DAVID HUME AND THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS

An Examination of the Relation of Hume's Philosophy to the Philosophy of Logical Analysis

by

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. First Evaluations of Hume's Philosophy and Nineteenth Century Histories of Philosophy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Further Evidence Illustrating the Need for Re-Interpretation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Interpretation Until 1905</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Interpretation Since 1905</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Historical Linkage of Hume to Logical Positivism, and the Positivists' Use of Hume's Causal Theory</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. The Positivist Use of Hume's Theory of the External World, and the Reference to Hume's Distinction between Matter of Fact and Relations between Ideas</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Hume and Positivist Moral Philosophy</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

"Leaving it to posterity to write the rest." With these words Hume commends himself and his works to the judgement of the world. One hundred and fifty years later Norman Kemp Smith writes, "Posterity ... has for the most part dealt very harshly with the author of the Treatise." In this thesis we will look at both sides of the coin, for, though it may have seemed to Kemp Smith in 1939 that posterity's verdict had been overwhelmingly against, the tide was slowly changing. Kemp Smith's own article bears eloquent testimony to that. Although Kemp Smith's work has been a great influence in the interpretation of Hume's philosophy, he has not labored alone. Others, motivated perhaps by a desire for historical veracity, or perhaps by the changing philosophical scene during the first half of the twentieth century, have also contributed to the new interpretation of Hume. Kemp Smith and those who shared his views on Hume have not worked in vain, as is evidenced in a recent anthology of philosophical experiences where Harold Taylor writes, "I share with Emanuel Kant one philosophical attribute. We were both awakened by David Hume." In defining the nature of this awakening Taylor con-

The implications of Hume's philosophy became clearer as I read ... the Treatise and Enquiry ... with a sense of excitement and discovery. I discovered that I disagreed with those who had given Hume his place in the history of philosophy as a skeptic who destroyed the possibility of rational certainty, as a man who employed "the fallacy of simple location," who destroyed the logical construct of the self, who atomized experience into discreet units, who made necessary the opinion of Kant. It seemed to me that Hume was a naturalist...

It was, for Taylor, the discovery of naturalism through Hume which resulted in the development of his own philosophic position. The surprising thing about these lines by Taylor is that today they occasion so little comment, and yet we cannot imagine their having been written before 1900. Since the turn of the century Hume has become one of the most dynamic and influential of the modern philosophers. We no longer read Hume to refute him but, rather, for guidance. Fifty years ago his influence was, at best, negative. Today, philosophers of almost all schools look to Hume, at one time or another, for

1. Taylor, p. 137.
3. A typical evaluation of Hume in 1899 is as follows: "His character was peculiarly devoid of qualities of an heroic and lofty cast. His mental constitution is defective through absence of the finer sentiments, aesthetic tastes and emotional feelings. These limitations were fatal to the highest attainment in literature of any class, not excepting even philosophy ... his emotional feebleness rendered it impossible for his writings to become powerful as a direct social force; while his lack of appreciation of, and reverence for, the ideal, excluded his philosophical works from the number of the greatest masterpieces of literature ... there is a total absence of that constructive power which can alone create great literary masterpieces." Wilson Stuart, English Philosophical Styles, Manchester, 1899, p. 85.
inspiration. It cannot be doubted that the re-interpretation of his philosophy has played a considerable role in his emergence.

Not only re-interpretation but also the changing philosophical scene has affected Hume's latter day fortunes. It is this factor which binds the interpretation of his philosophy and his relation to the logical positivists so closely together. Historians of philosophy seek to present a more objective account of Hume's life and philosophy. The positivists and their allies, in presenting Hume's doctrines in the light of contemporary philosophical developments, seek to demonstrate the truth of his philosophy. Sometimes the positivists take advantage of contemporary interpretation, sometimes they do not; but, nonetheless, their use of doctrines at least derived from Hume's philosophy represent his emergence as a positive force in the modern world.

A few words must be added concerning the underlying method used in the consideration and judgement of Humean interpretation. Two divergent methods can be used in the interpretation of Hume's philosophy. Charles W. Hendel maintains that "We cannot ever afford to lose sight of the biography of a man of letters." Alfred B. Glathe, on the other hand, considers Hume not as a "man of letters" but "as a philosopher [who] ... is known only through the statements which -- for us

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are his philosophy." It is the contention of this thesis that the conclusions of the first method are, for the historian, more significant and pertinent. The philosopher, not bound by a strict criterion of historical method, can make use of the results of either procedure. For him the various conclusions are only true or false insofar as they represent what he believes to be a true or false philosophical position. But, as we shall see, it is important for the philosopher not to talk like an historian if he is not actually being one. He may say that such and such a view is derived from Hume's philosophy, but he may attribute such and such a view to Hume only if he is speaking as an historian. Just as surely, the historian must refrain from any dogmatic assertion that one view is the only correct view which can to be derived from Hume's philosophy.

The treatment of the relationship of Hume to the logical positivists is, in its simplest form, an analysis of positivists' references to Hume. Such a procedure was found to be imperative because of the impossibility of tracing any significant historical relationship or connection between contemporary positivism and Hume. We are primarily interested

1. Alfred B. Glathe, *Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals*, University of California Press, 1950, p. 26. T.H. Green also states this same position, "We have been learning of late to know much more about philosophers, but it is possible for knowledge about philosophers to flourish inversely as the knowledge of philosophy." The *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, edited by R.L. Nettleship, London, 1899, p. 4.
in what posterity has written, and have, to a great extent, avoided merely comparative discussions of Hume's philosophy with that of the positivists.
CHAPTER I

FIRST EVALUATIONS OF HUME’S PHILOSOPHY
AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY

Before coming to any conclusion about the traditional interpretation of Hume’s philosophy, the background for that interpretation should be examined. The exceptional character of its beginnings are unique in philosophy.

It is generally agreed that the Treatise of Human Nature is not only one of the greatest philosophical works in English literature but that it is also the central and definitive work of Hume’s philosophical writing. It is true that some of the central doctrines of the Treatise, re-written and revised by Hume, were published as the Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, and that Hume publicly disowned the Treatise, or at least its style, and wished the Enquiries to be regarded as definitive of his philosophical position. But aside from the problems this posed for historical interpretation, the consequences were the same in Hume’s day as in ours. Then, as now, attention focused on the Treatise and it is on the Treatise that traditional interpretation rests. Whether or not this procedure is justified is of no consequence in determining the interpretation.

If the view is accepted that the Treatise occupies the central position in Hume’s philosophical work, we are then
forced to another conclusion; that from 1739-40 until 1819 the general interpretation of the Treatise depended not on that book itself, but on quotations and interpretations from books written about it. The Treatise, published in 1739 and 1740 in an edition of one thousand copies, was not reprinted again until 1819. During this period interest did not lapse, in spite of appearances.

Two books, Thomas Reid's Inquiry into the Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 1764 and James Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, 1770, written specifically attacking and refuting the Treatise had a phenomenally large sale. Reid's book, written "primarily as a refutation of Hume" and more specifically, the Treatise, was reprinted and issued in new editions fourteen times between 1764 and 1819. It was also translated into French and German. Beattie's book could not find a publisher in Edinburgh and was finally printed in London at the author's own expense. Although it was more in the nature of a diatribe against the Treatise than a systematic refutation, it was very popular. Between 1770 and 1819 it was published in thirteen new editions and translated into Dutch, German and French. The inference drawn from these facts is that, except for direct quotations, most of the readers had to accept Reid's and Beattie's version of what the

Treatise contained. It is obvious that the copies of the Treatise available could have supplied only the smallest portion of the readers. The question then is, what sort of picture of the contents and consequences of the Treatise did Reid and Beattie present?

Reid's opening comments on the Treatise, more lyrical than discursive, give only an emotional impression of Hume's work. In section III he loosely traces the development of philosophy from Descartes to Locke and states that their common denominator was their attempts, all unsuccessful, to prove the existence of an external world. Berkeley, however, cut the knot and proved by "unanswerable arguments what no man in his senses can believe," i.e. the non-existence of corporeal substance. Hume, further,

... proceeds on the same principles, but carries them to their full length: and as the Bishop undoes the whole material world, this author, upon the same grounds, undoes the world of spirits and leaves nothing in nature, but ideas and impressions without any subject on which they may be impressed. 2

This is the last instance in the introduction of a systematic exposition of Hume's principles, as then Reid continues in what can hardly be called anything but invective. He concludes the introduction by saying that either Hume's reasoning is "... sophistry and so deserves contempt; or there is no truth

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2. Reid's Works, p. 102.
in human faculties -- and then why reason?" He deals directly with the Treatise from time to time in the exposition of his own theory during the remainder of the book, but it is always in connection with the denial of the self or the denial of the existence of substance.

In the conclusion of his Inquiry Reid gives a more systematic account of the critical philosophy or Cartesian system. He says that by analysis the Cartesians, (this classification includes Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) find that sensations corresponding to secondary qualities cannot resemble any quality of body. Hence, Descartes, Locke and Malebranche infer that these qualities, not being qualities of bodies, are sensations of the mind. Berkeley went one step further than his predecessors and discovered, "that no sensation whatever can or could possibly resemble any quality of insentient being such as body is supposed to be." From this point of analysis, it is then only a short step to Hume's position. Reid observes that "the modern scepticism is the natural issue of this new system; and although it did not bring forth this monster until the year 1739 it may be said to have carried it in its womb from the beginning." Both Locke and Descartes failed to reach the logical conclusions through "lack of light" and Berkeley through

1. Reid's Works, p. 104.
2. Reid's Works, p. 206.
fright. "The author of the Treatise on Human Nature, more
daring and intrepid ... shoots directly into the gulf," and
asks what you mean when you assert the existence of such
things as body, spirit, time or place, cause or effect? Grant-
ing that our ideas of these existences are either ideas of
sensation or reflection, then, from what sensation or what op-
eration of the mind are they copied? On this basis the ques-
tion cannot be answered.

This represents both the spirit and substance of
Reid's references to the Treatise in the Inquiry. It is not,
however, Reid's final treatment of Hume's philosophy. He
deals with it in much greater detail in the Essays on the In-
tellectual Powers of Man, 1785. This book was much less popu-
lar than the earlier Inquiry, and until 1827 only the original
edition had been published. It must also have been less ef-
flective, for the general tone of interpretation remained the
same as that propagated by the Inquiry, i.e. that Hume '... up-
on the principles he has borrowed from Locke and Berkeley, has
with great acuteness, reared a system of absolute scepticism.'

On the face of it there are two criticisms which can
be made of Reid's interpretation. First, he always speaks of
the Treatise as if it were a well known, widely read book,
when, in reality, it must have been fairly obscure. The sec-
ond criticism is the impression he gives that the Treatise is

1. Reid's Works, p. 208.
only composed of one volume and that on the understanding. Of course he may have considered that the basic doctrines laid down in Book I rendered Hume's further work unimportant. Or he may have considered his own work as limited in scope, and he thus dealt only with Book I. The first possibility seems more probable when one views what Reid believed to be the contents and implications of Book I. He thought that its central theme was a continuation of the Cartesian system and that the final result of this would be the complete destruction of the basis for all human knowledge. In this case further writings of the Treatise were either manifestations of this pernicious sceptical philosophy or sophistries.

Beattie, in his Essay, takes his principles and interpretation directly from Reid. He does not, however, echo Reid's politeness and respect for Hume's arguments. In fact he distinguishes himself by the extreme bitterness of his attacks on Hume. The work had great popularity and influence; it was a favorite of Dr. Johnson and George III, among others, and it is said that this is the book which awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers (through Beattie's quotations of Hume). Aside from the repetition of Reid's philosophical arguments, the book is a moral condemnation of Hume for having constructed his system. As Beattie says in the preface to the seventh edition, 1807,

Ever since I began to attend to matters of this kind, I had heard Mr. Hume's philosophy mentioned as a system very unfriendly to religion, both revealed and natural; and this author spoken of as a teacher of sceptical and atheistical doctrines, and withal, as a most acute and ingenious writer. 1

He goes on to substantiate the first part of this accepted opinion, but finds little basis for the latter part. The Essay of Beattie is superior to the Inquiry of Reid in one respect. Beattie includes a great many direct and fairly substantial quotations from the Treatise, which in view of the scarcity of that book was a good thing. Otherwise Beattie's work can be looked upon as little more than a sequel to Reid's original criticism.

It is always difficult to specify traditional interpretation, and although the interpretation of Hume is uniform in the nineteenth century the problem is present. What should one consider as representative of traditional interpretation? T.H. Huxley's volume in the English Men of Letters series of which twenty-nine thousand copies were printed, T.H. Green's famous introduction to the Treatise in the Green and Grose edition of Hume's philosophical works, or William Knight's work in the Blackwood philosophical series? All are eminent philosophical studies and all, without doubt, support to one degree or another Reid and Beattie's original evaluation and interpretation of Hume's philosophy. They are, nevertheless,

unsuitable as a basis of analysis, because they are not only explorations of Hume's theories and doctrines, but also expositions and supporting arguments for each respective author's particular philosophic point of view. Each can be said to follow Reid and Beattie in such and such a way with quotations as proof; but then because of the philosophic position represented each also deviates to such a degree that Hume's philosophy becomes, as it were, secondary. Huxley says that in his explanation of Hume's philosophy, "often more is seen of his [Huxley's] thread than Hume's beads." 1 In stringing together what he considers the relevant passages of Hume's philosophy, his own philosophy often becomes the more prominent one. What is true of Huxley is also true of Knight and Green. This is in no sense a criticism of their respective works but does disqualify them as principal sources for the analysis of general interpretation.

The immediate objection to this disqualification is that their own position must have gained prominence at the expense of Hume's, and yet we accept them without question. This was the case with Beattie and Reid but it must be remembered that in the latter half of the eighteenth century no other source of interpretation was available. Theirs had to be the prominent interpretation because it was the only one advanced, and no matter how they biased that interpretation

in the exposition of their own position it is the one which has to be considered. In the latter half of the nineteenth century this is not true, as sources began to appear which make the determination of traditional interpretation very much easier. At this time the various histories of literature and philosophy began to be published. These are frankly historical studies of the development of philosophy and should be free of many of the disadvantages of more specialized works. They should also give as clear an idea of the traditional interpretation of Hume's philosophy as it is possible to obtain.

The first history we shall examine is Alexander Bain's History of Mental and Moral Philosophy, 1863. He begins by saying that "Hume is chiefly noted for having embraced the views of Berkeley with the exception of that relating to a separate soul. He thus reduced all existence to perceptions and ideas." Further, the refusal to admit anything that cannot be traced to a primary impression is a cardinal doctrine in Hume's philosophy from beginning to end. Bain then outlines the sceptical conclusions to which Hume seems led, i.e. the denial of the self and of the law of cause and effect. However, Bain says, Hume did not really deny the necessity of cause and effect and the existence of the self. "Hume was a man fond of literary effects as well as of speculation, we do not always know when he is in earnest." This is Bain's

2. Bain, p. 207.
A short outline of his moral theory follows, but no attempt is made either to connect it with his metaphysics or to interpret it.

The most prominent deviation from the Reid-Beattie interpretation seen here is the implication that Hume's analysis and conclusions were a literary display; that is to say, he wrote philosophy with tongue in cheek. No matter what Reid's and Beattie's opinion of Hume's philosophy was they always took it seriously. Bain seems to think that the arguments of the Treatise were a sort of 'reductio ad absurdum.' He is supported in this view in one way or another by two of his most respected contemporaries. Leslie Stephens says, concerning Hume's famous statement, that reason is and ought to be the servant of the passions, and that "Hume aimed at being paradoxical in his earlier treatise." In other words he did not really mean what he said. Selby-Bigge says of Hume's Treatise in his introduction to the Essays "that it was pretty plain he just meant to be offensive" in insisting that justice was an artificial virtue. In other words, again Hume did not really mean what he said. The general impression we receive from Bain is, then, that he agrees with Beattie and Reid but does not think that Hume really believed in all seriousness the conclusions at which he arrived.

From an English History of Mental and Moral Philosophy we now turn to the Frenchman H.A. Taine's History of English Literature. Although technically it is not a philosophical work, it reflects what must have been and perhaps still is a widely held opinion. In this respect it must have helped mould the general opinion of Hume to a great extent. Taine's evaluation of the metaphysics of the period, and Hume's in particular, is not in the least complimentary. Taine has no praise for Reid either, and says of him that "rarely in this world has speculation fallen lower." The only ray of sunshine in the whole scene is the emergence of the "moral sense" theory in which Hume had but a part. Taine believes that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Price, Smith, Ferguson and Hume find here their most original and durable ideas.


Locke was almost as poor, (as Newton) groipes about, hesitates, does little more than guess, doubts, starts on an opinion to advance and withdraw it by tours, not seeing its far off consequences, nor above all exhausting anything. In short, he forbids himself lofty questions and is very much inclined to forbid them to us .... If Hume, more bold, goes further, it is in the same track; he preserves nothing of lofty science; he forbids speculation altogether. According to him we know neither substances, nor causes, nor laws. When we confirm that one object is conjoined to another object, it is by custom; 'all events seem entirely loose or separate.' If we give them a connection 'it is our imagination that creates it.' The conclusion is that we shall do well to purge our mind of all theory, and only believe that we may act. Let us examine our wings only to cut them off, and let us confine ourselves to walking. So finished, a pyrrhonism serves only to cast the world back on established beliefs. In fact Reid, being honest, is alarmed. He sees society broken up, God vanishing, and the family evaporating in hypotheses.
The empiricism of Locke was the result of the mind being placed in a receptive rather than a creative position in regard to the external world. Experience is seen as determining the content of the mind, and hence, the type and structure of our knowledge. The ultimate test of the truth of this knowledge is its verification in experience. The mind is a blank tablet upon which the world writes, and the final appeal is always back to this external writer. In general, the doctrine, in conjunction with theological economical and political conditions of its time, has two consequences. First, it results in the fervent affirmation of the principal of inductive reasoning in science and an attempt to extend its use to all human activity, which, in philosophy, led to the "English systems of morals"\(^1\) of the eighteenth century. The second consequence, confined to theoretical philosophy, is a revolution in metaphysics. It is in this latter respect, too, that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume exert their full weight. Their method is analytical and they are interested, not in what the mind does, but in what it is capable of doing. Locke sets up the principles,

... that prior to all metaphysical considerations and controversies the general question must be decided, how far human insight extends, and that this is possible only by exact exhibition of the sources by which it is brought about.... From that time onwards, epistemology ... was brought into the front rank of philosophical

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The foundations of empiricism are found in Locke's doctrine of ideas. Up until his time, ideas had been the foundation of all knowledge, but the fundamental ideas in our mind were held to be innate or not derived from experience. Locke, as opposed to this position, holds that there are no innate ideas, and bases his assertion on two facts. First, the so-called innate ideas asserted by those who hold to their existence, are of such a complex character that their initial presence in the mind would be impossible. Secondly, we can find no single practical axiom which is universally valid for all mankind. After coming to this conclusion he then goes on to examine the ideas which come from experience. Objects are known by their qualities, and Locke divides these qualities into two classes, primary and secondary. The former embraces what objects are in themselves and consist of the different manifestations of matter, solidity and extension. Secondary qualities, however, lie not in the object but in the perceiver, and being appearances consist of a "certain relation to our organ of sense." Our ideas are further divided. In reflection we reproduce the copy of the original, and thus we have ideas of reflection and ideas of sensation. Also included in the ideas of reflection are the immediate sensations which

2. Erdmann, p. 106.
arise from the mind itself. In thought the ideas of reflection are combined by the mind into our complex ideas in much the same way as a small number of words are combined to make a great many different sentences. Complex ideas, however, are combined in three ways -- modes, relations and substances. These complex ideas are the work of the understanding and unlike simple ideas of reflection have no counterpart in reality or experience. There is one exception. Although no external or internal experience gives us conception of the idea of substance we must consider it to be real, since there must be some primary quality to which secondary qualities adhere. In the case of primary qualities we do not know what they are, but that they are.

Berkeley is the link between Locke and Hume in that he resolved Locke's inconsistency concerning substance. This inconsistency was real, for Locke himself showed that the conception of substance contains "all the relations which we are accustomed to class under the name of necessity." Our conceptions of substance are a complex idea and hence, being combinations of the understanding, have no counterpart in experience. Nonetheless, Locke says they are real and regulate the world, which is in direct conflict with his earlier assertion that our knowledge of the world must come from the world. Berkeley's solution is to deny Locke's original

1. Erdmann, p. 125.
distinction between primary and secondary qualities and in doing so he "demolishes the conception of corporeal substance." He asserts that after the elimination of an object's secondary qualities the further assertion of substance is a non-essential abstraction. This theory, although it satisfies the original empirical doctrine, is now given a metaphysical elaboration. If objects exist only insofar as they are perceived, how is it possible to distinguish between those objects which do in fact exist and those which are the production of imagination, dreams or hallucinations? Berkeley solves this problem with a "spiritualistic metaphysics"; "the ideas which constitute the external world are the activities of spirits." This type of solution places Berkeley outside the empiricist tradition to some degree. His demolition of corporeal substance, however, is a logical extension of the original doctrine.

Erdmann differs from Windelband in that he does not regard Berkeley as a line or transition stage between Locke and Hume. He says that Locke's inconsistency about substance was avoided by Hume's scepticism, which "maintained without any inconsistent exception the principle his predecessor laid down." Hume begins, following Locke's method of analysis,

1. Windelband, p. 469.
2. Windelband, p. 470.
by asserting that there is no substance in the internal world (the denial of the self); and further that there is no necessity in the external world (denial of substance). As a result of this we can have no real knowledge of either world.

Erdmann's conclusion rests on Hume's observations that we do not have any experience of the self or ego in which the ideas of reflection, pain, pleasure, the will, etc., adhere; nor do we experience nor can the understanding demonstrate any real connection, other than habit, or custom, between cause and effect. The consequences of the observations and conclusions are his attacks on natural science in the Treatise and the Essays, and on psychology in the Treatise. Other manifestations or secondary consequences are the "Essay on Suicide," which is the natural complement of the inquiries into the nature of the self; and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, whose negative assertions are the result of the conclusions about the causal connection.

Windelband, on the other hand, regards the connection or the logical development of empiricism from Locke through Berkeley to Hume as being of more importance than does Erdmann. "The transformation of Locke's doctrine by Berkeley leads further in a direct line to Hume's theory of knowledge." In this respect, Hume applies the same empirical analysis to the self that Berkeley had applied to substance and with equally

devastating effect. Another minor difference is that Windelband twice refers to Hume as the great "English" philosopher, a remark which probably occasioned some local activity on Calton Hill, Edinburgh, where Hume is buried. Other than these two points, Windelband's interpretation of Hume's sources and conclusions is much the same as Erdmann's.

After outlining these sceptical conclusions of Hume's theory of knowledge, both Erdmann and Windelband go on to emphasize that Hume cannot be regarded strictly as a sceptic. His aim was to "limit the understanding to the sphere where it could accomplish something", and his position was that of the absolutely consistent and honest empiricist. Windelband adds that Hume had a characteristic supplement for his theory of knowledge -- his doctrine of natural belief. This natural belief is completely adequate for practical life and is never perverted by any theoretical reflections. Erdmann says in this same vein that Hume always emphasized practical as well as theoretical philosophy.

Both histories treat Hume's moral theory as a separate entity and make no mention of any positive or negative relationship between it and his metaphysical basis. The prominent doctrines of his moral theory are mentioned, but because of lack of space no attempt is made at interpretation. As for the derivation of his moral theory, both histories

1. Erdmann, p. 130.
2. Windelband, p. 476.
place him between Hutcheson and Adam Smith. When put in synoptic form the similarity of these three make it needless for Windelband and Erdmann to point out influences.

The overall picture we receive from these accounts of Hume's philosophy is that in the theoretical field his theory of knowledge is a direct derivation from the empiricist doctrine formulated by Locke and further developed by Berkeley. In the moral field he is a member of a group which comes under the general heading of "English Systems of Morals." This group is divided into two factions, the rationalists and the moral sense school. In the former group are Clarke, Cudworth, Locke and Berkeley, among others. In the latter group are Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith and Hume. Thus Hume carries to a logical conclusion the doctrines of empiricism, but in moral theory he is not influenced, at least to the same extent, by Locke and Berkeley. How does this interpretation differ from the original ones of Reid and Beattie? They have a wider breadth; natural belief is included as a doctrine, Hume is not accused of perverting the youth of the nation by his teaching, and his interest in moral philosophy is to some extent recognized. Fundamentally, however, the interpretation has not changed. Although we are cautioned against regarding Hume as a sceptic, it is difficult from the foregoing account to see exactly why he should not be regarded as one. His reported conclusions seem sceptical enough. But almost as an afterthought, it is added that he supplemented his theory
of knowledge with a doctrine of natural belief. It is peculiar, however, that the systems of both Locke and Berkeley required "supplements," yet in both cases there seems to be no need to caution against regarding them as sceptics. How is it, we might ask, that Hume's theory of knowledge is so revolutionary while his moral theory seems to be so commonplace?

Huxley says that "After all, Hume's speculations on moral questions are not so remote from those of respectable professors like Hutcheson, or saintly prelates such as Butler." Is this because there is little or no connection between Hume's speculative philosophy and moral theory, as Selby-Bigge seems to imply? How is it that a man who destroys the basis for psychology and morality in Book I goes on to write about a positive psychology in Book II and a positive morality in Book III? A man who emphasized the importance of practical philosophy is busy on the speculative side proving practical philosophy impossible. The conclusions that can be and are drawn from these paradoxes about Hume himself are peculiar to say the least. Did he, so to speak, write metaphysics with one hand and moral theory with the other? Did he not, as many seem to believe, take his own arguments in the Treatise in all seriousness? Was there this fundamental lack of unity in Hume's original and most comprehensive philosophic work?

2. British Moralists, Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge M.A., Oxford, 1897, p. XIX. "But one can not help remarking how little support his moral theory receives from his speculative."
Further, after writing the *Treatise* did he go on to more popular fields of literary endeavor as coolly and cynically as he wrote Books II and III, after writing Book I? When Hume finally decided to re-write the *Treatise* did he cut out the more unpopular parts to make it more palatable to the public? It seems that all these implications as to the character, quality and intent of Hume and his work follow logically from the original interpretation of the *Treatise*, and that as long as this interpretation is followed there is no real basis for arriving at any other conclusion. Are these conclusions true? That can only be determined by examining the biographical materials that are available to determine (1) whether Hume can be placed in the empirical tradition like Locke and Berkeley; and (2) whether there is any evidence to support the implication that there is this fundamental paradox, or even worse, hypocrisy, in his life and works.
CHAPTER II

FURTHER EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATING THE NEED
FOR RE-INTERPRETATION

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, traditional interpretation up until nineteen hundred implied, if it did not state, certain basic contradictions mainly concern the relation of his metaphysical to his moral theory, but a more detailed study reveals in interpretations of that time contradictions in his moral theory itself. Thus, although Hume specifically endorses a moral sense as the basis of moral preceptions, Leslie Stephens finds sufficient evidence in Hume's writings on morals to name him as the founder and indeed the clearest expositor of the utilitarian theory of morals. Aside from these philosophic contradictions, certain conclusions about Hume's life, character and, most of all, the intent of his literary work seem to go hand in hand with traditional interpretation. There was and is a tendency to find, through his works and some of his statements, evidences of a fundamental flaw in his character, with the result that his philosophy is not taken to be what he really believed, but to be displays of critical and sceptical ingeniousness using as a foundation the presuppositions of Locke's and Berkeley's empiricism. It also seems that he did what no good philosopher should do, deserting philosophy for the more lucrative fields of economics, politics and history. In exploiting his literary
talent to suit public tastes he changed his style from that of writing long works like the Treatise to writing essays, a more popular medium in the eighteenth century. Finally, it is asserted, when he did revise the Treatise for re-publication, not only did he cut it up into essays, but he removed many of the especially radical sections which he thought might be misunderstood or offend public taste.

All these inferences are supported by external evidence as well as philosophical interpretation. Hume was exceedingly disappointed in the reception of his first work and after its publication seemed to turn immediately to other fields. His political essays were extremely successful, and it was here and in the writing of history that he gained most of his eighteenth century fame. In his late years he disowned his first work, the Treatise, wishing the Essays, together with the Enquiries, to be regarded as representing his philosophical position. In addition there are his own statements that his criterion of composition was the demands of the public, and that the pursuit of literary fame was the ruling passion of his life. The view that Hume was a clever dilettante trying to achieve contemporary fame appears to be well supported.

First, however, certain misapprehensions concerning the publication and composition of the Treatise must be cleared up and then it must be determined whether or not the broad outlines of his literary career follow the pattern just outlined.
Is Hume an ingenious writer moving from subject to subject with no central and lasting objective to guide his activity?

So far as biographical material is concerned, one thing must be kept in mind from the onset. Hume was the second son of an obscure Scottish land owner who died early in Hume's childhood. Aside from his initial education at the Old College of Edinburgh, Hume had almost no resources upon which to draw. All his life, except for a brief engagement as secretary to a madman and some government posts in his later years, he depended entirely on his writing for a living. He did not have the resources of Locke and Lord Shaftesbury nor a church living as had Berkeley and Butler. He also failed twice to obtain that traditional support for Scottish men of letters, a chair of philosophy, and in this way was deprived of the financial security enjoyed by Hutcheson and Adam Smith. Hume was the first British author in the field of what we now call the social sciences to support himself successfully by his writing. While this fact alone makes him unique in English literature, it may or may not have affected the nature of his career. It is certain, however, that it did affect the content of the advertisements found in his books. Today, we have the more efficient method of dust jackets, and it is to be hoped that two hundred years from now authors will not be held responsible for the 'blurbs' on these jackets. Taken in the

light of his financial necessity, it seems that Hume's conciliatory attitude in the advertisement to the Treatise is the only one possible for an impoverished and unknown author to express. It might also explain to some extent the other famous advertisement in which he disowns the Treatise, a book he had no plan to re-issue and with which, technically, he was very dissatisfied. It seems, therefore, a mistake to attach importance to these advertisements as significant clues to Hume's attitude toward his philosophy.

Concerning the Treatise itself, one finds on examination that it does not quite fit the description given in most sources, nor does it fit the description Hume himself gives in his later years. In the first place, it is usually described as a youthful masterpiece, which to a great extent misrepresents the book. Hume himself is the principle source of this misrepresentation, for he says in a letter to Gilbert Elliot that the book was begun before he was eighteen and completed before he was twenty-five. This general statement is repeated several times in his correspondence, and in substance he says the same thing in the famous advertisement to Essays, Moral and Political. No matter what motives caused Hume to speak of the Treatise in this way, we know in point of fact that he was not speaking the truth. From letters written at the time we know that he was still working on the

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Treatise until its last book was published in 1740, and a simple examination of dates shows that Books I and II were published when Hume was twenty-eight years old and Book III when he was twenty-nine or thirty. His letters lead us to believe that he had at least conceived its general outline as much as ten years earlier, and as far as is known the entire period from his eighteenth to his twenty-eighth year, except for a few months in Liverpool, was spent in the preparation of the Treatise. It seems to be much less a youthful masterpiece than a sustained philosophic effort. Berkeley and Descartes published some of their greatest works at an early age and these works really merit the title of 'youthful masterpieces,' for none were the product of ten years work. The Treatise, in contrast to what most of his critics have considered it and what he wished it to be considered, is apparently the sustained effort of ten of Hume's most productive years, and the singlemindedness and persistence of its production makes the Treatise unique, for a man of any age.

Another misunderstanding concerning the Treatise and one which explains to some extent Hume's later attitude towards it, is due to the circumstances of its reception on publication. This has been clarified by modern research in recent years. In his autobiography, Hume says of the Treatise that it "fell dead born from the press." This statement has

always been taken to mean that in Hume's estimation it received no consideration whatever. To counter this claim by Hume his chroniclers have always quoted the last two paragraphs of the review on the first two volumes of the Treatise found in "Works of the Learned," June 1739, one of the most prominent literary journals of the time. Hume referred to this review as somewhat abusive, and in quoting the last paragraphs which likens the Treatise to the juvenile productions of a young Raphael, his critics have shown him to be a bit ungrateful. In recent years, however, research into English and foreign journals at the time of the Treatise's publication has shown that it did receive a good deal of notice in its first years. In the light of all this new evidence it is well to re-examine the original statement that it "fell dead born from the press." Does Hume mean what he seems to mean or is this another of the lapses of memory from which he appears to have suffered, especially in relation to the Treatise, in his old age?

