THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST IN THE REIGN OF JOHN V PALAILOGOS

P.C.D. SOUTHERN.

Ph.D.
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
1973
SUMMARY

This study is an account of the various ways in which relations between the Byzantine Empire and the West developed during the reign of John V Palaiologos, 1341-1391. There is an extensive literature (of which a selection is given in the bibliography) on special aspects of the subjects; the thesis completes and corrects this literature on several points and draws the various aspects together in a manner not previously attempted. After an introductory chapter describing the problems which faced John V at his accession, emphasising the significance of the great losses of territory sustained by the empire between 1341 and 1354 and outlining the importance of the West in John V’s foreign policy, there are three main sections dealing with i) The formal negotiations concerning the reunion of the Churches of Constantinople and Rome, ii) The individual and intellectual contacts between East and West, iii) The commercial relations. There is also an Appendix dealing with the problem of the coinage of Constantinople during the period - a problem which throws light upon the financial position of the empire in relation to the West. The substance of these sections may be summarised as follows.

1) During the reign of John V the problem of obtaining western military aid for Byzantium was closely linked to the question of the reunion of the Churches of East and West. This topic has previously been the subject of a work by O. Halecki, Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome; vingt ans de travail pour l’union des églises et pour la défense de l’empire d’Orient, (Warsaw, 1930). This important work retains much of its value as a systematic account of the successive phases of the union negotiations, but in the present section it has been examined
in the light of recent research and a number of changes in points of fact and interpretation are suggested.

It is proposed that John V's first contact with the papacy in 1355 was a more serious and thoughtful plan than is generally supposed and that it led to the emperor's personal conversion to the Roman Church in 1357 (twelve years before Halecki dated the event). The failure of this initiative to produce substantial military assistance from the West caused John V to make a personal approach to King Louis of Hungary in 1366. The breakdown of the negotiations which took place in Hungary is considered in the light of evidence unavailable to Halecki and doubt is case on the sincerity of King Louis in his dealings with John V. Similarly, it is now possible to be more precise about the next phase of religious negotiations which followed the expedition to Byzantium in 1366 led by John V's cousin, Count Amadeo of Savoy. The existence of parallel sets of negotiations, between John V and Amadeo on the one hand and the ex-emperor John Kantakouzenos and a papal legate Paul on the other, and the relationship between them, elucidates both John V's decision to visit the Pope in Rome and also the papal legate's agreement that the West should meet the East in an oecumenical council. This is a most important incident because it illustrates the difference in the Byzantine and Roman approaches to the matter of Church reunion, and represents the closest rapprochement between the two sides in the period.

The visit of John V to Rome in 1369, which Halecki saw as the central episode in the emperor's relations with the West, is interpreted in a different light. The religious aspect of the journey was not the emperor's conversion, but simply a positive and dramatic reaffirmation of his personal faith designed to remind the West of his previous concessions and his empire's
The disappointment of these hopes, which John V experienced on his subsequent visit to Venice, is examined with reference to recent research. The years which followed John V's return to Byzantium in 1371 are marked by an increasing dependence on the Ottoman Turks and a growing disillusionment with the West. However, the plan for Church union and military aid was energetically pursued by Pope Gregory XI until 1378, and John V did not finally turn his back on the West until the Great Schism made the prospect of aid remote and the power of the Turks made further hopes of resistance vain.

ii) The second section of this study is concerned with a comparatively neglected area of contact between East and West - the individual and intellectual links. The existence of a body of Dominican Friars in the empire is considered in relation to the personal contacts which they made with individual Greeks, and the special qualities, particularly their knowledge of Greek, which gave them an important role to play in assisting the growth of mutual understanding between Byzantines and Latins. The most outstanding consequence of their work was the translation into Greek of many western theological works, especially those of Thomas Aquinas. The translations were made principally by Demetrios Kydones, John V's chief minister, who owed both his knowledge of Latin and his access to western manuscripts to the Dominicans. The part played by other individuals in creating links between Byzantium and the West is considered in the light of the careers of Barlaam of Calabria and Simon Atumano, converts and bishops of the Roman Church, Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, John Laskaris Kalopheros, cosmopolitan merchant, adventurer and union advocate, Anne of Savoy, John V's mother, and Francesco Gattilusio, John V's brother-in-law and Genoese
ruler of the island of Lesbos. Finally the West's impact upon Byzantium in religious affairs is examined with reference to the lives and writings of Demetrios and Prochoros Kydones, and Neilos and Nicholas Kabasilas. The first two members of this group accepted western theological teachings wholeheartedly and attempted to persuade their compatriots to see the Latins as co-heirs of the Byzantines' political and religious past, who could be learned from and admired. The success of their efforts is seen in the careers of Neilos and Nicholas Kabasilas who, while guarding their Greek orthodoxy closely, felt themselves able to express appreciation of certain aspects of Latin theology, of which previous Byzantines had been ignorant, and gained an understanding of western teaching and usage which few Byzantines had sought to achieve.

iii) The third section of the study deals with the commercial contacts between Byzantium and the West and their political consequences. The western colonies in the empire are examined to show their relationship with Byzantium. The position of the Genoese of Pera emphasises the increasing independence of their colony from the empire, seen in the appointment of their officials, their duties towards the emperor, the jurisdiction over their colony and the coinage of Pera. However, in the daily conduct of affairs there were substantial links between Pera and Constantinople in their commercial life and in the cooperation of the Greek and Genoese authorities over local taxation. An examination of the Venetian colony in Constantinople shows how its geographical situation and the nature of its trade tied it more closely to the empire than the Genoese colony. The colonies of the Catalans, Provençals and Anconitans are also briefly studied and the links between the Catalans and the Genoese in the later part of the period are brought out.
Finally the parts played by the Venetian and Genoese colonies in the political affairs of Byzantium are considered and the relationship between their policies and the nature of their colonies is emphasised. The primary concern of the Venetians was to maintain political stability and profitable trading conditions in Byzantium for as long as possible. To this end they consistently refused to become involved in local Byzantine politics and used their influence to minimise the damaging effects of the empire's civil disputes. Nevertheless they sought to use all the non-violent means at their disposal, chiefly economic pressures, to improve their situation in Constantinople.

A further part of their policy, which was of great benefit to Byzantium, was to obstruct the aggressive designs of the empire's enemies. The Serbs, the Hungarians and the Turks all sought Venetian help against Byzantium and were refused. The Genoese, on the other hand, played a more active part in Byzantine politics, but a distinction has to be made between the authorities in Genoa, which generally pursued a policy similar to Venice's, and the government of Pera, which regularly used its economic and military strength against Byzantium and Venice in the search for greater commercial power. Although Genoa and Venice had more interest in the survival of the eastern empire than anyone except the Byzantines themselves, neither was willing to antagonise the Turks by giving extensive military aid to Byzantium.

A brief conclusion summarises the results of the enquiry. Despite the considerable novelty and interest of several developments in the relationship between East and West, the weakness of the empire as a result of the territorial losses of the 1340s frustrated all these hopeful initiatives.
CONTENTS

List of abbreviations

I. THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF BYZANTIUM IN THE
REIGN OF JOHN V.

1) The political divisions of the empire 1341-1391.
2) The religious and social divisions of Byzantium.
3) Political despair and religious doubts.
4) The search for salvation.
   a) The orthodox world.
   b) The West.

II. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE REUNION OF THE
CHURCHES OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND ROME IN THE REIGN
OF JOHN V.

A. John V and Innocent VI.
1) John V's Chrysobull to Innocent VI, 15 December 1355.
2) To what extent were John V's plans feasible?
3) Innocent VI's reaction to John V's chrysobull.
4) The embassy of Peter Thomas and the conversion of John V.

B. John V and Urban V - a fresh start in the relations between the empire and the West.
1) John V in Hungary.
2) The crusade of Amadeo of Savoy.
3) Amadeo's expedition and negotiations for the union of the Churches.
   a) The debate between Kantakouzenos and the legate Paul.
   b) The negotiations between Amadeo and John V.
   c) Urban V's letter to Pera, 16 November 1369.
   d) The promises made by Paul and Amadeo.
   e) The Byzantine embassy to Urban V in 1367.

C. John V in Italy.
1) The religious aspect.
2) The political results of John V's visit to Rome.

D. Byzantium and the Roman Church, 1371-1391.
1) John V and Gregory XI.
2) Manuel Palaiologos and Urban VI.
III. BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST - THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTACTS.

A. The Friars.

The Dominicans and the Greeks.

B. The translation of western theological works into Greek.

C. The individuals.

i) Barlaam.
ii) Simon Atumano.
iii) Paul.
iv) John Laskaris Kalopheros.
v) Anne of Savoy.
vi) Francesco Gattilusio.

D. The effects of the contacts between east and west.

i) Demetrios Kydones.
ii) Prochoros Kydones.
iii) Neilos Kabasilas.
iv) Nicholas Kabasilas.
v) Other anti-Thomist polemic.
vii) The Thomist circle in Byzantium and converts to the Roman Church.

IV. THE COMMERCIAL CONTACTS BETWEEN BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

A. The Genoese colony in Pera.

i) The territorial expansion of the Genoese colony.

ii) The formal relationship between the empire and the Genoese colony.

a) The appointment of officials.
b) The duties owed to the emperor.
c) Jurisdiction over Pera.
d) The coinage of Pera.

iii) The commerce of Pera.

a) The privileges of Genoese nationality.
b) The relationship between the empire and Pera in commercial affairs.
c) Pera as a centre of local and international trade.
d) The volume and value of the trade of Pera.

B. The Venetian colony in Constantinople.

i) The structure of the colony.

ii) Colonial trade.

iii) International trade.
C. The minor western communities in Constantinople and Pera.
   1) The Catalans.  
   2) The Provençals.  
   3) The Anconitans.

D. Venice and the political affairs of Byzantium.
   1) Venice and Byzantine politics.  
   2) The sources of Venetian influence in the empire.  
   3) Venice and the external threat to Byzantium.
      a) Venice and Serbia.  
      b) Venice and Hungary.  
      c) Venice and the Turkish threat to Constantinople.

E. The Genoese and the internal affairs of Byzantium.
   1) The aggressive attitude of the colonists in Pera and the moderating influence of Genoa.  
   2) Genoa and the Turks.

CONCLUSION

Appendix: The Coinage of Constantinople and Pera in the Reign of John V.

Bibliography.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arch. Praed.</td>
<td>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.S.V.</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Venezia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Byzantion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.N.J.</td>
<td>Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS.</td>
<td>Byzantinoslavica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Z.</td>
<td>Byzantinische Zeitschrift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.M.H.</td>
<td>Cambridge Medieval History.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.S.H.B.</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae (Bonn).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalkokondyles</td>
<td>Leonici Chalkocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatari</td>
<td>A. Rubio y Lluch, Diplomatarium de l'Orient Català.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dölger, Regesten.</td>
<td>F. Dölger, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doukas</td>
<td>Istoria turco-bizantina, 1341-1462.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.T.C.</td>
<td>Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.E.B.S.</td>
<td>Ἑπετηρίς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.O.</td>
<td>Echos d'Orient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregoras</td>
<td>Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halecki, O. Un empereur</td>
<td>O.Halecki, Un empereur de Byzance à Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantakouzenos</td>
<td>John Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus), Historiae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kydones, Apologia</td>
<td>Demetrios Kydones, Apologia ai Greci Ortodossi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kydones, Symboleutikos Romaios</td>
<td>Demetrios Kydones, De admittinge Latinorum subsidio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makrembolites, Logos Historikos</td>
<td>Historical Discourse on the Genoese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercati, Notizie</td>
<td>G. Mercati, Notizie di Procuro e Demetrio Cidone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.M.</td>
<td>F. Miklosich and J. Müller, Acta et diplomata graeca medii sevi sacra et profana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.P.G.</td>
<td>J. P. Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeco-latina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S.H.S.M.</td>
<td>Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, ed. S. Ljubić</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muratori, R.I.S.</td>
<td>L. A. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.G.P.</td>
<td>Orientalia Christiana Periodica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raynaldus</td>
<td>G. Raynaldus, Annales ecclesiastici</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.B.</td>
<td>Revue des études byzantines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Chronicle</td>
<td>Βραχέα χρονικά, ed. S. P. Lampros and K. Amantos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.C.P.</td>
<td>J. Quétif and J. Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Táutu</td>
<td>Acta Romanorum Pontificum e regestis Vaticanis aliiisque fontibus, ed. A.L. Táutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiriet, Regestes</td>
<td>F. Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie, l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urkunden</td>
<td>G. Tafel and G. Thomas, Urkunden zur Älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.M.H.</td>
<td>A. Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungarian sacram illustrantia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zbornik Radova</td>
<td>Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The territorial recovery of the Byzantine empire in the years after Constantinople was recaptured from the Latins in 1261 was a slow and painful process. The Emperors Michael VIII, Andronikos II and Andronikos III had to ward off the threat of western retaliation against the reborn empire, while seeking to expand their possessions. The efforts of these first three emperors of the House of Palaeologus were gradually successful. By the time of Andronikos III's death in 1341, Byzantium had absorbed the independent Greek principalities which had survived the Latin Empire, and controlled a broad sweep of territory to the west of Constantinople, including Albania, Epirus, Acarnania, Aetolia, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, the central southern Peloponnese and many islands in the Aegean. On the other hand, the Byzantines had met with no success in Asia Minor. The Turks had overrun the areas which had remained Greek under the Empire of Nicaea, and Constantinople's authority in Asia was restricted to a few isolated towns such as Heracleia on the Black Sea and Philadelphia. In the south of the Peloponnese the imperial possessions based on Mistra were cut off from the rest of Byzantium by a patchwork of Angevin, Catalan and Venetian territories. Nevertheless, by 1341 the restored empire appeared to be secure and even expanding. It could be regarded as a coherent economic and administrative unit centred on a Greek heartland. Under

Andronikos III and his energetic first minister John Kantakouzenos the condition of the empire gave reason for hope for the future.

1) The political divisions of the empire 1241-1391.

However, the death of Andronikos III was a turning point for Byzantium. The progress of recent years was eclipsed by the emergence of old and new problems which were never far from the surface in the restored empire but which had a more disruptive effect in the years following 1341 than ever before. Most seriously the political unity of the empire was shattered by rivalry and civil war. Andronikos III had himself set the pattern for this development by his struggle against his grandfather from 1321 to 1328, but the bitterness and devastation caused by that conflict were minor in comparison to the divisions which appeared in Byzantine society after 1341.

At the time of his father's death, John V was a few days from his ninth birthday. His right of succession to the imperial throne was not challenged by any political group, but fierce competition for the regency ensued. John Kantakouzenos, who had controlled the government under Andronikos III, attempted to preserve an atmosphere of continuity. He wrote to the provincial governors and tax collectors instructing them to carry on their duties as before. He moved into the imperial palace but refused to adopt the title of emperor. This apparent modesty thwarted the ambitions of a former supporter of Kantakouzenos, Alexios Apokaukos, who chose to pursue his personal advancement by opposing Kantakouzenos.

---

1. John V was born on 18 June 1332. For this date see R.J.Loenertz, 'La chronique brève de 1352', part 2, O.C.F., 30, (1964), 63-64; but cf. P.Charanis, 'An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century', B., 13, (1938), 344.
right to the regency. While Kantakouzenos was away from Constantinople, Apokaukos with the help of the Patriarch Kalekas managed to persuade John V's mother Anne of Savoy that Kantakouzenos was a dangerous political rival to her son's imperial rights. Thereafter the capital turned rapidly against Kantakouzenos; his friends were driven out from Constantinople and his property was confiscated; the Patriarch Kalekas was appointed regent by Anne of Savoy. In reply Kantakouzenos had himself proclaimed emperor in Didymoteichos on 26 October 1341. Thus within four months of Andronikos III's death the empire was split into two opposing factions, and Constantinople was set against the provinces where Kantakouzenos rallied his supporters.

The dispute quickly developed into an open conflict in which both sides enjoyed periods of military success. Both Apokaukos and Kantakouzenos solicited the assistance of foreign powers, large areas of the empire were devastated and much property, particularly in the larger towns, was looted. In mid-1345 Alexios Apokaukos was murdered by political prisoners held in Constantinople. This event helped to turn the tide of the civil war in Kantakouzenos' favour. The regency lost its moving-force with Apokaukos. Cities and individuals began to declare themselves openly for Kantakouzenos. As she saw the end approaching, Anne of Savoy dismissed the Patriarch Kalekas, and on 2 February 1347 Kantakouzenos entered the capital and was accepted as co-emperor with John V.

It was arranged that for the next ten years Kantakouzenos should reign as the senior emperor and thereafter should share the government with John V on equal terms. The pact was sealed by the marriage of John Kantakouzenos' daughter,
Helena, to John V. This plan had much to recommend it. The energy and military skill of Kantakouzenos were qualities which the empire greatly needed. However, the youthful ambition of John V was not satisfied with the solution. He frequently threatened aggressive action to gain more independence. Eventually, in 1352 he attacked the territory which had been assigned to Kantakouzenos’ son Matthew around Adrianople. John Kantakouzenos hurried to restore the position, calling on the Ottomans for assistance, while John V relied on the help of Serbian troops. The issue was thus decided entirely by outside forces and the Ottomans won the day for the Kantakouzenoi.

In 1353 Matthew Kantakouzenos was proclaimed emperor and he was crowned the following year. John V was relegated in the imperial hierarchy and his name was omitted from the customary prayers and acclamations. In the face of this public humiliation John V planned a further attack on the régime of John Kantakouzenos. With some assistance from a Genoese adventurer, Francesco Gattilusio, he forced his way into Constantinople on 22 November 1354. An agreement for the joint rule of John Kantakouzenos and John Palaiologos lasted uneasily for a while but on 4 December Kantakouzenos abdicated his imperial rights in favour of John V.

The voluntary and peaceful abdication of John Kantakouzenos did not, however, bring an end to the political divisions within the empire. Matthew Kantakouzenos continued to oppose John V from his territory around Rhodope until handed over to his rival by the Serbs in 1357 when he was made to renounce.

his claim to the imperial throne. His brother, Manuel Kantakouzenos, resisted the attempts of the government in Constantinople to remove him from his appanage in the Peloponnesus, which he continued to rule independently of the central administration until his death in 1380. Matthew, who had joined him in Mistra, survived to control the province for a further two years.

In addition to the problems caused by the Kantakouzenoi, John V during his personal rule had to face a succession of challenges from within his own family. In particular his eldest son Andronikos IV made repeated attacks attempting to hasten his inheritance. In 1373 Andronikos joined Saudji, the son of the Ottoman Sultan Murad, in a concerted revolt against their fathers. The threat from this alliance was only stifled by common military action between the Byzantines and Turks. In punishment for this revolt Andronikos was imprisoned, partially blinded and his rights of succession were annulled in favour of John V's second son Manuel.

However, the political career of Andronikos was not finished. In 1376 the Genoese, in their search for a weapon to counter the influence which the Venetians appeared to have over John V, found in Andronikos an excellent tool to assist their plans. After Andronikos had escaped from his prison in a monastery, he was helped by both Genoese and Turkish forces to storm Constantinople and capture his father. His usurpation lasted three years during which the Genoese used him and the empire as pawns in their struggle against Venice. Peace between John V and Andronikos was not made until 1381, and the terms agreed restored the rights of inheritance of Andronikos IV and his son John VII. Even this settlement failed to bring lasting
tranquillity to the imperial house. Manuel II, whose hopes of succession had been overridden in 1381, removed himself to Thessalonica where he ruled independently of Constantinople and attempted to reverse his father's policy of rapprochement with the Turks. Andronikos IV and John VII also made further efforts to seize the empire from John V. In 1385, a few months before his death, Andronikos made an unsuccessful attack on his father, and in 1390 John VII managed to win control of the capital for five months.

John V was in possession of Constantinople when he died on 16 February 1391. His son and grandson, Manuel II and John VII, were not present. They had been summoned to serve the Ottoman Sultan and to assist his army in laying siege to Philadelphia, the last surviving Byzantine town in Asia. This pathetic situation at the end of John V's life was largely due to the domestic struggles which had punctuated his long reign, dissipating the empire's energies and resources and making the Palaiologoi increasingly dependent on the political support of the Turks. Even during the periods of family peace the empire was politically fragmented by the need to satisfy the rival claims of the members of the ruling house to a share in the government of Byzantium. Thus in 1383, while John V ruled in Constantinople, he had to accept the virtual autonomy of Andronikos IV on the Sea of Marmora, Manuel II in Thessalonica and his fourth son Theodore in the Peloponnese. The empire, as Nikephoros Gregoras described it, was like 'a ship, tossed on the waves, without a rudder or a navigator'.

The immediate price of the internal divisions of Byzantium, especially of the conflict between Kantakouzenos and the regency in Constantinople between 1341 and 1347, was an extensive loss of territory. Between the death of Andronikos III and the beginning of John V's personal rule in 1354, the empire lost about half its lands. The conquests which had given the empire a solid basis in central Greece were quickly undone. The chief beneficiary of Byzantium's political confusion was the Serbian empire of Stephen Dušan, whose help was solicited by both sides in the civil war. Without fighting a major battle he was able to annex the whole of Macedonia (apart from Thessalonica), Albania, Epirus and Thessaly. His kingdom was doubled in size and he could boast to the Venetians that he was master of 'almost the whole Roman Empire'. Meanwhile the Bulgarian Tsar, John-Alexander, acquired a large tract of land on the upper Maritsa, including Philippopolis, merely on the unfulfilled promise of aiding Apokaukos' faction. Likewise the Genoese profited from the uncertainties and exhaustion of the empire to seize control of Chios in 1346 and to fight for an expanded colony in Pera in 1348-1349. Kantakouzenos' Turkish allies occupied the fortress of Tzympe near Gallipoli in 1352, and in early 1354, when the walls of Gallipoli were destroyed by an earthquake, they took control of the city without opposition. Gallipoli, which was used by the Turks as a crossing point from Asia to Europe, was restored to the empire by the crusading expedition of John V's cousin Count Amadeo of Savoy in 1366. Only ten years later, however,

1. 'Stephanus dei gratia Servie, Diodice, Chilminie, Zenae, Albanie et maritime regionis rex, nec non Bulgarie imperii partis non modice particeps, et fere totius imperii Romanie dominus', 15 October 1345, M.S.H.S.M., 2, p.278.
Andronikos IV surrendered the town to the Turks again as the price of the Ottoman assistance he had received in his usurpation of John V.

The Byzantine losses in central Thrace in the 1360s are also directly attributable to the events of the civil war. Most of the damage seems to have been done by bands of Turks who came to the area originally as allies of Kantakouzenos. Didymoteichos fell to them in 1361. Adrianople was also taken while John V was away in Italy in 1369. Two years later a Turkish army utterly defeated the Serbs near Adrianople opening up eastern Europe to the Ottoman advance. This battle, by destroying the power of the Serbs, gave the Byzantines an opportunity to absorb some territory to the north of Thessalonica. The conquests made in this area lasted only briefly and were the only significant victories won by Byzantine arms in John V's reign.

After the Turkish successes in Thrace the Byzantine empire was mostly confined to coastal strips on the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora and the Aegean. Thessalonica was cut off from Constantinople. After Manuel II directed an aggressive campaign against the Turks from Thessalonica in the early 1380s the city suffered from their close attentions and fell in 1387. Only the imperial possessions in the Peloponnese enjoyed long periods of peace and they survived John V's reign intact. This fact more than any other allowed the province to become the centre of the Byzantine cultural achievements of the last years of the empire.

ii) The religious and social divisions in Byzantium.

The political disunity of the Byzantine empire in the mid-fourteenth century was intensified by other problems which were in part stimulated by the civil disputes. Byzantium
was also divided religiously and socially. The religious controversy of the early years of John V's reign concerned a question which was so esoteric that the ferocity of the arguments on both sides is surprising. The persistence of the dispute undoubtedly owed something to the manner in which the supporters of the two sides divided largely along political as well as religious lines. Laymen and theologians in the empire differed sharply on the question of whether the activities of certain monks, called the 'hesychasts', were orthodox. These monks believed that their personal meditations, aided by special ascetical techniques, allowed them to perceive the Divine Light which shone on the disciples on Mount Tabor. They were attacked, chiefly by a monk of Italian origin, Barlaam of Calabria, on the grounds that such claims to a personal experience and knowledge of God were incompatible with orthodox apophatic theology. Barlaam's main weapon was ridicule of the physical exercises with which the hesychasts assisted their meditations. Two councils held in Constantinople in 1341, the first presided over by Andronikos III and the second, after his death, by Kantakouzenos, asserted the orthodoxy of the hesychasts and their chief spokesman Gregory Palamas.

Although Barlaam's reaction to this defeat was to return to Italy, the dispute did not end there. Kantakouzenos' support for the hesychasts associated the religious controversy with the growing political split between him and the regency under the Patriarch Kaledas. Kaledas' antipathy towards hesychasm grew with his political opposition to Kantakouzenos. After Kantakouzenos' supporters had been

---

driven from the capital, Kalekas arranged for Gregory Palamas to be imprisoned and later excommunicated. The revival of Kantakouzenos' political fortunes caused a change in the regency's attitude towards hesychasm. Anne of Savoy dismissed the Patriarch Kalekas, Palamas was freed from prison and one of his supporters, Isidore, was appointed to the patriarchal throne. Kantakouzenos' eventual victory sealed the official acceptance of hesychasm. Two councils were held in 1351 which pronounced the complete orthodoxy of Palamas and a declaration was issued excommunicating those who held contrary views.

Although the hesychast controversy was greatly intensified by its association with the political division of the time the supporters of Kantakouzenos were not uniformly hesychast\(^1\). Demetrios Kydones is an outstanding example of the fact that Byzantine political and religious groupings cannot be thought of in 'party' terms. He was introduced to government service by Kantakouzenos whom he supported through the darkest hours of his campaign against the regency in Constantinople. On Kantakouzenos' victory he became chief minister to the emperor although never sharing his enthusiasm for hesychasm and often writing against the monks who practised it. Furthermore, he survived Kantakouzenos' abdication and served John V also as chief minister, becoming the dominant influence on imperial politics until 1371 when he resigned his official position. He remained in contact after this date with many of the most important figures in the empire, forming a close friendship with Manuel II. His letters and speeches,

\(^1\) On the question of politico-religious alignments see, D.M.Nicol, The last centuries, pp.220-222.
which cover the whole reign of John V, are one of our most important sources for this period.

The social division in Byzantium was largely an economic one which was exacerbated by the devastation of large areas of countryside by the warring factions and their allies, and by the crushing load of taxation which fell principally on the poorer classes in the towns and villages. The civil war encouraged the division of the empire along social lines. Kantakouzenos, after his exclusion from Constantinople, drew much of his support from the landed aristocracy to which he himself belonged. His opponents were able to stir up popular hatred against this wealthy minority whose interest in political power seemed to stem from personal greed rather than legitimist sentiment. Such propaganda was immediately successful in the larger Byzantine towns where the inequality between rich and poor was most evident. Stimulated first by Apokaukos in Constantinople, outbursts of anti-aristocratic rioting occurred spontaneously in other towns of Thrace and Macedonia. Thessalonica suffered in particular. The governor of the city had first declared for Kantakouzenos, but violent demonstrations against him and the aristocracy followed and a popular group, whose members called themselves the Zealots, seized control of the government of the city and, after a period of frenzied destruction, administered Thessalonica as an independent republic. Kantakouzenos likened the situation in the town to an enemy occupation.

Long after the outbursts of violence had played themselves out the social and economic inequalities in the empire

---

1. On the social divisions in Byzantium see particularly, P. Charalas, 'Internal strife in Byzantium during the fourteenth century', Π., 15, (1940-1941), 208-230.
continued to act in a divisive manner. The central government became identified with the oppressiveness of the rich because of its heavy tax demands, and 'the poor, not being able to endure the cruelty and inhumanity of the tax gatherers and the continual violence and injuries of the powerful, clamoured against those in authority and the army'. The most radical of Byzantine mid-fourteenth century writers was Alexios Makrembolites who for a time had worked under John Kantakouzenos' financial officer Patrikiotes. In all his writings, and particularly in his Dialogue between the rich and the poor and an unpublished discourse on the reasons for the Turkish expansion, he emphasised the theme of the oppression of the poor and defenceless citizens of the empire by the rich and the government. The rulers of the empire and its ecclesiastical leaders were almost worse than the Turks; they 'ate up' people and derived most of their wealth by robbery.

iii) Political despair and religious doubts.

The works of Alexios Makrembolites represent, although in an extreme form, a literary development which was shared by many other writers of John V's reign. The political decline of Byzantium and the miseries and degradations of its inhabitants were a common theme among authors of the second half of the fourteenth century. The future patriarch Philotheos, reviewing the state of the empire in 1352, estimated that the Byzantines controlled only between ten and twenty cities and strongholds, and added that these were 'daily besieged and at their last gasp'. In his Dialogue between the rich

and the poor. Makrembolites makes the rich excuse their lack of social action on the grounds that 'now ... not a province is left to us ... it is we who are now enslaved by all these peoples which were under our sway'. The historian Nikephoros Gregoras described the empire as a corpse being jumped at time and again by dogs. Also Demetrios Kydones, complaining near the end of John V's reign of the constant political squabbles, remarked that the contested prize was only 'a shadow of power', and that the result of the situation was that both sides had to serve the barbarian.

Not even Constantinople, which in previous centuries had stood inviolate above the occasional tidal waves of political disaster, was immune from the misery which afflicted the empire. 'Is our city, of which we are so proud, any better off than those which have been laid waste?' asked Demetrios Kydones. 'It is the metropolis of misfortune and suffering, instead of being the capital of subject cities'.

Makrembolites wrote a lament on the collapse of a cupola of Saint Sophia in 1346, calling it 'the last and most severe calamity in the long series of tribulations which the empire has suffered', and proclaiming that it foretold 'the end of the empire and of the world'.

This form of overstatement is a common feature of the writing of this time. It stemmed, however, from a genuine anxiety and confusion. Byzantium was seen as an embattled


2. D. Kydones, Correspondence, ed. R.J. Leenertz, letter 442, lines 42-44.


fortress, with its inhabitants crowded into the big cities, uprooted from their homes, their lives disrupted and their fears increased by the apparent inevitability of the approaching end. Demetrios Kydones described Constantinople, whose beauty and pleasures had once been the envy of the whole world, as a mere prison for its inhabitants, its gates shut all around, its ports empty of visitors. Those who did come brought only alarming rumours, and inside the city there was only clamour, poverty and tears, while outside only death, fire and destruction could be seen. 'Shut up like beasts, we await the final blow'. Gregory Palamas expressed much the same feeling of the isolation and encirclement of Thessalonica whose citizens felt themselves surrounded by predators. 'When the enemy go away we enjoy the walks in front of the town for a short while, but we do not abuse the freedom, feeling the time limited'.

The Greeks were in no doubt about the decline of their empire. The realities of the situation were only too evident to them. But when it came to an analysis of the causes of their misfortunes and a decision on how to counter them, the problems seemed too great to understand or combat.

On one point the Byzantines had little doubt. The successes of the Turks were due not so much to their proficiency with arms as to the moral deficiencies of the Greeks themselves. The most common explanation of any disaster was

1. "Ἡμᾶς δ’ ὀσπερ τὰ θηρία κατακλεισθέντας, τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀναμένειν πληγὴν." D.Jydones, Symboulautikos Romaios, Μ.Π.Γ., 154, 968a; also 1004c.
2. Ἐκάν ἐπὶ καλὸν ἀναχωρήσωσιν οἱ πολέμοι, χρώμεθα πρὸς βραχὺ τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ ἀτέστος περιπάτοις, ἀλλ’ οὐ καταχωρίσαμεθα τὸν καλὸν τῆς χρῆσεως συνεσταλμένον ὀρῶντες." G.Palamas, Homily 19, Μ.Π.Γ., 151, 264a.
'because of our sins'. To many this was sufficient explanation, but Alexios Makrembolites said what he thought some of the sins were. He attributed the Byzantine defeat at sea at the hands of the Genoese in 1349 to the maltreatment of the poor, the widows and the orphans in the empire. He contrasted this behaviour with the moral superiority and humanity of the Turks, many of whom, despite their abominable faith, were 'like true Christians in their deeds and lacked only the name of Christian'. In their ignorance the barbarian Turks destroyed painted icons, but the Greeks, by exploiting the poor, destroyed 'the living icons of God'.

The implications of this situation were far-reaching. If the Turks were the agents of God's just vengeance it seemed to imply some degree of divine approval for them. God had not merely withdrawn his favour from the Byzantines, which in view of their manifest sins was entirely comprehensible, but apparently He had transferred it to the Ottomans. The Byzantine equation of a strong empire with a true faith, which had served so assuringly for so long, became now a matter of grave concern. Was not the whole disaster a clear manifestation of the victory of a superior faith over a deficient one?

This possibility certainly occurred to some Byzantines, Makrembolites added a short note to a treatise conventionally entitled 'a demonstration that our fate and imprisonment are a result of our sins', which gave as a subtitle 'a refutation

to him who, seeing the holy icons in captivity and troubled by reasoning, says that the true teaching is that professed by the people of Agar1. Other writers also remarked on this state of affairs. Demetrios Kydones referred to the 'flood' of people drawn off into unbelief, leaving 'not one of us who has not openly deserted to the enemy'2. John Kantakouzenos compared the steadfastness of Christians living in infidel lands with the willingness of Byzantines to go over to the other side3. Also Barlaam of Calabria, after his return to the West, spoke disparagingly of the Greeks' firmness in faith when faced with the sect of Mohammed4.

It is not easy to find solid evidence of this tendency among the Greeks, but the degree to which the Turks were gaining acceptability in Byzantine eyes is somewhat borne out by the appearance of a Turcophile party in Constantinople. According to a speech of Demetrios Kydones in 1366 this group advised understanding with the enemy, visited them, drank with them and 'received as the price of our betrayal sheep, oxen, horses and money'5. Others, who did not act as propagandists for the Turks, nevertheless played a part in weakening the empire's resolution to defend itself. While Manuel II was conducting his policy of aggression towards the Turks, some prominent people in Thessalonica 'do not hesitate to proclaim openly that the attempt to free our native land from the Turks is clearly to war against God'6. This was said in spite of the

1. Ibid., p.197, n.64.
fact that in its early stage Manuel's policy provided the Byzantines with their only encouraging successes against the Turks in John V's reign.

iv) The search for salvation.

The religious doubts and political defeatism caused by the success of the Turks did not completely undermine the Byzantines' will to resist. Most Byzantines found it impossible to believe that they would see the end of the empire and many looked about them to see from where their salvation might come. The alternatives open to them were limited and raised many different problems.

a) The Orthodox world

The natural direction for the Byzantines first to look for help was towards those areas which had most recently been part of the empire and which shared with Byzantium its most vital characteristic, adherence to the orthodox faith. These areas were Serbia, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Russia¹. On two main counts it was confidently expected that aid would be forthcoming from these countries. In the first place the struggle which the empire faced was not merely one of political survival - it was for the security of the centre of the orthodox faith, the hub of the Empire of all Christians, a symbol and a reality which the Byzantines believed would be of the utmost importance to all those who shared their faith.

The inhabitants of these countries were, as Kydones put it, 'men like us, devoted to God, who have often shared many things

in common with us, men whose natural emotions should lead them to the defence of Byzantium

In the second place, if natural emotion based on orthodox solidarity was not sufficient, it could not be ignored that the threat affected all the Balkans, that Serbia and Bulgaria, at any rate, were directly faced by exactly the same crisis as Byzantium. Their political past just as much as their religious beliefs should make it clear that their interests lay in the same direction as the empire's.

Serbia

In Serbia the prospects of alliance appeared particularly bright, for that country had for some time been set on an active policy of Byzantinisation. Its court life, political organisation, and official titles were all founded on the Byzantine pattern, and under Stephan Dušan especially the work of making Serbia a mirror of Byzantium went ahead in the confident expectation that the imperial glories would follow. He has renounced his barbarian way of life and embraced the customs of the Romans' remarked Gregoras.

However, this trend in Serbia was full of danger rather than hope for Byzantium. The area in which Dušan was encouraging the outward forms of Byzantine life, the area between Skoplje and Christoupolis, was the land which had most recently been part of the empire and which had been seized by

1. 'Ανθρώπους δύσιος ἡμῖν, καὶ τῷ θεῷ προσκειμένους, καὶ πολλάς ἐν πολλοῖς καιροῖς πραγμάτων κεκοινωνηκότας ήμῖν.'
   D. Kydones, Symboleutikos Romanios, M.F.G., 154, 972c.
the Serbs while Byzantium was distracted by its civil wars. This action showed clearly the direction in which Dušan's ambitions were leading him. It was not out of regard for the Byzantine emperors that he adopted the double-headed eagle as his emblem and was represented on coins, seals and the frescoes of Dečani and Lesnovo wearing full imperial regalia with the nimbus. In 1345 Dušan assumed the title of Emperor of Serbia and Romania - it was a direct challenge to the Byzantine empire which indicated that his ultimate ambition was to take over the government in Constantinople and that he had no plans of co-operating with it in a joint defence against the Turks. In January 1346 Dušan offered an alliance to the Venetians for a campaign to 'acquire the empire of Constantinople' and, although rejected by them, he continued to do all he could without their aid to bring the provinces of Byzantium under his control. Clearly to Dušan war against the Turks appeared of secondary importance to the acquisition of Constantinople.

The notion that the Serbs' aid would be forthcoming because of their adherence to the orthodox faith and their consequent regard for the safety of the empire, was no more than a pious hope. In fact one of the most significant symbols of Serbia's independence and of Dušan's assumption of the imperial title was the creation of the patriarchate of Serbia. Dušan's knowledge of Byzantine political theory made clear to him the necessity for every thorough-going empire to have an independent patriarchate. Thus the influence of Constantinople in religious matters by no means acted as an encouragement to the Serbs to help in its preservation, not least because the Byzantine reaction to the establishment of the Serbian patriarchate had been to anathematize the Serbian Church. Further-
more, Dušan's commitment to the Orthodox Church was not so total as to prevent him from contemplating conversion to the Roman Church for political advantage. He was aware that conversion would win him moral authority in the eyes of western Christendom for his planned attack on the Greek schismatics. However, in his domestic policy, Dušan showed himself to be utterly out of sympathy with the 'Latin heresy', opposing marriages between members of the Roman Church, whom he called 'half-believers', and his Orthodox subjects. It was this side of Serbia's character which encouraged the Byzantines to persist in their hopes of a pan-Orthodox alliance.

The threat to Byzantium from Serbia passed in 1355 with the death of Stephen Dušan. The empire, which he had been able to dominate, split into many independent principalities. Byzantium was able to draw minor benefits from this development, but the prospect of an orthodox alliance came no closer. In 1363 the Patriarch Kallistos visited Serres to negotiate with Dušan's widow, but his sudden death there and subsequent rumours of poisoning merely increased the Byzantines' distrust of the Serbs.

The Serbian principality of Serres was ruled over by John Uglješa who continued Dušan's policy of preserving Byzantine forms in government. Under his influence the authority of the Byzantine patriarchate was restored over Serres in 1368 and over the whole of Serbia three years later. In 1371, as the decisive clash between the Serbs and the Turks at the battle of the Maritza approached, Uglješa again raised the possibility of common action between Serbs and Greeks. But John V was away from the empire at this time, and the moment

1. On the embassy of Kallistos see, Kantak. iv, 50; III, 360-362.
passed. After the battle the power of Serbia, both as a threat and as an ally, was utterly destroyed.

**Bulgaria**

Much the same considerations served to make the Bulgarians seem both a natural and a most unlikely source of aid to the Byzantines. They also shared the Orthodox faith but likewise were in conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities of Constantinople, having their own patriarch in Trnovo whose part in the consecration of the Serbian patriarch and the imperial coronation of Stephan Dušan had done nothing to improve relations. The Bulgarian patriarch further strained the community of religion of which Byzantium expected so much, by daring to consecrate Theodoret as metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia while the incumbent, who held his authority from Constantinople, was still alive — 'a most stupid and illegal act' according to a Byzantine patriarchal document.

Like the Serbs the Bulgarians had a political background which owed much to Byzantium, but they also had shown in which direction their most immediate objectives lay by taking advantage of the empire's weakness to attack its towns, taking many and with incomparable cruelty transporting their inhabitants and imposing on them charges heavier even than the Turks could invent. As Kydones commented, in destroying these towns they only made the task of the Turks easier. Nevertheless, the Byzantines continued to hope for Bulgarian military co-operation. In 1351 it seemed that some progress was being made. King John Alexander of Bulgaria, under pressure from Turkish forces in Thrace, agreed with John Kantakouzenos to share the expenses of

a fleet to prevent the Turks from crossing from Asia into Europe at will. However, the Bulgarian contribution for the enterprise never arrived.

Despite this setback, John V in the first years of his personal rule also regarded Bulgaria as an ally worth cultivating and many embassies were sent to promote friendship. Indeed the seal appeared to have been set on this part of the Balkan alliance in 1355 by the marriage between John V's eldest son and heir, Andronikos IV and Kyratza the daughter of John Alexander. The intention of this marriage alliance was obvious enough, indeed the synodal act confirming the marriage stated that it was planned 'for the conservation and profit of Christians, Greeks and Bulgars, and for the detriment of the infidels'. But such hopes were vain, Kydones not only considered the marriage infamous and demeaning but showed how useless it was, 'for when need arose they provided neither ship, knight, nor simple soldier, nor a single penny'.

The Bulgarians' lack of good faith towards Byzantium was given even more striking proof by their action taken against John V on his journey back to Constantinople from Hungary in 1366. John V had been to visit King Louis of Hungary in Buda in an effort to muster help for the empire. The negotiations in fact failed, as will be seen later, but John V had to endure further humiliations from the Bulgars who refused him passage through their country, and forced him to stay in the Hungarian-held town of Vidin until his release was secured by the crusading expedition led by Amadeo of Savoy.

1. Kantak. iv, 22; III, 162-165.
3. Αλλα τῆς χρείας καλούσης, ού ναῦν, ούχ ἱππέα, ούχ ὀπλίτην φιλών, ούκ ὑβόλον ἕνα προείντο. Symbouleutikos Romaios, M.L.S., 154, 976ab.
4. Ibid., 976c.
In 1367 John Kantakouzenos, in debate with a legate from the pope, summed up the Byzantine government's attitude towards its Balkan neighbours. He dismissed the Serbs and the Bulgars as little better than the Turks, for although they were orthodox, they coveted the Byzantines' material wealth and threatened their existence. They pillaged and provoked wars with the empire, and even in negotiations showed the dishonesty of their intentions. If Byzantium required outside assistance against the Turks it clearly had to look elsewhere.

b) The West.

Once it was clear that the special relationship between Byzantium and its Balkan neighbours, based on common faith and a common political background, was not a sufficiently cohesive influence for the creation of a united front against the Turks, the only other direction in which the Byzantines could look for aid on the scale which their plight demanded was to the West.

The involvement of western Christendom in the salvation of the empire raised a number of major problems for the Greeks. The first was the difficulty of persuading the West to lend its support. It was fruitless to appeal simply to Christian brotherhood when the western Church, in its most temperate moments, considered Greek orthodoxy to be an unfortunate error, and often more outspokenly as a damnable heresy.

However, the Byzantines were confident that limited aid would be forthcoming from the West to preserve the material

benefits which the trading cities of Italy received from Constantinople remaining in Byzantine hands. The privileges which the Venetians and Genoese had won from the Greeks would be lost if the Turks took the City, since the merchants would find themselves faced by a government strong enough to make its own terms. The Byzantines were not too proud to make a virtue out of their own impotence in world politics.\footnote{See below p.212.}

However, if such considerations would maintain Venetian and Genoese interest in the fate of Byzantium, militarily it would do no more than assure the empire of naval support. The maritime resources of the Italian cities were vital to any enterprise aimed at providing help for Constantinople, but if the Turks were to be pushed back sufficiently to guarantee the security of the Byzantine empire, then forces on land as well as sea were required.

This was the root of the problem facing John V. No single western nation had the political interest or the military resources to provide the necessary army. It was important to obtain the help of the western powers generally, and to make the appeal for aid to an authority which commanded wide respect. The only way to awaken a sufficient part of western Christendom to the empire's plight was to involve the papacy and to hope for the preaching of a crusade against Byzantium's enemies. But this was less easy than it sounded. Moreover it raised an entirely new matter, for religious questions are always interwoven in negotiations with Rome. Either the discussion is chiefly about these or, in order to appear more persuasive, the ambassadors bring forward precisely this point, aware that without mention of this they might not receive a gracious hearing, because neither for money, nor marriages, nor
any other worldly goods would the ambassadors of the Church agree to the alliance; only discussions about dogmas beguile them and draw them to agree to the proposal\(^1\).

The fact that in negotiations with the West the questions of military aid and the reunion of the Churches of Constantinople and Rome were inseparable was recognized by most of the political leaders in Byzantium, but it raised serious doubts in the minds of many Byzantines about the suitability of the Latins as a source of assistance. The Byzantine Church in particular could not be expected to co-operate in a plan in which the price of the empire's political survival seemed to be the surrender of its faith. This was especially true because the authority of the Church of Constantinople had stood up to the political reversals of the empire much better than had the authority of the emperor. Although the growth of Serbia and Bulgaria had been followed by demands for increased ecclesiastical independence, the influence of the Byzantine Church continued to be felt beyond the empire's boundaries through personal and monastic links which assisted the re-establishment of Constantinople's patriarchal supremacy in these countries in 1371 and 1379. The Church could claim to exercise some spiritual authority even over the Christians in Moslem territory. The Patriarch Neilos, writing to Urban VI in 1384, claimed that although 'we suffer from the Turks... we have full liberty to receive letters and to send replies and messages, to elect, ordain and send out bishops wherever we wish, and to deal with all ecclesiastical affairs unhindered even in the lands of the infidel\(^2\).

---

2. M.M. II, pp.86-87. The difficulties of the Byzantine Church in Asia are brought out strongly by S.Vryonis, The decline (contd.)
Although Neilos was undoubtedly exaggerating the undiminished authority of his patriarchate, it is certainly true that the Byzantine Church was able to exercise influence where the emperor had none, and consequently was under less pressure to make rapid agreement with the west.

The lack of enthusiasm for the West shown by the Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy was shared by the monks, who thought that orthodoxy was a better safeguard against the Turks than the arms of schismatics, and by the vast majority of the Byzantine people. In 1366, when a crusading expedition under Amadeo of Savoy was approaching Constantinople with practical assistance by Byzantium, Demetrios Kydones had to deliver a speech to the people of the capital to persuade them to accept the Latins' aid. Even with the immediate prospect of apparently disinterested western help it was difficult to make the Greeks forget the defeats and humiliations which western arms had brought to the empire, particularly in 1204 and more recently in the Genoese wars of 1348 and 1352.

Throughout John V's reign the policy of reliance on western military aid was unpopular among the Byzantine people. When the union of the Churches was made a precondition of this aid it was totally unacceptable. On two occasions John V refused invitations to visit the West on the grounds that his policy was so unpopular among his subjects that he could not be sure of the security of his throne. The Bishop of Durazzo, who was

of mediaeval hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century, (Los Angeles, 1971), pp.283-350.


a secret sympathiser with the Roman Church, confirmed this in conversation with a Dominican, saying:

it is not possible that there can ever be union unless such force is used that we do not fear the people; either the emperor can use his power for this or the Roman Church might send an army against the City, from fear of which the people would not dare rise up. Then ... with this intervention, we will announce clearly to them that what we believed to be false and heretical is true and catholic.

The question of the reunion of the Churches of East and West was not of itself a stumbling block in the negotiations for military aid. The unity of the Church was an ideal held as strongly in Byzantium as it was in the West but most Greeks could not accept the pope's claim to final arbitration in matters affecting the dogmas of the Christian Church and they rejected his demand that the Greeks should return to the unity of the Church 'as a son to his mother'. They insisted that true union could only be achieved through an oecumenical council, in which the pope would meet the patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem on equal terms. This point was made to the pope himself by Barlaam of Calabria in 1339. He realised that Pope Benedict XII had failed to draw the correct conclusion from the utter failure of Michael VIII's attempt to force his people into union with the Roman Church, and he gave him a clear account of the situation: 'If anyone says that these subjects were decided upon by a general council at Lyon at which the Greeks were present, let it be known that nobody will ever persuade the Greek people to accept the conclusions of that council except it be done by another council. For the Greeks who took part in

2. Raynaldus, ann. 1365, no. 22, p. 120.
that council were sent neither by the four patriarchs who
govern the eastern Church nor by the people. They were sent
only by the emperor who tried to impose union with you by
force and not with general will.1

The background to this fundamental division between
East and West is well known. But in the fourteenth century
the papacy's refusal to meet the authorities of the eastern
Church on the terms they demanded was not simply based on the
familiar ecclesiastical arguments with which both sides in the
schism fortified their positions. Despite Barlaam's warning
it was generally assumed in the West that Union could be
achieved without the need for a council. It was believed
that the Byzantine emperor's authority over the eastern Church
was sufficiently great to allow him to proclaim union by
decree. The emperor's control over the daily government of
the Byzantine Church was noted by many western visitors to the
empire. The Dominican Philip Incontri, writing in 1359,
recorded that 'the emperors have so subdued the patriarchs
that they depose them when they wish and they install whoever
they want whenever they want. For in my time, from 1312 to
the present day, only three patriarchs have died in office
while five or six have been deposed.3

Statements of this sort which were received in the West
never set out the limitations to the emperor's ecclesiastical
power which, by the fourteenth century, were generally under-

1. Raynaldus, ann. 1339, no. 21; cf. no. 23.
2. For a summary of the eastern and western standpoints see
D.M. Nicol, 'Byzantine requests for an ecumenical council
3. T. Kaeppeli, 'Deux nouveaux ouvrages', p. 172. For similar
accounts of the emperors' power over the church see
Ps.-Brocardus, Directorium ad passagium faciendum Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents arméniens, 2,
(Paris, 1906), pp. 428-3; The bondages and travels of Johann
Schiltberger, translated by J.B. Telfer, Hakluyt Society,
no. 58, (London, 1879), p. 33; D. Kydones, Apologia, Notizie,
pp. 373-374.
stood in Byzantium\(^1\). Furthermore, emperors occasionally played on the papacy's misapprehensions and, by volunteering the conversion of their people, convinced the West that the imperial domination of the government of the Church extended to decisions of dogma.

A striking illustration of the West's belief in the emperor's power over the Byzantine Church is found in the text of a debate held in Constantinople in 1367 between John Kantakouzenos and the papal legate Paul. The legate argued at first as though he believed that even the ex-emperor would, by virtue of his office, have sufficient influence over the decisions of the eastern Church to secure its conversion by his personal example. Paul suggested that Kantakouzenos was 'like a roasting spit on which everyone is suspended like meat, and whenever you make a move they turn with you\(^2\).

This was not mere flattery, but represented a belief widely held in the West about the emperor's powers in church affairs. From the West's point of view the concentration of ecclesiastical power in the hands of a temporal ruler, hard pressed by political adversity, promised to make the task of reunion considerably easier. Not only did it suggest that if this one man could be convinced of the righteousness or advantages of the Roman Church then all else could be achieved simply by his authority, but it seemed also that such a conviction could be instilled more readily in a secular ruler than in a

---


2. Ἐπί τεις πολλῶν συνελεύσεως ὁ Παύλος ἔφη, ὅτι οὐκ ἔτειδεν τὸ πᾶν ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῷ Ἐμπερῳ καὶ τῷ Παύλῳ τὴν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι γὰρ ἤσκεται χρήματα ἀνάμεσα πολλῶν, καὶ ὄντες ἄν σὺ κυρίαν, διὰ τὸ οὐκ οὐκ ἔτειδεν τὴν κράτος. J. Neyendorff, 'Projets de concile', B.U.F., 14, (1960), 174, lines 172-175. For Kantakouzenos' attempt to correct Paul's misapprehensions see lines 186-201.
religious leader whose first responsibility was to the integrity of his faith.

The Byzantines had attempted to correct the West’s illusion but the belief that union could be achieved through imperial decree remained strong, and since from the viewpoint of the western Church this method was greatly to be preferred to the uncertainties of an ecumenical council it is not surprising that the papacy clung to it. Throughout John V’s reign it remained the principal presupposition behind papal initiatives towards union and much greater efforts were made to secure the conversion of the emperor himself than to convince the Byzantine Church and people of the righteousness of the Roman Church and the benefits which would flow from reunion.
FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE REUNION OF THE CHURCHES OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND ROME IN THE REIGN OF JOHN V.

A. John V and Innocent VI.

Soon after John V entered Constantinople and became sole emperor on 4 December 1354, he came into contact with Paul, the Latin Bishop of Smyrna, who was on an unofficial visit to the city. As a result of his Calabrian background and his service in the East, Paul had acquired an understanding of the Greeks and a knowledge of the situation of the Byzantine Empire. He was also an ardent unionist who wished to make a personal contribution to the reconciliation of the Churches of East and West. In the course of the union negotiations up until his death in 1371, Paul constantly exerted his influence to bring Greeks and Latins together, but his relationship with John V was never closer than in 1355 when he collaborated with the new emperor in the formulation of his first approach to the West. This first contact took the form of an imperial letter addressed to Pope Innocent VI on 15 December 1355. Its composition may well have taken the better part of a year, and it was clearly the result of prolonged discussion. It laid a new foundation for negotiations between the emperor and the Roman Church based on the inter-relation of the questions of military aid for Byzantium and church reunion.

1) John V's Chrysobull to Innocent VI, 15 December 1355.

The Byzantine approach to the Papacy in 1355 must have come as something of a shock to Innocent VI who had had no

1. 11 February 1364, Pierre Ameilh wrote to Urban V about Paul's preference for work overseas in the cause of union, 'ipse (Paul) potius affectat vestram sanctitatem servire in partibus ultramarinis in quibus, prateribus temporibus, magna fecit et adhuc confidit et sperat majora et durabiliora fienda'. La correspondance de Pierre Ameilh, archevêque de Naples puis d'Embrun (1337-1372), ed. A. Brege, (Paris 1972) pp.171-172. For a fuller consideration of Paul's role as a link between East and West see below pp.68-72.

previous contacts with John V. Just as Clement VI had been taken rather by surprise by the emergence as emperor of John VI Kantakouzenos, whom he initially regarded as a rebel and an usurper, so Innocent VI must have felt that the unpredictability of Byzantine imperial affairs was not a good omen for the great work of the union of the Churches. However he was to find that the change was not without its advantages, for whereas Kantakouzenos had entirely welcomed the theory of Church union but baulked at the Papal plans for achieving it\(^1\), John V put forward none of the reservations which had impeded progress under his predecessor. The procedural objections were cast aside, the previous insistence on the convocation of an oecumenical council was forgotten, and John V appeared to consider the union of the Churches in the same light as Michael VIII had done and as the Papacy had never ceased to do.

John proposed that he should declare his personal obedience to the pope and the Roman Church and that he should do all that he could to persuade his subjects, both cleric and lay, to follow his example\(^2\), under the direction of a papal legate whose authority should also extend to ecclesiastical appointments. John further suggested that, should it happen that not all the Greeks would follow him willingly within six months, then a degree of coercion should be employed. The difficulty of this plan, as John admitted, was that the duration of the schism between the Churches of Constantinople and Rome had so hardened the hearts of his people that they could not

---

1. For Kantakouzenos' views on Church union see R.-J. Loenertz, 'Ambassadeurs grecs auprès du Pape Clément VI (1348)', C.R.F., 19, (1953), 178-196. See also Kantak, iv, 9; III, 53-62.

2. *Item quod faciam tota posse meo et toto conatus quod omnes populi sub nostro imperio constituti et nostrae jurisdictioni subjici sive sint laici sive clerici, quia uniusque conditionis et status aut dignitatis existant, erunt fideles, obedientes, reverentes et devoti eidem domino summo pontifici et elius successoribus*. Táutu 10, p.151.
easily be torn from their customs and be directed on a new path without some powerful incentive. The emperor proposed that a fitting and effective inducement would be the provision by the Papacy of a military force, to be placed under imperial command for use against his Turkish and Greek enemies; at once a demonstration of the West's good faith and a scarcely veiled threat against the empire's internal dissidents. The suggested composition of the force was fifteen transport ships, five galleys, five hundred knights and one thousand footsoldiers, the whole being at the disposal of the emperor for six months while the programme of conversion was taking place.

John V was certainly aware that his plan could not be sure of commanding immediate respect at the Papal Curia. Rome had had previous experience of the difficulties faced by any Byzantine emperor who volunteered the conversion of his entire people, and doubt must inevitably have been cast on the sincerity of an emperor whose objectives seemed so overtly political. Accordingly John V added many details to the bald outline of his project, designed to convince the pope of the seriousness of his proposals. He offered to send his second son Manuel to the pope as a guarantee of his good intentions, and promised that if he should happen to fail to carry out all the promises made, then the imperial dignity and authority should automatically fall upon Manuel under the adoption of the pope, in whose hands effective government of the Byzantine Empire would legally be placed.

Provision was also made for machinery whereby the Pope would be able to cover his financial losses if John should back out of the project after the flow of aid had begun,
without sending Manuel to Rome. Innocent VI was empowered to order the collection of up to 4000 florins for each galley he sent to the empire, and was free to raise the money from goods belonging to any Greek, either in Constantinople or in any other place under the emperor's jurisdiction. However, should John fail to keep his word because his power and not his will was lacking, he promised that he would personally visit the Curia and would, together with the pope, supervise the recovery and conversion of his empire from exile.

Furthermore, in order that the conversion of Byzantium should be based on firm foundations, it was suggested in the Bull that John's eldest son and heir, Andronikos, should be given a Latin teacher, and that three colleges should be set up to teach Latin letters to the sons of Greek magnates. The importance of an early Latin education for the eradication of the Greek faith had already been recognised by Raymond Lull and by the writer of the Directorium ad passagium faciendum, who had suggested the institution of such schools on the grounds that when Greek had been entirely replaced by Latin, the Byzantines would be less likely to return to their old errors and would have access to the truths revealed in the works of western writers.

ii) To what extent were John V's plans feasible?

Despite all these safeguards and intimations of sincerity, however, John's plans have often been regarded as a totally naive excursion into the realm of world politics by a young and completely inexperienced ruler, unconscious of the limitations of his own authority and impelled by fear for his

domestic security, rather than by any genuine desire to seek the union of the Greek and Roman Churches. Barker refers to 'this fantastic plan' and 'these fatuous proposals' \(^1\); but under a resolute emperor they were not, from a practical point of view, entirely foolish.

Certainly it was quite unrealistic to suppose that the population of Constantinople would voluntarily be converted to the Latin faith within a period of six months, but if the military resources provided for in the plan could have been delivered there was some reason to think that John could have pressed his scheme to its conclusion. It is clear from the chrysobull and his subsequent actions that John V had no personal objections to conversion, and he was supported and encouraged by other Byzantines in the City who thought as he did. Furthermore the military force which he had proposed could not have been resisted by any faction within the empire and, in its actions against external enemies, would have provided the emperor with the means to rally enthusiasm for his pro-western policy. It was also undoubtedly over-optimistic to allow only six months for the defeat of the Turks, but other military planners of the times, whose expeditions depended on the employment of mercenary troops, showed similar optimism. King Louis of Hungary, when negotiating with Venice for the hire of ships for an anti-Turkish expedition which he briefly contemplated in 1366, also thought that he would require them for only six months \(^2\). The forces engaged for Amadeo of Savoy's crusade to Byzantium in 1366, although nominally hired for a year, achieved all their military successes within five months of winter campaigning. The

\(^1\) J. Barker, Manuel II, p.5.
\(^2\) Letter from Venice to Hungary 10 March 1366, M.S.H.S.M., 4, no.148.
size of the expedition suggested by John seems also to have been decided upon after some thought, for it was neither so big as to be utterly impossible to raise, nor so small as to be militarily useless. Indeed the force which eventually reached Byzantium under Amadeo's command, was of very similar composition and size to the one requested by John in the chrysobull\(^1\).

Any doubts which Innocent VI may have had about John's sincerity must have been considerably alleviated by the fact that the emperor had been encouraged in his initiative by twelve prominent men, both Byzantines and westerners, who had confirmed John's good faith in letters to the pope. Among those who wrote, and who in return received letters of thanks from Innocent noting their co-operation in the matter, were Francesco Gattilusio, John V's brother-in-law and the Genoese ruler of the island of Lesbos, Lancelot de Castro, the Podestà of Pera, Maximos Kalopheros, a Byzantine monk who was later a convert to the Roman Church, three members of the Metochites family, which had for three generations favoured moves for union, all of whom held high official positions, and George Tagaris, a brother of Paul Tagaris who, in the course of a chequered career, was appointed Latin Patriarch of Constantinople\(^2\). Furthermore the text of the Chrysobull stated that it had been discussed and drawn up with Nicholas Sigeros, who earlier had been an ambassador to the Roman Curia.

---

for John Kantakouzenos, and with Paul, Bishop of Smyrna, who
carried the bull to Avignon and presented it to Innocent VI.

iii) **Innocent VI's reaction to John's chrysobull.**

With such impressive references John V's initiative
clearly had to be taken seriously, and Innocent's reaction
to the Bull, if cautious, at least showed that he was hopeful
that something substantial could come of it. However, it
could not be ignored that the Byzantine emperor had so far
done nothing, but had merely outlined what he proposed to do
if given sufficient encouragement. John had demanded military
aid in order, among other things, that the project of union
might be pushed through. Such an enterprise naturally required
some time to organise, and Innocent wished, before any final
step were taken, to assure himself more fully of John V's
position and state of conviction. This was Innocent's first
contact with the emperor and he can have had little faith
even in John's ability to survive in Constantinople until
further steps could be taken.

Nevertheless the pope was sufficiently convinced of the
possibilities of the plan to put the machinery for raising
military assistance slowly into motion. On 17 July 1356,
before he even replied to John's Bull, the pope wrote to the
leaders of those Mediterranean powers which were capable of
mustering substantial military forces, Cyprus, Venice, Genoa,
and the Order of the Hospitallers in Rhodes. These letters
were all identical and showed clearly how the Papacy regarded
the situation. No reference was made to the precise details
of the Byzantine emperor's proposal, but those features of it

---

which Innocent regarded as important were mentioned in the letters. Thus it was announced to the Mediterranean powers that John V had, through his ambassadors, abjured the schism, acknowledged the truth of Rome's teachings and recognised the primacy of the Roman See. It was emphasised that although this state of affairs was undoubtedly encouraging, it did not make the emperor a member of the western Church\(^1\) and was insufficient to confer on his empire those benefits which such membership would bring with it. In the letters John was referred to merely as 'magnificus princeps' and he was not granted the full title given to kings of the Roman faith 'carissimus in Christo filius noster'. In short the chrysobull could not by itself alter the West's attitude towards the Byzantine Empire\(^2\).

The Mediterranean powers were informed that John was to be encouraged to go a little further and to take the one vital step which would assure him of a place among the princes of western Christendom in the eyes of the pope, and which would open up all the advantages of such a position to his empire. This full acceptance could be gained if John would repeat his abjuration and submission to Papal nuncios who were to be sent to Byzantium. Innocent required that the profession of faith be made not in a letter but by the emperor personally, not through ambassadors but 'with the confirmation of his own voice'\(^3\). Once this had been done John would

---

1. 'Ex quo nos ingenti leticia et exultatione perfusi, cupientes tam salutare tamque acceptum Deo negotium votiva terminazione compleri...\footnote{ibid., p.358.}

2. On the significance of the change of title see O. Malecki, \footnote{op. cit., p.139. Although the modes of address are not completely stereotyped the appearance of the words 'filius noster' is a sure sign of membership of the Roman Church.}

3. 'Attestatione vocis propriae', \footnote{ibid., p.358.}
be regarded as a member of the Roman Church, and Innocent accordingly charged the Mediterranean powers to give the empire 'as much aid and favour as possible ... against the hostile attacks of the infidel Turks' when they should hear that John's personal submission had been received 'ore proprio'¹.

That Innocent should at this time have written to the military powers of the East, alerting them to the prospect of the emperor's conversion and the possibility of subsequent action against the Turks, was a clear demonstration that he took John's initiative seriously. Nothing could be done immediately to provide military aid for Byzantium for two reasons; John was not yet fully a member of the Roman Church, and it would take time to organise the forces necessary for such an undertaking. But the pope had set the machinery in motion for settling both these difficulties.

