a design for society at large. But, while the "official" expert's "design is in tune with the institutional programmes, serving as their theoretical legitimation, the intellectual's exists in an institutional vacuum, socially objectivated at best in a sub-society of fellow-intellectuals".⁵

Nettl, in drawing the distinction between new scientific or scope ideas on the one hand, and new forms of qualitative dissent on the other, is conscious of the danger of aligning himself with a tradition in the history and philosophy of science which has been

². Ibid.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid.
persuasively challenged, especially by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn, in his influential work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, overturned many of the commonly accepted notions of the nature of scientific endeavour and scientific development. Earlier views of science tended to stress the progress of science as one of continuing accretion and incorporation of new discoveries moving deterministically toward present nature truths and beyond. This view has been rejected by Kuhn, Karl Popper, and other writers, who emphasize instead the revolutionary process by which an older scientific theory is rejected and replaced by an incompatible new one. While Kuhn is concerned with paradigm development, rejection, and replacement, he nevertheless argues that the bulk of what he terms "normal science" or "normal research" or "puzzle solving" takes place within the parameters of commonly accepted scientific theory. He points out that

In no usual sense ... are such tests directed to current theory. On the contrary, when engaged with a normal research problem, the scientist must premise current theory in the rules of his game. His object is to solve a puzzle, preferably one at which others have failed, and current

1. While both Kuhn and Popper stress the revolutionary nature of scientific development, they disagree on many important points. Popper sees "science" in a state of more or less permanent revolution, while Kuhn views scientific revolutions as fairly rare occurrences. Popper's position is clearly stated in his *Conjectures and Refutations*. The *Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp.129, 215, 221. Also see his "Normal Science and its Dangers" in Iain Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1970), p.4. Kuhn deals with their differences in his article, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research" in the same volume, pp.1-24.
theory is required to define that puzzle and to guarantee that, given sufficient brilliance it can be solved.¹

The scientist is not so much concerned with the acceptance/rejection of a paradigm as "with research which adds to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can be applied".²

Kuhn's examples of revolution start with "miniscule" detail, with particularistic discoveries that do not fit the old paradigm - an anomaly. A time of crisis arises when the particularistic, limited scope work, casts doubt on the initial paradigm. The end of a scientific revolution (a historian's categorization) is characterized by the enthronement and internalization of a new paradigm, which provides the only suitable structure for normal or particularistic science to continue on its way.

Conflicts, or crises involving the continued acceptance, or rejection of paradigms, are usually restricted to a limited community - peer groups, academies and universities. Kuhn points out that "the decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other".³ It is at this stage, when scientists must choose between competing theories (or paradigms),

2. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.36.
3. Ibid., p.77.
that they behave most like philosophers.¹ The choice between incompatible paradigms "is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science" for these "depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue".² The world of qualitative dissent, with its ever continuing conflict of ideas preferred and thrust forward by socio-political movements or structures in conflict with one another, can really only be compared with what Kuhn calls pre-paradigm or immature science.³ Kuhn himself, while acknowledging "vast and essential differences between scientific and political development"⁴ draws parallels between them. For instance, he suggests that the growing awareness among segments of the political community that existing institutions have ceased to adequately meet the problems posed by the environment has a parallel in the growing sense, again within a limited section of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm no longer adequately functions in the explanation of an aspect of nature which that paradigm had previously led the way. In both cases, a sense of malfunction can lead to the "crisis" which is a prerequisite of revolution. He adds: "Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life".⁵

2. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.94.
5. Ibid., p.94.
Even if there does exist a certain resemblance between pre-paradigm or immature science, and conflicts involving qualitative ideas, the conflicts generally occur in different social contexts and are resolved on the basis of entirely different criteria. While conflicts or crises involving scientific theories or paradigms are generally restricted to limited communities which resent attempts to openly politicize disagreements, conflicts involving qualitative dissent are oriented towards the collective and often have far-reaching socio-structural implications. The rejection by scientists of a theory, or paradigm, is not based simply on a comparison of that theory or paradigm with the world. It involves the simultaneous acceptance of another theory or paradigm, and the judgment leading to that acceptance involves the comparison of both paradigms "with nature and with each other". In contrast, the rejection of qualitative ideas or paradigms, involves the demonstration of the failure of the old theory by a comparison with what the dissenter perceives to be socio-political reality, and the respecification or rearrangement of the old in relation to the changed perceptions of socio-political reality.

According to Kettl, the qualitative restructuring of components within systems of ideas depends on a much greater element of preference than does scientific scope work. There are, he points out, "no certainties as between Keynes and Pigou, between

1. See Kettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent", pp.70-7, and the Kuhn's "Postscript-1969" to his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in which he examines paradigms and scientific community structure, and the role of paradigms in providing group identity.
Levy-Bruhl and Levy-Strauss, not even between Marx, Fourier, and Hegel".¹ In the case of science, the situation is much more clearcut: new knowledge either adds to or replaces the old; oxygen replaces phlogiston; Newtonian physics broaden and replace Copernicus and are in turn displaced by still more inclusive relativity theories. Whereas qualitative thought is characterized by a continuing process of critical discourse — claims, counter claims, debates over fundamentals, it is precisely the abandonment of this discourse, Kuhn argues, that marks the transition to a science: "Critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy".²

Thus Nettl argues

A qualitative dissent ... defines the new or differently rearranged precisely by virtue of such a special respecification of the old. This has, as it were, to be demolished and shown wanting on account of its own internal failures or insufficiencies, which are in a sense independent of the new that supplants it. Scientific discoveries imply a "no" contingent upon a prior "yes", while dissent implies a "yes" contingent upon a prior "no". Hence dissent involves a special and summary statement of the ideas dissented from — an ideology. And the opponents of this dissent in turn dissent from it; their defensive formulation of the status quo, which

1. Ibid., p.72.
they uphold, is not made from mere affect but negatively stimulated by the re specification of the old, the "no" involved in the original dissent.¹

The notion of dissent is not used here merely in its oppositional sense but to signify an articulated response: intellectuals as dissenters are not always trying to change a status quo,² though often they are, but may also be defending it by arguing for a different arrangement of components than the original dissenters. This latter point is one that is often overlooked.


2. In contrast to Nettl, and most writers on intellectuals, Sartre doesn't admit the possibility of an intellectual being the defender of the status quo. Sartre, like Nettl, works from the initial assumption that ideas can be differentially classified, and that it is this differentiation that ultimately governs role and social contexts. Sartre defines the intellectual in terms of the "profound contradiction between the universality which bourgeois society is obliged to allow to scholarship, and the restricted ideological and political domain in which he is forced to apply it." - "Intellectuals and Revolution: Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre", Ramparts, No.4 (1970), p.52. When the individual with his education in universal knowledge, becomes aware of the contradiction between the universal and the particular in himself, an awareness his profession leads him to confront, he becomes an intellectual. It is the intellectual's consciousness of these contradictions between the universalistic and the particularistic which determines his socio-political role and his social attachment. There is, according to Sartre, a rigorous connection between the universality which results from practical and dialectical reason, and the classes which supposedly represent the universal - the proletariat. Radicalism is predicated by the rationality of universalistic thought, for in the struggle between the irrational particular, and the universal, no compromise is possible: it cannot consist of anything other than the radical destruction of the particular.
For instance Hehnert overlooked the fact that traditional intellectuals, confronted with the task of defending a particular value structure, had to restate and rearrange the value components, by taking into account the new thought system. Thus Hindu intellectuals, faced with both Western and Indian criticism of caste and Hinduism, rearranged components in such a way that the caste-system was no longer integral to Hinduism. Intellectuals who are concerned to defend the status quo have to take into account articulated dissent, and restructure their thought in such a way as to preserve what they perceive to be the status quo.

There are times when it is difficult to draw the distinction between qualitative and particularistic ideas. This was especially the case during the Middle Ages when, as Nettl points out, it was almost impossible to separate scope from qualitative forms of dissent because "everything was part of the faith, of the basic order of society". During the Middle Ages, almost the

1. Hehnert, passim.

2. Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent", p.30. Nettl also suggests that the "so-called Renaissance of knowledge and science, which added new dimensions of scope and relevance" was more important than the qualitative Reformation, structured by "religious-political movements of great durability" in undermining the mediaeval cosmology. — Ibid., p.77.
entire area of possible ideas was encapsulated in an undifferentiatedly religious context, or symbolic universe. In this situation, a particular scientific paradigm, e.g. Ptolemaic astronomy, was inextricably linked with a particular value or socio-political structure. Disciplined scientific inquiry contradicted the beliefs of what Revets refers to as a "Folk-science" which was adopted by the established cultural organs of 1. This would also be true of many pre-colonial African societies where universal experts held an effective monopoly over all ultimate definitions of reality. To be in such societies implied an acceptance of this tradition. The expert in the tradition was recognized as such by virtually all members of the society and had no effective competitors to deal with. There were specialists in cultural matters, people "desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life, and react in their reference to time and space" - Hobs, "The Intellectuals and the Lower", p. 7. There were administrators of ritual prescriptions, priests, teachers - possibly elders, and specialists in "law", if we interpret this to mean some especially salient set of normative prescriptions for human and social conduct other than ritual as such. Pre-colonial African societies, like all other societies, had a need for contact with their own pasts, and the rulers of those societies sought to strengthen their claims to legitimacy by showing the continuity of their regimes with the great personalities of the past. These societies required a body of symbols - histories, poems, songs, biographies - to diffuse a sense of affinity amongst their members. The traditional oral past served as a socio-political value integrator, and a maintainer of historical continuity, social structures, and social cohesion. There were persons in these societies who manipulated cultural symbols, thought in a universalistic-qualitative way, had a socio-political role, and were in culturally validated professions.

2. Revets points out that "the category of 'Folk-science' has long been recognized, but it has always been believed to apply only to literate or illiterate cultures. It is a part of a general world-view, or ideology, which is given special articulation so that it may provide comfort and reassurance in the face of the crucial uncertainties of the world of experience. In earlier ages, some of the leading sciences and educated arts grew out of popular folk-sciences; among these were the ancient art of prediction, as well as other forms of magic, along with the very sophisticated arts of alchemy and astrology" - J.R. Revets, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) p.336.
society. The doctrines contradicting established or official folk-sciences are ideologically sensitive: their effects may be disruptive of the stability of the society. Those with the responsibility for the maintenance of the symbolic universe used all means at their disposal to cope with or eliminate dangerous doctrines. Thus, in a situation where it is not really possible to distinguish between intellectually and socio-politically dangerous doctrines, any rejection of prevailing paradigms or folk-science on scientific grounds involves axio-normative, socio-political repercussions. If repression fails to cope with the situation, acceptance of the new paradigm will involve a corresponding adjustment of the axio-normative structure.

The Social Grounding of Qualitative Thought

Qualitative ideas seem to predicate socio-political movements and environments for their manner of formulation, acceptance, and diffusion. Qualitative dissent, and the rejection by intellectuals of the inherited and prevailing values of those intellectuals who have been incorporated in ongoing social institutions, is predicated on the assumption that it can be put into effect in society, and find attachment to socio-structural dissent. Qualitative dissent is oriented toward the collective. The intellectual must have others who maintain for him the reality of his qualitative dissent or deviant conception of social reality. In relation to this, Berger and Luckmann clearly show how
intellectual sub-societies serve as the "social base for the
objectivation of (the intellectual's) deviant conception of
reality". They add:

subuniverses (symbolic subuniverses) require
subsocieties as their objectivating base, and
counter-definitions of reality require counter-
societies.  

Social groups become carriers of qualitative dissent. Different
social groups have different affinities with competing theories
(ideas) and will, subsequently, become carriers of the latter.

Intellectuals, as qualitative dissenters, generally seek to attach
themselves and their ideas to these "carrier" groups.

Intellectuals create, or join onto a dissenting social
structure and themselves crystallize as a self-conscious group
through such attachment. Dissenters require a suitable social
structure to fulfill the role of the social stratum of intellectuals,
and to become effective for purposes of self-identification and
action.

It is argued by both Kuhn and Nettl that ideas of scope,
unlike qualitative ideas, are formulated, accepted, and diffused
through limited communities. The latter suggests that
an academic environment (not necessarily, except
under certain conditions ... a university environ-
ment) is, broadly speaking, the most suitable
structure for diffusing scientific ideas of scope.

2. Ibid., p.127.
for formulating, testing, validating, and spreading them. The choice of problems to be tackled is dictated by internal, professional considerations.¹

Nettl's point may be illustrated by reference to the development of the Phage Group of scientists who were primarily concerned with the problem of discovering the mechanisms by which genetic information was transferred. The new ideas were formulated, tested, validated, accepted, and diffused through firstly, a limited number of scientists interested in the new field, through limited communication, colleagueship, recruitment, and teaching, through extended communications networks and clusters of scientists, and ultimately through the institutionalization of a new discipline, molecular biology, in American universities.²

However, Nettl, in drawing his rather stark distinction between the social contexts in which occur conflicts involving ideas of scope and qualitative ideas, and the manner in which these conflicts are resolved, and the differing ways in which these ideas are formulated, articulated, and diffused, brushes over many of the complexities which exist. Of course it must be remembered that Nettl was writing about broad historical developments, and that the major examples of qualitative dissent have been diffused through socio-political movements of considerable scale and duration, e.g. Marxism. However, it would seem that initially qualitative ideas, while predicated on the assumption of social implementation, are

formulated, articulated, and diffused in structures very similar to those of ideas of scope—peer groups, informal groupings, clusters of intellectuals. Berger and Luckmann's point about the intellectual requiring others to maintain his deviant conception of reality, or qualitative dissent, is of immediate relevance here. At first, the intellectual's counter definition of reality, or qualitative rearrangement of existing components of idea-structures, is maintained in limited sub- or counter societies which objectivate the definition of social reality. For instance, the Jacobins were a group of dissenting intellectuals who attached themselves to an ultimately successful socio-political movement. Of the radical Jacobin intellectuals, Coser points out

many, perhaps most, had been members of the various provincial literary societies, debating clubs, provincial academies, and Masonic lodges in which the ideas of the Enlightenment had been discussed and which had served to disseminate these ideas among other strata.¹

An examination of radical and revolutionary intellectuals in 19th century Russia under the Tsarist autocracy would reveal a similar pattern. Qualitative ideas and counter definitions of reality assume a new reality when they become attached to a dissenting social class or stratum. But in most cases, such attachment fails to materialize for certain socio-political reasons, and the small group, the informal network with its clusters of intellectuals,

¹ Coser, Man of Ideas, p.146.
remains the objectivating base for qualitative dissent.

In his discussion of the socially unattached intelligentsia, Karl Mannheim conveyed this notion of the relationship of the intellectual's qualitative dissent to "carrier" groups. For Mannheim the intelligentsia was a relatively classless stratum of intellectuals who were recruited from a broad social base. While intellectuals retained to an important extent their class and status ties, their participation in a common educational heritage tended to suppress birth, status, professional, and wealth differences. The homogeneity of the intellectual stratum derived, not from similarities of social class and status, but from common intellectual and cultural traditions. In modern society, intellectual activity is carried on, not by a rigidly socially defined class such as a priesthood, but by a social stratum which is recruited increasingly from a more widely inclusive area of social life, and which is to a large degree unattached to any social class.

Unlike many later writers, especially those concerned with role analysis, Mannheim did not view social unattachment simply as an aloofness or social detachment, but rather as a basis for ideological commitment and political activism. The degree of social unattachment, and the intellectual's contact with an intellectual medium which embraced all contradictory points of

1. Mannheim, pp.136-146.
view, allowed the intellectual to transcend the limitations of specific social situations, and to achieve an intimate grasp of the total situation. According to Mannheim, intellectuals, in order to break free from this position of relative social unattachment, have historically taken two routes. Firstly, they have voluntarily affiliated themselves with one or other of the antagonistic classes; or secondly, they have scrutinized their own social moorings and engaged in the "quest for the fulfilment of their mission as the predestined advocates of the intellectual interests of the whole".¹

Many of Mannheim's critics have argued that the exaggerated the homogeneity of the intellectual stratum, and certainly the ability of its members to transcend the particularistic and specific of their social backgrounds. Hartung suggests that this contradicts his earlier proposition that a given position in the social structure carries with it a definite probability that he who occupies it will think in a certain way.² And Lucien Goldmann finds it difficult to see how intellectuals, since they express in their work not only the thought of other groups but also their own social character as intellectuals could possess a less subjective point of view than that of any other professional group, such as lawyers and priests. Intellectuals, like other groups, belong to


a social class, to a nation, and so on; and they have their own individual, particular and general economic interests. Furthermore, Mannheim's assertion that common intellectual, educational, and cultural traditions would reduce the importance of class, status, birth, and other factors, seems to overlook one major factor; while an intellectual stratum may be recruited from a broad, more inclusive social base, the cultural and intellectual traditions which are inculcated in recruits have derived from class interests, invariably those of the dominant group at a particular stage of socio-economic and political development. This last point is one which was recognized by the Italian Marxist theoretician Gramsci.

Gramsci begins his analysis with a basic assumption that many writers on intellectuals will find unacceptable: that in a sense all men are intellectuals in so far as they have the capacity for thinking, and that the only valid way of distinguishing the intellectual, in the more specific meaning of the word, from the rest of society is in terms of his function within the whole social context. This view is not so far removed from the phenomenological perspective, in which people routinely reconstruct


or reconfirm the "reality" or "existence" of social phenomena. All members of society are engaged in a continual process of interpretation, confirmation and reconstruction, and uniformities of interpretation are developed through language and common terminology, socialization, membership of sub-cultures and so on. The implication of this, Walker suggests, is that "every man is a practical theorist when it comes to investigate the social world". What distinguishes the intellectual from others is first, his ability to take into account a much wider range of constructions and interpretations than the ordinary person and to construct complex models or theories to explain social phenomena; second, his recognition or validation by others as "intellectual" or "expert" in the sense that he either works in a profession concerned with the construction of social reality, or shows a pronounced tendency to be concerned with such a pre-occupation and to produce changes in the consciousness or perceptions of others; and third, as Gramsci argues, by his function within the whole social context.

Gramsci points out that


3. Ibid.
The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations ... When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals; that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort.¹

Intellectuals, then, are those who have directive function in the broadest sense, in society; the word refers to more than just a privileged elite of great thinkers.

This way of posing the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of intellectual, but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete approximation of reality. It also clashes with pre-conceptions of caste. The function of organising social hegemony and state domination certainly gives rise to a particular division of labour and therefore to a whole hierarchy of qualifications in some of which there is no apparent attribution of directive or organizational functions. For example, in the apparatus of social and state direction there exist a whole series of jobs of a manual and instrumental character (non-executive work, agents rather than officials or functionaries). It is obvious that such a distinction has to be made just as it is obvious that other distinctions have to be made as well. Indeed, intellectual activity must also be distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, according to levels which in moments of extreme opposition represent a real qualitative difference - at the highest level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest the most humble "administrators" and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth.²


2. Ibid., pp.12-3.
Gramsci draws a twofold division between intellectuals in this functional sense. In the first place, there are the "traditional" professional intellectuals - literary, scientific, artistic, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it.¹ There is a Mannheimian flavour to this, but Gramsci shows a greater awareness than that writer of the intellectual's inability to surmount the particularistic and specific of his social background, and to develop an intellectual stratum which transcends the socio-economic composition of its members. For Gramsci, the position of the traditional intellectuals derives ultimately from past and present class relations, and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations.² Secondly, there are the "organic" intellectuals who emerge from a particular social class, and serve as the thinking and organizing elements of that class. Organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their professions, which may be any jobs characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong. The working class, like the bourgeoisie, is capable of developing from within its own, makes its own organic intellectuals, who are defined on the one hand by their role in

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¹ For Gramsci, the traditional intellectual is basically a member of traditionally validated or recognized professions - lawyers, artists, scientists, doctors, administrators etc. He is not "traditional" in the African sense, where the "traditional" intellectual is a person who operates within indigenous linguistic, literary, and cultural traditions, and maintains a relationship with his public which is more in keeping with the pre-colonial rather than the colonial situation.

² Ibid.
production and in the organization of work, and on the other by their "directive" political role, focussed on the Party. The party, whether mass or vanguard, channels the activities of these intellectuals, and provides a link between the working class and certain sections of the traditional intelligentsia. Working class organic intellectuals are initially characterised by particularism and defensive corporatism, but through their absorption of ideas and personnel from the more advanced bourgeois strata, a new universalistic dimension is added to their socio-political thought.

The distinction Gramsci draws between "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals, and the idea that it is not so much the intrinsic nature of the ideas, but rather the functions of persons within the relationships of social contexts that determines who should be designated as "intellectual", opens up considerably the idea of who constitutes an intellectual in any social setting. When transposed to the African context it enables us to identify as intellectuals persons with limited, if any, modern formal education, who have previously been ignored in the analysis of African, indeed, Third World intellectuals. In one sense, Gramsci did not take his analysis far enough. He argued that the peasantry did not develop its own organic intellectuals.

the mass of the peasantry, although it performs an essential function in the world of production, does not elaborate its own "organic" intellectuals,
nor does it "assimilate" any stratum of "traditional" intellectuals, although it is from the peasantry that other social groups draw many of their intellectuals and a high proportion of traditional intellectuals are of peasant origin.¹

Education and economic standing elevate the intellectual of peasant origins above the peasantry. Here, however, Gramsci seems to be placing greater weight on formal education than function within the relations of a social context. Individuals with little or no formal education can function as intellectuals in a predominantly peasant society while remaining "organically" linked to that society. Clearly it is beyond the scope and expertise of this thesis to deal with all the implications Gramsci's analysis has for the identification and study of intellectuals at several levels of East African society. It is necessary that the principal focus of this study be the basically university-trained intellectual who is objectively a member of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Thus far in this chapter, a definition of the intellectual in terms of three dimensions - qualitative thought, cultural validation as "intellectual", and social activist role has been undertaken, and the types of social contexts in, and channels through which qualitative ideas are articulated and disseminated, examined. An attempt has also been made to explore the way in which the intellectual and his thought are related to social collectivities and structures of dissent. Attention also needs

¹. Ibid., p.6.
to be given to the meaning of the term intelligentsia, as distinct from the mental technocracy and mandarinate. This is important because Tanzania is perhaps one of the only African states with a group of radical intellectuals who could be referred to as a radical intelligentsia.

The Meaning of "Intelligentsia"

The term intelligentsia was first used in Russia in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, and has been subject to considerable variation in meaning since then.¹ According to T.B. Bottomore, it referred to all those who received a university education which qualified them for professional occupations.² Such a general description, however, ignored the specific socio-political and historical factors which gave birth to the Russian intelligentsia, and the particular characteristics of its members.³ A more accurate description is to be found in Seton-Watson's characterization of the intelligentsia as "people with a modern education who live for and by political and social ideas".

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3. Berlin points out that the "real members of the intelligentsia were the political pamphleteers, the civic-minded poets, the forerunners of the Russian Revolution – mainly journalists and political thinkers who quite consciously used literature, sometimes very poor examples of it, as vehicles for social protest." – Isaiah Berlin, 'The Role of the Intelligentsia', The Listener, 2nd May, 1963, p.564.
intelligentsia is characteristic of a wholly or predominantly agrarian society where there exists a marked contrast between a small, western-influenced, university-educated group, and the poorly educated or illiterate masses, who continue to live in great poverty.\(^1\) In similar vein, Arnold Toynbee suggested that the intelligentsia was essentially an intellectual bureaucracy in a backward country which was recruited primarily from the lower orders of society. It was a modernising force whose members principal concern was to move the country toward the material and external forms of industrialised and progressive foreign cultures.\(^2\)

According to Renato Poggioli, the Russian intelligentsia was an intellectual order drawn largely from the lower ranks "whose function was not so much cultural as political".\(^3\) For Poggioli, the term intelligentsia referred to a "cultural proletariat" but these intellectuals are not so much proletarians as proletarianizing ... they may become ideologically and politically bound to the mass of the workers and peasants but they are not, at bottom, an order economically bound to the interests of the masses. A member of the intelligentsia is not born but made.\(^4\)

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3. Poggioli, p.36.
4. Ibid., p.37.
This definition possesses the virtue of bringing out the strongly marked relationship between dissent in ideas and a socio-political role which was characteristic of 19th century Russia. And the term itself, as Nettl suggests, captures the subtle increase in exacerbation over the word intellectual. Intellectuals may develop from a social stratum into a collectivity under certain favourable circumstances, e.g. the French Revolution, but "an intelligentsia is more of a self-conscious collectivity, ah ovo".¹

The term intelligentsia, as Martin Melia stresses, suggests more than intellectuals in the ordinary sense. Apart from the stress upon "critical thinking", and the stance of active opposition to a status quo which was viewed as an obstacle to human thought and progress, the intelligentsia was characterised by its members perception of themselves as the embodied "intelligence" or "consciousness" of the nation.² Although the intelligentsia were often recruited from more or less privileged groups which felt most keenly the inflexibility and cramping conditions of the old regime,³ they formulated and articulated their ideals and values in universalistic, absolutist terms.

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¹ Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent", p.95.
In regions of Western culture, and in Britain and the United States in particular, the term intelligentsia has come to signify not a class or order, but the professionals of culture or the professional category of intellectuals. The term has also undergone a remarkable transformation in the Soviet Union where, in the post-Revolutionary phase, a new definition of intellectuals or the intelligentsia has been sought. At the core of pre-revolutionary Bolshevik definitions were dissent and revolutionary activity. From Marx himself came the notion of praxis which superimposed the mandate of social action on the formulation of social dissent. However, the rise to power of the Bolsheviks undermined the very concept, and raison d’etre of qualitative dissent. There was little room for dissent on a qualitative plain, except of course in relation to the capitalist world. With the consolidation and institutionalization of the revolution, there developed an almost Gramscian emphasis on the dispersion of intellect throughout society. According to Nettl, "Soviet society denied (at least analytically, if not in practice) any version of differentiated modernity and asserted a projection of liberated and all-capable man for its vanguard or elite – at least during the process of transit to full Communism." The definition of the intelligentsia or intellectuals which evolved

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made no distinction qualitatively between science and culture, and no attempt to accept any difference between the scope or qualitative dimensions of thought. The key to the new notion of an intelligentsia has become professional qualification or intellectual work. Thus, the Moscow Dictionary of Philosophy states that

"The intellectuals constitute an intermediary social stratum made up of men who devote themselves to work with their minds. It includes engineers, technicians, lawyers, artists, teachers, scientific workers ... Intellectuals have never been, nor can ever be, a separate class, for they do not have an independent position in the system of social production."

In the above definition there is no mention of the self-conscious cohesiveness of collectivity which was surely a key characteristic of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. There is certainly no identification of the intelligentsia with socio-political dissent. There is no attempt to classify ideas, and no reference to the relationship between intellectuals and the formulation of ideas. The new Soviet intelligentsia is simply a neutral stratum of mental workers.

The intelligentsia, as a critical thinking, politically active, self-conscious intellectual collectivity with a concern for humanistic, universalistic values, is not to be confused, as some writers have done, with what I shall term the mental technocracy. This distinction can be maintained by the differences between what

1. Quoted from the introductory notes to the series of articles on intellectuals under the general title, "La Crise des Intellectuels", Arguments, Vol.V, No.20, p.34.
Rapoport refers to the 'intellectual commitment' and 'intellectual competence'. Intellectual commitment, according to Rapoport, involves the intellectual's ability "to analyse the content and perhaps, the genesis of ideas, to evaluate them critically, and to compare them with each other". The intellectual's interests "extend beyond the affairs of his immediate vicinity and beyond his life span, both into the past and into the future". Further, inherent in intellectual commitment is a search for the "truth". On the other hand, intellectual competence is much more restricted: "the intellectually competent need not concern themselves with ethical questions, only with technical ones". Thus, using Rapoport's conceptual distinction, the mental technocracy is characterized by intellectual competence rather than commitment. The mental technocracy consists of those with advanced education who have given up qualitative thinking, and a socio-political orientation, for the rewards of public administration.

The intelligentsia should also be distinguished from a mandarinate, a distinction which has become important in analyses.


2. Ibid.


of the "New Left" and student movements, especially in America, where the student movement has been led by "a critical, left-oriented intelligentsia" in ideological opposition to a mandarinate of "the scholarly and technocratic professors".¹

**Intellectuals, Universities, and the Compartmentalization of Intellectual Work**

The definition of the intellectual proffered in this study clearly has much greater relevance to the African situation than to the Western advanced industrial nations. The increasing institutionalization, professionalization, and specialization of the humanities and social sciences in the advanced industrial nations have virtually robbed the university-based intellectual of his three tools of existence. The development and increasing demarcation of specialist disciplines and sub-disciplines has had the effect of limiting the scope of the researcher-academic's concern, thereby constricting his universal reference, and reducing his concern with the quality of life in general. There are intellectuals - writers, journalists, artists, playwrights, for instance, who operate outside the university context,² and receive sufficient sub-cultural support to maintain dissenting views and intellectual activity. But for the apostles of the post-industrial society, they are essentially historical anachronisms.

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whose social and intellectual bases have been progressively undermined by a constellation of new social and technological forces. Thus, literary intellectuals are characterised by Daniel Bell as the chronically discontented purveyors of hedonistic, utopian ideologies, and nihilistic fantasies.1

The bases of the intellectual's tools of existence have been eroded by the fusion of qualitative thought with science. Indeed, the very term "social science" suggests a "fusion between scope and quality; it collapses (at least intellectually) the two dimensions into one".2 The fusion has its roots in the work of Saint-Simon and Comte, and in the early 19th century idea that social life can be understood, as well as engineered, by incorporating and applying new areas of scientific knowledge. Increasingly, there has developed an overriding tendency to look on society as a working system which can be made to work better and better by rational-technical means. This scientific outlook has been widely diffused, and could be said to predominate in the culture of the advanced industrial societies.3

The process may be viewed, as Habermas and Marcuse suggest, as one of a "progressive 'rationalization' of society ... linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical

development". Habermas points out that the "rationalization" has far-reaching implications for ideological perspectives.

To the extent that technology and science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, old legitimations are destroyed. The secularization and "disenchantment" of action-orienting world views, of cultural tradition as a whole, is the obverse of the growing "rationality" of social action.²

The growing power of technical control over the external conditions of existence determines the "pattern of human socio-cultural development" and "a more or less passive adaptation of the institutional framework to the expanded subsystem of purpose-rational action".³ Largely demolished bourgeois ideologies are replaced by a "substitute" ideology which, articulated as "technocratic"consciousness", represents a "common positivistic way of thinking" rooted directly in science and technology.⁴

Within this framework of progressive rationalization, the social sciences have assumed an increasingly scientific and technological character. The notions of "policy sciences" and

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2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.115.

4. Ibid., pp.114-15. For Marcuse, what Weber termed "rationalization" does not realize rationality, but rather, in the name of rationality, a specific form of unacknowledged domination. Technology is never an autonomous, determining force, but "is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason." Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp.223f.
"social engineering" have steadily gained ground since World War II. In spite of recent criticism, the main line of development in research continues to be toward quantitative, policy-oriented studies which are intended to provide technical solutions to social problems. We thus have what Touraine refers to as the "sociology of decision" whose primary function is the management of social tensions, adaptation, and the reconciliation of dissenting groups.¹

The institutionalisation and specialisation of the social sciences have progressively reduced the qualitative and humanistic content of the fusion with scientism.¹ Since Weber's attempt to create a value-free social science in which a strict distinction between social analysis and political preferences is mandatory, the social sciences have become increasingly scientific, rationalistic, and ahistorical, and have been characterised by the growth of positivistic, empiricist techniques of investigation which have to a significant extent lost sight of qualitative changes in social structures and of the historical dimensions of human facts. There has, of course, co-existed with the "sociology of decision" a "sociology of opposition" which has sought to interpret the significance, the tendencies, and aims of social movements which are in conflict with the existing society. The roots of this


2. For a brief discussion of this see Jurgen Habermas, "The Intellectual and Social Background of the German University Crisis", Minerva, Vol.9, No.3 (1971), pp.422-23.
oppositional sociology lie, particularly in France and Germany where the social critic has traditionally formed his ideas within an influential tradition of Marxist thought and often, within the socialist labour movement. It only becomes possible when society begins to react to its own changes, defines new objectives, and experiences "the social and cultural conflicts through which the direction of the changes and the form of the new society may be debated".¹

The comprehensive bureaucratisation of social and cultural life has deeply affected the university, the principal cultural and intellectual organ in most states. The modern academy is divided into a number of departments corresponding to scholarly disciplines and professional training centres. Departmental boundaries have become rigid as departmental fields have grown and as departments have developed, and this has discouraged intellectual curiosity beyond the administratively defined departmental boundaries. While lip service is often paid "cross-fertilisation", in actual fact "young scholars are generally advised to stay within the boundaries of the field".² Professional norms, and rules for advancement, and the expectations of colleagues and superiors, exert pressure on the junior members to play in accordance with the rules of the academic game. These rules include the observance

¹. Touraine.
of fixed standards of scholarship, intellectual discipline, due
defereence and attention to the contributions of senior men and,
of course, respect for the boundaries of the various specialized
fields.¹

The academic who transcends the bounds of his discipline to
consider a wide range of intellectual issues will be accused of
dilettantism. The emphasis on specialized fields discourages
potential generalizers, and leads the young academic to believe
that safety lies in involvement with narrow problems rather than
with broad questions. If the social science academic articulates
dissenting values, or manifests a strong preference for deviant
value-structures, he runs the risk of being put down as "un-
scientific" for "with culture linked functionally with the social
system, his profession ceases to be culturally validated as soon
as he "unscientifically" reflects or articulates inner-directed
and dissenting values."² Further, the specific organizational
framework of the modern university - with its bureaucratic apparatus
of deans, directors, registrars, and administrators of the most
unvariegated kind, exercises a control which inhibits political
activity and raises a barrier against the intellectual's "leap
into socio-structural dissent".³ The ability of the academic to
articulate dissenting views, and survive academically, has often

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
depended on his eminence. Noam Chomsky, for instance, is perhaps the world's most renowned theoretical linguist and his political dissent has been tolerated, if not approved of, by the academic establishment. The historian Staunton Lynd, on the other hand, has experienced a rough academic passage, as have numerous young academics without established reputations who have been denied tenure or dismissed for their dissenting activities.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s many social scientists, including Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Zbignew Brzezinski and S.M. Lipset, were confidently predicting the decline of ideological fervour in the Western industrialised nations. The growth of the welfare state, the increase in affluence, and the domestication of the socialist and labour movements in the West had, or so it superficially seemed, eradicated the old divisions and conflicts in society. Total ideologies, with their blueprint for utopia, were considered obsolete. Such predictions themselves constituted an ideology, a tacit one, that rationalised and supported the existing system. The proponents of the idea of the decline of ideology were in effect arguing that in Mannheim's term, utopia was dead, but that ideology, defined by Harold Lasswell as the political myth functioning to preserve the status quo, was triumphant.

1. See in particular, Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1960). Bell postulated that the idea of change no longer had philosophical roots: "Thus one finds, at the end of the fifties, a disconcerting caesura. In the West, among the intellectuals, the old passions are spent. The new generation, with no meaningful memory of these old debates, and no secure tradition to build upon, finds itself seeking new purpose within a framework of political society that has rejected intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions." — p. 374.
Events in the late 1960s and early 1970s have clearly overwhelmed such predictions. We do not live in a non-ideological age, in an age where there is a consensus on principle and values but disagreement over methods and minor matters of detail and adjustment. In North America, and also throughout Western Europe, the last two decades have witnessed the growth and proliferation of radical total ideologies ranging from a multiplicity of "New Left" ideologies to black power to women's liberation. However, while there has been this proliferation, few ideologies have been successful in attaching themselves to more than fragile, limited socio-political structures of discontent and dissent.

The issues raised in this brief discussion of the increasing specialization, professionalization, and institutionalization of the social sciences and humanities, the ethos of "scientism", the organisation of the university and the disciplinary pressures on the academic, and the end of ideology debate, are not confined to the European and North American experience. They are pertinent in the African context precisely because African universities have been integrated into the North American and European academic systems. African universities are modelled on those of Europe and North America and are staffed by their products, both local and expatriate, who have often absorbed without challenging and reconstructing the dominant values operating in the academic environment. Further, many institutes and research programmes are externally financed - in particular by the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations, and their areas of research, personnel, and even methodological and ideological assumptions are determined from without. The issues raised are of vital concern to many East African intellectuals, a concern which is brought out, not only in their discussion of intellectual role, but also in their examination of the role and nature of the university.

The African academic and intellectual operates in a socio-political and cultural context where little can be accepted as fixed. In a real sense the debate over the future of African societies has only just begun. The African academic and intellectual cannot, or should not assume, as most European and North American academics have been able to do, that the social and political structures within which he lives, the outlines of public policy by which his government is guided, and the legitimacy of the value-system which encompasses him, are all basically fixed, and that "nothing more is subsequently required than the demarcation of the academic underlabourer's square, such that he may till his little acre with all the care that these conditions enjoin."¹ Viable socio-political structures which are suitable for development purposes have generally yet to be developed. Public policies are still to be devised for the carrying out of fundamental social and economic transformations capable of destroying relations of economic and political dependence. Central value systems have yet to crystallize.

The "newness" African academics and intellectuals are confronted with is not simply a matter of discovering the unknown. It is also a matter of developing a new perspective on, and rearranging the components of, the known. For instance, when teaching history, or psychology, or politics and sociology, the African academic cannot assume that the received texts, written primarily by "bourgeois" Western academics, present a valid overview, leaving it to the individual researcher in a limited area to fill in detail or add a little here and there. The African intellectual is indeed involved in a major restructuring of systems of qualitative thought.

CHAPTER III

The Institutional Setting - Secondary Education and the Universities.

Introduction

Any analysis of the structure and nature of an intellectual stratum ultimately has to focus on formal institutional arrangements simply because intellectual life occurs within an institutional setting—in universities, research institutes, publishing houses, newspapers, journals, and libraries. These institutions, apart from providing intellectual employment, serve a number of other vital functions. They provide an outlet for the articulation and dissemination of ideas. They provide a sub-cultural base for intellectual activity, and serve as training and recruitment grounds for members of the intellectual stratum. They provide the structures through which intellectual values are transmitted from one generation to another, and which are necessary for the creation, maintenance, and development of intellectual traditions. They also provide the structural setting in which informal network relations develop, and play an important part in relating the intellectual stratum of one society to the ideas, traditions, and intellectuals of others. Above all, they are crucial in determining which idea structures will be relegated to insignificance, and which will persist through effective encapsulation in institutions, and dissemination through teaching,
lecturing, publication, and so on.

It should be constantly borne in mind that contemporary intellectual institutions in Africa are alien in origin and rationale; few, if any, have indigenous historical counterparts.\(^1\) They were introduced or imposed during a period of colonial subjugation by Europeans, often without much regard for the socio-economic and cultural context in which they were implanted. In the second place, they are mainly of recent origin. While primary education and literacy training linked with evangelization was well, if unequally, established throughout East Africa in the late 19th century, secondary schools, especially in Kenya and Tanganyika, were a comparatively late development, with universities, publishing houses, and journals, appearing at a much later stage. Thirdly, even to an important extent now, these institutions have been staffed by expatriate Europeans who have generally attempted to mould a particular organizational character. And fourthly, as alien institutions (and with the exception of the primary schools) they have catered for relatively few people and been of little immediate relevance to the rural masses, except perhaps as the key to material advancement and political power.

Admittedly this is a European phenomenon as well, but at least the European university is a product of European culture, and is plugged into the broader society through the production of large

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1. There is, of course, an ancient Islamic academic tradition represented by Al Azhar University in Cairo (founded in the 10th century), Kairouine University in Fez, and the defunct Sankore University which flourished in 16th century Timbuctoo until the Moroccan invasion of 1590. Sankore, unlike the other two, was not an Arab institution.
numbers of teachers, engineers, doctors, agricultural technicians and so on. The lack of relevance of the African university to rural and urban labouring classes is exacerbated by the fact that so few people attend universities; and the universities activities are carried on in languages which relatively few people are able to understand.

The alien nature of the institutions has given rise to crises of relevance, and sharply critical attitudes toward inherited structures and of the attitudes of the personnel staffing or produced by them. The critical response is reflected in the struggle to transform the school and university curriculum, in Nyerere's statement, Education for Self-Reliance, and in many of the recommendations of the Ominde Report in Kenya. Criticisms relate, not only to staffing, the underlying concepts of institutions, and to the need for transformation in the light of African traditions, culture, and modern requirements, but also to their structure and relations with other societal structures. Surprisingly, as in the case of universities, the last aspect has been neglected, clearly reflecting the extent to which African academics and intellectuals have been effectively socialized into the dominant European (rather


than North American) heritage. The neglect of structure, apart from stemming from a basic if somewhat critical acceptance of the British idea of the university, derives from an awareness that structural changes, especially those leading to democratization, threaten academics in many ways. Furthermore, the whole question of structural change within the university must be seen in relation to the nature of the society. For instance, in Kenya, a country committed to capitalist development, it would be foolish to expect structural changes at variance with ruling class interests and aspirations, or the creation of a socialist university.

The Two Bases of East African Secondary Education

Underlying the system of secondary education established throughout East Africa during the colonial period were two bases: religion and the institutional model of the British elite public school. As education was primarily left to the initiative of mission societies until the advent of independence, from the beginning religion and education were inextricably linked. There prevailed a religious theory of education which held that "the primary duty of an educational system is to bring up children in a

1. It is important to distinguish between European and North American traditions. In the case of United States universities, the question of the relationship of university and society has always been a prominent one. In the late 19th century, for instance, the establishment of "land grant colleges", which later became state universities, was predicated on the idea of a close practical connection almost along the lines of research station-agricultural extension. Moreover, the ideal that all high school leavers should find a place in higher education has never found acceptance in Europe, although in the United States it has been realised to a significant extent.
particular faith, and that this being so, secular subjects should be taught in conjunction with and in subordination to religion, as a safeguard against their being taught by others in a secular and irreligious atmosphere.¹ The religious theory and foundations of education grew up with the encouragement of governments, administrators and teachers who were themselves brought up to regard religion as a proper school subject, "taught by the regular teachers, usually laymen, rather than by priests and with religious observance an essential part of school life by day."² Evangelization has played a powerful role in East African Protestantism, including the Anglican Church, and has survived as a potent force in ways virtually unknown in Britain and Europe, not only among African christians but among European mission teachers as well. The dynamism and dedication of this Evangelism was, as Stanley notes, protected from erosion by the sectarian institutional-authoritarian structure of the secondary school, which represented a whole way of life divorced in many ways from the life of the society surrounding it.³

The second foundation stone of British secondary education in East Africa has been the institution of the elite English public school which fitted well into the East African setting since "in a thinly populated country with a selective educational system, it

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is quite inevitable, that the secondary schools should be boarding schools.¹ The public school was associated with four characteristics: boarding, fees, freedom from local control, and social selection. The major schools of Buganda, and King's School, Budo, in particular, conformed most clearly to these qualifications, since the latter criterion reflected, until recently, not only ability to pay but actual position in the official "Establishment" of Buganda.

Secondary Education in Uganda

The initial growth of education in East Africa occurred in Buganda under the auspices of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) in 1895. In spite of the destruction wrought by the religious strife of the 1830s, mission schools sponsored by the C.M.S. and the Catholic White Fathers, sprang up rapidly. By 1903 there were about 22,000 children attending C.M.S. schools in Buganda alone. In the lower levels of primary education, Buganda pupils dominated the system during the early years of this century, as the following table attests.²

1. Lucas, p.12.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1906-7</th>
<th>1907-8</th>
<th>1908-9</th>
<th>1909-10</th>
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<td>Buganda</td>
<td>24,324</td>
<td>25,257</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>26,390</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>5,521</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>7,295</td>
</tr>
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<td>2,144</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>2,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The early years of the 20th century saw the foundation of a number of C.M.B. High Schools which provided the apex of the education system. In 1904 Mengo High School was founded, and followed by King's School Budo (1905-6), and Gayaza Girls' School. On the Catholic side, the major schools opened at around the same time, following the appointment of an educational specialist attached to the Catholic Missions in 1901. In 1902 Namilyango College was established followed in 1905 by Kisubi school for girls (also known as St. Mary's). Namilyango College aimed at providing a higher education than the ordinary mission schools could give. Its primary aim, as in the case of the C.M.B. schools, was to train boys to teach and preach Christianity, although as the following

1. See Ibid. for a detailed history of their development.

2. There is considerable confusion surrounding the actual foundation dates of these schools, principally because teaching often started well before schools were officially opened. Gayaza Girls' School, for instance, had been conducting classes for six years before being advertised as a school. See G.P. McGregor, King's College, Budo, The First Sixty Years (Nairobi: G.P.P., 1967), p.13.

3. Stanley, p.70.

statement suggests, there was also a secular, if secondary aim, as well.

Boys on whose education time and money have been spent but who are incapable of becoming catechists, will either be sent away, or if their characters are good, will receive additional education to fit them for Government clerkships.¹

From the very beginning, education in Buganda was firmly embedded in the power structure and functioned as a major point of entry into positions of influence and prestige. The Buganda leadership, realizing after the 1900 Uganda Agreement that future success would depend on knowledge of English, followed the example of Sir Apolo Kagwa in sending their sons to Mengo High School and King's School, Sudo.² The C.M.S. schools received strong support from British officials, who relied upon them to supply the educated clerks and chiefs upon which the policy of Indirect Rule depended.³ By making the high schools the apex of their education system, the C.M.S. gained the adherence of the upper classes in Buganda, and were assisted greatly by their ability to build upon the indigenous foundations of higher education.⁴ Before colonisation, promising boys had been sent to the Kabaka's court for higher education — the kigalagala system, and similar systems operated in other kingdoms in Uganda. As Fallers has pointed out, the first teaching of Islam after 1854 created "an elite subculture" consisting of

¹. Quoted in McGregor, p.5.
². Watson, p.i.
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid., p.ii.
the intelligent 

bacalama class who were anxious to follow their

Kabaka's lead in religion, and to obtain mastery of letters through

understanding the printed word.\(^1\) The interconnection of education

and economic factors is well summarized by Weeks as follows.

The Buganda agreement of 1900 established title deeds
to land in Buganda and created an elite that held

mailo land (surveyed plots with title deeds) by the

square mile. These landlords, the chiefs and the

industrious peasants, had a source of wealth that

made possible the payment of school fees for the

education of their children. Thus a spirit of

educational development was reinforced in Buganda,
based on a peasant cash-crop economy.\(^2\)

These social and economic factors tended to act as an impediment
to further educational growth: "an educated elite, sure of being
able to educate its children was not militant in pursuing the goal
of education for all."\(^3\)

Using Buganda as its base, and relying on teachers trained at
Mengo High School and King's School, Budo, the C.M.S. in the first
two decades of the century extended its operations throughout the
rest of the Protectorate: in Eastern Province, Kamuli High School,
Busoga, was founded in 1911, and Nkara High School in 1909; in
Northern Province, Gulu High School, Acholi, was founded in 1913.\(^4\)
The British Administration, anxious to reduce or thwart Muslim
influence in Acholiland,\(^5\) gave strong support to the Gulu High

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2. Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in educational development: the
case of Kenya and Uganda (New York: Teachers College Press,
Columbia University, 1967), p.3.
3. Ibid.
5. The Acting Provincial Commissioner, writing in 1912 for a
C.M.S. High School referred not only to the need to train
clerks for the administration, but the need to block the
spread of Islam. Ibid., p.454.
School, and it soon took in Lango students as well as those from West Nile and Acoliland. As in Buganda, and other kingdoms, Gulu was originally created for the sons of chiefs. Canon A. Latigo's brief history of the school adequately summed up the aims of the missions and government officials in their cooperative effort.

After completion of building, the School was started with royal family boys with the arrangement of Rev. A.E. Fisher and D.C.'s and Provincial Commissioner Northern Province to bring royal family boys up with two points as follows: Firstly, to get urgently needed Education. Secondly to get good successors from those royal family educated persons to become hereditary chiefs.†

The G.A.S. Board of Education allowed considerable elasticity in creating a balance between academic and practical instruction.

While the High Schools at Mbarara, Toro, Bunyoro, Gulu and Kigezi gave only literary courses, the schools in Eastern Province—Nkoga, Kamuli, and Mbole in Bukedi provided both practical instruction and academic training. At Budo there was a practical bias, but Africans realized, as the Nigerian historian Ajayi pointed out in another context "industrial education taught skills, literary education taught knowledge and knowledge was power."‡

During the 1920s the Uganda secondary education system continued to expand. Two more secondary schools were founded near

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Fort Portal - Nyakasura, started by a retired naval officer under C.M.S. auspices in 1926, became a government secondary school in 1948, and a Roman Catholic school, St. Leo's. Africans first attempted the Cambridge School Certificate examinations at Makerere, where a School Certificate class was organized from 1933 to 1939, and at Kisubi in 1938.

Secondary Education in Kenya

The situation in Kenya was in marked contrast to that of Uganda. Due to the comparatively late advent of the missions, education had barely been initiated before 1914, and was characterized by an almost exclusive emphasis upon practical or industrial training. The development of African education was hindered by the nature of the plantation system and settler-society which developed. As Weeks has noted

An alien plantation economy in Kenya, coupled with the intense involvement in politics by the European settlers, resulted in a situation in which the paramountcy of African interests remained a paper expression until after the middle 1950s. The plantation economy demanded a ready supply of unskilled agricultural workers. The settlers' attitude was that an uneducated African was often a better worker than an educated one, even with only a few years of primary education.

This attitude was shared by the Kenya Government. The report of the Department of Education for 1920-21, for example, stated that

2. Weeks, p.3.
"it will be readily admitted by most educationists that literary education per se is harmful to the ordinary native of Africa."¹

This view had earlier been affirmed in the report of a special committee appointed by the Governor to examine the possibilities of a Native Civil Service in 1919.

Formal Government involvement in education began in Kenya with the creation in 1911 of an Education Department which was primarily to assist in the development of European education.²

There was considerable tension between the Department and mission educators on the one hand, and settlers on the other, over the question of African education. Many progressive missionaries had felt that they should help to stimulate the economic life of the African villages. In this they had the support of J.A. Orr, Kenya's first Director of Education, who, between 1911 and 1927, was convinced that he should focus his resources on the encouragement of village industries and agriculture.³ The settlers, who had ensured that African agriculturalists were denied the production of lucrative cash crops, were more interested in the supply of skilled and semi-skilled African labour outside the Reserves, exerted considerable pressure on the Education Department and the Missions. Indeed, one of Orr's first acts as Director was to initiate a system of grants to missions on the condition that they trained artisans to serve the European economy.⁴

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4. Ibid.
The new theories of African agricultural education, as King points out, partly reflected a genuine desire on the part of mission educators to develop a system of village education which had much greater relevance to immediate village needs. However, the missionaries and administration were certainly not unaware of the political threat an urban-based, partly educated group represented, and were able to discern the linkage between Thuku's movement of 1921-22 and its urban base. H.D. Hooper, of the C.M.S. had drawn attention to this political aspect of agricultural education as early as August 1922.

The effect of the native unrest and agitation arising out of legitimate grievances ... has been to render the younger generations discontented with home conditions, and to cut them loose from the sheet anchor of home interests, also ... an increasing number are going to swell the vagrant and detribalised proletariat which haunts the towns and alienated areas and which has no cares of land or property to temper the menace of its smouldering discontent.

Everyone is waking up to that menace but not to the means of countering it; we need the encouragement of far more agricultural activity in the Reserves. Impetus was given to the Kenya Education Department's increasing stress on agriculture in the elementary and primary schools by the recommendations of the Phelps-Stokes Commission in 1924 and the tenor of the Advisory Committee on African education in London. But, as King notes, "as so often happened in African education, a

1. Ibid., p.144.
2. Quoted in Ibid., pp.144-45.
genuinely progressive educational reform had been construed (by the radical politically conscious African) as a reactionary political manoeuvre on the part of the whites.¹

The schooling that did evolve in Kenya was thus limited and had the effect of ensuring the security of the labour supply for the highland farms, and developing a highly skewed educational pyramid. A 4-4-4 cycle developed, with a few children receiving a primary education in the vernacular for four years, culminating in a common entrance examination for the middle school with fewer than 10% continuing their studies, now carried on in Swahili. After another four years, these students took the KAPS (the Kenya African Preliminary Examination taken in English) to qualify for entrance to a four-year secondary or teacher-training college.²

Whereas in 1924 Uganda already had a number of post-primary schools, including a higher school (Makerere College), Kenya as yet had none. Following the visit of the Jones Commission, the Protestant missions in Kenya established the Alliance High School in 1926,³ and shortly after, the Roman Catholics started the Holy ¹

1. Ibid., p.145.

2. Weeks, pp.4-5.

3. The history of Alliance High School has been perhaps better documented than any other in Africa. The best account is B.E. Kipkorir, "The Alliance High School and the Origins of the Kenyan African Elite, 1926-1962", Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1970. An astonishingly pedestrian, year by year account is J. Stephen Smith's The History of the Alliance High School (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1973) which combines all the worst features of the school report approach to historiography. See also L.B. Greave’s account, Carey Francis of Kenya (London: Rex Collings, 1969), which is a biography of one of the driving forces behind the school.
Ghost College at Mangu. During its early years, the Alliance High School not only played the central role of developing a vital nucleus of well-educated African personnel, "but it acted as a model and challenge to other schools throughout Kenya".  

Anderson notes that

In providing education for Africans who were to become leaders in their communities the new missionary school masters were well aware that they had to succeed in educating men who would achieve the high standards which critical Europeans would apply to newly educated Africans. They gave the best education they knew at the time, which although adapted to African conditions and strictly Christian purposes, borrowed, because of the teachers' own backgrounds, much from the British public/grammar school tradition.

The next secondary school was established in 1933 - the Maseno C.M.S. School, followed in the next year by the Catholic School at Yala. Thus, all four secondary schools founded in Kenya before World War II grew from the Christian missionary tradition.

After World War II, and especially after 1950, there was rapid expansion at all levels in the African educational system. In the 1930s, and after 1945, African impatience with what seemed a slow rate of development for African education, combined with

2. Ibid.
dissatisfaction with the curriculum (and in the case of the
Kikuyu given greater impetus by the female circumcision crisis),
found expression in the moves to establish an alternative system
of education. Independent African schools which were linked to
the nationalist movement and the independent churches sprung into
existence. The links between the Kikuyu Central Association
(KCA) and the first independent schools were concealed as far as
possible in order to prevent government action being taken against
them on political grounds. Two organizations, the Kikuyu
Independent Schools Association (KISA) and the Kikuyu Karlinga
Education Association (KKEA) were established in the late 1920s.
At the height of the Emergency in late 1952 and early 1953 the
government closed 149 KISA schools, 21 KKEA schools and 14 other
independent private schools because they were considered breeding
grounds of rebellion. In Uganda, on the other hand, independent
schools continued to expand at this time, drawing many of their
students from Kenya.

1. There were independent African schools in Kikuyu District
as early as 1922, but it was not until the 1930s that they
grew in popularity and importance. See Richard D. Heyman,
"Assimilation and Accommodation in African Education: The
Kikuyu Independent Schools Association", in Education for What?
British Policy vs. Local Initiative (New York: Syracuse


3. J. Sasekama, "The Origin and Development of Independent
Private Schools in Uganda", Dar-es-Salaam, E.A.S.S.C. Paper,
Until the 1950s the intent of the education system in Kenya was similar to that in other areas where European settler interests were paramount. The economics and politics of white domination required an educational system that limited the possibilities for African advance. As Weeks argues:

It is no coincidence that the Jeanes schools - a system of education recommended by the Jones Commission of the 1920s - developed in colonies with European settlers, whereas in countries (e.g. Uganda) where Africans grew the cash-crops the schools never took hold. The Jeanes schools were designed to teach the family unit to grow better subsistence crops and to improve their rural existence. They did not conflict with the European settlers' desire for a secure supply of cash-crops by Africans.

The Beecher Report of 1949 established the form of African education over the next ten years in Kenya, its policies being endorsed by the Binns Report in 1953. It set a goal of primary school education entrance for 40% of the eligible age group, intermediate for 10%, and secondary for a cream of less than 1%, in this way amounting to a definite attempt to design a system of education that would keep the majority of primary leavers in the rural areas. Not surprisingly, the African community rejected

l. Weeks, p.7. The Jeanes School which was established at Kabete with Dr. J.W. Dougall, one of the secretaries of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, as Principal, is examined in Kenneth J. King, Pan-Africanism and Education (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Chapter VI, and Richard Heyman, "The Initial Years of the Jeanes School in Kenya, 1924-1931", in Vincent M. Battle et al., Essays in the History of African Education (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1970), pp.105-123. The Jeanes School was later transformed into the Kenya Institute of Administration.
the intention of the Beecher Report and the inferior education it provided them.¹

After independence there was a tremendous expansion of African secondary education with the number of aided and unaided schools rising from 95 (of which 55 were formerly Asian and European schools) in 1963 to 601 in 1968, the greater number of which (369) were unaided.² The 'Harambee' unaided schools which sprang up during 1964 and after to meet the growing pressure for secondary education accounted for much of the expansion, but were viewed "as a threat to properly planned educational, social, and economic development because they absorb capital, materials, and manpower that should be integrated into the total planned development of the country."³

The expansion was not evenly distributed throughout Kenya. The differential contact Africans had with missionaries, government officials and settlers, proximity to urban areas and educational facilities, have produced great regional and "tribal" educational and economic differences which have influenced the composition of the intellectual stratum and recruitment patterns. Whereas in West Africa the major centres of development were located in the coastal regions, in Kenya they have been in the south-western quadrant of the country, due largely to the influence of the

1. Ibid., p.6.
3. Weeks, p.12. Most of the "Harambee" schools suffer from inadequate capital resources and serious staff shortages.
Kenya-Uganda railway and the places Europeans chose to settle. The construction of the railway fostered the growth of important centres of communication and trade at Nairobi, Nakuru, and Kisumu. The following table indicates the extent to which inequalities in education are related to region and "tribe".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe ***</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of Population</td>
<td>Percent of Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamitic</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milo Hamitic</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu-Meru</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luyia</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>(3,354,773)</td>
<td>(1,020)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This distribution has been computed from the Kenya Population Census of 1962, Vol. III (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1966).
** Percentages do not add up to exactly 100% because of rounding.
*** The Hamitic group includes Rendille, Galla, and Somali speaking tribes. The Milo Hamitic group includes Kalenjin speaking tribes as well as the Masai, the Samburu, the Turkana, the Iteho, the Nilotobo, and the Njemps.
Selectivity Ratio - the ratio between a "tribes" representation in the school sample and its share of the total population.

2. Table from Olson, p.47.
The Kikuyu, who have an excess of 30% and 90% over their statistical "quota" among form-four pupils, are by far the most overrepresented group. The inequality is also borne out by the provincial distribution of secondary schools, a disproportionate number of which are located in Central and Nairobi Provinces where they principally benefit Kikuyu students. The regional inequality is even more marked in terms of schools providing higher school certificate and fifth and sixth form education.

Secondary Education in Tanzania

At the time of independence, Tanzania was the least educationally advanced of the East African states. Before World War I, a number of schools were started by the various mission societies operating in Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The personnel of the German administration, products of an entirely different educational system from the British, set up a number of Government schools to provide clerks, akides, and tax collectors for the administration. By the time of the War, when there were ten missions working in German East Africa, there were probably some 70,000 to 100,000 pupils "under the influence of some missionary

1. Anderson, p.150.

2. See Chapter V, p. 337 of this thesis on this point.

The prolonged and bitterly fought German East African campaign destroyed much of the pre-war mission-centred education system. As a result, the British Administration were faced with the problem of making a fresh start, a fact which led to much greater government initiative in education. Thus, at a time when Uganda had a number of well-established secondary schools, and was witnessing the creation of a higher college, in Makerere, Tanganyika was just getting back on the educational path. In the early 1920s a strong anti-academic bias was paramount, with attention being given to the establishment of a network of village schools (government "Tribal Schools"), with one central school in each province affording some post-primary education. The expansion of primary education in the 1920s had increased the African demand for further instruction, but the missions were unsympathetic, arguing that it was not their responsibility, and that "post-primary secular education could only create a detribalised and irreligious elite". As in Kenya, there was a pronounced missionary and administration fear that a literary education would

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1. Anthony Smith in "The Missionary Contribution to Education (Tanganyika) to 1914", TNR, LXXI (1963), p.107 gives a figure of 100,000 but Hornsby (p.37) suggests that it was about 66,000.

2. Discussed in Haynemamm, pp.35ff.


5. Ibid.
produce an "unemployable clerical class divorced from the interests and activities of their fellows, and dissatisfied with the rewards that can be earned after the completion of their studies".  

Rivers Smith in the Tanganyika Education Report (Dar-es-Salaam, 1925) argued along similar lines, pointing out that "agriculture shall be the keynote of our educational programme ... in the vast majority of cases the African's natural heritage is the land and it is therefore the first duty of the state to teach him to make the most use of that natural inheritance".  

The fear that literary education would produce a "top heavy Social system" was perhaps a misplaced one at the time, considering that Tanganyika was not to initiate its first secondary school for almost another twenty years.  

Africans determinedly resisted efforts to make agriculture an integral part of the syllabus, and demanded more post-primary education. "Every family, every kinship group in the areas where Western education had taken root, aspired to get at least one of its members away from home into paid employment from which they would all benefit."

In the 1930s doubts were raised about the dispersal of effort among the provincial schools, even though it had been imposed by the vastness of the territory and the rudimentary communications

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1. Quoted in Heyneman, p. 32.
2. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 32-33.
3. This is admittedly an a posteriori argument.
system. By 1940 secondary education was largely concentrated at Tabora; at the Tabora Government School which was modelled on a British public school and known as the "Eton of Tanganyika"; and at the Roman Catholic Mission school, St. Mary's. The other major secondary school was St. Andrew's, Minaki (now Minaki Secondary School), which was originally founded at Kiungani in Zanzibar in 1869 by the Universities Mission to Central Africa (U.M.C.A.). The three schools began to take Cambridge School Certificate (O.S.C.) in 1947-1948 and, until 1947, concentrated their efforts on the Makerere entrance examination. In 1943 there were 23 African candidates for the CSC (15 passed) and 25 for the Makerere entrance examination, of whom 12 passed. By 1954 numbers had increased substantially, but they were still small: 105 candidates for the CSC (93 passed) and in 1957, 150 candidates, all but one of whom passed.

During the mid 1950s there was a shift in Government policy away from the anti-academic bias as the need for educated personnel in the administration grew. As early as 1946, the Report of the Education Department had complained of a scramble among government departments for the limited number of senior secondary boys who

1. Huxley, pp.96-99. The school was originally founded in 1925 and accepted only the sons of chiefs and headmen for the first ten years.


4. Ibid.
were being tempted away from teaching and higher education by the pay and allowances offered during in-service training. The Report noted that "the dearth of suitable candidates for Makerere is holding up the development of the country". Yet in spite of the expansion of secondary education after World War II, in 1957 only 0.2% of the population had ever attended secondary school, and even fewer had received "O" level certificates. Relatively few schools, the principal ones being Tabora Boys, St. Patrick's (Mikani), St. Francis (Fugu), Tanga Secondary School, Old Moshi, and St. Mary's Tabore, provided recruits for university education and played a key role in class formation in Tanganyika. The expansion of the 1960s (in 1965 there were 76 secondary schools in Tanganyika of which only 7 were church-related "unassisted" schools) has meant the universities have recruited from a much wider range of schools, and hence geographical areas and ethnic groups.

The East African Educational Pyramid

It is apparent then that although colonial educators wished to spread some literacy training throughout the society, they limited academic education to just the very few Africans required for the British system of indirect leadership, as in Uganda, or to man the lower echelons of the colonial administration. The result of this policy was a sharply narrowing educational pyramid which has

1. Quoted in Ibid.
persisted into, and been reinforced in the post-independence period. In Uganda, for instance, in 1927 there were 225,000 students, adults and children, in Bible and literacy classes; fewer than 3,000 students in secondary schools; and fewer than 450 receiving any kind of post-secondary schooling.¹ Forty years later, a similar pattern existed, as the below table reveals.

**Table 3²**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Schooling</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary I</td>
<td>122,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary VIII</td>
<td>27,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form I</td>
<td>6,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form IV</td>
<td>3,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form V</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form VI</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Year Makerere</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much the same situation existed in Kenya and Tanzania as well.

The decision by colonial administrators and mission educators to use formal academic training as the criterion for access to the governing elite taught East Africans to equate education with economic benefits, political influence, and social status. It was basically for this reason that they resisted practical or vocational training and demanded academic training. Notwithstanding the efforts of Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinange, and other cultural nationalists, Africans, according to J.B. Castle, did not

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² Table in Ibid.
regard the transplanted British tradition as an "astonishing exercise in irrelevance", Castle wrote

The educational tradition ... was accepted for its cash value and as a sure means of moving away from poverty and weakness to comparative affluence and power. For at least a few it was an escape route from toilsome labour to the bright offices of the towns; for others it led the way to the dimmer lights of the mission schoolroom. The path to this was desirable and was strewn with Eng. lit., British history, world geography, British flora and fauna, British arithmetic and sometimes Latin. No one is to blame (sic!) This was all the very hard working expatriate missionaries and teachers knew, and all the examiner prescribed.

The results of the skewed educational pyramid and of the boarding schools modelled on those of England, as Prewitt points out, were essentially fourfold. In the first place, students were isolated from their families, "thus giving to mission educators nearly total control over the political socialization of the youth". Secondary schools, Stanley notes, provided a "moral-societal" substitute for the consistency of traditional socialization.

The Evangelical dynamic and dedication was in East Africa protected by the sectarian institutional-authoritarian structure of the secondary school. The present African Protestant intelligentsia ... have been nurtured in sectarian communities designed quite consciously to provide a "whole" way of life in ways not so functionally different from traditional society itself.

Secondly, it became clear to Africans very quickly that formal education as defined and controlled by the colonizer, was the

channel to a position of status. Thirdly, the selected few were taught to recognize their superior position in society, and the rewards given them were sufficient to demonstrate that they were indeed part of an elite. And fourthly, the aim of the mission educators, imperfectly realized as it was, was to inculcate standards of religious morality and disciplined behaviour which would "order the African's progression into Western technological society in a moderate way". The consequence of this education was to create a quiescent elitist group.

Most observers who have commented on the impact of Western education upon African society have stressed its disruptive and individualizing tendencies, and the way in which it has driven a wedge between the student and his family and traditional values. Stanley, for instance, accepts the thrust of this generalization, but argues that it is oversimplified, and more applicable to university than secondary education. It also overlooks the way in which the secondary school, as a social system provided a substitute for the consistency of traditional socialization.

Many observers, Prewitt notes, have perhaps underestimated the extent to which the "educational institutions in African nations have become in loco parentis for entire generations of school children". In the light of this, those views which stress the divergence between the values of secondary and university education

1. Prewitt, p.149.
2. Ibid.
have to be modified considerably given that most students, having been exposed for the greater part of their childhood and adolescence to the values of the school, tend to carry these values into the university setting. Rather than there being a conflict or divergence between "traditional" values and those which they now hold, there is a continuity of school and university values which tends to promote student political quietude. The model of "modernisation" upon which they are nurtured assigns to them key modernising roles, and the system normally rewards those who maintain the model. As the case of the Dar-es-Salaam students' protest against the introduction of National Service suggests, it is only when their positions and assumptions are challenged, that student political quietude is disturbed.

University Education: The Growth and Importance of Makerere

As we shall see, the question of the role of universities in East Africa has been debated for a long time by expatriate and African academics, students and governments. The debate has revolved not only around questions of the university's central role in meeting the high-level manpower requirements of contemporary African states and the reduction of the European expatriate academic staff component, but of transforming inherited structures and curricula as well. Crucial, and still largely unresolved questions, such as the relationship between government and the
university, and the university's role in developing a critical intellectual heritage and recovering an African cultural heritage, continue to trouble a great many African intellectuals.

Until the eve of independence, Makerere University College enjoyed a monopoly of higher academic education in East Africa. It produced intellectuals and political organizers who contributed to the ferment of nationalist forces leading to Independence, and helped to lay the foundations of an intellectual stratum in East Africa. It has trained successive generations of East African intellectuals and, in more recent years, provided them with occupational outlets.

Makerere College began in effect in 1922 as a Uganda Government technical school.¹ The following year, on the basis of recommendations made by Eric Hussey, Chief Inspector of Schools in the Sudan, to the Governor, Sir Geoffrey Archer, the school widened its scope to include both literary-professional and technical training. The courses then offered included carpentry and telegraphy, a clerk's course, and medicine. From the first the idea developed that the College should eventually become a university. This was borne out in the first report of the Uganda Education Department which stated:

This year has been devoted principally to organization - the only Government educational institution has been the college at Makerere, which is destined to become the University College for the Protectorate.²

1. See Margaret Macpherson, They Built for the Future (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1964), Chapter 1.

In 1928 the purely technical courses were withdrawn to a separate Kampala Technical School; in 1931 surveying was discontinued, and the short-lived expedient of junior secondary work had also come to an end by 1930, when the College may be thought of as entering the second phase of its growth. During the 1930s, the main effort was directed at building up the professional courses - medicine, engineering, agriculture, veterinary science, and the school masters' course. Makerere's main function during the 1920s and '30s was thus primarily to train the African assistant officers for the Uganda Government's technical services. However, the introduction in 1933 of courses leading to the CSC (the first available in East Africa) marked a major step forward, as it represented the first purely academic course at the College.

In its early years, Makerere drew most of its students from Uganda (predominantly Buganda) and its administration from 1922-1933 was under the Uganda Government. During the 1930s students from other territories were admitted; the first were a Kikuyu from Kenya in 1923, and a Zanzibari Arab in the following year. By the end of the 1940s the territorial distribution had changed substantially from that of the 1920s, Uganda students no longer representing the majority. In 1943 the Kenya entry exceeded the

1. Macpherson, p.16.
3. Ibid., p.11.
Uganda one for the first time.\textsuperscript{1} Major changes in the "tribal" composition of the student body also occurred. The Ganda proportion declined from 100\% in 1922 to 15\% in the first four years of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{2} This partly reflected the increasing entry of Kenyan and Tanganyikan students, especially after 1938 when the College became inter-territorial. However, even as a proportion of Uganda students, the Ganda declined with the greater entry of students from the outlying parts of the Proctorate.\textsuperscript{3}

The rates of entry of different "tribal" groups to Makerere, Goldthorpe has shown, clearly reflected the educational inequalities produced by variations in the intensity and distribution of mission and administration contact, access to urban, trading, and educational centres, and levels of economic advancement. On the basis of intra-territorial comparisons, Goldthorpe established that in Uganda the Ganda, Samia, Toro, and Nyoro had above average rates of entry; in Kenya, the Kikuyu, Luo, Samia, Luyla and Teita, had above average rates; and in Tanzania, the Bondi, Haya, Chagga, Zigua, Nyakyusa and Pare, had above average rates of entry to Makerere.\textsuperscript{4}

The De La Warr Commission of 1937 visited the East African territories and recommended that university education by developed.

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2. Ibid., p.101.
3. Writing in 1961, Goldthorpe pointed out that "it is of some significance that by far the biggest number of educated Africans today are Ganda; 671 of the 1,698 persons in the Register are Ganda." Ibid.
However, the Commission felt that Makerere should continue as a secondary school, and a separate site be developed.\footnote{1} The inter-territorial conference of the following year, which met to consider the recommendations of the De La Warr Commission, decided to develop at Makerere to maintain continuity, and because Makerere had already established a reputation that could be built upon.\footnote{2} The Asquith Commission, set up during World War II,\footnote{3} recommended that Makerere's advance to university status, along with several other colleges in the colonial empire, should be in a scheme of special relations with the University of London, in "order to ensure that the degrees available there should bear the stamp and standing of that University".\footnote{4} At the same time the Makerere Council felt that there was a need to develop academic courses which were not "purely and solely linked with professional training, and also the need to make provision for advanced study by members of the academic staff and (later) by attached research students, in order to develop towards university standard the education offered in the College".\footnote{5} The latter bore fruit in 1944.

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when the Institute of Social Research was conceived, and established with a Colonial Development and Welfare grant. The Institute's aim, as Macpherson points out, was to "base sociological research in East Africa at a place where some form of coordination of effort and pooling of material could be made and Makerere was the obvious choice".¹

University College status was granted in 1949. In 1950, teaching began for the intermediate examination of the University of London and, two years later, for the B.A. and B.Sc. The growth of degree work was accompanied by progress within the professional schools.² Along with the rise in standards went a rapid increase in student numbers: from 444 in 1954 to 861 in 1959-60, and a change in the racial composition of the student body with the admission of Asians in the early 1950s.

Obstacles to Africanization at Makerere

Until recently, the most striking characteristics of Makerere were the British orientation of its curriculum, and the high expatriate staff component, of whom the British, followed by the Americans in the 1960s, constituted the overwhelming bulk. As late as 1971, 2/3rds of the academic staff were of expatriate origins. The decade 1960-70 was a period of rapid growth: staff numbers rose from 170 to 581. In 1960 there were 10 East African

¹. Ibid., p.43.
². For details, see Goldthorpe, An African Elite, p.13.
members of staff; in 1969-70 there were 115. But while 1960-70 was a decade of localization the total number of academic staff rose from 170 to 581: that is, for every one East African appointed, two expatriates were recruited.

Makerere's age and traditions, Bert Adams an expatriate sociologist points out, "have made change and innovation in its established structures more difficult to bring about than in the newer campuses, especially Dar".¹ Makerere's structural links have been with the University of London and include the London degree and external examiner systems. During the late 1960s there was a substantial influx of Americans and American influence, supported by agencies such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Overseas Education Service, and USAID. For instance, it was a Rockefeller Foundation Grant which launched International Relations within the Department of Political Science and Public Administration.

Understandably, the predominance of British and American faculty at Makerere has aroused the antagonism of many local academics and politicians.² The culmination of this antagonism is to be found in the Report of the Visitation Committee to Makerere University, published in June 1970. The Report included recommendations for

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2. Picho Ali, for instance, argued in a letter to *The People* that an anti-Ugandan attitude prevailed at Makerere in so far as recruitment of the staff was concerned. The College was "a colony of the British and Americans" which discriminated against indigenous staff for senior appointments. (September 7th, 1968, p.9).
rapid Ugandanization rather than Africanization of the faculty, that Deanships be already held by Ugandans, and that department headships should be Ugandanized in the shortest possible time. Perhaps even more significantly, the Report recommended that the selection of faculty by foreign organizations, with their entire salaries paid by these organizations, must be discontinued. Thus, rapid Ugandanization and Africanization is the expressed goal of Makerere University, to be implemented with all possible speed and with all possible means. In the case of the Departmental Headships and Deanships, this has been rapid. Yet in the case of the total faculty the pace has not been as rapid. Adams, for instance, has shown that "after a fairly sharp rise of 7% in the proportion of African staff in the three year period from 1965-66 to 1967-68, there has been a rise of but 3% in the past five academic years. At the current rate it would be 1986-87 before half of Makerere's faculty would be African - and, of course, not all these would be East Africans or Ugandans".

According to Atwoki's analysis, three schools of thought have kept Ugandans out of the top levels of academic life in the University: first, the aristocracy of culture view which suggests that university graduates, imbued with the "merits of British culture", should provide leadership for the masses; second, the view that graduates, given the whole educational system, are more

1. See Appendix II of this thesis for details.
concerned with material advancement and job security than with the true values of education; and, third, the view that Ugandan graduates come from a type of background which is not conducive to academic advancement.\(^1\) The second of these views, as already argued, has fairly strong foundations, but Atwoki neglects perhaps the most crucial. The principal barriers lie, as Adams recognizes, in a combination of expatriate interests, a shortage of trained Africans, and administrative economic dependence.\(^2\) The last barrier is the one which is most frequently overlooked by those seeking "cultural" answers. In Uganda, as in most other African states, education could not operate at its present level without substantial external economic assistance. Economic dependence promotes a state of academic imperialism; funding agencies attach strings, if only in the provision of staff, who act as experts in agriculture, commerce, engineering, law and so on.\(^3\)

Obviously many expatriate staff members have a vested interest in continued expatriate dominance. Many would find difficulty in obtaining elsewhere positions offering equal status and power. For some it is economically advantageous.\(^4\) There can be little

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doubt that perhaps the bulk of expatriate academics at Makerere have seen the university as basically an extension of the British system, serving similar functions, and imbuing students with similar intellectual and moral values. Murray Carlin, playwright and Lecturer in English, adopted an essentially fatalistic view, arguing that whether it was desirable or not, Makerere was part of a process of Westernization. All the activities of the university contributed to "the subversion in an intimate and detailed way, of the African mind." He added

Whatever may come about eventually in Africa is far beyond our concern. All we can do is hand things on - much the same kind of activity, it seems to me, as was conducted throughout Europe during the Middle Ages, among the heirs of another Empire ... Our business is to give, now, what we have to give the peoples of the new Commonwealth - the means of remembering - of maintaining themselves in the main current of civilisation. This is no imposition, but an answer to a need. The framework within which the mind of Africa can find and extend itself, must be the framework of civilisation of Europe and America.2

Underlying much of the discussion of the curriculum in the Arts, and the most obvious source of friction amongst the expatriate staff,3 was a major concern with the lack of "background" or "frame of reference" of the students. This was best expressed by Langlands who, though opposed to the introduction of background courses, drew attention to the absence of those informal sources of education, including sub-cultural support, capable of sustaining

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2. Ibid., pp.3-4.
intellectual and academic activity.

Perhaps ... the time has come to try to see the position of these intellectuals and what there is to offer them when once they graduate from this ivory tower. In a house without electricity or water - in a school in the bush ... ten miles from town, and that a town without a bookshop - with no up-country libraries - possibly not even a cinema - with a radio which blurs out "pop" music interminably - with no periodicals except Drum ... and perhaps worst of all, unaccepted in the alien society that dominates the intellectual life of your country: What chance is there of being either civilised or intellectual in this wilderness?  

Langlands expressed opposition to changes in the University curriculum and structure, viewing them as a threat to "standards of academic scholarship". Nevertheless he was prepared to make some concessions to the cultural relativist viewpoint, arguing that the university would increasingly have to take into account the need for reorientation in the light of African traditions and the reappraisal of African culture and history.

Many expatriate academics were obviously concerned to maintain European academic or intellectual primacy by both advocating and defending the European ideal of the nature and function of the university against African counterclaims. Fighting a rearguard action, they have portrayed the transition from a colonial to a national university as an exhausting effort to preserve academic standards and academic freedom "in a comparatively hostile environment".  

moves for Africanisation as a threat to the "notion of academic autonomy and academic freedom", and condescendingly admonished Ugandan politician critics who were ignorant of the traditional role of the university when making them recommendations for Africanisation. He argued that to adopt Government or other criteria of education (instrumentalist views) would "betray completely the cause of the academic community and consequently the cause of education". Universities have a duty to "resist the ever-present tendency on the part of the dominant or vocal sections of society to reduce them to the level of mere instruments serving a "practical" purpose". Heron laid great stress on the role of university education in promoting a critical perspective which is implied in the whole notion of the academic way of life.

Our culture (sic) is permeated with a tradition of critical thought; a tradition which, studied and properly used, can enliven the thought of those we educate, and prepare them for the battle against the enemies of the academic spirit - the claims of expediency, and the claims of power-wielding social units such as Parliament and Church.

A measuring-stick for assessing the university-character of an institution is a "consideration of the size, development, and vigour of its Faculty of Arts. A University, as opposed to a mere institution for tertiary education, is more likely to be found where this Faculty flourishes". Clearly the two issues of

2. Ibid., p.40.
3. Ibid., p.41.
4. Ibid., p.39.
5. Ibid., p.41.
6. Ibid.
"academic freedom" and Africanization are distinct, but Heron confuses them by using the former as an argument against political calls for a rapid increase in the latter. In spite of the confusion, Heron does raise a real question about the critical function of the university. Is the university to be a quiescent institution doing the government's bidding without protest, or is it to be a place of independent critical thinking which provides a milieu for the growth of a critical African intellectual community? This critical role is not necessarily incompatible with the propagation of national ideology or the recovery of a national cultural heritage, but may well be so interpreted by incumbent political elites.

Makerere expatriate academics (and not only expatriates) have often looked with a great deal of apprehension at developments at the neighbouring Dar-es-Salaam campus, where attempts to create a socialist university have threatened many of the academic values they cherish. One of the most vocal of these academics has been Professor Malcolm Crawford, formerly Professor of Chemistry and Head of the Department of Chemistry. As with so many academics who feel threatened by change, Crawford points out that the relationship of African universities with European ones "led to the preservation of the standards and traditions of the parent university".¹ He laments that members of the three East African University Colleges are "not free to teach and to interpret their subjects

¹ Crawford, p.376.
in the manner they prefer." He criticizes governments for directing students into particular courses, and singles out the Tanzanian Government for his most vitriolic criticism. He also criticizes the bonding of students in receipt of government bursaries, and regrets that government appointees on councils have played a role in the determination of academic salaries and terms of service. Crawford condemns African governments for trying to influence decisions concerning the overall development of the colleges, decisions, that is, about such matters as the number and standards of student hostels and the opening of new departments and faculties. He views the Tanzanian Government's insistence that tuition fees be increased as another infringement of academic freedom, given that it affects only the students who are not East African nationals for they receive full bursaries. Crawford also criticizes the decision of the East African Colleges to employ expatriate staff largely on a contract basis, and is oblivious of attempts to create national academic and intellectual traditions. Indeed, the example of Crawford and others suggests that many expatriate academics, and especially older ones, were clinging to, and endeavouring to maintain in the

1. Ibid., p.399.
2. Ibid., pp.377 & 379.
3. Ibid., p.379.
4. Ibid., pp.377-78.
5. Ibid., p.378.
African setting, an Oxbridge derived tradition which had been effectively challenged, if not supplanted, in post-war World War II Britain.

If expatriate academics at Makerere have been fighting a rear-guard action on questions of Africanization and curriculum change, Makerere students have been politically quiescent and little interested in debate about the nature and function of the university. The editorial in the student newspaper, The Makererean described student life in the following way.

The cult of the university student boils down to playing bridge, smoking, spending a lot of time in the billiard room, gambling a little, spasmodic 'digging' in the library, election campaigning, and making debates at various social functions. A tacit attitude, political wise is the way to be 'discreet'. Not a small proportion of freshmen are already thinking about their future in terms of bread-winning capacities. Where is the life, alertness and vitality that is intrinsic to and symbolic of university life? This is a stale and barren campus.  

The Britishness of educational practises at Makerere have never really been the focus of student activism. Some five years after Independence, one Guild member asked rhetorically: "To what extent has Makerere shifted since the British were forced to opt out of this part of Africa?" and replied

Negligible, if any. We shall continue to produce the certified craftsman, the doctor, the agriculturalist, the mechanically trained man who will fit into a given system. British conservatism and ideals are our aims. Anything anti-British is anti-Makerere.

2. Quoted in Prewitt, p. 145.
There would appear to be a contradiction between the Guild member's view and that advanced by Heron. The Guild member does not view the university as an arena of critical discourse under threat from government instrumentalist demands, as Heron does, but rather as a place which already churns out functionaries who lack the critical perspective and spirit which Heron deems the hallmark of university education.

In his study of Makerere students, Prewitt gives some weight to the argument that gradualist political activity such as that engaged in by Makerere students, rather than being a preliminary to political radicalism, "may actually lower the probability of radical movements". Such a view was mooted in The Makererean which pointed out that Makerere students seem to prefer to act individually rather than collectively. Many of them are members of the national political parties. Perhaps this is one of the things that stifles concerted student action because they feel too much loyalty to their parties to act independently of them ... In this position, students lose all advantages of collective bargaining and limit their own freedom of expression and action.

The argument, however, is seriously flawed. One might ask: "Even if political gradualism does inhibit radicalism, why should it inhibit criticism of curricula and the nature of the university?"

At the University of Dar-as-Salaam, student members of the TANU Youth League (TYL) have been among the most active and theoretically

1. Ibid., p.147.
informed critics of university and government in Tanzania, suggesting that the actual nature of the party has an important bearing on student radicalism. The answer for Makerere student political quietude lies, as Prewitt argues, in careerism and security-consciousness promoted by the systems of primary and secondary education and their socialization processes, and the examination system which determines educational advancement and the achievement of 'elite' status. As S.M. Lipset puts it, elitist education systems "tend to assure those who succeed in reaching the university a guaranteed place in the upper levels of society ... Students may realistically expect to enter the elite, and thus they tend to identify with the existing one."

Quietude, rather than radicalism, represents the stable path to 'elite' entry.

The University of Nairobi

The second university in East Africa was, if only in terms of institutional antecedents, the University of Nairobi. The University developed out of the Royal Technical College in Nairobi, an inter-territorial institution to which the four governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar contributed the operational costs. The Technical College took its first class of students from

all four territories in 1956, offering courses in architecture, domestic science, applied art, commercial subjects, surveying, and engineering, in addition to intermediate courses in arts and sciences. It drew over half its students from the East African Asian community.

The Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, under the chairmanship of Dr. J.F. Lockwood, visited East Africa in 1953 and, in its report (published in 1959), recommended that the Royal Technical College be reorganised as a university college in which both academic and professional courses would have equal standing within faculties of arts, science, engineering, and special professional studies. Originally the intention of the colonial administration had been to develop Makerere as a University of East Africa in its own right, but the "growth of ambitions in both Kenya and Tanganyika for colleges in those territories made the idea of a single university politically untenable". The administrations were anxious to avoid over-burdening the economies of independent East Africa with the heavy expenses involved in setting-up three separate universities, and evolved the idea of a federal university linking the colleges in each territory in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary duplication. The details of such a scheme were examined by the Working Party, and endorsed in the


Report. All three colleges of the proposed University of East Africa were to provide basic arts and science teaching, and each one was to specialize in the provision of professional courses: Nairobi, Engineering and Architecture; Dar-es-Salaam, Law and Marine Biology; and Makerere, Medicine and so on.

As in the case of Makerere, the traditional British pattern was established when the University College of Nairobi became a constituent college of the University of East Africa. Anderson, while noting that the British heritage seriously affected professional schools such as engineering, pointed out that it was the academic faculties that suffered most from the British heritage.

There is little interchange between faculties, and the general degree pattern requires the study of only two subjects during the second and third years, which may not sound like over-specialization by British standards, until the effects of the lack of support subjects, math for physics and chemistry, economics for history and geography, and the more flexible arrangements of good American university programmes which allow the effective integration of basic academic and more vocationally oriented studies, are considered. Many departments have now instituted specialist courses in one subject only during the second and third years for better students, emphasizing the correlation in many minds of specialization with ability and status. There is little sympathy for attempts to integrate new subjects into the present programmes.¹

Africanization of academic staff has proceeded at a steady pace, although in terms of the Africanization of heads of department, is not as far advanced as the University of Dar-es-Salaam.² Within the University there still are largely unchallenged pockets

2. See Appendix 2 of this thesis for detail.
of expatriate academics which, in some cases persist simply because of the absence of qualified local staff. Others are maintained by financial dependence on external funding agencies - the Department of Design and Architecture, and the Institute for Development Studies, the principal social sciences research body in Kenya.

The University recruits expatriate academic staff from its traditional sources, Britain and the United States. A process of self-selection appears to operate, as it has done in the case of the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Whereas at the latter institution radical socialist academics from North America, Britain and Europe have been attracted by the possibility of participating in and contributing to a socialist revolution, the former has attracted essentially conventional academics who view their role in basically the same way as they have done elsewhere. Academic "gate-keepers" also ensure that certain types of non-controversial personnel are recruited, and help determine both the areas and the dominant methodology of research. The example of the Institute for Development Studies indicates how this mechanism works.

The Institute was established in 1966 and initially funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, although assistance comes now from the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Danish International Development Agency, the Swedish International Development Agency, and the British Overseas Development Administration, as well. When it began, the Institute had two divisions - a social science division and a cultural division, but the latter became the
separate Institute of African Studies in 1970. As a research institute primarily for the benefit of British, American, and Scandinavian researchers, it has successfully resisted Africanisation so that the proportion of local personnel is about the same - 1/3rd - as it was at the time of its foundation. The Institute serves as the main conduit of American foundation funds, and as the "main socialiser of expatriate social science graduate students". With regard to the latter function, and to academic researchers in general, it has played a key "gate-keeper" role, effectively excluding radical researchers and research with an important qualitative dimension.

At least superficially, the Institute provides a centre for the coordination of Kenyan economic, sociological, and political science research in the interests of development. However, the narrow, scope-oriented, almost strictly economic meaning attached to "development" almost completely excludes, with the exception of public administration and rural development studies, political science or political economy work. Economists have predominated;

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1. The Institute serves many other functions as well, including consultancy and advisory work by members to ministries, the East African Community, and international and bilateral development agencies.


3. In an interview in the East Africa Journal (Vol. IX, No. 4, 1970, p.6.) Professor Colin Leys, then Professor of Government at the University of Nairobi, thought that a similar emphasis had been overdone in political science teaching to the neglect of "the work of people who are working on the major issues and structures of politics".
sociologists and political scientists have been very thin on the ground. The research has been of a predictable nature. Microcosmic, quantitative, largely ahistorical studies abound, reflecting in only a marginal way the major sources of division and conflict within the society. There is a deliberate avoidance of propositions about the nature and course of the society's development - little effort is made to relate microcosmic studies to an overview of society. The narrowly defined interests often lead to a duplication of research in limited areas of work.\(^1\) As Gary Wasserman, a former research associate in the Department of Government has pointed out, "the submerged process of foundation funding enforces the tendencies toward safety and sterility in the field, and enables a foreign academic establishment to dictate the personnel, as well as the orientation, of the field."\(^2\) This situation clearly troubles many local academics. Mutiso, for instance, suggests that present outside funding of research "in essence means that the countries accept not only the research priorities of these agencies and governments, but also the theoretical and methodological parameters of the funding outfit and its researchers. This situation is not ameliorated when local researchers, made in the image of the funding agency, are the ones conducting the research".\(^3\)

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1. In 1970, for instance, there Ph.D. aspirants were writing dissertations on aspects of developments in Kisii District (Wasserman, p.14), and more recently, numbers of students have been doing basically the same repetitive work on import substitution-collecting and using what amounts to the same data.


In many departments substantial re-orientation of the curriculum has accompanied localisation of staff. The History Department, which, together with the Geography Department, was the first to be almost completely localised, very quickly developed an African-centred course structure. Resistance in the English Department took place. When the Acting Head of the Department presented a paper to the Arts Faculty Board on the 20th September, he pointed out that

The English Department has had a long history at this college and has built up a strong syllabus which by its study of the historic continuity of a single culture throughout the period of emergence of the modern west, makes it an important companion to History and to Philosophy and Religious Studies. However, it is bound to become less 'British', more open to other writing in English (American, Caribbean, African, Commonwealth) and also to continental writing, for comparative purposes.\(^1\)

In a reply to the Acting Head's paper, three proponents of change, James Ngugi, Taban Lo Liyong, and Henry Oguor-Anyumba, argued that underlying the suggestions is a basic assumption that the English tradition and the emergence of the modern west is the central root of our consciousness and cultural heritage. Africa becomes an extension of the west, an attitude which, until a radical re-assessment, used to dictate the teaching and organisation of History in our University.\(^2\)

If there is the need for the study of the historic continuity of a single culture, then why can't this be African, with African literature at the centre? In order to place Kenya, East Africa, and then Africa, at the centre, and reject the primacy of English

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literature and culture, the English Department should be abolished, and be replaced by a Department of African Literature and Languages which would focus not only on European literature, but modern African literature, Swahili, Arabic and Asian literatures, and above all, on the African tradition. The last is the "stuff on which we grew up, and it is the base from which we make our cultural take-off into the world". They added that the study of the oral tradition, primarily because of the social function it served, should lead to a multi-disciplinary outlook embracing literature, music, linguistics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy and religion. As African oral and modern literatures "cannot be fully understood without some understanding of social and political ideas in African history", courses, either with the help of other departments, or within the Department, or both, should be offered. The proponents of change also suggested that the 3.1.1 course structure should be abolished because undergraduate students should be "exposed to as many general ideas as possible". Specialisation, they suggested, should only be a feature of graduate schools. Thus, underlying their suggestions for change were a number of basic arguments which continually recur in the writings of the university critics in East Africa; the need for an African oriented curriculum which rejects the primacy of the west; the rejection of specialization as part of the

1. Ibid., p.147.
2. Ibid., p.149
3. Ibid.
heritage of British universities; and the development of a multi-disciplinary approach to education which can provide the student with a holistic view of social reality.

Student Radicalism at the University of Nairobi – The Emergence of a Critique of the Neo-Colonial University.

Hardly a year has passed at the University of Nairobi without some type of confrontation between students and the University Administration and the Government. Yet, until 1972, and despite the constantly recurring crises, surprisingly little debate about the nature and role of the university took place, and that which did was never as widespread and far-reaching in its implications as that at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

In the 1965 crisis, the students were agitating for a tunnel under Uhuru Highway, better catering standards, and non-sharing of single-rooms in the university halls-of-residence. The students boycotted classes and the police were called in. The University Administration, aided by the press, succeeded in undermining any public support for the students by predictably and justifiably depicting them as a group of privileged, spoiled brats who were kept at public expense, and financed by the poor and underprivileged.

In 1969, the Oginga Odinga "affair" erupted over the question of academic freedom, and the General Service Unit was called onto

1. The University College Campus was separated from the Halls-of-Residence by the Uhuru Highway; a number of students had been killed crossing the road.
the Campus. The crisis began to develop when students boycotted lectures on January 24th and 25th in protest against an announcement that Oginga Odinga, the leader of the KPU, would not be allowed to fulfil a speaking engagement at the campus on January the 24th.\(^1\)

Two weeks earlier, Odinga had been unable to begin an address to the Political Science Club at the same institution, ostensibly on the pretext that the students' invitation had failed to comply with college regulations. The cancellation of the second talk, after students had scrupulously followed university formalities, made it clear that the cancellations emanated from higher authority: "it was common knowledge in Nairobi that the University College had received word from the Ministry of Education on or before January 10th that Odinga was not to be allowed to speak on campus".\(^2\) The student boycott of lectures which led to closure of the University College, was provoked by a relatively clear-cut issue of academic freedom and a challenge to their maturity. The Government, however, chose to politicise the issue, defining it in terms of student defiance of the law and of the President. It adopted "sledgehammer" tactics, closing the campus, and using police and the armed GSU to forcibly evict the students from the Halls-of-Residence. Five students were suspended, including the president of the Students Union, Awori wa Katsaka, the President of the Political Science Club, C. Kantai, and Apolo Njonja, an arts student who is now a postgraduate student in Government.

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2. Ibid.
Ngugi wa Thiong'o resigned his post as special lecturer in English in protest, giving as his reason "the failure of the College Administration and a large section of the staff to make a public and clear stand on the issues that led to the crisis at the University College; the mishandling of the crisis by the same administration; and the consequent suspension, itself a form of victimization, of five students". He argued that the "free circulation of ideas is absolutely essential to any quest for truth and knowledge" and suggested that the crisis revealed the "wholly undemocratic" structure of the college in which the ordinary member of staff had negligible influence.

A further confrontation developed between the students and administration in January 1971, to be followed in July 1972 by another crisis which produced the first serious student critique of the university. In 1972 the issue was ostensibly about the dangers posed to students by the State House Road which also divides the Halls-of-Residence from the main campus, but very quickly developed into a critical examination of the university and, in some quarters, a call for revolution. After the arrest of a considerable number of students, the Students Council (which was banned after this crisis) sent a memorandum to the President, condemning police brutality, daily newspapers (especially the

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2. Ibid.
East African Standard) which are "irresponsible, ostensibly racist and detrimental to our national interest", and calling for the President, as Chancellor of the University of Nairobi, to initiate a Commission of Inquiry to look into the problems facing the University. The problems, according to the memorandum, included "a re-examination of the present educational system in the country and particularly in the University". The students also demanded the unconditional release of their arrested colleagues.¹

An article in University Platform argued that perhaps the most important cause of the student revolt is their utter contempt for the capitalist system existing in Kenya, wherein a ruling elite continues to maintain itself in power by oppressing the masses, conspiring with the imperialists and neo-colonialists and promoting the interests of a few at the expense of the majority.²

The article continued by suggesting, without any real foundation given general student pre-occupation with security and career, that the students represented the only "conscious revolutionary force". It stated

There has never been greater solidarity and revolutionary sentiment among students, who are rapidly emerging as a powerful extra-parliamentary force and becoming aware of their historical function and duty to the people. They understand from experience and education that the capitalist society is corrupt, unjust and oppressive, that it offers no solutions to the immediate problems of the people. They are convinced that only a programme of scientific socialism, self-reliance and cultural independence will serve the purpose of development.³

¹  The memorandum was published in University Platform, 27/7/1972, pp.3 & 7.
The article added that the "student revolt" was crushed primarily because of internal disorganization and lack of public sympathy and support. Given this, students must

immediately begin the reorganization of their leadership, with emphasis on discipline, vigilance, and revolutionary consciousness. It is also necessary to communicate and identify with the suffering masses, especially the proletariat, peasants and secondary school students.¹

Joshua Olewe Kyumja, a Nairobi graduate and former junior member of the research staff of the Institute for Development Studies, argued in the same issue of University Platform that the history of the University was one of passivism, and lack of involvement with the surrounding community. It was imperative that the University undergo an "internal revolution" in which priorities within and outside the campus are redefined to establish a tradition of African scholarship geared to the solution of African problems. As it is presently structured, the University preserves "colonial and irrelevant structures - especially the old syllabi of different disciplines retained for the pleasure of some black and white neo-colonialists who have no sympathy with, or concern for, the African problems." It is involved in teaching Eurocentric myths, not only in the Social Sciences and Arts, but in physical and technical disciplines as well, which "perpetuate the interests of African elites and foreigners".²

1. Ibid.
Nyunja suggested a number of strategies for establishing an African tradition of relevant scholarship including a complete review of the syllabi of all departments, the establishment of a system of open public seminars, the participation of students in mass education, and the general expansion of graduate programmes. Above all, it is important that the students develop an "activist-orientation" which is manifested, not so much in strike action, but in involvement. He added:

In a way, the students of Africa have a role different from those in the 'advanced' societies where institutions are established, traditions and norms set. Ours is the complex role of first educating and uplifting the society, establishing our own traditions and norms while struggling for our "student rights".1

A good deal of ideological confusion and cliché-ridden argument characterises much of the student response. J.A.B. Oromo, for instance, depicts the University of Nairobi as a neo-colonial institution which teaches something vaguely described as "archaic classicism and unprogressive cultural romanticism"2 and produces intellectual charlatans and social parasites.3 He demonstrates an almost frightening naivety and narrowness of scope worthy of the worst cultural romantic by suggesting that the false conception that before one studies and understands the British economic history or the theories and dynamics of the 18th-19th centuries industrial revolution then one cannot graduate in economics is both a farcical academic gimmick and a wasteful exercise.4

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.10.
4. Ibid., p.11.
One feels disposed to ask: "How do we explain colonialism, neo-colonialism (and for that matter the neo-colonial university), and problems of development without an examination of the industrial revolution in Europe and its impact on African society? How do we explain capital accumulation in Europe at the time of the industrial revolution without some reference to the slave trade?"