We shall begin with the original review in "Works of the Learned," the last paragraphs of which seem to contain no basis for Hume's claim. This review has two violently opposed themes and Kemp Smith notes a theory found in the Quarterly Review for 1841 that it may have been written by two different men. The following are typical examples of the type of criticism that go to make up the review proper. In a note concerning Hume's statement that we can find nothing
to be absurd or impossible of which we can form a clear and distinct idea, the reviewer remarks,

I have resolved this sentence in my mind till I have quite tired myself but cannot after all find meaning in it. I do not mention this as a singular instance of our Author's inscrutability for there are, to me, innumerable in this work of his; but I could not point out a more short and entire one, whereby the reader might judge how qualified this writer is to give us a clear idea of so complex a subject as human nature, or with what justice he tramples on Mr. Locke and pretends to restore what he has perverted. 1

Or again concerning Hume's principle that all ideas are derived from impressions,

I have afore hinted the mighty value of this discovery, the honor of which is due entirely to our Author, but it cannot be too often inculcated. I verily think if it were closely pursued it would lead us to several estimable 'desiderata' such as 'perpetual motion,' the 'grand elixir,' a 'dissolution of the stone,' etc. 2

In view of these statements and the fact that Hume is constantly referred to as the "Genius," it is not difficult to picture the young Scot storming into the editor's office, sword in hand. 3 (The surprising fact is that he failed to run the editor through). What is probably even stranger than the inclusion of the last paragraph in the review are the reactions of those who have written about Hume to the review. Huxley's statement that the Treatise was "on the whole

1. Article XXVI, History of the Works of the Learned, for November 1739, Author unknown, p. 362. (this periodical was obtained from the University Library, St. Andrews, the only copy available in Scotland).


respectfully and appreciatively reviewed" shows what Huxley himself thought of the Treatise or that he had not sufficiently read the review, aside from the last paragraphs. An equally strange reaction to the review is found in Burton's Life and Correspondence of David Hume. He says that "the paper is of considerable length and it has throughout a tone of clamorous jeering and vulgar raillery that forcibly reminds one of the writings of Warburton." He goes on to say, however, that "it is the work of one who respects the adversary he has taken arms against, and before leaving the subject, the writer makes manly atonement for his wrath..." and he then refers to the oft quoted last paragraphs. It seems that Hume was more interested in what was said about his book in the review proper than in the sops thrown to his ego at its conclusion. Calling ten years' work "juvenile" seems a little gratuitous in any case. His description of the review to Hutcheson as "somewhat abusive" can be viewed as a gem of understatement. "The Works of the Learned" never reviewed, as far as I can ascertain, the third volume; and so established a tradition which has lasted a long time.

In the last few years another early English comment on the Treatise has been found, a twenty-four hundred word letter to "Common Sense; or the Englishman's Journal." This

letter was published fifteen months after the appearance of Volumes I and II and about five months before Volume III was published. The letter, most unfriendly on a number of points, strangely enough refutes the Treatise mainly "on the grounds that it was so completely incomprehensible as to delude the weak-minded into accepting it as high philosophy." 1 The letter also attacks Hume on points of elementary arithmetic, and basic ignorance of scientific method, as well as castigating his style of exposition. If these criticisms seem strange today, what must they have seemed to Hume as payment for his great effort?

Among the criticisms of continental journals from 2 1739-41, only one can be considered favourable to Hume; and in the unfavourable reviews the points of criticism are always the same. The foremost complaint is Hume's manner of expression, for at the time of publication the style of the Treatise attracted more notice than its content. Another characteristic of these reviews is that in only two cases is the second volume reviewed and in only one case is the third volume considered. This seems to be a universal reaction to the book.

It now becomes evident that Hume meant in his statement about the reception of the Treatise and we understand better his comment that "never was a literary attempt more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature." Small wonder

1. Mossner, p. 293.
2. Also investigated by Mossner.
that by the time Beattie and Reid brought out the first even partially understandable criticisms from twenty to forty years later, Hume had given up the Treatise as a bad job which required complete revision. Hume aimed at their understanding and hit their literary prejudices.

Hume's statements concerning the reception of the Treatise have been clarified in order to widen the field of interpretation and to show that evidences must be judged as far as possible according to the conditions of the times. The meaning of Hume's statements is changed by their consideration in the light of recent research. This same process has been evident in the interpretation of his historical and political writings, the philosophic implications of which shall now be examined.

A surprising fact about Hume's political writing is that a great deal of it is included in the Treatise. It is customary to think of the book as a philosophical work and more usually than not it is believed to consist of a volume on metaphysics or epistemology, another on psychology and a third on morals. In some commentaries the only factor which appears to connect these three books is the name of the author. It is noteworthy that Book III, so far from being a book on moral philosophy of the sort expected after reading other moralists of the eighteenth century such as Hutcheson, Butler

1. C.F. Chapter I.
or Reid, contains a great many practical applications, mostly political in nature. As Huxley saw it, Hume did not even wait to finish the Treatise before turning aside to politics.

Comments and commentaries on Hume's political writing were as rare in Hume's day as they are now. During the nineteenth century when the first works on Hume began to appear, they were influenced to a great extent by Hume's conclusions, and paid little or no attention to the method or basis he used for his political analysis. They were much more interested in whether or not he had been right. A complicating factor is that as Hume grew older, his conclusions tended to obscure the historical context from which they had been derived as well as the method by which they were reached. To have been a Tory in eighteenth century Scotland long before the advent of educated masses and expanded electorates, and with the evidences of popular religion, the great Scottish revivals, before your eyes, was quite a different matter than being a Tory in 1900. The outcome was a remark on Hume's political writing which asserted that his political conservatism was a shelter from the scepticism of his philosophy.

Recently two short studies of Hume's political writing have been published and although they make no claim to comprehensive treatment, they give the information we require.

1. None the less, Huxley gives a very fair account of Hume's actual political conclusions.
2. A. Bain, John Stuart Mill, A Criticism with personal recollections, London, 1882, p. 34.
In all recent studies of Hume's political work there is almost complete agreement on the points stressed in these two, and it is a wholly different picture from the one which would have been painted in 1900. Hume's conclusions are not primarily considered, but it is rather the method he used in coming to these conclusions which interests modern political scientists. His contributions to political science are further shown to be logical and legitimate extensions of the philosophic position of the Treatise. As George Sabine says,

What Hume supplied was a penetrating logical analysis, which if accepted, destroyed all the pretensions of natural law to scientific validity. In addition he extended this critical result to specific applications of natural law in ethics, religion and politics. ¹

In fact the tenor of these sections is to emphasize that it is impossible to evaluate and understand Hume's political writing until the basic premises of his philosophy are taken into consideration. It is the underlying unity which Sabine stresses.

Frederick Watkins is also explicit on the unity of Hume's political and philosophical work.

Before Hume no thoroughgoing attempt had been made to justify and define the nature of the distinction between normative and factual investigations. Hume's epistemology provided the basis for such a distinction. By insisting on the necessary difference between 'is' and 'ought' and by limiting true knowledge to the non-normative determinations of logical relations and matters of fact, he laid the foundation for the empirical position adopted by most subsequent social scientists. ²

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It would be difficult, says Watkins, to determine whether political considerations inspired his philosophic position or philosophical considerations inspired his political position. In any case, one is such an integral constituent of the other that the consideration of one is ipso facto the consideration of the other.

George Catlin's, A History of the Political Philosophers is another recent account of Hume as political philosopher. This book contains some undesirable aspects common to popular accounts of Hume's life and writing, i.e. half truths and legends, but it is similar to the two sources just mentioned in that Catlin maintains Hume's political philosophy to be based on his philosophical position.

From these various sources, then, a different interpretation arises in respect of the relationship between the different phases of Hume's work. It is also interesting to note that although all of these sources emphasize the connection between politics and philosophy, none of them are very explicit as to what Hume's philosophic position really was. The general impression is, however, that its definitive aspect was concerned with method, i.e. his philosophic position rested on the methods of scientific investigation.

The situation with respect to the interpretation of Hume's History of England, appears analogous to that just examined in his political writing. First, interest was directed at its conclusions, and with perhaps much greater justifi-
cation than in the former case. From Hume's time until 1900, the tendency was to think of history as history: to have the general opinion that history, no matter who the author, should be the same if correctly written. The main difference in histories was a matter of sources, given the same sources and equal research ability, history would write itself. For this idealistic view of history Hume's work had many shortcomings and has been periodically and systematically criticised. The earliest interest which centered upon the way in which the History was written, the sources which influenced it and its value as a historical text, has its origin in Feuter's work published in 1911. Since then a small but steady stream of articles and books containing sections about Hume the historian, have appeared. In the beginning comment was exceedingly critical, but as the study of the history of history grows, the treatment of Hume has become more and more liberal. This has been the result of two factors, a more detailed study of the History, and a greater comprehension of the problems faced by eighteenth century historians. The first criticisms concentrated mainly on three points: (1) that Hume copied his History from Voltaire, (2) that it was written with a violent Tory prejudice and (3) that Hume neither knew how to use nor did he accurately check his source material. The critics were prepared to praise only his style. Most of these

1. I mean idealistic in the general not the philosophic sense.
charges have been dropped as either being not founded in fact or as unimportant. An example of a treatment of Hume's History which still follows the general line started by Feuter is that of J.B. Black. His greatest deviation, however, is that he refutes the theory that Hume copied his History from Voltaire. Apart from being, for chronological reasons, highly improbable, it is from the nature of the History and Hume's other work also very doubtful. It is not, says Black, the connection between Voltaire's History and Hume's History that should be examined, but the connection between his History and his philosophy. Even more than in the case of Voltaire his outlook and method as a historian were determined for him by his speculative ideas. His philosophy stands to his history in the relation of a 'prolegomenon' and both together constitute an organic unit. Instead, therefore, of searching for traces of borrowing from Voltaire it would be more profitable and practicable to investigate the extent to which Hume the philosopher guided Hume the historian. In spite of this approach to Hume's history, Black finds support for almost all the allegations of former critics in addition to some new ones of his own. It can only be the influence of Hume's philosophy which makes the History so inferior. An outline of Black's summation of Hume's philosophy and the inferences

2. Black, p. 79.
he draws from it may be set out as follows: "By common consent the core of Hume's metaphysics is to be found in his theory of causation" which has its roots in a belief in the uniformity of nature, and its practical application in his History. This implies two suppositions which Hume accepts. "One, that the mind of man is the scene of a uniform play of motive; and two, that the motives of men in the mass are quantitatively and qualitatively the same for all times and all countries." This leads Hume to the setting up of an 'historical man' in the same fashion as later an 'economic man' was set up. The assumption of the uniformity of human nature results, in the main, in the over-simplification of history: an inability to recognize or deal with extraordinary motives. Two examples of this failure to deal with out-of-the-ordinary cases are his treatment of Joan of Arc and Martin Luther. In accordance with Hume's philosophical theory "the universal is emphasized, the local and particular are suppressed, and all sense of perspective is obliterated." Joan of Arc and Luther are shown to be quite ordinary people who by accident of place, but mainly of temperament, come into prominence. Hume fails to show them as peculiar products of their age and environment.

Black's account of the connection between Hume's philosophical work and his History is faulty in two respects. First, it is doubtful that Hume, either consciously or un-

1. Black, p. 94.
2. Black, p. 95.
consciously, set up anything so artificial as an historical man, for it would seem that a person who realized that a well established myth like the social contract theory was nothing more than a theoretical tool, would also have realized the same would hold true for a "normal historical man." The more fundamental criticism underlying Black's main attack on Hume's historical method, is in fact a criticism of historical method itself. The writing of history, as Hume saw, depends on causal connection. The historian is one who traces this causal connection; he is not merely a chronicler of events which mean nothing in themselves. If there were not systems set up to account for these events, writing of history would be to a great extent pointless, and this is just as true of human actions as of natural happenings. If an historian is forced to report that a human action was utterly inexplicable, we and the historian can only assume that his system of explanation and/or historical data are incomplete. What is the difference between modern historical accounts of Martin Luther and that of Hume? Is it that they assume human actions to be inexplicable, extraordinary and beyond the causal link? No, the only difference found is that of technique and detail of research, for the theory behind the two accounts will be exactly the same, the attempted objective reporting of events in a causal sequence.

1. On this point see page 143, Vol. 3, Hume's History; also page 288, Vol. 8.
One thing to note about Black's account is that the interpretation of Hume's philosophy is traditional. Perhaps this induces Black to look in the wrong place for Hume's presuppositions.

Another account of Hume's History that has recently appeared is that of Mossner. Although he begins at the same point as Black, he comes to quite different conclusions. Mossner finds that the most critical comments on the History spring from two sources: one was the failure to apply historical method to the writing of history and the second was the failure to consider Hume's work as a unit, that is, constructing a dichotomy between Hume the historian and Hume the philosopher. "The two Humes cannot properly be separated; and it is this forced separation, this distinction without a difference, that affords a primary cause of confusion." Mossner, however, is much more careful than Black in coming to any conclusion concerning the central aspect of Hume's philosophy.

There is still a considerable doubt as to just what the real signification of Hume's philosophy is. The situation is even more complicated when the works of Hume are not considered narrowly metaphysically. Yet so far as Hume the Historian is concerned one important truth may be placed beyond question. Hume is not a rationalist historian, that is, if the term is taken in its ordinary philosophical significance.... The philosopher who refused to place his trust in reason ... who attacked metaphysical necessity in the causal relationship,

2. Ernest C. Mossner, p. 659.
and who scoffed at the intellectualism of the social contract, is not by any legerdemain of nomenclature to be labelled a rationalist philosopher, nor when he is writing history a rationalist historian.... He consistently disclaims all allegiance to the a priori or to a historical dialectic of any kind. 1

This also excludes such corruptions as the 'historical man' and the tendency to reduce human actions to a norm through a naive assumption of the uniformity of nature. What explanation of this mistake can be offered, if it is as Mossner claims, a mistake? The most obvious difference is the unity each respectively finds in his philosophy. Perhaps Black, seeking the unity of Hume's philosophy and history in one of the more obvious sceptical conclusions which traditional interpretation has attributed to him, has missed "the real significance" of which Mossner speaks. The positive conclusions of Mossner about the unity of Hume's philosophy and his history again emphasize that it is mainly one of method. This method was experimental. It was indeed the method, so recent in Hume's time, that Descartes and Newton have handed down to us. The History was unique in its time in that its purpose was not to support any particular faction or interest. This ideal has become the criterion of the modern historian; to explain the present in terms of the past. As philosophy was part of that past, the historian must be concerned with it, and as the study of philosophy was for Hume the study of human nature, so the data which went to make up this study could not be separated

1. Mossner, p. 664.
from history.

The same materials differently organized afford the basis for all of Hume's writing ... Hume did not turn to history, as so often indicated, because he was blocked in philosophy through scepticism; he never really deserted philosophy. In turning to history, he was not leaving philosophy, but merely enlarging the empirical data over the conclusions. 

This gives a good idea of the direction modern research has taken and the conclusions at which it has arrived. Although there has been no agreement as to the exact nature of the unity of Hume's work, the search for this unity has been constant. Research, on the other hand, is to a great extent incomplete. There is no comprehensive study of his political or economic writing and the sources available in these fields, as well as those concerning his History, can only be regarded as introductions to the complete studies of the future. While the factors just discussed could probably be regarded as sufficient basis for the contention that his work must be regarded as a unity, it is proposed that this evidence be supplemented by certain biographical evidence. The evidence, of varied importance, will give some idea of the age (and its influence) in which Hume lived.

The first noteworthy fact about Hume's work and life, in its pattern, variety and breadth, is that for his time it was unique only in brilliance. In fact if one decides that Hume deserted philosophy one also has to admit that almost all

1. Mossner, p. 666.
of his Scottish contemporaries did likewise. A cursory examination will show this. Francis Hutcheson deserted philosophy for the complete reformation of teaching at the University of Glasgow. This reformation included teaching in science and divinity as well as philosophy. The measure of his desertion of philosophy is the comparison of the philosophical works published after his death with those he wrote before becoming the head of the progressive faction at Glasgow. Another one of Hume's personal friends whose desertion of philosophy has almost obscured the fact that he wrote about it at all, is Adam Smith. The amount of time Smith spent on his Theory of Moral Sentiments, his comparative youth at the time of its publication, and the lack of ceremony with which he went on to other fields of subjects almost parallels Hume's earlier performance. In the eighteenth century the philosopher who concentrated solely on philosophy is the exception rather than the rule. The point is, however, that Hutcheson, Lord Kames, Hume and Adam Smith all wrote with equal authority if not with equal success on a variety of subjects. It seems obvious that all did not give up philosophy for some more lucrative field or because they were thwarted by scepticism. It seems inconsistent to judge Hume in a way that he would not have been judged by his contemporaries.

Two other factors may be mentioned together with

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1. Illustrations of this are to be found in Graham's Scottish Men of Letters.
the last instance, which can be regarded as symptomatic of the
general intellectual milieu of the early eighteenth century.
First is the close proximity of eighteenth century Scottish
universities to medieval educational practices. The most
striking difference noticed when looking back on these times
is the system of regents which dominated Scottish universities.
By this system each regent took a certain group of students
through their complete college curriculum.

Very early in the history of Scottish Universities
a system -- of which there is no direct trace in the
history of any other university -- established itself,
by which one regent attended to the entire instruction
of all the students who matriculated in a single year
through the whole of their four years' curriculum. 1

Each regent taught every course offered by the university.
The system, just modified in Hume's time, exerted considerable
influence on the thinking of members of the Scottish universi-
ties. The tradition of intellectual specialization was un-
known in the first half of the eighteenth century in Scotland.
It was only as individual fields appeared and broadened, a
process in which Hume, Hutcheson and Adam Smith played a
vital part, that in the interests of efficiency, specialization
was introduced.

The second factor often overlooked in accounts of
this period, is the important role played by the Church of

1. Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the
2. The University of Edinburgh abolished the regent system
in 1708; so Hume was not actually personally acquainted
with it.
Scotland. The general impression received, especially from accounts of Hume's life, is that eighteenth century Scottish Calvinism was much more of a hindrance than a spur to literary effort. This is far from true. Although in this period of the great revivals the darker aspects of Calvinism may have captured the minds of the uneducated masses, its effect on individuals who came from the educated minority such as Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith, must have been extremely stimulating. The central theme of these three men is critical analysis applied to the fields in which they worked. There is reason to believe that the habit, if not the application, of it is derived from their religious training. A good example of the intellectualism at this time was the now much deteriorated Scottish Sunday. In the eighteenth century it was an austere day during which one went to church twice, ate very little, and during the rest of the day applied oneself very seriously to religious problems. Now, what were these problems? Each Sunday at 11:00 the minister selected a passage from the scripture as his theme and constructed the day's lesson upon it. At the 6:30 sermon he enlarged further on this theme from his thoughts and from notes taken during the afternoon. The congregation discussed, during the afternoon at home, the sermon they had just heard. In the evening following the second sermon, there was another discussion. These discussions largely concerned the orthodoxy of the minister's enlargement on his central theme. They were not pious 'amens'
and were not expected to be. They were critical evaluations of the sermon from the point of view of orthodox Calvinist dogma. This was a natural school for young Scots and it was only a matter of time until this habit of mind was applied to philosophy, economics, politics and finally (or firstly) to the dogma itself. The intellectual level of the clergy in Scotland is said to have been very low, but it must be remembered that this was a period of reform in the church, and its critics are much more in evidence than its apologists. Certainly Hume, neither in his youth nor in his maturity, looked down on certain members of the Scottish clergy. There is evidence to show that in his youth he was much impressed by the church, but there is no evidence to support the oft made assumption that Hume turned to his religious scepticism at an early age or without emotional struggle. In later life, he, as well as Hutcheson and Smith, found the greater part of their friends and colleagues among this clergy. The church in its own way shaped the prodigious amount of literature produced in Scotland during the golden age of Scottish letters.

The third factor which might account to some extent for the initial efforts of Hume and his friends in the fields of morals and politics was the spirit of reform abroad in Scotland at this time. The reform of the clergy has just been mentioned. At the same time there was a great interest in the practices and aims of the universities. It was this spirit which caused the change from the system of regents to the
professional system, and the teaching of classes in the vernacular, two changes which systematized and liberalized Scottish education in every way. The other result of this reform was the turning of Scottish attention from the study of medieval metaphysics to the more practical study of politics, economics and natural science. This is illustrated by the following passage:

The Professors of Philosophy with the concurrence of the other masters have unanimously agreed to employ much less time as has been usually done in the universities, in the logic and metaphysick of the schoolmen, which seem contrived to make men subtle disputants — a profession justly of less value in this age than it has been in some preceding ones; and to employ themselves chiefly in teaching those parts of Philosophy which may qualify men for the more useful and important offices of society.  

Rashdall says this represents the spirit of Reid's common sense philosophy, but it more nearly represents the practice of men like Hume and Smith. They wrote what is today strictly speaking, philosophy, but they spent the greater part of their time on "those parts of philosophy which may qualify men for the more useful and important offices of society."

Here, too, we have something of what Hume must have meant when he said that the function of his History was to "enlighten and instruct."

The fourth and most important influence which must be taken into account in any study of literature written at

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1. Quoted from documents of Aberdeen University, p. 177, by Rashdall, p. 322.
this time is the way in which knowledge had developed from the original basis of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes, with his dualism, had freed natural science from the dictates of medieval theology and had enabled it to proceed along the lines of modern methodology. All those studies dealing with mind, however, were still subject to theological control. This is not to say that there were no attempts to use scientific method, or to construct systems of moral mechanics a la Newton in these fields. In fact, one of the characteristics of the period is the wreckage of such attempts. It is a central feature in the work of Locke, Clarke and Berkeley. In attempting to transfer scientific method directly to mental phenomena they instituted as great a chaos as the one which they thought they were supplanting.

In 1725, when Hume entered the field of philosophy, it included all subjects except natural science. As yet there was not even history as we conceive it today. History was a partisan subject written frankly to support points of view, not to achieve objective evaluation. While attempts had been made to transfer scientific method to these fields, no evaluation of this method or its meaning, and no understanding of what its uses implied had been achieved. It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that Scottish intellectuals, perhaps motivated by some of the influences just mentioned, began investigation along modern lines in the social sciences. When they began their studies they expected philosophy to develop
in much the same way as science had up to that time. It was only later experience which showed that while the common bond between the different fields of natural science is the formulation of quantitative results, there is no such bond in the social sciences. As for Hume and his contemporaries, they probably would not have known what was meant had they been told that what they wrote was not philosophy. In studying them it is sometimes forgotten that the distinctions we make today between the social sciences did not exist for them. Hume’s *History*, if we accept Mossner’s point of view, was an attempt to bring history into the realm of philosophy out of the field of propaganda, and, in the same manner, a study of his political writing which ignores its philosophical basis also ignores the spirit of the times in which it was written.

We have seen that the *Treatise* forms a much more integral part of Hume’s literary career than either he or many of his critics would have us believe. We have also seen that the demand for a unity of interpretation is not only confined to his philosophical works but is demanded by modern critics of his historical and political writing. In this chapter some general sociological lines upon which this unity might ultimately be based have also been suggested. We have also seen that the broad outlines of Hume’s career do not follow the lines suggested by the traditional interpretation of his philosophy.
Chapter I was concerned with traditional interpretation of Hume's philosophical works as represented by various general references published before 1900, and some of the difficulties to which this interpretation gives rise were illustrated. The second chapter covered a more inclusive field and indicated the primary misconceptions which tend to obscure the consideration of Hume's historical and political writing. Again there was demonstrated the importance of the consideration of his work as a unity, with emphasis on the fact that modern study in these fields is explicit in its insistence that this unity find its basis in his philosophical outlook.

The interpretation found in general sources of 1900 expresses to a very great extent views found in similar sources today. It is probably also comparable to the philosophy taught in most present day elementary classes. (Perhaps there is more to be said for the teachers, in point of view of simplicity and ease of reference, than for those who compile our histories of philosophy.) In general it can be said that elementary students in philosophy receive much the same idea of Hume as that entertained by the eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas Reid. There is, however, another level at
which study proceeds in philosophy, and that is the technical
research constantly being carried out by professional philosop-
phers. This research may be termed technical as, in its
original form, it seldom reaches the level of the greater
majority of philosophy students and is principally intended
for other professional philosophers. Perhaps it is an exag-
geration to say that the results never reach general texts,
but it can be said that progress from one level to the other
is extremely slow. In turning now to the second level we
find a situation that is not indicated by so much as a ripple
on the face of the first.

The interpretation of Hume's philosophy on the tech-
nical level was accurately reflected by that on the general
level until 1903, but to understand the changes which took
place at that time it will be necessary to examine in some
detail traditional interpretation on the technical level.
The most important study of Hume's philosophy written in Eng-
lish during the nineteenth century was Thomas H. Green's in-
troductions to the Treatise, first published in 1875 in an
edition of Hume's philosophical works. These introductions
are important for a variety of reasons. They represent the
first attempt at a critical survey of the Treatise as a unit.
The general point of view of this attempt is the same as that
of Beattie and Reid, but the general method of criticism bears

1. Green, Works of Thomas Hill Green, Edited by R.L. Nettle-
ship, London, Longmans, 1885.
little resemblance to these earlier critics. The basic criticism of Reid, is for instance, that

... the division of our notions into ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection is contrary to all rules of logic; because the second member includes the first. For can we form any clear and just notion of our sensations any other way than by reflection? 1

Green's criticism, however, refined and sharpened by a century of developing idealism is primarily concerned with demonstrating the impossibility of constructing a theory of primitive consciousness. Another reason why his arguments have proved important is that, in direct reaction to his view, a new interpretation arises. The source of this new interpretation is not found in the empiricist school of philosophy which has, surprisingly enough, always seemed to accept Green's general characterization of Hume's philosophy, but stems from the ranks of the idealists themselves. That a reaction to Green's views should appear is not surprising, as this study which seeks to destroy the philosophy of Hume root and branch, even to the point of discouraging the study of it, and spends no little part of its time tracing its supposed defects to faults in the writer's character, was perforce included with every

2. An interesting example of this attitude, although he did not have the advantage of being acquainted with Green's criticism, is that of Mill. In spite of disagreeing so fundamentally about philosophy in general, their respective opinions of Hume's personality and the general import of his philosophy were the same.
copy of Hume's works available for well over twenty years. Whereas the long and detailed account might have been very suitable for publication as an article or book, it must rank as one of the most unfortunate introductions to any author's philosophy ever written.

Beginning his account of Book I of the Treatise, Green says that Hume's chief characteristic lies in his more rigorous and logical application of Locke's principles to the problems of philosophy. Both Hume and Locke were subjective idealists, in that both of their philosophies ultimately rest on the faith that the world, or existence, can be explained by intellectual activity. Because of their similarity in this respect and because of their chronological as well as certain logical relationships, Green devotes almost the first half of his introduction to an examination of Locke's theory of knowledge. The outcome of this examination of the theory of "primitive consciousness" is the assertion that Locke holds the contradicting doctrines that (a) simple sense data given the mind are taken as wholly constituting the real; yet (b) what is imposed or 'superinduced' by the mind or the forms which lend sense data intelligibility is also taken as real. That means, for Green, that the theory of sense data presupposes that which the mind is said to impose or superinduce. Hume's relationship to this dilemma is that he attempts to follow through one of the opposing doctrines with much greater consistency and vigor than Locke applied to either.
He accepts the thesis that simple sense data wholly constitute the real "... and [tries] to clear the real, whether under the designation of mind or its object, of all that could not be reckoned as given in feelings which occur to us 'whether we will or no'." The process by which Hume attempts this clarification of the real is, according to Green, a simple one when once seen in its true colours. It depends principally on the faulty and misleading use of language. This language takes for granted popular conceptions which it later shows to be meaningless. It is an

... account of our primitive consciousness which derives its plausibility from availing itself of the conceptions of cause and substance [which] is the basis of the argument which reduces these conceptions to words misunderstood.

The explanation always assumes the relation which it seeks to reduce to "propensities to feign" or to feeling. For Hume, the problem, stated simply, is to reduce if possible all ideas of relation, i.e. cause and effect, substance and attribute, and identity -- to simple feeling; or if that is impossible, to a tendency to suppose we have ideas which we really do not have. The process which transforms sense data into ideas of relation is according to Green, Hume's doctrine of the association of ideas. "The vital nerve of Hume's philosophy," it is

1. Green, p. 132.
2. It is curious that the philosopher so often quoted in the works of the logical analysts is himself accused of the misleading use of language by an idealist.
3. Green, p. 132.
... a sort of process of spontaneous generation by which impressions of sensation issue in such impressions of reflection as will account not indeed for there being -- for there really are not -- but for there seeming to be these formal conceptions which Locke, to the embarrassment of his philosophy, had treated at once as real and creations of the mind. 1

At this point we can see the major assumptions, aside from his own characteristic philosophical position, which determine Green's view of Hume's philosophy. (1) It is a direct continuation of the philosophy of Locke and is influenced to no significant extent by any other philosopher. (2) Hume is basically dishonest in his philosophic approach, seeking only a position from which he could jeer at the traditional philosophers and theologians. In this respect he is pictured by Green as being driven from one damaging admission to another, but always having a facile explanation to extricate himself from every difficulty. (3) Hume, as were his immediate predecessors, is a subjective idealist, a philosophic position typical of his period. And (4) the doctrine of association is not merely a description of the observable ways in which ideas are associated but a process of spontaneous generation. After accepting these assumptions, the constant and consistent method of criticism is to throw Hume back on what Green considers to be his first principles. Each time Hume admits any formal conception to consciousness, Green asks from what impression of sensation it stems. How

1. Green, p. 164.
can we be conscious of that which endures in consciousness if indeed all our perceptions are momentary and remain with us only as decayed perceptions? In this way Green shows that a theory which explains thought by means of conceptions happening in a sequence of psychical events, always owes any semblance of its success to the fact that, by interpreting the earlier consciousness in terms of the later, it substitutes the latter for the former. That he demonstrates the futility of this type of theory cannot be denied, but that Hume's philosophy was of this type has been very much in dispute.

Green, who notes that aside from Locke, Berkeley is the only other influence on Hume's theory of knowledge, in this connection also observes that Berkeley's motive for elaborating Locke's philosophy was to rid it of its materialistic basis. He succeeded but cut the ground from under his own spiritualism in the process. This is for Green a classic example of the use of logical reasoning based on false premises resulting in fiasco for the user. Berkeley removed materialism by reducing "simple ideas to their simplicity ... showing the illegitimacy of the assumption that they report qualities of matter which is itself a complex idea." The implications of this position according to Green, are Berkeley's principle contribution to Hume's philosophy. Hume sets aside assumptions about spirit which Berkeley himself implicitly

1. Green, p. 133.
disproved.

We shall not consider in detail Green's specific criticism of Book I. It is mainly verbal in form, taking advantage of Hume's loose terminology and thus obscures the import of his arguments. While it may be valuable to conduct a detailed examination of sentences taken from their context, one instance is sufficient to demonstrate the point in question. Repetition of this type of argument fails to damn further Hume's philosophical work, and in the end reflects on the criticism itself. The real value of Green's treatment lies in its reflection of the positive idealist answers to the problems which Hume raised. That there is a great deal of value in the Oxford refutation of empiricism can not be ignored, but its application in this case exhibits the arrogance and narrow mindedness that has been the basis of more than one reaction.

Green assumes much the same position in his criticism of Books II and III of the Treatise as that from which he considered Book I. The position here is much less suitable for his purpose than it was in the consideration of the theory of knowledge. Green treats early and mid-eighteenth century moral philosophy as being dominated by Locke almost as much as were other philosophical fields of the period. Locke's domination, in this case, is more difficult to establish than it was in the former instance. Primarily, Locke devotes only parts of two chapters to moral theory and these portions have
commonly been regarded as the weakest and most inconclusive aspects of his philosophy. Nonetheless, Green devotes considerable space to extracting a view from Locke's treatment of morals which corresponds or is directly comparable to the general position he found in Locke's theory of knowledge. His correlative view extracted from Locke by Green, begins by stating that all desire is for pleasure and that the strongest desire, in every case, determines our action. Since, however, the only measure for the strength of desire is its effect on our actions, this definition is circular. The real problem as Green sees it, lies in Locke's faulty analysis of the nature of desire. He points out that it is possible to divide desires into two classes, first, those bodily appetites we have in common with the beasts and which, if any desires can, influence us as remembered pleasure. Second, those other desires which distinguish us as human beings and are determined only through reference to the self. The question arises whether Locke can, on the basis of his theory of knowledge, recognize this second type of desire? The answer, says Green, is no. The combination of simple feeling, if this were possible and even if it could account for the first type of desire, could never account for self consciousness, and so for this second class of desire. This fault, says Green, provides no obstacle for Locke, since in this field as in the theory of knowledge he exhibits the logical unscrupulousness which is one of the central aspects of his philosophy.
Just as he is ready on occasion to treat any conceived object that determines sense as if it were itself a sensation so is he ready to treat any object that determines desire, without reference to the work of thought in its construction, as if it were itself the feeling of pleasure or of uneasiness removed, which arises on the satisfaction of the desire.  