In a letter dated 21 July 1356 Innocent reminded John of all he had so far promised, and informed him that he was considered to have taken 'the first steps in his conversion'². But salvation, the pope commented, comes not from what is begun but from what is carried through, and although this letter does not specifically mention it, this undoubtedly refers to the need for a personal submission to a special representative of the pope. Innocent urged the emperor to complete his conversion and to ask help of God: 'God will

¹ 'Postquam idem imperator recognitata et confessata per dictos nuncios suos ore proprio ratificari et approbari et de ratificatione ac approbatione huiusmodi per dictos episcopos vel corum alterum fuerit tibi debita facta fides, omne quod poteris auxilium omnemque favorem praefato imperatori .... impendas et prestas'. Ibid. p.359.
² 'Haec.... tuae conversionis initia, haec devotionis primordia, haec firma fidei fundamenta huiusmodi litterae tuae... continebant'. Innocent's letter is published in L.Wadding, Annales Minorum, 8, pp.127-128; Raynaldus, ann.1356, nos. 33-34; Täutu 10, pp.155-158.
move the Christian princes to come to your aid to lay low
the persecutions of the infidels and bow the necks of your
rebels'.

John V's plan was in essence being carried through,
even in a modified form. In place of the safeguards and
money guarantees, Innocent merely demanded a profession of
faith 'ora proprio', and although the size of the military
force and the date of its arrival could not be guaranteed,
the prospects of its appearance had improved considerably.
The first steps had been taken, not only towards John's
conversion but also in the provision of western military aid.

iv) The embassy of Peter Thomas and the conversion of John V.

Innocent VI's reply to John V's chrysobull may not have
been quite as enthusiastic as the emperor had wished; cer-
tainly all the laborious details of the emperor's plan were
ignored in the pope's answer. Yet on the other hand Innocent
did not neglect the topic which was undoubtedly of paramount
importance in Byzantine eyes at this time - the question of
western military aid for the empire. John was assured that
once the business of union had been satisfactorily completed,
he could rely on the assistance of western Christendom; that
a little more progress in the religious sphere could bring
him all that he had wished for.

The legate sent by Innocent to receive John V's verbal
profession of faith was Peter Thomas, a man characterised by
Halecki as hard and inflexible, unsympathetic to the Byzantine
mind and to the empire's plight, whose attitude towards
schismatics had already been demonstrated at the expense of the
Serbs and was later to be seen in his forceful methods in
Crete. Certainly in contrast to the Calabrian Paul, who
assisted John V in the composition of his chrysobull of 1355, Peter Thomas appears a much more uncompromising character, and there is little doubt that he owed his appointment to this fact.

Our main source of information about Peter Thomas's activities in Byzantium is, however, one that is very sympathetic towards him - his 'Life' written by his friend and companion Philippe de Mézières. But if the characterisation appears rather too glowing, the chronicle of events seems largely accurate. What Philippe de Mézières had to say about the relations between the Papal legate and the Byzantine emperor is explicit enough. He described Peter Thomas's meeting with John V while the emperor was on campaign and how John and his chief men, although too busy to give the legate their full attention, were impressed by his personal example, his abstinence and his teaching. When the emperor returned to Constantinople accompanied by Peter Thomas, who never stopped preaching, he 'became true, catholic and obedient to the Roman Church, acknowledging the articles of faith one by one, with his hands in those of brother Peter, promising to observe and cause to be observed as far as possible what pertains to the holy Roman Church and to depose the faithless Greek Patriarch, the enemy of Church union, and to appoint a catholic'. Furthermore the emperor, 'tanquam

fidelis catholicius et devotus' received holy communion from Peter Thomas 1.

This account of Philippe de Mézières reveals that John V did exactly what Innocent VI had asked him to do. He took that one further step which the pope had said would make him a member of the Roman Church and a worthy candidate for western military aid; he made an oral profession of faith, in the presence of the pope's special envoy. Halecki, however, remained sceptical, taking the phrase 'ore proprio' in Innocent's requirement for full conversion, to mean a public declaration of his acceptance of the Roman faith, and he argued that John did not fulfil this demand 2.

There is, however, no evidence that Innocent did mean, by 'ore proprio', a public profession, and in any case John's letter to Innocent dated 7 November 1357, informing the pope of the steps he had taken under Peter Thomas's direction, makes it clear that his profession was not made in private. He stated that his promises had been made 'with the advice and consultation of our barons', and that he had given his oath to Peter Thomas 'in the presence of many bishops' 3 But Halecki still considered that even this fell short of what the pope wished for, and he pointed to the lack of further Byzantine-Papal communications and the failure of any western military aid to arrive in the empire, as proof that Innocent

1. 'Ipse imperator factus est verus catholicus et obediens ecclesiae Romanae articulos fidel sigillatim confitendo, et sanctam ecclesiam Romanam esse matrem suam asserendo; et hoc in manibus ipsius Domini Fratris Petri tactiv manibus ad sancta Dei evangilia iuravit, omnia etiam promittens observare et facere observari pro possa quae ad sanctam ecclesiam Romanam pertinent, necnon patriarcham Graecum perfidum et unitatis ecclesiae inimicum promisit deponi et unum alium catholicum eligi debere'. Ibid. pp.74-75.

2. 0. Halecki, op.cit. pp.54 and n.3, 62.

3. 'Cum consilio et deliberatione baronum nostrorum .... presentibus episcopis multis'. John V's letter is known only from its inclusion in Philippe de Mézières' Life of

(contd.
was still not satisfied that John had yet demonstrated his sincerity in conversion, and could not, on the strength of his actions so far, be considered a full member of the Roman Church.1

However, Malecki was unaware that there exists some strong evidence that Innocent VI thought that John V had, as a result of Peter Thomas's embassy, taken all the steps which he had been asked to take, and furthermore that the pope set about answering the appeals for help which John had reiterated in his letter of 7 November 1357. On 11 May 1359 Innocent VI wrote to his legate in the East, instructing him to help, and cause the faithful to help, the emperor in the recovery of his lands and rights from the Turks and the other enemies of the Christian name. This was to be done, the pope said, because John V had, on Peter Thomas's own avowal, sworn to obey the Roman Church and had promised to try to make others do likewise, and also in order that the emperor should adhere more firmly to this course of action as he saw himself assisted by the Church.2

The most significant feature of this letter was the title by which Innocent referred to John V. He used the formula reserved for the princes of western Christendom, 'carissimus in Christo filius noster' - a firm seal set on the acceptance of John as a true member of the Roman Church. This was the first mention of John V in a Papal letter since Peter Thomas's visit to Byzantium in 1357, and it was the first time that the emperor had been granted this style

St. Peter Thomas, pp.76-79. Also published in Tautu 10, pp.200-202. The tone and form of the letter as recorded by Mózières are perfectly consistent with a genuine imperial letter.
1. O. Halecki, op.cit., p.60.
2. This letter is cited by J. Sast in his edition of The Life of St. Peter Thomas, Appendix 5, pp.206-212.
instead of his former title 'magnificus princeps'. Clearly in May 1339 Innocent VI did regard the Byzantine emperor as a member of his flock, and in that capacity considered him deserving of all the military encouragement that Peter Thomas could raise on his behalf.

For the provision of military aid to the empire Innocent VI did not look to the great princes of the West because, despite all that Barlaam had reported about the harmonious order of the Latin world, their interests and martial energies were fully committed to local and intermarcine struggles. He turned instead to the League of Smyrna, a composite force of the powers of western Christendom with colonial and commercial interests in the East. In March 1357 the League, which had fallen into abeyance as a result of the hostilities between Genoa and Cyprus, was reconstituted. Under an agreement made by Venice, Cyprus and the Hospitallers, each party was to contribute 3000 florins a year and two galleys for five years to a league operating 'in the lands of Romania' for the 'defence and safety of Christians and their lands ... and for the destruction of the Turks and other infidels'. Although the offices of Captain of Smyrna and Papal legate, which had been united, were separated, Peter Thomas as legate still retained important responsibilities for the war against the infidels, and his jurisdiction extended not only over the Latin foot-


2. 'In partibus Romaniae versus Turciam, ad defensionem et tutitionem Christianorum et terrarum, locorum et possessi-
onum per ipsos detentorum, et ad destructionem Turcorum et aliorum infidelum'. D.V-L., II, pp.35-37.
holds in the eastern Mediterranean but also over the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In November 1359 the pope augmented the forces of the league by equipping new galleys at his own expense for a three-year term. He also ordered that the preaching of the crusade be renewed in Cyprus, Romania, Italy and elsewhere and that a tenth of all ecclesiastical revenues for three years be put aside to finance it.

In 1359, according to Mézières, one of Peter Thomas's first actions in conjunction with the forces of the league, was to visit Constantinople with several galleys as 'he had earlier promised to do'. Some time later, but before the end of 1359, the galleys of the league joined together with imperial naval forces in an attack on Lampeacus, a Turkish-held town on the Asian shore opposite Gallipoli. The expedition had little practical effect, for having destroyed the town's fortifications the force withdrew, but several facts of considerable importance had been demonstrated in the process. In the first place the potential value of western arms had been brought home both to the Turks and to the Byzantines, but more significant still the armed forces of western Christendom and the Byzantine empire had at last acted in concert against the infidels who were directly threatening the Greeks. The legate and the league had demonstrated their concern not only for the eastern members of the Roman Church but for the fate of the Byzantine empire.

A situation which had always presupposed the conversion of the emperor to the Roman faith had finally materialised, with the clear indication that John V was now an accepted convert.


2. 'Ipse autem legatus, privilégis apostolicis munitus, ... ad partes sibi inimicas venit, et officio sua legationis fungens ... Constantinopolim venit, et imperatorem contra Turcos guerram facientes et adiutorio indigentem ipse legatus plurimarum galearum associatus visitavit, et sicut eum prius promiserat confortavit'. *Ibid.* p. 84.

B. John V and Urban V - a fresh start in the relations between the Empire and the West.

The death of Innocent VI in September 1362 signalled a radical change in the attitude of the Papacy towards the Byzantine Empire and particularly towards John V. While it is certain that in 1359 Innocent had regarded the emperor as a 'son of the Roman Church', and accordingly had considered the empire a worthy recipient of western military aid, there is no doubt that by 1364, when direct correspondence between the empire and the papacy was resumed, the new pope, Urban V, did not see John V in the same light as had his predecessor.

John had only briefly enjoyed the title of 'carissimis in Christo filius nostro'. When Urban V wrote to him on 16 October 1364, in answer to a letter offering Byzantine participation in a papal crusading venture, he addressed him as 'magnifico vico Johanni Palaeologo imperatori Graecorum illustri', which is similar to the title used in the letters of Innocent VI before the mission of Peter Thomas to Byzantium. Likewise there was no ignoring the implication of a letter sent by Urban to John V on 1 July 1366, when the emperor was visiting the Hungarian king in Buda; the pope made a very clear distinction between the positions held by the two rulers, in papal eyes at any rate. The contrast between the title 'magnifico viro' given to John V, and 'Christianissimum et Deo amantissimum principem, charissimum videlicet in Christum filium nostrum Ludovicum' could scarcely be missed.

1. Raynaldus, ann. 1364, no. 27, p. 103.
Urban's most conciliatory letter to John V before 1369 began 'your highness and the clergy and people of Greece are erring damnable from the holy Roman and universal Church', 1.

What had caused this radical change in the tone of papal letters referring to Byzantium? Was it merely that Urban was more exigent than Innocent, or was it possible that the new pope, whose earlier career had not tied him closely to the curia at Avignon 2, lacked the necessary information about the previous negotiations and his predecessor's attitude to John V? Urban's ignorance seems to be an insufficient explanation, for Peter Thomas, whose rôle as an intermediary between Avignon and Constantinople had been so important in the later years of Innocent VI's pontificate, was still alive and in contact with the papal curia. It seems most likely that the new pope, feeling that no real progress had been made since the embassy of Peter Thomas, considered John V to have forfeited his membership of the Roman Church by his failure to make strenuous efforts to convert the mass of Byzantine people. In Urban's eyes John's membership of the Roman Church depended not only on the profession made to the papal legate, but also on the promises he had made regarding his future actions. In his letter to Innocent VI in November 1357, John had excused himself from taking immediate steps to implement his promise because of the instability of his political situation. 'Not all are faithful to me and many plot against me', he wrote, 'but if you send me the aid I seek, I shall carry the project through and nobody will gainsay it, for I

1. 'Tua serenitas ac cleru et populus Graeciae a gremio sacrosanctae Romaniae et universalis ecclesiae... damnabledevietia'. Raynaudus, ann.1365, no.22, p.120; Tauty 11, pp.122-123.

2. Urban was a compromise candidate for the papacy: before his election he was papal nuncio in the Kingdom of Naples. G. Rollat, The Popes at Avignon, (English translation, 9th edn., 1963) p.52.
know that if your legate comes with galleys and aid, all will submit and be faithful to you. John also added that the patriarch should not be a cause for any concern since he would be deposed and replaced by someone known to be faithful to the Roman Church.\(^1\)

These promises had not, however, been kept. The legate had arrived in Constantinople, the galleys had come, but there is no evidence that John made any effort to use this expression of western good faith to encourage his people to follow his example in abjuring the schism. The Patriarch Kallistos remained in office, opposing the Latin alliance and building up his contacts with the rest of the Orthodox world. When he died in Serres in 1363 he was actively engaged in an attempt to find an alternative to western aid and to strengthen the Orthodox cause.\(^2\) The election of his successor, Philotheos, was opposed for a time by John V, but on purely political grounds, and after they had been reconciled, the emperor played his customary rôle in the ceremony of induction. Philotheos could scarcely be described as 'faithful to the Roman Church'; he attempted to neutralise western influences in the empire and secured the reconversion of many Byzantines who had joined the Roman Church. In 1367 he refused even to meet the representative of the papacy, Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople.\(^3\) It is true that the military

1. 'Nunc autem hoc facere non possum quod totus populus oboediat, quia omnes non sunt mihi fideles nec obediunt et multo insidiantur ut habeant occasionem contra me.... Sicio enim quod si venerit legatus vester cum galeis et adiutorio quod quaero, omnes subiciantur et erunt fideles vobis'. Philippe de Mézières, The life of Saint Peter Thomas, ed. J. Smé, pp 76-79; Táutu 11, p. 201.
3. Philotheos was elected by the synod probably on 12 February 1364, while John V was away besieging Meseabria. (contd.)
aid which the empire had received was scarcely of the magnitude which had been anticipated in the chrysobull of 1355, and that the passage of time did little to stabilise the emperor's political position, especially when the union of the churches was such a live issue in Byzantium. But from a papal point of view it must have seemed as though John V had failed to honour his promises and that very little had in fact been achieved by Peter Thomas's presence in the empire.

Urban V had by no means given up all hope of the project, and in April 1355 sent a very conciliatory and encouraging letter to John V. It was made clear that the pope considered that the emperor and his subjects were still in schism, but not irrevocably. Urban announced plans for the formation of a naval league involving both the metropolitan and colonial Genoese, the Marquis of Montferrat and the Hospitallers. The enterprise was conceived on a larger scale than the League of Smyrna had been and, according to Urban's letter to John, was aimed specifically at the protection of the empire from

But he was not enthroned until 8 October 1364 because of John V's refusal to recognise him (date in H.M.I, p.443). On the causes of John's behaviour and Démétrios Kydones' peacemaking activities, see R.J. Loewenzrt, 'Démonius Cydonès 1. De la naissance à l'année 1373', O.C.E. 36, (1970) 61. Kantak.i.v,50; III, 303 tries to play down John's dislike of Philotheos. For reconversions under Philotheos see below p.208. For Philotheos' attitude to Paul see J. Meyendorff, 'Projets de concile oecuménique en 1367, un dialogue inédit entre Jean Cantacuzène et le légat Paul', D.O.F., 14 (1960) 170 lines 16-21. For Philotheos generally see D.T.C., 12, pp. 1498-1509.

1. An indication that John V had made no attempt to influence the attitude of the Byzantine Church towards the West is found in a synodal act of October 1364, M.M.I, pp.450-453. The bishops and Patriarch here declared their loyalty to the Emperor-appointed-by-God, the lawful successor to the throne etc. and 'the defender and protagonist of the undefiled dogmas of the holy Church of God'. (ʿ.Upēr tēs ἀγίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνικῆσας καὶ τῶν εἰλικρινῶν δογμάτων ὑπερμιχουντά τε καὶ ἁγωνιζόμενον.)

This expression does not indicate any suspicion in the minds of the bishops that John V was a threat to their orthodoxy.
the Turks. Furthermore, its formation was not dependent on the previous achievement of Church union. However, its establishment was in jeopardy as a result of conflict between Cyprus and Genoa, but it was hoped that a restoration of peace in the West and fresh efforts at popular conversion in the East would make the realization of the League possible. Although a peace treaty between Cyprus and Genoa was signed on the same day as Urban's letter was dated, nothing came of the plan, since the military enthusiasm of the West was diverted by the crusade against Alexandria led by Peter of Cyprus. However, Urban's initiative revealed his conviction that the impetus of union negotiations had been lost and that a fresh start was required.

1) John V in Hungary.

The fact that direct negotiations between the papacy and the empire had for the moment returned to the situation which had prevailed before 1357, and that much of the old ground would have to be recovered before any further progress could be made, was as apparent in Constantinople as it was in Avignon. Spurred on, perhaps, by the realization that the conditions in the West made the provision of military aid from the traditional Mediterranean sources unlikely, John V decided that his next appeal should be made to another quarter, to King Louis of Hungary.

This decision had several merits; Hungary was much more bound up in the immediate fate and fortunes of the East than were Cyprus, Venice, Genoa or the papal curia; King Louis

was the empire's nearest neighbour belonging to western Christendom and he was a member of the House of Anjou with many family connections among the nobility and royalty of the West. Also, the efficiency of his military forces had only recently been demonstrated at the expense of the Bulgarians. But this last fact also illustrated the two greatest defects of the Hungarian King as an ally of the empire. His campaign against Vidin had revealed that he was more interested in taking advantage of the weakness of his Balkan neighbours, than he was in joining them to present a common front to the Turks. Furthermore, his actions in forcing conversion to the Roman Church on 200,000 Orthodox inhabitants of the Bulgarian province, requiring even Prince Straci I to be subjected to the humiliation of a second baptism, indicated that a powerful secular ruler was much more dangerous to the integrity of the Eastern Church than the pope himself 1.

The visit to Buda began as a humiliation; in the winter months of early 1366 John V, accompanied by his two younger sons, set out by sea to the mouth of the Danube on a trip which no previous Byzantine emperor could have contemplated. He went as a suppliant, unadorned with imperial dignities and surrounded neither by an impressive circle of courtiers nor by an army in search of conquest 2. If John thought that

1. "Ο τῆς Ουγγρίας βασιλεύς τοῦτος πολεῖ, ἐκ οὗ ἀνεβάπτισε μὲν πολλοὺς, μετὰ τῶν ἡλιων δὲ καὶ τῶν τοῦ βασιλέως Βουλγάρων τοῦ 'Αλεξάνδρου νύσην,'
   J. Heyendorff, 'Projets de concile', D.O.P., 14, p.173, lines 144-146. "... Ad petitionem Christianissimi ac devotissimi regis Hungariae, vicarius
   mens Bosnae ad illam patriam, regno ac vicariis contin-
   guam, octo fratres nostri ordinis sibi subditos destina-
   vit; qui infra quadraginta dies ultra ducenta millia
   hominum baptizarent', L. Wadding, Annales Minorum, 8,
   pp.230-231.

2. The date and circumstances of John's journey are given by Short Chronicle 47, p.81, line 26; D. Kydones,
   Symboalouitikes Romaleis, M.P.C., 154, col. 1000d. The
   journey is also referred to at length in a laudatory
after such a beginning his situation could only improve, he was to be disillusioned. If he thought he could bypass the papal formula of union before aid, he was to be disappointed. If there was a difference between the negotiations in Buda and those previously conducted directly with the papacy, it was only in the increased severity of the demands made by the Hungarian king.

By appealing to a secular authority the Byzantine emperor must have hoped that the preconditions demanded by the papacy for the provision of military aid from the West could in some degree be diminished. But the pope's influence could not so easily be circumvented. Urban V indeed supported the initiative in Buda, but in his many letters of support to prominent people in Hungary, he never neglected to emphasise the relationship between the union of the churches and the giving of military aid. The alliance between Byzantium and Hungary was designed, so Urban's letters exhorted, 'to lead the Greeks back to the unity of the holy Roman Church and to exterminate the infidel Turks'. This order of priorities was clearly the

---

1. The poem to John V by John Katakalon, commissioned by Polycarpos, Metropolitan of Adrianople, written in late 1366. The poem is published in full by A.M. Bandini, Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae, (Florence 1769) pp.374-377; and in part, with brief commentary, by E.A. Zachariadou, 'The conquest of Adrianople by the Turks', Studi Veneziani, 12, (1970), 211-217. See also the manuscript note 'Ετελειώθη... κατὰ τὴν θ' τού Μαρτίου μνήμης, ἡμέρα γ' τῆς ε' ἐνδ. τοῦ σώος ἔτους... ὁπότε καὶ ο ἐυσεβέστατος κράτιστος ἄγιος ἡμῶν αὐθεντης καὶ βασιλεὺς, ὁ χαριτώπιος Παλαιολόγος, ἀπεδήμη διὰ τὸ λαβεῖν συμμαχίαν υπὲρ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐν τῇ τοῖς (Οὐγγαί)δομῶν χώρα. The weekday and the indication show that the year should be σωος (1366-1367). Sp.P. Lambros, Catalogue of the Greek manuscripts on Mount Athos, I, (Cambridge 1895) p.310.

1. 'Pro reductione Grecorum ad sacrosancte Romane ecclesie unitatem et pro exterminatione infidelium Turchorum', Vetera monamenta (Hungariam sacram illustrantia, 2, ed. A. Theiner, (Rome 1860), no.145. See also ibid, nos. 141, 143, 144. On Urban V and Louis see O. Halecki, Un emper. surn, pp. 124-137.
one adopted by the Hungarians also. John V seems to have been so alarmed by the conditions for aid which were presented to him that he sent an embassy to Urban at Avignon to obtain confirmation of his position regarding them, including the vexed question of the necessity for the Greek converts to undergo a second baptism. We can at any rate assume that this was the purpose of the embassy in view of the replies sent back to John by Urban. On 1 July 1366 Urban wrote three letters to John V in Buda; two concerned the form of the emperor's religious submission, the third was more political in tone. Urban made no mention of the need for a second baptism, setting out only those articles of faith to which John was required to subscribe and the oaths of obedience which he had to take. However, it is known from Kantakouzenos' debate with Paul in Constantinople in 1367, that Louis made the act of rebaptism an essential precondition for military aid, and that the Byzantines found the idea totally unacceptable.

The demand for rebaptism was a new one which distinguishes the negotiations in Buda from any of the other formal contacts between Constantinople and the West on the matter of Church union. It is also a useful indication of the underlying ambitions which affected King Louis' attitude towards

2. 'Αυτόν τον βασιλέα τον υἱὸν μου (John Kantakouzenos referring to John V) ἐκεῖσε εὑρισκόμενον καὶ ζητοῦντα βοήθειαν καὶ τῶν ὀνόματα καταπλήκτησαν αὐτὸς τοῦ βασιλέα καταφθάνας ἐκεῖσε καὶ ἔκαμεν τοῦ βασιλέα τοῦ ἐκεῖσε αὐτοῦ τοῦ πονεῖται, ὡς ἄλλη πρότερον ἀλληλομέτρητον δύναμθεν δοῦναι σοι ἄν ἑν μὴ τούτο πρότερον.

γένηται.'

Church union in general and the negotiations with the Byzantines in particular. The practice of rebaptising converts from one Christian group to another was not unknown in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Generally it was confined to heretical sects such as the Bogomils who, however much they considered themselves to have been properly baptised, were held by ecclesiastical authorities in both East and West to be in need of rebaptism. The rebaptism of the Bulgars of Vidin, which had been performed by eight Franciscans at Louis' direction, was justified on the grounds that they observed neither the Greek nor the Roman rite fully. Bartholomew of Alverna, the Vicar of Bosnia, even cited John V as an authority who approved of Louis' actions in Vidin, saying 'John, the Emperor of Constantinople, when he visited the king, said in the hearing of many: "the king did well to baptise those Slavs because they follow neither the Greek nor the Roman form".' While John V was prepared to abandon the Bogomils to such treatment, it was clear that neither he nor his people could submit to it themselves. When the eastern Church in Serbia under Stephan Dušan had, for a time, forced rebaptism on its converts from the Roman Church, the practice was formally condemned in the West, and Dušan promised the pope that it would cease.Officially


2. 'Stephatus, qui se cesarium seu regem Raxie facit communiter nominari, nonnullus christianus in eius regno habitantes per vim et violenciam ad eius perfidiam et infidelitatem trabat, ipsosque prater et contra formam ecclesie faciat (contd.)
Rome and Constantinople accepted the validity of the ordina-
tion of each other's priests and acknowledged the efficacy of
the sacraments which they administered. The Vicar of Bosnia
made this clear in a letter to his clergy, reminding them that
those who had been baptised according to the Greek rite required
no further baptism. The demand for rebaptism struck at the
very roots of the Byzantine Church - to deny the validity of
an eastern baptism not only condemned all the Byzantines of the
last thousand years to eternal hell fire, but placed the Greeks
on the same footing as pagans, infidels and heretics. No pope
had ever gone so far as to declare that the Byzantines were
utterly outside the Christian community, but this was the
implication of the stand which Louis was taking.

There is no doubt that Louis was aware that the precon-
ditions for military aid which he was demanding were more rigor-
ous than those which the pope himself required. Urban V had
written to John in Buda setting out the form which his conver-
sion ought to follow and the question of rebaptism was not

---

1. Baptizari in christiane fidei non modicum detrimentum'.
   25 May 1350, letter of Clement VI to Louis, King of
   Hungary; M.S.H.N.M., 3, ed. S. Ljubić, no. 263, p. 186.
   See also V.M.H., 2, ed. A. Theiner, pp. 11-13, 16;
   Directorium ad passandum faciendum, in Recueil des histor-
   iens des croisades, documents arméniens, 2, p. 26; J. Smet,

2. 'Si formam istam Graecorum servarent, scilicet "Baptizatur
   servus Christi in nomine etc." numquam aliquem baptizare-
   mus'. D. Lasic, loc. cit. In a letter to Greek priests,
   6 November 1367, Urban V recognised the efficacy of Byzan-
tine ordination, 'De quibus ex debito assumpti per vos
   prolationis officii obligatis vos Deo reddere rationem'.
   Tautu 11, p. 206. O. Halecki, Un empereur, p. 163, n. 1. For
   Gregory XI on the problem of rebaptism see Tautu 12,
   pp. 192-193.

2. 'Ὡς δήθεν ἄνωφελοὺς ὄντος τοῦ ἡμετέρου βαπτίσαματος.'
   J. Meyendorff, op. cit., p. 173, line 146.
touched upon in these letters. However, on 23 June 1366, just
a week before these papal letters to John were dated, Urban
wrote in a very different tone to Louis. The pope reminded
Louis of the long history of Greek perfidy which had caused
western unionists much disappointment in the past, and he cast
doubt on the sincerity of the Byzantines in the current negotia-
tions in Buda. Accordingly he absolved Louis from any promises
he might so far have made to provide the empire with military
assistance, and suggested that, although limited aid might be
given, Louis should consider himself free for any other works
of piety.1

This letter is most uncharacteristic of Urban who had
spent much time encouraging Louis and other western leaders to
give military support to Byzantium and who, in 1365, had even
shown himself willing to consider the provision of aid without
the previous achievement of Church union. However, on the
evidence of this letter it appears that Louis' insistence on
rebaptism was a response to the pope's warning and was designed
to test the depth of the Byzantines' sincerity in seeking union.

This interpretation, which takes as its basis the belief
that the Hungarian king's primary objective was the achieve-
ment of an outstanding victory for his religion, is unaccept-
able since it conflicts with much of what is known of Louis'
character and political ambitions. The posture of champion
of the Roman Church which he assumed, was a cloak beneath
which his policy of territorial aggrandisement in the Balkans

1. 'Sane cum, sicut in antiquis chronicis et scripturis
alis reperitur, idem Greci cum dicta ecclesia in tracta-
tibus per eam cum eisdem habitis dolose ac fraudolenter
inesserint, illudendo fallaciter ecclesie memorete,
et ex humusmodi pretetritis de similibus futuris sit vere-
similiter presumendum; presertim quia idem Greci non
videntur ex devotionis zelo et pura voluntaete, sed coacti
pro habendo tuo succursu venire velle ad humusmodi unita-
tem, cum eis est cum multa maturitate et cautele studio
procedendum.' V.M.H., 2, ed. A. Theiner, no.139, p.73;
Raynaldus, ann.1366, no.3, pp.122-123. O. Halecki, op.cit.
pp.129ff.
could be made to seem more creditable. This is clear from
his negotiations with Venice in 1366 and 1367 for a small naval
force which was to support his expedition to Byzantium. He
claimed initially that he intended to lead his army to defend
the empire from the Turks and required a few galleys for this
purpose. In March 1366 Venice welcomed this proposal and
agreed to provide up to five galleys at its own expense. But
during the ensuing months, when there was regular correspon-
dence between Venice and Hungary¹, Louis tried to reduce his
dependence on the Venetians cutting his requirement to only
two galleys and offering to pay for them himself. Finally,
soon after March 1367, Louis revealed to the Venetians the
true nature of his plans. He admitted that the galleys were
not required for an attack on the Turks, but were intended
for use against Serbia, Bulgaria and perhaps the Emperor of
Constantinople, whom he accused of bad faith and various
intrigues. When this became clear, Venice immediately with-
drew its offer of assistance².

This plan may not have been fully developed at the
beginning of the negotiations between Louis and John in Buda,
but it suggests that political ambitions were never far from
the surface in Louis' crusading plans. In the light of Louis'
later actions it seems likely that his demand that Byzantine
converts should be rebaptised was deliberately intended to
cause the negotiations with John V to break down, while putting
the blame for the rupture on the Byzantine emperor. He was
aware that rebaptism was a condition which the Greeks could

1. For this correspondence see M.S.H.S.M.; 2, ed. S.Ljubić,
nos.14, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157.
2. 'Dopo qualche giorno il re d'Ungheria scrisse all' inclito
duce, non voler più le galee offerte in sussidio del Greco
imperatore contra Turchi, havendo sua maestà intenzione
mover guerra al re di Servia e all' imperator di Bulgaria e
forse contra l'imperatore di Constantinopoli, quando il
non voglia osservar li patti che haveva seco: il quale non
cessava machinar contra sua regia maestà, havendo fatte
molte innovationi.' Chronicle of Casidio, cited by
S. Steinherz, 'Die Beziehungen Ludwigs I von Ungarn zu
(contd.)
not accept and that, in the rejection of his demand for it, he would have an excuse for repudiating his responsibilities to the empire which he meant anyhow to evade. Furthermore, the Byzantines, by refusing baptism according to the Roman rite, would appear to be displaying the lack of sincerity of which they were often suspected, and would lay themselves open to the righteous indignation and aggressive reaction of the forces of western Christendom under the leadership of King Louis.

Although this initiative to procure Hungarian aid failed, John V came out of his Hungarian embassy fairly well, at least in the eyes of the pope. The emperor had again demonstrated his eagerness for the project of union, and the negotiations in Buda had collapsed over a point which had little significance in the relationship between emperor and pope. Urban V never authorised Louis' demand for rebaptism, and the question was not raised again in the future. Urban had been made aware of John's determination to bring the matter to a conclusion, and had been most impressed with George Manikaites, the ambassador sent by John to the Curia at Avignon.

John's determination was also clear to the citizens of Constantinople who, it seems, fully expected the visit to Buda to result in the arrival in the empire of a powerful army under the command of a king of the Roman faith. Indeed one party in the city was so alarmed at the prospect of the appearance of such a force, under a leader whose talents for the conversion of schismatics had already been demonstrated in Vidin, that it proposed that on his return the emperor should be excluded from the capital. Little did they know that they

had been anticipated by the king of Bulgaria, John Alexander, who, from precisely similar fears, had prevented the Byzantine emperor from crossing his territory, although there was no sign of an accompanying Hungarian army. This was John V's final humiliation; to be forced to wait in the Hungarian-held town of Vidin until the Bulgars could be obliged to let him past was a most hurtful blow to the imperial pride. It was not even as though he had earned such treatment by succeeding in his mission; he was returning without union, without an army or any prospect of one, and indeed without his son Manuel, whom he had been obliged to leave for the time being in Buda as the hostage of the Hungarian king. For a second time John V had endured much in the cause of Church union and had got nowhere.

ii) The Crusade of Amadeo of Savoy.

In 1355 and 1366 John V had sought to encourage the provision of military aid to the empire by offering to make concessions in the religious sphere. However, as he waited

1. '(John V) reverti non poterat propter impedimentum quod sibi faciebat Imperator Burgarici', F. di St. F. Bellati, Illustrazioni della spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI, (Turin 1900) nos. III and 268. This Account Book of Amadeo's crusade thus makes it clear that John V was not arrested but impeded, on the orders not of Śiśman but his father John Alexander. This first point is now generally accepted, but many modern writers still name Śiśman as the man responsible. On these questions see F. Poss, 'Encore une fois sur le voyage diplomatique de Jean V Paleologue en 1365-1366', Revue des études sud-est européennes, 9, (1971), 535-540.


3. On the crusade of Amadeo see E. L. Cox, The green count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and transalpine Savoy in the fourteenth century, (Princeton 1967), chapter 7; J. Delaville Le Roux, La France en Orient au XIVe siècle, 1, (Paris 1886) pp. 141-158; A. S. Atiya, The crusade in the later middle ages (London 1938), pp. 379-397. The Account Book mentioned above (n. 1) is the most important source for the crusade, and it provides much valuable information on the commercial and financial situation in Constantinople in John V's reign.
in Vidin for his deliverance, he can have been little encouraged by the results of his initiatives, for there was nothing, apart from the transient successes of 1359, to show for years of effort. But the expedition of Amadeo of Savoy presents a very different picture. Amadeo was the only western ruler of the century who took seriously the call to bring about a reunion of the Churches by providing military aid for the Greeks. No doubt he was more influenced in this aim by his family connection with the Palaiologoi than by abstract zeal for religious unity, but in practice these two interests came together to make up the most effective link between East and West in the whole of the fourteenth century.

Amadeo's military plans, however, were rather confused. His intention of taking part in a crusading expedition had been announced on Holy Thursday 1363, but his preparations had been interrupted by domestic difficulties, his plans and objectives were unsettled and finally Urban V lost confidence in Amadeo's determination to such an extent that he revoked the papal bulls which had granted the count ecclesiastical tithes for six years for the expenses of the expedition. The first crusading plan was that a Savoyard contingent should accompany Peter of Cyprus to Alexandria, but Amadeo was so occupied by the need to suppress the marauding mercenary companies which were active in Savoy that he had to let the crusade leave without him. Amadeo's attention then turned to the project of a joint expedition with Louis of Hungary against the Turks, and ambassadors of the king were received in Savoy. By 27 May 1366 it had been definitely decided that the expedition's destination was to be Byzantium; on that day a contract was drawn up between Amadeo and 'Florimonz sire de Lesparra' who agreed to join the crusade with thirty men for one year and promised that any fortress he might take would be delivered

up only to Amadeo or to 'l'empereur de Costantignoble'.

It seems certain that at this time Amadeo still believed that he would be met on his arrival by a Hungarian army with which he would act in concert. The negotiations between King Louis and John V were still continuing in Buda. It is also clear from the date of this contract that Amadeo's decision to make Byzantium his objective was taken long before he could have heard of John's enforced stay in Vidin - his plan was to save the emperor from the Turks not the Bulgars. In any case the empire had a special claim upon Amadeo's sympathies for John V was his cousin through Anne of Savoy who was John's mother and a half-sister to Amadeo's father Aimon.

As we shall see in due course, the strength and importance of the family connection was appreciated by both Amadeo and John.

Amadeo went to Byzantium to fight the Turks, and his first military action on arriving in the empire showed that he had considerable talent for it. The city of Gallipoli had fallen to the Turks in 1354, after a severe earthquake had destroyed its fortifications, and its acquisition not only provided the Turks with their first crucial foothold in Europe but represented also a defeat of very great strategic and psychological importance to the Byzantines. It was, therefore, an objective of great significance to Amadeo's expedition for its recapture would demonstrate the efficiency of western arms.

---

1. Bellati, Illustrazioni, Document 3, p.336; see also no.73.
2. J. Servion, Geste et chroniques, p.151 and see below p.173 n.2. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ τε τῆς στρατείας ἐμείνης ἡγούμενος ἄνεψις ἐστὶ τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν βασιλεῖ.'

D. Kydones, Sybouleuitkos Romanos, M.P.G., 154, 993a.
and would give a much needed boost to the empire's morale.1

For this important venture the crusading force was strengthened by the presence of Francesco Gattilusio, the Genoese lord of Lesbos and brother-in-law to John V, and by the participation of some Greeks, perhaps under the command of John's eldest son Andronikos.2 The fighting was fierce and went on for two days; the walls were climbed and breached, but the city still held out. Finally, however, at night while Amadeo's men were resting in their ships, the Turks withdrew, and on the morning of 23 August 1366 the inhabitants shouted the news of the Turks' departure and the crusaders took possession of the city, garrisoning it with a substantial force.3

Amadeo's expedition thus started with a striking success against the infidels, the power of western arms had been demonstrated and hopes for the future raised.

---

1. The significance of Gallipoli's capture by the Turks is illustrated by the mention of the event in very many short chronicles. The strategic importance of the town is indicated by D. Kydones, De non redenda Gallipoli, M.P.G., 154, 1099-1386, where the rôle of the Latins in returning the city to the empire is emphasised.

2. J. Servion, Gesta et croniques, p.135, indicates the presence at Gallipoli of the 'signieur de Mettellin (Mytilene) avec les grezoyes'; this is confirmed by Bollati, Illustrazioni, nos. 154, 155. Servion op.cit., p.139 also mentions the 'noveu du signieur de Mettellin' who is not named. This could be a reference to Andronikos IV. Gattilusio only had nephews on his wife's side, since his brother Niccolò had no known sons. See W. Miller, 'The Gattilusio of Lesbos (1355-1562)', B.Z. 22, p.447; G. Denni, 'The short chronicle of Lesbos 1355-1428', Lesbiaca, 5, (1965), 19-21. Thus Gattilusio's nephews were Andronikos, Manuel and Michael Palaiologos. The last two had gone to Ouda with their father, leaving Andronikos as regent in Constantinople. Furthermore, Short Chronicle 47, p.31 states that Amadeo returned to Constantinople from Bulgaria metà τῶν βασιλέων. At this time Andronikos was the only holder of the imperial title apart from John V, having probably been proclaimed emperor at birth (Gregoras xviii, 2:2, 379-380) and certainly by the time of his marriage in 1355 (M.M., I, pp.432-433). These references suggest that Andronikos was not as indifferent to John V's plight in 1366 as has been suggested, e.g. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (Oxford 1968), p.538.

Amadeo in Bulgaria.

Despite the success of the assault on Gallipoli it was to be Amadeo's only major encounter with the Turks. The news of John V's plight in Vidin caused the expedition to reconsider its objectives, and in any case the failure of any Hungarian troops to make their appearance would severely have limited the crusade's capabilities against the Turks. So the main effort of the western army was deflected from the struggle against the infidel Turks and was turned to a campaign against the Christian Bulgars.

Amadeo led his men to Constantinople to make preparations for his next undertaking. They arrived on 2 September 1366 and stayed for a little over a month, laying in provisions. Meanwhile Amadeo took his first step towards procuring the release of John V, sending two of his chief men as ambassadors to the emperor in Vidin. The main body of the army then followed and Amadeo 'was approaching Bulgarian territory' on 4 October.

The invasion of Bulgaria was a fairly straightforward business, although John Alexander seems to have been in alliance with Turkish forces. Amadeo's army had the continued support of Francesco Gattilusio, and was further strengthened by the addition of two galleys provided by the Genoese colony in Pera and another two from the Empress Helen, who also contributed 12,000 hyperpyra for the expenses involved in obtaining her husband's release.

1. Louis had been expected to provide a land force of 60,000 men, *Ibid.* p.124. Servion suggests that Amadeo heard of John V's enforced stay in Vidin just before his attack on Gallipoli, and decided to change his plans and obtain John's free passage soon after he left Gallipoli. *Ibid.*pp.132, 141. Short Chronicle 47, p.81, lines 27-28; the date of Amadeo's departure from Constantinople is here given as 11 October. An item in the Accounts suggests an earlier date of departure, 'Libravit Guilielmo de Virg., familia Domini pro expensa per ipsum faciendis apud Constantinopolin certis valletias Domini, quos Dominus dimisit ibidem die quarta octobris quando ad partes Burgariae accederebat...' Bollati, *Illustrazioni*, no.274. See also no.266.

2. Turkish ships were found and sunk in the Bulgarian port of Staffida. J. Servion, *op.cit.* p.141. In 1365 John Alexander (contd.)
With these forces Amadeo was able to achieve considerable military successes. The towns of Sozopolis and Mesembria were taken, the latter not without some effort, although part of its fortifications had been destroyed by John V in 1364. Lemona, Staffida and Manthopolis also fell to the western array. Varna, however, the most important Bulgarian city on the Black Sea was too strong to be taken, being "trefforte, bien murs, et grandement garnie." Nevertheless it was subjected to siege, and while the military advance was thus halted, Amadeo turned to diplomacy to achieve his ends. An embassy consisting of five members of Amadeo's party, including Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, left Varna on 29 October for Trnovo the Bulgarian capital. It remained there, negotiating with John Alexander, until 21 December when it returned to Amadeo's winter quarters in Mesembria. During this time the Bulgarian king also received embassies from the citizens of Varna and from some Bulgarian prisoners taken at Anchialos, who went to Trnovo to impress upon the king the fact that all Amadeo wanted was the release of John V and that the siege of Varna would be lifted when this was achieved. At the same time Amadeo wrote in Greek to Dobrotica, the independent ruler of the former Bulgarian province.


1. Mesembria was taken on 21-22 October, Chronicle of Mesembria, ed. P. Schreiner, Studien zu den Brachea Chronika (Munich 1967) pp.145, 204. Staffida is the Bulgarian river and port of Skafida in the Bay of Burgas, between Sozopolis and Anchialos. Manthopolis might be Makropolis near Varna. On the topography of the Bulgarian coast see C. Jirocek, Das Fürstenthum Bulgarien, (Prague-Vienna-Leipzig 1891) esp. pp.519, 532. Anchialos is called Lassilo in the Accounts. Lemona is called Limona in the Accounts and Lymeur by Servian; it is thirty miles south of Varna, on the coast. J. Servian, op. cit. pp.141-144.


of the Dobrudja, perhaps encouraging him also to make these points clear to John Alexander. This diplomatic activity had the desired results, and about Christmas John V was free to resume his homeward journey across Bulgaria.

Amadeo thus succeeded in his limited objective, but his military conquests cannot have appeared an entirely satisfying reward for the expense and effort employed and for the noble intentions with which he had started out from Savoy. His disappointment must chiefly be attributed to the failure of Louis of Hungary to arrive with the expected horde, but the Greeks must also share the blame, for they contributed very little to the military endeavour. There is no evidence of the participation of any Byzantine land forces and it also appears doubtful whether they took over any of the responsibility for the garrisoning of the captured towns. Servion says that Mesembria, Anchialos, Steffida, Sozopolis and Manthopolis were handed over to the crews of the Greek galleys to be guarded in the emperor's name, while Amadeo and his main force proceeded against Varna. He also states that Kalokastro was later garrisoned by the Greeks but that not enough men could be found to guard Lemona as well. However, several entries in Amadeo's Accounts reveal that the picture drawn by Servion is not entirely accurate. The garrisons of Lemona, Anchialos and Mesembria remained under the command of the Count's men long after the expedition moved on to Varna, and Amadeo still retained the responsibility for feeding and paying them. Mesembria was not handed over to the emperor's men until 9 March 1367.

Possession of these towns was not without its advantages for Amadeo; he made a considerable amount of money by levying taxes on Anholalos and Meseubria and also from the sale of goods found there. Furthermore, since the return of Meseubria to the empire was made conditional upon John V paying a large sum of money into the expedition's treasury, the towns had an important role to play in the relations between Amadeo and his cousin.

Nevertheless it is certain that the military effectiveness of the crusading force was appreciably reduced by the need to garrison the towns it took. Not much is known about the garrisons of the Black Sea, except that they existed, because being placed in the centre of Amadeo's main theatre of action, their expenses are largely lost among those of the expedition generally. About the size and cost of the garrison required in Gallipoli, however, much more is known, since its expenses were entirely separate from those of the Black Sea forces. The entries in the Accounts concerning Gallipoli demonstrate that the need to garrison captured towns was a major drain on manpower and economic resources. One hundred and sixty men were permanently tied down in Gallipoli and cut off from any further involvement in the expedition's activities from 26 August 1366, when the garrison was appointed, to 14 June 1367 when the town was returned to the empire as Amadeo began his homeward journey. The total cost of the Gallipoli garrison to Amadeo's treasury is even more staggering, amounting to a little over 33,000 hyperpyra in wages, provisions and transport, and Amadeo was still paying debts incurred at Gallipoli long after he had returned to Italy.

1. Amadeus raised nearly 23,000 hyperpyra from taxes and nearly 1400 hyperpyra from the sale of goods. Bollati, Illustrazioni, nos. VIII, IX, XII, XIII, XXIII, and for receipts generally pp. 3–24.
2. Ibid. nos. 153, 433–436, 613, 1202, 1204. By the calculations of J. Delaville le Roux, La France en Orient, I, p. 148, the Gallipoli garrison occupied about a tenth of Amadeo's total force.
iii) Amadeo's expedition and negotiations for the union of the Churches.

Although Amadeo was denied the satisfaction of making large-scale military conquests at the expense of the infidel, he met with success in a sphere which was not directly connected with the initial objectives of his expedition. The presence of a western crusading party in Constantinople, which included such a dedicated unionist as Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople who accompanied the expedition, was a crucial factor in maintaining the momentum of religious negotiations between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople at a time when the disappointment and disillusionment of John's visit to Buda might have tended towards a widening of the gulf between the two sides.

The discussions about religious questions very likely began early in 1367 when John V and Amadeo met and stayed together in Sozopolis before their return to Constantinople in Holy Week, 11-17 April 1367. However, it is not certain what they talked about until they reached the capital, when they embarked upon two parallel sets of religious negotiations, involving on the one hand Paul and John Kantakouzenos, and on the other Amadeo and John V. These two concurrent yet independent dialogues illustrate the radically different approaches to the matter, and more especially to the manner of achieving union, pursued by the Churches of Rome and Constantinople.

1. 'Ο βασιλεύς δ Παλαιολόγος ἀπὸ τῆς Οὔγγρείας ἐρχόμενος, ὡσαυτώς καὶ ὁ κόντος Σαβείας ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου αὐτοῦ σὺν τῷ κυρίῳ Παύλῳ,... ἦν ἀδόξακος ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ Σωζόπολει. ἐνθα δὲ καὶ εὐχαρίστησαν παρὰ αὐτῶν, ἔγεν τοῦ κόντου καὶ τοῦ Παύλου, ἢ τὸν ἐνυπαρχόντα ένωσις.' J. Meyendorff, 'Projets de concile', p.170, lines 6-11. John V refused to enter into detailed union negotiations until he returned to Constantinople and could consult Kantakouzenos, the patriarch and the synod. Loc. cit., lines 11-15. For the date of the return see Short Chronicle 47, p.81, line 29.
Constantinople. We have three main sources of information for our knowledge of the religious discussions held at this time - accounts of both sets of negotiations, and a letter of Urban V written in 1369, which summarised the agreements reached before Amadeo left Byzantium for home.

a) The debate between Kantakouzenos and the legate Paul.

The attitude of the Byzantine Church to the question of reunion with Rome was given one of its fullest and most effective expositions in a debate between John Kantakouzenos and the papal legate Paul, which took place in Constantinople in June 1367. The responsibility of putting forward the case of the Byzantine Church fell to the ex-emperor since the Patriarch Philotheos refused to have any contact with a western official whose title of Patriarch of Constantinople negated his own, but Kantakouzenos, now the monk Joasaph, showed himself to be quite equal to the task. It was not the first time that he had found it necessary to explain the Byzantine viewpoint to legates of a pope, since in 1350 he had talked to Clement VI's envoys in much the same tone as he now addressed Paul.

Kantakouzenos insisted on his own personal desire for Church union, but stressed that the good intentions of both sides would come to nothing if proper attention was not paid to the form by which it was to be achieved. It was essential that union be re-established on equal terms, that Rome should not demand the return of the Eastern Church, but should meet it halfway in the convocation of an oecumenical council, in which all the churches of Christendom could discuss the


problems together, 'inspired by a love of the Holy Spirit and a feeling of brotherhood'. Only in this way could the Byzantine people be persuaded to consider re-union; their opposition to the methods of Michael VIII had in no way diminished, and they would resist attempts to secure union by tyranny and persecution just as much as they had a hundred years before.

Paul undoubtedly had a greater understanding than most members of the western Church of the importance attached by the Byzantines to the principle behind ecumenical councils. Yet in the course of his debate with Kantakouzenos, he put forward many of the customary Roman arguments based on a misunderstanding of the emperor's powers in ecclesiastical affairs and aimed at finding a route to union which did not involve the calling of a council. He made the common assumption that an ecumenical council was not a prerequisite for religious change in a church which was so manifestly under the personal influence and direction of the emperor. He imagined that an imperial decree would be quite sufficient to bring Constantinople back to the fold.

But, as far as can be judged from the Byzantine account of the debate, Paul was left unconvinced by his own arguments; he followed none of them through with any determination and finally ended the debate with a totally unexpected agreement that a council should be held in Constantinople some time before the end of May 1369. The form of the debate had closely followed that of the various earlier dialogues between representatives of the Churches of East and West, but it ended in the one true breakthrough, in the one realistic.

hope of achieving union through the involvement and agreement of both Churches, that emerged in the course of the religious negotiations of John V's reign.

The significance of this debate is to be seen in the fact that it, alone of all the union initiatives of the second half of the fourteenth century, produced any excitement or positive reaction from the hierarchy of the Byzantine Church. The Patriarch Philotheos was prepared, despite his earlier refusal to meet Paul, to take advantage of the concessions which Kantakouzenos had won for the Byzantine Church. A synod of the bishops under his jurisdiction, which was attended also by the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem, who were at this time resident in Constantinople, was held and expressed itself in favour of an oecumenical council being called in the City. Invitations to this council were then sent out to the Patriarch of Antioch and the Archbishop of Ochrid. Since Kantakouzenos in his debate with Paul had laid special emphasis on the fact that the council should include the Metropolitans of Russia, Trebizond, Alania and Zecchia, the Catholicos of Georgia and the Patriarch of Thmo, it seems likely that they also would have received invitations. Furthermore the patriarchs and monks living in Constantinople appointed ambassadors to travel to Italy with Amadeo and to visit Urban V. Suddenly the Byzantine Church awoke to the fact that there was now a real chance of pursuing union through the machinery and in the manner which it had always felt was appropriate and necessary for the re-establishment of union with the Roman Church. There was at last

1. Philotheos' letter to the Archbishop of Ochrid is published in M.H.1, pp.491-493. It suggests that Paul's agreement had papal authorisation: "Ὁ κύντρος Σιβωνίας...... ἐχὼν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ δυσικὸν ἀρχιερεία, τὸν κύριον Πάυλον, διεκκόμει λόγους τοῦ Πάπα πρὸς τὸν κράτιστον καὶ δίκιόν μου αὐτοκράτορα περὶ τῆς ἐνώσεως καὶ ὁμολογίας τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, τῆς τε ἡμετέρας δηλονότι καὶ τῆς τῶν Λατίνων."
an atmosphere of hope, produced by Kantakouzenos' debate with Paul, in which it seemed that the project of union could flourish and, with the goodwill and determination of both sides, he brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

b) The negotiations between Amadeo and John V.

While Kantakouzenos and Paul were making their momentous and most encouraging decision to seek a union founded on the solid basis of a full council, Amadeo and John V were engaged in discussions which seemed to undermine the progress made by the other two negotiators and returned the question of Church union to the secular authorities. The story of the negotiations of the emperor with his cousin is told by Servien in his Chroniques de Savoye, and although it contains some manifest inaccuracies, the basic features of the account are borne out by the evidence of other sources.

The story begins as Amadeo was nearing the end of his stay in Constantinople and was evidently feeling that he had not yet been sufficiently rewarded for his efforts. He asked John to consider how difficult and unpleasant it was for the House of Savoy to have such an eminent relative who did not profess the Roman faith or recognize the pope. Fearing the scorn of his western colleagues, Amadeo asked his cousin as a personal favour to visit Rome and to submit to Urban. John pondered on this request for some time and then agreed, since he was so indebted to Amadeo, to do as he desired. However, he said, it was not possible for him to leave his country at once, but he would send the patriarch and some counsellors to Italy with Amadeo and would follow himself within six months.

Amadeo expressed his pleasure at this answer and was preparing to leave for home when the patriarch came to him to ask whether he would mind if John did not after all carry out his promise, because his people had got wind of his intentions and threatened to depose him if he went ahead. Amadeo replied that he did indeed mind, and wondered at such ingratitude in the face of the expedition's successes and hardships in the emperor's service, and concluded that if John would not do as he had promised, the crusaders would undo the work they had done and would 'return the empire to the state in which it had been when they had passed the bras de saint George. Indeed, according to Servion, Amadeo and his men prepared for military action against the empire in order to force John V to honour his promise. When the emperor and his people saw how determined Amadeo was, they submitted to his demand and, as a pledge of good faith, handed over the 'riche chappel imperial' and four noble hostages to the count, to be kept by him until John visited Rome.

c) Urban V's letter to Pera, 16 November 1367

A letter written by Urban V to the Genoese authorities in Pera after John V's eventual arrival in Rome, is a document of great importance in resolving the apparent contradictions between the Byzantine and western sources relating to the union negotiations of 1367. The letter adds nothing to our knowledge of how the religious discussions were conducted, but it summarises the terms which resulted from them, and does so in such a way that the final agreement, made before the

1. Ibid. p.153.
2. O. Malecki, Un empereur, p.j. no.15, pp.300-351.
crusaders left the empire, seems to owe much more to the conversations of Amadeo than to the debate of Paul.

From this letter it appears that the main feature of the agreement made in 1367 was that John should visit Rome in March 1368, and that certain sureties were deposited by him as a guarantee of his sincerity. This was substantially what John V had promised Amadeo, according to the account of Servion. Urban's letter, however, went into greater detail than Servion about what precisely the sureties were and what penalties the emperor would be subject to if he failed to visit Rome. There is no mention of any hostages being sent to Italy, and it appears that it was not so much the Byzantine crown, 'chapel imperial', which John surrendered as a pledge, but rather a large jewel, 'balassius grossus', which the emperor wore in his hat. The sureties also included a ring of precious stone, two saphires, and some pearls 'of little value'\(^1\). An entry in Amadeo's Accounts confirms the handing over of the stones of a ring and a bracelet by John V, and their deposit in Pera\(^2\). The letter furthermore specified that if John broke his promise, he would forfeit not only these jewels, but also the entire commercial revenues which the empire received from Greek and foreign ships over a period of five years. Although it is not mentioned in this letter, we know from Amadeo's Accounts and from a letter

\(^1\) 'Et ut huiusmodi suam promissionem adimpleret, idem imperator in nostris manibus certa iocallia, videlicet unum balassium grossum, quem idem imperator super capello suo deferre solebat, ac unum anulum de petra pretiosa barracii duosque saphiros et aliquas margaritas munitas pauci valoris, necon sua commercia tali conditione adiecta deosuit'. \textit{Ibid.} p.380.

\(^2\) 'Libravit, de mandato Domini, Baldassano Nycholay notario pro redepczione duorum instrumentorum receptorum per ipsum, quorum unum est de deposto lapidum annulli et converiquiorum tradictorum Domine per Imperatorem Costantinopolis (et fuit factum dictum depositum de consensu dictorum Dominorum in manibus Comunis Pere)...' Bollati, \textit{Illustrazioni}, no.555.
from Urban to Amadeo in November 1369, that the emperor's pledges also included the sum of 34,862 hyperpyra, which was loaned to Amadeo on 29 May 1367 until John V, or his eldest son Andronikos, should arrive in Rome. John was thus given a financial incentive to fulfil his promise since Amadeo was bound to repay 20,000 florins, or 40,000 hyperpyra, to the emperor if he came.

The whole tone of Urban's letter to Pera and of the information given by the Accounts, is in accord with the story of the Chroniques de Savoye in suggesting that John was forced into promising to make a visit to the pope, and that the westerners were so unsure of his good faith that they obliged him to deposit very heavy guarantees with Amadeo and the podesta of Pera. However, it should not be ignored that the very nature of Urban's letters, demanding as they did the return of the sureties given by the emperor, caused them to dwell chiefly on the punitive clauses of the religious agreement of 1367, and so were bound to have more in common with Servion's story than with the account of Paul's debate with Kantakouzenos.

On this evidence alone it appears that John V was a party to irresponsible negotiations, and was influenced more by Amadeo's appeal to family honour and by the crusaders' threatening attitude than by a sincere desire to assist in plans for union, which would bring strength to the Church.

and the Byzantine empire. But it would be wrong to see the
two sets of negotiations as entirely independent of one
another, to see Amadeo's plan as a strict alternative to
Paul's, and to assume that the project of holding an oecu-
menical council was altogether undermined by John V's willin-
geness to accede to Amadeo's proposal that he should visit
Italy. It is clear from the dates of the two parts of the
religious negotiations that John's intention of going to
Rome was confirmed before the debate between Paul and
Kantakouzenos took place, and that it was not merely a method
of concealing Paul's rash concession to the Byzantine
position by obliging the emperor personally to pursue the
course known to be favoured by the papacy. John V's first
deposit of sureties, the return of which was dependent upon
his arrival before Urban, was made on 29 May 1367, when
34,862 hyperpyra were handed over to Amadeo. The discussions
preceding this settlement, and the raising of such a large
sum of money from two colonial Genoese bankers, had doubtless
been going on for some time\(^1\). On the other hand the debate
between Paul and Kantakouzenos, which produced the agreement
to seek union through holding an oecumenical council, is
dated June 1367\(^2\); it must in fact have taken place early
in the month since the legate sailed back to Italy with
Amadeo's expedition which left Pera on 9 June\(^3\). From these
dates it appears that the decision to hold a council was
reached after John had committed himself to visiting Rome and,
if anything, John's promise produced the favourable atmos-
phere in which it was possible for Paul to make concessions
to the Byzantine Church.

1. See above p. 74, n.1.
3. '...usque ad diem nonam mensis iunii, qua die Dominus
ultima vice recessit de Pera, veniendo apud Venecias'.
Bollati, Illustrazioni, no.612.
It is also clear from Urban's letter to Pera that John V's agreement to visit Rome was not an abject surrender to the terms traditionally demanded by the papacy for a political settlement. It emerges from the letter that the emperor was not immediately obliged to visit the pope by the terms agreed in 1367. His obligation only began when two imperial ambassadors, sent with Amadeo to the papal curia, returned to Constantinople with apostolic letters relating to 'several promises' which Amadeo and Paul had made to the emperor\(^1\). Once these letters had arrived in Byzantium, John was bound to visit Urban in March 1368, but if they arrived too late for John to be able to keep to this timetable, he was allowed to postpone his journey beyond this date. However, John did not have to wait for the letters later than September 1368; if they had not arrived by then, the emperor's obligations were at an end, and his sureties would be returned to him\(^2\). The nature of these promises and the rôle of the Byzantine embassy in Italy are therefore of great importance to an understanding of the religious negotiations of 1367 and of John's visit to Rome in 1369.

1. 'Iohannes Paleologus... promisit quod quamprimum duo ipsius imperatoris ambaxiatores de Romana Curia cum litteris apostolicis nonnulla, que per venerabilem fratrem nostrum Paulum, patriarcham Constantinopolitanum, et dictum comitem eidem imperatori promissa fuerant, continentibus reverterentur, idem imperator ad iter arripienda ad nos veniendi personaliter vel eius filius primogenitus, qui in imperio succedere debet, se pararet, ita quod per totum mensem marci tunc proxime futuri se ante conspectum nostrum presentaret', O.Halecki, op.cit. p.380.

2. 'Si huiusmodi littere apostolice tardarent et in tempore non venirent, ita quod idem imperator predictam promissionem per prefatum mensem marci adimplere non posset, non intelligeretur in penam incidisse predictam, sed intelligeretur tempus esse sibi prolongatum, ita quod conveniuntur et commode ad nostram presentiam evenire valeret, quodque si ipse littere apostolice per dictum mensem marci non venirent, prefatus imperator per totum mensem septembris tunc proxime subsequentem expectare deberet et essent obligata eius pignora supra-

(contd.)
The promises made by Paul and Amadeo.

There is no positive indication in any source about the nature of the promises made by Amadeo and the papal legate. It seems likely that the question of future military aid should have been a matter discussed between John V and the western negotiators. Concessions in the religious sphere were usually only contemplated in Byzantium if there was a reasonable expectation of deriving military advantages from them and it would have been natural for John to seek some assurances on this matter before committing himself to the journey to Italy. According to Servion this was how Amadeo represented the situation to Urban when they met in Viterbo. Later, when John actually arrived in Rome, Servion makes out that the emperor announced his willingness to submit 'sur condicion' that he received several armed galleys from the West until the Turks were chased out of Greece. Urban apparently was satisfied with this, but could not obtain his cardinals' consent to such a plan, and so John left Rome without any progress being made in either military or religious matters.

The obvious inaccuracy of the last statement of this account must cast doubt on all those parts of it which cannot be directly corroborated by other sources; but it is a Savoyard chronicle and its serious mistakes seem only to occur when it refers to events which did not directly concern

2. Amadeo told Urban that John V wished to submit 'en esperance que l'eglise luy deust ayder contre les infideles, qui trop fort l'opressoyent; et pour cestes choses acomboir, l'empereur son cousin luy avoit promis de venir en propre personne a Romme.' J. Servion, *Gestez et croniques*, p.157. See also p.159.
Amadeo. Amadeo at least knew about the negotiations of 1367 at first hand - as Servion made Urban remark to Amadeo, 'vous faites avez l'appointement et savez les choses comme elles se passent'. It may be through Servion that one can come closest to an account of what Amadeo himself knew to have taken place.

There is also one other topic which is known to have been the subject of discussion in the 1367 negotiations, which very likely was included in the promises made by Amadeo and Paul to John V. The holding of an oecumenical council had always appeared as an essential prerequisite for the reunion of the Churches, in Byzantine eyes, and the negotiations of 1367 are of prime importance to the history of East-West religious discussions in John V's reign since they produced, for the only time in that period, an agreement for such a council to be held. Indeed the only thing which Paul is known to have promised in the course of his stay in Byzantium, is that an oecumenical council should form the basis of Church reunion and should be held before the end of May 1369.

However, the opposition of the Papacy towards such a plan had been so consistent and so vehement on all the previous occasions that it had been proposed that, although Paul had full authority to negotiate on Church union as the representative of the pope, the agreement he made with Kantakouzenos clearly required Urban's ratification before any further progress could be made. It was up to Paul to persuade the papacy that its previous objections to the holding of an oecumenical council were no longer valid, and that the

1. Ibid. p.153.
established truths of the Faith would not be endangered, before the Byzantines would accept the next stage - the visit of John V to Urban in Rome.

c) The Byzantine embassy to Urban V in 1367.