Orengo suggests that students should "awaken the silent nation-builders" (sic) who are the workers and the peasants, and build for a fertile exchange of ideas between the two groups. Along Fanonist and Freirean dialogical relationships lines, the masses are the true teachers who possess the practical experience necessary for the "formulation of the strategies to development and the Five Year Economic Plans". Students should visit the rural areas, thereby sharpening their political consciousness. They are already on the move, however. Committed to the "task of nation-building", students are already involved in "fund-raising appeals for the institutes of technology, the freedom from hunger campaign and other self-help projects". One can only wonder what his student counterparts in the Tamu Youth League would think of such involvement.

The events of July 1972 provided a new momentum to more articulate student protest. In July 1973 it was disclosed that the government intended to abolish free university education and call

1. Ibid., p.12.
2. Ibid.
upon students to make contributions toward the cost of their education. Although the move brought surprisingly little active opposition from the students, it did arouse a considerable amount of hostility in press debate where it was interpreted by many as a move to consolidate the position of the "haves" or ruling class. In February 1974 a further clash between students, the University Administration, and the Government erupted when students in the Architecture Department accused its expatriate head of masterminding mass failures of African students in Architecture examinations. Architecture students resolved to boycott the examinations until Professor Jorgenson was removed. As a result of this decision, 150 students who had refused to sit their examinations, dismissed themselves from the University. The University was closed down after the police riot squad was called in to quash student protest.

Kutub Kasasa, the post-editor of the banned University Platform, who had been dismissed from the University staff for his part in the events of 1972, argued that unless substantial educational and administrative reforms were undertaken, confrontations would continue to occur and the lack of effective communication between the students and the administration persist. He wrote that

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The administration is bureaucratic, isolated, insensitive and intolerant. Moreover, the University is not that free, independent academic institution it was meant to be, but the instrument of powerful internal and external forces, both national and foreign. In other words, the University of Nairobi represents the classical neo-colonial situation.\(^1\)

Another writer to the press advanced similar arguments, asserting that

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\text{it is no longer a secret that while in Kenya we hold the nominal political power, the economic power, the power to decide our affairs effectively is not in our own hands. We are so much in the neo-colonial web that the University Administration cannot face the reality. This is the reality Kenya must face.}^2
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Change in the university and the education system, cannot occur in isolation: "it is the whole economic, political, and social structure in Kenya that must change".

Student leaders felt that it was necessary to have student representation in the University. This, they argued, would facilitate communication between the administration, academic staff, and students. For some students, the University of Nairobi had "built a class structure".

The lack of communication between the two classes - the "student" class, basically from a peasant background, and the "lecturer and administration" class, essentially from the upper stratum of society, is ... (a) ... potential danger spot in future crises.\(^3\)

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Clearly, the distinction between the social class backgrounds of students and members of staff is demonstrably false, but the class categorization does illustrate the extent to which many students perceive a real communications gulf between themselves and members of the academic and administrative staffs.

In many ways, the University of Nairobi can be seen to provide a very good example of the neo-colonial university. It is hierarchically structured, with limited, if any, junior academic staff and student participation in the decision-making processes. Student organizations have been emasculated: the Students Council was banned, as was the student newspaper, University Platform. It still has a substantial expatriate staff component, and is financially dependent in a number of areas on external funding agencies. The more progressive elements within its structures have sought, with varying degrees of success, to break with the British heritage, to reorient the curriculum, to produce course structure change, and to bring about changes in staffing. The last has perhaps been the easiest to accomplish, given strong pressures for Africanization in other areas as well.

Most of the problems facing the University are symptomatic of a broader societal malaise, and reflect the contradictions present in Kenya society. The Kenyan ruling class, despite the rhetoric of economic nationalism - "the European bourgeoisie had to be ritually humiliated while economically wooed to maintain capital inflows"¹ - is not anxious to bring about any fundamental

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¹ Leys, "The Kenyan State". 
restructuring of economic and social relations. There obtains what Freire describes as a "culture of silence" in which the ideological superstructure "turns upon the infrastructure and 'overdetermines' it". In the "culture of silence" the people are silenced by insecure, dependent, ruling groups, and there is an absence of democratic, participatory structures capable of expressing popular demands and dissatisfaction. The ruling party, KANU, which was riddled with factionalism is virtually moribund, despite numerous and unsuccessful attempts to revive it; as Kenya's comprador leaders did not want mass mobilisation through the party, and as KANU was an instrument created by them, they set out to destroy it. The National Assembly suffered a similar fate.

After endeavouring to control the Executive in the early years of independence, it has been turned into a "town club" for what John Okumu terms the "ethnic elite". The Government, as Loya points out, has to be strong to withstand pressures from factors arising from underdevelopment - "tribalism", which is reinforced by the Gathumbu court-system of ethnic patronage, and the dissatisfaction of the masses. There is a concentration of executive power, with the utilisation of the army and police, and the Provincial

4. Loya, "The Kenyan State".
Administration, for purposes of effective political control. Whereas metropolitan powers have been able to absorb their "ideological crises through the mechanism of economic power and a highly developed technology", Kenya has lacked the resources to support the slightest popular manifestation. At the same time, the intensification of contradictions inherent in the society has led small groups of intellectuals, students, and some politicians, to seek a greater social activist role, to reject "imported schemes and prefabricated solutions", and to identify more precisely the forces which make up their society. There has been an increasing emphasis by intellectuals and students on the exercise of political participation with the people even if, for educational, cultural, and other reasons, the identification has not moved beyond its incipient, largely rhetorical stages.

The Kenyan Government, while apparently prepared to tolerate or ignore critical analysis in literature, usually because it lacks specificity and any real social grounding, has been quick to silence substantive criticism in the press, and on the university campus. Student demands for the transformation of the university, especially when accompanied by strike action, pose a threat or an affront, however insignificant, to the ideological and social position of the ruling groups. Matters which appear to be eminently negotiable (demands for better catering, for instance) have


3. That these demands were eminently negotiable is indicated by their implementation after the initial repression.
usually met with considerable repression. Those student demands which throw into relief the nature of the Kenyan socio-economic and political system, and the university's position within it, such as those of July 1972, are not negotiable; to be set, fundamental changes in the society would have to be undertaken, and that is something ruling groups are not prepared to countenance.

The University of Bar-es-Salama: Toward a Socialist University

The University of Bar-es-Salama started in 1961 with a Faculty of Law and 15 students; it was a constituent College of the University of East Africa. As early as 1949 the US Trusteeship Council had argued that Britain should "without prejudice to the normal development of Makerere College consider the possibility of establishing, as soon as possible, facilities for higher education".1 Within five years this recommendation was being seriously considered, and in 1954, the British Inter-University Council delegation to Makerere strongly suggested that a start should be made without delay. In 1956 the Tanganyika Government opened a Higher Education Trust Fund of about £750,000 to establish its own college as soon as it had enough of its own students to do so. Working parties from Britain went out in 1955 and 1958 (the Lockwood Report) to examine the situation. Their reports confirmed the urgent need for more institutions of higher education to meet East Africa's future requirements.

1. Resolution 110 of the 23rd meeting of the Trusteeship Council, July 1949, quoted in Cameron and Dodd, p.145.
Initially it was envisaged that in Tanganyika, the university should open in 1965 or as soon after as possible. It opened four years earlier in the TANU Headquarters building in Dar-es-Salaam, pending completion of suitable buildings on the "hill" site north of Dar-es-Salaam. From the very beginning, the principle of specialisation which underlay the original planning of the University of East Africa was subjected to considerable strain; Dar-es-Salaam opened its own medical school, despite the fact that Makerere was fully equipped and able to cope with a greater number of students. The strain was also exacerbated by different political requirements in Tanzania as well, especially after 1967 and the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration.

On the 1st July, 1970 the University College became the University of Dar-es-Salaam. According to the University Act, one of its objects was to

preserve, transmit and enhance knowledge for the benefit of the people of Tanzania in accordance with the principles of socialism accepted by the people of Tanzania.

Courses were offered in the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, Science, Law, Medicine and Agriculture, with a Faculty of Engineering planned. In addition there was an Institute of Adult Education, an Institute of Education, and the Institute of Swahili Research. In 1971 expatriates still comprised 61% of the teaching staff, and in some faculties, as much as 78%. In 1970, however, the university administration was completely Africanized, and departmental headships
can be held by Associate Professors and Senior Lecturers, thus giving local staff the chance to take part in all the decision-making bodies of the University. As a result during the last three years, there has been a rapid acceleration of local Departmental Headships and Deanships. In addition, a University Staff Development Fund was created for the training of local staff.

When it began, the University recruited predominantly from the United Kingdom. Early on, however, an attempt was made to recruit from wider and more diverse sources to prevent the continuation of basically colonial or neo-colonial type relationships. American lecturers were recruited in the Law Faculty, and soon aroused the antagonism of the students. This culminated in the Law Faculty demonstrations of March, 1969, when students, including officials of the TANU Youth League and the University Students Revolutionary Front, called for the expulsion of all American lecturers, and opposed the introduction of a new curriculum. Charles Kileo, the chairman of the Faculty's Vigilance Committee, announced that three demands had been made to the Faculty Board. They included the above two, and also the demand for complete control of the Faculty by East Africans. The dispute arose in late February

2. See Appendix II of this thesis for details of academic staff composition, Departmental Headships, and Deanships.
5. Ibid.
when students learned that military law and public finance were to be incorporated in the next curriculum. Mary contended that research in these subjects would expose to the "enemy" the country's security secrets.

After 1966 there was a marked change in recruitment, with a new emphasis on Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, Scandinavia, and smaller European countries such as Holland. Those recruited were centered mainly in the Economic Research Bureau, the Economics and Sociology Departments, in Statistics and, the Scandinavians especially, in the Institutes of Public Administration and Adult Education. A number of local academics with Eastern European qualifications were also recruited. Following in the footsteps of the University of Ghana some years earlier, the University of Dar-es-Salaam became a type of "maccs" for foreign radical academics who were attracted by a combination of Nyerere's intellectual qualities and socialist aspirations, and the prospect of contributing to, or participating in, a socialist transformation capable of exciting a flagging radical imagination. Among those who were recruited, and who have left deep marks on the Tanzanian intellectual scene were Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, the Italian Giovanni Arrighi, and the West Indian historian, Walter Rodney.

The Debate About the Creation of a Socialist University

Quite soon after independence, segments of the Tanzanian leadership were disturbed by the elitist attitudes of those at the top of the educational pyramid who regarded the huge expenditure
on their education and the subsequent highly paid positions as a right. In order to counteract these attitudes, and to imbue students with a sense of social responsibility and to integrate them with the masses, the Government embarked on a conspicuously unsuccessful propaganda campaign which took the form in 1965 of the introduction of the TANU Youth League into secondary schools, and in 1966; the drafting of students into National Service to modify or negate the severe elitist attitudes. The Government proposal provoked student opposition, and demonstrations which resulted in the sending down of students.

An intensification of debate stemmed from the Arusha Declaration and the publication of Nyerere's policy statement, *Education for Self-reliance*. In this statement, Nyerere drew attention to the inequalities promoted by the nature of the colonial education system and how the aims of the system were at variance with the requirements for building socialism. The goals which he set for the education system laid stress on the inculcation of certain values, while aiming at a realistic preparation for a working life in a predominantly rural society. The values to be emphasised were to foster the social goals of living together... a sense of commitment to the total community... cooperative endeavour, not individual advancement... concepts of equality and the responsibility to give service... Our education must counteract the temptation to intellectual arrogance... must encourage... an enquiring mind; an ability to learn from what others do, and reject or adapt it to his own needs; and a basic confidence in his own position as a free and equal member of society,
who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains.\footnote{1}

Nyerere also pointed to two major priorities: first, the need to offset the effects of the elitist nature of existing education; and second, the strong student tendency to despise traditional values and wisdom, and "even their own parents because they are old-fashioned and ignorant".

A major stage in the discussion of the nature and role of the University was reached in March 1967 in the Conference concerned with the "Role of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, in a Socialist Tanzania". A number of draft recommendations were made which would have fundamentally altered the whole nature of the University. The Conference recommended that "it is the responsibility of the college to impart political education, and that a course in political education which would be compulsory for Tanzanians and optional for non-Tanzanians should be started".\footnote{2} Further, "the course on political theory and history etc. should place emphasis on Tanzanian and East African philosophy and history".\footnote{3} One of the most interesting recommendations was that a "new common course, compulsory for all students, and of a high intellectual standard, should be introduced at the University College".\footnote{4} This recommendation was based on a number of carefully

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\footnote{2}{Draft Recommendations of the Conference on the Role of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, in a Socialist Tanzania, \textit{Minerva}, Vol IV, No.4 (1967), \textit{p.558}.}

\footnote{3}{Ibid.}

\footnote{4}{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
considered and argued proposals put forward by a "group of nine lecturers" of whom the Canadian John Saul was the chief spokesman. Saul, in particular, was concerned about the existence of two major barriers which inhibited the "genesis of a cadre of 'high-level' manpower fully capable of playing the creative role we have now seen to be necessary to successful Tanzanian development along lines which the leadership envisages". The first of these barriers was the "generalised elitist mentality" of successful students; the second was the "fragmented vision which tends to characterise people trained, all too specifically, for professional careers". In the memorandum which he and other academics of the "group of nine" submitted to the Conference, it was pointed out that it is the fragmentation of perspective entailed by separate academic "disciplines" which provides the main obstacle to the development of an integral and coherent vision of man in history and society. Instead, these divisions - if they are not subsumed and contained within a wider framework of understanding - operate to produce technicians and technocrats with highly specialised knowledge but little or no comprehension of social development as a unitary process.

In order to counteract this fragmentation, which the "group of nine" argued is tied up with the historical development of capitalism, the memorandum recommended that the kind of approach needed is one which would enable the student to conceptualise the various analytically fragmented fields of man's activity - "economic", "social", "political", "legal", "artistic", "scientific", "religious" and so on - as a reality dynamically interrelated.

2. Ibid.
3. Quoted in Ibid.
The shattered and abstracted "parts" must be reconstructed into their real totality, in terms of which they will be analysed and made meaningful.  

This recommendation ultimately bore fruit, leading to the creation of a Department of Development Studies, under the Directorship of Lionel Cliffe. The Department offers a foundation course of study to students in all Faculties, seeking to "provide a broad, interdisciplinary perspective on the development problems of East Africa, and the potential for the socialist transformation of that society".  

The Conference also made recommendations about staffing: less reliance should be placed by the college on overseas agencies or foundations for both recruitment and salaries of staff; staff members should be sympathetic to Tanzanian socialism; top priority should be given to East Africanization of its academic, senior administrative and library staff; and that the goal for the University College in the area of staffing should be to develop a university institution which "exemplifies and plays a leading role in the programme of socialism and self-reliance as enunciated in the Arusha Declaration". In addition, recommendations were made about student work and service to the community, including the "practice of self-reliance in their daily lives on the campus".

1. Quoted in Ibid., p.280.
3. Draft Recommendations ... on the Role of the University College, p.559.
4. Ibid., p.560.
and the social integration of the College with the community. It was felt that there should be more "public and political representation on the college council and its committees". Views were also expressed that decision-making in the College should be democratized, with students being represented on such college bodies as faculty boards, the academic board, and the college council.¹

The debate was further advanced in 1969 by the appointment of a Presidential Visitation Committee to consider the question of fitting the university to national ethics and development needs. Student radicals, according to Karim Hirji, initially welcomed the inception of the national university and the installation of a top TANU cadre as its Vice-Chancellor. Hirji says

> We considered it a first and necessary step towards eventual restructuring of this institution to serve socialism. Building castles in the air, we looked forward to the day when this university would be churning out individuals who were both "red and expert" to further the African revolution.²

The TYL and the USARP (University Students/Revolutionary Front), in conjunction with the TANU Study Group, presented a voluminous and detailed memorandum to the Visitation Committee dealing with all aspects of university affairs including curriculum reorganization, student organization, staff recruitment, and so on. The most far-reaching of the recommendations proposed democratic representation

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¹. Ibid.

for all students, and the assignation of a central role for the TUL. Such a structure, Hirji notes, was “considered essential for the infusion of socialist commitment and perspectives in student activities”.¹

Although most of the TUL/USARF recommendations were not implemented, some impetus was given to radical student optimism by the University of Dar-es-Salaam Act of 1970 which contained a number of provisions that many students realized could bring about “revolutionary measures if implemented meaningfully”.² The Act for instance, following recommendations of the 1967 Conference on the Role of the University and those of the Visitation Committee, established that students should be included in the policy asking circles, the University Council, the Senate, and so forth. In establishing this, the intention was shown that students were to be allowed to take part in decision-asking processes, but as subsequent events were to show, the university administration was not prepared to interpret this too literally.

The revolutionary optimism of the student radicals was soon dimmed, according to Hirji, when the changes which did occur were superficial.

The essence remained – a neo-colonial elitist university. It must be realised that a call to revolutionise this university is simultaneously a call to revolutionise the society in which it maintains its existence and a break with imperialism which maintains it.³

1. Ibid.
The TYL leadership on the campus had devised a "plan of action to create the subjective conditions for the anticipated changes" and focussed their attention on the 1970 freshmen students. While they received considerable publicity, including reviews in The Nationalist and The Standard of the second issue of the TYL/USARF journal, Cheche, and the TYL's position was emphasized in speeches by the Minister for National Education and the Vice-Chancellor, they failed to build any popular base amongst students. Karim Mirji attributed this failure to a chasm between the Marxist leadership of the TYL and its "amorphous membership" while Mapolu argued that no such Marxist leadership existed in the first place. It was clear that they did not represent student interests; those who did clamoured for "constitutional sobriety" and "participatory democracy". Mirji, after examining their failure, wryly comments: "After being so vehemently vocal against KARADHA which aspirant car owners support, can one expect popularity".

They had already suffered a major setback earlier in the year (February 1970) when the President held the first of a series of informal question and answer sessions with the student body of the College. Many of the questions asked during this session were submitted by the TYL College Branch. Commenting on the occasion,

1. Ibid.
3. KARADHA was a subsidiary of the National Bank of Commerce which was empowered to give loans to civil servants to buy cars and other luxury items. It is now officially discredited.
Saul says that

For while the questions were ... responsibly, if militantly phrased, the tone and tenor of the answers were such as to make the radicals look foolish. It was, of course, difficult to gauge the President's intentions, whether he did in fact feel that further steps were necessary in order to discipline the "misguided" enthusiasm of the student left. But the result was obvious to any observer on the Hill. The least progressive elements at the College felt vindicated and elated, the radicals felt bruised and further rejected.¹

According to Yoweri-Museveni, the first Chairman of the USARF

the reactionaries were elated - we had been, according to them, crushed. But only one thing saved us - the President had not specifically denounced us which was the only thing the reactionaries wanted. During the second visit they further pressed for this but to their bitter disappointment, the President began to realise that he was being used by the enemies of socialism to denounce his supporters.²

Nevertheless, the isolation intensified.

It is difficult to gauge why Nyerere reacted so strongly to the USARF/TYL activities. They were, after all, endeavouring to create the socialist university which he had outlined in his inaugural address.³ One can only surmise that Nyerere viewed the university in instrumental terms, and did not really envisage it as an institutional springboard for critical attacks on Tabu policies and their implementation. He did however state that

1. Saul, "Radicalism and the Hill", p.3.
"the University of Dar-es-Salaam has not been founded to turn out intellectual apes whether of the Right or of the Left. We are training for a socialist, self-respecting and self-reliant Tanzania." Moreover,

The staff must be encouraged to challenge the students and the society with arguments, and to put forward new suggestions about how to deal with the problems of building a socialist Tanzania based on human equality and dignity ... The staff we employ must lead in free debate based on a concept of service, on facts, and on ideas ... the University of Dar-es-Salaam will be able to serve our socialist purposes only if we accept that those whom we are paying to teach students to think, must themselves be allowed to think and speak their thoughts freely.¹

Perhaps Nyerere felt that the radical students had to be clipped in the bud because their critical activities, while concerned with the nature of a socialist university and its opposition in society, had much deeper implications, and directly questioned many of Nyerere's own policies.

The position of the TIL/USARF was further weakened when the Vice-Chancellor's announcement of the dissolution of the student body, USUD (University's Student Union) helped crystallize the resistance of the complacent student majority. At a hastily convened student baraza (meeting), a majority of students successfully recommended that the USUD should continue as the student body on the Hill, and the TIL/USARF were vehemently attacked as "Korean puppets" and "government spies".

Wilfully ignoring the realities of the single-party system (which had made the presence of the party a vital dimension of all national institutions) and manipulating slogans of "participatory democracy" in the most demagogic manner sections of the established student leadership have made the continuity and autonomy of USUD a rallying point for student conservatism and a fear of TUL College Branch dominance a cat's paw for their own opportunism.

The defenders of the USUD were supposedly concerned with the protection of the future role of Kenyan and Ugandan students within the University political structures. That it was a "petit-bourgeois issue par excellence, with great capacity to mystify the susceptible", was clearly illustrated by the formation of the DUSO (Dar-es-Salaam University Students Organization) and the subsequent elections. A Kenyan, Syonda Akivaga, was elected President, the aftermath of which was one of "nationalistic hysteria" from "precisely those elements who had argued vigorously against TYL becoming the student organization 'because it would alienate the foreign students', now questioning the right of a non-Tanzanian to be elected through free elections."

Undoubtedly, the TUL/USARP's outspoken criticism of tourism, economic joint ventures and management consultancy agreements with foreign monopolies, suggestions for restructuring the party and arming the people, and publication of Issa Shivji's seminal,

2. Ibid.
4. This debate has been collected in a volume edited by Issa Shivji, Tourism and Socialist Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973).
"Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", in a special issue of Cheche, did much to antagonize important elements in the state and party bureaucracies, and to isolate them on the campus. After elections in the TYL and USARF (when Museveni was succeeded by a Tanzanian, Bagiuka as Chairman), the USARF and its journal, Cheche, were banned after a directive was issued from State House.

Determined to die an "honourable" and noisy death, a statement, "Our Last Stand" was issued, outlining the history and achievements of the USARF. This statement made newspaper headlines, and forced the party newspaper, The Rationalist, to write an editorial explaining that the banning was not to be interpreted as a denial of a militant role for Tanzanian youth. Hirji says that "we were visited by pious emissaries from the State House to assure us that the move was taken to "rationalize" student activities on the Hill, and in fact, to strengthen TYL."\(^1\) While the USARF, and Cheche, did much to spark debate about the university and Tanzanian socialism, its demise was perhaps inevitable. It could not "play a vanguard role without a social base. That is why it was so easy to wipe out just by a stroke of a pen."\(^2\) And, even though the membership of the TYL and USARF was essentially the same, the university administration and the government could scarcely countenance the separate existence of an articulate, revolutionary "ginger" group outside the formal party structure.

2. Ibid., p.11.
The banning of the UBAKF and Cheche did not stem the tide of critical debate on the campus. Debate about the nature of the university was renewed at the end of May 1971 when the TANU Study Group published a statement in *The Standard* which said:

"The Political Science Department at the University must reconsider or drop completely its new syllabus for education students."\(^1\)

This is necessary because the syllabus is "a confused document representing reactionary aims" and was "drawn up with hidden objectives" (which were never explicitly mentioned in the statement).

The TANU Study Group's statement was issued to express "strong support" to the "recent attack by the University TYL Branch" which was published earlier in *The Standard*.

The criticisms made by TANU Study Group and the TYL provoked a strong academic response. B.J. Mwansa, a lecturer in Political Science, argued that the attack was confusing and based at times on a serious mis-reading of the syllabus.\(^2\) For instance, one of the serious criticisms of the syllabus was that it made "no mention of the Arusha Declaration, on which Tanzania's socialism was based".

Mwansa responded by showing that this formed a prominent part of at least two courses, and that any course concerned with Tanzania's socialism and self-reliance could not possibly fail to deal with the Arusha Declaration. He added: "How can we teach Tanzania's socialism and self-reliance of the country's socialist development

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effort without "mentioning" the Arusha Declaration and showing the students 'the meaning, importance and interpretation of the Party document'?

In support of his defence, Mnasasu quoted Nyere's warning, given at the inauguration of the University. Nyere had said

But we must avoid the trap of allowing unqualified people to decide on subjects in the University teaching, just by looking at the name of the course, or at the syllabus outline, and then stating firmly 'this is relevant, this is not'.

Mnasasu hastened to add that he was not suggesting that members of the TANU Study Group were "unqualified people" but their arguments could easily lead others to fall into that trap.

Another "Hill" academic, the American Marjorie Mbilinyi, in an article in the Sunday News argued that the TII, by attacking the Department of Political Science alone, was resorting to

a bourgeois tactic of isolating one course, labelled 'political science' and demanding that it be relevant to the country's ideology, while at the same time neglecting completely the question of the relevancy and possible elements of the University itself taken as an entity.

Their attention is focused in minor contradictions operating within the whole university and between the whole university and the nation at large.

She continued:

The investigation will have to focus on the whole educational system before it is through. It is probable, however, the contradictions true of the educational system as a whole are found in most visible form at the University. Although engaged in pointing out and removing contradictions, such an investigation need not arouse unreconcilable antagonisms.

1. Ibid.

In a vitriolic and personalized attack on Mwansa and Mbilinyi in particular, and on senior officials of the university who signed a document written by Dr. A. Rweyemamu, the Head of the Political Science Department, V.D. Amri in an article in Maji Maji demonstrated at some length the fact that the TIL's statement on the Political Science syllabus, rather than being an isolated instance, formed part of a much deeper and wider body of critical analysis of Tanzanian socialism and the role of the university.¹

The foregoing discussion indicates clearly that at least since 1966, the role and nature of the University of Dar-es-Salaam has been subjected to a searching scrutiny by a number of groups: the radical members of the USARF and the TIL; the TANU Study Group; sections of the academic staff; and the Government. In terms of reconstructing the British university heritage, internal reorganisation and democratization of decision-making, course structure and curriculum changes, and the realignment of ideological orientations, the University is much further advanced than either Makerere or Nairobi. Despite this, the University is, as Saul notes, still a "crucial battle-ground for the hearts and minds of a future generation of Tanzanian leaders"² - whether they are to be socialists, nationalists, or just simply security conscious careerists. The conflicts between the university administration and the radical students of the USARF and the TIL are not only


understandable in terms of bureaucratic entrenchment and resistance to change, but also in terms of conflicting notions of what the university is to be. The administration is tied very much to the idea of a national, rather than a socialist university; the students, with their widely discussed criticisms, participation in "Operation Dodoma",¹ and attempts to establish worker-student alliances such as those of July 1971,² are committed to the construction of a socialist university which involves much more fundamental changes in both internal structures, and external relationships, than either the university administration and the Government are prepared to envisage.

The Intellectual Re-Assessment of the University

The problems faced by African universities and academics are very much at the heart of African ideological and intellectual reconstruction, and the pressing need for fundamental economic and social change. At a time when much European African scholarship is being questioned and revised, and when socio-political commitment and the demands of national development require a new conception of a university geared to the tasks of development, the continuing predominance of foreign academic and intellectual traditions, and the presence of expatriate university and technical personnel, raise many questions of considerable importance. Expatriates, formerly professionals and administrators under colonial administrations, have returned to Africa in different roles – as teachers,

1. For details see D.K. Mwaga, "Operation Dodoma", Maji Maji, No.3 (1971), pp.31-2.
technical experts, advisers, and professors, and their very presence and influence stand to question the viability of political independence if the technology, economy, and educational systems of any country are dominated by expatriates.

For many African intellectuals, the university, as the principal cultural and intellectual organ within a state, should play a major role in recovering the national cultural heritage and in providing national direction. Further, behind the concern of some African intellectuals and governments is the notion that African universities must be strongly committed to the predominant social and political ideologies of their respective nations. Such a commitment to national ideologies, and the transmission of norms and social values based on the particular social, economic, and political situation within that nation raises the question, however, whether the heavy staffing of universities by expatriates makes such commitment and transmission difficult, if not impossible.

The commitment of universities to national ideologies and their propagation poses problems unrelated to the presence of expatriates. For instance, can a university that is to be a transmitter of the social values of a culture also be an innovative agent for radical change within that culture, especially when such a university relies almost entirely on public funds? Will it be impossible for the University of Dar-es-Salaam to be an instrument of radical social change and innovation if it has to begin by
accepting the straitjacket of "the principles of socialism accepted by the people of Tanzania"? Will the call for a relevant university concerned with the propagation of a national ideology simply be another means of stifling often radical criticism of government policies and failings?

Another important question which arises is whether African universities, if they choose, or are forced to emphasize the propagation of the dominant ideology, can at the same time propagate features of a more universal culture, which is the aim, but rarely the practice of universities in the Western tradition. The nature of the dilemma that arises has been expressed by Lipset as follows:

The universities of the underdeveloped countries bear the burden of being, in an age of nationalism, institutions part of whose task it is to propagate a universal culture and to contribute to its growth, while simultaneously cultivating and developing the indigenous, actually or potentially national culture and enhancing national life.¹

As we have already seen, most intellectual critics begin their analysis of East African universities by referring to the class-based nature of British education and universities, and show that it was this model, with its premises of inequality and elitism, which was introduced in Africa during the colonial period.

There is, however, a divergence between those who envisage the creation of a socialist university and those who think of the African university primarily in terms of recovering the African cultural heritage and developing it. The Kenyan, Grant Kamenju,

who teaches at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, argues that the class nature of education should be kept constantly in mind when considering the need for radical change in universities. It is for this reason that we should not allow ourselves to be mesmerized by the seemingly erudite and speciously impressive but in fact shallow, erroneous, misleading and mystifying claptrap such as that which Professor Mazrui is so fond of and in which he indulges so adeptly and with such expert aplomb.¹

In a number of articles, Mazrui advanced the view that in its present conception, the University of East Africa was "basically Western in its ethos and approach to intellectual training".² As such, it embodies a contradiction inherent in the Western system of education: the contradiction between the formal political socialisation or cultural indoctrination of primary and secondary schools, and the questioning, critically detached approach of the university which tends to undermine the earlier learnt values.³

Mazrui recognised that the increasing politicisation of the university in the post-independence period led to the demand that it should inculcate and promote national values. He objected to this, at least superficially, primarily because of the confusion surrounding the definition of national values. A university, he argued, owes a government neither defiance or subserviance; rather, what it owes is a "combination of criticism and affirmation, of attachment and responsibility, or in other words, intelligent

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3. Ibid.
cooperation". Independent Africa cannot do without independent thought simply because nation-building, and with it norm-building, requires "controlled scepticism". A university cannot be a university in his sense, and at the same time be an ideological institute. Mazrui accused a "group of radical academics" who "have less faith in the concept of a university than President Nyerere himself" of attempting to convert the University College of Dar-es-Salaam into an "ideological institute". A genuine university, he argued, "should not be monopolistic, it should be multi-ideological rather than uni-ideological". In an interview, reported in The People, he said:

Western type of education is multi-ideological. It accommodates diverse lines of thought. It is much easier to find "Marxists" in a British university than to find a liberal conservative in a Chinese University, because Western university traditions value diversity of ideas that often produce radicals, particularly from non-Westerners who study abroad.

In opposition to Mazrui's view, Kamande, Changha Machyo, and Wanjongdey Songha, have retorted that the notion of a multi-ideological university is demonstrably false. Kamande states that "while bourgeois Western universities certainly have the appearance of being multi-ideological they have in fact a basic, underlying

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1. Ibid., p.335.
2. Ibid., p.336.
dominant, operative ideology which is the conflicting elitist liberal meritocratic ideology.”¹ The failure of bourgeois discussion such as that of Mazrui’s, he adds, stems from a failure to see concepts like the “multiplicity of ideology” and “academic freedom” in the political, social, economic, and class setting of capitalist society in which Western universities operate and which “negates most of the abstract virtues so loudly and pompously proclaimed in these empty bourgeois cliches and catchwords”.²

In an article written before the far-reaching changes at the University of Dar-es-Salaam in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kamenju argued that any consideration of the nature and social function of the university, as in the Tanzanian case, must be tied to the proposition that Tanzania is seriously committed to a socialist course of development. As it is presently constituted, the University College of Dar-es-Salaam (like Nairobi and Makerere) is both implicitly and actually anti-socialist. This anti-socialist position does not simply derive from expatriate staff dominance, but from its “whole bourgeois orientation”. Its underlying bourgeois ideology is expressed in the conventional emphasis on “standards”, established curricular divisions, and the supposed

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
universal character of scholarship. Above all, it is expressed in the physical and architectural lay-out of the university. The bulk of the texts, around which courses in the social sciences and humanities are built, originate in Britain and the United States and are soaked with the "official and widely-shared anti-socialist and anti-communist orthodoxy". If the university is either not to obstruct, or to assist in the development of socialism, then it must undergo a socialist transformation and produce socialist cadres or personnel who are able to provide lucid analysis and leadership, and engage, "on the intellectual level", in combat with anti-socialist thought and practice (including resisting bureaucratic routine or opportunism).

The Ugandan Chango Machyo has argued that the colonial origins and nature of University education in Uganda (and in Africa in general), "rather than encouraging people to serve the needs of their society, in fact encourages them to become social parasites who are only interested in reaping where they never sowed". He notes that hovering over the discussion of the university has been the concern with the maintenance of often ill-defined, elusive international standards as a weapon, we have already seen, used by both expatriates and locals alike to prevent or delay change in the

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1. Many workers at the University of Dar-es-Salaam campus have attacked the discriminatory housing conditions, provision of buses etc., as being anti-socialist. See "A Call for Worker Student Alliance on the Hill", Mafi Mafi, No.14, February 1974, pp.4-6.


3. Ibid.

curriculum and examination methods. He denies that such international standards exist, arguing that in Britain and the United States, for instance, different institutions are rated much more highly than others in the academic world. National, rather than international standards obtain, and are set in accordance with the needs of that society and its level of development.

Any cultural-ideological decolonization of the university, Machyo argues, must be accompanied by the transformation of the whole education system. Because of its pivotal position in society, it is necessary for the university graduates themselves to produce the change. Expatriate academics, or at least the radicals, are not necessarily opposed to basic change, but they "cannot bring about a change in the university education system", principally because of the sensitivity of their position. Unlike many other intellectuals, however, Machyo does not regard Africanization per se as a cure-all for university problems. Many Africans are, for instance, concerned to "preserve their prestige, to earn their income and hence to preserve the status quo".

Machyo argues that universities, in the name of university autonomy and academic freedom, have attempted to minimize government influence. Such concepts he points out, along with Cyrus Mutiso, should be viewed within a historical setting. If we

1. Ibid., pp.17-13.
2. Ibid., p.13.
3. Ibid., p.21.
4. Ibid., p.22.
examine the history of European universities, we find an identity of interest between the ruling classes and the university. In Africa, on the other hand, the conflict between the university and government has been brought about by a "divergence in ideological outlook and social objectives".¹ Freedom from Government control, especially given government financing and manpower requirements, is not feasible. It is further restricted by the types of external control exerted by foreign funding agencies such as the Ford, Rockefeller, and Nuffield Foundations which, apart from providing funds, do much to determine the ideology of research and promote academic imperialism.² National social objectives, Machyo suggests, should be reflected in the teachings of the university but, as he recognises, governments such as those of Kenya and Uganda do not have clearly stated ideological orientations which can serve as guiding principles for the university. Of the East African states, it is only Tanzania which has such clearly defined objectives.³

In 1971, debate about the nature of East African universities was renewed with the publication of an article by Wanjondoy Songha, a Kenyan postgraduate student studying in the United States, entitled "Toward a Relevant University in East Africa".⁴

² Ibid., p.25.
³ Ibid., p.26. Machyo is perhaps mistaken in the case of Kenya, where a coherent ruling capitalist ideology exists.
article is ill-informed, and quite unfair to all those who have been participating in vigorous debate at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Indeed, the author appears totally ignorant of their efforts to produce change, and the changes which had actually occurred at that university. The article is also full of the contradictions, endemic in African intellectual circles, of a basically Marxist analysis of colonialism and imperialism which is combined with a cultural nationalist stance which neglects the structural location of post-independence societies in an international economic system.

According to Songha, the African university, as a colonial creation and bastion of elitism and capitalism, remains the "most colonised enclave" in African society. Under the guise of academic independence it seeks to maintain the status quo, and is assisted in this by the lack of academic nationalism "even amongst our leading African faculty". The University, Songha argues, cannot exist outside the national ethos: "it seeks to legitimate its existence by imparting knowledge of what is inherently part of those it is created to serve. It neither seeks to negate their idiom nor to violate rampant ideology." The University of East Africa, he contends, "deems its mission as producing hard-nosed capitalists". It is "still hung-up on viewing the universe from a Western ethic". Songha, however, does not examine whether there is such a thing as a national ethos in Kenya and, if there is, what

1. Ibid., p.6.
is its nature. If, as it can be strongly argued, the national ethos of Kenya is a capitalist one, then there would not appear to be any basic contradiction between the university and the national ethos.

Songha argues that the commitment of African educational institutions should be to the enlightenment of the world about the nature of African civilisation. This is, of course, a commonly held view among cultural nationalists. Some five years earlier, for instance, David Rubadiri had eloquently advocated that the university, in its teaching and syllabus should seek to "consciously use African sources and draw from African senses of values in the assessing of facts". He added

We are living not only in a stormy political and social situation, but also in a strong intellectual climate. All aspects of our formal and informal education must be planted in African soil and take root amidst African traditions and culture.

In order to bring this about, and to purge the university of its alien domination, Songha suggests that Africanisation of staff must be accompanied by a drastic overhaul of the social sciences and humanities curricula; he does not, as Rubadiri, Nyunya, and Mutiso argue, envisage a similar overhaul in the case of the physical sciences. A drastic overhaul is necessary because these fields involve nothing more than "academic propagandising of a certain civilisation and ideology", and have excluded African humanism, communalism, African socialism and African ethnics from their purview.

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The major shortcomings of East African universities include an "overall emphasis on Euro-American history at the expense of Africa", the dominance of the Judeo-Christian ethic in philosophy and religion at the university, the absence of "African originality and concentration" in political science departments, the teaching of capitalist economics in a society where African socialism is preached, and the continuing usage of English, rather than Swahili, as the medium of communication. The university must be, Songha argues, "the depository of our past and the home of our cultural creativity. Only in this way can the university be part of the people." 2

Apart from restructuring the curriculum to overcome its Eurocentric shortcomings, the university should do away with the predominantly foreign-financed "institutes" which are "dumped on our campuses for the sole benefit of Anglo-American scholars". Any institute should be concerned with the rehabilitation and rejuvenation of its "colonially ravaged culture or its disaffected sons". 3 To ensure rapid Africanisation of staff, and the recruitment of better qualified and ideologically sympathetic academic staff, university recruitment should be handled by the Ministry of Education. 4 Of course Songha realises, as have critics such as Okot p'Bitek and Cyrus Mutiso, that the restructuring of the curriculum to place greater emphasis on the rejuvenation of the

2. Ibid., p.9.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.10.
African cultural heritage involves a reassessment of expertise and skill.

Areas like African philosophy, music, dance, and art can easily be taught by well-rounded, skillful local talents who may fail to possess M.A.s or Ph.D.s but who are well known for their practical experience. We must use non-degree teachers in Swahili literature and poetry too, because almost all the intelligentsia know no better than the skilful writers we have in Mombasa, Tanga, or Zanzibar.¹

It is this last suggestion which becomes the central focus for Cyrus Mutiso's consideration of university transformation.

Mutiso accepts most of Songha's major premises about the nature of the African university. However, he is much more concerned than Songha with institutional restructuring and the relationship of the university with its society. One of the most conspicuous features of the discussion of African university change has been the relative neglect of structural aspects—how the university is internally organized and how it fits in with other structures in the society. This neglect, apart from stemming from the effective socialization of African academics into a dominant British and North American heritage, (of course, both European and United States Universities frequently have "non-qualified" staff, including writers and artists in residence, but they contribute little to formal course programmes) stems from an academic awareness that structural changes, especially those leading to "democratization", threaten academics and intellectuals in several ways. A democratization of the university, particularly in terms of teaching (the

¹ Ibid., p.11.
admission of "traditional experts" to the academic staff) alters considerably the notion of qualification and expertise and their basically European nature. Mutiso, in relation to this point, argues that the university as a research and teaching institution is geared to the "status/power needs of asomi-academics" who are mere manipulators of foreign ideas.

Mutiso views the university, and the educational system as a whole, as potentially a vast research gathering organisation in which the distinction between asomi-academics and non-asomi experts and intellectuals has been broken down. The most serious indictment of intellectuals in East Africa is, for Mutiso, as it is with Okot p'Bitek, the failure to define or concede a systematic role for the non-asomi in research and learning. He points out that the asomi-academic does not deny that non-asomi have theories and knowledge, but reconstructs and reinterprets them in accordance with his "theoretical constructs which he has borrowed from his mentors". The granting of the dominant role in research and learning to the non-asomi would entail the decentralisation of institutional structures to suit the needs of the non-asomi teacher and his students. Such a restructuring of the university system would, Mutiso somewhat optimistically hopes, embrace all

1. In an interview, (Dar-es-Salaam, 2/9/1973), Bob Lesheon, the Head of the Theatre Arts Department at the University of Dar-es-Salaam recounted the difficulties he had, and the general academic opposition to, the appointment of an illiterate but highly skilled traditional musician and dance instructor to the Theatre Arts Department.


3. Ibid., p.8. "Asomi" is a Kamba word, and in Mutiso's interpretation, means a person who has undergone several years of formal western style education which has introduced him to new ideas and cultural patterns.
strata of society and throw up "alternative societal systems
animated by the values of the non-csomi" which are not derived
from, or determined by neo-colonial relationships. The last,
of course, appears to be derived from a completely untenable
idealistic portrayal of untravelled, uncorrupted peasant life.
It is to deny, in effect, that the integration of the peasant into
colonial and capitalist modes of production does not represent part
of neo-colonial relationships.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to describe briefly
the development and underlying bases of the systems of secondary
and university education in which most East African intellectuals
have been either partly or fully trained. These institutions, as
we have seen, have been subjected to searching scrutiny since
independence and their nature and rationale fundamentally questioned.
The strains and crises which they have experienced have largely
been the product of attempts by those who work in them, either as
academic staff members or students, to transform inherited
structures, curricula, and relationships with metropolitan powers
and their academic communities, in the light of what they perceive
to be African requirements. These crises have been exacerbated
where, as in Kenya there has been considerable administration and
government resistance to change or where, as at Makerere, resistance

1. Ibid., p.10;
on the part of the dominant expatriate academics. Two dominant strands, often confused in the writings of individual critics, have been discernible in African criticism: the first, represented by Grant Kamenju, and the Tanzanian critics, is concerned with the transformation of the university along socialist lines, although it does not exclude the university role in recovering and developing an African cultural and intellectual heritage; the second, represented by Songha, Okot p'Bitek, and Cyrus Mutiso, is concerned much more with the latter function. Both, however, accept the need for the university to be geared to national development requirements, and for the university's ties of funding, staffing, curriculum, and ideological dependence with Britain and North America especially, to be broken.
CHAPTER IV

The Institutional Setting 2 - The Press, Journals, Publishing and the Theatre

Introduction

Direct foreign influence was of critical importance in establishing the press and journalism throughout Africa. In West Africa, most of the important newspapers were published by foreigners, although during the 19th century a great many African owned and edited papers emerged in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Many of these served as organs of protest, and as vehicles for the expression of grievances, most of which were directed at colonial officials. They were also concerned with cultural reassertion: papers such as the Lagos Weekly Record "consistently urged the importance of African culture and customs." In contrast to West Africa, where the press was largely an African creation even if later it did succumb to European domination, the foundations of the East African press were solidly laid by Europeans. In Kenya in particular, and in Tanganyika, it was to serve as the voice of white settler opinion. Ainslie points out that

Whereas in West Africa, newspapers developed as a voice to express the protests of the ruled, in East Africa they were from the beginning vehicles for the culture and concepts of the rulers, with the considerable resources of white capital at their disposal.


3. Ibid.

Many of the newspapers and broadsheets designed for African readership were sponsored by the missions and government. They were used to proselytize, to forestall the development of an oppositional press, and to provide public information. The growth of an African press was hindered by the virtual absence of a number of pre-conditions: widespread literacy, a writing tradition, a corps of literary specialists, the technical ability to handle press and production methods, the managerial capacity to establish efficient systems of distribution (the absence of this condition was compounded by poor transport and communications, population dispersal, and the existence of few urban centres), a national language, and sufficient capital. In Kenya, political repression was a major obstacle, as was the late development of a strong middle class capable of sustaining a viable press. Uganda was the one East African state to possess an educated middle class at an early date. As a result, a vigorous privately-owned African press emerged in Uganda in the early part of this century. But in effect, only the European and Asian communities possessed the capital to establish a viable press.

The development of the African press and journalism has been intimately linked with political and social reform and the birth of nationalism. The early African newspapers and broadsheets were generally the mouthpieces of political associations or parties - Kwetu was the organ of the TAWCA; Musewithari of the KCA; Numenyoreri of the KAU. Political associations were often the only African groups with sufficient funds and distribution means, to set up papers and broadsheets, and tried through them to win public support for their objectives and to clarify ideas. Papers served organizational purposes, exerted leverage on government, and provided a coherent
interpretation of events for their supporters. Asian and European papers played a similar role, being concerned with the protection and advancement of their respective communities in the economic, social, political and constitutional spheres.

At the time of independence two distinct press traditions existed. First, there was the dominant European or foreign-owned press which was concerned either like the East African Standard, the Tanganyika Standard, and the Uganda Argus, with the protection of European settler interests and slow constitutional advance, or like the Nation Series, with African self-government and independence. Second, there was an African political press which was poorly financed and technically ill-equipped, and which in Kenya and Uganda had been battered by the colonial administration’s repressive measures during the 1950s - banning, closure, and court actions for sedition and libel. The two co-existed uneasily, but only temporarily. In Kenya, the political party press rapidly withered away under pressure from the two major newspaper chains, the moribund state of KANU, and a government policy concerned more with controlling the private press than with establishing its own. In Uganda, the position was more ambiguous. There, privately-owned papers co-existed with the unofficial UPC paper, The People, and a number of predominantly local newspapers set up by the Ministry of Information.¹ In Tanzania the state of co-existence persisted until 1970. But Tanzania was the one East African state which endeavoured to create an alternative to the European or non-African owned press. TANU established its own papers - The Nationalist and Uhuru - for the purpose of disseminating and discussing TANU policy and counteracting

¹ A detailed list of these local papers may be found in Notes on The Press of Uganda (Kampala: Department of Information, n.d.).
the influence of the foreign-owned local press. The state of co-
existence was effectively destroyed by the nationalization of the
Tanganyika Standard in 1970, although the Swahili daily Ngaruma
continued to operate under private citizen ownership. Tanzania thus
provides an example of the conversion of the oppositional, nationalist
party press into the post-independence national press.

The press is a major organ of cultural diffusion in East Africa,
even if per capita newspaper readership is well below that of Europe,
North America, and Japan. In 1967 the total sales of the four daily
Tanzanian newspapers was only about 50,000, which represented one
daily newspaper for 245 people. There were of course a number of
weekly, fortnightly, and monthly papers which boosted circulation
considerably, but the decade of the 'sixties witnessed a decline in the
number of weekly and fortnightly newspapers published, and in the case
of the weekly papers, a decline in circulation. The press is one of
the major agencies for the dissemination of new ideas, new techniques,
and new values. It also serves to either facilitate and support, or
hinder, the acceptance of specific government policies, and to justify
government and state structures. Further, the press helps provide a
basis for interpreting and evaluating political development, and for
relating the periphery to the centre. This last function is hindered
by poor and uneven distribution due to inadequate transport, and
educational and economic factors (the ability of a person to buy a

1. After the Zanzibar revolution in 1964, and the subsequent union
with Tanganyika, the Tanzanian press found itself forced into a
position of defending Government policy against hostile foreign
criticism.

2. A UNESCO survey made in late 1961 found that there were in the
whole of Africa only 231 daily newspapers, having a total circulat-
on of a single British newspaper, the Daily Mirror.

and its Relevance to Development", Dar-es-Salaam: Universities
of East Africa Social Science Conference, 1970, p.263.
newspaper). Distribution tends to be confined to the major urban centres. For instance in Tanzania in 1970, about 50% of the circulation of the four dailies remained in Dar-es-Salaam. The private daily paper, Ngurumo, which according to one survey enjoyed a greater readership in Dar-es-Salaam than the other dailies, suffered from up-country distribution problems, principally because it was not afforded the special air rates enjoyed by the other three papers.¹

The press in East Africa has also been a major employer of intellectual personnel. About 10% of the intellectual sample were employed in journalism,² and a number of others contributed articles of comment and features on a part-time basis. Apart from performing the above roles, however, both the party and non-party press in East Africa has been an important outlet for creative writing, essays, commentary, and criticism (social, literary, and artistic). Most of the major intellectual figures in East Africa have at one time or another contributed articles to newspapers. In Tanzania, partly due to the rudimentary state of other intellectual outlets such as journals and publishing houses, the press — the Nationalist, The Standard, the Sunday News and the Daily News, has provided a major arena for discussion and criticism which has reflected the disagreement and confusion surrounding key ideological questions relating to the role of the party and ideology, the nature of socialism, and the nature of under-development and neo-colonialism in Tanzania and the Third World in general. Two Swahili daily newspapers, Ngurumo and Uhuru have a special page of poetry which, as Walter Bgoya pointed out, has greatly reduced the need of the Tanzania Publishing House to publish volumes of Swahili poetry.³

1. Ibid., p.272.
2. See Chapter Five, Table VII.
For sixty years the Standard press group has been the most powerful in East Africa. Its origins, however, were modest. In 1902 a Parsi, A.M. Jevanjee, who had made a considerable fortune from railway supply contracts during the construction of the Uganda railway, started the weekly African Standard in Mombasa. An English editor-reporter named W.H. Tiller was imported to assist in its foundation. Ownership of the paper changed hands very quickly; in 1904 it was purchased by Mayer and Anderson who were at that time proprietors of the Grand Hotel in Mombasa. Anderson became the editor, and the paper's name was changed to the East African Standard. In 1910 it shifted to Nairobi, following the government; the Mombasa Times (founded in 1899) was revived to take its place. Once in Nairobi, the Standard very quickly absorbed the short-lived The Nairobi Advertiser, leaving as its only serious rival the weekly Leader of British East Africa (founded in 1908). However this was soon eclipsed with the Standard's introduction of a daily edition, and was bought out by the Standard in 1923. George Kinnear, the editor of the Leader of British East Africa was hired as the Standard's editor, a position he held until 1956. His successor was Kenneth Bolton.

The Standard Group expanded its publishing activities. A Swahili weekly, Baraza, was started in 1939 with governmental encouragement. Under the editorship of Francis Khamisi, Baraza was at least nominally editorially independent. In contrast to the East African Standard, which remained the outspoken and conservative voice of white settler interests until the advent of uhuru, from 1945 onwards Baraza advocated African political activity. The Standard Group also moved into the
other East African states. In 1930 the Tanganyika Standard was founded in Dar-es-Salaam at the invitation of the Governor. Much later (in 1955), the Uganda Argus was established in Kampala. Both papers shared wire services and correspondents with the Nairobi-based East African Standard. The Standard Group also took over the Kenya Weekly News in March 1968. The Kenya Weekly News (circulation about 7,000) was based in Nakuru, and drew its subscriptions and advertising from the white settlers. After independence, and the dwindling number of settlers, it found survival a struggle. When M.F. Hill, the long-term editor died, it was sold to the Standard group. Its existence was only prolonged briefly and it closed in 1969.

In May 1967 the Standard Group was purchased by Lonrho, a British-based firm with extensive interests in white-dominated Southern Africa. This change of ownership has clearly been important in determining the Standard's relationship with the Kenya Government, and exposed it even more to accusations of foreign ownership. At least before the change of ownership the majority of European shareholders had lived in Kenya.

The East African Standard was long the mouthpiece of conservative European interests in Kenya. After World War II it was recognized by the directors of the Standard Group, however, that changes were necessary if the newspaper were to adapt to the postwar situation. Indian Independence was a decisive factor, as an editorial on the 16th November, 1962, was to reveal. The new intentions brought little change. During the years of the Emergency the East African Standard appeared very much as an at times hysterical voice of extremist settler interests.

1. Ainslie, p.100.
Even in the post-independence situation, the East African Standard’s role has not significantly changed. The paper decided on a policy of 'responsible' support for the independent African Government, a support which has been uncritical and obsequious. Certainly the content of the paper has changed. It no longer caters so exclusively to the social interests of European settlers - "social affairs, horse shows, agricultural fairs, and news from Britain", and provides a fairly broad African news coverage. It has given extensive coverage to Government news, and especially that emanating from Parliament and the various ministers. But in terms of Africanization little has been done. Until 1965 the staff was almost entirely white and British-trained. By 1968 there was one African sub-editor.

The newspaper group which has successfully challenged the supremacy of the Standard Group is East African Newspapers (Nation Series), Ltd. The origins of this group are as recent as 1956 when Charles Hayes started a one man newspaper, Taifa Kenya. This he did by buying local material and selling it overseas. By coincidence he came across Michael Curtis, a former editor of the London News Chronicle who was interested in starting a paper. They became partners and Curtis, at one time Private Secretary to the old Aga Khan, persuaded the new Aga Khan to invest money in newspapers in East Africa. The Thomson Organization supervised the setting up of the paper, and the buying and installation of the plant.

The first paper, Taifa Kenya, was printed in Swahili. With the

2. Ibid., p.211.
3. Ibid.
4. There is quite a large Ismaili community in East Africa, and Kenya in particular. This has been responsible for a number of educational and hospital projects.
imminence of independence it was felt that Africans would be better able to air their views in Swahili, rather than English. Taifa Kenya later became the English-language Daily Nation. By the end of 1961 both the Daily Nation and the Sunday Nation had been established. Taifa Leo, the Swahili daily, followed, and expansion of the Nation Series was rapid. In 1962 an unsuccessful attempt was made to set up a separate Uganda Nation. This venture proved too costly, lasting only one year, and served as an effective deterrent against a similar operation in Tanganyika. In 1960 the Nation Series bought control of a former Katwe (Kampala) paper, Uganda N'pya (run by Eridadi Mulira) and brought it out as a daily, Taifa N'pya, first in English, then in Luganda from 1961. In 1962 it bought a half share in Mwafrica, run by Robert Makanja in Dar-es-Salaam. Apart from the Daily Nation and Sunday Nation, the Nation Series publishes Taifa Leo, Taifa Weekly, Nyota (monthly), and Africana (quarterly).

With the East African Standard, and to a lesser extent the Daily Nation, the Kenya Government has had little need to establish a government press. Both major publishing groups are constrained by their foreign ownership which imposes very tight restrictions on their critical activity. To criticise is to risk government take-over. George Githii, the present editor-in-chief of the Nation Series, has described some of the problems thus:

The editor, the management says, is, of course, free to express his opinion but he must also remember that he represents and is also a custodian of a huge investment. In this situation, the editor faces some sort of intellectual crisis, mainly about the sorts of choices and doors that would be open to him if he took a certain
course of action rather than another.... Nor is management pressure limited strictly to this economic aspect of investment. It also arises out of an insatiable craving to ensure the survival of the newspaper qua investment in an alien land.¹

Critical activity is also self-inhibited, stemming from a basic support for government policy. As previously indicated, the East African Standard is owned by Lonrho, whose Kenyan activities are of increasing importance. Government policies with regard to foreign investment and ownership, and the development of state supported capitalism, are clearly not in conflict with East African Standard policy. In this way the Standard has been able to maintain a continuity of role, even if the composition of its reading public has undergone changes. From the white settler mouthpiece of its first six decades it has become the mouthpiece, if only covertly, of foreign investment, European capitalism, and the rising Kenyan ruling class.

The East African Standard has never opened its columns to African intellectual debate in the way that the Daily Nation and Sunday Nation have. Apart from occasional book and theatre reviews, one would not realize that intellectual debate was taking place at all. Philip Ochieng has noted that

Anybody who reads the theatre and book reviews with which our newspapers feed us knows that they cannot be intended for true Africans.... He knows this because theatre reviews are on European forms of drama and they are done by Europeans for Europeans and because the only books reviewed at length have no direct relevance to local conditions, and they are done by European reporters whose guilty consciences, in their attempt to whitewash the colonial experience, is so embarrassing in the ignorance which it reveals.²


And Faraj Dumila in the following passage recounts one particular experience with an English journalist from the East African Standard.

The journalist told Dumila that his article on Swahili as a medium of national integration was

interesting... well written and I am sure it will interest many of my African readers and quite a good

(many) English and Asian readers of this paper but

I would be a traitor to my English... and possibly lose my job by publishing this article. Some of my

fellow English journalists will think me a fool by accepting this article.¹

Such neglect of African intellectual debate stems not only from a

Eurocentric editorial bias, but also from the actual composition of

the readership of the Standard. The 1968 East African Standard

Readership Survey showed that 46% (16,575) of the purchasers were

African, 19% (6,846) Asian, and 35% (12,611) European.² The distribu-

tion was much the same for the weekend edition. Thus, just over

50% of the readership was non-African, and therefore unlikely to be

interested in the types of intellectual and cultural questions which

would appeal to a number of African readers.

Moreover, many probably would not regard it as important that a

newspaper should be a forum for intellectual debate, there being, in

the case of expatriates, no real precedent at home.

From the beginning, the Nation Series papers gave full editorial

support to the cause of African self-government in Kenya. A policy

of rapid Africanization of staff was pursued, although in 1968,

1. Faraj Dumila, "The Cultural Environment of African Journalism". Paper presented to the Makerere Golden Jubilee Writers' Workshop, University of Nairobi, 1972, p.4. In the case of Dumila, the English journalist's reluctance to publish his article may have had something to do with its emptiness and general lack of quality.

2. U.S. Information Agency surveys in East Africa have found that of newspaper readers with some secondary education and above, 51% read the Standard and 50% read the Nation.
Europeans still provided the backbone of the editorial staff. By this time, however, the Nation had had two African editors-in-chief: first Hilary Ng'weno; and second, George Githii, the present editor.  

Like the Standard, the Nation has followed a policy of basic support for the Kenyatta Government. But it has also shown itself more readily disposed to criticism of certain aspects of government. The Preventive Detention Act was criticised by the Nation, as was the purchase of a Rolls Royce car by the mayor of Nairobi, who later decided against buying it. The Daily Nation and Sunday Nation have, unlike the East African Standard, provided an important outlet for intellectual debate. "On the Carpet" interviews have helped disseminate the ideas of among others B.A. Ogot, Okot p’Eitek, Taban Lo Liyong, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, John Mbiti, Jonathan Kariara, Okello Oculi, and Eneriko Seruma, and those of politicians including Bildad Kaggia, Mwai Kibaki, Oginga Odinga, Tom Okello Odongo and Joseph Murumbi. The "Commentary" column in the Sunday Nation has been used by Philip Ochieng, the late Cyrus Kamundia, Aloo Ojuka, and more recently, Peter Mwaura and Githiiif himself, as a forum for intellectual debate. And it has been in the pages of the Daily Nation and Sunday Nation that the cultural debate involving Okot p’Eitek, Taban Lo Liyong, Philip Ochieng, and Jared Angira Othieno has been brought to the attention of a larger public. Locally published books have been reviewed, and attention given to African theatre, although the European dominance in this sphere, and the sporadic African activity, have ensured that this is limited.


3. In early 1973 Ojuka, who was developing into a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist, was dropped from "Commentary". The column has since had a variety of contributors, none of whom has done much to relate specific issues to broader problems.
The only other Kenyan newspaper which provides an intellectual outlet is the Sunday Post. Independently started in 1935, the Post originally served as a settlers' newspaper. In 1961 it was bought by the English Press Ltd., a local publishing company, which continues to heavily subsidize its operations. The paper is badly put together, with poor layout and a mass of typographical errors — something to be expected given that it does not employ a full-time staff. During its early years it was an inept imitation of popular British Sunday papers replete with bikini-clad girls, syndicated articles, and trite features designed to titillate rather than inform. Under the editorship of Marnin Singh, a businessman with considerable journalistic experience, it has been transformed beyond recognition so that it has become a major forum to which Christopher Mulei, Magaga Alot, Philip Ochieng, William Ochieng, Atieno Odhiambo, and Chris Wanjala have contributed.

Of course the involvement of Kenyan Asians in the press and journalism is of long standing. It was A.M. Jevanjee, for instance, who in 1902 started the African Standard which developed into the East African Standard. Apart from the Europeans, Asians were the only group with the necessary capital, editorial, and technical skills to produce newspapers. The papers which were set-up supported the interests of their community, although they reflected the important divisions which existed within that community.1

In the years immediately after World War I, the "Indian Question" dominated politics, and in the press the campaign for a common electoral roll and the right to purchase land in the Highlands was pursued in

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papers such as M.A. Desai's *The East African Chronicle* and the Mombasa based *The Democrat*. The aftermath of World War II brought change; the success of the Indian nationalist movement providing radical Indians in Kenya with a new confidence in the possibility of successful opposition to colonial rule. Indeed, by the end of the War, the *Colonial Times* had begun to recognize a "community of interest between the two coloured communities in opposition to white privilege."  

It supported the attempts to combine the activities of the local Indian congress and the KAU, gave a great deal of publicity to the KAU, and opened its pages to African writers. The *Daily Chronicle* which was financed by A.B. Patel, was the most radical of the Indian papers, giving consistent support to the efforts of African politicians. Before the Emergency it was edited by Pio Gama Pinto who, after seven years of detention, edited the Pan-African Press until his assassination in February 1965. Its nationalist credentials were impeccable. Oginga Odinga wrote that

> The *Daily Chronicle* was the first and the only English language newspaper in Kenya to advocate a militant nationalist policy, and to issue a call for total independence of the colony under majority rule.  

Both the *Colonial Times* and the *Daily Chronicle* argued that Mau Mau was caused by economic, social, and political grievances but condemned its violence. By the end of 1954 the *Daily Chronicle* asserted that the interests and problems of Asians should not be divorced from those of the general community, and that the Asian community might have to subordinate its interests to the general interest.  

However, the

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1. Ibid., p.31.  
momentum of political developments in Kenya soon rendered irrelevant the attitudes of the Asian community and its press to constitutional advance. The radicals supported KANU and the rest KADU. The newspapers suffered crippling financial difficulties, and most failed to survive into the independence period. Only *Africa Samachar*, which served East and Central Africa, survived from the colonial period.

As in Tanzania and Uganda, many of the early African papers and broadsheets in Kenya were sponsored by missions or government. The African political press which began to develop toward the end of the 1920s relied a great deal on support from within the Asian community—provision of printing facilities and editorial assistance. The consolidation of European power after the First World War brought about some Asian-African political cooperation. Harry Thuku, for instance, used the offices of Desai's *East African Chronicle* as a base for the East African Association's campaign, and his Swahili broadsheet, *Tangazo*, was printed by the *Chronicle*. The D.L. Patel Press printed *Mulgwithania* and the *Luo Magazine* (1937) was printed by the Colonial Times Printing Works.

First published in May 1928 by the KCA, *Mulgwithania* (which means literally 'he who causes the whole group to understand each other') was the first African-owned paper. Its editor was Johnstone (Jomo) Kenyatta, the Secretary of the KCA. At this time Kenyatta had no writing experience and a limited educational background, so it is doubtful whether he was the driving force behind its foundation. His contributions were cautious and "over-correct". Highly conscious of the

1. Helen Kitchen in her 1956 study of the African press estimated that there were 40 or 50 papers for Africans before 1952.


4. Ibid.
pitfalls of political activity in a colonial society, and anxious to avoid the fate of exile which befell Harry Thuku, Kenyatta "supported the churches, district commissioners and chiefs; he urged on his fellow Africans the importance of agricultural and educational self-advancement; and he praised the role of the British Empire."1 Kenyatta noted that

The first thing (about the British Empire) is that all people are governed justly, big or small - equally. The second thing is that nobody is regarded as a slave, everyone is free to do what he or she likes without being hindered.2

After World War II a number of African vernacular papers developed largely as outlets for the political and economic grievances of the Kikuyu.3 The first of these was Henry Kwoia's Mumenyereri which began in 1945.4 By the time of the Emergency, there were about 40 of these "violently written papers, mainly in Kikuyu, mainly mimeographed, mostly highly seditious and taking a bitterly anti-white, 'quit Kenya' line."5 The papers and newsheets were often edited by prominent political leaders and

expressed general dissent and bitterness over the colour bar and the kipande, the insecurity and poverty of the Kikuyu squatter in the Rift Valley, the need for greater African representation in central and local government, and the hope for tribal and national unity.6

The most resilient of the post-war African newspapers was the Nyanza Times, a Luo weekly which was started by Orinda Okun and James Omoga and later edited by Achieng Oneko. Early in its operations it ran

1. Ibid.

2. Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, p.101.

3. Ibid., pp.211-12. Also Hechten, pp.201-2.

4. Mumenyereri ("He who looks after") had a weekly average circulation of about 10,000 and was widely distributed throughout Kikuyuland. As tension grew in 1951 and 1952 it became uncompromising in its nationalism.


6. Rosberg and Nottingham, p.211.
into crippling printing costs. However, the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, of which Oginga Odinga was full-time organizer, came to its rescue when it decided to purchase a press from the Daily Chronicle and publish the paper.1 By the end of its first year in 1947, the Luo Trading Press had purchased and established a press in Nairobi on which it printed Achieng Oneko’s Ramogi. Other African editors sought assistance. It printed the Kikuyu Numenyereri and Agikuyu; the Skamba Mwithia; Mulinavosi in Maragoli; W.W. Awori’s Swahili Radioposta; and Francis Khamisi’s Mwalimu. According to Odinga, ‘the level of politics differed in these papers, but some were quite outspokenly critical of the government... the most radical, hard-hitting paper was Uhuru Wa’Africa, run by Paul Ngei.’2

With the exception of the Nyanza Times, all of these papers were suppressed during the Emergency. The Nyanza Times managed to survive within the strict limits of Emergency censorship, and still managed to maintain a reputation as the champion of Kenyatta even when to advocate his release was a legal offence. After the vigorous suppression of the press during Mau Mau a number of African publications revived. However, they continued to operate in difficult conditions, especially in Kikuyuland (including Nairobi) where the State of Emergency was not lifted until 1959. The prohibition on the formation of national political parties meant that no newspaper could draw upon the financial resources and distribution outlets of a national political organization. The papers which did develop were local and mimeographed. One such was Uhuru, the organ of the People’s Convention Party in Nairobi, which supported Mboya’s candidature for

2. Ibid.
the Legislative Council.

The most radical of the post-Emergency African papers was *Pan Africa*. It was founded by Oginga Odinga and Jomo Kenyatta, and published by the Pan-African Press Ltd., which was associated with the *Nyanza Times*. The members of its Board of Directors included Pio Pinto, Margaret Kenyatta, and Okata Bala. Pinto was the editor-in-chief and the ideological driving force behind the publication. Undoubtedly he helped to give the journal its strongly anti-imperialist nature. With Pinto's death in 1965 the journal continued under the editorship of a young Australian until its demise soon after.

*Pan Africa* was the mouthpiece of the more radical elements within KANU. It adopted a strongly anti-imperialist position, and leaned towards the Soviet bloc. The strength of its anti-imperialism was demonstrated during the Congo "crisis". The cover of Number 46, under the heading of "The Teeth of the Imperialist Dragon", depicted a crocodile with three teeth – Mobutu, Tshombe, and Munongo, devouring the Congo. Then followed the caption, "This ghastly sight speaks for itself and does not need any tell-tale elaboration. Imperialism is trying to swallow up the Congo!" *Pan Africa* also demonstrated a fairly strong pro-Soviet, Eastern European bias. In the local situation, however, the radicalism and anti-imperialism developed an understandable ambiguity. For instance, H.S. Gathigira, the Managing Editor, dealt with Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia and Kenya over the question of national boundaries. Gathigira argued that the Somalis "have been shameless enough to suggest that thousands of their "brother (Somali) Muslims" were still under the yoke of "Christian imperialism"

1. Gathigira is now the News Editor for the Daily Nation.
in parts of Kenya and Ethiopia." He continued.

It is in fact unfortunate that any independent and sovereign African state should try to cover up its desire for territorial aggrandizement by introducing irrelevant and basically silly religious aspects. 1

Gathigira defends the territorial integrity of the colonially created arbitrary unit of Kenya, while accusing the Somalis of adopting the "divide and rule policies" of the colonial powers. Somali moves are not depicted as an attempt to recover what historically they considered to be part of their territory, or to redraw arbitrary boundaries more in accordance with ethnic and religious factors, but rather as part of a Somali territorial expansionism. African radicalism and anti-imperialism were quite capable of foundering on the rocks of territorial integrity. The introduction of Kenya's socialist manifesto, Sessional Paper No.10 on African Socialism, nevertheless revealed the paper's leftist stance, especially in its support for Bildad Kaggia's criticism of it. 2

Government and Press Relations in Kenya

Kenya is often cited as an example of the operation of a "free press". But as previously argued, the critical activity of the two main press groups has been inhibited by their foreign ownership 3 and the constant threat of nationalization. One observer noted that

The press was controlled in that it knew full well, by informal and unwritten agreement, just how far it could go in criticizing the regime or in reporting information "embarrassing" to the government... While some criticism was permitted, no one dared use the printed work for direct attack on Kenyatta himself or any program or action he strongly advocated. 4

2. See issue of April 16, 1965, no.53.
3. The view was often advanced, particularly in the early years of independence, that freedom of the press in African states was not a question of whether there was a one party or multi party state, but rather whether the press was African or foreign-owned. This was the view of Odinge Odera, the first editor of the East Africa Journal. See Tom Hopkinson, "A New Age of Newspapers in Africa", Transition, No.22, 1965, p.39.
Indeed, the history of the press in post-independence Kenya has been one of almost continual government warning and interference. For instance in December 1968, the widely circulated religious fortnightly, Target, was threatened with closure by the Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, because it criticized the growing gap between rich and poor and the division within KANU. Finally the Government allowed the paper, which was sponsored by the NCCK to continue publication, but insisted that its British editor, the Rev. John Schofield, be dismissed.

On January 14th, 1969, the Government warned Kenyan newspapers to cease "highlighting and sometimes exaggerating" its programs to break the Asian grip on trade lest the press itself be purged of its non-African elements. The East African Standard drew a sharp rebuke from Daniel Arap Moi for reporting all sides of the Asian citizenship crisis.

Informal and unwritten, rather than written controls operate, and one of most used methods of this informal control was the information ministry's calling of editors for group meetings. Hachten suggests that this method was characteristic of the early days.  

The response of the Kenya Government to press treatment of Uganda would suggest that it is a current practice.

During January and February 1973, Kenyan press criticism of the Ugandan military regime hardened considerably. Newspapers carried reports of disappearances, massacres, and lawlessness among the ranks of the Uganda army. The Sunday Post of February 18th in an article entitled "100s Feared Killed in Mbale Fighting" dealt with reported clashes between soldiers loyal to Amin and officers, mainly from Eastern and Western Uganda, who were supposedly assisting Dr. Obote's military strategist, Lt. Col. Ojite Ojok, in an attempt to "liberate

1. Ibid., p.218.
the so-called guerrillas who were due to be publicly executed in the town."^ The articles listed a number of prominent Mbale citizens who had apparently been victims of the fighting. The editorial in the same issue asserted that President Amin has placed the blame for each and every incident of oppression, tyranny and horror on imperialists, Zionists, Asians, the British, the newspapers of Kenya, and sometimes on his own soldiers without incurring the thought that an undisciplined soldiery is a grave reflection on himself. Of course, he himself can never do anything wrong.

The editorial went on to state that "Uganda is in a state of complete chaos already", with Ugandans themselves suffering in large numbers and in a terrible way", and raised the question of how long "can this state of affairs be allowed to continue, even from the Ugandan point of view?"

Kenyan newspapers reported a large-scale exodus of WaLuo who were fleeing for their lives from Uganda, and anxiety was expressed about the situation by politicians, including ministers.\(^3\) Amin responded by firstly denouncing the WaLuo, and the foreign" imperialist and zionist owned" Kenyan press which was concered to undermine the good relations between Uganda and Kenya. On the Luos he retracted, and sent his foreign minister, Wamume Kibedi, to reassure Kenyatta. The difficulties of the press were crowned, however, by two stories which broke over the weekend of the 17th and 18th of February. On the Saturday, the *East African Standard* reported that General Amin had paid a visit to Nairobi and had been seen by a reliable informant. Given the

2. Ibid., p.4.
3. Dr. Odongo Ouma, a Kenyan Cabinet Minister, speaking as a Luo, said he was surprised to note that a government of a neighbour State had accused a whole community belonging to another State without first checking with that State. *Sunday Nation*, 18/2/1973, p.4.
plight of the Luos, the story hardly lacked credibility. The Government dismissed it as without foundation, and reaffirmed that Kenya and Uganda enjoyed good sisterly relations. The next day, the Sunday Post reported that three of Amin's biggest enemies had been taken into Kenya police custody in Mombasa after crossing from Tanzania. At this point stringent warnings to the Kenya press were publicly made. Daniel Arap Moi warned that the press would be nationalised if it did not behave responsibly. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai then joined the fray. Representatives of the press were summoned to the Office of the Vice-President, with Mungai also in attendance. Among those attending were the editors of the East African Standard and the Daily Nation. The Kenya News Agency (KNA) report said that the editors had been asked to refrain from printing "sensational and inaccurate news" which would affect friendly relations and good neighbourliness between Kenya and "neighbouring" states.¹ An anonymous correspondent in the Sunday News wondered whether the "recent strictures mean that the Government now looks to them to behave as Government newspapers. As privately owned newspapers, can they interpret events in neighbouring states differently than the Government?"²

A more recent example which illustrates methods of government control is the treatment of Peter Mwaura of the Sunday Nation for his investigative story on the drug purchasing scandal. Mwaura was detained by the police for questioning, and spent two days and nights with the police. At the time Mwaura made his disclosure, the police

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2. Ibid.
were engaged in the investigation of allegations of illegal practices in the supply of drugs to the Government. Subsequently a number of persons, including a senior Government Official were charged with various offences. Hilary Ng’Weno, former editor of the Nation Series and founder-editor of "Joe Magazine" had the following to say about Mwaura's case.

Incidents such as the one involving Mr. Mwaura which can be interpreted by the press as Government pressure against the publishing of 'bad' news will inevitably lead to a cowed press and make nonsense of the constant claim by the Kenya Government that the Press in Kenya is free and unfettered.1

The Kenya press has been free to report whatever has been said in the National Assembly. This has enabled papers to carry a good deal of discussion of public issues, including outspoken criticism of particular policies and government ministers. Nevertheless, the National Assembly, as Hachten notes, has played a rather ambiguous role vis-a-vis press and government.2 One well known journalist has pointed out that

Unfortunately some Members of Parliament in this country have shown over the years a marked degree of intolerance over what the press can or cannot say. The intolerance seems to verge on paranoid fear of freedom of expression.3

This ambiguity was revealed in the response of members of the National Assembly to George Githii's article in the Daily Nation on the National Assembly and Presidential Elections (Amendment) Bill 1974. A number of members suggested that Githii was not entitled to discuss the Bill. The Speaker, Mr. Fred Matu was reported as saying that Githii "cannot

accuse the Members of this House of not respecting the constitution when he himself does not understand it and suggested that some of Githii's conclusions were provocative and unconstitutional. Mwaura rose to the defence of Githii and pointed out that

The Bill is of national importance and its implications could have far-reaching consequences if and when it is passed as one of the laws of this country. It would be a serious default of duty on the part of the mass media - not to mention the Members of Parliament themselves - if the members of the public were not given an opportunity to understand the implications of the Bill fully.

The Kenya Government of course exercises control over the mass media in other ways. One of the early decisions of the Kenyatta Government was to assume greater control of mass communications and to minimize the European influences which had for so long antagonized Africans. Under Achieng Oneko, the first Minister of Information, this policy was vigorously pursued. The Ministry had two major departments: the Voice of Kenya (VOK); and the Information Department, which encompassed the government press and information services, as well as the Kenya News Agency (KNA). The KNA is the main source of news in Kenya - both the newspaper firms and VOK buy their news from it. The Nation Series also has direct contacts with the American news agency, UPI, and bases reporters in all important areas and correspondents in main East African towns - Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Arusha, Mombasa, Jinja, and Nakuru. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia assisted in the development of the KNA and in line with its official policy of non-alignment, the government decided that the KNA would take only two world news services - Reuters and Tass, the latter being


provided free. After the ouster of Oneko in June 1966 and his replacement by James Osogo, the KNA modified its operations. Zdenek Kuber, the Czech adviser, was deported in March 1966, and what Hachten terms "the pro-communist influence" almost disappeared.¹ In addition to Tass and Reuters, the KNA began receiving AFP and UPI reports as well: "Also, there was much less tampering with incoming news reports."²

The Tanzanian Press

The origins of the press in Tanzania were similar to those in Kenya. Missions and government played a key role in the establishment of the African press, while the commercial press was dominated by Europeans, and the Standard Group in particular, and a number of small Asian-owned and directed ventures. Nevertheless there was a pronounced divergence of press development between the two countries, which became most pronounced during the 1950s. This was primarily due to the different conditions in which nationalist politics developed (e.g. the restrictions on the development of a national political press during the Emergency and even after in Kenya). The differences hardened in the post-independence situation when important ruling ideological and policy differences led to contrasting ideas about the proper function of the press. Whereas in Kenya the African political press declined relatively quickly after independence,³ and the two main foreign-owned press groups gained a monopoly of national and local publications, in Tanzania the TANU press expanded, and blossomed into a national press.

2. Ibid.
3. KANU sponsored publications such Sauti ya KANU, and its more radical members were associated with Pan Africa for instance, but the moribund state of the party ensured that no vital party press would develop.
which was assisted by the widespread use of Swahili as the political lingua franca. At the same time the Government extended its directive role. The monopoly of the foreign-owned press was quickly broken, and the nationalization of the Standard Group in Tanzania placed the control of the press firmly in Government and TANU hands.

The first ever newspaper in Tanganyika was probably that published in 1895 at Magila by the U.M.C.A. It was called Habari ve Mwezi and contained articles of both religious and secular content. In 1908 the newspaper had its first African editor in Samuel Schoza. The U.M.C.A. also published Pwani Na Bora in Swahili. Mission sponsored papers continue to be important at the local level, the Swahili-language fortnightly Kiongozi (founded in 1955) enjoying the largest circulation of any. The most important of the early African political papers was the Swahili Kwetu (1937–1952), the organ of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association, founded by the Uganda Erika Fiah. Fiah owned and edited the paper, and represented the radical strand within Tanganyikan politics at that time. He was alleged to harbour "Garveyite" African racialist notions and, according to Iliffe, "was in distant contact with Pan-African and even communist ideas." He was a vehement critic of Martin Kayamba and used the columns of Kwetu at the time of Kayamba's death to write a vitriolic obituary.

In Tanganyika, the 1950s witnessed not only the foundation of government-owned and directed papers, and several small commercial ventures, but the rise of a party press as well. It was only in the 1950s, when the pressure for self-government and independence was mounting, that the Colonial Office turned its attention to the question of newspapers for Africans. In Tanganyika a series of some twenty local papers run by local councils, native authorities, and growers
cooperatives were established with government support, apparently to encourage interest in local affairs; and three Swahili papers—Mwangaza, Baragumu, and Mambo Leo—were set up in Dar-es-Salaam and handed over to a "trust" in 1958. Mwangaza, a daily, died at the end of a year for financial reasons. Baragumu was taken over by the Nation Series in 1960. Mambo Leo, the most successful of the three, achieved a circulation of 30,000 weekly, and continued publishing until 1962.

Also in the early 1950s, a number of private publishing ventures were undertaken. Robert Makange, who later edited Mwafrika, began Zuhra, an English and Swahili weekly. In Bukoba, two papers were established. One, Fukya na Gundi was conservative in tone. The other was Tanganyika Mpya.

In late 1957, the foundation of the modern Tanganyika political press was laid. Sauti ya TANU, Mwafrika, and Ngurumo came into existence. Sauti ya TANU initially consisted of little more than duplicated sheets of party news in English and Swahili, together with policy statements by Nyerere. Ngurumo, a Swahili daily, was owned by Thaker's Ltd., and still provides a non-government and TANU press outlet. Ainslie pointed out that "it is passionately anti-colonial, rather than nationalistic, and seems to speak for an unorganized, and not solely African left-wing." 3

The TANU leadership became convinced of the need in the late '50s for a strong party press as an organizing and mobilizing force. They

1. Of the local papers, one weekly, one fortnightly, and six monthlies were still operating in 1965, when all the similar ventures in Kenya, only one, Sikio (a Swahili weekly) had survived.


3. Ainslie, p.111.
faced a major problem in terms of population dispersal (a large country with few urban centres), and widespread illiteracy. Nevertheless, they possessed two advantages: first, TANU was without a serious rival and possessed the roots of a national organization; second, Swahili provided a widely spoken lingua franca. A party press was necessary not only during the independence struggle, but also for the dissemination of party policy in the post-independence period. After independence, of course, and the development of an African socialist ideology, the need became more pressing. Thus, in 1959, the National Times Press was launched by TANU leaders. Nyerere was Chairman. It was planned to, publish English and Swahili dailies, and a Gujerati weekly. The press was under-capitalized, and relied on outmoded equipment, and its English paper, the National Times, lasted for only a short time. In 1961, TANU began Uhuru as a weekly paper printed in Swahili. It was edited by Roland Mwanjisi. After independence, TANU decided to convert Uhuru into a daily, and to provide it with a companion daily, the English-language paper The Nationalist. However at the end of 1965 Uhuru was still a weekly, and the Nationalist did not appear until April 17th, 1964.

The Nationalist was published by the Mwananchi Printing and Publishing Company, on whose board sat senior TANU officials and Government ministers. The editor-in-chief was Jweli Ngogo, a leading TANU member who was at one time Chairman of the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation. James Markham, an experienced Ghanaian journalist who had worked with Nkrumah in the days of the Accra Evening News, was brought in as Managing Editor, and staff were recruited in Tanganyika and abroad.  

1. Ibid., p.112.  
2. Ibid., p.114.
According to Henry Bienen, "it might have been useful to group a wide spectrum of implicitly non-Nyerere views under the heading of a "Nationalist Group"."¹ From its creation until the middle of 1965 The Nationalist served as the mouthpiece for those who differed from Nyerere's position.² The views of these people were expressed in editorials, news articles, and in the coverage given to various people. They were generally those whose ideological position derived more from Lenin and Mao than from Ujamaa and Democracy and the Party System.

These individuals include men from Zanzibar who, since the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964, brought to their government posts a new legacy, a new rhetoric. They have infused a distinct ideology into the mainland. Disagreement is also evident among middle-level leaders in Dar-es-Salaam and among junior ministers and administrative officials at TANU National Headquarters, a few regional and area commissioners.³

Two government ministers whose ideological positions were not in complete accord with Nyerere received considerable and enthusiastic coverage in The Nationalist. The first was the Zanzibari A.M. Babu, the Minister for Commerce and Cooperatives who entered the Tanzanian Government after the Union. Babu had been General Secretary of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and organizer of its youth wing. He edited a small newspaper called Zanews (really an information service) which was sponsored by the New China News Agency. Zanews was harrassed by the colonial government and seized four times in 1962. Indeed, Babu was jailed for twelve months on a criminal libel conviction arising out of an item in Zanews. After his release in 1963, he quarrelled with Ali Muhsein over the parliamentary representation to be allotted to his

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2. During this year The Nationalist was edited by James Markham, and there was a European - an Englishman, Richard Kisch, on the editorial staff. Markham was replaced, and Kisch was told to leave Tanzania on 24 hours notice.
youth wingers and resigned, establishing the Umma ("masses") party. The second was the now exiled and disgraced Oscar Kambona, who was at that time Secretary General of TANU and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Kambona adopted a much more outspoken and anti-Western position in foreign affairs than did Nyerere. He was, as Bienen notes, the subject of a type of personality cult construction programme in The Nationalist. The Nationalist did not, however, ignore Nyerere, and gave full coverage to his speeches and hailed him as the great leader of Tanzania. What it did do was challenge Nyerere on the very issues he himself had set out: African socialism, one party democracy, and the nature of economic policy in Tanganyika.

Nyerere had as early as 1963 said that there were different ideological roads to African socialism, but did not accept Marxism-Leninism as the ideology to be embraced in Tanzania. For him, ujamaa was African socialism. Indirectly, this rejection of scientific socialism was criticized in a series of articles published in The Nationalist in June 1965 which attacked Kenya's Sessional Paper No.10 on African Socialism.

An anonymous "Critic" in "Kenya's African Socialism" asserted that the Kenya White Paper was opposed to socialism and for capitalism, and was outraged by the statement that "both Marxism and Laissez-Faire Capitalism have been failures." The "Critic" interpreted the White Paper as asserting that feudal institutions were the strongest heritage on which to build African socialism. The specific institutions (e.g.

1. Babu operated within a very different ideological framework to Nyerere, placing his political and social analysis within a Marxist-Leninist-Fascist framework.


3. None of Nyerere's indirect critics ever went to the extent of referring to him as a "bourgeois nationalist".

independent farms) and traditions urged for preservation in Sessional Paper No.10 were the very same which Nyerere had stated as the basis for African socialism in Ujamaa. A few days earlier another contributor had written an article rejecting the very idea of African socialism. "A Contributor" argued that Marxism–Leninism was flexible, and capable of adaptation to national and national/state differences; Lenin's analysis "surely demolishes the myth that the scientific socialist theory is one and the same solution for all situations and for all time."¹ There is no distinctly African form of socialism simply because the diversity of states prohibits the inclusion of all under any one label. However, socialism, as a form of social organization, is universal.

The Nationalist provided excellent coverage of African news, stressing as The Standard and the Daily News were to do, liberation struggles in Southern Africa, and news from Zambia, Kenya,² the Congo,³ and Algeria. It managed to avoid the parochialism that afflicts many government newspapers elsewhere by basing itself firmly on news, and giving extensive coverage of foreign events. The Nationalist had the smallest average printing (about 6,000) and the smallest estimated readership (about 22,000) of the Tanzanian daily papers and went out of existence in early 1972 when its merger with The Standard produced the Daily News under the editorship of Ben Mkapa.

In the early 1960s two radical journals were published for a short time. The first was the discussion journal Spearhead (1962–63), edited by Frene Ginwalla, which had a continental perspective. The

2. The Nationalist was banned in Kenya.
3. Bienen points out (p.210) that the Nationalist "made itself available for various factions within the Congolese anti-central government movements and for particular factions the Southern Rhodesian and South African nationalist movements."
second was *Vigilance Africa* (Macho), edited by the late Samuel Kajunjemele. *Vigilance Africa* was published in English and Swahili and dedicated to Marxist-Leninist ideals: "Scientific Socialism and African Unity, against Colonialism and Imperialism." It was committed to Chinese positions, and devoted considerable attention to documentation, the activities of trades unions and cooperatives, and analyses of international institutions such as the World Bank. Predictably, the Congo, Rhodesia, and liberation in Southern Africa were major preoccupations. Among the contributors were the British communist author Jack Woddis, Nelson Nyondo, and Nsa Kaisi.

**The Standard and Daily News - The Press as an Intellectual Forum**

Frene Ginwalla, a South African born Marxist lawyer and journalist, became editor of *The Standard* and *Sunday News* after the nationalization of *The Standard* in 1970. Earlier Ginwalla had edited the radical Tanzanian monthly *Spearhead*, and had been deported in 1965. *The Standard* under its British editors had, after independence, endeavoured to adopt a sympathetic stance to the government. However, the sale to Lonhro of the newspaper chain to which *The Standard* belonged, rendered it more suspect in Tanzanian eyes and it was duly nationalized. The nationalization should nevertheless be viewed within its proper perspective. After the Arusha Declaration, nationalization became a major instrument of Tanzanian socialism. It was designed to give Tanzania greater control over its own resources and to break the dependency links which existed with the capitalist states. Greater control of the news media was a necessary stage in this process.

Ginwalla started work with a Presidential Charter, the message of which was to stimulate constructive debate within the country and to
promote the Arusha Declaration. The press, Nyerere said in his message,

Will be free to join the debate for and against any particular proposals put forward for the consideration of the people, whether by TANU, or by other bodies.

He further assigned to it the responsibility of freely criticizing any particular acts of individual TANU or Government leaders, and to publicize any failures in the community, by whomever they are committed. It will be free to criticize the implementation of agreed policies.

While on a visit to London in 1970, Ginwalla recruited on a two year contract Richard Gott (now Latin American correspondent for The Guardian and Editor of the Penguin Latin American Library), Rod Prince, former editor of Peace News, and Tony Hall, formerly an Oxfam publishing officer. Among the local people she recruited were the Kenyan journalist Philip Ochieng, and Abdallah Ngororo.

Ginwalla's Marxism-Leninism gave The Standard a marked international orientation. Tanzanian socialism was examined, often critically, against the backdrop of international socialism. Wide coverage was given to liberation movements in Southern and Portuguese-occupied Africa, and in South Vietnam. Eastern European, and Latin American affairs received considerable attention, as did the Black Power movement in the United States. Debate at the domestic level was concerned with the danger of the emergence of class divisions within Tanzanian society, and with the extremely critical analysis, often in unsigned articles by European radicals, of parastatal organizations such as the National Development Corporation. In the columns of The Standard two particularly important debates - those involving tourism ¹ and ujamaa vs.

1. This debate was later collected in a volume edited by Issa Shivji, Tourism and Socialist Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973).
capitalism - were carried on. These debates had the effect of opening up the paper to the ideas of a number of young intellectuals, most of whom were from the University. A distinctive feature of The Standard emerged. Contributions were encouraged from non-journalists, and academics from the "Hill", secondary school teachers, and members of the administration were able to disseminate their ideas to a much larger public through the press. It was under Ginwalla that the press developed as perhaps the major intellectual institution in Tanzania, and certainly as the major organ for the dissemination of intellectual ideas. Later under the editorship of Ben Mkapa this role continued although since mid-way in 1973, the paper has been effectively emasculated. Clustered around the Daily News - Sunday News have been intellectuals such as Philip Ochieng, Gora Ebrahim and Karim Bassack, Guido Magome, Naijuka, Jenerali Ulumwengu, and Chenga wa Change. Many of these people have been Marxists. This for a time gave the paper a certain ideological homogeneity, and helped provoke friction. Ochieng, for instance, found himself in conflict with Mkapa, a man of nationalist rather than Marxist inclination, and was dismissed. A similar fate befell Naijuka at an earlier date.

Some indication of the importance of The Standard as an intellectual institution may be obtained from a brief outline of the tourism debate which took place in its columns from May 1970 to August 1970. In Tanzania attitudes to tourism have been characterized by ambivalence.


2. Philip Ochieng was dismissed although he continued to work on a temporary basis. Guido Magome left to take up a position at the Co-operative College, Moshi.

3. Ebrahim and Bassack are two South African exiles who, while employed outside the Daily News, contribute a great many articles on foreign affairs, and especially liberation struggles.
Elements within TANU and the Government have clearly been troubled by the efficacy of the encouragement of tourism in a society which is supposedly committed to the development of a socialist economy and society. The debate revealed the perhaps unbridgeable gap between the younger members of the radical intelligentsia who wanted tourism to be assessed within the whole context of relations of dependence and underdevelopment, and the bureaucracy which, placed on the defensive by the force of the criticism of tourism, relied on limited economic and technical criteria to justify capital expenditure on its development.

The tourism debate began with the publication in *The Standard* of a paper entitled "Tourism and Socialist Development in Tanzania" prepared by the University College Branch of the TUL. The paper raised doubts about the actual value of foreign exchange earnings from tourism, pointing out statistical deficiencies and difficulties, and arguing that many of the items necessary for the maintenance of tourism had to be imported. If industrial policy were re-oriented to produce these tourist goods, it would mean that the basic needs of Tanzanians would not be able to be satisfied. The paper added that even if the tourist could be shown to be an important foreign exchange earner, this is not the sole criterion for "gauging the importance of a particular activity to our national economy." Furthermore, if investment in tourism does lead to a rise in GNP, this is no indication of "whether or not the economy is developing on socialist lines and whether such a rise will be sustained, i.e. whether the economy is autoexpansive." The paper doubted whether tourism created many employment opportunities and gave stimulus to secondary industry.

Employment opportunities could never be isolated from the long-term aim of restructuring the economy: the question whether it was cheaper to create a job in the tourist industry or in a textile industry had to take this into account. Tourism was hardly likely to generate the development of skilled manpower, and to lead to the development of an industrially oriented economy. The secondary industry tourism would most likely develop would be the souvenir industry which is not to be confused with "small-scale industries" or "cottage industries". Tourism was unlikely, through the provision of capital projects, to stimulate regional development, and was more likely to widen the gap between urban and rural areas. An improvement in social services is unlikely to result, simply because improvements tend to be tied to the needs or requirements of the tourist.

The paper argues that the cultural benefits to be derived from tourism are at best doubtful. To the argument that tourism helps "develop indigenous folklore", the paper retorts that this is to divorce culture from its socio-economic foundations and to ignore the point that the cultural influence is more likely to be on the recipient society than on the encapsulated tourist: "The flooding of tourists from western capitalist countries is only helping to rebourgeoisify our own people and especially the local petty-bourgeoisie." Tourism is capable of making workers and peasants aliens in their own capital city, and of turning it into a vast brothel, "the fate which is fast engulfing Nairobi." The paper also notes that "the ways and values we import through tourism are in no way compatible with our aspiration to build a rural based ujamaa society", and concludes by arguing that tourism cannot be viewed simply in terms of limited economic criteria, for that is part of the "compartmentalization of the study of society"
and society itself" which characterizes bourgeois society. It must be examined within the "holistic approach" which is essential for socialist development.

After publication of a number of letters, considerable momentum was given to the debate by an article by Frank Mitchell, at that time a Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies at the University College, Nairobi. Mitchell objected to the TTL statement's criticism of compartmentalization, arguing that such was essential if the government were to "analyze rationally the alternatives confronting it." He attempted to establish that an "understanding of wholes can only be approached by understanding parts", and that there is a difference between facts and values, a distinction which failed to emerge very clearly in his own analysis. The tenor of his statistically documented argument is that tourism does result in a considerable net gain of foreign exchange, and that it is much better value than, for example, a textile factory which requires exorbitant tariff protection, and leads to price rises in the commodities produced which adversely affect the people in the villages. He notes that "there are few 'infant' industries in East Africa which have outgrown their need for protection. The more common pattern seems to be that 'infant' industries become 'juvenile delinquents' which require even larger amounts of subsidy from the public in adolescence than they did at birth." He dismisses as confused the TTL's argument that the needs and demands of the tourist industry are not contemporaneous with those of the people, and that tourism, apart from gaining revenues through indirect taxation, does not produce inequalities of income distribution.

but rather produces some gain for people in the rural areas who are able to produce handicrafts for the tourists. Mitchell concedes that tourism creates fewer urban high pay occupations per pound invested than many manufacturing industries, but suggests that this is something in favour of tourism. He in effect subscribes to the largely discredited "labour aristocracy" view, suggesting that urban workers are exploiters of the suffering rural population. He largely brushes aside the social and cultural effects of tourism as of little consequence, and makes no attempt at rebuttal of the TLY statement's criticisms.

Understandably, the response to Mitchell's article was considerable and at times vitriolic. Karim Hirji concentrated on his treatment of holistic approaches and compartmentalization, pointing out that when the TLY members advocated a 'holistic approach' they were not advocating the "impossible task of taking into consideration all aspects of the complex reality when analyzing any phenomena." In similar vein, J.L. Kanywanyi, a lecturer in Law, pointed out that what the students are questioning is the bourgeois approach to analysis which aims and ends at analyzing parts exhaustively but neglects the relation of the parts to the whole in order to see clearly the interconnections between the two categories: how the parts constitute the whole and therefore what the nature of the whole is.

Mitchell's critics, including A.P. Mahiga, Hirji, and Kanywanyi repeatedly stressed that Tanzania's underdevelopment had to be seen in the context of inherited economic relations, which is something Mitchell

Completely failed to do. Mitchell, they argue, was solely interested in the profitability of an industry, and not whether it would help bring about a re-structuring of the economy along socialist lines. For this reason, his discussion of the relative benefits of the tourist industry and a textile industry was a spurious one.

Apart from Mitchell's article, relatively few letters to The Standard were sympathetic to the promotion of tourism. It was only after almost four months had elapsed that the Ministry of Information and Tourism, under considerable pressure from readers of The Standard, responded to the criticisms. The reply began by stating that the critics were conducting their case in a "theoretical manner divorced from the realities of both the Tanzanian experience and the Tanzanian objectives." The essence of the Ministry's reply was that tourism, as a profitable industry, was desirable, and should continue to receive substantial capital investment simply because it was already a part of the Second Five Year Plan. Tanzania, the reply pointed out, is developing a socialist economy which requires the development of "correct socialist institutions". In order to comply with this objective, the Tanzania Tourist Corporation had been created to effect socialist management of tourism. Little attention was given in the reply to the socio-cultural or political implications of tourism, which were described as "exaggerated". The reply did not meet any of the major objections of the critics and indeed, used the type of limited economic criteria which the critics were so vehemently condemning.

Above all, the reply made no attempt to demonstrate how tourism fitted into broader strategies of economic transformation and self-reliance in Tanzania.

The nationalization of much of the press, as in Tanzania, does not necessarily lead to a loss of "press freedom". The nationalization of The Standard and its merger with the TANU paper The Nationalist under the editorship of Ben Mkapa in the Daily News did not initially result in parochialism and loss of critical concern. It was precisely because The Standard and its successor the Daily News were government papers that they enjoyed far more critical concern than either the East African Standard and the Daily Nation, both of which have been restricted by foreign ownership and an unpredictable informal censorship stemming from an ill-defined ruling ideology and a "culture of silence" which operates to stifle criticism of government policy. It is arguable that even if the press in Kenya were nationalized, it would still make for critical sterility given the nature of the political system.

The Daily News, and The Standard before it, have benefited from the fact that they have been government organs operating within a reasonably clear ideological framework. This framework has provided scope for diversity. As Bienen argues, there has been a "mistaken tendency to equate the ideology of TANU with Nyerere's ideas" and to associate the ideas of one man with the "belief systems of a whole society." The press - the Nationalist from 1965 to 1966, and later The Standard and Daily News, has provided an intellectual forum in which a diversity of ideas have been presented and vigorously discussed - from ujamaa, to orthodox Marxism-Leninism in the writings of Ochieng and Ulimwengu, to expressions of cultural nationalism. Government ownership has

1. In an interview (26/7/1973) Guido Magome pointed out that the Daily News's feature writers found their own material, and discussed issues and topics with the editor at meetings. The major limitation on their journalistic activity was that they had to work within TANU ideology.