This confusion between desire as remembered pleasure and desire as the object of self-consciousness is disguised by the equivocation of both under the name of happiness in general. Green shows this term to be as lacking in objective content in Locke's philosophy as it was in the philosophy of Green's contemporaries, the utilitarians. This term, considering the theoretical basis upon which Locke's theory rested, could be given no objective content. Locke's further elaborations of his moral theory are, according to Green, merely assumptions; they describe the laws of the state and the laws of God to some extent, but fail to touch on the problem of their derivation or the obligation which is the basis of their authority. Hume accepts none of these latter assumptions.

Hume's relation to Locke's moral philosophy is that, as always with Locke's philosophy, he sees its inherent contradictions and strives to resolve them. His specific problem in this case, is to account for all the moral objects which appear to be other than appetite proper, or remembered pleasure.

Apart from the sparseness of Locke's writings on

1. Green, p. 308.
morals and their lack of logical cohesion, Green is faced with two further difficulties: to establish Locke as the dominant figure in moral philosophy at this period, and to affiliate Hume directly with Locke. The latter problem of affiliation is complicated by logical as well as chronological problems not encountered in the theory of knowledge. In that case, aside from Berkeley whose contribution is regarded by Green as of a largely negative character, Hume's philosophy is chronologically consequent to that of Locke. The corresponding period in moral philosophy had seen no such lapse in activity, however. In fact, by far the greater portion of philosophy written between the publication of Locke's *Essay* and Hume's *Treatise* had been of a moral nature. This is not to suggest that by mere volume the philosophy of Locke had been superseded, but Green's task is to show that this activity not only proceeded on Lockian lines, but also that it represents no significant advance from the Lockian position.

The general situation in moral philosophy, at the time Hume wrote the *Treatise* is represented by Green as being disputed between the doctrines of Hobbes on the one hand, and those of Shaftesbury on the other. A third, but less important group was represented by Clarke and his followers. The two major factions, (and we will confine our discussion, as does Green, to these two), were on all fours in respect to the theory of knowledge. Reason was conceived by each as a faculty which combined simple ideas into more complex ones,
and so, there being no method of deriving self-consciousness from such a system, they could admit only remembered pleasure as constituting desire. Hobbes's system, however, had the relative consistency of an explicit reduction to appetite proper of all those motives which Locke later took for granted. In the course of this reduction, however, he overstated his case and misdescribed a large class of desires, in fact, all those which distinguish us, in Green's eyes, as human beings. Shaftesbury, on the other hand, attacks Hobbes at the point of the over-extension of his theory, and also contradicts Locke's equivocation in identifying the good with pleasure and the morally good with pleasure of a certain kind. Shaftesbury asserts that the moral character of an act is not derived from the pleasure it affords, but rather from the nature of the affection whence the act proceeds. The nature of this affection in turn is not derived from the pleasure it affords but from its relation to the "public system" or, which is the same, to society in general. The "public system" and the "private system," or the good of the individual, are placed in opposition. Actions which tend toward the good of the public system, or rather done with the good of the public system in view, are moral; and those done with the good of the private system in view are immoral. At least this is the distinction which must be maintained, according to Green, if there is to be any valid distinction whatever. Shaftesbury, however, does not find these classes of actions mutually
exclusive, and Green says the remainder of his philosophy is a confusion of unanalyzed concepts, having at their roots the faulty epistemology of Locke. The success of Shaftesbury's philosophy in ethics is similar to that of Berkeley's epistemology. Its negative aspects stand while the failure to be thorough in application undermines the possibility of any positive conclusion.

Green then turns to Butler and Hutcheson, whom he says do not advance beyond Locke in epistemology nor beyond Shaftesbury in morals. His main point here is that, on the basis of Lockian epistemological doctrine, there can be no altruism. For these philosophers, altruism, or whatever it is named, is merely a synonym for pleasure of a particular sort; and so desire, in a Lockian system which excludes the possibility of self-consciousness, is by nature egoistic. Hence, although these philosophers demonstrate that all desire is in a sense disinterested, i.e. terminates in its object, this fails to exclude the view that their motivation is remembered pleasure.

Thus, on the eve of the publication of the Treatise, two questions were in violent dispute: what is the source of

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1. It is difficult to see how Green arrives at this position. If these philosophers have excluded the possibility of self-consciousness, how does even remembered pleasure constitute the ground of motivation? How in fact can this desire be by nature anything at all? Surely egoistic desire implies the existence of an ego. As in the first introduction much of the criticism seems to be ad hoc.
our moral judgements and the motivation of moral actions, and in what manner are the laws of the state and society which govern us derived? Two principle theories were advocated, but each has serious flaws. The selfish or Hobbesian view has the merit of internal consistency, but misdescribes human actions. The second theory successfully criticizes the deficiencies of the first, but the philosophies of Butler, Hutcheson, and Shaftesbury become chaotic in their positive aspects. It is difficult to determine from Green the exact position of Locke in relation to the broad picture. In some sense his views are derived from Hobbes and yet they also contribute to the basis of the theories of Butler, Hutcheson and Shaftesbury.

Initially there are two criticisms of Green's account of moral philosophy between Locke and Hume which may help to clarify some of the difficulties later philosophers have encountered concerning his treatment of Hume's philosophy. One of the questions that arises is the relation of the philosophy of Hobbes to that of Locke. Green only mentions this problem to say that their ethical doctrines are very similar. Surveying the moral philosophy of the period, both hedonistic and non-hedonistic, we find it to be almost a continuous polemic against Hobbes and his follower Mandeville. Very seldom, however, does one find any mention of Locke, since his only prominent connection was with Clarke and his mathematical philosophy. Clarke's philosophy, which was
derived from almost a chance remark of Locke's is dismissed by Green as having no practical application in morals. Considering the amount of controversy raging during this period we find Locke's position in moral philosophy, both in his own writings and in those references of his contemporaries, to be very indistinct. In relation to Green's account of early eighteenth century moral philosophy there are two conclusions. (1) Green has over-emphasized the importance of Locke, or (2) these eighteenth century moralists failed to recognize the essence of their predicament which Locke represented, and they considered, fallaciously, that the issues had already been defined by Hobbes. The former conclusion seems more likely. Green's interests lie in the direct linkage of Hume to Locke so as to complete an analogical position for which he has laid the foundation in epistemology, rather than in giving a description of a very complex period. He is also more concerned with showing the sad state of the early eighteenth century position than in explaining its derivation and its laudable aspects. In this sense, Green's representation of the period immediately previous to the publication of the Treatise is an abstraction. This may, to some extent, be the factor which leads him to interpret Hume's moral philosophy in such a way that the charge of misinterpretation was leveled from many quarters.

1. An estimation with which both Hume and Hutcheson agree.
Another comment which will be of greater importance as our study proceeds, concerns Green's remarks on Hutcheson. Green uses as reference the posthumous work published ten years after Hutcheson's death in 1747, which he says is merely a more systematic restatement of the material to be found in Hutcheson's earlier works. This view has been questioned by W.R. Scott in his biography of Hutcheson where he calls it a "confused work." Scott's view has been supported by the fact that later studies dealing with Hutcheson and the period have tended to ignore the posthumous work altogether. Hutcheson's influence on Hume is noted by Green in a footnote, but he fails to specify in any way what this influence was. We can only conclude that Green considered it of very minor importance.

As in Introduction I, we find Green committed to several general positions before his account of Hume's moral theory begins. (1) Locke represents the definitive as well as the typical moralist of this period. (2) The altruism of Butler and Hutcheson is Locke's problem of motivation, other than remembered pleasure, re-stated in a manner which is no advance on Locke's own statement of it. (3) Hume's moral philosophy is, like his epistemology, the logical consequence of Locke's and his method is to set about the resolution of contradictions found in that philosophy.

Internal criticism of Book II rests on two points; that it is not consistent with Book I, and that Hume does not consistently maintain the thesis which he adopts. The first criticism concerns Hume's use of the word "object" in relation to the direct passions, and the assumption that Hume seems to make in Book II of the existence of a continuant self. In neither instance does Hume have the theoretical right to speak in this fashion. The subject, or in this case the passion—object relationship is only possible for a conscious being; or in Green's terms, it could only be the product of reason. Thus in assuming the subject—object relationship in this primary instance of impressions of reflection, he lays the basis for that second class of impressions of reflections by which he must account for morality, and gives thought a role of which he had deprived it in the preceding Book. This second class of impressions of reflection from which Hume must "account for morality," are the indirect passions whose appearance he attempts to explain through his complicated and carefully worked out theory of the double association of impressions and ideas. This theory as described by Green, is the way in which

... a special sort of pleasure excited by another special sort of pleasure, and the distinction of the two sorts from each other depends on the character which each derives from an idea -- one from the idea of the self, the other from the idea of 'some quality in a subject.'

which is unspecified except that it is also capable of association with the self. This theory, as stated, is criticized on two grounds: Due to the sensational nature of Hume's theory of experience, the passions which he tries to "account for" with this method cannot be characterized by any of the distinctions drawn in the theory. They remain distinguished as only special kinds of pleasure and pain, and "special" in no separate or distinct way. Secondly, the "subterfuges" which Hume offers as characterizing the indirect passions are in the one case naive, and in the other plain assumption. The indirect passions derive their special nature from two sources, their natural constitution and their relation to the idea of the self. Green calls the first of these sources a crude physiological analogy, and the second he criticizes on the ground that Hume had no theoretical right to suppose we could experience any such idea. This raises the whole question of Hume's treatment of the self in Books II and III, and the seeming reversal of the sceptical position for which he is so famous in Book I. Green's explanation of Hume's procedure in this case is to attribute it to a bald and inconsistent attempt to give characterization to the indirect passions. It is extremely easy, after the method Hume himself has provided in Book I. As for the organic analogy, both Hume and Locke have been shown by Green to accept this as the solution to any problem which arises.

This has illustrated the criticism of inconsistency
which Green brings to bear on Book II of the Treatise. The other main objection he advances is that although Hume, as he must, excludes all motives which imply any other basis than pleasure and pain, he almost immediately breaks this rule and admits the excluded kind of motive. Hume does this explicitly in two different sections of Book II. Green says that these "aberrations" on Hume's part, which, incidentally, are fatal to the larger theory as a whole, are a result of a squeamishness on his part to equate the moral passions with those of "avarice or ambition." This identification "... might have revolted even the 'common sense' of the eighteenth century." In other words, any reference to this kind of motive is foreign to Hume's theory, and can only be accounted for by inconsistency or personal dishonesty.

This is the essence of Green's criticism of the moral sections of the Treatise, for he considers that in Book II Hume formulates the doctrines upon which Book III rests.

It is the assumption of pleasures determined by objects only possible for reason, made in the Treatise on the passions that prepare the way for the rejection of reason, as supplying either moral motives or moral standard, made in the Treatise on morals.

What does supply the moral motive and moral standard in Book III of the Treatise? If the moral motive can only be pleasure, how is moral good differentiated from any other sort of

1. Green, p. 347.
2. Green, p. 332.
pleasure? Green answers for Hume by saying that it can only be pleasure excited in a particular way, that it consists in the "satisfaction produced to the spectator of an act or character by the mere view of it"; or again, in the words of Locke as quoted by Green, "the usual likes and dislikes of society." As for the question of the obligation of moral law, Green believes Hume can only answer it in one way ...

"[One obeys] it to avoid either a legal penalty or that pain of shame which would arise upon the communication through sympathy as a contrary act would excite on others on the survey." We see what the nature of the laws of the state and of society must be; the laws of God, not being reconcilable to the pleasure principle, are simply discarded. Moral law must be artificial, in what sense Green cannot determine, but "the expression of [the theory] bears the marks of descent from Hobbes," so it is in this sense that we must take it. Thus, as a final measure of contradiction in his philosophy, we find Hume supporting in general the moral theory of which he had been so explicit in his criticism.

As he believes that a criticism of Book II is per se a criticism of Book III, Green does not go into detail in his consideration of Book III. With this extenuating circumstance he continues a tradition already a hundred and fifty years old.

1. Green, p. 366.
2. Green, p. 364.
The first sign of reaction (in English) to this interpretation came in 1903 with the appearance of an article in the Philosophical Review by E.B. McGilvary. The article "Altruism in Hume's Treatise," is of very limited scope and applies only to Book II and certain sections of Book III of the Treatise. McGilvary contends that Hume's moral philosophy is misinterpreted by Green and Selby-Bigge to such an extent that its meaning is radically changed.

McGilvary's first point of difference is the definition of altruism and egoism. It is useless to discuss Hume's moral theory until some workable distinction is drawn. McGilvary suggests that the selfish or unselfish distinction be differentiated through the end of the action: "the result of the action so far as it is foreseen and desired by the agent." The question of desire, however, only enters into our investigation as a mechanism having no effect on the object itself. In this respect too, McGilvary warns of another pitfall. The greater number of English philosophers who have used associational methods have used them to reduce apparently benevolent actions to egoistic motives. The mistake is to assume that association inevitably means that sort of reduction. The ultimate reference lies not in the association itself but in the object to which it leads. McGilvary held that Hume em-

1. McGilvary can see no reason why the moralist of this period should be prohibited from speaking of it.
ployed association "to explain certain altruistic emotions without explaining them away," against the prevailing opinion that in the Treatise all actions were represented as egoistic. This new position in fact does present primary difficulties because, as we have seen, both Green and Selby-Bigge quote passages which seem to uphold their position explicitly. They also maintain that in those passages where Hume seems to have the view that there are altruistic passions, he is deviating from the true intent and logical development of his theory. McGilvary's position is roughly the opposite. The true meaning and intent of the Treatise are represented by his altruistic statements while the seemingly conflicting data is held to be non-contextual quotation on the part of Selby-Bigge and Green, or 'careless obiter dicta' on the part of Hume. In support of this view he proposes first to examine the general drift of Hume's psychology, and then the passages in which he applies this psychology to love, sympathy and benevolence.

The conclusions of the first part of his examination are that Hume, in Book II, never tries to define the nature of a passion or reduce it to a lower term, but merely states the law of its occurrence; and that Hume recognizes, both early and late in Book II, the existence of passions not founded on pleasure and pain. In not attempting to define the nature of the passions but only their origin, Hume makes little

of the passions not founded on pleasure and pain in the same way that he makes little of the direct passions founded on pleasure and pain. Of passions which arise instinctively nothing much can be said, and as Hume does not consider that they can be accounted for by his theory of association, he merely mentions their existence. Since he considers that the origins of pride and humility, love and hate, can be explained by this theory, the greater part of Book II is taken up in the application and amplification of the theory in this respect. The mistake is to assume that the amount of time and energy expended on a passion is the criterion of its importance. This is illustrated in the course of Book III where, when Hume assesses the relative importance of the various passions in life, benevolence assumes the major role while pride is of minor importance. Also, in this connection it is profitable to examine what Hume meant by "passions founded on pleasure and pain." McGilvary asserts that Hume did not mean remembered pleasure but meant present pleasure. Hume's doctrine in this respect was that "pleasure functions dynamically not teleologically." It is not all remembered pleasure which can move to action, in fact it is only that which is enlivened by belief to the extent that it approximates present pleasure which can move to action. Thus, remembered pleasure, far from being the only possible rational end in Hume's doctrine, acts,

rather, as an instigation.

McGilvary finds only one possible conclusion in his examination of Hume's application of association to specific passions. As the application concerns only the mechanism or place in sequence in which they appear, it can have no implications as to the object of these passions. These objects, for Hume, are given to the passions naturally, except in the case of sympathy. Thus when McGilvary examines the doctrine of the double association of ideas and impressions, where applied to love or pity, he finds that it only works in virtue of these passions being originally altruistic in nature. It is the original characteristics of love that enables its relations to be shown through association,

... and one of these original characteristics is the fact that love 'is always directed to some sensible being external to us' ... the original and invariable altruism of love is presupposed by Hume's associational explanation. 1

The mistake often made, McGilvary states, is that Hume's explanation in Book I concerning the ideas of the understanding which do not seem to correspond to any previously experienced sensation, is sometimes misunderstood. In the case of secondary or reflective impressions (nothing can be said of sensation itself) certain relations obtain between them and the sensations which precede them. If these relations can be found to be always present in certain cases, and this is the view

which is held in Book I, then "they can be accepted ... as explanations for the appearance of the reflective impressions in these cases." Hence Hume shows no interest in the direct passions not founded on pleasure and pain and very little interest in the direct passions as a whole, as they are in a sense immediate and no ascertainable relations proceed them. Again McGilvary emphasized that, in respect to the indirect passions, it is the sequence of their appearance which interests Hume, not their ultimate nature.

This article by McGilvary is a new appreciation and reorientation of Book II of the Treatise. Hume, it is claimed, is not forced by psychological or epistemological presuppositions to exclude all motives except those of remembered pleasure from his moral theory. The seemingly contradictory statements of Book II are resolved into a coherent system, having as their theme a new doctrine of association. How does this new interpretation affect the attempt to consider Hume's philosophy as a whole? As we have seen, the only significant attempt found the conclusions of his epistemology to be a complete scepticism. Green found Hume, as it were, "floundering in the wastes of subjective idealism", and as a result represented the moral philosophy of Hume as differing in no significant way from that of Hobbes. Hence, if the article by McGilvary represents a tenable position it throws some

doubt not only on Green’s interpretation of Books II and III but also on his treatment of Book I.

The appearance of a view was soon forthcoming which followed and enlarged the inferences found in McGilvary’s article. In “Mind” during 1905 was published the most important and influential study of Hume’s philosophy to appear until 1941. It is not too much to say that the influence of this new interpretation can be seen in almost all the technical work done on that philosophy during the next thirty-six years. The article, printed in two sections, was “The Naturalism of Hume” by Norman Kemp Smith. In this article Kemp Smith makes no attempt to trace the influences on Hume but tries to determine the central theme of his philosophy. The attempt is motivated by a dissatisfaction with the Green and Selby-Bigge representation of it as a system of complete scepticism. Kemp Smith’s opposing position is that Green, in ignoring the positive aspects of Hume’s philosophy, has missed a great deal of the point, if not what is characteristic of that philosophy.

Kemp Smith contends that Hume’s philosophy is based on a new and revolutionary concept of knowledge not found in the philosophy of his predecessors. The new conception of knowledge is that reason is purely practical in its application and ultimately rests on theoretically unjustifiable

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1. The conception is in many ways analogous to the views held by Kant.
tendencies or instincts of human nature. "The function of knowledge is not to supply a metaphysic but only to afford us guidance in practical life." Thus Hume denies neither the existence of the external world nor the necessity of the relation of cause and effect, but recognizes them as natural beliefs, or "the outcome of ultimate propensities which constitute our human nature." They can be shown to be "as wonderfully adapted to the calls things make upon us as any of the animal instincts," but our mistake is to regard them as the "conclusions of supposed inferences, [as then] they will be found to rest on a mass of contradictions and of theoretically unjustifiable assumptions." Thus Hume's philosophy rests not on the assumption that everything can be explained, as Green maintained, but rather on a conviction that the great measure of human experience is for us ultimate, and cannot be explained. His treatment of experience is not a development of the philosophy of Berkeley and Locke showing the inability of their principles to account for experience. For the greater part it is a criticism of their philosophy, which he believed was bound to fail because of their view of reason. The positive aspect of Hume's philosophy, and it is this aspect which constitutes its unity and continuity, is "the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature by the

2. Kemp Smith, p. 155.
thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct."
The natural beliefs are analogous to our moral and aesthetic judgments in that they cannot be rationally justified, and although this is true, they can be shown to be "natural, inevitable, and indispensable" in practical life.

Kemp Smith proposes to support his assessment of Hume's central position by an examination of main arguments in the Treatise and the Enquiries. The sensationalist basis of Hume's philosophy, its second most definitive doctrine, must not, however, be overlooked. It has hitherto received a disproportionate amount of notice. And in beginning an examination of Hume's philosophy one must also remember the two functional meanings he attaches to the term reason. The first is that of demonstrative reason, or all those forms of knowledge which have their basis in the law of non-contradiction. According to Hume, analytic reason can be differentiated from synthetic reason in that the former concerns only relations between ideas. Kemp Smith agrees with Green that this is one of the greatest defects of Hume's philosophy, as it is impossible to make a strict dichotomy between the two. The same problems are involved in our consciousness of each. This is a factor which Hume virtually admits in his later discussions of the philosophic and natural relations. The second meaning of "reason" in Hume's philosophy is that of synthetic reason, which assumes

1. Kemp Smith, p. 150.
such an importance at times that he writes as if it were the only type of reason we possess. It is "nothing but a wonderful and intelligible instinct of the soul" or in other words, when we seek by means of inference to extend our knowledge of real existence we make use of certain non-rational principles which can only be explained as blind instinctive propensities of the human soul. 1

Reason, rather than being placed above these instinctive propensities which it uses in its activities, is their equal or supplement. Not the test of the natural beliefs, it works in conjunction with them, and although it justifies itself in its practical uses it can furnish no standard to which objective reality must conform. These are limiting restrictions which fail to define reason in its positive sense, and we find no real definition in this respect until the moral sections of the Treatise are reached.

In Book I, however, Hume did not assert the non-existence of rational necessity, but, rather, by postulating it "in a form [for] which he could not really account he seeks to show that owing to the constitution of our experience it cannot be attained in any of our knowledge of matter of fact." 2 He points out that although a number of fundamental assumptions play indispensable roles in our practical life, they cannot be demonstrated or otherwise theoretically justified. Thus the vulgar, if any explanation is demanded of them,

2. Kemp Smith, p. 158.
maintain through dogmatism the permanent existence of objects, even though these objects are apprehended at different times and places, having only resemblance as their connecting relation. The other error into which we fall is the assertion of a necessary relationship between cause and effect, when analytically all that can be demonstrated is mere succession in time. Why, asks Hume, do we assert such obvious contradictions? His answer, as Kemp Smith shows, is "blind powerful instinct," and the greater part of Book I is taken up with the demonstration of the futility of other explanations.

Hume's associational explanation of our error in ascribing permanent existence to either the self or external objects (they both rest on the same natural belief) is that gradual change leaves a feeling of sameness in the mind. It is, furthermore, an instinct of the mind to spread itself over external objects and ascribe to them any feeling which they occasion. Thus, the feeling of sameness or identity is annexed to perceived objects or, in the case of the self, to that "bundle of impressions of which we have an intimate impression." The explanation for the other natural belief, the belief in the necessity of causal connection, is already partially familiar. The interesting aspect at this point is the role played by feeling in the explanation. We make another assumption in addition to the feeling of necessity which is the basis of the belief. In all specific cases of causal inference we assume that the future will resemble the past.
Neither the feeling nor the assumption, says Hume, can be justified by any appeal to experience, as that type of proof would in this case merely assume the principles which we are attempting to prove. Since it cannot be demonstrated in this manner, the only other alternative for Hume is to attribute the feeling and the assumption to "the outcome of some unreasoning propensity." The propensity is habit or custom. Kemp Smith makes it clear, as McGilvary had insisted in Hume's theory of double association, that in grounding the assumption in custom or habit Hume does not pretend to give the ultimate reason for such a propensity, but merely indicates it as an observable principle of human nature. Furthermore, Hume says it would be sufficient if the investigation were stopped at this point, taking custom as one of the propensities conditioning belief. It is possible to carry the investigation one step farther. In the case of our certainty about particular instances of causal inference (for example, fire and heat) we could without logical contradiction imagine that cold instead of heat would be the result of fire. The contradiction arises in the way we conceive or "feel" the two inferences, and Hume's explanation of this is as follows: An impression such as fire, or for that matter any impression, is always attended by the greatest degree of belief. As it is an instinct of the mind to "spread itself over" external objects and ascribe to them any feeling which they occasion, the idea of heat, which arises through custom, follows naturally the
impression of fire; and some of the belief which the impression of fire occasions is ascribed, through instinct, to the idea of heat. An explanation in this abbreviated form may seem crude, but the philosophical position to which it leads is important. Inference, instead of being based upon and presupposing the relation of cause and effect, is one with it. "It is nothing but the custom-bred transition from an impression to an enlivened idea." Thus belief, not resting on insight or not depending for its validity on rational activity, is removed from the danger of being disproved by our sceptical doubts. Hume's general position is that nature does not leave these conceptions, which are so indispensable to the conduct of our every day lives, to as weak and variable a faculty as human reason.

It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible in its operation, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought ... and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. 2

This gives some idea of the way in which Hume accounts for the causes which make the doctrine fall into these two contradictions. This is not, however, the end of our trouble with the natural beliefs. Although they are inevitable, (only at very specific times can we free ourselves from them and doubt them) they themselves lead us into contradiction.

It is here also that we find a statement of Hume's second meaning of the term "reason." It is obvious that if we affirm the supposition of the existence of the external world we contradict all the consequences of our belief in the necessary causal connection and this, Hume thinks, forms the basis for the conflict so prevalent in Cartesian philosophy between reason and instinct. Reason is not opposed to or separate from our natural beliefs and it is because we must follow these beliefs that the seeming conflict arises. Reason in the second sense, or the "understanding", is "the imagination acting according to its most general and established habits or instincts." Reason is generalized natural belief. However, says Kemp Smith, although...

Hume in describing the understanding as nothing but the imagination acting according to its most general and established habits, certainly means to emphasize that it is in essence instinctive and contains no objective standard to which reality must conform, he must not be taken as implying that it is therefore identical with imagination in the ordinary sense, and is a source of arbitrary fictions. The imagination [according to Hume] constitutes the deepest trait in our human nature, and fulfills the same function as Kant's faculty of understanding: it creates the order of nature out of the detached impressions of sense. 2

The natural beliefs cause us to fall into error in two ways. When generalized they contradict each other and the conception of cause, being instinctive, is unlimited in its pretentions and leads us to demand a sufficient cause for all

1. Kemp Smith, p. 166.
things in spite of the fact that we have no idea of what a sufficient cause would be. In seeking a sufficient cause for all things reason must justify its own demands, and since natural beliefs rest on blind instinct this justification can never be attained. "The demand for a sufficient cause is itself insufficiently caused and in thus insisting on itself it finally brings to light its purely practical function and its non-rational basis."

This illustrates the basis of Hume's criticism of the metaphysics of Berkeley and Locke. In the case substance these philosophers, when they observe the contradictions found in our conceptions of the self and the external world, seek to justify them rationally and rid them of their contradictions by the construction of the fiction of substance. This "philosophical theory" is not supported by evidence, as a hypothetical theory must be, for a practical theory does not require that sort of justification. The ultimate function of the "philosophical theory" is to disguise the problems apparent in the generalization of these two conceptions by popular or "vulgar" theories, and the problems found there only crop out in a more insidious form later. Hume's criticism of both Locke and Berkeley demonstrates this, and the conclusion is that no practical purpose has been achieved.

By this means [the feigning of occult substances] these philosophers set themselves at ease and arrive at

last, by illusion, at the same indifference which the
people attain by their stupidity and true philosophers
by their moderate scepticism. 1

Here we have the two sides of Hume's rejection of
the metaphysics of Locke and Berkeley. On the one hand they
are shown to be of no practical value in solving the problems
raised by experience and on the other they are shown to be as
irrational as the beliefs they are meant to supplement. What
are the conclusions at which Hume arrives concerning meta-
physical speculation in general? The answer Kemp Smith gives
is that these conclusions differ in various aspects of his
philosophy, and the most sceptical ones are found in the first
section of Book I of the Treatise. Reason can only be employ-
ed in practical life, or in the ordinary course of experienced
events. "Nothing else can be appealed to in the field or in
the senate ... the more sublime topics are to be left to the
embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests
and politicians." 2 Philosophers will never be tempted to go
beyond common life once they have well in view the narrowness
and inaccuracy of the means they employ in their speculations.
This is really a much more sceptical position than his philos-
ophy demands and also a much more sceptical position than Hume
takes in the rest of his philosophical work. By showing that
synthetic reason is on a level with or analogous to natural
belief, Hume has also shown synthetic reason to be necessary

and indispensable in the same way as the natural beliefs. If we reject natural belief in favour of reason, we are merely rejecting a belief in the independent existence of our impressions for a belief in their causal interdependence. Yet to reject all application of the principles of synthetic reason beyond the experienced train of events is also contradictory, as it is only reason that discovers the contradictions latent in our beliefs and it is only in this way that we can ascertain their true value. A more consistent conclusion, Kemp Smith says, and one he finds substantiated in Hume's moral philosophy, is that

... though reason cannot take the place of natural belief, still less overthrow it, its generalizing powers are yet necessary for its interpretation and control. Only through the use of our natural beliefs as universal synthetic principles can we discover their limited range and merely practical worth.  

Considering Green's characterization of Hume as a subjective idealist it now becomes more apparent that in Hume's use of the words 'illusion' and 'tendencies to feign' he was applying them only to popular or vulgar notions of identity and causation. His criticism of the philosophical theories is not on the ground of their falsity but on the grounds that they can never be demonstrated. In his opinion this is all that is needed to "turn the scales in favour of the natural beliefs." The attempt to systematize the natural beliefs inevitably leads to a sceptical disbelief in them, for

in the particular instances of their appearance they always remain theoretically false. Even in his own mind the doubt of their validity cannot be banished; and this is, for Hume, only an illustration of the inevitable confusion to which the questioning of these ultimate beliefs leads. It does not matter whether we reason "in opposition or conformity"; an hour's return to practical life will convince us that there is both an external and an internal world.

In his treatment of Hume's moral theory, which he finds to be a natural and logical extension of the principles found in the theory of knowledge, Kemp Smith says that reason (being the slave of the passions) is no less the rule. He also agrees explicitly with McGilvary's examination of the Treatise, and a large part of the article is occupied with restating the central conclusions of that work, i.e. that Hume recognized passions not founded on pleasure and pain, and that Green has misinterpreted the phrase, 'founded on pleasure and pain,' in that the object of desire is not pleasure. The central point Kemp Smith wishes to make is that, in the same way as the natural beliefs constitute the grounds of inference, reason in morals is dependent on the natural passions. In the first part of Hume's explanation of the passions, reason is almost excluded. It is concerning the passions, which Hume considers the foundations of human nature, that his familiar arguments against reason as the sufficient cause of action are developed. The passions being original modifications of
existence cannot be either instigated or retarded by reason. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as the conflict between reason and passion, as a passion can only be unreasonable when "it is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects which really do not exist," or when we chose means insufficient for the gratification of any passion. And in these cases the passion "at once yields to reason" as soon as the mistake is noted. We fall into the confusion of mistaking moral judgments for rational judgments because the preliminary processes in each are analogous. The difference arises, however, in the conclusion of the process. Although in moral judgments all the relations are collected and presented to the mind as they are in judgments of the understanding, the mind reaches no new inferential conclusion from the survey of the various relations, but annexes the idea of blame or approbation to these relations. The mind colours the situation with its own judgments and these judgments, not being grounded in reason, must be ascribed to ultimate propensities of our human nature.

Thus far Hume seems to have excluded reason from any part in the determination of the ends of moral action. It is in connection with the determination of the ends of the artificial virtues that reason assumes its role in moral judgments. Although the ultimate ends of human actions cannot be accounted for by reason there is a class of virtues whose immediate ends, because of the complexity of human society, cannot be
accounted for in any other way. The most important of these is justice, and justice is founded on utility or self-interest. Judgments concerning these two principles can only be the result of the action of reason. Yet, although the virtues rest on these principles, that is not the reason why they are specifically moral in character. The moral approval rests on the sympathetic affection whose object, the good of society, is naturally appealing. Here we have the key to Hume's attitude toward the function of reason in morals. "Through the instinctive activities of reason nature adapts the other instincts of man to the complex requirements of social existence." Thus Hume's theory of instinct and reason can be traced through his entire philosophy, and although his doctrine of subjective mental states is equally important, it is impossible to evaluate or criticize that philosophy until his complementary doctrines of natural belief are recognized.

These articles by Kemp Smith and McGilvary give insight into the direction which the main stream of study of Hume's philosophy takes in the following forty years. The next chapter will trace and summarize this work, concentrating on its legitimate culmination in Kemp Smith's comprehensive study first published in 1941.