The papal ratification or rejection of the 'promises' made by Amadeo and Paul was to be transmitted to John V by the ambassadors which he had sent to the papal curia with the returning crusading force. This embassy was one of the most remarkable and encouraging results of the 1367 negotiations, and its significance can at once be seen from its composition. Among the eight ambassadors were representatives not only of the emperor, but also of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem, of the Byzantine regular clergy, of the citizens of Constantinople and the Byzantine aristocracy. This was the only time in the entire course of the religious negotiations between the Churches of Constantinople and Rome that all these parties on the Byzantine side came into direct contact with the pope, and it is a measure of the impact which Paul had made upon them by the sincerity and goodwill of his approach. The composition of this embassy lends weight to the supposition that the holding of an oecumenical council was among the promises made by Paul. Nothing else could have persuaded all these interests in the empire to come together in a common approach to Urban V, and a council was undoubtedly the one topic which the representatives of the eastern patriarchs and the Greek monks would have been prepared to discuss with the pope.

1. The composition of the Byzantine embassy is known from the papal letters with which it returned to Constantinople: Raynaldus, ann.1367, nos.9-10; Täutu 11, pp.202-206. O.Halecki, op.cit. p.j. no.10, p.369.
Unfortunately we do not know what in fact was said in the meetings between Urban V and the Byzantine ambassadors. We know only that the two sides first met in Viterbo on 7 October 1367 and that the Greeks went to Rome with the pope on 16 October and remained there until 6 November, on which day were dated the many letters which they took back with them to Constantinople. But these letters, of which there are twenty three all dated the same day, are most informative about what was discussed. Military aid, in so far as it is mentioned at all, is given no more prominent a place than was normal in papal letters to the empire. Union was to come first, and the territorial revival of Byzantium might then follow its spiritual salvation. The idea of an oecumenical council was passed over without mention. The letters to those parties which had sent representatives to the pope, and those to other individuals, both Latin and Greek, who had influence in the East, merely thanked them for their past encouragement of John V, stressed the promises which he had made to visit Italy, and exhorted everyone to continue to work for union and to help John on his way.

Urban's apparent lack of interest in the project of an oecumenical council was a very considerable setback, for nothing could be done without him, and it was an open rebuff to the leaders of the Eastern Church who had already busied themselves in sending out invitations. However, it is doubt-


2. 'Quare cum ex dicta obedientia et reconciliacione, si eas fieri contingat, Domino iuvante, completi, salus multarum alias perennis animarum, Christianitatis augmentum et tutela fortissima, infidelium repressio, aliaque multa spiritualia et temporalia bona sint probabilius provenienza'. 6 November 1367, Urban V to Joanna of Sicily, Raynaldus, ann.1367, no.7 Tātu 11, p.213.
ful whether the series of letters which Urban sent to Byzantium with the returning ambassadors, represented the apostolic letters which John V was waiting for before setting out for Italy. None of the letters dated 6 November 1367 was even addressed to John V, and although Halecki makes it plain that such a letter could easily have been written and subsequently lost¹, there is some evidence that Urban himself did not regard these letters as replies in the matter of Paul's promises, and did not yet consider John V to be obliged to make the journey to Italy in accordance with the terms agreed in Constantinople.

The letters of 6 November 1367 cannot have been Urban's final word on Paul's 'promises' for if they were sent on the day they were dated, they would have arrived in Constantinople in ample time for John to make his journey to Rome by March or, as Urban's extended timetable allowed, by May 1368. Yet John was not in Italy by this date, nor did he forfeit the jewels and commercial revenues as he would have done by the terms of 1367, had he received the apostolic letters relating to the promises of Amadeo and Paul. So presumably the letters which arrived in Byzantium were not those for which John was waiting and on receipt of which he was bound to visit Urban.

If any letters were written to John by Urban, between 1 July 1366, when the emperor was in Buda, and 2 September 1369, by which date he had arrived in Italy, they have not survived. There is no letter which was obviously a papal reaction to the promises of Amadeo and Paul. However, there is a brief entry in a short chronicle which is of some

significance to the contacts between the papacy and Byzantium. It reads, 'on Sunday 20 September 1363 letters from the pope were read out in the hippodrome'. It is the only entry between those relating to Amadeo's departure from Constantinople and John V's return to the City in 1371.

The most significant feature of this bald statement is the date which it contains. 20 September 1363 fell just inside the deadline beyond which John V was no longer under any obligation to wait for Urban's apostolic letter relating to the 'several promises' made by Paul. It cannot be stated definitely that these letters were the pope's long-delayed reply, but the date fits and within a year John was in Italy, was held to have fulfilled his part of the bargain and was able to reclaim his sureties from Amadeo and the Genoese in Pera. It is also reasonable to assume that any papal letters which were considered worthy of a public reading in the hippodrome, must have contained some elements favourable to the Byzantines. There was really only one thing which they wished to hear from the pope; that he was prepared to ratify the promises which had been made by Paul in 1367 about the calling of an ecumenical council. The normal papal letter, containing the standard mixture of exhortation, vague threats and vaguer hopes for the salvation of the empire from the Turks, can have given little encouragement to any Byzantine addressee and certainly would not have been broadcast in public.

A little over a month after the pope's letters were read out in the hippodrome, Urban wrote to Paul, his legate in the

1. "Ενει οτως Σεπτεμβριώ κ' ήμέρα ημιακή είς το ιππόδρομον καὶ ἀνεγυνώστησα(ν) ἑπιστολαὶ τοῦ Πάπας. Short Chronicle 47, p.81, lines 30-31. This chronicle is one of the very rare Byzantine sources even to mention the exploits of Amadeo of Savoy, or John V's visit to Hungary, and it is alone in recording John's return from Italy. On the manuscripts of this chronicle see P. Schreiner, Studien, pp.11-12, 18-20, 92."
East, in terms which show that he had not given up hope of making progress on the basis of the terms agreed in June 1367. It was a letter not of despair but of encouragement, for while Urban recognised that nothing might come of his plans, he exhorted Paul to continue his efforts to bring the matter of union to a satisfactory conclusion 'while there is still some hope remaining'. This hope can only have remained because Urban had managed to get his letters to Byzantium by the end of September 1368. Had he failed to do this, John V could have reclaimed his sureties and would have been under no obligation to visit the pope in Rome.

This hope which still remained was to lead John V to Rome in 1369 in the culmination to a chapter of East-West religious negotiations which had begun in 1366 with the arrival in the empire of a small western crusading force. Amadeo's exploits in the military sphere may not have amounted to much more than a psychological boost for the Greeks, but once he and Paul turned their attention to religious affairs they not only generated sufficient confidence to excite the enthusiasm of the Eastern Church, but in the negotiations of June 1367 they laid the foundations necessary to get John V to Rome in 1369.

C. John V in Italy.

1) The religious aspect.

That John V personally became a convert to the Roman Church cannot be doubted. Although no Byzantine sources accept or mention this fact, it is clear that in the West, at any rate, his renunciation of the schism was known and he was regarded as a 'princeps catholicus'. There is, however, some doubt about when this conversion took place and exactly what steps had to be taken by the emperor to guarantee its acceptance. John's willingness to submit to the pope and the Western Church had been expressed as early as 1355, but the conventional accolade of a western ruler, 'carissimus in Christo filius nostro', was not finally and permanently granted to him by the pope until 1369.

It was this fact above all which caused Halecki to entitle his chapter on John V's visit to Urban 'la conversion de Jean V Paléologue', and he regarded the ceremonies which took place in Rome as marking John's full acceptance of the Roman faith. But, in the overall picture of his relations with the Western Church, John's Italian journey has a different significance. He had, after all, briefly been called 'carissimus filius' some ten years earlier by Innocent VI. In 1356 papal envoys had been sent to Byzantium to receive the oral profession and submission which John had announced he was willing to make. John V's visit to Rome added little, in either matter or manner, to the promises which he had made in 1357 to the papal legate, Peter Thomas.

1. O. Halecki, Un empereur, chapter 8, pp.188-212, esp.p.139.
One of the most surprising features of the emperor's stay in Rome was how little it brought him into contact with the pope. When John V arrived in the City in late August or early September 1369, he found that Urban was not there, and the pope did not return until October 13. Urban, however, had already appointed a Cardinal to receive John and to stay with him, and we are told John was welcomed honourably and 'treated only a little less well than if he had been Emperor of the Romans'.

The pope had also already delegated the responsibility of receiving John's profession of faith to four Cardinals, but although Urban was not to be present, the ceremony did not take place until after his return to Rome. On 18 October 1369 John V was received by the four Cardinals in the Hospital of the Holy Spirit. John was accompanied by four members of his retinue, Francesco Gattilusio, Demetrios Kydories, Michael Strongylos and Philip Tzykandyles. These men were notable in two respects in that they were all members of the Roman Church and also all knew both Greek and Latin. The Cardinals likewise brought their interpreters, Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, Nicholas Bishop of Dryinopolis and a Franciscan, Anthony, from Athens. Several other Roman Churchmen were present as witnesses.


The profession of faith presented to John was the same as had been administered to Michael VIII and as had been sent by Urban to John in Buda in 1366. It was drawn up in two columns with Greek on the left and Latin on the right, and the interpreters all swore that the one was an accurate translation of the other. By signing this profession and sealing it with a gold bull, John explicitly accepted the jurisdictional primacy of the pope, as the successor of Peter, over the whole catholic Church, acknowledging the righteousness of the Roman claim that questions of faith and cases before ecclesiastical courts were ultimately subject to the decision of the pope alone. John further promised to 'hold to and persevere in all that the holy Roman Church held, taught and preached', and the profession itemised all the contentious articles of faith which divided the Churches of Constantinople and Rome, indicating and approving throughout the positions held by the Roman Church. Thus the emperor specifically accepted the western teachings on the procession of the Holy Spirit, the existence of seven ecclesiastical sacraments, the eucharistic rite, the legality of fourth and subsequent marriages and the doctrine of purgatory.

Three days later the emperor met Urban V, apparently for the first time, on the steps of St. Peter's. The pope was seated on a throne, and John, advancing towards him, kneeled three times and kissed the pope's feet, hands and cheek. Thereupon Urban took John by the hand and, singing the Te Deum.

1. The best edition of the profession of faith is in S. Lampros, op. cit., pp. 241-254; no. 10 has the Greek text; no. 11 has the Latin translation. Raynaldus, ann. 1369, nos. 2-3, p. 164; Târutu 11, pp. 283-286.
led him into St. Peter's where the pope sang mass in the presence of the emperor together with 'a large congregation of Greeks'\(^1\). With this ceremony, so reminiscent of Byzantine court ceremonial but with western 'political' overtones, the final seal was set on John's acceptance of and by the Roman Church - according to Halecki the efforts of the last fourteen years had finally resulted in the conversion of John V.

However, the ceremonies performed in Rome seem in no way to add to or improve upon those celebrated in Constantinople twelve years earlier. On both occasions John made his profession of faith not to the pope himself, but to papal agents specifically appointed and charged to hear that profession. Peter Thomas had been sent by Innocent VI to carry through the project John had advertised in 1355 and to complete them with a profession 'ore proprio'. There is evidence that when this had been done, not only did John V consider himself to be a member of the Roman Church, but that Innocent agreed and encouraged western princes to view him in this light also. In Rome John's profession was heard by the four Cardinals appointed for that purpose, before the emperor and pope had even met; in this sense certainly the Roman ceremony added nothing to what had gone before\(^2\).

We do not know about the form of the submission made by John in 1357 in the same detail as is provided by the documents of 1369, but there does not seem to be any substantial difference in the nature or solemnity of the promises made.

Philippe de Mézières in his Life of Saint Peter Thomas

2. For John V's conversion in 1357 see above pp.41-45.
stated that the emperor made his oath with his hands in those of the Papal legate 'promising to observe and cause to be observed as far as possible what pertained to the holy Roman Church', acknowledging the articles of faith one by one\(^1\).

It is entirely likely that the form of oath administered by Peter Thomas was exactly the same as that used in 1369. Already it had been used in the conversion of Michael VIII and had been sent to Buda in 1366 as clarification in the dispute over rebaptism which had arisen between the Byzantines and Louis of Hungary\(^2\).

Finally, the ceremonies of 1357 culminated, like those of 1369, in the Mass, and on the first occasion we are told that the emperor received communion from the hands of Peter Thomas 'tamquam fidelis Catholicus et devotus'. Both submissions also had a quasi political character; in 1357 John made his promises with his hands in those of the legate, a gesture of putting himself under the Church's protection, in 1369 by his kissing of Urban's feet, hands and cheek he emphasised his position as the pope's subject\(^3\).

There is indeed one important way in which John's conversion at the hands of Peter Thomas was more emphatic than the later 'conversion'. Innocent VI had laid great stress on the fact that the profession should be made 'ore proprio' which Halecki, without much apparent justification, took to mean a public profession. Whether or not this was what Innocent meant, clearly a public profession would have been more accept-


\(^2\) The same form of oath was also demanded of the Alan chiefs by Benedict XII and of Ossinius, the Armenian King, by John XXII. Cf. Raynalduces, ann.1333, p.143 and ann.1369, p.162. The 1369 profession adds more detail on the articles of faith, but the substance of the oath is unchanged.

able than a private one, to a pope intent on the conversion of the entire Byzantine people. According to John V's letter to Innocent the ceremony of 1357 was by no means private, the oath being made 'in the presence of many bishops' and 'with the advice and consultation of the barons'. Even if one were inclined to doubt these statements as being unduly designed to please the pope, it cannot be said that the smallest concession to a public profession was made in 1369. Although John brought a number of prominent men with him to Italy, not all of whom were members of the Roman Church, it was only those four who were already converted who accompanied him to the Hospital of the Holy Spirit to witness his profession of faith, and their participation seems largely to have been due to their ability to act as interpreters.

The similarities between the two ceremonies are manifest: the content of the profession of faith, the way in which it was received by agents of the pope, the celebratory Mass were common to both. Nevertheless it is true that nearly all the western sources with the exception of Philippe de Mézières imply that John V was converted in 1369. The catalogue of 'miracles' connected with Urban V and his pontificate, which

1. See above, p. 42.
2. Philippe de Mézières wrote The life of Saint Peter Thomas in 1366. In a later work, Le songe du vieil pelerin, written in 1389, he described John's profession in Rome as another 'conversion', stressing its similarity to that of 1357 and dismissing both as ineffective. 'Celui empeur apelle Jehan Palirlogos, souverain chief de la division de la cote de mon tresane Pere, et contre son sacrament et sa profession. Car deux foys depuis XX ans il a este reconsilie a l'egilse de Romme, et renoncie en publique au scisme tres maudit, l'une foiz en la main de frere Pierre Thomas, solemnel maistre en theologie, de l'ordre des Carmes, et le legat apostolique a l'empereur susdit; l'autre foiz en la personne du devost pape Urbain quint, en la cite de Romme. Et tantost qu'il fu retourne en Constantinoble, il ne donnast pas ung noble de sacrament qu'il eust fait'. Le Songe, ed. G.W. Coopland, (Cambridge 1969), I, pp.253-259.
was prepared as evidence for his canonization, cites John's visit to Rome as one such miracle and represents the event as marking his conversion. It was naturally no part of the compilers' task to detract from Urban's successes to give any credit to his predecessor, but most of the Lives of Urban V, some of which were written by authors who had already dealt with the life of Innocent VI, likewise state that John's conversion dated from 1369. There can be no doubt that the events which took place in Rome eclipsed those which had occurred in Constantinople in the Western imagination. Indeed it would appear that the West had a short memory even for John's visit to Rome, for in 1361 the terms of the Treaty of Turin included a clause enjoining the Venetians and the Genoese to work together for the return of John V and his subjects to the Roman faith. The Treaty had, moreover, been drawn up under the sponsorship of Amadeo of Savoy who, more than most westerners, should have remembered John's conversion and the visit to the pope.

There is, however, a significant, if somewhat confused, entry in the Fourth Life of Urban V which suggests that the author was not entirely ignorant of the steps which John had taken during Innocent's pontificate. It states that in 1364


find out whether he was firm in the faith which he had sworn to in Rome in the hands of his predecessor\textsuperscript{1}. We do not know anything of these two bishops from any other source, but it was in 1364, in the second year of his pontificate, that Urban first came into direct contact with John V through a Genoese intermediary, Michael Malaspina, and it is entirely likely that in this first approach Urban should ask for confirmation of John's past promises. John's reply, according to the Fourth Life, was the somewhat ambiguous statement that all his family had lived and died in the catholic faith and that he would always do likewise, deviating not at all from the faith of the Roman Church. Although the author of the Fourth Life was evidently confused in his statement that John V had made his promises to Innocent VI in Rome, he clearly was aware that the relations between the Byzantine emperor and the papacy had reached an advanced stage before the pontificate of Urban V.

One significant novelty, however, did come out of John V's visit to Rome. The pope now possessed a profession of faith written in two languages, signed and sealed by the emperor, witnessed by a number of prominent figures from both East and West. This was a considerable improvement on John's letter to Innocent VI in 1337, which, despite its insistent sincerity and the confirmation of a papal legate, lacked the force of the formal document produced in 1369. It

marked a further stage in the progression from John V's letter stating his desire for union, written in 1355, through his oral profession of 1357, to a final written submission with all the weight and authority of the imperial seal.1

This is the true significance of John V's visit to Rome. It did not mark his conversion, for that had been secured twelve years earlier, but it was the final personal submission of the emperor to the person of the pope authenticated by a written and sealed document. It was a legal and symbolic act, the importance of which came not from the profession of faith alone but chiefly from the fact of the emperor's presence in the West and his homage to the pope. This can most clearly be seen in the fact that John once again earned the title 'carissimus in Christo filius noster' not after the sealing of his profession of faith on 13 October 1369, but on 2 September 1369, on which day Urban wrote to the emperor from Viterbo rejoicing in his arrival in Italy.2 This final consummation of John's official conversion in Rome was the crowning glory of the closing years of Urban's pontificate. It must be seen in the context of the return of the Curia from Avignon to Rome and the reception there of several of the crowned heads of Europe including the Emperor of the Romans.3 Finally the emperor of East Rome came too, the first Byzantine emperor for seven hundred years to visit the former seat of the imperial


3. 'Ad dictum dominum Urbanum venit imperator Romanorum, imperator Greecorum, Johannes rex Francie, Johanna regina Sicilie, et fere cuncti principes seculi huius eundem timebant'. Baluzius-Mollat, Vitae, I, SextaVita, p. 413. This Sixth Life mentions the visit but not the profession.
power to which he was heir; he came not only with the authority of his ancient dignity, but as a convert to make submission to his acknowledged spiritual father. Urban could rejoice in the emperor's membership of the Roman Church, and also in the important testimony which the whole ceremony in Rome gave to the re-establishment of the pope's position in Rome, and also to the restoration, in some measure at any rate, of his position among the Christians of the East.

The emperor's reaffirmation of his new faith had also an important rôle to play in allaying some fears and suspicions as to his sincerity and depth of purpose. It could not be ignored that since his conversion he had done nothing to help the spread of the Roman faith among his people, and although this did not invalidate his personal conversion, it doubtless diminished its impact. It is not surprising therefore that Urban should have sought from John V this sort of personal confirmation of his adherence to the western Church. However, it is surprising - and it is a fact which shows the real depth of the suspicion with which westerners regarded the Greeks - that only three months after John made his personal and detailed profession of faith, he was obliged to make another, designed finally to allay any fears still remaining that his conversion was an elaborate fraud based on semantic sleight of hand.

John's second profession of faith made in January 1370, (the bull curiously does not specify the day), was much shorter than the first, its only object being 'to remove all ambiguity'. It referred to the profession made on 13 October and especially to the phrase 'holy Roman Church' which

occurred in it on a number of occasions. The bull declared that John meant by this expression the Church 'over which the aforesaid Pope now rules as his predecessors, the Roman pontiffs, have ruled, and as we believe the catholic Christians of the west understand it'. Clearly there were some at the papal curia who were not satisfied with the first profession, despite its explicitness, despite its recitation of disputed points and its clear enunciation of the western line on each, and who feared that John was inwardly merely reaffirming his membership of the catholic Church of East Rome.

It should not be assumed, however, because John was for the most part, from his own personal point of view, merely retracing the path he had trodden in 1357, and because the pope was anxious to obtain an unambiguous demonstration of his position and to close every possibility of evasion, that the ceremonies in Rome in 1369 were simply a secular formality with no religious significance. There is testimony (admittedly not altogether disinterested) to John's sincerity and devotion during his visit to Rome. The Book of Urban V's miracles tells of John's frequent visits and gifts to the pope, and his habit of arriving uninvited for meals at which he would ignore the elaborately prepared food and would insist on sharing the simple dishes which were brought for Urban alone, announcing that his body and soul were better refreshed by such a meal than by the feast prepared for him.1

Urban, impressed no doubt by such exhibitions of humility and spiritual and personal devotion, and with the additional reassurance of the second profession of faith, granted a request made by John for the use of a portable altar. Such a grant was by no means unusual, but on this occasion it significantly specified that it was for use by a Latin priest, according to the rite of the Roman Church.

The problem of a converted emperor remaining steadfast in his faith when once again among his Orthodox people was a difficult one. The provision of a portable altar, serviced by a Latin priest, was an obvious way of overcoming John V's personal religious problem. We hear no more of the Latin priest, and it must remain doubtful whether or how far John made use of the papal privilege. In practical terms, however, he would have had no difficulty in recruiting a priest from among the western clergy in Pera.

ii) The political results of John V's visit to Rome.

Urban's satisfaction with John expressed itself also in less personal ways which had more significance for the Byzantine Empire as a whole, and perhaps more relevance to the motive underlying John's Italian journey. On the strength of the first profession alone, Urban issued an encyclical to all catholics informing them of John's visit, telling them henceforth to regard him as 'a true son of the same Church' and requesting that aid and favour should be shown to him. On 29 January 1370 Urban directed his appeals more precisely and energetically towards those powers whose help was most needed and whose interest in the fate of Byzantium was most

1. Raynaldus, ann.1370, no.4, p.171.
2. 'Verum eiusdem ecclesie filium'. Raynaldus, ann.1369, no.4. O. Halecki, op.cit. p.201.
manifest. Identical letters were sent to the Doges of Venice and Genoa which informed them, with many references to the parable of the prodigal son, of John's visit to the pope and his submission to the Roman Church. They were reminded of the desperate situation of the empire, which had been brought to the brink of extermination as a result of the savage destruction and occupation of the infidel Turks. They were told that the emperor was now a 'princeps catholicus' and so was worthy of the support of all the faithful of Christ, and finally they were encouraged to help the emperor with all possible aid against the Turks. Urban also wrote a letter commending John V to Louis of Hungary, who apparently had heard rumours that John had been making derogatory remarks about him at the papal curia. The pope assured Louis that there was no truth in this suggestion and asked him to give help to John who was hoping for Hungarian aid against the Turks.

A possibility of great mutual benefit to both East and West was raised when Urban gave John permission to negotiate with the mercenary bands of Englishmen, Germans, and other nationalities, which were active in parts of Italy. Safe conduct was given to eight envoys of the mercenaries to enter the Papal territories to negotiate with the emperor, but the lure of honourable and beneficial employment against the infidels seems not to have been sufficiently great, for, although Urban wrote to Sicily asking for them to be given help in their passage, nothing is heard of them in imperial

1. 'Ad extremum exterminium deductum', Raynaldus, ann. 1369, no. 5; Tautu 11, pp. 309-310.
service. The full fervour of Urban's enthusiasm aroused by John's visit to Rome is revealed in his letter to all the churchmen of Byzantium which not only reminded them of the great victories which could be expected 'with the help of their western brothers', but also expressed the ambitious hope that the Turks would themselves be converted.

So far John had achieved all he could have hoped for from his journey to Italy. The West was reminded of his adoption of its faith and its leaders had been summoned to his aid by the one authority in western Europe which commanded some measure of international respect. Furthermore the pope had expressed himself in such a way that involvement in the enterprise against the Turks was seen not as charity but as a religious duty. There can be little doubt that John V had great hopes of the emotional impact of the ceremonies which he had performed in Rome. He had made Rome his first objective on his Italian journey, not because his personal spiritual health outweighed the fate of his empire on his scale of priorities, but because it seemed probable that the solution of the latter problem could be eased by the ceremonies and formal appearance of the sincerity of his submission. The customary and easiest route from Constantinople to Italy ended in Venice, but John made a long detour around Italy to visit Rome and to preface his political business in Italy

1. O. Halecki, op.cit. p.1, nos.16,17, pp.32-333; Tătu 11, pp.302-303,313. A similar plan inspired by Paul Archbishop of Thebes (later Latin Patriarch of Constantinople) had earlier had some success. 'Dominus Guillelmu Penes, miles de Anglia rediens de Romania, ubi cum Thebano archiepiscopo et sociis suis habuerunt, ... accedit ad presenciam Sanctitatis Vestre, suffragia petiturus pro isto bono principio continuando. Nam multi de Societate Anglicorum illuc creduntur ituri fitque duplex bonus quia purgatur Christi anitas a scandalis et bellum dominicum exercetur sine magno sumptu et quodammodo miraculo. ... Mirum est enim quod ducit vel illic homines ausi fuerint reriter aggredi tantum opus'. 23-25 January 1305, Pierre Amelih to cardinal Gui de Boulogne (copy of letter to Urban V), La correspondence de Pierre Amelih, ed. A.Bresc, pp.307-308. On the career of William de la Pole and his colleagues until their departure from Italy, see N. Iorga, Philippe de Mézières, pp.269-270.

2. 'luvantibus,...fratribus occidentalibus', Raynardus, ann. 1370, no.2. Tătu 11, 311-312.
with the religious ceremonies which he hoped would bring increased favour to his cause.

Immediately upon arriving in Italy John V had indicated that much of his business was to be with the Venetians. He wrote from Naples to Venice to announce his willingness to negotiate a renewal of the five yearly treaty which had lapsed in March 1363 and which had remained in abeyance despite the mission of Jacopo Bragadin to Constantinople early in 1369. The Venetian Senate replied to John's initiative by sending two ambassadors, Marco Giustinian and Tommaso Sanudo, to negotiate the treaty. They met the emperor in Rome in October 1369¹.

The treaty which was finally signed in 1 February 1370² reveals a much more conciliatory attitude than that displayed by Bragadin in Constantinople. The ambassadors' instructions allowed them to accept the Byzantine demands on all the contentious subjects which had caused the failure of Bragadin's mission. The Venetians accepted limitations on their rights to acquire property in Constantinople and the empire, and they allowed the number of their taverns to be limited to fifteen. Furthermore the instructions prepared the envoys to accept a demand which John V did not in fact ask for. The earlier negotiations having foundered on the Venetians' demand to preserve their right to trade in corn anywhere in the empire, the new ambassadors were told not to insist upon this privilege. In the event, however, John showed himself ready to conclude the treaty without having his way on this point.

¹. O. Halecki, op.cit., p.j. no.13, p.373, also pp.222-225.
These clauses were in fact standard and show no alteration from the 1363 treaty; but the fact that the Venetians were prepared to accept the status quo represented a decidedly accommodating approach to the treaty which was quite absent from the earlier negotiations. However, there is nothing in the treaty to indicate that the Venetians were in any way influenced by John's recent submission in Rome. The reason for the Venetians' willingness to make concessions on the points in dispute was simply that they were anxious not to leave their trade unprotected by treaty. A lapse in the treaty in 1356 had been followed by the imposition of very heavy taxes on Venetian merchants in Constantinople, and after John V left for Italy in 1369 these economic pressures were applied again. It was therefore in the Venetians' commercial interests to negotiate the renewal of the treaty as quickly as possible without insisting upon the most rigorous terms.

In the context of relations with Venice the new treaty must have seemed to John V a satisfactory conclusion to the long negotiations. It is a totally unexceptional document, entirely functional, concerned with the customary topics of corn sales, taverns, property and nationality. Nothing, it appeared, had changed. But fundamentally John V's plans had misfired, since he had not gone to Rome in order to maintain

2. For 1356 see Thiriet, Régestes, nos.285, 291. For 1369 see O.Halecki, op.cit. p.376. 'Post recessum ipsius domini imperatoris facte sunt nostris certe novitates et extorsiones contra formam treuguarum'. Also see below pp.248-749. Halecki, op.cit. p.223 attributes the Venetians' change of attitude to John's visit to Rome, but I can see no reason for accepting this view.
the status quo. He had seen the religious ceremonies in Rome as a stepping stone to further progress in the political field. But after the signing of his treaty with Venice his main purpose of extracting some advantage from his submission in Rome still remained to be achieved.

John V's dealings with the Venetians did not end with the conclusion of the treaty in Rome. He hoped also to arrange a financial settlement with Venice which would dispose of his long-standing and ever-increasing debts to the Republic and also provide an inflow of capital into the empire. This project required his presence in Venice where he hoped to receive a warm welcome and especial favour as a result of his activities in Rome. As Demetrios Kydones wrote after his arrival in Venice 'we have come to Venice, whither we have been hastening for a long time, in the hope that the treasures of Croesus will be proffered to us and our great hopes will be given substance' 1.

John V had left Rome with his galleys in early March 13702 and, stopping at Naples and Ancona on the way, arrived in Venice, the first reigning Byzantine emperor ever to visit this former imperial possession. The official reception in Venice was encouraging. The Venetians greeted the emperor enthusiastically and showed interest in his business proposals. The negotiations began and the basis of a financial settlement was agreed. John V offered the Venetians the island of Tenedos,

1. "Ἡλθομεν μὲν εἰς τὴν Βενετίαν, ἐφ' ἂν πόρωθεν ἑκείγόμεθα, καὶ ἂν τοὺς Κροίσου θεσαυροὺς ἡμῖν ἠπίζωμεν δείξειν καὶ τέλος ἐπιθήσειν ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐκείναις ἐλπίσεως.


2. 'Eodem anno (1370), de mense martii recessit dictus imperator Grecorum cum quatuor galeis, cum quibus venerat', Baluzius-Mollat, Vitae, I, Secunda Vita, p.392.
which they had long coveted for its strategic position at the mouth of the Hellespont, and in return he was promised twenty-five thousand ducats in cash, together with six ships' hulls and the jewels which his mother had pawned to Venice in 1343 for thirty thousand ducats. The arrangements were almost concluded and John had been given an advance of four thousand ducats on the sum he was promised. But at this stage the negotiations faltered and eventually broke down.

It seems that the collapse of the negotiations was caused by differences in the interpretation of the terms. The basic terms were accepted by both sides, but the Venetians insisted that the Byzantines should repay the principal of the loan given to Anne of Savoy in 1343, together with interest at five per cent for the first three years. The total amounted to thirty-four thousand five hundred ducats. Thus, instead of receiving twenty-five thousand ducats, John was required by the Venetians to pay nine thousand five hundred ducats and to cede Tenedos in return for the pawned jewels and six hulls. This interpretation of the terms gave John V nothing of value and was totally unacceptable, not least because John did not have nine thousand five hundred ducats to give the Venetians. John V remained in Venice but the Venetians refused to soften their attitude. They paid no


2. This explanation of the collapse of the negotiations is given by J. Chrysostomides, 'John V Palaeologus in Venice (1370-1371) and the Chronicle of Caroldo: a re-interpretation', O.C.P., 31 (1965) 76-84. She examines and rejects the alternative theory, that the cession of Tenedos was prevented by Andronikos IV, which had previously been proposed by R-J. Loenertz, 'Jean V Paléologue à Venise (1370-1371)', R.E.B., 16, (1953), 217-232.
attention to the pope's demands for aid to be given to the empire. They regarded their business with the emperor only as a long overdue settlement of an old financial obligation.

John's total failure to procure economic assistance for the empire was not all that he had to endure. His personal financial position in Venice was extremely serious. His lengthy stay in Rome had proved very expensive, and during his journey to Venice it was realised that additional funds from Byzantium were necessary to pay for the homeward voyage.

Constantine Asan, a member of the imperial party, was dispatched from Ancona to attempt to raise money in the Peloponnese, but Demetrios Kydones, writing to Asan after his departure, thought little of his chances.

The delays in Venice put John further into debt and, lacking any securities, he was obliged to borrow money at extortionate rates.

These circumstances have encouraged the view that John V was made a prisoner for his debts by the Venetians. Although

---

1. 'Ὅδε οὖς ἕδε τὴν ἡμετέραν πενήναν οἱ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στατήρες παρακαλοῦσιν, καὶ σὺ τῶν τοῦ βασιλέως μνησθεὶς ἐντολῶν ἀργυρολογίας τοὺς προσατούντας, ἐφόδια γοῦν πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα πορίσεις, ὡς τόν γ᾽ ἐξελοῦντα χρήματ᾽ ἐπιτίθειν ἐτέρωθεν πάντες ἐλλεβόροι δείσθαί φασί.


2. 'Πάλιν γὰρ ἐνέχυρος, καὶ δανειστής μόλις ἐπὶ πολλῷ δανείζειν πειθόμενος, καὶ νῦν μὲν ὕπισχυόμενος αὑριον δὲ ἀναβαλλόμενος, καὶ ταῖς ἀναβολαῖς τὰυτας αὑξών τὴν ἁπορίαν.'

Ibid., lines 16-18.

Caroldo states that John required his loan of 4000 ducats from the Venetians 'per il viuor suo'. J. Chrysostomides, 'Studies on the Chronicle of Caroldo', p.161.

this was certainly not the case, it is true that John could
not return to Constantinople until he could raise money to pay
off his debts. He was unable even to pay the wages of the
crews of the galleys which were to carry him home. Without
outside assistance John was powerless to raise the money he
required, and Asan's mission to the Peloponnese was apparently
fruitless. The emperor therefore ordered his eldest son
Andronikos, who had been left as regent in Constantinople, to
raise money in the empire and to send it to Venice. However,
Andronikos refused on the grounds that this would necessitate
the confiscation of ecclesiastical wealth which was canonically
forbidden. John V's second son Manuel was more co-operative.
He raised the necessary money himself, and in the middle of
winter 1370-1371 brought it to Venice in person.

John V's immediate problem was solved by Manuel's action.
He managed to pay off his pressing debts to the Venetian
merchants, and was free to leave for Byzantium. His departure,
like his arrival, was conducted in an atmosphere of official
friendliness. The Venetians provisioned his ships, the debt
incurred by his advance loan of four thousand ducats was can-
celled, Manuel was given a present of three hundred ducats,

1. 'Ω í δε μισθοφόροι ἐπίκενται, μισθοδοτεῖν μαί ἀποκλεῖν

D. Kydones, Correspondance, loc.cit. lines

2. John's appeal to Andronikos and the latter's reaction are
only mentioned by Chalkokondyles loc.cit. It is logical
that John should first approach his regent for funds.
Andronikos' excuse for refusing the request also rings
true in the light of a contemporary synodal act forbidding
the alienation of ecclesiastical property even to the

3. Manuel's journey is mentioned in the chrysobull granting
him an appanage in Thessalonica in 1371-1372. K.Zachariae
von Lingenthal, 'Prooemion zu Chrysobullen', p.1420, lines
5-33. Kydones also praised his action in a letter written
to him in Venice, Correspondance, letter 21. Certain
(contd.)
and a Venetian squadron escorted John's galleys on their way. But such gestures of goodwill could not conceal that the emperor's stay in Venice had been a failure. His negotiations for the sale of Tenedos had resulted only in a humiliating demand for the payment of past debts, and his prolonged stay had caused him to incur heavy new ones. The Venetian merchants had taken advantage of his plight, and the authorities had totally ignored the proofs of good faith which he had recently given in Rome. Finally he was obliged to leave Manuel in Venice as a hostage for further unpaid debts, just as he had been left in Buda in 1366. John V's two visits to western powers had brought him nothing in practical terms and had resulted in serious personal humiliation. Demetrios Kydones, the most prominent and vociferous advocate of the western alliance among the Byzantines, who had hoped that the treasures of Croesus would be unlocked to them, reported

writers have suggested that Manuel brought with him some jewels which were pawned to the Venetians for 30,000 ducats, with which John returned to Byzantium; see most recently D.M. Nicol, The last centuries of Byzantium, (London 1972) p.234. This arises from a misinterpretation of Caroldo, published by J. Chrysostomides, 'Studies', p.161. Caroldo is actually referring to the loan given to Anne of Savoy in 1343, see T. Bertelè, 'I gioielli della corona bizantina dati in pegno alla Repubblica Veneta nel sec. XIV e Mastino II della Scala', Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, ed. A.Giuffrè, II (Milan 1962) pp.125-126; J. Chrysostomides, 'John V in Venice', p.77; J. Barker, Manuel II, Appendix I, pp.444-445. John received no substantial sum from Venice in 1371.

that everything had turned to ashes\(^1\). Similarly, after his return to Constantinople, he referred to the voyage to Italy as a 'vain trouble of no use whatsoever to our country'\(^2\).

\(^1\) D. Kydones, *Correspondance*, letter 71, lines 15-16.

\(^2\) 'Το μόνον είναι μπρωσθαί μηδ' ὃτι οὖν τῇ πατρίδι λυσιτελοῦντα.'  
Ibid. letter 37, line 5. Cited by G. Ostrogorsky,  
*History of the Byzantine State*, p. 540. Also, 'Ἡ 5 ἐν Βενετίᾳ  
καθέδρα οὐ παντὸς χελρὼν βαρύθρου' D. Kydones, *Ad Ioannem  
Palaeologum oratio*, in *Correspondance*, ed. R-J. Loeneratz, 1,  
p. 15 line 2.
D. Byzantium and the Roman Church 1371-1391.

John V returned to Constantinople from his visit to Italy on 26 October 1371\textsuperscript{1} to find the condition and circumstances of the empire greatly changed since he had set out two years previously. The most significant development had taken place just over a month before his return on 26 September 1371 when the Serbian army under John Uglješa and his brother Vukašin had fought a decisive battle with a Turkish force at Šumen on the Maritza river, not far from Adrianople\textsuperscript{2}. The Serbs were totally defeated, their two leaders were killed and their surviving nobles became vassals of the Turks. This battle had far-reaching consequences not only for the progress of the Turkish advance into the Balkans which were defenceless against the steady expansion of the victors, but also for the countries of eastern Europe which were now laid open to the Turks and for the empire which found itself at the centre of a closing circle of enemies. It demonstrated the superiority of Turkish arms over those of the Balkan countries and the lesson was particularly striking for Byzantium which had long been incapable of raising an army as large as the one the Serbs had lost. Furthermore the battle had destroyed any chance there may have been of constructing a defensive alliance of eastern Christians against the Turks. This possibility had been raised by Serbian embassies to Byzantium before the battle while John V was still abroad and his son Andronikos was regent, but their suggestions of marriage alliances and financial

\begin{enumerate}
\item Short chronicle 47, p.81 line 32.
\item Short chronicle 20, p.37 line 3; 33, p.61 line 1.
\item Chronicon breve Thessalonicense, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance, I, p.175.
\end{enumerate}
subsidies were met with indifference in Constantinople\(^1\). The Patriarch Philotheos had for some time been attempting to counter the emperor's western orientated policy by building up his authority among the eastern Christians of Serbia, Bulgaria and Russia. These efforts had resulted in the submission of the Serbian Church to Constantinople in 1371\(^2\). The union thus cemented between the churches was, however, insufficient to produce a Byzantine force beside the Serbs at the battle of the Maritza. After the battle the Serbs, who would necessarily have formed the backbone of such an alliance, were in no condition to oppose the Turks any further. The significance of the battle was that, as an anonymous fifteenth century Greek chronicler expressed it, 'henceforth the Ishmaelites began to rule over the kingdoms of the Christians'\(^3\).

The other development which confronted John V on his return to the capital was that during his absence the Emir Murad had demanded that the Byzantines should surrender the city of Gallipoli to him as the price of temporary respite from attack. He thus clearly indicated the importance of this town as a link between his forces in Asia and Europe, and he also showed that the empire could not much longer expect to escape his attention. Demetrius Kydones, who had gone ahead of John V, returned to Constantinople in time to oppose Murad's demand with a forceful speech which succeeded in

1. Demetrius Kydones, Oratio altera deliberative de non reddenda Gallipoli petente Amurata, M.F.G.15\(^4\), 1033n.
3. A. Karpozilos and G.M. Parassoglou, 'Διηγηματικος Βασιλειων των Ισμαηλιτων', a short chronicle', B., 42, (1972), 75. 'Επι Ετους ευωθ' (6879-1370-1) υπόγυο αυτός ο σουλτάνος Μωράτης και ἐπολαξιμοισεν μὲ τὸν Οθωμάνιον, τὸν δεσπότην Σερβίας, ἓς τ(ὴν) ἄκοιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ Μαρούτζα, κ(αὶ) τ(ὸν) ἐνίκησεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἀρχησαν οἱ Ισμαηλιτες νὰ κυριοίβουν τ(ας) βασιλειας τῶν Χριστοτάνων(ων).' (sic).
stiffening the Byzantines' morale enough for the proposal to be rejected. But the most alarming aspect of the incident was that before Kydones' intervention, the majority of the capital's citizens was in favour of ceding the town, which Amadeo's crusade had restored to the empire in 1366, in return for the uncertain prospect of a peaceful interlude in which the harvest could be gathered.  

This demonstration of Turkish military superiority, together with the appearance of a significant group within the capital which advocated the appeasement of the enemy, must have raised doubts in the mind of John V - fresh from his failure to get aid from the west - about the possibility of continuing the struggle against the Turks. However, the emperor's disappointments did not reduce him to despair, and his initial reaction to the disaster on the Maritza was an aggressive one. He authorised his son Manuel to mop up the exposed and defenceless possessions of the Serbs and to hold them for as long as possible against the Turks. As a result of this action Serres was again integrated into the Byzantine Empire. John also showed his determination to reinforce the domestic military resources of the empire at the expense of the church which had consistently resisted attempts to oblige it to contribute money or property for the defence of

1. 'Καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολέως, καὶ τῶν συμβουλευτείν εἰσώθητον, φασὶ δεῖν ἃναρχα, καὶ μὴ μέλλειν.' Demetrios Kydones, De non reddenda Callipoli, M.P.C., 154, 1009b. The references in this work to recent Serbian embassies, see above p. 124-7, help to date Kydones' oration to 1371, rather than 1376 or 1377. The case for the latter date is argued by F. Charania, 'Strife among the Palaeologi', B., 16, (1942-43), 296-297; J. Barker, Manuel II, pp. 16 n. 3; 460. But now see R. J. Loenertz, 'Demetrios Cydonés, I', O.C.P., 36, (1970), 68; D. M. Nicol, The Last Centuries, p. 234.

the state. In Autumn 1371 half the monastic estates of the empire were secularised for distribution as pronoiai or military smallholdings, and the other half were subjected to new forms of taxation. In this matter John showed much greater resolution than he had in his earlier dealings with the privileges and immunities of the Church, and greater realism in understanding that Byzantium's security depended immediately on the employment of local resources, and only subsequently on foreign assistance.

1) John V and Gregory XI.

While John V was adjusting to the developments in the empire, new proposals for concerting military action for the salvation of Christians in the east were being made by the papacy. Urban V had died in Avignon on 19 December 1370 and

1. 'Ποὺ πολλῶν χρόνων εὑρὼς μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ δεσπότου τῆς Σερβίας, τοῦ Οὐγγυλοῦ ἔσχεν, διὰ τὴν ἐπιθέσιν τὴν, τότε γεγονόταν πάρα τῶν Τούρκων, ὁποιήθην οὕτων ἐγών καὶ συνεχῆ, ἐκέφθεις γενομένην πρὸς τὸ κοινῆ λυσιτελεῖν, ἔδοξεν, ἵνα προνοιακηθώση τὰ ἡμέρα τῶν μετοχῶν τῶν τε Ἀγιοριτῶν καὶ τῶν Θεσσαλονικῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ ποτὲ ἔρισθαι συλλήφθην χαθῶσιν.'

These are the opening words of a proostaga of Manuel II, issued in 1408, by which the taxes on monastic property were removed, ed. V. Hobin, 'Akti iz srpskih arhiva', Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Beograd, 91, (Beograd 1939), 165-167. It is generally assumed that the original measure was Manuel's responsibility alone, and that the confiscations were confined to the property of the monks of Athos and Thessalonica, whom Manuel was addressing in 1408. See G. T. Dennis, Manuel II, pp. 90-91. However, the expression 'καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα' suggests that the measure was more generally effective in the empire. See G. Ostrogorsky, 'The Palaeologi', C.R.H.I. IV, (2nd ed.) i, pp. 371-372; id. Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine, French translation by M. Grégoire, Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae, Subsidia, 1, (1934), pp. 101-162.


was succeeded by Gregory XI who, throughout his pontificate, showed exceptional concern for the welfare of Christians facing the Turkish advance. His first plan, which was inspired by the news of the battle of the Maritza, was designed to bring together all those powers, both major and minor, which were directly threatened. In order to arrange a common programme of action Gregory invited all the leaders of the east Mediterranean to a conference to be held in Thebes beginning on 1 October 1373. The letters of invitation were sent out on 13 November 1372, not only to those who were habitually exhorted to show concern for the fate of the east but also to the minor leaders of the islands, principalities and dukedoms scattered in the path of the Turks. A general encyclical was addressed to all the faithful informing them of the dangers faced by 'Romania and the other regions overseas' and granting a plenary indulgence to all who died on a new crusade.

The most striking feature of the letter sent to John V was that Gregory described the enterprise in purely political terms, lamenting the successes of the Turks in Serbia and their attacks on the empire and 'other Christian parts' and acknowledging that unless rapid action be taken the empire and the other lands of the faithful overseas would be totally lost. Thus Gregory represented the Turks as a threat to Christendom as a whole and recommended concerted Christian action. No mention was made of the union of the Churches which all previous popes had made a precondition of western aid for Byzantium.

The emperor was invited to take part in the Thebes conference on equal terms with his neighbours for the salvation of them all.

1. Ibid. pp.254-260.
2. Tantu 12, pp.94-96.
Thus the situation for Byzantium appeared to be relatively hopeful. Both at home and abroad the seriousness of the position was fully realised, and both pope and emperor were working actively to halt the Turkish advance. However, Gregory's plans began to go wrong before the end of 1372, and they were soon in complete disarray. The chief merit of the Thebes initiative, its international involvement, proved also to be its fatal weakness. The local rulers of the east Mediterranean were divided by strong rivalries and conflicting ambitions which made any plan based on their mutual co-operation a vain illusion. The major powers also sought individual profit at the expense of the common enterprise. Louis of Hungary, although welcoming the principle behind the pope's initiative, imposed conditions for his participation which Gregory was unable to accept. Genoa and Cyprus, whose participation was essential to the success of the league, were divided by a hostility which broke into open conflict in 1373. Meanwhile, on 7 February 1373 Louis of Hungary declared war on Venice and turned his army against the Republic in support of Francis of Carrara. In addition the whole of Italy was shaken by internal disputes which also involved the Emperor Charles IV and put the papacy into direct conflict with the Visconti. Although there was no official abandonment of the plan for an international conference and league, it was clearly failing from late 1372, and in March 1373 Gregory revealed that he no longer considered the plan worth pursuing. In its place he substituted a much less ambitious proposal for a fleet of only twelve galleys.

On top of this disappointment the empire suffered another blow. On 6 May 1373 John V's eldest son Andronikos fled from Constantinople and joined Murad's son Saudji in an allied revolt against their fathers. This action was to have profound consequences for the empire. In the face of this joint insubordination, Murad and John V combined to defeat the rebels and inaugurated a programme of military co-operation between Byzantines and Turks which characterises the last years of John V's reign. John V helped Murad and his army to cross into Europe and to pass through Constantinople in pursuit of the rebels. On 25 May Andronikos fought a battle at Derkoss and, being defeated, surrendered to his father on 30 May. Saudji held out until September before being captured, whereupon he was blinded by Murad who demanded that John V should punish Andronikos and his infant son, John, similarly.

This incident appears to have been the final factor in convincing John V that the most profitable course for the empire was to work with the Turks in the hope of obtaining favourable terms, instead of attempting to defeat them militarily. The combination of fresh disillusionment from the


2. According to Chalkokondyles, ed, Darkó I, 36-46, ed, Bonn 40-46. John V was already serving in Murad's army at the time of the revolt. Many authors accept this testimony, e.g. G.Ostrogorsky, 'Byzance, état tributaire de l'Empire turc', Zbornik Radova, 5,(1958),50. But the first corroborated, contemporary evidence of military co-operation between Greeks and Turks relates to the campaign against Andronikos and Saudji.

west and the necessity to co-operate with Murad to defeat Andronikos and Saudji forced John into a policy of rapprochement with the Turks, from which he could not later escape. Henceforth it was impossible to conceal that the emperor was acting as vassal to the Turkish emir. That the alliance was not a temporary expedient but a definite change of policy is clear from the rift which developed between Demetrios Kydones and the court. Kydones wrote to a friend saying 'far from the palace I have what I was wanting; ... to be a private man and to have no responsibility for what is taking place at this time.... for to be involved in that affair, even only in appearance, and to be a passive witness of another's insolence seems to weigh on me and to be unworthy of a man who knows how to distinguish between what is shameful and what is not' 1. Kydones was undoubtedly referring to the policy of appeasement towards the Turks against which he had argued strongly in 1371 when Gallipoli was the price of peace.

The news of the alliance between Byzantines and Turks was slow to reach the west. The Venetians knew of it by 14 July 1374, but Gregory showed no sign of having heard before 21 September 1374 2. During the period from Spring 1373, when the plans to hold a conference at Thebes broke down, until the news of the alliance reached the west, the papacy had been engaged on a more energetic programme of organising western military aid for the east than ever before. It was a period of disappointment for Gregory XI. He was continually obliged to limit his objectives and to cut down the size of the forces

---
to be employed in his schemes, but he showed constant concern for the empire's condition and great persistence in his plans to improve it.

Once it became clear that Gregory's initial plan for international action to be organised by the Thebes conference was too complicated to implement, he settled for a much reduced naval force which was intended only to act defensively by cutting the Turks' communications between Asia and Europe. The problem of driving the Turks across the Bosphorus was deferred until a land force could be assembled to supplement the defensive fleet. The co-ordination of this plan was placed in the hands of John Laskaris Kalopheros who was authorised to act as Gregory's ambassador to seek assistance from the countries which the pope wished to involve - France, Hungary, Genoa, Cyprus and the Hospitallers of Rhodes. Little is known of these embassies except that they met with no success. Charles V of France was too committed to the struggle with England to consider weakening his forces for the benefit of the east and not even the presence at his court of Philippe de Mézières, a tireless campaigner for crusading, could persuade him otherwise. Louis of Hungary failed even to acknowledge the letter sent to him by Gregory to enquire whether Kalopheros' embassy would be properly received and, when he finally did write, he indicated that he would play no part in a permanent Christian fleet of a defensive nature. It was only in Genoa that Kalopheros met with any success. He managed to obtain a promise that two galleys would be contributed to the enterprise, but without the backing of other

1. Ibid., pp.274-280, 298.
western powers this contribution was insignificant\(^1\). The attitude of the west generally is well illustrated by the reaction of Venice. In February 1374 the pope sent a Venetian, John Corsini, to sound out the Republic's feelings about a plan for providing the empire with naval aid. While applauding the plan in principle, the Venetians declined to make a firm promise to join the fleet on the grounds that the dispatch of ships was premature and that their arrival without warning might alarm the Byzantines who, in any case, could not be relied upon to accept the Latins' aid\(^2\).

On the evidence of these failures Gregory XI might be accused of obstinacy in adhering to an unrealistic attempt to organise military aid for the east through an international league. To a certain extent the charge is justified. But it must be borne in mind that Gregory's uncle Clement VI had successfully organised a similar alliance for the capture and defence of Smyrna in 1344. Given the condition of the major European powers and their preoccupation with local problems, it was vain to consider any plan which called for larger forces from a single nation. Louis of Hungary was the only leader of Roman Christendom willing and able to make a substantial personal contribution, and his motives for this were very properly questioned by the papacy\(^3\). It must also be emphasised that in relation to Byzantium Gregory showed a more accommodating and understanding attitude to local conditions and anxieties than any of his predecessors. He also took methodical steps to acquaint himself with the


\(^2\) O. Halecki, *op.cit.*, p.j. no.27, pp.390-391; also 289-291.

\(^3\) *ibid.*, p.268.
past history of the problems he faced and the solutions which had previously been attempted.

This is illustrated by a letter which Gregory wrote on 19 March 1373 to Gasbert, Bishop of Ceneda, who had been sent to the east in 1350 by Clement VI¹. Gregory asked him to provide copies of all the documents in his possession relating to the affairs of the Greeks, and to give information about the rôle he had played and particularly about the reactions of the Greeks towards him and those engaged in previous union negotiations. Gregory wished to know why earlier contacts with the Byzantines had achieved so little and what the bishop, with all his experience of eastern conditions, felt would be appropriate action in the future. Unfortunately it transpired that Bishop Gasbert had recently died, but Gregory arranged for his envoy to inspect his papers and send them to Avignon. In his search for accurate information Gregory sent a group of four ambassadors to Constantinople in the summer of 1374². In letters relating to this embassy the pope stressed its importance to the cause of church union, but the presence of two knights Hospitaller among Gregory's representatives suggests that the purpose of the visit was also military reconnaissance. The other two envoys were friars who were intended not only to take active steps towards union by negotiation, but also were to report on the internal state of the empire.

Gregory's many letters addressed to Byzantines illustrate both his energy and understanding. He equipped his four ambassadors with letters of recommendation to everyone whose assistance he valued or required, including Demetrios

¹. Ibid. p.1, no.26, p.389; also p.237.
Kydones, Maximos Laskaris Kalopheros, Philip Tzykandyles, and the people, nobles and clergy of Constantinople and the rest of the empire, and also to many western leaders. He went so far as to refer to John V as 'imperator Constantinopolitanus'. This was the title previously reserved for the titular Latin emperors. If not quite equal to the Byzantine style of 'Emperor of the Romans', it was a distinct improvement on 'Emperor of the Greeks' used in previous papal letters.

Furthermore Gregory recognised the important influence exercised by the ex-emperor John Kantakouzenos especially in the spiritual affairs of the empire, by writing him two personal letters, and he responded to Manuel's coronation by writing him a letter addressed with his imperial title. This letter was particularly apt since at the time it was written, in 1375, John V was suffering from a serious illness.

Gregory's awareness of the gravity of the empire's situation and the past history of the negotiations between east and west is clearly illustrated by his attitude to the question of church union. During Gregory's pontificate union remained the ultimate goal towards which all parties should work, but it was no longer regarded as the essential precondition for the supply of military aid. It was acknowledged that assistance should be given to all the Christians of the east, whether members of the Roman Church or Greeks. Gregory told the Byzantines that sincere participation in union negotiations would help and speed the plans to send western aid, but at no point did he expound the customary papal formula

1. Ibid., pp.294-297.
2. Ibid., p.296, n.2.
3. Ibid., pp.295, 310.
of full conversion first and military aid second. This concession broke down a major barrier between east and west, which had always distrusted the other's order of priorities, and it shows Gregory's recognition of the urgency of the problem.

The most striking indication of Gregory's exceptional sympathy and concern for Byzantium is found in his reaction to the news that the Greeks had entered into an alliance with the Turks. Although his initial and understandable attitude to the news of this 'impia colligatio' was to condemn it as inexcusable and beyond human judgement, he did not allow it to cause a complete breach between Byzantium and the west. Indeed his concern for the empire was increased. He warned John of the dangers of admitting too many Turks into Constantinople and giving them the opportunity to seize it. Furthermore in letters to Hungary and Sicily he described the alliance as evidence of the dangerous weakness of the empire which was now more oppressed than ever by the Turks and totally deprived of assistance. Gregory pointed out that the Turks were not to be trusted and that if Constantinople were to fall it would be followed by other Christian countries of Latin Greece and also Sicily and Hungary. Finally, in a letter to the Hospitalers in Bohemia, he stated that the west was partly responsible for this state of affairs which had come about 'as a result of Christian negligence'.

2. Letter of Gregory XI to John V, 13 December 1374, Tavut 12, p.244; Raynaldus, ann.1374, no.4, p.234.
4. 'Civitas... gloria Constantineopolitana et eius imperator illustmis adeo sunt arctati a Turcis eisdem, quod non solum eis tributarii facti sunt, sed fer in eorum manibus consistunt... Quae evenerunt propter Christianorum negligentiam'. Raynaldus, ann.1375, no.9, p.250.
Gregory did not consider that the cause of church union and the salvation of Byzantium was lost. He was convinced that if western aid could be organised the empire might yet return to the unity of the Church. Two embassies received from John V in late 1374 and early 1375 reinforced this impression. Philip Tzykandyles had been sent by the emperor to explain the circumstances of his alliance with the Turks, and the Bishop of Tabriz, who was returning to the west via Constantinople, brought a letter from John V asking the pope to encourage Louis of Hungary to fulfil the promise he had made in 1366 to supply military aid in return for John's personal conversion. The emperor said that despite his treaty with the Turks, he still hoped that the west would assist in the defence against them. The bishop was also able to inform Gregory that a party of Dominicans on their way to Armenia had conducted a debate in Constantinople in which John Kantakouzenos had enthusiastically participated and which had resulted in the conversion of many 'prelates, doctors and monks' to the Roman Church. Thus the pope was assured that neither John nor his people had entirely abandoned the west as a source of spiritual and material help.

With this encouragement Gregory set about organising another scheme for providing the empire with military aid. On 28 January 1375 he wrote, in accordance with John V's wishes, to Louis of Hungary to remind him of the emperor's conversion and his visit to Rome, and to exhort him to alleviate the Byzantines' present distress. It is clear from

this letter, with its reference to John as 'carissimus in Christo filius noster', that Gregory did not consider that the emperor had forfeited his membership of the Roman Church as a result of his alliance with Murad. The pope made preparations for an army based on a contingent of one thousand knights and squires of the Hospital to be drawn from all over Europe and to set out in the spring of 1377. However, even with this solid foundation the army required forces from other countries. Sicily, Genoa and Venice, in addition to Hungary, were approached by Gregory to secure some promise of help from them.1

This plan foundered on the obstacle which had wrecked all Gregory's previous initiatives. Louis was absorbed in the problem of his succession, and his interests showed a noticeable northward shift from his Balkan to his Polish possessions. Joanna of Sicily had recently married for the fourth time, and she was faced with dynastic complications and competition in her claim to be the rightful heir to Philip of Taranto in Achaia. In 1375 and 1376 Venice was in dispute with Byzantium over the renewal of the five-year treaty. Although the contentious issues concerned only the local conditions of Venetians in Constantinople and the vast debts incurred by the empire, and should not be interpreted as evidence of a general desire on John V's part to reject western contacts, the dispute was sufficiently serious to require a show of Venetian force in Constantinople in 1376 to produce a settlement. As for the Genoese, although they showed a willingness to join in Gregory's plan and were

rewarded with a present of twenty-five thousand florins from the pope, they had a quarrel with both the Venetians and the empire as a result of the treaty of 1376. This treaty had opened the way for the island of Tenedos to be ceded by Byzantium to Venice, and it aroused all the old fears of the Genoese that their rivals had stolen a march on them. Soon the empire was caught at the centre of a major war between Venice and Genoa, and the Turks were solicited by all sides.

Gregory XI's plans for the salvation of Byzantium by international co-operation broke down completely.

The affairs of the empire were forced even further into the background on the death of Gregory XI on 27 March 1378, when the election of his successor, Urban VI, was disputed by a group of cardinals who chose Clement VII as a rival and split western Christendom into two separate, opposing camps. In the early years of the schism in the western church the two factions were forced to concentrate on the struggle for supremacy in the west and inevitably the fate of Byzantium was relegated to a position of relative unimportance.

The events of 1376 to 1381 must have shattered any illusions that John V and his subjects still cherished about the readiness of the western powers to help Byzantium. They saw that Venice and Genoa could raise large enough forces to fight each other or to protect their own interests, and also that they would enter into alliances with the Ottomans and conspire

1. Ibid. pp.317-322
3. For the meagre western material on the contacts of Byzantium and papacy from 1378 until John's death see O. Halecki, 'Rome et Byzance au temps du grand schisme d'Occident', Collectanea Theologica (Mémo), 13, (1937) 477-493.
Reprinted with Un empereur, (1972).
against the legal emperor of Constantinople. It cannot have escaped the Greeks' attention that the fleet of ten galleys, with which Venice forced a renewal of the five year treaty in 1376, was almost equal in size to the fleet which the pope was incapable of raising from the whole of Christendom for the defence of the faith against the Turks. In addition, the empire was further humiliated by the Peace of Turin which put an end to the hostilities between Venice and Genoa in 1381. This treaty, which was negotiated under the supervision of Amadeo of Savoy, regulated the succession to the imperial throne, and reinstated Andronikos as John V's legal heir at the expense of Manuel without any reference to Byzantine opinion. It also contained a clause enjoining both Venice and Genoa to work for the conversion of John V and his subjects to the Roman Church. In 1369 Amadeo had received a letter from Urban V announcing the completion of John's conversion and submission, but by 1381 he had either forgotten it or no longer regarded his cousin as a member of the Roman Church. It seemed as though the contacts and negotiations of the past twenty-five years had achieved nothing and that John's personal submission had been in vain.

ii) Manuel Palaiologos and Urban VI.

During the period from John V's restoration to the throne in 1379 until his death in 1391 the dominant influence in Byzantine politics was the power of the Turks over the empire. The extent of Murad's control over Byzantium had been amply demonstrated by 1379. Twice within four years he had caused the imperial throne to change hands, receiving Gallipoli

as a result of his first effort, and increased financial and military services in return for the second. As Kydones wrote: 'they command and we must obey in everything. That is the measure of their power and our servitude.' Each new emperor accepted that one of his first duties was to visit Murad, and Chalkokondyles suggested that the emir's power over Constantinople was so great that he could conduct a test of public opinion to discover whom the citizens wished to have as emperor.

Policy in Constantinople became centred on the need to maintain good relations with the Turks. The treaty between Byzantium and Genoa signed on 2 November 1332, while providing for mutual assistance against each other's enemies, specifically excluded 'the Turks of Murad' from the agreement since the loyalty which John V now owed to the emir came before all other political considerations. Thus it was with alarm and displeasure that John V viewed the secret departure from Constantinople of his son Manuel, whose rights of succession had been overridden by the Peace of Turin. Manuel removed himself to Thessalonica where he set himself up as the independent ruler of a 'new empire' and, attracting to the city many supporters, pursued a policy of open aggression towards the Turks. Demetrios Kydones wrote to his friend John Asan to warn him that his political standing in Constantinople was being ruined by his adherence to Manuel's cause, and John V openly dissociated himself from his son's actions and held a council to discuss his fate.

3. L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', Atti della societá Ligure, 13, pp.133-140.
Although Manuel's campaign began with some successes over the Turks on land and at sea, the tide soon turned against him as the Turks organised their forces to meet this unexpected attack. Serres fell to the Turks on 19 September 1333 and Manuel's territories dwindled until he was besieged in Thessalonica. As the situation worsened Manuel recognised that outside help was required to maintain the policy of opposition to the Turks. He turned first to Venice, asking for financial aid and military supplies. But the Venetian Senate refused to prejudice its position with John V and the Turks by providing direct assistance, and it confined itself to offering its services as mediator between the opposing parties. Manuel's reaction was to embark on a course followed by many of his predecessors, sending an embassy to Urban VI in the hope that his authority in the west could assemble the material aid which Thessalonica required.

The history of Manuel's relations with the papacy is known from only one source, the letters of Demetrios Kydones, himself in Constantinople, written to Manuel and others in Thessalonica. The registers of Urban VI, in which details of the contacts might be expected to appear, have been lost, and since no other source, Byzantine or western, mentions the events, Kydones' account must be regarded with some reserve, particularly since it describes a development which had long been close to his heart. However, the picture which emerges from his letters is entirely credible.

1. G.T. Dennis, Manuel II, p.75 and n.60.
3. These letters are examined in detail with lengthy trans¬lations by G.T. Dennis, op.cit. pp.132-150.
Some of the facts which are mentioned by Kydones are beyond doubt. First he reported that 'under pressure of necessity the Thessalonians have submitted to send envoys to Rome'. Kydones identified the envoys as a certain Euthymios who appears to have been a known anti-Latin, and an unnamed Latin theologian described simply as 'the Master'. Manuel wrote a brief letter to Kydones in which he confirmed that the embassy had been sent to the pope. Secondly Demetrios provides the information from first-hand knowledge that Manuel's embassy resulted in the visit of a papal legate to the east in the spring or summer of 1386. In a letter to a friend, Rhadenos, in Thessalonica, Demetrios revealed that the legate, who had been supposed to visit Manuel first, had mistakenly gone straight to Constantinople where he met a cold and hostile reception. Kydones does not mention whether the legate had any contact with John V, but of the others in the City 'some did not suffer to see him and those who did showed unpleasantness and would not speak to him, ... mocking the pope... and calling his striving for union sheer folly... They began to demand of the pope that, unless he first removed this and that from the creed, they would have no further discussion with him at all'.

