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CHAPTER VI: THE ALEXANDRIAN FATHERS.
The Writings of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Methodius of Olympus, and Dionysius of Alexandria: Critical Editions, Allied Matters

In the case of Clement of Alexandria the critical texts employed were those of the Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller series. This represents a departure from our usual practice in this thesis, which has been to use the Sources Chrétiennes series. The reason for this was that the major portions of Clement's works are only in preparation with the French series, and it seemed undesirable to use one textual authority in certain instances and a different one in other cases.

The volume dealing with the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus is volume 12 in the G.C.S. series of texts and represents the work of Otto Stählin. It was published in 1905 by J.C. Hinrich's sche Buchhandlung at Leipzig. So far as the Stromata are concerned, Books I–VI were edited by Stählin in the same series, this work being published in 1906. (G.R.S. series No. 15). This editing has more recently been revised and published (1960) as a third edition (G.C.S. series No. 52). The person responsible for this work was Ludwig Früchtel. These editions of the text have been employed. Stromata VII–VIII were edited, again by Stählin, and this book was published in 1909 (G.C.S. series No. 17). This work also includes an editing by Stahl of the Excerpta ex Theodoto and the Eclanæ Propheticae, together with the Quis dives salvatur (fragments are also dealt with). This volume has been employed in dealing with the Stromata VII–VIII, the Excerpta ex Theodoto, the Eclanæ Propheticae, and the Quis dives salvatur, which are quoted passim.

Origen. The Sources Chrétiennes series was employed only with reference to the Homilies on the Book of Joshua, in dealing with this
writer. The S.C. series on the *Contra Celsum* was not readily available to us until this thesis was being completed. The volume mentioned in this series, which was employed, is number 71, and is entitled 'Homilies sur Josue'. It represents the work of A. Jaubert in edition, and it was published in 1960.

In the case, therefore, both of the *De Principiis* and the *Contra Celsum*, the volumes used were the appropriate ones in the Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller series.

**Methodius of Olympus.** The S.C. text was employed in this instance. The French edition of the text of the 'Banquet of the Ten Virgins' is entitled *Le Banquet* and is the work of H. Musurillo and V.H. Dehidour. It was published in 1963. Our quotations from Methodius of Olympus are taken only from this work on the Banquet, which illustrates sufficiently the themes which are in our mind.

**Dionysius of Alexandria.** Dionysius is treated as lying strictly beyond the field of our investigation, since he is not dealt with in his own right but is introduced simply as a foil to the thought of Origen. For this reason the English translation only has been given, where quotations from the fragments of his works are used. The translation employed is that given by C.L. Feltoe in his book, *St. Dionysius of Alexandria. Letters and Treatises*, published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in London, and the Macmillan Company in New York in 1918. The quotations given are from fragments of Dionysius' book, *On the Promises*, and modern knowledge of the text of the same depends upon quotations from Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History* VII, 24 and 25.
The Alexandrian Fathers

INTRODUCTION

When we refer to the Alexandrian Fathers, we have in mind Clement of Alexandria and his successor as head of the Catechetical School in Alexandria, Origen. The title constitutes a recognition that, despite important differences in their theological outlook, Clement and Origen had somewhat in common, both in their ecclesiastical background and in their outlook. Of the two Origen must be judged the more systematic thinker. Curiously, he is also at once the more original of the two and the one more entrenched within the Christian tradition. As Einar Molland judges, Clement shows more depth of thought than ability to systematize. Despite severe criticisms upon the limits of Hellenic philosophy, Clement inwardly seems to owe more to it than does Origen.

When we come to the subject of eschatology, many similar comments are frequently made concerning these two thinkers. The commonest remark is that they have 'spiritualized' eschatology. This charge is made particularly in regard to Origen, but it is also made of Clement. The charge regarding Origen has been made from ancient times. The first to make it was Methodius of Olympus, writing at the end of the third century. In dealing with Origen, we shall have to examine the approach of Methodius in order to elucidate whether the usual evaluation is sound, and whether in fact Origen and Methodius are as far apart in their views as is frequently stated. The contribution of Dionysius of Alexandria in opposition to Nepos of Arsenoe will also come under review.

Our procedure in this investigation will be to set forth the salient features of the eschatology of Clement and of Origen in turn. Thereafter, common features will be examined and critically assessed, while divergences will be noted. We shall then be in a position to estimate the overall contribution of Clement and Origen to eschatology, and to the developing thinking of the Church on eschatological themes.

It would be wrong in principle to anticipate details of interpretation in advance, for in this way contentions advanced would not be documented. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it should be stated at the outset that it is our conviction that, both with reference to Clement and Origen, far too much stress has been laid on what has been termed a 'spiritualizing' of eschatology. In fact, both thinkers appear to have accepted belief in final Resurrection and Judgment at the Parousia of Christ. It is true that neither is sympathetic to belief in a millennial reign of Christ on earth. This is because both, and Origen especially, lay stress on the thought that Christ became as we are, in order that our destiny may be that of those who share in the life of the Son of God. For this reason, not only is a millennial reign not to the fore in their thinking—while some features of it were repugnant to them—but also their whole conception of the future life is of one in which the limitations of our present earthly life are left behind. It would seem, however, to be a mistake to interpret this to mean that all bodily existence will be left behind. Our life is to conform to the pattern of the heavenly Logos. A comment made by Charles Bigg in his Bampton Lectures for 1886, with reference to Origen, may give the general perspective:

"Man, he(Origen)tells us, will eventually cease to be a 'soul' at all. When his redemption is complete, his love will no longer be 'cold'; he will become a pure intelligence, as he was before
he lapsed from his first estate. But even so he will still be corporeal, for except the Trinity no spirit can exist without a shroud. The same law will apply to the Saviour, in so far as He is perfect Man."  

It is not so much that Clement and Origen wish to repudiate corporeal existence as man's destiny through Christ: rather is it that they want to stress that man and his environment will be greatly changed under the new conditions. In particular, the concept of man's participation in ἐκκαθάρισμος, in 'in incorruptibility', will be discovered to be an important feature in the thinking of both men. It is the stress on this concept which has given the false impression that these writers are more concerned with 'spiritual' existence after death than with the realities of the Christian tradition: the Parousia of Christ, Resurrection, Judgment, a New Heaven and a New Earth.

Clement

With this statement of vantage-point, we proceed to our examination of the contribution of Clement of Alexandria to eschatological themes. This is in his case a somewhat more difficult task than in that of most other writers. He wrote much less than Origen, and what we have is particularly difficult to interpret. The Protrepticus, the Paedagogus, the Quis Dives Salvetur, and other fragments are relatively lucid, but the Stromateis present a real challenge to understanding, in view of the deliberately ambiguous style adopted. Clement seems for ever to be presenting alternative solutions of theological problems, as also he is guilty of breaking off the discussion of a theme to return to it later. Despite the fact that this may result from some vagueness in his own thinking, a charge quite frequently made, and despite the fact that depth rather than

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systematization may best describe his thinking, it would seem likely
that his own avowed intention, of so presenting matters that only those
with understanding (γνώσις) will perceive the true meaning, suggests
that there is greater coherence than at first appears. This statement
applies to Clement's eschatology, as to all his theology. It is note-
worthy that it is in the Stromateis especially that this vagueness
attaches to his style, while the Protrepticus and the Paedagogus are
relatively straightforward. Clement's intention to make his readers
search for the hidden meaning is set forth in Book I, chapter I. If
the Stromateis is the projected book, which was to bear the title, 'The
Master' (Ho Didaskalos), mentioned in Paed. I.I, then this book will be
seen to complete a trilogy of works, an Exhortation to those outside
the Faith followed by an Instruction to those inside the Faith, now
capped by a work which would only be understood by the Christian Gnostic.
It cannot be said with certainty that the Stromateis represents this
third book, with its name changed from that originally intended, but if
it is, it does help us to believe that there is a hidden coherence.

The Second Advent.

Direct references to the Parousia of Christ in the writings of
Clement are few. We mention two in which this Event is spoken of as
a 'second advent' and where the reference is almost allusive in
character.

The first is another fragment preserved by Cassiodorus, and
finds a place within certain 'Comments on the First Epistle of John'.
Commenting on I Jn. 1:23 Clement says:

"Qui negat filium ignorando eum, nec patrem habet neque
cognoscit eum. Qui vero cognoscit filium, et patrem secundum
scientiam novit. Cum manifestatut fuerit dominus in secundo
adventu, fiduciam habebit et non confundetur, quae confusio
est grande supplicium."

The second reference occurs in the Eclogae Propheticae. LVI.
Clement is commenting upon Ps. 19: 4-5. His thought is interesting.

He says: "Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ ένετο τὸ σκήνωμα αὐτοῦ ἐν παλαι ὑπερβατῶν ἔστιν, περὶ γὰρ τῆς παροιμίας τῆς δευτέρας ὁ λόγος, οὕτως ὡς ἀναγνωστέαν τὸ ὑπερβατὸν κατὰ ἥκολοςην. καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃς νυμφιός ἐκπρεποῦσαν ἐν κυρίῳ ἀνθιστατεὶ ὡς γίγνεται ἀναμνήσει τοῦ ἁγίου αὐτοῦ. μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐγκαθαρίσεων ἠ ἐξοδος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐνθάντος τῆς θεμηρίας αὐτοῦ. καὶ τάτη ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐνετο τὸ σκήνωμα αὐτοῦ."

The development of Clement's thought in this chapter and the next (LVII) is quite difficult. It need not concern us in detail. It is worth noting that the futurist reference is, however, reinforced.

"He hath set" is understood as having a partially future reference.

The 'tabernacle' is interpreted of the Church. Matt. 13:43 is understood as referring possibly to shining "in the sun" rather than "like the sun". The cause for the transposition in Ps. 19: 4-5 now begins to be apparent. Clement's thought is that when the bridegroom issues from His chamber, i.e. when Christ appears in glory, nothing will be hid from His heat. It is at that time that Christ will deposit His 'tabernacle', i.e. the Church, in the sun. It may seem a very curious concept which is in view here, but it rests in part on the judgment that "an angel high in command" is presently "in the sun". Just as he now exercises sway at God's command over days (and angels, we are told, are sometimes called days), so Christ's people will exercise sway over angels in the days to come. Chapter LVII suggests a more figurative understanding of the reference to the setting of Christ's people in Himself by God. The speculative thought is also advanced that the Gnostic Christians, "those who possess knowledge", shall become angels, being instructed by the angels for a thousand years after their being brought to perfection. All of this may seem highly speculative, but it does underline that Clement did believe
in a Second Advent of Christ in glory.

**Future Resurrection**

Clement's clearest references are to the doctrines of the future resurrection and the purging fire of judgment. We look now at certain references to resurrection. It is worth noting the characteristic standpoint from which these are penned. They assume, rather than argue for, the reality of the future resurrection: what is at stake is the character of the life of those resurrected. In two passages (Paed.I.IV and II.X) Clement quotes from Lk.20:34, with a view to distinguishing the kind of life in the body that we now have and that which believers are to have in that which is to come. The references to Jesus' words in their context provide strong evidence that Clement believed that the resurrection was a reality. Jesus was giving answer to a scornful question from the Sadducees who did not believe in the resurrection. Jesus answers, asserting its reality, but demonstrating the changed conditions of life for those "worthy to attain to that age and to the resurrection from the dead".

(οἱ … καταξιωθέντες τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐκείνου τυχεῖν καὶ τῆς ἀμωματάσεως τῆς ἐκ νεκρῶν) In. Paed.I:IV. what Clement wants to show is that in the resurrection there shall be neither male nor female. "Ἄν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ θάνατος, κοινὴ δὲ ἡ ζωή, κοινὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ σωτηρία, κοινὴ τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ ἡ ἀγαθή. Ἐν γὰρ τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, μοιχία, ὑμμαθοὺσι καὶ γαμικοῦται, ἐν δὲ τῷ μέτωπτῳ τοῦ θαλαττοῦ τῶν ζηνέων διακρίνεται, ἐν εἰκόνει δὲ οὐκέτι, ἐνδιοτι τὸν κοινωνικὸν καὶ λίκνον τοῦτον βίου τοῦ ἐκ ζωηγήσεως τῶν ἐκαθολικοῦ ἢμεροῦ καὶ θελητῆς, ἀνθρώπως δὲ ἐπάκειται, εἰκὸνικῶς δὲ Χωσεοῦς αὐτὸν πεσχαρισμένω." (10,2-3)
It may well be that Clement is misled through Gnostic influences at this point in his interpretation of Jesus' meaning. Jesus does not assert that in the Kingdom of God sexual differentiation will disappear, but only that the marriage relationship, with all that this implies concerning the physical aspect of 'conjugal relations', will be set aside. It was, however, quite a common idea in Gnostic circles that it is only the body which gives sex-differentiation, i.e. that the soul itself is sexless. If this is where Clement derives his particular interpretation of Jesus' word, at Lk.20:34, this provides a good example of the admixture of Biblical and other notions in his thinking. Thus, this passage witnesses at once to Clement's belief in physical resurrection and his assumption that the raised body will be sexless.

Again, in, Paed.II.X, a chapter devoted to what is appropriate for the Christian in sexual conduct, Clement makes a play on the idea of divesting oneself of clothing. He says: "μὴ δὴ ἔμα χιτῶνι ἀποδυμένω ἀποδυσάμεθα καὶ τὴν ἀνδρᾶ ποτὲ, ἐπει οὐδέποτε τῇ δικαίῳ σωφροσύνῃ ἀποδυσάμεθα ἀείς." (100,2)

In context, Clement's thought is that marriage must not be made an excuse for sexual licence. There is that which is appropriate, and that which is inappropriate in sexual behaviour, even within the marriage bond. He goes on to express the thought that the practice of self-restraint, "shall consign the man to everlasting chastity". (λιδίῳ σωφροσύνῃ παρακατάθυμ τὸν ἀθροισμού.) The balance of thought is clever and powerful. Just as a man divests himself of clothing on retirial for the night, but does not even in the married state shed his continence, which is appropriate to his dignity as a man, so in the age to come he will be enabled,
through this life of continence which has become habitual, to shed even sexual desire and attain a higher form of life and communion. Sexual desire belongs to mortality, which is to be 'put off'. Again Lk. 20: 34 is quoted. Clement concludes:- "..... καταργήσαντες δὲ τὰς οἰκήσεις ἢμας, αὐτής καθαρὰ τὴν οἰκήν ἐπενδυσάμενοι τὴν ἀφθορίαν τὸ πρὸς μέτρου τῶν ἁγγελῶν διάκομεν." (100,3)

These passages establish that Clement takes the thought of resurrection seriously, but that he is concerned about the conditions of the life of the age that is to come, i.e. after the resurrection. This is a characteristic concern of Clement, who is earnest that in this life we should prepare, as best we can, for that which is to come.

We should note that at Lk. 20:36 Jesus relates the cessation of giving and taking in marriage to the fact that the 'worthy' 'cannot die any more', (οὐ - γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἐτί σύνωναι) i.e. that they are incorruptible. In view of Clement's characteristic concern with incorruptibility--a concern shared by the Greek Fathers of the Early Church in general--it is worth noting this linkage. Clement does not comment expressly on it, but it would seem clear that for him the incorruptible life is one in which sexual functions are inappropriate. The implication of Jesus in the Lukan passage, as recorded, seems to be that sexual functions are bound up with the need to propagate the race. The 'never dying' character of the resurrected humanity makes sexual provision no longer necessary.

Two points are significant for Clement, and may be briefly noted only, since Clement does not explicitly comment on them at this point. The first is that such a passage as Lk. 20:34ff. seems to leave no room for millenarian hopes. This is in accord with Clement's outlook throughout. The second point is that Clement's concern that Christians
should reach the level of \( \gamma \nu \zeta \sigma \iota \) is based upon an eschatological understanding. This latter point is important and will be developed later. However, the basic ascetic drive of Clement, which is so related to his Gnosticism, is intended as an anticipation by Christians of the conditions which will obtain in the resurrection. This understanding is also implicit in Origen's writings. Preoccupation with food, sleep, money, worldly pleasures, or sexual functions, is to pay attention to that which is passing. In moderation such interest is not wrong for the Christian, but the superiority of the Christian Gnostic consists in his self-chosen anticipation of that which is in conformity with the life of the age that is to come. It is basically this understanding rather than the Greek adage, \( \mu \eta \delta \varepsilon \nu \gamma \gamma \nu \) 'nothing too much', that underlies Clement's asceticism. With such an understanding, one can understand resistance from Clement to the millenarian concept, which as we have seen (Chapter III page 343) on occasions seemed to suggest not only the continuance of sexual functions during the millennial reign of Christ on earth, but even their increase in intensity and fruitfulness.

It is interesting that *Stromateis* VII.XII, which deals with the Christian Gnostic's generosity, continence, and unworldliness, has been construed by some to have a sidelong glance at millenarianism. Thus Guerike considered that the statement in 74.7 that the Gnostic "\( \tau \nu \kappa \sigma \mu \iota \kappa \iota \alpha \iota \tau \iota \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \varepsilon \iota \nu \varepsilon \iota \chi \iota \iota \lambda \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \kappa \tau \epsilon \mu \iota \mu \iota \chi \iota \iota \iota \sigma \omicron \sigma \omicron \iota \sigma \omicron \omicron \sigma \omicron \iota \)" referred to chiliasm or millenarianism. Charles Bigg noted this in a footnote to the statement in his Bampton Lectures that Clement "rejects with scornful brevity the fancies of Chiliasm."\(^1\) It may be questioned whether in fact this passage has the concept of the

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\(^1\) *op. cit.*, p. 144.
millennium in view but if it does, it would seem to be the fact that
a reserve towards this concept and his attitudes towards asceticism
are rooted in a common basis, a particular understanding of the nature
of man as a resurrected creature. There is, however, nothing un-
balanced in Clement's asceticism or in his concept of the Christian
Gnostic: he even suggests in this very chapter (70, 6-7) that the true
Gnostic is not necessarily an unmarried man, for he can be the married
man, who has care of children and the things of this life, but has
endured the temptations commensurate with this estate, without giving
to sexuality or the cares of this world a greater importance than
they should have.

It may be felt in all of this that Clement's acceptance of the
fact of the resurrection itself derives from an unwillingness to break
openly with the traditional teaching of the Church, or that, if he
does accept it, it is not an integral part of his thinking. Such a
judgment surely arises from a misunderstanding of Clement. Strom.
VII.XII makes clear that it is the Lord Himself who is the pattern
of the Gnostic—in his virginity, unconcern with monetary values,
etc. And the resurrection of our Lord is not in doubt in Clement's
mind.

The Fire of Judgment

Clement's thinking concerning the judgment of God is rather
complicated, and interpretations of it vary somewhat. It seems
clear, at any rate, that he believed in purgatorial fires, through
which the believer would, after death, attain to the mansion
prepared for him. Strom.VI.XIV perhaps gives us the clearest, or
most complete portrayal, of Clement's thought.

At the end of the previous chapter (VI.XIII) Clement concludes
with the thought that "...... κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
He has already made it quite clear that he is thinking here of the Christian Gnostic—"the chosen of the chosen."

Among the Gnostics too, the middle wall of partition has been removed by Christ, so that the most august glory will be shared equally between Jews and Greeks. These do not remain "in the seventh seat, the place of rest" (ἐν ἐπομένῳ ἐνπαυσεως, VI.XIV.108,1) an allusion to Valentinian eschatological symbolism, but are promoted to the eighth grade.

Clement then introduces in chapter XIV a reference to the symbolism of the 'two folds' in John, chapter 10, and he appears to interpret the 'folds' in a two-fold fashion. The primary reference, as he rightly sees, is to Jews and Gentiles (or Greeks). Of whichever fold these believers are, they "understand gnostically the commandments". (συνιέντα γνωστικώς τὰς ἐνιαλοὺς, 108,3)

The secondary reference, employed a little later (109, 3-6) seems to distinguish between a fold for Gnostic Christians and ordinary believers. Such a vacillation in usage is characteristic of Clement.

Clement's primary concern in this whole section is with the Gnostic Christians, Jew and Gentile, who are promoted "to the eighth grade". (εἰς ὑγιασίας εὐεργεσίας κληρονομίαν). The reference to purgatorial torments applies only to ordinary believers, and the contrast is between the suffering of the ordinary believers after death in reaching their mansion and the swift flight of Gnostics to their grade. At the beginning of chapter XIII Clement
assures us: "Ὁ τοῖν τετρακαθήσας τὶ πρῶτα καὶ εἰς ἀπάθειαν μελετήσας λύθης τε εἰς εὐποιῶν γνωστικὴς τελειότητος ἵσθαγγελος μὲν ἐντυλθαὶ· φωτεινὸς δὲ ἡδὲ καὶ ὃς ὁ ἡλίος λάμπων κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὁ σύμβολον τῇ γνώσει τῇ δίκαια, δι' ἀγάπης θεοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν ἁγίαν μονὴν καθάπερ οἱ ἀπόστολοι...." (105,1)

In this latter passage we are reminded that this attainment is not the result of any peculiarity of nature, but of the Gnostic's free choice. Here we see the reason for Clement's insistence on free-will, which is so characteristic of his whole theology; resistance to heretical Gnosticism. Clement borrows imagery ostensibly from the Valentinians in his thinking about the life after death, but he wishes to make clear his rejection of their determinism. In chapter XIV, in a different manner, he insists that those who "gnostically understand the commandments" are marked out not by their faith alone, but also by their accompanying works: he reminds us that John 10's words were addressed by Jesus "to Jews alone who already kept the law and lived blamelessly, who lacked only faith in the Lord." (Ποιμανῶς μόνοις.... τοῖς νομικῶς καὶ ἀνεκπλήκτως βεβαιὼς κόσμῳ, οἵς μόνον γὰρ εἰς τὸν κύριον ὑπελείπετο πίστις, 108,5)

The Gnostic is the one with faith and blamelessness of life.

Other passages in Clement suggest that this 'blamelessness' is for him relative, not absolute.

Turning to the ordinary believer, Clement now remarks: "ὁκ ἢν ὁδὸν μετὰ λαμπρᾶς πιστοῦ εἶς, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἡ ἔξελθῃ τὴν σάρκα, ἀποδέσθαι τῇ πάθῃ ἀθήρητη τοῦτον, εἰς εἰς τὴν μονὴν τὴν ὀικείαν ἔχον ὑπὲρ ὑπηγορεύει." (109,1)

Clement's thought here seems to have close affinities with concepts used by Valentinian Gnosticism. Thus, both Stoics and Valentinian Gnostics taught that in the future life the soul needs no body, since
It is itself a body. Thus, we read at Excerpta ex Theodoto, XIV.2: "ἀλλὰ καὶ η ὑπόκηφος σώμα". The Valentinians, according to the Excerpta ex Theodoto, divided men into three classes: those with body only and no soul—these perish like the beasts; the spiritual who are predestined to eternal life; and the psychic, who have faith but not knowledge. Thus we read in chapter LVI: "τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν πνευματικὸν φύσει σωζόμενον, τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν αὐτεχοσυνὸν δὲ ἐπιτηδείῳτα ἔχει πρὸς τὴν πίστιν καὶ ἀθανασίαν καὶ πρὸς ἀποστίαν καὶ φοβοῦν κατὰ τὴν αἰκείαν ἁρεσίαν, τὸ δὲ οἰκείον φύσει ἀπολλυτεὶ." (Para. 3)

In the future life the spiritual soar immediately to the Ogdoad, the area of the fixed stars, through the seven planetary orbits. When they reach the Ogdoad, the spiritual beings are beyond the possibility of change. At the consummation of all things, Christ lays aside his soul and leads such into the Holy of Holies, these spiritual persons having now become pure Words, like Himself. On the other hand, the Psychic "are cleansed by fire, the sensible and intellectual fire, the pangs of sense, the stings of remorse." 1 Through the assistance of guardian angels they are raised through three 'mansions' or stages of discipline to the Ogdoad, which is their final home—unlike the Spirituals who finally entered the Holy of Holies, where even the kind of 'embodiedness' that can pertain to souls was left behind.

The thought that this passage from Strom. VI. XIV. has connections with Valentinian Gnosticism rests upon the account of the writings of the Valentinian Theodotus given by Clement in the Excerpta ex Theodoto. What is said above about Valentinian Gnosticism is indeed derived primarily from the Excerpta ex Theodoto. The only

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1 C. Bigg. op.cit., p.40
problem about this is that it is very difficult to be sure in this work how much Theodotus believed and how much represents Clement's reflections suggested by what he has culled from Theodotus. It may well be, therefore, that Clement's judgment that the believer on death must leave the flesh behind, in order to reach his own mansion, actually reflects ideas of his own in which he has already been influenced from other sources. In particular it may well seem to many commentators that what is basic to Clement's attitude at this point is the influence of Philo. It seems to be the case, as modern research has been making clear, that Philonic thought had a considerable influence upon Egyptian Gnosticism in general. Thus, the Philonic concept of the Logos as the High Priest Who alone could enter God's presence and live, may well lie behind the thought in the Excerpta ex Theodoto concerning Christ's laying aside his soul in the consummation of all things and leading the spiritual class of men (the Gnostics) into the Holy of Holies. It may also be the case that the ascetic tendency which underlies the language concerning the "putting off" of the flesh derives from a Platonic separation of man's spiritual essence from the flesh, which is clearly at work in the thought of Philo.

Two points require to be made in this connection. First, while it may well be that Clement reveals at various places the influence of a Platonic separation between the intelligible and aesthetic realms, which is reflected in a certain tendency to abstract from the flesh, we shall see evidence to suggest, as we proceed, that Clement made much of the concept of the future glorification of our present beings, in the light of the glory and new powers accorded the Risen Christ. This may be a Biblical feature which has intermingled, perhaps rather uneasily, with a derogation of the flesh which is Platonic and not Biblical in background. Second, whatever the
particular background to such a passage as *Strom*. VI.XIV.109.I, there are affinities between what is there presupposed and the so-called Valentinian framework set out in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*. In particular, we are enabled by that work to understand something of what is implicit in this passage. Further, modern discoveries of Gnostic Valentinian texts make it clear that whatever influences may be at work in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, the latter's teaching is recognisably Valentinian.

One or two remarks should be made. First, the fact that a recognisably Valentinian framework is that over against which Clement works out his own scheme, shows that Clement is here talking about the future of the soul after death, rather than at the Parousia of Christ. Second, and by the same token, it would seem to mean that Clement assumes that beyond this purification after death there lies the further change which will occur at the consummation of all things. The Valentinian concept had both an immediate future and a remoter future in mind. Clement does not protest against the latter, and his acceptance of belief in the resurrection, even though it modifies the Valentinian framework in which he talks of immediate purification after death, suggests that to Clement too the final consummation is important. Third, as we have already noted, Clement resists the determinism of the Valentinian scheme. What we experience after death depends upon our free moral choice during this life. Fourth, we must guard against the thought that Clement is here advancing a kind of universalism: his attention is focused on the Church. Here he is concentrating upon the distinction between ordinary believers and Christians living on the Gnostic level. He does not comment upon the Valentinian view that some gross persons have no soul at all, but only a body: this he would surely have repudiated, but his
silence is possibly significant of his agreement that some fail to find salvation at all. In Stromateis VI.XIV. (3, 2) Clement refers to what is said of the Gentiles in Is.40:15. He holds that the heavenly bodies had been given by God to them, "so that they might not become altogether atheistical, and so utterly perish." (ὅνε μὴ τέλειον Ἀθεοί γενόμενοι τελέως καὶ δισβαρώσιον, 110.3) Philosophy, likewise, assisted them, as did the Mosaic Law the Jews. He distinguishes between levels of response to their appointed guides, the heavenly bodies, but judges that it was of those who would not abide even by these but "fell away from them to stocks and stones", (τούτων ἄποκεκούτες εἰς λίθους καὶ ξύλα, 3.2) that it was said that, in the scales of divine justice, they were but as 'dust' (Χοοῖς) or 'a drop from a bucket' (σταγών ἀκού κάβε). The point of this is that for Clement there were those among the Gentiles also who did not in any way qualify as being within the sphere of salvation. The implicit parallelism of this passage with the situation obtaining among those of Jewish race shows that Clement assumes three classes of men everywhere--those beyond salvation, believers and Gnostics.

Some other points may be suggested from Clement's remarks in Strom VI.XIII-XIV. Thus, when we bear in mind Clement's acceptance of the traditional doctrine of resurrection, we see how prepared he was to use the Valentinian framework in a critical fashion. However changed Clement may have assumed that the body would be in the resurrection, his scheme works with the whole man, in characteristic Hebraic fashion, rather than with the Valentinian view that, after death and at the consummation of all things, it will only be the soul that is dealt with. From another angle, we should note that Clement may well have accepted in some form the Valentinian distinction for
the period after the consummation between the Spirituals and the Psychics. Thus, while the Psychics finally reach the Ogdoad of Rest, which is attained by the Spirituals immediately after death according to Valentinianism, the Spirituals at the consummation are made 'pure Words', i.e. they give up even that kind of embodiedness that pertains to souls and which Christ adopted in the Incarnation. What Clement rejects in this view is the thought that Christ's humanity was a passing phase -- there is no suggestion of such a view. Therefore, there is no thought of Christ's putting aside his soul, nor of Gnostics' putting aside their soul -- or, for that matter, their body -- at the consummation of all things. Nevertheless, Clement cites Solomon as an instance (Strom. VI.XIV. 110, 1-2) of the superior dignity of the mansion, to which the Gnostic will attain.

It is interesting to note that the Valentinians thought of the Spirituals as masculine and children of Adam, while the Psychics were viewed as feminine, the children of Eve. Possibly, in the passages already noted, where Clement notes the words of our Lord at Lk.20:36ff., there is again an adaptation of Valentinian thought-forms and terminology. In saying that the Psychics had to become in character as the Spirituals, after death, both Stoics and Valentinians had suggested that the 'feminine' must become 'masculine'. There does not appear to be any allusion to this concept in Strom. VI, but the Valentinian framework that is used and adapted by Clement in Strom. VI may well have suggested to Clement's mind Jesus' words, handed down by the tradition. If this be so, then again, we submit, Clement demonstrates his free handling of the Valentinian scheme. For Clement is not speaking in the passages already noted, of any change wrought after death and prior to the consummation, but he is talking of what is to
be the nature of the constitution of resurrected man. Gnostic terminology is employed, but the thought is quite different, and moves within the ambit of the Christian tradition.

Nevertheless, our investigation to this point has shown us that Clement does seem to think of purgatorial cleansing after death. It is important to reassert that only believers are in view. There is no suggestion that all men will be fitted for communion with God either after death or at the consummation. Further, Clement's thought is spiritual in character. He is characteristically concerned with the believer's inward attitudes after death, even if Clement does use Gnostic or Philonic language about the believer as "divesting himself of the passions," (ἐκδοσκόμενος τι πίθη) so that he can reach his own mansion. What Clement does seem to say in Strom. VI, chapter XIV, is that there is no possibility of sinning after death, and that the believer will be tormented with repentance for the sins he has committed after baptism (109,3). Shame and sorrow at "not yet or not quite attaining what he sees others to have acquired" (μηδέπαρ καί μη δ' οὖν τοιχώμων ἄν ἄλλους δὲ μετεικάνομεν) constitute the torments envisaged, as he passes from the bodily state at death.

Bigg reminds us that "the Greeks (as distinct from those of the Latin communion) have no word for Purgatory, and certainly do not admit the existence of Purgatory as a distinct state". The germ of the doctrine of Purgatory as a distinct state may be found in some of the treatises of Tertullian, and was a fully developed teaching in the West by the time of Augustine. In Clement, the concept of cleansing after death appears to be related to the

\[^1\] op.cit.p.346.n.2.
consumming flood of fire, which is to devastate the earth at the end of the age in a manner analogous to the devastation wrought by the Flood of water in Noah's day. Here Clement relies on the words of Jesus in His eschatological discourse (Matt.24:37ff.), and on the words of I Pet.3:18ff. and II Pet. 2:4ff. The thought is that the one who is in the Ark of the Church will be saved when God's eschatological judgment with fire (πῦρ) is poured out on the earth. Jean Daniélou helps us to see that not a few of the Early Church Fathers saw Baptism as implying that the Christian has already undergone (in Christ) the coming flood of judgment: already he has been overwhelmed by it.¹ This we must now seek to document, with reference to Clement. The main point, however, is that this suggests that, for Clement, purgatorial cleansing (trial δικαίωμα) after death is appropriate to the Christian, simply because his deliverance from Final Judgment, either on earth in the final eschatological woes or before God's judgment-seat, is guaranteed. His being cleansed by torments after death is a significant indication of his status within the community of God. Just as Christ has altered the conditions already of those righteous dead of ancient times, through His resurrection, so it is fitting that preparation for the heavenly mansions, which Christ will allot to His own at His appearing, should begin immediately upon one's removal by death from further opportunity of sinning. Thus, any concept of purgatorial cleansing in Clement rests on his understanding of the Church as the Ark, wherein the saints are delivered from the eschatological woes and Final Judgment.

Two contentions are made in the last paragraph, the latter of which is the more important for our present purpose. First, we have accepted the judgment of Charles Bigg that the general Greek view of Purgatory is at least indistinct. As this commentator reminds us, the Greeks "make no use of the texts I Cor. III. 15, Matt. III. 11, on which according to Cardinal Newman the Roman doctrine reposes." The Greeks, it is held, find no reference to 'purgatorial fire' or to punishments that are not eternal, in Scripture. On the other hand, Luke 12: 5 suggested to them the thought that there are some souls whom God releases from torment. Bigg asserts that the Greeks nowhere attempt to ascertain who these souls are. While accepting that the general Greek view is 'indistinct', as over against that of the Latin West, it would seem that Clement of Alexandria does make assertions about the identity of such souls: they are believers who have not reached the Gnostic level. Bigg is working with the understanding that Clement believed that, after death, souls that had not yielded to Christ might be induced by the 'wise fire' (πυρ... τὸ.... τὸ ἁγίου, Strom. VII. VI. 34. 4) to be truly penitent, and thus befitted for God's presence. He finds this judgment in both Clement and Origen. Where we disagree with this interpretation is that, so far as Clement is concerned at least, there appears to be no thought that those who have not had faith, while on earth, will be relieved from torments. Clement's thought is characteristically concerned with the anticipation of felicity that is given to the Gnostic immediately upon death and the delay in such experience that the man who has πίστις but not γνώσης has to undergo. Bigg himself confesses that

1. op. cit., p. 345, n. 2.
2. op. cit., p. 343
Clement does generally seem to be thinking of the doom of Christians, as compared with Origen, who, in his view, has in mind a definitely larger hope of the final repentance and purification of all men.¹

Perhaps the 'indistinctness', which generally attaches to the Greek view, is bound up with the lack of concern in the East to think legally about the relationship of the soul with God. It was in the West that an elaborate penitential system was worked out, whereby earthbound members of the Church expressed their penitence, and, as the theory developed, came to acquire 'merit' with God. All of this was related very definitely to post-baptismal sins. Purgatory was the continuation of the Church's school of discipline for the soul after death. The East, while not unconcerned about God's forgiveness of the sins of men, characteristically saw incorruptibility as the prime gift of the Gospel. This was at once a physical and an ethical stability over which evil could not triumph. The point is that it is harder to define progress towards such a state of incorruptibility than it is to express a legal relationship with God. It would, of course, in the nature of the case, only be finally achieved at the resurrection of the body. Nevertheless, ethical stability, loving God from the heart rather than from a sense of duty or fear, could be achieved or approximated to, while the saint was on earth. Just as it was found difficult to differentiate between 'Gnostics' and ordinary believers, while on earth, whereas it was relatively easy to do so with those who were or were not 'in a state of grace' owing to definite sin avoided or incurred, so in the Greek thought of the life after death it was only God who could distinguish the 'Gnostic' and his more struggling brother. It is for this reason that the concept

¹ op. cit., p.148
of Purgatory is, as Briggs asserts, 'indistinct'. The point must, however, be underlined that, in the case of Clement of Alexandria, it is only believers who are in view in his thought of 'purgatorial cleansing', and these are more closely defined as those who have not anticipated, while on earth, as closely as possible, that 'incorruptibility' of character, which is to be God's final gift to His people.

The second point, made above, was that Clement's thought of purifying fire (πῦρ) seems to be related to the thought of a final baptism of fire, which is to engulf the world at the consummation of all things. It is necessary to admit that this relationship is, in Clement's expressed words, extremely elusive. Nevertheless, it appears to be implicit in his thinking. A very instructive comment is made in a difficult and obscure section of the Stromateis, viz. VI.XI. Here it is the measurements of the Ark of the days of Noah that are being discussed by Clement in terms derived from Pythagorean number symbolism. Already the rabbis and the heretical Gnostics had raised speculations based on the measurements of the Ark, while Hippolytus related these to the millennium,¹ which he saw prefigured in them. Origen tells us that they reflect heavenly mysteries.²

The important passage in Clement is given below:- "γεωμετρίας δὲ έστι μνημονίου ἡ κατασκευαζομένη σκηνή καὶ τεκταίνομένη κιβωτός, ἀναλογίας τιοι λογικώταται, θείας ἐπινοιας κατα- σκευαζομεναι, κατα συνέσεις δόσιν, ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς τὰ νοηταί, μεῖλλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰς τὰ όμως καὶ τῶν όμως τὰ όμως μετανοούσις οὕμοι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταυτάραξεν ξύλως τὸ ταυτάραξεν οἶχαμ πάντη διαφέρουσιν ὁμάδας γνώσεως ἐκτελοῦν τὸ Ἰσραήλ ἔλεγοι καὶ μήκος μὲν πριν κοσμοί καθεῖς τοῦ κατασκευαζόμενος, πλάτος δὲν βέβαιος

¹. Comm.Dan.,IV.XXIV.
². Hom.Gen.,II.III.
Jean Daniélou calls attention to this passage. We must first see, however, what lies in the background of his comment at this point. In the previous chapters of this work, Daniélou has shown that in I and II Peter there is an important linkage made between the Flood and the coming outpouring of judgment on the earth. Chs. 3:17ff.

and 2:4ff. are more particularly, in view, respectively, in these epistles. Daniélou shows that some of the concepts found in these two epistles had significant antecedents in apocalyptic literature (such as the Book of Enoch), preparations in such Old Testament prophetic passages as Is.28:15ff., and considerable development in Early Christian literature, such as I Clement (VII, 6 : IX, 3) and Justin Martyr's Second Apology (VII,2). The basic ideas that are alluded to, are a comparison of the previous judgment in water with one that is to come in fire; a parallelism between Noah and Christ and between the Ark and the Church; and a profound parallel in II Peter (if Daniélou be sound in his interpretation) between Noah's victory over the forces of chaos, represented by the waters of the flood, and Christ's Descent into Hades. The last point is brought out in connection with I Pet.3:19-20:-

"The Chief difficulty lies in the word 'kerutteia' which is translated by 'preached', which seems to imply a conversion of the spirits in prison. But it is not this which is involved, but the proclamation which Christ makes of his victory as he makes his descent to the underworld. The spirits in prison are the angels who before the Flood took wives of the daughters of men, and were because of this, as we are told by Enoch, confined in the Abyss till the day of Judgment. To these Christ announces

(op.cit., pp.103-104.)
In context, Daniélou's thought is that, just as Noah overcame the forces of chaos, rising above them in the Ark, so Christ descended into Hades to worst His enemies, gloriously triumphing over them in the resurrection: so too does the Church triumph. A special instance of the Church's triumph will be seen in her deliverance when the final 'woes' are issued against the earth at the end of the age. A further feature of this is that, just as Noah was the τέλος of one order and the ἀρχή of the next, so it is with Christ, and so will it be at the end of the age: the deluge of fire will be followed by a 'new earth'.

It is necessary to have all this in mind, as we look at Strom. VI.XI, and the understanding of it which Daniélou proposes. One further particularly apposite citation, made by this commentator and mentioned above, may be noted in greater detail, viz. Justin's Second Apology, VII.2. Here it is asserted that it is the presence of the Church that meanwhile spares the world just as the world of Noah's day was spared, while the Ark was preparing. Justin relates Noah to the Greek Deucalion. The term conflagration is used of that which looms ahead for the world, and this term is in Justin's Greek, ἐκκαύρωσις, which was used by Stoics of the recurring conflagrations that they expected in their concept of world cycles. Further, Justin's concept is an explanation of the 'delay' of the Parousia in terms of II Peter's reasoning.

Of the passage in Strom. VI.XI Daniélou has not much to say, but

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1 op.cit., p.80. Daniélou acknowledges his indebtedness in this account to Bo Reicke's 'The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism', Lund,1946,pp.93seq; Daniélou also makes mention of K. Gachwind's 'Die Niederfahrt Christi in der Unterwelt.'
what is said is very important:-

"From this strange piece of symbolism we need only preserve the idea of a purification by fire (δι' ἐκπορώσις) associated with the Flood and symbolized by the pyramidal form (πυραμίδας τρόπον) of the ark. The image of a tetragon comes from Philo (Vit. Moys., II,128). We notice that Clement associates the ideas of Flood and purification, following in this Plato (Tim. 22,C-E), whom he cites in the fifth Book (I,9; Saehlin, p.332). We have met here the junction of the Biblical Flood, the platonic Flood and the Stoic ἐκπορώσις."

What Daniélou almost passingly mentions is of major importance for us at this point: whatever the true derivation of the word πυραμίς may be (most lexicographers seem to favour an Egyptian origin), for Clement the very word's form (πῦρ, cf. πυραμίς) expressive as it is for him of the shape of the Noahic Ark (i.e. as a pyramid) is a significant indication of the fire of coming judgment, from which the people of God are to be preserved. This shows conclusively Clement's acceptance of the concept of Final Judgment. It is true that the relation of the concept of purification with that of the Flood may be derived from Plato's Timaeus, where it occurs. It is entirely characteristic of Clement to accept with gratitude whatever element of truth there may be in the Greek philosophers or poets, however it may have been derived. Yet, Clement normally subordinates such citation of supporting evidence to the Biblical source of truth. In what follows Clement relates the particular figures of the measurements to Scriptural numbers, and however artificial this may seem to us, it is abundant evidence of the dominance of Biblical motifs in his thinking at this particular point. "εἰσὶ δ' οἳ τοὺς τριακοσίως πυραμίς σύμβολον τοῦ κυριακοῦ σημείου λέγουσι, τοὺς ν' δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος καὶ τῆς ἰσφάσεως τῆς κατὰ τὴν κεντρικὴν, καὶ τῶν λῆψι, ὡς εὖ τισι, δώσκα τῷ κήρυγμα ἐνθαῦσον ἱστορείαν, ἵνα τριακοσίῳ μὲν ἐκφύεσην ὁ κύριος ἐτείματε, β' δ' ἔδε ἄθαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι..." (87,2)  

1 *op.cit.*, p.104
Clement's final sentence in this sequence is most instructive, as showing the dependence of Clement at this time on biblical concepts, as understood by him, and the general relation with his own leading thoughts: "..... καὶ εἰς ἀγείρα ὑμῶν τὸ κατασκευάζω, εἰς μονάδα τελευταίης τῆς τοῦ δικαίου προσκομιῶν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς πίστεως." (87,2)

That is to say that the actual shape of the Ark symbolises the character of the Church in her various grades. The squares of the base, he has told us, indicate the secure basis, on which she rests, but the form indicates the approximation to perfection. We have already noted the importance to Clement of the concept of Christian Gnosticism, as over against heretical Gnosticism. Here he sees the Ark of salvation, as herself structured. It is the Christian 'Gnostic' clearly who is at the apex of the pyramid. When we remember that this figure occurs in a section which is clearly intended for the understanding of the Christian Gnostic, and when we recall that the asceticism which Clement related to the 'Gnostic level' appears to be thought of as an anticipation of conditions at the consummation of all things (vide above page 574) we see that what is fundamental in this image of the pyramid is an eschatological insight.

We may ask what, then, this figure of the pyramid tells us about Clement's thought. We have already noted that it shows his belief in coming judgment. We have traced the Biblical connections of his thought. We have seen the half-hidden eschatological basis of the figure, in which the apex of the pyramid shows the Christian Gnostic as spearheading the realization by the Church of the glories of the new age, which lies beyond the fire of judgment. We must now add to this that it seems probable that the passage in II Peter 2 is at least part of the Scriptural background that is in the
mind of Clement at this point. The very term, 'ἐκπορώσις', is latent in II Peter 3, which is related integrally (3:5ff), to the concept of the Flood, that underlies the symbol of the Ark, expressed by Clement in terms of its pyramidal shape. Thus, in II Pet. 3:7 we read that the present heavens and earth have been stored up for fire (τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰς πυρ) and in verse 12 of the same chapter we are assured that the elements of this present world will melt with fire (στοιχεῖα καυσώμενα τῇ θελεία). The interconnections of thought in this whole Second Epistle of Peter and that of Clement in this admittedly almost allusive mention, justify the conclusion that II Peter's concept of the coming fire of judgment is actively present to Clement's mind. Allusive or passing mentions are often more significant of a whole assumed ground of understanding than detailed passages of exposition. This, however, leads us in turn to an even more important conclusion. Clement characteristically avoids language which speaks of the Parousia of Christ, but I and II Peter are preoccupied with the very question of the so-called 'delay' in His Appearing and in the fire of judgment that is to consume the present earth at that time. Any connection in Clement's thinking with II Peter implies Clement's tacit acceptance of the fact that final judgment is at Christ's Appearing.

What remains to be shown is that Clement did in his own thinking relate the fact that the ordinary believer suffers torments over his post-baptismal sins after death with his expectation, implicit in the symbol of the pyramid, that all believers are to be delivered from the final eschatological woes (if living upon earth when they are poured forth) and from Final Judgment at Christ's Appearing. This again is implicit, rather than explicit, in Clement's statements, but that there is such a definite relationship in his mind can, we
believe, be demonstrated with reasonable credibility by an examination
of what is said.

Let us, first, of all, note again that in Strom. VI. XIV. we have
an explicit reference to purification of the ordinary believer after
death. It is true that the Greek word used (πολυπροσπόρις 109,6)
does not have its base in the word, 'πῦρ' or 'fire', as does its
English equivalent. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that, as we have
demonstrated above (vide page 578), Clement is here writing consciously
over against what he viewed as a Valentinian framework, and the
Valentinians did speak of the soul's being cleansed 'with fire'. The
Greek word employed by them was 'πῦρ'. Clement does not repudiate
this conception. We bear in mind that he did not bind himself
slavishly to the Valentinian scheme, but used it in a masterful way
to bring out his own conceptions. Thus, it is true that he modified
the Valentinian framework by accepting a bodily resurrection at the
end of the age. Nevertheless, as we have shown, he accepted the
Valentinian language which speaks of passions clinging to the soul,
conceived of as having some fine character of corporeal texture itself.
If Clement can think thus, is it unreasonable to assume that he took
equally seriously the Valentinian thought that this soul was cleansed
of the clinging sins by fire (πῦρ)? Since the Valentinians
conceived of the soul as corporeal enough to be held down by sins
clinging to it, we must not think of the fire as completely non-
corporeal or purely inward. Rather was it a matter of the inward
pangs of remorse affecting the whole 'soul-body' after death.
Probably this was Clement's conception also. If it was, it would
again fit in remarkably well with his implicit understanding, shared
with the other early Fathers such as Justin, that at the end of the
age eschatological woes, symbolized by fire (πῦρ) are to be
poured out on the earth, only believers being delivered from them. 'Fire' may have some symbolic quality, but it is opposed to a flood of water, and it does stand for quite physical suffering. It is significant that such suffering appears to be viewed as the ordinary believer's lot after death and prior to the Parousia.