2. Bienen, p.205.
eased the pressure to trivialize in order to capture a larger reading public. This allowed The Standard and Daily News to publish hundreds of articles by young intellectuals which would never have found their way into either the Kenya or Uganda press. The Marxist-Leninist orientation of Frene Ginwalla, which continued to influence The Standard and Daily News even after her dismissal, fostered an international outlook while at the same time promoting an intellectualism which is reflected in the theoretically grounded articles on ujamaa, capitalism, culture, and national and Third World liberation.

Yet in spite of the diversity which has flourished at times, real limits exist. Ginwalla was sacked, for example, as Managing Editor of The Standard and Sunday News. Her handling of domestic issues had obviously aroused antagonism, but it was her handling of a foreign issue which brought about her dismissal. The July 29th, 1971 editorial in The Standard attacked President Numeiry who was ousted for 48 hours in the Sudan by a communist backed coup. The Standard described Numeiry's round-up of his opponents as "a senseless witch hunt." The editorial said

They have paid the penalty of not behaving with the viciousness and brutality that has characterized General Numeiry's return to power. It is a lesson that will not be lost on future plotters.

The editorial came at a time when Nyerere was enjoying extremely cordial relations with Numeiry. Shortly after Ginwalla's departure, Richard Gott, Rod Prince, and Tony left the paper, having earlier been given notice by the President.

Tanzanian and Kenyan Press Coverage of Foreign Affairs

The Kenyan press coverage of foreign news is limited. As part of official policy, local news predominates.\(^1\) Foreign news reports are generally short and come via official news agencies, and there are few in-depth and critical feature articles. The mass media, and especially the radio and television, adopts a "radical" terminology to describe events in Southern Africa—"rebel" Ian Smith and his "racist" regime, Vorster's "fascist" government. The radicalism seems to lie in the vehemence with which words are expressed or written. The terminology adopted in relation to Southern and "Portuguese" Africa is in strong contrast to reports on S.E. Asia, South Vietnam, Israel and Palestinian liberation. In the case of S.E. Asia, the terminology comes directly from U.S. news sources. The Tanzanian press, on the other hand, uses a terminology which is grounded in a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist vocabulary. Whereas in Kenya, press treatment of South Vietnam would involve reference to "government forces" and "rebel troops", in Tanzania such reference would be to "troops of the puppet regime" and "national liberation forces". A much more fundamental difference, which is symptomatic of ruling ideological differences, is demonstrated in relation to press treatment of the Middle East conflict. The Tanzanian press has adopted a strong pro-Palestinian liberation stance, in line with government policy. Israel is viewed primarily as an agent of U.S. imperialism.\(^2\) In Kenya, which continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, the press stance has been, if not pro-Israeli,

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1. This of course reaches the height of absurdity when on the VOK radio news bulletin, for instance, the transfer of a police officer in a remote district takes precedence over international events of major importance.

at least "neutral" in the sense that reports are not concerned to place
the conflict within an imperialist-anti-imperialist framework.

In contrast to Kenya, in Tanzania until recently the press had a
very good foreign news coverage, although the bias was obvious —
African, European, Middle Eastern, Asian, North American and Latin
American affairs received coverage but the emphasis was principally
on "revolutionary" regimes and liberation struggles. Far less reliance
has been placed on news from official sources and news agencies, and
more attention given to lengthy feature articles written by staff
writers and foreign commentators. Two South African exiled Marxist
journalists, Gora Ebrahim and Karim Essack, have been responsible for
a good many of the critical articles on liberation struggles in
Southern Africa, S.E. Asia, and the Middle East. Jenerali Ulumwengu
has also contributed articles on liberation struggles, in late 1972
publishing a series of six on Frelimo in Mozambique. 1

Southern African affairs (and for that matter the Middle East,
Latin America, and S.E. Asia) have concerned Tanzanian intellectuals
much more than their Kenyan counterparts. This is accounted for in
part by Tanzania's special position vis-a-vis African liberation move-
ments and the colonial powers. Tanzania has been an active supporter
of African liberation struggles, and has been directly involved through
support of Frelimo-Tanzanian villages along the Southern border with
Mozambique have been bombed by Portuguese planes. Tanzania has also
been the base for a number of other liberation movements — SWAPO, MFLA,
for instance, and has been indirectly involved with Rhodesia through
its association with Zambia and support for the Zimbabwean liberation

1. See his articles in the following issues of the Daily News: 2/11/1972,
movements. This concern with liberation also stems from the ideological position of many of the Tanzanian journalists. As Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist influenced intellectuals, they tend to view events in the Third World as part of a broad historical process, and within a systematic, coherent ideological framework.

The Press in Uganda

During the colonial period, most of the East African newspapers which were directed at an African public were sponsored either by missions or by government. In Uganda the missions were instrumental in laying the foundations of an African press. Munno, the Luganda language daily founded in 1911 by the Catholic White Fathers has been the most successful. In 1970 it had a circulation of about 2000, and its editor was Fr. Stephen Mukasa. The enforced exile of the Kabaka in 1953 transformed the paper into a political as well as religious organ, and it later became the mouthpiece of the Democratic Party. Munno is only the most enduring of a great many, often localized, mission papers. More recent mission papers include: Ageeteerwine (1959), a Runyankore/Rukiga fortnightly with a circulation of about 6,500; Erwon K' iteso (Teso news founded in 1957), an Ateso fortnightly with a circulation of 5,500; the English Leadership, a monthly founded in 1957 with a circulation of 10,000; Lobo Nawa (Our Land), a Lwo fortnightly first published in 1952; Musizi, a Luganda monthly founded in 1955 with a circulation of 30,000; and, the English-language The Nila Gazette, founded in 1958.

Uganda was the one East African country which possessed the preconditions for the emergence of an African press. As we have already seen intense missionary activity by the C.M.S., the French-speaking
White Fathers, and the Dutch-speaking Mill Hill Fathers, led to the rapid expansion of both primary and secondary education. Buganda's combination of a prosperous ruling class, and the highest literacy rate in East Africa, led to the emergence of the earliest African newspapers there. Much of this newspaper activity was centred in Katwe, a village just outside Kampala. Most of the papers were poorly produced and short-lived. *Ebitu mu Uganda* began in 1907. *Gombase* was established in 1927, and in the following year, *Bbozo Iye Buganda* began publication. After World War II, a number of new papers were set-up. In 1953, for instance, two Luganda dailies, the *Uganda Eyogera*, and *Uganda Emyяa* (now Taifa Emyяа) were established. The former served as the campaign voice of the Uganda National Congress. Both papers spearheaded the fight to bring back the Kabaka from exile, and led a successful campaign to boycott the Uganda Royal visit of 1954. At a much later date another Luganda language daily, *Ssekanyolya*, was used to promote the Mengo Government. It was banned by Obote and closed.

After the independence the Uganda Government established a number of government-owned and directed newspapers, the most successful of which was the Luo, *Dwer Lwak*. These papers had their origins in the Colonial Government's Information Department and the rationale for their creation was best expressed in the Legislative Assembly in 1952 as: "A government without a well-developed information service is like a dumb man trying to win an election." The aims of the government-owned press in the independence period were basically the same as those of the colonial government: to link people more closely with the

1. *Uganda Eyogera* was edited by Joseph Kiwanuka. See entry in Appendix I for biographical detail.

2. The Proprietor/Editor of *Uganda Emyяa* ("New Uganda") was Eridadi Mulira, who had been Editor of *Ebitu mu Uganda* in 1946-47.

administration by telling them what the government was doing and why; to create confidence in the economic and social measures adopted by the government; to kill and combat subversive propaganda; to publicize Uganda abroad; to raise the standard of the local press; and, to provide papers for those areas not adequately served by the commercial papers. The Government Information Service started Omukulambaze in 1963. It was published in Luganda, and remained the smallest of the daily newspapers, its circulation never rising above 4,000. The decision to establish such a paper in the Luganda language, in competition with both Munno and Taifa Bayya, apparently reflected a desire on the part of the Uganda Government to counteract the influence of the Kabaka in Buganda.

The indigenous nationalist papers which sprang up after World War II failed to survive independence. This left only those which were foreign-owned or tied to sectional interests - papers in vernacular languages, and Luganda in particular. Joseph Kiwanuka's English-language Uganda Express was a poorly produced but aggressively nationalist paper which was never able to overcome its financial difficulties. It depended for its livelihood on advertising, and this, being controlled by Asians and Europeans, was never readily forthcoming. It was also harrassed by regular court action for libel and sedition and, in 1955, along with the Uganda Post and Uganda Kyogera, was suspended under emergency regulations.¹ The Uganda Mail, which was founded in 1954, quickly died through its failure to attract European patronage or African readership. The Uganda Times, which was often described "as being a stooge of the colonial Government", failed because of its lack of trained manpower.²

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¹. Ibid., p.29.
². Ibid.
The Uganda Herald was the longest surviving of the English-language papers, having been established in 1912. Commercially successful, the paper relied on a British expatriate public and included columns such as "Home News". It was owned by an immigrant planter and businessman, and its long run was brought to an end by the advent of the Standard's Uganda Argus in January 1955. Unlike the Herald, the Uganda Argus sought to broaden its readership, and move beyond the limited expatriate base. It was sympathetic to the nationalist movement but was much more reserved in its advocacy of it than the earlier African owned nationalist papers. Thus, at the time of independence, Uganda had two English language newspapers, both of which were foreign-owned. The first was the Argus; the second was the Nation Series' shortlived Uganda Nation which had local directors.

The People

The People was an English weekly, published for the first time in March 1964. It was owned by the Uganda Press Trust Ltd. which received sponsorship from the Milton Obote Foundation, the New York based Peace with Freedom Incorporated, and an organization called World Wide Partnership, Bonn. The Trust had as its Chairman a senior UPC man, Erisa Kironde. Kironde had been a teacher at King's College, Budo, and a lecturer at Makerere. He had written and adapted plays, and was a director of both the Nommo Gallery and Transition magazine. He was also a Governor of the Milton Obote Foundation. Apart from Kironde, the directors of the Trust included three UPC M.P.'s representing the Foundation, and three representatives of each of the overseas organizations. The editor of The People was Efeker Ejalu.

The People was essentially an unofficial party paper which, as
Ainslie points out, "tended to find itself trapped between two roles—on the one hand as unofficial spokesman for the Government, and on the other as independent 'popular' paper."¹ It certainly did indulge in trivia, especially in its first two years. It was short on international news, contained an excess of fashion and pop news, and used a great deal of syndicated feature material.

Events in the Congo in early 1965, however, certainly stirred the political commitment of The People, a commitment which it maintained. The editorials during the period from January to March were devoted to the Congo and made an impassioned plea for an end to foreign intervention. United States policy was attacked, and Tshombe subjected to bitter invective. Mercenary activities were condemned unreservedly.

The People during its years of existence, maintained a concerted attack on Buganda and Baganda traditions. This reflected in part the desire of Obote to break Baganda power and destroy feudalism. It was also a reflection of the composition of the People's journalistic staff, many of whom were from Acholi/Lang'o country which had been subjected to Baganda sub-imperialism.² The Acholi/Lang'o cultural re-assertion and intellectual awakening was as much a reaction to Baganda sub-imperialism as it was the British. During the crisis of 1966, which led ultimately to the attack on the Kabaka's palace and his flight, The People maintained a persistent attack on the Kabaka and Buganda, and was the mouthpiece of Obote and the UPC's policy.³

The People was an important African intellectual outlet in Uganda.

¹ Ainslie, p.117.
³ Nelson, p.31. After some soul searching, The People decided to publish the Kabaka's polemical account of his demise The Desecration of My Kingdom, principally on the grounds that publication would further undermine the position of the Kabaka and Buganda.
Makerere, and its publications such as the Makerere Journal were dominated by expatriate academics. The Uganda Argus and the vernacular press provided little outlet for the discussion of ideas. The People, with its letter-to-the-editor column, and its encouragement of contributions from non-journalist intellectuals, provided an intellectual forum in a society still very much under the influence of the expatriate academic and intellectual presence. Writers such as Ficho Ali, Ali Mazrui, Ahmed Mohiddin, B.J. Tajani, Chango Machyo, Okello Oculi, and John Kala used The People to disseminate their ideas. Questions such as the role of African universities and especially Makerere, the nature of post-independence education, and the meaning of African socialism were mooted and vigorously discussed. Mohiddin, for instance contributed three articles on the nature of socialism. Oculi from 1969 to Obote's ouster by Amin, wrote a regular column of comment. After the coup The People continued to publish, but its close association with Obote made its existence precarious and it was soon closed, leaving an unfilled gap in Ugandan intellectual life.

The East African Press and "Modernization"

This brief outline of the nature and historical development of the East African press and journalism raises many profound doubts about the usefulness of those sections of modernization theory which concern communications, and by extension, about the whole body of modernization theory. A good deal of the work on communications suffers from all the worst biases and defects of artificial dichotomies and blatant

Burocentricities. For example, it is often argued, in line with much sociological work concerned with differentiation of role and function that

the mass media dimension of the modern communications process not only is comparatively independent of other social and political processes, but also constitutes a distinctive industry in both an economic and social sense. Both as an industry and as a profession the modern field of communications tends to generate an ethos and a relatively distinct set of norms for guiding its functions. 1

It is then postulated that the "modern" communications profession is characterized by the assumption that "the objective and unbiased reporting of events is possible and desirable and that the sphere of politics in any society can be best observed from a neutral or non-partisan perspective." 2 "Traditional" communications processes, on the other hand, are characterized by partisanship: they tend to be so closely "wedded to social and political processes that the very act of receiving and transmitting messages called for some display of agreement and acceptance." 3 Hence, the emergence of professionalized communications is related to the development of an objective, analytical, non-partisan view of politics; "professional communicators perform their distinctive role as men who understand politics but are not of politics." 4

Undoubtedly Pye's elaboration of the criteria for a "modern" communications profession very much reflects a strong American bias. In the United States, an ethos of "professional" journalism, disseminated through schools of journalism, stresses "objective", "unbiased" reporting, and is much more firmly entrenched than it is in Britain or throughout Europe.

1. Ibid., p.78.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.79.
Thus, anyone accepting such a theoretical perspective would clearly have to conclude that the East African press is predominantly "traditional": firstly, because it is enmeshed in politics; secondly, because there is a good measure of government and party control, and the press is not independent of other social and political processes; and thirdly, because there is no journalistic or professional community as such whose behaviour is governed by norms stressing objectivity and non-partisanship.

However, we may raise the objection that "objective neutrality" is not even found in so-called "modern" societies, or dismiss the traditional-modern dichotomy as being beside the point, the mere mental aberration of an MIT social scientist carried away with his misconstrued Weberian typologies. The obvious inference to be gleaned from Pye's classification is that there is something pernicious or shameful about engage journalism; most African journalists would invert the inference, suggesting that not to be engaged is shameful.

As can be seen from the brief overview of the East African press, during the colonial period the distinction between writer, journalist and politician was a difficult one to make. The writer and journalist were committed to ideas and to the furtherance of the anti-colonial struggle, usually as part of a political party or association, and had no truck with "professional" standards of detachment and non-partisanship. Indeed, the African, as distinct from the European press, really knew no existence outside the realms of social activism and political nationalism.

The professionalization of journalism which, as Passin points out, "seems to follow an even moderate measure of economic growth", has not in East Africa, partly because of its incompleteness, resulted
in the "sundering of the close union of literature, politics, and journalism."¹ In the post-independence situation the Kenya press has moved closest to this situation principally because it is controlled by two—foreign-owned press groups which are anxious to maintain their "independence" in the face of government hostility. Where however, as in Tanzania and to a lesser extent in Uganda, the press is largely controlled by government and party, and is seen as an agency of propagation and politicization, the union has not been severed.

Journalism is not governed by distinct professional norms stressing objectivity and detachment simply because it is enmeshed in the whole process of propagation and justification of ideology and policy, as well as image building. And, as Rajat Neogy, the editor-founder of Transition indicates.

East Africa even as a whole is a small area, and there is a forced intimacy with news factors between people who make the news and those who report it. It is now too small for objective reporting.... There is a well-known axiom that if you are a political commentator you should never dine out with a politician. In East Africa this is literally impossible. You cannot keep this kind of objectivity and this deprives the press of its ideal detachment. ²

Most East African journalists whether full- or part-time, would find difficulty in accepting the assumption that a "modern" communications profession is governed by the objective, analytical, neutral, and non-partisan view of politics.³ Tanzanian journalists certainly, and a good many Kenyan ones as well, view journalism as an extension, or integral part of social or political activism. Guido Magome of the Daily News, for instance, viewed his role as one of "learning from the people" and of trying to help propagate party policy, "but with

3. The writer does not wish to imply that East African journalists reject out of hand notions of objectivity and analysis. The view which they accept is that analysis can never be freed from value biases and that analysis, informed by some body of theory, must be geared to certain important social tasks.
criticism." His task was to operate within the socialist national ideology and to criticize those "who divert the society from the course of socialist development." Leading authors and intellectuals have consistently performed journalistic tasks and engaged in political reporting and criticism. This has stemmed partly from the legacy of activism which they inherited from the colonial period and also, as we shall subsequently see, from a search for a viable social activist role in an environment which gives little recognition and support to intellectual activity. In Kenya, many of the leading commentators - Aloo Ojuka, Christopher Mulei, Magaga Alot and the late Cyrus Kamundia, have been part-time journalists who have viewed this activity as, apart from an additional source of livelihood, an extension of political activism.

Of course, some communications theorists would argue that the development of a professional journalistic ethos "becomes deeply enmeshed in the general problems of the writer's emergence from a traditional role." African journalists are still in the process of disengaging themselves from the tradition of the writer, and are hampered by the intrusion of a political legacy and social and political forces which impinge upon the journalist's work and prevent the emergence of attitudes of detachment and objectivity. However, to talk of such disengagement in the African case is to stumble into the trap of generalizations rooted in the Asian experience.

2. See Chapter IX of this thesis on this point.
3. The literary intellectual is unable to rely on his writing for a livelihood. Creative writers in Africa, and elsewhere, find it necessary to supplement their incomes, or make a living, from something other than writing. Journalism is an important supplementary source. See Passin, pp.113-114.
4. Fye, p.81
throughout most of Africa was the first form of literary activity.¹

A few historical, autobiographical, anthropological and sociological works appeared soon after the initial imposition of colonial rule, but the African literary consciousness surfaced first in journalism. In societies where a rich written literary heritage existed before the growth of the press, such as China, India, and Japan, the question of disengagement from the writer's tradition is pertinent, but whether it is a major problem depends on the value assumptions of the scholar.

In any one East African state it is doubtful if there exists a journalistic community with a "strong sense of independent professional standards."² This is in part attributable to economic underdevelopment which makes it impossible for the society to support a full community of professional communicators. It is also due to the high incidence of part-time journalists who are concerned much more with journalism as an extension of social activism than as a distinct profession with certain operational standards and a particular ethos. In Tanzania, many journalists on the Standard and the Daily News were seconded or directed from other positions and, after serving a couple of years as journalists, transferred to other posts.³ There are, nevertheless, some journalists (Peter Mwaura of the Sunday Nation for

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1. Of course there is a rich and varied oral literary tradition, and in those areas which came under Islamic influence, a written one. But throughout most of Sub-Saharan African, the modern written literary tradition was introduced by European missionaries and colonial rule. Christian churches played a key role in providing a basis for literary activity with the compilation of dictionaries, and the translation of religious works, the Bible in particular, into vernacular languages. This early work was carried out largely by Europeans, and not Africans. See F.N. Obiechina, "Growth of Written Literature in English-Speaking West Africa", Presence Africaine, No.66, 1968, pp.58-78.

2. Fye, p.79.

3. Guido Magome, for instance, didn't apply for journalism. He was posted to it. Interview.
example) who think in terms of the press as a distinct social entity which has to perform certain key functions.¹

Even if a journalistic community does not exist, journalists as intellectuals share some common attitudes and misgivings which, even in Tanzania, help distance them from government and party. They are, above all, hostile to government interference and censorship - the stifling of intellectual debate which prevents the development of a viable "critical tradition."² It has been such interference which has at times led the journalist to reiterate the role of the press in society. In the words of Peter Mwaura

The raison d'etre of newspapers and other mass media is to supply the information needs of the citizenry so as to enable them to make intelligent decisions.... Many issues in the world today have so many facets, so many possible implications, that the ordinary newspaper reader needs to be fed, not just with surface news, but with in-depth interpretative and analytical news. Only then does he stand a chance of beginning to understand the complex issues of the day and be in a position to react to them intelligently.... That is the hallmark of democracy; and the justification for having newspapers and other mass media. ³

East African Journals

It is only in a peripheral way that the major problems facing East African journals relate to those of the press. Their problems are not so much ones of overcoming external financial control, or critical inhibition, and overcoming a heritage closely identified with the former colonial power as of relating to and reaching a local public. Relations of intellectual dependence are important simply because so many journals are dependent for their survival, not only on foundation grants, but on


2. For a detailed discussion of this point, consult Chapter VI of this thesis.

the subscriptions of overseas readers and institutions as well. Thus, in a real sense, they are alienated from the readership of the society they purport to serve, and are locked into an international intellectual orbit which helps determine both their intellectual concerns and the national composition of their contributors and advisory boards. At the same time in Tanzania in particular, and to a lesser extent in Kenya and Uganda, the role of the journal in developing a critical intellectual tradition and contributing to social and political change has been subjected to increasingly searching scrutiny.

With the possible exceptions of Choche and its successor, Maji Maji, East African journals appear to have no consistent editorial policy, nor to have acted as the mouthpieces of particular ideological groupings. In most cases, frequent editorial changes, promoted often by the undergraduate origins and nature of journals (Penpoint, dhana, Busara) prevent any consistent, coherent policy from emerging or crystallizing. The journals, while they often have a hard core of contributors, depend for contributions from a heterogeneous group, including a large number of expatriates, which possesses no value or ideological integration. This is essentially a function both of the size of the intellectual stratum, and the stratum's dependent interconnections with the academic and intellectual world of Europe and North America.

In the West Journals such as the New York Review of Books, the Monthly Review, Commentary, and the Socialist Register have a hard core of contributors (they are almost incestuous) and an identifiable, clear ideological stance. In contrast Journals like the now defunct East Africa Journal and shala did have a consistent list of contributors, but they also wrote for other journals, and there was always a constantly changing list of personnel. The overlap of journal
contributors, apart from stemming from the limited size of the intellectual stratum and the limited number of outlets, stemmed from the fact that so many intellectuals, the younger ones especially, were much more concerned with getting published than with writing for a particular journal. This is not to deny that at least initially, *Transition* and the *East Africa Journal* were clearly the most prestigious in terms of contributors and readership.

If most journals haven't been characterized by a coherent ideological identity, they have developed a certain uniformity in the composition of their editorial boards and editorial advisers. The same intellectuals appear with almost monotonous regularity on the editorial boards: Mazrui, co-editor of *Mawazo*, associate editor of *the African Review* and *Transition*, member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*; E.A. Ogot, editor of the *East Africa Journal*, and member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*; P. Kimambo, associate editor of the *East Africa Journal* and *The African Review*, and a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*. The long list of international editorial advisers on journals such as *Mawazo* and the *African Review* has been principally an attempt on the part of the editors to internationally legitimize them (external cultural validation and recognition) and integrate local intellectual activity into an international academic or intellectual scene. This has also been reflected in the composition of the contributors. The following table provides a breakdown of authors of articles and reviews which appeared in *Transition* between 1965 and 1970.
The greatest number of articles, on both African and non-African subjects, were written by non-Africans from the western world; and of these the majority had relatively little experience in Africa. A similar pattern existed for the East Africa Journal. In contrast to Hawazo, Transition, and The African Review, the basically undergraduate and literary journals such as Chala, Darlite, Urama, Nexus, Zuka, Busara, Penpoint, dhana, and Taamuli, have been of little interest or relevance to most expatriate academics and intellectuals, in contribution terms.

The main intellectual and literary journals in East Africa cater for a limited public. The East Africa Journal had a circulation of about 3000, and a good many of its readers were located overseas.


2. Using 5 years in Africa as a dividing point, 38 of the articles were written by those with less than 5 years, 19 from those with more. Ibid.

3. Of the articles by Africans, 6 were written by Ali Mazrui, and the American Paul Theroux contributed 4 articles and 1 review, as well as other notes, letters etc.
The following journals in 1972 had subscription sales as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The African Review</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busara</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East African Law Review</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Historical Association Journal</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Eastern African Research and Development</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-African Journal</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umma</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They rely overwhelmingly on institutional subscriptions for their existence, the bulk of which come from North America, and United States universities in particular. (See Appendix 3 for greater detail).

The Pan-African Journal is only nominally an East African journal and its origins in the United States are reflected in its subscription figures: 88% in the United States. Out of the 423 subscriptions in 1972, only 30 were from East Africa, and 26 of these were Kenyan institutional subscriptions. The African Review, at least in terms of its editorial advisers, has a similar international orientation, but its origins in the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam have ensured that in Tanzania and Kenya it enjoys a measure of support, the bulk of that being institutional. Even so, only about 1/3 of its subscription support is East African; another 1/3

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1. These journals are all published by the East African Literature Bureau and, unlike the East Africa Journal, are not readily available in bookshops and at newsstands. Over the countersales in East Africa would be unlikely to increase circulation at all substantially. Sales could be boosted if the publishers sent batches of them to bookshops on American university campuses, black universities, and Harlem outlets. However, the problem of "Who is my audience"? would become even more acute.
is North American based. The East African Law Review also draws considerable outside support, 76% of its subscriptions being of non-African origin. The situation is much the same with the literary journals: 120 of Busara's subscriptions come from outside East Africa, and 86 from North America; 76 of Umma's 111 subscriptions were from outside East Africa; and 32 of dhana's subscriptions in 1972 were from outside East Africa.

One of the most significant, and surprising features of journal distribution in East Africa, especially given Makerere's prominence and the founding of Transition, is the small amount of subscriptional support for journals in Uganda. In 1972 there were only two private subscriptions for the Kenya Historical Association Review; 13 subscriptions for The African Review; 4 for Umma, including 3 private; 7 for Busara; and 6 for the East African Law Review (5 institutional).

dhana, which is a Makerere-based literary journal, had only 8 Ugandan private subscribers (cf. Kenya 12 and Tanzania 11), and only 4 institutional subscribers (cf. Kenya 35, and Tanzania, 4). The small number of Ugandan subscriptions may be attributable in part to the origins of the journals in other East African states, and the patterns of East African Literature Bureau distribution and sales promotion. Of the three East African states, Kenya has a much larger number of institutional subscribers than the other two. This is accounted for largely by secondary schools. For instance, of the 267 institutional subscriptions in Kenya for the Kenya Historical Association Review, 279 came from educational institutions, mainly secondary schools — indeed, all secondary schools, under a directive from the Ministry of Education, receive the journal. The institutional subscriptions in Kenya, especially from secondary schools, at least raises the
possibility that intellectual journals are capable of reaching a much larger public than sales or subscription figures would superficially suggest. (There is no guarantee that the students will read them). However, this does not alter the conclusion that first, a good deal of the readership is outside East Africa and consists of professional "Africanists", and their students and second, that much of the material destined for United States University libraries which have purchasing standing orders for journals and books, simply languishes and rots in desuetude.

**Journals in Uganda: The Importance of Transition Magazine**

In a chronological, if not intellectual sense, the fore-runners of East African journals were the Tanganyika Notes and Records (1937) and the Uganda Journal both of which, until recently, remained the preserve of Europeans, often colonial civil servants, who indulged their esoteric interests in archaeology, anthropology, linguistics and so on. The first literary journal of any consequence for Africans was the Ugandan Penpoint which began in 1958. Its origins lay in the English Department at Makerere, and it was never able to surmount its undergraduate origins (which was never its intention anyway). Nevertheless, like many of the later journals such as Nexus and Busara, it provided an outlet for the newly surfacing literary consciousness of young writers, and as a literary and intellectual testing ground. James Ngugi (now Ngugi wa Thiong'o) is a former editor, as are Jonathan Kariara and Peter Nazareth. Among the well-known writers who first found a public through Penpoint are David Rubadiri, John Nagenda, the playwright John Ruganda, Laban Erapu, and Davis Sedukima. In 1971, after its publication was taken
over by the East African Literature Bureau, it became dhana (Swahili word meaning "thought" or "idea"). The quality of its publication improved tremendously, but the nature of the material remained essentially the same.

Transition was the first major intellectual journal on the East African scene. As such it has been vital, performing an important catalytic role. For the first time, young East African writers and intellectuals were introduced to West African and Caribbean literature, and to debates about negritude. It was not until the creation of the East Africa Journal in 1964 that Transition had a serious local rival. And it was not until 1967 that the East Africa Journal opened its pages to include literary contributions.

Transition was founded by Rajat Neogy, a young Ugandan poet of Goan descent, and has reflected in its choice of material and editorial policy, his particular intellectual orientations. As Louis James has pointed out, Neogy "far from presenting any pattern of African culture... sets out to shock and disrupt the reader's conceptions."

According to Neogy, Transition should be a "do" magazine and not a "don't" magazine. However, a contradiction would appear to exist between the positive, "do" role that Neogy envisaged, and the fragmented, mirror-type role that he also posited for the journal. This contradiction was apparently resolved in Neogy's mind by the assertion that in the present African situation of conflict and flux, expressions reflecting the conflicting aspects amount to positive statements.


Neogy, like his associate editor Ali Mazrui, is universalistic in orientation. He has tried to widen the African debate about politics and culture by relying on a great many foreign contributors and by choosing subjects normally considered alien in an "African" magazine. In an interview in The People, Neogy elaborated upon this notion of universality. As editor of Transition he hoped "to create a living international dialogue through the magazine which ensures participation at the highest level between intellectual communities in Africa with their counterparts abroad."  

Furthermore, the editor's vision "should be short-sighted: to make the next issue as interesting and exciting as the first.... By the 'next issue' I mean it as a crystallization point of everything that has happened before (what you know), and what might happen in the future (what you see)."  

Neogy's opposition to systematization, his concern with debate and intellectual universality (similar to Mazrui's), and oftimes eclectic choice of material, tied in very much with his liberalism.

In October 1968, Neogy was arrested and detained by the Ugandan Government. Also detained with him was Abubakar Mayanja, a lawyer and former Minister of Education and Economic Planning in the Kabaka's Government. In a letter published in Transition, Mayanja had condemned the creation of an ideologically committed judiciary in Uganda. Both he and Neogy were charged with sedition. Before the trial, another letter writer to Transition, Davis Ssebukima, author of A Son of Kabira, was detained. Neogy and Mayanja were acquitted on the sedition charges but kept in detention. Neogy was deprived of his Ugandan citizenship; an action which provoked a great deal of misinformed reaction. As a spokesman for the Uganda Government

2. Ibid.
later pointed out, Neogy had dual citizenship—both British and Ugandan, which was prohibited under Ugandan law.

After his release from detention and expulsion, Neogy rose to the defence of Transition and the notion of the free press. To have continued publishing Transition in Uganda would have been a "betrayal of the principles that it stands for."

These principles include the belief that free and informal discussion has never overthrown any government; that detention without trial is politically and morally unjustifiable, that a free press and, therefore, a free society cannot exist in any country that uses "Emergency" regulations to intimidate its thinkers, writers, and others. 1

Neogy's detention, perhaps understandably, distorted his political perspective. The new issues which appeared from Transition's new Guandan home contained bitter, ill-informed diatribes against Obote, and uncritical support for the regime of his successor, Idi Amin Dada. 2

At a time when Amin was massacring his opponents, and Acoli-Lango military personnel were being slaughtered in the barracks, 3 Neogy and Transition were condemning Obote and reaffirming their belief in liberal values, including the free circulation of ideas, without much regard for the fundamental questions which Obote's overthrow and Amin's assumption of power raised about the nature of post-independence societies. Associate editor, Mazrui, at the same time, was envisaging greater freedom of discussion under the less "ideologically preoccupied" military although he was slightly troubled by their anti-political


2. See Transition, Nos. 38 (1971), 39, and 40. In the last issue, Philip Short, in an article entitled "Amin's Uganda" was able, despite abundant evidence of widespread violence, including fighting at the Baratra Barracks, to draw a basically sympathetic picture of Amin's regime.

3. This was reported extensively by David Martin, "Uganda soldiers in tribal pogrom", The Observer, 13/2/1972, pp. 1 & 2.
No African journal has aroused more sympathetic European and North American support, nor more vigorous local criticism, than Transition. To the writers of eulogistic letters whose happiness is unbounded at the sight of a new issue of the magazine, are juxtaposed the views of those who have played on its Congress for Cultural Freedom support, and its editor’s professed liberalism which has been viewed by them as, at best an anachronism in contemporary Africa, and at worst a dangerous stance capable of confusing the real nature of African problems. The thought uppermost in the minds of the critics has been that values have been defined and asserted in the abstract, without any real regard for the socio-economic and political complexities of contemporary African societies, or their position within overall relations of dependence. The editorial of No.39, for instance, which was written to villify Obote’s socialism and “move to the left”, revealed a strong anti-ideological disposition.

The dangers of ideologies whether from the left of the right, is the condescension implicit in their vision of the world formulas and patterns: they regard people, ordinary people, as nothing more than experimental fodder. We might further simplify this concept and say that the moment of theorizing marks the end of realism. This is why, in spite of all its clumsiness and its ungainliness, we believe in the democratic way of government.


2. Transition advertises itself by listing glowing reviews from the Washington Post, The Economist, The Sunday Times and other British and North American papers, and significantly, only one African paper, the defunct and formerly European owned Reporter of Nairobi. External cultural validation and recognition is clearly more important than African recognition. Transition was proud that Schlesinger and Lionel Trilling were readers, but indifferent to Obote. See E. Cameron Morton, p.2.

3. Every issue contains an abundance of eulogistic letters praising the journal’s freshness, liveliness, clarity, balance, coverage, and so on.
The Kenyan historian William Ochieng reacted strongly to the editorial, charging that "Democracy, as advocated by Western societies and their editors, is the bedrock of capitalist ideology, and the so-called democratic societies of the West are controlled by Euro-Christian principles and values which by emphasis on 'individual salvation, achievement and rights,' the which principles are some of the components of the capitalist ideology of exploitation and domination." It was, he adds, the capitalist democratic societies of Europe, which Neogy upholds as models, which during the colonial period were responsible for regarding ordinary Africans as "experimental fodder".

The anti-Chote issues emanating from the new Ghanaian home provoked considerable antagonism, including vitriolic letters from Mauri Yambo and Christopher Mulei. Mulei suggested the magazine was merely "a platform for some ineffective liberal talkie-talkee, but with the possible danger of confusing the African peoples." He continued:

the function of Transition is surely to be the antenna, not in a paternalistic but a genuine sense, of the African society. This would mean speaking out the truth-speaking of those who cannot defend themselves: the oppressed and the underprivileged.

The true challenge for Africa is that presented by the "international monopoly capitalists" and the "fight for the economic independence"

4. Ibid.
of Africa. True Africans are those who are prepared to fight imperialism to the end; not those who work from a "pedestal of non-concern" and who will "sell or betray Africa under the guise of intellectual detachment or to use that frightening phrase, 'non-partisanship'."¹ Such criticisms might superficially be viewed as rather empty radical cant, but they nevertheless possess a good deal of substantive content. A recent article entitled "Ideology and African Politics" by an expatriate American academic, E.O.G. Polson, provides a good example of what many African radical intellectuals have been attacking.

In this article Polson, after providing a brief overview of the historical development of the term ideology from the French philosophes through Marx to Mannheim, makes some well justified criticisms of often disparate bundles of tags and ideas which have been labelled ideologies in the African context.² He points out, without any serious attempt at substantiation, that socialism "has emerged as the characteristic ideology in Africa",³ and that "no single explanation of Africa's multifarious problems can be sufficient." He writes it is simplistic and extremely harmful to blame every problem in Africa on the imperialists and to see in socialism the answer. The lack of experience of most of Africa's leaders, the deprivation of education quite a number of them suffered in their youth, the lack of honesty and integrity in public life on the continent and the corresponding love of sordid materialism so prevalent in present-day African societies, the shortage of trained and experienced administrators, the existence of tribes and loyalties they generate to compete with loyalty to the nation, the lack of patriotism, the sheer irresponsibility of the educated classes - these and other

¹. Ibid.


deficiencies cannot all be legitimately blamed on imperialism. They have their roots in African societies themselves; they are generated by "late" development, this is, they are caused substantially by the beginnings of development and are exacerbated by the mere existence in half the world of already developed societies. 1

And yet, so many of the above problems are inexplicable without reference to the uneven impact of colonialism and Africa's absorption into the international capitalist economy. How do we explain the "sheer irresponsibility of the educated classes" without reference to the colonial education system and the model of modernization it provided its products? Or to colonial administrative patterns, and the types of independence bargains which were struck between the colonial power and nationalist leaders? Or to the structural location of "elites" in a political economy shaped by the interaction of dominant external forces and dependent internal ones?

Folson argues that ideology leads to authoritarianism, and to a situation in which the "Leader" is the "sole author, interpreter, and enforcer of ideology." He notes that President Kenyatta's attitude to socialism is "flexible", but fails to note that Kenya's ideology is not socialist but rather capitalist, and that rather than being centred in one man, is structurally embedded in important groups in Kenyan society. He adds that even in Tanzania, "Mwalimu's notions of socialism are the only ones allowed to be taught to Tanzanians", without acknowledging the vigorous and continuing debate about Tanzanian society and socialism, and the diversity which exists. Folson completely ignores the possibility that African ideologies are in large part a response to a situation of continuing

1. Ibid., p.15.
dependance, and have been aimed at countering the ideologies which were implanted during the colonial period and which present major barriers to economic development. Certainly, African ideologies have usually had little bearing on social reality, but Polson fails to ask whether the operative ideology is that which is occasionally given expression in manifestos and documents, or that which actually governs the behaviour of ruling groups.

The problem with Polson's article, which is symptomatic of a deeper Transition malaise, is that criticism is always directed at those leaders and societies which, despite their major flaws and shortcomings, could be labelled "progressive"—Ghana under Nkrumah, Uganda under Obote, and Tanzanian under Nyerere. The types of criticisms which Polson makes would be better directed at the Ivory Coast, or Kenya, or Malawi, which make no real pretence of being socialist, and which manifest the authoritarianism which is supposedly the product of ideological thinking.

A European critic of Transition, E. Cameron Morton, writing of Mazrui's article "Nkrumah—the Leninist Czar" and subsequent contributions to the magazine on the same subject, has drawn attention to the way in which supposedly balanced debate is deliberately constructed in a lop-sided fashion to ensure that the biases of the editor are driven home. In a passage worthy of full quotation, Morton argued that

Over the course of six issues, there appeared six articles and three letters (in varying degrees) against Dr. Nkrumah. On the other side: one article, one (one page) document and four letters. Even this does not tell the whole story: not only did the 'againsts' outnumber the 'fors' they out-weighted them in both terms of intellect and status. One has no concrete evidence to show that this stacking was

1. E. Cameron Morton was a member of staff of the Centre for continuing Education at Makerere University.
deliberate, but it need not have been... the effect was the same. A number of articles might have been commissioned from people like Thomas Hodgkin, more attention might have been paid to the role of the United States in the ruin of Ghana's economy and Nkrumah's subsequent fall. These things might have been done to present a more balanced view—especially when so much of the African press is owned and operated by outside and pro-Western interests. This is not to say that any or all of the attacks on Dr. Nkrumah were or were not justified—it is perhaps not as important as the fact that what LOOKED LIKE a one-sided appraisal was given. And on an issue as hot as Kwame Nkrumah that is a dangerous and inadequate performance. 1

A journal which started at almost the same time as Transition, was the Makerere-based Makerere Journal. Strikingly different in nature to Transition, for the first seven years of its existence it was a bastion of expatriate academicians, allowing British academics to indulge their often esoteric interests in a noticeably alien setting. In the first two years of publication, for instance, articles ranged from "Tanganyika in the Twenties", 2 to "Wordsworth and the Autobiographer", 3 to "William Blake", 4 and to "The Dionysian Principle and Jazz." 5 In 1967 it became Mawazo, a basically political and sociological journal which relied predominantly on European contributions for its analysis of contemporary African societies.

In Kenya the most prominent of the intellectual and literary journals was the East Africa Journal which began publication in 1964. During its nine year history, it published a wide range of articles on language, literature, education, music, the mass media, women, family planning, health and medicine, history, religion, economics,

4. Ibid., pp.38-49.
sociology, politics and African socialism. Every issue contained a short article of comment by iconoclasts on aspects of policy in East Africa, and a comprehensive book review section. In the early years it published articles by politicians, in particular by Tom Mboya, who responded to criticism of Sessional Paper No.10 by Ahmed Mohiddin and others in the pages of the East Africa Journal.

Odinge Odari, assisted by Said Kadhi, was the first editor of the East Africa Journal. He was followed by Oliver Litondo, who edited the journal in 1966 and 1967. The Kenyan historian, B.A. Ogot became the editor in 1968 and continued, with Philip Ochieng as his assistant editor, until the journal was forced to close in late 1972 for lack of funds. In May 1968, Dharam Chai, the present Director of the University of Nairobi, and John Okumu, the American trained political scientist and former head of the Department of Government at the same university, became associate editors, being joined two months later by Isaria Kimambo, the Tanzanian historian, and Terry Hirst, a British cartoonist and art lecturer at Kenyatta College.

The format of the East Africa Journal changed little over the years, although 1967 marked the appearance of a special literary edition to cater for the burgeoning literary activity throughout East Africa. After being guest edited by a number of prominent writers, including Ngugi wa Thiong'o, it settled down in 1968 as Chela under the editorship of Leonard Okola, a member of the East African Publishing House Staff and editor of a pioneer collection of East African poetry, Drumbeat.¹ The editorial policy of the East Africa Journal remained constant, being basically the same as that of Transition, but covering wider areas of debate of that magazine.

¹ The journal's editorial and selection policy was outlined briefly in

As is stated on Page 1 of this issue, the East Africa Journal is a publication dedicated to the free and open discussion of topics of interest to the East African region. We ask only this: that articles have substantial content and an intellectual appeal. In recent months we have received in our offices and returned a number of contributions which can be described only as political diatribes.

Apart from the professional and specialist journals such as the East African Economic Review, the Kenya Historical Association Journal, and the Transafrican Journal of History, a number of intellectual and literary journals followed the East Africa Journal, including Zuka (1967), Nexus (1967), Busara (1968), JOLLSO (1973), and Joe, a popular humour magazine founded by Hilary Ng’weno in 1973. The last represents perhaps the most interesting development in the journal or magazine field simply because, unlike other journals which depend for their continued survival on foundation or other sponsorship, it was established primarily as a commercial proposition.

Ng’weno, a former editor of the Nation Series, political commentator and satirical columnist, developed a magazine which was originally intended as a humour magazine—a sort of African Punch—but which grew into a literary magazine and journal of comment. In some respects, the journal was designed to cater for a Drum, Trust, Son of Woman public, but its literary contributions (Ngugi’s brilliant short story, "A Mercedes Funeral"), books reviews, and interview with Oginga Odinga, enabled it to reach the usual public for literary and intellectual publications as well. Even its humour, at least that provided by

Ng'weno and Terry Hirst, dealt with the contemporary Kenyan social scene, providing satirical and at times insightful comment on tourism, housing, Christianity, rising prices and the oil crisis. In many ways it was Hirst who gave the magazine its distinct style, from his drawings of Joe, Ng'weno's browbeaten, everyman comic character used to explore the contemporary East African situation, to his comic strips.

The previous brief discussion of *Transition* indicated that journals, as important channels for the articulation and dissemination of ideas, are not exempt from the intense debate about the socio-political role of the intellectual and intellectual institutions in African society. The nature of this debate is further revealed by the discussion which has surrounded two Kenyan journals, *Busara* and *JOLIOC*, and two Tanzanian journals, *Umma* and *The African Review*. The debate, it should be noted, has important national differences, the Tanzanian journals being conscious of operating in a society attempting to implement socialism and the demands it makes.

The first literary journal in Kenya was *Nexus*. It was founded in 1967 by Leonard Kibera and Kutub Kassam, two students in the English Department at the University College, Nairobi. James Cescu was associate editor, and ultimately became editor in July 1968. *Nexus* was basically concerned with the publication of creative writing, book reviews, and among its contributors were Taban Lo Liyong, Joseph Kimura, Edwin Waiyaki, Azim Kassam, Samuel Kahiga, Walter Biyo, Grace Ogot, and Leonard Okola.

In late 1968 *Nexus* was transmuted into *Busara* under the editorship of Awori wa Kataka. The composition of the editorial board reflected very much its origins in the English Department: Angue
Calder, James Stewart, and Adrian Roscoe were the expatriate staff members of the board; Taban Lo Liyong, Grace Ogot, and Henry Kimbugwe (Eneriko Seruma), author of the novel *The Experience* and a Senior Editor with EAPH, were the principal African members. In the first editorial, Kataka, a student political activist who was temporarily rusticated during the Oginga Odinga "affair" at the University College, explained that the name had been changed to *Busara* (a Swahili word meaning "wisdom" or "prudence") to provide the journal with a "name that is at once mystical, enticing, above all, symbolic." A Swahili title was adopted because it reflected the desire for the journal to be ultimately published in Swahili, thus reaching a much wider public. Kataka also announced a change in editorial policy. *Busara* would continue to publish creative writing and book reviews, but it would place greater stress than its predecessor on "critical factual articles regarding our cultural or social scene." Initially little change was discernible, although critical and review articles increased in number. The bulk of contributions were still undergraduate in origin, with the occasional contribution from more established figures in the East African literary and intellectual scene.

Many East African intellectuals have been concerned about the nature of literary criticism, the absence of a critical tradition, and the nature and role of the literary journal. It was this concern which led Chris Wanjala and Jared Angira to launch *JULIO* (Journal of

2. Ibid.
3. In 1970 the publication of *Busara* was transferred from the East African Publishing House to the East African Literature Bureau (EALB). It remains a publication under the auspices of the Literature Department, University of Nairobi.
4. Angira relinquished his Deputy Editorship of the journal before its first issue, basically on the ground that it would not serve its original radical purpose.
Literature and Society) in 1973.¹ Wanjala has been "unhappy about the standards of criticism in East Africa which has been done by people who are either doing it for the newspaper and who therefore are not interested in promoting any more permanent values of literature (or in) literature serving as a social vehicle" or by critics using Western aesthetic criteria without regard for the East African historical situation.² He suggests that "literary criticism as a social phenomenon and a field of intellectual engagement is new in East Africa."³ It should not be understood as of the "dry", sophisticated kind, nor as the "sensational titillation of newspaper reviews" but rather as a "tool of directing social change." The true critic "must show not only an active awareness of what his society needs from its literature, but have an obligation to that society." In support of this view, Wanjala draws upon the authority of Marx. He writes:

Here we are arguing with Karl Marx that a critic or the commentator, must acquire and cultivate a consciousness of what his society wants badly. For Marx this "can never be anything else than the conscious existence of men in their actual life process." This means that the critic must emerge from the average pettiness of his society, the folly and narrowness of range of his society and engage himself in the actual "production of ideas, of conceptions... interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life." ⁴

Like so many other East African intellectuals, he is critical of the vast gaps in knowledge which narrow disciplinary boundaries impose on

1. JOLISCO is published by the EALB.
4. Ibid., p.2.
the student. Literature students in particular, and critics in general, suffer from a poverty of the historical, sociological, economic and political background which will enable them to explain the genesis and structure of a work in relation to "East African social and historical development." To overcome what he terms this "naivete", he proposes that JOLISO should publish comments by historians, social scientists, philosophers, and educationists in order to develop an "interdisciplinary and radical approach to African culture with literature at the core." Indeed, the first issue of the journal, apart from containing creative writing and criticism, included articles by William Ochieng, C. - C.M. Mutiso, and H. Odera on aspects of East African politics and society.

Tanzanian Journals - The Debate About Political Role

As elsewhere throughout East Africa, Tanzanian journals have been tied very much to the university and other educational institutions. Both The African Review and Taamili have their origins in the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam; the former draws its contributors from East Africa, Britain, and North America, while the latter relies on contributions from undergraduate students in the Department and staff members. Umma (formerly Darlite) is based in the Department of Literature, and Swahili and Mulike are published by the Institute of Swahili Research. Swahili is a specialist journal dealing with literature and linguistics, and draws the bulk of its five hundred subscriptions from North American universities. Being concerned that the journal should reach as many secondary schools as possible, the Institute sends four or five
copies to each one. It also publishes a literary journal, *Mlaka* which is designed especially for secondary schools. *Cheche*, which was the organ of the USARF, and its successor, *Maji Maji*, have been based at the University where their contributors have been student political activists and radical staff members. Both journals have been crucial in the development of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia and have been responsible, through the publication of Shivji's paper *Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle* and Awiti's "Class Struggle in Rural Society of Tanzania: A Case Study from Isandi, Iringa,"\(^1\) in intensifying the debate about the nature of Tanzanian society and socialism. There is also *Mbionti*, the journal of Kivukoni College, which has concentrated on the publication of statements by Nyerere and comments, usually by Kivukono staff members, on various aspects of *ujamaa*.

It has been in Tanzania that greatest attention has been given to the actual socio-political role and ideological function of the intellectual journal. For instance, in response to a number of writers in the *Daily News* who advocated the creation of a literary journal,\(^2\) Cleveland Nkata, an employee of the Tanzania Publishing House, argued that

> The only justification for having the journal at all, should be the grave need to educate the masses on the many-faced class struggle; and to mobilize the people to expose, defeat and destroy enemies of the African Revolution. \(^3\)

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1. *Maji Maji*, No.7, October 1972. This paper is a slightly altered version of an Economic Research Bureau Paper. Both Shivji's paper, and Awiti's, are discussed at some length in Chapter XII of this thesis, "The Tanzanian Radical Intelligentsia."

2. These letter writers were unaware of the existence of *Darlita*, which is a fair indication of its impact outside university circles.

A journal concerned solely with providing an outlet for literary creations would, he added, "obviously be too abstract to be of any meaningful service to the 13 million Tanzanians." The real need is to awaken people to the nature of class struggle and not problems of literary creation.

This concern for the actual social and political role of the journal is reflected in the changes of name and editorial policy of Darlite, a journal founded in 1966 under the auspices of the Department of Literature at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Its first editor was Willy Kamera, a young poet, who was later appointed a tutorial assistant in the Department. His co-editors included two Ugandan writers, Austin Bukenya, author of The People's Bachelor and Peter Songa. In the first editorial, Kamera wrote that Darlite had been launched to fulfill "some responsibilities to our society and especially to ourselves." These responsibilities were "cultural, linguistic and, especially LITERARY." Kamera was troubled that in Tanzania, the fine arts were either neglected or treated with "downright" contempt. This was in contrast to both the sister university colleges, and to universities all over the world. And it amounted to a denial of the responsibility of the university to the community; universities were the "POWER HOUSES of taste and culture in all fields, including the LITERARY."

Darlite has had a succession of editors: Kamera, B.A.J. Katigula, Ralph Mg'etba, and James Birihanze. It remained essentially an undergraduate magazine, although occasionally contributions from staff members such as Grant Kamenju and Joachim Fiebach enhanced its quality greatly. If it had an editorial policy, then it was simply to publish creative writing efforts by young writers, regardless of

political stance (or lack of). In this way it did serve a useful purpose, providing Swahili playwrights Criapin Hauli, G. Uthinga, and Ibrahim Hussein, author of Kinjekatile and Masehatani with their first publishing outlet.

In 1970 Darlita became Umma ("masses") in response to the changes which had occurred in Tanzania. The late 1960s had witnessed the birth of student radicalism at the University College. The University Students Revolutionary Front published its own organ, Cheche ("Spark"), which was strongly anti-imperialist, and espoused a socialism that was much more firmly grounded in the scientific socialist tradition of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism than that of the Government. Following the Arusha Declaration there had been an intensification of the struggle against foreign economic domination and a recognition of the need to prevent the emergence of, or continuation of, basically anti-socialist forces within the economic bureaucracy, and hence, in TANU itself. As a literary journal Darlita could hardly remain immune from the struggle. In the editorial of the revamped journal, Birihanze, the new editor, began by dismissing intellectual or artistic detachment. He asserted that

any writer worth his salt should attempt not merely to communicate a mood or even an idea, but more important, to give insights into the contemporary social set-up... with a view to provoking positive action. To be able to do this, we believe the writer must be fully involved in the life of his society, and desire to change it for the better, since even as an individual he cannot live happily in a sick society.¹

Fully aware that Umma could only reach a very small section of Tanzanian society, Birihanze nevertheless pointed out that this was the most influential section. As a journal, Umma could not justify its

existence except through the "duty to effect the changes that will better the people's lot."¹

Under the editorship of Birihanze and Mukotoni Rugyendo, Umma has endeavoured to rise to the aims of the first editorial, the best contributions coming from Birihanze and Rugyendo themselves. However, the takeover of the journal in 1972 by the East African Literature Bureau (EALB), followed by the EALB's characteristic publishing delays and neglect of the local market, has most probably negated the journal's declared objectives, and divorced it from the audience it aims to influence.

The Foreword to the first issue of The African Review also revealed a concern with the proper role of the intellectual journal in the African context.² After stating that the journal had been launched to "encourage creative reflection on certain aspects of Africa's life", the Foreword went on to say that articles would analyze the "social, economic and political forces shaping the future of our continent." Utmost attention would be given to the phenomenon of imperialism and neo-colonialism and to overcoming the legacy of racial and cultural abuse and denigration.

The interpretation of significant events in African politics has been monopolized by foreign 'experts'. This journal will explore alternative African solutions to African problems and appeals to African scholars to contribute their knowledge and understanding of their continent and its people.

In a review of the first issue, however, the West Indian historian Walter Rodney noted that "an assertion of an African identity does not allow one to escape from an ideological commitment. There is

¹. Ibid.
presumably some direction in which African scholars would wish to influence their fellow Africans." He observed that while Tanzania had already been committed to a socialist path, the editors of The African Review, by stating

No one claims to have found a perfect way to realize (Africa's) objectives. However, a frank discussion of the various possible solutions... should shed much-needed light on the issues.

apparently did not consider themselves bound by the national choice of socialism.

East African journals have thus, like other intellectual institutions, been subjected to a critical reappraisal by intellectuals who are concerned that they should be geared to what they consider African cultural and political needs. They are, however, caught up in a situation where they are externally rather than internally oriented, with the result that they lack a mooring in their own society. In relations of persisting cultural dependence, it is in most cases external support which determines the survival chances of East African journals, and not the local reading public.

East African Publishing

Throughout British Africa publishing, mainly for education purposes, was tightly controlled by British publishing companies. From the 19th century up to the Second World War, there were small mission presses in most colonial territories as well as government and commercial printers. It was not until after World War II that "publishing began to achieve any real importance in the British colonies of Africa." With the advent of independence, the demand for Africanization of printing and publishing forced British publishers to expand their overseas offices and to start first reprinting and then publishing the major primary courses and readers in the countries where they were used.

The 1960s witnessed a tremendous expansion of the primary school population in nearly every African country, and the old-established London-based publishers such as Heinemann, Longmans, Evans, Oxford University Press, and Macmillan "fought very hard at this time in competition to exploit the growing need for essential primary school textbooks." The potential pickings were great: "A contract for a Primary Mathematics or English course for Tanzania could be worth several million shillings."

This rapid expansion of British-based publishing activity to tap the very profitable and assured school market meant, as John Nottingham observed several years ago, that "probably in no sphere of activity in East Africa" is neo-colonial economic control "more

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
obvious, and yet harder to dislodge, than in the Book trade."¹ He added that "this is the more frightening in that books are perhaps the most powerful political, cultural, ideological and educational weapons that the world has yet seen."² Understandably, this has been of immediate concern to many intellectuals who are anxious to break the economic and cultural stranglehold exercised by foreign-owned publishers over the East African book trade. Ojwando Abuor, author of White Highlands No More, has complained of problems of indigenous writers having their manuscripts manipulated and often rejected by foreign publishing houses, and has extended this criticism to bookshops which refuse to carry many works. In the case of his own work, he alleges that it was refused by a central Nairobi bookshop on the grounds that it was "too critical of the Europeans."³

In response to indigenization, most British-owned publishing houses set up local branches with local staff. MacMillan, however, went into direct partnership with African governments, partly in order to "make friends" with the key Ministry of Education officials who controlled choice of school material. In a damning and highly revealing article published in Africa magazine,⁴ and in the Daily News, Robert Hutchinson, a former General Manager of the Tanzania Publishing House, showed how the partnership between MacMillan's and the National Development Corporation brought MacMillan profits without risks, and Tanzania few, if any discernible benefits. MacMillan, through

2. Ibid.
provision of the manager, and through the agreement to "advise" and "assist" in organization and editing,1 were able to effectively control the entire operation. Through having the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Education as Chairman of the Board of Directors of its publishing house, "Macmillan could exert much more leverage to try and ensure that the most lucrative primary school courses were given to TPH to publish."2

The entire history of the partnership, as Hutchinson recounts, was one of bungling, mismanagement, authoritarian management, and considerable profit to Macmillan although many lucrative text-book contracts did not eventuate. Macmillan's world-wide organization was supposed to provide distribution for TPH books (to the exclusion of TPH finding its own) but the debacle surrounding Self-Reliant Tanzania and Private Enterprise and the East African Company indicated clearly that Macmillan was interested, not in providing an outlet for Third World books, but in "making quick money by exploiting a glaring need."

Macmillan's control led to serious embarrassment at times. In 1967 Swahili became the sole medium of instruction in primary schools throughout Tanzania, and the demand for Swahili books was enormous. In response to the burgeoning demand, Macmillan resurrected Swahili books, many of which they had been publishing for decades and which were written by colonial officers. They determined to sell them in a Tanzania which had seen the Arusha Declaration and subsequent policy statements, and had set its face firmly against the assumptions of colonialist and capitalist society. It was even suggested at one

1. In effect, Macmillan could charge 27 1% of manufactured cost for these services without risking loss.
time that L.W. Hollingsworth's *Milango ya Historia*, first published in the late 1920s, be republished. Book three of this work contained the following paragraph which adequately summed up the author's Eurocentric view of history.

Black people of Africa have not made any contribution towards the progress of our society.
For the past centuries, nothing of any significance has come out of Africa (except for Egypt).

Lakini watu weusi wa Afrika hawakuwa watu walisaidia hata kidogo maendeleo dunia nzima.
Kwa miaka mia nyinya hanapa jaaabo kubwa lililolotika katika Afrika ila katika Afrika ya Kaskazini (Misri).

As late as mid 1971, the Tanzania Publishing House was still selling a book called *Urain* ("Citizenship"), which was first published in 1927 and had been reprinted a dozen times since. A member of the Tanzanian Parliament, Mrs. B.M. Kunambi, wondered why no step had been taken to withdraw this book "which had colonial flags and also pledges of allegiance to the British monarchs." Local opposition to the terms of the agreement with Macmillan's had, of course, been expressed as early as 1968. A.C. Mwinga, the new Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Education had, before his appointment to the board of Tanzania Publishing House in September of that year, raised grave doubts about the agreement with Macmillan's; pointing out that it "binds TPH to Macmillan, but in no way does bind Macmillan to TPH." By 1970 and 1971, Tanzanian officials had become aware of "Macmillan's profit grabbing" and the number of titles published for the Ministry of Education by the Tanzania Publishing House declined rapidly. In both 1970 and 1971 the publishing house sustained substantial losses, and the publication of books for the Ministry of Education increasingly went to Tanzania Elimu Supplies, which now
enjoys a monopoly of the distribution of books and materials to primary schools in Tanzania. As a result, the Tanzania Publishing House has been left in a precarious position - it is an academic and general publisher in an overwhelmingly schools oriented market. Of course, as Hutchinson points out; Macmillan's partnership agreements were an exception amongst British-based publishers; much more typical is the mode of Heinemann's operations.

Heinemann, like other British publishing houses, were originally primarily interested in textbooks for African consumption, and were represented in Africa by their educational company and not the fiction house. According to Alan Hill, the Chairman of Heinemann Educational Books, the initial success of Chinua Achebe's first novel, *Things Fall Apart*, brought a fundamental change in their policy.

It now began to publicize Achebe, who was about to bring out his second novel. At once we began to get offers of manuscripts from other would-be African authors. The evidence accumulated that there was a wealth of potential literary talent in Africa seeking publication. But fiction and general publishers were simply not in sight in Africa. So HEB decided in 1961 to start its own African writers series. This was the idea of van Milne, then Overseas Director of HEB. Chinua Achebe agreed to be General Editor, and to devote part of his time to encouraging potential literary talent throughout the African continent. 

The African Writers Series published East African works - Ngugi's novels, Taban Lo Liyong's poetry, works by Serumaga, Mazrui, Jared Angira, Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Peter Palangyo, Hugo Gatheru, Mwangi Ruhendi and David Mwangi, and collections of East African writing, plays, and poetry. As such it provided an important outlet for East African writing, and brought some form of international

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recognition for a number of East African writers and intellectuals. Although Heinemann East Africa is an "autonomous" organization which employs local staff as well as Europeans from the London office, and makes decisions about the local manuscripts (especially the Swahili ones) to be published, the final choice for the publication of African Writers Series books lies ultimately in London. This has been at the root of much of the often vitriolic criticism which has been levelled at the Writers Series. Criticism focuses on the "trendiness" of the series, and its exploitation of African material and themes for an audience located in Britain and North America, and on its role in determining the main literary issues and concerns for Africa.

The first major indigenous publishing enterprise in East Africa was the founding in 1948 of the East African Literature Bureau which was financed as part of the East African Common Services Organization. Its early titles, with their emphasis on the achievement of European explorers, missionaries and administrators, reflected the bias of its origins. While the commercial firms were devoting their main effort to tapping the primary school market, the EALB not only encouraged local authors to write both in English and the local vernacular languages on a multitude of subjects - agriculture, civics, family welfare, economics and commerce, biographies of famous men, geography, language, law, literacy, history, health and medicine, poetry, politics, religion, science and sociology - and also provided

1. Interview with Heinemann East Africa personnel, including Henry Chakava, Nairobi, 6/3/1973.
a library service for readers in remote areas. Through its now
discontinued Students Bookwriting Scheme, many young writers
including H. Kasilahabi and C.K. Mwirah had their first works
published. Increasing attention has been given to the publication
of fiction, and since 1972 four volumes of East African literary
criticism have been published. The EALB has also assisted the
development and dissemination of Swahili culture by making available
major Swahili works which previously were often in written manuscript
form only.¹ In the last few years, as we have already seen, the
EALB has become the major publisher of journals in East Africa, often
with unfortunate effect on sales and distribution.

The other prominent indigenous East African publisher is the
East African Publishing House, founded in 1965 as a result of the
joint efforts of Andre Deutsch Ltd., the East African Institute of
Originally EAPH editorial policy laid much emphasis on school textbooks
and readers, with series such as the East African Junior Library,
the East African Readers Library, and the School Mathematics of East
Africa proving a success in Kenyan schools. During its history,
however, editorial policy has undergone substantial change. There
has been a "gradual expansion of the field of priorities so that now
the company boasts a varied list which reflects the buoyant intellect-
ual atmosphere of East Africa."² EAPH has maintained close ties with
academic institutions in East Africa and serves as publisher for the

1. Major Swahili writers to be published by the EALB include Mbarak
   Ali Binasy, Sheikh Amri Abedi, Mathias Mvumpala, R. Mwaruka,
   R. Abdallah, A. Hemeli hajjem, K.K.A. Akilimali Snow-White,
   Sheikh Lambert, and M.A.S.W. Buhrih.

2. "Key exercise towards decolonising the mind", Daily News
Makerere Institute of Social Research, the Historical Association of Tanzania, and the Kenya Historical Association. At the centre of its publishing programme lies the Modern African library. Okot's *Song of Lawino*, rejected by more than one British publisher, was the first in this library and, with the exception of Ngugi wa Thiong'o, EAPF has published the major literary works in English to come out of East Africa. Through the publication of Charles Mangua's *Son of Woman* and *A Tail in the Mouth* it launched the popular novel in East Africa. The EAPF has also been an important publisher of journals - *East Africa Journal, Transafriican Journal of History, Education in Eastern Africa*, and the *Journal of the Language Association of Eastern Africa*, and employer of intellectual personnel, including Enziko Seruma (Henry Kimbugwe), Leonard Okola, Richard Ntiru, and Ben Ogutu.

In addition to the British-based publishers with local branches, and the two main indigenous companies, there are a number of smaller indigenous publishing ventures: the Uganda Publishing House, Equatorial Publishers, Nairobi, Comb Books and Foundation Books. The last two represent an interesting development, being essentially responses to the emergence of a popular literature which was given its impetus by Mangua's *Son of Woman*. Comb Books was started by David Maillu, a Kenyan writer who, having met rejection from the established publishers, set up on his own to publish his works.

Clearly, East African publishers work under severe difficulties which stem from a multiplicity of languages, widespread illiteracy, and immense poverty. There is the problem of the economics of book production which is of most fundamental concern to those who publish creative and intellectual works rather than books for a primary and secondary school market. Publishers realize that they are caught-up
in a vicious circle involving the unit cost of books: people do not read; therefore publishers print few books; therefore books are expensive; therefore people do not read. The unit cost of anything the publisher does with a print run of two, three, four, or five thousand, as Bgoya points out, falls within a price range which most people cannot afford, especially when the books are not of a "sensational" kind. To the criticism levelled by such writers as Taban Lo Liyong who ask why enterprising publishers don't publish popular cheap editions for a shilling, even using newsprint or toilet paper if necessary, Jonathan Kariara of Oxford University Press in Nairobi responded by noting that "there are overheads, printer's bills to pay, and this is coupled with a fairly small reading market. So the editions that most publishers in East Africa do are rather limited and all this tends to make the unit cost of a book fairly high. I don't think cheap paper would cure the problem."  

Ideological and political considerations affect the economics of book production as well. As John Nottingham has contended, the situation of cultural neo-colonialism and dependency, imposes a "great moral responsibility" on those who produce or sell books. Publishers operating in Tanzania, where the government is committed to the implementation of socialism and the destruction of the colonial legacy, have much greater difficulty with their editorial decisions than their counterparts in Kenya, and particularly in Europe and North America where the chief concern is with market and not political or moral implications. Walter Bgoya has written that

1. Interview with Walter Bgoya.
The difference between publishing in capitalist countries and socialist ones... is that while the former is interested primarily in the making of profits and will therefore publish anything so long as it can sell, the latter is intended to develop and strengthen and propagate socialist culture.

Tanzania Publishing House must resist the temptations of publishing sensational and frivolous books which detract people from the real issues of the time. In reply to a number of letter writers in the Tanzanian press who have complained about Tanzania Publishing House rigidity in selection policy and its concern with "correct" Swahili usage, both Egoya and J.P. Mbonde, the Publishing Manager, have taken the trouble to explain the criteria used for manuscript selection. Egoya suggests that apart from the obvious factors of whether the manuscript is interesting and skilfully written, it should be of use to the people. We should only publish those books which are relevant in our struggle to liberate our nation from all vestiges of colonialism... The books we publish should serve to inspire our people and encourage them to fight against imperialism and all other causes of our poverty, ignorance and disease.

Egoya would not publish material that was counter-productive or counter-revolutionary but, as in the case of How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Tourism and Socialist Development, and The Silent Class Struggle, is prepared to publish progressive oppositional views which promote debate and further the "struggle".


4. Interview with Egoya.
East African Theatre

It is often overlooked that drama in the European sense has no roots in Africa; it is a new form.¹ This is not to deny, however, that there is abundant evidence of forms of theatre arts in the traditional patterns of life in East Africa, but they do not include drama proper. The traditional story-teller often accompanied his story with vivid gesture and a great deal of enactment when it came to the matter of dialogue, but it remained a narrative rather than dramatic form. In many traditional folk songs there was a cantor-response pattern which could be equated with dialogue, but the often strong emphasis upon beat precluded its development into pure dialogue form. In dance there were often strong mimetic elements which provided a variety of theatre experience, but as Macpherson points out, "as far as one can gather none of these forms had taken the direction that would have produced the evolution of a dramatic form in the traditional setting."² She added that

Although we can, therefore, assume a situation in East Africa equating in some ways with the situation in England in the 16th century, it is more one-sided since there is no folk-drama as such to perform a merger with the Drama arising out of exotic influences.³

The Ugandan playwright and novelist Robert Serumaga notes that the theatre in East Africa does not operate "with the same level of formalization as in Europe." On the other hand, he adds


3. Ibid.
The practice of people getting together to watch the story teller act out history, or to hear a musician like the famous Sekinnomo of Uganda relate a tale of trenchant social criticism, dramatized in voice, movement and the music of his Ndingidi, has been with us for centuries. And this is the true theatre of East Africa. 1

Undoubtedly, theatre is in a better position to exploit the rich heritage of story telling, dance, music, myth and metaphor than written literature which, as we have already seen, suffers from problems of language, literacy, and the economies of book production in both vernacular languages and in English. Clearly, the dramatic form can provide the most immediate method of communication of ideas; it can overcome the obstacles of illiteracy, expensive books, and the absence of established reading habits. It will only become a popular force, however, when the theatrical movement is "integrated and inspired by the society in which it is growing." And mass involvement will only come about, Serumaga points out, when plays "with their roots firmly embedded in the Africa of today, can be written and produced." 2

While in Tanzania and Uganda the roots of a genuine popular dramatic form are firmly grounded, theatre in East Africa suffers from a number of handicaps which stem partly from the still small body of local plays, the association of theatre with Europeans as a result of European dominance in personnel and play terms, and often from economic and location factors. A number of critics, including Philip Ochieng and Bob Leshoai have pointed out that many poorer Africans have been prevented from attending theatre because of cost,

2. Ibid., p.53.
inconvenience in terms of distance and transport, and "because most of the functions... are anathema to them." As Seth Adagala has also indicated, the cost of hiring theatres is often a prohibitive one for African groups in Kenya. Many East African theatre companies are situated in the capital cities, and it is only when they sometimes venture into the rural areas and into the poorer African suburbs that many Africans ever come in contact with theatre. Those with the educational background and financial means to support African theatre are often little inclined to do so. Philip Ochieng, commenting on this, suggests that Africans with money belong to that apex of society which I might describe as cultural write offs, where African culture is concerned. Some of them do go to theatre - not because drama means anything to their lives, but because it is the function to do so. The rest of them just will not be bothered with cultural activities; they are too busy making money to waste any time on anything else. They live like ghosts - those empty people whom T.S. Eliot saw in The Wasteland.

Tentative support for this view is to be found in Moikobu's survey of Woodley Estate in Nairobi which established that theatre going was strongest among European women, and not very strong amongst European men and African men and women. The relative lack of interest in theatre by educated Africans in Kenya is derived from a combination of factors including the association of theatre with racially segregated groups which have been European oriented in terms of audience, production, and material, instrumentalist views of

3. Ochieng, "Our Cultural Malnutrition Comes From an Alien Diet", p.6.
education in which cultural activities such as theatre have little value, and memories of deadening and inept school performances of Shakespearean plays. The very sketchy available evidence on audiences and audience response, suggests that the most enthusiastic and involved reaction comes from rural and urban workers and their families who have come into contact with theatre through travelling companies, and independent drama groups such as the Nairobi Tausi Group, Kampala's Ngoma Players, and Dar-es-Salaam's Tanganyika Textile Drama Group.

Theatre in Uganda

In Uganda, as elsewhere throughout Africa, the first theatrical stirrings appeared in schools, training colleges, and places of higher education. 1 Wycliffe Kiyingi, one of the most popular of the Luganda language playwrights has pointed out, for instance, that he owed his interest in drama to his former headmaster at King's College, Budo. 2 Initially educational institutions performed set pieces, but with rising academic standards and increasing student interest in acting and watching plays, students became interested in performing improvised pieces, often in vernacular languages. As the standards of performance improved and the taste of the audiences developed, various forms of drama festivals and competitions, including the Schools Drama Festival, were introduced and provided an impetus to the writing of local plays, as well as raising the standards of acting and production. Undoubtedly the initiation in 1947 of a Makerere

Inter-Hall English competition which culminated in the writing and performance of original plays did much to encourage the growth of "intellectual" theatre in Uganda, and many writers including Erisa Kironde, Rebecca Njau, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Elvania Zirimu first reached a public through this medium. Some years later the Makerere Travelling Theatre, which has a policy of including at least one local play, and the institution of the Ugandan Drama Festival did much to encourage the development of local theatre.

Compared to both Tanzania and Kenya especially, African theatre companies have manifestly flourished in Uganda even though they have been threatened by financial crises. Their apparent success stems partly from the absence of intense European competition, and from the development of a strong theatrical infrastructure in educational institutions. A Department of Music, Dance and Drama was established at Makerere in 1971, and the Department of Literature has offered Creative Writing Fellowships to playwrights such as Robert Serumaga and Elvania Zirimu.

There are over twenty theatrical companies operating in Kampala, although many are inactive. Some of the most prominent and active are the Kampala City Players which were founded by Byron Kawadwa and perform his works, the Makonde Group, and the Kayaayu Film Players. The two most important groups, however, have been the Ngoma Players and Theatre Limited.

The Ngoma Players have received guidance and support from Pio and Elvania Zirimu. Pio Zirimu, a lecturer in the Literature Department at Makerere, was one of those Makerere graduates who went to Leeds University to read for a Diploma in English Studies and who returned to play an important part in his country's intellectual and
cultural life. His interests have been diverse: he was on the editorial board of Mawazo and edited it in 1968; he has been President of the Uganda Society; Chairman of the Uganda Language Society; and Co-organizer of Kiswahili voluntary classes at Makerere. Pio Zirimu has also been active as an actor and producer. In 1967 and 1968 for example, he took a leading role in the Ngoma Players first experimental production of Lindsay Barrett's Jump-koɔ-koɔ Makka, and produced Frederick May's The Best is Silence for the 1967 Uganda Drama Festival. He also took part in the production of The Marriage of Nyakato, and African opera composed by S. Mhabi-Katumi. In addition, he helped organize the Youth Drama Festival Theatre Workshop, "Extravaganza 1967", and poetry readings and reciting sessions. In the following years he appeared in the Players National Theatre production of John Osborne's Look Back in Anger. He played the leading role in Soyinka's The Trials of Brother Jero, and produced John Ruganda's Black Mamba. Pio Zirimu's wife, Elvania, has also been actively associated with the Ngoma Players as an actress and producer, and has written a number of plays, the best known being The Day the Hunchback Made Rain.

From this brief outline, it can readily be seen that the Ngoma Players repertoire, like that of so many other African theatre companies, has been a mixture of modern European drama, plays by such established Africans dramatists as the Nigerian Wole Soyinka, and plays by the leading local playwrights.

The other major Uganda company is the semi-professional Theatre Limited, whose driving force is Robert Seruma. Born in Masaka in 1939, Seruma studied at Makerere and Trinity College, Dublin, where he completed an MA. in Economics. He returned to Uganda in
and became associated with Theatre Limited, a company which was gathered together with the aim of creating a semi-professional theatre. When it experienced financial difficulties, Serumaga became the Director, and Theatre Limited provided him with his first theatrical outlet and produced his first two plays, A Play, and The Elephants. It also produced his third play, Malangwa, with Serumaga producing and playing the leading role. As part of his attempt to realize his dream of a professional theatre attached to the National Theatre, Serumaga has collected together in the last few years a group of young school leavers who form a Drama School which staged its first performance with Serumaga's Renca Moi.

In Uganda, as Macpherson points out, it is important to distinguish between two streams of drama: the first is aimed at a popular appeal while the second appeals much more to the intellectual stratum. The popular drama uses as its subject matter the urban-setting with its bars, corruption, prostitution and drunkenness which are usually treated as suitable topics for farce, as is the Moliere-type bastard, the Katoto. It also uses, as in Nukiibi's Kikwabanga, historical themes, although as yet popular drama has not developed as, for example the Yoruba folk opera in Nigeria has, into a political forum of some potency. The intellectual drama, on the other hand, is often obscure and pretentious, suffering at times from the use of narrative rather than dramatic techniques.

Many of the plays which loosely fit into the intellectual tradition have involved the dramatization of local legend and material,


sometimes through the adaptation of European plays. Erisa Kironde adapted J.M. Synge's play, The Trick, dramatized local legend in Kintu, and made use of dramatic dialogue in The End of the Party to discuss the case for and against the bride wealth custom. Playwrights such as Tom Omara in The Exodóz, Joseph Mukasa-Balikuddembe in The Famine and The Mirror, Austin Bukenya in The Secret, Nuwa Sentongo in The Invisible Bond, and Elvania Zirim in The Day The Hunchback Made Rain have used local historical material to dramatic effect. Christopher Nukiibi's play, Kikwabanga, which belongs to the popular tradition, is set in early Buganda and concerns an arrogant and brutal chief who is finally overthrown in a bloody battle by rival chiefs and his reign of tyranny ended. Accompanying the dramatic action of the play there is dancing to the rhythm of drums which heightens the underlying message of the play.

In Uganda, three dramatists stand out clearly - Robert Serumaga, John Ruganda, and Byron Kawadwa. Their works have their roots in the intellectual rather than the popular tradition, although in Kawadwa's work especially, there is abundant evidence of a fusion of the popular and intellectual forms. Kawadwa, who started the Schools Drama Festival and founded the Kampala City Players, works largely in Luganda and has written mainly musical plays in collaboration with Wassanga Serukinya. Obufumbo Kye Ki? is an examination of guilt involving a husband who has poisoned his first wife in order to marry her sister. St. Lwango uses historical material, the burning of the Uganda Christian Martyrs by the Kabaka, and drumming and wrestling perform a genuine dramatic function in the play. Kawadwa's first musical play, Makula Ga Kulabako is a fairy-tale in which the princess marries the poor man and rejects
the rich man. In this play Kawadwa integrates dance and chorus singing into the dramatic patterns. His Oluyimba Lwa Wankoko, like St. Lwango, is set in the Baganda court and concerns a self-seeking politician who works upon the weaknesses of simple people only to be brought to his downfall.

The second important Ugandan dramatist is John Ruganda, a Makerere graduate, former editor of The Makererean and Penpoint, and former Oxford University Press Editorial and Sales representative, who now lives in exile in Nairobi where he is a temporary lecturer in literature. Ruganda's plays are fundamentally different from Kawadwa's, and have their genesis in European rather than local dramatic forms. They reflect a much more ascetic approach to theatre. The Burdens is set in a post-independence African country where Kamala, a former government minister, was detained for plotting with foreigners to overthrow the government. When released, he is unable to reconcile himself with his past and the life of abject poverty and nagging family obligations which now confronts him. He has sunk into alcoholism and alcohol-induced dreams about his past glory, and reveals to his wife in a state of drunkeness that he only married her as a political act. His wife refuses to believe that he can be anything again and ultimately kills him for the sake of their children.¹ Black Mamba is a seriously flawed satire which exposes the private life of a university sociology professor and his manipulation by a houseboy who provides his wife as a mistress for the professor for financial gain.²

The third dramatist, Robert Serumaga, is the best known in East Africa. His first play, A Play, is a symbolic drama written

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¹ Nairobi: CUP., 1972.
out of his own pertubation at the events of 1966 when the Kabaka's palace was attacked and the Kabaka forced to flee into exile. Buganda is represented in the play by Mutimukulu's wife, Rose, who was killed a year before the action of the play starts. As Chris Wanjala has pointed out, Serumaga apparently has a wish to resuscitate the Buganda Kingdom, a concern which emerges somewhat elliptically in his novel Return to the Shadows. Indeed, the concern of Serumaga's second play, The Elephants, is similar to that of Return to the Shadows in that it deals with a man who has created around himself, with the help of friends, a cocoon-like world which is divorced from the wider society. David is a university research fellow who has given home and shelter to a refugee artist, Maurice. His arrangement, however, is shattered by the intrusion of Jenny, a wealthy, identity crisis-ridden American embarked on the familiar voyage of self-fulfilment, who threatens to take away Maurice, David's only meaningful friend. The third play, Majangwa, provides some evidence of a shift in Serumaga's work from a narrow intellectualism to a fusion of popular and intellectual theatrical elements.

Majangwa focusses on a local figure, the legendary drummer tramp and his wife, Nakirijja, and consists of an extended conversation as they set out on the road from "nowhere to not where". In a series of circular dialogues, they look back on their debauched lives and try to extract some meaning and hope from them. This play, as

Macpherson points out, draws much more than his earlier works on his Ganda inheritance in terms of "characterization, character, dialogue (with its recollections of proverbs) and such features as the dancing and drumming."  

Serumaga's most recent work, *Kenga Moi*, extended this experimentation and uses traditional music, singing and dance and ritual which have been shaped into a more coherent dramatic form to express a feeling of deep unease at the seething undercurrent of violence in 20th century Uganda.

**Theatre in Kenya**

In Uganda, drama is a major literary form which has been utilized by intellectuals as a channel for the dissemination of their ideas. It has developed as a popular form as well because a number of playwrights have successfully been able to adapt elements of traditional theatre arts to new dramatic purposes. In Kenya, however, it is neither.

African theatrical development in Kenya has been hindered, as indicated previously, by the legacy of a settler society which was able to support a professional theatre (the Donovan Maule Company) and numerous amateur groups, which were strictly racially segregated. It was this racial legacy, as much as the desire to create a distinct African cultural identity, which prompted Seth Adagala, the first Director of the Kenya National Theatre, to reject the whole notion of theatrical integration.

It's not a matter of integrating with the European groups. What we want is to forge our own direction. It would be disastrous to regard this country as one which is going towards

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integration. This is an African country and you can't start asking African intellectuals to dilute themselves and integrate with European groups. I think this mentality should go.

Although Kenya has a National Drama School, and has had a successful Schools Drama Festival which has encouraged acting, production, and the writing of original plays, it has not had a Department of Theatre Arts (although the Literature Department at the University of Nairobi has a drama course) able to assist young playwrights with the construction and production of plays.

A number of small African theatre groups have emerged in Kenya only to quickly disappear, sometimes after apparent success. Perhaps the most successful of these was the Tausi Drama Club which consisted mainly of ex-secondary school students who performed in both Swahili and English. Their base was in a small hall in Bahati township and they performed mainly in the low-income African townships. The playwright and actress Ann Wanjugu was the driving force behind the Tausi Drama Club. She also founded the Uaridi Drama Club which performed her plays Dear God and Stepmother. She later went to study drama in Britain on a British Council Scholarship. Another small company which achieved success was the Sunguru Players with their production of Hansberry's A Raisin in the Sun. The major African group, however, has been the Inter-African Theatre Group which is located in the National Theatre and Kenya Cultural Centre. This group, whose guiding spirit is Seth Adagala, has almost completely merged with the Kenya National Theatre Company. It endeavours to stage at least one play a month at the Kenya National Theatre.

Cultural Centre and in other parts of the city. The Cultural Centre shows are free of charge. According to George Mence, a major figure in the group, "this is to show as many people as possible what we can do and also to prove to them that an African theatre has something worth presenting."\(^1\) The Kenya National Theatre was originally under the directorship of Seth Adagala, a speech and drama graduate from Tufts University, who resigned to become a Voice of Kenya television director and producer. After Adagala's resignation, the Kenya Cultural Centre's activities were reorganized; Tiru Gathwe became the administrator of the National Theatre Drama School; and George Nugele became the business manager. Adagala's former position was put into cold storage. It would not be unfair to say that the Inter-African Theatre Group and the National Theatre Company have relied overwhelmingly on established West African plays such as Soyinka's *The Lion and the Jewel*, J.P. Clark's *A Song of the Goat*, and Joe de Graaf's *Sons and Daughters* and *Through a Film Darkly*, although they have also performed Ngugi's *The Black Hermit* and plays by Kenneth Watene. Compared to Uganda, however, there have been few well established playwrights, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Kenneth Watene and Francis Imbuga standing out.

Ngugi's plays stem from his Makerere undergraduate days, since when he has concentrated on the novel and short story. The most substantial of his plays, *The Black Hermit*,\(^2\) was written for the Ugandan independence celebrations in 1962, and, not surprisingly, one of its fundamental concerns is the question of tribalism and

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politics. Ngugi does not view tribalism as an anachronistic reversion to pre-colonial patterns, but rather as a force intimately linked with the question of which groups shall possess power in the post-independence situation. The elders want a tribally based political party and a "prime Minister for the tribe", 1 so that they may enjoy some of the benefits of Uhuru. Remi, the young intellectual in whom they place their hopes has, however, a vision of a unified nation in which politically mobilized tribal loyalties will be superseded. He is, like many of Ngugi's fictional characters, a man possessed of a messianic vision of himself, but who remains ineffective simply because of his personal indecision. Married to Thoni, his dead brother's widow, he left her to study at the university and returned home with a white woman, Jane, estranged from his culture. When Thoni, who obviously represents African culture, concludes that he has no love for her, she kills herself. It is only after her death, when she is irretrievable, that he realizes his love for her and forced by Jane to adopt a positive course of action, decides to go back to his own culture. Another of Ngugi's short plays, The Rebels, 2 also deals with the question of culture conflict and national unity, while The Wound in the Heart 3 concerns a Mau Mau fighter who returns from detention to find his wife pregnant by the white District Officer. The wife, unable to face her husband, commits suicide. The third Ngugi short play This Time Tomorrow has as its theme the betrayal of those who fought and suffered during the struggle for freedom by the nationalist politicians. 4

1. Ibid., p.39.
2. In This Time Tomorrow (Nairobi: EALB, nd.).
3. Ibid.
Another Kikuyu playwright who has used Mau Mau as the subject matter for a play is Kenneth Watene, an actor, director and dramatist, and graduate of the Kenya National Theatre School. His play, *My Son For My Freedom*¹ is set during the early days of Mau Mau and examines its divisive impact on Geceru’s family. The socio-economic causes of the struggle are briefly outlined through the dialogue of the various characters. Geceru, like Ngotho in Ngugi’s *Weep Not, Child* wants liberation from colonial rule but is uncertain about the efficacy of Mau Mau. Under the goading of his brother-in-law Mwaura, and on the basis of his own carefully thought-out decision, he commits himself to the struggle and is given the job on the local Mau Mau committee of deciding who in the area shall die. Two of his sons are Mau Mau activists who have gone to the forest, whilst the third, Maina, is in love with Muthoni, the daughter of the Christian revivalist Wanjiru. Under the influence of Muthoni, Maina begins to read the bible and joins the revivalists. When the Mau Mau fighters attack Wanjiru’s home, they take away Maina as well. He manages to escape and rushes to his father’s house. He is followed there by the fighters who drag him away despite Geceru’s vigorous protests. A few minutes after their departure, Geceru is dragged out of his house by loyalist askaris and murdered. Another Watene play, *The Haunting Past*,² which he acted in and directed at the 1969 National Theatre Drama Season, has culture conflict as its theme. Weru, a young intellectual, openly disparages his culture and rejects the entreaties of his uncle, Mathu, to take part in the cleansing

2. In same volume as *My Son For My Freedom*.
ceremony. Tormented by the singing and dancing of those participating in the ceremony, he stabs his uncle and hysterically flees into the darkness, the inference being that the abandonment of one's cultural heritage leads only to despair and madness.

Culture conflict also provides the dominant themes for Francis Imbuga's plays. Imbuga, the most active of the younger Kenyan playwrights, is a graduate of the University of Nairobi who is preparing an MA thesis on the development of theatre in East Africa. He has acted in and produced his own plays, and written scripts for Voice of Kenya Television. His early plays, The Fourth Trial and Kisses of Fate focus on family crises. The first focuses on a couple who are childless after four years of marriage. The husband wants a divorce but is persuaded to give his wife a fourth chance during which the wife seeks the assistance of a witchdoctor. The second play, Kisses of Fate, begins with a family disagreement stemming from the wife's alleged practise of witchcraft. The disagreement leads to a separation, and the local authorities decide that the wife should go back to her parents with her daughter, leaving her son with her husband. In Imbuga's third published play, The Married Bachelor, Imbuga explores the perennial issue of the conflict of generations. Dennis, the married bachelor, is a member of the highly educated group which, cut off physically and culturally from the rural villages, is unsuited for leadership. In his hypocritical moods, he is the spokesman for traditional culture, has an anthropologist's

interest in traditional dances, and talks about having traditional food for his wedding cake. He is even able to describe the old men as "the granaries in which the knowledge of the society is stored." The conflict with his father stems from his inability to marry his academic cousin, his rootless urban lifestyle, and the attention to rural rituals. His father is incapable of grasping the nature of Dennis's situation, and talks defensively about circumcision, traditions, and Luhya customs. His criticisms of Dennis's relationship with Mary are from the standpoint of a rural villager, and overlook the fact that his son is a widower in an urban setting. In the play, Dennis's culturally uprooted urban existence is contrasted with the interdependence of the members of the traditional rural society where every individual appears to have a responsibility to that society. The whole social network is disrupted when one member fails to fulfill his obligations. Agala, Dennis's father, completes his duties as a grandparent of the boy to be circumcised. So does the strange friend Babu. But it remains for Dennis to bring in his role to facilitate a successful completion of the circumcision rite for his son, and this he fails to do.

It should be stressed that while Kenyan drama uses as its subject matter themes of culture conflict and political struggle, and individual dramatists such as Ngugi Wa Thiong'o conceive of theatre as a forum for the dissemination of critical political ideas, the notion that theatre should be strongly politically oriented remains an undeveloped one, especially when compared with Tanzania. And in contrast to Uganda, little attempt has so far
been made in Kenya to bring about a fusion of traditional theatre arts forms such as dance, story telling, music, drumming, and singing with European dramatic forms.

Theatre in Tanzania. \(^1\)

Tanzanian theatre is unique in East Africa. In contrast to Kenya in particular, and Uganda, \(^2\) it is Swahili drama, rather than European language drama which has emerged as the dominant form. It is also a popular rather than intellectual form, and is not professionalized in the way that various Yoruba Folk Opera companies in Nigeria have been. Tanzania, as Bob Leshoai notes, is simply too poor to support a professional theatre: "So far it has attempts to create a kind of theatre of the people - with the purpose of spreading the ideals of socialism and self-reliance." \(^3\) Drama is essentially an amateur form centred in schools and factories. As Abdulaziz has pointed out, in Tanzania an egalitarian centred interpretation of Swahili culture has developed. \(^4\) As a result, and in contrast to most black African states, where cultural activities are generally identified with a relatively small, urban, western educated intellectual stratum, much of the writing of poems, plays, and prose is done by people with little or no formal education in European languages. Many factory workers have been encouraged to improvise

1. Swahili theatre has been examined briefly by Farouk M. Topan in his chapter "Michezo ya Kuigiza" in F.M. Topan (ed.), Uchambuzi we maandishi ya Kiswahili (Dar-es-Salaam; OUP, 1971), pp.66-79.

2. Of course, as we have already seen, Luganda is the major language of popular drama, and is used by playwrights such as Byron Kawadwa.


and write drama - one of the most important adult groups is the Tanganyika Textile Mill group which has performed largely unwritten plays, improvised from stories, legends or topical events. Not being bound by script, they depend entirely on costume, speech and gesture for interpretation. The low standard of formal Western education of the members of local groups (Tanganyika Textile, Alwattan, Egyptian, New Star) has meant that they have not been exposed to Western types of drama, and to the influences of Asian and European countries, and their work, Ebrahim Hussein suggests, invokes striking parallels with the Commedia dell'Arte in both Italy and France in the second half of the 16th century.1

Swahili drama is strongly politically oriented, much of its material coming from topical subjects such as the Arusha Declaration, ujamaa vijiji, self-reliance, exploitation and cooperation. At the 1969 Youth Drama Festival, for instance, the winning play was

Nimechoka Kufundikizwa Mdani (I am fed up with being cooped up inside the house). This play concerns a young village girl who is married to a jealous, possessive and apolitical old man in the capital who denies her social or political activity. She is ultimately saved from her frustration by a social worker from the Union of Tanganyika Women.2

Conflict between African culture and European values is an important theme in Swahili drama. Martin, in G. Uhunga's play, Martin Kayamba, returns from abroad and looks down upon his people


2. This play was improvised by members of the Marian Drama Club (Marian Secondary School, Morogoro) and performed by them at the Azania Secondary School, Dar-es-Salaam, April, 1969.
and culture. In *Zabibu Na Masee Weke* (Zabibu and His Ancestors), the social values of Zabibu, a recent Makerere graduate are satirised, and city life is attacked. Some plays have historical themes. *Vita Vya Mkawa Na Wadachi* (Mkawa's Struggle Against the Germans), for instance, deals with Mkawa's resistance to the Germans and his subsequent suicide. Others are concerned with continuing neo-colonial relationships. Thus, in Madina Munro's *Usaliti* (Betrayal) a European spy wants to sabotage progress with the help of "Kupe", a social parasite. Conditions of employment are also the theme of Swahili drama. In J.A. Ramadhan's *Ngomo Na Mazinde* (The Mazinde Strike) workers who have experienced harsh working conditions on a sisal estate near Tanga join a newly formed worker's union and a strike follows. Corruption is also a prominent theme, and in Mrs. A. Mngodo's play, *Matandie Kwa Mfano* an honest man is abandoned by his family for refusing to take bribes, but ultimately his honesty triumphs. In Crispin Rauli's *Dunia Iliyofarakana* (The World Which Has Been Divided) a National Bourgeoisie assumes power at independence and is overthrown in a coup d'état. And, on a topical but relatively trivial note, Ubinga's *Jicho la Mungu* (The

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2. Scripted by the AgaKhan Girls' Secondary School, and performed by them at the 1969 Youth Drama Festival.


5. Script in the University of Dar-es-Salaam Library.


Eye of God) deals with the question of mini-skirts; to wear or not to wear them.\textsuperscript{1}

Swahili popular drama is capable of engendering a great deal of audience enthusiasm. In May 1973, the Azania-Jangwani Social Revolutionaries performed The Sinking Ground, a play outlining the pitfalls open to those entrusted with positions of higher responsibility. In the play, Mr. Goldbag is promoted from a junior post to Regional Agricultural Officer with an accompanying drastic increase in salary. His new financial status warrants better household goods, and the enjoyment of more sophisticated brands of beer and cigarettes. His irresponsibility draws him into a tragic love affair with Mary, a beautiful nurse, who wants him to divorce his wife so that they can be married. He is led to poison his wife. The murder lands him in court where, overcome by his folly and gross absurdity, he confesses to having been the victim of financial irresponsibility. The Daily News critic's description of the performance provides an indication of the type of enthusiasm popular Swahili drama is capable of arousing.

Existing alongside the popular Swahili dramatic idiom is a newly emerging dramatic tradition which is concerned with the establishment of more permanent values. This division is analogous to that which exists within Swahili poetry - the distinction between poetic

\textsuperscript{1} Written in 1968. Manuscript in the Drama Archives, Theatre Arts Department, University of Dar-es-Salaam.

works written for their immediate impact in the press, for example, and those written with the intention of promoting more permanent literary values. The intellectual tradition has received a good deal of its impetus from the Theatre Arts Department at the University of Dar-es-Salaam which offers a degree course. Its students are involved in the production of plays in Swahili and English, and each year the students take their productions on a three week tour throughout Tanzania performing for schools and adults.

Students in the Theatre Arts Department have also been commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Radio Tanzania to write short informational plays. The two most prominent Swahili dramatists, Ebrahim Hussein and Penina Muhando, are both products of the Department of Theatre Arts. It was Hussein with his play Kinjeketile who really provided the basis for the new intellectual tradition in Swahili drama. His early social comedy, Alkiona (He Saw It) concerned a woman who cheated her husband and then became caught up in her own lies. Another short play, Nakati Ukuta (The Wall of Time) dealt with the conflict between the coastal Swahili culture and the imposed European culture. His major play Kinjeketile dealt with the Maji Jaji resistance and the prophet Kinjeketile's doubts about the authenticity of the prophecy he received from the

2. Leshoai, "Theatrical Winds of Change in East Africa", p.16.
3. Another Swahili dramatist who falls within the intellectual rather than the popular tradition is Farouk Topan, formerly of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, who is now a Lecturer in the Department of African Languages and Linguistics at the University of Nairobi. One of his published plays is Aliyeonja Pepo (Paradise Experience) which is a satire on the notion of afterlife.
4. Kinjeketile is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII of this thesis.
river god Hongo. His most recent published play, Mashetani is about two youths who are studying at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and who come from two important families whose histories have been alike but also marked by inter-family tensions. The second young dramatist, Penina Muhando, teaches in the Department of Theatre Arts and has published two plays, Tammwani Haki Zetu (That We May Recognize our Rights), and Hatia. The latter play, which was first staged in 1970 by a University of Dar-es-Salaam company, is about a seventeen year old village girl Cheja who works in Dar-es-Salaam. She is made pregnant by her friend Juma who, anxious to deny responsibility, suggests that she put the blame on her employer, Sembuli. Cheja is expected by her parents to earn the money with which her brother Mhani can woo. Unaware of her daughter’s predicament, Cheja’s mother states the truth about having daughters — "we bear girls for others". Cheja runs away from her employer and returns home to meet her father who has received a telegram from Sembuli informing him of her absence. She alleges that she has been impregnated by the absent Sembuli, and her wrathful father forwards the accusations to the "Wazee wa Baraza" (village elders forum) for consideration. After Sembulu is forced to swear an oath of truth, and counter accusations have been made, a violent feud develops between Cheja’s father’s clan and Sembulu’s, and Cheja confesses her guilt. The people in the village realize that all the fighting has been caused by one who is sitting comfortably in Dar-es-Salaam. The city is a moral wilderness which has a corrosive impact upon

rural life and values.

The intellectual drama, as distinct from the popular idiom, owes much to the influence of modern European drama, and the works of West Africans such as Soyinka and Clark, in terms of structure, language, and the use of elements derived from local cultures. It is also partly embodied in the translation of major foreign works: Nyerere's translations into Swahili of Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* and Julius Caesar, and Sam Mushi's translations of *The Tempest, Macbeth*, and Sophocles' *Antigone*. Such translations, Mazrui notes, represent part of the process of taking pieces of "universal civilization and universalizing them even more in an African idiom."^1

From this brief overview, it can be seen that theatre in East Africa as an intellectual institution is still involved very much in the process of establishing local roots in terms of material, audience, and role, and of overcoming, in Kenya in particular, a European theatrical legacy which has done much to stifle the emergence of new dramatic forms which utilize elements derived from indigenous theatre arts. It can also be seen that national differences which have their roots in different socio-economic and cultural conditions, are important not only in terms of the socio-political function of the theatre and its relative importance as a channel for disseminating ideas, but in determining whether the dominant theatrical tradition shall be the intellectual or popular one. It has been in Uganda and Tanzania, and not in Kenya, that the theatrical movement, however undeveloped, has come closest to being integrated into and inspired by its society.

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CHAPTER V

EAST AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS:
A SOCIOLOGICAL PORTRAIT

The life histories of East African intellectuals, at least in broad outline, conform to the pattern depicted in novels such as Chinua Achebe’s *No Longer at Ease* and William Conton’s *The African*. The intellectual is born in a small village or town. He receives his primary education in the village, usually at a mission school. Secondary education follows at a boarding school away from home, or at a school in a provincial centre. His tertiary education is at a university overseas, or at one of the newly established in his own country. After university there is employment in the civil service, in teaching, in the university, or perhaps in politics. This pattern, with variations, holds for different generations. It doesn’t hold quite as securely for earlier generations of Swahili intellectuals brought up within Islamic traditions.

