WAR FOR SPREAD OF KULTUR

UNREAD GERMAN PROFESSOR TO UNREAD GERMAN POET: "Ah, dear Herr Poet, our ungrateful country may not have read us, but she has gone to war to make the foreigners do so!"
BRITISH ACADEMICS AND WAR WITH GERMANY 1914-1918

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1977
ABSTRACT

Before 1914 the German university system and German scholarship occupied a position of special prestige. The outbreak of the First World War not only severed ties of friendship and common endeavour between British and German scholars, but also seriously undermined the reputation of German Wissenschaft. British academics, hitherto admirers of German achievements, now claimed to have long harboured doubts as to the tone of German academic life. Others, like Lord Bryce, who had worked to promote Anglo-German understanding now joined the propaganda battle against Germany.

Intellectuals in all belligerent states saw the war as a great ideological contest. British philosophers provided an ideological exegesis for German policy, although the legacy of Hegel gave considerable difficulties for the neo-Idealist school then dominant in British universities. The historian's traditional explanation of Britain's role in the world was given greater importance by the German claim that the war was a contest for world empire.

The war also posed an intellectual problem for academics. Before 1914 there had been little discussion of the questions of war and peace amongst British academics. When war forced liberal academics to face moral issues, only Bertrand Russell stood out in total opposition to government policy. Gilbert Murray and Lowes Dickinson provide more typical examples of the behaviour of liberal intellectuals under the stress of war.
In Britain the eulogy of war may have been more muted than it was in Germany or France, the persecution of academic "dissenters" less intense than in the United States, but the involvement of academics as publicists and propagandists of the national cause was not less marked than in other belligerent states. However, the theme is not one of "betrayal". The commitment of British academics to value-free objective enquiry before the war was, in reality, as illusory as the similar claims of their German colleagues.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would especially like to thank three people for reading successive drafts of this thesis: Professor Geoffrey Best, who suggested the subject (albeit in a different form from that now presented); Paul Addison, who has been a most helpful and understanding supervisor; and Owen Dudley Edwards who volunteered to read it at two sittings - and who succeeded.

I would also like to thank E.V. Quinn, librarian of Balliol College Library for permission to use material from the A.L. Smith papers, and the following individuals: Mr Nicholas Barker, Mr E.J.W. Barnes, Mrs Sylvia Benians, Mr Kenneth Blackwell (Bertrand Russell Archives), Mr J.P.T. Bury, Mr A.W. Chapman, Dr David Coulton, Professor R.H.C. Davis, Professor Frank Eyck, Professor V.H.H. Galbraith, Dr Martin Gilbert, Mrs Mary J. Gregor, Dr Cameron Bazlehurst, Professor Agnes Headlam-Morley, Mr Michael Holroyd, Professor Victor Kiernan, Mr James Klugmann, Professor L.S. Hearnshaw, Professor Jurgen Herbst, Professor F.M. Leventhal, Dr Neville Masterman, Dr J.A. Moses, Dr R.C. Mowatt, Dr Peter Nicholson, Mr W.B. Reddaway, Dr Geoffrey Searle, Professor G.H.N. Seton-Watson, Dr J.O. Stubbs, Mr H.N.V. Temperley, Professor Ulrich Trumpener, Dr Alec Vidler, Mr Jeffrey Weeks.

To Sue Haggis and Rosemary Gentleman special thanks for producing such a good final copy, and for correcting my spelling.
The Librarians, Manuscript Librarians and Archivists of the following institutions gave valuable assistance in my search for the papers of British academics:

**Cambridge:** The University Library and the following colleges - Christ's, Downing, Gonville and Caius, King's, Peterhouse, Pembroke, St. John's and Trinity.

**Oxford:** The Bodleian, Taylorian and Rhodes House Libraries and those of the following colleges - All Souls, Balliol, Christ Church, Churchill, Corpus Christi, Exeter, Lincoln, Magdalen, Manchester, Merton, New, Queen's, University, Worcester.

**London:** The University Library and those of Bedford, Queen Mary and University Colleges, the London School of Economics and the Institute of Historical Research.

Also the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Royal Historical Society, the Royal Society, the Public Record Office and the British Library.

**Other:** The university libraries of Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bristol, Glasgow, Hull, Keele, Leeds, Liverpool, Newcastle, Reading, St. Andrews and Sussex; the John Rylands University Library and the library of the Humboldt University (Berlin); the libraries of the University Colleges of Aberystwyth and Bangor; the North Yorkshire County Library and the International Institute of Social History.
"The 'intellectual' is terribly sensitive to the approval and disapproval of rulers and other authorities in the outside world. His strong personal sympathies are engaged in keeping the good opinion of successful practical men. The knowledge that he and his fellows and the intellectual life they conduct are not directly productive of economic values, and are in this sense 'parasitic' on the practical life, feeds the sentiment of deference. His feeling for the dignity and importance of his intellectual function no doubt stands out more clearly in his 'consciousness', but underneath, in the hidden recesses of his mind, the sense of weakness and inferiority rankles. Man is primarily a doer, not a thinker."

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHR: American Historical Review


Assoc.: Association

BHR: English Historical Review

IJE: International Journal of Ethics

J.: Journal

Mag.: Magazine

Mthly.: Monthly

N.Y.: New York

Philos.: Philosophical

Proc.: Proceedings

Quly.: Quarterly

repr.: reprinted

Rev.: Review

Soc.: Society

TLS: Times Literary Supplement

Trans.: Transactions

TRHS: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the effect of the First World War on one group of British intellectuals, namely the university men or academics. Intellectuals in many countries saw the war as a great ideological conflict. Never before had so many of them employed their talents as publicists and propagandists for the various national causes; never before had the international exchange of ideas been so disrupted by war. The involvement of intellectuals in the battle raised questions which are still unresolved and which are the subject of fierce debate. Some examination, therefore, of the impact of the war on British academics would be interesting for this reason alone. Further justification for the study lies in the relative neglect of the "higher learning" in Britain by historians. The role of German professors as "educators of the nation" has received considerable attention recently and part of the reason for this lies in the desire to explain the failure of German universities to offer significant resistance to fascism. In a similar fashion McCarthyism in America of the 1950s prompted Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger to trace the American tradition of academic freedom, and a recent study of American academics and the First World War seems to have been written with the example of the "new mandarins" in mind.


The present study, therefore, was born of an interest in "the social role of the man of knowledge"—to use Florian Znaniecki's phrase. British academics were part of what has been termed an "intellectual aristocracy", a group bound together by ties of kinship and shared assumptions. The removal of the requirement of celibacy for college fellowships at Oxford and Cambridge in 1882 was important in the development of this group. More young men were encouraged to remain at the two ancient universities to teach, and this, together with the expansion of university education outside Oxford and Cambridge, fostered the development of a group of full-time academics. Smaller and less distinct as a group compared to their German counterparts, yet what has been said of the German "mandarins" might also be said of them: that they considered themselves "members of a distinct cultured segment of the nation"; that "their writings testified to the existence of a highly integrated and relatively homogeneous intellectual community." Because the British academics provided a definable focus for a study of the effect of the war on opinions and attitudes, the wider community of intellectuals who did not work in universities were generally excluded.

In another way, too, the present study is restrictive. From a variety of possible lines of enquiry, two in particular have been selected.

3. Ringer, p. 3.
The first concerns the impact of the war on the close ties between British and German scholars. The second concerns the reactions of British academics to the war itself. The first is thus concerned not just with the disruption of growing international cooperation between men of learning, but also with the fall of Germany from the unique position it had formerly occupied in the minds of scholars. The second theme is of war as an intellectual problem, a social phenomenon, requiring analysis and explanation. Before 1914 there had been little discussion of questions of war and peace by British academics—European war had come to seem unthinkable to all but a few perceptive observers, like Graham Wallas. Significantly, Wallas was one of the small number of university men interested in the new field of social psychology, and with the outbreak of war in 1914 liberal academics like Lowes Dickinson and Bertrand Russell had to come to terms with the apparently irrational forces which had involved European states in fratricidal conflict. The war had brought a number of important issues to the attention of intellectuals—how could war ever be right?; or, how far should the intellectual maintain a position of critical detachment from official policy?; or, wherein lay the root cause of war in the modern world?

Many academics (perhaps most) went on quietly with their work, as far as wartime conditions permitted, relatively untouched by the conflict. Research could continue even if there were no students to teach. The belief that one's professional life could be separated from the world outside was more easily sustained in some disciplines than in others. For a chemist the demands of total war were immediately felt, and university departments were heavily involved in munitions and gas warfare research.\textsuperscript{1} On the other hand, science had traditionally known no frontiers—

\textsuperscript{1} The Chemical Advisory Committee and Chemical Warfare Committee of the Ministry of Munitions included university professors (5 and 9 respectively—a majority of members in each case). The universities
there was as yet no talk of "German physics". But this study is not concerned with scientists except insofar as they wrote (as did Sir Oliver Lodge of Birmingham University) on the issues which intellectuals claimed were involved in the war.\(^1\) Most of the people who appear in the following pages are historians or philosophers. In all countries historians seem to have been the most prolific and influential apologists for the war.\(^2\) That this was so was due to the status enjoyed by history as an academic subject and to the status historians enjoyed as "national pedagogues".

This term has been used to describe the Wilhelmine professors like Sybel and Treitschke, and their disciples, who were so prominent in the struggle for German unification, and later in Germany's growth as a world power.\(^3\) But British historians had a similar, though less obvious, role in presenting justifications for Britain's position as a world power. Their tone is more judicious and restrained than that of German historians, but they were equally arguing a case. Those British historians, like Arnold Toynbee, who worked for the official propaganda machine and crossed

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1. Similarly, "technical" discussion among economists (e.g. on how to "pay" for the war) has been ignored, and the writings of academic economists used only where they were concerned with the general issues of war and peace.

2. In Britain the obvious exception was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. The writings of academic theologians were fairly numerous too, but they have been dealt with in at least two recent works: A. Marrin, The Last Crusade: The Church of England in the First World War, Durham, N. Carolina, 1975 and S.P. Mews, "Religion and English Society in the First World War", Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1975.

a dividing line between academic history and official history which was
never very clear, and even less so during wartime. Talk of "treason of
the clerks" suggests a state of freedom from political entanglement
before the war which was never true of the British "intellectual
aristocracy".¹

British philosophers were called upon not so much to justify official
policy (although some like Sir Henry Jones proved the equal of historians
in this) but rather to explain what had gone wrong in Germany. This
process was continued, with a brief interruption, after the war in the
ideological exegesis of national socialism. For some philosophers it was
an exercise in self-defence since British philosophy owed much to German
Idealism. For others, like L.T. Hobhouse, the war provided an opportunity
for renewed attacks on neo-Hegelian orthodoxy. For a younger generation
of philosophers led by Russell and G.E. Moore the argument over the
alleged legacy of German Idealism seemed less important than the task of
criticising the wartime growth in the authority of the state. It is per¬
haps no paradox that the harshest criticism of Germany after 1914 came
from erstwhile Germanophile academics, generally men who had reached
intellectual maturity well before 1914. For the younger generation, "it
was French culture and newly-discovered glories of Russian literature,
music and ballet that mattered".² To Bloomsbury intellectuals all the
talk of a war on behalf of civilization (by those who claimed that Ger¬
mans fought for Kultur) seemed quite irrelevant. But only Russell of

¹. "The influence of these families may partly explain a paradox which
has puzzled European and American observers of English life: the
paradox of an intelligensia which appears to conform rather than

². J. Mander, Our German Cousins, 1974, p. 12.
the younger generation of academics stood out against the idea of the "Holy War". He had the personal and intellectual qualities required of the political dissenter at a time when opinion was strongly in favour of Britain's entry to the war. That he was the only academic strongly critical of the government policy says much about the generally acquiescent attitude of most of his fellow-philosophers, not only in Britain but in all the belligerent states. Yet the protection of unpopular opinion (if not the holding of such) should have been one of the first duties of philosophers, just as the critical scrutiny of government policy (and the evidence presented in "white papers") was supposedly the concern of historians.

The limits of political dissent within universities were seriously circumscribed by hostile public opinion and by government action (as in the restrictions on Russell's movements) but academic freedom suffered most seriously from assault within the academic community itself. German-born professors whose loyalty to Britain was not seriously in doubt suffered at the hands of hostile local communities in Leeds, Birmingham and Aberystwyth. But the treatment of Russell and A.C. Pigou, was a serious reflection on the behaviour of Cambridge dons—-at best paying off old academic scores when the war offered an opportunity, at worst ignoring the idea that universities could be sanctuaries for men of independent mind. That there were not other cases at other universities (there was one at Oxford) was due more to the political docility (or enthusiasm for the war) of academics, one suspects, than to any climate of tolerance. Academic freedom was as precarious where universities were traditionally autonomous, as it was in countries where universities were state institutions (Germany) or dependent on local communities (American state universities). There were more dismissals in America because there were many more academics. If there was nothing in Britain to compare
with the manifesto of "the ninety-three", which virtually every German professor signed, there was (apart from Russell) as little attempt to question the war in Britain as in Germany.

After the war this theme of "betrayal" was taken up by J.A. Hobson, an economist who existed outside the academic community. In 1926 he wrote that the "graver perils to free-thought and scientific progress in the social sciences" lay not in the forced subordination of scholars to the state, but rather in the "timid conservatism" of professors "and their genuine class sympathies and reverences." The enemy was within. Professors were "not so much the intellectual mercenaries of the vested interests as their volunteers".¹ A year later Julien Benda expressed the same idea in the memorable phrase la trahison des clercs. Although an English translation appeared² Benda's book "received curiously little attention in England".³ In America errant wartime academics were scourged by H.L. Mencken's young men in the pages of American Mercury. The titles of the articles - "The Historians Cut Loose" and "The Higher Learning Goes to War"⁴ - give some indication of the approach. In Britain the academics closed ranks and there was no inquest on what had gone wrong with historians and philosophers in 1914. Not until the 1930s was there discussion of the role of the "secular intellectual" in British society.⁵

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1. Free Thought in the Social Sciences, 1926, pp. 54-5. "The definite fear of losing a teaching post plays but a small part in sterilising the scientific impulse as compared with the more constant and insidious breathing of this conservative atmosphere."


But the theme of "betrayal" is not the only one which characterises the wartime behaviour of British academics (and German, French and American ones for that matter). For betrayal implies something betrayed, and the commitment of historians in 1914 to value-free history (and for that matter, of philosophers to "pure" ideas divorced from social context) arouses a wry smile fifty or so years later.
"It is said that every educated man is at heart either a Roman or a Greek, and there are many arguments to be adduced in support of the theory. In modern times Englishmen seem to fall into one of two categories, that is to say there is something they would find it very hard to define which predisposes them in favour either of France or of Germany".

Sir Charles Petrie, The Chamberlain Tradition (1938)

The influence of German universities and scholarship in the world of learning in the second half of the nineteenth century was as great, if not greater, than that exerted by American institutions of higher education since the Second World War. The German example was responsible for what has been called a "knowledge revolution" in Britain, and the same is true of the rest of Europe and North America in the sixty or so years before the outbreak of the First World War. While German philosophy and biblical criticism profoundly influenced individuals in the late 18th and early 19th century, the second half of the nineteenth century saw an "institutionalization" of German learning in Britain. As an American historian has put it:

"...the clerics, aesthetes, and amateurs in all things German gave way increasingly to the professionals. No longer was it literateurs and biblical students who spread the new learning; they were replaced by professional philosophers, historians, philologists, jurists, physicians and scientists. This is the meaning of the phrase, 'the institutionalization of the German influence'. Within this phrase are included the professionalization of various disciplines, the introduction of new subjects of study, the creation of schools of thought, as well as changes made in existing English institutions as the result of the German influence." 

1. The phrase in this context is from S. Rothblatt, Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education, 1976.
Tracing the transfer of culture is never a simple matter, and this is especially true of German influence on British academic life before 1914. The transformation of intellectual values under the impact of this influence was uneven. What has been said of German observers of Britain could equally be said of those involved in the observation of things German— that "travel does not modify people's opinions very significantly; it merely provides them with words to express what otherwise might remain not only unsaid, but also unthought."\(^1\) Certainly, of the British scholars who visited Germany before 1914, some were repelled by the atmosphere of German universities while others were greatly attracted by German Wissenschaft. "For German intellectual achievements to be appreciated in Britain there had to be, to begin with, a predisposition to accept the fundamental assumptions behind the idea of the new knowledge. Simple contact and exposure are not sufficient; for these, as is well known, are frequently double edged. They enforce national prejudice and insularity as much as they challenge them."\(^2\) Among those who wished to reform Oxford and Cambridge and to revive a tradition of research in British universities the German example was a potent one. But the fact that they were generally more articulate than their opponents in this matter should not obscure the fact that there was always a body of more conservatively minded dons relatively unaffected by, or suspicious of, German scholarship—the "Chorus of Cloudy Professors" in the verse satire by H.L. Mansel

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contained the following much-quoted lines:

"Professors we,
From over the sea,
From the land where professors in plenty be;
And we thrive and flourish as well we may,
In the land that produced one Kant with a K
And many cants with a C."^1

However, the intellectual torpor of Oxford and Cambridge in the first half of the nineteenth century encouraged reform-minded dons, like Mark Pattison of Lincoln College, Oxford, to look appreciatively at the vigorous university system of Germany. After the mid-century reform of the ancient universities research facilities were still slow to develop and many serious-minded students went to Germany for higher study. Between 1835 and 1880 an increasing number of British students matriculated at German universities. Between 1890 and 1914 the increase in numbers was slower. Of course, British students did not flock to Germany in such numbers as did Americans, and after 1850 they were greatly outnumbered by the latter. But the largest group of foreign students at German universities (apart from the Austrians and Swiss whose universities, for all practical purposes, were part of the German system) was Russian. In 1880 they made up 18% of the student body, as against 15.5% American and 6% British.5

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1. Scenes from an Unfinished Drama Entitled Phrontisterion, or, Oxford in the 19th Century, 1852.
3. See the table in G. Hollenberg, Englische Interesse Am Kaiserreich, Wiesbaden, 1974, p. 294. There seem to have been temporary drops in the number of students in the early 1870s, 1880s and 1900s.
4. Table in J. Conrad, The German Universities for the Last 50 Years, Glasgow, 1885,p. 41. The numbers of British students rose from 26 (1835) to 42 (1860) to 71 (1880), but they still remained 5% to 6% of the total. American students rose sharply in number and percentage from 5 (1%) in 1835 to 77 (10.5%) in 1860 and 173 (15.5%) in 1880. According to L. Veysey, the number of American students declined after the mid-1890s. The Emergence of the American University, Chicago, 1965, p. 131.
In the case of Russian students political reasons were, no doubt, important in their decision to study in Germany. For the British and American students there were two great attractions. First, the accessibility of the German university—admission requirements were often minimal, living costs were low, and once matriculated the student could wander from university to university in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. Secondly, there was the attraction of studying under many of the leading scholars in their fields.

In 1911 A.J. Carlyle, the historian of medieval political thought, told the Albert Committee that, the "position of the great German nation in philosophy, science and literature was so powerful that students were bound to study German and go to Germany if they were of any promise."1 And the list of British scholars who did study in Germany is a long and distinguished one. Among historians, Lord Acton, J.B. Bury, G.G. Coulton, H.W.C. Davis, H.A.L. Fisher, A.G. Little, Ramsay Muir, Reginald Lane Poole, G.W. Prothero, R.W. Seton-Watson, and E.L. Woodward. Among economic historians, W.J. Ashley, J.H. Clapham, William Cunningham and George Unwin. Among philosophers, J. Cook, Wilson, Henry Sidgwick, W.R. Sorley, Norman Kemp Smith, James Ward. Among theologians, J.S. MacKinnon, John Oman, W.P. Paterson. Among philologists and classicalists, E.V. Arnold, J.S. Blackie, Ingram Bywater, H.M. Chadwick, L.R. Farnell, Henry Netteship, John Rhys, and Henry Sweet. And finally, two early figures in the "new" fields of anthropology and psychology, R.R. Marett and W.M. McDougall.2 Lord Bryce,

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1. Times Educational Supplm. 10 (6 June 1911), 91. The Albert Committee sought to promote the study of German in British schools and universities.

2. For a fuller list see appendix.
who later became one of the strongest supporters of the German idea of the university, as a newly-elected Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, had in 1863 travelled to Heidelberg "resolved to pass a semester studying law under Von Vangerow and perfecting himself in the knowledge of the German language". Later with Henry Nettleship at Dresden they met up with A.V. Dicey and T.H. Green chaperoning a party of Oxford undergraduates. "Our society is a little Oxford transplanted to Germany", Dicey wrote.¹ Half a century later, when he was British Ambassador to the United States, Bryce remembered his Wanderjahre and listed for a student audience at the University of Wisconsin the attractions of German universities—"completeness of teaching organisation, ...the amplitude of the provision of instruction in every branch of knowledge ..., and ...the services they render to the prosecution of research". On the whole, "the level of learning among the teachers" was "perhaps higher than anywhere else."²

But, even more than these measureable attractions, it was the spirit of German scholarship which made German universities so attractive. Academic freedom (lehrfreiheit) and scientific method were the two features which Michael Sadler noted in his preface to Friedrich Paulsen's classic work The German Universities and University Study: "The secret of the greatness of all institutions lies not in the form of their organisation, or in their legal status, or in their financial resources, though of course each of these has an important bearing upon their efficiency and well-being, but in the spirit of their work

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² "The Mission of the State Universities" (June 1908), University and Historical Addresses, 1913, pp. 156-7.
and in the unwritten tradition of public service. It is the inner tradition of German university life, the spirit which animates and controls them, that most deserves study and excites our admiration. The German universities have become strong and great through untiring devotion to science, through belief in the power of education, through resolute defence of intellectual freedom, and through personal obligation to the claims of the state.

During the First World War Sadler was to have second thoughts about this last feature of German universities, but in 1906 his admiration was not at all unusual (although as we shall see observers as different as L.T. Hobhouse and A.E. Housman were already expressing doubts). The belief of some British scholars in Wissenschaft was almost religious in intensity. As an American historian has put it, they "zealously devoted their lives to the service of an unchurched and unknown God." That most serious-minded historian Lord Acton wrote admiringly in the first number of the English Historical Review (1886) of the "familiar type of German scholar..., ...the man who complained that the public library allowed him only 13 hours a day to read, the man who spent

2. See below chapter 4.
3. Literally scholarship, science, learning, but with connotations. As Walter Metzger notes: "The very notion of Wissenschaft had overtones of meaning utterly missing in its English counterpart, science. The German term signified a dedicated, sanctified pursuit. It signified not merely the goal of rational understanding, but the goal of self-fulfilment; not merely the study of the 'exact sciences' but of everything taught by the university; not the study of things for their immediate utilities, but the morally imperative study of things for themselves and for their ultimate meaning." R. Hofstadter & W. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, N.Y. 1955, p. 373.
thirty years on one volume, the man who wrote on Homer in 1806 and who still wrote on Homer in 1870, the man who discovered the 358 passages in which Dichtys had imitated Sallust."1

In the same article Acton had spoken of Humboldt forging "the link between science and force by organising a university at Berlin."2 And although he did not enlarge on this, he seems to have been referring to the new conception of the university which arose in Germany— as symbols of (and contributors towards) national development and progress.3 This was the image of the German university which observers like Sadler and Bryce stressed. It was the same image implicit in the title of an early history of the movement for university reform—Lewis Campbell's On the Nationalisation of the English Universities (1901).4 Not only were German university laboratories seen, increasingly after 1870, as the source of important technological innovation, but the German university generally came to be seen as a symbol of wealth and power. As German industry forged ahead there seems to have been a growing fear in Britain of what we would now call a "laboratory gap". Something of this can be seen in the comments of M.E. Grant Duff a

1. "German Schools of History", repr. in Historical Essays & Studies, 1907, p. 370. Robert Browning's "Christmas Eve" offered the romantic vision of a medieval university town:
"The tall old quaint irregular town/It may be...though which, I can't affirm...any/Of the famous middle-age towns of Germany:/And this flight of stairs where I sit down,/Is it Halle, Weimar, Cassel, Frankfort,/Or Göttingen, I have to thank for't?/It may be Göttingen—most likely.": section XIV (1850).

2. "German Schools...". p. 370.

3. As the intellectual focus of society the university came to be seen "as the embodiment of the national mind". P. Farmer, "19th century Ideas of the University: Continental Europe", in M. Clapp (ed.) The Modern University, Ithaca, 1950, p. 9. In England and Wales (less so in Scotland) many scholars and scientists had worked outside universities (because of religious and pecuniary barriers to entry). This was at once a consequence and a cause of the intellectual torpor of Oxford and Cambridge.

4. Campbell was Professor of Greek at St. Andrews and a biographer of Jowett.
member of the Royal Commission on Oxford University in the 1850s, Rector of St. Andrews University in the next decade (1866-72) and close friend of the Oxford reformers Benjamin Jowett and Mark Pattison. "At the beginning of the last century", he told Parliament in 1876, "the German universities were far inferior to our own. A little more than a hundred years later they were far in advance of them; but there is nothing to prevent their respective positions being entirely reversed before the year 1900; if we are only wise now."\(^1\) In Germany state governments had revived the older universities and founded new ones.\(^2\) In Britain it was left, characteristically, to local initiative. Hartley Institution, Southampton, (1862) Owens College, Manchester, (1851) Firth College, Sheffield, (1879) and Mason College, Birmingham (1880) owed their foundation (as colleges of science) to the generosity of rich manufacturers and merchants. The Yorkshire College of Science in Leeds was started with money raised by public subscriptions (1874) and the colleges of the University of Wales at Aberystwyth (1872), Cardiff (1883) and Bangor (1884) had similar beginnings.

Envious British eyes looked at the relatively ample German state assistance to higher education. Sadler who had visited Germany to study its educational system in 1906 wrote that:

"At no earlier period in our educational history has German experience in organising intellectual activities had so close a bearing upon our needs. We find that what has long been going forward in German universities and technical high schools throws light upon the place of scientific research in industrial enterprise and national well-being. We see that German experience may guide us, by way both of warning and example, as to the right relationship between the university and the government or other...

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1. Cit. Haines, Essays..., p. 102. As late as the 1830s German students went to Paris for further studies.

2. Berlin (1809), Bonn (1818), Munich (1826). Older institutions were re-established at Breslau (1811), Braunsberg (1818) and Strassburg (1872).
public bodies from which most of the former receive an increasing proportion of their resources. As soon as we begin to consider the true cost of developing the intellectual powers of the nation we realized that in the bold application of public funds to higher education and to free scientific education it was Germany which led the way.¹

Was Sadler hinting at dangers in this government-university relationship? If he was, he did not elaborate, and British observers appear not to have recognised the less admirable features of the status of the German professoriate as civil servants—for example, the manifest discrimination against Jews and Social Democrats in the competition for professorial chairs.² Lord Bryce voiced the feelings of many academics when he pointed to the "tradition of respect" for universities "strong in the minds of the German bureaucracy" who had generally been educated within their walls. This, Bryce felt, was "efficient protection". To British eyes official control of German universities might seem "excessive" but in practice it was not "harmful". Public opinion protected "freedom of teaching".³

In Britain there seemed to be little of the German recognition of universities as national institutions. In Germany, Bryce claimed, "the whole nation cares for the universities, is proud of the universities, recognises as perhaps no other nation has ever done, the value for the practical life of full knowledge and exact training, so that everything is done which money and organising skill can do to maintain the institutions of learning and teaching at the highest level of efficiency."⁴

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1. "Preface" to Paulsen, p. vii. Sadler had contributed a number of special reports on German education to a series issued by the Board of Education. At this time he was Professor of the History and Administration of Education at Manchester (1903-11).
4. Loc. cit.
How different the situation was in Britain! Until the 1880s provincial colleges and universities, and the colleges of London, relied on public subscriptions, private benefactions, and sometimes finance from municipal authorities. Between 1882 and 1884 grants from central government were given successively to the new Welsh colleges. From 1889 government money was provided for eleven colleges and universities (fourteen by 1904), but never on a generous scale: in 1904 £54,000, in 1905 £100,000, in 1912 £150,000—still far short of the half million Sidney Webb had felt was necessary for proper financial support. Up until this time the government had always refused financial support, now its support was, at best, half-hearted. Oxford and Cambridge (apart from small grants for specific projects—generally scientific) remained outside this system of annual grants until after the war. However, the two ancient universities were the subject of government scrutiny and legislation from 1850 onwards.

The reform of Oxford and Cambridge between 1850 and 1882—what John Morley called the "long journey towards the nationalisation of the universities"—was also animated by the example of the vigorous German university system, as well as by dislike of the privileged position of the Church of England. The University Reform Acts of 1854 (Oxford) and 1856 (Cambridge) which ended the control of university administration by the heads of colleges and which removed religious tests for matriculation and bachelor's degrees, were a disappointment

1. Nottingham College was financed by the city council.
2. R.O. Berdahl, British Universities and the State, 1959, pp. 48-57.
4. But not for the M.A. (and hence a vote in Convocation) or fellowships.
for reforming dons. Further reforms during the 1870s which they
secured from Parliament have been somewhat overshadowed by the mid-
century reforms. However, the legislation of the 1870s was in some
ways even more far-reaching and certainly more obviously influenced
by the German example. The reformers looked at German achievements
in science and traced them to "the internal structure and organisa-
tion of German universities." And it was no coincidence that German
influence had been more marked in the 1870s, for had not France's
defeat by Prussia been a striking demonstration of Acton's "link
between science and force"? The Battle of Sedan had been won in the
lecture halls of Berlin, the laboratories of Giessen.

However, the Oxford and Cambridge which emerged from the scrutiny
of the Royal Commission of 1873-77 and the enacting statutes of 1882
were by no means replicas of contemporary German universities. Even
among the reform party at Oxford, for example, there had not been total
acceptance of the German university model. Jowett, who was Master
of Balliol by 1870, stressed the need to maintain what was best of the
traditional collegiate structure. The prime concern of the don
Jowett saw as undergraduate teaching rather than his own research. Against
this Mark Pattison argued for a university organised for research, on

1. See Minutes of Evidence before the Royal Commission on the University
of Oxford (1881), Part I, esp. pp. 55-9 (J.C. Wilson & L.R. Phelps),
108-9 (A.H. Sayce), 173 (W. Odling), 228-9 (T.K. Cheyne), 406-17
(Max Müller), 295-6 (E.B. Pusey, now more favourable to German Univer-
2. J.Ben-David & A.Zloczower, "Universities & Academic Systems in Modern
3. W.J. Ashley felt that the 30 or so years before 1870 were "marked in
England by an almost complete ignorance of contemporary German thought." J.S.
Mill was typical with his "superficial and second-hand acquaint-
ance" with "German speculations and investigations." "It was indeed
the time of Germany's humiliation and I suppose the victories of 1870
did more to make us learn German than any spontaneous enlargement of
interest." "The Present Position of Political Economy", in Die
Entwicklung der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre im 19 Jahrhundert,
Leipzig, 1908, I, 9.
a faculty rather than a collegiate basis, and concerned to produce
"a professional class of learned and scientific men".\footnote{1} Significantly, it was Jovett's vision which prevailed. The Royal Commission, faced with the difficult task of apportioning the respective areas of collegiate and university (i.e. professorial) teaching, and perhaps believing that the collegiate structure had certain advantages, left the organisation of teaching in reformed Oxford for adjustment within the university. Jovett's proposals, being less radical than Pattison's, secured the necessary support of moderate conservatives.\footnote{2} The idea that research was an important (if not more important) function of the university teacher, took at least another fifty years (and another Royal Commission in 1923) to develop. For example, one can note that until 1913 history teaching at Oxford was controlled by an unofficial group of college tutors and lecturers (the Modern History Association), there being no university faculty for the subject. C.H. Firth's criticism of the lack of serious historical research—in his inaugural lecture as the Regius Professor (1904)—was lost in the vociferous reaffirmation of traditional teaching goals: the liberal education of undergraduates.\footnote{3}

Outside Oxford and Cambridge the German example was at first more influential. In London the mathematician Karl Pearson established an Association for the Promotion of a Professorial University (1893)

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{C.F. Green, The Universities,} Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 72.
\item "By 1880 when the academic management of the university was first divided into faculty boards, the victory of the tutors was so complete that they were to dominate these boards as well." A.H. Halsey \& M. Trow, \textit{The British Academicians,} 1971, p. 149.
\end{enumerate}
in the hope of reforming the University of London along the lines of
the University of Berlin.¹ Imperial College, London, which was given
a charter in 1907, was established with the College of Applied Science
at Charlottenberg in mind. However, it was not to be the first of a
line of Technische Hochschulen, for it became a constituent college in
a reorganised University of London—a good example of the inclusiveness in the newer British universities which contrasted strongly with
the strict division in Germany between pure and applied knowledge. The
University of Birmingham was ready to admit the kind of technical sub-
jects, like commerce and brewing (mining in the case of Leeds) which
did not find a place in German universities.² The provincial colleges
had often been initially established as scientific institutions
(Firth and Mason Colleges, and the Yorkshire College of Science at
Leeds). But as time went on (and especially after the passing of the
1904 Education Act), they added arts faculties and sought university
status.³ The result was that the provincial universities were neither
like the German colleges of applied science or German universities.
In fact they began to look more like the two ancient universities
(allowing for the fact that they did not have colleges), since the
British university system, unlike the German, centred around a
"pyramid of prestige".⁴ Sir Eric Ashby has explained this by the

1. "When one thinks of the enormous power brought to a focus in the
University of Berlin—with its Ranke, Gneist, De Bois-Reymond,
Kirchoff, Wattenback, Mommsen, Curtius, Mollenhoff, Helmholtz,
Zupitza, Oldenburgh, Weierstrass, Kiespert, and a dozen or two
more European names—one is inclined to be impatient with Londoners
that they have slumbered so long." Pearson, "The Proposed Uni-
versity for London", Academy, 26, 660 (27 Dec. 1884), 430.
2. On the strict demarcation between "pure" and "applied" subjects
in Germany, see Ben-David & Zloczower, 49-50.
3. Birmingham (1900), Liverpool (1903), Leeds (1904), Sheffield
(1905), Bristol (1909), Southampton (1902) and Nottingham (1903)
became university colleges.
4. A.H. Halsey, "British Universities", European J. of Sociology,
III (1962), 97.
analogy of genetic mutation. This was what happened to German concepts of a university "as they crossed the Channel":

"Confronted with a different academic tradition in a different society, the German concepts were assimilated but transformed. One important reason was that there was no effective competition among British universities, such as existed among the universities in the German states. In Germany rivalry between universities stimulated them to adopt new ideas. In England higher education was dominated by the influence of Oxford and Cambridge: prestige was concentrated in these two centres in a way it has never been among the universities of Germany. And although the new institutions of higher education which were established in England were in part a protest against the exclusiveness of Oxford and Cambridge, nevertheless they had to live under the hegemony of these ancient universities. They acquired, by a process of social mimicry, some of the prevailing assumptions about higher education."1

Perhaps more than the structure of the German university the German approach to scholarship had obvious impact in Britain. Many of the leading learned journals were established after 1870 on the model of the scores of Zeitschriften, Jahrbücher and Beiträge.2 The London School of Economics, Victoria University of Manchester and (belatedly) Oxford began to publish series of monographs by young scholars.3 More generally, the historical and comparative approach to philology, pioneered by Germans, became a model for scholars working in other fields—biblical criticism, classical archaeology, ethnology, law, history.4 This was well expressed by W.J. Ashley, a pioneering economic historian who had

4. In political economy members of the "historicist school" felt that German influence (in this case Roscher's Grundrisse) had encountered resistance. See W. Cunningham, "Why Had Roscher so Little Influence in England", Annals of American Assoc. of Political & Social Science, V. 5. German influence on theology was most apparent after 1860 (except for E.B. Pusey), on classical studies, before this date. L.E. Elliot-Binns, English Thought 1860-1900, 1956, p. 26.
studied in Germany. In his inaugural lecture as the first holder of a separate chair in economic history (at Harvard) Ashley ended by pointing to the common motivating force of the biological, physical and historical sciences—the desire to "arrive at a more satisfying and intelligible conception of the evolution of human society." Ashley, visiting Göttingen twelve years earlier, just before taking his degree at Oxford, had been struck by "the German ardour for the extension of the bounds of knowledge", a quality he felt his own university lacked. On his first day there a "young German professor to whom Stubbs had written met him at the station and began immediately to ask eager questions on points of historical scholarship... This seemed to him characteristic of the German conception, according to which he thought it might be said with little exaggeration that a University had a responsibility in the first instance to knowledge rather than to students." Later during the war Ashley was to criticise some of the assumptions and achievements of German research, but in his contribution to the festschrift for his intellectual mentor Gustav Schmoller in 1908 he was still properly deferential. However, at about this time there were a few voices critical, not just of attempts to introduce German methods and organisation to British universities, but of the whole

1. "On the Study of Economic History" (Jan. 1893) repr. in N.E. Harte (ed.) The Study of Economic History, 1971, p. 16. "Just as in biological and physical science the investigator is buoyed up by the conviction that every isolated fact, could he learn but how, has its own place in a sequence, its own significance and appropriateness, so in the history of man we can never be content until we have found it a connected and consecutive whole, or until we know of a surety that it is but a chaos of meaningless fragments."

2. A. Ashley, William James Ashley, 1932, pp. 20-1. Ashley visited Germany again in 1883-4.

3. See his "Present Position..."
thrust of German scholarship. For example, a large part of A.E. Housman's inaugural lecture as Kennedy Professor of Latin at Cambridge (May 1910) was devoted to criticism of German classical scholarship for its emphasis on completeness and organisation at the expense of intellectual reasoning:

"On the battlefield of Sedan you may set up the gravestone not of one empire but of two, for where the military predominance of France fell down and perished, there also the intellectual predominance of Germany received a wound of which it bled slowly to death.... Germany, throughout the circle of the sciences, is losing or has lost her place, because her best brains are no longer employed upon the pursuit of knowledge. The Germany which led the thought of Europe was Germany disunited and poor: her union and power and wealth now provide great careers in politics, arms and commerce, and German capabilities—these are not my words but the words of a Chancellor of the Empire—'German capabilities,' said Prince Bulow four years ago 'have taken refuge in our industry and army.' The superiority which Germany now retains in classical scholarship, is not one of quality but of quantity."

The language of wartime criticism of German scholarship is very much the same, suggesting that it was, at least in part, a return to the traditional mistrust expressed half a century earlier in Mansell's Phrontisterion. There was, however, no reason to suspect that even the renowned objectivity of German scholars, the doctrine of the Wertfreiheit research, was merely being paid lip-service. Writing during the Second World War, H.A.L. Fisher remembered the "eloquent diatribes against Great Britain" which had formed the substance of Treitschke's history lectures at the University of Berlin, and how "a fellow-member of the Historische Verein explained...with the utmost friendliness that Germany regarded Britain as her eternal enemy and

predestined victim". This may have been a memory coloured by two world wars, but it certainly was not an untypical experience as recent study of Wilhelmine historians has shown. A similar experience befell E.L. Woodward twenty or so years later at university in Darmstadt in 1912. And in T.F. Tout's wartime memoir of his former pupil Mark Hovell (killed on the Western Front in August 1916) one reads of Hovell's disillusionment with some members of the Institute für Kultur und Universalgeschichte in the University of Leipzig. Apparently the Professor of English (Max Förster) "exhorted the students to play football that they might be better able to fight England when the time arrived".

Later chapters will chart the way in which British academics came to terms with this Anglophobia apparently so widespread amongst their German colleagues. However, first we shall turn to examine the British "academic community" as it had developed before 1914.

3. "I was startled to find that most of the students I met would talk to me in a friendly way about the coming war in which the British navy would be sunk, the British 'colonies' would revolt, and Germany would become the greatest power in the world." Short Journey, 1942, p. 70. Cf. his Great Britain & the War of 1914-1918, 1967, p. xv.
4. Tout also claims that Hovell "saw that Lamprecht studied English History in the hope of appropriating for his own land the secret of British prosperity". "Mark Hovell (1888-1916)", in Hovell, The Chartist Movement, Manchester, 1916. Lamprecht was also a member of the German peace movement, however.
II: THE BRITISH ACADEMIC WORLD BEFORE 1914

"...on the basis of present sociological literature the future historian would have less difficulty in ascertaining the social behaviour of the railroader, the taxi-dancer, or the professional thief than he would that of the contemporary university professor."

Logan Wilson, The Academic Man (1942)

What Harold Perkin has called "this most public and yet least studied of professions"—university teaching—had begun to develop its modern appearance in the years before the outbreak of the First World War. It is true that one cannot talk of an academic class in Britain before 1914 in the sense that the term can be applied in Germany in the same period. British academics were fewer in number, and, more importantly, less conscious of themselves as a distinct social group. This lack of professional self-consciousness was partly the result of the social status of the British academic. Professors in the Germany of William II were very definitely members of the upper middle class and were often very well-to-do. In Britain the demarcation between secondary and tertiary education was still unclear, and there was a certain amount of movement by teachers back and forth between

2. In 1900 there were approximately 800 Fellows of Oxford and Cambridge colleges; 500 professors and lecturers in English and Welsh universities and colleges, about the same number in Scottish universities (including the college at Dundee), and under 250 in the various institutions associated with the University of London. Halsey and Trow, pp. 139, 145. This was less than half the number of professors alone, in German universities (4,000 or almost all, signed the manifesto of "the 93" in 1914—see below p. 79.
3. Income often depended more on student fees than state salary—popular professors could be very rich. See Ringer, pp. 34-8.
public schools and the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. In Germany recruitment to the ranks of the professoriate from assistants in an Institut or from amongst the Privatdozenten was well-established by the 1870s. In Britain the career pattern differed widely between the older universities and the newer ones. Achievement in research and publication was not the only criterion for academic recruitment and advancement. "Essayists, writers, brilliant public speakers and administrators...found their way to universities to a greater extent than in Germany". The other reason for the slow development of professional self-consciousness in Britain lay in the "pyramid of prestige" we have already noted amongst the various universities and colleges.

Before 1914 the typical figure in British academic life remained the Fellow of an Oxford or Cambridge college whose loyalty was first to the body of which he was a member (and in whose affairs he had a voice) and second to the University. This, its official historian suggests, was one reason for the slow development of the Association of University Teachers. The largest and most prestigious universities, because of their collegiate structure, did not encourage the growth

1. The Cambridge historian G.G. Coulton was elected to fellowship at St. John's College after schoolmastering in Britain and France. At another level, the headmastership of a public school like Rugby was "not inferior...to the headship of an Oxford college". T.W. Bamford, "Public school masters: a 19th century profession", in Education and the Professions, 1973, p. 40. In terms of salary university lecturers received "little more than...secondary schoolmasters of three years standing, and less than most". H. Perkin, The Key Profession, 1969, p. 39.

2. Ben-David and Zloczower, 69.
of professional self-consciousness of the kind which the A.U.T. attempted to foster.¹ Although there was a "pecking order" among German universities which put Breslau below Bonn or Berlin, the German university system has been well-described as "competitive"—at least in relation to the more obvious hierarchical structure of British universities. Oxford and Cambridge, V.H.H. Green has noted, had "few competitors, even among the newly-founded universities, so that a professorial chair at Oxford or Cambridge represented, as it long continued to do, the crown of academic achievement". Even a college fellowship had the rewards that a chair outside Oxford and Cambridge could not always offer—"a comfortable and civilised environment in which a serious scholar could work without too many calls on his time or too great an intrusion of outside anxieties or administrative demands".² Who then was the more typical Oxford figure: the philosopher F.H. Bradley who remained a Fellow of Merton College, or the philosopher and social scientist L.T. Hobhouse who moved from fellowships at Merton (1887-90) and Corpus Christi (1894-7)³ to the editorial office of the Manchester Guardian, and ultimately to the London School of Economics where he became the first Professor of Sociology in 1907?

A recent study of the development of the "academic profession" at Oxford suggests that Bradley (despite his reputation as a recluse)

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1. Perkin, Key Profession, pp. 26-7. This was reinforced by the poverty, isolation and small size of most provincial universities and colleges.

2. Universities, p. 73.

3. Hobhouse had been an undergraduate (1883-7) and Assistant Tutor (1890-3) before becoming a Fellow of Corpus Christi College.
was probably more typical of the period before 1900 at least. By 1880 a college fellowship represented a commitment to teaching (and that largely within Oxford) which had not been present earlier in the century. "The outward structure of a fellowship had changed little, but its function had been drastically altered". Most Fellows, "and virtually all the younger ones", were engaged in teaching as a career, not as an interlude before finding a college living.¹ But if the career link with the Church of England was becoming the exception, fellowships were still filled by recruitment from within the university—at Oxford by any member of any college in the University, at Cambridge usually from members of the college offering the fellowship. In neither case was publication or scientific discovery important for success, and the dissertation required by Cambridge colleges was nearest equivalent to the practice of German universities.² Outside Oxford and Cambridge the "pyramid of prestige" encouraged the continuation of the practice of filling professorships with candidates from the two ancient universities. When provincial colleges and universities had first been established this had been a necessity, but as time went on chairs continued to go to ambitious college Fellows. A young scholar from Scotland, Wales or the English provincial universities could expect to have spent some time at Oxford or Cambridge before successfully securing a chair elsewhere.

¹ A. Engel, "Emerging Concepts of the Academic Profession at Oxford 1800-1894", The University in Society, Princeton, 1975, I, 308. Although 69% of Fellows 1801-1900 were still in holy orders, only 9% took college livings and 57% remained to teach at Oxford. Of the rest, most went on to teach outside Oxford. Fifty years earlier 92% were in orders, 53% took livings and 13% stayed to teach in Oxford (p. 352).

² At Oxford candidates were examined in the subject of some school. E. Barker, Age and Youth, 1953, pp. 14-16. The Ph.D. was only introduced after the First World War (to attract American students).
There were, therefore, the beginnings of a university "system" however pyramidal—and of an academic class or community before 1914. The increase in the size and number of universities and colleges from the 1880s meant that the number of university teachers grew also.¹ This was important because the period 1880-1914 was one of financial difficulty for the two ancient English universities and for most of their colleges. Agricultural depression had decreased the rental which could be expected from college and university estates, especially the former which were generally larger. Not only did this mean that very few new chairs could be endowed,² but also that the "dividend" attached to college fellowships actually dropped in value.³ But as time went on competition even for chairs outside Oxford and Cambridge became more fierce, and young men embarking on an academic career were often forced to choose between a long apprenticeship as a badly-paid lecturer or assistant to a professor in a Scottish university or in one of the newer universities or colleges of England and Wales (a position not unlike that of the Privatdozen), or the hope of a university chair overseas. The colleges and universities of the white dominions, of India, and of the United States (especially the eastern seaboard) provided the opportunity (it was hoped) to make one's reputation and for eventual return to a chair in a British university. The careers of two former pupils of A.L. Smith, Fellow of Balliol and mentor of

1. Student numbers grew from 1,128 (1800) to 5,500 (1885) and then jumped to 16,735 (1889) and 20,000 (1900). Perkin, Key Profession, p. 23. In London (and the same was probably true elsewhere) the 1904 Education Act, by encouraging teachers to seek university degrees, caused expansion of Arts faculties. See S. Webb's comments, cit. W.H.G. Armytage, Civic Universities, 1955, p. 255.

2. Engel, 351. Besides, the creation of new chairs might have been unwelcome to academic conservatives (i.e. a threat to tutorial teaching).

3. Depending on the college, they dropped to between £80 and £250 p.a. Green, Universities, p. 180.
many later eminent historians, illustrate the two career patterns. James Tait left Owens College, Manchester for Balliol in 1883. After taking his degree at Oxford he was appointed Assistant Lecturer in English Literature and History at Manchester (1887) and gradually worked his way up to a lectureship in Ancient History (1896) and finally the chair of Ancient and Medieval History (1902).

Tait's friend and contemporary at Balliol G.A. Wood, after unsuccessful attempts to find suitable academic employment in Britain, secured the new Challis professorship of History at the University of Sydney. He held this for thirty-seven years until his death in 1928. While Wood remained a grossly-overworked teacher with little opportunity for research or publication Tait gradually made his mark as the historian of the medieval borough and the other half of that formidable Manchester duo Tout and Tait. But a post overseas did not necessarily mean consignment to academic limbo. The young R.M. MacIver left a lectureship in political science and sociology at Aberdeen and moved to the University of Toronto (1915-27) and later to Columbia University in New York (1929-50) achieving distinction as a sociologist. Norman Kemp Smith, the Kantian scholar, moved from a lectureship at Glasgow (1897-1906) to the chair of Psychology (1906-14) and then of Philosophy (1914) at Princeton, before returning to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh in 1919. J.E. Todd, Professor of Modern History at

Belfast from 1920 had taught previously at McGill (Lecturer in History 1912), Dalhousie (Professor of History and Economics 1913) and Queen's (Professor of History 1919) universities in Canada, and at the University of Edinburgh (Lecturer in Economic History 1910-12). ¹

The links between Scottish and Canadian universities were strong ones, and the chances of return to an academic post in Britain were quite good. But after 1912 all the universities and colleges of the British Empire were linked in an imperial Universities Bureau,² forerunner of the present Association of Commonwealth Universities. This further facilitated career opportunities overseas. In Britain itself the links between the various universities and colleges were not much closer (except in terms of distance). There was no national system of grading academic posts (or salaries) because the growth of the newer universities and colleges had not been initiated by central government. Professors were the employees of their university or college, a situation which, as we shall see, led to difficulties just as did the fact that German professors were civil servants. Lecturers and Assistant Lecturers, however, were the employees of the professors, paid by them and generally given ad hoc contracts. At Manchester, one of the earliest provincial universities, only seven of the forty-three non-professorial staff had tenure. In provincial and Scottish universities their salaries were generally one third that of the professors. In other words there was a growing up, outside Oxford and Cambridge, a university system with proportionally

¹ Todd had some bad luck and some bad advice. See his "Apprenticeship of a Professor of History 1903-1919", History, XLIV (1959), 124-33.

fewer professors and more junior staff with no control over the
subjects they taught. In Britain, as in Germany, the growing
dissatisfaction with this situation led to the formation of Professional
associations, in which lecturers took a lead.

Professors had control of teaching in their departments, good
salaries and security of tenure, although this varied from University
to university. At Birmingham E.A. Sonnenschein, the Professor of
Classics, led his colleagues in opposition to the draft university
charter which gave all effective power to the largely "lay" Council.
The result of their successful campaign can best be described in
Sonnenschein's words:

"We have a City University which realizes for the first time on
English soil the form of organization familiar on the Continent,
in Scotland and America. It combines Imperium et Libertas—
ultimate control by the Council (on which, however, Principal,
Vice-Principal and all the Deans have a seat) with liberty of the
academic body. Among the primary constituents of this liberty
are (a) Full Faculty organization—fuller than in Scotland or
America. The faculties are what they are in Germany—constituent
bodies of the University with large powers of self-government
under their elected Deans. (b) Research is recognized by Regu-
lations as part of the duty of each Professor. (c) Lehrfreiheit
is recognized...as the right of each Professor subject only to
the requirements of his Faculty in regard to Time-table and

University Annual, 1964, 88. Professors received on average
£300 p.a. plus 2/3 student fees in the 1890s, £600 without fees
by 1910. But (as at Leeds) professors could get £1,000 or over
—not far short of the most remunerative Oxford and Cambridge
chairs (in Theology, Divinity or related subjects). Lecturers
and Assistant Lecturers got £70-£150 without fees in the 1890s
and an average of £200 by 1918 (although some got as little as
Taylor, Studies in the History of a University 1874-1974, Leeds
1975, p. 8; Perkin, "Manchester...", 88-91. Royal Commission

2. In Germany the "Corporation of Junior Faculty". Ringer, p. 55.
The lecturer's position is illustrated in the case of R.M. Mac-
Iver at Aberdeen. He was assistant to the Professor of Moral
Philosophy (J.B. Baillie) who broke off all relations with Mac-
Iver after the latter had published criticism of Bosanquet's
Idealism which Baillie took for an attack on himself. The
circumstances were petty but MacIver was left with little hope
of advancement. See his As a Tale That Is Told, Chicago, 1968,
pp. 74-5.
Degree Courses. (d) ... Security of tenure for all Professors, subject only to the opinion of their peers, i.e. the Senate.¹¹

At Liverpool the "New Testament" group led by John Macdonald Mackay, Professor of History, achieved very much the same results after a struggle with the Council comprised largely of hard-headed local businessmen and civic leaders.² At Manchester professors remained liable to dismissal by the Council, although this power was not used.³ At Leeds and Sheffield there was little opportunity for professors to exercise any degree of control and they had effective representation on the University Councils only after charters were obtained in 1904 and 1905. Thereafter there was occasional tension between professors and Council, as there was too at Bristol after the University College there received its charter as an independent university in 1909.⁴ It is quite apparent, therefore, that the growing power of the professors at Birmingham and Liverpool was the result of a hard-fought campaign. Evidence of internal disagreements does not usually find its way into the official histories, which tend to bask in self-congratulation. No doubt the special circumstances of the University College in Nottingham⁵ had


3. E. Fiddes, Chapters in the History of Owens College and of Manchester University 1851-1914, Manchester, 1937, pp. 199 n.1, 65-6. Before 1870 the college had been administered by trustees with similar powers.


5. Until it received charter as a university college in 1903, it was under municipal control. But even after incorporation Nottingham professors exercised little control. See A.C. Wood, A History of the University College Nottingham 1881-1948, Oxford, 1953, pp. 32-41.
something to do with the tension there between the committee of management and some professors. But one suspects that the belief that academics were no different from any other kind of employee (i.e. that they should be liable to dismissal completely at the discretion of the governing body) was widespread among the local notables who sat on University Councils. At Nottingham the difficulties of one of the professors was compounded by his public support for the ideas of Henry George,¹ and the most obvious examples of tension between academic staff and government bodies concerned the right of professors to hold unpopular views outside the university.

While Henry George and Single Tax had been the subject of discussion by University Councils in the 1880s,² twenty years later it was growing labour unrest which led to a certain amount of friction between politically-minded professors and their employers. In October 1910 a letter appeared in the Radical weekly The Nation alleging that in "at least two northern Universities" pressure was being brought to bear on lecturers if they associated themselves "at all openly with any political party". There was, it seemed, no attempt to conceal the fact that these restrictions were made "lest offence should be given to local magnates who have contributed or who may


2. In 1883 the Council of Bristol College (later University College) instructed Alfred Marshall, the Cambridge economist who was lecturing on George's ideas, to avoid becoming involved in "public discussion" after lectures delivered under the auspices of the Council. They need not have worried since Marshall was strongly critical of Single Tax. See G.J. Stigler, "Alfred Marshall's lectures on Progress and Poverty", J. of Law and Economics, XII, I (April 1969), 217-26 and J. Whitaker, "Alfred Marshall, the Years 1877 to 1885", History of Political Economy, IV (1972), 25.
contribute to the funds of the University". This, the writer noted, was in marked contrast to the "opportunities of free political discussion...in Oxford and Cambridge". In the same month the infant London School of Economics faced a similar, but this time more explicit, threat from some of its "local magnates". The railway companies which contributed £1,000 a year to the "Railway Department" in the School threatened to withdraw this unless Sidney Webb retired from the chairmanship of the Board of Governors—a course which he chose to save financial difficulties. Apparently his public statements on the Osborn Judgement had caused offence. Such incidents were more usual in America where business endowment and a corporate role on boards of trustees of universities were more pronounced.

In a situation where professors espoused the cause of organised labour much could depend on the university administrators. Someone like Michael Sadler, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds was able to protect the right of some of his academic staff to support municipal workers on strike in the city in 1913. One of them was D.H. MacGregor, Professor of Economics and a former Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His academic position made him especially vulnerable to criticism that, in defending the strikers, he was in danger

3. See Hofstadter and Metzger, chpt. IX. J.A. Hobson, who like Veblen had apparently suffered loss of academic employment because of his unorthodox views (see his Confessions of an Economic Heretic, 1938, pp. 30-1) echoed the American economist's criticism of university acceptance of benefactions: "The governors and the teaching faculty will meet them [the donors] more than half-way in their demand for safe teaching in all subjects where unsafe teaching might cause offence in rich and influential quarters." Free Thought in the Social Sciences, 1926, p. 5b. At least two university colleges (Nottingham & Bristol) were virtually kept afloat for many years by injections of money from local businessmen (J. Boot and H.O. Wills).
of carrying over his political opinions into his teaching of economics. However, Sadler was able to assure local businessmen that such dissent was valuable: "A muzzled University staff is a poor affair. But the forces in favour of silencing unpopular views as 'dangerous' or 'untimely', or 'likely to give offence to powerful friends' are always pressing and must be resisted", Sadler concluded.\(^1\) Sadler's knowledge of the German code of lehrfreiheit no doubt had something to do with his defence of his professors, but this protection of extra-mural freedom of speech by academics went beyond the original definition of lehrfreiheit: the freedom of the teacher to investigate and discuss his subject without interference. It was the wider definition of academic freedom which was to come under a certain amount of pressure during the First World War. The fact that there was no attempt to formulate a code of lehrfreiheit as in Germany (and later in America) was a sign of the slow growth of professional self-consciousness as much as the fact that "academic independence" was less likely to be threatened in Britain (the reason usually given).\(^2\)

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1. Shimmin, p. 40. Gosden and Taylor, pp. 239-40. In the same year students at Trinity College, Dublin, were prevented from attending meetings in support of the strike led by Jim Larkin. See Nation, XIV, 10 (6 Dec. 1913), 434.

III: BRITISH ACADEMICS AND THE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY

"...in the happy, innocent golden age before 1914 intelligent people did not worry themselves about international relations and the problems of preventing war—they left all that to the professional politicians and diplomatists. There were, of course, wars, but they were either colonial wars, in which white men slaughtered yellow men, or brown men, or black men, or wars between second-rate white men's states in the Balkans and South America. In 1914, although Colonial warfare, like the sun never set on the British Empire, and we had a nasty time; beating the Boers, it was sixty years since we had fought a European nation and one hundred years since we had been involved in a world war."

Leonard Woolf, Beginning Again (1964)

The involvement of British academics in matters of political controversy could be traced back at least to the days of the English Civil War. As Thomas Fuller wrote in his History of the Worthies of England (1662):

"Mark the Chronicles aright,
When Oxford scholars fall to fight,
Before many months expir'd
England will with war be fir'd."

But in the fifty or so years before the outbreak of the First World War British university men were involved in three great controversies over foreign policy. In the way that each issue split academics, as much as the public in general, they were domestic political controversies in contrast to the almost universal approval of university men for British foreign policy in 1914. Still, because they arose either out of colonial affairs or out of the perennial problem of the Balkan nationalities, these public debates did not lead to discussion about the prevention of war; especially European or world war which seemed unthinkable. 1

1. Ernest Barker remembers how, as a candidate for a Fellowship at an Oxford college in 1898, he wrote an examination essay "which dealt with the problem of war, and developed the theme that the horrors of military and naval invention" (he had not thought of the aerial) "would outrun the endurance of man, producing an apotheosis of war which would also be its extinction". Age and Youth, p. 334.
The attempt to put Governor Eyre on trial in 1868 for the brutal suppression of a slave rebellion in Jamaica set friends and academic colleagues against each other. At the Royal Institution (later part of Imperial College, London) John Tyndall, Professor of Natural Philosophy, joined the "Eyre Defence Committee" which also boasted the names of John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle. His colleagues at the Royal Institution T.H. Huxley (Professor of Natural History) and Edward Frankland (Professor of Chemistry) both joined the vigorously anti-Eyre "Jamaica Committee". Goldwin Smith, then Regius Professor of History at Oxford, joined the same group, but the Regius Professor of History at Cambridge (Charles Kingsley) sided with the "Eyre Defence Committee". Ten years later the controversy over Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria and the failure of the British government to act against them again divided the country, and with it the academic community. It was, as Richard Shannon points out, Britain's equivalent of the Dreyfus Affair, with leading intellectuals of the day divided for and against the "Bulgarian Agitation". Mark Pattison supported the "Eastern Question Conference", but that other Oxford reformer Benjamin Jowett did not. The Regius Professor of History at Cambridge J.R. Seeley was critical of the agitation, but Goldwin Smith and E.A. Freeman, past and future holders of the Regius chair of History at Oxford,

1. See B. Semmel, The Governor Eyre Controversy, 1962, passim. At least one member of the "Jamaica Committee" (A.V. Dicey) was still alive to support government policy in 1914.

2. Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, 1963, p. 202. Not merely because of "the brilliance of patronage and the opposition which it evoked among the greatest names in literature, art, science and philosophy", but also because the critics of the agitation were "men of the emerging era of idealism, imperialism, power, of challenge to the assumptions of mid-century Liberalism". There were certain similarities between British apologists for Liberal Imperialism and the new generation of radical French nationalists.
were leaders of the anti-Turkish campaign.¹

It is significant, in view of the reputation of Cambridge (and especially one college, Trinity) as a hot-bed of opposition to the First World War, that in 1876 members of that university were more heavily involved in the campaign against government policy than were the dons of Oxford. Shannon counted twenty Fellows of Oxford colleges on the list of conveners of the "Eastern Question Conference" and twenty-two Fellows of Cambridge colleges, including thirteen from Trinity.² However, when one allows for the strongly High Church flavour of the Oxford group (led by E.B. Pusey and H.P. Liddon), Cambridge’s lead in intellectual dissent becomes more obvious.³ This is the impression one also forms when the controversy in the universities over the Boer War is examined. In 1899 as in 1876 the critics of official policy were a small but vociferous minority at both universities, with intellectual dissent seeming to encounter more fertile ground for growth at Cambridge. Still, the public opposition of university men to the war in South Africa seems to lack some of the confident vigour of the "Bulgarian Agitation", due no doubt to the reluctance of many to criticise the government once it had gone to war.

1. Apart from Seeley and the Positivist Professor Beesly, British historians were firmly in the anti-Turkish camp: Acton, Bryce, Froude, Green, Stubbs as well as Freeman and Smith.

2. Shannon, p. 220, there were also 19 professors from Scottish, Welsh and English universities and colleges.

3. T.H. Green and Bryce were the leading Oxford liberals.
The difficulty of the intellectual in wartime is well illustrated in the case of Henry Sidgwick, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. As the legatee of Millite liberal philosophy Sidgwick had opposed government policy in 1876 as immoral. But South Africa was a question directly affecting British national and imperial interests, and Sidgwick found the role of critic less appropriate. But not only was he perplexed by the difficulty of "reconciling adequate security for England with effective independence for the Boers", there was also what he discreetly termed his "personal connection with the Government". His wife was the sister of the Tory leader in the Commons (Arthur Balfour), and so Sidgwick declined to lend his name to a protest petition circulated by Professor Sully of University College, London.¹ Ten years earlier Sidgwick had written of the definite limits to political dissent by "the thoughtful and moral part of every community", and now events had proved the truth of his philosophical reflections. Once war broke out it was "doubtless right for most, if not all men to side with their country unreservedly". For not even the most critical intellectual "should keep coldly aloof from patriotic sentiment". Only before war had broken out could such people be expected "to make an earnest and systematic effort at an impartial view of the points at issue".²


Where Sidgwick attempted to give due consideration both to ethical ideals and the **prima facie** duty of the citizen in wartime (attempting to neglect neither), his Cambridge colleague John Westlake, Whewell Professor of International Law, attempted to provide an ethical basis for British policy in South Africa. Writing one month after the outbreak of war, he freely admitted that British demands in the Transvaal were "not founded on any legal right". They were, he claimed, based on Britain's right to alleviate the "intolerable" position of her nationals in the Boer republics. National ideals were "always propagandist" (that is, expansionist) and hence admitted of "no compromise". But, judging between the ideals of the Briton and the Boer, Westlake had no doubt that the "racial" ideal of the latter was far inferior to "the English ideal of a fair field for every race and every language accompanied by a humane treatment of the native races". This was exactly the kind of conclusion to which a later generation of academic liberals were led when they supported British entry to the First World War. However, in 1914 they had the incalculable benefit of apparent legal as well as moral rectitude which Westlake could not claim in 1899.

In Cambridge two Fellows of King's College argued against the war in the Union. A.C. Pigou, who was to suffer for his opposition to the First World War, and Oscar Browning, who had joined the "Bulgarian Agitation", displayed considerable courage by doing so. Browning, who was also Treasurer of the Union Society, was particularly outspoken, comparing the issue of the Transvaal to the Dreyfus case.

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At Oxford academic liberals had rallied to oppose the granting of an honorary D.C.L. to Cecil Rhodes, widely believed to have been behind the Jameson Raid. However, Rhodes got his degree at Encaenia, the threat of proctorial veto not being carried out because of the presence of the Prince of Wales at the ceremony. The death of Rhodes in 1902 helped, as Oxford's official historian diplomatically put it, "to dim and allay resentments" within the University. The publication of his will with its scheme for scholarships disarmed his former critics. One of them (H.A.L. Fisher) even became a Trustee. Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, was perhaps the most vocal critic of the war and he made himself very unpopular within the University when he chaired meetings called to protest at the British policy of interning Boers in concentration camps. Arthur Sidgwick, brother of Henry Sidgwick and Fellow of Corpus Christi (another college with a "liberal" reputation) joined the "League Against Agression and Militarism", but he and Caird were untypical figures in Oxford.

1. C. Mallet, History of the University of Oxford, 1927, III, 476. J.G. Lockhart and C.M. Woodhouse, Rhodes, 1963, p. 404. Fisher's letters to the Gilbert Murrays (Box 7 Fisher Mss.). Signatories of the protest letter in The Times were Caird, A.V. Dicey (Professor of English Law), W. Markby (Reader in Indian Law), E. Abbott and J. Conroy (Balliol), V.S.B. Coles (Principal of Pusey House), S.R. Driver (Professor of Hebrew), G. Moberly (Professor of Pastoral Theology), W. Sanday (Professor of Exegesis), F.W. Bright (Professor of Ecclesiastical History), A.M. Fairburn (Principal of Mansfield College), J. Drummond (Principal of Manchester College), W.W. Fowler (Lincoln), H. Rashdall (New), H.M. Burge (University), F.C. Conybeare (University), F.W.B. Nicholson (Bodleian Librarian), J.B. Moyle (New). Times, 20 June 1899, p. 10e. The Vice-Chancellor had refused to publish the letter in the official gazette. See Oxford Mag. XX (21 June 1899), 6-7.


3 F.W. Hirst, In the Golden Days, 1947, p. 199.
The attitude of most Oxford dons to the war was summed up by an editorial in the *Oxford Magazine*. Under the heading "Oxford's duty to the Army" the editor claimed that the "slouching gait of the average undergraduate, the slipshod dress of the many, the unconscious ignorance of anything approaching discipline of almost all" would be vastly improved by "six month's residence in barracks". The perennial complaints about the younger generation were no new thing, but the suggestion that another "group" should be added to the Schools, or some existing subject modified "to suit the requirements" of the Army for officers, was new.¹ The war was seen as a kind of sporting activity, a means of building healthy bodies and forming healthy minds; a kind of super-athleticism from which even candidates for holy orders should not be exempt. A battle was "not a wild tumult in which selfish fury, hatred and malice, and all the worst human passions" were "given free reign". On the contrary, it demanded only "the loftiest qualities" of which man was capable, and this was "the sanction of the whole thing".² Oxford dons were soon hard at work drilling under the direction of L.R. Farnell, Rector of Exeter College, or on manoeuvres in the "cycle corps" organised by John Cook Wilson, Professor of Logic.³ In other colleges and universities the Boer War led to a revival of more volunteer corps and a general outburst of patriotic fervour.⁴ In Jesus College Cambridge a special meeting addressed by the Master (H.A. Morgan) and "the First Boat Captain" ended with twenty-one men (including the Bursar) offering themselves as recruits.⁵ Doubtless there were many other similar instances.

². Ibid., XX, 11-14 (5-26 Feb. 1902), 186-7, 208, 224-5, 227, 244, 153.
³. Farnell, pp. 148-57, 327. See also below p. 163.
But one can note some more disturbing features of this patriotic revival. For example, when the German press began to criticise British policy in South Africa, there were suggestions among British professors of German origin that some expression of support for their adopted country might be required. In the event public expressions of loyalty were not called for, but it calls to mind the persecution of German-born professors in British universities during the First World War. There were signs too that intellectual critics of government policy, once war had been declared could expect a rough time from the patriotic dons. Walter Raleigh, who was one of the noisiest patriots among British academics during the First World War, devoted much of an article in the National Review to criticising the "dainty and self-indulgent moralists" who opposed the war. Such people, he claimed, had "lived too long in the abstract and imaginary world...of discussion and theory" to have a "ready sense of the rudiments of politics"---the perennial jibe against critics of official policy.

The damage done by the war to Anglo-German relations, was obvious enough and it was this to which Germanophil academics directed their

1. See letter of E.A. Sommenschin (Professor of Classics, Birmingham) to H.G. Fiedler (Professor of German, Oxford), 21 Jan. 1902, Fiedler-Harding Mss., F.H. 33. Also letter to The Times, 21 June 1902, p. 11c.
2. See below p. 286.
3. "The Anatomy of the Pro-Boer", National Rev. XXXVIII (Sept. 1901), 55-7. "In a war like this where neither party is faultless and both are in the right, a man is bound by his nationality, by his allegiance to the land that gave him birth, and the civilisation that made him what he is." Raleigh's interpretation of the war as a "struggle for existence" was very far indeed from the ethical scrupulosity of Henry Sidgwick.
4. There were anti-British demonstrations at most German universities in 1901 and at Jena students had hanged Chamberlain in effigy: "at the foot of the gallows sat King Edward drinking from a champagne bottle". O.J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, N.Y., 1940, pp. 242-3 and n.
attention in the first years of the new century. An Anglo-German Friendship Committee (later the Anglo-German Friendship Society) was established in 1905 and it boasted many of the leading names in British academic life amongst its membership. Manifestos of friendship were exchanged between British and German academics—the one side denying allegations of "sinister designs entertained by the German people against England", the other assuring the Germans that the occasional diatribes of "certain journalists" merely demonstrated "their profound ignorance of the real sentiments" of British people. "For us, as between England and Germany", the British scholars wrote, "there is no frontier to be defended.... A war between the two Powers would be a world-calamity for which no victory could compensate either nation". However, one of the German-born members of the British society, Karl Breul, did warn his colleagues that all was not well in Germany. On a visit to that country he had noted a growing anti-British sentiment amongst "the younger generation". Treitschke's ideas of a future Anglo-German conflict as an "inevitable war of extermination between modern Rome and Carthage" were apparently "much in vogue" with German students. But it was more common to find

1. See appendix.3.
2. Anglo-German Courier, I, 2 (13 Jan. 1906), 15-17. This answered a manifesto from 41 German intellectuals.
3. Ibid., I, 23 (8 June 1906), 240-1. L. Stein (ed.) England and Germany, 1912, pp. 28-34. Breul had been born in Hanover (1860) but had come to Cambridge as a young man as a Lecturer (1884-99), Reader (1899-1910) and finally Professor of German.
academic Germanophiles passing over the chauvinism of the German Professoriate in silence. Really only with the war did the writings of Treitschke and Bernhardi become well-known in Britain.