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CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATION SINCE 1905

The forty years which followed Kemp Smith's and McGilvary's articles were a time of steady if not spectacular interest in the philosophy of Hume. Technical studies appeared with regularity and by far the greater number of these studies tended to support the interpretation originated at the turn of the century by Kemp Smith and McGilvary. Edna A. Shearer published a thesis in 1915 showing that Hume's moral sense was a central and integral part of his moral philosophy. Her main objective was to determine whether or not Hume could be described as a utilitarian in the sense that most commentators have attributed that philosophy to him. In showing that the doctrine of a moral sense played an important role in his moral theory, Shearer demonstrated Hume's affiliation with Hutcheson and correspondingly illustrated the differences between his moral philosophy and that of its supposed progeny, the utilitarians. In this study, too, the main interest is in the function of reason in morals, seemingly the key to Hume's philosophy.

In Mind, 1921, came F.C. Sharp's article "Hume's Ethical Theory and its Critics," which was again an attack on T.H. Green and other critics who had interpreted Hume's moral work as expressing some sort of egoistic hedonism. This article was especially designed for students of the history of
ethics and stated Hume's basic position on the central questions of ethics, previously obscured in faulty interpretation.

A work which has much in common with Kemp Smith's original articles, but does not go far beyond them, is C.W. Mendel's *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*. Mendel's main contributions lie within the technical processes by which he supports Kemp Smith's conclusions. Here he makes three notable advances: (1) he emphasizes the need for objective consideration of Hume's biography in the historical interpretation of his philosophy, (2) he recognizes that much which seems to be left out of the *Enquiries*, as compared to the *Treatise*, can be found in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. The *Treatise* can be treated as one expression of Hume's philosophy, and so also can the *Enquiries*, together with the *Dialogues*, be regarded as another more mature and considered expression of his views, and, (3) Mendel is the first of Hume's interpreters in English to consider the many German commentaries. The general effect of the *Studies* is to widen and deepen the context in which we view Hume's philosophy.

H. Miller emphasizes, in the *Philosophical Review* in 1929, the importance of the naturalistic foundations of Hume's philosophy, and also traces the influence of Newton on Hume. Miller maintains that Berkeley and Locke's influence account for the more obvious confusions in Hume's philosophy over the application of scientific or inductive method to subjects under the general classification of
mind. Locke in particular wishes to extend the empirical method to matters of mind, but on the other hand entertains a metaphysical foundation, the concept of substance, which can only be maintained on a dualist basis. Such influence can be seen, says Miller, by Hume's attempt to found a universal science. As it has been pointed out at the conclusion of Chapter II, this was a familiar phenomenon during the early eighteenth century, and although it was usually associated with rationalistic philosophers of the time, Locke and Hume are not free from it. For Hume, however, this idealistic epistemology is the camouflage for metaphysical naturalism which is pervasive in the whole thought of the man, and the basis of his constructive work. This metaphysical naturalism requires a further distinction in the application of the outlook and method of physics to human behaviour, and although Hume never clearly states the distinction it is illustrated by his work. The distinction is that the various scientific fields develop in their characteristic modes. Thus,

This metaphysics envisaged a world made up of independent substances and original powers engaged in real causal action. Among these substances and powers ... we must number the minds and faculties of men.  

Technical interest in Hume continues, and in 1930 there was published an examination of the backgrounds to Hume's empiricism by Mary S. Kypers. In 1932 two long studies by

2. Miller, p. 481.
John Laird and B.M. Laing appeared, but they seemed to add singularly little to the general picture. In 1935, an examination of the different types of scepticism to be found discussed in Hume's work isolated no less than six types and raised the question as to which kind of scepticism it was that Hume advocated. One of the last important contributions to specialized work in Hume's philosophy before 1941 came in 1937 with Constance Maund's detailed study of Book I of the Treatise. Maund considers Book I primarily as a work in epistemology, an examination of the relation of cognition and its objects. This view of Book I of the Treatise clears up a great many of the difficulties of interpretation which have plagued commentaries on it. An example is the misconception that Hume denied the possibility that abstract ideas are the objects of cognition. Viewed epistemologically it becomes evident that Hume was intent on denying that abstract ideas are abstract images. At times, however, Hume overstates his position and it appears that he does deny the possibility that abstract ideas are the objects of cognition. His position, correctly understood, is one of analysis, and in this way he is never concerned with the denial that we experience any idea which we believe we do. The analytical argument Hume presents simply denies that abstract ideas are of the kind which ordinary experience and philosophers suggest.

denial that abstract ideas can be known would be nonsense on Hume's basis, as so many philosophers have gone to such pains to point out. That Hume was as well aware of this as were his critics, becomes apparent in Maund's study. The preceding example has been noted to show that this important work supports and reinforces the tendency which we have been tracing in modern technical study of Hume's philosophy, and Maund says in the preface of her book,

... I must confess that in attempting to understand Hume I have come to disagree strongly with the view of his early critics, which is still widely current, that Hume has nothing of importance to contribute to philosophy and that his own claim to fame as a philosopher lies in the fact that he developed the false premises of his predecessors to their logical conclusion. 2

"The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy"; how different is the content which H.H. Price gives to this lecture from that which would have been given by his Oxford predecessor, T.H. Green. For Green it could only have been that Hume shows once and for all the futility of the empiricist approach to human knowledge. But Price says, sixty-five years later, "... Hume's contribution to Empiricist philosophy is worthy of careful and sympathetic study, and never more so than today." 3

In this lecture Price confines himself to the discussion of Hume's analysis of cause and effect and induction.

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His remarks form a valuable introduction to Kemp Smith's book on Hume which appeared the following year. Since much of Price's treatment, however, is similar to the work of Ramsey, Braithwaite, and Hobart to be discussed in Chapter V, we will not go into any detail now. It is interesting, nonetheless, to note the points Price emphasizes. He makes clear that Hume does not wish to deny the necessary connection between cause and effect. "In short, he [Hume] is not abolishing necessary connection, he is analysing it." In his analysis Hume tries to get at the nature of the "felt connection" between cause and effect. The term "felt connection" becomes very important for Kemp Smith, but, as we shall see, he calls it a form of "natural belief." Another interesting point, which will assume more importance in the light of Price's work to be discussed in Chapter VI, is his substitution of an expressive theory of causal language for what he terms Hume's "biological theory."

It is not Price's main purpose to modify Hume's theories, but rather to point out their importance in contemporary philosophy. He shows that it is not the negative implications of these theories which are so important but the positive implications, and in the case of induction and causation, "Hume ... has not said the last word... His work is,

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2. Price's theory of the external world will be discussed.
3. We discuss positivist modifications of Hume's theories in Chapters V and VI.
and will remain, the inevitable starting point for all further investigation of these subjects." This is the most sweeping and forceful expression of the new interpretation of Hume yet encountered.

The short resume above has not been meant to be a comprehensive survey, but has been designed to illustrate a general trend. The only consistent exceptions have been general or text book works on Hume which fail to give any indication of current dissatisfaction with traditional interpretation in general. On the technical level these studies fail to overturn the traditional viewpoint as a whole because of their desultory nature; their attacks on specific aspects, however, are carried home with great consistency and, in most cases, substantiate their opinions. Over the entire period, the original articles by Kemp Smith remain the most comprehensive. Although subsequent research covers inconsistencies not treated by him, there is no general systematized advancement of the view. What traditional interpretation loses by its logical inconsistencies, historical distortions, and downright petty personal implications, it regains through its unity and the inertia which attend established traditions. The obvious need in 1939 was for a work on Hume's philosophy which could gather together the strands of the previous forty years into a philosophical, historical and biographical unity.

2. Other important works are discussed in Chapters V, VI and VII.
Towards the end of the period there was a work nearing completion which seems to answer this need. In 1941 "The Philosophy of David Hume" by Kemp Smith was published. If accepted, this work and its conclusions, by a man who had already done so much in the development of the view we have traced, call for an almost complete reorientation of our view of Hume's philosophy. The new study of Hume not only deals adequately with research done during the previous forty years, but enlarges and transcends all previous study. Any subsequent study of Hume's philosophy which fails to take into account either affirmatively or negatively the theories herein expressed has no claim to comprehensiveness.

The new and revolutionary nature of this book is found at three levels. The first and in the long run most important level has already been illustrated in Kemp Smith's original article: it is impossible to evaluate the meaning and outcome of Hume's philosophy until its naturalistic foundations are taken into account. Kemp Smith's other theories are grouped around this theme in such a way that the rejection of any part of the complete theory is very difficult indeed. The second level is formed by the advancement of a theory concerning the influences on Hume's philosophy, and the third level by another theory concerning the actual composition of the Treatise itself. These three theories are never exclusive and the acceptance of each rests upon the acceptance of the total view. Historical data are presented to support all three
contentions. Only an outline of the work will be presented in the remainder of this chapter, but as it is undoubtedly the premier work in the field, it will be a fitting climax to our survey of the interpretation of Hume's philosophy, and will give us the proper perspective from which to view the positivist and analytical school's appeal to Hume.

Kemp Smith points out that critics have always represented Hume's philosophy as the extension of Locke's theory of ideas to its logical conclusion, having as a consequence the sceptical doctrines already examined. What they did not emphasize was that both Locke and Berkeley had supplements to the theory of ideas by means of which they accounted for experience not assimilated to that theory. Kemp Smith contends that Hume as well had a characteristic supplement to this theory, and that the point of much of the sceptical writing in his philosophy is to illustrate the necessity for his own particular supplement. No trace of this characteristic supplement is found in the philosophy of Berkeley and Locke, who up until now, have been recognized as the only significant influences on Hume. Kemp Smith turns to a logical source in his search for previous traces of the doctrines which he considers so central in Hume's philosophy. We have already noted that T.H. Green mentions the influence of Francis Hutcheson on Hume's moral philosophy, but fails to specify in any way what this influence was. Later Shearer, by her examination of the importance of the moral sense in Hume's philosophy,
makes this influence much more explicit. Kemp Smith now asserts that Hutcheson's influence is dominant not only in Hume's moral theory but in his theory of knowledge. In fact one of the keys to the understanding of all aspects of Hume's philosophy is the evaluation of this Hutcheson influence.

Historical evidence presented to support this section of the new view of Hume's philosophy is circumstantial. Hutcheson was the dominant figure in Scottish philosophy during what we can consider to be Hume's most formative years, and his two most influential works were published just before or during the period that Hume was working on the Treatise. It was to Hutcheson that Hume turned for advice on the composition and publication of the Treatise, and it was the lack of Hutcheson's support in the competition for the chair of philosophy in Edinburgh University that disillusioned Hume the most. Probably of greatest importance is the fact that the tone of Hume's works as a whole is moral. The writers he cites at the beginning of the Treatise are predominately those interested in moral theory, and later in life, when evaluating his literary work, he named The Enquiry on Morals as indisputably the best. Kemp Smith sums up the evidence by saying that "Hume entered philosophy through the gateway of morals" and that we find here the key to a wider interpretation of his philosophy.
Hutcheson cannot be truthfully called a Scot although he is listed in most histories as founding the school of Scottish philosophy. Although he achieved a great deal of popularity in the years following the appearance of his two important works he has been, with justice, regarded as a figure of minor importance in eighteenth century philosophy. His characteristic position has been obscured, however, by the immediate proximity on the one hand of the early eighteenth century giants, Locke and Shaftesbury, and on the other, by Hume. In that his work was avowedly a defence of the principles of Shaftesbury constructed on the system of Locke, he has generally been dismissed, as by Green, as having altered neither in any very significant way. It has also been noted, as by Green, that Hutcheson was of some influence on Hume. It is obvious that Hume in many instances adopts the terminology used by Hutcheson. In spite of this, the Christian benevolence


Francis Hutcheson, 1694-1747, was the son of an Irish dissenting minister, attended the University of Glasgow and became an ordained minister, but soon went to Dublin where he founded a school for the children of dissenters living there. It was in Dublin where he published his first work and soon after this he was offered the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He came to Glasgow in 1727 and remained there until his death. Only in one case does the work published while at Glasgow compare with his earlier production, and that is his "Essay on the Nature and Conduct of Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense." Other than these two works he produced no original writing except that designed for text-book use in his classes, and the work we have already noted, published after his death.
and deeply religious work of Hutcheson has been considered to
have been related almost by accident to the sceptical conclud-
sions of Hume. Kemp Smith, having for long insisted on the
primacy of naturalism in Hume's philosophy, and now advancing
the theory that Hume was in essence a moral philosopher, turns
naturally to Hutcheson for the answers to the problems of
derivation found in that philosophy.

Hutcheson does not assume importance only in his re-
statement of Shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense, although
it is only through him that this theory is lent any of the
dignity of a system. It is in Hutcheson's modifications of
Locke's theory of ideas that his greatest resemblance to and
importance for Hume's philosophy lies. This modification is
the clear recognition of impressions of reflection, those im-
pressions which are not the copies of impressions but arise
from the mind itself antecedent to impressions. The most
obvious examples of this type of impression are those of sweet-
ness or bitterness. It is Hutcheson's contention that all
aesthetic and moral judgments are included in this category,
for we are determined in our judgments of good and evil and
aesthetic beauty or deformity, by the "original frame of our
nature." The good is known in three general classes: natural
good, moral good, and aesthetic good. These are the same in
that they are involuntary, painful and pleasurable, and that
pleasure and pain are not determined by the will. Judgments
of this type are "disinterested" in that they are determined
for us and cannot be altered to suit selfish interest. Further likenesses are that they are, for us, certain and necessary, and they lack any sort of rational justification. Two points which follow from this are that moral judgments are in the last analysis non-cognitive, and disinterested. The former doctrine might be said in a sense to derive from Locke and the latter from Shaftesbury. Hutcheson proceeds from these to formulate his doctrines of the use of reason in the formulation of moral judgments. Two types of reasons can be given concerning moral acts. The first, exciting reasons, are our reasons for doing any act considered morally; and the second, justifying reasons, those which comprise our reasons for giving moral approval to any act. Exciting reasons presuppose certain instincts and affectations, and in the same way, justifying reasons presuppose the moral sense itself. These instincts and the moral sense can in some ways be modified by education and other influences; they can also become diseased or be lacking to an extent in certain individuals. Any moral education, however, presupposes their existence.

The general position and central theme of all Hutcheson's teaching, is that moral and aesthetic judgments are non-cognitive. That is to say, they are not based on rational grounds and are arrived at immediately upon the apprehension of their object. Hutcheson's criticisms of the other
prominent contemporary moral theories are based on this position. It is surprising how closely Hume adheres to the criticisms of moral theory found in the works of Hutcheson, and this position, Kemp Smith asserts, forms the central unity of his philosophy. The subordination of reason to feeling and instinct dominates throughout. Book I of the Treatise is the result of the extension of these doctrines, first noted in connection with moral and aesthetic judgments, into the realm of the theory of knowledge.

If the fundamental judgments of morals, as of aesthetics, rest on feeling not on reason, and if in matters of moral conduct nature had been thus careful in providing us, independently of all calculation and reflection, with these 'immediate monitors' may it not be likewise in the professedly theoretical field? May not our judgments of knowledge in regard to matter of fact and existence be really acts of belief, not of knowledge -- belief being a passion and not a form of insight, and therefore, like all passions, fixed and predetermined by the de facto frame and constitution of human nature. 1

By discovering the main influences on Hume's philosophy in Hutcheson, Kemp Smith, if he can substantiate his case, has added an important link to the chain of interpretation he had founded forty years previous. In placing the burden of the major derivation of Hume's philosophy on that of Hutcheson, Kemp Smith has strictly limited the influence of the other and more traditional sources. It is his opinion that although Hume derived to a great extent the formulation of his philosophic problem from Hutcheson, his philosophic method

comes from Newton and Locke. Aside from the more obvious mechanical explanations of mental phenomena which are plainly derived from the Newtonian view of physics, Hume's emphasis on experiment or experimental reason and his complementary doctrine, that there are ultimate human experiences resting for us on secret causes, occupy a central position in philosophy and are directly traceable to Newton. And it is these doctrines which involve Hume in some of his more obvious and perhaps more important difficulties. In the case of the emphasis on experiments, Hume, like many empiricists, fails to explain how they are controlled or directed. He seems to assume that the experiments tell their own story or perhaps in some way are guided by instinct or feeling. What the mechanism is that accomplishes this task is never shown. A second difficulty, and this one, in connection with the ultimate factors of experience, is the determination of whether or not an experience is ultimate. Kemp Smith points out that Hume has a distressing tendency to multiply his ultimates in order to extricate himself from philosophic problems.

The third major influence on Hume is, of course, Locke. While some implicit central factors of Hume's philosophy can be attributed to Hutcheson and Newton, the terminology, and most important, the sensational basis of all Hume's thought, are plainly Lockian. Furthermore, the philosophy of Locke is well suited to the uses for which Hume wished to employ it. It is not difficult to demonstrate, on the basis
of Locke's theory of ideas, the restricted content of the information we receive through the sense, and as Hume's object was to show our dependence on instinct and feeling in the moral and aesthetic as well as the epistemological field, this was a very important function. It might be said that Kemp Smith never tries to depreciate the influence of Locke on Hume, but seeks to present this influence in its proper context, a procedure that is impossible to complete if the only supplementary influence considered is that of Berkeley. In fact, Berkeley's is the traditional influence which suffers the most in Kemp Smith's hands. As for the two aspects of Hume's philosophy traditionally considered to have been determined mainly by Berkeley's treatment of similar problems, Kemp Smith finds Hume in disagreement on the most fundamental points. The first aspect is the existence of a material world. Kemp Smith says that one of the primary misinterpretations of Hume's philosophy is that he is thought to have followed the Berkelian system to the extent of a complete denial of the material world. Hume agrees with Berkeley in denying the knowability or the possibility of the logical demonstration of the material world. In view of this one must not lose sight of Hume's central problem, to show that the belief in this world does not rest on logical proof. The further assertion, that as it does not rest on this type of proof it therefore does not exist, is for him superfluous.

The second aspect concerns universals. Hume is
indebted to Berkeley only in respect to his investigation of how images (and universals must be images in his philosophy) function as though they were universals. He seems to have taken only this isolated part of Berkeley's theory concerning abstract ideas. Hume, says Kemp Smith, gives a misleading account of Berkeley's representative function of particularized images when they act as universals, and altogether ignores his tenet that spirits and relations are not images. In fact, Hume seems to have been little interested in the philosophy of Berkeley and to have had an incomplete idea of the content of that philosophy.

After provisionally assessing the relative importance and role of what he considers the major influences on Hume's philosophy, Kemp Smith proceeds to substantiate his case. He does it in two ways: the opening sections of the Treatise which have always come in for such severe handling and treatment from his critics are explained and clarified. This is done, not by attributing their faults to corresponding deficiencies in Hume's character as has been the usual practice, but by attempting to ascertain the difficulties which the young Hume would naturally have encountered in attempting to 'found a science of human nature on a basis almost entirely new.' Assuming that Hume was subject to the influences of Locke, Newton and Hutcheson, how can the early sections of the

be connected with these influences and with the remainder of the Treatise?

The second method Kemp Smith uses in his explanation, is to show that Hume had worked out his theory of the passions; in particular his doctrine of sympathy in regard to morals, and had achieved a satisfactory method for the subordination of reason to feeling and instinct in this field before his attempt to achieve the same result in epistemology. It is shown that the difficulties, other than those inherent in any strictly empiricist system, which Hume meets in the first sections of Book I are due to this attempt, since the problems encountered in the epistemological investigation call for the revision of central portions of the work on morals. This revision is conspicuous by its absence in the Treatise, but evidence that Hume was aware of its need is found in the comparative study of the Treatise and the Enquiries. The study, conducted on this new basis, throws light on omissions found in the revised work which Hume wished to represent his final statement in philosophy. A consideration of the two philosophical works from the naturalistic position, which Kemp Smith maintains is the central theme of each, results in a new conception of Hume's mature philosophical studies, and disposes of the myth that Hume in his later work merely deleted those portions of the Treatise he considered too abstruse for general consumption. Kemp Smith demonstrates, by considering the sections deleted in relation to the central problems of
the Treatise and in relation to the Treatise as a whole, that Hume was in many ways his own best critic. He came to recognize the sections which failed to be of service in solving the problems he had set for himself, and this is more than can be said for his contemporaries. In particular he came to distrust the associational explanations with which he had tried to reduce natural beliefs to more ultimate principles.

The first task of any study which seeks to explain the Treatise in this way, is to explain the relation of its opening sections to the rest of the book, and indeed to Hume's philosophy as a whole. It is these sections more than any others which have caused Hume to be called a subjective idealist, and which have been criticized as the incomplete beginnings of a psychological theory. Kemp Smith, assuming that Hume has already worked out in some detail his theory of morals and is attempting to apply the principles used therein to epistemology, tests the assumption by considering the opening sections from this viewpoint. It must be remembered, however, that Hume's doctrine of sympathy, which he is trying to utilize, rests on two epistemological assumptions: that ideas are such exact copies of impressions that merely through the enlivening contact of the 'impression we have the self' they can be made to resemble impressions of sensation to such an extent as to be undifferentiable from them. The other assumption is that we have an impression of the self.

Keeping this in mind and turning once again to the
opening sections, we now see in a new light the concentration on the problems of causal inference to the exclusion of what would seem the more basic problem of sense perception. This concentration appears as the natural result of the transference of the doctrine of sympathy, and we find this doctrine very suitable for dealing with problems which arise in the consideration of causal inference. Belief in causal inference, Hume argues, is not conditioned by the inference, but rather the inference is conditioned by the belief. Hence, the two impressions, cause and effect, are enlivened in a characteristic manner by belief, and thus the analogy to the doctrine of sympathy is completed. As the investigation proceeds, however, and the problem of ordinary sense perception is reached, the utility of the doctrine of sympathy in its epistemological application sharply declines. In this latter problem, there is no question of the enlivening of ideas. Perception carries us to matter of fact and existence in a manner which our experience in moral, aesthetic, and causal matters does not. According to Kemp Smith, it is the concentration on causal inference, which chronologically would be a secondary problem, that results in some of the misleading exposition found in the first three sections of the Treatise. This is not, he continues, the only source of confusion. Another effect of the policy of transference from the moral field is

1. We have already seen the method by which he arrives at that position.
possibly evident in the confusing method of beginning his investigation by trying to determine the exact nature of ideas, instead of proceeding to determine the exact nature of impressions, as one would think natural bearing in mind his insistence that all ideas are derived from impressions. This problem does not have the same obvious explanation as that afforded by the theory in the case of the preoccupation with causal inference. The position Kemp Smith suggests, although he admits that it is to a large extent hypothetical in nature, is that Hume is intent on showing that the ideas he considers in this fashion (space and time) arise not from impressions themselves, but from our manner of viewing them. There are no "impressions" of space and time, so the only method of approach must be through the medium of the ideas we have of them. If this explanation is accepted it harmonizes readily with that already advanced concerning the concentration on the problem of causal inference.

Another much criticized aspect of these early sections is the naive-realistic terminology and attitude adopted by Hume, further complicated by the fact that he does not mention his doctrine of belief until it seems that he has specified completely the contents of our experience. Here the precise sources from which the usual criticisms have arisen can be seen with greater clarity. It seems from a cursory examination that these sections, if they are interpreted in what we could call the naive-realistic manner, exclude a
great deal of human experience. This defect, says Kemp Smith, is much easier to reconcile with the remainder of Hume's philosophy than the two we have just considered. We must remember that Hume is concerned with two aspects of experience: (1) the criticism of the vulgar method of speaking of that experience, and (2) the criticism of philosophical theories about the nature of experience. The reason this criticism appears in such a confusing light is because Hume allows one of the conclusions, which he reaches as a result of the criticism, to intrude upon these early passages. Hume argues that in ordinary consciousness we do not in fact distinguish between the physical body which acts on the eye, and the object as seen. This attitude is both realistic and naive and its correction is demanded by the data which it itself presents. Thus, implicit in the vulgar theory we have two conflicting theses, that objects are independently real, but that we only know them through psychologically conditioned perception. As we can only become aware of the problems involved in perception through this vulgar theory, Hume has no choice but to employ its terminology until the distinctions between immediate experience and belief, and impressions and ideas as opposed to independent existences, are made. Philosophical re-interpretation rests on the vulgar theory of experience, and it is only by means of the vulgar system that we become aware of the problems of experience. Hence, Kemp Smith maintains, it is not Hume's use of language which is to be
criticized, as he could "get at" the problem in no other way, but his inadvertent inclusion of the sensational basis of experience, properly a conclusion, in his formulation of the problem. This, too, tends to obscure the other aspect of his conclusion: the importance and even the existence of natural belief, which, with theoretical justification, he fails to mention until the problems of experience have been illustrated.

From the non-technical viewpoint, the explanation of the first sections of the Treatise is the crucial task which any interpretation of Hume's philosophy must satisfactorily complete. If elementary students in philosophy become acquainted with the original texts of Hume's philosophy at all, they are usually referred to the opening sections of the Treatise. It would probably be better, in the absence of an introduction which can link these sections to the rest of his philosophy, to confine these students' studies to the Enquiries, and yet there is much to be said for an early consideration of the more difficult Treatise. When the opening sections have no suitable introduction, however, students conclude that Hume, in restricting experience to a merely sensational level, adopts the position Green and Selby-Bigge attribute to him. In accepting this as the basis of Hume's philosophy, they not only ignore the positive aspects of Book I but also of Books II and III. The danger in students adopting the "naive-realistic" approach to Hume's philosophy during and after reading the opening sections is that they are not
prepared for the introduction of his later doctrines. The main objection to a complicated interpretation of the early sections for elementary students is that there is no need for special interpretation, as these sections are found at the beginning of the Treatise, and as Hume, unlike Kant, wrote his philosophy in a straightforward manner, not on the margins of other books. Kemp Smith shows that Hume's presentation may not be as straightforward as has been presumed. A mitigating factor, however, is that these passages, taken at their face value, constitute one of the best examples available of the pitfalls of empiricism. They have formed, in conjunction with Hume's sceptical arguments, a very useful background and introduction for the philosophy of Kant. On the other hand, the new interpretation, by demonstrating the way in which Hume arrived at the problems, his criticisms of other solutions of them, and then his own solutions as contrasted with those of Kant, should be an even more productive introduction to modern philosophy.

Another interesting and neglected aspect of Hume's influence on German philosophy, other than the philosophy of Kant, is that of the "faith" philosophers, Hamaan, Herder and Jacobi. They used the positive doctrines of Hume's philosophy in the refutation of the "intellectual" position of Kant. These critics of Kant "... relied chiefly on the thinker whose work Kant had helped to continue and overcome, the man to whom
he owed his awakening, i.e. Hume." Hamaan in particular was of the impression that Kant was the "German Hume" but it must be emphasized that this was in connection with the sceptical application of Hume's naturalistic doctrines. By Hume's insistence on the primacy of "feeling" in all spheres of human activity, he was the philosopher "par excellence" for the faith school. In this way he is much closer to these German philosophers than any subsequent school of British philosophy, as is illustrated by the importance they attached to Hume's doctrine of "natural belief," one of the central doctrines of his philosophy. Subsequent British philosophy seemed unaware not only of this doctrine but also of its influence on German philosophy.

The avenues of historical development opened for further investigation by Kemp Smith are many, and while the modification of interpretation of Hume's philosophy on the general level is one of the most obvious, others show promise of interest and fruitfulness. As has been mentioned, there is a great need for studies, both at the technical and general level, concerning Hume's political and economic works. This philosophical work which begins to show his conception of human nature and the objective toward which his philosophy is directed should be invaluable as a starting point. Another

study which should be of great value for students of the history of philosophy would be an examination of the reactions to Hume's philosophy, not confined as is usual to Kant, but including philosophies of the Scotsmen, Reid and Adam Smith, and the German faith philosophers just discussed. The study which has not yet appeared, and which will probably be preceded by all those just mentioned, is that biography of Hume considering his life and work in their many aspects, relating him not only to his predecessors and to those who follow in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but also showing his position in the romantic movement as a whole. The problems faced by the author of such a work will be many, and not one of these will be the temptation to simplify Hume's life and work. When writing of Hume the philosopher, however, one must never forget the complexity of his philosophy. It is rationalistic, naturalistic, and empiricistic, and although we have argued that the naturalistic basis is that which forms its unity, the other aspects must never be ignored. In this way we will be able to reconcile the conservative political philosopher and the confirmed optimism of the eighteenth century man of letters.
CHAPTER V

THE HISTORICAL LINKAGE OF HUME TO LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AND THE POSITIVIST'S USE OF HUME'S CAUSAL THEORY

During our examination of the interpretation of Hume's philosophy, from its first expression in a letter to the Englishman's Journal in 1739 to Kemp Smith's book in 1941, we have noted several general tendencies. The most important of these has been the steady progress, since 1903, toward an integrated and comprehensive view of Hume's philosophy which tends to resolve many of the basic contradictions which critics and reviewers had previously considered important. This newer view of his philosophy stresses positive aspects which had long been ignored by emphasizing his more radical and paradoxical conclusions.

In turning now to the separate problem of the relationship of Hume's philosophy to that of the logical positivists, we must consider this newer interpretation in the light

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1. There is the question, encountered so often in recent years, of how the school known as 'logical positivism' throughout the '30's should be referred to today. The term 'logical positivism' has become unpopular throughout the movement itself as it is considered to imply a position which is not held today. This refers to the word 'positivism' and thus the alternate term 'empiricism' has come into wide usage. Since we are endeavoring to signify not the type of philosophy a school of thought advocates, but to indicate a group of philosophers who have become known as the members of a philosophical movement throughout the last thirty years, the earlier and more widely used name should have greater utility. (cont'd.)
of the positivistic interpretation. The two questions which must be discussed in this section of the thesis are: (1) the historical question of the direct or indirect influence of Hume's writings upon logical positivists, (2) the aforementioned problem of positivistic interpretation. The latter involves a discussion of the problem of causation or induction.

After the appearance of the works of Reid and Beattie in the latter half of the eighteenth century, interest in Hume's philosophical works never again completely lapsed. In spite of the fact that he was in vogue principally as a bad example, his philosophy remained close to the mainstream of modern speculation. In recent years, however, Hume has been much more in the limelight, and this is probably due not so much to the modern re-interpretation of his works as to the

(continuation of footnote from previous page.)

In fact, whether the character of the philosophy the school now advocates is so much different from the philosophy they advocated ten or fifteen years previously is a point which I do not believe is as yet sufficiently clear. In a review of a recent work on Spinoza it was remarked that while the book was a fair and on the whole excellent treatment of that philosopher, one always had the feeling that the author had the verification theory up his sleeve and was ready to spring it at any moment. This is exactly the position in which we find ourselves when we consider changing the name of the movement (in an historical treatment of this sort) at a time of transition. A change in terms might be confusing, and there is no assurance that it would be accurate. Those who object to the use of the term 'logical positivism' to indicate the philosophy of Mach as well as the latest writings of Professor Ayer may insert the term 'logical empiricism' at any point they wish.
emergence of a new school of thought.

The logical positivist movement has advocated methods of dealing with philosophic problems which seem to be violently opposed to those methods traditionally employed. Philosophy, the positivists insist, has been concerned in the past with problems which are the result of the faulty and misleading use of language. These problems disappear when the language in which they are expressed is analyzed, and with them goes most of what has hitherto been known as philosophy. The consequences for the study of the history of philosophy are plain. For those who hold this view, the study can only be, with few exceptions, an investigation of the mistakes of others. It follows that once those mistakes have been clearly recognized their further study does not require the services of a fulltime discipline. Hence, in consistence with its principles, the logical positivist movement has shown little or no interest in the history of philosophy. It is not our intention here to argue the merits or demerits of this position, but merely to inquire how the eighteenth century philosopher Hume has become so closely associated with the movement. Is there a direct historical connection between the two philosophies which the positivists themselves have not been interested in making explicit, or have both those within and

1. By 'historical connection' is meant the direct influence through the medium of a philosopher's works, or indirect influence so evident that no difficulty is encountered in making the line of derivation explicit.
without the movement merely noted the likenesses of the two philosophies? Are these similarities such that they account for the connection? We shall attempt, initially, to determine whether or not there is an historical connection between the two philosophies.

