MEDIATION, REALITY AND REASON:
AN EXAMINATION OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

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I declare that this thesis is of my own composition and that all of the work is my own.
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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Title of Thesis .... Mediation, Reality and Reason: An Examination of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

This thesis examines Hegel's attempt to mediate the opposition of subject and object. It is an explication and an interpretation of "Consciousness", "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason". Hegel attempted to develop a system of philosophy whose conclusion was demonstrated to be true and one in which all that falls within experience became rationally comprehended.

Since, according to Hegel, consciousness contains within it the two elements "subject" and "object" he analyzed the experience of consciousness in its relation to these modes. The procedure of the Phenomenology is to examine the claims of objectivity and those of subjectivity to be the essence of the true. Hegel shows that complete philosophical knowledge requires both sides to be equally essential. Part II discusses the unification of subject and object through the examination of knowledge and shows that this examination must also be of the object which is known. Therefore, in Hegel's theory, a true epistemology must also be an ontology. His conclusion is that non-sceptical knowledge is possible and that it is co-extensive with the actual. Part III shows that Hegel's conclusion is possible because Reason is what is real. So his rationalism is a metaphysical claim. This distinguishes it from other forms of rationalism and it is therefore immune to usual criticisms. However, his position requires a rational necessity in the world and, since contingency is an element of experience, he failed to give the complete account of experience he himself demanded.
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PART I: HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RADICAL MEDIATION

Chapter 1: Introduction

a. General Remarks.

In our age there is very little room for or sympathy with speculative metaphysics. The modern temper is to demand something more concrete than the (apparent) a priori ruminations of armchair speculation. What is wanted now are facts and things - or at least their physical correlates in the form of dial readings, computer read-outs, and such like - which can be tested, perceived and re-duplicated. Theorizing on the data of experience in the grand manner of past philosophies is considered too subjective, too dependent upon the vagaries of individual eccentricity, and too wooly-minded because too dependent upon carelessness in the use and/or abuse of language. The modern philosophical temper, on the contrary, is to strive for "objectivity". But when the attainment of "objectivity" means not merely the freeing of understanding from the external introduction of ideas and reflections but the elimination of the subjective, then no such "objective" account can adequately account for or properly express experience because subjectivity is an irreducible element of experience. A true philosophical understanding of human experience must include both sides and must encompass the essential
claims of both within it. Hegel's attempt to accomplish this task may not be accepted as finally convincing, but the profundity and suggestiveness of his philosophy is sufficiently great to justify the difficult task of trying to understand his thought. It is the high degree of success realized in Hegel's attempt to understand and explicate human experience as a whole containing an essential harmony of the two aspects that has motivated this examination of his Phenomenology of Spirit.

The "metaphysical wonder-sickness" which William James observed will always afflict those few - or perhaps those many - for whom not only the objective world of natural science but the whole of vital human experience is indispensable in the creation of the "vision" of the world which, explicitly or not, necessarily provides the background in which human lives are lived. Those for whom such a "vision" becomes sufficiently compelling are those who become philosophers. They are especially those who become metaphysicians.

Hegel was a philosopher with just such a "vision", and the philosophical system which he produced was an attempt to express this Weltanschauung in the form of language; thereby giving his thought externality and concreteness.² Hegel would certainly not endorse this description of his work in terms of a "vision" or anything of the sort. Such notions suggest that the content of such knowledge is somehow immediately given and that there must therefore be some easy and immediate access to its truth - perhaps through an intellectual intuition or something of the sort. Hegel, however, objected strongly to the suggestion that philosophical truth was a matter to be decided by such facile means.³ He is insistent that "True thoughts and scientific insight are to be won only in the labor of the Concept [der Arbeit des Begriffes]"⁴, and he is therefore uncompromising in rejecting post-Kantian philosophies of the immediate - whether the Glaubensphilosophie of Hamann
and Jocobi, Schelling's Identitätsphilosophie, or other irrationalisms of the Romantiker. This "Arbeit des Begriffes" is precisely the hard work required in order to transform the universality of the Concept from empty indeterminacy into a universal with substantial, determinate content. According to Hegel the setting forth of a system of philosophy ought to be descriptive of the labors of Consciousness to achieve this knowledge. Philosophy ought to be a description of what is, not a report on a particular "vision" of the world.

Yet Hegel did have such a vision. It was a vision generated out of the Zeitgeist and which therefore drew upon and expressed this spirit. Hegel stands as one of the giants of philosophy primarily because he could give to his time the breadth and depth of thought that was required to express it. Because of this his thought was also an extremely fertile ground in which succeeding Germanic ideas could find root and flourish. There is a sense in which Hegel is "all things to all men" - for everyone who approaches him seems to come away with a different Hegel. There are, of course, trends in the way in which Hegel is "read" from time to time - the two most persistent and important being the religious emphasis (often associated with "right-wing" Hegelianism) and the political emphasis (often associated with "left-wing" Hegelianism). Of these two the latter is in the ascendant in the present day and books on Hegel in recent years have taken this aspect as primary. Both of these "readings", and others besides, can find ample evidence for their interpretations within the works of Hegel. It is therefore folly to attempt to refute one approach or to try to prove another. There can be no absolutely right or wrong interpretation of Hegel but only different ones - more than one of which may have strong supporting evidence. Each is seeking to unravel
Hegel's vision from its (necessarily) imperfect external presentation. What follows is an attempt in the same spirit and therefore makes no pretense to give the "truth" about the System. The examination of the subject herein will achieve its object if it presents an enlightenment of what Findlay refers to as the "illuminating treatment" Hegel has given to some traditional problems.  

b. An Elucidation of Some Important Terms.  

It is well known among those who have tried that the task of discerning and understanding the details of Hegel's system of philosophy is a formidable one indeed. It is made formidable not least by the style and the language in which that philosophy is presented. We may be generous and put this difficulty down to the nature of the task which Hegel set himself. Perhaps Hegel's Weltanschauung forced him to stretch language to limits which it could only just endure; forced him to plumb the depths and the breadth of language and to tread a thin line between sense and non-sense in order to express what is nearly inexpressible. Whether or not our generosity would be misplaced, the result is the same - a notoriously difficult and obscure work which presents the reader with one of the most formidable obstacles in literature. However, these obstacles can be partly, though admittedly not completely, overcome. Yet after the exertion of effort required to overcome them, the reader may lapse into further frustration in trying to say precisely what Hegel holds about many of the central and important elements of his system of thought.  

This frustration is partly a result of Hegel's inconsistency in his use of terms: sometimes many terms have equivalent meanings, while at other times these same terms mutually encompass each other as though genus became species.
and species in turn became genus. This inconsistency in the use of terms led Hegel to evolve different emphases on different aspects of his thought. To a certain extent his later work was an evolution of his earlier work and not always a direct continuation of it. But even the various works themselves emphasize a different part of Hegel's vision. A reader who is solely familiar with Hegel's tracing of the progress of the Concept of Freedom in the *Philosophy of History* will surely come away with a different conception of the Hegelian philosophy than one who has followed the development of the Idea in the *Science of Logic*. This may go some way to explaining why different "readings" of Hegel become popular as his different works come into vogue.

Another cause of inconsistency is a gap between what philosophy demands as a system and what Hegel would like to hold in specific instances. What is sometimes implied by Hegel's general metaphysical position conflicts with what he would like to say is the case when considering particular problems.²

With the foregoing in mind it is clear that a treatment of Hegel's thought would be almost impossibly complex were it to be a full and complete exposition of it. For practical purposes a study of Hegel should concentrate on some element in his thought which is of particular interest and importance, and pursue it without becoming embroiled in all of the multifarious ways in which his thought can be approached and interpreted. Also, though its spirit may be somewhat un-Hegelian, it would seem best to ignore, as much as possible, the inconsistencies in the use of Hegel's terminology and to put forth, as well as possible, a consistent usage - realizing that there will be many passages in the corpus of Hegel's writings which will tell against any given consistent usage.

Some of these difficulties will be discussed and clarified in due course,
but it would be well, before going further, briefly to mention one important group of terms, the members of which are sometimes rather difficult to keep separate. These terms are: Freiheit, Gott, Idee, Geist, Vernunft and Verstand, Wissenschaft, absolutes Wissen, Begriff, and Dialektik. When these terms are used in this work in their technical Hegelian sense as logical categories or philosophical terms in general, they will be designated as such by the technique of capitalizing the initial letter. There is no point in trying to make fine distinctions which will discriminate all of these terms from one another. However, there is a common feature to all of them which makes their confusion - or fusion - a natural result of Hegel's system. It is that the system is teleological so that all natural and spiritual activities evolve toward an end. It is at this end that these concepts tend to coalesce. To a great extent it is true to say that these terms are ultimately all ways of expressing the same thing. Still, if what is about to be said about Hegel's philosophy is to be comprehensible, it will be necessary to be able to distinguish them and to be able to determine their proper role in the system. Therefore, a brief discussion of these important terms is given in what follows.

The notion of Freiheit or Freedom was important for the Romantics in general and in this respect Hegel was no different. Freedom for them was the precondition for the self-realization of the individual. This restriction of the notion as thus interpreted is perhaps too narrow when assigned to "Romanticism". Taylor has attempted to loosen the restrictions imposed by such traditional terms and refers this notion to a wider form of consciousness which he calls "Expressivism". Using this notion to include thinkers like Rousseau and Herder (who he says is the "founder" of expressivism), he gives us a tidy discussion of the importance of the concept of freedom:
...expressivist theory makes freedom a, if not the central, value of human life. Freedom becomes an important value with the modern notion of self-defining subjectivity .... But the expression theory both alters the notion of freedom, and greatly enhances its importance. It alters the notion in that the standard Enlightenment view of freedom was that of independence of the self-defining subject in relation to outside control, principally that of state and religious authority. Now freedom is seen as consisting in authentic self-expression. It is threatened not only by external invasion but by all the distortions that expression is menaced by. It can fail through a mis-shaping which is ultimately of external origin, but may become anchored in the self. Rousseau presents us with a theory of this kind.

Freedom takes on central importance because it is synononous with self-realization which is the basic goal of men. It may be only a, rather than the central value in this sense, that freedom is only one of the ways we can characterize this goal: we can also speak of it as unity, maximum fulfillment, harmony, and so on. Not every author will make freedom his privileged description of the goal, but it always is one available description.

As we have said, Freedom is one of the "definitions" of "God" in the Hegelian scheme; it is the category of Hegel, the philosopher of history. It is therefore an integral part of the Hegelian notion of the self-development of Spirit. It is, however, only one means of expressing or describing or comprehending this idea. As a primary ontological category Freedom will not be of major concern for the purposes of this inquiry as it is the primary category of the philosophy of history and, to a certain extent, of the philosophy of law. Our interest in these aspects of the Hegelian system will be at most peripheral.

Gott or God is mentioned here primarily because its absence might cause confusion. It is a term of which those who are primarily interested in the philosophy of religion may wish to make a special characterization. It is enough to say here that for our purposes Gott may be identified with Geist (Spirit) in its cosmological or absolute sense.

Also, in the present work there will be no great use of the term Idee or Idea, but it will be taken to refer to the universally intelligible structure of reality which is displayed schematically in logical sequence
in the *Science of Logic* and the First Part of the *Encyclopedia* (the *Logic*). The Idea is the a priori element of the absolute Knowledge which is the culmination of the evolution of conceptual knowledge as described in the *Phenomenology*. In the Preface to that work Hegel relates them as follows:

With this the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is concluded. What it has prepared for itself is the element of knowledge [Wissen]. In this element the moments of Spirit are spread out in the form of simplicity in which it knows its Object to be itself. They are no longer separated into the opposition of Being and Knowledge, but remain in the simplicity of knowledge; they are the Truth in the form of Truth and their difference is only difference of content. Their movement in which these elements are organized into a whole is Logic or Speculative Philosophy.

The seven remaining terms are the ones which will be of most concern herein and indeed it will be part of the job of this work to clarify and explicate their meanings. Briefly, however, we may characterize them as follows:

In its most fundamental sense *Geist* for Hegel means reality expressed as a vital principle. As such it means, in English, Spirit. The term 'Spirit' is used to re-assert the notion of self-consciousness which had been lost in the Substance of Spinoza, and to re-establish vitality into the "leblosen Schema" of Fichte and Schelling. Spirit is the Hegelian development of the Fichtean and Schellingian Absolute Ego (which was in turn the development of the Kantian transcendental ego). In Hegel it retains the position of Absolute in the sense that it represents the whole or the complete totality of natural and spiritual being. Again, as in Fichte and Schelling it retains the notion of self-alienation as a necessary factor in its being. For Fichte this self-alienation was necessary for morality; for Hegel, it was necessary for knowledge. As we shall see, in Fichte's formulation its
self-diremption created an eternal duality, whereas in Schelling it was resolved into an indifferent identity. For Hegel a middle course was taken in which the oppositions necessary for life persisted but the unity necessary for true rational knowledge was achieved. This study, though keeping always in mind the necessary opposition, will focus on the significance of the unification of the two sides as a means of achieving rationality. It is in the implications for this concern that Geist or Spirit has its significance herein.

Begriff or Concept is a technical term which appears in two related but different senses; one in the Logic and the other in the Phenomenology. In the Logic the Concept is the subjective principle of thought which becomes the Idea itself. But though the Concept represents "subjective Logic", it is the relating, through Judgments and Syllogisms, of the objective thought determinations shown in "Being" and "Essence" - which together comprise the "objective Logic". In the Logic the Concept develops from these subjective relations of thought determinations to the objectivity of relating inner principles to outer manifestations (as in Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology). The point is eventually reached where the Idea becomes the concrete unity of the subjective and objective. The Concept itself can only develop such wise because it itself is constituted out of its genesis in "objective Logic": "Objective Logic, which considers Being and Essence, thereby constitutes properly the genetic exposition of the Concept". 14

In this respect the Concept of the Phenomenology is similar in function to the Concept of the Logic: it represents the development from particularity to universality in the experiential knowledge of consciousness. In the completion of this development is achieved their unity as the "concrete
universal".

The distinction Hegel makes between Verstand or Understanding and Vernunft or Reason is a distinction which derived ultimately from Kant. Kant, however, subordinated Reason to Understanding, whereas for Hegel Reason is the higher mode of knowing. Furthermore, for Hegel they were not so obviously different faculties (though often he does appear to think of them as such), but rather names for different modes of knowing. In the *Encyclopedia Logic* Hegel describes the Understanding in this way: "Thought, as Understanding, keeps to fixed determinations [Bestimmtheit] and the differences themselves [der Unterschiedenheit derselben] stand opposed to each other; each such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence of its own". Reason he sees as having a negative, or dialectical side and a positive, or speculative, side. The former is the process of showing that the isolated thing of Understanding is necessarily dependent upon and therefore involves its other. We will see this in the *Phenomenology* where objectivity will be found to depend upon and finally give way to subjectivity. Speculative Reason Hegel defines in this way: "The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of determinations [Bestimmungen] in their opposition, - the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition". In the *Zusatz* to the same section he distinguishes the two in terms relevant to the present context:

...the speculative is in its true signification, neither preliminarily nor even definitively, something merely subjective: on the contrary, it expressly rises above such opposition as that between subjective and objective, which the Understanding cannot get over, and absorbing them in itself, evinces its own concrete and all-embracing nature.

Later, Understanding will be met with as a stage in the "Consciousness"
section of the *Phenomenology*. In that context, however, it is only an exemplification of a one-sidedness in the attitude of Consciousness toward the world. Understanding is to be found in all phases and shapes of Consciousness but in its truth it rises to become the unifying power of Reason; for example, note the following sentence from the *Encyclopedia Logic*: "The Logic of mere Understanding is contained in speculative Logic and may be extracted from it; for that purpose it need do nothing but omit from it the dialectical and rational element...."21

The re-assertion of Reason over Understanding to a certain extent constituted both a return to the Enlightenment and an advance beyond both it and Kantianism. It was a return because it paved the way for Hegel's re-assertion of rationalism and the identification of thought and being as found, for instance, in the Leibnizian rationalism of Wolff. It constituted an advance because mind, which was restricted by Kant to the essentially passive process of receiving sensory intuition and the activity of organizing them within the Understanding, became free to employ Reason upon experience. Reason therefore became radically active because the limiting power of the thing-in-itself was eliminated.

Reason uses Concepts and is therefore involved in the unification of the subjective with the objective. Its activity is that of Judgment and of Logical Syllogizing, which is the process of bringing together the universal and the particular. This brings it into its other use, which is that of a metaphysical principle in its own right. "...Reason" Hegel says "in its truth is Spirit..."22 and in this he places himself as the intellectual heir of Anaxagoras and Aristotle.23 The Enlightenment had proclaimed that the
world was open to knowledge through the light of Reason. But for the thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as Kant, the task of enlightened knowing was to receive the "light". For Hegel, however, it was "not the divergence of the ray but the ray itself", i.e. Reason itself rather than the formally rationalized world, which illuminates the human world and brings together knowledge with the object known.

Wissenschaft is Science or Scientific Knowledge and is not to be confused with merely natural science or its methodology. Philosophy, for Hegel, is Science; it is what Fichte called the Science of Science, except that for Hegel, Philosophy is the only genuine Science since it is the only truly "complete" Science; i.e. it is the only Science which has criticized itself and justified its presuppositions. It is, therefore, systematic because its content is demonstrated to be internally connected - that is, without surds or gaps. In this sense a systematic science is one (the one) which is totally rational (but not necessarily in the sense of implying that it is totally a priori). 25

We shall see that for Hegel a fully rational system is one in which everything is capable of being explained which falls within that system. That is, there can be no givens which are incapable of being explained or justified in terms of the relations of the parts of the system; likewise, the relations themselves are necessary and integral to the establishment of the system. Dualism, for example, is not rational because it cannot be incorporated, per se, within a fully integrated system. This is because the relation between the two sides of the dualism (just because it is a dualism) can only be given and can never be rationally comprehended. Likewise a reductionism which exalts either side will have the opposite side confronting
it as a given which cannot be explained or rationalized. Hegel expresses this by saying that each fundamental category by which the world is understood (such as those of Thought, Being, Substance, Subject, Etc.) is rationalized with reference to its Concept: Mechanism can never be the Truth about the world because it cannot incorporate the Concept of Teleology within it. As Kant discovered, organized beings cannot be explained in terms of mechanism. The Concept is the system of Rational Concepts in their relation to each other. Ultimately, the fully Actualized Concept, the Concept of all Concepts, is the fully rational system which expresses the Logical Idea.

Only in its full and complete development does Science express Truth, and it is, when full and complete, systematic. The task of the Phenomenology is to express this development to its completion and its actualization (in the Aristotelian sense of actuality). "That the True is actual only as a System" expresses the nature of systematic Science as a developed totality which is otherwise expressed as: "...that Substance is essentially Subject is expressed in the idea which pronounces the Absolute to be Spirit, - the sublimest Concept". Philosophical knowledge, when fully actualized in systematic Science, is what Hegel calls absolute Knowledge.

Absolutes Wissen or absolute Knowledge is the completed stage of the progression of knowledge as outlined in the Phenomenology. Absolute Knowledge is not in any sense "total knowledge". The philosopher does not know everything there is in heaven and on earth - not even after having read Hegel's Phenomenology. What he should achieve in his attempt to comprehend the world is a grasp of the underlying rationality which governs both it and the true thought of it. With Philosophy or absolute Knowledge there is no way of relating knowledge to the object of knowledge which is not contained
within its conceptual structure. In this sense, then, absolute Knowledge is infinite in having no form of knowing outside of it which could limit it. In other words, there is no form of knowing which absolute Knowledge does not encompass and utilize in its proper, rational application.

Dialektik is perhaps the most difficult and most contentious word in the Hegelian vocabulary. A large body of literature has been developed on the proper interpretation of this concept and it would be impossible here to do full justice to either the term itself or the literature on the subject. One thing is quite clear however, in general modern Hegel scholarship has disposed of the traditional characterization of dialectic as a formal structure exemplified by the Thesis - Antithesis - Synthesis triad. This it assuredly is not, though such a schema can be found in Fichte. One commentator has even insisted that the dialectic does not exist in Hegel. There is some virtue in such a denial since, as a formal device, it does not appear as such. But it does seem that it does play a role for Hegel, and after all the word is of relatively frequent occurrence - particularly in Hegel's post-Phenomenology works. The role that it plays is perhaps explicable in terms of Hegel's basic metaphysical position. Just as Spirit can be considered the metaphysical principle of vitality inserted into the substance of Spinoza (and into the Absolute of Schelling), the dialectic is the manifestation of this vitality in the world. It is the expression of Romantic dynamism which Hegel conjoined to the more static and passive Enlightenment notion of rationalism. In performing this function the dialectic appears in different guises and forms depending upon the way in which the inherent dynamism of the subject matter under question manifests itself. It comes closest to being a formalized schema in
the Logic (perhaps because logic is itself more conducive to formalism than other sciences), and it appears as a very loose principle of inherent development in the Phenomenology and other works. It is in this broad sense of putting inherent movement into a metaphysics of rationalism that it will be thought of herein. It is perhaps best expressed in this way in the following characterization which Hegel has made of it (although other descriptions of the dialectic may be found in Hegel which would lend support to a more restricted interpretation):

...Dialectic is the immanent surpassing wherein the one-sidedness and limitation of the determinations of the Understanding are seen for what they are; namely, as shown in their negation. For anything to be finite is for it to cancel and supersede itself [sich selbst aufzuhében]. Dialectic constitutes therefore the moving soul of scientific progress and is the principle whereby alone comes the immanent connection and necessity in the content of Science. In it in general lies the true and not the external elevation beyond the finite.32

It is because of the dialectic that the Phenomenology is possible as a development of Consciousness to true knowledge. Because of it Philosophy as Science is possible; because of it Hegel can say: "...this road [to Science], through the movement of the Concept, will encompass the entire world of Consciousness in its necessity".33


It has already been said that a discussion of the Phenomenology must not attempt to be a complete exposition of it but must limit itself to the more modest task of attempting to clarify some aspect of it. In line with this attitude the procedure of this work will be as follows: it will attempt to pinpoint a particular and primary problem as "the" problem with which
Hegel was occupied in the *Phenomenology*, and it will attempt to examine the development and resolution of this problem in the course of the development of that work. It will attempt to explain how this problem was to be resolved by Hegel and it will indicate some of the implications of the solutions offered by him.

Although the point of departure will make certain assumptions about the nature of the Hegelian enterprise, it is intended that these should be shown to be reasonable assumptions through having strong supporting evidence, primarily from what Hegel himself says. Thus, the procedure will be to propose first a problem as the *leitmotiv* of the investigation, and second, it will give a description of how Hegel tries to establish a solution to the problem.

This basic problem which Hegel is concerned to solve is that of the relation between subject and object. The problem first achieved this formulation in Kant and it was further developed by Fichte and Schelling. In modern philosophy, however, it has its historical genesis in Descartes. Hegel's attempt to resolve the problem of relating the two sides while keeping them distinct was through an epistemology based upon a metaphysics of Spirit. It is this attempt to find a solution to the problem that basically sets Hegel off from others who have attempted it. It is also the reason why Hegel's attempt is, in general, far more successful than most of the others.

The nature of Hegel's attempted solution will be explained more fully in the main body of this work, but the following might be said as a preliminary account.

My object is to discuss Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a work concerned with problems of recurrent interest in the history of philosophy, and particularly with the problem of the separation of subject and object. The
attempt to mediate oppositions characterizes every element and every stage of Hegel's thought. We can find this concern very early on in Hegel's thinking— even in the writings pre-dating his early publications in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. For example, in the essay "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate" Hegel describes religion as the need to unite the subjective with the objective; the particular with the universal. Here he is already showing concern for the inadequacy of one-sidedness, as for instance was characteristic of the subjectivity (the turning inward) of the Protestant religion. In order for religion to fulfill the function which he saw for it at this time, it was necessary that it contain a strong objective element as well:

To become religion, it must manifest itself in an objective form. A feeling, something subjective, it must be fused with the universal, with something represented in idea, and thereby acquire the form of a being to whom prayer is both possible and due. The need to unite subject with object, to unite feeling and feeling's demand for objects, with the intellect, to unite them in something beautiful, in a god, by means of fancy, is the supreme need of the human spirit and the urge to religion.  

Hegel, at this time, was very much imbued with the neo-Classical sentiment and he therefore saw the way of overcoming the one-sided subjectivity of Protestant Christianity to be the reassertion of what he called "folk-religion". Christianity, as the modern world knew it, was essentially a private religion which could neither effect the unity nor provide for the needs of fancy. Hegel saw the solution to the problem to lie in the reconstitution of religion such that the old virtues of mythological religions were combined with the Kantian truth of reason.

In this early essay Hegel looked toward religion as both the source of man's basic disharmony and as the medium of its rectification. However, in the fragment "On Love" and the "Fragment of a System" we see that Hegel had
already begun to develop the broader view which he developed in the Phenomenology. The former essay is an analysis of love in which the idea of harmony as the overcoming of opposites is expressed. But it comes out in this essay now in a very romantic form:

True union, or love proper, exists only between living beings who are alike in power and thus in one another's eyes living being from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the other. This genuine love excludes all oppositions.

Love is essentially a feeling but at the same time it is an attempt to unify opposites and to establish harmony for the individual. As yet, though, the thinking is not strictly dialectical, there can be no question about its tending that way. At least Hegel has conceived the need to replace sterile conceptual thinking with the idea of a living, spiritual unity.

In the "Fragment of a System" Hegel leaves the concept of love and arrives at the concept of "life". And here we meet the first major concept which for the most part becomes a part of the final system. We might say that at this point Hegel has discovered the dialectic. The following passage illustrates that Hegel's thought (with regard to this question of the unification of opposites through the evolution of knowledge) is already determined long before the Phenomenology itself was to give publicity to his way of thinking:

...life cannot be regarded as union or relation alone but must be regarded as opposition and relation, this union may be isolated again, and it may be argued that union is opposed to non-union. Consequently, I would have to say: Life is the union of union and non-union. In other words, every expression whatsoever is a product of reflection, and therefore it is possible to demonstrate in the case of every expression that, when reflection propounds it, another expression, not propounded, is excluded. Reflection is thus driven on and on without rest; but this process must be checked once and for all by keeping in mind that, for
example, what has been called a union of synthesis and antithesis is not something propounded by the understanding or by reflection but has a character of its own; namely, that of being a reality beyond all reflection.37

We can see here the emergence of the idea that reflection, which is mediation set in motion, has a compulsive nature which drives it to the point where reflection, or mediation, is itself extinguished. In other words, the union which is a union of union and non-union is itself a union and thus partakes in the immediacy of union; but it is an immediacy which is fully mediated. Later this idea will correspond to the notion of the mediation of mediation and immediacy.

Also, this phrase "life is the union of union and non-union" is the early expression of what Hegel would later call Spirit. Kroner recognized that the concept of "Life", and its connotations for the young Hegel of unity, carried over into his later concept of Spirit, which also includes the notion of the unification of subject and object.38 And the idea that

truth comes only with the Concept: or, more precisely, the Concept is the truth of Being and Essence, both of which, when separately maintained in their isolation cannot but be untrue, the former because it is exclusively immediate and the latter because it is exclusively mediated39

expresses again, in the fully developed system, this notion that neither union nor mediation nor non-union nor immediacy are, by themselves, "true". It is only when they are conjoined, united or mediated with each other that the truth of life or Spirit is realized.

The attempt to mediate oppositions characterizes every element and every stage of Hegel's thought.40 Again, we continue to find this interest in the years prior to the writing of the Phenomenology. In one of his earliest pub-
lished works, for example, we read his statement that "disunion is the source of the necessity of philosophy". It is Hegel's interest, and from a very early time as we have seen, to examine and to ameliorate these dichotomies which appeared so pervasively in the life of man.

As the discussion perhaps suggests, in his early writings Hegel showed a primary interest in the dichotomy or division between man and God and later between man and mankind. These emphases of the early writings persisted throughout Hegel's career and account in large measure for the focus of interest on these aspects since the publication by Herman Nohl of these early writings near the beginning of this Century. The present study will not be primarily concerned with these aspects. I would not deny their importance and value; nor would I attempt to maintain that the present work does not have implications for these questions. By the time Hegel began lecturing at Jena and began writing the Phenomenology, his interest had broadened to include a concern with basic philosophical problems. Accordingly, the main focus herein will be on what might be called the theoretical aspects of Hegel's work (that dealing with questions of knowledge and ontology) rather than the other, which one might consider to be its practical aspects (not that any such division can be quite so neatly and conveniently maintained).

The resolution of philosophical dichotomies is a pervasive theme in all of Hegel's works, but the emphasis herein will be to analyze the fundamental philosophical mediation which Hegel was concerned to achieve in the Phenomenology. Again, the interest herein is further limited in that it is primarily focused in the theoretical aspects of the development of the mediation and unification of subject and object. As such it concerns also problems associated with universality and particularity, but it is obviously essentially
focused on traditional metaphysical and epistemological questions. It is, in fact, in terms of epistemology and metaphysics that the question of the mediation of subject and object in Hegel is a concern of this work. The accomplishment (or failure) of this unification is considered here only from these aspects. For this reason, though the title of this work claims to be "an examination of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", it is such only from this limited perspective. Because of this the examination of the stages of the Phenomenology will neglect much that is interesting and important for other considerations, and it will emphasize some sections rather more than others - sometimes contrary to the emphasis commonly given by other commentators. Finally, it should be noted that only a little over half of the Phenomenology itself is actually considered as such. I hope that the justification for ending the basic analysis at the end of the section on "Reason" will be sufficient in the body of the work. I wish to claim that the theoretical problem of the mediation of subject and object in the Phenomenology is concluded at the stage of "Reason" and the remaining part of the work is quite different and represents the working out of this in its practical solution. I might add that in taking this position I am merely joining a select company of commentators on the Phenomenology.42

This work contains two phrases which entitle its last two main sections. A word ought to be said about them here. The first is "epistemological ontology" and the second is "metaphysical rationalism". Both of these phrases were deliberately chosen as being both descriptive and appropriate. In both cases there is a subtle paradox suggested. Epistemology is generally considered to be distinct from ontology. That is, an explanation of the process or state of knowing is not generally considered to involve, necessarily, a
pronouncement about the nature of being. Likewise, rationalism is generally thought to be a question of epistemology and not a metaphysical claim. Thus each phrase forms in itself the notion of the bringing together of an opposition; that is, they are mediated unities. The opposition which they represent is that between knowing and being or, in other words, between thought and being. It is this opposition which becomes transformed by Kant into the opposition of subject and object. As the following chapter will discuss, this is the fundamental opposition in philosophy which Hegel set himself to solve. The problem will be to show how, on the basis of Hegel's basic metaphysical position, this opposition was to be resolved through the conjunction of epistemology with ontology and the development of a metaphysical rationalism.
CHAPTER 2
FROM THOUGHT AND BEING TO SUBJECT AND OBJECT

a. The Problem from the point of View of this Thesis:

In the Introduction it was stated that our inquiry into the Phenomenology of Spirit will be guided by a consideration of the problem of subject and object. So far we have not learned a great deal from such a statement for it has not yet been explained just what this problem is or why it is a problem. We know already that the problem was not unique with Hegel but first developed in its specific form in Kant and then became a pervasive theme of post-Kantian philosophy. However, it is equally true that, in a larger sense, the problem did not originate with Kant. It has appeared under different guises at different times and "subject - object" is only one of the later formulations of it. Perhaps like most philosophical problems this one can be traced back to an origin in Classical Greek philosophy. Certainly Hegel's semi-historical analysis in the Phenomenology reflects the existence of the problem in the entire history of conscious attitudes toward the world. Indeed, to a certain extent the Phenomenology appears as a history of the ways in which the human consciousness has attempted to overcome the fundamental ontological and existential difficulties created by it. It is therefore prudent to attempt to lay out at the beginning a brief analysis of the philosophical development of the problem if we are to understand its significance, its treatment and its solution in the Hegelian system of thought. It is perhaps not too
much to say, in the true Hegelian spirit, that the history or genesis of the concept is an essential part of the concept itself.

Certainly in modern philosophy - that period of philosophical speculation originating with Descartes and continuing to the present\(^1\) - we will find that the formulation of the problem first appeared in a correlative construction as the distinction between thought and being. In fact, this may be taken to be the basic formulation of the problem from which others are merely derivative or of which they are merely reinterpretations. Hegel certainly designates this duality as a basic philosophical problem for modern philosophy. In the opening of his discussion on this period Hegel says: "This highest severance is the opposition between thought and Being, the comprehending of whose unity from this time forward constitutes the interest of all philosophies".\(^2\) On the other hand it may be fairer to say that the different formulations are merely different definitions of the same problem - just as Hegel terms the various Logical categories different "definitions of God".\(^3\)

Before we can go further in understanding Hegel's treatment of the problem of subject and object, it is necessary to recognize his unusually broad use of the terms "subject" and "object". "Subject" and "object" are not clearly defined terms in Hegelian usage and it can be particularly confusing if we bring into our reading of Hegel a substantially delimited notion of the meanings of these terms. For Hegel they have very broad applications and meanings relative to the context in which they are used. Since the Phenomenology shows an evolution of consciousness in its attitudes and relations to its world, that which is denoted by the term "subject" is relative to the Gestalt or form of consciousness under examination at any given time. That the meanings of key words such as this should be seen as relative and capable of change may be anathema
to many philosophical minds - particularly those of the present day. In fact, Hegel is merely reaffirming the relativity of some of our concepts long before recognized by Plato; furthermore, he has built this relativity into his system as integral and necessary rather than excluding it from ultimate truth as Plato did. Plato recognized that the ordinary meanings of some words were relative - for example, the word "large": that which is large compared to A may be small compared to C, or neither large nor small relative to B. Hegel takes the terms "subject" and "object" to be among these relative terms in a similar, though not identical way. Hegel so uses the term "subjective" that at one level A may be subjective when considered relative to B - as when A has its principle of movement internal to or intrinsic in itself, whereas B is moved only externally. A, for example, may be a living organism such as a plant while B may be a non-living thing subject to mechanical law, such as a stone or a billiard ball. At a different level of examination this A may be seen as an object compared to or even for the subject C - such as when the plant organism is seen to have its principle of development in the species and therefore external to it qua individual; whereas conscious animal life is goal directed and motivated and hence is determined from within.

There are also obvious parallels with Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality, and this is perhaps not purely fortuitous since Hegel's analysis of Aristotle's distinction of substances into kinds echoes Hegel's own distinction of subject and object into kinds - depending upon the nature and source of the subject's activity. For Hegel, subjectivity is to some extent a function of the degree of inwardness or freedom which a thing has. The more its activity is determined from within the thing itself, the more free it is, the higher degree of subjectivity it contains. In one sense
pure freedom is pure subjectivity; but this is not the highest form of the actual for Hegel. According to him such abstract freedom goes beyond what is actual into the purely ideal. Just as Hegel describes Aristotle's highest form of substance as "...that in which potentiality, activity and actuality are united..."; so too is the highest form of actuality for Hegel that in which objectivity, activity, and subjectivity are united. Pure freedom and pure subjectivity are only realized by driving out objectivity - with the result that freedom is not grounded objectively in the world but retreats into capriciousness. True freedom is that which is grounded in the objective. We might find many examples of this sentiment in Hegel's works, the following is only one of these many possibilities:

To think is in fact ipso facto to be free, for thought as the action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to self, where, being at home with ourselves, an as regards our subjectivity, utterly blank, our consciousness is, in the matter of its contents, only in the fact and its characteristics...thought is only true in proportion as it sinks itself in the facts; and in point of form it is no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities are liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is identical with all individuals.

This freedom or subjectivity is the "relating of self to self"; in other words, it is self-consciousness. In the Phenomenology the freedom realized by Self-Consciousness is freedom from the concrete and it involves the realization of the self-sufficiency of thought. But this attitude, Hegel shows, can only be hypocritical because thought is essentially connected to the concrete such that, as we shall see, in the Stoical consciousness,

This thinking consciousness, having determined itself as abstract freedom,
is thus only the incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence only in itself it has not accomplished the absolute negation of existence. The content is indeed valued by it only as thought, however, it is nevertheless at the same time held by it to be determinateness as such. 11

In the Phenomenology Hegel conjoins the notion of universality with those of subjectivity, thought and self-consciousness. Thought is of the universal and therefore the determinate or the particular (e.g. determinate thought rather than thought as such, as in the above citation) is relatively objective with respect to the universal of subjectivity. 12

There is a relatedness bordering on equivalency between the Hegelian concepts of subjectivity = freedom = self-consciousness = thought = universal which pervades his thought. It manifests itself in such a way that he often develops parallel constructions in his works. The Logic ends with the Idea as the unity of "objective logic" with "subjective logic". The Phenomenology has its division in Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason. Consciousness begins "before thought" and is therefore focused on the particular and hence the objective, whereas Self-Consciousness ends with pure thought and is therefore concentrated on the essentiality of the universal and hence the subjective. Reason is the unification of the two into the subject-object and the concrete universal. Again, to mention briefly the Philosophy of Mind, it is divided into Subjective Mind, Objective Mind, and Absolute Mind as the unity of the two.

Since the use of these terms is relative in the way described, we will find that when, for example, we are examining the section of the Phenomenology which Hegel entitled "Consciousness" and which represents the attitude of "objectivity", there will be found within this attitude an emphasis or orienta-
tion which can be described as "relative objectivity" and "relative subjectivity". This explains how in the History of Philosophy there can be "objectivity" as a mode or characteristic of philosophy along with "subjectivity". One might not expect this since philosophy is, after all, concerned with thoughts and the thinking conception of things and is therefore concerned with universals and the subjective. Also, Hegel thought of philosophy itself as the "...self-conscious awareness of consciousness itself..." in Cassirer's words, and, he continues, it "...reflects - as the proper focus of the period - the entire manifold of the age". So the history of philosophy ought to be the history of self-consciousness and therefore purely of subjectivity. There is some force to such an argument and the position put forth herein will be weakened to that extent. Since the position would be indefensible (if not absurd) if put forth as a strong position, such observations should not make a great deal of difference. The main point is to emphasize that thought, in Hegel's opinion, can be principally directed toward or related to either things (reality; objectivity) or the essence of thought itself (subjectivity). It is this weaker distinction which marks off the difference between conscious and self-conscious (i.e. objective and subjective) philosophy.

Because many of Hegel's works have more or less parallel structures, it is possible to draw comparisons between them. Thus, we might say that with Descartes the pairing of the concepts "thought" and "being" is the first formulation of the subject-object dichotomy which was truly Reasonable, in the sense of Reason of the Phenomenology as the unity of subject and object. Were we to attempt to further relate the Phenomenology to the History of Philosophy we might see Aristotle's substance-accident distinction or Plato's problem of the one and the many as the origin of the Conscious, and therefore
"objective" phase of philosophy. Scholastic-Christian philosophy on the other hand might be parallel to the stage of Self-Consciousness because it represents the assertion of the independence of thought and a subsequent retreat into subjectivity. With Descartes' thought - being identity we might think that we are still in the realm of Self-consciousness and are therefore in the realm of the (relatively) subjective. In fact this is largely true. It is still Self-conscious because it is not the content (i.e. the object) but rather the awareness in the "I think, therefore I am" that certifies the certainty of the "I am". Cartesianism, therefore, remains within thought, but in this thought the identity of the subjective or self-conscious principle of thought with the objectivity of being is becoming apparent. It is therefore the embryonic or immediate stage of the unification through Reason of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, or of object and subject. This immediate stage of Reason will itself mature by entering into various philosophical attitudes toward the world. Eventually, the Cartesian thought - being dichotomy will give way to Kant's subject - object distinction and when this occurs, we find the beginning of the truly mediated Reasonable phase in which subject and object are known to be inseparably united and reciprocally determining. It is Hegel who represents the culmination of this highest phase of unity.

We may note, before looking closely at this Hegelian history of philosophy, that the set of concepts "thought" and "being" becomes very complex because the relation and opposition between them can be seen to occur at several levels. The difficulty is not least confused by the tendency (generally unintentional) to merge epistemological problems with ontological ones. The question "how is thought related to being?" is a question asking both how is knowledge acquired and what reality status does the object of knowledge have. Hegel's approach,
we will discover, was to develop a theory of knowledge which was (consciously) at once a theory of knowledge and a theory of the real; i.e. it was an epistemological ontology.

Because the relation between thought and being has its reflection in other concepts, what amount to several different formulations of this basic dichotomy can be given. We may find subject asserted against object, particular against universal, mind against matter, God against man, God against nature, man against nature, man against mankind, and so on.\(^{17}\) All of these have their role to play in Hegel's thought for they all express, with different connotations and emphases, the same basic duality which requires mediating.\(^{18}\) Most modern studies on Hegel - including that of Niel specifically on mediation - have emphasized the dualism as expressed in the man - God and/or man - mankind opposition. These emphases unquestionably point out concerns of immense importance to Hegel, and they have justly been the subject of a great deal of work. Herein, however, the focus will be on the opposition in its expression as subject and object in its most basic form. In the case of the Phenomenology, the work of primary interest herein, this opposition has a concomitant duality in the relation between the particular and the universal. This focus therefore has the virtue and significance of grasping at what was for Hegel the heart of philosophy itself.

That the concepts of "particular" and "universal" are fundamental to Hegel's analysis is a fact of which he informs us; for instance, on the very first page of the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel tells us that "...philosophy has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it...."\(^{19}\) This emphasis therefore leaves the examination in the arena of traditional metaphysical and epistemological study;
it is this more traditional orientation which will select and determine the route to be taken through the Phenomenology. We will therefore be less concerned with questions like "what is the relation between man and God?" and more concerned with questions like "what is the relation between reason and experience or between knowledge and the real?" There is, of course, no clear line which sets off one set of problems from the other - especially since Hegel's thought was synthetic and his philosophy systematic resulting in the interdetermination of one problem with another. For example, the problem of man and God involves the problem of the finite and the infinite. But this last is also a question which is ultimately encountered in considering the relation of, for example, Understanding and Reason.

The basic opposition does not merely disguise several others, the nature of the opposition can itself become very complex. For example, the opposition can be given within the notion of thought itself - as when thought is made identical with being. The divided unity which results may again be set off against external being (material objects). In such a manner a double opposition may in effect be derived. The problem of the Phenomenology will be found to reside in determining which side of the opposition has ultimate claim to being the essence of the real. If the object is asserted to be that which is essential in reality, then the subject will be taken to be inessential and vise-versa. If the opposition of thought and being is given within thought (as one finds, for example, in subjective idealism and epistemological rationalism), then external being must be considered to be something inessential in experience. The problem for this position is to determine how to eliminate convincingly an element that seems to be an integral part of experience. If thought, as subjective, is set off against external being, as objective (a posi-
tion often characteristic of traditional realism), then both sides must be essential and the problem is how to bring them together. If external being is taken to be the essential element of the real, relegating thought or mind to, at best, an inessential epiphenomenon (as in materialism), then the problem is to account for the subjective aspect of experience which persists as an apparently irreducible element of experience. We may call this the problem of the essential and the inessential and it is this problem which forms the structural or methodological base for the Phenomenology.

The problem as Hegel saw it was to develop a systematic conceptual framework in which that which is true in each of the alternative theories is preserved while at the same time managing to overcome both their one-sidedness and their tendency to be mutually exclusive.

It is important to remember that Hegel wanted to account for experience as it is and as it is known to be. In this respect he is very much more empirical than is generally assumed. In Hegel's mind the two sides of experience - the subjective and the objective - were both irreducible elements of experience. Any complete and systematic philosophy must recognize this truth and account for it; any theory which does not do so is untrue to the facts of experience. The Phenomenology of Spirit is the "First Part of the System of Science" in so far as it establishes the mutual essentiality of the two sides - their opposition and their unity. In other words, it is the Science which purports to demonstrate the truth and the integrity of experience.

How was this to take place? The difficulty was to find a point of departure for philosophy which did not prejudice the outcome of the issue. We have, as noted already, three options. First, one may assert thought to be the fundamental fact or essential to which the other, being, stands as derived
or inessential. Second, one may start with being as the essentially real and the subject or thinker as the derived inessential element. These are the two primary options of modern philosophy, as Hegel tells us:

Spirit and nature, thought and Being, are the two infinite sides of the Idea, which can for the first time truly make its appearance when its sides are grasped for themselves in their abstraction and totality. Plato comprehended it as the bond, as limiting and as infinite, as one and many, simple and diverse, but not as thought and Being; when we first thinkingly overcome this opposition it signifies comprehending the unity. This is the standpoint of philosophic consciousness generally; but the way in which this unity must be thinkingly developed is a double one. Philosophy hence falls into the two main forms in which the opposition is resolved, into a realistic and an idealistic system of philosophy; i.e. into one which makes objectivity and the content of thought to arise from the perceptions, and one which proceeds to truth from the independence of thought.23

These two options have characterized modern philosophy and have been the subject of all attempts to overcome the duality. Even for Hegel they are never to be completely superseded. Spinoza to a certain extent pointed a way to a third alternative, and Kant came even closer to expounding one. However, according to Hegel, even Kant remained a subjective idealist. In Hegel's view philosophy must reach his own conception - that of "absolute Idealism" - if it is to be both certain and true. For Hegel this idea conveys the uniting of the two conceptions of subject and object and of ideal and real without one side being inessential to the realization of their unity.

The third alternative is, then, to steer a course somewhere in between the other two. Hegel is to accomplish this by starting with neither side as primary and by developing the essentiality of the two claims from a point of unity. It is this last option that Fichte, and more especially Schelling, first tried to develop; it is a variation on their attempts which Hegel argues for. From this position Hegel attempts to demonstrate how the actual opposi-
tions which obtain between the two terms can be mediated and thereby be brought into unity without eliminating them as opposites and thereby sinking into Schelling's indifferent identity.

In his attempt, Hegel rejected the notion of truth as immediate, as feeling, as intuition or as genius and re-asserted instead the necessity of rationality in truth. In this sense Hegel represented a return to an earlier way of thinking. But his was not merely a return, he synthesized Enlightenment rationalism with Romantic dynamism and unity. He therefore made concrete the abstract rationalism of the Enlightenment and gave it the motility of Romantic development. It is this synthesis which explains and gives meaning to Hegel's many statements to the effect that..."if we unite the Concept of the concrete with that of development we have the motion of the concrete". It is this Concept in its concreteness, developing through its own internal motility, which unites the universal with the particular and the subject with the object.


Before considering Descartes and our history of philosophy in general, it will help to consider first the general organization of Hegel's works. This will give us a clue to the proper interpretation of his System.

It is generally observed by those who read Hegel that his works are marked by a plan which divides the subject matter into three parts. Furthermore, each part is itself, generally, divided into three parts and these again, and yet again, are often divided into three parts. This is frequently interpreted to indicate a rigid scheme commonly described in the form of a dialectic of Thesis - Antithesis - Synthesis. This tripartite division is often adduced as evidence of Hegel's forcing a rigid, devised schema upon an unsuspecting
and hostile content. It is true that this triplicity is often - most often - found in Hegel's works, but there is no evidence that it has any connection with a schematic dialectic. In order to make a strong case for that contention one would have to ignore the fact that Hegel's few mentions of Thesis - Antithesis - Synthesis are generally hostile to such a "lifeless schema" and that in a number of cases this triplicity is not be be found. However, the predominance of such triplicities suggests that they are of rather more importance than merely "...a decided preference for triadic arrangements" as one commentator has suggested.26

One might note in the first place that though the division into threes is the most common formal device which Hegel uses, it is assuredly not the only one. There can also be found divisions into four, and sometimes more than four, sections. So it can immediately be seen that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with any universal, hard-and-fast rule about these divisions. But there would seem to be some significance to them and the significance derives from the main problem with which Hegel is grappling in his philosophy. That is the problem of subject and object. This problem, because of the way Hegel handles it, tends naturally to fall into three divisions - although a division into four can be accounted for as well because there is no formal necessity causing these divisions. Rather, the dialectic is, as Kaufmann says, "...at most a method of exposition...not a method of discovery",27 and it is in and because of this exposition in terms of rational development that the arrangement of the content is produced. Whether the triplicity was therefore fully intentional and conscious to Hegel is not crucial to this interpretation. What is important is that the problem of subject and object, and its solution, lends itself to this kind of division. We will
therefore find many works, sections of works, sub-sections of works, and so on, which have this form. By seeing this, and by seeing why this formal structure is natural (but not necessary) to the content, it will be easier to see what Hegel is doing in various works - and particularly in the Phenomenology, which is our primary concern here.

Why does the subject - object character of metaphysics and epistemology assume this tripartite form? Hegel's solution to dichotomies was, as we have noted, accomplished through the notion of mediation. Because of this, the Hegelian explanation is developed something on the lines of the following: In order for there to be mediation there has to be something to mediate. So let U represent the unity of a duality with two sides A and B. Now, if U is merely asserted to be the truth of A and B (that is, if A and B are only made rationally consistent by being brought together in U), then we may say that A and B are given immediately - This follows because A and B are, ex hypothesi, only known for what they truly or actually are when they are known in their unification (i.e. when they are known as U). But if the unity of A and B (U) is not demonstrated or proved to be true but only immediately given (asserted to be the case), then, since U is the truth of A and B, A and B are also immediately given. Their truth is given in what is given immediately (U) and outside of the immediate they have no truth. So the only ground for A and B is an assurance that U is - and therefore that A and B are. But, "One barren assurance, however, is of just as much value as another".

If, on the other hand, A and B are shown to be actual and to be distinct, then, unless they are shown to be mutually determinate, U will be externally imposed upon them and hence again immediately given. In this case we will have the mere assurance of U as externally imposed, and we will have the
opposite, the distinction of A and B, as a fact. Here that which is asserted contradicts what is factually given. In the face of this contradiction we can choose to believe what we are told, but its truth cannot be demonstrated; we can have faith, but not knowledge.

According to Hegel, U can only be shown to be the truth of a distinct A and a distinct B if A and B reciprocally determine each other. If B is necessary to the being of A and A is necessary to the being of B, then A and B are both necessary for each other. They are, in this case, intrinsically related and the unity of the two is not something different from A and B themselves. Because one is only because of the other, the truth of each is determined through the other. If, however, there is nothing which stands between A and B, call it C, then A and B would be related immediately and B would become identical to A because immediately determined by A (and vice versa); they would therefore lose their distinction and merge into an indifferent identity. This was Schelling's conclusion. Fichte avoided it, as we shall see, by making B a result of A's act of positing B. Since that act of positing B is part of A's nature, part of the logic of A, A and B in effect become eternally opposed and never united (because it is in the nature of A to always posit B opposed to it). There is in effect, for Fichte, distinction but no true unity.

Hegel took up a similar position but interposed C between A and B. A is thereby determined by B through C and B is likewise determined by A through C. The relation is therefore mediate and A and B remain distinct while being united. This is what Hegel means by mediation and this is why Hegel's is a philosophy of mediation. More will be said about this in a later chapter, but here we may take note of one of Hegel's characterizations of the notion of
mediation. In the Phenomenology he tells us that

a relation is mediate when the terms of the relation are not one and the same but are an other for an other and are one only in a third. The immediate relation however signifies in fact nothing other than unity. 31

It is obvious that if the synthesis of the two sides is to be demonstrated as mediated and therefore as actual, each side must show itself to contain its own truth, but it is a truth which is incomplete unless partly determined by the other. When this is fully expressed in both sides, it is possible to show that the truth resides in the position in which each side is essential to the truth of the other and each is essential to the whole and can only be known in the context of the whole. 32

This is the paradigm of the structure of the Phenomenology as well as other works of Hegel. Each side, subject and object, must come forth individually and be investigated for self-sufficiency and truth. The third stage shows in some way their mediation or unification - with perhaps a fourth or fifth stage making this mediated unity explicit. This position is clearly seen in the following:

The concrete is the unity of diverse determinations and principles; these, in order to be perfected, in order to come definitely before the consciousness, must first of all be presented separately. Thereby they of course acquire an aspect of one-sidedness in comparison with the higher principle which follows: this, nevertheless, does not annihilate them, nor even leave them where they were, but takes up into itself as moments. 33

It is only by testing the truth which each side claims for itself as an independent existing reality or total essential being that the ultimate or absolute truth can be demonstrated as both certain and true. That it is true that A and B can only be when mediately united will have then been given
through demonstration and the resulting truth will be absolute and not relative to any immediate assurances which might otherwise ground it.

The ultimate solution which Hegel evolved was that of the concept of Spirit and Spirit is precisely the express unification of subject with object. "True Spirit", he related at one point in the Phenomenology, "is the unity of absolute separation, and indeed it comes, even through the free actuality of these self-less extremes, to be the middle ground of existence". The unification of subject with object is actually accomplished in what Hegel calls the attitude of Reason. We will find that this unification, and its two sides, pervades all of Hegel's works - though not always overtly as subject and object. It can also take the form, as in the Logic, of Being and Essence unified in the Concept and completed with the Idea. In the Phenomenology it takes the form of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness unified by Reason and worked out in Spirit. In the History of Philosophy it takes the form of Ancient Philosophy and Christian-Medieval Philosophy unified in Modern Philosophy. In each of these the undercurrent is subject and object and their unity. The Logic, for example, ends with the completion of the Concept in the Realized End described as "...the overt unity of subjective and objective". Being a Logical Concept, it is necessary to make concrete this unification in the Concept. This, in the Logic is achieved in the Idea which, we are told, must itself (because it is relatively subjective) go forth in objective, concrete form as nature. The Idea, as the fourth stage of the Logic, is the working out of the truth realized by Reason. In the Logic we find that

The Idea is truth in itself and for itself, - the absolute unity of the concept and objectivity. Its 'ideal' content is nothing but the concept in its detailed terms; its 'real' content is only the exhibition which the concept gives itself in the form of external existence, whilst yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it.
Spirit in the Phenomenology is parallel to Idea in the Logic; that is, it completes the synthesis achieved by Reason - the third division:

Spirit is thereby the self-supporting absolutely real essential being. All previous forms of consciousness are abstractions from it. They are this, that Spirit analyzes itself, distinguishes its moments and lingers at each individual. The isolating of such moments has Spirit for its presupposition and subsistence, or they exist only in that which is Existence. Taken in isolation they have the appearance as if they were as such, however they are only moments or vanishing quantities in their advance and return upon their ground and their essence, and this essence is just this movement and resolution of these moments. Here, where Spirit or Reflection is posited in itself, may our reflection briefly recall them in this connection: they were consciousness, self-consciousness and reason.37

The section in the Phenomenology on Spirit is the working out of the truth, the mediated unity of subject and object, of Reason. What we are interested in is its achievement in Reason.

In the History of Philosophy, which shows a structure parallel in its fundamental organization to that of the Phenomenology and the Logic, we may find in philosophy a basic dichotomy analogous to the Phenomenological stages of Consciousness (parallel to objective philosophy) and Self-Consciousness (parallel to subjective philosophy). Descartes represents the original unity of the two and so, in the Hegelian history of philosophy, it is with him that philosophy first becomes Reasonable.

c. The Cartesian Beginning: Rationality in its Immediacy.

Descartes, we have said, is the founder of Modern Philosophy - or at least its first crucial figure. He represents the immediate achievement, in philosophy, of the unity of consciousness with self-consciousness, of objective philosophy with subjective philosophy. Within this "rational" consciousness the claims of subjective and objective have yet to manifest them-
selves overtly. In the process of making explicit what lies implicitly in
their unity they will break apart from one another again, but this time self-
consciously, i.e. with the recognition of the need to account for the claims
of the other. With Hegel we find the final achievement of this unity. It
can be seen, then, that within Modern philosophy itself is contained over
again the same struggle which the whole philosophical consciousness had to go
through in the development from Ancient to Medieval to Modern philosophy. 38

Hegel interprets the history of philosophy in terms of his own concerns
and according to the way he conceives the possible resolutions to these con-
cerns. So according to him philosophy previous to Descartes, when concerned
with the question "where is essential being to be found", thought that the
answer would be generated either from the other or from the self. This
orientation, he thought, serves to mark off one stage of philosophical con-
sciousness from another - in one case the attitude is typified by Aristotelian
substance and accident, and form and matter; in the other case it is found
as the Scholastic transcendent God. In both of these phases, although the
notion of thought and being is implicit in the philosophical consciousness,
it is only when thought both becomes the principle of philosophy and asserts
itself as being, that the split between the two sides can truly manifest itself
to consciousness. At that point, with Descartes, Consciousness becomes sub-
jectively certain of itself as being but still opposed to the existence which
confronts it as its other. Ancient philosophy found that the object demanded
explanation: how could things be both one and many at the same time? The
question for the ancients took the form of asking about the object: Plato
needed to explain the shadows on the cave wall; Aristotle asked about being
in general and answered, not in terms of thought or subject, but in terms of
substance and object. The universal was arrived at through the particular: we are able to come to know tableness because we see tables. True, we do find a concept of God in Plato and Aristotle and to that extent they share the same notion of an ultimate "subject" with the philosophy of the Christian era (as indeed with much of modern philosophy as well). At best, however, this was the notion of a demiurge as a creator and arranger of things. This is far from the conception of the Christian God as a saviour of souls. The Christian conception of God is a turning inward to the self in Hegel's view. Admittedly Aquinas' writings on Being and Essence, to name just one example, exemplify Aristotelian concerns with being, but the basic Christian consciousness, Hegel believes, and with some justification, is directed toward the subjective—toward the finite human soul and its relation to the infinite God. If the distinction between ancient and medieval philosophy has any justification or factual basis at all, then it surely must lie at least partly in the orientation of the consciousness of the time—toward being and the objective on the one hand and toward mind or soul and the subjective on the other hand.

The following citation indicates Hegel's view of the ancients as first being oriented objectively. It also points up something else already emphasized: because of the relativity of the terms, all of these different attitudes—the objective, the subjective and the Reasonable—can be found in all phases of consciousness; none of them is unique to any stage. What each represents is a basic attitude which tends to look toward one side rather than the other. They all have the same basic oppositions within them, the difference is in the way they manifest this opposition. As an analogous situation consider Plato's Republic. In the republic the division of the classes of the society is said by Plato to be a reflection of the division of the four cardinal
virtues which he has made. However, that does not mean that because the warrior class exemplifies courage they are devoid of wisdom, temperance, or justice. In the Republic each social class is an exemplification of the predominance of one of the virtues and in the Phenomenology each stage of consciousness is the exemplification of one of the possible general attitudes which it can take toward the world.

The Greek Philosophy is free from restraint because it does not yet have regard to the opposition between Being and Thought, but proceeds from the unconscious presupposition that Thought is also Being. Certainly certain stages in the Greek Philosophy are laid hold of which seem to stand on the same platform as the Christian philosophies. Thus when we see, for instance, in the Philosophy of the Sophists, the Academics, and the Sceptics, that they maintain the doctrine that the truth is not capable of being known, they might appear to accord with the later subjective philosophies in asserting that all thought-determinations were only subjective in character, and that hence from these no conclusions could be arrived at as regards what is objective. But there is a difference. In the case of ancient philosophies, which said that we know only the phenomenal, everything is confined to that....

The ancients...have perfect satisfaction and rest in the certitude that only that which appears is for Knowledge. Thus it is necessary in this respect to keep strictly to the point of view from which we start, else through the similarity of the results, we come to see in that old philosophy all the determinate character of modern subjectivity. Since in the simplicity of ancient philosophy the phenomenal was itself the only sphere, doubts as to objective thought were not present to it.39

Scholastic-Christian philosophy, contrary to the Ancients, began with the Logos, the subjective principle, and exalted it to the Absolute. This infinite subject was related to finite individuality and the external world was not a matter of concern for this consciousness. It is characteristic of the self-conscious or subjective stage to be characterized by the relation of reciprocity between the two elements. In the case of self-consciousness, however, the two elements are themselves found within the subjective, and the world in the form of an external other is left out of account.
With this interpretation it would seem that Hegel is, perhaps unconsciously, emphasizing the medieval philosophy of the Christian mystics. It is in the mystics that one finds especially the explicit attempt to transcend the world and to denigrate the finite in favour of an indescribable infinite (or at best an infinite describable only through negative predicates). This emphasis on the mystical side (whether done consciously or unconsciously) is perhaps partly understandable since the mystical Christian philosophers were, by and large, German thinkers, so it is entirely possible that there was a residual effect of some sort, or an influence from this tradition which was not entirely obvious. But this cannot be the entire answer. It is true that the mystical philosophers represented more clearly than many others, such as Aquinas, the consciousness of transcendence and separation from the world, but this was also the undercurrent of thought for scholasticism in general and Hegel might better be appreciated than criticized for recognizing this. So though Hegel may have been stretching a point, it is perhaps quite justifiable in terms of his purposes. One recent philosopher has restated this general argument in the following concise way:

In its ultimate foundations, such an orientation of 'mystical' theology might seem to conflict with Scholasticism; but, in fact, this conflict itself forms one of the characteristic features of the whole intellectual physiognomy of Scholasticism itself.40

In Scholastic-Christian philosophy the concern was with the relation between the two subjective aspects of man and God, and the world was something to transcend and to be rid of if possible. We find that

In this scholastic activity thought pursues its work quite apart from all regard to experience; we no longer hear anything of taking up actuality and determining it through thought. Although the Concept came into recognition earlier than this, in Aristotle, in the first place, the Concept was not apprehended as the necessity of carrying the content further; for this was received in its successive manifestations,
and there was present merely an intermingling of actuality accepted as
truth and of thought. Still less, in the second place, was the greater
part of the content permeated by Concepts, for this content was taken
up superficially into the form of thought - more especially with the
Stoics and Epicureans. The scholastic philosophy altogether dissociates
itself from any such endeavours; it leaves actuality to exist alongside
itself as if it were despised and had no interest. For reason found
its true existence, its actualization, in another world and not in this;
the whole progress of the cultivated world goes, however, to the re-
instalment of a faith in the present world.41

When this self-conscious, subjective philosophy reaches the point where it
can no longer hold the opposites within it together - except by authority and
commandment - then the way is prepared for the abandonment of this one-sided
subjectivity and the re-assertion of the principle of consciousness; subjective
and objective must take equal roles in the determination of the conscious
world.

Any clear cut divisions between ancient, medieval and modern philosophy
are impossible to make. Therefore, it may well be that the awakening of the
consciousness we are characterizing as "Reasonable" and as "Modern" may have
first found expression in the Renaissance. Cassirer suggests that the be-
inning is to be found as early as Nicholas Cusanus. For example, he says
that "Cusanus played an important role in the re-awakening of objectivity
and in the deepening of subjectivity".42 But even given this Cassirer still
places the beginning of the subject - object problem (and hence, according
to the present analysis, the beginning of modern philosophy), not in the
Renaissance, but with Descartes. Cassirer says that

The relationship of the Renaissance to the Middle Ages and to antiquity
has two sides and two meanings; and nowhere does this duality show
itself more clearly than in the Renaissance position on the problem of
self-consciousness. All the intellectual currents that nourish the
Renaissance flow into this central problem. But now, new systematic
questions suddenly emerge from the manifold and contradictory historical
conditions. The conscious formulation of these questions is, of course, one of the latest products of Renaissance philosophy, first attained by Descartes. Descartes discovered and defined the new 'Archimedian' point from which the conceptual world of Scholastic philosophy could be raised out of its hinges. And thus we date the beginning of modern philosophy from Descartes' principle of the Cogito.43

So it would seem that having reached the first conception of Reason and the equal essentiality of both subject and object that we have arrived at the historical point of the advent of Descartes.

With Descartes, then, we find the first significant attempt to become, philosophically, a rational self-consciousness. That is why, with him, the beginning is achieved in which the awareness of the thinking principle is made repositor of truth and reality. In the Cartesian beginning this awareness arises as an immediate certainty: "I think, therefore I am" gives indubitable proof that thought itself has claim to ontological status. I am a thinking thing. This statement sums up the primary knowledge with which rational philosophy may begin. Descartes has not departed from the principle of self-consciousness and, strictly speaking, he has not left Scholastic Philosophy. What he has done is to bring together into one consciousness the principle of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy; i.e. he has identified thought with being. The change from Christian Philosophy to the Cartesian Modern Philosophy is discussed by Hegel in the following way:

The first principle of that Philosophy which has taken its place in Christendom is thus found in the existence of two totalities. This is a reduplication of substance which now, however, is characterized by the fact that the two totalities are no longer external to one another, but are clearly both required through their relation to one another. If formerly Stoicism and Epicureanism, whose negativity was Scepticism, came forth as independent, and if finally the implicitness existent universality of both was established, these moments are now known as separate totalities, and yet in their opposition they have to be thought of as one.
We have here the true speculative Idea, the Concept in its determinations, each of which is brought into a totality and clearly relates to the other. We thus have really two Ideas, the subjective Idea as knowledge, and then the substantial and concrete Idea; and the development and perfection of this principle and its coming to the consciousness of Thought, is the subject treated by modern Philosophy. Thus the determinations are in it more concrete than with the ancients. This opposition in which the two sides culminate, grasped in its widest significance, is the opposition between Thought and Being, individuality and substance, so that in the subject himself his freedom stands between subject and object, and between Nature and Mind, in so far as this last as finite stands in opposition to Nature.44

We have in Descartes, then, the first awakening of Reason within Self-Consciousness. It therefore comprehends the subject-object unity within it. But since it has only arisen newly born out of the Scholastic age its comprehension of the subject-object unity is not fully conscious to it, and so it first asserts its new formula still imbued with the claims of a one-sided self-conscious subjectivity.

Because the knowledge gained by Descartes is immediate, it has effectively dropped the other side, external being, and reduced it to inessentiality. Now, rather than trying to make experience consistent by re-thinking its object, experience was to correct itself through clear and distinct thinking. Thought was to be the arbiter of truth and it would determine the ontological status of the object! Now we find a philosopher saying: "...it seems to me that it is mind alone, and not mind and body in conjunction, that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth in regard to [natural] things".45 The importance of this observation is less that it comes down on the subjective side than that it recognizes the need to account for both sides. This is the beginning of True Self-Consciousness or Reason. Rational philosophy, in its infancy and its immediacy, cannot yet ask itself if certainty is identical with truth; it takes it to be truth without question. Eventually it must find the answer
to this implicit question through its own attempts to make itself consistent.

Descartes, then, made thought the primary starting point and asserted its immediate unity with being: "I think, therefore I am" is the claim that knowledge of the immediate identity of thought and being is absolutely certain and therefore true. Because it is immediate, however, it again errs by being one-sided. Given such a starting point it is impossible to extricate being from the realm of thought - or rather it becomes, in essence, thought-dependent. Clearly more is involved in being than merely "I am", and the difficulty for Descartes is to get from this subjectivity to the realm of the being of objectivity - of the external other.

For Descartes thought and being are united in thought, together they are the essential elements of reality, but they in turn, as a unit, become opposed to the being which opposes subjectivity, i.e. to external being. Descartes recognizes a basic truth - that thought and being are inseparable, but he does not recognize their equal claim to truth. Being is not only united with thought - it is also the negation of thought, it is thought's other. Because this is not recognized or allowed for in this epistemological rationalism, there is no acceptable means, given the starting point, by which Descartes can achieve their mediation. This criticism is given by Hegel in the following manner:

Certainty with him [i.e. Descartes] takes the first place; from it no content is deduced of necessity, no content generally, and still less its objectivity as distinguished from the inward subjectivity of the 'I'. At one time we have the opposition of subjective knowledge and actuality, and at another their inseparable union. In the first case the necessity of mediating them enters in, and the truth of God is asserted to be this mediating power...Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has not the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness: but simple Being, set forth as the negative of self-consciousness is extension...Descartes does not trace extension in a true method back to thought; matter, extended substances, stand over against the thinking substances....
When being is known only through thought and thought serves to validate any claim to being, then external being is reduced to inessentiality as opposed to the essentiality of thought and it is distinguished absolutely from thought. In order to join the two spheres Descartes' only recourse was to God (not that he necessarily saw this as a weakness himself). In this Hegel does not find objection as such - particularly since, by these later works especially, he was often quite explicitly identifying his own conception of Spirit with God; but he does not accept the Cartesian conclusion because it is founded upon a conception of the absolute difference and separation of the two sides. Therefore, they could only be united or mediated externally and not in themselves. At the end of his discussion of Descartes in this work we find Hegel's criticism:

Descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in contra-distinction to matter, and on it based the independent subsistence of mind; for in his cogito 'I' is at first only certain of itself, since I can abstract from all. Now we find the necessity of a mediator to bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual. Descartes settles this by placing between the two what constitutes the metaphysical ground of their mutual changes, God. He is the intermediate bond of union, in as far as He affords assistance to the soul in what it cannot through its own freedom accomplish, so that the changes in body and soul may correspond with one another....Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of the conception: as long as I think rightly and consistently, something real corresponds to my thought, and the connecting link is God. God is hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites, since He is, as Idea, the unity of Notion and reality....Descartes' conclusion is quite correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect. Only the form employed by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the beginning there are two things, thought or soul and body, and that then God appears as a third thing, outside both - that He is not the Concept of Unity, nor are the two elements themselves Concept.47

Though the struggle between reason and faith was being won by reason with the advent of the Cartesian rationalism, the split which occurred in the Christian Scholastic philosophy between finite and infinite spirit was reasserted by Descartes as a split between the two finite spheres of mind and body with the
infinite brought in as a third thing to mediate them. The task of Modern Philosophy must be to bring all of these into a meaningful intrinsic union.

Descartes' beginning - not his conclusion - is the important thing for Modern Philosophy. Descartes recognized the unity and identity of thought and being, and Hegel agrees with this as a basic truth. But although Modern philosophy recognized both the consciousness of the object and the self-consciousness of the ego as thinking thing, the question concerning which is the essential element in knowledge and reality was yet to be resolved. We see, therefore, that the philosophy of Reason (the philosophy which recognizes that both sides have claims for epistemological and ontological status) must yet decide which side is the essential and which is the inessential. In effect it must itself go through its own phases of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason; in other words, it must look to the objective, the subjective, and finally the unity of the two before it can find the truth of Reason. The truth of Reason, we will discover, is the principle of Spirit, and the principle of Spirit is precisely the knowledge that all of these conflicting claims have grasped some element of the truth.\(^4\) Each side of the duality has legitimate claim to recognition, and yet their distinction as opposites is equally valid. The principle of Spirit recognizes all of these claims as valid and it is therefore the true expression of Schelling's formula of the identity of identity and non-identity. Hegel's own description of this is given clearly in the following citation from the Philosophy of Religion:

The aspects of Spirit - or Spirit in its objectivity, when it is pre-eminently known as God, and of Spirit in its subjectivity, - constitute the reality of the absolute notion or conception of God, who, as the absolute unity of these His two moments, is Absolute Spirit. The
determinate character of any one of these aspects corresponds with the other aspect; it is the all-pervading universal form in which the Idea is found, and which again constitutes one stage in the totality of its development.49

Where Descartes went wrong was in not seeing that the unity must be a total, original unity and not a unity within one side only. As long as thought is taken as originally essential, being (external being) will be inessential. But the external world will always stand out in contradiction to any attempt to reduce it to an inessential against the essentiality of thought. The other must always be either an embarrassment or an ad hoc addition to the theory, and the theory will then always remain less than convincing.

Given the situation as presented, there remain two basic approaches to the problem of the relation between thought and being. On the one hand one can try to be consistent with experience and give the objective being a realm of reality of its own in opposition to thought. After all, it impinges upon our perceptions and demands attention regardless of our efforts to ignore it. This is the position normally called realism but what Fichte and Schelling, and sometimes Hegel, called dogmatism. The result of this position is inevitably a dualism because neither side of the opposition can be explained in terms of the other or in terms of any mediating factor. Any such theory will necessarily remain incomplete since the relation between the two sides will always be either problematic or dogmatic; it will never fully conform with Reason.

On the other hand, one can choose to contradict experience and deny the ultimate reality of one side or the other. The result here will not be an irrational dualism as before; instead there will be an assertion of an (obvious) half-truth whose assurances are no better than the directly opposite
claim - neither will ever satisfy experience. Yet each of these reductions must be tried before the solution can be found. In Descartes we saw the subjective side, in Locke we will find realism and empiricism as an expression of the objective side. This position, however, ultimately gives way to the next reduction: materialism.

d. The Lockean Alternative: Empiricism.

We have seen then that for Descartes the only knowledge which is absolutely certain is knowledge of thought. The object of thought has no guarantee of its essential being outside of the warranty of thought and the subjective. But this subjective principle cannot finally hold out as valid for all experience since it cannot account for the reality of all objectivity; that is, it has reduced external being to inessentaility. Cartesian dualism is unsatisfactory not only because it is a dualism, but also because in this dualism one side, the subjective, takes the essential role.

The other alternative, that of taking the objective as essential, is the theory of empiricism. For the empiricists of e.g. the Lockean school the external other was the prius, the essential, and mind or thought was merely a tabula rasa which received impressions of sensation. Locke's famous statement of his empiricist principle is given in the first chapter of Book II of the Essay. Having disposed of the possibility of innate ideas in Book I he now goes on to give a description of the origin of ideas:

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: -How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either,
about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.50

It must be admitted that in this statement the theory does allow for the universalizing function of thought. In so far as it does, it gives legitimacy not only to the external, objective world, but also to the thought-constituted content of this reality. But it does so in an external fashion. Hegel always protests against what he calls the "external" and opposes it to what expresses the truth - the intrinsic or that which comes from within. Hegel at one point related empiricist epistemology to a corresponding philosophy or theology of revelation. The significant relation between these otherwise seemingly disparate theories is, in Hegel's view, the fact that for both knowledge has an external source and is impressed upon a blank mind from without. Empirical philosophy, he tells us, "carried to an extreme... is the doctrine of revelation in which everything is given from without."51

The Hegelian criticism of empiricism is not that it demands that particulars be an irreducible and essential part of the real, but that it attempts to deny the universal or thought-determined content of experience this same role. At the same time it re-inserts this universal element in the language and the concepts which it uses to describe the world of particulars. The problem is that the relation between the thought element and the real element of experience is merely accepted as given with no analysis as to the nature of the relation between the two elements. It is, in a word, uncritical. Hegel's criticism is clearly set out in the following passage from the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia where he is discussing empiricism at some length:
When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences, Empiricism - being in its facts limited to the finite sphere - denies the supersensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would define its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and formal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, &c; following the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and in so doing pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics - in wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical.52

According to Hegel, the Lockean kind of empiricism admits that both thought and being constitute reality but this is given purely empirically and there is no real attempt to demonstrate their mutual determination. The process of describing the various roles of sensation, reflection, etc. is passive and external to the subject matter resulting in a mere "physiology of the human understanding". In one of his early published essays Hegel has already said that "when the power of unity has disappeared from the life of man and the oppositions have lost their living relation and reciprocal action and have won independence, then arises the necessity of philosophy".53 The problem with Locke's brand of empiricism is just that it has not agonized over the real claims which each side has to be the essential constituent of reality. Therefore, any unification of the two which it achieves must be external and gratuitous. This, at least, is Hegel's position put forward in his discussion of Locke. He says that

...when thought is from the beginning concrete, when thought and the universal are synonymous with what is set before us, the question of the relation of the two which have been separated by thought is destitute of interest and incomprehensible. How does thought overcome the difficulties which itself has begotten? Here with Locke none at all have been begotten and awakened. Before the need for reconciliation can be satisfied, the pain of disunion must be excited.54
True to its empirical presuppositions this theory recognizes that thought and being are both constituent elements of truth and reality, but it fails to examine the relation between them or even to see that an examination might be necessary. It takes what is given in experience and merely analyzes it as it is.

Hegel agrees with Fichte that, taken to its logical extreme, empiricism becomes materialism. This notion no doubt came from the observation of the career of Locke's philosophy in France where his empiricism was transformed into materialism and mechanism - primarily by Holbach. This form of reductionism is the opposite of that of Cartesian rationalism and therefore it results in the same difficulty but in inverted form. Now the question is not to account for the fact of the external other, but, on the contrary, to account for the fact of mental life and of thought. So long as we are merely within the theory of empiricism we at least have the two worlds, although the relative essentiality of the two is not satisfactorily determined. Because empiricism takes the external world to be primary, when it sees the difficulty inherent in its position and tries to resolve it, it either leaves empiricism or it becomes materialism. In materialism the problem of the relation between the two sides no longer arises because one side, thought or mind, is dropped from having any essential claim to reality. Hegel explains this relation thus:

Natural plain Empiricism, though it unquestionably insists most upon sensuous perception, still allows a supersensible world or spiritual reality, whatever may be its structure and constitution, and whether derived from intellect, or from imagination, &c. So far as form goes, the facts of this super-sensible world rest on the authority of mind, in the same way as the other facts, embraced in empirical knowledge, rest on the authority of external perception. But when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent, it turns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species of fact; it denies the independence of the thinking principle and of a spiritual world which develops itself in thought. Materialism or Naturalism, therefore is the consistent and thorough-going system of Empiricism.
In the first place we may note here that this position is an example of Hegel's viewing epistemological claims, in this case empiricism, as intimately connected with ontological claims, in this case materialism. Empiricism is a position which tries to tell us something about the origin of our ideas. This origin is the object of sensation seen as an alien external reality existing independently of the knowing consciousness. When attempting to make empiricism consistent with an ontology, it confuses the origin of ideas with essential reality. It is this tendency to confuse the origin of something with its essence for which Hegel criticizes empiricism in general. He, in effect, accuses it of a version of what C. D. Broad would later characterize as the "genetic fallacy":

What is called the metaphysic of ordinary conceptions is the empiricism of Locke, which seeks to show their origin to be in consciousness, in as far as it is individual consciousness; which, when born into the world, emerges out of unconsciousness in order to acquire knowledge as sensuous consciousness. This external origin they confound with the Becoming and Concept of the matter in point. If one were to ask vaguely what is the origin and genesis of water, and the answer were to be given that it comes from the mountains or from rain, this would be a reply in the spirit of the above philosophy.57

It is because Hegel sees an intimate relation between epistemology and ontology that he will demand that the development of ontology from epistemology be a self-conscious process. This is what the Phenomenology attempts to do. In the final result Hegel hopes to convince us that rational explanation can be neither simply abstract nor simply concrete because either extreme ignores the legitimate claims of the other. Ultimately, thought and the universal must be tied to being and the particular, and experience must find its completion in thought.

If one attempts to assert the primacy of one side over another, then one
will never be able to account for the unity of experience. In the case of both Cartesian rationalism and materialist empiricism, it is impossible to get beyond the initial starting point. Beginning with thought ends with thought and beginning with matter ends with matter - or in Hegel's own words:

The sense in which, on the one hand, outer existence is made the criterion of the truth of a content is no less one-sided than when the idea, essential being, or even inner feeling is represented as indifferent to outer existence and is even held to be the more excellent the more remote it is from reality.  

According to Hegel what is wanted is to find a theory which will satisfy the claims of both thought and universality and the particularity of being. We have seen why Hegel believed the epistemologies of both rationalism and empiricism had failed and we have seen how, in his analysis, the ontology of materialism fails. Subjective idealism as an ontology is equally as one-sided and abstract as materialism. Hegel finds that even the attempt to equalize both sides can fail if it fails to recognize the truth of both sides - this failure we will find in Spinoza for one.

e. Attempts at Mediation: Spinoza and Enlightenment.

Hegel discusses Spinoza in his History of Philosophy in the same context as Descartes; indeed, he says that "Spinoza's system is that of Descartes made objective in the form of absolute truth". It is true that Spinoza is in the same rationalist tradition of Descartes, that there is an essential identification of thought with being, that God is the supreme mediator of essential dualism, and so on. However Spinoza also represents an attempt to dispose of Cartesian dualism by eliminating God as an external mediator of subject and object, or as a Third between these two. Instead, he asserts God
as the substantial unity of the two attributes. In this unity Cartesian
dualism falls away and the "One Substance" is asserted to be their truth. It
is this Spinozistic monism which prefigured and influenced the Romantic con-
ception of unity. Though Spinoza's thought long lay despised and unread, the
posthumous publication of Lessing's admission to Spinozism shocked the German
philosophical community. The result was the great Spinoza controversy which
involved some of the foremost minds in Germany at the time - notably Mendels-
sohn, Jacobi and Herder. The attention thus centered upon the philosophy of
Spinoza, coupled with an already emerging change in consciousness, combined to
make the philosophy of Spinoza a powerful force in the molding of the Romantic
vision. This general situation plus Schelling's early Spinozistic Romanticism
served to exert a great influence upon Hegel's developing thought. Spinoza's
attempt at mediation is therefore probably of more importance than might other-
wise be thought.

The attempt to resolve the difficulties in Descartes' subjective beginning
gave the impetus to the Spinozistic attempt to mediate Cartesian dualism with
the notion of God as Substance. In this way Spinoza points the way toward the
Hegelian solution. Hegel, however, transformed Spinoza's substance into Sub-
ject and in the process transformed a lifeless God into a living Spirit. The
problem with Spinoza's theory was that the two attributes of God (thought and
being) both stood as inessential elements and the One Substance stood as the
only essential. In the Ethics we find, for example, the following character-
ization:

...whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting
the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the
same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other.61

The result of this is that thought and being are thereby effectively reduced to mere appearance; that is, they both become inessential. This is the great failure of Spinozism and that is the problem which must be remedied. Hegel's criticism makes it clear that dualism cannot be satisfactorily overcome by eliminating the two sides of the dualism and denying their reality. Any attempt to do so is an outrage to experience. Hegel observes that in Spinoza's philosophy...

These two attributes are therefore adopted empirically. Thought and being represent the absolute in a determination; the absolute itself is their absolute unity and they themselves are only unessential forms; the order of things is the same as that of figurate conceptions or thoughts, and the one absolute is contemplated only by external reflection, by a mode, under these two determinations, once as a totality of conceptions, and again as a totality of things and their mutations. Just as it is this external reflection which makes that distinction, so too does it lead the difference back into absolute identity and therein submerge it. But this entire movement proceeds outside the absolute....Spinoza makes the sublime demand of thought that it consider everything under the form of eternity, sub specie aeterni, that is, as it is in the absolute. But in the said absolute, which is only unmoved identity, the attribute, like the mode, is only as vanishing, not as becoming, so that here, too, the vanishing takes its positive beginning only from without....the necessity of the advance of the absolute to unessentiality is lacking and also the dissolution of the unessentiality in and for itself in the identity; or,62 there is lacking the becoming both of identity and of its determinations.

Fichte criticized Spinoza for being a dogmatist; that is, for relating consciousness externally and mechanically to its content and neglecting the principle of self-consciousness.63 Hegel continued this critique,64 but the influence of Spinoza was very strong and, if Schelling's earlier writings were Spinozistic, Hegel's might be seen as a kind of critical Spinozism in which thought and being are shown to be equally essential. Thought and being are
thereby brought together into substance, but in such a way that substance is also subject - and this is the Hegelian Spirit. Spinoza's monism and attempt at mediation presages that of Hegel, but Hegel transformed Spinoza's substance into Spirit. He was able to achieve this speculative metamorphosis because of the prior transformation of the entire problem by Kant.

A further stage in the development of the unification of subject and object is to be found in the philosophy of the French Enlightenment. In this period of philosophy we find a great effort to combine the rationalism of Descartes with the empiricism of Locke. We find, therefore, a mixture of extremes of these two tendencies. Lockean empiricism is taken at this time to an extreme sensationalism, while at the same time the authority of faith and revelation is replaced by the inherent authority of the rationalism of the "geometrical spirit". The individual is told to trust the authority of his own reason but at the same time this rational faculty is given the criterion of its validity from an externally imposed system - i.e. from mathematics. So although the philosophes brought together Cartesian and Lockean principles, and therefore subjective and objective philosophies, the unification, as we have learned to expect, was unacceptable to Hegel because it relied upon an imposition from without. In the case of the Enlightenment, the source of enlightenment was essentially given and accepted dogmatically. It is not until philosophy can become critical and can examine the sources of its rational and experiential knowledge that, Hegel believed, a true unification of subject and object can begin.

f. The Kantian Revolution: The Object Turned Inward.

It is interesting that in his History of Philosophy, Erdmann entitles the section beginning with Kant "The Philosophy of Mediation". With Kant the dis-
tinction between thought and being becomes a distinction between subject and object. At least we may say that the real possibility of making this identification arises with Kant; for Kant put the subject - object distinction within consciousness and in turn distinguished this unity from an external being in the form of the thing-in-itself.

Here, then, we arrive at a distinction between the object as something external to and set out against the subject, and the object as internalized, as the product of the activity of the mind itself. The problem as such was brought to a head by Hume who effectively obliterated both the subject and the object by dismantling their unity and breaking them into constituent elements of sensation. The result was the production in experience of pure particularity and the elimination of the universal. But the universal as a constituent element of experience had to be accounted for. The only way to do this was by a revolution which would transform the notion of objectivity and rescue the universal from the sceptical destructiveness of Hume. The answer to Hume took the form of the development of the concept of subject and object in Kant's critical philosophy. This development from Hume to Kant was, in effect, an attempt to reassert the essentiality of the universal along with that of the particular. This change has been characterized by a writer on Schelling in the following way: "Pre-Kantian philosophy took experience to be complete before experience and knowledge to be merely passive comprehension of it. But this is contradictory. A fact exists before and after, not merely when apprehended. It is, therefore, not particular but universal". As we shall see, this conjunction of the problem of the particular and the universal with that of subject and object was to persist through Hegel's examination of the problem in the Phenomenology.
For Kant the mind was active in experience in so far as it organized intuitions according to necessary principles of understanding - what he called categories. Taken in this respect the object has an immediate relation to the subject and the object is, to a certain extent, in opposition to the subject within the subject.

Taken as presented so far it is easy to see why Hegel termed Kant's theory "subjective idealism", but he could call it such only by rejecting the other part of the theory - the "thing-in-itself". Though Kant had translated the problem of thought and being to that of subject and object and had therefore overcome the problem of particular and universal in Hume, he re-established the problem again with his doctrine of the thing-in-itself. The effect of this notion was to set off subject - object (as a unit) against a spectral object or external being. In this manner dualism was effectively reinstated and the problem not yet resolved.

If the thing-in-itself is rejected, then the problem is at once reduced to the question of the homogeneity of the two sides. One then becomes confronted with the opposition of subject and object within the conscious ego as the basic opposition which must be solved. Fichte was the first to take real advantage of the situation left by Kant, but he gives Kant full credit for making a new approach possible. As Fichte puts it:

...the eminent author [Kant] still retains unique credit for this achievement, of having first knowingly diverted philosophy away from external objects and directed it into ourselves. This is the spirit and inmost heart of his whole philosophy, as it is also the spirit and heart of the Science of Knowledge [Fichte's own theory].

Kant's solution was unsatisfactory as it stood because, first, it ended with a dogmatic dualism; and, second, the mediation of the opposition which he did
provide took place outside of the elements of the opposition itself. Yet it was a fruitful beginning for the resolution of the problem.

Somewhere in his *Secret of Hegel* Stirling says that Hegel mediates Kant's immediacy, and in a sense that is true. If, as Erdmann claimed, Kant's was a philosophy of mediation, it was only an apparent one because the dualism, which mediation is intended to abolish, reappeared at a different level. Where Descartes represented the immediacy of rational knowledge, Kant represents the immediacy of the final development of rational understanding. Kant brought the problem to its true significance in recognizing that subject and object were both essential elements of the real. Yet his emphasis lay still on the objective side of this unity; for the understanding, the faculty of categories, was effectively passive and non-productive. Furthermore, Kant, according to Hegel, did not demonstrate anything; his procedure was *ad hoc* and the solutions he offered had no more grounding than mere assurance. This difficulty is expressed by Hegel with reference to the deduction of the categories. He follows Fichte's criticism of Kant for not having deduced the categories in their inherent necessity but for merely finding them as given - as something merely asserted to the case:

But to pick up the various categories again in any sort of way as a kind of happy find, hit upon, e.g. in the different judgments, and then to be content so to accept them, must be regarded as an outrage on scientific thinking. Where is the understanding to be able to demonstrate necessity, if it is incapable of so doing in its own case, itself being pure necessity?

This kind of assertion which Kant makes can at best remain unconvincing to Hegel because it is no more than a bare assurance.
g. Fichte and the Absolute Ego.