After these humiliations the legate proceeded to Thessalonica, assured by Kydones that there he would be much better received. However, at this point, it is not known what happened. The only information comes from a letter in which Kydones told Manuel of the rumours which were prevalent in

3. Ibid. p.140.
Constantinople about the events in Thessalonica, and asked for fuller details. The rumours which circulated were that the legate had been warmly welcomed by Manuel and the church, and that 'now our city (Thessalonica) is persuaded to render the same honours to the Son as to the Father and to hold this teaching both in the common holy places and in the assemblies everywhere'. In the capital this news was regarded as 'not only the adulteration of the faith but also great dishonour to the imperial majesty'. Accordingly many voices were raised against Kydones 'for having persuaded the legate when he was here to demand this new faith in return for the alliance'.

Towards the end of Demetrios' letter he begged Manuel 'for God's sake be kind enough to reveal to me what is going on'. He was aware that the rumours he had heard might not represent the whole truth, but despite his anxiety for news there is no source which confirms or corrects the rumours which reached Constantinople. However, we know what the citizens of the capital thought had taken place. Clearly they assumed that an agreement had been made with the legate by which the church in Thessalonica accepted the authority and teachings of Rome in return for a promise of military assistance. However, there is no evidence of papal action to help Thessalonica and it is likely the fall of the city in spring 1387 would have left Urban with insufficient time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate a year after the fall of Thessalonica Urban ordered the bishop of Castello to supervise the arming of two galleys for service against

the Turks, the expenses of which were to be met by contributions from Venice and Ferrara, but no reference was made to any agreement which obliged the pope to take this action.

If an alliance was made with the papacy in exchange for the conversion of Thessalonica, it is impossible to believe that Manuel's interest in the Roman Church was founded on anything other than the desperate need to attract western attention to the plight of Byzantium's second city. Manuel had earlier received two letters from Gregory XI encouraging him to work for Church union and reminding him of the advantages which would flow from it, but at no time before 1383, when Manuel's embassy set out for Italy, did he show any signs of interest in the Roman Church. Indeed in 1400, when as emperor he visited Paris, again in search of western military aid against the Turks, he wrote a long polemical tract against the Latin teaching on the procession of the Holy Spirit. Perhaps his experiences in Thessalonica had convinced him that the west could not be persuaded to provide the empire with military aid merely by seeing the Greeks submit their Church to that of Rome.

Manuel II's appeal to Pope Urban VI for military assistance against the Turks fits in to the general pattern established by John V in the mid-fourteenth century. The only source of substantial military aid, which the Byzantines felt they could turn to with any degree of confidence, was western Christendom under the leadership of the pope. Repeatedly, however, this confidence proved to be misplaced. The pope's influence in the west did not extent to assembling an international military

force for service overseas in the name of Christian unity. Equally the promises which the Byzantine emperors were required to make to win the papacy's favour were incapable of being fulfilled. Even had the division between Greeks and Latins been merely on points of theological importance, the emperors could never carry their people with them into unity with Rome by imperial decree. But the differences between East and West went much deeper than the theological dispute, and therefore if any chance existed of the two sides coming together it lay in contacts on a more fundamental and general level than those pursued formally by the emperor, the pope and their ambassadors. The next two chapters are concerned with some of the daily and informal contacts between East and West which existed in the empire during the reign of John V.
At various moments in John V's reign, for example in 1357, 1367 and during the Italian visit of 1369-1370, the prospect that the Churches of Constantinople and Rome might be reunited appeared to those involved in the official negotiations to be quite hopeful. However, despite the conversion of John V personally and his submission to the Pope, the Byzantine people as a whole and their ecclesiastical leaders seemed to be as sharply divided from the Roman Church as they had ever been. The root of the problem was the difficulty of persuading the Byzantine people that the course of action to which they were constantly exhorted by the pope and occasionally by the emperor, meant anything but submission to a generally hated foreign power and to unintelligible foreign ceremonies and customs.

The formal contacts between East and West had encouraged the two sides to fortify their traditional positions and had provided the opportunity for the reading of prepared speeches. Thus the Greeks and Latins met usually only to slander and revile each other and there was little chance for any Byzantine to gain a rational view or the slightest understanding of the westerners. Moreover, those Latins with whom the Greeks came into direct daily contact came from the foreign colonies in Constantinople and Pera and formed an unattractive group. They confined themselves to 'soldiering, sordid trade and tavern keeping' and seemed entirely to justify the division of humanity into Greeks and barbarians, looking on the latter as donkeys and cattle and counting the Latins among them. 1.

who lamented this situation, saw that the basic problem was that 'there was nobody to persuade our people that there is any intelligence in the Latins and that they are able to discuss anything besides these paltry and mechanical arts, because the long separation of the two peoples has resulted in much ignorance of each other'. In addition to the division caused by ignorance there was also the factor of the hatred which repelled the East from the West as Barlaam plainly stated to Benedict XII.

For let me assure you that it is not so much a difference of dogma that separates the hearts of the Greeks from you as the hatred which has entered into their minds against the Latins as a result of the many and great evils which the Greeks have suffered from the Latins in the past and are still suffering day by day; and until this hatred is cast out from them there can be no question of union being achieved.'

The dangers of this situation were realised in the thirteenth century by Humbert de Romania, the fifth General of the Dominican Order, who observed that the longer a schism lasts the more difficult it is to bring to an end. A Dominican of the mid-fourteenth century, Philip Incontra, who had a lifetime's experience of Byzantine conditions, gloomily agreed that the positions of the parties were so entrenched that little progress could be hoped for.

'This division or cause of division has lasted until now and will remain until the end, so it seems to me, because I see that the Greeks have become so obstinate on this question that they would accept all heresies before they will confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. They are more obstinate now than they ever were'.

Even the most tireless and optimistic of missionaries would have felt some despair at the determination of the Byzantines and especially at the stream of formalised polemic which showed no sign of changing course or drying up. Demetrius Kydones, who in his researches into the background of the schism claimed to have read everything which had been written on the subject in the five hundred years the schism had lasted, commented that 'it seemed as though all our forefathers who had anything to do with learning, had firmly made up their minds and taken an oath to publish something anti-Latin, sometimes refutations, sometimes just abuse; anything to have a memorial to their zeal when they died.' In the west exactly the same phenomenon is found.

Thus on the surface there appeared no reason for believing that the Churches of Constantinople and Rome would ever be united unless the papacy could be persuaded to submit its case to the jurisdiction of an oecumenical council or the Greek people could be forced into abandoning its insistence that such a council was necessary. Meanwhile, however, despite the ignorance and hatred which often displayed themselves there were some people who held out at least some hope for the future. The situation was not unmittigatedly bad, East and West were not entirely cut off from one another, there were still some links which connected the two halves of the Christian world and which allowed a degree of communication to pass between them. Among the Byzantines who most consistently sought to emphasise the common factors and interests which formed a basic bond between

Latins and Greeks was Demetrios Kydones. He reminded the Byzantines that

'we have not been for long or completely separated from the Latins and have not inherited the struggle against them as a sort of feud, as the Greeks did against the barbarians and as we do still against those hardened blasphemers of Christ, so that we therefore have to keep up the old enmity at all costs. On the contrary, from the beginning we have both been citizens of one state, that is the Church, have the same customs and usages, obey the same authority. Only later did the moment of division come and the differences remained only in points of minor importance, if one can call them of minor importance if they involve a contradiction of the faith. The difference bears less resemblance to war between hereditary enemies than to a civil quarrel or a revolutionary movement.'

Demetrios was an exceptional man, quite unusual in his enthusiasm for western thought, but representative of the small but important groups among his Byzantine contemporaries who wished to know more of the Latins and to forge substantial links with them. During John V's reign there were three main sources of communication and understanding between the Greeks and the Latins. First of all there were the friars in Constantinople who formed an articulate and energetic body of interpreters of western religion and thought at the centre of the Byzantine empire. Secondly, there were the western theological works which were translated into Greek for the first time in the fourteenth century. Thirdly, there were the individuals whose lives and careers formed a series of personal links between East and West at this time. These will be considered in turn and their effectiveness in bringing the Latins and Greeks to a greater knowledge of each other will be assessed.

1. Ibid., p. 401 lines 39-48.
2. It is an indication of the Greeks' marked sense of superiority that translation had never been an admired form of activity. In the west from classical times throughout the middle ages the translation of Greek thoughts and forms into Latin had been one of the chief agents of literary and philosophic culture.
A. The Friars

By the mid-fourteenth century both the Franciscans and the Dominicans had been established for a long time either in Constantinople itself or on its doorstep in Pera, first under the Latin Empire and then, after a period of exile, under the protection of the Byzantines. About 1307 both orders were expelled from Constantinople by Andronikos II, whereupon Pera, where they were already established, became the centre of their activities. The association of the friars and Genoese colonial power was an important factor in their steady expansion and lasting presence. This is particularly true of the Dominican order whose four eastern houses in the mid-fourteenth century were found in the Genoese mercantile centres of Pera, Caffa, Trebizond and Chios. Their missionaries followed the merchants along the trade routes to the interior and the Genoese position in the towns gave the friars enough security to become the most influential and permanent outpost of the Roman Church in the East.1

Although both orders maintained similar establishments in Pera, the contribution made by the Dominicans is better documented and had greater influence on the Byzantines. The Dominicans were alone in producing individuals of sufficient stature not only to catch the historian's eye but to


O. Halecki, Un Empereur, p. 253, n. 4.
arouse strong emotions, both of respect and distrust, in Byzantine hearts. The zeal of the Franciscans cannot be doubted; the part they played in the conversion of Prince Stracimir of Bulgaria and the inhabitants of Vidin is proof of their militancy\(^1\), but the Dominicans possessed two very considerable allies which the Franciscans lacked. They could claim brotherhood with St. Thomas Aquinas, on whose person and teaching were centred many of the contacts and disputes between East and West, and as a result of this they had a firm and influential friend in Demetrios Kydones. But most especially the characteristics of the Dominicans, above all the emphasis they put upon preaching and writing, conformed well with the Byzantine mentality and way of looking at religious problems. They talked, debated and wrote in a fashion which the Greeks fully understood and appreciated. They were on the whole graver, more moderate and more scholarly than the Franciscans, and did not display either the hysteria or the extreme views which were common among the Franciscans. Significantly it was the Dominican order which received all the Greek converts to the Roman Church who felt a vocation for a religious life in a western mould\(^2\).

The Dominican house in Pera had in its founder, Guillaume Bernard, a man who exemplified the order's characteristics. When he had moved his twelve brothers from Constantinople to Pera he used his knowledge of Greek to 'preach the word of the Lord and to dispute against the errors of the Greeks'\(^3\). It is clear that from the start the order was instituted in Pera not only to serve the Latin population in the

\(^{1}\) Wadding, Annales Minorum, 8, 230-231. See above pp. 51, 54.
\(^{2}\) E.g. Manuel Kalokas, Andrew, Theodore and Maximos Chryseberges and Maximos of Constantinople on whom see G. Mercati, Notizie, pp. 101-105. The ability of the Dominicans to tackle the Byzantines in debate is emphasised by Kydones: 'Ανατεθες τον Αδελφόν διαλέγεν: Apologia, Notizie, p. 56, line 2.
colony but also to play an active polemical role against the schismatics of the empire. Guillaume Bernard was followed by others who also threw themselves into the task of exposing and correcting the errors of the Greeks. Simon of Constantinople was a prominent member of a long line of Greek Dominicans who brought the order the benefits of a deep knowledge of Byzantine theology; he made use of it himself to write five polemical treatises addressed to eminent Byzantines, including Andronikos II.

In the reign of John V few personal details are known about the Dominicans of Pera, apart from two major writers who both belonged to the earlier part of his reign. The most illustrious was Philip Incontri who had joined the house in Pera by 1312 and had known Simon of Constantinople in the last years of his long life. His career shows vividly the intensity and consistency of a Dominican's life in Pera, beginning with twenty five years of discussions and disputes with the Greeks 'putting the whole weight of his study and effort against them'. In 1356 he was inquisitor in the Orient, a job which was far from a sinecure having responsibility for the firmness of the Roman faith among the westerners and converts of the whole Latin East.


3. 'Ego, iam per XXV annos cum praefatis Graecis disputans et tractans, et totum contra eos meum impendens studium et conatum'. S.S.O.P. I, 646.
Only after Philip had been through this long apprenticeship of direct confrontation with the Byzantines and had been rewarded with an important position in the hierarchy of the Roman Church in the east, did he turn his attention to writing. His first known work was the translation of the abridged acts of the anti-Photian council of 869, known in the west as the eighth ecumenical council. This work was done in collaboration with Demetrios Kydones who had discovered the acts in Greek and brought them to Philip about 1355-1356¹. Immediately after this Philip began his programme of polemical writing, starting with his *Libellus qualiter Graeci recesserunt ab oboedientia Ecclesiae Romanae*, a historical work which grew out of his belief that the Latins had not sufficiently studied the causes of the schism. It was directly inspired by the discovery of the acts of the council of 869 on which the *Libellus* is largely a commentary with a brief summary of the later schisms up to the time of the fall of Andronikos II. It was written between 1356 and 1357 and was dedicated to ‘the most reverend father and lord’, who in all likelihood was the papal legate, Peter Thomas.

Following this, between 1358 and 1359 Philip composed the *De oboedientia Ecclesiae Romanae debits* which clearly draws heavily on the years of confrontation and disputation which began his career. Finally in 1359 he finished his *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, which he had worked on together with the *de oboedientia*². All these works were written in Latin, and so were not for a Greek audience directly; they were

intended for other Dominican missionaries to provide material for sermons, to give them the benefit of the questions Greeks had asked Philip and the answers which he had given. But above all, in common with most of the Dominican polemical works, their interest and influence lay in the fact that they drew on the authority of the Greek Fathers to support the positions taken up by the Roman Church, and also reported the arguments and authorities of the Byzantines.

The only other Dominican writer working during John V's reign of whom we know anything is John de Fontibus and our knowledge of him is extremely scanty. His only surviving work is a long letter in Greek to an unspecified Byzantine monastery in Constantinople. This is a polemical work composed on traditional lines, dealing with such contentious points as the primacy of Peter and Rome, the infallibility of the Roman Church and the orthodoxy of *filioque*. John admitted that the Latins had added the word but claimed that it had been done only for the sake of greater clarity and was not an innovation in the creed. In discussing *filioque* John reveals that this letter was not his first work on the subject and that his beliefs were 'set out more clearly and fully in another book written by me, containing many demonstrations about this article of faith, founded on holy scripture and approved by Greek doctors'. He added 'you can get this book from brother Manuel who lives in Galata'. The letter of John de Fontibus cannot be accurately dated, but it must

have been written after 1356 since it mentions the acts of the anti-Photian council which were lost 'for three hundred years' before Demetrius Kydones found them and translated them with Philip Linciari's help in 1356.

The Dominicans and the Greeks.

One of the characteristics which distinguished the Dominican order in the east was the emphasis which it put upon learning the language of the countries in which it operated. Humbert de Romanis, in his study on the schism prepared for the Council of Lyon in 1274, had given as his fourth reason for the continuance of the schism 'the difference of tongues, because of which we cannot preach to them'. For a Dominican this was a very serious disability and it is not surprising that among his proposals for promoting reunion Humbert stressed the importance of acquiring 'knowledge and skill in the Greek language' and lamented that it was 'scarcely possible to find anyone in the Roman Curia who could read the letters sent by the Greeks, and the legates sent out to them had to have interpreters of whom it was unknown whether they understood or were deceived'. Humbert also pointed out the necessity to the Latins of acquiring and studying Greek theological works and also the desirability of 'translating Latin books into Greek so that they can see

1. R.-J. Loenertz, *ibid.*, pp.164-165 tentatively dates the letter to c. 1353, but since it mentions that 'the complete acts of the aforementioned (eighth) council may be read both in Latin and Greek', p.135 lines 193-199, it must be post 1356.
2. 'Quod concilium per tricentos annos fuit ita occultatum', T. Kaeppler, *Deux nouveaux ouvrages*, p.165.
what learned Latins have written and taught. 1

This might almost be seen as the official programme of the Dominicans in the east. They set about learning Greek in order to be able to debate more effectively, studying Greek theological works in order to turn back their opponents' authorities against themselves and they encouraged translations to be made first by themselves, later by Byzantines. In 1333 the Chapter of Dijon ordered the foundation of a language school in the Dominican house in Pera, and although there is no firm evidence that it ever existed, the long line of Dominicans in Pera who clearly did know Greek shows that the spirit of the proposal was enthusiastically received.

It does not seem that the Franciscans shared this talent for Greek, for we know of no member of the order who made use of the language in the same way as the Dominicans did. Indeed the brief entry of Aregos (Henry), the superior of the Franciscans of Pera into the History of John Kantakouzenos strikingly illustrates this ignorance of Greek. The inhabitants of Pera sent Aregos and another Franciscan to visit John Kantakouzenos because they wished to know the rights and wrongs involved in the civil war between him and John Palaiologos. The two Franciscans were both 'well versed in Roman wisdom and in the philosophy of Aristotle'. They


interviewed Kantakouzenos for two days and were finally convinced of the righteousness of his cause, promising to let both the Greeks and the Italians know of their decision. They then acted as intermediaries between Kantakouzenos and his chief opponents, the Patriarch Kalekas and the Grand Duke Apokaukos, to whom they took a copy of Kantakouzenos' proposals for peace. They handed it over and later carried the reply back to Kantakouzenos' camp under the impression that they had convinced Apokaukos and Kalekas of the injustice of their actions and that the reply contained their submission to Kantakouzenos. Unfortunately Aregos, 'being completely ignorant of the Hellenic dialect and letters .... and deceived by the Patriarch's seal which he thought was like that of the pope and therefore trustworthy', had misunderstood the contents altogether and was shocked when Kantakouzenos revealed that nothing had been conceded at all. Evidently therefore Aregos' knowledge of classical Greek learning was derived from Latin translations since his actions show very clearly his ignorance of the Greek language.

The result of the Dominicans' enthusiasm for learning Greek was that they were able to become involved in Byzantine life much more deeply than any other group of westerners. They were first of all extremely well qualified to act as ambassadors, being able not only to talk to each side in its own language but also, when questions of church reunion were raised, to understand the positions taken up by both sides. However, while it is natural that successive

of Aregos with Henry see G. Golubovich, Biblioteca biblio- bibliografica, 3, p. 297.
pope should make use of these talents, it is surprising to find on a number of occasions Byzantine emperors entrusting their affairs to western Dominicans. Andronikos II used a Dominican called Andrew as his ambassador to the pope in 1326 and Andronikod III sent letters to John XXII by the hand of two Dominicans Francesco da Camarino and Richard of England who were returning to the Curia from the Crimea in 1333. Kantakouzenos, having received Clement VI's envoy Gasbert d'Orgueil O.P. in 1350, sent Fr. John of Pera as his representative to Innocent VI. In 1374, while Gregory XII's ambassadors Thomas de Bessolasco O.P. and Barthelemy Cherasco O.F.M. were on their way to Constantinople, John V's envoy, the Dominican John Bishop of Tabriz, was going the other way. The Dominicans thus demonstrated their usefulness as linguists and men of affairs in bringing east and west closer together on an official level.

It was, however, on the personal, individual level that the Dominicans had their greatest impact on Byzantium. Living more closely with the Byzantines than any other section of the Latin community they were able to have much closer relationships with them. John Kantakouzenos, describing his ambassador John of Pera, called him 'one of his friends living in Galata, of the order of preachers'.

1. R.J. Loenertz, 'Les missions dominicaines', Arch. Praed., 2, (1932), 9-11. Gasbert d'Orgueil was accompanied by a Franciscan Guillelmus Emergani; Kantak. iv, 9: III, 55 describes them both as well versed in 'profane literature'.

2. 'ο βασιλεύς τῶν ἐν Γαλατῇ διατριβών τῶν φίλων Ἰωάννην ὅνομα, τῆς τάξεως δυνα τῶν υπόκων, πρὸς πάντων πέμψας. Kantak. iv, 9: III, 62 lines 12-13. Fr. John of Pera is often identified with John de Fontibus, see R.J. Loenertz, 'Iohannis de Fontibus', Arch. Praed., 30, (1960), 163-165. In addition to the evidence he cites it should be noted (contd.)
most interesting source on this side of the Dominicans' activities is the autobiographical information supplied by Philip Incontri especially in his *De obedientia Ecclesiae Romanae debita*. He describes how the relations between Greeks and Latins had shown marked improvement during his career in Pera.

"Before, when I used to talk to them, their bishops, monks, priests and even people fled from us as though we were excommunicates or heretics, and there was a great fuss even to get permission for us to enter their monasteries or churches just to look. If it happened that one of our men was thirsty it was scarcely possible to find anyone to give him some water; and when he had drunk they would break or throw away the cup. Rarely could we find anyone who would talk to us about anything. However, when I began to deal with them more familiarly, visiting their monasteries, standing with them informally, debating with them and replying to their points, I have so tamed them within ten years that they do not by any means avoid us, indeed they eat and drink together with us and we with them."

Although Philip attributes this thaw in the relationship entirely to his own efforts and his more friendly behaviour, there was perhaps another basic factor underlying this. The *De obedientia* was written in 1338 to 1339 and if we are to take the ten years mentioned by Philip fairly literally the most striking change to have occurred

---

1. Similar events are reported by Ps.-Brocardus, *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents Arméniens*, 2, p.428, and Patriarch in a letter to Urban V, Raynaldus, ann. 1366, p.125. Both refer to the Byzantine practice of reconsecrating churches in which Latin priests have celebrated.

in Constantinople was the entry of Kantakouzenos into the capital on 2-3 February 1347. There is no reason why in itself this development should have produced such a result, but in his wake Kantakouzenos brought Demetrios Kydones to a position of power and influence as the first minister of the empire. The relations between Philip Incontri and Kydones therefore deserve some investigation.

The first occasion when the two men can definitely be linked was in 1355-1356 when they were both interested in studying the causes of the schism. Philip himself had worked on the subject for thirty years and then

'finally last year, working together with a certain faithful Greek called Demetrios Chidonij, a noble citizen of Thessalonica, who had been converted to the faith and was carefully enquiring into the same thing, he at last unexpectedly found the acts of the eighth council ... which had been lost for three hundred years .... When Demetrius himself found the acts of the aforesaid council in a certain monastery called St. John of Petra he, as a true member of the faithful, showed them to me, made a transcription and even handed them over to me so that I could make a transcription which I did carefully. After this we immediately made a translation into Latin together so that it could be transmitted to the ears of our people.'

This account suggests that the collaboration had begun some time before the discovery and translation of the acts and that their relationship was based on a common interest in the background to the schism. The description given of Kydones in this passage is interestingly similar to that given by Philip in his de processione Spiritus Sancti of a conversation he held with 'quodam nobili Graeco fideli'

1. Ibid. pp. 164-165.
in 1355 about a chapter in the Acts of the Apostles. In the past it has been suspected that this could be a reference to Demetrios Kydones, and its similarity to the explicit mention of him would tend to confirm it.\(^1\)

The regard which Kydones felt for Philip personally is shown in two letters he wrote in which he defends Philip against attacks made on him by George the Philosopher.\(^2\) George had provoked Demetrios' letters by publicly adhering to the Roman Church, making his confession to Philip during a service, and then later rejecting the western church and casting aspersions on Philip's morals. Kydones regretted that George was now libelling a man whom he had previously admired and whom, if he knew him better, he would heap with praises for his wisdom.

Besides his friendship for Kydones, Philip Incontri also had close relations with the Metochites family. He had been greatly struck by the firmness of faith shown by those Greeks who had supported the union of Lyon, especially George Metochites who died in 1323 after forty-two years in prison. Despite many offers of freedom in return for his recantation he remained firm and wrote two books against the Greeks while in prison which were given to Philip by George's grandson.\(^3\) Philip also mentions a meeting he had with the bishop of Durazzo, who revealed himself as a secret admirer of the Roman faith and exchanged texts with Philip on the


\(^3\) See also F. Tinnefeld, 'Georgios Philosophos. Ein Korrespondent und Freund des Demetrios Kydones,' O.C.P., 38, (1972), 141-171.

T. Kaeppeili, op. cit. pp.174-175.
procession of the Holy Spirit*.

The Dominican order played an important role in Byzantium because it operated on this individual level. In their writings and conversations the Dominicans demonstrated the human side of the Roman Church which rarely emerged in the head-on conflicts which characterised the union negotiations held on the official level. Their presence in the empire provided a focus, a meeting place and instruction for those Byzantines who were attracted to the Roman faith. But above all the friars were practical men of action whose greatest contribution to mutual understanding between east and west was made merely by living and working among the Greeks.

B. The translation of western theological works into Greek.

The dangers which arose from the linguistic division between Latins and Greeks were realised not only by the Dominicans but by the Byzantines as well. Demetrios Kydones in particular was aware that the difference in language had resulted in the Byzantines making an absurd distinction between the Greek and Latin Church Fathers. Although the latter were represented on the Byzantine church calendar and were invoked as intercessors during church services, their writings were ignored by the Greeks.

*Why should we listen to Athanasios, Basil, Gregory, John and Cyril, and then unceremoniously cast out of the Church Hilary, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Leo and Gregory as though they are no help to us in discussions about God, although we

1. Ibid., pp.176-177.
have anointed them with oil and invested them with the wool? The only charge against them is the difference of language, for I can see no other reason for condemning them.'

The first objective, according to Kydones, should be to make the Byzantines concentrate not on 'how' but 'about what' the Latin Fathers spoke. Alexis Kalothetos, in his correspondence with Barlaam of Calabria, also laid great stress on the advantages which would be gained if those authorities which Barlaam cited in his defence of Roman doctrines were as easily available to the Byzantines as they were to the Latins. He called for the translation not merely of the Latin Fathers Ambrose, Gregory and Jerome but also of past papal letters to the eastern Church and the acts of the 'quasi-general councils' which the pope had called to enquire into the problem of the procession of the Holy Spirit; 'for once we have seen these things about which you talk, we will be aware that our quarrels with the Latins have been for the most part solved'.

It was with this conviction that, during the reign of John V, a programme of translating Latin works into Greek was pursued. It was remarkable not only for the sheer number of works involved but also for the quality of the translations and the range they covered. This can partly be illustrated by a simple list of the translations made:

1. Kydones, Apologia, Notizie, p. 382, lines 35-41. Investment with the wool, ἐν δολῷ, is perhaps a reference to the woollen pallium received by archbishops from the pope in the period before the schism. It is thus intended as a reminder of the pristine and proper state of the undivided Church in which differences of language were irrelevant.


3. 'Nam si his visis, de quibus dicas, informabimur, bene scito, quod controversiae nostrae cum Latinis ex maxima parte solutae erunt'. M.P.G. 151, 1262d-1263a. John V had proposed the foundation of schools of Latin in Byzantium in his first approach to Innocent VI in 1355, see above p. 34 and O. Halecki, Un Empereur, pp. 35-36.
before the end of John V's reign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Translator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>Summa contra Gentiles</td>
<td>Demetrios Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>Summa Theologiae, Pars prima prima secundae, secunda secundae</td>
<td>D. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>6 articles from pars tertia and 76 articles from Supplementum</td>
<td>Prochoros Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos et Armenos ad cantorem Antiochenum</td>
<td>D. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis ad archiepiscopum Panormitanum</td>
<td>? D. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>De aetemitate mundi contra murmurantes</td>
<td>Prochoros Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>Introduction to the commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics</td>
<td>Prochoros Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae: quaestio de potentia and de spiritualibus creaturis</td>
<td>? Prochoros Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>Sermo de festo Corporis Christi habitus in consistorio pleno</td>
<td>D. Kydones or Manuel Kalekas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>De Trinitate</td>
<td>Maximos Planudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>De vera religione</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>De beata vita</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>De libero arbitrio</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>Eight Letters</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>Enchiridion ad Laurentian</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>Five extracts from Contra Julianum</td>
<td>Demetrios Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine</td>
<td>Sermon Vado ad Patrem</td>
<td>D. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-Augustine</td>
<td>De decem plagis et decem</td>
<td>P. Kydones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-Augustine</td>
<td>praecptis Colloquia</td>
<td>Demetrios Kydones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. This list is based on those found in S.G. Papadopoulos, 'Ελληνικές μεταφράσεις Θουμητήριων Έρωτων, Φιλαθομιστή, και Αντιθομιστήν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ', Greek translations, (Athens 1967), pp. 25-64, where there are details of the manuscripts of the translations of Aquinas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Title</th>
<th>Work/Commentary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-Augustine</td>
<td>De duodecim abusionum gradibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Prosper</td>
<td>Liber sententiarum ex operibus sancti Augustani delibatarum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boethius</td>
<td>De consolatione philosophiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boethius</td>
<td>De differentiis topicis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Anselm</td>
<td>De processione Spiritus Sancti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Anselm</td>
<td>De sacrificio azimi et fermentati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Fulgentius</td>
<td>De fide ad Petrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter of Poitiers</td>
<td>Genealogia de Iesu Christo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricoldo da Monte Croce</td>
<td>Contra legem Alcorani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hervaeus Natalis</td>
<td>Parts of the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Jerome</td>
<td>Preface to the Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The donation of Constantine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this list might also be added two other works of Thomas Aquinas, the hymn *Pange lingua* and the *Devotissima expositio super symbolorum apostolorum*. However the translator of neither of these works is known, and since the translations appear only in single manuscripts of late date, they may belong to a later period.

The earliest translator mentioned on this list is Maximos Planudes¹, a Byzantine monk who died in the early years of the fourteenth century. He is chiefly known to historians, as he was in his own day, as a classical scholar who was distinguished among his contemporaries not merely by his

---

sophisticated scholarly techniques but also by a thorough knowledge of Latin. This side of his work is represented by his translations of Caesar's *Gallic War*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and *Heroides* and Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*. But in addition, his translations of Augustine's *De Trinitate* and Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* were the first translations of substantial and fundamental works of early western Christian writers which were still unknown in the Byzantine world. His interest in Boethius and St. Augustine was primarily intellectual and had no effect on his own orthodox Byzantine religious convictions, indeed he also composed several polemical works against the Latins. Planudes was a contemporary of Guillaume Bernard, the founder of the Dominican house in Pera, who also knew both Latin and Greek and to whom are attributed the first translations of Thomas Aquinas into Greek. The early fourteenth century Dominican historian Bernard Gui who describes the institution of the order in Pera, adds the note that Guillaume Bernard 'libros f. Thomas de Aquino e Latino Graecos facit'. Unfortunately no trace of these translations remains and they appear to have had little impact in Byzantium since there is no evidence that any Byzantine had any knowledge of the works of Aquinas before the next generation of translators led by Demetrios Kydones began its work.

Demetrios Kydones' interest in the theological writings of the western Church was sparked off by a purely practical need. As chief minister at the court of John Kantakouzenos he frequently came into contact with western ambassadors and

travellers with whom communication was usually made through interpreters; however, the lack of adequately trained interpreters and Demetrios' desire to be able to converse directly with the more eminent Latins who passed through Constantinople caused him to learn their language himself. He found an able master in a Dominican who was already his friend and a skilful philosopher, who temporarily left his house in order to teach him. He worked at night after completing his official work for the emperor and made rapid progress.  

Kydones owed his knowledge of western theology to his Dominican master, who gave him the Summa contra Gentiles of Aquinas as a text. Kydones was so carried away by the contents that he translated several chapters of it into Greek to show the emperor and was encouraged to finish a translation of the whole book. It was an enormous task for a beginner, and Kydones marked his relief at its completion by noting the exact time at which he finished: it was three o'clock in the afternoon of 24 December 1354. Although in a letter written later in life Kydones said that he had been occupied with translating Thomas' writings 'since his first youth', it is clear that this was his first translation. After this, 'having tasted the lotus', he produced

3. 'Istum librum translulit de latino in grecum demetrius de thesalonica servus Thom Xi. laboravit autem translatendo per unum annum, et fuit completus M° c8c l°v indictione octava, xxiii mensis decebris ora post meridiem tertia. hoc autem dictum est non solum pro istis duobus libris tertio (sicilicet), et 4° sed pro tota Suma contra gentiles, tota fuit translata.' G. Mercati, Notizie, p.160.
5. 'Αυτοῦ δὲ γευσάμενος', Kydones, Apologia, Notizie, p.363 line 30.
a stream of translations. The second work he translated was also by Aquinas; it was the monumental Summa Theologiae the first part of which was produced in a fair copy on 13 November 1358\(^1\). None of the later translations can be dated accurately\(^2\). One of the most striking aspects of Demetrios' translations is the speed at which they were made. The Summa contra Gentiles was completed within a year and much of the Summa Theologiae was translated in the following two. During most of this time Kydones was also responsible for major affairs of state, being only briefly relieved of his duties as first minister after the abdication of John Kantakouzenos. However, the translations remain lucid and accurate. Kydones certainly had helpers, he even briefly acknowledges them, but apart from his younger brother Prochoros none of his contemporaries showed skill and enthusiasm approaching his\(^3\).

An examination of the material translated gives a clear indication of the change in the principle of selection in the course of the fourteenth century. Maximos Planudes had chosen for translation two of the front rank western works which were distinguished not by their contentiousness but

---

1. 'Ἐπληρώθη τῇ 1γ’ Νοεμβρίου τῆς 1358 έτη εὐδικτυών, περὶ ἕκαστην τῆς ημέρας, κατὰ τὸ ἔξωκελκίλισσιον διήνωσεν ἐξηνωσάτων ἐβδομον ἔτος (6867=1358) διὰ χειρός Νικολήν Τσικουνιδήν'. S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.49 n.102.
   It was copied again four years later, M. Rackl, 'Die griechische Übersetzung der Summa theologiae des hl. Thomas von Aquin', B.Z., 24, (1923-1924), 60.

2. Aquinas's De ratione fidei ... ad cantorem Antiochenum was translated before 1363, the year of the death of Neilos Kabasilas who cites the translation. Ricoldo da Monte Croce's Contra legem Alcorani was translated before 1360 when Kantakouzenos used it as the basis of his work against the Moslems. See below p.154 and n.2.

by their solid theological worth. Neither Augustine's *De Trinitate* nor Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* contained much that the Byzantines found objectionable. Their authors were in no way symbols of the schism but were cut off from a Greek audience merely by the language in which they were written. Planudes was attacked by the Dominicans, and later by Bessarion, for glossing over passages in St. Augustine which dealt with the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son without expressing the full force of the Latin in his translation, but the authentic text of the Greek of Planudes shows these charges to be without foundation. He inserted the *filioque* passages without alteration and with no comment because he translated the work not for its polemical possibilities but as a major example of western literature which deserved study in the east. The *De Trinitate* in particular achieved considerable popularity on Mount Athos, which indicates both its non-polemical character and the willingness of Byzantines to read it.

The works translated by Kydones show a rather different pattern. Most of them were associated with the differences between east and west, the works with which he began most of all. The *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae* were the most complete and uncompromising statement of western theology that could have been chosen, but they were not by


any means aimed against the Greeks. Their importance was that they were fundamental works of current Latin theology without which an understanding of the developments which the Roman Church had undergone while in isolation from the east was impossible to achieve. Another work whose subject matter has a clear relation to the schism is St. Anselm’s De sacrificio azimi et fermentati which although dealing with a disputatious topic is notable for the moderation of its tone¹.

Two other characteristics stand out in the bulk of the Latin treatises translated during John V’s reign. On one hand they are for the most part short works, many of them, especially the works of St. Augustine, often appearing together on one manuscript in the west where they were fairly common in the fourteenth century². On the other hand a large number of them have a clear connection with the Dominicans; this is particularly obvious in the large number of works of Aquinas, which not only illustrate the enthusiasm of Kydones for his writings but also indicate that the Dominicans were the translators’ source of Latin manuscripts. The Dominican link is also evident in the choice of other works notably the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard by Herveus Natalis and the Contra legem Alcorani of Ricoldo da Monte Croce. Herveus Natalis had


2. A catalogue of manuscripts preserved in the library of the University of Cambridge, 2, (1857) no.1251, pp.436-441.
been the General of the Dominican order from 1318 until his death in 1323, and had been a staunch defender of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas against his opponents within the order. On 18 July 1323 Aquinas was canonised by John XXII, an event for which Hervéus Natalis had long worked 1. Similarly Ricoldo da Monte Croce, whose refutation of the Koran was a very popular anti-Moslem source in the west, had been a Dominican himself and had written a defence of Aquinas's doctrines in collaboration with John of Pistoia about 1285 2. The works of both men therefore would have held a special place in a Dominican library where the short works of St. Augustine would doubtless have been found also.

The translations of western theological works in John V's reign opened up to the Byzantines the whole range of the developments which had taken place in the Roman Church during the schism. Even if the Byzantines did not like what they saw in Aquinas they had no excuse for misrepresenting or misunderstanding Latin theology after the labours of Demetrios Kydones. The translations formed an important channel of communication between east and west of which Byzantine writers both pacific and polemic were quick to take advantage.

C. The Individuals

The process of making the east and the west more intelligible to each other, and breaking down in at least a few

2. The text of Kydones' translation of Ricoldo da Monte Croce's Contra Legem Alcorani is published in M.P.G. 154, 1037-1152. It clearly shows the influence of Aquinas's Summa contra Gentiles. It formed the basis of the anti-Moslem polemic written by John Kantakouzenos in 1360. See E. Trapp, Manuel IX Palaiologos, Dialoge mit einem "Perser", (Vienna 1966), pp. 35*-48*
minds the barriers of enmity and ignorance, was aided by a force less easily isolated than the friars or the translations. There was a number of individuals in the mid-fourteenth century who by their office, background or career, were able to form a personal link between Greeks and Latins. This group includes both Latins in the east and Byzantines in the west, and prominent among them were three Greek speaking bishops of the Roman Church, Barlaam of Seminaria, Simon Atumano and Paul the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople.

1) Barlaam

Barlaam is particularly interesting because in him east and west were more inextricably mixed than in any other figure of the period. He was a product of Calabrian monasticism, which had kept the Greek language and the culture and Church of Byzantium alive within the territory of the western world. To a man of the great intellectual capacity of Barlaam a cloistered Calabrian life was too constricting and he sought the wider horizons of Byzantium, but it is important to appreciate that he came to Constantinople because he was seeking 'true piety' in the capital of his faith.

In Byzantium his advancement was rapid since he combined both Latin and Greek virtues and education. This fact won him the honour of disputing with papal envoys in Constantinople in


1334 and five years later he was sent to Avignon to discuss the reunion of the Churches with Benedict XII. His address to the pope on this occasion is one of the best statements of the Byzantine position on the question of union and the methods of achieving it, insisting at length on the necessity of calling an ecumenical council. These events demonstrate both the confidence which Patriarch and emperor had in Barlaam and also his personal orthodoxy. 

It was in the name of the orthodoxy of the Byzantine Church that Barlaam began a series of attacks on the practices of certain monks which they associated with mystical experiences. The arguments which Barlaam turned against the hesychasts were the same as those which he had produced against the papal ambassadors in 1334. He attacked them both for daring to claim to 'know' God, the former through individual mystical experience assisted by mechanical exercises, the latter through soulless syllogisms. However, his arguments were less popular against the hesychasts than they were against the Latins, and were condemned by the Byzantine Church.

This rebuff was fatal to Barlaam's loyalty to the Greek Church. He responded by leaving Byzantium for the west and the Church of Constantinople for that of Rome. He found a ready welcome in Avignon and very soon was appointed to the bishopric of Gaeta in Calabria. Barlaam's personal conversion cannot be said to have brought the Latins and Greeks to

a closer understanding of each other, he merely made a wholehearted exchange of one faith for another. One of his Greek friends who had been surprised at the speed with which Barlaam had been able to accept the Latin doctrines was told 'neither used I to know whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, nor do I consider that I know now. For I think that problems of this sort both are and were above all human knowledge, understanding, method and demonstration. But previously I believed that He proceeds from the Father alone, and now I believe He proceeds from the Son as well.' Such a conversion, which shows Barlaam's strong desire to cut the knots which could never be untied by reason, was not the sort which many Byzantines found themselves able to follow; even Barlaam required the spur of his condemnation in Constantinople.

Although most of Barlaam's writings were not designed to make either Church understand the other better, but merely asserted the orthodoxy of the one to which he belonged, there is one aspect of his career in which Barlaam can be seen as an important influence in the cause of union. He clearly enjoyed considerable authority in a circle of Greek friends, mostly from Thessalonica, with whom he remained in contact after his journey to the west and his conversion. To these men Barlaam offered a much more practical form of spiritual guidance than he had given to the Churches of Constantinople and Rome at large. Surviving from his correspondence with this group are two doctrinal letters sent by Barlaam to all

1. Letter to Demetrios of Thessalonica, M.P.C. 151, 1301c.
his friends in Greece, in which he extolled the virtues of
the Roman Church and of western society, two letters to Barlaam
from Alexios Kalothetos, a letter from a certain Demetrios of
Thessalonica who sought spiritual advice particularly on the
procession of the Holy Spirit, and also Barlaam's reply to
this letter¹. In these letters the difficulties which a
Byzantine faced in coming to an understanding and acceptance
of the Roman Church are revealed, not only the spiritual
problems which Barlaam did his best to answer in his own way,
but also the practical difficulties of not having Latin books
and not understanding those that they had.

The extent of Barlaam's influence over these Greeks is
further illustrated by a passage in the letter from Demetrios
of Thessalonica. Admiration for Barlaam and his teaching and
disappointment at his sudden departure from Constantinople
are expressed in the warmest language. It is also revealed
that Barlaam visited Constantinople early in 1347, and that
when his friends heard of his presence they prepared with all
possible speed to meet him.² But before they were ready to
set out they were disappointed to hear that Barlaam had

¹. They are published in M.P.G.151, 1255d-1314b.
². Demetrios of Thessalonica used to be identified with
Demetrios Kydones but R-J. Loenertz, 'Note sur la corres-
pondance de Barlaam, évêque de Gerace, avec ses amis de
Grèce', O.C.P., 23, (1957), 201-202, has rejected this
identification on the grounds that Kydones was with
Kantakouzenos in Thrace and Macedonia while Barlaam was
visiting Constantinople in 1347. His case is not com-
pelling, however, since the writer does not say that he
and his Thessalonian friends were in Thessalonica at the
time, nor that they hoped to meet Barlaam in the capital.
Further, Kydones often calls himself Demetrios of Thessa-
onica e.g. Correspondance, ed. R-J. Loenertz, Letter 117
line 73; also the signed manuscripts G. Mercati, Notizie,
p.160. Loenertz suggested an alternative identification
with Demetrios Angelos of Thessalonica, for whom see
Tautu 11, 124.
already left for Negropont. The writer's enthusiasm for Barlaam is clear enough, even allowing for some natural exaggeration in Barlaam's translation. It was on this personal level that Barlaam was most effective at communicating his own religious convictions and encouraging and assisting others to share them.

ii) **Simon Atumano**

When Barlaam returned to Avignon in 1347 after his brief visit to Constantinople he was, in all probability, accompanied by Simon Atumano, whose career shows great similarities with Barlaam's. Simon had been a monk in the monastery of Stoudios where he had acquired an impressive education and a dislike for the hesychast monks which must have made monastic life in Constantinople very disagreeable for him. Little is known of his early career until he arrived in Avignon in 1348. Almost immediately Barlaam died and Simon was hurriedly appointed to the bishopric of Gerace on 23 June 1348, almost six months before he was ordained and very probably before his official conversion to the Roman Church.

Although Atumano's chief recommendation to Clement VI as bishop of Gerace was his friendship with Barlaam, he represents a different kind of link between east and west.

When Simon first arrived in Avignon, he brought with him copies of

---

4. Tautu 9, 219-220; 'primam dumtaxat clericae tonsuram habentes'.
of classical Greek works which were of fundamental importance for the revival of Greek studies in the west and for the survival of the texts. He brought works of Euripides, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, and the Euripides was of supreme importance since it was the working copy of the great transcriber and editor of classical texts, Demetrios Triklinios, and bore his corrections, glosses and commentary¹.

But Simon Atumano was no mere porter. He made his own contribution to the study of classical texts, adding commentary and scholia to the Sophocles manuscript in his own hand and also translating Plutarch's De cohibenda ira into Latin. Although Coluccio Salutati criticised this translation for its lack of literary style, he excused Simon on the grounds that he was a Greek and praised him for making an important contribution by introducing the work to a western audience².

Simon Atumano's career illustrates the fact that the bulk of the work which saved the Greek classics for western readers was done by Byzantine scholars by the early fourteenth century. Although the influx of Greeks into Italy caused by the fall of Constantinople played a significant part in the transmission of the classics, the copying, critical editions and commentaries of the schools of Constantinople and Thessalonica under Thomas Magistros, Demetrios Triklinios Maximos Planudes and Manuel Moschopoulos were the essential prerequisite. The transmission of these texts was also well under way by the fourteenth century through the work of Simon Atumano and the enthusiasm of such men as John I of Aragon and his hard-working associate Juan Fernández de Heredia, the


2. K.M. Setton op. cit, p.50. F. Novati, Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, (Fonti per la storia d'Italia, Istituto storico italiano,16) p.23.
Grand master of the Hospital at Rhodes.

Although it is this side of Simon Atumano's activities for which he is chiefly remembered, he was also responsible for maintaining the influence of the west in Byzantium. He visited the empire several times and was in close contact with the western group led by Demetrios Kydones. During one of his visits he conducted an unoriginal debate with Matthew Angelos Panaretos on the Byzantine practice of putting warm water in the consecrated chalice before communion. Through Kydones Simon also remained in contact with John V, encouraging him along the path to union and conversion and giving him practical advice about the need for taking plenty of money to the papal curia if anything was to be achieved there.

In 1373, when Atumano had been transferred to the archbishopric of Thebes, the city was chosen by Gregory XI to be the site of an international conference, at which the Byzantines were to be represented, to discuss the possibilities of taking common action against the Turks. The conference never took place but the selection of Thebes as the site illustrates the position of both the city and its archbishop as a natural bridge between east and west.

2. P. Risso, 'Matteo Angelo Panareto e cinque suoi opuscoli', Roma e l'Oriente, 10, (1915), 146-148.
3. Demetrios Kydones, Correspondance, ed. R-J. Loomertz, Letters 93, 103, 226 the first two of these letters were written on John V's behalf. Simon also expressed his admiration for John Kantakouzenos in a laudatory poem, see, D.M. Nicol, The Byzantine family of Kantakouzenos, p.97, n.158; the full text is published in B.B.O.F.I, 797.
4. O. Halecki, Un Empereur, pp.257, 263, 286, suggests that the plan for a conference at Thebes was the initiative of Simon Atumano.
iii) Paul

Paul was another Latin bishop who, over a long period, played an important part in maintaining contacts between the Latins and the Greeks. Like Barlaam, he was a Calabrian, born in Naples and in all probability spoke Greek. However, he had been brought up a member of the Roman Church, and showed a more accommodating and understanding attitude to the Byzantines than those who had joined the Roman Church later in life. He was an influential figure during John V's reign both on the official and the unofficial levels, as a papal envoy and as an individual concerned with the promotion of Church union and the increase of mutual understanding.

Paul, when bishop of Smyrna, visited Constantinople in 1355. He was probably there on his own initiative and he used the opportunity to encourage the new emperor John V to make his first approach to the papacy about union and also helped to compose the letter in which John set out his proposals for the pope. Paul's influence is particularly to be seen in the positiveness and attention to detail which characterise this letter and distinguish it from most Byzantine initiatives on the matter of union. Paul travelled to Avignon with the letter and was able to explain the background to the Byzantine situation to Innocent VI. However, when Innocent's reply was ready it was not entrusted to Paul but to Peter Thomas, who had previous experience in dealing with aspiring converts and their possible duplicity, having been

---

sent to Serbia in response to Stephen Dušan's professed wish to join the Roman Church. It is possible that Innocent felt that Paul's enthusiasm for the project made him an unreliable representative of official papal policy, and Paul was transferred to the archbishopric of Thebes which, while being a hierarchical promotion, removed him from the scene of active union negotiations.

It was not until 1367 that Paul played an official part in union negotiations. On 17 April 1366 Urban V appointed him to the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, which he visited the same year as a member of Amadeo of Savoy's expedition to the empire. After the military events of the crusade Paul and Amadeo turned their attention to the question of the reunion of the Churches. The negotiations which Paul conducted in the form of a debate with the ex-emperor John Kantakouzenos have already been described. Paul's eventual agreement that an oecumenical council should be held to discuss the problems between the Churches represents such a complete acceptance of the traditional Byzantine position that Innocent VI's suspicion of Paul's enthusiasm in 1356 would appear to have been justified. That Paul's agreement was far from representing official Roman policy is clear from Urban's complete silence on the question of a council when Byzantine ambassadors arrived at the curia to arrange for the implementation of Paul's promise.

1. See above pp.404, Malecki, Un empeure 55-57.
Paul had been induced to offer the concession of a council by his realisation that for progress to be made some ground had to be given. His stay in the east had been long enough for him to understand how deeply the Byzantines felt on the matter of councils. Many westerners had this understanding, but what marked out Paul from his colleagues was his enquiring and sympathetic nature which led him to attempt to understand the Byzantine viewpoint at a much deeper level than any other papal representative.

This is illustrated by the unofficial contacts which Paul made on both his visits to Constantinople in an effort to understand hesychasm, the dominant influence on contemporary Byzantine religious thought. In 1355 a meeting was arranged by John V between Paul and Gregory Palamas, and this was followed by a debate between Palamas and Nikephoros Gregoras about hesychasm, at which Paul asked to be present as an observer\(^1\). In 1367 Paul again made inquiries into hesychasm to find out exactly what it was about and how widespread it was. When John Kantakouzenos heard of his interest he sent Paul an invitation to the palace where they had frequent conversations. A record of these discussions, in the form of letters between Kantakouzenos and Paul, was made probably by the ex-emperor himself who certainly put together a series of extracts explaining the Palamite viewpoint. In addition Kantakouzenos arranged for an eminent hesychast, Theophanes metropolitan of Nicaea, to compose a reply to Paul's questions\(^2\).

---


2. J. Meyendorff, 'Projets de concile oecuménique', B.D.P., 14, (1960), 139-160. 'Οὕτως δὲ ο Παύλος πολλά καὶ βλασφημία παρά τῶν τῆς Βαρθολόμαου καὶ Ἀκυλοῦντων φρονούντων ἀκποιμώς, συνομοφάνειας ἐπειγόντων τῇ τῆς Κωνσταντινούπολεως ἀγίᾳ ἐνυποληθῷ ἐπεζητεῖ τῆς ἀποφοίτησες παρά τίνος τῶν τοῦ μέρους

(contd.)
What conclusion Paul came to about hesychasms is not known, but the fact that he was prepared to pursue his enquiries over many meetings on both the occasions he was in Byzantium, shows that he, alone of all his colleagues in the Roman hierarchy, set great importance on gaining an accurate insight at first hand into current developments and viewpoints in Byzantium.

iv) John Laskaris Kalophoros

John Laskaris Kalophoros was cast in a very different mould from those individuals who have already been considered as links between east and west, but in his own way he played an important part in keeping Byzantium and the west in contact with each other, and he helped to maintain the momentum of negotiations between the Churches at times when they seemed to have broken down.

The nature of the link formed by John Laskaris Kalophoros can be expressed in several different ways. First of all he belonged to a family which provided many converts to Rome and he himself was converted some time before 1365. His brother Maximos Laskaris Kalophoros, who had encouraged John V's union initiative in 1355 was also converted by 1365, although he was a monk and chancellor of the patriarchate. Of the rest of the family Alexios Laskaris, a high

1. A letter published in N.P.G. 154, 835-838, purports to be from Paul to Urban V on the subject of hesychasm. It is known from only one sixteenth century Greek manuscript with the unusual title, Επιστολὴ Παύλου..., ἐπὶ τὸν μακροτάτον πάπαν καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ παρδίσαλΛους. J. Meyendorff 'Projets de concile œcuménique', p. 160 n. 50. concludes that it must be a forgery. See also G. Mercati, Notizie, p. 93f.

Imperial official, accompanied John V to Rome in 1369, and
Manuel Laskaris joined the Roman Church together with his
whole family and became a priest. The influence of John Laskaris Kalopheros was greatly
strengthened by the nobility of his birth. Whether or not
his claims to be descended from the family of Laskaris
which provided Nicaea with some of its emperors were sound,
his was everywhere accepted as a man of noble blood. This
was reinforced by a succession of marriages he made which
connected him with influential families in east and west.
His first wife was Maria Kantakouzene, John V's niece through
his wife Helen. The prospect of disaffection was a result
of this match between a Kantakouzene and a Laskaris caused
John V to forbid the marriage, and John Laskaris Kalophe-
rous went into exile among westerners. It was thus that
he came into contact with Cypriot society and, after Maria
Kantakouzene's death, married Marie de Mimir, the widow
of a noble Cypriot Jean de Soissons. Finally as his third
wife he took Lucia, the daughter of Erard III Mavros, Baron
of Arcadia. Each wife contributed to his circle of strate-
gically placed and influential relations, and to his growing

1. For the conversion of J.L. Kalopheros, see letter of
Urban V to Peter Thomas 18 April 1365, 'iam diu inverte-
eratum schisma totaliter dereliquit'. Täutu, 11 124-125.
For M.L. Kalopheros, see Täutu 11, 128; and O. Halecki,
Un emperEUR, p. 95.
For A. Laskaris, see O. Halecki, Un emperEUR, p. 94;
For M. Laskaris, see the letter of Gregory XI to Hugo-
Latin Patriarch of Constantinople 18 January 1373. Täutu
wealth. Most significant were his contacts in Cyprus. Here he quickly won the esteem of Peter of Lusignan with whom he went on several military expeditions, including the crusade to Alexandria, and whom he helped with financial contributions.

John's riches were derived not only from the large estates he had gained by marriage but also from his extensive trading interests. He obtained a special licence from Gregory XI to send trading galleys to Alexandria and he was a major exporter of silk to Aragon and Castilla. A letter from the Council of Barcelona to the King of Aragon in 1383 illustrates his importance in Mediterranean politics. It refers to a claim made on behalf of John and others for compensation to be paid for some of their goods which had been seized from Catalan ships by the captains. The Council advised the king to make a payment for the goods since John Laskaris Kalopheros was an eminent and powerful man in Modon and was Count of the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia where there were many Catalan merchants who might suffer.

1. R.J. Loenertz, 'Pour la biographie de Jean Lascaris Calophéros', R.E.B. 28, (1970), 129-139. Kydones Correspondence, ed. R.J. Loenertz, letter 73, lines 40-43, "what the emperor reproaches you for is no trifle, ... your crime is to have become the friend of those who do not like the emperor, to have coveted an alliance which would suit an emperor and to have become related to those who covet his crown".


3. Tautu 12, 229. Kalophéros also received permission to lead a hundred people on pilgrimage to the holy places, Ibid., pp.239-240.
if compensation was denied. As a result of these far-flung interests John was among the most cosmopolitan men of his day, for although he was always known in the west as 'miles Constantinopolitanus', he was also granted citizenship of both Venice and Genoa.

With this international background John Laskaris Kalophерos formed a permanent contact between the Greek and Latin worlds. But his contribution went deeper than his powerful connections since, as a confirmed unionist, he was able to play a unique role as a direct personal link between Byzantium and the Roman Curia. On 18 April 1365 Urban V wrote a very conciliatory letter to John V, in which he expressed great hopes for the reunion of the Churches and for the salvation of the empire from the Turks. With this in mind Urban made the unusual offer of forming a naval league to aid Byzantium without insisting that union be achieved beforehand. He said that positive action was only waiting for an end to the hostilities between Genoa and Cyprus and he added an invitation for John V to visit him.

This sudden thaw in the pope's attitude towards Byzantium

---

1. A. Rubio y Lluch, Diplomatari de l'Orient Català 1301-1402, (Barcelona 1947), pp.590-591. Reprinted by A. Eszer, Johannes Laskaris Kalophерos, pp.135-136. 'Johannes Lascaris hom assats notable e assimyalat en lo dit lech de Modo, e es conte de les illes de Jazant et de Sephalonia en les quals illes molts mercaders catalans e altres de vostra senyoria convenen ab lurs robes e mercaderies e han aquí pendre port de necessitat, e si satisfacció no s'ahia de la dita seda, es dubte que ls dits mercaders no fossem damnpificats'.


3. Gregory XI mentions Kalophерos' interest 'pro magnis et archis negotiis Ecclesiam Romanam ac incrementum fidei orthodoxae ac partes orientales concernantibus'. Täntu 12, 149.

4. Täntu 11, 122-123.
was entirely the work of John Laskaris Kalopheros who had
visited Avignon in the hope that Urban V would intercede
with the emperor on his behalf to end his exile. In the
letter which Urban wrote to John V to assure him of John's
loyalty he made it clear that Kalopheros had informed him
about the state of the empire and had given him news which
made him regard Byzantium more favourably\(^1\). The news which
Urban would have been most interested to hear was of the con-
version of Maximos Laskaris Kalopheros, Demetrios Kydones
and Manuel Angelos, to whom he wrote letters of congratula-
tion\(^2\).

John's second contribution to the cause of union was
made in 1373, when Gregory XI was convinced of the need
for positive action against the Turks, but was unable to
decide which of the possible plans would be most effective.
In this situation the arrival of a man who knew the local
situation well was a great help. The decision to set up a
sea-based international league which would draw small con-
tingents from the powers most closely concerned with the
Turkish problem, required an international man of affairs
as a co-ordinator. Gregory employed John Laskaris Kalo-
pheros as an ambassador to those whose help he required,
sending him to France, Naples, Genoa, Hungary and Rhodes.
Although this plan failed, Gregory made a final gesture of
confidence in Kalopheros, suggesting that formal union nego-
tiations should once again be undertaken and that the Roman
Church should be represented by the most eminent of its
converts from the east, Demetrios Kydones and John Laskaris
Kalopheros.\(^3\)

\(^1\) *Ibid*, pp. 123-124. 'Iohannes *... nobis multa quae tuum
et imperii tui honores et statum prosperum dinoascuntur
contigere, fideliter persuasit'.

catives no. 3.

XI described Kalopheros as 'animosus plurimum contra
Turcos eosdem et de bulgaeodi versuibus et confectionibus
ac negotios illarum parciam informatus et alias vir
intelligentes ac circumspectus'. Halecki, *op. cit.* p.278, n.1
v) Anne of Savoy

The personal links between east and west were not restricted to Greeks resident in the west; Byantium also had its share of Latin immigrants who settled in the empire and were a constant reminder that the two sides of Christendom were not totally irreconcilable. The most prominent of these figures during John V's reign was his mother Anne of Savoy, who was Andronikos III's second western wife.

Anne's departure from the west had raised some hopes that, by her influence, Andronikos III might be persuaded more readily to join the Roman Church himself. Benedict XII, however, had doubts about the wisdom of mixed marriages, and feared that it was much more likely that the husband would convert his wife to his rite. In an attempt to reduce the impact of her Greek surroundings, Anne was accompanied at her wedding by a large retinue of Savoyards, both men and women. Although most of them returned home after the festivities, some remained, notably a woman called Zampea (Isabella) who stayed with her sons and distinguished herself by her wisdom and education. Also several Savoyard nobles elected to stay and serve the emperor and introduced the court to jousting and tournaments. When these men had to leave for home replacements came from Savoy and 'there were nearly always some Savoyards with the young emperor'. The effectiveness of this retinue in keeping Anne enclosed in a Latin world could not be very great or lasting. A

3. Kantak. 1, 42: 1, 205; ἐμείληκαν δὲ μετ' αὐτῆς ὅλγυν τινὲς καὶ ζωητέα μία τῶν γυναικῶν ἐμὶ τοῖς ὕιεῖ, φρονήσει τε ὑπερέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας καὶ βασιλικὸς ὀνόμας διὰ τε παιδείαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιτηδειότητα πρέπουσα ἐνδιατρίβειν!

The Savoyards introduced τὴν τροποδοτού καὶ τὰ τερμέμεντα!
Dominican writer who visited the empire shortly after Anne's arrival, reported that she had been made to send away all her servants, nurses, counsellors and spiritual advisers including four Franciscans, and had become 'faithless Greek'.

Thus Benedict XII's fears were realised.

Anne's conversion to the eastern Church cannot be doubted despite the persistent story that she entered a Franciscan nunnery and left instructions in her will that she was to be buried in Assisi. Anne certainly became a nun, but in the Byzantine rite. The Synodicon of Orthodoxy records that she took the veil and the name of Anastasia, a fact which would not have been mentioned had Anne become a Franciscan nun.

Furthermore Anne played a full part in the affairs of the Byzantine Church, although in the early years of her regency she allowed the Patriarch Kalekas to manipulate the religious situation as part of his political campaign against John Kantakouzenos. To this end he secured the imprisonment of the hesychast leader, Gregory Palamas, on a warrant signed by Anne. But Palamas was convinced that Anne was basically on his side and insisted that his politically motivated arrest did not reflect Anne's true convictions.

There is some evidence to support Palamas' contention. Anne refused to recognise the ordination of Akindynos on the grounds that he was a formally condemned heretic, despite the fact that Kalekas had performed the ceremony; furthermore she authorised Akindynos's ejection from sanctuary. In 1346, with the political tide running against

1. Pas-Brocardus, Directorium ad passagium faciendum, Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents armeniens, p.424. Also Guillelmus Adam, De modo Sarracenos extirpandi, ibid, p.547. 'Graeca perfida est effecta'.
2. G. Golubovich, Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra


'Αυνή, τῆς ἐν ἑυσέβει τῇ μνήμῃ γενομένη δώδιμου δεσποτίνας ἡμῶν, τῆς διὰ τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετανοησθείσης Ἀναστάσις μοναχώς.'
her, Anne looked beyond the political intrigues of Kalekas and made an attempt to understand hesychasm. She received the Dogmatical Treatises from Philotheos Kokkinos on Mount Athos in defence of Gregory Palamas' teachings. She asked Kalekas to write a book setting out his side of the controversy and then arranged for Palamas to compose a reply. Finally, at Anne's request, David Dishypatos composed a history of the dispute between Barlaam and Palamas to explain the role played by Akindynos.

Although Anne was fully converted to the Byzantine Church, she did not wholly lose sight of her western background or of her potential influence in unifying east and west. Despite the reduction in her western retinue, Savoyards continued to appear in the empire as men of importance and influence. The superior of the Franciscan house in Pera, Aregos, known as Henry in the west, came from Savoy, and Philippe de Saint Germain, who had formed part of the entourage in Constantinople, was sent as an ambassador to Clement VI in 1343.

As a unionist Anne did less than might perhaps have been expected of her. Benedict XII wrote to her on 17 January 1337 to ask her to encourage her husband along the road of union, but although Andronikos III briefly showed signs of interest in the western Church there is no evidence that it was as a result of wifely pressure. Anne's embassy to Clement VI was the only direct contact she had with the

Roman Church which cannot have set much store by her insecure position as regent\(^1\). Her influence directly on John V cannot properly be gauged, but it is significant that he looked so immediately and consistently to the west after his accession. Finally the link established by Anne of Savoy's marriage made Amadeo a cousin of John V. This family relationship was very important in drawing Amadeo's crusade to the help of Byzantium and in encouraging John V to visit Rome\(^2\).

vi) **Francesco Gattilusio\(^3\)**

Francesco Gattilusio was a Genoese who like Anne of Savoy, though from more humble beginnings, married into the imperial family and together with his son remained a permanent western influence at the centre of Byzantine political life throughout John V's reign. His marriage to John V's sister Maria was a reward for the help which he gave John in entering Constantinople in 1354, and as a dowry he received the island of Lesbos. This action was not seen as the granting of political independence to Lesbos under Genoese lordship, but as the creation of a separate appanage within the empire for a member of the imperial family.