Not all East African intellectuals come from rural areas. Many are from the capital cities, provincial centres, and small towns which serve as trading, administrative, and educational centres. Intellectuals of Asian origin have almost invariably been

1. See Appendix I for biographical details of East African Intellectuals.
born and educated in the larger cities—in Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa, and Nairobi. Early generation intellectuals in Uganda, most of whom are Baganda, were born in, or near, Kampala. Others come from places such as Gulu, Masaka, and Kabele. Of the total number of Ugandan intellectuals, over half have urban rather than rural origins. A similar situation obtains in Tanzania where Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, Moshi, and Kigoma/Ujiji have been the main urban breeding-grounds for intellectuals. In Kenya, many were born in Kisumu, Mombasa, Nairobi, and Nyeri. But in Kenya, intellectuals of rural origins clearly outnumber those from urban areas. As the following table indicates there are generational differences.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Known</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1921-25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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<td>1936-40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | 36 | 48 | 13 | 97 |
For those born between 1900 and 1940, slightly more have urban origins. Between 1941 and 1950, the number of rural born increased remarkably. Closer analysis, shows, however, that many of these people are from Central Province, from Kiambu and Muranga, districts close to Thika, Murang'a Town (Fort Hall), and Nairobi, and well equipped with educational facilities.

Early missionary and administration contact, and the concentration of educational effort in certain regions, were decisive in determining both the tribal and area origins of the modern intellectual stratum. Uganda intellectuals are predominantly Baganda, Banyankore, Batoro, and Acholi/Lang’o. Kenyan intellectuals are overwhelmingly Kikuyu, Luo, Luyia and Kamba. Almost three-quarters of them come from three groups — the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia. Under 10 per cent are of Asian origin. A few come from small coastal tribes such as the Giriama. Ali Mazrui and Ahmed Mohamed are of Arab origin, although they would probably speak of themselves now as "Waswahili".

In Tanzania, the distribution among regions and tribal groupings is much more even, but again early missionary and educational activities were critical in determining persisting trends. Tanganyika benefited early from the creation under the German Administration of a state school system. The non-sectarian nature of the schools was instrumental in encouraging Moslem families to send their children to non-Qur’anic educational institutions. Their reluctance would have been much greater if the schools had been under the control of mission societies. Tanganyika has never lost this educational
advantage, and has been the major place of origin of Swahili intellectuals. The coastal areas around, and to the north of Dar-es-Salaam, occupied predominantly by the Bondi and Zaramo peoples, have been influenced, not only by long and rich Swahili cultural traditions, but by the concerted impact of European administrative and education systems. Other intellectuals come from near Mount Kilimanjaro, from the highly developed Chagga area, and also from the adjacent Pare and Sambaa occupied areas.

It is doubtful whether members of different "tribes" have different socio-cultural conceptions of the role of the intellectual-writer, or whether different tribal origins affect the way in which intellectuals see themselves. With a couple of possible exceptions, it is difficult to speak of distinct modern "tribal" intellectual traditions, simply because political ideological and intellectual orientations cut across "tribal" boundaries. Certainly, intellectuals - historians and writers, and social scientists as well, most often use their own histories and societies as subject matter. Kikuyu writers, for instance, write about the Kikuyu historical experience and about Mau Mau which distinguishes their work at least in content terms from that of writers from other groups. But despite these content differences, the subject matter is often used to illustrate certain tendencies in colonial or post-colonial society which affect, albeit unequally, all groups.
One could also talk about a Buganda theatrical tradition simply because Uganda theatre is Kampala based, has predominantly Buganda companies, and is dominated by Buganda playwrights such as John Ruganda, Robert Serumaga and Byron Kawadwa who utilise Buganda history, myths, and music and dance in some of their works. Nevertheless, with this possible exception, it should be emphasized that common intellectual concerns with a number of political, social and historical issues work against the emergence of distinct "tribal" intellectual traditions and are reinforced by foreign language usage.

Studies of both East African and West African students have consistently revealed that they tend to come from families with above average educational backgrounds. At face value, such findings appear obvious, even a little naive. Yet, in the African context they are ingrained with a much deeper significance. In societies with high illiteracy rates (often over 70 per cent) one or two years formal education, and literacy gained through informal educational processes, can be crucial in influencing the educational, and hence economic and occupational, chances of later generations. Early access to educational institutions, often accompanied by a necessary but superficial conversion to the beliefs of a Christian sect, underlies later patterns of class formation.

Although our information is rudimentary and incomplete, it may be tentatively argued that East African intellectuals generally

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come from families with some formal educational or literacy background. Many, of course, especially those in the older generations, have no such background. Jomo Kenyatta’s father was an illiterate peasant who died when Kenyatta was quite young. Koinange’s father, later to become Senior Chief Koinange and a prominent Kikuyu nationalist, had no formal educational background. Nyerere’s father, a Zanaki chief, was illiterate, but he had an older brother who had been to school. Younger intellectuals also come from backgrounds of illiteracy. This applies to those of Asian origin as well. For instance, the father of Amin and Kutub Kassam was an uneducated but wealthy trader in Mombasa. His wife had only a couple of years of primary education. In an interview, however, Kutub Kassam pointed out that an uncle had been well educated, and wrote poetry in his Indian vernacular language, and had been influential in his own intellectual and literary development. Some fathers acquired literacy without formal schooling. Chris Wanjala’s father is one such case. A member of the Carrier Corps during World War I, he developed broader world perspectives and a “karani” or clerk-type mentality, using as his chief reference group the white settlers and administrators he came in contact with. His literacy was acquired basically through his own efforts. Walter Egoya’s and Tigiti Sengo’s fathers similarly acquired literacy primarily through informal learning processes. Egoya’s father ultimately became an agricultural instructor during the 1930s.

1. Interview with Kutub Kassam, Nairobi, 12/7/1973.
2. Interview with Chris Wanjala, Nairobi,
Families with two generations of formal education are common. The fathers of many of the intellectuals in this study were catechists and school teachers, lower echelon civil servants, and medical assistants, thus providing their families with a rudimentary intellectual orientation, however limited. B.A. Ogot’s father was a teacher, and one of the first students at Maseno School where he was taught by Bishop Willis. He eventually became a Church Elder. Okot p’Bitek’s parents were both Christian. His father was a catechist-teacher in Gulu. Crispin Mauli is the son of a missionary teacher. Lesse’s father was a primary teacher in Tanga, and Cliff-Lubwa’s father a medical assistant in East Acholi. J.P. Mbonde, the Publishing Manager of the Tanzania Publishing House, was an only son. His father had Standard Four primary education and was a catechist-teacher in mission schools. He later became an agricultural instructor. Two of Mbonde’s sisters are well educated. One is a teacher, and another a nurse.

Intellectuals with two generations of educated behind them are rare. Given the relatively short history of education in most areas of East Africa, this is hardly surprising. Predictably, third generation educated are young. One is Fenina Muhando, the young Swahili dramatist and author of Hatia and Tambuoni Maki Setu. She was born in 1943 in Kilosa District, Morogoro Region. Her grandfather was a Christian who eventually became an archdeacon in

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1. There are some East African families, however, with a very long tradition of education. The Tanganyikan, Martin Kayamba, who was born in 1891 was, for instance, second generation educated. His father was educated by the Universities Mission to Central Africa in the late 1870s and between 1883 and 1885 spent two and a half years at an English public school, Bloxham’s, as one of the first Tanganyikans to be educated in Europe.
the Church Missionary Society. He was interested in writing and adapted traditional stories to Christian purposes. He wrote two books, one of which was entitled *Folktales Become Christian Teaching.* Penina’s father, now an official with the Rural Development Bank, had Standard Ten education. Another is Cyrus Mutiso, the Kenyan political scientist and television commentator. He was born at Kangundo in 1942. His two grandfathers were first generation Christians. His paternal grandfather was orphaned during a famine in the 1890s. During the construction of the railroad from Mombasa, he was picked up by missionaries and brought up at the African Inland Mission Headquarters at Kijabe. He later returned with the first missionaries who established an African Inland Mission at Kangundo. Mutiso’s father, who had form two standard education, was a teacher for 18 years until 1952. He then served two years as an education officer responsible for Adult Education, and from 1954-1963 was a chief. Since 1963 he has worked for the Public Service Commission. Mutiso’s mother was also well educated, having reached Primary Standard Six. Her parents were also educated. Mutiso’s solid educational background is reflected in the accomplishments of his brothers and sisters. Of the four sisters, two have been trained as nurses in the United Kingdom; the other two as teachers. Of the three brothers, one is now studying for a Master’s degree in Chemistry at the University of Nairobi. Another, after completing secondary school, works in a private

1. Interview with Penina Muhando (Nlama), Dar-es-Salaam, 30/7/1973.
business. The youngest brother is still at school in Nairobi.¹

East African intellectuals from Muslim families have a different educational and literary background. Although men such as Ali Mazrui, Ahmed Mohiddin, Sheikh Amri Abeid, and Suberi Hamadi Lesso went to secular schools, initially they were raised within literary traditions concerned with the celebration and teaching of the Qur'an, the nature of Islamic law, and the teachings of the Prophet.² They have usually attended a Quranic school before receiving a secular, western education. Of course, many Quranic schools taught little more than the slavish memorisation of the Qur'an, and this was often supplemented with handicraft work to contribute towards the upkeep of the school.³ It is doubtful whether most Quranic schools in East Africa provided a very solid basis for sustained literacy. But there were exceptions. At places such as the Mosque College of Lamu, for example, the discipline was much more rigorous. Students at the Mosque College studied the Qur'an, Arabic, the tradition of the Prophet, law and in the more advanced stages, a little sufism.⁴

In spite of their shortcomings, Quranic schools did instil in many of their pupils a reverence for books and provided them,

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2. Both Mazrui and Mohiddin went to the Government Arab Boys' School at Mombasa.
through Islam, with a broader understanding of the world. And Swahili poets such as Shabaan Robert learned to use the Arabic script in these schools. The Islamic literary background meant that in isolated cases there was a long tradition of literacy and scholarship. Ali Mazrui's family is one such case. Mazrui's ancestors had originally come from Oman after the overthrow of the Portuguese along the East African coast. They immediately won office as Liwali in Mombasa, and in the 18th and 19th centuries controlled a good deal of the Kenyan coast. For a time the Mazrus controlled Pemba, then the East African granary, and managed to place a vassal to the north in Pate. They were ultimately defeated in the mid-19th century by the Busaidi Arabs of Zanzibar. Ali Mazrui's father was Sheikh Al-Amin bin Abdallah bin Nafi Al-Mazrui, the polemicist and social reformer, who ultimately became Chief Kadhi of Kenya. Sheikh Al-Amin was influenced a great deal by intellectual developments in the Middle East and the works of Islamic scholars, philosophers, and political reformers which were aimed at "remoulding Arab Muslim thought and society to accommodate and face the problems of the new Age". He was fired by the liberalization of ideas and felt sufficiently compelled to found a Swahili paper, Al-Saheefa (The Newspaper) to disseminate them on the coast. The success of this paper encouraged him and led to a more ambitious project - the establish-

1. A "liwali" is a governor.

ment of Al-Islah (Reform), a Swahili-Arabic weekly published in Mombasa. Ali Mazrui thus spent his childhood in a family conscious of its considerable achievements and heritage. It was, and always had been, a family involved in contemporary issues. Sheikh Al-Amin's polemicistic and reforming zeal, and later his position of Chief Kadhi (an office involving not only religious leadership but important judicial functions as well) meant that Ali Mazrui was constantly confronted with discourse on theological and jurisprudential issues. Thus Mazrui, like many of the intellectuals of coastal origins, came from a Muslim family steeped in a literary tradition and a universal religion which helped promote an outward-looking orientation.

The earlier generations of intellectuals were concentrated in a small number of secondary schools. In Kenya, Alliance High School was the most prominent. In Uganda it was King's College, Budo. And in Tanzania, although to a less marked extent, it was Tabora Government Secondary School. Alliance High School, as the English public school modelled elite African school in Kenya, was the recruiting ground for African administrative and political elites. In the first year of independence more than half the Cabinet and three-quarters of the Permanent Secretaries had attended the school. P.J. Koinange, prominent nationalist, author of The People of Kenya Speak for Themselves, and long-serving Minister of State in the President's Office, was a student there in 1926-27.

Ronald Ngala was a student. First generation academics such as Dr. Julius Kiano, Professor Simon Ominde, Professor John Mbiti, Philip Ndegwa, and J.B. Kariuki were students. B.A. Gecaga, author of Home Life in Kikuyu-Land, and a lawyer and businessman, went to Alliance. James K. Njoroge, the poet and essayist who became Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education, was a student at Alliance from 1949-52. The school has continued to be an important training-ground for intellectuals. Of the generation born since 1945, B.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, James Gatanyu, David Gachago, William Ochieng, Sheb Migot Adholla, Francis Iabuga, and Aloc Ojuka were there. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Okoth-Ogendo, Edwin Waiyaki, Philip Ochieng, and Lemnard Okola, intellectuals of that generation born just prior to World War II and up until its end, were also Alliance students. However, while Alliance High School was a dominant factor in the creation of the Kenyan political and administrative elite, it has not played the same pivotal role in the formation of the intellectual stratum, although clearly the existence of an Alliance-Makerere intellectual nexus cannot be discounted. Another early-established school, the G.N.S. Maseno School, has been important. It lists among its former students Oginga Odinga, Professor B.A. Ogot, Gideon Were, Okoth Ogendo, Lemnard Okola, and Jared Angira Othieno. But the tremendous

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2. Interview with Cyrus Mutiso, 26th June, 1973. Mutiso, who went to Machakos High School before studying in the United States, pointed out that on his return he had difficulty establishing local contacts, mainly because of the strength of this nexus. As a result, he established more contacts with administrators than with academics.

3. With the exception of Were, the others are Luo.
growth of secondary education in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with its highly concentrated proliferation of schools in particular areas, has meant that members of the intellectual stratum born after World War II have come from many different schools. Of course, some have been more prominent than others. Strathmore College, in Nairobi, for instance, lists among its former students Wilson Kyalo Matio, Christopher Mulei, Edwin Waiyaki, Ralph Ng’ethe, and Mauari Yasbo. Jonathan Kariara and Joseph Mutiga went to Kagumo Secondary School. Leonard Kibera, Joseph Kimura, Joel Makumi, and Joseph Waiguru attended Kagumo Secondary School. Samuel Kahiga and Kenneth Watene were students at Thika High School. Seth Adagala, Awori wa Katakwa, Bernard Chahilu, George Muriuki, and Chris Wanjala went to Kamusinga Friends’ School.

With the exception of Kamusinga, the schools have been clustered in the densely populated and more developed areas of Central Province, in close proximity to the major centres of Nairobi, Thika, Fort Hall (Murang’a Town), and Nyeri. Most of the 13 national higher schools (forms 5 and 6) in 1970 were concentrated round Nairobi, where Central Province students tend to be predominant. The same situation existed with regard to the 59 higher school certificate schools in 1970: 15 were in Central Province, and 12 in Nairobi.

On the coast, Mombasa has been the major educational centre, and two schools have stood out: the Government Arab Boys’ School and the

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2. Ibid.
Age Khan High School. Ali Mazrui, Ahmed Mohiddin, and A.L. Salim, author of *Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965* were students at the former. Amin and Kutub Kasaam, and Sadrudin Kasaam went to the latter school.

In the case of Uganda, over a quarter of the intellectuals in this study received at least some of their education at King's College, Budo. Among the early students were Akiki Nyabongo, Eradadi Mulira, and Joseph Kiwanuka. Other former students include the Malawian-born poet and novelist David Rubadiri, Erina Kironde, John Kakongo and Phares Nutibwa. Okot p'Bitek went to Budo after attending Gulu High School. Of the later generations of intellectuals, Ficho Ali, Joseph Buruga, author of *The Abandoned Hut*, Peter Songa, and Elvania and Pio Zirimu are former students. No other school has achieved anything like the same prominence.

Taban Lo Liyong and Okot p'Bitek went to Gulu High School. From there Taban went to Sir Samuel Baker School, Gulu, where Okot was one of his teachers. Another pupil at the school was A.R. Cliff-Lubwa, the poet. Two intellectuals of Asian origin, Peter Nazareth and Rajat Neogy, went to the Old Kampala Secondary School. Nazareth then went to Makerere and Neogy, following a pattern which was common for both Asians and those of Arab origin (attending polytechnics in England), went to the Northwestern Polytechnic in London. John Ruganda, the dramatist, and Richard Mtimu, the poet and author of *Tensions*, attended Ntare School. Okello Oculi, the political scientist, and author of *Crohan* and *Prostitute* went to
St. Peter’s College, Tororo, along with Victor Ngwabe. Oculi also attended St. Mary’s College, Kisubi, where Michael Kaggwa and Robert Serumaga, the novelist, playwright and actor, were also students.

In Tanganyika no school ever achieved quite the same position of eminence as either Alliance High School or King’s College, Budo. Tabora Government Secondary School came closest. The late Sheikh Amri Abedi, the poet and TANU politician who became, shortly before his death, Minister for Community Development and Culture, was a student at Tabora between 1937 and 1941. Julius Nyerere studied at the school before going on to Makerere. At Tabora at approximately the same time was Hilbert Chagula (1939-44) who followed the well-trodden path to Makerere where he studied for the London Medical Certificate. A later student was Richard Juma. Another school at Tabora, St. Mary’s, where Nyerere taught for a short time after his graduation from Makerere, was important. Pugu, on the outskirts of Dar-es-Salaam, was a major centre of Roman Catholic mission education. Ben Mkapa, the editor of the Daily News and Shuru, and a member of the East African Legislative Assembly, and Rene Ngulukulu, recently Acting-Director of the East African Literature Bureau were students at St. Francis’ College, Pugu. Simon Mbilinyi, after attending St. Mary’s Tabora, studied at Pugu Secondary School. But as in Kenya, the expansion of secondary education in the 1950s and ’60s was instrumental in broadening the range of recruitment into the intellectual stratum, so that most of
the intellectuals born since the early 1940s have come from a much larger number of secondary schools.

The tertiary education of East African intellectuals is marked by two salient features: firstly, as we have already seen, it has been within either British universities and traditions and their derivatives in East Africa, or in North American institutions; and, secondly, much of it has been undertaken in institutions outside the country of the student's origin. Both points require elaboration. Of those in this study who have attended universities, about 1/3rd have studied in the United Kingdom, either after graduating from an East African University (invariably Makerere), or after completing secondary education in their own countries. And even allowing for the overlap of students studying in two or more overseas universities, almost one quarter have received at least some of their university training in the United States. Thus, almost 2/3rd of the university-educated have studied outside East Africa. And, when study in other East African countries is considered, nearly 90% of the university-educated have studied outside the country of their birth.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Makerere University College was the principal training-ground for members of the East African intellectual stratum. Obviously, this was only to be expected. Tertiary-level colleges, with the exception of Royal College, Nairobi, did not develop until the early 1960s in both Kenya and Tanganyika. Apart from Makerere, the only real opportunities
available for tertiary-level education were to be found overseas — in the United Kingdom, North America, Europe, and for a short time, India. Of the 166 people in this study who went to universities either in East Africa or overseas, 69 (40%) studied at Makerere, mainly at undergraduate level (See Table II immediately below).

### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As was to be expected, the foundation of universities in Kenya and Tanganyika in the early 1960s as part of the University of East Africa produced a fundamental change. Makerere lost its position as the intellectual "Mecca". Tanzanians and Kenyans born after 1940 increasingly went, in accordance with the demands of Government policy, to their own national institutions (See Tables III and IV immediately below).
TABLE III
Attendance at the University of Nairobi
by Nationality and Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1931-35</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IV
Attendance at the University of Dar-es-Salaam
by Nationality and Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
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</table>

With the duplication of teaching fields, the idea of the Federal University soon evaporated. As a result, there was little student interchange. And, in the 1960s and early '70s, while students still
went overseas for both undergraduate and postgraduate study, they
decreasingly went to another East African country.

East African universities, and Makerere in particular, have
served as a springboard for overseas study. Many East African
intellectuals (almost a quarter in this study) took their first
degree or teaching diplomas at Makerere before going overseas,
usually to the United Kingdom or the United States, for further
study (see Table V). This is in marked contrast to both the
Universities of Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi which, through a
combination of their relatively short histories and changing
emphases in tertiary-training, are unlikely to play a springboard
role to anywhere near the same extent. In the case of Makerere,
the pattern persisted from its early years through until the mid
'60s. All the Makerere graduates in our study who were born
before 1925 went to the United Kingdom - Julius Nyerere, Joseph
Kiwanuka, Erandi Mulira, Simon Ominde, and B.M. Ccaga. Nyerere,
for instance, trained as a teacher at Makerere from 1943-1945.
After teaching at St. Mary's, Tabora, where he was politically
active as the secretary of the local Tanganyika African Association,
Nyerere went to Edinburgh University to study history and economics.

Many intellectuals born in the period 1936-45 went first to
Makerere and then to English universities. Leeds University
became an important centre for graduates in English. Ngugi wa
Thiong'o, Grant Kamenju, Peter Nazareth, Pica and Elvania Zirimu,
Rose Mbowa, and Timothy Wangusa studied for either the postgraduate
### TABLE V

Attendance at East African and Overseas Universities by Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Dar-es Sal.</th>
<th>Makerer</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>U.K. &amp; Ireland</th>
<th>European</th>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>1931-35</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
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<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two students attended universities in both the United States and the U.K. after graduating from Makerere.
Diploma in English Studies or the M.A. at Leeds. It was here that Ngugi, Kasenju, Nazareth and Pio Zipimu came in contact with socialist academics such as Arnold Kettle, who were highly influential in terms of their intellectual development. In his foreword to Ngugi's *Homecoming*, the Nigerian Ise Ikiddeh, who was also a student at Leeds, provides an account of the influences at work in the case of Ngugi, and presumably in the case of others.

Extensive travels around Britain and Europe, acquaintance with some eminent British socialist scholars, including his supervisor, Dr. Arnold Kettle, and discussions with the radical student group led by Alan Hunt - these revealed that the root cause of incessant industrial strife in Britain was no more than the old inter-class hostility inherent in the capitalist system. Thus Leeds provided an ideological framework for opinions that he already vaguely held.¹

At this time Ngugi, along with Kasenju, Nazareth and others, first read Fenon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, and Robert Tressell's working class novel, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropist*. Nazareth was later, in his book of critical essays *Literature and Society in Modern Africa*, to devote a chapter to the latter work.²

Quite a large number of East African intellectuals received all of their university education at institutions outside East Africa. Almost 3/4ths of this group went to the United Kingdom and the United States (see Table VI immediately below).

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### Tertiary Education Overseas by Age and Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<th>U.K.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>7***</td>
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<td>1931-35</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 3 were educated in two overseas countries.
** 1 educated in two overseas countries.
*** 5 educated in two overseas countries, and one in three overseas countries.
**** 3 educated in two overseas countries.
An important pattern which emerged was for the student to do undergraduate work in one of these countries, and postgraduate study in the other. For example, Dharam Ghai, the Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, studied at London and Oxford Universities before reading for a Ph.D. in Economics at Yale. His younger brother Yash, went to Oxford for legal studies, and then to Harvard where he read for an L.L.M. There were variations to this pattern. Masrui for instance, received his B.A. from Manchester University. After M.A. studies at Columbia University, he returned to England, to Oxford, where he wrote his D.Phil. dissertation. Of course, the exchange was not exclusively between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Philip Ochieng, former assistant-editor of the East Africa Journal, and a columnist first with the Sunday Nation, and later with the Tanzanian Standard and Daily News, went to Roosevelt University (Chicago) and then to the University of Besancon, in France. Adhu Awiti, a Research Fellow at the Economic Research Bureau at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, did a B.A. at St. Edward's (Texas) before undertaking postgraduate study in Holland.

Very few East African intellectuals have attended European universities without first studying in either North America or the United Kingdom. Few have been to universities in Eastern European countries, although during the 1960s the flow of students wasn't as exclusively towards the United States and Britain. However, most of those who did study in Eastern Europe were in Agricultural Science,
Mathematics, and Engineering — not in the much more ideologically sensitive Humanities and Social Sciences. A number of younger Tanzanian academics, especially in Management, Economics, and Statistics have been products of Eastern European institutions. The Ugandan Ficho Ali, at one time a research officer in the President's Office, studied law at Moscow State University. The Kenyan poet Oumar Nassar studied Philology, International Law, and Political Science at Friendship University, Moscow. Joseph Kasella Bantu, a former TANU M.P., studied at Leipzig University where he obtained an M.A. in Political Science and History. Almost 15 years earlier, he had been a student at Witswatersrand University, Johannesburg.

During the 1950s, Indian universities attracted some African students, especially the more politically conscious ones. At this time India was assuming the mantle of Third World or non-aligned leadership and provided a Third World alternative to the West. Akana Adoko went to Calcutta University after attending the University College, Khartoum. John Kakonge, who later became Secretary-General of the Uganda People's Congress, and Ugandan Minister for Economic Planning and Development, studied at the Delhi School of Economics where he developed his Marxism. Tom Okello Odongo, a former assistant-Minister in the KANU Kenya Government, and later a leading member of the KPU, studied for a MA(Hons.) at Bharati University before going to Howard University in 1955.
Hugo Gatheru, author of *Child of Two Worlds*, studied in India before going to the United States. Intellectuals of Asian origin often went to India to receive university education, or even secondary education in the case of Joseph Murumbi. The Tanzanian Amir Jamal read for a B. Com. at Calcutta University, and the late Pio Gama Pinto studied at Bombay College, Bombay, although he did not take a degree.

East African intellectuals are to be found overwhelmingly in occupations or professions which have, certainly in many European writings, been designated as having cultural validation as intellectual (See Table VII), although a number work in business and public relations.

**Table VII**

*Intellectual Occupation by Birth*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>-25 1926</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1951</th>
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<tr>
<td>University</td>
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<td>-45</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>2 3 16 21</td>
<td>19 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching &amp; Teachers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colleges</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Journalism</td>
<td>3 1 1 8 2 4 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publishing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio, T.V. &amp; Theatre</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Politics</td>
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<td>Administration</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business &amp; Public Rel.</td>
<td>2 2 1 3 4 - -</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>- - - 1 4 9 1</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>- - - 3 6 5 -</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25 15 34 45 51 33 2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of our sample, almost 1/3rd are academics. The others are to be found in politics, administration, journalism, publishing, radio and television, and in business. A number (about 7%) are students who have been active as editors of, and contributors to journals such as *Neel Neel*, *Uma*, *Ghana*, and *Busara*. A brief glance at the table indicates that generational differences have been important in terms of occupation, although the table, in its present form, does little to reveal the occupational mobility which has characterized East African intellectual life.

Generational factors have obviously been important in influencing, if not determining, the occupational history of East Africans. The range of occupational choice for those born in the last thirty years has increased immensely, not only through the growth of new occupational sectors, but through the expansion and Africanisation of employment areas which were originally the preserve of Europeans. For Africans born before 1925, the range of occupational choice was severely limited, and restricted to teaching (almost half) and clerical work in the lower echelons of the colonial administration, and private business. For those of Asian origin, the range was much wider. For, in East Africa during the first two decades of this century

In every department of government - including the ones newly established - the Indians filled the middle ranks in an extensive variety of capacities: as hospital assistants, surveyors, draughtsmen, clerks, cashiers, customs collectors, policemen, artisans, mechanics, carpenters, post and telegraph assistants, shorthand writers, typists, and compounders, etc.¹

In Kenya they numbered 366 in 1912 and 1,447 in 1921. The comparable figures for Uganda and Zanzibar would probably be half that total. In Tanganyika, where after the establishment of the British Mandate the practice of employing Indian staff was adopted, a total of 304 were employed by the Administration in 1921. A further 336 served the railways in that territory. Asians were active in business and controlled most of the retail trade. Jamal, for instance, went into his father’s export business after his graduation from Calcutta University. The professions, including medicine, law, accountancy, and even journalism, provided an important additional outlet for educated Asians. Journalism, especially in Uganda where a vigorous Kampala-based African press had developed earlier than in the rest of East Africa, provided another outlet for educated Africans. Both BRIDADI Mulire and Joseph Kivunuku worked in journalism at quite an early stage. African journalism was initially, apart from being an instrument of mission societies and government, tied to the rise of nationalism, and as such provided an alternative system to that offered by the colonial administration. Kenyatta, for example, edited the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) paper, *Muirithania*, in 1923.

The problem for early intellectuals in Kenya was made more difficult by the nature of European colonial settler society which managed to maintain a denigrating and paternalistic view of African abilities right up until independence. In 1956 a reviewer in the

New Comment made the following comments about Tom Mboya's Fabian


I find it extremely difficult to believe that Tom Mboya wrote The Kenya Question: An African Answer, just as I cannot believe that Facing Mount Kenya was actually written by Jomo Kenyatta. Mr. Mboya will be back in Kenya any day now and may be able to convince me. I can devise several tests. The English is practically impeccable and compares more than favourably with, say, the latest effusion from that highly literate African, Mr. Argwings-Kodek.1

It was Argwings-Kodek who had broken the law studies barrier for Kenyan Africans, and during the early 1950s he was the only indigenous practising lawyer. A Makerere-trained teacher, Argwings-Kodek had been granted a government bursary "ostensibly" to study social science at the University of South Wales and Monmouthshire in 1947. After a term at the University he applied to the Kenya Government to take law, his originally chosen course of study. Government opposition to such a proposed change was strong, and permission was refused. However, with the help of the University, and some friends in the Colonial Office, he joined the degree course against the "specific orders" of the Kenya Government and by December 1949 had passed his finals.2

The examples of Mbiyu Koinange and Pemnas Githendu Mockeye illustrate clearly the difficulties and frustrations facing the educated African in a settler dominated society. Mockeye was a school teacher from Kahuhia. At the beginning of 1931 he was in Uganda attending a teachers' refresher course at Makerere when he received a call from the KCA headquarters asking him to represent them

1. Ojuando Abur, p.293.
2. Ibid., pp.308-9.
in London. The C.M.S. missionary, Handley Hooper, who had been stationed at Kahuha, arranged for Mockerie to take a year's course at the Firecroft Working Men's College in Birmingham, one of the Selly Oak group of colleges. Further study followed at Ruskin College, Oxford. Hooper, his patron, was pleased that he had managed to chaperone Mockerie away from the dangerous, pernicious influences which he believed had corrupted Kenyatta. In a self-congratulatory statement he said:

There is no danger at the moment of his becoming a sinister revolutionary ... I used to think that, compared with Kenyatta Parmenas need not be rated very seriously. My opinion has changed, and I know that he carries heavier metal than I ever suspected. We want to save him from becoming an embittered and discontented critic of things as they are.

In England Mockerie had written a short book entitled *An African Speaks for Himself*. It was published by Leonard Woolf at the Hogarth Press with a foreword by Julian Huxley. It was the first account to appear in England by an educated Kikuyu of his tribe's background and attitudes. But what could he look forward to in Kenya given the employment patterns of the colony? The missions could only offer jobs at low salaries. Political activity would be frustrating in the face of administrative hostility (including the real possibility of detention) and suspicious fellow Kikuyu.

1. For Mockerie's own brief account of his life until his return to Kenya from Ruskin College, see "The Story of Parmenas Mockerie of the Kikuyu Tribe, Kenya", in Margery Perham (ed.), *Ten Africans* (London: Faber & Faber, 1936), pp.159-172.

Mbiyu Koinange, the son of the senior and most respected Kikuyu chief, was the first Kenyan African to go abroad for a full period of university study. Koinange, along with a number of other Africans, got the idea of studying in America, and in particular the idea that Hampton and Tuskegee might be the most suitable colleges, from direct contact with Aggrey or Jesse Jones. It was his attendance at Aggrey's open-air meeting in Nairobi which aroused his initial interest. According to Kenneth King, his final decision in favour of Hampton was largely determined by G.A. Grieve, his headmaster at Alliance High School. He spent ten years in the United States (1927-1936), graduating from the Hampton Institute, Ohio Wesleyan University, and Columbia University, New York, where he obtained an M.A.

Compared to the thorough ideological commitment of many Africans in London and other British cities, the African students movement in America was sporadic and relatively moderate. Although there were exceptions such as Asikiwe and Itsa, America did not in the pre-war period produce political Africans of the stature of Kenyatta, Wallace-Johnson, the leaders of the West African Students Union (WASU), and others who came under the influence of the circle of radical pan-Africanist thinkers such as George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and Ras. Makonnen. Nevertheless, in the American environment


2. For a brief examination of this circle and the importance of James especially, see Roderick J. Macdonald, "Some Reflections upon London in the 1930s as a Focus for Black Anti-Imperial Agitation and Ideological Development", Makerere University: Universities Social Sciences Conference, 1971.
Koinange's political consciousness was heightened. He felt the inspiration of the Hampton "spirit of self-improvement and service"\(^1\) and began to develop the educational ideas which he was later to implement at Githunguri. As early as 1931 he addressed a lengthy statement to the Secretary of State for the Colonies which dealt with two major issues: "the education of my people, and their future relations with the white race".\(^2\) His major grievances related to the parity of educational provisions for whites and blacks in Kenya before the assessment of comparative racial abilities.

His statement was in effect an attack on widely accepted theories of African mental inferiority which took no account of cultural differences, nutritional factors, and social and educational deprivation.

It was clear that the educational aspirations Koinange held for his people would be much larger than the colonial government in Kenya could ever accept. In 1934, for instance, Koinange had presented to Jesse Jones a scheme whereby he would carry out with the assistance of the Director of Education an education programme that would embrace all tribes. Even though he disavowed any aim "to revolutionise or foster a political party",\(^3\) his scheme to assuage "the educational hunger of three million natives of Kenya" was unlikely to meet administration and settler approval, and unlikely to be met within the Jeanees School type framework which the Director of Education favoured.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid., p.247.
3. Koinange, quoted in Ibid.
Going to Britain in 1936, he did postgraduate work at St. John's College, Cambridge, and then at the University of London where he did not complete work for the Diploma in Education. A friend of Kenyatta, whom he had known since 1926, he attended the same seminar in Social Anthropology under Malinowski at the London School of Economics. His Cambridge tutor spoke highly of his resolve to serve his people, but the Colonial Office felt misgivings about his return. As one perceptive writer pointed out:

His own view of his mission in life is clearly very different from that of the Government of Kenya... He will find that these aspirations will be viewed with a considerable measure of frigidity in Kenya... There is not in Kenya, as there is in West Africa a local educated African "society" in which he could find a place. He will be an "oddman out" with no social background.  

Koinange's homecoming proved a bitter disappointment to him. Tentative negotiations with the Department of Education revealed that his salary would be very much lower than those of his often poorer qualified European colleagues, and that few opportunities existed for him to put his own ideas into practice. He thus turned his attention to the problem of independent schools. His father called a representative group of elders from both associations of independent schools - the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association and the Kikuyu Karing'a Education Association - to discuss the establishment of a joint committee to set up an independent teacher training college. At a meeting well attended

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2. Quoted in Ibid.
by leaders of both groups, it was officially agreed to cooperate on the new venture. The site at Githunguri was chosen, and strenuous fund-raising activity initiated. Koinange became Principal of the new college, the African Teachers College.

Compared to their counterparts in Kenya, the problems facing Ugandan intellectuals were not severe. Nevertheless, early generation Ugandan intellectuals such as Akiki Nyabongo and B.B. Kalibala did experience major difficulties with both the colonial administration and the missions. Nyabongo, who wrote a number of books including *Africa Answers Back* and *Economic Life of Uganda* was the nephew of the Cankasa of Toro and had received his early education at Mengo High School, and King's School, Budo. He entered the Tuskegee Institute in mid-1922 and after six months trade training in the auto-repair workshop, transferred to Clark College and Gammon Theological College in Atlanta where he might obtain a better preparation for university. He later attended Howard University. In 1934 Nyabongo rejected the Phelps-Stokes Fund patronage which had helped him in the United States and outspokenly criticized its interference with students in America: "Their financial aid ... does not mean that you are authorized to give gratuitous advice to African students. The Fund is supposed to be an aid to us - not a bribe." His increasingly critical attitude to the Fund and patronage stemmed partly, King suggests, from the active role he played in the African Students Union under

Nyabongo: "his term of president of the ASU in 1929 would have further sharpened his vision, especially as Azikiwe was one of the Africans who would have been associated with him at Howard throughout his term of office."¹ In that same year Nyabongo had been approached by Jesse Jones, who suggested that he had made a mistake in going to Howard and should have gone to an agricultural school instead. Some years later Nyabongo took up this matter in another connection and mounted an attack on what he thought were the major misconceptions about African education of the Phelps-Stokes Fund.

I should like to tell you now, however, that your idea that all African students should take agriculture (or study in a trade school) is absurd. Of course, some of them should study in agricultural industrial and trade schools; I myself have learned the handwork of woodcarving. But we are sending out our students from Africa not to perpetuate our homeland as a country of agriculturists, but to develop it. You assume a condescending air; you think that the African people must devote themselves entirely to agriculture. We are here to acquire all of Western culture that can be useful to us; the elements of Western culture that are suitable for us will be linked to ours, to form the new African culture that is to arise.²

Nyabongo thus launched not only an attack on African education viewed primarily in vocational terms, but also on the idea that it was a European, rather than an African prerogative, to decide on what might profitably be retained from African traditions, and what might be adapted from the West.

¹. Ibid., p.230.
². Nyabongo, quoted in Ibid.
Another early Ugandan intellectual who experienced difficulties with the colonial administration and the missions was E.B. Kalibala. Kalibala was dissatisfied with the mission education being offered in Uganda on two counts. The first was the feeling that the standards of education were very low. This feeling was intensified by the fact that when he went to England he was made to join primary three in King's Meado College, Derbyshire, with children much less than half his age.

I had completed King's College, Budo, and I was a teacher at Mango Secondary School, a school of no mean reputation in Uganda. Yet all that education had been reduced to nothing more than primary education two.

As a result of his disappointment, and because no high school in Britain would accept him, he left Britain for America to study at the Tuskegee Institute. Kalibala was one of that generation of young Baganda who had been greatly influenced and excited by Marcus Garvey's publication, the Negro World, and who were interested in Negro education in America. Within a year of his arrival at Tuskegee, Kalibala was attempting to leave for the Lincoln Academy in North Carolina. After studying at Lincoln, he read anthropology at New York University and did a Master's degree in education at Teachers College, Columbia University. It was during these years in America when he came under the influence of the type of

education being offered by institutions such as the Tuskegee Institute, that his second source of dissatisfaction with mission education in Uganda developed. In his Master's thesis, for example, he condemned the educational theories which were widely held by European experts on indirect-rule education, and attacked the idea of "Native Education." He was opposed to the distinction made between village and urban education, pointing out that in a situation of rapid social change there was a need to develop principles of education which, despite minor adaptations, would be common for the whole society.

When he returned to Uganda in 1934, Kalibala became assistant educational secretary for the C.M.S. schools, but soon discovered that he had no power of decision, or power to implement any of his educational ideas, that power residing in the European secretary of the C.M.S. He resigned, and began to organize his own school, the Aggrey Memorial School, which was designed to combine academic, agricultural and technical subjects.

Education as given by the missionaries was bound to alienate our children from the reality of their situation which was primarily agricultural. They would graduate and start to look for jobs among Asians and Europeans when the country had the most valuable property — fertile land. Then they would ever be servants of these foreigners.

Not surprisingly, his school met major difficulties. The missions disapproved of his educational theories, and objected to Kalibala and his black American wife teaching English in Primary One. He

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2. For Kalibala's criticisms, see King, Pan-Africanism and Education, pp.240-43.

lacked the capital to establish the type of school he envisaged, and his fund-raising campaign throughout Uganda did not make up the deficiency. His major obstacle, however, was the attitude of the Buganda establishment, and Uganda society in general, which viewed the academic education being offered by the missionaries as the ideal one, especially because it was geared to the growing number of clerical jobs within the administration and Asian businesses.\(^1\) He returned to the United States on a fund-raising campaign in 1936, but the war intervened. He lectured at Brown's College, Atlanta, took his Ph.D. at Harvard, worked for the United Nations, and only returned to Uganda in 1957. Thus, as in the case of Kenyatta, Koinange, and Nyabongo, a combination of educational opportunities overseas and a local society which offered little scope for the educated African, kept Kalibala in self-imposed exile for a good part of his life.

With only a few exceptions, all the intellectuals born during this period were drawn into nationalist politics. The anti-colonial struggle absorbed most intellectual resources, and the relationships of literature, journalism, and politics were close.\(^2\) The distinction between writer, journalist, and politician was a difficult one to make as the three roles were often embodied and combined in the one person. Francis Khamisi, who was born on the Coast at Habai in 1913, initially worked for the East African

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1. Ibid., pp.142-43.

Meteorological Service (1937-39). He was the first editor of
the Standard Group's Baraza, occupying this position from 1939 to
1945. From 1944 to 1947 he was General-Secretary of the KAU.
After working for a time as a clerk in the African Mercantile at
Mombasa, he became an elected member of the Legislative Council
(1955-60) and a Member of the Central Legislative Assembly
(1957-61). In 1958 he became the first chairman of the Pan
He is now editor of Baraza. The example of Kihadi Mulira also
illustrates the diffusion of roles. A M'Ganda from Kamere, Mulira
went to King's College, Budo, and Makerere College. From 1936 to
1938 he attended the Prince of Wales College in Achimota, Ghana,
for a teacher training course, and worked as a teacher from 1933-
1945. In 1946-47 he was editor of Ekitu mu Uganda, after which he
studied at London University (1947-50). Then followed a two year
period as an Assistant-Lecturer at the London School of Oriental
and African Studies (1949-50) and research at the East African
Institute of Social Research, Makerere University College (1951-52).
Between 1953 and 1963 he was the Proprietor/Editor of Uganda Mpya
and, in 1961, became a Director of Taifa Mpya. He was the
Founder/President of the Progressive Party of Uganda (1955-59) and
Publicity Secretary of the Kabaka Yeicka in 1963. He was also a
U.P.C. Member of Parliament.

1. Khamisi was the founder of the Mombasa African Democratic
Union (MADU), which had a paper, Sauti ya Mdu ("Voice of
Mdu").
Generally, the intellectuals born during this period were not first generation nationalists. Kenyatta is an exception, but of course he was born in a much earlier period. When he completed his primary schooling in July 1912, he was apprenticed as a carpenter. According to Murray Brown,

He evidently displayed no marked intelligence or aptitude for the new skills he was learning. Had he done so he would have been selected for specialist work around the mission, as teacher or evangelist or hospital assistant, for the boys who showed promise were expected to help forward the work of the church.1

The most sought after jobs, and the most lucrative, were with the administration. After a succession of various jobs, Kenyatta succeeded in 1922, through the patronage of the European John Cook, in becoming a store clerk and meter reader for the Nairobi Municipal Council. It wasn't until the beginning of 1923, when he became a full-time official of the KCA, that Kenyatta's name was linked with the political movement for the first time. The previous decade had seen, not only the foundation of the Kahuhia-based KCA under the leadership of James Beattah,2 but Harry Thuku's

1. Murray-Brown, p.49.

2. Beattah was born at the time of the full-scale penetration into the Highlands by the IBEA. After a childhood of considerable misfortune, he came into the hands of missionaries at the coast, from whom he received his first formal education. In 1910 he went to the Post Office Training school at Rabei. After the war he took charge of the telegraphy school at the C.M.B. headquarters at Maseno. Beattah worked in Uganda, in western Kenya, at Mombasa, and in Nairobi. He read American negro literature and had European lawyers as his friends. Beattah provided the "fledgling politicians of Kahuhia" with intellectual leadership and a wider vision of concern. See Murray-Brown, pp.170-1.
Pangani-based East African Association and the mission backed and chief-dominated Kikuyu Association. Preferring the Nairobi good life to the uncertainties of politics, "Kenyatta took no part in the upheavals which swept through Kikuyuland after the war".  

It was really in England, where Kenyatta had been sent by the KGA in 1929 to press their claims with the Colonial office, that his political thought began to take coherent and mature form. Obviously, when he first arrived, he was made fully conscious of his educational limitations. This was accentuated by his initial contact with Lapido Solanke, the Yoruba law student and founder of the West African Students Union. Solanke had qualified as a barrister in 1926 and in 1927 published his first political work. While encouraging his fellow Africans to rediscover their history and reassert their pride in traditional institutions, he clearly expressed self-government as one of his objectives. For Kenyatta, such a view as the latter must have been revelatory. In Kenya, it was mooted by the white settlers but certainly was not part of the KGA programme. And West Africans such as Solanke and his fellow members of the WASU represented academic and intellectual attainments for which there was no East African counterpart.

1. Pangani was an African location just to the north of the Nairobi River. It was made up of people from many different groups - Girigan from the coast, Kasaia, Nandi, Kikuyu, Christians and Moslems, who exchanged gossip in Swahili, and was by the early 1920s a breeding ground for political agitation.


Kenyatta sought assistance from W. McGregor Ross. Ross had been Kenya's Director of Public Works from 1905 to 1923, and on his retirement to England had written a penetrating, critical account of white settlement entitled *Kenya from Within.* With Norman Leys, a vehement critic of Kenyan settler policies and author of *Kenya,* Ross formed the nucleus of a growing body of influential opinion within the Labour Party. Ross assisted Kenyatta with the drafting of petitions to the Colonial Office, and provided him with necessary contacts. He saw members of the League Against Imperialism, former Broaway of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), and Kingsley Martin, a columnist on the Manchester Guardian and later the editor of the New Statesman and Nation.

During his long, self-imposed exile in England, Kenyatta established contacts with a great many organizations covering the broad spectrum of the "left": Fabians, Trotskyists, Marxists, members of the I.L.P., the League Against Imperialism, the British Labour Party, and Socialists of the Second (or Amsterdam) International and Communists of the Third. He contributed to a number of journals including the Labour Monthly, the Daily Worker, the Negro Worker, the New Statesman and Nation, and to the letters column of the Manchester Guardian. He also travelled extensively. During August and September 1929 he toured Europe, visiting Berlin, Hamburg, Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Sebastapol, Yalta and Constantinople.

3. For the relationship between Ross and Kenyatta see Murray-Brown, Chs. 10-15.
4. Murray-Brown surmises that it may have been George Padmore himself who took Kenyatta to Russia, but there is no hard evidence to support this - Ibid., p.164.
Kenyatta's formal education continued through the 1930s, although it took diverse forms. He met C.R. Buxton, a friend of the Rosseres, and the Labour Party's expert on colonial affairs. Buxton financed him for a few months (end of November 1931—March 1932) at the Quaker College of Woodbrooke, Selly Oak, Birmingham. Here, he took no formal course of study. He had time to read in the library and received daily English lessons. He was influenced by Quaker pacifism (Rosser's wife, Isobel possessed Quaker beliefs) and by Gandhi, whom he met in November 1931. A year later he received training of an entirely different kind. In the early 1930s the Comintern was dissatisfied with the League Against Imperialism, principally because it contained non-Marxists such as Fenner Brockway, and lacked representation of colonial peoples. George Padmore and J.W. Ford, a black American communist, were instructed to remedy this situation by recruiting suitable West Indian and African members into the newly created International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers. The first conference was held in Hamburg in July 1930, and Kenyatta's name was on the list of the Provisional Executive Committee, representing the 'Central Association of Kenya, East Africa'. After Nazi purges in late 1932, Padmore took Kenyatta to Moscow and installed him in a special institute for members of the colonial races. Here he was trained as a revolutionary, and "received some kind of para-military

1. Ibid., p.156.
2. Ibid., p.164.
training, together with a full grounding in the Marxist classics and the inevitable political indoctrination." It was here that he had to face what appeared to be a central contradiction of Marxism: the conflict of class and race. Stalinist orthodoxy dictated that the effort of the world-wide communist movement should be directed firstly to safe-guarding the Soviet Union, and then extending the revolutionary struggle into the advanced capitalist nations. An end to colonial rule would not be brought about by the 'unhistorical races', but when the working classes had made the revolution in the western capitalist states, Those African or Asian intellectuals who objected to such a view were denounced as petty-bourgeois nationalists, as George Padmore was soon to discover. For Kenyatta, this Eurocentric stance was unacceptable, especially when even the goal of self-rule seemed so distant. Both Kenyatta and Padmore felt that the "American sponsored Liberia must be defended because it was at least a black state; even Ethiopia, the most reactionary state in all Africa, must be defended against white aggression. For them it was race, not class, which was the first priority."  

Kenyatta's third period of formal education during the 1930s took place in another setting. From as early as 1929 he had been introduced to linguists at London University. The Phonetics Department of University College was interested in studying "obscure"
languages and for several years Kenyatta assisted them with Kikuyu. Between 1935 and 1937 he contributed to Lilian Armstrong's book, *The Phonetic and Tonal Structure of Kikuyu*,¹ and provided some assistance with Barlow's Kikuyu dictionary. At the same time he began to study anthropology at L.S.E. under Malinowski (1935-37). *Facing Mount Kenya*,² a collection of studies of Kikuyu life and customs with much autobiographical information, was based on the papers that he had written for Malinowski's seminars. It was in this work that Kenyatta endeavoured, through the coherent marshalling of anthropological evidence, to counter the philosophy of colonialism.³

Kenyatta was also active in Pan-African affairs while in England, but tempered the doctrinaireism of colleagues such as Padmore and C.L.R. James with an over-riding concern for the practical aspects of nationalist development in Kenya. He became an honorary secretary of the International Friends of Abyssinia organisation formed by James in 1935, and was associated with its successor, the International Service Bureau, a body launched principally by James and Padmore to propagate Pan-Africanism and to coordinate the activities of London's Negro intelligentsia. Kenyatta also helped organise the 5th Conference of the Pan-African Congress at Manchester in 1945.⁴

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1. London, 1940.
3. *Facing Mount Kenya* is discussed in detail in Chapter of this thesis.
4. For a discussion of Kenyatta's Pan-African activities consult Murray-Brown, Ch.17.
Apart from Kenyatta, there were two other early Kenyan intellectuals who spent a good deal of time self-exiled in Britain. The first, Mbiyu Koinange, has already been briefly discussed. The second is Joseph Murumbi. Murumbi was born in 1911, of a Goan father and a Masai mother. When he was seven he went to India where he was educated in Bangalore and Bellary. After completing secondary school, he worked for four years as a clerk with Burmah-Shell Oil Company, before returning to Kenya in 1933. On his return, and on the advice of his father, he decided to become a Kenyan citizen.

On his advice, and also through the experience I had had in India with the Anglo-Indians, who didn't associate themselves with Anglo-Indians, I came to the conclusion that I should identify myself fully with my own people — that is, my mother's people, the Masai and Africans in Kenya.

A gift of two books — McGregor Ross's *Kenya from Within* and *India in Bondage* aroused his interest in politics. From 1935 to 1941 he worked as a clerk with the Medical Department and, in 1941, left Kenya to work as a clerk for the British Military Administration in Somalia. From 1950 to 1952 he served as Assistant-Controller of Imports and Exports in the British Military Administration at Aden. He returned to Kenya in March 1952, at the height of the crisis before the emergency had been declared. After the arrest of Kenyatta and the other nationalist leaders, he became Acting General Secretary of the KAU and gave assistance to D.N. Pritt and the

1. "I've done my bit — I think I'd like to retire now!" Interview with Murumbi in the *Sunday Nation*, 5/12/1965, p.14.
2. Ibid.
defence lawyers at the Kapenguria trials. Immediately prior to
the banning of the KAU, and with his arrest imminent, he set out
for London, passing through India and Cairo. In London, with
Mbiyu Koinange, he maintained Kenyatta's contacts with the outside
world and organized "release Kenyatta" campaigns on an international
level. He included amongst his friends George Padmore, and
became a member of the Labour Party. His appointment as an
assistant-Secretary of the Movement for Colonial Freedom gave him
a "very good opportunity for travelling, not only in England, but
also on the continent, speaking on Africa and other related
problems". He lectured to universities, workers and cooperative
organisations, and addressed political gatherings organized by
local branches of the Labour Party and local Africa Councils such
as those of Tyneside and Darlington. He also wrote articles for
journals such as Tribune and the Co-operative News. In 1957 he
left the Movement for Colonial Freedom and worked in the Moroccan
Embassy. In 1960 he was, together with Koinange, one of those
specially prevented from returning to Kenya. After serving as
Minister of State in the Kenyan Government (1963-65), he became
Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigning in 1966.

In Tanganyika, intellectuals born during the 1920s invariably
cut their political teeth in the TAA which after the War, received
an injection of strength from two invigorating forces. The first
was the radicalism of local politics such as those of Kwanza. The

1. Ibid., p.13. For a brief examination of Murambi's activities
in Britain see C. Ojwando Abur's White Highlands No More
(Nairobi: Pan African Researchers, 1973), Ch.7.
second was the decisive shift in the nature of leadership. The TAA was taken over by young Makerere-trained intellectuals in Dar-es-Salaam. The first of the new leaders was Vedast Kyarusi. He was followed by Julius Nyerere.

Nyerere’s interest in politics had begun to develop when he was a student at Tabora Government Secondary School. He says:

But my real interest was not politics exactly, but philosophical subjects – ideas, thought. John Stuart Mill’s essay on representative government and on the subjection of women – these had a terrific influence on me.

At Makerere he organised a campus branch of the TAA. After graduation in 1945, he taught at St. Mary’s, Tabora, and helped organise an unsuccessful cooperative store which was designed to break the Indian monopoly of Tabora trade. He was the Secretary of the local TAA branch. From 1949 to 1952 he studied at Edinburgh University, and soon after his return was elected President of the TAA. He insisted that the TAA should form the nucleus of a mass nationalist movement. A meeting of the new leadership in October 1953 resulted in the reorganization of the Association, under the name of TAFU. Another intellectual present at the foundation was Joseph Kasella Bantu, like Nyerere, trained as a teacher. Born in 1922 in Naega District, he received most of his education in the Roman Catholic Seminaries at Itaga (1933–40) and Kipalapel (1940–44), where the Fathers came to view him not only as talented, but as rude and proud. Rather than train him as a priest, they decided that he should become a church linguist. It was

1. Edgott Smith, p.46.
toward the end of his seminary studies when he developed a strong interest in politics. From 1944 until 1946 he undertook the Army Education Course at Jeanes School, Nairobi, and attended the Bigwa Teacher's Training Centre in 1946. He taught at St. Mary's, Secondary School, Tabora, and Malangali Secondary School, Iringa (1946-50), and at the Teachers Training Centre, Butiama (1951-52). Bantu was Publicity Secretary of TANU, Dar-es-Salaam, from 1950. He then studied for an M.A. in Political Science and History at Leipzig University (1960-64), where he studied Marxism.

It was here I lost my religion and became more practical. But I don't believe you can do away with God. I was an active Roman Catholic there and chairman of the Catholic students. However, now I see religious people more realistically.²

On his return, he became a Research Officer in Foreign Affairs and M.P. for Mvuga East (1965-1968).

Also present at the foundation of TANU was the Swahili intellectual and poet S.A. Kandoro, author of Nito wa Uhuru and Masahiri ya Sanaani. Kandoro was one of a new generation of political leaders which emerged in Lake Province between 1950 and 1953. His background is considerably different from that of the Makerere, or other university-trained intellectuals, and reflects the nature of radical rural politics. Born in Ujiji-Kigoma in 1926, he was educated there and at the Dwimu Swansen Teacher Training College. By the time of the foundation of TANU he had a wealth of

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1. Bantu was the Programme Manager (Music) of Sauti ya Dar-es-Salaam (Radio Tanzania) from 1952 until 1954, and Sales Manager for the Aspro Company (1955-58) so he had experience for this job.

political experience. From 1944 to 1947 he was the treasurer of (Idara ya Kuweca Hazima) Uyui Tabora. He started a Fisheries, and an African Rightway Political Party in Ujiji in 1950. He was secretary of the Kigoma Muslin Society, and a Member of the Advisory Council at Tabora. In 1952 he became a fulltime officer of the TAA, becoming Provincial Secretary for Lake Province. In 1955 he became secretary of the Ilagala Farmers' Association and in 1958, Provincial Secretary of TANU for Dodoma and Tabora. Later he was made Administrative Secretary of TANU Branches. He was Administrative Secretary of the TANU Elders Section, and sat on the Central Committee by virtue of holding this office.¹

For those born roughly between 1930 and 1950, the occupational situation has been markedly different from that which faced the African intellectual who reached maturity in the period of the 1920s to the early 1950s. The growth of the press, publishing, radio and television and even theatre, secondary schools, universities, and the Africanisation and expansion of the government bureaucracies, widened considerably the career choice of the intellectual. With the imminence of independence there wasn't such a strong pressure for entry into politics, at least in the sense of politics as a vocation. Of course, negative factors have affected occupational choice as well. In Kenya, for instance, the present opportunities for entry into both politics and the administration are limited.

¹ Bienen, p.137.
KANU, in contrast to TANU, is virtually structureless, so that there is no party organization as such through which younger intellectuals can gain access. Government power lies in the hands of comparatively old men; the younger ministers - Kibaki and Kiano for instance, are in their 'forties. Rapid recruitment into the civil service was a characteristic of the early 1960s, but expansion has slowed, and the upper echelon positions are occupied by still fairly young men. Recruitment into business is also restricted, given Kikuyu dominance. Apart from those of Asian origin, the first Kenyan academics were Luo and Luyha who were concentrated in History and Geography in particular, first at Makerere, and then at the University College of Nairobi in the early 1960s. They were later joined by WaKamba. Initially Kikuyu academics were few, Kibaki and Kiano probably being the first two, but their academic careers were cut short by early entry into politics. WaLuo, WaLuhya, and WaKamba possessed a number of educational advantages during the 1950s. Although Kikuyuland was most highly advanced in terms of the provision of primary and secondary education, the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1952 made it extremely difficult for the Kikuyu student to leave Kenya to pursue tertiary training overseas.\(^1\) WaLuo, WaLuhya, and

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1. The colonial administration also forced many Kikuyu clerks and junior civil servants to abandon their positions which were filled with representatives from the Nyamia tribes. Toward the end of the Emergency this process was reversed and led to the trend known as "Kikuyisation". See John J. Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting", Chapter 3. Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.), Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: OUP, 1970), pp.33-34.
WaKamba students were not subject to the same restrictions and gained a short-term university training advantage. The early recruitment of the Luo and Luhya into academia was not, however, solely the result of greater access to academic qualifications. It stemmed also from the realization that many other avenues for advancement were blocked in politics, administration, and business. Certainly it is noticeable that with the slowing down of Kikuyu recruitment into administration and business in the late 1960s, the proportion of Kikuyu entering academic life has increased remarkably.

Intellectuals born between about 1925 and 1935 provided the first indigenous East African academic generation, men who were ultimately to occupy the senior academic and administrative positions, as well as control cultural organs and committees. The members of this academic generation were the conventional products of overseas universities. They were, as Mutiso has pointed out, mainly historians and geographers, although a number were economists. For this group, there was the pressing need to become respectable scholars in the eyes of the colonial academics. As a result, much

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1. There appears to be the distinct possibility of a Luo and Luhya intellectual tradition emerging in Kenya. The most prominent geographers are Luo - Simeon Gaita, Reuben Ogendo, R.S. Odingo, as are the historians - B.A. Ogot, William Ochieng, B.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, J. Osogo, and G. Ojwando Abuor. Kikuyu writers, and especially novelists have been the most important and prolific, but Grace Ogot, Jared Angima Othieno, and Ben Oguta are Luo. Philip Ochieng, Aloc Ojuri, and Ngence Aicot are well-known journalists and commentators. Other Luo intellectuals are John Okumu, Leonard Okola, and Sheu Magot-Adholla, and Mauri Yemo. Prominent Luhya intellectuals and writers include Gideon Were, Seth Adagala, Miriam Were, Awori wa Katata, Chris Nanjala, Khadambi Asalache, H.W. Anyumba, and Arthur Kemoli.
of the work they did was highly conventional and did not fundamentally challenge the intellectual reference point of the colonial education system. Nevertheless, members of this generation started to lay the foundations of an African scholarship. Academics such as B.A. Ogot, Gideon Were, I. Kimambo, and M.S. Kiwanuka were instrumental, through their extensive use of oral sources, in establishing the basis of an indigenous East African tradition of historiography. Undoubtedly, the contributions to the development of scholarship and intellectual life of this generation were cut short by rapid promotion into senior academic and administrative positions which left little time for concerted effort other than the occasional conference paper, review article, or the editing of a book. The publication of major works often ceased with the publication of a revised Ph.D. dissertation. The shortage of academics and intellectuals meant that they tended to spread themselves thinly, being required for committee work, university administration, the editing of journals, and occasionally work for the government.

Most of the academics of this generation were recruited into the university either just prior to independence or shortly after when the demand for Africanisation affected the university as well as government administration. Promotion was accelerated by the demand for African Deans and Heads of Departments. Professor Simeon Ginde, for instance, was an Assistant Lecturer in Geography at Makerere from 1955 until 1957, and a Lecturer from 1957-1963.
He became Professor of Geography at the newly formed University of East Africa in 1963, and the following year, Professor of Geography and Head of the Department at University College, Nairobi. He has since been Dean of the Faculty of Arts. In 1964 he was Chairman of the Kenya Education Commission which produced what has consistently been referred to as the Ominde Report. Recently, he was a full-time member of the International Labour Office organized team which produced the bulky report, employment, incomes and equality. Professor Ominde has also been Chairman of the Kenya Central Scholarship Board. Another Kenyan academic, also Luo, Professor S.A. Ogot, was a lecturer in History at Makerere from 1962 to 1964. In 1965 he became a Senior Lecturer in, and Head of the Department of History at, University College, Nairobi. Promotion was rapid. Between 1966 and 1967 he was Chairman of the History Department, and made a Reader. Since 1967 he has been Professor and Head of the Department. During this time he has been actively involved in University administration. Apart from serving as Dean of the Faculty of Arts, he has been Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Nairobi (1970-1972), and a Member of the University Council and Senate. His involvement in cultural institution work has been intense. He was Director of the Cultural Division of the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, and is presently Director of the Institute of African Studies (formerly the Cultural Division of the Institute for
Development Studies). He has also been Treasurer and Vice-President of the East African Academy, and Secretary-General of the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, which published the *East Africa Journal*. He is President of the Kenya Historical Association, and was Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Congress of African History. In addition, he is a member of the Kenya National Archives Council and the Governing Council of the Kenya Cultural Centre. Professor Ogot has also edited the *East Africa Journal*, and is a member of the Editorial Board of the *Journal of East African Research and Development*. The examples of Professors Ogot and Ominde, to which could be added other academics such as Ali Mazrui and I.N. Kimambo, illustrate not only the rapidity of advancement within the Africanizing university but the extent to which members of this generation came to control, even if with a debilitating effect on their scholastic and intellectual output, senior academic and administrative positions and the major cultural organs of society.

Many members of this generation were drafted early in their academic careers into politics, or senior administrative positions. Mwai Kibaki was a lecturer in Economics at Makerere in 1959-60, after which he became National Executive Officer of KANU. Julius Kiano lectured in Economics at the University College, Nairobi, from 1956 to 1958. His academic career came to an end when he was elected to the Legislative Council in 1958. Philip Ndegwa, was a Research Fellow and Lecturer in Economics at Makerere before becoming an
Assistant-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Erisa Kironde taught in the Extra Mural Studies Department at Makerere from 1959-1962. In 1962 he became Chairman of the Uganda Electricity Board and a Member of the Planning Commission for Uganda. And at a much later stage Dr. Wilbert Chagula was drawn into politics at ministerial level. Chagula, who was born at Shinyanga, Tanzania, in 1926, was an Assistant-Lecturer in Anatomy at Makerere during 1955 to 1957, and a Lecturer between 1958 and 1961. From 1963 to 1965 he was the Vice-Principal and Registrar of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, and from 1965, Principal of the College. He was also President of the East African Academy (since 1963) and Chairman of the Tanzanian Society of African Culture (also from 1963).

In February 1972, as a result of a ministerial reshuffle, he succeeded Abdul Bahmar Babu as Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning. The Tanzanian historian Arnold J. Temu is a National Member of Parliament. Born in 1934, Temu studied at the University of East Africa for a Dip. Ed. and at Oregon and Alberta Universities. His doctoral thesis from Alberta (1967) has been published as British Protestant Missions.1 He joined the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, in 1965, as a Lecturer in History, and was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 1968. He was Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in 1969-1970, and in June 1973 appointed a Professor.2


One member of this generation, Tom Okello Odongo, entered academia from politics. Okello Odongo studied at Bharati University in India, and at Howard University where he obtained an M.A. For two years he was a Lecturer in Swahili at Howard (1958-1960). This was followed by another two years as a Research Assistant at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University (1960-62). When he returned to Kenya in 1962, Okello Odongo founded Lakeside College at Kisumu, and the following year was elected the KANU member for Kisumu Rural in the House of Representatives. In the same year he became Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and was Assistant Minister of Finance in 1966. He followed Oginga Odinga into the KPU, retaining his seat at the "Little General Election". As an Assistant Minister, Okello Odongo had on several occasions doubted the wisdom of Government economic policies, and expressed concern at the uneven development of urban and rural areas that seemed to be the product of such policies. While in Parliament he refrained from voting against the Government and from engaging in direct conflict with the KANU front bench, his extra-parliamentary statements placed him quite clearly in the Radicals' camp. This was evidenced most conspicuously in the speech which he gave at the Lumumba Institute in June 1965. In this speech, Okello Odongo criticized the Kenya economy on the grounds that it was too closely aligned with the Western bloc, and argued that Kenya would have to "lean a little more to the East" if she were to achieve the economic alignment.

that African socialism required. With the banning and dissolution of the KFU, Okello Odongo is now the Assistant Director of Adult Studies at the University of Nairobi.

Not all the academics from this generation have come to occupy senior university, administrative, or political positions. Okot p'Bitek is one such case. Okot has never held a senior academic position although he entered the university system, through Makerere, in the early 1960s, when he was appointed Lecturer in African Studies in the Department of Sociology. He was for a time Director of the National Cultural Centre in Uganda and was dismissed from this post in 1967. However the publication of Song of Lewino in 1966, and the subsequent publication of Song of Ocol, Two Songs, and African Religions in Western Scholarship, numerous journal articles, and newspaper debates with Philip Ochieng and Taban Lo Liyong in the Sunday Nation and Daily Nation, as well as frequent appearances at Goethe Institute lectures and a general flair for publicity, have made him a central figure in East African (and more particularly in Kenya and Uganda) intellectual life. It has been Okot, probably more than any other person, who has determined the nature of the cultural debate in East Africa.

Frequent reference has already been made to the effects of chronological generational differences upon intellectual education and access to occupations. But generational differences have a

1. For an account of this speech, and Njoya's sharp reaction, see "Economic non-Alignment", Pan Africa, April 16, 1965, pp.4-5.
2. Okot p'Bitek is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter IX of this thesis.
much deeper explanatory power. The concepts of generation and
generation conflict serve as valuable analytical tools for the
understanding of intellectual behaviour and political and intellec-
tual differences. Even where, as in East Africa, important national
cultural and intellectual differences exist, generational factors
are capable of developing a uniformity of intellectual orientation
which transcends national factors.

Intellectual generations in East Africa can be identified in
either chronological or age-cohort terms, or in common experience
terms. In the latter cognitively specific sense, generation refers
to an aggregate whose identity depends upon the sharing of common
historical experiences. "Contemporaries are not merely people
born in the same years", as Neumann points out. "What identifies
them as people of one generation is decided by their common
experience, the same decisive, similar historical problems." These
experiences, whatever their nature, either create elements of
subjective commonality among members of such groups, or allow the
observer to analytically identify analogous behaviour and traits
which, in turn, "permit statements of relationship between experi-
ence (or event) and the group." Clearly, it is possible to

1. Victor T. LeVine, "Generational Conflict and Politics in
2. Ibid.
3. Neumann, quoted in Abraham Albert Cordova, Intellectuals in
Culture and Politics. A Study of French Men of Ideas in the
First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Brandeis University,
speak of a "common experience" only in vague terms. Different
social origins, types of education, and characteristics of life
histories result in different exposures to a situation for
intellectuals. The men who emerge as, or think of themselves as
spokesmen for a whole generation, are usually a small minority of
critically thinking individuals centred mainly in the capital where
they have greater access to organs of articulation and dissemination.
Furthermore, members of a particular generation do not develop their
ideas in an intellectual vacuum. Rather, they relate themselves
in a dialectical way to preceding generations. Their group, or
generational consciousness is crystallized through an awareness of
similarity of situation (which may include the experience of
frustration on the political and occupational levels), and a refusal
to accept the "definition of the situation" of their elders. While
a generation may exhibit a kind of unity, at least to the extent
that various members of it, though belonging to different groups,
are conscious of each other's ideas, it does not necessarily possess
a coherent ideological identity. For instance, the intellectual
orientations of what I have termed for convenience the post-
Independence generation range from Marxism, to cultural nationalism,
to a cultural iconoclasm and Westernism. The crystallization of
generation consciousness and unity is exhibited much more in a
common hostility to, or rejection of, the preceding generations
than in any uniform ideological outlook.
In the African context, the attainment of independence has been regarded by many writers as an experience which has given rise to behaviour that has been sufficiently isomorphic to permit meaningful generalization. Survey-type studies have supported the thesis that independence has been central to the analysis of generational conflict. Victor Le Vine's study of post-independence generational conflict in a number of West African states revealed that members of the political elites in these countries regarded independence as the central point of reference for the expression of differences in political ideology and style, as well as perceptions of what national goals ought to be, and what should be the best ways of attaining them. Criticisms by the post-independence generation have usually revolved around a lack of educated leadership, betrayal of the promises of independence, and the leaders' resistance to social, political, and economic change. The ubiquity of these attitudes led Le Vine to assert that

Independance ... became the cutting wedge between two (largely) non-chronologically defined generations, with the additional fact that a large number of the members of the post-independence

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generation of leaders, students and intellectuals were also in fact part of a younger age cohort than were the pre-independence leaders. However, the notion of independence as a "cutting-wedge" between two largely non-chronologically defined generations (which correspond to common age-cohort factors as well) can be misleading if construed in a simplistic way. Independence may be the dividing line between different socio-political experiences, but these experiences are filtered through, or given direction by, externally-derived systems of thought which impinge upon the intellectual's individual and group mental structure. A younger intellectual such as Peter Abayeeth in his novel In a Brown Mantle may view the nationalist and post-independence situation within the framework of false decolonisation established by Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth. In contrast, the dominant intellectual influences for pre-independence generations were, because of the constitutionalist-legalistic nature of independence negotiations over a protracted period of time, and the nature of educational influences, often within the confines of the colonial system, Fabianism, democratic socialism, and liberalism. Marxist influences were unlikely to be strong. Writing of Tanganyika, Issa Shivji suggests that

The British educational system which at most ended in British universities, did not encourage penetration in the country of radical - and especially - proletarian ideology ... The most radical ideology that could come via this source was therefore only Fabianism or the ideology of the British labourites.¹

Much the same could be said about the United States situation.

Of course Shivji is writing from the perspective of the 1970s and tends to overlook the fact that Fabianism and Democratic Socialism were radical in the context of settler Kenya and Tanganyika. And, as we have seen in the case of Kenyatta, there were considerable Communist efforts to proselytise African students and intellectuals in Europe. There were a number of individual East African Marxists including John Kakongo, Makkari Singh, Abdulrahman Nabu, A.S. Mtaki, and Joseph Kasella-Bantu but they clearly represented exceptions.

The notion of the "cutting-wedge" also tends to divert attention from continuities of thought which reduce the apparently sharp dichotomic divisions between pre- and post-independence generations. Many intellectuals and politicians who are in experiential terms part of the pre-independence nationalist generation have, through the continued development of their thought and the bringing to bear of their critical powers on the nature of the post-independence situation (often assisted by their isolation within ruling parties), reached an ideological position that is not

¹ Shivji, Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues, pp.52-53.
terribly far removed from that of younger post-independence intellectuals. Bildad Kaggia is one such example.

Kaggia was born in 1923 at Fort Hall, and educated at the C.M.S. primary school at Kahuhia. He left the school in 1939 and worked in the District Commissioner's Office until January, 1942, when he joined the army as a clerk. Before demobilization he had reached the rank of Staff Sergeant. As with other political activists, men such as Karuhia Itote (General China) and Dedan Kimathi, Kaggia's war experience was crucial in heightening his political consciousness. While he was in the army he visited Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Israel, and in 1943 I went to England to establish a reception camp for African prisoners of war repatriated from Germany. I met Jomo (Kenyatta) while I was in England. I first became really interested in politics when I was in the Middle East. Previously I had been a keen student of religion, but after seeing the Holy Land I looked at Christianity in a different way. I saw the establishment of foreign religions through missions as a stepping stone to colonialism, and I therefore thought that the first move in the struggle for independence must be to liberate our people from foreign religious beliefs. These missions used slogans that supported the colonial authorities, such as "The Government or Powers that be are ordained by God." Many of our people, led by this, believed it and could not be expected to fight with their lives for their real rights while still believing it. The missions on their side also found certain advantages in the preservation of colonial rule.2

After the war, Kaggia came into conflict with the authorities at the Kahuhia mission, and began to strongly attack all missionary


2. Rosberg and Nottingham, pp.192-93.
churches. His opposition gained support. The movement, which was widely known as Dini ya Kaggia spread rapidly, fanning out from Fort Hall to much of central Kenya, and ultimately even to Nyamza.

Kaggia became president of the Clerks and Commercial Workers Union. When Hakken Singh returned to Kenya in 1947 he immediately sought to develop the political potential of the nascent union movement. He linked up with Fred Kubai, the General-Secretary of the Transport and Allied Workers Union, the Kenya African Road Transport and Mechanics Union, and Kaggia. They announced the formation of the East African Trade Union Congress on May 1, 1949. Six unions were affiliated with the Congress. Singh was the General Secretary and Kubai the President. In 1951 Kaggia became General-Secretary of the Nairobi Branch of the K.A.U. as part of the militant urban leadership’s takeover from less militant elements. The group to which he belonged\(^1\) consolidated its power in Nairobi and began to extend its influence throughout the country. Its members were successful in forcing a national party conference in late 1951, and Kaggia became a member of the National Committee. The urban-based radical militants were able to oust the constitutional nationalists. Kaggia was one of those brought to trial at Kapenguria for supposedly organizing and instigating ‘Mau Mau’, and spent many years in detention.

In 1963 Kaggia became the elected KANU Member for Kandara in the House of Representatives, and increasingly became identified

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1. Others were Fred Kubai, John Kali, John Mungai, Paul Ngeli, James Njoroge, and Aggrey Mnya.
with the radical elements of KANU, which later formed the backbone of the KPU. Even when an Assistant Minister for Education, a position he relinquished in June 1964, he criticized the Government's land and settlement and education policies. After his departure from office, he assumed the leadership of the KANU backbench group. When the split between KANU and the KPU ultimately came about, Kaggia became the deputy leader of the KPU, and was also Chairman of the Board of Management of the Lumumba Institute. In the Little General Election of 1966, the immediate product of the constitutional crisis the formation of the KPU provoked, Kaggia found himself faced with a bitter campaign in Kandara. Kaggia, endeavouring to make the dispossessed his electorate, was soundly defeated. The KPU opposition operated under the most difficult conditions, and early in 1968 Kaggia was arrested, charged with holding an illegal meeting, and imprisoned for six months.

This brief account of Kaggia's career illustrates a very important point. Kaggia learned his radical politics during World War II, in the KAU, and in detention. His radicalism emerged from these experiences. His critique of KANU and of post-independence Kenyan society was not the product of university education, nor of a familiarity with neo-Marxist thought. Rather, it stemmed from what he perceived to be a betrayal of KAU and KANU policies, especially with regard to land and settlement, education, Africanization and nationalization. In addition, his critique was the natural outgrowth of his socialist position which was clearly influenced by Marxism-Leninism or scientific socialism. This was most evident
in his rejection of African socialism and the idea that socialism could be built on the communal basis of African society. Moreover, his critique was conditioned by the increasing isolation of "radicals" within a decaying KANU party organisation and the dominance both within the party and government of new "class" elements which felt threatened by measures such as limited nationalization and communal ownership of land. Kaggia's notion of the role and nature of the party, and the call for its democratization undoubtedly stemmed from his conviction that socialism could only be brought about by a mass-based mobilizing party, but it also stemmed from the realization that without such a party, he and other radicals would be increasingly isolated and pushed to the political periphery.

The development of younger East African intellectuals, the generation that has grown to intellectual maturity in the post-independence period of the 1960s and 70s, has been influenced by two decisive factors. Firstly, they have reached maturity in the post-independence period, and independence has not had the same meaning for them as it had for earlier generations of intellectuals and nationalist politicians. The issues that concern them are different. Younger intellectuals have been faced with a situation

1. See for instance his speech "African Socialism" given at the University College, Nairobi, 14/4/1965. Mimeographed Copy in the University of Nairobi Library.

2. Ibid. In this long speech, Kaggia argued that economic development plans and the definition of African socialism should be worked out within the party. It was only through a mass-based party that the people of Kenya could directly participate in discussion about policy and avoid the "neo-colonial abyss of capitalist exploitation".
which they find difficult to accept: continued economic neo-colonialism; continued ideological and cultural subjugation (intellectual dependence) which is partly reflected in the presence of large numbers of expatriate academics, and partly in the ideas, behaviour, and intellectual interests of local academics, in the institutions they are either taught in, or teach at. They are conscious of the inequalities and developing class stratification in their societies. They are impatient with a political leadership (to a lesser extent in Tanzania than in Kenya and Uganda), and an older generation of academics and intellectuals, who have been unable, or unwilling, to provide the intellectual analysis and alternatives the situation clearly demands. Obviously there is a great deal of political frustration. While younger intellectuals are generally well-off financially, including those still studying at university, they are effectively excluded from positions of power within universities, administration, politics, and even business. The intensity of the exclusion is increased by an awareness that the age differences between educational generations is often small. Those in senior positions are still relatively young, and are destined for long tenure of office.

Secondly, younger East African intellectuals have been influenced to varying degrees by the "crisis" which affected universities in North America and Europe in particular. The decade of the 1960s was one of tremendous ferment. Archaic university structures which allowed for the minimum participation of students and junior academic
staff in decision-making came under vigorous attack. In many instances the whole concept of the university was questioned, and the university’s class and ideological position in society subjected to searching scrutiny. What came to be referred to derisively as the “bourgeois” social sciences with their concern for scientific method, objectivity, and value free analysis, faced a concerted challenge from the New Left and neo-Marxist critics. In the United States, the “crisis” was given additional depth by the presence of a number of acute socio-political conflicts which directly involved the university. The first of these was the Civil Rights movement of the early 1960s which involved universities through the "sit-in", through the civil rights activities of students, and through the challenge which the whole movement posed to university recruitment policies and curricula. The second, and clearly the most important factor, was the Vietnam War, which more than anything reactivated the broken American radical tradition. As Christopher Lasch pointed out

The absence of continuity in American radicalism - in American life generally - made it possible for the radicals of the Sixties to discover all over again the existence of oppression and exploitation, the power of the ruling class, and the connection between capitalism and foreign wars. In their excitement, they quickly proceeded from reformist to revolutionary ideas.

The Vietnam war implicated American universities, not only through defence-oriented, government sponsored and financed research programmes, but through the "draft" of students and the recruitment of university academic personnel - "bourgeois professors" such as

Rostow, Dean Rusk, and Samuel Huntington - to help shape policy and provide legitimation for government action and policy. And thirdly there was, apart from the emergence of groups of New Left and neo-Marxist thinkers, the rise of militant black organisations such as the Black Power movement under Stokely Carmichael's leadership, and the Black Panthers, which found the Civil Rights movement unacceptable in terms of ideology and praxis.

East African universities, with the exception of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, remained somewhat immune from the ferment. Student radicalism at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, only became a possibility, as John Saul suggests, "after the sending down of the students in 1966 and the introduction of the Arusha Declaration."\(^1\) It became a reality in late 1967 with the presence of Stokely Carmichael on the campus and his indiscriminate transference of Black Power slogans to the East African setting. At the University of Nairobi, the Oginga Odinga "affair" of January 1969, when students boycotted lectures in protest against the university administration's refusal to give Odinga permission to speak on the campus,\(^2\) and subsequent "strikes",\(^3\) the last one of which resulted in the banning of the Students Representative Council, were

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1. Saul, "Radicalism and the Hill", p.27.
3. The student strike of January 1971 arose initially over the suspension of four girl students, which resulted from a "disagreement between the women and the warden over the allocation of rooms" - *Daily Nation*, Jan.19th, 1971. The students demanded that the women should be re-instated and made additional demands, including better services in the kitchen, improved services in the library, and healthier accommodation in the Halls of Residence.
manifestations of a student radicalism which, though linked in iconoclastic and ideological terms with student movements overseas, was precipitated by local administrative grievances which were generalised into a more fundamental and far-reaching criticism of existing socio-economic and political relations. Heavy-handed government and administration responses, combined with the career orientation of the students and the almost certain loss of job and economic opportunities for radical political activity, have been until now a very effective deterrent to student activism. The overseas fermentation did have an impact, however, if only in an indirect way.

Many East Africans studying in America in the 1960s were part of the "crisis". The intellectual and political conflicts often profoundly affected the African student's response to the Eurocentric social science theory which he encountered in the classroom situation, and in the bulk of texts. The revaluation affected the way in which he viewed his own history and society, and helped shape his attitude to an earlier generation of African academics, the conventional products of metropolitan universities, who moved very quickly up the academic ladder with Africanization and expansion.

Walter Egoya, the General Manager of the Tanzania Publishing House, although in chronological terms a member of an earlier generation, was a student at the University of Kansas when the civil rights movement was getting under way and beginning to impinge upon university life. For Egoya, the decision was one of
either ... accepting the racism and trying to survive, or challenging it, which I did with other students in the Civil Rights movement. I was very ... involved in this ... organizing demonstrations. My time was when it was beginning. For example, at the University I went to ... the sit-in that we organized - and I was one of the leading figures in that - this was really the first time that such a thing had ever happened at the University ... My problem there was very ambiguous. I was the product of a colonial society and there was the very exciting period of the independence struggle which I left at the peak, just before independence. And there you were, facing all these things - and, really, in many ways it was the continuation of a psychological preparation that had taken place when I was here.

For those who studied in the United States from the mid-sixties onwards the racial dimension, which was sharpened by the appearance of more militant groups such as those of Black Power and the Black Panthers and the call for Black studies in American universities, was supplemented by the critical reappraisal of social science theory, especially in its application to the Third World. Cyrus Mutiso pointed out in an interview that

For me, personally, I think that the whole North American thing is the most significant one, and I know for a majority of us who happen to be American trained that is the critical one.

However, Mutiso was careful to argue that a locally produced generation of non-North American (and British) trained people had emerged for which the North American experience was not at all significant. He added


2. Interview with Mutiso.
But(we) have also the whole crisis of African independence; all the glorious things that were supposed to have happened have not happened ... After the fall of Nkrumah, and after the beginning of Biafra, about 1966, really, a lot of the African intellectuals, even the ones who are confused and are still cultural nationalists really began to worry about the problems of power.

Mutiso thus refers to one division within the post-independence generation: the division between the locally educated with their experience largely limited to the East African setting, and the overseas educated. The locally educated tend to be younger. A second division is related to national differences, and the contrast between the political and ideological environment of Tanzania, on the one hand, and Kenya and Uganda on the other. Young Tanzanian intellectuals tend to be much more ideologically sophisticated than their Kenyan or Ugandan counterparts. One has only to glance at Cheche and Maji Maji, and then turn to Busara or dhana to detect the difference. This greater ideological sophistication is undoubtedly due to the presence of a number of expatriate intellectuals and catalytic radical academics in Dar-es-Salaam who have helped clarify issues and provide theoretical and ideological integration of thought, and to the fact that Tanzania is one of the few African states with a clearly formulated ruling ideology capable of sustaining analysis, comment, and intellectual criticism. Another division within this generation is that which lies between two chronologically defined groups. The first is composed of members

1. Ibid.
such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Grant Kamenju, Peter Kasereko, Cyrus Mutiso, Taban Lo Liyong, Okello Oculi, Joseph Buruga, Eneriko Seruma, Leonard Kibera, Robert Serumaga, John Ruganda, Adhu Awiti, Philip Ochieng, Pio Zirimu, B. Chango Machyo, Lennard Okola, Christopher Mulei, and Jenerali Ulimwengu. With only a few exceptions, these people were educated, at least in part, overseas, and were born in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Through the publication of their works either as journal and newspaper articles, or as monographs, and through teaching and editorial work, the members of this group have helped to determine not only the nature of the cultural debate and the critique of post-independence politics and society, but the dominant literary forms as well. It was this group which established modern East African literature in English, and African theatre. Robert Serumaga with his plays *A Play* and *Elephants*, and John Ruganda with *End of the Endless*, *Covenant with Death*, *The Burdens*, and *Black Maaba* were the first East African playwrights of any consequence. Hilary Ng'weno, the former editor of the *Daily Nation* who writes a satirical column for that paper and edits a new magazine, *Joe*, Philip Ochieng, Jenerali Ulimwengu of the *Daily News*, and Christopher Mulei who has contributed to the Tanzanian *Standard*, the *Sunday Nation* and the *Sunday Post*, provided the basis of post-Independence critical and satirical journalism in Kenya and Tanzania. Members of this group are also starting to advance in the academic hierarchy. Ngugi is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Literature at the
University of Nairobi. Mutiso is a Senior Lecturer in Government at the same institution. Grant Kamenju is a Senior Lecturer in Literature at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. But in terms of power within university structures, they are clearly subordinate to the academics who entered academia in the late '50s and early '60s.

The second, and chronologically younger group within this generation (generally born in the mid '40s and onwards), are basically the products of local education and university systems. While they may have travelled overseas for short periods of time, their intellectual development has taken place almost exclusively in the East African context. Many have until recently, been or still are students. Among the Tanzanian members of this group are Issa G. Shivji, and the students who have been associated with Cheche, Maji Maji, and the proscribed Students' Revolutionary Front at the University of Dar-es-Salaam; James N. Birhanze and Mukotani Ruggendo, Penina Muhando, Tigiti Sengo, Saifu Kiango, and Euphrase Kezilahabi, author of the Swahili novel Rosu Mistika. The Kenyans include Jared Angira-Othieno, Mauri Yombo, the poet whom was associated with Maji Maji and Taamuli whilst a student at the University of Dar-es-Salaam; Awori wa Katako, Aloo Ojuka, Hugo Humphrey, Francis Labuge, Chris Manjala, Nsaga Aloit, B.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, and Amín Kassam. There have been fewer Ugandans, the poet Richard Ntiru, Theo Lusuka, and Yoweri Tibuharuba-Museveni, the first Chairman of the Students' Revolutionary Front and leader of "Fronosa", an ill-fated revolutionary movement, being the most prominent.

CHAPTER VI

The Limits of Intellectual Activity and Problems of Intellectual Role Definition.

Independence brought a new set of problems for the East African intellectual. After years of protracted legalistic-constitutionalist negotiations and oppositional activity, the intellectual suddenly found himself faced with an African government in power. Initially this new situation created few difficulties. Many intellectuals were still pre-occupied with the desire to re-establish African culture and history. African writers and intellectuals responded to European denigration and denial by displaying African accomplishments and reasserting the values of the African tradition. However, the more perceptive of them, including the Kenyan Ngugi wa Thiong'o in The Black Hermit\(^1\) and A Grain of Wheat,\(^2\) were already scrutinising the pre-independence seeds of discord and class division which would profoundly affect the nature of the post-independence politics and society. Critical evaluation of the post-independence society and politics, of neo-colonial economic, political, and ideological relationships, and government performance, raised fundamental questions about the intellectual's relationship to government and ruling classes, political parties and people, indigenous and alien intellectual and literary traditions. The dominant questions became: What should be the social purpose of

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intellectual and literary creation? In what ways can and should
the intellectual contribute to social transformation? The
difficulties inherent in the responses to such questions were
compounded by a combination of related factors.

Pre-Independence Neglect of Post-Independence Role

The first was that little attention was usually given to the
tecontemplation of post-independence role during the pre-independence
period. Nationalist politicians, the press, intellectuals and
students, played essentially a negative, oppositional role. While
they often differed in political or ideological terms, they thought
little about the nature of their roles in an independent polity,¹
simply because their intellectual energies were absorbed in the task
of dislodging the colonial power. For pre-independence generation
intellectuals who were integrated into the formal institutions of
political power, and even into senior academic positions, the
problem of role definition was, if not immediately resolved, at
least less acute than for members of the post-independence generation
of intellectuals. Significantly, the intense debate about the
nature of the intellectual's socio-political role, whether in the
press, in journal articles, the novel or short story, has over-
whelmingly involved the post-independence generation. It is they
who have experienced greatest difficulty defining not only their
relationship to government, and to intellectuals who have been
integrated into the state structure, but to earlier generations of

intellectuals and academics and the "masses" as well. Nevertheless, there were nationalist intellectuals who, having been integrated into the formal institutions of power, even at ministerial level, felt compelled to re-examine the nature of their role. This was provoked largely by their disaffection with the course of development, and what they perceived as a denial, or betrayal, of the ideals of the independence struggle. Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia, Tom Okelo-Odongo, and Achieng Oneko were, in the early years of Kenyan independence, highly critical of educational, land and economic (including nationalization) policies. Kaggia attacked the KANU Government's Sessional Paper No.10, not so much in terms of its content or ideological nature, but on issues of failure of implementation. In Tanzania, Ngoebele-Mwiru, Nsa Kaisi, Joseph Kasella-Buntu, and A.S. Mtaki, have faced similar problems.

**Utilitarian Role Prescription and Unanimous Consensus**

The second complicating factor is the pronounced tendency of African governments to suppress or divert criticism of fundamental values and the nature of the socio-economic and political systems at a time when fundamental values have been at most only partly embodied in national social and political institutions. The suppression oftentimes stems from a desire to divert criticism which challenges ruling class and elite positions, rather than with any concern for fundamental values. "Leftist" critics in Kenya are, for instance, accused by government spokesmen of supporting the
"imperialists" and belittling the achievements of the government.¹

The rhetoric of African politics and political theory is imbued with developmental and integrative terminology—nation-building, national development, national integration, unity, which stresses social cohesion and unity. There is a concomitant emphasis on the utilitarian role of intellectual institutions—universities, press, journals, and intellectuals in general. The main functions of the press, "include not only giving news but also taking part in the national effort and contributing towards the building of a nation."² Normally, utilitarianism may be interpreted as political quiescence. According to the late Tom Mboya, there is

the need for the educated and the intellectuals to involve themselves in all the tasks, aspirations, and needs of the masses. They should be the officers in the battlefront of the war against poverty, disease, and insecurity of life which are the lot of the majority of our people ... Intellectuals must recognize their role in our efforts to develop and contribute all they have, especially by providing good leadership at all levels ... I also expect the intellectuals to devote some of their time thinking about our political and social philosophies.³

Acting on the prescriptions outlined by Mboya, the intellectual would soon find himself in intense conflict with the incumbent political elite of the ruling class. A commitment to mass

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mobilization for the purposes of eradicating "poverty, disease, and insecurity" would almost certainly threaten entrenched elite positions and values. And it would also raise profound doubts about the possibility of developing a self-sustaining, integrated economy, let alone a socialist society, in a situation of continuing neo-colonial relations. In order to prevent such a situation from arising, Nboya introduced a qualification designed to stifle conflict and restrict intellectual thought and action. The intellectual is to be constructive ("passive"), and supportive of the system. He is to be concerned with the immediate, the specific, the predictable.

The intellectual's approach should be practical and constructive with the thinking being based on intimate knowledge of the prevailing conditions and the aim being to guide the various changes toward the declared economic and social objectives.1

The intellectual should accept without question stated government economic and social objectives. He should work within the basic guidelines established by government.

The "mobilization of bias",2 coupled with severe and often informal government-imposed restraints on intellectual activity, has important consequences for both the definition of socio-political role and what is possible in social action or activist terms. But it does much more. It helps determine the parameters of intellectual activity and the issues dealt with. The Tanzanian

1. Ibid.
situation provides more scope for the intellectual because he can operate under the umbrella of TANU, which also provides a channel for the articulation and dissemination of his ideas. The variety of political commentary in the columns of the Daily News and Sunday News suggests that criticism and diverse interpretation can be subsumed under a general statement of support for TANU and its objectives, although clearly, explicitly anti-socialist or anti-Ujamaa views cannot. The existence of a clearly formulated, receptive, and changing ideology of Ujamaa, and policy statements such as the "Arusha Declaration", "Mwengeso", and "Education for Self-Reliance", provides the intellectual with a critical stick which can be used to belabour those who seem to be diverting Tanzania from its socialist course of development. The situation is different in Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya, Sessional Paper No.10 on African Socialism initially aroused debate, and the KPU endeavoured to keep this debate alive. But KANU as a moribund party, and Sessional Paper No.10 as at best only vaguely socialist, are incapable of providing an umbrella under, or channel, in which, the intellectual can work and develop a penetrating critique. The limits of intellectual activity generally mean that in Kenya, for example, the intellectual does not deal in a critical, specific way with questions of increasing social inequality, class formation, and land redistribution.

Another major consequence of extremely severe limits is the inhibiting effect they have on the development of intellectual
thought and maturity. This is certainly conspicuous in the Kenyan case, where relatively few, and macrocosmic analyses of the political economy and society have been undertaken by local intellectuals. Of course, one can concentrate on the whole issue of cultural nationalism, which receives philistine government support on occasions. As an issue, however, it is perhaps moribund, and certainly incapable of much development. If we examine the work of Okot p'Bitek, for example, we find basically a continual restatement of the same position - from *Ink Tax* and *Song of Lewino* through to *Two Songs*. There are others, including Philip Ochieng, Aloe Ojuka, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o who have shown a clear progression of development in their work, but who have also experienced a rough intellectual passage. This stems essentially from their discovery of Marxism, and the possibilities of its re-interpretation and renewed application in the socio-economic conditions of East African societies. But generally, what one finds throughout much of Africa is the repetitious, seemingly endless process of re-statement, leading ultimately to stagnation. A certain kind of growth occurs. However, it is a growth in relation to the interpretation of the past.

1. For example, Mr. J.G. Mburu, the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner and Chairman of the Nairobi Cultural Society, pointed out to Kenyan journalists that it was the duty of Kenyan writers to come out and "correct" the distortions produced in writings on history and culture by colonial writers. It was the government's intention to encourage the country's youth to take an interest in journalism and become "good writers capable of writing about Kenya's progress in education and economical, social and cultural developments." *Daily Nation*, 20/7/1972, p.5.
The Problem of a Critical Tradition.

A third complicating factor, which is essentially, though not entirely a product of the first two, relates to the absence of a "critical tradition". Ali Mazrui has viewed this problem as one of the real possibility of an incompatibility existing between the demands of "nation-building" and the emergence of an intellectual heritage. The first, at least superficially, demands self-censorship and the avoidance of dissension. The second requires an "atmosphere of dissension and public debate". The incompatibility lies, Mazrui suggests, in two fundamental fallacies of what he terms the unanimous consensus—avoidance of conflict argument. The first fallacy is the assumption that avoidance of conflict is the same thing as national integration, which really "consists in accumulating the experience of peaceful resolution of conflict". In relation to this, Mazrui adopts the liberal notion of the market place of conflicting ideas: "One form of such conflict is verbal debate between speech-makers or open controversy between writers." The second fallacy stems from a failure to realise that "the process of building takes a matter of several generations". Mazrui argues that if "nation-building" is thought of in terms of several generations, the apparent contradiction between nation-building and

1. Mazrui, Violence and Thought, p.263.

2. Ibid., p.275. Stated briefly, this argument is that a unanimous consensus, whether enforced or not, and the avoidance or stifling of conflict, in a plural society is necessary for the achievement of national integration and nation-building, and hence for development as well. It is the view expressed in the nation-building rhetoric of most African governments.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.276.
the construction of an intellectual heritage can be resolved. For "they become an inter-related process. And you cannot build a significant intellectual heritage worth being remembered by the next generation unless you refrain from stifling the creative instincts of the present generation."\(^1\)

Hezrui's concern about the construction of a critical and intellectual tradition is shared by many others. In a speech delivered at a Kenya Press Club gathering in March 1969, the Kenya Vice-President and Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, suggested that a fundamental identity of principle existed between the Government and the press: "there is no issue of principle or fundamental social purpose on which the Government and the Press have any cause to disagree."\(^2\) The implications of this passage troubled Philip Ochieng, who argued that it contained a "contradiction of the Government's stated belief in Press freedom". The correct interpretation to be placed on the passage is that the determination of attitudes (or editorial policy) to issues is government-sponsored. Ochieng cited as an example the plight of the KPU opposition. While admitting that he had no evidence of government directives to limit news space for news emanating from the opposition, he did know that it didn't receive adequate space. The tenor of Government-created obstacles for the KPU had filtered down to the press. According to Ochieng, the Government and

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1. Ibid.
politicians adopted a political (even party) partisan view of criticism, which precluded the idea that critical thinkers who were not career-oriented could operate. A society with a "Critical tradition" is healthy; a good newspaper is "a nation talking to itself". In this respect African newspapers had failed, simply because they have "failed to engage us in honest self-criticism".

Seth Adagala, the Kenyan television producer and poet, is concerned that Kenya has "committed itself to a typeless society". He envisages the intellectual providing a cultural direction for the developing nation, but is afraid that the forging of a cultural direction by intellectuals may well be misinterpreted by the government as a rebelliousness.

Now what I'm asking the politician is that when more and more intellectuals speak out, when at last it looks as though we may begin to get some cultural direction, for the politician not to cut off the intellectual's head and say this is rebellion.

Similar fears have been expressed by the former Sunday Nation commentator, Aloo Ojuka. The publication of an article by Christopher Mulei in March 1971 on Kenyan leadership and foreign policy brought a sharp rebuke from Dr. Hjoroge Mungai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ojuka interpreted the message of Mungai's response as

Well, boys, if you have any praise to shower on your Government, out with it and bravo! if you have none, then shut up.2

Like Ochieng, Ojuka argues that Kenyan leaders almost invariably equate criticism of government performance and policy with a lack of patriotism. In doing this they endeavour to establish that there exists a direct relationship between the African country and African leadership: "that the African leader and the African country is one and the same thing!" The identification is patently false, but useful as a means of diverting critical attention. But Ojuka argues:

What Mr. Nuruo did, and what I believe every African journalist must do, was to raise fundamental questions regarding Kenya's potential vis-a-vis the performance so far of Kenya's leaders. There could be nothing more patriotic than this.

Relations between local press and government have been marked by a "pathetic credibility gap" which is manifested in the divulgence of material to foreign journalists rather than local people.