The first piece of circumstantial evidence, therefore, for the implicit relationship in Clement's thinking, that we are endeavouring to demonstrate, namely, that between the suffering after death of purgatorial cleansing by ordinary believers and their release from Final Judgment, is the reasonableness of assuming that in some real sense Clement, equally with the Valentinians, was thinking of a cleansing by fire (νῦξ). The second is the simple fact, already mentioned, that the 'pyramid' (τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ) symbol implies Clement's acceptance of the common Early Christian belief in a coming Flood of Fire upon the earth. This, as we have seen, finds its basis in Mk.13, Matt.24-Lk.21 and in I and II Peter. It is at least suggestive that 'fire' (νῦξ) figures in Clement's thinking in both situations. It remains to note two further points about the 'pyramid' symbol that make the connection more sure. In the first place, Clement sees a significance in the meaning of the very letters forming the word 'pyramid' (τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ). These letters include the word 'νῦξ'. The fact that actually there may be an Egyptian derivation for the word, which has no relationship whatsoever with the Greek word 'νῦξ' was either unknown or unimportant to Clement. To him it was a providential sign, which the Gnostic would understand, that the Ark was shaped as a pyramid, the very letters of the word in the Greek being related to the word for 'fire'. For us the important point is that Clement's belief in a baptism of 'fire' 'νῦξ' at the end of the age is thus underlined. Second, and
this must be taken in relation to what has just been said, the shape of the pyramid is related in Clement's thinking to the distinction between ordinary believers and Gnostics, all of whom are to escape the eschatological woes and Final Judgment. In other words, this symbol of the 'pyramid' does two significant things. It underlines Clement's belief in Judgment by fire at the end of the age, and it shows the distinction between ordinary believers and Christian Gnostics among those thus delivered. But, when we take these two facts in conjunction with Clement's asseveration in Strom. VI. XIV that after death the ordinary believer is cleansed--and he seems to assume 'by fire' (πῦρ) --while the Christian Gnostic 'soars' or 'speeds' "by righteous knowledge through the love of God to the sacred abode" (Strom. VI. XIII. 105, 1, quoted above page 577) the only conclusion which seems to fit all the facts with consistency is this: Clement considered that all belonging to the 'pyramid' (the Ark of salvation from Fire) would be delivered from the final eschatological woes at the end of the age and from Final Judgment, but while the Christian Gnostic speeds immediately on death to "the abode of God", the ordinary believer has to be purified in soul by fire. The 'differentia' between ordinary believer and unbeliever is that the former suffers as a believer and that his purging does not have the character of final rejection. Rather does it presume his acceptance with God.

These facts surely imply, therefore, that all Clement's thinking about purgatorial cleansing after death has an eschatological basis. It is because the believer is in Christ that judgment of his (post-baptismal) sins begins immediately upon death, a purifying process which will be completed at latest by the Parousia. The fact that this process will be closed at the consummation of all things at Christ's Appearing was seen above (page 580) to be implied by Clement's use of
a 'Valentinian' or Gnostic framework, in which immediate purification and final settlement at the consummation of all things, are both in view. For those not in Christ the 'pyramid' symbol indicates the fires of divine judgment that will be poured out on the earth at the end of the age. Thus, it is implicit that the ordinary believer suffers now after death, because the Final Judgment does not apply to him.

Daniélou deals with a passage from Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, (CXXXVII.3), in which Justin says:—

"Είσιν δὲ, δι' ὁδατος καὶ πίστεως καὶ ξύλου οἱ προπαρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ μετανοοῦντες ἐφ' οἷς ἐματον ἐκβάλοντο τὴν μελλονταν ἐκβάλοντα τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσιν."

Commenting on this text Daniélou says:—

"what is new in our text is that Christian Baptism appears not only as a preparation for an eschatological judgment—a basic theme that we shall meet again—but also to a certain extent as a prefiguration. Baptism by its symbolism of immersion, appeared as a sacramental anticipation, by way of imitation, of the final judgment, which is a baptism of fire, enabling the Christian to escape this judgment, since he is already judged." 1

It is Daniélou's claim that Baptism was viewed by a number of the Fathers as a prefiguration of final judgment. So far as the concept of its anticipation is concerned, it is significant that he is able (CO. Mth. XV.23) in this matter to quote Origen, a thinker so closely associated with Clement in certain respects.

Our concern is with Clement of Alexandria. The point that we wish to make is that, if Clement shared the view alluded to above that Baptism is a sacramental anticipation of the fire of final judgment, then this would help to consolidate his eschatological understanding of

1. op.cit.,p.95 (The English translation misprints 'one text' for 'our text' in the first line of this quotation). The text from the Dialogue with Trypho is quoted on page 91.
purgatorial fire after death. After all, the 'pyramid' symbol certainly has to do with those who are baptized (ordinary believers and Christian Gnostics alike). It would seem likely that Clement considered that, just as the believer was judged in this life for his sins by God, Who chastised him in various ways, since he was His dear child, so after death this principle held good. Baptism placed a person in the situation in which all that happened to him, while in this life, was for his good. The believer's anticipation of final judgment in the waters of Baptism did not preclude him from chastisement. Rather, in certain respects, was it a dedication to the sphere where God's Spirit would act in conformity with the judgment, proleptically poured out on Christ—a judgment in which the believer was reckoned to have shared through his union in baptism with Christ. May not Clement have felt that such judgment must continue after death in the experience of the imperfect (i.e. non-Gnostic) believer? If he does not underline this fact, it is because it is self-evident to Clement. We cannot prove that Clement made this connection, but we do submit that the fact that the 'pyramid symbol' has a reference backwards to Christ's suffering on the Cross and to water baptism, as well as forwards to deliverance from eschatological woes, suggests that those in the 'pyramidical Ark of salvation' are consigned to purifying judgment, both on earth and after death, until the consummation of all things in the final flood of fire. The symbolism, having a relation to water Baptism, with its implications for the life of the believer on earth, could, therefore, readily yield such an understanding for the life after death also. What we are at pains to emphasize here, in addition to what has already been said, is that the interpretation of Baptism as an anticipation of the final judgment, being found in a number of the Fathers, makes it more
credible that Clement should take up this concept and apply it to the life after death. The 'pyramid' reference to water Baptism, as to final judgment, makes this feasible for Clement's thought at this particular point. And such a connection would help to establish that Clement is not simply saying that believers suffer purgatorial cleansing after death and that there is to be a Flood of Fire at the end of the status age, but that the believer's (as a baptized member of the Church) guarantees his purgatorial cleansing after death (if non-Gnostic), since in his Baptism he has anticipated already, through union with Christ, the Final Judgment. It is thus clear that Clement's whole conception of cleansing by fire after death related to an eschatological understanding, that is quite fundamental.

It is worth noting that Clement does not speak of prayer for the dead, during their period of chastisement. This is one of the two essential features of teaching about Purgatory in Roman Catholic thinking since the Council of Trent. In distinction from popular concepts and Scholastic theorising, the Council of Trent made only two features matter of essential faith for Catholics, viz., the existence of Purgatory and the fact that the suffering of the dead in Christ could be alleviated by the prayers of the saints on earth. All other details, such as whether literal fire was employed in Purgatory, were to be viewed as uncertain or as matter of individual opinion. Although Clement, like most in the Eastern Church, did not use the term, Purgatory, he does seem, as we have indicated, to believe in the reality that Romanists would say corresponds to that term. He does not mention this second feature about prayer for
the dead, though Bigg. seems to think that Clement verges on it in Strom. VII. XII. where he says that the Gnostic 'pities' (οἰκτείρων) "τοὺς μετὰ βασιλου παιδευμένους διὰ τῆς κοιλάσεως ἀκούσεως ἐκομολογούμενος" (78, 3). Clement goes on to say that the Gnostic "has a clear conscience with reference to his departure" (εὐσυνείδητος κρός τῆν ἐξοδον...). The clear implication is that all believers must be fitted for the closer fellowship with God. Since certain believers are chastized after death, as he again clearly says at this point, Clement deduces that this is because they have not been so fitted prior to death. What is fundamental is that believers, though guaranteed deliverance from Final Judgment, are assured of preparation for God's nearer Presence and this is assumed to be a painful process, where sins are clung to, and to be continued after death, where this is necessary. The background of deliverance from eschatological judgment is again implicit in this passage. We may doubt whether Clement does say here, or imply, that the Gnostic in any way alleviates the sufferings of the ordinary believer by his prayers, though such a concept would not seem out of place in Clement, who stresses magnanimity of spirit as one of the marks of the Christian Gnostic (vide VII. XII. 77, 6). For our present subject, the question is not one of importance, but the reference to the Gnostic's 'pitying' those who are 'being disciplined by punishment' has been mentioned, because it again seems to assume an eschatological framework, within which the whole concept of divine judgment is conceived.

The above discussion of Clement of Alexandria's thinking must suffice to show that he took with the utmost seriousness the

1. op. cit., p. 147, n. 3.
traditional Christian beliefs in resurrection of the body and Final Judgment, both of these thought of as taking place at the Parousia of Christ. More commonly, Clement speaks of 'the consummation of all things' than of the Parousia, but the two are one in his thinking. His thinking on purgatorial cleansing is his own, but it is conceived within a profoundly eschatological framework.

The Covenants of Law and Grace

Despite certain references or implications, relating to Clement's belief in the Parousia of Christ, resurrection of the body and Final Judgment, many scholars find in him a rejection of 'primitive eschatology'.

The following comment by Henry Chadwick is entirely characteristic:

"It is true that he (Clement) is far removed from the popular theology that a man like Justin Martyr takes for granted. He has no place for the primitive eschatology, and stands in this respect under the direct influence of St. John and the epistle to the Ephesians, and much, of course, under that of Philosophical idealism." 1

However, it is clear that such a scholar as Daniélou would dissent from this judgment (vide above pags 587ff: Daniélou's reference to Strom. VI.XI.86, 1-3 helps to make this clear). The evidence cited above makes us think his assessment the sounder. The only conclusion to be reached concerning the judgment of Chadwick and others is that they consider that Clement is only repeating the tradition, when he speaks of the resurrection of the body or of Final Judgment, but that such concepts are not closely interwoven with his thinking as a whole. Whether himself conscious of it or not, Clement was making concessions to traditional teaching in using these concepts. It is not, of course, denied that his thinking was ethical throughout and we can see how the

concept of a future judgment could be construed as emphasizing for Clement a valuable truth of the Christian religion. As for the resurrection of the body, it is usually held that it was a 'spiritual' body that Clement believed would rise. As for the Parousia, it is implied, rather than spoken of directly. We submit that the kind of analysis made above demonstrates that in fact Clement's eschatology is closely immersed with his whole thinking. His very reserve about eschatological matters springs as much from conviction about these realities, as from distaste for 'crude' conceptions. Nevertheless, that such interpretation of Clement is possible shows the need to demonstrate that eschatology belongs to the essence of his thinking. This means not that it is his main interest, but rather that in God's providential order of history, the consummation of all things in Christ's manifest reign, the resurrection of the dead and their judgment by Him, is the telos towards which all nature, history, and Christian experience point. That is, present Christian realities are most important, but they stand within a divinely ordered sequence of events, both past and future. Although many scholars hold that Clement's grasp on history is less than that of Irenaeus, it is not at all clear that this element is missing in Clement. His thought about the Covenants of Law and Grace helps to make this point.

It requires to be shown that Clement exhibits a profoundly historical understanding of the relation of the Jews under the Old Covenant, and the Greeks under a parallel 'οἰκονομία' of God, to the New Covenant in Jesus Christ, in the Incarnation. In demonstrating this relationship, Clement is activated in part by antipathy to Gnostic sundering of the Old Testament from the New, and by opposition to their failure to see the one God at work in past
and present time. If, however, Clement has such a firm grasp on history, we have to ask whether this does not imply a sure grasp of future history also?

It is true that many scholars are disturbed by the way in which Clement oscillates between talking of 'two covenants' and talking of 'one covenant'. This might seem to suggest that the Incarnation has brought us no new reality at all. Thus, a resistance to heretical Gnosticism would have led to a tumbling over backwards into a denial of the true substance of the Incarnation. If it be true that the New Covenant is but the Old expressed in different form, does this not empty of true depth and meaning as event the reality of the Incarnation? We would submit that the truth is that, properly understood, Clement allows to the Incarnation its true place as the foundation upon which the Old Covenant rested. Clement thinks in an essentially dynamic way about the meaning of the term 'covenant' (ἡ διαθήκη). This is for him the historical activity of God, in establishing a final end through a particular provisional or final ὁ σωματικόν. It is only when we think statically of 'Old' Covenant or 'New' that we gain the impression of entities which seem to be different, but which then Clement tells us are one. Rather Clement sees the unity of the two covenants in the One God. He can speak indifferently of two covenants or of one covenant, embracing an older and a more recent revelation. But he never speaks of two gods.

This is the point. He is thinking in dynamic fashion of the One God—as over against the heretical Gnostics—and he asserts that, though there are different provisional arrangements made by God, all tends towards the same ultimate purpose. Sometimes he calls the provisional arrangement a 'covenant', while at other times he reserves this term for the underlying purpose of God which is being served by different
'arrangements'. This is the source of the apparent conflict in Clement's thought.

Clement discusses this matter 'passim' especially in the \textit{Stromateis}. In fact, it is one of his dominant themes. He aims to show how God has historically educated the human race, preparing for the Incarnation, which occurred at God's appropriate time. \textit{Strom. VI} chapters V and VI give a good résumé of Clement's attitude to this matter, together with all the ramifications that it had in his mind. In doing so, Clement shows his attitude to the place of the Gentiles in the divine economy of salvation. In \textit{Strom. VI}, V(41, 6-7) Clement says: 

\begin{quote}
τὰ γὰρ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ Ἰουδαίων παλαιὰ, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ καὶ νῦν ὁ πάντως γένεις σεβομένοι Χριστιανοί, οἱ σαφῶς γὰρ, οἵματι, ἐδήλωσαν τὸν ἔνα καὶ μόνον θεὸν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἐλληνῶν θεολογίας, ἐπὶ δὲ Ἰουδαίων Ἰουδαϊκῶς, καὶ δὲ δὴ ἡμῶν καὶ πνευματικῶς γνωσκόμενον. 
\end{quote}

He goes on a few sentences later, "ἐκ γοῦν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νεωτυχίας εἰς τὸ ἐν γένος τοῦ σωζόμενον συνάγων. λαοῦ οἱ τὴν πίστιν σωζόμενοι, οὐ Χριστῷ διαμορφοῦσαν τῶν πρῶτων λαῶν, ἵνα τις φύσεως ὑπολογίζω τριττῆς, διαφόροις δὲ παιδευμένων διαθήκαις τοῦ ἐνῶς κυρίου ἀποτάσι ἐνὸς κυρίου ῥήματι."

(42, 2)

Here the basic point clearly is that it is one God Who reveals Himself though in different ways' or 'Covenants'. The emphasis falls as much, if not more, on the common source of the covenants than on their differentiation. Nevertheless, it is true that the differences are recognised. Clement, however, goes on to show that, in the divine economy of salvation (see especially chapter VI), everything tends in the end towards the completion of God's purposes in unity and in
equivalence of opportunity for Jews and Gentiles alike. In *Strom.* VI.VI Clement discusses the Descent into Hades, and he shows that it was the purpose of Christ's descent not only to grant salvation to Jews, but also to proclaim the Gospel to such Gentiles as were ready for conversion. (οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἐὰν ἔδωκεν ἐπιτυμβίωσιν ἐὰν ἐπιστροφὴν εὐχαριστήσαντο, 46.4) Here, he toys with the possibility that it may have been the apostles who preached to the Gentiles, while Christ concentrated on the righteous Jews (45.5ff. of *Strom.* II.9. 44, 1-2, vide page 607) On this point he is not certain, but he is sure that in Hades both Jews and Gentiles had the Gospel preached to them, whether this was by Christ alone, or by Christ and the apostles in the division of labour suggested. Presumably, the latter possibility of a division of function rests in Clement's mind on Christ's mission in His lifetime to the Jews, while that of the apostles in their lifetime included the great leap across to the Gentile world. Surely, nothing could demonstrate more effectively than this grandiose conception of a Descent into Hades the way in which Clement sees all history as leading up to the Incarnation and the subsequent achievement of salvation for all men.

It is noteworthy that the phrase, "those ready for conversion", is used by Clement of those Gentiles, to whom it may have been the task of the apostles to preach. This accords with what was said earlier, when we were discussing the question of purgatorial cleansing and insisted that Clement has in mind only ordinary believers (not Christian Gnostics nor unbelievers.) It is consonant with this view that when Clement talks about Hades as the waiting-place between death and the final consummation of all things, at least prior to Christ's entrance into it subsequent to His death on
the Cross, he sees Christ as descending, not to give a further opportunity to the unrepentant, but to proclaim the Gospel to those, Jews and Gentiles alike, who are "ready for conversion", i.e. to the righteous dead. Thus, here again, Clement shuts the door, it would seem, on any kind of universalism. He sees too that, though the righteous Jews and Gentiles differ from the unrighteous of these races of men, they still require the Advent of Christ and His Descent into their midst to achieve their actual salvation. This seems to give the lie to the view outlined by H. Chadwick: "--Clement has not a real 'theology of history' in the sense that Irenaeus has. He does not think of progressive education disclosing new truth. For him truth is eternal and unchanging, and the gospel is a republication of the primordial revelation given by God to the earliest man, but corrupted into polytheism."¹ This assessment views Clement as a thorough-going Hellenist, basically concerned with static concepts of eternal truth and with the typically Greek Christian concern with revelation of those same concepts. However, Strom. VI. V-VI shows us that at least in Hades, it is more than eternal truths that Jews and Greeks alike await. It is the presence of the victorious Christ, Who publishes salvation, because of what He has done, what He has achieved on the Cross. Clement, in fact, does have a theology of history, and he is concerned with the achievement of Christ in His Cross.

It is true that Clement does see those righteous souls, Jew and Greek, as benefiting in Hades by their disembodiedness. Clement tells us (VI. VI. 46 3) that adherence to Christ is easier in Hades than on earth. The thought is twofold. First, the soul in the

¹ op.cit., p.50
after-life is being punished, but this is corrective. Second, mere
flesh (σάρκιον) does make it more difficult to 'perceive clearly'
(καθαρύτερον διόρισον). Nevertheless, two things are assumed
in context, which are vital. The first is that Clement is talking
about those who were ready for conversion, while the second is that
though we need to perceive clearly, our salvation is far more
dependent upon the arrival of the One Who has triumphed in His Cross.
It is clearly the Cross, together with the whole Incarnation, which
provides Christ and apostles with the gospel that they preach in Hades.

Clement may not say much of the atoning Work of Christ. He
may not spell out very clearly why Christ has a 'gospel' to preach,
but it is at least clear that it is only with the Incarnation and the
Cross that the righteous dead in Hades receive salvation. This must
mean that the old and new dispensations cannot be viewed in a 'flat'
manner as of equal value. The new is not better simply in the sense
that it is more recent and is, therefore, presently appropriate. It
must mean that, though those of old time anticipated in some sense
Christ's day, the substance of salvation came with Christ in the
Incarnation. This also means that we have to do, in Clement, with
more than teaching or preaching. The Gospel is founded on historical
actuality, on event. Something happened, for Clement, in the
Incarnation, that is the basis of the New Covenant's fulfilment of
the Old. Clement is as much concerned to show the proper relation
of the Old Covenant and the New, and the Old Testament and the New
(the written documents of the same), as Irenaeus or other anti-
Gnostic writers of the Church. His special contribution is to
underline this by means of his doctrine of the Descent into Hades.
This is not, indeed, new with him, but he uses the doctrine to make
clear the unity in diversity of the two dispensations of salvation-
It is time to return to the question: What does this demonstrate regarding Clement's eschatology? We submit that it is significant, in that it does show us a Clement who is more concerned with history than with static truths of revelation. Einar Molland says with reference to Clement: "The marks of the new covenant are the Incarnation of Christ, the love of Christ, and the universalism of the Gospel."¹

In Strom. II. IX Clement shows that he sees this enlargement of God's purposes to include the Gentiles as being a fulfilment of Scriptural prediction and as being based upon Israel's hardness of heart. This is the familiar theme in the Early Church (we have already noted it in the writings of Justin Martyr (vide above, Chapter IV, pp. 424-433), and Irenaeus (vide above Chapter V. pp. 522) that Israel's rejection of Christ was the predestined hinge, on which rested the preaching of the Gospel to the Gentiles. Clement quotes among other passages, Is.65: 1-2 and Rom. 10:19 (Deut. 32:21) as also Rom. II:II. In the same context, he quotes the Shepherd of Hermas (Simil. IX.XVI. 5-7) to the effect that the apostles preached the Gospel to the righteous dead before Christ's time, who were thus elevated: "(<<)..... Αἰς τῶν καὶ συνανέβησαν μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ συνήρμοσαν εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀλητομητοι συν, ἐκομήθησαν εἰς δικαιοσύνην κυρία ἐκομήθησαν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ κυνείᾳ, μόνην δὲ τὴν σφηνίδα ταύτην οὐκ ἔχον."

Here again we see the new dispensation as demonstrated in the results of the Descent into Hades. We see here more clearly, however, that Clement understood that all of this happened within a predetermined

¹. op.cit., p.71.
sequence of dispensation. However, the Christian tradition saw that beyond this fulfilment stood the yet unfulfilled promise of the day when God's Kingdom would be universal in its scope. Is it likely that Clement did not believe this also? We submit that all the evidence suggests that Clement took very seriously the whole Christian eschatological tradition, and that, as our earlier investigation has suggested, he looked towards the consummation of all things at the Parousia of Christ, when the dead would be raised and all men would stand before the Judgment-seat of Christ.

What in fact is implicit in the judgment of H. Chadwick, quoted on page 600 above, is an interpretation, which seems to ignore certain facts. Further, this interpretation is served by an assumption that a 'realized eschatology' is the only eschatology that makes sense of the Fourth Gospel and of the Epistle to the Ephesians. If Clement is markedly influenced by these works, there is no evidence that he understood them as Chadwick appears to do. It is true that Clement is very much taken up with present Christian reality—this does but show his sense of balance—but he does have a place for the dimension of hope. Thus, in Strom. II chapter XII, Clement says: "Τῆς δὲ πίστεως καθέκερ τοῦ Χρόνου διστῶν οὔτως εἴρηομεν ἐν δίστης ἡμετέρᾳ οὐνοικούσαι ζωῆς. Τοῦ γὰρ Χρόνου τῷ μὲν καρπαχκότι ἡ μυθή, τῷ δὲ μέλλοντι ἐλπὶς ἐστὶ πιστεύομεν δὲ τὰ καρπαχκότα γεγονέναι καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἐσεοδίαν· ἡμακαμένεν τε ὃ, οὕτως ἐχειν τὰ καρπαχκότα πιστεί περεισμένου, τὰ μέλλοντα ἐλπίδι· ἀπεκδεχήμενοι. Διὰ πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἐγκατοίκιο τῶν γνωστικῶν περιοίγκεν ἐνα θεοῦ εἰδώτι." (53,1-2)

What is implicit here is a division of the dispensations, which is alluded to 'passim' in the 'Stromateis'. Fear belonged to the dispensation of Law, faith belongs to the level of the ordinary believing Christian, but love belongs to the Gnostic level—and the
Gnostic, in his love, anticipates that era, for which we now live in hope, when the love of God will be everything. Clement does not, indeed, deny fear a place even in the Christian life, but this is so that the hope may be realized, the hope of confirmation in Christ's eternal kingdom. "ο ..... τοῦ θεοῦ ἐχθρὸν καὶ δεόντας καὶ εἰς ἀγάπην ἀποκαθιστήσων ....." (55,5)

Clement's Gnosticism and Eschatology.

It is necessary now to look more closely at the presuppositions of Clement's concern that Christians should live on the Gnostic level, for this is one of his major interests in his writings and any eschatological basis, or understanding of this, that can be laid bare, demonstrates that eschatology is part and parcel of Clement's whole thinking about Christian theology. We have already alluded to Clement's foundation of the Christian Gnostic's asceticism in a voluntary anticipation of the conditions of eternity. This was implicit in his quoting of Jesus' words concerning the temporality of marriage in Lk. 20:34-35. This now requires further documentation and explanation.

Einar Molland makes the comment: "In the Paedagogus, Faith is the highest attainable stage of the Christian life on earth. The perfection spoken of as 'meat' belongs to the world to come. But in the Stromateis, Clement knows a via excellentior, practicable already within the sphere of this life. This way is called knowledge, γνῶσις. It is characteristic, therefore, that he gives another interpretation of 'milk' and 'meat' in this work. Here he accepts the distinction between a lower and a higher teaching".¹ Molland sees it as possible to reconcile these utterances by

¹ op.cit.,p.78.
supposing that the two writings belong to different stages of development in Clement's thinking. He repudiates the view that the view of the Paedagogus is affected by its readers, viz. heretics or other non-Christians whom Clement is seeking to win, while the Stromateis was written for those already Christians with a view to leading them on to a higher stage of experience. "The Stromateis is hardly less antiheretical than the Paedagogus and it is obviously not an esoteric writing put only into the hands of Christians who were worthy of its higher teaching."¹ With this judgment we may well agree. His quotation from the German scholar, Daehne,² seems to give the correct explanation: Christian faith is indeed, for Clement, a religious life complete in itself, but it is not a complete, or perfect, apprehension of the same. Our grasp of Christian realities is affected by our present corruptibility. Thus, there is ultimately no real clash in the statements of Clement—he does have a coherent unity of thought throughout on the subject.

It is instructive that, as Molland points out, Clement sees faith as being an adequate foundation for that life of perfection, it but that is reserved for the period after the resurrection, the life which is to come. "φατος δε ρωτα μενων και του σκοτους οδηγησεν εν εν τη ανεκταει των πιστευοντων άποκειται το τηλος· το δε ουκ άλλον τινώς εστι μεταλυμενιν ἄλλης της προσωπολογημενης ἐπαναλειτον····· "Εστι γαρ, ως ειπεν, δοκη μεν ἡ πιστις εν χρεω γεννημενη, τελος δε το τοκειον της ἐπαναλειτον εις αιωνας απειρουμενον."(Paed.I.VI.28,3-5)

Here Clement is concerned to refute heretical Gnosticism, while

¹ op.cit., p.78.
² op.cit., p.78. 'Die christliche Religion ist nach Clemens die Aufnahme einer vollkommenen Religion sie ist aber nicht ein vollkommenes Erfassen derselben, nicht ein Eindringen in die Grunde ihrer Wahrheit, sondern eine tote Aufnahme.' This is a quotation from A.F. Dähne's book, 'De γνώσει Clementis Alexandrini', Leipzig, 1831,p.26
showing that there is a truly Christian Gnosticism. He insists that perfection must build on common Christian faith, and accepts that perfection properly belongs to the life beyond the resurrection. Nevertheless, he does exhibit in this passage a remarkably clear 'inaugurated eschatology' in his understanding of John 3:36 and 6:40. Commenting on Jesus' words in 6.40 Clement says: "Καθ' ὅσον μὲν ὁ ἄνω δύνατον ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, δὲ ἐσχάτην ἡμέραν ἦν ἴσως τοῖς τηρώμενοι οὐ̂ ταῦτα τελείους ἴματείς γενέσθαι πιστεύσειν." (29,1)

It is interesting that Clement judges that the present time is "the last day", not some future time such as that of the Parousia. Nevertheless, this present period is to come to an end, and this is doubtless to be at the Parousia. This is implied in that, in context, this present age must be terminated by the resurrection from the dead, and we have already shown that, for Clement, that is to take place at Christ's Appearing. Clement is taking seriously that eternal life has begun for the man who has faith here and now. Faith and the present possession of eternal life are possible for us on earth in the present, because this is the 'last day'. Nevertheless, this eternal life somehow has to be consummated in the resurrection. What is important to note is that in all of this Clement is setting out his theory of the relation of Faith and Knowledge, πίστις and γνῶσις. Thus essentially Christian Gnosticism is that kind of life or perfection, which, properly speaking, can only be fully realized in eternity. Unlike heretical Gnosticism, however, it does not leave behind first Christian principles--rather does it build on faith, as its essential foundation. What all of this means, however, is that Clement's views on Gnosticism of the truly Christian variety are eschatologically oriented.

Clement has an illuminating section on what he believes pertains
to the life or experience of the man with faith, which is also given
in this chapter: "βαπτίζομενοι φωτισόμεθα, φωτισόμενοι ύποποιομεθα,
ἀποκοιμομενοι τελειομέθα, τελειομενοι ἀκαθαρσίατισόμεθα.....
Καλεῖται δὲ πολλὰς τὸ ἔργον τούτο, Χάρισμα καὶ φαντασία
καὶ τελείον καὶ λογισμὸν. Λογισμὸν μὲν δὲ ὡς ἄμαρτίας
ἀποκρυπτομέθα, Χάρισμα δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄμαρτομοιν ἔκτισμα
ἀνείται, φαντασία δὲ δὲν ὡς τὸ ὄριον ἐκεῖνο πῶς τὸ
σωτηρίου ἐποπτεύεται, τούτεστιν δὲν ὡς τὸ θεῖον ὄξωμάζομεν,
tελείον δὲ τὸ ἀκαθαρσίας ρημέων." (Paed. LVI, 26, 1-2)

It is like Clement not to balance off neatly in this section the
various benefits of the ordinary believer's experience of salvation,
but it is at least clear that the baptized believer receives, as
benefits, illumination, sonship, the forgiveness of sins, 'perfection',
and immortality. It is equally clear that none of these things is
received in completeness in this life, nor indeed for Clement would
they be received completely after death: rather would they have to
await the resurrection. This is manifest, where mortality is
concerned. The point is that we get here the clue to Clement's whole
perspective about the Gnostic life: these are its marks--forgiveness,
sonship, illumination, the gift of eternal life. All of these the
ordinary believer knows in measure; these are the blessings which
all will finally receive in completeness; but the Christian Gnostic
knows something more of the full meaningfulness and reality of each of
these aspects of the Christian life here and now, this in anticipation
of that completeness that belongs properly to 'eternity' or the time
after the resurrection of the dead. The very term, Gnosticism,
conjures up a picture of perfect knowledge. But this is vitally
related to the reality of 'illumination' which comes to all Christian
men. We have already noted, in dealing with Justin Martyr (Chapter IV,
that the concept of illumination was frequently used in connection with Baptism, especially where the baptism of Gentiles was in view. The underlying thought there seems to have been that the demonic enslavement of men's understanding was broken and the mists of man's wilful ignorance of God dispelled through the Gospel of Christ. What it is suggestive here to note is that Clement evidently sees the \( \gamma \nu \omega \sigma \iota \) that is to characterize this Christian who lives on the higher plane as the greater expansion of this understanding, which all illuminated, that is all baptized, men have. The Christian Church is the sphere where, through the Gospel, understanding reigns, but some believers apprehend more perfectly than others. It is important to see that, for Clement, it is not only a special mode of behaviour, which anticipates the life of the resurrection age—celibacy, carelessness regarding money, about food and sleep, and so on—but above all perfect knowledge, at least as near perfect as a man can get prior to the resurrection. This means that, whatever the appearance of some of Clement's remarks and however tinged his language may be by Hellenistic terminology and love for 'philosophy', basically Clement is motivated here also by an eschatological orientation of thinking. The Christian Gnostic is to study and to seek perfect knowledge, because this is that to which all Christian men are committted by their baptism. The Gnostic simply anticipates, in advance of the resurrection, that vision of God, which is to be his beatitude in eternity.

It would be easy to find in Clement's preoccupation with 'philosophy' and his encouragement to study and learning an intellectual cast of mind, which is at variance with the simplicity of Christ. Such would surely, however, be a misunderstanding of Clement. He never thinks of knowledge as available to mental discipline alone, but to that combined with strenuous exercise of the soul in prayer and
contemplation, so that, while intellectual exercise is helpful and even necessary to the fullest reaches of divine knowledge, yet it is vouchsafed primarily to a quality of spiritual acquisitiveness. In *Strom.* I.VI. 33, 5-6 Clement makes this clear when he reminds us of the proverb regarding the ant (Prov.6:6,8). Clement seems to feel that, if the greater knowledge comes with study, it is only laziness, an ethical or spiritual failing, that can stand in our way. Thus, Gnosticism is open to all believers.

The World and God

One final aspect of Clement's thinking must be examined, namely, his attitude to the relationship of the world with God. Recent studies by such scholars as Hal Koch and Eric F. Osborn have shown that the problems faced both by Clement of Alexandria and Origen were the characteristic concerns of middle Platonism. Daniélou notes that Hal Koch finds the idea of Providence in Origen as derivative from the philosophy of the time, since the idea of Providence was in fact central to that Middle Platonism, which was somewhat eclectic in character and which was in vogue during the second and third centuries A.D. Daniélou, however, in our judgment suggests the sounder solution: "The truth—is this: The problem of Providence was the one philosophers were most interested in during the second and third centuries. That was why Origen stressed such features in Christianity as were relevant to it. He represented Christianity as history, as the working out of a divine plan meant

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to bring human creatures little by little to acknowledge God's excellence, of their own freewill.\textsuperscript{1}

If Daniélou be correct, it is not that Origen borrowed whole-sale from Middle Platonism, but rather that the particular problems, to which he addressed himself out of his Christian tradition, were those current in the philosophical circles of his day. Probably the same is true of Clement of Alexandria. The questions of freewill and fate, the part played by demons in the world, the problem of the relationship between divine transcendence and divine immanence--these are the questions which constantly lie in the background of Clement's thinking.

E.F. Osborn makes us aware of Clement's connections with the developing trends in Middle Platonism in his understanding of the relationship of God and the world. This is viewed primarily in terms of the philosophical problem of the One and the Many, according to Osborn, although the problem of divine transcendence-immanence overlaps with it. There seems little doubt that Osborn draws attention to an important aspect of Clement's thinking.

"Two problems are of importance for the understanding of later Platonism--the problem of the one and the many, and the problem of divine immanence and transcendence. The first of these is philosophical and the latter theological. In the period that concerns us philosophy and theology are mixed together."\textsuperscript{2}

Osborn reminds us that the problem of the one and the many had first been explicitly stated by the Pythagoreans, but that it was Parmenides of Elea and Plato who first made an important distinction between two concepts of 'unity'. This distinction is that between a 'simple unity' and a 'complex unity'. What characterized Middle Platonism was a


\textsuperscript{2} op. cit., p. 17
preoccupation with the question whether a simple or complex concept of unity is to be preferred. A stress on divine transcendence goes with a stress on 'simple' unity, and a stress on immanence goes with 'complex' unity. This question had a bearing not only on the nature of God, in his relations with the world, but also on the questions, What is goodness? and, What is truth? In these three areas of investigation, philosophy has been confronted with the problem of the relationship between a 'simple' unity and the diversity of the reality with which we are confronted. Thus, if we say that God is 'one' we have to explain the multiplicity of being--this bears on ontology. If we say that there is only one thing or quality good in the absolute sense, we have to explain the seeming diversity of moral demand. Again, in the sphere of epistemology there has been a drive to discover some unitary principle or criterion of truth, which must somehow be related to the many things considered to be true.

Really these three aspects belong together. Our special concern is with the question in terms of the relationship of God and the world. In Plato's book, 'Parmenides',\(^1\) we have a clear statement of what is involved in the two concepts of 'unity', as applied to God. If we accept the notion of a 'simple' unity, then we must see that this is opposed to multiplicity. The One will not have parts nor be a whole. It will have no beginning, no ending, no middle, no limits, and no shape. It will be neither at rest nor in motion. It will neither be the same as, nor other than, itself or another. It will be neither like nor unlike, equal to nor unequal to, either itself or another. It will not occupy any position in time. Finally, it will be incapable of being named or spoken of. It will

not be susceptible to being known or perceived by any creature. As Osborn truly remarks, this concept of unity is based on the mental picture of a point in space and time, mathematically conceived.

Clearly, the point of all that is said, is that such a One is so 'alone', in His constitution of Reality, that to speak of Him in terms of size, shape, duration, or any other dimension of being or understanding would be out of place, since this procedure would invite a comparison i.e. would implicitly suggest once again that the One was only a part of Reality, instead of the whole of it. If this concept really influenced Clement one could see a basis for a strong stress on divine transcendence, on the need for revelation, and a distaste for the things of time and sense. Such a stress would have clear implications for Clement's understanding of man's future destiny.

On the other hand, a 'complex' unity has ascribed to it all the positive attributes which were denied to the 'simple' unity. This unity has simplicity and being -- even 'being' had been denied to the 'simple' unity. This One is a whole and has parts, and it is unlimited in magnitude. It has a beginning, middle and end, and some definite shape. The One is both in itself and in another. It is both at rest and in motion. It will be both like and unlike others. This One is in time, has a past, and a future, as well as a present, and can be known and perceived.

Quite clearly we have to do here with two quite different concepts of 'Oneness' or of 'Unity), and the problem posed by these two concepts is very far-reaching. Osborn puts the distinction well, when he says:

"The two concepts of unity can be briefly described as analogous to the unity of a pin-point and the unity of a spider's web. When we say a thing is one we may mean that it is simple and indivisible, or we may mean that it is a complex unified whole." 

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1 op. cit. p. 13.
We reach the first kind of unity by analysis, abstracting from a simple thing like a point in space all qualities and relations until we are left with a unity which is one and nothing but one. On the other hand, we reach a complex unity by taking a complex unity like a human being and adding to it qualities and relations until we have the whole universe itself. The limit cases of simple and complex unity or the limits of analysis and synthesis are equally outside our experience."¹

It is important to realize that in saying this Osborn is not merely setting forth the two possibilities, but he is also asserting that both these kinds of unity are found in Clement of Alexandria. Indeed, he says that "there is a systematic ambiguity,"² in Clement's use of the word 'one'. He then goes on to outline, in the passage quoted immediately above, the two kinds of unity represented. Clearly these two unities have a close correspondence with the 'simple' and 'complex' unities of late classical philosophy and of Middle Platonism. The important thing to grasp is that Clement accepts both kinds of unity. "The notions of simple and complex unity provide a key to the structure of Clement's philosophy. There is a reality, a goodness and a truth which is a complex unity."³ And in this Clement seems to have been in line with the tendency of Middle Platonism, which increasingly sought to resolve the tension between the 'one' (simple) and the 'one-many' (complex) and between transcendence and immanence not by finding a 'via media', but rather by asserting the transcendence of the one, on the one hand, and the imminence of the one-many, on the other.

It is easy to discern in this philosophical background the source of a certain stress on the inaccessibility of God in Clement, as also of the doctrine of the Logos by which he seeks to reduce the

multiplicity of contingent reality to a meaningful whole, essentially at one with the transcendence of the Father God.

Thus, in Strom. V.X,65,2, Clement speaks of God as being "ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν φωνὴν καὶ πᾶν νόημα καὶ πᾶσαν ἐννοίαν... ἀποκρητὸς ἂν δύνημει τὴν αὐτοῦ."

Again at Strom. V. XI,71,3, Clement has a most important section in which he tells us that we may discover what God is not, and that only, by a threefold procedure, consisting of confession of sin, logical analysis, and self-abandonment to Christ: "εἰ... ἀπελούτες πάντα ὅσα πρόσετον τοῖς νομασίων καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐνωμένως, ἐπιρρήσαμεν εὐτόος εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ κακείθεν εἰς τὸ ἀναχές ὑγιήτητι προϊόμεν, τῇ νοῆσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἐμῇ γε τῇ προσ抽查ομεν (καὶ), αὐχεῖ ὦ ἔστιν, ὦ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν γνωρίσασθε." Again, a little further on (para.5) Clement tells us that "ἐν τόκῳ το πραξεν αἰτίων, άλλ' ὑπερέκχει το ποιοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ και οὐσίατος καὶ νοῆσεως." It would seem that the second stage in the process mentioned, namely, that of logical abstraction, is a reflection of the concept of God as a 'simple' unity. In terms of this Clement is most emphatic that, properly speaking, we can ascribe neither position in time nor in space, nor movement, nor names to God. These are only concessions to our fraility of thought.

It is in line with Clement's emphasis on the essential unknowability of God as a 'simple' unity that, in like fashion, he sets forth a clear doctrine of 'creatio ex nihilo' and that he is the first Christian thinker to do so with distinctness. As Osborn says: "Clement is the first person to state and give reasons for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In the Protrepticus he denounces idol worship and Stoic philosophy for their veneration of material
things. God alone is to be worshipped, for he transcends the universe in power and majesty. --- Osborn goes on to note certain references from the Protrepticus, the Paedagogus, and the Stromateis, which make clear Clement's understanding. We cite some of these below:

**Prot.LXIII.3.**

"ὤς γε ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ. Μόνον αὐτὸν τὸ βασιλεύμα κοσμοποιία, μόνος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐκοίμησεν, ἐκεῖ καὶ μόνος ἄνως ἐστὶ θεὸς. ψυχὴ τῷ βούλεσθαι δημιουργητι καὶ τῷ μόνῳ ἐθελήσαι αὐτὸν ἔκται το γεγένηθαι."

**Paed.I.XXVI.3.**

"ὡς δὲ ἀρμα τὸ κελεύσαι αὐτὸν πάντα γίνεται, ὁπῶς ἔκται τῷ χαρίσασθαι μόνον βουληθήναι αὐτὸν (τὸ) κεπελημονωθαί τὴς χώρας."

**Strom.V.XIV.92**

"..... ὁπόταν εὕρῃ τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τούδε τοῦ πάντος εὑρεῖν τε ἔργου Έ, ὦ μόνον γενητὸν [τε] ἐδείξεν τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς αὐτὸν γεγονόναι σημαίνει καθέπερ οὐδὲν, πατέρα δὲ αὐτὸν κεκληθῆσαι, ὡς ὁ ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ μὴ οὖν ὄστρατον."

In the last quotation above the citation from Plato is found at Paragraph XXVIII C of the Timaeus. Osborn appropriately comments that "Plato did not mean this (i.e. that it derived its being from God alone and emerged out of non-existence), but Clement evidently does."^{2} If God is a 'simple' unity, then manifestly everything else

1. *op.cit.*, p.33
must be created 'ex nihilo'--for there is nothing else out of which to construct it. Both in respect of our knowledge of God and the question of creation, however, it is noteworthy that the Logos becomes Mediator. Though God in Himself is above all space and time, and therefore above what is less than Himself in any created order, He steps in the Logos to bring creation into being and to reveal Himself to that creation. Here, Clement relates the transcendent One to the immanent One-many by means of the Logos, Who is incarnate as Jesus Christ. It is particularly significant that Clement diverges from Philo, in consistently refusing to apply names to God and in ignoring the concept of a pre-existent matter on which God worked as a Demiurge. (cf. Philo's De Opificio Mundi where the official line is from a Jewish angle, orthodox with reference to the creation, but his aside remarks betray Hellentistic influence.) Thus, we see that Clement is resolutely opposed to any kind of dualism. Nothing exists beside God and there is nothing with which, properly speaking, God can be compared. This is why, ultimately, it is better to say that God 'is not' and is ineffable--beyond thought or comparison.

It is important, however, to ask ourselves whether Clement has simply taken over a Hellenic philosophical concept of God as 'simple' unity, or whether he is expressing theological truths out of the biblical-Christian framework in terms reminiscent of this philosophical concept. It makes a difference how one views this matter. May it not be that Clement saw analogies, and perhaps even genuine flashes of insight, in that philosophy, which he believed that God had given as

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1. In his book, 'The Beginning', Manchester Univ. Press, 1968, Arnold Ehrhardt comments: 'It was he (Philo) who, by introducing the Platonic doctrine of the demiurge, paved the way for Jewish mystics to maintain that the empirical world had been created by an angel.' (p. 188).
a guide to the Greeks, but that for him essentially they did but illustrate truths which were arrived at in independence of Greek philosophy and out of genuinely Biblical-Christian attitudes to God and His relations with the world?

All of this is very relevant to our understanding of the eschatological outlook of Clement of Alexandria. Many commentators look to his 'simple' view of divine unity, judge that for him the work of the Logos is only a temporary accommodation to the problem of helping man to know the ineffable God, and see the destiny of Christian believers as being to outgrow their physical environment and ultimately to become merged with God. If this be so, then it is at least still questionable whether Clement really believed in a Parousia of Jesus Christ of such an order as to suggest His physical presence on earth. One can understand the judgment that resurrection and judgment-to-come are but vivid symbols for a 'consummation of all things' in which present limitations will be set aside. We submit that, in the light of our foregoing investigation, it is very hard to believe that Clement would think in this way, but it might still just be possible that he assumed that the Gnostic—the truly wise Christian—would understand that Parousia of Christ, Resurrection, and Final Judgment were only symbols of some event or process, in which space and time would be left behind, at least by the People of God.

It has to be confessed that, despite the case made out above, certain features may suggest the understanding just mentioned. We ask, for example, why Clement should judge that non-Gnostic Christians after death are in a better position to arrive at true spirituality, simply because they have left 'the flesh' behind. Is this a Hellenic infiltration into Clement's thinking? Again, is it possible that Clement's reticence regarding the Second Advent of Christ does in fact
spring from at least a mild distaste for the crassly physical way in which many viewed this event? It is possible, of course, that Clement was inconsistent.

T.F. Torrance notes\(^1\) that Clement of Alexandria works with the distinction, taken over as axiomatic, that there is a philosophical \(\chiωρισμός\) between the two worlds, the \(κόσμος νοητός\) and the \(κόσμος δίειθνός\) which went back through Philo and Valentinian Gnosticism to Pythagorean and Platonic thought, especially to the 'Timeus' of Plato (51.A-C). If this be so, the results are indeed destructive and to some extent vitiate the Biblical character of Clement's general insistence that \(πίστις\) and \(γνῶσις\) cannot be sundered. "So far as the understanding of the \(οἶκονομία\) is concerned Clement's philosophical assumptions have the effect of making purely transient the time-element in it, for \(οἶκονομία\) tends to become only the passing form that the work of the Son takes as He puts on our manhood, runs His human course (\(τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα διατέκχων Quis.div.salv. 8,36f.\)), and returns back to the Father. That is to say, the basic significance of the \(οἶκονομία\) changes, for instead of referring to a saving movement within history from one covenant to the other as it is all gathered up and fulfilled in the incarnation and work of Christ, it is merely the temporal reflection of the timeless pattern of the divine \(χρόνοια\) \(^2\).

The question is whether Clement basically thinks in terms of philosophical distinctions, such as that between the 'simple One' and the complex 'One-many' or that between the \(κόσμος νοητός\) and the

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2. op.cit., p.237.
To what extent are these simply contemporary distinctions of the Hellenic world which Clement found it convenient to employ and to which he gave a more Biblical direction in thinking? The answer to this question seems to be bound up with all that was said earlier about Clement's view of the kind of life to be led by the true Christian Gnostic and the anticipation of the Christian's final destiny that he has while on earth and in the period between death and resurrection. We noted that moderation with regard to food, sleep, sexual functions, money, and so on, characterized, in his view, the Christian Gnostic on earth, and that the latter was seen as increasing in understanding, based on faith. We further suggested that, in part at least, Clement's pattern was that of our Lord Himself. However, our Lord rose from the dead, and there is no evidence that Clement did not believe in the Empty Tomb, or that he thought this a convenient myth, designed to illustrate an otherwise indescribable reality. This suggests, however, that for Clement the ideal Gnostic state was, physically speaking, one of incorruptibility, of άθραρσία which corresponded to Christ's moral and spiritual unconquerability.