2. Amadeo was also related to John V through his mother Violante of Montferrat who was a member of the cadet line of the Palaeologoi through Andronikos II's second marriage. See D. Muratore, *Una principessa Sabauda*, genealogical table. In the union negotiations of 1367, Amadeo appealed directly to John V's sense of family responsibility, *'lai este melencolieux considerer que ma mere partit de vous et vostre mere est partie de nous, les contes de Savoye'.* J. Servien, *Gestez et croniques de la mayson de Savoye*, ed. F.E. Bollati, *Bibliothèque de la maison de Savoie*, 1-2, (Turin 1879), p.151.
To a certain extent this position was maintained in reality as well as in theory. Although the practical administration of the island was henceforth no longer in the hands of the central Byzantine government, Gattilusio played the part of brother-in-law to the emperor very dutifully. In 1355 he was one of the advisers who encouraged John V to make his approach to the papacy about church reunion, for which he received a letter of thanks from Innocent VI. John's proposals had a more distinctly 'western' character on this occasion than on any other, incorporating such concepts as the use of force, the rapid acquiescence of the whole empire in the face of the emperor's example and western arms, and indeed the acceptance of the basic Roman tenet that union should be seen as a matter of the return of the eastern church to the purity of the faith through conversion. The part played by Francesco Gattilusio and Paul Bishop of Smyrna certainly contributed to the character of John's initiative.

Gattilusio next appeared on the Byzantine scene in 1366 when he assisted Amadeo of Savoy's crusade in its attack on the Turkish held town of Gallipoli. He played a large part in both the planning and the attack and, after the town had been taken, he accompanied Amadeo to Bulgaria in order to obtain leave for John V to return home from Hungary across Bulgarian territory. Francesco Gattilusio seems to have been the only member of the imperial family to have participated actively in the effort to rescue the emperor from his embarrassing position and bring him safely to Constantinople.

1. Ta'atu 10, 173.
2. A. Theiner and F. Miklosich, Monumenta spectantia ad unionem Ecclesiarum Graecae et Romanae pp.29-33 (Greek), 33-37 (Latin). See above, pp.31-34.
After the emperor's return to Byzantium the important religious negotiations, which were to result in his visit to Rome in 1369, were undertaken. Although Francesco's name does not appear in the records as a central participant in the discussions which took place, he received a letter from Urban V, dated 6 November 1367, praising him for his 'faithful advice and efficacious aid' in the business of reconciling the Greeks with the Roman Church. In addition, when John visited Rome to make his submission to Urban V, Francesco Gattilusio formed a part of his retinue and was one of the four Greek-speaking members of the Roman Church who witnessed the profession of faith on behalf of the Byzantine contingent.

The relations between Gattilusio and John V were not always good. After their return from Italy in 1371 John V, disillusioned by the lack of solid support which the west was prepared or capable of offering, and convinced of the invincibility of the Turks after their crushing victory over the Serbs on the Maritza river, gradually abandoned his westward-looking policy in favour of throwing in his lot with the Turks. Those who had consistently supported his policy of western alliance were alienated from the emperor and among them were Demetrios Kydones and Gattilusio. John V was sufficiently alarmed by their opposition to prevent them meeting on Lesbos.

However, this antagonism did not last. It is significant that in the Chioggia War, in which Gattilusio's Genoese sympathies would have caused him to support the revolt of Andronikos IV, he is instead found supporting the Venetians.

1. Täutu 11, 211.
2. Ibid., 239. See above, p. 85.
who were allied to John V. An agent of Gattilusio, Raffaele de Quarto, stirred up the Venetian inhabitants of the island of Tenedos against ceding the island on the terms of the treaty of Turin, saying that if the Genoese could gain power in Tenedos they would force the Venetian colonists to emigrate or turn into Jews.

Perhaps the most important contribution made by Francesco Gattilusio to the development of mutual understanding between east and west, was to give a practical demonstration of the possibility of coexistence on the island of Lesbos. He learned Greek and showed great tolerance of the customs and religious habits of his Byzantine subjects. Throughout his rule the Roman archbishop functioned side by side with the Byzantine metropolitan. It was through such attitudes and in such an atmosphere that the barriers between Latins and Greeks could be broken down, and the sharp divisions, which for the most part the official contacts only tended to emphasise, could be blunted by individual personal knowledge and respect.

---

D. The effects of the contacts between east and west.

In the preceding pages a number of factors have been examined whose influence tended in one way or another to strengthen the links between east and west by increasing their consciousness and knowledge of each other and, in the process, gaining a greater understanding of themselves, their prejudices and their misapprehensions. However, it remains to be seen to what extent these factors succeeded in influencing the thoughts and actions of Byzantines and Latins and whether there was a perceptible growing together as a result of these contacts. In order to narrow the horizons of this investigation, this study will concentrate on four of the most eminent figures of Byzantine intellectual and religious society in the reign of John V, representing two families and two distinct attitudes towards the west and the part it could play in Byzantine life. They are the brothers Demetrios and Prochoros Kydones on the one hand, and Neilos Kabasilas and his nephew Nicholas on the other.

These two pairs had much in common; most significantly they all came from Thessalonica, a fact which contributed to the similarities in their educational and political backgrounds and brought them into close friendly contact with each other. Both the Kydones and the Kabasilas families had noble antecedents and good connections, but suffered in common during the period of Zealot rule in Thessalonica between 1341 and 1346\. Both families gave political support to John Kantakouzenos, who became a personal friend of both Demetrios and Nicholas in whose company he once

---

contemplated entering monastic life.

Educationally and intellectually they shared a common background, indeed Neilos Kabasilas acted as master to both Demetrios and Nicholas in Thessalonica, and they all show a profound knowledge of the 'profane wisdom' of the Greek classics which they employed freely in their writings. In the religious sphere they had all been exposed to the same influences when young. Neilos and Nicholas Kabasilas were firm adherents of Gregory Palamas and the two Kydones were also well acquainted with hesychasm which had strong associations with Thessalonica. Demetrios had as his early spiritual director the future patriarch Isidore Boucheiras, a disciple of Palamas, and Prochoros spent his adult life as a monk on Mount Athos, a stronghold of hesychasm. The two families were equally divided between monastic and secular life; Demetrios was a layman, as was Nicholas for most of his life; Prochoros and Neilos were monks. Despite these many similarities, however, there were deep differences between the two families, particularly in their receptiveness to the western influences which were at work in Byzantium during their lives.

1. For the friendship of Demetrios, Nicholas and John, see Kantak. iv, 16:111, 107. For the friendship of Demetrios and Neilos, Kydones, Apologia, Notizie, p.391, lines 11-12, 'he was so attached to me that it surpassed the classic friendships'. Kydones, Correspondance, letter 37 invites Nicholas to share the fruits of Kantakouzenos' victory, for which he had suffered.

2. On Thessalonica as a centre of philosophers, writers and orators see Kydones, Occisorum Thessalonicae Monodia, M.P.G., 109, 644b.


Demetrios had an adelphaton in the monastery of St. George in Mangana, R.J. Loenertz, 'Démétrius Cydonès II', O.C.P., 37, (1971), 7. He was also a canon of the Roman Church in Patras, Τάτου 11, 316-318.
1) **Demetrios Kydones**

Demetrios Kydones was undoubtedly most unrepresentative of Byzantine society in the later fourteenth century in his enthusiasm for promoting the growth and dissemination of western influences in the empire. However, he illustrates how far it was possible for a prominent Byzantine to go in accepting western concepts and beliefs.

On a personal level the most important and evident sign of Demetrios' acceptance of western influence was his conversion to the Roman Church. To understand the nature and the cause of this development it is necessary to establish, as nearly as is possible, the date which it happened. The only certain fact is that Demetrios was a member of the Roman Church by April 1365 when Urban V, having been informed of the fact by John Laskaris Kalopheros, wrote to congratulate and encourage him. However, the evidence of two other western sources suggests that Demetrios' conversion should be dated rather earlier. Philip Incontri, describing the discovery and translation of the acts of the anti-Photian council in 1355 or 1356, stressed the part played 'by a certain faithful Greek called Demetrios Kydones, who had been converted to the faith'. Confirmation that Demetrios was converted before embarking on his translations, is provided by another Dominican, Bishop John of Sultanayeh who, writing in 1404 about the difficulties faced by Greek converts to Rome, mentioned 'several nobles and monks who were converted by one of our Spanish brothers. Among them was a learned man

who was like another Chrysostom, and who after being converted with many others to the catholic faith, learned the Latin tongue and grammar and translated the books of St. Thomas against the Gentiles. This passage suggests that Demetrios was converted before 1354 when his translation of the Summa contra Gentiles was completed.

Demetrios' own account of his conversion suggests that it happened after the translation of the Summa contra Gentiles and was preceded by a long religious crisis during which he attempted to resolve his spiritual difficulties by questioning all the people and reading all the books which might be of any help to him. These factors have led most writers to date Demetrios' conversion in the early 1360's. Two points, however, must be considered. Demetrios' long description of his conscientious yet fruitless exposure to the repetitive arguments of his opponents living and dead may have been exaggerated to make his decision to join the Roman Church seem more lengthily considered than in fact it was. Similarly his letter to Neilos Kabasilas, attributed to the period of his 'spiritual crisis', and dated by its editor between 1355 and 1361, in which he begs Neilos to share with him any information which would help him resist the charms of the Latin dogmas, has a distinctly ironical air in the extravagance of its language and of its sentiments towards Neilos.

---

2. Kydones. Apologia, Notizie, p. 386 lines 49-52, 'Thus armed I tackled the task of reading everything that had been written during the five hundred years or so that the schism had lasted'. p. 390 lines 52-53, 'When I had no more hope of finding out anything from books... I want to sit at the gates of the wise men, like a lovesick man at his girl's door'.
3. D. Kydones. Correspondance, ed. R. J. Loezert, letter 378 lines 4-11, 'If someone... staggers those who read him by his knowledge and subdues those who approach him by (contd.)
Demetrios' conversion could well have been accomplished by the time the letter was written.

The fact which emerges clearly from all the accounts of Demetrios's conversion, both his own and the western versions, is that it was an intellectual conversion, closely connected with his relations with the Dominicans and his translations of Thomas Aquinas. From the moment that Demetrios began to read Aquinas and experienced 'the flights of his thought and the forcefulness of his arguments' he was as good as converted. The translations began, Kydones' house became a meeting place for westerners, especially the Dominicans, and it is hard to believe that this period about 1354 does not mark the turning point in Demetrios' conversion.

The impact made upon Demetrios Kydones by Aquinas and the Dominicans not only resulted in his conversion to the Roman faith, but also is visible in much of his later writing. His concentration on Aquinas is expressed everywhere, in the identification of the Dominicans with the person of Thomas, and in the feeling that his writings formed the essence of Latin theology. Furthermore Kydones regarded himself as Aquinas's personal champion and, having introduced him into the Byzantine world, he felt responsible for his fate. Thus in his defence of Thomas Aquinas against Neilos Kabasilas, Demetrios wrote that he was prepared to stay silent while Neilos attacked the Latins generally, but once

his virtue, I call him ... a divine man ... I am convinced that you are one such, I love you like myself...

1. Το τον εννοειν μεταφα και τη τον συλλογικην αναγγή.

2. Οι δι και και πιεοι ευοι συλλογει την οικειαν εκκλησον, και μάλισθ' οοι ταρ' αυτοις της εκτρεπεις ησαν θωμα.

3. Ibid., p. 364 lines 53-54.

he turned against Thomas he felt bound to reply. In the course of this reply Demetrius closely identifies himself with Aquinas, referring to him as 'our Thomas' and to his enemies as 'our opponents'. He compares Thomas and Neilos to the disadvantage of the latter, but claiming both as his friends; however, 'Thomas without doubt surpassed the other... and what is more he had sanctity, a thing so great that even in the absence of knowledge it should cause us to associate with him who possesses it'. Throughout this work Kydones pays tribute to the excellence of Aquinas who 'by his wisdom, virtue and study of holy scripture eclipses not only our men but also many of those who formerly were eminent in theology'. He protests that Aquinas is not in need of a defender since it was 'a fruitless enterprise even to try to support the strength, majesty and holiness of his words with such weak and petty arguments' and he concludes that 'Thomas's works will remain for ever and ever and will be an example of his wisdom and
virtue to future generations, since they have been fortified on all sides by theology and philosophy.'

Kydones' most fulsome praise of Thomas Aquinas appears in a letter to Maximos Chrysoboges, which is of particular interest because it helps to explain the attraction of Aquinas to Demetrios and many other Byzantines.

For it is undeniable that an abundant treasure will be found in this man. Of all the difficulties which our holy dogmas might present, you will not find one which has not been directly resolved in his writings or which might not be cleared up by the questions and answers which he proposes elsewhere. It is that, one could say without fear of mistake, which gives his works their special character. Having placed on the lips of imaginary adversaries the objections which might be made to his thesis, he resolves them, not in a sloppy manner but in a way which discourages all insistence. He solidly establishes the truth which he is examining by all sorts of arguments, going first to the holy scriptures, which hold first place in his writings, then appealing to the rigorous deductions of philosophical reasoning, with the result that our faith is fortified by all possible proofs. He is the first to have used this teaching method, to my knowledge. According to the professional dialecticians, this is in fact the perfection of the science; add to the proofs which establish the thesis, the objections which tend to oppose it and show that they are without force, in such a way that no difficulty remains to sneak up on the unwary like a robber, able to snatch the truth which we thought we held away from us, and to deprive us of our treasure.

For Demetrios and other Greeks of his generation the particular merit of scholastic theology was its certainty, its refusal to admit more than one answer, and the seemingly

inevitable progression from problem to solution carrying the reader rigorously through every step. In a society which lacked any form of certainty and in which constant political retreat had undermined traditional explanations and beliefs, such a clear cut and lucid system had an immediate appeal. In Byzantium therefore there was fertile soil and it was possible for such sentiments as expressed by Demetrios to flourish in a way not found in the west until the supremacy of Thomas Aquinas was established among the theologians of the Roman Church in the late nineteenth century.

An associated theme which runs through much of Demetrios Kydones' writing is a profound admiration for Rome, the pope and the curia. Rome is praised not only as the proper residence of the papal curia but also as the source of empire. Demetrios continually reminds his readers of the principle of translatio imperii, but unlike most of his contemporaries who saw in the theory the ultimate proof of Constantinople's superiority to Rome, Kydones insisted that because the seat of empire had been transferred to the Byzantines from Rome, they should honour the old Rome for providing them with their name, institutions, titles and empire.

However, it was as the home of the curia that Rome held a special place in Demetrios' esteem. Despite his disappointment at the failure of his mission there with John V in 1369,

1. The theme appears in Kydones, Apologia, Notizie, p. 372 lines 80-86 'Αλλά καὶ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας οὖς ἐκεῖθεν ἤκειν ὡμ. ... παρ' ἃς καὶ βασιλείαν καὶ βουλὴν καὶ τὴν μεγάλην ἐκψυψίαν ἔδεξατο'. The relationship is like 'οἱ ἀποκτείνα ταῦτα μητροπόλεσιν'.

Kydones, Sybouleutikos, Romaiois, M.P.G. 154, 977d-980a. 'Ἡ γὰρ ἐκείνων πόλις τὴν ημερέας μητροπόλεις ἔγενε'.

he clearly enjoyed being a centre of attraction at the curia, sought out by wise men from all parts who congregated there and who 'enjoyed listening to him even more than they enjoyed speaking to him'. Although he told his brother in a letter that the pressure of business had prevented him from making friends with any of these men, he added:

nobody who is anybody here is completely unaware of me; the greatest of them and those who command the others know me, like me and invite me to their homes .... Everyone enjoys meeting me, they consider it profitable to hear me speak and they are annoyed when they hear me speak of returning home; they attempt to keep me even by force and promise me Rome and their company in exchange for my friends and my country. And he who is their chief and leader in everything believes that my presence will be very useful in his affairs and he honours me and gives me audiences today and promises me others if I remain a little longer1.

Among the honours given to Demetrios by Urban V was his appointment as a canon of Patras on 9 March 13702, and among the eminent philosophers and theologians with whom he became acquainted at the curia were Agapetus Colonna, bishop of Brescia and later a cardinal, and Pierre Roger of Beaufort, a cardinal, nephew of Clement VI and the future Pope Gregory XI3. In his Address to John V, written shortly after their return to Constantinople in 1371, Kydones suggested that he should be a permanent representative of the emperor at the curia of Gregory XI who might be better disposed towards John if his letters were delivered by his hand4.

2. Tutto 11, 316-318.
3. 'Τὸν γεννηθέν Αγαπητόν... τὸτε εἴδον ἐν Ῥώμῃ' D. Kydones, Correspondance, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, letter 190 line 61. 'Φιλος ἡμι καὶ πρότερον δύναμις' (Gregory XI) Ibid. letter 154 line 46. Also see Kydones, Ad Ioannem Palaeologum Oratio, ibid. I, p.22 lines 34-35.
4. 'Ἀλλὰ καὶ δ' Πάπας σοι χάριν εἴσεται... μάλιστα οὖν καὶ δι' ἐμοῦ τὰ γράμματα δέχηται' D. Kydones, Ad Ioannem Palaeologum Oratio, p.23 lines 2-4. On 18 March 1375 Gregory XI (contd.)
Gregory showed that Kydones was not misrepresenting the closeness of their relationship by suggesting that Demetrios should represent the Roman Church together with John Laskaris Kalopheros in fresh religious negotiations between Constantinople and Rome.

Demetrios Kydones was one of the very few converts who managed to remain sufficiently dispassionate to be of direct use to the cause of Church reunion. He was proud to remain a Byzantine despite his admiration for the west saying 'as I see it, after God, the fatherland is the thing most worthy of honour and the most holy and I set it before everything else as the origin and homeland of myself and all I have.... Even in misfortune I would rather live in my own country than enjoy great honours abroad." He remained at his official post until the policy of rapprochement with the Turks and the emperor's lack of confidence in him forced him to resign, and both in and out of office he continually advocated a policy of alliance with the west and worked personally for Church reunion on both official and individual levels. His letters to George the Philosopher, Maximos Laskaris Kalopheros and Maximos Chrysoberges demonstrate his lasting concern in the religious affairs of his friends.

suggested to Demetrios that he should act as resident ambassador for the empire at the curia, where his presence 'poterit esse catholice fidelis multiplicitcr fructuosa'. Letter published by G. Mercati, Simone Atumano, Studi e Testi, 30, (1915), 57 n.1. Kydones mentions Gregory's invitations in letter 154 lines 44-53 and letter 226 lines 174 ff.

1. Taktu 12, 150.
Although in the political sphere the west was a disappointment to Demetrios Kydones, his admiration for its church remained unaffected. Demetrios tried hard to communicate this admiration to his fellow Byzantines and through his work provided them with the materials necessary for a better understanding of the Latins. Largely as a result of his efforts the Dominicans had been brought into the centre of Byzantine life and he himself had crowned their work with his translations of Thomas Aquinas. The extent to which the Byzantines took advantage of the groundwork done by Demetrios will presently be considered.

ii) Prochoros Kydones

Prochoros Kydones, Demetrios's younger brother, was born about 1330 and entered monastic life while he was still very young. Apart from a short break when he visited his brother, he remained at the Great Lavra on Mount Athos until his death about 1368 or 1369. It is an unexpected place to find a man who devoted most of his energies to the translation into Greek of Latin works of scholastic theology and who in his secondary writing showed how entirely he had absorbed the material which he had translated. Prochoros may even have become a member of the Roman Church, for although there is no explicit evidence of the fact, the example of his brother and his consistent acceptance of western theological precepts and techniques suggest that he cannot have been far from an open conversion.

Inevitably this situation led to conflict between Prochoros and his colleagues on Mount Athos, but he was relatively

---

1. According to Gennadios Scholarios, Demetrios abandoned the Roman faith just before he died. This possibility is examined and dismissed by G. Mercati, Notizie, pp. 441-450. See also S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek Translations, p. 34.
2. For his career, see especially G. Mercati, Notizie, pp. 1-61.
3. M. Candal, 'El libro VI de Prócoro Cidonio (obra la luza tabórica)', C.C.P., 20, (1954), 257, claims to find 'prueba explicita' of Prochoros' conversion in a passage from his De essentia et operatione.

---
safe from official action against him while Patriarch Kallistos was alive and Demetrios held high imperial office. After Philotheos Koickinos succeeded Kallistos in 1364, Prochoros's survival depended on the influence of his brother, who had played a major part in persuading John V to accept Philotheos as patriarch, and of John V himself, who in appointing Philotheos had specifically forbidden him to take measures against his anti-hesychast opponents. This protection worked well enough until 1365 when the emperor and Demetrios left the empire to visit King Louis of Hungary in Buda. Philotheos took the opportunity presented by their absence to allow proceedings to begin against Prochoros who was expelled from Mount Athos by the igoumenos of the Lavra, James Trikanas. Despite painful protests from Demetrios, official investigations followed which culminated in April 1368 in the condemnation and excommunication of Prochoros by a synod which also canonised Gregory Palamas. Very soon afterwards Prochoros died, having made no recantation and leaving his brother to continue writing in his defence.

During his life on Mount Athos, Prochoros was a prolific translator. How he managed to learn the Latin in order to do this is not known, for while it was not difficult to find a teacher in Constantinople or Pera, it is unlikely that Mount Athos contained anybody suitably proficient in the language or books from which to learn. However, the success of his linguistic studies is undeniable. He translated from a wide range of authors, concentrating on St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but adding single works of Hervaeus Natalis.


(Contd. from p.187 n.3) 'τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐκχόντων, τὴν τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως δόξαν περὶ τούτων ἐκθέσθαι κελεύομεθα, καθ' ὅσον ἐν οἷον τε καὶ ὁ θεός χαράσσεται', p.276, lines 25-28. But this single reference to the Roman Church as 'catholic' is not compelling proof. See Mercati, Notizie, p.2 n.4.
Boethius and St. Jerome. The choice of works betrays the same Dominican source as used by Demetrius.

The significance of Prochoros, however, does not lie in his translations alone, but also in the use he made of western works, especially Aquinas, in his secondary writing. His major work, called Περί οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας or De essentia et operatione Dei, which was formerly attributed to Gregory Akindynos, consists largely of extracts from the Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. These passages were not taken from the translations of Demetrius but were new versions prepared by Prochoros himself, without any mention of the original author.

In this way the ideas of Thomas Aquinas were introduced to a Byzantine audience which was unaware of their western origin. Although the members of the synod which condemned Prochoros in 1368 had read the De essentia et operatione Dei, it is not clear whether they knew of its dependence on Aquinas.

The title of the work is not specifically mentioned in the Tomos of condemnation, but certain of its chapters were cited for rejection on the grounds that they were the product not of holy scripture, nor of the saints but were derived from Aristotelian syllogisms. These chapters were all taken from the Summa contra Gentiles. The synod did not recognize the source, but it knew that Prochoros posed a rather different and more developed threat to the eastern Church than that of earlier western orientated writers. Although the Tomos con-

3. M.P.G. 151, 705d.
deemed Prochoros for his adherence to the beliefs of Barlaam and Akindynos, which was the customary formula used in the refutation of Latin tendencies, it repeatedly emphasised that Prochoros had amplified their thoughts so that they were 'far worse, more absurd and more impossible to respect'. Thus the condemnation of Prochoros must also be seen as an implicit condemnation of the thoughts and writings of Aquinas. This is emphasised by the fact that John Kantakouzenos, who was certainly acquainted with the Greek translations of Aquinas, was sufficiently disturbed by Prochoros's work to write a refutation of it and so endanger his friendship with Demetrios. Despite these attacks the career of Prochoros Kydones not only resulted in a large amount of basic western source material becoming available to Greek readers, but also marked a new stage in the assimilation of that material into Byzantine theological writing.

iii) Neilos Kabasilas

Demetrios Kydones concluded his description of the making and dissemination of his translations of the works of Thomas Aquinas with the claim that 'now Thomas's book against the Gentiles is in many hands, praise is heaped upon the author and much profit is derived from it by the readers'.

1. 'Πολλά χείρω καὶ άτοποτέρα καὶ δυσμενήστερα', M.P.G.151. 714a, 698a. S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.136. The title of the condemnation έφημος συνοδικός κατά Προχόρου εργονομαχού του Κυδώνα, του φρονήσαντος τά Βαρλαμ καὶ Ακτινου'.


3. Kydones Apologia, Notizie, p.303 lines 27-29 Καὶ νῦν ἐστίν ἐν πολλαῖς χειροῖς τοῦ Θωμᾶ καθ' Ἑλληνῶν βιβλίων, ἐπαινοῦν μὲν θέρου τῷ συγγραφεῖ, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ τὸς χρωμένος ωφέλειαν ἔχουν'.


very hard to estimate the truth of this statement and to decide whether a significant number of people actually did read Aquinas once he was available in Greek, and if so whether what they read had much impact upon them. Furthermore it is questionable whether this readership spread far beyond a close circle of converts or sympathisers with the Roman Church to those whose loyalty to the Byzantine Church was never in doubt.

One of the individuals in the light of whom these questions may be most satisfactorily considered is Neilos Kabasilas, simply because our information about him and his attitudes is particularly full. Unfortunately however, much of the evidence about Neilos's attitude towards Thomas Aquinas and western theology is found in the works of Demetrios Kydones, who cannot be considered a disinterested commentator. Therefore we must compare what he has to say about Neilos with what can be gleaned from Neilos's own career and writings.

According to Demetrios's testimony, Neilos had used his translations of Aquinas and had 'gained much wisdom and theology from them'; he became a 'confirmed admirer of Thomas's books' and was certain that no other thinker approached him in depth of thought. When he was with Kydones in private, Neilos praised the theology of Thomas, calling him 'a holy man and the most useful of any of the doctors of the Church'. Furthermore, when Demetrios asked Neilos for his help in resolving his

---

1. "Ἐγὼ τε γὰρ πρώτερος τῶν θωμᾶ λόγων ἀπήλαµα, καὶ οὗτος (Νείλος) φέρετρον ἔμοι χρησάμενος ἔκρυμενε οὐκ ὀλίγα τῆς ἑκείνου σοφίας καὶ ἥθελον παρέστασέ".

2. Kydones Apologia, Notizie, p.391, lines.23-29, 'τὸν γὰρ τοῦ θωμᾶ βιβλίων μακικούς ἐραστής καὶ τῶν ἑκείνου λόγων ἐφησίζετο πολλά τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων διδασκάλων ἴττασθαι'.

spiritual difficulties, he found that Neilos was in the same state of doubt himself and was unable to be sure of the truth. He quoted a number of syllogisms which referred to the views of both sides, and the contradictions arising from them which similarly were valid for both sides ... He was in just the same position as I was\textsuperscript{1}.

Apart from the intrinsic likelihood that two men whose educational careers had been so interwoven should have shared similar views on the most striking intellectual novelty of their time, there is no obvious indication in any other source to suggest that Neilos found himself in the same condition as Kydones regarding Aquinas and western theology. The impression gained from Neilos himself is very much the opposite. The mere titles of some of his writings illustrate the point. The last part of his very substantial work Against the Latins, about the procession of the Holy Spirit, bears the title the Latins cannot demonstrate by the use of syllogisms that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son\textsuperscript{2}. Then there is a Homily against the Latins and a major work directed against the papacy in two parts, the first called About the papal primacy, the other with a long descriptive title which may be summarised as That the schism is the pope's fault for not calling an ecumenical council\textsuperscript{3}. There are also a number of hesychast works which attack all those who do not share the views of Gregory Palamas.

In the course of his work on the procession of the Holy Spirit Neilos Kabasilas repeatedly condemns and refutes the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Kydones Apologia, Notizie, p. 291 lines 24-27.
\item The last part is published by M. Candal, Nilus Cabasilas et theologica S. Thomas de processione Spiritus Sancti, Studi e Testi, 116, (Rome 1945), pp. 138-334.
\item The anti-papal works are published M.P.C.149, 700-730 and 634-700.
\end{enumerate}
thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. These criticisms are sufficient to show the extent of Neilos's acquaintance with the works of Aquinas. References to the *Summa contra Gentiles* appear most often; in the last section of the work it is cited thirty-five times, often with precise references to the correct chapter and book and occasionally quoted at length. The *Summa theologiae* is mentioned four times, all the references being taken from Part One. There is also a single citation of the *De rationibus fidei... ad cantronem Antiochenum*. In addition Kabasilas attributes to Aquinas a quotation which is not to be found among his works; this was a point which Kydones quickly seized upon in his refutation of Neilos's book, but it is his only error of this kind and seems to spring from a genuine misunderstanding. Neilos Kabasilas thus demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the works of Thomas Aquinas which were available to him, and also was clearly well acquainted with Latin theology generally, for in the forty nine chapters of the last section of his work on the procession of the Holy Spirit he deals with the whole range of Latin Trinitarian doctrine with an accuracy and comprehensiveness which no Byzantine writer before him had been able to achieve.

One of the most striking indications of the degree to which Neilos had absorbed Aquinas's work is found in the organisation and structure which he gave to that part of his work in which he attempted to refute the Thomist doctrines. He adopted a rigorously systematic approach which is almost a parody of Aquinas's own style. His thesis is that divine

---


2. Ibid., pp.63-69.
matter cannot be demonstrated, which he proceeds to illustrate in separate sections showing how this fact is made clear first of all by holy scripture, then by patristic tradition, citing Dionysios the Areopagite, St. Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom. He then attempts to show that 'even Thomas himself' at times said things incompatible with the demonstrative method in admitting, as in Summa contra Gentiles I,3, that some divine things are beyond human reason. In this way Neilos made Aquinas's words work against himself. In his fourth section Kabasilas produces his evidence to show that even reason itself cannot allow the demonstration of divine mysteries. Then he introduces and refutes seven objections to his case which the Latins make and finally, in the longest section of the work, he cites fifteen passages from Aquinas giving lengthy, accurate quotations and then refutes them one by one. In this section he makes Aquinas speak for the Latins generally in the same way as Kydones makes him do. Kabasilas is here following the technique which Kydones, in his letter to Maximos Chrysoberges, praised as 'the special character' of Aquinas's works: 'having placed on the lips of imaginary adversaries the objections which might be made to his thesis, he resolves them .... by all sorts of arguments, going first to the holy scriptures .... then appealing to the rigorous deductions of philosophical reasoning'. However, Demetrios found such methods less commendable in Neilos than in Thomas, and derided the work for attempting to conceal the inadequacies of its contents with 'altered presentation and unexpected style'.
This close acquaintance which Neilos shows of the form and content of Thomist theology suggests that Kydones' claim that Kabasilas was once an 'ardent admirer' of Aquinas's works may have been true. If so, however, it is not clear why Neilos should so utterly and so quickly have changed from admiration to refutation. What clues there are come from Demetrios' own works. He says that Neilos, while supporting him, urged him to keep quiet about his feelings for Thomas because of the unpleasantness which goes with disputes, saying 'you see for yourself that it is not much use arguing against the emperor, the patriarch and the nation'. However, 'when he saw that I could not be persuaded, and that for the sake of the truth I cared nothing for public opinion, he suddenly began to express his real views, to argue with me openly and to oppose my arguments with his own. This he did out of fear that as a result of his friendship with me he might be exposed to the same suspicions as I was, .... He was friendly with the most important people among my opponents, respecting them not for the reasons with which they supported their faith, but because of their holy clothing.... This is why he opposed me and later abused what he had formerly praised'.

This account is no doubt influenced by Demetrios's feeling of desertion and betrayal, and it is in fact self-contradictory. On the one hand it suggests that it was Neilos's position and aspirations within the hierarchy of the Byzantine Church that prevented him from making his admiration for Aquinas openly known and from going further towards an admiration of Latin theology generally.

1. Ibid., p.391, lines 35-48.
On the other hand Demetrios's account suggests that Neilos was never wholeheartedly behind Kydones and at no point was prepared to allow his admiration for Aquinas to lead him towards the same conclusion as it was leading his friend. Despite their apparent contradiction both these suggestions may have some truth in them. Neilos's appointment as Metropolitan of Thessalonica in 1361 may well have been the event which brought him to set about the compilation of his work against Aquinas and the Latins\(^1\). But equally there is no evidence that Neilos ever contemplated abandoning his orthodox faith. Indeed his praise for Thomas was evidently tempered by his fear of the effect his skill might have upon the faithful since God had given him such powers that he could pull apart arguments as easily as a spider's web\(^2\). In his book on the procession of the Holy Spirit Neilos showed that Aquinas had had an effect on him by adopting some of his stylistic and philosophical techniques; his apprehension about Aquinas's powers appears not only in the general attacks upon him but in his precise complaint that his writings do not proceed from scripture 'but from worldly wisdom ... and stir up the divine tradition as though it were imperfect or insufficient\(^3\). The use of syllogisms had to be kept within bounds as the servant of theology not its master. They could be admitted so long as they were concerned with elucidating material derived from revealed theology, but their use was quite unacceptable in the absence or in defiance of scriptural writings, as though

man could by his own efforts improve upon or replace divine revelation. The Latins had to be opposed and Aquinas had to be refuted, but their techniques had their uses so long as they were employed judiciously, as the Fathers themselves had used them, 'not always but in time of battle'. From Aquinas Neilos Kabasilas had learned the power of syllogisms allied with scripture. So he employed this method as he battled against the Latins and showed that some western characteristics could be absorbed and appreciated even by those who guarded their orthodoxy closely.

iv) **Nicholas Kabasilas.**

The main themes of Nicholas Kabasilas's writings concern the opportunity available to everybody for experiencing the mystical life, the 'Life in Christ', and the importance of the sacraments in attaining this experience. These themes tie him closely to the main Byzantine hesychast theologians such as Gregory of Sinai and Isidore Boucheiras, who had been Nicholas's teacher. Such a background might be taken to

---

1. *ibid.* p. 233 line 3, 'οὐδ' ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τοῦ πολέμου καιρῷ.'

indicate that Nicholas also shared the antipathy towards
the west which characterises many of the hesychast writers.
However, the Latins appear only very rarely in Nicholas's
works and he did not write at all on the central polemical
topics which occupied many of his contemporaries. When he
did refer to the Latins in a more general sense, he displayed
some of the same characteristics which have been observed
in his uncle Neilos.

Chapters twenty-nine and thirty of Nicholas's Commentary
on the divine liturgy are often described as anti-Latin polemic,
but such a bald statement misses a very important fact about
the author. Although the chapters represent an attack on
Latin church practices, Nicholas displays a thorough knowledge
of Roman ecclesiastical forms and the thinking behind them and
also a desire to find common ground between the eastern and
western usages. These facts are illustrated by the chapter
headings themselves; on the one hand 'the criticisms certain
Latins made of us and a refutation of these', and on the other
'that in the Latin Church the consecration is performed in
the same way as by us'.

The main point of conflict was the epiklesis, a prayer
of invocation to the Holy Spirit said in the eastern church
asking for divine blessing upon the bread and wine of the
communion whereby their consecration is completed. The Roman
Church contended that this prayer was superfluous since the
consecration was fully achieved by the Words of Institution

1. Gennadios Scholarios says that Nicholas did not write
against the Latins at all. M.P.G. 160, 682bd.
2. M.P.G. 150, 423c and 433c.
'This is my Body ...', 'This is my Blood' which are spoken earlier in the service. Nicholas explains the orthodoxy of the Byzantine Church's position in an interesting fashion. He first demonstrates that prayer is used to supplement the formal actions decreed in other ecclesiastical sacraments, citing the particular example of ordination in the Latin Church where 'the bishop ordaining priests anoints the head of the candidate with oil and prays that he may be richly endowed with the grace of the Holy Spirit'. Then Nicholas proceeds to show that the Latins themselves use a prayer some time after the Words of Institution which although not explicitly asking for the transubstantiation of the elements is nevertheless equivalent to the Byzantine epiklesis. He quotes the Roman prayer containing the words 'Command that these offerings be carried in the hands of thy holy angel to thine altar on high' and explains that the Latins are asking by these words that the bread and the wine should be transformed into the 'higher and holier' consecrated elements. 'Thus, though in different words, they are asking just what we ask'.

Nicholas emphasises the closeness between east and west in the matter of the epiklesis by explaining that the Byzantines do not believe that the prayer alone consecrates the elements for 'once the words (of institution) are pronounced, the entire sacrifice is complete'. 'Do we pray that the elements might be consecrated? Certainly not, for they are so already; but that they may sanctify us, so that God who

1. Ibid., 432c. In fact it is the hands of the priest which are anointed.
2. Ibid., 433d.
3. Ibid., 437a. 'δήμαςι διαφόροις καὶ λόγοις, ἐν καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ πράγμα εὐχόμενοι.'
4. Ibid., 425c.
sanctified them may also sanctify us through them. Thus Nicholas Kabasilas attempts to explain to both sides the customs and beliefs of the other and it is reasonable to assume that he made these same observations directly to the Latins with whom he must have come into contact in order to gain such a complete and lucid knowledge of the Roman rite.

Nicholas concluded chapter thirty of his Commentary on the divine liturgy with the statement that 'it is evident that it is not the whole Latin Church which condemns the prayer for the offerings after the words of consecration, but only a few innovators, who are causing her harm in other ways'. Perhaps Nicholas was deluding himself, but it is possible that in his contacts with Latins he had met some with whom he could establish some common ground. That Nicholas was deeply concerned with the search for such agreement is clear from the tone of his writing and the vocabulary he uses. For example, he makes frequent use of such terms and expressions as 'community', 'unity of the faith' and 'the plenitude of the Church'. Most significant perhaps is his use of the word Χριστιανισμός, or Christianity, which was

1. Ibid., 437ab.
2. Some writers have commented on the similarity between Nicholas Kabasilas' thoughts on redemption and those of St. Anselm in Car Deum homo. See in particular W. Gass, Die Mystik des Nikolaus Kabasilas von Leben in Christo (Leipzig 1889), but note the modifications of J. Rivière, Le dogme de la rédemption, Études critiques et documents (Louvain 1931) pp. 291-303. S. Salaville, 'Vues sotériologiques chez Nicholas Kabasilas', R.E.R. 1, (1943), 5-57. The superficial similarities are not enough to prove a direct acquaintance with Anselm, but they suggest a knowledge of western redemption theology, based on Anselm, and the De Sacramentis of Hugh of St. Victor.
the closest a Byzantine could get to expressing the concept of an all-embracing Christendom without any political overtones. Finally it should be noted that the value of Nicholas's attempts to explain the faith and look for points of contact between east and west was appreciated at the councils of Florence and Trent where Nicholas's works were recognised as fundamental to an understanding of the relationships between the Churches.  

v) Other anti-Thomist polemic

An attitude of guarded admiration for Thomas Aquinas is found quite often among Byzantine writers who, although composing works of polemic and refutation against western theology or Aquinas personally, show that Thomas had in some way caught their imagination. Sometimes this is visible in the sheer vigour of their attack, sometimes it is openly admitted, but most often it is displayed in the degree to which their own works reveal the absorption of Thomist techniques and a thorough knowledge of his writing. John Kantakouzenos, in his refutation of the work of Prochoros Kydones, illustrates this dual attitude well, paying tribute to Aquinas himself and admiring his philosophical abilities but showing alarm at the potency of his weapons and the undesirable results they might have among the Byzantines.

We join you in appreciation of Thomas the master of the Latinos, who breathes syllogisms rather than air; you will not be able to reject his writings completely and you will enjoy them as if they were the indestructible tablets of the law.

2. 'Κατὰ τὸν Ματθαίον διάδασσάν θυμὸν συλλογισμοῦ μᾶλλον η ἂρα πνεύματος τὴν μαρτύριον σοι παρεξήγησα πρὸς ἡν οὐκ ἂν εἰς δίκαιον ἀντιδιάνειν τοῖς αὐτοῦ συγγραμματίν ἐπιχείρησιν καὶ ταῦτα καθάπερ πλάκας ἔχων ἀκαταλύτους'. G. Mercati, Notizie, p.13 n.1.
An interesting example of a fierce anti-Thomist who was unable to escape the influence of the man he attacked, is Matthew Angelos Panaretos, a lay writer of the mid-fourteenth century who promised to refute all that Aquinas had written. Among his surviving works are two which are explicitly directed against Aquinas, attacking his views on the procession of the Holy Spirit and the fire of purgatory. The grounds on which he rejected Aquinas and the methods by which he proposed to refute him were standard; he attacked Aquinas for his failure to understand that 'the supreme and incomprehensible richness of theology surpasses not only human understanding but is also inaccessible and unintelligible to the angels themselves. Wherefore our faith ... is not proved by propositions and conclusions'. Accordingly Panaretos, 'courageously donning evangelic armour and putting on the arms of the apostles and girding with the knife of theologians' set out to do battle with the many 'slight books and frivolous writings in which the Latins take pride'. He proposed to 'contradict Aquinas's natural science and theology about the Holy Spirit, as far as possible following divinely inspired sayings'. Despite these good intentions Panaretos fell into precisely those habits which he was attacking, attempting to demonstrate the orthodox position and refute the Latin innovations by means of syllogisms and 'natural science'.

1. ‘... α' τινα (τὰ βιβλία τοῦ θεοῦ) τοῦ θεοῦ διάφορος ἡμῖν σχολὴν πάντα περιτέκτης ἀναρίθμητος’. A Demotrikopoulos, Ορθόδοξος 'Ελλάς, p.49.
5. S. G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.134.
vi) The Thomist circle in Byzantium and converts to the Roman Church.

The success of the Thomist translations in extending their influence beyond the restricted circle of committed western sympathisers was largely due to the encouragement and active help which Demetrios received from John Kantakouzenos. The emperor and the court were involved in Kydones' translating activities from the beginning. When Demetrios had made his first translation of a few chapters of the *Summa contra Gentiles* he gave it to Kantakouzenos to read. The emperor was impressed with the work and urged him to complete a translation of the whole book, saying that 'all the Greeks would benefit greatly from it'. When the translation was finished 'the emperor immediately had a copy made and many of the more respected people did the same'.

The emperor's involvement may indeed have been more personal. The word used by Kydones to describe Kantakouzenos' interest in having the work copied, 

*ἐγγράφατο*, could be translated as 'he made a copy for his own use', and it has been interpreted in this way. That John Kantakouzenos was a prolific copyist of manuscripts used to be a widely held belief until it was shown to be based on mistaken evidence, however, the notion is also supported by a further source. Matthew Angelos Panaretos, in a short note on the life and work of Thomas Aquinas, states that 'towards the end of his reign a certain man from Thessalonica,'

1. 'Οὕτω δὲ σπουδὴς ἄξιον ἐνοικίσθη, ἢτοι εὐθὺς μὲν ἡ βασιλείας ἄξιον ἐγγράφατο, ταύτῳ δὲ ἐπόγευν καὶ τῶν σεμνοτέρων πολλοὶ καὶ οίοι ἴνα μαθεῖν τι τῶν χρησιμῶν σπουδῆ.


called Kydones, translated all the works of Thomas Aquinas from Latin into Greek, some of which were copied by the Emperor Kantakouzenos and were put in his library. This account shows certain confusions; Demetrios Kydones never translated all the works of Aquinas, although to the Byzantines it may well have seemed that he did, and although he started the work in the last years of Kantakouzenos's reign, he did not finish his first translation until after John V's entry into Constantinople. However, since the completion of the Greek version of the Summa contra Gentiles coincided with Kantakouzenos' retirement from office and entry into monastic life, it may be supposed that the ex-emperor would at least have had the leisure to undertake a copy if he had so wished.

It must remain doubtful whether Kantakouzenos made copies of Kydones' translations with his own hand. However, it is certain that he took a direct interest in the production of copies. That much is clear from a note, found in two manuscripts of the Summa contra Gentiles, which states that 'this book was translated from Latin into Greek by Demetrios of Thessalonica and was copied by Manuel Tzykandyles of Byzantium at the command of the lord autocrator Kantakouzenos'.

1. Κατὰ δὲ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτοῦ (’Ιωάννου τοῦ Καντακουζηνοῦ) βασιλείας θεσσαλονικεὺς τις Κυδόνης τὸ ἐπάνυμον, μεμημένος τῆς λατινικῆς διαλέκτου, πάντα τὰ ἐκεῖνο (τοῦ θωμᾶ) τῇ ἐλληνιδίδι διαλέκτῳ ἔξεσθεν, ἐξ ὑμῖν καὶ τίνα καὶ μετεγράφαν παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ Καντακουζηνοῦ καὶ ἀπεπέθησαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βιβλιοθήκῃ'.

A. Demetrakopoulos, Ορθόδοξος Ἑλλάς, p.49.


3. Τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον μετεγράφησεν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λατινικοῦ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα φωνῆς Δημήτριος τις θεσσαλονικεύς, μετεγράφατο δὲ Μανουήλ Τσυκανδύλης ὁ Ἱεράντως, κατὰ πρόσταξιν τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοκράτορος τοῦ Καντακουζηνοῦ'.

S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.35 n.53 and p.36 n.54.
Manuel Tzykandyles was the official court copyist whom Kantakouzenos employed frequently for copying many works including some of his own, among which was his refutation of the *De essentia et operatione* of Prochoros Kydones. Tzykandyles also made a copy of the first part of the *Summa Theologica*. John Kantakouzenos' involvement in the copying of the translations and his encouragement of Demetrios personally is strongly brought out by Kydones in his *Apologia*. He mentions that the emperor financed the production of books and 'put them in his treasury, regarding them as more valuable than any of the treasures there'.

Furthermore Kydones claimed that as a result of his work the emperor, the court and the greater part of the people of Constantinople showed him increased honour every day, and those who attempted to bring him into disrepute with the emperor were rebuffed and served only to increase his importance further.

Kydones' claims are certainly not without foundation for, although later passages in the *Apologia* make much of the ignorant opposition which he had to face, it is significant that he was not condemned for his activities during his lifetime and his work was enthusiastically copied. The fourteenth century...

1. See above p.451 n.1 D. M. Nicol, *The family of Kantakouzenos*, p.99, n.164. S. G. Papadopoulos, *Greek translations*, p.35, n.53 suggests that there may have been two copyists called Manuel Tzykandyles. He also attributes several manuscripts to a Michael Tzykandyles who is otherwise unknown apart from an apparent misprint in R. Devreese, *Codex Vaticani Graeci*, 3 (Rome 1950) pp.18, 24. In his index Devreese mentions only one M. Tzykandyles; this is correct and his name is Manuel. For an authoritative commentary on Cod. Vat. gr. 616 containing books 3 and 4 of the *Summa contra Gentiles* see A. Tury, *Codices Graeci Vaticani saeculi XIII et XIV scripti amorumque notis instructi.* (Vatican City 1964) pp.150, 153.


3. Ibid., p.369 lines 89-97.
century manuscripts of the translations are numerous. Eight copies of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and ten of various parts of the *Summa Theologica* have survived from the fourteenth century. In addition two works of Aquinas, the *De rationibus fidei ad cantorem Antiochenum* and the *Quaestio de potentia* which Demetrios and Prochoros Kydones had translated, appeared in other versions by unknown translators.

The intellectual circle in Constantinople, centre largely on the court, was chiefly interested in the works of western theology from an academic and theoretical point of view. John Kantakouzenos, Neilos Kabasilas and Matthew Angelos Panaretos acquired their knowledge of Thomism as members of this circle but they all turned and wrote against Thomism when they appreciated the dangers which it posed to the orthodoxy of the Byzantine Church. However, a number of their colleagues connected with the court and the intellectual life of the capital were prepared to go further in their appreciation of western theology and became members of the Roman Church. Among them were Philip Tzykandyles, Michael Strongylos, Manuel Sgourooulos, George Manikalites and Maximos Laskaris Kalopheros, all of whom held important official posts in either State or Church in Byzantium. It is significant that most of them also knew Latin and were involved in frequent contacts with the west on the empire's behalf. We

1. S.G. Papadopoulos, *Greek translations*, pp.35-37, 49-50, 53-54, 56-60. Matthew Angelos Panaretos used the second version of Aquinas's *De rationibus fidei*.

2. Tzykandyles and Strongylos were witnesses to John V's profession of faith in Rome in 1369; Thitu 11, p.239. Sgourooulos translated a letter of John V to the pope into Latin and was thanked by Gregory XI for his help to Dominicans and Catholics in the empire; Thitu 12, p.253. Manikalites visited Hungary with John V and went on to Avignon, see O. Halecki, *Un empire*, pp.113, 116 and p.146, pp.364-367. For M.L. Kalopheros, the patriarchal chancellor, see Thitu 11, p.128.
know of these men largely because of their official duties and so it may be supposed that other converts of their background remain unknown because of their lack of public prominence. However, it is undoubtedly true that most of the Byzantine intellectuals who showed an interest in the translations of western works were not prepared to become members of the Roman Church.

The converts from the lower social orders in Byzantium are mostly unknown to us but what information there is suggests that the conditions of their life were very different from those enjoyed by the privileged intellectuals who were protected by their office from persecution and among whose circle interest in the west was common and accepted. The Dominican Philip Incontri described the situation of these Greek converts and the pressures upon them.

Since early times there have been many reasonably knowledgeable men among the Greeks, some of whom I have seen who fully confess the doctrine of the Roman Church about the procession of the Holy Spirit and even give me the authorities of the saints and councils to demonstrate this conclusion, but they do not dare to do anything unless the emperor proposes it himself, because they fear the people.... Speaking with them singly, I am often consoled, thinking that the desired goal will be arrived at finally. But although many of them talk to me secretly, none of them dares to say these things in the presence of others .... However, they are aware of each other's opinions and it often happens that one will point out to me another whom I do not know saying "go to so and so, because he knows the truth well".

Philip Incontri's description of the Byzantine converts who individually promised much but collectively were unable to take positive steps towards the reunion of the Church, suggests

that the supporters of Rome formed a kind of secret society among the Greeks. They were afraid to speak openly of their opinions, they knew each other's views and gave an appearance of solidarity so long as they were not put to the test. But the pressures put upon them were formidable. The only converts from the non-official classes whose names we know appear in the records only because they were forced subsequently to recant or else they sought refuge in the west. Gregory XI wrote a letter of recommendation to Peter II of Cyprus in favour of a certain Cassian of Constantinople who had been forced to abandon his family, his country, friends and station in order to become a member of the Roman Church. It is interesting also to note the large number of monks and priests among the converts. It was among such people that the friars had particular influence. A group of Dominicans on their way to Armenia stopped in Constantinople in October 1374 and in the course of their disputations many 'prelates, doctors and monks' were converted to the Roman Church.

The number of firm conversions made among the Greeks as a result of the activities of the friars, the example of notable individuals and the influence of the translations of western theological works, remained small throughout the fourteenth century. However, the particular importance of these contacts

1. 'Consanguineis, patria, amicis, facultatibus et gente... penitus derelictis conversus fuit'. 3 November 1374, Täutu 12, 223.

2. For the recantations of the monks see M.I.I, pp.501, 503-5, 530, 566, 574. A Genoese and a Moslem were among the converts to the Byzantine Church, ibid. 506-7, 550-1. On 28 January 1375 Gregory XI wrote to John V, John Kantakouzenos and Manuel II to protest against the harassment of Greek converts and Latins in Constantinople, Täutu 12, pp.254-299; Raynal. dam. 1375, nos 1-5.

made between east and west in the reign of John V emerged more clearly in the long term. The barrier of ignorance which, more than anything else, had separated the Greeks and the Latins during the schism was substantially broken down. The progress which had been made is illustrated by Joseph Bryennios who was active in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. He was a consistent opponent of Latin theology and the character of his attacks is uniformly anti-Thomist. But the most striking feature of his dealings with western theology is the depth of his knowledge of Aquinas's writings. This emerges very clearly from a debate which he conducted on Crete in the late fourteenth century with Maximos Chrysoberges, a Dominican and a disciple of Demetrios Kydones. Bryennios shows how his generation of Byzantine theologians had profited from reading Aquinas in Demetrios's translations to gain an understanding of the theoretical presuppositions of their adversaries with a view to refuting them. During the debate on Crete, when Chrysoberges introduced Aquinas into the discussion, he found himself confronted by a man who was better acquainted with Thomist theology than he was himself, and who proceeded to quote sections of the works of Aquinas attributing them correctly to their chapter and book.

This was the impressive legacy of the pioneering work which had been done during the early years of John V's reign. The translations, the friars, and the personal contacts with the west did not make great inroads into the membership of the Byzantine Church, nor did they produce official agreements.

---

with the Roman Church. But they laid the solid foundations on which the later generations could build relationships with the west on the basis of knowledge and understanding which had never before been possible. It was only as the result of such beginnings that the last Patriarch of Constantinople,

Gennadios Scholarios, could openly declare himself one of the most fervent of all Aquinas’s disciples\(^1\) while refusing to take the final step of accepting the western formula for the procession of the Holy Spirit\(^2\). To understand and revere the greatest of western mediaeval theologians, and yet to remain firm in the essential beliefs of the Greek Church, was the most refined result of the efforts of the fourteenth century translators and interpreters and, from a Greek point of view the best justification of the intellectual activities of the last century of Byzantium.

---


2. ‘Εἴθε θωμᾶ μὴ ἦσα γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ δύσει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ ἦν ἦσα ὁραδὸς καὶ ἦν ἐφόρονες καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰρήμενης τοῦ ἐγίου Πνεύματος ὁρθῶς, ὡς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν καλῶς λέγεις’.

S.G. Papadopoulos, Greek translations, p.44, n.90. See also p.154 for a similar note in Scholarios’s hand.
On the eve of the Council of Lyon in 1274, Humbert de Romanis wrote a detailed account of the causes of the schism between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople for the benefit of Pope Gregory X. Although he made it clear that fundamentally the schism was the fault of the Greeks, he found cause for complaint also in the attitude of the Latins to the East. He accused them of not caring enough about it. This assessment of the attitude of most of the major powers in the west to the fate of the reborn Byzantine empire was no doubt largely accurate, not only in 1274, but during the whole of the rest of Constantinople's faltering career.

However, while such countries as France, England and Germany were prevented both by distance and the pressure of affairs at home from taking a more active interest in Byzantium, it would be most unexpected to find the trading powers of the west holding back in an area which was of such vital importance to them. The geographical position of Constantinople and the Byzantine islands made the empire a political unit which was impossible to ignore. It commanded the sea route by which goods were taken to and from the Black Sea and Asia Minor, and the City itself not only was the established centre of a highly developed and far-flung colonial and trade network, but also supported a large and most privileged trade of its own. Finally the empire acted as a buffer state between Moslem East and Christian West, and Constanti-

nople was a secure stronghold in a constantly fluctuating and mostly unfriendly political environment.

The Byzantines themselves believed that the importance of their empire in the commercial calculations of the western world could be turned to political advantage. They knew that the busy markets of the Venetian and Genoese colonies in Byzantium provided a focus for western interest in the eastern Mediterranean and they realised that the tangible benefits which they offered western merchants would act as a powerful incentive for the west to guarantee the empire's survival by lending it practical support. In 1350 the Venetian Senate indicated to the emperor that its concern for Byzantium was in direct proportion to the economic advantages which were conceded to its citizens. Demetrios Kydones was confident that the western mercantile cities would give assistance to the empire if only to safeguard their own interests. He told the Greeks that the merchants were aware that once Byzantium had fallen, the ports of the empire would be closed to them, the carrying trade in foodstuffs would pass into other hands, the immunities from taxation which they enjoyed in Constantinople would be lost, and that the fall of the City would be followed shortly by the enslavement of their colonies and direct danger to their mother cities. Unlike the pope and most other western leaders, who had to take their inspiration for the salvation of the empire from the spiritual and far from certain victory of the True Faith over a schismatic church, the cities with commercial interests in Byzantium

1. On 2 March 1350 the Venetian Senate answered a complaint from John V about the growth of Venetian property in the empire with the claim that 'dominus imperator plurimum debet esse contentus quia nostri habentes possessiones predictas erunt magis dispositi ad bonum et augmentum imperii'. J. Chrysostomides, 'Venetian privileges under the Palaeologi', Studi Veneziani, 12, (1970), Document 4, p.333.
were spurred on by the knowledge that their profits could be measured in the same terms as their investment.

In the following pages various aspects of the western colonies in Byzantium will be considered: their structure and organisation, their formal relationship with the empire and the nature and importance of their trade. Finally the involvement of the trading cities in the domestic political affairs of Byzantium, and their attitude towards the empire's enemies will be examined.

A. The Genoese colony in Pera.

i) The territorial expansion of the Genoese colony.

In 1267 Michael VIII authorised the Genoese to establish the centre of their commercial activities in the empire at Pera. At the time this concession seemed not to be particularly generous. The Genoese merchants were cut off from the port and the commercial life of Constantinople by the Golden Horn. The fortifications of the area were destroyed and the colonists were not protected by the walls of the Byzantine capital. The houses were little more than 'wooden shacks and grass huts which were at first poor and not numerous'. However, by 1303, for which year we have our first and most detailed description of the settlement's shape and size, the Genoese had firmly established themselves in Pera. The


2. Makrembolites, Logos Historikos, p.144. The full title of this work is 'Historical discourse treating of the weakness of the Genoese when they arrived in the country of the Greeks and of the benefactions of the emperors towards them and of their consequent prosperity and expansion and their subsequent wickedness and intrigue against their benefactors.' Cf. Gregoras, xvii, 11, 341.
ditch, which marked their boundary, enclosed a colony larger than any previously granted to foreign settlers, with a frontage onto the Golden Horn of about 600 metres. Although this area formed only about a third of the colony's ultimate territory, it was always its heart.

The growth of the colony in both size and confidence is illustrated by the war it fought with the empire in 1348-1349. One of the major causes of the war, which were all colonial in character, was the Genoese demand for an enlarged territorial concession. Their objective was to incorporate some land for houses to the North of their boundary, on the hill which dominated their side of the Golden Horn. John Kantakouzenos refused the request for more land, fearing that it was fortifications and not houses which the Genoese intended to build on the hill. This was not the first time that such a request had been turned down and, together with other grievances, it seemed to the Genoese to be a sufficient cause for war. The colonists were encouraged also by the illness of the emperor which caused him to be away from Constantinople for a long time, leaving the capital apparently leaderless and defenceless.

The fighting broke out on 15 August 1348 and continued until March of the following year. During this period the Genoese 'extended the limits of their settlement, expanding it to the shape of a square by stretching its boundaries much further up the slope of the hill'. They also 'fortified their hill and built a tower towards the top'. The military confrontation was unspectacular and long drawn out. The Byzantines withstood the hardships of blockade by sea and long range bombardment much better than the Genoese had expected. But finally, when the time for direct action came, the Byzantine fleet was abandoned by its inexperienced crews and was totally defeated. By the terms agreed in the peace negotiations the Genoese were allowed to keep the land which they had seized, and received a chrysobull confirming their 'inalienable possession' of the hill on which their tower stood. The wall, which had been built during the war, stretching southwards from the tower, bore an inscription which confirmed the formal cession of the area to the colony in 1349. Underneath the date, written in Roman numerals, was the figure of St. Nicholas with the arms of Genoa on his right and the arms of the imperial house on his left.

4. 'ἀνασφαλείς των κατάσχεσιν, 'Makrembolites, Logos Historikos, p.159. Kantakouzenos described his cession of territory to the Genoese as voluntary: καὶ τὸ χώριον αὐτός ἐκὼν εἶναι ἐξαρίστευο,'Kantak.iv,11:III,79. The course of these peace negotiations is rather confused; for a further discussion see below pp.309-310.
On 6 May 1352 another peace treaty was signed between Byzantium and Genoa. The war which it concluded was not directly concerned with Genoese efforts to expand or increase the security of their colony, but the question was not ignored in the treaty. The voluntary cession of Pera to the Genoese was confirmed and a segment of land to the East of the colony's previous boundary was added.

Further extensions to the colony in Pera were probably made in 1337, 1397 and 1400. However, there are no treaties or documents which relate to these additions and the only evidence comes from inscriptions found on the internal walls of the colony, which divided it into cells, each of which was presumably acquired at one time. These inscriptions often include a date which gives some indication of when the colony was granted or usurped the land. One of these inscriptions, bearing the date 1397, was found on the first tower to the north-west of the Tower of Christ on the hill. It includes also the arms of Genoa and those of the podestà, Raphael Doria, but the imperial arms were not added as they had been in 1349. In the most north-westerly corner of the colony there is an inscription with the date 1397. The walls surrounding the most easterly and latest section of the colony have many inscriptions dated between 1404 and 1452.

1. 'Item per pactum imperium nostrum de gracia donationem facit comuni Ianue de Gallata... Libr Jurium Republicae Genuenis, 2, ed. R. Ricottius, Patriae Historiae Monumenta, 9, (Turin 1857) 602b. C. Manfroni, 'Le relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi,' Atti Società Ligure, 28, (1896-1898), 710, 713, considers that the 1352 treaty marks a new phase in the possession of Pera by the Genoese. However, the language of the treaty shows little difference from that of the Byzantine commentators in 1349. See above p. 215.

2. The most complete list of the inscriptions in Pera is in A. Schneider and M. Nomidis, op. cit. pp. 7-14. See also L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', pp. 321-336, and appendix with plates.
dates do not give a precise indication of when the land enclosed by the wall was absorbed into the colony, it is likely that the Genoese expansion followed the pattern revealed by the inscriptions.

ii) The formal relationship between the empire and the Genoese colony.

Although foreign visitors cannot be expected, except in particular circumstances, to give an accurate account of the government and social relationships of the countries they describe, yet their accounts deserve some respect. As eye-witnesses they may correct some of the misconceptions which can arise from an undue reliance on the written word of official documents or partisan descriptions. They will certainly be wrong in many particulars, but their general impression of the situation is likely to provide a valuable correction to the formal records on which we must for the most part rely.

One striking fact about the accounts of visitors to Constantinople is the extent to which they make the Genoese of Pera seem subject to the empire. A perceptive and much-travelled Moslem observer, known as Ibn Battuta, who arrived in Constantinople in 1332, visited the colony and remarked that 'it is reserved for the Christian Franks dwelling there. They are of different kinds, including Genoese, Venetians, men of Rome and people of France, and they are under the government of the King of Constantinople, who appoints over them one of their number whom they approve and call the Qam (comes). They are required to pay a tax every year to the King of Constantinople, but they often rebel against his authority and then he makes war on them until the pope restores peace
between them\textsuperscript{1}. Battuta's view of the situation is certainly misleading in various ways, not least in his faith in the mediating influence of the papacy. The Spanish visitors to the empire show the same mixture of fact and fantasy in varying proportions. Pero Tafur passed through Constantinople in 1437 and has left a vivid account of his impressions of the decayed splendour of the city. His description of Pera shows that he was impressed by the good walls, the tall houses, the fine churches, monasteries and business premises. He also added that 'when the ships come to Pera to traffic with the Genoese, they first salute Constantinople and pay tribute. Criminal justice is administered from Constantinople for Pera and for the whole country.... The common people are Greeks, but they are governed by the Genoese who hold all the offices'\textsuperscript{2}. Finally a Castilian, Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, who visited Byzantium in 1403, was convinced that the colony was entirely subject to the empire, and stated that 'Pera has always belonged to the emperor, only his money is current over there and his jurisdiction extends over the whole town'\textsuperscript{3}.

The relationship between the empire and the colony in the four areas commented on by these visitors to Constantinople was of great importance to the definition of the powers and freedoms exercised by each side. An examination of the


\textsuperscript{2} Pero Tafur. Travels and adventures, 1425-1439, ed. and translated G.le Strange, (London 1926), pp.146,149. See also A.Vasiliev, 'Pero Tafur, a Spanish traveller of the fifteenth century and his visit to Constantinople, Trebizond and Italy', E., 7, (1932),75-122.

\textsuperscript{3} Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, Embassy to Tamerlane, (1402-1406), translated G.le Strange, (London 1928) p.91.
appointment of Genoese officials, of the duties owed by them and their people to the Byzantine emperor, of the administration of justice in cases concerning Greeks and Genoese, and of the coinages current in Constantinople and Pera in the second half of the fourteenth century, sheds some light on the status of both parties and the basis of their relations with one another.

a) The appointment of officials.