Fichte's attempt to find an appropriate beginning in philosophy is a reversion to a more Cartesian way of thinking. However, it was also the improvement needed to furnish the way for the Hegelian solution to the problem. Fichte grasped the significance of the Kantian suggestion but rejected its objective bias by rejecting the alien objectivity or thing-in-itself. In doing this the ego, for Fichte, ceased to be non-productive and became totally productive. The result was the opposite of Kant's: Fichte's principle was subjectively biased. Self-consciousness now became the principle with which philosophical speculation had to begin.

In the Science of Knowledge Fichte asserts that philosophy, the science of science, must begin with a fundamental principle which is unconditioned. As such there must be absolute certainty that it is true. It must be a principle which itself is unproved (otherwise it would not be fundamental but would be grounded or conditioned by something prior and more fundamental), and it must be a principle which is presupposed by any empirical consciousness whatever (in this sense he is using a transcendental method something after the fashion of Kant). The opening lines of the Science of Knowledge set out this program very clearly. Fichte informs us that

Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, if it is to be an absolutely primary principle. It is intended to express that Act which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible.

The Science of Knowledge represents Fichte's attempt to carry on the philosophical analysis of the Kantian reformulation of the thought - being dichotomy into the subject - object distinction. As such it is of funda-
mental importance in the lead-up to the Hegelian solution to the problem. In order to understand the importance of the Fichtean position for the Hegelian theory it will not be necessary to explicate the detail of Fichte's arguments in the *Science of Knowledge*, but a brief presentation of the relevant content of the work will be necessary.

The fundamental principle with which Fichte begins is the logical principle of identity. Given anything at all, A, it is certain that A must be identical with itself; it must be the case that A = A. But the assertion that "if there is an A then A must be identical to itself" does not assert the actual existence of any A. Therefore, that which unites the posited A with itself cannot be A. The assertion that A must be self-identical is not an empirical observation of a fact, but a judgment within consciousness itself. As such it is, according to Fichte, the affirmation or positing of the existence of the ego. This act of the ego in its self positing is the fundamental, certain fact of knowledge:

We started from the proposition A - A; not as if the proposition 'I am' could be deduced therefrom, but because we had to start from something given with certainty in empirical consciousness. But it actually appeared in our discussion that it is not the 'I am' that is based on 'A = A' but rather that the latter proposition is based on the former.

If we abstract from 'I am' the specific content, namely the self, and are left with the mere form that is given with this content, the form of an inference from being posited to being, as for purposes of logic we are compelled to do, we then obtain 'A = A' as the basic proposition of logic, which can be demonstrated and determined only through the Science of Knowledge. Demonstrated, in that A is A, because the self that has posited A is identical with that in which A has been posited; determined, in that everything that exists does so only insofar as it is posited in the self, and apart from the self there is nothing. No possible A in the above proposition (no thing) can be anything other than something posited in the self.

If A = A is valid then it can only be valid because the consciousness in
which it is judged valid is a self-identical self-consciousness. The original positing is the affirmation or positing of the existence of the ego: "...no identity of object can be thought apart from the identity of the thinking self" is how one commentator on Fichte has expressed it.76

However otherness, that which opposes consciousness as the not-self, arises as a negation of the unity of the self-identical ego and thus fundamentally opposes it. This gives the science of knowledge its dialectic of opposition and resolution, but it ultimately denies it the possibility of a final resolution.77 This last is true because the unity which forms the fundamental basis is the subjective unity of self-consciousness and it is this very subjective unity which develops the primary opposition within itself. This opposition arises necessarily from the same logic that grounds the original unity of consciousness so any re-establishment of the unity of consciousness must immediately result in the re-positing of the opposition. According to Hegel,

...all reality which appears in the object for the ego is a determination of the ego, just as the categories and other determinations were in Kant's case. Thus it is here more especially that we should expect Fichte to demonstrate the return of other-Being into absolute consciousness. However, because after all the other-Being was regarded as unconditioned, as implicit, this return does not come to pass. The ego determines the 'other', indeed, but this unity is an altogether finite unity; non-ego has thus immediately escaped from determination once more and gone forth from this unity. What we find is merely an alternation between self-consciousness and the consciousness of another, and the constant progression of this alternation which never reaches any end.78

In the final analysis Fichte did not resolve the basic conflict between thought and being but instead derived yet another dualism. Also, he did not keep separate his work as an epistemologist and his work as a metaphysician - he did not demonstrate how the epistemology of the Science of Knowledge was legiti-
mately also metaphysics. He did, however, lay the foundation for the beginning which Hegel was later able to make in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

There are three important points which Fichte made and which Hegel was later able to exploit and develop in a more satisfactory manner. First, Fichte threw out the thing-in-itself and was then left with a primordial Ego which was productive of its own object. Had he carried on purely in this manner he would no doubt have arrived at a rather straightforward subjective idealist position. He must also have realized that such a position would have made it very difficult to come up with an alternative to Kant's solution to the antinomies and to the dialectic of pure reason. He therefore turned to the *Critique of Practical Reason* and justified his original active Ego as productive of moral objectivity. This notion of activity is in itself important to Hegel since for him consciousness rises to absolute Knowledge through its activity. Also, because the Ego for Fichte is active and productive of its objective world, the action of the Ego is a positing of itself and its *Reason* into the world. We have, therefore, the foundation for the Hegelian notion that "what is, is Reason". In the *Science of Knowledge* Fichte informs us that

...reason is the only thing-in-itself, and individuality merely accidental; reason the end, and personality the means; the latter merely a special way of giving expression to reason, and one which must increasingly merge into the general form thereof. Reason alone is eternal, on our view, while individuality must constantly decay. Anyone who does not first accommodate his will to this order of things will also never obtain a true understanding of the *Science of Knowledge*.

Fichte is here putting forth with little emphasis that which forms the crux of Hegel's system: that the essential reality is Reason, or, in other words, he is stating a metaphysical rationalism.
Second, the beginning for Fichte is what he calls an intellectual intuition of the original act of the self or Ego. Thus, self-consciousness is the presupposition of philosophy and it must be so, according to Fichte, if one is able to say, of anything at all, that it is. Now Hegel accepted neither that the beginning could be self-consciousness nor that it could arise from an intellectual intuition. In both cases the beginning will trap one in either a dualistic or a reductionistic problem. But self-consciousness implies that consciousness has two elements: that which knows and that which is known; and that these two elements are in consciousness itself. Thus, self-consciousness implies the unity of the subject of consciousness with the object of consciousness. Fichte, therefore, recognized that the beginning must be made with an original unity—an immediacy which can be mediated into its moments of opposition. The basis of the Science of Knowledge, therefore, had the germ of the truth though it did not have the absolute truth itself.

This statement, for example, is pregnant with suggestion for Hegel:

The procedure of the Wissenschaftlehre is the following: it requires each one to note what he necessarily does when he calls himself, I. It assumes that every one who really performs the required act, will find that he affirms himself, or, which may be clearer to many, that he is at the same time subject and object. In this absolute identity of subject and object consists the very nature of the Ego.83

This statement too indicates how the road to Hegel was paved by Fichte:

...the self is a necessary identity of subject and object: a subject—object; and is so absolutely, without further mediation. This, I say, is what it means; though this proposition has not been so readily understood as one might have thought, or weighed according to its high importance, which, prior to the Science of Knowledge, has been treated with utter neglect; so that the preceding discussion of it cannot be dispensed with.84

The third point is the notion of the development of the opposition of
subject and object (in the case of Fichte, between Ego and non-Ego) through the negation of the original unity. The non-Ego arises, in Fichte's system, from a postulation, necessitated by the empirical fact of consciousness, that from the judgment that not-A, it is necessary that not-A does not equal A. This gives rise to the objective negation of the original unity of the Ego and it is the attempt to negate this negation which produces the logic of the Science of Knowledge. The negation, it may be observed, is the negation of one moment by the other. Thus, one side, the subjective is essential and independent while the other side is inessential and derived from the other. No middle terms exist which can mediate them and bring them together. Fichte winds up, then, with a subjectively based dualism, the overcoming of which is not demonstrated but is only asserted as a moral duty. Very early on Hegel criticizes Fichte for beginning with an absolute identity of the Ego but failing to demonstrate that this identity is concretely realized through the unification of the Ego with the non-Ego:

The principle of Subject - Object turns out to be a subjective subject-object. Whatever is deduced from it receives thereby the form of a condition of pure consciousness, the I = I, and the pure consciousness itself receives the form of a conditional through an objective infinity, the time process in infinitum, in which the transcendental unity is lost and I is not established through the absolute intuition of the self. Thus I = I is itself transformed into the principle: I ought to equal I.

h. Schelling: The Absolute Ego Continued:

This failure to effect the unification of subject and object was rectified by Schelling - but in such a way that he too did not escape scathing criticism from Hegel. Hegel certainly drew heavily upon the ideas of his predecessors and his contemporaries (including Schelling), but whereas Hegel's first major philosophical work already exemplified the originality of his mind,
Schelling's early work was clearly based on Fichtean principles and he was for a time hailed by Fichte as the clearest expositor of the Science of Knowledge. Before long, however, the difference between them became more apparent. Fichte, still attempting to stay within the spirit of the moral imperative of the Critique of Practical Reason, lost step with the emerging romantic consciousness of which Schelling became the leading philosophical voice. The demands of duty, pluralism and universalizable principles contrasted sharply with admiration for artistic genius, individuality and transcendent unity. Though Schelling's thinking started from Fichte, the urge toward unity led him to the precise opposite conclusion of Fichte. Like Fichte Schelling would grant no middle term which would mediate opposed claims of nature and mind. The identity of the two sides was as immediate and certain for Schelling as the identity equation $A = A$ was for Fichte. According to Schelling "the absolute identity is as simple and therefore as certain as the proposition $A = A$". Whereas in Fichte this absence of mediation led to an interminable opposition between the Ego and the non-Ego, Schelling sought for their unity and found it only at the expense of their individuality. He thus collapsed the two sides into an indifferent identity in which each was merely the obverse of the other. He tells us, for instance, that "the quantitative difference of the subjective and objective is the ground of all finitude and conversely, the quantitative indifference of both is infinity". He maintained that quantitative difference could occur only outside of absolute identity, but absolute identity, he had shown, is the whole. Therefore quantitative difference could only be outside of totality - it therefore, he reasoned, could not as such be. In contrast, Hegel made quantitative difference part of totality, part of the logical system, because it was a fact of experience
and therefore a part of the world. Quantity as a logical category was a
part of the knowledge of the world and therefore opposition as well as identity
must be a necessary element in the absolute comprehension of the world. The
Hegelian absolute is less transcendent and mystical than Schelling's and is
therefore more concrete. To a certain extent it is true to say that Hegel's
was an absolute of knowledge rather than an absolute of being. Of course in
the final analysis knowledge can only be absolute when it is knowledge of
essential being. In Hegel romanticism, represented by the very notion of
absolute knowledge, is tempered by the need to accommodate the particular
which the enlightenment stressed.

i. Hegelian Justice: The Marriage of Enlightenment with Romanticism:

Hegel made use of the originality of Kant, not by opposing the unit
subject - object to being, but by making the subject - object distinction
into the whole distinction. The opposition between the two is then resolvable
through an epistemological ontology. This is the case because, under
the Hegelian conception, knowledge has for its content the rational structure
which underlies both the object which is known and the knowing which has an
object. When the Essence of both sides is grasped, then the Being of both
coalesce into the Concept. In conceptual understanding the universalizing
process of thought is known to be inseparable from the particularity of the
object - and vice versa.

In order to establish this rapprochement Hegel establishes a mediating
agency which will bring the two sides together. This is the function of the
Concept in the Phenomenology. The theories of Fichte and Schelling suffer be-
cause they lack such a device and one of Hegel's concerns is to make up this
deficiency. The mediation of the Concept is necessary if he wants to avoid a lapse, like that of Schelling, into an indifferent identity. Whether consciously or not, there is a real sense in which Hegel is seeking a synthesis of the Fichtean "thesis" of the eternal struggle of opposites with the Schellingian "antithesis" of eternal indifference. An indication of this is suggested in the following remark:

...Fichte's theory of knowledge regards the struggle of the ego with the object as that of a continuous process of determining the object through the ego as a subject of consciousness, without the identity of the restfully self-developing Concept.95

As has been stated and as will be discussed later,96 this synthesis is intended to be effected through the mediating power of the Concept.

The problem of the mediation of subject and object was incapable of resolution for Fichte because of the withdrawal into the particularity of the self and the consequent necessary production of the objective out of this subjectivity. So long as the subject produces its own opposed object, then the very notion of subjectivity must imply this opposition. The alternative is to deny this fundamental opposition - as Schelling did; but the result is then the denial of the actual fact of the distinction. In Hegel's mind the distinction between the two is legitimate, what should be denied is their absolute separation - consider the following passage as an example of this attitude:

Now, while the object which forms the starting-point perishes in this, its true source, and sacrifices itself, this does not mean that it has vanished in this process. Its content is, on the contrary, posited in its ideal character. We have an example of this absorption and ideality in consciousness. I relate myself to an object, and then contemplate it as it is. The object, which I at once distinguish from myself, is independent; I have not made it, it did not wait for me in order to exist,
and it remains although I go away from it. Both, I and the object, are therefore two independent things, but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things to each other, a relation in which they appear as one. In that I have knowledge of the object, these two I and the Other, exist for me in this my simple determinate character. If we rightly grasp what takes place here, we have not only the negative result that the oneness and independence of the two is done away with. The annulling which takes place is not only emply negation, but the negation of those two things from which I started. The non-existence here is thus only the non-existence of the independence of the two - the non-existence in which both determinations are abrogated, yet preserved and ideally contained.97

The enlightenment, with its emphasis on the attitude of passivity and on the techniques of observation, had made the world too distinct and had thus failed to grasp its inherent unity. Romanticism, particularly as represented by Schelling and his followers, had gone too far in the other direction and thus failed to grasp the essential truth which the enlightenment contained but which it expressed badly and in a one-sided fashion.98

However, romanticism did overcome the static passiveness of enlightenment rationalism and thus tended to overcome the dogmatic realism which made the opposition of thought and being irresolvable. For Hegel the resolution to this problem was to be found in an absolute in which the unity of the two sides could be an object of demonstrated knowledge. Yet he was not willing to accept the immediate intuition of this unity because its force lay only in bare assurance. The unity must be demonstrable and the knowledge of it must be rational and objective - only then can the certainty of the result be known to be true. The project, then, must be to demonstrate that rationality could be developed. This is what Hegel attempts to show in the Phenomenology.99 As such it is in essence a unification of the enlightenment with its notions of rationality, progress, and concern for the universal, with romanticism and its notions of dynamism, organicism and concern for the particular. Through the
marriage of the two was to be created the rational comprehension of the unity of subject and object through the historical development of the Concept. In other words we may say, to repeat a sentence from the Introduction, that for Hegel a middle course was taken in which the oppositions necessary for life persisted but the unity necessary for true rational knowledge was achieved. 100

Although ostensibly Kantian, Fichte's philosophy ends in what is essentially a romantic infinite striving toward an unobtainable ought: "The result of our inquiry so far", he tells us in the last part of the Science of Knowledge, "is therefore as follows: in relation to a possible object, the pure self-reverting activity of the self is a striving; and as shown earlier, an infinite striving at that. This boundless striving, carried to infinity, is the condition of the possibility of any object whatsoever: no striving, no object". 101 The object, in turn, is necessary for the Ego to strive against for the object puts limits to the striving Ego and therefore determines it as something - without the object the striving would be infinite and as infinite there would be no self at all - no subject or object:

The self is infinite, but merely in respect to its striving; it strives to be infinite. But the very concept of striving already involves finitude, for that to which there is no counterstriving is not a striving at all. If the self did more than strive, if it had an infinite causality, it would not be a self: it would not posit itself, and would therefore be nothing. But if it did not endlessly strive in this fashion, again it could not posit itself, for it could oppose nothing to itself; again it would be no self, and would therefore be nothing. 102

This incipient romanticism in Fichte finds its echo in the romantic literature of the time in general - though Fichte differed from romantics like the Schlegels in his emphasis on morality and ethical behavior instead of their emphasis on sentiment and poetic imagination. But this notion of the infinite striving Ego gives Fichte a superficial congeniality to romanticism - as it
does to many other thinkers of the time. For example, in its Faustian form it appears in the terse formulation:

Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt

- and it is a similar notion which is reflected in Hegel's vision of the striving consciousness which, although seeking truth, inevitably piles error upon error. In that respect Hegel was in harmony with the spirit of romanticism. Hegel, however, accepted not only the importance of the striving, but also the importance of the erring. The piling of error upon error is not simply erring; it is also the case, Hegel believes, that to err is to learn since each succeeding error increases experience and hence knowledge. Thus he finds romanticism a stepping stone to an absolute rationality which was unobtainable by enlightenment rationalism and its "objective" or "passive" observation of the world. Hegel's conception is therefore less resigned than Goethe's and is perhaps more sympathetic to Mary Shelley's statement that "the labours of men of genius however erroneously directed scarcely ever fail in ultimately turning to the solid advantage of mankind". 103

The notion of progress appeared in both romantic and enlightenment thought; though as a conception of the eventual achievement of an ultimate end it represented a less important notion to the Romantiker than it did to the philosophes. For example, we find the conjunction of progress, error and truth in Turgot. His conception of progress ran into the fact (as he saw it) that history was a history of error. So the problem for the irrepressible optimism of the enlightenment was to explain how error can contribute to truth: "Turgot was aware of the gap that existed between his a priori affirmation of progress and the evidence found when the actual record of human history was
The underlying belief in progress would seem to require a corresponding actual improvement in man's acts. As a good enlightenment observer of the world, however, Turgot seems almost perplexed that this is seemingly not the case: "But what a spectacle the succession of men's opinions presents! I seek there for the progress of the human mind, and I find virtually nothing but the history of its errors." Not to be dismayed, we find that in the final analysis "Turgot went on to convert this empirical observation into a universal and necessary principle, affirming that every error was necessary for truth." In the long run Turgot was able to say that "like a storm which has agitated the waves of the sea, the evil which is inseparable from revolutions disappears: the good remains, and humanity perfects itself." Such statements could almost have been made by Hegel himself - indeed, the key to the Phenomenology as a work describing the developmental progress of human consciousness in its search for knowledge and truth is contained in this terse statement of Turgot's: "the real advancement of the human mind reveals itself even in its aberrations...." Hegel therefore can be seen to accept a certain amount of this enlightenment view of progress. This notion, unlike that of romanticism, saw the progress as eventually arriving at an attainable goal; it had a belief in the "perfectibility of man" - a notion not shared by Hegel but one transformed by him into that of "absolute Knowledge" - without perfection.

Although there are those who would disagree, Hegel might be seen as one who attempted to bring together the rationalism of the enlightenment, and its notion of progress, with the dynamic of romanticism. To be sure the rationalism of the enlightenment produced an arid deism and Hegel, being more romantic, could not accept this. But the problem was not in the faith in reason
which the enlightenment stressed, but in its attitude of passive observation. Hegel took Schelling's clue that subject and object are not essentially different and made both sides rational so that Reason was only Reason in reciprocal action with itself. At any rate, mathematics must be rejected, on a romantic basis, as an inadequate foundation for rationalism;\textsuperscript{111} so Hegel replaced it with a dynamic method in accordance with the spirit of romanticism. This reconstituted rationalism is expressed by Hegel as the dialectic.\textsuperscript{112}

In order for rationalism to be acceptable it was necessary to deny the mysticism or semi-mysticism of romanticism and yet find a way of making everything rational without making it lifeless. On one hand dialectic, as the name for the dynamical logic of Reason, shows the inevitability and rigidity of deduction in the deduction of the logical categories, and also of the breaking down of hard and fast distinctions and definitions. On the other hand it provides the less rigid continuity of reason demanded in the post-enlightenment by providing a dynamical principle of sufficient reason which denies pure contingency and guarantees that the developmental process of Spirit is both continuous and knowable.

The notion of dynamism contained in romanticism finds its reflection in Hegel's concept of dialectic; likewise, the Hegelian synthesis incorporates also the enlightenment notion of progress, particularly in his belief in the consummation of this progress in a final end: absolute Knowledge.\textsuperscript{113} For Hegel this progress manifested itself on different levels. Within history it could be seen as the progress of consciousness toward freedom. Given this criterion it is in a sense true that for Hegel history did end with Napoleon and himself\textsuperscript{114} since, according to Hegel's interpretation of the spirit of the times, the idea of freedom had become universalized as the conceptual foundation
of the Germanic world; as Fackenheim puts it: "the modern world, Hegel thinks, is free in idea if not (or not yet) in actual fact".\textsuperscript{115} Freedom in its concrete aspect may not yet have been actualized, but the historical development of the consciousness of freedom was realized in Western European culture.

Contrary to the commentators on Hegel like Marcuse, who see Freedom as the concept pervading all of Hegel's thought, it is possible to see the Phenomenology as representing a development of consciousness in a somewhat different manner.\textsuperscript{116} A precedent for Hegel's Phenomenology can be found among the philosophes; for example, Condorcet, in his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, which has at least a superficial similarity to the Phenomenology but perhaps a good deal more than that, sees progress to be a development from one stage of knowledge to another - just as Hegel does in the Phenomenology.\textsuperscript{117} In his book Condorcet says toward the end:

Thus all the intellectual activities of man, however different they may be in their aims, their methods, or the qualities of mind they exact, have combined to further the progress of humanity. Indeed, the whole system of human labor is like a well made machine, whose several parts have been systematically distinguished but none the less, being intimately bound together, form a single whole and work towards a single end.\textsuperscript{118}

But though Condorcet anticipates the idea of the development of knowledge historically, he only "observes" or describes this development with no attempt to find an underlying principle of development or any necessity attached to it.\textsuperscript{119} This is a "defect" which Hegel tried to remedy.\textsuperscript{120}

Whereas for Hegel the philosophy of history is the story of the development of consciousness to freedom, the Phenomenology tells the story of the development of consciousness to absolute Knowledge, or, to put it another way, it is the development from certainty to truth.\textsuperscript{121}
j. A New Beginning:

If the Phenomenology is convincingly to effect the marriage of romantic
dynamism with enlightenment rationalism and faith in the progress of know-
ledge then a new beginning must be made. The old pitfall which plagued
philosophy from Descartes to Kant and Fichte must be avoided. Does Hegel
avoid the dualist's and reductionist's trap? How does he avoid choosing be-
tween a reduction which is contradicted by fact of experience on the one hand
and an ultimate irrationality (dualism) on the other? His attempt to satisfy
the demands of subjectivity and objectivity, along with those of Reason,
carries through the program of Kant. He does so by conjoining enlightenment
rationalism and optimism with Fichtean and Schellingian romanticism and
dynamism - finally going beyond them both to a dialectic of ultimate ration-
ality. Hegel does not begin his quest with the subjective thought or the
original act of consciousness. The Logic, it is true must begin with thought
as a given - although Mure goes a bit far in saying that "the Pure Being with
which Hegel's Logic begins, die Kategorie in its most abstract phase, is just
this 'original' unity; it is Descartes Cogito and Kant's unity of apperception
in their true meaning".122 It is however the case that Hegel does not really
get out of the Cartesian type of beginning in the Logic and it is therefore
necessary that this be done in the Phenomenology - if only to legitimize the
Logic.123

The result of Cartesianism is the dualism which is a necessary outgrowth
of having such a beginning. In fact, the result of beginning with pure thought
is the re-establishment of dogmatism - the very thing this new beginning was
to eradicate. Of course it is dogmatic in a much different, perhaps only
analogous, way. It is dogmatic precisely because if one attempts to begin
with pure thought, one can only achieve a content for that thought by accepting - or giving - it uncritically and unfounded, i.e. dogmatically. For what can we mean in talking about "pure" thought? What could a "pure" Cogito possibly be? Thought cannot exist without a content. Therefore, given only thought as the beginning, whence comes the content of that thought? Some extreme "rationalists" may say that the mind contributes its own content and thus there is no real problem. But the object is to begin with the "I think" and from that derive (by whatever means) the "I am". However, if we assert mind as the source of the content for the thought, then mind is obviously being asserted as primary and thought, as a content or product of mind, is secondary. Also, there is the questionable assumption that this hidden presupposition which allows a deduction of "I am" from "I think" is not merely mind, but mind active - active in supplying a content for itself. Will we thus wind up with a primordial creative mind which creates its own content? Where have we come from the old scholasticism then? - except perhaps to identify this self-determining mind with the Ego rather than with God - or rather the Ego becomes God. Perhaps this is the logical conclusion to which one is inextricably drawn.

We need not go so far as this to have doubts about this entire program. We merely need to ask ourselves in what sense the idea of "pure" thought can be meaningful. If we are unable to accept the preceding account we may have to conclude that all the talk about "pure" thought is really and literally talk about nothing. A "pure" thought can only be a pure emptiness - a nothing. Thought has to be thought of something. If thought cannot provide its own content then there is no way to get a content for it. We must then deny that thought can be the primary datum. Parmenides was absolutely correct:

80.
from nothing, nothing issues. If you start with nothing - truly start with nothing, with no hidden assumptions, premises or entities, then you will never be able to get anything at all. If you do get something then it must be from a subterfuge. 125

The alternative to starting with "pure" thought is to start with something else. But what else? Since "pure" thought is pure nothing, then if thought exists it cannot be "pure" in the Cartesian sense (although it may be "pure" in the sense of having been abstracted from all content). If it is not "pure", i.e. if it has a content, then something else must be primary and thought must be derivative from this primary element. 126 That which is prior to thought and from which thought is derived is consciousness. Hegel begins the Phenomenology with consciousness - with what might be called "pure" consciousness because it is consciousness without thought:

...neither 'I' nor 'thing' have within them the meaning of a many-sided relation; 'I' has neither the meaning of a multiplicity of ideas nor does it think; nor does 'thing' mean what has a multiplicity of qualities. Rather, the thing, the fact, is; and it is merely because it is. It is - that is the essential point for sense knowledge, and that bare fact of being, that simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. 127

Now it is obviously the case that Hegel's beginning is not a radically new beginning. He is certainly working within a tradition which he is trying to reconstitute on a more secure basis. The criticism which has been given of the Cartesian beginning could be directed back upon Hegel's attempt as well. Greene, for example, says that consciousness is Hegel's first principle and, since principles must be established (deduced or self-justified) then consciousness needs to be "...demonstrated in a science other than that of Phenomenology" - and that is the role of the "Anthropology" according to Greene. 128
This argument has a convincing air to it - especially as "Phenomenology", as a section of the Encyclopedia, is immediately preceded by "Anthropology". Of course the ultimate result of this line of reasoning would be to regress back to the Being of the Logic as the beginning and thus not have the rationale of any beginning established. There does seem to be a significant difference between Consciousness and Being, however. The first is taken to be an immediate fact whereas the latter is an immediate concept, and concepts presuppose consciousness and thought. 129

Admittedly, Descartes argued in much the same manner as Hegel. He too thought that his beginning, the "I think" was an immediate fact which was certain and sure, and that it was the only one which was certain absolutely. Certainly Hegel points out that, in the Principles of Philosophy (Part I, No. IX) "Descartes, in fact, is careful to state that by thought he means consciousness in general". 130 So Hegel's starting point is primarily a matter of emphasis - an emphasis directed toward the avoidance of the unacceptable conclusion of Descartes.

Hegel takes the wide view of consciousness and sees it as implying the object of consciousness just as surely as it implies the subject. It is from the unity of these two within consciousness that the examination must start. 131 When body and soul were thought to have two independent realms of being

...the question arose as to how the contradiction, to wit, that entities which are absolutely independent and for themselves, are yet in unity with one another, could be solved. The question as thus posed was unanswerable. But it is just this form of the question that must be recognized as inadmissible; for in truth the immaterial is not related to the material as a particular is to a particular, but as the true universal which overarches and embraces particularity is related to the particular; the particular material thing in its isolation has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial. Consequently, the standpoint which separates them is not to be regarded as final, as absolutely true. On
the contrary, the separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both. 132

The problem, then, is not that of the past, of trying to explain object in terms of subject or subject in terms of object, but is instead the problem of trying to show how, given the immediate unity of consciousness (implying subject and object within it) one can account for and give credence to the opposing claims which each side puts forward. That is the problem of the Phenomenology.
CHAPTER 3

THE PHENOMENOLOGY IN ITS OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MODES

a. Phenomenology in General.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is Hegel's attempt to show that the unification of the object with the subject can be demonstrated as both certain and true, i.e. as absolute knowledge. If it is to be demonstrated knowledge and not mere assurance then it must examine every possible alternative position to see if any of these alternatives can account for all of experience equally well. If more than one can, then absolute knowledge is impossible since there would be more than one totally rational position and no one of them could be given precedence on any rational basis. But if all alternatives are shown to fail, and through this failure to lead to one comprehensive position which does encompass all of experience, then this one position will have been demonstrated to be the only true and rational attitude - it will be demonstrated as absolute knowledge of the real. Therefore, of the Phenomenology Hegel tells us that "...this road [to Science or absolute knowledge], through the movement of the Concept, will embrace the entire objective world of Consciousness in its necessity".

This appears to be a gargantuan task which Hegel has set out for himself. Indeed, it seems a super-human task and the height of folly or arrogance to claim even to have attempted it - much less to claim to have succeeded. In fact, the task, though indeed formidable, is much less than
it appears at first sight to be. This is the case because Hegel believes himself to have found the clue by which the entire Science of knowledge and of the real unfolds itself. This clue he believes himself to have discovered within the very concept of consciousness itself.

Contrary to first appearances, because of the method which Hegel believes himself to have discovered, he does not have to analyze every possible theory of knowledge and reality. In that sense his task is lighter than it may otherwise appear. Instead, he analyzes what he calls the "shapes" or "forms" [Gestalten] of Consciousness. These represent the various general attitudes which any consciousness can take toward the world. Within these general Gestalten fall the various particular theories of particular thinkers. If any Gestalt is shown to be inherently false (not adequate to account for all experience), then the various specific varieties in which it appears will also fail. So the Phenomenology is, in essence, an analysis of the possible Gestalten which Consciousness can have.

For example, in the section entitled "Sense-Certainty", which will shortly be discussed, the Gestalt presented is that of the claim by consciousness to have immediate sensory intuition of reality. In fact, though entitled "Sense-Certainty" the argument could perhaps be applied more extensively. One could claim that this Gestalt is that of any claim to immediate knowledge and therefore includes those of mysticism, intellectual intuition, and so on. Hegel, however, does not actually extend it in such a manner. His analysis is concerned with consciousness as objectively oriented - in this case through sensory intuition. Whatever its possible uses, in the Hegelian application it is a Gestalt which covers extreme empiricist and realist theories such as Condillac's sensationalism and varieties of materialism.
The weakness in the Phenomenology, aside from possible errors or weaknesses in particular arguments which do not necessarily affect the program as a whole, is that it claims to give every possible Gestalt which consciousness can have. Obviously if one can show that it has failed to do this, then the comprehensive claim will have been defeated. This defeat of the position can be accomplished merely by coming up with a Gestalt which Hegel has not considered. Also, there is a difficulty - similar to that of the problem of induction - in that it is difficult to prove that nothing is missing from the system, that all possibilities have been exhausted, unless one has a blueprint for the system prior to its development which tells what the system must contain in order to be complete. But then the conclusion of the system will not have been demonstrated but will have been given beforehand in the blueprint. In other words, it would therefore have no more warrant than the assurance of the validity of the blueprint. Another assurance of the validity of another blueprint might equally well be given - and who is to judge between their conflicting claims?

Hegel tries to avoid this problem by claiming that knowledge (the Gestaltery of consciousness) is not infinite in extension but is a progression which turns back upon itself and contains itself within itself. In other words, it is self validating. Knowledge, that is, can be known to be true and complete when it is shown to be fully systematic. Systematic knowledge Hegel thinks to be necessarily true because it is organically connected and therefore reasoning about any one part of it leads to reasoning about greater and greater parts and eventually to reasoning about the whole itself. This organic and systematic nature of knowledge is grounded in the inherent logic or rationality which both knowledge and its object
contain and which guarantees that the end result is absolute truth. This is what is also called the dialectic, as the term used for the organic logic or dynamic rationality of the content of knowledge.

In Hegel's view philosophical Science justifies or proves itself, not by an externally imposed standard of what it ought to contain, but retrospectively by the fact that the progression from beginning to end is demonstrated to be absolutely rational. Again, this only guarantees the completeness and hence the uniqueness of the system when the rational structure is not imported into the system but is the essence itself of the development of the content as systematic. If Science (philosophy) can be a demonstrated system then its conclusions are guaranteed. There would arise no question of having left something out of account since it is shown that the beginning leads to the end through the organic connection of the intermediate parts. Anything else would lie outside of the chain of connection and hence would not be part of the system (and would not be an element of true knowledge).

Does the Phenomenology account for all of experience in the final analysis? The answer to this question shows just where the main weakness of the System lies - for it lies in the very assumption which it must make to try to answer it. In fact, we may say that Hegel does an admirable job of it but that he fails ultimately because, like the positions he criticises in the Phenomenology, it is finally contradictory. The contradiction is between the need to allow both contingency and necessity as part of the system (they are both irreducible elements of experience) and the need for the content of knowledge and the real to be necessary and not contingent if the theory is to stand up to its own demands as to what constitutes a System and demonstrated knowledge. These two things are thus incompatible: the
need to account for all of experience and the need to be systematic and hence totally rational.

The argument in support of the conclusion offered has just been touched on above and much will have to be said before it can be fully justified. At this point, however, it can be noted that two important conclusions can be developed. First, the examination that is carried out in the Phenomenology must attempt to show that its parts are inherently connected. Therefore, the development of its two elements: the knowledge itself, and its object; and it must do so in such a way that they are not left as separate. Were they to remain separate the relation between them would be problematic. Therefore, the development of one must coincide with and express the development of the other. This is what is meant by saying that the Phenomenology is an epistemological ontology. It cannot be anything else and still be what it purports to be: the Science of the experience of consciousness.

Second, the development of the Gestalten to a comprehensive and absolute truth can only take place because there is an underlying rationality in the content. Reflecting rationally upon knowledge and its content results in the reflection of Reason itself. We are able to follow the progress from "Sense-Certainty" to "Absolute Knowledge" because that development is itself inherently Rational. The Phenomenology is only possible because at the basis of it is the underlying assumption that not only is philosophical reflection rational but that Rationality is reflected in philosophy; in other words, that the content is in fact Reason or the Rational itself.

The first conclusion is a necessary outcome of the need of philosophy to be Systematic - as outlined by Hegel in the Preface to the Phenomenology. But if knowledge and its object are to follow one another and to reciprocally
determine each other, then that can only be because the underlying foundation of the System is Reason itself. It is this second conclusion that is crucial to the success and significance of the Phenomenology. Before being able to consider the detail of these conclusions, however, it is necessary to see first how the Phenomenology itself works in its project, content, structure and method.

b. The Clue to the Self-development of the System.

In the beginning of the previous section it was stated that Hegel believed himself to have found the clue through which the System unfolds itself to the inquiring mind. So as a preliminary to looking at the Phenomenology itself it will help to consider briefly these two questions: From whence does the method of the Phenomenology come? and how did Hegel determine that the Gestalten considered therein are correct and exhaustive thereof? The basic answer to these questions has already been founded in the preceding chapter and we need therefore only to point them out.

We already know that the primary question around which the devices of the Phenomenology are centered is that of the reconciliation of the opposition of subject and object. It has also been noted that this problem naturally develops a certain structure comprising alternate claims to essential reality of subject, object and subject - object as a unit. It is this structure that Hegel uses as the clue to analyze the Gestalten of consciousness. The two sides, he maintains (as with Fichte and Schelling) are inherently the two sides of consciousness itself. Hegel further concluded that they are the only elements in any possible attitude (Gestalt) which consciousness can take toward the world. Consciousness can only emphasize
either the primary essentiality of the object, that of the subject, or that of the two sides equally. So these must be the three divisions under which all possible forms of consciousness must fall. This, then, is the structure of the Phenomenology which first of all considers the claim that the object is the real. This claim is analyzed in the section first met with, that of "Consciousness". The other two claims are to be found in "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason". Again, within these broad orientations consciousness can find various modes of expression - but these are still limited by the two elements which comprise it: subject and object. Therefore we will find, as has been stated, Gestalten within Gestalten representing relative subjectivity and relative objectivity - and so on. Hegel does not explicitly characterize the structure of the Phenomenology as it has been characterized herein. This structure is more or less implied in the work itself and the explicit expression of it must, to some extent, be in the form of an interpretation. This interpretation, however, fits the facts closely and makes sense out of the difficult nature of the work. But there is some rather more concrete evidence to put forth as well. Certainly as to the interpretation of the three main sections of the work we find clear agreement with what is said herein in the later and rather more mature work of the Philosophy of Mind. True, Hegel's conception of the phenomenology of spirit had been modified by this time, but I doubt that the sentiment expressed in his Zusatz was in any way new to his thinking:

In Phenomenology, the soul, by the negation of its corporeity, raises itself to purely ideal self-identity, becomes consciousness, becomes 'I', is for itself over against its Other. But this first being-for-self of mind is still conditioned by the Other from which it proceeds. The 'I' is still perfectly empty, a quite abstract subjectivity which posits the whole content of immediate mind outside of it and relates
itself to it as to a world already in existence. Thus what was at first only our object, does indeed become an object for mind itself, but the 'I' does not as yet know what confronts it is natural mind itself. Therefore, the 'I', in spite of its being-for-itself, is at the same time still not for itself, for it is only in relation to an Other, to something given. The freedom of the 'I' is consequently only an abstract, conditioned, relative freedom. True, mind here is no longer immersed in Nature but reflected into itself and in a relation to Nature, but it only appears, stands only in a relation to actuality, is not yet actual mind. Therefore, we call the part of the science in which this form of mind is treated, Phenomenology. But now the 'I', in reflecting itself out of its relation-to-other into itself, becomes self-consciousness. In this form, the 'I' at first knows itself only as the empty, unfulfilled 'I', and all concrete content as something other than it. Here the activity of the 'I' consists in filling the void of its abstract subjectivity, in building objectivity into itself but, on the other hand, in making subjectivity objective. In this way, self-consciousness overcomes the one-sidedness of its subjectivity, breaks away from its particularity, from its opposition to objectivity, and attains to the universality which embraces both sides and represents within itself the immanent unity of itself with consciousness; for the content of mind here becomes an objective content as in consciousness, and at the same time, as in self-consciousness, a subjective content. This universal self-consciousness is, in itself or for us, Reason; but it is only in the third part of the science of subjective mind that Reason becomes objective to itself.

This is the basic structure which permeates the Phenomenology. Here we have seen it explicitly as the characterization of the three main parts of the work and this will be carried through in the analysis which follows. By interpolating from this main structure to the various levels of subsections, a continuity in the structure of the Phenomenology can be discovered. Through this continuity we can see how the immediacy of consciousness needs to traverse through the various forms and levels of mediation to arrive at the point where such mediation is complete. Through this process of mediation the object and the subject are finally brought together so that knowledge and its object are no longer separate but are found to be mutually determining. Our next step, the, is to see how this process is developed in the Phenomenology itself.
c. "Consciousness": Essential Particularity and the Universal.

As we know from the previous chapter Hegel's starting point must not begin from either subject or object and attempt from one to derive the other. Instead he must start with a neutral point in which both elements merely are. The beginning, then, cannot be Cartesian because it must be prior to thought. This is the reason that Hegel begins the Phenomenology with consciousness. Consciousness implies the distinction of subject and object within it and this is the most immediate fact about consciousness. Therefore, when Hegel begins with consciousness in its immediate appearance, he necessarily begins with consciousness at its more basic level of knowing:

The knowledge, which is first [Zuerst] or immediately our object, can be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of Being [...Wissen des Unmittelbaren oder Seienden].

Sense consciousness is an immediate knowledge in which subject and object are not ordinarily known as distinct - although the distinction is obviously implied. The subject - object distinction makes itself known when the recognition is forced upon consciousness that the object cannot be expressed by the subject as an immediate particular (because it is not adequate to it). It is at this point that thought arises and it is also at this point that being arises as the objective category of thought. Thought and being will thus begin to be recognized in their subjective and objective forms and the original simple unity of consciousness becomes superseded - but not cancelled.

We, the transcendent observers, can see that consciousness contains the two elements - ego and object - and we can see that they are therefore mediated through each other. But this knowledge is, at first, only for us. The original unity of consciousness, its bifurcation into the elements and their
mutual dependence is something which Hegel can see and which he describes to us - as he does in this paragraph:

But, when we look closely, there is a good deal more implied in that bare pure being, which constitutes the essence of this form of certainty, and is given out by it as its truth. An actual certainty of sense is not merely this pure immediacy but an example of that immediacy. Amongst the innumerable distinctions that here come to light, we find in all cases the fundamental difference - viz. that in sense-experience pure being at once breaks up into the two "theses", as we have called them, one this as I, and one as object. When we reflect on this distinction, it is seen that neither the one nor the other is merely immediate, in sense-certainty, but is at the same time mediated: I have the certainty through the other, viz. through the actual fact; and this, again, exists in that certainty through an other, viz. through the I.\(^9\)

Immediate consciousness itself does not contain within its concept the recognition of the distinction of its elements; in other words, it is not self aware. This recognition is, however, overt to those who analysis what is implied in the notion of immediate consciousness. The task, as Hegel saw it, was to show that the notion of immediate consciousness implies mutually incompatible theses.

At this point it is necessary to anticipate a later chapter and to note briefly what Hegel believes a demonstrated truth to be (a "true" truth one might be inclined to call it). If any truth claim is tested in terms of an external standard, then the truth claim is only tested in terms of another truth claim (i.e. the claim that the standard itself gives the measure of truth). Whether the original claim stands or falls is dependent only on the relative strength of the counter claim. But this counter claim has no more warrant than the first unless it is in turn tested. The result is either an infinite regress or the dogmatic acceptance of a standard of truth which is used to test all other claims. Hegel wants to show that such claims
to truth as put forward in "Sense-Certainty" require no standard to show their failure. It is therefore necessary, in order to find out the truth-value of the claim of immediate sensory knowledge, that it be analyzed in its own terms. It is only through this kind of "immanent critique" that this level of knowledge, or any other, can be shown to be intrinsically incapable of coping with the demands placed upon it; i.e. it will show that it cannot provide an adequate rational explanation of the relation between subject and object. Before looking at this process in the specific context of the Phenomenology, an instructive example can also be cited from the somewhat different context of the Philosophy of Religion. In this citation we are also able to see how the process leads not only to true knowledge about what it is to know an object correctly, but also to true knowledge about the being of the object itself.

When it has to be shown in regard to anything that it is necessary, it is implied that we start from something else, from an Other. What is here the Other of the true divine existence is non-divine existence, the finite world, finite consciousness. Now if we are to begin from this as the immediate, the finite, the untrue, and in fact as an object of our knowledge, and as immediately apprehended by us in its definite qualitative existence, if we begin in this manner from what is First, we find that it shows itself, as we proceed, not to be what it directly presents itself as being, but is seen to be something which destroys itself, which appears as becoming, as moving on to something else. Therefore, it is not our reflection and study of the subject, our judgment, which tells us that the finite with which we begin is founded on something that is true. It is not we who bring forward its foundation. On the contrary, the movement of the finite itself shows that it loses itself in something other, in something higher than itself. We follow the object as it returns of itself to the fountain of its true being.

It has been pointed out, and it is worth pointing out again, that for Hegel absolute knowledge is possible but only on the condition that it is demonstrated and demonstrated to be the only possible comprehensive account of experience. In order to show this it is necessary that all alternatives
are shown to be inadequate and to lead to the ultimate position. Each attitude which Consciousness can take toward the world is a state of knowing and therefore a possible candidate for absolute knowledge. Every one of these possible claims must therefore be examined and shown to lead to a position which is adequate. This is basically what Hegel means when he says that Science must be systematic. Each possible truth claim must, when it breaks down, lead to the next until every possible truth claim has become a link in the chain leading to absolute knowledge.

The Phenomenology must show how the claims of the object against the subject, and conversely the subject against the object, can be reconciled and overcome such that they are seen to mutually correspond. Subject and object are inherently the same but they each represent opposite negations of the basic self-identical unity. This unity begins in its most fundamental form as consciousness, and, through the process of making actual that which lies implicit within the notion of consciousness, the original consciousness becomes, in the final end of the process, absolute Spirit.

d. "Sense-Certainty": The Experience of the Immediate.

The first section "Consciousness" considers claims of immediate objectivity, that is, of particularity to be the essential element in knowledge of the real. It is primarily an analysis of the claim that the object is the essential element of knowledge and that the subject (the universal) is the inessential. This may appear too simplistic and perhaps even wrong, given the apparent structure of this section. The first it no doubt is since it is an attempt to generalize about a very complex discussion. But it is probably not wrong as such. It is true that the structure of each section of
"Consciousness" moves from the essentiality of the object and the consequent inessentiality of the subject to the reverse, i.e. the essentiality of the subject against the inessentiality of the object. But this apparent discrepancy has already been explained as reflecting the relativity of these terms. Since subject, object and their unity are the only general Gestalten available to consciousness, all of its attitudes must be a reflection of one of these modes.

For example, in "Sense-Certainty" the two sides, subjective and objective, are found implicitly in the very notion of consciousness, but this is not recognized by the consciousness of this level - or at least it is not recognized in the beginning; in other words, "knowing as it is found at the start, Spirit in its immediate stage is the Spirit-less [Geistlose], is sense-consciousness".¹³ The awareness of duality which is implied by consciousness as such comes slowly to it as it finds itself incapable of holding fast to any one-sided position. This gradual recognition of its inherent nature is the attainment of self-knowledge. But because it finds itself looking to its objective side it is not yet self-consciousness. The first move in the analysis of sense-certainty, that is, of consciousness in the form of immediate objectivity, is to take one side as being immediately essential relegating the other to inessentiality. "One of them", Hegel states,

is posited in it as the simple immediate being, or as the essence, the object; the other, however, is inessential and mediated, which is thereby not in-itself but is through an other, Ego, a knowing which knows the object only because the object is, and which can as well be as not be. The object however is the truth and the essence, it is, and it is indifferent to whether it is known or not, it remains even when it is not known. Knowledge, however, is not if the object is not.¹⁴

We know that the object of this form of consciousness must be presented
to consciousness immediately. This immediate presentation is in the form of pure sensory intuition. Now, we cannot sensuously intuit universals but only particulars; therefore, the object of the immediate consciousness must be the immediate apprehension of a particular. Such a particular, to be truly immediate, must be known only as it is and not as a "this" opposed to "that". In other words, such knowledge must exclude negation from itself since to identify an object in terms of other objects requires a reflective consciousness, i.e. thought. But the immediate consciousness of "Sense-Certainty" is prior to thought.

We can anticipate that this immediate consciousness is going to fail to account for all of experience since thought is apparently an irreducible element of experience. Yet it must have its day and it is at least possible that there is nothing added to sensation by thought at all. If everything could be accounted for by pure sensation alone, then thought will have been shown to be a will-o'-'the-wisp and the experience of it an experience of nothing - except a product of sensation itself (a kind of epiphenomenon of sensation). Though this is highly improbable the position itself must be taken seriously, and that for at least two reasons. First, it is the logically most basic beginning and the demands of system and demonstration require an organically connected chain from the logically first to the logically last position. Second, the position itself was put forward seriously by the philosophers of the sensationalistic school - notably Condillac.

But how would one go about making the examination of the claim? There is nothing claimed but bare awareness of pure being and how is that to contradict itself? Hegel's analysis in fact leaves an uneasy feeling, for it seems that he is importing into the analysis something which is not in the original
claim itself. It therefore seems to fail to give that value-free immanent criticism he demanded. The only justification for this seems to be that since this position, as indeed all of the others considered, claims to give a complete account of experience then using facts of experience to test the claim is not illegitimate since it is implied that they are included in the claim anyway.

Hegel attacks the claim in the following way. The most that can be said of the object which sense-certain consciousness has, he claims, is that it is merely "this". However, Hegel does allow that "this" can be broken down into the two constituent components corresponding to space and time, namely, the Here and the Now. This move might be justified if Hegel were arguing in a more Kantian context in which space and time were shown to be necessary forms of intuition without which even bare sensory intuition would be impossible. But Hegel has not established that this is the case and we can either conclude that he has made this assumption or we can try to defend him as above. Whatever we choose, the argument for this section is looser and therefore weaker than Hegel himself insisted was necessary in order to have a demonstrated conclusion at the end.

The Phenomenology itself does not necessarily collapse because of this weakness, however; or at any rate even if it does the program itself may be salvagable if the examination of Sense-Certainty were to be carried out in some other way. What we want to find out is how does he progress from this point to development of the three main Gestalten and the final overcoming of subject-object dualism? We will see that from this beginning the particular which is the object of this form of intuition carries within it an element of the universal and it is the bringing out of the significance
of this that causes the development of Consciousness. The converse, we will find, is the truth of Self-Consciousness.

Let us then consider Hegel's analysis of the "Now". Given that we have the Now we may ask what it is.

To the question, What is the Now? we reply, for example, the Now is night-time. To test the truth of this certainty of sense, a simple experiment is all we need: write that truth down. A truth cannot be lost by being written down, and just as little by our preserving it. If we look again at the truth we have written down, look at it now, at this noon-time, we shall have to say it has turned stale. This "test" of Hegel's may be suspect with regard to the demands of what constitutes value-free immanent criticism, but the point that is being made would probably remain unaffected by a condemnation of the particular procedure by which it is established.

The point is merely that even the concept "Now" necessitates the use of negation. "Now" is not determined negatively as a "this" as opposed to a "that", but it does require negation in the sense that it is neither this nor that. In so far as it does require this negativity it is not immediate but mediated since it is determined by what it is not. In order to maintain its immediacy it must deny this negative determinateness and become an indifferent immediacy. In other words, to be the pure immediate Now it must be completely indifferent to what is now the case. This seems in itself a sufficient condemnation of the claim, but Hegel takes it even further than this. It must, he concludes, be that which applies equally to anything and to everything if it is indifferent to what is. But such a thing is precisely what we call a Universal. In Hegel's words the argument goes like this:

This self-maintaining Now is not immediate but mediated; for it is
determined as permanent and preserved through the fact that another, namely day and night, are not. Thereby it is just as much as before simply Now, and in being this simple fact, it is indifferent to what is still associated with it; just as little as night or day is its being, it is just as truly also day and night; it is not in the least affected by this otherness. A simple entity of this sort, which is through negation, which is neither this nor that, which is a not-this, and with equal indifference this as well as that - a thing of this kind we call a Universal. The Universal is therefore in point of fact the truth of Sense-Certainty.\[21\]

The object, then, is expressed as a universal. But it has already been noted that sense experience can never be of a universal but must always be of the particular. This particular which is the object of immediate sensory intuition is what is claimed as absolute truth in "Sense-Certainty". But the particularity of sensation is contradicted by the universal which expresses it and it is impossible to account for this universal element in experience purely on the basis of the immediacy of sensory intuition. In the opinion \[
\text{meinen}\]
of sense-certainty the particular is the truth. But it is impossible for sense-certainty to express this opinion because language belies the particular and asserts the universal.\[22\] This same argument defeats the claim of sense-certainty in every attempt to assert its truth as the absolute truth. The argument is summed up by Hegel in this way:

Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say, if we bear in mind what we remarked before, the direct opposite of what they mean \[
\text{meinen}\]: a fact which is perhaps best able to bring them to reflect on the nature of the certainty of sense-experience. They speak of the "existence" of external objects, which can be more precisely characterized as actual, absolutely particular, wholly personal, individual things, each of them not like anything or anyone else; this is the existence which they say has absolute certainty and truth. They "mean" this bit of paper I am writing on, or rather have written: but they do not say what they "mean". If they really wanted to say this bit of paper which they "mean", and they wanted to say so, that is impossible, because the This of sense, which is "meant", cannot be reached by language which belongs to Consciousness, i.e. to what is in-itself universal.\[23\]
This argument defeats the claim of sense-certainty for the primacy of the object in the form of immediate particularity as the bastion of truth. This, however, does not complete the argument of sense-certainty, though all of its positions fail for the same basic reason.

That the object does not hold out as the receptacle of truth because the truth is expressed as universal suggests that the truth lies in the other side, in the "I" from whence the universal originates. The next step, then, is to assert the inessentiality of the object and the essentiality of the subject as the repositor of immediate and certain truth:

If we compare the relation in which knowledge and the object first stood with the relation they have come to assume in this result, it is found to have been inverted. The object, which professed to be the essential is now the inessential element of sense-certainty; for the universal, which the object has come to be, is no longer such as it ought to be in essence but the certainty is now found to lie in the opposite element, namely in knowledge, which formerly was the inessential factor. Its truth lies in the object as my object, or lies in the opinion of Meinen; it is, because I know it. Sense-certainty is thus indeed banished from the object, but it is not yet thereby done away with; it is merely forced back into the I...

As has been stated, this claim fails for the same reason as the previous one: it cannot express its truth. The only other alternative is to take the two elements together as the essential and base the claim for the truth of immediacy on this whole.

Sense-certainty discovers by experience, therefore, that its essential nature lies neither in the object nor in the Ego; and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other. For, in the case of both, what I "believe" is rather something inessential; and the object and the Ego are universals, in which that Now and Here and Ego, which I mean do not hold out, do not exist; We arrive in this way at the result, that we have to put the whole of sense-certainty as its essence, and no longer merely one of its moments, as happened in both cases, where first the object as against the I, and the Ego, was to be its true reality. Thus it is
only the whole sense-certainty itself which persists therein as immediacy and in consequence excludes from itself all the opposition which in the foregoing had a place there.\textsuperscript{27}

The truth is now asserted to be the ego, the "I" which is pure sensation which recognizes no multiplicity in its states. But Hegel argues to the effect that even the simple fact of pointing to what is Now requires the notion of a personal identity which persists through time and place — through each Now which succeed each other in the very act of trying to indicate them. "The Now and pointing out the Now are thus so constituted that neither the one nor the other is an immediate simple fact, but a process with diverse moments in it."\textsuperscript{28}

The move at this point is to make the ego into an independent subject which merely "feels" or intuits. This might seem a stage which ought to precede the former but Hegel is showing that the ego taken as universal — as an 'absolute' subject in which subject and object are not distinguished — itself breaks down because in order to maintain itself it must cease to have continuity or self-identity. To be self-identical involves a multiplicity and the indifferent ego must be at least a unity of the manifold of intuition.

So in the argument as Hegel pursues it we find that the attempt to express an immediate sensuous particular results instead in the expression of a universal composed of a multiplicity of elements:

Pointing out [das Aufzeigen] is thus itself the very process which expresses what the Now in truth really is: namely a result, or a plurality of Nows all taken together.\textsuperscript{29} And the pointing out is the experiencing that Now is a universal.\textsuperscript{29}

All of the possible ways by which sense-certainty tries to validate its
claim to truth are shown to ultimately fail on the basis of the inconsistency of trying to express the truth of immediate particularity in the language (or gesture) of universality. The universal cannot be immediate because it is determined by the particular elements which it attempts to negate (as self-subsistent) and encompass. Universality therefore implies mediation. The particular cannot be purely immediate because, as has been shown, the universal is an irreducible element of the experience of it. Therefore, mediation is necessarily an essential element of experience and sense-certainty cannot express essential truth.

e. "Perception": the Particular Subdued.

This same process of the alternating examination of the subject and of the object as candidates for truth is followed throughout the section of "Consciousness" and the method of "immanent critique" is applied to each to demonstrate that each alternative fails to produce what it promises (thereby avoiding a relative disproof from the use of an outside standard).

If we look at "Perception" we will find the use of the same basic technique of examination. Having shown that the truth of "Sense-Certainty" is the universal (which cannot be explained in terms of "Sense-Certainty" because the concept of immediate sensory knowledge is too restrictive), Hegel then goes on to examine the implications that this has in the search for objective truth. In "Perception" there is established the ego as that which connects intuitions and makes them my intuitions - that is, Kant's ego arises now as the universal which binds intuitions and makes them perceptions of an ego. Hegel opens this section in this way:

Perception...takes what exists for it to be a universal. As the Universal is its principle in general, so are the moments immediately distinguished within it also universal; I is a universal, and the
object is a universal. That principle has arisen and come into being for us and our apprehending of perception is, therefore, no longer an appearance of apprehension, as in sense-certainty, but is necessary.30

By "logically necessitated process" Hegel may appear to be overstating his case, but he is probably thinking in Kantian terms and the logical necessity refers to the necessity in a transcendental logic such that the ego necessarily unifies intuitions under categories and thus makes them the experience which an ego has. Without this unification, intuitions would be merely "a contingent series of acts of perception". Thus, in one sense at least, the unifying of these acts is necessary in order for there to be an ego as such and in order for there to be a universal; the manner in which this occurs is demonstrated by the logic developed by Kant.

The object in perception is then "constructed" through the implicit operation of the perceiving consciousness. At this stage the ego is merely passive and only orders intuitions which come to it from that which is external to it. It thus appears that the object is the essential element and the ego the merely inessential, organizing element. The object per se is not affected at all by the activity of the ego and the ego has no power to act except in the possible reception of intuitions and the putting of them into a particular categorial ordering. In this chapter we again find that it is the object which first takes the essential role:

...both the moments distinguished - that which perceives and that which is perceived - are what is inessential. But in point of fact, because both are themselves the universal, or the essence, they are both essential; but since they are related as opposites, only one can in the relation (constituting perception) be the essential moment; and the distinction of essential and non-essential has to be shared between them. The one characterized as the simple fact, the object, is the essence, quite indifferent as to whether it is perceived or not:
perceiving, on the other hand, being the process, is the insubstantial, the inconstant fact, which can be as well as not be, is the inessential moment. 31

The object must account for universality - the universal must be objective.

In perception the universal of Sense-Certainty is finally "perceived" - at first as the "thing with many properties"; that is, it is not merely the apprehension of a this, but of a thing which is composed of properties, e.g. whiteness, cubical shape, tartness, etc.: "...it is only perception that has negation, distinction, multiplicity in its very nature". 32 This negation is true negation and differs from the implicit negation of Sense-Certainty in that it is the distinction of properties such that the perception is of this and not that, e.g. that whiteness is not cubical shape. The negative is not a nothing but is a negative which has a definite content.

The problem here is to save the "thing" and its "properties" from collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions - the contradiction between universal and individual, which it must be both at once. In order to save the appearances it is discovered that the subjective (that of which objectivity is the negation) must take a positive role in the determination of the content of objectivity. The following passage illustrates this idea:

To begin with, then, I am aware of the "thing" as a "one", and have to keep it fixed in this true determination. If in the course of perceiving something crops up contradicting that, then I must take it to be due to my reflection. Now, in perception various different properties also turn up, which seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is a "one"; and we are aware in ourselves that this diversity, by which the thing ceases to be a unity, falls in us. This thing, then, is, in point of fact, merely white to our eyes, also tart to our tongue, and also cubical to our feeling, and so on. The entire diversity of these aspects comes not from the thing, but from us; and we find them falling apart thus from one another, because the organs they affect are quite distinct inter se, the eye is entirely distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are, consequently, the universal medium where such elements get
dissociated, and exist each by itself. By the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection, we preserve and maintain the self-sameness and truth of the thing, its being a "one."\[33\]

In "Consciousness" the claim always put forward is that the object is the arbiter of truth and the subjective is evaluated in terms of what is objectively expressed. In other words, consciousness has not yet come to the recognition of its self as object. The object is the essential as the negation of consciousness and asserts itself as truth. But in the attempt to make this truth consistent, to make it account for universality and necessity, it becomes apparent that mere "objectivity" cannot be sufficient. Empiricism, which is the epistemological truth of "Consciousness" can only be consistent by denying the objective truth of universality and necessity (as Hume does, for example).

If perception, therefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what men hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something illegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the content of which might be otherwise constituted than it is.\[34\]

f. "Understanding": Triumph of the Subjective Universal.

In the chapter on "Understanding", the universal, whose concept has progressively developed in its significance to knowledge, finally becomes the true object of consciousness - but even so it still remains an object, or, in Hegel's own words,

This unconditioned universal, which henceforward is the true object of consciousness, is still object of consciousness; consciousness has not yet grasped its principle, or concept, qua Concept.\[35\]

Understanding grasps what in "Sense-Certainty" is believed and what in "Perception" is perceived\[36\] but this truth, this universal, is made objective.
The attempt is made to "objectify" the universal by placing it behind the "apparent" objective world in the form of laws of nature and the like. In its primitive form it is seen as force [Kraft] - that which lies behind things as their inner reality.

Thus the process, which formerly took the shape of the self-negation of contradictory conceptions, here assumes objective form, and is a movement of force, the result of which is to bring out the "unconditioned universal" as something which is not objective - which is the inner being of things.37

Hegel shows that the notion of force splinters apart into a multiplicity of interacting forces which are brought together in the conception of law - expressed as the "kingdom of laws". However, the conflict between the universal (the kingdom of laws) and the particular is unresolvable without splitting the object of understanding into two distinct worlds - the world of the supersensible (the laws) and the world of appearance. This latter stands between consciousness and the truth of consciousness (the supersensible world) as the knowable manifestation of the supersensible reality. When consciousness penetrates the veil of appearance it discovers that what is real is in fact the universal element that it itself has imposed upon the objective world. The universal which has been traced from its first appearance in "Sense-Certainty" is now revealed in its truth - as subjectivity. In discovering the ultimate truth of "Consciousness", of objectivity and empiricism, consciousness discovers itself and it thereby becomes an object to and for itself; it becomes a self-consciousness. It discovers itself when it discovers that what lies behind particularity, behind appearance, is only the coherence, the universality, for which it itself is responsible.

This curtain [of appearance], therefore, hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner being [the ego] gazing into
the inner realm - the vision of the undistinguished selfsame reality, which repels itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and distinguished inner reality, but as one for which at the same time the two factors have immediately no distinction; what we have here is Self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen.38

The burden of the empirical consciousness is to demonstrate that objectivity as the negative otherness of consciousness is absolute truth. As this claim develops it depends more and more upon the mutual relation between the two sides. The truth of objectivity must have the support of subjectivity or it collapses. In the end, of course, it collapses anyway because the two sides cannot be brought into reciprocal relation so long as the purpose is to establish the truth of objectivity. This gives rise to the notion that truth resides in subjectivity and not objectivity after all. Thus we are transported to the consideration of the truth of self-consciousness in which subject and object present themselves within the basic unity of the ego.

The opening lines of the section on "Self-Consciousness" give a retrospective on the ground just traversed which clearly shows the move from the primacy of the objective in "Consciousness" to that of subjectivity in "Self-Consciousness":

In the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth for consciousness is something other than consciousness itself. The conception, however, of this truth vanishes in the course of our experience of it. What the object immediately was in itself - whether mere being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or force in the case of understanding - it turns out, in truth, not to be this really; but instead, the in-itself proves to be a way in which it is for an other...There has not arisen, however, what was not established in the case of these previous relationships, viz. a certainty which is on a par with its truth, for the certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth. Otherness, no doubt, is also found there; consciousness, that is, makes a distinction; but what is distinguished is of such a kind that consciousness, at the same time, holds there is no distinction made.39
This is an obvious indication that "Consciousness" examines the level of objective otherness which, when it is discovered that the "other" side of consciousness, subjectivity, is essential to the truth of objectivity, the examination is elevated to the level of subjectivity or self-consciousness.

g. "Self-Consciousness": The Complete Subject.

Self-consciousness is shown by Hegel to be a stage in the progress from immediate "otherness" to self-knowledge. Consciousness arrives finally at the stage of "Understanding" where it discovers that the laws and forces which underlie the empirical world are what it itself has put there. What it has discovered thereby is only itself - though it does not recognize that what it finds is itself. Self-consciousness must go through its own stage of immediacy to become explicit self-consciousness. Self-consciousness only becomes self-consciousness through the other. When consciousness progresses to explicit self-consciousness it reverses the previous process and takes itself to be the essential truth and drops the objective other as the inessential. The "truth" which "Consciousness" attempts to realize is founded upon the principle of otherness; the principle that the objective is the essentially real and that this object stands outside and independent of the knowing of reflection; the principle that the objective is the mirror of the subjective and that the truth resides in the subjective act of knowing. In "Self-Consciousness" consciousness is no longer claiming certainty comes through the mediate relation to itself. This subjective bias is expressed through the formula of self-identity. Hegel describes the attainment of this position in this way:

What seems to have been lost, then, is only the principal moment, viz. the simple fact of having independent subsistence for consciousness.
But, in reality, self-consciousness is reflection out of the bare being that belongs to the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return out of otherness. As self-consciousness, it is movement. But when it distinguishes only its self as such from itself, distinction is straightway taken to be superseded in the sense of involving otherness. The distinction is not, and self-consciousness is only motionless tautology, I am I. When for self-consciousness the distinction does not also have the shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for self-consciousness, and is a second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness occupies the position of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the world of sense is conserved as its object, but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself. And, consequently, the sensible world is regarded by self-consciousness as having a subsistence which is, however, only appearance, or forms a distinction from self-consciousness that in-itself has no being. This opposition of its appearance and its truth finds its real essence, however, only in the truth - in the unity of self-consciousness with itself.41

But for Hegel this self-identical consciousness or ego is not merely posited as it is for Fichte; it is developed out of the factual original unity of consciousness which progressively becomes aware of the distinctions within itself. In so far as consciousness remains at the level of pure self-consciousness, otherness can only be inessential objectivity opposed to the essentiality of reflection-into-self which characterizes self-consciousness.

In Self-Consciousness the "other" of ego is seen to be only itself; the object and its "concept" correspond42 because the activity of conceiving is itself the object. At this stage Hegel tells us that "...we have now passed into the native land of truth..."43 - implying that when the process of self-consciousness is completed we will have arrived at the consummation of the search for truth. But this expectation is to be disappointed because Self-Consciousness turns out to be as one sided as "Consciousness" was shown to be. The opposite error is made in "Self-Consciousness" because it takes
the subjective to be the essential and the objective the inessential. The "truth" to which Hegel refers can only mean the truth of "Consciousness" - i.e. that the universal, as an essential element of reality, is a product of reflection. In "Self-Consciousness" this "truth" is elevated to an absolute and the self-conscious ego thereby interprets reality in terms of subjectivity. The real truth will eventually be found in embryo at the end of the chapter "Reason" where the truth of consciousness and the truth of self-consciousness are brought together.

h. The Living Subject.

As in the case of "Consciousness" it is necessary to begin the examination of "Self-Consciousness" at its most basic, most primitive, and hence most immediate manifestation. One would expect that the immediate knowing characterizing primitive self-consciousness would be bare awareness of self as the Fichtean self-identical ego, the I = I. In a sense this is the beginning for self-consciousness. But the beginning is not self-awareness, though it is, in a sense self-consciousness. I = I represents only the implicit meaning of self-consciousness which, as such, only denotes an empty subjectivity turned into itself when the objective fails to hold out as the repository of truth. This emptiness must be filled with a content that will provide an adequate object for reflective subjectivity. The immediate self-identity must become a conscious mediation of one side by the other in order that the subjective can have an object which stands opposed to it (albeit the opposition is itself wholly within the subjective).

Hegel begins the examination of self-consciousness at the level of "life". This is surprising since life does not imply consciousness and it
would appear that Hegel has thus regressed to a point before the beginning of the Phenomenology in the sense-certainty of consciousness. The explanation for this move would seem to be that it was a requirement in order to avoid being stuck within pure individual subjectivity or solipsism. Eventually he must account for the plurality of self-conscious beings. Had he begun with immediate self-awareness, the developing content of the self-aware consciousness would have been a pure self-development and it would have been impossible to generate a plurality of such beings except by fiat. 44

The procedure, therefore, seems to be something like this. The principle of "Consciousness" was otherness or objectivity (considered as distinct from knowing subjectivity). The principle of "Self-Consciousness" is reflection-into-self or subjectivity. Objectivity, as met with in "Consciousness", is lifeless externality; a merely static being which impinges upon sensory receptors. What distinguishes subjectivity from this notion of objectivity is the fact that being-as-subjectivity implies the overcoming of inorganic quiescence, of mere being-in-itself, and becomes the vitality of living being with the principle of self-determination. The living being incorporates the "other", the objective, into itself and thereby maintains itself. It is because the other is, and because it engulfs the other in itself. This dependence upon the other is the manifestation of the nature of life and is what is called desire: "This unity [of self-consciousness with itself] must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is the state of Desire in general."

45 Living things therefore exist for-themselves and it is this character of being-for-itself which is developed in the odyssey of self-consciousness. "Self-Consciousness" does not, therefore, specifically begin with self-consciousness but rather with
subjectivity in general. What is true of life in general will be seen to have its fullest expression in self-conscious life. A fully expressed self-conscious life is in turn the attainment of the principle of Mind or Spirit in general. 46

Being self-conscious means merely to find oneself in the other. Self consciousness can only become a fully expressed self-consciousness when its other is another self-consciousness.

A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. 47

Self-consciousness is that which exists independently for itself. 48 Self-consciousness can only be brought into itself and be truly for itself when the other asserts its independence and thereby negates itself, for the other, as self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness is consciousness of another which is at the same time identical to itself (Hegel expresses this by saying that the other is itself but by this means only that it is another self-consciousness). This identity is only an identity through its genus - through self-consciousness in general. We who observe the process might say that at this point self-consciousness is only aware of the fact that there is self-consciousness. This is what its object is. But so far the object of self-consciousness is an other, i.e. another self-consciousness, and not itself. In order for it to become a self-consciousness in which both sides are truly itself - (where both sides reflect its subjectivity and its objectivity) - the otherness must be negated and forced inward. Only then is self-consciousness aware of itself (self-aware) as independent in the face of the other.
Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First, it has lost its own self, then it finds itself as an other essential being \[\text{Wesen}\]; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essential being, but sees its own self in the other. It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublate the other independent essential being in order thereby to become certain of itself as essential being; secondly, it thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself. ⁴⁹

Both self-consciousnesses are at the level of life for each other. In order to become independent self-consciousness it is necessary to demonstrate that it is not the mere particularity of life which they exhibit, but that they are other than life. ⁵⁰ Therefore, consciousness at this stage must risk its life in an attempt to negate the independence of the other. This gesture demonstrates both that it rejects the other's demand that it be mere life and replaces it with the recognition by the other of its independence, and therefore its self-consciousness as being-for-itself.

The original opposition of self-consciousness to another self-consciousness takes place within the universal of life in which both merely dwell. Hence in "Self-Consciousness" we find an opposite movement to that of "Consciousness", but it is opposite because "Self-Consciousness" represents an inversion of "Consciousness". In the latter the objective was primary and essential while the subjective was the inessential. The objective claimed the epistemological and ontological primacy of the particular and the resulting problem was the assertion of the claim of universality which emanated from the subjective. Every attempt to thwart this claim only strengthened it until particularity itself gave way to the epistemological and ontological claims of the universal in "Self-Consciousness". In "Self-Consciousness" the opposite claim is found. Here sub-
jectivity is primary and with its ascendency is a concomitant declaration of the essentiality and the self-sufficiency of the universal. The other side of this is the denigration of the particular to the inessential - to mere appearance at best.

This universal which we here find expressed in the near indifference of life is, however, an empty universal; and this universal must, to be anything at all, be filled with a content. The problem of "Self-Consciousness", therefore, is to account for and somehow incorporate the demands of particularity (which are needed in order to give filling to - to concretize - the universal). The development of "Self-Consciousness" therefore moves from the universal to the particular - just the reverse of the previous movement of "Consciousness". But there is a difference. The universal here is not the pure, simple universal encountered in the previous section. It is, rather, a universal as the mediation of two extremes which, though opposing each other, are identical in character.

In the first instance "the middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes" - the extremes being, in both cases, consciousness (as a knowing subject). Hegel then tells of the respective status of the two consciousnesses and their mediation through their awareness of themselves:

...each extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. While qua consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as being-for-itself, and is for-itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates.
and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate for-itself essential being, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.\textsuperscript{52}

Self-consciousness here has not attained to self-awareness but only to the status of recognizing that the "object" of its knowledge is another consciousness. Consciousness aware of consciousness is self-consciousness, and in this way self-consciousness has presented itself as the universal which mediates the two sides. But so far neither side has risen above the element of bare subjectivity, of life: "They are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life).\textsuperscript{53} However, in order for consciousness to assert itself as independent and hence as true self-consciousness it must rise above the immediacy of universal life and assert itself as in-itself a true universal and not as a mere inessential element. Hegel's expression of this is as follows:

The presentation of itself, however, as pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as a pure negation of its objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it is not bound at all by the general particularity of existence, and is not tied to life.\textsuperscript{54}

This low-level self-consciousness finds that its reality is a particularity within the universal. But the principle of subjectivity (now advanced to self-consciousness) is universality and if subjectivity is to maintain its truth it must transcend this essential particularity, cast it off into the obscurity of non-essentiality, and rise to the level of true universality. It must, therefore, cast off its essential relation to life.
i. "Master and Slave": The Victory of the Thinking Principle.

This brings the analysis to the famous and influential section dealing with the life and death struggle between self-consciousnesses trying to assert themselves as independent, and the resolution of this conflict in the dichotomy of master and slave. In the life and death struggle the attempt to shed the inhibiting particularity of life in order to attain subjective independence results in the negation of the self as consciousness per se, i.e. it results in death. But Hegel assures us that this is no final resolution to the problem since in death the truth of subjectivity, its universality, is destroyed as well as its particularity: "This trial by death, however, cancels both the truth which was to result from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether."\(^{55}\) The result of this is that

...the middle term [self-consciousness] collapses into a lifeless unity which is broken up into lifeless extremes, merely existent and not opposed. And the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from each other through consciousness; they let one another go quite indifferently, like things. Their act is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sublated.\(^{56}\)

When this attempt at mutual slaughter is recognized for what it is - the absolute denial of the truth of subjectivity - it is finally realized that life is essential for consciousness per se and for the attainment of independent self-consciousness in particular: "In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness.\(^{57}\)

It is apparent that self-consciousness cannot elevate itself to become absolute subject or absolute universal by canceling its participation in the universal of life since that, in effect, cancels itself as well. Neither can it rise to absolute self-consciousness by canceling the participation of
the other in life since that would leave its consciousness devoid of any content through which it can reflect itself and know itself as consciousness, i.e. it could not become a self-consciousness. The alternative is that two moments divide themselves into essential and inessential moments - a turn reminiscent of the methodology of "Consciousness". At first, the essential side is called the master; the inessential side is called the slave.

The master takes on the role of supporting the absolute claims of subjectivity because he exists as pure subjectivity, as pure being-for-itself: "The master is the consciousness that exists for itself...."\(^58\) However, in order for it to realize this pure subjectivity it must accept the mediation of the other consciousness, the slave. The existence-for-self which the master experiences is therefore "...no longer merely the concept of itself, but is a consciousness being for itself, which, through another consciousness, is mediated with itself...."\(^59\) The truth of self-consciousness is thus declared to be the truth of being-for-itself, of pure subjectivity, and the other is reduced to a thing and hence to inessentiality. The thing, as object of desire, is inessential because the slave stands between the master and it, and its independence vis à vis consciousness is eliminated. The slave, as consciousness in the form of being-in-itself, is reduced to the level of a thing and is thereby eliminated from the essentiality of self-consciousness. This, at least, is what is declared to be the case: "In these two moments, the master gets his recognition through an other consciousness, for in them the latter affirms itself as inessential...."\(^60\) It appears, therefore, that the master "...is thus the absolutely essential act in this situation, while the slave is not so, he is an inessential activity."\(^61\)

Self-consciousness implies independence. This is so because self-con-
Consciousness is the assertion of the fundamental essentiality of the universal and any dependence of self-consciousness upon an other (a dependence such that without the other it would not be self-consciousness) must be a dependence upon a particular. It would thus be dragged out of the sublime purity of subjective universality into the mud of objective particularity. The whole point of "Self-Consciousness", however, is just to maintain the claim that subjectivity, the repository of the universal, is an adequate basis for absolute truth. It turns out however that the master is not a self-consciousness which exists independently precisely because the possibility of his self-consciousness is dependent upon the mediation of the "inessential", of the slave.

In all this, the inessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its concept; for, just where the master has realized himself, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not certain of the being-for-himself as the truth; he finds that his truth is rather the inessential consciousness, and the inessential action of itself.62

The master is only a master if there is a slave. Masterhood, and consequently this form of self-consciousness, is therefore dependent. Since the master can only react to the slave, the slave in effect controls the essential nature of the master. The self-consciousness of the master represents the stage of relative objectivity within the subjectivity of Self-Consciousness. This is because the self-consciousness of the master is consciousness of another consciousness. In other words, the object consciousness is an other to itself. The slave, however, is at a higher level because he attains true self-consciousness as consciousness of its own consciousness.63 The slave therefore repre-
sents the subjective stage of self-consciousness - or at least the beginning of the subjective, for the consciousness here is still stuck in objectivity - in things and the world. The next stages develop this subjectivity to its purest form. If the notion of masterhood cannot express the truth of self-consciousness, then the whole conception of the essentiality of the subjective in the determination of truth must collapse unless an alternative is found. The problem to contend with is that the other to essential self-consciousness asserts itself as a thing which is. So long as self-consciousness needs this other then it cannot claim that subjectivity is essential and objectivity (represented by the thing) is inessential. Hegel next turns to the slave as a possibility: "The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the slave."64

The consciousness of the slave is, superficially at least, an unlikely place to look for support of the claim to the truth of subjectivity.65 The slave is sunk into an immediate relation with the world, with particularity, and he is therefore obviously not the truth of the universal. Hegel's analysis, however, is very clever and the examination of the truth exemplified by the slave-consciousness achieves what the master-consciousness could not - true self-consciousness. The master was self-conscious right enough; but his self-consciousness involved the recognition of one consciousness by another. By subduing the other the master encompassed the other within his domain and the other became his object. The difficulty was that he never became his own object, i.e. he never became conscious of himself. In other words, he did not achieve true self-consciousness as self-awareness, but only self-consciousness as a conscious awareness of another consciousness. The achievement of being a self-aware self-consciousness is left to the slave.
The slave becomes a slave, Hegel tells us, through his fear of death at the hands of the master. The master achieves recognition this way and to that extent becomes a self-consciousness. The slave receives no such recognition - he exists only as a thing to the other. The slave is forced to turn away from the conscious other to the world of things, of the non-conscious. The result is that he has no conscious object for him to be conscious of; in other words, he has no chance to be self-conscious by being a consciousness of a consciousness. It is precisely because he has no essential consciousness of himself as independent relative to another consciousness that he is forced to turn to the world of things. His nature as a consciousness held in bondage and servitude is to mediate the self-conscious master with the external other - the world of things. In the process of doing this, the slave works upon the things and transforms them from an alien object to an object of immediate use for the master. So the master in effect is related immediately to the objective. But, as we have seen, in this very immediacy he is dependent upon the slave.

The slave, however, has turned to the world and has worked in it. This process of work transforms the world and changes it in accordance with the idea which the slave sets before himself. A piece of leather stands before the slave as an alien, inanimate object with a form and with qualities totally unrelated to the consciousness of the slave - it is purely what it is in-itself. The slave, however, finds himself forced to work upon this leather and to shape it into an object of use. He has before himself, then, the idea of, e.g. a shoe, and it is his intention to transform the shapeless leather into the thought-determined form of the shoe. In this way the object ceases to be alien to the consciousness which works with it because it
becomes the medium of his own conscious activity. His conscious activity, his purposive labor, is possible only because of the thing and, through the activity of manipulation, the thing becomes taken into the conscious world of the individual subject: "The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self". Subjectivity has thus "over-reached" or encompassed objectivity. But beyond this, subjectivity itself has become objectified and then reflected back and internalized. In other words, self-consciousness has been achieved in which the object provides a true objective content. Thought is made objective by the transformation of the thing in accordance with the subjective intention; the idea has become objective in the form of the shoe and the leather has become subjective by taking the form of the idea of the shoe.

By the fact that the form is objectified, it does not become something other than the consciousness moulding the thing through work; for just that form is his pure being-for-itself, which therein becomes to him the Truth. Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the slave becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a "mind of his own".

"Self- Consciousness" had to recapitulate the movements of "Consciousness" to the point where, as Understanding found its object to be itself because it put the object there, the slave in the same way attains self-consciousness when he realizes that his object is his own thought. This will be replayed yet again in "Reason". In "Self-Consciousness" a dimension was added of activity, of work and labor. In "Reason" self-objectivity together with activity is joined again with an added dimension - sociality. When these are put together in "Reason" the immediate realization of Spirit as Spirit is
achieved.

However, the movement of "Self-Consciousness" is not yet totally complete. The true notion of self-consciousness has been realized and later it will become obvious that the germ of reason lies in this discovery. But self-consciousness has not yet fully asserted its claim for the truth of subjectivity. It is still necessary to see if subjectivity can hold as the ultimate truth. We have arrived at the stage where self-consciousness has been realized as the objectification and re-integration of thought. It is therefore necessary to examine the relation of thought to the world.

d. "Stoicism": Thought Freed of its Object.

Stoicism is the attitude which takes the true to be thought, to be the purely subjective. It essentially denies the objective as a factor involved in truth - it is the inessential moment and thought is essential moment. The leather itself is only a thing; it is a shoe primarily because the shoe was thought.

The manifold, self-differentiating expanse of life, with all its individuation and complication, is the object upon which desire and labour operate. This varied activity has now contracted itself into the simple distinction which is found in the pure process of thought. What has still essential reality is not a distinction in the sense of a determinate thing, or in the shape of a consciousness of a determinate kind of natural existence, in the shape of a feeling, or again in the form of desire and its specific purpose, whether that purpose be set up by the consciousness desiring or by an extraneous consciousness. What has still essential significance here is solely that distinction which is a thought-constituted distinction, or which, when made, is not distinguished from me. 69

Stoicism maintains that in thinking the ego is free because in thinking it is not in contact with any other but has only itself for its object. Thus it arises out of the unfreedom, the untruth, which was the result in the master-slave relationship. Neither master nor slave finds freedom and self
identity through the other, so stoical consciousness seeks it solely in itself. But this is a freedom which has turned solely within itself and it therefore ceases to have any content from a relation to the external. But this freedom and independence from the thing is only illusory for the stoical consciousness because its standard of truth in effect asserts the truth of nothing at all, or, in other words, the truth which it asserts has no content precisely because it has withdrawn into the total self-sufficiency of thought.

Freedom of thought takes only pure thought as its truth, and this lacks the concrete filling of life. It is, therefore, merely the concept of freedom, not living freedom itself; for it is, to begin with, only thinking in general that is its essence, the form as such, which has turned away from the independence of things and gone back into itself... here, by the way in which the concept as an abstraction cuts itself off from the multiplicity of things, the concept has no content in itself; the content is a datum, is given. Consciousness, no doubt, abolishes the content as an external, a foreign existent, by the fact that it thinks it, but the concept is a determinate concept, and this determinateness of the concept is the alien element the concept contains within it. Stoicism, therefore, got embarrassed, when, as the expression went, it was asked for the criterion of truth in general, i.e. properly speaking, for a content of thought itself.70

Therefore consciousness is forced out of the attitude of stoicism because that attitude expresses a determinate content to thought without giving that determination any content.71 If, however, there is determination in thought then there must be something which is determined. But stoicism has declared that thought is sufficient in itself - the pure universality of thought is the only essential element of truth. In order to consistently maintain this it is necessary to deny totally that thought-determinations are in any way dependent upon objective determinations. This attitude is what Hegel terms "Scepticism".
k. "Scepticism": Negative Thinking.

Scepticism is the form of consciousness which asserts its freedom to lie in its own self creation. Yet it finds itself confronted with a determinate world. But anything determinate is an "otherness" which denies its own self creation. Thus it works upon this otherness in a purely negative way and it thereby embodies a dialectic within its negative activity. Because it finds the "external" world to be unstable and changing it uses this as a basis of denying its reality as an other. Each attempt to establish the reality of the external world is met with the negative reaction of positing its opposite and the result is to establish its unreality. Sceptical consciousness thus finds that the otherness which it would ostensibly have standing fixed and determinate is transformed into a world of flux and change. Through this negating activity, this dialectic, it managed to eliminate the possible otherness which would stand opposed to it and deny its subjective essentiality. In this way it finds freedom in the form of independence.

Dialectic as a negative process, taken immediately as it stands, appears to consciousness, in the first instance, as something at the mercy of which it is, and which does not exist through consciousness itself. In Scepticism, on the other hand, this negative process is a moment of self-consciousness, which does not simply find its truth and its reality vanish, without self-consciousness knowing how, but rather which in the certainty of its own freedom, itself makes this other, so claiming to be real, vanish...By means of this self-conscious negation, self-consciousness procures for itself the certainty of freedom for itself, brings about the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it into the truth. What vanishes is what is determinate, the difference which, no matter what its nature or whence it comes, sets up to be fixed and unchangeable. The difference has nothing permanent in it, and must vanish before thought because to be differentiated just means not to have being in itself, but to have its essential nature solely in an other.
The sceptical consciousness has retreated to the haven of pure subjectivity and thereby rests content with the truth of its universality. At least that is its intention. In order to arrive at this state, however, it was necessary for it to deny any claim to universality on the part of the external other. According to Hegel's analysis of the claim to truth which this consciousness put forward, the actual result of what it attempted was to split its world into two opposite poles. What self-consciousness in the form of scepticism produced was, in effect, a re-assertion of the dichotomy between Parnenidean and Heraclitean worlds. Since universality is here taken as the essential ingredient in truth, any claim by the external world which would threaten the truth of subjectivity must be the claim that the external world is itself a repository of universality. If that claim could be eliminated then the external world would sink to pure particularity and hence to pure inessentiality. It could, therefore, be dismissed and self-consciousness would be assured of its independence, its freedom, and its truth.

The external world stands before consciousness as secure, enduring and substantial thereby making claim to having universal content. Scepticism, however, recognized that this substantial nature manifests itself as a constant series of change and flux. Scepticism takes this manifestation to be the essential nature of the world rather than its mere appearance and it denigrates substance and reduces it to the realm of appearance. By thus relinquishing the external other of its substantial nature it has freed itself from an objectivity which would deny its truth.

Sceptical self-consciousness thus discovers, in the flux and alternation of all that would stand secure in its presence, its own freedom, as given by and received from its own self.73
Although self-consciousness here has appeared to have validated its claim to truth, the real truth is that the world of unstable appearance is the result of the negating, dialectical action of consciousness itself: "...consciousness itself is thorough-going dialectical restlessness...." The impact of this is that self-consciousness has in fact split itself into two opposing sides - the consciousness which asserts its self-identity and independence and the consciousness which dialectically throws the world, and thereby itself, into constant change and instability. The latter world which it tries to create in order to save its own truth destroys itself by making itself changeable and hence not enduring universality. The former world it finds necessary in order for it to be, but in so doing it negates its subjective truth and the world thereby stands before it as a substantial universal. Thus essentiality and inessentiality become confused and self-consciousness breaks itself apart.

This form of consciousness is, therefore, the aimless fickleness and instability of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of self-same self-consciousness, to the other contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. It finds its freedom, at one time, in the form of elevation above all the whirling complexity and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, at another time, likewise confesses to falling back upon what is inessential, and to being taken up with that. It lets the unessential content in its thought vanish; but in that very act it is the consciousness of something inessential. It announces absolute disappearance but the announcement is, and this consciousness is the evanescence expressly announced. It announces the nullity of seeing, hearing, and so on, yet itself sees and hears. It proclaims the nothingness of essential ethical principles, and makes those very truths the sinews of its own conduct. Its deed and its words belie each other continually; and itself, too, has the doubled contradictory consciousness of immutability and same¬ness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself.
1. "The Unhappy Consciousness": Apotheosis and Estrangement.

Hegel's analysis of the sceptical consciousness has an obvious historical orientation in the post-Aristotelian scepticism of Pyrrho and his school. Likewise, in the discussion of Stoicism, the reference to Marcus Aurelius and to Epictetus are unmistakable in the statement that "the essence of this consciousness is to be free, on the throne as well as in fetters...." But such explicit references are all too rare and their absence helps to add to the enigmatic nature of much of Hegel's discussions. However, though the specific historical reference is perhaps useful and illuminating, it is also beside the point so far as Hegel is concerned. One might speculate that such references are intentionally lacking in order to emphasize that the discussion is about the viability of a given attitude of consciousness toward reality and is not expected to depend upon contingent historical circumstances. The question of the adequacy or inadequacy of a claim to truth is answered by examining the logic of its position and not its historical success.