There is not, of course, a complete absence of historical contextual treatments of the logical positivist movement. Such treatments are usually found in introductions to the philosophy and are, from an historical point of view, fragmentary and non-systematic. In these introductions the history of the movement is extended back in time to include aspects of the philosophies of the here-to-fore giants of philosophy. Some aspects of the philosophies of Kant, Spinoza and Mill are often listed as having significantly contributed to positivist doctrine. The references to these philosophers vary from account to account, sometimes one or the other being omitted entirely. One persistent and often central aspect of these introductions is the affiliation of positivism with Hume. Two examples of this are the introduction found in J.R. Weinberg's *Logical Positivism*, and Jørgen Jørgensen's recent *Logiske Empiricismes Udvikling*. Both writers claim that the

2. When this thesis was begun no English translation of Jørgensen's book had appeared. Now, however, a good translation has been published by the University of Chicago Press as Volume 9 of the Encyclopedia of Unified Science Series. The book's English title is *The Foundations of Logical Empiricism*. As this work is now generally available in translation, I have omitted many long and what would now be tedious references to it.
ultimate source of important and definitive positivistic doctrines is to be found in Hume. In the introduction to his book, Weinberg writes: "Many if not all the principal doctrines of contemporary positivism derive from Hume." In his view, the empiricist trend of this modern school may safely be traced to Hume. Jørgensen also traces the ultimate source of positivism to Hume. Neither Weinberg nor Jørgensen considers the question of how these aspects of logical positivism were actually derived from Hume. Jørgensen, however, does include a list of the founders and members of the school of logical empiricism. Initially, he lists Hume, and then there is a chronological lapse of almost one hundred years until he comes to what he calls the "founding philosophers" of "logical empiricism." These are Mill, Comte, and Mach. We shall now attempt to determine what direct contact there was between these three philosophers and the philosophy of Hume. It must be remembered that we are not interested in a comparison of their respective philosophical positions, but rather in what these philosophers said about Hume's philosophy, their references to it, and any other evidence of their indebtedness to it.

Of the three philosophers, it is Mill who should have been most influenced by Hume, for Mill writes in English and

1. Weinberg, p. 4.
2. Weinberg, p. 4.
3. In the English translation of his works the philosophers are called "philosophers of the enlightenment."
is a member of the school loosely designated as British Empiricism. Also, his interests, like Hume's, cover a wide range including moral and political theory, natural religion, and the logic of induction. In spite of outward signs that Mill might have been influenced by Hume, we find the actual evidence in support of this supposition exceedingly slight: when Mill does mention Hume directly he, with few exceptions, assumes a position which is very similar to that taken by most nineteenth century critics and philosophers. It is clear that in all cases he regards Hume's philosophical works to be of a strictly negative character, and, therefore, having little in common with his own positive approach to philosophy. This opinion is expressed by Mill only in connection with Hume's work in the theory of knowledge. As far as can be determined, he expressed no opinion at all concerning Hume's moral and religious theory. It is said that Mill had not read Book III of the Treatise nor The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, although we may assume that he was familiar with the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Insofar as he expresses an opinion we find that Mill has, in this respect, much in common with Dr. Johnson. He believes that Hume takes advantage of paradoxes and carries his scepticism too far. He seems unaware that there is a positive aspect to Hume's causal analysis. In this respect, Mill, unlike his contemporaries, does

not accuse Hume of downright dishonesty (except in the
thing of history), but it is obvious from random remarks he considered Hume's influence on his own philosophy to
negligible. Such random remarks are perhaps not a suffi
cient foundation upon which to base a conclusion. But we find that such a conclusion receives further support if Mill's philosophy is considered from another point of view.

Mill's philosophy was severely criticized by Bradley and Bosanquet. In fact, idealists and empiricists alike have been extremely critical of Mill's canons of induction and his treatment of inductive inference. His final position that the scientific principle or inductive syllogism is itself based on induction has been shown to be based on both logical and ontological presuppositions which, when made explicit, vitiate his explanation. This view can be found in many sources, but in at least two important works on logic we find it coupled with the accusation that Mill failed to understand -- or was unaware of Hume's problem. Thus L. Susan Stebbing writes, in A Modern Introduction to Logic, that Mill was unaware of the difficulties involved in inductive reasoning, provided that what Keynes calls the 'inductive hypothesis' is not assumed. That is, Mill assumed that the inductive

1. As A.D. Ritchie says in Mind 1926, "Since Mill built up his system of logic the rest of us have been doing our best to tear it down." He also says that the defects of Mill's logic are the result of its being built on the faulty scepticism of Hume.

principle "required no principles which could not be proved." Keynes also adopts the same position and says that "the full force of Hume's attack and the nature of the difficulties which it brought to light were never appreciated by Mill and he makes no adequate attempt to deal with them." Here Keynes is referring to Hume's analysis, which shows the inductive principle to be subjectively conditioned, and what follows from this, that it does not provide the certainty which Mill supposed it did. Mill assumes that the difference between true inductions and false inductions is a matter of absolute certainty, whereas it is Keynes's and Stebbing's position that Hume has shown beyond all doubt that the difference is one of degrees of probability.

But, it can be asked, does the fact that Mill held the opinion that inductions can attain absolute certainty necessarily imply that he was "unaware" of Hume's problem? This may be said to be true in a sense, but not in the complete sense which Stebbing's and Keynes's position seems to imply. Mill held the view, so prevalent in the nineteenth century, that Hume's conclusions are so preposterous, that he failed to consider the grounds on which they are based. Mill is aware of Hume's problem only in its most exaggerated form, and in this he fails to see the positive analysis which is so important for Keynes and Stebbing. Through Mill's eyes

we see Hume's association of ideas as a psychological rather than an epistemological theory, according to which causation is based on habit or custom, these words being used in their crudest sense. Viewed in this light, Mill's answer to Hume, while it is on a different plane from the answers or refutations of Hume by the common sense school of philosophy, has much in common with them. It would be contradictory for Mill to assert that science is in some sense, perhaps in a basic sense, unscientific, and this is what Hume's analysis seems, for Mill, to emphasize.

But what can be said concerning the influence of Hume on Mill and the former's connection with logical positivism? We may paraphrase Ritchie and say that, as far as Hume's philosophy is involved in that of Mill, Mill's theory of induction is based on, or in reaction to, a faulty view of Hume's scepticism. Both the absence of the positive influence and the presence of the negative influence of Hume are to be deplored. If traces of this negative influence can be discovered in logical positivism, they might be said to have come by them through the study of Mill. But it is difficult to believe that a line of historical influence can be traced from modern logical positivism through Mill to Hume, as Hume's influence on Mill and the latter's knowledge and opinion of Hume's work was of such a fragmentary nature.

Turning to the second "philosopher of the enlighten-
listed by Jorgensen, we find that Comte is isolated almost entirely from the influence of Hume. No reference to the philosophy of Hume can be found in Comte's work, who not only seems unaware of any comparative likeness between his own philosophy and that of Hume, but seems altogether unaware of the existence of Hume's philosophy. This is not surprising when we consider the philosophers to whom Comte acknowledged his greatest debt. They are D'Alembert, the Encyclopedists, and such writers as Condillac, Cabanis, Tracy, Turgot, Condorcet, Maistre, and Bonald. Of these, we can find no one familiar with, or influenced by, Hume's philosophical works. This is not surprising when we consider that the Treatise was not even partially translated into French until 1878 and, as far as can be determined, has not yet been completely translated. In France, as in England, Hume's popularity did not extend to his philosophical works, although he was widely known and respected for his political essays. This view is supported by Michel Uta who says that Hume's philosophy was almost unknown in France at the time the philosophers who influenced

1. As the term is translated in the University of Chicago English edition.
4. Michel Uta, p. 2, "La philosophie anglaise a exercé une forte influence sur la pensée des Encyclopédistes. On a cherché le origines du positisme dans la phénoménisme de Hume, ce qui est absolument impossible, puisque le positivisme français se forme une époque, où la philosophie de Hume est completment inconnue en France."
Comte were writing. Comte is undoubtedly influenced through these men by Bacon, Locke, Newton, and Berkeley, but not by Hume.

However we may account for the radically different nature of Comte's philosophy, it cannot be attributed directly or indirectly to the philosophy of Hume. Ernst Cassirer says that in his early years, Comte (this is the closest analogy I can find either in Comte's works or in works about Comte to Kant's statement concerning his awakening from his dogmatic slumber) acquired an extensive knowledge of the philosophy of Hegel. At this point in his career, Comte concluded that the Hegelian system was "hypothetical" and began the exposition of his own positive philosophy. However, as far as can be determined from Comte's works, or from studies of those works, Hume played no part in Comte's decision. Of the historical relationship between Comte and Hume, we can only say that one of the paradoxes of the history of philosophy is the fact that Comte seems so unaware of Hume.

The historical relationship of Ernst Mach to Hume is somewhere between that of Mill and Comte. Mach is neither so intimately connected with Hume as Mill nor so isolated as Comte. Actually, we find, while developing his philosophy, Mach was completely uninfluenced by Hume. In none of his scientific books do we find references to Hume. This, in itself, is not surprising as these are philosophical only in their implication,

if at all. In his one specific philosophical work, however, we do find references to Hume, and the most important of these supports explicitly the point made above regarding Comte and Mill. Mach writes: "By studying the physiology of the senses and by reading Herbart, I then arrived at views akin to those of Hume, though at that time I was still unacquainted with Hume himself." Here we have testimony in Mach's own words that Hume was of no influence. Mach's admission is supported by two other sources. Mordchai-Ber Rudajew, in 1913, maintained that it is obvious Mach had made no objective study of Hume. Hence, his treatment in *Mach und Hume* is carried out on a purely comparative basis. He makes no attempt to show that any of Mach's doctrines are derived from the philosophy of Hume. In 1937, C.B. Weinberg wrote that Mach "came to recognize a kinship between himself and David Hume." But he adds that it was only after his own philosophical position had been formulated that Mach became aware of Hume.

Perhaps a measure of the absence of a direct connection between these philosophers and Hume is the speed with which all available data on the subject is exhausted. But we can arrive at one definite conclusion. Though Hume is

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referred to as the fountainhead, or the "classical father," of logical positivism, it is obvious that a direct historical link between these "founders of logical empiricism" and Hume cannot be demonstrated. It is also obvious that this conclusion can be applied equally well to other important contributions to positivist theory such as those of Frege and Poincare. Nor need we stop here. This conclusion can also be applied to members of the Vienna Circle and to all those modern philosophers whose doctrines derive mainly from that Circle. This is clear from an examination of the early publications of the Circle, in which Hume is seldom mentioned, and from their present day writings. Consider two examples, Rudolf Carnap's the Logical Syntax and Philosophy and Moritz Schlick's Fragen der Ethic. In the former, it is plain that the view for which Carnap appeals to Hume for support is not derived from Hume but from altogether different sources, principally Mach. Hume is used as a corroborative authority. The group which can be included with Mach, Comte, and Mill as deriving little directly or indirectly from Hume includes Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Schlick, and Hans Reichenbach. Even A.J. Ayer must be included, for, to date, he has remained much closer in his philosophical outlook to the Viennese group than have many of

2. This will be discussed later in the thesis.
his British contemporaries.

If we wish to be comprehensive in our analysis of references to Hume's philosophy in positivist literature we cannot fail to consider Ayer's British contemporaries. These philosophers who are followers of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, have many points in common with the philosophers of the Vienna Circle but defy strict classification as to school or method. H.H. Price labels them the "Cambridge- Analysists" and Price himself must acknowledge a considerable debt to this group. Their consideration in this context is not meant as a classification, and two factors necessitate this consideration. (1) They have certain points in common with the logical positivists and any consideration of the ramifications of positivism which omitted them would not be comprehensive, and (2) they have been directly influenced by Hume's philosophy. Only insofar as their varied approaches to Hume's philosophy warrant will their philosophic position be considered.

One aspect of Hume's philosophy, namely his analysis

1. That Ayer can be considered to have remained closer to the Vienna Circle than his British contemporaries is illustrated not only by the radical position which he adopted in Language, Truth and Logic, but by his continued use of the verification principle. He insists that it can be used as a method of excluding a wide range of propositions as meaningless, while others in Britain have come to regard it as "a device which has brought out a great variety of differences between lots of legitimate utterances." G. Ryle, "The Verification Theory," Revue de Philosophie, Fascicule 17-18, 1951, p. 252.

of cause and effect and inductive reasoning or arguments from experience, has influenced the philosophers whom we shall now consider. These philosophers have variously considered themselves to be in accord or in basic agreement with this analysis, but differ from Hume in that they either think his position is incompletely worked out or they disagree with the inferences they believe Hume draws from it. Contemporary discussions in which these agreements and disagreements arise have usually been designated as discussions of "Hume's problem," but we must remember that when we speak of "Hume's problem," we refer to a problem which Hume solved, at least to his own satisfaction. There are, of course, those who hold that Hume was not happy in his empirical position and was struggling toward a rationalist outlook, but this is unsupported by direct philosophic evidence, and is indeed controverted by his last words on the subject in the Dialogues. Whether or not Hume was happy in his empiricism, we have no reason to doubt that he thought it the correct position, and we may, therefore, say that he had no "problem." We would speak more correctly, then, if we referred to these discussions as the problem of Hume, because it is Hume that philosophers and others have hoped to

1. Hume, Dialogues, K.S. Edition, p. 189, Cleanthes says, "There is no Being ... whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no Being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it." It is obvious that Cleanthes speaks not only for himself and Philo, but also for Hume. This is a conclusion with which Hume never became dissatisfied.
"supercede," "modify," "refute," and in the odd case "support."

This aspect of Hume's philosophy which has provoked so much philosophical activity in the last two hundred years, is what Price considers to be Hume's most important and permanent contribution to philosophy, and if volume is any measure of permanence and importance he is certainly correct. In all justice, however, when we consider Hume's relationship to logical positivism we should limit ourselves to those works which seem to have some intimate connection with Hume, and not merely to treatments of the problem of induction in general.

The first instance of interest in Hume's problem which seems to be intimately connected with the philosophy of Hume may be found in Keynes's Treatise on Probability. Keynes's work is particularly interesting for three reasons:

1. He says that Hume states the case against induction in a fashion that has never been improved upon;
2. he claims that in spite of this his own work would be viewed with sympathy and approval by Hume; and
3. he also implies that his answer to the problem of Hume might conceivably be accepted by Hume.

In asking why Keynes thinks that Hume presents the case against induction so well, we may begin with a review of Hume's statements about arguments from experience as found in the Abstract. In general, Hume echoes Malebranche's criticism of logic, that it is sufficient in matters of demonstration but

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fails us in the greater part of our reasoning which concerns matter of fact. Implicit in this criticism is the view that all reasoning can be divided into what concerns either matters of fact or the relations between ideas. He goes on to say that all reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and we never can infer the existence of one matter of fact to another from the latter's mere existence. They must be connected either "mediately or immediately in experience." As for the conditions which govern our use of causal terminology, three main conditions must be fulfilled: (1) events designated in this way must be contiguous in time and place; (2) the cause must be prior to the effect; and (3) there must be constant conjunction in our experience of events so designated (like must produce like). After listing the empirical criterion on which causal inference is based, Hume goes on to enquire into the nature of causal inference, given these qualifying conditions. He finds that it is nothing which reason discovers in the relations specified above which results in our use of causal terminology. That is to say, causal inferences or arguments from experience never amount to demonstration. The opposite of any chain of causal reasoning is always possible, for "the mind can always conceive any effect to follow any cause and indeed any event to follow any other." For Hume, self-contradiction tests the truth of any demonstrative argument but the ultimate test of truth for reasonings concerning matters of fact rests on some
other basis. We cannot say unexpected events or events which are contrary to experience are self-contradictory.

What then, for Hume, is the further qualification which attends arguments from experience if their necessity is not furnished through logical justification? Hume answers that all causal reasonings are founded on experience and gives examples to show that prior to experience we can have no idea that any event will cause any other event. He finds, further, that all reasonings from experience presuppose that constant conjunction, a necessary concomitant of our use of causal terminology, will be present in the future as it has been in the past. Like not only produces like, in the past, which our experience justifies, but like will also produce like in the future, a principle for which we have no justification in experience or in demonstration. Here in our causal reasoning or in our arguments from experience, we find a presupposition which can only be described as "habit," "custom," "felt connection," or "natural belief." Although this natural belief underlies our reasoning, it does not constitute a part of our reasoning. In Hume's words belief is "a manner of conceiving an object" or the peculiarly human factor which determines our experience as much as do the eyes and ears with which we see and hear the world.

In the light of this, what can Keynes mean when he says that Hume states the case against induction? Hume never suggests that arguments from experience are invalid or cannot
be justified. He says only that the formal conception of validity cannot be applied to inductive reasoning and, if we speak precisely, we can only say of inductive arguments that their conclusions are probable as opposed to the certainty of formal arguments. As for the justification of inductive arguments, Hume says that this rests on a number of factors which he does not pretend to analyse fully. On the one hand, there are the factors of experience such as constant conjunction, etc. On the other hand, there are certain psychological factors listed under the general heading of belief. Again, Hume emphasized that it is a mistake to apply the term justification in the narrow or purely formal sense. How can Keynes construe this as a case against induction? We could say, of course, that any analysis which finds arguments from experience to include psychological presuppositions would be contrary to a strict application of the term induction, which means only uniformity. Actually, Keynes does not insist that psychological factors be listed under the general case against induction, and he claims, on page 263, that we must "validly assume" them. In fact, this is the case with all of Hume's major arguments. Keynes accepts so much from Hume it is difficult to understand just where he disagrees with him.

The answer to this question lies directly in the use of language, and particularly in the respective ways in which Keynes and Hume employ such terms as "probable," "certain," and "reasonable." Because Hume uses these terms in two
different ways, Keynes tends to over-emphasize the differences between his own intentions and Hume's. Keynes wishes to employ these terms in one way and, instead of analyzing their use, opens his treatise by assuming that their meaning is clear and unequivocal. Thus, in relating his own theory to Hume's, Keynes represents the latter's intentions in a much more sceptical light than is either necessary or justified. It is not Hume's intention either to condemn or to reform our use of causal terminology and argument from experience, but to attempt to determine exactly what we mean when we use this terminology and what we are doing when we use this method. When Keynes uses such expressions as "reasonably justified" and "validly assume" without supporting analysis to show what he means by them, his relationship to Hume and his opinions of Hume's philosophy becomes confusing. This is particularly true with respect to his statement that Hume presents the case against induction. Added to this confusing terminology is Keynes's acceptance of the major points of Hume's analysis. Here we find passages like the following:

It is reasonable to maintain with the logicians of the Port Royal that we may draw a conclusion which is truly probable by paying attention to all the circumstances which accompany the case, and we must admit with as little concern as possible Hume's taunt that "when we give the preference to one set of arguments above another, we do nothing but decide from our feeling concerning the superiority of their influence." 1

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1. Keynes, p. 70.
Keynes accepts Hume's position but he pays as little attention to it as possible. He exhibits a tendency to see Hume's philosophy in an over-sceptical light. Either he agrees with Hume or he does not, and we see that basically he does agree. He goes on to imply, however, that this is all Hume has to say about arguments from experience, but this is not true, since there is a section in the *Treatise* dealing expressly with methods of judging causes and effects. This section has much in common with Keynes's own intentions and also shows that Hume did not feel himself barred, because of his analysis, from attempting to outline procedures which might facilitate our use of arguments from experience. Keynes's repeated acceptance of Hume's doctrines only increases the suspicion that their differences are merely verbal.

In his second main reference to Hume it is probable that Keynes is perfectly correct. It is likely that Hume would have read what Keynes has written with sympathy. At least Hume would find little to object to in the intentions expressed in Chapter IX of Keynes's *Treatise*. Hume would have been in entire agreement with an attempt to "systematise" the processes of probable inference and an elucidation of the rules by means of which the probabilities of different arguments can be compared. He agreed that the conclusions would be of great practical importance and that the 'most important

of these rules is the "Principle of Indifference" or, as Keynes otherwise entitles it, the factor of "direct judgment." There is some question as to what Hume meant when he said that he regarded his philosophy as only the starting point for philosophers-to-come. There is, however, as much reason to believe that he meant studies of the sort proposed by Keynes as to believe that he would have accepted the arguments of Kant. An enquiry into the logical foundations of arguments from experience, in the light of the procedures of modern science and symbolic logic, would seem to conflict with no Humean doctrine.

Has Keynes solved Hume's problem? In one sense it may be said that he has not. So long as such factors as "direct judgment" and the "valid assumption" of psychological presuppositions form a part of an analysis of inductive reasoning it will be impossible to turn inductive reasoning into deductive reasoning, and that is the only final solution of Hume's problem. In another sense, if Keynes has attained his objectives, he has supplemented Hume's analysis in an important way. By confining his attention to the practical he has shown the importance of analogy in inductive inference and has also attempted to show how statistical methods can be utilized. In these phases of his argument he is dealing with the technical aspects of induction and attempting to make it a more fruitful method. He is also protected from the criticism that talking about probability is not the same thing as
talking about causal inference. It is Hume who draws the
distinction between the probability of causes and the proba-
bility of chance, but he goes on to say that in practice we
do not distinguish between them. Speaking of the two philos-
ophers it might be said that in general Hume's position is
primarily an epistemological one, in which the practical im-
plications have been incompletely worked out. Keynes, on the
other hand, represents a practical position, the epistemologi-
cal and linguistic implications of which have not been suffi-
ciently clarified.

1. An account of some of the presuppositions which Keynes
makes is found in F.P. Ramsey's essay, "Truth and Probabilities," The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical
Essays, New York, 1931. His criticisms are briefly as
follows: (1) that Keynes supposes there is a one one
relationship between relations of probability on the one
hand and degrees of belief on the other. This, says Ramsey,
is not the case and might well serve as good a ground for
scepticism as the fact that these probability relations
cannot always be measured. The case is that probability
relations do not have a one one correspondence with de-
grees of rational belief. (2) No such things as proba-
bility relations can be perceived in the first place.
"All we seem to know about them are certain general pro-
positions, the laws of addition and multiplication; it
is as if everyone knew the laws of geometry but no one
could tell if a given object were round or square; and I
find it hard to imagine how so large a body of general
knowledge can be combined with such a slender stock of
particular facts." (page 164) Keynes himself does not
consistently hold that the numerical or measured degree
of probability must correspond to the degree of rational
belief. (see Keynes, p. 32).
An analysis of a series of articles by R.B. Braithwaite, who seems significantly influenced by Hume, suggests why certain logical positivists feel close to Hume. These philosophers are concerned with the same problems as Hume; they reach conclusions which at least are very analogous to those found in Kemp Smith's interpretation; and their conclusions may readily be translated into the method and terminology used by the Cambridge and Oxford section of the positivist movement. Braithwaite examines the difficulties involved in contemporary expositions of a view of causation which to all intents and purposes is the same as that of Hume. He also defends it against certain objections which have been leveled at it since the time of Kant. Although most of the objections to the theory stem from Kant, they had been presented as fresh ideas in the years immediately preceding Braithwaite's articles.

Braithwaite maintains that the necessity of any causal proposition asserts two universal propositions of fact. These are (1) that as a matter of fact, the properties concerned in the causal proposition are always associated; and (2)
that the universal proposition just asserted is always believed for reasons which are not logically demonstrable. He limits his discussion to the psychological proposition and illustrates the differences in his presentation of it from the way in which it was put forward by Hume. He criticizes Hume for adopting a psychological atomism which does not admit belief in general propositions on the same basis as belief in particular propositions. This psychological atomism breaks down when one attempts to account for modern scientific procedure in which causal terminology is used. In most of these cases the processes being investigated or talked about are so complicated that it is impossible to experience "constant conjunction," and Hume's transition of the imagination never takes place. Braithwaite says that it is Hume's exclusion of direct awareness of general principles which results in this defect. "It is my awareness of these beliefs [in general propositions] in myself and my knowledge that other people share them that is the foundation for my idea of necessary connection [in these special cases]." He does not say, however, that Hume's atomistic psychology and transitions of the imagination are insufficient for the uses to which Hume puts them, i.e. the discussion of our everyday use of causal terminology.

What is brought to notice by Braithwaite is the peculiar nature of the psychological aspect of the use of

1. Braithwaite, p. 467.
terminology. This is very ambiguous, and is different for different people. It is conceivable that after the de facto proposition asserting constant conjunction has been investigated or verified, then we should begin to talk about the character and previous veracity of the person asserting the necessary connection. In fact, in many cases this is just what we do do, and it seems that when we consider the psychological aspect of causal propositions an appeal to authority has a real place. This is also the reason why we find that "... disputes as to whether a certain causal proposition is or is not true are so futile."

In his second article Braithwaite deals with eight objections to the above theory of causal inference. He describes the first five objections as contingencies which never occur and the final three as necessities which never occur.

As is seen in the footnote, the first five objections arise

1. Braithwaite, p. 476.
2. Summary of the objections to Hume's theory and Braithwaite's answers to them:
   1. The justification of necessary connection in causal inference is the direct apprehension of that necessity; the necessity is a component of experience.
      ans. This is no argument for one who does not have that experience and Braithwaite implies that he does not.
   2. We do have an impression of necessity in our bodily actions; in volition we are directly acquainted with causal necessity.
      ans. If this argument is accepted it does not necessarily mean that Hume's analysis of causal inference is incorrect, but only that his analysis of volition is incorrect. Further, we could only know that volition is a sufficient cause of bodily activity and not a necessary cause.
from a number of sources. But the final three are variations
of the objection raised by Kant, Mill, and Keynes; that, as a
theory of causal inference, Hume's analysis excludes the possi-
bility of the logical justification of induction.

(footnote cont'd.)

And even that possibility is ruled out, Braithwaite
says, by Hume's point that there are all sorts of
intermediate causes which intervene between voli-
tion and bodily action.

3. Particular causal propositions are not derived from causal
laws but that the reverse is true. That is, "causal neces-
sity" is primarily concerned with particular relations
between events and that causal laws are derivative from
them.

ans. In our ordinary use of causal terminology it is
not the event which is necessary to the effect but
an event having certain qualities in virtue of
which the effect has certain properties. The
necessity of any event can only be expressed in
terms of causal law.

4. A thing is what it is and from this its causal relations
must follow, else we contradict the law of identity. Or
rather, that a thing must have the causal attribute P to
be what it is, and if it does not have this attribute P it
is not a.

ans. In this case two kinds of 'musts' are confused.
If this is 'merely stating that the assertion of
the causal connection between two particular
things involves the assertion of a causal law' it
is correct (and is also saying nothing different
from the position Braithwaite is maintaining) but
if it is meant to assert a logical connection it
is false as the mere proposition 'a has the causal
relation P' does not usually entail the proposition
that 'if a does not have the causal relation P it
is not a.'

5. As a causal law is a universal proposition, its contradic-
tory must be a particular proposition and we seem frequent-
ly to deny a universal proposition without the assertion
of the particular proposition. (We deny that day causes
night and yet do not assert that some days are not follow-
ed by nights).

ans. Hume's theory consists of two universal proposi-
tions, not one, and hence, to deny a causal law is
to assert that the non-psychological universal is
false, or else to assert that it is not generally
believed.
We find that Braithwaite's conclusions as to the implications of his own theory of causal inference to be remarkably similar to those which many modern commentators, especially Kemp Smith, attribute to Hume. Since induction is based on custom we are unlikely to find any arguments for its

(footnote cont'd.)

6. Universals of law must be different from universals of fact in that they state not only what does happen but what could, although as a matter of fact never does, happen. This argument takes the form that all P's are Q's even if there are no P's. It is illustrated in the proposition that gasses with unextended molecules will obey Boyle's law even though there are no gasses with unextended molecules. The question is why we believe that this sort of hypothetical gas will obey this law rather than some other law. The first answer is that this universal and universals of this type are only more generalized versions of statements of fact. Here it is a generalized version of the universal of fact that the less extended a gas the greater its tendency to obey Boyle's law. Braithwaite says, however, that he regards objections of this kind as derivative from the transcendental argument that without 'genuine' causation no knowledge or belief in any universal proposition is possible, except those believed on logically demonstrable grounds.

7. Our belief in permanent substances presupposes genuine causal relationships. This is also derivative from the desire to justify induction.

8. The final and most serious objection to analysis along Hume's lines, 'If we accept a theory which reduces the assertion of causal law to the assertion of two universals of fact, what justification can we possibly have for the assertion of these two universals of fact? What rational basis can there be for the process of induction? What justification do I have for believing the psychological universal of fact which I have made one of the criteria of causal law?" ... I have no logical justification. And I cannot say what sort of justification would be required. So I am never convinced by any 'transcendental' argument that certain propositions are the necessary presuppositions of knowledge of a certain sort.'
justification which will satisfy a logician. Our belief in scientific method is ultimately based on the fact that "so far it has not let us down badly." It appears to Braithwaite that as the scientist is concerned with fact the latter is justified in his investigations in accepting a simple uniformity theory of causation. On the other hand, when we pass from universals of fact to universals of law "certain very ambiguous psychological propositions about our customary beliefs must be admitted."

1. As a footnote to Braithwaite's articles we find F.P. Ramsey's essay "General Propositions and Causality" in The Foundations of Mathematics. Ramsey puts forward a definition of causal laws which is very similar to that of Braithwaite but which he says is not subject to certain exceptions as was Braithwaite's. The exceptions to Braithwaite's theory (causal laws are believed without logical justification) are that some causal laws are believed which can be logically demonstrated, some causal laws are not believed at all, and some universals of fact are believed on grounds which are not demonstrable. Ramsey states his theory in two ways: "... when we assert a causal law we are asserting not a fact, not an infinite conjunction, nor a connection of universals, but a variable hypothetical which is not strictly a proposition at all, but a formula from which we derive propositions." (p. 251) Or, "As opposed to a purely descriptive theory of science, mine may be called a forecasting theory. To regard a law as a summary of the facts seems ... inadequate. It is also an attitude of expectation for the future." (p. 255). Thus a causal law may be disagreed with but may not be proved to be wrong. In this way a variable hypothetical can be expressed in the form, if I meet an I shall regard it as an M. "This cannot be negated but it can be disagreed with by one who does not adopt it." (p. 241). Generally I think it may be said that Ramsey's theory states that causal laws are descriptions of how the mind works in certain cases, or more precisely, in H.H. Price's words, "a system of predictions."
During the decade between 1920 and 1930 A.N. Whitehead published important works in which he made many criticisms of Hume. The philosophical journals of the period indicate great concern with Whitehead's attacks on Hume. In fact, there has grown up a considerable body of literature devoted entirely to the Whitehead-Hume controversy. Much of this material has no direct bearing on the relationship of Hume to the logical positivists. Of course, many of the authors who defend Hume in this controversy are of an empiricist, realist or pragmatist persuasion. But we find, as a general rule, that most of the positivists are uninterested in this sort of activity and concentrate more on original work in analysis. Therefore the material dealing directly with the Hume-Whitehead controversy, with one exception, may be excluded. The exception is "Hume without Scepticism" by R.E. Hobart. This article also has a direct bearing on the problems which concerned us in Keynes's Treatise on Probability and Braithwaite's "The Idea of Necessary Connection."

Hobart's main contentions may be stated quite simply. Hume's complete discovery concerning causation can be put as follows; "A proposition may imply another proposition, but a thing may not imply another thing." Hume simply pried apart two concepts of words which had grown together by examining

what is meant by a thing and what is meant by a proposition. This basic position Hobart states again several times and in several different ways but it is always basically the position that inference is not a property of things, but is a property of "the meaning of terms" or the "reference of concepts." His most inclusive statement is that "Hume's deepest doctrine is not that we cannot discover the secret in the constitution of one fact by which it implies the coming of the other, nor yet that we cannot know whether there is such a secret or not; but that there is not and could not be any such secret." Most of Hobart's first article is concerned with the defence of this thesis against Whitehead's attack. The attack which Hobart regards as most serious is that Hume, in making conjunction in time the sole criteria of cause, commits a grave error, because succession is a derivative, not a basic, concept. It is cause from which we derive our concept of time or succession, not succession from which we derive our concept of cause. But it is not this argument which is of the greatest interest to us here. Hobart goes on to say that Hume was wrong in considering that his analysis justified a sceptical conclusion. Here we have again, not a philosopher insisting that he has an answer to "Hume's problem," nor a philosopher insisting that Hume did not have a problem, but a philosopher insisting that "Hume's problem"

does not need the answer that Hume by implication thought it did.