If this be a correct way of looking at things, the statement of Clement in Stron. V. VI that "ὁ κύριος ἀποδέται τε καὶ κατίων εἰς ὑψόθενον" (40,3), must surely refer not to a literal abandonment of the flesh by our Lord after the resurrection, but to a transcending of the limitations of our earthly body as we know it in the present dispensation or age. The reference in context to Christ as "ἐκεννεδαμένος τε γάμωμα τῆς δούλης," and as "τὸν πνευματικὸν ἐκείνου καὶ τελείον ἀνθρώπου τὴν ἀνορθοτον κληρονομικήν ἀπολαβάντα, ὥστε ὁ Θεός οὐκ εἴδεν καὶ οὐ δύοσκομεν καὶ ἐκτενείαν ἀνθρώπου αἰών ἀνθρώπον" (40,1) is suggestive of a Biblical understanding of Christ's state, having entered within the Heavenly Veil. The stress is on Christ's having
attained, by means of His Victory on the Cross and in the Resurrection, which that which as men we cannot grasp—that is ineffable, which we cannot understand conceptually or practically, and which Christ has made available for true Christian men by His Victory.

What is being suggested here is that ultimately Clement is thinking Biblically about God, about the Risen Christ, and about the future destiny of Christian believers. However much Clement may find it convenient to use the language and indeed the thought-forms of Middle Platonism, his God is not just a philosophical Absolute, Who has to be brought near by the Logos. Rather is He the living God of the Old and New Testament Scriptures, to Whom nature, history, and providence bear witness but Who cannot be contained, conceptually or otherwise, by man in his creatureliness and sin. It is surely as such that Clement's God is ineffable. The contrast, then, between God and man is not that between a purely spiritual, i.e. disembodied, Absolute and man in his flesh, i.e. in his bodily condition, but rather between the living God in His transcendent wisdom, power, and holiness, and the creature man in his limitedness and in his sin. If we ask why it is, then, that becoming disembodied helps non-Gnostic saints to become more spiritual, in the sense of being more dedicated to God's will, the answer must surely be that Clement, in truly Biblical fashion, sees death as a divine providential dispensation, which treats man as a whole being, body and soul, and which prevents him from perpetuating his arrogant self-assertion over against God. In the story in Genesis (3.24) it was a divine messenger who was given a sword of flaming fire to prevent sinful man from re-entering Paradise and eating of the tree of life and living for ever. A passage in a fragment of Clement's works, translated by Cassiodorus, shows that Clement has some such understanding. Commenting on the phrases, "the Father of our Lord"
and "by the resurrection of Jesus Christ" in 1 Peter i.3, which he brings together, Clement deals with the thought of this verse, which concerns the expectation of the believer, which has become ours through Christ's resurrection. He says:

"Decebat--iterum nunquam reverti secundo ad corpus animam in hac vita, neque iustam, quae angelica facta est, neque malignam, ne iterum occasione peccandi per susceptionem carnis accipiat, in resurrectione autem utramque in corpus reverti." (Comment on the First Epistle of Peter). (italics mine).

The underlined words represent the passing revelation of an assumed way of thinking. This, however, makes them no less impressive, but rather the reverse. We submit that Clement is not derogating the body—an attitude which would be inconsistent with his assertion of the reality of Creation and his belief in the resurrection—but that he sees man's creatureliness, coupled with his sin, as keeping him from attaining what only Jesus Christ was in the divine πρῶτον destined to win for us.

There can be no doubt, of course, that Clement has a heavy stress on the transcendence of God—such as characterized the 'simple' unity concept of God—and also a strong stress on the necessity of a Mediator between God and the whole created order: hence his doctrine of the Logos. It is true that Middle Platonism stressed intermediaries between the transcendent God and the created order, but this does not prove that this is the source of Clement's insight. It is surely equally true of Old Testament revelation that God is high above man and his creation, and it is true to Pauline and Johannine theology to lay stress on the mediatorial role of the Word in creation, providence, and revelation. It would, however, be natural for Clement to see in the attitude of contemporary philosophy some indications of what he knew to be true from within Christian faith. This would be no accident. How could it be an accident for one who
held strongly to a doctrine of divine providence? Clement oscillates backwards and forwards in his judgment concerning the question whether the natural man has any knowledge of God, as also whether revelation has been given to those outside the prophetic-Christian revelation given to the Jewish race, but his fundamental thought is concerned, significantly, with history and providence. However the Gentiles reached certain views about God, whether it was the result of an original planting of an awareness of God in man, or the result of a general revelation to all men, or simply the result of man's reflection upon his world, in none of these cases could he arrive at a conviction, which did in fact correspond in some way with the truth about God, apart from the divine providence. Clement discusses the origin of Greek philosophy most fully at Strom. I, XIX, 94, 1-7. His guiding thought is thus expressed:

"Εντ 'όν κατα περιπτωσιν θανείν ακοφθέγματα τιμώ τῆς Ἀθηναίας ἰδιότητος ὡς Ἐλληνας, θείας οἰκονομίας καὶ περιπτωσίς (όυ γὰρ ταυτότητα ἔχουσιν τις διὰ τῇ προς τὴν ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπομορφίαν), εἰτε κατὰ συντομίαν, εἰκὸν ισχύοντο ἀπὸ συντομία. " (94, 1)

There is something Biblical, compelling, and magnificent in Clement's grasp of this fact, and his use of it. Einar Molland brings out well this thought in dealing with Clement's views on the origins of Greek philosophy:

"In accordance with this conception (Hellenic philosophy as preparing for the truly royal teaching) Clement elaborates a historical theory which at once explains both the elements of truth contained in Greek philosophy and its human imperfections. Or, to speak more correctly, he outlines and tests different theories concerning the origin and development of Greek philosophy and rejects only those which cannot explain its pedagogical role as belonging to God's providence. He retains theories which are satisfactory on this point, without subjecting them to comparison in order to attain to a final theory." ¹

¹ op.cit., p.47 Bracketed comment mine.
If, however, Clement is not really dependent upon Middle Platonism or on Hellenic philosophy at all, for his views about God and his relations with the world, we cannot expect that we will find in him the characteristically Hellenic repudiation of space-time values.

Murdoch E. Dahl brings out certain ideas, which may well help to explain the possible framework of Clement's understanding of space and time. He describes what he terms 'the Semitic Totality Concept' "negatively as a refusal to adopt any analytical or abstract ideas." Stress has always been laid by Semitic scholars on the implications of this for our understanding of human personhood. Dahl however, stresses that this concept has a much wider bearing. Its importance for human personality "is only one instance of a general cosmological outlook on every aspect of reality." He summarizes the concept thus, believing that it grew along with later Hebrew thought and was influential in the thinking of such a New Testament writer as St. Paul:

"All reality is organized in a series of totalities within totalities. The final totality that unifies and comprehends the rest is God Himself. Unity and activity together represent the touchstone of reality, which means that reality must not be discussed in terms of 'spirit' as against 'matter' or that which is 'subjective' against that which is 'objective'; nor in terms of a graded series of degrees of reality whereby one form of existence is regarded as being 'more real' than another, but rather in terms of the dynamic factors of each part of the totality to which it belongs. Applied to the non-human universe this means, among other things, that the word 'soul' may be predicated of anything."
Continuing his discussion, Dahl says a little further on that "the Semitic totality-concept sees created realities as dependent upon God in no sense which diminishes their own reality. This may be expressed in such a statement as 'A pebble is as real as God'." ¹

Dahl argues that, according to the semitic totality-concept, the distinction is not between God who is real on the one hand and man or the world on the other, which are relatively unreal. This indeed offends the Western mind, because we think normally in terms of 'ultimate' reality and 'immediate' reality. Dahl characterizes the difference as consisting in the fact that "the Western-idealist conception of reality is centrifugal. Creation emanates from God, not, of course, in a pantheistic sense (the idea of creatio ex nihilo safeguards this), but in the sense that everything tends to be treated as less 'ultimate' and, therefore less 'real' than the Creator." ² Dahl tells us that for the Hebrew mind the gulf between created and uncreated is considered in terms of duration, rather than anything else, e.g. 'All flesh is as grass--', but God's Word 'abides for ever', and here eternity is understood in terms, not of timelessness but of 'timefulness'. Further, the duration of entities increases as they approach nearer to Godhead. Their 'glory' becomes greater, and this indicates qualitative change also. ³ Thus, as Dahl sees it, "the biblical-Christian conception of reality appears to be centripetal. Entities are called out of nothing and become real in that divine act of creation. But the nearer they are drawn to Godhead, the greater, the more complex, the more enduring is their impact, their 'glory'." ⁴

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1. op.cit., p.65.
2. op.cit., p.65.
4. op.cit., p.66.
What is the relevance of this contribution by Dahl to our present discussion of Clement of Alexandria? Simply this, that if such an outlook really characterizes Paul's discussion of the resurrection-body in 1 Cor.15, and if Clement is relying on Biblical and Pauline concepts--rather than on concepts derived from Hellenic philosophy--then we can gain a different understanding of Clement's attitude to space, time and matter, and to questions dealing with the Risen Christ in His bodily constitution and with God's plans for the future of His saints. We recall Clement's significant use of the word 'glory' (ἡ δόξα) (Strom.VI.40,1) (vide above, page 624) evocative, as it is, of a Pauline background of thinking. Basically, our contention is that Clement is not thinking in terms of a Hellenic philosophical distinction between an Absolute God and relatively unreal man in the flesh, or between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms. In Dahl's terminology, this would be a 'centrifugal' way of thinking. Rather is Clement thinking in a centripetal manner. There are various degrees of 'glory' within the one Reality. The difference between God and man, or God and the created order, is not that God is real and man is not: rather is it that God is wise, holy, all-powerful, while man is foolish, sinful, and frail. He is but 'dust'. God 'endures unchanging on', but man passes away. So too the world, for all its apparent agelessness, disappears while God remains. But what the divine Logos, Jesus Christ, has achieved in the Incarnation, Cross, Descent into Hades, Resurrection, and Ascension, is to confer on man a new degree of 'glory' and a significant feature of this new 'glory' is that man's flesh now has 'incorruptibility', i.e. death is taken away with all sickness, just as moral debility is removed, through the victory of Christ.

What gives strength to this view in our judgment is Clement's thorough pre-occupation with the concept of Ἰζομονία 'incorruptibility',
and his concern that true Christian Gnostics, building on simple faith in Christ, should attain as nearly as possible, while on earth, to immovability of character. Clement's concern with incorruptibility, in its physical and futurist aspect, is characteristic of almost all early Christian theology which employed the Greek language, and it would appear to have solid Biblical justification. It was finally to receive its perhaps classic and most spiritual exposition in the 'De Incarnatione' of Athanasius, (VII.5, etc) where Christ's physical incorruptibility is sensitively viewed as the living proof of the annulment of God's judgment on man's sin. Certain statements made by Clement take on a different significance when viewed from this perspective. Clement's reference, for example, to logical abstraction as the second stage (together with confession of sins and abandonment to Christ) in a process whereby the Christian Gnostic reaches God (Strom. V.XI.71,3. vide above, page 619) sounds very much, as if it represents a considerable degree of dependence on the concept of the 'simple' unitary concept of God, characteristic of Middle Platonism. Doubtless, the language, and even the thought-form employed, do owe much to this source. Nevertheless, we can now perceive another interpretation. It is surely significant that the stage of logical abstraction is sandwiched between confession of sins and 'casting ourselves into the vastness of Christ', going forward from there 'through holiness into the void'. This suggests that Clement may be reinterpreting the concept by thus placing it. Further, what are we to make of this 'casting of ourselves upon Christ', and our being led 'forward through holiness into the void'? This term, 'the void' (τὸ ἄχρηστον) may be understood as a further concession to Hellenic philosophical interests, but we do not need to understand it thus. If Clement's view of reality is semitic and is of the order described
by Murdoch Dahl, then he is opposed resolutely to all dualism. Dahl thinks that for Biblical thinkers the void must have been "the creation of God. Its essential character, however, is the absence of God's controlling, ordering power." When we think today of the Void we are inclined to conceptualize a 'nothingness', which lies somehow inert beside God. But, if we think along the lines described in Dahl's chapter on the 'Semitic Totality Concept', then we realize that our modern conceptualization makes the Void far too positive a thing: it only has reality, in so far as God gives it character and being. Outside God there can, in the nature of the case, be nothing. The correct mental picture would seem to be of God as filling all things, but creating a Void by withdrawing his full power from a certain area. It is not that there exists a prior framework within which God is placed. Rather are space and time created by God's withdrawal of His control over an area, which actually comes into being only through this withdrawal. Thereafter, God gives a fresh ordering to a part of this new area, but in such a way as to allow this space-time system, together with man as its crown, its autonomy of direction. The Void must now represent, on this understanding, the further possibilities consistent with God's so withdrawing that man's autonomy will not be swamped, and when Clement talks about being led forward 'through holiness into the Void', we submit that he is asserting that it is Jesus Christ Who thus leads us on to new possibilities of being and destiny, but that he never implies that in any sense we thus become 'lost' in God. Nor does he imply any discontinuity with the embodied life of faith that all believers now enjoy.

It would seem, then that in fact Clement may well have a very positive attitude to the realities of space and time. We submit that

1. op.cit., p.67
the picture given above of Clement's thinking does full justice to his repudiation of the dualism of heretical Gnosticism, and also makes sense of his consistent insistence on man's autonomy of action. The latter emerges from his realization that man is not the plaything of impersonal forces—as so often heretical Gnosticism asserted—but that his world and he have been granted a measure of freedom through its constitution's being derived from the divine fiat. At times Clement's statements concerning man's free will may appear to be, and may in fact be, at variance with certain Biblical understandings of man's moral enslavement, as e.g. in the Pauline literature. But it would seem that it is a genuine insight into the nature of this space-time world of ours, with its ethical concomitants where human action is concerned, that lies behind Clement's emphasis.

From this perspective we may now attempt a further answer to the question why Clement thinks that it is easier for disembodied non-Gnostic believers to achieve true spiritual dedication in this state where the body has been left behind, after death. The term 'mere flesh' (σαρξ) a diminutive, was employed by Clement. Surely Clement could speak of 'mere flesh' in this way, not because he wanted to derogate the body. His convictions regarding the resurrection of the body, already documented, should make us wary of so interpreting, unless we can find no way out. Rather Clement means that flesh, as we know it, which is the seat of sin, is a hindrance to obeying God. Removed from it we are unable any more to sin, since man—as distinct from angels and demons—is essentially a unity of soul and body. This we have already noted. What we must now add, however, is that our present frame was seen as 'mere flesh' when viewed over against the 'glory' of that body, which Christ received on entering the Heavenly Holy of Holies, into the very Presence of the Father, and which,
through his union of divinity and humanity, He makes available to His saints at the Resurrection of the dead. Thus, the basic 'motifs' appear to be Biblical rather than Hellenic, however much the language is that of contemporary Middle Platonism.

Undoubtedly, it is not easy to decide to what extent Clement of Alexandria was influenced materially by the terms and thought-forms which he employed. The fact that at Strom.V. XI.71 Clement can speak of the threefold process of confession, logical analysis, and self-abandonment to Christ as only leading to a knowledge of what God is not, undoubtedly seems somewhat negative, and as if it depended upon the Platonic concept of a ' \( \chi \omega \rho \iota \gamma \mu \delta \) ' between the intelligible realm and the realm of sense, to which space and time are attached.

T.F. Torrance makes a statement which may help us in this matter:

"This was the problem that faced Plato with regard to the concept of space, or indeed the spatial element in any human concept, when it is applied to the intelligible realm. The separation speaks of a world beyond space and time, and yet a spatial element (\( \chi \omega \rho \) ) is involved in the very concept of separation (\( \chi \omega \rho \iota \gamma \mu \delta \) ) itself. Spatial elements have to be used when we speak of what is beyond space and independent of it, yet we cannot project a spatial concept beyond the separation, as if we could speak of there being 'place' over there."

This quotation makes clear how the distinction between the '\( \kappa \sigma \mu \omega \varsigma \nu \nu \gamma \tau \omicron \) ' and the '\( \kappa \sigma \mu \omega \varsigma \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \gamma \tau \omicron \delta \omicron \) ' in Plato was bound up with a Platonic notion of space as a 'receptacle' or 'container'. It is made clear in the book quoted from above that Nicene orthodoxy avoided any 'receptacle' concept of space, whether in a Platonic or Aristotelian form, as also any Stoic concept of space, where space was conceived in terms of a body as an agency creating room for itself. 2

Rather did the Fathers in general work with a 'relational' concept of

2. op.cit., p. 10ff. The whole of Chapter I, 'The Problem of Spatial Concepts in Nicene Theology', forms the background to the discussion which follows in this paragraph on pages 635ff.
space, in which philosophical notions were set aside or reinterpreted in terms of the dynamic creative and redemptive action of God. On this view, God is seen as containing all things, not in some physical manner within Himself, but in terms of His power. Further, our space is not a framework which can limit the Son of God. Rather have we to understand the spatial statements concerning Christ, as that He ascended to the Father, in terms of the subjection of our empirical realm to Him. Christ was within our spatial realm without being hindered by it. Further, through His resurrection and ascension He has affirmed the eternal validity of our space-time order, but in such a way as to make available to those who have trusted in Him, His own sovereign way of overcoming the limitations of our space-time world. One further feature of such a relational view of space is that it does not separate considerations about space from considerations relating to time. The question presently before us, however, is whether Clement of Alexandria thought in this 'relational' manner about space and time, or whether he allowed himself, through his use of the Platonic distinction between the intelligible and sensible realms, to import a measure of ambiguity into his understanding.

We have to bear in mind the central place given to the work of the Logos in Clement's thinking. It is Christ Who leads us, in understanding and in future reality out into 'the void'. (τὸ ἄχραντος) Viewed in the light of Clement's overall positive assertions about creation, providence, and redemption, it would seem that, when it is said that through the threefold process of confession, abstraction, and self-abandonment, we only reach a knowledge of what God is not. Clement means that the God Whom we thus come to know cannot be circumscribed by the limitations of our earthly life. When we remember that the 'simple One' did not even have 'being' ascribed to
Hirn, we have the perspective from which this statement, made by Clement, is to be understood. It is simply that Clement employs the language used concerning the 'simple' One to describe the sheer transcendence of God. It is true that through Christ we are led to a real knowledge of God but the point is that, viewed in terms of earthly realities, we are given only a knowledge of what God is not. Form, position, and motion—these are not terms that are appropriate to the Almighty. If we ask how this can be consistent with the belief in the physical resurrection and ascension of Christ, Clement would surely answer that through Christ we are given a real knowledge of God, but that this knowledge is of One Who cannot be described in earthly terms. God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, but it is the Logos, the Son of God, Who is the mediator in creation, providence, and redemption, and the continuing humanity of Jesus Christ throughout eternity never suggests that the Father can be described in this-worldly terms. Rather does the Son act as a link between the illimitability of God and our frail humanity. Positively understood, Clement's statement that through Christ we know 'not what God is but what He is not' (Strom.V.XI.7. 3) is to be seen not as a denial of real knowledge of God, but as a denial that the God, Whom we thus come to know, can be described in this-worldly terms. Thus, there is opened up for us an amazing vista of illimitable reaches in God into the understanding of which we are to be increasingly and eternally led through the Son. In this process neither Christ's humanity, nor ours, is abandoned, yet the process of discovery is both continuous and unending. If this understanding seems to assume a process in time, which it is hard to think of the 'simple' One, we must answer that basically Clement's thinking is hebraic and Biblical, and that for him God is above our space and our time, but not in a
static timeless, spaceless manner. Where He is and when He is, are dependent upon His sovereign Lordship, but thus understood space and time doubtless have meaning for Him.

Clement's Eschatology: Review and Assessment.

It remains to assess briefly what we have noted concerning Clement, together with its implications, before passing on to deal with Origen. Later we shall pause again to consider the general contribution of both Alexandrian thinkers.

First of all, it should be noted that the futurist element is by no means missing in Clement's thought. He clearly speaks of Second Advent of Christ, of future resurrection, and of Final Judgment. It is true that his references to the Second Advent are few in number, and that he has more to say about purgatorial cleansing after death than of the Judgment Day as such. Yet the very allusive character of some of the references both to Second Advent and the consummation of the age show that he does take these events seriously.

It may be noted, however, that there is much less evidence in Clement's writings of thought concerning any intensification of evil prior to the End or any reign of Antichrist. Possibly Clement accepts this. Indeed, it seems likely that his belief in the coming Deluge of Fire, which we noted above (page 587ff.) in our discussion on Judgment, implies the horrors of Antichrist's reign. Nevertheless explicit references to Antichrist, which are not generalized (as, for example, in a fragment from Cassiodorus, where, in commenting on I Jn.1.22, he accepts that he who denies that Jesus is the Christ is 'an antichrist'), are lacking. No references are made to the visions of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. References to the significant passages in the 'Little Apocalypse', as recorded in Mark 13-Matthew 24-Luke 21, are lacking, except for a brief discussion in Strom.III. VI.
of such verses as Mk.13.7; Matt.24.19,37; Lk.21.23, where the interest is wholly focused on the question of undue preoccupation with sexual matters as significant of the evil of the age.

We have discussed at some length Clement's understanding of the Covenants of Law and Grace in order to show his genuine concern with the historical element in the Incarnation. The treatment of Clement's Gnosticism was intended to bring out the seriousness with which he anticipates future events which constitute the End of the present age. Finally, our investigation of Clement's understanding of the world in relation to God underlined the seriousness with which he took the reality of Creation, being indeed the first Christian thinker explicitly to set forth a doctrine of 'creatio ex nihilo'. It has to be confessed that Clement does seem at times to be thinking in terms of the distinction between the 'κόσμος νοητός' and the 'κόσμος λοιπός'. Nevertheless, it seems defensible to suggest that Clement thinks basically in Biblical categories, working with a relational concept of space and time, and that the most that the use of this Platonic concept does is to introduce an element of ambiguity into some of Clement's utterances. It seems probable, in the light of the explicit statements regarding Second Advent, resurrection, Future Judgment, and in view of his positive Biblical attitudes to Creation and the Incarnation as events suggestive of God's action in history, that the Platonic language is reinterpreted by Scripture rather than the other way round. Even so, it makes it difficult to be in the end sure whether Clement has one consistent view, which is oriented to a Biblical acceptance of realities in space and time and therefore to future realities in space and time, or whether there is a fundamental inconsistency in his thinking, in which Biblical and Platonic conceptions struggle to get the upper hand. One solution would be
to say that Clement does not really take seriously the language concerning eschatological realities, except in a generalized symbolic manner, that is, to say that Clement did not really anticipate any event which could properly be said to occur in space and time, even if it meant their consummation. On such a view, it would be understood that this would be clear to the Gnostic who knows, but that it would be obscure to the simpler believer, for whom such language is appropriate. This last view seems ruled out by the eschatological foundations of Clement's Gnosticism, which we have sought to reveal. It may be more difficult to choose between the first two options, but the balance seems very much in favour of the first. We conclude, therefore, that Clement's eschatology was traditional, although it may well be true that the Platonic distinction between the intelligible and sensible realms is not clearly seen by Clement to be at variance with Biblical thinking and affects his language at points in such a way as to introduce an apparent ambiguity into his expression. The failure clearly to set aside such language and thought-forms may well indicate also a tendency in Clement's thinking, which was unrecognized by himself and which could, if not checked, lead to a 'de-historicizing' of eschatology. It may not be insignificant in this regard that Clement clearly has little interest in millenarianism. It is not suggested that a genuinely historical view of the End of the age demands belief in a millennium, but in view of its prevalence in the earlier thinkers whose works we have been studying, it is perhaps not insignificant that it is passed by in such manner by one who does seem to allow his Biblical foundations to be overlaid at times by a Platonic superstructure.

If our conclusion that Clement does fundamentally believe that the events of the End are to be taken in a genuinely historical manner,
be sound, then Clement does once again give evidence of that refusal to 'de-eschatologize' which we have observed in the thinkers previously studied. Certainly too it is the fact that Clement gives no evidence of embarrassment over the delay in the Second Advent. At best this can only be read into his relative silence concerning the Second Advent in terms of direct references. Any tendency to treat futurist eschatology in a non-historical way could be viewed as evidence of an embarrassment over the non-eventuating of hoped for events. This, however, would not be the only explanation of such a tendency, if it exists. It is as likely to derive from the philosophical world of thought in Alexandria, which might well seem to be uncongenial to taking events of the End in a genuinely historical manner. In any event, the literature as such gives no evidence whatsoever of concern induced by the delay in the Second Advent, and so Clement's writings cannot be said in any way to support the common thought of Dodd and Werner, of 'realized' and 'consistent' eschatology schools of thought that embarrassment over this 'delay' led to a reinterpretation of eschatology, a reinterpretation which meant a diminution of emphasis upon futurism.

Does Clement exhibit a strong 'realized eschatology'? In fact this element is not stressed, as over against a futurist emphasis. Clement does not have much to add to Christian thinking with regard to the Church, or with reference to the sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist. Again, his relative silence concerning the Church's mission, on the one hand, and the intensification of evil, on the other, means that we are perhaps less aware in Clement of the sense of being launched by Christ upon a historical process, which will only be consummated at the Parousia of Christ in glory. This is not to say that the 'realized eschatology' element is lacking. It comes out best perhaps in regard to what Clement has to say about the life of the Gnostic Christian as
anticipating the conditions of the coming Age. It is also evident in Clement's thought (vide page 608 above) concerning a division of dispensations, in which fear as an emotion was appropriate to the era of Law, while faith is consonant as an attitude of mind and spirit in the present era introduced by the Incarnation, but love is thought of as that which is to be fully realized in the age to come and is now witnessed in Gnostic Christian behaviour. This is indeed a particular example of the way in which Clement's thought about Christian Gnosticism illustrates the element of 'realized eschatology' in his thinking: it does also, however, exhibit most clearly the historical way in which Clement does view both First and Second Advents of Christ in their effects. What seems to be true concerning Clement's attitude to the present era is twofold. First, he does believe in the effects of the Incarnation and of the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ, and he does expect real changes at the Second Advent, but he is somewhat less conscious than a Justin Martyr or an Irenaeus of the interval between the Advents as one of the progressive harassing of Satan's kingdom and of a related intensification of evil: his understanding of this interval is relatively more static and less dynamic. This has the effect of making his concept of Church and believer within this present era one in which the 'realized' element of eschatology is present, but there is less stress on the notion of an 'inaugurated' eschatology which presses vitally towards its goal and is visible at once in the Church's triumphs and Satanic opposition to her. Second, Clement characteristically thinks more in terms of the individual believer's blessing than the other thinkers studied so far. This is not to say that the individual stress ousts the belief in future public events of Parousia, resurrection and Judgment, but it is significant that Clement has so much to say concerning purgatorial
cleansing after death. Even the stress upon Christian Gnosticism, despite its eschatological implications, helps to differentiate one believer from another, and is consistent with an interest in the significance of Christian salvation for the individual believer in Christ.

We close this survey by noting that both 'futurist' and 'realized' elements of eschatology are present in Clement as in previous writers studied, but that the consciousness of 'inaugurated' eschatology is less prominent. It comes out best, where it is represented in the concept of the Descent into Hades, through which righteous Jews and Gentiles are brought into a place of greater blessing as they await the consummation of the age. The more general lessening of emphasis upon the dynamic element may in fact have much to do with the general impression given by Clement's writings that while he genuinely believes in a futurist eschatology, it matters somewhat less to him how soon it may be before these events take place. He is somewhat less conscious of being part of a living process, which is thrusting dynamically towards its consummation. This is, however, a relative judgment, and does not deny Clement's genuine appreciation of God's providential care of creation.

ORIGEN.

To a considerable degree the problems of interpretation that we must face in assessing the eschatology of Origen are those that we have already faced in the case of Clement of Alexandria. We discover in him the same preoccupation with incorruptibility and the glory of the future state, as also with the differentiation between Christians presently living on the ordinary level and those who have attained to the Gnostic level. It will be our contention that once again there is the presupposition that the Christian Gnostic has already attained
to the level of close fellowship with God that it is God's desire to give to all in the future ages. Thus, as in Clement, we discover in Origen a concern with the Gnostic level of Christian living which has an eschatological foundation and a close connection with concern about the attainment of incorruptibility.

**Clement And Origen: Points of Difference.**

Nevertheless, there are equally real differences in Origen's approach which here we attempt to do no more than sketch. One is that Origen is more thorough-going in his interpretation of the various levels of life. Thus, Clement had distinguished the non-Christian level (including that of the righteous Gentiles before Christ), the level of the ordinary believer, and that of the Christian Gnostic.

There is implicit in Clement, as we have seen, a connection between this fact and the 'levels' of Christ's earthly limitations and the glory that was revealed in Him after the Resurrection and prior to theAscension. In Origen, however, this connection with the Incarnation is not only made more explicit, but it is connected with another providential activity that is seen as a parallel case, namely, God's self-revelation in Scripture. Thus, there are 'levels' in Scripture that correspond to the levels of the Incarnation.¹ There is the 'carnal' level which corresponds with the external or historical facts concerning Christ's life and career on earth. There is the 'psychic' level that corresponds with that meaning in Christ that is grasped by ordinary believers. And finally there is the 'pneumatic' level that corresponds with the unveiled glory of Christ that will be manifested at His Parousia and which is understood by Christian Gnostics even now. A further parallel case is that of the Sacraments.

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¹ De Principiis, IV. II.
These are required to minister to the needs of ordinary believers, but the Christian Gnostic anticipates by his spiritual discernment the day when such concessions to human frailty will no longer be required and will be set aside. This does not mean that Origen would have anyone despise the sacraments. At the same time he does not overrate their value. They are but steps in a ladder. As such they have value, but once the topmost rung of the ladder is reached, it can be kicked away. Thus, we find explicitly in Origen a theory of levels which relates to the Incarnation, the Christian life, the sacraments of the Church, and the interpretation of Scripture.

The above understanding of levels may be illustrated by Origen's discussion in De Principiis, IV.II.4 concerning Scripture. The terms 'carnal', 'psychic', and 'spiritual' are not here employed, but are in the background of Origen's thought. The following section from this paragraph sets out the threefold division in Origen's mind: "οὐκοῦν τριῶσ ἀπογράφεσθαι δεῖ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῷ ψυχῆν τὰ τῶν ἁγίων γραμμάτων νοηματα. ἢν δὲ μὲν ἀπλοῦστερος οἰκοδομήται ἀπὸ τῆς οἰνοει σαρκὸς τῆς γραφῆς, οὕτως ὁμομαξιώται ἦμων τὴν πρὸκειμένην ἐκδοχὴν, δὲ δὲ ὁ ποσὸν ἀναβεβηκὼς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑστερεῖ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, δὲ τελείοις καὶ ὑμείοις τοῖς παρὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων λεγομένοις σοφίαις δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαις δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὔδε τῶν ἱράτων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργομένων, ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαις ἐν μυστηρίων τὴν ἀποκρυπτόμενην, ἢν προώρισεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸ τῶν αἰῶνων εἰς σοφίαις ἡμῶν "— ὑστερεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐν θεωτῷ συνεστήκειν ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ συναγωγὴ, ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίαν δοθῆναι γραφήν." !

The above Greek derives from the 'philocalia' composed by Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea. The Latin text of Rufinus follows closely at this point.

"Tripliciter ergo describere oportet in anima sua ununquamque divinarum intelligentiam litterarum: id est, ut simpliciores quique aedificentur ab ipso, ut ita dixerim, corpore scripturarum (sic enim appellamus communem istum et historialem intellectum); si qui vero aliquantum iam proficere coeperunt et possunt amplius alegir interi, ab ipsa scripturae anima aedificentur; qui vero perfecti sunt et similes his, de quibus apostolus dicit: Sapientiam autem loquimur inter perfectos, sapientiam vero non huius saeculi neque principum huius saeculi, qui destruuerunt, sed loquimur dei sapientiam in mysterio absconditam, quam praedestinavit deus ante saecula in gloriam nostram ----Sicut ergo homo constare dicitur ex corpora et anima et spiritu, ita etiam sancta scriptura, quae ad hominum salutem divina largitione concessa est."

It may be noted that the threefold division seems to agree here in Origen's thinking with a tripartite division of man. The quotation, however, from I Cor.2.6-7 shows that the threefold division into simple persons, those who have made progress, and those who are perfect corresponds with what has been made possible through the Incarnation. This is implicit in Paul's discussion in the passage quoted, as is also, however, his division into ordinary believers and the mature. Thus, the threefold division of Scripture corresponds to what has been made possible through the First Advent of Christ. The tripartite division of man analogy only supports this basic understanding.

The words omitted in the above quotation give an explanation of the Scripture quoted which is significant. It shows not only

that the Incarnation has made a certain division of men possible (into non-believers, ordinary believers, and Gnostics), but that in the coming Age the perfect will have their understanding made clear to all, so that they do but anticipate that which is to come. Origen says:

"ΑΠΌ ΤΟΥ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ, ΣΩΚΙΔΝ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΛΛΩΝΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΘΩΝ Χ'

The Latin equivalent of this from Rufinus' version is:

"Hi tales ab ipsa spirituali lege quae umbram habet futurorum bonorum tamquam ab spiritu aedificentur." 2

A second difference relates to Origen's universalism. It is sometimes asserted that this is found also in Clement of Alexandria, but we submitted above (page 585) that the evidence does not really favour this view. It seems impossible to deny, however, that Origen anticipates the ultimate conversion of all spirits, including even that of the Devil himself, whom he regards as a fallen angel. 3 It is true that there is a degree of tentativeness in this judgment.

Further, Origen is puzzled to know whether this conversion will be maintained. His insistence on freewill makes it difficult for him to dogmatize on either issue, but his belief in the achievement of Christ leads him to think that the ultimate conversion of all spirits is at least probable, while his uncertainty about the continuance of spirits in this state throughout eternity is matched by the hope that the love of Christ will have so won over these spirits that they will not desire to break free from it. At any rate, if Clement works with a threefold division of men into non-Christians, ordinary believers, and

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3. De Principiis,1,vi.3; cf. Contra Celsum, viii.72.
Christian Gnostics, for Origen it is extremely dubious whether such a division would have any ultimate validity.

A third area of difference relates to Origen's belief, taken over from Plato, in the pre-existence of all human souls and Origen's related judgment that the material world, as we know it, is the result of a pre-temporal Fall. The clothing of free spirits with flesh, with bodies, is seen as the result of this Fall, and Origen has an elaborate scheme in this connection which gives account of angels, demons, and heavenly bodies, as well as men. The animal kingdom also finds its place within it. This view of Origen's probably raises the most directly related problems for our understanding of Origen's eschatology. It would not seem likely that anyone with such presuppositions would look favourably on the continuance of the body in the coming ages. If the body has been created by God, but has been given as the result of sin in a former spiritual existence, then presumably the result of Christ's achievement is to restore men to their former state. This would seem, then, to have decisive implications for Origen's views regarding Resurrection of the Dead, Parousia of Christ, and Judgment Day. Nevertheless, we must ask ourselves whether it is not possible that, as in the case of Clement, what Origen is really concerned about is incorruptibility, i.e. a condition of spiritual and bodily stability appropriate to the future status of those renewed by the Risen Christ? It behoves us to recall the words of C.C. Bigg, quoted above (page 567), where he judges that for Origen even free spirits never lacked, nor can conceivably lack, some kind of 'shroud', i.e. some kind of corporeality, even if it be superior to that of our present earthly body.

It seems clear that Origen is more decisively unorthodox than Clement of Alexandria, however precisely we interpret either on certain
issues. Thus, for Origen the universalist hope is more emphatic, and when taken in conjunction with the theory of a pre-temporal Fall, leads to the setting aside of any too literal concept of a Judgment Day. Judgment remains a reality for Origen, but it is found in the circumstances of our present bodily life and may well be continued throughout future ages until all dross is purged out of us. It is not only the stress on universalism and the myth of a pre-temporal Fall with its view of our present bodily life as only a providential disposition of God induced by the sin of free spirits, that is less orthodox in Origen. We note also that Origen's stress on freewill in man leads him to a certain indecisiveness about the course of events in future ages. It is true that in Clement there is a certain stress on a process of purging after death for ordinary believers, but, if we have interpreted him aright, non-believers are excluded from this, while even for believers it ends at the Parousia of Christ.

Let us look first of all at the central questions. What does Origen make of the Parousia of Christ? What does he believe about the resurrection of the body? Does he in any sense believe in a Judgment day? The answers to these questions are not at all as simple as they may appear to be at first glance. Henry Chadwick judges that Origen does not understand these events in a literal or material sense, but rather symbolically and spiritually. Most commentators appear to agree, though with varying degrees of emphasis and even of meaning. Einar Molland gives one of the most balanced accounts. He sees a certain spiritualizing in Origen, derives it from Platonic influences, but concludes that though Biblical concepts have been

1. op.cit., pp. 77-79
'platonized', it is equally true that Plato has been brought into line to some extent with biblical concepts:

"In Origen the inheritance from Plato and the inheritance from the Prophets meet. And in his eschatology the two lines are combined. When he speaks of signs which are fulfilled not in the history of this world, but in the age to come, in the heavenly and spiritual world, 'sign' has come very near to being an earthly representation of the spiritual reality of the world to come. And, on the other hand, in Origen the Platonic conceptions of the analogy of earthly and heavenly reality, and of the perfect reality being seen in its shadows and images in this world, are connected with the eschatological perspective. The spiritual world is the world to come."

We shall be in a better position to assess the appropriateness or otherwise of these comments, when we have studied Origen's view of the Parousia of Christ, and of final resurrection and judgment. Here again, however, judgments differ as to Origen's meaning and intention. This will be made clear by the following references and quotations.

The Second Advent.

Jean Daniélou utilizes certain quotations from Origen's exegetical works on the Book of Joshua to bring out the reality of his belief in the Second Advent. In his Seventh and Eighth Homilies on Joshua Origen interprets the story of the fall of Jericho to Joshua in a threefold manner, consistent with his typological approach. Thus, the collapse of the walls of Jericho at the sound of the priests' trumpets prefigures the collapse of worldly opposition to God when the Church proclaims the Gospel. This is the Christological interpretation. A mystical and individualist interpretation is added to this, whereby meditating on the Law and the Gospel overthrows the 'Jericho' within. Finally, Origen reaches an eschatological interpretation of the story, and it is with this that we are especially concerned at this point. Origen notes that the victory

1. op.cit., p.152

over Jericho in our hearts is only partially fulfilled in this present age: "Est -- in hoc etiam resurrectionis futurae mysterium. --- iam tunc ultra omnino non erit diabolus, quia iam non erit more." (VIII.4). Then will the devil be no more. Shortly before this he says:


Such a passage seems to demonstrate that Origen literally believed in the Parousia of Christ, and whatever precisely it meant for him he makes it clear in context that whereas Christ has come in 'humiliation', He is yet to come in 'glory'. Further, whereas by faith and hope we are now raised above earthly and material things, "implebitur-- hoc in secundo eius adventu, ut ea, quae nunc fide et spe praesumpsimus, tunc etiam rerum effectu corporaliter teneamus", Origen says. Again the coming Resurrection is to spell the complete end of the devil's power. This last point may seem difficult to reconcile with Origen's speculations regarding the possibility of further 'falls' in future ages, but this is not in view here.

Daniélou also draws to our attention a further passage from the Homilies on 'Joshua' which helps to lay bare Origen's thought concerning the Parousia of Christ. Here it is the story from Josh.10 of the staying of the sun in its progress during Joshua's victory over the Amorite kings, that is in view. Origen relates the staying of the sun in its course to the question of the 'delay' in the Parousia of Christ:

"Volumus ergo, si possimus, ostendere quomodo Dominus noster Iesus protelaverit lucem et maiorem fecerit diem vel pro salute hominum vel pro interitu contrariarum virtutum."
Ex quo advenit Salvator, finis erat iam mundi. Denique et ipse dicebat: Peanitentiam agite, appropriavit enim regnum coelorum.
Sed retinuit et repressit diem consummationis et adesse prohibuit. Videns enim Deus pater salutem gentium por ipsum solum posse constare dicit ad eum: Pete a me, et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam, et possessionem tuam terminos terrae.

Denec ergo paterna pollitatio compleatur et ecclesiae ex deversis nationibus crescent atque introeat tota gentium plenitudine, ut tunc demum omnis Israel salvetur, dies producitur et differtur occasus nec unquam sol occumbit, sed semper exoritur, dum credentium corda mensura credentium et laterioriam ac decolor aetas ultimae generationis adverterit, cum increcente iniquitate refrigescat caritas multorum et perpauci remanserint, in quibus fides inveniatur, tunc iam abbreviabuntur dies.

Idem igitur atque ipse Dominus novit, et extendere diem, cum salutis est tempus, et breviare diem, cum tribulationis et perditionis est tempus. Nos tamen, dum habemus diem et producitur nobis spatium lucis, sicut in die honeste ambulemus et opera lucis operemur.

Daniélou comments: "The depth of the theology of history in this passage is remarkable ---The fading of the day, the ending of time is postponed first by the necessity of fulfilling the Father's promise to Christ, that the fullness of the nations enter into the Church. This is the mission which is being fulfilled during this present time and which is holding back the end of the day. The present time is a delay permitted by God's love. For, as the text expressly says, with the coming of Christ the end is already upon us. Origen further links up this idea with that of Christ as the Sun. If it is he who stays the sun, it is also he who is the Sun which rises in the hearts of believers and knows no setting--- We notice also the double movement of history which Origen emphasizes: in part it is the growth of the Kingdom of Christ, but also that of the powers of evil and the increase of corruption. The advance is thus in two directions, and good and evil grow together. Lastly we note how easily Origen's interpretation, inspired through and through by the Scriptures, links up with the words of Christ. This day, when it is possible to walk (John 12:35) before night comes, links up quite naturally with the story of Joshua. And it may be questioned whether these coincidences are not
due to the Biblical background of the teaching of Christ."

A number of points require to be made in the light of this further section from Origen's Homilies on 'Joshua'. First, Origen clearly takes very seriously the Second Advent theme. Second, we cannot dismiss this as mere exegesis which is not substantiated by the 'De Principiis'. There is nothing inconsistent with this in his major constructive theological work, but in any case the real Origen is to be found in the discipline of Biblical exegesis, if he is to be found anywhere. Third, Origen takes the Second Advent as a fact in a traditional manner, for he relates it to events in history, in the same way that Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and other Christian thinkers, had done. Thus, he sees the present age as one given over to the ingathering of the Gentiles into the Church and evidently looks for the conversion of Israel before the end comes. We had occasion to note above (page 607) that Clement of Alexandria was also sufficiently traditional to view Israel's present hardness of heart as a 'hardening' that came from God and has to be interpreted in the light of such passages as Is.65:1-2; Rom.10:19 (Deut.32:21) and Rom.II:II. Clement also, by implication, looked for the ultimate restoration of Israel. It is extremely interesting that one who, as we are told, 'spiritualized' eschatology, should so have his feet on the ground that he could believe in the coming conversion of the Jewish people. This applies even more clearly to Origen than to Clement of Alexandria.

Again, Origen takes seriously the view that things were to get worse before the end came. How can we judge otherwise than that Origen accepted the traditional and primitive eschatology of the Church, as based on such passages as Mark 13-Matt,24-Lk.21? In all of this,

1. op.cit., 284.
as Danielou says, Origen displays a profound theology of history.

The Temporal Gospel and The Eternal Gospel.

We meet with a different evaluation of Origen's eschatology, however, in certain other scholars. We look now at that presented to us by Einar Molland, who judges essentially that Origen's thinking is an amalgam of genuinely eschatological elements with a Platonising 'spiritualizing' process. We have already noted something of Molland's approach (above page 648). This now requires to be examined more carefully. Molland sees three characteristic notes in Origen's eschatology. These are, briefly, a spiritualizing of the eschatology of the New Testament, a view of history and its completion in terms of development, and a certain intellectualism in his view of the ultimate blessedness of God's people. Let us now examine these contentions.

There are three characteristic marks of this eschatology. Origen spiritualizes the eschatology of the New Testament, both as regards the resurrection of the body, the punishment, and the judgement. The second parousia of Christ must be spiritually understood. Are we to think that the Lord will come in a special place of the earth? Where is this place where all men of all nations and generations could be gathered? No, the second coming of the Lord will take place when his divine glory has become manifest to all men, so that not only the righteous, but even those who are now sinners, will know Him as He is. And He will not be in one place and not in another place, but everywhere. Those who have the deeper understanding of the Gospel, do not care much for knowing whether the consummation of this world will come through a sudden catastrophe or through a slow development. They will be content with knowing that the consummation of their own life comes as a thief in the night. Nobody knows the hour and day of his own death. Commenting on Matth.XXIV Origen even identifies the coming of Christ with the death of individual man. He is also very anxious to refute the popular materialistic conceptions of beatitude in heaven.

2. In Matth.comm.ser.56 (Or.Werke, vol.XI.p.130 13 sqq.)

Again, Molland notes, with reference to his point about the emphasis upon

1. op.cit., pp.144-145.
the note of development in his interpretation of history, that Origen speaks of innumerable ages (ἀιώνες saecula) both before and after the present age. Paul's use of the phrase ἐν τοῖς αἰῶνι τοῖς ἔπεροχομένοις in Eph.2:7 is taken to give support to this view.

Origen does not conceive of history in the terms of primitive Christianity: 'this age (ὁ ἀιών ὁ ἄτομος) and 'the age to come' (ὁ αἰών ὁ μέλλων). There is an infinite number of ages, behind and before us. On the horizon of all history, when all ages have passed away, there will be a time which is no time, but eternity. At an infinite distance he perceives 'something greater than the ages' (aliud saeculis maius) 'something which in perhaps even more than 'the ages of ages' (plus aliud quod est saeculum vel saecula, forte etiam plus quam est saecula saeculorum). This is eternity where the restitution of all things (ἈΠΟΚΑΤΙΣΤΗΣΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ) takes place, where all things have reached their perfect end, where God is all and in all.

5. De principiis II.11.5 (p.120 17 sqq.).

The third point made by Molland relates to Origen's emphasis upon the intellect or soul as the highest part of a man. He notes that Origen once defines beatitude as 'apathy of the soul together with a true knowledge of reality.' We have already observed in Clement of Alexandria a similar stress upon knowledge as a chief source of beatitude for the Christian Gnostic.

All of these points, Molland assures us, are summed up in Origen's conception of 'the Eternal Gospel'. This relates to the knowledge that all saints will have in the future, when we see God face to face, not as in a mirror, darkly.

"This knowledge is the Eternal Gospel. As the Deuteronomic Law was superior to the first legislation, so the Gospel is superior to the Law. But in the same manner the Eternal Gospel is superior to the Gospel. The Law is only shadow, compared with the Gospel. But even the Gospel is only shadow, compared with the Eternal Gospel. For the Gospel deals with the first coming of Christ, when He came in the form of a servant. But He will come again in the glory of His Father. And as He at His first

1. op.cit., p.145.
2. Sel.in Pss.ed.Lomm.,vol.XI,p.380:

Quoted by Molland, op.cit., p.46.
coming fulfilled the shadow of the Law through the shadow of the Gospel, so He will at His second coming fulfil the shadow of the Gospel through the Eternal Gospel." 1

It is easy to see how such an outlook in Origen can be construed as implying that the flesh of Jesus, with which the suffering of Christ, which formed the basis of the Temporal Gospel was connected was passing and was to yield place to Christ's form as God. Nevertheless, this interpretation must be questioned.

How are we to view this overall assessment given by Molland? We look at the statement that the Second Advent of Christ is to be spiritually understood and appreciate that other scholars would agree with Molland in his judgment. Nevertheless, we have to ask how this measures up to what we have noted in the Homilies on 'Joshua'. The passage on the fall of the walls of Jericho assumed that the final resurrection would take place in conjunction with Christ's Parousia in glory. Where the question of Final Judgment is concerned, we may certainly have to agree that Origen's theory of a pretemporal Fall and of the giving of the body as a disciplinary measure, gives Origen a more complicated view of what is to happen in future ages than is found in the primitive eschatology of the Church. However, with this one proviso, the passage quoted above from the Homilies on 'Joshua' make it very surprising that Origen should 'spiritualize' either the Second Advent or the Resurrection at the end of the age. Further, as we have seen (pp. 650-651 above) he appears to take a thoroughly historical view of the events leading up to the end, accepting belief in a period of intense tribulation prior to the consummation of all things, a gradual falling away in the love of the Church, the spreading of the Gospel to all nations, and the

1. op.cit., pp.146-147.
ultimate conversion of the Jewish people to Jesus Christ. All of this suggests the question whether perhaps Molland and others have misinterpreted the evidence which they adduce.