Much of the ignorance about Germany was due to the general lack of knowledge of central and eastern European affairs in British universities. At Oxford a few exotic undergraduates like Lewis Bernstein (later Namier) and his cousin Ludwig Ehrlich, or the occasional don like Alfred Zimmern, were the exception to what Arnold Toynbee described as the "invincible ignorance" of university men. The Modern History School—the one school which might have been expected to provide some stimulus to interest in foreign affairs—only taught European history down to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. And "woe betide the unhappy undergraduate who let his imagination wander beyond that date", Sir Charles Petrie wrote in his reminiscence of Oxford. Once, asking J.A.R. Marriott about the cession of Thessaly to Greece in 1881, he drew the "horrified and indignant" reply that he (Marriott) "was there to teach history, and not to talk politics". But generally "no one bothered much about anything which happened after the battle of Waterloo". E.L. Woodward, who was an undergraduate at Oxford

1. Liverpool University established a School of Russian Studies in 1907. Leeds followed in 1916, a year after the establishment (at King's College, London) of lectureships which were to form the basis of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Most colleges and universities had German chairs or lectureships (most begun after 1900).

2. J. Namier, Lewis Namier, 1971, p. 83. A. Toynbee, Acquaintances, 1967, pp. 50, 64-5, 74. Zimmern was the son of a German merchant settled in Britain. Bernstein and Ehrlich were from Galicia, where in 1914 the Austrian army was mobilized on the family estate, with the Russian army encamped just 20 minutes walk away over the frontier. But Bernstein's talk of imminent European war merely evoked laughter in the Balliol front quad.


4. Woodward, Short Journey, p. 40. After the Second World War the cut-off date was moved to 1914. At Cambridge the situation was the same: increased emphasis on European history after changes
between 1908 and 1913 described the intellectual atmosphere of the University in the following way:

"In these years...the chief interests of those who would now be described as 'intellectuals' were either in social questions or in religion. There was not much interest in foreign affairs. Many of the dons were hardly less ignorant than the undergraduates about the public affairs of Europe, although they knew the mountains of Switzerland, the cathedrals of France and the ancient monuments of Greece and Italy.... I do not believe that there were half a dozen men in Oxford who realized the European significance of the Balkan wars. The Agadir incident happened in the Long Vacation; in the following Michaelmas term, there was a good deal of vague talk about a narrow escape from war. There was also a good deal of talk, equally ill-informed, about Germany and the bellicosity of William II. This talk rarely went beyond reproducing current newspaper articles. I do not think that anyone in my year was worried about the possibility of a general European war."¹

Much the same impression was gained by R.M. MacIver during his three years at Oxford (1901-3) which he attended after graduating from the University of Edinburgh. Immured "within the walls of a dead age" most people in the University seemed unaware of the great changes going on outside". "Industrial and technological developments were causing social transformations and disturbances. There were troubles in the Balkans and mutterings between the power alliances of Europe." But, apart from the occasional debate in the Union, "the living present" did not intrude.² Reminiscences over sixty years after the events described must be treated with caution, but the same note enters many memories of Oxford life. Young Cambridge was perhaps marginally more concerned with the outside world although Leonard Woolf noted


1. Short Journey, p. 38. "Our youth, our ignorance, our sheltered and easy lives, our vague impression that an Anglo-French combination, with Russia as an additional weight, would certainly maintain the peace of the world, kept our interests within the bounds of problems of an industrial society." (p.39).

2. As A Tale..., pp. 61-2.
that it generally did not go beyond a "vague idea...that the prevention of war was to all intents and purposes a question of arbitration".¹ Still, Cambridge did have the largest number of "Norman Angellites" of any university in the country.²

The "International Polity Movement", started by Norman Angell (Ralph Lane) with money provided from a business foundation, had branches in most British universities and colleges, and attracted liberal academics as well as serious-minded undergraduates: at Birmingham W.J. Ashley, the economic historian, in London, L.T. Hobhouse, at Glasgow, Robert Latta, the Professor of Logic, at Oxford, Sidney Ball, Fabian Fellow of St. John's College, Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek, and W.M. Geldart, Professor of English Law.³ Angell preached the gospel of economic liberalism. "Angellism", as A.J.P. Taylor put it, "supposed that international banking and the gold standard, respect for private property and the sentiment of the Stock Exchange, would survive all upheavals."⁴ Even more than this Angell believed that the growing interdependence of developed economies meant that the forceful settlement of international disputes was rapidly becoming obsolete. T.H. Green had also taught earlier generations of Oxford undergraduates that the way to peace lay through Free Trade,⁵ but now Angell laid new stress on the economic unprofitability of war

¹. Beginning Again, 1964, p. 185.
⁴. The Troublemakers, 1969, p. 94.
⁵. See his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, new ed. 1941, p. 178.
(and imperialism) for the victor. "Winning a war brought no advantages; therefore by implication losing a war brought no burdens."¹

E.M.W. Tillyard, later famous as an English scholar, as a young fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, attempted to prove Angell's thesis by examining ancient history. His Athenian Empire and The Great Illusion (1914) published a few months before the outbreak of war was a novel tribute to Angell's best-selling book The Great Illusion (1910). Tillyard claimed that "the fall of Athens was her economic salvation, and for her it was lucky that it came when it did". Athenian trading strength was well-established before the city possessed "strong armaments". "The beginning of her so-called greatness" was really the "beginning of her economic decline", Tillyard concluded. "By living on plunder she damaged her trade". For a time Pericles managed to arrest this decline—"to reconcile Empire and Industrialism"—but after his death "a vigorous and aggressive foreign policy brought a swift decline which was arrested just in time by the fall of Athens and her political ruin. The fourth century saw Athens in a minor position politically, but economically supreme." Contrary to what one might expect, the economic and political successes of Athens varied "in most cases inversely". The economic interdependence of Greek city states in the sixth century was thus "a state of things where Mr. Angell's arguments on the futility of armed aggression may be said fittingly to apply", Tillyard ended.²

¹. Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 93.

². pp. 17, 29-33. Tillyard was the brother of the Greek scholar H.J.W. Tillyard and had himself taken a first class in both parts of the Classical Tripos and won a Craven Scholarship (1911). On his liberalism see B. Willey, "Eustace Mandeville Wetenhall Tillyard", PBA, XLIX (1963), 387.
Despite Angell's rather simplistic economic analysis (or so it seems now), at least two young Economics dons at Cambridge (both later well-known professors at Oxford and Cambridge) were members of the university Norman Angell Society. The Cambridge Union carried an Angellite resolution "declaring the futility of armed aggression", and at Manchester University Angellites called for the Government to pursue the path of peaceful settlement of disputes. And despite the outburst of destructive nationalism in the Balkans, which should have given Angellites pause for thought, the Great Illusion remained an enormously popular book right up until the outbreak of the First World War. Take for example R.M. MacIver's famous book Community, whose preface is dated September 1914. The following passage shows MacIver's use of Angellite ideas:

"The development of common interests is making the institution of war between nations irrational and vain. War is a relation of hostility between peoples organised as States. Its method of mere destruction implies that there is complete antagonism of interest between the warring peoples. But the interests of civilised nations are no longer isolable, one civilised people can't hurt the interests of another without hurting its own as well. It is only when communities are essentially isolated, or when the relation between them is that of dominant to subject peoples, that the hurt of one can be the good of the other. Therefore, as intercommunity extends, war becomes more and more irrational. This is most obvious in the economic sphere, owing especially to the internationalisation of capital, so that one civilised community in destroying the commerce and capital of another, is destroying or injuring the investments of its own members. Again, as international trade grows, more and more members of each community live by the commercial prosperity

1. D.H. (Later Sir Dennis) Robertson (Trinity), later Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge (1944-57) and D.H. (later Sir Hubert) Henderson (Clare from 1919) later Professor of Political Economy at Oxford (1945-51).
3. Angell claimed Turkey was a militarist state not yet fully assimilated into the world economy. However, the Cambridge economic historian W. Cunningham argued that such "economic cosmopolitanism" underestimated the very real strength of nationalism. See his "The Economic Basis of Universal Peace—Cosmopolitan or International", Economic Rev., XXIII, 1 (Jan. 1913), 7-13.
of other communities and are necessarily ruined when that suffers."

War between "civilised peoples" was nothing less than "civil war" since people were just not "as independent" of each other now (and probably never had been) as states were of other states, nor was "community" "co-extensive" with the state. If man could see the irrationality of "war instituted by non-political associations, the fatuity of the religious wars in which churches involved communities" and the danger of "resort to war by groups or classes within a community", why then could man not similarly "condemn warfare between nationalities"? All that was needed was a conscious act of will:

"...the cessation of war does not depend on federations or treaties arbitrarily entered upon by independent self-sufficient states, not on the mere fiat of high contracting parties, not simply on the convenience of governments or the intrigues of diplomacy or the relations of monarchs, but on the silent widening social will that ultimately all governments must obey. The mass of society, the great working mass of every people, have an interest in peace and not in war. Their interests are one in every State; they form a single common interest. Common interest when recognised begets common will."'

MacIver was expressing the liberal view of the obsolescence of war in the modern world. The "social conditions out of which war arose" had been transformed, and if man could understand this he could be "rid ...of the body of this dead thing" war. International law was developing, as civil law had developed within states, towards its final "legislative" stage.


2. Ibid., pp. 276, 422. The educated Englishman had "more in common with the educated Frenchman or German than...with his uneducated fellowcountrymen" (pp. 427-8). This interpretation also appears in MacIver's The Modern State (1926) where the "political prizes" or war are seen as "quite precarious and insubstantial" compared with the social and economic costs (pp. 246-8).

But MacIver was more aware than some peace advocates of the need to recognise the role of conflict in human society, to channel destructive impulses into "ever less wasteful forms". If stimulus to social solidarity were needed, man could perhaps "enter into the endless and fruitful struggle involved in the mastery of the environment and the conquest of essential evils". Much the same point was also made by J. Estlin Carpenter, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford (a body founded by the Unitarians). Speaking at the Eighth National Peace Conference in London two years before the outbreak of war, Carpenter pleaded with delegates to give attention to "the heroic side of war", to recognise the "fighting instinct" which was present "more or less" in all people. If only this could be directed towards "its proper object", then war could be avoided. Carpenter accordingly suggested "the great enemies of the body politic, ignorance, want, disease, and crime" as possible objects for human energy and ingenuity, and the establishment of university chairs in "industrial and commercial development and the history of peace". And why not, since there were already chairs of military history and lectureships in military science?

1. Community, p. 337. This was a better stimulus than war since the destructive nature of the latter could "spur a people only to occasional endeavour". In the intervals of peace it was the "warrior" who became "luxurious and degenerate", the "war-sustained people" who fell into "decadence", simply because the more sustained effort required in constructive effort did not appeal to them.

2. Promotion..., p. 4. A similar plea for the recognition of the heroic virtues of peace had been made earlier by the Rev. T.J. Lawrence, an international lawyer: "Courage and devotion, organization and discipline, are not the sole prerogatives of the soldier, though the world rings with his deeds of daring and feats of obedience and endurance, while civilians do not find special correspondents at their elbow and the daily press filled with descriptions of their exploits. The management of a great industrial concern requires as much talent for organization as the planning of a campaign. The thousands of workmen who obey one head and combine their separate efforts to attain a common end are disciplined differently but as thoroughly as the long lines of marching infantry who delight the eye at a great
Such ideas were very like those contained in William James's celebrated essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War", first published in 1910. This was also the year that Angell published The Great Illusion but the Harvard philosopher's ideas on peace went beyond the conventional truths of economic liberalism. James had posited an innate aggressiveness in man in order to explain the continued existence of war in the civilised world. Whether or not war was irrational or economically ruinous was thus beside the point.

"Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow", James claimed, "and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us."

review. If peace necessarily meant ignoble ease there would be much to say for the theory of Von Moltke and other great generals, that war was necessary to preserve the virility of the race and keep alive the manly virtues. But who can visit the bust hives of industry without being convinced of its fallacy? The arts of peace require as much active cultivation as the arts of war. While there are seas to be traversed, mines to be dug, explorations to be carried out, engineering feats to be accomplished, and scientific discoveries to be made, no one need fear that patience, courage, perseverance, and skill will die out among mankind for lack of exercise. The dangers of fire and flood would call forth heroism and devotion even if war were but a dim memory of a past evil. Honest toil and manly exercise would develop the human frame to the height of its strength and beauty even if military drill were as obsolete as the formation of the Macedonian phalanx."


1. But owing something too to T.H. Green who had written: "Till all the methods have been exhausted by which nature can be brought into the service of man, till society is so organised that everyone's capacities have free scope for their development, there is no need to resort to war for a field in which patriotism may display itself". Lectures..., p. 176.
But he had gone on to sketch the outlines of a "moral equivalent" to replace war. Instead of conscription for military purposes, James proposed "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of an army enlisted against Nature." Not only might this improve the quality of life for others, but, more importantly, "military ideals of hardihood and discipline" would be inculcated into the nation's youth. This would help preserve "in the midst of a pacific civilisation" those "manly virtues" which the "military party" had feared might disappear if peace broke out. Essentially an optimist, James believed that "patriotic pride and ambition in their military form" could be turned to more constructive purposes, since they were "only specifications for a more general competitive passion".  

James's search for a more acceptable replacement for the excitement (and even nobility) of war was noted by Bertrand Russell in his review of *Memories and Studies* (1911) where the essay was reprinted. Later during the First World War Russell again acknowledged his debt to James in his own search for "a peaceful outlet for men's energies" in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916). However, James's insight does not appear to have had as much influence with academic philosophers as one might have expected. Partly this was due to the unpopularity of Pragmatism (the school of philosophy which James

1. "The Moral Equivalent of War" (April 1910), repr. in *War*, N.Y., 1968, p. 29. The essay had originally been given as a lecture at Stanford University in Oct. 1909, and had been widely published in American periodicals.

2. Russell wrote that "men's energies" needed "an enemy to fight", but that "all progress" demanded that the enemy should not be human. *Cambridge Rev.*, XXXIII, 517 (16 Nov. 1911), 118.

3. p. 95. Russell wrongly attributed James's address to the time of the Spanish-American War (which James had opposed).
expounded) in British universities, partly it was the result of the late development of psychology as an academic discipline in Britain. Two early practitioners of "social psychology", Graham Wallas and William McDougall, did tackle the same problem James had. But more typical of the small group of liberal academics writing on the problem of war was Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

It was Dickinson who James had singled out as exhibiting in his writings the characteristic weaknesses of the "socialistic peace advocates"—namely, a failure "to realize the full inwardness of the situation", a failure to provide a "substitute for war's disciplinary function" or to provide a "moral equivalent for war". "The duties penalties and sanctions pictured in the utopias they paint are all too weak and tame to touch the military-minded", James concluded.

And it is true that, despite an undergraduate enthusiasm for drilling with the volunteer militia, Dickinson showed throughout his life a marked distaste for the martial virtues which James saw as the "enduring cement" of world peace. In October 1903 Dickinson had joined with C. F.G. Masterman, F.W. Hirst and G.M. Trevelyan to establish the Independent Review. In the best traditions of radical Liberalism it advocated social reform at home and the pursuit of world peace.

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1. According to D. Bell, it was "a matter of scandal" to most British philosophers. "Philosophy", in C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson (eds.) The 20th Century Mind, 1972, 1, 179.


3. James, p. 27. He cited Justice and Liberty (1909), one of Dickinson's then much-admired political dialogues.

Forster as a Cambridge undergraduate came under the spell of Dickinson and the Review which he described as offering its readers a picture of progress to the future "a passing through not insurmountable dangers to a possible utopia". To it, and its successor the Albany Review, Dickinson contributed articles on the problem of war in which he laid great stress on the role of reason in the fight against militarism and imperialism. Men might not simply be "reasoning animals", he wrote in July 1906, but "it would be absurd to conclude that they cannot be influenced by reason. Slowly but surely, argument works upon us all, partly by confronting one passion with another and compelling a choice between them, partly by insisting on the consequences of actions, partly by pointing out incoherences and contradictions in the arguments by which we are accustomed to buttress our instincts."^2

This belief animated all Dickinson's writing and especially his work, after 1915, for post-war international organisation. As he wrote two years before the outbreak of the First World War, "reason and imagination" were the only weapons available to the peace advocate. The role of the intellectual and the academic was thus to "destroy illusions and reveal naked acts". It was an "illusion", for example, that war was needed to cure defects in the nation's moral fibre. "The disease of war is...invoked to cure the disease of peace. But peace ought not to be a disease", Dickinson wrote in 1907. "If


2. "War and Peace", Independent Rev., X, 34 (July 1906), 115. This was a review of F.W. Hirst's anonymous book Arbiter in Council (1906).

3. "The Illusion of War", Nation, XI, 19 (10 Aug. 1912), 702. This was a review of the Quaker J.W. Graham's Evolution and Empire (1912).
our peace is cankered, that is not because it is peace, but because it is peace based on injustice and egotism".\(^1\) As for the supposed ideals of race, nation, empire and national honour, these arose from the ideology of the possessing class—from the "monotony of life among well-fed people".\(^2\) In other words Dickinson was echoing T.H. Green's judgement over thirty years earlier that the "privileged class involuntarily believes and spreads the belief that the interest of the state lies in some extension without, not in an improvement of organisation within."\(^3\)

However, Green was writing in 1879 before the flood tide of imperialist fervour in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. But working class jingoism and indeed the new interest in crowd psychology was something which Dickinson could not avoid twenty or so years later. Working-class jingoism Dickinson tended to excuse as "a more pardonable kind of feeling" produced by the monotony of "chronic overwork" and curable by social amelioration. For the peace advocate, as for the social reformer, "the masses" were "the last hope" for progress.\(^4\) In Dickinson's utopia there was no room at all for conflict: what was "base in the life of the average man of business, or clerk or artisan, compared with that of the best soldier",

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2. "Is War Inevitable?", War and Peace, I, 8 (May 1914), 221-3 and 9 (June 1914), 252-3.
3. Lectures..., p. 171. Although first published in 1882 (after Green's death) the book had been finished in 1879.
was not "the peaceableness of his occupation, but its lack of direct
and conscious subordination to a common end". "In a community well
organised and well moralised, such as the one the socialists con-
ceive", Dickinson claimed, "every occupation would be regarded as a
public function, and performed in the spirit of public duty." 1

Dickinson's colleague at the London School of Economics 2 Graham
Wallas was much less sanguine about hopes for world peace in the
period before 1914. Dickinson had seen the Hague Conferences as a
sure sign that mankind was becoming more peaceable and civilised;
that history was now being seen as "something to be transcended, not
repeated". 3 Wallas, however, wrote in his Human Nature in Politics
(1908) of the dangers of European war, 4 and began to concern himself
with the role of instinct in human behaviour. He had been greatly
influenced by William James's Principles of Psychology (1890) which
had stressed the importance, not only of conscious actions (as in neo-
idealist theory), but also of instinct—a bundle of atavistic impulses.
As Wallas's biographer notes: "His disillusionment with the unrealis-
tic assumptions of liberal-democratic thought had found a resolution

1. "Peace or War?", 137-8.
2. Dickinson lectured on political theory (as well as teaching
history and economics at King's College, Cambridge), Wallas
lectured on public administration.
3. "Peace or War?", 130-1.
4. "May the Germans and ourselves be now marching towards the
horrors of a world-war merely because 'nation' and 'empire'... are the best that we can do in making entities of the mind to
stand between us and an unintelligible universe, and because
having made such entities our sympathies are shut up with
in a new approach to politics based on 'Darwinism' and 'the new psychology'. The titles of Wallas's early books give some indication of his approach—Human Nature in Politics and The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis (1914). What Dickinson called Wallas's "bio-psychological realism" was thus far-removed from Dickinson's political dialogues which made "the claim of reason seem more worthy of reverence".

Wallas seemed even less confident than James about the likelihood of finding a "moral equivalent" for war. Like other liberals he could easily refute the arguments that war was necessary to improve "the breeding stock", or that it could not be prevented by any system of international law. But what of the argument "that peace, even if it could be secured, would leave the warlike dispositions permanently unstimulated, and would therefore produce the nervous condition...called baulked disposition"? Would it not be impossible for "man in such a condition" to "live a life which anyone would call good"? This argument, Wallas felt, had "more stuff in it". And

2. Cit. ibid., p. 124.
3. "The basis of his outlook...was an ethical sensitiveness...placed at the service of a reason he did not know how to betray". H.J. Laski, "Loves Dickinson and Graham Wallas", Political Qly., III, 4 (Oct./Dec. 1932), 461, 463.
4. Great Society, pp. 173-9. Wallas pointed to the "clear biological disadvantage" in the slaughter of the flower of youth, the danger of the spread of disease and "the waste of that capital which might have produced healthier conditions".
5. Loc.cit., As MacIver had done, Wallas pointed to the analogy of the development of law within states based on "custom arising from thousands of free decisions" (rather than compulsion).
instead of James's vision of a civilian peace corps, Wallas could only offer the tentative suggestion that "it would not only be more effective but more economical" if the heroism, excitement and discipline of war and military life could be achieved by more direct means—rather than "trusting that we may find them amongst the accidents and uncertainties, the fatigue and monotony of modern warfare."¹ "We have now made our national houses so vast and complex", Wallas concluded, "that the custom of firing them in order to warm our souls is yearly becoming more dangerous and expensive, and the necessity of inventing some other nervous tonic more urgent."²

In Wallas's book The Great Society, published only two months before the outbreak of war, are the following prophetic words: "An inter-nicene European war is the one enormous disaster which over-hangs our time..."³ Gone was the old optimism of nineteenth-century liberalism—what Wallas called the "old delight in the 'manifest finger of destiny' and 'the tide of progress'"—and even "the newer belief in the effortless 'evolution' of social institutions" looked far less certain. "We are afraid of the blind forces to which we used so willingly to surrender ourselves", Wallas concluded rather

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1. Ibid., pp. 171-2, 179, 123. Modern warfare could only "provide a very insufficient satisfaction of the fighting instincts. Battle-fury and blood-lust were evolved among our ancestors under conditions where you felt and saw the wounds you inflicted." (p. 181)

2. Ibid., p. 183. Wallas briefly mentions James's "Moral Equivalent" p. 66 n. 1. He saw the need for an improvement in the quality of life for the mass of the population which would perhaps include (quoting the conservative journalist St. Loe Strachey) "some wholesome discipline" and temporary "renunciation of ease and comfort" (p. 183). But generally he looked increasingly to "world consciousness" to replace an outdated nationalism. See Wiener, pp. 157-9.

3. p. 46.
pessimistically. Yet he remained a confirmed liberal who believed that human behaviour as distinct from human nature could respond to environmental changes. This was "the master-task of civilised mankind", to produce "a harmony between themselves and their environment far deeper and wider" than anything that could be found in existing society. In this he differed from the other Edwardian pioneer of British social psychology William McDougall who, Wallas felt, tended to see rational thought as "a merely subordinate mechanism acting only in obedience to the previous stimulation of one of the simpler instincts."

Yet the difference was a fine one, for McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908) was no more pessimistic about the possibility of European war than Wallas had been in *Human Nature in Politics*. The "instinct of pugnacity", McDougall wrote, operated "more powerfully" in the present age "than in any other in producing demonstrations of collective emotion and action on a large scale." And echoing Wallas's fears for the outbreak of international conflict, he continued.

"In our own age the same instinct makes of Europe an armed camp occupied by twelve million soldiers, the support of which is a heavy burden on all the peoples; and we see how, more instantly than ever before, a whole nation may be moved by the combative instinct—a slight to the British flag, or an insulting remark in some foreign newspaper, sends a wave of angry emotion sweeping across the country, accompanied by all the characteristics...

1. Ibid., p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 68. Wallas "never confused his reformist ideals with actual conditions; his faith was as great as the other social scientists, except that it began in greater scepticism". R.M. Soffer, "The Revolution in English Social Thought 1880-1914", *AHR*, LXXXV, 7 (Dec. 1970), 1962. This general judgement on Wallas's thought certainly applies to his writing on the problem of war.
of crude collective mentation and two nations are ready to rush into a war that cannot fail to be disastrous to both of them. The most serious task of modern statesmanship is, perhaps, to discount and control these outbursts of collective pugnacity. At the present time custom is only just beginning to exert some control over this international pugnacity, and we are still very far from the time when international law, following in the wake of custom, will render the pugnacity of nations as needless as that of individuals of highly civilised states and physical combats between them as relatively infrequent.  

Like Wallas, McDougall seemed to look forward to the time when warfare would be "replaced by industrial and intellectual rivalry". Indeed, there were already "unmistakable signs" of this change. Wars between "civilised nations" were "tending to become mere incidents of their commercial and industrial rivalry, being undertaken to secure markets or sources of supply of raw material which shall bring industrial or commercial advantage to their possessor." Trade warfare, which McDougall regarded which such equanimity as an alternative to military conflict, was not likely to appeal to Wallas who had broken with the Fabians over the question of imperialism and tariff reform. 

And there was too an echo of Social Darwinist assumptions in McDougall's writing not present in Wallas's work. At one point McDougall, considering the possibility that military warfare would be sublimated into less overtly violent forms noted that this would "end what has been an important, probably the most important, factor of progressive evolution, namely the selection of the fit and the extermination of the less fit (among both individuals and societies) resulting from their

2. Introduction..., p. 295.
3. Wiener, pp. 56-7
conflicts with one another." More thorough-going Social Darwinist arguments against attempts to abolish war were of course common at this time. Looking at his colleagues in the scholarly world, Wallas claimed that perhaps "more than half of the professed historians and psychologists in Europe" believed in the rightness or inevitability of war, basing "their arguments upon imposing biological and psychological generalisation."  

Apart from the exponents of Social Darwinism like Karl Pearson, Professor of Applied Mathematics and then (after 1911) of Eugenics at University College, London, Wallas was no doubt referring to the

1. **Introduction...**, p. 295. This passage remained in the many subsequent editions of the book during McDougall's lifetime. In Janus: The Conquest of War a Psychological Inquiry (1927) McDougall continued (despite the great carnage of 1914-18) to claim "that war was the great instrument of natural selection among states and Nations" and that was "the great antiseptic of national life", the need for self-defence "a bracing tonic influence without which nations must become relaxed in moral tone" (p. 13). However, in the foreword he had listed horrible cases of war madness from his experience as a wartime Major in the R.A.M.C. and he admitted that "even before the Great War the argument against war was already strong, the need for its restriction or abolition already urgent." (pp. 7-12, 15). McDougall repudiated crude Social Darwinism as represented by Karl Pearson but he went far beyond Wallas in his criticism of democratic society. See R.N. Soffer, "New Elitism: Social Psychology in Prewar England", J. of British Studies, VIII, 2 (May 1969), III-40, which seems to overestimate the influence of McDougall in Oxford (pp. 115-6 n. 10) Cf. L.S. Hearnshaw, p. 155 and McDougall's contribution to A History of Psychology in Autobiography, Worcester, Mass., 1930, p. 207.


3. E.G. his lecture to the Newcastle Literary and Philosophical Society, Nov. 1900, where Pearson claimed that "a time when the sword shall be turned into the ploughshare" would mean that "mankind will no longer progress". National Life From the Standpoint of Science, 1905, pp. 26-7.
academic apologists of imperialism—among British historians people like J.R. Seeley and his followers. However, in view of his long-standing rejection of Idealism he could well have added the writings of the philosophers F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet to his indictment. Among British intellectuals before 1914 the influence of Hegelianism was every bit as important in arguments for the rightness of war as was the use (or rather misuse) of Darwinian ideas. In this connection F. H. Bradley's article on "The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice" in the International Journal of Ethics for October 1894 is one of the best statements of the Idealist position on war. Here Bradley, who, unlike Bosanquet, tended to express himself in unequivocal terms, launched an attack on the "insincere professions" and "sickening cant" of the "Humanitarian" school. Against its claim for the equality and "absolute value of individuals" Bradley pointed out that the real world was quite different—"force rules the world, and ...self-assertion...is a condition of welfare", he wrote. And if "the end" were "the full development of human nature", then the end was "superior to the individual" and it was "right to act for this end to the best of one's judgement."


2. Wallas rejected Idealism (and orthodox religion) after his first year at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1877. See Wiener, pp. 5-9, 67-8. Over 30 years later Oxford rejected Wallas for the newly-established Gladstone Chair of Political Theory and Institutions, and chose instead the much less distinguished W.G.S. Adams.

3. It was originally written in 1878 or 1879.

What then of the argument used by Wallas and MacIver that international law would develop (and was developing) as law within states had developed? Bradley had two objections. First, one simply could "not argue in general form from civic to international morality", from what citizens could or could not do, to what nations could or could not do. Secondly, "analogy from civil life" did not reveal a picture of unlimited self-sacrifice. It showed, on the contrary, that "within limits self-assertion...[was] valid". Bradley then reinforced these points (especially the first) in the following striking passage:

"A nation must aim at the good of mankind and at peace in the end; but, as things are, this principle will in some cases justify violence, and even extermination. For, beside the principle which establishes the end, there can be no absolute law; and the means to this end cannot be fixed beforehand. And such means certainly need not always consist in abstinence from aggression. Our first hope at the present is an international executive enforcing the morality of the best; but, if that is to exist, then the best must agree, and must be the strongest. And strength means war in reserve. We may look beyond this possibility to a better state of things, but the first seems the only road to the second. The meek will not inherit the earth, and a nation which claims morality must be ready to use force in defence of right." 1

1. Ibid., I, 170-173, 175-6. Bradley doubted therefore whether international law could "be said really to exist" (p. 170). This point had been taken up by another Idealist W. R. Sorley, then a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Sorley, who seems to have been less "Hegelian" than Bradley, did agree that there was such a thing as "international morality" although it was quite different from individual morality, being of less importance and later growth. National life preceded international relations and nations possessed "an independence and self-sufficiency...not shared by the individual." A nation's duty was 'to itself'—a recognition of the patriotism (i.e. altruism) of its members rather than their selfishness. Morality (international or individual) did not depend upon sanctions, but law did. Without a "superior power" to enforce international morality, international law was "a dream of the distant future". "The Morality of Nations", JHR, I, 4 (July 1891), 442-6.
Although Bradley rejected Social Darwinist arguments for war,¹ there was some attempt, notably by D.G. Ritchie, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, to assimilate Darwinian ideas to Idealism. In an article in the International Journal of Ethics for January 1901 Ritchie described war as "a harsh form of dialectic, a rough means of solving hard problems", but nevertheless war or "the genuine threat of war" was "often the only way" to secure the desired end. This Ritchie defined as "constitutional government and...social progress", and he proposed to judge the rightness of war by weighing which of "the conflicting forces" would be most likely to achieve this end.² However, the article was published and part of it written during the Boer War,³ Some of it reads like a subtle justification of British policy. For example, perhaps with the Boer republics in mind, Ritchie concluded that the nation-state, so precious to radical liberals,⁴ was not "necessarily the highest and final type of society". May not a few great 'Empires', in which self-governing federated communities control the less advanced races, represent a higher stage—more likely to be stable, less exposed to war and preparing the way for a federation of the world"?, Ritchie asked his readers. And later in an

1. "...how can we consistently set up tribal morality and a mere struggle between states as ultimate, when within tribal morality the principle of selfishness is not paramount." Bradley, I, 174.

2. "War and Peace", IJE, XI, 2 (Jan. 1901), 149. Ritchie also had his doubts about "crude applications of biological conceptions to social evolution." The nation was obviously not an organism in the biological sense; the same human being could belong to many social organisms and extinction of the less successful did not necessarily mean the destruction of individuals belonging to it. "In other words human evolution does not take place only by death and by war", Ritchie concluded. Ibid., 154.

3. Ritchie, "The Moral Problems of War - In Reply to Mr. J.M. Robertson", ibid., 4 (July 1901), 493. The passage quoted above was written during the war. The body of the article had been written in 1898.

apparent reference to the pro-Boers he noted: "The sympathy so often expressed for the weaker or smaller state, simply because weaker or smaller, is aesthetic rather than ethical: it is really a survival of that barbaric feeling about warfare which regards it as a noble sport."¹

No doubt the peace advocates were thoroughly annoyed by this table-turning—usually they accused their opponents of harbouring an outdated nostalgia for war. But Ritchie's definition of the just war must have seemed even more shocking. "If we do not exactly say that all successful wars are just wars," he wrote, "we admit that no nation is justified in engaging in war unless with a reasonable prospect of success."² This was perilously close to the maxim that might was right, and during the First World War philosophers unsympathetic to Idealism would point to the similarity, in some of Bosanquet's writing especially, to the apparent acceptance of justification by force by Treitschke.³ However, one must admit that when they were not taking their arguments to extremes Bradley and Ritchie did show a grasp of real life in the international world. It certainly simplified "the internal problems of political society to isolate the state; but such simplification means abstraction from the actual truth of facts", Ritchie wrote. And with a wealth of historical detail he

¹ "War and Peace", 150-1, 148. The passage defending Empires was written in 1898 but fits so well conventional political justifications of the British Empire that it is difficult to believe that Ritchie did not have it in mind.

² Ibid., 147-8. On the same grounds "that a revolution is never justified except by success" (148).

³ See below p.116.
attempted to show that war had "ever been the maker of nations".  

Yet, it was true, as their critics alleged, that there was a kind of fatalistic acceptance of war in the Idealist position. While criticising the favourite radical explanation for the survival of war in civilised societies—the machinations of ruling elites; what came to be known as "secret diplomacy"—as over personalised and "not very scientific", Ritchie left himself open to the charge of ignoring the possibilities for reform of the international system. Ritchie's "scientific" explanation was that there was "everywhere an inevitable conflict between inconsistent types of civilization", and human nature and existing governments being what they were, this conflict could not "always be kept in peaceful channels". This fatalism was even more apparent in the writings of Bosanquet. For example, in a paper before the Aristotelian Society in December 1916 Bosanquet denied the charge that war arose from the state itself:

"And what about war? It is certain to my mind, that evil and suffering must be permanent in the world, because man is a self-contradictory being, in an environment to which he can never be adapted, seeing that at least his own activity is always transforming it. And in principle there can be no reason for treating war as an exceptional case, as if presided over by a special devil apart from every other form of wrong. Neither the possibility of eradicating war, nor the incidental good that comes of it, can reasonably be discussed, as they commonly are, apart from the general problem of evil in the world. While man has a conscience, and things he values above life, and yet his conscience is liable to err, the root of war exists. Issues

1. "War and Peace", 137, 138. "Nations exist for mankind and not mankind for nations; and when any nation, small or large, fails to serve the purpose for which nations exist, it has no moral right to block the onward movement of human progress, even while it may still have a certain quasi-legal status under the convenient fictions of International Law, until that status is altered by stern facts." "Moral Problems...", 494.

2. "War and Peace", 149. Maclver, for example, wrote of "a small ruling class, possessed of power and obsessed with its ideal" which could "make commitments which bind the whole state in the perilous game of external policies". Modern State, p. 236.
may arise between group and group which cannot be compromised. Within the state itself which is cited as the convincing analogy for a universal reign of law, both civil war and individual rebellion remain possible."

Although Wallas never condemned the Idealist philosophy of the state as roundly as did Bertrand Russell or L.T. Hobhouse, he did join them in attempts to stave off international conflict before 1914. In the Wallas papers at the London School of Economics there are letters from Hobhouse, Lowes Dickinson and J. Estlin Carpenter, concerned with the efforts of British liberals to maintain British neutrality during the July crisis. Together with the economist J.A. Hobson, Wallas established the British Neutrality Committee at the end of July.

1. "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind", repr. in Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals, 1917, pp. 300-1. And though he admitted the incidence of war could be "immensely diminished by the reform of states, and their reconstruction in certain cases", Bosanquet was sceptical of the possibility of international restraints unless they were based on "an organised moral world".

2. "I, who have never been an idealist, find myself realizing how thankful we ought to be for a certain moderation and good temper which has always characterised Oxford idealism. Oxford is, indeed, apt to be conservative, and to be, perhaps, unduly conscious of itself as a school of a governing class; but one never meets in the more influential Oxford thinkers of our own time that hard assertion of the state and official absolutism whose effects in Prussia are now part of the history of the world." Apart from the undoubted influence, for the good, of T.H. Green, Wallas saw this resulting from the dominance of Aristotle "in nineteenth and twentieth century Oxford". This made "Oxford students see Plato rather as a revolutionary idealist than a practical absolutist." Wallas, "Oxford and English Political Thought", Nation, XVII, 7 (15 May 1915), 227. No doubt this was in part a reflection of a wartime desire to close ranks (as Wallas hinted), but it was also an indication that his reaction against Idealism had not been as thorough-going as, say, Russell's.

3. A Letter from Carpenter (13 Sept. 1914), for example, suggests a national conference of peace organisations in Nov.-Dec. 1914. See also letters from Hobhouse (8 Aug. 1914) and Dickinson (n.d.), Wallas Mss. Box 5. Carpenter was a member of the National Peace Congress. For other members see appendix.

4. See Wallas's notes and minutes, Wallas Mss., Box 39. Other members were F.W. Hirst, J.L. Hammond, Gilbert Murray, Professor Rendel Harris, G.M. Trevelyan.
At about the same time Norman Angell was setting up the British Neutrality League with C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian and J.J. Thomson, Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge.\(^1\)

As the crisis deepened letters began to appear in the newspapers warning of the danger of British involvement in a war against Germany. On the first of August 1914, the day Germany declared war on Russia, The Times carried a "Scholars' Protest Against War With Germany", followed by the signatures of nine people, most connected with the University of Cambridge. These well-known scholars announced that:

"We regard Germany as a nation leading the way in Arts and Sciences, and we have all learnt and are learning from German scholars. War upon her in the interests of Servia and Russia will be a sin against civilization. If by reason of honourable obligations we be unhappily involved in war, patriotism might still our mouths, but at this juncture we consider ourselves justified in protesting against being drawn into the struggle with a nation so near akin to our own, and with whom we have so much in common.\(^2\)

This manifesto (especially with its admission of the limits of dissent if war broke out) was a good deal more cautious in tone than the spate of letters which appeared at this time in the Manchester

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2. E.G. Browne (Professor of Arabic), F.C. Burkitt (Professor of Divinity), J.E. Carpenter, F.J. Foakes-Jackson (Jesus College), K. Lake (Professor of Theology at Leiden University), W.M. Ramsay (Professor of Humanity Aberdeen), J.J. Thomson, W.B. Selbie (Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford), Taylor mentions 81 Cambridge signatories of a letter to The Times. Troublemakers, p. 117. Carpenter and Selbie, as Principals of Nonconformist colleges at Oxford (Manchester and Mansfield) were hardly representative of Oxford opinion. Times, 1 Aug, 1914, p. 6d. For the reaction of a Cambridge don who refused to sign, see W.E. Heitland, After Many Years, Cambridge, 1926, p. 209.
First, Graham Wallas voiced his fears of the certain disastrous effects of a European war on the British working class. There could, he claimed, be a return "to the general intellectual and moral stagnation of 1793 to 1815 during which the British working population, both in agriculture and manufacture, were brought down to a lower point of misery and hopelessness than at any other period of history."  

Two days later the British Neutrality Committee reiterated the belief that Britain was under no obligation to assist France in the event of a Russo-German conflict. For Russia was "only partly civilized" and was "governed by a military autocracy largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious freedom". Germany, by contrast, was "wedged in between hostile States, highly civilised" with a culture that had "contributed enormously in the past to Western civilization", and was in addition "racially allied" to the British, with "moral ideas" very like theirs.  

Ironically, at least one of the signatories—Gilbert Murray—was to spend much of the war denying the truth of the last two (if not the first) propositions. However, for the moment we can note that the Committee combined an idealistic appeal to the British Government to see that justice was done (especially to Belgium) "and to act as arbiter in the general interest", with arguments of economic self-interest. Britain, the signatories wrote, could only remain "the

3. See below chapter [IX].
financial centre of the world" in peacetime. If war broke out London's function as a centre of international finance "would be temporarily and perhaps permanently transferred to the other side of the Atlantic."

Perhaps this piece of Angellism was designed to appeal to the hardheaded businessmen of Manchester. Against these good economic and moral reasons for neutrality, the Committee had placed the "questionable" considerations of power politics.¹

Further protests from British scholars laid greater stress on the threat posed by war to "civilisation"—although soon they would be talking of a war for civilisation. C.H. Herford, Professor of English at Manchester (who incidentally had a German wife) spoke of the possibility of a "horrible crime against civilisation". And he continued: "let us clear away this figment of 'honour' which binds us to intervene, not to save France from being crushed, but to enable her to make an unprovoked attack upon her neighbour with a better chance of impunity."² Such obvious francophobia was uncommon and more liberal

1. "If we go to war, it will not be to defend any British right from violation: we do not even allege that even Germany or Austria has wronged or affronted us in any way; we cannot even pretend to a sense of wrong. We shall attack them because, in a quarrel of a very complex issue in which we have no qualifications to act as judge, we presume to decide them... or because on the basis of some cold calculations of high politics—which all the facts show to be of very questionable correctness—our security and interests render it opportune to do so...". Cutting in Wallas Mas.

2. Guardian, 1 Aug., 1914, p. 10b. See also letters from S. Alexander (Professor of Philosophy), A.S. Peake (Professor of Biblical Exegesis), R.S. Conway (Professor of Early and Classical Latin), all of Manchester University and W.M. Geldart (Vinerian Professor of Law, Oxford) in the same issue. Also later letters from T.N. Toller (Emeritus Professor), G. Unwin (Professor of Economic History), A.E. Boycott (Professor of Pathology), all of Manchester University, R. de Selincourt (Professor of English, Birmingham), C.H. Reilly (Professor of Architecture, Liverpool), L.T. Hobhouse (Professor of Sociology, London), Guardian, 3 Aug. 1914 (p. 9a), 4 Aug. 1914 (p. 14c), 5 Aug. 1914 (p. 3c). See also C.H. Reilly, Scaffold in the Sky, 1938, p. 182.
academics would have agreed with G.M. Trevelyan's talk of the Russian peril to civilisation. There was too the unspoken fear (hinted at by Wallas) of the threat to civilisation from within—internal disorder resulting from the dislocations and deprivations of wartime. Only this explains the widely-held liberal belief that British involvement in war would be "criminal". Yet even before the German invasion of Belgium some academics had brushed aside these moral objections. J.A.R. Marriott, history tutor of Worcester College, Oxford, and later a Conservative M.P., called for a closing of ranks at "an hour so solemn". Three days later, on the day Britain declared war on Germany, The Times printed "A Scholar's Protest" which effectively answered all the previous talk of German Kultur. H. Stuart Jones, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, and, as he was careful to point out, member of the German Imperial Archaeological Institute, pointed to the other Germany, the Germany of Treitschke and Bernhardi—names which were soon to appear in virtually every pamphlet and article. Did the signatories of "the Cambridge manifesto" realise that Germany was "not governed by scholars, but by statesmen, who solemnly believe that might confers not only right but the duty of attacking the weaker /states/", Jones

1. Guardian, 3 Aug. 1914, p. 6d. This fear persisted after the British declaration of war: "Even so sensible a man as Dicey can't get the old fashioned notion that the Russians are mere barbarians out of his head", Sir Frederick Pollock wrote to Lord Bryce, 26 Dec. 1914 (Bryce Mss. U157). The aged Positivist E.S. Beesly (Professor of History at King's College, London) in one of the last articles he wrote before he died spoke of the "crime" of Germany, but was unable to view with any pleasure the prospect "of Cossacks harrying the land between the Oder and the Elbe as they did after Kunersdorf in the time of the great Frederick." "The Russian Alliance", Positivist Rev., 22, cclxi (1 Sept. 1914), 195-9. A younger generation of liberal intellectuals nurtured on Tolstoy found it easier to slide into Russophilia.

2. Trevelyan, for example, warned of social and economic degradation, contrasting this with the peace and plenty of the 1860s. Gilbert Murray voiced similar fears. Guardian, 3 Aug. 1914, p. 6d & e.

3. Times, 1 Aug. 1914, p. 6d. Cf. A. Quiller-Couch (Prof. of English at Cambridge), Morning Post, 4 Aug. 1914, p. 4g.
asked. Germany threatened France, which incidentally had also rendered services to scholarship, in language that no liberal should tolerate.¹

With this rebuke events overtook the academic wrangling, and by the tenth of August letters began to appear from the signatories of the Cambridge manifesto. The invasion of Belgium had caused an almost total change of mind. The first letter was from J. Holland Rose, Reader in Modern History at Cambridge, who became one of the most prolific apologists for the British cause during the war. The invasion had convinced Rose "as to the imperative need of repelling that aggression and securing an honourable peace."² Professor Ramsay, the classical archaeologist, seemed to be under some misapprehension as to the precise reason for Britain's declaration of war (he mentioned the "invasion of Holland"). But he went on to explain his reasons for recanting:

"The admiration which I feel for Germany as a civilising Power in her own fashion (different from ours) is changed to dislike when she misuses her deserved influence in the world of thought to trample on law and right and to force the horrors of war on a neutral state. The same reasons which made me sign make me now recognize that the cause of Germany is turned into an attempt to enslave Europe, which must be resisted at all costs...I do not regret signing; it was right for us to seek justification before the world at large and in the memory of history by showing that we as a people desired by all honest means to avoid this war. My own private conviction that the war would be forced soon made me all the more resolute to show loathing for it."³

A dignified enough recantation. How different was Bertrand Russell's memory of the collapse of the British Neutrality Committee: "a loud clap of thunder, which all the older members of the committee

1. ⁴ Aug. 1914, p. 5d.
2. Times, 5 Aug. 1914, p. 9b.
took to be a German bomb...dissipated their last lingering feeling in favour of neutrality.\textsuperscript{1} One might expect Russell not to have too much sympathy with fellow-liberals who failed what he saw as the litmus test of ideals in 1914. There is a sense in which the wartime activities of, say, Gilbert Murray represent \textit{la trahison des clercs}, but with limited knowledge of the often cynical considerations which decided policy, there was the tendency in a crisis to believe Sir Edward Grey and to close ranks. Besides, as Howard Weinroth has remarked, it involved "no great intellectual feat" to move from support for small nationalities in the Balkans to support gallant little Belgium against German aggression.\textsuperscript{2} In South Africa fifteen years earlier many liberal intellectuals had opposed British policy because it had offended against this cardinal liberal principle, but Belgium altered everything in 1914. As L.T. Hobhouse wrote to his sister Emily, there was "no analogy between this and the Boer War. There we were doing a wrong—deliberately destroying two small peoples. Here we are fighting for France and Belgium which is beaten will be dismembered or


annexed."\(^1\) Not that Grey's foreign policy had been without fault.

"I still think that our adhesion to one side in the European alliance increased the tension and weighted the chances in favour of war", Hobhouse wrote in 1915.\(^2\) The Government had been wrong, too, in declaring war "without exhausting every possibility of avoiding it", but once in, national existence was at stake as it had never been in South Africa.\(^3\) "Now we are in it it seems...useless to recriminate. Later on we can have it out with Grey", Hobhouse assured Graham Wallas.\(^4\)

This collapse of liberal internationalism was not confined to Britain. Leading academics in the German peace movement, like the historian Karl Lamprecht and the scientist Wilhelm Ostwald, became defenders of the German cause.\(^5\) In France the sociologist Émile Durkheim was prominent in the Comité de Rapprochement Franco-Allemand, which held conferences at Geneva and Ghent (1912-13),\(^6\) but he like

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1. 8 Aug. 1914 cit. H. Smith, "World War I and British Left Wing Intellectuals: The Case of Leonard Hobhouse", Albion, V. iv (Winter 1973), 265. See also his letter to the Nation, XVII, 5 (31 Oct. 1914), 142-3 calling for a manifesto from "anti-militarists of long standing".

2. World in Conflict, p. 17. The Triple Entente emphasised the geographical vulnerability of Germany and translated it into "positive political fact". This, together with the vagueness of its terms, gave it "an appearance of hostility, and barely concealed...menace" in German eyes." German statesmen rapidly made up their minds that we should fight whatever they did, so that it was not worth while to forfeit any immediate advantage in the hope of securing our neutrality."(p. 61).

3. Letter to Emily Hobhouse, op.cit.

4. 8 Aug. 1914, Wallas Mss. V.


many other French savants wrote wartime propaganda.\(^1\) Clearly, British liberal academics accepted war as a *fait accompli*. With Hobhouse it was "sorrowful acceptance" of the realities of international power politics.\(^2\) With others, like Gilbert Murray, or the liberal journalist and historian J.L. Hammond, there was less perplexity over why the war had come about— one senses even a feeling of relief once Belgium had provided a clear moral issue for liberals.\(^3\) The assumption no doubt was that liberal ideals would survive the test of war, and might even exert some influence on official policy during wartime. In reality the intellectuals appeared to provide no more than an idealistic gloss which covered the more cynical (or realistic) considerations of war and diplomacy.\(^4\) Yet the wartime writings of British academics are of interest, since the First World War has all the trappings of a modern ideological conflict.

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2. The description is that of J.A. Hobson (even more reluctant than Hobhouse to accept official explanations in 1914) in Hobson and M. Ginsburg, *L.T. Hobhouse*, 1931, p. 50.


4. Even Hobhouse, sceptical as he was about British policy, could write in the following vein: "The alliance of Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, and Serbia has now been cemented with blood. It is going to be a part of the most moving historical traditions of these peoples. So far as the three Western States are concerned it is reinforced by a similarity of political development and by geographical considerations, and all these forces together have engendered a sense of true solidarity...", *World in Conflict*, pp. 90-1.
IV: "THE BROKEN FELLOWSHIP"

"It is the natural logic of the multitude that because we Englishmen feel it our duty at this moment to combat the German state to our last breath therefore Germany has never done anything of value for scholarship or letters. But that is just the kind of logic to which scholars should give no countenance. We surely need not be any weaker in our resolution to hold out till we have righted a great wrong and removed a great danger to our nation because we recognise the world's debt in science and letters to the researchers and writers of Germany."

"The Broken Fellowship" (editorial),
Times Literary Supplement, 4 Nov. 1915

For British scholars with ties of friendship and common intellectual endeavour to German colleagues the break in relations in August 1914 was especially painful. Some had German wives, and the war for them was, as G.W. Prothero put it, "a sort of civil war". Perhaps this feeling was best summed up by the Birmingham economic historian W.J. Ashley. He had studied in Berlin under two great German economists Adolf Wagner and Gustav Schmoller, and was especially close to the latter. Early in the war Ashley contributed a pamphlet to the Oxford series. Although it purported to analyse The War and Its Economic Aspect, Ashley spent the first part unburdening himself of his grief at the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Britain. First he described the Germany of his student days:

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1. Letter to W.H. Dawson, 24 Mar. 1915, Dawson Mss. 269. Dawson married twice into German families. Other men with German wives included C.H. Herford (Professor of English at Manchester) who lost his son Siegfried in the war, J. Mackinnon (Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Edinburgh), G.P. Gooch, Sir Eyre Crowe (of the Foreign Office) and J.W. Headlam (Historical Advisor to the Foreign Office), J.C. Wilson (Professor of Logic at Oxford), whose German wife had recently died, tried to obtain permission for his wife's family to live in Oxford but the war made this impossible.

"For many years—from the time when I first went as a student to Germany—I have had a warm place in my heart for the German people. Like many other young Englishmen, it was in Germany that I first caught the infection of the scientific spirit, the spirit that cares as much for widening the bounds of knowledge as for handing on knowledge already acquired; and what I saw of social intercourse in Gottingen and Dresden made me appreciate the Gemütlichkeit, the cheerful simple kindliness, which characterises so large a part of the people. I have believed that our two nations possessed many traits in common, and have had some common interests and duties; and I have done what I could to promote good understanding between them. And when the University of Berlin, in conferring an honorary degree, took occasion to describe me as a true friend of our nation, the epithet was not, I think, altogether undeserved.  

But now the war, "a special and personal grief" for Ashley, had broken the ties of scholarship and friendship:

"It means the end, for many years to come, probably for my lifetime, of the hopes I have cherished of amicable co-operation between the two countries; the cessation—though that, in comparison, is but a small matter—of friendly interchange of thought with men whose work for economic science and for social reform I have long admired. And although I am convinced that the German Government and the German nation supporting it are profoundly in the wrong; though I am sure that it made a fatally unwise decision in determining at all risks, to back up—nay, to prompt—Austria; though I feel that it has quite misunderstood both the purposes and the temper of England; though I have not the slightest doubt that it is the bounden duty of every Englishman to do all that in him lies to bring about Germany's complete defeat; I am not going to deny to Germany the qualities which first called forth my respect, and I am not going, if I can help it, to pay any German the poor compliment of returning his 'hatred'...."  

Although Ashley had first-hand knowledge of German society and politics, he never involved himself in wartime polemics.  

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1. pp. 3-4.  
2. Loc.cit.  
3. Shown in his Progress of the German Working Classes (1904) which followed many of the ideas of Kathedersozialisten like Schmoller.  
true of A.W. Ward, Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, and perhaps the most knowledgeable of British historians on modern Germany. Ward, who had been brought up in Germany until the age of sixteen, spoke German like a native and was deeply-read in German literature. "All through his life", said one of his colleagues, he "was anxious to do all that was in his power to emphasise friendly relations between the land of his birth and that of his early education. His constant social and literary relations with German scholars were not simply for the sake of scholarship but were conspicuously directed to this end." As well known in Germany as in Britain as an historian of the first-rank, Ward was uniquely equipped to be an intermediary between the scholars of the two countries. Just two years before the outbreak of war he spoke to the English Goethe Society of the close ties between British and German scholars:

"The service which German research and German sympathy have rendered to the study of Shakespeare during something like a century and a half can never be equalled, but they may, in some measure, be returned by the loving devotion of generations of Englishmen and Englishwomen to the study of Goethe. In these spheres of work and thought at least—in the payment of this mutual tribute to genius, and in this common acknowledgement of an indebtedness for which there is no sinking fund—the cooperation and competition between Germans and Englishmen is, we trust, destined to endure as it is our heart's desire that the friendship they alike betoken may continue and increase in all the relations between the two peoples of kinsmen." But war in 1914 put an end to all Ward's hopes—and to the Society which was not revived until 1923. Although Ward publicly stated

1. T.F. Tout, "Memoir", in A.T. Bartholomew, A. Bibliography of Sir Adolphus William Ward 1837-1924, Cambridge, 1926, p. xxvii. Ward was the son of the British Consul-General at Leipzig and Hamburg, Minister-Resident to the Hanse towns. Ward had a Prussian knighthood (1911) and an honorary degree from the University of Leipzig.

his belief that Britain's war against Germany was a "righteous war"\textsuperscript{1} he never used his considerably knowledge of Germany to join in attacks on her. Instead, he put together a long half-historical paper on Securities for Peace" and "retired into German history before the fall of Bismarck."\textsuperscript{2} His \textit{Germany 1815-1890} which was published in three volumes between 1916 and 1918 showed no signs of the very real grief which the war had brought for Ward. Its tone, a reviewer noted, was one of "serene detachment" and "absolute impartiality".\textsuperscript{3} It was left to others to argue over the "problem of German Kultur".

How could German policy be explained? Or as C.H. Herford, Professor of English Literature at Manchester, put it: "How does it come \ldots that a nation standing, in very many respects, in the foremost ranks of civilized peoples, can openly resort in its warfare not only to practices, but also to principles which suggest a methodical and intellectualised barbarism?" For Herford this was a personal dilemma—his wife was German and his own ties to German scholars were very close. But his answer was a rare example of clear thinking among academic Germanophiles. As he noted, the usual explanation was to divide "the German people into two alien hosts." On one side were "the thinkers, the idealists, the science-workers, the musicians, and the millions of kindly men and women" whose \textit{Gemütlichkeit} so readily disarmed "English reserve". On the other side was the "brutally aggressive military caste". Usually this view took the "form of postulating a fundamental

\textsuperscript{1} Founders' Day in War Time, Manchester, 1917, p. 2. This was at a memorial service for members of Manchester University killed in the war. Cf. the reaction of a Cambridge contemporary, the Master of Trinity College, in J.R.M. Butler, p. 197.


\textsuperscript{3} \textit{EHR.}, XXXIII, 2 (April 1918), 284.
contrast between Prussia and the rest of the German nation.\textsuperscript{1} This convenient division into "good" and "bad" Germans did not satisfy Herford, but it was commonly held by men who knew and loved the old Germany. "Of the two Germanys", Sir Michael Sadler wrote to a friend, "the one which you and we love is not responsible for this wickedness, except so far as it has not had the moral or physical courage enough to stab its Junkers in the face long ago."\textsuperscript{2}

Perhaps the foremost exponent of the "two Germanys" view was Lord Bryce who identified German "frightfulness" firmly with Prussia. "There was nothing of the kind in Southern Germany when I knew it fifty years ago", he wrote in 1916.\textsuperscript{3} He just could not believe that "the German learned class, or the commercial class—or the people in any sense" had been "persuaded by Treitschke, Bernhardi's system of doctrines, or had adopted the principle that State necessity justifies everything." Soldiers might believe anything they wished, nor were "most politicians much better." But could the theologians and professors have really forsaken ethics or religion?\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} "The Problem of German Kultur", Positivist Rev., 23 (Sept. 1915), 193.

\textsuperscript{2} To J. Harvey, 9 Aug. 1914 cit. M. Sadler, Michael Ernest Sadler, 1949, p. 270. Sadler had visited Germany in 1897 to gather material for his sympathetic report on German secondary education (1902).

\textsuperscript{3} "Preface" to A. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations, 1916, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{4} Letter to H.A.L. Fisher, 15 Oct. 1914, Fisher Ms. Box 3/1. Cf. Bryce's Neutral Nations and the War, 1915, pp. 7-8. Bernard Bosanquet made the same point: "The professors, it is said, have been mobilized in the service of Germany. And on the general merits of the dispute this is so. But I am not aware of evidence that philosophers of repute have adopted, say, Bernhardi's or Treitschke's views of justification by force." "Patriotism in the Perfect State", The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects, 1915, pp. 140-1 n. 1.
H.A.L. Fisher, whose lectures on *The War Its Causes and Issues* Bryce had been criticising for this indictment of German universities, was like Herford no "good hater" of Germany. Indeed, he had told his audience at the University of Sheffield, "I am the last man to draw up an indictment against a whole people of whose contributions to the great causes of humanity I am keenly sensible, whose poetry I read and love, of whose great masters of historical learning I count myself to be in some measure the humble disciple." He found "no pleasure in contemplating the ruin of any civilised country under the processes of war", especially this "struggle between the two great members of the Teutonic family" which was "fratricidal and therefore peculiarly terrible."\(^1\) And yet something was wrong with the German professors. "I am reminded", Fisher wrote to Bryce, "that cultivated people can very soon sink to the lowest levels of barbarism by the example of Görres who writing in the *Rhenische Mercur* in 1813 urged the destruction of Rheims Cathedral, of the Louvre and of the Notre Dame.\(^2\)

This could not fail to strike home with Bryce who was (like Fisher) involved in an official investigation of alleged German atrocities in Belgium, including the destruction of the university and historic buildings in Louvain.\(^3\) There was, too, considerable evidence that in their public utterances the "organised masters of German science" endorsed German military policy; that they like "the

\(^1\) *The War Its Causes and Issues*, 1914, p. 8.
\(^2\) 19 Oct. 1914, Bryce Mss. UB. 23. Joseph von Görres was Professor of History at Munich.
\(^3\) See below p.310.
enormous majority of the German people" not only passionately supported
the war, but also justified "at (the most with a regret for the loss
of life) the sinking of the Lusitania and all the other expedients... called into play for its successful prosecution."¹ The manifestos
of German scholars were specifically designed to show the solid support
of professors for German policy and to reject the idea of "two
Germanys". "The German Army and the German people are one", ninety-
three leading academics proclaimed in October 1914, "and to-day this
consciousness fraternises 70,000,000 of Germans, all ranks, positions
and parties being one."²

What one might call the battle of manifestos in 1914 was begun
by the Address to Evangelical Christians Abroad by thirty German
theologians, including some of the names best known to the British
public.³ Their rejection of the allegation of German atrocities and
their protest against "unnameable horrors" committed against Germans
living abroad, was answered by the address To the Christian Scholars of
Europe from theologians associated with the University of Oxford.⁴
As one might have hoped this latter was couched in tones of Christian
charity—no doubt the Germans would have called it British cant—the

2. "Manifesto of the Intellectuals of Germany", in W.W. Coole
   and M.F. Potter (eds.) Thus Spake Germany, 1941, p. 45.
3. Adolf Diesemann, Adolf v. Harnack, Julius Richter (all of the
   University of Berlin), Rudolf Eucken (Jena), William Wundt (Leip¬
   zig).
4. H.S. Holland, W. Sanday (the professors of divinity), W. Lock
   (Professor of Biblical Exegesis), R.L. Ottley (Professor of
   Pastoral Theology), E.W. Watson (Professor of Ecclesiastical
   History), G.A. Cooke (Professor of Hebrew), T.B. Strong (Dean
   of Christ Church), J.E. Carpenter (Principal of Manchester
   College), R.W. Macan (Master of University College), W.B.
   Selbie (Principal of Mansfield College), W.A. Spooner (Warden
   of New College), C.C.J. Webb (Magdalen), B.R. Streeter (Queen's),
   Hastings Rashdall (New), T.K. Cheyne (Oriel), E. Bevan (New),
   F.E. Brightman (Magdalen), P. Gardiner (Professor of Classical
   Archaeology) being the most eminent names on the list.
Oxford theologians claiming that German accusations arose from ignorance rather than from intellectual dishonesty:

"Some of us are specially bound to individuals on the list by personal ties of deep regard and admiration. Therefore we do our best to examine, with the self-restraint and effort of impartiality which befits those whose business it is to sift the evidence and to look below the facts for their causes, the points emphasized or indicated by their signatories.... We hasten to express our belief in the sincerity and good faith of these protestations and disclaimers so far as they relate to the motives of those by whom the document has been signed.... Naturally we do not charge the signatories with stating the facts other than as they saw them. But they wrote, we are quite sure, without having studied at first hand any adequate collection of the evidence." ¹

However, this assumption of superior British wisdom did not impress the German theologians who fought back with Another Word to the Protestant Christians Abroad—a manifesto, one of the Oxford divines sadly reflected, which was "a most unworthy piece of special pleading." ²

Reading the reply of the Oxford theologians one is immediately reminded of the critical evaluation of Wilhelmine academic life in the wake of the Fischer controversy of the 1960s. The intrinsic shortcomings of German universities were clearly revealed in 191⁴, for those with eyes to see. The Oxford theologians noted the increasingly homogeneous (and imperialistic) ideology of the German professoriate—for example, that "no Social Democrat" could "aspire to a professorial chair". And they concluded: "Of the existence and influence of this tendency the [German] signatories cannot be ignorant; and we do not know whether to be more grateful for their own implicit repudiation of

sympathy with it, or more astonished at their ostrich-like attitude towards a state of things so notorious." Normally, they would not have held their German colleagues "responsible for the theories of military writers like General von Bernhardi" any more than they would have expected them to assume that Oxford theologians necessarily agreed with "the views of Lord Roberts". But the German theologians had even denied the existence of aggressive imperialistic sentiments within Germany. Germany, they had claimed, had "not dreamed of depriving others of light and air". ¹

The German claim, often to be repeated, that this was a war of Kultur against "Asiatic barbarism" put some of the Oxford theologians in a rather difficult position. At least two of them (W.B. Selbie and J.E. Carpenter) had signed the manifesto, published in The Times after the Russian mobilization of July 1914 (but before the German invasion of Belgium), protesting against British involvement in war on the side of Tsarism against Germany. Even now the Oxford men thought it "reasonable, in estimating German policy, to allow for the deep-seated nervousness in German minds", which was "the outcome of the neighbourhood on their further border of the great mysterious northern Power with its huge population and the illimitable possibilities of its future." Such language perhaps suggested similar nervousness in British minds. Certainly, it was claimed that the Anglo-Russian Entente

¹ To The Christian Scholars..., pp. 6-7.
in no way committed Britain to "sympathy with some features of Russian internal administration." 1

However, the publication of the most famous of the German academic manifestos—that of "the ninety-three" in October 1914 pushed the battle of words between theologians into the background. The "Manifesto of the Intellectuals of Germany" became a by-word among the academics of Britain and France for the subordination of German scholarship to the dictates of state policy. It had been drawn up by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, doyen of German classical philology and a man in frequent contact with British colleagues. The original signatories included most of the leading German scholars, and after energetic propaganda by the historian Dietrich Schäfer there were finally about 4,000 signatures attached to the manifesto— as Fritz Fischer points out, virtually the whole German professoriate. 2

"As representatives of Science and Art", the signatories protested "to the civilised world against the lies and calumnies" with which the Allies had been "endeavouring to stain the honour of Germany in her hard struggle for existence—a struggle which has been forced upon her." The "lies" included the idea of German responsibility for the war, the "criminal" violation of Belgian neutrality and of international law, allegations of atrocities against the Belgians (except under "direst necessity"), and finally the claim of the Allies that in fighting German

1. Ibid., pp. 9-10. They also denied the German charge that the war was one of Protestant Germany against Catholic (even Pagan) France and Orthodox Russia. As for Russia's alleged "barbarism", they pointed out that one of Oxford’s "ablest and most distinguished professors" (Paul Vinogradoff) was Russian. "Russian intellectual development" had "not yet reached the pitch of German" but there were signs of "a very brilliant and splendid noontday."

2. Germany's Aims in the First World War, 1967, p. 156. n. I. Of the original signatories the best-known names were: Wilhelm Förster (Berlin), Johannes Conrad (Halle), Paul Ehrlich (Frankfort), Adolf v. Harnack (Berlin), Lujo Brentano (Munich), Rudolf Eucken (Jena), Ernst Haeckl (Jena), Max Lenz (Hamburg), Karl Lamprecht (Leipzig), Max Liebermann (Berlin), Eduard Meyer (Berlin), Wilhelm Hermann (Marburg), Friedrich Naumann (Berlin),
militarism they were not seeking to destroy German civilisation. "Have faith in us", the signatories asked the people of neutral countries. "Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilised nation to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is just as sacred as its own hearths and homes."¹

There is little doubt that this manifesto did immense damage to the reputation of German scholarship, in neutral as well as Allied states. "To many of us in this country," wrote one of the Oxford theologians, "it has been the most painful experience of their lives to find men, whose names they have been long accustomed to revere, showing themselves so blindly and bitterly partisan in their judgements regarding the causes of the war."² Another of the Oxford signatories noted that if one took German "pamphlet literature as a whole" and looked in it "for anything like the sense of proportion, the objectivity and balanced judgement of true science", it was "conspicuously wanting." "How is it", he asked, "that in regard to this present war, its causes and significance, there are so few traces of German science?"³

1. "Manifesto of the Intellectuals...", cit. Coole and Potter, pp. 44-5. Also printed in G.F. Nicolai, The Biology of War, 1919, pp. 2-5. For a less emotional response from some of the signatories (Max Planck and, according to him, Adolf v. Harnack, v. Willamowitz-Moellendorff and two others), see the letter sent to Sir Oliver Lodge via Professor H.A. Lorentz (University of Leiden), Times, 5 June 1916, p. 6d.


political scientist at Columbia University and one of the few defenders of Germany among leading American academics, had by 1915 condemned the conduct of German savants.\footnote{Herbst, p. 169. International protest at the destruction of Louvain University is collected in Resolutions of Protest, Official Correspondence and other Data Relating to the Destruction of Historic Monuments rev. ed. Westerham, 1915.} Even before American entry to the war in 1917 its university community had turned against German propaganda—the manifesto of "the ninety-three" had been the final blow to any hopes of critical voices being raised in German universities.

The explanation of this sad falling-off from the ideal of Wissenschaft depended greatly on the extent of one's sympathy with things German. The simplest interpretation was that German professors had on the spur of the moment been "swept away by a national impulse".\footnote{Gardner, Autobiographica, p. 44.} The aged A.V. Dicey felt that the explanation lay in the "false political" and "religious creed" of modern Germany. This diminished "the moral guilt of good men infected by its errors".\footnote{How We Ought to Feel About the War, Oxford, 1914, pp. 7-8.} For an Oxford theologian Germany was "a noble nation for a time gone wrong." The qualities of greatness remained but they were "unhappily blended."\footnote{Sanday, Meaning..., p. 109. One of his Oxford friends wrote that Sanday would "not think ill of anybody.... For the worse the Prussian case is, the more he finds himself constrained to apologise for it: and his apologetic attitude corresponds remarkably with the German one, for whatever lie the Germans tell he is bound to have an equivalent excuse, and these become as involved as the original lies that provoked them. However, he is honest at heart and admits the truth piecemeal." Robert Bridges to H. Bradley, 3 Dec. 1915, in Correspondence of Robert Bridges and Henry Bradley, Oxford, 1940, pp. 145-6. Bridges (the Poet Laureate) wrote anti-German poems during the war although he led attempts to resume contacts with German scholars after the war.} But for those less kindly disposed towards Germany, the manifesto of "the ninety-three" had a different explanation: The German scholar was "a singularly guileless and credulous person, entirely without political or constitutional
training, and ready, as a believer in 'divine right and passive obedience', obediently to sign any statement submitted to him by his superiors.¹

This explanation offered by an Edinburgh historian was echoed by many others who pointed to the obviously important consideration that German professors were civil servants, and proud of this status.