The appointment of the podestà of the Genoese colony was as much outside the control of the people of Pera as of the Byzantine emperor. The holder of the post changed annually, being selected in and sent out from Genoa. Only if a podestà failed to arrive did the colony have any power in the matter, and then only briefly. The Council of twenty-four was then empowered to elect an interim podestà who could serve until the permanent podestà arrived, but his term could in no case exceed three months. The emperor likewise was without any real influence in the selection of a podestà, although it was a post of great individual responsibility and a clash of personalities could only have the most serious effects. The case of Bernabo Spinola, to whose appointment as podestà in 1308 Andronikos II objected on apparently personal grounds, demonstrated the ultimate power of the Genoese metropolitan government to appoint the man of its choice even in the face of Byzantine disapproval. In Spinola's case, his claim to the post was not that he had been appointed to it, but rather that he had bought it.

2. Spinola had previously been 'vicarius lamuensis in toto imperio Romanie', in 1300. For documents on this and his later career, see L.Belgrano, 'Prima serie', pp.102,113, 115.
Far from submitting to a podesta appointed by the Byzantine emperor, the Genoese sometimes attempted to exert influence over some Byzantine appointments. One of the causes of the war of 1343 cited by Makrembolites, was the choice of Phakeolatos as commander of the Byzantine fleet. The Genoese considered him to be unduly hostile to them, and protested 'as if', Makrembolites commented, 'there had been some sort of agreement that the emperor should appoint no commander without receiving their consent beforehand'. In this instance the Genoese failed to make the emperor change his mind, but by 1332 they had grown more ambitious, and saw themselves as arbiters not only of Byzantine naval appointments, but of the imperial succession itself 1.

b) The duties owed to the emperor.

The former authority of the empire, if not its present power, was reflected in the honours and duties owed by the Genoese community to the person of the emperor in particular and to his empire in general. The salutes given by ships visiting Pera, which were mentioned by Tafur, are also described elsewhere. Pseudo-Kodinos briefly stated that 'when their ships come, whether they are numerous, few or single, they acclaim the emperor' 2. John V himself mentioned these honours due to him as emperor, in a letter of complaint sent to the Genoese about 1335. His indignation had been caused not only by the fact that his troublesome grandson John VII, had been paid imperial honours which were not due to him, but also because the inhabitants of Pera had failed to pay similar

1. Makrembolites, Logos Historikos, p.147. The Peace of Turin between Venice and Genoa in 1332 recognised Andronikos IV as heir to the Byzantine throne in place of Manuel II. See below p.316.
2. Pseudo-Kodinos, Traité des Offices, ed.J.Verpeaux, p.236. See also Pachymeres, De Michaelle Palaeologo, v,30;1,421, lines 5-7.
respects 'and to do those things which they were accustomed to do' when he himself sailed by.

Another highly important and regular illustration of the relationship between the imperial and colonial authorities, was the involvement of the podestà and the other Genoese dignitaries in the court ceremonial of Constantinople. They were given a specific place in the hierarchy of Byzantine officials, among the archontes of the empire, immediately after the Grand Drungarius of the Fleet. Pseudo-Kodinos described the scene in some detail. 'The podestà of the Genoese in Pera enters with the men of his entourage and kisses the emperor in the manner of the archontes... that is on his foot, his hand and his cheek. While the orthros is sung again they are given candles, as are the archontes; after the kissing ceremony they go .... When the podestà arrives from Genoa for the first time, and only then, when entering for the proskynesis, he bends his knee twice, when he is at the door of the triklinos and when he is in the middle of it. After that he comes forward and kisses the emperor's foot and hand as he is sitting on the throne. Likewise the other Genoese archontes, coming from abroad, make their bows and kiss the emperor's foot and hand. Every day when they come to the proskynesis, raising their hats, they bend their knee twice. It is clear from Kantakouzenos' History that the Genoese officials also came to the emperor every Sunday in accordance with a long-established custom, as a mark of honour and agreement.

3. Kantak.1,12,1,61.
In a western context, these ceremonies such as the bowing and the kissing of the enthroned emperor's hand and foot, indeed this whole involvement in the customary functions of court ceremonial, would amount to a definite acknowledge-ment by the Genoese of the suzerainty of the Byzantine emperor. Although the origins of the rituals may be partly found in this theory, the true significance of the Genoese rôle in the Byzantine court ceremonial was, by the second half of the fourteenth century, rather different. The whole tone of Pseudo-Kodinos' account is not that these acts are a constant reminder of the subjection of the Genoese, but that they are a demonstration of the comparative favour in which they were held. It was not a humiliation but a privilege to kiss the emperor's foot; it was a mark of high office which even Byzantines below the rank of archon were denied. Furthermore, a very obvious distinction was made between the Genoese and the Venetians in the rôles which their officials could play in the ceremonies of the court. The Venetians were not allowed to kiss the emperor's foot, and normally did not even kneel; they were not allowed to stay for the reception which followed the ceremonial and their boats did not even acclaim the emperor. Indeed their bailo ranked after the officers of the Pisans and Anconitans. In this way the Byzantines regularly commemorated the services of the Genoese in the recovery of the empire, and also Michael VIII's distrust of the Venetians, which caused him to refuse them a permanent treaty and to deny them a precise and exalted rôle in the ceremonial life of the Byzantine court. Nevertheless, these ceremonies would undoubtedly give a western observer a definite idea of the submission of the Genoese to the emperor.
c) Jurisdiction over Pera.

The administration of justice in Pera gives a good indication of the degree to which the colonists were subject to the authority of the empire. However, the emperor's rights in this respect were complicated by the frequent disputes over the nationality of some individuals. Genoese nationality had very definite attractions for Byzantines, especially those engaged in commerce, and it would appear that some Latins found it advantageous to be considered Byzantine. In practice the right to determine an individual's nationality was a Genoese one, and the emperor could do little about it. The system for settling disputes over nationality placed the responsibility for making the decision on a council of six Genoese, three nobles and three populares, which was always on hand to make a declaration on a person's right to be considered Genoese, should imperial officials question it. The decision of the Council of Six was final, and to be of Genoese birth was by no means a prerequisite for Genoese nationality. The determining factors were apparently custom and general opinion. The Gasmules, those of mixed Latin and Greek parentage, presented a special problem, since they really belonged to neither side, but they appear to have had more contact with the Greeks than the Latins, and are mentioned serving in the Byzantine fleet. However, the descriptions of them make it sound unlikely that either side courted their

1. Regulations for the government of Pera, 14 February 1317; L. Sauli, op. cit., p. 223.
2. Genoese documents generally use guarded definitions such as 'Iauenses vel qui pro Iauensisibus distinguuntur, dicitur, seu appellantur, vel qui dixi seu appellari solent, seu qui privilegio Iauensium gaudent'. L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', p. 287.
The author of the *Directorium ad passagium faciendum* had very little use for them, considering them 'vacillating in faith' and 'given to agitation' ready to call themselves Latin when with Latins or Greek when with Greeks. But the implication of the system for determining nationality was that if the Genoese should choose to regard them as their subjects and should extend to them the privileges reserved for the citizens of Genoa, the emperor could do nothing about it, and so in practice was denied assured sovereignty over his own subjects. However, since it was so much to the advantage of the Genoese to guard their franchises with jealousy, the empire was never threatened with a mass defection of its subjects.

Even once the question of nationality had been decided, the emperor still did not have an unfettered jurisdiction except in civil cases involving a Genoese as plaintiff and a Greek as defendant. The regulations for the administration of the colony issued in 1317 stated that such cases should be tried by two judges appointed by the emperor. The treaty of 1341 mentioned only one judge who was to sit in Constantinople and presumably was Greek. It is not clear from either document what provision was made when the plaintiff was a Greek and the defendant was Genoese, but it seems likely that a case of this sort would be tried in Pera by a Genoese judge.

This was the pattern followed in criminal cases - the trial was held in the defendant's court. A Genoese accused

2. For 1317 see L. Sauli, *Della colonia*, pp. 227-228. For 1341 see G. Bertolotto, 'Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll' impero bizantino', Atti Società Ligure, 28, (1896-1898) 547. Déjérèse, *Regesten*, 5, no. 2866, suggests that the judge was Genoese, but his evidence for this assumption is not clear.
of a criminal act in or against the empire could not be tried in Constantinople but had to be sent to Pera for trial before the podestà. Byzantine criminals in Pera had reciprocal rights and were tried by the imperial authorities¹. The full weakness of the emperor's position in criminal cases is revealed by the letter of complaint which John V sent to the government in Pera about 1335. It was a protest against the insolence of successive podestà in failing to bring actions against their subjects for crimes against the empire. John mentioned the discovery of two plots against his life, organised by Genoese citizens, who went unpunished, although in the case of the second plot a full examination was made by the Genoese officials of Pera and a confession was obtained².

The podestà's judicial powers inside Pera and in cases involving westerners were not in doubt. In 1348 the podestà, Benedetto d'Arco, judged a case between two citizens of Pera and two of Ancona, and judgement was pronounced in favour of the Genoese³. Clearly if the degree of the colony's subjection to the empire is examined in terms of the emperor's judicial authority over Pera and over Genoese criminals in Constantinople, it would not be possible to make a case for the empire exercising any sovereignty or dominion over the Genoese territory. The two governments were equals and partners in the administration of the law. We have no means of telling how the system worked in detail, but the fact that the emperor considered complaints to the Genoese authorities to be worth while suggests that the Genoese did not always ignore his demands. The degree of co-operation between

3. L.Belgrano, 'Seconda serie', Atti Società Ligure, 13, (1884), 936-947.
the two governments probably varied considerably according to the personality of the podesta and the amity or hostility of Genoa and Byzantium at particular times.

d) The coinage of Pera.

The sources concerning the coinage of Constantinople and Pera in the reign of John V fall into two principal categories: the western commercial records and the numismatic remains. Greek documentary evidence is very sparse and, for this period, adds little to the picture presented by the other two sources. The greatest problem posed by these two groups of material is that they are, on the surface, contradictory. The western documentary evidence leaves little room to doubt that the coinage of Pera was the same as that current in Constantinople, and that it was based on the traditional Byzantine gold hyperpyron until about 1376, when a silver half-hyperpyron superseded the gold coin in both the empire and the Genoese colony.

The situation described by these western sources is difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the numismatic remains. The last Byzantine gold coin to have survived in sufficient numbers to suggest that it formed the currency of the international trade passing through the Bosporus, bore the effigies of both Andronikos II and Andronikos III, who ruled together between 1325-1328. There are very few examples of hyperpyra of Andronikos III alone or of John VI Kantakouzenos, and not one of traditional design survives from John V's reign. It is therefore most unlikely that the gold hyperpyron referred to in the western sources, although Byzantine in appearance, was the product of a Byzantine mint under the control of John V. The evidence leading towards this conclusion, and the implications arising from it are considered in detail below in an appendix.
Foreign visitors like Battuta, Tafur and Clavijo, who stayed in Constantinople and Pera only briefly, were naturally deceived by appearances. Many of the ceremonies which they witnessed and the coins which they handled seemed to indicate that the Genoese colony occupied a subordinate position to the empire. In this way the growing practical independence of the colony was concealed and its exact relationship with Constantinople was clouded by ambiguity. The outwardly Byzantine aspect of the colony was clear enough for the Venetians to scoff at the theory propounded by the Genoese podestà in 1359, that Pera was as much Genoese territory as the other colonies which Genoa possessed. Similarly, the Dominicans working in Pera suggested to Urban V that they deserved special privileges for living in lands subject to schismatics. They pointed out to the pope that the colony used Byzantine money, that Greek flags flew there and that the empire exercised certain jurisdictional rights in Pera. In his reply Urban V acknowledged these arguments but contended that the true standing of the colony was not determined by such superficial indications of Byzantine authority, but by the presence there of Genoese judges, colonial officials and above all, from his point of view, of ecclesiastical officials of the Roman Church.

iii) The commerce of Pera.
   a) The privileges of Genoese nationality.

The flourishing commercial life of the Genoese colony in Pera was founded principally on the trading advantages and
1. In 1359 the Venetian bailo informed the Senate in Venice that he had protested to the Genoese podestà about interference with the work of Venetian officials stationed in Pera. He reported that 'idem potestas habuit respondere... quod Peyra erat sua sicut sunt alie civitates quas Januenses habent, et multa alia enormia verba dicent'. D.V-L., II, p.39.
franchises, which had been granted to it in return for military aid against the Latin Empire, just before the Byzantine recapture of Constantinople. These privileges were originally set out in the Treaty of Nymphaiion in 1261, and were continually restated and added to in subsequent agreements between Genoa and the empire. The fundamental freedom was extremely simple and far-reaching. It was a total freedom from any customs tax payable on entry or departure from the empire and from any levy on selling, buying or bartering inside the empire. In principle the Genoese colony could enjoy an entirely unrestricted trade with and through the empire, while most other merchants, in particular the Byzantines themselves, were subject to substantial taxes and limitations on their activities.

Other privileges of less dramatic consequence, were allowed to the Genoese traders, such as the right of using their own weights and measures in the colony. The Genoese pound was divided into 72 saggi or perperi (hyperpyra), which was also a Byzantine unit of weight, but the Genoese perpero was fractionally lighter than the imperial hyperpyron in the ratio of 100:99 3/4. Likewise the Genoese measure

1. The treaty of Nymphaiion, 'Item dedit et concessit... liberalitatem, franchiciam, et immunitatem de cetero in perpetuam in mari et terra in portibus et insulis nostris quas et quas nunc habet et de cetero dei misericordia acquisiverit, ita tamen quod omnes ianuenses et de districtu ianue et dicti ianuenses sint franchi, liberis et immunes in tuto predicte imperio nostro ab omni comergio, dari et exactione intrando imperium nostrum et eundo, stando et eundo de terra in terras per mare et per terram cum mercibus vel sine mercibus ille decatus vel iillo emptis et alio defferendis personaliter vel realiter'. Ed. C. Mannoni, 'Le relazioni fra Genova', p.793. Restated in the treaty of 1304, L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', p.107; see also treaty of 1352, Liber Jurium Republicae Genovensis, 2, ed. H. Nicotitius, 603a. For the taxes levied on other westerners, see F.B. Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, ed. A. Evans, Mediaeval Academy of America publications, n.28, (Cambridge Mass,1936), p.41.
of corn was used in the colony, although it was 6-7% smaller than the one used in Constantinople. These privileges were not in themselves of great importance, but they were a daily reminder of the differences between the Genoese colony and the empire, and symbolised the fact that each Genoese trader was a member of a strong and firmly-established organization, favoured and protected in the Byzantine empire by a long-standing treaty. It was similar to membership of the strongest of guilds, which conferred not only profitable advantages but also a confidence and security which was of great value in the uncertain world of international trade.

b) The relationship between the empire and Pera in commercial affairs.

Despite the autonomy of the colony of Pera and its commercial dominance of Constantinople, it was not by any means cut off from the trading life of the empire as a whole. Its port was visited by ships of all nationalities, and its market contained goods for the empire. Its popularity among foreign traders was, however, not due to the fact that it was independent of the empire and a haven from Byzantine taxes. Considerable precautions were taken both by the empire and the colony, to protect the rights of the emperor over non-Genoese citizens using the port of Pera. Despite the privilege of using Genoese weights, the weighers of Pera were not allowed unrestricted use of them, for they were forbidden to weigh in transactions which did not involve a Genoese, and if only one of the parties was Genoese the weighers had to be supervised.

by the podestà. In addition they were forbidden to accept any payment for weighing goods which belonged to a subject of the emperor, and the Genoese officials were obliged to tell the imperial customs officers about any foreign goods weighed on Genoese scales, to avoid defrauding the emperor of his customs tax.

There were other provisions designed to safeguard this important source of the emperor's income. Ships calling at Pera had to give the Byzantine customs officers a list of the goods and the names of the people on board who were subject to the taxes of the empire. The Genoese colonial authorities were bound to help the Greek officials in forcing payment of the imperial customs taxes in Pera from Byzantines and other non-Genoese who were liable for them.

This evidence of partnership in commerce and public finance is a striking illustration of the co-operation between the empire and the colony. Each had sovereign rights over its own subjects and each was allowed to enforce these rights in the other's territory. Imperial officials were to be found stationed permanently in the colony to safeguard the dues owed to the emperor, and likewise the local colonial taxes could be collected from Genoese ships which used the port of

Constantinople instead of passing through Pera\(^1\). In theory there was no way in which a Greek could escape paying his dues to the empire, or a Genoese could avoid the taxes of the colony, and the two governments co-operated to see that this was so. The empire occasionally found it necessary to protest to the Genoese about alleged breaches of the agreements between them. Genoese merchants were sometimes accused of carrying non-Genoese goods on their ships and passing them off as their own to protect them from the Byzantine taxes. However, the colonial authorities issued injunctions against this abuse of their privileges\(^2\), and since it was so much in the Genoese interest to guard their franchises against merchants of other nationalities, there was never any danger that such illegal activities would be allowed to continue unchecked by the government in Pera.

c) Pera as a centre of local and international trade.

The importance of Pera to the Genoese was emphasised by the fact that they did not enjoy the right, allowed to the Venetians, to buy property and engage in business in any part of the empire as they wished\(^3\). The treaty of Nymphaion in 1261, which specified the trading establishments conceded to the Genoese, mentioned Cassandria near Thessalonica, Smyrna, Chios, Adramyttion and Lesbos, and proposed that Crete and the Negropont should be added to the list if they should be recovered by the Greeks. By John V's reign all except the first of these places had been lost by the empire, and even in Cassandria there is no evidence of large scale Genoese

---

1. For the collection of Genoese customs taxes in Constantinople, see the regulations of 22 January 1343 in L.Belgrano, 'Prima serie', pp.285-293.
2. Ibid., pp.110-115. See also the instructions to the new podestà of Pera in 1317, L.Sauli, Della colonia, 2, p.222ff.
commercial activity\(^1\). The Accounts of the expedition of Amadeo of Savoy mention the presence of a few Genoese individuals in Mesembria and Gallipoli, but these merchants seem to have been established in the towns when they were controlled by the Bulgars and the Turks respectively, before the western army restored Byzantine authority over them\(^2\).

Pera therefore was the centre of Genoese trading activities in the empire. This base was strategically placed to play a dominant part in local trade with Constantinople and the international trade between the Black Sea and the West. The influence of the Genoese on the commercial life of Constantinople particularly on the provision of food to the city, was forcefully demonstrated on several occasions. In 1343 a local quarrel in the Black Sea, involving the Genoese colony of Caffa, was partly responsible for a corn shortage in the Byzantine capital\(^3\). In this way the daily life of the Byzantines was subject to outside interference over which they had no control. In their conflicts with the empire the Genoese colonists of Pera were able to impose heavy pressures on the citizens of Constantinople, by blockading the city and shutting the Bosphorus to any shipping but their own. Thus during the war of 1352 when the Genoese stopped selling food supplies to the Greeks, the price of corn in Constantinople doubled in a few days\(^4\).

---

3. Gregoras, xii,12; II,683-687.
4. Ibid. xvii,2:II,877; xxvi, 26 :III,92.
The list of goods which could be obtained in Pera is almost endless. The account provided by Pegolotti for the first decades of the fourteenth century probably still held good in John V's reign. Many of the commodities he mentioned are to be found among the purchases made by Amadeo of Savoy during his stay in Pera. The Account Book of Amadeo's expedition is a valuable source concerning the commerce of Pera. Although it only provides a random sample of the goods available in the colony the list of commodities he obtained must be fairly comprehensive since he was supplying a sizeable army.

Food was the most important item among the goods bought by the crusaders for supplying both the main expedition and the garrison left behind in Gallipoli. Corn, barley and biscuit were their staple foodstuffs, together with bacon, salt meat, and mutton. Occasionally the purchases included cheese, spices and wine. Dried fruit, such as prunes, dates and figs were bought for medicinal purposes, and rose water also was thought beneficial to the health.1

Various forms of manufactured goods were also found in Pera. Amadeo bought varieties of cloth there, including woollen and cotton material, cloth from Vervins and Milan, silk and samite, for making tunics, stockings, cloaks, flags and bedsheets. He also obtained some wolf and deer skins as he prepared for the winter's campaign in Bulgaria. Articles made of wood and iron, notably ladders, posts, beams, nails and unworked metal, a siege engine, a machine for burning pallisades and other military equipment were bought

by Amadeo for his army. On several occasions he bought writing materials such as parchment, paper and wax, for keeping accounts and writing letters.

Many of the large purchases made by Amadeo in Pera involved a Genoese merchant called Barnabus de Sancto Stephano de Pera. He dealt in a wide variety of commodities, but he was the expedition's main source of food supplies such as corn, biscuit, bacon and salt meat. He was also engaged in the cloth trade, and owned a workshop which produced much of the cloth bought by Amadeo. In addition to being an important manufacturer and retailer in the colony, Barnabus was also concerned in some of Amadeo's business transactions with other merchants. He seems sometimes to have acted as Amadeo's agent in Pera while the count was engaged in Bulgaria. He arranged for supplies to be sent to the garrison in Gallipoli, and sold some of Amadeo's stock of corn which was deteriorating in the army's absence.

Among the commodities found by Amadeo in Pera were mastic and salt, both of which had been specifically forbidden to Genoese merchants and were theoretically subject to an imperial monopoly. The monopoly in mastic had been broken by the Genoese in 1346 when they seized the island of Chios from Byzantium and thus acquired the principal mastic-producing area. The salt monopoly was still operated by imperial officials, but Amadeo was not only able to buy salt from a Genoese in Pera, but even imported some himself from Bulgaria and sold it in the colony. This illustrates how easily the

1. Ibid. nos. 192, 207, 271, 272, 429, 456, 557, 1135.
2. Ibid. nos. 265, 266, 267, 430.
3. Ibid. nos. 491, 493, 494.
4. Ibid. nos. 606, 607.
5. Ibid. no. 247.
6. Ibid. nos. XXIX, XXX, 430, 452, 579. For the restrictions on Genoese trade see L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', p.107; also L. Sauli, Della colonia, 2, pp.226-227. It was in the administration of the salt monopoly that Alexios Apokaukos first rose to prominence, Kantak.1, 4, 1, 25.
Genoese had been able to break into the Byzantine monopolies which had once provided a substantial proportion of the imperial revenues.

The list of commodities available in Pera clearly indicates the chief characteristics of the trading life of the colony. The bulk of the goods carried through Pera, as well as those sold in the market there, consisted of food from the Pontic coastlands, and luxury goods and precious metals from the Far East destined for the populous cities of the west. On their return journeys the Genoese merchants carried cloth and other manufactured goods such as tools, utensils and weapons. Pera acted as a staging post on this important trade route from East to West. It also supported a considerable local trade and was used as a depot where goods for transmission to Genoa could be collected from outlying trading posts. This function of the colony is brought out in the acts of a Genoese notary, Antonio di Podenzolo, who operated in the Black Sea port of Kilia between 1360 and 1361. The only part of his records which survives concerns the relatively inactive period from November to May, but it indicates that Genoese merchants and a few Greeks were involved in a thriving export trade from Kilia to Pera, and from Pera to both Constantinople and Genoa. Many of the acts concern the purchase of local goods in Kilia and further inland. Corn, honey, wax, salt and wine were transported to Pera where they were sold to other merchants who carried them to their final markets. Podenzolo's Register

1. The Register of Podenzolo has not been edited but forms the basis of a study by O. Iliescu, 'Notes sur l'apport roumain au ravitaillement de Byzance d'après une source inédite du XIVe siècle', Nouvelles études d'histoire, (Bucarest 1965), pp.105-116.
is an isolated survivor from among the many notarial records produced in towns like Kilia all around the Black Sea describing the activities of Genoese traders who were based in the colony of Pera.

The commercial importance of Pera resulted in the growth of a secondary industry of banking, money changing and money lending. To some people it was a full-time occupation, to others merely a profitable sideline. Together they turned Pera into a major financial centre. The experiences of Amadeo in Pera supply a wealth of detail on this aspect of the commercial activity of the colony. On many occasions he turned to the inhabitants of Pera to change and borrow money, and sometimes found it an unexpectedly expensive business.

While he was in Bulgaria, Amadeo sent one of his men to Pera to buy food for the garrison stationed in Gallipoli. The agent was provided with 2034 hyperpyra 'of the weight of Mesembria', which at the customary rate of exchange should have been equivalent to 957½ florins. However, when the money came to be changed in Pera only 918 florins were received, and Amadeo's treasurer had to make up the difference later. Similarly, one of the captains of Amadeo's fleet complained that he had lost 483 Bulgarian hyperpyra in changing 5400 of them in Pera.

Amadeo used the financial market in Pera chiefly for raising money, but this process also had its difficulties and expenses. When John V met Amadeo in Sozopolis early in 1367 he agreed to contribute 15,000 florins to the cost of the western army. Part of the money was raised by levying

a tax on the inhabitants of Nesebria, but since the crusaders had already exploited this source of revenue extensively, only about a third of the sum promised could be gathered by taxation. John V then gave Amadeo some gold and silver pledges to cover the remainder of his debt, but when these pledges were converted into cash in the market at Pera they fell far short of raising their nominal value. One lot of pledges, supposedly worth 6161 hyperpyra received no more than 4,500 hyperpyra from the bankers of Pera. Perhaps the Genoese colonists took advantage of Amadeo's pressing needs, or else they thought little of the emperor's pledges, for only about two-thirds of the promised 15,000 florins was actually received by Amadeo.

By the end of his stay in Constantinople, Amadeo's financial situation was critical. He had a long list of wages to pay and supplies for the homeward journey to buy, for which his income from gifts and the sale of captured goods was quite insufficient. Amadeo therefore began to raise loans. Although he received some loans from Venetians and from the men of his own expedition, he raised by far the greatest number from the Genoese community. It was not a haphazard process, for he engaged the services of two loan brokers who were responsible for arranging several loans each. The total sum raised by loans from Genoese in Pera amounted to 37,672 hyperpyra. In no case was a firm date set for repayment, but generally it was agreed that the loan should be repaid, together with a fixed sum of interest, a month or two after Amadeo arrived in Venice.

1. Ibid. nos. XL, XLIX.
2. Ibid. nos. 506, 508.
or after the letter of debt was presented to him in Italy. In several cases Amadeo was able to make repayment early before he set out for home, but the amount of interest was not reduced in these cases. The rate of interest varied considerably, on one occasion reaching forty per cent, but generally being about twelve per cent. The podestà of Pera lent Amadeo 3200 hyperpyra and waived the interest completely, but such generosity was rare. Overall Amadeo was obliged to pay 12,219 hyperpyra as interest in addition to the principal of the loans received in Pera.

The men from whom Amadeo borrowed money in Pera were not all residents of the colony. The Accounts make a distinction between the men 'de Ianua' and those 'de Pera', suggesting that the former were in Pera only temporarily, presumably on business, perhaps in passage between the Black Sea and the West. All those who lent money must have had close contacts in Italy where the money was to be repaid. Casano Salunio nominated his wife Bella Via to receive payment on his behalf in Genoa, and the others, if they did not use relatives, must have had agents to accept the money. Some of the money-lenders were bankers by profession and may have been representatives of Italian banks, but most of them seem to have been ordinary merchants. It is possible that these men found money-lending a convenient and profitable method of transferring wealth from the colony to their home businesses or bank accounts.

1. Ibid. nos. LXVI, LXVII.
2. Ibid. nos. LV, 526; LVI, 528; LVII, 529.
3. Ibid. nos. LXVI, LXVIII, LXXIV-LXXVII.
4. Ibid. nos. LXIX, 530.
5. Ibid. nos. LII, LII, LIII; LVI, LVII, LXXVII.
6. Ibid. no. LI.
7. Ibid. no. LXXXIII. Many of the loans made by Genoese were repayable in Venice, nos. LII, LIX, LXVII, LXXVI.
d) The volume and value of the trade of Pera.

The volume and value of the trade which passed through Pera has never been accurately assessed, and in all probability never can be. However, there is more evidence than the single piece provided by Gregorius which is often brought forward to illustrate the economic power of the Genoese position in Pera. Gregorius simply stated that the Genoese had managed to take over nearly all the sea trade and also a great deal of the revenue from the Byzantine treasury, until their annual income from taxation was almost 200,000 gold pieces, while the Byzantines themselves were hardly able to collect 30,0001. Any conclusion based on this statement to the effect that the Genoese controlled eighty-seven per cent of the sea trade passing through the Bosphorus, is reading into Gregorius much more than is really there2. There is no knowing how accurate the figures given by Gregorius are, and it is unclear whether the taxes he mentions were exclusively customs taxes and whether the rate of taxation was the same on both sides of the Golden Horn. As evidence of the state of Genoese trade in Pera, the figures given by Gregorius are totally inadequate.

Information of a more accurate nature about the commerce of Pera is found in the documents relating to the sale of the tax farm of the karati Peyre, the customs taxes payable by Genoese shipping at Pera3. The rate of taxation was expressed in carats of tax paid per hundred hyperpyra worth of goods carried. Although the rate of taxation fluctuated frequently, it is possible to estimate the value of the tax farm, and hence to have an approximate idea of the value of the trade carried through Pera. The graph shows the value of the tax farm over sixty years, expressed in terms of the number of

3. The sums paid by the tax farmers from 1341-1406 are given by J.Day, Les douanes de Gênes, 1376-1377, (Paris 1963), (contd.)
The graph is based on the sums paid for the farm of customs taxes levied by the Genoese on all the goods carried by their merchants through the Bosphorus. The figures are given in tabular form by J. Day, *Les douanes de Gênes* 1376-1377, pp.xx-xxi. Between 1341 and 1364 the figures are divided into two parts, i) for traffic with the Byzantine Empire and the Khanate of Kiptchak, and ii) on traffic with the empire alone. After 1369 this distinction disappears and a single set of figures is given. The continuous line shows the tax-collectors' estimate of the total Genoese trade passing through Pera; the dotted line shows the amount of Genoese trade with the empire alone in the years for which these figures are given.
Genoese pounds paid by the tax farmer for each carat of tax; in other words, the estimated value of the farm if all goods bought, sold or carried through Pera in one year, were taxed at the rate of one carat per hundred hyperpyra of their worth – which represents a tax of $1/24\%$ on all Genoese trade.

The significant feature of the graph is simple enough. Throughout the second half of the fourteenth century the volume of Genoese trade in Pera was steadily declining. Indeed by 1400 the value of the trade had declined to about one-tenth of what it had been in 1341. Since Genoese trade with the Turks was more lightly taxed by the colonial authorities than trade with Byzantium, it might appear that the decline in customs revenue was due in part to the territorial losses of the empire and the consequent taxation of much of the trade at the reduced tariff. But this was not the case since, for the purposes of the karati Peyre, the emperor was always held to possess the same lands as he had in 1343.

Nevertheless the Turkish conquests were at the root of the decline in Genoese trade in Pera. The Genoese were unable to win from the Turks the same trading privileges that they received from the Greeks, and they were themselves compelled to allow Turkish traders advantageous commercial privileges in Pera. Turkish merchants were conceded freedom from the customs taxes of Pera, and only paid a small sales tax, but Genoese merchants in Turkish lands were required to pay the local dues in full. As Turkish territory expanded, the Genoese gradually lost their one outstanding advantage in the

1. Ibid., pp. 297–298.
2. For the commercial treaty between Genoa and the Turks in 1387 see ibid., pp. 146–149.
eastern trade, but the colonial taxes were not adjusted to meet the changed circumstances. No doubt part of the drop in the volume of trade was caused by the effects of the Black Death in cutting back on the urban populations of western Europe, and consequently on the demand for the cheap food supplies of the East. Also the growth of the Genoese colony in Chios faced Pera with a new and vigorous rival. But by far the greater part of the decline must be ascribed to the changing political conditions caused by the Turkish advance.

However, the importance of the Genoese colony was less seriously affected by the steady decline in the commerce of Pera than might have been expected. For as long as the West maintained trading contacts with the countries of the Black Sea, Pera, by virtue of its geographical position if nothing else, remained a vital link between East and West. The trade of Pera was probably at its height in the early years of John V's reign. Thereafter, it appears to have declined, together with the empire, as the power of the Turks steadily grew. But the colony's greater resilience in the face of the political changes of the times was demonstrated by its survival as an important commercial centre long after the Byzantine empire had been entirely obliterated.

B. The Venetian colony in Constantinople.

The materials available for the study of the Venetian colony in Constantinople are substantially fuller than those relating to the Genoese colony in Pera. This fact has encouraged the production of several important works which have established the details of the Venetians' colonial organisation and commercial activity. I do not propose to recover this ground except to illustrate the differences between the Venetian and Genoese colonies and to examine how these factors affected Venice's relations with the empire.

i) The structure of the colony

The reason for the survival of a vast amount of detailed documentary source material concerning the Venetian colonies is not merely the care and good fortune with which the Venetian archives have been protected. The main reason, which is fundamental to the character of the colonies themselves, is that Venice exercised a much tighter control over most of its colonies than Genoa did, subjecting them to persistent metropolitan interference which generated a ceaseless correspondence between the authorities in Venice and their representatives in Constantinople. Therefore matters of extreme particularity and minute detail became preserved in the official records of the central government.


The extent of Venetian governmental supervision is illustrated by the use of the convoy system which determined the whole manner of conducting Venice's trade with the east. Nearly every year, in the early summer, a convoy of galleys was assembled in Venice to undertake the journey to Negropont, Constantinople, Tana and Trebizond. The organisation of the fleet was entirely in the state's hands and its security was guaranteed by an escort of Venetian warships. The government decided how many ships were to be sent, when they should set out, which ports they should visit and for how long, and when they should return, usually in December. Space on the galleys was auctioned to members of the patrician class who could either trade themselves or sub-let their cargo allocation to other merchants. The right to send goods on these official galleys was especially valuable since the most precious commodities such as spices, silk, jewels, dye, special cloth and alum could only be carried by ships in the convoy. However, the greatest advantage of the system from the point of view of both state and merchant, was that international trade was conducted under the most advantageous conditions possible. The goods were given the utmost protection, they were assured of a firm market with certain profits in Venice where trading rivalries could not upset the commercial stability since government ordinance controlled the supply and assessed the future demand. In short, the element of chance was removed as far as was possible from international trade by the constant supervision of the Venetian authorities.

It was but a step from the control of trade to the control of the life of the Venetian colony in Constantinople from the metropolis. The colonial government was appointed from Venice and its daily affairs were subject to rigid regulations. The bailo was in constant correspondence with Venice, reporting on the local situation and asking for advice on particular matters. He was empowered to intervene in colonial commerce at all levels, collecting taxes, weighing goods, inspecting the loading of ships and, in extreme cases, taking over the running of maladministered Venetian businesses. Colonial officials had to keep elaborate records of their expenses which were checked by the bailo and his council. The bailo was required to give a full account to his successor and to the Venetian Senate on his return to the west. The private activities of the bailo were also restricted by the state. He was not allowed to engage in any form of trade during his term of office and could not accept gifts beyond a small value even from the emperor for a year after his return to Venice. It is not surprising that official posts in the colonies were not always sought after and could only be refused on payment of a fine.

The office of bailo in the colony in Constantinople was the most senior of all the Venetian posts in the east. The bailo was set over the consul of Thessalonica, the bailo of Negropont, the doge of Crete, the castellans of Coron and Modon.


and the bailo of Tyre, and furthermore he was an important figure at the imperial court where he was the permanent representative of the Venetian government. Despite his theoretical eminence the bailo was entirely subject to the metropolitan government for instructions concerning international affairs. His document of appointment set out even how he was to greet the emperor on arrival in Constantinople, and during his term of office he received constant orders on how to conduct himself with respect to the empire. The bailo’s technical subordinates in charge of the other Venetian communities in the east Mediterranean often received their instructions directly from the Venetian Senate, and in times of emergency it was usual for a special ambassador to present Venice’s views to the Byzantine government.

The difference between the formal rigidity exercised by Venice over its colonial government and the greater freedom assumed by the Genoese of Pera is not particularly surprising, Genoa had risen to greatness with a late challenge to the already established dominance of Venice. Hence from the beginning there was an element of intrusion and opportunism in its relations with the East. The contrast dominated the development not only of trade, but of the domestic governments of the two cities. The social upheavals in Genoa which resulted in the establishment of a popular government in the

2. In 1374 the bailo was instructed: 'quando ibis coram eo (imperatore) accipere debes pellem de collo et berictum sive caputem de capite, et flectere genua in terram et levare in continenti sursum et hoc in principio, et postea plus non debes flectere in terram genua,...' C. Diehl, op. cit., p. 130. On the office of bailo see especially Oh. Maltzou, Ο Βασιλιάς του Βασιλια, the independent action of the bailo which she describes p. 44, was no more than the slowness of communications made inevitable.
early fourteenth century hastened the creation of a new nobility in which men of wealth could always find a place. There was no parallel development in Venice where an exclusive oligarchy was able to keep control of the Great Council and the major offices of state without difficulty. The only exception to the general rule that new members of the Venetian Council had to be foreign princes or the nephews of popes, was made in 1381 when thirty new men were admitted. The new men were those whose money or military skill had kept Venice going during the war of Chioggia. They not only had irresistible claims to the state's gratitude but their contributions were vital to Venice's strained finances. The influence of the great Venetian families was also powerful in the colony, which had a Great Council and a Council of Twelve with important administrative functions and severely restricted membership.

The physical nature of the Venetian colony was another reason why a semi-independent local administration of the type found in Pera could not emerge among the Venetians. In 1303 the imperial government had granted the Genoese a plot of land in Pera on which they could build their colony. By the force of bribery, force and cunning this area was expanded, fortified and finally won outright. The Venetian colonists had no similar opportunities to assert themselves in this way. After the fall of the Latin Empire of Constantinople the Venetians were naturally regarded by the Byzantines with great suspicion which was reflected in the terms of the treaties

2. See above pp.213-217.
between the two powers. The first commercial treaty between Michael VIII and the Venetians in 1265, by which the city's merchants were granted exemption from all Byzantine customs and other taxes, specified that Venetian traders should live outside the walls of Constantinople and Thessalonica. In 1268 they were allowed to rent accommodation inside the cities. In the treaty of 1277, which remained the basis of all future treaties with the empire, the Venetians were granted free use of twenty-five houses for merchants and three for colonial officials. Extra houses were to be made available by the Byzantines inside the city if the number of Venetian merchants increased. Similar provisions were made for Venetians visiting Thessalonica. In addition to these lodging places, which were grouped within the area of the colony which had existed before 1204 on the shore of the Golden Horn inside the city walls, the Venetians were given the right first to rent and later to buy houses, bakeries, fields and gardens and all kinds of property both in the capital and elsewhere in the empire. However, these privileges were small compared with those of the Genoese. Venice never received a grant of land which the colonists could regard as a unit belonging to them and over which they could in time establish effective sovereignty.

Without this permanent base the Venetian colony lacked the security which the Genoese established in Pera. The feeling of impermanence was heightened by the system of

2. 'Hospicia', Urkunden, III, 139.
temporary treaties which regulated the relationship between the empire and Venice, generally for five years at a time. On the occasions on which the treaty was allowed temporarily to lapse it is likely that the Venetians lost the use of their lodgings\(^1\). The lapses also exposed the Venetians to the demands of the imperial customs and other tax officials. On 11 April 1356 the Senate told its ambassador in Constantinople to protest strongly to John V because his officers had taken advantage of the lack of a treaty to impose very heavy taxes on the Venetian merchants\(^2\). Again, on 26 October 1369 the Venetian envoys, sent to negotiate with John in Rome, were told to inform him that since he left Byzantium his officials had invented 'certain innovations and extortions against the form of the treaties'\(^3\). Similarly, on 13 February 1375, shortly after the expiry of the treaty, Venetian ambassadors were sent to John V to protest about the aggressive attitude of the Byzantine tax officers who had imposed taxes on Venetian merchants in the empire\(^4\). The Venetian colony was

---

1. The instructions given on 12 March 1376 to the Venetian provveditori to Byzantium included the clause 'Si vero per dominum imperatorem vel suos fieret vobis mentio quod descenderetis in terram secundum usum quia dominus imperator faciet vobis parari domos et alia ut est solitum....' A.S.V. Senato, Misti 35, f.98 (Thiriet, Régestes 575).

2. Thiriet, Régestes 291.


4. 'Item quia Venetis et mercatoribus nostris conversantibus in partibus imperii sui fiunt multe alie novitates et extensiones contra formam treuguarum in damnum et sinistrum suorum et specialiter infrascripte, videlicet: Primo, Veneti nostri de Mesembro molestantur per officiales et commerciarios domini imperatoris. Item, dominus imperator ab aliquo tempore citra imposuit unum commercium super macinatura quod commercium redundat in damnum nostrorum. Item, Veneti nostri de Salonicis molestantur in Salonicos per officiales ipsius domini imperatoris'. J. Chrysostomides, 'Venetian privileges', doc.13, p.347.
continually disturbed by this kind of activity since in the course of John V's reign of fifty years the treaties between Byzantium and Venice were in operation for only thirty-three years.

The Venetians' vulnerability was not entirely removed even by the operation of a formal treaty with Byzantium. Between 1342 and 1349, while the Venetian merchants were under the protection of a treaty, they suffered damages amounting to twenty-two thousand hyperpyra at the hands of the Greeks. On 21 April 1358, only six months after a treaty had been signed, ambassadors passing through the empire were told to protest about the many losses which the Venetians in Byzantium were still enduring. Three months later the vice-bailo was ordered to complain again about the injustices his countrymen were suffering. The Venetians, however, were not maltreated only by the Byzantine people, but even the emperor sometimes ignored the treaties and attempted to levy taxes or to restrict Venetian activities in an illegal manner. In January 1361 a special ambassador was sent from Venice to John V to demand the punishment of those responsible for killing several members of the crew of the Venetian trading galleys in a church, and also to protest against the introduction of a new tax. This tax fell on Byzantines who

1. Thiriet, Régestes 325, 335.
2. 'Item exponere debeat idem ambaxator praeefato domino imperatori de gravitatibus et novitatis quae per ipsum et officiarios suos indebite et contra formam treuguarum nostris civibus et mercatoribus ac fideli-bus continue inferuntur unde infaciendo eos solvere datia, commercia et alia insolita de bonis et mercati-onibus suis contra formam ipsarum treuguarum'.

bought from a Venetian merchant although the earlier treaties between Venice and the empire made it clear that the Venetians' exemptions protected both seller and purchaser from taxation. The importance which Venice attached to this issue is illustrated by the fact that it offered to levy a tax on its own retail merchants in the wine trade if John would abandon his taxation plans.

The other major weakness of the Venetian colony compared with Pera was that it was situated within the walls of the Byzantine capital. Venetian ships did not have an independent harbour in Constantinople and indeed often preferred to use the excellent facilities of the port of Pera instead of their own colony. Some Venetian officials had to be stationed in Pera to supervise the activities of their citizens, to weigh their goods on Venetian scales and to prevent them from escaping Venetian dues and trading regulations. The presence of these Venetian officials in Pera was inevitably a source and a focus for friction between the two communities.

Furthermore the Venetian colony had no independent defences or fortifications, which the Genoese had made a symbol of their freedom from imperial controls and which, more than anything else, had allowed them to act as equals.

1. See John V's response to the Venetian complaints; '..... imperator potest facere suis Grecis quicquid vult sine preliudicio Vetetorum'. D.V-L.II, p.53. See also J. Chrysostomides, 'Venetian privileges', pp.300-301.
towards the Byzantine authorities. The Venetians were protected from outside attacks by the walls of the City, but they had no defence against the Greeks themselves. Thus in 1390, when no treaty was in force and tension between Venice and the empire was particularly high, the Senate recommended its ambassador to consider the possibility of evacuating the colonists from Constantinople to the greater security of Pera\(^1\). The Venetians' belief that they could not effectively challenge Genoese commerce without possessing a secure and independent territorial unit which they could dominate, was a main reason for their persistent attempts to win control of the island of Tenedos\(^2\).

i) Colonial trade.

The relative weakness of the Venetian colony did not mean that its officials and merchants were always on the defensive in their daily dealings with the Byzantines. The extent of their power and influence within the empire by the reign of John V is clearly visible in the series of treaties between the Republic and the empire. The substance of these treaties changed little in the clauses relating to Venetian commerce with the result that the Venetians came in time to claim their privileges as permanent and irreversible rights. If the emperor attempted in any way to reduce Venice's advantages he would be referred back to the earlier treaties which his predecessors had made and reminded that nothing less would do. Thus in 1356, although there was no treaty in

---

1. Thiriet, Régestes 772.
2. For Venetian ambitions regarding Tenedos see F. Thiriet, 'Venise et l'occupation de Ténédos au XIVe siècle', Mélanges de l'École française de Rome, 65, (1953), 219-245.
operation, a Venetian ambassador was told to protest to
John V against the loss of the 'customary liberties and
freedoms' to which Venetian merchants were entitled 1.

Indeed by John V's reign the privileges of the Vene-
tians had become so established that many of the treaties
contained small concessions made by the Republic to the
empire. Venice thus managed to convey not only its con-
stant concern for Byzantium's well-being, but also the fact
that its freedoms were hallowed by time and could only be
diminished temporarily by the free will of Venice and with-
out prejudice to its undoubted rights 2.

These concessions reflect the empire's concern about
the Venetians' influence in certain sectors of Constantinople's
commercial life. The merchants of the colony were closely
involved in the local trade of the capital and, because of
their exemption from all Byzantine taxation, were able to
undercut Greek traders and caused serious losses to the
imperial treasury. This situation caused John V to demand
a comprehensive review of Venetian privileges. In 1359 and
1362 John drew up lengthy lists of complaints and grievances
against the Venetians, detailing the ways in which their
activities brought hardship to the Byzantine state and people 3.

1. 30 January 1356, '...Rogamus eum (imperatorem) quatenus
consideratis predictis sibi placeat taliter cum effectu
mandare quod nostri mercatores et fideles predicti non
recipiant ipsas gravitates et onera, sed potius iuxta
treuguarum forum in suis libertatibus et franchisit
solitis conservatur'. A.S.V.Senato, Misti 27, f.57.

2. The concessions were introduced by clauses such as: 'Quod
licet dominus Dux et commune Veneciurn manifeste habeant,
ex forma treuguarum novarum et veterarum, quod suis Venetis
liceat emera (domos, campos, zardinos atque possessiones in
Constantinopoli et in toto imperio nostro, tamen predictus
dominus Dux et commune Veneciarum, cognoscentes statum
presentem imperii nostrY, ut suam cognoscamus bonam des-
posicionem ad nostram conservationem, providentur per viam
curialitatis et amoris complacere nobis in hunc modum,
videlicet:...' D.V-L.II, p.225 (Treaty of 1390), Cf.p.83
(1383), p.152 (1370).

3. The complaints of 1359 are partly published by J.Chrysosto-
mites, 'Venetian privileges', doc.o, pp.333-338. For 1362
see D.V-L.II, pp.82-85.
Among the topics raised there were three which stood out particularly and were a source of constant friction between Byzantium and Venice. John V questioned the Venetians' right to buy property in the empire and to refuse to pay the normal Byzantine land taxes upon it. John complained that the practice had become so widespread that the state was losing not only its essential revenues but its legal powers also. The right to acquire property was the basis of the Venetians' position in Constantinople since they were thus able to integrate themselves into the general economic life of the empire. Their success in doing this is illustrated by John's other major complaints. He demanded limitations on the activities of Venetians who sold retail to Greeks, especially in the wine and corn trades. The Venetian response to such demands was always to reiterate that they could not be deprived of their privileges which successive emperors had confirmed, but usually they were prepared to offer some voluntary limitations on their rights in order to safeguard the Byzantine economy. However, the number of their privileges remained undiminished.

In addition to his attempts to limit the local activities of the Venetians in Constantinople, John tried to extract certain privileges for Byzantine merchants visiting ports under Venetian control. In 1359 he asked Venice to order its officials in Coron, Modon and Crete to stop demanding customs dues on merchandise belonging to Greeks. He claimed that his subjects had enjoyed this freedom before the Genoese war of 1352. The right is not mentioned in any of the formal treaties

1. For a detailed examination of these and other Venetian privileges see J. Chrysostomides, 'Venetian privileges', pp.267-356.
between Venice and the empire. The Venetian authorities were themselves uncertain whether the Byzantines were entitled to the privilege they claimed, but they directed their colonists to cease their demands for tax if it was true that the Greeks were exempt. The matter was raised again in John V's next list of questions and complaints addressed to Venice in 1362. He suggested in this document that the Venetian officials in Coron and Modon had ignored the Doge's instructions and continued to exact the customs dues from John's subjects, but he admitted that the officials on Crete had obeyed the orders from Venice and had granted Byzantine traders exemption from customs tax. The Cretan authorities, however, were not prepared to be more generous than those of Coron and Modon, and John feared that they were about to reimpose the former dues.

1. A.S.V. *Senato, Misti*: 28, f.95v: 'Item petit ambaxator quod cum a septem annis cista in Motono, Coron et Creta accepta sint suis Grecis commercia et datia de suis mercibus de quibus ante non solverunt, scribatur et mandetur rectoribus dictorum locorum quod habeant ipsos Grecos decetero liberos et frances secundum formam pactorum,... f.96v: *Capta*: Quod super quinto capitolo continent quod Greci domini imperatoris et sui imperii sint liberi et franchi a dato in partibus Coroni, Motoni et Crete, responsaeur quod mandabimus castelanis nostris Coroni et Motoni et duche et consilio Crete quod si est verum quod non sit solitum ante guerram Janue solvi datium per ipsos Grecos in dictis partibus non exigant amplius ullo modo, et eonverso si soliti erant solvere solvant, et ex nunc sit captum quod sic mandetur dictis rectoribus'. This proposal and the decision taken on it (Capta) is found among the Senate deliberations of 19 March 1359.

2. '.....Dummodo sunt tres anni vel circa, querella fuisset vobis deposita de hoc, ducante tunc domino Johanne Delphyn scriptum fuit omnibus vestris rectoribus deinde quod nullo modo accipere deberent dictis Grecis commercium aliquod; sed illi de Coroni et Motono, postponentes litteras vestras, neglexerunt mandatum, accipientes continente sicut consueverunt; sed illi de Creta observaverunt formam litterarum ducalium usque modo, qui modo voluimt accipere, eo quia asserrant quod illi de Coroni et Motono etiam accipiant dictum commercium...' D.V-L.II, p.64.
these claims is available but John's complaints, surviving in
the form of Venetian summaries, indicate that the Byzantines
enjoyed tenuous reciprocal privileges from the Venetians in
local eastern trade and that the emperor campaigned vigoro-
sously to preserve these privileges, although with little
apparent success.

Another interesting point to emerge from these complaints,
which can be seen in many other disputes between Venice and
Byzantium, is the large measure of doubt which persisted
throughout John V's reign concerning the exact terms of the
treaties between the two powers. The reason for these doubts
and confusions in 1362 was made clear by John's letter to
Venice. The letter began with a request for copies of the
three previous treaties to be sent by the Venetians to
Constantinople. John confessed that the Greek versions of
the treaties had been lost in the course of the empire's
domestic upheavals and he did not know which privileges had
been formally granted to the Venetians and which they had
simply usurped. In addition to this temporary difficulty
there was the constant danger that mistranslations from the
Latin text to the Greek version would sow serious doubts
in the minds of both parties about what had actually been
agreed.

It is important to emphasise that despite the occasional
disputes there was a general atmosphere of co-operation and
agreement between Venice and Byzantium. The Venetians' basic
privilege of using Constantinople as the centre of a far-

p.320, n.122.
flung commercial network without paying any customs dues was never seriously challenged during John V's reign. The conflicts between Byzantium and the Venetians were exclusively concerned with the local power of Venetian businesses operating in the capital. This fact illustrates the importance of Venetian retail trading in Constantinople and also the Byzantines' acceptance of the Italians' domination of international trade passing through the empire.

iii) International trade.

The local activities of the Venetian merchants in Constantinople were of minor importance in comparison with their international commerce which was the chief business of the colony. Most of the foreign ships which visited Byzantium were carrying goods destined for a more distant port. The Bosphorus was a major channel for trade between east and west, but Constantinople was only a stopping place along the way, contributing little to the conduct of the trade and deriving only nominal profits from it.

Constantinople was the centre of a Venetian colonial organisation which extended over the whole empire and parts of the Black Sea coastline. The smaller colonies used Constantinople as a marshalling point where their goods could be collected for sending on to their final destination. Within the empire the most important Venetian community outside Constantinople was at Thessalonica. This was of some importance until about 1340, as the centre of an international trade in corn from Macedonia and Thessaly and of a small local trade in commodities like wax and hides. A Venetian consul was in charge of the colony. Although the consul is
not mentioned in documents after 1340, the Venetian trade of Thessalonica continued. The trading galleys of the official Venetian convoy did not visit Thessalonica but unloaded goods at Negropont to be taken onward in smaller private ships. Other places where Venetian merchants operated included Varna, Mesembria and Licostomo on the Black Sea, and Mistra. The Venetians in all these centres depended on the colonial organisation at Constantinople.

The nature of the international trade conducted by the Venetians in Constantinople was very similar to that which passed through Pera. Spices, corn, slaves, and precious metals were carried from the Black Sea to the West, and manufactured goods, chiefly cloth and weapons were taken in exchange. Secondary occupations such as banking and shipbroking, on which the daily workings of international trade depended, were as important in the Venetian colony as they were in Pera. The merchants themselves often stayed in Constantinople for several years as the representatives of Venetian businesses. Some of them remained in the City permanently, especially in the fourteenth century when there was a growth of trading houses which were independent of business organisations in Venice.


2. Amadeo of Savoy transacted most of his business in Pera, where he was based, but he raised a couple of loans from Venetians, Bollati, Illustrazioni, no. L, LXV.

It is not possible to determine precisely the volume and value of Venetian trade passing through Constantinople. However, some general trends can be discerned from the prices which Venetian shippers offered at the auction of space on the trading galleys sent regularly in convoy to Byzantium and the Black Sea. These figures are particularly valuable since they form an almost unbroken series for the whole of John V's reign. It should be noted that the sums offered fluctuated wildly and do not always reflect the general state of Venetian commerce as revealed in other evidence. Sometimes the cause of an abnormally high or low price is not immediately clear. But as a general rule these figures are an indication of the mood of Venetian traders and their confidence in securing a profit. This is particularly true because the system of official trading galleys removed the speculative element from commerce as much as possible and attempted to make the

1. The figures for John V's reign are set out in tabular form by F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne*, pp. 344-345. For an assessment of the usefulness of these figures see F. Thiriet, 'Observations sur le trafic des galées vénitiennes d'après les chiffres des incanti (XIV-XVe siècles)', *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani*, 3 (Milan 1962), 493-522. For a more critical view see G. Luzzatto, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

One of the difficulties of the whole subject of Venetian trade with Constantinople is the uncertainty about the amount of trade carried in private ships, and consequently not accounted for in the records of the convoy trade. It seems likely that the private trade grew in the course of the fourteenth century, while the convoy-carried trade certainly declined. But there seems to be no way of establishing the proportions of the two systems until the early fifteenth century (see below p. 261.).

2. The number of galleys sent by Venice is sometimes more instructive than the sums they raised at auction. When few galleys were sent the price per galley was relatively high but the size of the convoy indicates a low level of commercial confidence. Also, an expression of the total sum raised by the auction of space on the whole convoy may be misleading since individual galleys raised very different sums; e.g. the 1371 galleys raised between ten and three hundred ducats each. Thiriet, *Regestes*, 498. See also 1372, *ibid.*, 508.
conditions of trade stable and invariable. Thus the rise and fall of the auction prices should reflect only the external factors which could not be controlled, such as the danger from foreign shipping, the difficulties of obtaining supplies in the east and the inescapable hazards of the sea.

The most obvious feature to emerge from an examination of these figures is that the first forty years of the fourteenth century was the most active and profitable period of Venetian trade based on Constantinople. A large convoy of about ten galleys was usually assembled each year for the journey to the Black Sea. However, even in this period of relatively calm prosperity the sums bid at the auction of galley space varied between five hundred ducats per ship in 1339 to about one thousand two hundred ducats in 1336. The relative importance of the Byzantine and Black Sea commerce can be gauged from the fact that between 1332 and 1345 fifty-eight per cent of Venetian trade conducted by convoy in the eastern Mediterranean passed through Constantinople.

In 1344 the number of galleys sent to the Black Sea dropped sharply to two and for the remainder of the century the number never rose above five and was generally about three. In 1344 the Venetian merchants in Constantinople and elsewhere in the empire were harassed by imperial officials, but the major uncertainty affecting trading confidence concerned the situation in Tana where the Tartars of Kiptchak under Djanibek molested Venetian colonists, imprisoned some and caused such concern in Venice that the two trading galleys

---

were forbidden to venture beyond Constantinople without the bailo's permission. This crisis was temporary, but Venetian trade never recovered to its earlier level. In the course of the 1340s Venetian commerce in Constantinople and beyond was affected by a number of factors which influenced its long-term prospects. The conditions of civil war in Byzantium between 1341 and 1347 added political uncertainty to economic disruption. In 1348 the Black Death reached Venice, having spread from the Black Sea through Constantinople in two years. It has been estimated that three-fifths of the Venetian population died of the disease causing great changes in the domestic consumer demand and in Venice's other western markets.

Another general factor affecting Venetian trade was the gradual decline of Mongol power. The trade routes bringing goods to the Venetian colony in Tana became less secure and the colony itself was subject to increasing disruption. In addition, while the conditions of trade in the Black Sea became more difficult, the direct route to eastern goods through Syria and Egypt was reopened by the lifting of the papal prohibition of trade with the Moslems in 1344. Trade with Alexandria was immediately popular with Venetian merchants and later Beirut also became an important centre of Venice's eastern trade.

Throughout the second half of the fourteenth century the number of galleys visiting the major Moslem cities was consistently higher than the number sent through Constantinople, and the prices they fetched at their auction were generally very much higher. The gradual change of emphasis from the commerce of

---

Constantinople and Tana to that of Crete, Cyprus, Syria and Egypt is reflected in the changing proportion of Venetian trade passing through Byzantium. In the first twelve years of the fifteenth century fifty-one per cent of all Venetian convoy trade with the east went through Alexandria, and Beirut accounted for another twenty-seven per cent, while only twenty-two per cent was carried through Constantinople.

However, these figures do not tell the whole story, merely indicate that the Venetian state was reducing its dependence on trade passing through Constantinople for reasons which had nothing to do with the Byzantine Empire. But although the trade carried by the state convoys never returned to the level which had been normal before 1344, it is clear that Constantinople remained a flourishing centre of Venetian commerce. The decline of the convoy gave greater opportunities to the private, unarmed trading ships. The Account Book of Giacomo Badoer for 1436-1440, which is the earliest detailed source concerning the private commercial activities of an individual Venetian merchant in the east, shows that he sent sixty-five per cent of all his goods by Venice's official convoys and the rest by unarmed ships. But if his trade with Constantinople and the Aegean ports is considered by itself, it has been calculated that the galleys accounted for only five to six per cent of his trade and eighty-eight per cent was carried by private ships.

These figures show that the nature of Venetian trade in Constantinople had undergone some changes, but the commercial

2. Ibid. p. 522, n. 60.
importance of the colony was unaffected. The luxury items which were the particular concern of the galleys of the convoy were more readily obtainable in the great Moslem cities than they were in the Crimea, but throughout the last years of the Byzantine Empire the Venetian colony in Constantinople remained an important centre of international commerce in staple commodities and supported a considerable local trade.
C. The minor western communities in Constantinople and Pera.

The major centres of commercial activity and western influence in Byzantium were the colonies of Venice and Genoa. However, other western cities and nations also had a share of the trade between east and west, and some had communities of citizens in the empire with a settled organisation and substantial trading privileges. Pegolotti, comparing the respective taxes owed by the various groups of western traders in the empire in the early fourteenth century, mentions Genoese, Venetians, Pisans, Florentines, Provençals, Catalans, Anconitans, Sicilians and 'other foreigners'. By the reign of John V some of these communities seem to have disappeared, or at any rate are no longer distinguished individually in the fragmentary records which remain. Others, however, continued to trade with the empire and maintained a colonial organisation in Constantinople or Pera.

i) The Catalans.

The Catalan colony is one of the communities about which details are relatively plentiful. In comparison with the major Italian colonies, the Catalans were recent arrivals in the empire, but by the beginning of John V's reign they had been in close contact with Byzantium for about fifty years as mercenaries, troublesome neighbours in Athens and merchants. In 1296 the first commercial privileges were granted to the Catalans who, by that date, had a consul in Constantinople. In October 1315 their privileges were brought into line with those of the other second-rank western colonies and hence-

forth they paid customs tax to the empire at the rate of two per cent ad valorem.\footnote{1}

In the mid-fourteenth century the contacts were reinforced by an alliance which bound the Greeks together with the Catalans and the Venetians in opposition to the Genoese in 1351-1352\footnote{2}. Although the joint military enterprise ended in failure, the Greek and Catalan forces regarded each other with mutual esteem and agreed that the Venetians were chiefly responsible for their misfortunes. The Catalan fleet suffered particularly heavy losses because of its inexperience in Byzantine waters and many of the Catalan sailors had no ship in which to return home. John Kantakouzenos arranged for the repatriation of two thousand of these men overland, but between three hundred and five hundred chose to remain in his service in Byzantium\footnote{3}. They gave him enthusiastic service in his struggle against the supporters of John V and were largely responsible for the sack of Adrianople in 1352. The Catalans were selected as Kantakouzenos' personal bodyguard and they refused to surrender to John V in 1354 until Kantakouzenos himself ordered them, in Latin, to do so\footnote{4}. After the civil war the Catalans drop from sight almost completely, but one of their leaders, Juan de Peralta, later distinguished.

\begin{enumerate}
\item A. Luttrell, 'John Cantacuzenus and the Catalans at Constantinople: 1352-1354', Martínez Ferrando, archivero. Miscelánea de estudios dedicados a su memoria, (Barcelona 1968), 265-277.
\item Kantak. iv, 30; III, 227-228. Gregoras, xxvii, 30; III, 151.
\item Kantak. iv, 39; III, 243-243; iv, 39; III, 286; iv, 40; III, 291-293; iv, 41; III, 300-304.
\end{enumerate}
himself as an architect, helping to repair earthquake damage to St. Sophia early in John V's reign.

The survivors of the Catalan fleet may have stayed in the empire after 1354 to form the nucleus of a permanent Catalan community. However, Greek sources do not mention this community and our knowledge of its nature and activities is dependent on Catalan sources of a commercial nature.

These sources are very restricted, but there are a few documents and incidents from which some information about the colony's organisation can be gathered. On 25 February 1383 Manuel de Finar, a citizen of Pera, was appointed Catalan consul by the city council of Barcelona. He was given the same powers as the other forty-two Catalan consuls stationed overseas, with jurisdiction over all Catalans and other subjects of the King of Aragon who traded, lived in or passed through 'Pera in the land of Romania'.

However, on 26 August 1383 John V wrote to Peter IV of Aragon to protest against the appointment of Manuel de Finar on the grounds that he was Genoese. Since Byzantium and Genoa had been at war for six years until November 1382 the appointment of a Genoese citizen to the office of Catalan consul was impolitic, and in John V's view brought no honour either to himself or to Peter IV. On 23 December 1383 Peter IV wrote to the councillors of Barcelona and to John V suggesting that Manuel de Finar should be deprived

1. Kantak. iv, 41; III, 30. Peralta had also served Kantakouzenos as the commander of the Catalan garrison in the fortress of the Golden Gate. Kantak. iv, 41; III, 301.

2. Most of the documents cited below are published by A. Rubio y Liuch, Diplomatarí de l'Orient català: 1301-1402, (Barcelona 1947). The editor excluded much commercial material in the archives in Barcelona from this collection. This material, when studied, will increase our knowledge of Catalan trade with Byzantium.

of office and that no Genoese should thereafter be chosen as consul. He further declared that the new consul should be a Catalan or alternatively that one of the many Greeks who knew Latin should be appointed. Otherwise a 'special consul' would be imposed upon the colony by the emperor.

The problems arising from the selection of a consul suggest that the size of the Catalan colony in 1383 was not great. In view of the disruption caused to international trade by the war of Chioggia, especially to the commerce of Pera which was under siege for over two years, the reduced state of the Catalan colony in Pera is not surprising. These documents concerning the office of consul provide ample evidence of the close links which existed between the Catalan and Genoese colonies. The date at which the Catalans transferred themselves from Constantinople, where they were found in the early fourteenth century, to Pera is not known, but since they were in alliance with the Greeks and Venetians against Genoa in 1352, the move to Pera probably happened after this date.