It is interesting to note against what Origen shows 'animus' in the passages adduced by Molland. It is not that Origen denies the reality of the Second Advent or its glory. Rather does he hit out against any view of it which would bring its circumstances too much into line with those of Christ's Advent in 'humiliation'. This may raise problems. We may ask whether Christ is really to return to earth, if He is to be 'everywhere' (πολλὰξχώσα) Nevertheless, the intention of Origen seems to be not to deny the reality of the Second Advent, nor is it to make it purely symbolic. It is simply that he is so aware of the overwhelming glory and urgency of Christ's coming παρουσία that he does not wish to see it treated in terms of present realities. Connected with this is his resistance to popular materialistic conceptions of beatitude in heaven. However intellectualist Origen's aspirations may appear, what he was against was a failure to see that, when Christ comes again, it will be with superlative glory. Conceptions of beatitude which stressed bodily bliss or pleasures seemed to Origen out of place. We have already noted, with reference to Clement of Alexandria, that his conception of Christian Gnosticism led him to stress γνῶσις as an anticipation of future bliss and that it seemed to him essentially in line with that illumination which all baptized believers were granted (vide above pp.612-613). Further, we saw that to him the stress on knowledge would not have seemed intellectualist, since piety of spirit was an essential condition of spiritual understanding (vide above, page 613) We submit that the same attitudes hold good for Origen. As for Origen's irritation with those who
made speculation concerning the suddenness of Christ's Appearing or its slow development, again Origen evidently thought it almost impious to probe into what could not, in the nature of the case, be known until the event itself. It may be that Origen was too hard on those who interested themselves in such questions, since the problem may well be suggested by the nature of varying Scriptural references. At the same time, we all know that there is a kind of speculative interest which is unhealthy. Paul himself inveighed against an undue concern about the time of Christ's Appearing (I-II Thess.) The Little Apocalypse appears, similarly, to warn against undue and overhasty speculation regarding the consummation of all things (cf. Mk.13: 5-8, 32-37; Matt.24: 5-8. 36-51; Lk.21:8-9, 34-36). Nevertheless neither Jesus, as reported in Mark 13-Matthew 24, -Luke 21 nor Paul, discouraged the expectation of the Second Advent, and it may be questioned whether Origen did so either.

It is true, of course, that Molland does not explicitly say that Origen wished to discourage interest in the Second Advent. But the point is that no precise analysis is attempted of what is meant when it is said that Origen 'spiritualized' the Second Advent. The Overall impression given by Molland is not that Origen said that there would not be such a Parousia in glory. Rather is it that, though Origen talked of such an event and though it held a very important place in his thinking, it was treated as essentially unimaginable. It is implied, if not stated, that Origen held that at the consummation our present bodily existence would be totally left behind. In line with this understanding of things is Molland's handling of Origen's comparison of Law, Temporal Gospel, and Eternal Gospel. Molland tells us that Origen saw the Temporal Gospel as imperfect, while the Eternal Gospel, which is to come, is perfect.
Molland cites various passages in support of his understanding of Origen's view of the contrast between the Temporal Gospel and the Eternal Gospel. He cites a passage from Origen's Homilies on the Book of Joshua which makes a comparison of what the saints will know in the future with the thoughts which we derive from Scripture, and which speaks of that future time as one when we shall no more see in a mirror, darkly, but face to face.¹ Again, Molland refers to Origen's frequent citation of Lam.4.20b in the form given to it in the Septuagint:

"πνεύμα προσώπων ἡμῶν Χριστός Κύριας συνηλήμβην εν τοῖς διαφθοραῖς αὐτῶν, οὗ εἰπαμέν· ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ αὐτοῦ ξησόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἑθνεῖς"

Origen discussed this text in his Commentary on Lamentations in a fragment which survives.² Molland says: "He often alludes to this text which to him revealed an important aspect of the Christian life and permitted him to develop his Platonizing idea of the shadow of Christ..."³ Molland then cites a number of passages from Origen's writings in which Origen deals with this text.⁴ Again, it is noted that when Origen comments on Rom.1.2 he judges that St. Paul may have wished to distinguish between the Gospel of which he is presently speaking ("the Gospel of God which He promised afore by His prophets") and the Eternal Gospel "which shall be revealed when shadow has passed away, and truth has come, when death has disappeared, and eternity

³. op.cit., p.147,n.1.
has been restored. Christ became flesh that He might be manifested to men and preach the Gospel to men. He was also seen by angels, as the Apostle says (I. Tim.III.16), and certainly He did not appear to them without a Gospel. To them he preached the Eternal Gospel."¹

This is not just because of human inability to grasp the Gospel set forth through the Incarnation. "but Origen is far more radical in his thoughts on the imperfection of the Gospel. The Temporal Gospel is imperfect because it is temporal. It must be imperfect, being a revelation within an imperfect and corruptible world."² If this be so, then Origen does seem to imply a radical discontinuity between the two.

Molland's view: "When perfection comes, we shall know Him (the Logos) in the form of God, in the likeness of the Father. For He was not on earth such as He is in heaven. He had become flesh and could only speak through shadows and patterns and images."³ The implication of this is that for Origen the Temporal Gospel is to be set aside because Christ's 'flesh' has been set aside when He comes in glory and the Eternal Gospel is proclaimed.

Molland is very careful in his analysis of Origen's thinking at this point and strives to bring out clearly the Biblical, as well as the Platonic, elements in his thinking. He asserts with reference to Origen's view: Although the two Gospels are to be distinguished from each other as the imperfect and the perfect revelation, they must not be separated. They are not opposed to one another as truth, to illusion,


². op.cit., p.148

³. op.cit., p.150. The first sentence of this quotation is supported by a reference to In Rom. VI.3(ed.Lomm., vol.VII, p.13 sq), and the second by a reference to In Joh. 6 49 sq. (Dr.Werke, vol.IV. p.60 15 sqq).
but they are related as the shadow of truth and the truth itself.\textsuperscript{1} 

The things of this world are neither true nor untrue, but they stand in the relation of an analogy to the intelligible things. "This is Origen's epistemology, which is the epistemology of the whole Platonic tradition."\textsuperscript{2} St. Paul is called in by Origen to support this outlook, since he had said that the invisible things of God are perceived through the visible things. This must be by means of reason and analogy. However, side by side with such reasoning, Origen employs the Biblical notion of a 'sign' (\textit{σήμερον}) Here again the terms 'shadow' and 'reality' or 'truth' are employed, but now they signify prediction and historical fulfilment, whether as between the Old Testament shadow and New Testament fulfilment or as between New Testament 'shadow' and fulfilment in the revelation of the Eternal Gospel at Christ's Parousia. It is in this context that Molland reaches the conclusion, noted earlier, that Origen combines the Platonic and Prophetic elements.\textsuperscript{3} Molland notes that the influence of Platonism on Origen's theology has been strongly emphasized by scholars like Harnack, de Faye, H. Miura-Stange, and Hal Koch. He judges that even more important than this element is what has not been sufficiently emphasized in recent scholarship, viz. "the Christianization of Platonism in Origen."\textsuperscript{4} Origen sees Christ as having left behind 'the

\begin{enumerate}
\item op.\textit{cit.}, p.150
\item op.\textit{cit.}, p.150
\item op.\textit{cit.}, pp.151-152
\end{enumerate}
flesh' at His Ascension to the Father. Is the Incarnation to be understood in Origen as simply a phase? If he does mean this, then it seems fair to judge that he is to a serious degree unbiblical in his thinking. It would mean that he does not sufficiently reckon with the 'one-for-allness' of the Incarnation and Atonement. When we remember, however, how Clement of Alexandria appears to depreciate elements concerned with space and time but recall that he may in fact take these much more seriously than at first appears, the question emerges whether the same may not be true of Origen. Is it possible that what Origen is endeavouring to say, in company with Clement of Alexandria, is that Christ in his Ascension is our 'forerunner', Who has already dignified our mortal bodies with new glories, which are to be conferred on His people at His Second Advent? Such a view would not imply discontinuity with 'the flesh' or 'the body' of the Incarnation, nor any setting aside of Christ's humanity in its glorified state, but it would lay stress on the eschatological glory to be revealed.

In attempting to give a judicious answer to this question, it is instructive to notice a further section from Molland, in which he stresses that everything in the Temporal Gospel corresponds to heavenly realities. Origen's refusal in this setting to distinguish between the Platonic 'image-reality' pattern and the Prophetic 'Signs-events' pattern is noted.

"This is seen even in his teaching on the universal significance of Christ's passion and death. Knowing Origen's strongly spiritualizing tendency and his distinction between the two Gospels, we should expect him to consider Christ's passion on earth in the form of a servant as belonging only to the bodily and temporal Gospel, His suffering is linked up with His life in the body. And is not the Eternal Gospel the Gospel of the heavenly Christ in His glory? But we are surprised to see that Origen finds a place for the passion of Christ in the Eternal Gospel. This fact proves how central is the idea of Christ's sacrifice in his conception of the Gospel. He has not been led by his philosophical scheme--bodily-spiritual, temporal-eternal, imperfection-perfection--to despise or neglect the passion of
Christ.—1

Molland goes on to point out that Origen discovers a spiritual
sacrifice in heaven which corresponds to that bloody sacrifice of His
body on Golgotha. Heb.12:23 and Col.I:20 are used to suggest support
for this concept. "there is a sacrificium duplex, the sacrifice on
Golgotha corresponding to a sacrifice in heaven." Further, in the
'De principiis'-in a passage (IV.III.13) stated by Molland to be "an
unquestionably genuine fragment"3 Origen develops "the audacious
possibility that Christ is crucified in heaven and that His crucifixion
will recur in the ages to come until the end of all time. This passage
is important and we cite it below: " Αλλά κἂν μέχρι τοῦ πάθους της
ζητήσεως τομημένον δώξει ποιεῖν περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων τόπων αὐτοῦ
ζητῶν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τοῖς πνευματικά τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις,
όρα εἰ μὴ τὸ πρὸς ἑυθεῖα διὰ τοῦ πεποιθήθαι, οὕτω καὶ Κριτὴς
τὸ παραπλήσιον διδόντες γίνεται καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξης
γίνεται τῆς συντελεῖσθαι τοῦ πάντως αἰώνος οὖ φοβησόμεθα." 4

This passage is a most significant one and, in consequence, it is
important to use the best textual tradition. Fortunately the Greek
text has been preserved in a quotation from Justinian's Epistula ad
Mennam. This is the text given above. Rufinus omitted this passage.
It is interesting to note that this passage follows upon a section in
this same chapter, in which Origen contrasts the present 'temporal

1. op.cit., p.153
2. op.cit., p.153
4. G.C.S., Or., V.p.344,1.8-p.345,1.4.
It seems incontestable that when Origen introduces speculations regarding the possibility of a whole series of future ages, and events associated with them, he leaves behind Biblical affirmations, and is induced thereto by his own distinctive scheme, which lays stress on the reality of Christ's achievement, on the one hand, and the possibilities raised by human freedom and God's refusal to coerce, on the other. This, we would judge, is the source, of the possibility in Origen's mind—and he does not dogmatize on the matter—that Christ may again be crucified in future ages. It is, of course, understandable and justifiable that the Church should react to such speculations in the way that it historically did. Nevertheless, if we concentrate our attention on what is said about a 'sacrificium duplex', as Molland calls it, it is not immediately apparent that Biblical thinking has been set aside. It is only when Origen's speculation regarding future ages is introduced that such a possibility seems definite and indeed undeniable.

What is latent in Molland is an interpretation of Origen's dependence on the Pauline statement of Col.1:20 in terms of both Platonic and Prophetic categories. There Paul makes the affirmation that Christ, through the blood of His Cross, has reconciled not only things on earth but also things which are in heaven. Molland judges that Origen is led by his Platonism to see a correspondence with the sacrifice on Calvary in the spiritual sacrifice in heaven. Further, the possibility of a whole series of future ages naturally leads Origen to think about the possibility of Christ's having to suffer again within them.¹

¹ op.cit., p.155
Is it however, Origen's 'platonizing' interpretation of Col.1:20 and of certain allusions in Heb.12 which makes Origen come to the conclusion that the sacrifice on Calvary must be 'duplicated' in heaven? Is it not more likely that what lies behind this is the genuinely Biblical insight that heaven and earth belong together as the creation of God, and that, in order that Christ's sacrifice should be efficacious, it must encompass heaven as well as earth? We recall how seriously Clement of Alexandria took the question of Christ's Descent into Hades, so that the spirits in prison might benefit by His achievement on the Cross. Why should not Origen think, consistently with Biblical teaching, that, in similar fashion, after His Ascension, Christ must needs bring His whole Mission to a fitting close by offering a spiritual sacrifice in heaven? It seems dubious whether Platonism explains this aspect of Origen's thinking, though it is possible that his familiarity with the Platonic tradition helped to underline for him the necessity for the publication of Christ's Victory in the heavenly realm.

Molland seems to think that, since Origen refused to separate the Platonic and Prophetic aspects of his thinking, it is a Platonic concept of a heavenly sacrifice that is projected, through his dependence on prophetic eschatological notions, into the future. Thus, what happened on Calvary becomes an 'image' or 'shadow', in Platonic terms, of that sacrifice in heaven which is to be manifested when the Eternal Gospel is proclaimed at Christ's Parousia in glory. Thus understood, Christ's earthly sacrifice loses its 'once-for-all' Biblical character, and the counterpart sacrifice in heaven is related rather to that which is to come, the Eternal Gospel, than to that which is past, the Temporal Gospel.

What strikes one as significant, however, is that Origen portrays
Christ as preaching the Eternal Gospel already immediately after His Resurrection. It would seem that Molland who recognizes this fact, \(^1\) interprets it to mean that, since Christ has already shed the flesh, this visitation of angels is an anticipation of what is to be manifested to the world at the end of the age. Thus, he is able to maintain the so-called Platonic distinction between 'shadow' and 'reality', though he appreciates its combination with the prophetic notion of 'sign' and 'fulfilment'. The visitation of angels, by being brought into line with that which is to come, rather than with that which is past, is not allowed to disturb this neat scheme. Surely, however, for St. Paul, what was central was one stupendous event which tore the dividing walls between that which is visible and that which is invisible and which was cosmic in its significance in the fullest sense of the term. Thus understood, Christ's visitation of angels was certainly an anticipation of the glory that is yet to be revealed in that which is visible, but it was only the other side of the victory achieved by Christ on Calvary and in the Resurrection. Is there adequate reason for thinking that Origen thought otherwise? We submit that there is not. In fact, what Origen is asserting is that both visible and invisible realities required to be cleansed by the blood of Christ, and that this is precisely what the sacrifice in the body on Calvary achieved. Molland seems to fail to see the significance of the visitation of angels in such close proximity to the event of the Cross in its physical aspects.

At the same time Molland seems justified in his rejection of the attempt made by Redepenning in the 19th century to explain away Origen's speculation concerning the likelihood of Christ's having to suffer again.

\(^1\) Vide above, page 659 where we noted Molland's reference to I Tim. 3.16. Molland was reflecting Origen's thought, as set out in his commentary, In.Rom.1.4
in future ages. Molland thus summarizes and comments upon Redepenning's argument: "There have been innumerable worlds before the world we are living in, but our world is the Last in the series of worlds. The consummation of our world is imminent, for our Saviour suffered at the end of this αἰών... and then comes the consummation of all things. The blood of Christ is offered on the heavenly altar simultaneously with His offering once for all on Golgotha. REDEPENNING prefers, therefore, to read ἐν τῷ σωτηρέαίας τοῦ παντός αἰῶνος instead of εἰς τῷ ἐξῆς ἐώς τῷ σωτηρέαίας τοῦ παντός αἰῶνος. But the Greek text is quite clear and is not in need of any emendation. Both Jerome and Justinian had looked askance at Origen's speculativeness in this matter, and Molland considers that only the Greek text as we have it can explain their criticisms of Origen. Molland also judges that "Redepenning's argument from the imminent consummation of the world is--very doubtful. Origen is looking forward to a long development, and to a series of successive worlds." Molland's point is that, though Christ certainly did not suffer in the world before Golgotha, nor in any world before that, yet Origen's speculation regarding future ages inevitably raises the question whether He will have to suffer again within them.

Granted, however, that Molland is right to reject this interpretation by Redepenning, it remains true that Molland fails to see that it can only be the achievement of Christ in the body on Golgotha which makes possible Christ's visitation of angels with the Eternal Gospel. In fact, the uniqueness of the Cross, in all its crass materiality, is

2. op.cit., p.155.
preserved by Origen. The actual visitation itself results from the comprehensiveness of Christ's Work and stands in somewhat the same relation to the Cross as does the the Incarnation: it emphasizes its cosmic significance.

Molland himself does, of course, see it as the result of Origen's Biblically based concern with Christ's Passion that His earthly suffering on the Cross must needs be duplicated in heaven. Nevertheless, for Molland the reason why this preoccupation about Christ's Passion results in belief in a corresponding passion in heaven, is found in Origen's alleged Platonism. The alternative, which seems to us more satisfactory, is to see any stress on visitation of angels in the heavenly realm as emphasizing Origen's Biblical understanding of the cosmic implications of the Cross. The further implication of this latter understanding is that Origen does not in fact see Christ's Passion as 'duplicated' in heaven. Rather does he see the physical-spiritual agony of Jesus on the Cross as the one unique event in all history. The Incarnation leads up to this, the visitation of angels results from it and brings some of the consequences of the Cross into effectiveness, but the central and sufficient event is found in the quite physically real suffering and obedience of Jesus on the Cross.

Bound up with this criticism of Molland's interpretation of Origen is a repudiation of Molland's estimate of heaven, or the realm of angels, as essentially that which is to be manifested at the end of the age. Molland thinks of heaven, in an essentially Platonic fashion, where his interpretation of Origen is concerned. It parallels this world and is where God dwells surrounded by the

1. op.cit., p.153.
heavenly retinue. It is this realm, which, through a concession to prophetic insights, is to be revealed at the end of the age. However, a more Biblical way of thinking, and that which it seems that Origen may well have adhered to, is one which views both visible and invisible realities as belonging together as the creation of God. Heaven may be a higher place or state, angelic beings may have powers denied to man, just as man has greater powers than the animal world, but the gulf between heaven and earth is as nothing compared with that between all that is created and its Creator God. Thus, it is not that at the consummation the earth and the body will pass away and that this spiritually parallel realm will replace it. Rather is it that both heaven and earth will arrive at their true end and will be transformed. What is to be conferred in this transformation is the gift of 'incorruptibility (ἀμώμησις) which belongs properly to God alone—not even to angels or the heavenly realm. What is true, however, is that Origen thinks of those angelic beings who live in God's nearer Presence as participating already—in a manner no doubt appropriate to their surroundings and status—in Christ's victory on the Cross. In so far as such beings now enjoy in a closer fashion the glorified humanity of Christ, it may be said that it is the blessedness appropriate to their present state which is to be revealed. The point remains, however, that for Origen heaven itself stood as much in need of cleansing as did earth. The major point, however, in our criticism of Molland's interpretation is that for Origen the Eternal Gospel became a reality whenever Christ suffered on Calvary and rose triumphant over death. This implies that Molland is wrong in thinking of the replacement of the Temporal Gospel by the Eternal Gospel in the same way in which the Law was earlier replaced by the Temporal Gospel. It is true, however, that
Origen has a strong emphasis on the glory that was hidden in Christ during the period of his humiliation on earth and which only occasionally broke forth in miraculous healings and other such happenings. This is the glory that was manifested in the Resurrection and the post-Resurrection appearances, which was shown to angels, and which will be made visible at the end of time to the whole created order. Origen may at times be in danger of so emphasizing the glorified nature of Jesus Christ that he seems to make Him discontinuous with us. It seems, however, that what he really intends to convey is that it is Christ in His humanity who thus glorified. Thus understood, Origen's Christ is not discontinuous with us. Earth is not set aside by heaven, nor time replaced by eternity. Rather are all created realities--and man supremely--transformed through the manifestation of the glorified humanity of Jesus Christ.

We have spent some time on Molland's views because they recognize an element of prophetic or Biblical insight in Origen's eschatology. It is Molland's very recognition of this element, combined with his insistence on its mingling in Origen with Platonic elements, which makes Molland's view at once so plausible and so dangerous an attack on the essentially Biblical character of Origen's thinking.

In the discussion above we have done little other than suggest an alternative way of understanding Origen's eschatology to that offered by Molland. The interpretation made seems to be at least coherent and helps to make sense of certain elements in Origen's thinking. One passage may now be cited from Origen's 'De Principiis' --the more remarkable that it is found in his more philosophical work-- which seems to support some of the attitudes outlined above in criticism of Molland's views:

"Quoniam sane visibilia quaedam dicit esse Paulus et temporalia,"
alia vero praeter haec invisibilia et aeterna quae visum pro eo quod nihil omnino post hoc erunt in omnibus illis futuris spatiis ac saeculis, quibus dispersio illa unius principii atque divisio ad unum et eundem finem ac similitudinem reparatur, an pro eo quod habitus quidem eorum quae visum transeat, non tamen etiam substantia eorum omnimodis corrupatur. Et Paulus quidem videtur id quo posteriorius diximus confirmare, cum dicit: Transiet enim habitus huius mundi. Sed et David cum dicit: Caeli peribunt, tu autem permaneabis, et omnes sicut vestimentum veterescent, et sicut amictum mutabis eos, sicut vestimentum mutabuntur, eadem videtur ostendere. Si enim mutabuntur caeli, utique non perit quod mutatur; et si habitus huius mundi transit, non omnimodis exterminatio vel perditio substantiae materialis ostenditur, sed inmutatio quaedam fit qualitatis atque habitus transformatio. Esaias quoque cum per prophetiam dicit quia erit caelum novum et terra nova, similis sine dubio suggerit intellectum. Innovatio nonque caeli et terrae et transmutatio habitus huius mundi et inmutatio caelorum his sine dubio praeparaburit, qui per illum viam, quam supra ostendimus, iter agentes ad illum finem beatitudinis tendunt, cui etiam ipsi inimici subiciendi dicuntur, in quo fines omnium genere intellectui meo occurrere potest, quumodo tot et tantae substantiae vitae agere ac subsistere sine corporibus possint, cum solius dei, id est patris et filii ac spiritus sancti naturae id proprium sit, ut sine materiali substantia et absque ulla corporeae adiectionis societate intellegatur existere. Alius fortasse dicit quoniam in illo fine omnis substantia corporalis ita pura erit atque purgata, ut aetheris in modum et caelestis cujusdam puritatis ac sinceritatis possit intellegi. Certius tamen qualiter se habitura sit res, scit solus Deus, et si qui eius per Christum et spiritum sanctum amici sunt. (I,VI.4).1

A number of features stand out in this quotation. First, we may remark upon Origen's tentativeness of conclusion. This emerges not only from humility of spirit or discretion of utterance, but above all surely from a realization of the impossibility of expressing, or knowing, in advance what kind of life we will possess in this future age, when we judge that it is based on the resurrected life of Christ, at once human and divine, physical and spiritual. Second, Origen himself--in this passage, as we have it--clearly interprets Paul and 'David' to mean that it is the 'form' of our present constitution that is to

1. G.C.S., Or., V,p.84, 1.22-p.85,1.24.
It is not that matter is to be put aside or destroyed. Third, Origen expressly says that it belongs to the Triune God alone to be able to live without any kind of bodily adjunct. This is precisely in line with C. Bigg's statement that for Origen only God can exist "without a shroud" (noted above page 568). It is clear that Origen does not think of our creaturely necessity of having a bodily constitution of some kind as deriving from a pre-temporal Fall—rather does this belong to creatureliness as such, God alone being exempt. Fourth, this passage clearly treats heaven and earth as creaturely realities, as over against the Triune God. Thus, some support is found for our contention that for Origen the angelic realm, visited by Christ after His Resurrection and Ascension, is not the timeless eternal realm that always has existed and always will exist, and which parallels this shadowy world that we know through our senses: it is not the Platonic 'intelligible' world, set over against the world of 'sensible' reality. Origen does elsewhere use this Platonic conception, but he thinks of both realms as created by God. Rather does the heavenly realm stand alongside the world, which we observe with our physical senses, as the creation of God.

It is true, of course, that we have a first class problem with reference to the 'De principiis', in attempting to discern what is the original utterance and sentiment of Origen and what may be the gloss provided by his translator, Rufinus. Even the statement quoted, as it stands, has, as we have seen, a degree of tentativeness. However, it is significant that what Origen finds uncertain is whether the new bodies, that saints will have in the future life, will have an aetherial quality or not—as the passage stands, what is definitely excluded is the possibility of our possessing no bodies. One has to ask, too, whether the whole scheme that we find in the 'De principiis' does not present a pattern that is the product of one mind. After all, this
scheme is not exactly an orthodox one. If Rufinus really altered
Origen in any drastic fashion, he does not seem to have been
conspiciously successful in sheltering Origen from adverse criticism.
Origen is shown in the De Principiis to have believed in a pre-temporal
fall (which, undoubtedly, he seeks to bolster with Biblical support),
that our present kind of material clothing is the result of this fall,
and to have been puzzled about the questions relating to the conversion
of demonic spirits and continuance of all spirits in a state of
obedience to God. If Rufinus wished to make Origen appear orthodox,
why did he not alter these passages or simply suppress them? The
fact that references to the pre-temporal Fall occur in Book I.V-VI,
along with the section cited, above lends support to the conviction
that the whole form of Origen's thinking has not been distorted by
Rufinus. Thus a sequence which speaks of a pre-temporal Fall speaks
also of the necessity of man's remaining a creature endowed with
some form of body throughout all eternity.

THE CONCEPT OF A PRE-TEMPORAL FALL AND RELATED IDEAS

It is true, however, that Origen's theories regarding a pre-temporal
Fall and regarding the possibility of future 'falls' from grace in the
ages to come represent an aspect of his thinking which must be viewed
as largely speculative and which reveals, to a greater extent than
what we have so far studied, the influence of philosophical and Hellenic
concepts which is essence are alien to Biblical thought. It falls to
us now to set out briefly just what Origen did say, what supposed
Biblical support he offered for these views, and what extraneous
influences probably played upon him. The importance of this for
our understanding of Origen's eschatology is that we have to try to
determine whether Origen's more Biblical concepts in this field
represent his real thinking or in fact are an accommodation to
traditional Church thinking or whether the Biblical and Hellenic are held together in Origen's mind. If the last point is the correct answer, as it may very well be, there are a further two possibilities to be considered. Did Origen not see the inconsistency of certain ways of thinking with his other more Biblical concepts and did he not realize how the acceptance of these concepts would undermine what he elsewhere had to say? Or, is it not rather the case that Origen judged, even if he was wrong in so judging, that Biblical and philosophical conceptions converged at these points?

What did Origen say with reference to a pre-temporal Fall? and regarding the possibility of a certain instability in our state of grace in future ages? All of this was closely related to an insistence on man's freewill, which we find both in Clement and Origen. This was clearly directed against the views of various groups of Gnostics who wished to assert that our destiny was determined by our nature, and that at best only some persons (those with 'psychical' natures) could influence their destiny one way or the other. Thus, in *De Principiis* III.1.21, Origen begins with a reference to "those who introduce souls of different natures" (qui diversas animarum introductum naturas).¹ Later in this same chapter Origen says:

"Ex quo opinámur, quoniam quidem, sicut frequentius diximus, immortalis est anima et aeterna, quod in multis et sine fine spatiis per immensa et diversa saecula possibile est, ut vel a summo bona ad infima mala descendat, vel ab ultimis malis ad summa bona reparetur." ² It is interesting that this last statement does not appear in the Greek text which is extant, but does find its place in Rufinus' translation. Thus, Rufinus' edition of Origen's work leaves us

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1. G.C.S., Or.V,p.240,1.20
with the concept, which is latent in the above statement, that souls may by means of the exercise of their freewills over the endless ages rise and fall. This statement in itself leaves room for a Fall in pre-temporal times (i.e. before the existence of this present empirical world) and for the possibility (not to say the likelihood) of changes in state of grace in future ages.

In De Principiis I.V Origen has an extended discussion concerning 'rational natures' (naturae rationales). In this he discusses the origin and nature of angels, principalities and powers, and of the Devil or Satan. It is significant that Origen's judgment concerning the origin of the Devil is a combination of rational reflection and Biblical affirmation, as he understands the matter himself. Since God cannot be the author of evil, the wickedness of the devil must be the result of wrong choice in past ages (pars. 2-3). But this view appears to be supported by such passages of Scripture as Ezekiel 28: 11-19 and Is. 14,12-22 (pars.4-5).

Again, in De Principiis II.IX.6ff. Origen answers the allegations of some belonging to the schools of Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides (vide paragraph 5 of this same chapter) who saw injustice in the different estate of the various beings within the cosmos. Broadly three groups are distinguished, viz., those in the heavens, those on the earth, and those in the lower regions (para.3). Moreover, there are variations of dignity in each division. Thus, among men some are given positions of honour, while others are made slaves. Origen thus explains the reason for this diversity:

"Quia ergo eorum, quae creanda erant, ipse extitit causa, in quo neque varietas aliqua neque permutatio neque impossibilitas inerat, aequales creavit omnes ac similes quos creavit, quippe cum nulla ei causa varietatis ac diversitatis existeret. Verum quoniam rationabiles ipsae creaturee, sicut frequenter ostendimus et in loco suo nihilminus ostendimus, arbitrii liveri facultate donatæ sunt, libertas ununquemque voluntatis suaee vel ad profectum
It becomes clear, then, that the world as we know it, with all its diversity (upper spheres and lower regions are included in the concept of the world), is the result of a Fall which must have occurred before the world, as we know it, originated. Again, Origen uses the concept of freewill in order to reach this conclusion. He is most conscious of the inequalities of life, of what is 'evil' in the sense of being unharmonious, and he finds this solution for the situation, one which in his view is in line with Scriptural implication.

What all of this seems to mean is that the creation of the material order, as we know it, is the result of the Fall in heaven, a Fall which affected all spirits so that they either remained as superior spirits, or were enfleshed for a period of education, or became demonic spirits. In this view to be embodied is not the greatest judgment, because neither angels nor demons have such flesh as ours, and one of these groups is less culpable than man and the other is more culpable. At the same time our 'enfleshing' is thus seen as the result of a pretemporal Fall, a view which does not seem easily to fit in with a high estimate of the body and God's purposes for it.

It may be noted in the passing that the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls also implies previous disembodiedness, and fits in with the notion that our present 'enfleshed' condition is the result of the Fall. Origen rejected both the creationist and the traducianist accounts of the origin of individual souls. The view which he accepted was that of Plato, the pre-existence of souls. As Henry

1. G.C.S., Or., V.p.169,1.25-p.170,1.5.
Chadwick says, this doctrine seemed preferable to the "all too materialistic doctrine of the traducianists that the soul is derived with the body from the parental seed and is transmitted by the lowly process of reproduction, or to the seemingly fussy creationist notion that every time a human couple casually conceive, God is put to the pains of sending a soul to inhabit the embryo. But the first motive is always the most powerful: like Plato himself in the Republic, Origen must assert the pre-existence of souls because he must explain the diversity of human fortune in this world as a consequence of choices freely made by souls before their incarnation here."\(^1\)

Scripture was brought in to reinforce Origen's view. Twice the leaping of the babe who was to be John the Baptist within his mother's womb at the approach of Mary who was carrying the Christ child is cited as evidence for the pre-existence of souls (De Principiis, I.VII.4; III.III.5).

We have endeavoured to set out above in brief Origen's speculative concepts regarding the origin of things. What of his view of the consummation of all things, which corresponds to this? This is set forth in De Principiis, I.VI. Origen expressly says at the commencement of this chapter that, having dealt already with what is best set forth in dogmatic propositions, it must be understood that what is now discussed is done in the manner of an investigation rather than in that of fixed and certain decision." (quam pro certo ac definito; para.1).\(^2\) Origen has as his guiding thought the idea that "similis est finis initiiis" (para.2;).\(^3\) It is his belief that ultimately

1. op.cit., p.115
2. G.C.S.Or.V,p.78,1.18
all rational or spiritual beings will return to that from which they have fallen. He says:

"Hi vero qui de statu primae beatitudinis moti quidem sunt, non tamen inreparabiliter moti, illis quos supra descriptimus sanctis beatisque ordiniibus dispensandi subjecti sunt ac regendi: quorum adiutorio usi et institutionibus ac disciplinis salutaribus reformati, redire ac restitui ad statum suae beatitudinis possint. Ex quibus adestimo, prout ego sentire possum, hunc ordinem humani generis institutum, qui utique in futuro saeculo vel in supervenientibus saeculis, cum caelum novum et terra nova secundum Esiam erit, restitueretur in illam unitatem, quam promittit dominus Iesus dicens ad deum pater de discipulis suis---- 1 Origen goes on to quote John 17.20-21, and then vv.22-23, with some phrases omitted: the emphasis is upon the unity of men in God through Christ."

In the following paragraph in this same chapter Origen notes that certain beings had fallen to such a depth of wickedness (in a pre-temporal fall) that they were deemed altogether unworthy of "institutio hac vel eruditione, qua per carnem humanum genus adiutorio caelestium virtutum instititur atque eruditur":(para. 3). 2 On the contrary they actively oppose this instruction and training. Origen implies that such may be converted to righteousness in future ages, since they possess the faculty of freewill. Meantime all these beings are arranged according to a regular plan in the order of their merits, and by means of punishments imposed over long ages are themselves being trained. He concludes:

"Ex quo, ut opinor hoc consequentia ipse videtur ostendere, unamquamque rationabilem naturam posse ab uno in alterum ordinem transeuntem ratione singularum in omnes, et ab omnibus in singulos pervenire, dum accessus profectum defectuumque varios pro motibus vel conatibus propriis unusquisque pro liberi arbitrii facultate perpetitur." (para. 3). 3

Now it is in this context that Origen, in paragraph 4 of this same chapter, sets forth the passage quoted above (pp.668-670), which surely shows that Origen does not really think in terms of the

2. G.C.S., Or.,V.,p.82.11.22-24.
3. G.C.S., Or.,V.,p.84,11.16-v.21.
abandonment of some kind of body in future ages, nor in terms of the destruction of the material order. This is all the more significant in that we can now see that Origen envisages that what is to be at the end corresponds in some manner to that which was in the beginning. Surely what this means is that, although Origen thinks, for example, of the pre-existence of the soul before its embodiment in human flesh, he does not really mean that it had no "material substance" (materialis substantia). As he expressly suggests, that is an attribute only of the divine nature, that is, of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

What this seems to mean is that, even if we judge that Origen has taken over from Plato the concept of the pre-existence of souls, and even if it is unbiblical to hold that our present embodiment is the result of a pre-temporal fall (a view which emerged out of his insistence on man's freewill and his attempt to justify the inequalities of life with belief in a good God who created the empirical), yet Origen does not ultimately suggest that man ever had (before this world came into existence) or ever will have (in future ages) no embodiment. It does, however, seem to be consistent with his speculations to believe that our previous and future kinds of embodiment may be very different from what we now know. This clearly is directly relevant to Origen's understanding of eschatology.

At the same time it is true that certain passages attributed to Origen leave a doubt in the mind whether this is the whole truth about Origen's views. Thus, the chapter in De Principiis, III, VI dealing with the End of the World (Consommatio mundi) has some problems to be resolved. Thus in paragraph I Origen discusses the significance for the purpose of God for future ages of Gen.1.26 and I Jn.2, together with a conflation of Jn.17 verses 24 and 21.
He says:

"In quo (the reference is especially to his conflation of Jn.17, verses 24 and 23) in dividetur ipsa similitudo, si dici potest, proiciere et ex simili >unum< iam fieri, pro eo sine dubio quod in consummatione vel fine >omnia et in omnibus deus< est." 1

Clearly Origen's judgment at this point may seem to open up the way for the speculation that, as God is Himself disembodied, we may become one with Him in this respect also. It seems only right that we should bear in mind that what Origen has already said in I.VI.4 is assumed in the discussion here in III.VI.1. There he set forth that only God exists without some kind of material form. Is Origen now prepared to abandon this stance? Or, rather, to say that it is this very difference between God and all other beings which yet raises the possibility of future incorporeality for us, since in Christ we are to become fully one with God?

The form in which the ensuing passage is preserved for us by Rufinus seems not to commit Origen in any way. He says:

"In quo requiritur, a nonnullis, si ratio naturae corporae, quamvis expurgatæ ad liquidum et penitus spiritalis effectae, non videatur obsistere vel ad similitudinis dignitatem vel ad unitatis proprietatem, quod naturae divinae, quae utique principaliter incorporea est, nec similis videatur posse dici quae in corpore est natura nec unum cum ea vera ac merito designari, maxime cum id, quod >unum est filius cum patre<, ad naturae proprietatem referendum fidei veritas doceat." (para I.)

Jerome, however, renders this last passage somewhat differently in his Epistle to Avitus, No.94. He thus puts it:

"Since, as we have already frequently observed, the beginning is generated again from the end, it is a question whether then also there will be bodies, or whether existence will be maintained at some time without them when they shall have been annihilated, and thus the life of incorporated beings must be believed to be incorporeal, as we know is the case with God. And there is no doubt that if all the bodies which are termed visible by the apostle, belong to that sensible world, the life of incorporeal beings will be incorporeal."

1. G.C.S., Or., V,p.281,11.3-5.
2. G.C.S., Or., V,p.281,11.6-12.
A little later in the same Epistle to Avitus Origen is related to have said:

"That we must believe the end of all things to be incorporeal, the language of the Saviour Himself leads us to think, when He says, 'As I and Thou are one, so may they also be one in us'. For we ought to know what God is, and what the Saviour will be in the end, and how the likeness of the Father and the Son has been promised to the saints; for as they are one in Him, so they are also one in them. For we must adopt the view, either that the God of all things is clothed with a body, and as we are enveloped with flesh, so He also with some material covering, that the likeness of the life of God may be in the end produced also in the saints; or if this hypothesis is unbecoming, especially in the judgment of those who desire, even in the smallest degree, to feel the majesty of God, and to look upon the glory of His uncreated and allsurpassing nature, we are forced to adopt the other alternative, and despair either of attaining any likeness to God, if we are to inhabit for ever the same bodies, or if the blessedness of the same life with God is promised to us, we must live in the same state as that in which God lives."

What then, are we to conclude that Origen really believed with regard to the body, the material world, and the future state? Many scholars have concluded that Rufinus has suppressed these passages because they were unorthodox. It seems not improbable that Rufinus was disturbed by them and accordingly modified them. Yet, it is still not clear that Origen is seriously at variance with what he had to say at I.VI.4. Thus, it is surely significant that Jn.17.21 is quoted in the second of the passages above, taken from Jerome's record in his Epistle to Avitus, Number 94. This verse, as we have seen, does naturally raise the question whether we are not to leave behind in future ages the present form of existence. May it not be simply a due discretion on Origen's part which makes him unwilling to dogmatize about the future world, by insisting that we must retain the form of existence which we now possess? We shall see later (pages 702-704), that Origen shows a certain vacillation regarding the nature of the body of the resurrection. Now can we know in advance what our future
existence will be like? We will suggest that all that Origen feels that he must believe, in the matter of the resurrection body, is that it has continuity with the whole man, in his outer and inner reality, as he now is. Is it not a similar perspective which informs Origen's outlook regarding the possibility that at some future time, in perhaps some remote age, we shall leave the body behind completely? It is not just that Origen wishes to be generous about the possibilities: it is also that the concept of 'oneness with God' seems to demand, as he reasons in the present passage, that our present form of existence be left behind.

It is surely most important in all of this that Origen thinks in terms of our union with God through Jesus Christ. Does this not imply that any possibility in future ages, with reference to our form of existence, is conceivable which is congruous with the nature of the Risen Lord Who is one with God and with us in our humanity? What Origen wishes to leave room for is the adventuring of the saints with God in future eternity. What Origen wishes to get away from is the idea that the preservation of such continuity means that we retain for ever our present bodies, or a form of bodily existence which suggests little change from earthly conditions.

The point may be pressed, however, that this explanation is inadequate, since the fulcrum of Origen's argument here is that God is incorporeal, and that, if we are to be fully one with Him, we too must become incorporeal. Presumably this means that this will be true of Jesus Christ also, if it is not thought of as true already. It is interesting to observe in this regard that in the last passage quoted from Jerome's Epistle to Avitus Origen thus poses the alternatives: he talks of the necessity of God's being clothed with a body and in view of our being "enveloped with flesh", His also
requiring some material covering, or of our not inhabiting "the same bodies". The point is that, if we are to become one with God, then either God must become like us or we must become like Him. Which, asks Origen, is more appropriate to think? How could Origen forget in all of this that already God had sent His Son to be one with us? This being so, it is appropriate that God's future intentions for His saints be realized. What Origen may well have in mind is a dynamic act or process whereby in future ages God will, in a manner consistent with His condescension in Christ in the Incarnation, give to us not the 'same bodies' but a new form of existence in which we are fully one with Himself without abandoning that essential continuity with flesh and blood, which the Incarnation guarantees.

It may be agreed, in conclusion, that not all will understand Origen's intention in the manner set forth above. It may be true that Origen says one thing at one time and one at another. If this is the case, it may have been on account of his not wishing to appear unorthodox. Yet it seems much more true to the character of the man to conclude that, if He was inconsistent, He was himself unaware of it. It may also be true, even if the understanding of his thinking suggested in the preceding pages be acceptable, that there is the danger inherent within it of Origen's virtually conceiving of the body as being left behind in future ages, whatever continuity may be presupposed with our present bodies. It may seem to be so inconceivable to think of a form of existence which is fully one with God and which is incorporeal and which yet preserves continuity with our present frames. Yet probably Origen's answer to this would be that it is equally inconceivable how God's Son could become fully one with man and fully corporeal while retaining continuity with His former mode of being, yet this has taken place.
The question remains as to what influences may lie behind some of Origen's speculations. It seems clear that in part at least the above discussion regarding how seriously Origen took the body and the material world emerges out of Origen's attempt to explain the world's diversity and the problem of evil within it in a manner congruous at once with God's goodness and the freewill of all spirits, including those of human beings. Scripture and reasoning, as we saw, combined in Origen's explanations of these matters. If, however, Origen did in fact capitulate, however unwittingly, to a view of the body and the material universe which suggests its inferiority to non-material and purely spiritual existence, it seems likely that this came to him from Hellenic sources. Plato's view of a 'cosmic soul' may, in this case, have been one of the major influences at work. Plato in the 'Timaeus' saw the cosmic soul as bridging the gulf between the intelligible and the sensible realms (κόσμος νοητός and κόσμος ἀισθητός). We know that Origen accepted this distinction. Thus he can comment concerning the words of St. Paul in II.Cor.4:18;

'The things that are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal', in the following manner:

"Ἀντίκρυον γὰρ τοῖς ἡκούσιν δυναμένοις παρίστησι τὸ μὲν ἀισθητὸν λέγων ἀυτὰ ὑπενθέμενα, ‹τὰ δὲ νοητὰ καὶ νὰ μόνῳ κατακλητὰ ὄνομά ὑσφών ὑπὲνθέμενα, ὁτὸς δὲ καὶ ‹πρόσκειρα ὑμῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀισθητὰ καὶ ‹ὑπενθέμενα, ὑπὲρ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ μὴ ἐπενθέμενα, " (Contra Celsum vi.xxx)

Now Plato further believed in a 'cosmic soul' or 'world-soul'. What is of interest to us is that some of Origen's language seems to suggest the possibility that he was indebted to this idea. Plato says in the 'Timaeus':

"But this (i.e. the 'world-soul'), woven through from the centre

towards heaven everywhere and enwrapping it (sc. the empirical cosmos), and itself turning round within itself, has begun a divine 'beginning' of an unending and intelligent life throughout all time. And indeed, the visible body of heaven has come into being, but the soul, being invisible as well as partaking in reason (λογισμός) and harmony to the eternal things of the mind (Τῷ νου τῆς) has been created by him who is the best, as the best of all things created."

This cosmic soul penetrates the whole material cosmos, being able to do so because it is not matter itself. The most important feature for our present purpose, as Arnold Ehrhardt puts it, that "this cosmic soul is the 'beginning' (ρόχη) of the empirical world in the same sense that it mediates between the world of ideas, the things of the eternal Nous, and creation." The cosmic soul is itself a created entity, but it has become constituted "within the world of ideas, as it were by right, whereas the empirical cosmos received in its creation a perpetual motion by sufferance only." We shall see later (pages 691 - 693) that this concept of a cosmic soul may have influenced Origen's language in discussing the dignity attributed to certain bodies in the heavens.

What is especially relevant, however, to our study of Origen's ideas is what Plato hints at concerning another soul or power which was operative in the empirical world and was responsible for evil within it. Was this really what led Origen to speculate in the way that he did in the De Principiis, namely the problem of evil? We look now at what Plato has to say. Plato's remarks concerning this other 'soul' which leads to disorderliness within the empirical world are few. It is clear, however, that orderliness of motion

1. Timaeus, 36E-37A. Translation is that provided by A. Ehrhardt in his book, 'The Beginning', Manchester Univ. Press, 1968, p. 97 Bracketed comments are also his.
2. op.cit., pp. 97-98
3. op.cit., p. 98.
bespeaks the operation of the world-soul, while disorderliness in motion is evidence of the functioning of some other mysterious power.

Plato rejected the notion of Parmenides that evil was the non-existent, the \( \mu \eta \) of Ehrhardt comments:

"His dualism contrasted mind and matter, Nous and Ananke, good and evil, as in the Phaedrus, so also in the Timaeus, and in the tenth book of the Laws. What was new, and indeed revolutionary in this his newly found cosmology, was just this contrast of mind and matter. I have stated repeatedly that the philosophical abstraction 'matter' does not appear to have been consciously achieved before the middle of the fifth century B.C., and the contrast of mind and matter seems to have belonged only to the generation of Socrates. Finally it was Plato who identified this contrast with that between good and evil."

It would seem that just as the world-soul pervaded the universe, so the existence of evil within it indicated the obscure but real presence of some 'evil soul'. What it is important to state in discussing this is that both the world-soul and the 'evil soul' were seen as \( \lambda \rho \lambda \kappa \upsilon \) \( \lambda \). The world-soul formed the bridge between the intelligible and sensible realms, making its presence felt in harmony and peace in the empirical realm. On the other hand, the 'evil soul' was also responsible for certain aspects of the empirical realm. In time the concept of the 'evil soul' was to recede in those who developed the hints found in Plato, and the real beginnings of the empirical realm were discovered not any more in 'world-soul' and 'evil soul' but were transferred to the meta-physical realm. As Ehrhardt notes, we see this, for example, in Plutarch who established Ananke or Necessity as a 'third principle and power' between God and matter.