Whatever the exact reason for their fierce support of official policy, German scholars had effectively destroyed any credibility that remained in the image of "two Germanys" in August 1914. As C.H. Herford noted sadly, the "relation between the things we honour and the things we abhor in the Germany of to-day, is to intimate to permit either of them exclusively to dominate any one region or class. They often appear to co-exist as different aspects of the same mind. And whatever demarcation could be discerned...before the war, the war itself has all but completely effaced." Herford had come as close as was perhaps possible, for a British scholar steeped in German culture, to a critical assessment of the German professoriate's role in creating the prevailing ideology the Wilhelmine ruling elite. The "glaring" defects of modern Germany were "rooted in a kind of fundamental rightness and nobility"—one could discern "the root of idealism from which even that which proudly called itself 'Realpolitik' drew not a little of its vital sap."²

Herford had also noticed an "incapacity to value, and even to

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2. "Problem of German Kultur", 194-7. A recent observer has written that Wilhelmine foreign and domestic policy is "only intelligible against the Weltanschauung constructed by German philosophers and historians during the earlier nineteenth century which had been adapted and applied by their spiritual descendants at the end of the century." J.A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion, 1974, p. 10.
understand, the mentality of other nations", and this grave "defect" in German scholarship soon drew the attention of other sympathetic observers. W.J. Ashley, for example, had found certain "disquieting features" in the "mental attitude" even of scholars he greatly respected:

"In academic circles the legitimate pride in German science seemed sometimes to have become almost an obsession and to have had the effect of shutting out of sight what was being done in other lands. It seemed hardly to be realized that what Germany had to teach the western world in the way of thoroughness and method had already been pretty well learnt, and that there were intellectual qualities of almost equal value, qualities of lucidity and discrimination and balance, which could perhaps be better learnt elsewhere—even in despised France. There was a curious national self-satisfaction which failed to perceive that the great new ideas, the waves of intellectual inspiration within and without the realm of scholarship and research, which were affecting the minds of this generation all over the world, were now almost all of them coming from other directions than Germany."2

With such doubts being expressed by academic Germanophiles it was not surprising that British scholars less sympathetic to Germany should now turn and attack German scholarship itself. A notable example of this occurred at the annual conference of the Classical Association in 1915. Its President W.F. Ridgeway, Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge, earned great applause with his claim that German contempt for Britain was, "in no small degree", due to the attitude "of British scholars, theologians, and some scientists, with some few exceptions, towards everything German." The fact was "that for the last two

1. Herford loc. cit.
2. The War..., pp. 4-5.
generations British scholars, British theologians and British men of science" had "aimed chiefly at being the first to introduce into this country the last thing said in Germany, even though that might be only the worthless thesis produced by some young candidate for his doctorate. But what was worse, no one dreamed of inquiring whether the statements of the savant were correct or his arguments valid."¹

There were, one suspects, academic sour grapes mixed in with traditional British mistrust of research on the German scale, for Ridgeway spent some time listing his difficulties on getting published his criticism of Mommsen's work. But at the Classical Association conference no one could be in any doubt that most delegates agreed with criticism of what one of them called "that mass of Teutonic learning" which had "encumbered and almost crushed classical study" since the 1870s.² Even the classicist E.A. Sonnenschein, a man by no means unsympathetic to German scholarship, wrote of it as "one of the idols before which too many people in this country—including the writer of this paper—have bowed down."³ The Professor of Colonial History at Aberystwyth claimed that British historians, rather than classicists, had "been subjugated by the Germans",⁴ but it was clear that anyone who had doubts about the influence of German learning on his own field now felt free to make a declaration of independence."I'm glad to be rid of the German incubus", Walter Raleigh wrote to a French friend,

2. T.E. Page, ibid., 31 (discussion following Ridgeway's address).
4. T. Stanley Roberts, Times Educational Suppln. 49 (1 Sept. 1914) 150c. Much of his ire was directed at the late Bishop Stubbs.
"It has done no good, for many years, to scholarship; —indeed, it has produced a kind of slave-scholarship, though there are still some happy exceptions."¹

Mixed with this reaction there was a certain streak of anti-intellectualism. Usually this was confined to the more lurid wartime pamphlets with titles like Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur, but occasionally it showed through in more serious discussions. A good example of this is the article by L.P. Jacks, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, and a Nonconformist theologian, in the Atlantic Monthly for April 1915 where he wrote of, "something... now moving in the philosophical and theological heart of Britain which, if pressed into utterance, would say, 'No more Kant, no more Hegel, no more Strauss, no more Nietzsche, no more Harnack, no more Bucken—for me!"" There was in this, Jacks admitted, "some insularity", but there was "also a great deal of human nature." Faced with "the hideous crime committed on Belgium", things German "stood discredited in the British mind".² And in another article at this time Jacks rejoiced that, "The age of German footnotes is on the wane."³

Of course such blanket condemnations were not typical and British theologians usually rallied to the defence of German scholarship. As John Oman wrote, "Only ignorance can afford to mock at German culture.

2. "The Changing Mind of a Nation at War", Atlantic Monthly, CXV, 4 (Paril 1915), 344. Jacks felt that the British had "overestimated the German head" and "underestimated the Russian heart".
The man who has no debt to it to-day has no great intellectual debt to anybody. The contribution of no other nation is so great, and that let us ever gratefully acknowledge. And a University of Manchester theologian wrote that "science and her votaries" would suffer if research "ceased to be cosmopolitan" and "seekers after truth" duplicated research "through refusal to read work already published in a foreign and hated tongue." But the question of the relationship of British and German theology aroused sufficient controversy for the Oxford University Press to commission a pamphlet in their series on wartime issues. Its author W.B. Selbie, Congregationalist theologian and Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, was in no way anti-German, as his signature to one of the neutrality manifestos before the outbreak of war had shown. Selbie was not one to deny British theology's "indebtedness to Germany". Almost every book on a theological subject written in Britain showed this to be true. German theologians has "worked so assiduously and thoroughly in all the various fields", their scholarship was "so exact and their speculation so bold and far-reaching" that their writings inevitably dominated the field. British students came back from Germany "imbued with something of the German spirit and method; and full of admiration for teachers like Harnack and Hermann, Troeltsch and Jülicher, Johannes Weiss, Seeberg and Loofs."

2. J.H. Moulton, British and German Scholarship, 1915, p. 6. Moulton died two years later after the ship on which he was travelling was torpedoed in the Mediterranean.
But even so sympathetic an observer as Selbie felt that there was "some ground for the apprehension" that British theology was "coming to depend too exclusively on work done in Germany", and that native scholars were not always being given credit "for the excellent and original work" they did. The appearance of the manifesto of the German professors had only served to remind Selbie of the shortcomings already apparent in German scholarship—and here he quoted from L.T. Hobhouse's *Democracy and Reaction* (1904)—"It is learning divorced from its social purpose, destitute of large and generous ideas, worse than useless as a guide in the problems of national life, smothering the humanities in cartloads of detail, unavoidable, but fatal to the intellect."¹ This characterisation of German scholarship was amplified by Hobhouse in a lecture in 1915 to one of the summer schools organised by F.S. Marvin. There was, he claimed, "a want of proportion" in some of the "vast Teutonic treatises" which took "the heart out of the English student."²

Those who had always doubted the value of the massive structure of the German research industry now felt that, with the war, the time had come to reassert the older British traditions of scholarship. Gilbert Murray felt the difference between the British and German approach to classical literature was that the Germans aimed "more at knowing; we at feeling and understanding. They are professionals, we are the amateurs.... We are always aiming at culture in Arnold's sense, not

1. Ibid., pp. 7, 9. As an example of this divorce Selbie noted the division in Germany between theology as a science and its social and religious context and purpose. Cf. Elliott-Binns, p 339.

Bernhardi's, they are aiming at research or achievement. And the historian J.W. Allen wrote of a "German mind" that was "at once powerful and dull". The "German intellect" was "remarkably comprehensive". It had "a great power of grasping complicated detail and a great faculty for the wide generalisation". But, at the same time it was "extraordinarily lacking in fineness of perception, in intellectual subtlety" and in humour". These deficiencies are so great as to render German comprehensiveness almost futile. They account for the odd stupidity which marks almost all German work", Allen concluded. Clearly, German pedantry was yet one more manifestation of Shrecklichkeit.

The heights to which anti-German sentiment among British scholars could go is illustrated in a letter to The Times in December 1914 from the eminent ancient historian A.H. Sayce, Professor of Assyriology at Oxford. Whereas Hobhouse had been willing to concede "the element of disinterested drudgery" as the German contribution to science, Sayce denied even this "faithful, unrepaying service of the hard dry fact", as Hobhouse had called it. In science "none of the great names" was German. Apart from Goethe, there were no great names in German literature.

1. "German 'Kultur'—III German Scholarship", Quarterly Rev. 223 (April 1915), 333, 336.
2. Germany and Europe, 1914, pp. 45-6.
3. Hobhouse had claimed that "the cooperation of both types of mind", German and British, was necessary. A "patient endeavour in the elaboration of detail", a "certain encyclopaedic minuteness" was the German contribution to the "international division of labour". Each element had its place: "English common sense, French lucidity, German idealism; English liberty, French equality, German organisation; English breadth, French exactitude, German detail". "Science and Philosophy...", 170, 172-3.
Kant was "More than half Scottish in origin", and Schiller "a milk-and-water Longfellow". The German scholar could "laboriously count syllables and words, and pile up volumes of indices", he could "appropriate other men's discoveries in the interests of 'culture'", but beyond this he produced "only theories which take no regard of facts", which, because they came from Germany "must be regarded as infallible."

Not content to condemn German researchers to be "intellectual 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'" for their colleagues overseas, Sayce finished by damning the Germans for being "still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who raided our ancestors and destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire."

This was as bad as the worst anti-English pronouncements of German professors. Significantly there was little criticism of Sayce's letter from his academic colleagues. Percy Gardner, who held the chair of Classical Archaeology at Oxford, described it as an outburst full of "wild theories and inconsistencies", but he also stressed his "acutest pain" at the "detestable ends" to which German scholarship was now being put. Perhaps the best answer came from the Savilian Professor of Astronomy, who was later to be one of the first to call for the resumption

1. 22 Dec. 1914, p. 6c. Sayce quoted Porson's well-known lines: "The Germans in Greek are sadly to seek: Not five in five score, but ninety-five more: All save only Herman, and Herman's a German". For the correspondence following his letter, see Times, 24 Dec. 1914 (p.9d), 26 Dec. 1914 (p. 7d), 30 Dec. 1914 (p. 9d), 2 Jan. 1915 (p. 9e), Sayce also attempted to deny the "Teutonic element" of the British people (ibid., 20 Aug. 1914 p. 7e).


3. Times, 28 Dec. 1914, p. 7d.
of scholarly relations with Germany after the war. "It ought to be impossible to think of Newton without also thinking of Kepler; or of Pasteur without thinking of Koch", he wrote.\textsuperscript{1} In its way a reply in the fine tradition of those British astronomers one hundred years earlier who had refused to allow war to interrupt the exchange of information with French colleagues.\textsuperscript{2} But this was 1914 not 1813 and Professor Ray Lankester, who strongly supported Sayce's charges against German science, had the last word—the "delusion" of German superiority in scientific research was due to "the irresponsible gush of young men" lately back from German universities.\textsuperscript{3}

Can one say much more about this controversy than to voice a suspicion that academic knives were being sharpened; that the rights and wrongs of Wissenschaft were convenient ammunition in controversies of longer standing? There does seem to have been a general sense of doubt about the state of German universities and their professoriate, induced by the shock of war even in the formerly most sympathetic British minds. What greater contrast could there be between Michael Sadler's preface to Friedrich Paulsen's great work on German universities (first published in English in 1906) and his wartime reflections on German education? In the first Sadler, while not uncritical of certain aspects of the German system, obviously believed that "in education the truth lies somewhere between the German system and the English.\textsuperscript{4}

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3. \textit{Times}, 26 Dec. 1914, p. 7 d. Like Sayce, Lankester claimed German falsification of the "history of science in the voluminous treatises written by them deliberately ignoring the claims of others to discoveries and fruitful conceptions upon which their own work has been based."
Nine years later in a contribution to a symposium on German Culture: The Contribution of the Germans to Knowledge, Art and Life (1915), Sadler now strongly criticised the "one-sided excellence" of German education:

"Its elaborate organisation, triumphantly enforced by the State, has weakened its moral independence... German education has paid the penalty for going to excess in the use of methods which, if employed in moderation, are salutary and wise. Its long tradition of mental discipline has exposed it to influences which have preyed on its fairness of mind and have perverted intellectual passion into partisanship. Its conception of the claims of the State had led it to neglect the duty of disinterested reflection by means of which, in the past, German scholars have done signal service to the cause of truth and to the scientific progress of the world."

The much-vaunted Lehrfreiheit of German scholars had been revealed for what it really was—something which masked the very real subordination of the professor to the German state.

Of course this raised the question of whether German scholars could still be considered worthy of membership of learned societies in Allied countries. In May 1915 King George had deprived the Kaiser, the Emperor Franz Josef, the King of Wurttemburg, the Crown Prince of Prussia and other German princes of their garter knighthoods. Might this not be a precedent for depriving enemy scholars of their similar, if more lowly, privileges? This was the conclusion of the academies of Paris and Brussells. To their credit the British Academy and the Royal Society declined to do this.

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1. "The Strength and Weakness of German Education", p. 301. The whole book was an attempt (in the words of the editor W.P. Paterson) to steer a course between emotional rejection of "the hollowness of Teutonic pretensions" and German claims "in her worst excesses of megalomania." (p. vi).

This was true also of German academies and learned societies—"with inconsiderable exceptions", British names remained on their membership roles. As we shall see later, universities, in the northern cities of England especially, were not able to withstand pressure to dismiss professors of German origin but of British nationality (let alone those of German nationality). Even in Oxford, the Warden of New College was forced to defend his inclusion of German names among those on the college memorial to war dead. However, perhaps the most celebrated case involved the German Celtic scholar Kuno Meyer.

Meyer was a professor at the University of Berlin on the outbreak of the world war, but up until 1911 he had been Professor of Celtic at the University of Liverpool and after that time honorary Professor of Celtic. For most of the war period Meyer was a "travelling professor" in the United States, a position which gave him opportunity for subtle propaganda on behalf of his country. It was Meyer who published a letter from an Oxford scholar (F.C. Conybeare) which was extremely critical of British policy in 1914, and it was this which first brought him to the attention of British colleagues. In a letter to the Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool University, Sir Alfred Dale, Meyer made disparaging remarks about Britain's ability to withstand an invasion. This, together with his remarks on the future loyalty of the Irish, was enough for the Council of the University

2. See below pp. 286-92.
4. See below pp.
to deprive Meyer of his honorary professorship and condemn him for "acting as an agent of sedition in imputing treason to loyal Irish soldiers now prisoners in Germany".\(^1\) When it became known that Casement was working among Irish prisoners of war in Germany it was not surprising that Meyer was accused of using his time in Britain to secretly prepare the ground for Irish rebellion. His trips to the Aran Islands to study their dialect became especially suspect now in retrospect. A Cambridge Celtic scholar called for Meyer to be deprived of the freedom of Dublin and Cork previously given to him for his services to Irish studies.\(^2\) And the University of Wales was only prevented from depriving Meyer of the honorary D.Litt. they had granted him before the war by the discovery that their charter did not empower them to withdraw a degree once granted.\(^3\)

Of course the war raised not only problems of maintaining contact with scholars in enemy countries, but even the involvement of scholars themselves in the hostilities. Although he himself became heavily involved in wartime propaganda for the Allies, Lord Bryce was at pains to stress the need for bodies like the British Academy to chart a course of strict neutrality. In his Presidential Address to the Academy in 1916 he suggested that its wartime policy should be not to let the war "disturb the even tenor" of its activities. Meetings and public lectures carried on as before,

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1. Letter of Mr. A. Allan (Liverpool University Archives) to the writer, 24 May 1973. *Times*, 2 Jan. 1915, p. 9e. See also letters from H.O. Forbes (Reader in Ethnography at Liverpool) and J. Sampson (University Librarian), *Times*, 8 Mar. 1915 (p. 9e) and 9 Mar. 1915 (p. 9e). Meyer wrote a rather bemused reply (7 Jan. 1915, p. 9e).

2. E.C. Quiggin (Gonville and Caius College), *Times*, 28 Dec. 1914, p. 3e.

3. The Registrar (J.M. Angus) on his own authority, however, removed Meyer's name from the calendar, although it was later replaced after passions had cooled. Letter of Mr. J.G. Thomas (Registrar of the University of Wales) to the writer, 8 June 1976. Wilhelm Ostwald and Eduard Meyer, both of whom indulged in wartime polemics against Britain, were listed as honorary graduates of Liverpool University in all the wartime calendars.
the only change being suspension of the election of "foreign men of learning" as "Corresponding Fellows"—as Bryce put it, "lest the judgement of their merits might be, or might be possibly seem to be, influenced by the political relations in which the country stands." The more learned bodies were "kept outside the passions of war the better for them and the nations", Bryce concluded. The difficult course which the Academy had to steer in wartime is suggested by an incident involving the French anti-war writer Romain Rolland. Originally invited to speak before the Academy during the celebrations for the tercentenary of Shakespeare's death in 1916, Rolland was asked later not to come presumably because of his growing notoriety after the publication of his Above the Battle in an English translation in 1914.

However, not all British scholars shared Bryce's desire to keep learned bodies "outside the passions of war". In his presidential address to the Classical Association in 1915 Professor Ridgeway eschewed an "address of the conventional order" on the grounds that it would be "singularly out of place" during wartime. Instead he launched into an impassioned plea for conscription, citing the evidence of Athenian democracy to lend weight to his argument. Where Bryce had decided to say nothing in his address which might cause pain to a member reading it "ten or twenty years hence," Ridgeway considered that normal scholarly activities

1. PBA, 1915-16, pp. 3-6.

2. Starr, p. 118. Rolland's contribution was printed in the Academy's publication Book of Homage to Shakespeare(1916), which had no Austrian or German contributors (the latter especially who had done so much for Shakespearean studies,) although it had Japanese, Chinese, Armenian, Indian, Burmese and even Persian contributors.
should be suspended for the course of the war. To "hold annual meetings of societies as if the conditions were in no wise abnormal", he noted, "would...be highly immoral, for such a course would tend to the continued opiation of a nation so long drugged with every drowsy syrup of the world and which is even yet not fully awake." Such unworldliness among British scholars had led "the leading minds of Germany, not merely soldiers and politicians, but the professorial and intellectual classes, to the conclusion that England was so besotted by cowardice, luxury and sloth, that she would fall an easy prey to any vigorous martial race."¹

Allowing for the special bees in Ridgeway's bonnet—conscription, eugenics, the "alien" menace²—his idea of mobilizing the scholars in the nation's cause was widely held. One of Ridgeway's successors in the presidency of the Classical Association called upon the members to do "a piece of war work" for which there was a "definite call"—namely the creation of "well-informed public opinion on the Greek situation". By this Professor Ure meant support for the pro-Allied Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos and against the pro-German King Constantine.³

2. See his article "The Problem of our Racial and National Safety", Eugenics Rev. VII (1915), 123-30. Britain, Ridgeway believed, "had been brought into the present life and death struggle by a combination between millionaires (frequently aliens in origin), and their dupes, the masses (p. 123). He was also very critical of Quakers and Nonconformists, presumably for their role in the peace movement. See also his letter to The Times on "Does Democracy Mean Peace", 23 April 1915, p. 9d.
The dividing line between creating informed public opinion and disseminating propaganda was clearly a fine one. However classical scholarship continued through the war years, despite Ridgeway's call for its suspension, and the Classical Quarterly (on whose Board of Management Ridgeway sat) continued to publish summaries of important German research. This is perhaps a convenient point to turn to two disciplines—philosophy and history—which were both affected by the war, though in different ways.

1. Reviews of German work fell off in other British classical journals more, one suspects, from the difficulty of obtaining such books than for any other reason.
"The War provided the most delicious opportunities for the philosophers. They are all agreed that the wickedness or virtue of a nation depends upon the metaphysical creed of its professors of philosophy, and that Germany is an awful example of the effect of the wrong creed. If they are opponents of Kant and Hegel, they find in these two the precursors of Bismarck, Treitschke, Ludendorff and Co. .... If, like the bulk of our most patriotic instructors in mental and moral science, they have been in the habit of praising Kant and Hegel, they have a more delicate task to perform. They have to explain that these great and good men belonged to the old Germany which we all regret, and that the abandonment of them in favour of Nietzsche was what caused the invasion of Belgium."

Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy and Virtue", The Athenaeum, 2 May 1919

What was the effect of the war on British philosophers? In some respects it was minimal. As one of them put it: "Those whose business it is to read philosophical serials even in time of war must have been struck by the spirit of calm detachment with which the great problems of thought are discussed as though there were no such thing as war and politics. This is magnificent and is as it should be."¹ This spirit of "calm detachment" could be found in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology, edited by G.F. Stout a supporter of the war and G.E. Moore a critic of official policy.² Abstracts of articles in German periodicals continued to appear in its pages throughout the war and any falling-off was due, one suspects, more to difficulty in obtaining publications from


². Moore was an early member of the branch of the U.D.C. at Trinity College, Cambridge, on which see below p.
enemy countries than to any intellectual embargo. In each volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* the name of the eminent German philosopher and psychologist Wilhelm Wundt continued to appear on the list of "Corresponding Members", even though he was a leading apologist for the German cause.¹

Some philosophers like Bernard Bosanquet, the leading British representative of Idealism, eschewed public debate on the war, although he was privately in no doubt as to the rightness of the Allied cause.²

When J.H. Muirhead, another Idealist who was Professor of Philosophy at Birmingham, proposed a joint statement on the war by British philosophers "who on the whole adhered to the tradition of great German idealists", Bosanquet showed himself "more desirous of shunning controversy". He preferred to concentrate his remaining years (he was 66 in 1914) in study and in making up his "own mind on the new aspects of things, e.g. in logic".³ He had, according to Muirhead, "made up his mind that the supreme duty of the non-combatant was to use his talents and opportunities given him to the best advantage in his own field as far as the general distraction allowed."⁴

Of course this reaction was a means of relief from the emotional strain of war. But it was also an indication of the dilemma of the

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1. His *Die Nationen u. ihre Philosophie* (1915) castigated the shallowness of British philosophy.
4. Ibid., pp. 171-2.
philosopher in wartime. After science and mathematics, philosophy is one of the most cosmopolitan disciplines. The tension between patriotism and the ideal of international scholarship was less marked than in the case of, say, historians. Yet British philosophers were second only to historians in their busy activity as publicists for the Allied cause.

While Bosanquet and the Oxford Idealist F.H. Bradley corresponded learnedly on "the nature of play" through the war years, their colleague Sir Henry Jones (Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow) wore himself out giving rousing speeches on recruiting drives up and down the country. And in an article for the *Hibbert Journal* with the title "Why We Are Fighting", he gave this estimate of the British case: "Our country can clothe itself in the splendid strength of the rectitude of its cause, and it will put the stern might of conscience into its strokes.... This war has come upon us as a Duty, and duty leaves no loose options either to a good man or to an honourable nation."^2

But there were some philosophers whose consciences were not so easily satisfied. The unusually acute self-critical faculty of the Cambridge philosopher C.D. Broad has been remarked on by others. And in a remarkable piece of autobiographical reminiscence he has described his state of mind at the outbreak of war. He was neither a "conscientious objector" nor a fervent supporter of the war in 1914:

"...even if I had been convinced that it was my duty to enlist, I have little doubt that my physical cowardice would have led me to

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1. Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 171.

2. XIII, I (Oct. 1914), 52. As a philosopher in peacetime Sir Henry had been "less concerned with demonstration than with eloquent pleading and living conviction, all philosophy being for him an attitude to life and a spiritual dynamic rather than a system of theoretical doctrine." R. Metz, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, 1938, p. 302.

try to evade it. And even if I had been convinced that it was my duty to refuse to take part in the war, I have little doubt that my moral cowardice, in face of popular obloquy and the disapproval of friends and relatives would have led me to conceal my conviction. I suppose that if no other way out of the dilemma had presented itself, I should have finally enlisted under the pressure of public opinion in the circles which immediately surrounded me.”

But an alternative did present itself "by which appearances were saved and 'honour', though 'rooted in dishonour', was satisfied." Broad found work at the university where he was then teaching (St. Andrews) in the laboratory of the Chemistry Professor who was engaged in munitions research.¹

At a less personal level, searchings of conscience are suggested in a lecture by the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics to whom Broad had been assistant at St. Andrews, G.F. Stout, whose Manual of Psychology (1899) was a standard work, was giving a lecture at Bedford College, London, early in 1915 on "War and Hatred". At this time an official commission under Lord Bryce was investigating alleged German atrocities against Belgian civilians. Stout admitted to his audience that he tended to "skip such passages in the newspapers as those which describe German atrocities in Belgium. I refuse to read even official reports. I put myself off by hoping that in the main they are not true, or that they are greatly exaggerated, or that they can be explained as to case another light on them. Yet I have been gradually forced to believe in their reality by evidence which I cannot reasonably resist."²

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² The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects, 1915, p. 123.
This reluctance Stout marked down to "circumstances and education", for the scholar, he felt, was singularly unfitted to comment on political affairs: "Persons of this type do very well so long as they live a sheltered life, spent, for instance, in study. But they are unfit to grapple effectively with certain forms of evil or really to appreciate their nature, or fully to recognize their existence." Although this seemed to be an admission of his own unworldliness, it soon became clear that Stout was more concerned with those people—and clearly he was not one of them—"who, though they are by nature fully susceptible of angry sentiments, suppress them on principle, because they regard them as wrong and especially because they are afraid of giving way to hatred." On the contrary, "some developed forms of the primitive emotion of anger" were "necessary and right." This meant "resentment or righteous indignation" rather than "hatred or malevolence". In other words, "enlightened anger...inasmuch as it is free from the various forms of blindness which characterize hatred." 1

This injunction to set aside the precept to love one's enemy—it could, after all, never be "a practical guide amid the stress and strain of daily life"—was a favourite argument of the more philosophically-minded academic apologists for the Allied cause.2 To argue, as Stout did, that it might "sometimes be better to run the risk of being

1. Ibid., pp. 123-5. As long as anger was not blind, there was "no general limit to its strength, persistence, or intensity."

2. E.g. A.V. Dicey, How We Ought to Feel About the War, Oxford, 1914, pp. 8-9. J.P. Mahaffy, "The Ethics of Retaliation", in Ad Clerum, Dublin, 1918, pp. 180-2. Dicey opposed retaliation for German "crimes", Mahaffy argued strongly for them (see below, p. ). See also the remarks of R.R. Harett in "Presidential Address: War and Savagery", 26-7, where "righteous indignation" is defined as "that stern and disciplined mood in which the best of civilized men may be expected to fight against injustice and oppression"—a kind of "cold" anger "controlled by the higher system".
actuated by hatred than to run the alternative risk of not feeling due resentment" seemed nicely attuned to the priorities of total war. For one thing it justified the official injunction to "Love your friends and hate your enemies", as Stout put it. It also provided one with ammunition against critics of official policy—the honest doubters. For these people in "opposing the natural tendency to regard the faults all on one side, that of the enemy", tended "to run to the opposite extreme" and to make out that it was "their own side" which was "wholly or mainly or at least equally to blame in cases where an impartial consideration of the evidence would show the contrary."¹

This was the very charge which Bertrand Russell, who had studied under Stout (then a Fellow of St. John's) in his fourth year at Cambridge, set out to refute in his earliest writings on the war. In his pamphlet criticising British foreign policy in the ten years before the outbreak of war he explained that if he seemed to his readers to "emphasise the faults on our own side", it was because they were "ignored by our compatriots". If little was said "about the faults on the other side", that was "because every newspaper and every professor throughout the country" was "making them known." Moreover, it was "more profitable" to be conscious of one's own faults "than of the faults of our enemies: we can amend our own faults if we become aware of them, whereas we can only increase hatred on both sides by proclaiming the faults of the enemy", Russell concluded.²

¹ Stout, pp. 123-4.
² The Policy of the Entente, 1904-14, Manchester, [1916], p. 3. Also pp. v-vi.
What then of the darker side of human nature? Russell, appearances to the contrary, was no stranger to this.\(^1\) And he was well aware that his pleas for balanced assessment and rationality in wartime might seem mere logic-chopping to some. "I am willing to admit that disinterestedness itself may become a passion", he wrote in answer to an American critic. "When a German is accused of having murdered a baby, and it turns out that he murdered a boy of twelve, I almost forget his crime in the desire to prevent injustice. I am conscious that if I belonged to a neutral nation I should reprobate the spirit of Germany wholeheartedly; but I am restrained by disgust at the orgy of self-righteousness that has swept over the British nation."\(^2\)

Russell returned to this theme in "Justice in War-Time An Appeal to the Intellectuals of Europe", an article published in neutral Switzerland. The philosopher Leibniz had spoken of a "'war, in which philosophy takes no interest'", but now, Russell claimed, "philosophers, professors and intellectuals generally" undertook "willingly to provide their respective governments with those ingenious distortions and those subtle untruths" by which it was made to appear that "all good" was on one side and "all wickedness" on the other. How could one talk of "moral reprobation"? It was "nothing but an embodiment of hatred", and hatred


2. "The War and Non-Resistance a Rejoinder to Professor Perry", *IJE*, XXVI, 1 (October 1915), 24-5. Perry had written: "It is doubtless the principal task of the philosopher to offset the bias of the multitude and resist the current that sweeps by him. But it sometimes happens that the common opinion is correct, and that even such blind passions as patriotism and righteous indignation will be found working for the general good." "Non-Resistance and the Present War: A Reply to Mr. Russell", *IJE*, XXV, 3 (April 1915), 316.
was "a mechanical product of biological instinct." Righteous indignation merely prevented one having "humane feelings towards the enemy", "any nascent sympathy for his sufferings." And how could one talk of the war as a contest of Right over Might? The war, whatever philosophers might say, was "not being fought for any rational end". It was "being fought because, at first, the nations wished to fight", and now because they were "angry and determined to win victory." "Everything else" was "idle talk, artificial rationalizing of instinctive actions and passions."¹

Russell's description of the belligerent states as two dogs fighting in the street² could not fail to infuriate every patriotic professor of philosophy. But they could at least console themselves that the weight of numbers was on their side. His scepticism as to "reputed influence of pure thought on human action" was echoed only by Britain's lone academic practitioner of Pragmatist philosophy F.C.S. Schiller, who, although critical of British policy, never campaigned openly against the war like Russell.³ And one is forced to admit that the belief that wars are ideological has proved durable for all Russell's scepticism.

Thus one can find another British philosopher writing twenty or so years later of another World War that it was "as perhaps never before in the whole course of history, one between philosophies which differ fundamentally


2. "When two dogs fight in the street, no one supposes that anything but instinct prompts them, or that they are inspired by high and noble ends.... And what is true of dogs in the street is equally true of nations in the present war." Ibid., pp. 13-14.

3. The words were Schiller's and he went on (in the course of a review of John Dewey's German Philosophy and Politics) to demonstrate that "philosophic ideas" had "as little to do" with this as with previous wars. Self-defence, property and national existence were "the primary motives that send men to the battlefields, though at various times governments have eked them out by appeals to honour, glory, loyalty, religion, plunder and (now) 'nationality'. All this was as true of the Germans as of the other combatants." Mind, NS. XXV, 98 (April 1916), 254.
as to what man is and what he is here for.\(^1\)

Philosophy and philosophers were in the front-line of battle in 1914 as in 1939. Articles began to appear with titles like "German Philosophy and the Present Crisis", "The War and the Theory of the State", "'Shall We Serve God for Nought?' Treitschke and Hegel", "German Thought: The Real Conflict". This last, by a lecturer in philosophy at King's College, London, put succinctly what others struggled to express: "The fact that there is a struggle of ideas underlying the great war is now a matter of common realization."\(^2\) While German professors raged against Manchestertum—that perfidious individualism of the British—British philosophers discovered "behind the attack on the British Empire ... a deeper design, which was nothing less than the overthrow of the moral foundation on which Western civilization has been built up."\(^3\) This was one of the main themes in the wartime writings of L.T. Hobhouse, first Professor of Sociology in the University of London.

For Gladstonian Liberals like Hobhouse the most disturbing feature of the world of thought in 1914 was that during his lifetime there had "been a profound change of intellectual", even "of moral outlook. The Victorian age believed in law and reason", he wrote in The World in Conflict (1915). Now its sons had "come in large measure to believe in violence, and in impulse, emotion or instinct." Biological theory had been "interpreted as a justification for force and self-assertion." This grew into "a theory of revolt against law and morals", against "intellectual" and "moral restraint". Who was to blame for this

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1. Editorial, "Why We Are at War", Philosophy, XIV, 56 (Oct. 1936).
regrettable development? The Pragmatists, Bergson and especially Nietzsche, "a Pragmatist in everything but name". These were the thinkers who stressed "the feebleness of reason, the arbitrary and unreal character of scientific law, the primariness of impulse, the superiority of instinct to rational purpose, the glorification of movement without vision." They had pushed man "back from reason to will" and in so doing had encouraged him to go back "one step further on the line of retrogression from will to instincts, emotions and impulses which man shares with brute creation."¹

Although Hobhouse supported official policy in August 1914 his acute pessimism was matched only by that of Bertrand Russell, who stood on the opposite side of the fence on the issue of war and peace.² No doubt Hobhouse was also concerned to settle old philosophical scores (the reference to Bergson and the Pragmatists suggests as much). But his indictment of Nietzsche for destroying "the moral restraints against which power chafed",³ was echoed by other British philosophers. J.H. Muirhead, who was no friend of the Realist school to which Hobhouse owed allegiance, admitted that Nietzsche (and Schopenhauer) had contributed to "the naked assertion of the right of self-affirmation in the line that instinct and interest" prompted. But his condemnation was less enthusiastic. So much of British Idealism had derived from German philosophy that one had to be careful in placing blame.⁴

1. pp. 29, 38-40, 51. The erosion of values had been unwittingly begun by Victorian science which had destroyed both "the ethical edifice" and "the ideological substructure" of Christianity, though intending to preserve the first. Now science had been eroded from within so that it no longer provided a basis for "a mechanical view of the world." (pp. 33-4, 42).
2. "All one's hopes for social and political progress are shattered once and for all.... We may write Finis to our work, and hope that civilization may rise again elsewhere." Hobhouse to Emily Hobhouse, 8 Aug. 1914, cit. S. Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State", Past and Present, 72 (Aug. 1976), 89 n. 13.
3. World in Conflict, p. 56.
4. German Philosophy in Relation to the War, 1915, p. 46.
But for armchair philosophers Nietzsche was a godsend: "Down with Nietzsche! Ah, that was fun, drubbing the nasty blackguard, the man who presumed to sneer at liberals without admiring liberal-unionists. He was an epileptic, it seemed, a scrofulous fellow, and no gentleman." And in case Clive Bell's description\(^1\) should seem irreverent invention of the 1920s, here is what one Oxford historian offered in 1914 in *The Germans: What they Covet*:

"This Superman was the special invention of a philosopher called Nietzsche, who spent his life railing against the 'superstition', as he called it, of Christianity, and against the virtues of pity, mercy and love, which are, he said, the most distinctive doctrines of that superstition. You need not remember anything else about Nietzsche except that he went stark staring mad before he died. But while he was going mad (and it would only be charitable to suppose that he was never very sane), he contrived to bite a great many of his countrymen, and to instil a good deal of his poisonous doctrine into those he bit."\(^2\)

Small wonder that an enterprising bookseller in the Strand (no doubt with many unsold copies of Oscar Levy's translation still on his hands) put a sign in his window proclaiming the conflict to be "the 'Euro-Nietzschean' war".\(^3\) But Nietzsche was to figure far more prominently in the ideological exegesis of Nazism in the 1930s. In 1914 Hegel's state rather than Nietzsche's "blond beast" was the real centre of

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2. C.R.L. Fletcher, p. 5. The pamphlet (one in a series published by the University of Oxford) was designed as a popular account in "homely language".
3. A. Wolf, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, 1915, p. 10. Wolf defended Nietzsche on the grounds that it was unreasonable "to hold anyone responsible, not only for his real views, but also for other people's distortions of them". Although Wolf could see dangers in a "system of ethics...characterized by naturalism and evolutionism", he concluded that Nietzsche's political views were more reminiscent "of the peace societies and of the Society of Friends rather than Bernhardi and Treitschke." (pp. 17-18, 22-3). These were brave words in 1915 from the Reader in Logic and Ethics at University College, London. For the conventional coupling of Nietzsche with Treitschke and Bernhardi, see E. Barker, *Nietzsche and Treitschke*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 4-5.
attention. It was widely believed that, "more than anything else", it was "the German theory of the State" which lay "at the bottom of German aggression"—the words of Lord Bryce opening a series of lectures on that very subject in London early in 1916. The main features of this German theory—repeated so often that they came to have an incantatory quality—were, according to L.T. Hobhouse: "The deification of the State and the belief that it is the supreme type of human organisation, the contempt for democracy, the unreal identification of liberty with law which simply puts every personal right at the mercy of the legislator, the upholding of war as a necessity, the disregard of humanity, the denial of the sanctity of treaties and of international law". Hobhouse's indictment was animated not only by a deeply-felt political liberalism, but also by long-standing antipathy to the philosophy of Hegel. The kernel of the German theory of the state, he wrote, could all be found in Hegel's Rechtphilosophie.

Hobhouse had found that by immersing himself in the writings of Hegel, Nietzsche and Treitschke, "reading their theories day by day to the refrain of the war news", he had become far "less sceptical about the relations between the academic and the practical." And later after a Zeppelin raid he wrote: "In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which lay...in the book before me...In the Hegelian theory of the god-state, all that I had witnessed lay implicit." How else could one explain why.

1. See the different treatment accorded to each in a typical survey of "German Philosophy" by A.D. Lindsay in W.P. Paterson (ed.), German Culture, 1915, pp. 59, 62-3. However, during the Second World War, Hegel was still under fire as the debate between E.F. Carritt and T. M. Knox in Philosophy for 1940 shows. (XV, nos. 57-9; 51-63, 190-6, 313-7).
5. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, 1918, p. 6 (part of a prefatory dedication to Lt. R.O. Hobhouse, R.A.F.).
the ideology of the German ruling class was so different from that of Western Europe. Only in Germany had the twentieth-century revolt against reason created a state of mind which made for war. For, "while elsewhere the disruption of moral bonds produced political, literary or artistic eccentricities which in the end were bound to correct themselves, in Germany it removed the feeble barriers which stood between an avalanche and a peaceful world."^1

Hobhouse's analysis of just where Germany had gone wrong foreshadowed many of the explanations offered later for the rise of Nazism. Germany had reacted against the ideas of the eighteenth-century enlightenment which "sprang up in France, England, America and countries in sympathy with them. She did not return to barbarism. She developed a new variant in civilization—in point of fact a new religion." This Hegelianism was "the first completely reasoned answer to the democratic and humanitarian ideal." A line of descent could be traced from the "humanitarianism" of Kant through "the medium" of Fichte's "idealistic nationalism" to Hegel's state philosophy.\(^2\) Where Hobhouse led others followed and soon not even Goethe was spared the attentions of seekers after the genealogy of German wickedness.\(^3\) In later times the answer of conservatives has been to point to Rousseau rather than Hegel as the source of troubles

1. World In Conflict, p. 56.
3. E.g. G.W. Prothero, German Policy Before the War, 1916, pp. 5-14. Goethe's idea of "self-cultivation" and "self-elevation" grew, in the hands of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer into the Will for "self-annihilation" and then the Will "to Power". From Kant came "the transcendent duty of submission to the moral law". To this Fichte added "the idea of civic duty and self-sacrifice" for the nation. Hegel deified the state and the army, and Treitschke made force the sanction of the State. Thus the ideas of Kant and Goethe "metamorphosed almost out of recognition, and taking in many extraneous elements by the way, became capable of fusion in the political theory that now holds the field."
in the modern world. But during the First World War the reaction of
British Idealist philosophy was almost wholly defensive. This was to be
expected in a school of thought described more recently as "Hegelianism
modified by Anglo-Saxon caution".2

The task of the British Idealist was thus to rescue what was worth-
while (anything up to the time of Hegel, and perhaps Fichte) in the
German philosophical tradition. "How comes it, they needs must ask, that
a people whose thinkers a century ago were pre-eminent in their disin-
terested passion for truth have been led to prostitute their spiritual
energy to the gospel of national self-aggrandizement", wrote the Professor
of Philosophy at Reading University College.3 The best answer came from
Muirhead, the most Hegelian of English Idealists,4 in his German Philoso-
phy in Relation to the War (1915). Here he set out to prove that Hegelian-
ism had been superceded by other less noble ideals in the Germany of 1914
and that anyway Hegel was innocent of the charges laid against him; in
fact to argue, as another Idealist put it, that there was "indeed no
true philosopher whose teaching can without violence be made to serve as
a basis to the superstructure raised by Pan-German theorists."5

1. A.E. Taylor claimed this in his review of The Metaphysical Theory
of the State. See Mind, NS. XXIX, 113 (Jan. 1920), 92-3.
p. 3.
1917), 288.
4. That is, compared to Bosanquet whose Idealism was more eclectic.
5. Oakley, 113. This Bosanquet sought to do for Fichte, by showing
that his reputation as the philosopher of racist imperialism was the
result of "a perversion" of his teachings on "a primary life-
force". Fichte's claim "that a civilized state in contact with un-
civilized ones cannot help extending its borders", Bosanquet felt,
was "a partial truth, though not at all a negligible one". Social
and International Ideals, 1917, pp. 318-9. For a more critical
assessment by another Idealist, see W.R. Sorley, "The State and
Morality", International Crisis The Theory of the State, pp. 36-42.
Instead of the "continuous development" of German philosophy from Hegel's "great constructive effort of thought" to the present, Muirhead pointed to "a reaction—a great rebellion and apostacy" after 1831. A reaction had set in when, "going along with material expansion and the devotion to the special sciences it evoked", there arose "a philosophy which sought to invert the old order and to read body and matter where it had read mind and spirit." This new materialist school—here Muirhead cited Feuerbach, Moleschott and Büchner—at first "was content to rest its ethics on the humanistic tradition it had inherited from Idealism. But it was not surprising that this element in its teaching, which had shrunk to little more than a hesitating note, should fall into the background in the popular mind." When Social Darwinist thought came to Germany the "seed fell on ground prepared by a quarter century of materialist thought", of which Ernst Haeckel's Riddle of the Universe was but the best known. Instead of being created "as only one among other agencies in development", the "struggle for existence" had been "exalted into the position of the supreme law of life."  

Clearly then British Idealists blamed not the German Idealist tradition and its conjunction with modern anti-Materialist thought, but rather Materialism itself, especially when tainted with Social Darwinism. But did this explain why Germany was so different? "Good philosophic idealists among us", Hobhouse wrote in 1916, "go about trying to prove that the reaction in Germany is modern and represents a sad falling-off from the idealism of Hegel. But the truth is that Hegel is the father and

1. German Philosophy in Relation to the War, pp. vi, 51, 57. Muirhead cited Ranke's complaint—"Everything is falling. No one thinks of anything but commerce and money"—as contemporary evidence of this trend.

2. Ibid., pp. 60-1.
by long odds the serious champion of everything reactionary in the ninteenth century."  

To this Muirhead could only reply by drawing attention to the "good" Hegel, who--like Burke--had merely reacted against the anarchic individualism of the French Revolution. Hegel, had "felt that the time had come to vindicate the reality of the State as the "substance" of the individual, family and national life." And he had been "further convinced that justice could only be done to the unity of the State by a personal head as in a modern constitutional monarchy." As for the claim that Hegel was the philosopher of Prussian militarism, there was textual evidence to show that he placed great emphasis on "art, science, religion—all that goes to make...the good life—for the full development of which the State" was the "essential condition."  

The anti-Hegelians, although fewer in number (among professional philosophers at least), seem in retrospect to have had the better of the argument—not the least, one suspects, because the Idealist defence was just that, a defence. It was easier to accept that a German victory "would be a world-wide advertisement for the State-philosophy of Hegel and its offshoots", than to read Hegel. Besides the bright young men of philosophy (mostly from Cambridge) were rejecting Idealism itself as old-fashioned. Bradley, Bosanquet and Muirhead were of a generation that had been brought up with Victorian certainties—a belief in progress and western civilization if not in orthodox Christianity. Russell and G.E.


2. German Philosophy in Relation..., pp. 35-7. As for Kant, he had written Perpetual Peace.


4. Bradley had been born in 1846, Bosanquet in 1848, Muirhead in 1855 and Hobhouse, another Victorian, in 1864.

Moore, who started the Cambridge attack on Idealism in the 1890s, had both been born a generation behind the old men of Idealism—a sufficient time for them to have reacted (especially in rationalist and scientific Cambridge) against many of the values of the Victorian age. C.D. Broad, a younger man who attended Russell's lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, has caught the mood of this generation gap in British philosophy. Writing in 1967 he noted:

"The reactions of the clever young men following able and inspiring leaders, in an exciting attack on the orthodoxy of their immediate predecessors, are inevitably accompanied by a pleasant glow of intellectual contempt and quasi-moral indignation. We felt this strongly about such old fogies as Bradley and Bosanquet, to whom we must have appeared insufferably uppish and superficial, and we were no doubt often highly deficient in understanding and appreciation of what they had taught and of their reasons for it."2

The reaction against Idealism was also in some ways a reaction of Cambridge Realism against Oxford neo-Hegelianism. Idealism was very much a product of Oxford. Edward Caird, T.H. Green and R.L. Nettleship had made Balliol a centre of the newly-imported German doctrine in the middle of the nineteenth century. Later leading British Idealists—Bradley, Bosanquet, Muirhead, H.H. Joachim, D.G. Ritchie, William Wallace, J.A. Smith—were educated at Oxford, where some of them also taught. Except for J.S. Mackenzie, and perhaps W.R. Sorley, the Cambridge Idealists—relatively fewer—had moved far from Hegelian orthodoxy.3 As Broad noted, "Cambridge...had always been rather aloof from the current orthodoxy of

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1. Russell was born in 1872, Moore in 1873.


3. James Ward and especially J. McE. McTaggart. Henry Sidgwick, who died in 1900 provided a link between Utilitarianism and new Cambridge Realism.
Oxford and the Scottish universities."¹ There were obviously good practical reasons for this; science and mathematics-based undergraduate tuition at Cambridge meant that fellowships were mostly in this field.

The extent to which the war encouraged the reaction against Idealism is uncertain. One recent assessment is that it "did not provoke in philosophy profound changes which echo on in subsequent years...It may by that the xenophobia which induced worthy citizens to persecute dachshunds and German waiters in 1914 does have something to do with subsequent contempt in Anglo-Saxon philosophy for Hegelian idealism. But it is easy enough to demonstrate that an argued philosophical basis for such contempt existed at least a decade before the outbreak of war in 1914."²

This is certainly true in the sense that as early as 1899 G.E. Moore had attacked Idealist ethical theory in The Nature of Judgement and Russell had followed a few years later with criticism of Idealist metaphysics.³ However, two points should be noted. Firstly, Oxford was still dominated by Idealism (even if Cambridge was not) at the outbreak of the First World War, according to the American Idealist Brand Blanshard who was a student there in 1913.⁴ Using the evidence of examination papers, G.G. Mure has pointed out that the logic of "Aristotle, Bacon, and Mill"

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² D. Bell, p. 174.
formed "a nucleus" which dwindled "very slowly before the idealist war of attrition until we reach the period of the Great War."¹

Secondly, we can say that the war, even if it did not "provoke... profound changes" at least encouraged them. Indeed, David Bell appears to admit as much when he concedes that perhaps it could be "more than insignificant speculation to suggest that the blood-letting of 1914-18 really had made it difficult to take seriously the [Idealist] idea that reality was a harmonious whole tending towards perfection."² This philosophical bankruptcy was what Schiller had pointed to in 1916 when he noted that the war had "revealed that the actual world was a very different thing from the cosmic order" which Idealist philosophers had "constructed in their minds."³ And at least one Idealist, Sir James Black Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen, had his "belief in Hegelian world-reason...so deeply shaken as to be no longer susceptible of justification."⁴ Under the impact of the meaningless destruction of world war he turned from "optimistic idealism" to the study of human nature in an attempt to explain what had happened.⁵

The coincidence of the war and attacks on Idealism are especially noticeable in the field of political theory. Hobhouse's counterblast to Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory of the State (1899) appeared in 1918, although he had taken issue strongly with Idealist social and political philosophy from the time of the Boer War. Hobhouse the philosophical

³ Schiller, 250.
⁴ Metz, p. 316.
Realist and political Liberal had found conservative, not to say reactionary, implications of Bosanquet's writings deeply disturbing. The belief that "the ideal is realized in the actual world and in particular in the world of organised society"—in fact that the social world was "an incarnation or expression of the ideal"—meant that there could be "no question...of realizing an ideal by human effort. We are already living in the ideal."1 The implicit quietism in such a belief is best summed up in the title of one of Bradley's essays, "My Station and its Duties".2

But during the war it was the Idealist view of the state "in its external relations", which was most worrying. For, in confusing the ideal and the actual Idealism rested on "mere generalisations of customs and institutions" which happened "to be familiar". Thus it set "the State above moral criticism", constituted "war a necessary incident in its existence", condemned "humanity" and repudiated the idea of a league of nations. In short, Hobhouse concluded, "we see in it a theory admirably suited to the period of militancy and regimentation in which we find ourselves."3

1. Metaphysical Theory...pp.17-18.
2. "In political matters he was deeply conservative and reactionary... Bradley was the implacable enemy of all utilitarian or liberal teaching; he could not abide pacifism or generalized humanitarian sentiment, and any belief in the natural equality of man or in the inviolability of life (whether political or religious in inspiration) he regarded as 'sentimental', 'degenerate', and 'disgusting'". R. Wollheim, F.H. Bradley, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1959, p. 14.
3. Metaphysical Theory..., pp. 23-5. A good example of Idealist argument against a league comes in the course of an address at Manchester College, Oxford, by Sir Henry Jones: "'No nation', we are told by Mr. [H.A.L.] Fisher, 'has yet consented or in the present state of public ethics, is likely to consent to refer matters affecting its vital interests, independence or honour to an international tribunal.' I agree, and I go further. No nation ought to do so. A nation like an individual may consult its neighbours as to its duty, borrow light from its neighbours to see what it should do, but it cannot delegate the responsibility of choosing. There is a certain isolation and sacredness of soul in this matter of morality. We can send no proxies to meet duty or death." "Morality and the War", in J.E. Carpenter (ed.), Ethical and Religious Problems..., p. 41. In 1913 Sir Henry joined the Conservative League of Free Nations Association.
An extreme example of what Hobhouse termed the confusion of the real and the ideal can be found in the attempt of some Idealists to explain the slaughter on the Western Front in terms of good arising out of evil. "This war", wrote the Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford, "is not an accident, nor an outburst of subterranean forces, but the act and deed of human will, and being so it cannot be merely evil." And he went on:

"Primarily and principally what is taking place, is a tremendous revelation of the potencies which in our nature—in that which makes us men—have escaped our notice and therefore, because unseen or ignored, working in the dark, have not yet been drawn upon and utilized. There has been and is still going on, an enormous increase of self-knowledge. At first this seems wholly an opening up of undreamt-of evil. Side by side there has come to us a parallel revelation of undreamt-of good. I must bear witness to my conviction that we are beholding a tremendous inrush or uprush of good into man and his world."

As rhetoric this was little different from the emotionally uplifting writings of historians who had little conception of the intricacies of Hegelian metaphysics. But the Waynflete Professor in denying the charge that such analysis was mere "sentimental optimism" could claim that it was consistent with Idealist belief in "eternal progress". The war was "in its essence a victory over evil", since "nothing" was "wholly evil". War, as Hegel had shown, should be accepted as giving rise directly to good. War like tragedy had its part to play in human history. "When

(as opposed to the Liberal League of Nations Society) which argued for the wartime alliance against Germany as the basis for a future league with wide powers. See his Form The League of Peace Now (1918). Although, in a way, this was a tribute to the elasticity of Idealist theory, Sir Henry had none of the liberal "illusions" that structural changes could affect the transition from war to peace without due recognition of the role of force in the world.

1. J.A. Smith, "Progres As An Ideal of Action", in Progress and History, 1916, p. 311.
2. See below p. 155.
3. J.A. Smith, pp. 312-3.
I ask myself whether I wish for the total disappearance of war," A.C. Bradley wrote in 1915, "I answer 'Yes, if or when, uninterrupted peace can perform the office and generate the good of war'."¹ For someone with no sympathy for Idealism like F.C.S. Schiller such arguments seemed as meaningless as the war itself. The "rational order of human affairs was shattered before their eyes and the belief that thought" controlled "men's feelings" and determined his acts "should have been among the first of the illusions swept away in the wreckage of war", but still the Idealist philosophers "insisted on finding ideal reasons to which to attribute the catastrophe."²

A more savage attack on Idealist political theory was launched in May 1916 at a joint meeting of the Aristotlean Society, the Oxford Philosophical Society and the Mind Association.³ In a symposium on "The Nature of the State in View of Its External Relations" Russell and two younger political philosophers G.D.H. Cole (then a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford) and C. Delisle Burns (a University Extension Lecturer) attacked the idea of a benevolent state resting on the consent—the "general will"—of its citizens in an age of mass death and military conscription.

It was the "intolerable" theories of "Mr. Bosanquet or any Prusso-philosopher", Cole (who had a reputation as an enfant terrible) alleged, which denied the role of the "individual citizen or the functional

1. A.C. Bradley, "International Morality: The United States of Europe" in International Crisis...Ethical and Psychological Aspects, pp. 64-5. Bradley was the younger brother of F.H. Bradley and had been Professor of English at Glasgow (1890-1900) and Professor of Poetry at Cambridge (1901-6). He was a noted Shakespeare scholar.
2. Schiller, 250.
3. They poured "scorn upon it as the state" as a collection of elderly middle-class gentlemen in control of power, gambling with the lives of their fellows". Muirhead in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 190. Bosanquet himself was not at the meeting (J.A. Smith represented the Idealists). By nature a reconciler of opposing viewpoints Bosanquet's reply to his critics was characteristically courteous. See his Social and International Ideals, pp. 304-9.
association" in the world of the state. As the dilemma of the German socialists in 1914 had shown, men were "bound together not by political or even national ties alone, but also by non-political bonds" which were "no less compelling in the obligations they impose".¹

Cole as a guild socialist was concerned to cut the state down to size—it did not "exhaust either the individuality or the organisable individuality of its citizens", nor was it "greater than its citizens". In short, the state could not claim to use people "as mere pawns in its own game." But it was also clear that the sovereignty of the state was relative in the sense that it was circumscribed by other states.² This was the line of attack from Burns, who in the inter-war period was a leading ideologist of the League of Nations. Far from Bosanquet's conception of the state as the "supreme Community", it was (judging by results rather than intentions) "in its external relations...obstructive to moral action." There was thus a clear need for a world "political complex"—not just a belief in the "sentimental unity of mankind"—to assist the resolution of "moral issues" between states "by the use of moral criteria."³ But until the authority of the state over its citizens was questioned it was difficult to see a "way by which each State could yield up a portion of its sovereignty to some international authority."⁴

Russell, as we shall see later⁵ was already questioning the authority

1. FAS, NS. XVI (1915-16), 312-3, 318.
2. Ibid., 314-5.
3. Ibid., 290-301. Burns castigated Bosanquet for confusing "two quite distinct problems—(i) the relation of a citizen to the State, and (ii) the relation of the human being to society."(294). But this conflation was basic to the whole Idealist approach.
5. See below p.276. Cole was also a member of the N.C.F., though an inactive one. His attitude to conscientious objection was equivocal (see below pp.266-7). Burns worked in the Ministry of Reconstruction (1917-19) and the Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Labour (1919-20). According to Margaret Cole he also worked during the war in M.I.5 and was not averse to passing its secrets onto his friends in the Fabian Research Department. Growing Up in Revolution, 1949,
of the state by his work for the No-Conscription Fellowship. Two months after giving his paper at Manchester College, Oxford, he was fined in London "for statements likely to prejudice the recruiting and discipline of His Majesty's Forces". Now he was concerned to tear away the "mythology" in Idealist political theory, which talked of the state "as though it were an actual entity, something remote and god-like, vastly superior to its citizens and deserving of a quasi-adoration none of them deserve."

This was "mere superstition":

"The orders given by the State are in fact given by actual men, the purposes of the State are the purposes of certain people in office. There is nothing superhuman about these people. In most ages and in most countries they are composed of very common clay.... For this reason it must often happen that the purposes of the State are such as cannot commend themselves to men who have more humanity or more insight than most of their contemporaries. Such men, if they have courage, may easily find themselves forced to resist the State; any theory which would make it their duty to submit in spite of adverse individual judgement would take away something of human dignity and independence; it would have a savour of oriental despotism, and if successful would prevent the best men from growing to their full moral stature. The State embodies the wisdom of average men, and its institutions are clogged with the superstitions of the past. Those in whom any new wisdom is growing up, in whose minds the seeds of some future good is germinating, cannot but find themselves in greater or less degree out of harmony with established authority. For this reason, if for no other, the duty of obedience to the State cannot be made absolute."

The Idealists and their critics were each speaking a different language, to their mutual incomprehension. While for Russell the "essence of the State" was "the organisation of force", Bosanquet approached

p. 69. Another young critic of monistic state theory H.J. Laski was in America. See his Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, N. Haven, 1917, pp. 6, 8, 12, 19, 20-1.

1. PAS, N.S. XVI (1915-16), 306-7. Critics were quick to seize on what seemed to be an assumption of intellectual superiority. "There is a curious inversion of emphasis in Mr. Russell's article. It is not impossible that a distrust of vulgar opinion should lead a nicely analytical mind to exaggerate whatever is contrary to the general prejudice". R.B. Perry, "Non-Resistance and the Present War...", 316.

2. Ibid., 303. "The main purposes of States in their external relations are the exploitation of what are called under-developed countries and the successful assertion of claims by the use of force against other States. These are precisely the purposes of highwaymen". (308). Conscription was "a wholly evil thing, quite as evil as the power of the Church which in former days put men to death for unorthodox thought." Principles of Social Reconstruction, 1916, p. 49.
"the thought of the state...through familiarity with long-self sacrificing lives spent in service, or on behalf of the State, of the children of the poor, or from recollections of the change and opening of people's minds, within my own experience, from stolidity and resistance to welcome and intelligence in such matters as sanitation."¹ There was much in Russell's criticism which seemed violently repugnant to that earnest Victorian Bernard Bosanquet, and nothing more so than his belief in the irrational basis of power in the state. The masses, craving security, were but "impotent tools" in the hands of the rulers, using irrational fears (such as fear of the outsider) for their own purpose—to satisfy their need to dominate. "Only passion can control passion, and only a contrary impulse or desire can check impulse", Russell concluded.² A neat solution, although one which did not satisfy Bosanquet.

Although Russell had expressed scepticism about the attempts to intellectualise the conflict between Britain and Germany, his reaction against Idealist theory of the state cannot just be seen as a theoretical justification of the campaign of passive resistance to authority with which he was involved in the N.C.F. His criticisms were clearly influenced by natural rights theory (in resistance to authority),³ ideas on future world organisation, and arguments for the rights of groups within

1. His review of Principles of Social Reconstruction, Mind. NS. XXVI (1917), 233. In such people the state was "awakening in them."


the state. In so doing he was expressing an idea, which was gaining increasing currency even before the war, that the state as it then existed fell between two stools. As A.D. Lindsay noted in February 1914, the state was too small to properly regulate international conflict, and too big to allow proper "consciousness of common interests". Russell's realisation of the importance of instinct in human nature may also have come from his "endeavour to understand popular feelings about the war", but it was also part of a wider movement of thought. There was, Ernest Barker noted in 1914, "a certain trend of anti-intellectualism" abroad in 1914, and the experience of war would do much to strengthen it.

VI. BRITISH HISTORIANS AND THE WAR

"Fortunately in the twentieth century, the conception that no historian has the right to be a patriot, and that he will serve best the interests of his country, if he try only to serve the interests of truth, has gained considerable ground.... The influence of Lord Acton had begun to make itself felt, not only in this country but in many others, and there have been signs that, wherever academic work could be carried out, free from state control or interference, historians were returning to the ideals of Ranke and his school. How far progress will now be checked it is impossible to say. But even if the value of historical work be lowered by false ideals of patriotism, it is yet better that it should be done badly than not at all. The difficulty increases indeed the responsibility of the historians of every country. No country can afford to neglect the study of its own foreign policy, without taking the risk that its ideals will be misunderstood and misconstrued. We must hope for enlightened patriotism." - C.K. Webster, The Study Of Nineteenth Century Diplomacy An Inaugural Lecture (1915).

British historians, practitioners of "a great inductive science",\(^1\) were less confident about the influence of abstract concepts, like the German theory of the state (Hegelian or not), on the outbreak of war. "Nothing is more difficult than to estimate the influence of abstract theory upon action", one of them wrote in 1914. "Political theories as such, are coherently conceived and held by very few persons anywhere."\(^2\) The historians had the techniques of their own craft to place at the service of the Allied cause. However, the resulting "war-history" has not

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2. J.W. Allen, Germany & Europe, 1914, p.4. But he went on to attempt this task, as one might have expected from a historian of political ideas who wrote the standard English Political Thought 1603-60 (1938).
hitherto received much attention. "To treat of it would be a painful and almost indecent task", was the warning of F.J.C. Hearnshaw, who during the war had been one of the most prolific writers of "war-history". But a less-developed sense of "decency" does enable one to ask to what extent the wartime writings of British historians might have influenced attitudes to Germany, and reinforced certain long-established images such as the role of Britain in Europe.

In 1914 history in British universities had approached something very like its zenith in popularity as a field of study. By the turn of the century the History Honours School at Oxford had outstripped the school of Literae Humaniores in size although the prestige of a classical education was probably still greater. At Cambridge the Historical Tripos had gained a considerable reputation under the guidance of Lord Acton, a man of immense prestige not confined to academic circles. In London A.F. Pollard was beginning his campaign for the establishment of an institute for historical research which might one day eclipse even the older universities as centres of professional training. At Manchester T.F. Tout and James Tait had already achieved much of what Pollard desired for London. All the smaller universities and colleges in Britain had chairs of history before 1914, with the exception of St. Andrews (which still had only a lectureship in history) and


Nottingham (a college whose status as a university institution was still uncertain).

By 1902 the older generation of historians, who had been public figures as well as professional historians, were dead. But their ideas lived on in their pupils. Although history was spoken of publicly as a science, unspoken assumptions about the past were of equal, if not greater importance. A.L. Smith, who as tutor in modern history at Balliol coached many future historians (like Lewis Namier), had in turn attended the lectures of Bishop Stubbs. In this way the mid-Victorian certainty of Stubbs about Britain's role as the major world power was transmitted to later generations. Likewise the notion of scholarly objectivity, the belief in the possibility of complete impartiality on the part of the historian, continued to hold sway. It was Acton's successor as Regius Professor at Cambridge who confidently claimed that a "complete assemblage of the smallest facts" would "tell in the end." And one of A.L. Smith's former pupils wrote that the historian "needed...an intellectual detachment so complete that all the hopes of humanity [would] fail to arouse a dominant


2. Although not in the sense of the natural sciences which provided general laws: "If history is not commonly regarded as a science, it is only because it is too complex and too human to lend itself to those summary methods of treatment by axioms, rules, and formulae which are commonly taken as tests of scientific truth." A.F. Pollard, "The Value Of History" (1911) repr. in Factors In Modern History, rev.ed. 1932, p. 4.


emotion."¹ These two themes - an implicit belief in Britain's mission in the world and an explicit commitment to "scientific" history - uneasy partners it seems to us now, ran through British historiography before 1914. There might be scholarly debate but there was no discernable rejection of these values until after the World War.²

One result of the quest for complete impartiality, and of underlying historicist assumptions, was that political history - especially in the guise of medieval constitutional history - dominated university teaching.³ There were documents and other records to provide the raw material of "facts". Scholarly rigour was essential in order to deal with them. It was Bishop Stubbs who said constitutional history could "scarcely be approached without an effort",⁴ as generations of readers of his Select Charters have found. And being remote from the present, there was less danger of partiality in the historian. As one of Stubbs' young men put it: "The further back...that we carry our historical studies in point of time, the greater will be the educational value of the training".⁵ For historians interested in Britain

1. J.W.Allen, The Place Of History in Education, 1909, p.61. If sympathise he must, it should be "Shakespearian in breadth and highly intellectualised." This injunction is repeated in his History Of Political Thought In The 16th Century (1928),p.xix.

2. Trevelyan's plea for History as an Art did not really raise issues of relativism. However, see the criticisms in: C.H. Firth's Oxford inaugural lecture "A Plea For The Historical Teaching Of History" (1904), repr. C.H.Williams (ed.) The Modern Historian, 1938, pp.44-9, and W.Cunningham, "Impartiality In History", Scientia, I(1907),121-3.


5. D.J.Medley (as Professor of History at Glasgow), The Educational Value of A Study of History, Glasgow, 1899, p.11.
in the nineteenth century (especially the period after 1870) the continual complaint was that the documents were not being made available. In this sense British historians were ill-prepared for the role of semi-official apologists for the British declaration of war in August 1914.

Three weeks after the outbreak of war members of the Oxford History School decided on the publication of an authoritative presentation of the British case against Germany. On September the 14th *Why We Are At War: Great Britain's Case*, a fairly substantial volume of over 250 pages, appeared from the Clarendon Press. This was to be the first of many "Oxford Pamphlets" on the war and (with Gilbert Murray's *Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*) one of the most widely-quoted. Within a month it had reached a third edition and by the end of 1914 it had gone through five further impressions and been translated into six languages. Its authors were some of the best-known history tutors in Oxford at that time - Ernest Barker and L.G. Wickham Legg (New College), H.W.C. Davis (Balliol), C.R.L. Fletcher (Delegate of the Clarendon Press), Arthur Hassall (Christ Church), and F. Morgan (Keble). In Germany too historians were busy at work on a weighty justification of official policy, and this was published a little later as *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg* (1915).

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2. Walter Raleigh (Professor of English at Oxford) claimed credit for the idea (see his *Letters of Walter Raleigh*, 1928, II, 411) but in a letter to this writer Sir Keith Feiling wrote, "My clear recollection is that the moving force in the matter was H.W.C. Davis" (21 Mar. 1973).


Like their German colleagues, the Oxford historians disclaimed any intention to write propaganda. Their appeal was to the head rather than the heart. "We are not politicians," they wrote, "and we belong to different schools of political thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of the present war, and the principles we believe to be at stake. We have some experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat the subject historically."¹ And to substantiate this serious purpose there were more pages of documents than there were of text. Authorised translations of the German "White Book" and of extracts from the Austro-Hungarian "dossier" on the Sarajevo assassination, extracts from the Russian "Orange Book" (in French), from the dispatches of the British ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin, and from Grey's correspondence during the July crisis - all this suggested a well-educated, middle-class readership.

In appearance Why We Are At War had all the apparatus of scholarship and the comprehensiveness of a history textbook. Not only were there chapters on the diplomacy of the 1914 crisis and on the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, but also on "The Development of Russian Policy", "The Growth of Alliances and the Race of Armaments Since 1871", and "The New German Theory Of The State". The fact that the "first-hand evidence", as it was called, obviously presented a very partial interpretation of events was quietly passed over. Except, that is, in the case of the German "White Book" which was damned as "an official apology, supplemented by documents."² In truth Why We Are At War merited the

1. 2nd rev. ed. 1914, p.5.
2. Ibid., p.6.
same description, and one might well speculate on the extent to which the historian's passion for "facts" and his training in documents led him to place so much reliance on official papers.¹

The claim of British historians to be exercising the highest standards of scholarly objectivity in their writings on the war, though often made was seldom as merited as in the case of Why We Are At War. Compared with the usual example of "war-history" it was a sober book - as fair-minded as one could expect from men who had no doubts as to the rightness of the British case. Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at Manchester and later a well-known Liberal publicist, published a similar study in 1914. He made the usual claim for impartiality,² but the whole tone of his Britain's Case Against Germany: An Examination Of The Historical Background Of The German Action in 1914 was more sensational. His list of German "crimes" rose to a crescendo with a description of the bombardment of Louvain: an "Unspeakable crime. Tilly's sack of Magdeburg is nothing to it; Alaric's sack of Rome fades into insignificance beside it."³ No doubt German action had been criminal, but the Oxford historians had been rather more discreet in their choice of words. However the intention of this chapter is not to compile a list of the "minor horrors of war",⁴ an anthology of bad history - in much the same way as

¹. And to place less, say, on the informal Anglo-French military conversations.

². "Despite the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of aloofness and impartiality during a great war, I have honestly tried... to see the facts plainly, and never to tamper with them."(p.vii)

³. Ibid., pp.41, 45.

⁴. The term used to describe the "minor poets, the pamphlets of the professors, the people who write to the papers about 'Kultur'" by A.E.Shipley (Master of Christ's College, Cambridge). The Minor Horrors of War, 1915 (preface).
the British historians themselves ransacked the works of German professors in search of damming passages. Rather it might be more useful to examine "war-history" to see just how British historians attempted to give an historical dimension to (and hence a justification of) official policy.

"Poor little Belgium" was a godsend for the Asquith government. As Cameron Hazlehurst has shown, cabinet members like "Simon, Pease, Harcourt, and above all, Lloyd George were prisoners of their own pacific images. Supporting a war demanded of them a reversal of life-time commitments. Belgium, as Asquith sensed, would relieve them of unbearable embarrassment."^1 Good liberal historians like J.L.Hammond^2 and Ransay Muir stressed the importance of Belgium in their writings as the issue on which Britain had gone to war. Any suggestion that Britain was committed before 1914 to render military assistance to France was strenuously denied.^3 But other British historians were in no doubt that France was as important as Belgium in Britain going to war. "You are quite mistaken in saying that we allege no cause of war but Belgium", H.M.Gwatkin wrote to a neutral. "In the critical days of 1914 our intense reluctance to fight was nearly overcome by a clear conviction that we should not let France be crushed, and we should certainly have

^1 Politicians At War, 1971,p.103. But see p.14 for qualifications to the importance of Belgium as the deciding factor.

^2 See his letters to Gilbert Murray, Murray Mss.

^3 Muir, "Introduction" to E.Rignano, The War & The Settlement, 1916, pp.9-10. Hence German anger when Britain declared war, Muir claimed. But this German anger was also used as evidence by other historians of conscious German attempts to blame Britain for the outbreak of world war. Britain's commitment to aid France had been a "matter of common knowledge", the Oxford historians claimed. Why We Are At War, pp.27-8
fought on that ground when the invasion of Belgium removed our last hesitation." And Ernest Barker, one of the authors of Why We Are At War, felt able, away from the sobering influence of his Oxford colleagues, to give free rein to his Francophilism in a pamphlet, Great Britain's Reasons For Going To War (1915):

"France, like England, is a democracy. France is one of the greatest democracies of the world. She is one of the greatest treasure-houses of European civilisation; she is one of the great seed-beds of liberal thought and ideas. Would England have been right to watch unconcerned and without one proffer of any sort of aid, the crushing by military force of that democracy; the rifling of that treasure-house; the trampling down of that seed-bed? It is impossible to answer 'Yes'."

Barker's pamphlet seems to have been written for a relatively unsophisticated audience. The further one reached for a mass readership, the greater the danger of presenting an over-simplified, even distorted picture. Thus R,S.Rait's Why We Are Fighting Germany A Village Lecture (1914) claimed, among other things, that Britain was fighting to defend French colonies. These "could only be a mere stepping-stone to the possession of other colonies", namely British ones: "The Germans want to seize colonies. The French have colonies, but not in very healthy climates. Great Britain has a great number of colonies and a large number of possessions scattered all over the world....Germany's real aim is to seize not French colonies and dependencies, but British colonies and dependencies." Clearly, the Germans "wanted to pick their victims off one by one, France this year and Great Britain a few years hence." Britain, Rait concluded, should fight Germany because that country despised "humanity" and "everything that distinguishes a fighting man from a ravening beast."