In the purely interpretational aspect of this problem I think it perfectly legitimate to maintain, with Hendel, that Hume is at heart a sceptic, and still hold that he did not consider his analysis of arguments from experience destroys their usefulness. It can also be maintained that he believed that when we became aware of the true nature of causal inference we become sceptical about the validity of arguments from experience. In regard to fine points of interpretation such as these, however, it is undoubtedly true that Hume's philosophy will support all of them, and this is perhaps why it is so influential. Such minor differences of interpretation must be noted because they seem always to be involved in the relationship of philosophers like Keynes, Braithwaite, and Hobart to Hume. Each interpretation changes the question which each asks and each time we get a substantially different aspect of the need or lack of need, for logical justification of inductive reasoning. Hobart's second article is concerned with the question of whether Hume's analysis of cause and effect and his derivative position on arguments from experience justify doubt in the validity of inductive arguments. As we have seen, this is the main reason for positivist concern with Hume, and philosophers from J.S. Mill
to Reichenbach have assumed that it does justify doubt, and have presented their own justifications of induction. Hobart, like Braithwaite, is convinced that on the basis of Hume's analysis induction does not need the kind of justification these philosophers attempt to provide.

The discussion is not concerned with a justification or defence of the theory of causal inference presented in the first article, but rather with an attempt to determine why it is that this analysis is not accepted. In the case of causal inference the lack of acceptance is laid to the inability of the mind completely to accept the conception of analysis which Hume applies to causal inference. More directly Hobart attributes this lack of acceptance, or confusion, to the terms which Hume employs in his analysis. In this second sense, the words "sequence only" or "mere sequence" have come to designate cases where causal inference is not meant, and this obscures the fact that we have no other conception with which to think of causation than that of succession. When we speak of the dependence of one thing upon another or the "force" or "power" of cause we are speaking only in terms of strict laws of invariable succession; and when these laws of succession

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1. Reichenbach, H., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 305, "The Logical Foundations of the Concept of Probability," "I regard it as a particular merit of the new theory that it makes possible a solution of the problem of induction, for which no satisfactory philosophical solution had been known since David Hume's outstanding formulation of the problem."
disappear so also does the "power" or "force." "The idea of power is the idea of law."¹ The law does not follow from the power or force, as Braithwaite also pointed out, but it is the power or force which follows from the law.

We come now to the impact of analysis on the mind and the mind's subsequent rejection of Hume's analysis. This rejection is usually found in the assertion that such an analysis denies the rationality of the world, or as we have seen, that it removes the force or power from causal sequences. The real difficulty is that the principle of analysis is only half accepted, i.e. we want an explanation of the world but nonetheless insist that,

... there should be just one ultimate in the matter, namely the nature of substance, of which the world is composed; so that we might ... read off from this substance ... all the activities it would display. Now what Hume has enabled us to see is that to understand process we have to examine process, it is not enough to examine substance ... Just as truly do we take substance from experience so we take process from experience ... they are equally ultimate. ²

Thus the demand for the 'rationality' of the universe is really only a demand that all events be deducible from the nature of substance taken strictly in itself. This kind of thinking, Hobart points out, simply does not work and we wind up in the

¹. Hobart, p. 411.
². Hobart, p. 415.
position of having to say that 'the universe retains its rationality only if we think irrationally.' This only obscures the fact, however, that it is not the universe's business to be rational, it is ours, and in this respect Hume has ... "not taken the lynch pin out of the universe, but only the confusion out of philosophers' minds."

The insistence on the ultimacy of both substance and process forms the introduction to Hobart's last argument, that the nature of causal inference does not justify rational doubt about the validity of arguments from experience. He first points out that mathematical methods are nothing but methods of analysis and in that way are methods of systematizing our experience. They are not ways of conjuring knowledge out of the magician's hat for they tell us nothing about facts unless some universal synthetic proposition is assumed. "It is a pertinent question," continues Hobart, "why logicians ... will demonstrate their thesis triumphantly by sheerest ratiocination -- granted merely that they may avail themselves by way of a slight convenient assumption here and there about the future ..." The desire that induction be deduction Hobart aptly illustrates with quotations from Bertrand Russell, and he implies that Hume, in principle at least, expresses the same desire.

2. Hobart, p. 419.
3. Hobart, p. 420. Hume considered that inference from mere experience is irrational on the same ground, that it is not deductive, and hence he called his results sceptical.
But in the end, Hobart says, we find not a principle but a procedure, and it is this which we must accept as ultimate. "A vigilant procedure may be as truly ... ultimate ... for the mind as a principle," and its ultimate justification is that it works. It is irrational to want proofs for that which has the status of solid fact. "No proof could make it better in our eyes than fact." The problem does not even concern deduction, and the questions we must answer are practical ones such as "what is the nature of inference from experience; what are the nature of its standards," etc. It is this type of question which Hobart says Hume could have and should have answered.

The common characteristic which seems to have drawn forth these two re-affirmations and interpretations of Hume's causal theory has been criticism of that theory which neither Braithwaite nor Hobart thought conclusive. In Braithwaite's case the criticism was of various kinds and from various sources. Hobart's paper is a specific answer to the criticism of Hume's theory by the idealists and more particularly by Whitehead. In spite of the different stimuli we find Braithwaite, Hobart and F.P. Ramsey very much in agreement. All three would agree that there is a problem of induction, but not the problem which philosophers from the time of Hume

have been trying to solve. All three would agree with Hume that when we seek the justification of induction we seek it in the wrong place if we think it must be found in logical principles. Induction is not deduction and it is futile to try and make it such. These three writers would disagree as to exactly what causal propositions are, but it must be noted that their ideas in this respect are very close. It is in relation to the validity of causal propositions that all three believe it is wrong for Hume to consider his arguments of such sceptical import; and Braithwaite and Hobart also imply that even Hume is not free from the wish to make induction into deduction. They all think that Hume, instead of regarding his arguments in this negative light, could have, and should have, gone on to give a more complete and practical account of the implications of his analysis of inductive reasoning.

In one sense the consideration of these three philosophers has been a digression, as their views concerning induction are radically different from those thinkers more accurately designated as logical positivists. Philosophers such as Reichenbach and Carnap believe, or have believed, that a logical principle is indeed the answer to "the problem of Hume," and perhaps this is one gauge of the influence of Hume in their circle. If there is one characteristic which stands out among the philosophers generally called logical positivists, logical empiricists, or logical analysts it is their lack of unanimity on this point. J.S. Mill, Russell, and
the others mentioned have been uninfluenced by Hume, while Braithwaite, Hobart, and Ramsey have been very much influenced.

There are two characteristics of Braithwaite's and Hobart's treatment which open the door to further discussion. It was noted that each writer carefully confined himself to the defense of only one portion of Hume's philosophy. Braithwaite is careful to isolate his discussion of induction from the rest of Hume's philosophy; and Hobart says, "We shall assume for present purposes, as Hume does in this portion of his work, the existence in some true sense of a physical world." This assumption leads, indirectly perhaps, to Hobart's final position that both process and substance are ultimate. Now, in relation to Hume's philosophy this final position is peculiar, as it is just this position that led him to his most sceptical conclusions. These conclusions have more lately caused Hume to be labeled the "perfect pyrronist." The effect of Hume's theory of causation on his theory of the external world is not discussed by Braithwaite and Hobart. In the introduction to his study of Hume's theory of the external world Price says that many philosophers who otherwise acknowledge Hume as their master have ignored this portion of his philosophy. He adds that this is unfortunate as some of

1. Ramsey is excluded from this generalization as he did not specifically leave himself this loophole.
Hume's best analysis and last contributions to philosophy can be found here. Price criticizes Hume for assuming the existence of the external world in his analysis of causation, and for assuming the existence of a continuant self while analyzing both causation and the external world. This criticism can be applied equally well to Hume's modern disciples, Braithwaite and Hobart, with one extenuating circumstance; they tell us they are going to do it. But that they tell us they are going to do it before they do it does not obscure the fact that they do do it. If we accept Kemp Smith's interpretation, it is the conflicts between the natural belief in causation and the natural belief in the external world which involve Hume in his greatest problems. Also it is this conflict which results in some of Hume's most sceptical statements. At this point then, we turn from the consideration of the problems which Hume did not have to those which he did have.

In this chapter we have considered two further examples of what posterity has written: the attempt to link Hume historically with contemporary positivism, and the use by the positivists of Hume's theories about causation and induction. The first class of references were found to be unsupported by historical evidence. The historical ties between Hume and subsequent philosophical movements are, strangely enough, stronger between his philosophy and German idealism than
between his philosophy and empiricism. The wide interest in Hume's philosophy as a positive source of inspiration is strictly a contemporary phenomena for the positivists and empiricists.

We have seen that interpretation determined to some extent the way in which Keynes, Ramsey, Braithwaite and Hobart have used Hume's doctrines. Keynes received the least guidance from Hume because he saw in Hume's doctrines the basis for a pernicious scepticism, i.e. an attack on inductive reasoning. Ramsey, Braithwaite and Hobart believe that Hume draws over-sceptical conclusions from his doctrines, but, in contrast to Keynes, do not believe that the doctrines in themselves are of sceptical import. Their own conclusions reached through the use of Hume's doctrines are not, however, too far removed from those of Hume according to Kemp Smith's interpretation. But, although we may note the role which interpretation plays, no question of correct or incorrect interpretation arises in these cases. The differences can, rather, be ascribed to the wide nature of Hume's philosophy. In the following chapter the use of other Humean doctrines by the positivists will be discussed.

1. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, New York, 1950, p. 596. "Just as Berkeley's anti-materialistic philosophy was mainly influential as a step toward the naturalism of Hume, and as such still survives in the philosophies of John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Mach and Carl Pearson, so in turn Hume's anti-metaphysical theory of knowledge was destined to be one of the chief contributory sources of the German speculative movement."
CHAPTER VI

THE POSITIVIST USE OF HUME'S THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD, AND THE REFERENCE TO HUME'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER OF FACT AND RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEAS

Noting the lack of interest shown in Hume's theory of the external world by those who, in other matters, acknowledge Hume as their master, Price sets out to correct this situation. His study falls roughly into two parts: (1) the re-statement of Hume's theory of perception and the resolution of his sceptical doubts as to a possibility of a solution for the problem of the external world, and (2) the presentation, in the light of this re-statement, of a theory of the external world which he not only thinks is valid but which Hume would also accept. It must be evident, even from this abbreviated statement, that interpretation plays a large part in Price's study and that much of this material might well have been included in Chapter IV. As Price's re-interpretation and re-statement are very difficult to separate and as it is partly the presentation of his own ideas with those of Hume which lend interest to the study, it seems best to present them here as a unit.

The main point of the reformation of Hume's analysis of our idea of the external world is Price's contention that Hume simplifies and misrepresents the consciousness of the everyday man or, in Hume's words, the vulgar. On the other hand, Price thinks that Hume's important and original contribu-
tion in this part of the Treatise is his observation and speculation about the fragmentary or 'gappy' nature of experience. But even though Hume is the first philosopher to broach this important subject, the positive contributions he makes in the explanation of how the imagination overcomes fragmentary experience is vitiated by his original mistake. This mistake, according to Price, becomes most obvious when Hume attempts to assess the roles which constancy and coherence play in their influence upon the imagination. These features distinguish, for Hume, the fragmentary perceptions which we regard as having constant existence from those not so regarded. Hume represents the effects of constancy as a compounded illusion or mistake in the ordinary man's idea of the external world. This confusion first arises in connection with our idea of identity, which is itself a confusion between unity and temporal multiplicity, i.e. an object which is a unity is not supposed to change itself but is supposed to 'participate' in the changes which take place around it. In constancy our confusion is even greater as we not only ascribe identity to a single 'unchanging entity' but to two of these entities with a lapse in time between them. This process takes place as follows: there is an absence of qualitative difference between the two entities; our mental attitude is the same as it was in the case of identity; the passage of time is scarcely felt; and we have a smooth uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one resembling entity to the other and vice-versa.
As a result, the mind ignores the gaps between the two resembling impressions. This is only half the process, however, for if the mind could always overlook the gaps between resembling impressions the problem of the existence of the external world would never arise. As, however, some of these gaps cannot help but come to notice in our memory, the mind goes even farther and postulates additional particulars to fill up these gaps. For Price, even this simplified version of Hume's long and involved analysis is too complicated; the difficulty lies in Hume's original analysis of identity. Here Hume makes use of the term "constant uninterrupted perceptions," and Price insists that according to Hume's theory of perception (which he thinks is correct in principle at least) there is no such thing. Because of his theory that all ideas are derived from impressions Hume is "committed to an event theory of continuance," and hence, perceptions can give us an awareness of only a continuous series of impressions or events, the members of this series being much like one another, and not in the least like Hume's constant uninterrupted perceptions. According to Price, we know that our perceptions must be a series for two reasons: the perception of anything could have been interrupted at any time; and, though the perception may remain qualitatively the same, its relations change, and these are as real as any of its other characteristics. Thus

1. Price, p. 47.
what we postulate in the imaginative supplementation is not the uninterrupted continuance of an impression but a series of events going on while we are not observing it. What we ignore is the numerical difference between these events. It also follows that the Humean "constancy" is merely another name for a monotonous series of events.

This brings us to Price's criticism of Hume's account of the effects of coherence upon the imagination. It is easy to predict on the basis of the foregoing account of constancy that Price will find very little difference between the two principles. In considering the effects of coherence, Hume himself introduces the idea of a series, although it is a series of a slightly different kind than that introduced by Price in respect of constancy. In this case it is a variegated series as opposed to the monotonous series of constancy, and similarly, we fill in the missing parts of the series by postulating the existence of particulars which we have not observed. In ordinary language this might be called argument from analogy as it takes the following form: we have observed instances of ABCD repeatedly in the past; now we observe AB-D and postulate the existence of the unobserved particular C. This process is also, in some respects, similar to causal reasoning but is different in that it concerns only broken series and not constant conjunctions. For Hume it is also different from constancy, because he does not attribute the influence of coherence to a confusion or mistake but to an
original tendency or principle of the mind; in Price's words, to the inertia principle. Price thinks that this principle may also be discarded along with the confusion and mistake of constancy.

Because of Hume's original mistake or over-simplification in the analysis of the perception of the vulgar, it is Price's opinion that we must entirely discard Hume's positive account of the effects of constancy and coherence on the imagination. What we then have left is the empirical fact that all of our impressions are fragmentary and that many of them are "gap-indifferent." The question still remains as to what characteristics impressions are to have if they are to be gap-indifferent. Price's answer (and he thinks it is perfectly consistent with Hume's philosophical position) is that the supplementive principle, on the basis of gap-indifference, is the assimilation of one sense given complex to another, or the assimilation of a partial form AB-DE to a complete form ABCDE. He calls this process the "assimilation of complexes" or "the assimilation of series." Within this process there are two different kinds of assimilation: that in which a complete series is given in experience and the interrupted series recalls the complete one; and a more complicated kind in which a complete or standard series is never given in experience. We may have experienced A-D or -B-D but we have never experienced ABCD in that precise form. What we do here, according to Price, is to assimilate not the broken series with the
complete one, but the fragmentary series with one another; and in this process the differences in the fragmentary series are as important as their resemblances. The gaps cannot always appear at the same places. Another modification which must be introduced to account for the ordinary man's consciousness is that co-existent with gap-indifferent forms, there must be succession-indifferent forms; for we only see one aspect of an object at a time and it is "succession-indifference" which gives our perceptions their three dimensional quality over and above their persistence through time.

What the ordinary man does finally conceive of as the external world or as material objects is a continuing form or family of sensed particulars or sensibilia, and this is in no way different from what is given in experience. It is true, says Price, that we are not always perfectly conscious of the exact determination of this form or family but we do regard it as exactly what it is in experience. Hume is right insofar as he says that the vulgar do not regard it as fleeting representations of something different, we know not what.

At this point few will argue that Price has not proved his thesis that Hume over-simplifies the consciousness of the vulgar. There is one point, however, which must be questioned. It seems that his ground for discarding Hume's inertia-theory as superfluous is his view that constancy and coherence are the same thing. The question is not whether
they are the same, but whether Price's principle of assimilation by convergence and superposition can be explained without the assumption of some sort of principle which must be very like Hume's inertia theory. Why is it that the imagination notes the filled parts of the forms of experience and assimilates them to other filled and unfilled parts of experience? We do not merely assimilate with no general principle to guide us. If Price answers simply that it is a fact of experience that the mind works thus, is this any more than Hume claims? There is this principle of symmetry and it is a matter of experience that the mind does work in this way.

We now turn to the second aspect of the problem. Here, we find that Price's critical discussion depends largely on the way in which this section of Hume's philosophy is interpreted. It is held by Kemp Smith, as well as more recently by Popkin, that this part of the Treatise is meant to be purely destructive. Although they disagree as to Hume's ultimate intentions, they agree that the specific aim of this section is to show that no positive theory of the origin or nature of our sense data is tenable. Price makes the assumption (and this is not to say that the assumption has no basis in Hume's philosophy nor that it is absolutely incorrect), and bases the first sections of his argument on it, that Hume means to present the "generative theory of percep-

tion" as a true one. Once this assumption is made it is not difficult for Price to show that the theory is untenable for two reasons: (1) the empirical evidence which Hume presents in support of his contention that "our sensible impressions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits" at best only proves that some of the time some of our impressions are either partially or wholly dependent in this way; and (2) the generative theory ultimately proves false the premises on which it rests. Here we can compare Price's criticism with a passage from Kemp Smith to show that he thinks Hume is maintaining just what Price is criticizing. At the end of this passage, however, we find Price admitting that this may be just Hume's point and we find further support of this interpretation in C.D. Broad.

Hume maintains that we unreflectively adopt a selective theory of the external world, while experience shows

1. Price contrasts the generative with the selective theory of perception. The former states that insofar as we can determine, the external world is dependent on sense perception for its actual existence, perception generates its objects. The latter theory holds that the external world exists and perception selects particulars from it.


3. Price, "It [the generative theory] can only be stated in the 'realistic' language of eyes and fingers, sense organs, nerves and animal spirits ... And yet if we do state it so we land in an intolerable paradox." p. 120.

4. "... but the two [the natural beliefs in the external world in causality] turn out to be in irreconcilable conflict with one another; in acquiescing in the first belief we run ... in the face of all the supposedly rational ... consequences of the causal postulate." Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of Hume, p. 127.

us that our perceptions are at least partially dependent on "our organs and the disposition of our animal spirits." Further, it is by definition impossible to prove that all our perceptions are absolutely not dependent in this way. It seems to follow, also, that we know without doubt that some of our perceptions are physiologically and psychologically dependent, and this seems to cast doubt on all the rest of our perceptions, although in a majority of cases we would not be able to actually prove they are psychologically dependent. From the nature of the problem we see that, although it is possible to amass a certain amount of evidence in support of the generative theory, it is impossible to collect any evidence at all in support of the selective theory. The most one could say is that, in many cases, perhaps a large majority of cases, it is impossible to prove the selective theory false. But this for Price is meaningless support. Price makes a mistake in assuming that evidence against the generative theory is evidence for the selective theory. What he might have said, had he not thought that Hume was presenting the generative theory as true, is that the generative theory, while supported to some extent by experience, is logically unsound, and the selective theory, supported by no evidence nor any method of obtaining evidence, is unverifiable and, hence, meaningless. But this position would probably be considered a pyrrhonism as bad as Hume's.

Price, in any case, takes a different position.
Since there is some evidence to support the generative theory, and it is impossible to prove the selective theory false, he supposes there is reason to believe that they both are partly true. He notes that we all distinguish between perceptions which seem to be more or less physiologically and psychologically conditioned, and it seems in every day life we use a kind of scale. The generative theory is at one end of this scale and the selective theory is at the other, and our perceptions never actually reach the generative level at the one end, nor the purely selective level at the other. Thus we see that the two theories represent differences in degree rather than kind. For Price perception consists of portions or sections of series of events, and it is not logically impossible that these series go on both before and after perception has taken place. It is obvious, however, that the perceived events in a given series are somewhat different from the unperceived events, and because of this the generative theory can never be completely eliminated. It is also obvious, for Price, that some perceived events in certain series are very similar to those events which proceed and follow them and some are very different from those which precede and follow them. We find the former at the selective end of the scale while the latter are found at the generative end. The only remaining

1. One wonders if it could not be argued that there are purely generative perceptions but is reminded of Bradley and Bosenquet's position on falsity. Every statement must touch upon reality at some point, however obscure. In this case we would have to say that every perception is to some degree selective, however small the degree.
problem is to find out whether a given number of events is more like those which we presume proceed and follow them or less like those which proceed and follow them. Price maintains that we do have criteria for determining the degree of similarity and dis-similarity, namely his doctrines of gap-
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-indifference and spatial synthesizability. We now see that the whole question of the existence of unsensed sensibilia involves merely a confusion about questions of origin and continuity. Once we understand that the main question is whether the series of events resemble those events which proceed and follow them to a greater or lesser degree, the question of the origin of these events "now becomes a question of detail." 2

Leaving aside this theory, Price now asks us to assume that Hume's empirical evidence does not, in fact, throw any doubt on the selective theory. How then would Hume answer the question, do unsensed sensibilia exist? Price believes that at this point Hume is forced into the position that he should have assumed, and almost did assume, at the beginning of his discussion, which opens with the following statement, "We may well ask what causes induce us to believe in the

1. Both of these doctrines, if I interpret Price rightly, are ultimates of experience. Speaking of spatial synthesizability Price says "This characteristic of them [families of sense data] is just as much given as colour or shape.... It seems to me no more in need of explanation than colour or shape -- and no more likely to get it." H.H. Price, Perception, London, 1950, p. 217. We have already seen that gap-indifference is a 'fact of experience.'

existence of body but 'tis vain to ask whether body exists or not." As we have seen in his investigation of the first clause of the sentence, Price disposes of explanations which Hume presents, and the notice of gap-indifferent series is the only positive value of Hume's treatment of the effects of coherence and uniformity on the imagination. The second clause represents, for Price, what Hume's true position must be. He says that Hume, by this clause, can only mean that questions concerning the existence of unsensed sensibilia are meaningless, as such questions are by definition unverifiable. But the matter cannot be left thus, for although questions about the existence of unsensed sensibilia are meaningless, material object statements play an important role in our language and it is imperative that we be able to say whether or not they are true or false. If we accept Price's interpretation of the second clause of the sentence quoted, we see that the question which Hume should have answered is of a logical and linguistic rather than a psychological nature. What is needed is a theory of language which will explain how it is possible to make meaningful statements, i.e. verifiable statements, about material objects, if questions about the actual existence of material objects are by definition unverifiable.

The first theory which Price presents as a way out of this difficulty is the 'as if' theory, which states that with-

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in the syntactical form of our language it is meaningful to say that a certain sense data is as if a certain material object existed, although any statement about the actual existence of that object would be neither true nor false. Accordingly all realistic propositions of the material object type, such as 'I see a piece of paper,' are abbreviated forms of the $s$ (sense data) is as if $P$ (material object) proposition. In its completed form such statements state that my present perceptions (a white patch) are the same as they would be if they were members of a certain sort of a complex and spatially-unified group of sensibilia (a piece of paper) which goes on whether I am sensing it or not.

Price illustrates many of the difficulties which arise in the adoption of this theory, but once it is admitted that there can be degrees of 'as if-ness' most of these difficulties are disposed of. There is, however, one criticism which he raises against Hume's account of the effects of coherence and uniformity on the imagination which he does not consider in connection with his own theory. The 'as if' process obviously enters into our language at its very lowest levels. The child pointing at a teddy bear is the basic illustration of the 'as if' theory, and to paraphrase Price, it is incredible that the vulgar -- the children and peasants -- have passed through this labyrinth of 'abbreviation' whenever they attribute continued existence to a 'hat, shoe or store.'

1. Price, p. 45.
One story (Hume's) seems to be about as much of a nightmare in this respect as the other (Price's). But it is obvious that Price's criticism of Hume and my criticism of Price are pointless. Hume cannot be criticized on the grounds that his explanation of the "causes which induce us to believe in an external world" are too complicated for the reflective processes, as he is explicit in stating that this process depends not at all on reflective processes. We believe in the existence of the external world naturally and spontaneously, and in fact, in Hume's eyes, we do so in the face of a certain amount of contrary evidence. The unreflective belief in the external world is a natural belief which we cannot abandon, except perhaps in the privacy of our study, even in the face of this evidence. As for my criticism of Price, it is pointless largely for the same reason. Price never says that anyone actually reflectively goes through the process of 'as if' abbreviation. It is merely that the syntax of our language, if we are to explain how we make meaningful material object statements, is such that we unconsciously fall into this kind of abbreviation. Perhaps what Price would say is that the language lends itself so naturally to abbreviation that it is only at a more advanced philosophical stage that we become aware of our habits of language. His criticism of Hume's theory as too complicated, merely on the grounds of its complexity, is even more surprising when we find later that he

rejects such a criticism of an even more complex phenomenalist account of external object language. Here he specifies his reasons for rejecting such an argument, and it seems that the same reasons would have led him to reject a similar argument in respect to Hume.

The major difficulty Price finds confronting the 'as if' theory is much the same as that which F.P. Ramsey brings against the causal theory of Braithwaite, that it does not enable us to say in what way material object sentences, having no possibility of de facto verification, can be true or false. Ramsey finds that Braithwaite's causal theory affords no methods of dealing with unknown, that is, de facto unknown, causal laws except by referring to them as meaningless. Price finds that the 'as if' theory, unless it is modified, affords no way of attributing truth or falsity to de facto unverifiable material object statements, except to refer to them as meaningless. This difficulty only applies to specific material object statements, as general material object statements are genuine examples of the 'as if' theory.\(^1\) Specific material object statements of this type still present a difficulty and Price finds that he must modify the 'as if' theory to some

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1. "Our sense-impressions are as if there were a vast and complicated world of sensible particulars, having a determinate structure. But they are also as if the vast majority of these particulars were not sensed by anyone; and they are even as if very many of these particulars were such that we have no evidence as to their specific qualities and relations." P. 169.
extent. The modification consists in the addition of another 'if' clause to the 'as if' formula. The formula now takes the form that $s$ is as if $p$, if $p$ were checked by actual sense experience, but the explanation which he advances for this special kind of material object sentence is in no wise different from the phenomenalist explanation of all material object statements. The special form of the 'as if' theory required for these statements includes directions for the verification of the sense data asserted to exist, and it is the phenomenalist position that all material object statements, or those statements which assert the existence of unsensed sensibilia, include these directions. The abbreviation is merely greater in the phenomenalist account than in the 'as if' theory. Price points out in respect to the phenomenalist theory that the 'hypothetical sense-impressions' (used to supplement gap-indifferent series as opposed to Hume's unsensed sensibilia) themselves lead to unending series of hypothetical 'ifs,' and one can never reach the end of the abbreviation. He says it is probable that the phenomenalist thinks of unsensed-sensibilia in the first place and then changes them or infers from them the hypothetical sense-impressions. But in spite of these objections to phenomenalism, the 'as if' theory must become phenomenalist to account for the truth and falsity of unknown material object statements, and the choice between the two theories narrows really to the question of the amount of abbreviation in material object statements.
Price's second method of solving Hume's problem, while of a purely linguistic nature, is much more Humean in its conception. In labeling it the 'expressive' theory, Price is extending Ramsey's theory of causation to the problem of the existence of external world. The expressive theory states that general material object sentences, such as 'there is an external world,' include two different statements. First, they 'give expression to' certain kinds of mental processes, i.e. the activities of our minds in the coordination of our sense data. Second, they state that there are sense data to which these processes apply. When we become aware of these two components of general material object sentences we understand why arguments as to their truth or falsity seem "silly" and why, if forced to argue, it seems less silly to affirm than to deny them. The first component, that they "give expression to mental processes," is not a statement to which truth or falsity can be applied, as we cannot say that a process is true or false. We can say that it works or does not work but not that it is true or false. The second component of the general material object sentence, the affirmation that there are sense data to which these processes apply, is so obvious an empirical fact that no one can meaningfully deny it. That there are gap and succession-indifferent series of sense data is why the whole question of the external world arises, and in this empirical fact that we have the roots of the 'vulgar' affirmative answer to questions about the truth or falsity
of general material object statements, and why, even for philosophers, it seems "less silly" to answer in the affirmative.

Specific material object sentences, words, and phrases, according to this theory, are the specific instances of the habit or process of supplementation to which they give expression. They are formulae, recipes, or "dodges" for coordinating our fragmentary sense data, and each of us has a great number of such formulae, depending of course, on the size of our material object vocabulary. These formulae, as with the general process of which they are the specific instances, are neither true nor false. Second order true or false statements can be made about them, but strictly speaking we do not negate the formulae but discard them when they prove to be of no use in the coordination of our sense data.

We now arrive at the nature of this coordination of our sense data. In Ramsey's theory of causation, causal language is concerned solely with predication. Is this the case with material object language? Price says that it is not, for two reasons. First, material object language is not only concerned with prediction but with "retrodiction" and "justadiction." Second and basically, material object language does not predict sense impressions, as does causal language, but predicts, retrodicts, and justadicts sensibilia or unsensed sense impressions. It does not say that sense impressions will be observed, but that they would or could be observed. In this sense material object language is not a process of predicting
sense impressions but a process of accommodating them should they arise. It is a method of fitting possible new sense data into a system, the sensibilia with which we supplement our fragmentary sense data being the framework to which we attach those data. As for the unobserved sense objects which troubled the 'as if' theory, they are explained in much the same way as they were in that theory. Sentences of the unobserved material object type always include directions or instructions for their possible verification. If they were checked by actual sense impressions, the actual sense impressions would be coordinated by the material object sentence, word, or phrase used. Since the expressive theory is not one of abbreviation, it does not run the risk of being confused with a phenomenalist theory as did the 'as if' theory.

Two suppositions are required for the imaginative supplementation process expressed by material object language. The first is that the selective theory of perception is true. This assumption is necessary because, if we are to coordinate sense data, we must have something (not sensibilia) to coordinate. We cannot test our imaginatively constructed system unless we assume with the vulgar that sense impressions exist independently of our perception of them. The second supposition is that the mind has the tendency to interpolate the facts of experience and to reject the interpolations which are not 'fitting.' In Price’s words, "the mind brings to experience," (1) the assumption that this experience is not
sense dependent, (2) the tendency to interpolate certain types of experience, namely, gap and succession-indifferent series, and (3) the further tendency to reject or accept these interpolations depending on their 'fittingness,' or in idealist terminology, their 'coherence,' and in pragmatist terminology, their 'usefulness.'

In reviewing Price's theories and his treatment of these sections of the Treatise, it is not our object to point out the defects, if such there be, in those theories. If we are to give a linguistic account of material object language, it is clear that the two alternative theories presented by Price are eminently satisfactory. It is likewise clear that, of the two theories, the expressive theory is much more Humean in character as it at least emphasizes the existence of the factors which "the mind brings to experience," or, alternatively, "the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of the external world" other than those given in sense perception.

The question which must be answered when we consider the relationship of Price and Hume is whether the answers (two linguistic analyses of material object language) which Price gives are the answers in which Hume is interested. Does not Price in his interpretation of Hume commit the latter to positions which he might not have necessarily accepted, and as a result answer not Hume's question but his own?

1. Here I adopt much the same position as that of Ralph Church in his review of Price's work in the Philosophical Review of 1943, p. 317. This view has been expressed, however, by others much more sympathetic to Price's book than Church.
The process of substituting his own question for that of Hume is most evident in Price's interpretation of Hume's original formulation of the problem. What causes induce us to believe in the existence of an external world?—becomes for Price—what characteristics of sensory experience necessitate our belief in the external world? This, of course, changes the nature of the answer expected. Hume wishes to know why we attribute continued existence to external objects, whereas Price merely says the only possible answer to his question is that we observe gap and succession—indifferent series of sense data. Price says, in further support of his view, that Hume's question is too psychological. But even if Hume's question is too psychological, is that justification for substituting another question and calling it Hume's?

A second instance of the 're-reading' concerns the second clause of the passage just quoted above. Hume says "'tis vain to ask whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." Here it must be admitted that Price makes a good case for his interpretation that all Hume can mean is that questions about the existence of the external world, or unsensed sensibilia, are by definition incapable of being answered. What Price fails to note is that another interpretation, which is in many ways simpler, is held by a good many philosophers and that they make out an equally good case for their version. By this interpretation Hume now is held to be interested in belief, and
that in this particular passage he is admitting that he must work within this particular belief, or, that our reasoning at all times presupposes the existence of the external world. Hume is, in effect, warning us of the paradox which results. He finds himself forced to use realistic language to formulate his argument, yet the conclusions of that argument contradict the suppositions of this realistic language. The existence of the external world is a belief which is not by definition unverifiable but one which is, for Hume, verifiably false, and even if Price has completely refuted (and I cannot see that he has) the evidence which Hume presents against this belief, the question still remains, what are the causes which induce us to go beyond the evidence of our senses and attribute a continued existence to the external world?