What is the significance of the above discussion for our understanding of Origen's thought? Two facts seem important. First, the Platonic distinction between mind and matter as linked with that

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1. op.cit., p.104.
2. op.cit., p.105
between good and evil, to the extent that it really influenced Origen, would seem to point in the direction of a depreciation of the bodily and the material at the expense of the mental and spiritual. If Origen really does think of the final abandonment of the body in future ages, in the way in which this is usually understood, probably such a Platonic understanding as underlies the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible realms, especially as related to the equation of good with the spiritual and evil with the material, has some influence upon his thinking. We have already noted that Origen accepted the distinction between the intelligible and sensible realms and understood St. Paul to have referred to it at II Cor.4.18. It is true, however, that Origen's Biblical understanding probably modified his use of the distinction, in that he would see God as wholly beyond either intelligible or sensible realms. The second point is that Plato was striving towards an explanation of evil in the universe first of all in terms of some 'evil soul' which seems to have been thought of as pervasive, at least of certain areas of the empirical world and experience, in the way that the world-soul was. We have to remember that Plato's explanation of the existence of the empirical world is complicated: as the 'Timaeus' puts it, the world is formed by a god who is an artificer; in making the world this artificer looks at an ideal model which is conceived as living and includes ideas and what the artificer does is to make an image of this ideal model out of a pre-existing chaos. "As the image is also to be animated and intelligent and as intelligence cannot exist except in a soul, the artificer fashions a cosmic soul out of stuff, the ingredients of which are called 'the indivisible' and 'that which is divisible about bodies', 'the identical' and 'the different'." 1 What this

means is that the cosmic soul reflects an ideal world beyond it. This appears to be the situation also with reference to what is evil. The question now emerges whether it is this shadowy realm of ideas, of which earthly realities are a copy, and which lies behind the empirical world, which corresponds in Origen's mind to the heavenly world surrounding God, which existed before the world was. Does Origen find in the stories of Ezekiel 28.11-19 and Is.14.12-22 support for a notion which was suggested to him by Platonic concepts? It is possible that, just as Plato saw an 'evil soul' as responsible for evil in the empirical world, and implies that it must mirror something beyond the empirical realm, so Origen reflects this concept in the imagery of a pre-temporal Fall.

If Origen really moved far from the Biblical concepts in his more speculative passages, then it may well be that Plato's tendency to align good with mind and evil with matter, together with his way of thinking about the world-soul as reflecting through the work of the demiurge or artificer an ideal realm and his uneasy acknowledgement of the presence of evil in the empirical world, may have provided the ingredients for his own concept of a pre-temporal Fall. This would thus doubtless represent the transposition into a more characteristically Hebraic historical (or pre-historical) form of the myth given by Plato: it would be a dynamic counterpart to a Platonic static one. The thought that the material world resulted from that pre-temporal Fall may have been influenced by Plato's depreciation of matter. Plato does seem a more likely source for such ideas than notions deriving from Philo, who rejected the concept of a world-soul. It may well be, of course, that Middle Platonism provided the medium through which some of the Platonic ideas reached Origen, though he shows evidence of a direct knowledge of certain of Plato's major works.
If Origen's thinking be accepted as more Biblical than has sometimes been allowed, even when the speculative passages of the De Principiis are in view, then it may be that these influences from Plato or Greek thought (Plato was not of course the first or the last to envisage a 'world-soul') are not so significant after all. Even so, it may well be that certain Platonic modes of thinking have coloured Origen's thought, and have endangered his more Biblical concepts, even if they have not succeeded in overturning them. Thus, it seems not unlikely that Origen's attitude to the body is not unaffected by the Platonic depreciation of it inherent in the division between the intelligible and the sensible realms. It seems more questionable what influence Plato's equation of the distinction between good and evil with that between mind and matter had on him. Further, Plato himself did not really make that equation in any straight-forward fashion: it is rather that matter tends to become the locus for evil. As for the possibility that the pre-temporal Fall reflects hints found in Plato's way of describing the existence of the empirical world and its origin, with its reference to a world-soul and an 'evil soul' and an ideal realm reflected in the empirical world, this seems much less certain. If Origen was here influenced by such a way of thinking, it seems not to have been clear to himself. It remains, however, a possibility.

The Semitic Totality Concept.

When we were dealing with Clement of Alexandria, we had occasion to note particular aspects of the thinking of Murdoch Dahl and to suggest that they helped us to understand certain perspectives in Clement (vide above, pages 629 - 632). Especially did we note the affirmation of Dahl that the Jews and St. Paul did not make the modern Western distinction between 'ultimate' reality and 'immediate' reality.
We recall the startling illustrative sentence given by Dahl: 'A pebble is as real as God'. Another consequence of this whole view was expressed in the statement: "Ap lied to the non-human universe this means, among other things, that the word 'soul' may be predicated of anything." (vide above page 628). The point is that the view outlined by Dahl as characteristic of Hebraic thought and as found, in his view, in St. Paul, minimizes the gulf between different entities, so far as reality is concerned. It is possible that we find in Origen some possible traces of a similar viewpoint. Certainly, as we have seen, Origen distinguishes carefully between God and the whole created order. So, for that matter, did the Hebrew 'totality concept' (to use Dahl's expression), but it did not do so in terms of 'ultimate' reality and 'immediate reality'. It is significant that Origen thinks of God as self-sustaining and not in need of bodily appendages. God is high above man. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in Origen, it would seem, to minimize the differences between man and other entities within the created order, while the difference between God and the whole created order is expressed not in terms of difference in degrees of reality but in terms of δύναμις of power. God does not require a bodily constitution, whereas men, animals, even angelic beings do. So far as the differences between man and other entities in the created order is concerned, we have already noted Origen's insistence on the close relationship of angels and men as belonging much more closely together in their creatureliness than does either relate to God. Origen recognizes the difference in glory between angels, men, and animals in a descending scale, but they all belong together as creatures of God's hand.

It is arguable that Origen finds no distinction between inanimate objects, men and angels other than that which emerges out of the
dignity conferred on each by God. One wonders to what extent, if
at all, this fact influences Origen's speculations regarding the
heavenly bodies. It was a question which could not be scientifically
determined in ancient times, what kind of constitution or being the
sun, moon and other heavenly bodies had. This was a matter of
speculation, not only among Christians in the 2nd and 3rd centuries
A.D., but also among all thinking people and especially among people
who were philosophically minded. We note the following passage on
the nature of the heavenly bodies in Origen's De Principiis:

"putamus ergo posse ea (sun, moon, and stars) per hoc animantia
designari, quod et mandata dicuntur accioire a deo, quod utique
non nisi rationabilibus animantibus fieri solet. Ait ergo***
mandatum: Ego autem omnibus stellis praecepi. Quae sunt autem
ista praecepta? scilicet ut ununquodque astraorum ordine
suique cursibus indultae sibi quantitatis splendor(em) praebeant
mundo. Aliis enim hi, qui vocantur planetae, moventur ordinibus,
aliis hi, quos Δημοκριτος vocant. In quo illud manifestissime
ostenditur, quod neque motus ulla eorum corporis sine anima effici
potest, neque quae animantia sunt, possunt aliquando esse sine
motu. Stellae vero cum tanto oruine ac tanta ratione moveantur,
ut in nullum prorsus aliquando cursus earum visus sit immeditus,
quomodo non ultra omnes stoliditatem est tantum ordinem
tantamque disciplinae ac rationis observantiam dicere ab
irrationabilibus exigii vel expleri? Apud Hieremiam sane etiam
regina caeli luna esse nominatur. Quodsi animantiae sunt
stellae et rationabiles animate sunt, sine dubio videtur inter
eas etiam profectus aliqui et decessus. Hoc enim quod ait
Iob: Et stellae non sunt mundae in conspectu eius, talem
mihi quendam indicare videtur intellectum."(I.VII.3.)

It is interesting to follow Origen's argument in this whole chapter
and to see how it is developed. Scriptural and general considerations
are intertwined. Further, it is soon clear that Origen is motivated
throughout the entire discussion by the desire to vindicate his
conviction that there was a pretemporal Fall and that, as a result
of this episode, spiritual or intelligent beings have been given
bodies of various kinds-some as lowly objects, some as animals,
others as men, some as angels, and others again as the heavenly

1. G.C.S., Gr.,V,p.88,l,9-p.89,l.II.
bodies. Origen considered that the dignity accorded the spirits clothed in the sun, moon, and stars must have been considerable, in view of their glorious appearance and the important functions accorded them by God. Back of this lies the Genesis account of creation, and the injunction to the heavenly bodies to be for times and seasons and as 'signs'.

Origen's statement that only rational being ordinarily receive commandments from God seems certainly to indicate his conviction that the stars were rational entities, i.e. beings with consciousness and capable of moral decision. This understanding also appears to fit in with Origen's views about a pre-temporal Fall; spiritual beings were thereafter clothed with their present bodily constitutions. The stars each received a particular dignity and status within this material state which depended upon their degree of fallenness and which was intended by God as the medium within which their being disciplined for salvation was to be carried out through long ages until the consummation of all things. The reference to 'uncleanness' of the stars in God's sight, culled from Job.25.5 is also, in Origen's view, an indication of moral failure rather than of any external dimness: this suggests to him that it is their moral failure in a previous age, i.e. before the creation of our space-time world, that is being spoken of. Thus, Origen conceives of the stars as embodied spiritual beings.

Origen goes on to distinguish between different 'stars'. It is clear that this is a term used by him to include sun, moon, planets (of which five were known in his day) and stars. The precise scientifically ascertained differences between these heavenly bodies (as that the sun is a star and that the planets are relatively dense, non-gaseous objects) were not known to the ancients. The movement
of certain of the 'stars' was of a 'wandering' character—hence the term, planets (cf. παρεκτάς) which describes their movement. Other heavenly bodies—such as sun, moon and stars appear to trace a more immediately discernible and less complicated path in the heavens. However, Origen perceived that, once their movements were known, all of the heavenly bodies displayed order and regularity in their movements. To him their movement suggested their 'ensouled' condition, while the regularity of movement suggested their rationality.

Various influences may have contributed to Origen's overall outlook in this passage. Thus, it may be that the Platonic conception of the cosmic soul here colours his expression. Origen sees motion as evidence of the presence of 'soul'. To Plato, however, motion was that which characterized the empirical cosmos, perpetual motion. This contrasted with eternal static realm of ideas. So far as the cosmic soul is concerned, we have already seen that in the Platonic scheme its role is to mediate between the static timeless realm of ideas and the empirical realm characterized by motion. It is this cosmic soul which is ultimately responsible for the movement in the universe. Not only so, but it is significant that Plato in his account of the universe made much of the dignity accorded to the sun, moon, and the stars. This has to be understood in the context of his concept of a cosmic soul. The movement of the cosmic soul was understood to be gyratory in character. Ehrhardt remarks at one place: "It was the 'well-ordered' rotatory motion of cosmic soul, imitated by that of the archontes, the rulers of the astral spheres, which caused the continuity of change and motion, and was thus the 'beginning' of the empirical world." ¹ The point which Ehrhardt is making in context has to do with the fact that

¹ op.cit., p.148.
Plato used the concept of ἔλεος, order, "to provide the static element in the ontology of the continually moving empirical world." Now, the point is that Plato saw that the outer stars displayed greater regularity in their movements, as did also the sun and the moon, than the planets which had an apparent wandering motion. Partially connected with this is the fact that Plato could ascribe 'eternity' to the cosmic soul and 'divinity' to the souls of the sun, moon, and stars (as he did in the tenth book of the 'Laws'), while the importance of the human soul diminished in his various works. This corresponds to the way in which Plato gradually came to think of the 'cosmic soul' in a less transcendental way. The real beginnings of the universe were transferred to a metaphysical realm, and within the universe itself matter became a 'locus' for evil (which again, it is hinted, was initiated from beyond the empirical realm). In accordance with this way of looking at things, the heavenly bodies appeared more aethereal and less heavy with the matter than human beings. The radiance of these bodies and the absence of precise scientific information about their composition contributed to this judgment. The result of all this is that for Plato the sun, moon, and stars possessed a 'divinity', even though this only a relative term (the whole cosmos was ultimately finite, existing through the goodness of the demiurge who had created it). The planets did not display quite the same regularity in their apparent movements and so seemed to display less rationality, that quality which increasingly contrasted in Plato's mind with what was gross or material. As for man, his soul is very much enclosed in matter.

One can see immediately that Origen's attitude to the place held

1. op.cit., p.148
after the pre-temporal fall by the sun, moon, and stars, may well reflect a Platonic background of thought. Whatever the explanation given by Origen, the question emerges whether in fact he is not reflecting attitudes which derive from Plato. Thus, his acceptance of the thought that motion reveals soul and that regular motion betrays rationality fit in with Platonic ideas. So too Plato's tendency, which seems to have developed with the progress of his thought, to transfer to the metaphysical realm the real beginnings both of good and evil in the cosmos and increasingly to see matter as the 'locus' of evil in the universe, which expressed itself, among other ways, in the ascription of superior souls to the heavenly bodies, may clearly have some bearing on Origen's thought, as expressed in the passage in De Principiis, I.VII.3.

It is possible that other concepts such as those associated with the Mandaean myth concerning the fall of souls from the light-source and their imprisonment in the body, have also had an influence on Origen's thought and that this is reflected in the passage in question in the De Principiis. According to this Gnostic myth, man's soul has been imprisoned in the body and will only finally be freed by the redeemer, Manu de Hayye, who—like Jesus Christ—was once on earth himself. The redeemer's knowledge and experience means that he can guide souls through the heavenly spheres. On such a view the area occupied by the 'fixed stars' represents the spheres to which the souls ascend as they are purified of the grosser material which keeps them earth-bound and attached to the body. De Principiis, II.VIII. is one passage which gives the impression that Origen regards souls as the result of a cooling from a fiery (and therefore more aethereal) substance. He notes the statement in Heb.1.7 (taken from Ps.104.4) that God makes His angels spirits and His ministers
a burning fire. He goes on to reason that if God and His angels and saints are 'fiery' in character, it follows that those who have fallen away from the love of God have cooled in their affection for God "ac frigidis effectis esse dicendi sunt." (para. 3). Later in the same paragraph Origen wonders whether in Greek the term, ψυκή is derived from the verb, ψύχεσθαι which means "to grow cold or cool." Origen says:

"requirendum est ne forte et nomen animae, quod Graece dicitur ψυκή a refrigescendo de statu divinior ac meliore dictum sit et translatum inde, quod ex calore illo naturali et divino refrigisses etideo in hoc quo nunc est et statu et vocabulo sita sit."  

The thought which is latent may be that the cooling is bound up with our materiality of nature and it may be in mind that, when this process is reversed, souls or that from which they have been formed will be elevated to the area where the fiery spirits dwell, i.e. in the heavenly spheres.

The point of the above discussion is that we have here a passage (De Principiis, I. VII. 3), which well illustrates that combination of Biblical and Hellenic motifs which seem to converge in his thinking. Not only so, but the passage is important in so far as it helps us to understand Origen's approach to what is bodily or material. This issue is important for Origen's eschatology, even if in an indirect fashion. What then, are we to say? Does this passage illustrate a Platonic outlook on the soul? or does it represent an outlook related to that inherent in the Mandaeasian myth? or does it in fact reflect a Biblical outlook in which heavenly bodies, men, and angels are all viewed as being at one in that they are the creatures of God's hand? This last was the view set forth for us by Murdoch Dahl as the 'Semitic totality concept'. The question concerning Mandean influence may be more questionable. What it seems especially

1. C. C. S. O. Y. V. p. 156, l. 25.
important to determine is what concept of 'soul' Origen is working with in this passage. It seems hard to deny that Origen thinks of that which shows movement as possessing soul. It seems not unlikely also that his respect for the souls that inhabit the sun, moon, and stars owes somewhat to the Platonic concept of the cosmic soul and his emphasis upon the stars as more aethereal and less material in character. These concepts are not Biblical. Taken by themselves they would seem to suggest the presence in Origen of an outlook which stressed what was 'spiritual' as over against what was 'material'. Their presence naturally seems to raise questions concerning Origen's concept of the role of matter and the body in future ages. Further the view (which is his own) that the giving of material bodies is the result of a pre-temporal Fall seems to emphasize the spiritual as over against the material. At the same time we should not miss in this passage the strong emphasis upon the commandments given by God to the sun, moon, and stars. Certainly their movements betray the presence of 'soul' in the Platonic (and modern) sense of the term, and their regularity of movements strongly suggests their rationality. Yet, while this is true, it remains a fact that it is Origen's Biblical understandings which seem to provide the framework of this passage. The dignity given to sun, moon, and stars emerges out of God's appointment. The ability to move and to act according to rational patterns is given by God with a view to the fulfilment of the tasks allotted. The point is that this outlook, assumed rather than expressed directly in the passage, links up with the 'Semitic totality concept' of which we have been thinking. According to that concept, if Dahl's view be sound, the term 'soul' can be predicated of anything. We would judge that Origen would not have so used the term, but his understanding seems to reflect an Hebraic realization
that what gives dignity to an entity is not its movement or rationality (although these accompany God's directive and are His gift), but the functions given to it.

It may be said, of course, that the Hellenic elements which do seem to be present in this passage are the ones which are significant for our present purposes, since it is they which seem to have most bearing on how Origen would view the body. It may be admitted that, if Platonic influences really are present in this passage, as seems not unlikely, these elements do tend towards a depreciation of the body and what is material. It is not at all clear, however, that the other more Biblical element, which we believe is present, is of no significance for Origen's estimate of the body. Surely such an outlook, as Dahl has described, if this is really implicit in Origen's thinking, does carry implications in this regard. This would mean that Origen recognized real differences between 'spiritual' and 'material' entities (this impressed on him by an Hellenic background of thought, probably chiefly Platonic), but that all reality is significant and meaningful in so far as it has been called into being by God and has been assigned roles and functions by Him, with the attendant characteristics to fulfill these roles. Such an outlook would not really depreciate matter or the body.

The safest conclusion seems to be that Origen's thinking was influenced by non-Biblical concepts, and it may be admitted that if these alone had influenced his thought, then in all probability a depreciation of the body and of the material order would have resulted. Since there was in fact, however, an intermingling of motifs, it is dangerous to ignore the Biblical aspects of his thought, with their consequences for Origen's view of the body and the material order. In view of the evidence earlier presented
regarding the Parousia of Christ and the relation of the Eternal Gospel to the real history of the Incarnation it would seem that what has happened in Origen’s mind is that Biblical and Hellenic motifs have modified one another. The result is that Origen believes in a genuinely historical future in which the body and the material order will find their place, but he so emphasizes the changed character of the body and of nature in that age that there may be the danger at times of failing to see that real continuity with the present bodily and material realities has to be preserved. Probably Origen would justify the emphasis upon the coming transformation with reference to the transformation evident in the life of the Risen Lord, but it is not unlikely that Hellenic motifs have had a subtle influence upon his readiness to use that argument. He would probably have refused to think of any severing of continuity with present bodily and material realities in future ages, as our earlier discussion has attempted to show and as our treatment of the ‘resurrection body’ will attempt to uphold, but it seems probable that Hellenism has influenced his thinking more than he himself realized.

The Resurrection Body

It is a great pity that only fragments of Origen’s work, De Resurrectione, have been preserved. This means that the only account that we have of his overall approach in this book comes to us from such critics of his position as Methodius of Olympus and Jerome. It may be questioned whether they were fair to him in their assessment of his position. Henry Chadwick is among those who judge that Origen, in his attitude to popular Christian eschatology of his day, accommodated himself to the weakness of some of the brethren. Thus, he attributes to Origen the view that,
if simple believers take the hope of the Second Coming of Christ in a literal and material sense, "it is better that they should believe the right thing in the wrong way than, that they not believe it at all, and it is the best of which they are capable." 1 Similarly, belief in everlasting fire is not accurate—the fire is intended to be remedial—but it is better for simple believers to think thus, if the fear thereby induced keeps them from sinning against God. 2 Again, the resurrection of the flesh is an article of the creed that some unreflecting Christians understand to mean the resuscitation of this physical body, with all its organs. This belief goes with the literal expectation of the reign of Christ for a thousand years at a renewed Jerusalem. Origen regarded as credible neither the millenarian hope of Christ's return to this earth nor the expectation of a literal resuscitation of this body. 3

Origen has an extended discussion of the resurrection and the nature of the resurrection body in Contra Celsum, Book V, chapter XVff. Origen says in chapter XXII:

"Μη υπονοείτω δε τις γείμας ἢ πι' ἐκείνων εἶναι τῶν λεγομένων μὲν Χριστιανῶν ἀθετούντων δὲ τὸ περὶ ἀναστάσεως. κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς δόγμα. " 4

Chadwick refers to these chapters in the Contra Celsum V in support of the statement made above regarding Origen's understanding of the meaning of the resurrection. We may note a statement from the beginning of V.XXIII which may be taken as summing up Origen's

1. op.cit., p. 77
2. op.cit., p. 78
3. op.cit., pp. 78-79
4. G.C.S., Or., II.p2311.9-II.
attitude, as expressed in these chapters:

"Arsis μὲν -- οὖν φιλοτικευτέον οὐμα μετάφρασθει εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχής φύσιν, ὥσ τού διαφθορήθημα κόκκον τοῦ σῖτου. Μετάφρασθει εἰς τὸν κόκκον τοῦ σῖτου λέγομεν γὰρ, ᾧπερ ἐπὶ τὸν κόκκον τοῦ σῖτου ἐγείρεται στάχυς οὕτως λόγος τις ἐγκείται τῷ σώματι, ἢ ὦ μὴ φθειρομεύον τῷ σώμα ἐν ἀθάνατοι."

Chadwick supports his comments regarding Origen's attitude to chiliasm or millenarianism by certain references. He sums up fairly the position by remarking: "Origen's attacks on chiliasm, though rare, are decisive."

We have already outlined an understanding of the essence of Origen's eschatology, including his view of the Resurrection. This is to the effect that there is to be a Second Advent, and a Resurrection at the end of this age, co-incident with and dependent upon, that Advent, but that it will be Christ in His Glory Who appears and that the bodies with which we will be raised will not be limited as are our present bodies. We have suggested that, for Origen, the concept of the resurrection combines an insistence on continuity with our present body with an emphasis upon the changed character of this body. What we must now do is to examine this contention further in the light of these comments, made by Henry Chadwick, and over against the background of the supposed criticism of Origen's views by Methodius of Olympus. For such a consideration does help to bring out more clearly Origen's distinctive approach. It also helps to bring out a further aspect of Origen's thinking with which

2. op. cit., p. 151,n.29. The references given regarding chiliasm are as follows: Comm. in Matt. XVII.35; de Oration. XXVII.13; Comm. in Cant. Cant. prol.(p.66 Basrens); frag. in Methodius, de creatie 12 (p.499 Bonwetsch); Origen, Hom. in Ps. XXXVI, 3.10 (XII.196f. Lommatsch).
we have not yet dealt—his attitude towards millenarianism.

Chadwick's combination of Origen's denial, as he sees it, of a 'resuscitation' of the body, and his rejection of millenarianism, is significant. For, if there is latent any misunderstanding of Origen's view of the resurrection, it is likely that it will pertain also to the understanding of his rejection of the millennium. As we have seen, Chadwick himself significantly notes that Origen seldom actually mentions chiliasm, as he terms it. It may seem that Origen's attitude towards millenarianism is a sideline, an interesting topic for a special memorandum, but nothing else. Chadwick however, rightly sees its significance—whether or not we accept his interpretation and estimate of meaning. He sees that a denial of mere resuscitation and of millenarianism go together. The remark that some Christians understand the doctrine of resurrection to mean "the resuscitation of this physical body, with all its organs", is highly significant. Actually, in Contra Celsum, V.XVff. which Chadwick cites in support of this statement, no reference is made to the organs which are presumably bound up with mere resuscitation. However, Chadwick sees that there is a connection with Origen's attitude towards the question of the millennium. Certain believers in the millennium laid stress on bodily pleasures that the resurrected would take delight in during this period. Clearly, any theology, such as that of Origen, which stressed rather the transformation of the body, would look askance at the idea that in the coming reign of Christ believers would pander to the physical appetites. It is hard here to see which comes first logically—a certain view of the nature of the resurrected body or an ethical recoil from indulgence, especially in sexual functions, which to many in the Early Church appear to have been only a temporal provision by God for the continuance of the
human race after the fall. It seems, therefore, that there is, indeed, as Chadwick implies, a connection between Origen's attitude towards the nature of the resurrection body and his attitude towards the question of a millennium. At the same time, such a finding helps us to see the perspective of Origen as he 'rejects' the millenarian concept. When we remember, however, that there were various kinds of millenarian teaching, as Jean Daniélou has most thoroughly documented, the question emerges whether in fact it was only millenarianism of a certain kind that Origen repudiated. Further, if Chadwick lays all the stress on the discontinuity of the resurrection body with our present frame, whereas Origen in fact, as we have argued earlier, wants to emphasize the unlimitedness of Christ's Risen Humanity and ours, then we have to ask whether in fact this does not support the notion that Chadwick and others may have misunderstood Origen's rejection of the millennial reign of Christ on earth. Is it possible that what Origen accepted was belief in a different kind of reign of Christ on earth?

There are a number of aspects in regard to this matter. We look first of all at Chadwick's understanding of Origen's view of the resurrection of the body. Chadwick is cautious in his assessment of Origen and faithfully records a certain variation and tentativeness in Origen's thinking. He by no means lays all the stress on the leaving behind of the body in a purely Hellenic way of thinking. He notes three possibilities on Origen's view of "the exact status of matter in the divine purpose":

"First, there is the view that matter is eternal and that it will suffer an eschatological transformation, in which case the resurrection body will be in form like our earthly body but glorified and radiant. Secondly, it is possible that discarnate spirits can exist without any bodies of any kind whatever, though they may need bodies for a time at a certain stage of their education on the way back to God. If so, the material
order will be brought into existence as required, which may be from time to time since progress upward may not be constant and there may be occasional set-backs and manifestations of recalcitrance to the divine will. Thirdly, there is the possibility that the visible and corruptible part of the world will be entirely destroyed, but the glorious spirits in the upper spheres of the cosmos may come to have yet more glorious forms than they already possess. Origen simply submits these three views to the reader's judgment. His own sympathy lies more perhaps with either the second or the third than the first.  

Chadwick notes it as an implication of the third view that "all created spirits are in some degree involved in corporeality." He notes the Neoplatonic conception of an 'astral body' as indicative of the kind of bodies possessed by angels, and expresses the judgment in agreement with C.C. Bigg whose name he does not mention that for Origen only the Trinity is intrinsically incorporeal: "if we speak of angels as 'incorporeal', we mean that they are relatively incorporeal in comparison with us."  

Again, Chadwick goes on to take note of the current dogma, accepted by Origen, that "in itself matter is without form or qualities, a common substratum, upon which various qualities may be imposed in accordance with the archetypal ideas." This gave Origen an "unanswerable argument" against Platonists who objected to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body: "why should not the Creator impose a fresh form on the same common matter, so preserving continuity with the personality in this life, while making its new form appropriate to its environment?"  

At the same time Chadwick judges that Origen's attitude towards matter is much less positive than Clement's. In support of this he adduces Origen's view that sun, moon, and stars are ensouled by fallen

1. op.cit., pp. 86-87. Chadwick notes, however, at page 152, n. 43, that at de Orat. 26.6 the first view does appear.
2. op.cit., p. 87.
3. op.cit., p. 87
4. op.cit., p. 88
5. op.cit., p. 88
6. op.cit., p. 88
spiritual beings. Though these may be splendid bodies, so far as we are concerned, they represent a degradation, so far as the spirits are concerned, since they are the result of the pre-temporal Fall. Here Chadwick again lays the emphasis on the contrast between the spiritual character of the beings who inhabit the stars and their present material condition. On the other hand, there appears to be evidence, as we submitted earlier, (above pages 685-698) that Origen combined with this recognition of giving to these spirits of a material structure as a disciplinary measure, an Hebraic emphasis upon the function of these spirits in their present embodied condition. It is all a matter of where one lays the emphasis.

What, then, may we say of Chadwick's understanding of Origen's view of the resurrected body? Chadwick justly takes note of the tentativeness of Origen's thinking, putting forward on different occasions, as it seems, at least three views regarding matter. The point that we have to note, however, is that, in all of this, Origen felt free to be undogmatic, since there was never any question in his mind about the fact of continuity between our present bodily frame and the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection. In Contra Celsum, V.XXII which is quoted by Chadwick, we find the background to Origen's humility and unwillingness to dogmatize. Origen's thinking is based on I Cor.15. Origen sees a considerable difference between a tree and the seed which produced it. Nevertheless, there is a presumption of continuity. How, thinks Origen, can we anticipate with certainty the form that our spiritual body will have? All three possibilities, mentioned by Chadwick, whereby Origen seems to have interpreted the resurrection body, are consistent with the kind of continuity which Paul envisages in I Cor.15 and which Origen takes over from him. Origen never doubts this basic fact
of continuity, but he likes to emphasize the glorious character of the resurrection body and so looks with distaste and disfavour on views which seem to think simply of the prolongation of our present earthly experience. It is true, of course, that the second view is not consistent with 1 Cor. 15, in so far as it envisages a possible fluctuation of state this reveals the influence of Origen's unhistorical speculations which emerge from his stress on free will.

It may be asked whether, in reality, all three views are consistent with continuity with our present earthly state; the first view clearly does envisage this, but we may question whether the other two views do this adequately. In our own earlier discussion, both of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen, (vide especially pages 568,580; 582; 647; 663-672) we have been at pains to insist that they thought of our life after the resurrection as based on union of divinity and humanity in the Risen Christ. This seemed to involve the retention of a body, however transformed. We may now ask how the second and third views of Origen, noted by Chadwick, can be reconciled with such an interpretation. The answer to this seems to be that Origen may have used his terminology in a somewhat varying manner. Thus, are we to think of the body at its fullest extension of powers in the experience after the resurrection as still 'body'? Origen's thought about eternity is essentially dynamic. He thinks characteristically of a growing into all the future purposes of God for us. Nevertheless, the question may be repeated: if the body is ever left behind, as in the second and third views, have we not broken the continuity without present being? Only if we say that man's personality is the essential part of him may we feel free to discard completely the body, it may be argued. Thus, it could be said that the second and third alternatives, noted on pp 702-703 above, clash
in fact with the idea of continuity and with the understanding of God's purposes for us, that we had worked out as inhering in Origen's thinking in our earlier discussion. What Origen fundamentally believes, however, is that God is ineffable, that He can never be reached by man, but that in Jesus Christ man has a shining destiny. This means that, whether we stay in the body or out of it in future ages (this is now possibilities, two and three, can even be envisaged), we remain, even through Christ's Risen Humanity, in a line of development from our present being. What Origen wants to be at is that it is not as if there were two realms—the intelligible and the sensible, that God is in the intelligible realm, and that it is our destiny in Christ to cross from the sensible to the intelligible side of the gulf. For Origen, both the realm of ideas, of angels, and of powers, on the one hand, and that of men, the sensible, on the other, belong together. How can Origen dogmatize what precisely is our destiny in future ages? But he is positive that, whether or not we become discarnate, we remain men, however glorified. It is because he is sure of this that he can toy with various possibilities about the possibility of the body's being put aside. On the third view, Origen sees some form of corporeality as pertaining to all beings apart from the Triune God. If this is not so clear on the second view, it remains true that for Origen God cannot be approached in terms of 'power' (vide page 689 above). Not even in Christ shall we ever equal God's ineffability. The first of the three views adduced by Chadwick, as found in Origen, seems to make most clear his fundamental understanding, but the other two views appear as tentative possibilities which Origen did not feel free competely to rule out, without appearing to know more than mortal man can claim properly to know. He is at least certain that what we are to become
is patterned on what Christ has become for us, as God and as Man. There is no question of the humanity of Jesus, or of ours, ever being set aside. It is when Origen, in this context, considers the difference between the seed and the tree, in terms of Paul's understanding, in I Cor.15, that he realizes how different we may become in the glorified state from what we now are. The question is whether we should apply the same term to the tree as to the seed. So we may ask whether the term 'body' remains appropriate for our future glorified condition, but Origen is certain that what we are to be is not a mere prolongation of the 'soul' or of the spiritual side of our earthly being: it is the glorification of the whole man as he now is, body and soul, which is already manifested in Jesus Christ.

It would seem that Chadwick is cautious in his assessment of Origen's view of the resurrection body and does not lay all the stress on one view ever against another. Nevertheless, he thinks of the second or third views, above mentioned, as being more characteristic. With this view we would wish respectfully to disagree. In so far as I Cor.15 is basic to Origen's thinking, as it seems to be throughout, we should judge that the first view, with its talk of the resurrection 'body', is primary. Nevertheless, we have to concede that Origen did lay heavy emphasis on the eschatological glory of the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection and that he considers the continuance of an interest in present bodily appetites as unthinkable.

**Attitude towards Millenarianism**

We turn now to Origen's view regarding the millennium, which we saw to have some connection with his estimate of the nature of the body of the resurrection. It is a striking fact that a view of a
millennium of some kind was in fact very strong in the Early Church. We have found the concept of a millennium in 'Barnabas', in Justin Martyr, in Irenaeus, and we will find it again in Hippolytus. Noteworthy is its representation in Methodius of Olympus in Asia Minor who is reputed to have attacked Origen's concept of the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection. Methodius' millenarianism in combination with this criticism, may well seem to act as a significant foil to the alleged combination in Origen of a rejection of the millenarian concept with a repudiation of any view of the resurrection of the body which sees it as a mere resuscitation of the physical body together with all its organs. We submit that it is at least salutary that, the Alexandrian Fathers were almost alone among the Fathers to the middle of the Third Century A.D., in putting to one side the millenarian concept. What makes it more significant in Clement of Alexandria and Origen is that, as we have seen, they appear to have had such a distinctly traditional theology of history. We noted above (pg. 652) how Origen accepted belief in a worsening of human behaviour and the presence of apostasy in the Church prior to the End of the Age. The passage quoted from the Eleventh Homily on 'Joshua', chapter III, seems to imply Origen's acceptance of belief in Antichrist in that he thinks of a final era of great wickedness, which is shortened for the sake of the elect (cf. Mk.13.20 and pars.). This was usually linked in the Early Church with the reign of Antichrist. We saw too, that both Clement and Origen accepted belief in the conversion of the Jewish people at the end (vide above, pages 607 and 652) All this, most of which we might not expect in these writers whom we have been accustomed to think of as having 'spiritualized' eschatology, makes it the more surprising that belief in a millennial reign of Christ
is not part of their outlook. This may be because, as some scholars think, the Alexandrian Church had been founded through the influence of Rome where millenarianism had no vogue and that in fact belief in a millennium was found only in certain areas, even though many early Church notables may have adopted the view. On the other hand, we now have to consider whether Origen's attitude towards the question of the millennium is not bound up with his attitude to the resurrection body, at which we have been looking. It may be, further, in Origen's case, that his attitude towards the millennium was bound up with his distinctive views regarding a pretemporal Fall, and God's purpose in Christ to bring us, at least to a more 'spiritual' body than we presently possess as a disciplinary measure imposed by God.

Chadwick, as we have seen, (vide above pp698-699) relates Origen's attitude to the resurrection body as no mere resuscitation of the physical body with his repudiation of any millenarian concept. We now have to examine this more closely, in the light of our discussion of Origen's attitude to the resurrection body. We also did ask earlier whether it was possible that Origen did in fact accept belief in a millennium, but in such a form that his acceptance of it was not apparent. Part of the difficulty in all of this is that it is not easy to define the essence of millenarianism. Is it necessary, for example, to take the 'thousand years' literally in order to be a millenarian? Can we define millenarianism simply as the view that Christ will one day establish his reign on earth, however transformed that earth will be? It seems doubtful whether this is justified, since we must surely think of millenarianism as having Revelation chapter 20 as its 'locus classicus' and chief source.

Is the concept of the millennial reign of Christ on earth simply
one form among others of asserting the truth of the Parousia of Christ? If it is, then the implication is that presumably it may be exchanged for other modes of presenting this truth. This approach has indeed its appeal. It disposes of a difficult strand of early Christian thinking. It views the idea of Christ's reign on earth as a vivid symbolic means of asserting the truth of the fact that in the future life, after the Second Advent, our humanity will not be left behind. So far this is doubtless Biblical enough, but it may be questioned whether it takes with sufficient seriousness, the necessity of the historical interruption of Christ's reign on earth which is certainly set out in Rev.20, is probably implied in I Cor.15, and which is assumed in most of the early Christian developments of the millenarian theme.

Where did the notion of such an interruption of the millennial reign come from? It appears to be bound up with the concept of a repetition in history of salient features of past historical event, within the divine economy: thus, in Daniel, the features of an Antiochus Epiphanes' reign seem to have been a preview of what is to happen at the end of the age in the reign of Antichrist. This is certainly how Hippolytus was to understand (vide Chapter VII, pp.774-779) the matter. Again, Paul assures us that what happened to Israel was for an example to us, who live in the end-time. The early Christians took this fact very seriously, and this is the basic theological source of their concern with typology. In like fashion, it would seem that the growing apostasy in the Church, the intensification of evil in the world and the final period of intense tribulation under Antichrist, was viewed as the projection into future history of the pattern of Christ's own struggle with Satan during His period on earth. The approach of Christ, both in the Incarnation and in the
Second Advent, provokes the reaction of Satan and his forces. Just as Antichrist attempts to stand in Christ's place, so it would seem that Satan's attempt to usurp authority at the end of the millennial reign is construed as his imitation of the Parousia itself. The period of the millennium itself would thus seem to be a kind of suppression of evil which parallels the period of Christ's hiddenness between the Two Advents. It is in some such way, surely, that the theology of history, which is embodied in the concept of the interruption of the millennium, must be understood.

It has been necessary to review all of this, so that we may be in a satisfactory position to assess Origen's view of the millennial reign of Christ on earth, and the relationship between his understanding and judgment of it, on the one hand, and his view of the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection, on the other. It requires to be said immediately in this connection that Origen does seem firmly to reject the notion of a millennium, if it is to be understood as we have suggested above that it should. He did not accept the belief in a millennium, if this entails acceptance of a reign of Christ on earth in the future which is to be terminated by the attempt to usurp power by Satan and his followers. If, however, we understand the term 'millennium' more loosely of the concept of Christ's future reign on earth, without any reference to its interruption or termination, it may be less easy to give a definitive answer. Much depends at this point on how we understand Origen's view of the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection. For Chadwick is surely right in seeing a close relationship between one's view of the resurrection body and the question of a millennial reign of Christ, thus loosely defined. It does at least seem clear that, as Chadwick says, Origen repudiates any view of a reign of Christ on earth which suggests the
continuance in believers in that age of functions and pleasures associated with this present age. In fact, it would seem that Origen's few references to the millenarian concept are provoked by his opposition to such a view of the resurrection body. It may be questioned whether Origen is really interested at all in the question of a millennium, however conceived, apart from this.

One has to ask, however, why Origen was uninterested in the question of the millennium. Was it because any reign of Christ on earth was totally unthinkable to him? Or, was it that he assumed that Christ would reign on earth, and only felt it necessary to deal with the matter, where this assumption was in danger of being made foolish or improper through the suggestion of indulgence in pleasures within it that are appropriate only to this age? If it is true, as we have argued above, that Origen everywhere assumed the essential continuity of our future state with our present state, the truth of our continuing humanity based on the perfect humanity of Jesus Christ, and that his most characteristic mode of expressing this was in terms of the 'spiritual body', which implies a glorification of our present body rather than a shedding of the body and the progress towards a discarnate state—if all this be sound, then it seems more than likely that Origen accepted belief in a reign of Christ on earth. For the glorification of our bodies at the resurrection does not happen in isolation from the transformation of the whole world.

Why, then, may we ask, does Origen not talk with sympathy of the millennial reign of Christ on earth and simply explain how he understands that reign? The answer to this may well be that Origen's view is complicated by his conception of the pretemporal Fall and above all by the notion that our future redemption may be compromised again and again by our recalcitrance. So far as the
pretemporal Fall is concerned, we have seen that this resulted in the
embodying of spiritual beings in matter as we know it. This might
seem to suggest that redemption means our deliverance from matter.
As we have already argued, however, in dealing with Clement of
Alexandria and again with reference to Origen himself, the Risen
Humanity of Christ means for them not the setting aside of human
flesh but its glorification, and this glorification is to be
transferred to believers at the resurrection at the Parousia of
Christ. Further, where Origen is concerned, we argued that it is
doubtful whether he ever views any being other than the Triune God
as capable of existing without a 'shroud'. Hence, for Origen
belief in the result of a pretemporal Fall does not by itself make
belief in a reign of Christ on earth difficult. It simply would
mean that after the Parousia our spiritual beings, which have always
had some kind of body, would transcend the limitation of the body
as we know it, which was imposed as a result of the pretemporal
Fall. Where the difficulty does come in is where the idea of
indefiniteness of human repentance enters Origen's view. It is
clear that, if on account of his emphasis upon human freewill Origen
has no certainty that future bliss will be continuous and that sin
will for ever be put behind men, it is almost inevitable that any
schematisation of future history which thinks in terms of an ultimate
irreversible defeat of evil can find no place. Quite apart from the
fact that the millennium is closed by such a final defeat of evil
according to Rev.20:7ff., Origen's view of the possibility of
fluctuation in state of moral earnestness and obedience to God's will,
would have made it difficult for him to accept the view of a long
period in which obedience to God and conditions of bliss would
prevail. In addition to this, even the concept of a suppression of
evil during the millennial period would have been difficult to fit in
with Origen's heavy emphasis upon free will and God's unwillingness

to coerce human obedience. It would seem likely that, although Clement

of Alexandria's eschatology is more traditional in character, his
distaste for millenarianism, expressed by his general silence on the
matter, emerged from the emphasis of certain thinkers, such as Cerinthus,
on bodily pleasures during the millennium. One may hazard the opinion
that in Origen this was probably a 'non-theological' factor in his
distaste also for the concept. Both Clement and he saw chaste

behaviour, scorn for earthly possessions, and a due disciplining of
the body, as the hallmark of truly Gnostic behaviour, that which
brought into the present the conditions that would obtain when the

Kingdom of God was established. The way in which millenarianism

leant itself to a stress, as they supposed, on bodily pleasures,
was almost certainly one of the major factors for their putting aside

of the idea, at least in its usual forms. Nevertheless, so far as

(when millenarianism is defined in the strict manner that we set out above, as)

Origen is concerned, we must reiterate that only based on Rev.20,

must we say that Origen definitely repudiated it. He may well have

believed in the reign of Christ on earth, though the earth in view

would be one greatly transformed in a manner analogous to the

transformation of the human body.

It may be, of course, that Origen was motivated in his attitude

towards millenarianism not simply by distaste for an emphasis on bodily
pleasures, nor even by considerations bound up with his views regarding
the likelihood of a fluctuation in the state of moral earnestness of
free spirits in future ages, with all that this would entail for
their possible repeated incarceration in flesh. It may be judged
that Origen was one of the first to see something which not all
earlier Fathers of the Church had understood, namely, that the
passage in Revelation 20 must be understood simply as an apocalyptic symbol and not as giving details concerning the future which can, so to speak, be plotted in advance in an historiographical manner. If this be the situation, then Origen would not think it necessary to do any more than see in the concept a symbol. This would, perhaps in conjunction with the other two factors already mentioned, explain his attitude towards millenarianism. It is interesting, however, that if Origen did understand in this way, he does not find it necessary to explain this. This, however, seems surprising in view of the general strength of the millenarian tradition in the Early Church up to his day. It may be, of course, that, although such writers as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus bear witness to the strength of the tradition, which understood the concept in a literalist fashion, the concept only had strength in certain restricted areas and that Alexandria was not one of them. It certainly is true that both Clement and Origen lay stress on the transformed character of the life of the ages to come. This may suggest a tacit understanding on their part that such features of the millenarian symbol as its limitation with reference to time (one thousand years) and the interruption of the reign of righteousness by a fresh outbreak of evil (at the end of the thousand years) are to be explained in general terms. Origen's overall view does indeed, as we have urged, take cognizance of a future Kingdom of God, possibly thought of in terms of a transformed earth in conjunction with the concept of a transformed 'resurrection body' and does think of the possibility, not to say, likelihood, of future outbreaks of evil.

If Origen does view the concept of a millennium in the way set out in the last paragraph, then his attitude in this regard may serve to highlight the seriousness with which he took the concept of the
Parousia of Christ. It may be that he was unwilling to believe that the finality of Christ's work which is to be manifested at the Parousia could be qualified by the retention of conditions appropriate to the present age. It is indeed one of the problems of the millenarian concept, when understood in the literalist fashion, that it does not explain how this can be. At the same time, it is curious that Origen is able to qualify the unveiling of the finality of Christ's achievement at the Parousia, at least in his more speculative passages in the De Principiis, by allowing of future falls from grace with a consequent reversion to corporeality for those involved.

Probably we do not have sufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion regarding either Origen's precise attitude towards millenarianism or the factors motivating his attitude. It does seem clear, however, that he does not accept the concept in the strict, literalist sense, and it does seem congruous with his attitude to the transformed character of the resurrection body that he should think in this way.

**METHODIUS OF OLYMPUS AND DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA**

We look at the thinking of Methodius of Olympus, who is reputed to have criticized Origen's views of the resurrection body, since, as we saw above, we find in him significantly the very combination of millenarianism with a stress upon the continuity of the resurrection body with our present frame, which contrasts with the supposed absence of both these features in Origen. Our concern here is to bring out, through this brief survey, the character of Origen's own thinking and to reinforce what has been already said. Methodius of Olympus is important in his own right, but it is as a foil to Origenism, if not to Origen himself, that he has achieved note historically.

Methodius of Olympus wrote his books towards the end of the third
century A.D. He was one of the first to criticize Origen, it is said, in any manner which called serious attention to the theological thinkers. It must be said that it may have been Origenism, rather than Origen's own views, that Methodius criticized, and it should also be noted that, even in this regard, it is chiefly an interpretation of Methodius which views his as critical of 'Origen'. Doubtless, there is a tradition which has reported Methodius' criticism of Origen from very early period after his decease. Nevertheless, one searches in vain for unambiguous criticism of Origen, at least by name, in the extant records of Methodius' own works. It is in Methodius, as reported by Photius in the ninth century, that criticism of Origen, and especially of Origen's view of the resurrection body, is found. It is true that it is commonly said in modern textbooks that Methodius was the first major critic of Origen's eschatology, but this seems to be in some measure, an interpretation, rather than a statement of fact. Rasing their judgment upon the criticism of Origen, as reported by Photius, (which may or may not be accurate), and upon their own understanding of Origen's eschatology and what seems to them the opposing drift of Methodius' thinking, as seen in the fragments of his work; 'On the Resurrection', and in 'The Banquet of The Ten Virgins' and elsewhere, they discover an absolute conflict between Origen and Methodius.

The question arises whether scholarship has misinterpreted the evidence. What we are at pains to point out is that the evidence for a direct conflict between Methodius' views and those of Origen is all second-hand, somewhat late, and probably influenced by an interpretation of Origen, which may be disputed. Thus, Methodius is cast in the form of the critic of Origen's 'spiritual body' of the resurrection.
However, we have already seen reason to suggest that Origen's view of what is meant by the 'spiritual body' may be variously interpreted, and also that it is not even certain that Origen himself had a constant view of what was meant by this phrase, which he took over from St. Paul. In particular, we have suggested, in the foregoing account of Origen, that Origen thought essentially of the 'spiritual body' as continuous with our present body, and as requiring to be understood in the light of the Risen Humanity of Jesus Christ. If, however, interpretations of Origen vary, we have to ask whether that one which Methodius is supposed to attack, was in fact Origen's view. We must also ask, if we decide it is not, whether we should assume that Methodius misinterpreted Origen in the way that so many critics of Origen down the centuries have, on this, done. And, if our own interpretation of Origen be sound, it is clear that the view of Origen's concept of the resurrection body, which Methodius has been supposed to attack, was not in fact held by him. It is indeed true that Origen did not think of the resurrection body as one in which present bodily functions of sex would be continued, to take one example. However, this view was shared by Methodius of Olympus, and he thinks that this is true of the millennial reign as well as of the period after the end of the millennium. We know that some advocates of the millennium, on the other hand, believed in the increased productivity of the human species during the millennium. The main point here is that it is not at all clear that Methodius and Origen did in fact hold opposing views of the nature of the resurrection body. What is certain, however, is that we find in Methodius that unambiguous adherence to millenarianism, in the strict sense, which appears to be lacking in Origen. This is all the more interesting, in view of the fact that Methodius appears to share Origen's stress upon
human freewill—a fact which is consistent with Jerome's record that at first Methodius was a great admirer of Origen and only subsequently became a critic. If he really did become Origen's critic, it would appear that he was still quite heavily influenced by a stress on freewill which we find, in slightly varying forms, in Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Methodius himself. Many scholars have also noted the fact that Methodius adopts an allegorising interpretation of the Scriptures, in Origenist fashion, even where his interpretation by allegory differs from that of Origen or Origen's followers.