According to Awori wa Kataka:

there has over the years developed the impression that our political leaders think that no Kenyan working on his own could criticize the country, policies, or that everything in the country is so orderly that whichever Kenyan does criticize does so at the behest of the country's foreign enemies.1

In an article in the Tanzanian Standard, Philip Ochieng at some length took up the question of the barriers preventing the emergence of a critical tradition. He bemoaned the fact that journalists were unable to inform the reading public fully because of the strait-jacket through which they received news from public officials. But

a more serious criticism was that the ideas which journalists threw up for public debate "were never followed up adequately by members of our "thinking public"." This reticence was partly due to an increasing sensitivity to the disparity between TANU policies of socialism and self-reliance, and the position of potential public critics. It is safer for academics, civil servants, and members of the parastatals to discuss sensitive issues relating to socialism in private, rather than in the public arena where the risk of victimization is high. Members of the "expatriate Left" have probably been more affected than most and the vulnerability of their position - "the constant threat of being dismissed if they oppose certain varsity policies and practices", is ever present. Ochieng contends that those who are stifled and gagged are the "very same people who are committed to TANU's policies on paper". The stifling of the "committed ones" enables people in key positions to "consolidate their positions of power". As a result, a situation obtains where few people do the thinking, and most leaders want to copy "unintelligently" their ideas and pronouncements. They provide the creatively thinking few with little stimulus, and do not help themselves to think independently, critically, and creatively. The latter behaviour is, Ochieng suggests, a legacy of colonial

2. Ibid. It is interesting to note that Ochieng's article did not provoke a response in subsequent editions of The Standard, thereby very fittingly illustrating the malaise of lack of critical enquiry.
education which trained the civil service to "behave mechanically and unquestioningly". There exists an overriding need to challenge "feudalistic and bourgeois assumptions". TANU policy will only be served by people who are prepared to "play the role of an iconoclast", systematically breaking down the legacies, the false images "incurred by feudalistic and capitalist teachings". In order to build the tradition of a "healthy society talking to itself about itself" - in other words a critical tradition, people must assist in criticizing intellectuals, thereby either reinforcing, modifying, or rejecting their ideas.

This concern has also been taken up by S.S. Mushi who views critical thinking - representing "an attitude as well as an aptitude of mind: the mind that is open to impression, a mind that is ready to learn and to make fine distinctions or rendering judgments" - as distinguishing the "scientific" from the Unscientific mind. Critical thinking is inextricably linked with "modernization", whose history is probably the "history of the development of critical thinking, whatever Marx and Marxists may say". ¹

Mushi points out that in the African context, criticism has had negative connotations. It has been associated with fault-finding and captiousness to the extent, as other writers such as Ochieng, Mulei, Ojuika and Kataka have realized, that the critic can be represented as unpatriotic. This negative view of criticism has been reinforced by the glorification of the principles of

'unanimous consensus' and 'universal acclamation', which receive their justification, not only through reference to values which operated in traditional society, but in the "consensus on major national policies ... vital for national integration". While Mushi accepts the legitimacy of the latter constraint on critical activity, he considers that it can be carried to excess. When pressed too far, the principle of unanimous consensus is counter-productive, producing a "neo-traditional political culture" which prefers "superficial consensus to a critical analysis of issues of national importance". Tanzania has created a neo-traditional political culture which has achieved a "reasonable measure of success". The principle of consensus has, however, been hampered by Nyerere's stress on the importance of 'self-criticism' and the role of 'freedom' and free discussion in national development. But as yet the attitude still prevails that criticism is basically a vice—certainly not a useful contribution to development. The perfect consensus model of development is unrealistic. Moreover, it can pose an obstacle to development by discouraging a critical assessment of issues and problems, and by consciously suppressing constructive criticism of their action in an effort to create a false image of unanimous consensus.

According to Mushi, at the root of this hostility to critical thinking lie the influence of African traditional values and norms, especially to authority and, the modern, western-derived "theoretical dichotomy between politics and administration which permeated (African societies) during the period of Western acculturation".
The reluctance and refusal of civil servants and members of the parastatals to participate in discussion of public issues, particularly in the mass media, is a function of this dichotomy. The reliance on a few leaders for ideas stems from "the traditional principle of universal acclamation of leaders".

Marginality of the Intellectual Sub-Culture

A fourth factor which complicates role-definition and the nature of intellectual and literary creativity is the marginality of the intellectual sub-culture. Intellectuals share a social and educational experience, alienation from dominant and subordinate classes within their societies, similar identity and role definition problems, and a basic pre-occupation with similar intellectual issues, which provide them with a certain sub-cultural identity. There is a uniformity of life style, but this is not really distinguishable from that of other educated groups, including the middle level salarist, within the petty-bourgeoisie. In Nairobi,

1. In Marxist literature, petty-bourgeoisie referred to those strata which could not be included in either the bourgeoisie or proletariat. They existed in the middle ranks or interstices of a developed capitalist society and usually included such people as small property owners, shopkeepers, small traders, lower ranks of the intelligentsia and members of the liberal professions. It was never a ruling class, nor even a stratum of the ruling class. In contrast, in East Africa, it was the petty bourgeoisie which led the independence struggle and came to control the state apparatus, thus becoming a ruling class, albeit one subordinate to the external international bourgeoisie. In Kenya, this situation has been considerably modified by the emergence of a local bourgeoisie which has strong but dependent links with international capital. Power, as far as one can ascertain, lies with a relatively small ruling group centered on Kenyatta and his Gathundu court in a way, Levy has suggested, which bears a strong parallel to the Bonapartist state described by Marx in the 18th Brusaire of Louis Bonaparte (c.f. Shivji, Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues, p.22). In Tanzania, on the other hand, the bureaucratic segment of the petty bourgeoisie has, according to Shivji, emerged as the ruling class.
much of the informal intellectual contact centres around the University Senior Common Room, the Norfolk Hotel, Brunner's Hotel, the Sens Chique Bar, and the Goethe Institute. The cliques which abound reflect occupational and educational, and even ethnic backgrounds, rather than common ideological orientations. This is principally a function of the size of the stratum, and the limited number of places where intellectuals can meet in congenial surroundings. In Tanzania the situation is different. The concentration of intellectual activity on "The Hill" of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, combined with the much more systematic concern with analysis and ideology, has produced groups such as those which disseminate their ideas through Cheche and Maji Maji, and which possess ideological rather than an occupational or educational integration and identity. But what essentially gives intellectuals their identity as a sub-culture is their "deviance" in their professed criticism and rejection of dominant class values. This is reinforced by similar life experiences, and common identity problems and intellectual concerns which are the direct product of the colonial experience and the nature of the neo-colonial situation.

The intellectual sub-culture or stratum is also identifiable in terms of the occupations of its members, most of whom are employed in universities, the press, and publishing, or are still students. Relatively few work for the government in the sense that they are employed in the upper echelons of the state apparatus, although some, such as Ali Mazrui, Simeon Oinde, and Cyrus Mutiso, may be called
upon at times to participate in governmental commission enquiries. Generational differences, as previously argued, are important. Many of early generation intellectuals, along with those who attained intellectual maturity in the 1950s, control key political positions in the state apparatus in East Africa. Those from the pre-independence generation occupy many of the most important positions in universities, the press, and major cultural organs, although they are generally outside positions of political power. For most intellectuals, and especially those of the post-independence generation, their position, in terms of power and access to those in power, is marginal and weak. In Kenya few intellectuals are members of KANU, and its atrophied, moribund condition prevents effective penetration. In Uganda under Obote, intellectuals, while generally denied access to positions of power, were often called upon to provide assistance.

While the intellectual stratum's position is one of marginality, this can be modified by the intellectual inclinations of political leaders, and the nature of party organization. Although many years ago, Jomo Kenyatta had pronounced intellectual inclinations, they are, apart from the occasional mundane pronouncement on culture, aloof from any intellectual debate, and occupy key positions in a system characterized by a "culture of silence". The response of the Kenya Government to specific intellectual criticism has been one of repression and censorship, if only in an informal way. The only Government ministers able or prepared to respond to
criticisms in an intellectual manner (at least since the death of Tom Mboya) have been Mwai Kibaki and Julius Kiama, both of whom have an academic background. In Uganda, on the other hand, relations between intellectuals and the Obote government were profoundly conditioned, as Masrui has pointed out, by the aspirations of two men - Obote, and his cousin and political ally Akena Adoko, the Head of the Intelligence Service at the time. Both men aspired to two forms of respectability - socialistic respectability and intellectual respectability. Partly in order to satisfy the twin ambitions "both turned to that top floor of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere" which houses the Department of Political Science. Masrui states

Fortunately the Department was ideologically diverse in any case. And some degree of radical applause did ring out from that floor as Obote began to shift leftwards, in his policies. Some members made themselves available to the President and his cousin Akena Adoko, almost as part of the intellectual wing of Obote's party.

Ahmed Mohiddin, Yesh Tendon, and Okello Oculi, along with Picho Ali and for a time Chango Machyo, formed the core of an informal Obote "think tank" which was concerned primarily with issues of socialism and expressed its views frequently in the columns of The People. Obote achieved socialist credibility with the Common Man's Charter and the Nakivubo Pronouncements. His intellectual success came with the "highly innovative" Document Number 5 on the representation of the people. Akena Adoko, a key figure in the evolving

2. Ibid., p.11.
3. Ibid.
intellectual radicalism in Uganda, also hungered for a twin success. Symptomatic of this longing were his attempts at writing in blank verse both the events of 1966 (Uganda Crisis) and the affair of Brian Lee, and his challenging of Masrui to a debate in the Kampala Town Hall on the role of intellectuals in the African revolution. According to Masrui, Akena Adoko "was not specially gifted in ability" but "he did have the capacity to be fascinated by ideas, and cultivated the friendship of at least one gifted member of the Department of Political Science as an intellectual companion." Both Obote and Akena Adoko arranged and encouraged some long sessions of intellectual conversation with political scientists, sometimes indeed with the entire membership of the Department at Makerere. In spite of his superficial anti-intellectualism and distrust of political scientists as "neo-politicians" or politicians amanques, Obote had a side which "put a special premium on the value of discussion". There is abundant evidence to suggest that his emphasis on "government by discussion" was not a mere exercise in cynicism. That he himself was prepared to engage in debate is illustrated by the letters he sometimes promptly wrote on encountering something he disagreed with. Masrui, for instance says:

2. See pp. 462-64 and pp. 497-84 of this thesis for Akena Adoko's and Masrui's contributions to this debate.
I used to receive long letters from him, arguing out some point I had made, or asserting his own counter views on a variety of public issues. One of his letters to me was thirty pages long, foolscap, single space. Much of the discussion in that letter concerned *Transition* as a magazine in an African context. Much of the discussion also thrashed out certain points raised in *Transition* about Obote's 1967 constitution. There was no doubt about it - Obote loved debate.¹

Obote invited political scientists to thrash out with him certain aspects of his "Move to the Left". Members of the Political Science Department, and Ahmed Mohiddin and Yash Tandon in particular, had closely discussed with Obote the draft of *The Common Man's Charter*. Intellectual involvement in such activity, apart from enabling the intellectual to socially implement in a limited way his ideas, also probably influenced conceptions of the intellectual political role. Yash Tandon, widely believed to have been Obote's principal adviser with the drafting of *The Common Man's Charter*, has noted that

African governments are still busy writing their "Sessional Paper Ten's" and "Arusha Declarations". "Capitalism", "socialism", "freedom", "equality" and "justice" are much talked of in the developed societies, but their meanings are largely assumed. In Africa they are still by and large empty boxes with competing contenders for their occupation. The intellectual's role in Africa, as seen by its governments at least, is to help fill these boxes.²

In Uganda under Obote they were, with government willingness, endeavouring to do precisely that.

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1. Ibid.
In Tanzania, a well-developed TANU party organization with active branch membership, has enabled people such as Walter Bgoya, J.P. Mbonde, and Hamedi Lesso to disseminate their ideas through party channels. Younger Tanzanian intellectuals such as Issa Shivji, Haroub Othman, Karia Hirji, Henry Napolu, and A.P. Mahiga, have been active in the proscribed U.S.A.R.P. and the campus branch of the TANU Youth League (TYL). But the chief product of this involvement has been intense ideological debate provoked by the publication of papers such as Shivji's seminal Tanzania, The Silent Class Struggle. Symptomatic of the marginality of the intellectual stratum, has been its reliance on methods of influence and channels which, in almost all cases, reach segments of the petty-bourgeoisie at home, and a substantial public located overseas - newspaper and journal articles and debate, public appearances at, for instance the Goethe Institute in Nairobi, and perhaps the occasional radio and television appearance.¹

Intellectual Isolation From Urban and Rural Labouring Classes

In terms of education, occupation, and life-style, the intellectual is generally a member of the petty bourgeoisie. His educational and occupational background and life style divorces him from his mainly rural or village origins, and from the mass of rural-based people. However, his rejection of both petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie classes leads either to a situation where he dissipates his

¹ Of course, in Tanzania there is no television as yet, although Zanzibar is about to get colour television.
intellectual energies, or to an identification with those who while politically conscious, lack both the intellectual apparatus and channels to effectively express their dissatisfaction. The intellectual's subjective class consciousness, or identification with rural and urban labouring classes, is understandable in two major ways. Firstly, those intellectuals who experience little difficulty in relating, or producing a unity of thought and socio-political role or action through an adherence to Marxism, recognize rural and urban labouring classes as at least putatively revolutionary and progressive classes. In the case of those of Asian origin, there is a racial dimension to this. Thus, Kutub Kassam expressed the view that ultimately the only path for East African Asians to follow is a socialist one. It is only in this way that they can break down their social and cultural isolation, and reduce the antagonisms aroused by their position within the Kenyan economy. Neither the liberalism of a Bahadur Tejani, nor the passivity, or even the uncritical sycophantic rantings of those anxious to preserve their financial interests, is a viable solution to the position of the East African Asian. India does not really offer a home. And neither does Britain. The only solution is for the Asian intellectual, and Asians in general, to identify fully with the aspirations and struggle of the African labouring classes. Secondly, a cultural nationalist such as Okot P'Bitek, while concerned with

1. Interview with Kutub Kassan, Nairobi, 12/7/1973.
growing educational and economic divisions within society, views
the people en masse, not as a potential revolutionary force, but
rather as the repository of the true cultural heritage from which
intellectuals and educated alike have become alienated. The
psychic element of this identification is similar to the type of
guilt-mechanism lucidly described by Fanon in both *The Wretched of
the Earth*\(^1\) and *Toward the African Revolution*. In the colonial
situation, the reaction of many educated Africans who found them-
selves intellectually assimilated, but not socially accepted by
those whom they had modelled themselves on, was to seek "salvation"
and forgiveness in a return to the sources or roots.

This culture, abandoned, sloughed off, rejected
despised, becomes for the inferiorised an
object of passionate attachment. There is a
very marked kind of overvaluation that is
psychologically, closely linked with the
craving for forgiveness.\(^2\)

However, instead of the abandoned culture becoming the sole "object
of passionate attachment", the largely undifferentiated "masses"
become the new peg on which the intellectual can hang his guilt
feelings about cultural alienation and intellectual arrogance.\(^3\) One
senses the operation of this mechanism in the case of Okot p'Bitek.

As Chris Manjala points out

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1. See especially Chapter 4, "On National Culture".
2. "Racism and Culture", *Toward the African Revolution* (New York:
3. The class basis of this arrogance is discussed in relation to
Latin America by Paulo Freire in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), Ch.1. A similar
situation obtains in Africa where the "elitist" nature of the
education systems, combined with dominant leadership notions,
issues the tertiary trained African with the idea that he is
destined and equipped for leadership.
Though the traditions a writer like Okot talks about still survive in the countryside, he talks about them with a longing and distance only peculiar of people who have been away from the village for some time. Thus he feels separated from a golden age and the gods of his clan. This is the reason why one would argue that there is a contradiction in what Okot advocates in his songs, and how he actually lives his real life. No wonder Okot is more at home in Nairobi than at his village in Galu.

Whether a Marxist-Leninist or a cultural nationalist, the intellectual's identification with the rural and urban labouring classes rarely gets beyond the realm of rhetoric. Social and cultural obstacles interpose themselves between intellectuals and others, thus preventing the emergence of what Freire terms effective "dialogical" relationships. The intellectual is not in a position to play a "Robin Hood" role characteristically played by "semi-charismatic figures who can rally around them disadvantaged and confused people", nor to become one of Hobson's social bandits. The Robin Hood role exists in a situation where older patterns of obligation have been eroded, and where there is a need for "the assertion of new-found rights and obligations to be personal and moral". The typical "Robin Hood" acts in the name of a public,

1. "Alienation in Modern East African Literature", Paper presented to the Department of History, University of Nairobi, 29/11/1972, pp.7–8. Actually Okot's demobilisation is deeper than the passage suggests. Okot's father, a catechist-teacher, ran away from his village as a youth - as such Okot has no village.

2. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, passim.


4. See E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (1969) and Primitive Rebels (1959) for a discussion of the meaning and nature of social banditry.

5. Ibid., p.324.
"or some wide and relatively significant grouping that manipulates virtue, defining it in such a way that it derives from an attack on authority". However, culturally and socially (and spatially) removed from the rural and urban labouring classes, the intellectual is more likely to be viewed by them as a deviant than as a Robin Hood figure. Moreover, the intellectual's radical appeal is unlikely to take deep root with people who are pre-occupied with more specific grievances which affect their daily lives: the building of a local school, provision of water supplies, support for a "Harambee" self-help project, and the restitution of land rights. The local politician, however much he may be despised, has access to greater material resources than the intellectual can muster. He is in a position to provide much needed amenities and restore recently obtained rights. At worst he can buy limited political support; the intellectual can really only offer revolutionary consciousness. Cyrus Mutiso's study of Kathue, a member of the "transient proletariat" gives some indication of how many ordinary people view intellectuals and politicians. Kathue organised for Mboya in the Majengo location of Nairobi. She "despised the educated people who she claims did not join Mboya's party until it became clear that the transient proletarians had already provided a framework". An activist during the Mau Mau period, she was attracted to the party and Mboya by the promise of free land and

1. Ibid., p.325.

schools. A bitter disillusionment followed the realization that the promises would never materialize. Kathue says:

We followed the politicians because we expected a better life, but we have found out that all politicians are liars. The only sincere politician was Mbaya, who paid some of his organizers about 45 dollars a month in the later years out of sympathy. Lately we the little people switch parties because it is the only way we get food.¹

The African politician possesses an important advantage over the intellectual which stems from the fact that he is ostensibly the bringer of independence. As such he has acquired a legitimacy denied the intellectual.² The Africanization of politics and of bureaucracy created a state of insecurity for the academic and intellectual, who saw his age mates and junior age sets (some of them former students) increase in wealth, status, and power. This was accompanied by the realization that intellectual workers were outside the institutions of power, and despised by the bulk of powerholders.³ Furthermore, they had no formal basis in the "traditional" society to draw upon. Correspondingly, there developed an increasing interest in buying societal insurance and recognition either by allying with politicians (to get upper echelon civil service and political positions), or by moving into the world of commerce (beer halls, butcheries, retailing, and real estate).

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¹. Ibid., pp.71-2.
³. Ibid., p.133.
Foreign Intellectual Recognition and Validation

The intellectual's marginality and lack of recognition in his own society, coupled with the difficulties of defining a viable social activist role, is exacerbated by a cultural dependence which has meant that the "pariah literati", as Mutiso refers to them, derive most of their class rewards from the recognition awarded them by their international counterparts. Books, journals, and art-works are consumed overseas, and even the recognition of one's worth as a creator of culture or ideas depends so much on overseas publishers, critics (Ulli Beier, Gerald Moore, Jahnheniz Jahn), conferences, and lecture tours. A cutting reference to this made in Bukunya's novel, *The People's Bachelor*.

> The speaker was a poet, perhaps Africa's leading poet after the dissolution of Senghor's tigritude ... One of the achievements for which this muse-inspired son of Africa could claim distinction was that he had never written a complete sentence in his career. But American and British connoisseurs said he was very good (My italics).

The plaudits accorded Ali Mazrui - Africa's leading political scientist and East Africa's foremost intellectual - also demonstrates the process of external (metropole) cultural validation. Clearly, this reputation and cultural validation has only partly been established in East Africa, where his publications in local journals, membership of editorial boards, public lectures, newspaper articles, and "clashes" with Milton Obote aroused public interest. But his

1. Ibid., p.117.
reputation is built principally upon foreign recognition - through publication and perfunctory "jet-setting" from conference to conference. A closer examination also reveals that this recognition is linked with ideological considerations. Masrui's expressed liberalism, and his "cultural engineering", "nation-building", terminologically-ridden academic work, fits comfortably into the mainstream of American political science. Fellow East African political scientists and academics are much more begrudging in their praise.¹

International recognition by foreign radicals raises many problems for the radical intelligentsia of Tanzania. The romanticisation of Tanzanian radicalism by foreign intellectuals (what Masrui refers to as "Tanzaphilia")² is a type of recognition and lionisation which is often not really qualitatively different from that given by Ulli Beier and Heinesmann to African writers.³ As Henry Napolu has pointed out, the contributors to Naji Naji are conscious of this external interest, but are basically concerned with the radicalization of people in Tanzania - not in Europe. They


³ It should also be pointed out that expatriate academics and intellectuals were in large measure responsible for the emergence of the radical intelligentsia in Tanzania. See Chapter X, "The Tanzanian Radical Intelligentsia", of this thesis.
write for politically conscious students at the University and for those who, having contributed to Cheche and Maji Maji and been active in either the Students’ Revolutionary Front or the TANU Youth League, are now dispersed throughout Tansania in various positions.\footnote{Discussion with Henry Mapolu, Edinburgh, 20/2/1974.} Foreign lionisation, while not solicited, poses a number of problems for the radical intellectual. It can contribute to the development of factionalism within the radical intelligentsia through external support for different ideological positions. Local ideological difficulties, rather than being resolved through praxis, may be exacerbated by the championing of “correct” lines. It can also complicate the already sensitive position of the intellectual who has no firm basis in society and few intellectual channels for the dissemination of his ideas. This problem is of pressing urgency, given the effective TANU control of mass media, including publishing outlets.

For those intellectuals who, unlike Masrui, have been unable to get recognition and validation at the international level (that is, presuming they have wanted to), three alternatives seem possible. Firstly, they can fall back upon the unresponsive national setting and seek recognition there. Secondly, they can turn to their local “ethnic” community. And thirdly, they can manipulate cultural traditions for international recognition. The last, a type of tourist recognition, is aided by publishing houses such as Heinemann with their African Writers Series, which help determine the types of
themes the intellectual tackles. As both Ayi Kwei Armaah in his novel *Fragments*\(^1\) and Cyrus Mutiso in his commentary on that novel have recognized, African writers "manipulate the content of traditional culture for their own gain from their international friends. The images of the Cultural Freedom and Fairfield Foundation among others, are very much with us."\(^2\)

**Intellectual Marginality and Popular Literature**

The intellectual's position of marginality and lack of recognition in his own society has been intensified by the emergence of a popular literature which has served to both emphasize his inability to tap a large local public and to challenge his historically determined social activist intellectual role.

Popular, rather than overseas and limited local intellectual recognition and validation has not been readily forthcoming for East African writers. However, the situation is changing with the emergence of the popular novel which is able to tap a secondary school leaver public formerly addicted to imported popular writing. Charles Mangua, a Kenyan-born, Makerere and Oxford graduate who now works in the Ivory Coast, is the forerunner of this new development. His first novel, *Son of Noah*, dealt with the chaotic life of Dodge Kiumyu; from his orphaned childhood in the shanties of Nairobi; to his youthful frequenting of brothels; to his days at Makerere and as a corrupt civil servant and finally, as a seasoned prison inmate.

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**Son of Woman** has sold over 75,000 copies and Mangua's second novel, **A Tail in the Mouth**, over 10,000 in the first few weeks of its publication.¹

The initial intellectual response to Mangua's success has been mixed, the most virulent criticism coming from Christopher Mulei. In the case of **Son of Woman** Mulei "quarrelled with Mangua's diction because it is a fine example of cacology fed on neo-colonialist pulp."² And, **A Tail in the Mouth** "gives us a glimpse of the colonial mental havoc wrought by the colonialists and their heirs."³ His fundamental objection however is not based on mere accusations of cacology and scatology. Its roots are deeper, and lie in the realization that the success of Mangua's novels is symptomatic not only of continued ideological dependence, but of the penetration of African cultural production by capitalist production and sales techniques. Mulei states

That Mangua's books are popular no one can argue; but this is hardly surprising when we daily witness the alarming number of colonized minds in the country. Entertainment has, and continues to be, a vast, monopolized industry in which hundreds, even millions of pounds are invested. I don't mean here, but the ominous signs are there. Capitalism, having destroyed the basis on which the popular art of pre-capitalist societies had grown, has created a huge and most profitable industry for supplying the masses with a substitute art made for and by the people and loaded with an ever-increasing triviality.⁴

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Mulei’s European critic, Patrick Pender-Cudlip, failed to grasp the importance of this point, and argued that Mulei effectively wanted to keep African literature as “pure and undefiled, serious, educational and morally uplifting”, and the “exclusive preserve of literature students and university graduates”. He suggested that Mangua had struck a “blow against western cultural imperialism by challenging the near-monopoly of Western novels in the popular market”. That Mangua succeeded in the latter is indisputable.

That Mangua’s success struck a blow against Western cultural imperialism is much more doubtful. Son of Sonan brought in its wake Muruah’s Never Forgive Father, Ruheni’s What a Life! and The Future Leaders, and Meja Mwangi’s Kill Me Quick, the latter three being published by Longmans and Heinemann. All represent part of the phenomenon, of which foreign literature still is the dominant part, which Mulei is condemning.

The emergence of popular novels such as Son of Sonan and What a Life! has had the effect, Chris Nanjala among others argues, of exploring the theme of individual alienation while at the same time divorcing the writer-intellectual from the traditional communal responsibilities of the artist. In “healthy holistic societies”,

2. Ibid.
Hoirimu suggests, the dominant aesthetic sense is the communal or social one which is developed in the authentic artist by a
"process comparable to osmosis to be inspired and guided by it."¹

In pre-colonial African society, the artist and oral poet, as a manipulator of visual and linguistic symbols, had a recognized role in the social group. He expressed the needs of his social group, and ordered his own experience of social reality, although within the often narrow confines of the dominant literary forms.² Because members of the social group usually shared a common ideology, the poet could use stylistic devices, subtle innuendo, metaphor and imagery without losing contact with his audience.

The position of the poet and artist, and systems of patronage, differed from society to society. In some societies poets were not readily distinguishable from their fellows in terms of training, reward, and position. In others, poets, while employed like their fellows in agriculture or cattle-keeping, were marked out by their expert skills on special occasions. Pre-colonial societies characterized by greater economic and social differentiation were able to support professional poets, griots, or praise singers. In the kingdoms of the Sulu, Sotho, Congo, of West Africa such as


2. For example, the lyrics of the heroic epic recitations of the Ankole suffered from a rigid repetitive structure heavily clogged with nominal phrases, which gave the poet no scope for narrative or emotional depth. Ben Obumolu, "The Background of Modern African Literature", fbadara, 22, June 1966, pp.46-53.
those of Ashanti and the Islamic emirates of the Hausa of Northern Nigeria court poetry, with professional poets, flourished. In other court societies, the poet depended on private enterprise, and wandered from patron to patron relying on his wits. Swahili poets, as Whiteley points out, appear to have lived in or near the main centres and close to the plantations, and to have enjoyed the patronage of wealthy Arab landowners. It could be tentatively argued that Swahili poetry, and more generally the literary tradition, existed symbiotically with Arab ruling groups until the early 20th century. The destruction of the slave trade, and the break-up of the plantation system, with the resulting decline of Arab economic and political power, undermined both the social system and the system of patronage which had sustained the literary tradition for centuries.

While the position of the artist and poet, and systems of patronage differed from society to society, the artist and poet performed basically the same type of clearly defined and recognized social role. The poet, whose function was mainly didactic, served as a value integrator, maintainer of historical continuity (through genealogic recitations, historicio-legendary traditions), social structures and social cohesion. Swahili literature had a "function in the daily life of the Swahili as it was often quoted, and recited

on special occasions'. Religious poetry was publicly intoned for the enlightenment of the masses. The inspiration of the early poet especially was Islam, and "Islamic culture and thought impregnates all the early verse". In this way the poet was a type of conscience, drawing people's attention to the limitations of the material world and the glory and serenity of the spiritual. For example, Sayyid Abdullah bin Ali bin Nasir in his famous Al Inkišaf (The Soul's Awakening), used the decline and fall of Fata as evidence of the transitoriness of life and the futility and vanity of the material world. The Swahili poet didn't operate from outside society. He wrote from within, as an integral part of society, although at times he possessed sufficient critical detachment to turn his critical and satirical powers on individuals, and social behaviour in general.

The integration of African societies into the capitalist system with its consequent effects on production methods, employment patterns, and the division of labour, together with Christianity, western education, and foreign languages, produced a fundamentally altered relationship between the newly created group of colonial intellectuals and their society, and helped "provide a perspective in which the artist is no longer a key and central figure in the social group". Colonialism initiated a process which had begun

3. Whiteley, p.18.
in Europe as early as the 13th century. As Diana Laurensen points out:

Capitalism evolves an ideology in which the artist does not have a vital an integral function to perform; he feels therefore edged to the periphery of society, encouraged to produce diversions for leisure hours, literature of entertainment, escape, or naturalistic social reporting that does not constitute a fundamental challenge.¹

Popular East African literature falls into this pattern, and as such, prevents many writers from effectively realizing their posited role of social activism, which is often rationalized in terms of the socio-political role of the oral poet. Works such as Son of Woman and What a Life! negate the role of social activism. The literary intellectual’s struggle for self-definition, including a progressive social activist role, demands that his work should have a serious purpose. It should delineate the nature of major social formations and their relations, and provide literary and ideological solutions to the most important questions of the time. Literature, whether in journalistic, poetic, novel, or dramatic form, possessed a serious social and political purpose during the nationalist phase. To view literature primarily as a medium of entertainment is to deny the heritage of social criticism, activism, and responsibility.

And yet, the success of Mangua’s novels, and their ability to tap a large local public, is perturbing for the intellectual, if only because it raises profound questions about the relationship of the writer to specific publics, and to the nature of the literary language

¹. Ibid.
and form he uses. The problem has been stated as thus by Atieno-
Odhiambo.

The lesson from all this is that perhaps the
widest section of our reading public reads to
be entertained, and not to be informed. This
being the case, the writer who wants to change
society with the people must surely find out
how to rechannel the thinking of our readers.¹

Certainly, some East African intellectuals have given serious thought
to the problem.

The writing of newspaper articles by people such as Ogot
p'Bitek, Taban Lo Liyong, Ahmed Mohiddin, Ali Mazrui, and William
Ochieng reflects a desire on the part of many intellectuals to
reach a public they would not otherwise reach in their books and
contributions to journals. There are inherent dangers, nevertheless.
While we may summarily dismiss Preston King's objection that Ogot,
for example, is frequently "caught up in irrelevant newspaper
debates",² we cannot overlook Gurr's observation that Ogot, because
he has become a public figure identified with the preservation of
traditional culture, has been pushed into defending, in an over-
simplified manner, a position which he believes to be far more
complex than newspaper readers.³ Many intellectuals, including the
Swahili writers Homedi Lesso and Cuthbert Omari, draw a distinction
between the types of contributions they make to newspapers which are

¹ E.B. Atieno-Odhiambo, "The End of Uhuru Worship",

² Preston King, "A Note on the Relevance of Literature to Social

³ Andrew J. Gurr, Interview, Sunday Nation, 7/5/1972, p.31.
designed to have some sort of immediate impact, and those which are intended to maintain more permanent literary values. This distinction is reminiscent of that made by Berger between propaganda works which have an urgent temporary function, and those which "embrace contradictions". ¹

The Kenyan poet Jared Angira has written that "every artist is a dreamer, but we seek to communicate our dreams, and attempt to transform them into a reality". ² The task of converting commitment into a literary form is thorny: "You discover that there is no prescribed form, so you start to experiment." The recognition that the writer cannot go to the farm just once and "expect a harvest" provides a stimulus to literary experimentation, and the adaptation of literary form for more effective communication. Angira says that

When you discover that the poetry reaches nowhere, you try instead to take theatre to the expropriated peasants, or to the lumpenproletariat, or you go to read ballads to the compradors hoping that they will learn that clouds symbolize rain. You most likely fail, but you don't fold your arms and say "I surrender". No. You put something else, prose-cum-poetry.³

It is necessary for the writer, he points out, to understand the changes within his society if he wants to be an agent of change, although unlike Georg Lukacs, for instance, he is extremely vague about the ways in which the writer should approach social reality


2. Jared Angira, "Experimental Writing", in Gurr and Calder, Writers in East Africa, p.75.

3. Ibid., p.71.
and realise its complexities and contradictions in his work. Instead, he is only able to suggest that the writer's outlook should be reflected in a "mode of reaction" and in constant literary experimentation.¹ Angira himself has not explored a variety of forms. Apart from some short stories, his work consists of volumes of poetry such as *Juices* and *Silent Voices* which are impenetrable by, and inaccessible to ordinary people. There is in his case a profound contradiction between his Marxian-Leninian and his literary creation which effectively prevents the latter from developing into a revolutionary force.

In his discussion of the historical sense and creative literature, Atieno Adhiambo extends Angira's argument by noting that in a society torn by major conflicts and convulsions, "the historian and the literary man find themselves, if they are to live relevantly at all, participating. What is generally termed engagement means in this context that each individual historian or creative writer is to concern himself with the way society has developed or failed to develop."² For the African writer with "artistic sensitivity" the question of commitment or non-commitment is not one "that arises at all", simply because he becomes caught up in the conflicts of his society. With historical justification, Atieno suggests that there is a correlation between demands for commitment and societal tensions; it is only in stable societies

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that an "attitude of non-commitment can crystallize". He is careful, however, to indicate that commitment should not be confused with immediate political activity, nor with "mealy-mouthed acquiescence". Above all, a historical sense must prevail in production. Without alluding to other writers, and without exploring in any depth the implications of this view, Atieno is thus making a point which has concerned among others Lukacs, Lucien Goldmann, Arnold Hauser, George Steiner and John Berger.¹ Atieno recognizes that there appears to be a contradiction between the writer as a "visionary" and the demands of revolutionary activity and of the present. The contradiction, he infers, is an unreal one if the writer is concerned with his relationship to "the people", for such a relationship renders questions of posterity and the future an irrelevant one. Above all, Atieno is concerned that the writer should create out of the "specifically historical" by deriving, in Lukacs phrase, "the individuality of characters from the historical peculiarities of their age". He thus not only broaches the question of adapting forms to reach a wider public, but also the question of the actual character of the portrayal contained in the literary work. The two, he fails to note, might however be incompatible.

Intellectual Activity and Discontinuities in Social Communication Processes

While not perhaps as important for certain types of intellectual and literary works (many literary and intellectual works are directed at a small, limited public or sub-culture which clearly influences their fundamental nature) market conditions help determine, or at least favour, the conception, writing, and circulation of books and other intellectual products. In the African situation, as elsewhere the actual nature of the public, and of market conditions in general, is difficult to grasp. Different languages, and markedly different levels of literacy in them, widespread illiteracy and differing standards of education, economic factors (the ability of a person to buy a book, magazine, newspaper, radio or television), geographical, ethnic, class and distribution factors, give rise to major discontinuities in social communications processes, and make extremely complex the paths by which new values and ideas are transmitted, mediated, and disseminated.

Discontinuities in social communications processes, while perhaps exaggerated in the sense that we overlook the role of intellectual brokers, agitators, and value mediators operating in the interstices,1 go to the heart of the African intellectual's socio-political role dilemma, as well as the language, form, structure, style, content, and conception of his work. The critical problem is that of public, for in East Africa, as in the

rest of sub-saharan Africa, the actual although not necessarily potential public for intellectual products is quite small. The number of people with the social and educational background, let alone the financial means and the inclination to read intellectual works, is limited indeed. Such people, as Angus Calder has pointedly observed, "also form the bulk of the local bourgeoisie, and would see on all available evidence to prefer the sick fantasies of James Hadley Chase or the meaningless romances of Anya Seton to novels about real local conditions by local writers." The intellectual thus finds himself addressing a relatively small group which is probably, of all sections, "least interested in a really radical message or a really subtle criticism of contemporary manners". The expansion of this reading public is hampered also by the small number of libraries (generally ill-stocked), and bookshops which cater only for the capital cities and main regional centres (e.g. in Kenya, Nyeri, Mombasa, Kisumu), and often for a tourist rather than a local market.

Some East African intellectuals are prepared to argue that publishing houses, by the policies they adopt, also effectively hinder the growth of a large reading public. Taban Lo Liyong, as has Cyrus Mutiso, has recognized that the popularity of magazines such as Drum, Flamingo, Trust, Spear, and Boom attests to the existence of a "mammoth audience". Local publishers, however, overprice books and are so "respectable" that they think it "beneath

2. Ibid., p.84.
their dignity to publish books for the populace. Taban has wondered: "Why don't we have enterprising publishers publishing popular, cheap editions for a shilling? Use newsprint. Or toilet paper. It is not slick publishing, it is not glazed paper, it is not the best binding the people go for. They want the cheapest way of exposing the secrets of modern life to them." A number of Tanzanian intellectuals have been highly sceptical about the role of the publisher, arguing that publishing houses are basically capitalist, and that a direct relationship of book printing and public be established. This view stems from the belief that in a socialist society, "education is the right for all to enjoy", and that the free distribution of books is essential for this. The distribution of cheap or free books and pamphlets - chapbooks - is vital in terms of the dissemination of political information, as well as information about matters such as health and animal husbandry.

An effective barrier to the development of vernacular literature is the economics of book production; there is no point writing books if they can't get published. Okot p'Bitek, for instance, who is an ardent advocate of vernacular language literature, admits

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4. The Institute of Adult Studies publishes follow-up books for post-literate students which go hand-in-hand with campaigns to disseminate various types of new knowledge - "atu ni Afya" for example.
that many of the small language groups in East Africa "have not the slightest chance to publish vernacular novels or books of poems simply because it would be uneconomical." \(^1\) Okot no longer writes in Acoli first and Stephen Ngubish, a teacher-novelist from Kiambu, turned to English after failing to interest publishers in his Kikuyu fiction. \(^2\) Swahili, of course, possesses long term prospects but suffers, in the short-term, from the absence of the international market which books in English can reach.

The above factors account in large measure for the pronounced disposition of most contemporary intellectuals and writers to use European languages — especially English and French, and European-derived intellectual and literary forms. The choice of the "international" public has contributed to a continuing state of external recognition and validation. It has also influenced many of the conceptions and themes contained in the literature, and given rise to the oft-expressed objection that "most writers had an eye too much on the foreign reader and tended to write sociological accounts of the particular societies they lived in." \(^3\) According to Abdallah Ngororo, the writer has been caught up in the foreign system of commercial book production with its demand for the exploration of certain themes, e.g. the dilemma that confronts the "been-to" on his return home. As a result, he suggests, much of what is being churned out is the gigantic struggle of the bourgeoisie (which is) irrelevant to the masses in so far as the African nouveau riche

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is also adding to the misery because the national bourgeoisie class is on an economic grafting rampage.\(^1\) It has been the publication of such works which led the American writer John Updike to proclaim that they "showed a deficiency not only of continental self-consciousness but of national identification". He elaborated upon this thesis.

One listens in vain in these African works for an echo of Emerson's and Whitman's confident sense of national audience. For whom are these works written in the language of the departed occupiers? Not for the "niggertrash" still sunk in the tribal dream and the struggle for sustenance. Or for the African whites, even more anachronistically clinging to their plantations and prerogatives and 19th century credos that justified them... At the moment, the Black African artist, from his niche in American colleges or Paris literary circles, seems a voice without an auditorium, a sensibility between worlds.\(^2\)

The absence of a "confident sense of national audience" stems, as Calder argues, from the writer and intellectual's problems of identity in relation to his public.\(^3\) For instance, if the writer sets his work against a "tribal" background, then he will find it necessary to explain many things to those who do not share that background. A consciousness of an international audience may bring further problems of style, tone, and form: Do you write English for critics in London, or for ordinary people in Nairobi?

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Further, the fact that school students represent a large part of the local reading public, must affect the attitude of both writers and publishers to questions of style and language and, in some instances, to the moral complexion of the work.¹

But the absence of a "confident sense of national audience" stems often from the fact that the African intellectual, through his educational background, indeed his whole life history, has been "internationalised"; he has been integrated into the Western or even universal intellectual culture. It is largely within this framework that he carries on intellectual discourse and work. The language of East African universities, with their still substantial expatriate academic component, is English and this, combined with the unavailability of texts in Swahili or other vernacular languages, ensures the continuation of foreign language intellectual activity, with all its implications for communication and the development of an indigenous intellectual tradition. It would be fairly safe to argue that what goes on in the universities is unlikely to reach the state bureaucracy, let alone a much larger public. Nevertheless there is some evidence, most of it quite rudimentary, that filtering processes do allow for dissemination. Recently, for example, feature articles in the Sunday News dealt with two widely discussed and provocative Economic Research Bureau papers written by Professor Clive Thomas and Dr. Adhu Aviti.² And

¹ Kasilahabi's Swahili novel, Rose Mistika (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1971), was not included as a set book in Tanzania for secondary schools principally because it portrayed a woman of doubtful virtue. Song of Songs has met similar objections from educational authorities in Kenya.

the decision of the editors of Mafi Mafi to increasingly publish the journal in Swahili represents an attempt on the part of members of the radical intelligentsia to introduce a public wider than a small university group to many key issues of ideological debate.

East African intellectuals have been acutely conscious of the problems which language factors interpose between their work and a reading public. Journalists, mainly because of their daily familiarity with the problem of getting through to a reading public, have been most conscious of the difficulty. Guido Magone pointed out that readership of the DailyNews is limited and that the people he wrote for were primarily employed in the middle-level salaried and upper echelons of the civil service, and in the university, including "responsible" students. This he found disturbing; he thought he would get through to a much bigger public if he wrote in Swahili. He said that when writing in English, "sometimes (I) feel I'm a stranger". In similar vein, Christopher Nulei considered his major problem as one of relating to a particular type of public, and making certain that he was establishing the point he wanted to. He thought that most works were written for a very small public, often consciously so. The use of vernacular languages, while facilitating communication, could only exacerbate the conflict between socialism and tribalism. It is for this reason that Ngugi wa Thiong'o, who favours the use of vernacular languages, writes in


2. Christopher Nulei, "When will Cotu begin to work for the workers?" Sunday Post, 17/9/1972, p.17. Also Interview, Nairobi,
English. Writers such as Ogot p’Eitek who advocate the use of vernacular languages, are much more concerned with questions of cultural authenticity as expressed through continuity of language, than with the apparent contradiction between vernacular language usage and nationalism and socialism.

The Swahili intellectual is in many respects in a better position than his English-using counterpart. He is using a vernacular language which has acquired the status of a major lingua franca, and which has been the vehicle of a literary culture of some antiquity. This literary culture, as the dramatist Penins Muhando has pointed out, does not however necessarily facilitate communication at the popular level. Muhando says that she has not been influenced by authors such as Shabaan Robert and Mithia Nsanzapola who use "classic" Swahili: "when you come to writing plays (you) use the natural dialogue which the people use in the society." In trying to write plays which are relevant to the masses in general, there are many expressions "which are understandable to the masses which we can use without necessarily restricting ourselves to Standard Swahili." She adds:

I can get across expressions which can be understood by the masses, the people in the street, and not by the intellectuals. So I think plays especially have a big role in preserving these expressions.¹

While East African intellectuals are generally fully conscious of the difficulties which language factors pose for their work and

relationship to a public they are also aware, although to a lesser extent, that the literary and intellectual culture introduced from Europe presents a number of barriers to the proper formulation of the kind of discourse they wish to achieve. African literature has, for instance, adopted European literary forms, and its creators have been markedly influenced by European intellectual traditions and the works of writers such as Conrad, Lawrence, Eliot, Yeats, and Hopkins. This is not to deny that Okello Oculi, Taban Lo Liyong, and Okot p'Bitek, among others, have fused European language and form with traditional poetic language, structure, imagery, innuendo and metaphor. In *Song of Lawino* Okot successfully translates Acoli idiom, rhythms, imagery and proverbs into a satisfying poetic form which, although expressed in English, produced basically new effects in that language. This successful fusion of languages and forms probably stems, as David Cook has noted, from his "possession of two or more language heritages" which have been allowed to "react upon each other so that new integral possibilities are created in each".

The Problem of Intellectual Traditions

It should not be overlooked that the language and literary form problems facing East African intellectuals are part of a more


fundamental problem confronting African societies — the general lack of a strong modern intellectual tradition of any depth. While it is manifestly clear that Africa possesses cultures of great antiquity and richness, it did not possess, with the exception of areas which came under early Islamic influence, literate intellectual traditions. As Herbert Passin has pointed out:


The absence of a literary tradition in Africa ensured that the African intellectual would be unduly preoccupied with the task of demonstrating that Africa did possess a pre-colonial history, and did have artistic, literary, religious and philosophical traditions of considerable antiquity, complexity and worth.

The relatively late colonisation of East Africa by Europe, and the relatively late development of Western-style educational institutions, has meant that compared to West Africa, East Africa does not have a modern intellectual culture of any depth. It is difficult, apart from the Swahili poets, early Islamic reformers on the Kenya coast, and a number of Buganda intellectuals, to name more than a handful of intellectuals of any stature who produced any body of written work at least before the 1960s. There is of course
in Tanzania and Kenya a rich Swahili literary and intellectual tradition, and in Uganda a Baganda tradition which is perhaps exemplified in the works of Sir Apolo Kagwa. The attitudes of contemporary intellectuals to these traditions are, however, at best ambivalent. Opposition to the Baganda tradition stems from, among other factors, continued resentment or even hostility towards Baganda administrative, economic, and intellectual dominance, especially from those groups which were subjected to a type of Baganda sub-imperialism during the early years of colonial rule. The ambivalent attitudes toward Swahili cultural traditions have diverse bases: Swahili literature was a court literature in a basically feudal society and was closely identified with Islam; most African intellectuals have not been socialised into this culture and generally find its intellectual products of limited relevance to contemporary socio-economic and political problems; and modern East African intellectuals are the products of Western style educational institutions and the types of attitudes they help to mould. This is not to deny that elements within the tradition are adaptable to modern intellectual needs. The dominant literary form in the Swahili tradition has been poetic with a limited prose tradition occupying a subsidiary position. From at least the time of the Mombasa-based poet Muyuka, there has existed within Swahili literature a revolutionary tradition which has been extended by poets such as Amri Abeid, Mathias Kyempala, Mwaruka, and Hemedi Lesse and which has emerged as a popular form in Swahili papers such as Ushuru.
While the utendi verse form has been readily adaptable to contemporary requirements, the dominant forms within the prose tradition have been highly resistant to change, and capable of dealing with only a limited range of the human experience. The *Pauluma Pahuma* or fable form has, for instance, suffered from inflexibility. Novel writing is only in its rudimentary stages, and the development of a modern literature has been until recently hindered by the absence of a written critical tradition.² Intellectual discourse has increasingly been occurring in Swahili but this, rather than involving the development of indigenous elements of the tradition, has entailed the Swahilising, sometimes through translation,³ of externally derived concepts and systems of thought.

If one is discussing literary and linguistic traditions in the contemporary East African situation, one is not necessarily referring to the continuation or maintenance of indigenous oral traditions, simply because the continuity of these traditions is at best precarious. Modern African literature derives mainly from European rather than African linguistic and literary traditions. Certainly writers have utilised vernacular languages, imagery,

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2. The publication of Farouk Tepan (ed.), *Uchambuzi wa Uamashilini ya Kiswahili* (Dar-es-Salaam: O.C.P., 1971) and Tigiti S.Y. Songo and Saifu D. Kiango, *Hisi Zetu* (Dar-es-Salaam: Institute for Swahili Research, 1973) has provided the basis for such a written critical tradition but there is no certainty about the types of critical criteria to be used.

3. For instance Gabriel Ruhumbika has translated Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* into Swahili as *Viambu Yalioleana*. 
mythology, style and structure, but these have been used in a way which is qualitatively different from traditional usage. There has been, as the Nigerian critic Ben Obuaselu has pointed out, a discontinuity of language, literary form and consciousness which has driven a wedge between earlier traditions and contemporary creations. Instead of writing, both consciously and unconsciously within indigenous traditions, the modern writer, where he chooses to, often draws on the traditional sources in an eclectic way, rather like the cultural outsider drawing upon aspects of other cultures for the nourishment and enrichment of his own work. To write within a literary and intellectual tradition is both a conscious and unconscious process; a selective process, a constant paying of reference to previous language use, concepts and subject matter, structure and form. One could view the literary tradition, for instance, as the Mexican writer Octavio Paz has, as an organic whole within which a literary work is inextricably linked to others.

In their recourse to stylistic features derived from the formal features of traditional African literature and the use of folklore, African writers have begun to separate African literature from the dominant European heritage, and thus to lay the foundations of a proto-tradition. It could also be argued, as Ngugi and Teban Lo Liyong have, that modern African writing is distinguished from the European heritage by the uniqueness of its material, this providing the basis of a new tradition. At the level of these, and to some

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3. See Ngugi, Homecoming, Appendix.
extent motif, there is certainly unity. But the basic situations African literature deals with are universal ones, being found for example in Latin American and Indian literature as well. Thus, while the subject matter of contemporary East African, and African literature in general, may be differentiated from the European heritage, it is no different from that of other Third World literatures. The problem of tradition, very clearly, is of greatest concern to the cultural nationalist intellectuals who are pre-occupied with cultural identity and the choice between foreign and indigenous ideologies and traditions. Marxist intellectuals have been able to surmount the problem by endeavouring to take a thought system which has assumed universal dimensions, and to extend and reinvigorate it through application in the African setting.

The problems of intellectual role definition in East Africa have thus involved a multiplicity of factors, including the lack of attention to post-independence role in the nationalist struggle, government stress on utilitarianism and the avoidance of conflict, and the absence of a critical tradition. In addition there has been the intellectual's position of marginality which has been reinforced by the absence of popular organs through which he can disseminate his ideas, and by the lack of local recognition brought about by language and cultural barriers, and by the fact that he has, unlike the politician for example, no formal basis in society. These problems have been clearly reflected in the intellectual discussion of socio-political role.
CHAPTER VII

INTELLECTUALS AND THE SEARCH FOR PRAXIS

Introduction

Apart from the writing and presentation of academic papers at
Conferences such as the annual East African Social Science Research
Conference and Writers' Workshops, and the writing and publication
of academic books, journal articles, novels, plays, poems, and
short stories, the search for a viable intellectual socio-political
role has been manifested in a host of other activities: in
journalism, in radio and television work, in lecturing, and public
debate. Okot p'Bitek and Taban Lo Liyong have been active figures
at the Goethe Institute in Nairobi, and frequent contributors to the
Sunday Nation and Daily Nation where they have for several years
carried on a debate which has done much to determine the key
intellectual issues in Kenya. Okot also organized the Kisumu
Cultural Festival. Cyrus Mutiso, apart from being a frequent
presenter of papers at academic conferences, appears as an
interviewer–panelist on VOK's current affairs television programme,
"Mabzo Leo" ("Today's Affairs"), as does the historian A. Salim.
The ubiquitous Ali Mazrui lectured throughout East Africa, often at
secondary schools, wrote articles for newspapers such as The People
and the Sunday Nation, appeared on Uganda television, engaged in
public debate with President Obote, edited or was a member of the
editorial boards of a number of journals including Nawazo, Transition,
and *The African Review*, and presented innumerable papers at academic conferences. Okello Oculi contributed a regular column to the now defunct *The People*. William Ochieng contributes to *Africa*, and *Sunday Post*, has presented VOK radio programmes on Kenyan history, and is editor of the *Kenya Historical Association Journal*. Chris Wanjala presents "Mazungumso" on VOK television, frequently contributes to "Books and Bookmen" on VOK radio, writes reviews for the *Sunday Post*, and presents lectures at the Goethe Institute and elsewhere. The list could be extended much further. What it reveals is that there is, besides a marked diffusion of intellectual function and the absence of a fully "professionalized" communications industry, a search for a viable role outside that of mere professional role.

Conspicuous indications of the search for a role are to be found in the almost incessant discussion of role in journals, newspaper articles, novels, and even poems. Indeed, so much of contemporary African fiction, like that of 19th century Russian literature (Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Dostoevski especially) is pre-occupied with the intellectual and his personal crises, that (unlike 19th century Russian literature) the delineation of major social forces, including the peasantry, is neglected. The dominant assumption underlying the discussion has been that there must be, loosely paraphrasing Wole Soyinka's formulation, a vital relevance between intellectual work and activities and the patterns of reality within which the intellectual finds himself enmeshed. Coupled with this

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has been the explicit, and almost general, rejection of what has been termed Western, European, or "bourgeois" notions of intellectual detachment and uninvolveinent.¹

Intellectual agreement about the need for "commitment" and "social responsibility" does not however extend to the ramifications of such concern. The lack of agreement about these reflects the uncertainties and problems which relate to the duality of thought and action – the problem of praxis, and to the relationship between the intellectual, his work and life activities, government and the "masses". Of course, the solutions to these problems often remain suspended in the realm of rhetoric and for a number of reasons, including the previously discussed absence of viable structures of dissent, and fear of government repression, do little to determine the intellectual's actual political behaviour.

Intellectual responses to problems of role definition may conveniently be divided into two analytically distinct, if at times overlapping categories: first, the mass basis-collectivist and second, the individualistic response. Within the mass basis-collectivist response two dominant strands emerge; what have already been termed the cultural commitment and the political commitment responses.

¹. African intellectuals tend to be ignorant of, or to overlook the fact that in European societies there are traditions, which often exist within labour movements, which stress intellectual social activism and certainly not detachment.
Cultural Commitment

The cultural commitment response, found in the work of the Ugandans Okot p'Bitek, Okello Oculi, Emiriko Seruma, and Joseph Buruga, is characterized by the belief that the people in the villages, who constitute the bulk of the population, represent not necessarily a true revolutionary force, but rather the repository of the true cultural heritage from which intellectuals and educated alike have become alienated. Oculi discusses intellectual and artistic role primarily in terms of what he calls "social imagination", and is concerned to break down the distinction between the artist-painter, poet, novelist, musician, etc. - as a special human being, and the ordinary human being, a concern he shares with Okot. He suggests that "the most common error is the tendency to single out the poet, the novelist, the playwright, the painter, the musician as the only artists." Every human being is a special kind of artist.

The artist is, for Oculi

he who picks out the particles, the atoms, of our environment and our existence, sees through their qualities, characteristics, and relationships and decides to bring out a new experience, a new fact, from what he has seen and picked out.

The artist is concerned with smashing silences in people. In this respect, there is a similarity between his social role and that of the politician.

2. Ibid.
The politician and the artist assume their social role by their ability to explode silences in other people; they evoke certain emotions, inspire certain patterns of thought, direct attention to certain areas of the environment of the human condition.¹

There is also an important relationship between literary talent and social imagination, by which Cculi means "the exercise of drawing possible patterns that the structure of society could take."²

In the African situation, social imagination "is marked by a return to the social philosophy of traditional African society".

Previously, the literary imagination was concerned with the structure of colonialism, but is now "fighting against the tendencies of forms of social, economic and political processes inherited and invented in the ethos of colonization."³ Social imagination is "committed to the reassertion of African values as the foundation on which socio-economic processes shall be carried out in the new Africa."⁴

It is the role of the artist and the intellectual to provide new visions, to reassert the African heritage, not in terms of a return to a glorious past, but in relation to those aspects of the past which made tradition worthy of respect - the strength that is found in human relationships based on dignity and pride and respect.⁵

1. Ibid., p.9
2. Ibid., p.10.
3. Ibid., p.11.
5. Cculi, as with other cultural nationalists, manifests a peculiar form of inverted Marxism. Instead of changes in the mode of production determining, or helping to determine the nature of the cultural and ideological superstructures of society, it is the cultural and ideological superstructure, already changed by new modes of production and the colonial cultural impact, which provides the basis for future economic and social development.
For Oculi then, the intellectual, like the politician, is an awakener of consciousness. At the root of this consciousness, which arose to reject the distortions and denigration produced by the colonial system, was the replacement of the rejected by "African proposals aimed at serving the true African needs". Out of the new consciousness emerged proposals which fall into two main groups: first, those which address themselves to the psychological aspects of the issue; and second, those which address themselves to the "substantive aspects of the issue". The "psychologists" are basically preoccupied with the mental "diseases" and "psychological poisons" which had been injected into the African through learning processes in the colonial context. The "substantives", rather than being concerned with the impact of mental structures on the colonised, have focussed much more on the "colonial structures within which learning had taken place". Their role should be seen in relation to "Africanizing" which has meant, at least in the university context, to "apply scholarship to African history or the history of the African peoples with a proud disposition and with the objectivity that only a native can muster a fuller and richer understanding of."  

2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ibid., p.32.  
5. Ibid.
At the forefront of this Africanizing process have been the "purists" - historians, students of Swahili and African musicologists in particular - whose work has been specifically focused on a "micro-African field of interest". Social scientists, Oculi suggests, are to be found at the foot of the "purist continuum". Oculi is essentially arguing for an intensification of the "purist" approach, but is also aware of its pitfalls. It is necessary to "keep up with the tempo of the momentum of development". However, the concentration on the recapturing of the African heritage could divert attention from another major concern. He says that "we have been denied a clear and objective view of the development of human society and history of ideas and events for a long time; now that we are free to search and see for ourselves, let us delve." 2

Many East African intellectuals have moved from the cultural commitment to the political commitment position. Philip Ochieng and Aloo Ojuka are two such cases. Ojuka, in his earlier writing, suggested that the notion of "objective withdrawal" which supposedly characterizes the bourgeois epoch in the West is "running out of vogue", and is of little relevance in the African context. The African intellectual, as a concerned leader, should avoid abstract speculation and articulateness. He should act and react and make as his major concern the study of black aesthetics - "all that is

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.34.
beautiful in black life - intellectual, social, material culture". This study should take place within a historical spectrum to discover what was the nature and form of the beautiful in traditional societies and how this has been transformed and distorted by the "colonial experience and the slavery epoch, and how it fares in the post-colonial situation". The concern with black aesthetics, however, should not remain suspended at the level of intellectualisation; the intellectualism must be reintegrated with practice through popularisation.

This discussion of intellectual role is obviously informed by a cultural nationalist-black aesthetics rationale. In later writing Ojuka moved away from this position to one concerned much more with the critical-analytical role of the intellectual. For instance, in a reply to Atieno-Odhiambo's criticism of the "self-styled left-wing intellectualism" of Kamundia-Mulei-Ojuka, he elaborated upon the perception of his role.

For my part, all I can say is that I have tried diligently to use that Sunday Nation column to analyse and then inform my readers on the most pressing problems of our societies. A programmatic critical analysis of the prevailing conditions is a critique of those conditions, and is an integral part of any meaningful process that seeks to change the conditions.  

The same sort of shift is discernible in Philip Ochieng's position although, in his case as in that of many other African Marxists, cultural nationalist strands are never completely transcended. At a time when he was starting to move beyond his cultural nationalism, Ochieng suggested that the intellectuals have an interest in the "whole cultural fabric". The impersonality of their work "puts them in the vantage position of being able to see the whole cultural panorama of their people." As a group, intellectuals are in a position to both analyse and remove the "cultural rot" and its causes: "the attitudes inured in our minds by middle-class values such as private enterprise and the sanctity of huge personal or family property." They represent a mirror through which the development and inadequacies of culture can be seen.

However in Africa they are in a dilemma; "either their modes of expression are anathema to the very masses they represent" or they are addressing a public of political leaders who never bother to read their works. In his more mature Marxist position, Ochieng had moved to a stage where he could talk about the need for a worker's party with an intellectual component; "there must be a proletarian party - with revolutionary peasants and revolutionary intellectuals."

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
According to Akena Adoko, formerly Chief General Service Officer in the Uganda Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs, Africa is in the midst of a revolution which consists of the war against feudalism, vested interests, and foreign economic exploitation. The objective of this ill-defined revolution is to accord "every citizen in any African state equal and unqualified opportunities for the enjoyment of his political, economic and social freedom." The intellectual is someone whose prime duty it is "to obtain and express the truth"; he is possessed of the capacity to use his "knowledge to see the essential identity in all things" and to resolve those things "in terms of a few principles". He plays, or rather should play, a key role in propagating the African revolution but has, Akena Adoka argues, failed effectively to do this.

The failure has at least three major roots: first, the fact that intellectuals "are not very much concerned about knowing Africa"; second, the intellectuals attempt "to make applicable to this continent theories and ideologies that cannot work here"; and, third, the failure is related to a fanaticism about foreign ideologies which is due principally to attempts at proselytisation by the great powers and the nature of the colonial educational and employment situation." Apart from being amongst the initiators of the

2. Ibid., p.20.
3. Ibid., p.22.
revolution, intellectuals have a didactic role; they are the "educators of the masses to understand the nature and purpose of the revolution". Because the masses are preoccupied with daily living, and handicapped by a lack of education, they are ruled out "completely from ever being able to master any ideology to revolutionise their social conditions". Akena Adoko thus reveals a most un-Fanonist arrogance bred by the very education systems he condemns. He states:

"The position of the intellectual in African society, his training and educational background, are such as to enable him to master philosophical and social truths about the world and to use that knowledge to guide and influence the masses."  

Akena Adoko, like so many other intellectuals, has been imbued with the idea that it is the tertiary trained African who is equipped for leadership. As Freire has pointed out in relation to Latin America, but with an aptness in the African case, they (the leaders) almost always bring with them the marks of their origins ... their prejudices and their deformations which include a lack of confidence in the people's ability to think, to want and to know ... Our converts ... truly desire to transform the unjust order; but because of their background they believe that they must be the executors of the transformation.  

Akena Adoko notes that African nationalist politicians believed in the people; he seems loath to share such a belief.

In sharp contrast to the views of Adoko are those of Nyerere. Both accept that intellectuals have a "vanguard" type of role to

1. Ibid., p.21.
2. Ibid.
3. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p.36.
perform. Nyerere suggests that intellectuals are key agents of change: they have "a special contribution to make to the development of one nation, and to Africa." Unlike Adoko, however, he regards them as being essentially servants whose masters are the uneducated masses. He points out, as Okot p'Bitek has been concerned to do, that intellectuals in Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, have acquired their training and skills "at the expense of the society". As such, they have special responsibilities invested in them, and are required to provide a "service to the community" in roughly direct proportion to the amount of investment made in them. Their task is to help transform the lives of ordinary people from "abject poverty" to "decency and simple comforts". To perform this task properly, it is necessary for intellectuals to fully identify themselves with the uneducated and to be an integral part of the society which they are changing: "we have to work from within it (society), and not try to descend like ancient gods, do something, and disappear again." To successfully do this, they must accept equality, regardless of educational differences, and transcend superiority feelings bred by a commitment to "modern technology and modern knowledge", which lead to the denial or

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.25.
5. Ibid., pp.23-24.
6. Ibid., p.25.
7. Ibid.
rejection of "traditional" values and knowledge. Intellectuals should not overlook that "we have wisdom in our past, and in those who still carry the traditional knowledge accumulated in the tribal past."¹

This last point is, of course, one which is perfunctorily taken up by cultural nationalists. Nyerere is aware, however, of the practical value of much "traditional" knowledge and cites the example of an "expert" Groundnut Scheme which failed simply because its planners, relying on average rainfall statistics, did not consult local farmers about the regularity of the rainfall on a yearly or even monthly basis.² The intellectual, apart from being able to appreciate the value of such knowledge, must also ensure that if he is not able to establish a position of leadership, he at least be able to establish viable working relationships with those who are in such positions.³

The Intra-Marxist Debate About Praxis

Much of the discussion of intellectual role in East Africa, and in Tanzania and Kenya in particular, has been taken up with what may loosely be termed an intra-Marxist debate about the nature of praxis. This debate has been intensified by the previously discussed isolation and marginality of intellectuals and their inability to establish a mass basis of support. This was something driven home

1. Ibid., p.27.
2. Ibid., p.27.
very firmly to the radicals of the TUL/USARF on the University of Dar-es-Salaam campus in the late 1960s and early '70s when their optimism about producing change in both the university and the broader society was quickly shattered. Karim Hirji noted that

For a successful achievement of the objectives of any social movement, a necessary - though not sufficient - condition is the fulfilment of the principal of reciprocal interaction between the centre and the periphery. In other words coordination and amalgamation of interests between the leadership and those it claims to lead is a fundamental prerequisite for victory. Lacking this, the movement is headed towards either ineffective petrification or collapse.¹

He pointed out that one of the reasons for the failure of the radicals on the campus was that they were "de-radicalized by isolation". While they "shouted in the name of workers and peasants", no worker or peasant could hear their voices. This point has been advanced by many others as well. Ali Ichumo, for instance, suggests that intellectuals divorced from the people are "impotent and ineffective". It is insufficient for them, he adds, to opt for the "mass line"; serious ideological commitment should be accompanied by a commitment to scientific socialist ideology. According to Ichumo, the apparent choice between commitment to socialist ideology on the one hand, and the "bogey of 'objectivity'" on the other, is an unreal one, simply because the intellectual is either for or against the people. In the final analysis, any choice is not a free one because "either an intellectual joins in the people and the revolution or he gets crushed by the people's revolutionary force, for certainly the people can and must dispense with the 'intellectual' who is not for them."²

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One strand in the debate about praxis is represented by the Kenyan novelist, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, who, in his recent work, has moved from a Panonist perspective to a Marxist position. Ngugi, along with prominent West African writers such as Achebe and Soyinka, has noted that the African writer, at least until recently, "was in danger of becoming too fascinated by the yesterday of his people and forgetting the present." This view was stated most forcefully by Panon in The Wretched of the Earth when he warned of the dangers arising from the intellectual's continuing preoccupation with the past.

The desire to attach oneself to tradition or bring abandoned traditions to life again does not only mean going against the current of history but also opposing one's people. In similar vein, Ngugi points out that the African writer, "involved as he was in correcting his disfigured past", had forgotten that fundamental changes had occurred. His society

was no longer peasant, with common ownership of means of production, with communal celebration of joy and victory, communal sharing of sorrow and bereavement; his society was no longer organized on egalitarian principles. Conflicts between the emergent elitist middle-class and the masses were developing, their seeds being in the colonial pattern of social and economic development.

1. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Homecoming (London: Heinemann, 1972) p.44.
What intellectuals must realize, as many of the younger writers have already done, is that the very basis of a "successful and objective reclamation is the dismantling of all colonial institutions, and especially capitalism, as patterns of social and economic development."¹

As a type of conscience of the nation,² the writer must get beyond mere superficialities, the ephemera of present realities. In an analysis of Soyinka's satirical works, Ngugi criticizes Soyinka's treatment of certain themes, and in doing so elaborates upon his conception of the writer's and intellectual's role. He states:

Although Soyinka exposes his society in breadth, the picture he draws lacks depth; it is static, for he fails to see the present in the historical perspective of conflict and struggle. It is not enough for the African artist, standing aloof, to view society and highlight its weaknesses. He must try to go beyond this, to seek out the sources, the causes, and the trends.³

The intellectual is much more than a mere recorder of events. He should be the awakener of revolutionary consciousness,⁴ and not exempt from struggle in the political arena.

All over the world the exploited coloured majority, from the Americas, across Africa and the Middle East, to the outer edges of Asia, is claiming its own. The artist in his writings is not exempted from the struggle. By diving into the sources,

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1. Ibid., p.45.
2. Ngugi, "My Protest was against the hypocrisy in the College", On the Carpet Interview, Sunday Nation, March 16th, 1969, p.16.
4. Ibid., p.46.
he can give moral direction and vision to a struggle which, though suffering temporary reaction, is continuous and is changing the face of the 20th century. 1

However, the exact relationship which Ngugi posits between the intellectual-writer and the "masses" remains somewhat ambiguous. Clearly the intellectual is to act as a type of vanguard, giving "moral direction" and "vision" to the masses with whom he must align. 2 Nevertheless, Ngugi states that "I don't believe in joining political parties myself" and quotes Fanon with approval about honest intellectuals instinctively distrusting the race for positions. 3 This attitude stems probably much more from the disillusioning history of African political parties than from a more fundamental fear that active involvement in political organizations compromises intellectual values.

Ngugi has been subjected to a certain amount of criticism from Christopher Mulei, another Kenyan who has moved to a "scientific" socialist position. In his review, Mulei wrote that Homecoming runs like the Sermon on the Mount. Here lies its weakness. It is defeatist, and even cunning, to take people to a high mountain, show them the riches yonder, and then start composing songs of deprivation. How to end the deprivation is the issue: there is no point, Ngugi, in continuing to "lift thine eyes unto the hills". 4

1. Ibid., p.66.
2. Ibid., p.50.
3. Ngugi, "My Protest was against the hypocrisy in the College", p.16.
The test of militancy is not whether the pen has been used "as a stethoscope in examining our society". Rather it is to be found in Mayakovsky's saying "I object to being torn up, like a flower after a long day's work. I want the pen to be on a par with the bayonet."¹

Nulei is reluctant to define the term intellectual and to designate himself as one. He argues that definitions and self-perceptions are much less important than the actions of particular people within a socio-economic and political setting.² Hence Mazrui-type definitions are of limited value. Despite his reluctance to actually posit a definition, Nulei in effect defined the intellectual social role in an indirect manner. He cited the example of expatriate intellectuals such as Reginald Green and Ann Selden in Tanzania who, although for him not radical, were able to produce a vast body of detailed information for government appraisal. In contrast, "self-styled leftists or self-styled communists" were unable to produce the material necessary for rebuttal. Nulei admits that this failure is partly due to the "Left's" limited access to resources and channels of information. But more importantly, he argues, the failure is symptomatic of a more basic flaw; it reflects a continued, unsophisticated preoccupation with general ideological issues.³ Many leftist intellectuals are "arm-

1. Quoted in Ibid.
2. Interview with Christopher Nulei, Nairobi, 16/12/1972.
3. Ibid.
chair revolutionaries, novices armed to the teeth with revolutionary phraseology” who are “anaemic in regard to revolutionary theory.”¹ They are deficient in “scientific analysis” – the ability to examine in a rigorous, systematic way the nature of economic and political conditions, and develop theory and action accordingly. The problem with the “left” in Africa is, according to Mulei, not only its “pathetic weakness” and “basic rawness”, but its lack of sophistication in adapting alien ideologies, and Marxism-Leninism especially, to the African context.² Because many younger Marxist-inspired intellectuals in Tanzania help to confuse issues, they present a real danger of the defeat of a viable “Left”. Many of those who belong to this group are at present undergoing a honeymoon with Marxism-Leninism, but “their grasp of dialectical materialism is very often patchy.”³ Clearly, Mulei’s invective is directed against the young university radicals of the TYL and Maji Maji and Marxist journalists working for the Daily News.⁴

In the case of Kenya, Mulei asserts the need for intellectuals to operate from within political parties in order to produce change in a society where there at present no real politically viable alternatives. The problem, as he recognizes, is that KANU is

2. Interview with Mulei.
4. As shall subsequently be seen, Mulei’s invective is mis-directed. Young Tanzanian intellectuals such as Issa Shivji, Karim Hirji, Henry Napolu, and Othman have done much to develop the intellectual and ideological climate conducive to socialist transformation.
basically a moribund, atrophied political organisation which consists of little more than a number of offices and office-holders. Its very nature effectively precludes the radical intellectual from operating within it. Ultimately then, Mulei is left in a quandary: the intellectual is defined by praxis and is to provide revolutionary prescriptions and not simply analysis; and yet the lack of effective channels of dissemination and the danger of antagonising possibly sympathetic groups with premature and "raw" radicalism present an apparently insuperable barrier to the realization of praxis.

Another Kenyan, Walter Oyugi, a Marxist who lectures at Kenyatta University College, distinguishes between two fundamental types of literary and intellectual activities: those which help "stabilise the status quo" and those which, "guided by Marxist ideas of society", contribute to the destruction of the existing "bourgeois-capitalist social order". In East Africa, literary activity of the latter type is only in its infancy, and has acquired a "revolutionary function in Ngugi's Homecoming", although that work is, according to Oyugi, "bereft of revolutionary prescription". Literary activity should be intimately linked with revolutionary praxis. It is not enough for the writer to talk to and on behalf of the working classes; he must "join that very class in its

1. Interview with Mulei.
3. Ibid.
4. Oyugi makes no attempt to define what he means by working class in the African context.
concerted and organized efforts to create the hegemony of the working masses of the people." Mental workers have "remained stranded at the threshold of praxis - restlessly chewing the scholastic cud of pure intellection."\(^1\) Somewhat paradoxically, given that he characterises Walter Rodney as a "racist social democrat who masquerades as a Marxist dialectician,"\(^2\) Cyugi warns of the dangers of intellectuals slipping into a pathological state of anarchic individualism where they try to out radicalise one another. He argues, without any sustained analysis, that critical writing in East Africa has been excessively individualistic and timid, and dominated by the free competition of ideas without social mooring and responsibility; it has been "unaccompanied by praxis".\(^3\) Taban Lo Liyong is supposedly representative of such individualism. While he may at times provide critical insight into the nature of the post-independence situation and colonial ills, he is unable to conceive that his works may be "still-born" in the sense that they do nothing to transform ideas into social activities.

The young University of Dar-es-Salaam trained sociologist and poet, Mauri Yambo, makes a similar but more refined distinction to Cyugi between different modes of perception. The dominant mode of perception "may well be the subtle tentacle of domination - and not only domination, but exploitation as well-spread all over by the ruling class."\(^4\) And yet, as Yambo points out, "every oppressive

1. Ibid., p.2.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.3.
system has within itself those very elements that shall destroy it."¹

Intellectual creations, and books in particular, either consolidate
the dominant mode of perception, are "demolished by it" in the form
of banning and repression, or help transform it through their
rejection and the consolidation of the "socialist, revolutionary
(committed) outlook."² Yameo adds

The principle of commitment requires that we make a
crucial decision — a decision that is focussed
essentially on two alternatives: the mass of the
people, on the one hand, and the exploiting,
domineering class on the other. Only those who
are fully committed are decisively on the side of
the people, for commitment in the context of
literature, is part and parcel of the revolutionary
language.³

Running through the political integrationist, radical position,
is the view that professionals, including academics and lawyers,
should be more than mental technicians or intellect workers, tilling
their own limited scope areas of interest. This view is expressed
perhaps in its strongest form by Issa Shivji, in his discussion of
lawyers and intellectuals. He argues that "meticulous legalism"
may indeed make a great contribution to the lawyer’s curriculum
vitae, but does little to contribute to the "greater understanding
of the society" and help it "move towards a rational, human social
order."⁴ It is precisely the latter which should concern the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Issa G. Shivji, "From the Analysis of Forms to the Exposition
   of Substance: The Tasks of a Lawyer Intellectual", Eastern
intellectual of the underdeveloped world. It is only in this way that the lawyer, as an intellectual, will in the long term be "socially relevant to the large masses of people." His analysis of "law forms" should help to expose the "real social and political relationships obtaining in his society," and lay bare law and legal forms as an important part of ruling ideology: the ideology of the ruling class or classes. Such intellectual analysis would obviously antagonize the "powers-that-be", but then, that is the essence of commitment.

Shivji makes the point that African intellectuals "cannot always echo the voices of others." At some stage they must make original contributions "both to the natural sciences and to the science of society", and it is Marxian, and not bourgeois social theories, which allows for such original contributions, simply because Marxian is a method which can be continually enriched by "social practice of struggle against oppression and exploitation of the African people." According to Shivji, and in contrast to the position of the cultural nationalists, the choice confronting African intellectuals is thus not between "foreign" and indigenous ideology but rather between the "practice of social struggle thereby enriching Marxian and intellectualizing about bourgeois theories in support of the exploiting ruling classes."

1. Ibid., p.7.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
In contradistinction to the cultural and political integrationist views of intellectual role and social commitment, there is what I have termed the individualist response. This bears greatest similarity to the Lipset, Coser, Shils, and Parsons notion of intellectual role. However, the involvement of representatives of this group such as Mazrui, Taban Lo Liyong, and Rajat Neogy, in frequent public controversy suggests that social engagement is not anathema to them.

**Intellectual Individualism**

As Chris Wanjala points out, there exists in East Africa a small minority of writers who "refuse to portray social realities, but choose to pursue private reality and individual fulfilment in art for its own sake."¹ He suggests that Taban Lo Liyong is the banner-bearer of this "anti-integrationist" group, which also includes Ali Mazrui and John Nagenda. Such a view is obviously simplistic; it is most appropriate in the case of Nagenda,² but clearly wrong in the case of Taban Lo Liyong and Mazrui. Taban is an opponent of "traditionalism" who dismisses negritude as "crying over spilt-milk" while acknowledging its importance as a historical phenomenon. He also ridicules Okot p'Bitek and claims that he is.

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a failed politician who is nursing his frustration by writing.\(^1\)

But Taban does not reject the notion of social responsibility, even though he does come down firmly on the side of individual vision and critical detachment.

Taban is in many ways the direct embodiment or personification of what he sees as the intellectual role. He is an iconoclastic figure; an intellectual gadfly, who aims his often misdirected word darts at current African political concepts and ideologies, and political and intellectual figures. He argues that

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\begin{align*}
\text{Inflated words} \\
\text{Without substance} \\
\text{May raise a cheer} \\
\text{In the animated rally} \\
\text{But the cold analysis} \\
\text{Of the student's mind} \\
\text{Will gape at the holes} \\
\text{Current philosophies hold.} \quad 2
\end{align*}
\]

The intellectual's commitment to the world of ideas and to humanity should be supreme - even if this involves harsh criticism of government.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yet where the martyr is} \\
\text{The intellectual must be} \\
\text{One keeps his word} \\
\text{The other the word keeps.} \quad 3
\end{align*}
\]

Taban's invective is scathing when he directs his attention to intellectuals who immerse themselves in the ranks of the intelligentsia - "the faceless regime supporting, office-working intelligentsia",\(^4\) and seek approval for their devotion and

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3. Ibid., p.11.
4. Ibid., p.32.
commitment, "whether the head stays, or strays." If the intellectual surrenders his critical detachment he becomes

The eunuch scholar
Fat with manhood beaten out;
The disguised lackey
of bourgeois power-holders.

Members of the "faceless intelligentsia" serve the ends of power holders, providing means of social control, and justificatory ideologies. They are assisted by social scientists who

In the name of objectivity
Not a word passes their lips
To do with value judgment.
That way they keep mum
And never squeak a word
About the evils perpetrated from above.

Taban argues that the writer in particular must be prepared to act out the role of critic and visionary. The writer not only has a responsibility to understand the "implications of present events", and to venture predictions about their future course, but to "establish the traditions of the future." However, Taban is apprehensive about the relationship between literature and politics: "Literature and literature blend; literature and politics produce court artists and poor literature." This fear that literature may become "an appendage to African politics", while understandable, would appear to possess a basic contradiction, especially given the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.29.
3. Ibid.
4. The Last Word, p.66.
5. Ibid., p.169.
6. Ibid.
type of intellectual social responsibility posited by Tahun.
The apparent contradiction becomes more glaring when viewed in
relation to the following passage.

Writers are supposed to be the most sensitive
(with heightened awareness) part of the
community; where was the sensitivity of (for
example) Nigerians when their country was
heading for the maelstrom? Writers are
supposed to be the seers: where was their
prophetic eye when danger was all around? ...
What were these writers doing except write
songs of goats, toads for supper, write about
blades! One of them was even a savage!

Thus Tahun's apprehension about the relationship between literature
and politics is not a denial of the role of literary political
criticism, but rather stems from a fear that literature, if
subservient to politics, will become a literature of apologetics,
robbed of its sensitivity and critical function - hence his
reference to "court artists". Tahun is not an integrationist.
He says nothing about the intellectual identifying with, or
attaching himself to, progressive currents or social movements in
his society. But like Mazrui, he does not absolve the intellectual
from social responsibility; he does not deny that the intellectual
should participate in the major debates of his time.

For Mazrui, the intellectual is someone who possesses the
"capacity to be fascinated by ideas" and who has "acquired the skill
to handle some of those ideas effectively."2 The ideas may be

1. Ibid., p.168.
2. Mazrui, "What is an intellectual?", p.11.
"social, aesthetic, philosophical, political or scientific."¹ The definition does not posit a role of social activism as an essential defining characteristic of the intellectual, but Masrui does not deny the importance of social activism in the African context. He recognizes a "primacy of politics" and the way in which this has determined the nature of a good deal of intellectual activity.

Academic, literary, and political intellectuals serve an important function in the dissemination and application of ideas to social needs: "all play a particularly critical role in spreading ideas and giving them social relevance."² The task of the political intellectual is predominantly one of providing the Sorelian-type myths or ideologies which will give direction to development efforts and serve as integrative agents. In contrast, the task of the academic intellectual is to contribute not towards a definite doctrine at this moment in time but towards general intellectual sobriety. A combination of faith and scepticism, sympathy and criticism, loyalty and nationalism, is the dialectic of the teaching process in a developing African university.³

There may well be a case for academic intellectual political commitment; commitment should not, however, be confused with political conformity. Commitment, depending upon a combination of factors such as the nature of the regime in power and the types of policies being pursued, may sometimes demand social criticism rather than compliance.⁴

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.12.
3. Ibid., p.15.
It is certainly clear that Mazrui does not reject social engagement. His whole life history is one of public discussion and debate, and the Department of which he was head, was intimately involved under Obote's government in the major issues of the day. Mazrui views himself as a "20th century African liberal" committed to the perpetuation of an "open society". He says of his role

I believe those who have the ability to handle the ideas may well also have the talent to understand some aspects of their ideas. My own duty as I see it is to try and understand African and to try to contribute to Africa's own self-comprehension. Africa will never understand herself fully unless her sons try to be sufficiently detached without losing sympathy.

Something further is to be found of his perception of role in his response to a Uganda friend who criticized him as an "enemy of freedom" in Uganda because his dissenting activities created the false impression that Uganda was a free society. In reply, Mazrui argued that the intellectual should

attempt to make use of whatever toleration is available for the ultimate goal of pleading for further toleration and right of dissent ... it was worth trying to keep the flame alive, to maintain a tradition of some public discussion of public issues, and to encourage the government in these aspects of its policies which were still liberal and humane.

1. Ibid.
3. Interview with Mulei, p.13.
Besides, the development of a vigorous critical tradition capable of sustaining an intellectual heritage of some substance requires criticism and the maintenance of a national "seminar" situation.

As an intellectual who has been given considerable international recognition, Nkrumah has been sensitive to the apparently contradictory demands of universalism and localism. At great length, and perhaps irrelevantly as Peter Nazareth argues, Nkrumah in his novel The Trial of Christopher Okigbo, examines the whole question of intellectual creative and social responsibility within this situation.

Briefly, The Trial of Christopher Okigbo is set in "After Africa", a vast Pan-African panoply, where all generations and cultures intermingle and unite across the centuries. Okigbo, the Nigerian poet who was killed in the crash of a plane smuggling arms to Biafra is on trial. The case against him is that he has forsaken the duty of the poet and intellectual towards a larger view of Africa, in the service of a cause which is local and perhaps largely "tribal" in nature. Okigbo's professed universalism and individualism, best manifest in his refusal to accept such labels as "Negro Art", is seen as betrayed by his partisan zeal and the cause of Biafra.

1. Peter Nazareth, "The Trial of a Juggler", in Wanjala, Standpoints, pp.147-60.
3. The anonymous reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement, March 3rd, 1972, p.248 pointed out that Nkrumah begged the essential question by in effect equating the claims of the "Biafran" collectivity with the African collectivity.
4. Okigbo rejected the first poetry prize in the 1966 Festival of Negro Art held in Dakar, declaring "there is no such thing as Negro Art."
Okigbo is defended by a Swahili critic from Mombasa (perhaps Mazrui himself) on the grounds that both individualism and universalism must give place to the claim of the African collectivity.\(^1\) Apolo-Gyeaafi, a Ghanaian lawyer who is also on trial for committing suicide whilst at Oxford, presents the prosecution case. He opens by arguing that the great artist is "first of all an individualist, secondly a universalist, and only thirdly, a social collectivist."\(^2\) The life of the gifted artist is much more valuable than that of the ordinary man. While it may be true that the common man's duty is a duty to his own society "it is simply untrue to regard the death of Christopher Okigbo as being no more significant than that of an upright but simple fellow tribesman. All life is sacred, but some lives are more sacred than others."\(^3\)

In reply, Mazisi rejects Apolo-Gyeaafi's tripartite distinction as "excessively European" and points out that African creativity derived from a "collective experience."\(^4\) The description of the artist or intellectual as ultimately loyal to himself and to his individualism must be "dismissed as an alien idiosyncracy imported from the principles of European aesthetic and wrongly invoked to pass judgment on a great African artist."\(^5\) In Africa it is society

2. Ibid., p.67.
3. Ibid., p.68.
4. Ibid., p.77.
5. Ibid.
which gives meaning to art. Therefore, "How could Christopher Okigbo be deemed guilty for giving his life in the cause of his immediate society?"\(^1\) Apolo-Gyamfi is drawing an antithesis between art and life which has no grounding in the African situation.\(^2\) A great writer has a duty which goes beyond his own society,\(^3\) but this duty does not transcend that society. "National agonies" demand the full engagement of the intellectual,\(^4\) and such commitment should not be confused with social conformity.\(^5\) Universalism only assumes true meaning when grounded in the particularities of concrete socio-political reality: "To fight for universals is to concretise literature — and the fight in Biafra was indeed such a fight."\(^6\)

That the Elders return a Scottish law verdict of "Not Proven" against Okigbo indicates a certain ambiguity in Mazrui's position; he is sympathetic to Okigbo's plight and yet is not fully prepared to abandon the position that ultimately the intellectual's commitment should be to the universal.

Similar views to Mazrui's have been advanced by his former colleague Yash Tandon. Tandon says that an intellectual is "simply a person who uses his critical, creative or contemplative powers to

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1. Ibid., p.30.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.33.
5. Ibid., p.39.
6. Ibid., p.90.
understand, criticize, examine, ponder or theorize about the social, economic and political well-being of his community, national and international. ¹ The intellectual is the conscience of society, and the guardian of the "ideal" who raises his voice of dissent when political practice falls from the ideal. In the African case he has been accused, by government, colleagues, and "society at large" of committing "seven sins": political perfectionism; objectivism; liberalism; leftist, especially as an uncritical reaction against Western capitalism; oppositionism; softism; and, ivory-towerism. Moreover, because of socialization into Western traditions of the university, the academic intellectual's loyalty "is often bifurcated between his community and the international community overseas."² The academic intellectual risks his proper role, Tendon argues, if he serves his government only as a technician, as most American academic intellectuals do, "helping to make an existing policy work rather than considering whether the policy itself is right."³ He


2. Ibid., p.300.

3. Ibid., p.303. There appears to be little evidence that many East African intellectuals are aware that intellectuals in the United States and Europe have been concerned with similar "role" definition questions. In America, the Vietnam War, the existence of various government "think tanks", and the drafting of academics into administration, has provoked intellectuals such as Chomsky, Roszak, and Horowitz to re-examine the role of the intellectual in American society.
notes that Shils described a type of intellectual that supposedly existed in the developing nations. These are "civic spirited, realistic, and responsible intellectuals, devoted to the public good, critical and yet sympathetic, interested in the political growth of their society, and yet detached enough from immediate partisanship."¹ This, according to Tandon, sums up very well the ideal to aspire towards.

The Literary Critique of Intellectuals

It should be apparent at this stage that coupled with the discussion of intellectual role has been a body of critical and satirical material reflecting, not only an intellectual self-hatred, but a sensitive and acute observation of how many intellectuals actually behave. Atieno-Odhiambo portrays his Kenyan colleagues as a group caught-up in a colonial sexual hangover, still preoccupied with revenge through the "phallus".² He says that "the Writer on his part has fangled out a non-historical yet functional philosophy. The argument is that in sleeping with a white girl he is paying the national debt."³ Supposedly committed to the discussion and reassertion of African culture and values, the Writer is still haunted by the "white image as his reference group".⁴ This

¹ Quoted in Ibid., p. 305.
³ Ibid., p.21.
⁴ Ibid. This point is also made in Jared Angira, "Letter to Philip Ochiong", Busara, Vol.3, No.2 (1971), p.16.
is also the point of Francis Kamau’s "The Norfault Hotel" where radicals and intellectuals discuss with their "red-faced" white counterparts "the eminent decadence of the UN after the entry of China into the Organisation (and) the best seems to solve the Vietnam War."¹ With them they have their ego-boosting "groupies", miniskirted, bewigged girls with "smooth and succulent thighs" clad in fish-net stockings. The Black African intellectuals speak with refined English accents as befitting graduates of Oxbridge and Harvard and their interminable discussion with their white friends, their smoking, their downing of Tusker and Pilaner, renders them immune from the harsh external reality; the "hungry stares from pedestrians passing by."² Over the road from the hotel, the "popular National Theatre" features such nationalistic productions as "Kismet" and "Call Me Madaa". At the Cultural Centre nearby "the faltering notes from a beginner at a piano float through the windows."³ Outside a Mercedes Benz stands, ready to spew forth "another two couples of our Black African intellectuals", wearing their sandales and Kitenge shirts.

In Peter Hesareth’s in a brown mantle intellectuals are portrayed as talking incessantly "about rejecting the corrupting effect of modern life, rejecting Western civilisation, returning to their old cultural values, ad nauseum. ‘African Socialism’ and ‘Culture’ were the twin barrels of the shotgun these intellectuals

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2. Ibid., p.31.
3. Ibid., p.82.
were hunting with." As part of their radicalism they identify with the Black Power movement in the United States. However, if they chose to identify with the masses in their own country they certainly "did not choose to go and live in mud huts or in the villages". While they espouse the cause of African socialism and culture, they don't hesitate to enjoy "luxurious houses, cars, and other toys of the West". Their radicalism being fundamentally hollow, lasts only "until they could get in on the act". There is the suggestion in Mutiso's "A Spastic Montage of the Intellectual Broker" that the intellectual is a parasite, performing a "dung-beetle" role. Created in the colonial mould, the intellectual is a broker and guide for the departed colonialists. Educated in the metropole, he returned to the homeland and briefly immersed himself in the mother culture: "there were opportunities in pretending caserious aspects of his behaviour to sit on the earth - this earth brothers! - and listen to the old men. It was in the name of scholarship of sociology and history of our people. This was to lead to international recognition of our people and methods, he is reputed to have said, but we knew that it was strictly for the weaver birds (the colonialists)." With juridical independence,
he watched the fields for the weaver birds. The rules of guidance demanded that the guides be few; the excluded languish, criticize the weaver bird guides, and re-examine and reject the inheritance of brokerage. But they remain their hostages.

Serumaga points to the irrelevance and impotence of the intellectual in *Return to the Shadows*.\(^1\) Awiti suggests that he is nothing more than an "intellectual goat".

Of all the fools that live
and toss heads
in innocent air

Of all the heads not blessed
with spiritual intellectual water
Of all the empty baskets of being

the most outrageous
is the intellectual goat.
The billy goat that stinks
and pees
smells the nose about
smells all including female filth
sticks into the mud
gets dirty
and gets nowhere.\(^2\)

Leonard Kibera raises doubts about the ability of the intellectual to play an effective social activist role. His novel, *Voices in the Dark*, is basically concerned with Gerald Timunu, Mama Njeri's foreign-educated, writer son. Gerald is an intellectual of sorts.


since he writes plays about the exploitation of the masses by capitalist society. His identification with the masses is artificial because he is not one of them in either contact or in life style. He exists in a nihilistic world. His on-off relationship with his girl-friend, Wilma, the daughter of an ex-loyalist, now rising capitalist, is stormy. It is Wilma, however, who reveals that Gerald’s plays are nothing but attempts to create a living for himself by playing artistic psycho-therapy for guilty African politicians and their expatriate experts. Wilma tells Gerald:

You don’t even seem to live with people ... And even your plays – they help the establishment. As long as writers just write they will do nothing only praise one another at literary conferences and mutual admiration groups. A good line done for the day and you are off to celebrate. Like the rest of them.

Gerald denies the heritage of Mau Mau – the heritage of social activism against social and political ills.

The crippled beggars, the ex-freedom fighters in Mau Mau, and the dispossessed of independence, know that the intellectual is an irrelevant factor in terms of changing their lives. An unemployed youth who finds a copy of part of Gerald’s play, “The Beggars’ Squad”, thinks that:

One day when he has a big job he would like to see a few of these great plays ... When that dream comes true and he can afford his own five shillings like the reverend he must remember to


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ask the bus conductor the way to the theatre and, of utmost importance, the driver must let him off at the nearest bus stop for he hates wasting time. But toilet paper doesn't come easy these days and he must not throw the play to the winds again.¹

Thus, the intellectual's posited role of activism is denied, on the one hand, by his irrelevance, and on the other, by the rejection of the group he seeks to serve.

¹ Ibid., p.112.
CHAPTER EIGHT

NATIONAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM

It is truism to suggest that the whole movement of cultural revival, cultural nationalism, and the written literary awakenings throughout Africa can only be understood in relation to the political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions of the colonial situation. The nature and growth of contemporary African intellectual life has been profoundly conditioned by the colonial experience and its aftermath. As we have already seen, many of the intellectual and cultural crises which relate to language use, literary forms, intellectual traditions, intellectual validation and recognition, socio-political role, and the intellectual's social situation and relationships with urban and rural labouring groups, have been determined by the dualities and conflicts introduced and engendered by the imposition and consolidation of colonial rule. Even more important, however, the substantive content of thought has been taken up with the refutation of colonial claims and ideologies, and the reassessment and reconstruction of both the indigenous and colonially imposed cultural heritages.

Indispensable to the imposition and maintenance of colonial rule were "depository myths" or justificatory ideologies, the internalization of which by at least some of the colonized was necessary for effective control. The dominant features of the colonial situation—the expansion of the capitalist economy into pre-capitalist economies and the consequent development of the externally oriented raw material, cash crop economy, cultural, political and social dependency,
virtually non-existent social benefits, and racial segregation — were predicated on a series of rationalizations which at least partly derived from a European ideology of Eurocentric evolution. Central to these rationalizations were the superiority of the white race (and hence the inferiority of the black), the inability of constantly warring African "tribes" to govern themselves, the despotism of traditional chiefs, and the inability of African peoples to develop natural resources. The dominant view, restated by two modern apologists for colonialism, was that Africans could be saved from wasting struggles and from their general economic and technological backwardness only by the imposition of stable government. No indigenous power possessed either the technological or the administrative resources required for such a task, and the solution at long last came from the West.

In other words, the colonial powers were engaged in a philanthropic mission which was an integral part of their manifest destiny to expand into new regions and spread their civilisation.

The myth that the European colonialist, whether administrator, missionary, or settler, was the bearer and bastion of civilization in a hostile, barbaric environment, was especially strong in a settler society such as Kenya where a plantation system had been developed. In Ngugi's story, "The Martyr" this view is expressed by Mrs. Smiles, the wife of a settler who was "convinced that she and her kind formed an oasis of civilization in a wild country of Savage People." 

Lord Delamere justified the settler position in Kenya in terms of a


triple set of claims. One was that the "extension of European
civilization in Africa was in itself a desirable thing." 1  A second
was that the British race, "with a history of culture and civilization
behind it, was superior to heterogenous African races only now emerging
from centuries of relative barbarism." 2  A third justification was
that the "opening up of new areas by means of genuine colonization was
to the advantage of the world." 3  Even such perceptive critics as
Julian Huxley were capable of sympathizing with the "ideal of a white
island along the backbone of Africa."

After all, there is such a thing as a scale of values,
and the realization of values is the only ultimate
aim which we can perceive for man on earth. Is it
not inescapably good to realize these values of ordered
activity, cultivated mind, civilized enjoyment, such
as I see here springing up on the soil of Africa
within the tropical belt, where before was only black
barbarism. 4

However, Huxley was capable of unmasking the essential philistinism
of the "civilizers" embroiled in their routine of "money, golf, bridge
and gossip."

Of a large and important section of white people in
Africa, officials as well as settlers, it is not
unfair to say that the Tatler, Punch, a few magazines,
detective stories and second-rate romantic novels,
represent their intellectual and cultural level. 5

It is little wonder that many educated Kenyans, using such people as a
key reference group, have little interest in intellectual questions.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
If the colonizers disparaged the cultures of those they colonized, they were also concerned to understand them. As Freire points out, in a different context "in their passion to dominate, to mould others to their pattern and their way of life, the invaders desire to know how those they have invaded apprehend reality - but only so that they can dominate the latter more effectively."¹ This has been recognized by Okot p’Bitek, for instance, who has argued that functional anthropology provided the "doctrine by which we were enslaved."² Ali Mazrui had, in the face of Okot’s attack on social anthropology in his *African Religions in Western Scholarship*,³ argued that

imperialism in the first half of the 20th century partly through the insights provided by the anthropologists, did set out ostensibly to build the new on the foundations of the old – on the traditions of society as they were found to be. So in British Africa the doctrine of indirect rule began to influence the destinies of different institutions. Africans were to be allowed concessions to their traditions and to be ruled through their own traditional structures of authority.⁴

British indirect rule appeared as a "touching concession by a major colonial power – a concession that there was indeed something in traditional Africa worth respecting."⁵ Much of this "cultural toleration implicit in indirect rule," Mazrui argued, "owed something to the sympathetic recommendations of anthropologists."⁶

In reply, Okot retorted that British administrators were concerned to run their colonies with the least cost of policing and administration. They therefore welcomed native social institutions which were "orderly and self-maintaining." Their "touching" respect for a Kabaka or a Lukiiko was nothing more than a deceit aimed at preserving and extending colonial interests. In a similar way, missionaries studied African riddles, proverbs, folk tales, myths and songs, in a search for the local name of the Supreme God and as a way of breaking down the image of Christianity as an alien white man's religion. Calls by critics of colonialism, often did not amount to a condemnation of colonialism as such, but rather as a call for more sophisticated techniques of controlling change. Julian Huxley, for instance in his Africa View, suggested that administrators and missionaries should undertake specialized training, including courses in history and geography, psychology, science, and in social anthropology in particular "so that they may understand the meaning and value of the institutions and beliefs they are setting out to alter." The concern of metropolitan powers with understanding the nature of colonial societies for manipulative and control purposes did not end with juridical independence, but continued in subtler forms. The United States clumsily bungled "Project Camelot" for Latin America represented the extreme end of this. More typical is the use of foundation and government sponsored research, the provision of

3. Huxley, Africa View, p.344.
personnel including government economic and planning advisers, and the training of indigenous researchers imbued with the academic and methodological values of the metropolitan societies in order to discern the dependant society's future, and "thereby attempt to guide the evolution of that future along lines that will favour their own interests." 1

It was important for the colonial power that the people of the dependant-colonized society should ultimately view themselves with the outlook of the metropole rather than with their own — through the myths, theories, aesthetics, economic philosophy, and history of the dominant power and culture, as disseminated through churches, schools, universities, books, mass media, and the administration. The more the colonial imposition was accentuated and those colonized alienated from the spirit of their own culture, the more they wanted to be like the colonizer. The colonized society introjected the values and lifestyle of the colonizers resulting in "the duality of the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of its long experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society." 2

The colonial society was set up as the model for emulation, but placed obstacles in the path of the neophyte. 3 Assimilation was held out as a basis of equality; it was a means of overcoming feelings of guilt and inferiority produced by the systematic denigration of traditional cultural patterns. 4 However, as the colonial world was

compartmentalized on the basis of race, among other factors, the
evolve, after "proclaiming his total and unconditional adoption of the
new cultural models found himself stumbling against the rationalizations,
the ideologies bolstering the dominant position of the colonizer."¹
Intellectually assimilated, he was denied social assimilation.
Unacceptable to the society he modelled himself on, the inferiorised
individual often fell back upon his despised culture.² According to
Fanon, "the intellectual throws himself in a frenzied fashion into the
frantic acquisition of the culture of the occupying power and takes
every opportunity of unfavourably criticizing his own national culture,
or else takes refuge in setting out and substantiating the claims of
that culture in a way that is passionate but rapidly becomes
unproductive."³

Colonial rule had the effect of inducing a loss of cultural
confidence. It led to the withering of the creative impulse; the
destruction of many of the social and religious practices and beliefs,
and systems of patronage which gave support to, and provided meaning
for creative activity, undermined many of the conditions necessary
for particular types of creation. Cultural conquest led, as Freire
notes, to the "cultural inauthenticity of those who were invaded; they
began to respond to the values, the standards, and the gods of the
invaders."⁴ It can be strongly argued that the creative impulse was
only renewed in opposition to colonial rule. The response of the
colonized to the political, social, economic, and cultural violence of

2. Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, p.41.
3. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.190.
the colonizer was grounded in the desire to be human, and to recover cultural initiative and regain control over their own lives. For instance, separatist churches and schools, and messianic or nativistic movements, constituted on the one hand a rejection of the order imposed by the European colonizer - a gesture of refusal allowing for a sphere of independence within the confines of the colonial system and on the other, a desire for cultural differentiation. There is obviously a link between political nationalism and cultural protest. As Wauthier has noted,

Throughout history, the demand for national independence has gone hand in hand with cultural revival... the African cultural renaissance is clearly an aspect of the political revolution. 1

Ultimately the link between cultural renaissance and protest is not far from a literary consciousness and protest. Resistance to cultural domination, and the assertion of cultural consciousness and distinctiveness, finds expression in the protest of the literary mind. In the African context, one cannot help but be struck by the literary bent of nationalists, including Kenyatta and Nyerere, and by the literary and cultural content of the manifestations of nationalism.