1. Britain's Case Against Germany, 1917, p.7.
2. p.5.
3. pp.5,8-9. Rait was Professor of Scottish History at Glasgow.
The suggestion that, if France had been the first to violate Belgian neutrality, Britain would have accepted this with "ready acquiescence" touched a sensitive nerve. Had not even the authors of Why We Are At War written that, "we fight in the noblest cause for which men can fight", "the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially the small"? "How little the German Chancellor realized the Anglo-Saxon reverence for the sanctity of the plighted word", exclaimed another Oxford historian. If Britain had accepted Lichnowsky's offer of July 29th she would have felt "the paralysing shame...more deadly than fifty defeats. Disgraced in the eyes of the world, stricken in all probability with civil war, she would easily have succumbed in final round of the world conflict" - such was the considered opinion of the Reader in Modern History at Cambridge.

However, the British stress on morality and legality, which so infuriated the Germans, was, as the American philosopher John Dewey (a not unqualified admirer of Britain) pointed out, not complete hypocrisy. As he wrote in the Atlantic Monthly in

1. p.115. "Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element." (p.116)


3. J.H.Rose, The Origins of the War,p.185. The German offer to respect the territorial integrity of France in return for British neutrality was "dismissed as possessing no official character." (p.181) A younger historian considered that Foreign policy generally was "as a rule, a matter of business, not of sentiment", but then this was in the course of a defence of Italian neutrality. K.Feiling, Italian Policy Since 1870, Oxford, 1914,p.3
in February 1916:

"Each nation...expresses its justification through the ideas which its past history has made most intelligible to itself - in terms, that is, of its own national philosophy. The English are traditionally Protestant, evangelical, and individualistic in their consciousness. Their moral defence instictively takes a personal, a moralistic form. The blamelessness of their own conscience, the virtuousness of their motive - such as the defence of the sanctity of treaties and their pledged word - support them. Since their activities, as distinct from their consciousness, have been largely commercial and imperialistic, it is not surprising that the hypocrisy, the uncious Pharisaism of the British have become proverbial among the nations with another cast of thought. But since the emotion of good intent is a perfectly genuine phenomenon, the English are totally puzzled by the accusation. Nothing is more remote from their all too hearty and bluff straightforwardness than conscious double-dealing."

There was a very real fear that if the German argument of "military necessity" (to justify the invasion of Belgium) went unchallenged, "then away [would] go all those restraints which humanity and civilisation" had been trying to build up since the seventeenth century.\(^2\) And in case the practically-minded Briton

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1. "The Mind Of Germany", repr. in Characters & Events, 1929, I, 133. But the British defence of the Allied invasion of Greece in 1915 must have sounded unconvincing to neutrals when compared with British defence of Belgium the previous year. J.W. Headlam, Historical Advisor to the Foreign Office (formerly a history tutor at King's College, Cambridge) claimed that the "neutrality of the two states was as different as black and white. For the neutrality of Belgium was the fulfilment of a solemn engagement, the neutrality of Greece was the violation of an engagement equally binding; if the one was a virtue, the other was a crime." Greek refusal to aid (as they had promised) the Serbs - "a refusal sufficient to justify a demand that the nation which was guilty of it should be struck out of the society of civilised states" - was enough to justify the Allied invasion, Headlam claimed. But in addition the Allies had only asked that their troops be given passage over Greek territory - "never in the history of the world has a State been treated with such consideration", he concluded. Belgium & Greece (1915), pp.3-4, 10-12. The cases were not exactly parallel, but Headlam's defence is worthy to stand beside the pamphlets of German historians justifying the invasion of Belgium.

2. Sir H.E. Richards (Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford), "The Issues At Stake In This War", Scientia, XII (1917) 202-3.
was in any doubt, the economic historian W.R. Scott was able to demonstrate that "the inviolability of public faith" was "not only of supreme importance in the political sphere" but it also lay "at the root of the whole mechanism of foreign trade and the international money market." The alternative was "a bankruptcy of external credit" and "a feeling of doubt and insecurity throughout the money-markets of the world." There could be no question, in such a case, of Teutonic solidarity. The British, Ernest Barker claimed, felt "that the call of Right" was "higher than the call of blood". And this term "the Right" (always written with capitals) echoes through the writings of British historians. It was "no mere lawyer's pretense, but the sternest of all the realities" for civilised man.

Asquith had answered the charge that British policy in August 1914 was based upon cant "by reference to history" and this called forth numerous articles and pamphlets all concerned to demonstrate the continuity of British policy in Europe. Parallels were drawn between Kaiser Wilhelm and Richelieu or Catherine II who had both tried "tilting the balance [of power] for their own aggrandisement", and between the attitude to small states of von Bethmann-Hollweg and of Napoleon - for had not the latter referred to Switzerland and Holland as "mere trifles"? This idea was

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2. Great Britain's Reasons for Going To War, 1915, p. 3

3. E. Barker, Mothers & Sons In Wartime, rev. ed. 1918, p. 67. This book of essays reprinted from The Times went through several editions, a tribute to Barker's ability to churn out patriotic prose.


...the war we are waging now is not on behalf of some new-fangled notion. The independence of the Belgians and the Dutch has been a matter of concern to every British ruler who has had our interests at heart. That independence has been in turn threatened by the French, the Spaniards, again by the French, and now, lastly, by the Germans. If we go as far back as the reign of Edward I, we find that he tried to prevent the French conquering the people of Flanders...."1

The "natural tendency" of the British was "to side with the pigmy ...menaced by the giant", 2 but there were also good practical reasons for opposing German control of the Channel coast. 3

However, there were two exceptions to this picture of historical continuity. The first anomaly, Britain at war with Austria-Hungary to which she had "been united for centuries by close ties of friendship and sympathy", 4 did not cause too many problems for the historian. The subordination of Habsburg to Hohenzollern interests from the time of Bismarck suggested that Vienna was not as much to blame in 1914 5. But the second anomaly, Britain fighting on the side of Tsarist Russia, had already troubled British liberals. The authors of Why We Are At War attempted to provide some positive reasons (aside from common opposition to Germany) for the alliance. First, there was their

3. Luxemburg & Serbia, being out of range of British sea-power(& of less strategic interest) could be left to France & Russia to defend. Why We Are At War,pp.14-15,21.
"common cause" for international arbitration and disarmament. Then there was their common interest in the independence of Balkan states and common opposition to German influence in Turkey. Lastly, there was the beginning of "Russian constitutionalism" which "not only coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but (which) also owed much to the inspiration of England."¹

There had been high hopes of the Duma and also of a deeper democracy within peasant Russia. Authors like Stephen Graham who had written rhapsodically for years on "Mother Russia" reached new emotional heights during the war.² The cult of Dostoyevsky gained new devotees. This was the background against which British historians began to "rediscover" Russia - a Russia truly democratic in a way which left "western constitutionmongers far behind the times." This was how the Professor of History at Bedford College, London, described the phenomenon:

"If by 'democracy' we mean merely a form of government, it is quite ludicrous to denounce Russia because our own particular arrangements do not or may not suit here. If, on the other hand, democracy means something vastly deeper and more important than forms of government, if it means a spirit, a point of view, and a quality informing the life and thought of a people, then the least I can say is that while I see a great deal of democracy in Russia, I do not see much of it in England. One might, indeed, go further and say that while, in that sense, England is the least democratic of all European countries, and the most completely under the dominion of the superstitions of 'class' and 'rank', Russia is probably the most democratic of all."³

1. p.56.
2. See the writings of J.Y.Simpson (Professor of Natural Science at New College, Edinburgh, 1904-34), especially his The Self-Discovery of Russia (1916).
3. Germany & Europe, p.112. Tsarist imperialism, anti-semitism and discrimination against national minorities were due to a "Germanisation of its central governing bureaucracy" (pp.110-11). Cf. J.H.Rose, "The War & Nationality", Scientia, XVIII (1915), 27.
There was a sense in which such ideas were a reaction to
German claims to be fighting against "Muscovite barbarism", but they also tell us something about the discontent among some intellectuals with British industrial society. However this is a theme to which we shall return later. For the present we can note that British historians were, as one might expect, inclined to give the Tsarist government the benefit of the doubt when apportioning responsibility for the outbreak of war. This was decidedly not the case - again as one would expect - with their judgement of German policy during the July crisis. Few historians followed the advice of the aged Liberal A.V.Dicey "to try to form an historical view of the war", "to look upon the war from something like the point of view from which it will be regarded by a fair-minded historian writing in A.D.2000." For the "fair-minded historian" of A.D. 2000 reading the efforts of

1. See J.B.Bury's Germany & Slavonic Civilization, 1915, in which he claimed that Russia had more in common with western democracy than did Germany & that Russia had "done more perhaps than any other of the great peoples in the interests of small nations" (p.13).

2. "If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step as a consequence of German threats." Why We Are At War, p.79. There was no other alternative if France & Serbia were to be protected: "unless Russia meant to stand aside what else could she have done?" Allen, Germany & Europe, pp.75-6

3. How We Ought To Feel About The War, p.5. This address to the Working Men's College, London (Nov.1914) was one of the most judicious wartime pamphlets from a British historian. A firm supporter of the war, Dicey still felt its pressures on his attempts at objectivity: "At every turn as I think about the iniquity of Germany, and especially of the Kaiser, I am forced to understand the feelings of men like Burke and Nelson towards the Jacobins and revolutionists, and at the same moment I am compelled to reflect on the impossibility of any nation engaged in a great war judging, with the fairness which one ought to practise, the conduct of an unscrupulous enemy." Letter to W.P.Ker, 16 Nov.1914, cit. Rait, Memorials of A.V.Dicey, p.231.
his predecessors during the World War of 1914-1918 it would only be too obvious - to paraphrase Acton - where the Oxford historians laid down their pens, and whether Meinecke or Ramsay Muir took it up.

Muir's Britain's Case Against Germany is fairly typical of the level of explanation for the outbreak of the war offered by British historians. The continuity of German foreign policy, and the conscious motives behind it, were stressed almost to the point of crude conspiracy theory, as the following passage shows:

"The whole policy of Germany during the last five and twenty years is of one piece. Its enormous and constantly increasing military preparations; its far-reaching schemes of aggression in the Balkans; its attempts to stir up discontent in South Africa, and to assert a general protectorate over the Mohammedan subjects of the three powers with which it is now at war; its blustering and bullying methods of diplomacy; its refusal to play a fair and honest part in the discussions of the nations, its eagerness to sow discord among the small and sorely-tried nations of the south-east, its readiness to disregard agreements, such as that of Algeciras, into which it had entered: - all this points to the same conclusion which is enforced by nearly all the political literature of these years, that the policy of the last quarter of a century has been one long and not overskilled preparation for the great bid for world power which was made in 1914 on so slight a pretext."¹

Muir believed that he possessed "moral certainty" - clearly something less than factual certainty - that all the arrangements for war had been completed in Germany "long before the Archduke's murder". There was the evidence that gun platforms had been

¹. p.163. Muir had no sympathy with German fears of Russia and their consequent fierce anger at Britain's lending aid to Franco-Russian "encirclement" of Germany. But J.W.Allen was able to recognise the reality of this fear & the "to a very large extent genuine" feeling of the Germans that they were "waging a war that was defensive from the beginning." Germany & Europe, p.35 D.Medley even conceded the implications of this for German military policy: a large army, a large navy & frontier fortifications (since she had no natural borders). Why Britain Fights, Glasgow, 1914, p.6. But such attempts to the sympathetic understanding advocated by Dicey were very rare.
secretly constructed at strategic points in Belgium by German agents; German coalers had taken up station a week before the assassination at Sarajevo; the Kiel Canal had been widened, the summer manoeuvres enlarged; and German investors had rushed to sell Canadian Pacific stock in London. "Is it, in the face of these facts, possible to deny that Germany had for some years been preparing to engage in war, and that even if the Archduke had never been murdered, war would have come this summer?", Muir asked his readers.¹ Perhaps there was more of E. Phillips Oppenheim in Muir than in other historians, but even fairly level-headed colleagues could make wild assertions - for example, that pre-war German societies which sought "mutual good understanding" with Britain were but "a blind behind which she developed her devilish plots".²

Paradoxically, what was written by British historians in the heat of battle has been restated, after a "revisionist" interval of some forty years (1920-60), by a new generation of German historians under the leadership of Fritz Fischer. The very title of his book Griff nach der Weltmacht (1961) calls to mind the claim by British historians nearly half a century earlier that Germany was aiming at no less than world power and the destruction of the British Empire.³ And on the idea that social and political

1. Muir, Britain's Case, pp.15-20
2. D.J. Medley, "The War & The Races Of Europe", Proc. Of Royal Philos. Soc. Glasgow, XLVI (1914-15), 15. Medley, as we have just seen, was capable of better things.
3. E.g. F.J.C. Hearnshaw, Main Currents Of European History 1815-1915, 1917, pp.303-4. Germany, to cover its own colonial failures, planned "to seize from the older colonising nations more attractive and profitable regions." Conquest, "supplemented by indemities", would also solve other "financial, industrial and commercial difficulties".
pressures in Wilhelmine Germany disposed its ruling elite to risk war in 1914, we can note that G.W. Prothero (an important organiser of British wartime propaganda) was writing in 1916:

"The prospect of domestic revolution has driven rulers into foreign wars before now; and it can hardly be doubted that the spectre of Socialism and the menace of a revolutionary proletariat have contributed to make the great capitalists, the dominant military party and the Emperor himself, already inclined on other grounds to war, more ready to adopt this solution as an alternative." ¹

Prothero was one of the more knowledgeable historians when it came to German affairs. He had studied in Germany under Sybel (1873-4) and ten years later translated the first volume of Ranke's Weltgeschichte. ² However, the study of modern German history in Britain was carried forward virtually by A.W. Ward alone. The generation of historians who followed Seeley and Bryce ³ produced little on German history. One suspects that much of the interest in Germany consisted of a vague feeling for Wissenschaft and Kultur, for the cultural concept of "Germany", rather than great knowledge of the social and political realities of the modern Reich. It was this blindness which the Cambridge historian, J. Holland Rose castigated in his lectures on the war. "Treitschke

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2. Published as Universal History (1884).
3. James Bryce wrote his classic work The Holy Roman Empire in 1864. Sir John Seeley's Life & Times Of Stein appeared in 1878. Ward's Germany 1815-1890 appeared between 1916 & 1918, although it had been begun before the outbreak of war. It was the first comprehensive history of modern Germany by a British historian & its tone, one reviewer noted, was one of "serene detachment" & "absolute impartiality" (EHR, XXXIII, ii (April 1918), 284). Ward wrote virtually all the chapters on German history in the Cambridge Modern History, apart from those written by continental scholars (notably Oncken & Meinecke).
and Bernhardi are excused as freaks, alien to the German genius in its best form, as typified by Goethe, Kant, Schiller", he noted. But Imperial Germany was "not now the land of Goethe, Kant, Schiller. She is the creation of William I and II, of Roon, Moltke, Bismarck and Krupp; and she takes after her creators."

Despite this coupling of Bismarck with the creators of Prussian military power, he was not treated too unfavourably in the wartime writings of British historians. A typical assessment was this one by W.T.Waugh: "Bismarck was unscrupulous enough and at times brutal enough: but there was in his diplomacy a coolness and restraint which stand in the sharpest contrast to the bluster and swagger of his would-be imitators." To the Oxford historians J.A.R.Marriott and C.Grant Robertson Bismarck was the "embodiment of the Fredrician tradition." "In the line of his defects, crimes or blunders, megalomania cannot fairly be placed. The intoxication of success, the fever of nationalist pride, never mastered his head." The legacy of Bismarck would be scrutinised more critically during another world war, but for the moment he was placed (though with some vague misgivings) in the company of the "good" Germans. However, the same could not be said of

1. Origins Of The War, p.157
Heinrich von Treitschke who vied with General (retired) Friedrich von Bernhardi as the most-quoted German name in the writings of British historians.¹

For British historians the "Prussian School" of German history epitomised all that had gone wrong with German intellectual life after the 1870s. H.A.L. Fisher, writing with the bitterness of one who remembered the old "good" Germany, penned this indictment of Treitschke and his disciples:

"They have exalted material power and have belittled the empire of moral sentiments. They have applauded war as an instrument of progress and national hygiene. Holding that aggression is a symptom of vigour, and vigour the sign manual of political virtue, they have championed every violation of right which has subserved the aggrandisement of Prussia. They have scorned small states because they were small and have applauded big states because they were big. And in their violent but not unnatural reaction against the quietism and happy contemplation of that old and pleasant Germany for which Mozart wrote music and Goethe verse,...they have exaggerated with Teutonic thoroughness the brutal side of politics as a thing much to be respected...."²

Ironically, in his own country Treitschke had suffered neglect since his death in 1896. In 1914 "Germans were surprised to find the almost forgotten Treitschke singled out as one of the intellectual instigators of the war", writes a recent biographer.³

But the singling out of Treitschke was not entirely inaccurate. In a subtle way he had influenced, and continued to influence,

1. A translation of Treitschke's monumental history of 19th-century Germany began only in 1915. H.W.C. Davis' study of The Political Thought Of Treitschke (1914) was a reasonably fair-minded study (see pp.163-4,173).


3. A. Dorpalen, Heinrich von Treitschke, N.Haven, 1937, p.298. J.W. Allen recognised this in 1914: "To the great majority of Germans, as to the great majority of Englishmen, Treitschke can be little more than a name." Germany and Europe, p.4.
the assumptions of the German ruling elite. Even the new generation of historians, led by Erich Marcks and Max Lenz, who looked to Ranke rather than Treitschke for inspiration seemed to echo many of the latter's ideas, as they had been described by Fisher.\(^1\) In nationalist circles in Germany the writings of von Bernardi, "the faithful disciple of Treitschke",\(^2\) kept the ideas of the Master - reinvigorated by a dose of Social Darwinism - in circulation. In Britain a Bernhardi-like figure, Professor J.A.Cramb, kept Treitschke's ideas before the public almost up until the outbreak of the war.

John Adam Cramb (1861-1913) is a rather mysterious figure. After taking a classics degree at Glasgow University (1885), he had gone to Bonn University and attended Treitschke's lectures (presumably in Berlin). After teaching at Queen Margaret's College, Glasgow (1887-90) he went to Queen's College, London (1892-1913), where he taught for the rest of his life. Although he was styled Professor of History, the college was in fact a private girls' school.\(^3\) He was a friend of Frederick York Powell, Regius Professor of History at Oxford (1894-1904), and like him a man of fertile imagination and little scholarly discipline. Cramb was involved in Lord Roberts' campaign for compulsory military service and, perhaps as a result of this, lectured from 1910

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2. Why We Are At War,p.112. Most of his writings were translated into English: Germany & The Next War (1912), Britain as Germany's Vassal (1914), How Germany Makes War (1914), The New Bernhardi (1915).
3. L.M.Russell, John Adam Cramb (1950) is an adulatory portrait (with Cramb's lectures) by an ex-pupil.
onwards at Staff College, Camberley, and at other "military stations" throughout Britain. He was thus, at the most, on the periphery of the community of academic historians in Britain.¹

Despite this Cramb's posthumously-published lectures on Germany and England(1914) became one of the best-known expositions of Treitschke's writings.² It was widely quoted by British historians - including the authors of Why We Are At War - and other academic writers who sought to explain the "German mind".³

In fact, the book, reconstructed (literally) from lectures given early in 1913, is a strange rambling series of reflections on the dangers of "Pacificism", ⁴ and on the "Tragic conflict" of Britain and Germany,⁵ rather than a systematic exposition of Treitschke's ideas. As one critic wrote, Cramb "was himself strongly imbued with the spirit of the movement" of thought he had set out to expound.⁶

1. Apparently inability to subscribe to Anglicanism prevented his gaining a professorship at King's College, London.
2. The "popular edition" (1915) has on its cover: "Treitschke Expounded", "Bernhardi Explained".
4. "...in war man values the power which it affords to life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the Ideal." (p.60).
5. "And one can imagine the ancient, mighty deity of all the Teutonic kindred, throned above the clouds, looking serenely down upon that conflict, upon his favourite children, locked in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of that struggle, the heroism of the children of Odin the War-god!" (p.137: last paragraph in the book).
But if Cramb was widely read, few historians echoed his Social Darwinist belief in the inevitability of Anglo-German conflict. Where Cramb had talked of the impossibility of "friendly rivalry" between the two powers, British historians set out to praise British foreign policy (especially that of Grey) for its attempt to foster just such friendship. "The characteristics of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy during the past ten years", wrote C.S.Terry, "have been transparent honesty, and a disposition to be conciliatory which no rebuff could repress." Faced with a slowly changing power situation on the Continent as the result of German unification, British policy refused to be driven into extreme course of action. Grey "neither thwarted or opposed Germany's aspirations". He "took the German menace seriously, but met it with consideration and common sense". And "Germany's almost insane hatred" of Grey was a "confession of her knowledge" that he had "presented the case against her in terms of civilisation itself". Such eulogies of Grey were not uncommon, and his defence of the balance of power in Europe was seen as the lynch-pin of Britain's sensible middle course. As an international lawyer put it, while it could not be called a "fundamental principle of International Law", yet the European

1. One exception was D.J. Medley: "A rapidly-growing nation must needs find outlet for its energies or it will die of congestion. But if it can find salvation only at our expense, we must protect ourselves or become mere satellites of the rising power. Germany believes that there is not room in the world for herself and us at the same time." "The War & The Races...", 15.

balance was "a political principle indispensable to the existence of International Law in its present condition".  

For the Germans, who tended to write of the European balance as an outdated concept (at least in its existing form), the British stress on legality and morality seemed hypocritical. "Public opinion in England is wonderfully responsive to cant", wrote the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. "It is like a musical automat - one needs only to throw a cant phrase into the slot and the instrument begins to grind out a highly moral melody." The German habit of unsentimentally viewing the established order - whether it was the European balance or the British Empire - in terms of real power was rather embarrassing to the British. One of the Oxford pamphlets on the war was entitled *Is The British Empire The Result Of Wholesale Robbery?* - to which its author, the Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford (H.E.Egerton) replied defensively: "No doubt in the making of the British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have happened that one may wish might have happened otherwise". But, if Britain had been "fortunate in her opportunities, her use of them" had been "assuredly not more unscrupulous than the use made of their opportunities by other nations."  

3. Oxford,1914,p.27. A similar justification of the French empire by two Oxford historians: "No doubt the colonizing powers of Europe have sometimes alleged a grievance which did not exist, or have made a mountain out of a molehill, in order to justify the establishment of a protectorate. But each case must be judged on its merits; and we have no right to denounce France as a robber simply because she has become the protector of numerous uncivilised or half-civilised communities." F.Morgan & H.W.C.Davis, *French Policy Since 1871*, Oxford 1914,p.12.
Treitschke had portrayed Britain as "a middle-aged burglar who desired to retire from business, and therefore proposed that burglarys should cease." Germany was the "young and enterprising burglar, just starting a promising career." And there was at the bottom of Treitschke's idea that right was "a question of might", B.A. Sonnenschein admitted, "a sense of outraged justice."

In moral terms one could not "justify Great Britain's having painted red one-fifth of the habitable globe". But nor could one "justify the fact that A earns five times as much as B, but not one-tenth the income of C", Sonnenschein concluded. "In this workaday world we have to be content with a rough kind of justice, and to acknowledge accomplished facts. We must live and let live." But Sonnenschein, who had been born in London in 1851 of an Austrian father, was not typical of British academics in his understanding of German jealousy of Britain's "place in the sun".

The apologists for the British Empire were unashamedly idealistic. Once German criticism had been answered, there were no limits to what was felt to be well-earned self-congratulation. "The English are not much given to introspection, nor are they gifted in explaining what they aim at or what they do", wrote one Cambridge historian. "They live by instinct, and advance by experience and their policy seems from hand to mouth, but it is an expression of national character, and is thus a continuous tradition." But under the stress of world war, "wherein Empires

2. He had been the first to call attention to the manifestos of German professors in the first months of the war.
and the principles upon which they have been built are put to the test", the manner in which the Empire had rallied to Britain was proof enough of its true nature. "Against the German ideal of Empire - the march of Teutonic culture over the earth" - one could place the British Empire. It was truly one of "those subtle and half conscious compromises, through which the English achieve their full power of co-operation." Germany - the "nation of machines" - could never understand "the dominance of personality", the importance of "individual resource and character" for the British.

This self-image was a potent one, and British historians frequently drew attention to the national reputation for gifted amateurism and the "clean rigour" of British games. The Germans, Ernest Barker alleged, approached sport with the "deadly concentration of a mind which never relaxes its rigour in play, the passionate earnestness of a combatant who has never learned in a mimic struggle to abide by limiting rules". This had led to "the temper, which, wedded to the doctrine of necessity of State", had produced poison gas and "massacre by submarines". H.A.L. Fisher was making much the same point when he noted that young Englishmen read articles on golf and cricket or bridge, while young Germans read books on war. In short, the ideological

1. E.A. Benians, The British Empire & The War, 1915, pp. 3-4, 16. After the war Benians (with J.H. Rose & A.F. Newton) edited the Cambridge History Of The British Empire (1929-) in which similar ideas were repeated (see esp. vol. 2, 1940).
3. Mothers & Sons In Wartime, pp. 67-8. The "tap-root" of the difference lay in the British "instinct for truancy" as against German "docility". The British could not tolerate being "set in a mental uniform and placed under spiritual drill" (p. 69).
dimensions of the world conflict for British historians were well-expressed by Ramsay Muir's explanation of the basic antipathy between Germany and Britain: "Science over against sportsmanship; discipline over against self-government."¹

Nor was this picture of political freedom and encouragement of individualism altered by the fact that Britain possessed the world's greatest empire. What was "the outstanding mark of the British Empire?", the Professor of Politics at Oxford asked. Why, it was "the freedom of the people in it and the security which union gives".² Far from being "a machinery to enable the English to exploit a quarter of the globe", it was in fact "a far-reaching and elastic structure, wherein the force of nationality" could have "free development". It was an example of "union and peace" to set before the rest of the world.³ What then of those embarrassing exceptions - "thrown in our teeth", H.E. Egerton complained. Ireland and South Africa by no means disproved the general rule. National aspirations were quite acceptable if "compatible with the interests of the Empire as a whole".⁴ When talk turned to a league of nations later in the

2. Adams, Responsibility..., pp.19-20. The principle of "unity through diversity" was claimed to be present in British policy as early as the 18th century (in former French Canada). "Difficult as it may be for the logical, systematic German mind to realize it is still the fact that different kinds of patriotism may co-exist side by side simultaneously in the same man." Egerton, War & The British Dominions, p.13. Cf. Fisher, Value Of Small States, p.22
3. Benians, p.10
4. War & British Dominions, pp.17-18. "Does Ireland, too, believe that the cause of law is the vital element in the blood of Englishmen? That England assumes with tenderness, out of courage of nobility, the protection of small nations? That it battles for them against militarism for the cause of justice?" Tonnies had asked (Warlike England, p.12).
war it is not surprising that more than one British historian offered up the British Empire as an obvious model,\(^1\)

We began this chapter with the suggestion that the Edwardian historians' credo of strict objectivity was in some sense undermined by the prevailing historicist assumptions about British history and Britain's role in the world. Perhaps it was this conflict which prompted H.E. Egerton to give the impression of momentary doubt in the course of a defence of British policy. "Often the deeper our knowledge," he wrote, "the stronger becomes the case which can be made for the side which has failed and is therefore discredited. But there are limits to these grounds for cool-headed doubt and scepticism; and when the case of our adversary can be decided by his own admissions, it would be the merest pedantry to affect an attitude of uncertainty."\(^2\) This is perhaps the best summary judgement that one can make of the wartime writings of British historians. The seeds of "war-history" were there before 1914 in the essentially nationalistic (and sometimes imperialistic) assumptions of British historiography. The image of Britain as protector of the small states of Europe through the balance of power was so deeply-held that not even the wartime reaction against the wilder excesses of "war-history"

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1. Eg. A.F. Pollard, "The Paradox Of The British Empire" (June 1917) repr. in Commonwealth At War, p.226: "It is the only permanent league of nations in existence, and its nations comprise all sorts and conditions of peoples."

2. War & British Dominions, p.22. One could recognise the good points of Napoleon whilst claiming that "the resistance to Napoleon's aims to world-empire to have been necessary". But the same could not be true of Serbia & especially of Belgium in 1914. The latter case involved an "issue...plain to the simplest understanding." (pp.22-3).
could dislodge it.¹

1. In R.W.Seton-Watson's *Britain In Europe 1789-1914* (1937) the continuity of British policy in Europe is stressed in much the same way as it had been during the war, though without the obvious moralising (see esp. pp. 35-7). During the Second World War the image was re-emphasised even further. Eg. see A.L.Rowse, "The Historical Tradition Of British Policy", in *The English Spirit*, 1944, pp. 29-34 & "The Tradition Of British Policy", in *The End Of An Epoch*, 1947, pp. 39-49.
VII. "THE PEACEFULNESS OF BEING AT WAR"

"His temple of learning war lays in temporary ruins - ruins not only material but spiritual.... Who cares to-day wholeheartedly for the Hittites or Minoans? Who raises to-day the question of the Origins of Tragedy or Comedy? Learning and still more research is a hard mistress; she will have your whole heart or none of you, and which of us has the genius to die the great death of Archimedes? War upsets every value; the beam is suddenly kicked, and down falls the scale of learning....The odd and interesting thing is, not that war should temporarily upset values, but that this very upset...which places learning lowest, is positively welcomed by just the man who might be expected to resent it - the scholar and thinker."


With the outbreak of war the universities and colleges began to change in appearance. Undergraduates and younger dons disappeared into the army and navy. "The melancholy of this place now-a-days", Bertrand Russell wrote from Cambridge, "is beyond endurance - the Colleges are dead, except for a few Indians and a few pale pacifists and bloodthirsty old men hobbling along victorious in the absence of youth. Soldiers are billeted in the courts and drill on the grass; bellicose parsons preach to them in stentorian tones from the steps of the Hall."¹ For Russell the war was an almost unbearable time, but for many other academics it was a time of something approaching exhilaration. "Its going to be a good war, though some of us will have a lot to bear", the Professor of English at Oxford wrote in the first days of the war.

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"I've often known this must come when I've heard the Germans talk about their destiny and their plans for achieving it. I'm glad I've lived to see it, and sick that I'm not in it." And together with Robert Bridges [the Poet Laureate] and Gilbert Murray, Raleigh joined the Oxford Volunteers to "rise at six every day to line hedgerows in the dark and 'advance in rushes' across the Oxford meadows." The younger dons saw active service, as did Sir John Myres, Wykeham Professor of Ancient History at Oxford, who commanded raids by small craft on the Turkish coast, where his "ingenuity and buccaneering spirit served him no less than his detailed knowledge of the geography and people of the Asia Minor coast".

However, most academics being over military age, stayed at home. In common with the general public they had little idea of the realities of trench warfare. As the historian R.H. Tawney (a private in the Manchester Regiment) pointed out, the

2. R.Brooke to R.Loines, Dec.1914, The Letters Of Rupert Brooke, 1968,p.644. Aldous Huxley, then a Balliol undergraduate, was less impressed:
   "The Volunteers in vomit-colour
   Go forth to shoot the lamb of God.
   Their leaden faces redden to a blazing comet-colour,
   And they sweat as they plod.
   Parson and poet-laureate,
   Professor, grocer, don,
   This one as fat as Ehud that, poor dear! Would grow the more he ate
   Yet more a skeleton.
   Some have piles and some have goitres,
   Most of them have Bright's disease,
   Uric acid has made them flaccid and one gouty hero loiters,
   Anchylosed in toes and knees."
people on the Home Front created for themselves an "image of war", not as it was, but a "picturesque" version which flattered their "appetite for novelty, for excitement, for easy admiration", and superficial emotion. Ernest Barker, an otherwise sensible historian, could write of the Western Front as if it were some kind of gigantic playing-field. Another historian J.W.Allen claimed that the young men at the Front were feeling "for the first time in their lives" that they were "wholly right with the world", "doing their whole duty and nothing else". "In that consciousness" they were dying. If that were not "happiness", then what could happiness be, Allen asked. And as late as April 1917 the economic historian W.R.Scott told an audience at University College, London, that "in the modern British system" soldiers were "recognised as men not as inanimate pieces in a vast war game". Was it really, one wonders, so easy to explain the terrible losses of the previous year? The significance of all this rhetoric is not so much the hideous unreality of the "image" of war (that much is obvious), but rather that the war brought to the surface - as it did in France and Germany - a series of images of society which had been partially obscured during peacetime.

1. "Some Reflections Of A Soldier" (Oct.1916), repr. in The Attack & Other Papers, 1953,pp.24-6. "The reality is horrible, but it is not as horrible as the grimacing phantom which you have imagined", Tawney told readers of The Nation who hopefully were more serious-minded. But for most civilians the lighter-hearted picture of cheery Tommies hunting down Huns like "merry assassins" was more popular.


3. The Danger Of Peace,1915,p.8. However, at least one historian (T.F.Tout) did receive letters from former students at the Front which spoke of "putrefying corpses". See letters of A.L.Prince & R.Bedford in Tout Mss.

This was noticed by Jane Harrison, classical scholar in peacetime, and part observer part participant in the great upsurge of nationalism among British intellectuals. The same "watchwords", she noted, appeared time and time again - "discipline, faith, simplicity, convention, law, obedience". There was not so much a eulogy of war, as there was on the Continent, but rather a recognition that it had a positive and creative side: "War is savagery - a setback to civilisation - and yet, or rather because of this, it has for the quite young - say, for those under thirty - a singular charm lacking to the middle-aged." But if British academics were any indication, the middle-aged were quite ready to join Rupert Brooke in breaking free of the old orthodoxies. "Ten years ago to mention the word 'duty' was to write yourself down a fogy." Now everyone talked of "Home and Country", "Church and Army". The creed of "individualism", Harrison concluded, had been replaced by "collectivism". This too was the thesis of A.L. Smith, who told an audience at King's College, London:

"War is indeed a mighty creator. It is an intellectual awakener and a moral tonic. It stirs men to think, and thinking is what we most lack in England. It creates a conscious unity of feeling which is the atmosphere needed for a new start. It purges away old strife and sectional aims, and raises us for a while into higher and purer air. It helps us to recapture some of the lofty and intense patriotism of the ancient world. It

1. Peace With Patriotism, Cambridge, 1915, pp.10-14. The reaction against peace as "a poor, emasculate and even effeminate business" had been "less explicit" in Britain than in France, and though "quite as anti-intellectualist, much less logical and theoretical". Only T.E. Hulme could be compared with Péguay or Barres, one might argue.
reveals to us what constitutes a modern nation, the partnership between the living, the dead, and the yet unborn."

Since Smith's nationalism was a Christian nationalism, he had to reassure any waverers that the war could be justified without doing violence to Christian teaching. This was the theme of his contribution to the series of Oxford pamphlets on the war, The Christian Attitude To War (1915). Taking as his text "Resist not evil", Smith wrote as follows:

"There have been, in all Christian times, some who make this text contain the whole duty of a Christian towards war. 'War is organised murder.' But the general view of mankind has decided that things are not as simple as this, and the Christian duty not so one-sided. Even the texts make it possible to present the other view. The essential elements of Christianity, as it appears to the intelligent non-Christian races, are that it inculcates the sacrifice of everything in a righteous cause, and that its founder was a man who gave his life for other men; and are not these the two facts which are just the redeeming side of war? It was a great general (Sherman) who said, 'War is Hell', but a still greater (Moltke) who said, 'War is the most devilish but almost the most heroic of human things.' Do not our highest and deepest feelings forbid us to accept 'Peace at any price' as a maxim? Do we not feel already at work among us all the ennobling and the purifying influence of this spirit of sacrifice? Do we not see also how it has brought out in the whole nation the sense of brotherhood, how one month brought us nearer to acting as a true Commonwealth than sixty years preceding? And if we look beyond our shores, could it be a possible conception of Christian duty to look on impassively at the sufferings of Belgium? Would that be loving our neighbours? No, not so simple is the great problem, how to bring both aspects of the

Christian spirit to bear upon the facts of modern life; how to interpret the duty of unselfishness without deserting the duty to the oppressed.\textsuperscript{1}

Such theological casuistry was common enough from academic apologists for the war,\textsuperscript{2} and the image of "sacrifice" was one which ran through much of the writing.\textsuperscript{3} What is perhaps more interesting is the reaction against industrial civilization which the war brought to the surface in the writings of middle-class intellectuals like Smith. Much of the peacetime existence of British society was "uglier, more fundamentally evil, more anti-Christian than even the cruelty, waste and idiotic folly of war". The New Testament, Smith claimed, had expressly denounced wealth rather than war, for the first was the "more deadly corruption" for the "soul of modern societies". If the war could generate "a mighty spiritual force" then it would have been "worth its cost, not only in millions of pounds, but its cost in killed and

\textsuperscript{1} pp.3-4.

\textsuperscript{2} Eg. F.C.Burkitt (Professor of Divinity, Cambridge) noted that modern eschatological theory showed the Sermon on the Mount to be Interim Ethik, acceptable only in a world which believed in imminent "cosmic catastrophe" to usher in the kingdom of God. See report of his lecture in Cambridge Rev., XXXI, 895(20 Jan.1915), 143. Another noted Cambridge theologian J.Oman (University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion) rejected the argument of some theologians that in accepting the state Christianity also accepted war. He felt that "moral surrenders" to the oppression of others was a worse evil than war. Like Smith too, he wrote of war as a "cleansing fire" after "the accumulation of pestilential decay" \\& hoped for a new world to "spring out of the blood drenched ground". Oman, pp.23-35.

\textsuperscript{3} Eg. "The Prussian has so polluted the earth that the rest and best of mankind has to descend into the mire to cleanse the defilement away. The descent, the humiliation, and the suffering are not good things in themselves, but only as sacrifice. It is the spirit that matters and the purpose that sanctifies the squalor of the via dolorosa. "A.F.Pollard, "A Parable of the War" (Aug.1917) repr. in Commonwealth At War, p.254.
wounded, in widowed and orphaned and childless". All this was not unlike "the ideas of 1914" expressed enthusiastically by the German academics, and it seems that Werner Sombart's jibe at shallow Manchesterturn in his wartime polemic Händler und Helden (1915) was not lost on Smith. It was because the Germans thought of the British as "decadent money-grubbers, soulless individualists, that they thought their cause the cause of world progress", Smith wrote in a pamphlet for the Christian Social Union. "We see they left out the good side of individualism, freedom, individual liberty, a priceless thing. But were we not in danger of leaving out discipline, unity, self-sacrifice, till the war recalled us to the elemental requisites of natural life." The war, Smith thought, provided an opportunity for a new departure: "The time has come to meet the old, narrow, exploded form of individualism in English thought by definitely developing that other aspect of life which is conveyed in the words Co-operation, Community, Corporateness. Our literature, our politics, our society, one might say our religion itself, is saturated with the conception of the 'individual'; in spite of the fact that, literally, there is no such thing among human beings as an individual; and that even if there were, it would still be more intelligent and profitable to regard him in his true character of a member of a community." This theme of the recreation of a sense of community under the stress of war is one which occurs time and time again.

1. Christian Attitude To War, pp.4-6
2. Sombart contrasted the "traders" with the German "heroes". See Ringer, pp.183-5.
3. The War & Our Social Duty, 1915, p.3. The war gave the opportunity to combat "'the gospel of self-interest' as the economists of the last century were wont to call it".
4. Christian Attitude..., p.16
in the writings of British academics. It was as if - as Jane Harrison put it - that war provided conditions for satisfying the longing for "fellowship" in "the real student, the born don". "Thinking can only be shared with the elect feeling almost is fraternity."¹ But it was also linked to the underlying sense of disquiet in the years before 1914 at the apparent moral vacuum at the centre of British life - at least this was the analysis of people like C.F.G. Masterman and Charles Gore, as well as Smith.² There were other manifestations of this disquiet; the fascination for some British intellectuals of peasant Russia. This latter - what one might call the cult of the moujik - of course reached new heights with the wartime alliance with Russia. A typical comment in this vein was that by an Oxford theologian who quoted approvingly the maxim that "The kind heart of the Russian moujik is a more valuable asset to civilisation than the mighty brain of a German professor."³ Ironically, the German professors themselves made the same claim for deeper moral values for their own Kultur. If the welcome for war in 1914 was less explicit amongst the British academic community, it was there all the same. The difference was that in Germany the standard-bearers of traditional

2. See D.Newsome, "The Assault on Mammon: Charles Gore & John Neville Figgis", J. of Ecclesiastical History, XVII, 2 (Oct. 1966), 227-41. Newsome does not mention Smith, but well before the war he was writing of the need for a "reconstruction of the sense of community" to replace "rampant 'Manchesterdom'". Spencer's maxim "Man versus the State" was already "a grotesque antithesis". Vast forces lay dormant in "the associative principle". The need was "to strike the right balance between an extreme socialism, which might ruin production and culture, and a Mammonism which might provoke men to Anarchism." Smith, "History & Citizenship A Forecast", Cornhill Mag., NS.XXVI, 5 (May 1909), 607ff. See also his Ford Lectures at Oxford (1905), Church & State In The Middle Ages, Oxford, 1913, p.134.
liberal values were fewer in number and perhaps less influential.

In Britain there was still considerable suspicion, even among liberal intellectuals who supported the war, of the state of mind summed up in the phrase "the peacefulness of being at war" - the feeling that the ideological truce occasioned by war should not just be tolerated but positively welcomed. This phrase had been coined by L.P. Jacks, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, and editor of the popular theological periodical the *Hibbert Journal*. The war, Jacks claimed, had brought to England a "peace of mind" she had not possessed for years. The calm was the result of burdens everyone had to bear. It was "comparatively easy to love one's neighbour" when one realized that all were "common servants and common sufferers in the same cause".¹ The war had also administered a much-needed shock to bring Britain out of the deep malaise into which it had fallen. "I can imagine nothing worse for my native land than another century of such a life as we were living before the war", Jacks told a gathering of the "Fight For Right" movement in 1916.² And while that Victorian liberal Graham Wallas could have been expected to share this condemnation of the social irresponsibility of the affluent classes in Edwardian England, the complacent view of wartime consensus which preceded it rather stuck in his gullet. It was the state of mind which reminded him of the Parliamentary Committee's recruiting

poster of "a solder's smiling face with the inscription, 'He's happy and satisfied, are you?'"¹

Wallace wondered whether "peacefulness" was "so supreme a human good" that it made "war the best form of international relationship", and, if war were judged evil, whether "peacefulness" was at all useful during wartime. Not surprisingly, in view of his powerful critique of Social Darwinism in prewar writings like The Great Society, his answer to the first question was an emphatic negative. Besides this "peacefulness" was "doomed by the nature of things to be transitory". But this brought up the second question. The value of "absolute surrender of consciousness" was obvious for the soldier in the trenches. It was "an anodyne" which few would grudge him and possibly "an important source of military efficiency". There might even be a "certain military value" in a like surrender by non-combatants, but it was something in which Wallas just could not share. To do so, he wrote, "would be to abandon as far as I am concerned any attempt to control by reasoned thought the policy of my nation". Surrender of consciousness was just not possible for the liberal intellectual. It was better to have "unrest of thought" than to allow the war to go on after its continuance ceased "to be the less of two monstrous evils". National policy, Wallas concluded, "should even during the fighting be guided not only by the will to conquer but also by the will to make possible a lasting peace."²

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2. Ibid., pp.95-7
With this article first published in the New Republic
Wallas had gone to the heart of the dilemma for the liberal in wartime - the reasonable limits of criticism of official policy. For Wallas Wilhelmine Germany represented all that he opposed politically - "a medieval aggressive dynasty wielding the whole material force of a fully consciousness national machine-industry".¹

But there was a danger that in fighting this immoral force the Allies would be caught up in a contest of rival powers, instead of opposing ideologies. To this end Wallas sought to influence liberal opinion in Britain and America against a future punitive peace settlement.² Among liberal intellectuals there was a widespread fear that the violent forces unleashed in 1914 might well become self-perpetuating; that the war might become an end in itself. As L.T.Hobhouse wrote in 1915: "It is the painfully won tradition of fear and self-restraint that man learns to impose on himself with so much effort which, being in a sense an artificial fabric, is ever liable to yield to the crude instincts of naked self-assertion which it scarcely covers, and with difficulty holds in."³ Hobhouse had been initially even more enthusiastic for the war even than Wallas - and this despite the fact that his

1. "Veblen's Imperial Germany & the Industrial Revolution", Quarterly J. of Economics,XXX,i(Nov.1915),182. Wallas felt that if it had not been for the war "this phenomenon would have been transient", a characteristically optimistic conclusion.

2. See his letter to Lord Bryce proposing a manifesto with the signatures of "a few big men, yourself perhaps, with a couple of historians, and a bishop or two, and one or two respected and independent men in business and politics" (17 Mar.1916, Bryce Mss. UB.23). Such names were intended to influence the British Government against pursuing "economic war" against Germany. In America Wallas was well-known to Professive intellectuals, some of whom (eg. Felix Frankfurter) were government advisors, and he contributed articles to the New Republic (ed. by Walter Lippman). Later in Feb.1918 Wallas was consulted by Wilson's "Special Commissioner" Ray Stannard Baker (together with Cole Murray, & A. E.Zimmern) on war aims. See Wiener,pp.168-74; A.J.Mayer, Politics & Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1968,p. 35.

3. World In Conflict,p.28. The greatest danger was in Germany, but (p.t.o)
close friend J.A.Hobson, and his sister Emily were active in the anti-war movement. He was even prepared to consider military and industrial conscription, until they became distinct possibilities in 1916. But in the last two years of the war Hobhouse became increasingly disillusioned with Lloyd George's pursuit of "total victory".1

At this point we should consider briefly the impact of the controversy over conscription on the academic community, for the argument was in part an extension of the one between Wallas and Jacks over the "absolute surrender of consciousness" by the individual citizen in wartime. But conscription or national service was also an issue in which academics had been involved well before 1914. At the end of the nineteenth century Oxford University could boast the largest volunteer batallion in England. Its organiser L.R.Farnell, Rector of Exeter College, became an eager propagandist for Lord Roberts's National Service League. This body had been established in 1902 to press for the introduction of compulsory military service.2 After Haldane's reorganisation of the Army between 1906 and 1909 the universities had been encouraged to establish Officers' Training Corps, but the

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racialist imperialism was not "the peculiar product of the German mind", as the Boer War had shown. The decline in respect for law and order in Edwardian England seemed to Hobhouse, a Gladstonian Liberal, to be due as much to the political extremists of the Left as to the reactionary Right (pp.48-52).

1. H.Smith, 267-72. Hobhouse ended up amongst the moderate liberal "Writers' Group", which included Wallas, Hobson & Murray.

2. Farnell, pp.146-57, 327. One of the Exeter Fellows has described the Corps training at Aldershot during the Boer War and going down with ptomaine poisoning after eating tinned peas recommended by Farnell as "a gentle laxative". See R.R. Marett, A Jerseyman At Oxford, 1941, pp.154-5.
N.S.L. still pressed for the introduction of compulsion.¹ For this campaign they recruited the services of two historians - F.J.C.Hearnshaw, Professor of History at King's College, London, and G.G.Coulton of Cambridge.²

Coulton, always a doughty controversialist, had been giving his own Liberal interpretation to the argument for compulsion since the time of the Boer War. Citing the example of Switzerland, Coulton stressed that "in history, compulsory service has been the usual note of the democracies, while despot have preferred a paid army". It was, he claimed, "an obviously democratic principle that all the necessary burdens of the state should be shared as equally as possible among all citizens".³

1. Lectureships in Military History & Strategy were established at Manchester & Oxford in 1905 (the latter was converted into a professorship in 1909). At Manchester there was a lively protest meeting against the new post. See Fiddes, p.143.


3. The Case For Compulsory Service, 1917, p.3. "Democracy & Compulsory Service", Hibbert J., XV,2(Jan.1916), 204. Coulton claimed that the Swiss short-service officer was less likely to be jingoistic than a career professional. In the ranks one received training in physique and character together with an opportunity to reach the top - "while the millionaire might vegetate in the ranks, the artisan might rise to the highest military posts!" A Strong Army In A Free State, 1900, p.37. Any "illiberal tendencies" apparent in Germany were "mere local accidents easily separable from the essential principle of universal service". "A Liberal's Plea for Compulsory Service", 19th Century, LX(Nov.1906), 721. To win over socialists. Coulton pointed to Bebel, Vaillant, and above all Jaurès (Coulton had his L'Armée Nouvelle translated into English) as Continental advocates of compulsion. One could distinguish, he claimed, between offensive and defensive war, and the "general spirit of a Nation in Arms" was defensive. Nor could such an army be used as strike-breakers against the wishes of a large section of the population. The Case For..., pp.258,278. To win over Liberals, Coulton pointed out that "to-day in the civilised world, the majority of democrats" treated a voluntary army "as scarcely more practicable" than voluntary taxation. The national education and insurance systems showed the way the (p.t.o.)
Historians were specially involved in the whole controversy over conscription during the First World War, since arguments from history were considered as important as the widespread contemporary use of conscription on the Continent. Hearnshaw and Coulton both pointed, for example, to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd as the ancestor of modern national service. The line was then traced carefully through the Assize of Arms (1181), the national levy of Tudor times and the militia. "Far from voluntarism being the immemorial tradition of the English race", Hearnshaw wrote in 1916, "it is a mushroom innovation established (and that only tentatively and provisionally) under the eyes of our grandfathers." Later in the same article he referred to the "degenerate descendants of the Victorian era who, deluded by the pacifist prophecies of the Manchester School of politicians, forgot their martial traditions, shed their soldierly qualities, and relegated defence to voluntarists." In short, voluntarism was not a "'heritage' to be proud of and to cling to", but a "recent humiliation and disgrace, utterly of a race which aspires to be imperial, or lays claim to leadership among mankind".¹

In this the roles of historian and propagandist were unhappily mixed, for Hearnshaw was very definitely claiming to use his historical expertise in this and other articles. The other

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army had to develop. And (this was the clincher) none less than John Stuart Mill had given his imprimatur to such a scheme (ibid.,p.202). But even with this strongly democratic thesis, Coulton hinted at the possibility of using compulsion as a means of social indoctrination. Under the existing system "the ordinary British voter" had "no direct reminder of his civic duties". British school-boys were "never systematically taught what the Fatherland" had done for them and what their "reciprocal duties" were in return. "A Liberal's Plea...",724.

arguments of the advocates of wartime compulsion did not involve such role confusion. There was the moral argument - that Britain had 'hitherto stood on a lower moral plane than the countries of the Continent'. There was, it was argued, "some justification for the German contempt" of a country which relied "so largely upon pay and economic forces to provide men for her army". A.L. Smith weighed in with a description of the "soul-destroying" effect of voluntarism on society. Compulsion, he argued, "would be putting national defence on the sound basis of national duty". It would guard against the danger, "which was perhaps the chief cause of decadence of ancient Rome, the dereliction by the individual of his duties of active citizenship". Yet another historian, J. Kirkpatrick (Emeritus Professor at Edinburgh), hoped that compulsion "would go far to reduce the huge crowds of betting, drinking, smoking and swearing crowds of spectators at races and football and other matches" - and this at a time when better men were at the Front. Behind these moral strictures, the advocates of compulsion assumed that "the right to call upon subjects to aid in the defence of the realm" was "inherent in the very conception of sovereignty". In evidence they were able to cite Mill, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet and - surprisingly perhaps - Hegel. It was the function of the State, Hearnshaw claimed, to secure, as far

1. Sonnenschein, Idols Of Peace and War, p.9 and letter to Times, 5 June 1915, p.9d.

2. Christian Attitude..., p.13. Smith also floated the idea of "non-military, industrial service" to counter talk of class war. But he wanted "honest respect" for the conscientious objector (pp.8, 14, 18).

as it could, "the good life of its citizens". The "logical and inevitable corollary" of this was that it was the "duty of every citizen to support and safeguard the State". 1

The influence of Idealist political philosophy - especially that of Bosanquet - was obvious in all this. The Cambridge historian J. Holland Rose, for example, talked of "true liberty" as primarily "the liberty of the community or nation". "In comparison with that ideal the liberty of the individual is of small moment", he wrote in a letter to The Nation. If the liberty of the community was endangered then "every member of it ought to offer his services (his life it need be) to ensure its survival". 2

The opponents of compulsion appeared "anxious to enjoy all the advantages of life in a community" while claiming "a right to act on their own judgement, and to deny the General Will" - at least this was the impression of the Cambridge economic historian Archdeacon Cunningham, who, as we shall see in the next chapter, was a strong opponent of conscientious objection. 3 The opponents of compulsion were not slow to label these assertions giving a licence for unbridled "state absolutism" on the German scale. 4

But few academics were prepared to write in such uncompromising terms as John Oman who, despite his firm support of the war, could only see danger in the talk of compulsion. "With compulsory

2. XVIII, 16 (15 Jan.1916), 576.
military service effective control over our foreign affairs, even the control of our subsequent disapproval, would pass from our hands", he wrote in 1915. "And, with that loss, our liberties at home would begin to be in grave peril." 1

As soon as it became apparent, late in 1915, that some kind of conscription would be introduced, it became increasingly difficult for those who supported the war (including virtually all the academics) to argue against a measure which seemed to promise its more effective prosecution. From the conscriptionists there was much talk of cleaning up the "laggards" and " slackers". 2 The only area where influence could be exerted was over the operation of the tribunals established to hear conscientious objections to military service. Liberal academics with very different views on the war - Lowes Dickinson and Gilbert Murray, for example - were equally exasperated by the " extremism" of the " absolutists" (those objectors who refused even alternative service) and of the authorities who allowed no exemptions at all. 3 But when it became clear that the Government was allowing the maltreatment of conscientious objectors, the liberals rallied themselves and signed a protest manifesto published in the magazine of

1. War & Its Issues, pp. 84-5
2. Scott, Economic Problems..., Ser. 1, 11. Seton-Watson in Nation, XVII, 25 (18 Sept. 1915), 803: "The one essential is that no one of either sex or whatever age shall be free to say during the war that the country does not ask for his or her services, or after the war that he or she did no work for the war." Three months earlier the heads of 14 Oxford colleges had written to The Times calling for an " immediate announcement of forthcoming legislation to establish national service for the home, the workshop and the fighting line" to replace "the voluntary go-as-you-please methods" (2 June 1915, p. 7e). Those who did not sign were F.W.Pember (All Souls), C.B. Heberden (Brasenose), T.B.Strong (Christ Church), T. Case (Corpus Christi), L.R. Phelps (Oriel), W.A. Spooner (New), W.Lock (Keble) & Sir John Rhys (Jesus). The letter died a few months later in December 1915.
3. Nation, XIX, 8 (20 May 1916), 209-10 (C.H. Herford), 22 (26 Aug. 1916), 664 & 24 (9 Sept. 1916), 729 (Dickinson). One of the few defences of " absolutists" came from V.Gordon Childe (then at Queen's College, Oxford); ibid., XIX, 25 (16 Sept. 1916), 760.
the No-Conscription Fellowship. And although there were honourable efforts on behalf of objectors by people like Murray, Fisher and Keynes - people with entrée to government circles - there were as many voices from within academic circles raised against the whole conception of conscientious objection itself. A.V.Dicey, so many of whose thoughts on the question of reprisals against Germany had contained good sense, supported moves to deprive objectors of their right to vote in national and municipal elections - something which, ironically, the Representation of the People Act of 1918 managed to do.  

Dicey's claim, that a false "sentiment of political toleration" protected objectors from suffering the appropriate penalties for their lack of civic consciousness, hardly squares with the actual treatment meted out to them. But what seemed to liberals to be obstinacy on the part of the "absolutists" was construed in the worst possible way by people with little sympathy with those who questioned the judgement of the government. "The State does not and cannot submit the validity of its enactments to the private judgement of its subjects", Hearnshaw wrote in a book entitled, significantly, Freedom In Service (1916). The


2. Dicey, "The Conscientious Objector", 19th Century, LXXIII (Feb.1918)37.also he proposed additional taxes for them. The 1918 Act disenfranchised them for 5 years. For the efforts of Murray, Fisher and Keynes, see J.Rae, Conscience & Politics, 1970, passim; D.Boulton, Objection Overruled, 1967, pp.165-6, 191-2; Keynes, Collected Writings, XVI, 160-1, 177-9; A.S. Peake (professor of Biblical Criticism at Manchester), Prisoners of Hope, 1918, passim; Murray's introduction to M.Hobhouse, "I Appeal Unto Caesar", 1918. This last was written by Bertrand Russell, although not even Murray knew this.
state had to demand "implicit obedience". The individual had to recognize "that politically he has no separate existence".1 There was, however, an even less agreeable side to this opposition to conscientious objection - the stigmatising of pacifists as "degenerates, cosmopolitans and undesirables"2, or as a group of theologians put it simply "foreigners".3 Clearly the record of academics - as of the rest of British society - on this issue was a very mixed one. No doubt the increasing pressures of war in 1916 did not help otherwise intelligent men to maintain what we would now see as a sense of equity.

The conscription issue was an acid test for liberal values, but not in every case. R.H.Tawney, a young W.E.A.tutor in 1914 had enlisted as a private in the Manchester Regiment on the outbreak of war. After being invalided back from the Front and discharged from the Army (after some difficulty with the War Office), Tawney worked with other advisors of Lloyd George on a memorandum which recommended industrial and/or military conscription up until the age of sixty. Under the heading "National Obedience" it was

1. pp. 45-6, 95-6. Hearnshaw proceeded on the assumption that error was "in inverse ratio to the magnitude and complexity of the respective organisms concerned". Thus mankind was less likely to be wrong than the nation, the nation than class, class than the individual. "At the present moment...the conscience of mankind is rightly asserting itself against the conscience of Germany; the conscience of the British nation is rightly asserting itself against the conscience of the I.L.P.; the conscience of the organised churches is right asserting itself against the conscience of the pacifist." Democracy At The Crossways, 1918,pp.375-6. Cf.E.V.Arnold, War-Time Lectures, 1916,p.132


3. Including J.H.Moulton (Professor of Philology, Manchester) & H.J. White (Professor of Theology, King's College, London). Westminster Gazette, 13 Jan.1915,p.2c. For years before the war Moulton had held strongly to the Quaker position and had been Vice-President of the Peace Society. His support for the war and compulsion caused much criticism in the Society after 1914. W.F.Moulton, p.111-2.
argued that "obedience to the considered decision of the Government should be rigidly enforced upon all sections of the Community". The Home Front was to be fully mobilised with no half measures. And, in a clear reference to industrial unrest and trouble from the South Wales miners, the memorandum concluded: "It is detestable that the conduct of industry, any more than the manning of a fire-trench, should be the subject of haggling over the division of financial spoils wrung from the country in its hour of need. The soldier at the Front expects from the civilian and from the Government a sense of obedience to duty and an enforcement of discipline as severe and as exacting as that to which he is himself accustomed."  

By this time Tawney had moved from his prewar Liberalism towards the ethical Socialism of his Acquisitive Society (1921). But there were other Socialists, like Harold Laski, who although supporting Britain's entry to the war were opposed to conscription; not to mention those, like G.D.H. Cole, who opposed the war itself. The difference was that Tawney had been a front-soldier (one of the few survivors of his company). His experience on the Somme separated him from the liberal intellectuals behind the lines whose idealism was faltering under the heavy casualty figures of 1916. As Tawney wrote of them in October 1916:

1. T. Jones, Whitehall Diary, 1969, 1, 3-5.


"While you seem - forgive me if I am rude - to have been surrendering your creeds with the nervous facility of a Tudor official, our foreground may be different, but our background is the same. It is that of August 1914. We are your ghosts."¹ This belief in the "moral quality of war"² Tawney never lost, although in the last two years of the war he came to feel that "the loyalty which was given to the cause for which the War was undertaken" was being "transferred to the War itself". The end was "no longer thought of as the reconciliation of enemies through the victory of a principle", but merely as "the last trick to be snatched by the winner of a game of bluff and cunning". Even the idealism of the front-soldier, "the generosity which would feel that the nation were contaminated if it snatched material advantages from the world's misery, the liberal spirit which knows that even among its enemies there is a better mind", was daily denounced as treason to the war dead.³

Much of what Tawney wrote during the war expressed ideas very similar to those of his old tutor at Balliol A.L. Smith. Both men welcomed war as a counter to the peacetime ethic of possessive individualism. For Tawney military training - "the conversion of a mob into an army" - was like "organising an unorganised body of workers".⁴ Where Smith talked of the "corruption" in the soul

¹. "Some Reflections Of A Soldier", p.23."...to kill in hatred is murder, and we are not murderers, but executioners." p.27.
³. Sword Of The Spirit, p.10. "The inertia, the apathy, the weight of custom and routine, which make it difficult to begin [a war], make it hardly less difficult to contemplate its being ended, and in proportion as the soldiers grow more pacific, the civilians grow more bellicose."
of modern society, Tawney pointed to the "cult of power" in capitalist society.1 And what did Tawney hope would follow the war? A society which would allow "the free development of the ancient pieties of Europe";2 in short, something very like Smith's picture of war as a "moral tonic". No doubt this was an indication that Tawney's views were not too far removed from those of the Christian Social Union, of which Smith was a member. But it shows too that the war, for the moment at least, was as productive of some strands of social thought as it was to be destructive of others - liberalism in particular. The disillusionment during the later years of the war (and during the first postwar decade) of liberal intellectuals like Wallas, Hobhouse and Murray (who we turn to later), has perhaps obscured the role of other intellectuals (the great majority) for whom the war was indeed an "intellectual awakener".

However, intellectual dissent during the war is important - if only because of Russell's stature as a critic of the war - and it is to this, and to a consideration of the differing roles of three liberal intellectuals, that we now turn.

1. For Tawney's demonstration of "the not very obscure analogy between a conception of politics which would trample on all moral laws in the pursuit of political power, and a conception of economic life which regards any kind of organisation as justified by its efficiency, and therefore holds that there are no moral principles upon which economic conduct need be based", see R.H.Tawney's Commonplace Book, Cambridge 1972, pp.82-3, and The Attack, pp.33-4.

VIII. THE QUESTION OF A COMPROMISE PEACE.

"Mr. Trumpington (to Mr. Mitford)..... In Cambridge, they have ever bred strange doctrines; being more obnoxious, as I suppose, to the winds of learning that blew from overseas; in Oxford, as I conceive, we live more by the memories of our past."

Ronald Knox, Let Dons Delight (1939)

The advocacy of compromise peace during the war was not common amongst British academics, but such that there was became associated with Cambridge rather than its sister university. While Oxford University Press produced a long series of patriotic pamphlets on the war (most written by members of the University), Cambridge became notorious for the Cambridge Magazine, an unofficial publication edited by the brilliant and eccentric undergraduate C.K.Ogden.\(^1\) Begun in 1912 the Magazine achieved a circulation of 25,000 during the war, and a national reputation far beyond that of its sober rival the Cambridge Review.\(^2\) While never a pacifist magazine (like the No-Conscription Fellowship's Tribunal), the Cambridge Magazine did open its columns to people like Bertrand Russell, Lowes Dickinson and Siegfried Sassoon, as well as to literary figures like Thomas Hardy, John Masefield and Arnold Bennett. Because of this it came to have a reputation for

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1. Later author of Basic English (1930) & joint-author of The Meaning of Meaning (1923)

2. One attraction was "Notes from the Foreign Press" (including those of the Central Powers) by Mrs C.R.Buxton.
"pacifism", although such a charge would have been difficult to prove. William Ridgeway, Professor of Archaeology at Cambridge, spent much of his time on this task, complaining that every week Dickinson and others poured "gentle streams of luke warm water upon patriotic enthusiasm". Other academics - many of them supporters of the war - sprang to the Magazine's defence, but Ridgeway's campaign may well have had something to do with the attack on its offices in Armistice Week.

The unsavoury reputation acquired by the Cambridge Magazine (among the noisy patriots, at least) was shared by the Union of Democratic Control, a foreign-policy pressure group with strong Cambridge connections. The U.D.C. had been established in December 1914 by Radical Liberals (like C.R.Trevelyan), anti-war socialists (like Ramsay MacDonald) and liberal intellectuals (like H.N. Brailsford and J.A. Hobson). Lowes Dickinson and Russell - we shall examine the ideas of these two academic "dissenters" in greater detail in following chapters - organised the Cambridge branch which soon became the largest outside London. Again, Trinity was the college most involved - no fewer than thirteen of its Fellows were members of the U.D.C. The main objective of the

1. Morning Post, 24 Feb.1917, p.6e. Other protests came from members of the "Fight For Right" movement (E.Underhill & Sir Francis Younghusband). See also letters from R.H.MacLeod (lecturer in Indian Law at Cambridge), 1 Mar.1917, p.4 & T.C. Fitzpatrick (Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University) 27 Feb.1917, p.4f. The latter was at pains to deny that the Cambridge Magazine had no official connection with the University.


3. Including G.H.Hardy, G.B.Moore (whose Principia Ethica was later alleged to have provided the ethical basis for pacifism), A.S. Eddington (Professor of Astronomy), D.A.Winstanley, E.W.Barnes, F.G.Hopkins(Reader in Physiology). See Cambridge Mag.,IV,13(13 Feb.1915),260;11(30 Jan.1915),223;V,21(20 May 1916),470-1. Also G.H.Hardy, Bertrand Russell & Trinity,Cambridge,1970,p.22.
Union was to oppose "secret diplomacy" and to press for the "democratic control" of foreign policy, presumably through Parliament. The rest of its programme was based on the assumption - as the Secretary of the Cambridge branch put it - "then made by almost everybody, that the war must be won, and...won fairly quickly". The U.D.C. was (in its avowed aims at least) not so much concerned with prewar British policy, or even with the war itself, but rather with the future peace settlement.

Taken on its own, the proposal on "democratic control" expressed the kind of sentiment to which all good liberals - whether they supported the war or not - could subscribe. One could hardly find a more "respectable" supporter of official policy than Lord Bryce, yet his presidential address to the British Academy in 1915 showed concern at the control of foreign policy decisions by so few people. But it was another liberal who pointed out that "the foremost obstacle" to "democratic control"

1. Hardy, p.11.

2. Other aims were: (i) to hold plebiscites before transferring territory between states, (ii) to establish an "International Council" of states, (iii) general disarmament and nationalisation of the arms industry, (iv) to oppose "economic war" against Germany after the war.

3. "How few are the persons in every state in whose hands lie issues of war and peace. In some of the now belligerent countries the final and vital decisions were taken by four or five persons only, in others by six and seven only. Even in Britain decisions rested practically with less than twenty-five, for though some persons outside the Cabinet took a part, not all within the Cabinet are reckoned as effective factors. It is probable of course that popular sentiment has to be considered, even in states more or less despotically governed. Against a strong and definite sentiment of the masses the ruling few would not act. But the masses are virtually led by a few and their common opinion is formed, particularly at a crisis, by the authority (p.t.o.)
was not so much "the existence of an aristocratic caste or its alleged aversion to intruders from another class, as the boundless and dispiriting indifference of the masses" to problems of foreign policy.¹ If there were no "keen and well-informed public opinion", A.F. Pollard wrote at about the same time, "democratic control" would simply be "a proposition that expert knowledge should be controlled by general ignorance".² But men like Pollard and Seton-Watson did tend to believe that the existing foreign policy elite was, if not a sinister class interest, not particularly efficient or well-informed.³

Conservative historians, like F.J.C. Hearnshaw, were more sceptical about the possibilities of creating well-informed public opinion. When Hearnshaw considered "how unreasonable and bellicose uninformed public opinion" tended to become "at times of excitement", he could only feel "thankful" that hitherto foreign policy had been the preserve of an elite. And touching on something often ignored by the theorists of the U.D.C., he noted: "If it is a fact that from time to time unwilling and pacific peoples have been dragged or driven into war by bellicose governments, it is equally a fact that at other times cautious and reluctant governments (both autocratic and bureaucratic) have been

(3. cont. from previous page)

and the appeals of those few whom they have been accustomed to trust and obey. And, after all, the vital decision at the vital moment remains with the few. If they had decided otherwise than they did, the thing would not have happened. Something like it might have happened later, but the war would not have come then and so." PBA, 1915-16, pp.9-10 (see also p.24).

forced into war by bellicose public opinion, or have with difficulty held back a populace less pacific than themselves."¹ But although this difference of opinion was a basic one, what Hearnshaw objected to most was the assumption that all governments were, to some extent, responsible for the outbreak of the war. "The war was not due to the 'European Anarchy', but to Austro-German design", Hearnshaw wrote in a reference to Lowes Dickinson. All states were not "equally guilty", for two stood "convicted as criminals".² One Cambridge critic of the U.D.C. pointed out that once one accepted "that war was inevitable", then there was "nothing left to justify mistrust" of British diplomacy.³ But the confusion between the inevitability of war due to an anarchic international order, and belief that "secret diplomacy" was in some way responsible for war, does not seem to have unduly troubled the U.D.C.

More serious was the fact that the U.D.C., although professing to avoid controversy on the origins of the war, was coming increasingly to be seen as an advocate of compromise peace. According to the secretary of the Cambridge branch, this characterisation was "to a considerable extent justified".⁴ The fact that it was the unstated assumption which underlay much of U.D.C. writing on the war only served to lend credence to talk of "machinations of secret traitors" and a "sinister" combination of "secret diplomatists".⁵ What so enraged people like Hearnshaw, Heitland

¹. Main Currents..., pp. 6, 352-3.
². Democracy At The Crossways, p. 470.
⁴. Hardy, p. 13.
and G.G. Coulton, whose *Main Illusions of Pacificism* (1915) exposed the "Angellite" basis of the U.D.C.,  was that this body cast doubt on the official British version of the outbreak of the war without giving any evidence for this scepticism. Unless there was an attempt to produce evidence, Heitland claimed, any attempt to blame Grey for "causing unnecessary bloodshed" was little short of treasonable.  

This from a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, was an indication of the considerable feeling against the U.D.C. among some of the dons. Matters had not been helped by the fact that the first public meeting of the Cambridge branch had been addressed by E.D. Morel, one of the most extreme opponents of government policy. Later in the war Morel was equalled in his reputation as an uncompromising critic of government policy by Bertrand Russell, at that time Lecturer in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge.

For what seemed to be the main body of British academics - at least those who expressed themselves publicly - there was acceptance of the war as "an end in itself". The intellectual brilliance of Russell and the tortured doubts of Dickinson (surely the most prolific of the liberal "dissenters") should not obscure the fact that for most academics (as for the public at large) the danger was not that the war would be pursued too vigorously, but rather the opposite. The address by the Professor of History at

1. Cambridge, 1915. Characteristically, Coulton did not pull his punches when dealing with Angell, who he accused of emigrating "to make money and popularity by lecturing in America, as an American against the country of his birth" (p. 82).


3. Hardy, p. 12.
Bedford College, London, in May 1915 was typical of many such arguments against the U.D.C. suggestions that a compromise peace should be considered. "The common will to peace", J.W. Allen claimed, was "really a negative thing", "a mere revolt or a shrinking from the consequences of war". A nation "which refused war merely by reason of its natural fear and shrinking would be hopelessly decadent and doomed to disappear". Aside from the moral justifications for "rentless war" against Germany - for had not she "made war upon the soul of man" - there were the realities of war itself. "There is only one thing of real importance, and it is to get Germany helpless. When we have done that we can be as generous as we please." The advocates of compromise peace implied, if they did not say openly, that so far as the war was "not quite immediately defensive" it had "no rational purpose at all".