Methodius of Olympus is a fascinating thinker and he is important for our understanding both of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen. Perhaps the most notable feature of his work is his explicit formulation of that eschatologically oriented view of Christian perfection, which we have suggested is fundamental both to Clement and Origen. The 'Symposium' or 'Banquet of the Ten Virgins' extols the blessedness of 'virginity'. (ἡ ἕγυνεία) It does this in a balanced fashion, and we find it hard on occasions to define precisely what is meant by 'virginity' or 'chastity'. The overall impression is that what matters is not whether one is married or single, but that self-control should be exercised in sexual relationships. It is not only matters of sex which are in view when 'chastity' is considered, but the main emphasis does fall on the control of sexual functions, since they best epitomise the unruliness of bodily passions. However, anger, gluttony, and other appetites which exhibit themselves in bodily

1. De Viribus Illustriis, LXXIII.
2. We note, as one example, comments made by Edgar J. Goodspeed in his book 'A History of Early Christian Literature' (1942) rev. and enlarged by Robert M. Grant 1966. The Univ. of Chicago Press, p. 158.
action of an uncontrolled character, or are susceptible to such lack of self-control, are also in view. It is most interesting, however, that, in regard to sexual functions, Methodius clearly sees the life of virginity as that which most nearly anticipates the life of the world to come. This is, however, precisely the understanding that we have already suggested, is integral to the thinking both of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen in regard to Christian Gnosticism. Methodius does not use the latter term, but there is a marked congruity of conception between Methodius, on the one side, and the two great Alexandrian thinkers, on the other.

Methodius shows the eschatological orientation of his praise of virginity throughout the 'Symposium'. Even though Methodius may have copied the form of Plato's Symposium, the theological pattern for the work is found in Jesus' Parable of the Ten Virgins, five of whom were wise and five were foolish (Matt.25:1-13). This fact alone makes clear the basic eschatological orientation of the whole work. Various individual emphases and passages may be adduced to reinforce the point. One such factor is the assumption throughout of a close connection between 'sensuality' (ἡ δυσπάθεια) and 'corruptibility' (ἡ στηθείων).

Thus, Marcella, the First Virgin, uses the Platonic imagery of the chariot of the soul seeking out its heavenly goal with reference to chastity. She says: "Δεῦτα — ἐρωμένων καὶ γενναίων φύσεων λήτινες ἀθρόως τὸ δέωμα μεταχειρίσασας τῆς ἡσυχασθείας ζῶν μετέχον ἀπευθύνοντο τῷ ὑκμῷ τῆς ψυχῆς, μή ἀπολήγοντο τοῦ οἰκοποίου ἐστὶν ὑπερτερήσομεν κούφως τοῦ κόσμου ἀξιότατον δικαιότατον πάθει καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ οὐρανίᾳ ἀληθῶς ἁφίδα σταθεία, αὕτην εἰλικρινῶς γείσωσε τῇ ἁθανασίᾳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμαίνων τοῦ παυσεπράποτος ἀναγκάζομεν κόλπων." (XI)
Platonic language and imagery should not obscure for us the Biblical background of Methodius’ thinking in Marcella’s speech. The context and tone of the whole work make it clear that immortality is not to be thought of simply in terms of life after death (though it may encompass that) but as a reference to the whole future world. Further a reference to Leviticus 2:13 makes it evident that Marcella thinks of defilement through sexual expression in terms of the Levitical concept of ‘ritual defilement’ rather than in any purely moralist manner derived from Hellenic sources. Marcella goes on to say that the virgin should avoid “

"τοὺς ἸΧώρας — τῆς ἡσυχασείας μὴ παρ᾽ ἔνα θεόν ἱσχύειν σπείρων γεννήσων τὸν οὐρανόν τῆς ἀκολουθίας." (xiv. 3)

What is hinted at here is a close connection between moral instability and death. At the back of this lies the characteristically Greek Christian concern with incorruptibility that we have had occasion to note on numerous occasions, and probably the view that sexual functions, if not sinful in themselves, are tolerated only as a result of the changed conditions produced by the Fall.

We proceed to note one or two passages which make explicit the eschatological orientation of Methodius’ thinking in the ‘Symposium’. Thus, Marcella speaks of Christ as the Archvirgin (XXIII.XXV-XXVIII). Man has passed through various dispensations with reference to virginity—the toleration of brother-sister marriages for the purpose of populating the world, polygamy, monogamy, moderation within

Christian marriage, and finally, as a crown, celibacy (XVI-XXVII).
In this way, celibacy or 'virginity' is seen as a form of 'realized eschatology', for it is clear that celibacy belongs to the future world rather than marriage. A whole theology of history is here imbedded in Marcella's speech. Perhaps, however, the most signal evidence of eschatological orientation, certainly in Marcella's speech, is her treatment of the one hundred and forty-four thousand of John's prophetic vision in the 'Revelation' (14:1-4) as those who were virgins. The reference to these as "those who were not defiled with women" (οὶ μετὰ γυναικῶν οὐκ ἐμολύνθησαν. xxvi) is here taken quite literally. Previous references to those who practised 'moderation' in marriage show that actual celibacy is in view, as Marcella sets the matter out. The 144,000 are distinctly set over against the other saints. They stand in a relationship of special favour to God, and this will be made evident at the end of the age. (XXVI-XXVIII).

The speech of Thecla, the Eighth Virgin, is especially involved, but is important both for Methodius' insistence on virginity and his eschatology. In particular, Thecla essays an explanation and interpretation of the Vision of the Woman in Heaven who is assailed by the Red Dragon. (Rev.12:1-6) (CLXXIXff.). Basically what Thecla says is that the 'male child' whom the Woman brings forth (Rev.12:5) is not Christ but the result of a miraculous conception. The Holy Spirit overshadows the Woman, who is the Church, and she produces offspring, who are patterned in Christ's image. Clearly, at the back of this lies the concept of Christ's Virgin Birth through the overshadowing of the Most High. Implicit in this is an attitude of profound respect for Mary as a Virgin. The fact that Mary later had
children by natural means is secondary. What we find here is a
deep respect for the state of virginity, and in this passage the
view that the 'conception' in which believers should interest
themselves is that 'spiritual' conception which takes place through
the ministrations of the Church under the power of the Holy Spirit.
Thecla does not think that the Church consists solely of virgins,
but clearly virginity and spiritual conception belong to the very
being of the Church. It is such a community that the Dragon will
be unable to overthrow. (vide especially CXCII-CCIII).

It is interesting that Thecla interprets the twelve hundred and
sixty days of the Woman's preservation in the wilderness in terms of
the Church's continuance and divine protection in the present age.
She does not go on to speak of what is to happen at the end of this
time, but it is clear that Thecla saw the Church as a community whose
being and mode of life is not only sustained by the Spirit of God but
as one which has been given a particular historical setting in the
divine providence.

However, it has been reserved for Tusiane, in Methodius' plan,
to say what is probably the most significant word in regard to
eschatology. The Ninth Virgin refers to Lev.23:39-43, which
incorporates the regulations for the celebration of the Feast of
Tabernacles during the month Tishri. (CCXXXIV-CCXXXV) Tusiane accuses
the Jews of failing to see the true significance of the Feast and its
provisions. She goes on: "Τὸς αὐτής ταῦτα καὶ σκηνώματος,
pροέβαλλον τὴν ἄνοστασιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ παππούδας
εϊς γῆν ἡμῶν σκηνῶματος, δ' τῇ ἐβδόμῃ χιλιοντετετραδί
παίνει ἄθλητον ἀπειληφότες ἐξόρισμον τὴν μεγάλην ἔορτὴν
τῆς ἀληθινῆς σκηνοπηγίας ἐν τῇ καινῇ καὶ ἀλώτῳ κτίσει,

...
What is here set forth is in part that tradition of millenarian interpretation, which links it to the thought of the 'cosmic week' of seven days: in Origin this is an interpretation of the Hexaemeron of Genesis, together with an understanding of the Sabbath Rest that followed the Six Days of Creation—it sees the Genesis account as predictive of world history. We find this way of thinking in the 'epistle of Barnabas', and Danielou notes the emphasis both in 'Barnabas' and Methodius on the element of rest as attaching to the millennial reign of Christ on earth. He thinks that it is the note of 'rest' which is stressed in this tradition as over against certain other millenarian concepts, and connects with this the assumption of the cessation of procreation during the millennium both in 'Barnabas' and in Methodius. The passage, above quoted, certainly makes clear a linkage between the cessation of human sexual functions and the theme of God's Sabbath Rest.

It was part of the ritual of the Feast of Tabernacles, as set out in Leviticus, that on the first day of the feast the celebrants should take to themselves "καρπὸν εὐλογημένον καὶ καλλυνταὶ φοινίκας καὶ κλάδους εὐλογημένους καὶ ίτέκς καὶ ἄγνων κλάδους ἐκ χειμάρρου, εὐφρανθῆναι ἐναντίον κυρίου τοῦ Θεοῦ ὕμων ἐπὶ ἡμέρας τοῦ ἐνίαυτοῦ." (CCXXXIV-

This is Methodius' rendering of Leviticus passage following the

Septuagint as over against the Masoretic text in v.40 in the
(γ Ζυνος)
reference to 'chaste-trees'. It was with such branches and leaves that
they built their arbours. What lay behind this, historically, was the
adoption of a harvest festival (of the vintage) in the autumn to a
theological signification. Originally a harvest festival, taken over
in all probability from the Canaanite, it was made to denote the
temporary structures of the Israelites' wilderness wanderings between
Egypt and the Promised Land. Daniélou has ably shown that, at least
from post-exilic times, the Jews invested the Feast of Tabernacles
with an eschatological significance: "...past events in Israel's history
especially the Exodus, were recalled in order to keep up the people's
hope in future events in which Yahweh's power would be manifested in
favour of his own still more strikingly: the events of the Exodus
became the figures of eschatological realities. This was the beginning
of typology. It is true of the Passover and the going out from
Egypt--they were seen as the figure of the eschatological deliverance
of God's people--but it is eminently true of the Feast of Tabernacles,
which more than any other festival took on eschatological significance.
Perhaps one reason for this may be found in the fact that, as Philo
points out, the feast of Tabernacles marks the end

\text{TELE\i\os}

of the year's agrarian cycle."¹ It is shown that a close connection
developed between the Feast of Tabernacles and messianic expectancy:
Zech.14 by its imagery documents this connection. "The messianic

Trans. by Donald Attwater from the French, 'Les Symboles
crédients primitifs (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1961);
chapter I, 'The Palm and the Crown', pp.2-3. The reference in
the quotation to Philo recalls a passage in the latter's

\text{Spec. Leg.} (Particular Laws), II, 204. Daniélou also remarks in
a footnote on the same page that Theodoret, at \text{Quest. Ex.}
(Questions on Exodus), 54, calls the Feast of Tabernacles
the feast of consumption (σον \text{TELE\i\a}) at the year's end.
interpretation of the feast in Judaism was continued into the early Christian centuries. Jerome, commenting on Zech.14:16, says that the Jews "through a fallacious hope" saw in this feast "a figure of things to come at the millennium."

J. Daniélou comments that "the festivities of Tabernacles, when each man ate and drank with his family in his arbour decked with greenery, appeared to the Jews as a prefiguring of material pleasures in the messianic kingdom."

Referring to Judaistic reinterpretation of the Feast Daniélou says that the rustic background of the Feast "recalls the original Garden of Eden. Its observances herald the material abundance of the messianic kingdom. Jerusalem restored is Paradise regained. The living water (here there is an allusion to Zech.14:8) is the river of Paradise flowing in four directions. The 'athrog' (a citron) carried in procession is a symbol of the fruit of the free of life-(Jerome, loc.cit.,1537A)"d

It is this milieu of thought which is reflected in Methodius' understanding in the speech of Tusiane. Methodius characteristically adds to this development the significance of the 'chaste-tree' (ἡ γυναικί) which he sees as signifying 'chastity' (ἡ γυναικά) This is almost certainly no accidental reference here. It is not simply that Methodius wishes to introduce his usual emphasis on chastity, which is after all the chief subject under discussion in the 'Symposium'. Rather is it that Methodius wishes to adopt the Jewish traditional interpretation of the Feast as a prefiguring of the

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1. op.cit., p.4.
3. op.cit.,pp.4-5.
4. op.cit., p.5.
messianic kingdom, but to reject that characteristically Jewish concern with purely externalistic or material features. Methodius' insistence upon 'chastity' in this connection is thus a distinctively Christian reinterpretation of the symbolism of the Feast of Tabernacles. The significance of the so-called 'chaste-tree' derives from the fact that "it was long thought to have anti-aphrodisiac qualities if carried on the person."¹

Tusiane considerably develops the parallelism between the Feast of Tabernacles and the millennium in her speech. Two further passages may be noted:-

"Τὸτε γὰρ ᾧ ὁ θηγενεὺς Πήγνυνται πόντον ἡμῶν, ὥσπερ τῶν ὀστῶν συγκολλωμένων καὶ συμπηγωμένων ταῖς συρξῖν ἀνίσταται σῶμα.
Τὸτε τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς ἱερᾶς ἔορταξομεν κυρίως εἰλικρινῶς, ὥσπερ τὰς θηγενᾶς ἐρωτόσωμεν ἀποληψάμεθα οὐκετί Θεοβομένας ἦ λαυθρομένας εἰς γῆν Χαματος."² (ccxlii - ccxlii)

"Οδεύουσα γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἔξελθονσα καλῶ τῆς Ἁγίουτον τοῦτου τοῦ βίου ἔρχομαι πρῶτον εἰς τὴν ἀναστάσιν, τὴν ἀληθινὴν σκηνοπηγὴν, κακῶ τοῖς καρποῖς τῆς ἔορτῆς πῆλου τῆς σκηνῆς μου κεκαμφημένης τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς ἔορτῆς ἀναστάσεως ἡμέρᾳ τῇ κρίσει, σονορτάξῳ τῷ Χριστῷ τῆς Χιλιουτατηρίδα τῆς ἀναστάσεως, τα ἐπὶ καλουμένας ἡμέρας, τὰ σόββατα τὰ ἀληθινά. Ἑτὶς αὕτης ἐπομένη τῷ διελθήσθη «τοὺς οὐρανοὺς» Ἰησοῦ ἔρχομαι πάλιν καθάπερ κάκηνοι μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τῆς σκηνοπηγῆς εἰς τὴν γῆν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, ἐνσκιώας μὴ ἀπομείνας. Τοῦτο τοῦτο οὐρανώματος μου

In the comments, following on the first passage quoted above, Tusiane shows Methodius' conviction that physical death is the result of the Fall. "For our tabernacle had in other days been firmly made: but it was shaken through transgression and was bent." Ἡν γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ πρόσθεν ἀπετόντος ἡ σκηνή ἐλλά ὑπὰ τὴν παράβασιν ἐσαλέβη καὶ ἐκλίθη.—

Clearly for such a view the resurrection is the very antithesis of that "shaking" which resulted from the Fall. Further Tusiane assures us that the reason why death followed man's sin was "lest man become a sinner for all eternity": (Ὕν μὴ ἐκατέρως ἀμαρτωλὸς ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἡν—) death was a merciful and restraining providence of God whereby that sin, which was the cause of man's downfall, was 'revented from reaching its full effect. This is important because it helps us to realize how sensitively Methodius interprets the doctrine of the resurrection. This is no mere concern with the material order, no interest in incorruptibility dictated by a Hellenic concern about death: it sees man, in Biblical fashion, as a unity of body and soul, regards death as their un-natural sundering made necessary by the Fall, and consequently views the resurrection at Christ's Parousia as the eloquent expression of a fact that in Christ God has adequately dealt with the sin of the human race.

It is in the second passage quoted above from Tusiane's speech that we most fully discover Methodius' understanding of resurrection, millennium, and the future world. The Feast of Tabernacles points to the millennial reign of Christ on earth, but the interim character

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of that phase of the Israelite experience in past history, which it celebrated, points to the interim character of the millennium. It may be noted that Methodius says nothing about any outbreak of evil at the end of the millennium and preceding the commencement of what we may call 'eternity'. Nevertheless, he has in mind a true millenarianism, in that he does think of the future millennium as a definitely limited period of time. It may well be, in addition to this, that he does assume that the millennium will be brought to a close by a fresh rebellion of evil, for Rev.20, which is the 'locus classicus' of the doctrine of the millennium taught this, and the parallelism that Methodius makes with Israel's wilderness experience in the aftermath of the Exodus and prior to the crossing of the Jordan, is suggestive of the final campaign of victory over the enemies of God's people under Joshua, the Jesus of the Old Testament. It is true, however, to say that, while this may be implicit in Methodius' thinking, his emphasis is placed rather on the progressive aspects of the parallel with Israel's progress from Egypt to Canaan. Moreover, there is implicit here not only a parallelism with Israel's past experiences under Joshua but with that of her new Joshua, Jesus Christ, who has passed into the heavens. The thought here seems to be that Christ has already reached the Heavenly Promised Land, and that this fact guarantees our final reaching there also. It could be argued that, in so far as Methodius looks for an eventual removal from this world to "the very house of God above the heavens" there is even in him some measure of depreciation of the body. It may be appropriate to quote this section:

"Ενθα λοιπον ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ τῆς σκηνῆς αἰ παρθένοι τοποῦ μετὰ τὸ συμπερασθῆναι τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς ἀναστάσεως εἰς τῇ μείζῳ καὶ κρείσσω διερχόμεθα εἰς
As we suggested, however, in the case of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, it seems more likely that Methodius' thought is that Christ's Risen Humanity, which expresses the eternal unity of God and Man, promises for us a future in which both our continuing humanity and our union with God through Christ, must be expressed: in Methodius' case this is achieved by the representation, first of a future life on earth with Christ, and then of a translation into the heavens.

This may well be more than a convenient method of depicting the two aspects of our future destiny. The determination to express these aspects by periodizing them in this successive manner, first the millennium, then life with God in heaven for eternity, probably stems from a conviction that the Church must be patterned in her destiny on the experience of her Lord. Before Christ entered the heavens, he displayed his glory on earth for forty days, and so the Church is thought of as repeating her Lord's experience of glorification on earth first and of entering the heavenly realm thereafter.

It is true, of course, that Clement and Origen put to one side millennial speculation, but they did, as we submitted earlier, take seriously the bodily character of the life of the resurrection and they did consider that the fulness of the future glory would consist in our being moulded on the pattern of Christ's glory with the Father in heaven itself. It may be that, since Clement and Origen were wary of much thought concerning the millennium, they did not stress this note of successiveness in quite the way that Methodius does, but it remains true that they did think apparently of a progression in the future life in the direction of the glory of...
heaven. It was because of this very fact that so many scholars down
the centuries have accused these thinkers of 'spiritualising' the body.
If our own understanding was sound, it will be remembered that we
plead that they did take seriously the fact of continuity with our
present humanity, and this can only be intelligible when it means th t
for them the resurrection will restore our present full humanity,
though future ages will add to our glory through our growing more
fully into the destiny that God has prepared for His people in
Christ. Thus, whether or not Clement and Origen think in terms of a
'millennium', they did think in terms of a developing experience of
glorification in the future life after the Parousia of Christ. In
reality there may be less between the thinking of Clement and Origen,
on the one hand, and Methodius of Olympus on the other, at this point
than has been imagined.

We must now ask what conclusions we have arrived at, in regard
to the supposedly conflicting views of Origen and Methodius with
reference, first to the 'spiritual body' of the resurrection and,
secondly, to the concept of the millennium. Especially important
is our assessment of any logical connection, for the development of
their doctrine, between the views of each on the resurrection body
and those of each on the millennium. Briefly, we may say that the
picture broadly given by scholarship on these matters is not easy
to substantiate. Origen has been portrayed as 'spiritualising'
the resurrection body, while Methodius has been viewed as holding
to the materiality of this resurrection body. It seemed to follow
that Origen naturally would not believe in such a crassly material-
istic view of the future life as to think in terms of a millennial
reign of Christ on earth. On the other hand, one could understand
a Methodius' acceptance of millenarian teaching, when he stressed
the material structure of the resurrection body. This scheme, however seems unconvincing for a number of reasons. First, Origen as it has been claimed above, did not have such a 'spiritualising' view of the resurrection body, as has been commonly held, and, second Origen's reasons for dispensing with a 'millennium', in the strict sense may well be derived from his peculiar views about future redemption rather than from any other source. It seems clear, therefore, that it is wrong to assert that Origen and Methodius' somewhat differing views regarding millenarianism should be viewed as stemming from differing views of the resurrection body. It is not, in fact, evident that their views of the resurrection body do differ. Origen does not distinguish clearly between a reign of Christ on earth and 'eternity', but he does think of the whole future age as one in which it is inappropriate to think of the continuance, for example, of sexual functions. In this latter respect Origen and Methodius are at one, and are in fact in agreement precisely because of a similar view of the nature of the resurrection body.

**DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA**

One further piece of evidence regarding Origen and his attitude to millenarianism may be briefly noted. This comes to us through the work of another Alexandrian, Bishop Dionysius. This man was from 231-247 A.D., leader of the famous School over which Origen had presided in Alexandria and thereafter he was Bishop of that city from 247-265. Dionysius wrote a book entitled, 'On the Promises', of which some extracts have been preserved for us by Eusebius. This work was in response to an earlier book by Nepos, who had been bishop of Arsenoe, in Egypt. Nepos' work was entitled, 'Refutation of Allegorists'. C.4, Feltoe makes some remarks which are important for our present purpose:-
"This ('On the Promises') was a direct reply to the 'Refutation of Allegorists' ('Ἐλεγχος Ἀλληγοριστῶν') in which Nepos of Aresnoe had thought to support his grossly materialistic views of the millennium by the Revelation of S. John the Divine. As the title suggests, this work had, no doubt, attacked Origen's fondness for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, and especially on the subject of the millennium, and therefore we may with some amount of certainty infer that Dionysius in his refutation of Nepos would accept Origen's methods as a commentator. But the extracts given by Eusebius deal almost wholly with the authorship and textual criticism, and so give no proper clue as to his method of interpreting the subject-matter of the book."

The implication of Feltoe's remarks is that Origen had justified a rejection of belief in the millennium by allegorizing the relevant passages in the Book of Revelation. Nepos is thought of as having and denied Origen's right so to allegorize. By refusing to allegorize, as having sought to substantiate "a grossly materialistic view of the millennium". Thus Nepos thought to wet Origen in argument by denying that the relevant passages in the Book of Revelation should be allegorically understood. In fact however, we know next to nothing of Nepos' views on the millennium, and it seems, therefore, a highly interpretative judgment which can speak of his "grossly materialistic view of the millennium." It is based on the assumption made by many scholars that millenniumism as such is a materialistic view.

As we only know of Nepos' Refutation' through Dionysius' criticism of it in his book 'On the Promises' and we only have extracts of that from Eusebius, most of which relate in any case to Dionysius' discussion of the authorship of the Book of Revelation, it is hard to see how Feltoe's view of Nepos' thinking can be derived from anything other than this preconception. Our previous discussion, however, if it has proceeded by sound principles, has recognized various kinds of

emphasis in the interpretation of the millennium, and we have seen that such a thinker as Methodius of Olympus was most anxious to retain millenarianism, while rejecting any view of it which would in his judgment debase the conception.

It is doubtless true that Origen would 'allegorize' the relevant passage in the Book of Revelation, if we mean by that he ignored the limited character of the millennium and viewed the passage in a broad way as symbolising the continuity of our experiences in the future world through the resurrection body with our present life. There is no evidence, however that he thought this passage meaningless for the real nature of future reality. The question then emerges however, whether it is likely that Nepos of Arsenoe would criticize Origen in the way that Feltoe implies. Feltoe works with two possibilities only: either one can adopt a "grossly materialistic view" of the future life in terms of a millennium, or one must reject completely all millenarianism. If this is a simplification which is unjustified, as we believe it is, then it becomes highly doubtful whether the respective views of Nepos, Origen and Dionysius are adequately portrayed for us by Feltoe.

It is noteworthy that Dionysius speaks in a balanced fashion in his book, 'On the Promises', concerning the Revelation of John. He mentions the view that the real author of the 'Revelation' was Cerinthus, the heretic and early Gnostic. The reference here may be to the view of Gaius of Rome, or just possibly to the Alogi in the East, for both Gaius' school and the Alogi were strongly opposed to millenarian views. Dionysius says:-
"For they say it is not John's, no nor yet a 'Revelation', because of the heavy thick veil of obscurity which covers it; and not only is the author of this book not one of the Apostles but he is even not one of the saints nor a churchman at all; it is even Cerinthus, the founder of the heresy that was called Cerinthian from him, and he desired to attribute his own composition to a name that would carry weight. For the substance of his teaching was this, that Christ's Kingdom will be on earth, and he dreams that it will be concerned with things after which he himself, being fond of bodily pleasures and very sensual, hankered such as the satisfying of his belly and lower lusts, that is eating and drinking and marrying and such means as he thought would provide him more decorously with these pleasures, feasts and sacrifices and the slaughtering of victims. I should not myself venture to reject the book, seeing that many brethren held it in high esteem, but, reckoning the decision about it to be beyond my powers of mind, I consider the interpretation of its various contents to be recondite and matter for much wonder. For without fully understanding, I yet surmise that some deeper meaning underlies the words, not measuring and judging them by calculations of my own; but giving preference to faith, I have come to the conclusion that they are too high for me to comprehend, and so I do not reject what I have not taken in, but can only wonder at these visions which I have not even seen (much less understood)."

It is interesting that Dionysius does not reply to Nepos by aligning himself with an allegorical interpretation, whether of Origen's or anyone else. He contents himself with confessing that he does not understand the visions of Revelation. Some may think that he has his tongue in his cheek as he says that he does not reject the book, but there seems no doubt that Dionysius does wish to dissociate himself

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1 Quoted by C. L. Feltoe, _op. cit._, p.p. 55–56.
from the imaginings of the persons mentioned. In another passage for example, he makes it clear that he does think that someone called John wrote the 'Revelation', that is, not Cerinthus, and that this John was "holy and inspired".1

The important thing in all of this is its significance in reference to the views of Origen. Feltoe judges that Origen must have rejected millenarianism by resorting to allegorism. This is an understandable view when we consider how given Origen was to this mode of interpreting Scripture. As Nepos had written in opposition to 'allegorists' in defence of millenarianism, it seemed logical to align Dionysius with Origen. Certain conclusions of the above discussion must now be set down, in so far as they have a bearing on this outlook set forth by Feltoe. First, the whole assumption that Nepos had been criticising repudiation of millenarianism by Origen by means of an allegorizing exegesis of Revelation 20:13 is not proved. Nepos may have written against Origen with reference to the latter's allegorism, but there is no evidence that he advocated, in opposition to Origen, a 'sensual' view of the millennium. A second major conclusion on this subject is that the available evidence tells us very little of what Nepos of Arsenoe really thought or what it was in him that Dionysius was opposing. The third and most important conclusion is that any picture of Origen which emerges out of Feltoe's reconstruction of Dionysius as championing Origen's views in opposition to Nepos is extremely questionable. We cannot deduce from the evidence, presented' by Dionysius of Alexandria's work, 'On the Promises', that Origen violently rejected millenarianism. In fact, though Dionysius is

an important and respectable theological figure in his own right, he does not really advance our understanding of Origen's eschatology.

Origen's Eschatology: Review and Assessment.

We must now draw to a close our investigation of Origen's eschatology. The more Biblical and traditional features of Origen's thinking in this field seem to require greater emphasis than is frequently given. It is significant that even Jean Daniélou, in his classic work on Origen, makes no mention in his chapter on Eschatology of Origen's acceptance of belief in the Parousia of Christ, as he has done elsewhere. Perhaps this is assumed, but it is not stated. What receives pride of place is Origen's pre-occupation with God's mercy, which works on a pedagogical principle, and man's freewill. Granted that this is an important aspect of Origen's thinking which cannot be ignored, surely Origen's adherence to belief in a Second Advent and to a resurrection of the body are equally significant. It also seems curious that Daniélou can say that "in eschatology, as in 'archaeology', there was not much traditional teaching to set Origen his limits." We are told that this explains his feeling more free in this area to give expression to his own philosophical views. Doubtless, it is true that there is an unimaginable and inexplicable element about God's future purposes for man, when the most conservative view of eschatology has been set out on Biblical lines. Nevertheless, the Scriptures and the Early Church had a great deal to say about eschatology, and the remarkable thing is, if our survey has soundly interpreted, that Origen accepted so much of this Biblical and traditional picture, even down to such details as belief in an intensification of evil prior

2. op.cit., p.288.
to the end of the age, belief in the reign of Antichrist, and the reconversion of the Jewish people.

Danielou sums up what he sees as wrong in Origen's eschatology among the points which were rejected by later Tradition:-

"The point that appears questionable in the present instance is the philosophical principle that evil must eventually disappear altogether. If that is the case, universal salvation becomes a matter of purely physical necessity, and the longer duration of the process in no way diminishes the necessity. But that makes nonsense of the tragic part of man's lot, the terrible power he has, through free will, of refusing his God. For that matter, Origen himself saw the difficulty; as he thought so highly of liberty, he could hardly fail to. He admitted that a creature with free will could always refuse to give itself to God. But the inference he drew from that fact was that it was possible for such creatures to go on falling and rising and falling again for ever. And that is contrary to another element in Christian dogma, viz. the doctrine that the choice made in this life is decisive in character. The weak point in Origen's theory is thus his idea that there is more than one existence. A spirit will go through many incarnations and in none of its existences will it remember anything of the previous ones. This comes from the Platonist theory of metempsychosis, which set its mark indelibly on Origen's arguments and distorted them. The final point on which his views are at variance with Tradition is the idea that the soul will return to the purely spiritual state it was in before it came down into the body. This point in particular was condemned by the Fifth General Council in its first canon under the name of 'πατοκαταστασις'. If anyone teaches the mythical doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul and the 'πατοκαταστασις' that follows from it, let him be anathema."1

With reference to these comments made by Daniélou, it must be said that, if our treatment of Origen has been sound, Daniélou's last point calls for some modification. He speaks of the traditional understanding of Origen that the soul had a purely spiritual existence prior to its being clothed with flesh in this earthly existence and that it will return to this. If it is true that Origen characteristically thinks only of the Trinity as wholly non-corporeal, then even though Origen may have been influenced by Plato in believing that all souls have existed from all eternity, he does not think of them as existing in a "purely spiritual state", nor does he think of them

1. op.cit., p.288.
as returning to such a state. Doubtless there was much that was
dangerous in Origen's view that God's eternity as Creator demands our
eternal existence, but it would seem that Origen did think more
realistically about the whole person, body and soul, than is sometimes
allowed. It is also true, of course, that, as Daniéelou points out,
what the Church rejected in Origen's theory was not the doctrine of
splendid itself, but his Platonist distortion of it. The
element of Platonism remains, even if Origen modified it by not
believing in a purely spiritual existence prior to this life. It is
hard to find Biblical justification for any view of pre-existence for
human beings, other than in the sense that we have been predestined
each one by God to come into existence at a particular time.

Origen's citing of John the Baptist's leaping in his mother's womb at
the approach of his Lord is not really satisfactory proof that he
remembered Christ from his pre-existence. Rather does it bespeak
the Biblical sense that even that which is not fully conscious can
be called into consciousness by the Creator Lord. For one destined
to the high privilege of heralding Christ such a divine gift of
recognition was singularly appropriate. It is interesting that this
is the only use Origen makes of the Platonic concept of ανάμνησις
or recollection, a fact which reminds us that Origen's philosophical
environment was the eclectic Middle Platonism of the mid-3rd century
A.D., which emphasized certain features of Platonism at the expense
of others and combined Platonism with features from other philosophical
systems.

It does seem clear that Origen's speculations cannot just
be set aside. They represent one aspect of his thinking, and one
which does not fit in readily with Biblical concepts, although it is
doubtful whether he would have recognized that fact. From a Biblical
and evangelical point of view, they represent an aberration. We have sought to show how they emerged in Origen's mind. All of them seem related to his attempt to explain the presence of evil in the world. Origen judges that in a pre-temporal fall a wrong exercise of freewill had been made by spiritual beings. His concept that incarceration in flesh was for some of these beings God's judgment on sin and at the same time a disciplinary remedy probably was more to Platonic, or at least Hellenic, attitudes to the body than Origen was himself aware. At the same time, as we have seen, Origen's apparent dilution of the Biblical approach to the body has to be viewed over against the fact that he appears to understand that some form of corporeality is appropriate to all beings apart from the divine Trinity and also by his understanding of the form of being which is to be ours in future ages as being congruous with that possessed by the Risen Christ. Again, Origen's views regarding the ultimate conversion of all spirits, including that of the Devil himself, reflect Origen's concern with the problem of evil and his desire to see it ultimately overcome and eliminated rather than simply suppressed.

We may summarize with reference to Origen's eschatology in the following way. Origen is much more traditional in eschatology than is sometimes allowed. He takes seriously belief in the Second Advent, resurrection of the dead, and consummation of the age. He accepts belief in an intensification of evil prior to the End of the age and appears to look for a restoration of Israel in the End time. Less traditional is his attitude to the concept of a millennial reign of Christ on earth. It may be that Origen saw more clearly in this regard than some who wrote before his time, but his attitude does represent a change from that found in the thought of other writers studied to this point, although there seems to be some congruity
between his thought on this matter and the attitude of Clement of Alexandria. Over against this we have to set the presence of certain speculations which represent a less Biblical and traditional outlook, viz. belief in the ultimate restoration of all spirits (though there may be other 'falls' in future ages), belief in a pre-temporal Fall as the occasion for the kind of embodied existence that we know in this present age, and the accompanying belief in the previous existence of all human spirits. These are important for our present investigation in so far as they carry implications regarding the nature of the age.

The presence of two elements in Origen's thinking, a more Biblical-traditional line, on the one hand, and a speculative-Hellenic way of viewing things, on the other, makes it difficult to assess Origen's eschatology. In attempting to do so, it seems important to endeavour to see Origen's total outlook in the unity which it doubtless seemed to possess to his own mind. Whether we agree that certain elements can properly be harmonised is not the question. What we are attempting to assess is Origen's eschatology as he saw it in the light of all the various aspects of his thinking.

It must be stressed in the first place that Origen's theology is definitely futuristic. The evidence concerning his belief in the Second Advent and the resurrection of the body makes this quite clear. It may be that there is a heavy stress upon the changed character of the material universe and of the resurrection body at Christ's Appearing. Nevertheless, it is evident that Origen does anticipate some great Event in future time, even if that Event ends time as we know it. Holland's treatment of the Eternal Gospel, as over against the Temporal Gospel, while questionable, as we have suggested, in certain aspects, does show just how important the future age and all
connected with it is in Origen's eyes. If there is any reduction from
the Primitive Christian way of looking at things it is in connection
with the nature of the raised body or the conditions of the new age,
not in relation to the fact that the present age is due to give way
at Christ's Appearing to the age that is to come.

It may be suggested, of course, that Origen's language in
traditional, but that he does not himself seriously believe in such
an event as the Second Advent or the resurrection in any literal
fashion. There seems, however, to be no real evidence for such a
view. This is rather a modern outlook, and it would seem that
interpreters are sometimes prone to read this back into such writings
as those of Origen. It may be admitted that Origen has a stature
and independence as a thinker which eludes the earlier thinkers
whose works we have studied (with the possible exception of Clement
of Alexandria). This means that it is more difficult to be sure
concerning his meaning at particular points in his teaching. Yet
the evidence, as surveyed in the preceding pages, suggests strongly
that Origen deeply respected the Gospel as traditionally handed
down, even although certain speculations introduced an element into
his teaching which made for ambiguity. Thus, Origen should be seen
as accepting meaningfully all that he says he accepts, viz., Second
Advent, future resurrection, intensification of evil prior to the
end of the age, and so on.

This means that Origen's futurism represents a further proof
that the Early Church was not dismayed by the delay in the Second
Advent. There is no suggestion of concern on Origen's part concerning
the passing of time since Christ's death, resurrection, and ascension.
It is interesting, however, that the passage cited from the Eleventh
Homily on 'Joshua' (above, page 655) thinks in terms of the staying
of the sun by Joshua as significant of the prolonging of the Gospel age. It is also interesting to note precisely why Origen says that the end is delayed: it is so that the Father's promise maybe fulfilled, that the Church may be built up from all nations "et qua tota gentium plenitude, ut tunc demum omnis Israel salvetur." Thus, Origen shows that his answer to the question why the end is delayed is fully in line with the general answer of Early Christianity, one we have already found in Justin Martyr and in Irenaeus: it is so that the Gentiles may be gathered in, this being a predestined period in God's plan which culminates in the conversion of the Jewish people.

The allusion to Rom. II. 25 seems to make clear what Origen means by the saying of 'all Israel'.

Again, the reference to the intensification of evil prior to the end of the age and the probable implication of belief in Anti-christ's reign show that for Origen too it would be unthinkable that Christ should come in glory before the foretold series of events had been completed. Here again, we see evidence in Origen's thinking of the view that the world was presently in the midst of a series of events which had been initiated, in the language of Origen, by the Temporal Gospel and would be consummated by the Eternal Gospel.

Positively, the ingathering of the Gentile nations was proceeding according to plan, and negatively the fact that the final period of wickedness had clearly not yet dawned showed where the Church and the world stood in the divine ordering of history.

It is true that the passages cited may seem to be only few among the many more speculative suggestions of Origen. It is doubtful whether this impression is really justified. It emerges largely from the way in which scholarship has focused its attention on the De Principiis and the Contra Celsum. It is in Origen's
exegetical and homiletical work that the evidence is to be discovered for the other more Biblical aspect of his thought, which has frequently been almost overlooked. In any event there is no reason to doubt the seriousness with which Origen speaks, as in the passage mentioned above, concerning the Second Advent and the reasons for its delay. Origen betrays no sense of concern whatsoever in regard to this delay.

What evidence does Origen provide concerning an emphasis on 'realized' aspects of eschatology? Origen, like Clement, does not in fact have very much to say in this regard. This is perhaps because he has less to say concerning the sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist than the other writers whose works we have studied. This may connect up with what was said at the beginning of our study of Origen, when we noted (above, page 644) that Origen thinks of sacraments as temporary helps, which will later be set aside. We saw that this was connected with a theory of 'levels' which related to the Incarnation and Christ's post-Resurrection glory, to the 'carnal', 'psychic' and pneumatic' levels of Scriptural meaning, and to differing levels in the Christian life. It is in fact in connection with the highest level in each case that Origen comes closest to a 'realized eschatology'. Thus, it is the Christian Gnostic who now anticipates the glories of the age that is to come. Here Origen's thought seems to be in agreement with Clement. This element is perhaps less emphasized than in Clement's writings, but it is everywhere assumed.

We conclude that Origen is at one with the thinkers considered to date in his loyalty to a view of eschatology which is best described by the word, 'inaugurated'. The presence of certain speculations undoubtedly constitutes a major problem in Origen's thought, but it is not clear that in his own understanding there was
any attempt to undermine what was everywhere assumed in his writings, namely, the Christian Hope in its broad traditional understanding. Thus, Origen might speculate concerning a pretemporal Fall in a way which suggested that the body is inferior to spirit, a thought which could lead to the suggestion that in the age to come it would be set aside. Again, he might think in terms of 'innumerable ages' which lie ahead in such a way as to lose something of the force with which the New Testament and the Primitive Church thought in terms of 'this age' and 'that which is to come'. Nevertheless, Origen displays a genuine futurism accompanied by certain elements which show that ultimately his eschatology is 'inaugurated' in character, viz. his understanding of the life of the Christian Gnostic, his appreciation of the present mission to the Gentiles as set within a divine predetermined framework of history, and his conviction that there was to be an intensification of evil prior to the end—an intensification which Origen does not seem to think of as having yet commenced. By his genuine futurism, and by his lack of concern regarding the passing of time since the Second Advent Origen provides further evidence for the judgment that the actual passage of time did not produce within the Early Church any diminution of emphasis upon futurism or any process of 'de-eschatologising' of theology.

ESCHATOLOGY IN THE ALEXANDRIAN FATHERS: FINAL ASSESSMENT.

In closing, we summarize our finding with reference to the Alexandrian Fathers Clement and Origen. First, we must say that, where eschatology is concerned, Clement of Alexandria stands more firmly within the primitive Christian tradition, in that he does not indulge in the speculative conceptions found in Origen. Second, it should be said that both take much more seriously that tradition than is sometimes recognized. In particular, we have found cause
to deny that Clement and Origen 'spiritualized' the great themes of eschatology. Third, it seems that both Clement and Origen believed in the Parousia of Christ and in the Resurrection of the dead. They did this with the utmost seriousness. Fourth, the reason why the charge of 'spiritualising' has clung to them over the centuries has been that they both desired to stress the glorified condition of the resurrection body. This insistence is most notable in Origen.

Fifth, where these two thinkers do come to differ is with reference to the theme of Judgment. Many scholars think of both as universalists. We saw reason to deny this where we have Clement in mind. Clement seems to have thought of a purgatorial process as commencing in believers at death and as reaching completion at the Parousia. Origen takes seriously the themes of Second Advent and Resurrection, but his stress falls on this as the consummation of the creation. He appears to believe in the 'ultimate restoration' of all free spirits to God in reconciliation, but he cannot be certain of this on account of problems arising from the freewill which attaches to genuinely spiritual beings. Judgment is a reality, but he characteristically thinks of this as a process going on all the time, within the divine Providence, both in the lives of individuals and of nations, to say nothing of principalities and powers. Another significant common feature in Clement and Origen is their adherence to a traditional portrayal of history leading up to the Parousia of Christ-intensification of evil prior to the end of the age, growing apostasy in the Church itself, the emergence of Antichrist, and the conversion of the Jewish people. A major feature of difference between the two thinkers emerges from Origen's whole conception of a pretemporal Fall, undue stress on freewill and failure to see the solidarity of believers with Christ as guaranteeing their final
stability in eternity. Clement, indeed, also lays stress on human freewill to a greater extent than do Irenaeus and Justin Martyr, but he has no doubts about the ultimate stability of God's people.

A common feature, which should not be ignored, is found in their attitude towards Gnosticism of the Christian variety. They see this as a kind of anticipation of the blessedness of the future world. It is here especially that a 'realized eschatology' is to be found, both in Clement and Origen. While both thinkers see a sense in which all believers anticipate that age, it is supremely among Christian Gnostics that this is so, and their characteristic emphasis on freewill is connected with their distinction between ordinary believers and the Christian Gnostics—any one can choose to see perfection.

The note which impresses one most in both thinkers, and which they share, is a stress on continuity between the future life and this present one, combined with an emphasis upon the glorified conditions of that future age. A stress on this element of change makes both Clement and Origen wary of millenarian views, though in Origen's case we have seen that his extreme views regarding freewill make it almost impossible for him to accept millenarianism in the strict sense of the term. Many scholars would not consider that Clement and Origen do sufficiently stress the note of continuity between this age and that which is to come. Some have seen in Origen's methods of Scriptural interpretation the key to his whole theology and have argued that, just as he sometimes leaves the historical meaning of a passage, its literal sense, completely behind, so he thinks ultimately of the passing beyond the things of time and flesh. It may be questioned whether this adequately represents Origen's thought. Doubtless, there is significance for
his whole theology in his views of Scripture—which constitutes a subject in itself—but we must not overemphasize his occasional complete disregard for the literal or historical meaning of a passage. This is the exception rather than the rule, and corresponds perhaps to the way in which the body of the resurrection will not require organs connected with reproduction. Both Clement and Origen in fact make much of the ages that are to come, and their whole theology is essentially forward-looking. While one may think that they point to the future at the expense of the past—glorification in place of humiliation, the Christ Who is divine rather than the One Who is man—this does not seem sound interpretation. Both Clement and Origen stress the glorification of this world, of what remains genuinely human and earthly, and the Christ Who comes to reign is none other than the One Who suffered under Pontius Pilate. The Incarnation, the Cross, and even the Descent into Hades, the Resurrection and the Ascension—all these constitute the basis for faith. For both of them the achievement of the historical Jesus, as God and as man, is the effective basis of the hope for the future.

The most important finding with reference to both Fathers is that they exhibit a genuine futurism. Neither gives evidence of being concerned about the delay in the Second Advent. We did note that Clement was perhaps less aware of the sense that history was thrusting forward in dynamic fashion towards its consummation. This seems to have been connected with his emphasis upon the individual. It is interesting in this regard that, while Origen is less traditional in his eschatology in that he introduces certain speculative concepts which were to be a constant source of trouble in his theology as a whole, yet we find also in him a rather greater realisation than in Clement that the Temporal Gospel is due to give
way to the Eternal. These, however, are only relative judgments.

In broad outline, Clement and Origen stand together, therefore, in their witness to an outlook which, as we have seen earlier, characterized the Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, and Irenaeus. Neither provides evidence for a process of 'de-eschatologizing.'
CHAPTER VII: HIPPOLYTUS OF ROME.

The majority of the quotations from Hippolytus' works found in the following pages are derived either from his De Christo et Antichristo or from his Commentary on Daniel. Certain other references, however, are taken from his 'Refutation of All Heresies', and his 'Apostolic Tradition', together with certain fragments of his works.

So far as the De Christo et Antichristo is concerned, the text employed has been that found in the critical edition of the Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller series. The series, indeed, opened with the production of Hippolytus' works in 1897, being published by J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung at Leinzing. This volume was the work of G. Nathaniel Bonwetsch and Hans Achelis, and dealt with the Commentary on Daniel, and the Treatise on Christ and Antichrist, together with fragments of Hippolytus' works.

The text employed with reference to the Commentary on Daniel has been that of the Sources Chrétiennes series. This is number 14 in the series. An introduction for this volume was written by de Gustave Bardy, but the actual editing of the text, together with the translation into French, is the work of Maurice Lefèvre. This volume was published in 1947. This editing of the text has been preferred to the earlier important work of Bonwetsch and Achelis because it is more recent and is able to take into account greater knowledge concerning the text of the Commentary on Daniel, now available to scholarship.

Where the 'Refutation of all Heresies' (Refutatio omnium Haeresium) is concerned, the C.C.S. text published in 1961 has been used. This was number 26 in that series and was the work of Paul Wendland.

The 'Apostolic Tradition' of Hippolytus is a work which has excited considerable interest of recent years. The editions of B.S. Easton (Cambridge, 1934) and G. Dix (London, 1937), especially the latter, have been in hand, though only one reference to this work by Hippolytus is actually made in
This chapter. This work of Hippolytus, important as it is, is not so relevant to the study of his eschatology.

It only remains to mention two other sources for quotations. The quotation from the Scholia on Daniel, found on page 807, is given according to the text found in Migne's edition of the Patrologia Graeca, Volume X, which deals with the Roman Pontiffs and others. It is found in column 684 of that volume. Again, on page 825, a quotation is made from a fragment of Hippolytus' Commentary on Genesis, which has been preserved for us by Jerome. The text is given as found in the C.C.S., critical edition, volume I in that series. It is located in the second half of the volume on 'Exegetische und Homiletische Schriften' which was prepared by Hans Achelis. The fragment is given on pages 54-55 of that half-volume, and the precise quotation made is found on page 54, lines 5-6, and page 55, lines 1-3.