Confirmation of the friendly relationship between the Catalans and the Genoese at Pera is given by several documents which reveal the harassment suffered by Catalan merchants at the hands of Byzantine and Venetian officials during the war of Chioggia. Often goods belonging to Catalans were

1. John V's complaint is known only from Peter IV's letter to the Council of Barcelona, Diplomatari, no.556, p.600, '...eill no haia per placent que 1 consol dels catalans qui esta en Pera sia Genovés, segons que vuy es...' and also from Peter's reply to John V, Diplomatari, no.557, pp.600-601, '...placet vobis qued ipsi (merca¬tores Catalani in Pera) consulem habeant Catalanum vel in Constantinopole unum Grecum in consulem eligant qu¬cumque voluerint, cum plures sint inibi sufficientes et boni literas et lingam nostram scientes, aut si maluerint, vos eis dabitis consulem specialèm...'

L.Nicolau d'Olver, 'Note sur le commerce catalan à Con¬stantinople en 1380', B. 4,(1927-28),193-194, takes 'lingam nostram' to mean Catalan, noting that the Infant Joan wrote a letter in Catalan to John V, Diplomatari, no.426, p.504. However, Latin was the normal language of international communication and would have sufficed for a consul.
seized on the suspicion that they belonged to Genoese traders. The correspondence which arose from these incidents is a valuable source of detail on the trading activities of Catalans in the empire.

For example, on 8 May 1379 a Catalan ship, loaded with goods belonging to several Catalan and foreign merchants, was surprised at the entrance to the Dardanelles on its way to Constantinople by three Venetian galleys. It was forced to put into Tenedos where the goods were impounded and the merchants maltreated. Peter IV protested about the incident to the Doge of Venice and listed the goods taken from his subjects as woollen cloth of various colours, aniseed, Greek wine and vermilion, all of which had been loaded at the port of Pisa. A similar event caused Peter IV to write to John V on 23 December 1383 complaining that Byzantine officials, who had confiscated some Genoese goods in the possession of the Catalan merchant Guillem P onc while he was in Constantinople, had also seized some cloth which belonged to P onc himself. No attempt was made to deny that much of P onc's cargo was being carried on behalf of the Genoese. Further documents, which do not relate directly to Catalan trade with Byzantium, illustrate the general nature of Catalan commerce in the eastern Mediterranean. Peter IV complained to the Doge about the seizure, by the Venetians of Modon, of goods bound for Syria. This merchandise—consisting of Florentine cloth, broadcloth, Irish woollen cloth,

paper, leather, saffron and hazel nuts\(^1\), belonged to Catalan, Pisan and Florentine merchants and had been loaded partly at the port of Pisa and partly at Naples. Catalan merchants are also known to have frequented the islands of Cephalonia and Zakynthos and to have taken part in the silk trade of the area\(^2\). From these documents we can see that the Catalans had a varied and widespread place in the commerce between Constantinople and the West, chiefly as shippers carrying goods belonging to merchants of all nationalities.

A letter of complaint sent by Peter IV to Manuel II on 18 October 1386 reveals that Catalan traders visited Thessalonica as well as Pera and Constantinople. A ship carrying Catalan goods had sailed to Thessalonica where it was impounded by Manuel in retaliation for a fraud committed by two other Catalan merchants, Guillem Ponç and En Canyelles, in Pera. Manuel wrote to Peter IV inviting him to recompense the injured merchants from the property of the two who had defrauded the empire\(^3\). The exact nature of Manuel's complaint is impossible to determine, but it was certainly a personal one. The strained relationship between Manuel and his father at the time precludes the possibility that Manuel's action was requested by the authorities in Constantinople in response to a breach of official trading practices by the Catalans. Furthermore, in such a case the Byzantine authorities would doubtless have seized another Catalan ship in Pera or Constanti-

\(^1\) Diplomatari, no.388, p.469-471.
\(^2\) Diplomatari, no.541, pp.590-591. Also no.508, pp.559-561. See above p.168 n.1.
\(^3\) Diplomatari, no.598, pp.634-635. G.T.Dennis, Manuel II, pp.130-131.
nople where Ponq and Canyelles continued to trade, rather than making the arrest in Thessalonica. Therefore it must be assumed that Manuel had commissioned the two Catalans to act in some way for him at Pera, perhaps raising money or arms or buying supplies for Thessalonica, and that they failed to fulfil their promises, leaving Manuel no option but to act against the next Catalans to visit his city.

The picture of the Catalan community in the empire, presented by the sparse documentary records, is incomplete in many details but its general character is discernible. In the later fourteenth century the permanent colony was small and loosely organised with none of the elaborate governmental machinery which controlled the life of Venetian and Genoese colonists. The consul of the Catalans was not mentioned by Pseudo-Kodinos in his list of western dignitaries and office-holders who played a part in the court life of Constantinople. The Catalan documents only refer to the transient population of merchants, although it is reasonable to assume the existence of a more permanent community after 1352. Pero Tafur, who visited the empire in 1437-1438 mentions a considerable settlement of Spaniards in Pera and the presence of a Castilian interpreter at the imperial court.

The Catalan merchants were great travellers and their trade routes covered much of the east Mediterranean. Their sea

---

1. Diplomatari. loc.cit. '...cum per multum spaciun temporis fuerint in vestro imperio ad quod postea redierunt et inibi nunc cum suis mercaturis et bonis esse dicuntur'.

charts or portolans were among the earliest, and long remained the most accurate of their kind. They acted as individuals, sharing ships which were sent singly wherever seemed profitable. Official galleys and convoys, like those which carried much of Venice's trade, were not used. In comparison with the Genoese colony of Pera, where the Catalans were based, the Catalan colony was insignificant and its commercial life was completely overshadowed, but on occasion the presence of Catalans in the empire was of political importance and the existence of the colony was a permanent link between east and west.

ii) The Provençals.

There is occasional evidence that the towns of southern France came into contact with the Byzantine Empire and were represented among the merchants who visited Constantinople. Three of the ships which made up Amadeo of Savoy's crusading expedition in 1366 came from Marseilles. However, the only Provençal city which enjoyed special commercial privileges in the empire was Narbonne. The first treaty between Byzantium and Narbonne was signed by Andronikos III on 21 April 1340. John V confirmed the terms of the treaty, probably shortly before April 1346.

By the terms of these treaties the merchants of Narbonne were given freedom to trade in Constantinople and elsewhere in the empire, and were made subject to a customs tax of four per cent ad valorem. Although these privileges were less favourable than those of most westerners, they made Narbonne's trading

1. The Spanish Dominican who encouraged Demetrios Kydones' conversion probably had contacts with the Catalan community. See above pp. 179-180.
2. Bollati, Illustrazioni, no. 308.
activities in the empire more profitable than the Greeks' who paid ten per cent. There were a number of minor provisions in the treaty, including a prohibition against carrying goods belonging to other nationalities. The merchants of Narbonne also received security against the looting of their ships if they should be shipwrecked, and immunity from claims for damages caused by the pirates of their town. The treaties provided for the presence of a permanent colony under the supervision of a consul who was elected by the city's traders in the empire. He had a scribe to assist him and an official residence. He had jurisdiction in disputes which arose between his compatriots, with the limitation that he could not impose capital punishment. When John V renewed the treaty the only clause which was added to the previous terms forbade the alteration of the merchants' system of measurement except at the time of official treaty renewal.

Additional material on the trading activities of merchants from Narbonne is also provided by correspondence preserved on Venetian and Genoese archives, arising from the molestation of neutral shipping during the hostilities between Venice and Genoa. One of the victims was Raimond Seraller (Serailer) who had links with Montpellier and Cyprus as well as Narbonne. He was twice robbed by Venetian ships, in 1353 and 1355, which suspected that he was carrying Genoese goods. He did not take his misfortune lightly but complained

at length to all available authorities in Venice, Rhodes and Chios. The regent of France, later Charles V, and Pope Innocent VI also intervened on his behalf. From the documents thus produced it emerged that Seraller's goods were taken from a Sicilian ship as it was at the Dardanelles approaching Constantinople. The confiscated cargo consisted of Flemish and French cloth, linen from Rheims and camlet. The Venetians refused to settle Seraller's claim peacefully and an order of confiscation was promulgated which prevented the Venetians from visiting ports in the south of France.

iii) The Anconitans.

The commercial privileges of the merchants of Ancona were set out by Andronikos II in July 1308\(^2\). They were made subject to customs dues at the rate of two per cent. The extent of their activities and the importance of their community is difficult to determine. The earliest evidence of a settled colonial organisation appears in 1348, when two Anconitan merchants were involved in a dispute with two Genoese over a shipload of corn which was exported from Pera to Ancona. The ensuing court case was brought before the podestà of Pera and the Anconitans were represented by Vitalutio Martini of Ancona, who is described as 'sindicus et procurator communis universitatis hominum de Ancona'\(^3\). The work of Pseudo-Kodinos, which was composed about 1350-1360, mentions an Anconitan consul in its description of the Christmas Day ceremonies in which the foreign communities paid their respects to the emperor.

---


The consul and his entourage followed the officials of the Genoese and Pisan communities, and on entering the emperor's presence they knelt and received his good wishes translated by an interpreter. 

From later western documents it is apparent that the consul was appointed by the authorities in Ancona and was assisted by a body of local merchants who were based, like him, in Constantinople. In September 1380 a new consul was appointed, apparently after a vacancy, and special ambassadors were sent to the emperor to protest about his introduction of harmful and unreasonable novelties against Anconitan merchants in the empire. The exact nature of their complaint is not known but it may be assumed that the Anconitans were suffering in common with other neutral Italian merchants from the uncertainties and suspicions caused by the war of Chioggia. In 1380 the authorities in Ancona were particularly anxious to clear up any outstanding difficulties with the empire since a large number of their citizens were about to visit Constantinople.

Our knowledge of the minor western communities in Byzantium is largely derived from sources which relate to expeditions:


2. W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce_, 1, 474. John V visited Ancona in the course of his journey from Rome to Venice in 1370. A certain Conrad, 'τὸν ἔξ Ἀγίωνος Κορώνου', encouraged the citizens to give the emperor a warm welcome. In return for this service Conrad was given imperial letters granting him immunity from Byzantine taxes in Constantinople. He presumably had commercial interests in the empire. See Kydones, *Correspondance*, ed. R. J. Loemertz, letters 71, line 9; 349, especially lines 9-10.
which suffered some misfortune or got into trouble with foreign officials\(^1\). We know little about the successful enterprises or about the daily workings of the colonial organisations. It is therefore necessary to recognise that there was much activity which has remained below the surface because of its lack of extraordinary incident. But it is clear, both from the silence of the Greek sources and from the incidents which are recorded, that the Catalans, Provençals and Anconitans were far inferior in population and commercial activity to the colonies of Venice and Genoa which, in the experience of most Byzantines, represented the West.

---

1. The only evidence of Amalfitan trade with Byzantium in John V's reign is contained in a lengthy correspondence which arose from the detention of two ships from Amalfi on a voyage to Romania in 1352. See M. Camera, Memorie storico-diplomatiche dell'antica città e ducato di Amalfi, 1, (Salerno 1876), pp. 541-542. Also I libri commemoriali, II, especially v, 132; 139; 230; vi, 189.
D. Venice and the political affairs of Byzantium.

The immediate Venetian reaction to the fall of the Latin Empire of Constantinople was to work in any way possible for its restoration. This attitude towards the Byzantines became mitigated with time as the impossibility of ever actively reconstituting the international force which had been so successful in 1204 became increasingly obvious. By the reign of John V the Venetians had given up all ideas of re-establishing the Latin Empire. The plan was impracticable and also unnecessary, since the trading privileges conceded by the Byzantines were so sweeping that a Venetian government in Constantinople would have done little to enhance them.

In 1354 the degree to which the Venetians had abandoned their plans for ruling in Byzantium was illustrated most clearly. The bailo of the Venetian colony in Constantinople reported to the Senate in Venice that the citizens of the empire, worn out by the struggles of the civil wars and unable to see advantages in either John VI Kantakouzenos or John V Palaiologos, were disposed to have neither of them, but to submit to the authority of the Doge of Venice in the hope that they might be defended by his galleys. So desperate were they that if the Doge were unable to protect them they would turn to the King of Hungary or the King of Serbia. This news was received in Venice without any excitement; no reply seems to have been sent, and certainly no action was taken. This incident is, however, of considerable importance, not only because it illustrates the radical change which had come over Venice's own attitude

1. For a general account of Venetian policy towards Byzantium after 1261, see F. Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne au moyen Âge, (Paris 1959).
2. 6 August 1354, M.S.H.S.M., 3, ed. S. Ljubić, pp. 266-267.
also because to the empire, but it reveals that Venice was not the only power which the emperors had cause to fear. All Byzantium’s neighbours saw the chance of profit for themselves in Constantinople; and Venice, whose prosperity had come to depend greatly on the empire’s independence and relative peacefulness, had to carry its policies beyond merely refraining from attacking Constantinople itself. Its interests depended on the preservation of the stability of the entire area by maintaining, so far as was possible, the status quo between Byzantium, Serbia, Hungary and the Turks, and by abstaining from direct intervention in the internal political disputes of the empire.

i) Venice and Byzantine politics.

On 4 October 1390, in reply to an embassy from John VII requesting military aid against John V, the Venetian Senate answered that the proposal could not be agreed to since it would create a difficult situation for merchants and anyway it was not Venice’s practice to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign nation¹. One might suspect that the first part of the reply was more to the point than the second, and that John VII’s evident insecurity in Constantinople and his background as the son of Genoa’s close ally, Andronikos IV, were sufficient reasons to disqualify him as a candidate for Venetian aid. However, by 1390 Venice had established a record of non-intervention in Byzantine affairs which, considering the political upheavals of John V’s long and eventful reign, was quite impressive.

Throughout the period from 1341-1391, Venice showed itself willing to deal with whoever held effective power in

¹. The Venetian Senate’s decision is partially published by N.Iorga, ‘Veneția în marșa neagră’, Analele Academiei Române, memorile sesiunii istorice, series 2, 26, (1913-1914) 1105. See also Thiriet, Régestes, no.780; Dölger, Régesten, 5, no.3192a.
Constantinople. During the six years of civil confusion which followed the death of Andronikos III in 1341 John V's mother Anne of Savoy ruled as regent in the Byzantine capital. Her position was recognised by the Venetians who, on 21 August 1343, lent her 30,000 ducats on the security of some of the crown jewels. The instrument of debt was drawn up in the name of John V but contemporary Venetian records of the loan make clear the influence of Anne of Savoy as regent. Even such a matter as the arrest of a Venetian Jew by the Genoese of Pera resulted in the Senate writing to Anne, although there was little she could do about it. Also in 1343 the Venetians received an embassy from Anne asking for help against the Turks and for the use of Venetian influence to persuade the Serbs not to intervene in the civil war on John Kantakouzenos' side.

Although the Venetians were willing to grant the second request, their appreciation of political realities was such that, as Kantakouzenos' cause prospered, they were prepared to recognise his 'promotio et exaltatio' and to express the hope that the good relations between the two powers should continue during his reign. However, the Venetian Senate was composed of cautious men, and in the same resolution of 14 July 1347 they instructed their ambassadors to visit the 'young emperor and his mother' if the bailo and his counsellors approved.

1. For a detailed account and many of the documents concerning this loan and its influence on subsequent relations between Byzantium and Venice, see T.Bertellò, 'I gioielli della corona bizantina dati in pegno alla Repubblica Veneta nel sec. XIV e Mastino II della Scala', Studi in onore di Amintore Panfani, ed. A.Giuffré, 2, (Milan 1962), pp. 91-177. For the instrument of debt see pp. 144-149. The first Venetian records referring to the loan, 5 April 1343, make it clear that the negotiations were conducted 'de parte Imperatrix Constantinopolis et eius fillii domini Imperatoris', ibid. p. 139.

2. Thiriet, Régestes, no. 152.


This caution also shows in the treaty between Venice and Byzantium of 9 September 1349. Both emperors are mentioned in the preamble and both put their signature to it. John VI's signature is interestingly closely modelled on that of his father-in-law. This is the only document since 1347 which bears the names both of Palaiologos and Kantakouzenos, and the treaty states that the clauses have been ratified by both emperors together and singly.

In 1350 and 1351 it was to Kantakouzenos as the effective ruler of Byzantium that Venice turned for aid in its struggle against Genoa. The Venetians sent two embassies to Kantakouzenos in an attempt to make him support their cause, and their ally Peter IV of Aragon sent a similar message. However, John VI rejected the proposals for as long as he could and angered the Venetians by his determination to remain neutral and to concentrate on his own domestic problems. Eventually he was forced to accept the alliance because the Genoese of Pera began attacking Constantinople with stones hurled from their colony. The arrival of the first stone Kantakouzenos was prepared to regard as accidental, but when another arrived the next day he declared war on Genoa, recalled the Venetian ambassadors and, in May 1351, made a pact with them.

The alliance between Kantakouzenos and the Venetians was not a success. The combined fleet was put under the command of a Venetian admiral, Niccolò Pisani, who was not a dashing leader and who allowed many opportunities for decisive action against the Genoese to pass. Finally, after a storm had wrecked several of his ships, Pisani lost heart completely and withdrew the Venetian and Catalan fleets without consulting Kantakouzenos. After waiting forty days, and on hearing that the Venetians had sailed across the Aegean, Kantakouzenos made peace with Genoa on 6 May 1352. Venice and Byzantium each considered that the pact of May 1351 had been broken by the other, the Venetians by sailing away, and the Byzantines by making a separate peace with Genoa.

The coolness which existed between Kantakouzenos and the Venetians after the Genoese war is illustrated by a pact made by the Republic's envoys with John V at Ainos on 10 October 1352. By the terms of this agreement the island of Tenedos was ceded to the Venetians for as long as they remained at war with Genoa and in return John V was to receive 20,000 ducats which were also to be repaid at the end of the war. This must be regarded as an attempt to foster the disaffection which existed between Kantakouzenos and John V and to promote the latter's cause by providing him with money. At this time John V was in open conflict with John and Matthew Kantakouzenos and


had already appealed for help against them from John Alexander of Bulgaria and Stephen Dušan of Serbia. A civil war seemed imminent which would involve all the powers of the Balkans including the Turks, whose support Kantakouzenos solicited, and for which the Venetians had clearly taken sides. However, it is most unlikely that the pact between John V and Venice was ever implemented. John V's cause collapsed swiftly with the defeat of his Serbian and Bulgarian allies by the Turks, and in the winter of 1352-3 he was forced to come to terms with Kantakouzenos. The Venetians gained nothing out of their brief entry into the intrigues of Byzantine politics, and when John V did succeed in ousting Kantakouzenos it was not with Venetian help, but, on the contrary, the rewards for this exploit went to a Genoese freebooter, Francesco Gattiluso.

The change in government was accepted calmly enough in Venice. On 15 August 1355 the Senate drew up instructions for an ambassador to Constantinople who was to salute John V in the customary way and, it seems, treat him as though he had always been in power, recalling past debts and regretting the damage suffered by the empire in the war with Genoa. The next four treaties between Byzantium and Venice, in 1357, 1362, 1370 and 1376, were made with John V alone.

However, during this period of John V's personal rule the Venetians continued to make political contact with those who

---

1. See below p. 313.
2. Thiriet, Regestes, 275.
had influence with him. During the lapse of the treaty between 1 February 1375 and 1376 Venice's increasing anxiety about the dangers posed to their trade and privileges is easy to see. It is also clear that at this time John V was seriously ill and that this was holding up the negotiations. Therefore on 15 February 1375 Andrea Gradonigo, the ambassador to Constantinople, was empowered to visit Manuel and pay him the respects customarily due to the emperor, if John V so wished. A little later two other envoys were also instructed to negotiate with Manuel. On this occasion they were also told that if they considered it worth while to their mission they could visit 'the lord emperor Kantakouzenos' and greet him with 'words of love and regard'. These negotiations were apparently successful in obtaining a renewal of the treaty between Venice and the empire, but it cannot be ignored that the achievement was not solely due to the peaceful political counsel applied by Venice to John through his son and father-in-law. The presence of ten Venetian galleys in the harbour of Constantinople was certainly largely responsible for bringing the negotiations to a conclusion.

The usurpation of Andronikos IV from 1376 to 1379 was a difficult period for Venice. He was little more than a puppet of the Genoese and it was not long before Venice was in open conflict both with its Italian rivals and the empire. Venice

1. ‘Quia dominus imperator Constantinopolis pro maiori parte anni est multis gravatus de persona et propter dictam causam resuare posset quod noster ambassiator quando erit in Constantinopolis iret ad presentiam suam, sed vellet quod compararet ad presentiam filii sui coronati et quod si faceret reverentiam solitam’. A.S.V. Senato, Misti 34, f.104. Thiriet, Régences, no.553.
was drawn into war with Andronikos as a result of his cession of Tenedos to Genoa on 23 August 1376\(^1\), soon after his usurpation and only about two months after Venice had finally succeeded in obtaining the island from John V, after negotiations which had lasted intermittently for twenty-four years\(^2\). Late in 1376, after Genoa had sent an expedition which was unable to gain possession of the island owing to the opposition of the inhabitants who remained loyal to John V and friendly towards the Venetians, a Venetian fleet occupied the island. The Genoese were furious at the loss of such an important prize and forced Andronikos to prepare for war against Venice. Meanwhile Venetian traders in Constantinople were attacked, their property was confiscated and their bailo was imprisoned together with several merchants.

This situation called for the sort of positive action which the Venetians had studiously avoided in their dealings with John V. The Senate instructed two provveditori to visit Constantinople with a force of ten galleys to protest against the imprisonment of the bailo and other Venetians. They were further commissioned, in the event of Andronikos refusing their requests, to seek help among the Greeks for the deposition of Andronikos IV and the restoration of John V, or else the elevation of Manuel Palaiologos or Matthew Kantakouzenos. Moreover, should this fail, they were told to visit Murad and to apply for his help in freeing the bailo and restoring peace and freedom of trade. Finally, once this had been achieved, they were instructed to make a treaty with whoever should be on

\(^1\) Libor Iurium Reipublicae Gennensis, 2, pp.819-321.
the throne. This is the only example of Venice actively attempting to stir up political disaffection in the empire. It was the only occasion on which the Venetians found it impossible to treat with the possessor of de facto power.

John V re-entered Constantinople with Turkish help on 1 June 1379. The last Genoese troops were ejected from the City on 4 August after the Byzantines had obtained the assistance of some Venetian ships. However, Andronikos fled to Pera, and the struggle between him and his father was not formally concluded until about April 1381. Peace between Genoa and Venice was made at Turin on 8 August 1381.

Although the interests of Venice and John V had coincided during the war and there had been limited military co-operation between them, there was a long period after John V regained Constantinople when there was no treaty governing the relations between Venice and Byzantium. The treaty signed in 1376 ran for five years, and in 1381 John V, although reportedly well disposed to the Republic, showed no desire to renew the treaty despite frequent requests. On 25 November 1384 John stated that he was willing to regulate his affairs with Venice as though there were a treaty made on the customary model in operation, but he insisted that he could not sign a treaty with Venice's ambassador, Ludovice Contarini, who had caused offence both by the political innovations he attempted to introduce and by his 'harshness and dishonesty of speech'.

One of the major divisions between Venice and Byzantium was the Venetian demand for compensation for losses suffered by

the Venetian colony during Andronikos' usurpation.

The situation deteriorated sharply in 1390. The treaty was still not renewed, and the Byzantines had arrested two Venetian corn ships in Constantinople. On 9 April the Venetians prepared for more positive action against the empire. The possibility of abandoning the colony in Constantinople was considered and the Genoese were kept informed in case the Venetians needed to take refuge in Pera. Two galleys were sent to evacuate the merchants and their belongings to Modon if necessary. The Venetians were clearly aware that they were not the only people who were dissatisfied with John V. The instructions of 9 April made provision for the possibility that John would not be on the throne when the ambassador arrived and they set out what should be done if John VII or the Sultan Bajezid was found in possession of Constantinople. The Venetian intelligence was perfect, for only five days after these instructions were drawn up by the Senate John VII entered Constantinople.

The fact that Venice's contingency planning was so swiftly proved justified, taken together with the facts that John V had been exceptionally awkward over the renewal of the treaty, and that John VII was willing, within two months of entering the City, to conclude a treaty with Venice, suggests very strongly that the Venetians not only had a direct interest in the replacement of John V, but also took a hand in bringing it about. However, the only major source relating to this event,

---

1. The Senate's decisions of 9 April 1390 are partially published by N.Iorga, 'Veneţia in marea neagră', p.1104, Thiriet, Régestes, no.772.
2. Short Chronicle 15, p.32 lines 23-31; 52, p.89 lines 41-43.
the account by Ignatius of Smolensk of his pilgrimage, makes no suggestion that Venice was in any way involved, but stresses the rôle played by the Turks in the usurpation. Similarly the answer made by the Senate, on 4 October 1390, to an embassy sent by John VII, suggests that the Venetians were unwilling to become involved with John VII in his struggle against his grandfather. The reply stated as a general policy the Venetians' desire to avoid the difficulties which would befall their merchants if they were to take up arms in an internal dispute, and they further suggested that instead of fighting John VII's battles, they would be very willing to negotiate a peace between him and John V.

In deciding to make this principle the basis of their policy towards John VII, the Venetians may well have been influenced by the knowledge that Manuel was visiting Rhodes to organise western help against the usurper. Indeed on 17 September 1390, three weeks before the Venetian Senate composed its reply to John VII's embassy, John VII was expelled from Constantinople by the force which Manuel had raised. Venice had been directly involved neither in his usurpation nor in his defeat, but it had managed to profit from his brief occupation of Constantinop

2. The deliberation of the Senate 4 October 1390 is partially published by N. Jorga, op. cit. p.1105. Thiriet, Régistes, no.780. There is no clear justification for Thiriet's remark that this deliberation indicates Venetian collusion in John VII's usurpation, ibid. p.138 n.2. Also the assertion made by J. Barker, Manuel II, p.75 n.199, that the embassy to which the Senate was replying was not sent by John VII, is impossible to reconcile with the fact that the Venetians were refusing to take up arms 'contra imperatorem Chaloianj, avus ipsius domini imperatoris'. See Dölger, Regesten, 5, 192a.
3. Ignatius of Smolensk, ed. B. de Khitrowo, p.142; Short Chronicle 52, p.89 lines 44-46; P. Charanis, 'An important short chronicle', pp.356-357.
to renew the treaty which John V had been so unwilling to grant. The events of 1390 reveal the basic characteristics behind Venice's policies with regard to the Byzantine empire. By being willing to deal with anyone in power the Venetians had gained a treaty; by insisting on peaceful negotiations rather than direct involvement they had safeguarded their position with the old emperor and so demonstrated the belief they held throughout John V's reign, that whenever possible, the interests both of Empire and Republic lay in the preservation of peace.

ii) The sources of Venetian influence in the empire.

Although Venice adopted a policy of preserving its position in the empire as best it could by non-violent means, its concern for Byzantium did not extend to allowing its rights and privileges to be infringed with impunity. Venice's fundamental consideration in determining its policy in Constantinople was how best to obtain maximum benefit from its presence there, and therefore its privileges had to be protected. But the ultimate weapon of direct physical intervention was denied to the Republic because it would involve those very evils which the Venetians were so anxious that the empire should avoid. The only occasion on which any force was threatened while John V ruled in Constantinople was in 1376 when John was being especially difficult and when Tenedos, the prize sought, was of such importance and was so likely to inflame the rivalry of the Genoese, that a military force would not be out of place anyway. On the other occasions when there was a clash of interest between Byzantium and the Republic, other methods had to be employed to ensure that the Venetian interest prevailed.

The technique most frequently exercised for putting pressure on the emperor was to remind him of the vast sums owed
by him in compensation for the losses sustained by Venetians in his territory. These debts, mostly incurred before John V's full acquisition of imperial power in 1354, were constantly referred to throughout his reign. For instance in 1375-1376, when Venice's anxiety to make the emperor renew the treaty was unusually acute, Andrea Gradenigo, sent as Venetian ambassador to John V, was instructed that his first task after greeting the emperor was to remind him of the 21,163 hyperpyra which he still owed to the Republic in compensation.

However, there were two major drawbacks involved in the application of such pressure on Byzantium. The first, of which the Venetians became very conscious, was the 'weakness and poverty of the emperor and his empire' which, by John V's reign had become so severe that even the Venetians acknowledged that the emperor might be unable to pay the debts even if he wished to do so. Although every treaty between Venice and the empire from 1342-1390 calculated the amount owed by the Byzantines and specified exactly how and when it was to be paid, usually by means of five yearly instalments, only in 1342 did Venice receive more than the first instalment which was to be paid to the ambassadors when the treaty was signed. On every other occasion the payments lapsed immediately the ambassadors left for home.

The other major difficulty in using these debts as a weapon against Byzantium was that if the emperor failed to pay the

1. Thiriet, Régestes, nos. 551, 575.
2. 12 March 1376, 'stricta et debilis condicio sua et imperii sui', A.S.V. Senato, Misti 35, f.98v. A very similar expression was used by the Senate on 21 April 1363, Misti 32, f.122; Thiriet, Régestes, no.459. And again 13 February 1375, Misti 34, f.181.
3. In 1342 19,000 hyperpyra were owed, of which 5,000 hyperpyra were paid as the first instalment; five annual payments of 3,000 hyperpyra were promised, of which only the first was made. In 1349 the debt was still 12,000 hyperpyra and a further 22,000 hyperpyra were owed for losses sustained since 1342.
required sums the Venetians could do nothing except wait. They might refuse to renew the treaty, but this was likely to hurt them more than the Byzantines. This was clear in 1368 when the Senate reversed an earlier decision insisting that a new treaty should not be signed until the Greeks paid at least one-sixth of the 25,663 hyperpyra owed for the damages suffered by Venetians. The critics of the hard-line policy argued that 'in view of the very large quantity of goods to be sent to those parts this year, it is not a good thing that the treaties should not be confirmed for the sake of a trifle'. In short, the debts owed by the empire were at best a very uncertain asset for Venice - one that could be tapped to the extent of perhaps 5,000 hyperpyra every time a treaty was signed, but not one which was a great source of strength to the Republic. However, the debt owed by the empire, of which the gross amount during John V's reign was 41,330 hyperpyra, slowly decreased as small and irregular portions were paid. After 1349 the Venetians practically stopped adding to the total sum of damages although they always reserved their right to do so and doubtless had frequent justification for it. The Venetians clearly did not think they were getting a bad bargain when they exchanged their rights to all damages sustained in Andronikos IV's reign for John's 'perpetual silence' concerning the devastation of Tenedos after the

1. 'Non sit bonus quod, pro una modica re, treugue non confirmetur habitu respectu ad maximum havere quod est iterum hoc anno ad dictas partes'. 21 April 1368, Thiriot, Regestes, no. 459 and p. 115 n.1.
2. The total debt in 1349 was 34,000 hyperpyra. 7,000 had been paid since 1342 and 330 were added in 1363. The damages debt 1341-91 = 41,330 hyperpyra. D.V-L., I, pp.342-343; II, pp.89-90.
Peace of Turin. Although in John's reign Venice received 24,167 hyperpyra from Byzantium as payment for past damages, the effort required to extract the money from the emperor was out of all proportion to the sums involved.

The weakness of the Venetian position in this matter is clearly seen in the instructions given to the envoys to Constantinople on 12 March 1376. Their powers were much greater than those of any other Byzantine mission to Byzantium. They went not as ambassadors but as 'provisores', military inspectors, they went in company with the Venetian fleet bound for Trebizond, they were instructed to behave with unusual haughtiness to the emperor to whom they were to make it clear that they had come not to negotiate but to ask questions and make demands. However, when their instructions touched on the matter of the debts owed for damages their tone was more moderate. The subject was only to be raised if the emperor seemed to be well disposed and if he were unable to pay the whole sum he should be asked only for as much as he could manage. The Venetians were scarcely using the empire's debts to put pressure on John on this occasion.

1. 'Quia libenter vellemus quod poneretur perpetuum silentium isti facto Tenedi, ita quod dominus Imperator seu successores sui amplius non faceret nobis requisitionem de amenda vel restitutione predicta, relinquimus in libertate tua ... quod... facientibus nobis quistationes et liberationem de dictis damnis illatis nostris tempore Chirandronici... ipsae Imperator similiter faceret nobis quistationem et liberationem de dicto facto Tenedi'. 23 July 1339, N. Forza, 'Venetia in marea negra', p.1100. Thiriet, Régestes, no.760. The Venetians were hoping for something for nothing since on 20 April 1332 they had agreed that nobody could be held responsible for damages caused since 1376, Thiriet, Régestes, no.619.

2. 'Si vero dominus Imperator erit bene dispositus et velit attendere ad trahentum tunc in bona gratia incipiat a damnis... Si vero dicaret non posse cum integritate solvere ipsa damn propter strictam et debilem conditionem suam et imperii sui, tunc procuretis quod solvat ad presens illum malorem quantitatem quam obtinere poteritis pro bono nostri... A.S.V. Senato, Misci 35, f.98v. Thiriet, Régestes, no.575.
Another form of the empire's indebtedness to the Republic which was used on several occasions by the Venetians to exert influence on John V, concerned the loan of 30,000 ducats made by Venice to Anne of Savoy. The initial agreement of 1343 made this sum repayable within three years, but the whole was still outstanding when John's personal rule began. Since the loan was subject to an interest rate of 5%, which was sometimes interpreted by the Venetians as compound interest, it provided Venice with a considerable hold over the empire.

This was all the more so because the surety for this loan was the 'iocalia imperii' or 'κόσμια τῆς βασιλείας' which apparently, from their name at any rate, were of outstanding importance to Byzantium.

The jewels were undoubtedly an important bargaining counter in Venice's hands. So much is clear from the detailed work which has been done on John V's negotiations in Venice in 1370-1371, in which the restoration of the jewels formed a major part of the price Venice was to pay for the acquisition of Tenedos. The exchange was not finalised however, since the Venetians' refusal to remit the interest incurred on the loan, required John to pay 9,500 ducats as well as cede Tenedos to recover his jewels. Hence the transaction held little attraction for the emperor. In 1376 the positions adopted by Venice and Byzantium had softened sufficiently for the island and the jewels to be regarded as of equal value, and simple exchange would have taken place had John not been deposed by Andronikos. Even when the jewels were not considered as part of a specific transaction they played an important part in the general economic threat held over the empire by

Venice. For example, in 1368 the Venetians, by adding the reparations due for damages to Venetian property, to the loan on the jewels, the interest on the loan and another smaller loan, arrived at the conclusion that Byzantium was indebted to the Republic to the overwhelming extent of 85,331 ½ ducats or 170,663 hyperpyra. Coupled with this crushing load of debt Venice also had the power to threaten the sale of the jewels. In 1368 the Venetians stressed their authority to sell if they wished but promised that because of their love for the emperor and the empire they would defer the move for as long as possible 'not without much loss and inconvenience' to themselves. The next year Venice's patience had run out, and an ambassador was instructed that John should be invited to send a representative to witness the sale of his jewels, if he refused to pay his debts.

The threat to sell the 'crown jewels of the empire' sounded an impressive and powerful final sanction from which Venice could extract considerable advantage. However, it seems to have had little effect on John V. Perhaps not enough attention has been given to a letter from the emperor to Venice in 1362 at the end of which John V acquiesced in the sale of the jewels, hoping that the Doge would like to buy them himself, and he promised that any part of the debt unredeemed by the sale would be repaid also. It would appear from the fact that the Doge did not take advantage of this offer that Venice's desire to have its loan repaid was less than the advantage it saw in retaining the jewels as a bar-

1. T.Bertelè 'I gioielli', pp.174-175; Thiriet, Réestes, nos. 459, 470. Venice had threatened to sell the jewels twenty years earlier, 12 July 1348, Bertelè, op.cit., p.158; Thiriet, Réestes, no.195.
gaining counter with the empire

Another source of Venetian power over the empire, which
was occasionally employed when John V seemed to be particu-
larly intractable, was the possibility of threatening to remove
the Venetian colony from Byzantine soil and to set up a similar
trading post in Turkish territory. In 1365 the bailo reported
that the emperor and his subjects were, despite the existence
of a treaty, behaving badly towards the Venetians who
were subject to many innovations and extortions and whose
condition in Constantinople was 'feeble'. He drew a direct
contrast between this unjustified ill-treatment and the 'many
advantages' which were available to Venice from Murad. The
next bailo was accordingly told to obtain more details from
Murad if John should remain obdurates.

Nothing came immediately from these exchanges but in
1366 the bailo was told that since Murad evidently wanted the
Venetians to operate from his territory, he should go to
inspect Scutari, a town just across the Bosporus from Constanti-
nople, to see whether it was suitable as a port and could be

1. D.V-L., II, p.85. The overriding importance of the 'crown
jewels' is accepted by J. Chrysostomides, op. cit., p.80.
Doubtless their cash value was greater than the 30,000
ducats of the loan, but nothing suggests that the jewels
had great constitutional significance. Gregoras, xv, 111, II,
738, noted that the jewels on view at the banquet to cele-
brate the coronation of John Kantakouzenos in 1347 were
glass imitations. Even if this testimony is accepted it is
clear that the validity of his coronation, and all subse-
quent Byzantine coronations, was not affected by the absence
of the jewels pawned in 1343. The western tendency to
exaggerate in these matters is seen in J. Servion, Gestez et
croniques, p.155, where a jewel from John V’s hat, pledged
in 1367, is described as 'son riche chappei imperial'.

2. Thiriet, Regestes, no.423.
defended with a boom. Scutari was to be defended at Murad's expense, for the safety of Venice's merchants, so that they could enjoy their accustomed tax free commerce. The Venetians were determined not to make the move unless the conditions which had made their stay in Constantinople so profitable could be entirely reproduced elsewhere. They further demanded that their privileges should apply not only in Scutari but throughout Murad's territory generally. The Venetians were being rather over-ambitious. They were dealing with a power which could afford to refuse, and which apparently did, since no more is heard of the matter for a while.

In 1376 the Venetians again showed interest in a base in Turkish territory, but in a rather more diplomatic manner. The 'provisores' sent to Constantinople were told that if John V refused to come to terms they were to visit Murad to enquire about his attitude to a Venetian colony on his soil, to find whether he was disposed to grant the merchants a walled area with a port, and how extensive were the privileges which he was prepared to concede. Although these enquiries were to be completed even if John accepted the treaty quickly, it is clear that the main purpose of the project was that John should get to know about it and should realise how determined the Venetians were. The result of this mission to Murad is not recorded.

1. The Venetians demanded the right to 'stare et mercari ad beneplacitum sum liber sine aliqua datio vel comerclo persolvendo tam intrando quam exitando quam emendo quam vendendo, et quod habeamus etiam in alii locis sus omnes ilias franchisias, avangia et iuridictiones ac libertates’. M.S.H.H., 4, no.165. Thirist, Régates, no.461.

2. 'Et quin posset occurrere quod in tractatu predictorum veneritis dominum imperatorum nolle condescendere ad intentionem nostrum predictum, tunc... sumus contenti pro bono nostro et nostrorum quod vos provisores nostri... ire debeatis ad parlamentandum cum Morato. Et... debeatis investigare et sentire de intentione, voluntate et disposi-

(contd.)
The sort of privileges which the Venetians were demanding from Murad are revealed somewhat by the instructions given to Marino Malipiero who was sent as ambassador to Murad and John V in 1384, when Venice and the empire were again in conflict over John's refusal to renew the treaty. The important feature of the instructions was that the Venetians' privileges should be better than anyone else's. If possible they should include the right to buy and export corn without any tax, but a charge of up to half a hyperpyron per modius would be agreed to if Murad demanded it. The ambassador was further told that since the Turks normally charged four hyperpyra per cantarium for the export of alum to the West, the tax imposed on the Venetian merchants should be less.

The force of Venice's threat to withdraw its colony from the empire and seek another trading post on Turkish territory was very strong. Had the Venetians been able to find the same economic advantages under a strong government as they enjoyed in Byzantium then the particular attraction of the empire would have been lost and Venetian and western interest in the fate of Constantinople would have declined rapidly. However, since the Turks showed no sign of granting the Venetians the sweeping privileges which they demanded, John V's hand was not forced unduly by the threat of the colony's transfer. The only

---

time John V seems to have been influenced by Venetian pressure of any sort was in 1376 when Venice, in its effort to secure a new treaty and the cession of Tenedos, employed all its threats simultaneously, damages, jewels, withdrawal of the colony and also, uniquely, the possibility of direct military intervention.

iii) Venice and the external threat to Byzantium.

The Venetian attitude to Byzantium went considerably further than merely avoiding direct intervention in the empire's internal affairs. In the area of the Balkans generally, where ambitious eyes turned naturally to the crumbling empire in the hope of some easy conquest, the Venetians consistently pursued a policy designed to stabilise the situation, to keep conflicts local and the empire in Byzantine hands. Venice was able to exercise this moderating influence since its sea-power was constantly sought by those who were planning attacks on Constantinople. But by the second half of the fourteenth century the Venetians had not only abandoned their own plans for a re-enactment of the events of 1204, but they had firmly decided that the prize should not be allowed to fall to anyone else. In this sense the Byzantine character of the empire came to be of increasing importance to the Italian trading cities, for they knew that as long as the Byzantine empire lasted their trade routes, bases and, above all, privileges were secure. Ottoman conquest or Serbian or Hungarian takeover would have destroyed that characteristic weakness which made the Byzantine rulers so attractive to Italian traders.

a) Venice and Serbia.

The Venetian policy of promoting peace so far as was possible between Byzantium and its external enemies is clearly seen in
the relationship between Venice and Stephen Dušan of Serbia. The civil wars in Byzantium had given Serbia ample opportunities to increase its territory southwards so that the empire retained little more than Constantinople and Thessalonica. The Serbian expansion was made easier since Dušan was sought as an ally first by Kantakouzenos and later by John V. In 1343 Anne of Savoy asked Venice to intervene with Stephen Dušan in an attempt to divert him from his alliance with Kantakouzenos. In accepting this task the Venetian Senate observed that 'any change or evil which affects the empire causes harm to our whole community'. This was the thought behind the whole of Venice's policy towards Byzantium and its neighbours.

Thus, when Dušan's ambitions turned to the possession of Constantinople itself, and he sought naval help to achieve this, Venice was consistently firm with him. On 3 March 1346, in answer to an embassy from Dušan, Venice willingly rejoiced in his coronation as Emperor of the Romans but refused outright to give him the help he needed to take Constantinople and to add substance to the title he had claimed. Tactfully Venice excused its inability to help on account of the rebellion it faced in Zara and the many other troubles with which it was occupied. It also draw attention to the treaty it had with the empire which could not be broken without loss of honour in the eyes of God and the world.

---

1. 'Habentes... respectum, quod omnis novitas et sinistrum, quam et quod subiret ipsum imperium, toti communitati nostrae redundaret in damnum', M.S.H.S.M., 2, p.174. Thiriet, Régestes, no.155.

2. 'Ad factum unionis, quam inter ipsum et nos fieri petit pro aquisitione imperii Constantinopolis, respondeatur quod... considerationes treuguarum existentium inter imperium Romanie et nos, firmatarum cum iuramento, quas non esset fas violare absque derogatione honoris et fidei nostrae apud deum et mundum, ad factum dicit e unionis intenderem non possemus'. M.S.H.S.M., 2, no.540, p.320.
Dušan was apparently deceived by the tone of the Venetians' rejection of his plan, since on 13 April 1350 the Venetian Senate had once more to compose an answer to a similar request. The Venetian summary of his letter states that Dušan had already acquired 'the whole of the Empire of Constantinople except for the city of Constantinople', which he could not take without naval support. As an incentive, Dušan offered Venice the freedom of Constantinople and also of Pera if that could be taken as well, but the Republic refused utterly to contemplate such an alliance. Dušan's ambassador was again reminded that the Venetians were bound by an oath to the emperor and his people to preserve 'a pure and true peace', which, if it were broken would cause offence to God and damage to the honour of Venice.

Not only did the Venetians effectively prevent Dušan's dreams from becoming realities by refusing to lend their maritime strength in support of his designs, but they worked actively to promote peace between Byzantium and Serbia. On 6 April 1349 a Venetian ambassador was sent to Dušan charged primarily with discussing the relations of Venice with the inhabitants of Ragusa. However, he was also told to address Dušan politely in an effort to make peace between him and the emperors of Constantinople, and he was ordered to visit Constantinople if he considered that this would be useful to the establishment of concord.

1. M.S.H.S.M., 3, pp.175-178. Thiriet, Régestes, no.241. On 3 May 1350 Venice received another Serbian embassy with a similar request, and replied 'cum verbis quibus pridie responsum fuit altori ambassatori... excusando nos a dicta requisitione sua', M.S.H.S.M., 3, p.181.
Venice again showed its willingness to exert its influence in Serbia on Byzantium's behalf in 1351. The Venetian ambassador sent to Kantakouzenos to promote an alliance against Genoa, found the emperor preoccupied by the need to recapture the territory lost by Byzantium to Serbia. The ambassador suggested to Kantakouzenos that Dušan could be influenced in favour of Byzantium by Venetian pressure, since he had been made a member of the Republic's Senate. Although this argument failed to persuade Kantakouzenos to join the alliance he was clearly impressed by this close link between Dušan and Venice. Later, when he met Stephen Dušan, he asked him how it had been possible for a man with an empire more glorious than the Venetians to hear the shame of being enrolled in their Senate. It must have been gratifying for Kantakouzenos to hear that Dušan had been driven to taking the step because his fear of Kantakouzenos was such that it was keeping him awake at night.

In May 1351, when Kantakouzenos was finally driven into an alliance with Venice against Genoa, a clause in the agreement negotiated between the allies required the Venetians to use their influence with Dušan to make him mitigate his attitude towards the empire.

1. ‘Τῶν δὲ ἑπαγγελλόμενων, εὖ διαθήσειν αὐτῷ τὰ κατὰ Κράτην, γεγενηθαί γὰρ ἕνα τῆς αὐτῶν βουλῆς και ἧκεν ἀνάγκην καθεσθαι αὐτοῖς.’ Kantak. iv, 19; III, 118. The privilegium granting Venetian citizenship to Stephen Dušan and his family is published in M.S.H.S.M., 3, pp. 185-186.

2. Kantak. iv, 21; III, 152.

3. ‘Item, ut nostrum imperium in quise et statu pacifico remanescat cum rege Raxie, cum quo ad presens discordiam habet, offert et promittit prefatus dominus ambiator, quod per ambasatores seu nuncios predicti domini ducis et communis Veneciarum tractabitur et procurabitur, in quantum fieri poterit, apud regem prefatum quod se pacificet cum nostro imperio vel tresguam seu concordiam faciat saltem per totum tempus unionis predicte, si hoc ab ipso rege haber poterit’. D.V-L., II, pp. 4-12, especially p. 10.
b) **Venice and Hungary.**

A policy similar to that exercised with Stephen Dušan may be observed in the relations between Venice and Hungary. In 1365-1366 Venice was well aware that King Louis of Hungary was planning a major military expedition. His intention of going on crusade had been known for some time. On 24 January 1365 the Senate noted a rumour that Louis was intending to hire a fleet of ten galleys from Nice and Provence, and decided, because of the danger to Venetian interests which these galleys might represent, to ask Louis not to arm these or any other galleys from those places. The Hungarian plans were revealed by Louis to the Venetians in rather greater detail some time before 10 March 1366 on which day the Doge composed a reply. From this reply it is evident that two Hungarian ambassadors had been in Venice asking for a fleet of between two and five galleys to serve Louis at his expense for six months as part of an expedition by land and sea to help Byzantium against the Turks. The Doge was assured that this plan had been made by the Hungarians at the request and with the approval of the Emperor of Constantinople.

The Venetians expressed great willingness to supply these ships and even offered to pay for them themselves, asking only that Louis should let them know when they were required. However, in a slight note of warning at the end of his letter, the Doge reminded Louis that Venice had a treaty with the Emperor of Constantinople, and held jurisdictions, pacts and

---

2. 'Ambaxatores predicti nomine sue regie maiestatis petierunt a nobis de possendo armare duas galeas usque quinque in Venetiis ad suas expensas per sex menses, dicentes esse intentionem sue excellentie de eundo personaliter cum magno exercitu per terram et per mare in subsidium imperii Romanie contra Turchos, et quod istud erat de requisitione et beneplacito domini imperatoris Constantinopolis'. M.S.H.S.M., 4, no.148, pp.85-86.
franchises from him which the Hungarians were asked to respect in all circumstances. Evidently it had already occurred to the Venetians that Louis' expedition might not have been designed so exclusively for Byzantium's benefit as the Hungarian ambassadors had suggested, and it is likely that Venice's proposal to pay for its own galleys resulted from a desire to keep them under its control and preserve its freedom of action.

On 20 September 1366 Louis wrote again to the Venetians thanking them for their offer to pay for the ships. However, being aware of the efforts, expenses and burdens which daily afflicted Venice and not wishing to upset the pacts which it had with the Turks, Louis asked only for the hulls, and said that he would pay for the galleys' equipment himself. Negotiations continued until March 1367 and the Venetian element in the expedition was reduced still further. Louis cut his request to only two unequipped galleys and furthermore he raised three hundred of his footsoldiers from Francis of Carrara, a declared enemy of Venice.

Shortly after its summary of Louis' letter of 5 March 1367, the Chronicle of Caroldo mentions another letter from the Hungarian King to the Doge, in which he revealed the true objectives of his expedition. He no longer wanted the galleys for the defence of Constantinople from the Turks but planned to make war on the King of Serbia, the Emperor of Bulgaria and perhaps on the Emperor of Constantinople, whom he accused of plotting against Hungary. Now that Louis had openly stated his genuine intentions, there was no question of Venice continuing to lend him any aid at all. The Doge's answer to Louis stressed the treaties which Venice had with the empire, the

---

good relations it had with Serbia, whose king was a Venetian citizen, and the peace which it enjoyed with the Bulgarian empire where Venetian merchants operated securely. The chronicler concluded with the observation that such divisions between the King of Hungary and the emperor of Constantinople and the other princes gave the Turks their best opportunity of increasing and expanding their power in Europe.

c) Venice and the Turkish threat to Constantinople.

The Venetians extended their policy of refusing assistance to the enemies of Byzantium to include the Turks who, despite their seemingly irresistible forces, were not above asking for additional support. Hoping to turn the strained relations between Venice and Genoa to his advantage, shortly after the end of the Chioggia war, the Emir Murad proposed that Venice should join in a combined attack on the Genoese of Pera. However, on 10 March 1384, the Turkish ambassador was flatly told that the project could not be considered since, 'as the whole world knew', the Genoese and the Venetians had recently made peace at Turin which they did not intend to break. The Venetians expressed their willingness to make enquiries about replacing some dogs which Murad was evidently upset at losing, but they were adamant that common action with the Turks against Pera was not possible.

1. *Fu risposto a sua maestà, che la repubblica Veneta haveva le loro convenzioni con l'imperatore di Constantinopoli formate con sacramento, e che il re di Rassia over di Servia era cittadin Veneto, con il quale haveva patti e obilo di trattarlo amichevolmente, e have eziandio pace con l'imperatore de Bulgari, nel paese delle quali li mercanti Veneti conversavano e negociavano securamente. Però pincease a sua maestà, haverla iscusata*. The Chronicle of Carlo, cited by S. Steinherz, 'Die Beziehungen Ludwigs I von Ungarn zu Karl IV (2)', Mitteilungen des Institutes für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 9, (1888), 369 n.3.

The dogs appeared again on 24 July 1338; Murad was apparently very pleased with them, and the Venetians were willing to send more. However, in other ways the relations between Venice and the Turks were less good. Murad still held some Venetian prisoners, taken near Coron and Modon, the conditions for whose release had been negotiated in 1334. Moreover it appeared that Murad had failed to understand that Venice was unwilling to consider joint action with the Turkish forces. Murad was under the impression that Venice had promised to send an army to him at its own expense, but the Venetians assured him that he must have misunderstood the ambassador who not only was not empowered to make such arrangements, but also knew perfectly well that Venice would not contemplate such a project for a moment. In order, however, not to aggravate the situation with Murad more than was necessary, the Venetian ambassador was told not to raise the matter unless Murad first mentioned it.

Despite Venice's refusal of military alliance much Venetian policy was directed towards gaining trading privileges from the Turks, a task which would surely have been greatly eased if the Venetians had enjoyed the status of allies. Furthermore the honour of Venice in the eyes of God and the world would not perhaps have been too badly shaken at the news of an alliance against the empire which had itself made an 'unholy alliance' with the Turks and was paying regular tribute to them. However, the advantages of supporting

1. 'Ad aures nostras pervenit quod videtur in imaginatione domini Moratj, ... quod promissum sit per ambaxiatorem nostrum qui fuit ad presantiam suam quod mitteremus exercitum nostrum ad nostras expensas ad subsidium domini Moratj; de quo valde mirati fuimus'. N. Iorga, op. cit. pp.1096-1097. Thiriet, Regests, no. 742.

2. This expression was used by Gregory XI in a letter to John V, 13 December 1374, Taktu 12, p. 244.
a weak Byzantine empire for as long as possible to the exclusion of a powerful and organised regime were still obvious enough to make active participation in the fall of Constantinople no part of Venetian policy.

The delicate balance involved in Venice's attitude towards Byzantium as the source of present prosperity and to the Turks as the future arbiters of eastern Mediterranean trade, is illustrated in the negotiations between Venice and Manuel in 1385. At this time Manuel was ruling independently of his father over the 'new empire' in Thessalonica. The policy of active resistance and aggression against the Turks which he had inaugurated, had passed through its brief successful stage, and the tide had turned against him. Thessalonica was under Turkish siege from the autumn of 1383 until it fell in April 1387. During this period of siege Manuel sent an embassy to the Venetians to inform them of the situation and the extreme necessity of arms and support. He asked for two cavalry transport ships, two hundred sets of armour, twenty thousand arrows and seventy crossbow men to be hired for three months; he also requested a loan of six thousand ducats, offering in pledge some of his territory and fortifications. He further suggested joint action between his galley and a Venetian galley from Negropont, in defence of both Byzantine and Venetian territory, and he offered rewards in the Morea if the Venetians would help his brother Theodore against the Navarrese there. Finally Manuel asked for Venice to intervene between Murad and himself so that a truce could be made between them.

On 18 April 1385 the Senate replied to Manuel's requests. In the matter of supplying arms the Venetians agreed in principle.

1. Venice's reply, which summarises Manuel's requests, is published in full by G.T. Dennis, Manuel II, pp.163-164; and partially by N. Lorga, op.cit. p.1007. Thiriet, Régestes, no.693.
but insisted that the money for their hire should arrive in Venice before the arms could be sent. Manuel's application for a loan was turned down because his ambassador's credentials did not cover either the receipt of the money or the authority to offer territory in pledge. A definite answer to the question of Venetian help against the Navarrese was not made because the matter was still under review. However, the suggestion that a Venetian galley should operate in conjunction with a Byzantine one was rejected outright on the grounds that the galley was at all times required for the defence of Negropont and for other Venetian business. The only part of Manuel's list of requests that Venice showed complete confidence in agreeing to concerned the possibility of the Venetians using their influence to restore peace between Manuel and Murad. The Senate informed Manuel that since Venice wished particularly for the peace and prosperity of the lord emperor, the next time that a Venetian ambassador was visiting Murad he would do his best to bring about peace between the Byzantines and the Turks.

To be involved in direct action against the Turks on Byzantium's behalf was quite as impossible in Venetian eyes as acting with the Turks against Byzantium or the Genoese of Pera. Venice, being anxious to take full advantage of the empire so long as it lasted, was also interested in seeing that the empire lasted as long as possible. But it was no part of Venetian policy to slow the empire's faltering collapse by antagonising its future masters with whom Venice hoped to have a profitable trading relationship in the years to come.

Thus although Demetrios Kydones was certainly correct in his belief that the commercial importance of Constantinople
would assure continued Venetian concern in the fate of the empire, his conclusion that this circumstance would result in a flow of western aid to Byzantium was more questionable. Indirect aid, such as the occasional dispatch of supplies for the Byzantine navy, was as far as Venice would readily go, and it never neglected to demand payment for the materials provided. Positive intervention, striking at the established power of the enemies of Byzantium and Christendom at large, could not be contemplated.

Venice’s attitude, which periodically aroused the anger of the papacy, was excused on the grounds that since the Republic was 'without fields, vines or any other possession than the exercise of commerce,' it could not enter lightly into an enterprise which might undermine its livelihood. The experience of the crusade led by Peter of Cyprus against Alexandria, which Venice joined while ignorant of its ultimate objective, and which not only caused great losses to Venetian merchants in the city but also made relations with the Moslems very difficult, resulted in Venice seeking assurances from aspiring crusaders that they would avoid the shores of Syria and Egypt.

Venice confined its military activities against the Turks to participation in international enterprises, such as the League of Smyrna. The justification for this project was that it was a pre-emptive strike against a potential threat.

1. Thiriet, Régestes, nos.222,237,507,547,693.
3. The Venetians reminded King Louis of Hungary in a letter 10 March 1366 that he had stated that he had no plans 'de eundo ad partes Socris et Egipta, propter dampna maxima que sequerentur toti mundi si mercationes et exercitium mortium deberent taliter devastari'. M.S.H.S.N., 14, no.148.
to the trade of the eastern Mediterranean. Reports that Umur the emir of Aydın was preparing a massive fleet to pillage the coastal cities of Europe led to the formation of a confederation of naval forces armed by the pope, the King of Cyprus, Venice and the Hospitallers for the capture of Smyrna. The expedition was fundamentally defensive, aimed at the protection of trade, and it was a corporate effort which did not leave the participants exposed. Under such circumstances the Venetians were prepared to contribute forces, but generally they sought to avoid involvement. Instructions sent by the Senate to the Castellan of Coron on 6 March 1341 summed up the Venetians' attitude towards crusading ventures generally.

The Senate saw crusading as a speculative business, run by unreliable people, and discouraged the castellani from supplying ships and provisions for such undertakings. Diplomacy on the other hand was a less lethal weapon which Venice was prepared to employ in defence of its own interests and to the incidental benefit of the Byzantine empire.

---

B. The Genoese and the internal affairs of Byzantium.

i) The aggressive attitude of the colonists in Pera and the moderating influence of Genoa.

A cursory examination of the political events in the empire in the reign of John V gives the impression that the Genoese protected and promoted their interests in Byzantium by involving themselves directly in the domestic politics of the empire. While the Venetians pursued a policy of non-intervention and relied on their diplomatic skills to further their commercial position, the Genoese fought wars against Byzantium in 1348 and 1352, and supported rival candidates to John V's throne in 1376 and 1390.

The apparent difference in the attitudes of Venice and Genoa towards Byzantium's internal affairs is surprising since the position of the two Italian republics in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea was governed by factors which applied equally to both of them. The importance of Constantinople, situated on the Bosphorus and commanding the essential link between the food producing areas of the Pontic coastline and the consumer cities of the West, was common to them both. Similarly the empire contained their most important colonies and afforded them trading privileges and concessions which could not be matched elsewhere. In this connection the interests of the trading cities were clearly to be served most profitably by maintaining the empire for as long as possible as a haven of advantageous commercial conditions to the exclusion of the growing power of the Turks who would be unlikely to grant the same trading privileges in Constantinople that Venice and Genoa enjoyed under the empire.

However, there was one important respect in which the conditions of the Venetians and Genoese were not identical.
Venice's attitude towards the empire was dictated among other things by the relative vulnerability of its colony, situated in the centre of Constantinople and subject to the provisions of a treaty which had to be renewed every five years. The Genoese were limited by no such restrictions. Their security was guaranteed by permanent treaties and by the position of their colony across the Golden Horn from the capital, with its own deep water harbour and defended by its own considerable walls. In this position of independent strength the Genoese of Pera were able to act towards the empire as an equal and to protect their interests in a direct and often aggressive manner. This difference in the local conditions of the colonies was of great significance in determining the attitude of the Genoese to Byzantium, since although the policy of the authorities in Genoa itself was largely governed by considerations similar to those affecting Venice, the Genoese of the colony of Pera showed a more independent and self-confident spirit than their Venetian counterparts in Constantinople.

The freedom of action of the Genoese colonists is clearly visible in the war between Pera and Byzantium in 1348-1349. All the Byzantine commentators who record the war agree on the essentially local nature of its causes. Nikephoros Gregoras mentions the Genoese fear of the expansion of the Byzantine fleet and the danger it posed to their trading revenues since it had been built not only to oppose the Turks but also to help divert more sea trade into the

---

1. 'As these people (the Genoese of Pera) expanded and multiplied, so their avarice increased, until they felt bold enough to turn openly against their benefactor as the devil turned against his maker'. Makrembolites, *Logos Historikos*, p.146.
harbour of Constantinople. Kantakouzenos agrees that the Genoese motive was to 'rule the sea' and to oppose the increased fleet of merchant ships which the emperor had constructed. Finally Makrembolites says that the Genoese embarked on the war because of the 'long ships' which the Greeks had built and more specifically because their commander was a certain Phakeolatos who in 1346 had inflicted damage on Genoese merchant shipping and against whom they had ever since nursed an implacable hatred. The other grievance of the Genoese was also colonial in character, concerning the emperor's refusal to allow them to expand and fortify their district in Pera.

The war was fought by the Genoese of Pera with some help from Chios and Rhodes, but although the colonists sent envoys to Italy to rouse their compatriots to their assistance, no reinforcements were forthcoming from Genoa. One of the most interesting aspects of the war concerns the peace negotiations which followed the resounding Byzantine defeat at sea in 1349. The conflicting accounts of the Byzantine writers make it impossible to determine the exact course of the negotiations and the terms agreed. The most precise details about the conduct of the peace talks are provided by Gregoras.

4. Kantak. iv, ii, III, 68 and 70.
5. Gregoras, xvii, 3: II, 851.
6. A vivid description of the battle is given by Makrembolites, Logos Historikos, pp. 136-153. 'Of this great (Byzantine) fleet there was not so much as a bubble to be seen; it came and went with the speed of a lightning flash'. Cited D.M.Nicol, Last Centuries, p. 231. See also Gregoras, xvii, 6: II, 360-364; Kantak. iv, ll, III, 76-78; and P. Schreiner, 'La chronique brève de 1352', part 4, Q, C, F., 34, (1968), 38, 40-46.
according to whom the negotiations were begun by representatives from Pera on terms which were favourable to the colony, and after four days were taken over by envoys from Genoa itself. These ambassadors arrived from Genoa in a galley and immediately concluded a peace settlement entirely satisfactory to the Byzantines.

The terms described by Gregorios, involving the payment by the Genoese of over 100,000 gold pieces covering the empire's war expenses, may well exaggerate the mitigating influence of the Genoese envoys. However, their intervention in the peace negotiations is somewhat confirmed by a document containing the instructions given to other Genoese ambassadors to the empire in 1351. These men were told to remind the emperor of the cordiality of an embassy sent to Constantinople some time previously under Lancelot de Castro. The only embassy known, from sources other than Gregorios, to have visited Constantinople shortly before 1351, is one concerned with the future of Chios, but the names of these envoys are known, and Lancelot de Castro is not among them. Thus it is probable that Lancelot was a member of a different embassy, possibly the one described by Gregorios. He would have been dispatched from Genoa while the Byzantines were still effectively resisting the attacks from Pera, with instructions to heal the breach between Constantinople and Pera as amicably as possible.

1. Gregorios, xvii, 7: 11, 366. The terms described by Makrembolites, Logos Historikos, p.159 and Kantak. iv, 11: III, 79, are less favourable to the Byzantines but also suggest that the negotiations took place in two phases.