So far all of the various attempts of consciousness to assert its subjectivity as an independent entity containing its subjectivity and its own objectivity have come to grief because of the irreconcilable claims of particularity. Even the pure universality of thought must be the thought of something and this determination of thought contradicts its claim to being the pure universal. The divided consciousness which has resulted from the self-contradictory self-consciousness of Scepticism now manifests itself in the attempt to overcome this contradiction within subjective self-consciousness. The form this takes in the Phenomenology is of the religious consciousness which separates the believer from the believed. There ought to be no
necessity that this "unhappy consciousness" is a Christian religious consciousness for the same analysis should hold good for any consciousness in which beliefs are held which are contradicted by what the nature of the object of belief really is.\textsuperscript{78}

In this Unhappy Consciousness we find the ultimate form which self-consciousness can take before the claim to subjectivity finally breaks down with nowhere to go to salvage its truth. In the transitions from the consciousness of the master through those of the slave, the stoic, and the sceptic, we have seen the progression from a self-consciousness oriented toward relative objectivity to the subjective self-consciousness. Both sides have failed to hold out and the third alternative, the express unity of the two, is now represented by the Unhappy Consciousness. In this state the unity of subjective self-consciousness persists but it is internally divided against itself. Hegel describes it thus:

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... \text{while being an undivided consciousness, it is a double consciousness. It is itself the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its own essence; but objectively and consciousness it is not yet this essence itself - is not yet the unity of both.}\textsuperscript{79}
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In the beginning of self-consciousness consciousness was only aware of another consciousness. This however did not give consciousness what it wanted - the certainty that in its own self it was the essence of truth as the pure universal. In order to maintain this truth it was forced to deny the particularity which the other implied by retreating further and further into itself. Finally, when particularity itself could not be avoided, it attempts to overcome it by encompassing it within itself. Here in the contradictory self-consciousness it wavers to and fro between the universal self-identical ego
which it wants to be and the changing particularity in which it is. The move to overcome this contradiction takes the form which we have seen in previous forms of consciousness, i.e. it asserts one side then the other to be the essential opposed to the inessentiaity of its opposite. For example in the first instance we find the following move:

Since, in the first instance, it is the immediate unity of both, while for it they are not one and the same, but opposed, it takes one, namely, the simple unalterable, as essential, the other, the manifold changeable as the inessential. For it, both are essences foreign to each other. Itself, because consciousness of this contradiction, assumes the aspect of changeable consciousness and is to itself the inessential; but as consciousness of unchangeableness, of the simple essence, it must, at the same time, proceed to free itself from the inessential, i.e. to free itself from itself. 80

This is the familiar structure of taking each possibility and examining it as a claim for the essential element of the truth claimed by consciousness. In the case of "Consciousness" the problem was to try to find truth in the particular and the evolution of consciousness through sense-certainty, perception and understanding saw the progressive claims of the universal and the vain attempts to account for this element in experience purely in terms of particularity. In "Self-Consciousness" the opposite is the case. The universal seems at first to be all that is needed to account for experience. But the attempt to maintain this truth runs into various ways in which the universal can only maintain itself through its essential dependence upon what is not universal - upon the particular. 81 The point at which we have now arrived, at the Unhappy Consciousness, both of these sides of the opposition have been taken up within consciousness itself in order to eliminate any claim coming from an external other. Implicitly the result is that universality and particularity have been united as mutually essential
elements of the truth of experience. At this point the awareness of this mutual essentiality has not yet been developed but the germ of the truth is there. The position, as Hegel describes it, is found to be thus:

...although the "unhappy consciousness" does not possess this actual presence, it has, at the same time, transcended pure thought, so far as this is the abstract thought of Stoicism, which turns away from particulars altogether, and again the merely restless thought of Scepticism - so far, in fact, as this is merely particularity in the sense of aimless contradiction and the restless process of contradictory thought. It has gone beyond both of these; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure thought itself. It rather stands midway, at the point where abstract thought comes in contact; it is the union of pure thought and individuality; and this thinking individuality or pure thought also exists as object for it, and the unchangeable is essentially itself an individual existence. But that this its object, the unchangeable, which assumes essentially the form of particularity, is its own self, the self which is particularity of consciousness - this is not established for it.82

When this does become established for it consciousness will recognize itself as both particularity and as universality, and as both subjectivity and as objectivity. Ultimately, it is when the individual discovers himself as essentially in society and an essential element of society that the complete mediation of universal and particular, of subject and object finally takes place. At that moment consciousness knows the truth and the truth is what is. The attainment of this is through the stage of "Reason" and the result is the elevation of consciousness to Spirit.

So Self-Consciousness is set forth as truth - the whole truth - and the external other of "Consciousness" is regarded as mere appearance. The process of "Self-Consciousness" traces the truth of this claim and demonstrates, eventually, that in itself Self-Consciousness cannot stand as the whole truth anymore than "Consciousness" could.83 The truth is ultimately
the union of self-consciousness with consciousness. This truth is finally achieved at the stage of Reason - the stage when consciousness recognizes itself (hence self-consciously) to be all reality and that objectivity is nothing other than itself. Reason is the truth of subjectivity and the truth of objectivity. In the development from "Consciousness" to "Reason"

There appeared two aspects, one after the other; the one where the essential or the true had for consciousness the determination of being, the other where it had being for consciousness. But both were reduced to one truth, that what is, or the real in-itself, only is in so far as it is an object for consciousness, and that what is for consciousness is also in-itself.

The course of the Phenomenology to "Reason" is the demonstration of the essential unity of identity and difference; that ego and non-ego are not different but fall within the unity of the same substance. Ego and non-ego, or subject and object, or thought and being, or mind and matter, are not only negative aspects of the same substance, but that unifying substance is itself the consciousness in which the distinction falls:

While this negative factor appears in the first instance as a dissimilarity between ego and object, it is just as much the dissimilarity of the substance with itself. What seems to take place outside it, to be an activity directed against it, is its own activity; and substance shows that it is essentially subject.

This truth raised to the level of knowledge and of truth is Spirit. Kant was wrong because he failed to see that all reality falls within the unity of the absolute subject. Hegel criticizes him in the opening section of "Reason" in the following way:

To put it otherwise, the category [the transcendental ego] means this, that being and self-consciousness are essentially the same; the same not as a matter of comparison, but in and for themselves. It is only
a one-sided, unsound idealism which lets this unity again appear on one side as consciousness, with a reality in-itself over against it on the other. 86

This, then is the basic movement and conclusion of the Phenomenology, but we have yet to see how this demonstration can satisfy the demands of rationality. The next step must be to examine how this basic truth is worked out from its bare, immediate appearance to become the final overcoming of the dualistic dilemma.
CHAPTER 4
THE ORIGINS OF RATIONALITY: THE ORGANIC VIEW OF THE WORLD

a. The Truth of Reason: Elevation to Transcendental Idealism.

The point that has now been reached in the Phenomenology is "Reason". Here the oppositions between the truths of objectivity and of subjectivity are overcome and the real truth, as the unity of the two, is finally realized. In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel has described the problem as we have seen it developed in the body of the text. Here it is clearly laid out and exemplified in historical terms. He begins by expounding upon the importance of the negative activity of mind in cancelling the immediacy of the objective and transforming it into a mediated knowledge. This, then, is the overcoming of "Consciousness" by "Self-Consciousness" - it is the gaining of freedom and independence through the negation of dependence upon the external objective. He describes it as follows:

But that an accident as such, when cut loose from its containing circumference, - that what is bound and held by something else and actual only by being connected with it, - should obtain an existence all its own, gain freedom and independence on its own account - this is the portentous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of pure ego.¹

This negative action of mind, of thought, of subjectivity, is a necessary moment in the development of true knowledge. By means of it consciousness is transported out of the immediacy of the objective where negativity or mediation is only between objective "thises" and "thats" to an inwardness
in which mediation is a subjective fact existing for itself. Hegel says this a few sentences later:

it is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being. That power is just what we spoke of above as subject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance, cancels abstract immediacy, i.e. immediacy which merely is, and, by so doing, becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this mediation itself. 

We are then led immediately into the historically oriented description of the problem and the process as we have so far encountered it:

This process of making what is presented a property of pure self-consciousness, of raising it to the level of universality in general, is merely one aspect, not the completed development. The manner of study in ancient times is different from that of the modern world, in that the former consisted in the cultivation of the natural consciousness. Testing life carefully at all points, philosophizing about everything it came across, the former created an experience permeated through and through by universals. In modern times, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready made. In straining to grasp it and make it his own, he rather strives to bring forward the inner meaning alone, without any process of mediation; the production of the universal is abridged, instead of the universal arising out of the manifold detail of concrete existence. Hence nowadays the task before us consists not so much in getting the individual clear of the stage of sensuous immediacy, and making him a substance that thinks and is grasped in terms of thought, but rather the very opposite: it consists in actualizing the universal, and giving it spiritual vitality, by the process of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts.

At the stage of reason we have in fact come to the realization that universality must be conjoined with objective particularity; in other words, the unification of subject and object has been implicitly achieved and its achievement has also meant the implicit recognition of the essential truth of the "concrete universal". This might be put otherwise by saying that consciousness has, in "Reason", implicitly grasped the truth of the mediat-
ing power of the Concept. 4

In the opening section of this stage of consciousness we find that consciousness in the form of reason has come to assert its own essential reality and that it thus brings the objective within itself. At the beginning, however, this unity exists only as a synthetic unity which merely subsumes within the unifier (the self or ego) an objective universality and a subjective individuality. This rational consciousness recognizes that the objective universality is precisely the truth of the individual, but, as we shall see, this unity is an artificial one - it is the unity brought about by subjective idealism (Fichte, Kant and perhaps Berkeley). Thus, the previous negative attitude of consciousness in its concern for its independence and freedom from the "other" is seen to involve the denial of its essential nature. As a result it turns into a positive attitude in which all reality becomes nothing else but itself; this is the attitude of idealism: "Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is reality. This is how Idealism expresses its Concept." 5

Reason is consciousness in its truth. In the beginning, however, just as in all of the other claims to truth made previously, this truth is expressed as an immediate certainty. The expression of this immediate certainty is found in the exclamation of idealism that "I am I" is posited as certain of its truth. It is interesting to note what the Phenomenology has achieved at this point. At the level of "Reason" we have finally arrived at the starting point of Fichte and Schelling, i.e. the unity of subject and object within the subjective. "Consciousness" examines the objective as the analogue to Fichte's non-ego and the analysis of that section was the analysis of the possibility of this non-ego to represent a self-contained world which
was merely "known". "Self-Consciousness" was the other side of the coin. It looked at the possibility of the pure ego, the Cartesian cogito, to be the essence of the real. In that sense it is the pure Fichtean self-identical (but not self-opposed) ego. "Reason" is the Fichtean and Schellingian (and Kantian) subject - object or unity of the ego with itself in its pure subjectivity but as "creator" of objects. By showing how the notion of consciousness develops to this point, Hegel avoids the pitfall of Fichte. Fichte began with the fact of the intuitive certainty of the self-identity of consciousness. But the recognition that a thing is identical with itself, though indisputable, presupposes the reflective thought of something - be that thing only itself. This, in turn, pre-supposes thought as primary and self-consciousness thereby originates in thought for Fichte. Thus the external objective always remains an unapproachable other to it. Hegel, on the contrary, develops consciousness to the point of the awareness of its subject - object unity. Hegel here criticizes Fichte for having started at this point and for not having developed the essential subjectivity and objectivity out of the primitive unity of consciousness itself. Hegel's criticism is that "the consciousness, which is this truth, has forgotten the process by which this result has been reached; the pathway thereto lies behind it." This idealism therefore cannot "...understand its own nature [or] make itself intelligible to any one else". It announces "I am I" as an intuitive certainty, but in saying this it also "sanctions the truth of the other certainty, viz. there is for me an other" and this other has equal claim to the assertion. What is not recognized by this idealism is that "only when reason comes forward as a reflection from this opposite certainty does its assertion regarding itself appear in the form not merely of a certainty and an assurance, but of a truth - and a truth not alongside others, but the only truth".
In a similar vein Hegel criticizes Kant. We have already seen how Hegel chastizes Kant for not having deduced his categories but for having put them forth in the manner of mere givens. He continues this criticism by maintaining that the transcendental ego, being a pure unity — what Hegel calls the Category — is, in effect, the essential nature of the specific categories. But these latter contradict the former since they contain, among them, difference and not pure unity. The pure Category thus "sublates" them by being their negative unity. This, however, is merely to exclude them from itself and thus set itself off in opposition to them. The result is that it thereby creates an other for itself, an other which is its self-alienced self — the different categories themselves becoming the objective content. The result is the establishment of a new Category — individuality — which stands in relation to an other — the "schema". Hegel says that the result is the affirmation of pure consciousness in a two-fold form, but without the necessary recognition that the essence of this duality is the self as a whole which encompasses unity within diversity.

We see pure consciousness here affirmed in a twofold form. In one case it is the restless activity which passes hither and thither through all its moments, seeing in them that otherness which is sublated in the process of grasping it; in the other case it is the imperturbably unity certain of its own truth. That restless activity constitutes the "other" for this unity, while this unity is the "other" for that activity: and within these reciprocally determining opposites: consciousness and object alternate. Consciousness thus at one time finds itself seeking about hither and thither, and its object is the pure in-itself and essence; at another time consciousness is aware of the simple category and the object is the movement of the different elements. Consciousness, however, as the essence, is this whole process itself of passing out of itself qua simple category into individuality and the object, and of viewing this process in the object, cancelling it as distinct, appropriating it as its own, and declaring itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its object.
This beginning stage of rational consciousness thus involves again the splitting up of consciousness into two opposing sides, although both sides originate now from the primary unity of the self. We saw earlier how this Kantian-Fichtean standpoint attempted to assert the primary unity of subject and object within the subject but was forced to abrogate this unity by postulating an other which stands opposed to the unity of the subjective subject-object. This is the point at which we have now arrived. Because of this essential split which occurs necessarily out of the postulated original unity, any re-establishment of the unity will necessarily reassert the opposition again. It is the nature of this subjective unity that it have an alien other opposed to it. The philosophical development of this idea is Romanticism because there is an inherent longing for unity but a necessary infinite striving in its quest. This situation is clearly summed up by Hegel in the following quotation which leads into the first section of the examination of "Reason":

[This subjective idealism] falls into a direct contradiction; it asserts that the real has a twofold nature, consists of elements in sheer opposition, is the unity of apperception and a "thing" as well; whether a thing is called an alien impact [i.e. Fichte], or an empirical entity, or sensibility, or the "thing in itself", it remains in principle precisely the same, viz. something external and foreign to that unity.

This idealism falls into such a contradiction because it asserts the abstract notion of reason to be the truth. Consequently, reality comes directly before it just as much in a form which is not strictly the reality of reason at all, whereas reason all the while is intended to be all reality. Reason remains, in this case, a restless search, which in its very process of seeking declares that it is utterly impossible to have the satisfaction of finding. But actual concrete reason is not so inconsequent as this. Being at first merely the certainty that it is all reality, it is in this notion well aware that qua certainty, qua ego, it is not yet in truth all reality; and thus reason is driven on to raise its formal certainty into actual truth, and give concrete filling to the empty "mine".
Hegel's critique is ingenious and convincing. But it is not enough for him to merely give a critique. Unless he can show a way out of the contradiction, especially now that he has brought his own analysis to the same point, his pronouncement will carry no more weight than any other.

In the section of "Reason" Hegel sets himself precisely this task. In "Reason" we find the way out of the problem of subject and object and we find that the way out is precisely parallel to the way in. "Reason" will retrace the steps taken by "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness", but it will do so with the developed knowledge that Reason itself represents the whole of reality. In its first stages this self-aware progression begins with the attempt to prove its truth through "observation" of itself in the world. In other words, it attempts to find that the external world is merely a manifestation of itself.

b. Observational Reason I: Concrete Immediacy.

In observation the rational consciousness looks for itself in the world. This rationalistic attitude is not what is traditionally regarded as rationalism. It does not seek for certainty in a priori truths of discursive reason. This is the kind of rationalism which is based upon epistemological claims as to what is the source and nature of absolutely sure and certain knowledge. Reason, as an activity of consciousness, does seek certainty and truth, but, in Hegel's examination of it, it does so because Reason lies at the bottom of what is - it is the nature of Being itself.

"Observation" is the rational consciousness which seeks the truth of itself, of Reason, in the immediate objective. It is, therefore, the same attitude as found in "Consciousness" and Hegel describes it as such:
This consciousness, which takes being to mean what is its own, now seems, indeed, to adopt once again the attitude of "meaning" and "perceiving"; but not in the sense that it is certain of what is a mere "other", but in the sense that it is certain of this "other" being itself.  

There is, of course, a difference between the primitive state of Consciousness and that to which we have now arrived. Now consciousness does not merely "sense" what is given to it, rather, "...it itself settles the observations to be made and the experience to be had". 

Reason thus seeks to find itself in the world, it seeks to find that the world itself is purely Reason. Rational Consciousness turns toward the world because it feels that its own reality goes deeper than its being in the form of a transcendental ego of pure unity. Thus it tries to find itself as a concrete object. In observation it is believed that the activity in which consciousness engages is merely the passive activity of "finding" itself in the world as a thing. What it does, however, is to make the thing into a thought-constituted being, or, in other words, it makes thought into an existent thought, a thing. Thus, though the attitude is intended to be one of passivity as in "Consciousness", the reality is one of activity and work as in "Self-Consciousness", particularly as found in the slave-consciousness. But here again it is found at a different, higher level. In its earlier form, consciousness sought independence for itself in order to become self-conscious, and it became independent self-consciousness when it discovered itself through work and action. In Reason this independence eventually becomes negated and transformed into the truth of the individual who works with others. Reason, in the end, brings together the truth of "Consciousness" with the truth of "Self-Consciousness". By so
doing it brings together the truth of objectivity with the truth of subjectivity, of particularity and universality, of immediacy and mediation, and the result is Spirit itself as the certainty and truth of this developed unity.

The most basic form of Observation is that which merely observes nature in general as though there were no essential differences between the kinds of natural objects which there are. It sees inorganic and organic nature as essentially the same.

The beginning of the analysis takes off from a standpoint analogous to that of "Sense-Certainty" because it in essence makes sensory knowledge the most basic kind of knowledge. But in fact "...it has really and rationally determined for itself already the object thus sensuously apprehended". This primary sensuous particular is unsatisfying for the observational consciousness since what it is seeking is the universal. However, at this point the only universal it can find is the universal of self-identity - of the empirical ego. It is, at this point, at the level of "Sense-Certainty" in the aspect of reflection. It does not, however, as yet understand what the object is. The object, so far, is only expressible as a universal in terms of "recollection" - which is an activity of consciousness. The ego, because of its unity through its self-identity, is able, superficially at least, to put universality into the thing by means of recollecting it. Thus the process is so far taking place only in consciousness and "...not as yet a process effected in the object itself". The process, as a process of recollection is thus only able to take place as a describing (since it can at least describe what is seen to subsist as self-identical). The result is found in the "sciences"
which are concerned with description and classification as pure activities for their own sake; - Hegel probably has in mind here those of his age, like Linneaus and Cuvier, who were engaged in the process of classifying everything under a devised schema. But this classifying of things by "distinguishing marks", "sex characteristics", or whatever, becomes self-confusing because of the overlap of classes and other anomalies which do not fit into any neat classification. Also, in this process the object itself gets lost in the endless activity of seeking to describe and classify more and more objects - it seems that it is the activity itself which becomes important²⁰ and its original purpose is forgotten.

The difficulty is that the ploy used in the preceding levels of consciousness cannot be used here. Whereas, in "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness" the truth was taken to be one side of the opposition between the subjective and objective aspects, this is no longer the case; the truth of Reason must take into account both claims. It is therefore no longer possible to distinguish or separate the sides into essential and inessential and attempt to support these respective claims of essentiality. In "Reason" both sides are known to be essential. Therefore, when it is claimed that certain things are essential for knowledge, i.e. the intellectually derived classificatory schema, the implication arises that this must also be essential to the thing which is classified (otherwise the rationale of the procedure would be rather difficult to establish and justify). Hegel explains that

This twofold essentiality produces a certain hesitation as to whether what is essential and necessary for knowledge is also so in the case of the things. On the one hand, the qualifying "marks" have merely to serve the purpose of knowledge in distinguishing things inter se;
on the other hand, however, it is not the inessential quality of things that has to be known, but that feature in virtue of which they themselves break away from the general continuity of being as a whole, separate themselves from others and are for themselves. The distinguishing "marks" must not only have an essential relation to knowledge but also be the essential characteristics of things, and the system of marks devised must conform to the system of nature itself, and merely express this system. This follows necessarily from the concept of reason....

At a certain level this method of descriptive observation may appear to work well and it may appear to be expressing something of the essential nature of knowledge and of things. Reason, however, is looking for a universal principle, one which is true of all of nature because it has not, as yet, made a fundamental distinction within nature.

Once one gets below the level of plant life, however, a difficulty arises in that the things do not distinguish themselves by their activity "as in sexual reproduction, use of claws or teeth, etc.), but are only distinguishable chemically. A chemical analysis, however, loses the thing as it is in itself. A thing in the chemical sense is different from a thing in the natural sense. A confusion then results as to whether the chemical properties constitute the object or whether they merely express the thing as it appears to us to be. If the first is the case then the thing becomes no longer distinguishable from other things; in fact, it is not a thing at all. If the thing is taken as the thing as it appears, then it remains self-identical, but in that case it is incapable of being distinguished in terms of essential properties, i.e. it cannot be classified. Here we are considering a parallel attitude with that of "perception" and its concern with the "thing and its properties". In that case the universal element was denied by the particular in order to keep the truth of objectivity. In the present case both sides are recognized as necessary and the attempt is to do justice
to particularity within the necessary claims of the universal. But here we find that when we determine the thing in its essential universal characteristics, i.e. as classified and described, we lose the thing in its particularity or individuality. When we keep to it as a thing, as a particular, we are unable to account for its participation in the universal.

The classificatory system of description will not work because it attempts to make nature correspond to a universalizing system of thought. "Reason" thus passes over to the parallel level of "Understanding" in which "...it seeks after the law and the concept of law". Hegel has attempted to show that systems of classification exemplify an attempt to maintain that what is essential for knowledge is also what is essential for the object of knowledge. It recognizes the principle of Reason, i.e. that both sides - subject and object - are equally essential, but it universalized what it found in one side and assumed that it must be equally true for the other. We have yet to come to a realization of the essential and necessary reciprocity between the two. This truth is not yet to be realized in the search for Laws; for here the opposite mistake is made (again!). The laws sought for have dropped their subjective determination and they are looked for as essential properties of the objective, but they are supposed to be found as rationally necessary and universal. The intention is to link up universality and particularity by finding universal laws in the world.

To the consciousness observing, the truth of the law is given in "experience", in the way that sense existence is object for consciousness; the truth is not given in and for itself. If, however, the law does not have its truth in the concept, it is something contingent, not a necessity, in fact, not a law. But its being essentially in the form of a concept does not merely not contradict its being present for observation, but really gives it on that account necessary existence, and makes it an object for observation. The universal in the sense of a rational universality is also universal in the sense implied in the above concept: its being is for consciousness, it presents itself there
as the real, the objective present; the concept sets itself forth in the form of thinghood and sensuous being.23

Because the laws which observation seeks are determined by the objective, i.e. since they are expected to be found as a fact in the world, they will ultimately not stand up to what is demanded of them. But by placing them in the world observation has gone beyond the attempt to found them in the subjective. At the present level they are at least "for consciousness"; that is, they present themselves as something which in fact is and not merely what ought to be. Therefore, their universal validity is a fact looked for in the world and is not, as for Kant and Fichte, something which should be there but which is not something actually met with in experience.

Consciousness takes the law to be something real as such. However, it persists as an external other which stands over against consciousness. But, Hegel tells us, consciousness contradicts itself by taking the law to apply to every sensuous individual with necessity. This is a contradiction because the individual can only give one instance of the law, not the necessity of the law itself. The law, on this basis, can only assume the aspect of probability; but since consciousness is seeking a universal reality, it applies to the individual cases an inductive generalization in order to make the laws universally valid. Induction, however, can never establish universal necessity so the certainty of universal necessity cannot come from the mere accumulation of individual instances. It must therefore come from the concept of the law itself. Without this factor there would be no way to go from the particular to the universal. We are told by Hegel that

Consciousness thus finds in experience the being of the law, but also has it there as concept; and only because of both factors together is the law true for consciousness. The law, therefore, is accepted as a
law because it presents itself in appearance and is, at the same time, in its self, a concept.24

Rational consciousness knows that both sides must be brought together - that the concept or subjective element must be brought to correspond with the experiential or objective element. The attempt to establish this by further and further experimentation may seem to be an attempt to immerse oneself further and further into the sensuous, but, Hegel tells us, the real effect is to drive out the sensuous object by reducing the kinds of objects with their varying manifestations of different laws to fewer and fewer laws. Hegel's example is that what at one time were considered to be different forms of electricity, each related to some particular kind of object (his examples are of "resin electricity" and "glass electricity") are discovered to be different characteristics of a more general thing, i.e. positive and negative electricity.25 A modern example of this sort of "instinct of reason in this type of consciousness"26 might be the search for a unified field theory. Whether this is the case or not, the point Hegel wants to make is that the experimenter is inevitably drawn further and further from the grounding of the law in sensuous things to greater and greater abstraction and universality. Finally, we are told, the concept of "matter"27, as the universal being in which the laws reside, takes the investigation out of the realm of sense altogether:

Matter...is not a thing that exists, it is being in the sense of universal being, or being in the way of the concept. Reason, still instinctive, correctly draws this distinction without being conscious that it, by the very fact of its testing the law in every sensuous being, cancels the merely sensuous being of the law; and, when it construes the moments of the law as forms of matter, their essential nature is taken to be something universal, and specifically expressed as a non-senuous element of sense, an incorporeal and yet objecting being.28
As a result of this development we are transported out of the attempt to observe nature in general because we have, in the attempt, been driven out of the sensuous world entirely into the realm of what Hegel calls "pure law":

As the outcome and truth of this experimentation we find pure law, which is freed from sensuous being; we see it as a concept, which, while present in sense, operates there independently and unrestrained, while enveloped in sense, is detached from it and is a concept bare and simple. 29

In the observation of nature the attempt was to find the laws to which the objective world corresponded. It did seek the laws in nature but it sought them as universal and therefore as that which brought nature as a whole together. Unfortunately it came about, according to Hegel's analysis, that not all of nature could be totally adequately explained in terms of laws which were external to the object. The next step is to see the pure law as self-maintaining and self-determining. This is the activity of organic nature.

c. Observational Reason II: The Organic View of the World.

The pure law which has been freed from sensuous elements now becomes the object of consciousness. The transition this produces to the observation of organic nature is not entirely clear but, as will be discussed, the organic view of the world is clearly of much more universal validity for Hegel than the mechanistic. Indeed, the organic model is retained throughout the Hegelian metaphysics as the basic explanatory model. The transition at this point is, perhaps, brought about through the insufficiency of the attempt to explain the conjunction of the objective with the subjective on the basis of laws working externally to the lawful object (or subject). 30

The organic is that which sustains itself through its internal relations.
The inorganic thing can only be externally related if it is to become a determinate thing. But the process of thus determining it swallows it up into an unconnected universality in which the thing becomes lost. The organic, however, determines itself in the sense that in it

...all determinate characteristics, by means of which it is palpable to another, are held under the control of the simple organic unity; none of them comes forward as essential and relates itself freely to an other being. What is organic, therefore, preserves itself in its very relation.31

We see here that the distinction between essential and inessential is overcome and superseded by the very concept of organicism. This, of course, has yet to be made explicit.

The first attempt at observation of organic nature is to relate it to inorganic nature. It is an attempt to discover the necessary and sufficient inorganic or external factors which delineate one organic type from another. As in the preceding mode of observation, the "...individuated nature is at once dissolved..."32 and the inorganic, the "individuated unit of nature"33 become separate elements existing independently of each other: "Air, water, earth, zones and climate are universal elements of this sort...."34 The law, which is the object of this observing consciousness becomes the relation between these natural inorganic units (which are only partial abstractions) and the organic being. But, Hegel points out in a manner reminiscent of Aristotle, there can be no necessary and sufficient conditions which relate organisms to environment; that e.g. "...animals in northerly climates have thick coats of hair..."35, etc. This is true for two reasons; first, there are exceptional cases, and second, "...even though we do find as a fact a thick coat of hair associated with northerly latitudes,...there is nothing in the concept of the
North implying the concept of a thick covering of hair..."\(^{36}\) - just what Aristotle would call an "accidental attribute", e.g. that it is hot in the Dog Days (because even though this situation should sometime fail to occur, that is not seen as a contradiction). This "necessity" has no inner necessity at all and Hegel concludes that it

...can no longer be comprehended as inner essence: has also ceased to have senuous existence and can no longer be observed in actuality but has stepped outside it. Finding thus no place in the real essence itself, it becomes what is called a "teleological relation", a relation which is externally related, and consequently the very opposite of a law. It is an idea entirely freed from the necessity of nature, a thought which leaves this necessity of nature behind and moves beyond it to be for itself.\(^{37}\)

It is discovered, then, that when relating the organic to the inorganic it is not possible to express thereby the true nature of the organic in terms of natural conditions. In the attempt, however, it is found that "...its true being, the concept of Purpose, on the other hand, does contain it...."\(^{38}\) Although at this preliminary stage it does not understand this purpose as its essence but only as an external relation, consciousness becomes aware of the fact that the concept of teleology is inherently bound up with the concept of organism. Hegel is no doubt influenced by Kant's description of the organic in the *Critique of Judgment* when he says:

In this way we have here not only something appearing as a result of necessity, but, because it has returned to itself, the last or result is just as much the first which starts the process, and is to itself the purpose which it realized. What is organic does not produce something, it merely conserves itself, or what is produced is as much there already as produced.\(^{39}\)

Again in the remarks following this, Hegel tells us that the finite teleology seen by Reason at this stage is an external relating of the purpose
to the thing:

The essence of their relation, however, is something different from what they thus appear to be, and its effect has another meaning than that which it immediately has for sense-perception. The necessity inherent in the process is concealed, and comes out at the end, but in such a way that this very end shows it to have been also the first. The end, however, shows this priority of itself by the fact that nothing comes out of the alteration the act produced, but what was there already. Or, again, if we start from what is first, this, in coming to the end or the result of its act, merely returns to itself and just by doing so it demonstrates itself to be that which has itself as its end; that is to say, qua first it has already returned to itself, or is in and for itself.

In "Consciousness" we discovered that an object existed "in itself" when it was immediately related to its other and when these relations were external ones. In "Self-Consciousness" the subject was "for itself" because it was mediatelty related to its other and its other was itself as the object of reflection. In "Reason" we have the developed notion of the subject as both "in and for itself" because it is the unification of the truth of Consciousness, or the in-itself, and Self-Consciousness, or the for-itself. It is, in other words, the unification of subject and object. As we have seen, \(^{(41)}\) a subject is one which is self-subsistent and "over-reaches" the other and absorbs the other into itself. An organism is precisely this kind of natural being which represents an internally related union of separate elements into a single whole. The individual organism is, then, a representation, at the level of individuality, of the unification of the universal with the particular and of the conjunction of the self-maintaining subject with the physical object.

The phrase "in and for itself" expresses more than just the basic subject-object unification however - it also implies through the notion of organism, a fundamental teleology. We may see this even at the grosser level
of historical development. We have already noted the difference of attitude that marked the change from the mechanistic rationalism of the enlightenment and its corresponding empiricist and mechanistic approach to the romantic notion of development in terms of organic evolution. In this respect Hegel certainly sided with the Romantics but he saw the notion of organic development as affording an opportunity of salvaging the rationalist belief in the attainment of certainty. The certainty to be achieved was precisely the necessity which was entailed in the idea of organic growth and its culmination in a final end. The maturation process was fixed and capable of being the object of certain knowledge. This knowledge, when finally achieved, could be known to be true.

Given that history displays a development, then there are two possible alternatives. On the one hand we can claim that such development is a random and inchoate series of changes related to each other only externally, i.e. through a temporal juxtaposition. Or, on the other hand, we may try to penetrate into this development itself in order to discover an internal necessity by which the different stages of development are related one to the other.

The first view is that taken by an empirically-minded investigator whose work is limited to the cataloging of the various elements as they are discovered (as we saw in Hegel's analysis of Reason in the form of descriptive observation). If, however, we attempt to find some rationale to the particular existence of any given stage, then we are at the preliminary stage of discovering, or searching for, the reason why one stage has appeared to assume an ascendancy over another. If we try to discover why in a particular epoch certain attitudes were held concerning the world, e.g. certain
fundamental religious beliefs, where shall we look? We will perhaps look first toward the physical and cultural conditions which gave rise to it. But once we have done that we have yet to answer two further questions: (1) Why did this situation give rise to this particular conceptualization of the world and (2) what gave rise to these changes in external conditions in the first place?

The answer to the first cannot be that the concept under which the given world is organized is related externally or accidentally to the conditions since the assumption, according to which our search is to proceed, was that these conditions gave rise to the concept. Therefore, there must be some kind of internal relation between the two. If we search for the answer to the second question we will be looking for further conditions which will establish the ground of the first conditions. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress we will eventually be faced with the choice of once again accepting the contingency of the ground for the development from one set of conditions to the other, or we will seek in the prior stage the reason for the development from one stage to the next. On this last view we will be faced with the prospect of seeking for a Principle of continuity to explain the historical development which we are trying to understand.

As reason delves deeper into the meaning and significance of historical development it will find itself compelled to seek the internal conditions which ground the development from one stage to the other. The purely empirical consciousness, consciousness at the level of what Hegel calls understanding, will seek to discover grounds for distinguishing one stage from another. Reason, however, will seek to explain the grounds themselves. The methodology of the former is to isolate its subject as much as possible
in order to study it as it is by itself. That is, it attempts to examine it without the misleading effects of outside influences. *Ceteris paribus* is the hallmark of this method. Its ideal is to eliminate all "other" factors than the one being studied. The closer the outside influences approach zero the more accurately is it possible to study the object *per se*. By so isolating the object it is possible to guarantee the purity of its behaviour and the more "true" will be the analysis. As the object and its behaviour becomes more and more isolated, the more precisely does its behaviour approach the invariability of mathematics and, therefore, according to the theory, the more "true" is the picture of reality that is being painted. This procedure, which is the procedure adopted by the natural sciences, makes of its object a lifeless abstraction and as such must present a one-sided view of the whole.

The whole is grasped by speculative reason because speculative reason is knowledge by means of Concepts. It is therefore capable of mediating the oppositions into which Understanding inexorably falls and of bringing the oppositions together into a mediated unity.

The natural scientist may, for the purposes of natural science, believe the mechanistic model to be superior to the organic model - indeed, he may have to prefer mechanism if he is to be a natural scientist. The philosopher, however, may make a different judgment for his purposes and, in this case, the preference for an organic theory has a philosophical, not a natural scientific, justification. Hegel's preference for an organic explanation is based upon his attempt to solve philosophical problems and though we may sympathize with Hegel, we do not necessarily have to insist that the natural scientist *qua* natural scientist do so as well.
From Hegel's point of view, then, the method of natural science, since it uses the techniques of Understanding, cannot accomplish the rational unification which philosophical science demands. Perhaps the most that can be said about it is Fackenheim's description of Hegel's position: "Natural science", he tells us, "...is not simply finite and passive apprehension of a simply given Nature. It is an arrested mediation".

This analysis may seem to fit better a natural science such as physics than one such as biology. To a certain extent this is true. The study of biology is the study of organic beings - individuals as opposed to particulars, and it studies them in such a way that they are seen as unities of diverse elements which work together to provide, in general, a harmonious relationship. Of course, even the biologist is limited to looking at particular individuals out of contact with their normal surroundings (there are those who study an entire biosphere, but this removes the individual one step further back. The point is to move back to the whole as such, and for that one needs dialectical and speculative Reason). Thus, though the biologist may be at a higher stage, he is still not able to comprehend the truth as such. One needs to go another step (or rather many steps) beyond, carrying this organic principle to a higher and more universal conception.

The model of the physicist gives rise to a materialist and mechanistic view of the world in which all phenomena are explainable in terms of the mechanistic model of the most basic unit, i.e. the entity (the atom) of which we can say that it is most self-subsistent or the most free from the effects of external influences.

A wider, organic conception attempts to look at the whole - a whole knowledge of which must include not only its most basic elements, its parti-
culars, but its individuals as well and the relations between these individuals. It is only in relation with its world that an individual is truly what it is; and the world only is what it is because of those individuals and their relations. The difference between the two approaches is, as already noted, a difference between the attitude of Understanding and the attitude of Reason; between an attempt to know the matter of the world and the attempt to know the matter and the form of the world. The latter encompasses the former, but the former can never account for the latter.

This problem of trying to account for the truths of Reason with the techniques of the Understanding was not an original problem to Hegel. Since Classical times there has been this conflict concerning the proper interpretive model for explaining the universe. On the one hand there was the atomism and the mechanism of Leucippus, Democritus, et al, who denied any but explanations based upon the mechanical movements of "atoms". This model, however, found opposition among those who felt it unable to account for the facts of organic and intelligent (not to say goal-directed) life. When Aristotle faced the problem, the two options open to him were mechanistic atomism and an organic interpretation based upon biology. It was Aristotle's conclusion that the former could never incorporate the facts of goal-directed or teleological behaviour, whereas the latter model could explain them adequately - indeed, presupposed them, - but it could also handle other behaviour as well if need be.

The Aristotelian theory of the teleological nature of the world was the accepted model for explaining the world until Descartes, and later Newton, gave legitimacy and potency to the mechanistic theory again. The
mechanics of Newton did give a decidedly powerful weapon for explanation of phenomena through the generalized application of mathematics to physics. Yet, however seductive this form of explanation may have been, it was not universally accepted as the ultimate explanation; and for some good reasons as well — some of them similar to those which Aristotle found compelling. For though mathematical physics could in fact give a satisfactory explanation for almost any phenomena, it was found wanting in explaining the existence and the development of organized phenomena. Leibniz, for example, felt the pull in both directions and attempted to give to each side its claim to universal validity. He says at one point, for example,

...[regarding] the sequence and the correspondence of perceptions. These are like two kingdoms, one of efficient causes, the other of final, each of which separately suffices in detail to give a reason for the whole, as if the other did not exist. But neither is adequate without the other when we consider their origin, for they emanate from one source in which the power which makes efficient causes, and the wisdom which rules final causes, are found united. Leibniz finds the pull of two contradictory theses to be irreconcilable — they appear true but both cannot be — and he finds the ultimate solution only in a hypothetical unification which guarantees the validity of both claims. But then we might expect such a solution from the author of the pre-established harmony. The important point, however, is underscored in a statement by Leibniz made a little further on in the same work: "...the laws of mechanism by themselves could not form an animal where there is nothing already organized". This problem is one which has plagued thinkers to the present day. We have much more sophisticated and elaborate methods of analyzing data in accordance with mathematically rigorous models, and the issue has still to be
finally resolved.

Even in the French Enlightenment the conflict is to be found. It was difficult for even the philosophes - those paragons of mathematical rationality - merely to dismiss what appear to be facts of "life" as though they did not exist. The philosophes who took over Locke's sensationalistic tendencies and built them into a systematic mechanisim were unable to escape the demands of apparent contradictions to mechanistic theories and ultimately could not reconcile their belief in progress with their materialism without recourse to teleology - which did not have any firm theoretical foundation in their system.52

Again, a similar difficulty finds expression in Kant. In his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant declared that a science has only so much truth in it as it has mathematics.53 And this work, as indeed the Critique of Pure Reason itself, was an attempt to give a philosophical - or logical - foundation to Newtonian mechanics which would put it on a sure and certain basis, safe from the arguments set against it and its mechanical interpretation of nature. Yet for Kant too it became clear that the idea of purpose was inseparable from the notion of organism. Thus, in the Critique of Judgement he gave the notion of teleology a limited validity. He says for example,

...a machine has solely motive power, whereas an organized being possesses inherent formative power...this, therefore, is a self-propagating formative power, which cannot be explained by the capacity of movement alone; that is to say, by mechanism.54

And again later on we find another example of this sentiment expressed:
Indeed this conception of physical ends leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which mere mechanism no longer proves adequate in this domain.

For Kant Reason is the faculty which attempts to unify - the experience which has been subsumed under the categories of the Understanding. Judgment is the faculty which unites sense and Understanding - or universal and particular.

Causality, for example, is a category of the Understanding which is necessarily applied to the manifold of intuition in order to make it into a unified perception. The category of cause is, then, objectively valid in that it is directly connected with experience and represents merely a necessary ordering without which perception would not be possible (although some kind of intuition presumably would be possible since only space and time are the pure forms without which intuition would not be possible). Since causality is a category of Understanding, Reason puts forth the universal law that all change is mechanical. However, a difficulty arises here in that this idea fails to be applicable universally as Reason would have it. These laws are taken to be universal laws of nature and therefore to apply to nature in total, "...although owing to the constitution and limitation of our faculties of cognition we may entirely fail to see this necessity." Reason is forced to unify experience under a universal law because of a "need of Understanding" and must, therefore, put forth an idea which will take up the unexplained element of experience.

The notion of teleology thus comes into being as an organizing principle according to Kant. He makes it clear, however, that the truth of the objective nature of teleology can never be established. It is purely subjective idea. That is, it arises from Reason, not from Understanding.
It therefore does not arise from an experience of finality in nature. This could never, according to Kant, be an object of experience since it would require a transcendent viewpoint, i.e. it would have to go beyond experience itself. Thus, teleology is used as a purely "regulative idea"; that is, it is acceptable purely on utilitarian or pragmatic grounds. A typical statement of this idea is the following:

Organisms are, therefore, the only beings in nature that, considered in their separate existence and apart from any relation to other things, cannot be thought possible except as ends of nature. It is they, then, that first afford objective reality to the conception of an end that is an end of nature and not a practical end. Thus they supply natural science with the basis for a teleology, or, in other words, a mode of estimating its Objects on a special principle that it would otherwise be absolutely unjustifiable to introduce into that science - seeing that we are quite unable to perceive a priori the possibility of such a kind of causality.

The idea of organism and its attendant notion of teleology allows us to explain phenomena which are inexplicable with a purely mechanical idea. But it can never become an objective idea grounded in experience as such, and hence it can never be proven in experience.

This was much the situation as Hegel came upon it. Except, of course, that the decline of the Enlightenment was now a fact and the advent of philosophical Romanticism was hard upon the times. In philosophical and artistic circles the conflict between the two competing models of the world created much less of a dilemma. Darwin had not yet appeared to give an explanation of organic evolution consistent with mechanistic theory. Nor had Watson yet given a behaviouristic account of conscious activity by reducing it to purely quantitative terms and, though even they may not have provided the means of finally resolving the problem, for a thinker like Hegel who
preceded such theories, there was little in the mechanical explanation as a universal model of nature. 59

In the Science of Logic Hegel discusses Kant's antinomy of freedom and determinism and the corresponding antinomy of teleology. Against those like Kant, Leibniz and others, he says:

If mechanism and purposiveness stand opposed to one another, they cannot for that very reason be taken as indifferent concepts, each of which is correct on its own account, possessing as much validity as the other, the only question being where one or the other may be applied. This equal validity of both rests merely on the fact that they are, that is to say, that we have them both. But since they are opposed, the necessary preliminary question is, which of the two is the true one; and the higher and real question is, whether their truth is not a third concept, or whether one of them is the truth of the other. But the relation of end has proved to be the truth of mechanism. 60

One has always to remember that for Hegel there is ultimately only one thing - Spirit. Unless we grasp this essential cosmological monism, the idea that there is in essence only one ultimate thing, we will get entangled in numerous difficulties concerning the relation between e.g. mechanism and organicism - they would seem to belong to different things, i.e. inorganic and organic nature respectively. Thus, neither could really be "higher" than the other and thereby incorporate the other. But we must understand for Hegel these are different categories - different ways of conceiving reality, the same reality. Mind, or consciousness, is nature as self-reflected - it is not a different thing from its object at all; Reason is in the world and Reason is in mind. One could interpret Hegel's remarks to mean that there is ultimately nothing in the mechanical explanation of phenomena once the concept of organicism has been consciously developed in its truth. Were this the case, however, the result would be that in the
Hegelian system there would be only one Category of thought - the absolute Idea because it is the highest and most over-reaching Concept of all. This, however, would be absurd and it is doubtful that Hegel would want to argue for such a position. What it would seem that Hegel is arguing against is the tendency to break up the world, or at least nature, into the organic and the inorganic, or some such other division, and apply different techniques to each. The result would be to make some kind of absolute split between the two such that the categories for understanding one would not be permitted to encroach upon the methodology for understanding the other. This is precisely what Hegel wants to avoid. The point for Hegel is that each category of Understanding has its Rational application, and the system of Categories can be Scientifically (i.e. philosophically) expressed when each Category is demonstrated to have its proper role in the hierarchy of Logical Categories. Thus, mechanism has its proper and limited role as a Category of Rational Understanding. The truth of the Category of Mechanism is the propriety of its application including its ultimate limitation; this truth is expressed in the Category of Teleology because this category establishes the proper role of Mechanism. That each Category has its proper role in the development of complete philosophical knowledge (Rational Understanding) - but without a corresponding break-up of the objective world into distinct units over which these separate categories have sovereign authority - is one of the ideas expressed in Hegel's phrase "the Cunning of Reason". It is worthwhile quoting complete two sections of the *Encyclopedia Logic* which clearly express the argument being offered here. It is also illustrative of the importance of Teleology in uniting subject with object. This is accomplished in the *Phenomenology* with the correlative stage of Conscious-
ness, "Observation of Organic Nature". In the former work Chemism and Mechanism find their truth in Teleology; in the latter book they find it in Organicism.

Purposive action, with its Means, is still directed outwards, because the End is also not identical with object, and must consequently first be mediated with it. The Means in its capacity of object stands in this second premise, in direct relation to the other extreme of the syllogism, namely, the material or objectivity which is presupposed. This relation is the sphere of chemism and mechanism, which have now become the servants of the Final Cause, where lies their truth and free concept. Thus the Subjective End, which is the power ruling these processes, in which the objective things wear themselves out on one another, contrives to keep itself free from them, and to preserve itself in them. Doing so, it appears as the Cunning of reason.

The realized End is thus the overt unity of subjective and objective. It is however essentially characteristic of this unity that the subjective and objective are neutralized and cancelled only in the point of their one-sidedness, while the objective is subdued and made conformable to the End, as the free concept, and thereby to the power above it. The End maintains itself against and in the objective: for it is no mere one-sided subjective or particular, it is also the concrete universal, the implicit identity of both. This universal, as simply reflected in itself, is the content which remains unchanged through all the three termini of the syllogism and their movement.62

All Rational Understanding involves Categories and the proper use of Categories leads to true knowledge - or rather, it is true knowledge. When the truth of all Categories is known, i.e. when they are employed in the way appropriate to each, then absolute Knowledge or absolute Rationality is realized. In other words, if Reason is knowledge by means of Categories and Categories are used in their proper role, then nothing could be more rational; hence the knowledge so gained is absolute, i.e. certain and unimpeachable. Given this interpretation, the following statement, which otherwise appears quite enigmatic, can perhaps be understood:
This dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself - on its knowledge as well as on its object - in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is termed Experience ...This new object contains the nothingness of the first; the new object is the experience concerning that first object.⁶³

The truth of a way of knowing⁶⁴ is only itself known when knowledge of the object has progressed beyond a limited way of knowing to a higher, more encompassing way of knowing. The true experience of an object necessarily involves the experience of the limitations of that object as an object of knowledge. This truth is only possible when consciousness has passed to a higher form of experience or knowing. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion we will discover that

The experience which consciousness has concerning itself can, by its concept comprehend nothing less than the entire system itself or the whole realm of the truth of Spirit, and in such a way that the moments of truth are set forth in the specific and peculiar character they here possess; not as abstract pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them and in virtue of which they are moments of the complete forms of consciousness. In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as an other; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, the proper science of Spirit. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself.⁶⁵

The point is, then, that when we look at the world in terms of the category or form of knowledge of organism we will be led to look toward the whole itself; whereas, approaching it from a point of view of mechanism will lead us to see only its various parts - but not as parts of a whole and not as a whole with interdependent parts. In other words, with the notion of organism we can look at the whole and its parts, but with the
notion of mechanism we see only the parts. This point is worth pursuing a bit further because it furnishes a rationale for accepting the notion of organism as higher and more encompassing than that of mechanism.

According to Heidegger the world is a process, a becoming which is self-creative only when it is becoming. He expresses this by saying that "die Welt weltet". Stop the world, dissect it, remove a part of it and you will kill it as a world. Hegel too might say die Welt weltet. The world for Hegel is also a process - an organic process. Only such a conception can be the foundation for a theoretical system with sufficient explanatory power to incorporate a human world.

This last is a sweeping statement. What is the justification for it? Why is this model superior?

Let us take another look at Heidegger for a moment. Heidegger rejects the substance - accident and matter - form models of reality and replaces them with a different conception: one based on "reliability", or, we might say, certainty. That is, the unconscious reliability which my world has for me is more basic to its determinable structure than the matter - form or substance - accident description of it. It is because something has reliability for me that it has the matter that it has and the form in which it is shaped. I determine by my living in the world the matter and the form of that world. We can see the same sort of position being gradually evolved in Wittgenstein as he moves from a logical atomism in the *Tractatus* to the position in *On Certainty*.

Heidegger does not tell us directly why he takes this Lebenswelt view as being more basic and more fundamental than the traditional models, but we may make an educated guess as to the reason. The problem with the con-
ception of reality based on a substance - accident or matter - form model is just that it cannot account for the fact of reliability; or, in other words, it cannot deal with the world as a lived-in, human world. There is great difficulty in arriving at the notion of reliability from an analysis of either substance-and-accident or matter-and-form. So how is it then possible to give a complete description of the world if the fact of reliability cannot be accounted for? Any position which claims to tell us what reality is like, that is, any metaphysics, has an obligation to include within that description what we know to be the case. The traditional models, however, are incapable of doing this. That is why Heidegger, and eventually Wittgenstein, made reliability, or certainty, the metaphysical foundation.

It would be a mistake to attempt to modernize Hegel's doctrines to fit in directly with Heidegger or Wittgenstein, but a similar reasoning can justify Hegel's option for making the organic process, as opposed to the mechanistic model, the basic descriptive model of the world. As an indication of this way of thinking we may look at a section from one of the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia Logic:

The relation of whole and parts, being the immediate relation, comes easy to reflective understanding; and for that reason it often satisfies when the question really turns on profounder ties. The limbs and organs, for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they are unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect it. These limbs and organs become mere parts, only when they pass under the hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not with the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is illegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of whole and parts is not sufficient for us, if we want to study organic life in its truth.
The models of physics and anatomy, since they proceed by isolation (abstraction) and the formulation of general laws based on an artificial and abstractive technique, are incapable of going from this analysis to the description of the world as a non-static, human world, i.e. a world that is lived in by people. The organic model, however, is capable of including within it not only the human world which is lived, but also the mechanical world which is described by natural science. There is no difficulty in going from organicism to mechanism but it is impossible to go the other way without an independent principle. The biologist works within and accounts for a biosphere in which organisms live, but it is not incompatible with this to recognize further and further reductions and isolations of parts of this biosphere as particular elements for study and analysis - and to recognize that such study may also take place within the same reality in which the biologist works. But the further away one gets from a complete view, the further from the truth of the whole does one get. One can discover truths about particulars, but it is impossible to discover truth about the whole unless it is seen as a whole. This is the reason why Hegel says that "...the truth is the whole".68

There is yet another reason for preferring the notion of organism as an explanatory model over non-organic models. It has already been mentioned that the notion of organism brings together subject with object and universal with particular. In the notion of organism universal and particular are brought together at two levels so that the universal is both universal and particular and the particular is also both universal and particular. This needs some clarification. Hegel's position is perhaps influenced again by Kant's analysis of the organic and its relation to ends. Kant, for in-
stance, says the following:

A tree produces, in the first place, another tree, according to a familiar law of nature. But the tree which it produces is of the same genus. Hence, in its genus, it produces itself. In the genus, now as effect, now as cause, continually generated from itself and likewise generating itself, it preserves itself generically. 69

The genus, as pure universal, is produced by the individual, its particularization, through the process of generation (the individual reproduces itself and hence maintains the species through the process of reproduction). The individual is the particularization of the universal genus, but it is itself also a universal which is composed of its particular parts. Hegel's description is given near the end of this chapter on Observation of Organic Nature and is as follows:

We have, then, here a connected system, where one extreme is the universal life qua universal or genus, the other being that same life qua a single whole, or universal individual: the mediating term, however, is a combination of both, the first seeming to fit itself into it as determinate universality or as species, the other as single whole proper or single universality. And since this connected system belongs altogether to the aspect of the organic embodiment, it comprehends within it too what is distinguished as in-organic nature. 70

Before proceeding with our analysis of "Reason", however, it is important to enter a caveat at this point. With the Concept of organism as rationally observed we have come to the realized unification of subject and object. But this unification has not yet become actual for consciousness; it has not yet become a lived experience. The use of the principle of organism as an explanatory principle may lead one to conclude that for Hegel reality itself is an organism, but that would be a mistake for such is not implied - though it may be suggested. 71 The physical sciences, we
have noted, use mathematics as their explanatory principle, but it does not follow that for these sciences reality is somehow conceived of as number—although it possibly could be. In both cases what we have are explanatory principles only. These explanatory principles have certain implications as to the probable nature of reality, but there is no necessity to assume that reality is identical with the principle; it must only be explainable in terms of the principle. For Hegel the idea of organism exemplified the manner in which the appearing world finds its most rational and most complete conceptualization.

"Reason" has so far been analyzed as it appeared in its immediacy—as it finds itself in nature. As such it represents the rational stage corresponding to what we previously analyzed in "Consciousness". There is yet the corresponding stage to "Self-Consciousness" to be analyzed and Hegel turns next to it. It is unnecessary to trace the detail of this argument but only to note that it is the observation of the subjective rather than the objective side of Reason; it is what Hegel calls the "Observation of Self-Consciousness in its Pure Form and in its Relation to External Actuality—Logical and Psychological Laws:, and the next section "Observation of the Relation of Self-Consciousness to its Immediate Actuality—Physiognomy and Phrenology:.. The problem here is essentially the same that we found in the first phases of Observation, i.e. the procedure is merely observation and is therefore, though rational, still only passively empirical. The result is that the dualism of subject and object is only overcome in theory or implicitly. The truth is there in germ but the very search for it has in effect reasserted the old dichotomy by separating rational consciousness from the objective manifestation of Reason.72 Consciousness
must not only Observe Reason in the world, it must be integrally bound up with it such that they reciprocally produce each other. This can only be done by acting in the world - not merely Observing it. Therefore, in the next stage Hegel tells us that

Consciousness no longer seeks to find itself immediately, but to produce itself by its own activity. Consciousness itself is the purpose and end of its own action, as in the process of observation it had to do merely with things.73

The process of this activity, however, is to assert the individual against the world. The truth of Reason cannot be realized, however, so long as the individual stands opposed to the world. But by himself the individual cannot be one with the world. So the individual takes himself to be the truth. At that point "Self-Consciousness has now grasped its own principle which at first was only our notion of it, viz. the notion that, when consciously certain of itself, it is all reality".74 This radical individuality is related to the world through its acts and to this extent there is a unity of the individual, as universal subject, with the world, as objective particularity. But what is discovered is that the act is and the individual is only because they are produced in the universal context of conscious human society. At this point the unification of subject with object has become an actualized fact for consciousness.
CHAPTER 5

DUALISM OVERCOME THROUGH RATIONAL ACTIVITY:

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

a. Recapitulation and Continuation.

The conception of the realization of Spirit through community of action is propounded by Hegel in the last sections of the analysis of "Reason". The first chapter of this section is the key chapter in the Phenomenology because it traces the development of Consciousness from the subjective certainty of the individual as essential reality to the recognition of the fact that the essential truth for all individuals lies in the activity, in the reality, of all and each - i.e. it lies in the essential social community of acting individuals. This is the key chapter in the Phenomenology for it is here that Spirit, as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity and of universal and particular, comes into existence as a conscious fact.

In "Self-Consciousness" we saw the first developments of sociality develop through the confrontation of conscious selves, and the consequent development of self-conscious selves through the conflict of desire and the need for recognition by another self. But as yet the social aspect is thwarted because the truth of self-consciousness is only the unification of its immediate consciousness with its immediate knowledge that
consciousness is. Thus, the dialectic of Self-Consciousness is the dialectic of subjectivity and of the attempt to make the objective a subjective element of selfhood. The slave is only a slave from external conditions; the social consciousness has not yet become an objective fact of his subjective self-certainty. He must turn to the world to find himself because he cannot yet turn to his created objective self - society.

The sociality of Master-Slave is only an external sociality and has not yet spiritual meaning for the slave - or for the master. Consciousness must attempt to find its essence in the object, its subjective self-certainty must become an objective fact for it. But in this process its self-certainty becomes alienated from it into an irreconcilable bifurcation in which its essence is separated into an irretrievable "beyond". In the case of the Unhappy Consciousness, the inherent and essential reality is a "beyond" remote from itself. But this process of self-alienation occurs precisely as a result of the individuality of self-consciousness. Self-Consciousness, then, is the process of immersing itself in its object and finally breaking away from the objective in order to become real for itself. But since it has not been able to completely break away from objectivity it must reassert this objectivity out of its own subjectivity - and thus arises the self-alienation.

This process of self-consciousness is the process of consciousness seeking itself in the objective. The conflict which is carried on in Master-Slave, for example, is the attempt by consciousness to find in another consciousness itself. Likewise, through the dialectic of that chapter the leitmotiv is a search for self-recognition. The slave Consciousness is the result of realizing that the objective is not itself as truly independent and
self-subsisting; as a consequence there arise the attitudes of Scepticism and Stoicism. But since the satisfaction which consciousness seeks is the recognition of itself as the object of itself it alienates what was previously its subjective truth and makes it objective in order to find itself there. The result is consciousness in the unhappy state of finding that what is essential has ceased to be the truth of itself and instead has become an alien truth to which it cannot become reconciled as an individual existing in subjectivity. What was subjectively its own - its will - became, for consciousness, alienated and its will subordinated, in fact, extinguished, by a universal will to which it surrendered its own truth - "not my will but Thine will be done".3

The result here would seem to be an impasse and the transition into the realization that consciousness has been all along aware only of itself and that essence is in fact not alienated from it after all but is, in fact, really only itself, is effected almost perforce. Hegel makes the transition only in a very perfunctory manner:

But in this object, where it finds its own action and existence, qua this particular consciousness, to be inherently existence and action as such, there has arisen the idea of Reason, of the certainty that consciousness is, in its particularity, inherently and essentially absolute, or is all reality.4

Now if action is the hallmark of "Self-Consciousness", it is even more so that of "Reason".5 In Reason, consciousness is certain of itself as all reality. In other words, the real is rational - the objective is Reason in its objective aspect and the process of Reason (Rationality) is the process of finding this Reason which is in the world. This takes place, as we have seen, first of all passively through the attempt to "Observe" in
the world the objective reality of Reason. These Observational activities we have seen take the form of Observation of Inorganic and Organic Nature, Psychology, Physiognomy, and Phrenology.

We have seen that this fails because of its inherent passivity; consciousness must now turn to an active search for Reason in the world. The immediate attempt is to return to subjective inwardness through seeking Pleasure - making the world conform to myself through passive activity. The next stage is activity in the world - making the passive world conform to my own rational activity. But the world has its own course and the attempt to alter it according to my idea is necessarily thwarted. The final attempt is individual activity taken for itself with an apparent indifference to objectivity conjoined with the realization of purpose. This is where the coming together of subject and object takes place. It is discovered that it can only take place when consciousness has transcended individuality and entered into community. Thought, as subjective, is the apparent resting place of the individual. But as merely subjective, thought has no objective meaning for the individual. Thus, in order to make thought essential it must be objectified. However the process of objectification puts it in a public domain with the result that as the pure objectification of particular individuality it has no truth. It is taken up by other consciousnesses and transformed according to their conception of the world. Thus, the individual loses control of his objectified thought, of his essence, and, though he may affect a lack of concern about this loss, this apparent lack of concern is transformed into a concern for his objective essence. However, he (the individual) discovers that it is only possible to control this objectivity in community with others. So long as they remain in a
society of animals (individuals) the "Thing" (the objectified essence) becomes only a battlefield. But through cooperation it is turned into a true essence. Particularity has passed over into universality and universality provides the ground for the realization of the particular. Abstract essence has become united with concrete essence through the mediation of universal essence. The opposition of subject and object is overcome and the universal (society) has become the essentially real.

With the close of this section the purpose and goal of the Phenomenology has been implicitly achieved - subject and object have come together into a unity. I agree with Hyppolite that the end of "Reason" is the fundamental end of the Phenomenology for it is here that Spirit is finally realized. Since this is the key chapter it would be well to look at it in some detail so that the precise nature of the transition from consciousness to Spirit can be seen.

Spirit in its truth is the absolute concrete universal, but the attainment of this truth is reached only through the prior truth that individuality is real in and for itself. From this realization the truth of atomistic individualism is seen to prevent the true unification of the subjective individual with the objective individual. The truth is found in Spirit itself, in the universal subjective which is its own objectivity.

b. From the "Spiritual Animal Kingdom" to Social Reality.

In all previous modes of consciousness, consciousness attempted to annihilate either its "other" or itself in an effort to abolish an absolute distinction between them. In the attempt to come to grips with the fact of the opposition between itself and the alien other it discovered itself in "Reason" as either for-itself, as in the observation of Reason, or in-itself,
as in "Heart" and "Virtue"; but it had not yet found itself at the same time as in-and-for-itself. It was never able to transcend completely the duality of subjectivity and objectivity and recognize itself as the truth of both moments.

At the stage under consideration we reach the culmination of the process of Reason in which consciousness comes to realize itself as being real both in and for itself. That is, it recognizes, after having tried all other possible modes of consciousness, that "...when consciously certain of itself, it is all reality". In other words, it comes to know itself not only as it is implicitly or in-itself, but also explicitly or for-itself as a created being in the visible, external world; and it sees itself as self-created through its making explicit what it is implicitly, i.e. through its own activity.

The situation is no longer, as previously, an individual attempting to penetrate the universal, but is rather the interpenetration of particularity and universality through individuality. This interpenetration means nothing other than that it is the finally realized unity of the two extremes:

Reason now knows its reality as in and for itself and no longer first seeks to create itself as Purpose in the opposition which opposes immediate actuality, but has the Category as such as the object of its consciousness.

This "Category as such" is the elusive transcendental ego of Kant finally transformed here by Hegel into the wholly inclusive category in which the self is being and being is the self. Thus, consciousness now "...is itself the category become conscious of itself".

Being-for-self as negative self-consciousness is now superseded for
good. That is, the self no longer finds itself as being the negative of the "other" and the "other" is no longer seen as the negative of itself. A new level of being has been attained in which consciousness is certain of itself as real in-and-for-itself.

Its account with its previous forms is now closed; they lie behind it in the forgotten past; they do not come forward against it as its world found ready to hand, but are developed solely within itself as transparent moments. Yet they still fall apart within its consciousness at this stage as a movement of distinct moments which has not yet got combined into its own substantial unity. But throughout self-consciousness holds firmly to that simple unity of being and of self which is its genus.9

Previously, consciousness had "discovered" the external determinate reality set off against its own reality. This "other" which it discovered was the limiting condition of its activity and of its self-realization. Now, however, consciousness has "...cast away all opposition and every condition limiting its activity".10 It no longer finds itself opposed to and limited by some external determinate existence in which it must somehow find room to operate. Such an alien "other" is no longer the content of its concern; rather, its concern is now a reality which is itself, i.e. its concern is itself. It is through this concern with its own self that consciousness finds that the opposition between the in-itself and the for-itself has disappeared into the unity of its being itself all reality. According to Hyppolite,

There is not a world being in itself and an individual being for itself, but this world is that of the individual, and the individual is in its turn the meaning and the expression of the world. It is impossible to separate the two terms being-other and Self in order to compare them. Consciousness of itself in its truth is that which rests itself in its being-other, that which finds and produces itself through the mediation of this distinction.11
Action has now become the truth for consciousness. Through activity the individual creates himself for himself - he becomes what he does and what he does is what he is; in Hegel's terms: "The true being of a man is, on the contrary, his act...." The individual is the sum total of his own activity. Action, then, becomes the way to the realization of the self as an explicit determinate being such that what is brought to light is the self for itself - a being which is known to be what it is explicitly.

While Purpose and being-for-itself have proved to be the same as being-for-another and the discovered actuality, truth is no longer separated from certainty - the supposed Purpose now becomes taken for the Certainty of self and the realization of that Purpose is taken as the truth; or, again; the Purpose is taken for the truth and actuality is taken for Certainty. However, the essence and the Purpose in and for itself is the Certainty of immediate reality - the penetration of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, of universality and individuality. Action is in itself truth and actuality and the representation or the expression of individuality is the Purpose in and for itself.13

That which was previously hidden in the darkness of the individual fighting an oppressive external "other" has now become the internal brought into the light of day; an internal become externalized as it is in-itself; the implicit become explicit; the inner become outer; and the invisible become visible.

The stage which we are now considering is generally held to be the consciousness characteristic of the artist, the scientist, perhaps the business executive, and certainly that of the scholar or the intellectual.14 Each of these thrusts himself into his work and defines himself in terms of this work. His activity is the essential element of his nature and of his world. Indeed, it is so essential that it is,
as we shall see, more important than the actual product of the activity, and this is where the first deception which the individual perpetrates upon himself arises; it is thus also where the critical dialectical move takes place.

The kind of interpretation which one gives to this section of the Phenomenology will no doubt be reflected in the way in which one understands the title of this section. The German for the title is Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug, oder die Sache Selbst; which is translated by Baillie as: "Self-conscious Individuals Associated as a Community of Animals and the Deception thence Arising: The real Fact", and which Findlay rather imaginatively renders thus: "The Spiritual Zoo and Humbug, or the Affair-on-Hand Itself". The translation preferred here, however, is perhaps a bit more literal but it also provides a clue to the meaning of the section itself: "The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and its Deception, or the Concern itself".

All of these titles convey some significant meaning with regard to this section. In some ways Baillie's is the most descriptively illuminating if the least literal. But it is most illuminating in the places where it is least literal; for instance, he effectively points out the self-consciousness inherent in this stage and also its concern with individuality. However, the title preferred here puts this across in a somewhat more covert manner and yet perhaps a bit more profoundly for that. The notion of animal Kingdom, the Tierreich, suggests the society of self-contained individuals related only externally to each other - the German Gesellschaft. Here the individual is as an animal, pursuing his own interest; others exist for him primarily as a hind-
rance, or at best, a tolerable but unnecessary aid in self realization. At the same time the individual at this stage is at the level of Reason of a geistige Tierreich, and has thus grasped the essential nature of his spirituality—though he has not developed it fully as yet. That is why it is the individual's own rational concern (Sache) which is of primary importance. As it develops it will be seen that this phrase "Spiritual animal Kingdom" is in fact self-contradictory. True spirituality, Spirit in its truth, can only be realized through Gemeinschaft, a community of endeavor and effort. Thus this section on Reason is the ultimate development of Spiritual truth and hence the embryonic realization of the "union of union and non-union".

Although consciousness has here reached the stage wherein it realizes itself as in and for itself all reality, it first exists at the level of a Leibnizian monad or the individual of atomistic liberalism. Here it is totally involved with itself and its own interest or concern. What matters to the individual is the actualization of his own self, his inner nature, and making it real for him. In so doing he thereby makes himself real for himself. The individual lives, as Baillie describes it, in a community of animals; a "spiritual zoo" in Findlay's terms, in which the individual members merely exist side by side as self-sufficient and self-contained entities.

Here we can envision the artist totally preoccupied with his creative activity and actively disdaining the interference or the "help" which others bring to him. The example comes to mind here of Gulley Jimsen, the artist in Joyce Cary's The Horse's Mouth, for whom the exis-
tence of others, in so far as they did exist for him, had reality only as a means toward his creative activity or as a hindrance thereto. So too the scholar finds his worth and his raison d'être in his individualistic scholarly activity. It is his work that is important and it is his work that is truly real. As we have learned to expect, such an attitude is an essentially false one which must be brought to the recognition of the implicit deception or contradiction which such an attitude involves. The deception is the belief that the individual actor's essential truth is found in his isolated productive activity. The truth, however, is that the individual cannot produce an adequate correspondence of subjectivity with objectivity outside of the activity of others. So long as the individual believes that the product of his activity is in-itself a self-sufficient essential overcoming of the separation of subject and object, he deceives himself. The product of activity cannot be produced outside of the productive activity of others. There is thus a contradiction between the individual whose concern is his own product and the real fact that such productive activity is dependent upon the social reality in which that activity necessarily takes place. We will then be brought to the realization of spiritual existence as the society of mutually dependent beings whose self realization can truly only be brought about through the activity, not of the individual working in isolation, but the activity of each and all, i.e. through social activity.

The major moments of this form of consciousness display the falsity of taking the isolated production of the individual as his essential reality. Dialectical transitions run all through this section and the
commentary runs forth and back through the analysis in a dazzling, terribly obscure, and, on careful analysis, perhaps a not always consistent array of (dialectically) false moments. But the main points seem to be the following:

The activity which the individual pursues is for him the essential reality. But that work or concern (Sache) which he brings to the light of day through his activity cannot remain for him an essential reality. In bringing it forth he makes it an objective fact in the world. As such it must be encountered by others as an element of the reality in which they are working to bring forth their own reality. In order to create their own essential selves they must act within this same reality and through their individual concerns produce their own essential being. Their activity then usurps the work of the other and replaces it with their own. The particular world of the individual is therefore transitory and inessential. Hegel tells us that at this point for such consciousnesses,

the work is, i.e. it is for other individuals, and for them it is an alien reality, in whose place they have to put their own, in order to get by their action consciousness of their unity with actuality. In other words, the interest which they take in that work owing to their original constitution is other than the peculiar interest of this work, which thereby is turned into something different. The work is, thus, in general something transitory, which is extinguished by the counter-action of other powers and interests, and displays the reality of individuality in a transitory form rather than as fulfilled and accomplished.16

In such a manner, then, the activity and that which is produced by the individual becomes cancelled. That which one scholar produces is annulled by the work and the criticism of other scholars. The individual's work cannot stand as essentially true and real against this onslaught of contradictory products which all have equal claim to reality.
Thus, what the individual took to be his essential reality is transitory and impermanent. Likewise, since his being is bound up with his work, his being fails to be essential and is reduced to a transitory, fortuitous circumstance. What remains is what he takes to be essential for him; and what remains is just the activity itself—the game which he plays, or, as Hegel says, the concern itself (die Sache selbst), rather than the product. Success or failure of the activity is beside the point here; mainly because success is impossible so long as it is taken as my success. This discussion is in essence a working out of the situation met with and discussed by Hegel in "Virtue and the Course of the World". The only interest here is in personal commitment, but now it is the attempt which is important and not the result. Here, then, is the Romantic man for whom the effort to achieve is greater than the achievement itself. The individual need but try to effect his purpose and the game is seemingly won. The concern itself, the universal in which particular facts or states of affairs are pursued, is taken to be of no account. However, others may then move in to declare that the thing, the object of the activity, is already produced and that it is their activity which has accomplished the end; or, they may step forward to render assistance in bringing it forth. But when they do they find to their surprise that the individual cannot take the activity as his own essential reality precisely because it thus proves, through the activity of others, to be inessential and transitory. What is now the real concern of this consciousness is the universal, the game they are all playing, or just the universal activity—the concern itself. He thus continues along apparently unperturbed and uninterested in the realization of this particular fact (i.e. it is art for art's sake that is important and not this particular art work or style of artistic
production that has ultimate validity; or it is the philosopher who sees value in doing philosophy and not a particular philosophical theory). Hence he seems quite content to let the others go about their business of realizing their "own" concern.  

It would appear then that what we now have are independentconsciousnesses - individuals - working at their own concerns and unconcerned about the affairs and the concerns of others. In fact, Hegel tells us, this is a deception because, when activity remains private, consciousness remains closed within its own particularity. The desire of consciousness, however, is to attain to the equal truth of universality and it therefore has a real concern with the publicity, and hence the universality, of its individual action; i.e. it recognizes the necessity that it be involved in a community of action and a community of concern. Those who put themselves forward as believing differently are merely deceiving themselves and others when they give out their efforts and doings as something only for themselves, in which they merely have themselves and their own nature in view. But since they do something, and thus express their nature, bring themselves to the light of day, they directly contradict by their deed the pretence of wanting to exclude the daylight, i.e. to exclude the publicity of universal consciousness, and participation by every one. Actualization is, on the contrary, an exposing of what is one's own in a universal element, where it comes to be and has to be a concern for every one.  

Those, then, who discover the deception arising in this individualistic form of consciousness discover that the fact must be public, i.e. it must be as much for the other as it is for itself. Both sides are found to be equally essential. Thus, it finds in the universal fact, the public fact, as opposed to the individual's own personal fact, an essential reality whose existence means the action of the single individual and of all individuals, and whose
action is only a fact in the sense of an action of each and all. That action of each and all is the essential reality which is the essence of all consciousnesses - it is the essence of Spirit.

Consciousness finds both sides to be equally essential moments, and thereby learns what the nature of the concern itself really is, viz. that it is neither merely concern, which is opposed to action in general and to individual action, nor action which is opposed to permanence and is the genus independent of these moments as its species. Rather it is an essence whose being means the action of the single individual and of all individuals and whose action is immediately for others, or is a concern, and is only concern in the sense of an action of each and all - the essence which is the essence of all essences, which is spiritual essence.19

Consciousness has thus seen the falsity of the realization of the self through the action of the individual concerned only with himself and with his own personal essential reality. Such action, it discovers, involves the putting forth of a purpose and of actualizing this purpose - making it a fact in the world. But in so doing it makes it public and hence integrally and necessarily bound up with the concerns of others.20 It finds that it can only find its essential self through a reality which is essential for everyone. Its own being, then, depends upon the action of others as much as upon the action of itself. One writer on Hegel has said that "Spirituality is just intercourse, communion of spirits. This is the essential publicity of consciousness, whereby all the secrets of our hearts are known".21 The point being made is that the individual knows himself only as he exists in a social context, i.e. as he is with and for others. If he isolates himself in order to discover who he is he finds he is nothing because he has no existence as such in isolation. He must unite his particularity with human universality, his subjectivity with a public objectiv-
ity, in order to know himself and his world in its truth. When he has reached this point he has reached the realization of himself in the realm of Spirit.\(^{22}\)

We have now seen that at the point of the full expression of Reason the metaphysical end point of the Phenomenology has been implicitly achieved. It is true that the next long section of the Phenomenology is entitled "Spirit" and that in it the same oppositions are again to be worked out, as we see in this statement from the opening of this section:

Spirit, being now sundered within itself, traces one of its worlds in the element of its objectivity as in a crass solid actuality; this is the realm of Culture and Civilization; while over against this in the element of thought is traced the world of Belief or Faith, the realm of essence.\(^{23}\)

But the unification which we have been tracing has already been achieved with the advent of Spirit - and "Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself."\(^{24}\) This is the awareness gained when the "community of animals" is transformed into the "spiritual community"; this we have seen occur in this last section to be discussed as such.

c. Epistemology becomes Ontology through Metaphysical Rationalism.

Though the commonest and perhaps the easiest interpretation of this section is to see it in light of various obvious creative endeavors such as those of the artist, the scholar, and so on, it ought to be the case that any creative transformation of nature in accordance with reason will achieve the state of spiritual realization to some if only to a limited extent. In so doing we should find that the unification of objective reason
with subjective reason ought to begin to find its conscious realization within mind. The transformation is not and cannot be purely on the side of intelligence, however. That is, it cannot be the case that it is intelligence and subjective reason, in transforming nature and making itself objective, which in itself effects the rapprochement between subject and object or thought and being. Some have thought that this is Hegel's meaning. Marcuse, for instance, has said that according to Hegel "Thought ought to govern reality. What men think to be true, right, and good ought to be realized in the actual organization of the societal and individual life". For Marcuse's Hegel the world becomes rational through man's action - but it seems to do so because man is rational and through his action he imparts rationality to the world. This is true, but is only one aspect of the realization of rationality. We might rather say that action in the world brings man as "thinking reason" into correspondence with objective reason. Marcuse says that "...reason cannot govern reality unless reality has become rational in itself". But Marcuse confuses the rationality of the world with the process of coming to know it. The world is not made rational by reason as a process of knowing; rather, Reason is what is and the process of knowing is the process of Reason becoming united with itself. Knowing becomes absolute and has spirit and the real for its object when Reason knows itself as all reality. One must come to see that Reason is in the world. Marcuse says that one must make the world conform to Reason, but that is too one-sided: "What is Rational is actual and what is actual is Rational". The emphasis here is on the conjunction.

Not only is it the case that thought must transform the world and make it rational, it must also be the case that the Reason which is concretely
immanent within reality must transform thought and make it rational - this is the dialectic as it appears in nature. Objective reason forces thought to become rational by resisting the imposition of inadequate categories upon nature. Kojève is more accurate than Marcuse in this respect - though he relates rationality too closely to language. Kojève says:

The True and the Concept are, as Hegel himself says, a Logisch-Reelles, something logical and real at the same time, a realized concept or a conceived reality. Now "logical" thought that is supposed to be true, the concept that is supposed to be adequate, merely reveal or describe Being as it is or as it exists, without modifying it in any way whatever. The structure of thought, therefore, is determined by the structure of the Being that it reveals. If, then, "logical" thought has three aspects, if in other words it is dialectical (in the broad sense), this is only because Being itself is dialectical (in the broad sense), because of the fact that it implies a "constituent-element" or an "aspect" that is negative or negating ("dialectical" in the narrow and strong sense of the term). Thought is dialectical only to the extent that it correctly reveals the dialectic of Being that is and of the Real that exists. ...Being can be revealed by Thought; there is a Thought in Being and of Being, only because Being is dialectical; i.e. because Being implies a negative or negating constituent element. The real dialectic of existing Being is, among other things, the revelation of the Real and of Being by Speech or Thought. And Speech and Thought themselves are dialectical only because, and to the extent that, they reveal or describe the dialectic of Being and of the Real.²⁹

Just as in "Virtue and the Course of the World" it was discovered that the subjective is incapable of immediately transforming the world according to its own desire and certainty but must transform itself in order to accommodate what the world demands of it, so too must the subjective reason develop itself in conformity with objective reason in order that subjective reason may be capable of objectifying itself and thereby transform its object.

We have seen how the examination of the forms of knowing through which consciousness passes has become at the same time an examination of what is ultimately real. This simultaneous epistemology and ontology, or episte-
mological ontology, is possible because for Hegel the essence of thought is Reason and the essence of what is is Reason. What is important for Hegel is the idea that thought and being are not essentially or fundamentally different things or different sorts of things. If they were different then of course the problem of dualism and the connection between the two is not resolvable. A materialistic reduction will not only be unable to account for the process of thought but, perhaps even more importantly, it cannot account for organic and other goal-directed behaviour. But it is equally a mistake, as we have shown, to reduce the distinctions between mind and matter to a distinction purely within thought. Hegel’s metaphysical position is not that of epistemological idealism where things are because they are conceived in some mind. This would give mind a pure creative activity; but Hegel would certainly not hold that individual minds somehow create physical objects (although they may determine in some way the manner in which they are the phenomenal objects of individual minds). To accept such a position would be to fall into a kind of solipsistic metaphysics in which nothing exists except through its being conceived by the self. To attempt to evade this conclusion by asserting that the physical world is there as a possibility of being conceived by some mind is to fail to resolve the problem of the relation between the subjective thinker and the objective physical reality - which is the question at issue. It is also a failure to determine the metaphysical nature of things; it only determines the phenomenal character of how things appear - and this is basically nothing more than a psychological description of how my mind works.

However, it is equally impossible that the physical world can depend for its existence upon some transcendent universal mind in which things are
conceived. This sort of conception was that which Berkeley accepted after his epistemological idealism led him to the position that esse is dependent upon percipi. For Hegel, however, such a transcendent mind is incapable of being part of the system of science because it is by definition beyond individual minds and therefore beyond intelligibility. This is to leave a gap in knowledge and hence to make knowledge as such impossible since the working of the Mind which controls what is can only remain mysterious.

So we might well ask what alternative Hegel had to offer which would solve the difficulties presented without lapsing into one of the alternative reductions. Hegel was by admission an idealist and it would thus seem that he has opted for one of the alternatives which we have already seen to be unsatisfactory. But Hegel's is a different sort of idealism from that of Berkeley, or Kant, or Fichte and to the extent that it is different it avoids the obvious problems which traditional idealist theories fall prey to. Whether it is completely satisfactory itself is another question.

We may note that Hegel's form of idealism is similar to epistemological idealism in that the metaphysical nature of the real is determined through an examination of how things are known. But he does not therefore conclude that things are only because they are known. It is just as true that knowing is dependent upon there being things. That which is an object is only an object to a subject, but just as truly Spirit comes to know only when there is an object for it to have knowledge of.

Given all of this we may well ask what form his idealism can take and still be idealism. In fact, Hegel's idealism is unique because it is not mind which is primary for him; instead, Reason is the substance and the subject of the world - in this he is the intellectual heir of Anaxagoras.
and Aristotle. To a certain extent it is only by a rather arbitrary convention that one might call Hegel's metaphysics idealism. A preferable description is metaphysical rationalism because for him it is Reason which is metaphysically real. One may say that it is the world which conforms to the rational processes of the mind and that it is in that sense that Reason can be said to be in the world. But it is just as true to say that the mind conforms to the rational processes of the world, and that is why mind is called rational or capable of reasoning. Either is true and both are true.

In the Encyclopedia Mind is the unity of the rational, i.e. a priori necessary structure of thought with the rational, i.e. a priori necessary, structure of nature. Mind manifests itself in concrete Spirit - including human life as well as nature. When fully conscious of this unity, conscious that what is is Reason, it is what Hegel terms Spirit. Absolute Spirit is realized when the rational essence of thought is expressed concretely.

The meaning and significance of Hegel's epistemological ontology and his metaphysical rationalism have so far been only briefly discussed. The detailed examination of the text of the Phenomenology up to "Reason" has shown the operation of these two procedures. But the detailed discussion and examination of them - and their implication - have yet to be done.

However, Hegel's philosophy has been called here a philosophy of radical mediation as well because through this notion of mediation - particularly mediation through the Concept - the program of epistemological ontology based upon an underlying metaphysical rationalism is made viable. Therefore, before these last two can be properly discussed it is necessary to first examine the notion of mediation as it appears in the Hegelian system.
a. The Metaphysical Background to Mediation.

We have now come a long way in the understanding of the Phenomenology - not only as a text but in terms of what it was intended to accomplish as well. We know that Hegel had to begin with the most basic fact of experience and that this was consciousness per se. Although the concept of consciousness implies both subject and object, it does not posit one as primary at the expense of the other - both merely are. The process of bringing out the implications of this latent unity of consciousness has shown that in the end the real is what we began with - consciousness itself. Neither the object nor the subject could develop the entire world of conscious experience out of itself. Only the total experience of consciousness itself is sufficient. When the total experience of consciousness is developed systematically, then the result is absolute knowledge or Spirit:

Spirit's immediate existence, consciousness, has two moments, Knowledge and that to which knowledge is negative opposition. Whilst in these elements Spirit is developed and its moments displayed, they come into opposition and they all occur as forms of consciousness. The Science of this development is the Science of the experience which consciousness has; the substance and its process are considered as its object. Consciousness knows or comprehends nothing but what is in its experience; for what is in this experience is only spiritual substance, and indeed, as object of itself. Spirit becomes the object and it is itself this process of becoming an other, i.e. it becomes an object to itself and is the superseding of this being-other. Experience is what we call this process wherein the immediate, the unexperienced or ab-
stract — whether as sensuous being or as mere thinking simplicity — alienates itself and then from this alienation is reunited with itself, and is thereby presented for the first time in its actuality and truth as a property of consciousness.  

For Hegel there is one thing which is ultimately real. This thing is what he calls Spirit. That which we take to be real, the external world which is the object of our experience, is nothing more than the externalized (alienated, estranged) other of Spirit.

Spirit alone is actuality. It is essence or being-in-itself which conducts and determines itself as other-being and being-for-itself — and it remains in-itself in this determination or in its being external to itself; — or it is in and for itself. However, its being-in-itself, at first for us or in-itself, is spiritual Substance. It must be also for itself, it must be knowledge of the Spiritual and it must be knowledge of itself as Spirit; i.e. it must be itself an object, however, by that fact it is immediately superseded in its reflective object. In so far as its spiritual content is produced through itself it is for itself only for us. In so far as it is also for itself for itself is this self production the pure concept, and, at the same time, the objective element wherein it has its being. It is in this way, in its existence for itself, its reflected object. Spirit, which knows itself to be thus developed as Spirit, is Science. It is the Actuality and the Kingdom which it constructs in its own element.

So far this position can be made concordant with many an idealist thesis. But Hegel's idealism is rather different than the usual sort. Indeed, if one translates Geist as Mind generally, as does Baillie, then the difference in the Hegelian position from other idealisms tends to become obscured. Mind is the highest development of Spirit; but Spirit, being the result of the Science of the experience of consciousness, must contain objectivity within itself as well as subjectivity. So when the other is spoken of as the externalization of Geist, it is to be emphasized that this other is fundamental to Spirit and not merely a creation of some Mind.
But why, we may well ask, does this externalization take place? What makes Spirit want to externalize itself? Unfortunately these questions, when directed at the Hegelian System, must be considered misguided and hence to have no answers as such. Depending upon one's basic inclinations, Hegel's position may sound either intriguing or ridiculous and most often one seems either immediately attracted or repelled by Hegel's philosophy on the basis of a "gut" reaction to this kind of approach. But whatever one's sympathies, it is quite likely that at sometime, particularly when confronted with questions like this and answers like this, the impression gained will be that all of this is, as in Findlay's terms, a "mystical game". We may well sympathize with this description given by him:

Spirit is infinite, but it must pretend to itself to be finite, in order to overcome this pretence, to distinguish itself from everything finite, to become fully aware of its own infinity. Spirit is the only reality, but it must confront itself with something seemingly alien, in order to see through its own self-deception, to become aware that it is the only reality. And the creation and setting aside of this strange deception is moreover necessary to Spirit, which could have no being without it: Spirit is in fact not merely the goal of its own game, but is indistinguishable from that game itself. These propositions are familiar enough in mystical literature, but one does not expect to find them on the pages of a sober philosopher, constituting, in fact, the propositions without which his system does not make sense.

Findlay's description of Hegel's position is essentially accurate, but he has attempted to answer the questions which we have stated to be misguided and unanswerable. Because of this he has had to have recourse to such disquieting notions as "pretence", "game", "deception" and so on. Hegel's system, he tells us, does not make sense without these notions - and with them one is inclined to think that it does not make sense either.

If we are not to dismiss Hegel's system but to try to make some sense
of it, then we clearly must avoid answering the questions asked. Such questions must be considered misguided and unanswerable because they imply that Spirit is something before its alienation from itself and that it is a thinking something which "decides" to alienate itself. Its "reason" for doing so could only be irrational since nothing could move it to do such an action since Spirit is all that there is. The position must therefore be something similar to Taylor's interpretation. At least he seems to be on the right track in considering the question of the development of the alienated other from the original unity of Spirit. We can agree to a great extent that:

...although Hegel takes up the notion of creation, as he takes up all Christian dogmas, he reinterprets it, and speaks of the creation as necessary. To say the world was created by God is to say that it exists necessarily so that Geist can be. It is to say the same thing as that Geist posits a world, and just what this means we shall try to make a little less obscure below. But what it cannot mean is what it means for orthodox theism, that God created the world freely, having no need to do so. Or as he put it in his notes for the lectures on the philosophy of religion 'Without the world God is not God'.