A peace based on agreement for "the automatic avoidance of war in the future" was no substitute for one based on military victory.1

This in fact was the core of the objection by the patriotic dons to the criticism of the Union of Democratic Control of official policy, and it explains the sense of outrage felt by many academics at Bertrand Russell's espousal of "pacifist" sentiments. To say that war was irrational was to sound patronising to the fervently patriotic. To talk of compromise peace was to ignore the desire for revenge.2 To talk of compromise peace was also


2. This was illustrated by A.F.Pollard's article on "The Temptation of Peace" where he claimed that the U.D.C. talked "of peace and reconciliation without a thought of atonement". In the name of "ethics" they denounced "all justice as revenge" & in that of "progresse" pleaded for the status quo ante bellum. How could these people "make peace with Miss Cavell's murderers, with the slave-drivers of Belgium, and with the perpetrators and accomplices of the Armenian massacres"? "A nation's capacity for sacrifice in moral causes", not readiness to make peace, was "the test of its morality". Repr. in Commonwealth At War, pp.181, 185-6.
to ignore the lessons of history - or so it seemed to historians like A.V. Dicey and J. Holland Rose. The example of the war with Napoleon seemed especially potent, as the title of one of Rose's articles "1815 and 1915" suggests. For the next two years there was a sustained campaign in the press by academics to quash any talk of peace without victory. The weight of academic expertise and influence was clearly marshalled against the U.D.C. and its fellow-travellers.

But during 1916 even some hitherto staunch supporters of the war-effort began to waver. Typical of the growing apprehension as to the consequences of indefinite continuance of the war was a series of War-Time Lectures (1916) published by E.V. Arhold, Professor of Latin at University College, Bangor. Arnold predicted that if the war went on much longer there was a definite danger of revolution at home and abroad (especially in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the establishment of revolutionary left-wing regimes. The defeat of the Central Powers, he wrote, would mean that "the wild ideals and hideous cruelties of the French Revolution would be re-enacted: and the whole proud structure of German civilization would crumble into nothing". The Dual Monarchy would be split into a "dozen petty kingdoms...engaged upon mutual wars upon the model..."


2. Eg. letters to The Times from H.J. Haverfield (Professor of Ancient History, Cambridge) 17 Aug. 1917, p. 5e; J.P. Mahaffy (Provost of Trinity College, Dublin) 21 Aug. 1917, p. 4c. Also Hearnshaw, Main Currents..., p. 342 & A.F. Pollard, "Is It Peace?" (Jan. 1917) repr. in Commonwealth At War, p. 193.
of the Balkan states". Events would show a certain degree of truth in this prediction, and it is difficult just to write Arnold off as merely a conservative Germanophile. In November 1916 he wrote in A.R. Orage's New Age that Britain would have to face the facts about "Pan-Germanism and 'Central Europe'", for they could not be altered. It "would be a crime to destroy" "Berlin to Baghdad". "Why indeed, should we oppose ourselves to 'Central Europe'?" Arnold asked. "It is, to say the least, a half-way stage to 'All Europe'." This was very different from the map of Europe envisaged by British historians.

In November 1916 - a year before the publication of the Lansdowne Letter - it was not easy to call publicly for a negotiated peace, even if it were argued that this would best serve the interests of France and Belgium. Arnold had to phrase his suggestion carefully - "even the bravest of peoples" might "in the end be forced to yield to necessity". But in a remarkable passage, Arnold dared to ask his readers: "If Germany were to conquer England, and admit Englishmen to its citizenship, should we individually suffer?" This was worthy of Bertrand Russell

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2. Although he was this also. Arnold felt that English ridicule of Kultur was "misplaced". It was in fact "the maintenance of law and the upraising of industry". "To cross the border from German-Austria to the East" was "to pass to the conditions of the Middle Ages when neither life nor property had any security". War-Time Lectures, p.76.
4. War-Time Lectures, 86, 75. A German occupation, Arnold claimed, would "preserve the English social system as it now exists from the violent catastrophies which now threaten it. As such we might expect it to be welcomed by the upper and middle classes, but viewed with suspicion by the well-to-do and powerful working men's unions. The course of events has shown that even in England material interests count for nothing with any class as against a strongly roused national sentiment."
at his most provocative, and the fact that Arnold seems to have escaped public abuse merely demonstrates that "Lansdownism" was making talk of a compromise peace more respectable than it had been a year earlier. Arnold had the grace to admit the similarity of his ideas with those of the U.D.C.\(^1\), but this can have been of little comfort to the radicals and liberals who had been (and were being) hounded for "pacifism". Arnold's dire predictions of revolution in Britain were again aired in a series of anonymous articles in *The Times* in September 1917,\(^2\) and in a memorandum on "Labour In Revolt" circulated among members of the War Cabinet by Lord Milner.\(^3\)

While labour unrest continued to concern conservative

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1. Ibid., p.137. Like the U.D.C., Arnold feared that a rejection of peace-feelers from Bethman-Hollweg would only strengthen the military part in Germany, already flushed with success on the battle-front. "Germany's Peace Offer", 80-1.

2. 25-28 Sept. 1917. The last article opened with the claim that there was a "revolutionary movement" which had "long passed the stage of mere talk" & which had "realized itself in formidable action". "There has been no attack on the throne, no rioting in the streets, no destruction of visible property; but changes have already been brought about which are thwarting the efforts of the Government to conduct the war with efficiency, and if these changes go further they will bring the country into confusion." (p.9b).

3. War Cabinet Minutes, CAB. 24/24. Arnold compared the "working class movement" with Pan-Germanism & Sinn Fein in the "passionate, revolutionary fervour" of its supporters. It was distinct from "middle-class" pacifism & "Lower-class" revolutionary activity in London's East End, being centred amongst "well-paid artisans" in Clydeside, the Midlands, South Wales miners & dockers in general. Leadership was young and alienated from trade union bureaucracy, and much influenced by the Russian Revolution. The movement had "humbled Government" and could impoverish the country with its demands, undermining "confidence in lawful authority" and causing large-scale industrial violence. And he concluded; "The crushing of such a movement is one of the ordinary tasks of Government, and almost any method within reason, will crush it if carried out with decision and courage. But I do not myself believe that it can be done without serious conflict." (pp.160-163). Beatrice Webb's version (from Tom Jones) was rather inaccurate. See her diary, 5 Oct.1917, pp.96-7. For contrasting academic views of industrial unrest, see W.A.Spooner, "Two Permanent Causes of Industrial Unrest", *Church Quly.Rev.*, LXXXV,3(Oct.1917), 121-34 (sympathetic) and letters of N.Wedd to F.P.Bulmer, 27 June 1915 & 19 Jan.1916 (favouring industrial compulsion without limits).
academics like Hearnshaw and Arnold in 1918, the last year of the war saw yet another U.D.C. objective attain political respectability. From early in 1915 the Union had envisaged the establishment of an "International Council" as an essential part of any postwar settlement. At about the same time the "Bryce Group" first met for private discussions to work out the details of a postwar league. Prominent in this group, besides Bryce, were Dickinson, Wallas and J.A.Hobson. Public debate, however, was still "hampered by the prevailing belief that the league movement was a stop-the-war movement, and that such action would be to the advantage of Britain's enemies". There were also other more basic conservative objections to the league idea. The idea that it was possible to set up machinery for the settlement of international disputes aroused scepticism, as well as hostility. This can be seen in a lecture by J.W.Allen in May 1915:

"I do not believe that any judicial or conciliation machinery could ever prevent war, or even really affect the probability of war. The most it would ever do would be to postpone a war; and it is doubtful whether postponement of war is ever a gain ...War is the logical, that is, the necessary, issue of a certain psychological situation. So far as that situation is created by governments, they are responsible for the war; but certainly it is never created by any single group of men....Hardly ever, if at all, is the technical and diplomatic question upon which, formally, war is commenced, expressive of the cause of war, except very indirectly and incompletely. Often it is a mere pretext for war.""
Allen was not only criticising the personalised explanation for war so favoured by the U.D.C. - the machinations of diplomatists and politicians - but was also repeating many of the objections to liberal internationalism expressed earlier by Idealist philosophers like F.H. Bradley and D.G. Ritchie. And, in view of the postwar disillusionment of liberal intellectuals, there was an element of realism in the conservative position. As one Cambridge don wrote in a pamphlet criticising the U.D.C.:

"I do not believe that any League, however solemn, will suddenly change the nature of mankind, and (if I may so express it) humanize human societies once and for all. A higher morality is more likely to invent better machinery than a better machinery to create a higher morality. This does not imply that better machinery will not be helpful. The danger is that machinery devised in a moment of enthusiasm and responding to the aspirations of war-worn peoples may appear less satisfactory when enthusiasm has been cooled by time."

Clearly, this left the door open for some kind of conservative interpretation of league proposals, and in the last two years of the war - especially after the entry of America into the conflict - the league movement took on new life. The "Bryce Group" published its proposals and the League of Nations Society (established in May 1915) took on the task of educating public opinion. However, it was the League of Free Nations Association which represented such conservative support that existed.

1. W.E. Heitland, "Democratic", p.24. Heitland was also sceptical of that other liberal ideal - national self-determination. In the Balkans explanations of "the moral beauty and political advantage of (say) 4,000 minority of one race peaceably yielding to 4,500 majority" of another was, to say the least, an unpromising task. Heitland, If We Win, p.2.

2. The Lansdowne Letter of course had argued for a postwar league to settle international disputes, as well as for a statement of limited war aims, as a means of strengthening the peace party in Germany.
Significantly, it was founded three years after the League of Nations Society, and consisted mainly of "more reputable people, known most of them...to have been ardent supporters of the war, and good haters of Germany". Not surprisingly its vision of a postwar league differed greatly from that of the Society, which it tended to regard as "a fad of liberal and religious idealists". The Society envisaged a league consisting of "any civilized State desiring to join", but tended to be rather vague on the question of enforcing league decisions. The Association, by contrast, clearly hoped that the existing wartime alliance against the Central Powers would continue as the basis of a strong postwar league wielding armed power. As one of its members put it, the Allies were "already engaged on the purposes of a league of peace". Germany and its allies would be excluded until they renounced their "barbaric ambition". And he continued: "Germany's weapon must be broken in its hands. Germany,...must lose its trust in military force and seek greatness in some other way. It must learn to despise military ambition. It must recognise the political crudeness of the spirit and will to dominate."  


The seal of political respectability for the league idea was finally given when members (and former members) of the government began publicly to advocate it. In January 1917 Lloyd George had set up the Phillimore Committee (which included among its members the historians A.F. Pollard and J. Holland Rose). In May General Smuts and Lord Hugh Cecil joined Bryce and the Archbishop of Canterbury in addressing a public meeting at the Central Hall, Westminster. In March 1918 the Phillimore Committee presented a detailed league scheme to the Cabinet, and in October the League of Free Nations Association and the League of Nations Society decided to amalgamate—the latter body giving up virtually all its "idealistic" programme in the process. The middle-of-the-road approach of the new League of Nations Union was reflected in the keynote address given by Viscount (formerly Sir Edward) Grey, who had emerged from two years retirement from politics to take up the league crusade as President of the Union. Undoubtedly, this crusade helped to revive the flagging ardour of liberal

1. Winkler, pp.76-7. Pollard wrote one of the most informed pamphlets, on the evolution of the league idea in history. In this he criticised the schemes (presumably those of Dickinson and other "Idealists") which stressed justice rather than security, tribunals rather than treaties, and which tended to ignore the strength of national sentiment (as an obstacle to international organisation as well as to arbitration of disputes). His conclusion that "elaborate schemes on paper" were "less satisfactory" than methods which were slower to develop but more realistic, was echoed by historians and international lawyers. See Pollard, *The League of Nations An Historical Argument*, Oxford, 1918, pp.29-63. Also: E. Barker, *A Confederation of Nations*, Oxford, 1918; R. Mair, *Nationalism & Internationalism*, 1918; F. Pollock, *The League Of Nations*, 1919; L. Oppenheimer, *The League Of Nations*, 1919; T. J. Lawrence, *Lectures On The League of Nations*, 1919; W. T. S. Stallybrass, *A Society Of States*, 1918.

2. Although a league should not be used as a weapon against Germany, Germany should only be admitted after she had shown a clear desire to adopt democratic institutions. There was a clear implication that economic blockade could be used to achieve this. It was largely due to Grey that the two groups came together. See Dickinson-Woolf letters, Woolf.Mss
academics, like Gilbert Murray, who had become mildly infected with "Lansdownism". Those who had striven for future international cooperation from the first months of the war, like Lowes Dickinson and J.A. Hobson, were understandably bitter. And it is to Gilbert Murray that we now turn in order to examine the pressures which drove a liberal academic first into enthusiastic support for the war and then into equally enthusiastic support for what originally had been an idea of the anti-war intellectuals - the League of Nations.

1. Murray, together with liberal critics of official policy (eg. G.P. Gooch) signed a manifesto presented by Lord Loreburn to Lansdowne to thank him for his initiative.
"However badly we may have been or are yet likely to be demoralized by this war, that is a lesser evil than if all Europe were conquered by Germany. And even to be conquered by Germany now, after all we have suffered, would be a lesser evil than to have submitted to her without a struggle." - Gilbert Murray, "The Turmoil of War (1917).

"It is quite probable that the effects would have been less disastrous if we had stayed out and allowed Germany to become the complete master of western Europe, on more or less equal terms with U.S.A. and Russia." - Gilbert Murray to Bertrand Russell, 20 August, 1955.

Shortly before his death in 1957 Gilbert Murray said, in a broadcast talk, "there has never been a day...when I have failed to give thought to the work for peace and for Hellenism. The one is a matter of life and death for all of us; the other of maintaining, amid all the dust of modern and industrial life, our love and appreciation for the eternal values." Murray always maintained that the life of scholarship and the path of political commitment were inseparable. Although he did not have a political career like James Bryce, Murray was also a member of the intellectual elite (a generation after Bryce) which believed that privilege conferred certain duties. As one of his colleagues noted: "He set his course by a tradition which was both Victorian and classical; to him it was unquestionable that, in peace as in

2. He was asked several times to stand for parliament. Ibid., p. 108.
war, the public call must be obeyed first, and that research, however laborious or entrancing, was a privilege of unclaimed leisure. He could not split his personality as to teach Greek without being a political animal."¹ Another member of this "intellectual aristocracy" who married Murray's daughter described his politics as those "aristocratic liberalism".² And, underpinning the belief in the social obligations of the rich and powerful, was the legacy of Murray's classical studies - "an unshakeable trust in reason" and a belief that "extremism or fanaticism, even in a good cause" was "a bad thing".³

At school in England Murray read Mill and Spencer,⁴ and at Oxford, with L.T.Hobhouse and others, he started the Oxford Home Rule League in 1885.⁵ When he came back to Oxford as Regius Professor of Greek in 1908 he was not only a leading classical scholar but also a politically active Liberal intellectual with radical pretensions. In 1912, for example, he presided over meetings organised by Oxford Fabians in support of striking municipal transport workers.⁶ As an undergraduate at Oxford he had joined the Volunteer Corps, but during the Boer War he wrote

2. A.Toynbee, ibid., p.215
4. Murray had been born in Sydney & spent his first 11 years there.
5. Murray was also close to Arthur Sidgwick (brother of Henry), Fellow of Corpus Christi College and like Murray a Greek scholar and Liberal. Corpus had a reputation for political liberalism, with Fellows like Sidgwick, F.C.S.Schiller and (for short periods) G.Wallas and L.T.Hobhouse. L.R.Phelps (Oriel) was another of the few "Home Rulers" among the dons.
a scathing criticism of "National Ideals"\(^1\) and joined F.W.Hirst and J.L.Hammond in writing essays for Liberalism and Empire (1900).\(^2\) When the Liberal Government came to power Murray continued to criticise British foreign policy, as someone who stood on the left of the Liberal Party. In the preface to his wartime defence of Grey's foreign policy Murray described his position - before his change of heart in 1914 - as follows:

"I have been unhappy about Morocco and Persia; profoundly unhappy about our strained relations with Germany; sympathetic in general towards the Radical and Socialist line on foreign policy; and always anxious to have the smallest Navy vote that a reasonable Government would permit.

I have never till this year [1914] seriously believed in the unalterable aggressive designs of Germany. I knew our own Jingoes, and recognized the existence of German Jingoes; but I believed that there, as here, the government was in the hands of the more wise and sober part of the nation. I have derided all scares and loathed (as I still loathe) all scare mongers and breeders of hatred. I have believed (as I still believe) that many persons now in newspaper offices might be more profitably housed in lunatic asylums. And I also felt, with some more impatience, that though as an outsider, I could not tell exactly what the Government ought to do, they surely could produce good relations between Great Britain and Germany if only they had the determination and the will."\(^3\)

But now Murray admitted that "on a large part of this question" he had been wrong. Addressing a meeting at the Essex Hall, London, in 1916 Murray asked: "Have I any doubt in any

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1. "National Ideals: Conscious & Unconscious", IJE (Oct.1900) repr. in Essays & Addresses, 1921. Murray's first sentence reads: "If I had one remark and one only to make about National Ideals, it would be this: that the conscious and professed ideals are as straws in the wind; the unconscious or concealed ideals are the real forces that govern mankind." (p.160) Cf.his second thoughts on this in 1921, ibid.,p.8.

2. Murray's essay was on "The Exploitation of Inferior Races in Ancient & Modern Times".

3. Foreign Policy...,pp.9-10.
corner of my mind that the war was right? I have none. We took the path of duty and the only path we could take." Yet, only fifteen years previously - as Murray also admitted - in this very hall he had spoken against British policy in South Africa. "I little imagined then that I should live to speak in favour of the policy of a much greater and more disastrous war", he concluded rather sadly.¹ What had caused him to change in 1914? Undoubtedly it was the German invasion of Belgium, which, as we have seen, operated so powerfully on the consciences of liberal intellectuals like L.T.Hobhouse, L.J.Hammond and Graham Wallas. With them Murray had signed neutrality manifestos, but between the time of his signing (26 or 27 July) and its publication (3 August) he was converted to support for the war by the published documents. "They all told fundamentally the same story", he wrote in his defence of Grey. "The statesman whom I had suspected as over imperialist was doing everything humanly possible to preserve peace; the Power whose good faith I had always championed was in part playing a game of the most unscrupulous bluff, in part meant murder from the beginning."²

But even more than the documents - important as they were - it was the figure of the Foreign Secretary which was crucial in sustaining the return to the fold of most liberal intellectuals. Forty years later Murray recalled "that calm and irresistible speech of Grey's to Parliament on the third of August", "a speech


². Foreign Policy..., pp.10-11. Others found the documents quite unconvincing. Eg. see MacIver, As A Tale That Is Told, p.75.
which he had not had time to prepare, but which yet seemed perfectly clear in its narrative and consistent in its reasoning.¹

To the Morels, Russells and Conybeares, Grey was either a knave or a fool. To Murray he became the perfect embodiment of the English gentleman. All the cynical brilliance of Metternich, Talleyrand or Bismarck seemed "so utterly opposite to the characteristics of this quiet, able, unpretending Englishman of country tastes, simple in word and thought, a little tongue-tied and shy, learned in birds and good at fishing, and kindling quickly to warm sympathy in all questions of labour".² This was why Murray could not understand the special venom reserved for Grey - no one seemed further removed from the world of "secret diplomacy". This "queer delusion", Murray felt, was a reaction to the bipartisan approach to British foreign policy during the July crisis. The "peril [was] so awful that wise men were mostly willing to measure their words and avoid the possibility of fanning any dangerous smoke into flame".³ This then was the background against which Grey's policy had to be judged:

"If here and there on some point of detail he has not driven as clever a bargain as he might; if he has not stood up to our friends Russia and France as defiantly as some of his less responsible critics would have done; and if, here and there, he has not pressed fearlessly forward in support of some weak nation to which British liberal sympathies went naturally forth; if under his guidance, with all our enormous naval

2. Foreign Policy..., p.123. "He seems so unlike a diplomat. The traditional qualities of the diplomat, the polished surface, the social brilliance, the narrow ruthless outlook, the skill in moving gracefully among traps and mines, the smiling falsehoods and coups of unscrupulous cleverness..."
3. Ibid., p.124
expenditure and prestige, Great Britain has sometimes seemed to have little spare strength for the running of avoidable risks or the championing of disinterested causes; let those who criticize him who can still say he over-rated our danger. The rest of us will only be grateful for ever to one who through all these years of crisis acted justly and sought no aggrandizement, who kept faith with his friends and worked for a good understanding with his enemies, who never spoke a rash word to bring the peril nearer, and never neglected a precaution to meet it when it should come.  

Murray had fewer reservations about changing his mind on the eight years of Grey's tenure of the Foreign Office than many of his friends. He did not, for example, agree with "a Radical friend" who claimed that, although "for the last twelve days" Grey had been "working for peace", British policy generally before 1914 had "been making peace impossible". Murray now swallowed the Dual and Triple Ententes, Morocco and Persia. Even over Persia, where Radical criticism of Grey had been so strong, Murray concluded that, if he did not "feel any enthusiasm" for Britain's record in Persia, still it was difficult to see how it could have been much better. His attitude to unrepentant critics of Grey, like H.N.Brailsford and Bertrand Russell, was that such writers were "in their way high-minded, disinterested, courageous, and often very clever" but, for all that, "impassioned advocates, not fair-minded inquirers". To these two critics

1. Ibid., p.127.
2. Ibid., p.11
3. Ibid., p.84. "After all it is not always the fault of the doctor if the patient dies." His conclusion about Morocco was much the same and he noted of the non-white world (& Ireland) that, while there were "a few rusty spots on our large shield", one could not "have free institutions everywhere". The Way Forward, 1917, p.22.
4. Foreign Policy..., p.9. He damned Dickinson in the same way by pointing out that "neutrality of opinion" was not the same as "sincere and honest impartiality". "Conclusions Without Premises", Nation, XVIII, 13 (24 Dec.1915), 480, 482.
Murray was bound by ties of friendship and marriage,¹ and relations between Murray and Russell though on the surface friendly (despite different views) were seriously strained. While professing not to charge Russell with being "the friend of every country but his own", Murray came pretty close to implying just this.² Russell for his part claimed that Murray's "charmingly idyllic" account of Grey's foreign policy was written "under the tutelage" of the Foreign Office.³ And, while claiming that their friendship still lived "in the eternal world"⁴ Russell wrote elsewhere of Murray as "a snivelling sentimental ass", "as squasy as a slug".⁵

Although Russell's comments tell us something of the bitterness brought by wartime divisions, one must admit that some of Murray's writing warranted the description.⁶ But the strongest impression one gets from reading his wartime articles and pamphlets is of a liberal conscience grappling with the problem of the evil of war - for Murray was under no illusion about that:

"I have all my life been an advocate of Peace. I hate war, not merely for its own cruelty and folly,

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1. Brailsford & his wife were former pupils of Murray when he was Professor of Classics at Glasgow (1889-99). Murray had married Russell's cousin Lady Mary Howard.

2. See Foreign Policy..., pp.5-8. Murray had been called just this in his time. During the Boer War he had written that those who were called this were "at least friends of almost all humanity and in practice...often the best friends of their own country". "National Ideals...", p.181.


6. Eg. "When I realize most fully the burden we are bearing, the ordeal of the fire through which we are resolved to pass, I am not only proud of my country, I thank God that, if this awful event was to fall upon humanity - this awful evil to avert another yet more awful - that our country was called upon to stand in the very van of the battle and of suffering, and that we have not flinched from our task". "America & England" (Nov. 1916) repr. in Faith, War & Policy, 1918, p.181.
but because it is the enemy of all the causes that I care for most, of social progress and good government and all friendliness and gentleness of life, as well as of art and learning and literature. I have spoken and presided at more meetings than I can remember for peace and arbitration and the promotion of international friendship. I opposed the policy of war in South Africa with all my energies, and have been either outspokenly hostile or inwardly unsympathetic towards almost every war that Great Britain has waged in my lifetime.¹

Murray could thus "sympathize with every step" of the pacifist argument but baulk at acceptance of what seemed evil. For it was a "cardinal fact that in some causes" it was "better to fight and be broken than to yield peacefully". The "mere act of resisting to death" could be "in itself a victory".²

However, Murray did not confine himself to the firmer ground of philosophical objection to non-resistance.³ He was soon on the slippery slope which leads from "national honour" to talk of the "nobleness" of war. At the time of the Boer War he had written of patriotism as the practice of "always admiring whatever you yourself happen to do", and national "self-interest" as the basis of international politics.⁴ Now Murray professed to see "national honour" and "dishonour" as indeed "real things". No doubt a "deal of nonsense" was talked about them, but they were real all the same. Their "characteristic" was that they could not be bargained. Honour was "simply that which a free man values

¹ "How Can War Ever Be Right?" repr. ibid., p.20 (This had originally appeared as an Oxford pamphlet on the war) Murray had also newly translated Euripides' anti-war play Trojan Women, a project into which he put his most intense feelings.
² Loc.cit.
³ See below p.245.
⁴ "National Ideals...", p.163
more than life and dishonour as that which he avoids more than suffering and death", Murray wrote in September 1914. And what was true of individuals was also true of nations. Nations which did not follow this axiom were simply "corrupt". Belgium was therefore not merely a case of "self-preservation" for Britain but also one where interest coincided with honour. "Dishonour would have brought with it a subtler and more lasting disadvantage, greater in its sum than immediate death", Murray concluded. War was thus "not all evil". As "true tragedy" it had "nobleness and triumph in it as well as disaster".

Murray did not have such intimate ties with German culture as fellow-Liberals Bryce and H.A.L.Fisher - he had never studied at a German university for one thing. This may account for a certain ferocity in his attitude to Germany; certainly for his taking few pains to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans. In one of the first pamphlets on the war published by Oxford University Press Murray wrote as follows:

"We have now not only to strain every nerve to help our friend [France] - we must strain every nerve also to injure our enemy. This is horrible, but we must try to face the truth. For my own part, I find that I do desperately desire to hear of German dreadnoughts sunk in the North Sea. Mines are

1. "How Can War Ever Be Right?", pp.25, 30, 32, 39-40. Murray characterised the German invasion of Belgium as an attack by a "wicked man" on a "little girl" - an image well calculated to arouse righteous indignation.

2. Ibid., pp.41-2. Murray conceded that this was "dangerous ground" which lent itself easily "to foolish bombast". "We must not begin to praise war without stopping to reflect on the hundreds of thousands of human beings involved in such horrors of pain and indignity that, if here in our ordinary hours we saw one man so treated, the memory would sicken us to the end of our lives". But still it was possible "to see in this wilderness of evil some cases of extraordinary good".

3. His marriage prompted him to give up a chance to study under von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff in Berlin.
treacherous engines of death; but I should be only too glad to help in laying a mine for them. When I see one day that 20,000 Germans have been killed in such-and-such an engagement, and the next day that it was only 2,000, I am sorry."

But when reduced to "terms of private human life" Murray could see the tragedy of it all: "Maass is with his regiment, and we shall do our best to kill him and after that to starve Ulf and Ulf's mother." Yet for Murray this was - as the Germans would have put it - "A regrettable necessity". The starvation in Poland, as the result of the British blockade of the Central Powers, was "part of the normal means of war...There was no choice." It was not easy "to think of actions much more horrible", but the alternative was "something equivalent to helping the enemy".

If one accepted the war, then much of what Murray said was a realistic assessment of the consequences. But at times the tone of Murray's writing suggested a more emotional and new-found enthusiasm for what had become a moral crusade. "Some English liberals", he wrote in October 1914, "seem to be sorry and half ashamed that we have Russia as an ally; for my own part I am glad and proud. Not only because of her splendid military achievements, but because, so far as I can read the signs of such things, there is in Russia, more than in other nations, a vast untapped reservoir

1. "Thoughts On The War", (Aug.1914) repr.ibid,p.7 (this had appeared as an Oxford pamphlet).

2. Loc.cit.

3. The Problem Of Foreign Policy, 1917,pp.9-10. Elsewhere Murray insisted that "No human being in Germany need starve" because she was "completely self-supporting". Great Britain's Sea Policy, 1917,p.24
of spiritual power, of idealism, of striving for a nobler life. And that is what Europe will most need at the end of this bitter material struggle."¹ Similar Russophilia can be found in much of the writing on the war, but Murray had only a few months previously signed a neutrality manifesto which had called Russia "only partly civilised"; a power whose governing class was "largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious freedom".² Such a volte face was uncommon even among British liberals - suspicion of Russia did not always evaporate with support for the war. Murray began to keep company with members of the "Fight For Right" movement, a patriotic ginger group.³

Murray in common with most other Britons was ready to believe the worst of Germany, especially after the publication of the Bryce Report. He knew of the evidence uncovered even before its publication ⁴ and Murray continued to talk of "the great criminals and semi-maniacs in Germany and Austria" who had caused the war.⁵ He completely turned his back on the liberal view of the world he had once held and now agreed that the Germans had "plotted" the war for many years. As an American critic wrote in 1928, the original liberal view "was inadequate for the substantiation of the idealistic theories which were essential to the Liberal's support of the war. Bricks cannot be made without straw

¹ "First Thoughts On the War", p.18.
² See above p.63.
⁴ See letters of H.A.L.Fisher to Lady Mary Murray, Fisher Ms. Box 7.
⁵ "The Turmoil Of War" (Mar.1917). repr. in Faith, War & Policy, p.254. German "frightfulness" was a logical continuation of prewar plotting. Germany had gone "at each step outside the old conventions". "The broken treaty, the calculated ferocity in Belgium and Northern France, the killing of women and non-combatants by land and sea and air, the shelling of hospitals, the ill-treatment of wounded prisoners; all the doctoring of weapons with a view to cruelty; the explosive bullets the projectiles tinctured with substances which would produce a gangrenous wound; the poisoned gasses; the infected wells. It is the same method throughout." "Ethical Problems Of The War", p.20.
nor could the ideal of a war to end war be erected upon so narrow a ground as that afforded by the conviction that the war arose out of a diplomatic 'failure to improvise a Concert'....Germany's 'heavy balance of criminality in the last crisis' did not furnish enough handle for the newly uplifted Sword of Peace."

This is certainly true of Murray. He moved further from his prewar liberalism than other liberal intellectuals who supported the war. Once his initial commitment to the war was made Murray had to go on believing in the rightness of the Allied cause - that is, unless politicians were "using the language of mere hypocrisy".

Privately, however, Murray was beginning to voice his fears as early as May 1915. In a letter to J.L.Hammond he wrote:

"The thing that I mind is the realization that it is not the higher England, the England of freedom and moderation, that is fighting now; it is just England the mass of brute force and passion and cunning. And so, I suppose, it was bound to be....I had hoped against hope that, for once, war would not necessarily bring oppression and reaction. But I fear it will be the Pitt business all over again....We are a nation very like Germany without its discipline - a nation which scarcely deserves to win, or deserves it about as much as Russia does, because she was originally innocent."

In public Murray put on a brave face and told the "Fight for Right" movement that although militarism - in the form of Lord

1. I.C.Willis, England's Holy War, N.Y. 1928, p.125
2. Eg. A.D.Lindsay: "We recognize that for the general condition of Europe which made such a war possible we may, along with other nations, have been partly to blame, yet we hold that in the immediate situation we were guiltless and that it made most for the eventual peace of Europe that we should fight." War Against War, Oxford, 1914,p.3.
3. The Way Forward, p.24
4. 20 May 1915, Hammond Mss. vol.30
Roberts and Colonel Maude - did exist in Britain, they had as yet no political influence. Despite "this froth or scum", which sometimes floated to the surface, Britain remained "fundamentally true to her great traditions" and trod underfoot that which threatened its reputation as "a nation of 'white men', of rulers, of gentlemen". The role of the liberal intellectual was therefore to ensure that patriotism continued to be the preserve not just the Jingo. The danger was that "the many thousands of social reformers and radicals", who instinctively loathed war and had "only been convinced with the utmost resistance, if at all of the necessity of...fighting", might "from disgust and discouragement fall into the background". That, Murray felt, "would be the last culminating disaster. It would mean that the war had ceased to be a war for Free Europe against militarism, and had become merely one of the ordinary sordid and bloody struggles of nation against nation, one link in the insane chain of wrongs that lead ever to worse things."^2

But when could one decide the moment that war against the Central Powers had achieved the "deliverance of humanity from the power of the Sword", "Freedom for all nations, and for all men and women inside the nations"^3? The dilemma which Murray as a liberal faced is apparent in his address to the "Fight for Right" movement in March 1917. Anyone who prolonged the war "one day  

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3. The Way Forward, p.16
longer" than was "necessary for the establishment of the Right" would be "more wicked than the wretches who caused the war", Murray claimed. Such a man could see the consequences of his actions more clearly even than the German rulers who had embarked upon war in July 1914. But one should not wish for the war to be ended "a day sooner" than "Public Right" became the law of the civilised world once again. "One is sometimes bewildered by this drag in two contrary directions", Murray noted, "bewildered till it is hard to see clear."¹ This bewilderment was evident in Murray's association with Lansdownism in January 1918² at a time when he was still counselling against peace talks. For a peace settlement not to be motivated by "a mere grabbing or Jingo sentiment" there first had to be military victory. "If we make peace now we make peace with militarism triumphant", Murray wrote in the Daily News. "If we propose peace now we are offering terms to the very dragon we set out to destroy. Remember we are fighting for a just peace. Let us face the facts. Let us not trouble too much about our Northcliffes and our Carsons. When a different spirit begins to rule in Germany and Austria there will naturally come a change here and in France.³

The long effort to keep British liberalism "fully in touch with the war"⁴ seemed to have paid off a few weeks later when Lloyd George's statement of war aims appeared, followed soon by the

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¹ "The Turmoil Of War", p.254.
³ 1 Jan.1918, cit. Willis,p.247, n8.
⁴ Murray to Fisher, 10 Aug, 1914(typescript),Murray Mss.Box 19.
publication of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. It now seemed to Murray that his fears of "punitive tariffs, the crushing of Germany, annexations, war-indemnities, new naval stations, and the whol imperialist farrago" had "disappeared into the bog of No-man's Land".¹ There now seemed a real chance of the kind of peace settlement which Murray had hoped for from the first weeks of the war.² It was Wilson - for Murray as for Dickinson - who was now the "leader of the Allied cause"; a welcome counter to the "Northcliffian Ministry" led by Lloyd George.³ Indeed, there seemed no obstacle to a "clean peace" except military stalemate. If the strain of war was "prolonged beyond a certain point" it seemed "almost inevitable that the common longing for peace among the suffering poor throughout Europe, reinforced by a vague but widespread conviction that, while their Governments can never agree, they themselves are agreed" would lead to European revolution which could even affect Britain.⁴ The fear of what Murray called a "Bolshevik peace" was common to liberals like Fisher and leaders of the moderate left like Beatrice Webb, to supporters of the war like Murray and critics like Dickinson.⁵

But there was little direct likelihood of revolution in Britain, or so it seemed to Murray,⁶ and he was more concerned

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¹ "Preface" to Faith, War & Policy, pp.ix, xiv
² See his letter to Fisher op.cit. and "Thoughts On The War".
⁴ "Preface" to Faith, War & Policy, pp.xi-xii.
⁶ "...except in the sense that a very great transfer of votes at a General Election might be termed a revolution." "Preface to Faith, War & Policy, p.xi."
with the "grave danger of political reaction". As he wrote to E.D.Morel in August 1919, the "imminent and ghastly danger" was "comparatively slight on the revolutionary side but very great indeed on the reactionary, protectionist, military side".¹ As a Liberal he felt himself caught between this and the Jingoism of the "mob". "The political reaction" would "not take the form of a mere wave of extreme conservatism". The "real danger" would be "a reaction against anything that might be called mellow and wise in politics", "a struggle between crude, militarist reaction and violent, unthinking democracy".² This had been the basis of his objection to the U.D.C. idea of "democratic control" of foreign policy³ as it had been part of the reason for his efforts on behalf of conscientious objectors persecuted by the Government.⁴ The price of Britain's entry into the war had been a marked diminution of moral purpose. "It was part of the price we had to pay", he told the "Fight For Right" movement. Total war meant that a "high and austere duty" was handed over to agents who could not possibly perform it: "to masses of very ordinary people, and not only of very ordinary people, but of stupid and vulgar and drunken and covetous and dishonest and tricky and cruel and brutal people, who will transform your imagined crusade into a very

1. 23 Aug. 1919, Morel Mss.
3. Increased democracy was no "substitute for character and wisdom" and could in fact lead to "recklessness", "unreason" and "chauvinism". It all depended on what was meant by "the people": the readers of the yellowest type of newspaper or those who rose to "the mind's eye as one returns from a meeting of the Workers' Educational Association or a particularly good trade union discussion". "The Democratic Control Of Foreign Policy". Contemporary Rev., CIX, 2 (Feb.1916), 180-91 (a review of A.Ponsonby, Democracy & Diplomacy).
4. One his visit to Asquith to prevent death sentences being carried out in France, see Murray to J.W.Graham, 28 Dec.1920, Murray Mss.Box 57.
different reality."¹

There was no disguising Murray's disillusionment - the distaste which sprang from life-long teetotalism was the least of it. "We want to democratise the country...but we do not want to vulgarise it", Murray lamented² - a lament echoed by subsequent generations of genteel liberals. All around him the world of the first fifty years of his life was crumbling. The war had exacerbated "every kind of social instability" and fostered a "habit of violence in public things". There had been heroism and self-sacrifice, but the war had also revealed "startling flaws" in the social order. Murray listed these for the Civic and Moral Education League: the amount of "hysteria" which lay so close to the surface, "the defects of the governing machine, the immense power of the organised lie and the hideous tyranny of the advertisement; the thinness of the crust which separates civilisation from savagery; and the rapidity with which human beings become inured to stories and even actions of cruelty, which not only have sickened them, but would have seemed incredible to them in the years before the war."³ Hence the importance for Murray of the League of Nations. He was one of those people for whom it "offered all the advantages of revolution without its troubles.

¹ "The Turmoil Of War", pp.240-1.
² "The Pale Shade", 1917, p.35. In the course of this pamphlet (widely distributed in America) Murray stoutly defended royalty, the House of Lords (except for the Tory "stranglehold") and, most of all, the English gentleman.
³ "Is An Estimate Of Our Own Age Possible?", Contemporary Rev., CXVI, 2(Aug.1919), 133.
There need be no social upheaval, no abandonment of ancient values; simply a slight twist to the existing machine of international relations, and all would be well.  

Through the twenties and thirties Murray continued to preach that the only way to salvation lay through the League. "If our civilization is to be saved", Murray told students at Aberystwyth in 1933, "we must meet the campaign of violence by reason, by fairness, by accurate information, and by trust in the ultimate good will and good sense of the great mass of disinterested mankind." This work for the League and peace in the thirties is largely beyond the scope of this chapter, but we can note that Murray's approach to the League was in some ways a natural extension of his prewar liberalism. "The parallel holds good between the governing and the governed Britons on the one hand, and on the other between Great Britain and the lesser breeds without the law which Britain was to bring within the pale." Such is the assessment of Salvador de Madariaga, who worked closely with Murray during the thirties. Murray never ceased to regret the passing of the "Victorian Cosmos" - life with values, public morality order and respect for the law - and all his efforts were directed towards

1. Troublemakers, p.156
2. The Cult Of Violence, 1934, p.18
3. "Gilbert Murray & the League", in Murray, Unfinished Autobiography, pp.186-7. "The assumption, the subconscious attitude was that Britain would rule the waves of international assemblies as she had ruled the waves of the sea; that she knew best what was good for the happiness of other nations." Madariaga calls Murray & Lord Robert Cecil "Civic Monks" in their "desire to widen the scope and concept of their deity" from Britain and the Empire to greater international organization (p.178).
the recovery of that "wholesome tradition" "of veracity, of consistency, of honesty and economy, and of intellectual competence" inherited from Peel, Salisbury and Gladstone. He claimed too that the war had caused "a certain change of emphasis" in his attitude to political change - a new appreciation of true conservatism - but it was the world rather than Murray which had changed the most.

Murray's faith in the League saved him from the disillusionment which affected that other Gladstonian Liberal L.T. Hobhouse after the war. In a sense the consistency of his beliefs over a lifetime, which spanned two world wars, also prevented him from coming to terms with the problem of "the cult of violence", although in the thirties he came to believe (as he had during the First World War) that the League had "to stand up against violence for the sake of right". His Cambridge contemporary Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, with whom Murray had disagreed so profoundly during the war, had similar hopes of the League although he died before Nazi Germany presented the most serious challenges to it. But in other ways the two men were completely different. Dickinson, the retiring don, invented the name "League of Nations" and was one of its earliest supporters during the war. But apart from a

1. Problem of Foreign Policy, pp.5-6. The Ordeal Of This Generation, 1929, pp.173-9. Like Hobhouse (see above p.105) Murray held the erosion of a synthetic world view (especially in science) as in part responsible for the existing "chaos".

2. "Before the war I was a Liberal, and I believe now that nothing but the sincere practice of Liberal principles will save European society from imminent revolution and collapse... Before the war I was eager for large and sweeping reforms, I was intolerant of Conservatism, and I laughed at risks. The social order then had such a margin of strength that risks could be safely taken. Now I feel a need above all things of qualities that will preserve civilization." Problem Of Foreign Policy, pp.5-6.


short term of service on the "Committee on Intellectual Cooperation" Dickinson took no part in League affairs in Geneva after the war. Murray, although he had hoped for some postwar "Concert" during the early months of the war, did not publicly espouse the cause of the League until 1918 when, as we have seen, it had become a politically respectable thing so to do. After the war Murray became the foremost League intellectual - Chairman of the League of Nations Union in Britain (1922-38) and President of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at Geneva from 1928 onwards.
"Yet still, after centuries of stumbling, reason is no more than the furtive accomplice of habit and force. Force creates, habit perpetuates, reason the sycophant sanctions. And so he [Man] drifts, not up but down, and Nature watches in anguish, self-forbidden to intervene, unless it be to annihilate. If he is to drive, and drive straight, reason must seize the reins; and the art of her driving is the art of politics."


The character of Geoffrey Vivian, "a man of letters", in Dickinson's most famous book has been said to be "the character whom he cast in the role of himself". But from the time of the First World War until his death in 1932 Dickinson was known to the public as publicist for the League of Nations and author of The International Anarchy (1926), a book with an influence comparable with Angell's Great Illusion a quarter of a century earlier. As we have seen, Dickinson, like Gilbert Murray, was involved in political affairs before 1914, standing to the left of main-stream Liberalism. It was as the author of the then standard text on The Development Of Parliament During The Nineteenth Century (1895) that Dickinson wrote a series of long letters in The Nation during the controversy over Lloyd George's budget in 1910.


2. VI, 23 (5 Mar.1910), 881; VII, 6 (7 May 1910), 205-6; 8 (21 May 1910), 277-8; 9 (28 May 1910), 312; 10 (4 June 1910), 348-9. Or rather, as author of the French translation (1906), for in a new preface Dickinson disassociated himself from his earlier criticism of the House of Commons & general antagonism to democracy (and presumably of his support for a second chamber). In 1895 Dickinson had been "a kind of Socialistic Tory". Autobiography, p.144
As a young Fellow of King's College, Cambridge - he had been elected for a dissertation on Plotinus (1887) - Dickinson's views had been those of an elitist conservative. "He took the Tories at their own valuation as aristocrats, and held with Plato that the best should rule", another Fellow of King's wrote of him.\(^1\) In this he was probably like a great many Oxford and Cambridge dons. But the Boer War encouraged Dickinson to turn to Liberalism, and he began to see that "Tory rule meant pluto-cracy, not as he had held aristocracy".\(^2\) As E.M. Forster points out, this was in a sense a "return" since Dickinson had been influenced as an undergraduate by the writings of Henry George.\(^3\)

Dickinson's later writings show traces of the earlier elitism, and he never quite lost a rather fastidious horror of the working classes whose cause he came later to espouse.\(^4\) His dislike of violence extended to the ideas of the revolutionary

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1. Wedd, 178.
2. Loc.cit. Forster, p. 72
3. See Forster, pp. 32–42. Dickinson had progressed through bell-ringing, reforming prostitutes, the Church of England Temperance Society to working on a co-operative farm (1885) started by Harold Cox, later a member of the Bryce Commission on German atrocities in Belgium.
4. "For the working classes as then existing he had little enthusiasm, and it was not until much later in his life that he established personal contacts with them. He had been brought up in a Victorian household, he minded his h's being dropped, he knew he ought not to mind, still he did mind. And - a more serious aversion - he could not see that the working-class movement was proceeding in a direction which was either good or new." Even after he moved further left as the result of the war, Dickinson persisted in his doubts. "He feared that there would be a levelling down, instead of a levelling up....Thus, although he came more and more to condemn our economic system and advocate drastic changes, he had no sympathy whatever with the Marxian who rejects Shakespeare and Chekhov on the ground that they wrote for capitalists." Ibid, pp. 72-3.
socialists, and there was in Dickinson's prewar political philosophy something of the fashionable literary anarchist of the London salon. "I have far more sympathy with Proudhon and with Kropotkin than with Marx and the Social Democrats", he wrote in 1906. In short, when airing "socialist" views, Dickinson would quote from Mill or Ruskin or Whitman, but not Marx. As far as international affairs were concerned, Dickinson views seem to have been a mixture of optimism about the prospects for peace and a vague foreboding of future war. "There may, indeed, be war between Germany and England", he wrote in November 1907, "but, if so, it will be because the government and peoples of those countries have willed it; not because of any necessity to be." But in August 1914, a few days after the outbreak of war, Dickinson exonerated the "peoples" but not their governments from blame.

Writing in an obviously emotional state, he wrote of the death and destruction which would be the only certain outcome:

"Not one of the men employed in this work of destruction wants to perform it; not one of them knows how it came about that he is performing it; not one of them knows what object is to be served by performing it. The non-combatants are in the same case. They did not foresee this, they did not want it, they did not choose it. They were never consulted. No one in Europe desires to be engaged in such work. We are sane people but our acts are

1. "It would be hard to find any possible case for international war which would be as strong as the case for social war, if the analysis of the militant socialists were correct and sufficient. I do not myself think it is; and, further, I think no solution by force of the social question is possible, even if it were desirable." "Is War Inevitable?", 222.


4. "Peace Or War?", 132
mad. Why? Because we are all in the hands of some score of individuals called Governments. Some score among the hundreds of millions of Europeans. These men have willed this thing for us over our heads. No nation has had the chance of saying No. The Russian peasants march because the Tsar and the priest tell them to. That of course. But equally the German Socialists march; equally the French Socialists. These men know what war means. They know what its effects must be. They hate it. But they march. Business men, knowing too, hating too, watch them march. Working men watch them march, and wait for starvation. All are powerless. The die has been cast for them. The crowned gamblers cast it, and the cast was death.¹

The war was a terrible blow to Dickinson. There was a feeling of sheer helplessness for a man over fifty years of age who did not feel able to fight the Germans with his pen. As he wrote to Janet Ashbee in November 1914: "It would be easier to bear, and probably one would get the perspective better, if one were a young man who could serve, or had trained oneself for some function that might be useful now. But if one's whole life has been given up to trying to establish and spread reason, and suddenly the gulf opens and one finds the world is ruled by force and wishes to be so, one feels forlorn, indeed worse than forlorn."² This despair was deepened by the ostracism Dickinson experienced in Cambridge. As President of the Cambridge branch of the U.D.C. he was an obvious target for the super-patriots.³ Being of a far more sensitive nature than Russell, Dickinson became a virtual recluse

1. "The Holy War", Nation, XV,19(8 Aug.1914),700."...common men are tools. The rulers play on them like pipes."


during wartime, confining himself to the writing of pamphlets and articles on the war.\(^1\) Later he moved to the more anonymous surroundings of London. But he was not persecuted like his colleague at King's, A.C. Pigou. "I suffered nothing in Cambridge except a complete want of sympathy", he later wrote.\(^2\) But this was bad enough for someone like Dickinson.

After the dismissal of Russell from his lectureship at Trinity Dickinson wrote bitterly that "endowed semi-public institutions" were "no place for genuine and independent minds". "If you are honest and intelligent you must be a heretic and an outcast."\(^3\) But, compared with Russell, Dickinson was not cut out to play the role of outcast. "Dickinson was a man who inspired affection by his gentleness and pathos", Russell once remarked.

And he continued:

"When he was a Fellow and I was still an undergraduate, I became aware that I was liable to hurt him by my somewhat brutal statement of unpleasant truths, or what I thought to be such. States of the world which made me caustic only made him sad, and to the end of his days whenever I met him, I was afraid of increasing his unhappiness by too stark a realism. But perhaps realism is not quite the right word. What I really mean is the practice of describing things which one finds almost unendurable in such a repulsive manner as to cause others to share one's fury. He told me once that I resembled

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1. "My sense of isolation from common opinion, my melancholy, and my clear sense of fact (for I must call it) caused me to retire altogether from such life as there was in the place. I lived and ate alone, when I was in Cambridge, and saw almost nobody. The long winter evenings still linger with me. Shut into my room, I seemed for a time to have shut out the world. My dim reading lamp, the rich red wallpaper, the flickering fire, were my background." Autobiography, p.196 (written May 1927). See Proctor's comments, p.24.

2. Ibid., p.195. "Cambridge is just dead. It has something of the alleged repose of the tomb, and that's all one can say for it." Letter to N.Wedd, 4 Nov.1916. Wedd Mss.Box 3. For Pigou, see below p.

3. Letter to N.Wedd, 4 Nov.1916, Wedd Mss.
Cordelia, but it cannot be said that he resembled King Lear."¹

One of Russell's "unpleasant truths", with which Dickinson seemed never to have come to terms, was the problem of human violence. Roger Fry echoed William James when he noted that Dickinson's writings betrayed "far too optimistic and naive" a "conception of human nature". They showed "no notion of how much a primitive and prelogical mentality still survived in civilised man". E.M. Forster was nearer the mark when he added that Dickinson did in fact realise this but refused to face the "consequences".² But one might go one step further. Dickinson was intellectually and temperamentally incapable of facing the consequences of a view of man which suggested, if not that war was inevitable, that some kind of violence was. The writings of Professor Cramb, he noted in November 1914, could not be "answered. Those things lie too deep for argument. One is one kind of man or the other."³

And there Dickinson left it, having no desire to read Cramb or anyone like him. But, as we shall see, the experience of war pushed Dickinson further to the limits of his faith that reason would prevail.

1. "Some Of My Contemporaries At Cambridge", Portraits From Memory, 1956, pp.67-8. The authoress Vernon Lee, another U.D.C. member was exasperated by Dickinson's "fairmindedness" and claimed "that he was 'wrinkled with scruples'". Forster, p.133. See also K. Martin, Father Figures, 1966, pp.117-27 & Woolf, Beginning Again, pp.190-1.

2. Forster, p.136. This too was the view of the leader writer in the Morning Post who noted of Dickinson's criticism of the public school cult of games: "The football match of which he is the horrified witness, is merely the microcosm of an even fiercer and more horrible struggle from which his sensitive nature instinctively veils itself. That unreflecting patriotism of which he complains is nothing but the tribal or racial instinct of self-preservation which exists in all healthy animals and all healthy flocks of animals. Mr Dickinson's quarrel is really with Nature. It is an offence to him that there should be 'violent instincts'." 9 Jan. 1918, cutting in Dickinson Mss. See also Dickinson's reply ibid., 15 Jan. 1918, p.6.

As an early member of the U.D.C. Dickinson made the customary obeisance to the idea of democratic control of foreign policy. As he wrote the Professor of Political Economy at the L.S.E.: "Of course public opinion is anything but infallible. Yet I think that publicity in diplomacy, if and so long as diplomacy goes on, is essential. For one does have a chance of enlightening opinion, but one has none of enlightening foreign office officials and militarists and diplomatists." And he noted in an American magazine in August 1916: "It is a diplomatist's war. None of the peoples wanted it, and none of them would have stood for it, if in some way they could have been jointly consulted in the light of the full knowledge of the facts." This belief in the pacific nature of the electorate was, however, somewhat shaken by Italian entry to the war at a time when the full extent of the carnage was becoming apparent. How could it be explained? Dickinson admitted that it had been probably "forced...by popular enthusiasm". And if this were true, then for those who believed in the Allied cause it was "an example of the sound instinct of the people defeating the erroneous calculations of the statesmen". One cannot help but feel that here Dickinson was trying to have it both ways, given his doubts about the war.

1. Letter to E.Canaan, 11 Sept.1914, Canaan Mss. 1022. Canaan himself was rather sceptical of the practicability of "democratic control". See his letters to E.D.Morel, 12 Sept.1914 & C.R.Buxton, 13 April 1916, Canaan Mss.1023.

2. "Democratic Control of Foreign Policy", Atlantic Monthly, CXVIII, 2 (Aug.1916),145."...this war, like all wars for many centuries in Europe, was brought about by governments, without the connivance and against the desires and interests of peoples....War is made - this war has been made - not by any necessity of nature, any law beyond human control, any fate to which men must passively bow." "Wars are made by governments acting under the influence of governmental theory," "The War & The Way Out", Atlantic Monthly, CXIV, 6 (Dec.1914), 820. The War & The Way Out, 1914, p.10

Dickinson was never as unequivocally opposed to the war as was Russell. In his first pamphlet, for example, he began with the disclaimer that it was "not a 'stop the war' pamphlet. Being in this war, I think, as all Englishmen think, that we must go on fighting until we can emerge from it with our territory and our security intact, and with the future peace of Europe assured, so far as wisdom can assure it."¹ Nor did Dickinson criticise Sir Edward Grey during the war - in public at least. In the European Anarchy (1916), the forerunner of his International Anarchy, Dickinson even described him as "probably the most pacific Minister that ever held office in a great nation". "I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward Grey", he concluded.² This was not very different from the eulogies of Grey composed by Gilbert Murray. Why then were Dickinson's writings listed with those of Russell by the War Office Censor (March 1917) and the National Peace Council forbidden to collect them on behalf of the Nobel and Carnegie peace organisations?³ That he was a leading U.D.C. intellectual was enough reason in itself. But in addition, a reader of one of Dickinson's pamphlets would have come away with the impression that his support for the war was qualified to say the least.

In a way it seemed that Dickinson could not really make up his mind. "While...it is unhistorical and unjust to pretend that

¹. War & The Way Out, p.7.
². pp.22, 126
³. C. Playne, Britain Holds On, 1917, 1918, 1933, p.59
Germany as such stands for domination, and the Western Powers for freedom", he wrote in 1915, "yet we may say with truth that a victory of the Western Powers, so far as their influence can reach, should make for freedom, while a victory of Germany will make for domination." A carefully-weighed judgement unusual among British historians during the war. Yet, only a few pages earlier, Dickinson had talked of the war as just "one of the many wars for power and position". 1 Much of Dickinson’s writing on the war was, as his friend Nathaniel Wedd commented, "shorn of its rhetoric just an impotent, helpless cry of the heart". 2 It was this lack of what might be called "tough-mindedness" in Dickinson which probably attracted him to the idea of an "international anarchy" as the cause of the war. It enabled him to account for the breakdown of peace in impersonal, even mechanistic terms, and so to play down the element of individual responsibility on all sides. As he wrote to Leonard Woolf: "From these and most of the despatches, one gets a curious and disconcerting impression that none of the diplomats seriously wanted war, indeed that all feared it, but that the situation like a greek fate was leading them on into it." 3

While Dickinson agreed "with the general view outside Germany that the final responsibility for the war at the last

1. After The War, 1915, pp.13,7. At other times Dickinson came very close to the talk about Kultur common in the usual justifications for British policy (eg. see p.111).

2. Letter to F.P.Bulmer, 21 Feb.1915 (typescript), Wedd Mss. "Dickinson says we could not avoid making war and he hopes we shall win: but on the other hand he does nothing to help us to win and always talks of war as wicked in such a way as to imply that it is wicked of us to take part in it. The fact is he is upset by the horrors of war and cannot stop to make his attitude logical or his position clear." Wedd to Bulmer, 10 Sept.1917 (typescript) Wedd Mss.

3. 2 Nov.1918, Woolf Mss.
moment" rested with the Central Powers, he disputed "with full conviction" the view "universally held in England" that Germany had been "pursuing for years past a policy of war", while all the other powers had sought only peace.¹ The invasion of Belgium was not the culmination of long-term German policy, but merely "an episode in a war already begun" - the previously bloodless warfare of competing states in an unregulated international system.² Belgium was thus only "a contributory cause of British intervention", although Dickinson agreed - in public at least - "with the general view" that it would have been "neither right nor wise" for Britain to abstain after 1914.³ If Germany made war inevitable "at the last moment", the origins still lay in the "state of fear and suspicion on both sides". "When there is such tension ...in the European situation", Dickinson concluded, "some Power or other will be tempted to precipitate the catastrophe, and some Power or other will always succumb to the temptation."⁴ If it had not been Germany in 1914, it would have been Russia the following year. "And some other year it might have been France or England. The War came out of the European system, the system of states armed against one another, and dominated by mutual suspicion and fear." So long as that system continued to operate

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1. European Anarchy, pp.134-5
2. After the War, p.7.
3. "The War & The Way Out: A Further Consideration", Atlantic Mthly., CXV, 4(April 1915), 518. The Choice Before Us, 1917, p.v. Privately Dickinson wrote to Leonard Woolf:"...I think nations really never go to war merely in defence of supposedly outraged international law, but always for their interests. We should never have gone to war merely because the Germans broke the treaty. And we should probably have aided and abetted France if she had wanted to break it." 7 Dec.1916, Woolf Mss. This was the kind of allegation made publicly by Morel & Russell during the war.⁵
there would always be a danger of war. These views, expressed as early as the first months of the war, were Dickinson's lasting contribution to the postwar debate on the war.

After the first months of the war Dickinson seems gradually to have lost interest in the idea of "democratic control" and to have spent less time working for the U.D.C. Unlike Russell, who also moved away from the apparent dead-end of the U.D.C., Dickinson did not move further "left". From 1915 onwards he became increasingly involved in agitation for a postwar league of nations, and generally kept company with "the moderate liberals of the Bryce Group". It was Dickinson (or perhaps someone else in this group) who first coined the term "league of nations", and certainly he was an important intermediary between the U.D.C., the Bryce Group and the American League to Enforce Peace. A recent American estimate is that, apart from his scheme for an international police force, "Dickinson's ideas were the common denominator of early American and European peace programmes. Within the United Kingdom numerous internationalist, pacifist and reform organisations and Liberal and Labour party politicians propagated them." Dickinson was the very antithesis of a "remote and ineffectual don". "Remote", perhaps. But "ineffectual"? Dickinson's auto-

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1. "The War & The Way Out: A Further Consideration", 518. Britain, he noted elsewhere, was fortunate in one respect: "As ambitious, as quarrelsome, and aggressive as other States, her geographical position has directed her aims overseas rather than towards the Continent". European Anarchy, p.11.

2. Taylor, Troublemakers, pp.16, 162-3.


biography makes it clear that his greatest wish was "to influence opinion and the course of events". To the extent that the league movement, as we have seen, had become politically respectable by 1918, Dickinson succeeded in this objective.

However, in the first two years of the war Dickinson's path was a lonely one. He was the only British representative at a meeting in the Hague in April 1915 held under the auspices of the Anti Oorlog Raad (Committee Against War) to discuss international law and the prevention of war. The Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable which resulted from this meeting was severely criticised in the British press. Dickinson saw Grey when he returned but received little encouragement, though the latter expressed no objection to Dickinson's plans for an American lecture-tour to publicise the league idea. The admirer of Kropotkin in 1906 now, nine years later, found international anarchy an indisputable raison d'etre for international organisation. "A league of Europe is not Utopia. It is sound business", he wrote in 1914. And a year later: "The ideal of the future is federation and to that ideal all the significant facts of the present point. It is idle for states to resist the current".

1. "I never wanted to write learned and scholarly works....Whether I have been at all successful I doubt. Events can be influenced by thought, but only if the thought is more original than mine has ever been, and the personality behind it more massive. Voltaire and Rousseau did for France and Marx for Germany and the world what I should have liked to do for England." Autobiography, pp.145-6.

2. Eg. the international lawyer T.E.Holland in The Times, 18 Oct. 1915, p.4d. See also M.Z.Doty, The Central Organisation For A Durable Peace (1915-1919), Geneva, 1945, passim. There were German & Austrian representatives at the meeting.


4. War & The Way Out, p.41. After The War, p.21. It was neatly encapsulated by Sir Arthur Salter in his preface to the posthumous edition of The International Anarchy (1937): "Internation anarchy is the cause of war; and international government, therefore, the indispensable condition of preventing it." (p.vii)
But privately Dickinson feared that military stalemate might be the only way to peace - and that would "never be accepted till everything else" had been "tried in vain". When the war still continued after the terrible losses of 1916, Dickinson's worst fears seemed justified. He had now to recognise "the fundamental fact" that men's actions were "controlled more by passion than by reason". Passion was "aroused by abstract notions and words" and thus it became possible for men to sacrifice everything for causes which had "no bearing on their real interests, whether material, moral or spiritual." 

It was not in the "real interests" of the British people, Dickinson argued, for their government to "crush" Germany. True, she had "behaved barbarously in Belgium" and at sea, but there were dangers in pursuing a policy of unconditional surrender. Any plans to punish the Kaiser and German officials, any talk of "annual tribute" or annexation of German colonies, would nip in the bud the growth of a German peace party. After the Economic Conference of the Allies in Paris in June 1916 Dickinson was especially worried by the possibility of "economic war" against Germany when military hostilities had ceased. As he wrote to C.P.Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, there seemed "only too much reason to fear" that the Allies were "continuing the

2. Choice Before Us.p.88
war, not to achieve their avowed objects, but to realize illegal schemes of conquest" which would "leave the condition of Europe worse than before". Perhaps even more alarming was the threat to civil liberties in Britain. The "persecution of conscience" was a direct outcome of continuing the war for its own sake.¹ The revelations next year of secret Allied diplomacy by the Bolsheviks confirmed all Dickinson's fears that an opportunity for compromise peace had been missed. In a letter to Gilbert Murray he laid the responsibility for the demise of civilian control in Berlin squarely at the door of the Allied governments:

"For the sake of definition, not of controversy, I will say that I agree with you that once war had broken out, it was 'inevitable' that every means would be adopted, at every cost to everything, to win the war. Hence, if other governments offered their aid only on terms which were contrary to all their and our professions, our government could not refuse. This is all the hideous logic of war. But, on the other hand, it is equally 'inevitable' that effects should produce causes[sic]. And from the moment those treaties were entered into, our professions became insincere, and being known to be insincere by the decent people in enemy countries, the possibility of a meeting point on a good 'league of nations' peace between the internationalists... of all countries was ruined. No one could think worse than I do of the German military party. They show what they are sufficiently now they are in power. The tragedy is that there [sic] were not in power until Brest-Litovsk, but only fighting for power. They would, I believe, have been defeated, if the allied governments had been able and willing to meet the policy of the Reichstag majority with sympathy instead of with blank negation."²


². 3 May 1915, Murray Mss.Box 81.
No doubt Dickinson overestimated the strength of "pacific and internationally-minded elements" in Germany, and it is interesting to compare his analysis with that of his Cambridge colleague J.M.Keynes. Keynes was sceptical of the favourite liberal distinction between German government and people. Writing in August 1916 under the pseudonym "Politicus", he saw at least "passive acquiescence" in the attitude of Germans towards their government's foreign policy. "The idea that the German government is entirely freed from this influence and can make the people do exactly what it wishes will not bear examination", he noted. "Had the will for peace in Germany been wholehearted and strong and really widespread, it would not have been so easy to bamboozle the people in August 1914." For this had in fact been necessary.  

1. How then did this affect the advocates of a compromise peace? Keynes felt that they had to establish first that there was military stalemate, and second that an early peace would prove "durable", before they could "hope to influence any important section of public opinion" in Allied countries. And he continued:

"So long as we think that there is a reasonable chance of 'crushing' Germany and 'dictating' terms, there is not the smallest doubt we shall insist on going on. On the other hand, even when we have finally made up our minds that there will be no decisive military victory, we shall refuse and rightly refuse to make peace, if we think it probable that it will be used by Germany for a policy of 'reculer pour mieux...

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1. "Face The Facts", War & Peace (Aug.1916) repr. Keynes, Collected Writings, XVI, 183. A year previously Keynes had written that Germans were not as different from the rest of the world as wartime propaganda claimed. The "general note" in Germany was one of "moderation, sobriety, reasonableness and truth". "The Economics Of War In Germany", Economic J., XXV, 3 (Sept.1915), 452.
sauter'. We could at least hang on and let 'attrition' work for a year or two, until a different result became probable. Pacifists must show that a different result is probable now, and unless they can do that, the most convincing demonstrations of 'deadlock' are in vain."¹

Events were to prove Keynes right. Many people were beginning to doubt the effectiveness of attrition, but the number confident of the possibility of compromise peace in 1916 was much smaller.

The secret treaties not only prolonged the war but, in Dickinson's eyes, they were also "largely responsible for the character of the Treaty of Versailles". Yet, although he fully accepted J.M.Keynes's denunciation of the penal aspects of the Treaty,² Dickinson had to swallow it as a "Hybrid Peace". If he wanted to see Wilsonian plans for international organisation come to fruition, the most he could do was press for far-reaching revision, and not rejection. Unlike many wartime supporters of Wilsonian ideas, he did not desert the American President.³ As he wrote in the house journal of the League of Nations Union, "the territorial and economic provisions" were "framed on the traditional lines of cupidity and fear". Over this monstrous fabric thus erected" the League was "left to float, like a rainbow in the sky". But still it was "an achievement which, at the outbreak of the war, would have seemed to most men incredible". Criticism was justified, but it had to be remembered that the League was

¹. "Face The Facts", 180. The attribution to Keynes is on circumstantial evidence only (see p.179).
². The "effect, and, presumably the intention" was to destroy Germany as a great economic Power", to make her "a helot nation". "The Choice Before Us", Covenant, I, 2 (Jan.1920), 186-90. "The Plight of Germany", Nation, XXVII, II (11 Dec.1920), 381.
"the creation of victorious states just emerged from a bloody and bitter war. And to expect this fact not to be reflected in the terms of the Covenant, and in the behaviour of the Governments, was to expect a cool magnanimity which victors have never been able to show." Such cool-headed analysis was not common among intellectuals of the liberal-left in 1920.

According to E.M. Forster, the war made Dickinson a supporter of the Labour Party, and his analysis of the war in books like *The Causes of International War* (1920) and *War Its Nature Cause And Cure* (1923) showed the influence of this with their references to the "social class" basis of British foreign policy. The war, he wrote in 1920 had killed liberalism: "war is the opposite of Liberalism; and Liberals, when they wage it, cease to be Liberals." The growth of national hatreds and of the conflict of Capital and Labour had also killed liberalism, but there was more danger in "the bitter intransigence of the possessing classes than from any desire of the mass of workers to have recourse to violence." This was, at best, qualified faith in working class internationalism, and Dickinson still saw the masses as "easy dupes of imperialism". Before "working people" could be

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1. "The Choice Before Us, 186. Dickinson did, however, try to understand how such a "Hybrid Peace" had come about: "To say that the Allied nations went to war in order to do what they have actually done may be unjust...while certain generous conceptions haunted the upper storeys of men's minds, the currents of tradition, of habit, of half-unavowed interest and ambition were sweeping them, all the time, along the old channels".

2. p.95.

3. A class basis "so direct, so simple, so unamenable to discussion and argument, as to resemble an instinct". *Causes of International War*, pp.69, 103. Cf. *International Anarchy*, 1937 ed., p.36

"secured for internationalism" they would have to "stand up against a deadly assault of imperialism upon their predatory instincts".\(^1\) Possibly what Forster calls Dickinson's "hatred of crowd psychology"\(^2\) was even stronger now, after the popular clamour for revenge in Allied countries. In a pamphlet written for the Swarthmore College peace "handbook" series Dickinson faced the unpalatable fact of the "colossal egotism of the herd":

"...'people', the great mass, that is, of the uninitiated, who pursue their daily work and play, until the trumpet of doom blows from the heaven of their rulers, these must be regarded as victims and dupes, not accomplices, in the great game. But though that may be so, yet the masses must bear their responsibility, seeing that it is their passions, instincts and emotions that respond to the call when it is made...

One might compare nations to patients liable to outbreaks of homicidal mania, but normally sane, kindly, helpful and productive. Certain words, rashly spoken, are known to bring on the attacks. Wise and humane keepers would, therefore, avoid speaking to them."\(^3\)

In Dickinson's last major book The International Anarchy he ended with the words: "Europe is armed, suspicious, and covetous, even more than she was before the war".\(^4\) The next six

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1. Causes Of International War, pp.103-4

2. p.86. The Allied governments had "created a Frankenstein, and Frankenstein insisted on his pound of flesh at Versailles." "Future of British Liberalism", 553.

3. Causes Of International War, pp.82-5. In his bibliography Dickinson cited Wilfred Trotter's Instincts of the Herd in War & Peace (1916), a pioneering work of social psychology with an influence comparable to McDougall's book eight years earlier. Trotter denied that the mass of voters exercised rational choice. The "herd instinct" encouraged conformity & fear of deviance. Any consensus was thus basically irrational, conservative & acquiescent to authority.

4. p.492. In a note of June 1927 added to his Autobiography Dickinson wrote: "I know that this is a good book - I believe it to be possibly the best book on the subject; because it is the only one I know which stresses the only important fact, that it is not this or that nation nor its policy, but the anarchy, that causes wars. The book was considerably and favourably enough reviewed, but it has not sold as much as a thousand copies. Another testimony to the general truth that truth is the last thing people care about." (pp.198-9).
years until his death in August 1932 did nothing to relieve Dickinson's disillusionment. In a review of K.A. Bratt's *The Next War* (1930) he conceded that the younger intellectuals were fighting new battles but these, he feared, had little to do with the cause of peace. Bolshevism and Fascism, the "principal manifestations of youth", whatever else they were, were "movements towards war".¹ Dickinson continued to believe in the League of Nations to the end, but a League with effective sanctions including the use of military force.² And perhaps this is an appropriate point to leave Dickinson for, despite all the criticisms one can make of his conception of international politics, there was still underneath a visible strand of political realism.

The same problems were approached in a different way by Dickinson's Cambridge contemporary Bertrand Russell. It might be said that the latter, though more able to come to terms with impulse, had a less realistic conception of international politics.

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1. "The Abyss", *Nation*, XLVII, 6(8 Nov.1930), 212.