Metropolitan-satellite economic relations, besides being crucial for an understanding of the political economy of contemporary African societies, are fundamental in the cultural realm as well. Although we cannot underestimate their importance, the cultural inauthenticity and dependence of African societies was not simply the product of

1. Wauthier, p.17.
Christian evangelical proselytization, mission-dominated education, and imported ideas and values. It had its economic roots as well. New and metropole-derived values became structurally embedded in groups created by the uneven penetration of capitalist modes of production and the consequent changes in social structure. Cultural patterns were transformed by new technology and production methods. Formal education, both government and mission, was part of the larger environment of metropolitan and colonial society relations, and both reflected and inculcated its values, including those of "possessive individualism" characteristic of advanced capitalist societies, while at the same time imparting new skills. While the nature of the economic and political relations between African states and the advanced industrial nations is vital for an understanding of underdevelopment, "much more pervasive, and at least as important for development, though less evident," Dudley Seers argues, "is the intellectual element in this relationship, an influence almost exclusively in one direction - at least if one ignores artistic fashions." Through various channels, and especially through the universities, both local and foreign, have flowed the "central economic, social, and political philosophies derived from the experience of the industrial countries" that help shape the consciousness of African politicians, administrators, and intellectuals. It is the metropolitan intellectual's response to socio-economic and political questions. Even ideologies and belief systems formulated

by African political leaders and intellectuals are not generally derived from a study of the history and structure of their own societies, but rather have involved the bringing to bear of European socio-political theory and ideas on the African context. This is not to suggest, however, that European socio-political theory is ipso facto irrelevant and alienative in Africa, although the more extreme cultural nationalists would argue otherwise. African Marxists, for instance, are basically concerned to overthrow only those European ideas, theories and philosophies which represent an impediment to the understanding of African socio-economic and political reality and the development of revolutionary consciousness.

It cannot be forgotten that cultural domination during the colonial period, and the post-independence situation as well, is part of a system of total relations. Both the metropolitan and dependent African societies are "part of a greater whole, the economic, historical, cultural, and political context in which their mutual relationships evolve."¹ In this situation, it is not the metropole which constructs a culture and imposes it on the dependent society, even though its actions possess a directive character, and those of the dependent society, whether in response or initiative, have a dependent character. In other words, "it is not the dominator who constructs and imposes it on the dominated. This culture is the result of the structural relations between the dominated and the dominators."²

Given the nature of the colonial situation, and persisting relations of cultural dependence which are tied to the structure of

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1. Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p.58.
2. Jose Luis Fiori, quoted in Ibid., pp.57-58.
the economy, technology transference, and consumption patterns among other factors, it is readily understandable why cultural nationalist strains should permeate most contemporary African thought, including that of the neo-Marxists. It is this which accounts for a certain ambivalence in the intellectual's position. While he is concerned to attack European and North American systems of thought, he has himself in an important sense been integrated into the intellectual culture to which they belong. It is largely within this culture that he carries on intellectual discourse and work, even if his major intention is to dissociate himself from it. The ambivalence is often most acute in the case of the African Marxists, and their attitudes to the European "left" and its Eurocentric thought which, although qualitatively different, represents part of those cultures that engulfed them, and altered the fundamental assumptions, values, and perspectives of so many of their members.

At the risk of gross oversimplification, the progression of modern African thought may be viewed as one of cultural reassertion tied to political nationalism and constitutional advance in the colonial context - the works of Kenyatta, Koinange, Mockerie, and Nyabongo, through the syncretic cultural nationalism of the immediate pre- and post-independence periods which found expression in theories of African socialism, the literary awakening, and the recreation and reinterpretation of African history, to the more systematic analysis of the structure of colonial and post-independence societies. The cultural nationalists have concentrated on regaining African cultural authenticity and initiative through the recovery of African history and the selective reassertion of African values, and through
endeavouring to break the ties of cultural dependence. Their focus has been on the more obvious superstructural manifestations of cultural dependence—Christianity, schools and universities modelled on those of Europe, western systems of thought, European cultural and literary forms, women's fashion and so on. They have, as their Marxist critics have repeatedly pointed out, failed to appreciate the fundamental nature of economic relationships and the ways in which they help determine the nature of cultural phenomena. They have invariably failed to appreciate the way in which dependent capitalist structures, linked with dominant and directive ones, have fundamental cultural ramifications, and have facilitated the transference of ideas, "development" solutions, and technology geared more to the economic and political requirements of the metropole than those of the dependent society and economy.

In many ways the neglect of economic questions by cultural nationalists is understandable. Christianity and mission schools are much more conspicuous forces in divorcing or alienating the African from his cultural heritage, and introducing new thought-systems and values, than are systems of economic production. The intellectual, who is after all, the often alienated product of a mission-dominated and Eurocentric education system, is much more likely to be conscious of those cultural forces which shaped his consciousness than of the nature of economic relationships which unevenly changed cultural patterns throughout his society.
African History: Methodology, Content, and Ideology.

Contemporary African historiography is in many ways a reaction against the "colonial-minded" historiography of the pre-independence period which, often predicated on the assumption that Africans did not have a history before the arrival of the Europeans, focussed on the "intervention of more advanced external cultures upon an inert tropical Africa." Indeed, at the core of the African response has been the desire to demonstrate that Africa did possess a history before the arrival of the Europeans. B.A. Ogot, in the introduction to his History of the Southern Luo felt constrained to explain that the Luo did have a history despite being African; this view has been expressed more recently, in the introductions to Kimambo and Temu's A History of Tanzania and Godfrey Muriuki's A History of the Kikuyu 1500-1900, for instance. In conjunction with this assertion has been a stress on the brevity of the colonial period, a stress which restores African initiatives, but only at the risk of underestimating the depth and extent of the changes introduced by the imposition of colonial rule and the absorption of African societies into an overarching world economic system.

The debate about the place of history in East Africa, as elsewhere throughout Africa, has largely revolved around three concerns: the methodology of history; the content of history; and the political or

5. Ibid., p.1.
ideological functions or applications of history. All are inextricably linked.

The problem of method, especially for the historian who wants to deal with pre-colonial societies, most usually involves the status of oral sources of data. Faced with an apparent shortage of documentary material before the colonial period, the historian, as Mazrui notes, has at least three courses of action to pursue: first, he can endeavour to demonstrate that such documentary evidence does exist; second, he can assert the validity of oral traditions as historical evidence; or thirdly, he can cast doubt on the validity and certainties of documentary history.¹ The latter two, rather than the former approach, have characterized the approach of East African historians. Ogot pointed out that when he began his work on the Southern Luo, many of his "friends and mentors ridiculed the decision on the grounds that one cannot study what is non-existent."² His response was to show that neither the oral tradition nor the written word as historical evidence could be an accurate or dispassionate record of the past. For one thing the accumulation or collection and interpretation of historical evidence is intimately linked with social and political factors. Ogot cites as an example the contrasting accounts of the East African slave trade by Burton and Speke, and Livingstone, and how the latter's much more brutal picture was linked with his abolitionist zeal and evangelical mission. He states

It should be clear from the passages I have cited that written evidence per se is no more reliable than oral evidence, especially when it emanates from such biased observers...

The problem of conflicting accounts of the same historical events is thus not a special feature of oral evidence, as some historians and anthropologists have contended. It applies to all historical evidence. 1

According to Ogot, the problem facing the traditional historian is not so much one of lack of evidence, as one of complexity: "One is often confronted with a wealth of conflicting stories and traditions, sociological data, linguistic evidence, place names, and in some cases the discoveries of the archaeologists." 2 Godfrey Muriuki concurs with this view, pointing out that the distinction made between centralized and acephalous societies for the collection of oral material is a fallacious one. He asserts that far from there being a poverty of oral tradition among such uncentralized societies, "Their social and political structure only calls for a different approach in the retrieval of this tradition." He adds

Whereas traditions in the centralized societies were often controlled and rigidly regulated by a narrow circle of courtiers, those in the uncentralized societies were spread among much wider groups such as the heads of families and lineages, or experts in judicial, political and religious processes of the tribe. 3

The methodology of African history cannot be easily divorced from a second major concern, the content of history. As one of the prime concerns of the African historian is to reassert or recover African initiatives in history, it is necessary for him to undermine the older orthodoxy which assumed that the imperial power held most of the

1. Ibid., p.16.
2. Ibid., p.19.
historical initiative most of the time, and to demonstrate the
importance of peripheral African pressures even at the height of
imperial strength. This has often led, as Denoon and Kuper note, to
a diminution of scale in order to establish the primacy of local
initiatives.¹

A number of dominant themes, identified by Ranger, usefully
summarize the major concerns of the East African historian.² Firstly,
in order to confute the classic colonialist picture of pre-colonial
Africa as static and riven with pointless and bloody feuds (vide Trevor-
Roper: "We cannot afford to 'amuse ourselves with the unrewarding
gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of
the globe'"), the African historian was to focus on the developing
scale of trade and the expansion of plural tribal states. Secondly,
in order to counteract the colonial picture of indigenous peoples
submitting without resistance to colonial rule, the African historian
has examined the role of primary resistance in forcing an expansion of
scale and scope of indigenous institutions. Related to this second
theme has been a third, the focus on messianic movements, "witchcraft",
and separatist African churches as expressions of nationalist
resistance, adjustment, and as the nurturing grounds for new Afro-
centred philosophies. The fourth theme is that of the "innovators"
or "new men", the first generation educated within the colonial frame-
work - John Iliffe's Modern Tanzanians³ and King and Salim's Kenya
Historical Biographies⁴ - who assumed positions of leadership, often

¹ Denoon & Kuper, p.330.
² See T.O. Ranger's "Introduction" to the volume he edited, Emerging
Themes of African History (Nairobi: EAPH., 1966), pp.ix-xxii, and
his inaugural lecture at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam,
"The Recovery of African Initiative in Tanzanian History", Dar-es-
Salaam, 1969.
within the colonial administration, and displaced "traditional" authorities. The focus, as in Tanzanian historiography, is usually on those who, having formed trade unions and voluntary improvement associations, invariably came into conflict with the colonial authorities. The fifth theme, which has been most pronounced in Tanzania, is the search for the 'roots of nationalism'.

A major problem facing the African historian, Atieno-Ödhiambo notes, is the importance he attaches to the colonial period. Does it emerge in retrospect as "an earth-shaking era of irreversible change, or merely as a half-century of evolution in Kenya like any other?"¹ Is the colonial period simply a period of stagnation for the African as the nationalist politicians would have, or did it set in motion major moves for change in African society? According to Atieno, the historian is able to shed light on a number of historical questions by answering the simple question about who actually held the initiative for social change in the first two decades of colonial rule, and how the pace and direction of change was governed by the structure and function of African societies. In this way the colonial period is one of change and does not represent a disjunction in historical continuity because the link between pre-colonial society and colonial society is established. Even though the European colonizer was the dominant factor in the overall situation, African societies nevertheless actively participated in change rather than being passive recipients, and helped give change its particular direction.

Atieno argues that in Kenya, the first two decades were crucial in the determination of attitudes and relations between African societies and British forces and for subsequent historical development.

During this period, it was African initiative which was the "crucial determinant factor in a positive or negative sense" in the process of social change. Relations between the Luo, Masai, Kikuyu, and Turkana, and the British, he endeavours to illustrate, were played largely within the "idiom of power and initiative as conceived by African societies," and that the white presence was not the "overawing ogre that it is sometimes conventionally assumed to have been." This, of course points to an unresolved ambivalence in much African historical writing: on the one hand, there is a tendency to refer to the strength and crushing brutality of the military conquest (aided by the indispensable maxim gun and its fundamentally disruptive impact); and on the other, to the adaptability and resilience of African institutions in the face of the colonial power, and on the need for the colonial power to strike bargains with competing groups in the African society to secure a measure of control. Atieno, as his example of the Luo illustrates, recognizes that the colonial military presence was often based more on rumour and reputation than on reality. Indeed, those who stress the military strength of the European colonialists often ignore the fact that it could not readily be deployed in the African continent, as the prolonged Hehe resistance to the Germans in Tanganyika confirms.

According to Atieno, the African historian by emphasizing African initiatives is able to move beyond questions of disruption and continuity to the more interesting process of "adaptation of the institutions to colonial usage." During the colonial period the pace of change was undoubtedly accelerated, but nowhere was the African an acquiescent

1. Ibid., p.35.
2. Ibid., p.35.
object "being worked upon, favoured and not favoured, patronized and not patronized, at the whim of the colonial power." Atieno writes that

The internal contradictions in these societies put forth situations of structure, ideology, and personnel that enabled each society to cope with the colonial situation. This is not to say that the Africans were the winners... What is most important is that African societies had evolved institutions and patterns of behavioural relations that did adaptively accommodate the colonial onslaught. In other words, the idiom of social change was part of the working vocabulary of the Africans, who had had to cope throughout their existence with geographical, environmental, biological and social change as they migrated, settled or interacted among themselves. 2

Historical Interpretation and Politics

Of course, the interpretation of pre-colonial and colonial history depends a great deal on political considerations, and the types of tendencies, strengths and weaknesses the historian will concentrate on. Atieno notes that "history is written very much in conformity with and in response to, the popular moods and idioms of a given political unit." 3 The stress on national integration will for instance lead to the examination of cultural similarities and interchange, and areas of cooperation between different "tribal" groups. This point is taken up in some detail by the Kenyan historian William Ochieng in his discussion of the role of history in nation-building.

Ochieng suggests that the historian begins his work with a number of value assumptions which are rooted in his experience, and in the general social, philosophical, religious and economic ideas of his age. Given Africa's problems, the interpretation of African

1. Ibid., p.36.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.30.
history could be a useless intellectual exercise unless used to emphasize African needs. In several articles Ochieng has stressed the utilitarian or didactic value of history, as a way of instructing youth, and of using knowledge of the past as a "specific and significant tool for shaping the future."¹ He states that the African historian must delve deep into the past and select only those facts and ideas that are in keeping with the aspirations and needs of their people.... The African historian will learn to be very selective. He will learn to concern himself with the relevant aspects of the past. There is no sense and point in resurrecting facts of the past which have already served their purpose and are no longer of interest and use to us. ²

The aspects of the past which are relevant to present and future purposes must be selected according to ideological criteria, the ideology of African revolution. In a staggering act of oversimplification, distortion, and apparent ignorance, Ochieng asserts that despite superficial differences, fundamentally African ideologies of development are similar, the differences relating to strategies rather than goals.³ The goals he declares are three — Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Socialism, but possible incompatibilities are not countenanced. The African revolution must "seek a connection with the egalitarian and humanist past of the African people, before their social evolution was ravaged by colonialism."⁴ Apart from adapting new methods of industrial production and economic organization to serve the interests of the people, a genuine African revolution will


². Ibid., p.15.

³. Ibid., p.16.

⁴. Ibid.
"seek ways and means of crushing important tendencies like the growth of class inequalities and antagonisms created by the capitalist habits of colonialism."¹

In the implementation of this "revolutionary" ideology, the historian has the role of selecting and portraying "those aspects of Africa that would kindle emotional pride and confidence in our ability to exist and to develop." This entails the refutation of European claims and distortions, although Ochieng is careful to point out that the historian must treat both Islamic and Euro-Christian civilizations as experiences of African history.² The European contact must find "its place in this history only as an African experience, even if a crucial one."

It is up to the historian, Ochieng writes, to decide which areas of the past need careful examination and emphasis.

Those areas of our past which deal with traditional African unity and cooperation like trade, the growth, stability and expansion of economically viable and stable empires and Kingdoms, areas of ethnic and cultural assimilation, all these will require intelligent investigation and exposition, and their relevance to our present day aspirations must be stressed. On the other hand, those areas of our past that have been maliciously emphasized by imperialist historians, like the prevalence of intermittent wars, persistent starvation and malnutrition, and so on, must be consciously suppressed. Not because they were true and therefore humiliating, but because these accusations stand for flagrant ignorance of our past as well as a calculated move towards our domination culturally, economically, and politically. ³

The contemporary African historian, Ochieng notes, can find a precedent for this approach in the pre-colonial setting where a

1. Ibid., p.17.
2. Ibid., p.18.
3. Ibid., pp.19-20.
selective historical tradition operated to strengthen clan and tribal honour, and to expunge unsavoury elements likely to weaken that honour and increase dissension.

Atieno Odhiambo expands on this last point, drawing the distinction between centralized and acephalous or segmentary systems that Muriuki was concerned to make in his discussion of oral tradition. The court historians of Buganda, Bunyoro and Rwanda, were the "official rememberancers for the ruling family", interpreting history in a mechanistic way according to the "mood of the regime". In the segmentary system, the ordinary man was also the historian, and was called upon to remember as well as forget certain facts. However, in both types of societies, Atieno notes

historians answered questions which people asked them: they functioned as applied academics, adjusting their role to the need of articulate societies. The pre-colonial historian was also in a sense a futurologist, determining tactics of living, who to raid, what alliances to make, what crops to plant. They applied the past for the prediction of the future. In facing difficulty they gave ambiguous answers. The main point about these pre-colonial historians is that they reflected the balance of power in which they lived. 1

Thus, the African historian is able to rationalize the development of a selective historical tradition both in terms of the role of his pre-colonial predecessor, and in terms of the utilitarian demands of "nation-building."

Tanzanian National Historiography and its Shortcomings

A number of writers have referred to the existence of a University of Dar-es-Salaam "school" of history, or Tanzanian national historiography, which has been concerned to break with the dominant themes of "imperial history" and to write Tanzanian history much more from the standpoint of the African population as the key motor force. ¹ Many of the major figures in this loose "school" have been expatriate historians, including Terence Ranger, Andrew Roberts, John Iliffe, Edward Alpers, Fr. Shorter, and John Sutton; the major local representatives have been I.N. Kimambo, A.J. Temu, G.C.K. Gwassa, and I. Katoke. The general aim of the "school" was expressed by Professor Ranger in his inaugural lecture, delivered shortly before his departure in 1969, as "the attempt to recover African initiative in Tanzanian history." In Temu and Kimambo's introduction to A History of Tanzania this was restated as a "main... interest in the African himself." ² As John Saul, Denoon and Kuper, and Ranger himself have recognized, this national historical perspective has a number of inherent dangers. Denoon and Kuper argue that "it is one thing to reassert the continuity of African societies and the role of African initiatives; it is quite another to play down the significance of the colonial context within which they were worked out." ³ The national perspective, Saul points out, is capable of shifting attention too far away from the overall imperialist framework within which African initiatives are taken. ³ In other words, all the manifestations of

the non-African factor at the local, territorial, and metropolitan levels cannot be excluded. Indeed, Ranger, in his inaugural lecture, was careful to note that "Tanzanians have been pushed around and acted upon a great deal" and that "emphasis upon the African voice, upon African initiative in the singular is only meaningful when it is opposed to a doctrine which denies any African initiative at all."¹

The concentration on "the African himself" can lead to some staggering omissions. Kimambo and Temu, for instance, state in the introduction to A History of Tanzania that "there has been no attempt to deal with colonial administrative structures", the inference being that these are of little importance in understanding African initiatives. Given the studies by Lonsdale and Ogot of the close inter-relation between colonial local administration and politics in Western Kenya,² one would think this a fruitful area of analysis. Further, to play down the effect of metropolitan economic, land, and labour policies on the colonial society is to greatly limit one's understanding of reaction and initiative. The focus on the "African himself" can also encourage a blurring of the differentiation within the African community. Colonial economic, land, and educational policies have had an uneven impact, and have led to the formation of new economic and social groups with different political and economic requirements. Colonial policies with regard to land and its distribution have often been crucial to an understanding of rural class formation, as Awiti's study of Ismani Division, among others, confirms.³ Many of the

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problems facing the implementation of rural socialism - ujamaa vijiji, have their roots in the types of inequalities produced by the colonial administrative and economic policies. The focus on the "people" as a motor force, and on the activities of innovators or men of "improvement", tends to blur the types of differentiation which stand as a barrier to socialist change. The full "meaning or significance" of African initiatives, as Saul notes, is lost without reference to the overall imperialist framework. Tanganyika farmers during the colonial period may have often taken the initiative in choosing cash crops, even in opposition to policies and preferences of the colonial administration. That they took the initiative, however, did not mean that they were any the less integrated into the world economic system as raw material suppliers than if the colonial power had chosen the crops for them. In the pre-colonial period, the ivory trade did have the effect, of increasing very considerably the volume and flow of trade in general, and in some cases led to the centralization of power in African kingdoms. According to Roberts,

instead of being directed simply to the maintenance of subsistence economies, production began to be directed towards sustaining complex and extensive trading net-works which met certain needs of industrial and plantation economies far from Nyamwezioland. This transformation involved a real measure of commercial enterprise and risk taking.... the Nyamwezi and their neighbours were bold enough to supplement their familiar staple crop, or even to replace it. It need hardly be stressed that changes in the production and distribution of food are essential to any sound process of development away from the subsistence economy, and judged by this basic criterion there was a real element of significant economic growth in "western Tanzania during the nineteenth century." 3

2. Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule.
But the implications of these changes for future patterns of development are just as important. African initiatives may have led to changes in production and the development of more extensive trade networks, and to political centralization and expansion; at the same time, however, they helped create a dependence on an external economy which was reinforced and extended with the imposition of colonial rule.

I.N. Kimambo and African Initiatives

Kimambo’s *A Political History of the Pare* illustrates clearly the way in which a solidly researched and important study of pre-colonial political development can be used to provide historical continuity and reestablish pride in African initiative. This study, which utilizes oral traditions as a major historical tool, is a detailed and convincing account of the development of the political systems of North and South Upare, and of the interactions between them. It is also a "massive, sustained and convincing attack" on the theory of cultural diffusion which, given its most cogent expression in Oliver and Fages generalizations about "Sudanic states", Seligman’s diffusion of the civilization of the Hamites, and Murdoch’s "African despotisms", would have us believe that most African political institutions stem from one original innovation and spread from community to community. Kimambo writes that the main weakness of the diffusion theory is that it "fails to recognize the possibility of independent evolution in different parts of the continent." Its second weakness is that it

tends to emphasize the "conquest theory". Since the Pare people clearly developed their own institutions without waiting for the advent of similar models from elsewhere, the work demonstrates that ordinary people were capable of devising solutions to their own problems. Kimambo does not claim that his study destroys the theory of diffusionism. He nevertheless states:

I am convinced that when most states have been thoroughly studied, it may become evident that independent invention, perhaps sometimes stimulated by contact diffusion, did play a more significant part in the origin of African states than hitherto realized.

A closer analysis of Kimambo's study uncovers at least two salient points for a national historiography: firstly, the rejection of the cultural diffusionist model in the case of Upare can, without a great effort of imagination or extrapolation, be redirected to the rejection of the primacy of European-derived cultural diffusion during the colonial period; and, secondly, the stress on change in Upare deriving from endogenous rather than exogenous sources, ties in neatly with the success of nationalism and the supposed recovery of control over the African destiny.

In a more recent work, Kimambo actually took up these points. Writing about the Tanganyikan interior before 1800, he argued that: first, no single group was responsible for transmitting the ideas of change and "improvement" to all parts of Tanzania; second, that "even where ideas (were) diffused from one area to another, local initiatives transformed these ideas and adapted them to the needs of that particular society"; and third, that the "changes were introduced in society not for fun, but as a means of solving problems of communities which were

1. Ibid., p.3.
2. Ibid.
becoming more complex." In stressing the growth of more centralized political systems, he found this clear evidence of "the efforts, initiative, and even success achieved by the people of Tanzania even in the distant past." (My italics) Centralization and unification in Ugweno is merely an instance of the "Tanzanians of that period" being "able to create political ideologies which suited their own environments and needs." In conclusion, Kimambo wrote that "it is from the realization of such achievements that the Tanzanians of today must draw inspiration and courage as they share in developing a modern nation founded on their own culture." 

Resistance and Historical Continuity

The Tanzanian historian's focus on movements of primary resistance against colonial rule is not only to establish their role in the expansion in scale and scope of indigenous institutions. It is also used to discover the nurturing grounds for Afro-centred philosophies, and to establish historical continuities, especially in terms of the fore-runners of modern nationalism. This focus can lead the historian to fall headlong into the pitfalls of national historiography and into the realm of national mythology when, without any concerted attempt to trace linkages between earlier resistance movements and subsequent nationalist developments, he can write

Our nationalism began with the onset of colonialism for it was then that, threatened with German invasion, the people of mainland Tanzania rose to defend their country against colonial invasion... Tanzanians rose in different parts of the country at different times as and when the Germans threatened their independence.

2. Ibid., p.33.
There is thus evidenced a pronounced tendency to discuss "Tanzania" prematurely, "assuming an entity even while it is in the process of formation,"¹ and to equate anti-colonialism with nationalism without any consideration of the actual definition of a nationalist movement. The emphasis on resistance is also capable of making the historian lose sight of the fact that despite concerted and continuous resistance from indigenous peoples, the colonial power was gradually extending its control over them.

In his chapter in A History of Tanzania Gilbert Gwassa deals with German intervention almost exclusively in terms of African resistance to the imposition of colonial rule. As a result, he largely ignores the extent of the German presence and the socio-economic changes it introduced. Gwassa argues firstly, on the basis of a great deal of carefully assembled evidence, that resistance to colonial rule has taken many different forms. Responses to the imposition of colonial rule have ranged from military and passive resistance to accommodation and collaboration. The actual form of the response has depended on a combination of a number of factors including the peculiarities of local conditions, the nature of local political structures and social organization, the balance of power and traditional rivalry as it existed at the time of the German intervention in Tanganyika, and the nature and intensity of the techniques of the colonial power in a locality. Gwassa shows that much of the resistance to German intervention was isolated, occurring at the time of the initial contact, the vigorous and prolonged resistance of the Hehe under Mkwawa in the late 1880s and early 1890s being the outstanding example.² His

¹. Saul, "Nationalism, Socialism, and Tanzanian History", p.70.
second argument is that "resistance in its diversified forms was a continuous process which affected the minds and lives of the peoples of Tanzania... the various resistances were a process of an enlargement of scale which culminated in the Maji Maji rising." In addition, Gwassa argues, the resistances suggest continuity in Tanzanian history: they "cannot be studied as isolated episodes in Tanzanian history and that since they are an element of continuity they form one of the important background themes to Tanzanian nationalism."

Gwassa discusses two major resistance movements which succeeded in bringing together different groups in common opposition to German intervention and occupation. The first was the Bushiri resistance of the 1880s; the second, was the 'Maji Maji' resistance of 1905-1907.

The Bushiri resistance was primarily an "Arab" response, whose underlying cause was the threat which German intervention posed to the position of two local magnates, Abushiri bin Salim and Bwana Heri. The threat, Gwassa notes, was political, but clearly economic considerations were the dominant ones. The participation of so many of the coastal peoples suggests that the resistance grew, not out of a desire to protect the property of individuals, but primarily in order to retain independence in the face of foreign interference and occupation. For Gwassa, however, to present Abushiri or Bwana as patriots, or proto-nationalists, he had to play down, or not mention, their complex links with the declining slave trade. In the light of this, it is clearly important to distinguish the objectives of the Arab leadership from those of the African followers, which is something Gwassa fails to do. This thus provides, as Saul notes, another example of the strong tendency of Tanzanian nationalist historians to talk about the...
"people" as a motor-force without regard for the internal differentiation which often provides the key to understanding.1

**Maji Maji**

The resistance movement which has assumed such a central place in contemporary Tanzanian imagery and rhetoric is that of the 'maji Maji'. In contrast to other resistance movements, Maji Maji erupted long after the initial intervention. After first breaking out in Umatumbi, the movement spread rapidly, so that eventually most of the peoples south of a line from Dar-es-Salaam to Kilosa and thence to the northern tip of Lake Malawi were involved. It was not, as even Gwassa suggests,2 simply fanatically anti-European. Those who collaborated with the colonial regime were condemned. The people who began the resistance in Matumbi, for instance, tried to clear their hills of "missionaries, Arabs, Indians, akidas, askaris, and all those who had contact with the government."3

The movement relied on traditional methods of warfare and the leadership, selected according to traditional standards, was strengthened by the intrusion of millenarian elements. "The effect of the Maji (Swahili: "water") was," Gwassa writes, "universalization of leadership. In other words local leaders from different parts were brought together and worked together for a common end."4 As such, Maji Maji represented an attempt to enlarge political scale, and was able to assume the dimension of a mass movement because "it acquired

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4. Gwassa, "The German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania", p.120.
an ideological context which persuaded people to join and to fight. The ideology was religious.\textsuperscript{1}

Any assessment of the role of military resistance against German rule in promoting wider unity and a proto form of national consciousness must be cautious. Certainly, "all movements of national focus have used Swahili as an instrument for achieving inter-tribal unity and integration."\textsuperscript{2} Maji Maji drew its support from different mother-tongue speakers, not only through the ability of leaders to establish elements of underlying cultural unity, but through the rallying force of Swahili. Both the Bushiri and Maji Maji resistance movements inspired political nationalist poetry, thus contributing to the continuous development of a radical tradition within the corpus of Swahili literature.\textsuperscript{3} In addition, Maji Maji has provided the present political leadership with a strong sense of historical continuity.

In national mythology, it stands as a great experience of united mass action. This can readily be seen in a statement which Nyerere made to the United Nations in December 1956, when he suggested that it was TANU's function to "articulate the spirit of rebellion" shown by African resistance to the Germans.\textsuperscript{4} However, the relation between Maji Maji and later political developments if immensely difficult to establish. Gwassa's summary is not at all convincing.

The relationship between privileged and unprivileged groups (after the suppression of resistance and the establishment of colonial administration) falls outside this chapter. It is sufficient to say here

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that such a phenomenon held a potential for conflict which in turn led to the beginnings of mass nationalism. African resistance to German intervention provided posterity with something to think about and to emulate if necessary in the quest for lost independence. Tanzanians strengthened the process of mass nationalism by building on past mistakes and successes.¹

Yet almost 50 years elapsed between the Maji Maji resistance and the next mass movement in the area, TANU. Indeed, as Gwassa observed in a lecture at Makerere, TANU recruiting was difficult in the Maji Maji area precisely because of the memory of the war and its suppression campaigns. Although the actual war brought about a degree of unity among diverse peoples, the unity was brittle and the crumbling process rapid. According to Iliffe, Maji Maji "undoubtedly increased local disunity, for not all the peoples in the rebel areas had joined, and even those who had were seldom unanimous."²

Maji Maji and Literature

The reconsideration of 'Maji Maji', and of African history in general, is something which does not only occur in orthodox historical work. It has occurred in literature as well where the nature of the form, combined with much less rigorous demands of scholarship, allows for the freer inter-play of historical interpretation, ideology, and mythological elements. In many ways literature is much more important than historical work in changing or shaping consciousness simply because it reaches a larger public, although writers obtain many of their interpretations from the latter.

Ebrahim Hussein's play, Kinjeketile demonstrates the manner


in which the past can be recreated to disseminate semi-historical information capable of strengthening the new nationalism, in a way not totally dissimilar to that of historians such as Kimambo, Temu, and Gwassa. Hussein dramatizes the story of the 'Maji Maji' prophet Kinjeketile Ngwale, at the same time bringing out the cultural features that underlay the unity of the different tribes in their fight against the Germans.

Kinjeketile is set against the economic and political background which led to 'Maji Maji'. There is economic exploitation and forced labour which forces Africans to neglect their own farms: "All the men are spending all their time cultivating for Bwana Kinoo, and not for themselves." ¹ Famine is imminent. The rule of the colonialists and their African overseers is cruel,² and the rape of African girls is a major source of aggravation.³ While there are individual acts of resistance to this situation, there is a general lack of concerted resistance to this situation, there is a general lack of concerted resistance. This passivity is decried by M'kichi, a leader of the Wakichi, who says

From the day we held our first meeting until today, nothing has been done. There isn't a single thing we have done. The Red Earth is still in our country. What's more, he has taken our country from us by force. And we, like women, just stare at him. Now he has forced us to cultivate his cotton plantation for him. We just stare at him. Is it for him to demand taxes from us? He should be paying us tax, but oh no! We, like women, just meekly sit, watching him do what he wants with us, with our land. ⁴

². Ibid., p.3.
³. Ibid., pp.9-10.
⁴. Ibid., p.5.
Colonial rule is thus seen by Mkichi as above all emasculating, robbing the African of his manliness and his spirit. In the way that Okot’s Lawino decries the emasculation of Cool by books, Bibi Kitundu taunts the African men with their impotence and castration in the face of the Germans.¹

Hussein’s play evokes the spiritual experience which led to the resistance by focussing attention on Kinjeketile, the seer who, after days and nights spent in contemplation in a river, is possessed by the local spirit Hongo. The spirit gives Kinjeketile a message for his people. Kinjeketile, using water as a symbol of unity, immunity, and love, asks the tribes to unite for a military confrontation with the Germans. When he returns from contemplation, transfixed in his state of possession, he tells the people:

The sun has risen,
it will fill us with
warmth and love —
love for one another,
love between the tribes —
and the warmth of love will free us,
we will expand, yes expand
we will reach out, reach out
and we will unite. ²

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When we are united,
we will be free.
We will be the children of Sayyid Said.
The Red Earth will be destroyed,
he will be kicked out of this country.³

As depicted by Hussein, Kinjeketile is a prophet who, while able to appeal to the past and to messages from the ancestors,⁴ is nevertheless concerned with the restructuring of society. His leadership is not some reactionary, anachronistic reversion to pre-colonial patterns, but seeks to transcend tribal limitations.⁵ Kinjeketile is calling for

1. Ibid., p.10.
2. Ibid., p.15.
3. Ibid., p.16.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.18.
the creation of a new order in which the colonial pressures, the divisions and conflicts introduced by colonial rule, and the tensions of small-scale society, will cease to exist.

Hussein points to the cultural features underlying the unity of the different tribes in their struggle for freedom. Unity and cooperation is produced in part by opposition to a common enemy, but principally by Kinjeketile's ability to establish cultural links between the various groups. Hongo, who possessed Kinjeketile, is the spirit of the Wamutumbi. Another tribe, the Wazomo, have their own spirit, Kolelo, but soon "believe that in actual fact Kolelo and Hongo are one." It is only when this cultural link is established that the two tribes are able to unite in their opposition to the Germans.

At the core of the play is Kinjeketile's self-doubt, and the juxtaposition of his messianic vision and calling with the intellectual detachment and scepticism of Kitundu who, when Kinjeketile emerges from the magic river possessed of the spirit Hongo, like the biblical Thomas, "kneels to feel Kinjeketile's garment" to prove for himself that it is dry. Kitundu will only act when he is convinced of the efficacy of his action. It is he who, in a quest for greater truth, challenges liberation from the Germans, only to come under the hegemony of Seyyid Said and the Arabs. Kinjeketile begins to doubt whether he in fact heard the voice of Hongo for "If this is Hongo, then why does he say that we will be children of Seyyid Said after winning the war?..... If this Seyyid Said could with our consent enslave us body and mind, he would be a far worse enemy than the German." An element of caution entered his thinking. There is a need to "wait until we are completely united.. until we are many and strong."

1. Ibid., p.24.
2. Ibid., pp.28 and 29.
3. Ibid., p.28.
It is the introduction of Kitundu's reason which ultimately undermines Kinjeketile's leadership. While the people unite under his leadership, and await his word to start the war, he withdraws into a morbid self-questioning state in the face of the imminent resistance. He skulks at his home,emasculated, torn by the urge to act with his people, and by the doubts about the success or failure of the resistance. The people, with no such doubts, place their faith in the protective powers of the water and, carried away with enthusiasm and optimism, launch a disastrous offensive against the Germans.

In a way similar to that found in the formal historical works, Hussein's semi-historical play shows that colonial rule was not accepted without resistance, and that the resistance brought about a great degree of unity among diverse peoples. Although Kinjeketile focuses much more than the historical works on the self-doubt of Kinjeketile and the failure of leadership, it nevertheless attempts to establish that the resistance was not an anachronistic reversion to pre-colonial patterns, and that messianism was used in a new way to emphasize underlying cultural unity.

The Historical and Literary Reconsideration of 'Mau Mau'

In the last decade, the historiography of 'Mau Mau' has undergone remarkable changes which are the product, partly of increasing distance from the events which has allowed greater "objectivity", and partly of the concern of more radical historians and social scientists with the analysis of national liberation struggles elsewhere in the Third World. As Robert Buijtenhuijs notes, there are three basic approaches
to 'Mau Mau', the first two of which are of greatest relevance to our discussion. The first may be described as the "European myth" which until recently was maintained by a virtual monopoly of communications and of publicity by the colonial administration and the settlers. While this myth, which is still dominant in European societies, had several variants, its central hypothesis was that Mau Mau, rather than being the culmination of a whole series of real and objective political and economic grievances, was the result of a profound mental instability "springing from the abrupt collision of two civilizations." This was essentially the thesis of the Corfield Report, and was defended by the psychologist J.C. Carothers, who, although considering the political and economic grievances of the Kikuyu, concluded that Mau Mau arose from an "anxious conflictual situation in people who, from contact with the alien culture, had lost the supportive and constraining influences of their own culture, yet had not lost their 'magic' modes of thinking." Perhaps the most extreme form of the "European myth" is to be found in the fictional works of Robert Ruark, and in *Something of Value* in particular, where Mau Mau is presented chiefly as an event that demonstrated an inherent African savagery.

The second approach is the "African myth" which developed really only after independence, and gained impetus from the desire of some nationalist leaders to undo the "savage" image of the revolt presented

by the settlers and the colonial administration. The first of the
books spawned by this new approach was J.M. Kariuki’s autobiographical
"Mau Mau’ Detainee published in 1963. The book was mostly a
factual account of Kariuki’s experiences in several detention camps
during the emergency. Although not a forest fighter, he presented
a version of the Emergency events in which the whole European picture
of Mau Mau changed: he wrote of the "heroic struggle" in the forest,
and the "bestialities" and "savage crimes" being committed by the
security forces rather than the freedom fighters. Instead of
describing Mau Mau as a tribal movement, he evoked the "spirit of
African nationalism of which we were a part." Even if the leadership
were Kikuyu, Kariuki suggested, Mau Mau received active support from
other groups. Thus, in Kariuki’s account Mau Mau does not differ
very much from the wars of liberation in Algeria or in Vietnam; it was
a modern and rational political movement and not a "return to the
bush" and to the tribal past.

The African myth was given greater substance by the publication
of Roseberg and Nottingham’s The Myth of Mau Mau which refuted the
European myth of Mau Mau as the consequence of the Kikuyu’s inability
to adapt to the modern world. The study showed Mau Mau to be the
rationalization of a breakdown of colonial policy which had been
latent from the foundation of the colony, and whose imminence grew
steadily. The authors wrote that

In our view, the outbreak of open violence in Kenya
in 1952 occurred primarily because of a European
failure rather than an African one; it was not so
much a failure of the Kikuyu people to adapt to a

of his Experiences in Detention Camps, 1953-60. (London: Penguin

2. For a discussion of this argument see also Peter Marris, "Mau Mau"
modern institutional setting as the failure of the European policy makers to recognize the need for significant social and political reform. In suggesting that the European conception of 'Mau Mau' constituted a myth, we maintain that "Mau Mau" was indeed an integral part of an ongoing, rationally conceived nationalist movement. 1

The study presented in effect, a very systematic and penetrating survey of the history of Kenya and Kikuyu politics from the First World War onwards, and of the roots of Mau Mau. Little attention was given, however, to the revolt itself, oathing, and life in the forest.

This last aspect was taken up in Donald Barnett and Karari Njama's Mau Mau From Within. 2 Njama's account shows how the forest fighters remained essentially local groups, fighting and foraging from the forest borders of their homeland and reluctant to move far afield for fear of betrayal. Njama describes the unsuccessful attempts of the forest fighters to achieve military cohesion and to somehow make known their political demands while their acknowledged leaders were in jail or exile. A schoolmaster and latecomer to the forest, Njama was better educated than his companions and ambivalent about their methods. His Christian feelings were shocked by the ritual of the forest oath, even though he understood its purpose. The cruelty of terrorist reprisals and the aimlessness of the struggle that brought suffering and division to the Kikuyu without harming the settlers, disturbed him. In vivid detail and with great sympathy, Njama shows the bewilderment of uneducated men in their attempts to organize a chain of command and articulate their political demands. A similar view was advanced by Ngugi wa Thiong'o who pointed out that "it is true that after the capture of Dedan Kimathi the men became disorganized,

1. Rosberg and Nottingham, p. XVII.
became desperate and tended to rely more and more on the advice of witchdoctors instead of a clear analysis and understanding of the forces against them."¹

Since the publication of Kariuki's Mau Mau Detainee and Barnett and Njama's Mau Mau from Within there have been a number of other autobiographical accounts of Mau Mau which fit into the "African myth": the first was W. Itote's (formerly General China) 'Mau Mau' General,² followed by J.K. Mariithi's War in the Forest. The Autobiography of a Mau Mau Leader,³ J. Namweya's Freedom Fighter,⁴ and life histories collected by Donald Barnett including Man in the Middle. The Story of Ngugi Kabiro⁵ and The Hardcore: The Story of Karigo Muchai.⁶

The third approach to Mau Mau, which has never been fully articulated, is what Buijtenhuijs terms the Euro-African which is tied up very much with questions of national unity and the need for African leaders to dissociate themselves from the Mau Mau violence.⁷ The Euro-African myth accepts that Mau Mau was something abhorrent. In its most extreme form it was stated by Kenyatta as: "Mau Mau was a disease which had been eradicated, and must never be remembered again."⁸

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¹ Ngugi, Homecoming, p.29.
⁵ Richmond, Canada: LSM Information Centre, 1973.
⁷ Buijtenhuijs, pp.49 - 72.
It also attempts to picture Mau Mau as a phenomenon of only peripheral or secondary importance to Kenya's nationalist politics. As Buijtenhuijs shows, this new "official" of Euro-African myth stemmed from at least four principal sources: the desire to create national unity by stressing that "We all fought for Uhuru"; the desire to establish and maintain good relations with the British which has to be viewed within the context of settler visions of doom which were given their archetypical expression in Ruark's novel *Uhuru*; the reconciliation between the Mau Mau fighters and their supporters and the Loyalists; and the need to establish Kenyatta's place in history.

Mazrui has argued that the myth of Kenyatta as a national hero, and the selective myth of Mau Mau as a patriotic movement were both needed at the time of independence for the awakening and maintaining of Kenya's unity and national spirit.

So many of Kenyatta's most ardent admirers have for years been at pains to dissociate Kenyatta from Mau Mau – almost as if they shared the British attempt to equate 'being the founder of Mau Mau' with being 'guilty of having founded Mau Mau'. In other words, a good many African nationalists have, on the one hand, glorified Mau Mau as something which favourably changed the course of Kenya's political history, and on the other hand, they have tried to rescue Kenyatta's reputation from any association with the movement. And, of course, Kenyatta himself has, since his trial, consistently defended himself against charges of having founded that movement. 1

Of course, Kenyatta was always a political moderate, and during his nine years detention, did not play a direct active role in the Historical events of the day. There is thus an incompatibility, which Mazrui overlooks, between the myth of Mau Mau as an integral part of the nationalist struggle, and the myth of Kenyatta as Father of the Nation.

Much of the Kenyan reconsideration of Mau Mau has taken place in autobiographical accounts and in novels, short stories, and drama, and not in formal historical studies which have been few in number. This dearth of historical and social science studies may be accounted for by a combination of factors including a European monopoly of areas of study, the difficulty of putting together disparate and at times inadequate material, and the very small number of Kikuyu as opposed to Luo and Luhya professional academic historians. The two historical accounts briefly considered here are by two Luo historians: one an amateur, and the other Kenya's foremost historian.

White Highlands No More by the journalist Ojwando Abuor purports to be a modern political history of Kenya with Mau Mau and the independence struggle at its core. It is a poorly organized work, lacking in coherent structure and analysis, and is far from being the "lucidly written book" which "is an African overview about his colonial past, and ... vividly portrays both the peaceful and armed struggle by the African people for self-determination" that one Kenyan reviewer suggested. The work manifests all the worst features of nationalist historiography. There is no real consideration of the nature of imperialism, nor of Kenya's economy and its links with metropolitan capitalism. No attempt is made to analyse the differentiation within the African community as the result of economic changes or education, nor to delineate major forces, and how these affected the bases of support and opposition to Mau Mau. The rationale of Mau Mau was to "reclaim the African lands which had been robbed wananchi by the white men; and where the Africans were now only allowed to live on a written

permit as serfs or squatters," but nowhere does Abuor ask whether it was a national liberation struggle, a civil war, or as Barnett argued, a class war between a Kikuyu landed gentry which had benefited through collaboration with the colonial administration and missions and the dispossessed Kikuyu landless. There is almost no reference to the division between "Loyalists" and "freedom fighters" so that the assassination of Tom Mbotela becomes inexplicable for Abuor. 2

B.A. Ogot's discussion of Mau Mau reflects the doubts, noted by Mazrui, 3 which many non-Kikuyu have had about the moral stature of the revolt, and about their role in the nationalist struggle. While the number of autobiographical accounts of Mau Mau has swollen in the last few years, Ogot writes, so far no Loyalist accounts have been produced, although Harry Thuku's autobiography does contain some very brief references to Mau Mau. 4 Ogot would like to see such accounts encouraged because "history is a science and cannot be based on popular myths." 5 He believes that the role of the Kikuyu Loyalists has so far been ignored in writings on Mau Mau, which is a surprising omission considering that they won the military war, lost their argument, "but still dominate the Kenya society in several significant respects." 6 He points out that the official accounts of the Loyalists,

1. Abuor, p.126.
2. Ibid., pp.197-202.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p.135.
and Michael Blundell's in *So Rough a Wind*, are of little value, simply because they never ask the basic question: "Who were they"? Rosberg and Nottingham merely suggest that the Loyalists comprised a few scattered groups of people who were for various reasons out of sympathy with militant and radical nationalism. They included a few of the tougher chiefs and their Government servants, some businessmen and teachers, and others, together with a large number of Christians who looked at least in part for religious, not political, solutions to their problems. 1

Oginga Odinga in *Not Yet Uhuru* viewed them as "despicable collaborators" and ascribed the origins of loyalism to British policies of divide and rule. 2

Ogot is careful to point out that Loyalism has deep roots, and the Homeguard was not the first of the Loyalist groups in Kikuyuland during the colonial period, Chief Koinange's Kikuyu Association, the South Nyeri based Kikuyu Progressive Party, and Thuku's Kikuyu Provincial Association, being its predecessors. Sorrenson's study established the thesis that Mau Mau was partly a civil war and partly an anti-colonial war; the two were not incompatible, however, as Ogot implies. Sorrenson wrote

The conflict over land lay at the bottom of much of the unrest in the Kikuyu reserve during the post-war years and which was to develop into the Mau Mau revolt - as much a civil war between the Kikuyu as a revolt against the colonial government. If the politicians were mainly concerned with attacking the chiefs on political grounds, many of the rank and file were more concerned with attacking them, sometimes physically, to settle scores over land. Many grievances over land were in fact settled by the sword during the Emergency. 3

1. Rosberg & Nottingham, p.295.
Many Mau Mau attacks were probably the result of long standing land feuds, but the land feuds usually had their roots in the acceptance and refusal by different groups of Land Commission settlements. Sorrenson's study also tentatively established that the Loyalists were partly represented by the landed gentry and the petty-bourgeoisie.

The attack on the chiefs and headmen, initiated before the Emergency, was directed against them as representatives of the landed gentry as much as for their political position as government servants. 1

The limited evidence available would suggest, Ogot argues, that the active loyalists were composed in good measure of the landed and wealthier groups, while the Mau Mau activists were either smallholders or landless, and received the bulk of their support from the mass of smallholders in the reserve and the repatriated landless. 2 He also tentatively argues that the Loyalists drew support from Elders who revolted against "the activities of young people which they regarded as a violation of the traditions and customs." 3

In addition to the three major groups of loyalists already mentioned - the proponents of law and order, the representatives of the landed gentry who felt their economic interests threatened by radical politics, and the "traditionalists", there were the Christians who remained loyal to their faith. There were also men such as Tom Mbotela and E.W. Mathu, former leaders of the Kenya African Union (KAU), who were opposed to the violent methods that were being advocated by Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai, and the radical wing of the KAU.

In the final part of his discussion of the various categories of

1. Ibid., p.101.
2. Ibid., p.107.
the Loyalists Ogot briefly considers the current theory about the legacy of loyalism in Kenya. This legacy was succinctly summarized by Oginga Odinga as follows.

The two sides of the Emergency persisted into later years. Freedom fighters were unemployed and landless, and the loyalists had become the dependable middle group that government had aimed to create. Those who had sacrificed most in the struggle had lost out to the people who had played safe. Political divisions had been given concrete economic shape and so would persist into the post-Emergency period. 1

This view was consistently voiced by Bildad Kaggia, who insisted that the Kenya Government's first priority was to the dispossessed, the landless, the former forest fighters who had returned from the detention camps and the forest only to find that the quislings who had helped to suppress them were growing fat on the land that had been stolen from them. 2 These were the people, Kaggia argued, who had sacrificed all in the fight for independence, and who had not benefited at all. It is this view of the loyalist legacy which has found expression in fiction: in Ngugi's A Grain of Wheat and his recent short stories; in Leonard Kibera's Voices in the Dark; and Charles Mangua's novel, A Tail in the Mouth.

Ngugi and the Literary Interpretation of Mau Mau

A number of Kikuyu writers, including Godwin Wachira, Leonard Kibera, Samuel Kahiga, Charles Mangua, Mejia Nwangi and Kenneth Watene have, in their literary work, been concerned partly with the revaluation of Mau Mau in the Kikuyu experience. The most sustained of the literary analyses, however, has been performed by Ngugi wa Thiong'o who,


in a series of novels and short stories, has explained not only the socio-economic causes of the revolt, and its impact on Kikuyu life, but its centrality as a Kikuyu experience and its place in subsequent developments. While in a literary work we cannot expect a systematic analysis of the causes and nature of Mau Mau, we can find in a way generally beyond the ability of the historical or sociological work, an examination of the way in which the historical phenomenon impinges on the lives of those involved, shapes their attitudes, and creates new divisions in their society. Furthermore, the writer, much more than either the historian or the politician, is capable of transforming an historical event into part of the national intellectual heritage, as well as into a part of the national or popular consciousness.

In a review article written in 1963, Ngugi pointed out that in the Kenyan colonial situation, economics, politics, and culture were interwoven, and that only in terms of these closely interrelated planes of conflict could the "Mau Mau" revolution be understood. To single out only one of these, especially the cultural, and use it as a basis for an elaborate explanation of Mau Mau is clearly a gross oversimplification. And yet, Ngugi argued, this approach characterized nearly all the works of European writers. Fred Majdalany in his State of Emergency, for instance, saw Mau Mau as the product of the inability of a primitive culture to withstand the impact of a superior one. Majdalany, Ngugi shows, failed to see that the economic conflict was at the heart of the matter, and that the expropriated land had always been the key to Kenya's problem. The book, he noted,


repeated the usual Eurocentric generalizations, without making any attempt to consider or understand African perspectives. Mau Mau was not "something evil, atavistic and completely unrelated to the mainstream of African nationalism or any decent political sentiments."

It was anti-European and anti-Christian simply because "every revolutionary movement is anti-the people/run and perpetuate an oppressive exploiting system, is anti-the cultural and religious values and assumptions which are used to rationalize that oppression and exploitation." Mau Mau was an act of counter-violence against the economic, social, political, cultural, and psychological violence of the colonial situation.

This clearly stated view does not emerge so clearly in Ngugi's literary works mainly because, as a number of critics have pointed out, literary works embrace contradictions, and concentrate "not upon the isolated exigencies of the moment", but as Berger suggests, "upon the new, now imaginable totality which reality represents." The literary work which embraces contradictions reveals the ideology of the author, and discloses the other side of political ideologies as well. Historically, Ngugi's work deals with the life of the Kikuyu from the period of their initial contact with European missions and pacification forces to their contemporary situation. The first novel, The River Between is concerned with the way in which the introduction of Christianity set in motion cultural conflict and exacerbated tensions already present in Kikuyu society. The second novel, Weep Not Child although still concerned with the themes of

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1. Ngugi, Homecoming, p. 29.
The River Between, is set during the Emergency and explores its disruptive impact on Kikuyu life through the disintegration of Ngotho's family; the third novel, A Grain of Wheat is set at the time of independence when the Kikuyu are endeavouring to recover from the destruction of Mau Mau and the Emergency, and when the nature of post-independence social and political divisions were starting to become clear. The later short stories develop the themes of A Grain of Wheat, viewing Mau Mau increasingly in class terms, and as being a crucial event in determining subsequent class and political divisions in Kikuyu, and by extension, Kenyan society.

Ngugi's novel The River Between fits into the general pattern of culture conflict novels established by such West African works as Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease, and focuses on the way in which the European presence, especially in the form of Christianity, exacerbated pre-colonial divisions in Kikuyu society and created new ones. A novel dealing with the theme of culture contact and the disintegrating effect of alien socio-cultural values on a tightly knit "tribal" society, must show the characters acting within a clearly delineated social context and under social pressures. Because so many African culture conflict novels have been loosely disguised autobiographies held together, like 18th century picaresque novels, by the actions of the hero, there has been a general failure to describe societies which are comprehensible and completely articulated, and which
shape the consciousness of the fictional characters. Ngugi, however, has not been a victim of such failure and his works, certainly better than those of any other East African writer, succeed in delineating the nature of the major social formations and forces present in Kikuyu, and by extension, Kenyan society.

Central to The River Between is the rift between the two ridges, Kameno and Makuyu, which are separated by the river Honia. Makuyu is the home of the Christians, and Kameno the home of all that is beautiful in the tribe. Christianity is used by the alien ruler as a weapon with which to disrupt the closely knit society, but the European is not present in any physical sense. Christianity is in the hands of a convert, the fanatical Joshua who, having rejected the traditional truths of the Kikuyu, "had nothing to rest upon, something rich and firm on which to stand and grow, he had to cling with his hands to whatever the missionaries taught him promised future." The opposing ridge, Kameno is led by the tribalist Kabonyi, a man brimful of hatred and jealousy. Caught between the warring factions is Waiyaki, the Teacher, the messianic man of vision who, though torn between a love for Western education and a no less passionate desire to keep tribal values intact, is endowed with the mission to unify the opposing factions.

A profound ironic symbolism permeates The River Between, for underlying the division of Kameno and Makuyu is a fundamental

unity. The Honia River, the physical gulf between the two ridges is "their common source of life." When the split occurs between the ridges, the Church in Makuyu draws inspiration from the Honia; while on its banks the people of Kameno perform their circumcision ceremonies.

The other major underlying unity resides in the close similarity between Christian and Kikuyu myths. The creation myths of Gikuyu and Mumbi and Adam and Eve are almost identical and Ngugi fuses Gikuyu myth and legend with biblical narrative to make a saviour come from the hills. Mugo, the Kikuyu seer, had prophesied not only the coming of white men, "people with clothes like butterflies," but also the coming of a saviour for his people.

Salvation shall come from the hills. From the blood that flows in me, I say from the same tree, a son shall rise. And his duty shall be to lead and save the people.

That saviour is Waiyaki, and only the zealous, inflexible, intransigent Joshua could fail to see the irony of the situation. The similarity between Christianity and the Kikuyu prophecy is so obvious. And yet, Joshua could declaim to his congregation "Isaiah, the white man's seer had prophesied of Jesus. He had told of the coming of a Messiah. Had Mugo, the Gikuyu seer, ever foretold of such a saviour?"

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1. Ibid., p.1.
2. Ibid., p.22.
4. Ibid., p.33.
The crisis in the relations between the two ridges is reached when Muthoni, one of Joshua's daughters, disobeys her father and takes part in the circumcision rites, which her father regards as the most abominable of pagan customs. To the people of Kameno however, as it was for Kenyatta in *Facing Mount Kenya*,

Circumcision was an important ritual to the tribe. It kept the people together, bound the tribe. It was at the core of the social structure, and a something that gave meaning to a man's life. End the custom and the spiritual basis of the tribe's cohesion and integration would be no more. The cry was up. 1

Muthoni believed that it was both possible to be a Christian and to participate in the traditional life of the Kikuyu. Her aim was to be a "Christian in the Tribe." Her's "was a search of salvation for herself. She had the courage to attempt a reconciliation of the many forces that wanted to control her. She had realized her need, the need to have a wholesome and beautiful life." 2 Her wound became septic, and she died after being taken to the Christian hospital. As a result, the Christians adopted a very severe line to circumcision, and banned from the Siriana school all children who undergo the rite.

Waiyaki, as the Teacher and Saviour, sets up an independent

Kikuyu school, and organizes similar schools throughout the region. Deeply affected by Muthoni's unconscious attempt to reconcile Christianity and the traditional beliefs, he comes to regard his mission as a double one — to educate the youth in the new knowledge and to weld the opposing factions into a single strong unit. His obsession with the schools and with education forces him to neglect the political organization of his people, and the mysterious political body, the Kiama, falls under the influence of Kabonyi. He is thus outmanoeuvred by the more militant anti-European and anti-Christian group, and is ultimately discredited before those who hope to preserve intact tribal values because of his love for Nyambura, Joshua's eldest daughter.

Waiyaki shows a flexibility in his approach, and is able to view his actions in the context of the broad social situation. He responds to the people's call for action against the colonialists without losing his vision of reconciliation and unity. He admits the need for political action against European settlers and administrators, but sees the success of such action contingent upon the establishment of an African unity. For

How could he organize people into a political organization when they were so torn with strife and disunity? Now he knew what he would preach if he ever got another chance; education for unity. Unity for political freedom. 1

Nevertheless Waiyaki's fundamental flaw is that he is an idealist who is often lost in his "pastoral utopian visions" of unity within the tribe and between the tribe, the ancestors, and nature. His vision, as Edwin Macharia has observed, is of a tranquil utopia. 2

1. Ibid., p.164.

With the little knowledge he had he would uplift the tribe, yes, give it the white man's learning and his tools, so that in the end the tribe would be strong enough, wise enough, to chase away the settlers and missionaries. And Waiyaki saw a tribe great with many educated sons and daughters, all living together, tilling the land of their ancestors in perpetual serenity, pursuing their rituals and beautiful customs and all of them acknowledging their debt to him. He was elated by this vision of greatness.

As a result, as Ravenscroft notes, he becomes in Ngugi's portrayal an almost stereotyped romantic hero, too lost in his vague, romantic, generalized yearnings to come to grips with the forces opposed to him.

Although Waiyaki's mission of unification and leadership is unsuccessful and he is vehemently rejected by the Christians and condemned by the "tribalists", Ngugi implies that his mission will ultimately be successful for he has, like Okolo in Gabriel Okara's novel, The Voice, sown the seed of learning and truth through his education campaign. The tribalists' victory is only temporary; Kabonyi lacks vision and foresight. Of him, Ngugi asks: "How could he understand that the people did not want to move backwards, that the ridges no longer desired their isolation? How could he know that the forces that drove people to yearn for a better day tomorrow, that now gave a new awareness to the people, were like demons, sweeping the whole country."

Of course, Waiyaki had no desire for the tribal heritage to be swept away. He recognized that

A people's traditions could not be swept away overnight. That way lay disintegration. Such a tribe would have no roots, for a people's roots were in their traditions going back to the past... If the white man's religion made you abandon the customs and then did not give you something else of equal value, you became lost.

4. Ibid., pp.162-3.
It was necessary for traditions to be blended into a new value structure; hence Waiyaki's desire to preserve the tribal basis but build modern education upon it. Culture is not static, and the individual like Joshua or Kabonyi, who fails to reconstruct what it has absorbed, is going to fail. Joshua had, for instance, taken over so wholeheartedly the European's faith that it was distorted into a narrow, loveless creed of stern duty. He developed into a dehumanized dogmatist, devoid of compassion and forgiveness and the spirit of reconciliation. So convinced of his righteousness was he, that he could, admittedly painfully, put his children from his thoughts when they flouted his unbending beliefs.

Ngugi expresses in *The River Between* a strong nostalgia for the pre-Western, pre-industrial, agricultural society which he commends as valuable in its own right. Such a society provided a way of life which was a coherent, unified response to Murungu, the Creator, to Nature, to the land, and to fellow human beings.

Whereas in *The River Between* the dominant conflict is one of cultures which finds expression in the establishment of Kikuyu independent schools and a proto-form of nationalism, in *Weep Not, Child* it is the fight for political independence and the recovery of lost lands which is the central conflict. Nevertheless the underlying cultural element of *The River Between* is crucial because the forces represented by Joshua's fanatical Christians and Kabonyi's "tribalists" in the Kiama, are still present - the first in the loyalists who support the administration and are opposed to Mau Mau; the second in the dispossessed population who provide the basis of support for the freedom fighters.

*Weep Not, Child* focuses on the experiences of an adolescent
schoolboy during the Emergency. Njoroge is an intellectually bright but immature schoolboy who, like Waiyaki, continually dreams about some vague "mission in life" and for whom "schooling was the end of all living." Like Waiyaki he is passionately attached to the idea of education as a panacea for the country's ills and sees himself as destined to play a very important role in the liberation of his country. Ngugi however views this youthful and empty idealism with irony, never hesitating to show its basic immaturity whenever he can. Njoroge has delusions of grandeur, and he singles out Old Testament figures such as Moses for his heroes. There is, as in The River Between, a strong messianic motif; Kenyatta is "the black Moses" and Njoroge sees himself as his successor. After his education he would use all his learning to fight the white man, for he would continue the work that his father had started. When these moments caught him he actually saw himself as a possible saviour of the whole of God's country. In real life, however, he is a weak character, self-pitying and escapist, and apparently devoid of real political consciousness. When he learns, for instance, that the forest fighters are planning to burn down the government-approved school where he is a pupil, he can only exclaim bitterly, "I thought Mau Mau was on the side of black people", but the question why the Mau Mau leaders should want to destroy government and missionary schools at a time when all the Kikuyu independent schools were forcibly closed down by the colonial authorities, never enters his mind. When his tender

2. Ibid., pp.49-50.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.94.
relationship with Mwihaki, the daughter of Jacobo, a wealthy Christian loyalist, is threatened and finally destroyed by the involvement of his family in Mau Mau, he can only think of escape to another country where they can be free of strife. He only reacts to the events of the Emergency in so far as they threaten his own petty existence, as for example when near the end of the book he has to interrupt his schooling because of his family's alleged Mau Mau associations.

The first part of Keep Not, Child sets the general political situation in Kenya, and in particular in Kikuyuland, which led to Mau Mau, and explains the relationship between the Gikuyu people and the white settlers to whom the government allocated large areas of Kikuyu lands for farms. This political information is woven into the structure of the novel through Njoroge's own experiences and those of his father Ngotho, within whose memory the dispossession took place. As he grows up Njoroge learns from the tribal legends how the Kikuyu country had originally been given to Gikuyu and Mumbi (the first parents of the tribe) by the Creator, Murungu. The part which had belonged to Ngotho's own forefathers had been allocated by the British to Mr. Howlands, and English settler, after the First World War. According to Ngotho:

It was the first big war. I was then young, a mere boy, although circumcised. All of us were taken by force. We made roads and cleared the forest to make it possible for the warring white man to move more quickly. The war ended. We were all tired. We came home worn out but very ready for whatever the British might give us as a reward. But, more than this, we wanted to go back to the soil and court it to yield, to create, not to destroy. But Ng'o! The land was gone. My father and many others had been moved from our ancestral lands. 1

1. Ibid., p.29.
Ngotho now works for Mr. Howlands as a landless labourer because he feels the need to be near the soil that belonged to his ancestors, to watch over it and perform the traditional family rites there. Beneath his calm, efficient bearing, he hides a very natural, smouldering resentment about the deprivation of his ancestral heritage and hopes for the day when he will be able to re-possess it. On the other hand, Howlands too is passionately attached to the farm, which he sees himself as having created out of the wilderness.

Howlands is a deeply embittered man, estranged from life in England by the shock of his experiences in the war, and by the death of his older son in World War II. There is a hidden tension between Howlands and Ngotho which is present even when Ngotho appears to be contentedly working for Howlands.1 When Ngotho joins an abortive general strike and leads an attack on Jacobo, he loses his job on Howlands farm, and there develops in Howlands a strong desire to humiliate him.

In Weep Not, Child Ngugi frequently refers to the two world wars, and World War II in particular, in the context of Mau Mau, and how they changed African attitudes to Europeans. He examines the effect that the recruitment of African troops by the imperial powers had on the rise of nationalism in the post-war period. Boro, one of Ngotho's sons, was uprooted from his home and traditions during his formative years, and taken to the Western world to fight. His experiences were traumatic, and he was left permanently embittered by the death of his favourite brother. He is one of the young Kenyans who, having been brought up to revere white religion and civilization

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1. Ibid., p.35.
and to regard themselves as at least semi-savage, suddenly found that
the white people who preached brotherly love and Christian virtue were
capable of killing their fellow-whites with greater savagery and
technical efficiency ever envisaged by the African. They discovered
the squalor of Europe, and the white prostitutes who were willing to
take any African to bed with them so long as he paid the usual fee.
After the war they returned to unemployment or menial jobs, to
landlessness, and the prospect of little change in their position.
They grew impatient with the slowness of constitutional advance and
the KAU, and the passivity of their elders.

Boro's father, Ngotho, is representative of the generation which
knows of the prophecy that a leader will one day arrive to lead the
people to freedom, and is perfectly prepared to wait for its fulfil-
ment. Boro is openly scornful of the prophecy and his father's
inaction and joins Dedan Kimathi in the forest. Circumstances, in
the form of a strike however, force Ngotho to take a stand. Despite
his personal misgivings about its success, he gives it his endorsement.
In the following passage his basic weakness of indecision is revealed:

'What's black people to us when we starve?'
'Shut that mouth. How long do you think I can
endure this drudgery, for the sake of a white man
and his children?'
'But he's paying you money. What if the strike
fails?'
'Don't woman me!' he shouted hysterically,
This possibility was what he feared most. She
sensed his note of uncertainty and fear and seized
upon it.
'What if the strike fails, tell me that!' 
Ngotho could bear it no longer. She was driving
him mad. He slapped her on the face and raised
his hand again. 1

1. Ibid., p.60.
Nyokabi, like so many other Ngugi heroines, has the intuitive capacity to lay her finger on Ngotho's doubts and fears. When he hits her, it is not because he resents being hit by a woman, nor because she is wrong, but precisely because he knows she is right.

During the strike Ngotho, borne on a tide of emotion, rouses the crowd to physical violence against Jacobo without giving any thought to the possible consequences. This is the only time he acts in a decisive way, but his unpremeditated action is a gross miscalculation. The strike brings about his downfall; he is dismissed from his job, loses his house, and has to endure Boro's accusing eyes. Boro blames his father's irrational action for the failure of the strike and its consequences, and unsuccessfully attempts to force him to take the Mau Mau oath. Ngotho is further humiliated by the arrest of his wife Njeri and his son Kori when he is unable to save them. Ngotho nevertheless redeems himself before his death. Thinking that his son Kamau, a carpenter and mainstay of the family's economy after Ngotho's dismissal, was the murderer of the loyalist traitor Jacobo, Ngotho confesses to the murder to save his son after being brutally tortured and castrated. Howlands, now a District Officer during Mau Mau, is bent on Ngotho's humiliation, but is unable to break his spirit.\footnote{Ibid., p.144.} Njoroge is finally left as the only male member of his family. His secondary education is prematurely cut short, and he is reduced to a shop-assistant in the Indian-owned village shop, his messianic visions shattered. Even this job he loses. After being tortured by the police, and in utter despair, he attempts suicide.
but is stopped by his mother, and in an unconvincing manner, comes to terms with the unpleasantness of his new situation.

By focussing on the microcosm, the family, and its disintegration in relation to a broader social and political context, as Kenneth Watene does in his play My Son for My Freedom Ngugi in Weep Not, Child is able to show the destructive and divisive force of colonialism and the violent struggle which emerged to overthrow it. At the beginning of the novel Ngotho's family is reasonably united and stable, although Boro's experiences in the Second World War have alienated him from his society and his father, and another son Mwangi died in the war. With the outbreak of the Emergency the disintegration accelerates rapidly. Boro goes into the forest and is eventually arrested after killing Howlands. Kamau, another brother is sent to prison for life. Kori is in detention. Ngotho is tortured by the police and ultimately dies from his injuries. Njoroge is tortured by the police and attempts suicide out of a profound sense of failure, his vision of education as the great unifier and liberator shattered.

Ngugi is not, however, harsh in his condemnation of Loyalists such as Jacobo who are caught up by forces they cannot really grasp. The administration and the settlers use Jacobo to pacify a strike and to betray the long years of waiting and suffering that it culminated. He is made a chief by the administration, and used to fight against the Ihii cia mutitu (Freedom Boys of the Forest). Yet Jacobo, a profiteer in the colonial situation, does not realize that he is a mere instrument in the hands of the settlers and the administration. For Howlands, he is still a 'savage'.
But he would use him. The very ability to set these people fighting amongst themselves instead of fighting with the whiteman gave him an amused satisfaction. 1

Jacobo fails to grasp that he is dissipating his energies putting down his fellow Africans, while the colonial administration of which he can never be more than a subservient instrument continues to dominate them all. Ngugi shows how the terrorism of Mau Mau which was directed against the African officials in the administration and members of the Homeguard, and the indiscriminate counter-insurgency methods of the Emergency, gave rise to a situation which exacted total involvement from even the irresolute.

It led, for instance, to the senseless disciplinary killing of Kenyans who were out after the sunset curfew without their identity papers, and to the torture of people such as Njoroge whose only involvement was through association. Ngugi resists the temptation, however, to idealize the freedom fighters. Little is said about Boro's life in the forest, but the most important passage devoted to this subject, a dialogue between Boro and one of his lieutenants, clearly gives a rather negative and even nihilistic image of the Mau Mau army, which is strongly reminiscent at times of Godwin Wachira's novel, Ordeal in the Forest.

"Don't you believe in anything?"
"No. Nothing. Except revenge."
"Return of the lands?"
"The lost land will come back to us maybe. But I have lost too many of those whom I loved for land to mean much to me. It would be a cheap victory."

Boro was a bit more communicative as he sat with his lieutenant on a look-out a few miles from their new hideout... Boro had always told himself that the real reason for his flight to the

1. Ibid., p.88.
forest was a desire to fight for freedom. But this fervour had soon worn off. His mission became a mission of revenge. This was the only thing that could now give him fire and boldness...

"And freedom"?, the lieutenant continued. "An illusion. What freedom is there for you and me?"

"Why then do we fight?"

"To kill. Unless you kill, you'll be killed. So you go on killing and destroying. It's a law of nature...

"But don't you think there's something wrong in fighting and killing and unless you're doing so for a great cause like ours?"

"What great cause is ours?"

"Why, Freedom and the return of our lost heritage."

"Maybe there's something in that. But for me Freedom is meaningless unless it can bring back a brother I lost. Because it can't do that, the only thing left to me is to fight, kill and rejoice at any who fails under my sword..." 1

Ngugi's position thus tends to be ambivalent, and the movement pictured as a mixture of idealism and nihilism born of the bitterness bred by the colonial experience which recalls Gluckman's description of Mau Mau as "a nihilistic movement of desperation-kill and be killed." 2

When Ngugi began writing his third novel, A Grain of Wheat, he came into contact, Peter Nazareth recounts, with Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth and this work, 3 until his more recent Marxist reading, profoundly influenced his basic political position. Some hint of an earlier transformation in his thinking about Kenyan politics and Mau Mau was given in a short and poorly realized play, This Time Tomorrow, which fitted into the widespread legacy of loyalism theory

1. Ibid., pp.115-16.
articulated most prominently by Bildad Kaggia and Oginga Odinga.
The setting of This Time Tomorrow is a squalid, shanty village on the outskirts of Nairobi. The village, the home for the landless, is to be demolished by the City Council because it might offend the delicate sensibilities of foreign tourists. A stranger comes to the assistance of the villagers. He is a man who once worked for the European, who went to the forests and then to detention only to come back and find that "his little piece of land had been taken away." He is a man who believes that "the poor peasants and workers, who fought for Uhuru shall inherit this earth." For him, independence has brought no change in the position of the masses and that it is only the national bourgeoisie which enjoys the fruits of independence. His intervention is unsuccessful, however, and the village is torn down. The police inspector in charge of the demolition tells the people: "Good people! Remember, this is your city. Be proud of it and keep it clean." They are to show the "Harambee spirit, and move!" But they are offered no housing no jobs, and told to return to their villages where they have no land.

The Fanonist influence in A Grain of Wheat in which Ngugi describes the unsuccessful attempts by Kenyans to get back their land which led to the guerrilla violence of Mau Mau, is discernible not only in the thought of Kihika, the forest fighter, but in the actual betrayal of the freedom fighters by the nationalist politicians

1. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, This Time Tomorrow (Nairobi: EAPF, nd), p.37. This play was written by Ngugi when he was a student at Makerere.
2. Ibid., p.42.
3. Ibid., p.44.
at the time of the Kenyan Independence celebrations in 1963, is the question of what constitutes heroism and betrayal. The events described shape not only the attitudes of individual characters, but those of an entire village on Thabai Ridge - and by extension, a nation, towards its own past and toward the meaning of independence. Ngugi fully realizes that the compromises and disappointments of personal life are not solved by a political 'new deal'. Uhuru is not the easy solution to problems; it is their inescapable context.

All the main male characters in the novel, with the exception of Kihika, have some private guilt. Each is exposed as having privately betrayed both himself and, either directly or indirectly, his people, for the novel moves on two plains, the personal and the public. The two are linked by the fact that the protagonists of both are the same, and also, by the fact that a betrayal of personal integrity is bound to extend from the personal to the public self.

Mugo, a lonely, withdrawn member of the village, is honoured as a former detainee, the close friend of the great freedom-fighter Kihika, who was betrayed to the British and killed during the revolt. Mugo owes his stolid suffering in the detention camps to a self-inflicted expiation of his betrayal of Kihika. Mugo, like Njoroge and Waiyaki in the earlier novels, had always dreamed of being the villagers' Moses who would lead them into the Canaan of Independence. However, he had no real contact with the people of his village, and even during the Emergency argued that

If you don't traffic with evil, then evil ought not to touch you; if you leave people alone, then they ought to leave you alone.

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His isolation, and hence his messianic vocation, is nevertheless shattered by a knock on his door. It is Kihika who is seeking shelter after killing the hated D.O. Robson. Kihika says to Mugo:

I often watched you in old Thabai. You are a self-made man. You are a man, you have suffered. We need such a man to organize an underground movement in the new village. 1

Mugo, deeply disturbed by the intrusion, protests feebly that he has not taken the oath. To his objection Kihika replies:

But what is an oath?... there are those who'll never keep a secret unless bound by an oath... No, you take an oath to confirm a decision already made. The decision to lay or not to lay your life for the people lies in the heart. 2

Mugo does not however sympathize with Kihika and what he stands for. He thinks:

Why should Kihika drag me into a struggle and problems I have not created? Why? He is not satisfied with butchering men and women in cold blood. I am not his brother. I am not his sister. I have not done harm to anybody. 3

Mentally tortured by the intrusion, Mugo decides to betray Kihika to the authorities, and realizes too late that by doing so, he has betrayed his own humanity. Thus, when he stops the guard from whipping Wambuku, this reveals, not only a real courage, but his strong need to atone for the wrong he has done, for Wambuku is Kihika's lover and she is carrying his child.

This account of Mugo's treachery and remorse is interwoven with other stories of betrayal. Gikonyo, the carpenter who was a supporter

1. Ibid., p.218.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.220.
of the movement before the Emergency and who had taken the oath of unity, obtained his release from the detention camp by being the first to renounce the Mau Mau oath simply because he missed his wife too much. When he returned home, however, he found her nursing the child of his old rival Karanja, whose belief in the invincibility of the white man led him to uphold white authority against his people. Ngugi is careful not to condemn such betrayals out-of-hand, and analyzes why people such as Mugo, Gikonyo, and Karanja succumbed. Karanja, for instance, is in many ways a despicable and yet pathetic character, who has only contempt for his own people. But he has such a sense of racial inferiority that he is always ill-at-ease with white people. When invited to drink tea by Mrs. Thompson, he drinks it without sugar because he is too frightened to tell her that he likes sugar. When his European superior, whom he sees as an almost infallible father-figure, leaves Kenya on the eve of independence, he is left in a state of complete disarray.

Kihika is the only character in A Grain of Wheat who is not tainted by guilt, and who is admired by everybody. He sided with Mau Mau long before the Emergency, and took to the forest as soon as the fighting broke out, leaving behind everything he loved, including his fiancee. Kihika is driven by a powerful desire for justice, and a refusal to compromise in his pursuit of truth and justice. This was revealed in his youth when he pointed out to his teacher that he was wrong when he said that the Bible forbade circumcision. Rather than be unjustly punished, he chose to run away. Indeed, his moral inspiration comes from the Bible. He has underlined several passages in his copy of the Bible, and Ngugi uses some of these quotations as
motifs. One, for example, is

"And the Lord spoke unto Moses,
Go unto Pharaoh, and say unto him,
Thus saith the Lord,
Let my people go." 1

Kihika's political inspiration comes from the fight of earlier
Kenyans such as Harry Thuku, and from Gandhi and Nehru. His guerrilla
action is an integral extension of his moral values. When Hugo says
to Kihika, "Have you come to kill me," Kihika in reply in effect
explains the rationale of Mau Mau.

We do not just kill anybody... We are not murderers.
We are not hangmen - like Robson - killing men and
women without cause or purpose... We only hit back.
You are struck on the left cheek. You turn the right
cheek. One, two, three - sixty years. Then suddenly,
it is always sudden, you say: I am not turning the
other cheek any more. Your back to the wall, you
strike back. You trust your manhood and hope it will
keep you at it. Do you think we like scuffling for
food with hyenas and monkeys in the forest? I, too,
have known the comfort of a warm fire and a woman's
love by the fireside. See? We must kill. Put to
sleep the enemies of black man's freedom. They say
we are weak. They say we cannot win against the bomb
... You think we don't fear death? We do. My legs
almost refused to move when Robson called out to me
... And the animal groan of dying men is a terrible
sound to hear. But a few shall die that the many may
live. That's what crucifixion means today. 2

From these words, which reveal Kihika to be entirely different to the
nihilistic Boro in Weep Not, Child, and from Kihika's significance in
the structure of the novel, it is clear that Ngugi has resolved much
of the ambivalence toward Mau Mau present in his earlier novel, and
adopted the view that there would have been no independence for Kenya
without it. Kihika is fully conscious of the price he may have to

1. Quoted in Ibid., p.37.
2. Ibid., pp.216-217.
pay personally, but to him, that is what the crucifixion means. The Christ-like analogy is emphasized for, even in death, Kihika continues to have a powerful effect on the lives and thinking of the people.

The people of Thabai attempt to create some order out of the chaos they have experienced and to find a man who, by retaining his integrity throughout the struggle, is worthy to become their leader. They must also know their history, and to discover who it was in the midst of war who betrayed their hero. They must discover the traitor, for as General R. tells the crowd at the Independence celebrations:

> even now this war is not ended. We get Uhuru today. Tomorrow we shall ask: where is the land? Where is the food? Where are the schools? Let therefore these things be done now, for we do not want another war... no more blood in my... in these our hands.

Burdened with guilt, Hugo, the man the villagers had invited to lead the local celebrations on Uhuru day, makes a public confession at the celebrations. The villagers, unable to react after the immensity of their suffering, numbly disperse, the Independence celebrations having come to a shattering anti-climax.

> The sun had faded; clouds were gathering in the sky. Nyamu, Warui, General R., and a few other elders remained behind to complete the sacrifice before the storm.

The exuberance of independence is dampened before its accomplishment by a sense of betrayal and disillusionment. This betrayal is conveyed in similar fashion in Mangua's *A Tail in the Mouth* when Moira comes of out the Abedares under the post-independence amnesty, eager to "reap

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the fruits of our struggle" only to find a new class of Africans already firmly in power. His family's land has passed into the hands of Thuo, a former homeguard, who has taken every advantage of land consolidation and redistribution, and has become a rentier, absentee landlord. In A Grain of Wheat there is already the exposure of the duplicity of some of the local politicians who were already in power. Thus when Cikonyo and a group of peasants want to buy the farm of the departing settler Burton, they are refused a loan by a Member of Parliament who then goes on to purchase the same farm for himself. Cikonyo is bitter about the new class of African capitalists, and says to Hugo:

But now, whom do we see riding in long cars and changing them daily as if motor cars were clothes? It is those who did not take any part in the movement, the same who ran to the shelter of schools and universities and administration. 1

He wonders during the celebrations whether Uhuru would "bring the land into African hands? And would it make a difference to the small man in the village?" 2 And yet he himself is a successful businessman, about whom Ngugi comments:

God helps those who help themselves, it is said with fingers pointing at a self-made man who has attained wealth and position, forgetting that thousands of others labour and starve, day in, day out, without ever improving their material lot. 3

As Peter Nazareth notes, A Grain of Wheat is a socialist novel, if only by implication, because it argues that the replacement of expatriate capitalists by local ones is not a solution to Kenya's

1. Ibid., p.80.
2. Ibid., p.237.
3. Ibid., p.67.
problems. Ngugi does not attempt, however, to represent Mau Mau as a socialist struggle, even though fighters such as General R. believe that Russia is ruled by ordinary people and admire it for that. What Ngugi does do in his later short stories especially is to provide a Marxist-socialist analysis of Kenyan society with Mau Mau symbolizing not only the betrayal of those who did so much to make independence possible, but also as representing an event which did so much to determine future patterns of class differentiation in Kikuyu society. In short stories such as "Minutes of Glory", "Wedding at the Cross", and "A Mercedes Funeral", Mau Mau does not superficially form the subject, but the major characters' lives have always been influenced in a profound way by it.

Ngugi's "A Mercedes Funeral" is recounted by a narrator in the Ilmorog Bar and Restaurant. It is an election year and the parliamentary seat is being contested by four candidates: the sitting member John Joe James, who had dropped his African name on first being elected - "standards, efficiency and international dignity demanded it of him you know"; a Lumumba goateed student radical who during the campaign spoke in the name of hard work and the common man, and lashed out against ostentatious living and wealth, only to become an important landlord after graduation; an aspiring businessman; and a former government chief who had resigned his job to enter the race. The challengers, while divided amongst themselves, were at least united in their denunciation of the incumbent's self-enrichment while

3. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, "Minutes of Glory", ghala, Vol. IX, No.7 (1972), pp.4-
in office. The sitting member met their criticisms with the record of his government's achievements, including the construction of tourist hotels and resorts, and referred to lazy, envious people wanting a piece of the waiting national cake without working for it.

The campaign would have been of little interest or importance but for one thing: the death of Wainy, the second watchman at the Ilmorog Bar and Restaurant who died suddenly from alcoholic poisoning. At a public meeting addressed by the candidates, one of the town's habitual drunkards had stood up and asked who cared about the poor workers, and who cared whether they were buried without a decent funeral? What about Wainy, for instance? The candidates, spurred into action, responded by approaching Wainy's widow and offering to arrange her deceased husband's funeral. The competition for the body is fierce, and it is only after it is snatched by the sitting member that the candidates arrive at an agreement about arrangements and form a burial committee.

The narrator recalls that he first knew the deceased well in the early 1960s when rumour of Uhuru had begun to make "people's hearts palpitate with fearful joy of what would happen tomorrow." At that time Wainy had been a porter in Shukla and Shukla stores. His father had died fighting in the forest and his independent primary school had been burnt down by the British because it had been suspected of aiding in the freedom struggle. Wainy always spoke enthusiastically about history, and the struggle of the great African leaders who had resisted the British during the imposition of colonial rule. Wainy's teacher at the independent primary school had

instilled in him the promise of Uhuru.

He used to tell us: after Uhuru, we must work hard: Europeans are where they are because they work hard; and what one man can do, another one can do it. He was a good man, all the same, used to tell us about great Africans... Then one day... One day... you see, we were all in school... and then some whitenan came, Johnies, and took him out of our classroom. We climbed the mudwalls in fear. A few yards (away) they roughly pushed him forward and shot him dead. 1

The narrator, a product of a similar school which was saved from destruction by its affiliation with the District Educational Board, of course learned while at the Siriana Boarding School that the true and correct history was that of Europe, and anglo-Saxons in particular. 2

Despite his set-backs, Wahinya retained his dreams of higher education, harbouring the ambition that he would one day be able to read the Standard with consummate ease. There was still the promise of Uhuru: "Uhuru is coming, you see... Uhuru... more and better jobs, more money... might even own part of Shukla and Shukla." 3 The narrator went to Makerere, eager to step into the shoes of the colonial masters and enjoy the perquisites of elite status. Wahinya worked as a turn-boy on a bus owned by John Joe James, still fired by his ambition to succeed, this time as the owner of a Peugeot matatu. 4

The narrator's life is one of continuous success: work with a commercial firm, bank loans, a large formerly European-owned shamba, 5

1. Ibid. (2), p.22.
2. Ibid., p.17.
3. Ibid., p.20.
4. "matatu" - an unregistered taxi operating in the rural areas.
5. "shamba" - Swahili word for farm.
Wahinya's life never improved. He was severely injured in a collision between two racing buses, lost his job, and given no compensation by J.J.J. Eventually he worked as a watchman at the Ilmorog Bar and Restaurant and sank into alcoholism, the last remnants of his ambition and optimism destroyed.

As with Ngugi's other recent short stories, "A Mercedes Funeral" focuses on the dispossessed of independence, those who with hopes raised high, were dashed to despair by the realization that Uhuru brought benefits for the educated few, and only poverty for those who had suffered during the struggle for independence. By concentrating on the contrasting life-histories of Wahinya, and the narrator, Ngugi has shown how the events of Mau Mau brought about profound divergences between people who, until that stage, were in basically similar positions. In life, Wahinya was a poverty-stricken, disillusioned man, robbed of his earlier ambition and promise by the harsh reality of post-independence society. He was one of the dispossessed, the common man in whose name the politicians spoke but never acted. It was only in death that his life achieved any significance, and this simply because his body became involved in a political tug-of-war.

On the day of the burial, people flocked to the Ilmorog Presbyterian Church where the candidates donated money, pressed their political points, and donated coffins. J.J.J., having heard that Wahinya once expressed the desire to ride in a Mercedes car, donated as his coffin "an immaculate model of a black Mercedes Benz 660 complete with doors and glasses and maroon curtains and blinds." The crowd, stunned into silence by this obscenity, silently dispersed, leaving the politicians to their electioneering.

Ngugi's treatment of Mau Mau in a quite substantial body of literary work is thus important, not only because it is the most sustained analysis of the effects of Mau Mau on Kikuyu society and subsequent political developments, but also because it provides an excellent illustration of the way in which the interpretation of historical events changes with shifts in the intellectual-historians political perspective and in the broader society. The development of, and changes of interpretation in Ngugi's work, reflects his transition from a cultural and political nationalist concerned above all with questions of national unity (see for instance his play The Black Hermit), to a Fanonist, and to a Marxist position. This intellectual transition, assisted by his acquaintance with a body of new work, has corresponded to the types of developments present in Kenyan society.

Thus, in an important sense Ngugi, as a writer, has moved beyond the concerns of the nationalist historians who are pre-occupied principally with the recovery of African initiatives in history, historical continuity, and the roots of nationalism. Ngugi is also concerned with those matters but unlike the historians, has moved to a position where he is able to reinterpret a major event in national history, Mau Mau, as being decisive, not in promoting national consciousness, but rather as a key factor in class formation and the determination of the post-independence political economy.
The reinterpretation of history represents but one major strand in the quest for a distinct African societal and cultural identity. East African cultural nationalists, like East African Marxists, are asking fundamental questions about the type of society they want for Africa, and the types of economic, cultural, political and social institutions which are to be created out of the colonial inheritance and the indigenous cultures. Many East African intellectuals have looked for solutions for what they perceive as the major contemporary problems, and a general moral and spiritual malaise, by attempting to root the new culture firmly in reinvigorated traditional values. They have been concerned to develop a culture which, although it borrows and adapts elements of foreign cultures, derives, or claims to derive, its main source of inspiration from the autochthonous cultural heritage, and is concerned to stress the unique and valuable elements of that heritage. At the aesthetic level, this concern is marked by an attempt to reestablish the communal nature of artistic creation, and the rejection of alien aesthetic criteria which disparage the African and alienate him from his cultural heritage and from the authenticity of his being. At the political and ideological level, the concern is marked by the desire to "devise political institutions that are basically African in values and orientation".
Africans must be bold enough to accept themselves for what they are, that they are Africans. Africans must utilize their own traditions and institutions in order to create modern political institutions, which are both meaningful and effective in solving the problems as seen by Africans themselves.¹

This concern has found expression in theories of African socialism, and Nyerere's ideology of ujamaa especially. At the social and psychological levels, the concern has been marked by the desire to restore traditional communal values capable of overcoming the alienation, unease, and dissatisfaction produced by education, urbanization, and rapid social change.

In the East African setting, at least three major critical responses to cultural nationalist concerns are readily discernible. The first comes from critics such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Grant Kamenjui who, while concerned with cultural reassertion and the creation of national cultures place, because of Fanonist and Marxist influences on their thought, much greater stress than most cultural nationalists on the economic bases of cultural phenomena and emphasize the importance of international economic relations. The second major critical response comes from the Marxist critics, such as Philip Gachieng, Jared Angira Otieno, and Issa Shivji who, while often bitter about the penetration of capitalism and Western culture into African societies during the colonial period, eschew any romantic concern for Africa's past. Instead, they stress the economic bases of cultural and ideological phenomena, and view

colonialism as a necessary stage in historical development which has accelerated the rate of historical development in Africa. In contrast to the cultural nationalists, they argue that Marxism, both as an ideology of revolutionary struggle, and as a tool of analysis, is of direct relevance and applicability to the African situation. The third major critical response comes from intellectuals such as Taban Lo Liyong who dismiss questions of cultural reassertion and authenticity as largely irrelevant in the struggle for African development, and as being signs of weakness rather than strength in the confrontation with the advanced industrial nations.

The Cultural Nationalist Heritage

The cultural nationalist strand in East African intellectual thought has deep roots, and has been intimately linked with the political struggle. The actual literary form the cultural protest and reassertion assumed was influenced not only by European models, but by the nature of the proto-nationalist and nationalist movements which absorbed the energies of young intellectuals. Hugo Gathuru, for instance, in his *Child of Two Worlds* recounts that

The little leisure which we had was spent in discussing politics and our hopes for higher education. We read history and political literature dealing with the Indian struggle for independence. We read Gandhi, Nehru, and M. Jinnah pretty thoroughly. There was little social life for us.

As an assistant editor of *The African Voice* I wrote many articles protesting against the pass laws, colour bar, and the deplorable wages and housing, and demanded the opening up of the Kenya Highlands for the Africans.¹

Since literary activity was tied very much to the demand for the redress of grievances and the correction of European denigration and distortion, there was little place for creative literature. In addition there was the problem of outlets. Since publishing was controlled by mission presses, Europeans, colonial governments, and a few Asians (who were often sympathetic to African efforts and provided assistance), the main outlet for the African writer was in the newspaper and the occasional pamphlet. Other factors were at work too, which often related to questions of language and literary technical competence as well. Taban Lo Liyong has argued that

> Because the British are a practical-minded people, we became practical-minded too. If they had followed the Romantics they would have given us more culture and more Joyce Carys; but they continued a colonizing race giving us Lord Lurgards. Poetry writing and the art of fiction were not taught us though we debated and reasoned. This led directly to early writings which were of a quarrelsome nature; political grievances (about land, mostly) and answering back the white racist charges through pamphlets, and biographies and anthropological works.¹

While such a generalization would be hard to substantiate it does possess a strong measure of accuracy.

There was a widespread feeling amongst Europeans that it was wrong for an educated African to write about his culture, because he should only be concerned with questions of modernity. An interest in his people's past was considered unhealthy, and as a betrayal of the civilization to which he had become attached through education and Christian baptism. The mere act of writing about

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one's culture was during the colonial period a form of cultural protest. Sir Apolo Kaggwa, the Katikiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda for many years, an ardent Christian and supporter of King's School, Budo, was not by the standards of his own culture and period a "radical", but rather a member of the Buganda Protestant establishment. He was an authority on Baganda traditions, and a story-teller of note, and published a number of historical-anthropological works and tales in Luganda. Born in about 1865, he was apparently converted to Christianity by the CMS in the early 1830s. Like many of his contemporaries, Kaggwa acquired a passion for writing, and appears to have begun at an early date to record events of the 1830s and 1890s. By 1894 he had already written a small book called Entalo La Buganda (The Wars of Buganda). Kiwanuka surmises that much of Kaggwa's initiative to write came from the literary atmosphere provided by the missionaries around him such as J. Roscoe, R.P. Ashe, and Walker.\(^1\) Kaggwa's family has argued that it was John Roscoe who suggested to Kaggwa that he should write in Luganda what he himself was writing in English. It was Kaggwa who provided almost all the informants for Roscoe's study, The Buganda (London, 1911). Kaggwa's studies, Kiwanuka notes, had some surprising omissions in informants which suggested that he "discriminated against some informants on political and religious grounds".\(^2\) Memories of the civil and religious wars of the 1830s and '90s were obviously too fresh in many minds to allow


\(^2\) Ibid., p.xxxiv.
many people to be amenable to Kaggwa's efforts. Some members of the Royal Family presumably regarded him as a traitor for his collaboration with the colonial regime, and his part in the deposition of King Mwanga II. To many Catholics and Muslims he was no more than the leader of the Protestant faction. And apart from being selective in his choice of informants, he also had to appease his Christian mentors. His discussion of Baganda religion, for instance, suffered from his desire not to offend the CMS. That Kaggwa was able to write so many works and actually get them published is a good indication that the cultural climate in Uganda was markedly different from that in settler-dominated neighbouring Kenya.

Two prominent Ugandan cultural nationalists of a later generation were Akiki Nyabongo and E.B. Kalibala, both of whom studied at the Tuskegee Institute in the United States. Nyabongo, as we have already seen, had while in America launched an attack on the Phelps-Stokes misconceptions about African education, rejecting the emphasis on agricultural-industrial vocational training.

We are here to acquire all of Western culture that can be useful to us; the elements of Western culture that are suitable for us will be linked to ours, to form the new African culture that is to arise.1

Nyabongo's criticisms were thus not only of vocational training, but of the European prerogative to decide those aspects of the African patrimony which should be preserved, and what might profitably

1. Quoted in King, Pan-Africanism and Education, p.
be adapted from the West. In a number of mild, and not overtly polemical works, including *Africa Answers Back*, *The Bicoro Stories*, and *The Story of an African Chief*, he presented a refutation of Western disparagement of African culture. In a manner similar to Kaggwa, he simply wrote about his culture in a straightforward way without being burdened by European-Christian induced guilt.

Kalibala, who published a volume entitled *Nakaima and the Clayman, and other African Folktales* (1946), during the 1930s set up an independent Aggrey Memorial School which would be free of missionary and administration influence. Later, at Howard and Columbia Universities he developed a detailed critique of "Native Education" in M.A. and Ph.D. theses.

One of the most important books to come out of East Africa has been Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya* which is in essence an anthropological study of the Kikuyu and a justification of their customs, institutions, and values. In the Preface Kenyatta attacks the idea that Africans cannot speak for themselves but must always have their opinions interpreted by a well meaning missionary or an anthropologist who has learned their language. Part of the inspiration for *Facing Mount Kenya* came from the circumcision crisis which precipitated the independent schools movement. The roots of this crisis were located in the Kikuyu challenge to the total cultural transformation demanded of them by the missionary church. The missions excluded the possibility of selective change,

"by which the Kikuyu might absorb some elements of Western culture while rejecting others as unacceptable to their values or social institutions." Confronted by mission opposition to female circumcision, the Kikuyu sought a way of finding a realm of social and religious independence within the confines of the colonial system. Kenyatta directly challenged the missionaries on the sensitive issue of clitoridectomy.

The missionaries who attack the *irua* (circumcision) of girls are more to be pitied than condemned, for most of their information is derived from Gikuyu converts who have been taught by these same Christians to regard the custom of female circumcision as something savage and barbaric, worthy only of heathens who live in perpetual sin under the influence of the Devil. He advanced the basic Kikuyu argument for the retention of female circumcision by endeavouring to establish the fundamental connections between clitoridectomy, initiation, and Kikuyu culture as a whole. Circumcision, Kenyatta argued, was an institution which marked the boundary between childhood and adulthood, and hence was of great social and educational importance. In *Facing Mount Kenya* Kenyatta also denounced the injustice of the European expropriation of Kikuyu land, pointing out that in Kikuyu culture everything found strength and unity from the land.

1. Roseberg and Nottingham, p.150.
3. Ibid., p.133.
A culture has no meaning apart from the social organization of life on which it is built. When the European comes to Gikuyu country and robs the people of their land, he is taking away not only their livelihood, but the material symbol that holds family and tribe together. In doing this he gives one blow which cuts away the foundations from the whole Gikuyu life, social, moral and economic.1

At the same time he asserted the primary role of culture in a people's discovery of their identity,2 and as part of his desire to reproach the European colonizer, Kenyatta also made a comparison of Kikuyu (African) and European education. Whereas African education, he argued, aimed at the blending of the individual with his group, European education was concerned with the development of the individual at the expense of society.