Spirit cannot be originally a thinking thing since there is nothing which could be the content of that thought (ex hypothesi). We may sometimes speak of empty thoughts, but truly empty thoughts are not thoughts at all but at best only the possibility of thoughts. No mental act could be the instigator of the original estrangement of Spirit from itself. Hegel speaks sometimes of the Logic as being God before the creation of the world, but this can only be an allegorical or metaphorical use of words.

It is clear that the Logic represents only the a priori structure of mind or thought in its possible application to the world. Nature and Mind are two opposite expressions of this logical structure but neither they,
nor anything else, can be said to exist before Logic. In Hegel's theory of Spirit that which is is implicitly its own manifestation. For Spirit to know it must know something and since it is the ultimate reality it can only know itself:

Spirit is, therefore, in its every act only apprehending itself, and the aim of all genuine science is just this, that spirit shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth. An out and out other simply does not exist for spirit.⁹

This is the basic metaphysical position. But it must further do justice to experience and therefore Spirit is conceived by Hegel to be both concrete and ideal. So far it may appear as though there is little difference between Hegel's metaphysics and that of Spinoza. But whereas for Spinoza thought and extension (for Hegel, subject and object) were mere attributes of God (Hegel: Spirit), for Hegel Spirit is concrete or extended, and it is ideal or thought. The Phenomenology is the process of showing how these two sides come to be united through the mediation of the Concept: "The goal of the process is the revelation of the depth of spiritual life, and this is the Absolute Concept".¹⁰

Spirit is that which manifests itself in the world. Spirit comes to know itself through this manifestation of itself. Since Spirit comes to know itself it is necessarily something of the nature of mind - for only mind is that which can be said to know at all. Therefore, in so far as what is real is a knowing then it must have something of the nature of mind - but is it mind or does it have mind? In fact this question does not as such arise for Hegel since it presupposes certain categorial ways of thinking which are inappropriate to the concept in question. In the Logic of
the Encyclopedia Hegel says the following:

Being-for-itself may be described as ideality, just as being-there-and-then was described as reality. It is said, that besides reality there is also an ideality. Thus the two categories are made equal and parallel. Properly speaking, ideality is not somewhat outside of and beside reality: the concept of ideality just lies in its being the truth of reality. That is to say, when reality is explicitly put as what it implicitly is, it is at once seen to be ideality. Hence ideality has not received its proper estimation, when you allow that reality is not all in all, but that an ideality must be recognized outside of it. Such an ideality, external to or it may even be beyond reality, would be no better than an empty name. Ideality only has a meaning when it is the ideality of something: but this something is not a mere indefinite this or that, but existence characterised as reality, which, if retained in isolation, possesses no truth. The distinction between Nature and Mind is not improperly conceived, when the former is traced back to reality, and the latter to ideality as a fundamental category. Nature however is far from being so fixed and complete, as to subsist even without Mind: in Mind it first, as it were, attains its goal and its truth. And similarly, Mind on its part is not merely a world beyond Nature and nothing more: it is really and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it involves Nature as absorbed in itself.11

Most commentators on Hegel want to interpret him as leaving nature as an external other which retains an independence from the subject - otherwise it seems difficult if not impossible to keep out of a subjective idealism which makes the world dependent upon my thought of it. But this alternative either results in another dualism - which is plainly against Hegel's theory, or it places nature outside of individual human consciousness and in God or Spirit. In this manner the alienation or bifurcation is overcome and the only subjective idealism is that which persists solely at the level of God or Spirit. In either case the objective is a something which is out there to be known as it is; that is, it has a definite and determinate character which consciousness comes to know. However in each case the result is a dualism - either directly between knowing consciousness and its object or between God and man. But we already know from the examination of the Pheno-
menology that any position which asserts a separation between the two elements of the real is incapable of accounting for the factual experience of their unity.

The difficulty in these positions is encountered primarily because in them the assumption is made that certain categories of thought are valid and undemonstrable. That attitude is one in which mind is seen to be somehow unique and totally different from nature. But for Hegel mind is not absolutely different from nature but only the universal aspect of the natural particular. Nature is not a creation of mind - that puts mind as primary or essential and nature as inessential. Neither is mind a product of nature by the same reasoning. They are both opposite manifestations of the same thing. Just as negation is a necessary element of things, so too is it of mind and nature which are negatives of the basic reality - Reason.

In a real sense, all knowledge is self knowledge because the object is the self in its concrete, particularized alienation from Spirit. But of course this is not the content of knowledge per se, for such knowledge requires self-consciousness combined with consciousness, i.e. Reason. Each on its own is one-sided.

It should be noted that we cannot be dealing solely with individual consciousness in Hegel's grand metaphysical theory. However, the individual is the creation of and the creator of the consciousness in general which typifies his time. This is similar to the notion we have today of the socialization process of the individual. We accept this process as being an unconscious determinate of the way the individual interprets his world - it is the foundation or the presupposition which underlies his thinking. At the same time that same individual contributes to the creating of his world
and of the presuppositions which lie behind his thought and his knowledge.

Because there is no basic separation between nature and mind - or thought and being - neither can be primary and the ground for the other - except in so far as they mutually ground each other. Spirit's self-alienation is not an intentional act; it is the necessary condition for there to be Spirit. In other words, there is not and cannot be any "act of creation" - such an idea can only be a Vorstellung, an imaginative representation or figurative idea which represents the truth contained in the conceptual knowledge of Rational consciousness. The original distinction between Geist and the world, or subject and object, is a logical one only. Of course the Concept or knowledge develops and is historically concrete - but the original "positing" can be a logical one only and not a historical one - as with Fichte and Schelling. Hegel's analysis of the enlightenment is interesting in this context. In the section of the Phenomenology "the Truth of the Enlightenment" Hegel sees it as having two distinct sides in its cosmological theory. On the one hand there is deism and on the other is materialism. However, when they are conceptually analyzed we discover that,

both...are entirely the same concept; the distinction lies not in the objective fact, but purely in the diversity of starting point adopted by the developments of thought, and in the fact that each stops at its own special point in the thought-process. If they rose above that, their thought would coincide....

In other words, Reason demands that both elements retain essentiality and therefore neither can be prior to or derived from the other. Rational consciousness will not ask why the estrangement of Spirit from itself takes place because that assumes that estrangement or otherness is not essential to Spirit qua Spirit.
What then is the object that opposes the thinking subject? We must be careful not to try to describe it in any way - it merely is. Any attempt to say that it is material, or spatial, or extended, or subject to the necessity of cause and effect, or whatever, is to apply a category or concept to it. But concepts (categories) are merely the ways in which the world is known by intelligence. We think in terms of concepts and only in terms of concepts. The mind ultimately is nothing but concepts. Since the object is the self-externalized other of mind (Spirit) it too is nothing but concepts. Nature is the conceptual structure of the real externalized, i.e. seen in terms of external relations or as independent or semi-independent. Thus, when we try to describe being in its most fundamental way we are applying concepts to it - we are stating how being appears to us, or how we understand or interpret being. But being is nothing more than our knowledge of it and so the process of trying to know being creates it as it is - it makes it determinate. In other words, consciousness is always self-consciousness: "Consciousness of an other, of an object in general, is indeed itself necessarily self-consciousness, reflectedness into self, consciousness of self in its otherness".

The Phenomenology is nothing more than the description of how the original distinction between subject and object, which arises as a logical fact of consciousness itself, is resolved into a unity of subject and object. It tells the story of its coming to realize the reality of the object and the reality of itself. In the end, it discovers that the objective world is nothing but itself and that it is nothing but Reason itself. This overall metaphysical position, which is clearly idealist (but not a usual form of idealism) is the well known position put forth in the Lectures on
the Philosophy of World History (especially the Introduction known as "Reason in History") and in the lesser known Zusätze which form the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Because it is a grand metaphysical view it is likely to lead to a misunderstanding of Hegel's philosophy in total which is much more fully and meticulously worked out. Nevertheless, it is the case that this grand metaphysical vision does underlie the more specific subjects which Hegel takes up in detail in other works. This metaphysical position therefore ought not to be dismissed, nor ought it to be over-played. It is the background against which other parts of his system are understandable.

What we can say in general on the basis of this brief description of Hegel's grand metaphysical view is that the structure of thought is the structure of Reason and is Rational and all that is Rational. At the same time it is true that the structure or way of the world is Reason and is Rational and is all that is Rational. Hegel's theory is still very much in the way of thinking of Schelling's philosophy of identity, the difference being that for Hegel the identity is not indifferent. It is this basic identity of thought and being through the medium of Reason that makes knowledge possible. Because of this, absolute knowledge is possible - that is, because the way of the world is the same as the way of thought, there is nothing which is not inherently a possible object of knowledge.

When this is realized then unity again prevails between subject and object, but it is not the empty unity with which we began (and Schelling ended) but Spirit with a content which is concrete and made concrete through the historical instantiation of itself. Philosophy is the comprehending of this content and the history of this comprehending is the history of
the ways of comprehending the development of objective Spirit in time, i.e. of the Concept.

Before going further it might be worthwhile to consider the following question. If Reason is all reality according to Hegel then it is not clear why Reason cannot have an immediate contact or "intuition" of itself. But Hegel refuses to accept this and insists that Reason must find itself, must seek to discover what lies behind its phenomenal object. The thing-in-itself is Reason itself and it waits there ready to be known by itself. But Hegel must show why this obstruction of Reason's self knowledge is necessary. It is desirable to be sure, but is it necessary? The answer to this is partly that it is a position which is consistent with experience whereas a position claiming immediate knowledge is not. But we must be careful not to put too much weight on this or we might be forcing Hegel into a kind of "observational Reason" to which he objects. Syllogistic logic, for Hegel, is the form of thinking and the form of the world and its merit is that it is composed, in all of its figures, of two extremes united in a third. But we do not want to make this an empirical observation lest Hegel run foul of his own criticism. 22

There does not seem to be a totally adequate answer to this question. Partly it is a result of the weakness already mentioned that there is a basic conflict between what Hegel wanted to say and what his general system demanded. But we can go part way in explaining Hegel's position and this brings up the whole question of mediation.

Mediation by another is necessary according to Hegel.23 This is true, he maintains, because for him knowledge is ultimately self-knowledge. However, one cannot know this truth immediately because as such it is only
formally true as the empty \( I = I \) of transcendental idealism. But this empty identity is at best only the logical structure of the possible self. The self must have a content in which this logical structure is expressed as concrete. Thus, the categories of knowledge must descend out of the pure realm of universality and put themselves forward as concrete particularity in order that the true nature of their universality can be known. In other words, until each category - or each schematism of the categories of knowledge - is tried out in terms of its self-consistency, then any claim for them will be as good as any other claim - but no better. They must be shown to be a consistent, coherent and rational system of categories of thought. That is, knowledge must be elevated or developed to absolute completeness and consistency. The "external" is, therefore, the particularization of the abstract universality of the logical structure of thought and therefore this particularity mediates the empty universality and makes it concrete.\(^{24}\)

The Concept is the form of Rationality and is the "regulative idea" of systematic Science which provides the standard for determining whether and when the unity of the abstract universal with the concrete particular, of subject and object, has become realized, i.e. whether they are adequate to each other.\(^{25}\)

This is a barely satisfactory mention of mediation and it will therefore be necessary to discuss it in greater detail. To a certain extent we will find some of the mystery of the self-alienation of Spirit explained.
b. The Philosophy of Radical Mediation.

If Schelling's could be called the "philosophy of Identity", then Hegel's should be called the "philosophy of Mediation". Hegel's object was to develop a philosophy which retained the truths of the various dualisms while also reconciling them and effectively abolishing them as dualisms. A good brief description of his basic position is given to us in this paragraph from the Preface to the Phenomenology:

The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly actual solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state to another. As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its opposition. What is true is merely this process of reinstating self-identity or of the reflection in the other-being in itself, and is not an original unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.

Mediation, therefore, is an integral and necessary part of the elevation of Spirit to self knowledge.

In the above citation from the Preface we can see the concept of mediation laid out. We see the notion of the "living substance" which joins at once the notions that "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well" with the notion of dialectic. That is, as living, substance is subject and, as living, it is progression, activity and self-actualization. This process of "self-positing" and of "mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite" expresses the activity of mediation.
which sometimes stands equivalent to dialectic. This equivalency is implicit in many cases but is more overt in others. For example, the close similarity of the two notions is evident when comparing such statements as:

...mediating is nothing but the self activity of self identity; or, in other words, it is reflection into self, the movement of the Ego's being-for-itself, the pure negativity, or, reduced to its utmost abstraction, the simple becoming. The ego, or becoming in general, this process of mediating, is because of its being simple, just immediacy coming to be, and is immediacy itself. We misconceive therefore the nature of reason if we exclude reflection from the truth, and do not take it to be a positive moment of the Absolute. 29

with the statement that "...in its essential nature the truth is subject: being so, it is merely the dialectical movement, this self-producing movement of leading away and returning back into itself". 30 Dialectic, however, is only one aspect of the mediating process. Hegel is not consistent in his use of terms and he sometimes uses "dialectic" in a wide sense to cover the entire process and all of its aspects, whereas at other times he uses it in a narrower sense to stand for one side of the process of mediation.

The same is true with other Hegelian concepts as well. We see in the above citation that mediation is also related to "reflection into self", "pure negativity" and reason itself. It would be a difficult task to unravel all of the confusions between these terms and to delineate an absolutely consistent Hegelian use for them, but basically we can say this. "Reflection" can in general be taken to be mediation as it is manifested in consciousness - particularly when consciousness becomes self-aware. This is because self-awareness is achieved when consciousness sees itself in the other.

"Negation" is usually used by Hegel in a narrow sense of "otherness"
or "self-alienation", though there are times when it is broadened and seems to encompass dialectic and mediation both within it. Generally, however, we may say that "dialectic", being the manifest form of inherent rationality, is the basic notion of which "negation" is the negative side of diremption and separation, and "mediation" is the positive side of reconciliation and unity. Thus we find that Reason is negative and dialectical but that it is equally positive and dialectical as well:

The understanding determines, and holds the determinations fixed; reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive because it generates the universal and comprehends the particular therein. Just as the understanding is usually taken to be something separate from reason as such, so too dialectical reason is usually taken to be something distinct from positive reason. But reason in its truth is spirit which is higher than either merely positive reason, or merely intuitive understanding. It is the negative, that which constitutes the quality alike of dialectical reason and of understanding; it negates what is simple, thus positing the specific difference of the understanding; it equally resolves it and is thus dialectical. But it does not stay in the nothing of this result but in the result is no less positive, and in this way it has restored what was at first simple, but as a universal which is within itself concrete.

Negativity is the process of opposition - of taking a self-identical unity and sundering it into moments of opposition. As a self-identical unity it has only immediate truth and is real only in so far as it exists in itself, i.e. as a pure possibility or potentiality. When this potentiality begins to be actualized it has externalized its inner potency and made itself concrete. In this way its implicitness and its self-sufficiency (its subjectivity) is negated and it becomes objectified. The bringing of this opposition back into unity is effected through the subsequent negation of the original negation - and this is mediation:
...that an accident as such, when cut loose from its containing circumference, - that what is bound and held by something else and actual only by being connected with it, - should obtain its own existence and separate freedom - this is the portentous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of pure ego....Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being. That power is just what we spoke of above as subject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance, cancels abstract immediacy, i.e. immediacy which merely is, and, by so doing, becomes the true Substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this mediation itself.32

Spirit must become actualized through the process of self-diremption and reintegration such that the unity is reasserted within the actualized diversity. In this way the result is the best of both of the Fichtean and Schellingian worlds. There is the original I = I or A = A which is the starting point of the Fichtean philosophy and the conclusion of Schelling's. There is also the element of self-positing of the other - of the I = not I or A = not A which provides the possibility in both Fichte and Hegel for the opposition of subject and object.33 But Fichte could not get beyond the point of the opposition of subject and object - he did not have, as we have already noted, "...the identity of the restfully self-developing Concept".34 It was Hegel's attempt to bring the two back together through the medium of the Concept that gave the impetus to his theory of mediation.

Taylor tells us that for Hegel "...mediation becomes a cosmic principle",35 and this is probably a reasonable description of the case. But such language may tend to put off some readers of Hegel so it might be better just to call Hegel's philosophy a "philosophy of radical mediation". Indeed, it is so radical that in the end mediation itself must be mediated:

It has been shown to be untrue in fact to say that there is an immediate knowledge, knowledge without mediation either by means of some-
thing else or in itself. It has also been explained to be false in fact to say that thought advances through finite and conditioned categories only, which are always mediated by a something else, and to forget that in the very act of mediation the mediation itself vanishes. And to show that, in point of fact, there is a knowledge which advances neither by unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed mediation, we can point to the example of Logic and the whole of philosophy.³⁶

We have already seen that in his early work Hegel suggested that philosophical truth is to be found in the "union of union and non-union".³⁷ This same idea is also expressed as the identity of identity and non-identity in Schelling's writings, and its mature Hegelian form is the mediation of mediation and immediacy:

...immediate knowledge, like mediated knowledge, is entirely one-sided. What is true is their unity, an immediate knowledge which is likewise mediated, something mediated which is likewise simple in itself, which is immediate reference to itself. Inasmuch as the one-sidedness is done away with by means of such combination, it is a condition of infiniteness. Here is union, in which the difference of those characteristics is done away with [aufgehoben], while they at the same time being preserved ideally have the higher destiny of serving as the pulse of vitality, the impulse, movement, unrest of the spiritual, as of the natural life.³⁸

In the end true philosophical knowledge is immediate. But here immediate means mediated mediation. Knowledge is thereby in the form of recollection (Erinnerung = inwardization) but in recollection the content contains mediation within it.

The simple immediate (unmediated immediacy) is what characterizes the extremes of both sides of dualisms. Hegel spends much of his time attacking philosophies of immediacy such as those of Jacobi and Fries which seek immediate knowledge through some cognitive process such as presentiment (Ahnen) or intuition (Anschauung). We have also seen in the chapter on Sense-Certainty that Hegel equally attacked the notion that knowledge was to be
gained through immediate sensory intuition. The main point is that immediate sensory intuition is no more a valid claim to philosophical truth than is immediate intellectual intuition. The former must be mediated by thought and the latter by experience. In the final analysis immediacy does not as such exist - except in its absolute form as recollection. In its usual sense "'immediate knowledge' exists where we have not the consciousness of mediation; all the same, it is mediated".39

So immediate knowledge must be mediated by its other, i.e. it must become mediated knowledge. The unity which immediacy puts forth as truth - whether the Here and Now of sensationalism or the transcendent unity of mystical insight - must be mediated by the claims of the experience of diversity and non-union. "The maxim of immediate knowledge", we are told, rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract being, or pure unity taken by itself), and affirms in its stead the unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not purely immediate unity, i.e. unity empty and indeterminate, but that - with equal emphasis - the one term is shown to have truth only as mediated through the other; - or, if the phrase be preferred, that either term is only mediated with truth through the other. That the quality of mediation is involved in the very immediacy of intuition is thus exhibited as a fact, against which understanding, conformable to the fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge that the evidence of consciousness is infallible, can have nothing to object. It is only ordinary abstract understanding which takes the terms of mediation and immediacy, each by itself absolutely, to represent an inflexible line of distinction, and thus draws upon its own head the hopeless task of reconciling them. The difficulty, as we have shown has no existence in fact, and it vanishes in the speculative Concept.40

The end result of the philosophy of mediation is a knowledge which, by being absolutely mediated, has become immediate.

This may sound paradoxical, and perhaps to a certain extent it is. But Hegel probably has in mind the stage reached in the chapter of the Phenomenology entitled "Absolute Knowledge" which "...forms at once the recollection
and the Golgotha of absolute Spirit...." There has been some difficulty in interpreting this line from Hegel, but I take it to signify, not the death of God as an existentialist might have it, but rather the state in which the dialectical mediation of opposites - of subject and object - has completed itself and where the world of spirit exists as a recollection of these developing forms of experience; where Spirit is the actualization of its former becoming and a having become what it is.

At the end of the Encyclopedia, in the section called "Philosophy", Hegel informs us that "this movement, which philosophy is, finds itself already accomplished, when at the close it seizes its own concept - i.e. looks back on its knowledge". This is essentially the same thing which he had said originally about absolute knowledge at the end of the Phenomenology. In that work we are told that,

Since its accomplishment consists in Spirit knowing what it is, fully comprehending its substance, this knowledge is its concentrating itself on itself, a state in which Spirit leaves its external existence behind and gives its form Gestalt over to Recollection. In thus concentrating itself on itself, Spirit is engulfed in the night of its own self-consciousness; its vanished existence is, however conserved therein....

Upon its attainment to absolute knowledge or philosophy, the various Gestalten in which Spirit understood its developing and unfolding experience cease to have the liveliness of existing in and for consciousness and are reduced to dead bones which litter the road to the absolute. On the other hand, it is only their role as "pretenders" to the throne of the absolute which is left behind as the lifeless history of their development. Spirit in possession of absolute knowledge is this history, but it is this history in its immediacy as completed and actualized.

In a parallel construction Hegel analyzes the development of the in-
individal mind to the standpoint of philosophical science. Hegel tells us that the individual mind has to go through essentially the same development as the human consciousness generally. He assures us, however, that this is not the prodigious task it seems since each of the forms already experienced by consciousness in general have shown themselves to be useless for a complete account of experience, or, in Hegel's words, "...the content is one where reality is already cancelled for spiritual possibilities...." The vitality which a form of consciousness contains for the consciousness which lives and dwells in it becomes a lifeless but integral element in the higher consciousness which supersedes it. "Hence it is", Hegel concludes,

that, in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, and even pastimes, for children; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the universal Spirit, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature.

Just like Spirit itself, the education of the individual through the possible forms of consciousness is only immediate when the mediation of a form is itself complete. This mediation thus "sinks to the level of information" and the mediation itself becomes the object of immediate knowledge in the form of recollection. So for the individual, it being

...already a thought, the content is the property of Substance; it is no longer existence in the form of being-in-itself, it is no longer either purely primitive or sunk into existence, but rather prepared to return as recollected in-itself in the form of being-for-itself.

It is in this same sense that the Gestalten described in the Phenomenology
"form at once the recollection and the Golgotha of absolute Spirit". In each case the vitality of living and dwelling in a form of consciousness ceases to exist when it becomes a part of the history of that consciousness. That is why it is the "comprehension of History" which forms this recollection and Golgotha.

When the process of self-alienation and return to self is completed - when the process of knowledge or coming to know progresses from certainty to truth and knowledge, certainty and truth finally coalesce - then do the actualized forms of knowing present themselves as complete and actual. Then has disappeared the activity of living in each form and with the end of this activity so too is there an end of the life and vitality with which each form was born. It is this which gives poignancy and lucidity to Hegel's famous statement that:

the truth is thus the bacchanalian revel, where not a member is sober; and because every member no sooner becomes detached than it is thereby immediately dissolved [auflösen], the revel is just as much a state of transparent unbroken calm. Judged by that movement, the particular forms [Gestalten] of Spirit do not indeed substist any more than do determinate thoughts; but they are, all the same, as much positive and necessary moments, as negative and transitory. In the entirety of the movement, taken as an unbroken quiescent whole, that which obtains distinctness in the course of its process and secures specific existence, is preserved in the form of self-recollection in which existence is self-knowledge, and self-knowledge, again, is immediate existence. 49

So the process is indeed one of returning to the beginning at the end. In fully mediated knowledge the disappearance of mediation is accomplished and knowing has become again, through the process of mediation, immediate. Expressed in a different way, another commentator agrees that for Hegel the circle of knowledge is exemplified by the return to immediacy through the completion of the mediation of original immediacy:
Truth is never immediacy, never the direct apprehension of a formal element in abstraction from all others, but the mediation of its immediate self with its mediation. "The true is the Whole." It is the result of the comprehensive interrelations of formal elements, and is "immediate" in the sense that actuality is the totality of mediations.

The life of Spirit is its becoming, — the process of the mediation between its reality as subject and its reality as object. When it becomes objectively fully actualized it is \textit{eo ipso} absolutely mediated. Thus life, as the becoming of its forms of experience, ceases, and their actualization is their Golgotha. By the fact that in absolute knowledge Spirit is fully actual, because it has expressed its inner being in an outer form which is perfectly adequate to it, the category of "life" no longer applies to its Gestalten. It has only to "recollect" its forms - to "inwardize" them - in order to know itself as it is in and for itself.

The development of the Phenomenology is not itself a temporal process but a logical one. The development displays the logical progression of the ways in which the categories of knowing can be applied. But according to Hegel pure logic is abstract and therefore has no meaning until filled out with objective content. Therefore, the logical development must have some concrete instantiation in order to be real. Even more strongly, the logical structure of the possible attitudes of consciousness only becomes an actual structure when it is applied to a content which itself becomes actual.

What then is time according to Hegel? Time for Hegel is not unreal as such — though it is not objectively real in the sense of the absolute time of Newtonian physics. It is similar to the Kantian conception of time as a form of intuition. "Time, like space", we are informed,
is a pure form of sense or intuition, the non-sensuous sensuous; but, as in the case of space, the distinction of objectivity and a subjective consciousness confronting it, does not apply to time. If these determinations were applied to space and time, the former would then be abstract objectivity, the latter abstract subjectivity. Time is the same principle as the I = I of pure self-consciousness, but this principle, or the simple Concept, will in its uttermost externality and abstraction - as intuited mere Becoming, pure being-within-self as sheer coming-out-of-self.53

Time, then, is the form of inner intuition. In other words, time is "thinking space". Time occurs only with the application of thought, by means of logical categories, to the world. Once the thought is actualized through the dialectical procedure of its application, then too is the world fully actualized, for it is then known for what it is in its totality.

Then must Spirit retreat to a-temporality, for the process is completed and "temporality" is only the term for the process itself. The result is that Spirit need only recollect itself in order to know itself. The Golgotha of Spirit is its temporal cessation and transcendence of the temporal order into the realm of non-temporal actuality. It is not the death of God, but His actualization.

Again, the question arises as to whether or not the world was begotten in time. Is there a first cause or are we stuck again in the antinomy of causality? Though this question is misleading and unanswerable as such, it is now possible to say something about it. The answer (in so far as it is an answer) is that, for Hegel, time arises only with knowing:

Spirit, to which belongs Being which is absolute and supreme, is, exists only as activity; that is to say, in so far as it posits itself, is actual or for itself and produces itself. But in this activity it has the power of knowing, and only as it thus knows is it that which it is.54
In the Logic Hegel attempts to show that Being is an eternal category which represents only the possibility of the development of categorial ways by which Spirit can know itself. The end is the beginning in that Being is what is, and knowing is knowing what is implied by Being. Thus, the real is as eternal or non-temporal as the logical possibilities of knowing it and no question of the coming to be of the real, of Being, arises. The only question that can arise in this regard is: does the process of knowing begin at some time? And the answer is that it begins at the beginning of time for it is the beginning of time. What existed before time began? Only the logical possibilities of knowing and of being known. In the end they turn out to be the same thing.

c. The Concept as Mediator.

It was mentioned earlier that the mediation of subject and object which the Phenomenology carries out is effected by means of the Concept. This is a most unusual thing to say and must therefore be clarified. It is true that in the Phenomenology the mediation is carried through because the two sides of subject and object meet in a third thing which brings them together. This third thing is the Concept.

Obviously Hegel is using the term "Concept" in a rather original and unique way. There is, of course, no ready agreement among philosophers as to what a concept is. Some claim they have objective status as such; others believe them to be nothing more than general words; still others think of them as no more than mere dispositions. There are, of course, many other conceptions of what "concepts" are, but one thing they all seem to have in common is that they are utterly different from what Hegel seems
to mean by the term. What can he possibly mean by saying that "that in which Science exists I have placed in the self-development of the Concept"?  

One way of answering this question is to imagine that Hegel is doing or advocating some sort of conceptual analysis - such as that which is so popular in current-day philosophy. One could perhaps stretch some of Hegel's statements so that those like the following can be interpreted as having this meaning:

...the important thing for the student of science is to make himself undergo the strenuous toil of conceptual reflection, of thinking in the form of the Concept. This demands concentrated attention on the Concept as such, on simple and ultimate determinations like being-in-itself, being-for-itself, self-identity, and so on; for these are elemental, pure, self-determined functions of a kind we might call souls, were it not that their conceptual nature denotes something higher than that term contains.  

Certainly modern conceptual analysis "demands concentrated attention on the concept as such" and in this respect Hegel seems to be in general agreement with this form of philosophizing. However, it is rather difficult to reconcile this view with Hegel's comparison of Concepts with souls (though it is admittedly unclear just what such a comparison can mean). And how does one account for the idea of Hegel's that the Concept is self-moving and self-developing from a point of view of conceptual analysis? - particularly when Hegel sometimes places this self-developing Concept in the Object. Consider, for example, the following:

Since the Concept is the very self of the object, manifesting itself as the development of the object, it is not a quiescent subject, passively supporting accidents: it is a self-determining active Concept which takes up its determinations and makes them its own. In the course of this process that inert passive subject really disappears; it enters into the different constituents and pervades the content; instead of remaining in inert antithesis to determinateness of content,
it constitutes, in fact, that very specificity, i.e. the content as differentiated along with the process of bringing this about.\footnote{57}

We might be able to imagine that thinking about and analyzing a concept involves the development of knowledge about what is contained within that concept. But Hegel is apparently saying far more than this. It is the Concept itself which develops; furthermore, its development is the determination of the object itself, not merely the passive container of it.

So what is the Hegelian Concept then? We have already developed part of the answer to this question. We know that the "object", according to Hegel, is the "self-alienated other" of consciousness. We also know that because of this it follows that if the mind is made of concepts, then the "other" (which is only itself) must be made up of concepts in objective form. So for Hegel concepts are not only the intelligible aspects of things, they are also the real element in them as well.

In his\textit{ Idealism: a Critical Survey}, Ewing pointed out that "Concept" can stand for both the conceiving and that which is conceived.\footnote{58} Whereas most philosophers usually refer to the first element when referring to "conceptual analysis", Hegel refers to them both. Furthermore, he does so in such a way that what he means is that both subject and object are the elements of what makes a "Concept". In other words, the Concept represents to Hegel the unity of the two sides.\footnote{59}

In order to bring the two sides of an opposition together and yet be able to admit of their essential distinction, it is necessary to have a middle term which can unite them. This is the function performed by the concrete universal or, as it is otherwise known, the Concept:
The unification therefore belongs to this other aspect, which by contrast is the aspect of reflection into self, is that side therefore which contains its self and its opposite, and contains them not only in-themselves, or in a general way, but for-themselves, or expressly developed and distinguished. The content, as well as the other aspect of self-conscious spirit, so far as it is the other aspect, have been brought to light and are here in their completeness; the unification still a-wanting is the simple unity of the Concept.60

The Concept, we might say, has a foot in both worlds - it is in the realm of being and it is in the realm of thought. This double nature of the Concept is described by Kojève in the following way:

Like the Spirit or the Idea, each Concept is hence double and single at the same time; it is both "subjective" and "objective", both real thought of real entity and real entity really thought. The real aspect of the Concept is called "object" (Gegenstand), "given-Being" (Sein), "entity that exists as a given-Being" (Seiendes), "In-itself" (Ansich), and so on. The aspect thought is called "knowledge" (Wissen), "act of knowing" (Erkennen), "knowledge" (Erkenntniss), "act of thinking" (Denken), and so on....these two aspects are inseparable and complementary.61

Through the Concept the universalizing process of thought is brought into correspondence with being. It is thereby made concrete through the immediate relation of universal essence with particularized being. In the end, then, mediation itself is mediated and becomes immediate in recollection. But this is an immediacy which contains mediation within it - it is, in other words, the Concept.

The Concept is capable of mediating because it is both object and subject. Because of this dual nature it is incomplete when grasped only as thought or in language because, as concrete, it needs to be tied to the world. It is a mediator when it is the object of rational activity - and rational activity is Spirit. This is the conclusion we discovered at the end of our analysis of the Phenomenology in the "Spiritual Animal Kingdom".
This rational activity, we discovered, manifests itself in society and mutual interaction among members of society. Thus, the identity of objective and subjective reason is grasped through community action or work.\textsuperscript{62} But this is, so far, only the immediate grasp of the truth. It has to become self-conscious Spirit, and this it becomes through Art, Religion and ultimately, Philosophy.\textsuperscript{63}

This discussion of the Concept may still appear confusing for, on the one hand, it is claimed that the Concept is neither subjective nor objective, but mediates the two; while on the other hand, it seems obvious that concepts are cognitive phenomena. But it must be remembered that Hegel was an idealist - though he tried very hard not to be a subjective idealist; that is, he tried not to make mind primary over matter. For Hegel both are opposite aspects of Reason - and Reason conscious of itself (or reflected into itself) is Spirit. So the true Concept of a thing is its manifest reality as an object which is at the same time an object of knowledge. Knowledge only exists when it is knowledge of an object. Likewise, an object is only an object when it is reflected into another. The consciousness of this reflection is knowledge of that object. When the object is finally discovered to be merely the self-alienation of consciousness itself, then the object is no longer merely "in-itself" but is also "for-itself". The subject - object unity is the Concept, and consciousness of the Concept is absolute Knowledge.

The role of the Concept might be made clearer if we relate it to another mechanism used by another philosopher which does not already have the associations attached to it that "Concept" has. The parallel is not exact by any means and it must therefore be taken for its illustrative and illumini-
native function. On the other hand, there is a great deal of similarity between the two as well. The parallel mechanism in question is that of Kant's schematism.

The typical problem that arises when one attempts to delineate two "types" of things is to discover a way in which they can be related. Of course they can be "externally" related by merely being said to exist side by side. But if it is necessary that they have some sort of interaction, particularly some kind of reciprocal determination, then there must be a point of mediation between them. In the case of Descartes, for example, mind was defined as a thinking thing, as not extended, as immaterial, as indivisible, whereas body was extended, divisible, material and non-thinking. The problem with this is that there is nothing in common between them and it is then very difficult, if not impossible, to explain how they can interact.

Kant recognized this problem in his own theory and therefore maintained that in order for an object to be subsumed under a concept there must be a similarity or "homogeneity", as he phrased it, between the concept and the representation of the object. Empirical concepts can apply to objects because empirical concepts arise from experience and hence must be, in some sense, "like" the experience, and hence like the object. However, in the case of the pure concepts of the understanding (categories) there is nothing which can be a corresponding intuition or object of sense. Causation, for example, is a category which cannot be intuited as an object of experience. The question thus arises: "How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible"? The answer Kant gave is that "obviously there must be
some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible". Just like Hegel's Concept, this third thing, the schematism, must have a foot in both worlds:

This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.

Beyond this it is very difficult to say exactly just what the schema is, for this is one of the most difficult and mysterious notions in the Kantian vocabulary.

We have already noted that Hegel could well have brought the two sides of subject and object together since both are essentially Reason, and Reason ought to be able to relate to itself without difficulty, so there is inherently no difficulty with "homogeneity". So far, then, Hegel's situation is considerably different from either Descartes' or Kant's. However, as he did not want to make the relation immediate and thereby drive out the significance of distinction and determination, he created a self-imposed problem of bringing the two sides together through an intermediary. This intermediary is what Hegel calls the Concept.

The truth of a thing is thus its Concept precisely because the Concept represents the universalized particular or the particularized universal. To know a thing's Concept is to know it as it is in itself. Likewise, a thing has achieved its complete fulfillment - it is what it ought to be - when it is the object of purely adequate knowledge. The Phenomenology represents an attempt to make the Logic, with its system of categories, aplic-
able to the world. It is an attempt to develop an adequate schematism or Concept of the objective world.\textsuperscript{67} Absolute Knowledge is knowledge which is perfectly schematized or conceptualized; that is, the Concepts of knowing are then capable of being applied as fully and completely as possible.

Of course the schema could not be pure in the sense that the categories were pure, i.e. purely intellectual. Were that the case then Kant would be no better off than before. So they had to be, as was stated, both intellectual and sensuous. The only way of making this seem plausible was to relate the schematism to the forms of intuition in general. Kant therefore chose to relate the schematism to time since time was a form of sensuous intuition and at the same time pure, in the sense of being a cognitive presupposition.\textsuperscript{68} Therefore, we find that

the schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules relate in the order of the categories to the time-series, the time-content, the time-order and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible objects.\textsuperscript{69}

We might not go too far wrong in calling the schematism a "formation rule" in that "it is a rule of synthesis of the imagination..."\textsuperscript{70} - though it is difficult to say for certain just what it really is.

The Concept for Hegel is perhaps something like a "formation rule" as well. Given that the Logic is the system of categories which becomes applied to the object (technically: which become objectified), then there is needed a rule whereby the various categories are applied properly. It is not good enough to say that the Logic gives the hierarchy of categories since the implication would be that only the final category is properly applicable to objects. Clearly all of the categories are involved in Rat-
ional comprehension. The question is how are they to be applied so that each has its proper application relative to the proper application of all of the others. The categories of Being always have their place and their proper application, and the Phenomenology shows what happens when the Concept or the schematism is not properly comprehended.

It is no wonder, having looked at the parallel between the Kantian schematism and the Hegelian Concept, that Kojève was moved to remark that "generally speaking, in his theory of the Concept, Hegel merely makes more precise (and consequently transforms) the Kantian theory of the Schematismus". The parallel is perhaps even more striking when one realizes that, like the schematism, the Concept is related to time. In the previous discussion of time a citation was given in which Hegel made the very Kantian statement that time is a pure form of sense or intuition and that it is "the same principle" as "the simple Concept". We can thus begin to grasp what constitutes the mediating power of the Concept. Each Gestalt of the Phenomenology represents one of the logically possible attitudes which consciousness can take toward the world, and the Phenomenology itself gives the logic which demonstrates these to be all of the possible Gestalten. It is therefore not a description of a temporal process, but a logical one. Yet corresponding to each Gestalt is an attempt to grasp the Concept, the unity of subject and object. So the forms of consciousness must find historical instantiation at some point - and this is the history of the self-realization of Spirit. When the Concept is fully comprehended then the logical possibilities of conscious forms is exhausted and the temporal instantiation becomes history and knowledge is recollection:
Time is just the Concept which is there, and presented to consciousness in the form of empty intuition. Hence Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time so long as it does not grasp its pure Concept, i.e. so long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self, it is the Concept apprehended only through intuition. When this Concept grasps itself, it supersedes its time character, comprehends intuition, and is intuition comprehended and comprehending. Time therefore appears as Spirit's destiny and necessity, where Spirit is not yet complete within itself; it is the necessity compelling Spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the in-itself (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or, conversely, to realize and make manifest in-itself that which is at first within - i.e. to vindicate it for Spirit's certainty of self.74

The Concept is the mediation between subject and object which comes into being as the temporalization of the knowing process. In becoming actual, it provides the mediation which guarantees that the actualization of thought is also the actualization of its object. The Idea of the Logic is the Concept a-temporally, i.e. as the abstract possibility of being instantiated. The Idea has no history - its essence is its analysis. The Concept is history; or its genesis is an essential part of its essence and conceptual analysis must therefore be supplemented by historical analysis, i.e. logic must become dialectical. Hegel had to show all possible categories if the end result was to be actual. Thus, the Phenomenology had to be the series of forms which establish absolute Knowledge - or else the actualization of both subject and object could not be demonstrated as actualized together.

Whereas on the universal, or perhaps cosmological, level it is Mind which mediates between Spirit as Idea and Spirit as Nature,75 it is the Concept which mediates subject and object at the epistemological level. The philosophy of mediation and the concepts which support it - e.g. life,
organism, dialectic, negation, reflection, etc. - could not effect the reconciliation of the opposition between subject and object which they seek were it not for the presupposition made by Hegel that what is, is Reason; for it is necessary that the concrete objectivity be capable of being taken up into Rational consciousness and be seen to be the concrete alienation of Rationality itself. Only in such a way could a Cartesian or a Kantian dualism be avoided. But it is avoided because an assumption is made that Reason is metaphysically real and therefore that what is known by thinking Reason is Reason itself, and therefore, it has ontological validity. Thus, Hegel's Phenomenology is grounded on a metaphysical rationalism in which an enterprise of epistemology is carried through in order to establish that what constitutes true knowledge is not only knowledge of the real but is the real itself. For Hegel, epistemology becomes ontology and the separation between the knowing subject and the external world is overcome. This is very clearly expressed in the following passage which, though long, is worth citing in its entirety for the clarity with which it expresses this idea:

At first the two [i.e. subject and object] are distinguished; what it is essentially does not exist for consciousness, and thus its essential existence still wears for Spirit an aspect of otherness or strangeness. But the two stand in a relation of reciprocity, so that the advance of the one is at the same time the perfecting of the other. In the "Phenomenology of Spirit", Spirit is considered in its phenomenal existence as consciousness, and the necessity of its advance till it reaches the absolute standpoint is demonstrated. The forms assumed by Spirit, the stages which it produces, are there treated of as they present themselves in its consciousness. What, however, Spirit knows, what Spirit as consciousness is, is one thing; the necessary nature of that which Spirit knows, and which exists for Spirit, is, as the word implies, a mere fact of existence, and appears therefore as contingent. The latter, the necessity, namely, by which this world has arisen for it, does not exist for Spirit at this stage of consciousness. So far as Spirit is concerned it takes
place secretly, it exists only for philosophical contemplation, and belongs to the development of that which Spirit is according to its concept. In this development a stage is now reached where Spirit attains to absolute consciousness, at which rationality exists for it as a world; and while on the other hand as consciousness it develops itself toward a consciousness of the essential nature of the world, it is here the point is reached, where the two modes, which were at first different, coincide. The perfect form of consciousness is reached when it becomes conscious of the true object, and the object, what is substantial, Substance, reaches its perfect or completed stage when it exists for itself, that is, when it distinguishes itself from itself and has itself as object. Consciousness forces itself on to consciousness of the Substantial, and this latter, which is the concept of Spirit, forces itself on to phenomenal existence and to a relation in which it exists as self-consciousness or for itself.76

Philosophy has for its purpose the examination of knowledge from its most basic and fundamental form as "Sense-Certainty" to its most developed and complete form as "Rational" comprehension. In the process of this development it is demonstrated that this examination of knowledge is nothing other than the development of knowledge, and in the end it is the actual knowledge of what is. The Phenomenology, as the Science of this experience of consciousness, is, therefore, an epistemology raised to the level of ontology; or, in other words, it is an epistemological ontology. Having established this, the next task will be to examine this notion more closely.
PART II: HEGEL’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

CHAPTER 7

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

a. Introduction.

So far we have discovered that Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology was to bring about a systematic reunification of the traditional dichotomy of subject and object (or thought and being), and that the way in which he attempted to do this was through a philosophy of radical mediation. But saying that his is a philosophy of radical mediation does not say very much about the nature and method of his theory. However, it has also been indicated that Hegel’s method of doing metaphysics is through an epistemology which is also an ontology and that the metaphysical position which he develops to make this epistemological ontology perform the function assigned to it is a metaphysical rationalism. Still, however, we do not know a great deal about Hegel’s theory and it will therefore be necessary to consider in detail what is meant by these two phrases “epistemological ontology” and “metaphysical rationalism” in order to see what Hegel is doing. The second of these will be taken up in Part III and the first will be the concern of the present section.

Weiss claims that Hegel had no epistemology as such but that he went "beyond epistemology". In what sense can one say that Hegel went beyond epistemology and does this really leave epistemology behind? One reason
why one may be inclined to say that Hegel went beyond epistemology and therefore is not to be engaged in epistemology is that the term 'epistemology' has several different meanings. In at least some of the senses of the term it is true that Hegel is not doing epistemology. But in another sense he is doing an epistemology which is at the same time something else - something beyond mere epistemology. In *Reason and Experience* Walsh has listed a number of questions which philosophers, legitimately engaged in epistemology, may and do ask. One such philosopher may ask some of them, or perhaps only one of them, but the leaving out of consideration of others of them does not preclude that philosopher from being an epistemologist. One of the questions which such a person might ask and try to answer is, according to Walsh, "from our having this knowledge [i.e. how we know different kinds of things and different kinds of truth] what can be inferred about (a) ourselves; (b) the objects of knowledge and their relations to one another; (c) the relations of (a) and (b)?" He then says that these are questions which are

"...asked in the first instance in metaphysics, when that is taken to be an inquiry into the general nature of reality and man's place in the universe; and it may be agreed that it is more properly classified as metaphysical than epistemological".

Now it seems that the obvious argument to make here is that such classifications do not properly delimit the spheres of epistemology and metaphysics but that in some cases at least the doing of one presupposes or involves the doing of the other, that, in other words, it is a reasonable position to claim that through the analysis of knowing we may determine (perhaps are compelled to determine) not only what knowing is, but also what knowledge is
knowledge of. If it is claimed that what we know has truth, then something is also being claimed for the object of knowledge. So if knowledge is determined to be knowledge of what is ultimately real (that is, to be true knowledge), then the study is in fact neither mere epistemology nor mere ontology, but is the one by way of the other; it is epistemological ontology. This is what Hegel is doing in the Phenomenology.

Those who accept that there is an epistemological element in Hegel usually think that this is limited to the section on "Consciousness" and that the succeeding sections are concerned with other problems; as Findlay says, "the Dialectic, on the general principle of making the implicit explicit, therefore "moves" from the epistemological to the practical, social level". But this seems unsatisfying if for no other reason than that such a view is incapable of showing any real continuity between the various sections of the Phenomenology which, in this view, must appear as a collection of essays on subjects which concerned Hegel and which he tended to treat in a similar manner. But not only is this an unnecessary thesis to assume, it also destroys any claim of the Phenomenology to have a demonstrated and systematic Science of Consciousness. One may very well think that Hegel failed in providing this, or that he was mistaken in thinking such a thing to be possible, but it is clearly the case that this is what he set out to do and what he thought he had achieved.

Also, Findlay's position seems too simplistic. "Self-Consciousness" is not really a study of society or social consciousness at all. True, in "Sense-Certainty" we have no need to postulate the existence of others and the examination is centered purely on knowing consciousness as such, whereas "Self-Consciousness" is clearly involved with other consciousnesses. In the
first case, however, the concern is to discover what it means to know passively; that is, to know particulars. In the latter the concern is to discover what it means to know actively; that is, to know thought itself as the ground of the universal. As such there is involved the notion of inter-subjectivity, but this is not yet sociality. Social consciousness does not arise until the last section of Reason, das geistige Tierreich, where the common activity is discovered to be the true source of actuality and rationality.

In the examination of the Phenomenology from "Sense-Certainty" to "Reason" it was shown that Hegel's concern was to examine the various knowledge claims which consciousness can put forward. In the process it was shown not only what the nature of this knowledge was, but also what the reality status of the object of this knowledge had. So the development of this examination progressed from epistemology in its more traditional sense of knowing things to what might be called a "moral epistemology" in the section on "Spirit" and "religious epistemology" in the section on "Religion". The end result is found to be knowledge which has the real itself for its object and which is absolute in the sense of being demonstrated to be true and complete knowledge.

b. Truth as Developmental.

The Phenomenology is the demonstration of the historical/logical progression from knowledge in the form of subjective certainty to objective truth. In other words the course of the Phenomenology, as we shall soon see, is the development whereby certainty becomes truth. But before we can explicate the meaning of this further it would be well to ask just what Hegel means by "truth" for it does seem to differ from the notion of truth as many
philosophers, particularly those of a modern empiricist or logical empiricist bent, conceive it.

First of all, it is clear that Hegel is not really concerned with truth as a characteristic of propositions. We may be inclined to say that the proposition that "the cat is on the mat" is either true or false and that it is true if the cat is on the mat and false if otherwise. Hegel might agree that this is one way of talking about truth if one is willing to accept that there may be truths of various kinds. But to do so is confusing at best. Hegel talks about this sort of propositional correspondence as correctness as opposed to truth. The former is subjectively determined in that it depends upon the particular conception of the "state of affairs" which I happen to have. Truth, however, is more objective than this for Hegel in that it implies that the Concept is fully actualized through the subjective and objective sides being a completely adequate expression of each other:

"...Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the concept: not of course the correspondence of external things with my conceptions, for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person....Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the concept."

Hegel often uses the term "correspondence" in connection with truth, but he is definitely not thinking in terms of a "correspondence theory of truth" - that is the theory of truth which he criticizes as really being concerned with correctness. He often talks of truth as being the adequacy of the concept to the object; in other words, it is the situation in which the subject adequately reflects the object and vice versa. To put it in
terms we are already familiar with, it is the realization of the Concept as the actualized unity of subject and object. This distinction between "corresponds to" and is "adequate to" is an important one for Hegel. A number series may correspond to a given objective state of affairs, but in Hegel's sense it is not adequate and does not express truth since to know the truth of something is to know the thing and a thing (except perhaps a number) is always something more than a corresponding number series or any other quantitative or qualitative description. These are all proper categories of knowledge - as is shown in the Logic - and they are therefore at best only partial truths or perhaps pragmatic truths; but, as Caird pointed out, for Hegel "a half truth is necessarily distorted into a falsehood when taken as the whole truth".7

It is clear that, except for a fundamental disagreement on the proper task of philosophy, Hegel can have no, or very little, quarrel with those philosophers who consider the task of philosophy to be to analyze the nature of propositional correctness. Hegel is doing something different and not necessarily in conflict with such an enterprise.8 Hegel's conception of truth is more normative, as is seen from his continuation of the previous passage:

It is in this deeper sense of truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. These objects are true, if they are as they ought to be, i.e. if their reality corresponds to their concept.9

There was a great deal of talk, by the British neo-Hegelians in particular, about degrees of truth - and to a certain extent this way of looking at the notion of truth reflects Hegel's own thoughts on the matter. Something is more of less true depending upon how closely it approaches what it ought to
be. Now this conception has some important implications, but it is first of all imperative to examine briefly this normative element in Hegel's conception of truth lest it be misleading.

What does it mean for something to become what it ought to be? This sounds very Platonic; it would seem that there is an ideal form toward which the thing ought to strive for ever more adequate embodiment. But this is clearly not what Hegel has in mind. An indication of what he does have in mind is given in the following:

It is one of the fundamental assumptions of dogmatic Logic that Qualitative judgments such as, "the rose is red", or "is not red", can contain truth. Correct they may be, i.e. in the limited circle of perception, of finite conception and thought: that depends on the content, which likewise is finite, and, on its own merits, untrue. Truth, however, as opposed to correctness, depends solely on the form, viz. on the concept as it is put and the reality corresponding to it.10

and in the Zusatz to the same section he continues:

In common life the terms truth and correctness are often treated as synonymous: we speak of the truth of a content, when we are only thinking of its correctness. Correctness, generally speaking, concerns only the formal coincidence between our conception and its content, whatever the constitution of this content may be. Truth, on the contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself, that is, with its concept. That a person is sick, or that someone has committed a theft, may certainly be correct. But the content is untrue. A sick body is not in harmony with the concept of body, and there is a want of congruity between theft and the concept of human conduct.11

This sounds vaguely familiar and it almost seems as though Hegel has replaced Aristotle's "justice" with "truth". But this is not entirely true because for Hegel there is a difference.

We must remember that an object is an object only because of the activity of the mind in conceptualizing what is presented to it. In this
respect Hegel does not differ greatly from Kant. Objectivity arises from the employment of the *a priori* categories of knowledge upon a given manifold of sense intuition; or, rather, for Hegel we might better say, in accordance with the discussion in section a of chapter 6, that objectivity arises because the categories of thought become self-objective, become the objects of thought. Therefore, the concept which a thing "ought" to correspond to is the full and complete objectification of the ways in which knowledge can occur. Error results when mere correctness is elevated to truth - as when, for example, causality, as a correct description of an event or of events, is asserted to be the truth *per se*, or when a quantitative analysis of natural phenomenon is asserted to be the only true analysis. Truth, in the Hegelian sense, includes these correct descriptions but goes beyond them and places them in their proper perspective.12

The *Logic* demonstrates or deduces the categories which are applicable to experience and the *Phenomenology* shows the *Gestalten* through which these categories can be applied. Any given *Gestalt* is a way of knowing and the progression of *Gestalten* is the progress of knowledge. This is what Hegel means when he says that "it is this process by which Science in general comes about, this gradual development of knowing, that is set forth here in the *Phenomenology of Spirit".*13

The point at which the object corresponds to its concept is, then, the point at which the absolute *Gestalt* has been developed. The achievement of this absolute *Gestalt* is what Hegel calls absolute Knowledge and by this he refers to the situation where all categories are fully expressed in experience.14 When this stage is reached then the object and concept are the same thing; that is, consciousness has attained to knowledge of the Concept. At
any lesser point truth has been achieved only relatively and not absolutely. But each point is necessary because the absolute can be seen as the whole which encompasses all of the lesser, inadequate stages only if those stages have brought forth the Concept through the possible forms of knowledge. Loewenberg is essentially correct in saying that "absolute truth...is the totality of relative truths, each of which attains self-realization through the process of oscillation between self-assertion and self-alienation"; but this is not the complete truth of the Hegelian absolute. It is not only the totality of relative truths but is this totality put into systematic order. Only thus is philosophy Scientific and only thus is absolute truth demonstrated to be organic. It is in this sense that for Hegel:

The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely its essence reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming.

Truth, then, arises from a process, the process of consciousness coming to know. It must always be looked upon both historically and in the process of self-development - organic development toward an end (that is, toward the whole or the absolute). Through the historical stages of its process it reaches certain levels of development which are its complete development so far as it is possible. Just as the child is no longer an infant and has reached his full development for his stage in his growth but is not yet fully actually what he will be, so too in any given stage of its development will truth reach its fullest possible expression.

So truth at any stage is true so far as that stage is concerned. Loewenberg referred to "relative truths" and though Hegel did not use this
phrase, and may well have objected to its use, there is a sense in which this phrase is useful in the Hegelian context. Such a phrase, particularly with reference to Hegel, may sound paradoxical or even contradictory but it is useful when taken to mean that there is a truth which can be known at any given historical stage of development of knowledge. Given any form of consciousness, there is a truth which corresponds to it and which exemplifies the full expression of that form. There is also implied in it that this truth is different for each stage. Collingwood would say that each stage has a knowledge system predicated upon a given set of "absolute presuppositions" and that these will change from time to time. Metaphysics for Collingwood was just the process of determining these absolute presuppositions for the different ages of man. Hegel's theory may be looked upon something like this because for him each philosopher "...is a child of his time..." and can only express the truth of his time. Furthermore,

We may rest assured that it is the nature of truth to force its way to recognition when the time comes, and that it only appears when its time has come, and hence never appears too soon, and never finds a public that is not ripe to receive it.

So it must be the case that the truth which is possible to know at any given stage must be the truth for that stage and thus must be true within the inherent limitations of that stage.

From this it might seem after all that Hegel's concept of truth is essentially a form of relativism; for if we can say that at a given time the truth for that time was in fact truth, then are we not opening up the concept of truth for anyone - or at least for any epoch or any form of consciousness - to decide what it will accept as truth and have it stand? Yes and no must be the (typically Hegelian) answer. Yes, it is relative in the
sense that the truth for any stage of development is truth and may differ from Truth per se or from the truth of any other stage. But no, it is not relative either in the sense that it can be arbitrary or that all truths are equal. But surely, one will say, if something is true then it is true and if false then false - truth does not change. But for Hegel Truth does change in the sense that it develops toward a stage of completion. Only on such an interpretation is it possible to make sense of and understand Hegel's statement that "Truth moves itself by its very nature..." It might be said that it is not truth but knowledge which develops until such knowledge becomes absolute and hence has Truth for its object. If in saying this one is careful not to separate truth from the absolute, then it is correct and is merely another way of saying the same thing. As we shall see knowledge develops concomitantly with its object and in the mutual or reciprocal action of the two is the Truth developed. In the end the epistemology of the Phenomenology is shown to be ontology.

c. Fear of Error and Fear of Truth.

The opening sentence of the Introduction is very revealing concerning the project and the scope of the work which is to follow. Hegel's primary concern in the beginning is to tackle the Kantian epistemology and to examine just to what extent it is a viable starting point for philosophy. Though essentially a critique of this Kantian position, we will find that ultimately he does not reject epistemology per se but only the Kantian notion that it can be carried out as a function separate from (and ultimately hostile to) metaphysics. Yet at first it appears that Hegel is criticizing epistemology per se. In the opening sentence we find him giving the Kantian position:
It is a natural assumption that, in philosophy, one must first come to an understanding concerning the nature of knowledge before taking up the real subject matter, namely, the actual knowledge of what truly is.22

Here, then, Hegel notes that according to the conception which was common at the time, i.e. according to Kantian philosophers, the subject matter of philosophy is first of all epistemological in nature. That is, it is first of all necessary to examine knowledge before philosophy can get down to its real subject matter: "what truly is". However, it is still here declared that "what is" is the fundamental philosophical problem — even though Kant's critical epistemology ruled out the possibility of meeting this problem. Kant's notion was that before any metaphysics or ontology can be judged possible it is first necessary to critically analyze the very process by which we determine the nature and characteristics of what is. In other words, Kantian and post-Kantian philosophers placed epistemological investigations at the forefront of any philosophical speculation. Until we know what knowledge is and what its limits are we cannot determine the extent to which knowledge of the real is possible. On the face of it this sounds eminently plausible and reasonable and Hegel will have to find a way to circumvent these demands or to show them to be inherently impossible if he is to save metaphysics from the Kantian critique.

Kant, of course, concluded that the only possible knowledge which can be gained from the application of pure reason to sensory intuitions must be restricted to phenomena and cannot extend to the noumenal thing-in-itself except as a "regulative idea" or, as we might say, a logical construct which serves to give completeness to the phenomenal world which we know directly. But of course this restricts knowledge to what appears for us
and bars it from reaching toward what is in itself. So there is a hint of irony in this opening sentence of the Introduction since "the actual knowledge of what truly is" is impossible of attainment by those such as Kant who have carried out the first part of the program - the critical epistemology.

In the next sentence Hegel goes on to say the following:

Knowledge, in turn, tends to be regarded as the instrument with which one takes hold of the absolute or as the medium through which one discovers it. The concern that there may be various kinds of knowledge, of which one might be better suited than another for attaining the end in view, seems moreover legitimate, for by making an erroneous choice among them one will thus grasp clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth; and when knowledge is taken to be a faculty of a determinate kind and scope, the concern once again seems legitimate that error will be grasped instead of truth unless the nature and limits of this faculty are still more precisely determined.23

Here Hegel's irony is carried a bit further. Hegel says "knowledge, in turn, tends to be regarded as the instrument with which one takes hold of the absolute or as the medium through which one discovers it", but this is true only if it is concluded that knowledge of the absolute is in fact possible. However we immediately find that, when taken from a Kantian perspective, a scepticism regarding this very point is developed precisely because the knowledge of what constitutes knowledge is determined to be incapable of achievement. There arises instead a confusion as to what kind of knowledge is suitable for ontological certainty, and as long as one is bound up with problems about the kinds of knowledge which are more or less suitable for the task then there would seem to be no criterion by which one may select one kind over another. Therefore the arbitrary selection of one kind over another may, ontologically speaking, lead to error
just as well as it could lead to truth. There would seem to be nothing but the assurance of each kind of knowledge that it gets at the truth.

Given this result, the Kantian position is a natural consequence. Knowledge of how to determine which of contending claims represents the proper claim to knowledge is impossible to achieve by any means. There is an unbridgable gap between knowledge and the absolute. This gap results because "...the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a shaping and alteration of it".  

It is therefore impossible to ever know the object of knowledge except in so far as it is an object of knowledge. Regardless of the tack taken, so long as this basic idea is retained, knowledge which is ontological knowledge is impossible.

Hegel terms this denial of the ability to know "fear of error". Now presumably by this he means to say that the position latterly characterized results because the former position requires a choice between kinds of knowledge with no criterion by which to choose being given. The easier way out, it would seem, would be to assert that no means of knowing is capable of grasping the Truth (the absolute) for then one need make no choice at all and thereby will at least not fall into the error of choosing wrongly and thus "grasp clouds of error". Hegel, however, ventures that perhaps it is the case that "...this fear of erring[is]already the error itself". For the fear of error which results in the final bifurcation of knowledge from the absolute guarantees that error will be the result. The best that it can do is to minimize the error which it guarantees.

One of the great difficulties in this position, according to Hegel, is that "...it presupposes that the absolute stands on one side and that know-
ledge, though it is on the other side, for itself and separated from the absolute, is nevertheless something real".27 Here Hegel is no doubt referring to Kant's noumenal world which Hegel sees as having, in the Kantian scheme, a kind of reality and truth of its own which is absolute because independent upon whether or not it is known. On the other side stands the whole of the knowing subject with its intuitions, perceptions, categories, etc. Hegel concludes that what this position in fact says is that knowledge (in the scope and limits determined for it by the critique of pure reason) can be true and yet lie outside of the absolute (the noumenal world). In other words, it says that knowledge can be true and yet lie outside of Truth! The upshot of this is that "by taking this position, what calls itself the fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth"28 - a perhaps particularly biting reference to Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment" in which he enjoined the reader to take up the motto of the enlightenment for his own: *Sapere Aude* - Dare to Know.

This last statement that fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth is highly curious for it seems not to follow from what has been said. However, if we consider Hegel's notion of truth as progressive, and the process by which knowledge develops (as has just been mentioned), it will be possible to suggest what is meant by characterizing this position as a "fear of the truth".

d. Belief and the Dialectic of the True.

What is fear of the truth? And how does fear of error become or imply fear of the truth? As a preliminary to considering these questions let us examine briefly a passage from Plato's *Theaetetus*. Having been asked a
question by Socrates Theaetetus hesitated to answer declaring that he was afraid to answer "no", though that is what he believed he should answer, because it might contradict what he had said before. In response Socrates says:

An excellent answer; really, you might be inspired. But apparently, if you say yes, it will be like the situation in Euripides; the tongue will be incontrovertible but not the heart.

In this interchange Plato is expressing the opposition between belief and reality; between fear of error and fear of the truth.

The choice confronting Theaetetus was between consistency in the objective interpretation of his belief and an objective contradiction which destroys belief while trying to maintain it (that is, if he preserves his belief by answering in accordance with it, he threatens that belief through the contradiction he asserts). Socrates might also have said, had he read the Phenomenology of Spirit, that had Theaetetus said "no", then too would the tongue be incontrovertible but not the heart - he would be objectively consistent but contradictory in belief. Theaetetus found himself in the position that belief (heart) has run its course and can no longer remain within its subjective certainty of itself. Truth has won out and the truth is the emergence through the dialogue - or the dialectic - that subjectivity and objectivity (heart and the world) do not coincide. In the Phenomenology Hegel describes this situation as "The Law of the Heart" in which "the aim and object of this individuality is thus to cancel and transcend this necessity which contradicts the law of the heart". As for Theaetetus, "Heart" confronts an objective world which does not concord with that "Heart", its realization is therefore its destruction: "The law of the heart ceases
through its very realization to be a law of the heart". 30 In the same way
Theaetetus has reached the situation in which the expression of the sub-
jective in the objective, in terms of the theoretical presuppositions laid
down by the heart and by belief, ultimately result in an objective contra-
diction which can only be resolved through a change in presupposition, a
change in belief; a new relation between subject and object thereby being
created. When finally the expression of the objective in terms of the sub-
jective is accomplished such that the one is perfectly adequate to the other,
then has Theaetetus achieved the end of the search for knowledge which is
absolutely ontologically adequate: "...a philosophy which has not the ab-
solute form identical with the content must pass away because its form is
not that of truth". 31 Such, perhaps would be the course and the resolution
of the Theaetetus were it to be rewritten and reconstituted in the light of
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

We know that Hegel eschewed any attempts to find the absolute through
immediate experience "as though shot from a pistol"32 but that Truth, i.e.
the absolute, is to be found through the relentless and merciless dialec-
tical movement of knowing itself. Such claims for the immediacy of know-
ledge fail because they demand that Truth be given now. This impatience
for Truth fails to recognize that Truth is historically determined; such
"impatience asks for the impossible, wants to reach the goal without the
means of getting there"33 but such knowledge that it gains is barren and
devoid of the wealth of existence. In order to gain Truth,

The length of the journey has to be borne with, for every moment is
necessary; and again we must halt at every stage, for each is itself
a complete individual form, and is fully and finally considered only
so far as its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a
rounded and concrete whole, or only so far as the whole is looked at in the light of the special and peculiar character which this determination gives it.34

One must seek the truth in so far as it is given by one's time and not attempt either to transcend that time or to halt the progress by refusing to participate in the process. Fear of choosing wrongly and of discovering clouds of error is not, in fact, as we might suppose, fear of living in error, but fear of finding that what is put forth as truth shows itself to be error. In showing itself to be error, the real truth of the original position is discovered - it is discovered that it is not true.35

In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that for Hegel it is not only the striving for truth that is necessary to achieve truth, it is also the case that the inevitable error produced by this striving is equally necessary. So for us who see the dialectical development (as shown in the Phenomenology and other works such as the Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy), what is shown up for error is in fact a stage on the way to truth36 - just as in the case where we might explain the fact that "the bud disappears when the blossom breaks through" by saying "that the former is refuted by the latter",37 but the truth of the matter is that

these stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole.38

The denial of the possible coincidence of knowledge with the absolute is an initial error which denies truth by stopping the dialectical movement. It does this first because no attempt at truth is taken and this, being the
error, means that the real truth cannot be demonstrated - the real truth being the fact that what was accepted as truth was in fact error. Second, no progression is possible and the achievement of absolute knowledge is thwarted.39

There is an inherent conservatism in belief. This is not surprising since to believe implies some notion of the acceptance of the content of that belief. Each stage of the Phenomenology may be seen as representing a belief that true and complete knowledge has been achieved - that the Gestalt through which the categories of thought are applied is absolute. This means that a complete account of experience is expected to be given on the basis of this knowledge claim. When it is discovered that experience has not been made totally coherent or totally rational through the given Gestalt, the tendency, because of the conservatism of belief, will be to deny that any more complete Gestalt is possible. That is, it is afraid of discovering the truth about its own belief - the truth that it is untrue. This, then, is what Hegel is referring to when he says that "by taking this position, what calls itself the fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth". To admit that there may be a more comprehensive and more rational system of belief is to destroy the present system of belief by casting doubt upon its truth claim.40

After this statement about fear of truth Hegel continues in the next paragraph as follows:

This conclusion [that the fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth] follows from the presupposition that the absolute alone is true or that the true alone is absolute. To reject it, one might draw a distinction between knowledge of the absolute, which is the aim of science, and a knowledge which, though it indeed does not know the
absolute, might be capable of yet another truth. But we are beginning to see that such talking back and forth will only lead to an obscure distinction between an absolute truth and truth of some other sort, and that "absolute", "knowledge", etc., are words presupposing a significance which has yet to be discovered. 41

The first sentence in this quotation may seem to beg the question. Hegel tells us that "fear of error" becomes "fear of the truth" when it is seen that "the absolute alone is true or that the true alone is absolute". In other words, when this becomes the given assumption then any attempt to avoid error by resting at a point less than the absolute is an acceptance of a present error for a potential truth. But this argument of Hegel's depends upon the fact that the true alone is the absolute which, at this point at any rate, is no more than a bare assurance on Hegel's part. Recall that Hegel declared that systems which are predicated upon a critical epistemology assume the existence of the absolute even though they may deny it as an object of knowledge. What these philosophers in effect say, according to Hegel, is that Truth as such, though existent, is unknowable and that there is a limited truth which is knowable and which must be the object of philosophical thought.

Hegel rejects the suggestion that there may be two kinds of truth - a truth of the absolute and some other kind of truth, which, while not absolute truth, yet is the truth which knowledge is capable of grasping. 42 It is this idea of such kinds of truth which places either an inhibition on knowledge or, if it does not restrict knowledge, allows the immediate or near immediate comprehension of absolute truth. But for Hegel truth is not of this nature - not to be grasped "shot from a pistol" as in some sort of intuition like that of Schelling's artistic genius. Truth for Hegel is truly "scientific"; it is the truth of a speculative philosopher. This
does not come easily but requires "the labour of the Concept".

However the biggest objection, for Hegel, is that this position ultimately creates a transcendent metaphysics, an extreme romanticism which places truth and the ultimately real beyond the world; capable of being known only by a supernatural means which denigrates the perceived world. Though Hegel can be classed as a rationalist in some sense of the word, he does not want to even suggest that metaphysical knowledge is gained by a flight into the genius of the pure intellect.

To a certain extent we may characterize Hegel's program as one of "saving the phenomena". It is commonly thought that Hegel held finite truths to be true but not Truth, but the last citation from the Introduction suggests that this is not the case. But this denial is only true in a limited sense. What Hegel is denying is that absolute knowledge is of a different kind from non-absolute knowledge. Natural consciousness has certainty but not truth and it is this certainty that natural consciousness identifies with truth - only to discover the real truth: that its assertion of truth on the basis of its certainty was only a semblance of knowledge and not true knowledge. It is rather the distinction found in Plato between opinion and knowledge, except that for Hegel opinion, or certainty, becomes truth through its dialectical development - as we saw in the examination of the development from "Sense-Certainty", with its "meinen", to "Reason". That is why in the Phenomenology Hegel proposes "to undertake a description of knowledge as it appears, a presentation of knowledge as a phenomenon", for it is the knowledge which appears to consciousness to be truth which must ultimately lead to truth or to absolute knowledge. Each appearance of "knowledge" becomes the truth of its untruth and leads to a more complete knowledge. The first
stepping stone to wisdom is scepticism.

Now such statements by Hegel as "natural consciousness will show itself to be merely the concept of knowledge, or unreal knowledge" should be quite understandable and cause no undue problems. Of course the use of the word 'concept' here is misleading since, in its technical use, we would expect the concept of knowledge to be the Truth of knowledge, to be knowledge itself. However, the qualifying word 'nur' suggests that what he must mean by the "concept of knowledge" is the claim by consciousness that what it is certain of is what is true. Thus, it is the relating of the content of consciousness to its object or, of the essence with the thing. With this in mind, the next sentence is very revealing:

But since it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge, this pathway has a negative significance for it, and what is actually the realization of the Concept is for it rather the loss and destruction of itself: for on this road it loses its truth.

Two things are noteworthy in this passage. First, the "pathway" and the "road" refer to the preceding paragraph of the Introduction where Hegel describes the phenomenal investigation of knowledge as:

...the pathway of the natural consciousness which is striving toward true knowledge, or as the path of the soul which is making its way through the sequence of its own transformations as through waystations prescribed to it by its very nature.

But "this pathway has a negative significance for it" because it is the continual negating of the certainty which consciousness has claimed for itself. Thus, "the road may be viewed as the way of doubt, or, more properly, as the way of despair", because consciousness has lost its self-certainty and its truth has ceased to be.
Second, an important suggestion as to the basic program of the *Phenomenology* lies in the phrase "it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge". In this is the beginning of the transition in the *Introduction* from epistemology in general to epistemological ontology or metaphysics. What each stage in the *Phenomenology* represents is a claim by consciousness to have metaphysical knowledge, i.e. knowledge as to what really is, and the attitude which consciousness ought to take toward this reality. So long as consciousness remains in this attitude of certainty it will believe itself to be in truth. It will be shown in the course of the dialectic of consciousness how each of these attitudes is insufficient as a characterization of reality. So long as the truth is sought no stage can give satisfaction until the absolute is achieved, for each lesser stage will have the concept not adequate to its object; in other words, each stage "...convicts itself of untruth".49

When consciousness realizes the unsatisfactory state of its knowledge it becomes sceptical concerning that certainty which it had and "through that scepticism which directs itself over the whole compass of phenomenal consciousness, Spirit becomes able, for the first time, to examine what truth is".50 Only then can it embark upon the pathway to knowledge or the same "voyage of discovery" which Hegel undertook. Hegel emphasized that the scepticism which is so necessary for consciousness to progress in its knowledge is not a scepticism of a purely negative nature which denies the possibility of knowledge of reality: "...the presentation of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative moment, as natural consciousness one-sidedly views it"51 (as shown in the *Phenomenology* in "Self-Consciousness"). This negativity is one of the attitudes which conscious-
ness encounters but it must pass beyond that. The scepticism which is a necessary element of philosophical endeavor is, rather, a willingness to remain unsatisfied in a philosophical position until it has proved itself able to give a comprehensive explanation of experience - a result which we know can never be achieved until it comes to absolute knowledge itself. Consciousness must therefore traverse the negative road from its initial certainty until this certainty becomes truth.
a. Experience and Knowledge.

Hegel warns against separating knowledge from truth. The two must coincide lest each lose the effective meaning which it has. Knowledge, however, cannot be immediately conjoined with truth for, as we have seen, truth cannot be immediate but must develop itself if it is to be established as absolute. But to say that the only knowledge is absolute knowledge is to put a gulf between knowledge (as experience) and the absolute, for it cannot be denied that there is experience which, though perhaps less than complete, still gives us some information about the world and is therefore, in some sense of the word, knowledge. In other words, knowledge can be correct information while not the absolute truth. What Hegel wants to show is that knowledge develops from its most basic and immediate level to greater and greater comprehension - culminating in a knowledge which has nothing not encompassed by it; that is, a knowledge which is absolute.

The Phenomenology purports to give the Science of the experience of consciousness, but it does so only in a limited sense. Experience includes all that which falls within consciousness, including such things as dreams, fantasies, illusions, delusions, mistaken perceptions and the like. These, however, do not as such constitute knowledge (though they may lead indirectly...
to knowledge)\textsuperscript{1} and are therefore not as such subject to the investigation of the Phenomenology. The Phenomenology is concerned to examine serious claims to knowledge, certain beliefs which consciousness may entertain (and has entertained) as to what is known and how it is known. It is this conception of the Phenomenology Hegel has in mind when he says that "Consciousness knows something; this object is the essence or the in-itself. This object, however, is also for consciousness, the in-itself; therewith enters the ambiguity of this truth".\textsuperscript{2} So it is knowing consciousness that is of concern to the Phenomenology - as is suggested by the German word for 'consciousness' itself, das \textit{Bewusstsein}, which has as its root a derivation from \textit{Wissen} (knowledge). So to be conscious is to be in a state of knowing.

At the same time the object is the essence for consciousness; that is, consciousness takes the object to be what is real. But this opinion is not consistent with what the object proves itself to be in reality and the certainty of this belief gives way to the real truth, i.e. that the opinion or belief is false. So to be experiencing the process of knowing and of coming to know is to be moving from one state of knowing to another. This is suggested by die \textit{Erfahrung} (experience) which contains \textit{fahren} - and this has the meaning 'to travel', but it also includes, significantly (considering the discussion on "Belief and the Dialectic of the True"), the meaning 'to renounce' or 'to abandon'. Knowledge, for Hegel, progresses from its lowest level to its highest level. At the lowest level it is mere certainty, but in the process of its development this certainty is abandoned in favor of the truth. The process of the Phenomenology is the process of the continuing destruction and reaffirmation of certainty. Because of this the
initial certainty forms the first step in the demonstration which develops toward Truth itself. When experience becomes fully comprehended, that is, when the Science of experience is complete, then certainty, truth and knowledge perfectly coincide: "...only when Spirit steps forth as an immanently developed totality, not till then has that certainty established itself as truth." At the end of the Phenomenology, when Spirit has been fully realized and knowledge has become absolute, then Hegel can say the following:

This last form of Spirit - Spirit which at once gives its complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its Concept, and in doing so remains within its own Concept - this is absolute Knowledge. It is Spirit knowing itself in the shape of Spirit, it is conceptual knowledge. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty; it has also the form of certainty of self; or in its existence - i.e. for Spirit knowing it - it is in the form of knowledge of itself. Truth is the content, which in religion is not as yet at one with its certainty.4

Certainty is to be found along all of the stages of the Phenomenology, but at the beginning it is found to be only certainty. As each of the one-sided forms of immediately certain consciousness breaks down, giving way to the truth asserted by the succeeding stage which supplants it, a new certainty arises - but one in which there is more than mere certainty, there is the cumulative knowledge which demonstrates the weakness of the previous claims and the status of the new claim as the developed truth of the preceding. When the final stage is reached certainty and belief no longer need to be transcended for there certainty is shown to be identical with Truth.

Because of this conception that certainty leads to truth Hegel, in the end, demonstrates not only what is valid knowledge, but also what is the true object of knowledge. In other words, the examination of knowledge demonstrates the essential nature of the real as well. However, though we
might be convinced by Hegel's examination of the kinds of certainty met with
in the Phenomenology, and though we might be convinced that these kinds of
certainty break down and demand a demonstration of their truth which can
only be given by the entire development of the experience of consciousness,
there are still forms of certainty which have not been examined in the
Phenomenology and which, if they cannot be criticized by the Phenomenology,
may cast doubt upon the demonstration per se.

One particular case in recent philosophy is interesting because in one
way it is the antithesis of that of Hegel and in another way it shares an
interesting and unusual similarity. The position is that of G. E. Moore
as put forth primarily in his two articles "A Defence of Common Sense" and
"Proof of an External World". In these articles Moore's position is the
opposite of Hegel's in that certainty, knowledge, and truth have an original
and immediate relation such that to deny the certainty is self-contradictory,
whereas to affirm it is declared to be self-consistent. At the same time
Moore's position is similar to Hegel's in that addressing the problem "what
constitutes true knowledge?" also involves the question "what is the reality
of which we have knowledge?". In other words it is, to a certain extent, an
epistemological investigation which also involves, to some degree, ontology.


The first thing we must do is to look at Moore's argument in the two
articles.

In "A Defence of Common Sense" Moore states that there are certain
propositions which he knows to be true\(^6\) with certainty and he proceeds to
give us a list of some of these Common Sense truths.\(^7\) They are propositions
of the sort "I have never been far away from the surface of the earth" and
"the earth has existed for many years past" and others of similar ilk. Included in this list of Common Sense beliefs is also the belief that there are other human beings similar to me and of whom these propositions are equally true.

Next, Moore states that besides these truisms there is one other truism which he knows for certain to be true. This truism is that very many of the human beings of whom these things are true have and do also exist and also know that, with respect to them, these things are known to be true.

In other words what Moore asserts is only (what seems an obvious enough truism) that each of us (meaning by "us", very many human beings of the class defined) has frequently known, with regard to himself or his body and the time at which he knows it, everything which, in writing down my list of propositions in 1, I was claiming to know about myself or my body and the time at which I wrote that proposition down.

In sum, what Moore is saying is that there are certain Common Sense truths which I know for certain to be true. Among these Common Sense beliefs which I know for certain to be true is the truth that there are other human beings who also know with certainty that these things are true for them - including the truth that there are other human beings who know these things with certainty to be true.

Now, according to Moore, anyone who is willing to admit that these are beliefs of Common Sense, i.e. that they are beliefs entertained by most men, must logically be admitting that they are true. That is, the assertion that these beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense logically entails the belief that they are true. The reason for this entailment is the nature of the beliefs which Moore says we all have. The beliefs which Moore claims we must have are so constituted as to be claims of knowledge rather than merely belief.
Moore describes them this way for the particular reason that, in Wittgenstein's words, there is "...the grammatical peculiarity that 'p' follows from 'I know p'". So for Moore it is very important, indeed it is all important, that he makes his assertions of Common Sense into assertions which are known to be true. Thus, anyone who admits that they are known to be true must thereby be admitting that they are true. In other words, anyone who admits that Moore's common sense beliefs are in fact beliefs of Common Sense is, because of the nature of the beliefs, asserting that he knows them to be true. It therefore follows, on Moore's analysis, that they are true:

The features in question...are all of them features which have this peculiar property - namely, that if we know that they are features in the "Common Sense view of the world", it follows that they are true: it is self-contradictory to maintain that we know them to be features in the Common Sense view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that we know this, is to say that they are true. And many of them also have the further peculiar property that, if they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether "we" know this or not), it follows that they are true, since to say that there is a "Common Sense view of the world" is to say that they are true.

Moore is, superficially at least, taking a position opposite to that of Hegel. Moore wants to claim that if a proposition is accepted as expressing a Common Sense belief then it is self-consistent to assert its truth and self-contradictory to deny its truth. Hegel, of course, says the opposite: to assert the truth of what is known through mere certainty is to (eventually) fall into a contradiction. Moore's position is somewhat more difficult to maintain because it depends upon being able to determine what constitutes a Common Sense belief (for Hegel, any certainty, save that which is commensurate with the absolute, will convict itself of un-
truth) and it depends upon being able to analyze these common sense beliefs to see what is implied by them.

Moore has come some distance from the modest claim that he was making in the title of his essay - that he was providing a "defence" of Common Sense. The net result of his essay is an attempt to prove that denial of the truth of Common Sense beliefs lands one either in solipsism (because one would necessarily be denying that other human beings - or indeed anything else - exists) or it would land one squarely in the contradiction of using the term "we" and then asserting that the existence of other human beings is only belief and not knowledge. That is, anyone who maintains that they are beliefs only and are taken on "faith" and are not known to be true is involving himself in the contradiction of asserting that "there have been many other human beings besides myself, and none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings". The use of the term "we" belies the individual's belief that the existence of others is not something known to him - something open to doubt. In this respect Moore is perhaps not too far from Hegel's analysis of das geistige Tierreich.

The difference between Moore's position and that of Hegel in das geistige Tierreich is that Moore points only to the use in language of a particular kind of collective known - in this case 'we' - as conclusive evidence both for the existence of other people and for the objectivity of the truth of Common Sense beliefs (since their truth is then no longer dependent merely on the fact that I know them for certain to be true but depends on the fact that we know them for certain to be true). Hegel might well agree with the idea that our language demonstrates the essentially social element in our
knowledge - indeed the Sache Selbst of the geistige Tierreich may as well be a verbal product as the concrete material product of an artist or craftsman. On the other hand, such elements in language (as well as language itself) may well be the truth discovered by those who act rationally and communally in the world. The point is, however, that for Hegel it is action that is the determinant; it is through action that the Concept is grasped in its concrete actuality. Language reflects this truth.

Moore and Wittgenstein both seem to look to language to discover what we can know and what we do know about reality. Hegel, however, wants to go deeper than this and discover this reality itself. The position of Moore and Wittgenstein is rather like that of "Understanding" in the Phenomenology where the situation is described in this way:

Our object henceforward has thus the form of a syllogistic inference, whose extremes are the inner being of things and understanding, and its middle term the sphere of appearance. The course of this inferential process however, furnishes the further characterization of what understanding detects in the inner world by the aid of the middle term; and gives rise to the experience understanding goes through regarding this relation of the terms when joined and united together.12

For Moore and Wittgenstein language is the middle term through which the "inner world" is understood. This does not make such information wrong, only incomplete. Hegel wants to go beyond mere language; he wants to go beyond just epistemology to the "inner world", to reality itself. For Hegel, therefore, we do not look only at the way language now is in order to discover what our concepts are, we look at the logical history of the ways consciousness can relate itself to the world. Moore's discovery that the use of our language demonstrates what we believe is correct but superficial. Therefore when Moore considers such statements as "material things
exist" he admits that they are not capable of analysis unless other, more basic statements, such as "here is one hand" are analysed:

It seems to me quite evident that the question how propositions of the type I have just given are to be analysed, depends on the question how propositions of another and simpler type are to be analysed. I know, at present, that I am perceiving a human hand, a pen, a sheet of paper, etc.; and it seems to me that I cannot know how the proposition 'material things exist' is to be analysed, until I know how, in certain respects, these simpler propositions are to be analysed. But even these are not simple enough. It seems to me quite evident that my knowledge that I am now perceiving a human hand is a deduction from a pair of propositions simpler still - propositions which I can only express in the form 'I am perceiving this' and 'This is a human hand'. It is the analysis of Propositions of the latter kind which seems to me to present such great difficulties, while nevertheless the whole question as to the nature of material things obviously depends upon their analysis. 13

But even before making this statement Moore has already said that these simpler cases are also incapable of any certain analysis:

I am not at all sceptical as to the truth of such propositions as 'the earth has existed for many years past', 'many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it', i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is. 14

It is not only statements like "material things exist" which have a problematic analysis and ultimately depend for their analysis upon other, more specific propositions, these specific propositions themselves are thought by Moore to be problematic in their analysis. What Moore is saying, then, is that something of a certain kind exists, but what the nature of this something is I am incapable of determining. So we can anticipate the "Proof of an External World" already in noting that though Moore appears on the surface to be offering some sort of ontological information, he in fact
is not doing so. He is merely telling us that there are certain types of propositions in our language which are compelling or universally accepted or self evident, and which we are therefore certain are true. Hegel would say that the reason Moore is sceptical about the analysis of these propositions is that they are not true in the way in which Moore wants to believe that they are true. By saying "this is a hand" Moore has not given us a determinate piece of knowledge which is certainly true (as opposed to any other determinate piece of knowledge) but instead has given us a universe of particulars. Wittgenstein said that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it". In a similar way Hegel's dialectic from "Sense-Certainty" to "das geistige Tierreich" demonstrates that certainty implies a world, a universe, in which its truth resides. Moore's Common Sense beliefs do not stand on their own as unjustifiable givens but presuppose a universe in which they become known as true. In other words, Moore has no way of showing what the cash value of his Common Sense belief is - it is merely given in so far as it is given at all. Hegel says that they are to be cashed in terms of what they imply; and what they imply is no less than the entire universe of knowledge itself shown in its organic development. The method of cashing them is the dialectic of the progression from certainty to truth as shown in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

One of the main reasons Moore gives for philosophizing at the level of Common Sense is that the attempt to ground these knowledge claims on something more fundamental inevitably results in scepticism; that is, we will tend to doubt that what is known by Common Sense to be true is in fact true. We also find Moore to be sceptical with regard to the analysis of the propo-
sitions of Common Sense, and this must be the case for Moore because Common Sense only tells us that a thing is, but not what it is. This is precisely one of the issues, arising inevitably from such a position, with which Hegel finds great dissatisfaction. We have already seen how for Hegel a healthy scepticism is necessary if consciousness is ever to transcend belief in the truth of its immediate certainty and arrive at truth itself. The problem is that a position like Moore's is a negative scepticism and not a positive scepticism which leads one on to seek the real truth. Moore, then, is one of those who "fears error" and fears truth". The upshot of the Hegelian criticism of a Moorian type of position is that he not only sees it ending in an unproductive scepticism, but it rests upon a subjective claim to truth based upon mere assurance. Though Moore claims that he does not doubt the truth of his basic Common Sense beliefs but considers them to be known for certain to be true, this positive assertion only hides the negative scepticism behind it. In the end it is really only a negative scepticism put forth in a positive way. Though Moore's position is ostensibly an empiricist one, Hegel's real criticism of it is to be found in connection with a criticism of idealism. In the end, however, Hegel perhaps anticipates a fundamental implication of the Moorian position: i.e. that it convicts itself of a kind of idealism of which it disapproves.

To see how this emerges we might note the rather polemical attack which Hegel makes upon the Moorian position. In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel criticizes this kind of position for refusing to subject itself to philosophical criticism and for failing to undergo the "labour of the Concept":

Just as much as in the procedure of ratiocination, the study of philo-
sophy finds obstruction, too, in the unreasoning conceit that builds itself on well-established truths, which the possessor considers he has no need to return upon and reconsider, but rather takes to be fundamental, and thinks he can by means thereof propound as well as decide and pass sentence. 17

More specifically and less polemically we find this criticism being leveled in "Certainty and Truth of Reason", the "mere" certainty which characterizes the first realization of the truth of Reason (see the first part of Chapter 4). Moore's position that Common Sense beliefs do not have to be "philosophically justified" is the position which Hegel criticizes as Idealism - specifically that of Fichte. But the criticism is appropriate to Moore as well:

The kind of Idealism which does not trace the path to that result, but starts off with the bare assertion of this truth, is consequently a mere assurance, which does not understand its own nature, and cannot make itself intelligible to any one else. It announces an immediate certainty to which there stand in contrast other immediate certainties that have been lost just along that very pathway. Hence the assurances of these other certainties are equally entitled to a place alongside the assurance of that certainty. 18

We have already seen that Moore's argument takes the form of asserting that certain things are true and then showing that if they are true (and Moore says that they are) then certain things follow from that - namely, that they are true. Anyone who asserts that they are not things which are known for certain to be true is asserting that they are not known and hence is contradicting Moore's assurance that they are. Hegel notes that this is just the recourse that the appeal to Common Sense must have, mere assurance:

Since the man of common sense appeals to his feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is done with any one who does not agree. He has just to explain that he has no more to say to any one who does not find and feel the same as himself. In other words, he tramples the roots of humanity underfoot. 19
But other than this criticism, does it make sense to lump Moore's position in with that of Idealism - especially that of Fichte with whom it would seem he would have little in common?