This chapter places considerable stress on the ideas of Hippolytus in his definitely eschatological material found in the De Christo et Antichristo and the Commentary on Daniel. It is held that he reveals certain assumptions which were quite widespread but which are more fully set out in his writings than elsewhere in the Early Church. This being so, it may be wise to note briefly the major facts regarding the sources for the text upon which the critical editions depend.

The Commentary on Daniel is the longest of Hippolytus' writings. The entire text is preserved in a Slavonic version, but much of the Greek is also recoverable from fragments. When Migne's text was prepared (1857) it was still not possible to set out the whole in a continuous fashion. Certain of the fragments of the Commentary on Daniel recovered through Early Church Fathers, who quoted from the work have proved in fact to be true to the sense of Hippolytus' work but are nevertheless confections of passages in the Commentary. This work dates from c.204
and it is the oldest Christian commentary on any Biblical book to survive.

Certain fragments, such as those 'On the Psalms' have come down to us, together with other writings on sections of the Old and New Testaments, such as one on the 'Blessing of Jacob' which is extant in Greek, Armenian, and Georgian. A similar work on 'The Blessing of Moses' is given in complete form only in Armenian and Georgian. It has not been felt necessary to quote from these, although they betray the characteristic position of Hippolytus that Old Testament types were to be fulfilled in Christ and His Church. They betray Hippolytus' strong sense that in Christ the End-time has now arrived.

The De Christo et Antichristo and the Philosophoumena (or, Refutation of all Heresies) are extant in Greek in full. A 'Paschal Homily' of Hippolytus is mentioned in the 7th century 'Paschal Chronicle'. Père C. Martin claimed to have found it in 1926 among the spurious homilies attributed to St. Chrysostom. This is disputable, but it is generally agreed that this work has at least a Hippolytean basis. It is written in Greek and appears in its present form to be not earlier than the fourth century. It is significant in that it fills out our picture of the kind of literature which is found in the Homily of Melito of Sardis.

Hippolytus places more emphasis on the resurrection of Christ and on Christ's Victory than does Melito. This again accords with a stress on the fact that Christ has inaugurated the End-time, fulfilling the type given in the Exodus. This work is not specifically dealt with in the chapter which follows, since other works provide sufficient evidence concerning his general viewpoint on eschatology, futurist and fulfilled.
HIPPOLYTUS OF ROME

INTRODUCTION

It is evident from the outset that in Hippolytus, we are confronted with a thinker who devoted certain of his writings in a direct manner to eschatological themes. One thinks especially of his 'Treatise on Christ and Antichrist', together with his Commentary on Daniel. However, his other writings carry implications for his understanding of eschatology, which cannot be passed by. In this connection, we shall have occasion to note aspects of his 'Refutation of all heresies', and his book on 'The Apostolic Tradition'. At the same time, it is in his direct contributions to eschatology that Hippolytus concerns us most of all.

In turning to such works as the 'Treatise on Christ and Antichrist' and the Commentary on Daniel, one is conscious of entering a world of thought, which has been largely overlooked or forgotten in the twentieth century, and which was more hidden in the extant works of other early Christian writers. Hippolytus was a disciple of Irenaeus of Lyons, and we know that in the latter's thinking eschatological themes had a place of considerable importance. Nevertheless, not even in Irenaeus do we have writings which so concentrate on eschatology and which so help us recover the mentality of at least a section of early Christian thinkers. Better still, we are faced with certain principles of the thinking of ordinary Christian people, as it would seem, which are here laid open to our gaze, and which we might hardly have suspected otherwise, or which, if we had, would not have been set forth in such coherent fashion.

What comes across most strongly in Hippolytus, especially in his works dealing with eschatology, is his crass futurism. Hippolytus plainly believed in a most definitely historical fashion, not only
in the Parousia of Christ in glory but in a whole series of events stretching from the Incarnation to the final Parousia. These included the collapse of the fourth world empire of Daniel, Chapters 2 and 7, the appearance of Antichrist, the Great Tribulation of the saints. Coterminous with this whole period is the proclamation of the Gospel by the Christian Church. Hippolytus also seems to have seen history as continuing in some way beyond the Parousia during a millennial reign of Christ on earth, though he is far less fulsome on this issue than is Irenaeus. What we find here is a whole theology of history and there is virtually no concession made to the tendency to 'spiritualize' eschatology or reduce it to symbols. This concern with the future, as it unfolds before us, is matched by the realization which comes out best in his non-eschatological works, that in Christ the End-time has already arrived. 'Realized eschatology' and 'futurist eschatology' are held in balance in Hippolytus' mind, but it is his extraordinarily clear and detailed futurism which catches our modern attention.

Hippolytus gives important witness not only to the persistence of the Christian Hope of Christ's Return in the Early Church, understood as a definite event in history - at least in the sense that it will break into and cut off history at a particular point (which he conceived to be about 500 A.D.\(^1\)) - but also the pre-supposition that future history stretches out before the world in a predetermined fashion, that it has a pattern and meaning, and that the Parousia will be the climax of a whole series of events, foreshadowed by prophecy. While Hippolytus is normally careful not to run ahead of history, he is sure that such terms as Antichrist stand for an historical reality, which was still future in his day. A sentence in the *De Christo et Antichristo*

\(^1\)In Danielem, IV. XXIII
well sums up the characteristic perspective of Hippolytus on such matters:-

"τῶν γὰρ καιρῶν ἐκπειθομένων καὶ
άυτὸς περὶ οὗ προείρηται φανερώθησεται καὶ
τὸ ὄνομα δῆλος πᾶσι σημανθῆσεται."

History is for Hippolytus like a map that is gradually unrolled, and prophets are those who, by divine grace and gift, have been given glimpses of the future ahead of the time of fulfilment. Thus, Hippolytus' thinking about eschatology is imbedded in a whole theology of history.

Some of Hippolytus' assumptions and conclusions have a most important bearing on the theme of this present thesis. It may be best to set these out concisely, first of all, and then to document them and comment on them in detail. First Hippolytus underlines for us the truth that the early Christians did not have what may be termed an 'Any moment' expectation of the Parousia of Christ, since they held that certain other important events must first take place. This is quite definite and explicit in Hippolytus. To the extent that this was true of the Church as a whole, we must ask how, in the light of this, it is meaningful to talk of the Church's disappointment at the 'delay' in the Second Advent. Second Hippolytus most clearly sets these events that stretch between the two Advents of Christ in prophetical perspective. Daniel, in particular, and to a lesser extent, John, the writer of the 'Revelation', has detailed history before it reaches us. The visions of Daniel are of crucial importance for Hippolytus, especially those recorded in chapters 2 and 7. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Paul,

\[1\] G.C.S. Hippolytus 1, p.34 ll. 11-13
and our Lord Himself fill out the picture given in advance by the
prophet Daniel, who, of course, is viewed without question as a
prophet living in Babylon in the Sixth century before Christ. Third,
and in more detail, the empire of Rome is seen as the fourth world
empire of the visions of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7, which is taken to
mean that the 'ten toes' of the image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream
recorded in chapter 2, and the 'ten horns' of Daniel's own vision of
various beasts in chapter 7, refer to a reality, still future in
Hippolytus' own day. Both visions refer, under differing symbolism,
to the same reality, though the 'little horn' of Daniel 7, which is
taken to refer to Antichrist, is an additional revelation in Daniel 7.
The result of this is that, since the ten nations have not yet emerged
from the Roman empire, and Antichrist can only appear after they have
emerged on Rome's collapse, there is still time to run before the
Second Advent. Fourth, in his Commentary on Daniel, though not in
the Treatise on Christ and Antichrist, Hippolytus makes use of the
concept of seven millennia as delineating the course of world history. This
we have already found in Irenaeus, and before him in the writer
of the Epistle of Barnabas among the Apostolic Fathers. Hippolytus
reaches the conclusion that Christ will come in 500 A.D. However
mistaken this kind of thinking may be, it helps to give the lie to
the common judgment that eschatological visionaries were always men
who expected unique divine intervention in their own day. Fifth, there
are imbedded implicitly in his eschatological works certain important
assumptions regarding history itself. Thus, the reign of an Antiochus

1 IV. XXIII
2 Adversus Haereses, V. XX VIII 3
3 XV. 3-8.
Epiphanes is viewed as a foreshadowing, in the divine providence, of the final revelation of Antichrist. Connected with this is Hippolytus' interpretation of prophecy. If history itself is so arranged by God that past events point forward to others yet to come, prophecy may have a reference to some events in the near future and at the same time to others which are yet more remote. Thus, certain words of Isaiah refer both to Babylon that took Israel captive, and to Rome. Hippolytus cunningly seems to imply a parallel between Daniel's captivity in Babylon in Mesopotamia and John's in Patmos. It is in such situations, fittingly, that both receive revelations. Thus Hippolytus says:

"λέγε μοι, ἄ μακάρει Ἰωάννη, ἡ στολή καὶ μαθητα τοῦ κυρίου, τί εἶδες καὶ τί ἤκουσες περὶ βαβυλῶνος. γράφομεν καὶ εἶπε· καὶ γάρ αὕτη σε ἐξέρχομαι."

It is appropriate, Hippolytus thinks, to take words uttered by Isaiah, as we would most naturally assume concerned literal Babylon, as having a further reference to Rome, the New Babylon. Whether we agree with Hippolytus or not, it seems important to realize that he is not simply misunderstanding Isaiah's reference. He assumes two meanings, which correspond to the divinely planned repetitiveness of history.

In all these respects Hippolytus' thinking is most salutary and challenging. One further aspect of Hippolytus' eschatology may be mentioned. By implication he suggests an interesting approach to the meaning of the New Testament term, 'Son of Man', as applied to Jesus. His concern with the Church's location in time in his day during the period of Daniel's fourth world empire, when combined with his acceptance of Jesus as Son of Man, seems to suggest that in his view Jesus' use of the term would be much more than the adoption of a useful Scriptural 'tag': rather Jesus would have implied that in Him, as Son of Man, prophetic history had fulfilled itself. This is important

\[G.C.S. \text{ Hipp. 1, p.23 ll. 10-12}\]
not only for our understanding of the term 'Son of Man, but for the whole question of eschatological perspective. For, in Daniel's vision (Chapter 7) the 'one like unto a son of man' (v.13) appears after the emergence from the fourth beast, or world empire, of the ten horns, or kingdoms, and the effrontery of Antichrist. This at any rate is how Hippolytus should have seen it, since he expressly thinks of Rome as the fourth beast, which in his day had still to give place to the 'ten horns', out of whom Antichrist would emerge. How, then, could Hippolytus reconcile with this interpretation the fact that the Son of Man came in fact during the period of the fourth beast's power, before the emergence of the 'ten horns'? The only reasonable answer seems to be that Hippolytus sees an additional truth revealed through Christ's First Advent. Just as Daniel has more revealed to him in the vision of the beasts (Dan. 7) than Nebuchadnezzar had in his vision of the great image (Dan. 2), so the appearing of Christ in the flesh, in advance of his coming in glory as described in Daniel 7, helps us better to understand God's purposes. From this standpoint the period between the two Advents is not just one in which the glory of the future Parousia is proleptically anticipated or even realized: it is a 'time between the times' in the sense that the fifth world empire of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7 has already come but not in such a way as completely to fulfil what is portrayed in these chapters. Hence, this particular prophetic background, which is always in the mind of Hippolytus, suggests a peculiarly historical and prophetic perspective for the meaning of the term 'Son of Man' as found on the lips of Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. It also reinforces the tension of realized and futurist eschatology in our understanding of Hippolytus' eschatology: when he combined the prophetic forevisions
of Daniel with his faith in Jesus as Son of Man, he had to make room both for the presence of the Kingdom in Christ and its future unveiling. His outlook here may well reflect that of the Fourth Gospel, with its stress on the present reality of 'eternal life' combined with belief in future resurrection. It will be necessary for us to document all of this at greater length in due course, as we proceed to examine Hippolytus' eschatology.

THE REIGN OF ANTICHRIST AS PRECEDING THE END

We look firstly at the fact that Hippolytus expected the emergence of Antichrist before the Parousia of Christ. In practice, this point must be combined with the second, mentioned above, namely, that this is set in prophetical perspective. For in Hippolytus' thinking these two points are a unity. The details of the third point also emerges imperceptibly with the first two. What all this amounts to is that Hippolytus took most seriously the predictions of the prophecy of Daniel, as of certain other old Testament prophets, as also those uttered by Jesus, Paul and the writer of the Book of 'Revelation'. He did not think primarily in terms of symbol, but rather in terms of historical actuality. Thus, it is clear that for him, as for us, the fourth beast of Daniel 7, to take one example, is a symbol, appropriate to vision, but it is for him as much a symbol that corresponds to reality, as the term 'Father' represents for us a real truth about God. Utterly characteristic of Hippolytus' thinking is what he says in chapter II of the De Christo et Antichristo: "οὺ γὰρ ἐξ ἰδίας δυνάμεως οἱ προφήται ἐρέγιγνοντο, μὴ πλανῶν, οὐδὲ ἄχρι αὐτοὶ ἠβουλόντο ταῦτα καὶ ἐκήρυσσαν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐσοφίζοντο ὀρθῶς, ἐκεῖτα δὲ δι’ ὑστάματων προεδρίσκοντο τὰ μέλλοντα καλὰς καὶ εἰθ’ οὕτως κεμπόμενοι ἐλέγον ταῦτα, ἄχρι αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἢν ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἀποκεκαλυμμένα, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον ὁ προφήτης προφήτης λέγεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι κνεύματι προεῷρα τὰ μέλλοντα; εἰ γὰρ..."
This is bound up for Hippolytus with the judgment that it was the Word Himself Who communicated His revelations to the prophets in former times, He Who has now Himself become flesh. Hippolytus says, completing a long and involved but impressive metaphor, based on weaving:

This is more than simply an impressive figure of speech. It lays bare for us the understanding of history, which Hippolytus everywhere assumes. The words of the prophets have to be fulfilled, because their historical predictions were part of the divinely ordained preparation for the Incarnation. Prophetic prediction and historical fulfilment belong together in the divine purpose and method. Closely connected too is the interpretation of prophecy as fulfilled in Jesus Christ.

As Hippolytus passes to the immediate matter in hand "τίς καὶ κοσμημένη ὡς τοῦ ἐνυξιστῶν παρουσία..." he alludes indirectly to I Peter 1.10:

1 G.C.S., Hipp. 1, p.5 ll. 1-10
2 G.C.S. Hipp. 1, p.7, ll. 6-9
3 G.C.S., Hipp. 1, p. 7, ll. 13
"they (the prophets) inquired what person or time was indicated by the Spirit of Christ within them when proclaiming the sufferings of Christ and the subsequent glory".

The thought is that, so far as the Coming of Christ is concerned, believers know the truth, because their believing is part of a divine movement in history, which commenced with the revelations to the prophets, reached its consummation in the fulfilment of prediction in Christ's Coming among men, and has now spilled over in our apprehension by faith of this reality. There is a connection here with the thought of II Peter 1:19ff., where it is stated that prophecy is not a matter of private interpretation, any more than it was of private devising. What this sets forth clearly is that, for Hippolytus, history is in the hands of God; that certain significant areas of it have been predicted beforehand through the Word; that it is the Incarnation which brings prophetic prediction to completion; that certain events and historical movements remain to find fulfilment in the future; and that interpretation of these mysteries is to be found only through the Spirit of God who instructs believers and who has been given to the Church in a new way through the Incarnation. All this seems to be implicit in Hippolytus' opening remarks about prophecy in the De Christo et Antichristo. There is no surrender in any of this to a spiritualising of history nor any tendency to emphasize symbol at the expense of historical actuality.

It is interesting that Hippolytus seems to have believed that the prophets saw much more clearly than they expressed themselves. This reserve was apparently thought of as bound up with the arcane character of spiritual truth. Having equated the fourth world empire of Daniel, chapters two and seven, with imperial Rome of his own Day, Hippolytus states that he imparts these things with fear, but that he does so nevertheless, "δια τῆς ἀπεράσσαγος Χριστοῦ ἡμών". (De. C. et. A. xxix; as the inverted commas indicate, this phrase probably reflects the language of Eph.3.19)
Hippolytus had good cause for fear, since it could have been regarded as treasonable to predict the collapse of the Roman empire, which was regarded as eternal. However, in context the thought is that such knowledge is for the elect only. This was why the prophets did not set it out clearly. It is inappropriate for those without faith to have these matters displayed before their gaze, hence the truth should be so presented that only those with spiritual perception will understand it. Hippolytus' own interest is in helping believers to understand, but, since the times of which the prophets wrote have now arrived, it is necessary to speak with greater clarity than did the prophets in their predictions, else the faithful would derive no benefit. Hippolytus' understanding of the prophets' visions reminds one of the claims of a Nostradamus (16th century) to see more clearly than he set forth the future. Whether Hippolytus' judgment here is sound is not at present the point. It is simply that this standpoint underlines how definitely historical is his view with reference to the fulfilment of prophecy. This meant that for him prophecy, which was as yet unfulfilled, would be fulfilled historically. Nevertheless, Hippolytus is careful not to dogmatize concerning the meaning of prophecy before its fulfilment. Thus, he takes the number of Antichrist, six hundred and sixty-six (Rev. 13:18), as having a definite reference to a future historical Antichrist, whom he conceives of as a person in a most definite and detailed fashion, but he does not dogmatize about the significance of the number. Following the lead of Irenaeus, he discusses such names as 'Titan', 'Evanthes', and 'Latinus', whose numerical value totals this mysterious number. Because of his characteristically non-symbolic method of interpretation, he does

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1 Adversus Haereses, V.III.3
not discuss the likelihood that this term is suggestive of human incompleteness, though he would doubtless have agreed that this is part of the truth. He assumes that there is a literal Antichrist to come and that this clue would help establish his identity when the time came. At the same time, he says that we cannot be sure in advance of what is intended. He favours the interpretation of the number in terms of 'Latinus' (since Antichrist is to emerge from the second beast of Rev. 13, which is equated with Antichrist's emergence from the fourth beast of Daniel 7, that is, Rome) but he cannot be sure. His words are a useful commentary on his attitude: "... oüte prokhróssei diá, òs òntos toutou òn, oüte pálin ònnoeíno òti òntos òntos diántass légethai, "ekountas dé to mosithron tou theou en katharà karbía" metà roboú filástosein píostas ti ópò toutou makariws proshètow præierhèn, òma ginomànw auton proesidòtes auto præhæména".

It is not difficult, then, to demonstrate that Hippolytus understood that certain events had been predicted, which had not yet come to pass, and that certain historical movements and figures still lay ahead in the future in his day. The whole of the De Christo et Antichristo, together with the Commentary on Daniel, is indeed a commentary on this fact. In dealing with the future Antichrist, Hippolytus gives us a résumé of his whole interpretation of future history up to the Parousia of Christ in terms of prophetic prediction, understood in the literal way spoken of above. Martin Werner notes Hippolytus' belief that Christ came in 5500 years from Creation and that He would not return until the 6000th year (documented in Commentary on Daniel only) and judges:

1G.C.S., Hipp. 1, p.34 ll. 7-11
"Of the first instance in the 2nd century of retrospective dating to the year 5500 there are many witnesses. But this new date was only reached gradually. In the 4th century Lactantius still knew various datings between 6000 and 5500. For Hippolytus the new dating of the Birth of Jesus in the year 5500 was especially important, because he obtained thereby an effective argument against the periodic revival of the expectation of the Parousia: for, if one, living in the 2nd century after Christ, placed the Birth of Jesus in the year 5500 and expected the Parousia in the year 6000, he could easily prove that there were still centuries to wait before this future event".  

Werner had noted that in certain early Christian documents, the death of Christ, as also His birth, had been dated in the year 6000, and his argument is that as time passed and the Parousia did not occur, it became necessary to shift Christ's birth or death back, so that it could still be believed that in the year 6000 the Parousia would take place. Doubtless, there are certain difficulties in Hippolytus' use in the Commentary on Daniel of the concept of seven millennia of world history, the more especially for the modern mind with our knowledge of the vast geological ages of the past. At the same time, it is hard to believe that Hippolytus was motivated in the way that Werner suggests, for his conception of a programme of history that was to intervene between the two Advents of Christ is quite basic to his interpretation of prophecy. Werner judges that Hippolytus is cautious about the Parousia expectation, being worried about its results in fanaticism in some, but what is more fundamental to his view is surely an interpretation of history which resulted in an 'any-moment' expectation of the Second Advent's being seen as unbiblical and untrue to prophetic prediction. And Hippolytus' view of a relatively long

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time perspective for the Second Advent from his own day does not stand or fall with his adherence to the 5500 dating for Christ's birth. It is rather that, since he already believed that Christ's Parousia could not occur until Antichrist appeared and Antichrist could not manifest himself until the Roman Empire had dissolved into ten kingdoms, he did not think of the Parousia as literally immediate. This being so, the seven thousand millennial scheme might appeal to him as fitting in with this more fundamental conviction. There is no doubt at all that Hippolytus believed implicitly that a whole series of events were destined to mark the years between the two Advents. In view of all of this, one may question whether Werner has soundly assessed Hippolytus' vantage point. The more important point for us is not, however, the negative rejection of Werner's attitude, but the positive understanding of Hippolytus' theology of history, for this is what it amounts to. We shall now document this briefly from Hippolytus' eschatological works.

THE PROPHETIC BACKGROUND TO HIPPOLYTUS' THOUGHT CONCERNING ANTICHRIST:
ROME AS THE FOURTH WORLD EMPIRE OF DANIEL, CHAPTERS 2 AND 7

In chapter XXIII of the De Christo et Antichristo Hippolytus sets forth his understanding of the visions recorded in Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. The 'head of gold' (Dan. 2) and 'lioness from the sea' (Dan. 7) are identified with the kingdom of the Babylonians; the silver breast and arms of Nebuchnezzar's vision, and the bear of Daniel's represented the Persians and the Medes; "κοιλία καὶ μηροὶ χαλκοῖ, ἡ παράδεισος, οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου κρατῶντες Ἑλλήνες (ὁσιοῦ)." while "κυρίμωι σιδήραι, θηρίων ἐκθρημμένων καὶ φθηροῦν, ἐραμωτοὶ οἱ υἱοὶ κρατῶντες (ὁσιοῦ)" Hippolytus goes on; "εἶχαν ποδῶν ὀστρακον καὶ σίδυρος, τὰ δέκα κέρατα, τὰ μέλλοντα ἐσεοθαῖ.
This general picture is confirmed by his Commentary on Daniel. There he discusses again the visions of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7, in parallel and makes the same application with reference to the symbolism as it relates to the Babylonians, the Persians and the Greeks under Alexander. He then says very explicitly: "Metà tauta legei kynmias
sideras, oun to beryou to ekvambov kai roberon sunev, to
exous tous odontas siderous, uper estein ois vno kratooutes
promalois, istoroi outes ois o sideros. Metà youn tas kynmias tis
eikonos tas sideras ti peri leipetai, ei mèi ois kódes, en ois eisio
ske daktuloi kai othoi anamumianen ostraako kal sidero. Ína
dia mev twn deka daktulovn sunevthati và deka kerata, dia de tòi
ostraako kal to ostraako ex toton anumian, ìs sunevthei mev ouvtau en
skhmeios anvbptov, òxi ouvtau de kolaxmenvi othos metà toton." (IV.vII.4-5)

The modern conviction is strongly entrenched in most theological
circles that Daniel was written, not in the sixth century B.C., but
in the second, during the period of Maccabean persecution. In
consequence, the four kingdoms of the Book of Daniel are normally
identified with Babylon, Media, Persia, and Greece, the 'ten kings'
being taken to refer to the divisions of Alexander's kingdom and
Antiochus Epiphanes being viewed as the 'little horn' of Daniel 7.
It is, therefore, harder perhaps for modern thinkers to get back into

1 G.C.S. Hipp., 1, p.19, 11. 9-15
the assumptions which underlie Hippolytus' interpretation. Nevertheless, what Hippolytus says is perfectly consistent with his own basic principles. Further, his views were by no means peculiar to himself, though he discusses this matter in greater detail than others. The Epistle of Barnabas, Irenaeus and Tertullian all explicitly affirm that Rome was the fourth world empire of Daniel's visions. As for the sixth century dating of 'Daniel', which goes with this, this was the common view of early Christianity and it was only in the third century A.D. that this dating was first questioned by the Neoplatonist scholar, Porphyry, in his fifteen volume 'Adversus Christianos', written about 270 A.D. Porphyry said:

"Daniel did not predict so much future events as he narrated past ones. Finally what he had told up to Antiochus contained true history; if anything was guessed beyond that point it was false, for he had not known the future."

As Le Roy Edwin Froom succinctly puts Porphyry's charge, he asserted that some Jew writing in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes (d. 164 B.C.) gathered up the traditions of Daniel's life and wrote a history of recent events but in the future tense, falsely dating them back to Daniel's time. Methodius of Olympus, Eusebius, the historian, and Apollinaris were among those who wrote against Porphyry. Jerome is among those who defend the authenticity of Daniel, which continued to be accepted indeed throughout the centuries and right up to the latter part of the 19th century by the majority of Christians. There were some converts, it is


2. Quoted by Jerome in the latter's Commentaria in Danielem, prologue (PL. vol. 25, col. 491)


true, to Porphyry's judgment on the Book of Daniel, even in ancient times, amongst whom were Ephraem Syrus, an important figure in the Syrian Church of the 4th century, and Polychronius, bishop of Apamea, who flourished about 430.

Our concern is not with the correct dating of the Book of Daniel, though our study of eschatology may suggest a questioning of the modern approach to that book, as an indirect result. The point is that there was a strong tradition in the Early Church, witnessed to clearly by Hippolytus, which, relying on the 6th century B.C. dating of Daniel, saw Rome as the fourth world empire of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. We cannot ignore the significance of this Early Church tradition, the more so because it seems to have been quite widespread. If the Church took seriously the equation of Rome with the fourth world empire of Daniel 2 and Daniel 7, how could it have anticipated the imminent coming of Christ in glory? Hippolytus certainly did not have any such expectation. It is possible, of course, to argue that this thinking resulted from an accommodation on the part of the Church to the hard fact that the Parousia had in fact been delayed long beyond the original expectation of the apostles and primitive Church. We have to reckon, however, with the fact that St. Paul can say, in one of his earliest epistles (II Thessalonians), that the 'day of the Lord' "will not come, unless the rebellion comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of perdition, who opposes and exalts himself against every so-called god or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God" (2.3-4). Significant
too is the fact that St. Paul goes on to say that he had already instructed the Thessalonians in these matters while he was among them. (v. 5). This was evidently a matter of normal elementary instruction of converts in St. Paul's practice.

It is an impressive fact that Hippolytus relies not only on the Book of Daniel for his interpretation of history, but that he combines with this other prophetic references, including certain from our Lord, St. Paul, and 'the blessed John' (ὁ Ἰωάννης ἡμῶν). If we put to the side for the moment the support derived from the 'Revelation', since its utterances are less susceptible to unanimous interpretation, it is surely salutary that Hippolytus purports to derive his view of history from what is recorded in the New Testament. It is not in his view a 'de novo' interpretation that he offers, nor even does it rely simply on common or traditional acceptance by Christians: rather does he see it as the New Testament's way of understanding history, guided by Old Testament prediction and the supreme action of God in the Incarnation, and the death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord Jesus Christ. To say this is not to assume that Hippolytus is necessarily sound in this judgment. Nevertheless, it is impressive evidence as to how the Early Church itself interpreted Old and New Testament Scriptures, and this is what we are presently concerned with. For, if Hippolytus is right, that is, in his assumption that he was not voicing anything new, then we have to question radically the assumption that the Church of his day, or even earlier, was dismayed by the 'delay' in the Parousia of our Lord. At the same time this raises the question whether New Testament scholarship is sound in its broad support for the view that it documents an 'imminent' expectation of the Parousia. Thus, Hippolytus' view of history raises far-reaching considerations.
In chapter LXIII of the De Christo et Antichristo Hippolytus expressly cites II Thess. 2.1-2. In the previous chapter he has quoted Matt. 24.15-22 in substance (parallels at Mark 13.14-20; Luke 21.20-23), in conjunction with Dan. 11.31; 12.11,12. It is his conviction that all these passages of Scripture must be taken together, in the divine providence, in order to gain a total picture of the future, especially in connection with the revelation of Antichrist's reign.

This thesis is that the seventieth week from the "going forth of the word to restore Jerusalem" (Dan. 9.25) is to be divided into two parts. This knowledge is gained partly from Dan. 9.27 and partly from the collocation with this passage of Rev. 12.6 (with its reference to 1260 days) and Matt. 24.15-22. Rev. 12.3 is also at the back of Hippolytus' mind. The thought is that the seventieth week from the going forth of the word for Jerusalem's restoration to the end of the age is divided into two parts, each being 'a time, times, and a half'. This is taken to refer to three and a half days in each part of the seventieth week, or, on what is known as the 'year-day' principle, three and a half years in each part. This should give a period of 1260 days to each part, when reckoned in terms of the lunar year of 360 days. Relying on Dan. 12.11 this is altered to 1290 days for the second part of this 'seventieth week'. During the first half of the week the two witnesses of Rev. 12.3 prophesy. At the end of the half-week Antichrist is revealed, the two witnesses are put to death, and Antichrist's reign begins. It is cut short at the end of 1290 days by the Appearing of Christ. This is a fairly complicated series of events and the coalescing of the supporting evidence is equally complicated. It may be questioned whether Hippolytus was justified in viewing all scripture in this 'flat' manner as of equal value and
as being inter-related. Be this as it may, Hippolytus did so view things and he takes up our Lord's reported words in the relevant section of Matthew 24, as well as such a passage as II Thess. 2, in order to justify his conclusions. Further, there is the fact that other writer drew these same Scripture passages together, though their statements on the subject are not so detailed as in Hippolytus. And we have to reckon with the fact that, as reported, Jesus evidently understood Daniel to be referring to events still future in His own day. Whether or not Jesus did in fact refer to an Antichrist figure, still future in Hippolytus' day, or to the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, Jesus evidently accepted the principle that the 'seventieth week' of Dan. 9 (based on Jeremiah's prophecy 25.11-12; 29.10) was to be divided and that it was to be split by the appearance of the 'desolator' of Dan. 9.27. What is fundamental here is not whether Jesus was right so to understand (many would argue that in this He was a child of His time), nor whether Hippolytus is right so to think. Rather the point is that Hippolytus' apparently 'flat' way of treating Scriptural passages has somewhat in common with the method of Jesus, as of other early Christian thinkers. Where did Paul derive his concept of 'the man of sin' of II Thess. 2, if it was not either from the Book of Daniel or from a primitive Christian testimony concerning such a Dominical utterance, as we find in Matt.24.15-22 and parallels? It would, therefore, appear that one strain of early Christian thinking does not favour the 'imminence' of the Parousia.
THE ANTICHRIST PORTRAYED

There is much more to Hippolytus' De Christo et Antichristo than the relatively straightforward judgment that Rome is the fourth world empire of Daniel, chapters two and seven. So far we have concentrated attention on references to this view, since this is in itself adequate to show that Hippolytus did not expect the Parousia of Christ in any imminent fashion. We have also sought to show that the reference in the Commentary on Daniel to the scheme of millennia, within which the Birth of Christ occurred at the year 5500 and the Parousia remained future at 6000 (i.e. 500 A.D.), must be understood within the relatively long time perspective provided by the prophetic interpretation of the Book of Daniel and this judgment that, as the Roman Empire still existed, the emergence of the 'ten kingdoms' and the subsequent appearance of Antichrist still lay in the future prior to the Parousia of Christ. We shall look in a little more detail later at this scheme of seven millennia, as Hippolytus alludes to it, in its bearing on his attitude to millenarianism. Our present concern has been simply with the time scheme with which Hippolytus worked. What we must now do is to look at some of the more detailed statements of Hippolytus regarding the future between the two Advents and especially regarding Antichrist and his reign. There are a number of reasons for so doing. One is that, in order to document properly the eschatology of Hippolytus, this should be done. A second is that it is difficult to see individual contributions in their proper light unless they are set within their total original framework. A third is that it is by so doing we shall best set forth what was intended by our reference to Hippolytus' conviction regarding the repetitiveness of history. In setting about this task, we shall rely primarily on the evidence provided by the De Christo et Antichristo.
The basic principle of this Treatise which is concerned primarily with the doctrine of Antichrist is that "καὶ τὸ πάντα γὲρον ἐξομοιούμενα βούλεται ὁ κλάων τῷ νιντοῦ θεοῦ. "(VI). 1. The allusion to I Peter 1.10, already mentioned and found in chapter V reminds us that the 'anti' (Ἀντί) in the term, Antichrist, (Ἀντίς Ἰσραήλ) refers not solely, or perhaps even primarily, to the opposition of this figure to Christ's kingly rule. 'Anti' (Ἀντί) is used not so much in its meaning 'against', as rather in that other sense, 'instead of' or 'in place of'. Antichrist is one who stands in for Christ and pretends to be Christ, by his manner of life and activity.

In chapter VI Hippolytus summarizes the ways in which Antichrist imitates Christ. We may set these out thus, very briefly, in tabloid fashion:

a. Christ is a lion, so Antichrist is a lion. At Rev. 5.5 Christ, as the 'lion of Judah', prevails to break the seals which conceal and keep back the future destiny of God's people. The thought is that Antichrist, by his tyrannous rule, seeks to usurp the destiny of Christ.

b. Antichrist appears as a lamb, but inwardly he is a wolf.

c. Antichrist is to come into the world in the circumcision i.e. He is to be of Israelitish stock.

d. He is to send out apostles, as did Christ.

e. He also is to gather together a people that is scattered abroad.

f. He is to give a seal, as did our Lord. Latter is a reference, it would seem, to Christian Baptism.

g. In form he is to be a man, as Christ was a man.

h. He is to imitate resurrection of our Lord's body by raising a temple of stone in Jerusalem.

From all of this it seems clear that Hippolytus, under one dominant aspect of his thinking on this subject, envisaged Antichrist as a human person who would claim to be the true Messiah of Israel; that he would be instrumental in the return of the Jewish people to the Promised Land; 1. C.C.S., p.8, ll.1-2.
and that he would be responsible for the erection of the Temple, in ruins since the destruction of it during the overthrow of Jerusalem by the Romans in A.D. 70. However, this figure would, of course, be a deceiver, an imitation of the true Messiah, Jesus of Nazareth, who has already come and who will reappear in order to overthrow this contesting of His throne. What is implicit is the concept found in Irenaeus, of the Antichrist as an incarnation of evil, parallel to and in opposition with, the Incarnation of God's Son.

It is true that certain aspects of Hippolytus' thinking on the subject do not seem to fit into this pattern. Thus, we may ask how such a picture, as given above, is reconciled with his understanding that Antichrist is to emerge as a figure who displaces three of the 'ten kingdoms', spoken of in Daniel 7, since these ten kingdoms are thought of as continuous in some way with the fourth world empire, identified as Imperial Rome. It is certainly possible to conceive of a Jewish leader as overthrowing three nations which would emerge from the dominion of Rome. Nevertheless, the appearance of the 'little horn' of Daniel 7 is at least suggestive of a continuity on his part also with the fourth world empire. One would at least have expected a figure more closely connected with Rome than a Jewish Antichrist, whom Hippolytus affirms at one point (chapters XIV-XV) to be of the Jewish tribe of Dan. Possibly Hippolytus saw no contradiction, since the Jewish people and land had come under Roman domination. The main point, however, is surely that he is not concerned to give an entirely consistent picture. Rather is he concerned to be faithful to Scripture, even if it leads him into obscurities, which, in his assumption, only future history would unravel. It is, therefore, fair to Hippolytus to view his thinking, whether ultimately satisfactory or not, as scientific, in the sense that it seeks to be consistent with the data, which is found in Scripture. Essentially Hippolytus wishes to be faithful to Scripture, and is not speculative in his thinking.
THE PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION WITHIN HISTORY EXAMPLES

An interesting allusion occurs in connection with his claim that Antichrist will come from the tribe of Dan. He bases this claim on Gen. 49.17 "Let Dan be a serpent, lying upon the ground, biting the horse's heel", also upon Gen. 3.1 and Jer. 8.16. Irenaeus had already made the suggestion that Antichrist would be of this tribe, alluding to Jer. 8.16 and the fact that the name of Dan is omitted from the tribes of Israel listed in Revelation 7. Hippolytus' attitude regarding Gen. 49.16 is especially noteworthy. "Ἄλλ' ἐρεῖ τις τότε ἐκ τῶν Σαμωρῶν ἐγρηγται, ὡς ἐκ τῆς πολῆς τοῦ Δαν γεννηθεὶς ἐκρινε τὸν λαὸν εἰκοσίον ἐτη, τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῶν Σαμωρῶν μερίκοις γεγέγονα, τὸ δὲ καθ' ὅλου πληρωθεὶς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιΧριστων."

Other examples of this kind of reasoning are found in this same Treatise. In the same context of discussion regarding Antichrist, as of Dan's tribe, he goes on to quote Isa.10.12-17 as having a reference to Antichrist. Here the thought is not that this passage demonstrates this particular tribal origin of Antichrist. It is rather simply another instance of a Scripture which had a nearer fulfilment, as having a more remote one also. Thus, Hippolytus clearly knows that the prophecy of Isa.10 has already been fulfilled and that the pride of Assyria has been laid low. Sometimes, it would seem, the justification for choosing a particular passage as having a further reference is that the prophecy has not been fulfilled in every detail on the first occasion. This serves to show that some further reference is in view.

1 Adversus Haereses, V, XXX.2.
2 G.C.S., Hipp. 1, p.11 l.21 - p.12 l.3
Thus, in chapter XXX Hippolytus takes the words of Isa.1.7-8 as having their more full outworking in the overthrow of Jerusalem by the Romans than in that by the Babylonians. Here it is not perhaps so much that details are left unfulfilled on the first occasion as rather that, in the light of history we can look back and see how much more thoroughly this prophecy has been accomplished through the Romans.

An important illustration of this principle is given in chapter XLIX where Hippolytus remarks in the passing that the conduct of Antichrist, dealt with under the figure of 'the beast' in Rev. 13, was anticipated by Antiochus Epiphanes. The reference is especially to Rev. 13.16-17, where we are told that the beast will cause to be marked everyone, both great and small, so that no one will be able to buy or sell unless he bears this mark. Hippolytus takes the reference to having this mark 'in the right hand' or 'on the forehead' as having to do with the requirement of sacrifice. He goes on to say that this is what happened already under Antiochus Epiphanes:

"οὗτος γὰρ ἔτεκνότατο κατὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ Ἑπιφάνης, ὁ τῆς Συρίας γενόμενος βασιλεὺς, ὅπερ ἐκ γένους Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῖς τότε καιροῖς ἐπισείς τῇ καρδίᾳ ἔριψε ψῆφισμα βαρύνει πρὸς τῶν θυρῶν τιθέσθαι ἀπανταῖς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ κισσοὺς ἐστηθανομένους πομπαδεῖν τῷ Διονύσῳ, τοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους ὑποτάσσεσθαι, τούτους μετὰ σκλαβεύσαι καὶ ἐτησμᾶν καὶ βαινᾶν ἀναφεύγειν." (XLIX)

It is true that Hippolytus does not here assert that a prophecy has a double reference. This thought appears to be, however, in the background, for it is asserted as we shall see, in the Commentary on Daniel. Even if this were not so, the thought of the above passage would be significant, for basically Hippolytus sees the double reference of prophecy as corresponding to a double movement of history.

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1G.C.S. Hipp. 1, p.33, 11.2-8
Clearly, if a prophecy can have a double reference, there must be some marked similarity between the circumstances of the two occasions prophesied. Nonetheless, the thinking of Hippolytus, in this instance, comes out most clearly in what is said in his Commentary on Daniel.

In his Commentary on Daniel Hippolytus reaches the section in Daniel, Chapter II, which appears to relate to the time of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dominion of Palestine. It is the close approximation of references in Daniel II to actual historical events during this period, combined with alleged inconsistencies in this Book with 6th century B.C. events and circumstances, that has constituted the most impressive argument for the second century B.C. dating of the Book of Daniel. Hippolytus recognizes the references to the Greek period. The one spoken of in Dan.II:20ff. is recognized as Antiochus Epiphanes. The sufferings of those mentioned in Dan.II:33 are referred explicitly to those who remain faithful during Antiochus' persecution (XLIII.2-4), and the 'little help' of v.34 is taken of Matthias (Mattathias) and Judas Maccabeus (XLIV.3). Hippolytus, however, takes v.36ff as having reference, not to Antiochus Epiphanes, but to Antichrist. He says: "Διηγησάμενος ὁ δὲ θρόνης τα ἡδι συμβαίντα καὶ Χρόνοις ἱδίοις καὶ τελεσθέντα, ἑτέρον ἡμῖν μυστήριον καταγγέλλει, ἑδαίμων καιρῶν ἐνδειξιν ποιούμενος. Λέγει γὰρ ὁ θεός: καὶ ὅπως ἑτέρος ἀναστήσεται ἐτέρος βασιλεὺς ἀναστήσεται καὶ ὁ ὑπερθέντα ὑπό τεν θεοῦ καὶ μεγαλύθησεται καὶ λαλήσει ὑπερογκα καὶ κατευθυνεῖ μέχρις ὁ συντελεσθῇ ἡ ὑπερί οἷς γέροντες συντελοὶ γίνεται." (IV, XLVIII : 1-2)

1Hippolytus alludes to I Macc.2.33 as indicating the fulfilment of Dan. II.33.
It has always been a question of interpretation, among those accepting a 6th century dating for Daniel, whether vv.40ff are to be viewed as having a second century B.C. reference, or whether the thought has swung away to a series of events, then in the remote future. However, Hippolytus sees the change as occurring at v.36. The text he relies on is that of Theodotion, which both Jewish and Christian commentators used from the second century A.D. onwards, as a replacement for the Septuagint version of Daniel, because the latter contained so many alterations and modifications. Our present interest is in the fact that this version which Hippolytus here relied on, seems, by its very language, at this point to suggest a change of reference: "And there shall rise up another shameless king --". Nevertheless, Hippolytus clearly sees what follows Dan.II.36 as paralleling in some way what happened in Antiochus' reign. In this way we once again find documentation for the view that, for Hippolytus, history works out in an ordered manner, so that the wise may understand. On such an understanding the reason why Daniel, writing in the 6th century B.C., gives such close attention to what takes place in the second, is because, in the divine providence, what happened then is intended to be a portrayal of what will occur during Antichrist's reign at the end of the age. That Hippolytus really does see a parallel between Dan.II.36ff and what has preceded in that chapter, that this is his meaning, is evident from the fact that phrases, such as 'the king of the south', occur in both parts of the chapter. We cannot imagine that this fact was lost on Hippolytus. If it be once granted that another figure is spoken of from v.36 onwards, the chapter is most naturally interpreted on the assumption of some correspondence between the situation described prior to v.36 and that described after it.
This kind of thinking, which sees parallels in differing historical situations, may well be suspected in certain places, where it is not possible to prove conclusively that it is present. Thus, in chapter XXXII of the *De Christo et Antichristo*, Hippolytus notes that Daniel has been proved correct by history in his prediction that the third world-empire would split up into four 'horns'. Here Hippolytus is relying on Daniel, chapters 7 and 8: "ἐὰς γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἐφεσθώ. ἄνεσθη γὰρ ἡ κάρδαλις, ἐλθεὶν δ’ ὑπάγος τῶν δύμων, ἔτυμε τὸν κριόν, συνέτριψεν αὐτοῦ τὰ κέρατα, καὶ κατεπάτησεν αὐτοῦ τὸις ποσίω, ἐκράτησεν, ὠμόθη. ἐν τῷ πεσεῖν αὐτοῦ ἄνεσθη τέσσαρα κέρατα ὑποκάταθεν αὐτοῦ. εὐφραίνον, μαχάρε Δαυιῤῥ, οὐκ ἐπλανήθης, γεγένηται ταῦτα πάντα."

Hippolytus goes on to note in chapter XXXIII that Daniel had then prophesied of the fourth beast, with reference to whom it is said:

"οἱ δὲντες αὐτοῦ σιδηροῦ, καὶ οἱ ὅνωξες αὐτοῦ χαλκοῦ."

Already, he says, this kingdom is present. The plain implication is that, since so much of what Daniel had prophesied has come to pass, the rest will assuredly come to pass also. The ten kingdoms will arise out of Imperial Rome, and Antichrist will emerge thereafter, displacing three of these kingdoms. Beyond this, however, there is surely latent the suggestion that there is a parallel between the history of the third and fourth world kingdoms of Daniel's prophecy. Just as Greece divided into four divisions, so Rome will divide into ten. And just as one from these horns 'mouthed great things', so the ten will come under the sway of one such, the true Antichrist. This parallelism is remarkable,

1 G.C.S., Hipp.1,p.21,11.10-14
2 G.C.S., Hipp.1,p.21,11.15-16
though it is not directly alluded to at all. It seems implicit in Hippolytus' mind and hinted at in his narration of fulfilled prophecy at this point.

In this same Treatise in chapter XLIIff Hippolytus expresses the view that, just as the first advent of our Lord was preceded by a forerunner, it is appropriate that the same should occur at the second advent. He tells us in chapter XLIII that at Dan.9.27 the prophet was referring to the seventieth week at the end of the age. He goes on:—

Here again we find conflation of scripture passages from various parts. Dan. 9 is being brought into line with Rev.II.3, where two unnamed witnesses are spoken of as witnessing for a period of twelve hundred and sixty days. It is true, of course, that in this case the conflation obviously does not begin with Hippolytus, since Rev.II.3 has a close relationship to Dan.9.27. We have already noted Hippolytus' conviction that the 'seventieth week', dealt with in Daniel 9, is to be divided into two parts, the coming of Antichrist representing the point of bisection. Here he relates Rev.II.3 to the first part of this last week of the world, that is, to the part prior to the rise of Antichrist. With this in mind, we must now observe Hippolytus' reasoning concerning these forerunners of Rev.II.3. Basically he believes that two such witnesses will precede the coming of Antichrist because the Revelation asserts that this is so, but he sees it as congruous with God's way of working in history, hence his explanation of it, which he now sets forth in these words:—

\[1\]G.C.S., Hipp. 1,p.27,11.22 - p.28, 1.2
We have quoted this passage at some length on account of its richness of thought. The basic argument is that, just as Christ came twice, so there must be forerunners on both occasions. John the Baptist preceded the first advent of our Lord, and the "two witnesses" of Rev. II.3 will precede the second advent. In the latter case they also appear immediately before the emergence of Antichrist, though they do not witness to him — rather they are killed by him, as Rev. II.7.

\[1\] G.C.S., Hipp. 1, p. 28, 11.2-3; 11.15-19; 11.22-23; p. 29, 11.2-10; p. 29, 1.14; p. 3, 1.1.
informs us. Clearly the concept of repetitiveness in history is at work here.