XI. BERTRAND RUSSELL.

"...men of learning, by allowing partiality to colour their thoughts and words, have missed the opportunity of performing a service to mankind for which their training should have specially fitted them....Men of learning, who should be accustomed to the pursuit of truth in their daily work, might have attempted at this time, to make themselves the mouthpieces of truth, to see what was false on their own side, what was valid on the side of their enemies. They might have used their reputation and their freedom from political entanglements to mitigate the abhorrence with which the nations have come to regard each other, to help towards mutual understanding, to make the peace, when it comes, not a mere cessation due to weariness, but a fraternal reconciliation, springing from realisation that the strife has been a folly of blindness. They have chosen to do nothing of this. Allegiance to country has swept away allegiance to truth ....The guardians of the temple of truth have betrayed it to idolaters, and have been the first to promote the idolatrous worship."

- Bertrand Russell, "Justice In War-Time" (1915).

Russell's writings during the war on British foreign policy reflect a liberal idealism which would have seemed unexceptional in time of peace. In his reply to the defence of Sir Edward Grey's policy by his friend Gilbert Murray, Russell noted that all the standards by which historical judgements were usually arrived at had been cast aside: "We perceive that in previous wars among the great powers similar views have been held on each side, to be unanimously discarded by subsequent historians; and we do not believe that what has always been false before has now suddenly become true."¹ A quarter of a century earlier Henry

1. Policy of the Entente, p.3.
Sidgwick, who had taught Russell at Cambridge, had made a similar plea for careful and balanced assessment of the justifications offered by contending parties in international disputes. But unlike Sidgwick, Russell insisted that the intellectual's duty remained exactly the same even when his country had gone to war. "There is no reason to expect an unusual degree of humane feeling from professors", he wrote in 1915, "but some pride of rationality, some unwillingness to let judgement be enslaved to brutal passions, we might have hoped to find." But, alas, it was a vain hope. The "ingenious distortions" of German international lawyers and the "subtle untruths" of British historians were but two examples of the general failure of intellectuals on both sides "to resist the process of self-deception to which their Governments invited them."

Since there was little influence he could exert on Germany, Russell proposed to concentrate his energies on criticising the foreign policy of his own country, for here there was "far more hope of reform". Such hopes would be "utopian in regard to Germany". But this order of priorities for the intellectual in wartime

1. The "thoughtful and moral part of every community" could not be expected to "keep coldly aloof from patriotic sentiment" once war had broken out. "The Morality Of Strife", 14. See above p.32.

2. "Justice In War-Time...",pp.10-12. "What little attempt at truth there has been has been almost wholly confined to Socialists, who had none of the educational advantages which proved so unavailing among professors."

3. Policy of the Entente,pp.vi-vii. It was "important that England, the birthplace of liberty and the home of chivalrous generosity, should adopt in the future a policy worthy of itself, embodying its best, not deviously deceptive towards the hopes of its more humane citizens....above all because I love England...I wish to make the English people aware of the crimes that have been committed in its name, to recall it to a temper in which peace can be made and preserved, and to point to a better national pride than that of domination."
which seemed logical enough to Russell, aroused bewilderment in people like Gilbert Murray. Writing of Russell's apparent failure to feel any moral indignation at the invasion of Belgium, he asked: "if this is the sort of language, or anything like the sort of language, he would have used if England had done what Germany did? Suppose our fleet had treacherously seized Antwerp, suppose a tenth part of the devastation and outrage which Belgium has suffered had been ordered by our officers and committed by our men? I feel sure that, in that case, Mr. Russell and I would have been standing on the same platforms; my language would probably be stronger than it is now, but Mr Russell's would be utterly unrecognizable."¹ But while Belgium, as we have seen, had been a crucial moral issue for Murray, for Russell it merely represented the hypocrisy of power politics. The invasion had shown Germany "at its worst" but it had not shown Britain in a very favourable light either. And in words borne out by more recent research Russell remarked: "if the Germans had not attacked Belgium there would have been more resignations in the Cabinet and less unanimity of public opinion, but the Government would have found it impossible to stand aside while France was crushed. France, not Belgium, was for us the decisive factor."²

Given Russell's rather jaundiced view of the nation state, which we touched on earlier, there was reason enough to see a difference merely of degree (rather than of kind) between British

¹. *Foreign Policy...*, p.8.
"Stripped of Parliamentary verbiage, the fundamental fact about the European situation is that all the Great Powers of Europe have precisely the same objects - territory, trade and prestige. In pursuit of these objects no one of the Great Powers shrinks from wanton aggression, war and chicanery. But owing to the geographical position of Germany and our naval supremacy, England can achieve all its purposes by wars outside Europe, whereas English and Russian policy has shown that Germany cannot achieve its aims except by a European war. We have made small wars because small wars were what suited our purpose; Germany has made a great war because a great war was what suited Germany's purpose. We and they alike have been immoral in aim and brutal in method, each in exact degree which was thought to be in the national advantage."

There was a certain logic in all this, although Russell was obviously begging the question of whether Germany's "aims" were not more potentially destructive. Russell's ideas on the international system rested on two assumptions. First, that "Germany had as good a right to an Empire as any other Great Power, but could only acquire an Empire through war". Second, that peace could no longer be maintained by "a static conception of international relations". "In a world where nations grow and decay, where forces change and populations become cramped, it is not possible or desirable to maintain the status quo for ever", Russell claimed. If peace was to be preserved, nations had to "learn to accept unfavourable alterations of the map without feeling that they must first be defeated in war, or that in yielding they incur humiliation". This was as true of Britain as of any power - perhaps truer, since it was Britain which Germany sought to emulate:

"The mood in which Germany embarked upon the war was abominable, but it was a mood fostered by the habitual mood of England. We have prided ourselves on our territory and our wealth; we have been ready at all times to defend by force of arms what we have conquered in India and Africa. If we had realized the futility of empire, and had shown a willingness to yield colonies to Germany without waiting for the threat of force, we might have been in a position to persuade the Germans that their ambitions were foolish, and that the respect of the world was not to be won by an imperialist policy. But by our resistance we showed that we shared their standards....So convinced were we of the sacredness of the status quo that we never realised how advantageous it was to us, or how, by insisting upon it, we shared the responsibility for the war."¹

This is suggestive of intellectual justifications for appeasement of Germany in the postwar period, a policy which Russell supported at least until 1938.² But it also shows the lack of importance Russell attached to the concepts of national interest and balance of power so important in international politics. In Morocco, Russell, like H.N. Brailsford and E.D. Morel, considered that British policy had been quite without justification. Britain "ought to have met Germany's desire for schoolboy triumphs with the tolerant smile of an elder brother". Instead, Lloyd George's Mansion House speech had reduced British foreign policy "to the German level".³ At times like this it seemed that Russell had, not only a healthy scepticism of national

1. Principles Of Social Reconstruction, pp.85-6. "Germany had no good ground for ency; we had no good ground for resisting whatever in Germany's demands was compatible with our continued existence." "War As An Institution", Atlantic Monly, CXVII, 6(May 1916),605.


3. Policy Of The Entente, p.35
honour and the like, but also little real conception of just how
deeply ingrained they were in the minds of people. It probably
did not matter that the Germans cherished "a desire to own African
swamps", of which Britain had "a superfluity". But his claim
that the "only things worth fighting for are the things of the
spirit" showed a certain insensitivity to the hopes and desires
of ordinary people. It was this feature of his wartime writing
which one historian linked (perhaps unfairly) to Russell's talent
for logical thought:

"The morality of peace is the strongest
weapon of the pacifist, and there is no assumption
more common or more confident in that school of
thought than that the conscientious objector is the
superman of pure reason and a paragon of virtue; if
all men reasoned as they do there would be no war,
and the prevalence of war is due to animal instinct
and low rationality. That, no doubt, is true as an
abstract proposition, and it is not a mere coincidence
that the intellectual protagonist of pacifism in
England is an expert in the field of mathematical
abstraction." 3

Of course Russell was at pains to present the pacifist
alternative as an eminently reasonable course of action - the
emotional rhetoric of religious pacifism was as foreign to him
as conventional patriotic sentiment. What Britain should have
weighed in considering its reaction to the German invasion of
Belgium was not "the legal fact that a treaty was broken", but
rather "the fact that a terrible cruelty was inflicted on an

Justice In War-Time, p.53.

2. "The Philosophy of Pacifism", in Towards Ultimate Harmony, 1915,
p.8. Russell was speaking at a conference on "Pacifist Philosophy".

3. A.P.Pollard, "The Temptation of Peace" (1916) repr. in Common¬
wealath At War, pp.177-8.

4. Only rarely would exasperation break through the logic of argu¬
ment: "But, of course, all that I have been saying is fantastic,
degrading, and out of touch with reality. I have been assuming
that men are to some extent guided by reason, that their actions
are directed to ends such as 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of
unoffending nation". The "question which England had to consider was, not whether Germany had committed a crime", but whether she "should do anything to mitigate the bad consequences of that crime by going to war". "If we had not come in the Belgians would in all likelihood not have resisted the German army", Russell claimed. "In return for a free passage and for our neutrality, the Germans would have respected Belgian independence, and Belgium would have been spared almost all it has suffered." And, in confirmation of this analysis, Russell could point to Luxemburg. It also was under international guarantee but it was "impossible to compare its sufferings with the devastation, murder, and rapine... inflicted on Belgium". 1

In August 1914 Britain had encouraged Belgian resistance - for its own strategic rather than idealistic reasons, Russell could have added at this point - and terrible suffering had resulted. If this were not to be repeated (and, in the case of Luxemburg, newly inflicted) when the tide of war began to go against Germany, some kind of compromise peace would be necessary. "The obligation of honour towards Belgium", Russell wrote, "is more fully discharged if the Germans are led to evacuate Belgium by negotiation than if they are driven out at the cost of destroying whatever they have left unharmed." 2 As we have seen, the advocacy

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1. "The War & Non-Resistance: A Rejoinder To Professor Perry", 25, 27. "If the faithful observance of treaties were a frequent occurrence, like the observance of contracts, the breach of a treaty might be a real and not merely a formal ground for war, since it would tend to weaken the practice of deciding disputes by agreement rather than by armed force. In the absence of such a practice, however, appeal to treaties is only to be regarded as part of the diplomatic machinery." There was thus "a certain unreality" in official explanations of British involvement. "The Ethics Of War", 127-9.

2. "The Danger To Civilization", Justice In War-Time, p.122
of a compromise peace had been severely criticised, not only by the "good haters" of Germany, but also by people like Maynard Keynes. But what of Russell's arguments for Belgium allowing the free passage of German troops? This would have been rejected out of hand by most patriotically-minded Englishmen, but G.G. Coulton did ask some hard questions in his book *The Main Illusions of Pacifism*. His objections to Russell's scenario centred on the fact that neutrality imposed obligations as well as privileges on a state like Belgium:

"It would be impossible to find any purely moral plea which would justify the Belgians in... opening the back door to let Germany loose upon the weakest frontier of France, especially since that frontier had been left comparatively unfortified in reliance upon a treaty of neutrality which created, not merely a Belgian privilege, but also a corresponding Belgian duty. Secondly what valid reason has Mr Russell for supposing that Belgium, by betraying her trust, would in fact have avoided the horrors of invasion? In any fairly equal war, Belgian soil would have become the main battle-ground. Not only would the English and French have had the right to go and meet the Germans wherever they could find them, but they would also have been justified in inflicting direct punishment upon Belgium for her treacherous breach of neutrality."

Leaving aside the emotional image of Belgium "betraying her trust", there was something in what Coulton said. Russell's suggestion had not really resolved the terrible dilemma of the small neutral state caught between powerful neighbours. As

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1. pp.246-7. One critic suggested that Belgian non-resistance might lead to an even greater decline in respect for the neutrality of small states. See Perry, "Non-Resistance and the Present War: A Reply To Mr.Russell", 312-3.
Coulton pointed out, there was only "one contingency" which could have "saved Belgium from martyrdom", and only one other which "could have mitigated her martyrdom" - neither of which helped Russell's case. Firstly, if "the Germans, with Belgium connivance, had cut their way through to Paris, and had ended the war as brilliantly as in 1866 or 1870, then the Belgians would...have lost little besides their honour." But, in the long-term, could Russell, "as an impartial student of politics and morals", contemplate so complete a German victory "with anything but horror?" Russell could not. As he wrote many years later, the "successes of the Germans before the Battle of the Marne were horrible to me. I desired the defeat of Germany as ardently as any retired colonel." Clearly, Russell - for all his ability to state "unpleasant truths", was, like Dickinson, torn between a belief that the rulers of Britain were "accomplices in abominable crimes against humanity and freedom" and a desire for Allied victory.

Coulton's second "contingency" raised even more serious criticisms. What would Belgium have gained from allowing passage to German troops "if the Allies had been more successful from the first"? If there was "practically nothing to choose between the

1. Ibid., p.247
2. Autobiography, II, 17. Cf. His letter to Ottoline Morrell (29 Oct.1915) on hearing that D.H.Lawrence was leaving England(p.55). At the time he wrote: "I consider that either a serious weakening of England, France, and Italy, or a serious strengthening of Germany, would be a great misfortune for the world. I wish ardently to see the Germans expelled from France and Belgium, and compelled to feel that the war has been a misfortune for them as well as for the Allies. Those things I desire as strongly as the noisiest of our patriots... And if any Power is to be supreme at sea, it must be better for international freedom that that Power should be England, whose army is too small to be a danger, rather than Germany, which has by far the most powerful army in the world. On these broad grounds, if I belonged to a neutral country, my sympathies would be against Germany." Policy of the Entente, pp.vi-vii.
German soldiery and Allied soldiery", then Belgium would "have gained nothing, even in a material sense". Russell could only prove one part of his case by disproving another, Coulton concluded.

"Mr Russell cannot mitigate the martyrdom of Belgium, even in theory, except by postulating the excessive inhumanity of German military methods, as compared with those of the Allies; and that is precisely what he cannot afford to do."1 Coulton's gleeful exposure of what he felt was a logical flaw in the argument of a master logician was a little unfair. Although Russell believed that the ends of German foreign policy "were exactly similar" to the ends pursued by British foreign policy, that Britain had been more willing to provoke war in 1911 than Germany three years later, he still conceded that "the sins of England" sank "into insignificance beside the German treatment of Belgium".2 This ambiguity certainly does not make Russell's arguments for a policy of non-resistance, if the Germans invaded Britain, more credible.

These arguments were presented in articles in the Atlantic Monthly and the International Journal of Ethics between August and October 1915 - both, significantly, American periodicals. There would have been few journals in Britain willing to risk printing Russell's deliberate taunts to London's clubland. One might cite, for example, Russell's arguments for the advantages of "tribute", levied by a victorious Germany, over the alternative of prolonging war if the Allies were losing. It would be cheaper

2. Policy of the Entente, pp.vi-vii
in lives and money, and also a means of taxing "the idle rich". Since "tribute" would logically consist of "the total economic rent of the land and natural resources of England", "wages and other earned incomes could not be diminished without diminishing the productivity of English labour, and so lessening England's capacity for paying tribute." Of the potentially demoralising effects of such levies Russell did not seem to be aware - perhaps could not be, since the experience of "reparations" was in the future. But it was a more sophisticated version of the argument which people like A.L. Smith had found amongst British workers; that they would be no worse off under German rule. As for the possible loss of colonies to Germany, this could only be a blessing in disguise, Russell argued. It would remove from Britain the taint of imperialism - "a canker of corruption and [political] immorality".

This was the context in which Russell presented his scenario for non-violent passive resistance. It is important to note that Russell never held that this was right in all circumstances. Although he was often accused of holding "the extreme Quaker doctrine of non-aggression", Russell saw his position as different from that of Tolstoy or the Quakers. Where they judged conduct in terms of its inherent moral component, he judged "conduct

2. See below p.297.
by its consequences".¹ This consequentialism had only recently replaced Russell's earlier intuitionist view of ethical questions.² It meant, for one thing, that logically he could not say that the war was unjustified on purely moral or rational grounds, because he was presenting his "feelings" rather than ethical facts. It meant, too, that he could not logically argue that passive resistance was the objectively correct course. However, this did not prevent Russell from presenting reasoned arguments "to clarify" those "feelings".³ But there was a certain ambiguity in his writings and, as Alan Wood notes, Russell "did not always keep strictly to his opinions as a philosopher. He constantly wrote as if 'good' and 'bad' had some objective meaning".⁴ This encouraged people like A.F.Pollard to criticise Russell's apparent exaggeration of the importance of "pure reason".⁵ But perhaps one of the most perceptive criticisms was that of T.E.Hulme.

¹ "The War & Non-Resistance", p.41. "The principle that it is always wrong to employ force against another human being...has always been rejected by the great majority of mankind as inconsistent with the existence of civilized society. In this, no doubt, the majority of mankind are in the right. But I think that occasions where forcible resistance is the best course are much fewer than is generally believed and that some very great and important advances in civilization might be made if this were more widely recognized." (ibid., p.40.)

² Russell had been greatly influenced by G.E.Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) which had argued that one knew by intuition what was good (good being an indefinable non-natural quality). The objectively right action was thus that which would have the least unfavourable consequences. See D.H.Munro, "Russell's Moral Theories", in Bertrand Russell, N.Y.1972,pp.328-30.

³ "The Ethics of War", 127. "The fundamental facts...in all ethical questions are feelings; all that thought can do is to clarify and systematize the expression of these feelings." See L.W.Aitken, Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, N.Y.1963,pp.63-5.

⁴ Bertrand Russell, 1957, pp.84-5.

⁵ See above p.253.
Hulme was with the Royal Marine Artillery on the Western Front (where he was killed in September 1917) when he published his objections to Russell in the pages of the Cambridge Magazine and (even more forcefully) in the New Age. He had published little apart from scattered articles and translations of Bergson and Sorel. 1 As a severe critic of Bergson, Russell had not commended himself to Hulme and philosophically the two men were poles apart. To Hulme Russell's views were "the result of an entirely commonplace and uncritical acceptance of the liberal ideology" that has prevailed since the eighteenth century. Russell's ethical ideas were those of a "rationalist humanitarian", but he (Hulme) sought a "more tragic system of ethical values". 2 There was much that was unfair in Hulme's attack on Russell - and some abuse - but he did note that Russell's subjectivism in ethics "debarred" him from saying that "pacifist impulses" were "better than the low atavistic instinct behind the opposed ethic". The most Russell could say was "that he prefers pacifist instincts", Hulme concluded. 3 And in an answer (entitled "The Kind of Rubbish We Oppose") to Russell's lectures on Social Reconstruction Hulme complained that Russell always gave "many Reasons" why wars were evil, but only "Impulses that made men

1. He came to St. John's College, Cambridge, with an exhibition in mathematics in 1902, but was sent down in 1904, possibly for hitting a policeman in May Week. However, at intervals he continued to attend the lectures of Sorley & McTaggart at Cambridge. Bergson, who he first met in 1907, exerted an even greater influence and Hulme wrote a series of articles on him for the New Age (1909-12) and translated his Introduction to Metaphysics (1913). His translation of Sorel's Réflexions Sur la Violence appeared in 1915.

2. "War Notes by North Staffs", New Age, XVIII, 18 (2 Mar. 1916), 413. He had dealt roughly with Russell's definition of "scientific philosophy" (separated off from traditional philosophical problems) in an unpublished essay. See his Speculations, 1924, pp. 28-9, 43.

3. "War Notes By North Staffs", loc. cit. Earlier Hulme had talked of Russell's "insufferable complacency" which was "so satisfied that its own ideals" were "the inevitable ideals of man - that opposition appears almost pathological and is regarded with tolerant pity". "War Notes By North Staffs", New Age, XVIII, 17 (24 Feb. 1916), 390. Russell was not treated as roughly as Clive Bell. See ibid, XVII, 218 (13 Jan. 1916) 246.
think them justifiable". Russell never seemed "to admit that any real Reasons" could exist among supporters of the war.  

No doubt one of the passages in Russell's lectures to which Hulme most objected was his denial that the war was concerned with real rather than imaginary principles. Men's "sense of right" or of the "public good" was very subjective. It depended very much on their "own impulses and passions, a subjective thing, much influenced by prejudice and class-interest and accidents of geography or education". "Ethical notions", Russell told the Aristotelian Society, "are very seldom a cause, but almost always an effect, a means of claiming universal legislative authority for our own preferences, not as we fondly imagine, the actual ground for those preferences." For Britain the war was not a contest of principles - it was "trivial for all its vastness". "No great principle is at stake, no great human purpose is involved on either side", Russell wrote. "The supposed ideal ends for which it is being fought are merely part of the myth."

1. Repr. from Cambridge Mag. (5 Feb. 1916) in Further Speculations, Minneapolis, 1955, p. 180. This avoided "the necessity for any tedious examination of the actual arguments" used by opponents by depriving them "at one stroke of all validity". Russell replied that he was "concerned to represent both sides as moved by impulse", and that difference of "ethical valuation" was on the surface only. Ethical agreement could "only arise through similarity of desires and impulses". The claim which Hulme and others made for the "universality" of their ethical judgements merely embodied "the impulse to persecution or tyranny". And Russell concluded: "I wish North Staffs would tell us explicitly what are the things which he values for so long as he keeps silence about this, the controversy remains indefinite." Reply to Hulme repr. in Further Speculations, pp. 209-13.

2. "It is sheer cant to speak of a contest of might against right, and at the same time to hope for a victory of the right. If the contest is really between might and right, that means that right will be beaten. What is obscurely intended, when this phrase is used, is that the stronger side is only rendered stronger by men's sense of right. But men's sense of right is very subjective, and is only one factor in deciding the preponderance of force." Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 67


"legitimate to make war in order to end war", but - despite the rhetoric of intellectuals like H.G.Wells - there was "no reason to think that this war had any such purpose."

Nor was this a war of self-defence in any real sense. As Russell explained to a pacifist conference in July 1915; "Everywhere, the war is regarded as a war of self-defence. And, whatever may have been true of its origin, it has become, from the moment of its outbreak, in actual fact a war for self-defence." The war, which had begun with an aggressor state and a victim state, had rapidly become a war of self-preservation on both sides. This had been recognised too by Maynard Keynes who sympathised with the dilemma in which the German socialists were placed in August 1914.

At first they had opposed government policy:

"But when it was generally believed that the enemy had set foot beyond the frontier, how could a party which represented a third of the German nation take the responsibility of active and practical opposition to those whose business it was to defend the country? It is the horrible paradox of war and the perpetual scourge of peace parties in all countries, that when once war is joined it is for all nations a war of defence - a scourge of which those who, I will not say love war, but hate lovers of peace, do not spare the use."

Here Keynes and Russell were expressing a view of the war very similar to that popularised by their Cambridge friend Lowes Dickinson, although Russell, characteristically, expressed the idea in a more provocative form.

4. Of the naval race Russell wrote: "I do not say that our fear was irrational or groundless, and I do not say that we were wrong to (p.t.o.)
Russell rightly considered that if "the right of self-defence" were "unreservedly admitted", then "no effective theoretical opposition to war" was possible. But one might add that his own conditional pacifist ideas still left the thorny problems of deciding which wars were justified and of the efficacy of passive non-resistance (if rightness was to be judged by consequences). He would allow that wars of principle might in some cases be justified, that wars of self-defence, if against an inferior civilization, were justified, as were wars of colonisation when judged solely by "results". It is perhaps sufficient to note that Russell's actions (if not ethical

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take precautions. What I do say is that the measures we actually took were ideally calculated to bring the danger nearer, to increase the aggressive temper which was beginning to grow up in Germany, to persuade the Germans that we would yield nothing to the claims of justice....I say that our policy revived warlike feeling in France, and fostered it in Germany." The British were thus at least "accomplices in abominable crimes against humanity and freedom". Policy of the Entente, p.16.

2. The claim of "principle" should be approached "very sceptically". Civilised communities were justified in "defending themselves against savages" since this would preserve civilisation. Defence against another civilised state would merely harm civilisation. Wars of colonisation were "totally devoid of technical justification" and were "apt to be more ruthless than any other sort of war". But they at least had "the merit, often quite fallaciously claimed for all wars, of leading in the main to the survival of the fittest". It was "chiefly through such wars that the civilised portions of the world" had been extended. These, however, were in the past. Since 1870 such wars had really, like the First World War, for prestige and plunder. "The Ethics Of War", 130-7. This last point was not unlike that made 25 years earlier by Russell's former teacher Henry Sidgwick, that "nations most advanced in civilization" tended to "absorb semi-civilised states in their neighbourhood, as in the expansion of England and Russia in Asia and of France in Africa". This could not "be altogether condemned" since it seemed "clearly conducive to the general happiness that the absorption should take place". But conditions for legitimacy were difficult to define, and conflict among civilised states very probable. "The Morality of Strife", 12.
theory) in later life suggested that these exceptions were open to considerable debate. But what of Russell's recommendation that "both the right and the duty of self-defence" resulted from "too material a conception of human and national welfare"? The things in life which really mattered were "not subject to force" and could be "defended without the help of armies and navies", Russell had claimed.\footnote{1} Although Russell, would have denied that the civilization, which he wished to preserve was that of a small and privileged elite,\footnote{2} one wonders whether the mass of Englishmen would have shared Russell's order of priorities. But, even passing over this, was it true that what was of "real value could not be endangered if a merely passive resistance were offered to the invader"?\footnote{3}

Certainly, one could agree that many of the "evils" suffered by an invaded country were "due to the resistance offered to invasion".\footnote{4} But Russell also envisaged a disarmed Britain, "after a generation of instruction in the principles of passive resistance", being able to make German rule, after invasion, quite impossible. As he wrote in reply to an American critic: "A nation sufficiently numerous and strong to resist successfully by force of arms will also be able, if it chooses, to resist by the method of the strike, by mere refusal to obey. No one seriously supposes that the Germans would undertake to govern England, even if we had no army and navy. The mere political difficulties would be insuperable."\footnote{5} "Passive resistance would discourage the use of force (by

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] "The Philosophy of Pacifism", p. 9.
\item[2.] Eg. in Political Ideals, 1903, pp. 25-35 (first U.S. edition 1917).
\item[3.] "The Philosophy of Pacifism", p. 9.
\item[4.] Loc. cit.
\item[5.] "The War & Non-Resistance; A Rejoinder To Professor Perry", 27.
\end{itemize}

Russell was much influenced by syndicalism and had (ironically, in view of his controversy with its translator) read Sorel's Reflections On Violence. Russell, Roads to Freedom, 1914, pp. 70-95, 138.
the invaders) by arousing a sense of shame in the aggressive
nation", for there would be absolutely no pretext for aggression.
The German High Command "could not congratulate themselves upon
their military prowess". "To the soldierly mind, the whole expedi-
tion would be ridiculous, causing a feeling of disgust instead of
pride." Within Germany the "opposition of whatever was not
utterly brutal" would be aroused. By this time, "if all Englishmen
still passively resisted, administration by Germany would be
impossible...after shooting a few, the Germans would have to give
up the attempt in despair."¹

The legacy of the Second World War is a conflicting one.
Should Russell's case be judged in the light of Denmark or of the
Jews? Russell himself certainly changed his mind on this point as
the result of the Second World War,² but even in 1915 at least one
American critic had pointed to potential difficulties: "One cannot
even hope to avoid evil because it may be the determination of the
enemy to perpetrate that which one holds to be evil." If the
intention was to defend that which was held to be good, then there
were "only two alternatives: To yield, with the expectation that
these good things will be destroyed, or to resist in the hope that
they may be preserved, albeit at great cost and in diminished

"Much the same conditions - large population, public spirit,
power of organisation - are required for passive non-obedience as
are required for success in armed conflict." "The War & Non-
Resistance: A Rejoinder to Professor Perry", 23. The "fortitude and
discipline" needed were probably even greater for non-resistance.

². Non-resistance "depends upon certain virtues in those against
whom it is employed. When Indians lay down on railways, and
challenged the authorities to crush them under trains, the British
found such cruelties intolerable. But the Nazis had no such
scruples in analogous situations. The doctrine which Tolstoy
preached with great persuasive force, that the holders of power
could be morally regenerated if met by non-resistance, was obviously
(p.t.o.)
During the war Russell seemed to pin more hope on peace through a "central government of the world" wielding armed force, although he continued to stress that this had "no bearing upon the question of whether non-resistance would be a good policy, if any nation could be induced to adopt it".  

This concept of strong international government, together with Russell's talk of "the present international anarchy" and "the tragic chain of violence" which had led to the war, shows the common ground he shared with Lowes Dickinson. But Russell was more inclined to come to terms with "the herd instinct". In an essay of 1935 entitled "Some Psychological Difficulties Of Pacifism In War Time" Russell admitted that the war had been an educative process for the pacifist. Before the war they had not known of "the wiles of the herd instinct", which were less obvious in peacetime. And Russell continued: "We did not realise that it is stimulated by the cognate emotions of fear and rage and blood-lust, and we were not on the look-out for the whole system of irrational beliefs which war-fever, like every strong passion, bring in its train." 

On the evidence of Russell's published writings this change of heart had begun with the war itself. His letter to the Nation printed on August 15th 1914 spoke of the play of "forces of

(footnote 2 cont. from previous page)


national greed and national hatred - atavistic instincts, harmful to mankind at its present level, but transmitted from savage and half-animal ancestors".¹

Russell, therefore, did not believe that future world peace was simply a matter of establishing the machinery for its enforcement.² He had been influenced by instinctualist psychology,

1. XV,20(15 Aug.1914),738: "...a whole population, hitherto peaceable and humane, precipitated in a few days down the steep slope to primitive barbarism, letting loose in a moment the instincts of hatred and blood-lust against which the whole fabric of society has been raised. 'Patriots' in all countries acclaim this brutal orgy as a noble determination to vindicate the right; reason and mercy are swept away in one great flood of hatred; dim abstractions of unimaginable wickedness...conceal the simple fact that the enemy are men, like ourselves neither better nor worse". This hatred was "concentrated and directed by Governments and the Press, fostered by the upper class as a distraction from social discontent, artificially nourished by the sinister influence of the makers of armaments, encouraged by a whole foul literature of 'glory' and by every text-book of history" with which the minds of children were "polluted". Russell's first reaction was thus a mixture of conventional U.D.C. theory combined with a realisation that the war had indeed been welcomed by large sections of the population.

2. Russell was sometimes ambiguous on the point of whether a hypothetical "Council of Powers" should exercise military power or rely on public opinion to enforce its decisions. Cf. "The Philosophy Of Pacifism", p.101 & "The War & Non-Resistance",pp.41, 59. But this was perhaps the result of a failure to resolve his ideas on law & force. First he speaks of the "internal orderliness of a civilised community" as a great achievement, and then makes the customary liberal analogy (as MacIver had done for example) to the pacification of international anarchy; the two essentials for world peace being true "respect for treaties and international law" and a "growing realisation" that wars are "cruel and immoral". But then he speaks of law as merely the codification of force. Thus, if "the object of civilization" is "to secure justice, not to give victory to the strong", then law cannot be "the best way of settling disputes"; "Law is too static, too much on the side of what is decaying, too little on the side of what is growing. So long as law is in theory supreme, it will have to be tempered, from time to time, by internal revolution and external war. These can only be prevented by perpetual readiness to alter law in accordance with the present balance of forces. If this is not done, the motives for appealing to force will sooner or later become irresistible. A world-State or federation of States, if it is to be successful, will have to decide questions, not by legal maxims which would be applied by the Hague Tribunal, but as far as possible in the same sense in which they would be decided by war. The function of authority should be to render appeal to force unnecessary, not to give decisions contrary to those which have been reached by force." Principles of Social Reconstruction,pp.52-67.
and he may have read McDougall and Trotter (his use of the term "herd instinct" suggests at least an indirect acquaintance with the latter). Certainly he had read Bernard Hart's little book The Psychology Of Insanity (1912), which was designed to present the ideas of Freud - "probably the most original and fertile thinker who has yet entered the field of abnormal psychology" - to a general public. The visible world conflict was thus rooted for Russell in man himself:

"There is in all men a disposition to seek out occasions for the exercise of instinctive feelings, and it is this disposition, rather than any inexorable economic or physical fact, which is at the bottom of enmities between nations. The conflicts of interest are invented to afford an excuse for feelings of hostility; but as the invention is unconscious, it is supposed that the hostility is caused by some real conflict of interest... The cause of this absence of harmony between our instincts and our real needs is the modern development of industry and commerce.... [In the modern world our economic organisation is more civilised than our emotions, and the conflicts in which we indulge do not really offer that prospect of gain which lets loose the brute within us."

However, Russell found it surprising that "so primitive a feeling" as "herd instinct" could "attach itself to somewhat artificial aggregations such as modern States or even alliances of States", and he was not satisfied with merely a simple biological

1. See Hart's preface pp.v-vii. Russell cites it in Principles..., p.15n. Russell may also have read an article on "War & Sublimation" by Freud's disciple Ernest Jones in the International Rev. (Zurich), I, 10 & 11 (24 Dec.1915), 443-61. This journal had published one of Russell's articles earlier the same year. Certainly Jones's argument was echoed by Russell: eg. "The old primitive passions, which civilization has denied, surge up, all the stronger for repression. In a moment, imagination and instinct travel back through the centuries, and the wild man of the woods emerges from the mental prison in which he has been confined."
"War As An Institution", 667.


explanation for war. He recognised the "idealistic" motivations - for national honour as much as for power, wealth, prestige, and the "sheer desire for excitement". There was "a passionate devotion to the Nation, conceived as an entity with a life of its own". This "impulse of heroism for the welfare of the nation" was "more widespread than any other kind of subordination to something outside self, with the sole exception of parental affection". It was "by far the noblest of motives" making for war and it could not "be combated by merely material considerations". Inevitably Russell was drawn towards the same search for a "moral equivalent" undertaken previously by William James. His solution Russell found inadequate but all he himself could offer were "partial solutions" - peaceful outlets for men's energies which cumulatively would diminish the "force" which made for war.

It was not enough to show, as Angell had done, that wars did not benefit the capitalist and financier. "Socialism as a panacea" seemed to Russell also to be mistaken, since it was "too ready to suppose that better economic conditions" would "of themselves make men happy". But, on the other hand, Russell was also sceptical of the idea, commonly held by peace advocates, that national pride could simply be transformed into a wider, international patriotism. Patriotism, he noted, was "in essence religious, like

1. Ibid.,pp.61-4
2. Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp.95-6. However, Russell does sound rather like James when he talks of "imagination and love of adventure" being catered for by "intensification" of political life in a world state and of the necessity for conflict in human society separated, where possible, from evil and hatred. "War As An Institution", 607-12.
3. Principles Of Social Reconstruction, p.43
the impulses that lead to martyrdom". It could only be "adequately combated by a wider religion, extending the boundaries of one's country to all mankind". But such extension eroded the "primitive gregarious instinct underlying patriotism", and it became - "except in a few men gifted with an exceptional love of power" - "a very pale and thin feeling" when compared with the "devotion" that led men "to face death willingly on the battlefield". This then was the nub of the matter:

"The economic and political forces which make for war could be easily curbed, if the will to peace existed strongly in all civilised nations. But so long as the populations are liable to war-fever, all work for peace must be precarious; and if war-fever could not be aroused, political and economic forces would be powerless to produce any long or very destructive war. The fundamental problem for the pacifist is to prevent the impulse towards war which seizes whole communities from time to time. And this can only be done by far-reaching changes in education, in the economic structure of society, and in the moral code by which public opinion controls the lives of men and women." 2


2. "War As An Institution", 608. "No hostility is more instructive than that of cat and dog, yet a cat and dog brought up together will become good friends. In like manner, familiarity with foreigners, absence of journalistic incitements to fear and suspicion, realisation that their likeness to ourselves is much greater than their unlikeliness, will entirely prevent the growth of the impulse to go to war. The desires for triumph and power can be satisfied by the ordinary contests of football and politics unless the nation's pride is embodied in large and efficient armaments. The feeling that war is the ultimate test of a nation's manhood depends upon a rather barbarous standard of values, a belief that superiority in physical force is the most desirable form of superiority. This belief has largely died out as between individuals in a civilised country, and it seems not Utopian to hope that it may die out as between nations". "Why Nations Love War", p.65. The "incitements" of politicians, journalists, financiers and arms manufacturers Russell considered "exactly analogous to those of men who distribute indecent pictures or produce lascivious plays". "The War & Non-Resistance", p.58.
Maynard Keynes said of Russell that he "sustained a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in fact human affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion, but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was to carry them on rationally."\(^1\) Russell may have had this bon mot in mind when he described Keynes's wartime work at the Treasury as advising the Government on how to achieve "the maximum slaughter at the minimum expense".\(^2\) There was some truth in each of these rather unkind remarks. Russell found himself impaled on the horns of a philosophical dilemma; Keynes found himself dining with Lloyd George. Each in their way reflected the dilemmas of the academic in wartime - as did the paths of Gilbert Murray and Lowes Dickinson, though less starkly. All four expressed fears for the fabric of civilised Europe, but none more strongly than Russell who saw, not only the horrors of modern warfare, but also a return to the Dark Ages. Not only was the war "perpetrating moral murder in the souls of vast millions of combatants",\(^3\) but it threatened the "universal exhaustion" of Europe:

"In all that has made the nations of the West important to the world, they run the risk of being involved in a common disaster, so great and so terrible that it will outweigh, to the historian of the future, all the penalties of military defeat and all the glories of military victory....[The] small stock of very unusual energy that makes mental

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3. "Heroism is succeeded by a merely habitual disregard of danger, enthusiasm for the national cause is replaced by passive obedience to orders. Familiarity with horrors makes war seem natural, not the abomination which it is seen to be at first. Humane feeling decays, since, if it survived, no man could endure the daily shock." "The Danger To Civilization", pp.110-11. Here Russell approached the reality of war more closely than any of his detractors.
progress...is being wasted on the battlefield....

[If the war lasts long, it is to be expected that the great age of Europe will be past and that men will look back to the period now coming to an end as the later Greeks looked back to the age of Pericles. Who then is supreme in Europe will be a matter of no importance to mankind; in the madness of rivalry, Europe will have decreed its own insignificance....The collective life of Europe, which has carried it on since the Renaissance in the most wonderful upward movement known to history, will have received a mortal wound which may well prove mortal."

For Russell, whose philosophical horizons had been extended by Georg Cantor's Mannichfaltigkeitslehre and Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift, it seemed "the politics of Bedlam" which decreed that all Germans were now moral enemies. In July 1900 he had gone with Alfred North Whitehead to the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. His meeting with the mathematician Giuseppe Peano was, Russell later wrote, "a turning point in my intellectual life". But now the war had interrupted plans for a similar congress in London in 1915 and it seemed difficult in the midst of world conflict to envisage a time when scholarship would again become international. Even when the first steps were made towards reconciliation between the scholars of the Central Powers and the Allied states after the war, the publicly-expressed misgivings of some of their number were proof enough that the "collective life of Europe" had indeed received a wound - though not a mortal one as Russell had feared.

1. "The Danger To Civilization", pp.105,117,120. To W. Rothenstein Russell wrote on New Year's Day 1916: "I wonder whether this year will see the end of the madness, and what will be left of Europe when peace returns. We who knew life before the war will come to seem like odd survivals of a softer age, like the Romans who lingered on after the barbarian invasion." Cit. Rothenstein, Men & Memories, 1933,11,316.

"May I plead...with the great local authorities, and especially those of England and Wales; with the Lord Mayors and Councils of our cities; and with the Education Committees of our Counties, that they will have patience with us University people, and with other teachers, and will not, in their natural desire for smoothness, endeavour to force us to repress unpopular opinions or to expel those among us who have unusual thoughts or sharp, unwary tongues? ...In hours of great excitement some eager eyes 'see red' and red alone. But a University, if you give it freedom, does not all 'see red' at the same time."

M.E. Sadler, "The Universities & The War" (August 1916)

The dismissal of Bertrand Russell from his lectureship at Trinity College, Cambridge, is perhaps the best-known case of the infringement of academic freedom in a British university during the First World War - although a judgement on it depends, as we shall see, on one's definition of "academic freedom". There appear to have been no other dismissals in Cambridge during the war, although there is evidence of pressure being exerted against dons believed to have pacifist leanings. Sydney Cockerell, Director of the Fitzwilliam Museum and "supernumerary Fellow" of Jesus College suffered great unpopularity among his colleagues for his "supposed pessimism" about the war. Even in Trinity, a college where the U.D.C. found support among the younger Fellows, G.H. Hardy found that life for the honest doubter could be "unpleasant", and this experience contributed to his decision to take up an offer

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1. W. Blunt, Cockerell, 1964, p.163. He ceased to be a Fellow of Jesus in 1916, but this seems to have been the result of the terms of tenure.
of the chair of Geometry at Oxford after the war. ¹ Dickinson suffered no more than isolation as the result of his views on the war, but his colleague at King’s A.C. Pigou was actively persecuted by some fellow Cambridge economists. But before turning to Pigou we shall examine a similar case at Oxford where the number of U.D.C. members and sympathisers was smaller than at Cambridge.

**Conybeare:** F.C. Conybeare was one of the most eminent Armenian scholars of British birth. He had been a fellow of University College (1880-7) but, being possessed of private means, he was able to resign his fellowship. However, he continued to live in Oxford, remained on the list of the Faculty of Theology in the university calendar, and was regarded as one of Oxford’s leading scholars. He was also the author of more controversial works, such as *The Dreyfus Case* (1898), which defended the Captain on the basis of private information, and the *Historical Christ* (1914) which lead to his resignation from the Rationalist Association. In short, his views were probably not unlike those of his Oxford colleague, Gilbert Murray, although his reaction to the outbreak of war was very different.

Conybeare began to have doubts about the war well after initial British involvement in August 1914. "In August, September and October", he wrote, "I felt so sure that England had all the right on her side and Germany all the wrong, that I hardly troubled

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1. Hardy, p.10. He did not return to Cambridge until 1910. The patriotic dons were led by R.H. MacLeod (Lecturer in Indian Law) and Professor Ridgeway, who disliked females and claimed that Newnham College was a nest of U.D.C. sympathisers. See *Cambridge Mag.*, VI, 8 (17 Feb. 1917), 322-3 and 14 (24 Feb. 1917), 367. Also J. Stewart, *Jane Ellen Harrison*, 1959, p. 151.
to read the diplomatic documents....At the beginning of October
my attention was first drawn to the [German] Emperor's correspon-
dence with the Tsar, and I realized that he had made a sincere
effort for peace in the days July 28-31." This being so, Conybeare
felt that he had to speak out: "I am not the man to see clearly
the point in favour of the enemy and to conceal it."¹

Next Conybeare turned for documentary evidence to M.Phillip
Price's Diplomatic History Of The War (1914), a book "temperately
written without bias or flag-waving", as he put it.² Conybeare
then came to his own conclusions as to the relationship between
the two Central Powers in the July crisis. The Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was "a sensible fellow" with a sensible policy of conciliating
the subject nationalities of the Empire. For this display
of good sense he was murdered by the Serbians. The Austrian
ultimatum was thus quite justified and the difficulties of the
German position understandable. "I quite realize what a testy,
obstinate, authoritative and somewhat senile old gentleman" the
Wilhelmstrasse "had to deal with" in the person of Franz Joseph,
Conybeare noted. Especially when he was "aided by that arch-
oppressor the Magyar Tisza."³

But Conybeare was concerned mostly with Grey, the minister
who had secretly "mortgaged our fleet, our only serious arm, to
France unconditionally." With the Triple Entente Britain was "as

¹ "New Light On The Causes Of The War", in England On the Witness
Stand, N.Y., 1915,p.99. Also see clipping in University College
Library with E.F.Carritt's comments.

² Gilbert Murray considered it "somewhat hurried and inaccurate, as
well as a little morbid in its surmises." The Foreign Policy Of Sir
Edward Grey. Oxford,1915,p.12. See also Murray to J.L.Hammond,
21, June 1915, Hammond Mss. vol. 30.

³ "New Light On The Causes Of The War", pp.99-100
much lashed to Russia's chariot wheels as France." Although Grey wanted peace, he had "set himself to follow Sazanof who...had him in his waistcoat pocket". Sazanof had been the one who wanted war. "The more Germany yielded, the more provocative and imperious he became." But Grey was also at fault. He did not tell the Cabinet or the House of Lichnowsky's conciliatory proposals (using the excuse that they were unofficial) because he knew they would accept them. So far this was a fairly typical B.D.C. version of events, but what really got Conybeare into trouble was his claim that Grey had "tricked" Britain into war. It was worse than the case of the Ems telegram for "Grey had acted more criminally than Bismark ever did." 1

All this Conybeare had written privately to Kuno-Mayer, Professor of Celtic Philology at the University of Berlin (1911-19), who was in America during the war. 2 He had written in one letter: "I do not see any harm could result from my opinions being known, and I air them very freely here, already at two meetings of university tutors and the other night before the Fabians." 3 Meyer must have taken this as permission to publish, for Conybeare's letter was widely distributed in America in at least two pamphlets. 4

1. Ibid., pp.100-4. "Take my word for it, Grey will, in good time, be running for his life over this sinister business." Parliament had "been utterly hoodwinked. "Presently they will send him to the gallows." Emphasis in the original. Keith Robbins has noted that, "Opinion on the Left wavered uneasily between the view that he [Grey] was feeble and gullible, a mere tool of his permanent officials and the conviction that he was devious and secretive." Sir Edward Grey, 1971, p.300

2. Meyer had been Professor of Comparative Philology at Liverpool (1894-1911) and had been much criticised in Britain for his remarks about Ireland and the possibility of a German invasion. See above p.92.

When news of these got back to Britain there was an immediate outcry. Sidney Ball, member of the Fabian Society and Fellow of St. John's College wrote to The Times to disassociate himself from Conybeare, stressing that the meetings to which he referred were private and unofficial. Angry letters appeared in the Morning Post from other Oxford scholars and an editorial in the paper called for the court-martialling of Conybeare as a traitor.

Walter Raleigh, one of the most beligerently anti-German Oxford dons, felt that this response would be enough to make Conybeare "willing to do anything short of crawling" in order to be left alone. But Conybeare, although no Bertrand Russell, appeared to regret the publication of the letter but not its contents. Private discussion (and it had been a private letter)

(footnotes continued from previous page)

1. Sir E. Grey must bear a large share of the catastrophe, whether he acted as he did consciously or stupidly. He steadily refused to give Germany any assurance of neutrality on any conditions, until he produced a belief that he meant England to fight, and Germany thereupon ran 'amok'. But the evidence shows that she was willing to bid high for our neutrality (Lichnowsky's offer)....It is sickening to think that this deluge of blood has been let loose in order that the tyranny of the Tsar shall be extended over all the world. "Cit. Russell, Autobiography, II, 44-5. Schiller was possibly at the meeting of tutors.


1. 2 July 1915, p.9d.

2. See letters from A.J. Butler (Brasenose College), J.T. Cunningham (former Fellow of University College) who considered people like Conybeare "cowards as well as traitors", G.W. Prothero who wrote of "virulent and libellous attacks" on Grey: 19 June 1915 (p.9e), 21 June 1915 (p.6e), 22 June 1915 (p.6g) 24 June 1915 (p.6d).

was quite in order, although perhaps his references to Grey had been "intemperate". Grey was less a knave than a fool - "a weak man and given to vacillation". Conybeare went ahead and published an article in an American magazine on "Responsibility For The War" in which he concluded that "the future historian... will blame Russia and Germany about equally".

Two years later Conybeare said his last public word on the subject in a letter to the Cambridge Magazine. Again, his assessment laid emphasis on Grey's weakness:

"When I so intemperately attacked Sir Edward Grey on this score [the rejection of Lichnowsky's offer], I ignored the fact that - in spite of his declaring on August 1, 1914, that his hands were free - he was really bound hand and foot by commitments made (even before he assumed office) by King Edward and Lord Lansdowne in 1904. He inherited those obligations, and only lacked the insight into events, the foresight, courage, originality, and force of character needful in order to break away from them, and orientate our national policy afresh, while there was yet time to do so, say, prior to Agadir in 1911. It was, however, humanly speaking impossible that he should at the last moment, in August 1914, treat those commitments as scraps of paper; in my letter which gave so much offence to some of my friends, whose judgement I respect, I assumed - it is true in deference to his denials of their existence - that he could and should have so treated them. He was indeed no more to be blamed for refusing the German offer of August 1, 1914, than a clock for striking the hour. If any were to blame, it was they who had fashioned, wound up, and set the clock going."  

2. Open Court, XXIX, vii (July 1915), 395n.(letter to the editor P.Carus), 402: Germany "deliberately provoked us to war, as I consider, Sazanof provoked the poor Kaiser; and I fear that there is nothing for us now but to fight it out." See also ibid., viii (Aug.1915),506.  
3. VI, xxiii (2 June 1917),661.
Just who "they" were Conybeare did not specify. No doubt the readers of the Cambridge Magazine did not require the identification of vested interests. But in Oxford Conybeare's name was still unpopular. He had, after all, held to his criticism of Grey (though now on the grounds of his being a mere cipher). His position in Oxford became so uncomfortable that in 1917 he sold his house there and eventually moved to Folkestone. As he wrote to an American magazine from neutral Spain in 1916: "Let any one in Berlin or London or Paris to-day raise his voice in favour of peace and the entire press will denounce him as a traitor." This could well have been the bitter comment of our second "dissenter", the Cambridge economist A.C. Pigou.

Pigou: A.C. Pigou, Fellow of King's College and Professor of Political Economy (1908-43) at Cambridge, had not been involved in controversy before the war. He seems to have had no taste for the rough and tumble of public debate - something which his Cambridge contemporary Russell often relished. Vociferous criticism of his views on the war "was responsible", a former pupil noted, "for transforming the gay joke-loving, sociable, hospitable bachelor of the Edwardian period into the eccentric recluse of more recent times. In the words of his colleague and life-long friend C.R. Fay, "World War I was a shock to him, and he was never the

1. "In a word it was Russia's war and we had to consent to all her wishes." Conybeare to E.D. Morel, 8 Jan. 1921, Morel MSS.F.9.

2. When he died Conybeare left his valuable collection of Armenian books to the London Library, not the Bodleian.

same afterwards."¹ Like his Cambridge colleague J.M.Keynes, Pigou worked for the Government during the war (part-time at the Board of Trade).² But he also continued to lecture in Cambridge, and, significantly, did voluntary ambulance work at the Front in France, Belgium, and later in Italy, where G.M.Trevelyan was doing similar work.³ His experiences at the Front sickened him, but even more unpleasant, in some ways, was the campaign against him by some of his Cambridge colleagues.

Pigou seems to have doubts about the war from the beginning. In February 1915 he published in The Nation "A Plea For The Statement Of The Allies' Terms", which contained the following sentence: "There are some of us who believe that Germany, like Britain, entered upon this war reluctantly, not as the result of a deep-laid plot, but from the mishandling of a diplomatic situation." Pigou also stressed that the pursuit of "victory for its own sake" and the imposition of a "penal peace" could only be a miskake. Why did not the Allies state their war aims?, he asked. Was it because they feared that Germany might accept them?⁴ Not surprisingly this interpretation, close to the ideas of Lowes Dickinson, provoked an outcry.

² Fruits of this work appeared in numerous articles and the book The Economy & Finance Of The War Being A Discussion Of The Real Cost Of The War And The Way In Which They Should Be Met (1916).
³ Trevelyan undertook ambulance work because poor eyesight prevented his acceptance into the Army. Pigou's was a conscientious decision.
⁴ XVI, xix (6 Feb.1915), 591. See also the report of a Cambridge Union debate in which Pigou took part, Cambridge Mag. IV, xvii (13 Mar.1915), 336.
The Morning Post printed an editorial called "The Professor's Past" and commented that "we seem to remember that Professor Pigou has always been favourably inclined to Germany". 1 It is not too difficult to see the kind of picture that the Post was drawing for its readers. The evidence for its assertions about Pigou's political loyalty was not given. The letters of two Cambridge colleagues of Pigou squashed the idea that his views were common within the University, and called for a penal peace settlement. Germany had "committed crimes against God and man", wrote one of them. She was "ready to interpret any generosity as a sign of weakness on the part of the Allies and as a tribute to her own rectitude." 2

Undeterred by this Pigou wrote again to The Nation in May 1915 to warn against "undiscriminating hatred" of Germans, especially those living in Britain, in the wake of the sinking of the Lusitania and the use of poison gas by the Germans on the Western Front. His argument was based on the distinction - common among British liberals - between the two Germanies. It was, he wrote, "incumbent upon us to recollect that the direct responsibility for German methods of warfare lies upon the shoulders of a few men; 3

1. 15 Feb. 1915 (p.6e) and 27 Feb. 1915 (p.6e). For critical letters and Pigou's reply see: 17 Feb. 1915 (p.6f), 23 Feb. 1915 (p.6g), 27 Feb. 1915 (p.6e).

2. W. Cunningham (Fellow of Trinity), Nation, XVI, xx (13 Feb. 1915), 619. Also H.S. Jones (Trinity), Morning Post, 25 Feb. 1915, (p.6f); German power had to be "absolutely ground to powder".

3. XVI, xix (15 May 1915), 222.
by whom the Empire is controlled, and not upon those of the great mass of the German people."

Six months later Pigou gave an address to the London Peace Society in which he returned again to the question of peace terms. Obviously influenced by U.D.C. ideas, Pigou saw three principles as essential for any successful peace-making: the right of national self-determination, negotiations "with goodwill", and negotiation initially on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. Pigou's main concern was that "none of the nations concerned" should be "left suffering under a sense of outrage and wrong". For this reason "general war indemnities" were to be excluded, though not "money compensation to Belgium", as Pigou put it, "a concession to right and not to mere power". As well as opposing plans to transfer the Kiel Canal to Denmark and destroy the German fleet, Pigou rejected talk of "deposition" of the Kaiser, and, an enforced change in the construction of the German Empire. This revealed the deep gulf between Pigou and liberals like Gilbert Murray, for whom forcing internal change in Germany was perhaps the main reason for supporting the war.

Although his proposals had been couched in very moderate language, Pigou again incurred the wrath of the Morning Post.


2. Peace negotiations should be "started on the general basis of the territorial status quo before the war. That should be the basis of the negotiations. In certain cases, however, it would be necessary to depart from that basis, and I suggest that the departure should be made in this way. All the belligerents should recognise the right of others to territorial possessions as these existed before the war, and whenever any change was made it should be made by way of purchase. An arrangement of this sort might, I think, be so carried through as to leave no strong thirst for revenge or feeling of outrage and humiliation in any of the belligerent countries." Ibid., 54-5.
which returned to the attack with an editorial headed "Professorial Pedantry". In Cambridge R.H. Macleod wrote an angry (and not particularly clear) letter to the Cambridge Daily News, which drew a reply from J.N. Keynes (father of J.M. Keynes), while not in agreement with Pigou, Neville Keynes felt obliged, as Chairman of the University Special Board for Economics and Politics, to rebut the charge that Pigou, by speaking at the Peace Society conference, was neglecting his job. The existence of Neville Keynes's diary for these years enables one to see the full extent of the campaign of vituperation against Pigou within the University itself, for Keynes as Registrar of the University was privy to most deliberations. There were concerted attempts to remove Pigou from his chair of Political Economy and in his diary for the eighth of May 1916 Neville Keynes records, "A very trying meeting of the General Board (of Studies) to consider Pigou's claim not to serve in the army in consequence of the need of the University for his services."

Pigou did not have the easy time with the local conscientious objectors tribunal that his colleague of military age, J.M. Keynes, had. The latter could claim that he was engaged on work of national importance and the Treasury secured his exemption.

1. 26 Nov. 1915, p.6d.
2. 30 April 1916, np. For Macleod, see above p.254 n.15.
3. See entries for 30 April; 6, 8, 10, 19, 22-23, 25-6, 29-30 May; 13, 19-22 June 1916; 25 and 29 April, 1917.
4. The entry gives details of the vote.
Unfortunately Pigou only worked part-time at the Board of Trade. Unfortunately too, he had an implacable enemy in H.S. Foxwell, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Professor of Political Economy at University College, London (1881-1928). Foxwell had been an unsuccessful candidate for the Cambridge chair of Political Economy against Pigou in 1908. He also belonged to a rival school of economic thought, the "historical school" of protectionist economics (Pigou was a follower of Alfred Marshall), and seems to have had far right-wing views.¹ For whatever reason (personal spite seems to have been a strong influence), Foxwell appealed against the tribunal's award of exemption from military service to Pigou. He offered "if necessary [to] lecture in Pigou's place" if his university work was not deemed to be of national importance. Pigou would then be free to be drafted into the army. Not until poor Pigou had been before the tribunal three times (as the result of repeated appeals against his exemption) was he finally left alone.²

The reaffirming of Pigou's exemption was in no small measure due to the staunch support of his colleagues among the economics lecturers at Cambridge (one might specially mention J.H. Clapham) and the Vice-Chancellor T.C. Fitzpatrick. "We wonder how far MacLeod & Co. have been at work", Neville Keynes confided to his diary. "The other University men [i.e. undergraduates] whose cases


originally came up with Pigou's have apparently not been called
to appear any more." The whole episode leaves a rather dis-
agreeable impression, but then one might reflect that such were
the penalties for being a critic of the war when of military age
(Pigou was in his thirties). However, the treatment of another
young academic opponent of military age, G.D.H.Cole, perhaps
illustrates gentler (and more subtle) methods that could be used.

Cole: G.D.H.Cole after taking a first class degree at Balliol in
1912 had taken up a post as Lecturer in Philosophy at Armstrong
College, Newcastle, but had "found it highly uncongenial". The
transition from "the high and rarified atmosphere of pre-war
Oxford" to lecturing to technical students was not easy. Luckily
he was almost immediately elected to a prize fellowship at Magdalen
College, Oxford, "which provided him for seven years with an annual
income of several hundreds of pounds without any obligation to
teach or to do anything else, with 'common room privileges', and a
fine set of oriel-windowed rooms by the Deer Park." In these
aristocratic surroundings Cole wrote The World of Labour (1913)
which established his reputation as a student of trade union
affairs. Already Cole was taking a separate, if parallel, path
from the Webbs as a guild socialist.

Cole was an active member of the Oxford University Socialist
Society, which had about 125 members in 1914. However, as one early

1. Keynes Diary, 19 May 1916.

Herbert Warren (whose snobbery was equalled only by that of
Oscar Browning in Cambridge) was a rather "aristocratic"
college.
member recalled, membership of the Society in no way dampened patriotic enthusiasm in August 1914, and "as a result of the rush to join up, it was soon reduced to an unrepresentative group of fifteen or so."¹ Early in 1915, according to Cole, the Society decided "not to express any opinion on the war."² This too tended to be the official line of the Fabian Society. The only group in Oxford at this time which did express critical opinions on the war was the University branch of the Union of Democratic Control, whose president was not a don (as at Cambridge) but an undergraduate at Queen's College, V. Gordon Childe.³

According to R. Page Arnot, although against the war, was "not utterly against it. He thought that Britain had been more justified in going to war, than had other Powers."⁴ But a recent study of Cole has stressed that for him the war itself "was not the polar issue; class warfare was".⁵ So far this was not unlike the analysis of R.H. Tawney, another Oxford socialist. However, the decisions of Cole and Tawney, faced with the fact of British involvement in war, were quite different. Tawney volunteered as a private. Cole (from 1915 onwards) worked as an unpaid research officer for the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. As his wife has

1. R.P. Arnot in *Historical Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History*, 13 (Autumn 1966), II. The Society had been established in 1915 after splitting from the University Fabian Society (established 1895).


3. Later Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology at Edinburgh (from 1927).

4. Arnot, loc.cit. Arnot later became the historian of the Miners' Federation.

pointed out, he "was never a 'pure' pacifist, one who believed that there was nothing in the world worth fighting about",¹ but a defence of alleged British interests in Belgium were less important to him than a defence of trade union rights at home. This attitude annoyed some of his colleagues, like Beatrice Webb. Even militant pacifists like Clifford Allen wondered if Cole was not simply avoiding a moral issue,² but one can agree that his position (given his belief in the plurality of allegiances) did have a certain logic.

Although Cole, like Russell, was a member of the No Conscription Fellowship (they seem to have been the only academics who were), he was not an active one. Most of his time was taken up with union work, which he was able to claim was of "national importance" to get exemption from military service. This suited the members of the Oxford Tribunal - most of them dons. As Beatrice Webb noted (a little acidly, one suspects): "It is said that the College authorities who dominate the tribunal, did not choose to see a Fellow of a College humiliated and made to look ridiculous."³ Cole was lucky that he had no enemies in Oxford who might appeal against his exemption (Pigou's fate), although at one point he seems to have feared this.⁴ The Fellows of Magdalen may, as Margaret Cole suggests, have had "no formulated desire to punish" Cole.⁵

¹. M.Cole,p.72.
They may even have had some idea of protecting free expression of opinion. But it may have also been the case that by engineering Cole's exemption for trade union work, they hoped to avoid associating the name of the College with anti-war agitation. It was bad enough, they might have felt, to have had Jim Larkin of the Irish Transport Workers' Union in College as Cole's guest during the Dublin lock-out, without giving Cole the chance to now associate with anti-war agitators like E.D. Morel or Clifford Allen.

But what his colleagues were willing to do for Cole they were not willing to do for his "followers" - undergraduate members of the Socialist Society who came before the conscientious objector tribunal. According to Beatrice Webb, even theological students preparing for the ministry had "been turned down with contumely"1 - a sure sign that the tribunal was taking a hard line. One of the members of the Socialist Society J. Alan Kaye, an undergraduate from St. John's College, applied to the tribunal to be registered as a conscientious objector only to find himself convicted under the Defence of the Realm Act to two months imprisonment for distributing material for the No-Conscription Fellowship.2 Another member Rajani Palme Dutt, classical scholar of Balliol, was also...

1. Diary, vol.33, 18 Mar.1916. The previous year 80 "members of the university" (unnamed, but presumably undergraduates) had written to the Daily Chronicle to protest at the call for conscription by the heads of Oxford colleges (see above p. ) and threatened that many of them were "prepared to go to any lengths in resisting any form of conscription". The fact that their names were not given was understandable, although "patriotic" dons made much of this omission. See Daily Chronicle, 5 June 1915, p.5b; 7 June 1915, p.5b; 9 June 1915, p.6c.

2. Kaye applied for exemption as "an international socialist". Aldous Huxley described how at this point the military representative "leapt up and made a Phillipic against him, bringing up the fact that he was the son of a naturalised German, that he was a Jew, that he had often been in Germany and finally... tho' perhaps it was a little pathetic...that he was a member of the Fabian (p.t.o.)
sent to jail in 1916 and sent down for socialist anti-war propaganda the next year. The feeling against conscientious objectors was so strong that the Warden of Wadham College, J.Wells, suggested that lists should be published — presumably to make life as difficult for them as possible. It was a similar hostility to pacifism in Cambridge which led to Bertrand Russell’s dismissal from his Trinity College lectureship. This was perhaps the most celebrated case of pressure on academic freedom during wartime.

Russell: At the outbreak of war Russell was already pacifically inclined. Earlier, under the influence of the Webbs, he had been a Liberal Imperialist and a supporter of the Boer War. However, early in 1901 he had become "a pro-Boer and a Pacifist". This was part of a sudden change in his conception of the world, a process which he later described as "a sort of mystic illumination", and which seems to have been akin to religious conversion in its completeness. In 1903 he resigned from the "Coefficients" which

(footnotes cont. from previous page)
Society. On the grounds of his being of alien extraction he declared that the army did not want him and that the tribunal had no powers to deal with him, a civil court meeting the case more adequately. The military man brandished a manifesto of the No-Conscription Fellowship, which Kaye had distributed and which was thought to do harm to recruiting." (Letter to Leonard Huxley, 10 Mar.1916). Kaye, "a practicer of the Pure Intrigue", after appeal was released on bail. Huxley, Letters, pp.92-4.

1. His entry in Who’s Who reads: "First Class Honours Moderations, 1916; First Class Literae Humaniores, 1918; imprisoned as socialist war-resister, 1916; sent down from Oxford for Socialist anti-war propaganda,1917". See also letters of V.G.Childe to Gilbert Murray 27 May[1918?] to 17 Nov.1918, Murray Mss.Box 57. Included with these is a typescript statement on his being forced to resign from his post at St.Andrews College,University of Sydney, because of his political views. He had returned to Australia, after receiving an Oxford research scholarship, to avoid trouble in Oxford over his views on the war.


H.G.Wells described as a "curious little talking and dining club...which met monthly...between 1902 and 1908 to discuss the future of this perplexing, promising, and frustrating Empire of ours."

On the test of whether the Empire came before all else, Russell "flung out of the club" concluded that he "would rather wreck the Empire than sacrifice freedom." It was, as Wells perceptively observed thirty years later, "a parting of the ways." The issue of tariff reform was merely symptomatic of a more basic difference in world views.

Russell's candidature in the Wimbledon constituency (in 1907) on behalf of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies was a sign that he had moved to the left of the Liberal Party. So too was his strong criticism of Liberal foreign policy from 1910 onwards. Over Persia he joined Professor B.G.Browne in the condemnation of Russian suppression of constitutional liberties. To Lady Ottoline Morrell he described Grey's policy as helping "in the perpetuation of a crime against liberty, justice and civilization...Motive: fear of Germany - which nearly caused war last summer and is the ground for a vast naval expenditure. Cure: Friendship with Germany. Means: Assassination of Grey."

As one might have expected, therefore, Russell was one of

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1. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography*, II, 762-5. The club, founded by Sidney Webb, included Haldane, Leo Amery, Lord Milner and three academics: W.A.S.Hewins (Director of the L.S.E., 1895-1903), H.J.Mackinder (Principal of Reading College, 1892-1903, then Hewins's successor at the L.S.E., 1903-8, as well as teaching geography at Oxford and London), and M.Sadler (Professor of Education at Manchester, 1903-11 and Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University, 1911-23). Hewins & Mackinder became Liberal Unionist M.P.s, Sadler had earlier worked in the Education Department.

2. Undated [1912?] cit. Clark, p.244.
the group of radical Liberals who in 1914 campaigned against British involvement in the threatened European war. He busied himself collecting the signatures of Cambridge dons for the statement (published in the Manchester Guardian) recommending a policy of neutrality for Britain. He was one of the few British intellectuals who did not change his mind after the British declaration of war on the third of August and he just could not understand why liberal intellectuals "like J.L. Hammond, who had been writing for years against participation in a European war, were swept off their feet by Belgium". In part this stemmed from a basic scepticism when faced with the moralising rhetoric of liberal apologias, but there was, too, a streak of gritty realism in Russell's conception of foreign policy - although he could also use moral arguments himself, as he had done over Persia.

The war for Russell thus involved a position as clearly-defined as that of the intellectuals who now supported British policy. "I never had a moment's doubt as to what I should do", he wrote later. "I have at times been paralysed by scepticism, at times I have been cynical, at other times indifferent, but when the war came I felt as if I heard the voice of God. I knew that it was my business to protest, however futile protest might be.


2. "Germany is less guilty and we are less innocent, than the news from London would make you think. It is plain (though under the influence of war-fever people here deny it) that Germany and Austria thought they could punish Serbia without causing Russian intervention and that they desired a diplomatic humiliation of Russia. They did not expect war, but were hurried into it by the Russian general mobilisation. As for Belgium, that was, for us, merely a pretext. It has long been universally known that Belgian neutrality would be violated in the next Franco-German war. All the Great Powers except France are to blame, but not Germany only; it is the terror of Russia that has produced Germany's apparent madness....And if we succeed, the only Power that will profit is Russia - the land of the knout." To Lucy Donnelly, (p.t.o.)
My whole nature was involved....I hardly supposed that much good would come of opposing the war, but I felt that for the honour of human nature those who were not swept off their feet should show they stood firm."

From the beginning Russell was very close to the members of the executive of the U.D.C. and he was one of the main forces in the establishment of a branch in Cambridge. As we have seen, by mid-1915 many people formerly sympathetic to the idea of "democratic control" had begun to turn against the U.D.C. Russell, as one of its best-known publicists, was singled out for special criticism. After "the sinking of the Lusitania," he wrote, "a fiercer spirit began to prevail. It seemed to be supposed that I was in some way responsible for the disaster." I wonder where R[ussell] will end up", wrote the philosopher Bernard Bosanquet. "His views about the war are not unreasonable I think, but the steps he has got involved in are undesirable. I all but gave my name to the Union of Democratic Control when it first started but felt an instinct that it would develop into things one could not approve."³

Russell's pamphlet War The Offspring of Fear (1915), published by the U.D.C., earned the distinction of being probably the first work to be publicly burned in a British university⁴ since

(footnotes cont. from previous page)
22 Aug.1914 cit. B.Feinberg & R.Kasrils, Bertrand Russell's America, 1973,1,51. Apart from the reference to Russia, a generally more level-headed view of the war than could be found amongst most British critics.
1. Autobiography,II,17-18
2. Ibid.,18-19
4. According to one of Russell's former pupils the incendiaries were led by one of the divinity Professors. Clark,p.257.
Froude's *Nemesis of Faith* more than half a century earlier. The lectures given by Russell in the Caxton Hall, London, between January and March 1916 brought his name before an even wider public. They were published as *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) on the recommendation of Professor J.H. Muirhead who nevertheless did not share all Russell's views on the war. This book, like his wartime essays - published as *Justice In Wartime* (1916) - gave Russell a following in America as well,¹ and some copies reached soldiers at the Front. At least one young officer was nearly persuaded to declare a conscientious objection to the war after reading Russell.² Not surprisingly Russell's name (and that of the U.D.C.) began to be linked with the anti-conscription campaign which was gathering strength from mid-1915 onwards.³

A.E. Taylor, an Oxford philosopher then holding the chair of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrews, wrote to *The Times* to protest at the failure of the authorities to prosecute Russell. "Is there one law for the working class agitator and another for members of the Whig oligarchy who are also Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge?" he asked.⁴ But Russell was not deterred, and when the Military Service Bill was passed through Parliament in January 1916 he began to work for the No-Conscription Fellowship.

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2. "...I stayed up late and read B.Russell's 'Justice in War Time', and went to bed so impressed with its force that I determined to stand out openly against re-entering the Army." A.G. West, *Diary of A Dead Officer*, Oxford, 1919, p.50 (19 Aug. 1916). West had been reading English Literature at Oxford and had joined the Public Schools Battalion. He did, however, return to France (promoted to officer) and was later killed. Siegfried Sassoon apparently made his (more successful) decision before meeting Russell. See *The Complete Memoirs Of George Sherston*, 1932, p.477.

3. "There is a general belief that our friends [Dickinson & Russell] when not making speeches or pamphlets against their country, spend their time persuading possible recruits not to enlist! I cannot quite believe that! N.Wedd (Fellow of King's College) to E.F. Bulmer, 21 Feb. 1915, Wedd MSS.

From June 1916 until February 1918 Russell was a leading member of the N.C.F., becoming its acting-chairman when Clifford Allen and other leaders were imprisoned. In this capacity he wrote ten feature articles and 45 editorials for the N.C.F. magazine The Tribunal, including one for which he was imprisoned for six months in 1918. Even more than his work for the U.D.C. this put Russell quite beyond the academic pale. If, like Lowes Dickinson, he had involved himself in the league of nations movement when U.D.C. work had appeared to reach a dead-end, Russell would have retained a modicum of academic respectability. But the N.C.F. was "a much less 'intellectual' body than the U.D.C." - the only other academic member was G.D.H. Cole, and he was not a very active one. But for Russell this political activism injected new meaning into his life. "I look round my shelves at the books of mathematics and philosophy that used to seem full of hope and interest, and now leave me utterly cold", he wrote in 1916 to Ottoline Morrell. "The work I have done seems so little, so irrelevant to this world in which we are living." 