Europeans assume that, given the right knowledge and ideas, personal relations can be left largely to take care of themselves, and this is perhaps the most fundamental difference in outlook between Africans and the Europeans.3

To the European assertion that pre-colonial African societies were authoritarian and governed by despotic chiefs, Kenyatta retorted that "the Gikuyu system of government prior to the advent of the Europeans was based on true democratic principles."4 This very point was taken up by another Kenyan, Parmenas Githendu Mockerie in his An African Speaks for his Own People. Mockerie argued that

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.317.
3. Ibid., p.121.
4. Ibid., p.186. See Chapter IX.
"the Kikuyu country had been a democracy for centuries before it came under the European power." Of course, the claim that democracy existed in African societies before colonization was an important one for the African nationalist. It was designed to refute European distortions of all African political systems as despotic, and was intended to show the Christian-democratic European colonizers that African societies possessed one of the supposed hallmarks of civilization, namely democracy.

During the 1940s and '50s there were also a number of books - Muga Gicaru's *Land of Sunshine*, Mbiyu Koinange's *The People of Kenya Speak for Themselves*, Muga Gathuru's *Child of Two Worlds* which combined biography, analysis, cultural reassertion, and the listing of grievances against the colonial power. The principal themes they dealt with were taken up more systematically by younger intellectuals in the late 1960s. In the same period the cultural revival and reassertion was being manifested in the publication of a number of historical-anthropological studies dealing with various peoples throughout East Africa: B.A. Geaga's *Home Life in Kikuyuland*, or Kariuki and Muthoni; Ronald Ngala's *Nchi na desturi za Magiriama* (The Country and Customs of the Giriama); S.H. Omide's *The Luo Girl: From Infancy to Marriage*; and S.M. Kombo's *Ustaarabu na maendeleo ya Uafrika* (The African's Civilization and Progress).

1. Mockerie, *An African Speaks for His Own People*.
The cultural reassertion and revaluation of the pre-independence period in East Africa, which so often assumed the form of accounts of the cultures of different peoples mixed with biographical elements, was linked with the growth of national consciousness and political nationalism. It was a way of responding to European denigration and undermining the justificatory myths which bolstered the position of the colonialists. In the post-independence situation, while this element is still important, but only one of several, cultural revaluation and reassertion is directed at Africa's new ruling classes and educated who are seen as being alienated from their cultural heritage, and as instruments of the physically departed, but economically and culturally present former colonial masters. Admittedly, this concern is not so different from that of the pre-independence negritudinists such as Senghor and Césaire whose work was often self-reproaching and pre-occupied with self-alienation from cultural roots. Cultural revaluation thus involves issues of differentiating African cultures from those of dominant external cultures which continue to impose themselves through schools, universities, systems of economic production, technology transference, consumption patterns, and the impact of alien cultural artifacts including films, music, clothing, books and magazines. It also involves questions of the nature of political, social, and economic institutions, and their reconstruction to meet African needs, and the spirit and values of African culture. In addition, it involves a plethora of questions relating to the
aesthetic criteria for critically evaluating African beauty, works of art and literature, and distinguishing African or black aesthetics from the dominant European ones. Cultural reassertion and revaluation is thus not simply a refutation of European claims, but much more a search for a distinct African societal and cultural identity.

The Importance of Okot p'Bitek

The foremost contemporary cultural nationalist thinker and writer in East Africa has been the Ugandan born, Kenya domiciled Okot p'Bitek, in whose substantial body of work most of the above questions have been dealt with. Okot's own background provides many of the keys to the understanding of his later intellectual concerns. He was born at Gulu in Northern Uganda, the son of a catechist teacher in Gulu and an illiterate mother. His father had left his village home at an early age to join the missionaries at Gulu, and as such Okot has no village. Okot was educated at Gulu High School and King's College, Budo. At an early stage in his life, his interest in African literature was sparked by his "mother's songs and the stories that my father performed around the evening fire". This interest persisted during his formal literary training at King's College, Budo. About this experience Okot has written:

As a sixth former at Budo ... I used to take part in the weekly seminars at the headmasters house for the final preparation for the Cambridge School Certificate. We dressed up like 'ladies and gentlemen', and sat on comfortable sofas and were served coffee. Those of us who were smokers were allowed to smoke. The atmosphere was always relaxed and pleasurable. But halfway through the evening, quite a number of us would
be snoring in the corners. When the year ended we made a bonfire of the now useless notebooks and English setbooks. Somehow, I managed to pass the literature papers; but on leaving school, I never read another novel or book of poetry, and never visited the theatre, until very much later on.¹

As a student he had participated in 'get-stuck' dances which were prohibited for school children, and had learned "with great joy and pleasure" many songs. After studying Education at Bristol, Okot returned to teach at the Sir Samuel Baker school at Gulu where Taban Lo Liyong, later to be his chief cultural antagonist, was one of his students. It was as a teacher that he talked to the old men and the poet musicians of Acholiland: Omal Adok-Too, Goya, Yona Gewaa, Acamu Lubwa Too, Oloya Acil and Abonga Bongomin Lutwala.

According to Okot

We began to organize festivals of music, dance and poetry in which the village poets and musicians and dancers came together with highly placed public officers, schoolboys and schoolgirls and students to enjoy the cultural wealth of their area.²

His best known work, Song of Lawino, which was originally written in Acoli, "was greatly inspired by these most stimulating experiences". There can be little doubt that the subsequent developments of many of Okot's ideas were nurtured during this period - especially those relating to the social role of the poet-writer and his work, and the rejection of alien definitions of literature. While he was acquainted with the otole (songs of the war dance) and the bwala (chiefly or drum dance) within which were

² Ibid., p.22.
enshrined the myths of origin and history of the chiefdoms, and with the courting songs of Acoli youth, he was also familiar with the contemporary political poetry of oral poets such as the blind and 'illiterate' Adok-Too who was gaoled by the British administration for protesting against the forced labour system.

Okot's interest in Acoli oral literature continued to develop and at Oxford, where he reacted strongly to the disparaging terminology used by Western scholars when referring to African societies, he wrote a B.Lit. dissertation on oral literature: "Oral Literature and its Social Background Among the Acholi and Lango". In this thesis, apart from describing the nature of Acholi-Lango society, he explored the social role of the lacak wer, the creators or composers of words and tunes, who are "well-known, feared and respected, because of their talent and for their ability to lampoon their enemies".1 Okot pointed out that they did not enjoy "any special economic status" and that they socially "killed" with their "sharp and painful songs". In the transitory orak songs, were contained running commentaries on the day-to-day affairs of individuals, and which "like news items in a newspaper", soon became out of date: "The vast majority of them treat local issues; and the jokes, the ‘twist of the tail’ are understood only locally."2 Many of the songs concern important persons - a chief, a jago.

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2. Ibid., p.304. See also Okot's Horn of My Love (London: Heinemann, 1974), passim.
a headmaster of an important school, an army officer, who are caught in a funny situation and "become objects of ridicule and fun". The element of protest, of hitting back, Okot suggests, is quite clear in these songs. Clearly Okot in Song of Lewino, Song of Cool, and Two Songs views himself in much the same way as his oral precursors, and as continuing a particular attitude to artistic creation. When he said

What my mother was singing about was about our society, about the chief going with somebody's wife, about a loose woman and so on. This was not professional; it was because someone thought something ought to be said and had the musical and poetical talent to state it.\(^1\)

Okot was not simply indulging in sentimentality, but grounding the social concerns of contemporary writers such as Taban, Ngugi, and himself, in the tradition of non-professional oral social commentary.

One of Okot's major concerns has been the hardening of an elite-mass communications and education gap, and hence cultural gap, which follows urban-rural lines. Central to this concern is his rejection of the dominant notion of what literature is. He points out that western scholars, by defining literature in terms of writings which are valued especially for "excellence of form and expression", effectively exclude non-literate societies. When defined in this narrow and discriminatory way, the history of literature is the history of the literature of the ruling classes.

\(^1\) Okot, *Africa's Cultural Revolution*, p.43.
Those who did take an interest in the literature of peasants and workers were not literary men, but rather folklorists and musicians. Rejecting the standard definition as "elitist, restrictive and discriminatory", Okot adopts a definition - "literature stands for all the creative works of man expressed in words" - which embraces in effect all creations, whether oral or written, which possess some coherent and discernible form. The re-definition of literature is of great importance to universities because it expands the literary curriculum to include "the rich and exciting literary materials from the African countryside". This literature, as the "expression of the soul of the nation" should become the core of the university literature curriculum. Okot has frequently pointed out that the aim of any literary activity (or more generally cultural activity)

must be to ensure that there is communication between the singer and the audience, between the story-teller and his hearers. There must be full participation by all present. Literature must not be allowed to degenerate into a quest for 'knowledge' to be attained through pains.

While Director of the National Cultural Centre and National Theatre of Uganda, for instance, he endeavoured to bridge the widening cultural and literary gap by conducting poetry readings where both intellectuals and villagers were able to contribute their own poetic offerings in a setting where mutual communication and understanding was possible. Okot is above all concerned to restore the traditional

1. Ibid., p.19.
2. Ibid., p.20.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.22.
5. Ibid., p.22.
notion of a communal artistic celebration, a concern he shares with many others. Ngugi has written that in pre-colonial societies art was functional, and not severed, as it is in modern Europe, from the physical, social and religious needs of the community.

Song, dance and music were an integral part of a community's wrestling with its environment, part and parcel of the needs and aspirations of the ordinary man. There was never, in any African society, the cult of the artist with its bohemian priests along the banks of Seine or Thames. Today the artist in Europe sees himself as an outsider, living in a kind of individual culture, and obeying only the laws of his imagination.1

Culture, because of its public nature, helped to weld society together. This Okot contends, should be its function today, and it is important to realize that the bulk of cultural activity, rather than occurring in the urban areas, is found in the countryside where "the vast majority of our people ... have a full-blooded literary culture".2

In his essay, "Literature and Man", Okot further examined the question of the definition of literature and stressed the elitism and cultural denigration contained in standard Western definitions: "Western intellectuals, who are actually members of the working class hired by the ruling class, devote their time to their masters, and an important part of their activity consists of denouncing and despising the cultures of all other societies, both in the West and abroad."3 By adopting what he describes as a "dynamic and

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2. Okot, Africa's Cultural Revolution, p.25.
3. Ibid., p.37. Okot's view of Western intellectuals is obviously ludicrous and illustrates a strong tendency on the part of African intellectuals to make rash generalizations about European society without understanding and foundation.
democratic definition of literature", Okot rejects the 'so-called' Great and Little Tradition theory of society, based as it is on the "other fallacy that literature is the activity of the elite". ¹ Of course, Okot completely misinterprets Redfield's dichotomous scheme; his dismissal of it is based on a normative choice and not on the basis of any systematic analysis. Redfield may have developed the dichotomy in relation to Yucatan, but he applied it with greatest effect to Indian and Chinese civilization. Redfield was not, as Okot strongly implies, endeavouring to impose elite or class based notions on the analysis of other cultures. His distinction between "great" and "little" traditions was drawn to show how urban-based, literate intellectual traditions develop out of the little traditions of peasant and village culture. He took into account the existence of economic surpluses in these societies which enabled a distinct specialist group of intellectuals to emerge and to refine village-derived concepts and values to a state of complexity and abstraction beyond the ready comprehension of those in the villages. Redfield linked the formation of the "great" tradition with the stage of primary urbanization. The distinction was thus based on differences of literaciy and conceptual complexity and was not developed, as Okot suggests, to justify an existing state of affairs. It is arguable that in Africa such a process was underway even in pre-colonial times. Swahili culture, for instance, possessed both "great and "little" traditions.² The imposition of colonial rule with its accompanying

intense missionary and educational activity, helped drive new cultural wedges between peoples—the illiterate and literate, the Western educated, and others. Initially the "great" tradition of the new western-educated groups or "asomi" was European—it had not developed out of any indigenous "little" tradition of the villages and peasantry. The growth of nationalism, and with it the intellectual concern for cultural revaluation and reassertion, possessed the seeds of a new "great" tradition. The African intellectual, by taking concepts and terminology from indigenous cultural sources and integrating them into new systems of thought, is participating in the types of processes outlined by Redfield. Okot is concerned that such a division should not arise because it is contrary to the nature of cultural creation in many pre-colonial African societies, and because it creates a clear and perhaps permanent cultural gap between city and village.

Okot is one of the East African intellectuals who has given serious thought to the question of language and the writer—intellectual's relationship to his community and audience. As we have already seen, he realises that vernacular languages suffer from their limited numbers of speakers and readers, and the economics of book production. Partly in response to this, he suggests that it would be desirable if, through processes of codification and standardization, there were only three or four major vernacular languages throughout East Africa: Luo, Bantu, Lango and Sudanic. However, he recognizes the need for the simultaneous co-existence of
a number of languages, simply because "whatever is chosen as the official language cannot be the only language of culture". Particular manifestations of local or specific cultures can only be expressed in their respective vernaculars. If necessary they can be translated into official or national languages to increase their range of enjoyment and appreciation. Nevertheless, Okot is not prepared to accept English or French as the cultural language of African peoples. This rejection, while stemming partly from the belief that the artist can only express himself authentically through his own language, derives much more from the realization that most cultural activities in any African country take place in the countryside, where the vernacular language is predominant.

English is, however, an extremely useful tool for international intercourse, and does provide access to a rich literary heritage. The English used in both translation and writing should not, Okot argues, be an imitation of what is supposed to be the "Queen's English". Rather, the English used will be influenced, not only by the vernaculars, but by the different experiences of groups which will give new meanings to English words. Okot notes that "for me then good English is that English which is understandable and enjoyable by the East African listener. It is the English language enriched by the concepts and ideas embedded in our local language and literature."
African Religions in Western Scholarship

Central to Okot's concern to bring about a complete re-evaluation of both the indigenous cultural heritage and that introduced during the colonial period, is his attempt in African Religions in Western Scholarship to de-Hellenize African religions and to rescue them from the clutches of social anthropologists and Christian theologians who distort their fundamental nature with their intrusive and mystifying alien concepts.

Okot's analysis begins with an attack on British social anthropology which he divides into two historical sections: evolutionary anthropology and functional anthropology. The former "propagated the myth of 'primitive' as the justification for imperialism" and the latter, which developed after the First World War, provided the "doctrine by which we were enslaved". Faced with a vast body of disparaging and distorting Western anthropological literature, the African scholar, Okot argues, should expose and destroy the false ideas about African peoples and culture that have been perpetuated by Western scholarship. An integral part of this would be the critical examination, overhauling, and rejection of terms such as Tribe, Folk, and Non-literate, which, apart from being vague, are rooted in concepts of the primitive. The African scholar should also attempt to cut through the mists of Western terminology and analysis and present African institutions and cultures as they really are. There are, Okot admits, dangers of over-reaction: "this is already happening in the field of religious studies where
African scholars now claim that African deities have all the attributes of the Christian God.\(^1\)

Okot has a particular aversion to the concept of tribe. He shows without much difficulty the confusing and contrasting definitions given to it by scholars such as Lewis, Henry Maine, Monica Wilson, Meyer Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and Lucy Mair,\(^2\) and recommends that it be no longer used in Africa. This recommendation aroused B.A. Ogot's objection that Okot does not provide a substitute or alternative term. A more serious objection, however, should be that Okot has almost completely ignored the recent debate about the meaning and usefulness of the term: his list of references has a faded, pre-1960s appearance.\(^3\)

Basic to African Religions in Western Scholarship is the unproven and dogmatic assumption that no African people believed in a High God and that "belief in a High God is the product of the Western mind."\(^4\) Those who disagree with this "truth" are mere speculators: Busia, Danquah, Kenyatta, Idowa, Abrahams, Senghor, Mbili, and other African scholars who insist that Africans had a concept of a High God are "intellectual smugglers",\(^5\) busy introducing "Greek metaphysical conceptions into African religious thought."

2. Ibid., pp.9-16.
4. Okot, African Religions in Western Scholarship, p.57.
5. Ibid., p.33.
According to Okot, the missionaries, so completely convinced of the universality of the belief in a High God, did not carry out systematic studies "in order to determine, first of all, whether or not Africans believed in a High God." In defence of African scholars, Ogot objects that Okot himself has never offered any evidence to the contrary (apart from speculations about the deities of the Nilotes), and that John Ibiti, one of Okot's chief "intellectual smugglers", had at least in his Concepts of God in Africa collected the deities of some three hundred peoples, all of which were called God.

Okot raises the question: "Why were 'pagan' deities identified with the Christian God?" In reply, he suggests that the identification stemmed firstly from the missionary need to discover African terms for God, and secondly, from a missionary desire to break down the idea that Christianity was simply a white man's religion. He does not, however, ask a more basic question, as Ogot points out: "Must a High God be a Christian God?" Are the different societies and races not capable of having their own independent visions of reality or creation. Ibiti makes this assumption when he states "I take it that the majority of the concepts presented here have sprung independently out of African reflection on God."  

Another group of intellectual smugglers according to Okot are the missionaries and modern Western Christian anthropologists who

1. Ibid., p.64.
3. Okot, African Religions in Western Scholarship, p.60.
are unaware that "Africans do not think metaphysically." The scanty evidence he offers for this assertion is that the term "being" has no meaning in any African language. He also suggests that Africans have "no thought of another world" and concludes that all African deities are actually continuously and geographically present and intimately concerned with the day-to-day life of the people, here on earth. No genuinely metaphysical speculations are attached to them, and there is no thought of another world. It follows then that, in so far as Africans believed in certain "powers", they may be called religious; but, as most of them did not hold beliefs in any deities similar in conception to the Christian God, we may refer to traditional Africans as atheistic in their outlook.

It is readily apparent that Okot falsely identifies belief in a High God with belief in the Christian High God. This is something which Mbiti, despite his Christian theological training, does not do. When he wrote "In all these societies, without a single exception, people have a notion of God as the Supreme Being", he was not equating a High God with the Christian High God.

Okot's critics, including B.A. Ogot and Peter Rigby, responded strongly to Okot's denial that Africans do not think metaphysically. Rigby retorted that the limited evidence adduced by Okot "certainly does not establish the basis for the incredible claim that all Africans do not think metaphysically; generalizations of the crudest

1. Okot, African Religions in Western Scholarship, p.35.
2. Ibid., pp.99-100.
kind of negritude ... empirically indefensible."¹ Ogot found it
difficult to understand why Okot had ignored one important aspect of
African metaphysics - African cosmological ideas. He wrote

"This is a surprising omission because I fail to see
how one can discuss a people's religion without an
understanding of their world-view. It is therefore
dangerous and unscholarly for p'Bitek to conclude
that Africans do not think metaphysically without a
comprehensive and serious discussion of their thoughts
about the universe and man's place in it."²

At best, Okot's reply to such criticism has been inadequate.

Apart from a brief description of what is meant by metaphysics, he
can only suggest that what is being "paraded before us as 'African
metaphysics' are actually attempts, mainly by European scholars who
are steeped in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, to interpret the
African's religious ideas in terms of that philosophy."³

Undoubtedly, however, Okot's much needed debunking of European romantics
such as Jahnheims Jahn and Flacide Tempels is based on solid
intellectual grounds.

Father Flacide Tempel's Bantu Philosophy is, Okot shows,
essentially a neoTheist recreation of what a Roman Catholic priest
intuits to be the core of African philosophy. Tempels carried out
his researches only among the Beaba of Lake Kweru and among the
Baluba, and out of this he created a model which he confidently
termed "Bantu philosophy". Okot notes that Tempels, after erecting
a model replete with words such as vital force, monotheism, Mana, and

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1. Quoted in Okot, "Reflect, reject, recreate", p.29.
2. Ogot, "Intellectual Smugglers in Africa", p.3.
animism, proceeds to present it as 'Bantu Philosophy' and not as a 'mere tool' for analysis. As Okot points out, Tempels does not claim the work is the result of his own metaphysical production; it is supposedly a systematic exposition of Bantu philosophy. However, it is one thing to justifiably and with solid foundation attack those such as Tempels and Jahn who smuggle European metaphysics and romanticism into the study of African religions; it is another thing entirely on the basis of this debunking, to boldly assert that Africans do not think metaphysically. The case, at best, is not proven.

Okot and Afro-Centred Myths

Okot's attacks on social anthropology and the dominant approaches to the study of African religion are not to be viewed in isolation. Rather, they represent part of his much broader concern to restructure African thought and reduce the importance of European importations. Although not a Marxist - "Marxism is inapplicable in the African situation" - Okot nevertheless accepts what may loosely be described as a Marxist view of the nature of ideology. He argued that

Western sociological theories may be described as myths propounded by European thinkers to promote the interests of certain classes in the Western world. Social anthropological theories are myths composed by Western scholars about peoples in colonial bondage to promote the interests of imperialism.

2. Okot, "Reflect, reject, recreate", p.29.
He notes, without any elaboration, that St. Simon and Auguste Comte, the founders of Western sociology, propounded their theories to promote the interests of the middle class which had seized power from what they called the "useless" aristocracy. Marxist sociology "preaches the destruction of all exploiters" while, according to Okot, the elite theory of Mosca and Pareto, and Max Weber's "charisma" (sic) are all reactions "protesting against Marxism". The functionalism of Parsons, the "high priest of American capitalism", is similarly a rejection of the idea of revolutionary socialism. Further, Okot suggests that Western social theories were founded to meet "the challenge of social change as viewed by Western thinkers," and that their key concepts of class, democracy, conservatism, bourgeoisie, feudalism, radicalism, and class struggle reflect "European social history". That they reflect the European experience is indisputable, but Okot does not consider whether they are still of relevance in the African situation, or can be profitably reinterpreted in the light of the African historical situation. Instead, he argues that it is necessary for African thinkers to "stop repeating parrot-like, the social theories of Europe", and to create new and Afro-centred myths on which to reconstruct "our new nation". African thinkers, must analyse objectively the nature of African society and propose Afro-centred social theories of society, government, and philosophy of life which

1. Ibid.
have firm roots in African soil: "These will have to take into account the traditional background of the African peasants as well as the challenges of the modern world."

While Okot accepts that Western sociological theories or myths have been propounded to promote the interests of certain classes, he is extremely loath to draw the right inferences from the generalization. He does not consider, for example, whose interests, or whose class interests, new Afro-centred theories and myths will serve. This is a conspicuous omission. Okot is acutely aware of increasing social differentiation in African societies based on economic factors and education, and is able to talk about a "dictatorship of the educated". Why would new Afro-centred theories not serve the interests of a petty-bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie, or privileged African economic groups with some other non-class appellation, or even the interests of economically depressed urban and rural labouring groups? Apparently he is able to accept the notion (despite his own identification of an elite-mass gap), fundamental to doctrines of African socialism, that Africa is a classless society and any Afro-centred theory must serve the interests of the communal whole rather than the interests of the privileged or depressed part.

Okot's concern with the development of Afro-centred theories and myths is inextricably bound-up with the whole question of which direction and shape African post-independence society is to take. Is the post-independence society which is being created out of the "rubble of the colonial system" going to be based on true African
roots, or will it merely be at best a rootless hybrid, at worst a self-caricaturing imitation of a European society already sunk in decay? Colonial rule created a hierarchical social set-up, Okot notes which has been perpetuated in the post-independence society by cultural "apes", the products of colonial schools and universities. Such cultural "apedom" is particularly pathetic, he believes, when it is realized that Western civilization is moribund, sapped of its vigour, and bereft of direction. It is important for the African to reject ideas of development and developmental solutions from elsewhere, as well the "assumptions of colonialism which suggested that the West was ahead, and the world must catch up with it."

Africans must sit down and "create our own goals as to where we want to go. To suggest that Africans have no culture of their own is the language of apedom".1

Okot, however, is not a traditionalist as some of his more vigorous detractors have asserted.2 He recognizes the need for advances in science and technology but stipulates that they must be adapted to African cultural conditions and "basic African assumptions about what life is all about." The African education system which produces arrogant and alienated members of the "dictatorship of the educated" must be overhauled and geared to the production of people who are capable of spearheading the "village revolution" in accordance with the "wisdom of Africa". He points out that


Those who are going to effect the village revolution must be deeply versed in African philosophy and culture. The village revolution in Africa has no place for apes with degrees which show they are experts in things in other men's countries, but who are ignorant about things at home.¹

African progress must be viewed, Okot suggests, within the context of a number of major questions, including that of "Where are we now?" This question, he adds, "involves critical analysis and study of the existing social, economic and political organizations. It involves debates as to the merits and demerits of the present and a determination to change it, to make it become what we want it to become."²

The Cultural Debate in Song of Lawino and Song of Ocol

Cultural conflicts hold a central place in the poems of Okot p'Bitek, and his attitude to these cultural conflicts is much closer to the negritude writers than most other English-language writers in East Africa. He is not, however, as Mazrui and Taban Lo Liyong contend a negritudinist. He is not confronted by a colonial situation, but by a neo-colonial situation where the white man is not necessarily physically present but is very much economically and culturally present. It should be emphasized that whereas the earlier East African cultural nationalists such as Kenyatta and Keinange used cultural reassertion as a means of heightening national consciousness and responding to European claims about African culture and society, Okot, like Joseph Buraga and

1. Okot, "Which way are we headed?"
2. Ibid.
Okello Oculi directs his cultural reassertion at the new African ruling classes. The basic idea which runs through Okot's poems has been stated in *African Religions in Western Scholarship* as follows:

> The most critical decision which leaders of Africa must take is not so much in the economic or political fields, but in the field of culture and of basic human values ... the basic conflict is between the fundamental assumptions of Western civilization and the fundamental assumptions of African civilization.¹

This is, of course, the basic concern of cultural nationalist thought in East Africa. Buruga, for instance, in his book length poem, *The Abandoned Hut*, stringently attacks the anti-traditionalism and the cultural iconoclasm present in East Africa, and laments the decline of traditional morality and its replacement, incomplete as it is, by shifting, false values. Buruga decries the onslaught of materialism, a crass materialism which has corroded personal relations and reduced everything to market terms. The continued ideological and cultural neo-colonialism is neither, he infers, a solution to developmental problems, nor to the moral and spiritual malaise which afflicts African societies. The narrator of *The Abandoned Hut* warns:

> If you go on
> Growing the strange ideas
> You got from
> Other countries
> You may one day
> Fall into the abyss
> of despair
> One day
> You may be dying of thirst
> And find no one
> To give you water.²

Similarly, in Okello Oculi's *Orphan* it is suggested that if Africa is to reassert its identity, its soul, or its "manness", it must not mimic diseases in others in the name of "catching up". No husband borrows soldiers to fertilize his wife with, and no sane woman goes for pregnancy from the murderer of her husband.¹

African identity must be worked out in terms of the African past. There must be a reaffirmation of faith in Africa's own strength and vitality.

Give the injured manness in you a chance! Feed its yearnings for a healing. On the curative herb manness of tenderness To manness in others.²

Okot advances much the same views as Buruga and Oculi, but builds greater tension into his treatment of the cultural debate by allowing a series of poetic works to embrace contradictions.

Okot uses the turbulent marriage of Ocol and Lawino to analyse in a witty and at times poignant way the real absence of a cultural marriage. He does, in Kamenju's Fanonist terms,

demonstrate how out of the Manicheanism of imperialism in Africa flow two rival and conflicting aesthetics: on the one hand, the neo-colonial aesthetics of capitulation and subjugation whose representative and spokesman is the tragicomic figure of Ocol, the white-washed, mission-educated graduate of the colonial university; and on the other, the aesthetics of black pride, black affirmation, resistance and ultimate liberation confidently articulated by Ocol's defiant and proud wife, Lawino, the representative of the patriotic African masses.³


2. Ibid.

The problem with such "right on, brother" rhetoric is that, while it does crudely state the problem Okot is pre-occupied with, it brushes over its complexity and thrusts a sophisticated political consciousness on a woman, Lawino, whose perspectives move little beyond the village and its way of life.

Okot is in many ways the triumph of the colonial civilizing mission, having through schools and Christianity embraced almost totally European culture. Although he rejects the white man, he also bitterly laments that he was born black:

Mother, mother
Why
Why was I born
black?

His acute inferiority complex leads him to denounce and desecrate his cultural heritage as a black man, and to deny everything which serves to remind him of his blackness. He would

..... arrest
All the village poets
Musicians and tribal dancers

.............
The sustainers of
Village morality,

destroy African literature, and "close down all schools of African Studies". He would detain the "preachers of negritude", explode the "balloons of the African Personality", and consider it of no relevance whether or not black men built the "citadel of Zimbabwe" or "architected the Pyramid". He wants to

Smash all these mirrors
That I may not see
The blackness of the past
From which I came
Reflected in them.¹

Ocol has indeed succumbed to the colonial dictate that "the colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards (and) becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness."² The civilization he upholds is that of knowledge with its gifts of prosperity. He proclaims

We will not just
Breach the wall
Of your mud hut
To let in the air ...
We will set it ablaze
Let fire consume it all
This liar of backwardness.³

He tells Lawino to

Stop crying
You woman,
Do you think those tears
Can quench the flames of civilization?⁴

Lawino, the neglected wife, is defensive about her position. Ignorance is not her word for her situation. Her comparisons of traditional African values and those of the urban dwellers and the new ruling classes are made to show that ancient values possess coherence and vitality, and are not only things of the past. She says defensively that

¹ Ibid., p.31.
² Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p.13.
⁴ Ibid., p.79.
My mother taught me
The way of the Acholi
And nobody should
Shout at me
Because I know
The customs of our people!

She is not wholly on the defensive, however, because Ocol is open
to attack on several fronts through his upholding of Westernism and
his position as a member of the new ruling classes. In politics
he is a local representative of one party while his brother supports
the other. To Lawino politics is a disintegrating force. She
comments on the stupidity of political personalities and parties who
say that they want essentially the same things but cannot even agree
to be seen together, and of the splitting of society, family, and
marriage because of the political parties.

The new parties have split the homestead
As the battle axe splits the skull!

Politics has aligned the people behind politicians who are more
interested in accumulating the spoils - Privileged Looting - of
office than in fulfilling their promises to the people. Lawino
informs us that

The stomach seems to be
A powerful force
For joining the political parties.

She recalls that

2. Ibid., p.183.
3. Oculi, Orphan, p.57.
4. Okot, Song of Lawino, p.190.
Someone said
Independence falls like a bull elephant
And the hunters
Rush to it with drawn knives
Sharp shining knives
For carving the carcass.
And if your chest
Is small, bony and weak
They push you off
And if your knife is blunt
You get the dung on your elbow
You come home empty-handed
And the dogs bark at you.¹

She laments that Independence has produced no fundamental transformation of the lives of people in the villages. The parties claim to represent the masses, but in the villages things remain virtually unchanged. The politicians "return to the countryside ... for the next elections", ² and then go back to the city. The politicians and the party stalwarts "throw themselves into soft beds", ³ while

the hip bones of the voters
Grow painful
Sleeping on the same earth
They slept before Uhurul⁴

Ocol, of course, is prepared to justify the politician's privileged position by denying the role of the masses in the struggle for Independence. He asks

Tell me
My friend and comrade,
Answer me simply and frankly,
Apart from the two shillings fee
For Party membership,
And the dances you performed
When the Party chiefs
Visited your village,
And the slogans you shouted
That you did not understand,

1. Ibid., pp.138-9.
2. Ibid., p.195.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
What was your contribution
In the struggle for Uhuru?

Comrade,
Do you not agree
That without your present leaders
Uhuru could never have come?¹

But Lawino can only think that if the political protagonists, the political parties, were to channel "the fury ... with which they fight each other" into attacking poverty, disease and ignorance, then perhaps some of the ideals of Uhuru would be attained.

Lawino recognizes furthermore that Ocol is a pernicious petty bourgeoise politician who has been groomed by the colonial power to serve as its intermediary and agent. She bluntly tells him

Listen my husband,
Hear me cry!
You may not know this
You may not feel so,
But you behave like
A dog of a white man!

A good dog please its master
It barks at night
And hunts in the salt lick
It chases away wild cats
That come to steal the chicken!
And when the master calls
It folds its tail between the legs.

The dogs of white men
Are well trained
And they understand English!
When the master is eating
They lie by the door
And keep guard
While waiting for left-overs.²

This passage, with its image of Ocol as a scavenger "waiting for left-overs", is reminiscent of Fanon's characterization of the

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¹ Okot, Song of Ocol, p.56.
² Ibid., pp.204-5.
national bourgeoisie stepping into "the shoes of the former European settlement"¹ and discovering its "historic mission: that of intermediary" and the Western bourgeoisie's business agent."² Cool is also open to attack for his devotion to his new woman, the westernized Clementine. She is a piteous spectacle, an open target since her Western affectations are so much more superficial than Cool's - she "aspires to look like a white woman", her lipstick smeared mouth is "like raw yaws", and her amply applied face powder when it is moistened by sweat makes her look as if "she has dysentery".³ For Lawino she is a ridiculous creature, and she is even more outraged because it is for such a creature that

- my husband despises me,
  He laughs at me,
  He says he is too good
  To be my husband.⁴

Lawino's approach to Cool's condition, Kamenju shows, is to diagnose his state of a "severe affliction of colonial complexes" and to prescribe as the cure "his symbolic ceremonial cleansing by means of the therapeutic resources and wisdom of the people."⁵ But first he must overcome the "scales that have formed" on his eyes.

She tells him

1. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.122.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.27.
The blindness that you got in the library
Will be removed by the diviner!
You must vomit
The shyness you ate in the Church...
Spit out in the insults with the water
The abuses you learnt
From your white masters. 1

She points out that by denouncing his cultural heritage, and
dismissing her as "a mere village girl", he was abusing not only
his ancestors, but the dignity and humanity of African society and
all black people. When Lawino tells Cool

Listen Cool, my old friend
The ways of our ancestors
Are good,
Their customs are solid
And not hollow
They are not thin, not easily breakable
They cannot be blown away
By the winds
Because their roots reach deep in the soil
I do not understand
The ways of foreigners
But I do not despise their customs
Why should I despise yours? 2

She also reveals that she is not necessarily arguing for a return to
the past. She is a sensitive person who argues for cultural
relativity and the acceptance of this position by those who are
educated and call themselves modern, but who do nothing other than
engage in blind "apadom" or imitation of what they perceive to be
European - like the wearing of "blanket suits" in the middle of the
hot season.

Lawino points out that it is the educated African who is most
alienated from his cultural heritage. In the period of Independence

1. Okot, Song of Lawino, pp.211-12.

2. Ibid., p.29.
During the quest for cultural identity, it is really the educated African who has no culture or tradition to fall back on. This, as Okot, Nyerere and Mohiddin among others have argued, has serious implications for the realisation of any fundamental socio-economic and political transformation involving the mass participation of the people. As Mohiddin notes, "it is the elites who are intimately involved and who have the effective power to transform society". But as they are divorced from the masses and African culture, and man colonially inherited institutions which give them their power and wealth, are they "reclaimable" or are they going to cling to "foreign magic bags" as the solution to Africa's problems? 

Similarly, Okot is wondering whether African elites, as cultural "apes", are capable of generating the cultural resurgence necessary for change. He is asking the crucial question, Ngugi notes, whether imitation or apedon can ever lead to creation. Moreover, Okot is suggesting, the estrangement of the educated African and intellectual from his culture and people prevents him from interpreting the experience of colonialism and independence in a way which is able to provide continuity and meaning to the changes which have affected all Africans.

In a final plea, Lawino appeals to Okot:

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2. Ngugi wa Thiongo, Introduction to Okot's Africa's Cultural Revolution, p.xii.
Here is my bow harp
Let me sing greetings to you ...
Let me show you
The wealth in your house
Ocol, my husband,
Son of the bull
Let no one uproot the Pumpkin. 1

This is certainly something Okot is not prepared to do.

African Humanism, Religion and the Crises of Identity and Security

In Okello Oculi's long poem Orphan, an African child berates his mother for having rushed to

the false hopes of romance with. The Wild Cat in the Western glow. 2

The Orphan clearly represents modern African man seated at the junction of two paths, torn from his ancient traditions. But why has the poet used the wild cat as a symbol for his European father, and hence for colonialism and European influence? Because this wild cat, "ngunydeng", is a beast that traps hens by opening its anus for hens to peck and poke. When a hen has dipped its head far enough in to enable a grip, the wild cat suddenly closes its anus. It can thus carry a heavy weight without a fight. The hen suffocates fast. 3

This is modern Africa's plight. And it is the rashness and folly of the "hens", even more than the cunning of the "wild cats" which is lamented and attacked by the writer. Africans who have given themselves up to European influences, to the lure of the promises of a better life in the Europeanised city, have rejected traditional

3. Ibid., p.103.
culture, and abandoned themselves to moral and spiritual uncertainty and suffocation.

It is the uncertainty of fluctuating values, and the new values stressing the importance of wealth, power, and "modernity" for its own sake, that makes living in the new societies such a difficult and confusing and unsatisfying experience for the European educated. This confusion is central to Eneniko Seruma's novel, The Experience which deals with the complex relationship between two European and two African characters. Tom Miti is a Muganda village boy who has made love to the neighbour's daughter, gone to study in the United States, and suffered under the white man's racism. He returns to a society which is still dominated by the spectre of whiteness. With the other three characters he goes to see the Karamajong, a "tribe" which until now has resisted missionary and administration efforts to clothe and civilise them. The headman wants to marry Sarah, the European woman, and this leads Miti to wonder "was every black man vulnerable to whiteness?" Miti attempts to be African by falling in love with a Karamajong beauty - "the blacker and more unwhite the girl could be, the better for Miti." He would show "those English and Americans who held education and materialism supreme qualities ... his utter contempt for them." He would recover his ancestral core, his African identity.

2. Ibid., p.142.
3. Ibid., p.143.
Here you see white people, here I am; you touched me with your bewitching influence and yet I escaped unscathed. I am still a genuine black man in my paradise of simplicity, without psychological problems, heart failures, air pollution or anxieties over two women for I have twenty that are only flattered to do my bidding.¹

Of course, his proposed marriage to the Karamajong beauty falls through. Miti’s education and European experience prevent him from integrating himself into the traditional society and from completely returning to the past. He decides to return to his father’s village, to the security and stability of the life there, and reconstruct the diverse elements of his life.

In a newspaper interview, Seruma said that the experience swings like a “pendulum from the Africaness of the Karamajong and the Westerness of his (Miti’s) British friends. This is just symbolic of the way we Africans swing like a pendulum from Left to Right.”² He pointed out that few Africans were “dedicated to their values” in the same way that a “Chinese is dedicated to Chinese Communism.” His short story, “The Heart Seller” was written to show that the selling of the heart is “just symbolic of the African who just embraces western values for the convenience that kind of life offers and it is the attitude of the writer that a heart seller like Muavu has no way to end but disastrously.”³

Many East African intellectuals tend to view with regret the weakening of “traditional” values not because they are African, but

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.15.
because they offered every man, regardless of his accomplishments, opportunities for genuine personal satisfaction in life. It is not only the abandoned traditionalists and those caught between "two worlds" for whom the experience of Independence has been painful and hollow. The men and women of the city, lured by the prosperity the city is supposed to offer, and cut off more or less permanently from their rural kin and past, have found little satisfaction. The city, while it releases the African from certain communal responsibilities and pressures, offers little in return for the loss of personal stability. This theme constantly recurs in literature: in George Muruah's novel Never Forgive Father; in Robert Serumaga's Return to the Shadows; and in Charles Nangaa's Son of Woman.

In Samuel Kahiga's story, "In Silent Shadows", a "successful" executive is critical of his educated girl-friend for having accepted the meaningless conformity of urban life, and yet in a way he envies her. The executive is as much a passive victim of his life of mediocrity and materialism as he is detached and alienated from it. His relationship with his girlfriend is typical of relationships in the urban milieu from which they felt powerless to escape.

In our circle of the whirlpool we have been thrown together and the forces around us hold us in place. Our dazed minds say that we have chosen it. In the maelstrom of the city, the urban dwellers have little choice but to cling to each other for a security which is transitory and illusory. Kahiga sees the city as a type of whirlpool. For

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2. Ibid., p.13.
Okello Oculi in *Prostitute* a muddy stream of rain water becomes a microcosmic society. The water, once dirty, will never be purified again.

When things get dirty and turn brown they get dirtier and browner more and more as if caught up in a huge long net that starts folding over one more and more with each new commotion from within until the commotion grows weaker and weaker and then surrender comes.¹

In this muddy stream, people surge in confusion and helplessness, sometimes finding some peace, and then being thrown back into the confusion "to join their course of destiny for the long ride of ordeal."²

Some writers reminisce most nostalgically about the restfulness and peace of the rural traditional life. When Lombe, in *Hubadiri's No Bride Price*, returns to his village accused of bribery, he is welcomed by the villagers and provided with a security and peace denied him in the city. In Charles Mangua's novel, *A Tail in the Mouth*, the city is portrayed as an alienating, exploiting agent in which men struggle to establish a meaningful identity. Moira, an ex-freedom fighter robbed of his land by the Loyalists, shifts to Nairobi where his life is one of almost complete misfortune. He crashes his taxi, his girl friend commits suicide after discovering his unfaithfulness, and he drifts into a life of petty thieving and scrounging. Homeless, penniless, and jobless, he seeks a sense of direction and assistance from a Roman Catholic priest, but is abused and dismissed as a drunkard. He is only saved by two of his old village friends who have recovered from the wreckage of Mau Mau.

2. Ibid., p.39.
and established new roots. They persuade him to return to the village where he can make a new life on his old land. The land will give him a new identity and a non-alienative relationship with the products of his own labour and his fellow men. There is also the inference, however, that the types of urban capitalist values which Moira acquired in the city will be valuable in the cash-crop coffee farming he will undertake.

John Mbiti, the Kenyan poet and Makerere Professor of Theology, has viewed the changes during the colonial and post-independence periods as basically a religious experience. Mbiti's approach to traditional culture and contemporary solutions has been profoundly influenced by the fact that he is a Christian theologian whose major concern is not only to examine traditional religion and its primacy in African life, but to bring about some type of fusion between indigenous practices and beliefs and the external imposition.

Mbiti argues that in their traditional life African peoples were deeply religious. Religion coloured "their understanding of the universe and their empirical participation in that universe, making life a profoundly religious phenomenon." Under the impact of Islam and Christianity especially, traditional religions have had to yield their hold in shaping "people's values, identities and meaning in life." They have been undermined rather than overthrown, and continue to exert a great deal of influence upon individuals and communities. The undermining of traditional solidarity, Mbiti points out, has led to the search for new values, identity and

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security which were previously supplied and assured by the primacy of religion. The search, Mbti asserts, has been concentrated more in the religious than the ideological sphere; this is attested by the prevalence of numerous Christian sects and continued proselytization and conversion. Ideologies, Mbti notes, are new and accessible in intellectual terms to a very small educated minority.

According to Mbti, "African peoples experience modern changes as a religious phenomenon, and respond to it in search of a stability which is fundamentally coloured by a religious ... outlook." Traditional religions have been highly resilient, and conversion to Christianity and Islam is often only of a superficial nature: "Christianity and Islam have made only an astonishingly shallow penetration in converting the whole man in Africa, with all his historical-cultural roots, social dimensions, self-consciousness and expectations." As such, traditional religions present a challenge to Christianity and Islam because they successfully evolved a system which was able to humanistically embrace in a religious whole secular, socialist, communist and capitalist elements.

Mbti points out that co-existing with the religious search for new values and identity has been the ideological search. At one level there has been the Christian ecumenical movement concerned with healing the breaches of division among members of the different Christian traditions. At another level there has been negritude

1. Ibid., p.263.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.266.
which, because of its vagueness, multiplicity of forms and definitions, has only been an ideological reference point for a relative few people in mainly Francophone Africa. Mbiti states that negritude is a comfortable exercise for the elite who wants, seeks and finds it when he looks at the African Nsamani and hopes for an African future. It has neither dogma nor taboo, neither feast days nor ceremonies. You only need to imagine it and you will be able to identify it; be lucid about it and you will be able to see it. Negritude is because it is said to be.¹

There is also the equally, if not more nebulous and elusive African Personality which Mbiti believes, really only has a place in the "realm of art". On another level, there is African unity and Pan-Africanism and African socialism, which represent progress but it is, he argues, a progress in search because it "lacks concreteness, historical roots, and a clear and practical goal, at least for the individual to be able to find in it a sense of direction worthy of personal identification and dedication."²

The ideological claim of Negritude, the African Personality and African socialism is oriented to the Nsamani (historical) roots which are profoundly religious,³ and also point to the future. The traditional religion which is strong in Nsamani myths is "absolutely devoid of future myths". Furthermore, Mbiti notes, traditional religions lack their scholarly champions to advocate their use, but their main contribution lies in the fact that they provide in a sense the bases for the ideological claim, as well as

1. Ibid., p.269.
2. Ibid., p.271.
3. Ibid., p.273.
a model for the type of all-embracing philosophy of life capable of meeting the identity and security needs of contemporary Africans.

A strong stand in East African thought asserts that traditionally, African societies were characterized by humanism rather than materialism, scientific or otherwise. The emphasis has been on man, and the family system and communal life, it is argued, shows this. Apart from its spiritual aspect, the communal society possessed certain qualities which should be retained—collectivism, unanimity, palaver, mutual aid, and the solidarity of the individual and the group—and used as the basis for the new African society. In Oculi's Orphan there is the suggestion that Africa will lead the way in the reassertion of humanistic values largely because, despite erosion they are still present in African societies. The orphan's father tells him:

Humaneness and morals were known and practiced
Before you began life;
Tenderness, humility and decency
By man to man in honour of manness.

He urges him to revive those virtues which do not belong to Africa alone, but which are basic to humanity. According to David Rubadiri,

The only thing that Africa has got to boast about, which can contribute towards humanity, is the spiritual force which we still retain. A rough road doesn't bother me very much. The fact that I can't point at skyscrapers or fantastic machinery when I take people to my capital doesn't bother me at all. Sometimes I'm thankful about this. The African is not only a poet, but is a creative human being. He has still got a sense of values which a number of our friends in other countries are beginning to lose because of fast and rapid economic

1. Oculi, Orphan, p.98.
development. Of course, I want these things to come. I want a better way of life for my people, but it must be directed with a spiritual force behind it, not just for show. 

This concern for African spiritual values and humanism is given expression in No Bride Price, where Rubadiri argues that attempts to bridge the economic gap between African and advanced industrial nations have led only to the sacrifice of Miria, Lombe's mistress, and people like her. Rubadiri deplores the sacrifice of people such as Miria, but clings to an element of optimism. The situation is symbolised by the phoenix, a fabulous Arabian bird that burned itself away every five hundred years or so and rose rejuvenated from its ashes. Miria's sacrifice, the death of the repulsive labour minister Choso, and the military coup, are not seen as leading to an endless cycle of coups and violence, but as signs of a rejuvenation of African society.

Rubadiri attacks the dehumanizing effect of modern technology and of industrial society, and the fluctuating, uncertain values of a rootless urban existence. Communal values, while they may take priority over the individual, do not crush him as the values of individualism do, and provide him with meaning and security. Rubadiri stresses communal obligations and values in a disparaging attack on an African Socialism that Africans in a communal setting practiced quite naturally. When Lombe arrives at his village he is welcomed with food by the villagers.

Food began to arrive from the homes nearby. This was the custom. One welcomed strangers and especially relatives because they belonged. This thing had fallen on Lome's house had fallen on all of them. It was their duty to see it through and finalise it properly. This was inspiring concern of man for man is what the big people in the big new government had been trying to write down. They had given it a big name, "African Socialism."

Rubadiri shares an affinity with the apostles of negritude, his romantic vision of the humanising effect of an African "spiritual force" and African values being somewhat akin to strands within Senghor's thought.

**African Socialism**

At the political and ideological level, cultural reassertion has found its most concrete and detailed expression in various doctrines of African socialism which find their raison d'être in the anti-imperialist struggle and the exigencies of national reconstruction. The doctrine of African socialism supposedly represents a way of differentiating the socialism of Africa from other kinds of socialism, particularly Marxism, thus preserving a distinct societal and cultural identity and dissociating Africa from the ideological battles of the "Cold War." During the early 1960s especially, the idea expressed by Tom Mboya that Africa "should be left alone in these formative years to develop her own personality and her own brand of socialism," was a strong one.

Embodied in the cluster of ideas associated with African socialism is the search for some common African identity and the attempt to ground the roots of socialism in the indigenous societies. The foundations of African socialism are to be discerned, it is argued, in traditional socio-economic structures, including the communal ownership of land, the egalitarian character of society, and the extensive network of social obligations that led to considerable cooperation. In traditional societies, Migot-Adholla points out, "reciprocity and redistribution in conditions of scarcity made possible the mutual dependence which in turn ensured that while no individual accumulated excessive wealth, no man suffered undue deprivation. It cannot be overemphasized that such an egalitarian distribution of remunerative awards necessarily implied the coercion of the 'collective conscience' upon the individual."  

There is a stress on the value of hard work and sacrifice which finds justification in tradition where the African, tied to collectivities such as the compound or extended family as the basic unit of both production and consumption, made sacrifices for those groups. Strongly implanted in the notion of African socialism is the view that African society is by nature classless and collectivist. This was Nyerere's position in the pre-Arusha Declaration period when he wrote his booklet, Ujamaa – the basis of African socialism.


2. Ibid.
The foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the Extended Family. The true African Socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the 'brethren' for the extermination of the 'non-brethren'. He rather regards all men as his brethren — as members of his ever extending family.

Ujamaa, then, or 'Familyhood', describes our Socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the Exploitation of Man by Man. And it is equally opposed to doctrinaire Socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable Conflict between Man and Man. 1

In similar vein Mboya, in rejecting the relevance of European socialism, pointed out that "there is no division into such classes in Africa, where states come to nationhood through the pressure of mass movements and where governments consist of the leaders of the workers and peasants rather than the nobility (sic) who have ruled Europe." 2 In effect, as Arrighi and Saul have observed, the views of presumptive solidarity and an automatic socialist "attitude of mind" have prevailed. 3 "The ideals and attitudes which nourish African socialism", Mboya asserted, "are indigenous, and are easily learnt, for they have been expressed for generations in the language of the soil which our people understand, and not in foreign slogans." 4 There are few Africans who are so "detribalised that these attitudes no longer have their hold on them" and most of those who have moved

to work in the towns, Nboya added, "still understand these values and still behave in the same fashion as they did in their original homes and land units."  

The claim has led, in the case of Magago Alot, for instance, to the equation of mass pressure such as Maji Maji and participation in nationalist struggles with a propensity to socialism and justice.  

Many of the concerns of cultural nationalists and African socialists are dealt with by Okello Oculi in his discussion of the full-africanization of post-independence society. Unlike many others, Oculi touches upon substantive questions such as the contradiction between the nature of the inherited colonial bureaucracy and its underlying rationale, and the values of traditional society and, by extension, African socialism. According to Oculi, the fundamental issue facing African post-independence societies is whether they will be fully africanized, or "remain a hybrid of Europeanism and neo-colonial control". The issue, he adds, is not simply the extent to which the control of economic and political power is in the hands of Africans, but also of the "degree to which the structure of institutions both economic and political and their workings, are peculiarly African: are fundamentally in conformity with the philosophy and ethical values of Africans."  

Adopting a basically Marxist approach, Oculi argues that Europe, by imposing colonial rule, "put Africa within a pattern of societal and socio-economic forces and trends that has already started in the European system of societies."  

Africa was absorbed into the

1. Ibid., p.167.
4. Ibid., p.12.
international capitalist system with the result that its mode of economic production and relations of production were altered. Colonialism, Oculi suggests, "froze the path of African social development" and set in motion a "purposeful and systematic level of disintegrating forces."\(^1\) The colonial period was one of European initiative and participation in history and central to that initiative, Oculi asserts, was the "disintegration of African society and patterns of societal growth that had been achieved". Given the extent of the penetration of the capitalist system and its disruptive impact, it was imperative that Africanisation be much more than a change of personnel, and involve the reorganisation of economic processes in conformity with the basic values of African culture. The return to African culture, to traditional forms of organisation and values, and the "consultation that leaders made to reservoirs of social experience of traditional Africa" was no mere exercise in "tribal romanticism". Rather, it was an attempt to recover African initiative in a situation where Africa's own path of development had been halted and disrupted by "colonial anti-development", and determined by external forces. If Independence, Oculi suggests meant the possession of the capacity to participate in history with any degree of autonomy, the possession of initiative, then Africa had no choice but to reject and reverse the momentum of capitalistic development, and capitalism itself.\(^2\)

To the possible objections from those such as Talcott Parsons that the momentum of capitalism could not be reversed, Oculi responds by asserting, on the basis of little more than a few rhetorical statements

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1. Ibid., p.13.
2. Ibid.
and certainly no empirical evidence, that "the most exciting drama that has been happening in Africa in the area of social planning is the conscious and systematic reversal of these trends of colonial capitalism's development." 1

The basic contradiction in the post-independence situation, Oculli suggests, is that while "social imagination" in Africa is committed to the reassertion of African values as the foundation on which socio-economic processes should be carried out in the new Africa, Africa has inherited forms of social organization which have taken their form from the values and ideologies of capitalist Europe. One of the best examples of this, he contends, is bureaucracy.

The colonial bureaucracy was, Oculli points out, antagonistic to the values of traditional African socialism - man's cooperative spirit, his desire to work in harmony with his friends, desire to serve, the well-being of the community - because it emphasized individualism, the rewards of personal achievement, the use of position to wield power over others below oneself or outside the bureaucratic machine, the spirit of competition at the expense of another, inequality in rewards for work, and, in the colonial situation, racial inequality. The colonial bureaucracy was an "instrument of conflict used by one racial group against another racial group" and an instrument for "collecting, harvesting the fruits of that conflict for the winner. i.e., the colonial power." 2 Oculli points out that there has been virtually no attempt to question

1. Ibid., p.14.
2. Ibid., p.15.
"the whole concept of importing the system of bureaucratic organisation" developed in European societies, and its incompatibility with the "types of cultural values that prevail in the tribal system."¹

The ideology and structure of colonial bureaucracy imparted a number of attitudes which have to be destroyed before full-Africanization can be realized. A socialist transformation of the bureaucracy has thus to face a number of problems including the use of power against the people, and the use of power for material, individual wealth, and to replace anti-socialist values with those stressing service to the community, relations of equality, and the spirit of communalism and cooperation and not personal advancement.

Culli raises the question of the flow of power and command in the bureaucracy, and the relationship of the young university trained bureaucrat and his older but ill-qualified junior. The issue, he suggests, is problematic in a society that outside the bureaucracy "holds old-age as a sacred condition, surmounts it with dignity, sees the elderly not only as reservoirs of wisdom and deep experience of the trickeries of human existence but, more importantly, as those who have given their best to the service, rearing and maintenance of the community." More generally, it raises the problem of the role of the old in the new Africa and more concretely, the position of the elders in the new political community, and the process of decision-making for the total political system. The colonial system put the elders at the periphery of power, even though minimal concessions were often made in terms of quasi-advisory and judicial councils.

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1. Ibid., p.13.
Oculi suggests that in the programme of Africanizing personnel and the processes of decision-making, "there has to be some form of the 'independence of the elders' from the oblivion and silence at the periphery of the political system."

The Three-Pronged Critique of Cultural Nationalism and African Socialism

The first major critical response to the cultural nationalists has come from those such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Grant Kamenju who, while they share with the cultural nationalists a concern for cultural identity, place much greater stress than them on the economic foundations of culture. Ngugi's discussion, especially in the essays in Homecoming, is marked by a tension between his quest for cultural identity and his Fanonist and Marxist perspective which is opposed to the more romantic aspects of cultural reassertion and nationalism. Ngugi's Marxism leads him to recognize the socio-economic bases of cultural change, while the nationalist bent leads to the advocacy of the reinvigoration of values, the socio-economic bases of which he points out, have changed fundamentally.¹

Ngugi is highly critical of those who view African culture "as if it were a static commodity" which can be preserved and even projected on to a contemporary socio-economic and political stage.² This is an attitude which pervades most government-sponsored attempts to establish national cultures. The reassertion of an "irrelevant

1. Ngugi, Homecoming, pp.11-12.
2. Ibid., p.4.
traditionalism" is often confused, Ngugi points out, with the
development of a national culture. The attempt to develop national
cultures, he adds, is also thwarted by the desire of ruling class
members to graft an African culture on to colonially inherited
institutions. This situation is exacerbated by the very nature of
the inheritance elites, which have adopted the life style and values
of the departed colonial administrators. For them, the revital-
ization of African culture simply appears as an afterthought. They
occasionally sing "a few traditional songs: hymns of praise to a
mythical past: we must preserve our culture, don't you think?"1
Ngugi suggests that if true national cultures are to be achieved,
political and economic life must be wholly socialized and Africanised,
and the break with capitalism realised. According to Ngugi

Capitalism can only produce anti-human cultures, or
a culture that is only an expression of sectional,
warring interests. African cultures used to be most
communal when and where economic life and the means of
production were communally organised and controlled.
Any ideal, any vision, is nothing unless it is given
institutional forms and solid economic bases.2

In order to have a national culture, Ngugi contends, a number of
conditions must be realised, including a completely socialized
economy, and a complete and total liberation of the people through
the elimination of all exploitative forces. A stratified society,
he notes, can only produce a stratified culture or sub-culture; such
is the situation of the peasantry and working people in modern neo-
colonial states.3 At present there is a "dangerous, unhealthy gap

1. Ibid., p.12.
3. Ibid., p.13.
between intellectual and practical labour", and between rural and urban centres which could be bridged, Ngugi suggests, if schools and universities were taken to the countryside and involved in the "creative struggle of the peasants and workers".¹

Compared to Ngugi, Kamenju places much greater stress in his work on the types of psychological problems induced by colonialism and racism, and on cultural alienation. The influence of Fanon on his thinking, as evidenced for example by his essay, "Black aesthetics and pan-African emancipation",² is abundantly clear, and has led to a derivative rather than creative intellectualism. According to Kamenju, the most valuable lesson which can be learnt from Fanon's work is "that a genuine, comprehensive cultural revolution in depth is inconceivable without the total dismantling of all the recalcitrant cultural, social and economic institutions and structures spawned by imperialism."³ The cultural revolution involves much more than the elimination of the vestiges of "imperialist control" of the press, mass media and the education system. It involves the destruction of the capitalist monopolies and the "neo-colonial political system." The cultural revolution will remain "aborted and unconsummated" until revolutionary institutions and organisations that serve the interests of black workers and peasants have been created.

In the case of both Ngugi and Kamenju, there is thus the major premise that cultural revolution involves much more than the

1. Ibid., p.18.
reassertion of traditional values and romantic appeals to African humanism; it is something, they argue, which can only be achieved as a result of the total transformation of existing socio-economic and political structures. For them, new national cultures will not stem from what Fanon referred to as the revival of a few "sanitized fragments", but rather from the involvement of peasants and workers in the struggle to bring about a socialist society.

The Marxist Critique of Cultural Nationalism and African Socialism

The second and most concerted critical response to cultural reassertion and African socialism comes from a relatively small group of Marxists, principally from Tanzania, who have had to defend themselves from attack on the grounds that they are peddling alien and inapplicable ideologies. The central thrust of the Marxist critique of cultural nationalism is to be found in Philip Ochieng's vitriolic criticism of Okot p'Bitek and those of his ilk who are "only paying romance with an African past which they have never experienced, nor, therefore, know anything about. Worse still, this cultural romanticism always betrays profound ignorance of history, or historical materialism in particular." 1 Ochieng points out that culture is a function of the mode of economic production, and accepts the Marxist historical categorization of the five modes of production. 2 The negritudinists, he suggests, want to return to the pre-colonial situation (a gross distortion) which was predominantly

2. Ibid.
the primitive communism stage, although several African societies had reached the stage of feudalism. It is on the basis of the stages of history, that Ochieng, as does Jared Angira, rejects Okot's claim that one culture cannot be more developed than another: "this is to divest culture of history, which is its very vehicle". This is not to deny, however, that European colonialist myths of the superior race were ridiculous. But Ochieng, like Aloo Ojuka, Jared Angira, and other African Marxists argue

Colonialism is an inevitable historical phenomenon of an advanced stage of capitalism. And if Africa had reached capitalism before Europe, you can be sure it would have colonized Europe, among other places.  

Ojuka argues that the restrictive nature of African reason presented an effective barrier against any "fundamental or revolutionary change from the given reality" and that hardly anywhere in "traditional structures of Reason" were to be found the "built-in concepts capable of transcending them." Colonialism was a "blessing in disguise" because it loosened the restriction, and provided the alternatives which made possible the transformation, to a higher stage of development, of the subsistence productive process. Anticipating the objections of the cultural nationalists, Ojuka points out that Africa's state of subsistence was a necessary stage in human development. Asian societies were still in this basic position, and European states had passed from "antiquity, to

1. Ibid.
primitive tribalism, to feudalism, to bourgeois capitalism — with all its features of industrial technology, economic neo-imperialism (sic), and the like. ¹ Colonization interrupted slow evolutionary change and set in motion economic and social change which had the effect of pushing most of Africa past the slave and feudal "cultural stages" into the "capitalist cultural stage".

While primitive communism, upon which African socialism is supposedly based, and socialism, are alike in terms of their non-exploitative relations, there is, Ochieng notes, a "whole world of socially qualitative and economically quantitative differences between the two". ² Society, he adds, "is always a dialectical unity (i.e. a unity of opposite forces) between production forces and production relations." ² Cultural changes, and cultural revolution are inextricably linked with the contradiction between production relations and forces, even though the cultural phenomena of earlier stages of development persist and help determine the nature of struggle at a later stage of development.

In response to African thinkers and leaders who contend that Marxism, apart from being historically inapplicable in the African situation, is dogmatic and theological, and has been shown as incorrect by the course of developments in advanced capitalist states, the East African Marxist has stressed both its flexibility and scientific methodological value. Ochieng, along with many other East African Marxists, adopts the view that through the development

¹. Ibid.
². Ochieng, "'African Culture' in perspective", p.5.
of imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, internal contradictions within advanced capitalist states have eased, while those between advanced capitalist states and colonies and neo-colonies have intensified. Class struggle is thus transferred from the internal situation to the international arena, with the result that colonies and "semi-colonies" have become the centre of socialist revolution. Ngombele-Mwiru points out that in Tanganyika during the colonial period, the principal contradiction was that between the colonizers and colonized: "the evolution of the other contradictions, such as that between the traditional feudality and the masses of the peasantry, or that between the growing stratum of local intermediaries (commercial) and the colonial bureaucracy, depended upon the development of the principal contradiction." In the post-independence situation, on the other hand, the principal contradiction is that between international capitalism "represented by the owners of the nationalised banks, foreign trade, etc. and their local henchmen on the one hand, and the masses of the Tanzania people in general on the other." It should be added that in the case of some East African Marxists, the focus on the contradiction between the advanced capitalist states and the "Third World" (international stratification) has the effect of shifting attention from internal class divisions which are obviously crucial for the success or failure of socialist revolution, and on to an ill-defined relation


2. Ibid.
between capitalist states and neo-colonies. Chiong points out that the "greatness of Marxism is that it is not a dogmatic static rough-and-ready method of doing things. It is a dynamic process based on the scientific method which lends itself to new historical situations, new developments, new knowledge, and peculiarly local conditions."¹

The Marxist critics of African socialism all dismiss one of its fundamental tenets, the supposed classless nature of African society, and refer to the existence of feudalism as both a refutation of pre-colonial classlessness and the communal ownership of land.² Some, like Justinian Kwesamu, who place greatest emphasis on the role the introduction of metropolitan-oriented cash crops to the African peasantry played in class-formation,³ note that the pre-colonial village community "lacked wage labour, the pre-condition for capital accumulation, since each individual peasant was not separated from his land."⁴ The emergence of classes, Kwesamu points out, would have "dissolved communal landed property and hence the village community as a productive system."⁵ Nevertheless, he adds, the communal structure in many areas had yielded to feudalism, and he identifies in the west lake, Kilimanjaro and Usambara regions a

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4. Ibid., p.5.
5. Ibid.
"banana culture" which led to "social differentiation based on land holding", and the gradual emergence of feudal oligarchies. It was, however, German and British colonization that reinforced "traditional class differences" and introduced and developed new class differences which were linked to "capitalist exploitation of the country". This class differentiation, Sweeney notes, went "hand in hand with the uneven development that is so characteristic of capitalist penetration". The major agents of class and regional differentiation were economic, in the introduction of cash crops and the labour market, educational, and administrative, especially in the form of indirect rule. The individualization of land holdings in cash-crop areas such as around Kilimanjaro gradually eroded the fundamental feature of communal land tenure and started to create the landless peasant, the proletariat. Where commercial agriculture was developed and dominated the village economy, and the communal system of land tenure had begun to disintegrate, old systems of mutual and reciprocal obligations were destroyed and what Sweeney terms the "nascent rural bourgeoisie" began to exploit largely migrant hired labour. Furthermore, the mission-centred educational system, which was closely tied to the regional development of the productive system, led to the emergence of a "salaried African class".

1. Ibid., pp.7-8.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.27.
5. Ibid., p.28.
Kweyemmu's discussion of class formation and differentiation in Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania reflects very much the Tanzanian situation; also Ojuka's notion of "tribal class" has obviously been greatly influenced by the nature of the Kenyan setting. Ojuka suggests that the ethnic intolerance which characterises relations between many groups is not simply a cultural feature - a feature of "cultural backwardness". Rather, it is economic in nature: "Ethnic battles are being fought on the economic front" to decide which groups will take the "larger portion of the economic cake". According to Ojuka, pre-colonial Africa was split into "tribal nations", although their actual nature remains vague in his formulation, and no attempt is made to distinguish between the various types of societies which existed in the pre-colonial period. Tribes remain, but their relations have been profoundly altered by the introduction of new types of economic relations. The new economic relations have given rise to class differences to produce classes with distinct ethnic characteristics - hence "tribal class". Ojuka writes:

The preponderance of tribal interests in the African economic and political sphere only leads to the theoretical conclusion, fully backed by available experience, that at the apex of the hierarchy will be a class whose cultural identity is tribal, although its interests are, like those of all other classes before it, economic.  

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 33.

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This concept of tribal class, he suggests, more adequately describes the prevailing conditions than the orthodox Marxist notion of bourgeoisie because it contains an awareness of tribalism and its interaction with economic class differences to produce a distinct type of new phenomenon.

Politically and economically immature, the tribal class, Ojuka asserts, does not possess the "mushroomization consciousness" required for the "rise and running of industrial capitalism". Whereas Europeans possess a "mushroomization consciousness" coupled with an ascetic, renunciatory discipline which finds its ultimate expression in the "Christian spirit of innerworldly asceticism", the African is a man of "tangible concretion ... not conceptual abstraction" who lacks the quantification mentality necessary for the economic reason of capitalism. Even if the tribal class is politically and economically immature, it is nevertheless "historically inevitable under neo-imperialism in Africa". According to Ojuka

In pursuing its selfish interests, the tribal class ignored the rational requirements for progress leading to industrialisation. It sought to be at the apex of governmental bureaucracy, because that is the nerve-centre of political power. It annexed whatever could be called the economic apparatus, because the cake is there. It sought too the control of the military, because that control protects the operations in Government and the economy. It established an omnipresent power of government and business bureaucracies.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.39.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
The alleged non-existence of classes and class struggles in Africa, Ojuka and Issa Shivji among others point out, and the "elite substitute, serve perfectly the interests of the ruling classes both national and international." The implied non-existence of classes excludes by definition the Marxist theoretical tools and, therefore, the possibility of a "genuine revolutionary movement guided by scientific ideology". African socialism and African humanism, Ojuka argues, are a "mask for class capitalism."

Shivji, Adhu Aviti, and Philip Ochieng note that both among academics and ruling circles in Africa, Marxism is shunned as dogmatic and theological, and as a body of theory developed in different historical circumstances and societies, and therefore inapplicable to Africa. The argument, Aviti notes, is that the nature of class struggle is irrelevant in a predominantly agrarian society without a proletariat. Mboya, argued for instance, that "African socialism has an entirely different history from European socialism. European socialism was born of the agrarian and industrial revolution, which divided society into the landed and the capitalists on one side and the landless and the industrial proletariat on the other." There has also been, Aviti and Shivji observe, the "bourgeois argument."

2. Ibid., p.3.
3. Ojuka, "Industrialisation and Capitalism in Developing Africa", p.32.
about skipping the capitalist stage, an argument which has two central features. The first feature is that Marxism was essentially developed in, and therefore for, highly developed capitalist societies. As Africa does not have highly developed capitalism, Marxism is not applicable, because Marxist societies develop out of the destruction of capitalism. The second feature of this argument is the claim that there is a dualism or plurality of modes of production in Africa which renders Marxism inapplicable. The thrust of this argument, in other words, is that there is no developed capitalism in Africa and therefore Marxist analysis of capitalism is ipso facto irrelevant. As a result, socialism must be built on African traditions - hence African socialism. Accompanying this "myth", Shivji points out, is the subsidiary argument that the problem in Africa is not about distribution, because there is little to distribute, but rather of producing more.

In response to such arguments, the Marxists point out that African societies have been integrated into the world capitalist system. Shivji notes that theories of the dual economy which left out large sectors or regions as "subsistence" have been persuasively challenged, especially by those writers who have shown that almost all people have been integrated into the modern or capitalist economy either as wage labourers or suppliers of food. The dominant mode of production, Shivji emphasises, is capitalist, and the nature of the class holding state power is decisive in categorising a particular mode of production. Because, as Shivji, Aviti, Ngoabele Kwiru, and Rwesanzau among others argue, African societies are already
a part of the world capitalist system, the question of jumping or
skipping the capitalist stage is an irrelevant one. In relation to
this, Aviti refers to those who talk about Africa charting a non-
capitalist, non-socialist path of development and wonders, "What is
that 'third' social system that emerges outside historical practice?" To
those who argue that classes in a European Marxist sense do not
exist in the African setting, Shivji admits that a proletariat in
the classical sense did not develop and "could not have possibly
developed in the conditions of colonial and now neo-colonial
economies." He notes that Europe and Africa have had "different
though interconnected histories resulting in different socio-economic
structures." In such a situation, it would be most surprising to
find "similar patterns of class divisions and a similar nature of the
classes." This point, Shivji adds, needs emphasis because "even
some Marxists tend to apply the classical class categories to Africa." If a
proletariat in the classical sense does not exist, nevertheless
a class of wage earners did develop — in plantations, docks, transport,
commerce, construction and so on — and played a key role in the
independence struggle. The sectoral distribution, combined with
the system of migrant labour, made trade union organisation difficult.
The plantation system, according to Rwemanzira, "failed to bring about
the proletarianisation of the African peasantry." Shivji is

1. Aviti, "Class Struggle in Rural Society of Tanzania", p.3.
3. Ibid., p.19.
4. Rwemanzira, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania,
p.22.
careful to dismiss the often advanced argument that the lack of revolutionary consciousness is evidence of "the falsity of Marxist theory". This clearly is an important point in the African context where migratory labour and the phenomenon of the urban labourer with strong rural ties pose problems for the emergence of class consciousness. Shivji points out that consciousness does not emerge spontaneously, as many Marxist critics would have, but rather out of the revolutionary struggle itself. Furthermore, "what is important is that such potential revolutionary strata are mobilized under the leadership of proletarian ideology."^2

One of the fundamental tenets of African socialism and cultural reassertion is that the communal nature of traditional society provides both a basis for the development of socialism and socio-economic and political institutions, and a model for society in terms of egalitarian human relations. Marxist oriented intellectuals, however, are concerned to demonstrate that the communal nature of traditional society has been eroded by new systems of economic production with their different labour relationships, and land-holding systems. Bildad Kaggia concedes that in certain areas the communal spirit survives, but indicates that in Buganda, for instance, there has been "feudalism at its worst", and in Central Province in Kenya, land consolidation has individualised landholding and broken the traditional communal nature of production. He states

2. Ibid., p.24.
You hear some leaders, even writing books, even speaking to the public the nonsense that we have African socialism based on our traditions. The question is are the traditions the same? Does the past tradition of communal spirit still fully prevail today? Certainly not.\(^1\)

The communal-cooperative spirit which would have been conducive to the development of socialism, he points out, "had largely been broken down as a result of the introduction of the capitalist system and the wage economy. For all purposes (the) Kenya economy today is capitalist and no longer communal."\(^2\)

Migot-Adholla argues that "one of the most important effects of colonialism is that it undermined the structural bases of indigenous egalitarianism,"\(^3\) and set in motion the process of alienation by forcing a separation of the economic from the social activities, thus separating labour "from the social essence of man".\(^4\) The notion of individual responsibility was introduced through wage labour and the tax system, and capitalist ideology propagated the idea of individual earning. This had the effect of driving a wedge between "competent" and "non-competent" members of rural society, and led to the introduction of the idea of ownership, particularly land ownership or individualisation of tenure.\(^5\) Colonial administrations worked on the assumption that individualisation of land ownership ensured rapid development in that the individual could raise loans.

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2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
for agricultural development against the security of his individual land title.¹ The intention, as Ahmed Mohiddin has pointed out in relation to Kenya, was often to create a landed middle-class which would provide stability and perpetuate colonially introduced institutions and values.² The idea of individual ownership of land was accompanied by the idea of the sale and purchase of land. The most important implications of these developments for the social order was, Migot-Adholla notes, that kinship membership "would no longer determine an individual's right to land and his commitment to the lineage group."³ Changes in land-holding rules have thus been basic in eroding the autochthonous social order, and particularly the "coercive influence of the "collective conscience". Migot-Adholla notes that social differentiation among peasants has been intimately connected with the process of general agricultural development, and points out, on the basis of Saul and Woods classification,⁴ that four variables have been of greatest importance in defining social differentiation characteristics. These variables, Migot-Adholla writes are

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¹ Ibid. The introduction of land titles, and the ability of land-owners to raise loans on them, is a crucial, but often overlooked factor in capital accumulation and patterns of class formation.
³ Migot-Adholla, "Traditional Society and Cooperatives", p.27.
(1) the presence of labour-demand centres,  
(2) the suitability of local ecological  
environment for cash cropping, including the  
accessibility of marketing facilities,  
(3) the presence of white capitalist settlers,  
and (4) the existence of an indigenous rural  
"bourgeoisie" —a kind of "kulak" class.  

The interaction of these variables, combined with the integration of  
African societies into the international capitalist system, has  
resulted in the destruction of much of the communal basis on which  
theories of African socialism are intellectually grounded, and points  
to the relevance, as Aviti's study of Isanani attests, of rural class  
struggle.²  

The tendency to dismiss the application of Marxism in Africa  
arises subjectively, according to Shivji, from a basic misunderstanding  
or lack of understanding of Marxist methodology. In his Tanzania:  
The Silent Class Struggle he wrote that in the neo-colony  

Nationalist slogans bordering on philistine  
chauvinism take the place of scientific  
analysis and understanding of the current  
world situation. An attempt to apply  
scientific theories, evolved out of an  
accumulation of mankind's knowledge, is  
dubbed as importing 'foreign ideologies'.  
And, paradoxically, this by the petty  
bourgeois intellectuals whose mental laziness  
has not allowed them even to read about these  
so-called 'foreign ideologies'.³  

This is the point which is emphasised by Philip Ochieng when he  
suggests that "most of us will run away from the very mention of the  

2. Aviti, "Class Struggle in Rural Society of Tanzania",  
3. Issa Shivji, "Tanzania — The Silent Class Struggle", in  
word communism, not because we know what the concept is all about, but because we are ignorant of its social truth, and, through our ignorance, are scared of the dreadful myths with which the capitalists surround it. ¹ The African desire to overcome racial humiliation and supposed inferiority has not led, as one would expect, to the search for scientific truths, but to "black theology" and clichéd exhortations of "black is beautiful" which are dangerous because they "mystify us into the belief that black skins are inherently incapable of exploitation, an idea which cannot stand any scientific test."² International capitalism with its black African agents represents the major enemy, and the wallowing in blackness is not a condition for liberation. There is only "one culture or ideology" which can liberate black Africa; that is "economic materialism, or socialism".³ The Tanzanian journalist, Chenge wa Chenge, refers to the paradox of the rejection of scientific socialism as "foreign" by an African leadership class which came colonially inherited institutions and which is the product of foreign schools and universities. The dominant ideas in practically every African country, he adds, are those of the educated few who "keep political, military, legal, religious, artistic and ethical vigil over their (international bourgeoisie) interests in Africa in return for privileged material conditions of life."⁴ Ruling groups in Africa reject scientific socialism because

³ Ibid.
it is anathema to their class interests: "if the masses of Africa had the scientific knowledge of Africa's social situation and its historical explanation, they would all embrace scientific socialism as their weapon." It is because scientific socialism threatens their interests that African leadership groups prefer "ignorant socialism, alias African socialism (or, in plainer terms, dependent capitalism)." This argument is also supported by Ojuka, who stresses the importance of the bureaucratic and economic inheritance situation in conditioning ruling and petty bourgeois attitudes to scientific socialism.

Objectively then, as Napolu and Shivji stress, the relevance of scientific socialism is denied on the basis of class interest. The former adopts a strictly determinist view, suggesting that it is the economic position of leadership and petty-bourgeois groups which leads them to reject Marxism, and not a combination of objective class position, the nature of colonial education and the dominant intellectual influences, and the need to overcome racial humiliation and cultural denigration by asserting Africa's unique identity. Shivji and Ochiang, on the other hand, admit that there is a "subjective rationalisation which clearly shows genuine misunderstanding".

1. Ibid.
The Cultural Iconoclasts

The third main critical response to the cultural nationalists and African socialists comes from intellectuals such as Taban Lo Liyong and B.A. Ogot who show a scepticism about the distinctiveness of African values and condemn the often unproductive preoccupation with the reassertion of ancestral values. It is often overlooked by Taban's many critics in particular that both he and Ogot do not dismiss the value of African culture and history: Taban has been responsible for the collection of such oral literature and Ogot is the founder of indigenous modern East African historiography.

Taban has described himself as a synthesist, but his synthesism is in marked contrast to that of most other East African intellectuals. Leonard Kibera, for instance, adjoins a nostalgia for the past: "I really do not decline the ride back along the exciting path of nostalgie, a path swept moist with the sweat of Senghor's black muse." But he is a "groping half-way, transitory self", who realises that the "reality of the moment" makes impossible a reversion to the past. From the diversity of cultural influences he will "strive to yield shape to this transitory embryo" in order to "reinspire the native ego." Taban, however, argues that

What we need is a philosophy appropriate to our time. A vigorous philosophy to dislodge the medieval and peasant nostalgia. And this new philosophy I name Synthesism. To reach synthesism Africa has to feel the impact of the East and the West, with their influences in various degrees."

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2. Ibid.
He does not share the faith of the negritudinists and African socialist-humanists in the value of African humanism. He does not deny that such a humanism may exist, but doubts whether it is any different from European humanism; "the peasants of old Europe had their own special personality — their Buritude."¹ Tabor notes that

The spirit of their humanism and the audacity of their simplicity are remarkably similar to those which African humanists, African socialists and advocates of the 'African Personality' claim to be unique to the present African society.²

This view is similar to that advanced by Ogot, who has suggested that "in our quest for specifically 'African' characteristics, we tend to assume that much of the old community ways of feeling and thinking in Africa were unique."³ The values of African socialism are similar in many respects to those of many populist movements, including the Narodniki, and reflect a similar response to, and desire to avoid and challenge the inhumanity produced by industrialized capitalism and rapid urbanisation. It is for this reason, Ogot suggests, that the "dilemma of preserving ancestral values, on the one hand, and modernisation, on the other is, in a sense, a false one."⁴ Tabor views the espousal of African humanism as a sign of weakness in a world where humanistic goals are not generally shared.

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.36.
and respected. He does not see, as both Okello Oculi in _Orphan_ and David Rubadiri in _No Bride Price_ do, Africa playing a vanguard role in re-awakening humanistic values in a materialistic western world. Indeed, it is that very materialism and industrialisation which has become a "god" for Taban.¹ He points out that although they were built on some truth, African socialism, Negritude, the African personality and history were myths used to "facilitate our attainment of independence" and overcome feelings of inferiority and "Caucasian charges of African cultural backwardness". They have done their work: the task is now to "fashion new and relevant myths to meet our challenge".²

Taban does not completely reject the African past, although he thinks, in the way that William Ochieng has in his examination of Africa's technological backwardness,³ that African cultural values have failed Africa. If values derived from the African cultural heritage are to be of any contemporary use, they must be judged within the context of a modern technological civilization.⁴ Referring to African antiquity, philosophies, and institutions, Taban asks

After all
All these things are social creations
Produced to satisfy needs

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¹. See especially Taban's _13 Offensives Against Our Enemies_ (Nairobi: SALB, 1973), First and Second Battles.


Dispensable when not in need
Without a tear shed
For more can yet be made.¹

In similar vein, Ogot points out that

Our traditions should not become objects of
uncritical devotion, for a culture can only retain
its vitality by its ability to replenish and enlarge
its capital of fundamental ideas. We need a
genuinely African and positive philosophical movement
which can yield bold speculations and original thoughts
in science, literature, religion etc., and not a few
sterile essays partly inspired by Western philosophy,
and partly directed against it.²

Taban justifies his rejection of much of the African patrimony,
and his advocacy of extensive cultural and technological borrowing,
partly on the grounds that African society has always been receptive
to external cultural influences.³ Quite unwittingly, by stressing
the receptive nature of African society, Taban almost falls into
line with those historians who view colonialism as a rather brief
phase in Africa's development and who see a surprising continuity
of African institutions. Taban's emphasis on the receptive nature
of African societies does reduce the significance of the colonial
period so that it becomes a time of major cultural importation and
enforced acculturation, albeit part of a much longer process of
acculturation.

Taban has, as Basil Busacca has pointed out, a "renaissance image
of Africa: an Africa surging, creative, limitless in possibility."⁴

3. Lo Liyong, "The Role of the Creative Artist", pp.33-34.
This idea emerges clearly in his poem, "Anabasian Tabanisa".

Now that ours have been cast aground
Couldn't we mount
An assault unique
On schools of thought
And revolutionise the mind?
Unhampered with a past
We possess the chance
To see beyond the screens of others.
By shaking the chains
At its weakest point
We stand to find
The fatal faults.

His thought, however, is an over-reaction to those African intellectuals who romanticise and idealise the past, and is conditioned by his realisation that a materially weak and divided Africa will always remain prey to external interference, as in the Congo. His cultural nationalist critics point out that he overlooks the important identity and self-image function of the past and "acquiesces (in) the exploitation of African values by the West." His Marxist oriented critics point out that he has no understanding of the nature of underdevelopment and neo-colonialism, his advocacy of the ideology of African Development dismissing as irrelevant questions of socialism and capitalism. When Taban mentioned in an interview that he looked forward to the day when Africa would produce its own millionaires, Mulei retorted that Taban was in effect "proposing that there should be a large-scale exploitation of the peasants by the new politico-commercial regimes." What is

3. Chris Wanjala, "Licking their boots" (letter), Sunday Nation, 21/5/1972, p.11.
5. Christopher Mulei, "Taban Misused his Talents (letter), Sunday Nation, 21/12/1969, p.3.
needed, he suggests, is a philosophy which will be both a national exposition of her past experiences and an intellectual stimulus to her renaissance. Taban should by now have known that the problems of decolonisation - of political institutions and economies no less than of the mind - will present challenges as great as the struggle against colonialism itself. This is the real challenge to the African intellectuals.

Few East African intellectuals would disagree with Mulei. That they disagree about, however, is what that philosophy is.

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1. Ibid., p.10.
CHAPTER X

POST-INDEPENDENCE SOCIETY AND STATE:
KENYAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE TANZANIAN
RADICAL INTELLECTUALS

At a superficial level, East African intellectual analyses of post-independence society, whether in literature or formal academic papers and articles, possess a certain uniformity. Central to intellectual analyses is the idea that independence was juridical, and that real independence in the economic, cultural and ideological spheres is yet to be achieved. The theme of the betrayal of the African masses by petty-bourgeois nationalist politicians who serve neo-colonial agents is, for instance, found in novels such as Ngugi’s A Grain of Wheat, Kibara’s Voices in the Dark, Nazareth’s In a Brown Mantele, and Subadiri’s No Bride Price, and in almost countless newspaper and journal articles.

Many intellectuals have viewed independence as a type of ‘social contract’ or ‘political compromise’ between the colonial powers and the African nationalist leaders. In Kenya, as Ouma and Nigot-Adholla point out, the social contract was facilitated by the nature of KANU and colonial policies which effectively prevented more than a “loose amalgam of different groups” with ethnic bases from emerging. The nationalist parties, Nazareth notes in his novel, In a Brown Mantele, were weak and without deep grass-roots


organisation. Kyeyune's Party in the mythical African state of Danibia was a loose coalition of diverse groups which had come together "to jointly share the fruits of independence."\(^1\) It had risen to power in the "wash" of other independence movements: "We did not have to fight, just agitate and non-cooperate."\(^2\) The struggle for independence, being relatively short, did not allow for a long transforming struggle. The party did not wither, as Fanon thought, but rather, according to Nazareth's own politician narrator, Joe D'Souza, "came into existence already withered."\(^3\) In order for the colonial power to arrive at a favourable "social contract" in which the new state remained within the sphere of influence of the departing colonial power, it was necessary for it to negotiate with a "'civilised', 'democratic', indeed 'Christian' leadership."\(^4\) To this end, every effort was made to ensure that elements which were opposed to free enterprise and private foreign investment, economic stability, and democracy, and concerned to bring about a profound restructuring of colonial relationships, were excluded from negotiations and power.

It is the struggle between the radical or progressive and the reactionary wings of the ruling party which, according to Chango Machyo, is one of the keys to the understanding of the post-independence situation.\(^5\) The former calls for a "complete and progressive socio-economic transformation of the inherited colonial system",

\(^1\) Nazareth, *In a Brown Mantle*, p.49.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.49.

\(^3\) Ibid., p.49.


while the latter, the "meascent bourgeoisie" are, because of their structural location, opposed to measures which would endanger their economic and political position. In their resistance to fundamental change they have, as oppressor agents, the support of the former colonial powers and international capitalist interests. This struggle, Ndirigo suggests, has the effect of diverting attention from the plight of the "common man". The national bourgeoisie he notes, following Nyan, is not a creative bourgeoisie; it is initiative and unproductive, preferring to follow in the footsteps of the former master socially, economically, culturally and intellectually. According to Schindin, it has "neither the capabilities nor the inclination to lift Africa from her present oppressed, disregarded, exploited and humiliated position in the international community of nations." It was the national bourgeoisie, created by the penetration of the capitalist system and supportive educational institutions, which was trained to operate the political institutions modelled on those of the metropolitan countries. The term national bourgeoisie, used so indiscriminately by Schindin and Ndirigo and others who have not read Nyan critically, is rejected by critics such as Ndogo-Nyacholi and Ince Shiyi, the former pointing out that the term may "give a rather exaggerated picture of the economic role of this group in the development process if it is assumed to be similar to its European counterpart of the 18th and 19th century." Munigo, using Netil

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
and Robertson's concept of inheritance, ¹ points out that the asomi, as inheritors, accepted economic roles as agents of foreign capital "whether it is in terms of aid or private business. This is the basic source of wealth and not localized production."² Okello Oculi in his Orphan refers disparagingly to attempts by the new leaders to demonstrate to the former colonial masters - "their former despisers who gave them verbal pride called independence"³ - how civilized they are, and how they, estranged from the poor and illiterate at home and eager for approbation, continue to endorse white standards and desperately seek white approval and patronage.⁴

Developmental priorities have largely been determined by pre-existing ideologies and foreign expert guidance,⁵ and perpetuate "unbalanced colonial economic development whereby those regions which have, shall have even more added to them; and the towns especially, will become even more socially distant from the countryside."⁶ There is the suggestion that expatriate personnel formulate not only development priorities but serve as a buffer between the new ruling class which is jealous of its power, and better educated, younger, and perhaps more radical Africans who pose a threat to its position.⁷ Economic policies, designed to encourage foreign

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³ Oculi, Orphan, p.55.
⁴ See Kibera, Voices in the Dark, passim.
⁵ Ibid., and Nazareth, In a Brown Mantle, p.107.
⁶ Chango Machyo, "Is independence meaningless to the masses?", p.15.
⁷ Nazareth, In a Brown Mantle, p.107.
investment, reinforce export-import economic structures,\(^1\) which are oriented to serve the metropolitan countries. This, combined with declining or fluctuating world prices for primary commodities, produces a decline in rural incomes, and a decline in living standards.

Chang'asha observes that one of the reasons for the failure of independence to benefit the masses stems from the absence of a clearly-defined social ideology,\(^2\) but fails to note that this failure is directly related to the objective class position of leadership. Mutiso suggests that African humanism, African socialism and the one-party state have been neither African nor socialist, and have simply served as a mask for personal rule: "Presidentialism has led to alliance with foreigners for economic control rather than redistribution for nationals; political repression in the name of kinship and corruption in the name of development."\(^3\)

It should be noted that many East African intellectual analyses of post-independence political economy and society never move beyond this type of general, unarticulated, and 'non-influenced treatment'. In Kenya, relatively few intellectuals have started to seriously and systematically examine the nature of post-independence society and state, and in Tanzania, a small group of intellectuals who constitute the Tanzanian radical/intellectuals have been endeavouring to systematically analyse Tanzanian underdevelopment.

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1. Chang'asha, "Is independence meaningful to the masses?", p.16.
2. Ibid.
state and society. In the remainder of this chapter it is proposed to briefly examine Kenyan and Tanzanian intellectual approaches to their respective societies.

**Intellectual Analyses of Kenya**

...radical expatriate researcher in Kenya once commented that the country was over-researched and yet under-analyzed. The development-oriented research which abounded between narrow, economic-oriented methodological assumptions and theoretical perspectives neglected the basic questions of who gets what, when and how. This sentiment is most apt in the case of expatriate researchers. In the case of local researchers and intellectuals, Kenya has been both under-researched and under-analyzed. Since we move away from the general and fictional treatments to more systematic and theoretically informed analyses of the Kenyan political economy and society, we are left with only a handful of intellectuals, including John Suma, Cyrus Tutino, Umaru Sholle, Ahmed Schindin, Zoh Chai and Ali in his fictional works, who have even begun to provide an explanation of the nature of the post-independence political economy and society.

Admittedly the local intellectual has had to operate under considerable difficulty. Unlike the expatriate, he has had to live in the society he studies and bear responsibility for his analyses; as a result many sensitive areas relating to executive power, and

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class formation have been neglected. There have also been, apart from self-imposed and informal censorship, problems of research funding and European-North American monopolized areas of work which have been maintained by foreign foundations through choice of personnel, dominant methodological and theoretical assumptions, and funding.

The Political Preconditions of Independence.

According to Nkrumah, in order for the colonial power to arrive at a favourable "social contract" in which the new state remained in the sphere of influence of the departing colonial power, it was necessary for negotiations to be carried on with a "civilised", 'democratic', indeed 'Christian' leadership. In this end, every effort was made to ensure the exclusion of radicals and "Communists" who appeared to threaten free enterprise, economic stability and democracy. For Odling, the struggle for independence was a process of structural transformation, the creation of a new institutional base and the permeation of these institutions with a new social ethic. However, he notes, the actual process was calculated to prevent the emergence of an anticolonist ideology. The policy was designed to contain the nationalist movement within the framework of colonial institutions and the ideas which support them. Thus Odling was excluded from the first "responsible" government in 1963: "the period known as interim self-government ... is characterised by

2. Ibid.
pressures on the national leadership that they conform to an ideology safeguarding the rights of private investors and minority alien groups."1

Odinga argues that the outbreak of the Emergency, and the arrest and imprisonment of the EDU leaders consecrated them as revolutionaries although the majority of them had not historically shown any signs of thought or action. And yet this was the leadership, Ouma points out, which set the pace for the later generation of leaders which emerged during the Emergency. This younger generation of political leaders was essentially white-collar, middleclass, self-interested, self-identified and basically tribalist in nature. It symbolized the best expression of the hegemonic Eastern ideology. This is the framework which enabled it and within which it operated.2 According to Ouma, this younger generation saw itself as a model and "normative reference group for the anticipatory socialization of the masses."3 But paradoxically, their model and reference group, as for the masses, in the European community, and leadership provided a chance for early entry into the reference group. The significance of this fact, Ouma notes, is demonstrated by Odinga's "subtle sketches of his political colleagues."4 It is also perceptively illustrated in Leonard Kibera's short story, "The Spider's Web" and his novel, "Voices in the Dark", where the civil servants and politicians of Miserable Road

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. See Odinga, pp.131-45.
eat and drink and demonstrate their internalization of European cultural values and imitation of European social behaviour. This generation of leadership was basically "self-interested and self-identified" and had to contend for power with the remaining members of the old generation of whom Odien was the most articulate. Its reliance on the European reference group facilitated the determination of developmental priorities by pre-existing ideologies and foreign guidance.

Class and Nationalism

A number of Kenyan intellectuals have endeavoured to trace the links between the emergence of new social formations or classes; the rise of nationalism; the nature of early organization; and the effect class formation has had on the political economy of independence and public policy. Ouma argues that as early as the 1920s, a class of individualised administrators, church leaders and teachers had emerged whose behaviour was "determined by their desire to please the colonial authority since this was the norm. They were the benefactors, Ntiryo points out, of 'whatever government programs were allowed to Africans' - the introduction of cash crops, trading licences and plots in rural centres." Capital accumulation in the African sector "was basically allowed to this group by the colonial ruler." They were not conscious of the

4. Ibid.
implications of their immediate social structure, insensitive to the demands made upon them by the wider social structure, and conscious of their "status position vis-a-vis their unfortunate brothers and sisters." This is the "Christian and propertyed" class described by Ngugi in "Winding at the Cross" and represented by the devout Christian Douglas Jones, the owner of several groceries and tenements, who fiercely disapproved of his daughter’s proposed marriage to Mariki, a care-free clerk on a settler farm. Jones condemned "useless, half-educated upstarts, who disturbed the ordered life, peace and prosperity of European farms" and who attempted to challenge the colonial system. This group formed one of the major segments, according to Okumu, Coot, and Scabey and Nottingham, of the Loyalists, especially during Kenema. The "official classes" which Okumu designated the petty bourgeoisie, and Ngot-enkella the class aswae — members of the colonial service, businessmen, teachers, diplomats and doctors, desired to widen and modernize this privileged class of Africans because they intended to give it an active role in the ruling class in the advent of self-rule by the Africans. The unwavering loyalty and subservience of the class to constituted colonial authority nurtured in them the belief that no change could be initiated in society unless it was done by others, through the colonial government.

The petty-bourgeois class was originally represented in Kikuyuland by the Kikuyu Association, and in Nyanza by Archdeacon Owen's Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association. This class, together with the missionary-moulded Africans, opposed the Kikuyu Central Association. But, as Mutiso has pointed out, the leadership of both groups was what he terms asomi, the former being associative, and the latter dissociative asomi. The dissociative asomi were critical in organizing the nationalist movements, and relied on non-asomi support. They nevertheless accepted the emergent colonial society's values as the "binding values in their behaviour" but "simultaneously rejected the institutional framework for the operationalization of the values."^ In other words, Mutiso suggests, dissociative asomi accepted the values of the colonial order, but rejected how and why they were to be expanded into the African sectors of society.

In Nyanza, both Okumu and Ogot point out that the conflicts were between the newly created petty-bourgeoisie, and the traditional status group, the Jodong-gweng which served the critical function of arbitrating in disputes and of regulating the "tenants' evolution in status". While the absence of land alienation in Luoland left this system virtually undisturbed, the introduction of land

1. Mutiso, "Cleavage and the Organizational Base of Politics", p.22.
2. Ibid., p.23.
consolidation conferring a legal title-deed upon the individual
peasant threatened to transform the whole system. The Jodoa-ward,
with the support of the tenants, openly opposed the Symerton Plan,
thereby standing in direct opposition to an already growing
‘landed class of ex-Chieftain and other members of the local councils
loyal to the administration.’ Thus, whereas in Gambia and
opposition to ‘idealists’ tended to come from the more literate and
urbanised, and the alienated educated, in Nyasaland it came from a group
of traditional notables.2

Mutiso suggests members of the local or elements of the petty-
bourgeoisie such as assistant agricultural officers, assistant
veterinary officers, and the first assistant administrative officers
rose to enjoy high status by the late 1950s: ‘Their success of
influence were the new government programs tied up with renovative
agriculture and resettlement.’3 He notes that well before the
Symerton Plan and the concept of the middle class peasant, a group
of better farmers had emerged who were essentially “ex-tribalists
into border tribal lands or improvement farmers.” As improvement
farmers they not only had to break with traditional land patterns,
but had, according to Mutiso, to build a very dependent relationship
with the officials who were supervising the processes whether they
were colonizers or colonials.”4 Mabin, however, focuses his
attention, not on the better or improvement farmers who emerged

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
before land consolidation, but on those who were consciously created by the colonial administration. He cites Sir Philip Mitchell's concern to "undertake a radical transformation of the subsistence economy in which the masses are still enmeshed", and to create a rural middle class which would be sufficiently civilized and progressive to participate fully in the affairs of a multi-social society. 1 The Nyamorton Plan, Schilidan observes, was ultimately concerned with the "creation of a capitalist class society in which mobility upwards would depend on the possession and the use of private property - in this case and at this stage, agricultural land.

Indeed before consolidation, and the Nyamorton Plan, as both Schilidan and Chum 2 notes, was designed to boost the social and economic status of the Igorot to create a stable middle class of Igorot farmers "who will be too busy on their land to worry about political agitation". 3 It was conceived as a general measure to create a new class of civilized farmers as a political and economic plan designed to combat Mau Mau, and, as Schilidan suggests, "a mechanism whereby Nationalists and Nationalists could be controlled."