These criticisms are of minor importance, however, and could easily be remedied by the placing of a footnote here and there noting the existence of alternative interpretations. Hume's philosophy, particularly in the type of scrutiny and "imaginative supplementation" which Price gives it, will support various interpretations. It would have perhaps been better had Price noted this. The major criticism of Price's work is more fundamental, being noted by hostile critics such as Church and those friendly to the book such as A.C. Ewing; the book's title is a misnomer and the positive theory which Price

presents should not have been attached to Hume's name in the first place. There is much to be said for this view and it is, for these philosophers, the work's major flaw. There is no doubt that when we study the Treatise we find theories of various kinds. Many philosophers have believed that a theory of perception can be found in the Treatise but all who believe this have found the theory of perception extremely faulty. Not only that, but if Hume's doctrine of impressions and ideas is taken as a theory of perception, it can be shown to be faulty by any first year student of philosophy, and Huxley's question as to whether or not Hume could have meant to build such an imposing epistemological edifice on such shaky psychological foundations is certainly justified. There are three main ways, and we have seen examples of all three, of regarding Hume's theory of impressions and ideas. (1) It is possible to regard it as a faulty theory of perception and then carry the faults of this theory over into Hume's other theories and show how incapable it is of supporting them. This is Green's method. (2) It is possible to regard it as a faulty theory of perception and pay no further attention to it. This is the method of Braithwaite. (3) It is possible to regard it as a "logical tool," a method of determining logical priority and the method by which Hume brings us to his analysis of accusation, the external world, the self, and his constructive theory of belief. This is the method of Hendel; it is also supported
Now we may ask, how does Price regard Hume's theory of impressions and ideas? The key sentence in this respect is one already quoted, "Hume's whole theory of knowledge -- the fact that he starts from impressions and will admit no idea not derivable from them -- commits him to what is called an Event-Theory of Continuance." Taken in itself this statement might not mean much more than Hendel's and Ayer's "logical tool," but what we actually find Hume committed to in the remainder of the book is Price's theory of perception. From this point onwards the discussion is carried on in terms of "series," of "series of particulars," "series of unsensed particulars" and "unsensed sensibilia." In other words an "even-theory" of perception. This is not a criticism of Price's theory of perception but only a question as to whether he is justified, on the basis of Hume's theory of impressions and ideas, in committing Hume to it. Does Hume's philosophy need a theory of perception? If so Price does not show that it does, and this is partially the grounds for Church's, B.M. Laing's and Ewing's suggestions that Price's theories be divorced from Hume.

2. Price, p. 47.
The other ground for these suggestions lies in the very title of the book itself, *Hume’s Theory of the External World*. There is a great deal in Hume’s philosophy, and this whole thesis has been mainly concerned with the dispute over what is and what is not in his philosophy. One thing which most commentators would agree on, however, is that there is no theory of the external world. To be sure there is a theory about our belief in the external world, but this is not the same as a theory of the external world, a fact which is obviously true from even a casual examination of the theories which Price presents. They are not to be found in imperfect form in the pages of the *Treatise* nor can it even be said that they are suggested by what is found in the *Treatise*. They are suggested, rather, by the writings of the modern empiricists, and the 'as if' and expressive theories cannot be said to be more than linguistic explanations of the way in which we use material object language. Indeed, this is perhaps their greatest virtue, but in any case they do not provide a substitute for Hume’s theory of belief.

Price could have avoided these criticisms of his relationship to Hume merely by following the example of Braithwaite, Ramsey and Hobart. Braithwaite considers the problem of belief, but strictly limits his analogical relation to Hume. Ramsey says that Hume looks for the impression of necessary connection and in so doing departs from the question which he (Ramsey) asks. Ramsey says that he does not know
whether or not there is such an impression; and Hobart dis-
missses the whole question of a theory of belief as "mere psy-
chology." None of them attempt the attribution of their own
views to Hume. This attribution is at best a very uncertain
process.

We must also mention in this context the forerunner
to Price's linguistic theories, the sense data theory generally attributed to Bertrand Russell. The terminology used by
Russell in presenting his theory in Our Knowledge of the Ex-
ternal World bears a great resemblance to that used by Hume in
the Treatise, and it is important to determine if this resem-
bance stems from an historical or derivative relationship.
There are two factors which lead us to suspect that the resem-
bance is due to the fact that Hume and Russell are merely
talking about the same problem. The first reason which would
lead to this conclusion is that it is impossible to specify
the nature of this derivation or historical influence. Russell
gives the impression that the influences which lead him to the
formation of his "hard sense-data theory" were the works of
Frege and Whitehead, and discussions with Wittgenstein. In
another context Russell acknowledges a more general debt to
Hume, but in such a technical matter as the hard sense-data the-
ory he is never mentioned.

2. Russell, Bertrand, Our Knowledge of the External World,
London, 1914, p. 235. Here Russell mentions Hume's dis-
cussion of causation.
The second and more basic reason which leads us to believe that the terminological likeness between Hume and Russell is merely superficial lies in the nature of the sense-data theory itself. The theory is one which seeks to explain how, given certain sense impressions, physical objects necessary for science can be logically constructed from them. It is Russell's objective to explain how, if we had no belief in the existence of external objects, this belief could be logically justified. Hume, on the other hand, begins with our belief in the external world and tries not only to explain how we come by this belief, but also what its effects are.

The differences between the theories of Russell, Hume, and Price may be clearer if we contrast them in the following way. Hume is concerned with the causes which induce us to go beyond the evidence of the senses and believe in the existence of the external world. Russell is concerned with the problem: given certain types of sense perceptions, by what method is it possible logically to construct material objects. Price wishes to render material object language syntactically consistent.

Price, Hume, and Russell are similar in the following ways: they are all concerned with the same general problem, each thinks that he is attacking the basic aspect of the problem of the external world, and each is primarily concerned with sense experience. It is probably this last similarity which results in the use, by all three, of similar terminology.
As we have seen in the case of Price, attempts to carry the analogy further are dangerous because of the tendency to misrepresent Hume's position and the tendency to substitute other questions for those asked by Hume, and then attribute the answers to Hume. In Russell's case we find not only that he is concerned with the objects of science rather than the objects of everyday life, but also that Russell, in seeking logical justification, looks for that which Hume concludes is impossible to find.

Another problem which Hume himself finds most perplexing and with which he publicly expresses dissatisfaction, is his treatment of personal identity. We find that the positivists, on what we have called the general level in Chapter IV, are interested in this problem and tend to identify their views with those of Hume. A very early example of this in positivist literature is to be found in Ernst Mach's *Analysis of Sensations*. Here Mach identifies the views of Hume and Ribot concerning the ego (in Hume's case the self) with his

1. On page four of this work, in speaking of the ego, Mach gives the following reference to the *Treatise* -- Vol. I, Part IV. He gives no indication of what edition of the *Treatise* this reference refers to, so it is uncertain just which passage he means. In the Selby-Bigge edition, and hence the first edition, this page (186) discusses the nature of belief in the sceptical arguments regarding reason. As Mach is referring to the attribution by Ribot of "the principle role in the continuity of the ego to the general sensibility" (page 4) it is difficult to see how Mach could be referring to this passage. The Green & Grose edition is almost identical on Part IV, page 6, with the Selby-Bigge edition. As yet I have not been able to locate a copy of the 1826 edition of the *Treatise* and it is this edition which one may suppose Mach to have used.
own. Later in the work Mach identifies the views of Hume and Lichtenberg with his own demand that "the [observer] should consider the ego to be nothing at all, and should resolve into a transitory connexion of changing events." Mach, however, never goes beyond this tentative equation of Hume's views with his own and never discusses the Appendix to the Treatise.

There are no positivist studies of Hume's theory of personal identity of the type that Ramsey, Braithwaite, and Hobart give to his theory of causation and Price to his account of the external world. The problem of Hume's philosophy is for the positivists only two-thirds solved, with perhaps the most difficult aspect remaining. They, like Hume, assume the existence of the external world when talking about causation and the existence of a continent self when talking about causation and the external world. The only work in which we find a positivist advocating Hume's theory of personal identity while taking into account his rejection of that theory is Ayer's Language Truth and Logic. Ayer's argument is too briefly and inconsistently stated to be considered on a level with the arguments we have been considering in Chapters V and VI, but through a re-statement and amplification of it we can perhaps observe the course a linguistic account of personal identity might take.

Ayer says that the positivists "... have solved

Hume's problem by defining personal identity in terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense data. "To say anything about the self is always to say something about sense experiences; and our [the positivists] definition of personal identity is intended to show how this reduction (from statements about self to statements about sense-experiences) could be made." This doctrine is combined with a further principle which asserts that no sense experience can be a member of two life histories. The first difficulty which a theory resting on these principles must face is the escape from solipsism, and to see how Ayer does this, his theory must be re-stated.

First, we must understand just what Ayer is trying to do.

Ayer is attempting to give a linguistic account of personal identity: he is trying to formulate a theory which will render our "same person and other person language" syntactically consistent. He begins this theory by analysing 'same person' or 'I and me' statements, and maintains that they are always translatable into statements about the resemblance and continuity of sense contents. Sense contents are by

3. We must assume this, as the only evidence he gives in support of his argument is linguistic. See p. 127.
4. By other person language we mean in particular the pronouns you, them, they, etc. as well as statements about the existence of others in more general terms. Same person language is mainly concerned with the use of personal pronouns I, me, etc.
definition restricted to one life history: "it is logically impossible for a sense-experience to belong to the sense history of more than a single self." But here in his analysis of 'same person' language the imputation of solipsism first arises, but we see that because Ayer himself refers to this difficulty as solipsism he expresses himself very poorly. Instead, it is really a question about the use of language, and his problem is the syntactical form of 'other person' language. Given that the foregoing is a correct analysis of 'same person' language, how are 'other person' statements to be affirmed or negated? We see that questions about the data upon which 'same person' statements rest are meaningless when applied to 'other person' propositions. As a sense-experience cannot be a member of two life histories such questions are, by definition incapable of being answered.

To solve this difficulty Ayer introduces an 'as if' theory of 'other person' language. 'Other person' statements are of the type, P is as if it were possessed of C: or, a sense content I now have is as if it were possessed of the same consciousness which I possess myself; or again, a thing which I call George is as if it were a self-conscious human being such as I am myself. It is not as if it were a robot obeying certain laws of physics, nor is it as if it were a vegetable following certain biological trends.

"... one cannot in any sense observe the existence of other people, one can nevertheless infer their existence with a high degree of probability from one's own experiences." 1 Or that "... my observation of a body whose behavior resembled the behavior of my own body would entitle me to think it probable that that body was related to a self which I could not observe, in the same way as my body was related to my own observable self." 2

We must, of course, re-interpret Ayer's use of phrases such as "high degree of probability" and "entitled to think it probable." Neither we nor Ayer are talking about the use of logic but rather about the use of language. If Ayer insists on the phrases just quoted we should be forced to consider his explanation vitiated, because the point of the argument is just that we are not entitled to infer the existence of other selves. Such inferences are by definition impossible of verification and hence, meaningless.

To continue with the theory, in the case of general other person statements, the 'as if' theory works perfectly satisfactorily. We have the evidence of myriads of other things acting as if they were conscious beings like ourselves, and we also have the evidence of the complicated social organizations which can only be explained in terms of self-conscious human beings. In any case, general other person statements are

1. Ayer, p. 128.
seldom objects of dispute. As for particular other person statements, the 'as if' theory works equally well and also clarifies some of the ways in which we use these statements. We see that there is no single factor upon which the 'as ifness' of these statements depend. Let us consider for example, the physical form common to the species "homo sapiens." Is this an indispensable concomitant of any 'other person' statement? We could almost say that it is until we consider the possibility of life on other planets. Here we find no contradiction in saying that a man on Mars might have a definitely non-human shape. This holds true for all the particular manifestations of sense data upon which this type of statement depends and no one factor can be singled out as constituting the essence of other person 'as ifness.' Their 'as ifness' depends, rather, on the context in which specific 'other person language' sentences are used.

But even though the 'as if' theory works well enough in 'other person' language, it fails as a theory of same person language. We find that it is not applicable. We cannot meaningfully say, "I am as if I were a conscious being," because the 'as if' in this statement is merely redundant. It presupposes the knowledge of what being a conscious being is like, and yet the only way it is possible to attain this knowledge is through our own experience. The only meaningful same person statement is "I am a conscious being," yet on what basis are we to affirm or negate this type of statement?
With this difficulty in mind let us go back to Ayer's original statements about same person language: that to say anything about the self is always to say something about sense experiences, and also that personal identity is to be defined in terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents. Now it is obvious that both these statements will have to be radically modified before they can be accepted.

When we use same person language what is it we say about sense experience? Is there not another equally important factor to which we refer, namely what the mind does with sense experience? To use Price's words again, the sentence, "I am a conscious being," is a compound statement. First, it states that I have sense experience and, second, it "gives expression" to the way in which the mind treats this sense experience. When Ayer says that personal identity is to be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents, we may presume that he is talking about the former aspect of same person statements. But when he goes on to say that he has "vindicated" Hume's contention that it is necessary to give a phenomenalist account of the nature of the self," we can conclude that he is talking nonsense in more ways than one.

First, Hume made no such contention. It is Hume's contention throughout the section on personal identity that such an account, far from being necessary, is impossible.

This is amply attested by one of many of Hume's own definitions of personal identity: "that [personal] identity is nothing ... belonging to these different perceptions [Ayer's sense-contents] and uniting them together; but is merely a quality we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect on them." This is but one of Hume's definitions and we see that it is in imaginative rather than phenomenological terms.

The second way in which Ayer may be wrong in saying that we must give a phenomenological account of the self is that his own definition of personal identity is itself not in phenomenological terms. This difficulty revolves around the question of whether or not the relations of resemblance and continuity are phenomenal; that is, are we aware of the resemblance and continuity of sense data merely through observation or do these terms refer to Price's "dodges" or formulae?

Do they not "give expression" to processes of the mind? Hume would perhaps take the former position, but even granting Ayer this, it must be emphasized that what is referred to here is not the resemblance and continuity of the external world but the continuity and resemblance of sense contents. Can we give a phenomenological account of this resemblance and continuity? It would seem that the continuity and resemblance of sense contents is something we add to sense experience and not something given in sense experience.

Our discussion has indicated that the expressive theory suggested by Price in connection with the problem of external world terminology might also serve as a theory of same person language. Again we may say that in the discussion of Ayer's treatment of the problem it has only been our objective to point out the direction such a theory might take. One thing should be made clear, however, and that is the importance of maintaining a sharp distinction between what is Hume, and what is added to Hume. It would also be of assistance if alternative interpretations are at least noted. Further, it should be emphasized that the linguistic answer is not the answer to Hume's problem but an answer to the linguistic aspect of Hume's problem. That the positivists consider Hume's answer to his problem too psychological need not obscure the fact that he gave this answer.

Aside from the pitfalls which the expressive theory itself encounters the most propitious beginning for such a theory might be a thorough analysis of the Appendix to the Treatise. To say, as Ayer does, that Hume found himself unable to perceive any real connection among innumerable distinct impressions is merely to parrot Hume's conclusions without knowing why he came to them. What would be of the greatest utility would be the answers to the questions: In what manner is Hume dissatisfied with his own theory, and how may this dissatisfaction be overcome? It is clear that he thought
a solution possible.

The third general type of reference to Hume, based on a comparison, not of any particular doctrine, but of the positivists' and Hume's general philosophic objective, is best illustrated in the opening essay of a collection of positivist articles entitled *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*. Feigl contrasts the schools of thought which he says have characterized the history of philosophy. On the one hand are the philosophers who have a "... respect for the facts of experience, an experimental trial and error method, and the capacity for working in an incomplete and unfinished world view." On the other hand, are the philosophers who have no regard for the facts of experience, are not open minded, and who tend toward all sorts of "dilettantish and quackish" projects. In the one camp reside the exponents of Empiricism, Naturalism, Positivism, and Pragmatism; in the other the exponents of Speculative Metaphysics, Intuitionalism, Rationalism, and Absolute Idealism. Hume is regarded as the proponent, par excellence, of the first group.

1. Hume, *Treatise*, S.B. edition, "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile these contradictions," p. 636.
3. Feigl, p. 4.
4. It is perhaps noteworthy that Feigl's sentence is constructed so that the former group is capitalized and the latter group is not.
On a superficial examination, there seems to be little to recommend this method of interpreting the history of philosophy. In Hume's case the method has already been used by T.H. Green, but from a different philosophical standpoint. Green attributed the aspects of Hume's philosophy with which he disagreed to defects in Hume's character, while this author, in a more sweeping manner, attributes the aspects of which he approves to the excellence of Hume's character. Undoubtedly Hume would have agreed that there is some truth in each approach, but would have gone on to insist that neither furnishes an adequate basis for the explanation of his philosophical outlook. We are even further impressed by the inadequacy of Feigl's principle when we consider other figures in the history of philosophy. It is not true that Bradley and Bosanquet were unable to work in an incomplete world order. In fact, on most interpretations it is their insistence on our partial and incomplete knowledge of the world which characterized their philosophy. Further, even the positivists in recent years have come to admit that metaphysical and theological thinking is not entirely analogous to animistic, magical, and mythological thinking, and they do not entirely

1. As Feigl notes, a history of philosophy has been written on this basis, Tragikomoede der Weisheit by R. Wahle. This book furnishes many amusing insights into the history of philosophy but it is so limited by the author's underlying thesis, that philosophy is a function of personality that it has remained a philosophic oddity.
1. Feigl, p. 5.
in the parts and of evidence in the whole, these are everywhere to be met within the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself." This type of polemic against the philosophy of his time is often repeated by Hume and is repeatedly used by the positivists today.

There is a real basis for this type of reference to Hume and it ultimately rests on Hume's initial distinction between matters of fact and relations between ideas. Hume is of supreme importance to the positivists in that he clearly draws this distinction. He is not the first philosopher to do this, as Leibniz preceded, and in many ways went farther than Hume in substantiating the distinction. Hume is, however, one of the first philosophers to make the distinction in no uncertain terms.

D.G.C. MacNabb, speaking of this aspect of Hume's philosophy, says that Hume's distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions has become the chief cornerstone of modern empiricism and its main weapon against metaphysics. But MacNabb's statement is far too simple. Other factors have entered into the empiricist's use of Hume's distinction, and

2. Perhaps Hume was influenced by Leibniz between the times of the publication of the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries*. In the former he holds that geometry is empirical while in the latter his position is identical with that of Leibniz, i.e. geometry is tautological.
even Hume's own use of it must be taken into consideration. There are three factors which lead to the modern empiricist's use of Hume's principle: (1) the development of non-Euclidian geometries, (2) the proof by Frege and others that mathematics is tautological, and (3) the *Principia Mathematica* which shows that logic is also of an analytic nature. Thus, the modern empiricists are able to sustain the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions in ways which were available neither to Hume nor Leibniz. Kant would be forced radically to alter his refutation of Hume insofar as it is based on the belief that geometry and mathematics are synthetic.

One further development of positivism must be noted before it becomes fully evident how Hume's distinction has been used as a weapon against modern metaphysics. The direct result of the positivist ability to substantiate the distinction between analytic and synthetic was the formulation of a formal criteria of meaningful statements. This development is stated succinctly by Ayer. "A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable." The question here is not the determination of whether or not a proposition is analytic, as that is obvious, but the establishment of a criterion of empirical verifiability. The criterion set up by Mach is a rigid specification

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that propositions, to be empirically meaningful, must be empirically verifiable through sense experience. Ayer modifies this criterion by not insisting that an empirical hypothesis be conclusively verifiable, "but that some possible sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of their truth or falsity." But the intent of both Mach's and Ayer's principle is the same; the exclusion of certain propositions from philosophical discussion, not on empirical grounds, for the empirical test merely follows from the original distinction, but on formal grounds.

The range of this exclusion was, at first, very wide. Consider, for instance, an early American positivist, J.A. Irving, in his chapter "Toward Radical Empiricism in Ethics." All propositions asserting value judgments are analysed as "aesthetic": "the aesthetic temper may be detected at the heart of every ethical system." He also excluded dialectical and intuitive metaphysics as altogether meaningless. In fact the term "metaphysics" designates, for the positivists, those statements which are merely instances of bad grammar and, thus, meaningless. In this article can be found almost all the arguments put forward and popularized by Ayer several years later. Ayer, however, goes farther afield than Irving

1. Ayer, p. 31.
4. Irving, p. 236.
and adds that all religious arguments about a transcendent god are meaningless.

Now let us return to Hume and consider the effects of his distinction between analytic and synthetic on the method he follows in his own philosophy. We find that, unlike the positivists, he fails to limit discussion on merely formal grounds. One passage in his philosophy suggests that he did at least consider such a method. At the conclusion to the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* we find the following statement, "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quality or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Here it cannot be doubted that we have a classic expression of the positivist principle, but in Hume's philosophy is there anything which corresponds to the positivist practice? The answer must be no, for in Hume's philosophic writings no single instance can be found of the implementation of the criterion just enunciated. Consider the way in which he speaks of discussions of natural religion in the *Dialogues*. "These have been always subjected to the disputations of men: Concerning these, human reason has not reached any certain determination:

But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless enquiry with regard to them though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have, as yet, been the result of our most accurate researches."

Hume not only fails to implement his criterion; indeed, in his philosophy as a whole his general policy is to avoid discussions of the relations between ideas. He, as was the general rule in the eighteenth century, seemed in the Treatise to incline toward the belief that mathematics is an empirical science. In the Enquiries Hume seems to wash his hands of the whole dispute. As for geometry, he holds, in the Treatise, that it is empirical, and in the Enquiries that it is not. Of the reasons given by commentators for his reluctance to commit himself fully on relations between ideas, the following statements describe his position best: First, he underestimated the importance of relations between ideas, and second, he became aware in his later works that these discussions involved him in questions which he could not answer. Modern empiricists claim that these questions can now be answered.

It appears that Hume's practice and that of the

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2. Hume says in a note on page 156 of the Selby-Bigge edition of the *Enquiries*, "Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points." The complicated discussion of mathematics found in the Treatise is discarded.
3. Hume refers to relations between ideas as "objects of curiosity."
positivists is radically different and this difference might be traced to discoveries in logic, geometry, and mathematics made more than a century after Hume's death. But this theory is tempered by a recent evaluation of the verification theory. Ryle says, "... the needle of the verification principle was so narrow that it excluded not only a few Teutonic camels but nearly all domestic animals ... it has done what was not intended; brought out a great variety of difference between lots of classes of legitimate utterances. What was bought as a lens has worked as a prism." We see that Hume's practice would not be far from one based on this view of the verification theory. Although only uncertainty and contradiction have been the result of the discussions of natural religion so far, Hume seems to think that some sort of conclusion is possible. It is clear from the arguments of the Dialogues that the conclusions at which we arrive will not have the certainty or finality that belongs to our conclusions about relations between ideas and matters of fact. But even so Hume never seems to doubt that some sort of knowledge is possible.

Perhaps, after all, Hume is on safer ground in his failure to carry through the criterion of formal exclusion

2. An example of this is Pamphilus's statement at the end of the Dialogues "... that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth." Dialogues, Kemp Smith, Editor, p. 228.
formulated in the *Enquiries* than at first appeared. If Ryle is correct, the verification principle does not show Hume to be inconsistent in his overall philosophic method but lends theoretical justification to that method. Ryle's formulation need not provide re-entrance for the Teutonic camels of dialectical and intuitive metaphysics; it need merely show the wide difference between that kind of statement and a statement concerning matter of fact. Ordinarily this in itself will exclude such metaphysical statements from discussion. Hume, in any case, devotes very little time to examining these metaphysical statements and in the *Dialogues* is mainly concerned with religious arguments which Ayer fails to consider. The argument is not that a transcendent god exists, but the empirical argument that the observed world leads us to believe in an immanent deity. Although it may be difficult to determine Hume's own answer to this question, he indicates the conclusions at which we might arrive. He clearly thinks that the problem is a fit subject for philosophic enquiry.

In this chapter we have again been concerned mainly with the positivist use of Hume's philosophy. Price has shown that Hume's contributions to the problem of the external world are equally as helpful and challenging as is his theory of causation. The detailed analysis of the sections of the *Treatise* dealing with the problem of the external world highlights many of the problems which linguistic analysis must face, and in the end leads Price to the formulation of the
"as if" and "expressive" theories. Although Price, in this process, leaves himself open to various criticisms concerning his treatment of Hume's philosophy, it is difficult to agree with critics such as Ewing and Church who maintain that his theory should be separated completely from Hume. Price could easily answer the criticisms by using greater care in distinguishing his own theories from those of Hume. He might have been more successful had he drawn a strict distinction between his work as a creative philosopher and his work as an historian of philosophy. In attributing certain views to Hume he should have kept in mind and made specific note of the role interpretation plays. But the complete separation of Price's work as creative philosopher and as historian of philosophy would probably reduce the value of each.

In this chapter we have also attempted to indicate the direction which the positivist use of Hume's theory of personal identity might take. The positivist failure to attack the problem along Humean lines must prove significant for those who maintain that Hume's philosophy stands or falls on its ability to account for personal identity. If we consider the questions which Hume asks in Book I of the Treatise and in the Appendix to the Treatise, we must conclude that, above all others, the problem of personal identity is "Hume's problem," and is, perhaps, one which the positivists should have attacked first.

The analysis of another prominent reference to Hume's
philosophy found in positivist literature has shown that Hume's distinction between matters of fact and relations between ideas does not play the same role in his philosophy as it does in positivist philosophy. Although in one case Hume formulates the distinction in the form of a criterion which seems very close to early positivist doctrine, he is slow indeed to exclude classes of statements from philosophical discussion on formal grounds alone. But we have also seen that later positivist writers have in theory and in practice reached positions much closer to Hume. They do not exclude classes of statements on formal grounds but distinguish carefully between different kinds of statements. It seems that as positivist philosophy proceeds the importance and pertinence of Hume's writings become even more evident. This is particularly true in both Hume's and the positivists' demands that philosophy be scientific.
CHAPTER VII

HUME AND POSITIVIST MORAL PHILOSOPHY

We have now examined four significant types of positivist references to Hume: reference to his theory of causation and analysis of induction; to his theory of the external world and of the self; the historical reference; and the reference to his distinction between matters of fact and relations between ideas. The only major class yet to be considered is the positivist references to his moral philosophy. Their characteristics have, of course, been largely determined by the positivists’ conception of moral philosophy as a whole, and in tracing the history of this conception we find that in the early days of the movement there were three main positivist approaches to moral philosophy.

Moritz Schlick relegates the main task of moral philosophy to the science of psychology. He contends that philosophy is an activity which clarifies and demonstrates the meanings of the statements of science. Hence, to be considered meaningful the statements of moral philosophy must be scientific. The scientific study of ethics, for Schlick, falls into two parts: the definition of moral terms; and the causal investigation of why moral codes form the standard of human conduct. The former activity, says Schlick, is necessary but routine, i.e. largely a matter of statistical investigation. The determination of the psychological laws of
motivation, however, is, for Schlick, the main task of scientific ethics. We need not go into his actual formulation of these psychological laws, for he makes no mention of Hume. Schlick says, however, that ethics is not a set of philosophical propositions except when it is concerned with the classification and meaning of scientific statements. Thus, he wishes neither to abandon its study nor to equate ethical statements with those of metaphysics, but rather to investigate scientifically their causal implications. This he does in terms of psychology.

J.A. Irving presents a second, and more comprehensive, positivistic view of moral philosophy. He is concerned with the kind of knowledge we can expect from the study of moral philosophy; or rather the kind of questions which we can expect moral philosophers to answer in light of the discoveries in logic and mathematics discussed in Chapter VI. He says that moral philosophy has been traditionally concerned with the definition of the "final end of man." The methods that have been used traditionally in these attempts are three: dialectical metaphysics, intuitive metaphysics, and scientific generalization. The propositions of the first method, says Irving, are admittedly unverifiable and, by positivistic standards, meaningless. The intuitive metaphysicians, on the other hand attempt to communicate their own private feelings and have in this attempt "built for themselves a kingdom of
metaphor." But, says Irving, "... logically the core of their intuition is a fluent blur." The third group includes hedonists, utilitarians, and evolutionary moralists such as Stephens and Herbert Spencer. Hedonists and utilitarians have failed, says Irving, because they have been able to give no adequate positivistic analysis of the terms "pleasure" and "the general good" which they equate with the final end of man. The evolutionary moralists, on the other hand, in changing the moral "ought" to the physical "must," repudiate the questions of moral philosophy altogether.

For Irving the implications of this critique of previous moral philosophy can have but one issue: "The concept of a final end is meaningless; it has been for centuries the ignis fatuus of Ethics. Hume realized ... that the ultimate ends of human action can never be accounted for by reason; and all of our researches have confirmed his position." But what are the results of this position? Irving replies that "... it is the destiny of the men of the twentieth century frankly to admit ethical relativity -- and to ... establish a scientific Ethics," which will study the moral consciousness. Its primary questions will be, "Under what conditions does the moral consciousness arise? ... What is the function of the moral consciousness in a specific social order?"

2. Irving, p. 236.
5. Irving, p. 245.
ethics will go for its data to the social sciences as well as to psychology, and will require a much more comprehensive investigation from these studies than has yet been produced. Ethics will become the "queen of the social sciences." 

The third positivist approach to moral philosophy, represented by Rudolf Carnap, is the least critical of the three. Carnap dismisses ethical statements as metaphysical and, hence, meaningless. He does not imply that the study of moral philosophy should be reformed, as do Irving and Schlick, but that it should be abandoned entirely. He gives no advice at all to the psychologist or the social scientist and, apparently following his own criteria, does not mention the study of ethics again.

These first expressions of positivist moral theory all refer to Hume in one way or another. Irving notes Hume's contention that reason cannot give us knowledge of ultimate ends. It was this point in Hume's philosophy which enabled Irving to unify his treatment of ethics. Wittgenstein's and other positivists' treatment of ethics were too vague and obscure, Irving maintains. It was Hume who enabled him to apply the conclusions of positivist epistemology to ethics. Schlick also refers to Hume, but only when he discusses the freedom of the will. Carnap's reference to Hume is indirect; he equates ethical statements with metaphysical statements, and

1. Irving, p. 246.
in dealing with metaphysical statements, quotes with approval
the passage found at the conclusion of the Enquiry Concerning
the Human Understanding.

All of these references are clearly limited. While
we might find Irving's conception of moral philosophy to be
similar to that of Hume, we also find that the evidence he
presents in support of it is derived, not from Hume, but from
other sources. Irving believes Hume's position to be correct,
not because he has been convinced by Hume, but because he has
been convinced that Hume's position follows from discoveries
concerning the nature of metaphysical systems, which in turn
follow from discoveries about the nature of logic and mathemat-
ics, i.e. the nature of deducibility. Nonetheless, Irving's
knowledge of Hume enables him to focus the discussion of
ethics on the problem of "final ends." Schlick derives much
less support from Hume for his general method in ethics than
does Irving. It is true that he refers extensively to Hume
in his discussion of the freedom of the will, but freedom of
the will occupies merely a subordinate position in Schlick's
moral theory. It is not a fundamental problem, but a con-
fusion which must be clarified and which he simply wishes to
lay in its grave. The lengthy controversy over this problem
is "one of the scandals of philosophy," says Schlick, who
never considers Hume's general ethical method or conclusions.

1. The passage in which Hume lays down a strict formal
criterion and which was discussed at the conclusion of
Chapter VI.
As for Carnap's reference, we have already discussed its implications regarding metaphysics, and it is plain that Hume does not equate the statements of moral philosophy with those of metaphysics. These first expressions of positivist ethical theory are, to a great extent, the last by these particular philosophers. Irving has become interested in the philosophy of language, the relation between anthropology and ethics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His activities in these fields have ethical implications, but he no longer writes of ethical theory in the manner of the logical positivists. Schlick suffered an untimely death, and Carnap has remained true to the criterion laid down in Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Positivist ethical theory has passed into other hands.

Subsequent development of positivist moral philosophy has not proceeded along any of the three lines just considered. Since the publication of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic and C.L. Stevenson's "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," positivist moral philosophy has been concerned mainly with the analysis of ethical terms. The clue to this preoccupation with ethical language can perhaps be found in Ryle's reformulation and re-evaluation of the verification theory. Ryle tells us that this theory has proved useful as a method of showing lots of differences between lots of different kinds

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of statements. Hence, positivist philosophers have not dismissed ethical statements as meaningless, but have attempted to determine the ways in which we use ethical language. This development was anticipated by Irving in the chapter previously mentioned, where he says that "there are two uses of language -- the logical and the aesthetic." Logical language "refers to our public world of ... communicable meanings ... in which every proposition can be verified by means of public exhibition of the structure of the situation to which it refers ..." Aesthetic language refers to, or rather, reproduces, "... my private world of immediately perceived sense contents ..." Ethical statements, Irving insists, are instances of the aesthetic use of language. From this position it is but a short step to the emotive theories of Ayer and Stevenson.