Moore is certainly an empiricist in his insistence that what is perceived is real and has true existence. But he does relate the knowledge that is known to himself; the propositions which he enumerates are those which, he says, I know with certainty to be true. This, in Hegel's interpretation, is the kind of Idealism he is referring to. In essence he sees it as no different than empiricism:

Its first declaration is merely this abstract, empty phrase that everything is its own. For the certainty of being all reality is to begin with the pure category. Reason knowing itself in this sense in its object is what finds expression in abstract empty idealism; it merely takes reason as reason appears at first, and by its pointing out that in all being there is this bare consciousness of a "mine", and by expressing things as sensations or ideas, it fancies it has shown that abstract "mine" of consciousness to be complete reality. It is bound, therefore, to be at the same time absolute Empiricism, because, for the filling of this empty "mine", i.e. for the element of distinction and all the further development and embodiment of it, its reason needs an impact operating from without, in which lies the fons et origo of the multiplicity of sensations or ideas. This kind of idealism is thus just such a self-contradictory equivocation as scepticism; only while the latter expresses itself negatively, the former does so in a positive way.20

Making due allowance for the age to which Hegel was addressing himself, it seems that Moore's position fits well with the position Hegel is criticizing. Moore, of course, would not consider himself an idealist - far from it. On the other hand he does subscribe to a "representative theory of perception" in which the percept only stands for the thing perceived; and he holds that what are perceived are "sense-data" and not the things themselves.21

So though Moore's position is that of empiricism in that "the evidence of the senses is...the evidence upon which all our other ways of knowing
material objects seems to be based\textsuperscript{22} this position is in itself no more anti-idealist than was Berkeley's adherence to the same sort of empiricist epistemology. Moore, of course, argues against the notion that esse is percipi in his "Refutation of Idealism" but in fact he gives us no more warrant for accepting any other metaphysical position purely on the basis of the epistemology he gives us. At best he argues that we cannot know whether we know of the existence of material objects\textsuperscript{23} - the sceptical position which Hegel predicts will be conjoined to such an epistemology as Moore offers. The only real argument he gives us for the actual existence of material things is that when we know their "sense-data" we "know" as well, somehow and someway, that the material object also exists.\textsuperscript{24}

Moore's position then is an idealism which is "at the same time absolute Empiricism" since it takes sense experience as the basic data of knowledge but is basically epistemologically egocentric and bases its claims upon the perceptions which the self has. Also, "this kind of idealism is just such a self-contradictory equivocation as scepticism" (for Moore, to some extent it is scepticism) because its epistemology tells us nothing about the nature of material things so far as their separate existence is concerned, and yet Moore attempts to prove by this epistemology that "the external world" exists. In this instance at least Hegel's criticism seems perceptive and well taken.

Moore believes he has shown that most people show by the way they live and the language they use that they do know certain things. It is only when someone demands that these knowledge claims be in some sense "philosophically justified" that questions arise regarding their legitimacy as things that are known. But, Moore wants to maintain, it is precisely this demand for justi-
fication that is wrong-headed in the first place. It assumes that what is known is not known and that something else is known from whence our Common Sense knowledge can be shown to follow (or to be in conflict with). But this is precisely to contradict what in fact one does know.

One of the things that Moore is giving in his "Defence of Common Sense" is a theory as to what constitutes some, if not all, knowledge. There is nothing to suggest that Moore believes the only human knowledge to be that derived from Common Sense so there is no reason to suppose that he is giving a complete epistemological position. However, he is telling us what at least some of reality is. This foundation of a limited ontology on the basis of a limited epistemology is continued in his essay "Proof of an External World".25

Moore wants to show that if there are any things of a certain kind, i.e. things which are not logically dependent upon my mind for their existence, then it follows that there is a thing which exists externally to my mind (and any other minds like mine). He will then assert that from Common Sense we do know that certain of these kinds of things exist (as proved in his "Defence of Common Sense"). Therefore, he will conclude, those things and all others like them do exist externally to our minds.

In very brief form Moore's argument runs as follows: He first tries to show that there is a distinction between things presented in space and things to be met with in space. The former include things in the latter but also things which are dependent upon my mind but which appear to me as spatial, e.g. negative afterimages. Things to be met with in space are things which are not dependent upon my mind (but also which may not be presented to me). Thus, they are things which can present themselves to more
than one person. The negative afterimage can be presented to more than one person, but not the exact same afterimage - only a similar afterimage which may be identical to mine. Thus, it would not be contradictory to speak of a normal person in the same room as myself looking in the same place as myself and who did not and could not see the afterimage that I see there. But of things to be met with in space, it would be contradictory to assert of a normal person in the same room looking in the same place as myself, that he could not and did not see that same thing.

Thus, if there is any thing of the sort that it would be contradictory to assert that two normal people in the same relative proximity to that thing at the same time could not have it presented to both of them, then it is external to any mind. Moore then wants to go on to say that there are things of that sort - some of which he attempted to establish in his "Defence of Common Sense".

Moore's proof of the external world is to hold up one hand and say "here is one hand" and then to hold up his other hand and say "and here is another". By thus establishing that at least two things of the sort he is looking for do exist he is, he believes, proving the existence of an external world. That he can know that "here is one hand and here is another" can only be established by reference to his proof that we do in fact know certain Common Sense beliefs to be true. There is then an implicit assumption that "here is one hand and here is another" is one of those Common Sense beliefs which we know for certain to be true.

Moore admits that he cannot prove his premises (here is one hand and here is another) in the sense of deriving them from propositions which are more certain than themselves. In order to do this he would, for example,
have to prove that he is not now dreaming (in the manner of Descartes) but Moore does not believe that he or anyone else can do so. He can only give conclusive evidence, not proof, that he is not dreaming. If what counts as proof of the external world is something that goes beyond "here is one hand and here is another" then Moore is willing to concede that he has not given any such proof. Moore insists that he does in fact "know" his premises to be true and since he knows them to be true, the rest of his proof stands. To anyone who doubts that he did in fact know these things to be true, he gives the following argument:

...in favour of my view that none of these things, which might have been the case, is in fact the case, I have, I think, no better argument than simply this - namely, that all the propositions in 1 are, in fact true.26

Moore is doing exactly what both Hegel and Wittgenstein say he must do. Hegel notes, as we have seen, that the tactic to which the appeal to Common Sense must have recourse is just mere assurance.27 Wittgenstein is rather more charitable than Hegel. He says that the only recourse that Moore has, given his position, to someone who constantly assails his most firmly established beliefs - beliefs which he would not be willing to overthrow regardless of the evidence that is offered to the contrary - is persuasion. Moore cannot offer proofs for belief of this kind but he can try to persuade those who may not so readily accept the belief that they are indeed true. Wittgenstein puts it this way:

I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long...etc. - we should be trying to give him our picture of the world. This would happen through a kind of persuasion.28
Moore is trying to give us his picture of the world, and he is doing so by trying to persuade us that it is the correct picture of the world. He asserts categorically that he knows that his premisses are true and anyone else who is a normal human being knows it as well. Thus, "...those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know their premises, have no good reason for their dissatisfaction".  

Moore wants to maintain the integrity of our Common Sense beliefs and with this desire one might well have an initial sympathy. If not all Common Sense beliefs, then at least the kind that Moore adduces in support of his "defence", have proven their viability over several thousand years of human history. Perhaps regardless of Moore's opinion of William James' pragmatism he might ultimately have to rest his tendency to prefer an ordinary or Common Sense view of the world to the more "artificial" and sophisticated systems of much traditional philosophy upon some sort of pragmatic principles. After all, it is no secret that sophisticated philosophical theories of this genre have no apparent efficacy in permitting a more efficient intercourse with the world. Rather it appears that contrary to modifying the philosopher's attitude and actions, there is no perceptible behavioural change at all in his actions (Dr. Johnson's graphic attempt to disprove Berkeley's idealism may be given as a rare exception). There is, in fact, an apparently remarkable consistency in attitudes toward the world which seems to prevail among all men - philosophers included. Furthermore, this prevailing more-or-less homogeneous approach to the world does in fact work with somewhat more than a modicum of efficiency; an efficiency which seems not to be facilitated by more complex schemes. Thus, there seems to be no good reason for supposing that this Common Sense view is not highly adequate for all theoretical purposes as well.
It is doubtful, however, that a pragmatic justification is all that Moore wants to give or believes that he can give. Such a justification could hardly be considered to give a "proof" of the external world. Moore is concerned to tackle traditional philosophical problems and to do so in such a way that his argument against them constitutes a conclusive argument. His approach to these problems shows that he believed them to arise from what is essentially a basic error in epistemological and metaphysical perception. He seems to think that these problems arise in the way that they have because they have been conceived wrongly in the first place. He sees them as arising from a mistaken idea that our epistemological and metaphysical conclusions must in some way be justified by means of proofs which somehow guarantee the truth of what we already know to be the case.

It is unfortunate but true, according to Moore (and in this respect much like Kant), that reason can always ask beyond its ability to answer. But whereas knowledge is limited by what is, there is no ultimate "why" at which reason is logically forced to curtail its questioning. Philosophical problems arise from the philosopher's attempt to make his ability to know extend to the limits of his ability to question. It is because of this philosophical desire to extend the limits of knowledge that it is held that any epistemological and metaphysical positions must be justified as following from something more absolute and certain than themselves.

Because of this belief that our fundamental ideas regarding epistemological and metaphysical problems must be so justified, the kinds of conclusions that are drawn reflect our notion of what counts as an acceptable (justified) analysis rather than what actually makes sense for us to accept from our normal, everyday, successful intercourse with the world. Thus,
whenever a justification for a position is demanded, there is an inherent presupposition that only certain types of justification are acceptable. Once you have established what is to be considered as an acceptable justification you have necessarily limited the kind of answer that counts as satisfying the requirements.

In general the tradition has been that Common Sense was not considered within the limits of what counts as a legitimate justification, and yet, Moore believes, it is precisely our Common Sense notions of the world which seem to be the most certain. Moore's position does not fall handily into any of the specific forms of consciousness which Hegel considers in the Phenomenology but there are several places where Hegel's criticism touches on points which are integral to Moore. One that immediately springs to mind is Hegel's characterization of sense-certainty and its bearing on Moore's belief that Common Sense gives us the immediate certainty that some knowledge is genuine. It is this kind of position, though not precisely this position, which Hegel spoke of in this way:

the concrete content, which sensuous certainty furnishes, makes this prima facie appear to be the richest kind of knowledge, to be even a knowledge of endless wealth....Besides that, it seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge: for it has not as yet dropped anything from the object; it has the object before itself in its entirety and completeness.

True, Moore does not state that these Common Sense truths are the richest in content but they do appear to him to be the truest and most authentic knowledge. Common Sense truths are certain and therefore they cannot be justified by anything which is more certain than they are themselves.

The analysis of Sense-Certainty is not, therefore, directly an analy-
sis of a Moorian position, but there is some similarity. So, as when in
"Sense-Certainty" Hegel confronted the claim that immediate sensation was
the well-spring of truth and knowledge, that through it experience could
be totally comprehended, and he asked this sense-certain consciousness to
express this truth, so too can we ask this of Moore. What is the Now?,
what is the Here? Hegel asked. In reply Sense-Certain consciousness proved
itself to be not the richest and truest form of knowledge but to be "...admittedly
the abstractest and the poorest kind of truth". In trying to
say what its truth and its knowledge consisted of it showed instead that
its certainty disappeared and its truth was the truth about less and less
- as we saw Moore admitting that the analysis of certain universal propo-
sitions depended upon the analysis of more particular propositions. Its
real truth turned out to be the falsity of its position.

So Hegel might well agree with Moore that his Common Sense truths
are not the richest kind of knowledge and he might well agree that such
Common Sense truths are, in some way, true. But the truth which they carry
is the poorest kind because it is founded upon mere certainty. Hegel would
agree that the failure to distinguish certainty from truth and knowledge is
the most basic and fundamental position that can be taken in any conscious
attitude toward the world. Because of this it cannot be justified by any
more basic position. So far he agrees with Moore, but for Hegel this
position must demonstrate its own completeness; that is, it must describe
its world consistently. But when this position of certainty is asked to
describe its truth it is discovered that its truth is narrow and poor in
content. As we have seen, Moore himself recognizes this in that, as men-
tioned above, universal propositions cannot be properly analyzed unless
particular ones are analyzed, and, at the same time, the proper analysis of these particular propositions is not certain (just as in "Sense-Certainty" it was necessary to turn away from the universal and describe its truth in terms of that which was more and more particular, only to find that the most particular was the most universal and hence did not give the knowledge that "Sense-Certainty" claimed it had).

Therefore, we see that the statement 'material things exist' Moore claims is not capable of analysis as an immediate certain truth ought to be. Such a statement depends upon the analysis of more particular statements - ultimately upon the analysis of "this" itself. Hegel does not object to the claim that this knowledge is in some sense given as an atomic fact which is taken to be true in itself. Moore claims that he is certain that "this is a human hand" but such a determinate "this" does not distinguish this "this" from any other "this". Any immediately intuited thing is a "this" and in so far as it is, it is a universal which applies to anything. So what is being said by "this is a hand", "this is a dog", etc. is that the universe of "this" is particularized by "hand", "dog", etc. In saying "this is a hand" Moore has not given us a criterion for determining in what way such knowledge claims are any more certain and true from any other "this is".

We may also ask of Moore what precisely his "truths" of Common Sense are and how they are to be distinguished from other certainties. Is what is certain for me known by me (is an object of knowledge) because it is true, or is something true because it is known as something certain? If Moore's intention is to ground knowledge upon certainty then there seems no way of answering this question for Moore.

If what is certain for me is known (is an object of Knowledge) because
it is true, then knowledge is in effect defined as being certain of what is true. But what then can be the criterion of truth? Certainly not Common Sense. If this were the case then what in turn could be the criterion of what is or is not Common Sense? Questioning must come to an end at some point - that much is granted. But to say that Common Sense is the criterion of truth because questioning cannot go beyond it to a more secure foundation is merely to say that it is most certain. Thus truth must become founded upon certainty. How would we be able to distinguish certainty of something which is true and certainty of something which is false? For it must surely be the case that both situations are possible or any objective distinction between truth and falsity is destroyed and truth becomes merely subjective certainty, and therefore subjectively relative.

The problem for Moore is the same as the problem for Hegel in that he must determine a criterion for what is true and what is false. Moore has an impossible task in providing such a criterion because he believes first, that truth is a question of propositions and the correspondence between the proposition and the objective state of affairs; and second, he does not recognize an intimate connection between subjectivity and objectivity. So long as he sees an absolute distinction between subject and object, then certainty cannot be explained upon any other grounds than pure subjectivity and truth is necessarily reduced to subjective relativity. Certainty cannot be explained on objective grounds since the only possible criterion for the validity of certainty (since certainty is a subjective state) would be a correspondence between the subjective certainty and the objective state of affairs. But this would presuppose knowledge of the correct state of
affairs in order to establish the correctness (truth) of the correspondence and the validity of the certainty. Thus, certainty would not ground knowledge and truth but instead would presuppose them.

One might say at this point that Hegel also tries to use certainty as the foundation for knowledge and truth. But he avoids Moore's problem by denying the two assumptions which Moore makes. For Hegel truth is not mere correspondence and for him subject and object have an intimate and reciprocal relation. According to Hegel certainty marks only the beginning of knowledge and knowledge in turn passes through a process of development toward truth. This process and the development is made possible through the reciprocal influence of the subjective with the objective and through the fact that, because of this mutuality, a standard or criterion of truth need not be externally applied as a test of knowledge.

Admittedly the distinction between certainty, truth and knowledge is not completely lucid in Hegel. Certainty is a low level of knowledge, so it is knowledge; knowledge involves truth but is not truth per se unless it is absolute knowledge. The bare awareness of being in the Here and Now, the immediate certitude of the Cartesian Cogito, or of the identity of the self in the Fichtean I = I all reflect a certainty in which knowledge and truth lie implicit. It is the testing of the truth of these minimal positions that eventually leads one to the actual truth.

For Moore, however, the relation between certainty, truth and knowledge is much more muddled. By saying "I know for certain that x is true" he seems to be grounding the certainty that x is true on its epistemic content: there is no possibility of seeking for a justification of the certainty that x is true because it supposes that that which justifies it has
a greater epistemic value than it itself has. This certainty that x is true is, however, the most basic fact of knowledge that there is, according to Moore. Therefore "I am certain that x is true" is a fundamental fact of knowledge.

Yet when Moore says "I know for certain that x is true" he is also basing his epistemic claims on the immediate certainty of x. Moore does recognize that there must be a distinction between Common Sense beliefs which are not true and those which are true. But there would seem to be a class which are known for certain to be true and he puts them forth as having an unimpeachable claim to truth and to epistemic content:

The phrases 'Common Sense view of the world' or 'Common Sense beliefs' (as they are used by philosophers) are, of course, extra-ordinarily vague; and, for all I know, there may be many propositions which may be properly called features in 'the Common Sense view of the world' or 'Common Sense beliefs', which are not true, and which deserve to be mentioned with the contempt with which some philosophers speak of 'Common Sense beliefs'. But to speak with contempt of those 'Common Sense beliefs' which I have mentioned is quite certainly the height of absurdity. And there are, of course, enormous numbers of other features in 'the Common Sense view of the world' which, if these are true, are quite certainly true too....

There are, then, true and false Common Sense beliefs. But upon what basis we can decide which kinds of Common Sense beliefs are which Moore gives us no criterion except that they are known for certain to be true; in other words, he gives us mere assurance:

But do I really know all the propositions in (I) to be true? Isn't it possible that I merely believe them? Or know them to be highly probably? In answer to this question, I think I have nothing better to say than that it seems to me that I do know them, with certainty.

As we know, for Hegel such assurance gives us neither knowledge nor truth
but only some degree of certainty. The best that Moore has offered so far is a circle of justification which can never in fact justify itself. At one time certainty is the ground for true knowledge, at another time knowledge is the ground for truth, at yet another time the fact that certain Common Sense beliefs are known to be true is the ground for saying that the certainty identifies which Common Sense beliefs have universal acceptance. Hegel too has a circle of grounds by which certainty truth and knowledge become justified. But whereas Moore's circle is one of simultaneity - each immediately grounds the other, Hegel's is a circle in which the justification is 'retrospective'. It is through the development from certainty to truth that the original certainty is justified and the final truth is demonstrated. It is in order to establish the validity of this circle of justification that Hegel insists that philosophy be a Scientific System.


G. E. Moore put forth what looked at first like a position which had not only obvious differences from Hegel but apparent similarities as well. This, however, proved to be an illusion. Moore's epistemology in the end said nothing at all about what is. That "here is a hand" has never been doubted by any philosopher - least of all Hegel. What has been contentious is the analysis of this statement; there is some doubt as to what the nature of this hand is. Toward the answer to this problem Moore is no help at all. Wittgenstein, in On Certainty was a direct critic of Moore's position. He recognized that Moore's confusion of certainty, knowledge and truth really led nowhere and helped to solve no problems. In the process of criticizing Moore's position, however, Wittgenstein himself developed a theory which
differed from Moore's position in its emphasis and in fact approached very closely to Hegel's position in *das geistige Tierreich*; in other words, to Hegel's original discovery of the unity of subject and object. The strength of Hegel's position is brought out by comparing it to Wittgenstein's position which is essentially the position one would describe as Hegel's in *das geistige Tierreich* were one to dismiss the preceding sections of the *Phenomenology* and the dynamic development through which the position was developed.

Since Wittgenstein's position is developed as a confrontation and criticism of G. E. Moore's position the best way to describe it is in that context, i.e. as a criticism of Moore. In this way we will see how Wittgenstein's position relates both to Moore and to the difference between Moore and Hegel.

Wittgenstein asserts in the beginning of *On Certainty* that if Moore does know what he claims that he knows then the rest of his argument follows or at least will be granted him: "if you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest". The lines have been drawn early. Wittgenstein is not going to attack Moore's "Proof of an External World" except in so far as it depends upon his "Defence of Common Sense". That is, Wittgenstein wants to question whether or not Moore does know what he claims that he knows. Certainly just because Moore says that he knows certain things it does not therefore make it the case that he does know them: "...from his utterance 'I know...' it does not follow that he does know it, "that he does know takes some shewing". The fundamental distinction between Wittgenstein and Moore arises in this statement - the distinction between what Moore thinks he is saying when he uses the phrase "I know..."
and Wittgenstein's analysis of what Moore is saying in uttering that phrase. Wittgenstein wants to maintain, as opposed to Moore, that if you assert that you know something then you should be able to show the grounds upon which you claim to know it, i.e. you must be prepared to justify your claim to knowledge. Moore claims that Common Sense beliefs are known to be true but that they cannot be justified by anything more certain than themselves. Wittgenstein takes issue with this idea of what it means to know something. Like Hegel Wittgenstein believes that we come to know something, and because we come to know it we must be able to determine the grounds upon which this knowledge is based. If we cannot then we cannot be said to know what we claim to know.

Wittgenstein is not prepared to accept that because Moore believes certain things to be true and asserts that they are true, that they are therefore true and that he, Moore, has proven that they are true and that he knows them to be true. Wittgenstein, then, falls into the category of those philosophers who Moore says are maintaining a contradiction. Wittgenstein certainly does admit that these beliefs of Moore's are indeed Common Sense beliefs, but he is not willing to go beyond this to say that they are things which he and everyone else knows to be the case. Moore's Common Sense beliefs included the belief that many other human beings have existed and do now exist who know these things to be true. Wittgenstein is going to maintain that this is a peculiar use of the term 'know' and it is precisely because it is being used by Moore in an unnatural 'philosophical' usage that Moore gets the kind of conclusion that he does from it.

When Wittgenstein says that "the truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them" he is
granting Moore his case if Moore can show that he, Moore, does in fact know them. But of course this is precisely the question at issue - what do we know and how can we know that we know it? What Wittgenstein has to say about this is not straightforward and clear, nor is it always consistent. 42 Certainly Wittgenstein at one point seems to have misunderstood Moore's argument and seemingly conceded Moore the fact that he does know what he claims to know:

"doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observation proved to exist. - Or does Moore want to say that knowing that here is his hand is different in kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well. 43

But it is reasonably clear that Moore would want to say that there is no essential difference in kind between knowing that here is a hand and know of the existence of the planet Saturn. In fact, proving the existence of the planet Saturn would establish the existence of the external world as well as proving the existence of my hand. The planet Saturn is, after all, one of those kinds of things which are to be met with in space and which, if it exists, would ipso facto prove the existence of the external world. In fact, Moore says almost this identical thing in stating that "...from 'there is at least one star' it follows not only 'there is at least one thing to be met with in space' but also 'there is at least one external thing....' 44 But Moore would still have to show that there is in fact at least one star, i.e. he would have to prove that he is not now dreaming. The only way he can do that, as has been pointed out, is for him to assert
that this is one of those things which he "knows" to be true, i.e. it is a Common Sense belief. Moore uses the example "here is one hand" rather than "Saturn exists" because the former is a belief which all of us, if we know it to be true at all, know directly whereas the latter is dependent upon a complex of evidence which must first be relied upon for their veracity. Thus, although proving the existence of any object of the sort Moore requires would prove the existence of an external world; the only kinds of objects of this sort to which he has immediate access are those of the sort "here is one hand, and here is another".

The end result of both Wittgenstein's and Moore's analyses are practically the same. Neither Wittgenstein nor Moore doubt the existence of an external world. However, this absence of doubt arises from somewhat different conceptions as to what it means for there to be no doubt about this. Thus, although Moore and Wittgenstein seem to reach the same basic conclusion, they arrive at that conclusion from somewhat different ways. Moore apparently does not want to assert that the planet Saturn exists and knowing that here is a hand are different in kind. Wittgenstein, however, does seem to think that there is a basic difference and that the certainty of one is dependent upon the certainty of the other.

In order to show how Wittgenstein does differ from and agree with Moore we may examine those points in which the agreement and difference is most explicit. From the previous analysis of Moore's argument we can extract five points upon which the arguments are based. These are also the points which Wittgenstein directly addresses. Therefore it would be well to set them out before proceeding with a consideration of how Wittgenstein engages them. They are:
1. There is a point at which justification of our beliefs must come to an end.
2. For many of our beliefs we hold them, rather than others, for the reason that we have no good reason for believing otherwise, or, as Wittgenstein puts it, we have no grounds for doubting them.
3. The way we act describes what we believe.
4. We have a foundation of Common Sense beliefs which everyone "knows" to be true.
5. We can be said to "know" what Common Sense tells us is true.

Previously it was argued that Moore objected to philosophers who would demand that certain of our Common Sense beliefs be in some way philosophically justified. Moore holds that such justification cannot be forthcoming and furthermore is entirely unnecessary. In the same vein, Wittgenstein wants to maintain that there is a point at which justification comes to an end, and we simply accept what is left as unfounded and not subject to the requirements of justification. "At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description", Wittgenstein says, and this is exactly what Moore was trying to do. Moore was trying to describe the kinds of things that he knew for certain to be true without feeling that there was any corresponding necessity to explain this knowledge.

In other words, both Moore and Wittgenstein felt that at some time you reach a point at which what you are using to try to prove something is less certain than that which you are trying to prove. In such a situation you have no proof at all and you are merely complicating matters beyond what is necessary. Furthermore you may cast doubt upon that which you did not doubt since the uncertainty of the means of proof may be reflected in the thing being proved. So for Moore, and likewise for Wittgenstein, the process of justification must come to an end and the remainder taken for what it is - as unjustified and unjustifiable. Wittgenstein expresses this
in the following way:

Does anyone ever test whether this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it?

We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested. Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?

Doesn't testing come to an end?

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

The question then is at what point do we stop asking for proof or justification. Or, better yet, at what point do we begin, and by beginning resist the urge to try to go further back beyond the beginning to something more ultimate; as Wittgenstein says, "it is so difficult to find the beginning. And not try to go further back".

Hegel does indeed find it difficult to realize the groundlessness of our believing but, as we have already noted in connection with Moore, Hegel's position is not necessarily in conflict with the idea that justification must, at some point, come to an end. For one thing, if one were to have such a justification then that position would in turn have to be justified. This suggests an infinite regress which in fact never leads to any absolute ground anyway. So it does make sense to stop this regress at the most basic foundation of certainty. Hegel would not necessarily fault this logic as he was himself a steadfast opponent of the "bad" infinite, that is, the infinite regress (or progress). He would therefore agree that justification in the sense of finding prior grounds must cease. That is why he begins with consciousness per se and not, as Fichte, with a first
principle.\textsuperscript{50}

However, Hegel would not remain content, as do Moore and Wittgenstein, with mere certainty as the foundation for knowledge and truth\textsuperscript{51} since that is not to get away from mere assertion or assurance. The beginning for Hegel must be justified, but it cannot be justified in terms of a prior or more fundamental ground since that involves the "bad" infinite. Hegel, however, believes that another justification is possible. This justification is what might be called "retrospective" justification or "systematic" justification. That which has nothing outside of it is infinite in that it is not limited by something else. Yet it is an infinite which contains the finite within it. In other words its limitation is only internal to itself - it is limited in what it is but not by virtue of what it is not. If, therefore, knowledge forms such a system then it will be self-verifying and self-justifying. It will contain totally within itself absolute knowledge, i.e. a knowing which is not limited by anything outside of itself and a knowing which contains its own limit.\textsuperscript{52} So knowledge for Hegel can be absolute and this means first, that both subject and object are contained absolutely with it. As we saw knowledge cannot be set over against the absolute (a noumenal world which is independent of knowledge) if there is such a thing as knowledge which is true. Second, it means that the beginning is justified by the fact that it forms an integral or organic part of the system. If the system is demonstrated to be absolute then all that falls within that system is part of the demonstration. The beginning is therefore justified by the end if the end is a demonstrated system. Finally, it means that knowledge which is systematic and absolute is also true because it is not founded upon an unjustifiable certainty. Instead, the cer-
tainty has developed to justified true knowledge.

Hegel takes a fundamentally different position regarding the justification of certainty as the foundation of knowledge than either Moore or Wittgenstein. Yet where Moore's naive realism leads nowhere but to a circle of justification, Wittgenstein's position is much more sophisticated and also much closer to Hegel's position in terms of the foundations of true knowledge.

Moore had maintained that the Common Sense standpoint, as he had attempted to define it, was the obvious starting point. It was obvious because it is a given body of knowledge which is immediate and which arises in us naturally. But perhaps just as importantly, neither Moore nor, he believed, anyone else, could find no good reason for supposing otherwise than that it is true. Here then is a point at which Wittgenstein comes into agreement with Moore, for it is equally true for Wittgenstein as for Moore that the kinds of things which Moore enumerated as being Common Sense beliefs are the kinds of things which Wittgenstein could find no grounds for doubting:

The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.G. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth. - Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either memory, or having been told. - Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.53

and again:

"I know that I am a human being". In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean "I know I have the organs of a human". (E.G. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen). But what about such a
a proposition as "I know I have a brain?" Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on.54

But the fact that it is imaginable that Wittgenstein's head may not contain a brain does not necessarily imply that the existence of a brain in that skull is somehow open to doubt. The fact that an alternative is imaginable does not necessitate holding that imagined alternative as a live possibility. "What I need to shew is that a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible. That the possibility of the language-game doesn't depend on everything being doubted that can be doubted".55

There does seem to be in both Wittgenstein's and Moore's views a sub-stratum - and a surprisingly similar sub-stratum - of beliefs which are held to be true by all or nearly all men. And this sub-stratum is believed true in fact precisely because there is no good reason for believing otherwise.

But if there is this system of beliefs that all men believe to be true as a matter of Common Sense, the question still remains of how we know this. And this is the point at which Wittgenstein begins to take issue with Moore. As noted before Moore wants to maintain that anyone who uses the words "we" or other similar words is demonstrating by the way he lives and the way he speaks that there are certain fundamental beliefs which he acts upon as though they were things that he knows for certain to be true. And Moore goes beyond this to draw the conclusion that they are true.

Likewise, for Wittgenstein it is my life and my language that shows that I am certain of - or do not doubt - a particular body of beliefs. Thus, the beginning point, or the point at which giving grounds ceases, is not
axiomatic, i.e. it is not an assumption that is made and from which the rest is deduced. On the contrary, the beginning is not a thought but an action - or rather, a way of acting: "as if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting". Again:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

For Moore, the end is a kind of seeing on our part, something which strikes us as immediately true. Although it is our acting which demonstrates that this is the case - which belies our attempts to assert otherwise - it is not the acting itself which lies at the bottom. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, it is.

There are certain beliefs which we do not in fact doubt although we may try to doubt them in theory. One can always apply doubt to any assertion, but the fact that we might profess doubts verbally does not substantiate the fact that we truly entertain a real doubt concerning the proposition. What is conclusive evidence is the way we act. And for all men (with a few possible exceptions such as the mentally deranged) we all in fact do act in such a manner that we show that no real doubt at all exists. The difference between those who express doubt about these fundamentals and those who do not is that those who doubt both act and talk a lot about what they claim to doubt, whereas those who do not express doubt only act. The point is, however, that they act no differently. As we speculated about Moore, it appears that Wittgenstein accepts a kind of pragmatic justifica-
tion for the foundations of certainty.

According to Wittgenstein the fact that we do not doubt certain things is demonstrated by the way we live. We act in such a manner that what we believe - what is true for us - is manifest: "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend, e.g. 'take that chair over there', 'shut the door', etc. etc." We do not learn what the world is by learning what things in it exist. We learn what the world is by doing things in the world and by using things: "Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc." What we learn are not particular and individual truths which we somehow come to "know" in the same way that e.g. we come to know of the existence of Saturn. We learn to live and to act within a certain framework - within a world. In short, we learn a form of life.

We grow up into a community which shares a way of treating the world. Thus, I am "sure" of X (X being one of Moore's Common Sense beliefs) because "we" are sure of it. Those Common Sense types of belief of Moore's are not the sort of thing that we know in the same way that we know that Saturn exists. Rather, they are a foundation, a system which has its roots in the community or in the society. It is a foundation which is not subject to doubt and which is therefore not subject to being "known". It is merely something of which we are indubitably certain - something which we are trained to take as indubitably certain: "Something must be taught us as a foundation." It is this foundation which serves us as an unquestioned standard by which we make other judgments. When we come to "know" something, what we come to know is that which has its origin in this fundamental system.
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.62

It is an inherited background, i.e. it is a form of life, a foundation which is not and cannot be justified or proved, which cannot be true or false. It is that which lays the basis for any justification, proof, truth or falsity. It is primary and original. It has its origins in the history of mankind and as such is the foundation of his actions.

For Moore, there are a number of Common Sense beliefs which all, or nearly all, of us know for certain to be true - regardless of what we might say to the contrary. For Wittgenstein, there is a basic foundation of ways of acting which we share with our community. These shared practices are a fundamental sub-structure which is inculcated into our actions through training. We learn them. We learn them by doing. They are prior to any ability to question and to doubt and they are therefore beyond and not subject to doubt. Doubt is dependent upon them: "Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second".63

Moore had maintained that he had conclusive evidence for holding our Common Sense beliefs to be true. Conclusive evidence is evidence which is strong enough to warrant a conclusion drawn from it, but it is not thereby a proof. A proof was the very thing that Moore claimed that he could not give. For him, the fact that here are two hands is a truth known to him, and the fact that he knows - and everyone else does too - establishes it as ultimate, as needing no further justification. The reason why no justification can legitimately be demanded of my belief that here are two hands is because giving justifications presupposes something more certain than
that which is justified, but it is precisely because there is nothing more certain that no justification can be given. To this extent Wittgenstein is in agreement with Moore:

My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it.66

Wittgenstein's agreement only goes so far. He does not doubt what Moore does not doubt but he does not accept that Moore has added anything to this lack of doubt - he accepts neither Moore's "defence" nor his "proof". And his refusal to accept them is based on the same reasoning for which Moore proposed them - the perception of two hands is less certain than the having of two hands. Therefore, what is proved has more certainty than that used to prove it.

The verification that I have two hands presupposes that the method of verification is in some way more firmly established than the fact which it is trying to substantiate. But my seeing that I have two hands does not add anything to the certainty that I have two hands. My having two hands is just as conclusive evidence for the truth of the proposition that there are two hands as my perception that I have two hands. In other words, seeing does not add to the certainty that I have two hands. Our foundation is that than which nothing else is more certain:

And here the strange thing is that when I am quite certain of how the words are used, have no doubt about it, I can still give no grounds for my way of going on. If I tried I could give a thousand, but not as certain as the very thing they were supposed to be grounds for.65

But it is equally wrong in some sense to say that we "know" these things as
to say that they must be justified. We are certain of them but we do not "know" them.

Wittgenstein agrees with Moore that we do have a set of Common Sense beliefs concerning the world. Wittgenstein, however, does not want to allow Moore that we somehow come to "know" that these things are true. It is true that they are beyond doubt because they are not doubted, but the fact that we do not doubt something does not necessarily imply that we in some sense "know" it. We do not "know" them but we do not doubt them either - they stand fast for us: "I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid as part of our method of doubt and enquiry".66 That something stands fast for us means that it is not something which we doubt - we accept it without (real) question. It is a part of our lives and our way of living.

We do come to know that e.g. Saturn exists, but we do not come to know that I have never been very far from the surface of the earth - at least we do not come to know it in the same way. No one will deny that we not only act as though it were true but we are also capable of formulating it into a thought and expressing it. "I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates",67 but that axis, that foundation, is given to us as a part of our language and our form of life. We do have Common Sense beliefs, but we do not believe them because we "know" them to be true. Instead, we believe them because we engage in activities which require us to believe them and which depend upon them.

So Wittgenstein does want to maintain that there is a difference in
kind between knowing of the existence of the planet Saturn and knowing that my hand exists. The latter is not, in the same sense, knowing at all. Moore's beliefs of Common Sense are most assuredly beliefs of Common Sense and Moore is most assuredly certain that they are true. But Moore is wrong, according to Wittgenstein, when he says that they are things which he knows for certain to be true: "'knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories" asserts Wittgenstein. Moore's saying that he knows these things implies that he has somehow been in a position to confirm them: "One says 'I know' when one is ready to give compelling grounds. 'I know' relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth....But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes".

This is precisely the case with Moore and his Common Sense beliefs.

One can legitimately assert that he knows that the planet Saturn exists because he is prepared to justify the assertion of this knowledge by reference to facts more certain than the planet's existence itself. But this is not the case with Moore and his assertion that he knows here is one hand and here is another. The only grounds for asserting that he knows it is: "here is one hand and here is another"; or, as Wittgenstein puts it, "Moore's mistake lies in this - countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying 'I do know it'".

Moore makes the mistake of using the phrase "I know" where it has no meaningful applicability Wittgenstein believes. In other words, according to Wittgenstein, Moore is crossing the bounds of discourse by trying to use ordinary language to solve philosophical puzzles. His problem arises from leaving himself on a philosophical level:
But on the other hand: how do I know that it is my hand? Do I even here know exactly what it means to say it is my hand? - When I say "how do I know?" I do not mean that I have the least doubt of it. What we have here is a foundation for all my action. But, it seems to me that it is wrongly expressed by the words "I know".

And in fact isn't the use of the word "know" as a preeminently philosophical word altogether wrong? If "know" has this interest, why not "being certain"? Apparently because it would be too subjective. But isn't "know" just as subjective? Isn't one misled simply by the grammatical peculiarity that "p" follows from "I know p"?

Wittgenstein does not like the use to which Moore has put the expression "I know". Moore has in some sense bastardized what it means for someone to know something - or better yet, what it means when they say "I know..." Wittgenstein thinks that the term should be gotten out of the philosophical environment and restricted to the use it has in ordinary discourse. The philosopher seems to be meaning something different with his use of "I know":

For when Moore says "I know that that's..." I want to reply "you don't know anything! - and yet I would not say that to anyone who was speaking without philosophical intention. That is, I feel (rightly?) that these two mean to say something different.

I would like to reserve the expression "I know" for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

According to Wittgenstein, Moore has a peculiar use of the phrase "I know". It is peculiar because it implies that the person uttering it is prepared to give a justification for what he claims to know. If he cannot then he cannot be said to know what he claims to know. But Moore's Common Sense beliefs are just those kinds of beliefs of which any justification would be no surer than the belief itself. But how then could one make sense of the statement that "I know..." when I am incapable of showing that I have
any basis by which I can justify my assertion that I know it? The philoso-
pher who demands that any knowledge claims must be justified is not wrong
in his demands. Wittgenstein is inclined to agree that this is a legitimate
demand. What is unreasonable, however, is the expectation that one can
give such a justification whenever there is no question of doubt. That which
is not doubted and that which is known are not identical classes. The philo-
sopher must realize that ultimately he must rest content upon an ungrounded
foundation from which all knowledge and all doubt is derived.

Wittgenstein, then, knocks the props out from under Moore's "Defence
of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World". He does it by showing
that Moore cannot in fact be said to know what he claims to know. If it
is not conceded to Moore that he does know it, then his argument in both
cases fails. Wittgenstein is not going to dispute Moore's conclusions,
but he does dispute any claim to have proved them. Of course Moore could
not prove them because they could not be proved - not by Moore, not by
Wittgenstein, nor by anyone else. However, because they cannot be proved
and one cannot therefore be said to "know" them, one ought not thereby to
feel compelled to doubt them - because in fact one does not doubt them.

Wittgenstein thus avoids Moore's claim that whoever is not with him
is against him. Wittgenstein wants to hold that Moore is wrong in think-
ing that one must choose one side or the other. Either you know Common
Sense beliefs to be true or you doubt their truth - so says G. E. Moore.
Wittgenstein wants to say that there is another way. You may not know
something to be true and yet not doubt it - and that is what Wittgenstein
says we all must do at some point.

Wittgenstein, then, challenges Moore in some of the same ways that
Hegel's theory challenges Moore. Wittgenstein, like Hegel, rejects the circle of grounds which is implicit in Moore and he rejects it by rejecting the conception that certainty can be grounded on truth. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel believe that certainty forms the foundation and that from this foundation we come to determine what is true. Hegel, however, rejects Moore's circle of grounds by expanding the circle into a circle of knowledge in which certainty is not separate from truth but comes to display its truth and to finally become one with its truth. In this way the actualized truth becomes the evolved ground of the original certainty which forms the foundation. Wittgenstein, however, rejects Moore's circle and does so by separating both knowledge and truth from their foundation in certainty. Certainty has an uniqueness for Wittgenstein such that it is neither truth nor knowledge. These depend upon certainty and certainty, in some way, forms the ground for them - but they are not directly connected in their essential natures. For Hegel, on the contrary, knowledge is to be found at all levels of certainty and truth. Certainty and knowledge are not different categories for Hegel as they are for Wittgenstein. Our certainty arises out of our relationship with the world. It therefore tells us something about the world and in this way it is, to some degree, knowledge about the world. We find out, Hegel believes, that this knowledge is very poor and abstract; eventually it is shown to lead to its further completion only by transcending the certainty out of which it arose. Nevertheless, it is knowledge and this knowledge progresses towards truth.

Wittgenstein, in order to hold his distinction between certainty and knowledge, had to distinguish "kinds" of knowledge - had to distinguish what it means to "know" something in the philosophical sense and what it
means to know something in the ordinary sense. In other words, he distinguished between justified knowledge and unjustifiable knowledge. Only in philosophy, he believed, was justification *always* demanded - that is why Moore was caught in his circle of justification. But some knowledge, he believed, was ungrounded and hence could not be the kind of knowledge demanded by philosophy - it could not be "known". This knowledge was *given* by the way one lives and the language one speaks.

If, however, knowledge and truth are grounded on our "form of life" and on our "language game" then, as with Moore, there is no *criterion* for determining truth from falsity or knowledge from opinion - it is something which our consciousness has "built in", something ungrounded and unjustifiable, something to which we cannot apply reason or rational criticism but can only change through persuasion or being persuaded. Hegel, on the other hand, finds the criterion to be immanent in the knowledge claim itself. So for Hegel there is no criterion in the sense in which Moore and Wittgenstein conceive it; but unlike them he found the criterion to be possible as a result of conceiving knowledge to be a process of development and evolution from certainty to truth.

Wittgenstein's general position is in general accordance with Hegel's analysis of knowledge and truth in *das geistige Tierreich*. As already suggested, Wittgenstein's position might be taken as Hegel's without the comprehension of the road to its realization from the foundation of certainty. Wittgenstein sees the true position (as Hegel sees it) but he does not see the means of getting there. That is why Wittgenstein sees the foundation of certainty to be largely distinct from the truth and the knowledge which he recognizes. He does not see how this certainty can become truth or that
it is itself essentially knowledge. He can only see that this certainty is somehow the foundation of truth and knowledge. According to Hegel what we know for certain to be true is determined through our action, including our communication, within the spiritual community, but this foundation in what we do has its logical precedents and its ultimate philosophical justification in the organic development of the way knowledge appears from its origins in certainty to its culmination in truth.

It is worth noting that the difference in the practical result of the two theories is as significant as the difference in their theoretical results. Oddly enough, on the basis of Hegel's position, there is little justification for anything but an evolutionary, non-radical change, whereas Wittgenstein's theory may well imply change in belief, not only through persuasion, but also through a radical revolution.

For both Hegel and Wittgenstein certainty forms the foundation, and for both this certainty becomes justified (insofar as it is justified for Wittgenstein) by the superstructure which is built upon it. For Hegel, however, the justification is a real one for the superstructure, the System, can only exist because the foundation of certainty is a necessary and integral part of that System. Hegel's system is meant to justify itself by attaining absolute knowledge or a complete comprehension of experience. If it does so then each stage in that System is part of the justification of that System and is in turn itself justified. For Wittgenstein, however, the base - the certainty - is "justified" by the superstructure of knowledge and what is taken for truth only so long as that superstructure itself is accepted. What the world is "stands fast" for us only because of the way we relate ourselves to this world. But our relationships in turn are what
constitutes our knowledge of the world and what we accept as true about the world.

So for Wittgenstein knowledge cannot be expressed systematically - at least not in the Hegelian sense. The knowledge system (as opposed to systematic knowledge) is logically a-historical (though there may be a historical element giving continuity to it); it is also autonomous and contingent. That is, the given base of certainty need have no relation to the development of human knowledge. The only logical requirement is that there be such a base if there is knowing. This gives a theoretical structure for the a-historical kind of revolutionary theory put forth by some critical positivists. On this theory bases may be changed at will; the way to change knowledge is to make a radical change in the presuppositions or in the foundation. This may be arbitrary and it is at least unconditioned.75

For Hegel, however, the base is given logically and historically. Immediate certainty must be the beginning and that beginning persists because knowledge is progressive and built upon the logical beginning.76 Because there is a goal there is a self-justification of the beginning. No radical change is possible; the only change possible is at the top - and then only within the limits as given by the logical/historical development.
CHAPTER 9
FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

The course of this examination into Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* has given rise to a number of occasions for pointing out why in Hegel's theory epistemology must become a simultaneous ontology. For the most part, however, the rationale for uniting these normally separate endeavours has come from within the Hegelian theory itself. It is also the case, however, that this notion arises naturally for Hegel out of the partial acceptance of the Kantian critique of reason and out of his partial rejection of it. It will be of considerable help in understanding this aspect of the *Phenomenology* to look, albeit briefly, at the development of this Hegelian standpoint out of the critical philosophy of Kant.

When Hegel, with Fichte and Schelling, rejected the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena as untenable, the natural conclusion to be ultimately drawn was that a "science" of phenomena would necessarily have to be a science of appearance and reality. The rejection of the thing-in-itself was a natural consequence of following through Kant's critical program since the thing-in-itself was the one most obvious element of the Kantian theory which could not be deduced properly from within the allowable limits of that theory. The Post-Kantians concluded that since nothing
positive could be asserted about things-in-themselves then nothing positive could be gained by retaining them and, conversely, nothing positive would be lost by discarding them. They existed as an irrational element within an otherwise rational, or at least coherent, system; and they might not have been utilized by Kant himself had he not had a fundamental commitment to preserve the realm of sense experience as the repository of mundane knowledge. The noumenal world was needed above all for morality and also in order to keep limits upon the speculative activity of cognition, thereby preserving worldly knowledge within the limits laid down by the natural sciences. The ideals which reason did produce had a kind of pragmatic justification in their capacity as unifiers of experience, but they could not be accorded either certain or true without opening a Pandora's box leading to irrational flights of fancy masquerading as truth. When some Post-Kantian philosophers accepted the basic Kantian theory while yet rejecting the irrationality of the thing-in-itself they concomitantly threw out its function as well and thereby, once again, opened the floodgates of speculative metaphysics. Thus the way was made clear for the metaphysical groundwork of romanticism and a general disdain for mundane natural science.

Hegel too found it necessary to reject the thing-in-itself: "...it is easy to perceive", he remarks, "that such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself is itself only a product of thought, and of merely abstractive thought at that".\(^1\) We also know that he was not impervious to the call of romanticism. He did of course reject the romantic quest for the immediate grasp of truth, but at the same time he too reasserted the possibility of a positive metaphysics. The rejection of the negative, limiting function
of noumena had the result of releasing the Ideas of reason from the restriction placed upon them by Kant, so for the Post-Kantian philosophers it thereby became possible for Reason to apply itself to reality - to have a constitutive use:

Transcendental idealism in its more consistent development recognized the nothingness of the spectral thing-in-itself left over by the Kantian philosophy, this abstract shadow divorced from all content, and intended to destroy it completely. This philosophy also made a start at letting reason itself exhibit its own determinations. But this attempt, because it proceeded from a subjective standpoint, could not be brought to a successful conclusion.²

Hegel's absolute idealism was conceived in the same spirit as that which he here dismisses as being incapable of being "brought to a successful conclusion". Hegel himself, however, was convinced that he had succeeded where others had failed.

Metaphysics, for Hegel, was the progressive application of Reason to experience; it was the attempted application of Ideas and it constituted their progress toward the absolute Idea in which metaphysical truth resides. For him, then, metaphysics was the uniting of all experience under an Idea and in that respect his is similar to Kant's critical conception of metaphysics.

Hegel does not distinguish in Kant's way between Understanding and Reason:

...the usual practice of separating understanding and reason is, from every point of view, to be rejected. When the Concept is regarded as irrational, this should be interpreted rather as an incapacity of reason to recognize itself in the Concept. The determinate and abstract concept is the condition, or rather an essential moment of reason; it is form spiritually impregnated, in which the finite, through the universality in which it relates itself to itself, spontaneously catches fire, posits itself as dialectical and thereby is the beginning of the manifestation of reason.³
For Hegel the categories of knowing are not merely categories of understanding, as they were for Kant. Since understanding and reason are not distinct, then, if the categories are in the understanding, they must also be in reason. So when Hegel rejects Kant's bifurcation of thought into the faculties of Understanding and Reason, he also necessarily rejects the notion that the categories are left out of reasoning:

If we are to believe the Critical philosophy, thought is subjective, and its ultimate and invincible mode is abstract universality or formal identity. Thought is thus set in opposition to Truth, which is no abstraction, but concrete universality. In this highest mode of thought, which is entitled Reason, the Categories are left out of account. 4

Since for Kant the categories are left out of reason, the ideas of reason cannot apply transcendentally to objects of experience and any attempt to make them do so (which Kant admits is inevitable) will give rise to dialectical illusion. But because Hegel does not accept the faculty theory of Kant he cannot exclude reason from its proper employment in experience. 5 For him, therefore, the dialectic is not a dialectic of illusion but one of negating and transcending, forming antinomies and solving them. Understanding is not absolutely distinct from reason, according to Hegel, it is merely the applying of a limited set of categories, or the set of categories in their improper application, to a given element of experience: "...the understanding is to be distinguished from reason only in the sense that the former is merely the potentiality [Vermögen] of the concept in general". 6

The categories, according to Kant, structure experience by determining the way in which the manifold of intuition is to be understood. The
categories thereby worked directly upon intuitions and had a definite concrete content which by its very nature limits the possible operation of understanding. The ideas of reason, however, had no concrete content to limit them. Reason, therefore, was liable to "ideas" which, having no sensory content - no "real" content - have the capability of erring by going "beyond" the understanding, i.e. beyond the possible employment of the categories. But since reason had no "real" content it had no "real" employment, i.e. it could not legislate the content of experience. Its only legitimate function was to bring the concepts of experience under a unifying idea; but there was no guarantee that its result would be truth. Hegel sums up the situation as he saw it in this way:

The merely formal position that the Concept holds as understanding is fully confirmed in the Kantian exposition of what reason is. In reason, the highest stage of thought, one ought to have expected the Concept to lose the conditionedness in which it still appears at the stage of understanding and to attain to perfect truth. But this expectation is disappointed. For Kant defines the relation of reason to the categories as merely dialectical and, indeed, takes the result of this dialectic to be the infinite nothing - just that and nothing more. Consequently, the infinite unity of reason, too, is still deprived of the synthesis, and with it the beginning referred to above of a speculative, truly infinite Concept; reason becomes the familiar, wholly formal, merely regulative unity of the systematic employment of the understanding. It is declared to be an abuse when logic, which is supposed to be merely a canon of judgment, is regarded as an organon for the production of objective insights. The concepts of reason in which we could not but have an intimation of a higher power and a profounder significance, no longer possess a constitutive character as do the categories, they are mere Ideas; certainly, we are quite at liberty to use them, but by these intelligible entities in which all truth should be completely revealed, we are to understand nothing more than hypotheses, and to ascribe absolute truth to them would be the height of caprice and foolhardiness, for they - do not occur in any experience. Would one ever have thought that philosophy would deny truth to intelligible entities because they lack the spatial and temporal material of the sensuous world?

Kant had demonstrated that metaphysics (what Hegel called the "former meta-
physics"") presupposes that knowledge is invariably of the real and that it is only a matter of interpreting the content of experience to determine what is there to be known. Kant's "Copernican Revolution" however established the active nature of thought such that experience is seen to be a necessary transformation of input according to certain \textbf{a priori} determined functions of thought itself. Thus, if metaphysics claims to analyze experience for the ultimately real content contained therein, then it will be always doomed to failure because it fails to recognize that experience is always a categorizing function such that what can be the object of thought is only an object \textit{for me} or, at least, \textit{for us} as consciousnesses. What is therefore needed is not a searching of experience for what it can tell us about the real, but an examination of the way in which experience can take place. The critique of reason, therefore, will not be a critique of what is but rather a critique of the limits of its use:

Reason's nature is such that it can never conceive anything except insofar as the latter is determined under given conditions. Consequently, inasmuch as it can neither rest with the conditioned nor make the unconditioned comprehensible, nothing remains for it, when thirst for knowledge invites it to grasp the absolute reality of all conditions; but to turn back from objects to itself in order to investigate and determine the ultimate boundary of the capacity given it, instead of investigating and determining the ultimate boundary of things.  

Therefore, according to Kant we will never discover what the ultimate nature of reality is, but we can discover what we contribute to our experience through the necessary operations of our minds. When we discover what is necessarily added to experience through the \textbf{a priori} categories of the understanding, then we will also be able to determine what in this way is not necessary in what we contribute. We may thereby be able to control
these other elements so that we may not be misled by them. Though meta-
physics, the science of the real, becomes impossible, at least we can
eliminate the contingent and non-universal elements of our thinking and
thereby be certain that when we do make claims for knowledge we will be
making a universal claim. This universal claim may not have ultimate
metaphysical validity, but it will have a universal (though relative)
validity for all human consciousness. The reality we know will therefore
not be a metaphysical reality, but it will necessarily be a human reality.

Kant recognized, as indeed he must, that the other elements of reason
have in fact a necessity of their own. This necessity is different from
the necessity of the a priori categories of the understanding which are
necessarily what they are (Kant believed). They only have necessity in
that they must be. That is, it is only necessary that they are, but what
they are is contingent. These are the ideas of reason. They serve the
function of providing a foundation, or in other terms, a presupposition,
under which a generally unified theory of experience is given. So what
a critique of the knowing process can accomplish is to pinpoint for us
what these ideas are (as distinguished from the necessary categories).

On Kant's analysis reason was subject to errors of various kinds -
primarily what he called antinomies and paralogisms. The way in which
reason could be subject to such errors was by virtue of its capacity to
go beyond experience, that is, to produce the ideas of reason which ex-
perience could neither validate nor refute. But we may wonder at this
marvelous power of reason which represents an inverted rationalism. Know-
ledge, insofar as it is possible, is derived from the senses and takes the
form which the understanding is capable of putting on to that sensory in-
tuition. Reason can only give further knowledge by staying within the bounds of sense, and it errs when it transgresses these bounds. Yet, under the Kantian scheme, reason does have an inherent activity of its own - as rationalists claim, but for Kant this activity is not limited by sense experience and is therefore incapable of giving any knowledge at all. Rationalists want to maintain that the autonomous activity of reason gives us a unique access to truth. For Kant, it is because the activity of reason is autonomous (and Kant is different from ordinary empiricists in maintaining that it does have the capacity for such an autonomous activity) that error, not truth, is its only pure production.\(^9\)

Because of Kant's theory concerning the roles of Understanding and Reason and the dialectical errors which necessarily arise from the latter, there was no possible rational solution to the antinomies which resulted from the activity of reason. Yet these antinomies necessarily arise because of the need to unify experience under a theoretical idea.\(^10\) But because these ideas of reason arise inevitably there is no question of solving the antinomies by refusing to reason. Therefore, the only solution which Kant could provide was the notion of a thing-in-itself which could not be known but which provided a basis for the solution to the antinomies of reason. For example, with regard to the antinomy of free will and determinism, Kant finds the solution to reside in the conception that each of these ideas is found in the respective realms of things-in-themselves and appearances:

...there is no contradiction in supposing, that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free, while yet, as belong-
Hegel, however, rejected both the thing-in-itself and the division of thought into faculties. At the same time he recognized and accepted the validity of Kant's analysis of reason as prone to fall into antinomies. However, if there is no limiting concept, such as the thing-in-itself, which serves as a device for keeping reason within limits, then reason becomes unlimited in its possible legitimate applications. Reason is the thing-in-itself because it is the "highest mode of thought" and is unrestricted in its proper application to experience. It is therefore the source of true knowledge and, because it is unlimited by anything outside it (such as things-in-themselves) it is also constitutive of reality:

The demonstrated absoluteness of the Concept relatively to the material of experience and, more exactly, to the categories and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and prior to the Concept has no truth; this it has solely in its ideality or its identity with the Concept. The derivation of the real from it, if we want to call it derivation, consists in the first place essentially in this, that the Concept in its formal abstraction reveals itself as incomplete and through its own immanent dialectic passes over into reality; but it does not fall back again into a ready-made reality confronting it and take refuge in something which has shown itself to be the inessential element of Appearance because, having looked around for something better, it has failed to find it; on the contrary, it produces the reality from its own resources.

But given this position it would seem that there could be no solution to the antinomies which Hegel admits reason necessarily falls prey to; and there would then seem to be no way of distinguishing truth from falsity. Hegel, however, believes that he has found another way out of this problem. One of the virtues of removing the thing-in-itself and thereby making reason the highest source of knowledge is that one is thereby also freed of a
If thought and phenomenon do not perfectly correspond to one another, we are free at last to choose which of the two shall be held the de- faulter. The Kantian idealism, where it touches on the world of Rea- son, throws the blame on the thoughts; saying that the thoughts are defective, as not being exactly fitted to the sensations and to a mode of mind wholly restricted within the range of sensation, in which as such there are no traces of the presence of these thoughts. But as to the actual content of the thought, no question is raised.¹⁵

The correspondence theory of truth is one-sided because it neglects the possibility that the objective side has not properly realized itself. A proposition which asserts some information about an object may give a correct description of the current state of affairs, but the truth about that object is something much different according to Hegel: it is the agreement of conceptions with reality. Kant could never get beyond the notion of truth as correspondence so long as he restricted truth to the understanding:

When Kant, in connection with logic comes to discuss the old and fam- ous question: what is truth? he first of all presents to the reader as a triviality the explanation of the term as the agreement of cog- nition with its object - a definition of great, indeed of supreme, value. If we remember this definition in connection with the funda- mental assertion of transcendental idealism, that reason as cognitive is incapable of apprehending things-in-themselves, that reality lies absolutely outside the Concept, then it is at once evident that a reason such as this which is unable to put itself in agreement with its object, the things-in-themselves, and things-in-themselves that are not in agreement with the Concept of reason, the Concept that is not in agreement with reality, and a reality that does not agree with the Concept are untrue conceptions. If Kant had considered the Idea of an intuitive understanding in the light of the above definition of truth, he would have treated that Idea which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought but rather as the truth.¹⁶

The dialectical activity of reason is as real for Hegel as for Kant and in order for Hegel's theory to have credibility he must demonstrate that dia- lectical illusion resolves itself into truth. Were he to accept the Kantian
duality there is no apparent means by which he could do this - as Kant himself aptly showed. The dialectical activity of Reason must itself be rationalized and not put down solely to the limitation of Reason. If the dialectic were solely within reason as a faculty of thought then the result would be what Hegel characterized as an Unhappy Consciousness in which, as we have seen, one side is "the simple unalterable" and the other is "the manifold and changeable", the two being "foreign to each other". The dialectic must therefore be a metaphysical principle: it must be in things and in the world just as much as it is in Reason (as an aspect of thought). For this reason Hegel says that "what disorganizes the unity of logical reason, equally disorganizes actuality" (the opposite is what we would normally expect and Hegel would agree that that is also true). Therefore, an accurate epistemology can only be carried out by examining not only reason as a function of knowing, but the object to which that reason is applied as well.

Kant effected what he termed a "Copernican revolution" in philosophy by recognizing that the mind is not a purely passive receptacle of an autonomous outside reality acting upon it, but that the mind itself is active in shaping experience. However, Kant again saw the relation between outer and inner or, in his terms, "objects" and their "representations" in his typical either/or dualistic fashion. For example, he makes the following analysis of the relation between objects and representations:

There are only two possible ways in which synthetic representations and their objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation to one another, and, as it were, meet one another. Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible.

Because for Kant there existed an "inner" and an "outer" which were separate
and distinct from one another he also saw the relation between the two, insofar as they could relate, as dualistic. Now it would appear that Kant would have to make a choice between the two options that he put forth, but he avoids doing so by making the term 'object' ambiguous, thereby allowing himself to choose both alternatives. Kant therefore continues with the following:

In the former case, this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. This is true of appearances, as regards that [element] in them which belongs to sensation.20

Here the object makes the representation possible because the object is the object of sensation; it is that which is sensed. This implies that the object is an "external" object which affects the senses such that the conditions for experience are made objectively possible. The object, then, is that which exists prior to the experience of it and which unilaterally affects the mind (or the senses).

The other case is one in which the object takes on a different meaning. In this case it is not the external object of sensation but is the internal, phenomenal object of perception. Here there is no question of existence, but only of its being an object for me or for knowing consciousness. Kant continues from the preceding:

In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object in so far as existence is concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will. None the less the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to know anything as an object.21

Here Kant maintains that representations make possible the objects qua ob-
jects of experience, but in the former case the object is that which makes sensations possible. So there is still not a direct link between objects per se and representations per se. The object of sensation affects the senses and gives rise to a sense content. This sense content must be organized by the mind in order to become an intelligible content, and it is this function of the mind which makes the object, the categorized manifold of sensory intuition, possible as an object of experience.

Accordingly the Transcendental Analytic leads to this important conclusion, that the most the understanding can achieve a priori is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general. And since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, the understanding can never transcend those limits of sensibility within which alone objects can be given to us. Its principles are merely rules for the exposition of appearances; and the proud name of an Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general...must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding.22

Philosophy, in other words, can be epistemology but it cannot be ontology according to Kant. It can investigate the understanding and its object, but not the object and its reality. The science of objectivity must therefore be the science of phenomena, i.e. it must be a phenomenology.

Hegel rejected the notion of a thing-in-itself and the concept of a transcendental object which is hypothesized as the ground of the empirical object because the existence of such entities had really only an ad hoc justification. On Kant's own theory nothing at all could be said or known about them - not even that they are since 'existence' itself is a concept of understanding and can therefore only be applied to phenomenal objects. To say that they are transcendentally justified is to make them purely hypothetical: if the ground of our empirical objects is not ideal but real,
then there must be an object = x, we know not what, which serves to ground them. In other words, it assumes realism and dualism as the metaphysical foundation and it is because of this assumption that they are needed. 

However, if we are not willing to make metaphysical assumptions; if we want to overcome dualism and its inherent insoluble problems; and if we have no prior need to save realism and deny idealism, then these hypothetical entities serve no purpose at all. Because Hegel had no inclination to make these assumptions he consequently rejected the Kantian unknowables which supported them. The result was that for Hegel it was true both that objects make representations possible and representations make the object possible. The job of philosophy is to comprehend the Concept in both its objective and its representative aspects. Anything which is, is encompassed in the phenomenal reality. Neither can the object be separated from knowledge nor can knowledge be separated from its object. To comprehend one is to comprehend the other.

Hegel accepted the Kantian notion that the mind is active in experience but denied the dualities which allowed Kant to retain its essential passivity. For Hegel, on the contrary, the mind is radically active because
the "object" and the "representations" determine each other. Therefore the relation between object and representation is not a duality of simple relations but represents a relation of reciprocity and of mutual effect. It is therefore the case that:

by the act of reflection something is altered in the way in which the fact was originally presented in sensation, perception or conception. Thus, as it appears, an alteration of the object must be interposed before its true nature can be discovered.23

And because of this it is necessary to conclude that "to discover the truth in things, mere attention is not enough; we must call in the action of our own faculties to transform what is immediately before us".24

According to Hegel the concepts of Reason are concrete and they are made concrete because, in opposition to Kant, they have a "real" use. But since there are a limited number of possible categories (and Hegel thinks that this can be demonstrated to be necessarily the case in the Logic) then Reason cannot go beyond these categories. This must be the case since for Hegel, again as opposed to Kant, all thought is logical and therefore categorial (i.e. they are categories of Reason and not just of Understanding). Since there are no categories beyond the possible categories, and Reason contains all possible categories, then Reason itself is absolute, i.e. it is not externally bounded but internally limited to the possible; it is therefore infinite. Since thought cannot be absolute or infinite if the object of thought is something external to it, or if it is something essentially different from thought (since that would limit it), then thought, or more accurately Reason, must have itself as its own object:

...it is...the very essence of thought to be infinite. The nominal
explanation of calling a thing finite is that it has an end, that it exists up to a certain point only, where it comes into contact with, and is limited by, its other. The finite therefore subsists in reference to its other, which is its negation and presents itself as its limit. Now thought is always in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. The thinking power, the 'I', is therefore infinite, because, when it thinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself. Generally speaking, an object means a something else, a negative confronting me. But in the case where thought thinks itself, it has an object which is at the same time no object: in other words, its objectivity is suppressed and transformed into an idea. Thought, as thought, therefore in its un-mixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it keeps to limited categories, which it believes to be ultimate. Infinite or speculative thought, on the contrary, while it no less defines, does in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect vanish.25

Reason must discover itself in reality, i.e. it must go through the process of objectifying itself through the application of its logical categories to experience: it must, as we saw at the beginning of "Reason", be "...the conscious certainty of being all reality". From all of this we may conclude that knowing and being are not fundamentally different and that the examination of knowledge is therefore an examination of what is. Also, it is necessarily the case that what can be known is rational and what can possibly be known is what can possibly be. Therefore the relation between the rational and the real is: "what is rational is real and what is real is rational".

Phenomenology becomes ontology because Hegel rejects the idea of noumenology. Reason, as the manifest expression of the essence of Spirit, is reality as it appears. The following is a good summation of this position:

While Kant maintained that ultimate reality is opaque to human knowledge, Hegel returns to the classical Aristotelian position that reality is intelligible. Kant's Ding-an-Sich ultimately left human knowledge knocking, to no avail, at a closed door. Hegel, however, tried to do away with the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Hence the title Phenomenology of Spirit, which implies that ultimate reality, Geist, is manifest in its phenomenological appearances and intelligible through them.26
But the **Phenomenology** is not the same thing as a noumenology with an additional denial that the object of knowledge is a thing-in-itself having a reality totally removed from the knowing subject. Such a "noumenology" would, in fact, make knowledge, as knowledge of what truly is, impossible - just as Kant claimed. This is the case because, though there would not be the Kantian dualism to contend with, what is would only be known as a phenomenon of mind and not of the phenomena per se. In other words, there would be a distinction between phenomenal reality and phenomenal appearance - essentially the same distinction as that of Kant between phenomena and noumena.

To be a phenomenal object implies that there is an intimate relation between that object and the knowing subject. Thus a complete phenomenology could not be accomplished merely from a consideration of the object of knowledge. That which knows is as essential to the investigation as that which is known - and the reverse is equally true.

So the **Phenomenology** must be an observation or description of the ways in which consciousness can possibly be related to its object. This cannot be of the form of an introspective report upon personal experience as an existing consciousness since this relies upon the contingent circumstances of an individual consciousness which may or may not display all possible forms of consciousness and some form of consciousness may thereby be left out of the report. Also, of course, such an examination would be just that kind of "observation" which we saw strongly criticised by Hegel. Furthermore, and more fundamentally, since, according to the theory, the relation between subject and object is **intimate** and therefore a change in one effects a change in the other, the very process of introspection, being an activity
of the consciousness being investigated, will influence the subject under investigation. Therefore consciousness cannot be investigated as it is in-itself by using the activity of consciousness itself. So the investigation can only succeed by observing consciousness in its logical necessity. To that extent Hegel's is a transcendental analysis; he must be determining what is the case only in so far as it must be the case in order for it to be at all. That is the only way in which the investigation itself can be objectively neutral, that is, free from the contingencies of personal experience. In other words, with regard to Hegel's system, the dialectic must be immanent in the content of Reason itself and the logic of the content must be the same as the logic of the reasoning about the content and together they must produce the Systematization of Reason by inferring what is implied in the objective and subjective manifestations of Reason itself.

But is this problem limited to introspection and "observation" as a method? The problem is: how to investigate the essential nature of something which changes its nature through being investigated, or whose essential nature is partly its being as known or investigated. This problem has some affinity to Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle in physics and we might therefore call it the problem of epistemological indeterminacy. It would seem to be a logical problem involved with any examination of knowledge whether "observational" or transcendental. Kant has this problem built into his criticism of reason because, for him, the understanding is always active in knowing. Therefore, a critique of the "faculty" of understanding itself involves the understanding. The understanding is, however, active and not passive in the production of knowledge and for that reason just as things-in-themselves are unknowable, so too is the activity of knowing un-
knowable as it is in-itself. Knowledge and knowing are necessarily of phenomena and likewise knowledge and knowing must themselves be phenomena to the self-reflective consciousness. Therefore a critique of knowledge, or a critique of pure reason, must be itself a critique of how knowledge or reason appears and not what it is in-itself.

This difficulty is implicitly recognized by Hegel in the Introduction to the Phenomenology:

For if knowledge is the instrument to take hold of the absolute essence, one is immediately reminded that the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a shaping and alteration of it. Or, if knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium.

The only "...remedy for this parlous state..." would seem to be a critical examination of knowledge such as Kant undertook; in this manner it is perhaps possible to determine what the process of knowing adds to the content of knowledge and thus be able to eliminate this from the result. This is what Kant set himself to do in the case of knowledge itself although he denied it possible in the case of the objective content of knowledge. That is, Kant accepted the validity of criticism in so far as it was applied purely epistemologically but denied its validity as a program for ontology. But given the assumption that knowledge is gained through the active understanding it is difficult to see how either program could be logically possible:

...if the examination of knowledge, which we now represent as a medium, makes us acquainted with the law of light-refraction, in the medium, it is likewise useless to subtract this factor from the result; for knowledge, through which the truth touches us, is the ray of light itself rather than its refraction; and if this be subtracted, we would be left with no more than an indication of pure direction or empty place.
A great part of Hegel's criticism of Kant's critique of pure reason is that in order to criticize reason it is necessary to use reason - to use the very thing that is being criticized. This criticism of Kant's critique is repeated again in the Philosophy of Religion in more explicit form:

Reason is to be examined, but how? It is to be rationally examined, to be known; but this is, however, only possible by means of rational thought; it is impossible in any other way, and consequently a demand is made which cancels itself. If we are not to begin philosophical speculation without having attained rationally to a knowledge of reason, no beginning can be made at all, for in getting to know anything in the philosophical sense, we comprehend it rationally; we are, it seems to give up attempting this, since the very thing we have to do is first of all to know reason. This is just the demand which was made by that Gascon who would not go into the water until he could swim. It is impossible to make any preliminary examination of rational activity without being rational.31

The crucial question is, then, how is it possible to have any knowledge which is not merely phenomenal knowledge and therefore of what is in itself? But in fact this is not possible and that is why the Phenomenology is "...a presentation of knowledge as a phenomenon".32

But the problem still remains as to how phenomena can be known as they are in themselves, i.e. without what is contributed by the subject to the phenomenal object. In other words, does not any phenomenology or any critique of reason involve a second-order phenomenality - and so on and so on? If a critique of reason is to examine the relation between the object and knowledge then in fact that relation itself becomes an object for the knowledge gained by the critique and the knowledge gained is not the in-itself of knowledge but only knowledge as known, i.e. of the phenomenon of knowledge. This problem is obvious if the critique of reason is accomplished through some kind of observation, but
Kant, of course, did not fall into this trap. His method was transcendental and therefore logical and necessary rather than historical and contingent. Given that a certain kind of experience is possible, e.g. synthetic a priori knowledge, he said, how is this experience logically possible? He concluded that such experience was only possible if knowledge had the a priori structure outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel agreed that this is the only way in which "epistemological indeterminacy" could be circumvented. Kant, he felt, erred, in being too empirical. The categories were merely "found" by Kant and were therefore not transcendentally justified (deduced). Furthermore, if such a transcendental method is accepted as the only way to avoid epistemological indeterminacy, then all knowledge must be phenomenal and the critique of phenomenal knowledge must itself account for all experience - because the transcendental method itself was devised as a method to account for otherwise unaccountable elements of experience. Such a "phenomenology" must account for the whole of experience and must therefore account not only for the subject as knower but also for the object which is known. True philosophical knowledge is knowledge of the Concept and "the absolute Concept is the category; it is the principle that knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same".

Hegel tells us that we may view the Phenomenology "...as a description of the way science is related to phenomenal knowledge, and as an investigation and critical examination into the reality of knowledge..." and it may therefore seem appropriate to call it an "ontology of knowledge". But though he says that it is an examination into the "reality of knowledge", the object is not to discover the being of knowledge, but being in so far as it is known - it is to discover the essence of consciousness or Bewusstsein;
that is why it is a "description of the way science is related to phenomenal knowledge", and for that reason it is better described as an **epistemological ontology**. In other words, because Kant's noumena are rejected, then the Kantian plan of critical epistemology will in fact be an ontology. So the problem of the phenomenality of knowledge is eliminated to a certain extent. It is eliminated because the **Phenomenology** is a descriptive analysis of the progress of knowing consciousness to the realization that knowing and being are the same thing.

Hegel believes that he has avoided "epistemological indeterminacy" because the critique of reason is not done externally to reason in which case reason would have to apply itself to itself. Instead, reason contains its own "immanent critique" so that the application of reason leads itself to the truth about reason. For this reason "truth moves itself by its very nature" to the point where "Reason is the conscious certainty of being all reality" and where it knows this for certain to be true.
CHAPTER 10

DIALECTIC, DESCRIPTION AND MOTILITY

a. The Thesis of Immanent Criticism.

Throughout this examination of Hegel's Phenomenology it has been mentioned that a cornerstone of his system is that it contains a principle of self-movement and that it is self-verifying. The truth of this gives the rationale for the structure, content and method of the Phenomenology in general; it is necessary for his theory of truth to have meaning; and the entire enterprise of epistemological ontology rests upon it - as we have just seen. We must therefore enquire into the viability of this notion and see if it is a self-contained truth which is itself self-verifying or whether it presupposes something even more fundamental than itself.

Following a position similar to that of Alexandre Kojève, K. R. Dove has made the interesting suggestion that Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit "...was probably the first philosophical treatise whose method was radically and consistently non-dialectical".1 Later in his article Dove gives us an indication of the import which his statement has for an interpretation of the work. He says:

...Hegel's method is radically undialectical. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical, and Hegel's Phenomenology is a viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the extent that it merely describes this dialectical process.2
I interpret this to mean that, according to Dove, philosophy for Hegel was not properly served by the imposition of an external structure upon its content - such as, we will recall, the "lifeless schema" of Fichte and Schelling. The method which is appropriate to philosophy is purely descriptive, and this accords well with some of Hegel's own explicit statements regarding the way in which, at least with respect to the Phenomenology, philosophical knowledge is to be gained. In this work Hegel reiterates on several occasions his acceptance of the notion of the passive nature of philosophy. This he does, for example, in the Introduction, in the chapter entitled "Sense-Certainty" and again in the final chapter of the Phenomenology, "Absolute Knowledge" in which he expresses his agreement with the idea: "...knowledge" he says, "lies...in the seeming inactivity which merely watches how what is distinguished is in itself self-moved and returns again into its own unity".

According to this conception, philosophy is not properly a dialectical activity in which philosophers are engaged, but the content of true philosophy, that which philosophers philosophize about, is dialectical in nature. This is what I take Hegel to mean when he says the following:

...it is this self-construing method alone [sich selbst konstruierenden Wege allein] which enables philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. It is in this way that I have tried to expound consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

It is clear, then, that for Hegel, if the dialectic appears in the Phenomenology at all, it must be inherent in the content of description and not externally imposed through the act of describing. But description can be done at different levels of involvement. Dove and Kojève seem to want the description to be totally neutral and merely give the "facts" or "what
is the case. This content, these facts or states of affairs, will be self-explanatory (it is assumed) so that description, if absolutely neutral, will be, in virtue of the inherent nature of the content, a simultaneous explanation. In other words, passive description is to have as its end result conceptual comprehension.

The description, we are told, is to be passive and neutral. However, it cannot be only description for then it would be the description of an alien process occurring outside of the description. There must be some objective conditions which determine the description to some degree. It cannot be, e.g. my description but must be the description; otherwise the description would be dependent upon the describer and what the describer brings to the description. It would therefore only reflect the describer's standards for "true" description. But philosophy, the end product of the description in the Phenomenology, must be not only an objective science, but also a demonstrated science. Therefore the content must determine the description, and if the content displays a progressive development, or movement of any kind, then that must be inherent within the content itself and not a function of its being a described content. The content is, in other words, a self-construing content.

Given this conception of philosophy as passive, the dialectic of the content of such a philosophy must contain its own necessary progressive movement. The question naturally arises as to how this inherent motility can be accounted for if it is not put there by the needs of description itself. In other words, what is it which gives the dialectical content its motility; what provides the impetus for development in the "self-construing" method of philosophy? Metaphysical theories which involve a notion of development
or evolution or dynamism as a fundamental ontological fact generally include some basic ontological category to account for this inherent movement. A vitalistic theory will have something like "élan vital" and voluntarisms will assert a "will to power" or something of the sort. That there is a fundamental ontological movement in the Hegelian metaphysics is beyond question. Such common statements as "science can become an organic system only by the inherent life of the concept" and "truth moves itself by its very nature" and many more of similar sentiment leave no doubt that Hegel accepted the idea of a motive force in reality. Yet there seems to be no obvious principle or category which grounds this inherent motility. All we really seem to have is the bare assurance that there is an "inherent life" to the real. But, as Hegel reminds us many times and in many ways, "one barren assurance, however, is of just as much value as another".

What I would like to consider is whether on the basis of Dove's and Kojève's analysis there can be a possible ground for the inherent motility of the content of the Phenomenology.

When one asks the question what is the ontological ground for the inherent motility of the content of philosophical knowledge, the reply which one is likely to receive immediately is: it is the inherent dialectic, of course. This seems quite a good reply and it is tempting to let the matter rest there, particularly as there is strong evidence from Hegel's own writings (or assertions) to support this position. But this answer appears too easy. 'Dialectic' is a word with many uses in Hegel's philosophy and in some of them it tells us something significant whereas in others it seems to be no more than a name for the process or the dynamic element rather than a description or explanation of it. The concept of
dialectical movement - or simply, dialectic - does appear to give us some knowledge of the conditions for the movement (e.g. the internal contradictoriness of things, etc.). But it is necessary to distinguish between the necessary conditions for something and the sufficient conditions for that thing. The term 'dialectic' tends to gloss over this distinction and the appearance is that necessary conditions are sufficient conditions. This, however, would seem to be illicit unless it is demonstrated how the one becomes transformed into the other. These two basic uses of the word 'dialectic' ought to be kept distinct lest we bewitch ourselves into believing that the word explains something which it does not. What is wanted is to know why the movement takes place granted that the conditions for the movement are present.

Again, the answer might be given that Hegel's system is teleological in nature and it is this teleology that explains why the movement from one state to another takes place. But even if it is true that Hegel's system is teleological this merely tells us that if a movement takes place then it will be a progressive movement toward a specifiable end. Final causes may provide a reason for any change but there also have to be efficient causes which are contemporaneous with the event which will serve to ground it within the context of its occurrence. Consciousness in the Phenomenology may be seeking to achieve its goal, but what is it about consciousness which motivates it to go beyond any intermediate stage until its goal is achieved?

Oddly enough this question really only arises as an important question with respect to the Phenomenology. I say "oddly" because the term 'dialectic' is of infrequent occurrence in the Phenomenology itself and really only occurs as one of Hegel's frequent and primary concepts from the Science
of Logic on (although the Preface to the Phenomenology which was written some time after the main body of the text, shows more frequent use of the term than the main text itself; indicating Hegel's growing appreciation for the concept from even that early stage of his mature writings). Yet the dialectical movement in the Logic can be made acceptable as a fact if the Phenomenology first achieves its purpose, and this purpose can only be achieved if the dialectical development of its content is satisfactorily established.\(^\text{12}\)

b. Logic and Phenomenology.

This statement about the Logic needs further clarification. The Logic is a description of the a priori structures of thought. As such it does not show the evolution of thought but only the logical categories of thought and the logical connection of thought's conceptual apparatus. The "movement" of the Logic is described clearly and concisely by Collingwood in the following way:

Being in general is nothing in particular; so the concept of pure being passes over, as Hegel puts it, into the concept of nothing. This passage or logical transition from one concept to another is not a merely subjective or psychological transition of our thought from one concept to a different concept; it is an objective transition, a real process by which one concept evolves itself logically out of another which it presupposes. This is the idea of becoming, development or process, which in its primary or fundamental form is logical becoming.\(^\text{13}\)

Collingwood is quite right to point out that this transition from one logical concept to another is no "merely subjective or psychological transition of our thought" because Hegel is claiming universal validity for his logic - which he could not do if the necessity which it entails were a contingent fact of a contingent consciousness.\(^\text{14}\) Hegel's is more akin to a Kantian
transcendental analysis in that he is showing us what must be the structure of any being which thinks conceptually. There must be a logically least concept and this is the concept called 'being'. Being a logically least concept, however, it cannot be defined or described by the application of any attribute to it since that would, in the first place, be giving some determination to it by which it could be distinguished from other determinations (or lack of determinations). In the second place, it would be applying or using some category to describe it which means that the least category would be defined or grounded on other categories and it would thereby not be the least category. So this category of 'being' can only be defined negatively - it is the category of absolute negation of all determination. Absolute negation, however, is logically equivalent to the concept or category of 'nothing'. We find, however, that such a unity of being and nothing is the definition of becoming. The process of coming-to-be and passing-away, of being and not-being, is the pure Heraclitean flux of becoming.15

Now, just as the category of 'being' implied the category of 'nothing', so too did the unity of these two categories imply the third category of 'becoming'. In like manner is the rest of the development of the Logic and its categories supposed to follow dialectically.

The Logic shows the logical relations which obtain between the various logical categories, but any being which has the possibility of thinking conceptually must have the necessary conceptual apparatus shown by the Logic. If such a being has one of the concepts then it must have all of them. That is what Hegel means when he says that the content of the Logic "...is the exposition of God as He is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind". We must be careful not to make too much out of this "Vorstellung", but it is clear that Hegel means to suggest that the Logic demonstrates the structure which any conceptualizing mind must have and must have in its entirety. The categories or concepts of the Logic do not, in themselves, develop. The a priori structure of God's mind has not evolved but is His "eternal essence". What can evolve and does evolve in the case of human consciousness is the application of the logical structure of thought in the attempt to understand the world. Solomon suggests that Hegel thought that "a number of mutually exclusive alternative sets of concepts" could be employed by consciousness. This idea would tend to support, or at least be compatible with, the notion of an evolution of logical concepts; I would argue, however, that the "evolution" is a process of learning the limits of application of the various categories and the proper hierarchy of their relation. So rather than alternative sets of mutually exclusive concepts we will have merely the same basic set of concepts applied with different emphases. The absolute Idea represents that point at which all concepts have their proper emphasis, that is, where the object of knowledge and its conceptualization are totally adequate to one another.

We have noted that the dialectic does not necessitate that the thinking of one concept will lead to the thought of the next concept since that is a psychological fact which may hold true for some consciousnesses but not for others. For an absolute knowing, however, for a knowing which is valid in all respects and without limitation, the using or employing of any concept with which to think will necessitate the use of all the other possible concepts, and it can be shown how and why this is necessary. The logic of
the Logic is only possible for an absolute knowing. This is not because lesser stages of knowing use different sets of concepts, it is because only in absolute knowledge, contrary to any lesser kind of knowledge, is the relative application of the concepts adequate for true knowledge of the object. Therefore, any logic of less than absolute knowing would be incapable of demonstrating the necessary relation which any concept must have within the system of concepts. In other words, it could not be systematic. Demonstrating the necessity presupposes that "true knowledge" or "the Idea" is both the goal and the possibility of conceptual thought. This is demonstrated by the Phenomenology and that is why the Logic presupposes the Phenomenology as the first part of the System of Science. At the end of the Phenomenology certainty, truth and knowledge coincide and it is then that the logic of conceptual thought as a necessary system, as a pure science, is possible:

...in logic, the presupposition is that which has proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration - the Idea as pure knowledge. Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development. But in the said result, this Idea has determined itself to be the certainty which has become truth....

Besides preparing the way for the possibility of the Logic in this manner, the Phenomenology serves this function in two other important respects. First, it establishes thought and its content as ontologically grounded. Hegel begins with immediate certainty as consciousness - which implies the distinction between subject and object. This beginning point is analogous to beginning with 'being' in the Logic because at this point consciousness merely is and because it merely is it has no determinations in it such as thought, conceptual comprehension, desire, will, etc. Thought is developed out of the immediacy of consciousness and Hegel thereby avoids
the Cartesian problem of never being able to get beyond the identity of thought and being. The Logic must begin with thought as a derived fact and the Phenomenology supplies this derivation. 21

Finally, the Phenomenology is the temporal actualization of self-consciousness and as such it is the working out of the conceptual schemata which will relate Logic truthfully to the world. Once the Phenomenology is given then the Logic becomes essentially a transcendental deduction because knowing consciousness is an established given.

In order to accomplish these three tasks the Phenomenology must demonstrate not only the possibility of absolute Knowledge but also that it is necessary in the way shown in the Phenomenology. It must do this if it is to establish the ontological ground of thought. If the beginning were not logically necessary then the grounding of thought on that beginning would leave it ultimately contingent. It would not be "true" absolutely but only in reference to the starting point which, being merely assured, may as well be accepted as not.

Also, if the Logic is to be the true relation of thought to the world then the development of absolute Knowledge must be shown to be absolute. The forms of consciousness which go to make up absolute Knowledge must therefore be shown to be the only possible forms. This can be done only if the starting point is logically necessary and all transitions are likewise logically necessary. 22

If all of this is accepted then I conclude that the Logic can establish the dialectical movement of its content when the Phenomenology has accomplished its object - absolute Knowledge. This is true because the "movement" of the logical concepts is not a "movement" of the individual
concepts per se but is the movement of thought which thinks absolutely, i.e. with the full deployment of its logical categories. In general we may say, then, that the logical beginning point, the presupposition, for the Logic is the demonstrated conclusion of the Phenomenology.

The search for the motive force of the dialectic will therefore devolve upon an examination of the movement of consciousness through its ways of knowing up to the attainment of absolute Knowledge. This development is the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant called dialectic the giving to ignorance the semblance of truth. Hegel takes this one step further and holds that the dialectic is also the exposing of ignorance in what was thought to be truth. In the Phenomenology certainty appears as truth, and knowledge is, in part, the recognition that what was asserted to be truth was in fact only certainty - what was believed to be truth - and not truth per se.

Natural consciousness will prove itself to be only the concept of knowledge or not real knowledge. Since however, it immediately takes itself to be the real and genuine knowledge, this pathway has a negative significance for it; what is a realization of the concept of knowledge means for it rather the ruin and overthrow of itself; for on this road it loses its own truth.

Once this is recognized then that particular claim to truth must be abandoned and a new attitude toward reality taken up.

When once, on the other hand, the result is apprehended as it truly is, as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen; and in the negation the transition is made by which the progress through the complete succession of forms comes about of itself.
The Phenomenology is the process of tracing this experience of consciousness from truth to absolute truth and from certainty to knowledge.

c. Epistemological Self-destruction.