The system, Schilidan adds,


2. Ibid., and Chum, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya", p.11.

of Kenya which makes it virtually impossible for the Government to take any action against private enterprise or to interfere with private property.¹

It is very noticeable that when Kenyan intellectuals turn their attention away from the petty-bourgeoisie and landed gentry, and to other social formations, they suffer from all the uncertainty and vagueness which characterizes most attempts to identify and categorize classes in the African setting.² Mutiso is unable to move much beyond the ascoli - non-ascoli dichotomy. Migot-Adholla has identified a colonial proletariat of urban workers who joined urban voluntary associations which "served as agents of political awakening in the colonial state."³ He notes that after World War II economic expansion led to the rapid growth of migrant labour and plantation workers who came into conflict with the colonial administration, settlers, and moderate nationalist leaders. The ranks of the colonial proletariat or "ascoli-proletariat" were swollen by demobilized veterans, people such as Boro in Ngugi's A Lesson Not, Child, who adopted a much more uncompromising attitude to politics and social equality than the moderate nationalists. Mutisa, writing of the Kamba, however, suggests that most of the demobilized soldiers were not recruited into politics and the MAU, but into clan organizations.⁴ It was elements within the "ascoli-proletariat",

¹. Ibid.
². For some of these problems see Kitching, "The Concept of Class and the Study of Africa", passim.
according to Migot-Adholla, who provided much of the support for Mau Mau, which gained its activists from other smallholders or landless.1

The Kenya peasantry has received almost no attention from local intellectuals. Atienco-Adhikabo is really the only Kenyan to deal with the question of the rise of a Kenya peasantry, and his analysis does not countenance prolonged peasanitization in the face of continuing dependence and peripheral capitalism. Adopting Saul and Woods definition of the peasant - "those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants"2 - Atienco notes that the creation of the African peasantry was primarily the result of the interaction between traditional economic and social structures and an international capitalist settler economic system.3 He adds that the logic of capitalist exploitation "upset the rural economic equilibrium" and therefore created both the rural and urban proletariat. After voluntarily responding to the new opportunities the penetration of the capitalist economy offered them, the peasant producers found themselves subordinated to "dominant imperialist aggressors",4 and increasingly lost control of "the

4. Ibid., p.13.
disposal of their own produce to the Europeans and Indians." The crucial factor in the alteration of relationships was the decision of the colonial government to invite white settlers into the highlands of Kenya. The effect of settler occupation was to bring widespread migration—movements to a halt with the creation of tribal lands. Soil erosion in the reserves resulted from population pressure and increased production required for payment of taxes. Landlessness, particularly among the Kikuyu shai, also resulted from the introduction of settler agriculture. The reserves, Atiemo suggests, "were saddled with a rural proletariat who could not live off the land" and who provided the basis of an urban proletariat.

By the early 1920s, the decline of the peasant had set in: the peasant, under considerable pressure, became a poor man and consequently a ready source for the proletarianisation of the towns. However, by referring to the decline of the peasant in the early 1920s, Atiemo overlooks the fact that peasantry has been a continuing process. Despite the emergence of capitalist farmers; especially since the mid-1950s, and the growth of an urban-proletarian or labouring class, relations of dependence and peripheral capitalism have prolonged peasantry.

Ethnicity and 'Tribalism'

Many Kenyan intellectuals conceive of ethnicity and 'tribalism', rather than class, as a major socio-economic and political factor in

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1. Ibid., p.14.
the post-independence situation. William Ochieng and Cyrus Mutiso argue that tribalism is basically a colonial creation. In the pre-colonial situation, while there was interaction between different groups in terms of trade, time of crisis, and exchange of institutions, the "basic socio-cultural units remained defined in unique sociological concreteness although over time complete peoples may have been absorbed." The "divide and rule" policies of the colonizer "discouraged interethnic rural migration", and mission and employment policies which were tied to specific areas contributed to interethnic suspicion. According to Mutiso, the colonizer "operationalised ethnic specialisation in the colonial situation", which led to the Kamba/Kalenjin composition of the army, and Kikuyus as clerks and junior civil servants until Mau Mau brought about a shift of Luo into clerical jobs and the labour unions. The colonizer's need for "racial control" encouraged colonially controlled ethnic associations which were designed to pre-empt nationally based political organisations.

3. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Colonial policy also denied the growth of these zones of confluence in terms of legislating land holding only in terms of race. Tribesmen who came to the zones of confluence and started ... encouraging very rapid growth of interaction were shipped back to the tribal preservation. Inter-ethnic rural migration was discouraged.1

Ochieng points out that the practicing of tribalism "in the form in which we know it" originated from the African politicians, "and even today one still hears it said now and again that the Kenya masses are mere pawns in the tribalistic political and economic power game that Kenya's elites practices." 2 In Seng's The Black Hermit there is the suggestion that 'tribalism' stems from the concern of ethnic groups with obtaining a share of the economic and social goods which are distributed from the centre. The elites, Ochieng notes, have "commandeered tribal sentiments to help them maintain and improve their positions." While he is able to recognise that 'tribalism' does not stem from the need for the natural expression of ethnic group interests or identity, Ochieng has not been able, as also Ojuka had, of recognising that ethnic loyalties have been mobilised basically for class purposes - hence Ojuka's notion of tribal class.3 Ochieng nevertheless indicates that the incumbent elite's emphasis on "law and order" and stability for development purposes (important for the encouragement of foreign investment and tourism) does little to reduce the ethnic dimension of politics. Furthermore, tribalism has lingered because of the

1. Ibid., p.43.
"continued absence of any aggressive equalitarian and just nationalist policies and economic ideology."¹

Processes of ethnic retrenchment in the post-independence period have been encouraged, Mutiso observes, by the institutions which have been set up to serve the tribesmen in land buying, in the former White highlands and other inter-face districts like KwaLe, Narok, Kilifi, etc." Events at the centre (e.g. the assassination of Aboya and increased tension between the Kikuyu and Luo) have greatly affected retrenchment and led to the "scaling down of elite investments like houses in confluence zones" and to home and farm purchase in tribal areas and investment in towns in the tribal zones.² Retrenchment has also followed, Mutiso notes, the "tribalisation" of personnel of commercial Firms or portions of them, and in the resurrection of the tribal welfare associations as the "most powerful agents of the tribesmen at the centre."³ The Harambee self-help Colleges of Technology, by shifting welfare norms to the periphery, have helped to consolidate retrenchment, and to emphasize the importance of local, as distinct from national, issues.⁴ Given the weakness of KNU and the National Assembly, this has strengthened the Executive's reliance on patronage for control purposes, and enhanced the role of the Provincial Administration.⁵

3. Ibid.
The uneven development of educational facilities among the various ethnic groups poses, Okumu suggests, "something of a dilemma in civil service staffing", in terms of universal criteria of appointment which would lead to domination by various groups, and the use of particularistic criteria which would undermine the "usual criteria regarding merit and achievement in civil service recruitment."¹ The diverse regional endowments and the plethora of ethnic groups competing for political advantage, provide a political leader in Kenya with a great many opportunities to shape and re-shape alignments for control purposes. But while Okumu notes that patronage in the administration has had a long history in Kenya, and refers to the development of an alleged Kikuyumisation since the end of the Emergency when the colonial administration adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Kikuyu,² he does not explore the system of Presidential patronage which centres on Gathundu and reinforces the ethnic dimension of politics.³


The central thrust of the intellectual's critical appraisal of Kenya's African socialism is that it neither is African nor socialist. Mohiddin points out that Sessional Paper No.10 does not specifically define what socialism is,⁴ while Yash Chai observes that it is

1. Ibid., p.32.
3. Laya, "The Kenya State".
surprising that in the theoretical part of the paper, no attempt is made to relate the discussion to the wider thinking about African socialism elsewhere. Indeed it "aims to base ideas of African socialism on generalized African traditions" and assumes that there "is a general consensus about these traditions." Many Kenyan critics, including Mohiddin, Ghai and Nigo-t-Adholla suggest that the paper places greater stress on economic development and growth than on questions of distribution and social justice, although Ghai does note that the paper "is unusual among the documents of African Socialism in its emphasis on political freedom and individual rights." 

According to Mohiddin, fundamental to the paper is the proposition that any impediment to growth is to be avoided. Therefore, any tampering with the inherited economic system is not to be condoned, and every encouragement to be given to capital inflows from outside. Africanisation, being basically the substitution of personnel rather than structural change, is seen as the solution. The net result of the perpetuation of inherited structures, substitution of African personnel, and the encouragement of external capital is the creation of a "small class of people endowed with all the privileges that a society based on economic status offers." Apart from Odinga and Kaggin, there were other members of the


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.22.

Government who believed that a fundamental restructuring of
economic and social relationships would have to be attempted.
Moi Kibaki, for instance, said in 1965 that

"What we are called upon to do is to plan and
create new institutions which shall, on the one
hand, retain those African socialist values and
yet, on the other, shall be efficient enough to
meet the needs of the modern industrial society."

The only safeguards against the misuse of economic power, and of
the state becoming the tool of special interests, are "mythical and
ceremonial abstractions" of "mutual social responsibility" and
"African democracy".

Chei points out that in common with African socialism elsewhere,
the Paper rules out total state ownership. State ownership and
enterprises are seen merely as a response to the problem of domestic
accumulation of savings, and as fulfilling a role in certain
strategic industries. The main emphasis is on planning and control,
with the State's primary function being "to guide and to prevent
abuse and exploitation". Kenya's economy, Mohiddin and Migot-
Adholla note, is basically capitalist, and if nationalisation, even
with compensation, had been used to secure local control and owner-
ship of the economy, it "would have meant the withdrawal of support
by international capital." Both Mohiddin and Migot-adholla,

1. Moi Kibaki, Speech on "African Socialism", The East African
4. Ibid. See Ali Mwaura, "Socialised Capitalism in East Africa",
unlike most other critics, have been alive to the fact that Kenya's Socialism has been profoundly influenced by the nature of the inheritance situation, including the colonizer's insistence on the protection of settler and capitalist interests, and the payment of compensation for the takeover of settler lands—something Naggia so vehemently objected to.\(^1\) Mohiddin has demonstrated at some length that the position of Kenya's socialism with regard to land policy has its roots in pre-independence land consolidation policies, which the Kenya government has simply continued and strengthened.\(^2\) Traditional communal ownership of land is always deemed one of the main pillars of African socialism. Sessional Paper No.10, however, declared that communal ownership and cooperatives can be impediments to economic growth, and that greater individualization of property ownership should be encouraged.\(^3\) In an attempt to resolve this apparent fundamental contradiction, Mohiddin observes, the paper introduced the distinction between actual ownership and the use to which the property was put. On another plain, Sessional Paper No.10, introduced a similar distinction. Kenya opted for Africanization of the economy, and endeavoured to achieve this by shifting the emphasis from "actual ownership" to "effective control".

The whole tenor of Kenyan African socialism, Mohiddin notes, has been anti-colonialist, and the chief architect, Tom Mboya, rejected Marxism and the notion of class and class struggle in the

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African context. But Kenyan Socialism, "far from preventing the existence of classes, vigorously encourages it." Flippantly, Masrui suggested that this might not be socialism, "but it does not prevent it from being good Marxism, simply because, following Angles, an "African bourgeoisie is as necessary a pre-condition of an African socialist revolution as an African proletariat." Of course Kibaki, a former academic and one of the most perceptive Government members, was able to see that Africanization, if thought of in terms of substitution of personnel, would lead to the development of a class society. Yash Chai reiterated this point, suggesting that Africanization was unlikely to solve the class problem, and indeed, would intensify it by making class more difficult to eliminate. Chai also notes that a conspicuous omission is no absence of discussion of the role of the political party in the achievement of African socialism, as well as other means of mass education and mobilization. He fails to relate, however, this omission to the underlying capitalist rationale of Kenya's "socialism", which renders unnecessary any mass-based, mobilizing party for structural transformation purposes. This is surprising

1. Ibid., p.12.
5. Ibid., p.20.
considering that the key features of Kenya's African socialism which he identifies,1 with the possible exceptions of some state ownership and some state control, are those of a capitalist or state capitalist society. In a sense Nkrumah's notion of "socialised capitalism" involving the "encouragement of private enterprise and the creation of an African commercial class ... controlled by the Government and regulated by a national ethos of fairness and equity"2 in an art one in the Kenyan case - if we exclude the ethos of fairness and equity.

The weakness of Kanu

Higot-adholla points out that the nationalist party which led Kenya to independence was a "loose alliance of different groups responding to their several interests."3 Ojuma concurs, noting that "we forced our political parties simply for the sake of fighting for shuru." Since shuru, he adds, "our politics have played around personalities, individual and group interests rather than parties. Kanu as a political party is not there, and when its own leaders talk of reviving it they seem just that: you don't revive something that is alive."4 Ojuma observes that in Kenya "we are struck by the omnipresence, opportunism and parochialism of

1. Ibid., p.23.
politicians, and are perturbed by the impotence of political parties."¹ This position, he suggests, was not reached by mistake, but rather because "our leaders of political thought have brought us there."² Most political leaders have not acted as men possessed of a higher national consciousness; they have experienced feelings of powerlessness and insecurity which have prevented them from "risk-taking in political decision-making" and contributed to their inability "to serve collectively as the primary focus and symbol of national unity." This has led to the neglect of party organization and has emphasized parochialism and the ethnic dimension of politics. The salience of KANU, Okumu notes, has its roots in colonial policies which was designed to "prevent the development of a united national party embracing all ethnic associations."³ Where parochial support for a national leader is as pervasive and traditionally rooted as the one for Oginga Odinga in Central Nyanza i.e., it is bound to have a weakening effect on the "transfer of the people's loyalty to the State and contribute to the creation of national political parties with loose structures and ineffective leadership." During and after the emergency, the aim of the colonial administration was to "prevent the development of a tightly organised nationalist movement in favour of a loosely organised operation which would certainly be easier to manipulate after the transfer of power to the African."⁵

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.11.
5. Ibid., p.12.
By the time the first direct election of Africans to the Legislative Council was carried out in 1957, there were indeed a multiplicity of locally based, political associations. Naijira points out the 
the varied nature of the colonial situation encouraged this phenomenon. 
The dissociative naqti who led the nationalist movements had no 
power or foothold in the colonial order (unlike the associative 
naqti) and found it necessary to mobilise at the local level, "in 
spite of the fact that ultimately resolution of any grievances 
would have to come from the colonial centre." The naqti had to 
appear to speak for Africans, and demonstrate to the satisfaction 
of the colonial administration that they had a following before they 
could get their grievances to the colonial centre, and often relied 
on traditional organisational bases.

Apart from the local or parochial basis of party organisation 
working against the creation of a national party and leading to a 
decline, Okumu suggests that the presence of a charismatic leader 
had much to do with the decline of party politics as well. Kenya's 
nationalism, like that of other African countries, lacked a 
"persuasive social philosophy beyond the strategy for gaining 
independence." This absence, Okumu adds, "created a fertile soil 
for a sterile struggle for leadership". Out of the struggle 
emerged "two poorly articulated" ideologies. The first, articulated 
principally by Mboya, was that a nationalist movement, rather than 
a national party, was the key to winning independence... The

2. Ibid.
corollary of this was that policy questions should be taken after
power was obtained. Co-existing with this "pragmatic" approach
was another which stressed that the main task of the nationalist
movement was to totally liberate the people's attitudes and minds
"contaminated" by the colonial system. ¹ This could be affected by
immediate planning for the fundamental transformation of the basic
institutions of colonial rule. Central to the success of this
mutation would be a mass party, well organized and disciplined, armed
with a social ideology that could provide the guidelines for
decolonization. ² Organizing for independence should not be
conciliatory and compromising, but revolutionary in order to destroy
the continued influence of "relations of dependence and domination." ³
Oginga Odinga and Jbildung Kaguru, especially, stressed the vanguard
nature of the party, as well as the mass base, and its role in
decision-making at all levels. The competing ideologies were
contained within KANU until the March 1966 Liguura conference and
the formation of the K.A.I.O. Both KANU and KADU, Ocsuru points out,
were "basically devoted to the development and expansion of capitalism
and its later Africanisation." ⁴ The issues which divided these
were largely peripheral. It was easy for KANU to re-absorb both
KADU and Ngeli's Akamba Peoples Party "without making any major
ideological readjustment."

Okumu points out that once Kenyatta was made the "focus, and the condition for the winning of political independence", indeed the saviour, it "almost wholly prevented all other leaders from playing a creative role in the party, a role which a few of them were also capable of." This also had the effect of undermining the party's claim "to be the main instrument for legitimization of power or the medium for crystallization and convergence of interests."2

There can be little doubt that the nature of, and moribund state of KANU is, as Okumu, Mutiso, Migot-Adholla and Ojuka argue, the product of colonial policies and the nature of the devolution of power in the colonial context. Clearly, the importance of this factor cannot be overlooked. However it is to ignore the point, emphasized by Leys, that the Kenyan ruling group had no need for the party after independence: it was their creation and therefore their's to destroy. It was necessary to satisfy the legalistic-constitutionalist procedure for colonial devolution, but not necessary for the "development" strategies adopted by the ruling group. Indeed Sessional Paper No.10 makes no mention of the role of the party at all.

The Weakness of Parliament and the Civil Service

The weakness of KANU, Okumu suggests, is one of the reasons why the National Assembly is little more than an ethnic elite debating society.3 Ghai and Mauzalan point out, however, that during the

1. Ibid., p.15.
3. Ibid., p.9.
colonial era, even though the Legislative Council was a "forum to
air grievances and to criticize the Government or its officials"; its
legislative role was unimportant. They add:

"An active and vigorous legislature was one of the
institutions which Kenya inherited at Independence.
Combined at the time with the newly acquired
democratic character, it had a potentially important
role as an instrument of legitimation of the new
political and constitutional order. Since inde-
pendence, the thrust of the Government's constit-
utional changes, and administrative and political
practices has been to whittle down the controlling
function of the legislature, and curb its political
effectiveness."^2

While Parliament's legislative competence may have increased, its
control over the executive has decreased. The thrust of constitutional
measures relating to the procedure for removal of the government and
its role in the operation of emergency powers, and the amendment
relating to the forced resignation of members who leave the
parliamentary party (adopted at the time of the formation of the KPU),
has been to enhance executive power.

Undoubtedly, as Obama recognizes, the weakness of Parliament
has helped foment tension between the upper echelons of the civil
service and politicians. A strong body of opinion within KNU,
directed basically in the Backbencher's Group which provided the core
of the KPU, asserted that the civil service should be subject to the
control of the Party and Parliament. Much of the tension stemmed
from the politicians' realization that the civil service, and the

1. Y.F. Chai and J.R.W.B. Macaulan, Public Law and Political Change
2. Ibid., p. 58.
Provincial administration especially, was being used by the Government for law and order and development purposes. Okumu suggests, however, that much of the tension between upper echelon civil servants and politicians is reduced by a convergence of interests: both are "struggling to transform their status from a salariat to a property-owning group." The structure of the civil service has been, and is, a major "instrument for promoting an incipient class structure of the salariat type."

The upper echelons have taken over the colonial salary structure, with its marked inequality, and have stressed status differences. The role of the upper echelons of the civil service, and indeed of the "political elite" and "new middle classes as a whole", is managerial. The new middle classes do not own the means of production, and in that sense, as Penon observed, do not fit the classic conception of the middle class. Rather, they control state power without controlling the means of production, and the newcomers have been forced to accept managerial positions in locally based foreign enterprises which gives them little power, if any, over the activities of these enterprises. Having acceded to state power, much of the subsequent activity of the new middle class has been directed towards the acquisition of property and consumer goods. However, lacking a sound financial footing, it has become "heavily

2. Ibid., p.35.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.39.
5. Ibid., p.40.
6. Ibid.
indebted to the financial institutions of the old ruling class.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, according to Okumu, much of the activity of the new middle class is motivated by the desire to shake off dependence on foreign capital by transforming itself into a genuine middle class possessing productive capacity.\textsuperscript{2} This dependence has created insecurity among both civil servants and politicians.

\textbf{Conclusion}

From this brief overview, it can be seen that while a number of Kenyan intellectuals have addressed themselves to questions of nationalism and the nature of the colonial inheritance situation, class differentiation and "tribalism", the role and nature of parties, Parliament, the Executive and the civil service, they have given little attention to a number of other questions which are important for an understanding of the post-independence political economy. For instance, there is very little analysis of the nature of the settler and colonial economy and its effect on the structure of the post-independence economy and society. Surprisingly little attention has been given to the analysis of the role of foreign capital in development strategies, and its effect on the structure of the economy, wages and employment, technology transference, and who controls its access. Further, little attention has been given to the state, and to questions of who controls it, and whether it is a direct class instrument, or whether it enjoys a certain autonomy above competing or antagonistic classes.

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p.41.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
The Tanzanian Radical Intelligentsia

Several writers have made some attempt to classify various ideological strands and groupings in Tanzanian intellectual and political life. Mazrui and Tordoff, for instance, point out that "the Left, even in Tanzania, covers a broad spectrum of viewpoints. The spectrum is from the militancy of the Super-Left to the evolutionary and accommodationist orientation of the Semi-Left."¹

Nyerere is viewed by them as a non-doctrinaire, pragmatic socialist who, while moving further to the "left", still represents the midpoint of the left spectrum. To his left stand a rather ill-assorted, inadequately identified group which consists of supposed racist and Marxist-Leninist elements, and others who could at best be described as radical nationalists. The "Super Left" or the "extra-revolutionary left" consists of a small number of intellectuals at the university, and others such as A.M. Babu and the Zanzibaria, A.S. Mtaki, and Joseph Kasella-Bantu. Because Mazrui and Tordoff seem to be pre-occupied with illiberalism and strident rhetoric, rather than with explanation, some of their candidates for the ill-defined "Super Left" are absurd. Mtaki, regarded by them, as well as Rienen,² as a Marxist-Leninist, uttered some crude Marxist pronouncements but was, as Cliffe notes, an executive of one of the remaining bastions of international capitalism in Tanzania and the only M.P. not to declare his acceptance of the Arusha Declaration's


conditions of leadership. Mazrui and Tordoff's article has one brief reference to Shivji's paper, *Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle* and his lamentation about the lack of scientific analysis in Tanzania, but no discussion of the paper and the reactions it produced. Mulei's categorisation in his article on "The Predicament of the Left in Tanzania" suffers from similar problems of definition, and the politicians and intellectuals referred to are basically the same as those mentioned by Mazrui and Tordoff.

In an important sense, attempts at taxonomy produce fruitless results, especially when undertaken without any effort to examine the thought of those being classified. For this reason the emphasis in this brief outline of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia is on thought and not categorization of people. The Tanzanian radical intelligentsia has emerged from the broader intellectual stratum, and consists of a relatively small number of critically thinking, politically active intellectuals whose thought is grounded in Marxist-Leninist traditions, and who are conscious of their existence as a collectivity.

The radical intelligentsia is of recent origin, and has not developed out of an indigenous tradition of radicalism. Its members are young, and the products of university education, both in Dar-es-Salaam and overseas in the 1960s. Their major intellectual influences have been Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Fanon,


Castro, Debray, Guevara, Althusser, Mandel, Baran and Sweezy, and Frank. They have been little influenced by the strong cultural nationalist mood of both Kenya and Uganda, and have little truck with concepts of African socialism and humanism. Undoubtedly, much of the impetus for the emergence of the radical intelligentsia has come from foreign intellectual catalysts such as John Saul, Lionel Cliffe, Thomas Szentes and Walter Rodney who have helped place Tanzanian underdevelopment within its historical context and relationship with the international capitalist economy. In addition, Nyarere's intellectual inclinations and body of published thought, if within an African rather than scientific socialist tradition, have been capable of sustaining analysis and of providing a take-off point for further discussion. The presence within TAMU and the Tanzanian leadership of a number of people committed to the implementation of socialism, and the promulgation of documents such as the Arusha Declaration, Education for Self-Reliance, and Nsongoza, has served to encourage serious debate about the difficulties of implementing socialism in Tanzania.

While the radical intelligentsia is not completely ideologically cohesive, cohesion does come from Marxist traditions, and the perception of underdevelopment in terms of relations between dependent or subject societies and global capitalist system. Added cohesion is provided by its location in Dar-es-Salaam in a relatively few institutions, and by the fact that its members know each other, have often been students together, and been associated with the TLY and journals such as Cheche and Maji Maji. Its members possess a consciousness of collectivity, and gear their work basically for
each others' consumption.¹ For instance, a paper such as Shivji's "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" and "Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues" will be discussed shortly after publication by other members of the intelligentsia in Maji Maji, and perhaps in the daily press. Cohesion is also provided by the limited number of outlets available for dissemination - the Daily News and Sunday News, Maji Maji, an occasional Economic Research Bureau or Development Studies Paper, and sometimes an article in The African Review or Taamuli.

**Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle**

Compared with their counterparts in both Kenya and Uganda, Tanzanian intellectuals have been much more concerned to systematically build up a comprehensive view of how the interaction of dominant external factors (especially the penetration of the capitalist system and the integration of African economies into the global capitalist system) and subordinate internal factors, has shaped the history, political economy and society of their country. The first paper by a local intellectual to achieve this was Issa Shivji's seminal "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", first published in the now defunct journal, Cheche.

In his paper, Shivji dismissed the question of rural stratification and class antagonism as being of secondary importance, and argued that the main contradiction in Tanzania is not between rural capitalists and rural labouring classes, but lies in the context and nature of the relationship of Tanzania's economy with international capital.² In the theoretical introduction to the

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¹ Discussion with Henry Mapolu, Edinburgh.
² Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", p.3.
paper, Shivji distinguished between three broad types of neo-colonial situations, thus illustrating that continued imperialist control which constrains 'Third World' development can take a variety of forms. In what Shivji terms the "neo-colony par excellence" the means of production are owned directly by the international corporations,¹ and the private sector is dominated by the international bourgeoisie. The bureaucracy is essentially of the administrative type which makes the state apparatus in the interests of the international bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeoisie, is even if it wishes to convert itself into a genuine bourgeoisie, incapable of competing with the "big sharks" and engages in petty trade and the running of the service sector of the economy.

In the neo-colony par excellence, the investment policies of international corporations and hence of productive forces is extremely "lop-sided". The colonial pattern of capital investment in production has remained basically unaltered with mining and petroleum taking the major share. Industrial investment, other than in mining has been almost entirely concentrated in primary products processing for the export market, or in import substitution in the light branches of manufacturing such as food, beverages, clothing, and other consumer goods. The general policy of international corporations has been, as both Rweyemamu and Guruli have pointed out as well,² to adopt capital-intensive techniques in consumer and light industries. This policy, Shivji suggests, has

¹. Ibid., p.8.

had an important effect on patterns of class formation and given rise to a "labour aristocracy". It has led to the expansion of the service sector, and hence the petty-bourgeoisie, and does not "rapidly add to the genuine proletarian class". It also helps swell the number of the lumpen-proletariat. This type of system, Shivji asserts, is at least superficially the most stable of the variants of the neo-colony, its most immediate danger coming from "the extreme right - especially the army." The Left, as in Kenya, is "mercilessly curbed". Nevertheless there is, according to Shivji, a great deal of intrapetty-bourgeoisie conflict over the allocation of international bourgeoisie derived rewards.

The second neo-colonial situation which Shivji identifies is bureaucratic capitalism. This situation is characterized by nationalization of large sectors of the economy without socialisation and a break from the imperialist economy. The control of the client state's economy is no longer direct; the international bourgeoisie maintains its control through partnership agreements with state corporations which supply management. This has the effect of creating, above the administrative bureaucracy of the civil service, an economic bureaucracy which is directly concerned with the managing and running of the production process.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.10.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p.11.
administrative bureaucracy, however, is not directly related to the production process — it is essentially part of the political superstructure. It is because the economic bureaucracy has roots in the economic base itself, that its position and interest in the maintenance of the status quo is much deeper and stronger than that of the administrative bureaucracy. As it has a class base in the international bourgeoisie, nationalization and state ownership do not necessarily resolve the antagonistic contradiction between the international capitalist class and the workers and peasants.

The third brood type of neo-colonial situation Shivji identifies is state capitalism which he claims is distinguished from that described by Engels by the fact that state capitalism in an underdeveloped country is not an evolution of a developed capitalist society; rather it "functions within a neo-colonial framework where the international bourgeoisie has a decisive hold over both the state and the economic system of the client state." This economic formation is distinguished from others by the existence of a small, genuine, indigenous bourgeois class. It is this formation which offers the most revolutionary potential. In the neo-colony par-excellence and bureaucratic capitalism the fluidity of social formations and the sway of false ideologies brunts contradictions within the system.

According to Shivji, Tanzania before the Arusha Declaration fell into the first type of neo-colonial formation. At the time of

1. Ibid.

independence it did not disengage itself from the imperialist economy, and industrial investment, exemplified by the Dares-Salaam Oil Refinery, the Kilombero Sugar Plant and the joint Associated Portland Cement Company - Cementra Holding of Zurich cement plant, was still in the "export - enclave machine". The Tanzanian economy remained tied to its traditional markets, and its exports consisted mainly of raw materials. Class formations corresponded fairly closely to those of the neo-colony par excellence: administrative bureaucracy; petty-bourgeoisie; a sub-capitalist stratum consisting of Asians (the commercial bourgeoisie); the peasantry and kulaks in the agricultural sector; and a small working class.

The nationalization following the Arusha Declaration resulted in much of the economy coming under state ownership but did not lead to a break with the international capitalist economy. It did, as Shivji was to demonstrate in a later paper, pave the way for the eventual elimination of the Asian sub-capitalists as a social stratum. Furthermore, it provided the conditions for the emergence of the economic bureaucracy. It did not, however, place Tanzania within either the bureaucratic capitalist or state capitalist categories, mainly because the economic bureaucracy has not gained the upperhand yet in the face of determined socialist leadership.

Partnership agreements, management and consultancy agreements,

1. Ibid., p.18.
2. Ibid., p.19.
3. Ibid., p.21.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.22.
technical assistance and feasibility surveys have nevertheless enabled international corporations to keep a foothold in the Tanzania economy, and have ensured that Tanzania remains within the "neo-colonial web." Joint ventures protect regional interests and markets, provide political security, help with concessions on import duties, and give the "global monopolies" a strong bargaining position. Shivji points out that National Development Corporation investments, because they tend to be in consumer goods and service sectors, do not help to construct an integrated economy, "and a strong industrial sector which is a sine qua non if the country is really to develop." There is, because of investment patterns, the dominance of commercial capital which is not transformed into industrial capital. And, moreover, "the large portion of the surplus generated by the hard toil of the masses finds its way to the metropolis through these foreign partners."

Because of the domination of international capital, the class struggle is on the international plane. The antagonistic contradiction is between imperialism and its local agents on the one hand, and the people in the individual subject country. The task in Tanzania, Shivji suggests, is to resolve the central antagonistic contradiction, which is inseparably tied to the secondary contradiction between the economic bureaucracy and the revolutionary leadership. Once the central contradiction is resolved, the secondary contradiction will be weakened, the social base of the bureaucracy having been destroyed.

1. Ibid., pp.22-33.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.33.
4. Ibid., pp.33-34.
5. Ibid., pp.34-35.
The Critical Response to "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle"

Commenting on Shivji's second paper, *Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues*, Foster-Carter said that it seized "that essential local initiative" and determined that henceforth every serious approach to a macro-analysis of the Tanzanian situation "must take Shivji as a starting point."

The same observation could have been made about Shivji's first paper. Othman suggested that its publication exploded the myth that Tanzania was somehow "different" from other developing countries and undermined the "illusion which seemed to be maintained that the nationalization measures of 1967 and after had in any way changed our neo-colonial economic situation."

Rweyemamu accepted that the pattern of nationalization in Tanzania, as Shivji argued, left important loopholes for further income drains and social stratification. He noted that both the lack of capital and skill encourages parastatals to "leave industry initially to foreign capital and enterprise." He pointed out, however, that nationalization can ameliorate only one of the several dependency relationships - "dependency on the metropolitan markets in so far as Tanzania does not have exports with a home base, export industries having been established to complement the metropolitan economies; dependency on imports of basic goods giving rise to a technological dependency and dependency on foreign entrepreneurs for investment decisions. It is these dependency structures that must


ultimately be altered if Tanzania has to overcome underdevelopment, the precondition to socialist reconstruction." Nevertheless, the recognition of nationalization's shortcomings should not, Rweyemamu suggest, undertake "the significance of the nationalization measures", which are able to secure ownership of capital, "the instrument of production to the people of Tanzania." Rweyemamu notes that Shivji is very vague about the question of the nature of social classes, and suggests that social classes are basic groupings of individuals in a society opposed to one another by virtue of the role they play in the productive process, from the point of view of the relations they establish among themselves in the organisation of labour and in respect of property. In Tanzania there is not, as Shivji at least implied, a class of peasants and workers. There is, Rweyemamu contends, a small "weak" industrial working class, a class of peasant owners of land, and an "elite substratum" (not a class) which rules, not through ownership of the means of production, but through occupying decision-making positions in the party, state and the economy. In effect, his formulation is as imprecise and limited as Shivji's and takes no account, for instance, of rural social differentiation. Much the same could be said of Guruli's class scheme as well. Rweyemamu does, however, draw attention to what he terms the "periphery

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.131.
4. Ibid., pp.131-32.
proletariat's position within the international division of labour which "significantly restricts its unaided role in the struggle" against imperialism.\(^1\)

According to Rweyemamu, the weakness of the working class and the "low level of consciousness of the majority of the peasantry" raises the question of the proper way of establishing a mass party which is at the same time a vanguard party.\(^2\) Shivji's view was that for Tanzania to move towards socialism, it is necessary to establish a revolutionary party of dedicated cadres. He asserted that

the state power must be in the hands of the workers and peasants led by the present revolutionary leadership and not the bureaucracy. A class, in this case the workers and peasants, cannot build a society in its interests without wielding political power.\(^3\)

Rweyemamu was troubled by this formulation, partly because Shivji had not made clear how the class nature of the state is determined, and partly because he doubted whether workers and peasants formed one class. He also questioned whether Shivji expected class consciousness to develop more or less spontaneously out of the objective social situation, or from the efforts of a stable and vanguard group in the party concerned with the superimposition of revolutionary consciousness.\(^4\) Rweyemamu is surely mistaken in raising this question of ambiguity: Shivji is quite clear on this point, and in his Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues explicitly rejected the pitfalls of spontaneity. In his first paper his

\(^1\) Rweyemamu, "The Silent Class Struggle in Retrospect", p.132.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", p.39.
\(^4\) Rweyemamu, "The Silent Class Struggle in Retrospect", p.130.
position was clear: in order for disengagement from the imperialist economy to be achieved, and underdevelopment overcome, "the working class must be surely and firmly in political power. This can be ensured only if the working class is *guided by a revolutionary vanguard party of dedicated cadres.*" (author's italics)\(^1\)

The formation of a vanguard party, Rweyemamu suggests, would not necessarily abolish most of the old social relations left intact by nationalization measures and state control.\(^2\) They are not even maintained by the identification of an "elite" or "economic bureaucracy" with the international bourgeoisie. Rather they continue to exist because of the "reproduction of the old economic, ideological and political relations"\(^3\) which can only be destroyed in the wake of protracted struggle. Relationships associated with the capitalist division of labour, for instance, continue to reproduce themselves long after a society has embarked on the path towards socialism.

Rweyemamu thus places much greater stress than Shivji on the nature of the inheritance situation and the international division of labour. Haroub Othman also emphasizes the importance of inheritance through his focus on the nature of the state. He claims that neither Shivji, nor other commentators have really touched upon this question and that indeed, Marxist theorists since Marx and Lenin,

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3. Ibid., p.136.
with the exception of Gramsci and Milliband, have not bothered to
discuss the question of the state. In spite of the attempts of
non-Marxist social scientists to portray the state as the mediator
between conflicting diverse groups and not as a coercive class
instrument, and the increasing intervention of the state in the
regulation of the economy and social welfare, its fundamental nature
has not changed: "the modern state... is essentially a capitalist
machine, the state of capitalists the ideal personification of the
total national capital." According to Othman, no serious socialist
could suggest that the coming of the Arusha Declaration heralded the
arrival of Tanzanian socialism. Nationalization measures have not
fundamentally altered the country's position from its immediate pro-
Uhuru position, and social life and all industries, including the
nationalized ones, are permeated by an "ordinary capitalist bureau-
cratic spirit." Tanzania still belongs to the capitalist orbit,
its economy, like its state structure, being linked with the interna-
tional phenomenon of capital: "While attempts are being made to
disengage the country from international finance capital, the state
which is to be an instrument in this disengagement still remains
interlocked with that system." The colonial state and its organs
were conceived as instruments for the promotion of colonialism and
"for the production of the colonial situation." Instead of
dismantling the inherited colonial state structures, the inheritance
elite, though widespread Africanization without structural change,

2. Ibid., p.9.
3. Ibid.
perpetuated the colonial state structure. It is in this respect that Othman agrees with Shivji, and dismisses Szentes criticism of the use of the concept of status quo in socio-economic analyses. Inherited values and attitudes pose major obstacles to change and the introduction of socialism, as Marx realized, but none important in the Tanzanian case, the "machinery itself is not the kind of instrument needed for transforming this society into a socialist one."^2

When discussing the perpetuation of colonial state structures, Othman does not consider which organs of the colonial state have been inherited and which have either been strengthened or weakened. He believes that before any serious talk of socialism can be entertained, complete decolonization has to be effected and this involves the total destruction of the inherited colonial structure and its supporting values. In this vague formulation, there is no notion that perhaps decolonization and the implementation of socialism are part of an indivisible and protracted struggle. Instead, following orthodox Marxist thought, Othman argues that societies are at different historical stages from others, and that "each stream in this revolutionary unrest" is not faced with the same task. In the case of Tanzania "the present task surely cannot be the building of socialism."^4 It is necessary to complete the democratic phase of the revolution in the way China, Mongolia and

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3. Ibid., p.13.
Cuba have done.  

The Arusha Declaration made clear the path of Tanzanian development, and the debate between socialism and capitalism is a very real one. But before Tanzania can embark on the socialist path, the national democratic phase has to be completed. According to Othman

National democracy is a stage of transition from a semi-colonial, dependent situation to a socialist order, and it addresses itself to the question of further development of the revolution, unity of all the national, patriotic and revolutionary forces (none of what Othman identifies in Tanzania) and continually sees to it that the revolution develops towards the establishment of a socialist society. The stage of development is to consummate the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution.  

In this phase, which does not represent the dictatorship of one class, the key determining role will undoubtedly be played by the "alliance of working class, peasantry, and revolutionary intelligentsia" in a well-organized and disciplined party.

The Class Struggle Continues

In Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues Shivji devotes much more attention to theoretical and methodological questions than in the first paper. The first substantial part of the paper is designed to establish the applicability of Marxist theory in Africa.

1. Othman is surely being naïve and dogmatic here. The distinction between a democratic and socialist phase of revolution is obscure at both, especially when seen within a limited time perspective. In the Chinese case, for example, one could argue that a democratic phase did exist, but it was not successful in eradicating feudalism and never successfully established itself.


3. Ibid., p.15.
discredit elite theory, and clarify a number of issues relating to
the definition of class and class struggle. Shivji also deals much
more fully with the crucial role of the state in all types of under-
developed polity and highlights its role as follows.

One thing that stands out sharply is the central,
decisive and almost omnipotent role played by the
state and state apparatus in these struggles.
This is not to say that economic interests have
had no effect. But the economic interests of the
ruling class have had to be established and
buttressed by state power.

He also deals with the question of an elite becoming a class, and
the conditions of reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

In his criticism of Shivji's first paper, Szentéss had maintained on
theoretical grounds that the elite cannot reproduce itself and can
therefore have no long-term existence as an independent class, since
its only real asset, education, is increasingly eroded by social
mobility fostered by educational and economic expansion. According
to Shivji, however, political control of the state apparatus, class
control of the neo-colonial territorial economy through the state,
and continued reproduction of the system of underdevelopment within
the world wide capitalist system are important conditions of the
extreme and reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In
addition, these conditions are supplemented by the uneven distribution
of educational facilities, including the urban location of schools,
the sharing of residential areas, social exclusiveness, and "old boy"
networks, and possibly intermarriage.

2. Ibid., pp.86-88.
3. Ibid., p.88.
In his earlier paper, Shivji's formulation of class was vague. In *The Class Struggle Continues*, much more attention is given to the identification of classes in the pre-colonial setting and how their nature has affected subsequent development and struggle. At the time of independence, Shivji argues, there existed the following class formations: the metropolitan bourgeoisie; the predominantly African commercial bourgeoisie; the African-petty-bourgeoisie; kulaks; workers; and the peasantry. The African petty-bourgeoisie at the time of independence is divided into three different groups.¹

upper level
(intelligentsia) — intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers.

middle level — middle government salariat, junior clerks, soldiers etc.

lower level — shopkeepers, lower salariat in the services sector and generally lowest grades of the salariat.

Both Foster-Carter² and Walter Rodney,³ however, wonder how operational these divisions and sub-divisions are "either in terms of the way people subjectively see themselves and others and behave accordingly, or in terms of different objective relationships to the means of

2. Foster-Carter, p.16.
production (these differences appear to be at most only quantitative, not qualitative)." As Rodney indicates, there is a lack of precision in the use of terms such as "middle government salariat" and "lower salariat". Clearly, Shivji fails to relate them sufficiently to "given numbers of people earning salaries in a stated bracket." Hence, one of the major shortcomings of Shivji's class divisions is that they are not sufficiently "fleshed" in. In a society such as Tanzania, where those belonging to the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" would be relatively few in number, the identification of members should not prove an insurmountable obstacle. Further, Shivji's class divisions, because of their static nature, tend to obscure differences between the situation at independence and that which obtains now. For example, as a result of colonial educational policies (see Chapter III of this thesis) very few Tanzanians would have been eligible for membership of upper level groups or intelligentsia within the petty-bourgeoisie.

According to Shivji, the petty-bourgeoisie did not form a homogeneous mass, though it provided a common front in the fight for Uhuru. The leadership positions of TANU, trade unions and cooperatives were generally occupied by those of the upper-level of the petty-bourgeoisie. It was the petty-bourgeoisie which for various objective reasons, was the only class in a position to lead uhuru struggle against the colonial state. With independence the

1. Foster-Carter, p.16.
4. Ibid., p.52.
petty-bourgeoisie itself developed internal contradictions; "there is a strong tendency for the ruling section of the petty-bourgeoisie to become cut off from its general petty-bourgeois base." In Tanzania, the ruling section of the petty-bourgeoisie developed into a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.

At the time of independence, a good deal of economic power was in the hands of the Asian "commercial bourgeoisie" which "could be considered a subordinate partner of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the latter being the ruling class in the real sense of the word. The Tanganyikan African petty-bourgeoisie which assumed political power at the time of independence had been unable, in contrast to its counterpart in Kenya, to develop deep economic roots in the colonial economy. While this meant that a situation of the separation of power and property existed, it also meant that the "ruling group" within the petty-bourgeoisie had a much freer hand than did its counterpart in Kenya. Using its control of the state apparatus and radical state intervention in the economy, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" was able to modify its relations with international capitalism and strike a "decisive blow against the commercial bourgeoisie", which lacked effective political weapons. The radical state intervention thus made possible the consolidation of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie while producing some structural

1. Ibid., p.54.
2. In his earlier paper Shivji used the term economic bureaucracy.
4. Ibid., p.57.
5. Ibid., p.75.
The Arusha Declaration, apart from marking the important historical turning point in the development of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie, marked the beginnings of class struggle for socialism by putting socialism on the agenda and promoting discussion of proletarian ideology. This was to intensify with "Mwanga" and the increased emphasis on workers' participation and control.

Ujamaa Vijiji and Rural Stratification

In Tanzania, the stress on rural socialist development through ujamaa vijiji has led to some vitriolic exchanges between intellectuals. The Daily News columnist, Change wa Change, whose position swings considerably, felt constrained after the spate of workers' lockouts to question the principle that a socialist revolution can only be led by the working class. In Tanzania, he suggested, they had become exploiters of hardworking and revolutionary peasants. A number of intellectuals, including Henry Mapolu, Roy Chihota, and Bernard Olua reached strongly to this suggestion. Olua reiterated that the fight for socialism is

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
first and foremost a fight against the rule of capital. We should not confuse this with the democratic struggle. Since the struggle is against the rule of capital, the workers in the vanguard of the socialist struggle, therefore, can only be the modern wage slaves because they are directly and wholly dependent on capital. 1

Guruli suggests that it is difficult to argue, as Change has done, that the peasants are more revolutionary than the workers simply on the grounds that the peasants are poorer than workers. 2 Peasants have always had property and have an inherent tendency to increase property and develop into a petty-bourgeoisie. 3 This is not, he is careful to add, to underestimate the revolutionary potentiality of the peasantry.

In both his first and second papers, Shivji devoted almost no attention to the peasants and his position, along with that of many other Tanzanian radicals is, as Foster-Carter points out, 4 that of the Mao–Cabral camp which insists on mobilization of the peasantry under proletarian ideology. 5 Of course, as previously indicated, the neglect of the peasantry and rural class struggle by Shivji and others, stems principally from their focus on what they perceive to be the major antagonistic contradictions between the international bourgeoisie and the Tanzanian people, and the secondary antagonistic

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
contradiction between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the Tanzanian people. Nevertheless, as both Cliffe and Saul have observed, the overwhelming rural bias of Tanzania means that ultimately, "the only available class base for revolutionary transformation would seem to be a reconstructed peasantry - even if elements from other strata of society provide much of the leadership."¹

The intellectual bases of ujamaa vijiwé are to be found in Nyerere's essay, Ujamaa, and Socialism and Rural Development and are too well-known to be discussed here. As Mushi recognizes, however, insufficient attention has been given to the juxtaposition of the major underlying concepts of traditional ujamaa with their contemporary reconstruction. He takes what Nyerere has termed the "assumptions of traditional ujamaa living" - mutual respect, the sharing of joint production, and the universal obligation to work - and subject them to critical scrutiny. In the case of mutual respect, he notes that it traditionally depended on a combination of filial obligations, common cultural factors, including reinforcing myths of "origin of the fatherland", and the insecurity of the traditional group which induced "mutual affinity and a feeling of a common purpose."²

However, in the modern ujamaa village, such a combination of factors no longer prevails, and mutual respect "cannot be assumed to be a continuation of a traditional behavioural pattern, or a spontaneous

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outgrowth of a conglomeration of people in a geographical location called a ujamaa village."¹ For Nyerere, Mushi notes, the relevance of traditional ujamas and its three principles is not simply a device for selling rural socialism, but at least a "possible operational base for the creation of ujamaa villages."² Following Cliffe,³ Mushi suggests that the strategies for the creation of ujamaa villages are conditioned by the nature of socio-economic stratification and differentiation, land tenure systems, and the mechanisms of cooperation.⁴ He points out that the sharing of joint production which characterized traditional society is affected by more sophisticated technology, the market rather than subsistence orientation of production, and the emergence of an "internal hierarchical system of supervision and control" which introduces a "stratification pattern and division of labour totally unknown to the traditional society."⁵

Mushi points out a fact which is often neglected in more romantic accounts of ujamaa; that is, post-independence ujamaa is in many ways different from the traditional system which was a mixture of ujamaas and ujima. The former, traditionally existed only at the level of the primary and perhaps extended family,⁶ while the latter ujima

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.20.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p.22.
referred to the cooperation of villagers in certain peak seasons involving cultivating, planting, harvesting and so on. This did not involve any notion of communal ownership, even though it did involve mutual assistance and reciprocity. It is ujima and not ujamaa cooperation which can still be seen in Tanzania today, but not ujamaa cooperation upon which modern ujamaa villages are to be built. It is for this reason, Mushi suggests, that there is a "danger of seeing too much continuity in traditional forms of cooperation what may blind the leaders to the essential fact ujamaa is to be built rather than taken for granted." Modern ujamaa village cooperation thus differs from traditional forms of cooperation both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The different levels of ujamaa production and sharing in the newly formed villages, Mushi concludes, require further investigation in the light of the influences of Government and Party cadres, the initial motivation of those joining the village, the size of the group, the nature and scale of the economic activities undertaken, and the environmental factors peculiar to the location of specific villages.

Throughout much of Africa, the break between nationalist parties and the peasantry has been of the kind described by Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth. In Tanzania, however, there has been a concerted attempt to resolve such a contradiction within the overall framework of "socialism and self-reliance" with the peasants and workers serving as the key agency for transforming established

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.25.
structures from within. Nyerere has stressed the prime responsibility of workers and peasants for socialist development. While he has eschewed any concern with the language of class struggle, Nyerere has pointed out that the peasantry has an interest in confronting those elements, even their leaders, who might work to sustain subordination. He has been acutely aware of the development of capitalist relations of production in rural areas which have challenged the system of "extended family production" and led "towards the development of a class system." The policy of ujamaa vijijityhaa has been conceived of as an attempt to structure collective agricultural communities at the base of the Tanzanian system, and thus designed to involve peasants in socialist construction and improve the quality of rural life by raising productivity and making available services and amenities. By helping to rally more critical and radicalized action, they might serve as a check on petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic deviations from socialist construction.

Nyerere has been fully conscious of the fact that ujamaa villages are easier to create in marginal - subsistence areas where capitalist relations of production are undeveloped. It is necessary, for this reason, to foster moves towards collectivism in established cash-cropping areas, even though they "will be more difficult to achieve."

Nyerere has argued that "any citizen who understands the principles of ujamaa is encouraged to take the initiative" in the establishment of ujamaa villages, and that the transition to collectivism is a voluntary one. He has endeavoured to strike a delicate balance

2. Ibid., pp.361-62.
3. Ibid.
between local control and spontaneity and the leadership of persons who "will lead by doing." There is thus, in his position a certain ambiguity about the need for, and role of rural socialist cadres.

A number of radical critics of ujamaa vijiji have seized upon the failure of the Tanzanian leadership, and by implication Nyerere, for failing to relate rural transformation to the broader struggle against imperialism and dependency. Shivji has pointed out that while the policy paper Socialism and Rural Development talks a great deal about peasant differentiation and the threat of agricultural capitalism, it does not raise important questions which are "linked and integrated with the global analysis of the Tanzanian economy as being part of the world capitalist system." Disengagement from the world capitalist system and the building of a nationally integrated economy does not simply involve questions of economic structure. It involves, above all, political struggle—"class struggle against the internal and external classes with vested interests in maintaining and perpetuating the existing system of production relations." It is for this reason that the struggle against the kulaks and the creation of ujamaa vijiji cannot be divorced from overall class analysis and class struggle. And yet, Shivji argues, this is precisely where Tanzania's ujamaa misses. Moreover, the economic aim of the expansion of areas of the cash economy has the objective result of integrating people into the market system which, given the existing overall structure of the territorial economy, "means integrating them within the world market system."

3. Ibid., p.98.
system.\(^1\) Awiti basically support this view. He states

If the internal class contradictions in the rural areas are to be analysed fully, this understanding of the overall position of the Tanzanian economy in relation to international monopoly capital must not be forgotten. \(^2\)

The flaw in Awiti's formulation, however, is that he fails to differentiate, in the way that Shivji does, between a bureaucratic or economic bourgeoisie and other capitalist or petty-capitalist states within the petty-bourgeoisie. Because of this, his argument about capitalists and petty capitalists in Tanzania being unable, due to the position of the international bourgeoisie, to transform themselves into a fully fledged national bourgeoisie loses its force in the face of radical state intervention in the economy and the emergence of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The real test of the *ujamaa vijijini* party, Shivji argues, is how it confronts the question of the *kulaks* and rich peasants.

But this should not lead to the conclusion that the *kulaks* are a very strong national class. While rural differentiation may be advanced in certain areas, it is the national bureaucratic bourgeoisie who control state power. Both Shivji and Awiti assert that there has been a complete lack of class analysis in the implementation of *ujamaa vijijini*, and a failure to develop relevant political strategies capable of making the class struggle apparent. In Iramani District of Iringa, as Awiti's study shows, poor peasant farmers as well as sections of the rural petty-capitalist class were able to take the lead in the development of *ujamaa* villages simply

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1. Ibid., p.99.
2. Awiti, "Class Struggle in Rural Society of Tanzania", p.36.
because relations of production were highly developed and a strong rural capitalist class of landlords and labour employers existed. There, however, the regional bureaucracy relied on decrees and edicts rather than mobilization of peasants. According to Awiti, the struggle of the workers and poor farmers against the mabepari (capitalists) has been "unscientifically guided by the Party" and raises serious questions about the mobilizing role of the Party and Government cadres. The latter have tended to stress material incentives from the government, and have been unable to organize the "ideological and political mobilization campaign" necessary to raise the political consciousness of the farmers and develop an awareness of their place in a national socialist transformation. Shivji adds that with only a few exceptions, there has also been a complete lack of planning in ujamaa villages which can only be overcome if "there are politically committed, ideologically sound and trained cadres living with the people; sharing their lives and aspirations and fully backed by the Party against bureaucratic pressures."  

The Party, Cadres, and Workers Participation and Control

Members of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia have constantly stressed that socialism can only be built by a party with a stable and united vanguard group armed with a scientific socialist approval. Of course, this view had been expressed earlier

1. Ibid., p.45.
by Babu and a few other Marxist influenced intellectuals but had found little acceptance. Babu argued that

in order to be able to pursue and to practise a policy of socialism, there must first be a Party with a distinct socialist orientation, led by a class conscious leadership determined to wage the struggle against capitalism through to the end. 1

This formulation stood in marked contrast to Nyerere's Democracy and the Party System which said little about the actual nature of the party, and concentrated on the weaknesses of the two party system and the strength of the one-party system. In Nyerere's more recent writings, there is no conception of the party as a vanguard party guided by a class conscious leadership. The conception which emerges is of a mass-based party whose prime function is to educate, explain and build. 2 In a lengthy article on "Party Propaganda and the Mobilization of the Masses" P. Msukwa (TANU National Executive Secretary) was able to refer to propaganda for mobilization in a socialist direction without reference to the nature of a vanguard or socialist cadre or the nature of class struggle. 3 There was no reference to the organizational bases of propagandizing. According to Guruli, the "lack of a vanguard leadership in the Party led by scientific socialism means for instance that the Party in Tanzania is not supreme over all other bodies." 4 It needs to cleanse itself of "anti-socialist elements in its ranks and must have a well-knit, clear-

headed group at its centre, at the same time reforming its mass character, and it must put forward a clear socialist ideology.\(^1\)

TANU, as a mass-based nationalist party without a systematically formulated ideology was, Kisenge notes, an effective instrument for the gaining of independance. However, in the light of the Arushu Declaration and subsequent development, and the attempt to break the hold of "international monopoly capitalism", it requires reconstruction and reorientation.\(^2\) The party has embarked on building socialism but has no cadres.\(^3\) As it is an "incontestable" fact that "you cannot successfully build socialism without a hard corps of committed and dedicated socialist cadres who have a clear picture of what socialism is all about", it is inconceivable that the implementation of socialism should be entrusted to potentially, if not actually, antagonistic elements. Kisenge notes that in 1967 a "modest attempt" was made to train \(\text{ujamaa}\) village cadres but this failed "because of alleged lack of funds."\(^4\)

The ambivalence which characterizes Tanzanian attitudes both to a vanguard party and socialist cadres has its roots in the persistence of African socialist ideas of presumptive solidarity and an automatic socialist attitude of mind, combined with a rejection of scientific socialism's supposed historical inapplicability.\(^5\) The ambivalence

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3. Ibid., p.10.
4. Ibid., p.12.
5. For a clear statement of this position see Interview with the late Jacob Namfua, Sunday News, 7/1/1973, p.7.
and even hostility also stem, undoubtedly from bureaucratic entrenchment. One Tanzanian intellectual who, unlike other members of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia, occupies a senior administrative and party position is Ngombale - Mwiru. Ngombale - Mwiru has consistently stressed the key role the political cadre plays in bringing about socialist transformation, interpreting the objectives of the Party to the masses, and linking leadership and masses. Their role, he suggests "must be that of perpetually imparting ideological education, organizing the masses. They should be agitators and propagandists all in one." A socialist cadre, he points out,

is a person who is committed to socialism, is conversant with socialist theory and unites this theory with practise. A socialist cadre is at once a Socialist agitator and educator. He does not need a blackboard... to propagate the ideas of Tanu. Whenever he is, whatever his occupation, he will make use of every opportunity to spread the ideas of the Party. That is why, in addition to the initial political consciousness of a prospective cadre, there is the necessity for training at Kivukoni. 3

The role of Kivukoni College, as Tanzania's ideological institute, is not to produce revolutionaries, but rather to train cadres for the party. Revolutionaries are formed in the struggle - "the struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation - in villages, in factories, in short, in society." Potential cadres

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
should not select themselves because that is the primary responsibility of the party. Moreover, the conversion of TANU into a vanguard party is not to be achieved, as Othman suggests, by rejecting present TANU members on the grounds that "they don't have enough socialist theory" but by conscientious and systematic ideological and political training which will create a solid core of socialist cadres. In this process, Ngombale-Mwiru adds, the party will continue for a long time as a mass party, "but with a vanguard within the mass party." This vanguard is bound "to become bigger and more qualitative as we intensify our efforts in political training - theoretical and practical." 2

The ambivalence or antagonism which characterizes Party and bureaucratic attitudes to the question of a vanguard party and socialist cadres is present in their attitude to workers' participation and control. It has been workers and students who have most actively responded to Mwongozo's apparent invitation to take power into their own hands, and the bureaucracy which has resisted such spontaneity. 5

Members of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia have generally viewed workers' participation and control as a major element in the struggle for socialism. Rweyemamu argues that it is generally recognized that the dignity of the worker cannot be maintained unless

the work process "allows autonomy, responsibility and self-fulfilment."

These can only be achieved if there is no separation of the worker from the means of production (public ownership of the means of production), worker influence over general managerial decision-making, and worker control over the immediate work process as well as conditions of employment. Mapolu points out that in capitalist states workers' participation in decision-making has been viewed as "another artifact in the quest for profit maximization" and of enmeshing workers into the "ideological web" which gives strength and stability to the capitalist system. Workers control is crucial to the whole strategy of socialist construction. It is an integral part of class struggle, concerned with the structure of power in society as a whole, and ultimately with "struggle against the state itself." It is also essential because it is one way of overcoming the inhumanity and alienation which stems from the division of labour under capitalism. In socialist states, Mapolu argues, workers' participation has never been effectively realized because of the contradiction between the non-capitalist mode of production and the "bourgeois form of distribution which is a result of the bourgeois form of management."

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.7.
5. Ibid., p.8.
6. Ibid., p.9.
7. Ibid., p.10.
In the underdeveloped world, the difficulties of the implementation of workers' participation are duplicated by the "repressive and authoritarian" nature of foreign capital, as well as the "general domineering social milieu inherent under neo-colonialism." In Tanzania, ever since the Arusha Declaration, a vigorous campaign for opening TANU branches in corporations and institutions has been underway. Mapolu points out, however, that TANU branches in corporations and institutions have been effectively denied a viable role, and that matters which should concern branches (discussion of planning, production, sales in the context of the Party's socialist policies) are under the purview of workers' councils and committees. When they have attempted to involve themselves in these affairs, as for instance in the National Development Corporation, "they have been warned against interference." The root cause of this problem stems from the "very nature and content of the party in Tanzania." While both the Arusha Declaration and Mwangozo have called upon the party to assume leadership in all affairs of the nation - "the government, parastatals, national institutions, etc. are instruments for implementing the Party's policies" - TANU has not been able to assume these leadership responsibilities because of "serious structural and ideological limitations." Given its "amorphous" membership and wide-ranging, ill-defined function, it is doubtful whether TANU is a "socialist party at all."

Workers' committees, which were established in 1964 with the

1. Ibid., p.14.
2. Ibid., p.17.
3. Ibid., p.18.
4. Ibid., p.19.
reorganization of the trade union movement, have "tended to be instruments of the employers for keeping the workers down." The Workers' Councils, which were first mooted in 1969, were not established until 1970, and were initially conceived of as bringing the workers close to the management of industries and to promote better industrial relations while giving the workers more say in formulating policies.

The rationale, Mapolu notes, is far removed from that of Marxist theory which sees workers' management within the total context of the total organization of society, and therefore "inextricably connected with the overall problems and goals of liberating man." While the post-Arusha Declaration nationalization measures had been made under some philosophic conception of the reorganization of society at large, the conception of workers' participation was not. In addition, there is no attempt to relate the factory level participation to the more general form of democratic control in the socio-political life of the country." Even after Mwongezo the "method of work" which reigns in Tanzania as a whole is not democratic. The problems, Mapolu suggests, have deeper roots in the conceptual difficulties involved in identifying the key categories involved in the implementation of socialism. While the Arusha Declaration envisages a socialist society in "which all people are workers", Tanzania's strategy has not gone as far as to recognize a "working class" that can be viewed as the "chief action - agent of socialist

1. Ibid., p.20.
2. Quoted in Ibid., p.22.
3. Ibid., p.36.
4. Ibid.
development." Because ujamaa does not emanate "from a dialectic class analysis of society" and relies very much on an "attitude of mind" it cannot be used very easily for purposes of analysis and evaluation. The problem is compounded by the ambiguous role of TANU. And furthermore, "as a consequence of the absence of political strategy due to the lack of a class ideological position, there has been no conception of bureaucracy as a structural phenomenon."

The years 1970 and 1971 in Tanzania were marked by a strong wave of strikes which have been carefully documented by Mapolu.¹ These strikes were not generally concerned with wages, and were directed mainly against the "commandism" and abuses of the managers and bureaucrats.² Clause 15 of Mwongozo especially armed workers with a potent weapon for use against the bureaucracy. The response of the bureaucracy has been characterized by highhandedness and resort to repression. The repressive measures have, however, produced a higher political consciousness on the part of workers³ who have, since the sacking of textile workers at the Sungura Textile Mill in August 1972 and the Government's emphasis on loss of production,⁴ relied more on the lock-out technique to have their grievances met. Mapolu suggests that this second phase is characterized by a shift in emphasis from workers grievances about humiliation and oppressions to issues of general mismanagement and sabotage of the economy and its

4. Ibid.
policies. During the first phase, the standard bureaucratic response, supported by some intellectuals, was that workers were misinterpreting Mwongozo and that Clause 15 should be revised. In the second phase workers relied on other clauses as well, placing bureaucrats in the different position of having to ask for a revision of Mwongozo. In the newest phase, which dates from the middle of 1973 and the workers takeover of the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory, workers have "resorted to seizing capitalist property."5

The spontaneity of workers struggle in Tanzania has led Mapolu to argue that it is "increasingly becoming apparent that the major and sharpest contradiction internally in Tanzania is that between the working class and the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'."6 Shivji adopts a similar view, seeing workers strikes as the beginning of the proletarian line and as the heightening of the antagonistic contradiction between workers and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.7

5. Ibid., p.34.
6. Ibid., p.43.
This brief outline of certain areas of thought of the Tanzania radical intelligentsia has necessarily been brief. It has nevertheless established a number of salient features of Tanzanian radical thought. Firstly, its members perceive of themselves as activists - revolutionaries involved in the transformation of their society and structure their thought accordingly. Secondly, having been grounded in Marxism - Leninism and its more recent development and reinterpretations, they conceive of social reality as a totality and adopt a holistic approach to its analysis.\(^1\) Thirdly, they place Tanzania's underdevelopment, its internal contradictions, and struggle to achieve socialism firmly within the context of international economic and ideological relations, and see the principle antagonistic contradictions as those between the global capitalist system and international corporations and the Tanzanian people. Fourthly, because they stress the key role of proletarian ideology, a vanguard party and socialist cadres in socialist transformation, they give much less emphasis to rural socialism and the peasantry than Nyerere and other Tanzanian leaders do. Fifthly, unlike their Kenyan counterparts, they give little thought to the ethnic dimension of politics, and are little preoccupied with the questions of cultural nationalism and identity which still tend to play a prominent part in intellectual debate in both Kenya and Uganda. Indeed, members of the Tanzanian radical intelligentsia have been able to surmount the identity and praxis problems which trouble so many other African intellectuals by immersing themselves in a thought system - Marxism - Leninism - which has assumed universal dimensions.

\(^1\) See the volume *Tourism and Socialist Development*, passim on this.
CONCLUSION

The major thesis of this study has been that no adequate understanding of the East African intellectual stratum can be achieved without the recognition of its location in the overall framework of colonialism, underdevelopment and persisting neo-colonial economic and cultural relations. The stratum's origins, institutional bases, membership, relationships with government, party, and society, and perceptions of its own socio-political role have all been profoundly influenced by the colonial situation, colonial policy, and by the types of economic and cultural relations which have been maintained in the post-independence situation.

The stratum itself is the direct product of the colonial situation, the result of missionary and government educational and employment policies. Its uneven development in the different East African territories is directly related to differences in the extent of the colonial penetration, educational policies, and the presence of European settlers, as for instance in Kenya. Even the ethnic composition of the intellectual stratum is the result of uneven colonial and capitalist penetration, access to educational centres, proximity to urban areas, and the development of the cash crop, market economy. The nature of colonial society ensured that early generation intellectuals such as Kenyatta, Mockerie, and Koinange in Kenya, would have access to only a limited range of occupations, and provide the leadership of the nascent nationalist movements. The type of educational pyramid colonial educational policies encouraged, created a relatively small group of educated, including
the intellectuals, who more than any other group benefited from the expansion of educational opportunities immediately prior to and after independence. The educational policies, reinforced by foreign language use and foreign curricula, helped drive a cultural wedge between the intellectual and the rest of society. They gave rise to his identity crises and alienation and, combined with the cultural denigration inherent in the colonial situation, contributed to his preoccupation with questions of cultural identity and reassertion, and the recreation of, and recovery of African initiative in history.

The East African intellectual is the product of educational institutions which were imposed or introduced during the colonial period. They were modelled on those of Britain, staffed by expatriates, and were Eurocentric in orientation. They were designed to, and had the effect of integrating their African products into a metropolitan based cultural and intellectual milieu in which the key reference points were European and not African. With the attainment of independence, and the realization that the whole institutional setting for intellectual life would have to be reconstructed in the light of new national objectives and requirements, the universities as the principal cultural organs of their societies, were in particular subjected to critical scrutiny and a process of redefinition. The dominant view which emerged stressed the need for the Africanization of personnel and curricula and the university's prime role in the recovery and development of African culture, with little attention being given to the actual restructuring of inherited relationships within the university. In Tanzania, however, where the stress has been on socialism rather than Africanization, much more attention
has been given to democratization of the university, re-orientation of the curriculum along socialist lines, and the move away from the scope-orientated, specialized, and bureaucratized British and North American university which works against the integrated, holistic view of society and change so necessary for socialist construction.

The nature of the colonial situation and of nationalism ensured that questions of cultural reassertion and identity should dominate both intellectual and political discourse in the pre- and post-independence situations. Doctrines of cultural reassertion, including African socialism and humanism, were seen as a way of breaking free of European cultural and political domination, and of constructing African societies on the foundations of indigenous societies. The cultural nationalist focus on the more obvious super-structural manifestations of colonial and neo-colonial relations, meant that the fundamental importance of economic relationships in helping to determine the nature of neo-colonial cultural phenomena was overlooked. It has only been the younger generation of intellectuals, many of whom have been subjected to the influence of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Fanonian thought, who have attempted to place African underdevelopment and cultural subordination within a complex international capitalist economic framework. The primacy of cultural nationalist type thinking in both Kenya and Uganda, reinforced by literary forms (the novel, short story, play) which are little suited to systematic and detailed analysis, partly explains the dearth of analyses of the political economy and society of these two countries. While there is a certain unity of East African intellectual life, and intellectuals tend to be conscious of each
other's work, the ties between Kenya and Uganda tend to be strongest, partly because of the presence of Ugandan intellectuals such as Okot p'Eitek and Taban Lo Liyong in Kenya. Most Tanzanian intellectuals have little interest in the nature of the cultural debate being carried on in Kenya and Uganda, which as far as they are concerned is of little relevance to the struggle for socialist transformation they are involved in. The Tanzanian radical intelligentsia, for instance, other than that it is involved in the general intellectual debate about the future of African societies, has little in common with other East African intellectuals simply because it has no solid roots in cultural nationalist traditions and derives its intellectual equipment from Marxist-Leninist and neo-Marxist traditions. For most Tanzanians radical intellectuals the crucial question is not whether an ideology is foreign (and therefore inapplicable) or local, but rather, as Shivji points out, whether it helps intellectuals to both understand and transform their social reality.

The close relations of literature, politics, and intellectual life in general during the nationalist struggle, and the nature of the post-independence situation of neo-colonialism, has led the East African intellectual to reject any notion of detachment or disengagement and to define himself in social activist terms. While there is general agreement among intellectuals about the need for involvement, there is disagreement about the nature and ramifications of such concern, and the problem is exacerbated by the intellectual's position of marginality and powerlessness in society and the absence of viable structures of dissent which the intellectual can use as a
vehicle for his ideas. The very nature of the neo-colonial state and society reinforces intellectual marginality and impotence, and encourages the perpetuation of external recognition and validation. In Kenya, as previously argued, the commitment to a state capitalist course of development in which stability is maintained to encourage private foreign investment, has meant that popular and democratic organs through which intellectuals can disseminate their ideas are absent. The emphasis on stability, combined with an increasing reliance on repressions, has meant that the limits of intellectual activity have been narrowly defined, thus seriously delimiting many areas of analysis. The use of a foreign language in intellectual work, economic underdevelopment, the economics of book production, and the small local public has maintained an external intellectual orientation, thus presenting at this stage a major barrier to the achievement of local recognition and the surmounting of the situation of marginality and powerlessness.
APPENDIX I

SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF EAST AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS

The compilation of biographical information for this study raised a number of problems. Originally it was intended that a detailed questionnaire be used to extract data about educational and occupational histories, as well as perceptions of role and the socio-political process. The limitations of this approach were soon revealed. In Uganda, the present political situation made any research impossible. In Tanzania, the late receipt of a research clearance reduced the amount of time available for this slow and cumbersome procedure. Further, by their very nature questionnaires tend to be unsatisfactory. They pose questions which are more in the interest of the researcher's designs than in elucidating the respondent's intellectual development. They tend to set up "straw men", artificial juxtapositions which the respondent finds necessary to demolish before he can develop his own ideas at length. There was a pronounced reluctance on the part of many intellectuals to submit to standardized, formal interviewing, and a complete refusal in a couple of instances to be interviewed at all. Many younger intellectuals were understandably wary of the social scientist. They are highly critical of American "bourgeois" social science theory and methodology, and are reluctant to become its guinea pigs. Many view the expatriate social science researcher as part of a system of academic imperialism. Socialization studies are to be shunned. Issues and ideology are the crucial questions; not the socio-economic and educational backgrounds of individual persons.
Added to these deep-rooted difficulties are other practical problems. East African intellectuals are mobile people. Many, at the time of the study, were in North America and Europe. Others were difficult to pin down sufficiently to elicit the required information.

Faced with these problems, it was necessary for the researcher to rely on diverse sources for information. Details were obtained from personal interviews. The East African press, especially the Sunday Nation with its "On the Carpet" interviews, was a mine of information. The East African Who's Who, although outdated and essentially a business guide, provided a great deal of information about the earlier generation of intellectuals, use was also made of Ronald Segal's outdated and often factually incorrect Political Africa. Two other biographical works were consulted: the Dictionary of African Biography and The New Africans, a volume which was useful only in the case of a few prominent political figures. Other important sources included book jackets and journal contributors lists, university calendars and reports, and general texts on East African politics. Monographs on East African intellectuals and politicians are few, but Jeremy Murray-Brown's Kenyatta, and William Edgett Smith's impressionistic, journalistic Nyerere of Tanzania were valuable. The diversity of sources, and the difficulty of obtaining information on a number of people, meant that the material obtained on individual intellectuals varied tremendously.

The people chosen for this study were selected according to the criteria elaborated upon previously: a concern with qualitative thought; cultural validation, especially in terms of a self-professed concern with the quality of life in general; and, socio-political role. They are people who, through various means of expression—writing, lectures, speeches, political activity—have been sufficiently concerned to articulate their values and ideas in the expectation of producing changes in the social and political consciousness of others. This method of selection possesses one basic disadvantage. It excludes people who qualify in terms of the triple criteria, but who are not conspicuously public in the sense of the articulation or publication of ideas. There are ways of surmounting this difficulty. The use of a "snow-ball" interviewing technique, for instance, is one. In this case, the researcher identifies a basic sample according to certain criteria. He asks the respondent to name others whom he would regard as intellectuals and with whom he associates. The researcher then follows up the newly-named people. In this way, informal intellectual networks are identified, definitions of intellectual are established, and processes of cultural validation elucidated. The problem with this technique lies in its mechanistic nature. Sensitive and critical people are reluctant to comply with the neat manipulative designs of a social science researcher. The gap between theory and methodology, and the actual fieldwork situation, is an unbridgeable one.

1. The propagation of thought is surely central to any definition of the intellectual. The intellectual structures, or endeavours to structure his thought in such a way that it is capable of social attachment.
The final sample for this chapter consisted of 215 people. A number of others had to be excluded on the grounds of lack of detailed information—little more than a name was known. None of those excluded could be considered major figures. Their exclusion was unlikely to significantly alter the types of generalization which could meaningfully be made about the socio-economic and educational backgrounds of East African intellectuals, or about the general sociological character of the intellectual stratum.

For reasons of length, it was decided to include brief biographies of only a small number of the total sample. Those chosen have been referred to in the text, often at some length, and could be regarded as the most important members of the intellectual stratum.
Naphlin Akena Adoko. Uganda.


Born 1941. Went to King's College, Budo. In 1961 he served as Publicity Secretary of the Uganda Peoples Congress in the West Nile Region of Uganda. Studied at Moscow State University, and graduated in 1967 with an LL.M. degree. Worked as Research Officer in the President's Office.

Sheikh Mohamed Ali (Tanzania).

Born 1927, Tanga. Educated at Tanga School 1939-40; Mwanza Town School, 1940-43; Tabora Secondary School, 1943-48; Islamic Law Study and Religion 1949-51; Clerk, Liwali's Court 1951-52; Assistant Akida/Liwali Civil Service 1954-59; Liwali of Tanga, 1960-62.

Legal translator in Attorney-General's Chambers, Dar-es-Salaam, since 1963. Has been an Islamic Sheikh since 1952. He is a member of TANU, NUTA, East African Swahili Committee (1958-65);
Chairman, Jumuiya ya Kustawisha Kiswahili; Member, Board of Trustees to the National Museum.

Magaga Alot (Aquarius Agola), Kenya.

Journalist. Attended a Harambee Secondary School, John Kennedy High School, Kenyatta College. After leaving school worked for a couple of months with the East African Standard Group, then did the Diploma of Journalism course at the University of Nairobi with the sponsorship of the Nation Series. He was the Nation's campus correspondent and a member of the editorial board of Busara. Worked for the East African Community in the Dept. of Information. Contributes articles and book reviews to The Sunday Post.

Jared Angira (Othieno), Kenya.

Born in the Siaya District of Kenya in 1947, and educated at Maseno, Shimo-la-Tewa, and the University of Nairobi where he completed a Bachelor of Commerce Course in 1971. He has been an editor of Busara, and the Kenya Representative of the World University Students Council. Angira has published poetry in Busara and Zuka, as well as in the Daily Nation and the Kenya Weekly News. Angira says of himself:

"Karl Marx is my teacher; Pablo Neruda my class prefect (when I am in the class-room) and my captain (when I am on the battle field). Although I am 'no longer at ease' here, I have to confront the 'world without end' and see how to endure all in the spirit of forgetting all past and present bad things." - Cook and Rubadiri, p.187.
He was a founder (and treasurer) of the Writers Association of Kenya. He turned down a Scholarship to Canada and now works for the East African Harbours in Dar-es-Salaam.


E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo. Kenya.

Attended Alliance High School where in 1965 he won the East Africa Journal prize and in 1966 the Kenya Open Scholarship competition. Studied at Makerere where he obtained a 1st class honours degree in History. Recently he completed his Ph.D. at the University of Nairobi (1973) and is a lecturer in History in that Institution. He has been a regular contributor of articles, poems, and reviews to the East Africa Journal, *Busara*, Chala, the Sunday Nation and *Target*.


A political economist born in 1939. Studied for a BA at St. Edward's, Texas, an M.Sc. in the Hague, and a doctorate in Amsterdam. He was a Research Associate with the Economic Research Bureau at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and now works in Kisumu.

Okot p'Bitek. (See Chapter IX for biographical detail).
Austin S. Bukunya. Uganda.

Born in Masaka, Uganda, in 1944. Attended Secondary school in Kampala, and the University of Dar-es-Salaam, where he graduated in 1968 with a degree in Literature, Linguistics and French. He obtained an MA degree in traditional African literature at Makerere University, where he is now a lecturer in literature. He was a founder co-editor of Darlita, and has written a novel, *The People's Bachelor* (1971) about life at an East African University.

Joseph Buruga. Uganda.

Born in West Nile, Uganda in 1942 and educated at Arua, King's College, Budo, and Makerere, where he graduated in Science in 1966. He was a research Student and Demonstrator in the Department of Botany at Makerere University and completed an M.Sc. degree in 1970. Buruga is the author of *The Abandoned Hut* (1969).


Born in 1936 in Nairobi. Educated Duke of Gloucester School, Nairobi, London University, Oxford University, and Yale University where he obtained his Ph.D. Ghai was a lecturer in Economics, Makerere University College, 1961-65, and Deputy Director, Institute for Development Studies, University College of Nairobi and Senior Research Fellow in 1966 and 1967. Since 1967 he has been Research Professor and Director of Economic Research at the Institute for Development Studies.
Yash P. Chai. Kenya.


Born 1936.

Started his journalism career as a reporter on the East African Standard and the Nation Group of newspapers (1959–60). He has a diploma in journalism from LSE, and studied economics, politics and industrial relations at Ruskin College, Oxford (1960–63). He served as private secretary to Kenyatta (1963–65) before becoming Editor-in-Chief of the Nation Series (1965–68). He then took a BA. Hons. degree at Balliol College, Oxford in politics, philosophy and economics and returned to Kenya to become once again Editor-in-Chief of the Nation Series.

Crispin Hauli. Tanzania.

Born in 1945 at Ilela Maunda, the second son of a missionary teacher. He graduated in Education, Economics and Literature at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam and is now a tutor in the Institute of Adult Studies at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.
A number of his short plays, stories, and poems have appeared in Darlita.

Born in 1947 at Chavakali (Maragoli), in Kenya. Attended Kevege School, Chavakali School, and Alliance High School. He read for a B.A. in Literature at the University of Nairobi and is presently writing an MA. thesis on East African theatre. An actor and playwright, Imbuga has written and acted in many plays for V.O.K. Television and the National Theatre.

Born at Uthiru in c. 1944. Attended Thika High School, and read for a Fine Arts degree at the University of Nairobi. He works as a Television producer with V.O.K. Short story writer, and author with his brother, Leonard Kibera, of Potent Ash.

Grant Kamenju. Kenya.
Studied for a BA. at Makerere, and an MA. at Leeds University. Kamenju is now a Senior Lecturer in Literature at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and has contributed newspaper book reviews, articles to Darlita and Umma, and edited with Farouk Topan a volume of newspaper poetry, Mashairi ya Azimio La Arusha (1971).
Jonathan Kariara, Kenya.

Born in 1935 at Tumufumu, Nyeri, Kenya. He attended Kagumo Secondary School, and in 1955 went to Makerere where he took an Honours Degree in English. From 1958 until 1965 he worked in the book production division of the East African Literature Bureau. Since 1966 he has worked with Oxford University Press in Nairobi where he is a Senior Editor. Kariara is the editor of Zuka, a poet, short story writer and playwright, whose works have appeared in Zuka and the East Africa Journal as well as in a number of anthologies.

Awori wa Kataka, Kenya.

Born in the Kakamega District in Kenya in 1944. He attended the Kamusinga Friends School, and University College, Nairobi, where he combined political activism with studies in English, History and Political Science. He was editor of Busara in 1968, and has contributed articles and letters to the Sunday Nation. For a short time he worked as a journalist with the Nation Series.

Saifu Kiango, Tanzania.


Born in Uthiru, 1943. He attended Kangaru High School before going to Canada. Studied English at the University College of Nairobi, where he was the co-founder of Nexus with Kutub Kassam. Author of the novel Voices in the Park (1970).

I.N. Kimambo. Tanzania.

Born in 1931, Kimambo studied for his MA. and Ph.D. degrees at North Western University, and returned to Tanzania to become a lecturer in History at the University College. He became Vice-Principal of the College and in 1970 was appointed Professor of History. He is the author of A Political History of the Pare, Uthiru Popular Protest in Colonial Tanzania, and co-editor with A.J. Temu, A History of Tanzania.

Erisa Kironde. Uganda.

Born at Mukono, Kironde attended King's College, Budo (1934-45), Makerere College (1946-49), and Cambridge University (1950-54) where he obtained a BA. (Hons) in Anthropology and English. He taught at King's College, Budo (1954-59), and was a lecturer in the Extra-Mural Studies Department at Makerere University College (1959-62). He was a Director of the Nambo Gallery and Transition magazine, and a Governor of the Milton Obote Foundation which was involved in the running of The People newspaper. Kironde has an active interest in drama and has adapted plays.
M.S.M. Kiwanuka. Uganda.

Born in 1936. Educated at Namilyango College, Royal College, Nairobi, Makerere University College, and London University where he received his doctorate in history in 1965. He has been on the History Staff at Makerere since 1965, and his major works include A History of Buganda from Early Times to 1900 and From Colonialism to Independence.

Taban Lo Liyong. Uganda.

Born in Northern Uganda in 1939, Taban was educated at Gulu High School, Sir Samuel Baker School, the National Teachers College, Kampala, and Howard University, Knoxville College, and the University of Iowa where he obtained a Master's Degree at the Writer's Workshop. He was a Tutorial Fellow in the Cultural Division of the Institute for Development Studies, at the University College, Nairobi, where he is presently a lecturer in Literature. His works include The Last Word, Fixions, Eating Chiefs, Frantz Fanon's Uneven Ribs and Another Nigger Dead.

Guido Magome. Tanzania.


Born in Mombasa, Kenya, in 1933.

Educated at the Government Arab Boys' School, Mombasa (1939–48), Huddersfield College of Technology (1955–57), and Manchester University where he obtained his BA. (1957–60). Mazrui took an MA. at Columbia University in 1961, and a D.Phil. at Nuffield College, Oxford in 1963. He joined the Staff at Makerere University College in 1963 as a Lecturer in Political Science and was appointed as Professor in 1965. He has been an Associate Editor of Transition, a co-editor of Kivuazo, an Associate Editor of The African Review, and on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Eastern African Research and Development. His books include Towards a Pax-Africana, The Anglo African Commonwealth (1967), On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship, Violence and Thought, The Trial of Christopher Okigbo, and Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa.


Born Kitui, Kenya in 1931.

Educated at Alliance High School, and at Makerere University College. He studied at Barrington College, Rhode Island, and at Cambridge University where he received his doctorate in theology. He was appointed as a Lecturer in Religious Studies at Makerere in 1964, and became a Professor in 1969. He has published a volume of poems, Poems of Nature and Faith (1969), collected Akamba Stories (1968), and published a number of theological works including African Religions and Philosophy (1969) and Concepts of God in Africa (1970).

Born in Mombasa, and educated at Alliance High School. Took a BA. degree from the University College, Dar-es-Salaam in 1969, and then studied at U.C.L.A. for a Ph.D. in Sociology. At present he is a Research Associate in the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi.


Born in Mombasa and attended the Government Arab Boys' School. He received a Bachelor's degree at Birmingham, and took his M.A. degree in Canada. He was appointed a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Makerere in 1966, and is working on a Ph.D. on African Socialism for McGill University. He was an editor of Mawazo in 1968 and has contributed numerous articles on African socialism and Tanzania to local and overseas journals.

Christopher Mulei. Kenya.

Attended Strathmore College, Nairobi, and the University of Dar-es-Salaam where he obtained a degree in Law. He worked as a journalist for the Nation Series, and contributed to The Standard and The Sunday Post. After working for Africa Research Limited, he now works for the Kenya Commercial Bank in their legal department.
Eridadi Mulira (Uganda).

Born at Kameae, and educated King's College, Budo (1927-29), Makerere College (1930-33). He undertook teacher training at Prince of Wales College, Achimota (1936-38), and attended London University (1947-50). He was editor of "Mifu mu Uganda" (1946-47), and an Asst. Lecturer, S.O.A.S., London University (1949-50). He was Proprietor/Editor of "Uganda Empya" (1953-61) and a Director of "Taifa Empya" (1961).

Sam S. Mushi. Tanzania.

Studied at the University of London (BA.) and the University of California (MA.). He was an Official in the Ministry of Community Development and National Culture, and Assistant Dean in the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. He is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and on the Editorial Board of The African Review. He is an active Swahili translator and has translated The Tempest and Macbeth.


Born Kangundo, Kenya, in 1942. Attended Kangundo Primary School (1949-56), Machakos High School (1957-60), Parsons College, Fairfield, Iowa, University of Kansas, and Syracuse University where he received his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1968.

After working as an Assistant Professor at Monclair State College and Rutgers University, he returned to Kenya where he was
appointed a Lecturer in the Department of Government. He is an interviewer-discussant on V.O.K. Television's programme, "Mambo Leo" and worked with the International Labour Organization Inter-agency Team which produced the report, Employment, incomes and equality (1972). His major work is Socio-Political Ideas in African Literature (1974).

Peter Nazareth. Uganda.

Born in 1940 in Kampala. Educated at St. Theresa Primary School, Old Kampala Senior Secondary School, Senior Secondary School, Kololo, and Makerere University College where he obtained a BA (Hons) degree. He was a teacher at St. Mary's College, Kisubi (1962) and Kololo Senior Secondary School (1963). He studied for the Postgraduate Diploma in English at Leeds University (1965) and returned to Uganda to become an Administrative Officer in the Ministry of Finance. He was a member of the Ngoma Players, and the Entebbe Goan Institute. His major works are In A Brown Mantle (1972) and Literature and Society in Modern Africa (1972).

Rajat Neogy. Uganda.

Ndugu Ngombale - Mwiru. Tanzania.

Ngombale - Mwiru is mainly West African educated. He was a tutor in Politics at Kivukoni College, and Regional Commissioner for the Coast Region where he did much to mobilize the workers and to instil the ethos of the people's militia. He was appointed Singida Regional Commissioner but this appointment was revoked, apparently on the grounds that he forged a caucus to oppose a Bill (which had Presidential blessing) enabling those Ministers who were appointed Regional Commissioners to retain their constituency seats. In June 1972 he was appointed Principal of Kivukoni College and in April, 1973, Tanga Regional Commissioner.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o (James Ngugi) Kenya.

Born at Limuru, Kenya, in 1938, Ngugi attended Alliance High School, Makerere University College (English Hons), at the University of Leeds where he did postgraduate work in English. He worked for a short time in journalism, and on his return from Leeds became a special lecturer in English at the University College, Nairobi. He resigned his position in 1969 in protest against the Oginga Odinga affair and in early 1970 joined the Staff of North Western University. He is now head of the Literature Department at the University of Nairobi. He has been editor of Zuka, and during his Makerere days, was editor of Penpoint. His works include The Black Hermit, A Grain of Wheat, The River Between and Weep Not, Child.
Hilary Ng’weno. Kenya.

Born in Kenya in 1938. Educated at Mangu High School and Harvard University where he graduated in physics and mathematics. He became a journalist with the Daily Nation and worked in a variety of capacities - reporter, feature worker, humourist, satirist, as well as Editor-in-Chief. Now works for Africa Research Limited in Nairobi and edits the humour and comment magazine, Joe, which he founded in 1973.


Born in 1946 at Kigezi, South West Uganda. Ntiru went to Ntare School, Mbarara, and in 1968 entered Makerere University College’s Literature Department where he edited the Campus newspaper, The Makereseran. In 1969 he organized the Makerere Arts Festival and edited Penpoint. He works for the East African Publishing House and was on the editorial Staff of the East Africa Journal. He has published a volume of poems, Tensions, as well as criticism.

Julius K. Nyerere (Tanzania).

See Chapter V for biographical detail.


Ochieng was born in Manyata, South Nyanza in 1938 and educated at Alliance High School, Roosevelt University, and the University of Besancon in France. He worked as a journalist for the Sunday
Nation, and as a staff writer for The Standard and Daily News and Sunday News in Dar-es-Salaam.


Ochieng was educated at Alliance High School, and the University of Nairobi where he obtained his Ph.D. in History. He is editor of the Kenya Historical Review Journal, has presented programmes on V.O.K. radio on African history, and contributes regular reviews and articles to The Sunday Post. He is also a regular contributor to Africa magazine.

Okello Oculi. Uganda.

Born at Dakoto County, Lango, Northern Uganda in 1942. Oculi was educated at Soroti College, St. Peter's College, Tororo, and St. Mary's College, Kisubi, before reading Political Science at Makerere. He obtained an MA. from the University of Essex and was appointed a tutorial Fellow in Political Science at Makerere. Oculi was a regular contributor to The People and was briefly detained after General Amin's coup. His best known works are Orphan and Prostitute.

B.A. Ogot. Kenya. (see Chapter V for further detail)

Born in 1929 at Luanda, Gem; Ogot was educated at Maseno School and Makerere University College. He taught for two years after leaving Makerere and then studied at St. Andrew's University (1955-59). He obtained his Ph.D. from S.O.A.S., London University and
was a lecturer in History at Makerere (1962-65). In 1965 he was appointed a Senior Lecturer in the History Department at University College, Nairobi. He has been Professor and Head of the Department since 1967. He has also been Editor of the East Africa Journal, and is Director of the Institute for African Studies and the University of Nairobi. His major work is his History of the Southern Luo, Vol. 1.

Aloo Ojuka. Kenya

Born in Alego in 1945, Ojuka was educated at Nduru and Ng’iyia primary schools before going to Alliance High School. He started writing poetry "casually" in 1963 while still at school, and many of his poems have appeared in the Sunday Nation. Ojuka has travelled widely in Europe and the United States and worked for Trans-World Airlines in Nairobi. He contributed a regular column of comment to the Sunday Nation.

Lennard Okola. Kenya

Born in 1942 at Alego, Okola was educated at Maseno School (1947-60) and Alliance High School (1961-62). He read English at Makerere University College (1963-66) and joined East African Publishing House in 1966 where he is now Deputy Publishing Director. Okola was editor of ghala and edited a pioneer collection of East African poetry, Drum Beat.
John Okumu.  
Keny.

Okumu, the Kenyan political scientist, received his B.A. at Grinnell, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from U.C.L.A. He was appointed a Lecturer in the Department of Government at the University College, Nairobi where he ultimately became an Associate Professor. He was an Associate Editor of the East Africa Journal and The African Review, and Assistant Editor of the Journal of East African Research and Development.

David Rubadiri  
(Malawi - Uganda)

Born in 1930 in Malawi, Rubadiri went to School at King's College, Budo. He received his B.A. in English at Makerere University College, a Dip. Ed. from Bristol University, and an M.A. from Cambridge University. At Makerere Rubadiri was active in the Makerere College Literary Society (founded 1947). An activist in Nyasaland's nationalist movement who during the 1959 emergency was arrested and detained by the Government, he was in 1964 appointed the first Malawian Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations (1964-65). In 1965 Rubadiri became a Resident Tutor in the Department of Extra-Mural Studies at Makerere, where he is now a member of the Literature Department. Although a poet, his best known work is a novel, No Bride Price.

John Ruganda.  
Uganda

Born in 1941 in Fort Portal, Uganda, Ruganda was educated at St. Leo's College and Ntare School before reading English Honours at Makerere (1964-1967). At Makerere Ruganda was prominent in Student politics, and was chief Editor of The Makererean and on
The editorial board of Penpoint. Ruganda was the winner of the Uganda one act play competition in 1966. He worked for Oxford University Press in Uganda and is now a Temporary Lecturer in Literature at the University of Nairobi.

Gabriel Ruhumbika. Tanzania.

Born in 1938, Ruhumbika took his B.A. degree at Makerere and in 1964 he went to France where he prepared a doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne, under the direction of Georges Balandier, on "Le theatre africain". He is now a Senior Lecturer, and Head of the Department of Literature at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. He has written a novel, Village in Uhuru and translated Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth into Swahili.

J.F. Rweyemamu. Tanzania.

Born in Bukoba in 1942. Received his B.Sc. Econ. from Fordham, and M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. In 1969 he was appointed a Special Lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam where he is now a Senior Lecturer.
Tigiti Sengo. Tanzania

Born in 1945 in Kizuka Village, Morogoro Region, and began his primary education at Kidugallo Primary School in 1956. Attended Ngamvu Boarding School and Mzumbe Secondary School. He studied Swahili at the University of Dar-es-Salaam where he is now a Research Assistant in the Institute of Swahili Research. Co-author of a volume of Swahili literary criticism, Hisi Zetu.

Enoriko Seruma. Uganda

Born in 1944 at Mengo, Seruma attended Aggrey Memorial School, Kampala Commercial School, and the College of Social Studies at Kikuyu. After working with the Makerere Institute of Social Research, he proceeded to the United States where he read creative arts in Marlboro College, Vermont. He was on the editorial board of Busara (1968-70), and works with the East African Publishing House as a Senior Editor. His works include a novel, The Experience, and a collection of stories, The Heart Seller.

Robert Serumaga. Uganda

Born in Uganda in 1939, Serumaga sent to Makerere and to Trinity College, Dublin where he received an MA in Economics. He returned to Uganda in 1966. Serumaga was the inspiration behind Theatre Limited, and became the Director. He has written a novel, Return to the Shadows and a number of plays, including Elephants, A Play, and Majangwa.
Issa G. Shivji. Tanzania

A Tanzanian Asian, Shivji graduated in Law from the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, in 1970. He studied for an LL.M. degree at London University, and is presently an Assistant-Lecturer in Law at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. He is editor of the East African Law Review Journal, and has written two papers, Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, and Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues which have done much to intensify the debate about the nature of Tanzanian society.

Yashpal Tandon. Uganda

Born at Kaberamaida, in Uganda, in 1939. He attended the Senior Secondary School at Mbale, and North-Western Polytechnic London, and received his B.Sc. (Econ) degree from the London School of Economics in 1961. He received his Ph.D. from London University in 1968. Tandon has taught in the Political Science Department at Makerere since 1964.

A.J. Temu. Tanzania

Born in 1934, Temu studied for a Dip. Ed. at the University of East Africa, an MA (Oregon), and a Ph.D. at Alberta, his Ph.D. thesis being published as British Protestant MISSIONS in 1972. Temu joined the University College, Dar-es-Salaam as a lecturer in History in 1965 and was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 1968. He was Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in 1969-70, and in 1973 appointed a Professor. He is also a National Member of Parliament, and co-editor of A History of Tanzania with I. Kimambo.
Chris Wanjala. Kenya

Born in 1944, in Bungoma, Western Kenya, Wanjala attended Bungoma Secondary School and Kamusinga French School. He took a B.A. (Hons) in Literature at the University of Nairobi, worked for a short time with the East African Literature Bureau, and is now doing postgraduate work in the Literature Department at the University of Nairobi where he is a Part-time Lecturer. He helped found the Writers' Association of Kenya, and was Chairman of the Writers' Workshop (1969-70). He is on the Editorial Board of Busara; founded a new journal, JOLOSO; does reviews for V.O.K. Radio's "Books and Bookmen"; and occasionally presents "Mazumgumzo" on V.O.K. Television. He has edited a number of volumes including Faces at Cross-Roads (1971) and Standpoints on African Literature (1973).

Kenneth Watene. Kenya

Born in Central Kenya, Watene attended Thika High School where he sat his Cambridge School Certificate in 1964. He studied at the National Theatre Drama School, where he directed and acted in his own play, Haunting Past in 1969. Watene has published several short stories and articles, notably in the now defunct Kenya Weekly News. His major play to date is A Son For My Freedom.
Gideon S. Were. Kenya

Born in 1934, Were was educated at Kakamaga, Maseno School, the Royal Technical College, Nairobi, the University College of North Wales, Bangor, and S.O.A.S., London University where he obtained his Ph.D., the thesis being later published as *A History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya: c. 1500 – 1930*. Were is now a Reader in the Department of History at the University of Nairobi, and Editor of the *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*.

Mauri Yambo. Kenya

Born in 1949 in Nairobi, Yambo attended Strathmore College and the University of Dar-es-Salaam (1969–1972) where he took a degree in Political Science and Sociology. Yambo was editor of *The Scroll*, the student magazine at Strathmore, and on the editorial board of *Taamuli*. He is now a postgraduate student in Sociology at the University of Nairobi.

Elvania Zirimu. Uganda

Born in 1938, near Entebbe, in Uganda, Elvania Zirimu attended King's College, Budo, and went on to Makerere where she qualified as a teacher. She also took an English Honours Degree at Leeds University. An actress, producer and playwright, she is prominent in the Ngoma Players, and held a Creative Writing Fellowship in the Department of Literature at Makerere.
Pio Zirimu. Uganda

Zirimu took a BA. and Dip. Ed. at Makerere University College before going to Britain where he studied for the Diploma in English Studies at Leeds, and an MA at the same University. He is a leading figure in the Ngoma Players, and edited Mawazo in 1968. He is a member of the Department of Literature at Makerere.
APPENDIX II

FOREIGN/LOCAL STAFF COMPOSITION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND ARTS IN EAST AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES

UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM


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UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM


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** 2 vacancies
*** 1 vacancy
**** 2 vacancies.

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### UNIVERSITY OF DAR-ES-SALAAM

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### Makerere University

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**University of Nairobi**

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*This apparently abnormal figure was obtained because of an inclusion of 14 part time lecturers in accountancy, and 37 people from IDS.*
## UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

### Heads of Departments 1961 - 1971

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* 1 vacant
** 2 vacant

### DEANS 1961 - 1971

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* Replaced by Commerce in 1964.

The data for the above tables was obtained from the University Reports and Handbooks, as well as from the Commonwealth Universities Yearbooks. The inclusion of Science Faculties would have increased substantially the foreign component.
### EAST AFRICAN LITERATURE BUREAU JOURNAL SUBSCRIPTIONS - 1972

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*All U.S. subscribers*

Institutional subscriptions come from 30 countries
Private subscriptions come from 10 countries.

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**East African Law Review**

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* Of the private subscriptions, 9 were complementary copies and 1 was a review copy.

** Two of the individual Ugandan subscribers were Austin Bukenya (a founder co-editor of Umma’s predecessor, Darlita), and Prof. Zirimu, both of the English Department, Makerere University.
## The African Review

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## KENYA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION REVIEW JOURNAL

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1. **East African Journals**

   **The African Review**
   **Busara** (formerly **Nexus**)
   **Cheche**
   **Darlita**
   **dhana** (formerly **Penpoint**)
   **East African Economic Review**
   **East Africa Journal**
   **East African Law Review Journal**
   **Ghala**
   **Jenga**
   **Joe Magazine**
   **Journal of East African Research and Development**
   **Jelisa** (Journal of Literature and Society)
   **Kenya Historical Association Review Journal**
   **Maji Maji**
   **Makerere Journal**
   **The Makererean**
   **Mawazo** (formerly **Makerere Journal**)
   **Mbiondi**
   **Malika**
   **Nexus**
   **Pan African Journal**
   **Penpoint**
   **The Reporter**
Swahili

Tanzania Educational Journal
Tanzania Notes and Records
Transition
Uganda Journal
Umma (formerly Darlute)
University Platform
Zuka

2. East African Newspapers

Daily Nation (Nairobi)
Daily News (Dar-es-Salaam)
East African Standard (Nairobi)
The Kenya Mirror (Nairobi) Discontinued.
The Nationalist (Dar-es-Salaam) Discontinued.
The People (Kampala) Discontinued.
Spearhead (Dar-es-Salaam) Discontinued.
The Standard (Dar-es-Salaam) Discontinued
Sunday Nation (Nairobi)
Sunday News (Dar-es-Salaam)
The Sunday Post (Nairobi)
The Tanganyika Standard (Dar-es-Salaam) Discontinued
Target (Nairobi)
Uganda Argus (Kampala) Discontinued
Uhuru (Dar-es-Salaam)
Vigilance Africa (Dar-es-Salaam) Discontinued.
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