In Stevenson's original articles in Mind 1937, and in Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic the emotive theory assumes a radical tone. Stevenson says, "Their [ethical terms] major use is not to indicate facts, but to create an influence."
The statement "X is good" is almost always translatable into

1. Irving, p. 232.
3. Irving has stated that he considered taking this step as early as 1932. But he rejected it as too crude a move in the light of what was known concerning the psychology of emotion. Irving believes that the term "emotive," as used by Stevenson, is itself an excellent example of the emotive use of language.
"we like X"; in cases where the statements "we like X" and "we do not like X" occur in the same context, no rational method can be employed to dissolve this contradiction. Stevenson maintains that most ethical disagreements reduce to an irreducible emotional basis. The emotional basis cannot be changed by empirical method since this method is only of utility in the modification of belief, not attitude. There is a method of obtaining ethical agreement, however, but "it is persuasive, not empirical or rational." What Stevenson disputes is that "all disagreement is rooted in disagreement of belief." Traditional ethical theory has neglected the emotive meaning of ethical terms. This is also the general position of Ayer in his chapter on ethics in Language, Truth and Logic.

During the next seven years Stevenson modified his theory. Whereas in positivist epistemology we find a transition from a "strong verification theory" to a "weak verification theory," and, finally, a complete modification of the supposed conclusions of the verification theory, we find that Stevenson goes from a "strong emotive theory" to a "weak emotive theory." There is no counterpart in Ethics and Language to the 1937 statement that the major use of ethical language is to create an influence, for it is merely insisted that there are two kinds of ethical disagreement; that which involves belief and that which involves attitude. The technical aspects of Stevenson's work, important as they may be, need not concern us here since we are concerned only with Stevenson's
references to Hume. But before considering them in detail, it must be emphasized that there has been no general agreement in positivist ranks about an "emotive theory."

An instance of positivist disagreement with Stevenson and Ayer is H.D. Aiken's review of Ethics and Language. His criticism begins at the point where one might suppose Hume would have disagreed with Stevenson. Aiken challenges the distinction between "disagreement in attitude" and "disagreement in belief," and also the conclusions drawn from this distinction. His main criticism is that "belief" and "attitude" are both effective-ideational processes: both belief and attitude are in the strict sense attitudes. In the case of differing beliefs as in the case of differing attitudes, the use of language is emotive in the sense that it attempts to modify attitudes. "We do not say, however, that the effectiveness of the statement in changing a belief forms a part of what is meant by the statement." Aiken goes on to say that "Stevenson's doctrine would have a point ... only if he could show (a) that in some (important) cases the utterance of a proposition has a merely emotive or expressive significance, and (b) that ethical judgments usually, or always, are cases of this type." Stevenson, says Aiken, is able to show only that ethical judgments have emotive causes and

3. Aiken, p. 459.
4. Aiken, p. 461.
effects; but this is a truism, since all judgments have emotive aspects.

The difficulty encountered in determining what is meant by an attitudinal difference is evident in Stevenson's work. In fact, he finds the only precise method to be the use of illustrations rather than definitions. Thus, in his illustrations, we see what Stevenson is concerned with, but when we attempt to define attitudinal differences we can only say that they are exhibited by individuals for no assignable reason. But, as Aiken has pointed out, all disagreements are disagreements of attitude; while, on the other hand, all disagreements are also disagreements of belief, for we can never be sure that they are not. This, we could suppose, would be one of Hume's criticisms, i.e. that it is impossible to specify the difference between "disagreement of attitude" and "disagreement of belief."

Later we shall consider one other recent positivist contribution, but now let us turn to the references to Hume found in Stevenson's moral theory. From the point of view of this thesis the most interesting and important aspect of these references is the change in the interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy found in Stevenson's later work as compared to his earlier work. In the 1937 article we find that Hume is mentioned prominently. Stevenson says that for Hume "good" means approved by most people;¹ or again, "For according to

1. Stevenson, p. 15.
Hume, to recognize that something is "good" is simply to recognize that the majority approve of it.... This requirement excludes any attempt to define "good" in terms of the interest of people other than the speaker; or finally, "according to Hume's definition, one may prove ethical judgments (roughly speaking) by taking a vote." Stevenson dismisses in a few short sentences the Hume represented by these references. And if the references accurately represent Hume's position in ethical theory, there can be little doubt but that Stevenson is well justified.

Thus far we have seen Hume's position in moral theory characterized as complete hedonism by Green, complete utilitarianism by Stephens, and as complete statistical computation by Stevenson. By now it is clear that Hume's moral theory affords various interpretations. There is even a change of interpretation in Stevenson's own thought, as can be seen by his comments on Hume in Ethics and Language: "Of all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the questions that here concern us, and has most nearly reached a conclusion that ... [Stevenson] can accept." Stevenson then quotes a passage from the Enquiries in which Hume gives a

1. Stevenson, p. 16.
2. Stevenson, p. 17.
4. "The hypothesis we embrace is plain. It remains that all morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary." Hume, Enquiries, S.B. edition, p. 289.
sentimental rather than a statistical definition of ethical terms. In his later work Stevenson's criticisms concern a point, the moral sense theory, which is not considered in his earlier article. As an introduction to Stevenson's characterization of this criticism of Hume let us consider its discussion by another contemporary moralist, S.E. Toulmin. In discussing the "objective approach" to ethical problems, he says that "Hume, in his ethical theory, had to assume that there would in fact be no ethical disagreements between fully informed people." Toulmin then quotes the following passage, "The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion toward it." The factor which immediately impresses us concerning Toulmin's statement as compared with the quotation from the Enquiries is Toulmin's peculiar and misleading use of language. He says that Hume "had to assume" there would be no ethical disagreement between well informed persons. When we examine the passage quoted, however, we find that Hume says, "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common to men." It is probably gratuitous to point out that there is a wide difference between the verbs "to imply" and "to assume", but herein lies what could be called a massive mis-

representation of Hume's position. Hume, in the general context of his philosophy seldom puts himself in the position of "having to assume" anything. It is, rather, his policy to make a specific point of the examination of things which we think we have to assume; or which we assume without making explicit. This, however, is only one aspect of Toulmin's misinterpretation, for in the equation of Hume's position with "assumption," Toulmin ignores the whole intent and achievement of what is known as the "moral sense" school of ethical theory.

What lies beyond Hume's use of the word "implies" in this context? We find that the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler, in addition to Hume's own work in classical philosophy and history, and political economy, form the data from which Hume draws the implication. Viewed from our twentieth century perspective, we should by now begin to see that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler's works, insofar as they concerned the foundations of ethical judgments, were analyses of the use of ethical language. What Hume says is that the use of ethical language implies a large area of agreement in ethical judgments. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler had, before him, taken on themselves the analysis of the formation and determination of roots of ethical language. Hume is not making an assumption when he says that the educated men of ancient Greece, seventeenth century France and eighteenth century England should have the same ethical norms. He is

1. This is one of Hume's general arguments in The Principles of Morals, and he supports it with a host of literary references.
stating what he considers to be the correct position, in view of all available evidence; we may question his evidence, but we may not accuse him of making an unsupported assumption. Nor is Hume's position so far afield from that of some positivist philosophers. Irving, it will be recalled, says that moral philosophy's role is the investigation of the moral consciousness in a specific social order. This conception of a moral consciousness implies a wide area of agreement about moral judgment, and Irving quotes C.I. Lewis as saying, "If we had no moral sense, philosophy would not give us one." Is this more than Hume (or for that matter Hutcheson, Shaftesbury or Butler) mean when they speak of a moral sense, or when Hume says, "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common to man?" In the discussion of Hume's so-called assumption, Toulmin's criticism is that the moral sense is not completely analogous to any other sense, in this case the sense of sight. This is, of course, the criticism of several generations of British philosophers, but it pertains only to those passages where the moral sense philosophers attempt to draw a strict analogy. Undoubtedly they were guilty, at times, of stretching their evidence too far, yet the criticism is not valid for the passage Toulmin quotes. There Hume refers to an

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1. Toulmin, "No one thinks it necessary to make such an assumption when accounting for the general agreement about ordinary simple qualities. No one suggests that the notion of redness implies any 'sentiment common to all mankind..." P. 21.
empirical fact, which is an empirical fact even by positivist standards.

Although Stevenson also parts company with Hume at this same juncture, he does not do it in the same way as Toulmin. Stevenson says, "it ... would be paradoxical if different spectators would experience approbation in opposed ways, but such a possibility is excluded by an explicit assumption which underlies Hume's whole work." He then quotes the same passage as Toulmin. Stevenson's criticism, however, is as follows: he asks what the case would be should the inference which Hume draws prove to be incorrect, and, in answering this question, says, "... nothing would be a virtue and nothing a vice." Stevenson maintains that his analysis has shown the contention that "all disagreement in attitude is rooted in belief," to be doubtful. He concludes, therefore, that there must be some other way in which we use ethical statements. But, he continues, attention must be paid to this central theme of Hume's argument, "for when [this inference proves false] ethical disputes will have no scientific solution." Stevenson maintains that Hume, like so many other moral theorists, emphasizes disagreement in belief to the exclusion of disagreement of attitude. But we might be more precise if we said that Hume emphasizes moral agreement, whereas Stevenson

2. Stevenson, p. 275.
emphasizes moral disagreement. He also says that Hume gives a "persuasive" definition of ethical terms. This criticism, however, has been tempered, first by Aiken, and then by Irving. Aiken says that all language has an emotive aspect, and Irving says that Stevenson himself gives a "persuasive" definition of ethical terms. If Aiken is correct, Irving has to be correct, because a non-persuasive definition would be impossible.

This excursion into interpretation has been most interesting, but we may now ask what real bearing this shift has on Stevenson's moral philosophy and on positivist moral philosophy as a whole. Although Stevenson amplifies and modifies his argument and in this process is influenced by Dewey, Ayer, and Carnap, as well as Hume, the crucial point of Stevenson's moral theory is reached in his consideration of Hume. When Stevenson concedes that no scientific solution of ethical disagreements is possible if Hume's criterion fails, he, in effect, concedes Irving's, Aiken's, and, in the end, Hume's point. Aiken says, in effect, that a change in attitude always involves a change in belief, and vice-versa. Stevenson parts company with Irving, Hume, and Aiken when he maintains that disagreement in attitude and in belief can be theoretically and operationally separated. The positivists were first attracted to Hume by his insistence upon scientific answers to the questions of philosophy, and by his stated objective, the foundation of a science of human nature. Stevenson is
evidently not attracted in this way, but, through the greater emphasis on disagreement of belief found in his later work, the influence of Hume becomes apparent. In his admission that his own method of reconciling ethical disagreements is unscientific, Stevenson also admits Aiken's central argument, that the modification of ethical judgments through persuasion involves the modification not only of attitudes but the modification, for no scientific reason, of belief about matter of fact. Even though seemingly scientifically unsolvable ethical disputes do occur, it is difficult to see how Irving and Aiken can accept Stevenson's procedure as the final method of their solution. It might also be supposed that if Stevenson's basic moral theory were to undergo any change (and this possibility should not be disregarded, for it has been a radical change in the past) it would be toward a rapprochement with the positions of Aiken, Irving, and Hume.

In "Emotive Meanings and Ethical Terms" Aiken points out that the "emotive theory" may have the greatest appeal to the "ethical intuitionalists." When analysis shows that the simple, unanalysable quality to which "... on his [the ethical intuitionalist] view 'good', in its ethical meaning, could (only) refer, just is not there, he has no other recourse than to adopt an emotive theory if he is not to deny altogether the phenomenon of ethical discourse and ethical

Since Stevenson has at least modified his theory in the direction of a naturalistic theory of the type both Hume and Aiken hold, his abandonment of the "emotive" theory represented in Ethics and Language should not be too surprising. In any event, this, for Aiken, would be a much less surprising development than G.E. Moore's complete acceptance of the emotive theory.

As for positivist moral philosophy as a whole, it is Aiken's contention that the issue is joined at the point noted in Stevenson's review of Hume's moral theory. The crux of the controversy over the emotive theory, Aiken says, lies in Stevenson's analysis of the nature of ethical disagreement and in his insistence "that no ethical theory can be maintained which would render unintelligible disagreement 'on' ethical questions." To fulfill this requirement ethical disagreement must be simply "a matter of suggestion and counter suggestion." But this analysis breaks down when we consider ethical controversy and the role which belief plays. As Aiken points out, once it was understood "that when I say 'X is good' I am merely trying to re-direct your interest, the very real power of ethical discourse, its 'magnetism', would rapidly fall to a vanishing point." He continues, "One of

1. Aiken, p. 469.
2. G.E. Moore, The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, edited by Paul Schilpp, "I am inclined to think that ... [the emotive theory] is so, but I am also inclined to think that it is not so; and I do not know which way I am inclined the most strongly." P. 554.
3. Aiken, p. 464.
4. Aiken, p. 462.
the merits of Hume's moral philosophy which Professor Stevenson and I admire for partly different reasons, is that it recognizes the futility of a theory of obligation or duty which fails to account for the "appeal" which every call to duty ... may be expected to take." Stevenson and Aiken would be in agreement in their approbation of Hume concerning this point. It is possible that Aiken would also approve of Hume's "explicit assumption," i.e. that "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind ..."

The above account should not indicate that the positivist philosophers, including Hume, believe language has no emotive, or better, aesthetic use. In fact, an American positivist, A.I. Meldin, finds in Hume's philosophy an emotive theory which he considers superior to Stevenson's. Meldin contrasts the two as follows: "For Hume ... the ethical term good is, ... an 'epithet', since it expresses an approval, namely, a felt pleasure, which occurs when, under certain conditions, the pleasantness, immediate or indirect, of the object is contemplated. For Stevenson ... there is, in the experience in (sic) the speaker, a liking which occasions a wish that others share it and which is the essential function of the ethical term to express."² It appears that this interpretation of Hume's moral theory is the result of a closer and

1. Aiken, p. 461.
more technical study than has been given to it by previous moral philosophers. The difference between Meldin's version of Hume's "emotivism" and Stevenson's "emotivism" is indicated by his statement that Hume thinks "good" is an "epithet," and Stevenson believes that "the essential function" of ethical terms is to express a liking and a wish that others share it. The significant deletion in this version of Hume's emotive theory is Meldin's failure to say that this is the only way in which Hume believes ethical terms are used. Also, Meldin does not say that emotive use forms a part of their meaning. In other words, when Stevenson discusses ethical terms he constantly stresses their emotive meaning, while Hume, presumably, could discuss the meaning of ethical terms without taking the epithetical aspect of their use into consideration.

This latter method is, in fact, adopted by Aiken who maintains that "... we must distinguish between the intention which activates us to describe from the meaning of the description." Whatever we may say about Hume's contention that equally well informed persons would make similar moral judgments, we are not justified in "... regarding ordinary ethical discourse as a totally different sort of thing from ordinary 'descriptive' communication." The reason, Aiken says, that ethical terms have more consistent and pervasive emotive, or epithetical, uses is because they enter "so closely

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1. Aiken, p. 467.
2. Aiken, p. 467.
into contexts which affect human interests or ends. 1 This failure to distinguish between the uses of ethical terms and their descriptive meanings, Aiken implies in his later review of Stevenson's book, is no mere academic problem but a very practical one. In the techniques of psychological propaganda we see the attempts at the "persuasive" transformation of "attitude" with the resultant unscientific shifts in belief.

Let us stop at this point and consider the positivist moral philosophy which we have discussed. We find it amounts only to two books and a relatively small number of articles; yet it cannot be doubted that these writings represent not only the most significant, but also the bulk of positivist moral philosophy. From our discussion and from the fragmentary and contradictory nature of the material discussed we may draw two conclusions: (1) that Hume, of all the figures in the history of philosophy, has had by far the greatest influence on positivist moral philosophy; and (2)

1. Aiken, p. 467.
2. Aiken puts this well when he says that "... purely from an ethical point of view we should not wish to extend the notion of 'meaning' in such a way that it could be significantly applied to wholly irrational and non-cognitive stimulus-response mechanisms ... because we should not wish to leave open the possibility that ethical judgments are neither true nor false. To do so ... would invite even more irresponsibility and unscrupulousness in public means of communication than now exist. Persuasion without meaning might be used to good effect by men of good will ... but it seems far more likely to be the weapon of the charlatan and sophist." Aiken, p. 47. From his general view of human nature we could expect Hume to arrive at the same ethical judgment.
that positivist moral philosophy is still in an intermediate stage of development.

In connection with the first conclusion, a close parallel can be drawn between positivist moral philosophy and positivist epistemology. In both cases many of the early positivists' knowledge of Hume was superficial and fragmentary. In some cases, as in those of Mach and Stevenson, Hume's doctrines are oversimplified and the versions they give differ little from those given in traditional interpretation. But in the case of the development of positivist epistemology, this phase quickly passes and the positivists become interested in the close analysis of Hume's doctrines and their application to present day problems. In positivist moral philosophy the attraction to Hume has proved even stronger, and this attraction is well illustrated by the comparison of Stevenson's 1944 evaluation of Hume's position with his evaluation of Hume in 1937. It is Hume's philosophy which forms the crux of Stevenson's disagreement with other positivists; and it is arguments derived from Hume's general philosophical position which are used to counter Stevenson's position.

As for the second point, it is obvious that positivist moral philosophy has not developed nearly to the same extent as has positivist epistemology, but if their development is analogous we may expect in the future a positivist analysis and application of many of Hume's specific moral doctrines.

The pattern in epistemology was: superficial reference to Hume;
more extensive study and appreciation; and the analysis and application of specific doctrines such as Hume's theories of causation and of the external world. The pattern in positivist moral philosophy has, so far, been: superficial reference; and more extensive study and appreciation. If the analogy becomes complete we could expect, for instance, a positivist analysis of Hume's theory of sympathy, using as its tools, not only linguistic analysis, but also contemporary discoveries in psychology, sociology, etc. The same might be done with Hume's doctrine of utility. But here, as in epistemology, special attention must be paid to the role of the self, for as we have seen, it is an essential component of his moral as well as his epistemological theory.

As has been recently pointed out, T.H. Green made one of philosophy's greatest mistakes when he said that Hume's philosophy was "played out." Positivist moral philosophy becomes more and more Humean in its character as its development proceeds; and this is but one instance of Hume's influence on contemporary philosophy. In the field of moral philosophy Hume's main attraction to the positivists is his objective, the formation of a science of human nature. It is true that his utilitarianism, his "emotive" theory, and the strictures he places upon the role which reason can play in ethical

judgments, are all important, but lying behind this is "the science of human nature." The implications of a science of human nature in contemporary social science have been recently examined by Irving, and he finds some of the first evidences of the use of the comparative method in Hume's philosophy. He says, however, that the comparative method had to wait for "the theory of evolution to supply the key to the genetic relationships of all living organisms before it could become of truly scientific and philosophical importance." Hume went on to the social sciences and to classical literature for the data of the science of human nature. Irving maintains that this is the course which the study of ethics must take, but qualifies this position by stating that we must also realize the limitations of the comparative method. Hendel says in his interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy, that it is, in its completed form, a study of man in society. Irving says, "the development of an adequate theory of human nature requires the consideration of man in his social environment ..." In the integration of the data of the social sciences into scientific ethics, the further investigation of Hume's procedures and conclusions should prove to be of great importance, showing the pitfalls as well as the advantages of this contempor-

2. Hendel, Seminar on the Philosophy of Hume, Yale University, Spring term, 1953.
ary development. In any case, it is clear that at least one positivist believes that he is carrying on Hume's work when he says, "Such a comparative science of human nature constitutes the only secure foundation for philosophical anthropology in its twentieth-century search for the idea of man."

1. Irving, p. 556.
CONCLUSION

In the treatment of our subject, Hume and the Logical Positivists, the material examined has fallen into two sections: the interpretation of Hume's philosophy; and the positivists' actual connection with his philosophy. Any study of Hume's influence on contemporary philosophy should, perhaps, begin by coming to some position on interpretation, or at least by pointing out the various interpretations which have been held. In this thesis, however, an extensive investigation of these questions was imperative for the following reasons: (1) no history about this aspect of Hume's philosophy was available, and, historically speaking, these questions were unformulated and confused; and (2) the problem of interpretation is a central one in the attempt to treat historically the relationship between Hume and the logical positivists. Of course, it is impossible to specify precisely the manner in which the positivists come by their knowledge of Hume, but it is a curious coincidence that the positivists' attitude toward the implications of Hume's philosophy has changed in roughly the same way and time as has modification of the interpretation. This may be mere coincidence, for it might be pointed out that their own philosophical position, as well as their interpretation of Hume, has been modified. One conclusion, however, which has, it will be hoped, been established beyond all doubt, is the
importance of careful distinction between the use of doctrines which may be derived from Hume's philosophy and their strict attribution to Hume. It must be insisted that the first procedure is illegitimate only insofar as it intrudes without qualification upon the second. The strict attribution of certain doctrines to Hume himself opens up a host of biographical, historical and philosophic questions, and this is where questions of "correct" or "incorrect" interpretation arise.

In the first two chapters we concluded that, for historical, biographical and philosophic reasons, the traditional interpretation as represented by Beattie, Reid, Bain, Taine, Windelband, Erdmann, etc. was inadequate as an historical explanation of Hume's philosophy. In the third chapter we considered the most systematic representation of traditional interpretation by T.H. Green, and the first reaction against traditional interpretation as represented by McGilvary. This reaction continued, and in the writings of Kemp Smith, Shearer, Hendel and others it becomes the mainstream of Humean interpretation. The movement is not confined to Hume's philosophical works, but extends to his History and his Essays. His biography has also been a central issue, and contrary to those who wish to explain the shortcomings of his philosophy by reference to undesirable personal characteristics, his personality is usually represented in a most favorable light.

Two recent examples illustrate the change in the
modern attitude toward Hume. Vinding Kruse and John H. Randall Jr. present views of Hume's personality which bring to mind the views of Beattie, Mill and Green. But, whereas Beattie, Mill and Green's views were received with general approval and a modicum of protests on the part of supporters of Hume, scarcely a good word can be found for the views of Kruse and Randall. Kruse has been generally attacked, while Randall's chapter called forth a highly articulate and documented article by Mossner in the Philosophical Review. It must be admitted, however, that the modern philosophers who disparage Hume's personal characteristics are in a much weaker psychological position than their eighteenth and nineteenth century predecessors. Whereas Beattie dismissed Hume's philosophy as inconsequential, Mill as purely sceptical, and Green as "played out", Kruse and Randall must try to explain how it is that a man with such faulty personal characteristics has become one of the most influential historical figures in contemporary philosophy; how a man so unsuited for serious philosophical endeavor could be so phenomenally successful at it. It is small wonder that Kruse and Randall are attacked by Jessop, Kemp Smith and Mossner. But it might be noted that

although Kruse and Randall adopt the same biographical position about Hume as did Beattie, Mill and Green, their estimations and interpretations of his philosophy have radically changed. For both, he is perhaps the most important British philosopher, and both admit that his philosophy is not merely the reductio ad absurdum of Locke's empiricism. To at least this extent, then, Hume has triumphed.

In chapters one to four it has been shown that the new interpretation of Hume's philosophy has not been the result of any sudden discovery, but, rather, the result of approximately forty to fifty years of research and study on the part of many philosophers and historians. And it is argued that Kemp Smith's book, The Philosophy of David Hume, is the most complete and comprehensive expression of the new interpretation. It would, of course, be ill considered to say that any one interpretation is the correct interpretation, but we may say that Kemp Smith seems to gather together the different strands of the previous forty year's research and present them as a coherent whole. Together with his own discoveries and theories he presents an argument which should not be ignored in the subsequent study of Hume.

It may be claimed that too much space was given in this thesis to the work of Kemp Smith and that his theories were endorsed too enthusiastically. There are other reasons, however, for the emphasis laid on Kemp Smith's work. Initially, like Hume's, Kemp Smith's work on Hume has, as yet,
attracted little of the attention it merits. It is, by all odds, a book which puts forward controversial theories about Hume's philosophy, and has, as yet, produced surprisingly little controversy. We need not go far afield for evidence of this. In Great Britain, three prominent reviews were published which are generally favorable. They appeared in *Mind*, *Times Literary Supplement* and in *Philosophy*; the latter appearing five years after the book was published. The surprising thing is, however, that, as late as 1951, the book occasioned no further comment. But, even more surprising is the lack of response to the work in the United States. As far as can be determined no review has, as yet, appeared in the American journals. Kemp Smith's theories about the derivation of much of the *Treatise*, and about its composition are, for the most part, unknown in the United States.

It is difficult to say just what the reasons are for lack of interest in this work. In the United States one reason must be lack of publicity, for neither American philosophy nor philosophers have the reputation of provinciality or for failure to investigate new sources. Jessop, in his review in *Philosophy*,¹ says that if Kemp Smith's theories are

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1. In a large university in the western part of the United States an eighteen week seminar is given on Hume. The professor in charge of this seminar was unaware that Kemp Smith had written a book on Hume other than his edition of the Dialogues.

accepted we must radically modify much of what is usually taught about Hume's philosophy. The question is, do we accept them, and if not, why not? Those of us who are convinced that we must accept them can only be swayed in our judgment by arguments from those who believe that they cannot be accepted. But who are these persons who say the theories are faulty? That we do not know, for there have been no attacks from a philosophical point of view, and, in fact, there has been almost no mention of the theories.

This, then, was one of the subsidiary aims of the first half of the thesis: to show that Kemp Smith's work was, in many ways, the logical conclusion of forty years of research by numerous people; to show that Kemp Smith's theories solve many of the problems and contradictions that we find in the exegesis of Hume's philosophy; and, to re-emphasize Kemp Smith's conclusions in the hope that discussion about them might be stimulated, and, in this way, they would become the property of the entire philosophic world rather than only of Great Britain.

The material examined in the second section of the thesis was mainly composed of references to Hume found in the writings of the logical positivists and those closely allied with them. Here again it may be argued that this method of considering the relationship between Hume and the positivists is too restrictive and that the subject might be better treated from a comparative point of view. It must be remembered,
However, that this study has, from the beginning, been historical. Our objective has been to examine "what posterity has written," and just as works on Hume form the data of the first section of the thesis, references to Hume and the use of doctrines taken directly from his philosophy, form the data of the second section. In an historical study there is no objective data for judging the relationship between a school of philosophy and any preceding figure in the history of philosophy, other than what is written and said about the philosopher by the members of the school. Comparisons, no matter how apt, may be mistaken, because the aspect of the school being compared may not be derived from the philosopher in question, but from an entirely different source or sources. This, we have seen, is sometimes the case with Hume and the positivists.

But it would be naive to expect that an analysis of positivist references to Hume could answer all our questions about the relationship of the positivists to Hume. In their classes and in their discussions, positivist philosophers mention Hume much more often than in their writings. It may be that Hume has had a greater influence on their thought than is indicated by their references to him, and on this point a comparative treatment is the only method available by which we may arrive at even tentative conclusions. But, although an analysis of references will not answer all our questions about the relationship between Hume and the logical
positivists, it will answer some of them, and is an indis-

tensible prelude to the various comparative studies which

could be conducted. It might be pointed out also, that the

conclusions of a comparative study can be only tentative,

while the conclusions of a study based on the analysis of ref-

erences can be a great deal more definite.

We must first ask ourselves, what questions about

the relationship between the logical positivists and Hume do

we wish answered? The first question, and the one first con-
sidered, was the historical question. Formulated, it would

be this: can a direct historical link be traced from contem-

porary positivists -- through the founders of positivism --
to Hume? In our researches we have found the answer to be no.

No matter how similar their doctrines may appear, there is

little or no evidence to show that the early positivists de-

rived their doctrines from Hume. All our researches have

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tended to confirm the thesis that the positivists derived

their doctrines from other sources and then learned, in one

way or another, about Hume.

But if the answer to this question is no, what is

the significant question which we may ask about the relation-

ship? In view of the persistence of reference to Hume in

positivist literature, the question which immediately arises

is, what are the reasons for this positivist attraction to

Hume? Except insofar as it enables us to understand the way in which the positivists view Hume's philosophy, the question of correct or incorrect interpretation does not arise. The positivists have been interested in the truth or falsity of philosophical doctrine, not in interpretation; and, even though what they believe to be in Hume's philosophy does not agree with the latest interpretation, this has no bearing on the determination of the factor which attracts them to his philosophy.

We have found that positivist references to Hume fall generally into six classes: (1) the historical; (2) the reference to his theory of causation; (3) to his theory of the external world; (4) to his theory of the self; (5) to his scientific approach to philosophic questions and his rejection of metaphysics; (6) and to his moral theory. We have already discussed the first type of reference in our answer to the question concerning historical influence. The second type of reference is represented by Keynes, Braithwaite, Hobart, and Ramsey, and if the amount of attention paid causation is a gauge of the positivist attraction and the influence of Hume's account of causation, it might be said that this is the major aspect of his philosophy which attracts and influences them. But when we examine the general nature of positivists' writings on causation we see wide differences in their ranks. Some would hold Hume's position with few modifications, while others would claim that they have solved
Hume's problem. We see that while this doctrine holds out a special attraction to some positivists, it holds no attraction at all to others; we must conclude that this is not the general principle we are seeking.

The third type of reference is also clearly limited in its appeal, as is the fourth. In the case of the external world, the question which Hume asks is not answered by Price, but another question is substituted for it and answered. Russell, also, is not interested in Hume's question but in a question of a different sort. Perhaps the measure of the attraction for the positivists of Hume's theory of the external world is, as Price says, their neglect of it. Hume's theory of the self is also only of minor interest to the positivists, and their treatment of this problem has, as yet, been incomplete. It may be, as has been suggested, that Hume's attraction and influence will become greater as they consider the problem. That remains to be seen.

The fifth reference forms Hume's main attraction for positivists, although it is doubtful that it greatly influences them. This attraction is more one of spirit and intent than of any one philosophical doctrine. Hume is, in a sense, an iconoclast tearing down the sacred statues built to pure reason; he emphasizes at every point the importance of experience as opposed to the powers previously ascribed to reason. He wishes to be scientific and he is looking for scientific answers to philosophic problems; he disparages,
with few exceptions, the efforts of the philosophical schools he sees around him. All these traits can be found in the works of the positivists, often expressed in terms similar to those Hume uses. This was positivism's first bond with Hume, but in the works of Price, Braithwaite, Ramsey, and Hobart we have seen the formation of other bonds with Hume's specific philosophical doctrines. While these are not now generally accepted in positivist ranks, perhaps, as the positivist movement develops and differentiates, other ties will be formed and Hume will have an even greater influence on twentieth century philosophy than he has at present.

Let us again consider for a moment the problem of interpretation. If Kemp Smith is right, the characteristics which form the wide basis for the positivist attraction to Hume also form the external manifestations of a deep seated naturalism on which his philosophy rests. And, Kemp Smith maintains, Hume realized the implications of this naturalism. His philosophy, taken as a unit, is the long and complex expression of this realization. What, then, could the ever widening positivist interest in Hume portend? Could Hume not become the vehicle by which the positivists come to a fuller recognition of what is involved in acceptance of the procedures and doctrines they admire so much in Hume’s philosophy? The possibility of this development depends on two debatable suppositions; (1) that Kemp Smith's interpretation of Hume is substantially correct, i.e. that the unity of Hume's
philosophy is of the type described in chapter four; and (2) that the similarities between positivism and Hume's philosophy presuppose the same kind of naturalistic basis.

The sixth type of reference, to moral theory, has been left until the last because here the evidence of Hume's influence is strongest. Probably the greatest difference between positivist philosophy and Hume's, considered in their broadest sense, is the differing emphasis each places on moral philosophy. Positivism is mainly concerned with questions about the method of natural science, logic and mathematics. Hume is mainly concerned with the problem of man in society, with man's moral nature and its functions. But recent years have seen the beginning of an awakening interest in positivist ranks to the problems which Hume thought so important. First we have an interest in the linguistic analysis of ethical terms, and we find Hume intimately connected with the controversy which has arisen. But some positivist philosophers, such as Irving, recognize, as did Hume, that analysis is only a small part of moral philosophy, and that its larger function is the examination of morality in society. A new interest in Hume's philosophy considered in its broadest sense, as a science of human nature, may yet overshadow his original influence on positivist epistemology.
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