For Kant the only results which could be obtained when attempting to achieve such goals as truth and knowledge were illusions. Dialectical illusion was a necessary and inescapable result for Kant because he concluded that complete knowledge, complete rationality, could never be achieved. Knowledge, for Kant, must be foregone but this he believed to be neither unfortunate nor undesirable for he saw it as the necessary condition for practical activity. Thus he "...therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith".26 For Hegel, on the contrary, natural consciousness becomes elevated to truth by its own search for it. There is an end to the struggle, a goal to be reached - as we are told in his statement that the goal "...is that point where knowledge no longer has need to go out beyond itself, where it finds itself and where the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept".27 But upon what basis can he justify the assertion that consciousness is impelled toward the goal of absolute knowledge?

Clearly the compelling force must be either internal or external to consciousness. But Hegel rules out the suggestion that consciousness is under external compulsion to transcend itself. A living being which exists merely as a "natural life" must be forced into self-transcendence. The only form of self-transcendence available to non-thinking life is death. That is, "natural life" exists only immediately and it is therefore governed by "fate", i.e. powers external to the individual or the community. The
only existence for "natural life" is that of sensuous existence. If thought is to be ascribed to some forms of non-human life, as it seems it must, this power of thinking relates only to the existential relationship between the being and the nature from which its existence is derived.28 So the only transcendence possible for it is the transcendence of existence itself.

Man, however, is capable of rising above fate. Human or philosophical consciousness is a self-creating existence; it does not merely relate itself to an alien nature, but creates its object and hence itself through the process of knowing. In this process of self-creation there is, as we have seen, a goal, and it is the pursuit of this goal which forces consciousness to transcend itself - to seek a new level of knowledge in which it will attempt to find an end to its search:

The progress towards this goal consequently is without halt, and at no earlier stage is satisfaction to be found. That which is confined to a life of nature is unable of itself to go beyond its immediate existence; but by something other than itself it is forced beyond that; and to be thus wrenched out of its setting is its death. Consciousness, however, is for itself its own concept; thereby it immediately transcends what is limited, and since this latter belongs to it, consciousness transcends its own self...Consciousness, therefore, suffers this violence at its own hands; it destroys its own limited satisfaction. When feeling this violence, fear for the truth may well withdraw and struggle to preserve for itself that which is in danger of being lost. But it can find no rest.29

Whereas for non-human life it is its immediate relation to its object which defines what it is, for human consciousness the knowledge claim which it makes for itself is what defines what it is - what it claims as its truth defines its self-existence and that becomes the truth in which it finds its own being and its raison d'être. Therefore, the realization that this truth-for-consciousness is limited and must be transcended is the recognition of the necessity for its own destruction - which necessitates its own rebuilding
upon the foundation laid for it by the previous structure.\textsuperscript{30}

We may conclude then that the compulsion which forces consciousness on and on through repeated self-transcendence is not an external compulsion determining it from without, but is an internal compulsion - consciousness contains the seeds of its own destruction within its essence. But we do not yet know the source or rationale of this compulsion.

Epistemological self-destruction leads to self-transcendence. This sounds plausible as an explanation of how the movement from one stage of knowing to another takes place - how could one stay at the point of self-destruction? In fact, however, not only is there a problem of determining why the self-destruction takes place but also a problem as to why a reconstitution at a higher level is necessitated. The result of self-destruction might just as well be obliteration or reversion as progression. The magic word 'aufheben' assures us that the progress is made - but does no more than assure us, and, as we know, "one barren assurance is as good as another".

d. Transcendence of Belief.

If we consider the stages of the Phenomenology to be stages of belief which underlie knowing and hence condition knowledge, then, since belief implies an either implicit or explicit acceptance of the metaphysics underlying that knowledge which is grounded by the belief, there is no reason why the recognition of the untruth of one's knowledge should occur. Our beliefs condition what we accept as true and there is no internal criterion by which the destruction of that belief could be accepted as warranted. Such acceptance could only happen if there were an objective standard of truth against which truth claims (which result from certain beliefs or
metaphysical presuppositions) can be measured. But Hegel will accept no external criteria against which belief can be measured. Were there an external criterion the phenomenological examination would not be passive description but would depend upon what we choose as the standard of truth.

The essence or the criterion would lie in us; and that which was to be compared with this standard, and on which a decision was to be passed as a result of this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize that criterion.\(^{31}\)

In order to be consistent with the general program of the *Phenomenology* as passive description, the criterion can only be a criterion determined by the consciousness which is the object of the investigation. Thus, the truth correspondent to belief must somehow contain its own criterion of validity: "Thus in what consciousness inside itself declares to be the in-itself or truth we have the standard which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its knowledge".\(^{32}\)

But belief does validate itself since it determines its own criteria\(^{33}\). Belief is the certainty of the truth of the belief content (and whatever is validly inferred from that content), and belief is held fast as a valid truth claim because it is grounded by knowledge which, in virtue of belief, asserts the certainty of its truth. There is, therefore, a reciprocity of ground. The ground not only grounds but is in turn grounded by what it grounds. The immediate question is then: how does one get out of this circle of grounds? Hegel's answer is as follows:

Suppose we call knowledge the concept, and the essence or truth "being" or the object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the concept corresponds with the object. But if we call the essence or in-itself of the object the concept, and, on the other side, understand by object the concept *qua* object, i.e. the way the concept is
for an other, then the examination consists in our seeing whether the object corresponds to its own concept. In brief what this seems to say is that false belief will always show itself up to be false because that which it declares the world to be will, in some way, be discrepant with what the world declares itself to be. In other words, the conclusion is similar to that of Solomon who declares that "...there can be no adequate notion of truth that does not begin with recognition that it is the facts that make our beliefs true, even if we ultimately 'determine' [the facts]." This answer assumes that belief will always be weaker than the whole of experience; that the latter will always contradict the former if the former is not true belief. But can belief determine the facts to the extent that experience will be unable to reflect the objective conditions but will only be able to reflect what is determined by the belief itself? Hegel recognizes this possible objection and his attempted answer gives some indication of how changes in belief occur. Hegel expresses the recognition of the problem involved with the relation between the object of knowledge as object and the object of knowledge as a belief-determined object in the following way:

The object, it is true, appears only to be in such wise for consciousness as consciousness knows it. Consciousness does not seem able to get, so to say, behind it as it is, not for consciousness, but in itself, and consequently seems also unable to test knowledge by it.

This is a very tricky problem for Hegel as it would seem necessary to solve it in order to be able to distinguish mere belief from true belief, fact from fancy. Yet the attempt to develop a criterion based on a dis-
tinction between the object as object-for-consciousness and the object-as-it-is-in-itself is to risk raising the spectre once again of Kantian sceptical dualism. But this is the basis upon which Hegel tackles the problem. However he retains the object-as-it-is-in-itself, not as an unknowable thing-in-itself, but as an object of knowledge itself along with the object-for-consciousness. Both are contents of knowledge which consciousness is then able to compare to see if they fully correspond to each other.

...just because consciousness has, in general, knowledge of an object, there is already present the distinction that what the object is in itself, is one thing to consciousness, while knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present, the examination turns.38

Hegel cannot be making this distinction a distinction between the object as a phenomenal object and the object as a noumenal object, so he must be making it a distinction between the "believed" object and the "known" object. This distinction is somewhat suspect but it provides an explanation for the progression of knowledge.

Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. But in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself also, in point of fact, is altered; for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge. Hence consciousness comes in-itself, or that it was in-itself only for it. Since then, in the case of its object consciousness finds its knowledge not corresponding with this object, the object likewise fails to hold out; or the standard for examining is altered when that, whose criterion this standard was to be, does not hold its ground in the course of the examination; and the examination is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the criterion used in the process.39

This gives Hegel's basic explanation of how changes in beliefs occur.
I find it unsatisfactory as it stands since it requires, or seems to require, a distinction between phenomenal and noumenal without actually admitting it. There seems to be two phenomenal worlds which can be compared with each other, but one of these "phenomenal" worlds looks very much like a noumenal world except that it is not unknowable. A realist has no problem with belief in this respect as he has given to him an objective world which, by definition, is distinct absolutely from belief and against which belief can be measured. Hegel wants to have the objectivity of the realist without the dualistic or sceptical implications, but on the face of it it appears that he is doing so by a subterfuge. The only plausible explanation for this situation which seems to avoid such an unpleasant conclusion is suggested by Solomon (though not specifically as a solution to this problem). He distinguishes between (my) belief and "what is believed", or, what I say and what I am told.\(^{40}\) What I believe can be compared with what is believed generally within the community (world, epoch, Zeitgeist, or what-have-you). Thus we might say that my world is determined by our beliefs, but that my particular belief about the world is mine, i.e. it is the way in which I particularize the general belief. If I find that my belief is out of harmony with the general belief then I will have to change my belief to make it harmonize with "what is believed". But since "what is believed" is what we believe, if I change my belief it must follow that to that extent "what is believed" is changed.\(^{41}\) Taken far enough it is obvious that an attempt to make belief or knowledge correspond with its object will have just the effect which Hegel says it will have: the object itself will change and thereby the criterion of truth will have changed as well.\(^{42}\)
But of course the question we are seeking to answer is why does "consciousness seem bound to alter its knowledge in order to make it fit the object"? Are we told any more by this than Kojève's simple statement that "to become aware of a contradiction is necessarily to want to remove it"? Why is this the case? Are we given anything more than barren assurance? An objective discrepancy between belief and the world ("what is believed") may as well be put down to the insufficiency of the world - to "what is believed" - as to the insufficiency of my belief. In the traditional conflict between faith and reason there would seem to be no necessary reason why one could not as well remain in "learned ignorance" as in purely rational understanding. Kant was satisfied to deny knowledge and Kierkegaard certainly felt comfortable in remaining with belief while accepting an objective paradox as a necessary consequence of (indeed, as he explained it, as a necessary condition for) the truth of belief. Truth for him was subjectivity and it could not be destroyed by objectivity - no matter how paradoxical.

If there is to be a change in belief at the ontologically important level then at some point the change would have to occur at the level of "consciousness-in-general". There are two possibilities as to how this change can be motivated. First, it can be motivated within individual consciousnesses which in turn, since they comprise the general consciousness, effect a change in this latter. The second alternative is that the change comes "from the top down" so to speak. In other words, there is an inherent motivation to consciousness-in-general which effects the change and this change is reflected more or less contingently at the level of individual consciousness.
The second alternative requires a transcendentist reading since there must be something in consciousness-in-general which is not in individual consciousness. Thus Spirit, as conscious Spirit, would universalize individual spirits or consciousnesses not concretely, not immanently, but abstractly and transcendently. It would be very similar to Platonism in this case. The individual would be reduced to a merely imperfect reflection of the truly real and the distinction between reality (Realität) and actuality (Wirklichkeit) would be a qualitative distinction incapable of being overcome. Individual consciousnesses would only be some kind of epiphenomena of Spirit and the Phenomenology would be an attempt to understand Spirit by reading its manifestation; it would, in other words, be not unlike the attempt to determine or "read" character and personality traits and capacities by examining their "manifestation" as cranial bumps. But Hegel disposed of this kind of "rational observation" at some length in the Phenomenology.

The first alternative seems the more promising and would especially seem so to those who wish to give Hegel as much of an immanentist reading as possible. It would seem from what has already been said that motivation at the individual level would be too dependent upon individual contingencies which are beyond the reach of strict necessity - is there anything self-contradictory about a world of Kantians or Kierkegaardians? We will have to see, however, if there is anything which will determine the individual into self-transcendence.

What is needed is some factor in individual consciousness which will determine it to action once its objective epistemological position becomes untenable. It may be instructive to look at a parallel situation encoun-
tered by another philosopher to see if there are any suggestive clues.

e. John Locke and Satisfaction.

In a similar way, but certainly in a different context, John Locke found that he had to explain why the will puts the mind into activity. Of course the notion of will, like that of the dialectic, contains within it the notion of an auto-motive capacity. But what is thereby explained is only the kind of auto-movement it is - volitional in the case of Locke's will; inherent self-destruction in the case of Hegel's dialectic. For Locke something more is needed to set the will into motion and for Hegel something more is needed to ensure that belief will not only self-destroy but will also self-reconstruct.

Locke observed that the will was always put into motion in conjunction with some desire - we will not will something until we desire it. But this was not the final answer. Locke thought that in desiring something the mind was thereby made "uneasy". It is this uneasiness which determined the mind to will the object of its desire. He says the following:

The motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness' sake we will call determining of the will....

Locke was able to tie the notion of uneasiness to that of desire quite readily because, although he was investigating the universal structure of human understanding, his investigation proceeded upon the lines of a "physiology" of the individual mind. In other words, he was concerned to determine how a particular mind was put upon action and the relation this
question had to the will and desires of the same individual. Thus he could easily say: "this uneasiness we may call, as it is, desire; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good" which seems to be equating uneasiness with desire. Of course if they are the same thing then Locke has made a distinction which is no distinction and the concept of uneasiness would play no role that desire did not play. But in fact the concept of uneasiness does have a special function and therefore what he must be saying is not that the two are the same but that they are necessarily connected. In so far as we have a desire for something, then in like proportion do we experience an uneasiness in the mind, and it is this uneasiness which sets the mind to activity (through the will of course). The distinction is necessary because observation "...plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon". If desire were the same as uneasiness then desire would be that which sets the will in motion. But desire is always desire for some relatively specific thing and it would be inexplicable how what we will could be at odds with what we desire. 'Uneasiness', then, is the link, the mediating factor, between desire and will for Locke.

If the individual consciousness is necessarily going to transcend itself then Hegel needs a device similar to uneasiness in order to account for both the changes in belief and the progression of knowledge. Without it such change would be as gratuitous and irrational as the mysterious change of autonomous paradigms in Kuhn's philosophy of the history of science. There is a clue that Hegel might entertain some implicit notion parallel to the notion of uneasiness in Locke. Such a conception would be
a psychological correlate to the concept of dialectic; that is, it would be the dialectic as manifested in the individual. This is the notion of 'satisfaction' (Befriedigung) which appears occasionally in the works. We have already encountered it once when citing Hegel's statement that

the progress towards this goal consequently is without halt, and at no earlier stage is satisfaction to be found...Consciousness, therefore, suffers this violence at its own hands; it destroys its own limited satisfaction.52

At times this notion of satisfaction plays a surprisingly similar role to the notion of uneasiness in Locke. In his discussion of "Psychology" in the Philosophy of Mind Hegel tells us that, although the satisfaction of one need leads to the reemergence of that need and the consequent reemergence of the activity leading to its satisfaction (as sating one's hunger merely prepares the way to become hungry again - leading once more to eating in order to attain another satisfaction),53 the end result of the many and various particular attempts by the individual to gain satisfaction is seen to have the goal of happiness. Thus Locke's recognition of this is reiterated by Hegel. Locke says that "...the present uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to attain to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions"54 which is very similar to Hegel's observation that "...the truth of the particular satisfactions is the universal, which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim."55

This notion of satisfaction has not generally been given much importance in studies about Hegel even though it is a fairly common word in use in descriptions of the dialectic of consciousness.56 If, as many would have
it, the Phenomenology is about the progress of individual consciousnesses or a description of how the individual consciousness recapitulates the development of conscious Spirit, then the dialectic would need to be brought down to the level of the content which is described, i.e. individual consciousness. Satisfaction, being a psychological correlate of the wider and profounder notion of dialectic, would seem to be an ideal concept to use for this purpose. Yet it seems peculiarly neglected.

With respect to studies of Hegel the only significant treatment of the notion of satisfaction per se is that of Solomon. He recognized the importance of satisfaction as a criterion of truth for Hegel. His interpretation is shown in this statement:

The truth of an endeavor is what will satisfy its goals or purposes; an endeavor is true when its goals or purposes are satisfied. The truth of science is knowledge, or conclusively rational belief; the truth of ethics is morality or right action; the truth of art is beauty; the truth of religion is God, and the truth of philosophy is the truth about truth.

This is a remarkably odd notion of truth altogether and may represent the logical conclusion to be drawn from taking the notion of satisfaction as the criterion of truth while at the same time seeking the arbiter of truth at the level of individual consciousness. Be that as it may, Solomon apparently does not see the notion of satisfaction as something particularly inherent within Hegel at any rate. He finds it necessary instead to import the notion into Hegel's theory. In order to develop his theory of truth Solomon used Tarski's notion of satisfaction, as found in his semantic conception of truth, and reinterpreted Hegel in light of that notion.

From Tarski, let us borrow the technical notion of "satisfaction", but expand it considerably beyond the limited context "satisfaction
Solomon's analysis is an interesting attempt to examine the notion of criteria in theories of truth but it does not take us very far with the question of the role of satisfaction in the dialectical movement in the Phenomenology. Though essentially agreeing with him that "ultimately, Truth is self-satisfaction, the optimal satisfaction of the categories which we have imposed upon our world", this is merely agreement about the goal of philosophy, i.e. knowledge which is both certain and true, and the criteria for ascertaining the attainment of this knowledge, i.e. satisfaction. In fact what "satisfaction" tells us is that the dialectic, the need to go further, no longer exists. But either an external standard or an internal motive power is still needed to ensure that satisfaction guarantees truth.

f. Desire.

So satisfaction per se cannot provide us with all that we are looking for. But satisfaction is always satisfaction of something - satisfaction of a desire - and perhaps it is this notion of desire for satisfaction which is wanted. There is ample indication in Hegel's writings that this may be the case; as an example:

As regards the sober nature of the word at issue - thought - we can tell from everyday experience that if we fast we feel hunger either at once or very soon. But sober thought always has the fortunate power of not resulting in hunger and desire, but of being and remaining as it is, content. Hence the thought expressed in such an utterance reveals the fact that it is dead understanding; for it is only death which fasts and yet rests satisfied. But neither physical life nor intellectual remains content with mere abstention; as desire it presses on through hunger and through thirst towards Truth, towards
knowledge itself. It press on to satisfy this desire and does not allow itself to feast and find sufficiency in a reflection such as this.63

This use of desire is parallel with Locke's. In both it is the instigator of action, or it at least provides the occasion for the action. Kojève is perhaps the greatest exponent of making desire the fundamental driving force within the Hegelian metaphysics. At one point he says, concerning man, "desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action"64 which is very Lockeian indeed. But generally he is not taking a Lockean line of tying desire with some other state of mental uneasiness or whatever. For Kojève desire as such is what forces men on to self-transcendence and he in effect agrees with Rosen who says: "In the tradition of such modern philosophers as Machiavelli and Hobbes, [Hegel] recognizes desire as the "engine" of world-history...."65 But are individual desires the force which drives consciousness (in general) on from mere consciousness to absolute knowledge?66

Kojève certainly believed that the answer to this question is "yes". But in order to use this conception of desire as the "engine of history" he interpreted the Phenomenology as a whole in terms of the Hegelian notion of the progressive development of world history. In particular he based his interpretation on the phenomenological analysis of desire in the section of the Phenomenology entitled "Self-Consciousness". There is no doubt that at the stage of "Self-Consciousness" the movement of consciousness is prompted by desire. And since desire is an established fact of consciousness at this point one could make a good case for desire propelling consciousness throughout the rest of the movement traced by the Phenomenology. Kojève tells us that satisfaction is the key to history67 and the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History certainly support this idea. We
find there that it is the desires of individuals - of world-historical individuals - and their compelling need to find satisfaction which drives human history.

The state of the world is not yet fully known, and the aim is to give it reality. This is the object of world-historical individuals, and it is through its attainment that they find satisfaction. They can discern the weakness of what still appears to exist in the present, although it possesses only a semblance of reality. The spirit's inward development has outgrown the world it inhabits, and it is about to progress beyond it. Its self-consciousness no longer finds satisfaction in the present, although it possesses only a semblance of reality. The spirit's inward development has outgrown the world it inhabits, and it is about to progress beyond it. Its self-consciousness no longer finds satisfaction in the present, although it possesses only a semblance of reality. The spirit's inward development has outgrown the world it inhabits, and it is about to progress beyond it.

This exciting view of history forms the background for Kojève's analysis of desire. Hegel calls this spiritual necessity underlying and directing individual desires toward the fulfillment of a higher purpose the "cunning of reason". But then it would seem to be the cunning of reason that is the motive force behind human action and history and not the individual desires which are reason's "tools".

Hegel does say at one point that the Phenomenology is "partly historical in character [...] in dieser zum Teil erzählenden Exposition..." and in so far as it is it does perhaps involve this notion of historical satisfaction which Kojève sees as so important. But the Phenomenology begins
with Consciousness per se and this conception of pure consciousness excludes any notion of desire or will or any other kind of "psychological" factor from it. Desire arises when consciousness has already gone through a dialectical process of development. Desire, therefore, cannot explain this original movement since it is demonstrated that desire is a later manifestation of consciousness. Kojève makes his interpretation of the whole of the Phenomenology in terms of the desire and the dialectic of Self-Consciousness work only because he is willing to accept that the Phenomenology must be founded upon certain premises which make it possible - and those premises include the notion of desire. Therefore, desire can naturally be taken as a valid inference from the deductions of the phenomenological content. Kojève's "four premises" are given as follows:

Generally speaking, by accepting the four premises mentioned above, namely: (1) the existence of the revelation of given Being by Speech, (2) the existence of a Desire engendering an Action that negates, transforms, given Being, (3) the existence of several Desires, which can desire one another mutually, and (4) the existence of a possibility of difference between the Desires of (future) Masters and the Desires of (future) Slaves....

Kojève's analysis explains the movement of the Phenomenology but it does so by reading the earlier section of "Consciousness" in terms of the later section of "Self-Consciousness". But this works only if one is willing to accept that the logic of the Phenomenology is purely a function of the purposes of description and not a logic which is essentially part of the content. The result, however, would be that the description is thereby not neutral to the content. A logic of description is merely what is necessitated in order to show that e.g. an ordering of the content can display a certain structure. Some mountain climbers may wish to know the relative
order of heights of mountains within a given mountain range. What they are interested in is the order from smallest to highest without regard to their spatial order, or their order of formation, or order of climbing difficulty, or anything else. Given their aims, there is only one way in which the ordering can be given and, in order to produce the desired structure, the place occupied by any mountain within the hierarchy is logically necessitated. If one is willing to accept the conclusion that the Phenomenology is a similar sort of production then one can assume that Kojève's analysis is a reasonable one. If Hegel's purpose was to show the logical order from barest consciousness to fullest consciousness then it is not inconsistent to try to show that such things as thought and desire belong to "Consciousness" as well as "Self-Consciousness". And indeed Kojève's first premise may be necessary to make sense of the first chapter of the Phenomenology since Hegel on the one hand says that "...the I here does not think..." and one the other hand tests the truth of Sense-Certainty using language as the standard - and language surely implies thought.

If we accept such a conclusion as suggested by Kojève then it will be obvious that the Phenomenology cannot be the passive description which he and Dove claim for it since the logic of the Phenomenology is, by definition, necessitated by the purposes of the description and not by the content. Furthermore, the necessity of the ordering could not be displayed. The dialectic of the Phenomenology would describe only the break-down of each stage but not its overcoming by the next stage. That is, the dialectic would demonstrate that stoicism necessarily breaks down and must be overcome, but it cannot show the new form of consciousness which is to arise out of it. It can merely show that some new form will necessarily
arise. What actually does arise is purely contingent and not dialectically necessitated at all. That Scepticism follows Stoicism is purely a function of the ordering required for the purposes of the phenomenological description. This is the position which Findlay would apparently agree with when he says:

It would have been better, and more in agreement with his own central ideas, had Hegel recognized an indefinite plurality of such routes, and had he looked on his own Phenomenology as being (what it actually is) a single paradigmatic instance.75

This conclusion of Findlay's, however, in effect destroys the rationality of the Phenomenology and leaves it an impotent description which cannot do any of the tasks which Hegel assigns to it. It is, I think, impossible to defend the Phenomenology absolutely as having succeeded in achieving Hegel's purposes for it. But I do think that it can be given a stronger basis than Findlay's which reduces it to a merely "illuminating treatment" of the subject matter.76

g. Presupposing Rationality.

In order to salvage the Phenomenology as a work important to the entire system of science; in order for it to prepare the way for the Science of Logic, it is necessary that the content of the work displays the necessity of the conclusion. In order to do this it is necessary to reject Findlay's assertion regarding the outcome of the Phenomenology. The content of the Phenomenology must be absolutely rational, i.e. it must show that the conclusion is the only possible conclusion given the starting point. In order to make this claim plausible the dialectic must be not only a negative dialectic showing the self-destruction of consciousness, it must also be
a positive dialectic showing the necessary reconstruction of consciousness as necessarily proceeding in the way it does. In order to do this it is necessary to reject also the thesis of Dove and Kojève that the Phenomenology represents a purely passive description of a dialectical content. It will in turn be necessary to accept what we have seen implied in Kojève's analysis, i.e. that the necessity of the content of the Phenomenology is a function of the purpose which it serves. As will be shown, this reconstitutes the notion of desire as per Kojève, but it also reconstitutes it at a different level within the Phenomenology. The position which must be taken is the one taken by Loewenberg and described by him in the following manner:

Hegel's statement touching on the dialectic of experience is indeed without warrant if the dialectic is what in the introduction he says it is. The only experience that can be experienced as dialectical is the experience of the investigator. He it is who in examining the appearances of persuasion must broach them in alternate ways. The consciousness wedded to specious truth-claims can obviously not qualify as dialectical, unaware as it is of the speciousness detectable only by 'us', a supervenient one, supervening, that is, upon a singular mode of experimentation, that embodied in the impersonation of types of consciousness ignorant of the inherent fallaciousness, and only in this kind of experience is the power of negativity triumphant, scepticism becoming the road to truth and comedy the vehicle of reason. Nothing is here so important as the distinction between the consciousness of the experimenter and the consciousness experimented with, the latter being completely unconscious of cutting a comic figure in the eyes of the former. Only the experimenter has the awareness that his 'subject' is self-deceived and that self-deception is both inevitable and sublatable. And if none but an experience enjoying such awareness may be called dialectical, it is an experience clearly reserved for the 'subject' conducting the experiment and not for the 'subject' submitted to it.77

The picture of the Phenomenology which has emerged is one of dialectical necessity relative to the purpose for which that necessity needs to be demonstrated. Once we have come this far we must then resolve the prob-
lem of the relation between the describer (the "we" as Dove calls it) and the described. There are three possible ways in which this relation might be conceived.

(1) The describer is an absolute consciousness who, like Spirit itself, only needs to recollect the forms of experience through which it has developed its being. This in turn has two possible alternatives.

(a) Either Hegel has reached the absolute and "we" have not; or,
(b) "We" have all reached it.

In the case of (1 a) we might well ask how the less than absolute consciousness is supposed to understand or even recognize the absolute truth of consciousness which is given in the Phenomenology. As we saw in the analysis of belief and in Loewenberg's statement that "only the experimenter has the awareness that his 'subject' is self-deceived and that self-deception is both inevitable and sublatable", consciousness believes itself to be in truth. So how could it recognize the Phenomenology as the truth about truth unless it were already at that level?

This, however, brings us to (1 b). If "we" are already at the end - have attained absolute knowledge - then is not the Phenomenology superfluous? Would it not then be reduced to, at best, a mere justification of what is, or, perhaps, to some kind of apologetics?

(2) We may consider the "we" who are describing the process as somehow transcendent yet not absolute - "'we' look down" on the process.

Then, however, there would be no way in which Hegel can establish the completeness of his system since he must include the knower as well as the known within it. Were this the case then Findlay would be quite right that the Phenomenology gives merely an "illuminating treatment" of its content.
Clearly this will not do at all for Hegel and it will not do at all as the basis upon which to found the Logic.

(3) "We" may be considered to be consciousness similar to that being described.

But then we could not do what we are charged to do by Dove and Kojève since our description could not be passive and uninvolved but must be subject to dialectical pressures like that of the object-consciousness [unless, of course, "we" have gotten beyond dialectic by having already achieved absolute knowledge - in which case we are back to alternative (1 b)].

In my opinion none of these alternatives is satisfactory. We seem to have arrived at a contradiction which arises from an attempt to maintain two inconsistent theses: that the Phenomenology is passive description on the one hand, and that the content of the description contains its own motive force on the other. If the describer is truly passive and only describes the real, then, if the real is "dialectical" or contains inherent motility and interaction between subject and object, the describer himself must not be part of the reality which he is describing. He must somehow and in some way transcend the reality which is the subject of descriptive philosophy (phenomenology). If, on the other hand, the describer is part of the process, then he cannot simply passively describe it. The only way out of this contradiction is to reject the notion of the Phenomenology as passive neutral description. In the final analysis description must also be interpretation. We cannot keep our "...mere apprehension free from conceptual comprehension" as Hegel asks us to do for the mere reason that the world does not explain itself. This is underlined by the fact that the truth of the forms of consciousness are knowable only to an absolute
knowing because only an absolute knowing can understand their truth, i.e. can see their place in the whole. So Hegel's presupposition or "premise" must be that completely rational knowledge is possible and the necessity of the dialectical movement of the Phenomenology is a function of the purpose - which is to demonstrate its possibility. The Phenomenology is, then, an attempt to demonstrate that all of our knowledge, all possible ways of relating ourselves as knowers to the object of our knowledge, expresses a series of relations which are logically necessary in order to establish the systematic nature (completeness) of absolute Knowledge (philosophy).

The motive power of the dialectic of the Phenomenology is, then, similar to that of the Logic. What is dialectical is the content in the process of description. Consciousness is not itself dialectical but the truth of consciousness is dialectical given that complete rationality is the goal of the description of this truth. What the Phenomenology is able to demonstrate, then, is that any claim to knowledge [less than the claim made by absolute (totally rational) knowledge] will show itself to be untenable on rational grounds, i.e. it would be irrational to remain at the position. So self-destruction is followed by self-transcendence because both are necessary in order to achieve rational knowledge. The Phenomenology is still descriptive as Dove and Kojève would have it, but the description is not purely neutral to the content. It is the purpose of the description itself which provides the standard against which truth is to be measured - the standard of rationality - and dialectical movement is necessary with regard to that goal. The motive force of the dialectic comes, then, from desire, but it is Hegel's or our desire to demonstrate the possibility,
the actuality, and the necessity of rational knowledge.

In summary we may say this about the search for the motive force behind the dialectic of the Phenomenology. The assumption that the Phenomenology is passive description of the dialectic of consciousness cannot account for the movement of consciousness being necessary - which it must do. Kojève's analysis in terms of desire will not work without making certain assumptions which Hegel did not and would not make. The conclusion is that the movement of the Phenomenology cannot be determined at the level of individual consciousness. Neither can it be determined "from the top down" unless it is assumed that consciousness-in-general somehow transcends and makes possible individual consciousness. However, the Phenomenology is a description of individual consciousnesses and the universal or general consciousness (Spirit) is the developed truth of the various "instantiations" of the general consciousness.

The ultimate conclusion is that the Phenomenology is similar to the Logic. The former presupposes rationality is possible, the Logic presupposes that if rationality is possible, then absolutely rational knowledge is actual - in other words, that the rational is actual. Only under this interpretation can the necessary logic of consciousness be shown. Like the Logic, any standpoint less than absolute will be unable to account for its necessity. The dialectical movement is the result of an external standard - the possibility of absolute rationality. But the external standard is not an arbitrary one or one given without grounds for accepting it. This means that the notion of description is not what is claimed by Dove and Kojève. The Phenomenology is not a description of the dialectic of consciousness, but is a description of the dialectic of the knowledge or
truth of consciousness - as judged in accordance with an accepted standard of what constitutes true knowledge. This is only possible because it is assumed that complete rationality is possible and actual.

Of course the Phenomenology also attempts to demonstrate the rationality of the System and thereby demonstrate that it is the System of Science. So Hegel both presupposes rationality and attempts to demonstrate rationality - which means that he is only proving what is already assumed. The compelling nature of the Hegelian System is, I believe, a result of the failure to recognize this fact. Since the presupposition of rationality can only be ascertained through careful analysis of the implications of the System, this presupposition may easily be accepted unwittingly (as it probably was by Hegel himself). One may only conclude, therefore, that Hegel did not establish the presuppositionless System that he thought he had. Therefore, in at least this respect, the Hegelian System does not in fact present us with ultimate philosophy; it does not give us absolute knowledge.

The nature of this rational presupposition, and the nature of Hegelian rationalism in general (which is intrinsically interesting regardless of its ultimate success in his theory), must next be considered in order to complete our picture of the nature and meaning of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
a. The Syllogism as the form of the real.

We have discovered through the course of our examination of the Phenomenology that Reason is what is the real according to Hegel's theory. It is because this is true that he is able to establish that knowledge is knowledge of what is ontologically real; that epistemology is also ontology. This notion that Reason constitutes the essence of both the subject and the object and that this thorough-going rationality is presupposed in the System of philosophy created by Hegel has by now been well established. It will not now be necessary to recapitulate the basis of this conclusion in its entirety. It will, however, be worthwhile to look briefly at this doctrine as it is expressed in terms of the syllogism as the form of the real and then to examine in what way Hegel's rationalism differs from other forms of rationalism.

First, then, I would like to say something in general about Hegel's rationalism and what is implied by it. In order to do this I will make two points after which I will discuss the second first since it concerns the
matter at hand. The first point is a much bigger and more fundamental one which I will discuss secondly and in greater detail.

We may say that the means whereby the mediation of subject and object (or mind and nature or thought and being) is to take place is through Reason and is therefore through a form of rationalism. It is, however, a rationalism of a rather special sort since it asserts the metaphysically real to be Reason itself which is fully expressed when it is self-conscious and is thereby Spirit. For this reason I have called Hegel's position "metaphysical Rationalism" in order to distinguish it eventually from epistemological rationalism. In the context of the Phenomenology I mean basically two things by the term 'Rationalism'.

First, I mean to say that there must be no lacunae in the development from immediate, certain knowledge to absolute Knowledge. Certainty must become truth and it must be seen to become truth. What this in effect says is that there is nothing which is not knowable (i.e. everything is knowable). In this sense rationalism is a position the direct opposite of scepticism. Generally, sceptics see the position which opposes theirs to be dogmatism, as Hegel notes when he says "dogmatism may be most simply described as the contrary of scepticism". But for the metaphysical Rationalist like Hegel, scepticism must be considered to be the opposing position and dogmatism to be a form of scepticism. The metaphysical Rationalist claims the possibility of knowing anything which is because anything which is is ex hypothesi rational. The sceptic explicitly denies that such knowledge (or any knowledge) is possible; the dogmatist makes this denial implicitly. Dogmatism is a position which, as Hegel says, "...consists in the tenacity which draws a hard and fast line between certain terms and others opposite to them. We
may see this clearly in the strict 'Either-Or'\textsuperscript{3}. In other words, the dogmatist claims to have knowledge by proclaiming that anything outside the realm of his metaphysic is either unknowable or does not exist. In the first case he is obviously sceptical (with regard to some knowledge); in the second case he is what might be called a "hidden" sceptic.\textsuperscript{4}

Those who accepted the critical philosophy of Kant in its general spirit rejected, at least in intention, dogmatism, the method of what Hegel called the "old metaphysics". Post-critical metaphysics had to be critical, but it need not be sceptical. That is, it had to concern itself with the examination of the nature and limits of knowledge but it need not conclude, as indeed Hegel did not conclude, that the examination necessarily showed finite limitations to knowledge.\textsuperscript{5}

For the metaphysical Rationalist, what is, is knowable. This was the natural result of the rejection of the thing-in-itself of the Kantian philosophy. So long as there was this limiting concept it was possible to have a criterion for the validating of reason in its attempted constitutive use. But, as has been seen, Hegel rejected both the distinction between the understanding and reason in its Kantian form and the notion of the thing-in-itself. The result was that the categories became applied by Reason through the Ideas of Reason and, at the same time, there was no external standard by which the application of Reason to experience could be certified as legitimate. Reason must therefore validate itself. The standard of truth is the degree of adequacy by which Rational thought grasps the Rational object. The Science of the experience of consciousness was just to be the demonstration of how this coherence was to be made explicit.

Second, I mean to say that whatever is, is also that which is knowable,
and that which is knowable is also that which is. This is to say, in other words, that what is, is rational, and what is rational, is. Again, the same thing might be said by the phrase: "Reason is in the world". Traditionally logic is the science of reasoning, but Hegel believes his logic to contain, not just truth concerning discursive reasoning, but important truths of speculative philosophy. Reason is not just characteristic of a way of thinking; it is also, according to Hegel, characteristic of the developmental process of the world itself.

This perhaps sounds strange - in the same way that it sounds strange for Hegel to say that contradiction is in the world. Just as we normally think of contradiction to be a characteristic of propositions and not a characteristic of things, so too do we think of Reason as a process of thought or cognition of some kind and not a process of things or in things. Hegel's assertion that "everything is a contradiction" is an odd and confusing way of saying that Reason operates dialectically in the world. Likewise, the expression "everything is a Syllogism" is his unique way of saying that Reason is in the world and that it is the process of mediation. The abstractive activity of the understanding, as we have seen Hegel to believe, breaks the world into constituent elements which are made to stand alone. Reason, however, unifies what has been separated and opposed. The syllogism of traditional Aristotelian logic was thought by Hegel to express this unity-in-difference in a truly "speculative" way. The syllogism brought together two terms through the mediation of a third - and this expressed precisely Hegel's conception of philosophical truth. Every syllogism, then, expresses the form of reality and philosophical truth is to be discovered when this rational form is applied to the content of speculative
philosophy itself.

The Syllogism is the form of Reason in its reality, and until the absolute form is achieved (the Rational Syllogism complete), the rational syllogistic conclusion will not be a deduction which perfectly synthesizes the first and second terms - or, in other words, the middle term will not in fact be a true middle term, i.e. it will not perform a complete mediation. The final three forms of the Syllogism show the essentiality of the two extreme sides. Their mutual essentiality is demonstrated in the final form of the Syllogism. In the last section of the Encyclopedia we find the following characterization of the third form of the Rational Syllogism:

The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing Reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances characterizes both as its manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: - it is the nature of the fact, the Concept, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The external Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Spirit.8

Here the distinction between Mind and Nature is shown to be mediated through the self-knowing Reason. This might suggest that self-knowing Reason is something distinct from the two extremes which it unifies - Mind and Nature. But that this is not so is demonstrated if we look at what Hegel is talking about when he speaks of the Syllogism in this context.

The final three sections of the Encyclopedia (the last of which has just been cited) offer a description of the three moments of the Rational Syllogism and this is repeated in somewhat more concise form in the Logic
section of the Encyclopedia where Hegel says the following:

In their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare that everything rational is manifested as a triple syllogism: that is to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the extremes, as well as the mean which reconciles them. Such, for example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy; the Logical Idea, Nature, and Mind. As we first see them, Nature is the middle term which links the others together. Nature, the totality immediately before us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind. But mind is Mind only when it is mediated through Nature. Then, in the second place, Mind, which we know as the principle of individuality, or as the actualizing principle, is the mean; and Nature and the Logical Idea are the extremes. It is Mind which cognizes the Logical Idea in Nature and which thus raises Nature to its essence. In the third place again the Logical Idea itself becomes the mean: it is the absolute substance both of mind and of nature, the universal and all pervading principle. These are the members of the Absolute Syllogism.

We might want to say then that the objective world puts itself forward analogously to a syllogism and that in saying this Hegel is putting forth a theory of radical mediation. A syllogism is the rational conceptualization of the process of mediation; it is the process of relating two terms by means of a third. Because a thing only is what it is in virtue of the relations it has to other things - to what it is not - then it is a fact that a thing is what it is only because it is mediated through its other. In its immediacy it is not determinable as anything. Any determination is negation and negation is the relating of something to itself through that which it is not; self-identity presupposes non-identity. The process of bringing the elements of negation back to unity is dialectic, and both together, or negation dialectically comprehended, is mediation.

On the other hand, it may well be that Hegel means more than that nature is syllogistic by analogy. What we call a syllogism is the process of perceiving and making explicit the truth of mediation which is objectively
real. When we recognize this subjectivity then subject and object are approaching correlation. Reason is actual both in thought and in the world because that which is the object of veridical thought is the rational process itself by which the world unfolds itself to the inwardizing process of thought. In one of the Zusätze found in Hegel's discussion of Psychology in the Philosophy of Mind we find this expression of this idea:

In this thinking, which is identical with its object, intelligence reaches its consummation, its goal; for now it is in fact that which in its immediacy it was only supposed to be, self-knowing truth, self-cognizing Reason. Knowing now constitutes the subjectivity of Reason, and objective Reason is posited as a Knowing. This reciprocal interpenetration of thinking subjectivity and objective Reason is the final result of the development of theoretical mind through the stages, antecedent to pure thinking, of intuition and mental representation.  

So the Syllogism is the universal form of thought and things because "...the Syllogism represents the orbit of intermeditation of its elements, by which it realizes its unity", 11 or again, "the Syllogistic form is a universal form of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, which couples together the universal and the singular". 12

As we may have learned to expect, the Syllogism itself, as the universal form of Reason, must have its stages of immediacy and mediation because Hegel's is a philosophy of radical mediation. Thus,

In the 'immediate' Syllogism the several aspects of the Concept confront one another abstractly, and stand in an external relation only ...this Syllogism is consequently the Rational as conceptless - the formal Syllogism of Understanding. 13

This "immediate" Syllogism has still not grasped the mutual relation of the elements in their internal necessity. That is to say, it has not grasped Reason itself. In the ultimate Syllogism the unity of consciousness is made
explicit; knowledge is seen to be self-knowledge and Reason is objective.

This is what Hegel calls the Rational Syllogism:

In the Rational Syllogism, on the contrary, the subject is by means of the mediation coupled with itself. In this manner it first comes to be a Subject; or, in the subject we have the first germ of the Rational Syllogism. \(^{14}\)

Since Reason is in the world and Reason is the form of thought, then subject and object are not different. And to say that the world is Reason is to say that it is knowable and from that it follows that knowledge is of the world - of concrete Reason:

The Rational exists, i.e. it is an existent for consciousness, or this last experiences it; it must be seen and heard, it must be there or have been there as a phenomenon of the world. \(^{15}\)

What is, therefore, is the object of knowledge and a complete exposition of knowledge is necessarily also a complete exposition of what is. This is what the Phenomenology sets out to demonstrate and it is therefore an epistemological ontology grounded upon a metaphysical Rationalism. This demonstration depends upon the truth of two statements:

What is Rational is Actual (real);

What is Actual (real) is Rational.

The exposition of these statements brings us back to the consideration of the first point made here and to this we must now return.

b. Reason and Experience.

The foundation of Hegel's philosophy is his rationalism. The tortuous dialectical turnings which formalize the metaphysical structure of his sy-
stem are held together by the basic rationalism which underlies it and gives it meaning. For German philosophers, especially up to the later 19th Century, rationalism was not anathema as it is for most present day, English-speaking philosophers. Clearly much of the abuse that Hegelian philosophy - and other metaphysical systems as well - has had heaped upon it has been an attack upon rationalism in general. In the contest between rationalism and empiricism the latter has clearly emerged on top at the present time. So the attacks against rationalism have been generally accepted as decisive.

If we are to understand the Hegelian system and the role which Reason plays in it, it will not be sufficient to show merely the role of Reason and Rationalism in Hegel's thought, we must also try to clarify what Rationalism is in the Hegelian philosophy. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to analyze the various forms in which rationalism and empiricism may be manifest. Then we can perhaps know what is meant when Hegel is called a rationalist and perhaps we can tell, to a certain extent, what the cash value of that claim is.

One of the difficulties that has been present in many discussions on the subject of rationalism and empiricism is that the position criticized is very often taken to be only one position - usually the extreme one - whereas in fact both rationalism and empiricism are multi-faceted. Criticism which is directed toward one of the facets may be deemed successful, but it is often the case that such a criticism is also deemed successful against the entire enterprise as such and not just one facet or one particular manifestation of it.

Suppose that position R contains the factors s,t,u,v and that position E contains the factors f,g,h,i. Now if E (f,g,h,i) is the basic position
which is set off in attacking, e.g. \( R(s) \), then the defeat of \( R(s) \) may be accepted by those who find the criticism agreeable. However that will still not have shown that \( R \) itself is invalid - although the position of \( R \) may be weakened. There are still the possibilities (or claims) of \( R(t) \) and \( R(u) \) and \( R(v) \) which have been neither met nor defeated. This may be true, one might reply, and yet surely the way to attack \( R(s) \) and \( R(t) \) and \( R(v) \) is by attacking what they all have in common, namely \( R \). This seems a reasonable reply and would assuredly represent the most efficacious means of resolving the problem.

There is of course the prior question which must be answered before this sort of inquiry can proceed: it must be ascertained that there is such a thing as \( R \), the universal, as distinguished from the way \( R \) is manifest in particular ways. Hegel, of course, denies that there are universals of the platonic sort which have a reality in a realm outside of concrete actuality. But the case of rationalism may be different from the normal universal since it is a way of forming theories, a method of structuring our way of proceeding in our ruminations concerning the world. Fortunately we do not have to resolve this controversy in order to state that the suggested procedure is not applicable to the problem at hand.

In the case of rationalism the attempt to defeat it by this means must remain a forlorn hope. The reason it is forlorn is that the case of rationalism and empiricism is a case of overlapping classes. It has been most commonly taken to be the case that empiricism and rationalism have represented one of the basic dichotomies within philosophy and that philosophy has this distinction, in some sense absolute, within it. This has, in turn, served to bifurcate philosophy into two poles which may approach each other
but must never touch. The situation is not like this at all however. Rather, if we were to draw up our picture of the contending positions and display the various factors within each they would look more like this: \( R(1,m,n,o) \) and \( E(1,m,n,f) \), where in the cases of \( E(1) \) and \( R(1) \); \( E(m) \) and \( R(m) \) and \( E(n) \) and \( R(n) \), what \( R \) and \( E \) represent is more a matter of a difference of emphasis than a real difference in content.

This schematism is itself perhaps too simplified and too schematic and therefore suffers some of the same ills as the position it is seeking to clarify. But the real argument is yet to be made in more concrete terms and in a manner in which the very confusions that exist in this situation will come into play.

There has been recognition of the fact of this overlap of categories. Aaron, for one, has shown in an article\(^{16}\) that empiricism must contain elements of reason and that reason must in turn contain experience. His conclusion is simply that an absolute distinction cannot be maintained between them. Though his article has a very common sense ring to it, there have been very few philosophers who in fact have maintained extremes of either rationalism or empiricism. But despite these exceptional cases it would seem that Aaron is on solid ground in his main thesis. Unfortunately he does not develop his argument and leaves the discussion at a superficial level, for the important question is whether the apparent overlap between the two is real or only apparent. This is the question which must be resolved merely in order to set the problem aright - to mark it out clearly so that arguments can be directed toward a clearly defined position and a reasonable decision can be made.

Before getting on to the subject directly it would be prudent to point
out one confusion that has been quite common in discussions of rationalism and empiricism—especially by modern-day empiricists arguing against rationalism. This is the tendency to associate rationalism with some form of metaphysical theory—most notably idealism. This is no doubt partly due to the tendency of many empiricists, notably those of the logical empiricist temper, to classify any position which does not conform to their quite narrowly drawn definition of meaning as "metaphysics" (the term always being used as a pejorative). Thus, rationalism, which is often only an epistemological theory, is termed "metaphysical" along with idealism, mysticism, and other "non-scientific" philosophies.

While it is true that rationalism and idealism are often bedfellows, it is also the case that they may happily sleep with other mates as well. So an attack upon an idealist position which is conjoined to a rationalist epistemology does not necessarily attack the rationalism.

For example, Lazerowitz makes just this confusion. He sees rationalism as a denial of the validity of sense experience and as a claim for the existence of a different reality which is accessible only to reason. According to the rationalist that Lazerowitz characterizes, any truth contained in sense experience must be guaranteed by reason, but the sense experience itself gives us no direct contact with a real world. Thus, he sees the question at issue between rationalism and empiricism to be that of the question of the reality of the objective physical world. This, of course, is sometimes the case. A rationalist such as Descartes may claim that our senses often deceive us and the only way of distinguishing between veridical and non-veridical perceptions is through a guarantee of reason. A more extreme rationalist position would be that of Plato who believed that true knowledge
was impossible so long as the soul was dependent upon the body and consequently acquired only untrue "knowledge" through sensation. So it is undeniable the case that rationalism is often linked to a belief in the insufficiency or even the error of sense knowledge.

All of this may be true so far as it goes, but it does not follow that rationalism entails such metaphysical theories. Lazerowitz takes Descartes as representative of rationalism in the following quote:

Our senses are capable of revealing the existence of external objects to us and by our senses, and nothing else, we can get to know apples and chairs, and hands exist. But anyone who maintains, as Descartes did, the sense experience does not contain in itself the possibility of providing justification for a claim to be perceiving a physical thing implies that the nature of the senses is such as to preclude perceiving things.18

Lazerowitz's technique here, as one would expect, is very Moorian in that he begins by giving a "true" statement and then shows that, since the object of criticism implies the denial of that original statement, it must be false. In typical Moorian fashion the original statement asserted as the truth is just the very claim which is at issue.

But regardless of the merits or lack of merits of the form of argument, the passage is interesting in that it seems to claim that rationalists, of which Descartes is put forth as a typical example, deny that the senses give us any knowledge of "things" - it denies that we are capable of perceiving "things" through the senses. And for Lazerowitz a "thing" is taken in a naïve realist sense as being that which we perceive by the senses. Of course others besides rationalists have made this claim. Certain kinds of mysticism would not be far from this position attacked by Lazerowitz. But, most interesting of all, some alleged empiricists have made the same claims - most
notably one thinks of Berkeley in this connection.

The point is that rationalists do not have to claim that the world is unreal, that sensory knowledge is not true knowledge, or even that all sensory knowledge has to be validated by reason. Neither do empiricists have to make all of the opposite claims. However, there are epistemological differences between the systems so it is important not to underestimate them. Yet it will be of no help to attack rationalism by attacking idealism. They must be kept separate if any real value is to be gained.

This caution may be thought to be superfluous in the case of Hegel since he was both a rationalist and an idealist and the attempt to separate them is, by Hegel's own standards, necessarily a falsification of his philosophy as an organically connected system. There is more truth in this than may be supposed because it has been established that Hegel's rationalism is identical to his metaphysics in certain fundamental respects. So the critique of one is necessarily a critique of the other. But the caveat entered heretofore is concerned with a non-critical approach and the externally ascribed identification of idealism with rationalism - devoid of the analysis necessary to show in what way and in what sense the two can be said to unite such that a critique of one is legitimately a critique of the other.

c. Hegel: Rationalism on the Basis of Experience.

With this understood it is now possible to begin an analysis of rationalism and empiricism and a discussion of Hegel's position with respect to each of them.

It is generally accepted that Hegel was a rationalist, but it is very seldom that any commentator bothers to try to explain just what form his rationalism takes other than to say that it is rather peculiar. Certainly
it is different from the common sorts of rationalism most often found in metaphysical writings. And because it is important to the understanding of Hegel's metaphysics it would be well to consider more closely than usual what is meant by saying that Hegel is a rationalist.

Empiricism is generally held to be that position which claims that all knowledge can only arise from experience and may contain no more than what is reducible to experience. Rationalism, on the other hand, is the claim that at least some genuine knowledge is gained purely from the activity of thought itself. It should be noted that this position does not necessarily entail the denial that some genuine knowledge is also obtainable through experience.

In the first place, it may be noted that empiricism is a "hard" claim whereas rationalism is a "soft" claim in the form in which they have been represented. By this I mean to say that empiricism must somehow show (providing that it is not dogmatic) that all actual, and perhaps all possible, knowledge is derived from experience. Rationalism, however, has only to show that not all knowledge is so derived; that some knowledge is derivable from thought and not from experience. Lazerowitz makes both into a "hard" claim and then criticizes rationalism for not meeting this standard.

Though this characterization would appear accurate, a closer inspection belies the claim that any genuine knowledge not derivable from experience is sufficient to establish rationalism as a fact. It may or may not do so. The best that can be said is that it will definitely show the possibility of the truth of rationalism but not necessarily its actual truth. In this context, then, some claims to knowledge which are non-empiricist claims are not necessarily claims for the truth of rationalism. In this class come most
commonly those claims of some forms of mysticism. Extreme forms of mysticism would, in fact, seem to preclude any rationality or rational procedure at all. It is true that they reject sensory experience and the objects of sensation entirely as in any way giving "true" knowledge. They hold that the world with which we are normally acquainted through sensory experience is a "veil of illusion" which obscures the true reality lying behind it.

The only way of getting knowledge of the real, they may claim, is by allowing all sensory "knowledge" to dissipate from consciousness, thereby allowing a direct communion with Being to be had. This sort of attitude is not rationalism at all but is, if a choice is to be made, irrationalism.¹⁹ Rationalism, I want to suggest, has to do with reason and with knowing through processes of reason. In so far as this sort of mysticism makes no claims to using reason at all, then it cannot be called rationalism. In so far as it may deny that the use of reason is a positive benefit in grasping the real, it is, in a sense at least, irrationalism. Of course if it claims an indifferent attitude toward reason we may term it non-rationalism.

This is true, as we have said, for extreme forms of mysticism. Is there any way in which Hegel might be considered a mystic or at least one of their bedfellows? Certainly much of what Hegel says finds a corresponding echo in mystical literature. And it may be noteworthy - but then it may not - that William James claimed that he could understand Hegel only after having partaken of nitrous oxide and that after the nitrous oxide had worn off Hegel's ideas, which had seemed so clear under the gas, retreated to their former intelligibility.²⁰ And Hegel himself was certainly sympathetic with the mystics and seemed to think that they were at least closer to true speculative truth than those "arrested" at the level of understanding. Yet he did
not himself accept a mystical solution\textsuperscript{21} - though Findlay refers to him as an "immanent mystic"\textsuperscript{22} and Fackenheim refers to him as though he were a "rational mystic",\textsuperscript{23} and this seem suggestive, if paradoxical. Yet Meister Eckhardt attempted to found mystical insight on reason so perhaps it is possible that Hegel did too. But it would seem doubtful that he would make such an attempt regardless of the sympathy he may have had with mystical claims.\textsuperscript{24}

Mysticism, at least as used here, would have to have some element of mystery, some unknown which makes it mystical. As such, however, it can never be more than a personal claim for truth, and the best that the mystic can do is to attempt to show the way to the truth. Philosophy is a different sort of thing. We must remember that "...philosophy must beware of wishing to be edifying".\textsuperscript{25} Philosophy is the comprehension of truth through Reason, according to Hegel, and therefore every element of that truth must accord with Reason. Were there to be any lacunae in the whole system of truth then it can never be more than a likely story, a bare assurance of which one is as good as another.

The important point, then, is that in the dispute between rationalism and empiricism, the case for rationalism may be improved, but certainly not proved, by establishing that some non-empirical knowledge is possible since that knowledge may also be either non-rational or irrational. It may, however, help the rationalist claim by demonstrating that empiricism per se is false. What a rationalist must do to prove his case is establish that something can be known about reality purely by the use of reason.

The general statement concerning empiricism must be clarified as well before proceeding any further. As it stands the characterization of em-
piricism which has been given above would not exclude the type of mystical knowledge which we have just been discussing. But clearly no empiricist would want to agree to this sort of knowledge claim. The problem, of course, is the word 'experience'. We may say with Hegel that "...whatever is in consciousness is experienced"\(^\text{26}\), but it is clear that empiricists want to restrict experience to the kinds of experience arising, whether directly or indirectly (as in an association of ideas of the Lockeans or in the complex ideas of Humeans), from sensation. It is at this point, where the lines of defence are marked as they now have been, that the real confrontation begins.

Rationalists, it is often supposed, all claim that at least some knowledge, and perhaps all "true" knowledge, of the real (whatever it may be) is derived from an "intellectual intuition" of one kind or another. But, of course, the problem is to define what is meant by a phrase such as 'intellectual intuition'. If it merely means that some knowledge is gained by the activity of the intellect, then there are few people who could not be called rationalists. It has been pointed out, by Aaron for instance, and more acutely by Walsh, that the traditional distinction between empiricism and rationalism is generally one of emphasis rather than one of substance. Sensation, it is held, must be organized by processes of thought, and thoughts must work upon data derived from experience. But this analysis needs to be reconsidered in light of what we have to say concerning Hegel's rationalism.

Hegel himself objected to the idea that knowledge could be gotten purely from sensation. The opening chapter of the *Phenomenology* is directed squarely at such an attitude. The origins of this empiricist idea are undoubtedly traceable to Locke, but the French form took the extreme view that
pure sensation itself is what constituted all of the knowledge which we have. The epitome of this way of thinking is Condillac and his "sensuous statue", about which he maintained that, given a statue, and the hypothesis that one could add organs for sensuous reception, one could observe the development of mind and what we would ordinarily call "higher order" thought emerge so that in the end a fully developed thinking being would be produced.

The section in the Phenomenology entitled "Sensuous Certainty" we have already seen to be an attack precisely on this way of conceiving knowledge. But it would be well to notice that in accordance with Hegel's conception of knowing as a progression, the stage of sensation is never eliminated from knowledge. Knowledge is of the form of the Rational, to be sure, but it does not thereby exclude the content of sensory experience. The Phenomenology may be looked at as an argument for a rationalism which is a synthesis of the two extremes of sensationalism and mysticism or revelation. Sensationalism is not empiricism and mysticism and/or divine revelation is not rationalism. What the difference between rationalism and empiricism comes down to is a matter of emphasis. Empiricists stress the experiential element and rationalists stress the thinking or reasoning element in knowing. Consciousness working at the level "before thought" cannot account for experience as we know it to be - it is a philosophy "out of harmony" with actuality and experience.

Hegel rejected a pure empiricist view of knowledge, but this does not suffice to make him into a rationalist except in a nominal way. Aaron might be right in showing that experience without thought is blind and that thought without experience is empty, but that is not a particularly profound observation and one might recognize that much the same thing was said by Kant
before Hegel. Though not profound, the observation does serve to point up the fact that either extreme is equally implausible if not impossible. More of a distinction must be made, then, if we are to really make any concrete distinction between empiricism and rationalism.

W. H. Walsh, in *Reason and Experience*, noted the argument which Aaron later put forth and concluded that it is necessary to distinguish two essential ways in which thought works - and this is where the real distinction between rationalism and empiricism is found. Walsh distinguishes between the logical employment of reason and a real use of reason. Rationalists, he maintained, are those who give reason a real use.

He suggests that one of the ways in which the real use of the intellect might come is through the organizing power of the mind on its data - the application of concepts and the making of judgments (as Kant maintained). This activity is what is presupposed by consciousness in order for there to be experience. The mind - the understanding Kant would call it in his faculty terminology - is active and not passive as the sensationalists want to maintain. Experience does not write upon a *tabula rasa* but, rather, the mind and the sensations both participate in creating experience. The element of participation which the mind gives is not in organizing the content according to the mind's own implicit nature. This idea is not very far different from Hume's distinction between simple and complex ideas. Yet the ultimate constituents of experience - what is left after the organizing activity of the mind is subtracted - is just sensation or simple ideas.

This conception may be a kind of rationalism as Walsh suggests, but it cannot be the kind of rationalism which characterizes Hegel's position since it requires, as we have seen, a separation of mind from an external
reality. There may, however, be other real uses of reason to which a rationalist might subscribe. Walsh notes two forms of intellectual intuition which may be claimed: there may be intellectual intuitions of particulars, or the intellect may have some kind of "power of intuitive insight, which enables it to establish synthetic connections between concepts or propositions". So, if the Kantian kind of rationalism is unacceptable, what, according to Walsh, the rationalist must do is to show that somehow the mind itself can have a direct relation with, or can itself produce, knowledge. That is, that besides sensory intuitions there are also purely intellectual intuitions. The rationalism which asserts that there is valid knowledge through intellectual intuition holds that what is real can be an object of "true knowledge" and cannot be known, at least not totally, except by a direct acquaintance of the intellect with that reality - whether that reality be a particular or a relation. As already mentioned, some kinds of direct acquaintance with "reality" are not rational processes at all but mystical or revelatory acquaintances. A true rationalist would want to maintain that it is the discursive intellect which is capable, through a process of reasoning, of reaching knowledge and truth.

An intellectual intuition is generally held to be the immediate knowledge of some thing or some fact. In Fichte, for example, it is the immediate knowledge of the activity of the ego. But we have already seen that Hegel cannot accept any form of immediate knowledge to have ultimate truth or to serve as an absolutely certain foundation or principle for philosophy. The immediate must be mediated by its other in order to be a determinate something. Otherwise it is pure emptiness. The intellectual intuition of a pure immediate unity such as Schelling's must be rejected
as a "...night in which all cows are black". Knowledge is true knowledge when it is of the unity of the whole, but it must be a unity which contains mediation and hence difference within it. So intellectual intuition, at least of this sort, must be rejected.

So, as we have seen, Hegel rejects the notion of an intellectual intuition as the source of knowledge. Or at least he has rejected it as a source of knowledge which is immediate and certain in this immediacy. But if the notion of rationalism is to have any significance at all as an epistemological theory, then there must be some acceptance of knowledge through intellectual intuition. So either Hegel cannot be a rationalist or he must have some conception of intellectual intuition which is distinct from that considered by Walsh (and therefore distinct from what we normally call intellectual intuition). But Hegel is not an empiricist, nor is he a mystic, nor is he a fideist - and these would seem to be the options available to him if he is to reject completely intellectual intuition and therefore rationalism.

The problem is that most people see rationalism as a purely epistemological claim. That is, reason is seen to be the source of knowledge and capable of achieving content in its own right, just as sensation is a source of knowledge or at least of the content of knowledge. But this epistemological rationalism cannot be maintained without accepting the validity of some immediate knowledge (the rational knowledge). If the object of this knowledge is something different from reason itself; if it is not just self-reflected reason, then the relation between the knowledge (reason) and the object must itself be irrational because it can only be mysterious how this immediate relation between reason and its object takes place. Such rational-
ism is only possible on the basis of an underlying irrationalism. On the other hand, pure self-reflected reason may support the idea of an intellectual intuition but only at the expense of the content of knowledge. For the datum of such an immediate apprehension of a fact can only be the apprehension of the self-identity of reason itself, of the subject, of the I = I. But any attempt to characterize this I as a particular, or any attempt to ascribe attributes to it is an attempt to relate it to something else. But this mediated knowledge can in no way be derived from or related to the immediate intellectual intuition. Thus, the knowledge that is claimed from such a source is empty and without significance.

The question must be: is there such a thing as an intellectual intuition which is not immediate knowledge but the process of reason itself and which transcends what is merely given in sensation or given by the purely logical function of mind? In other words, is there a possible true knowledge which contains something more than pure data of sensation as translated into experience? Oddly enough, again the answer for Hegel must be a frustrating yes and no. Knowledge, for Hegel, does not overreach the logical function of mind. All knowledge is categorial knowledge, but, as we have seen in the examination of the Concept, the object of knowledge is only the categorized content - there is nothing else. This may be thought to be a kind of phenomenalism but for Hegel it definitely is not. Phenomenalism implies the absolute truth of certain categories, e.g. matter and mind, or an absolute distinction between thought and being. For Hegel, however, these are only categories. So the statement that there is something behind phenomena only has meaning by taking some categories to be absolute in relation to others. Ultimately, for Hegel, the absolute Idea
is the knowledge that what is is only the categorized object - or the objec-
tive categorization. Therefore, thought and being are only negative abstrac-
tions of the real. But Hegel must ground the distinction between subject 
and object somewhere. He cannot ground it in a fundamental distinction or 
it could never be unified. So the distinction itself must be grounded in 
the reality which is identical with the unity of both sides. Reason is 
thought which has reached the level of knowledge that its object is the 
concrete negative of itself. Reason knows that it is all reality.

Having reached this conclusion, we can see that, though for Hegel know-
ledge is gained through the process of reasoning, this process is not, as 
it is for epistemological rationalists generally, merely discursive reason-
ing. It would therefore be a mistake to go as far as Rosen and say that 
it is therefore true that for Hegel true knowledge is obtained through 
"total discourse". The process of Reason is not discourse but dialectic 
and discourse need not be dialectical for it can be abstractive (though 
Rosen would probably argue that discourse is ultimately turned into dia-
lectic when it is carried through completely). However, all rational thought 
must be abstractive since thought itself is necessarily abstractive; i.e. 
it abstracts the universal from the particular. Language is the external-
ization of thought and to that extent is thought made concrete. This con-
cretion of thought, however, is the self-consciousness of thought - thought 
reflected into itself. It still represents the one side of an opposition, 
for the being of language is essentially the being of thought. It becomes 
truly concrete, perhaps, by being written down for then it takes on true 
objective form. But, as Hegel shows in "Sense-Certainty", truth as subjec-
tive certainty is lost when it is written down and made objective. The very
process of making it objective negates its subjective character so that it is no longer able to express what was subjectively certain; what was intended. To be sure, language is the highest expression of thought for Hegel; it is also at a higher level than representation (Vorstellung). It is therefore essential to the achievement of true rational understanding. But, as we have seen in the discussion of Das Geistige Tierreich the complete reconciliation of subject with object can only take place in a community of discourse and, more importantly, a community of action - action in the world.\(^{32}\)

If Hegel rejects rationalism as a purely epistemological claim, but retains rationalism, then he must be making either more or less than an epistemological claim. But to accept less than epistemological rationalism is to accept either the intuitive nature of knowledge as sensory intuition, or it is to accept revelatory or mystical knowledge. But we have seen that Hegel has shown these to be unacceptable. So he must be taking a position which is accepting more than an epistemological rationalism; he must, in Weiss' words, be going "beyond epistemology". This extra claim is precisely that Reason is the source of knowledge about the real because the real is itself Reason. Therefore, rational knowledge is self-reflected Reason for Hegel. This is what is meant in saying that Hegel's is a metaphysical rationalism: Reason is actual, and the actual is Reason.

d. The A Priori in Rational Knowledge.

So far the discussion of rationalism has shown that the traditional kind of epistemological rationalism is not descriptive of Hegel's position. But there is another distinguishing mark of rationalism which we cannot fail to consider. The controversy between rationalists and empiricists is
not simply that of the status and kinds of intuitions, but also that of the status of the a priori and the necessary. It is often said that rationalists are those who claim that there is a priori knowledge of facts, whereas empiricists are those who claim that all a priori knowledge is analytic and all knowledge of facts is derived from experience. Detractors of rationalism have often claimed that rationalists believe they could construct the entire universe out of their heads. However, in reality their claims are usually must more modest than that. An example of this sort of criticism is to be found in Reichenbach's article which is worthy of brief consideration.

Reichenbach confuses the source of knowledge with its verification. But, if I know (somehow) that one of the systems X or Y or Z is descriptive of reality, that does not imply that I know which one in fact is. It may be the case that I must "look" at the world in order to verify which is the truth or which is truer. It would, however, be a mistake to claim that because X was found to describe reality and Y and Z not to do so, that the knowledge which I have of the world was totally derived from sense perception. What I did derive from sense perception is the knowledge that X fits or describes the facts. But X itself was, ex hypothesi, not itself an object of sense perception. This, of course, is the procedure of the scientist and many metaphysicians alike. True, there are some rationalists who believe that sense experience is a hindrance to gaining knowledge, which should be of a purely rational character, but this need not be characteristic of rationalism itself.

If the propositions within X are asserted to be analytically true within that system, and X is demonstrated to 'fit' the world by observation, then what is true in X must be true in the world. Such is the type of rationalism
which was developed most notably by the French philosophes, and for them \( X \) was a mathematical system - so the end result was a rationalism based upon mathematics. Of course, their claim rests upon the fact, if it be one, that \( X \) does in fact fit the world (whereas \( Y \) and \( Z \), whatever they may be, do not do so). This claim may or may not be true, but the rationalist does not cease to be a rationalist because he does not claim to know a priori which which of \( X \), \( Y \) and \( Z \) is descriptive of the world. We may be able to determine that there is an a priori logical form of thinking, but that does not necessarily determine what intuitions we have - only how we have them.

Kant, for instance, thought that mathematics applied to representations but did not determine them. He thought that there was only one type of mathematics and therefore whatever we intuit must be possible only under that one form. But there would seem to be nothing wrong with saying that the world must conform to some mathematical system - several of which may be valid.

Reichenbach thought that such an admission was in fact an admission of defeat for rationalism:

The logical development which pushed mathematics from its throne is amazingly simple. As long as there was only one geometry, the mathematician seemed to have the key unlocking physical space, and reason appeared to be the lawgiver of physical reality. If there is a plurality of possible geometries, the mathematician is unable to tell which of them fits physical space, and the selection of one geometry that describes the physical universe is left to the physicist.\(^{35}\)

Reichenbach, thus, believes that rationalists attempt to deduce which of \( X \), \( Y \) and \( Z \) is the truth about the world and the fact that they have not been able to do so destroys rationalism completely.

But there may be a fundamental error in this reasoning. Reichenbach first defines rationalism thus: "...by rationalism I understand a philo-
sophy which makes reason prior to sense observation, or which regards reason as a source of knowledge independent of and superior to empirical observation. With certain limitations this would seem an agreeable enough definition. Rationalists are not, however, committed to either the proposition that all knowledge is independent of empirical observation or that it is always superior to it. They may, in fact, only maintain that it is superior for gaining the knowledge which is only derivable from reason - leaving open the possibility that other knowledge is possible from sense experience.

But as it stands, the definition is not too objectionable. However, Reichenbach's criticism of rationalism does not in fact trade upon this definition which he puts forth so explicitly. Rather, the position he attacks is something quite a bit narrower. This is evident by the following statement which we find a page later: "What distinguishes the rationalist from the empiricist is the doctrine that there are some fundamental truths controlling physical reality which reason, and reason alone, can find out". This may be true for some forms of rationalism, but again it certainly is not characteristic of all (possible) forms of rationalism. The key phrase in this citation is "controlling physical reality". In the first place, Reichenbach has seen fit to qualify "reality" with the adjective 'physical' which is suggestive of a reality which transcends physical reality and which a transcendent metaphysician may assert lies "beyond" the physical and which is thus the proper object of rational truth. This may be quite compatible with Reichenbach's position. Second, the important word is 'control'. In what sense, we may legitimately ask, does he use this term. It is strange to speak of 'truths' controlling something as though truth were instrumental in the world rather than about the world. But we may guess by the context
of the article that Reichenbach means to refer to rationalists who hold that reason tells us truths of fact about the world.

If a philosopher or a physicist decides by observation that a deductive system or theory X fits the facts of the world, then it would seem not entirely rash of him to conclude that propositions which are necessarily contained within that system must be true of reality. Their truth would be at least as sure as the truth that the system as a whole fits the facts (at least as sure since it is a proposition which could be true even though the system be false since it could be a theorem of another system). This, however, would be some degree of a priori synthetic knowledge (though not of facts). Surely no one would want to maintain that each theorem of a system must be individually verified if the system in total is taken as truly descriptive of reality.38 But this is perhaps unfair to Reichenbach since he does say that "mathematics is not descriptive of physical reality".39 But on the other hand he does also say that:

as in the case of physical hypothesis, mathematics merely presents us with a set of possibilities, among which observation singles out the one that corresponds to reality. The criterion of synthetic truth is not reason, but observation - the empiricist principle includes the application of mathematics to physical reality.40

So although mathematics is not descriptive of reality, at least it does correspond and apply to it.

All of this argument on the part of Reichenbach and others of similar ilk rests upon the contention that the rationalist is always out to give a priori knowledge of the facts of the world - to tell us through reason alone what the world of facts is really like - whether A is or B is, or whether A follows B or B follows A. Some, perhaps, have attempted such,
but it seems dubious that all rationalists can be reduced to this enterprise and it seems just as dubious that such a description of rationalism is descriptive of it in the Hegelian form.

What then is the role of the a priori if it is not to give us practical knowledge of the world? Clearly Hegel did not think that it was possible to tell from pure reason alone what the facts of the world are, and yet he did hold that Reason plays a role in the determination of the a priori aspect of experience. This may sound like a contradiction, but it seems to be what he holds, as is evident from the following citation:

...philosophy is the child of experience and owes its rise to a posteriori fact... But there is also an a priori aspect of thought, whereby through a mediation, not made by anything external but by a reflection into self, we have that immediacy which is universality, the self conplacency of thought which is so much at home with itself that it feels an innate indifference to descend to particulars, and in that way to the development of its own nature... We may safely say that experience is the real author of growth and advance in philosophy. For, firstly, the empirical sciences do not stop short at the mere observation of the individual features of a phenomenon. By the aid of thought, they are able to meet philosophy with materials prepared for it, in the shape of general uniformities, i.e. laws, and classifications of the phenomenal. When this is done, the particular facts which they contain are received into philosophy. This secondly, implies a certain compulsion on thought itself to proceed to these concrete specific truths. The reception into philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought has removed their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at the same time a development of thought out of itself. Philosophy, then, owes its development to the empirical sciences. In return it gives their contents what is so vital to them, the freedom of thought, - gives them, in short, an a priori character. These contents are now warranted necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of facts merely, that they were so found and experienced. The fact as experienced thus becomes an illustration and a copy of the original and complete self-supporting activity of thought.  

So for Hegel, the truth of the real is not to be gotten either from pure experience in the form of sensation or in the form of pure thought without experiential content. Both represent only negations of the real,
of Spirit. Experience is the beginning of knowledge but experience needs to be taken up into thought, and the universal and the necessary, being extracted from the particularity of experience, are then reinserted into that experience. The universal which is extracted from the particular by thought is the abstract concept, and the bringing of the concept into concrete actuality is Truth. Pure Reason knows not what is but only what the conditions are for things to be. Therefore, the truth of subjective reason must be tested in the world. Reason gives a priori necessary knowledge, but not a priori knowledge of facts in the sense of telling the world what it must be:

...philosophy should understand that its content is no other than actuality, that core of truth which, originally produced and producing itself within the precincts of the mental life, has become the world, the inward and outward world, of consciousness. At first we become aware of these contents in what we call Experience. But even Experience, as it surveys the wide range of inward and outward existence, has sense enough to distinguish the mere appearance, which is transient and meaningless, from what in itself really deserves the same actuality. As it is only in form that philosophy is distinguished from other modes of attaining an acquaintance with this same sum of being, it must necessarily be in harmony with actuality and experience. In fact, this harmony may be viewed as at least an intrinsic means of testing the truth of a philosophy. Similarly it may be held the highest and final aim of philosophic science to bring about, through the ascertainment of this harmony, a reconciliation of the self conscious reason with the reason which is in the world, - in other words, with actuality.42

This important relation between experience and thought is reiterated many times by Hegel and it is what makes his particular form of rationalism so difficult to discuss within the traditional categories of rationalism and empiricism. It may be well to cite further statements of this position from Hegel in order to establish this position of his firmly. In Volume Three of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel says the following:
We have already called to mind how important it is to lead on to the content of actuality, of the present; for the rational must have objective truth. The reconciliation of spirit with the world, the glorification of nature and of all actuality, must not be a Beyond, a Futurity, but must be accomplished now and here. It is this moment of the now and here which thereby comes into self-consciousness. But those who make experiments and observations, do not realize what they are really doing, for the sole interest taken by them in things, is owing to the inward and unconscious certainty which reason has of finding itself in actuality; and observations and experiments, if entered upon in a right way, result in showing that the Concept is the only objective existence.43

And in the Philosophy of Nature he says the following:

The philosophy of Nature takes up the material which physics has prepared for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warrant and base. Physics must therefore work into the hands of philosophy, in order that the latter may translate into the Concept the abstract universal transmitted to it, by showing how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds from the Concept.44

And again from the same work:

It has already been mentioned that, in the progress of philosophical knowledge, we must not only give an account of the object as determined by its Concept, but we must also name the empirical appearance corresponding to it, and we must show that the appearance does, in fact, correspond to its Concept. However, this is not an appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content. Even less admissible is an appeal to what is called intuition, which is usually nothing but a fanciful and sometimes fantastic exercise of the imagination on the lines of analogies, which may be more or less significant, and which impress determinations and schemata on objects only externally.45

Hegel, then, insists that experience must be the starting point and, in the sense of the testing of ideas, the end point of knowledge. Nothing is to be gotten from pure thought itself. But if experience is the basis or foundation of knowledge, then where does the necessity which Hegel wants to demonstrate come from? Hume showed that empiricism itself is the denial
of necessity in its objective sense. In order to meet this difficulty we may take up the distinction made by Brand Blanshard between ideas arising from experience and ideas arising through experience. Necessity cannot come from experience for experience can only give the particular and never the universal. But experience contains the universal within it implicitly. That is, everything which is experienced is an instance, a particular, of some universal. Thought, as understanding, is the process of separating the universal from the particular or, we might also say, the necessary from the contingent. Thought as Reason is the process of putting together what is sundered by the finite application of thought to reality. One says that the universal and the necessary are never experienced because one sees experience as being somehow absolutely different from thinking. But thought is experience, it is the universal element of what we call experience. There is no "pure" thought. Hume's analysis of necessity can only be held given an absolute distinction between thought and experience. Given this empirical foundation the only possible type of metaphysics is descriptive, but metaphysical rationalism is demonstrative. The former can only say what there is; whereas, the latter says why there is what there is. The former is, again, external only and cannot give any but external reasons and therefore cannot account for necessity. It is, therefore, subject to Hume's criticism of metaphysical necessity. The latter is precisely the attempt to give reasons and to demonstrate necessity.
CHAPTER 12

RATIONALLY, NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY

a. Rationality: Internal and External.

If pure epistemological rationalism is denied and metaphysical rationalism accepted, then rationality implies necessity. We can see how this follows by considering the two ways in which rationality may belong to a system of thought. First, internal rationality and second, external rationality.

The first claims that within a given system every element or moment of the system is given, or is capable of being given, a reason why it is. The second claims that the system, as a whole, is the only possible system and is therefore necessary: given alternative systems it is possible to give a reason why the system is the true system and the others are merely (logically) possible systems. Now it can be argued that if the second is true then the first must be true also, since, if the system is absolute (unbounded or unlimited) then it must include the thinker who chooses systems, and therefore no transcendent viewpoint is possible from which to survey the alternatives. One can then only choose from inside the system and is incapable of choosing from outside the system. So if the system can be determined to be completely rational this must be determinable from within
the system. That is, the system must display or demonstrate its rationality — and this it can only do if it is internally rational.

Any system which is complete and consistent will be logically possible. That which is really possible will be so because reasons can be given for it that cannot be given for the others. A system can only be proved necessary when it is impossible to conceive of a system which has a reason for its existence which the actual does not have. But it is always possible to conceive of a complete system being possible when given any incomplete system. Therefore, unless the system is totally (externally and internally) rational it cannot be shown to be necessary. If it is not necessary then something more than reason is required to establish its truth. Hence, absolute knowledge, knowledge which is both certain and true, would not be totally rational. So if the second is true then the first is true — and the second is true only if the rationality of the real is a presupposition of the theory.

We might also say that if the first is true then it can be argued that the second must be true as well because, if the elements of the whole are joined by necessary relations so that the progression of moves from beginning to end is a rational sequence, then the beginning must be logically necessary to the system. But this, so far, only proves that if the beginning is given then the system and all of its parts follow. It does not prove that the beginning is necessary or that it is uniquely necessary. The only way that this can be established is through a principle of sufficient reason — which is to say that the assertion that "if the first is true then the second is true" is true only if the rationality of the real is presupposed. In other words, either option implies the other and, at the same time, either option
makes the same essential presupposition: that the real is rational.

Here is a problem for Hegel: Rationality may be proved within the system; that is, any element within the system may be rationally determined. Also, any choice of judgments made within the system may be sorted so that any which are rational are separated or distinguished from those which have no rational basis. However, it is another question whether or not the system as a whole can be rationally justified within a number of possible (consistent) systems. Does the system not only establish the rationality of the real, but the rationality of itself? Presumably if the starting point is grounded as the only possible starting point then, if the development of it is perfectly rational (all true judgments are necessarily true) the system itself must be the rational system. The question is, of course, is it the only possible starting point, and is the internal movement wholly rational? If the rational ground is the only possible beginning, that does not necessarily establish the rationality of the system because the movement from the ground is necessary only if the rationality of the movement is presupposed, i.e. either the system must be given prior to the beginning or the rationality of the whole is a presupposition.¹

One might say that in the end, the system as a whole is rational and necessary but that the movement of the parts and the parts themselves are not necessary; are contingent. But this would make the system, the whole, something greater than or at least different from the parts. This may be good organic dogma, but it is difficult to see how it can be justified for Hegel. For if the whole is greater than the parts then the necessity of the whole can not be shown unless one's knowledge is able to transcend the particularity and arrive at the Absolute itself, i.e. at the whole.² Only
then can be seen just what is implied by the whole and the nature of its possible existence. This, however, would require transcendent knowledge par excellence - not qualitatively different from that which Plato sought. But then the transcendence itself would be irrational since it cannot be necessitated internally but requires a "qualitative leap". This is a mysterious notion and the system of knowledge would therefore be unable to explain itself, that is, it could not explain how absolute knowledge is derivable from particular contingent knowledge. Can any number of contingencies ever be sufficient to make necessity? No rational system can verify itself by an organic theory necessitating a movement not contained in the parts.

So if the whole is not greater than the parts, can it be necessary without the parts also being necessary? Again, if so it must be the case that contingency can add up to necessity - that going through a process of progressing from one stage to another is not necessary but contingent until the absolute is reached, at which time the progress takes on the form of necessity. This is the analysis which is suggested by those who take pains to point out that Hegel said "what is rational is actual \[wirklich\]" and not "what is rational is real" (including in the real what is existent so that the phrase also means that "what is rational is what exists") because then it is possible to say that only the fully actualized is totally rational. However, this is only to say that only the Actual is truly real - anything else contains reality and also non-reality (negation). It would seem that identity in difference would have to be denied, for to be actual is to achieve a state where negation (non-reality) is not longer definitive; where interconnectedness is so realized that everything is a predicate of every-
thing else. One thing stands for the whole and abstraction is no longer possible. On one level we call the full grown oak the actualized reality of the acorn. At any point up to maturity it contained both reality (as possibility and semi-actuality) and non-reality (as possibility and semi-actuality). But the full grown oak is not what Hegel can mean by actuality under the present interpretation, for it still has within it the distinction between internal and external determination. In itself it is actual but is non-actual in relation to externality - for it still is not-this and non-that and thus contains negation for itself. So this is not the kind of actuality which is rational or necessary. Such examples are, however, metaphors only. Hegel is not concerned with particulars as particular existents, but with ideas or conceptualizations and particular ideas and conceptualizations. So it must be the case that what is necessary is the actualization of a theory about the world. The Phenomenology shows us that any possible attitude or theory about the world is condemned to insufficiency. So there is only one true attitude about the world; one true philosophical system which relates all possible ways of knowing the world into one idea which thus expresses the truth of them all and which is the fully actualized idea because nothing can or does stand as negative to it.

At this point it seems that we have arrived at a position which is stronger than others considered because it permits both aspects - contingency and necessity - to be unified in one theory. It therefore provides what Hegel wants practically and theoretically. The position is that there may be a rational core which runs through the world, cutting its way through the irrational multiplicity of the contingent. Certainly this is suggested by Hegel's notion of the List der Vernunft or "Cunning of Reason" in which
the contingency of historical development is seen to forward the ends of Reason itself. This idea certainly is an analysis amenable to Hegel's Philosophy of History where only selected civilizations are picked out as exemplifying the movement to absolute Freedom - others being ignored or dealt with off-handedly. There is a ring of plausibility about this conception.

Spirit must alienate itself in order to know itself. We know from the Phenomenology that the logically first form of knowledge is not self knowledge at all but only immediate knowledge incapable of apprehending even the basic distinction between thought and being. Now the knowledge, which develops through the course of consciousness' "voyage of discovery" or odyssey through the various ways in which consciousness comes to think its world, is, in its final stages, to be Spirit's self knowledge of itself. This knowledge is supposed to be fully rational, hence forming a whole of systematic necessary connections. If the object of its knowledge is to be only its rational self, then the contingent world cannot be the object of that knowledge. The contingent world could, it might be maintained, provide the occasion or the conditions for rational knowledge even though it is itself irrational. It would be what in chemistry would be called a catalyst, or it would be akin to William James' nitrous oxide which provided the conditions for his (temporary) insight into the truth of Hegel but was not itself the object of that knowledge or the subject of that truth.

This argument in support of contingency within the Hegelian system can be put in two ways:

1. The knowledge which Spirit accumulates, as consciousness passes through its forms of knowing, is knowledge of the part of the world which
is rational. The contingent part does not enter into it. This is the position suggested most strongly by the Philosophy of History, and those who accept this work as the paradigm for Hegel's metaphysics will probably accept this formulation of the theory.

2. The entire objective world, nature, history, etc., is contingent and only provides an occasion for Spirit to examine its own implicit nature. Spirit's self-knowledge, and hence absolute knowledge, is knowledge of the a priori categories of knowing as laid out in the Logic - and after all, the Logic is "identical with metaphysics".

The first formulation has several problems. First, what is the criterion by which one asserts that X is a rational part of the world and W and Z are not? Descartes proposed that the clarity and distinctness of our ideas would separate the real from the apparent, but Hegel could hardly agree to this since he is seeking conceptual comprehension of the world, i.e. a comprehension in which the world (the object) is shown to be concordant with its Concept - not merely with my subjective idea. And one could hardly hold that it is rational because it is part of the system as that would be begging the question. This last position has initial plausibility for it could be that the development of the system proves that the correct elements have been chosen, for if the wrong elements were selected the system could not have been completed; could not be conceptually satisfying. Or, even if other components were chosen the result would have been the same since it is the law or principle at stake and not the particular parts, which only exemplify the principle. This is the kind of position taken by Findlay when he maintains that Hegel should have "...recognized an indefinite plurality of... routes" which would achieve the goal of the Phenomenology. Given this
notion, however, we will have to conclude either that Hegel provides merely "an illuminating treatment" of certain problems, as Findlay suggests, or that the rational elements of the world are somehow distinct from the contingent elements, for if there were interactions between the rational and the contingent then some part of the rational would not be fully knowable, i.e. that part in which it is involved in contingency (which is to say that the rational is effectively the contingent). In Findlay's case Hegel will not have a demonstrated systematic Science at all; in the other case, there will be a situation essentially the same as position 2 described above.

The problem with the second main option is this: Hegel's purpose was to discover a way out of dualism. He sought to effect a mediation between subject and object, or thought and being, in such a manner that this truth is expressed not only as Substance, but also as Subject. So if Spirit's knowledge of itself is purely knowledge of itself as knower - as subject - then Substance is pure Reason and Hegel will not have gotten beyond Kant - the contingent world out there (or distinct from the Rational world) is not included in knowledge and cannot be the object of rational thought - it only gives rise to rational thought. There is, then, a kind of dualism in the world which cannot be accounted for and, on this last option, it takes something of the form of a thing-in-itself.

However, were there some way of getting around the conclusion above, the result would not be absolute Spirit as the fundamental unity within difference, but, rather, a deistic type of god who, though creator of the objective order, retreats into subjective self-objectivity, knowing itself while the natural world spins on spiritless. The ultimate reality, self-knowing Spirit, would transcend the world and natural consciousness, as well
as nature itself would sink into Unhappiness for the sake of its essence lost in the Beyond. Spirit, however, develops immanently in the world and the world is the object of its knowledge. Spirit is nothing but the world and the world is nothing but Spirit. If absolute Spirit is absolute knowledge of itself, then it is absolute rationality and it is an absolute rationality in the world. This being the case, there is nothing that cannot be a possible object for absolute knowing. To deny this is to deny the very nature of what an absolute System is.

b. Necessity.