3. The envoys concerned with Chios were Jacopo Erminio and Adaro Spinola. Kantak. iv, 12: III, 81-82.
The actions of the Genoese of Pera were again in conflict with the policies being pursued from Genoa in the war of 1352. Byzantium had no direct interest or relevance in the dispute which Genoa had at the time with Venice, arising out of a merchants' dispute at Tana at the mouth of the Don and concerning the domination of Black Sea trade. However, the strategic position of Constantinople caused both sides to solicit the empire's aid, but the Venetian and Genoese embassies were rebuffed by John Kantakouzenos who refused to be diverted from his own problems by involving himself in a foreign dispute. Genoa accepted this position and even sent ambassadors to the emperor to thank him for his neutral attitude and to encourage his resistance to the Venetians' offer of alliance. However, by the time the ambassadors arrived in the empire the situation had changed dramatically. They found that Byzantium had entered the war and was firmly allied to the Venetians and the Catalans.

This sudden change in Kantakouzenos' attitude was not caused by any alteration in his policy, but by an unprovoked attack on Constantinople by the Genoese of Pera who hurled rocks into the City and forced the emperor to seek security in the Venetian alliance. The motive of the colonists for this attack is unclear but, as in 1348, it was probably a reaction to renewed attempts to Kantakouzenos to build up the Byzantine merchant fleet. Immediately after the Byzantine defeat in 1349 the emperor had attempted to rejuvenate Greek trade by cutting the tax paid by the empire's ships from ten per cent ad valorem to two per cent, a level which made

1. Kantak, iv, 13, III, 118 and iv, 25, III, 186-190. For the background to the war see ibid, iv, 26, III, 191-193. Also Thiriet, Regestes, 244.
4. This information, given by Kantak, iv, 12, III, 81, has been differently interpreted. See especially D.A.Zakythinos, (contd.)
their activities more competitive with the Genoese traders who were exempt from Byzantine charges and were subject only to a local colonial tax at a basic rate of one and a third per cent. Kantakouzenos, in his own account of these measures, claimed that they had an immediate success in building up the merchant fleet to almost two hundred ships.

After Byzantium had been deserted by its allies, Kantakouzenos made his peace with the Genoese who were represented in the negotiations by their admiral, who had been appointed by the Commune of Genoa, and by the ambassadors who had been sent to Constantinople in 1351 with instructions to be pleasant to the emperor. The Genoese of Pora, who had provoked Kantakouzenos to enter the war, were not represented, and the negotiators set about re-establishing peace as far as possible in conformity with the instructions given in 1351. The terms were for the most part confined to preventing the Byzantines from providing the Venetians and Catalans with further aid for the duration of the war, and no attempt was made to humiliate or weaken the empire.

Another example of local Genoese involvement in the politics of Byzantium may perhaps be found in the restoration of John V in 1354. The contribution made by Genoese arms, under the direction of Francesco Gattilusio, in assisting John V to enter Constantinople has been taken as an established fact since it appeared in contemporary Italian chronicles and later works based on the same tradition, notably the History of Doukas, who worked on Lesbos for the Gattilusio family in

---

the mid-fifteenth century. According to his account Francesco Gattilusio met John V on Tenedos while on a journey from Genoa with two merchant ships which he offered to John to help him regain his throne. Doukas makes Gattilusio the central figure in John's entry into the capital, duping the guards into deserting their posts and then leading acclamations in John's honour until the people assembled to welcome him. Francesco was later married to John's sister Maria, and received the island of Lesbos as her dowry.

Doukas's assertion that Gattilusio was chiefly responsible for setting John V upon the throne has only recently been questioned, on the ground that neither of the contemporary Greek chronicles mention Genoese involvement. Indeed Gregoras makes a point of emphasising that John entered Constantinople without the help of any foreign ally, and Kantakouzenos reports that he told his men not to resist since their opponents were not foreigners. Here again there is a conflict of evidence which cannot be satisfactorily resolved. On the whole it seems likely that Gattilusio did play a part in John V's restoration, but he was acting on his own initiative and Kantakouzenos may formally be right in saying that John had no foreign ally. Even Doukas indicates the casual nature of Francesco's employment, making out that he was seeking his fortune wherever opportunity presented itself. The forces which supported John V were meagre according to all the accounts and suggest an individual rather than an official enterprise.

4. Doukas, xi, 3, p. 67 (Grecu) p. 40 (Bonn).
After Francesco received the island of Lesbos he showed his independence of the authorities in Genoa on more than one occasion, persisting in counterfeiting Venetian coins after being ordered to stop, and generally putting his personal interests and those of his adopted nationality before those of Genoa. His activities on behalf of John V in 1354 would be an early example of his independent attitude and cannot be taken to indicate official Genoese approval for his action.

Thus in the wars of 1348 and 1352 and the restoration of John V in 1354, the interventions and aggressive actions of the Genoese are attributable to the independent action of Genoese forces not immediately under the control of the metropolitan government and often acting in clear contravention of its policies. The only occasion when the Commune of Genoa came into prolonged and bitter conflict with Byzantium was between 1376 and 1379 when the Genoese supported the usurpation of Andronikos IV. This intervention was only a part of a much wider conflict between Genoa and Venice throughout the Mediterranean, in which Byzantium became involved as an almost inevitable consequence of the treaty between John V and the Venetians in 1376. By the terms of this treaty John agreed to cede to Venice the island of Tenedos, which had long been coveted by the Italian trading cities since it commanded the route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. By this agreement John V not only affected the balance of power between Venice and Genoa in such a manner that renewed hostilities between them could scarcely be avoided, but he seemed to

be placing himself and the empire squarely in the Venetian camp. Even had Andronikos not been available as an alternative candidate for the imperial throne, Venice and Byzantium as its ally would have faced the certainty of Genoese revenge.

The presence of Andronikos, imperfectly blinded and loosely confined in a monastery, disgraced and disinherited for his attempted usurpation with Saudji in 1373, made the task of the Genoese much simpler. Andronikos was able to escape to Pera where he was given military assistance for the capture of Constantinople and the deposition of his father. He also had the support of a Turkish army which seems not to have taken part in the fighting in which one hundred and sixty Genoese died\(^1\). Having gained the throne, Andronikos set about rewarding his allies, ceding Gallipoli to the Turks and Tenedos to the Genoese\(^2\). But when the Genoese attempted to take their prize they were resisted by the island’s inhabitants who remained faithful to John V and the Venetians whom they allowed to occupy the island. This was precisely the situation which the Genoese had sought to prevent by supporting Andronikos’ usurpation, and the conflict widened inexorably into general war. Demetrios Kydones reported on the situation in Constantinople:

the Genoese cannot bear to keep the peace while their rivals hold Tenedos, for they believe that they would thus be deprived of access to the sea and of the profits of maritime commerce, a thing which is more terrible to them than if they were driven out of their own country. Therefore, they aim at investing the island with triremes, ships, engines of war and everything else that those who go to war invent. And they compel the emperor to co-operate with them, for otherwise, they say, he

---


2. Liber Jurium Reipublicae Genuensiae, 2, pp.319-321.
would connive with the Venetians in their robbery and prefer them to the Genoese. The emperor, in order to avoid all suspicion, has agreed to ally himself with them and now, in the midst of so much misery, he is preparing arms, munitions, engines of war and ships, and is forced to hire troops, a thing which for him is more difficult than flying.

The Genoese attempt to prevent Venice acquiring a dominant position in maritime commerce involved them in heavy losses, not only in Pera which suffered a long siege exacerbated by plague, but in the west as well which, after the initial exchanges, became the main theatre of the war.

However, the Peace of Turin which brought the hostilities to an end in 1381 showed that the Genoese effort had not been in vain. Under the terms of the Peace Tenedos was denied to both the Republics and to Byzantium, its inhabitants were transported and its buildings destroyed. A central feature of the Peace was that Andronikos IV and his son John VII were reinstated as the rightful heirs to John V to the exclusion of Manuel's claim. The assumption was that John V and Manuel were Venice's men, and Andronikos and John VII were Genoa's men, and that control of Byzantium should alternate between the two trading cities. On the surface this was a considerable victory for Genoa, since it appeared to guarantee the republic a substantial future influence in Byzantine politics. But this was not the cause for which Genoa had supported Andronikos' usurpation. The Genoese were aware of the dangers of polarizing Byzantine politics between Andronikos and John V, between themselves and the Venetians. Andronikos had served his function as a tool with which excessive Venetian influence in the empire could be countered, but he and his son could

2. The text of the Peace of Turin, Liber Aurium Republicae Genuensis, 2, pp.838-906.
not rely on continued Genoese support to bring John V's reign to a premature end.

After the revolt of Andronikos Genoa reverted to its natural policy of maintaining the peaceful conditions within the empire on which its prosperity depended. This was illustrated in the spring and summer of 1385 when Andronikos renewed his struggle with his father and attacked a castle between Selymbria and Constantinople. It was a serious situation, not least since it appeared to be reopening the conflict of 1376. But on this occasion the Genoese took no part, it was a purely internal dispute in which one of the most significant features was that the Genoese appeared in the rôle of peacemakers. On John V's own testimony the Genoese kept aloof from the fighting and the podesta of Pera took active steps to reconcile the parties. He could not, however, prevent a pitched battle between the two Greek forces which John V won, although at great danger to his life, but the podesta's action is a striking illustration of the Genoese concern that the empire should not be weakened further by internal disputes and that the Italians should not become parties to them.

The events surrounding John VII's usurpation of the Byzantine throne in 1390 provide further evidence both of the Genoese government's commitment to the preservation of peace in the empire and also of the difficulty of making the colony of Pera follow the policies of its metropolis. The actions of John VII immediately before his revolt are by no means clear and all the sources relating to this period show manifest confusions.

2. 'Potestates Peyre fuerunt ibides quasrentes pacem s(icut) ipat ostendebant', R-J. Loechner, cit., p.37.
However, there is considerable evidence that John VII prepared for his attack on his grandfather by visiting Genoa in search of assistance. The fifteenth century historian Chalkokondyles mentions John VII's presence there, and a short chronicle records his return to the empire from Genoa in 1390. From western sources it is also clear that John VII's mother was in Italy in 1390 and it is a reasonable assumption that she visited the west with her son to get help, and remained there to await results. Furthermore it is known that an imperial procurator, representing John V, was in Genoa in 1390 and it has been suggested that his presence was designed to counter the influence of John VII.

It is impossible to be certain whether John VII himself visited Genoa, but the likelihood is strong since the Genoese had made his rights of succession part of their terms in the Peace of Turin in 1331, and so appeared, to John VII, to be his natural champions. It is certain, however, that when John VII presented himself before the walls of Constantinople in April 1390, his forces did not include a large official contingent of Genoese troops. All the accounts agree that his army was chiefly composed of Turks and even they were not required to fight since John VII's sympathisers inside the walls opened one of the gates and admitted the usurper without his Turkish followers.

2. Documents edited and discussed by J. Barker, loc.cit.
It would seem, therefore, that the authorities in Genoa rejected John VII's request for aid. The Genoese of Pera were less circumspect. They had already given grave offence to John V by paying his grandson imperial honours to which he was not entitled and by neglecting the customary acclamations when John V himself sailed past the colony. In a letter to the Commune of Genoa John V complained that the colonists had been responsible for a number of plots against his life, and that one conspirator, although confessing his guilt, had gone unpunished. As soon as John VII had gained entry into Constantinople, it was to the Genoese of Pera that he turned for help in besieging John V in the fortress of the Golden Gate where he still held out.

John V succeeded in resisting the besieging forces and his son Manuel was able to escape from the City to seek help outside. After the stalemate in Constantinople had lasted about four months the policy of the Genoese underwent a sudden change. A series of expense accounts from Pera reveal that the Genoese made contact with John V in his fortress and attempted to arrange a truce between the two factions. In the light of

1. R. J. Loenertz, 'Fragment d'une lettre', R.Z., 51, (1958) 37-38. John V's complaint that the Genoese of Pera had honoured John VII 'sine voluntate grechorum (et contra ritum) ecclesie ipsorum' is additional evidence that John VII was not crowned by Andronikos IV in 1377, see J. Barker, Manuel II, p.29 n.70.
2. Ο δὲ βασιλεὺς ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ εἰσῆλθε... εἰς τὸ καστέλλιον τῆς Χρυσῆς πολιορκούμενος ύπὸ τοῦ ἐγγόνου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Γαλατηνῶν'. Short Chronicle 15, lines 31-32.
3. 8 August 1390. 'Pro .... expensis factis .... in barchis, pro transitu equorum cibo et potu quando dominus Potestas ivit ad Creseam (the Golden,Χρυσῆ , Gate) pro ponendo acordium inter Imperatores'. L. Belgrano, 'Prima serie', Atti Società Ligure, 13, p.151. Several other entries testify to contacts with John V and John VII after the latter's expulsion from Constantinople on 17 September 1390. Ibid., pp.151-152 and also N. Iarga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, I, (Paris 1939), pp. 41-50.
previous such reversals of Genoese policy it seems likely that
this change from aggression to conciliation was the result of
instructions from the government in Genoa, which can have had
little faith in the stability of John VII's regime and little
liking for a government in Constantinople which was even more
subservient to the Turks than the previous one. The extent to
which John VII considered himself betrayed by those whom he
took to be his traditional allies is revealed by the fact that
he sent an embassy to Venice about August 1390 seeking assist-
ance against his grandfather. The Venetians, however, proved
no more willing than the Genoese to become involved in Byzan-
tine internal affairs 1.

In the event John VII's brief reign was brought to an end
by the forces which Manuel had managed to raise from Rhodes,
Lemnos, Christopolis and Constantinople. A sudden sally from
the fortress of the Golden Gate caught John VII unprepared,
and he was driven from the City to find temporary refuge in
Pera before fleeing finally to the Turks. The only resistance
encountered by Manuel's men came from Francesco II Gattilusio
who was displaying the same individual enterprise and dis-
regard for official Genoese policy that his father had shown
nearly forty years previously 2.

ii) Genoa and the Turks.

Underlying Genoa's attitude towards the empire was the
realisation which grew as John V's reign progressed, that Con-
stantinople and eastern trade generally would soon become
subject to Turkish power. Genoa therefore, like Venice, was
at pains not to prejudice its future trading prospects either
by allowing its existing privileges to slip from its hands,

2. Short Chronicle 15,lines 35-39; 52,lines 44-46. Ignatius
   of Smolensk, ed. B.de Khitrowo, p.142.
or by antagonising the Turks. The forwarding of these aims necessarily led to extremely tortuous policies on all sides, but while Venice restricted its relations with the Ottomans to polite diplomatic exchanges, the Genoese often had closer contacts and active alliances with them.

Following the battle of the Bosphorus in February 1352, the Genoese made plans to press home their advantage by bringing Orchan, the Emir of Bithynia, into the war on their side. An alliance between the Genoese admiral and Orchan was arranged through the mediation of Philip Delomede and Boniface de Saulo, two Genoese from Pera who had been expelled from the colony by their compatriots and had entered Orchan's service. John Kantakouzenos states that Orchan was promised money and a prominent place on the roll of benefactors to the Genoese Senate and people. This promise, together with a grievance of his own against the Venetians, persuaded Orchan to send a large force of infantry and cavalry to help in the protection of Pera. The value of the Turkish intervention was acknowledged in letters from Genoa to Pera and to Orchan himself, in which Philip and Boniface were readmitted to the colony. Orchan had been pressing for the restoration of their colonial privileges for some years, perhaps in order that he could use them as commercial agents, and his request, 'although hard, serious and harmful' to the Genoese was granted. The letter

2. Letter from Genoa to Pera 21 March 1356, L.Belgrano, 'Prima Serie', Atti Società Ligure, 13, 126-127. The privileges were confirmed 20 November 1356, '.... recollentes grata et magnifica servitut per viros providos Philippum Delomede et Bonifatium de Saulo burgenses civitatis Peyre exhibita circa inaedum concordium inter Comune Janue ... et magnificum dominum Orcambech magnus amiratus Turcie, .... ex quo quanta salus quantusque robur Comuni Janue et innuensi nationi additus'. Ibid. p.129. The privileges were revoked in 1361.
sent to Orchan, informing him of the decision, refers to him as 'our brother and father to our people in Pera'.

The Genoese, however, could not rely on lasting peace and favour with the Turks. When Pera was besieged in 1379-1381, the forces which blockaded the landward side were Turkish. When the commune of Genoa signed a commercial treaty with the Turks of Murad in 1387, the earliest document of the type which has survived, it is apparent that the Genoese enjoyed no special trading privileges in Turkish territory. While Murad's traders were allowed complete exemption from customs dues in Pera, and paid only a small sales tax, the Genoese trading in Turkish territory were subject to the same charges as 'Saracens, Greeks and Venetians'. By the terms of the treaty the Commune of Genoa was held to make sure that the podestà of Pera and his council observed all the articles agreed with the Turks. However, the colony's dissatisfaction

1. '... nostro frai e chi è stato payre di li nostri de Peyra ... E si recommandano li nostri de Peyra che sun nostri figi e servizio e veragi'. Ibid. pp.125-126. Genoa also had good relations with Hizir, Umar's successor as Emir of Aydin. On 26 May 1351 a Genoese ambassador on his way to Romania was instructed to go 'ad altrum locum (Ephesus) quia ille dominus Halabi (Hizir) sicut scitis multum bene se habuit et ostendit voluntatem sergo omnes Januenses etiam et multum curialiter scrisit nobis per suas litteras se offerendo ad omnia que possit pro nobis.' The ambassador was told to make contact 'cum consule et mercatoribus nostris existentibus ibi'. G.Bertolotto, 'Nuova serie', Atti Società Ligure, 28, 551. Cited P.Leomeli, L'Emirat d'Aydin, p.233 n.6.

2. 'E tenevano l'assedio a Pera per la via di mare; e da terra il Turco le aveva attorno il campo, essendo in lega coll'Imperadore Calojanni, e avevano posti mangani appresso la Città, che facevano gran dannò'. Chronicon Patavinus, Muratori, R.I.S., 17, 350c. Cf. Daniele di Chianszo, Cronica de la Guerra de Veneciani a Zonovesi, ed. V.Lazzarini, Monumenti Storici, Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezia, n.s.11, (Venice 1938), 217. G.Stella, Annales Genuenses, Muratori, R.I.S., 17, 1113a.

3. L.Belgrano, 'Prima serie', Atti Società Ligure, 13, pp.146-149.
with the trading conditions imposed upon it by the treaty found expression in an anti-Turkish alliance concluded in November or December 1331. Pera associated itself with the main powers of the alliance, Chios, Rhodes, Lesbos and Cyprus, making no reference to the Commune of Genoa but acting as an independent entity. This is a further illustration of the manner in which the policies made in Genoa to safeguard the long-term interests of Genoese traders clashed with the immediate ambitions of the colonists who, when thwarted, showed instant aggression.

1. Ibid. pp. 953-965. The alliance was formed 'contra illum Turcum fillum iniquitatis et nequicie, ac sancte Crucis nimicum, Moratum Bey et eius sectam'. No action was taken by the allies causing the Genoese of Pera to complain. See letter of Francesco II Gattilusio to Pera 15 June 1396, Ibid. p. 966.
The three main topics which have been discussed above were the chief areas of contact between Byzantium and the West in John V's reign. The negotiations about Church reunion, which were the central feature of his foreign policy, had produced some original and hopeful plans for bringing East and West closer together, but despite the personal conversion of the emperor, the practical assistance of Amadeo and John V's visit to Rome, no firm agreements were reached. The differences dividing the two sides were too great for a solution sought along such formal lines to be fruitful. The personal conversion of the emperor was too narrow a basis for persuading either the Byzantine Church to follow his example or the West to take an active interest in the fate of the eastern empire.

More important than the official negotiations, was the success of a few individuals in personally bridging the gulf between East and West and creating an atmosphere of understanding and conciliation at least in intellectual and court circles. A number of Byzantines, not all of them committed to the Roman Church, began to look at the Latins in a new light and to seek common ground in a way which had not been possible before the influence of the Friars, the translation of western theological works and the individuals began to be felt. This was the area of the greatest novelty and interest in the relations between Byzantium and the West in John V's reign.

The commercial relationship was also moving the two sides closer together. Economically the empire had become no more than an outpost of the West in the eastern Mediterranean by the beginning of John V's reign. Although this fact was financially the ruin of Byzantium and exposed the empire to the dangers of
Venetian and Genoese rivalry to exploit the eastern trade, the growing political and commercial identity of interest between the West and Byzantium offset the economic threat. Increasingly the political importance of the empire in the world depended on the presence of the western commercial colonies. The failure of these colonies to provide Byzantium with substantial military aid was largely due to their pessimism about the empire's ability to survive under any circumstances and their realization that the Turks were the future masters of the area.

Given time the individual contacts and the commercial relationship might have played a more important part in bringing East and West towards mutual understanding, religious union and practical co-operation. But there was no time. The territorial losses of Byzantium between 1341 and 1354 had totally altered the empire's situation and had transformed it from a workable political unit to an embattled fortress under immense outside pressures. Time for the gradual change of long-held attitudes was not available, as John V recognised in his persistent and energetic pursuit of a negotiated settlement. It was not simply disillusionment with the West but political realism which forced him into a rapprochement with the Turks shortly after his return from Italy in 1371. It was a decision for which he has frequently been reproached by modern historians who perhaps have understood his situation less clearly than did the Italian trading cities, which looked to the Turks for commercial concessions, or Pope Gregory XI, who accepted that the West shared the blame by its slowness in offering assistance to Byzantium.
APPENDIX

THE COINAGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERA IN THE REIGN OF JOHN V
In recent years much has been written on the coinage of the Byzantine Empire in the era of the Palaiologoi. To a large extent this has been due to the substantial finds of late Byzantine coinage which have been made in Bulgaria and Romania. As a result the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries are now much better represented by Byzantine coins than they were, but the new discoveries have also re-emphasised the paucity of gold coinage in the empire from about 1330 onwards.

The disappearance of gold coins after the usurpation of Andronikos IV has been convincingly explained by Bertelè who drew attention to the introduction, about 1376, of a monometallic currency based on the silver half-hyperpyron. Although the hyperpyron continued to survive in financial records until the end of the empire, it ceased to refer to a single gold coin and was represented by two large silver pieces instead. Bertelè considered that this new silver coinage had achieved dominance in Constantinople by 1389 when it appeared in frequent use in the accounts of the Genoese notary in Pera, Donato de Clavaro.


2. Bertelè, 'L'iperpero', 70-89.
However, there remains a long gap from about 1330 to about 1376 for which no substantial Byzantine gold coinage existed and during which no substitute for gold is known. There are some isolated examples of gold coins in the names of two groups of rulers, Andronikos III and Anne of Savoy with John V, and also John V with John Kantakouzenos, but neither of these coin types is sufficiently common to suggest that it formed the basis of Byzantine coinage for any length of time\(^1\). The only gold coin attributed to John V alone is known from only one example and is of such an unusual design as to cast doubt on whether it was really a coin at all\(^2\). In this period some issues of silver coinage in small denominations are common\(^3\), but no coinage has survived from this period which can be identified as the currency of Constantinople's trade.

This lack of numismatic material is all the more surprising since there is a large amount of documentary evidence which suggests that trade in Constantinople was based on the gold hyperpyron until the last quarter of the fourteenth century and that Byzantine gold coins were used by merchants of all nationalities for transactions as far afield as the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria.

---

1. A. Veglery and A. Millas, 'Gold and silver coinage', 486-487.
2. A. Blanchet, 'Les dernières monnaies d'or des empereurs de Byzance', Revue numismatique, 14, (1910) 87.
The outstanding problem of using written sources for mediaeval numismatics is whether the units of money mentioned in the texts refer to actual identifiable coins; when, for example, a Genoese merchant uses the term hyperpyron does he mean a gold coin belonging to the Byzantine family of solidus/nomisma/hyperpyron? This cannot be assumed since, as has already been mentioned, the use of the hyperpyron as a money of account is evident by the end of the fourteenth century. The first task of this study is to decide whether this development took place earlier than 1376, which is the date when the silver half-hyperpyron can be shown to have come into existence as the normal medium of exchange.

The documents which help to shed light on the nature of the currency used in Constantinople are all western, yet they are sufficiently numerous and varied in character to suggest a clear picture of the coinage even for the mid-fourteenth century when the information from the numismatic sources is most scanty.

The first is an official document of the Commune of Genoa concerning the regulations for the sale of the tax farms which covered the customs paid by Genoese shipping in Pera for the year 1343-1344. It states that 'in Constantinople and Pera, where for the most part the tax should be collected, hyperpyra and no other sort of money (non alie monete) from diverse provinces is used (expenduntur)'\(^1\).

The use of the words *moneta* and *expendo* show that the document is describing the actual business process in which the

---

coins are weighed out before being handed over; they would be out of place if hyperpyra were only a money of account.

The second document dated 12 December 1348, is also Genoese. It contains the judicial decision of the podestà of Pera in an action between two Anconitans and two Genoese who were in dispute over 'a large quantity of good gold hyperpyra of the weight of Pera received in cash'.

The third source was written in 1352; it forms part of the accounts of the Catalan naval expedition in the weeks after the battle of the Bosporus against the Genoese. The Catalans were able to recoup some of their heavy losses by the sale of equipment and captured goods in Crete, Constantinople and elsewhere on their way homewards. The entries show clearly that the treasurer reduced all the sums he received to a single currency for ease of accounting; he chose gold ducats for this purpose. Thus when he was paid in ducats he made a simple entry, for example, 'Item, sold to Pero Ffranxische, one basin for the price of one ducat'. If the payment was not made in ducats, the sum was translated into them: 'Item, four empty pots sold to a Greek grocer for the price of ii ps. iii q. which are worth i ducat x q.' That ps. stands for perpers or hyperpyra and q. for carats is clear from the exchange rate set out in a later entry: 'Sold in Constantinople on Monday 13 March to ser Dimitrio Verdali, a Greek, one horse transport ship which had been Genoese, for the price of 1,130 perpers

1. 'In Gostantinopoli e in Pera ...... il pagamento di perperi si fa a peso e non a novero di conto'. F.B. Pego-lotti, La Práctica della Mercatura, ed. A. Evans, p.40.
2. L. Belgrano 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera', Atti della società ligure,13,(1877-84) 937. '... recepisse in pecunia tantam quantitatem suorum bonorum perperorum auri ad sagium Peyer'.
which are worth, at the rate of 41 carats to a gold ducat, 661 ducats and 19 carats¹. It is evident from both these last two entries that the treasurer received hyperpyra from some of the men who bought his goods and he translated the sums into ducats in order to have a common unit of coinage for all the sales made on the journey home¹.

The fullest and most exciting literary source, which contains a wealth of information on the financial and trading affairs of Constantinople and Pera, is the Account Book of Barberius, the treasurer of Amadeo of Savoy during his crusade of 1366-1367². It is in two sections, receipts and expenses, which account for all the money which passed through Barberius' hands. Since the army travelled from Savoy to Venice, Coron, Negropont, Constantinople and Bulgaria, and returned via Dalmatia, northern Italy and Rome, it is not surprising that one of the most striking impressions given by the Account Book is of the vast variety of coins with which the treasurer had to deal, nor is it surprising that he, like the Catalan treasurer, found it necessary to express the value of each sort of coin in one standard currency for ease of reckoning. His choice for this purpose was also the gold ducat and the gold florin which were of equal value. Thus at the end of his first section, adding up all the receipts he had made in 'parperi¹, he calculated that he had been given '132,381 gold hyperpyra and 7 carats of the weight of Constantinople or Pera, reckoning 24 carats to a parpero and two parperi to a gold ducat'. Similarly Barberius added up his receipts of coinages whose actual existence is undeniable,

¹. Ibid. pp. 272-275.
such as grossi of Tours which he valued at twelve and a half to a florin. Finally at the end of his work, having added up all his payments made in all coinages with the words 'facto cambio monetarum modis superius declaratis ...' he proceeded to estimate by how much his expenses had exceeded his receipts, reducing each denomination of coins, including 95,659 gold hyperpyra, to ducats.

Three further examples can be given which show Barberius using hyperpyra in such a way that they can only be gold coins. There are a number of entries in the Account Book which include several payments for various articles under one heading. One of these entries records that the treasurer bought bean flour from one man and paid in silver aspers, from another merchant he got corn, paying in florins, and finally from the same man he bought bacon for which he gave gold hyperpyra.

Secondly, when Amadeo required a loan, as he frequently did, he generally turned to the Genoese of Pera. In the Accounts the technical amount of the loan was usually expressed in florins or ducats while the money actually received was invariably expressed in hyperpyra. On a number of occasions, although payment did not become due until Amadeo reached Italy, he chose to pay off the loan in Pera. Thus John Bassus who had given Amadeo 3000 hyperpyra against a letter of debt for 2100 florins, received his money early; he was not paid in florins but was given the equivalent number of hyperpyra, 4200.

---

1. Ibid., p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 278.
3. Ibid., no. 267.
4. Ibid., nos. LXVI, 531.
Finally the relations which Amadeo had with the money changers (campsores) of Pera must be mentioned. On one occasion some of them had made a payment on Amadeo's behalf which they had made in ducats because they did not have any hyperpyra. This was evidently considered unusual and Amadeo was charged an extra carat per ducat on the exchange.¹

The meaning of these entries is unmistakable; gold hyperpyra were, just like the grossi of Tours, coins which had been actually received and handed out. This is made additionally clear by the fact that Amadeo, during his first stay in Constantinople from 2 September to 11 October 1366, used hyperpyra only very rarely and in small quantities but nearly always spent florins². The reason for this was simply that his treasury had not yet received a significant number of hyperpyra and he was dependent on the coins which he had brought with him from Italy. This removes the suspicion that all payments made within the orbit of the Byzantine Empire were recorded in hyperpyra regardless of the coinage actually used. When a standard coinage unit was required for accounting purposes both Barberius and the Catalan treasurer used the gold ducat or florin; many examples of this are found in the loan transactions where the money which actually changed hands was expressed in hyperpyra while the florins appeared only on paper.

If it is accepted that gold hyperpyra were circulating in large quantities in Constantinople and Pera in the mid-fourteenth century, there remains the problem of attempting to identify them. None of the more or less contemporary issues

¹ Ibid., nos. 496, 604. 'Quia... parperos non habebant pro solucionibus faciendis pro Domino'.
² The dates are given by Short Chronicle 47, p.81. Bollati, Illustrazioni, nos. 222, 243, 266, 267.
of the Byzantine mint was large enough, to judge from the surviving examples, to form the basis of the empire's currency. If Amadeo alone was able to receive 132,881 hyperpyra they must have belonged to an issue much larger than any of those produced jointly or severally by Andronikos III, Anne of Savoy, John V and John Kantakouzenos.

The last substantial series of gold coins issued in the name of any Byzantine emperor was the one which featured Andronikos II and Andronikos III together. Indeed there are so many of these coins and the period of the joint-rule of these two emperors is so short that they are worth a close examination. They have been studied most fully, though with an unfortunate amount of confusion, by Gerasimov who has published an analysis of fifty-three coins of this series from at least eight Romanian hoards. The most startling of his discoveries is that there is no instance of die-duplication among his examples. The coins also show a considerable amount of stylistic variation among their number, with both columnar and circular inscriptions and a wide range of dots, stars, letters and other marks. Altogether no less than fifty-three distinct types can be distinguished among the fifty-three coins examined by Gerasimov. These facts can only indicate that many different dies of slightly differing types were used in minting coins bearing the names of the two Andronikoi together, and this in turn suggests that a very large number of these coins was produced, certainly far too many for them all to be accommodated within the restricted range of their joint-rule.

which lasted from 1325 to 1328. The inevitable conclusion must be that they became a type immobilisae, continuing to be struck long after the period of joint-rule had ended.

Exactly how long the minting of these coins continued is very hard to estimate. The information about the hoards in which they were found is unfortunately too scanty and too confused to give reliable dates for their deposit which would help to indicate how long the issue remained in circulation. Many of the hoards have been incompletely recorded and some were dispersed before they had been studied at all. It is clear, however, as the number and variety of the coins has already suggested, that the hyperpyra of Andronikos II and III were in use long after 1328. The hoard from Alexandrovo, to the north-west of Tarnovo, contained thirteen silver grossi of John Alexander so that the three hyperpyra found with them must have circulated after 1331. The hoards at Plovdiv and Markovo, in western and north-eastern Bulgaria respectively, both contained coins bearing the effigies of Andronikos III, Anne of Savoy and John V together which were probably struck between 1341 and 1347 as well as hyperpyra of the two Andronikoi. We may therefore conclude that the gold hyperpyra in the joint names of Andronikos II and III were in circulation at least as late as 1341, but the lack of detailed study of these hoards makes it impossible at present to suggest, on the basis of the coin evidence alone, the date at which this archaic coinage ceased to be struck. The literary evidence examined above, however, provides strong reasons for thinking that it was in full use at least as late as 1367.
The existence of a substantial gold coinage of whatever issue in Constantinople and Pera at least as late as Amadeo's visit in 1367, together with the continued issue of coins attributed to Andronikos II and III, raises the puzzling question of who was striking the coins. The Byzantines themselves can be ruled out since there is no reason by John V should have struck coins without his own head upon them. The use in mid-fourteenth century Byzantine of coinage iconography to proclaim legitimacy and assert sovereignty is clearly visible in coins of John associated with his dead father and in issues showing John Kantakouzenos alone, which date from 1353-1354. If John V had been able to strike a personal gold coinage he would certainly have followed these examples and placed his own head and name upon it.

The obvious explanation is that, although the coinage was modelled on the Byzantine hyperpyron, it was the product of a mint outside imperial control. If this was the case, the Latins are the most obvious source. The probability that the Venetians were striking coins on a Byzantine pattern during their occupation of Constantinople is gradually gaining acceptance despite the lack of any coins which can be positively attributed to them. The mention by Pegolotti of 'Latin gold hyperpyra' among the coins current in Constantinople about 1320 certainly suggests that such minting had taken place, and the treaty between Theodore I and the Venetians in 1219 which forbade either party to strike 'yperperi, manuelati or stamena' on the other's model would not have been necessary if it had not

T. Bertolè, 'Monete dell' imperatore Giovanni VI Cantacuzeno', Mélanges Ostrogorsky, I, (Belgrade 1963), 53-56 and Pl.IV/15.
already been done or at least planned. The striking of a saracen-like besant by the Kingdom of Jerusalem is one example of many which show the Latins' capacity for producing imitative coinages. In this regard it is interesting that the only form of coinage known so far to have been struck by the Genoese of Pera was a counterfeit of the Venetian sequin.

However, the most powerful reason for suspecting the Latins is that they more than anyone else needed a currency of stable value, which the Byzantines had shown themselves unable to produce, for their trade in and around Constantinople. The trade passing through the Bosporus was now out of Byzantine control and in the hands of the Italian trading cities whose dominance enabled and their trade required them to guarantee the striking of gold coinage. The reign of John V was a period of relative stability for the hyperpyron whose gold content had fallen from sixteen carats to eleven between 1261 and 1340 and whose exchange rate against the ducat then remained at about two to one until the last years of John's life. This suggests that in these years the striking of the hyperpyron was in the hands of some power which was not so vulnerable to daily economic strains and stresses as were the Byzantines.

3. P. Lembros, 'Ανέκδοτα νομισματα, ηπέντα εν Πέραν ὑπο τῆς αὐτής ἀρχοντᾶς τῶν οντοτατικῶν', ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΝ, 1, (1872) 103-122.

(contd.)
We may ask, however, why the Latin colonists should have met their need for a stable coin by striking Byzantine counterfeits instead of coins modelled on their native florins or ducats or actually imported from Venice or Genoa. The first part of the answer lies in their need for a coinage recognised throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Although the florin and ducat had become popular in some areas of eastern commerce, especially Egypt, these places which had remained under direct Byzantine control or influence until more recent years continued to recognise and use for preference coins of a Byzantine type. The Venetians accepted this fact in Crete where the name hyperpyron lived on in a coin of Byzantine appearance long after political control had passed to the Republic. The trading communities of the Black Sea for example, which only comparatively recently had become accustomed to the appearance in strength of Italian merchants, would have missed their traditional Byzantine trading coin even more.

A second reason which was certainly of considerable force was the unwillingness of the metropolitan governments to allow their distant colonies any minting rights which might result in the production of coins imitating their prestigious domestic florins and ducats and endangering their universal acceptability by unsupervised minting and perhaps debasement. This is certainly the interpretation to be put upon the clause, which appeared among the regulations drawn up by the Commune of Genoa for the administration of its colony in Pera in 1304, forbidding any Genoese official or individual to strike any form of coinage anywhere in the

1391: 2 hyp. 7 carats - 1 ducat. Atti Soc. Lig., 13, p.165.
world. This provision was clearly designed for the protection of the minting rights of metropolitan Genoa from colonial competition. By the mid-fourteenth century the situation had changed somewhat and the Genoese could no longer rely on Byzantine coinage for their eastern trading currency as they had in 1304. But while some colonial minting for trade purposes was clearly necessary the need to protect the florin remained as great as ever and encouraged the production of a non-Genoese coin type. Furthermore the copying of a Byzantine coin had the particular advantage that it was much easier to counterfeit the coinage of an empire too weak to retaliate than to invite the hostility of the metropolitan or some other strong government.

There is some evidence to suggest that the minting of gold hyperpyra after 1330 was more likely to be the work of the Genoese than the Venetians, but the documentary sources unfortunately are nowhere explicit on the question of minting and we have to rely on very inconclusive material. There are, for example, many references to transactions involving hyperpyra 'of the weight of Pera', (ponderis Pere or ad sagium Peyre) which might seem to indicate the origin of the coins. In Amadeo's Accounts mention is also made of hyperpyra 'of the weight of Constantinople' and 'of the weight of Romania', but from the manner in which the terms are used it seems that they all refer to the same coins;

2. Bollati, Illustrazioni, no. 454.
5. Ibid., no. 430.
certainly they were of the same value. The most likely explanation of these names is that they indicate the place where the sum of money was officially weighed. Thus hyperpyra of the weight of Pera are most commonly used since Amadeo conducted most of his business in the Genoese colony, and the hyperpyra of Constantinople or Romania appear when the transaction took place in the capital or in the provinces. The apparent confusion which arises when Amadeo receives hyperpyra of Pera from the Emperor of Constantinople while in Mesembria on the Black Sea, is explained by the fact that the money was raised from Genoese bankers, and so was weighed in Pera.

However, while the bulk of the evidence strongly suggests that this interpretation of the expression 'of the weight of Pera' is the correct one, there are a couple of facts which are rather puzzling. The expression does not appear in the acts of the notaries operating in Pera in 1281. Their acts usually specify 'ad sagium Constantinopolitanum', occasionally merely 'de sagio' and sometimes omit any mention of sagium at all. The earliest appearance of 'perperi ad sagium' Peyre' known to me is in the judgement delivered by the Genoese podestà of Pera in 1348. The sparsity of the sources suggest that the term must have been in use earlier, but it would be surprising that the thirteenth century

1. 'Perperi auri ponderis Pore seu Romania', Bullati, Illustrazioni, no. 459 'Parperi auri ponderis Constantinopolis seu Pore', Ibid., p. 25. There were also 'Parperi auri ad pondus Mesembrì', Ibid., no. 423. These presumably were the same coins but weighed on local scales - seventeen of them exchanged for eight florins, Ibid., p. 278, but cf. nos. 427, 423.
3. Bullati Illustrazioni, no. XLVII.
notarial acts do not use the expression at all if it merely indicated where the money was officially weighed for each transaction. Similarly, if the expression signified an official weighing which was part of every large business deal, it is difficult to explain how Amadeus on his first visit to Constantinople was able to use hyperpyra with no mention of their *ponderis* in the Accounts\(^1\).

Moreover, while the use of the term is easy to understand when it concerns large sums of money used in payment for goods received in a business deal, since the only satisfactory method of estimating the value of a pile of coins of unequal weight is to weigh them as a whole, the purpose of such an official weight guarantee is harder to see in the case of single coins given in alms or as a gift\(^2\). Yet these payments also are entered in the Accounts with the certification of 'ponderis Pera' when it is clear that they would not have been weighed at all. These few points arouse suspicion that there was something more Peran about the hyperpyra than merely the scales on which they were weighed.

The differing characters of the colonies of the two Italian republics is another factor which causes the suspicion over the minting of hyperpyra to fall more heavily on the Genoese than the Venetians. The Genoese colony situated outside the walls of Constantinople on territory over which the Byzantines had surrendered their sovereign rights, was accustomed by the reign of John V to deal with the Byzantine Empire on terms of equality. The wars of 1348-1349 and 1352 had brought home to the Greeks their inability to prevent the Genoese colonists from doing very much as they liked. The

---

Venetians' attitude towards the Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, is symbolised by the presence of their colony within the capital city. They were no less successful than the Genoese in getting their way in commercial matters, but the methods they employed were less violent and they strictly honoured their treaties with the Empire. The direct challenges to imperial authority which punctuate the relations between Pera and Constantinople were rarely attempted by Venice and so it would have been most uncharacteristic of the Venetians to counterfeit Byzantine hyperpyra.

The extent to which the Genoese used hyperpyra for their colonial trade can be seen in many commercial documents. However, the most striking illustration of it is found in a financial record which only indirectly concerns Constantinople. This is the Register of acts kept by a Genoese notary in Kilia, Antonio de Podenzolo. About a hundred acts remain in the surviving part of this Register, covering a period from 27 November 1360 to 12 May 1361. They concern all kinds of business conducted both in Kilia, on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria, and inland, but of particular interest are the thirty-three letters of exchange concerning loans made to merchants. In every case the amount of the loan is expressed in silver, usually silver somni of the weight of Kilia, sometimes aspers and occasionally in uncoined metal; the exact number of somni is not always specified. The two invariable features in the letters are that the loan is to be repaid in Pera within twelve to fifteen days of the merchant's arrival there, and the sum to be repaid is always expressed in gold hyperpyra of the weight of Pera. This pro-

1. The Register of Podenzolo has not been edited but forms the basis of an article by O. Iliescu, 'Notes sur l'apport roumain au ravitaillement de Byzance d'après une source inédite du XIVe siècle', Nouvelles études d'histoire, (Bucharest 1965), 105-116.
cess resulted in the transfer of 7,770 hyperpyra from Pera to Bulgaria in the period covered by Podenzolo's Register. It must be borne in mind furthermore that the months covered by these acts were not the peak months of the Black Sea trade. So much is clear from the fact that nearly half the acts come from the 1-12 May when trade was beginning to pick up again after the winter. Also Podenzolo reveals that he was not the only Genoese notary operating in Kilia. He several times mentions Bernabò de Carpina who, since he was Genoese consul in Kilia, was doubtless a more important notary than Podenzolo himself.

Podenzolo's evidence reveals that the Genoese exported a large volume of hyperpyra for their trade with Bulgaria. This strengthens the identification of these coins with the issue bearing the names of Andronikos II and Andronikos III. All the major finds of coins from this series have been made in north-eastern Bulgaria, south of the Danube, in the fertile food-producing areas which the Genoese merchants visited to purchase corn. It is also interesting that the hoards which contained coins of the joint emperors, although producing a large mixture of other coin types, held no florins. This is another indication that the currency of international trade in Pera was hyperpyra.

On the other hand the local trade in Bulgaria was conducted in silver somni, which suggests the reason why in the end the archaic gold currency of international trade at Constantinople and Pera succumbed to the use of silver which was the medium of exchange not only in Bulgaria but also generally to the north and east of Byzantium. The relative values put upon gold and silver in the east and the west from the mid-thirteenth century onwards caused a flow of gold

westwards from areas where it was relatively undervalued. Conversely silver, both in the form of metal and coin, found its way to Moslem lands where its value against gold was relatively high. Byzantium stood near the centre of these streams of precious metals, relatively unaffected by the violent fluctuations in value which occurred in east and west, but influenced by the general process nevertheless. The empire traditionally belonged to the eastern bloc so far as precious metals went, tending to be closer to the Moslem lands in the relative values given to gold and silver than to the Christian West. In this sense the gold coinage of Constantinople and Pera was by the last quarter of the fourteenth century a growing anachronism and it was only a question of time before the empire joined its immediate neighbours in adopting an exclusively silver and bronze currency.

There were in addition more immediate reasons for the re-establishment of the Byzantine mint which help explain why the Genoese, if they had once started to produce gold hyperpyra, were ultimately not in a position to protect the minting rights which they had usurped. Although the credit for the revival of minting in Constantinople and the innovation of a silver-based Byzantine currency has been given to Andronikos IV, it cannot be forgotten to what an extent he was himself a pawn in Genoese policy. His accession was merely the result of Genoese fears that John V was too much under the influence of the Venetians, and having received his throne with their assistance he was obliged to reign as their puppet, pursuing an anti-Venetian policy which he could not

---

afford. His situation at the hands of the Genoese was, in
the words of Demetrios Kydones, 'more difficult than flying'.
Furthermore, Andronikos had to bear the cost of buying
protection from the Turks who 'exactetl such a sum of money
that nobody could easily count it'. These are not the cir-
cumstances which one would expect to form the background to
the re-establishment of Constantinople's minting independence.

The critical factor which led to the changes was cer-
tainly not an improvement in Byzantium's economic position.
It was on the contrary the major financial crisis which
faced Genoa as a result of its war with Venice. Both
republics saw the war of Chioggia as a fight to the death,
as a war which was finally to end their ancient rivalry,
and to this end they poured all their financial resources
into the battle. In Genoa ten forced loans were levied
between 1376 and 1381 which yielded an average of 100,000
florins. This crushing burden of taxation, together with
the total disruption of trade in the eastern Mediterranean,
brought the city close to ruin. The colony of Pera suffered
particularly badly, being subjected to a long siege by land
and sea which naturally brought all commercial activities
to a standstill. In this situation of blockade and economic
stagnation the hyperpyron ceased to be a coin of international
trade and became merely a local currency under domestic
Byzantine control. To fulfil this function a silver coin

1. On the monetary reforms of Andronikos IV see T. Bertele, 'L'iperpero', 70-89. On his usurpation and indebtedness
to the Genoese see D.M. Nicol, The last centuries of
Byzantium 1201-1453 (London 1972) pp.287-292. D.J. Dennis,
The reign of Manuel II in Thessalonica, 1382-1387,
Demetrios Kydones, Correspondance II, ed. R-J. Loemertz,
Letter 167.

2. G. Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia dall'XI al
was quite sufficient and indeed brought Byzantium in to line with its neighbours and trading partners in such a way that, with the revival of commerce after the war, the silver half-
hyperpyron became the standard coin of the trade passing through the Bosporos.

The final question which must be answered is why John V should have allowed apparently Byzantine hyperpyra to be minted by outsiders. Schlumberger considered it utterly improbable that the Genoese would have struck money in Pera since 'the Byzantine court would never have put up with such an attack on its rights by foreigners settled in the very suburbs of the capital'. If the arguments set out above are acceptable, they would show that the Genoese colony enjoyed far greater independence than Schlumberger imagined, and this would conform with the practical freedom which it undoubtedly possessed in other areas such as legal administra-
tion, land ownership and taxation. Surprising though it may seem at first sight that John V could not prevent the issue of an unauthorised coinage on his doorstep, there is nothing in the situation to suggest that he could do anything about it. Nor did it diminish perceptibly his already exig-
uous political or economic authority; the coins were largely used by foreigners for a trade which involved only a few Byzantines and which brought little profit to the imperial treasury. If the traders chose to produce coins themselves rather than to come to his mint for coins he was powerless to prevent them unless he was able to produce a coinage him-
self which would meet their needs better.

It may have been an attempt to make such a coin which led to the production of the one gold coin which has been attri-

2. See above pp. 213-231.
buted to John V's personal rule. This issue, which is known from only one example, differs from the traditional Byzantine hyperpyron in almost every particular. It is small, absolutely flat, and on the reverse, instead of the Virgin with her arms raised encircled by the walls of Constantinople which appeared on all hyperpyra after 1261, it bears the figure of John the Baptist. However, the most significant features of this coin are its weight and its fineness; it weighs 1.38 grams of which 1.34 are pure gold. This amount of gold is very close indeed to the amount contained in the last debased hyperpyron which John V issued with his parents' effigies. The purity of the coin and its western appearance suggest that the issue could represent an attempt by John V to improve the acceptability of the Byzantine hyperpyron without altering its basic value. If this was an effort to win the western merchants back to the imperial mint it clearly failed; the likely fate of any pure gold coin in Constantinople was rapid export to the west - perhaps that is why only one survives today.

Once again the question has returned to the poverty of the numismatic sources for the reign of John V. An attempt has been made in these pages to explore the reasons why no issue of gold coins directly attributable to any Byzantine emperor after 1330 exists in substantial numbers and to suggest what might have replaced them as the basic trading currency for the empire and its environs. No more than a hypothesis can be offered until coins are found in such circumstances that it can be proved that they circulated in mid-fourteenth century Byzantium. Until they are discovered

it would be unwise to close our mind to the possibilities outlined above, which take account of the record sources as well as the sparse, and as yet imperfectly explored, numismatic remains.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. SOURCES

A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Venetian State Archives, Senato, Misti vols. 19-41.
(Deliberations of the Venetian Senate).

B. PRINTED SOURCES.

1. General Collections.

BELGRANO, L.T. 'Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia
di Pera', Atti della società ligure di storia patria, 13,
(1877-1884), 97-336.
— 'Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di
Pera', Atti della società ligure di storia patria, 13,
(1880), 931-1003.

BERTOLOTTO, G. 'Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di
Genova coll' impero bizantino', Atti della società ligure

DÜLGER, F. Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches,
part IV: 1282-1341; part V: 1341-1453. (Munich and Berlin,
1960, 1965).

JORGAN, N. Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des
croisades au XVe siècle, 1. (Paris, 1899).


Liber Iurium reipublicae Genuensis, 2, ed. H. RICOTTIUS,
(Historiae Patriae Monumenta, 9, Turin, 1857).

MARTÈNE, E, and DURAND, U. Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum
historicorum, dogmatariorum, moralium amplissima collectio,

MIGNE, J.P. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graecae

MIKLOSICH, F. and MÜLLER, J. Acta et diplomata graeca medi
sevi sacra et profana, 6 vols. (Vienna, 1860-1890).

Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, 2-4,
2-4, ed. S. LJUBIĆ, (Zagreb, 1870-1874).

Monumenta historica Slavorum meridionalium vicinorumque popula-
lorum e tabulariis et bibliothecis Italicis deprompta,
collecta, atque illustrata, 1, ed. V. MAKUSEV, (Warsaw, 1874).
MÜLLER, G. Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'Oriente. (Florence, 1879).


PAPADOPOULOS-KERAMEUS, A. Ανάλεκτα Ιεροσολυμιτινής Σταυρολογίας, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1891-1898).


QUETIF, J. and ECHARD, J. Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti, notisque historicis et criticis illustrati, 1, (Paris 1719).


STEGMÜLLER, F. Analecta Upsaliensia theologiam mediæ evi illustrantia, 1, Opera systematica, (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, 7, (1953).


THEINER, A. and MIKLOSIICH, F. Monumenta spectantia ad unionem ecclesiarum Graecae et Romanae, (Vienna, 1872).


WADDING, L. Annales Minorum seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum, 8, (Rome 1733).

2. Individual sources. I) Greek.


— Oratio pro unione habit, M.P.G. 151, 1321-1342.
— Pro Latinis, M.P.G. 151, 1255-1330.


KANTAKOUZENOS, John, Historiae, ed. L. Schopen, 3 vols.
(C.S.H.B. 1828-1832).


— De admittingo Latinorum subsidio, M.P.G., 154, 961-1009.
— De non reddenda Callopoli, M.P.G., 154, 1009-1036.


MAKREMBOLITES, Alexios, Historical discourse on the Genoese, ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, 'Ἀνάλητα Ἴεροσολυμικῆς Επαχυνδρόων, 1, (1891), 144-159.


MOŠIN, V. 'Akti iz svetogorskih arhiva', Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Spomenik, 91, (Belgrada, 1939).


PANARETOS, M.A. see P. Risco, 'Matteo Angelo Panareto e cinque suoi opuscoli', Roma e l'Oriente, 7-11, (1914-1916).


SHORT CHRONICLES:

- Chronicon breve thessalonicense, ed. R.-J. Loenertz, Démétrius Cydonès Correspondance, 1, 174-175.
- Καρποζίλος, Α. and Παρασσογλού, Γ.Μ. 'Διήγησις Βασιλέων τῶν Ἰσπαμπλιτῶν, a short chronicle', Ρ., 42, (1972).
- SPIRANTZES, George, Chronicon minus, edited together with the Chronicon minus of Pseudo-Phrantzes by V. Greco, Georgios Spirantzes, Memoriai 1401-1477. (Bucharest, 1966).
- ZORAS, G., ed. Χρονικὸν περὶ τῶν τούρκων σουλτάνων (κατὰ τὸν Παπαθεόρου Κώστα ΙΙΙ), (Athens, 1958).

2. Individual Sources 11) Western, Slavonic and Oriental.

BALUZIUS, S. *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, new edition

BOLLATI DI SAINT-PIERRE, P. *Illustrazioni della spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI*, (Biblioteca storica italiana, 5, Turin, 1900).

CAMERA, M. *Memorie storico-diplomatiche dell' antica città e ducato di Amalfi*, l, (Salerno, 1876).


RUBIO Y LLUCH, A. Diplomatari del Orient Català, 1301-1409, (Barcelona, 1947).


SERVION, J. Gestez et croniques de la Mayson de Savoie, ed. F.E. Bollati, Bibliothèque de la maison de Savoie, 1-2, (Turin, 1879).

Statuti di Pera, ed. V. Promis, Miscellanea di storia Italiana, 11, (1870) 513-780.


II. SECONDARY WORKS


ARNAKIS, G. 'Gregory Palamas among the Turks and documents of his captivity as historical sources', *Speculum*, 26, (1951), 104-118.

ATTYA, A.S. *The crusade in the later middle ages*, (London, 1933).


BECK, H-G. Kirche und theologische Literatur in byzantinischen Reich, (Munich, 1959).


BERTÈLÈ, T. 'L'iperpero bizantino dal 1261 al 1453', Rivista italiana di numismatica e scienze affini, 59, (1957), 70-89.


— 'Monete dell'imperatore Giovanni VI Cantacuzeno', Mélanges Ostrogorsky, 1, = Zbornik Radova, 8, 1, (1963), 43-59.


BLANCHET, A. 'Les dernières monnaies d'or des empereurs de Byzance', Revue numismatique, 14, (1910), 78-90.


BOUVY, E. 'Saint Thomas, Ses traducteurs byzantins', Revue Augustiniens, 16, (1910), 401-408.


BRATIANU, G.I. Recherches sur Vicina et Cetatea Albă. Contributions à l'histoire de la domination byzantine et tartare et du commerce génois sur le littoral roumain de la Mer Noire, (Bucharest, 1935).

Recherches sur la domination byzantine et tartare et du commerce génois sur le littoral roumain de la Mer Noire, (Bucharest, 1935).

BRUNETTI, L. 'Sulla quantità di monete d'argento emesse sotto Anna di Savoia imperatrice di Bisanzio (1341-1347)', Rivista Italiana di Numismatica, 11, (1963), 143-168.


Nilus Cabasilas et theologia S. Thomas de processione Spiritus Sancti, Studi e Testi, (Rome, 1945).

'El libro VI de Prócoro Cidonio (cabra la luza tabórica)', O.C.P., 20, (1934), 247-297.

CHARANIS, P. 'An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century', B. 13, (1938), 335-362.


'On the social structure and economic organisation of the Byzantine empire in the thirteenth century and later', B.S., 12, (1951), 94-153.


— 'Venetian commercial privileges under the Palaeologi', Studi Veneziani, 12, (1970), 267-356.


DAVIS, J.C. The decline of the Venetian nobility as a ruling class, (Baltimore, 1962).

DELAVILLE LE ROULX, J. La France en Orient, au XIVe siècle, 2 vols, (Paris, 1886).

DEMETRAKOPULOS, A. Ὑπὸ τῶν γραφίτων κατὰ Λατίνου καὶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ξυτῶν, (Leipzig, 1872).


DESIMONI, C. 'Nuovi studi sull' atlante Luxoro', Atti della società ligure di storia patria, 5, (1867), 171-270.

— 'I Genovesi ed i loro quartieri in Costantinopoli nel secolo XIII', Giornale linguistico di archeologia, storia e delle arti, 3, (1876), 217-274.


DÖLGER, F. 'Johannes VII. Kaiser der Römär, R.Z., 31 (1931), 21-36.


PIDDALTO, G. Simone Atumano, monaco di Studio, Arcivescovo latino di Tebe, secolo XIV. (Storia del Cristianesimo, 2, Brescia, 1968).

FERNANCIČ, B. 'Notes sur la diplomatique byzantine', Zbornik Radova, 10, (1967), 251-296.


GAY,J. Le pape Clément VI et les affaires d'Orient (1344-1352), (Paris, 1904).


GIANNELLI, C. 'Un progetto di Barlaam Calabro per l'unione delle chiese', Miscellanea G. Mercati, 3, Studi e Testi, 123, 157-208.

GIBBON, E. The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, 7, (London, 1900).

GOLUBOVICH, G. Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell' oriente Francescano, 3-5, (Florence, 1919-1927).


— 'La correspondance inédite de Nicolas Kabasilas', B.Z., 30, (1930), 96-102.

NALECKI, O. "Un empereur de Byzance à Rome. Vingt ans de travail pour l'union des églises et pour la défense de l'empire d'Orient, 1355-1375". (Travaux historiques de la société des sciences et des lettres de Varsovie, 3, Warsaw, 1930).


- "Le commerce vénitien et les changements dans l'importance des centres de commerce en Grèce du 13e au 15e siècles", Studi Veneziani, 9, (1967), 3-34.

ILIESCU, 0. "Notes sur l'apport roumain au ravitaillement de Byzance d'après une source inédite du XIVe siècle", Nouvelles études d'histoire, (Bucharest, 1965), 105-116.


ILIESCU, 0. and SIMION, G. "Le grand trésor de monnaies et lingots des XIIe et XIVe siècles trouvé en Dobroudja septentrionale. Note préliminaire", Revue des études sud-est européennes, 2, (1964), 217-228.


JANDER, R. Constantinople byzantine, (Paris, 1950).

JIREČEK, C. Geschichte der Serben, 2 vols. (Gotha, 1911-1918).

— 'Démétrius Cydonès et la théologie latine à Byzance aux XIVe et XVe siècles', E.O., 27, (1928), 385-402.
— 'Barlaam est-il né catholique?' E.O., 39, (1940), 100-125.


KERN, A. 'Der "Libellus de notitia orbis", Johannes III (De Galonifontibus?) O.P. Erzbischöf von Sultanyeh', Arch. Praed., 8, (1938), 82-123.

KOLIAS, G. 'The revolt of John VII Palaiologos against John V Palaiologos (1390)', (in Greek), Hellenika, 12, (1952-1953), 34-64.


— 'John Cantacuzenus, the Genoese, the Venetians and the Catalans (1348-1354)', Byzantina, 4, (1972), 333-356.

LAMBROS, P. 'Anékdocta nousmata kómpenta en Peiran úpo tis autódí

apokias tōn Genonhsów, 'Αθήναι, 1, (1872), 113-122.

LANE, F.C. 'Venetian merchant galleys, 1300-1334, private and communal operation' Speculum, 39, (1963), 179-205.

LASCARIS, M. 'Le Patriarchat de Péa a-t-il été reconnu par l'église de Constantinople en 1375?', Mélanges Ch. Dichi, 1, (Paris, 1930), 171-175.


LAURENT, M.-H. and GILLLOU, A. Le 'liber visitationis d'Athanase Chalkéopoulous, (1457-1458), Studi e Testi, 206, (Rome 1960).


— 'La liste épiscopale du synodicon de Thessalonique', E.O., 32, (1933), 300-310.

— 'L'archevêque de Péa et le titre de patriarche après l'union de 1375', Balcania, 7, (1944), 303-310.


— 'Démétrius Cydonès, citoyen de Venise', E.O., 37, (1938), 125-126.


— 'Pour l'histoire du Péloponnèse au XIVe siècle (1382-1404)', R.E.B., 1, (1943), 152-196.


'Le chancelier impérial à Byzance au XIVe et au XVIe siècle', O.C.P., 26, (1960), 275-300.


'L'exil de Manuel II Paléologue à Lemnos, 1387-1389', O.C.P., 38, (1972), 116-140.


— 'La corona de Aragón y la Grecia catalana 1379-1394', Anuarí de estudios mediecales, 6, (1969), 219-252.
MALTEZOU, Ch.A. 'O Ægeio του ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενετού Βασιλείου (1265-1453), Bibliothèque Société N. Skopoulou, 6 (Athens, 1970).
MARINESCU, C. 'Notes sur les Catalans dans l'empire byzantin pendant le règne de Jacques II (1291-1327)', Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge offerts à Ferdinand Lot, (Paris, 1923), 501-513.
MARKL, O. Ortsnamen Griechenlands in 'fränkischer' Zeit', (Byzantina Vindobonensia, 1, 1966).
— Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota, ed altri appunti per la storia della teologica e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV, Studi e Testi, (Rome, 1931).


— 'L'origine de la controverse palamite', Theologia, 26, (1955), 77-90.


— Essays on the Latin Orient (Cambridge, 1921)


Muratore, D. Una principessa sabauda sul trono di Bizanzio - Giovanna di Savoia imperatrice Anna Palaeologina, (Chambéry, 1905).


NICOLAUS d'OLMERY, L. L'expansió de Catalunya en la Mediterrania oriental, (Barcelona, 1926).


NORDEN, W. Das Papsttum und Byzanz, (Berlin, 1903).

OBOLENSKY, D. 'Byzantium, Kiev and Moscow, a study in ecclesiastical relations', D.O.F., 11, (1957), 21-78.


OSTROGORSKY, G. Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine, translated H. Grégoire, Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae, Subsidia, 1, (1934).

'Byzance, état tributaire de l'empire turc', Zbornik Radova, 5, (1938), 49-58.


SALAVILLE, S. *Vues soteriologiques chez Nicolas Cabasillas*, *Revue Élamite*, 1, (1943), 5-57.


SCHIRò, G. *Un documento inedito sulla fede di Barlaam Calabro*, *Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania*, 8, (1933), 155-166.

— *Il paradosso di Nilo Cabasila*, *Studi bizantini e neoeellenici*, 9, (1957), 362-388.


The Byzantine background to the Italian Renaissance, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 100, (1936), 1-76.


Notes on Stephen, the Novgorodian pilgrim to Constantinople in the fourteenth century, Südostforschungen, 12, (1953), 165-175.

'Nicholas Cabasilas' correspondence and the treatment of late Byzantine literary texts', B.Z., 47, (1954), 49-59.


SILBERSCHMIDT, M. Das orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des turkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen, (Leipzig, 1923).


SKRJINSKAJA, E. 'Storia della Tana', Studi Veneziani, 10, (1968), 3-45.


STARR, J. Romania, the Jewries of the Levant after the Fourth Crusade, (Paris, 1949).


TAFRALI, O. Thessalonique au XIVe siècle, (Paris, 1913).


— 'Venise et l'occupation de Téénodos au XIVe siècle', Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, 65, (1953), 219-245.


THIRIET, F. and WIRTH, P. 'La politique religieuse de Venise à Néogroport à la fin du XIVe siècle', B.Z., 36, (1963), 297-303.


TURYN, A. The manuscript tradition of the tragedies of Aeschylus, (The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1943).

— Studies in the manuscript tradition of the tragedies of Sophocles, (Illinois studies in language and literature, 36, 1952).


VAN MILLIGEN, A. Byzantine Constantinople: the walls of the city and adjoining historical sites, (London, 1899).

--- 'Pero Tafur, a Spanish traveller of the fifteenth century and his visit to Constantinople, Trebizond and Italy', E., 7, (1932), 75-122.


VILLER, M. 'La question de l'union des églises entre Grecs et Latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu'à celui de Florence', Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 16, (1921), 260-305; 315-352; 18, (1922), 20-60.


VRYONIS, S. 'Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme', Speculum, 31 (1956), 493-443.
VRYONIS, S. 'Byzantine attitudes towards Islam in the later middle ages', Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 12, (1971), 263-286.

The decline of medieval hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century, (California, 1971).


WEISS, R. 'The Greek culture of south Italy in the later middle ages', Proceedings of the British Academy, 37, (1951), 23-50.


ZACHARIADOU, E. 'The conquest of Adrianople by the Turks', Studi Veneziani, 12, (1970), 211-217.


ZUNTZ, G. An inquiry into the transmission of the plays of Euripides, (Cambridge, 1965).