Russell's isolation from Cambridge was increased as Trinity dons who had belonged to the U.D.C. got commissions in the army and left. J.B. Littlewood, for example, turned his mathematical skills to good effect "doing ballistics as a Second Lieutenant in the

2. Hardy, p.15.
Royal Artillery". Russell was left as the only critic of the war in College - or at least the only one who would speak out. He began to find himself avoided at high table. His friend and former philosophical mentor John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart asked him no longer to come and see him "because he could not bear" Russell's opinions on the war. His close friend and collaborator on Principia Mathematica Alfred North Whitehead, who had a younger son killed in the war, disagreed strongly with Russell's views and a lasting coolness grew up between them. Russell, it is true, increased his own isolation by his uncompromising - some would have said provocative - attitudes. But he did have some very antagonistic colleagues, in particular Henry Jackson, Regius Professor of Greek and Vice-Master of Trinity, and it seems the main force behind Russell's removal from his lectureship.

Even before this actually happened there were hints of


2. Russell, "Some Of My Contemporaries at Cambridge" Portraits From Memory, 1956, p.67. As an undergraduate McTaggart was "a follower of John Stuart Mill, a radical, and an empirical realist. But after a year or two..., having discovered Hegel and become an idealist, he became also, for most purposes, a conservative" - "an imperialist, a believer in public schools and universities (of the older type), a lover of all ceremonies and traditions, of feasts, port wine, scarlet robes, professorships, mayors and corporations, bishops, the House of Lords, and in fact everything English except the House of Commons", McTaggart was "the most curious combination imaginable of Dr.Johnson, Hegel, and Robert Browning". Dickinson, Autobiography, p.143 (this passage was written in 1921).

3. But as Russell later noted, "it was much more my fault than his that these differences caused a diminution in the closeness of our friendship." Portraits From Memory, p.93. See also letter from Whitehead 4 June 1916 cit. Russell, Autobiography, II, 65.

4. "If I were Prince of Peace", A.E.Housman (Professor of Latin, Fellow of Trinity) said to E.H.Neville, "I would choose a less provocative Ambassador." cit. A.Wood, Bertrand Russell, p.89.

5. "What pigs the Germans are! It is a sacred duty to hate them." (Jackson to Sir G.O.Trevelyan, 20 Mar.1917) "There was a time when I shrank from taking life, and might perhaps have become (p.t.o.)
difficulty over Russell's position at Trinity. When the lecture-
ship in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics came up for re-
newal early in 1915 there was an attempt to get him a fellowship
which would have afforded him greater security. In the end the
College Council renewed the lectureship for another five years,
although they knew Russell's view on the war. The reason for
this, according to Hardy, was that Russell's intention of using
his two terms leave of absence for political activities had alarmed
the Council. Bestowing a fellowship, they had felt, might "be
interpreted as a public gesture of approbation, and might have
had serious effects on the future of the College". The fact
that Russell was not a Fellow of Trinity after the expiry of his
prize fellowship (1895-1901) meant that his position was that much
more vulnerable, since a Fellow could only be deprived of his
fellowship in exceptional circumstances.

Russell appeared before the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House
in London in June 1916, charged with "statements likely to pre-
judice the recruiting and discipline of His Majesty's forces" in
a pamphlet he had written to protest against the imprisonment of a conscientious object.\textsuperscript{1} The charge does not seem to have been borne out by the evidence - perhaps the reason for the Government's suppression of the report of the proceedings. Russell's friends were able to attend, Lytton Strachey leaving us this description:

"The Lord Mayor looked like a stuck pig. Counsel for the prosecution was an incredible Daumier caricature of a creature - and positively turned out to be Mr. Bodkin. I felt rather nervous in that Brigand's cave."\textsuperscript{2}

Russell was convicted and ordered to pay a fine of £100, a sum paid by anonymous friends when his valuable library was threatened with sale as a result of his non-payment. The Trinity College Council then decided, "That, since Mr. Russell had been convicted under the Defence Of The Realm Act, and the conviction has been affirmed on appeal, he be removed from his Lectureship in the College."\textsuperscript{3} Technically the Council was within its rights. A Lecturer, unlike a Fellow, held office "during the pleasure of the Council" who could dismiss him without reference to the opinions of the other Fellows not on the Council (the majority). However, the evidence which Hardy published for private circulation points fairly conclusively to the Council acting as they did

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1.] The Case Of Ernest F. Everett, 1916, repr. in Russell, Autobiography, II, 63-4. See also Boulton, pp. 182-5.
\item[2.] Cit. Holroyd, p. 622.
\item[3.] H. McL. Innes to Russell, 11 July 1916, cit. Autobiography, II, 68. Russell seems earlier to have realised that he could lose the lectureship (see his letter to Lady Ottoline, cit. ibid., 67).
\end{footnotes}
because of Russell's general views on the war.¹

Russell's dismissal aroused a good deal of adverse criticism among British philosophers who, though not agreeing with Russell's views, felt able to "respect honest convictions" and had expected the College Council to do the same.² One of the older Fellows of Trinity James Ward, pioneer in the developing discipline of psychology, gives some idea of the feeling amongst the pacifically minded minority in Trinity, in a letter to Russell: "I am amazed and grieved to see how you are being badgered and hounded about. It is most outrageous, and what the motive for it all may be I am quite at a loss to surmise. Are they afraid that you will sneak off to America or is there some rabid fanatic trying to persuade us that you are what the McTaggarts call us - pro-Germans?³ There were also public protests from other Fellows and former members of Trinity College, including one on active service.⁴

There was a world of difference between the views of the handful of Fellows on the College Council (all older men) and the body of Trinity Fellows as a whole. "Something will have to be done when the younger ones come back", F.M.Cornford wrote to Russell. "I am sure there would have been a majority of the whole body against the Council, if it had come before a full College meeting."⁵

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¹. Hardy, pp.43-6 (a remarkably charitable view of the Council's action). McTaggart, one of the Fellows to vote for the resolution, was not unsympathetic to Russell whose views he felt were no stronger than those of at least one other member of the staff." The dismissal had simply been "because of his conviction....I looked on the case as if it had been one of removal of a Fellow....I do not blame Russell morally. I think he acted honourably [revealing himself as the author of the pamphlet]....But I do think that after such a conviction he ought not to be a lecturer of Trinity." To N.Wedd, 12 Nov.1916, Wedd Mss.Box III.


³. 3 Sept.1916, cit. Russell, Autobiography, II, 71


But the difficulty was that under war-time conditions a general meeting was very difficult to arrange, many of the younger dons being on active service. And anyway such drastic action would have been deemed inappropriate by many. "The Council, in fact, were for the time in an impregnable position; they had only to sit tight and say nothing." 1 In the end there was an official protest to the Council from twenty-two (out of a total of over sixty) Fellows. "Without implying concurrence in Mr Russell's political views" the signatories "deplored the fact of a reversal of University traditions". 2 However, no action was proposed to be taken while the war continued, and it was not until 1919 that Russell was offered another five-year lectureship (which he accepted). 3

In public at least the argument among academics over the rights and wrongs of the Russell case was conducted with little reference to conceptions of academic freedom. 4 For Liberals the action of the Council could be construed as "shoddy Prussianism" -

1. Hardy, p.43.
2. Proof of manifesto in J.M.Keynes Mss.Box 17(Ec.2).
3. Only to resign for personal reasons a year later. The manifesto calling for Russell's reinstatement was signed by 28 Fellows (including all who had served in the armed forces during the war), and 5 others approved but did not sign (including Ward had no wish to sign "anything that would whitewash the action of the Council" in dismissing Russell. Cit.Hardy,p.53). It contained the veiled threat that college harmony could not be maintained if it were rejected, but significantly it did not imply "that the action taken during the war was not right in the circumstances then obtaining". For the text see Hardy,pp.49-51.
4. It has been said that the British experience of academic freedom depends "much more on tradition, on atmosphere, and on public opinion than upon legally established rules." Lord Chorley, "Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom", Law & Contemporary Problems, XXVIII (Summer 1963), 662. It might be argued that this offers less protection.
the kind of criticism made of proposals to introduce conscription. But it was Lowes Dickinson who pointed to the obvious fact that "Mr. Russell's offence was political". Gilbert Murray, too, found it ironical that a university institution of all places should place penalties on opinion. If there was "any place where opinions, supposed to be pernicious", could "be aired with comparative safety and exposed to the full blast of intelligent criticism", then surely that place was "one of the great seats of learning". But there were not many who felt that here an issue of principle was at stake.

This description of the impact of the Russell Case suggests that it was confined largely to Cambridge and to Trinity College itself. No doubt the difficulties of war-time had something to do with this. One could also say that the "parochial" nature of the British academic at this time (one was a Fellow of Trinity or a Lecturer in London rather than a member of a "key profession") was also important. In America, by contrast, where there were also cases of dismissal of academics in "loyalty cases", the stronger professionalisation of university teaching led to the establishment of guidelines on academic freedom in wartime by the newly-formed American Association of University Professors (1915). In Germany

1. Eg. C.H. Herford (Professor of English at Manchester and an old Trinity man) saw it as a combination of "German abuse of authoritative power malignly compounded with English contempt for ideas." Nation, XIX, 17 (22 July 1916), 503.
4. But see J. Stewart, Jane Ellen Harrison, p. 152
5. Not that the A.A.U.P. was conspicuous in the defence of what was after all its raison d'être - academic freedom. Its leaders A.O. Lovejoy and J. Dewey were both strong supporters of American entry to the war. Their report on "Academic Freedom in Wartime" recognised four grounds for dismissal of faculty (three of them involving no (p.t.o.)
where the idea of lehrfreiheit was first formulated the fate of academic critics of the war was mixed. The University of Munich resisted government attempts to secure the dismissal of Professor F.W. Förster, but a more outspoken critic G.F. Nicolai, Professor of Physiology at the University of Berlin, was deprived of his chair and imprisoned at least twice for his views.¹

Certainly one can say that the British Government's treatment of Russell did amount to something like persecution, especially when he was sent to prison for six months in May 1918 for "having made certain statements likely to prejudice His Majesty's relations with America".² But even before this the Government had been able to harass Russell by restricting his movements (as someone who had been convicted under D.O.R.A.) within Britain. Lloyd George claimed that Russell had to be prohibited from giving lectures in special security areas (including all coastal towns and cities) because they "undoubtedly interfere with the prosecution

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prior government action : (i) conviction for disobeying a law or wartime regulation, (ii) involvement in anti-conscription propaganda or opposition to military law, (iii) attempting to dissuade others from assisting the war effort, (iv) "hostile and offensive expressions concerning the United States or its government" (in public or in private) by Professors of German origin. Not surprisingly, there were many cases of dismissals and forced resignations, of which those of W.A. Schaper (Professor of Political Science, Minnesota), J. McK. Cattell (Professor of Psychology, Columbia) and H.W.L. Dana (Professor of Comparative Literature, Columbia) are only the most celebrated. See J.R. Mock, Censorship 1917, Princeton, 1941, pp. 32-3; R. Hofstadter & W. Metzger, pp. 495-506; Gruber, chapter V.


2. On the strength of a report of speeches in the U.S. Senate, Russell alleged that American soldiers would be used as strike-breakers in Britain as they had in their own country. See "The German Peace Offer", Tribunal, 90 (3 Jan. 1918), I (repr. in Russell, Autobiography, II, 79-81). Russell had in fact made the same charge five months earlier (Tribunal, 72 (30 Aug. 1917), 2.
of the war in this country". ¹ But for Russell, now without means of support, perhaps the worst blow was the refusal of the Foreign Office to grant him a passport to travel to America to lecture on Logic and Ethics at Harvard. ² Quite apart from the issue of civil liberty there was the simple question of financial support.

Russell was lucky therefore to have friends prepared to rally round and support him when he came out of prison in September 1910. Gilbert Murray organised a memorial, signed by many of the leading philosophers, to raise money to support a lectureship of from £150 to £200 a year for three years "in order to enable... (Russell) to devote himself exclusively to philosophical work, in the form of teaching or research or both. It is to be feared, however, that he may find this impossible, since in the present state of public feeling no ordinary university institution is likely to be willing to employ him as a teacher after his expulsion from Trinity College, Cambridge." ³ As one of the signatories, A.E.Taylor (who in September 1915 had called for the prosecution of Russell) pointed out, universities in Britain had "to think very much of student fees, and...any which appointed Bertrand


2. On the grounds that he had been convicted under D.O.R.A., but really because they considered him "one of the most mischievous cranks in the country". Cit. Feinberg & Kasrils,pp.60-1.

3. Manifesto among Keynes-Russell letters, J.M.Keynes Mss. 32.2 (also in Murray Mss.Box 57). Signatories were S.Alexander, H.W.Carr(Secretary of the Aristotelian Society), G.D.Hicks (Professor of Philosophy University College London), T.P.Nunn (Professor of Education, London), A.E.Taylor, J.Ward, A.Whitehead. See also various letters to Murray, 7-20 Sept.1918, Murray Mss.
Russell might have to face a real falling off from the illogical wrath of the British Parent in his present mood." And he concluded, "I certainly do not see what is going to become of lehrfreiheit if he can be victimised in this way without a very energetic protest."¹

For all his difficulties Russell was fortunate in being an eminent philosopher and a man with connections in high places. Unlike his fellow political prisoner E.D. Morel he was able to get into the first division at Brixton Prison on appeal. With more comfortable conditions he was able to read and white what he wanted (provided that he did not indulge in political propaganda). Acting on the suggestion of Gilbert Murray, Lord Balfour had intervened with the Home Secretary on behalf of a fellow-philosopher to secure prison conditions which would not break him physically or mentally.² What greater contrast could there be to this than in the treatment meted out to Professors in British universities who happened to be of German origin. These dismissals aroused virtually no publicity and, unlike the Russell case, they have been virtually forgotten.

When the war broke out in 1914 university teachers who were German nationals could expect to be interned (if they were males of military age) in Britain. This was in fact what happened to

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¹. Letter to G. Murray, 4 Sept. 1918, Murray Mss. Box 57. This had also been a consideration with Trinity College Council when dismissing Russell, according to Dickinson. See his letter to N. Wedd, 4 Nov. 1916, Wedd Mss. Box 3.

Julius Freund, Professor of German at Sheffield (1906-15). Other German nationals, like Max Freund (Professor of German at Belfast, 1903-14) were in Germany when the war broke out. All were quickly removed from their chairs and lectureships by resolutions of the governing bodies. However, anti-German feeling was not very discriminating. People with German names were easy targets for hatred, even if they were British nationals or Germans who had lived in Britain for twenty years or so and who had just never taken British nationality. Provincial universities and colleges - with the exception of Manchester, where there was a large community of German origin and many university teachers with German names - were least able to withstand local pressure because of the strong representation of local interests on their governing bodies.

1. At the end of 1916 his professorship was terminated by the University Council because it believed "there was little likelihood that students would want to be taught by one of his nationality". A.W. Chapman (former Registrar) to the writer, 26 July 1973. Freund went on to become a professor at Berlin (1919).

2. The claims for arrears of salary was not settled until 1927, by which time Freund was Professor of German at the Rice Institute in Texas. See T.W. Moody & J.C. Beckett, Queen's Belfast 1845-1949, 1959, II, 457 & n.6, 611. There were similar cases with lecturers in German at Reading (K. Holl), St. Andrews (G. Schaaafs) and Dundee (W. Stede). Official records of Reading University College Council (27 Oct. 1914) and Minutes of the St. Andrews University Court (19 Oct. 1914, 10 May, 1915). The Professor of Greek & Reader in Oriental History at Liverpool (1911-14) C.F.F. Lehmann-Haupt resigned soon after the outbreak of war. Annual Report of Vice-Chancellor (courtesy of Mr A. Allan, University Archives). The Professor Sanskrit & Comparative Philology at Edinburgh (1875-1914) H.J. Eggeling was in Germany at the outbreak of war and resigned his chair. His high standing within the University is shown in the long extract in Senate minutes regretting his retirement. Edinburgh University Senatus Academicus Minutes (5 Nov. 1914). His son continued to teach German in the University.

3. W.T.S. Sonnenschein (Vice-Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford) with his father W.Swan Sonnenschein) assumed his paternal grandmother's name Stallybrass, although he was still affectionately known as "Sonners". H.G. Hanbury in DNB 1941-50, p. 816. His uncle. B.A. Sonnenschein (Professor of Latin at Birmingham) did (p.t.o.)
Anti-German hysteria was present from almost the first days of the war, but it reached its height from 1915 onwards. In December 1914 the shelling of East coast towns, in January 1915 the first Zeppelin raids, in April 1915 the sinking of the Lusitania, all fuelled the hysteria. In April 1915 there were anti-German riots in London's East End, and in May the Stock Exchange excluded brokers of German birth (even if naturalised). In October 1914 the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of Battenberg) was forced from office because of his German origins. In May 1915 the Unionists secured the exclusion of Haldane from office, presumably because his penchant for Hegel made him suspect. Spy mania affected otherwise intelligent people, and together with stories of Russian soldiers with snow on their boots passing through Britain, provide evidence of the disturbed state of the public mind. The Principal of Birmingham University, Oliver Lodge blamed the shell-shortage on spies and agents provocateurs. The "natural tendency of hard-worked and ignorant men to drink and idleness" was, he claimed "readily fostered by aliens".1

footnotes continued from previous page)
not change his name, although his son did (to Somerset). Sir Charles Waldstein (born in America of German parents), former Professor of Art at Cambridge, anglicised his surname to Walston. See his letter to N.Wedd, 12 May 1918, Wedd Mss.Box 3. The orientalist Arthur Schloss became Arthur Waley.

4. There was only one Manchester professor with a German background: Arvid Johansson had been born in Russian ruled Livonia and educated at the universities of Dorpat, Tübingen and Berlin. He had been professor of German at Manchester since 1895 and Dean of the Faculty of Arts from 1916. By the time of the outbreak of war Arthur Schuster (another naturalised Briton of German origin) had moved from his professorship of Physics at Manchester to the Secretaryship of the Royal Society.

1. The War & After, 1916 pp.152-3. Such aliens were "loathsome and filthy as well as horrible" (p.154). Cf. the belief of Arthur Hassall that Britain had for many years "been infested by spies, who were to be found in every grade of...society and who regularly notified their views of the political situation to the German authorities". Hassall,p.4.
In May 1915, the month of Haldane’s fall, the Government announced further alien internments. At this time a letter appeared in The Times from five professors of German origin but British nationality, who held chairs of German at Oxford, Cambridge, Birmingham, Leeds and London. They declared their "unswerving loyalty" to the country of their adoption.1 Five days later another letter appeared in which the Professor of International Law at Cambridge — another British national of German origin — expressed disgust at German atrocities in Belgium2 But subsequent events showed that not even such declarations could save at least two of the signatories from further criticism, and ultimately persecution, by the communities in which they lived. We will look in more detail at three of the cases:

Wichmann: Karl Wichmann was Professor of German at the University of Birmingham. He had been born in Germany, taken a degree at Kiel University, and then had come to Britain very probably for political reasons. He lectured at Birmingham before taking up a chair in German at Sheffield (1901-7), finally moving back to Birmingham as Professor of German in 1907. According to Sir William Ashley, eminent economic historian and Vice-Principal of Birmingham University, Wichmann was a great admirer of Britain:

1. 14 May 1915, p.10d. The signatories were K.H.Breul (Cambridge), H.G.Fiedler (Oxford), A.W.Schüddekopf (Leeds), K.Wichmann (Birmingham), R.Priebsch (London). There were many similar letters at this time.

2. 19 May 1915, p.10b. Lasa Oppenheim had been in Britain since 1895 and had been naturalised in 1900. Like many other Anglo-Germans he had left for political reasons. But he was still very sensitive, as his reaction to a colleague’s jibe about the "Anglo-German" appearance of his legal writing showed. See his "On War Treason", Law Quarterly Rev. XXXIII,400 (July 1917),266.
"...with a great admiration of English political institutions and a great detestation of Prussian methods of government and of Prussian militarism. While proud of the traditions of the great age of German philosophy and Literature and Music - the age of Kant, and Goethe and Beethoven - he greatly disliked the materialistic tendencies of modern Germany. I must confess that there always seems to me a strain of unpracticality in his ideas, but, in theory and temperament, he was poles asunder from the pan-German or militarist German type. His influence, I am convinced, among his students, was on the side of all that is high and noble in the best of German literature of the past."

The occasion for Ashley's letter was the news that Wichmann was the subject of investigation by the "Certificates of Naturalisation (Revocation) Committee" in London. Ashley was at pains to portray Wichmann as a "good German". In Wichmann's lectures on "German Institutions" he had pointed out to the students "the lack of genuine self-government in the German constitution". From Ashley's letter it is also clear that Wichmann had been forced to resign from his chair in 1916 "due to the action of the City Council, which...was not based upon any specific charge of any kind but on the broad principle that no German might hold a Chair in an English University". Wichmann had then withdrawn from Birmingham, not because of "any specific fault on his part, or any charge against him, but because, whether wisely or not, it was thought that his presence was undesirable in a munition area, and in a University where so much confidential work was being done for the Government."

1. Letter to the Secretary, Certificates of Naturalisation (Revocation) Committee, 21 Oct.1918. (Courtesy of Birmingham University Archives).

2. Loc.Cit. There was research at the University on explosives, gas, aircraft, alloys and submarines. See M.Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry 1850-1970, 1972,pp.221-3, 229-30.
No more is heard of Wichmann, who disappears quietly from university records.¹ His chair remained vacant until 1918 when Dr Sandbach, formerly Special Lecturer in Commercial German, became Professor. The fate of Wichmann's colleague at Leeds is known. It could be said that A.W. Schüddekopf was killed by the mental anguish of seeing the two countries he loved best at war with each other, and perhaps too by the shoddy treatment he received from the community in which he lived.

Schüddekopf: Albert-William Schüddekopf had been Professor of German at Leeds since 1896. Born in Germany he had graduated from Göttingen in 1885 and then settled in Britain. He was Professor of German at Bedford College, London (1888-90), before coming to Leeds as a Lecturer in 1890. With the outbreak his difficulties were compounded by his wife's habit of speaking her mind. Her comments on the truthfulness of the Bryce Report had led some local people to complain to the Vice-Chancellor Sir Michael Sadler. In July 1915 the local M.P. (J. Butcher) asked the Home Secretary whether it were true that Schüddekopf had "refused to allow his son [a Second Lieutenant in a Territorial Regiment] to fight against the Germans". Apparently the Professor was quite "willing that his son should serve for home defence, but did not wish him to fight Germans abroad".²

¹ There is no official mention of his resignation in the Report To The University Council for 1916-17(letter to the writer from Miss C.L. Penney, 26 July 1973).
² Hansard, Ser.5 LXXIII (July 1915), 185-6. Butcher had been Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge (1875-84).
Although Shüddekopf had signed the letter of loyalty in May 1915 (see above) he was now prohibited by the Home Secretary from associating with members of the armed forces "without the permission of a competent military authority" - and this despite the fact of his being a naturalised British subject. In November 1915 the University was forced to grant him indefinite leave of absence because the City of Leeds Education Committee had threatened to withdraw its grant to the University. In June 1916 Sadler advised Schüddekopf to resign, and three months later he died in a nursing home in Harrogate aged fifty-four.

The third case involved not a Professor of German but an eminent German-born orientalist. C. Hermann Ethé held a combined chair of German and Oriental Languages at University College Aberystwyth from 1875. Like Wichmann and Schüddekopf, he "was a political exile who was too liberal to live easily in Bismarck's new Germany." After four years as a lecturer in Oriental Languages at Munich (1867-71) Ethé came to Britain where he married an English woman and gained an international reputation amongst scholars for his catalogue of Persian, Turkish, Hindustani, Pushti and Arabic manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (from 1872) and his catalogue of Persian manuscripts in the India Office Library. This reputation was recognised by Oxford's appointment of Ethé as Public Examiner for the Honours School of Oriental Studies (from 1887).

1. Information supplied by the German Department, University of Leeds, June 1973.
As a former colleague pointed out, the only reason he never got a chair in a German university was due to his liberal political views:

"With the growth of his reputation attempts were made naturally to recall him. To many Oriental faculties in German universities it seemed anomalous that one of the first Persian scholars in Europe should be spending the prime of his life in teaching French and German at a little town on the coast of Wales, and he was repeatedly nominated for an Oriental chair. Very possibly he would have accepted the call. But all these attempts broke down before the resolute refusal of the Imperial Ministry to tolerate a scholar of his suspicious political opinions in a German university chair."¹

When war broke out Ethé and his wife were in Germany, but he was allowed back to Britain at the request of the College authorities. Back in Aberystwyth in October Ethé and one of his colleagues - an Englishman with a German name² - were threatened by a mob led by a local magistrate and a town councillor. Ethé took refuge with his wife's family, and, although in obvious financial difficulties, was asked to resign by the College Council. Even the small pension offered by the College was attacked by a member of the Town Council who asked "why a member of the family of brutes who left our men to die and jeered when they saw their coffins pass" should receive even £150 a year.³ This affair caused a good deal of strain between town and gown in Aberystwyth.

Although Ethé (unlike Wichmann and Schüddekopf) had never

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2. G.A. Schott (Professor of Applied Mathematics) who had a German wife.

3. Dr Harries was referring to a report on Wittenberg Camp. The Town Council condemned the annuity. *Times*, 13 April, 1916, p. 11d. The Professor of History in the College (E. Edwards) who was present strongly defended Ethé.
become naturalised, he had been in the country for forty-two years. All the time Ethé had worked in the India Office (for no remuneration since 1901) no one had ever suggested that he was "concocting treasonable information for Berlin". Ethé died at Reading in 1917 without returning to the College that he had served so faithfully. "Despite his age", the College historian writes, "he was a casualty of the war just as certainly as any young soldier killed at the Front."  

These seem to have been the only cases of persecution - all the more discreditable in the cases of Wichmann and Schüddekopf because they should have been able to expect to be treated as loyal British subjects, which they were. Some of the opposition among Cambridge conservatives, like Ridgway, to the idea of an English Tripos - put forward during the war - was probably due to anti-German feeling, for two of the leading reformers were Hermann Breul (Professor of German) and B.G.W. Braunholtz (Reader in Romance Languages), both German-born. Herman George Fiedler, Taylorian Professor of German at Oxford (1907-39), had his loyalty called into question by an undergraduate magazine early in 1915; the title of the article was "Can The Leopard Change His Spots?" Although 144 undergraduates protested publicly against the "innuendo
and veiled threats", it was perhaps surprising that only two dons signed the protest letter.\(^1\) Two months later Fiedler was taken to task by a Fellow of Jesus College (A.E.W.Hazel) for not being specific enough in his condemnation of Germany when he had written to The Times with other professors of German in May 1915. "An ambiguous declaration of this kind", Hazel wrote, "may save their windows, but will hardly save their reputations." Fiedler must have taken this to heart, for a week later he sent a letter to the Oxford Magazine stressing his revulsion at the sinking of the Lusitania and at the German use of poison gas.\(^2\)

In this examination of the pressures on political dissent in universities in wartime perhaps the most interesting conclusion is the extent to which academics themselves were willing accomplices of a general sensitivity to criticism. Although the number of academics apparently willing - for whatever motive - to persecute their colleagues may not seem large, they were not greatly outnumbered by those who publicly defended the right of people like Pigou or Russell to openly criticise official policy. The attitude of the majority was either tacit acquiescence or a desire not to get involved. Whether academic freedom was in fact being infringed during the war of course depends on one's definition of being infringed, but it would be hard to deny that the war revealed the definite limits to freedom of speech which an academic could expect

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to enjoy. The treatment of German-born academics revealed not only the irrational hatreds of wartime but also the extent to which the newer universities and colleges were vulnerable to community pressure. But the treatment of Russell by Trinity College Council also shows that similar pressures could operate -

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1. Strictly defined it is "the freedom...to investigate or discuss" one's subject and to express "conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials" of the university, unless one's methods "are found by qualified bodies of one's profession "to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics". A.O. Lovejoy, "Academic Freedom" in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1930, I, 384. Lord Chorley was using a similar definition when he claimed in 1963 that in Britain there did not "appear to have been any case where even a colorable argument has been advanced that a dismissal took place which involved a breach of academic freedom". Chorley, 664, Cf.E.Ashby, Universities British, Indian, African, 1966, p.292. However, in America by the end of the nineteenth century professors were attempting to include extramural freedom of speech into a broader definition of academic freedom. This was reflected in the 1915 Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the A.A.U.P. See Hofstadter & Metzger, pp.403-12. Needless to say, the Lernfreiheit component of the original German definition of academic freedom was not stressed in Britain or America.

2. Manchester seems to be an exception. Not only was there apparently no persecution of professors of German origin, but the Professor of Economic History George Unwin held his chair although he was a member of the U.D.C. and of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Unwin also organised lectures for "that miscreant Russell" and owned to "going about in a sneaking way insinuating the subversive principles of the Sermon on the Mount at Methodist Colleges and other unlikely places". Cit. R.H.Tawney, "Introductory Memoir" to Unwin's Studies In Economic History, 1927, p.liii. Unwin's views were very like those of Dickinson: "no nation was guiltless, and, compared with the general responsibility, the relative criminality of the different combatants was a question of secondary importance." (ibid., p.lili) Unwin's colleague at Manchester R.H.Tawney expressed similar views in his Commonplace Book (pp.81-2).
though more indirectly - on the two ancient universities. What A.E.Taylor called "the illogical wrath of the British Parent" spelt possible future financial trouble just as much as an unsatisfied local education committee.¹

Yet, although some academics suffered persecution because of the atmosphere of wartime hysteria, some of their colleagues were engaged in feeding war hatreds, working in the largely clandestine British propaganda machine.

¹. I have not been able to find any evidence that wartime conscientious objectors had any difficulty in obtaining academic posts after 1918. There were cases of universities refusing to take conscientious objectors as students during the war, and there was a proposal in the House of Lords to bar conscientious objectors from the teaching profession in state schools (Nov.1917). However, this was defeated much to the relief of H.A.L.Fisher. See Tawney "Introductory Memoir", pp.1iii-1iv and Rae,pp.199-200.
"In the wars of to-day, which comprise entire peoples, thought is enlisted; thought kills as well as cannons; it kills the soul; it kills beyond the seas, it kills across centuries; it is the heavy artillery which works at a distance."

Romain Rolland, *Clerambault* (1920).

The dividing line between propaganda and history can be fine, and never more so than during wartime. The writings of British philosophers and historians, which we have examined in previous chapters, were often little more than attempts to give an ideological basis for Allied war aims and policies. In a sense they were propagandist, although there was often very little to distinguish them from more scholarly writing on the subject of, say, German culture and politics, of Britain's role in Europe. It is easy enough with the classicist Gilbert Murray to distinguish propagandist from scholarly writings. But what of the historians, whose business it was to write, in peacetime, the history of Wilhelmine Germany or of modern European diplomacy? Was it just coincidental that historians were the most prolific wartime pamphleteers? Or was it the result of the position of the historian in British society? Acton had written that a "knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by experience", was valuable not just for itself, but as "an instrument of action" and a "power" for "the making of the future".¹

¹ "Inaugural Lecture On The Study of History" (1895), repr. in *Lectures on Modern History*, 1906, p.2.
And while some British historians took issue with Acton's injunction to make moral judgements, few dissented from his belief that modern history was characterised by unmistakable signs of "forward movement".

It is perhaps not surprising then that historians were intimately involved in the development of official British propaganda. In 1914 Britain was as unprepared to wage what would now be called propaganda warfare as it was to fight a long continental campaign. G.W.Prothero, editor of the *Quarterly Review* and previously Professor of History at Edinburgh (1894-9), was one of the first people to realise this deficiency, and in the first month of the war he raised the matter in *The Times*. His letter, headed "A Fight To The Finish", expressed grave concern at the "evidence that in large and influential sections of the population" the war was "not regarded with whole-hearted approval, or, indeed, approval at all." The reason, Prothero claimed, was that "even if the demands of honour and the maintenance of treaties" made a "widely-understood appeal", vital British interests did not appear to be involved. And it was clear that it was with "the vast masses of working people in the north and centre of England" that Prothero was concerned. His fears might be dismissed as those of a conservative with little knowledge of working class opinion except that one of the leading lights in the university extension and adult education movement confirmed them. One can find ample evidence in the papers of the Balliol history tutor A.L.Smith of his own attempts to combat the disturbing lack of enthusiasm for the

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1. 20 Aug.1914, p.3b.
war among members of his classes.¹

Smith used the W.E.A. as a means of reaching working-class opinion, and the titles of his lectures which survive and the broadsheets suggest the message he attempted to put across: "The People and the Duties of Empire", "The Empire Fabric", What The War Really Means", "Never Again".² Privately Smith and Prothero worried over the workers who greeted recruiting drives with the claim that they would not "be any worse off under German rule",³ and the revelations of German "frightfulness" in Belgium from early 1915 onwards gave them welcome ammunition to use in their lectures. At the same time the neutral "market" overseas became more important in the considerations of those involved in propaganda. Still, it is not completely true that propaganda was "directed, not towards the ignorant masses, but to educated doubters",⁴ and one can find many published lectures delivered to unsophisticated audiences.⁵ The Oxford University Extension Delegacy had a well-organised network of lecturers, and its secretary J.A.R. Marriott, like Smith, sought to make use of this to reach working-class

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1. Eg. his circular letter to W.E.A. branches which mentions Prothero's letter but in which Smith feels that it might be better that any campaign should "come less academically and more through their own working class organisations, and if possible through membership of their own class; so as to be above suspicion of being in any 'interest' (political, religious, academic or social)." Smith Mss. Box I, Group I. A year later Smith felt that there had been a "'clarification' of working-class opinion", due largely to W.E.A. lectures. Letter to A.Schuster, 15 Oct.1915. Cf. R.H.Tawney to A.L.Smith, 27 Dec.1917, cit. Winter, p.170.

2. See Smith Mss.Box.1/Group 1.


4. Marwick, Deluge, p.45

5. Eg. Dicey, How We Ought To Feel About The War (a lecture at Working Men's College, London) & Ashley, The War & Its Economic Aspects (a W.E.A. lecture at Birmingham), both Oxford pamphlets on the war.
opinion. "Propaganda in the narrower sense was not within our proper province", he wrote later. "But we substituted for our usual lecture subjects, courses which had a direct bearing upon the war, its antecedents and issues.¹ No doubt Marriott's intentions were not unlike those of Smith, and the Delegacy and W.E.A. were soon represented on a "central committee" of national patriotic organisations, like the Victoria League and Cavendish League, together with the Business Men's League and the Social Service Bureau.²

Should the universities become involved directly in this patriotic activity? E.A. Sonnenschein, Professor of Classics at Birmingham, thought they should take "a prominent part in the campaign of enlightenment" which was "needed not only to stimulate recruiting, but also to clear away some cobwebs from the minds of certain sections" of the population.³ However, Alfred Marshall, the eminent Cambridge economist, sounded a note of caution about the proposal to recruit academics as travelling patriotic lecturers. Picking up one of Prothero's points - that there should be no need for "bitter or inflammatory" addresses, since the truth about German actions was bad enough - Marshall raised the spectre of jingoism. "It is to be remembered", he wrote, "that a great many Germans, especially among the working classes, are very averse to

¹. Memories Of Four Score Years, 1946,p.153. Marriott, like Prothero, was an ardent Imperialist (though a Tory, while Prothero was a Liberal Unionist). On the political colouration of Extension lecturers, see S.Rowbotham, "The Call To University Extension Teaching 1873-1900", U.of Birmingham Hist.J.,XII,1(1969),57-71.

². The committee set out to "unify and coordinate the work of the several leagues and associations already engaged in educating and arousing the country as to the reason, justice, and necessity of the War." Prothero's letter to Times, 5 Sept.1914,p.9d. See letters from T.B.Strong (Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University) & L.R. Farnell (Rector of Exeter College), Times, 31 Aug.1914,p.4b. Also from the historians J.H.Rose & C.G.Robertson, Times, 21 Aug.1914 (p.4c),26 Aug.1914(p.5a),27 Aug 1914(p.7e).

³. Times, 5 Sept.1914,p.9d.
wars of exploitation, but, like similar classes at home, are
exasperated by insults to the fatherland."\textsuperscript{1} But quite apart from
this, Marshall insisted that intellectuals should not abandon
their usual standards of critical enquiry just because war had
broken out. And, making no secret of his own attitude to things
German, he wrote that "those who know and love Germany, even while
revolted by the hectoring militarism which is more common there
than here, should insist that we have no cause to scorn them.\textsuperscript{2}

"Professorial folly", wrote one correspondent in response
to Marshall's letter. But perhaps even more wounding were the
attacks from other academics. L.R.Farnell, Rector of Exeter
College, Oxford, and a pugnacious man at the best of times, felt
that such "moderate and compromising speech" was "unworthy of this
moral doomsday of Europe, and flatly inadequate as a criticism of
Germany's guilt."\textsuperscript{3} But J.H.Morgan, Professor of Constitutional
Law at University College, London, came to the heart of the matter
with his claim, in answer to Marshall, that "any attempt...to dis-
criminate between the German Government and the German people,
between the policy of one and the culture of the other" was "an
otiose and dangerous thing". Like Marshall, Morgan had seen German

\textsuperscript{1} Times, 26 Aug.1914, p.9a.

\textsuperscript{2} Times, 22 Aug.1914, p.7e. Cf. Memorials Of Alfred Marshall, 1925, pp.490-1. Marshall, however, was in no doubt that Britain was
fighting in "the right cause". Letter to C.P.Scott, 10 Mar.1915, C.P.Scott Mss.

\textsuperscript{3} Times, 25 Aug.1914, p.7d & 31 Aug.1914, p.4b. Farnell had been
involved in agitation for conscription before 1914. See
above p.163.
Wissenschaft at first hand - in the University of Berlin of Treitschke's day - but he had concluded that the professors were completely the creatures of the state which appointed them. They and the wider German public were the accomplices of German imperialism. "No one who has lived in Germany", he concluded, "can fail to be impressed with the hypnotism exercised upon the German mind by the pomp and circumstance of war. It has acted like an opiate on all the finer feelings of the people."¹ This argument for total war was couched in stronger terms than was usual among British academics, but then Morgan seems to have been more Germanophobic than most.² Scholars like James Bryce and H.A.L. Fisher were more reluctant to give up their notion of the two Germanies - militarist, authoritarian Wilhelmine Germany and the gentler, cosmopolitan Germany of their youth. But this distinction tended to lose its force as the war went on, and as propaganda concentrated on the dangers of premature peace and on the need for total victory.

In the first two years of the war there was, as we have seen, a great flood of idealistic writing by British academics. This began to peter out by 1916 - no doubt the slaughter on the Western Front had something to do with this - by which time the official government propaganda machine was revealing itself publicly.

¹ Times, 28 Aug. 1914, p. 5b & c.
² Morgan was attached to the B.E.F. in France as legal advisor (1914-19) and was involved in collecting evidence of German atrocities. After the war he was a member (till 1923) of the Inter-Allied Council of the Control Commission for German Disarmament and he actively opposed German rearmament. In 1945 he interrogated most of the major Nazi war criminals. For evidence of his wartime Germanophobia, see below pp. 320-1.
Yet even before the creation of the War Propaganda Bureau in 1916 the Government was organising propaganda, although great care was taken to obscure the fact. Early in the war C.F.G. Masterman, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, had been entrusted by the Cabinet with the task of consulting with leading figures from the worlds of journalism, literature and the universities with a view to speeding the flow of privately-organised propaganda against Germany. Out of these meetings grew a clandestine propaganda bureau under Masterman, with offices in Wellington House, centre of the National Insurance Commission. Some of the Commission's civil servants took up this new work. These transfers, together with the building itself, were, as the head of Pictorial Propaganda later noted, admirable camouflage for propaganda warfare. "Wellington House", as it became known to the select few, was concerned, not with supplying news to the press (this was the job of the Foreign Office), but with "the production, translation, and distribution of books, pamphlets, Government publications, speeches...dealing with the war, its origin, its history, and all the difficult and varied questions which arose during its development". It was also concerned to place "articles and interviews designed to influence


2. Including J.M. Barrie, F.M. Hueffer (later Ford), A. Bennett, R. Bridges, G.K. Chesterton, Conan Doyle (who had been knighted for his services in defending the British army from atrocity charges during the Boer War), J. Galsworthy, T. Hardy, J. Masefield, A. E. W. Mason, G. M. Trevelyan, H. G. Wells and Gilbert Murray.
One of Wellington House's most successful ventures was the distribution of the manifesto of the Oxford theologians *To The Christian Scholars of Europe and America*, which most recipients did not recognize had any connection with official propaganda distribution. Just how this happened has been described by W. Macneile Dixon, Professor of English at Glasgow and head of the American office for Wellington House. With a list of all the principal American newspapers and of all the leading public men in the United States, he was able to send them pamphlets and books as though they had come from the publishers themselves, and not from the propaganda bureau. Further, the publications written by members of Wellington House, or commissioned by it, were issued by commercial publishers (including Oxford University Press) or by non-official propaganda bodies, like Prothero's Central Committee of National Patriotic Organisations. Wellington House supplied them with literature, and they in turn "interested in their scheme many well-known people" in Britain. These people directed the literature "to their distinguished friends abroad", giving "a personal touch to what was in essence propaganda".


4. S. Gaselee, "Prefatory Note" to G. W. Prothero, *Select Analytical List of Books Concerning The Great War*, 1923, p. iii. See also material in Prothero Mss., esp. correspondence with informants on neutral opinion: Countess Martinengo in Italy (pp. II) & Miss (p. t. o.)
So wrote another wartime academic employed in propaganda work.\(^1\)

Apart from civil servants, seconded from other departments, academics were probably as numerous as journalists on the staff of Wellington House. Arnold Toynbee, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, was involved in organising propaganda for the American market until his transfer to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office in April 1918. This was the beginning of a long familiarity - on and off - with the corridors of power. He was a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, advising on Middle Eastern affairs, and twenty years later in another world war he again headed a team of expert advisors at the Foreign Office, housed this time in Balliol College. From King's College, Cambridge, came J.W. Headlam who had worked as Historical Advisor in the Foreign Office before the war. Lewis Nanier, who advised on Polish and Austrian affairs, also divided his time between Wellington House and the Foreign Office. Edwyn Bevan, the classical scholar formerly of New College, Oxford, was assigned the job of studying the German press and he soon became an authority on the pan-German movement. Later he was joined by H.H. Joachim, philosophy don at Merton, whose major work ironically had been *The Nature of Truth* (1906)\(^2\) and Norman Kemp Smith,

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\(^1\) Caselee was a Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge (1901-19) who worked in the Foreign Office during the war (1916-19) and went on to become Librarian & Keeper of Papers (1920-).

\(^2\) Joachim, the son of a Hungarian who had settled in Britain, worked in propaganda 1917-19. He was, notes his biographer, "most scrupulous in dealing with German documents, such as captured soldiers' diaries, to avoid distorting the translation to a sense more favourable to the allied cause than it properly bore." H.W.B. Joseph, "Harold Henry Joachim 1868-1938", *FBA*, XXIV (1938), 405.
translator of Kant and Professor of Philosophy at Princeton - a position which gave him useful American contacts. Finally there were three popular novelists: Gilbert Frankau, Anthony Hope (Hawkins) and Sir Gilbert Parker (also a Tory M.P.), as well as the dramatic critic William Archer.

From the first the United States was the main object of attention and several academics, like Sir George Adam Smith (Vice-Principal of Aberdeen University) and G.G.G. Butler (international lawyer and historian, of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge), went on speaking tours to drum up support for the war. In America, unlike Britain, propaganda (and academic involvement in it) was much more openly organised by the Committee on Public Information, an official body under the journalist George Creel, and the National Board of Historical Services, a group of historians working under the chairmanship of Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University. The latter body, although not a government agency (in fact its closest ties were with the American Historical Association) and although it aimed not "to swerve in any way from historical impartiality", produced material very like the more obvious propagandist writings of historians working for Creel’s committee. According to Lord Bryce, who admired the way the American historians had organised themselves to support the war effort, a body like the National Board was not really possible


in Britain where historians formed "a very small class". But one could argue that it was hardly necessary. British historians seemed to require no prompting to get on with the task of enlightening the public on the issues involved in the war, and their pamphlets and articles could be widely distributed on the clandestine Wellington House network.

However from 1916, when Wellington House was reorganised, propaganda increasingly became the province of the newspapermen rather than of the scholar. Harold Lasswell, father of American research into techniques of propaganda, has remarked of journalists that "they are not hampered by what Dr. Johnson has termed 'needless scrupulousness'. They have a feeling for words and moods and they know that the public is not convinced by logic, but seduced by stories." And when the two press lords Northcliffe and Beaverbrook took over British propaganda in 1918 there seemed to be a relaxation of standards, and the academics in Wellington House (Headlam, Toynbee, Namier, Zimmermann and Bevan) moved to the more exalted surroundings of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, before these changes, Wellington House had always claimed that although it presented "facts and general arguments based upon facts" its intention was to make its audience "take a right view


2. Propaganda Technique In The World War, 1927, p. 32

of the actions of the British government".1 Its most serious lapse from these standards - the "Kadaver Factory" story2 - was largely the result of outside pressure. But Masterman and Lord Bryce were not above agreeing to the replica of the "Lusitania medal" which had (to say the least) an ambiguous basis in fact.3 Bryce, who did not work for Wellington House although he seems to have acted often as an advisor, was also involved in the specialist field of atrocity propaganda. In this he was assisted by Arnold Toynbee.

The publication of evidence of German and Turkish atrocities was the one area where the printed word held its own against the newer medium of the motion-picture in propaganda.4 And perhaps the most outstanding success for Wellington House was the Bryce Commission of Inquiry into alleged German atrocities in Belgium. Not only was Bryce one of Britain's most eminent scholars - a historian and political scientist - with strong ties of affection

1. First Report (June 1915) cit. Sanders, 120.

2. The story of Germans melting down dead soldiers' bodies for glycerine (for fertiliser and explosives) originated with Haig's Chief of Intelligence (General Charteris). The "whole idea was repugnant to the more scrupulous men in Wellington House, who already had some doubts as to the authenticity of the tale." Nevertheless they circulated bound volumes of Louis Raemaker's Cartoon History Of The War (1916) in which there was a cartoon showing the use of German corpses for the manufacture of glycerine. J.M.Read, Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919, N.Haven, 1941, p.38 & n.76. Sanders, 137-9. A.Ponsonby, Falsehood In Wartime, 1928, pp.102-13.

3. Sanders, 140. The medal was originally satirical in intention but the British (perhaps unwittingly) interpreted it as celebratory. Bryce referred to the medal in his Presidential Address to the British Academy in 1916 as an example of the German Government keeping "its subjects in ignorance of the facts of a war" - the medal had shown "that the Lusitania was a vessel not only laden but conspicuously overladen with munitions of war." PBA, 1915-16, p.24. Bryce did not enlighten the academicians of the "facts" concerning the replica.

4. The shortage of paper also helped curtain printed propaganda.
and respect for the German Wissenschaft, but he had also been a very popular British ambassador in the United States (1907-13). He was every inch the public's (especially the American public's) image of a grey-bearded, dispassionate scholar, as well known in Cambridge Massachusetts as in Cambridge England. As a leader in the St. Louis Republican put it: "If there is a man in the entire British Empire whom the people of this nation are prepared to believe implicitly, it is James Bryce." And this was a common reaction in America when the sensational findings of the Bryce Commission were published.

The outbreak of the war had been a great shock to Bryce. H. A. L. Fisher, himself a member of the Bryce Commission, has left this description of how Bryce's attitude to Germany stood in 1914:

"From early youth he had drunk deeply from the well of German literature and historical science, counting as one of the happiest recollections of his life those student days in Heidelberg, in that delightful, old, idealistic Germany, which had been so easy and hospitable and so intent upon the things which minister to the higher needs of man. Then as a young man he had made his literary reputation by a treatise on German history [The Holy Roman Empire, 1864], which won for him a widening circle of friendships among German students, which he was careful and glad to preserve. Having been brought up in the strongly anti-Louis-Napoleonic atmosphere of his generation, and being somewhat defective on the side of French humanities, he was perhaps inclined to overrate the specific contributions of the German genius to the literary culture of Europe. Moreover,

1. Bryce had studied law at Heidelberg in the 1860s. Later he received honorary doctorates of law from the universities of Jena (1908) and Leipzig (1909).

although he was alive to the dangers of Prussian militarism he had always hoped and believed that the forces of moderation and good sense which he knew to be widely spread among the German people would prevail against the mania for violence. He was never, therefore, in the company of the alarmists."

The German invasion of Belgium was decisive for Bryce's attitude to the war, as it was for most British liberals. But Bryce was closer to Germany, intellectually and emotionally, than most. Thus the distinction between "good" and "bad" Germans was very important for him. Writing in 1916 of the ideas of the necessity and desirability of war, and of the elevation of the state above morality, Bryce noted:

"I do not attribute to the German people an adherence to the former set of doctrines, for I do not know how far these doctrines are held outside the military and naval caste which has now unhappily gained control of German policy, and I cannot believe that the German people, as I have hitherto known them, ever since I studied at a German university more than fifty years ago, could possibly approve of the action of their Government if their Government suffered them to know the facts relating to the origin and conduct of the war as those facts are known to the rest of the world. We have no hatred of the German people....Our quarrel is with the German Government."²

Bryce obviously had a great belief in the force of public opinion, and the theme of one of his wartime presidential addresses to the British Academy had been the power of modern governments to thwart this safety-valve.³


2. The *Attitude Of Great Britain In The Present War*, 1916, p. 26

Once Bryce had made the distinction between German government and people, he felt quite able to support the British war effort whole-heartedly. For Bryce the war presented itself "as a conflict of principles", and, since Britain's cause was "righteous", there should be no half-measures. As he wrote to an American friend: "At present we rejoice to believe that it is not going to be a war of half-measures and limited liability. War is one of those things that if done at all ought to be done with all one's might." This seems to have been his position throughout the war. Although he was a leading member of the movement for a post-war league of nations, he was never numbered among the left-liberal critics of official policy. He published many pamphlets and articles for the American market to air, as he told Theodore Roosevelt, the "supreme moral issues" of the conflict. The Allied cause, he told Bayard Henry, was "a righteous cause". That was the thing to be "constantly impressed" on Americans, and this, together with his success in blackening the German reputation in America, was Bryce's great contribution to British propaganda. The

1. Attitude Of Great Britain, pp. 24-5.
2. To B. Henry, 5 April 1917, cit. Fisher, Bryce, II, 159
3. 21 Mar. 1917, cit. ibid., II, 159
4. 5 April 1917, cit. ibid., II, 159. There was, too, "one point of similarity" to the American Civil War. "Had the curse of slavery prevailed, all moral ideas would have been sadly set back, not to speak of political ideals. So now if Germany were to succeed, the sense of right and the sentiments of common humanity would receive a terrible blow...." To C.W. Eliot, 25 June 1915, cit. ibid., II, 155. Eliot had written on behalf of the Union cause during the Civil War.
The investigation into alleged German atrocities in Belgium served also to strengthen Bryce’s resolve to support the war effort and to dispel any doubts he might have had about the common prejudices against German methods of warfare. This, too, was the intended effect on neutral (especially American) readers of the official report.

Commissions of inquiry into alleged atrocities were a feature of the propaganda campaigns of most belligerent states, even the smaller ones like Serbia and Belgium. "One after the other established an inquiry, or an 'atrocity commission', always with the avowed purpose of getting at the 'truth', the 'real facts'. The attitude of the soldiers at the Front, if Robert Graves is any guide, was one of extreme scepticism. As Graves wrote in his literary autobiography:

"Propaganda reports of atrocities were, it was agreed, ridiculous. We remembered that while the Germans could commit atrocities against enemy civilians, Germany itself, except for an early Russian cavalry raid, had never had the enemy on her soil. We no longer believed the highly-coloured accounts of German atrocities in Belgium; knowing the Belgians now at first-hand. By atrocities we meant, specifically, rape, mutilation, and torture - not summary shooting of suspected spies, harbourers of spies, franc-tireurs, or disobedient local officials. If the atrocity-list had to include the accidental-on-purpose bombing or machine-gunning of civilians from the air, the Allies were now committing as many atrocities as the Germans. French and Belgian civilians had often tried to win our sympathy by exhibiting mutilations of children, stumps of hands and feet, for instance, representing them as deliberate, fiendish atrocities when, as likely as not, they were merely the result of shell-fire. We did not believe rape to be any more common on the German side of the line than on the Allied side."

1. J.M.Read,p.64. Like many other American historians of the inter-war period Read stresses the role of Allied propaganda in the U.S.entry to the war.

Graves was writing at the height of the reaction against the war in 1929, and no doubt this coloured his account. But of course atrocity propaganda was not intended for front-soldiers but rather for the civilians at home and in neutral states. With this consideration in mind, the use of eminent jurists and academics by the Allies on their atrocity commissions showed a greater degree of sophistication in propaganda than the German use of government employees (usually the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs) alone. ¹ In Britain there had at first been some talk of having the popular novelist Rider Haggard as a member of the Bryce Commission because of his name and his experience as a chairman of Quarter Sessions, but it was felt by the Government "that a reputation for writing blood-curling stories of a highly imaginative order" would not be appropriate to a body with a reputation for sober objectivity. ² In the event the "Commission on Alleged German Outrages" consisted, besides Bryce, of four lawyers (all King's Counsels), the historian H.A.L. Fisher (at that time Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University), and the economist and journalist Harold Cox. ³ The lawyers were Sir Alfred Hopkinson (former Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University, Manchester), Sir Edward Clarke (former Tory Solicitor-General 1886-92), Sir Kenelm

1. Eg. The Belgian report (1915) carried the names of 3 professors of the University of Brussells (Catier, Nys & Wodon). See Belgium, Report on the Violations of the Rights of Nations..., 1915, i, xxxiv-xxxv. Prince Max Baden suggested to the Kaiser "a Report on Atrocities, no longer issued as heretofore, by our official authorities, but endorsed by the responsible signatures of well-known German jurists and philanthropists." Cit. J.M.Read, pp.142-3. See also Peterson, pp.38, 40.


3. Cox had been Secretary of the Cobden Club (1899-1904), Liberal M.P. (1906-9) and was editor of the Edinburgh Review.
Digby (a former permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office) and Sir Frederick Pollock (former Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford). The collection of evidence began in September 1914 and over 1,200 depositions were taken from Belgian witnesses, under the supervision of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Charles Matthews. Evidence from British soldiers at the front was collected by Professor J.H. Morgan, Home Office representative with the Expeditionary Force, who also collected the diaries of dead German soldiers for use as evidence.

In the 1930s historians, and especially American revisionist historians, made much of the fact that a great deal of the evidence from witnesses outside London was collected by twenty barristers who had, in the words of the Bryce Report itself, "no authority to administer an oath." H.C. Peterson, writing in 1939, concluded that the Bryce Report "was a collection and not an analysis....Rumours and opinions were included uncritically. It is not impossible that many of the statements used were the product of leading questions. Incomplete versions of actual events were the basis of the report." In addition it "dignified a great many old wives' tales and considerable barrack-room gossip." J.M. Read, writing two years later, distinguished between atrocity

1. Clarke had been a Tory M.P. (1880-1900, 1906), Digby Vinerian Reader in Law at Oxford (1868-74) and County Court Judge (1892-4).


3. Loc. cit. They were instructed "not to 'lead' the witnesses, or make any suggestions to them, and also to impress upon them the necessity for care and precision in giving their evidence." However, they were encouraged to cross-examine them.

4. Peterson, pp.53-4.
stories and evidence of the execution of *france-tireurs*, the latter being allowed in international law.¹ There was, he concluded, "not one clear-cut case of confessed 'atrociousness'" in any of the stories although many told "of the execution of alleged *france-tireurs* and more, of plunderings."² Interestingly enough this seems to have been suggested as a possibility by Alfred Marshall - although, it should be stressed, before the publication of the Bryce Report. In August 1914 he had written to *The Times* to point out that tales of German troops "shooting civilians in cold blood should never be repeated without inquiry whether the laws of war had been broken by hostile action on the part of the non-combatants."³

This was extremely courageous of Marshall, and, at a time when most people seemed to believe the worst of the Germans, he pointed out that when Britain had been at war other nations had

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¹. Sir T.E. Holland (former Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford) had pointed out that the Hague Convention (1907) ruled decisively "against the legality of resistance by individual civilians" to an invading army. "Lawful belligerents" had to be "responsibly commanded", to bear "distinctive marks visible at a distance", to "carry their arms openly" and to "Conform to the laws of war". The first two requirements could be dispensed with if there had not been time to organise properly. Writing at the time of Nurse Cavell's execution, he also noted that (despite her invasion) Germany had certain rights of "self-defence" flowing from her military occupation of Belgium. "No one, for example, would have complained of her stern repression of civilian attacks on her troops, so long as it was confined to actual offenders". *Letters to "The Times" Upon War & Neutrality (1881-1920)*, 1921, pp. 77-8.

². J.M. Read, p. 204.

³. 22 Aug. 1914, p. 7e. Lasa Oppenheim, German-born Professor of International Law at Cambridge, also stressed that the inhabitants of a conquered country owed temporary allegiance to an occupying power, and were thus liable to the doctrine of "war treason" for resistance. This was a courageous thing for Oppenheim to say in wartime, and he even pointed to the application of this doctrine by Britain during the Boer War. However, in Belgium, Oppenheim felt, Germany (p.t.o.)
accused British soldiers of "cruelties of which we have been certain they are incapable". If there had been German atrocities, then alcohol and a "criminal" element could be the root cause. No doubt Marshall was reacting against the more sensational rumours, at third and fourth hand, which surrounded the investigations of the Bryce Commission. The wartime atmosphere of rumour and hearsay was captured perfectly by the unknown Admiralty clerk who wrote:

"Absolute evidence have I none -
But my Aunt's charwoman's sister's son,
Heard the policeman in Downing Street,
Say to a housemaid on his beat,
That he has a brother, who has a friend,
Who knows to a day when the War will end."

But amongst all the sensational evidence of the Bryce Commission there was a "prevailing base of truthfulness". And one could not simply assume that, since some of the allegations were unproven.

(footnote continued from previous page)

1. Times, 28 Oct.1914, p.9d. Marshall wanted "the dissemination of accurate information as to the conditions under which the civil population of a country" could "oppose the violence of an invading army. The Belgian Government had no time to arrange this; and a few errors by Belgian civilians seem to have been to some extent the real occasion, and to a greater extent the pretended occasion, of violence that has horrified the world." Cf. Marshall to C.P.Scott, 10 Mar.1915, Scott Mss.BM.Add 50908.

2. Cit.M.B.Lowndes, Diaries & Letters of Marie Belloc Lowndes 1911-1947, 1971, p.73. A good example of third-hand atrocity story is given by the Rector of Exeter College, Oxford. A speaker on a recruiting-drive near Newcastle told miners that the Germans had buried alive Belgian civilians in a pit. At this appeal to "the miners' code of (p.t.o.)
and sensational, all the others had been greatly exaggerated. Recent evidence shows, as an American historian put it, "that the behaviour of the German military authorities in occupied areas was extraordinarily severe, if not brutal, and that the Bryce Report was essentially correct in its major indictment, namely that the German army used terror as a weapon of intimidation."¹

From the perspective of the experience of two world wars we can see this, but in 1915 it was the more sensational (and more suspect) evidence which excited most public attention. There were stories of the mutilation of corpses - Uhlans were reputedly the worst offenders - the bayonetting of babies, the burning alive of innocent civilians, the cutting off of women's breasts (as at Malines and Hofstade), the massacre of civilians - 400 at Andenne - the general rape, pillage and desecration - especially by defaecation (supposedly a German trait) - of property.² And, even with this mound of evidence of Hunnish bestiality, the Commission claimed to "have rejected hearsay evidence except in cases where hearsay furnished an undesigned confirmation of facts with regard to which" there was already "direct testimony from some other source", or where hearsay "explained in a natural way facts imperfectly narrated or

(footnotes continued from previous page)

¹ chivalry" 4,000 of them "at once downed tools and marched to the recruiting office". Farnell heard of this and had it "corroborated" by a Belgian minister at the time at work on the Belgian atrocity report. Farnell, p.329.
² J.M.Read,p.26. Read was making a point about all propaganda, not just the Bryce Report.


2. See pp.37-41 for some of the most sensational evidence.
otherwise perplexing.”¹ Such exceptions no doubt explained the inclusion of the sensational evidence, and proved to be the rock on which the reputation of the Bryce Report (in part) undeservedly foundered in the 1930s.

The Bryce and Fisher papers give little information on the way the Commission went about its work, and the private discussions which must have taken place. However, one letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Bryce is an interesting comment on the question of the reliability of evidence. Apparently, Harold Cox wanted the Commission itself to examine witnesses. Pollock was thus provoked into amazement at "Cox's state of mind in dealing with the testimony. He seems to require a far higher degree of probability than a court of justice ever gets, and to think that every statement of fact must be absolutely true or absolutely false."² But this, unfortunately for the Report's later reputation, was just what its readers thought. Pollock, from other evidence, seems to have been rather a "fire-eater" and was no doubt ready to read the material uncovered by the Bryce Commission in the way most damaging to Germany.³ However, his former colleague on Oxford University's Faculty of Law Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, as an international lawyer of some repute, was generally more sceptical of atrocity stories. In a letter to Bryce he pointed out that under international law an invader could "shoot civilians who fire on his troops". It was even

1. Report, p.6. Evidence omitted “was probably true” but unreliable.


permissable to take hostages "for the fulfilment of agreements or carrying out of requisitions". There was, he concluded, "nothing in black and white about punishment for civilian resistance (not that Germany would care if there were)."  

The hand of Lord Bryce is obvious when reading the Commission's report. It opened with the admission that the commissioners had begun "the inquiry with doubts whether a positive result would be attained". But the further they went, the more evidence they examined, the more their "scepticism" was reduced. This tallies with Fisher's observations of Bryce during the Commission's investigations. The general conclusions as to where responsibility for atrocities should lie, also reflected Bryce's analysis of the situation in Germany. The individual German soldiers were absolved from much of the blame. True, some "outrages" were the result of individual excess - what else could be expected when "intoxication was extremely prevalent among the German army, both in Belgium and France". But there was more of this kind of excess than "would be expected in warfare between civilised Powers". More serious was the "deliberate plan" by which non-combatants were "systematically killed" in large numbers during the first

1. 18 Sept.1914 & 23 Sept.1914, Bryce Mss. UB/23.
3. Fisher, Bryce, II, 132 n.2. J.H.Morgan's claim that he approached the evidence with initial scepticism, does not convince in view of his readiness to give credence to atrocity stories even more lurid than those in the Bryce Report. See Lowndes, pp.75-6, for his disclaimer.
4. They differed "rather in extent than in kind from what has happened in previous though not recent wars." Report, p.31.
weeks of the invasion of Belgium. The purpose of these killings was "to strike terror into the civilian population and dishearten the Belgian troops, so as to crush down resistance and extinguish the very spirit of self-defence." The Germans used the pretext of civilians allegedly firing on their troops "to justify not merely the shooting of individual franc-tireurs, but the murder of large numbers of innocent civilians, an act absolutely forbidden by the rules of civilised warfare." ¹

Yet even with this second class of outrages (the doctrine of "necessity" in warfare) the German troops who carried out the killings were absolved. It "cannot be supposed to be a national doctrine", the report noted, "for it neither springs from nor reflects the mind and feelings of the German people as they have heretofore been known to other nations." It was a specifically military doctrine - "the outcome of a theory held by a ruling caste

1. The general conclusions of the report were that there was proof of frequent "deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civilian population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages"; that men and women were "murdered in large numbers" and women and children raped during the general "conduct of war"; that "looting, house-burning, and the wanton destruction of property were organised and countenanced", even planned, by German officers - and this not because of "military necessity", but simply to create general terror; "that the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag." Stories of Belgian franc-tireurs were rejected because sometimes the Germans did not recognise "legitimate military operations", or they fired upon each other by mistake, or because they encouraged stories of atrocities by Belgian civilians (especially the gouging out of German soldiers' eyes). This last reason for scepticism is ironical in view of the Commission's readiness to believe Belgian tales of mutilation. The first reason, however, is quite possibly true (although Belgian civilians also seem to have risen up in arms), and the second certainly so. For an objective recent study of events in Louvain, see P. Schöller, Das Fall Löwen Und Das Deutsche Weissbuch, Köln, 1958
who have brooded and thought, written and talked and dreamed about war until they have fallen under its obsession and been hypnotised by its spirit." And striking a Bryce-like note, the report concluded: "whoever has travelled among the German peasantry knows that they are as kind and good-natured as any people in Europe."¹

As we shall see later, the belief in an innocent peasantry led astray by their leaders hardly faltered even when Bryce was faced with the terrible evidence of massacres of Armenians by the common Turkish soldier. But for the moment we can note that the conclusion of the Bryce Report had an immediate bearing on the whole question of reprisals for German "frightfulness".

Bryce was to repeat many times his belief that the German people were not responsible for the actions of their government. It was necessary to quash any talk of reprisals which did not distinguish between guilty leaders and misled people, and Bryce could claim a certain logic for this position by pointing to the autocratic nature of the German government. In a review of J.H. Morgan's popular account of the Bryce Report, German Atrocities An Official Investigation (1916), Bryce denied the suggestion that all Germans shared "in all the guilt of their Government". The strictness of official censorship, the German habit of unquestioning obedience to authority, both argued against this. And Bryce hoped that after the war, when "the facts hitherto concealed from the people" became known and were "reflected on with calmness", there would be a "condemnation" of the outrages and that the

¹ Report, pp.34-5
Central Powers would join efforts "to regulate and mitigate the conduct of war".¹ This review was appended to Morgan's book, but Bryce had refused to contribute a preface on the grounds that Morgan advocated a policy of Allied reprisals against Germany. Yet apart from this, Bryce's review accepted uncritically Morgan's sensational conclusions. These included a belief in innate sexual perversion among Germans who allegedly showed all the atavistic characteristics of the original Huns. There could, Morgan claimed, "be force in the contention of those who believe that the Prussian is not a member of the Teutonic family at all, but a 'throw-back' to some Tartar stock". Germany was a "hybrid nation" with the acquired "idiom" of Europe and the "instincts...of some pre-Asiatic horde". Like "the intellectual savage" Germany nurtured "dark atavisms and murderous impulses" beneath a civilised veneer.²

1. Repr. from Westminster Gazette. On Bryce's attitude to reprisals, see Fisher, Bryce, II, 133-5. Bryce touched on the question in an address at Bedford College, London, in March 1916. To hope that reprisals might "lead the enemy Government to desist from breaches of the usages of war" was, Bryce claimed, mistaken. For "every cruelty tends to call forth another, and in a competition of cruelty the Government against which we are fighting would always win. There is no reason to think any recourse to inhuman practices shocking to philosophy and morality, such as the enemy have adopted, would have the slightest effect on him or promote in any way our military success. We should not gain; indeed we should certainly lose, because there is nothing which has more won for us the approval of all that is best in neutral nations than that we have championed the cause of justice and humanity....We stand for the interests of mankind as a whole. We acknowledge a moral law; and we acknowledge it as a State no less than as individuals. From that position we must never depart." "Opening Address", International Crisis The Theory Of State, pp.6-7.

2. pp.52-3, 57. Morgan laid great stress on cases of sodomy, child rape and what he called "deliberate defilement" and "bestial pollution" of billets (pp.114-5). See also his letter to The Times, 2 Aug.1916,p.7d. The official German statistics showed the "moral distemper" of the German people, especially, widespread sexual perversion, Morgan claimed. He also cited the (p.t.o.)
Over 1½ million copies of Morgan's book were printed, and no doubt the use of Bryce's name not only helped sales but also lent weight to Morgan's wilder charges. Bryce also recommended Morgan's translation of the German "Manual of the Usages of War on Land", although its wartime reputation as a total reflection of "German military ideas and methods" has been shown to be unwarranted.¹ And even though Bryce opposed reprisals, the logic of Morgan's general assertions (which Bryce did not criticise) led straight to the advocacy of such a policy. "It is the fondest of delusions to imagine that all this blood-guiltiness is confined to the German Government and the General Staff", Morgan had written. "The whole people is stained with it. The innumerable diaries of common soldiers in the ranks which I have read betray a common sentiment of hate, rapine and ferocious credulity. Again and again English soldiers have told me how their German captors delighted to offer them food in their famished state and then to snatch it away again." It was "useless to discriminate between the people and their rulers". The German people were "rotten to the core". One could "extirpate a dogma" but one could "not alter a temperament."² The roots of "Vansittartism" were well and truly established during the First

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¹ (footnote cont. from previous page)
French historian Fustel de Coulanges on the unusually high incidence of homosexuality in Berlin. German Atrocities, p. 52. Typical of Morgan's tales of girls "abused by hordes of savage and licentious" German soldiers, was one from Richebourg l'Avoué where advancing British soldiers found "naked girl lying on the ground "pegged out in the form of a crucifix". Morgan, Dishonoured Army, 1916, p. 19. Such a tale was calculated to suggest blasphemy as well as rapaciousness as German traits.

² The German War Book, 1915, pp. 1-11 (Morgan's introductory remarks). Cf. J. Bell, B. Fischer & B. Widmann, Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1927, I, 26-9, 36-7. At best the views expressed in the German War Book were semi-official, reflecting the views of "Young Turks" in the officer corps: "eine reine Privatarbeit". In Britain (France) it was published as an official German training manual, a "Handbook of the Hun".