Most people would agree that what rationalists attempt to do is to account for necessity. But rationalists are not the only ones to do this, for even empiricists feel compelled to account for apparent necessity. This again is another indication of the difficulty in separating absolutely rationalism and empiricism. However, to a certain extent this difficulty is only apparent, for the difference between the two theories is in the conception of the nature of necessity which they put forward. One can discern six different forms and levels of necessity:

1. Psychological necessity.
2. Formal necessity.
4. External necessity.
5. Internal necessity.

Empiricism, Hume showed, must always end in scepticism since it is impossible to establish necessity in experience when experience is merely
the passive result of the action of sensation. We might put it another way by saying that necessity cannot be experienced because nothing universal can be experienced purely at the level of sensation. This is demonstrated by Hegel in his critique of sense-certainty. Hume had shown that necessity could never be the object of experience and that our idea of necessity is only a habit or custom of expectation formed in the mind from the experience of constant conjunction. We might say that in effect there is no such thing as necessity for Hume, as for all such empiricists; or, if that is too strong, we might say that for them necessity means only psychological necessity — what Kant called subjective necessity.6

We may, in the first place, ask how the idea of necessity arises if it is never the object of experience and if it is equally true that ideas are limited to the experienced. The answer which an empiricist might give is that we do not in fact have the idea of necessity at all (if it even makes sense to talk about the ideas that we do not have) but only call the expectation of constant conjunction "necessity". Using this logic we will discover that many of the ideas we thought we had were not ideas at all; as Hegel says:

If perception, therefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what men hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something illegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the content of which might be otherwise constituted than it is. It is an important corollary of this theory, that on this empirical mode of treatment legal and ethical principles and laws, as well as the truths of religion, are exhibited as the work of chance, and stripped of their objective character and inner truth.7

Hegel also pointed out - as have others since him, including the more honest empiricists such as Karl Popper8 - that the empiricist must use "metaphysical" concepts if he is to attain the realization of any form of natural
The necessity of logical self-consistency is the guarantee that a thing cannot deny its own definition. Square circles cannot exist because the definitions of 'square' and 'circle' establish the incompatibility of the two concepts. Likewise, the logical laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle would exemplify this kind of formal necessity. This form of necessity is compatible with empiricism; indeed, it is compatible with any theory of knowledge at all because it is purely formal necessity, i.e. it has no content which can run counter to the content of any knowledge claims. When in the Science of Logic Hegel expressly tried to deny the validity of these logical laws of thought he cannot have been saying that it is correct to say that "the cat is on the mat" and "the cat is not on the mat" at the same time and reference to the same state of affairs.\(^9\)

The idea of what Hegel would call real necessity or true necessity can only begin to arise through the application of reason to sensation. This first takes the form of understanding according to Hegel. But unlike Kant, the understanding, for Hegel, was not a separate faculty from reason. It is because the understanding abstracts and separates that it is incapable of comprehending necessity - although necessity is an irreducible element of understanding. Understanding uses but cannot account for necessity precisely because necessity is the result of the interconnectedness of things. But in so far as the understanding unifies within its abstractive function it can be said to involve necessity. The Kantian categories of understanding are just such unifiers and abstractors. Kant, of course, would not agree that the categories abstract but only that they unify. This is because the action of the understanding in its categorial employment
creates experience out of an incoherent manifold. It is the process of subsuming the manifold under categories which makes the manifold intelligible. Necessity arises through the fact that the structure of the understanding is predetermined in some unspecified way such that it can only present the manifold under certain necessarily determined concepts or categories. Because these categories are necessarily applied to intuition, the formal structure of experience itself will appear under the notion of necessity because the form cannot be other than it is. This kind of necessity is what might be called structural necessity because that which is necessary in the object of experience is just the structure of experience itself.

What is given to sensation is purely contingent. Experience, then, is a mixture of necessity and contingency. Loosely speaking, we might say that what is experience is contingent but how it is experienced is necessary. This kind of conclusion is very tempting because it accounts in some manner for what we experience to be the case, i.e. that experience is a mixture of contingency and necessity. However for Kant this contingency depends upon an unknowable thing-in-itself. The problem for an anti-sceptic and anti-dualist is to account for contingency within a system that is rationally necessary.

For Hegel the structure of experience can, in a sense, be other than it is at any given time or in any given experience. That is because, for Hegel, the understanding is the application of a limited set of categories through an accepted schema, and this gives experience its apparent contingent nature. That is, it is possible to see that a different schema is possible, that a different, limited set of categories could be applied to the world to give a reasonably coherent experience of the world.
mately, of course, no limited set is available which will provide a schematic interpretation of experience which will include a more or less different but, at the same time, an equally or more adequate interpretation of experience. It is only when an absolute schema is possible, i.e. a schema in which the set of categories is not limited but all-inclusive, that no other interpretation of experience is possible at all. This is why Hegel can say that "...a philosophy which has not the absolute form identical with the content must pass away because its form is not that of truth".\textsuperscript{11}

An absolute schema comprehends absolute Reason itself since it is unlimited in its application. Reason, in its absolute use, is therefore infinite because there is nothing beyond it which can be a possible object of experience, or a possible condition for experience:

\ldots if no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic, the result is only the familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a strange result for - since the infinite is the Reasonable - it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing the Reasonable.\textsuperscript{12}

Strict empiricism, which allows of no rationalist procedures at all, can never achieve the notion of necessity but must always remain sceptical. And an empiricism, such as Kant's, which accepts logical rationalism as a legitimate extension of empiricist principles, can only achieve the notion of necessity in so far as it is structural necessity. Metaphysical rationalism, however, must include the notion of necessity within the content of experience as not only structurally necessary but as \underline{rationally necessary} as well.

The notion of contingency thus becomes a problem. For just as empiricists are worried, or ought to be worried, about justifying judgments of
necessity, so too ought rationalists to be worried about permitting contingency at some level within their system - few will accept that the world can be "deduced" a priori.

c. Necessity and Contingency.

There has been a great amount of difficulty explaining Hegel's theory of necessity and contingency. In most of his works he appears to put the emphasis upon necessity. Thus, with regard to the History of Philosophy, Hegel says:

...the whole history of philosophy is a progression impelled by an inherent necessity, and one which is implicitly rational and a priori determined through its Idea; and this the history of philosophy has to exemplify. Contingency must vanish on the appearance of philosophy. Its history is just as absolutely determined as the development of Concepts, and the impelling force is the inner dialectic of the forms.¹³

The rational, according to Hegel, destroys contingency and replaces it with necessity - with the necessity which is a fact in the world and which must be a fact in the world if the world is to be knowable: "what the mind rationally knows, just because it is rationally known, becomes a rational content. Thus intelligence strips the object of the form of contingency...."¹⁴ When reason becomes fully applied to its object it finds that its object is only itself and therefore its object cannot be contingent for it but must be what it inherently is.

We can recall that the process of development in the Phenomenology is a process of certainty rising to truth through the accumulation of degrees of truth which become more and more adequate and encompassing. We have also expressed this by saying that the schemata through which we organize and come to know our objective world become more and more inclusive of all the logical categories of knowledge until, at the end, an absolute schema is
achieved from which no further progress is possible. This progression, we know, is dictated by necessity. 15

Now the necessity of this progression through "stages" needs further clarification. If these stages are states of knowledge into which consciousness "fits" itself, that is, into which it enters because they are there to be entered into, then there is the danger of implicitly making the stage of knowledge itself a thing which has an ontological reality in its own right. These stages would have to exist in a sort of Platonic manner as real in themselves. In order to establish that the universe is essentially rational, it is requisite that the elements in it be necessarily connected such that they can be grasped in a systematic manner and known totally for what they are in themselves. If they are not necessarily connected, then the movement from one element to another can only be gratuitous and the knowledge thence arising cannot be such that the whole is totally grasped. What would be grasped would be a plurality of elements which could not be synthesized under one unifying principle. So the stages must be necessary. But, if their necessity is not solely dependent upon the nature of consciousness itself, then perhaps the necessity will be external to consciousness. That which is externally necessary cannot be the truth of consciousness which consciousness is seeking to realize, for in that case that which consciousness grasps could only remain an external other which could not be the reality of consciousness, although it could be the reality for consciousness.

If such were the case, then Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel would be entirely valid. That is, the necessity which the individual consciousness encounters would be the negation of the individual consciousness as an individual consciousness. The individual would be, in effect, a "vanishing
moment". This must be so because the process of consciousness coming to apprehend itself would be the process of absolute Consciousness (Spirit) coming to apprehend itself since the necessity by which it proceeds cannot belong to consciousness (since it is an external necessity) but must belong to the reality which is only for an absolute consciousness. The individual would only be an element of the absolute which is coming to apprehend itself. The individual would proceed through a process which is external to it and which it obeys out of an imposed determined necessity. Its individual existence would be that of a plant which sprouts, grows, blossoms, etc. but which only does so because the laws of its development are external to the plant itself - it is the law of the genus, not of the individual. Thus, the stages of development and the end result of the development could have no meaning for the plant - or such a consciousness. Its existence is solely for the totality of which it is a part and not for itself. The analysis of consciousness, if considered as externally conditioned and necessitated, would therefore be the same as the analysis Hegel gives of the nature of the plant:

The genus-process, the relation of the individual self to the self, as a return into itself, arrests the growth of the plant as an unrestrained sprouting from bud to bud. But the plant does not attain to a relationship between individuals as such but only to a difference, whose sides are not at the same time in themselves whole individuals, do not determine the whole individuality; therefore the difference, too, does not go beyond a beginning and an adumbration of the genus-process. The germ is to be regarded here as one and the same individual, whose life runs through this process, and through return into itself has not only advanced to the maturity of a seed, but equally has preserved itself; but this process is, on the whole, superfluous since the process of formation and assimilation is itself already reproduction as production of fresh individuals.

This kind of interpretation is suggested very strongly by the notion of the
cunning of Reason which is of great importance in the philosophy of history for Hegel.

If this alternative is unacceptable then one might assert that these stages of consciousness are not ultimately real in themselves but are merely "vanishing moments" in the progress of self-realization. But if they are not ultimately real and consciousness is not driven through the process by its own implicit necessity, then they can only be contingent states for consciousness. For to speak of necessary relations existing between unreal elements and these necessary relations leading to a stage where the parts suddenly transform into a Reality can be mysterious only and never rational. However, if the process is not rational but rather contingent and gratuitous, then the attainment of total (self) knowledge would be a miracle and not a rational process at all. Thus, it would be impossible to demonstrate the progress through the stages of knowledge, as Hegel purports to do in the Phenomenology. One would be left with only a mystery which would be resolvable not at all, or perhaps only resolvable through some sort of divine mystical grace.

Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel rests upon the observation that the individual who exists as an individual consciousness, that is, as a human individual, can enter upon the causal sequence of "things" and alter and change this sequence with reference to its own goals. The purposive activity of the individual is a contingency which cannot be subordinated to a greater teleology.

On the other hand, in Appearance and Reality, Bradley claims that the evil of having individual goals and purposes unrealized and unrealizable is an apparent evil only. This is so because the individual is only an
element of a larger whole with a grand teleology to which all individual teleologies are subordinated. We find, he says, that the goals and purposes which we truly want accomplished are truly accomplished sub specie aeternitatis. The evil that we think we see is only judged evil because of a finite viewpoint. We err in choosing immediate goals which cannot accomplish the larger goals which we really want to be realized. In the Absolute of Bradley these Real goals are in fact realized and so our individual failure to realize our greatest goals is only a part of the grand design for the realization of True goals of which we are ignorant.

In the first place, we may note that this position of Bradley's is sceptical and could thus never be acceptable to Hegel. Bradley's scepticism resulted from the incommensurability of the infinite Absolute with the finite mind. But for Hegel the absolute is "infinite" only in the same way in which mind itself can be considered infinite. The absolute for Hegel is therefore intelligible to the "finite infinite" mind. Kierkegaard accepted the same Bradlian position of the incommensurability of the infinite and the finite, but he accepted it as a Christian religious conception which allowed him to deny rationality and intelligibility and make a "retreat to commitment and to irrationality.

Second, we may say that this conclusion of Bradley's may be comforting to some, but it is difficult to see how this can give any significance to the individual actor. The individual becomes merely a pawn in the larger game of the Absolute. Freedom in any significant sense is ruled out. One may perhaps be free to choose which pair of shoes to put on in the morning, but, with the exception of some existentialists, this would hardly be considered the type of freedom of true ontological import. It is as signifi-
cant as the choice between bones made by a dog. True freedom means the
ability to choose in life and to live within one's choice.

This is the point at which Kierkegaard takes issue with Hegel. He
sees Hegel as setting forth a system in which the concept of the individual
as being a significant and meaningful actor in the world is abrogated. It
is true that Hegel sees history as in some sense necessarily determined.
Great figures do come upon the scene of history and transform the given
situation into a new stage of history. Such world-historical individuals,
like Napoleon, are significant, but are they significant as individuals,
or are they merely playing out their predetermined role in the universal
history of the absolute Spirit? Kierkegaard obviously thought Hegel an¬
ered no to the first part of the question and yes to the second part.
Did Hegel in fact hold this position ascribed to him by Kierkegaard?

If Spirit is primary and the individual is subordinated to it, then
the necessity in which consciousness operates in its own self-realization
must be an external necessity dictated by the process of the Absolute. The
individual consciousness would have no more personal significance than the
plant which develops according to necessary laws which are external to it.
The plant leaves, buds, blossoms, etc. because it is a plant, not because it
is the particular individual which it is. Is human consciousness analogous
to this sort of external necessity? Certainly there are obvious ways in
which we perceive the human individual to develop according to laws over
which he has no control. But is the process per se of consciousness coming
to know itself, the self-actualization of the individual, subject to the
same sort of external necessity?

The alternative is not necessarily to deny that the individual is
subject to necessity. This is one alternative - and it is the one taken by existentialist thinkers such as Kierkegaard. But the other alternative is to allow that the individual consciousness is subject to necessity, but an internal necessity as opposed to an external one. That is, it is a consciousness which develops according to its own determined necessity rather than a necessity determined externally to it. In this case we might say that nature is governed by an external necessity and consciousness or mind by an internal necessity. The external necessity is what is called contingency and the internal necessity is necessity, but not with mechanistic overtones. In so far as the development of consciousness in the Phenomenology is concerned, we know that the development from immediacy to mediation and back must be shown to be a necessary movement and the only possible movement. This must be the case for if there were no necessity to the movement and/or if the movement could not be demonstrated to be the unique real possibility, then the rationality of the system would be violated and it could never be more than a likely story. Hegel certainly believed that the progression of forms of consciousness is the only possible progression which can be actualized. Simply put, the reason why the Phenomenology must have strong claims and an invariable structure is that were there more than one complete system with equal claims to validity, then knowledge in any absolute sense, i.e. knowledge which is true in itself, would be impossible - it would be impossible to determine which system describes the world. Also, if there were any contingent elements in the system (like nature, for example) then there would be something which is logically outside of rational knowledge. In either case the best that could be achieved would be a limited scepticism; limited in the sense that it is not completely arbitrary,
i.e. it would not be the case that any claim is as good as any other, for it might be the case that one could demonstrate all of the real possibilities but be unable to indicate which of them is true.

So the problem as it stands is that the nature of systematic Science, that is, the demonstration that absolute Knowledge is attainable and the subject-object dualism resolvable, requires that the system be rationally determined both internally and externally. We know from Chapter 10 that the inner motility which guarantees the movement of consciousness from "Sense-Certainty" to "Absolute Knowledge" depends upon the presupposition that the System is internally rational. We also know that the system must be determined to be rationally grounded in its beginning as well; in other words, the beginning must be the only rational beginning if the system is to demonstrate its uniqueness. This, however, seems to depend ultimately upon the acceptance of some form of principle of sufficient reason. Wherever we look at the Hegelian system we seem to find the need for rationality. And yet the kind of rationality required to produce absolute knowledge and a demonstrated system is one which requires a strict necessity as well. On the other hand, contingency is very much a part of experience and cannot be ignored - as we see from the great pains that Findlay, for one, took to reconcile rationality, necessity and contingency in the Hegelian system. It seems, however, that in the end they must be finally irreconcilable. Before making a final judgment, however, we ought to look at Hegel's most developed consideration of necessity and contingency to see if there is something there which will rescue the System.

What Hegel says about necessity and contingency in the Logic is assuredly obscure and at best confusing. His frustrating manner of putting
forth a position and then immediately putting forth the opposite position makes it very difficult to trace the train of his reasoning. It is reasonably clear what general position he is trying to take but not at all clear how, or how well, his arguments take him there.

There is no question that Hegel's reaction to Herr Krug's demand to deduce his pen is never abandoned. Hegel, of course, flatly refused to consider that such a deduction was possible in the first place and he asserted that it was not the business of philosophy in the second place. This reaction has often been noted and some have made more out of it than others. Findlay, perhaps more than anyone else, believes that Hegel thought there to be much of the fact of the world which philosophy could not reach:

Hegel emphasizes that the notion of Contingency, of a merely chance being, is a legitimate phase of the Idea, and has also a genuine application on the surface of nature and mind. There are many more or less superficial matters of fact which are also matters of mere fact, for which no scientific or philosophical reason can be given why they should be thus and not otherwise.  

It certainly appears that this is something Hegel would want to hold. For example, he says at one point that:

As regard truth in matters of historical fact - to deal briefly with this subject - so far as we consider the purely historical element, it will be readily granted that they have to do with the sphere of particular existence, with a content in its contingent and arbitrary aspects, features that have no necessity.

So it appears that there is something of a contradiction in what Hegel is maintaining, for it does not seem that contingency can be an irreducible fact for Hegel, and on the other hand, that he can hold to the program of demonstrating rational necessity in the world. Since this last program is seemingly the most fundamental for Hegel it would seem the most important
to preserve. Perhaps it is for this reason that Stace, for one, takes the following view:

...[the philosophy of Nature] cannot deduce this plant, but only plant in general...The details of nature, he says, are governed by contingency and caprice, not by reason. They are irrational and the irrational is just what cannot be deduced. It is most improper, he tells us, to demand of philosophy that it should deduce this particular thing, this particular man, and so forth.

This position will not bear examination. If there is in this stone, or this man, nothing but thought, nothing but universals, then it ought, theoretically at least, to be possible to deduce this stone or this man. If it is not possible, the impossibility can only arise because the stone contains some element which is not universal, and which, as absolutely particular, is outside the reach of thought altogether. What is outside the reach of thought is unknowable. It is the Kantian thing-in-itself...In my opinion Hegel was wrong, and Krug right, as regards the question of the pen.20

But then Stace is more inclined to the mystical and intuitive type of philosophy than Findlay, so it is not surprising that they come down on different sides on this question. Findlay defends Hegel against the modern-day empiricists by not setting Hegel's position in opposition to theirs, but by trying to establish a compatibility between them:

...there is nothing in Hegel's doctrine of Necessity which could affront the most austere empiricist. It is quite free from the doctrine that we can deduce the plan of the universe, or any segment of it, merely by scrutinizing one of its parts.21

Yet I think that this is a bit optimistic. Hegel will offend an austere empiricist. Findlay tries to make his case too strongly, for in order to save Hegel for the sake of empiricism, he has given up too much. According to Findlay, Hegel admitted the indeducibility of contingent aspects of the world. Indeed, Hegel does say such things and that seems inconsistent when he also says, according to Findlay, "...that there can be but a single experi-
ential route leading up to Systematic Science...a route in which there are absolutely no arbitrary steps nor the smallest possibility of deviation". But Findlay thinks that Hegel should have gone even further than merely admitting the indeducibility of contingent aspects of the world, he should also have said, according to Findlay, that in its broad features it cannot be deduced as such but can be given, at best, merely an "illuminating treatment". Findlay plays down the feature of necessity which seems so much a part of the Hegelian theory and emphasizes the need to see the world as contingent. The job of the philosopher is merely to give an "illuminating treatment" and not to seek rational knowledge. This may in fact be the end result and the value of Hegel's labors, but it is emphatically not what he thought he was doing. Hegel's Philosophy of History in particular but also the History of Philosophy, the Logic, and the Phenomenology, would make no sense and have no rationale if Hegel intended what Findlay says he did. Findlay repeats the notion that the Phenomenology is a "single paradigmatic instance" of the "experiential route leading up to Systematic Science", but it seems inconsistent to seek Systematic Science if its development is incapable of being given a systematic treatment.

Findlay makes too much of contingency in Hegel and too little of necessity in order to mollify empiricist hostility to Hegel. It seems very likely that Hegel was inconsistent on this point; that there is a gap between what he wanted to maintain and the demands of his system. If Findlay is right then necessity in Hegel is an illusion just as it is for empiricists because it is founded on contingency. One can only escape this conclusion if one is willing to accept the possibility of an intellectual (or some other kind of) intuition of necessity in the contingent world. But we have seen
that Hegel rejects that alternative - as would Findlay, presumably. If necessity is the case then contingency must be a "surface play" which disappears on the attainment of higher modes of knowing. This position is suggested very strongly by Hegel's statement that "the world is this actualization of divine Reason; it is only on its surface that the play of contingency prevails".24 By all means, then, contingency is aufgehoben - superseded and preserved - but preserved as a way of understanding that everything must have a sufficient reason for its possibility to become its actuality.

Since Hegel sees the world as inherently rational then it seems to follow that necessity of some kind must prevail within it. But if it can be shown that necessity does not imply deduction then perhaps the problem of accepting necessity can, to some extent, be reduced. The development of the world, and the comprehension of the world in philosophical science, is concomitant with the degree of development of the world; furthermore, it expresses this development. God, as the Absolute, need not deduce the world since He has arisen to the stage of recollection and the world is laid out before His intellect in its full and complete development - after all, it is nothing more than His full and complete development.

One might say, then, that contingency is a category of the present and the future, while necessity is a category of the past (of the realized Concept). Thus, infallible prediction is ruled out but description, as description of rational necessity, is possible. Hegel suggests this idea very strongly in his Owl of Minerva allusion in the preface to the Philosophy of Right. Absolute Spirit recollects; that is why Hegel's system can only stand on the assumption of some notion of an achieved end to history.
Hegel, as we know from his inaugural dissertation, disapproved of the notion that any system could permit the deduction of a matter of fact, e.g. that the existence of a new planet could be deduced a priori from a system of natural science [whether such is an a priori deduction is not important - Hegel apparently did believe it was]. Hegel's reaction was to set out to prove that what is known to be the case from experience is fully rational in itself. So in the case of Herr Krug, Hegel could not claim to "deduce" his pen, i.e. show that his pen must exist as such. If one could do so, it would make no difference whether the pen was actually known to exist since a "deduction" should be possible (if Krug and Stace are correct) anyway just because of the necessary nature of things. This, then, would be the same as prediction. Deducing that Herr Krug's pen exists is the same as predicting that it must exist. Hegel need not hold that, but what it seems he must hold is that, given Herr Krug's pen, Hegel's system guarantees that that pen exists for a reason and that it necessarily exists as that pen.

The conclusion must be that contingency exists in the relations of the parts within the whole only at a certain level of Understanding. Reason reaches behind Understanding to grasp the rationality underlying the apparent contingency. This is shown by Hegel in the Phenomenology in the section on "Understanding".

Certainly contingency is possible within the Hegelian system just as the scepticism which is the philosophical result of it must be an element of the system. But both have their being as the result of ignorance, or, more politely, as a result of the progress of knowing not having completed itself in the absolute schema. Contingency only appears as contingency
because the knowledge of the world in which contingency appears is knowledge as the object of Understanding or as a finite application of reason to its object.

Yet contingency is not purely an illusion. It is, in fact, a name for one kind of necessity - external necessity. Hegel suggests this explicitly in the Philosophy of Nature:

...necessity is the inseparability of different terms which yet appear as indifferent towards each other; but because this abstract state of externality also receives its due, there is contingency in Nature, i.e. external necessity, not the inner necessity of the Concept.

Contingency, then, is external necessity, and "the sole aim of philosophical inquiry is to eliminate the contingent. Contingency is the same as external necessity, that is, a necessity which originates in causes which are themselves no more than external circumstances". A thing is contingent if the grounds for its being, if the reason why it is, is determined by the conditions in which it comes to be. A thing which has the grounds for its existence in-itself is necessary and not contingent. In Nature external relations hold between things and thus "contingency" prevails and nature is "irrational".

d. Systematic Science and Sufficient Reason.

If contingency is merely another form of necessity then there is an indication that contingency is only what appears to a knowing which is less than absolute. That this is the case for Hegel will be shown when we come to consider his discussion of contingency and necessity in the Science of Logic. Already, however, we might be inclined to think that the rationalism of Hegel is similar to that of Leibniz in that Hegel too presupposes a
Principle of Sufficient Reason as the ground for his system. But whereas for Leibniz this principle guarantees that necessity is the truth of contingency for a transcendent God whose knowledge is capable of comprehending everything, Hegel cannot accept this situation. For Hegel rationality implies intelligibility for any rational mind provided only that it traverses the entire series of forms of consciousness to absolute knowledge itself. We might recall that the "...road, through the movement of the Concept, will embrace the entire objective world of Consciousness in its necessity". The Bradlian transcendent Absolute is unacceptable to Hegel so the sufficient reason why something is must be available to any consciousness that achieves the goal of the Phenomenology - complete rational understanding. Therefore, given that X exists as a fact, a metaphysical rationalism will be assured that since X exists it can be reasoned to exist and can therefore be shown to exist necessarily (an epistemological rationalism may imply this but it need not necessarily do so). That is, such a philosophy can create an all-encompassing system such that everything that does exist can be shown to be consistent with that system. Hence it can be explained on "rational" grounds. Such a system, being a rational exposition, must assume the basic rationality of that which falls into and is not contradictory to that system. 

In other words, given that X exists, it is assumed that X's coming into being follows upon some rational ground which can be discovered or known. The reason for postulating the inherent rationality of the world is to make the ground of being qualitatively similar to that of thought. By so doing, no inherent contradictions or problems such as the interaction of two logically dissimilar things will arise. If reality conforms to the a priori structures of the mind, i.e. is rational, then any logical problems
that might otherwise be encountered regarding the possibility of the human mind knowing ultimate reality are skirted. That is, the mind can know reality because thought is *ipso facto* rational; and reality, when organized in accordance with the rules governing thought, is rational and can be reached in thought (can be an object of thought). If this is accepted as the case, then it must follow that for any phenomena which are not self explanatory (have the reason for their existence within themselves), it can be asked "why is it?", and that question is inherently meaningful and demands an answer:

When anything is said to be necessary, the first question we ask is Why? Anything necessary accordingly comes before us as something due to a supposition, the result of certain antecedents. If we go no further than mere derivation from antecedents, however, we have not gained a complete concept of what necessity means. What is merely derivative, is what it is, not through itself, but through something else; and in this way it too is merely contingent. What is necessary, on the other hand, we would have be what it is through itself; and thus, although derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is derived as a vanishing element in itself. Hence we say of what is necessary, "It is". We thus hold it to be simple self-relation, in which all dependence on something else is removed...The intellectual principle underlying the idea of divine providence will hereafter be shown to be the concept. But the concept is the truth of necessity, which it contains in suspension in itself; just as, conversely, necessity is the concept implicit. Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood. There is nothing therefore more mistaken than the charge of blind fatalism made against the Philosophy of History, when it takes for its problem to understand the necessity of every event. The philosophy of history rightly understood takes the rank of a Theodicy; and those, who fancy they honour Divine providence by excluding necessity from it, are really degrading it by this exclusiveness to a blind and irrational caprice.  

Any systematic explanation of any phenomena must therefore be explained as coherent with (perhaps necessitated by) the system of which it is a part. If no explanation is forthcoming then the system is irrational or contains irrationality. Likewise, the system itself must follow upon rational
In the statement that "the real is rational and the rational is real", the element "the real is rational" is the claim that what exists and what is real can be known by rational subjectivity. But of course, this is merely to say that there is no such thing as the Kantian thing-in-itself which is unknowable and yet somehow real. The question which Hegel must answer is whether the rationality of the real can be established and whether it is possible to adequately account for its rationality through the Hegelian system.

If it is possible to show that there is no thing-in-itself which is an integral part of reality but which is unknowable, it must be demonstrated by showing reality to be entirely rational, i.e. consistent, interdependent and coherent. In other words, if reality can be demonstrated to be totally describable in rational terms and totally independent of any other construction, then the possibility that there is a part of reality which is not known would be an idea which is inconsistent and contradictory. The unknowable thing-in-itself becomes a possibility only when it is a concept needed in order to make experience coherent. In other words, the noumenal world can be a possibility only when the phenomenal world is incomplete, i.e. lacking something to be totally complete within itself. As long as it can be shown to be self-consistent and self-contained, then a noumenal reality is superfluous and irrational.

If reality, taken as a system, is asserted to be rational then any X within the system must be asserted rational as well, i.e. there is and can be determined the reason why that X exists as it does. It would not be cogent to say of some existent X that it might not have existed, e.g.
Y might have existed instead. The rationalist must claim that such contingency is false since the fact that X does exist establishes that nothing exists instead of X. If X's existence had been capricious, i.e. if both X and Y might equally have come into existence, then there would be no reason why X did so rather than Y. But if there were no reason why X rather than Y came into existence, then in no sense could one say that the world is rational. That is, if there were no reason why X rather than Y exists there would be a hiatus in the system of reasons and the system could not therefore be determined rational, i.e. not all phenomena of the system could be explained totally and solely in terms of the system. Thus, any rational system, if it is metaphysically rational, must ultimately rest upon the principle of sufficient reason. That is, given that anything exists (or happens) there is a reason why it exists (or happens), and this reason must be capable of being known (because rationality implies intelligibility).

The fact that X exists must, then, be seen by the metaphysical rationalist as necessary. But then the question arises as to what the nature of this necessity must be. The two normal types of necessity that are generally considered are causal determinism and logical necessity. But it seems that for the rationalist neither one of these types of necessity is ultimately satisfactory.

Causal determinism functions satisfactorily at a certain level but ultimately it is not a sufficient means of explaining Being in general. Obviously determining the causal antecedents of an event is one way of describing that event. It might even be considered in some sense to give the reason for that event. A very complex mechanical determinism could be imagined which conferred necessity upon all things and events. But such
a method is doomed to failure when its turn comes to address itself to the problem of original necessity. There is no conceivable way that it can do so. First, it must ultimately resort to the infinite regress - a very unhappy solution for most rational minds. Second, causality itself must be shown to have a rational basis but this can only be given by going beyond causality itself.

The same sort of analysis holds true for logical necessity as well. It is obvious that given p implies q, and p, you necessarily have q. This explains or gives the reason for q. But it does not do so for p implies q nor for p. They must remain unexplainable givens. If not, they must be shown as derivable from the same logic in which they function and hence they must rest their necessity upon other givens. In other words, logical systems are, by definition, axiomatic and hence must presuppose a given which cannot be derived by that logic. Here again arises the spectre of the infinite regress and once again our metaphysical question of origin stands virgin and unblemished.

"The rational is actual" is Hegel's way of stating the Principle of sufficient Reason. It would follow if the rational is what is actual and the world can be shown to be rational that the resulting system would encompass all reality within a totally rational system and hence would be an Absolute System, i.e. leaving nothing out and positing nothing beyond itself.

Hegel put an implicit faith in the Principle of Sufficient Reason; he made it a rational principle which could not be doubted or violated. He did not explicitly assert this principle as fundamentally necessary but, as has been shown, it is a necessary assumption to get where he
wanted to go. The upshot of this is that Hegel failed to produce what he set out to produce, i.e. a presuppositionless system.

Because of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the fact that the world exists establishes the fact that it is rational - because otherwise there would be no reason why this world exists rather than another possible world. It can only be because it is rational. Hegel then tried to prove that it is rational because by so doing he would thereby prove that it must necessarily exist. If the world can be proven to be rational, then the underlying principle of reason by virtue of which it is rational can be capable of being grasped by an intellect. If the system can be shown to be rational and real, then since that underlying rationality can be grasped, the real can be known and what is known is what is real.

Starting from the obvious assumption that something exists, Hegel tries to show that this something which exists is entirely rational. It is capable of being totally explained and understood. The course of all history, the coming into and going out of being of all things, all development and change is, for Hegel, the working out of the dialectic. The discovery of the dialectic is, for Hegel, the discovery of the ultimate rational principle of all things. Thus, the coming into being of anything is necessitated as arising from the logic of history. Yet if this necessity by which any given X comes into being is in some sense a logical necessity, it is still not the ultimate principle whereby an Absolute System is derived. The logic of the dialectic requires, as a logic, a given which cannot be explained or "rationalized" by that logic. The System as a whole must follow upon the same logic as that which is contained within the System. Otherwise it must refer to something which is outside the System and hence it would not be
rational - hence not actual. The result would be, in Hegel's case, a tremendous thought experiment but not absolute Knowledge.

The dialectical method gives a reason why a particular X exists, but it does so only on the presupposition that what exists is Reason. Hegel has determined that give that Spirit (Reason) exists, the rest follows from the nature of the dialectic. However, if what has been said here is in fact true about the Hegelian system, then one can only conclude that Hegel ultimately fails in what he sets out to do. He has only shown that if the System exists, its content must be necessary. In other words, he fails for the reason that Kierkegaard says that he must fail - a logical system is possible, that is, given an axiomatic starting point a completely self-contained system can be formulated. But an existential system is impossible - an existential system being a system which contains the grounds for its existence with itself.

If Kierkegaard is correct, then Hegel fails to achieve what he set out to achieve - a self-verifying system. It also appears that he fails to create a presuppositionless system - and therefore also fails to achieve a self-verifying system. It has also been suggested that Hegel fails to account for contingency within his rational system because the two are incompatible. On this last question, however, we must consult the Science of Logic for it is there that Hegel directly considers the question of contingency and necessity.

e. Necessity and Contingency in the Science of Logic.

The section dealing with necessity and contingency is that dealing with the category of Actuality - the final category before the Concept. Here one cannot be very confident of discerning Hegel's final position.
He clearly wants to have contingency within necessity, but the form in which
the argument is couched is terribly obscure and requires much heavy going
before one can begin to extract some sense from it.

Anything which exists is within a nexus of other things and is thereby
related to them. That any particular thing exists leaves a supposition both
that it is possible and that it is a part of the nexus. An immediate or
formal Actuality, therefore, is one which will be assumed to have an under-
lying possibility as, for instance, in pure reflection into self, $A = A$,
(after all, it is) and it will also be supposed to be conditioned by that
in which it has its being, i.e. Existence in general:

$$...$$

...possibility is not yet all actuality; no question has yet arisen
of real and absolute actuality; it is at first only that possibility
which at first presented itself, namely, formal possibility which has
determined itself as being only possibility, and thus formal actuality
which is only Being or Existence in general. Everything possible has
therefore in general a Being or an Existence.29

So in this sense a formal possibility only means something which, were it
actual, would be within a set of circumstances with which its being is
compatible - it is, therefore, the same as what Hegel calls formal Actuality.

Now,"This unity of possibility and actuality is contingency. The con-
tingent is an actual that at the same time is determined as merely possible,
whose other or opposite equally is".30 We have seen that formal possibility
or actuality implies a general being or Existence, a nexus in which it is
conceived to exist. Therefore, the contingent is merely something within
this possible being and whose opposite also has being in the way described.
So far contingency does not yet imply real actuality.

We can see then that the contingent has no ground since it rests only
upon formal possibility which cannot determine it any more than such formal
possibility can determine its opposite - either is equally possible. But in so far as it belongs to a nexus it is grounded within the existence it implies. Therefore, in that sense it is grounded. In order for Unicorns to exist the world would have to be different than it is - the world would have to provide the conditions for their existence. In that the concept of Unicorn implies a world in which they can exist (since they are formally possible), they have a ground in that possible world and its conditions (the further question to answer is, if the conditions exist, would Unicorns necessarily exist?). This is what I make Hegel to mean in the peculiar statement that "the contingent then, has no ground because it is contingent; and, equally, it has a ground because it is contingent". Now anything which is must contain possibility and it must contain the existence through which it is possible. Therefore it must, at this level, be contingent. Anything can be seen as having formal possibility or formal actuality. Therefore anything can be understood under the concept of contingency. In that way, for anything to be it must be thinkable as formally possible and formally actual, or, in other words, as contingent. Findlay is right then in arguing that contingency is an irreducible fact for Hegel. But, if the argument herein given is accepted, we disagree with what he infers from this.

There is no doubt that Hegel makes a place for contingency in his conceptual scheme. We will recall that "Logic...coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts, - thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things", and since contingency is a category of thought (since it is a category of the Logic), it must thereby "express the essential reality of things".
But how seriously can we take the contingent nature of things? Can we, like Findlay, see much of the furniture of the world as beyond philosophical reason, or perhaps we will be more inclined to agree with Mure's twice-repeated statement that "the contingent event has nevertheless actually occurred. It must, therefore, have been somehow necessitated, for we cannot persist in the thought of the purely contingent." This last, I shall suggest, is more consistent with Hegel's thought and with his system.

We find that when we next come to the category of Real Possibility we find also established real necessity rather than formal necessity. What distinguishes real from formal possibility is the fact that the existence which for the latter is merely supposed as being in general, is now a determinate existence; it is a real actuality; "Real actuality as such is in the first instance the thing of many properties, the existent world". What this implies is that the existence of a nexus in which the possible thing has its existence, has resolved itself into a system of conditions for existence:

Thus real possibility constitutes the totality of conditions, a dispersed actuality which is not reflected into itself but is not determined as being the in-itself, but the in-itself of an other, and is meant to return back into itself.

The possible thing then, has a ground in the conditions through which its possibility is translated into real actuality. When these conditions obtain, the really possible thing must be the only real possibility:

Therefore what is really possible can no longer be otherwise; under the particular conditions and circumstances something else cannot follow. Real possibility and necessity are therefore only seemingly different; this is an identity which does not have to become but is already presupposed and lies at their base.
It appears that we have resolved the issue in favor of necessity over contingency. But lest we become too complacent Hegel immediately reminds us that contingency is still to be reckoned with. He says now that "...this necessity is at the same time relative. For it has its starting point in the contingent". 37 Hegel's reason for saying this is given in the next few lines:

For the real actual as such is the determinate actual and has first of all its determinateness as immediate being in the fact that it is a multiplicity of existing circumstances; but this immediate being as determinateness is also the negative of itself, is an in-itself or possibility, and thus it is real possibility. 38

The real actual is the existence of the conditions such that only X can be, Y cannot. But that X is is not determined. So the determinate being is still only possibility, resolved into real possibility, granted, but formal possibility remains its ground and hence it is contingent. Contingency, though, is already beginning to lose much of its meaning. What we will now discover is the true meaning of the words 'contingency' and 'necessity' in the category of Absolute Necessity.

Here we find a necessity which is internal to the thing such that it is self-contained and self-determined. Such a necessary being must look something like a Leibnizian monad although Hegel does not say that in so many words, but such seems to be implied in statements like this:

Absolute necessity is therefore blind. On the one hand, the different sides which are determined as actuality and possibility have the shape of reflection-into-self as being; both are, therefore, free actualities, neither of which is reflected in the other, nor will let any trace of its relation to the other show in it; grounded in itself, each is the necessary in its own self. Necessity as essence is concealed in this being; contact between these actualities appears therefore as an empty externality; the actuality of the one in the other is only possibility, contingency. 39
And this further suggests that contingency is to be found in the relations between things. Because of this,

...this contingency is rather absolute necessity; it is the essence of those free, inherently necessary actualities. This essence is light-shy, because there is in these actualities no reflective movement, no reflex, because they are grounded surely in themselves alone, are shaped for themselves, and manifest themselves only to themselves, because they are only being. But their essence will break forth in them and reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity of their being and their self-support is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their reflectionless immediacy.40

What Hegel seems to be saying is that contingency is the form of appearance, or of the isolated individual of the understanding put into an external relation with other individuals. We can then but agree with McTaggart who quotes Noël, and with whom Stace also asserts agreement, that,

...if we took all Existence as a whole it would form a Necessity which was not contingent, but which had contingency as an element within itself. It would not be contingent, for it would have no ground outside itself. But contingency would be an element in it, because each part of it would be determined by other parts of it. Each part then would have its ground outside itself and looked at separately would be Contingent.41

That which is determined externally is what is called contingent or appears contingent. The necessary has its determining principle within itself. We can but conclude then that contingency is, for Hegel, only one kind of necessity, a necessity which is external to the thing.

Now for those who want to say that all of this may be very well but it is nevertheless the case that Absolute Necessity as the union of formal necessity and real necessity has its conceptual origins in formal possibility and hence in contingency, Hegel offers a last word:
This manifestation of that which the determinateness is in truth — negative self-relation — is a blind destruction in otherness; the illusury showing or reflection which breaks forth is, in that which simply affirmatively is, a becoming or transition of being into nothing.42

In other words, the relation between the determinate parts of existence is one of negation, of "negative self-relation". This negative self-relation is presumably the identity of self through another — X is not Y. And this relation "is a blind destruction in otherness" — and necessity, we remember was characterized as blind. So this determination or reflection into and through another is becoming which takes us back to the beginning of the Logic since there becoming is equally a "transition of being into nothing". So the determination of one thing through another is no more founded upon empty possibility and contingency than is the whole of the Logic itself.

As if to emphasize this Hegel then continues:

But conversely, being is equally essence; and becoming is reflection or an illusury showing. Thus the outwardness is its inwardness, their relation is absolute identity and the transition of the actual into the possible, of being into nothing, is absolute necessity, it is itself the presupposing of that first, absolute actuality.43

So "being is equally essence" — essence being the second main division of the Logic, and becoming, which we saw above is determination through another, is reflection or an illusury showing [Scheinen]. The first division of Essence is Reflection (into-self) and the second is Appearance [die Erscheinung]. So becoming is itself the third — Actuality. So again the movement of becoming is as necessary as the logic of the development of Essence to Actuality. Absolute Actuality is no longer posited or supposed in its determinateness, but its Actuality is as necessary as Being itself.

We have said then that contingency is a form of necessity different
from the internal necessity of the Concept itself. But the concept is purely the Essential Being which develops its content through history to its necessary end - Absolute Spirit. Its necessity, then is that of internal ontological development and, nearly everyone would agree with this, the complete comprehension of the Concept will reveal its necessary existence. For the complete comprehension of the Concept is Absolute Knowledge itself and is rational understanding of the unity of Spirit with itself.  

But what of the necessity which we call Contingency; that is, the necessity of external relations? Obviously, according to our analysis, the complete knowledge of any one thing per se will not give the reason for its existence precisely because its existence is determined by the conditions in which it has its being.

Findlay is right and Stace is wrong in that the contingent facts of the world (those which are externally necessary) are not deducible. They are not deducible because, given the conditions for a fact X to exit it does not follow that X in fact exists, but only that if it exists it must be an X.

It may be objected here that if X did not exist, then something other than X did in fact exist; namely, not-X and not-X is a Y. This may be a valid criticism and if so then Hegel would have to conclude that X necessarily exists or Y, that is, not-X, would exist which would make X contingent - i.e. merely possible, which means not-X is equally formally possible. But in order for this to be accepted as a valid criticism it would also seem to be necessary to accept the non-occurrence of an event as an event and the non-existence of a thing as a thing. If one is not willing to make non-events and non-things ontological entities (as someone like Meinong is
willing to do), then the conclusion we have reached about Hegel would seem to be still in need of a destructive criticism. That Unicorns need not exist in a Unicorn world, but that if they do then they must be Unicorns, may perhaps be a bad example to use. It is perhaps slightly more intelligible to say that although it is impossible to infallibly predict that cue ball A will have a certain determinate effect on striking ball B, one can say that if A strikes B and has an effect, then it must be such and such. In the case of the Unicorn there is difficulty because it is not certain what will necessarily count as a Unicorn. So in effect Hegel seems to be implying that what is necessarily determined is essence. The essence of a thing precedes the thing - not as an ontological entity, but, rather, as determined by its world. Perhaps an analogy is the individuation of a thing by the space that it fills or the relations it has. This does not imply that the thing is, but only that if it is it will occupy a space or have relations with others which will uniquely identify it. So although Stace is wrong, Findlay is wrong also for carrying contingency too far. Once X is determined to exist it then follows that there is a reason why X exists and not Y. This is what is implied by Hegel's famous statements that:

What is actual is rational - and
What is rational is actual.

Since the world of determinate Existence, the thing and its properties, is the Actual - as we have just seen - it must be rational. An expression of the situation for Hegel, as it has here been analyzed, is clearly set forward by another rationalist of the Hegelian mold, Brand Blanshard:
For the present, to be sure, the world has a recalcitrant way of rebuffing our attempts to find in it a rational order; we do not know why roses are red or the sky is blue; we do not know, as Hume showed so conclusively, why one billiard ball rolls away when another strikes it. Of course, the idealists were familiar with Hume's arguments. They held that in this matter he was right about what we did know, and wrong about what we might know. Granting that we could not now answer these questions, there must be some reason for the colour of rose and sky; and if billiard balls, rivers and planets follow an invariable course, we cannot suppose this to happen by chance or miracle. Within the unvarying sequence there must be some thread of necessity, and with time reason may isolate it. Indeed, nothing in this world is single; every thing, event, and quality stands in relation to others, and is what it is because of those others. Hence we shall not fully understand it unless we see it in the context of the relations that determine it, and ultimately in the context of the universe as a whole.45

There is no question that nature is less mediated Reason than the state, and the ethical world with its institutions. These latter represent the mediation between the subjective concept and the objective concept. It is mind transforming nature to accommodate itself. But nature, in turn, forces mind to work within natural limitations. So whereas nature per se is Reason as immediate objectivity (though still Rational or Reason), the ethical life is Spirit knowing itself as Spirit. Its object corresponds to its concept. The unity of subject and object is achieved at that point. This implies that subject and object, when manifested as the opposition of mind and nature, will never come into complete correspondence. Nature will always appear to contain some contingency because the rationality, the necessity which underlies it will always be at best only immediate. When it becomes mediated and hence fully correspondent with subjective reason or mind, it is no longer what we call nature but is what we call the ethical or social world. Thus, as we saw in the Geistige Tierreich, the course of the world can provide the occasion for the realization of Spirit, but nature itself cannot be the object of fully rational knowledge - for then we would
not call it nature. What it is necessary to understand is that nature is not an "out there" which is unrelated to mind. When seen as unrelated then it appears as contingent and unknowable. But the object of knowledge and knowledge are not different so the ethical and social world is the objective world raised from the status of mere externality, i.e. nature, to mediated externality or Spirit, or subject-object.

That is why the Logic is the pure form of subjective reason. Nature, when opposed purely to subjective mind, will always be less than fully rational to that subject. Thus the philosophy of Nature can only demonstrate the Concept in its external manifestation because Nature itself has no internal principle as such. Granted, it does include within it the concept of life, but Hegel still does not give life a principle of inner determination. As we have seen, for example, that the plant has its principle of development external to it in the genus, only mind has inner determination: "The highest level to which Nature attains is life; but this, as only a natural mode of the Idea, is at the mercy of the unreason and externality..." 47

There is a difference between something having a necessary existence and something being determined to exist through necessity. The former has its existence as part of its concept - as part of its essence. The latter has its existence determined by the conditions which necessitate the thing. Philosophy is concerned with the former since it is the ultimate content of conceptual or rational knowledge. Thus it can be the object of Absolute knowledge (Absolute knowledge being conceptual understanding which is complete), meaning that no experience could be irrational or fall outside the bounds of conceptual comprehension. Experience is the foundation of con-
ceptual knowledge but not identical to it. There are many occurrences which cannot be totally experienced as necessary because they are the result of the totality of the conditions in which they occur. The philosophy of Nature is intended to show how the world of experience of the natural sciences - the empirical world - can be organized under the totality of our conceptual schemata. Thus, though we cannot be assured of being able to demonstrate the necessity of an occurrence, it can be known to be necessitated if it occurs.

The empirical sciences, knowledge under the form of "Understanding", seek to give laws to the apparent contingency of Nature. Though we still sometimes refer to mere chance happenings as "Acts of God", what we are expressing is our belief that no happening is purely by chance, i.e. there must be a reason why it happened even though that reason is not understood and hence is the result of an inscrutable act of God. But in fact, the development of more and more sophisticated methods of explaining apparent gratuitous or even random natural occurrences has shown that more and more of these have fallen under the explanatory power of the "science" of succeeding epochs. By the 18th Century it was generally accepted that inability to explain "chance" occurrence only demonstrated the limitations of the explanatory theories. It was assumed that given sufficient sophistication or sufficient knowledge it could be shown why an event occurred. Now there is no reason to suppose that this is inconsistent with Hegel's own philosophical science, but he certainly thought that empirical science had its limitations - emanating from the mere fact that its explanations are always in terms of external influences. Of the two defects of empirical science,
The first is that the Universal or general principle contained in it, the genus, or kind, etc., is on its own account, indeterminate and vague, and therefore not on its own account connected with the Particulars or the details. Either is external and accidental to the other; and it is the same with the particular facts which are brought into union: each is external and accidental to the others.

But, even given that empirical science can be assumed to be logically extendable to the point of subsuming any given event under a general principle and therefore to show the conditions for that event to have been actual, it will not have explained the reason for that event. The knowledge so acquired is a low grade of knowing for it is limited to the bounds of experience whereas philosophy proper goes beyond mere experience to find the rational underpinnings of experience itself. Hence the knowledge produced by philosophy is True or absolute knowledge. The special sciences are once removed from mere experience for they demonstrate that the world is not purely the world of the experience of apparently contingent events and things, but a world of law and necessity. Philosophy gathers the special sciences together by demonstrating that the universals demonstrated by the particular sciences have a common base and a foundation of presupposition within a universe.

Because philosophy for Hegel, as for Fichte, is the Science of science, it is necessary that contingency remains part of that rational comprehension; not because there is pure chance in nature, but because contingency is a level of knowing (not a level of things) out of which develops understanding and rational comprehension. The world, including nature, is not an independent something existing "out there" but is only the way in which knowing takes place. If the world contained contingency in the strong sense of completely fortuitous, then the world would have to be independent of mind
in a Cartesian sense because, to some degree, it would have to be independent of concepts. True, we can have the concept of an independent object and in so far as we do have this concept, the object subsumed under this concept is judged to be contingent. Yet it is only conceived as independent and thus is only apparently independent of the conception. When we attain knowledge of the conceptual nature of reality, i.e. when we have conceptual knowledge per se (self knowledge of Reason) that contingency disappears in favor of the Concept in its rational necessity. In other words, because the world is nothing but concepts, then any relations in the world must be necessary because they are part of the logical system of concepts.
Vorstellung and Begriff:
An Analysis of "Revealed Religion"

In chapter 6 (section c) the Hegelian idea of the Concept was discussed in its role as the mediator between thought and being. The Concept has, it was claimed, a foot in both the realm of subjectivity and that of objectivity. Of course concepts are primarily thought of as in some way cognitive. Indeed, for Hegel the highest form of knowledge, philosophical comprehension, is conceptual in nature. The grasping of the Concept as the true reflection of subjectivity in objectivity is accomplished by means of philosophical concepts. However, just what Hegel is referring to by "Concept" in this sense is not easy to appreciate. It has been suggested that the philosophical concept is realized by the expression of subjectivity in the world through the action and work of the individual in society. Clearly, then, the philosophical Concept is not purely linguistic (as discussed in chapter 12., especially footnote 30). It is also the case that philosophical comprehension, what Hegel calls speculative truth, is not to be found in some kind of mental image or representation - what Hegel calls a vorstellung. This kind of "pictorial representation", he believes, can contain basic speculative truth but it cannot ultimately achieve the truth contained in philosophy because it is still tied to its sensuous content. It is in Revealed Religion, particularly in the form of Christianity, that this kind of knowledge reaches its highest expression. Ultimately, however, it is necessary to transcend the truth as thus expressed and arrive at the true
Concept or philosophy. The relation between the truth as expressed in Vorstellungen and that achieved in the Begriff is discussed by Hegel in "Revealed Religion". In order to help bring out this distinction and perhaps thereby help elucidate the meaning of Hegel's "Concept", a selective discussion of this section of the Phenomenology is here given.

The final stage of the development of consciousness towards the Concept is to be found in the section which considers Religious consciousness. In religious consciousness the overcoming of the inherent dichotomy of consciousness is implicit. In religion the Concept has ceased to take on the appearance of mere objectivity and has resolved itself into the full Concept of Spirit. Spirit is the consciousness which has as its content only itself. We, of course, long ago saw the achievement of self-consciousness, but at that level, though consciousness had become aware of itself, it was not aware of itself as Spirit. It was only aware of itself as a consciousness in which appeared a subject and an alien object. With the achievement of Reason, however, consciousness arrived at the realization that both subject and object are the same; or, in other words, that what exists as the content of consciousness is its own alienated self returned to itself. But of course this realization does not come upon consciousness immediately as it achieves this level of spiritual awareness. The consciousness of Spirit must also go through its own dialectic; beginning, as in all preceding cases, with Spirit in its immediacy and culminating with its full concrete realization.

In Natural Religion the content of consciousness, Divine essence, is only implicitly Spiritual. Consciousness does not yet recognize that its content is essentially itself, is essentially Spirit; it sees Spirit in
natural phenomena. What it finds there is itself; though at this stage it does not recognize that the object it sees is itself. The representations of the Artificer, says Hegel,

contain inwardness and existence [Dasein] - the two moments of Spirit: and both kinds of manifestation [of the artificer] contain both moments at once in a relation of opposition, the self both as inward and as outward. Both have to be united...The artificer, therefore, combines both by blending the forms of nature and self-consciousness.

The situation here is analogous to the immediate consciousness we discovered in "Sense-Certainty". Thus, though the dichotomy of subject and alienated object is overcome, this translation into Spirit is as yet only implicit. At the next stage it must become explicit.

In the religion of art, consciousness comes to the realization that its object is itself (Spirit), and Hegel tells us that "through the Religion of Art Spirit has passed from the form of substance into that of subject". He means by this that consciousness recognizes itself in its object and its object thus becomes for it; it becomes a subject. But in this recognition consciousness has caused the unity of Spirit to "pass over to the extreme of self" and "the proposition, which gives this light hearted folly expression, runs thus: 'The Self is Absolute Essence'" This is to recognize absolute being as subject, but it does so by reducing it to a predicate of the Self. We might expect that at this point the dialectic of Spirit has culminated, for Spirit is now self-conscious of itself as Spirit. But this is not the case as Hegel tells us:

The Essence which was substance, and in which the self was the accidental element, has dropped to the level of a predicate; and in this self-consciousness, over against which nothing appears in the form of essence, Spirit has lost its aspect of consciousness.
In saying that Spirit, in the Religion of Art, "has lost its aspect of consciousness" Hegel means to tell us that consciousness which takes Spirit to be itself no longer has any content, and in no longer having content, it no longer has substantiality. The final resolution of this position is therefore comedic. But it is a comedy which has as its source the same despair as the Unhappy Consciousness. For by reducing Substance, or absolute Being, to a predicate of the self it has lost all the significance that the Divine essence had for it. The promenade in its unmasked nakedness is the manifest pronouncement of the cruel words "God is dead".

In natural religion, then, we see the emergence of conscious Spirit. In the religion of art Spirit becomes self-conscious. The final dialectical move will be the unification of the two moments into a new universal in which the concrete and the abstract will find their true expression. This final move will find Spirit revealing itself. In the religion of art Spirit was submerged into the self and thus became subject, but without concrete content. In the final phase the concrete actuality of Spirit will be revealed to consciousness in such a way that consciousness will have self-consciousness as its content. This, according to Hegel, will be actualized Spirit.

Spirit becomes self-conscious, or conscious of itself as Spirit, when it "empties" itself of itself and so knows itself: "For Spirit is the Essence which is the process of retaining identity with itself in its otherness". The dialectic of Spirit alienating or emptying itself of itself in order to know itself; this "other" then becoming self-conscious of itself; and finally this self-consciousness becoming aware that what it is, what it is self conscious of, is Spirit - which is nothing less than Spirit be-
coming aware of itself as Spirit. In other words, Spirit must become con-
crete Spirit, as well as abstract thought-constituted Spirit; and it is the
coming together of these two moments which completes the Concept of Spirit:

Spirit, which is expressed in the element of pure thought, is essentially
just this: not to be merely in that element, but to be concrete, ac-
tual; for otherness itself, i.e. cancelling and superseding its own pure thought constituted concept, lies in the very concept of Spirit.

However, this necessity by which the Concept comes to realize itself
as Spirit knowing itself as Spirit is known, as such, only to us. We have
seen, through the course of the Phenomenology, this process of Spirit emptying
itself, actualizing itself and thus knowing itself and thence returning to
itself as self-knowing Spirit. But the consciousness which is undergoing
this process is not aware of the nature of the Concept which is developing.
It must discover what is contained in the Concept by allowing it to unfold
itself and hence reveal itself to consciousness. Whereas we would expect
that once the revelation is complete, so also would consciousness come to
the acquisition of absolute Knowledge of what it is, this is not the case.
For the revelation of Spirit must still occur for consciousness. Spirit
knowing itself as Spirit must first become the content of consciousness, the
truth of the Concept in consciousness, before this can take place on the
side of consciousness itself.

Religion is the state of consciousness having Spirit as its content, or
as its idea, of the Concept. Thus, it is through the religious consciousness
that it must first work itself in consciousness. Hegel tells us in the
next chapter, "Absolute Knowledge, that:

This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus
proves to be brought about in a double-sided way; in the one case, in the religious mind, in the other case, in consciousness itself as such...this unification has, however, already taken place in-itself, and has done so in religion in the return of the figurative idea into self-consciousness, but not according to the proper form....

In Revealed Religion, then, consciousness attains the true content of the Concept, of philosophy, but not yet in its true form. It is only in the chapter on Absolute Knowledge that we see the movement which occurred on the side of the idea (the content of consciousness) occur also on the side of consciousness itself, thereby fulfilling completely the implicit nature of the Concept. At this point Spirit becomes Spirit both in and for itself. It seems fair to say that the stage reached in Revealed Religion is the stage of Spirit being Spirit only in itself.

Since the dialectic of Spirit in Revealed Religion takes place only in consciousness and not for consciousness, it occurs only in a figurative way. It will actually occur when it transpires for consciousness. In other words, "...philosophy put thought, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate concepts, in the place of the generalised images we ordinarily call ideas". Religion, Hegel tells us, is "...a way of imagining an other". What it imagines is Spirit and the manner in which Spirit resolves its Concept will occur in the imagination of consciousness. We know this, of course, but consciousness does not. Consciousness believes that its figurative representations are actuality and truth.

Since consciousness only sees the Concept as developing in it and has not attained the level in which it develops for it, the moments of the development of the Concept cannot yet appear as they are in-themselves. They can only appear as consciousness is able to picture them as occurring,
i.e. in the natural world. Thus, the three moments of the dialectic of Spirit will occur in a pictorial representation:

This form of representation constitutes the characteristic form in which Spirit is conscious of itself in this its religious communion. This form is not yet the self-consciousness of Spirit which has reached its concept as concept; the mediating process is still incomplete. In this connection of being and thought, then, there is a defect; spiritual essence is still cumbered with an unreconciled diremption into a "here" and a "beyond". The content is the true content; but all its moments, when placed in the element of mere imaginative presentation, have the character, not of being conceptually comprehended, but of appearing as completely independent aspects, externally related to one another. 13

There is then a suggestion by Hegel that the pictorial representations of the dialectic of Spirit are merely figurative ways by which man represents to himself a movement or happening which in reality occurs on a more abstract and more profound level. Thus, Christianity, which is revealed religion, presents pictorially what consciousness at this level is unable to conceptualize. The idea of "Creation", for example, Hegel says "...is the word which pictorial thought uses to convey the Concept itself in its absolute movement...." 14 And at another time he tells us that "...the pictorial thought of the religious communion is not this conceptual thinking; it has the content without the necessity; and instead of the form of the Concept it brings into the realm of pure consciousness the natural relations of Father and Son". 15 So we may well wonder if these Christian images of the mysteries of Spirit are given actualities only to the believing consciousness which the acquisition of true speculative philosophical knowledge will leave behind in their untruth. Such would seem to be the implication, and if the inference is properly drawn, we may well dismiss any suggestion that the Hegel of the Phenomenology was
in any way a defender of Christian orthodoxy.

We might surmise that the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, with which Hegel ends the odyssey of Spirit, may well be the death of God in so far as the Christian religion pictorially represents Him. In that final dialectical move the Christian representation of God is superseded when consciousness knows the truth of the Concept, rather than the pictorial representation, and elevates itself to the realization that History is the concretion of the world Spirit in which it finds its own conceptual actuality.

Yet, though the figurative idea of Christianity is ultimately superseded, it does play its necessary role in the expression of the Concept. The tripartite schema of Spirit, which has already been mentioned in its conceptual form, is expressed explicitly, if figuratively, in the Christian imagination. The myth of the Creation is the expression in pictorial imagery of the self-alienation of Spirit. Consciousness can understand this image whereas only the philosopher who understands the Concept can grasp the self-alienation of Spirit as a concept. Hegel interprets this Christian idea as follows: "Merely eternal, or abstract Spirit, then, becomes an other to itself: it enters existence, and, in the first instance, enters immediate existence. It creates a World". Given that we have a world, we may have some difficulty in understanding precisely how this world becomes the object of self-consciousness. Hegel attempts to account for the myth of the fall of man from Divine Grace and perhaps the later medieval struggle against manicheism and the doctrine of the positive evil through the notion of man, the created, external object, becoming conscious of himself as an object. The fall and the evil are taken to be the expres-
sion of consciousness' accepting the essential reality which the natural has over and against the Divine. Thus, the otherness which has thereby become alienated from the Divine Essence must go through an internal dialectic of its own, culminating in the appearance of Christ who is the final realization of the other as Spirit and who is conscious of this fact. Pictorial thinking characterizes this as the Son who has an implicit Father and a real mother. That is, this self-conscious Spirit is brought forth out of the natural world into implicit unity with Spirit.

But the process of the "other" (Christ pictorially represents the "other") coming into unity with the Divine Essence does not come about through the apotheosis of the one into the other. Rather, Christ represents the unity of man (otherness) elevated to Divinity and the Divine submerged into nature. Hegel puts the matter in this way:

The alienation of the Divine essence is thus set up in its double-sided form: the self of Spirit, and its simple thought, are the two moments whose absolute unity is Spirit itself. Its alienation with itself consists in the two falling apart from each other, and in the one having an unequal value as against the other. This disparateness is, therefore, twofold in character, and two connections arise, which have in common the moments just given. In the one the Divine Being stands for what is essential, while natural existence and the self are inessential and are to be cancelled. In the other, on the contrary, it is self-existence which passes for what is essential and the simple Divine for inessential. Their mediating, though still empty, ground is existence in general, the bare community of their two moments.

The dissolution of this opposition does not take effect through the struggle between the two elements, which are pictured as separate and independent Beings. Just in virtue of their independence each must in itself, through its own concept, dissolve itself in itself.

And the dissolution of each into itself and hence into each other is manifested in the Spiritual being of Christ.

However, Hegel continues in the following, "the struggle only takes place where both cease to be this mixture of thought and independent exi-
stence, and confront each other merely as thoughts. \(^{18}\) By which he means that as long as they exist within separate realities there is no meeting ground for them. Hegel does not seem to offer any necessity for this, but it does permit him to emphasize the importance of the death of Christ and His subsequent ascension into the realm of Spiritual Essence. Hegel's description of this requires another citation:

Therefore that element which has for its essence, not independent self-existence, but simple being, is what empties and abandons itself, gives itself unto death, and so reconciles absolute essence with its own self. For in this process it manifests itself as spirit: the abstract essence is estranged from itself, it has natural existence and the reality of an actual self. This its otherness, or its being sensuously present, is taken back again by the second process of becoming "other", and is affirmed as superseded, as universal. Thereby the essence has come to itself in the sphere of the sensuous present; the immediate existence of actual reality has ceased to be something alien or external to the Divine, by being sublated, universal: this death is therefore its rising anew as spirit. \(^{19}\)

So long as Christ remains a human individual he remains only the immediate unity and Spirit is realized only in him. Upon his death He, through the communion, becomes a universal possibility. Through the communion the self enters into the Christ and through Him enters into Spirit proper. God is consciousness, Christ is self-consciousness and the unity of the two, in which all selves may participate through communion, is Spirit. And by entering the self into union with the Divine Essence, Substance (God) becomes subject (self):

This self-consciousness does not therefore really die, as the particular person is pictorially imagined to have really died; its particularity expires in its universality, i.e. in its knowledge, which is essential Being reconciling itself with itself. That immediately preceding element of figurative thinking is thus here affirmed as transcended, has, in other words, returned into the self, into its Concept. What was in the former merely an existent has come to assume the form of Subject. \(^{20}\)
The sought conversion of the proposition of the Religion of Art that "the Self is Absolute Essence" is realized. The truth of Revealed Religion, of Christianity, is the implicit truth of the Concept. Consciousness can now truly say, if perhaps it does not quite yet know, that the Absolute Essence is Self.\textsuperscript{21}

So we see that in the content of Revealed Religion:

...this figurative thinking retreats from the pure object it deals with, and takes up a merely external realtion towards it. The object is externally revealed to it from an alien source, and in this thought of Spirit it does not recognize its own self, does not recognize the nature of pure self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{22}

The content of religion implicitly contains the truth of speculative philosophy and the final realization of this truth is achieved when the content in its representative form is elevated to its true form, i.e. when its Vorstellung becomes its Begriff.
APPENDIX II

Notes and References

Abbreviations of Hegel's Works Most Often Referred to:

All references to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences are to section numbers. They therefore refer both to the English and German editions. The Felix Meiner edition of the Enzyklopädie, however, does not contain the Zusätze found in the translation.

The parts of the Encyclopedia are abbreviated as follows:
EL - Part 1, Logic.
ETW - Hegel on Religion, Early Theological Writings.
HCE - Heidegger's Hegel's Concept of Experience, which contains a translation of the Introduction to the Phenomenology by K. R. Dove (this translation is used in Chapter 9).
LHP - Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vols. I, II or III as indicated.
LPH - Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.
PG - Phänomenologie des Geistes.
PM - Phenomenology of Mind (Baillie's translation of PG).
SL - Hegel's Science of Logic (Miller's translation of WL).
WL - Wissenschaft der Logik, Vols. I or II as indicated.

Abbreviations of other Works:
CPR - Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Smith translation).
DCS - G. E. Moore's "Defence of Common Sense" (in Chapter 8).
OC - L. Wittgenstein's On Certainty (in Chapter 8).
PEW - G. E. Moore's "Proof of the External World" (in Chapter 8).
SK - Fichte's Science of Knowledge (Heath and Lachs translation).
Chapter 1

Introduction

1. This is in fact an idea with which Hegel is in sympathy and which he tries to make his own. This can be seen in the discussion in chapters 3 and 10. These discussions may be anticipated somewhat by citing the following passage from the Preface of the Phenomenology (PG, p. 48; PM, p. 117): "We must abstain from personal incursions into the immanent rhythm of the Concept; we must not intervene with an arbitrary knowledge acquired elsewhere; this abstention is itself an essential moment of the concentration of attention to the Concept."

2. The role of language in the objective expression of the subjective, i.e. in making thought concrete, is discussed briefly in chapter 11 and in note 31 to that chapter.

3. A discussion of Hegel's rejection of immediate knowledge will be found in chapters 2 and 3 and especially in chapter 6.

4. PG, p. 57; PM, p. 128. This sentiment is to be found throughout Hegel's works and it especially pervades the Preface to the Phenomenology; for example, on PG, p. 48; PM, p. 116, we find a nearly identical statement: "What is important to get across in the study of Science is to take upon oneself the effort of the Concept [die Anstrengung des Begriffs]."

5. Hegel, of course, had many similarities with all of these schools since they were the cultural milieu in which his thought developed. Thus, the Glaubensphilosophie of Hamann, Jacobi and Fries was aggressively attacked by Hegel - especially the latter two. Yet Jacobi paved the way for Hegel's reassertion of Reason over Understanding. Herder, who is sometimes classed in this school had many of the same concerns as Hegel; for example, he had "...a great desire to reconcile opposites..." (H. B. Nisbet, J. G. Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science, p. 2) which will be the major theme of the discussion in this work. Also, Herder might be considered the progenitor of Hegel's use of the idea of organicism and organic analogy. Likewise, it will be seen that though Hegel attacked romanticism generally and Schelling's Identitätsphilosophie in particular, he had an obvious and heavy debt to them.

6. J. N. Findlay, Hegel, A Re-examination, p. 79.

7. For example, as will be discussed in chapter 12, Hegel wanted to allow for contingency as an irreducible element in experience - even in "absolute experience", but the demands of his philosophy as a rational System of knowledge run counter to this desire and require necessity.


9. In the Philosophy of Right, p. 14, Hegel says that "...the Idea [is] the rational factor in any object of study".
10. PG, p. 33; PM, p. 97. The relation between the Logic and the Phenomenology is found in various brief mentions in most of Hegel's works. The primary discussion is perhaps to be found in several points in the Prefaces and Introduction to the Science of Logic. A short discussion can be found herein in chapter 10.

11. Geist can, of course, also be translated as "Mind" and often is. Mind is the highest natural expression of Spirit and the term is appropriately translated as such in some instances (as in the Philosophy of Mind in the Encyclopaedia). There is a point at which the distinction between the two terms is very unclear or perhaps non-existent, so renderings of the term Geist must at times be a matter of judgment.

12. PG, p. 19; PM, p. 80: "In my view - a view which the developed exposition of the System itself can alone justify - everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but precisely as subject".

13. PG, p. 41; PM, pp. 107 - 108. There we find the following statement: "After the still dead, still uncomprehended Kantian triplicity, first rediscovered by him instinctively, was elevated to an absolute significance, then was the truer form in its true content propounded together and the concept of Science emerged. We have seen those who keep to the use of this form for some Sciences reduce it to a lifeless schema, to an essential schema, and Scientific organization reduced to a synoptic table."


15. The inversion of this Kantian distinction and the re-establishment of the primacy of Reason over the Understanding was first effected by Jacobi. Jacobi's use of the term "Reason" was markedly different from traditional conceptions and became more of an equivalent term for Faith or Belief. Hegel returned the notion to a more traditional conception and more in line with Kant's. However, as section III of this work will discuss, Hegel's notion of Reason tended in the direction of Jacobi's and was itself a rather unusual conception. On this question Arthur Lovejoy's The Reason, the Understanding and Time is useful and interesting.

16. See e.g. WL I, p. 6; SL, p. 28.

17. EL 80.

18. EL 81.

19. EL 82.

20. EL 82 Zusatz.

21. EL 82.
22. WL I, p. 6; SL, p. 28.

23. Hegel's relation to Aristotle has been noted by a number of writers; particularly noteworthy is G. R. G. Mure's Introduction to Hegel in which about half of the book is concerned with Aristotle. Such references are to be found in other works as well, such as Stace's The Philosophy of Hegel, Findlay's The Philosophy of Hegel: and Introduction and Re-examination, and Weiss' Hegel's Critique of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind.

24. PG, p. 64; PM, p. 132.

25. This sense of Science Hegel opposes to Fichte's in the following way: "...knowledge is real and can only be set forth fully in the form of Science or as a System; and further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, is yet none the less false just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition or first principle" (PG, p. 23; PM, p. 85).

26. Again, reference should be made to Mure, Stace and Findlay as above in note 23. Kaufmann has made a particular point of this distinction - see e.g. his Hegel: A Reinterpretation and his "Hegel Myth and its Method".

27. PG, p. 24; PM, p. 85.


29. This same position is expressed by Klaus Hartmann. He says: "...the position adopted by Hegel is not an 'as if' position; on the contrary, it asserts the established rationality. Again, this rationality is not omniscience: we do not come to 'know' things we did not know when we read through Hegel's categorial arrangement; we merely learn about the rational explanation of categories. From this angle, Hegel's position in the Logic is an innocuous one, as it cannot possibly conflict with knowledge" ("Hegel a Non-Metaphysical View" in Hegel, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Alasdair MacIntyre, p. 109).

30. For example, in the Science of Knowledge, p. 113, Fichte says the following: "Just as there can be no antithesis without synthesis, no synthesis without antithesis, so there can be neither without a thesis...This, as applied to our system, is what gives strength and completeness to the whole...." See also note 13 above.

31. In Kaufmann's Hegel: a Reinterpretation, p. 160, we find the following statement: "...I am not so much rejecting the dialectic as I say: there is none". But I gather that Kaufmann's analysis is, in the final analysis, not too far different from the one presented in this work. Kaufmann is no doubt rejecting the formalization of the dialectic into that very "Ieblossen Schema" Hegel objects to.

32. EL 81.
Ch. 1 cont'd, p. 4.

33. PG, p. 31; PM, p. 95. Similar sentiments are to be found throughout the Preface. Another very similar one is: "Science can organize itself only through the inherent life of the Concept" (PG, p. 44; PM, p. 111).

34. ETW, p. 289.

35. This conception of a folk religion is very much emphasized by Harris in his Hegel's Development. He is perhaps not being overly enthusiastic in his very extended treatment of this subject for, in its general content, the concept of a folk religion is an attitude which is never completely forsaken by Hegel. In fact, it contains the seminal elements of the quest for unity through mediation. Specifically, it expresses his desire to see man reunited with himself. In order to accomplish this Hegel put forth three 'canons' of folk religion, as Harris calls them, which are necessary in order to reassert the positive unification value which religion ought to have. They are:

1. Its doctrines must be grounded on Universal Reason.
2. Fancy, Heart, and sensibility must not thereby go empty away.
3. It must be so constituted that all the needs of life - the public affairs of the State are tied in with it (Harris, p. 499).

These canons are an explicit attempt on the part of Hegel to introduce the Greek conception of religion into the religion of modern Christianity. The first canon Hegel gets from the enlightened rationalism of his day - especially Kant. The Protestant revolution of Luther, et al. was the beginning of the way back for it asserted the subjective element as opposed to the positive (authoritarian) element of the Church. Of course by the time Hegel was writing this subjective element had overtaken and overthrown the objectivity necessary for the true expression of religious subjectivity. The Rousseauian religion of "sentiment" expressed this tendency (on this see Cassirer's Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, pp. 43ff.) and it was heightened by Hegel's time with the foundation of religion and philosophy on feeling and intuition by thinkers such as Jacobi and Fries.

In becoming so subjective this form of religion remained private and locked up in the individual - the extreme of this being developed by Kierkegaard. As such it was not open to the satisfaction of heart, imagination or sensibility; nor did it provide for the establishment of a real human social life. This may sound paradoxical because these are assuredly subjective elements - at least all but the last. Yet Hegel says that satisfaction of these subjective elements could only be effected by the mediation of a publically external object of religion which could provide the means for religious community rather than religious individuality.

In order to achieve the objectivity necessary for true religious subjectivity Hegel felt called upon at one time to put forth proposals for a re-institution of a popular mythology: "Here I shall discuss particularly an idea which, as far as I know, has never occurred to anyone else - we must have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service of the Ideas, it must be a mythology of Reason. Until we express the Ideas aesthetically, i.e. mythologically, they have no interest for the people, and
conversely until mythology is rational the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus in the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands, mythology must become philosophical in order to make the people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make the philosophers sensible. Then reigns eternal unity among us" (System Fragment of 1796, trans. in and by Harris as "Ein Ethik", pp. 511 - 512). The new mythology is not just a reversion to the ancient Greek mythology for it must also account for the Kantian truth of Reason. This proposal is perhaps a bit too impractical and in the Phenomenology we will find that this form of religious consciousness, though it may have the essential truth contained in it, is criticized precisely for having too much sensibility in it - at that later stage he calls it Vorstellung - and the absolute truth will raise this content to the Concept (see also Appendix I).

Though perhaps naïve, this proposal of a new mythology does indicate that the problem, as Hegel saw it, was to provide for the re-establishment and the re-integration of the objective with the subjective. Harris tells us that "Hegel initially felt that it would be a fairly simple matter to reintegrate the contemporary ideal of enlightened rationality back into the older Greek ideal of a rational harmony of life to which he was always drawn...and it is clear that, when he had finished applying this canon to Christianity, he felt he had among other things, vindicated both the Greeks and Kant" (p. 323).

The three canons bring together the rationalism of the enlightenment with the needs of man to recognize the validity of his imagination and emotion and the reality of his social existence. Then the religion so constituted will become a true religion of the people; it will harmonize essential human nature which hitherto had been sundered and alienated from him. Here, then, we can see that Hegel from the first did not abandon the claims of the enlightenment for the claims of the romantic movement. He sought rather to reconcile them and bring about a philosophical comprehension of the world in which the truth of enlightenment and romanticism, of object and subject, would be harmonized.

This then was the appeal of the Greek religion for Hegel: it harmonized the individual into a true unity of organism - a unity in which each element of human nature and human deed was brought into its proper functional sphere. The felt need for unity and harmony is the most striking fact which is impressed upon the reader of these early writings. The concept of the folk-religion is the most striking example of this need.

36. ETW, p. 304; see also p. 291.

37. ETW, p. 312.

38. See R. Kroner, "Introduction" to ETW, p. 15; see also Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 47 where this point is also made.

39. EL 83 Zusatz.

40. Niel tells us that the term "mediation" does not occur in the early
theological writings, but he also tells us that mediation has an essentially religious origin for Hegel; so it seems reasonable to conclude that the concept of mediation pervaded all of Hegel's thought - although perhaps not specifically as such; see H. Niel, De la Médiation dans la Philosophie de Hegel, pp. 70 - 71.

41. This found in the early (1801) essay of Hegel's: Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie, p. 12.

42. Hyppolite, for instance, agrees with Haering in this. In his "Translator's Preface" to his French edition of the Phenomenology Hyppolite says: "The first volume corresponds, in effect, to what would have been the Phenomenology in the strict sense of the term. Th. Haering, on the occasion of the 3rd Hegelian Congress of Rome, demonstrated that, in its primitive design, the Phenomenology would end at 'Reason', the section with which this first volume terminates". See also Labarrier, Structures et Mouvement Dialectique Dans la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel, pp. 19 - 27. It should also be noted that in the somewhat changed conception of the Phenomenology which appears as a part of the Philosophy of Mind of the Encyclopedia, Hegel ends it with Reason, not with Spirit - although the content of Spirit is transferred to what he calls "Objective Mind".

Chapter 2

From Thought and Being to Subject and Object

1. The section of Modern philosophy in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy begins with Bacon rather than with Descartes. Hegel's development of the problem is therefore the reverse of the one given here. That is, he begins with empiricism and realism and proceeds to Cartesian rationalism. Here we proceed from Cartesian rationalism, as the expression of the first alternative, to Lockean empiricism. The question as to which has priority, or how closely one should follow Hegel's discussion does not need to be entered into here. There will be such anomalies throughout this discussion - for instance with regard to Spinoza, who Hegel lumps with Descartes but who is given separate status herein. The point is to consider the various possible ways of approaching the problem, not merely to describe Hegel's moves in his history of philosophy. It is of greater value to set out the most important representatives of the various positions and to let the question which is the "first" alternative be dictated by that more important consideration than to merely repeat Hegel's moves.

2. LHP III, p. 160.

3. EL 85: "Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which follow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as definitions of the absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God...."
4. In one of the "Additions" appended to Hegel's Philosophy of Right from student lecture notes, we find the following interesting and relevant discussion (p. 232): "It is usually supposed that subjective and objective stand rigidly in opposition to one another. But this is not the case; it would be truer to say that they pass over into each other, since they are not abstract categories like positive and negative but already have a more concrete significance.

Consider first the word 'subjective'. We may call 'subjective' an end which is only the end of one specific individual subject. In this sense a very bad work of art, one which is not quite the thing, is purely 'subjective'. The word may also be applied, however, to the content of the will, and it is then almost synonymous with 'arbitrary'; a 'subjective' content is that which belongs to the subject alone. Hence bad actions, for example, are purely 'subjective'. But further, it is just that pure empty ego which may be called 'subjective', the ego which has itself alone for its object and possesses the power to abstract from any other content. Thus subjectivity sometimes means something wholly idiosyncratic, and at other times something with the highest of claims, since everything which I am to recognize has also the task of becoming mine and attaining its validity in me. Subjectivity is insatiably greedy to concentrate and drown everything in this single spring of the pure ego.

No less varied are the ways in which we may take 'objective'. We may understand by it everything which we make an object to ourselves, whether objective actualities or pure thoughts which we bring before our minds. We also include under this category the immediacy of existence in which the end is to be realized; even if the end is itself wholly singular and subjective, we none the less call it 'objective' on its appearance. But the 'objective' will is also that in which truth lies, and thus God's will, the ethical will, is an 'objective' one. Finally, we may also call 'objective' the will which is entirely absorbed in its object, as for example the will of a child, which is rooted in trust and lacks subjective freedom, and the will of the slave, which does not yet know itself as free and on that account is a will-less will. In this sense any will is 'objective' which acts under the guidance of an alien authority and has not yet completed its endless return into itself.

Here the relativity and changing nature of the terms is more readily accepted because it is mostly in the context of will, morality and judgment. If, however, one is willing to grant initially that there is a legitimate use of the terms "subject" and "object" in the realms of metaphysics and epistemology, then a comparable relativity ought not excite too much opposition.

5. We will see in the discussion of "Self-Consciousness" that Life as such, or in its bare expression as Desire, is the most basic attitude of a consciousness which could be described as a Self-Consciousness. This is because in Desire we find a self-motivating principle. By this internal drive the "other" is transformed into an object for the self; as an animal devours food (an other) in order to sustain itself. This is sufficient to characterize it as Self-Consciousness or as subjectivity - though it is so in a very
Ch. 2 cont'd, p. 3.

basic and embryonic form. This kind of analysis is closely tied up with Hegel's interpretation of End which is to be found in sec. 204 of *EL* under the title "Teleology". He says there in part: "In the End the concept has entered on free existence and has a being of its own, by means of negation of immediate objectivity. It is characterised as subjective, seeing that this negation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the relation between it and objectivity is still one of contrast. This character of subjectivity, however, compared with the totality of the concept, is one-sided, and that, be it added, for the End itself, in which all specific characters have been put as subordinated and merged. For it therefore even the object, which it presupposes, has only hypothetical (ideal) reality, -essentially no-reality. The End in short is a contradiction of its self-identity against the negation stated in it, i.e. its antithesis to objectivity, and being so, contains the eliminative or destructive activity which negates the antithesis and renders it identical with itself. This the realisation of the End: in which, while it turns itself into the other of its subjectivity and objectifies itself, thus cancelling the distinction between the two, it has only closed with itself, and retained itself... Animal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of the End. They are the felt contradiction which exists within the living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this negation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the want or appetite restores the peace between subject and object"; and so on.

6. Compare this with Hegel's discussion of Plant and Animal nature in *EN* 348 to 350.

7. See LHP II, pp. 141 - 143.

8. LHP II, p. 143.

9. And by driving out necessity as well. Hegel sees necessity as not only not contradictory to freedom but essential to it. Here again each side of an opposition is shown to be equally essential: "A freedom involving no necessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this way untrue formulae of thought" (*EL* 35, Zusatz). Here again Necessity is not always a clearly defined concept. Kaufmann claims that "Hegel often uses 'necessary' quite illicitly as the negation of 'utterly arbitrary'" (*Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, p. 11), but I rather think that Hegel again sees it as a somewhat relative term: a causal sequence may seem necessary to an empiricist, materialist or mechanist, but to a teleologist, for instance, it may prove to be only external necessity and not true necessity (see also Chapter 12). In general, for Hegel, Freedom is an attribute of subjectivity while necessity is an attribute of objectivity - presumably because most of the time he sees necessity as mechanical action, causality or determination from without. Abstract freedom, therefore, sinks into pure subjectivity unless it is made consistent with objectivity and hence made concrete. This is why freedom, for Hegel, must be unity with necessity: "...the process of necessity is so directed that it overcomes the rigid externality which it first had and reveals its inward nature. It then appears that the members,
linked to one another, are not really foreign to each other, but only ele-
ments of one whole, each of them, in its connexion with the other, being,
as it were, at home, and combining with itself. In this way necessity is
transfigured into freedom, - not the freedom that consists in abstract ne-
gation, but freedom concrete and positive. From which we may learn what a
mistake it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. Neces-
sity indeed qua necessity is far from being freedom: yet freedom pre-
supposes necessity, and contains it as an unsubstantial element in itself"
(EL 158, Zusatz).

10. EL 23; see, for another similar example, LHP I, p. 26.

11. PG, p. 154; PM, p. 246.

12. Stoical thought, for an example from the Phenomenology, fails to free
itself from the concrete because it lapses into determinate thoughts while
at the same time being unable to express what these are. Determinate thought
is concrete and objective relative to the universality and subjectivity of
contentless pure thought (whatever that might be); see also the discussion
of "Stoicism" in Chapter 3.

13. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy,
p. 1.

14. Hegel recognizes that philosophy exists in the mode of thought and in
the realm of the universal, but he also is careful to note that true ideas
are really concrete and philosophy is precisely the attempt by thought to
go outside itself and make itself concrete; see, for example, LHP I, p. 24.
If philosophy goes primarily in the direction of the concrete and seeks for
truth there, then it is "objective" philosophy and has not self-consciousness.
If it looks only to the essence of thought or mind and its various manifes-
tations, then it is self-conscious but at the expense of the concrete.
Philosophy is Reasonable when it accepts the need to account for both the
conscious and the self-conscious attitudes.

15. Where it is not too awkward to do so I will attempt to use the word
"Reasonable" when referring to the attitude of Consciousness which Hegel
is characterizing in the section of the Phenomenology entitled Reason. The
reason for this is to help distinguish it from preconceptions which the word
"rational" might have. Hegel's is a form of rationalism, but it is not
typical and ought not to be confused with other rationalisms of the episte-
iological sort. This will be clarified in Part III. In those places where
"Reasonable" is awkward or less desirable than "Rational", the important
distinction will still be ascertainable through the use of the upper case
initial "R" for the Hegelian meaning.


17. Others may be given, or perhaps many of the same ones are often given
in different ways. Taylor's list, for example, emphasizes somewhat different aspects: "These then are the oppositions which philosophy must overcome, between the knowing subject and his world, between nature and freedom, between individual and society, between finite and infinite spirit, or between free man and his fate" (Hegel, p. 79). Taylor, however, does not view them as herein as having their ground in a fundamental dichotomy.

18. E.g., man vs. mankind can be put forth as the opposition between the individual subject and the general or universal subject. It is then an easy step to see the former as an object who exists for the universal subject. It is this kind of move that allows Hegel to view the particular as objective relative to the universal.

19. PG, p. 9; PM, p. 67. A more explicit statement of this relation between the universal and the particular is to be found in LHP I, pp. 24 - 25 where Hegel tells us that the abstractness of the universal is made concrete by conjoining it with the particular, and that, we are informed, is the function of philosophy.

20. One of the difficulties in making these kinds of characterizations is that the labels, such as "subjective idealism" or "traditional realism" and such like are simplistic and tend to create the impression that there is an essential difference between the theories which permits separating them under different headings. In fact the most that can be said is that such divisions have general validity only in that, for example, certain epistemological positions tend naturally to have certain metaphysical implications as to how the problem of thought and being will assert itself. For example, empiricism tends toward materialism but is conjoined with idealism in Berkeley. Also, as Chapter 11 discusses, rationalism need not be opposed to empiricism although it is generally thought to be so opposed.

21. Hegel fully agreed with Fichte's statement that "a philosophy whose results do not agree with experience is surely false, for it has not fulfilled its promise to deduce the entirety of experience..." (SK, p. 27).

22. There has been some controversy as to whether the Phenomenology of Spirit represents an introduction to the System of Science or whether it is, as the title page says (some say by virtue of a printer's error) the First Part of the System of Science (see for example the discussions of W. Marx in the forward to his Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and also the first chapter of Labarrier's Structures et Mouvement....) So far as the present interpretation goes the Phenomenology provides both functions. In Chapter 11 is discussed the necessary role of the Phenomenology in making the Logic possible. In that sense, and in the sense indicated here, the Phenomenology provides the rationale for the System and it is therefore an integral part of the System.

23. LHP III, pp. 161 - 162. Fichte put forth the options clearly and concisely also; see SK, pp. 14 and 147.
24. LHP I, p. 25.

25. Some readers have expressed confusion with regard to the word "motility" and have suggested that I meant "mobility". I have chosen the word because it contains the suggestion of movement which originates from within the subject of movement. "Mobility" may contain this meaning as well, but it also refers to any capacity for movement (such as spinning, wobbling or swaying in a breeze) and, it seems to me, especially for movement which is imparted from without. The use of the word "motility" is further reinforced by its connection with "motor", "motion" and "motive". It is a word of special importance in Chapter 10.


27. Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 162.

28. PG, p. 66; PM, p. 135.

29. A good example of this idea is given by Hegel in LPR I, pp. 166 - 167: "I and God are different from one another; if both were one, there would be an immediate relation, free from any mediation; relationless unity, that is to say, unity without differentiation. Because the two are different, One is not what the Other is; if however, they are related, if they have identity at the same time with their difference, then this identity is itself different from both of these, because otherwise they would not be different. Both are different, their unity is not themselves; that wherein they are one is that wherein they are different from their difference. And this implies that mediation takes place more strictly in a Third as contrasted with the elements of difference, and thus we have a syllogism; we have Two who are different, and a Third which brings them together, in which they are mediated, are identical".