² German Atrocities, pp. 44-5, 118-9, 60.
World War. Even people, who could in no sense of the word be described as Germanophobes, reluctantly concluded that Germans seemed to have "a comparatively less strong inner revulsion from atrocious actions performed by authorized agents of their Government."¹ And Edwyn Bevan, who had close ties with German scholars, wrote that since German soldiers had shown "a singular degree of callousness" there must be "some want of sensibility" among the German population as a whole.²

Of course it was also less difficult to consider reprisals against Germans if they could in some way be separated off from the rest of European peoples. Morgan had talked of "Tartar" origins, and he was not alone in this.³ Historians tended to be more cautious and merely talked of the Prussians (who were the "real" enemy) as "German in little save language".⁴ Even the "very word 'Prussia'" was not German, J.W.Allen wrote. The Prussians "in whom Treitschke managed to see the quintessence of the Germanic are, at bottom either Germanized Slavs or at the most the result of a mixture between Slavs and Germans."⁵ And in an age when the same

1. Gwatkin, pp.8-9
3. Eg. Walter Raleigh's claim that in "a portrait of eight German generals with the Kaiser...only two have European faces - the others are Kalmucks." Letter to G.S.Gordon, 17 Dec.1914, cit. Raleigh, Letters, II, 409.
5. Germany & Europe, p.46. Like Lord Vansittart 20 or so years later, J.H.Rose cited Tacitus as evidence of long tradition of German deference to their leaders. Origins..., pp.21-2.
value was not attached to life if skins were not white, the use of the term "Hun" was significant. J.P. Mahaffy, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, may have had this in mind when he advised a meeting of 180 clergy of the Church of Ireland in July 1918 that as long as the Germans openly repudiated "all the limitations of justice and humanity" and made "brutality and cruelty the attributes of victory", then so long were the Allies "bound to regard them as poisonous reptiles, or as vermin, which the most Christian men does not feel it any violation of his duty to exterminate." 1

However, Mahaffy was almost alone among British academics in calling for a policy of reprisals. 2 Certainly leading theologians, in so far as they expressed themselves publicly, were opposed to such a policy 3 as were the members of the Bryce Commission, with the exception of Morgan. H.A.L. Fisher, for example, stressed that whatever the Germans might do it was for the British "to show the world how a nation of gentlemen conducts the most arduous and terrible business of life." 4 And at about the same time (September 1914)

2. Mahaffy's lecture was a lengthy justification for following the celebrated passage in Exodus XXI, 24 & 25. This included proposing a resolution between the Sermon on the Mount and the "universal law among sentient creates" of retaliation, by using the Aristotelian model: a "proper mean" (being a moral rather than mere arithmetical quantity) would be nearer one extreme than the other. "The teaching of Christ might, therefore, be regarded as...an exaggeration of the unpopular extreme [renunciation], so as to counteract the far too prevalent extreme of retaliation or revenge." Now, especially since there was nothing approaching a Pax Romana, Christ's precept was "utterly out of place". The warped stick of human nature, to be made straight again, would have to be bent in the opposite direction by a "stern necessity" which overrode "all the ordinary laws of human morality". Ibid., pp.178-84.
Sir Frederick Pollock wrote to *The Times* to warn against the adoption of reprisals. But once it became clear that British, and not just Belgian or French civilians were going to bear the brunt of German "frightfulness" - in the form of Zeppelin raids and coastal bombardments - then more public men, like the novelist Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, called for retaliation. In the Cambridge Review for May 1915 one can find a letter on "Asphyxiating Gases and their use in Wartime", which claimed that there seemed "to be no valid objection against the use of every scientific contrivance possible" against "an unscrupulous foe". But for liberal academics who supported the war it seemed neither "just" nor "politic to identify the German people with the German Government", or to penalize German soldiers "for their rulers' sins". Victory would not be complete until the German Government was "punished for its crimes" and a policy of reprisals could not fulfil this requirement. They merely punished "the innocent and let the guilty go free".

For his part Bryce, whether he realised it or not, was

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bombed German cities. He was turned down (but not when he raised the matter again in Sept.1917). See P.Kerr to Curzon in Lothian Miss. GD 40/17/43. Also Marwick, *Britain in a Century of Total War*, Harmondsworth, 1970, p.112.

4. The War...p.30. British soldiers would be "chivalrous, temperate, and disciplined".

1. 1 Sept.1914,p.12a & b. T.E.Holland also criticised the view that German submarine crews should be punished as "pirates" & murderers. His letter to *The Times* on the case of Nurse Cavell and German air raids show commendable restraint. See *Letters To "The Times"*, pp69-72.


3. XXXVI,906(19 May 1915),326.

caught up in the atrocity propaganda machine which fed the very desire for revenge among the general public that he was so at pains to oppose. The Bryce Report was translated into thirty languages, and in Britain its low publication price (six pence) ensured wide circulation. In addition, there were various "popular accounts" (Morgan's was just one of many) and newspapers published long verbatim extracts. Bryce was now called upon to contribute a whole series of introductions to further atrocity pamphlets, notably those of Arnold Toynbee. For example there was Toynbee's Belgium Deportations (1916) which was concerned to expose the forced shipment of Belgian workers to Germany. This, Bryce wrote, was "virtual slavery" unsurpassed even during the Thirty Years War. The Germans were no better than "those Arab slave-raid ers in Africa who carried off negroes to the coast to sell." But, as always, Bryce returned to the soldiers who were involved - "the 'Hans'...a good, simple, kindly sort of fellow" in peacetime, but "in the Army...merely the passive instrument of his officers". It was the officers, not the common soldiers, who were to blame.¹

Toynbee, who as we have seen was working at Wellington House, did not have the same concern for "Hans". His job was to whip up feeling against the Germans, and to this end he ended his documentary record with a list of German "outrages":

"In 1914 the Belgians were attacked, ruined, and massacred. In 1915 they were stripped of their manufactures and raw materials, their

capital and their plant. In 1916 they are being exploited like their own cattle and machines by the State which has inflicted all these outrages upon them. They are being deported forcibly to Germany and compelled by violence to labour there that their labour may assist Germany to secure the fruits of her crimes and to evade a just retribution for them, at the hands of Belgium and her Allies."

The evidence against the Germans was damaging, and Toynbee made the most of this with his rising crescendo of accusation. His lasting contribution to British propaganda was to coin the image of Germany as a "vampire-state" that sucked "the life blood of any nation" that fell into her clutches. This was the logical end-product of the "German organisational genius", Toynbee wrote in his pamphlet The Destruction of Poland (1916). This had been written especially for the Polish-American market to counter German claims that the sufferings of Poland were due to the Allied blockade of the Central Powers.

Toynbee also produced further compilations of German "frightfulness" for Wellington House - The German Terror In Belgium (1917) and The German Terror In France (1917) which were based in part on the Bryce Report and the French and Belgian atrocity reports. But it was his investigation of the massacre of Armenians

by Turkish "irregulars" in 1915 which reveals most fully the extent to which academics could become involved in the shady world of atrocity propaganda. Although there was even less doubt (than in the case of Belgium) that atrocities had in fact taken place, the motives of the Allies in publicising them seemed to surpass the normal cynicism of governments. News of the massacres reached the Allies at an opportune moment in October 1915. The German General Staff had not long before invited American journalists to view the horrible evidence of pogroms in the Jewish Pale, carried out by the retreating Russian army. Publicity for Turkish massacres of Armenians, and, if possible, German complicity in them would be an excellent counter to the effect of the pogroms on the powerful Jewish-American community. Over fifty years later Toynbee wrote of his (and Bryce's) innocence in the affair. Had they known of the politics behind the investigation, Toynbee noted, "I hardly think that either Lord Bryce or I would have been able to do the job that H.M.G. assigned to us in the complete good faith in which we did, in fact, carry it out. Lord Bryce's concern, and mine, was to establish the facts and to make them public in the hope that

1. As in 1896 the Armenians were the scapegoat for Turkish military reverses, this time in the Caucasus. Armenians in the Ottoman army were deserting and Armenian nationalists trying to secure Allied assistance. Armenian men were deported and together with women and children massacred in cold blood or died from exhaustion and starvation in the mountains of central Anatolia. The death-toll was possibly as high as 1½ million. R.G.Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1971, I, 11-15; U.Trumpener, Germany & the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918, Princeton, 1968, chptr VII; M.Ferro, The Great War 1914-1918, 1973, pp.100-1; F.G.Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, Ithaca, 1970, pp.144ff.

some action might be taken".  

The Blue Book on The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (1916) was also republished by Hodder and Stoughton, thus achieving a wide circulation. It was prefaced by supporting letters from leading British academics. Gilbert Murray gave his unqualified approval to Toynbee's and Bryce's sifting of the evidence "from regions so far removed from the eyes of civilised Europe". "I realize that in times of persecution passions run high, that oriental races tend to use hyperbolical language, and that victims of oppression cannot be expected to speak with strict fairness of their oppressors", he wrote. "But the evidence of these letters and reports will bear any scrutiny and overpower any scepticism." H.A.L. Fisher also had no doubt that the report bore "all the marks of credibility", and then he turned to what was to become the most important issue - that the evidence tended to suggest that the Central Powers "were, in a general way, favourable to the policy of deportation" which led to the deaths. Bryce had been careful not to charge them with complicity in his preface to the report as no evidence pointing to this had been uncovered.

Toynbee, who had compiled the evidence and written the report, was

1. Acquaintances, 1967, p.149
4. "I have not so far been able to obtain any authentic information regarding the part said to have been taken by German officials in directing or encouraging these massacres, and therefore it would not be right to express any opinion on the subject." (p.14). However, a year earlier Bryce had written to an American friend that reports suggested that the German officials had done this. See Fisher, Bryce, I, 153.
also careful to say that the "active participation of German officials" was "not sufficiently proven", and that it was "on the whole unlikely that the German authorities initiated the crime."
The Turks had no need of "tempters". However, the Germans had made no effort to stop the massacres although they had the power to do so. They "had but to pronounce the veto, and it would have been obeyed". The German Government had been "criminally apathetic", Toynbee concluded, and for good measure added that it sought to profit from the destruction of Armenian economic power in the Ottoman Empire.¹

Later in the war Bryce was ready to label official German policy as "tacit acquiescence". The Germans, he wrote, had made "themselves accessories, whether before the crime or after the crime, to the most awful catastrophe that has ever befallen a Christian nation." Some German consuls seemed even to have encouraged the slaughter, while their government had deceived the German people with false tales of Armenian insurrections and imposed strict censorship on the revelations of German missionaries.² And Toynbee, in a pamphlet designed for distribution in America, charged the Germans with doing a deal on the massacres. In return for

¹. Armenian Atrocities, 1915, pp.106-8, 110,115-6. This was based on the official report. No mention was made of massacres of Armenians in Russia in 1905, although Toynbee later referred to forced deportations of Armenians by the Tsarist authorities, even during the war, to make space for Russian settlers. Toynbee, "The Position of Armenia", New Europe, IV, 50(27 Sept.1917), 329-35. Significantly this was after the removal of Tsarism.

². "The War State" repr. in Essays and Addresses In Wartime, 1918, p.52.
German "moral and military support" the Turks provided "'cannonen futter'" for the war-effort. More than this, the policy of "'Ottomanisation'" of minority groups, which had been carried to the bloody extreme of mass killings, had been inspired by the "'Prussianisation'" of the Poles and the "'Magyarisation'" of Roumanian, Slovak and Southern Slav minorities in the Dual Monarchy.  

These were serious charges and they have been repeated by more recent historians. But the most authoritative study of Ottoman-German relations during the war, while stressing that the massacres were part of a "deliberate" policy, concludes that it "was neither instigated nor welcomed by the German Government". At the most Berlin and Vienna (and some of their representatives in Constantinople) "were guilty of extremely poor judgement, a considerable degree of moral callousness, and an altogether excessive concern with what was or seemed to be politically expedient."  

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1. "The Murderous Tyranny Of The Turks", NY, 1918, pp.7, 23-4. The title came from the Allied reply (Jan.1917) to President Wilson's request for a statement of war aims (one of the latter being the liberation of subject nationalities in the Ottoman Empire.)

2. The German Government "was not only unwilling to irritate its Turkish allies [by interceding] but actually wished them to clear its prospective colony from the most formidable competitors on the spot. The German public learned little and late of what was afoot in Turkey." W.W.Gottlieb, Studies In Secret Diplomacy During The First World War, 1957,p.110.

3. Trumpener, p.204. "Despite mounting indications to the contrary they accepted far too long the spurious claims of the Porte that its anti-Armenian policies were necessitated by widespread sedition in the eastern provinces. More importantly, even after it became apparent that the Ottoman 'security measures', including the ruthless evacuation of entire provinces, were part of a deliberate effort to decimate and disperse the Armenian population in Asia Minor, the German and Austro-Hungarian governments steadfastly refused to do anything drastic about the matter. While they abhorred and were acutely embarrassed by the brutal policies of the Turks and directed numerous admonitions and protests to the Porte, the statesmen in both Berlin and Vienna were too much concerned with the keeping of Turks in the
Perhaps it was fortunate that Britain was not placed in a similar position, for the calculation of political advantage outweighs humanitarian considerations, especially in wartime. It was also fortunate that Bryce was unaware that the British Government was quite willing to pursue separate peace negotiations with Turkey which, if they had succeeded, would very probably have involved dropping their public demand for an autonomous Armenia.\(^1\) This perhaps makes the efforts of Bryce on behalf of the Armenians of little importance, although they did form part of a more general campaign to dismember the Ottoman Empire. As Bryce, the veteran campaigner of the "Bulgarian Agitation" forty years earlier, noted, the Turk "as a Governing Power" was "irreclaimable".\(^2\) And, as with the German "outrages" in Belgium, Bryce showed the same willingness to believe the best of the Turkish peasants who had massacred their Armenian compatriots; they were honest and kindly "when not roused by fanaticism".\(^3\) It was the Turkish government which aroused widespread "ideological hostility", even among the ranks of British foreign policy-makers.\(^4\) Hence the story of James Bryce and the Armenians is not one of successful lobbying for small states -

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war to risk alienating the Porte by really strong pressures. But it should be added that there were numerous German and Austro-Hungarian officials, particularly diplomatic and consular, who did not condone such a policy of expediency and whose efforts to stop or to mitigate the brutal measures against the Armenians were a great deal more emphatic than has hitherto been assumed." (pp.204-5). Clearly Germany did not have the control over Turkey claimed by Bryce and Toynbee.


2. He advocated turning the Turks out of Adrianople, Constantinople and "the western coast regions of Asia Minor" as well as out of Armenia, Cilicia & Syria. This would leave a "weak Turkish State" in "Central and North Asia Minor". Preface to Toynbee, Murderous Tyranny..., pp.iv-v. Gladstone's famous demand for the Turks to be turned out of Bulgaria "bag and baggage" was quoted on the
as could be said of R.W.Seton-Watson and the South Slavs or of Ronald Burrow and the Greeks\footnote{1} - but rather of the use for propaganda purposes of a scholar's reputation, and a liberal's conscience.\footnote{2} Dying in 1921 Bryce was spared the massacres in 1922 of Greeks by Turks at Smyrna, and the reconquest of the Straits by Kemal Pasha. Ironically, Toynbee lost himself the new Korges chair of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies in the University of London because of his reporting (for the \textit{Manchester Guardian}) of Greek atrocities against the Turks in 1919.\footnote{3}

Toynbee, who had done so much work for anti-German propaganda during the war, during the 1930s became one of the leading apologists for a policy of appeasing Germany. As Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (from 1925) Toynbee worked for the formal readmission of German scholars to international conferences and meetings. In the pursuit of this objective he was joined by his father-in-law Gilbert Murray, after the death of Bryce, perhaps the academic best-known to the general public.\footnote{4} Murray as a member of the executive of the Committee on

\footnote{(footnote continued from previous page)}

\footnote{dedication page.}


\footnote{4. Rothwell, pp.25-30, 117-8.}


\footnote{2. Although, to be fair, Bryce's position as principal advocate of Armenian independence (founder and first president of the Anglo-Armenian Society) from 1876 meant that he was as much using the report for his own purposes, as being used by the Government,}

\footnote{3. Toynbee, \textit{Experiences}, 1969,p.72.}

\footnote{4. Murray seems to have been a forerunner of A.N.L.Munby's non-Bellocean don of the 1960s: "Don back from Russia, off to Rome, Don on the Third, the Light, the Home".}
Intellectual Cooperation, a League of Nations organisation based in Geneva, was intimately involved in the machinations of institutionalised international scholarship,¹ a subject to which we now turn.

¹. See *Times*, 5 Mar. 1924, p. 10c.
XIV. POSTWAR RECONCILIATION

"Before 1914, if any of us had been questioned as to the position of scholars in the event of a war between nations, I think our answer would in substance have been that scholars, as men, would take such part in the defence and assistance of their country, as circumstances qualified them to take, but that as scholars they would have no share in the hostilities and would be ready, when the war was over, if not before, to take up in common that pursuit of truth which is the scholar's function. It has been recalled that at the height of the Napoleonic Wars Sir Humphrey Davy was invited to Paris and received with great honour; and I think most of us would have felt that on scholars, more perhaps than on any other class of men the duty would lie of keeping alive the spirit of sane human relationships, which war tends to interrupt so forcibly. The facts have turned out otherwise."

- Sir Frederic Kenyon, International Scholarship (1920)

Early in 1915 Bertrand Russell had described Europe as "a house on fire, where the inmates instead of trying to extinguish the flames" were "engaged in accusing each other of having caused the conflagration". When peace came at least half of the house was in ruins and the inmates were no longer on speaking terms. Russell was anxious that there should be no condemnation of intellectuals for their "wartime transgressions" so that reconciliation could proceed smoothly. But although individual British scholars got in touch again with German colleagues as soon as peace was declared, the institutional framework of international scholarship

1. War The Offspring Of Fear, 1915, p.3.
seemed - as Russell had predicted - to have been fragmented permanently. This can be clearly seen in the controversy which surrounded the question of Germany's participation in postwar scholarly congresses and conferences. Before the outbreak of the war these had been increasing in scale and number. The war had put a virtual end to them. Now with peace came the question of whether the wartime activities of German professors had put them quite outside the international community of scholars.

Bernard Bosanquet, who had been elected President of the projected Fifth International Congress of Philosophy to be held in London in 1915, hoped to be able to offer "cordiality to all philosophers after peace". However, this aroused opposition amongst other members of the General Organising Committee and he had to be content with the more cautious statement expressing "an earnest hope that the confederacy of the entire philosophical world" would "not be set aside for a longer time" than "outward circumstances" rendered "absolutely imperative". "We are confident", the philosophers wrote, "that the common interest in philosophy which has expressed itself so effectively in the past meetings of the Congress will prove to be an enduring bond." But German and Austrian philosophers were not invited to the Philosophical Congress in Oxford in 1920, nor to the Fifth International Congress which was held, not in London, but in Naples in 1924. Only in 1926 at the Sixth Congress held at Harvard University were German and Austrian philosophers officially

represented. The story of the International Historical Congress is very much the same. Last held in London in 1913, planned for St. Petersburg in 1918, postponed by war, revolution and civil war, and finally abandoned. Austrian scholars attended the 1924 Brussels congress in an unofficial capacity, and not until 1926 were German, Austrian and Bulgarian delegates officially invited to join the new Comité des Sciences Historiques.

The war also put an end to plans for congresses of Orientalists at Oxford in 1916, and of Anthropology and Prehistoric Archaeology at Madrid in 1915. However, the International Congress of Americanists did go ahead as planned in Washington D.C. in December 1915. The list of participants included two from the Central Powers, and one German scholar gave a paper. But even so neutral a gathering could not escape entirely from the politics of European war and there were official representatives from "Bohemia" and "Russian Poland". This must have been one of the few important scholarly congresses held during wartime. Otherwise the picture was bleak. Many years work was lost when the International Association of Universities (1901) and the International Association of Universities (1899) broke up after the outbreak of war. But of greater importance was the disruption of the international cooperation of scholars on projects like the Anglo-German-Austrian edition of the Mahābhārata. Doubtless there were many other lesser known examples.

1. PAS, NS, XX(1919-20),304-6.
4. F.Kenyon, British Academy,p.21.
Yet, even during the war, some eminent British scholars talked of the time when links with their German and Austrian colleagues could be renewed. Considering the hysteria and hatreds of the time, the few who did speak their minds deserve our admiration. That crusty individualist James Bryce was one such. In 1916 he informed members of the British Academy that it was for "learned bodies to try to link up the bonds of personal regard and intellectual cooperation" then "unhappily severed" - but after "bitterness of feeling" had subsided. 1 Obviously the Academy would find it difficult to be too much out of step with public opinion, but at a time when many people were calling for enemy nationals to be struck off the rolls of learned societies both the Academy and its sister institution the Royal Society successfully resisted. The wartime behaviour of German professors (especially the manifesto of "the 93") was difficult to explain away and Bryce felt that the distinction between willing and unwilling participation in expressions of anti-British feeling was not always clear.

In May 1918 the British Academy heard an address on "International Scholarship After The War" by the Oxford theologian William Sanday. As the most prestigious body of British scholars in the humanities the Academy was the natural place for discussion of future relations with German and Austrian scholars. Even so, Bryce's successor as President Sir Frederick Kenyon was careful to affirm the Academy's continued belief in the rightness of the

1. FBA VII(1915-16), 3-4.
war. As The Times reported:

"The President...stated that the discussion of the subject was not to be taken as a sign of any weakening on the part of British scholars with regard to the war. On behalf of the Academy he could affirm that they believed as firmly as ever in the righteousness of the war, and in the necessity of fighting until an honourable peace was secured. It would be impossible to resume intercourse with German scholars until they had renounced the crimes against civilization which Germany had committed. But if such a change of mind should take place when Germans discover the truth, British scholars might assist the process of conversion by which alone Germany could win readmission to the fellowship of civilised nations. This would be done, not by condoning crimes, but by making the truth known, without unnecessary acts of unfriendliness such as the expulsion of enemy members of learned societies." ¹

There was much talk from the assembled academicians of Germany as a sinner in the world community - her "absolution" would depend on "repentance". ² Sanday gravely asked his audience just how "a gentleman" would behave after "a serious quarrel... in which one of the disputants had right on his side and in which he had great cause to be aggrieved". The revelations of Prince Lichnowsky, the former German ambassador in London, should cause "a complete revulsion and revolution in public feeling in Germany". But would they? Here was a "great opportunity" for those theologians, like Loofs, Troeltsch and Harnack, who had signed anti-British manifestos, to assist in this process of "repentance". ³

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1. 10 May 1918,p.9d. See also letter from B.A.Sonnenschein, ibid., 29 Nov.1918,p.11f.
3. "There was probably no country whose population was, on the whole more chivalrous sportsmanlike and fair than our own, but the provocation we had received was so deep and so deadly that it was not surprising that Germany was regarded by many as having made itself an outlaw among the nations." Loc.cit.
Obviously for many British scholars German re-entry to the world of international scholarship was conditional upon a renunciation of statements made during wartime in the heat of the moment, just as German participation in the League of Nations was seen as conditional upon far-reaching internal political changes. But even this carefully qualified expectation of future normalisation of relations between scholars was bitterly attacked by those whose sole concern was to "get on with the war and win it". Where Sanday and Bryce saw apostacy on the part of the German professors, other British academics saw the professors as "agents of the German Government" and the German universities as bastions of "the political and military power of the German nation".

Even before the war had ended, however, there were signs that some of the signatories of the manifesto of "the ninety-three" were beginning to have second thoughts. The great Lujo Brentano, pioneer historian of British trade union and economic history, claimed as early as 1916 that he had not read the manifesto before signing. This was reported in the British press in November 1918, together with similar explanations by other German scholars. Other equally eminent scholars, like the classicist

1. J.A. Stewart (Professor of Moral Philosophy, Oxford). Times, 13 May 1918, p.11d.
2. C. Dampier Whetham (Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge). Times, 24 Aug. 1918, p.46. Whetham called for a postwar struggle against "the German academic offensive", by taking a leaf out of the German book - "Subsidies to universities, careful study of the needs of foreign students, help towards the expenses of research cheap production of good literary and scientific books, especially for export, immediate translation...of noteworthy treatises in other languages". German universities, he felt, had a predominance "far beyond their intrinsic merits".
   but see p.189 n.49 for Sheehan's doubts about Brentano's conversion.
4. 7 Nov. 1918, p.5f.
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, never recanted their wartime views, but they were in a minority. By 1919 over half of the signatories who were still alive had publicly acknowledged that they had been mistaken in accepting the assertions in the manifesto or had not read it before signing. In November 1919 Brentano was in London as a German delegate to a meeting of the "Fight the Famine Council" in the Caxton Hall, London, where he met Keynes, Hobhouse and Leonard Woolf. Brentano's visit seems to have gone largely unnoticed, unlike the visit two years later of Albert Einstein. Einstein had never signed the manifesto of "the ninety-three"; in fact he had been one of the few German academics who had signed G.F. Nicolai's counter "Manifesto To Europeans". But even so, Ernest Barker, who as Principal brought him to King's College, London, to lecture, feared that there might be an outcry.

Barker's fears proved groundless and Einstein was elected a member of the Royal Society and went on to receive an honorary D.Sc. from Manchester University. On his return to Berlin, where he was Professor of Physics until 1933, Einstein spoke of the desire "among English savants and statesmen" for a resumption

2. Bryce to J.F. Rhodes, 22 Aug.1919, cit. Fisher, Bryce, II, 223-4. E.A. Sonnenschein, "The German Professors", 19th Century, LXXXVI (Aug.1919), 322. H. Wehburg, Wider den Anruf den 931, Charlottenburg, 1920, pp. 8-13. The latter shows that by 1919 of the 93 signatories, 18 were dead, 16 unchanged in their views, 42 claimed to have been deceived (most had not seen the text) or mistaken, 17 had not replied (from a sense of shame Wehburg surmised).
4. See Nicolai, Biology Of War, pp.7-9.
5. Age & Youth, p.136
6. Times, 10 June 1921, p.8c & 7 June 1921, p.10f.
of "friendly relations with Germany". It was, perhaps understandably, from British scientists that the first moves for reconciliation were seen. Although scientists had placed their knowledge at the disposal of the war-effort, they had on the whole not been involved in the bitter war of words between Germany and Britain. Possibly they could also claim in one sense to have a less emotional attitude towards their work than, say, historians. Could one talk of British physics in the same way as one could of British history? Although there were some who called for a boycott of German scientists and scientific publications, the debate among scientists in the correspondence columns of *Nature* and *The Times* generally proceeded on the assumption that reconciliation would come about - the question was how? The learned societies of formerly neutral states were calling for the inclusion of German scholars in international meetings. In *Nature* one of the elder statesmen of British science recommended his colleagues to oppose this move, while Professor D'Arcy Thompson of St.Andrews recommended that German overtures be "freely reciprocated". "I cannot say that I have always been on the side of tolerance and reconciliation", he wrote, "but already we have had some little time

1. *Times*, 2 July 1921, p.12e. Ernst Troeltsch (one of "the 93") was invited to give a series of lectures in Oxford and London in March 1923 (Published as *Christian Thought*, 1923) but died before leaving Germany.

2. Eg. Sir George Hampson (Natural History Museum, London): "German is, without doubt, a barbarous language only just emerging from the stage of primitive Gothic character, and I venture to suggest that it would be to the advantage of science to treat it as such." *Science*, NS.XLIX (21 Feb.1919), 193. Cf. Lord Walsingham (Trinity College, Cambridge) who proposed to ignore scientific papers in German. *Nature*, CII (5 Sept.1918), 4 & H.H. Godwin-Austen, *ibid.* (26 Sept.1918), 64.

3. Sir E.Ray Lankester. *Nature*, CIV (30 Sept.1919), 172. "...the less our academies and societies move in this manner the better".

But it took another year before any formal overture was made to German scientists. The lead was taken by Oxford scholars, many of whom had been in the forefront of the propaganda battle during the war. According to the organiser Robert Bridges, the Poet Laureate, the manifesto had been sent to 120 members of the University "whose names were picked on the register solely for their position and eminence". Significantly, slightly more than half of those approached had refused to sign and the resulting list, though impressive enough, was criticised as not really being representative. The manifesto is worth quoting at length since it made no demand for a public confession of national guilt from German professors - a point commented on unfavourably in *The Times* leader. The manifesto was addressed to "the Professors of the Arts and Sciences and to members of the Universities and Learned Societies in Germany and Austria":

"Since there will be many of you who fully share our heartfelt sorrow and regret for the breach that the war has occasioned in our friendly intercourse, and since you cannot doubt the sincerity of the feeling which engendered and cherished that old friendliness, you must we believe, be sharing our hope for its speedy re-establishment.

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1. Ibid., (23 Oct 1919), 154
3. 18 Oct.1920, p.12b/c. "...justice demands that there shall be no pardon, to say nothing of 'amicable reunion' and the restoration of former 'friendliness' until the offenders publicly confess their guilt, exhibit heartfelt sorrow for their crimes, and make the utmost satisfaction in their power. Then, and only then, will it be time to readmit them upon equal terms either into the fellowship of learning or into 'the honourable comity of European states'."
We, therefore, the undersigned doctors, heads of houses, professors, and other teachers and officers in the University of Oxford, now personally approach you with the desire to dispel the embitterment of animosities that under the impulse of loyal patriotism may have passed between us.

In the field where our aims are one, our enthusiasm, our rivalry and ambition generous, we can surely look to be reconciled, and the fellowship of learning offers a road which may - and if our spiritual ideals be alive, must - lead to wider sympathy and better understanding between our kindred nations.

While political dissensions are threatening to extinguish the honourable comity of the great European states, we pray that we may help to hasten that amicable reunion which civilization demands. *Impetret ratio quod dies impretratura est.*

Some eminent scholars were uneasy "about the temper still prevailing in German universities" or were doubtful whether this was really the best way to go about normalising relations. The case for greater caution had been put by Sir Frederick Kenyon as President of the British Academy in July 1920. The "notorious" manifesto of "the ninety-three" - "a gross crime against scholarship" and "an offence against good manners and the common decencies of life" - still rankled. Even though "the pressure of official authority" had been removed from German scholars, there was still no official disavowal. British scholars had "legitimate grounds for resentment", especially now that Germany and Austria were appealing for help to maintain their "intellectual life". And Kenyon continued: "We do not...ask for express withdrawal or

1. 18 Oct. 1920, p.8e. For a list of signatories see appendix 6.

apology. We do not want to make reconciliation difficult. But I think English scholars are entitled to some indication that German scholars desire the resumption of relations; that they recognize that an obstacle stands in the way of any cordiality in such relations; that they regret the obstacle, for the existence of which there may be excuses, though not justification; that they do not, in short, hold such opinions of England as must make sincere and genuine relations impossible.¹

In the end it seems that Kenyon's views prevailed over the more open-handed Oxford approach. Although individual scholars continued to extend the hands of friendship to German and Austrian colleagues, there was a fairly effective boycott at the level of organised international scholarship. There were serious differences of opinion, as in the Royal Asiatic Society,² between those who supported, and those who opposed, normalising relations. At an international level, American and especially Scandinavian scholars exerted pressure on their British and French colleagues for the reinclusion of German and Austrian delegates in invitations to congresses, like that of historians at Brussels in 1924 and Oslo in 1928.³ By the end of the 1920s German and Austrian

1. International Scholarship, pp.5-7. "With our allies we can work with fuller accord, with a more deeply based affection, than ever; and we welcome the opportunity of renewing connexion with the nations which perforce remain neutral during the war." But restoration of links with Germany would "be a matter of years".

2. In 1921 the Society was preparing to celebrate its centenary and the proposal to invite Germans to attend was defeated on the governing Council. E.G.Browne who voted with the minority "came very near to resigning from the Society". E.D.Ross, p.xv.

3. Successfully in the case of Oslo. Previously the Belgians had been very reluctant to invite Germans & had extended invitations only to nations which were members of the League. Henri Pirenne, who had been imprisoned during the war by the Germans, "explained that they did not want to exclude private German historians, only they could not persuade themselves to address official invitations
scholars were again participating in international congresses
- sometimes in an unofficial capacity, it is true - but membership
of the Union Academique Internationale and the International
Council of Scientific Unions remained closed to them. These had
been established soon after the war to replace the old International
Association of Academies and their refusal to admit the former
Central Powers to membership through the 1920s aroused a certain
amount of hostile comment among British scholars.1

In one field there was a re-establishment of prewar ties.
In 1926 the formation of the Anglo-German Academic Board, acting
in association with the Akademischer Austauschdienst of Berlin,
helped to encourage more British students to travel to Germany for
study and research.2 But it is unlikely that the number of
British students attending German universities reached prewar
levels.3 Quite apart from the estrangement caused by the war,
German universities were in a difficult financial position after

(footnote 3 cont. from previous page)

to German universities and academies". Danish & Swedish historians
then refused to accept invitations, and the Norwegians (supported
by the Americans) moved "to assure a complete international organi-
sation of the following congress by moving it over to neutral
ground". Thus Oslo, rather than Warsaw, was chosen for 1928. H.Koht,
The Origins & Beginnings Of The International Committee Of Historical
Sciences, Lausanne, 1962,pp.2-4.

1. Austria & Germany were invited to join the U.A.I. in 1935 by a
unanimous vote "though not without some lively previous discus-
sions" Kenyon, British Academy, p.26. These countries, together
with Turkey, Bulgaria & Hungary were invited to join the I.C.S.U.
in 1926 on the proposal of Britain (with Sweden & Holland).
Several previous attempts had been defeated & by 1928 only Hungary
& Bulgaria had joined. A Description Of the I.C.S.U., Cambridge,
1930,pp.2,114-5. See also: Nature, CVII,17 Mar.1921(72) & 24
Mar.1921(108); Forster,pp.154-6.

2. Times, 28 Oct.1926,p.9b. The Board included Murray, Barker, Sir W.
Beveridge, C.G.Robertson (Principal of Birmingham University), Sir M.
Sadler, A.C.Seward(Master of Downing College),G.Foster (Provost of
University College, London),P.Giles(Master of Emmanuel College),Sir
T.Morrison (Principal of Armstrong College, Newcastle).

3. There had been a fall-off after 1900.Cf.Veysey,p.131 for the American
situation in relation to Germany.
the war and may thus have been less attractive centres for research. The establishment of the doctorate as a research degree at Oxford and Cambridge after the war (following the example of London and the newer universities) had the effect of encouraging British students to go onto further study in Britain. The spell of German Wissenschaft had been broken, too, and the decline of German universities after 1933 meant the end of any attempt to re-establish the close relations which had existed before 1914. The invitation to British universities to participate in the 550th anniversary celebrations of the University of Heidelberg in June 1936 was declined by Oxford and Birmingham, and then by all the British universities. But that, together with the reception of refugee academics in Britain during the 1930s is another story.

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1. See the correspondence repr. in Heidelberg and American Universities, N.Y., 1936, which (despite its title) is concerned with the response of British Universities to Nazism.
## APPENDIX ONE

### GERMAN EDUCATION OF BRITISH SCHOLARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>City/Institution</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.B. Acton</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F.E. Adcock</td>
<td>Berlin, Munich</td>
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<tr>
<td>W.J. Ashley</td>
<td>Göttingen (1880)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.B. Baillie</td>
<td>Halle, Strassburg, Paris</td>
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<td>J.S. Blackie</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Bryce</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Burt</td>
<td>Würzburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.B. Bury</td>
<td>Göttingen (1880), Leipzig (1883)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Bywater</td>
<td>Bonn (1868) Heidelberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.M. Chadwick</td>
<td>Berlin (1895)</td>
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<td>J.H. Clapham</td>
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<td>G.G. Coulton</td>
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<td>W. Cunningham</td>
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<td>H.W.C. Davis</td>
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<td>Berlin, Munich</td>
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<td>H.A.L. Fisher</td>
<td>Berlin (1890), Paris (1889)</td>
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<td>G.D. Hicks</td>
<td>Leipzig (1896) Ph.D.</td>
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<td>C.H. Herford</td>
<td>Vienna, Berlin (1881-2)</td>
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<td>M. Hovell</td>
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<td>A.G. Little</td>
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<td>J.S. McKenzie</td>
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<td>W. McDougall</td>
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<td>R.R. Maret</td>
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<td>R. Muir</td>
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<td>A.S. Napier</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Nettleship</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.W. Oman</td>
<td>Erlangen, Heidelberg</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>W.P. Paterson</td>
<td>Leipzig, Erlangen, Berlin (1883-85)</td>
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J. Peile
L. R. Phelps
R. L. Poole
W. M. Ramsay
J. Rhys
W. H. R. Rivers
J. G. Robertson
R. W. Seton-Watson
H. Sidgwick
C. E. Spearman
G. A. Smith
N. Kemp Smith
W. R. Sorley
J. Sully
H. Sweet
G. H. Thomson
G. Unwin
J. Ward
J. C. Wilson
E. L. Woodward
J. Wright
H. C. K. Wyld
H. J. Watt

Göttingen (1866)
Göttingen, Leipzig (1876-7)
Leipzig (1882) Ph.D.
Göttingen
Leipzig
Jena (1892) Heidelberg (1893)
Leipzig (1892) D.Phil.
Berlin, Vienna, Paris (1903-6)
Dresden
Leipzig, Ph.D. Würzburg, Göttingen (1900, 1902-7)
Tübingen (1876), Leipzig (1878), Berlin
Zurich, Berlin, Paris (1895-6)
Tübingen
Göttingen, Berlin
Heidelberg
Strassburg (1906) Ph.D.
Berlin (1898)
Leipzig, Göttingen (1870)
Göttingen (1873-4)
Darmstadt (1912)
Heidelberg, Leipzig
Bonn, Heidelberg (1890)
Berlin, Würzburg, Leipzig

Philologist
Provost of Oriel
Historian
Classical Archaeologist
Philologist
Psychologist/
Anthropologist
German Scholar
Historian
Philosopher
Psychologist
Theologian
Philosopher
Psychologist
Philologist
Psychologist
Economic Historian
Psychologist
Philosopher
Historian
Philologist
Philologist
Psychologist
APPENDIX TWO

BRITISH INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS & THE WAR

At the outbreak of war in 1914 international law as a university discipline in Britain was still at a relatively undeveloped stage - even, as one lawyer noted, in an "unsatisfactory condition". With few teachers and poorly-endowed chairs (even in the three great universities) there was little public interest in the subject. One effect - and perhaps a contributory cause - of this neglect was that there was no British journal devoted to the study of international law. "Indeed", the same observer noted, "in the scientific study of the subject less interest is shown in this country than in almost any other leading State."¹ Yet British entry to the war was ostensibly, as Asquith put it, in "the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation".² The German invasion of Belgium was portrayed by British international lawyers (and by historians) as a challenge to "the existence of any code of law at all between nations". "Any system of international law must be based on the equality of States", the Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford told the readers of the Italian review Scientia. Every state had to have "the same rights and the same duties irrespective of its power or of its resources naval or military".³

The German invasion of Belgium seemed to be a body blow to international law, but to the question "Does international law still exist?" the British answer was in most cases a confident

1. E.A.Whittuck, "International Law Teaching", Trans.Grotius Soc., III (1917),55. In 1910 there were 10 professors, readers and lecturers in international law in Britain, compared with 20 professors and several lecturers in France and one or two professors in each German and Swiss university. A.P.Higgins, The Binding Force Of International Law, Cambridge, 1910,p.48,n.12.
2. Cit. Holbraad,pp.37-8
3. H.E.Richards "The Issues At Stake In This War", 202-3.
affirmative. As Sir H. Erle Richards told a W.E.A. meeting in Birmingham: "if you had asked me to address you on the growth of International Law as late even as last July, I should have told you that it was strengthening its hold on the world year by year, and that law was gradually displacing force in the settlement, at least of some classes, of international disputes." But now Britain was at war because "her enemy...declined to be bound by International Law". Even so, Richards concluded, since public opinion was "some check even in the darkest days", one could confidently assert that International Law did still exist and that at the end of the war would "stand on a more secure footing than before". This confidence was reflected in the decision to investigate the conduct of the German army in occupied Belgium (although this was also considered in terms of propaganda warfare) and in the plans (which never came to anything) for a general commission to investigate German violations of the laws of war.

Confidence in the future of international law was perhaps reflected also in the establishment of the Grotius Society in 1915 to fill a gap caused by the cessation (for the war years) of the activities of the International Law Association. Membership of the new society was restricted to British subjects, although foreigners (invariably of allied or neutral states) were allowed to become honorary or corresponding members - this to avoid the embarrassing situation of the I.L.A. on the outbreak of war. However, the first President (Henry Goudy, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford) was at pains to disclaim any intention to "discuss international questions from a purely British standpoint, or to support...

1. Does International Law Still Exist?, Oxford, 1914, pp.8, 13-17. c.f. C.Oppenheim, The League of Nations, 1919, p.v. (lectures given in 1918). A.P.Higgins gave a less confident assessment in 1910: "Hague Conferences, Inter-Parliamentary Unions, Federations, Unions of Workers, and such-like gatherings all tend to a growing feeling of solidarity among the nations of the world, and tend to create an atmosphere in which the observance of International Law will be increasingly easy to be realised. But as yet I see no prospect of perpetual peace. International Law is developing, but has not yet reached the fulness of the development of national laws." Binding Force..., p.22. For the optimistic view of prewar international law, see above p.43.

2. See I.Abrams, "The Emergence Of The International Law Societies", Rev. of Politics, XIX, 3 (July 1957), 361-80.
dogmas because they might be thought advantageous to the British interest*. Discussion was to be from a "cosmopolitan point of view"; suggestions for the reform of international law were to be "based on humanity and justice wherever possible". This was a brave standard to nail to the mast in wartime, and a few sentences later Goudy gave evidence of partiality in his interpretation of recent events in the light of international law.\(^1\) Nowhere was the objectivity of British international lawyers put to greater test than on the question of contraband.

As a maritime nation the law of the sea was of utmost importance for Britain. Before the outbreak of war the whole question of the rules of naval warfare had been raised at a conference in London, which had taken place as the result of an initiative by the British Government in December 1908. The resulting "Declaration of London" was accepted by the British Government but not by influential sections of political and naval opinion. A bill embodying the provisions of the Declaration was passed by the House of Commons but thrown out by the Lords in December 1911. A similar division of opinion existed among British international lawyers, especially on the merits of the central proposal in the Declaration - the immunity from capture of private property at sea in time of war. The former Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford T.E.Holland was strongly opposed to this idea, and, echoing what had been official government policy up until 1908, he also argued against restraint on the British right of blockading enemy ports and capturing enemy ships.\(^2\) However, his successor in the Chichele chair Sir H.Erie Richards seems to have come down on the other side. As late as 1915 he was arguing for some compromise on the question of contraband between complete abandonment of the belligerent right of search, and including all conditional

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1. "Introduction" to Trans.Grotius Soci.,I(1915),1-2. Goudy gave as an example of dynastic autocracy the Greek monarchy (which was then giving Britain trouble as a potential adherent of the Central Powers) and made no mention of Tsarist Russia.

contraband in the category of absolute contraband.¹

Two other international lawyers, Sir John Macdonell and the Rev. T.J.Lawrence, campaigned strongly for the inviolability of private property in wartime. Both men were involved in attempts to foster better Anglo-German relations before 1914, and Lawrence's Principles of International Law (1895) was one of the major works on the subject.² In a letter to the "Anglo-German Understanding Conference" held in London in 1912 Macdonell listed what he felt were the real motives behind the opposition in Britain to the idea of immunity from capture of private property in wartime. There was the procedural objection that this issue was merely part of the wider one of regulating contraband and commercial blockades, and could not therefore be solved in isolation. Then there was the argument that "liability to capture" was really a "deterrent from war" since people who would otherwise be "untouched" by war felt its effects. Macdonell disposed of these objections - both really depended on how urgently one desired reform, and on whether one really believed in the efficacy of "deterrents" to prevent war. The other objections, being based on less rational arguments, were more difficult to deal with."Mahanism", which Macdonell described as the belief that "every concession to the cause of peace" was an admission of weakness, a "slurring over of the moral issues and aspects of war", could only lead to an end to all rules of war (not merely those concerned with contraband). This was not much better than the arguments of the Social Darwinists which Macdonell saw as part of a general "upthrust of barbarism; a secret admiration of force unrestricted; impatience at every limitation of the area of warfare; an unavowed belief in war as something divine, or as the true field for manly virtue."³

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¹ Does International Law Still Exist?, pp.14-15. Richards did not discuss blockade, but did propose the establishment of an International Prize Court (a favourite idea of the "liberal" international lawyers).

² Macdonell in the Anglo-German Friendship Society and Lawrence in the Church of England Peace League (see above p.44 n.2). On Lawrence's reputation, see D.H.N.Johnson, The English Tradition Of International Law, 1962, p.25.

What Macdonell was approaching from the perspective of international law, MacIver and Wallas had approached from the perspective of the social sciences - namely, the persistence of attitudes which could very well lead to war at a time when nations were increasingly interdependent in economic and financial terms.1 As T.J. Lawrence wrote in the Peace Yearbook for 1914: "The increasing community of interests among nations, the reciprocity of services rendered by international commerce, becomes every year a greater obstacle to the free use of the right of capture." The inviolability of private property in wartime was an issue upon which "the pacifist, the politician and the trader" could "heartily agree".2 Agreement on this would also "limit the destructiveness of war", and perhaps even the peacetime arms rivalry which so exercised the minds of delegates at the Anglo-German Understanding Conference.3 But Lawrence was more realistic than many peace advocates in his assessment of what could be achieved,4 and when war did break out and the Declaration of London came increasingly

1. For MacIver and Wallas, see above pp.42ff.
3. Lawrence, "The Inviolability Of Private Property At Sea In Time Of War", Peace Yearbook 1913, pp.6-9. Cf. his The 3rd Hague Conference and Innocent Commerce In Time Of War, 1912, and his contribution to the Understanding Conference in Report Of Proceedings. Macdonell even argued that capture and blockade were no longer the potent weapons against an enemy they once were: it was "highly probable" that their use would cause "much trouble with neutral States", and it was "ridiculous to suppose" that the "bottling-up" to any extent of the German merchant marine, could appreciably influence the issue of hostilities". Some Plain Reasons For Immunity From Capture Of Private Property At Sea, 1910,pp.9-10.
4. The claim that the abolition of the right to make war on innocuous sea-borne commerce would enable "navies...to confirm to the standard of humanity already reached in military operations", showed little knowledge of the barbarity (despite the Geneva Convention) of war on land. One could not argue in moral terms:" "The capture of an enemy's merchantman is an operation as regular as the levy of a requisition for beef on a country village." Barbarous as war was, "it would be still more barbarous if disciplined forces were deprived of the power of striking hard blows at the warlike resources of their enemies. There would be in it no more of mercy and humanity than at present, and it would last longer." The formula of advance was thus to "protect scrupulously (p.t.o.)
to be ignored by the belligerent states, Lawrence's reaction was a level-headed one. But the same could not be said of other British international lawyers.

The most uncompromising statement of the British case came, predictably enough, from J.H. Morgan of University College, London - editor of the English translation of the Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (The German War Book) and participant in Lord Bryce's investigation of alleged German atrocities in Belgium. Throughout his life Morgan never seems to have wavered in his bad opinion of the Germans, but his Rhodes Lecture in November 1915 has more than a whiff of Realpolitik in its defence of British policy on war at sea:

"I believe our departures from the orthodoxy of international law have been thoroughly justified. If I have any criticism to make of them, it is that they were made too soon, but that they were not made soon enough. But their justification is to be found less in law than in morality. If we have 'scrapped' the Declaration of London and laid a profane hand on the Declaration of Paris, it is because the Germans have broken nearly every one of the Hague Regulations governing the conduct of the war on land, and have sunk neutral merchantmen by way of vindicating what they are pleased to call the freedom of the seas. We were justified and more than fully justified. But let us realise no less resolutely than sadly that international conventions never counted for so little as they do now. We must, I think, take a long farewell of the American contention that peace, and with it

(footnote continued from previous page)

persons and things not immediately useful for warlike purposes, and seize or destroy all who are". Lawrence, International Problems & The Hague Conferences, 1908, pp.106-7. In other words, Lawrence did not feel that complete abandonment of belligerent right of search desirable, and that advance in international law had to be argued for in terms of practical benefit rather than abstract moral principles.

1. "...the ill-starred Declaration of London, whose misfortune was that it came either too late or too soon - too late for the regulation of a sea-order about to perish owing to the advances of science and retrogressions of morality, and too soon for the regulation of a new order whose outlines are yet in the making." The Society Of Nations, p.83.
the commerce of neutrals, should govern the
rules of war. This is an age of iron, and it
has little room for such academic conceptions."¹

There was little to choose between this conception of war at sea and German "frightfulness" on land. In his introduction to The German War Book Morgan had written that its "peculiar logic" consisted "for the most part in ostentatiously laying down unimpeachable rules and then quietly destroying them by debilitating exceptions".² Was not this distinction between Kriegsmanier and Kriegsraison reflected in a similar distinction in British rules of war at sea? Were not the departures from international law justified on the grounds of necessity - the notorious Notwendigkeit which had been used to justify the German invasion of Belgium?

This was the question dealt with by J.E.G. de Montmorency, Lecturer in International Law at Cambridge and later (1920) Macdonell's successor as Quain Professor of Comparative Law at London. Writing in February 1915, Montmorency noted that there were "two points of view" on international law during wartime:

"There is the purely legal view, difficult and complex, often involving the clash of nations, statesmen and jurists, a legal view that is ultimately based upon economic necessity, and one therefore that varies as that necessity varies from nation to nation. The other point of view, the non-juridical and commonsense point of view, is the view that is too little considered, though it is the view that has ultimately determined and must always ultimately determine the minds of statesmen and the policy of nations. War is a form of reality that will not have its dread purpose thwarted by unrealities. If a legal doctrine has

¹ "The War & The Empire", Law Quly. Rev., XXXIII, 131 (July 1917), 215-6. On the outbreak of war the Central Powers promised to observe the Declaration of London if the Allies did likewise. The latter, however, only agreed to this "subject to certain modifications and additions" they deemed "indispensable to the efficient conduct of naval operations". Such piecemeal ratification violated Article 65 of the Declaration (which Britain had not ratified), and, more importantly, was a first step in a retreat from the spirit as well as the letter of all rules of naval warfare (including the Declaration of Paris on blockade and capture). Both sides were to blame for the subsequent measures and counter-measures (maritime war zones, mining, long-distance blockade, unrestricted submarine warfare, armed merchantmen). See E.Castren, The Present Law Of War & Neutrality Helsinki, 1954,pp.21-2, 358-9, 535 & J.W.Garner, International Law & The World War, 1920,1,30.

² p.1.
ceased to be a reality, if it is a mere echo of realities once all important under conditions that have passed away, then such a doctrine, though it may persist on record in times of peace, is necessarily swept away when a new economic position is forced by war."\(^1\)

If there was a hint of "blood and iron" in Morgan's ideas, was there not a touch of Clausewitz in de Montmorency's words? This he of course denied. He was not advocating:

"...the monstrous German doctrine of Kriegsverrath. Necessity whether in war or peace, has no claim to interfere with fundamental principles of righteousness. Neither might nor necessity justifies the overturning of right....But a legal doctrine is not necessarily a principle of righteousness, and, indeed, has often proved a perverse and evil thing, that has been handed on from one set of economic conditions that justified it, to later sets of economic conditions that abhorred it. The continual adjustment of the doctrines and practices of law to changing economic conditions is one of the explanations of the growth of English Common Law."\(^2\)

A recent "neutral" international lawyer has criticised this kind of justification of British policy during the First World War\(^3\) and at the time Macdonell expressed misgivings along the same lines. He was especially worried by British departures from previously accepted rules of blockade. An Order in Council of March 1915

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2. Loc.cit. "No doubt, from a juridical point of view, it is important to see if possible the processes of growth by which legal doctrines are expanded to meet new conditions; but from the point of view of the businessman and statesman the practical question of the moment is the thing that must be faced, it is the business of the jurist later to show that this new attitude was in fact an inevitable growth."

3. "As the existing law must be observed until it is repealed or amended in a regular manner, changed conditions may not be invoked as a ground for establishing war zones....the British observed that obsolete rules of warfare were simply being adapted to suit new conditions better, and that there was no intention of deviating from the general rules of international law concerning blockade. But this explanation too is unsatisfactory." Castren,p.314.
"empowering British cruisers to detain all vessels attempting to enter or leave German ports" prompted his comment that international law now consisted of little more than "polite fictions". It was just "an imposing name for opportunism". And in a reference to the kind of arguments put forward by Morgan and de Montmorency, Macdonell attacked those people in positions to "influence our actual policy" who suggested "either let there be no rules, or rules drawn in terms so elastic and vague that they be interpreted to meet any new or unexpected circumstances". Such talk of course meant "the abrogation of all law"; it was "the familiar doctrine of necessity, to be reprobated on land, but, it would seem, to be approved at sea". The "actual working creed of some Governments" - and here he meant his own in particular - could be summed up in the following way: "By all means let there be rules and let them be observed when they are not seriously inconvenient. But when they prove to be very much in the way, let us be free to break them, paying damages, to be awarded by an international tribunal. Compensation to neutrals is, and must be, no small part of the normal cost of a modern naval war." 2

But with the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in January 1917 Macdonell found it difficult to remain so critical of British sea policy. The entry of America into the war on the Allied side later in the year invited historical parallels

1. "The New Blockade", Nation, XVI, 25(20 Mar.1915), 793-4. Britain made additions to contraband lists (conditional and absolute) and from April 1916 intercepted "contraband" (now all considered absolute) even if it were bound for neutral ports. The idea of "continuous voyage" assumed that goods were eventually destined for official government use in Germany and could be intercepted at any stage of the journey.

and the description of German policy as "barbaric".\(^1\) It was perhaps inevitable that international law would be influenced by national considerations during war-time - neither philosophers nor historians had proved able to resist. Unrestricted submarine warfare effectively diverted attention - in Britain, if not in all neutral states - from departures from the law of the sea by the Allies. Whether sinking merchantmen by torpedo was more "barbaric" than the long-range blockade of the Central Powers is difficult to say. The newness\(^2\) and the spectacular nature of submarine warfare meant that it tended to arouse repugnance sooner than blockade, a weapon hallowed by long use (though not in its present all-encompassing form).\(^3\)

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1. "...three times have the United States interposed with armed force in the affairs of the Old World....First in 1805; next in 1815; and lastly in 1917, and all three times with the like object - in 1805 and 1815 to put down the unrestricted invasion of the freedom of the seas by the Barbary pirates, and in 1917 to stop unrestricted U-boat warfare. The American troops and sailors are now doing much the same work as did Admiral Decatur's ships against the Dey of Algiers." Macdonell, "The True Freedom of the Sea, 19th Century, CXXXII, 479(Nov. 1917), 1017. Cf. de Montmorency, "The Barbary States In International Law". Trans. Grotius Soc., IV(1918),87-94.

2. In 1908 Lawrence had called submarines a "monstrous race of maritime hermaphrodites". International Problems...,p.197. British counter-policy of arming merchantmen was defended by A.P.Higgins in Defensively-Armed Merchant Ships & Submarine Warfare,1917. See also his essays in Studies In International Law & Relations, Cambridge,1928.

3. One has only to compare Lawrence writing in 1908 where he criticises equally categorising food as absolute contraband and arming merchantmen (the British side), and mining the high seas and using submarines (the German), and his different tone in wartime, to see the changes wrought by war. See International Problems..., pp.121-7, 155, 174-7, 190-1 & Society of Nations, pp.91-110.
APPENDIX THREE: ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIP OF THE ANGLO (BRITISH) - GERMAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY

W.R. Anson (Warden of All Souls)
Sir Thomas Barlow (Professor of Medicine, London)
C.R. Beazley (Professor of History, Birmingham)
K. Breul (Professor of German, Cambridge)
A.J. Butler (Professor of Italian, London)
E. Caird (Master of Balliol College, Oxford)
Sir William M. Conway (Professor of Art, Cambridge)
T.W. Rhys Davids (Professor of Comparative Religion, London)
Sir Herbert von Herkomer (Professor of Art, Oxford)
Sir John Macdonell (Professor of Comparative Law, London)
Alfred Marshall (Professor of Economics, Cambridge)
J.H. Muirhead (Professor of Philosophy, Manchester)
W.P. Paterson (Professor of Theology, Edinburgh)
Sir William M. Ramsay (Professor of Old Philology, Aberdeen)
J.G. Robertson (Professor of German, London)
M.E. Sadler (Vice-Chancellor, Leeds University)
A.W. Ward (Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge)
APPENDIX FOUR: ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL PEACE CONGRESS

J. Bryce
E.G. Browne (Professor of Arabic, Cambridge)
J.E. Carpenter (Principal of Manchester College, Oxford)
T.J. Lawrence (Reader in International Law, Bristol)
Sir John Macdonell (Professor of Comparative Law, London)
W.J. Roberts (Professor of Economics, Cardiff)
A. Schuster (Professor of Physics, Manchester)
F.E. Weiss (Vice-Chancellor Manchester University)
The involvement of British academics in Whitehall during the Second World War—subject of many an autobiographical or fictional account of the corridors of power—had been foreshadowed during the 1914-1918 war. The Civil Service is an environment not unlike that which academics normally inhabit, and, when war broke out in 1914, university men too old for active service searched out old school or college friends in the hope of finding anything which seemed to provide useful employment.1 Almost anything, it seemed, was better than lecturing to half-empty college and university class-rooms. Some, like the Oxford philosopher and ancient historian R.G. Collingwood found jobs which required certain of their professional skills. Collingwood found a job in Admiralty Intelligence from 1915 onward, where he "employed" his knowledge of French, German, Spanish and Italian as well as his skill in sifting evidence which he had developed as an archaeologist."2 In his Autobiography (1939) Collingwood tells how he worked on a philosophical treatise Truth and Contradiction during this time, and Admiralty Intelligence seems to have become rather a haven for philosophers. Beside the usual bevy of classicists, Collingwood’s colleagues included the Kantian scholar Norman Kemp Smith and two Oxford moral philosophers (H.J. Paton and Hastings

1. Sir Charles Oman, Professor of History at Oxford, found a job on the Neutral Press Committee through his old school friend, Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary. Oman, Things I Have Seen, 1933, pp. 220-4.
Rashdall). Working closely with the Admiralty, as well as with the Board of Trade, was a small group of academics who organised the trade intelligence section of Postal Censorship. This "Trade Clearing House" was formally recognised as a branch of the War Trade Department in February 1915, with the job of licencing exports. A few months later it was again transformed into the War Trade Intelligence Department with two Oxford historians as chairman and vice-chairman—T.H. Penson (Pembroke College) and H.W.C. Davis (Balliol).

So successful was Davis in his job of drafting daily minutes for the Cabinet on the progress of the commercial blockade of the Central Powers that he was chosen to represent the department on the British delegation at Versailles in 1919. This in turn lead to a C.B.E. in the New Year's Honours List and offers of Vice-Chancellorships from the universities of Liverpool and Sheffield. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was also considering Davis for an "important position", and all this made Davis hesitate before returning to academic life. But apart from taking over the direction of the Department of Overseas Trade for six weeks (March-April 1919) while his superiors were absent, Davis did not rise in the civil service. However, his wartime experience seems to have had a profound effect on his scholarly activities. The editor of Stubb's Select Charters and the author of England Under the Normans and Angevins now turned his attention to the antecedents of the war. Contributions to

1. Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 42. For a fuller list of academics employed in wartime Whitehall, see below.

Temperley's History of the Peace Conference and articles on pre-war diplomacy in the English Historical Review testify to his new concern with contemporary history.¹

Lloyd George did not have Asquith's intimate links with Oxford, and he is better-known for recruiting businessmen than academics to government service during wartime. However, he was not averse to recruiting advisors and even ministers (H.A.L. Fisher) from the universities. One member of his secretariat—"the garden suburb"—was W.G.S. Adams, Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions at Oxford (1912-33) and founder of the Political Quarterly (1914). Adams had joined the Ministry of Munitions, which was well-stocked with Oxford dons, in 1915, and a year later he joined Lloyd George's staff, a position which he held until 1919, editing the War Cabinet Reports (1917-18) and working on labour matters. Adams was also a member of the Commission which examined the Civil Service (1918) and he acted as liaison officer between Lloyd George and Sir Horace Plunkett, chairman of the Irish Convention. However, he was probably closer to Lord Milner than to Lloyd George.² The other academic member of the secretariat was Arthur Greenwood, until just before the war a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Leeds. In 1914 he had been appointed General Secretary of the Council for the Study of International Relations. In 1916 he became a member of Lloyd

¹ See also his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of History at Oxford, "The Study of History" (Nov. 1925), in Weaver, esp. pp. 70-4.

George's secretariat and between 1917 and 1919 worked in the Ministry of Reconstruction under Christopher Addison. Later still he became one of the leading members of the Labour Party until his death in 1954.1

Lloyd George's other notable academic appointee was H.A.L. Fisher, who became President of the Board of Education in December 1916, with the task of introducing major educational reform. With the details of the 1918 Education Bill we cannot be concerned,2 but we can note that Fisher was sensitive to criticism from other liberal academics, like Gilbert Murray, because of his decision to work for the politician who had so recently deposed Asquith. In their eyes Lloyd George seemed as dangerous and ambitious as Gladstone had to an earlier generation of academic liberals during the Home Rule controversy. "All my sympathies are with Asquith and Grey. The Press Campaign against them has been hateful", Fisher wrote to Murray. But his decision to accept Lloyd George's offer of political office had not been "as a politician but as an educationist."3

Fisher's doubts over Lloyd George were shared in more extreme form by the leading academic liberal of the next generation, John Maynard Keynes who from January 1915 worked full-time at the Treasury. With many of his friends conscientious objectors, Keynes found the moves towards the introduction of conscription made his position difficult. However, a letter to his mother of January 1916 shows a genuine liking for life in the corridors of power mixed in with a dislike of some of the men he

found there. In the event he did not break from Lloyd George until the Peace Conference in 1919.

A fuller list of academics employed in government departments and secretariats follows:

1. **Admiralty Intelligence:**
   - F.E. Adcock (King's College, Cambridge; later Professor of Ancient History, Cambridge)
   - C. Bailey (Balliol College, Oxford; classics)
   - J. Baillie (Professor of Moral Philosophy, Aberdeen) O.B.E. 1918
   - W.M. Calder (Professor of Greek, Manchester)
   - R.G. Collingwood (Pembroke College, Oxford; classics and philosophy)
   - H.N. Dickson (Professor of Geography, Reading)
   - G.B. Grundy (Corpus Christi College, Oxford; ancient history)
   - L.G. Wickham Legg (New College, Oxford; history)
   - R.B. Mowat (Corpus Christi College, Oxford; later Professor of History, Bristol)
   - J. Orr (Lecturer in French, Queen Mary College, London; from 1919 Professor of French at Manchester)
   - H.J. Paton (Queen's College, Oxford; philosophy)
   - H. Rashdall (New College, Oxford; philosophy)
   - N. Kemp Smith (Professor of Philosophy, Princeton; from 1919 Professor of Philosophy, Edinburgh)
   - W.B. Stevenson (Professor of Hebrew, Glasgow)

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1. "Things drift on, and I shall stay now, I expect, until they begin to torture one of my friends. I believe a real split now and a taste of trouble would bring peace nearer, not postpone it; otherwise I'd swallow a great deal. I've been very busy and with occasional excursions into high life—met the P.M. at dinner on Saturday, refused to dine with the old scoundrel on Sunday, banqueted with the Lord Mayor yesterday." To F.A. Keynes, 13 Jan. 1916, cit. Collected Writings, XVI, 161-2. A year later he vented his feeling about Lloyd George to Duncan Grant: "Did you read his last speech? The war is a road paved with gold and cemented with blood." God curse him." (14 Jan. 1917) "I work for a Government I despise for ends I think horrid", Keynes wrote in another letter to Grant (15 Dec. 1917). Both letters in Keynes-Grant Correspondence.
2. **War Office Intelligence:**

S. Alexander (Professor of Philosophy, Manchester)
C.F. Crutwell (Hertford College; history)
J.D. Dennistoun (Hertford College; classics)
G.B. Grundy
G. Gordon (Professor of English, Leeds and later Oxford)
R. Hackforth (Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge; classics)
R.G.D. Laffan (Queen's College, Cambridge; history)
K.W.M. Pickthorn (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; history)
J.T. Sheppard (King's College, Cambridge; classics)
H. Summer (All Souls College, Oxford, from 1919)
H. Temperley (Peterhouse, Cambridge; history tutor and later Regius Professor)
C.K. Webster (Professor of Modern History, Liverpool and later Professor of International History at Aberystwyth and London)
W. Lorimer (Lecturer in Greek, St. Andrews)

3. **War Trade Intelligence Department**

H.W.C. Davis (Balliol College, Oxford; history tutor and later Regius Professor)
T.H. Penson (Pembroke College, Oxford; economics)
F.M. Powicke (Professor of History Belfast and later at Manchester and Oxford)
R.S. Rait (Professor of Scottish History, Glasgow)
C.E. Vaughan (Professor of English at Leeds up until 1913)
W.T. Waugh (Lecturer in History, Manchester)

4. **Ministry of Munitions:**

W.G.S. Adams (Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, Oxford)
J.B. Baillie
C. Bailey
F.M. Cornford (Trinity College, Cambridge; classics tutor and later Professor of Ancient Philosophy)
H.W. Garrod (Merton College, Oxford; classics tutor and later Professor of Poetry)
A.E.W. Hazel (Jesus College, Oxford; law)
A.J. Jenkinson (Brasenose College, Oxford; classics)
W.T.S. Stallybrass (Vice-Principal of Brasenose College) O.B.E. 1918.
5. Other:

G.G.G. Butler (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; history) News Department of the Foreign Office


Z.N. Brooke ( Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; history) Ministry of Food

A.D. Lindsay (Balliol College, Oxford; politics) Deputy Controller of Labour in France

J.H. Clapham (King's College, Cambridge; economics tutor and later Professor of Economic History) Board of Trade and Cabinet Committee on Priorities.

A.C. Pigou (Professor of Economics, Cambridge) Board of Trade

J.M. Keynes (King's College, Cambridge; economics) Treasury

E. Barker (New College, Oxford; philosophy) Ministry of Labour

W.G.S. Adams: Lloyd George's Secretariat

A. Greenwood (former Lecturer in Economics, Leeds) Lloyd George's Secretariat

H.S. Jones (Trinity College, Cambridge; classics) Foreign Office

R. McKenzie (St. John's College, Cambridge; classics) Foreign Office

L. Oppenheim (Professor of International Law, Cambridge) Foreign Office

A. P. Higgins (Lecturer and later Professor of International Law, Cambridge) Treasury and the Trade Division of the Admiralty

6. Paris Peace Conference 1918-1919:

W.M. Calder: Foreign Office advisor

H.W.C. Davis: Foreign Office "Intelligence Clearing House"

C. Guillebaud (St. John's College, Cambridge; economics) Supreme Economic Council advisor

A.P. Higgins: Advisor to the Admiralty

J.M. Keynes: Treasury

R.B. Mowat: War Cabinet Secretariat under Smuts

H.J. Paton: Foreign Office advisor

T.H. Penson: Foreign Office "Intelligence Clearing House"
H. Sumner: Military Intelligence Section (Assistant Secretary)

C.K. Webster: Military Intelligence Section (Secretary)

N.B. For academics working in propaganda agencies, see the chapter on propaganda.
APPENDIX SIX: LIST OF SIGNATORIES OF THE OCTOBER 1920 OXFORD MANIFESTO

W.G.S. Adams, E. Barker, A.D. Lindsay, G. Murray, R. Bridges, 
H.W.C. Davis and: E. Armstrong (Pro-Provost Queen's)

J.D. Beazley (Christ Church)
H. Boyd (Principal of Hertford)
G.C. Bourne (Professor of Zoology)
J.E. Carpenter
E.F. Carritt (University, Hertford)
R.W. Chapman (Secretary to the Delegates of the University Press)
A.C. Clark (Professor of Latin)
G.A. Cooke (Professor of Hebrew)
Sir Arthur Evans (Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology)
P. Gardner (Professor of Classical Archaeology)
E.E. Genner (Jesus)
H. Goudy (Emeritus Professor of Civil Law)
B.P. Grenfell (Professor of Papyrology)
J.S. Haldane (New)
G.H. Hardy (Professor of Geometry)
A.C. Headlam (Professor of Divinity)
C.B. Heberden (former Principal of Brasenose)
D.G. Hogarth (Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum)
L.P. Jacks (Principal of Manchester)
H.A. James (President of St. John's)
H.H. Joachim (Professor of Logic)
H.W.E. Joseph (New)
S. Langdon (Professor of Assyriology)
T.E. Lawrence (All Souls)
W. Lock (Professor of Divinity)
F.J. Lys (Provost of Worcester)
J.C. Masterman (Christ Church)
J. Murray (Christ Church)
J.L. Myres (Professor of Ancient History)
C.S. Orwin (Research Officer in Agricultural Economics)
R.L. Ottley (Professor of Pastoral Theology)
L.R. Phelps (Provost of Oriel)
Judge Radcliffe (All Souls)
C.G. Robertson (All Souls)
W.R. Ross (Oriel)
A.S. Russell (Lee's Reader)
C.H. Sampson (Principal of Brasenose)
W. Sanday (Emeritus Professor of Divinity)
P.C.S. Schiller (Corpus Christi)
W.B. Selbie (Mansfield)
J.A. Smith (Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy)
W. A. Spooner (New College)
G.H. Stevenson (University, Balliol)
J.L. Stocks (St. John's)
T.B. Strong (former Dean of Christ Church)
T.H. Tizard (Oriel)
M.N. Tod (Oriel)
J. Wells (Warden of Wadham)
H.H. Williams

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C.M.M. Adye (St. Hugh's)
M.P. Appleby (St. John's)
C. Bailey (Balliol)
J.V. Bartlett (Exeter)
J. Bell (Queen's)
K.N. Bell (Balliol)
K. Bourdillon (University)
F.H. Brabant (Wadham)
A.M. Bruce (Vice-Principal Somerville)
J. McL. Campbell (Hertford)
A.J. Carlyle (University)
E.I. Carlyle (Lincoln)
D.L. Chapman (Jesus)
T.W. Grundy (Christ Church)
M.V. Clarke (Somerville)
N. Cunliffe (Forestry School)
H.C. Denneke (Lady Margaret Hall)
J.D. Denniston (Hertford)
C.H. Dodd (University)
P.W. Dodd (Jesus)
G. Elton (Queen's)
H.J. George (Jesus)
H.L. Henderson (New)
W.E. Hiley (Queen's)
C.N. Hinshelwood (Balliol)
R.H. Hodgkin (Queen's)
M. Holroyd (Brasenose)
J.S. Huxley (New)
M.L. Jacks (Wadham)
K.E. Kirk (Magdalen)
R. Lennard (Wadham)
A.E. Levett (Vice-Principal St. Hilda's)
K.K.M. Leys (University)
E.C. Lodge (Vice-Principal Lady Margaret Hall)
H.L. Lorimer (Somerville)
E.W. Lummis (Worcester)
K.H. McCutcheon (Lady Margaret Hall)
D.G. McGregor (Balliol)
I. Macrae (Manchester)
N. Micklem (New)
W.H. Moberley (Lincoln)
W.H. Moberley (Principal St. Hilda's)
A.W. Pickard-Cambridge (Balliol)
E.G.C. Poole (New)
M.K. Pope (Somerville)
H.J. Pybus (St. Hilda's)
H.R. Raikes (Exeter)
A.E.J. Rawlinson (Christ Church)
A.M.H. Rogers (St. Hugh's)
E.W. Rooke (St. Hilda's)
J.W. Russell (Balliol)
N.V. Sidgwick (Lincoln)
M.G. Skipworth (Lady Margaret Hall)
A.H. Smith (New)
E.M. Spearing (St. Hugh's)
J. Spens (Lady Margaret Hall)
C.G. Stone (Balliol)
B.H. Streeter (Queen's)
H.T. Wade-Geny (Wadham)
A.F. Walden (New)
E. Walker (Balliol)
C.R. Young (Somerville)
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