30. But C cannot be externally imposed or a third thing completely different from A and B - so what is it then? We will discover that Hegel's answer is that it is the Concept which, like Kant's schematism, is neither fish nor fowl, neither subject nor object but, enigmatically, is both and neither; see also Chapter 6.

31. PG, p. 461; PM, p. 664.

32. In the Zusätze to sec. 32 of EL Hegel opposes the dogmatism of the Understanding to the unifying function of Reason and we are told that "it often happens in philosophy that the half-truth takes its place beside the whole truth and assumes on its own account the position of something permanent. But the fact is that the half-truth instead of being a fixed or self-subsistent principle, is a mere element absolved and included in the whole". In the same vein Hegel criticizes Kant for having put forth the antinomies of reason as opposites which are absolutely separated from each other. The problem is that Kant "...never got beyond the negative result that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the dis-
Ch. 2 cont'd., p. 7.

covery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. That true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual thing involves a coexistence of opposed elements. Consequently to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations" (EL 48 Zusatz).

33. LHP II, pp. 13, 14.
34. PG, p. 372; PM, p. 542.
35. EL 210.
36. EL 213.
37. PH, pp. 314 - 315; PM, p. 459.

38. This notion of the individual repeating the developmental phases of the universal, or the species, was later developed by some of the biological evolutionists - such as Haeckel. For Hegel this is an all important and all pervasive theme. It will be a major consideration in our interpretation of the Phenomenology in general but it is to be found throughout Hegel's works. In the Phenomenology we find it occurring at two levels. That which is to be important for our purposes is the repetition at a higher level of the same development as the "universal" mind: "The individual must likewise pass through the content toward the degree of culture of the universal [allgemeinen] Spirit...." (PG, p. 27; PM, p. 89). We are assured, however, that since the universal Spirit has already accomplished this journey the work is already done for us and we have merely to learn and to recollect it. See PG, pp. 26 - 29; PM, pp. 89 - 92 on this generally; see also Chapter 6.

39. LHP I, p. 107. This relation to and origin in things in Greek philosophy is also perhaps brought out even better in the statement that "in the Greek world what is potentially and actually eternal is realized and brought to consciousness through thought; but in such a way that subjectivity confronts it in a determination which is still accidental, because it is still essentially related to what is natural" (LHP I, p. 153). It is worth repeating that we must remember that when we are dealing with the history of philosophy we are dealing with the history of thought - and self-conscious thought at that, so there will be a fundamental thought constitution of the content at all levels. The real question is, "to what is the thought directed and what problems is it trying to deal with"? In the case of the Greeks, thought is concerned with problems originating in the object, in Scholastic philosophy the problem arises within thought itself, e.g. what is the nature of God - God being an abstract thought-constituted conception. It might be noted again that Greek philosophy itself must go through the three phases before it can be "sublated" by Medieval Christian philosophy - see, for instance LHP I, p. 165. Hegel's point is this: given that there are three general attitudes which consciousness can take up toward its world and that there are three corresponding attitudes within each of these
general attitudes (and so on if necessary), then none of them can be considered true unless all of the alternatives are tried. It is impossible to tell a priori if an attitude is true; it must be taken up and tested by being believed. If it is inadequate to account for all of experience then it must give way to a more comprehensive and more promising attitude. The true or absolute attitude can only be known to be true as well as certain (believed) if it is shown to be the only possible comprehensive attitude which is consistent with all of experience; it can only be demonstrated as such if all other possibilities are attempted and found wanting. See especially LHP III, pp. 547 - 552 for the clearest statement of Hegel's view of philosophy.

41. LHP III, pp. 42 - 43.
42. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos... p. 36.
43. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos... p. 123.
44. LHP I, pp. 106 - 107.
45. Meditations, IV.
47. LHP III, pp. 251 - 252.
48. Reason, we have said, has its own stages of Conscious Reason (relative objectivity), Self-Conscious Reason (relative subjectivity) and Reason. We might therefore say that Spirit is the stage arrived at when Reason has become Reasonable.
49. LPR, p. 258.
50. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter I, Paragraph 2; p. 121 of Vol. I.
51. LHP II, p. 44.
52. EL 38. Note the comment that empiricism "...presupposes and applies the syllogistic form". This is Hegel's way of saying that empiricism is not as purely empirical as it claims but rather presupposes rationality and the conjunction of universal and particular. In Chapter II the syllogism is discussed as representing for Hegel the standard of rationality, and particularly of rationality through mediation. This is because in the syllogism a middle term unites two others. Furthermore, the three terms of the syllogism are universal, particular and individual, each taking the role of middle term in one of the syllogistic forms. The "absolute Syllogism" unites universal and particular through the individual.
Ch. 2 cont'd, p. 9.

54. LHP III, p. 312.
55. See SK, pp. 13, 19.
56. EL 60; also see EL 38 Zusatz.
59. LHP III, p. 256.

60. This conception, we will find, is in fact not much different from Hegel's. The difference is primarily one of emphasis. Subject and object are, for Hegel, not merely two attributes of Spirit, they are Spirit in its historical instantiation.

61. Spinoza, Ethics, p. 86.
63. See Sk, pp. 101 - 102, 117.
64. See PG, pp. 19 - 20; PM, p. 80.
65. See PG, pp. 35 - 37; PM, pp. 101 - 102.
66. See G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 34 - 36.
67. Watson, Schelling, pp. 6 - 7.
68. See Chapters 3 - 5.
69. SK, p. 52.

70. This is justified by the fact that though the understanding was active in so far as it organized the content furnished by intuitions, it was passive in so far as it was not productive of intuitions - see also Chapter 9.

71. PG, p. 179; PM, p. 277. Hegel makes the same point in other places as well, see e.g. EL 42 & 60 Zusatz. Fichte's similar criticism of Kant's "deduction" of the categories is found in SK, p. 51.

72. We may say this because he starts with the consciousness of the self as a thinking self, but Adamson (p. 130) is probably more accurate in describing him as "Spinoza in terms of Kant" - however this description could apply to Schelling and Hegel as well, with at least as much warrant.
Ch. 2 cont'd, p. 10.

73. For example, from SK, p. 65 we have the following: "...objectivity for mere thought is also undoubtedly to be attributed to the self from which the Science of Knowledge proceeds, or what amounts to the same, to the act whereby that self constructs itself for itself. Only through thinking does it obtain, and only for thinking does it possess, the objectivity in question; it is merely an ideal existent."

74. SK, p. 93.

75. SK, pp. 99 - 100.

76. Adamson, p. 158.

77. See, e.g. SK, p. 102.

78. LHP III, pp. 491 - 492.

79. Compare, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 49: "The moral law adds to the negative concept a positive definition, that of a reason which determines the will directly through the condition of a universal lawful form of the maxims of the will. Thus reason, which with its ideas always became transcendent when proceeding in a speculative manner, can be given for the first time an objective, although still only practical, reality; its transcendent use is changed into an immanent use, whereby reason becomes, in the field of experience, an efficient cause through ideas", with this from the SK, pp. 40 - 41: In answer to the question how is one to justify the claim that the intellectual intuition which grounds the Science of Knowledge is real, Fichte says: "This comes about solely by exhibition of the moral law in us, wherein the self is presented a thing sublime beyond all original modifications effected by that law; is credited with an absolute activity founded only in itself and in nothing else whatever; and is thus characterized as an absolute agency. The consciousness of this law, which itself is doubtless an immediate consciousness derived from no other, forms the basis for the intuition of self-activity and freedom; I am given to myself, by myself, as something that is to be active in a certain fashion, and am thereby given to myself as active in general; I have life within me, and draw it from myself. Only through this medium of the moral law do I behold myself; and in thus seeing myself, I necessarily see myself as self-active; and thereby arises for me the wholly alien factor of my self's real efficacy, in a consciousness that would otherwise be merely that of a succession among my presentations."

80. Also, for Hegel Spirit, as Reason made Reasonable, is manifested in social relations, and for him this means in ethics and morals. Therefore Spirit is ultimately realized through a kind of practical Reason.

81. SK, p. 75. On p. 83 we find the following remark which could easily have been made by Hegel himself: "The self as Idea is the rational being, partly insofar as it has exhibited universal reason perfectly within itself, is indeed rational throughout, and nothing else but rational: and thus also
has ceased to be an individual, which it was through sensory restriction alone; partly insofar as it has also fully realized reason outside it in the world, which thus equally continues to be founded in this Idea. The world in this Idea remains a world in general, a substrate governed by these particular mechanical and organic laws: yet these laws are adapted throughout to present the ultimate aim of reason".

82. Schelling too suggested this position with his notion of reason as "...the supreme unity out of which all flows..." (Adamson, p. 73), and the ultimate indifferent identity he identifies with absolute reason: "I call reason the absolute reason or reason insofar as it is thought of as the total indifference of subject and object" (Darstellung Meines Systems der Philosophie, p. 10).

83. Quoted in Adamson, Fichte, p. 156.

84. SK, p. 99fn.

85. SK, p. 104: "As surely as the absolute certainty of the proposition 'not-A is not equal to A' is unconditionally admitted among the facts of empirical consciousness, so surely is a not-self opposed absolutely to the self".

86. SK, p. 33: "The basic contention of the philosopher, as such, is as follows: Though the self may exist only for itself, there necessarily arises for it at once an existence external to it; the ground of the latter lies in the former, and is conditioned thereby: self-consciousness and consciousness of something that is to be - not ourselves, - are necessarily connected; but the first is to be regarded as the conditioning factor, and the second as the conditioned".

87. On occasion Fichte does suggest that a middle term might be sought which would bring the two sides together such as this: "...we must attempt to reconcile the opposites in question. (...) this does not mean that in the course of reflection we are to invent for them some artificial point of union. On the contrary, since the unity of consciousness is posited, together with this principle that threatens to overthrow it, the point of union must already be present in consciousness, and the task of reflection is merely to find it" (SK, p. 124). And again, on p. 225, an explicit suggestion is given: "The conflict therefore lies between the self as such in its two different aspects. It is these that contradict each other, and between them that an intermediary must be found". But Fichte does not take up the suggestion that a mediation is really possible so there is no possibility for him to find an ultimate unity. He therefore draws the conclusion that it is what ought to be sought but which cannot be achieved: "We shall encounter this highest unity again in the Science of Knowledge; though not as something that exists, but as something that we ought to, and yet cannot, achieve" (p. 102).

88. Perhaps more than anything else this pan-moralism (or ethical-ontology)
serves to mark the difference between Fichte and Hegel. Whereas Fichte claims that "...our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not determine what is, but what ought to be" (SK, p. 147), Hegel asserts just the contrary: "No less than Empiricism, philosophy recognizes only what is, and has nothing to do with what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist" (EL 38).

89. Differenz, p. 5.

90. For example, we have this statement from Schelling's Darstellung, p. 17: "There is an original knowledge of the absolute identity and this is posited immediately with the proposition A = A".

91. Of course the two sentiments utilized the same concepts - they merely emphasized them differently. For example, the concept of "universal" was to be found in the Enlightenment as a search for universal principles (as in natural or moral laws) whereas the romantics sought the Universal as a metaphysical reality in its own right as a transcendence of the distinction, difference and pluralism which the Enlightenment stressed.


93. Darstellung, p. 27.

94. See Darstellung, pp. 20ff.

95. LHP III, p. 501.

96. See Chapter 6.

97. LPR, pp. 107 - 108.

98. Kaufmann in "The Young Hegel and Religion" reminds us that "...it deserves emphasis how very close to the spirit of the Enlightenment the young Hegel was" (p. 77).

99. PG, 17; PM, p. 77: "...to arrive at rational knowledge through the understanding is the just demand of the consciousness which comes to Science".

100. From p. 9 of the Introduction.

101. SK, p. 231.

102. SK, p. 238.

103. Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, p. 48.


105. Turgot, "A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human
Ch. 2 cont'd, p. 13.

Mind", in Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics, p. 44.

106. Frankel, p. 125.

107. Turgot, p. 44. He reiterates this belief many times. In one we find the use of an organic analogy such as we later find in Hegel: "In this slow progression of opinions and errors, pursuing one another, I fancy that I see those first leaves, those sheaths which nature has given to the newly-growing stems of plants, issuing before them from the earth, and withering one by one as other sheaths come into existence, until at last the stem itself makes its appearance and is crowned with flowers and fruit - a symbol of late-emerging truth!" (p. 46).

108. Turgot, p. 58.

109. Hegel's criticism of the notion of the "perfectibility of man" can be found in LPH, p. 124ff.

110. Kaufmann champions Hegel's association with the Enlightenment and criticizes those who interpret him as Romantic (see also note 98 above). But there are those who see Hegel as Romantic, for example see Kroner, pp. 20 - 21; Mandelbaum suggests that "if one seeks a common denominator in the rebellion of Jacobi, of Fichte, and of Hegel against Kant's position, one can find it in the fact that not only did each seek in his own way to overcome the dualisms inherent in the Kantian system, but each sought to put an end to the critical, analytic spirit of the Enlightenment" (p. 283). Niel disagrees that Hegel is attempting to bring the two together but instead claims that he is attempting to go beyond both. According to Niel neither the Aufklärung nor romanticism could sufficiently bring about the unifications necessary. I am saying much the same thing but claim that for Hegel the answer was generally to weld the useful elements of both together. See Niel, pp. 13 - 14, 22.

111. In WL I, p. 6; SL, pp. 27 - 28, Hegel states that "philosophy, if it would be science cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere, borrow its method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on grounds adduced by external reflection" by which he has rejected not only the rationalism of the Enlightenment, but also the appeal to intuition of romanticism. "On the contrary", he continues, "...it can be only the nature of the content itself which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing, since it is at the same time the reflection of the content itself which first posits and generates its determinate character". In other words, the content of knowledge has its own immanent development and true knowledge must account for this motility. Rationalism, in other words, cannot be the passive rationalism of the Enlightenment, but must be a dynamic or dialectical rationalism demanded by romanticism: "the understanding determines, and holds the determination fixed; reason is negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive because it gener-
ates the universal and comprehends the particular therein". See also PG, pp. 35ff; PM, pp. 100ff.

112. Perhaps this notion of dialectic and the conjunction of error and truth can be traced back to Schiller who says: "If the manifold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, there was no other way but to pit them one against the other. This antagonism of faculties and functions is the great instrument of Civilization - but it is only the instrument; for as long as it persists, we are only on the way to becoming civilized.... Onesidedness in the exercise of his powers must, it is true, inevitably lead the individual to error; but the species as a whole to truth" (On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, "Letter Six", p. 41).

113. Plant, Hegel, pp. 64 - 65, believes that Hegel got the notion of historical development and progress from Steuart. This may be the case, but it was such a pervasive theme of both the Enlightenment and romanticism that it would seem unlikely to have such a single source in Hegel's intellectual development.

114. This is greatly emphasized by Kojève in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.

115. Fackenheim, p. 37.

116. See Marcuse's Reason and Revolution, especially Chapter 1. This statement is not intended to deny that the Phenomenology may in some way also represent a development toward Freedom.

117. This notion of an Entwicklungsgeschichte des Geistes is also a relatively important consideration for Fichte and Schelling - See Schulz's Einleitung to Schelling's System des Transzendentalen Idealismus, p. xviii.

118. p. 168.

119. There is a supportable claim that Hegel is doing just what Condorcet is here said to be doing, i.e. "observation", but I dispute this in Chapter 10. According to Mandelbaum, the difference between the Enlightenment view of progress, represented by Condorcet, and romantic "historicism" was that the former "...insisted upon the existence of an eternal standard against which specific achievements and errors were to be measured; in other words, it did not find its standard within the process of historical development itself" (p. 53).

120. But Hegel's is not a purely historical account - though it is partly historical. It is primarily a historico-logical account - conceived in much the same way that Rousseau's notion of the natural man was related to "l'homme homme". Also, symptomatic of the changed orientation of both Hegel and his times from that of Condorcet and his times, is the difference in analogical models. Condorcet sees the development and progress of the human mind in mechanical terms as a "well made machine"; Hegel compares it with
the organic development of a plant - see e.g. PG, p. 10; PM, p. 68. A fundamental difference between Hegel and Condorcet is that the latter saw change as essentially superficial while the "substance" remained the same. That is, the human mind, as the well made machine, did not change in nature but only became more refined and more enlightened. For Hegel the development was substantial change. Consciousness itself "grew" as a plant grows and changes its essential nature. So for Hegel the development is fundamental in that it is a basic change in the nature of the thing.

121. This development from certainty to Truth is discussed in Chapter 8.
123. See also Chapter 10.
124. LPR, p. 164: "Knowledge is absolutely simple, but I must know something; if I am mere knowledge, I know nothing at all. It is the same with pure seeing. In pure seeing I see nothing at all. Pure knowledge may be called immediate, it is simple; but if knowledge be actual, be real, we have then what knows and what is known, we have relation and mediacy". Compare this with Fichte's similar statement that "...a thinking that rests upon no intuition, that does not include an intuiting, present in the same undivided moment, is a empty thinking, and indeed no thinking at all" (SK, p. 63), or with Kant's famous dictum that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (CPR, A 51).
125. Fichte says this same thing on p. 68: "From what you take to work on, you will never extract anything but what you already have in it; so long as you otherwise proceed honestly and do not resort to legerdemain".
126. Fichte and Schelling began with an immediate act or positing of the consciousness of the identity of A = A, but again this act is a thought content or is an act of thought.
127. PG, p. 80; PM, p. 150.
129. Fichte made a similar distinction but he denied the ability to start from a fact and avoid dualism - see SK, p. 42.
130. EL 76.
131. In this way he continues the tradition of Fichte, Schelling, Reinhold and others; see Adamson, p. 141 and Taylor, p. 89.
132. EM 389 Zusatz.
Chapter 3

The Phenomenology in its Objective and Subjective Modes

1. PG, p. 31; PM, p. 95; also PG, p. 74; PM, p. 144.

2. See e.g. PG, p. 75; PM, p. 145 and PG, p. 32; PM, p. 96.

3. WL I, p. 53; SL, p. 69: "In this science of manifested spirit [phenomenology] the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous consciousness and this is immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the word; in that work there is discussed the significance of this immediate knowledge. Other forms of consciousness such as belief in divine truths, inner experience, knowledge through inner revelation, etc., are very ill-fitted to be quoted as examples of immediate knowledge...."

4. This notion of the circularity of knowledge and Science is important for Hegel primarily because it is what establishes the content as systematic and demonstrated. Because it is a circle, Science is self-contained and complete. On this basis, conjoined with the idea of organic connection and self-development of the content, Hegel is able to claim that his System is self-validating. This notion of circularity is emphasized more in the Logic and in the very title of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The same idea is also to be found in the Phenomenology however - as this quotation clearly indicates: The development of true reality, we are told, "...is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves" (PG, p. 20; PM, p. 81).

5. In PG, p. 32; PM, p. 96 we find the following: "The immediate being [Dasein] of Spirit, Consciousness, has the two moments of Knowledge [Wissen] and Objectivity as the negative of knowledge. Whilst in these elements Spirit develops itself and displays its moments, it thus approaches this opposition, and all of them appear to it as forms of consciousness [Gestalten des Bewusstseins]."

6. Admittedly this subject - object form may not always appear to be the distinction made in the text. But for the most part it will be shown that this holds if the nature of the Phenomenology is properly understood. Thus, though it has been stated that the three main divisions of the Phenomenology represent objectivity, subjectivity and the unity of the two respectively, this same division can be found within each of these as well. For this reason the three sections of "Consciousness" ("Sense-Certainty", "Perception" and "Understanding") provide the model for the rest of the Phenomenology. They represent within the "objectivity" of "Consciousness", relative objectivity, relative subjectivity and their unity. On this basis the following quotation can be adduced in support of the claim being made herein, rather than offered as contrary to it, as it might otherwise appear: In PG, pp. 549 - 550; PM, p. 790, we find the following: "Consciousness...must have taken up a relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and have grasped its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its
Ch. 3 cont'd, p. 2.

determinate characteristics makes the object in-itself a spiritual reality; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness, when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as itself, i.e. when it takes up towards them the spiritual relationship just spoken of.

The object is, then, partly immediate existence, a thing in general - corresponding to immediate consciousness; partly an alteration of itself, its relatedness, (or existence-for-another and existence-for-itself), determinateness - corresponding to perception; partly essential being or in the form of a universal - corresponding to understanding. The object as a whole is the mediated result of the passing of universality into individuality through specification, as also the reverse process from individual to universal through cancelled individuality or specific determination.

These three specific aspects, then, determine the ways in which consciousness must know the object as itself".

7. EM 387 Zusatz.

8. PG, p. 79; PM, p. 149.

9. PG, p. 80; PM, p. 150.

10. This notion of "immanent critique", often emphasized in Marxist dialectics, is a useful description of the Hegelian technique. However, the critique is less "standard free" than either Hegel or his defenders would perhaps like to admit. See Chapter 10 where this notion is again considered.

11. There is perhaps a parallel here with Kant's theory of the categorical imperative in which one is enjoined to will only those laws of action which are not self-contradictory; see e.g. the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 17 or 30.


14. PG, pp. 80 - 81; PM, p. 151.

15. This is already established by Kant; see e.g. Critique of Practical Reason, p. 46.

16. In the Phenomenology Religion retraces the same procedure as the rest of the forms of consciousness. That is, it goes from Natural Religion to Religion in the Form of Art to Revealed Religion, and this process is parallel to that of the move from the objectivity of Consciousness to the subjectivity of Self-Consciousness to the unity of the two in Reason - see PG, p. 480; PM, p. 694. However, in LPR, pp. 89ff. Hegel discusses the problem of beginning with the universal and developing the proper claims of the particular from this beginning. Also, it may be recalled that in note 1 to Chapter 2 it was pointed out that Hegel's actual discussion of Modern phi-
Ch. 3 cont'd, p. 3.

Sophy did not start with Cartesian rationalism and dualism but with Bacon's empiricism and proceeded thence to Descartes. This indicates that it is not the beginning with objectivity that is important to Hegel but that this beginning was forced upon the Phenomenology by the need to start with Consciousness.

17. See also page 81, Chapter 2.

18. PG, p. 81; PM, p. 151.

19. PG, p. 81; PM, p. 151.

20. Compare this situation with that of Schelling.

21. PG, pp. 81 - 82; PM, p. 152.

22. PG, p. 82; PM, p. 152.

23. PG, p. 88; PM, p. 159; see also PG, pp. 101 - 102; PM, p. 178.

24. "Thought is the activity of the Universal; it is the Universal in its activity, or operation; or if we express it as the comprehension of the Universal, then that for which the Universal is, is still Thought" (LPR, p. 94).

25. PG, pp. 82 - 83; PM, p. 153.

26. PG, PP. 83 - 84; PM, p. 154.

27. PG, p. 84; PM, pp. 154 - 155.


30. PG, p. 89; PM, p. 162.

31. PG, pp. 89 - 90; PM, p. 163.

32. PG, p. 90; PM, p. 163.

33. PG, p. 95; PM, pp. 169 - 170.

34. EL 39.

35. PG, p. 103; PM, p. 180.

36. PG, p. 181, PM, p. 280.

37. PG, p. 106; PM, pp. 184 - 185.
471.

Ch. 3 cont’d, p. 4.

38. PG, pp. 128 - 129; PM, pp. 212 - 213.

39. PG, p. 133; PM, p. 218.

40. Here Hegel parts with Fichte (SK, p. 39), but he accepts Fichte's criticism that to get rid of intellectual intuition is to deny sensory intuition.

41. PG, pp. 134 - 135; PM, pp. 219 - 220.

42. PG, p. 133; PM, p. 218.

43. PG, p. 134; PM, p. 219.

44. Fichte starts analogously to Hegel's Life, but with the notion of the Self as a universal self from which the individual arises through the synthesis with the object or not-self. Fichte distinguishes between self and individual - the former is the distinction from everything outside us; the latter distinguishes ourselves from other persons (consciousnesses). Hegel makes a similar distinction between self-consciousness as the mere finding of oneself in the other, and self-consciousness as consciousness of a consciousness. This is repeated again with the self-aware self-consciousness. See SK, pp. 72ff.

45. PG, p. 135; PM, p. 220. Also compare: "Because in desire I am subject to another, and my Being is in a particularity, I am, as I exist, unlike myself; for I am "I", the universal complete, but hemmed in by passion" (LHP I, p. 100). Compare with Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 9fn.

46. PG, p. 140; PM, p. 227.

47. PG, p. 140; PM, pp. 226 - 227.

48. There is a dependency relationship in that self-consciousness participates in conscious life and what it is, is therefore determined by its relation to what it is not. It is through this determinate negation that its self-consciousness is consciousness of itself. Its independence is therefore only its independence for itself or as it appears to it. In-itself, or what it is in its being, it is determined negatively through the other; for-itself it is independent and the other is inessential to it: "Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is individual. That which for it is other stands as inessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a self-consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life)", PG, p. 143; PM, p. 231.
Marx, of course, made very much of this notion that the slave is actually at a higher level in the development of consciousness than the master - ontologically speaking.

Findlay thinks that Hegel looks for such unlikely places to be higher repositories of truth: "The central nerve of Hegel's dialectic is in fact of this sort: it consists in finding absoluteness, finality and infinity precisely in what at first promised never to be so" (Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel", in MacIntyre ed., Hegel, p. 6). However, although this certainly is true in the case of the Slave, I think it a bit exaggerated to say that such moves are "the central nerve of Hegel's dialectic".

Compare this idea with that expressed by Cassirer in his Individual and the Cosmos... , p. 67: "Man can only be certain that the sense world has form and shape if he continually gives it form. Ultimately, the beauty of the sensible world does not derive from itself; rather, it is founded in the fact that it becomes, in a sense, the medium through which the free creative force of man acts and becomes conscious of itself". Such a
conception, were it taken up by Hegel in the narrow form of relating this self-creating activity to art, would be very close to romantic notions like those of Schelling where it is artistic genius that has the inside track to true knowledge. Hegel, however does not limit this creative activity to art alone, but takes a much broader view and encompasses human activity in general within it. This allows him to make the break from individualism to the social construction of reality.

67. PG, p. 149; PM, p. 238.
68. PG, p. 149; PM, p. 239.
69. PG, pp. 152 - 153; PM, p. 244.
70. PG, pp. 153 - 154; PM. 246.
71. PG, p. 154; PM, p. 246.
72. PG, p. 156; PM, pp. 247 - 248.
73. PG, p. 156; PM, p. 248.
74. PG, p. 156; PM, p. 248.
75. PG, pp. 157 - 158; PM, pp. 249 - 250.
76. PG, p. 153; PM, p. 245.
77. Another example is Rousseau's use of the concept of L'homme de la Nature, which was not intended to be a description of a historical fact but served as more of a "regulative idea" - see Cassirer's Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, pp. 18 - 25.
78. Kaufmann's criticism of Hegel is interesting in that he takes the almost directly opposite view of the problem of reference in the Phenomenology and criticizes Hegel for being too specific! His point is an interesting one and seems to have a good deal of merit. His statement is this: "The real fault is that the overly heavy dependence on allusions makes Hegel's discussions too specific. What ought to be merely a vivid illustration becomes the subject matter itself. It is in this way that the poetic impulse takes over" (Hegel, p. 129). Hegel's descriptions of the "forms of consciousness" - perhaps especially the Unhappy Consciousness - would have fared better had he examined beliefs in general rather than having a specific form of them in mind.
79. PG, p. 159; PM, p. 251.
80. PG, p. 159; PM, pp. 251 - 252.
81. See fn. 6 above.
Ch. 3 cont'd, p. 7.

82. PG, p. 163; PM, pp. 256 - 257.

83. Compare this from the Philosophy of Right, p. 227: "Man is the pure thought of himself, and only in thinking is he this power to give himself universality, i.e. to extinguish all particularity, all determinacy. This negative freedom, or freedom as the Understanding conceives it, is one-sided; but a one-sided view always contains one essential factor and therefore is not to be discarded. But the Understanding is defective in exalting a single one-sided factor to be the sole and the supreme one".

84. PG, p. 177; PM, p. 274.

85. PG, p. 32; PM, p. 97.

86. PG, p. 178; PM, p. 276.

Chapter 4
The Origins of Rationality: The Organic View of the World

1. PG, p. 29; PM, p. 93.

2. PG, p. 30; PM, pp. 93 - 94.

3. PG, p. 30; PM, p. 94.

4. Referring to the "Phenomenology of Spirit" in the Encyclopedia (EM 417 Zusatz), Hegel says: "It is hardly necessary to remark that Reason, which in our exposition appears as the third and last stage, is not merely a last stage that has resulted from something extraneous to it but is, on the contrary, the foundation of consciousness and self-consciousness, therefore the prius, and, by the supersession of these two one-sided forms it proves to be their original unity and their truth".

5. PG, p. 176; PM, p. 273.

6. In SK, p. 75 we find this passage which is reminiscent of Hegel's theory of the development of Reason in history: "In the Science of Knowledge... reason is the only thing-in-itself, and individuality merely accidental; reason the end, and personality the means; the latter merely a special way of giving expression to reason, and one which must increasingly merge into the general from thereof. Reason alone is eternal, on our view, while individuality must constantly decay. Anyone who does not first accommodate his will to this order of things will also never obtain a true understanding of the Science of Knowledge".

7. PG, p. 177; PM, p. 274.
Ch. 4 cont'd, p. 2.

8. PG, p. 177; PM, p. 275.

9. PG, p. 177; PM, p. 275.

10. PG, p. 178; PM, p. 275.


12. PG, p. 180; PM, pp. 278 - 279. Note the similarity between this analysis and that of the Unhappy Consciousness.


15. PG, p. 183; PM, p. 281.

16. PG, p. 185; PM, p. 284.

17. PG, p. 185; PM, p. 284.

18. PG, p. 186; PM, p. 284.


20. This attitude characterizes consciousness in Chapter 5 and is shown to break down because it is impossible to maintain the activity as such without recourse to others, and eventually to ethical values.


22. PG, p. 189; PM, p. 288.

23. PG, p. 189; PM, p. 289.

24. PG, p. 191; PM, pp. 290 - 291.

25. PG, p. 192; PM, p. 291.


27. "Matter" was a technical concept of the physics of Hegel's time, and it was a concept of Schelling's philosophy - see Darstellung..., pp. 43ff and PG, p. 409; PM, p. 592 where Hegel again discusses "pure matter". In that section we find that "pure matter is merely what remains over when we abstract from seeing, feeling, tasting, etc., i.e. it is not what is seen, tasted, felt, and so on; it is not matter that is seen felt or tasted, but colour, a stone, a salt, and so on, we have here the pure essential nature of thought, or pure thought itself, as the Absolute without predicates, undetermined, having no distinctions within it".
30. Here, then, is a parallel step to the transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. In this earlier move we find consciousness going behind the veil of appearance to find pure law and finding instead only itself. In this later move we find behind the inorganic "matters" and "laws" the self determining organism which obeys laws internal to itself rather than laws imposed externally - this organic nature is the first true reflection of Reason into itself.

32. PG, p. 193; PM, p. 294.
33. PG, p. 193; PM, p. 294.
34. PG, p. 194; PM, p. 294.
35. PG, p. 194; PM, p. 294.
36. PG, p. 194; PM, p. 295.
38. PG, p. 195; PM, p. 296.
40. PG, pp. 195 - 196; PM, pp. 296 - 297.
41. See Chapter 3, p. 112.
42. See Chapter 2.

43. Schelling, for one, did see the development of the organic out of the inorganic as a supplanting of the one by the other, but he saw this "organicism" as a means toward proving his thesis of absolute identity, not as a development toward an end; see Darstellung..., pp. 102 - 104.

44. Condorcet may have steered a course in between since although he did not seek an underlying necessity in historical development, he did attempt to view it as an inevitable progression to an end - see Chapter 2.

45. "In the philosophical field they proceed, as in the physical field the physicist; who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties and matters - or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into matters also for the physicist) - and that these
matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another. But the question is, of what kind is this relation? Every peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things, inorganic and living, depend solely on the different modes of this unity. But instead of ascertaining these different modes, the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one, the most external and the worst, viz. composition, applies only it in the whole range of natural structure, which he thus renders for ever inexplicable" (EM 573).


47. Compare from Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws: "can anything be more unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive of intelligent beings?"


51. Leibniz, "Considerations...", p. 589. Leibniz ultimately used the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" to weld causality with teleology - on Hegel's discussion of this see WL II, pp. 65 - 66; SL, pp. 446 - 447; on the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Hegel, see Chapter 12.

52. See e.g. Frankel, pp. 85, 125, 154 - 156.

53. Translated by James Ellington, pp. 6, 7.

54. Part II of Meredith's translation, p. 22.


60. WL II, pp. 384 - 385; SL, pp. 734 - 735. Compare with G. H. R. Parkinson's "Hegel's Concept of Freedom", p. 77 where he says that "... Hegel discusses...the question whether explanation in terms of ends can be reduced to explanation in mechanical terms. In his answer, Hegel does not deny that mechanical explanations can in principle be given of all human acts. He does, however, deny that this is the whole story. Human acts,
Ch. 4 cont'd, p. 5.

he seems to say, are to be explained both in mechanical terms and in terms of ends, but he adds that the latter type of explanation is more complete and more coherent".

61. This could perhaps be seen as the result of, or implication from, Kant's antinomies and his breaking up of the world into two realms. The antinomies are then solved by giving two different principles validity in their separate realms.


63. PG, p. 73; PM, pp. 142 - 143.

64. This notion of truth is also discussed in Chapter 8.

65. PG, pp. 74 - 75; PM, pp. 144 - 145.


67. EL 135 Zusatz; see also 156 Zusatz.

68. PG, p. 21; PM, p. 81.


70. PG, p. 218; PM, pp. 324 - 325.

71. A contrary view which holds that Hegel did consider ultimate reality (Spirit) to be an organism has been put forward by some commentators; see e.g. Pringle-Pattison, The Development from Kant to Hegel, p. 80 and Caird, Hegel, p. 38.

72. See LPR, p. 176.

73. PG, p. 253; PM, p. 370.

74. PG, p. 283; PM, p. 414.

Chapter 5

Dualism Overcome Through Rational Activity:

The Social Construction of Reality

1. PG, p. 175; PM, p. 272.

2. PG, p. 175; PM, p. 272.

5. We might say that in this chapter we find the transition from theoretical to practical Reason. In Kant, Fichte and Schelling we find emphasis on the primacy of practical reason and action - see Mead, pp. 106ff, Royce, pp. 99 - 100, Watson, pp. 110 - 111. Hegel did not as such make the distinction which Kant and Fichte made between theoretical and practical reason, but there is a parallel with Hegel's move from Reasonable consciousness to Spirit. In effect we move from attitudes of consciousness to concerns of consciousness, or, in other words, from knowledge in the form of thinking about the world to knowledge in the form of acting in the world. It is in this last chapter of Reason that these two are implicitly united.

7. PG, p. 283; PM, p. 414.


14. For example, see the respective commentaries of Hyppolite, Findlay and Kojève on this section of the Phenomenology.

15. This is very like Schelling's position (see Mead, p. 111) and to a certain extent Hegel agreed with it; adding, however, the social dimension. This chapter may be, in part, a criticism of Schelling and the romantic emphasis on the particular (individual).

17. Hegel called this type of attitude "honest" - presumably referring to the notion of the "honnête homme" as the "proper gentleman", the neoclassic man, who disdained any claim to originality or genius but preferred to be what "one ought", as determined by the standard of the time.

18. PG, pp. 299 - 300; PM, p. 437.
19. PG, p. 300; PM, p. 437.
20. Essentially the same analysis is given by Hegel in the chapter "Consciousness" on PG, pp. 450 - 451; PM, pp. 65 - 651.


22. In this way the individual also realizes true or concrete freedom.

23. PG, pp. 315 - 316; PM, p. 460.

24. PG, p. 313; PM, p. 458.


26. WL, pp. 110 - 111; SL, p. 123. Also, in the LPR, p. 194, Hegel called philosophy "thinking Reason". We may say that man is philosophical or that he is thinking Reason when he recognizes himself as the Universal.


28. Philosophy of Right, p. 10; also EL 6. See also Mandelbaum, pp. 280 - 281.


Chapter 6
The Philosophy of Radical Mediation

1. PG, p. 22; PM, pp. 83 - 84: "The result is the same as the beginning solely because the beginning is purpose; - or the actual is therefore only the same as its concept, since the immediate, as purpose, has in itself the self or pure actuality. The realized purpose, or the existent actual, is movement and unfolded development. Even this unrest is the self, however, and it is the same as that immediacy and simplicity of the beginning since it is the result which has returned to itself. This returning back to itself, however, is just the self and the self is the self-relating identity and simplicity".

2. PG, p. 32; PM, p. 96.

3. PG, p. 24; PM, p. 86.

4. "A plain, positive answer cannot be given to the question whether the world has, or has not, a beginning in time. A plain answer is supposed to state that either the one or the other is true. But the plain answer is, rather, that the question itself, this 'either-or', is badly posed" (EN 247 Zusatz). In other words, this Kantian antinomy arises because of
certain categorial ways of thinking - in this case the dogmatic assumption that finitude and infinitude are absolute categories of thought which divide up the spatial and/or temporal domain between them (recall the discussion on p. 160 herein). Hegel denies that this way of thinking has the highest truth value; it is characteristic of Understanding rather than Reason. In the same way this question of why self-alienation of Spirit occurs assumes that an answer can be given in terms utilized by Understanding. This is all very well but unfortunately Hegel also never really gives us an answer which will satisfy the demands of reason - except to say that without its self-alienation Spirit would not be Spirit, i.e. that the Concept of Spirit contains non-identity as well as identity. Still, to say the questions are misleading and unanswerable as such has meaning in so far as they demand answers which are not "speculative" (in the Hegelian sense) or which are given in terms of "Vorstellungen" rather than the "Begriff" (as discussed by Hegel in the section of the Phenomenology, "Revealed Religion". This section is discussed from this point of view in Appendix I).

5. Findlay, Hegel, p. 36.

6. For one thing, as has been shown, Spirit cannot be an originally thinking thing without assuming a one-sided standpoint from the beginning.

7. Taylor, Hegel, p. 100.

8. Fichte, of course, thought otherwise.


10. PG, p. 564; PM, p. 808.

11. EL 96 Zusatz.

12. See Appendix I in which the section "Revealed Religion" is discussed. We find that religion has the same content as Absolute Knowledge but we find it there in the form of an "imaginative representation" rather than as the Concept. In Religion, then, "'Creation' is the word which pictorial thought uses to convey the Concept itself in its absolute movement...." (PG, p. 536; PM, p. 769).


14. PG, p. 409; PM, p. 593, see also PG, p. 410; PM, p. 594.

15. This is similar to Hegel's concept of Being in the Logic - see also Chapter 9 herein.

16. The Logic gives the a priori structure and content of both mind and nature - that is why Hegel can say that "Logic...coincides with Metaphysics..." (EL 24). Of course this makes it appear that it is only the
intellectual function of mind that has any claim to reality if mind is nothing but concepts. But Hegel takes the broad view of Mind and includes within it the emotive and vegetative functions as well, like those of feeling and willing. These other functions, however, appear as ways of representing objectively the conceptual structure of Mind. Thinking is the highest form of this activity - or perhaps more precisely we might say that intelligence is the highest form of thinking which is the essence of Mind and therefore of all of its functions: "If thought is the constitutive substance of external things, it is also the universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human perception thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of conception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in willing, wishing and the like" (EL 24 Zusatz).

17. We can begin to see here what kind of idealism Hegel's is. It clearly is not like that of Berkeley, for there is no dependence upon the thinking for things to exist. To be more accurate, natural objects are dependent upon thought but only in the same way that thought is dependent upon objects. Hegel criticizes Kant for being a "subjective idealist" because, according to his interpretation (which dismisses things-in-themselves), both subjectivity and objectivity are essentially supplied by the Ego. Hegel, however, goes on to find much of value in the Kantian form of "subjective idealism" and his own formulation differs in being more Spinozistic. Hegel tells us that "it might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that objects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to the subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain by the mere fact that they possessed being. The main point is not, that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content is true....Laying aside, therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: i.e. its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective" (EL 42 Zusatz). Since both subject and object are the two sides of Spirit, they are both two sides of the same reality; that is, they both express the Logical structure of absolute Spirit.

18. Of course the highest forms of natural being express a greater degree of internal relation. The Philosophy of Nature, though beginning with Mechanics and proceeding to Physics, ends with Organics and the Animal Organism as the highest natural form. This is not surprising considering Hegel's treatment of organicism in the Phenomenology.

19. As we know from Chapter 5 it is definitely our knowledge of being that makes it what it is. Again, Hegel's is not a subjective idealism in which things are dependent upon their being thought per se. But the world is different for each consciousness of it. It takes on objectivity and universality by being a world of shared experience. The scientific world, for example, is the reflection of the concepts which the scientific community uses to describe and understand its world. They are, of course, only a part of the larger community of acting and understanding which finds its objectivity in ethical rules and in the state. These, as uni-
versals, encompass the particularity of the individuals within them.

20. PG, p. 128; PM, p. 211.

21. EL 24 Zusatz: "To speak of thought or objective thought as the heart and soul of the world, may seem to be ascribing consciousness to the things of nature. We feel a certain repugnance against making thought the inward function of things, especially as we speak of thought as marking the divergence of man from nature. It would be necessary, therefore, if we use the term thought at all, to speak of nature as the system of unconscious thought, or, to use Schelling's expression, a petrified intelligence."

22. Logic as a kind of observation is criticized by Hegel in the section of the **Phenomenology** dealing with "Observation by Reason".

23. "Knowledge is absolutely simple, but I must know something; if I am mere knowledge, I know nothing at all...Pure knowledge may be called immediate, it is simple; but if knowledge be actual, be real, we have then what knows and what is known, we have relation and mediacy" (LPR, p. 164).

24. See also the discussions of **Wissenschaft** and **absolutes Wissen** in the Introduction, pp. 12 and 13.


26. See the citation in chapter 2, pp. 72 - 73.

27. PG, p. 20; PM, pp. 80 - 81.

28. PG, p. 19; PM, p. 80; see also chapter 1, fn. 12.

29. PG, p. 21; PM, pp. 82 - 83.

30. PG, p. 53; PM, p. 123.

31. WL I, p. 6; SL, p. 28.

32. PG, pp. 29 - 30; PM, pp. 93 - 94. See also WL I, pp. 136 - 137; SL, pp. 146 - 147, where we are told that mediation represents the negation of the negation.

33. But, of course, for Hegel the positing of the other cannot be dependent upon, or secondary to, the positing of the self or the result would not be an overcoming of the opposition. Recall chapter 2, section g.

34. LHP III, p. 501, also cited in chapter 2, p. 72.


36. EL 75.
37. See chapter 1, p. 19.

38. LPR I, p. 58; See also pp. 111, 161, 162.

39. LPR I, p. 163.

40. EL 70.

41. PG, p. 564; PM, p. 808.

42. See appendix I on Revealed Religion.

43. EM 73.

44. PG, pp. 563 - 564; PM, p 807.

45. See also chapter 2, fn. 38.

46. PG, p. 28; PM, p. 91.

47. PG, p. 27; PM, pp. 89 - 90.

48. PG, p. 28; PM, p. 91.

49. PG, p. 39; PM, pp. 105 - 106.


51. See appendix I.

52. EN 258: "Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly [to space] an out-and-out abstract, ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it is, is not, and inasmuch as it is not, is: it is Becoming directly intuited; this means that differences, which admittedly are purely momentary, i.e. directly self-sublating, are determined as external, i.e. as external to themselves."

53. EN 258 Remark.

54. LPR I, p. 74; see also EN 257 Zusatz.

55. PG, p. 57; PM, p. 128. It should be pointed out that Hegel also uses the term "concept" in its ordinary sense - what he sometimes calls a "mere" concept. In such cases he means the abstract general idea which philosophy usually concerns itself with. This represents, to Hegel, only one side of what he means by "Concept" in the technical or truly philosophical sense.

56. PG, p. 48; PM, p. 116.
62. It might seem that Hegel would have to accept the idea that concepts are socially relative because they are socially determined (in the manner described in chapter 5). To a certain extent he probably would have to agree, but it is perhaps more accurate to say that, though societies (in so far as they relate to the Gestalten of consciousness) use different conceptual frameworks as the context for comprehending the world, the concepts themselves don't change - only the schema or framework changes. This means that though the understanding of the world may vary from culture to culture (or Gestalten to Gestalten) and/or epoch to epoch, the fundamental structure of Reason which underlies the conceptual context of understanding is invariable, but the development of Reason's manifestation in the world through the evolution of conceptual knowledge is variable.

63. See appendix I where the relation between religion, as the truth in the form of Vorstellung, is compared with philosophy, which has the absolute truth in the form of Begriffe. Clark (Logic and System, p. 28) says that Vorstellung is the mediator between thought and its object and that "...Vorstellung must be seen both as thought and as the "other" of thought". This is no doubt the case in that a "pictorial idea" or mental image has a sensuous as well as an intellectual content. But it does not complete the job of making both thought concrete and objects cognized. This is the undertaking of the Begriff.

64. CPR, p. 180.

65. CPR, p. 181.

66. CPR, p. 181.

67. The similarity between the notion of Concept in the Phenomenology and the Logic has already been mentioned (chapter 2). The Concept in the Logic was described as "...the overt unity of subject and object". The two-sided nature of the Logical Concept is also similar to the Concept of the Phenomenology. However, it is still incomplete and one-sided at this point because Logic has not yet gone outside of thought in true concrete form. This it does in Nature.

68. In other words, it was a necessary form of intuition - without it there could be no conscious activity at all. It therefore is presupposed by cognition.
Ch. 6 cont’d, p. 7.

69. CPR, p. 185.

70. CPR, p. 182.

71. Kojève, p. 142fn.

72. pp. 213 - 214 above. Hegel goes even further than this and tells us that "...time...is the Concept itself in the form of existence" (PG, p. 38; PM, p. 104). In EN 258 we get a somewhat different picture of this. Hegel there tells us that "Time...has no power over the Concept, nor is the Concept in time or temporal; on the contrary, it is the power over time, which is this negativity only qua externality". And in the Zusatz to the same section he says that "the Idea, Spirit, transcends time because it is itself the Concept of time; it is eternal, in and for itself, and it is not dragged into the time-process because it does not lose itself in one side of the process". According to this, then, the Concept must develop in time until it becomes fully actualized in Spirit - at which time it transcends time and becomes Recollection.

73. PG, pp. 563 - 564; PM, pp. 806 - 808.

74. PG, p. 558; PM, p. 800.

75. See Fackenheim's discussion of this mediation in chapter 4 of his The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought.

76. LPR, pp. 112 - 113.

Chapter 7

Knowledge and Truth

1. F. G. Weiss, in his Forward to Beyond Epistemology.

2. W. H. Walsh, Reason and Experience, p. 3.

3. Walsh, p. 3.

4. Walsh, p. 3.

5. Findlay, Hegel, p. 94.

6. EL 213. Also note the use of "concept" here in a subjective sense, much more like its ordinary use rather than Hegel's technical use of the term as described in chapter 6 (see also chapter 6, fn. 55). This is quite common and often makes understanding of the text difficult.
Ch. 7 cont'd, p. 2.


8. Of course Hegel would argue that what they are doing is not really philosophy.

9. EL 213.

10. EL 172. Hegel also discusses the propositional judgment and makes much the same point—though he relies on using the form of "is" as the "is of identity"—sometimes in ways and instances which are suspect. See also WL I, pp. 76 – 77; SL, pp. 90 – 91, and PG, p. 51; PM, p. 120.

11. EL 172 Zusatz. In ordinary usage "truth" can mean either correctness or genuineness. Most philosophical theories of truth identify it with the former and neglect the latter. Hegel, however, does just the opposite and sees truth as genuineness and whereas correctness, for him, is just mere correctness. Mure's description of this Hegelian notion is good: "Truth is genuineness, not the formal coincidence of the object, whatever its content, with our Vorstellung, but it accordance with itself, with what it ought to be or with its own true nature. We can have a correct Vorstellung of a sick man or a thief, or of a bad political constitution, but these are all false, not true. A mere qualitative judgment like 'this rose is red' may be correct, but it is philosophically neither true nor false, because it implies no criterion of value" (Philosophy of Hegel, p. 21). Because of this normative conception of truth Hegel would very much agree with Aristotle's statement that "...the mathematical sciences take no account of goods and evils" (Meta., Bk 2) and they are therefore not qualified to pronounce upon truth.

12. This position is very much like that of Bosanquet, who said: "There are places for all predicates; and when all predicates are in their place, none of them is contrary to any other. It is the bringing them together, on an inadequate basis of distinction, which is the essence of contradiction and contrariety; and this may happen with any diverse terms whatever" ("Contradiction and Reality", p. 2).


14. Compare with Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, p. 11; see also chapter 4, pp. 162ff herein.

15. Jacob Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology, p. 6. Compare EL 32 Zusatz: "It often happens in philosophy that the half-truth takes its place beside the whole truth and assumes on its own account the position of something permanent. But the fact is that the half-truth, instead of being a fixed or self-subsistent principle, is a mere element absolved and included in the whole".

16. PG, p. 21; PM, pp. 81 – 82. See also EL 14 and for the relation of this to the philosophy of history, also PG, p. 10; PM, p. 68, also fn. 42.
in this chapter.

17. PG, p. 31; PM, p. 95: "This movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific procedure in general. Looked at as the concatenation of their content, this movement is the necessitated development and expansion of that content into an organic whole. By this movement, too, the road, which leads to the concept of knowledge, becomes itself likewise as necessary and complete evolving process...."

18. Philosophy of Right, p. 11. Also compare Walsh, p. 173: "Every category has a content of its own: it is an attempt to provide a definition or characterization of the Absolute, to say what reality is as a whole. So regarded, every category is a simple or single idea. But every category contains, despite this, the seed of its successor, and so is complex. And the contradiction which breaks out inside any given category arises from the fact that no two concepts of this kind can in the last resort tolerate each other's presence. Each category is a partial definition of the Absolute, and so must clash with other categories. So far as they (or any of them) are right, it is wrong".

19. PG, p. 58; PM, p. 129.

20. "Within its own limits, each of these forms is the truth" - Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 152.

21. PG, p. 40; PM, p. 106.

22. HCE, p. 7; PG, p. 63; PM, p. 131.

23. HCE, pp. 7 - 8; PG, p. 63; PM, p. 131.

24. HCE, p. 8; PG, p. 63; PM, p. 131.

25. HCE, p. 10; PG, p. 64; PM, p. 132.

26. HCE, p. 10; PG, p. 64; PM, p. 132.

27. HCE, p. 10; PG, p. 65; PM, p. 133.

28. HCE, p. 10; PG, p. 65; PM, p. 133.

29. PG, p. 267; PM, p. 392.

30. PG, p. 268; PM, p. 393.

31. LHP I, p. 37.

32. PG, p. 26; PM, p. 89.

33. PG, p. 27; PM, p. 90.
34. PG, p. 27; PM, p. 90.

35. PG, p. 102; PM, p. 178: we find that, for example, when "Understanding" tries to maintain the truth of its "moments" it is discovered that "...it does not secure them their truth, but convicts itself of untruth".

36. WL II, p. 56; SL, p. 437: "Truth also is the positive as the knowing that agrees with the object; but it is only this likeness to itself in so far as the knower has put himself into a negative relation with the other, has penetrated the object and sublated the negation which it is. Error is a positive, as an opinion asserting what is not in and for itself, an opinion that is aware of itself and asserts itself".

37. PG, p. 10; PM, p. 68.

38. PG, p. 10; PM, p. 68.

39. See LHP I, p. 15.

40. See chapter 10 section d: "Transcendence of Belief". Of course Hegel himself believed that his position was the most comprehensive and complete account of experience possible. He may therefore be accused on his own grounds of stopping the dialectical process. In his favor, however, he at least recognized this and admits that he must demonstrate that his position actually completes the process and does attain absolute knowledge. This is shown, Hegel believes, because his Phenomenology is systematic and therefore displays every possible Gestalt and shows their organic connection.

41. HCE, pp. 10 - 11; PG, p. 65; PM, p. 133.

42. Here Hegel appears to be contradicting what was said before. But it is only a superficial contradiction. Hegel's denial of a truth which is not absolute is done for emphasis and nothing is lost by talking of truth which is other than and less than absolute truth so long as it is realized that a lesser truth cannot be totally satisfactory. Hegel is taking an extreme position to combat possible or actual complacency. Furthermore, the "relative truths" referred to previously were not different in kind but only in completion. Therefore, it is still possible, in a Hegelian context, to speak of finite, incomplete, or degrees of truth so long as one does not confuse such talk with kinds of truth. Socrates would say that these degrees of truth partake in Truth but are not themselves Truth; just as we can enumerate virtuous acts or just acts; they are rightly so called only if we do not believe that in seeing the particulars we have seen Virtue or Justice themselves. This is also misleading, however, since the Platonic conception places Reality in the universals whereas Hegel sees Truth as the particular expressions of truth when they are gathered together into an organically unified goal: "For the truth is concrete, that is, whilst it gives a bond and a principle of unity, it also possesses
Ch. 7 cont'd, p. 5.

an internal source of development. Truth, then, is only possible as a universe or totality of thought...Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production...Apart from their interdependence and organic union, the truths of philosophy are valueless...." (EL 14). Truth, then, is the whole of the scientific system of it, but there are "finite" or limited truths which are truths for consciousness at a particular stage in its development. When the truth for consciousness attains to the organic, scientific conception of its object, then the truth for consciousness is Truth: "...the Truth thus determined within itself is impelled towards development. It is only the living and spiritual which internally bestirs and develops itself. Thus the Idea as concrete in itself, and self-developing, is an organic system and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of moments in development. Philosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this development, and as conceiving Thought, is itself this development in Thought. The more progress made in this development, the more perfect is the Philosophy" (LHP I, p. 27).

43. HCE, p. 13; PG, p. 66; PM, p. 135.
44. HCE, p. 13; PG, p. 67; PM, p. 135.
45. HCE, p. 13; PG, p. 67; PM, p. 135.
46. HCE, p. 13; PG, p. 67; PM, p. 135.
47. HCE, pp. 13 - 14; PG, p. 67; PM, p. 135.
48. See also chapter 10, section c.
49. PG, p. 102; PM, p. 178.
50. HCE, p. 15; PG, p. 68; PM, p. 136.
51. HCE, p. 15; PG, p. 68; PM, p. 137.

Chapter 8

The Development from Certainty to Truth

1. E.g., as they do for Freud. Of course even these kinds of experience are conditioned and limited by the logical categories, so a critique of the a priori conditions of knowledge would be a critique of these things as well.

2. PG, p. 73; PM, p. 142.

3. EM 490 Zusatz.
4. PG, p. 556; PM, pp. 797 - 798. Many other citations expressing this idea could be given; one of the best is to be found in WL I, p. 30; SL, p. 49: "The Concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the truth of mode of consciousness because, as the course of the Phenomenology showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the object from the certainty of self is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth".

5. See the citation in chapter 2, p. 108. Also note the beginning of each of the three stages we have considered in the Phenomenology. We found at the beginning of each section, "Consciousness", "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason", that some claim always came first as an absolute certainty. In the first section we had first to examine "Sense-Certainty" (die Sinnliche Gewissheit); the second section began with "The Truth of Self-Certainty" (die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst); and in the final section the first encounter was with the "Certainty and Truth of Reason" (Gewissheit und Wahrheit der Vernunft). In each of these forms, and in the other Gestalten besides, we have seen what happens when, according to Hegel, certainty becomes confused with truth and knowledge, and therefore with experience as a whole. That is, these claims to certain, true knowledge are claims to give an adequate account of the whole of experience. It is shown, however, that they cannot do so and that they must therefore be abandoned in favor of a more comprehensive claim. This is what gives the movement and the justification to the investigation of the Phenomenology.

6. Moore is one of those who sees truth to be what Hegel would call correctness, so in comparing the two of them we are not always looking at the same concept in each case. This difference between the concepts used - particularly with regard to "truth" - is not unique to Hegel and Moore but is a fundamental difference to be found throughout philosophical speculation. The difference cannot be merely overcome by agreeing on definitions, however, since much of the point of these arguments is to convince others that this is the proper concept of truth. The comparison between Hegel and Moore is perhaps closer however since Moore believes that he is using the concept "truth" in a way which is absolute: "Some philosophers seem to have thought it legitimate to use the word "true" in such a sense that a proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true; and some of these, therefore, would perhaps say that propositions like those enumerated in (1) are, in their view, true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false. I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I am not using "true" in any such sense. I am using it in such a sense (and I think this is the ordinary usage) that if a proposition is partially false, it follows that it is not true, though, of course, it may be partially true. I am maintaining, in short, that all the propositions in (1), and also many propositions corresponding to each of these, are wholly true" (DCS, pp. 35 - 36).
7. Another, similar list, is given in "Certainty" in Philosophical Papers. It is interesting how Hegel, though concerned with a different kind of common sense philosophy, often anticipates a criticism of Moore — as here where he says: "while flowing along in the restful bed of common sense, natural philosophy gives at best a rhetoric of trivial truths" (PG, p. 55; PM, p. 127).

8. DCS, pp. 34 - 35.


10. DCS, pp. 44 - 45.

11. DCS, p. 43.


13. DCS, pp. 53 - 54.

14. DCS, p. 53.

15. Klemke, in the Epistemology of G. E. Moore, lists 4 criteria used by Moore for determining what is or is not Common Sense knowledge. Here we have dismissed nos. 1, 2 and 4 as really boiling down to mere assurance of some kind. The third criterion is rather more substantial and is considered further along. The four criteria Klemke gives are (1) universal acceptance; (2) compulsive acceptance; (3) inconsistency upon denial; (4) self-evidence (see Klemke, pp. 21ff).

16. OC, sec., 410.

17. PG, p. 54, PM, pp. 124 - 125.

18. PG, p. 177; PM, p. 275.

19. PG, p. 56; PM, p. 127.


21. See, e.g. DCS, p. 55.


23. At the end of his chapter in Some Main Problems of Philosophy entitled "Material Things", Moore says "All this, I am aware, is only strictly an argument in favour of the position that we do not know that we do not know of the existence of material objects" (p. 144).

25. This interconnection between the two is explicitly put in "Certainty" (p. 242) where Moore, referring to the list of propositions put forth at the beginning (roughly corresponding to his list of Common Sense propositions in DCS), says the following: "I am going to refer to this common feature of all those seven propositions, by saying that they were all of them propositions which implied the existence of an external world - that is to say, of a world external to my mind".

26. DCS, p. 42.

27. See above, p. 262.

28. OC, sec. 262.

29. Moore, PEW, p. 150.

30. Moore's general position is the kind of empiricism which is probably closer to that discussed by Hegel in "Perception" than anywhere else. The "thing" of Perception, in Moore's case, is an object "met" with in space, i.e. a thing of many properties. But Moore's equation of certainty with truth, though a characteristic of all of the stages of consciousness examined in the Phenomenology is most precisely criticized in "Sense-Certainty".

31. PG, p. 79; PM, p. 149.

32. PG, p. 79; PM, p. 149.

33. Hegel, of course, attempted to justify his own position - but he did so on the basis of other considerations, see the end of chapter 2. Furthermore, for Hegel Sense-Certainty was the logically most basic position that could be taken given that consciousness implies the duality of subject and object within it; see WL I, p. 53; SL, p. 69.

34. DCS, p. 33.

35. DCS, p. 45.

36. DCS, p. 44.

37. Given that PEW proved what it claimed: the existence of an external world, we are still no clearer as to what the nature of this world is. So Moore's epistemology only seems to give us an ontology as well. In fact, the most it has done is to defeat solipsism - but that is very little ontological information.

38. OC, sec. 1.


40. OC, sec. 14.
41. OC, sec. 100.

42. OC is, however, a suprisingly consistent and organized work for Wittgenstein. Still, it is like all of Wittgenstein's works of this type and is not the well laid-out system we are used to finding in most philosophical works. It is a work in which Wittgenstein hits at and upon different points here and there. He seems to be wrestling with problems of a particular sort that concerned him from time to time. It might be that Wittgenstein was going more or less on a "gut" feeling that there was something wrong with Moore's claiming to know what he claimed. Wittgenstein's analysis seems to be so many "shots" at the target in hopes that some philosopher "...would recognize what targets I had been ceaselessly aiming at" (sec. 387).

43. OC, sec. 20.

44. PEW, p. 144.

45. OC, sec. 189.

46. OC, sec. 163.

47. OC, sec. 169.

48. OC, sec. 166.

49. OC, sec. 471.

50. See PG, p. 23; PM, p. 85.

51. Moore of course ultimately tried to ground each of these on the other.

52. See also chapter 1, p. 14.

53. OC, sec. 93.

54. OC, sec. 4

55. OC, sec 392. Moore makes much this same point in "Certainty".

56. OC, sec. 110.

57. OC, sec. 204.

58. OC, sec. 7.

59. OC, sec. 476.

60. See OC, sec. 298.
Ch. 8 cont'd, p. 6.

61. OC, sec. 449.
62. OC, sec. 94.
63. OC, sec. 354.
64. OC, sec. 250.
65. OC, sec. 307.
66. OC, sec. 151.
67. OC, sec. 152.
68. OC, sec. 308.
69. OC, sec. 243.
70. OC, sec. 521.
71. OC, sec. 414.
72. OC, sec. 415.
73. OC, sec. 407.
74. OC, sec. 260.

75. An example of this theory is Kuhn's notion of paradigms in which scientific revolutions are seen to occur through a change in paradigm, but this change in paradigm itself has no necessary historical antecedent. Therefore, for Kuhn, the history of science will necessarily be seen as a history of revolutions rather than one of evolution - see Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

76. WL I, p. 56; SL, p. 71: "We see therefore, that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as result that into which the movement returns as into its ground. In this respect the first is equally the ground, and the last a derivative; since the movement starts from the first and by correct inferences arrives at the last as the ground, this latter is a result. Further, the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. The progress does not consist merely in the derivation of another, or in the effected transition into a genuine other; and in so far as this transition does occur it is equally sublated again. Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations".
Chapter 9

From Epistemology to Epistemological Ontology

2. WL I, p. 28; SL, p. 47.
3. WL II, p. 252; SL, p. 612; see also chapter 1, pp. 9ff.
4. EL 61.
5. Pelczynski (Hegel's Political Writings, "Introduction", p. 114) distinguishes concepts of reason from concepts of understanding in his interpretation of Hegel. This would seem at best misleading, however, as it reasserts the distinction between understanding and reason again and this, of course, limits reason. This might be a valid distinction if it distinguishes between abstract concepts and "true" or concrete concepts, but it is not valid if it distinguishes between empirical concepts and pure concepts. This latter distinction is misleading in the Hegelian context for it suggests that the pure concepts of reason become applied to an external other from which it is absolutely separated (since otherwise there would be no point in speaking of "pure" concepts of reason). But as we know, for Hegel, philosophically important concepts are both objective and subjective. The process of philosophy is not merely to control the application of concepts but also to bring the two sides of the Concept into harmony.
6. WL II, p. 239; SL, p. 600. One might even say that Hegel reversed Kant and that it was now the understanding which was the source of the dialectic (and the antinomies, etc.) whereas Reason was the power of overcoming them.
7. WL II, p. 227 - 228; SL pp. 589 - 590. See also EL 45, 52 and 52 Zusatz.
9. See, e.g. the "Preface to the Second Edition" of CPR.
10. This need for unification has a similar function and a similar lack of justification as Hegel's notion of the desire for satisfaction - see chapter 10 following.
11. CPR, p. 28; B xxvii - xxviii.
12. Indeed, Hegel extended them far wider than Kant: "...the Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken from Cosmology: they appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects in this propert of theirs, makes a vital part in a philosophical theory. For the propert thus indicated is what we shall afterwards describe as the Dialectical influence in logic" (EL 48).
13. See e.g. WL II, p. 47; SL, p. 64.
15. EL 47.
17. See chapter 3, sec. 1.
18. EM 541.
19. CPR, p. 125; A 92; B 124.
20. CPR, p. 125; A 92; B 125.
21. CPR, p. 125; A 92; B 125.
22. CPR, p. 264; A 246 - 247; B 303.
23. EL 22.
24. EL 22 Zusatz. See also W. Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 71 - 73. Fichte was perhaps the first to recognize that the elimination of the thing-in-itself created a conflict between passivity and activity. He therefore put forth a doctrine of radical activity: "The concept of reality is first given with and by way of the self. But the self exists because it posits itself, and posits itself because it exists. Hence self-positing and existence are one and the same. But the concepts of self-positing and of activity in general are again one and the same. Hence, all reality is active; and everything active is reality. Activity is positive, absolute (as opposed to merely relative) reality" (SK, p. 129). Fichte tried to resolve the problem of activity and passivity but in so doing seemed to wind up in a contradiction of saying that the self is both active and passive. He concluded, however, that "this contradiction is to be resolved through the concept of interdetermination, and it would certainly be resolved completely if the following proposition could be entertained in place of that above: The self determines its passivity through activity; or its activity through passivity. In that case it would be both active and passive in one and the same state" (SK, p. 132). The Fichtean notion of interdetermination is the precursor of Hegel's notion of reciprocity and both were use to allow for passivity and activity to be conjoined without contradiction.
25. EL 28 Zusatz.
27. This only applies to the principle as interpreted to assume the particle
theory of light. This interpretation may well be challenged and even wrong but the resolution to that argument is not germane to the present use of the principle as an analogy.

28. HCE, p. 8; PG, pp. 63 - 64; PM, p. 131.
29. PG, p. 64; PM, p. 132.
30. HCE, p. 9; PG, p. 64; PM, p. 132.
31. LPR, p. 53.
32. HCE, p. 13; PG, p. 66; PM, p. 135; also, HCE, p. 19; PG, p. 70; PM, p. 140.
33. See chapter 2, p. 63.
34. PG, p. 389; PM, pp. 565 - 567.
35. HCE, p. 18; PG, p. 70; PM, p. 139.
37. Feibleman, in "Hegel Revisited" suggest a view similar to this - not however with this particular phrase - see especially pp. 17 and 21.
38. PG, p. 40; PM, p. 106.

Chapter 10

Dialectic, Description and Motility

1. Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method", p. 35. Kojève, in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, made this point in several places, for example, on p. 179 he says: "Hegel's method, then, is not at all dialectical, and Dialectic for him is quite different from a method of thought or exposition. And we can even say that, in a certain way, Hegel was the first to abandon Dialectic as a philosophical method. He was, at least, the first to do so voluntarily and with full knowledge of what he was doing".


3. In the Introduction see PG, p. 72; PM, p. 141; in Sense-Certainty see PG, p. 70; PM, p. 149.
4. PG, p. 561; PM, p. 804; see also PG, p. 48; PM, p. 117; WL I, pp. 53 - 54; SL, p. 69, among many others.

5. WL I, p. 7; SL, p. 28. By "self-construing method" I take Hegel to be referring to the self-development and the self-validation of systematic philosophy.

6. Compare, for example, Findlay's notion that "...the basic characteristic of the dialectical method is that it always involves higher-order comment on a thought position previously achieved. What one does in dialectic is first to operate at a given level of thought, to accept its basic assumptions, and then to proceed to stand outside of it, to become conscious of it, to become clear as to what it really has achieved, and how far these achievements do or do not square with its actual professions. In dialectic one sees what can be said about a certain thought-position that one cannot actually say in it" ("The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel", pp. 4 - 5).

7. See also Kojève, p. 186.
8. PG, p. 44; PM, p. 111.
9. PG, p. 40; PM, p. 106.
11. See EL 81 and 81 Zusatz.
12. One could argue whether or not the term "dialectic" has any significance as a concept applicable to the Phenomenology (recall chapter 1, pp. 14 - 15), or what the specific nature of this dialectic, if there is one as such, might be. However, in accordance with the discussion in chapter 2 and elsewhere, it can be said that the point is really that the Phenomenology presupposes some kind of inherent movement to its content and that is what will be called "dialectical" for the purposes of this discussion.
14. At times Hegel does seem to illustrate logical development with an appeal to psychological evidence - see EL 88 as an example.
15. In WL I, pp. 77 - 78; SL, p. 92, Hegel says: "It is the common opinion that being is rather the sheer other of nothing and that nothing is clearer than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is equally easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is unsayable. Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the difference consists. If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they
still are. Their difference is therefore empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference, then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion. Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not proper to an exposition of this kind. But the third in which being and nothing subsist must also present itself here, and it has done so; it is **becoming**. In this being and nothing are distinct moments; becoming only is, in so far as they are distinguished. This third is other than they; they are not self-subsistent. Becoming is as much the subsistence of being as it is of non-being; or, their subsistence is only their being in a one. It is just this their subsistence that equally sublates their difference”.

16. Of course the essence of consciousness is its knowing so as consciousness evolves in its application of logical structures, so too does its knowing, and hence its essence, evolve.


18. There are indications that Hegel at times puts forth suggestions more in line with Solomon's analysis than this one - but I do not think that they are conclusive against the one given herein. See WL II, pp. 383 - 385; SL, pp. 734 - 735 (quoted in chapter 4, p. 161 herein) as a possible example.

19. Compare this use of "absolute" with that of Kant in CPR, p. 317; A 324 - 325; B 381.

20. WL I, p. 52; SL, p. 69; also, WL I, pp. 30, 42; SL, pp. 49, 60.

21. See, however, EM 400 Zusatz where there is a suggestion to the contrary of the one put forth above. That is, it suggests that the Phenomenology is rather more Cartesian that suggested herein. Hegel says that the Phenomenology can only begin when "...the soul has attained to the abstract thought of its 'I'..." However, I think that the notion of "thought" of the "I" is misleading in this context. The "I" must be brought to the level of thought. The beginning for Hegel would probably be closer to the bare "transcendental unity of apperception" which merely makes the "I" a necessary deduction from the bare fact that consciousness is.

22. WL I, p. 53; SL, p. 68.

23. CPR, p. 99; A 61; B 86.

24. PG, p. 67; PM, p. 135.

25. PG, p. 69; PM, p. 137.

26. CPR, p. 29; B xxx.

Ch. 10 cont’d, p. 4.

28. There are suggestions made by Hegel that only man thinks - see LPR I, p. 132, LHP I, p. 4 and WL I, pp. 110 - 111; SL, p. 123, although in this latter reference it seems Hegel is thinking of what he distinguishes as "thinking reason" as opposed to mere thought itself.

29. PG, p. 69; PM, p. 138.

30. See citation from LPR, pp. 107 - 108 in chapter 2, pp. 72 - 73 for example - also, of course, the discussion in chapter 7 generally.

31. PG, p. 71; PM, p. 140.

32. PG, p. 71; PM, p. 140.

33. Compare this analysis of belief with that of Solomon, esp. pp. 712 - 713.

34. PG, p. 71; PM, pp. 140 - 141.

35. Dove gives a fuller account of Hegel's answer in terms of the Concept. In line with chapter 6 I would agree that it is in terms of the Concept that the complete analysis would be given; see Dove, pp. 37 - 38.

36. Solomon, p. 713.

37. PG, p. 72; PM, p. 141.

38. PG, p. 72; PM, pp. 141 - 142; see also W. Marx, pp. 69 - 70.

39. PG, pp. 72 - 73; PM, p. 142.

40. My discussion here, though similar in some respects to Solomon's, is not and is not intended to be a description of his position and would probably not be endorsed by him. The terminology and expressions used are not used by Solomon. See Solomon, pp. 702 - 705 and 712 - 717.

41. Of course, to be consistent with the notion of system, these levels of belief and their mutual inter-determination would have to be necessitated by the historical conditions which give rise to them. The final, truly philosophical stage, would not contain the conflict - belief would be identical with truth and it would be demonstrated to be so.

42. It is basically this situation, as manifest but not understood, that creates what Hegel calls in the Phenomenology "The Frenzy of Self Conceit" which is only resolved through the "universal ordinance" which cancels, temporarily, this interchange.

43. Kojève, p. 54.

44. Compare this with the similar sentiment expressed by Kojève, p. 92.
45. Taylor sees Hegel's Geist as transcendent or "other" than man and as achieving a completeness unavailable to man. This would be a position of scepticism, however, since only Geist can achieve fully rational knowledge. This is much more of a Bradlian interpretation than I would be willing to accept. Hegel's position is definitely anti-sceptical. On the other hand Kojève's opposite extreme view that for Hegel God = Man seems equally unlikely. See Taylor, pp. 92ff.

46. This was discussed by Hegel in "Observational Reason" in which the specific attack on phrenology and physiognomy is on PG, pp. 227 - 254; PM, pp. 338 - 372.

47. Locke's discussion of this is found in the Essay, Bk II, ch. XXI, pp. 330ff.

48. Locke, paragraph 29, p. 331.

49. The examination of inner and outer is, for British empiricism, to be carried out in the same manner for each - the only difference being the content or subject of examination. For Hegel inner and outer cannot be examined separately as independent spheres but only as a unity and as interdependent, interdeterminate, and reciprocally active.

50. Locke, para. 31, p. 333.

51. Locke, para. 30, p. 332.

52. PG, p. 69; PM, p. 138.

53. In LPR, p. 181, Hegel says: "The annulling of what is finite is already found to have its place within this finiteness; every impulse as subjective relates itself to what is Other than itself, if finite; but in satisfying itself it annuls this relation, this finite character. This return into its affirmation is its satisfaction. On the other hand, however, it remains finite, for the satisfied impulse reawakens, and the annulling of the negation again becomes a sense of need. Satisfaction, this infinitely recurring feeling, is only an infinitude. The content remains finite, and thus the satisfaction remains finite too, just as the need as such involves defect and is finite. According to the former side, however, the need annuls its finiteness when it satisfies itself. The satisfaction of hunger is an annulling of the separation between me and my object, it is an annulling of finiteness, yet only a formal annulling".

54. Locke, para. 36, p. 336.

55. EM 478; see also 428. Hegel's critique of this position is found in PG, pp. 259 - 260; PM, p. 380.

56. For some examples of the use of this term see Kojève, esp. chapter 1; Findlay's Hegel, pp. 86 - 87; Rosen, pp. 29 - 35; Mure, Hegel, p. 36fn.
Ch. 10 cont'd, p. 6.

57. See chapter 6, pp. 210 - 211.


60. Solomon, p. 719.

61. We have said that the Logic need not explain the motility of its dialectic if the Phenomenology can explain its own. Interestingly, however, Hegel makes this comment in EL 17: "This is in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy - to arrive at the concept of its concept, and thus secure its return and its satisfaction".


63. LHP I, p. 18; see also LPH, p. 49.

64. Kojève, p. 4.


66. Another point of interest (refer to fn. 61) is Hegel's discussion in WL II, pp. 439ff; SL, pp. 783ff, where he talks of the "subjective Idea" as an urge, specifically, the urge to truth. It is interesting to compare Hegel's notion of desire, urge, etc. with that of Fichte's notion of longing as the motivator of the Fichtean "dialectic": "The object of this reflection is the self, the self as driven, and hence, idealiter, as internally active; driven by an impulse lying within itself, and thus altogether lacking in choice and spontaneity. But this activity of the self is directed to an object, which it cannot realize, as a thing, nor even represent through ideal activity. Hence it is an activity that has no object whatever, but is nonetheless irresistibly driven out towards one, and is merely felt. But such a determination in the self is called a longing; a drive towards something totally unknown, which reveals itself only through a need, a discomfort, a void, which seeks satisfaction, but does not say from whence. - The self feels a longing in itself; it feels itself in want" (SK, p. 265).

67. Kojève, p. 47.

68. LPH, pp. 84 - 85. Note that Hegel relates this activity to the activity of self-consciousness.

69. LPH, p. 89; see also WL II, p. 398; SL, p. 746.

70. PG, p. 47; PM, p. 116.

71. It is rather like the pure consciousness of Condillac.

72. Kojève, p. 43.
Chapter 11

Reason and Experience

1. Scepticism is irrationalism but not all irrationalism is scepticism - or at least to call it mere scepticism is misleading. This is the case because irrationalism may in fact claim absolutely infallible and certain knowledge (e.g. in mysticism or fideism) but deny that the connection between thought and its object is knowable - it must be accepted. Rationalism,
however, must be able to state this connection because it is the process of reasoning itself which is the source of the knowledge. It is only rational if a reason can be given as to why that knowledge is true, i.e. if it can be deduced (justified).

2. EL 32 Zusatz.

3. EL 32. Hegel is true to this by making a form of scepticism itself a necessary element in the advance to absolute knowledge.

4. A "hidden" sceptic is one who's position precludes the possibility of anything falling outside it having existence or reality, and who does so without demonstrating that the said position is capable of giving a complete account of experience. Compare this notion with the discussion of belief in chapter 10.

5. This may seem redundant to speak of "finite limitation" but it is meant in the sense that something can be non-finite and yet capable of completion. If all the apples in the world were to be put into one box we might rightly say that there is a finite number of them since the criterion of finitude is number and spacial extension. If they are subjected to enumeration then they do not exhaust the application of numbers which are logically possible. Likewise, they are spatially finite since the spatial extension of them is bounded by a space which they do not fill and which they logically could fill were there more of them (i.e. it is logically possible that there could be more of them). But this analysis of the finitude of things involves what Hegel calls the "bad" infinite. However it must be noted that it is "bad" only with respect to certain applications. In the case of apples it seems perfectly good, but in the case of something like knowledge it seems totally inappropriate. Knowledge can be considered infinite if it is unbounded by anything and has no logical extension beyond itself. Yet we might consider it limited if it is completatable and the completion is co-extensive with the bounds of the possible. A good brief discussion of this is given by Hegel in EL 28 Zusatz; and in WL I, pp. 133ff; SL I, pp. 144ff.


8. EL 577. Note how spinozistic this passage sounds - particularly the second sentence.

9. EL 187 Zusatz. See also Fackenheim's discussion of this in his Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, pp. 83ff.

10. EM 467.

11. EL, 181.
Ch. 11 cont'd, p. 3.

12. EL 24 Zusatz.
13. EL 182.
14. EL 182.
15. LHP III, pp. 303 - 304.
17. Lazerowitz, Philosophy and Illusion,
18. Lazerowitz, p. 126.

19. One must be careful here for we normally consider an irrational act to be one which is done for wrong reasons, or against reason, or for reasons which cannot be justified by any valid process of reasoning. But we must distinguish between rationality as an adjective ascribed to acts and rationalism as an epistemological or metaphysical position. I do not want to imply that epistemological or metaphysical irrationalism is based on faulty reasoning but that it does not involve reason at all and therefore cannot be called rationalism.

21. See EL 82 Zusatz.
22. Findlay, Hegel, p. 65.
23. Fackenheim, p. 79.
24. Reference might be made to W. T. Stace's book Mysticism and Philosophy, where many of Hegel's ideas and sympathies can be found expressed among those who claim to have had mystical experiences.
26. EL 8.
27. This quotation, as well as a general clarification of my representation of his position was contained in a letter sent to me by Prof. Walsh in March 1977.
28. PG, p. 19; PM, p. 79.

29. Likewise, the non-rationalism of pure empiricism is possible only through rational argument - see W. W. Bartley III, The Retreat to Commitment, New York, 1962.

32. Language is the expression of a self-subsistent but subjective individual attempting to externalize its subjectivity and make it objective (mediated): "...language is the existence of spirit as an immediate self" (PG, p. 468; PM, p. 674). But this ultimately cannot work, for in the process of expressing itself through language it loses itself as a self-subsistent entity: "Language and labour are outer expressions in which the individual no longer retains possession of himself in himself, but lets the inner get right outside him, and surrenders it to something else. For that reason we might just as truly say that these outer expressions express the inner too much as that they do so too little: too much - because the inner itself breaks out in them, and there remains no opposition between them and it; they not merely give an expression of the inner, they give the inner itself directly and immediately: too little - because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else, into another, and thereby puts itself at the mercy of the element of change, which transforms the spoken word and the accomplished act, and makes something else out of them than they are in and for themselves as actions of a particular determinate individual" (PG, P. 229, PM, p. 340). So we must be careful not to make discourse the means of attaining absolute knowledge as Rosen claims for Hegel. Language is the externalization of the subjective and therefore the objectification of the subjective (compare Findlay, Hegel, p. 151). But if this is the means of uniting subject and object, then Hegel's entire enterprise is a sham. It would mean that the mediation takes place from the original primacy of thought and thus can only be a unity within the starting point, i.e. subject and object are then both thought-constituted. Hence we would have gotten no further than Descartes or Fichte.

Also, we know that the mediating factor is the Concept. So to say that language is the means to achieve absolute knowledge (unity of subject with object) is to make the Concept identical with language (see Kojève, p. 101) and the result must be some kind of nominalism (admittedly this kind of position is strongly suggested in EM 462). But this cannot be the case for Hegel. For him the Concept incorporates objective particularity within it and effects the translation of this into the universality of thought - and vice versa. The means of getting to absolute knowledge is by "grasping" or comprehending (begreifen: it is not insignificant that begreifen has this physical connotation of grasping and the intellectual connotation of comprehending - just as the English word 'grasp' has. This fact underlines the concrete nature of the object of the comprehension) the universal which is there. And, as the universal is essentially process, it is reason. So the means of reconciling subject and object is through reason (concretely) grasping itself.

Rosen is no doubt influenced by a modern concern with the primal importance of language, but it is misleading to read this into Hegel. Language is important for Hegel - it is the highest expression of thought. It is important in that it is a means whereby the Concept is made explicit, but it is not the means, and especially, it is not the Concept itself.
Finally, discourse might seem the means because it is itself the form of reason and rational discourse is the objectification of subjective reason. It is self-conscious reason - reason projected outwards but it is wrapped up in the form of individuality. When language is put in the form of particularity and contingency (written) then it takes on a Popperian third world form and has an independent existence which no longer conforms to the immediate intentions of subjectivity. That is why the next object for "observation" after language is physiognomy and phrenology which attempt to capture the concrete externalization of subjectivity and retain, at the same time, its immediacy.

Rosen tries to make too much of language and discourse in Hegel's system. He is correct in saying that "discourse is the genuine work of man, the medium in which the interiority of Spirit is united with the exteriority of objective nature. In slightly different terms, Spirit as universal manifests itself only in the individual, and discourse is the principle of individuation" (p. 271). But it is not the case that because it is the "exteriority" of man or of spirit that it is therefore the adequate expression of the inner by the outer (Marcuse, for instance, says that language is the first integration of subject and object - p. 75. Plant, in discussing one of Hegel's early writings, shows that Hegel perceived the contemporary German language to be incapable of achieving a relationship between individuals. It may be that he later thought this to be a logical or objective limitation of language per se - see Plant, p. 31. It is a means by which this expression comes to be achieved (on WL II, p. 379; SL, p. 729 Hegel calls language the "neutral" mediation). Rosen it seems fails to consider the crucial significance of work and action for Hegel. It is through action that Spirit is achieved precisely because in work and in action individuality cannot be retained in its isolated form (in his Introduction a la Philosophie de l'Histoire de Hegel, Hyppolite, on p. 23, shows that Hegel, in his early writings, was opposed to the notion that true religion can be expressed in books and objective language but, rather, "lareligion subjective s'extériorise dans les actes"). The creative act of the individual transforms his objectivity into a form which expresses his subjectivity (see LHP I, p. 24) One of the ways in which this transformation may take place is, admittedly, through language since language and discourse is the transformation of the external world (sounds or ink marks) to form an intelligible structure which translates thought into objectivity. But the importance of this transformation lies not in the individuality which it encapsulates but precisely in the fact that the individual loses control over the production as his production, as an expression of his subjective idea, of what he intended to express. The whole or the absolute must be the inter-subjectivity expressed as inter-objectivity, it is the interrelating of the elements of the whole such that they stand only within this interrelation. Language as the expression of individual subjectivity can never achieve more than a whole as an aggregate, the members of which can only have external relations. But the absolute is precisely the realization of its organic composition and the corresponding internal relation of the elements which compose it.
33. In the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 12, Kant says that "...knowledge through reason and a priori knowledge are the same thing".


35. Reichenbach, p. 338.
37. Reichenbach, p. 333.
41. EL 12.
42. EL 6.
43. LHP III, p. 181.
44. EN 246 Zusatz.
45. EN 246 Remark.
46. "...the essential character of the rational is just to bring together what is separated" (EM 394 Zusatz).

Chapter 12
Rationality, Necessity and Contingency

1. Rosen thinks the former is the case - see his G. W. F. Hegel, p. 273.
2. This is the position which F. H. Bradley developed in his Appearance and Reality.
3. Compare this discussion with Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method", in MacIntyre collection, p. 38.
4. The development enforced by this "Cunning of Reason" is also mentioned in chapter 10, p. 346.
5. Findlay, Hegel, p. 84.
Ch. 12 cont’d, p. 2.


7. EL 39.

8. See Popper’s discussion of the "problem of demarcation" in his Logic of Scientific Discovery.

9. What it seems he must be saying is that the statements "this is a cat" and "this is not a cat", though contradictory are both true in the sense of Spinoza’s declaration that "all determination is negation". A thing is not only what it is but is also what it is not. This interpretation at least seems more plausible. An implication of this is that Hegel's rejection of the law of contradiction applies to facts as things rather than to states of affairs. It is not clear, however, that this distinction would be acceptable to Hegel (consider, for example, his use of Zeno’s flying arrow paradox as an example of a "living" contradiction).

10. However, the categories from which a set may be taken are limited in number and fixed in nature. It is their application - or perhaps just their emphasis - which is possible to vary.

11. LHP I, p. 37.

12. WL I, p. 38; SL, p. 56.

13. LHP I, p. 36; see also LPR, p. 47.


15. EM 445: "The nominal knowledge, which is only certitude, elevates itself, as reason is concrete, to definite and conceptual knowledge. The course of this elevation is itself rational, and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the concept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of mind) into another. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found, starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence in its capability of rational knowledge, and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason, which it and the content virtually is".

16. EN 348; see also the discussion of organicism in chapter 4 above.

17. This phrase "finite infinite" mind seems at least paradoxical and perhaps contradictory. Here Hegel’s use of "infinite" must mean "absolute" in the sense that the Logic shows the complete set of categories through which understanding is possible. In that sense it is "infinite" in not standing opposed to anything outside it, but it is "finite" in having a determinate nature. Its finitude is therefore different from ordinary finite being which has limitation by otherness as part of its nature. But its infinitude is not that of the "bad" infinite or unending progression. See also fn. 5 to chapter 11.
Ch 12 cont'd, p. 3.

18. Findlay, Hegel, p. 213; see also his "Contemporary Relevance of Hegel", in MacIntyre collection, p. 13 for another explicit statement of this.

19. PG, p. 35; PM, p. 100.


21. Findlay, Hegel, p. 216; see also Hartmann's remarks quoted in note 29 to chapter 1.

22. Findlay, Hegel, p. 83.


24. EM 396 Zusatz.

25. EN 248 Zusatz.

26. LPH, p. 28.

27. This may go some way to explaining Hegel's peculiar statement in the Philosophy of Nature 266 Remark, to the effect that "throwing shows contingent motion in contrast to the essential motion of falling...." He means that it is an essential property of bodies that they are influenced by gravity - it is a kind of internal determination (though, of course, it is only relatively internal with respect to movement caused from e.g. throwing. Relative to the internal determination of a living being, however, the motion due to gravity appears as external determination). Throwing is motion imparted from without.

28. EL 147 Zusatz.


32. EL 24.

33. G. R. G. Mure, Philosophy of Hegel, p. 130; also Hegel's Logic, p. 136.


40. WL II, p. 183; SL, p. 553.
42. WL II, p. 184; SL, p. 553.
43. WL II, p. 184; SL, p. 553.
44. See EL 14.
46. See EM 384 Zusatz.
47. EN 248 Remark.
48. EL 9.
49. See EL 16.

50. We might say with Bradley: "...reality must own and cannot be less than appearance" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 119) - but exchanging "contingency" for "appearance" - not to change the meaning so much as for emphasis.
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