One or two points call for more detailed mention. Hippolytus' understanding of John the Baptist's role is impressively set forth—in the womb, in his preaching ministry and witness to Jesus at Jordan, and even in death. Again, the concept of the Descent into Hades by our Lord is documented as having considerably occupied the minds of the Early Church Fathers, and Hippolytus gives it a special slant all his own, in introducing John the Baptist as our Lord's forerunner here, though the point is probably to be regarded as chiefly homiletical in character. Another significant point is that emphasis falls on the repetition of the situation that our Lord should be heralded. It happened at His first advent: it is to occur again at His second advent. The fact that, on the second occasion two witnesses are sent does not receive emphasis, but the fact is faithfully set forth, because this is what John relates through his vision. It is likely that Hippolytus sees congruity even in this fact with past history, though not now with the first advent of our Lord: rather is the congruity with the Exodus leadership of Moses and Aaron. The passage in Rev.II seems unquestionably to owe a good deal to the portrayal in the Book of Exodus of the contest between Moses and Aaron on the one hand and Pharaoh on the other. The 'signs and wonders' that they perform remind one of the contests between Moses and Pharaoh, who thus tacitly becomes, both in Revelation and surely in Hippolytus, an anticipation of Antichrist. If Hippolytus wonders why there is only one forerunner before Christ's first advent, while there are two before His second, he does not comment on this matter. It may be that he sees a congruity even here, in that just as both John and Jesus were put to death, so the two witnesses will both be put to death in the End-time. At any rate the whole passage is an
impressive witness to Hippolytus’ understanding that in the divine providence there is an element of repetitiveness in history. We find this concept powerfully at work, of course, in Deutero-Isaiah, in the Pauline concept of Christ’s baptism in blood on the Cross as a New Exodus, and elsewhere in the Scriptures and in the Early Church Fathers, but Hippolytus reckons with this fact in his understanding of the future in a specially systematic and detailed fashion.

One could multiply examples of this kind of thing in Hippolytus’ eschatological writings, but to do so would be unnecessary. Suffice it to mention that in the Commentary on Daniel, IV.I, the ‘two witnesses’ are again referred to, as preceding Antichrist’s period of rule, though here no comparison is made with the past witness of John the Baptist. Again we find in IV.LIV. a quite explicit expression of that understanding of Daniel II in terms of a parallelism between Antiochus Epiphanes’ rule and that of Antichrist, which we claimed above (page 777) was implicit in the De Christo et Antichristo in chapter XLIX and virtually explicit in the Commentary on Daniel, chapters XLIII-XLIV. Hippolytus says

"Δύο οὖν βδελόγματα προείρηκεν Δαυιδ, ἐν μὲν ἀρνισμοῦ, ἐν δὲ ἐρμακέως. Τί τὸ τοῦ ἀρνισμοῦ ἄλλ’ ἢ ὁ ἐστήσεν ἐκεῖ κατὰ τὸ καιρὸν ὁ Αὐτίκος, καὶ τί τὸ τῆς ἐρμακέως ἄλλ’ ἢ τὸ καθ’ ὅλου, ὡς παρέσται ὁ ἀντίΧριστος. " (Para. 1)

The reference again here is to the wanton destruction of Antiochus Epiphanes, viewed as alluded to in sections of the earlier part of Daniel II, and the coming desolation under Antichrist, spoken of in Dan.9.27 and the latter part of Daniel II (v.36ff) and on into chapter 12. To the two advents of Christ, and His two sets of forerunners, there corresponds the two outpourings of evil, though that under Antiochus is only one notable example of a principle that has been operative throughout history.
THE VISION CONCERNING THE SEVENTY WEEKS

We must now look briefly at Hippolytus' understanding of Daniel's vision in chapter 9 concerning the 'seventy weeks'. Daniel's interest stems from the prophecy of Jeremiah (recorded at 25.11-12; 29.10) to the effect that after seventy years God will punish the king of Babylon and make his land an 'everlasting waste'. Daniel, it is asserted, writing in the first year of Darius the Mede (of whom history records nothing), now prays to God asking whether the punishment of Babylon is to be succeeded by the restoration of God's people to their own land. Gabriel is sent by God, in view of Daniel's prayers and his special favour with God, to instruct him concerning God's plan for His people and sanctuary in Jerusalem in future days. Dan. 9.24-27 records the revelation which he gave to Daniel. The basic assertion is that 70 weeks of years must run concerning Daniel's people and city "to finish the transgression, to put an end to sin, and to atone for iniquity, to bring in everlasting righteousness, to seal both vision and prophet, and to anoint a most holy place." (v.24). This period of 70 weeks of years was to be divided into three sections, viz., seven weeks, sixty two weeks, and one final week. This last week was to be divided into two parts. During its first part a strong covenant is to be made with many; during its second half sacrifice and offering are to cease; further, the desolator of the sanctuary is to rule until "the decreed end is poured out on the desolator". If it be asked from what time these 70 weeks are to run, the answer is given in v.25 -- "from the going forth of the word to restore and build Jerusalem". At the end of the first 7 weeks, an 'anointed one', a prince, is to appear. During the 62 weeks Jerusalem is to be built -- this would seem to mean, on most interpretations to be in a built state -- "though in a troubled time". At the end of the 62 weeks an anointed one is
to be cut off; "and the people of the prince who is to come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary."

(v.25).

Interpretation of Daniel's vision of the 70 weeks was a matter of considerable concern in the Early Church. It is interesting that Septuagintal changes in the text of Dan.9.24-27 in the pre-Christian era appear to have been made with the intention of favouring an interpretation which saw the 70 weeks as terminating in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes. Thus, in v.25 the phrase, "from the going forth of the word to restore Jerusalem", which marks the starting point disappears. This leaves the prophecy 'floating' in history and makes it more susceptible of any application. However, the Septuagint includes for the phrase, "seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks", its rendering, "seven and seventy times and 62 of years". What is interesting in this is the interpretation of the 62 in terms of years. This appears to be the first instance of the so-called 'year-day' principle of interpretation. The translators of the Revised Standard Version of the Old Testament evidently judged that a comparison of MSS. suggested that originally the Hebrew contained a reference to years and that the Septuagint gave this point away in its emendations. Hence the R.S.V. speaks of 'weeks of years' in v.24, not simply 'seventy weeks' as in the Authorized Version of 1611. It is also noteworthy that Josephus understands the 'seven times' of Dan.4.32,

which were to pass over Nebuchadnezzar, as meaning 'seven years', and it seems to be hinted at that he also understood the seventy weeks of years in this way, since he speaks of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans as perhaps completing these 'weeks'\(^1\). It is in this setting that we have to note the interpretation made by certain Early Church Fathers.

Until Tertullian's day interest focused on the second half of the seventieth week. Thus, Irenaeus mentions only this half-week, which he views as the period of Antichrist's reign. This he equates with the 'times, two times, and half a time' of the Little Horn of Daniel 7.25. The understanding of the latter period in terms of literal years was common at this time. Justin Martyr so understood, in opposition to Trypho, the Jew, who thought in terms of a 'time' as 100 years (ch. XXXII). Justin does not expressly identify this period, however, with any location in the 'seventy weeks' of Dan.9.24-27. In Tertullian we find an explicit reference to the 'seventy weeks' as such, and it is contended\(^2\) that these stretch from the first year of Darius up to the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 by the Romans under Titus. He considered that the birth of Christ took place at the end of 62 and a half weeks. Clement of Alexandria has a similar understanding. He discusses this matter in the Stromateis\(^3\). He considered that the Temple was built in the prophesied first 7 weeks. During the 62 weeks everything was quiet in Judaea. Christ reigned as Lord during the

\(^1\) Antiquities, chapter II, section 7.

\(^2\) Adversus Iudaeus, chs.VIII and XI.

\(^3\) III. XXI
seventieth week. He seems to think of the seventieth week in terms of our Lord's ministry, rather than as being counted from His birth. Clement's account of the seventieth week is somewhat confused. He places Nero during the first part of it. During its second half he was removed and at its close Vespasian became supreme and desolated Jerusalem. Julius Africanus (c.160-240)\(^1\) has a more consistent interpretation of the 70 week period. He dated it from the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, 444 B.C., to 31 A.D. This consists of 475 solar years, which correspond to 490 lunar years, i.e. 70 weeks of years. Thus, we find variations in interpretation, but broadly the years are thought to span the period between the Persian kings and the death of Christ or the Fall of Jerusalem. The 'year-day' principle seems to be established in all these interpretations.

Le Roy Edwin Froom deals with Hippolytus' understanding of the Danielic prophecy of the 'seventy weeks' in Daniel, 9 and he makes this comment:--

"Hippolytus places the period of Antichrist's predicted domination of three and one half 'times', or 1260 days, in the last half of the 'last week' of Daniel's seventieth hebdomad, or week of years, which he arbitrarily separates by a chronological gap from the preceding sixty-nine weeks, placing it just before the end of the world, and dividing the seventieth week between the two sackcloth-robed witnesses (Enoch and Elijah) and the Antichrist. Hippolytus is believed to be the first to have projected such a theory, making the sixty-nine weeks reach from the first year of Darius the Mede to Christ's first coming, and the seventieth to begin separately after a gap, just before Christ's second coming."

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He goes on to explain that the other commentators usually understand the seventy hebdomads, as we have seen, as terminating at Jesus' death or at the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Thus, in these writers, says Froom, the hebdomads have no reference to Antichrist.

Froom's judgment that Hippolytus separates the seventieth week from the other sixty-nine weeks is based on the fact that in the De Christo et Antichristo, XLIII, he takes Dan.9.27 as having a reference to Antichrist's future reign, while in the Commentary on Daniel this impression seems to be confirmed in that Hippolytus there deals with the first 7 weeks in sections 13-14, with the 62 weeks in sections 15-16 and says explicitly: "Τῶν γὰρ ἐξήκοντα δύο ἕβδομάδων πληρωθεὶσῶν καὶ Χριστοῦ παραγενομένου καὶ τοῦ ἐναγγελίου ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ κραυγαλέους ἐκκενωθέντων ταῦτα καὶ μία ἕβδομα περιελήφθεται ἡ ἐσχάτη, ἐν ᾗ παρέσται Ἡλίας καὶ 'Ενώκ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου ἡμίσει αὐτής ἀναφανθείται «τὸ βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρμίμασεως» ἐν 'ΑντίΧριστος, ἐρμίμασιν τῶν κόσμων καταγγέλλων." (iv.xxxv.3)

Nevertheless, one wonders whether this picture represents the whole story. When we note that in both the Treatise and Commentary Enoch and Elijah are mentioned at the relevant passages, and when we recall that, as we have already observed (pp.779-782 above), Hippolytus believed that, just as there were two comings of Christ, so there should be two sets of forerunners, it seems impossible to doubt that there are certain hidden assumptions made by Hippolytus. It would not be his intention to be secretive; rather was he working with a concept of repetitiveness which he had made clear elsewhere. He, therefore, saw no need to make it explicit at this point, but there seems little doubt that it is in fact present throughout.
What Hippolytus appears to assume is that the seventieth week occurred at the close of the sixty-nine, but that it is to be repeated at the end of the age. The references to Enoch and Elijah seem good confirmation of this assessment. The fact that he sees Antichrist foreshadowed in Antiochus Epiphanes, taken in conjunction with the other examples of his concept of repetitiveness in history, helps to make this judgment more credible. If Antiochus' desolation of the Temple was a type of Antichrist's havoc at the end of the age, it is not likely that Hippolytus would find it difficult to see either the crucifixion of Jesus or the destruction of Jerusalem, more probably the latter, in this light also. It may be objected that on this view, the other sixty-nine weeks should also be repeated. Whether this be sound or not, Hippolytus does not think in this way. This may indicate inconsistency, or an oversight in his thinking, or, more probably the presence of other considerations which made him stress the parallel, between the years 30-70 A.D. and the 'last week' of the age. In any event, the fact that no such reference is made does not invalidate the concept that Hippolytus did look for a repetition in the end of the age of what had happened in the death of Jesus or consequent upon it. For, if we accept the thesis proposed above with regard to this matter, Hippolytus does accept like Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Julius Africanus, that the seventy weeks refer basically to the period from the Persian era in the Babylonian Captivity of the Jews up to the era, approximately 30-70 A.D. There is no reason why he should not choose to select one moment in that series and see it as significant of the end of the age. There is no reason why the choice of the final week as significant of what is to happen at the end of the age, should demand, in Hippolytus' thinking, that the other weeks should also be repeated. What Hippolytus really meant by the concept, that we have
denominated 'repetitiveness', was simply that, viewed with the eyes of faith and enlightenment, certain events and certain periods -- chosen from a worldly point of view somewhat randomly -- point forward to what is to happen at the end of the age. Such a view does not basically work with a rigid conformity of one event to another or one period to another. It leaves the illuminated spirit to perceive what is significant. This may indeed be viewed as fanciful, but this is a charge all faith has to meet, and it does seem at any rate to represent fairly closely what Hippolytus believed.

That Hippolytus was not rigidly bound by the desire to find precise parallelism and adjustment of periods seems obvious from an examination of the whole section, in the Comm. on Daniel, Chapter XXXII dealing with Daniel 9.24-27 in its details.

There is something curious about the way in which Hippolytus explains the manner in which the predictions regarding the first seven, and the subsequent, sixty-two weeks have been fulfilled. We must now consider this in a little detail. In the first place, Hippolytus deals with the 'seven weeks', which he consistently understands to mean 49 years. He notes the year in which Daniel is recorded as having received this vision, concludes that it is twenty-one years after the year in which Jeremiah made his celebrated prophecy, found at Jer.25.11-12 (cf.29.10), and shows that the sum of these two figures (forty-nine and twenty-one) makes up the 'seventy' of which Jeremiah spoke (XXX:4-6). The forty-nine years from the date of Daniel's vision are terminated by the year in which the sanctuary was rebuilt (c.518 B.C.). This corresponds approximately to 70 years from the time of Jeremiah's original utterance. Thereafter Hippolytus goes on to note that 62 weeks of years is equivalent to 434 years, and considers it appropriate that the period from the return from Babylon to the first advent of
Christ should be 434 years, since the first covenant was given to Israel after a period of 434 years (XXXII:1-2). Hippolytus follows in this the Septuagint rendering of Ex.12.40, which speaks of the sojourn in Egypt and in Canaan as 430 years, the tradition which Paul also relies on in Gal. 3.17. What is noteworthy, however, in all of this is that, though he is concerned about the approximate correctness at least of these numerical periods, that is, their congruity with prophecy or the principle of repetition, Hippolytus seems to be very cavalier in his attitude to the fixing of the precise boundary lines between the various periods. Thus, the first period is taken to last from Jeremiah’s prophecy down to the rebuilding of the Temple, some years after the Return from Babylon. One would have expected the next period to follow neatly thereafter, that is, 434 years from 518 B.C., making due allowance for lunar reckoning rather than solar. However, Hippolytus puts it in this way: “Μετὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιστρέψαι τοῦ λαὸν ἐκ βαβυλῶνος ἡγομένου αὐτῶν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Ἰωσεδὲκ καὶ Ἑσφραῖον τῶν γραμματέων καὶ Ζοροβάβελ τοῦ Σαλαβίου, οὕτως ἐκ φυλῆς Ἰουδαία, τετρακόσια τρίακοστα τέσσαρα ἔτη γεγένηται, ἐώς τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . .” (Com. in Dan. IV.XXI.2).

What seems curious here is that Hippolytus feels free to group together Jesus the son of Josedech and Zerubbabel, who were active around 520 B.C. with Ezra, who is to be dated around 444 B.C. From Ezra’s time to that of Christ’s birth was around 434 years, although it falls further short of it on lunar reckoning than on solar. Probably Hippolytus’ knowledge of the distance in time between Ezra and Jesus Christ was inexact, but more probably he is not in any case concerned, not because the figure should not be at least roughly accurate (he seems to assume this in the case of the 70 years), but because he has
given himself a commencement-point for the periods which is of a
'sliding' character. Clearly from 520 B.C. to Christ cannot be reckoned
430 years either on lunar or solar reckoning. Conceivably Hippolytus
was not sure how long there was between the rebuilding of the Temple
and Ezra, but he must have been aware from his knowledge of the
Scriptures that a considerable period of time was involved. From
Ezra's time, the figure seems perhaps near enough in its accuracy to
be striking, at least to someone who already has faith and is not
sceptical in outlook. One is reminded in Hippolytus of the attitude
to the placing of beginnings and endings of a period which characterized
the work and understanding of H. Grattan-Guinness in his books,
'The Approaching End of the Age' and 'Light for the Last Days',
written in the latter years of the 19th century. Why does Hippolytus
adopt this attitude? Is it simply in order to make the figures fit?
One may be tempted to surmise this, yet it seems more probable that
Hippolytus, like Grattan-Guinness after him, worked with the
assumption that, when dealing with periods, as distinct from precise
events, it is more realistic and true to the nature of history to
recognize that in fact movements are fluid in character. When did
the Jews return from Babylon? We know that various 'caravans' returned.
Hippolytus seems to assume that the Ezra date is acceptable because it
was an important date in the effective return of the Jews to their
own land. This is part of his thinking. The other even more
fundamental assumption appears to be that it is only as history unfolds
that we can look back and see where the periods begin and end and which
events mark off the beginnings and endings of periods which prophecy

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1 The Approaching End of the Age viewed in the light of History,
Light for the Last Days (Mrs. H. Grattan-Guinness was co-author of
this work). Morgan & Scott Ltd. 1886.
My references are to the 2nd edition of 'The Approaching End of
the Age' (1878) and to the 1917 edition of 'Light for the Last Days'
edited and revised by E.P. Cachemaille.

2 Cf. Light for the Last Days, p. 14 and passim.
has indicated in advance. Once again one is reminded powerfully of Grattan-Guinness in this outlook.

It seems clear, then, that Hippolytus is prepared to leave a gap between the first seven years and the ensuing sixty-nine weeks, if a consideration of how the prophecies have been fulfilled seems to lead to this conclusion. Thus, the seventy years of Jeremiah's prophecy and of Gabriel's further prediction (in terms of 49 years) appear to terminate in 518 B.C. This we understand, because this is in fact what happened and it fits the prophecies. Similarly, on Hippolytus' view, we move back from the time of Christ 434 years and we come nearly to the time of Ezra. This would seem to leave a gap from 520-444 B.C. However, we have also seen that Hippolytus coalesces the beginnings of the period of Return from Babylon. In fact he thus seems to be closing the gap.

In this way Hippolytus brings together the first 'seven weeks', which terminated approximately 518 B.C. and the 'sixty-nine weeks' which commenced about 444 B.C., in that the period between them belongs to the one era, that of the Return from Babylon. This is suggestive concerning his understanding of the period between the sixty-ninth and the seventieth week of Daniel's prophecy. Could it be that the whole 'era of Christ' is viewed as spanning the gap between the end of the sixty-ninth and the beginning of the seventieth week? This would be in line with his thinking about the joining of the 'seven weeks' and the 'sixty-nine' weeks. It may be argued that this is an alternative way of looking at things, and that we cannot consistently thus understand Hippolytus and at the same time also aver that he saw the whole seventy weeks as fulfilled by A.D. 70 at the latest and the final week repeated at the end of the age. However, one must ask why both views
should not represent aspects of Hippolytus' thinking. The view that the whole seventy weeks were on Hippolytus' view completed by A.D.70 seems feasible, in view of the factors adduced above. It would not be unreasonable to see the final week of that span repeated, when we consider other examples of 'historical repetitiveness' in Hippolytus' thinking. At the same time, the way in which Hippolytus bridges the gap between the seven weeks and the sixty-nine is at least suggestive of the possibility of a similar understanding between the sixty-ninth and seventieth weeks. In the Comm. on Daniel, IV chapter XXXII, Hippolytus thinks of Jesus Christ in His Incarnation in the flesh and in history as having fulfilled what was to take place at the end of the 'seventy weeks', as indicated in Dan.9.24. Thus, to take only one phrase, quoted by Hippolytus from that verse, Christ Jesus is said to fulfil the utterance, "<τοῦ συντελεσθεὶ λόγος καὶ τοῦ σφραγίσθει λόγος.> Οσοὶ γὰρ ἔως τέλους ἤπειθησαν αὐτῷ, τούτων οὖν οὐ συντελέσθησαν αἱ λόγοι, ἀλλὰ ἐσφραγίσθησαν εἰς κρίσιν τηροῦμεν. Οσοὶ δὲ ἦμελλον πιστεύειν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξαρχόμενοι αὐτῷ ὑπὸ δυσμένων ἄφιεναι λόγους, τούτων ἐπελείφθη τοιαύτη.» (Paras 6-7)

This seems to envisage Jesus Christ in this period between the two Advents as having in principle completed the work of the seventieth week, as envisaged in Dan. 9.24. Again Is.29-II is quoted (XXXIII.5) where it is asserted that the learned man will be unable to read a sealed book. This is explained in terms of Christ Jesus as the One Who has opened the book — cf Rev.3.7 and Rev. 5.1-2,6-9

Hippolytus puts it this way(XXXIV.1) "ἀυτῶς γὰρ ἦν οὗ τελεία σφραγίς καὶ η ἐκλείς ή ἐκ <Διότι, ο ἐναύγων καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐκλείς καὶ ἐκλείς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀνοίγει.>"
The point may still be pressed, however, that we cannot have it both ways. How can Hippolytus see the seventieth week as past already, though due to be repeated at the end of the age, when he, under another aspect of his thinking, views the sixty-ninth and seventieth weeks as meeting in the period of the Incarnation? One answer would be that apocalyptists are not always consistent in their imagery and that this would seem to impose a like attitude on their interpreters. However, it is not clear that the two views are necessarily inconsistent in this case. Is it not Hippolytus' whole thinking that the seventy weeks received their fulfilment in the Incarnation, but in such a way that fulfilment has yet to be fully manifested? Such a view would gather up both the attitudes previously described, viz. that the 70 weeks were completed at A.D. 70, and that the 69 weeks only receive their total completion at the Parousia. The reason for such a curious junction of views is that the completion in the Incarnation is of such a unique character that it requires future explication and outworking. The basic standpoint would seem to be that of the completion of the 70 weeks by A.D. 70 in the Incarnation, but it is realized that, because of its unique character, precisely those events of the seventieth week require a public manifestation in the Parousia. Thus, what we have here is not just an inconsistent harmonising of views, which, it might be alleged, is characteristic of apocalyptists and their interpreters, but rather a combination of views which seemed to Hippolytus to be demanded by the uniqueness of the events with which he was dealing, namely, the 'salvation-events' bound up with the Incarnation, Cross, Resurrection, and Ascension of Jesus Christ. This is not to say that Hippolytus consciously thought all this out, but this seems a reasonable explication of the subconscious motives at work in the apparent mingling of two seemingly divergent interpretations regarding the fulfilment of the 'seventy weeks' prediction of Dan.9.24ff.
THE PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION IN HISTORY : CONCLUSIONS

We may conclude this section of our study of Hippolytus by asking what is the significance of such a concept of repetitiveness in history, as Hippolytus seems to work with. What is the relevance of this for our study of his eschatology and of Early Church eschatology in general? Certainly the immediate relevance to our understanding of Hippolytus' eschatology is apparent. Hippolytus takes certain events, such as Antiochus Epiphanes' desecration of the Temple at Jerusalem, as significant of that final desecration of Christ's seat by Antichrist at the end of the age. The ultimate significance of this for our purposes, however, is surely that Hippolytus works with a whole theology of history. This is important because this represents the context in which Hippolytus' discussion of 'final events' takes place. For our present interest in eschatology one or two factors emerge which are relevant. First, the Parousia is treated in a thoroughly historical fashion as the consummation of a process which is carried forward over many centuries. Clearly, in so far as this event brings history to its completion, it transcends it, but Hippolytus sees it as terminating history at a definite point. Second, history is repetitive in character, and this by divine foreordination. The standpoint is that of I.Corr.10.11. Paul evidently saw not only judgment upon the Israelite grumblers in the wilderness as a warning to Christian believers, but discerned a divine purpose in the very happenings which overtook Israel at the Exodus: they took place so that a pattern of divine grace and judgment might be set forth which would shed light on the Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Hippolytus sees a divine meaning in the seemingly insignificant series of events of ancient times, sometimes just in particular events, such as the blasphemy of an Antiochus Epiphanes, or particular careers, such as that of a
Nebuchadnezzar. Third, it is implied by this, especially when we collate this element of repetitiveness with what is said concerning the five world kingdoms of Daniel, that world powers are, without being aware of it, fulfilling the divine plan, and the pattern of events proves that God is in control of history. Fourth, it would seem that Hippolytus combines with this conviction an assurance that the freewill of such rulers is not overridden. In his quotations from Isaiah and elsewhere, it is implied that heathen rulers, who were used by God to punish His people, took delight in what they were doing and deserve judgment in their turn. Fifth, this element of 'repetitiveness' is not usually something which can be readily discerned or easily proved. It is evident not to cold logic but to faith. It is faith that discerns patterns of meaningfulness in certain correspondences. It could sometimes be argued that these correspondences do not inhere in reality, since it is only by adopting a standpoint of faith in the first place that certain events are singled out from others, so that the patterns can be upheld. Sometimes, of course, Hippolytus talks of correspondences which are open to verification even by unbelievers, such as the 434 years in the wilderness, but even here it is arguable that such correspondences are coincidental. This dependence on faith is not necessarily a weakness, since faith is always used by the Christian in his attitude to life, though it is true that there is the danger here of multiplying parallelisms which have significance only in the judgment of private individuals. Hippolytus feels he guards against this, it would seem, by referring only to parallelisms which are mentioned in Scripture or concern the people of God, either under the Old Covenant or the New or both.
Underlying all of what is summed up above under these analytical headings or points is the conviction of Hippolytus that God was dynamically operative in history. He believes that faith enables us to discern repetitiveness and meaningfulness in history, but his stress is on the fact that God is actually operative in history. It is not just that He enables us to view it from certain perspectives: He could hardly do this unless those perspectives corresponded to reality. This is a valuable stress. It links up with the Early Christian conviction regarding the Lordship of Christ over all things, historical as well as natural. It helps Hippolytus to see the Parousia not as an isolated Hope of the Church or of the world, but as an event which will not be hurried and which will come in God's good time.

Hippolytus by his outlook on God's action in history and its 'repetitiveness' (to use our own term, not one employed by Hippolytus himself) documents more fully than many Early Christian Fathers what underlies typological concepts, when it comes to Scriptural interpretation. We are reminded that, in their own eyes, the Fathers were not just drawing fanciful parallels, but were thinking God's thoughts after Him. The concept that God planned history in a particular way, so that men with faith might discern its meaning, is surely worthy of our respect, even if we do not accept all typological interpretations as corresponding with reality. For eschatology the significance of this is that we are reminded that those with insight will be able to learn, from a study of the Scriptures and divine providence in history, something of our own place in the ongoing purposes of God. By contrast most modern theology would feel that such an outlook takes too much upon itself. Doubtless there have been many extremists and such have brought odium upon intense eschatological expectation, but not all interested in eschatology have in fact been scaremongers or preachers of an
imminent Advent. It would seem that both Paul and Hippolytus used prophetic interpretation, and an understanding of the future in terms of the past, actually to discourage any kind of frenzied expectation, which cut across the ordinary responsibilities of living before Christ and in the world.

HIPPOLYTUS' ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE 'SON OF MAN' CONCEPT

Just as Hippolytus does not view the Parousia in isolation from the whole theology of history, which he discovers in Scripture, so too there appears to be a rich significance in his understanding of the movement of history that is set forth in Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. In his handling of the passages from Daniel he assumes that each part has its place in a divinely ordained series. This would seem to pose a challenge to that kind of thinking about Jesus as the Son of Man, which almost unconsciously uses the name as a 'tag' and no more. Hippolytus nowhere sets out to discuss the meaning of the term, Son of Man, as applied to Jesus. Rather does he make certain assumptions, which are implied by his use of the term and of Scriptural prediction (Daniel 7) of the Son of Man. It is our purpose here to endeavour to lay bare these assumptions, and to compare them with current understanding of the term. Present-day scholarship is divided on the meaning of the term as used by Jesus. Most scholars agree that Jesus used it of Himself, though sometimes there is a curious 'third-personal' undertone to His use of the term, as if He were describing
Someone else. The broad consensus of opinion seems to be that Jesus' usage is to be understood in terms of Daniel 7 and/or the Book of Enoch. Some scholars, however, judge that the usage of this expression in the Book of Ezekiel is a better guide. Moreover, some scholars, including Oscar Cullmann hold that there is a connection with the Heavenly Man myth of wide familiarity in ancient Near Eastern religions. This does not exclude the view (based on association with Daniel 7 or the Book or Enoch, or both) that the Son of Man has to be understood in apocalyptic terms: rather is it an addition to this. The thought is that the myth sees a connection between our first parents who were made after the prototype of this Heavenly Man, and that, embodied in this figure, they reappear at the end of the age. Thus, the myth had 'protological' as well as 'eschatological' content. Judaism found some difficulty in using the protological aspect, since it was hard to reconcile with the 'fallenness' of Adam. Therefore, Jewish usage does not make explicit the connection with this myth. Cullmann believes that at I.COr. 15.45-47 Paul is explicitly rejecting the Philonic adaptation of this myth, by his assertion that it was not the 'first Adam' who was a 'life-giving' spirit, but the Last Adam, whom he identifies with Jesus Christ. If Cullmann is right, Paul's concept of Christ as the 'Second Adam' and as the 'Last Adam' represents his counterpart to the term 'Son of Man', which does not appear in his writings.

How does Hippolytus' understanding fit in with these theories?

One feature of these theories is that for the most part they could be said to regard the term or name, Son of Man, as a 'tag', that is, in isolation from its original context, whether in Daniel 7 or in the Book of Enoch. Thus, the term is generally taken as signifying a future eschatological role for Jesus Christ. If Daniel 7 or the Book of Enoch represent the correct source of Jesus' use of the term, and this seems likely, then surely no one would wish to dispute this interpretation so far as it goes. The question is whether it goes far enough, if it is to represent adequately the assumptions of these sources. Modern interpretation of the term, Son of Man, as applied to Jesus, ignores the fact that, if Daniel 7 be the true source of Jesus' use of the term, He could hardly ignore the dynamic presentation of God's action in history, of which the Son of Man was viewed as being the climax. It is true that there is much discussion whether 'Son of Man' in Dan. 7 is to be viewed as an individual figure or as a community of people, opinion tending to favour the latter view. Probably the truth is that both individual and corporate elements are requisite to a complete understanding of the passage, at least in the view of Jesus. T.W. Manson did much to lay stress on the thought of 'Son of Man' as representing 'the saints of the Most High', an expression which found fulfilment in the community founded by Jesus, namely, the Christian Church. In so far as modern interpretation recognizes the fluidity of the concept, it is doubtless true to the sense of the passage. What Hippolytus reminds us of, however, is that we

cannot appropriately view Jesus as the Son of Man (whether alone or in company with His Church) without at the same time finding ourselves involved in an interpretation of history from Daniel's day to that of Jesus in terms of the 'four world empires' of Daniel 2 and 7.

Modern interpretation has largely concluded that the Book of Daniel was compiled under the threat of Antiochus Epiphanes in the 2nd century B.C. It would seem that for this reason attention has been diverted from the element to which we are now pointing, on the basis of Hippolytus' understanding. Since in fact (as modern scholarship sees it) the four kingdoms did not stretch up to Jesus' own day, then the whole concept can be ignored. But this is surely an inconsistent and unscientific way of looking at things. Whether or not Daniel was referring to Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, this is surely the way in which Jews and early Christian commentators saw the matter.

There is no direct evidence that Jesus viewed the Roman Empire as the fourth world empire of Daniel's visions, but if we view him as taking prophecy seriously, then surely He must have implied by His references to Himself as Son of Man that He saw the four world empires as closing with that of Rome. It is true, of course, that in Daniel 2 and 7 the 'stone' or 'Son of Man' follows Antichrist's reign (if we so interpret the 'little horn' of Dan. 7.8) and Antichrist emerges from the 'ten kingdoms'. But it remains true that the 'toes' of Dan. 2 and the 'horns' of Dan. 7 have a specially close connection with the fourth empire. Granted that the Son of Man's coming in advance of His coming with glory was not anticipated either in Daniel 2 or Daniel 7, it is still more likely that Jesus would have viewed Rome as the fourth empire than one under Antiochus Epiphanes, which would have left an unexplained gap in prophetic forevision. Hippolytus, in his interpretation, seems to assume a dynamic understanding of the appearing
of the Son of Man, or 'the Stone', which in all probability expresses Jesus' own understanding also.

It may be said, of course, that modern commentators are aware that Jesus probably thought thus, but that it is ignored because it is a part of Jesus' conception which is no longer acceptable to us. Our point is that it is inadmissible to view the matter thus, unless we are quite explicit about it. Even then, it is doubtful whether we properly represent Jesus' outlook, if we mention but immediately put to one side Jesus' probable view regarding Rome as the fourth world empire. If we remove one of the pillars of Jesus' outlook, or, if this be viewed as too strong, simply disturb one of the chief features of the circumstances concomitant to Jesus' view of Himself as the Son of Man, then it is surely doubtful whether in fact we are presenting Jesus' view of Himself as such. If two persons hold the same view in any matter, but for different reasons, it is a moot point whether in fact they hold the same view. If Jesus did in fact view Himself as Son of Man, in this dynamic understanding of Daniel 7, as Hippolytus seems to construe the passage, then His view was that He came on the scene at this particular point in history because the scroll of history, prophesied beforehand, had been unrolled to the appropriate point. It is true that Jesus could not have been in any way subservient to the letter of prophecy, for Daniel's visions did not in fact anticipate, or at least spell out, that the Son of Man would come in humiliation before He came in glory. It belonged to Jesus' masterful interpretation of Scripture -- of which Hippolytus saw Him also as Author, as Divine Word -- that He focused in Himself so many Old Testament 'motifs' - Suffering Servant, Messiah, Son of Man. It remains true, however, that Jesus, on this view, would be asserting that the divine moment had come and that it was for this reason that He was come.
The significant thing is that this is surely precisely what Jesus did proclaim: "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel." (Mk.1.15). In this passage both the reference to the fulfilment of the (prophesied) time and the reference to the kingdom are significant. If Jesus did have in mind such a dynamic understanding of prophecy, when he spoke of Himself as Son of Man (his most characteristic Self-designation), then we can understand the preoccupation of His message with the Kingdom. This latter would not, then, be any inner kingdom of righteousness and peace alone; rather it would be the proleptic anticipation of the fifth world empire of Daniel 2 and Daniel 7, that kingdom shadowed in advance in humiliation before its emergence in glory at the Parousia of Christ. Jesus' preoccupation with the Kingdom, on the one hand, and His preference for the term 'Son of Man', on the other, surely witness, then, to one common feature, viz. Jesus' Self-understanding in terms of a dynamic understanding of the prophecies of Daniel 2 and Daniel 7, when combined masterfully with other Old Testament 'motifs' which He saw as fulfilled in Himself and His Mission. When Jesus exhorted His enemies to 'search the scriptures' (Jn.5.27), he approved that there they would in fact find eternal life, because they spoke of Him -- though this His enemies failed to understand. This truth Jesus had surely discovered in His own reading of the Scriptures in the silent years at Nazareth.

It may be said that much of this is self-evident and that, though Hippolytus thinks dynamically in his interpretation of the Danielic passages and of the term 'Son of Man', and though Jesus may well have thought thus of Himself, the viewpoint is that of an apocalyptic, which sought to write history before it took place. Many perhaps see clearly enough the possibility of Jesus having thought thus,
but would wish to save Him from subscription to what they regard as sub-standard spirituality and substandard thinking. These attitudes appear to be bound up with a derogation of apocalyptic, which is questionable. If Jesus did think dynamically about the interpretation of the Danielic passages and His own place in their fulfilment, it is not immediately obvious that His status is thereby diminished. Rather would it seem that His adoption of such a viewpoint should make believing men question their estimate of apocalyptic, at least in this instance.

The major point that we would wish to make is that in fact such a dynamic understanding of the Danielic passages and His place in regard to them is consistent both with Jesus' stress on the Kingdom in His teaching and with His preference for the term 'Son of Man' as a Self-designation, and that, though we find in Hippolytus no direct references to Jesus' understanding of Daniel, this was how Hippolytus himself understood Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. What Hippolytus thought, taken by itself, may not seem so significant, but for our present purpose he is a significant pointer to the 'mentality' of the Early Church and of our Lord Himself. And it is true that, though many scholars would perhaps concede that Jesus may possibly or even probably have thought thus, this dynamic understanding of the term 'Son of Man' is not to the fore, largely, it would seem, because such an understanding of prophecy is thought of as having little to contribute today or because scholarship does not wish to discover a Jesus to Whose thinking it cannot subscribe. In either case, such considerations are surely irrelevant. We cannot force Jesus Christ into the moulds of our own shaping.
Hippolytus seldom actually employs the term 'Son of Man', but there is not a shred of doubt that he does actually think of Jesus as such only in terms of the dynamic movement of history, set forth in Daniel 7 and paralleled in Daniel 2. When Hippolytus thinks of Jesus as 'Son of Man' or as the 'Stone', he sees Him as the consummation of the process of history set out beforehand under divine inspiration in Nebuchadnezzar's vision recorded in Daniel 2, and that of Daniel himself in chapter 7. We may briefly illustrate this point. In the Commentary on Daniel II, XIII, Hippolytus says, after, in the previous chapter, relating the four major portions of the great Image of Nebuchadnezzar's vision to the Babylonian, Persian, Greek and Roman empires: "Μετὰ ταῦτα τί λέγει ό Δανιήλ; Ὁ Ἐκεῖσθαι λίθος ἐκ ὅρuos ἀνευ χειρῶν και ἑκτάβεν τὴν εἰκόνα. Τού δὲ σιδήρου σῶν ὀστράκων ἀναμεμομφένω καὶ ἑπὶ τὰ ἀκρα τῶν δακτύλων χαρῆσαντος καὶ ὀσμαρσών ἄλλης τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενμένων, τί δὲι λοιπὸν κεριμένειν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἡ χριστιανὸν ἁπ' οὐρανῶν ἐφισάμενον, ὡς λίθου ἀπὸ ὅρους τεμνόμενον, ἐν τῷ τῶν κόσμων τούτω βασιλείας μεταστησάω, ἀναστήσω δὲ τὴν ἐκουσάνιον τῶν ἁγίων βασιλείας, ἂν τις εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας οὐ διαφθείρησεται, καὶ τὸς ὁ' ὅρος καὶ τόλμη τῶν ἁγίων γινόμενος πλημμῶν καὶ τὴν γῆν." There is no doubt from the reference to the Romans in the previous chapter that Hippolytus is thinking in the future tense. The 'stone' was still to come in fulfilment of Daniel 2, since the 'ten toes' of the great image of Nebuchadnezzar were still future. It is difficult to doubt, however, that Hippolytus was not at the same time conscious of the triumph of the Christian Gospel as it spread out to the very ends of the earth. Such he would surely see as an anticipation, and as the guarantee, of the future fulfilment of Daniel, chapters 2 and 7.
The major point, however is that in these sections Hippolytus may not use the term 'Son of Man' but he clearly sees the 'stone' as a parallel term for Christ and His Kingdom. And he manifestly does not think of 'stone' or 'Son of Man' as a 'tag', as an apocalyptic figure who will one day come to earth, in dissociation from all that is said about the preceding four world empires. Hippolytus takes seriously the dynamic view of history within which the coming of the 'stone' or 'Son of Man' is presented in the Danielic passages. What is perhaps most significant is that he is obviously wholly unconscious of innovating in doing this. He assumes that Daniel must be so interpreted.

Again, in the Commentary on Daniel, IV.XXIII-XXIV, we find the discussion of Christ's birth as taking place in the 5500th year from the creation of the world. Hippolytus sees the 6000th year as introducing the Sabbath rest. He says: "Ἡ γὰρ πρώτη παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ έν τούτοις ἔτη έστω τοῦ πρώτου ἐκ τῆς γενεσεως, ἐν τούτῳ γεννήθη τῷ Θεῷ εἰς ἰδρύμα ἀνθρώπων, ἰδρύμα εἰς καρφίτην πάντων τῶν ἐγγένεσιν. Δει τούτων ἐν τῷ πασχαλίῳ τούτῳ τοῦ πάσχαλιον της Πάσχαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ, παραγενόμενον ἐν τῷ πάσχαλιον τῆς Πάσχας εἰς τῷ πάσχαλιον τούτῳ διδασκαίειν. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ κυρίου ἐπὶ τῆς χάριτος." [Is there perhaps a hint here that Jesus Christ is the Second Adam, the One Who comes in glory at the end of the 'six-day working week' of God in His providential care of history? When we recall Cullmann's association of the Pauline concept of Christ as the Second Adam and as the Last Adam as bound up with the figure of the Son of Man, so frequently mentioned in all four Gospels, one wonders whether]
Is there perhaps a hint here that Jesus Christ is the Second Adam, the One Who comes in glory at the end of the 'six-day working week' of God in His providential care of history? When we recall Cullmann's association of the Pauline concept of Christ as the Second Adam and as the Last Adam as bound up with the figure of the Son of Man, so frequently mentioned in all four Gospels, one wonders whether the basic thought of Hippolytus in this passage is not that of Jesus as coming Son of Man. It would be hard to prove this, but this is at least a distinct possibility. Further, the thought of this chapter illustrates the theme of the dynamic activity of God in history. Just as four world empires give way to 'ten kingdoms' (and to Antichrist's reign) and then to that of 'the stone' or the 'Son of Man', so the six 'working millennia' give way to God's millennium of rest at the end of the age. Whatever infiltrations of Hellenic thinking there may be in this whole scheme of 'seven millennia', the Hebraic and prophetic notes are by no means absent.

In the Scholia on Daniel we find an interesting passage on Dan.7.14:

"Quae non auferetur. Hippolytus. Potestatem omnem a Patre Filio datam ostendit, qui coelestium, terrestrium et infernorum rex et judex omnium manifestatus est: coelestium quidem, quia Verbum ex corde Patris ante omnia natum est; terrestrium autem, quia homo inter homines factus est, per se impsum reformans Adam; infernorum tandem, quia inter mortuos computatus est, annuntians felicitatem sanctorum animis, ipse morte mortis victor."

1The Greek text is that given in Migne's Patrologia, Graeca, Tomus X, column 684. The following is the Latin as given in column 683.
The thought latent in this passage is of Christ as 'Son of Man', though it views this as only one of the designations appropriate to the divine Son of God, who breaks through all the moulds, as it were. He in His Person is more than they all are. In speaking of Him as the One Who 'created Adam anew of Himself' the thought of Christ Jesus as the Second Adam is at least present surely, for in the Pauline concept the interest in thus describing our Lord is soteriological and practical, as it is here. What, however, is of especial significance is that Hippolytus here seems to think of Christ as One Whose reign has already begun — as divine Son of God; as Son of Man or Second Adam; and as First fruits from the dead, Precursor of the resurrection. Here the note of 'realized eschatology' is to the fore, though the context shows that it is recognized that certain events still remain in the future, viz. Parousia of Christ and the general resurrection. Among other aspects this passage recognizes that the kingdom of the Son of Man has been inaugurated since the Incarnation and especially since the Resurrection of Christ.

A very similar passage occurs in the De Christo et Antichristo, Chapter XXVI. After quoting Dan. 7.13-14 Hippolytus says:

"Τὴν ἐξουσίαν πάσαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ δεδομένην τῷ ἡκεδείσειν, ὅσ' ἐποιημένοις τε καὶ ἐπιγείαν καὶ καταχθονίων 'βασιλεὺς καὶ κριτῆς πάντων ἀποδεικτεῖ, ἐποιημένοις μὲν, ὅτι λόγος ἐκ καρδίας πατρός πρὸς πάντων γεγενημένος ἢν, ἐπιγείαν δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐγεννήθη, ἐναπλάσασθαι δ' ἐκείνῳ τοῦ Ἀδάμ, καταχθονίων δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἐν νεκροῖς κατελογίσθη. ἐκαγγελισμένος τῆς τῶν ἀγίων ψυχᾶς, διὰ θανάτου θανάτον νικάν."

1 G.C.S. Hipp 1, p.18, l.18, p.19, l.4
The thought is almost identical with the passage from the Scholia on Daniel. The only significant addition here is the reference to Jesus Christ as Judge. We recall that the concept of the Son of Man as appointed Judge has an important place in the Similitudes of Enoch, as also in the references in the Fourth Gospel (cf. Jn. 5.27). We ought perhaps to judge that Hippolytus was in part influenced by the concept of the Son of Man in the 'Similitudes'. The Early Church up to the end of the 2nd century A.D. appears to have treated this work as canonical, so it would not be surprising that Hippolytus should have his view of the Son of Man coloured by this source. Nevertheless, there seems to be much to be said for the view that our Lord's usage depended much more, if not solely, on that found in the Book of Daniel, and it may well be that Hippolytus' stress on Jesus Christ as Judge, under the form of Son of Man, is arrived at in independence of the Similitudes of Enoch. It is noteworthy that C.H. Dodd is doubtful about the influence of the 'Similitudes' on Jesus' concept of the Son of Man. He notes, among other points, that "in any case Jesus refers explicitly to Daniel and not to Enoch", and to the fact that "He (Jesus) was at least as capable as the author of the Similitudes of giving his own reinterpretation (as that author does) of the Danielic symbolism". As for Hippolytus, his reference to Jesus as Judge may well be dependent primarily on the Fourth Gospel and on his own methodology of interpretation: this latter consisted in interpreting Daniel, but in doing so in a way that harmonised with the

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further and decisive light imparted by the Incarnation, Cross, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. In these parallel passages Jesus has authority because of His origin, achievement in His early life and ministry, and His Descent into Hades. Probably the reference to Jesus as 'Judge' in the 'Treatise' was deemed appropriate in part because of its usage in the Fourth Gospel in connection with the Son of Man, but primarily because it expressed the dignity of the Son of Man, predicted certainly in Daniel, but set forth by his argument.

We have cited these passages in order to show that, though Hippolytus understands Christ in terms of the prophecies of the Book of Daniel, he also understands Daniel in the light of the events associated with the Incarnation and the Christian Gospel. It is in this way that the note of 'realized', or perhaps it is better to say 'inaugurated', eschatology, is introduced in Hippolytus. The fact that he has so much to say about God's purposes for future history, culminating in Antichrist's blasphemy and his overthrow by the appearing of Christ in glory, should not blind us to his very real sense of what Christ achieved in His humiliation and of His present exaltation to God's right hand. Indeed, with all other Early Christian thinkers, Christ's 'exaltation' is the basis of His Lordship over history. This must surely lie behind all that Hippolytus has to say concerning the future outworking of Daniel's predictions. It was the Word Who revealed future history to Daniel. It is He Who has become flesh to achieve the redemption of men and has triumphed; and it is He Who will guide to its completion the section of history that remains before His coming in glory.
In referring to some possible dependence of Hippolytus on the Fourth Gospel, in particular, in his understanding of the Son of Man, one wonders whether Hippolytus and the author of that Gospel do not have a great deal in common. If Hippolytus helps us to see a valuable perspective from which Jesus' claim to be Son of Man is to be viewed, namely, that whereby Jesus would see Himself as fulfilling a dynamic Danielic presentation of history, may it not be that he sets forth also the significance of the frequently noted Johannine preoccupation with the 'realized' note in eschatology? Upholders of 'realized eschatology' as that which best represents Jesus' thinking normally rely heavily upon John's Gospel, where so much futurist eschatology may seem to have been transmuted into something else. Nevertheless such few passages as John 5.25 ff. either have to be viewed as concessions to the older tradition concerning Jesus' eschatology or reinterpretations of the same. An 'inaugurated' eschatology is able to treat as authentic and fully meaningful the references to future resurrection and judgment in this chapter and in John II (where indeed it is Martha who speaks of resurrection at the last day), while laying stress on the present triumph and reign of Christ. It is interesting that Jn. 5.28-29 appears to reflect, in language, Dan. 12.2. Jesus made considerable use of the Book of Daniel, and such an allusion would help to confirm that He believed firmly in future resurrection while in this passage Jesus lays stress on the Presence of future judgment and resurrection in His own Person. Hippolytus may offer us confirmation of the 'mentality' by which Jesus and the writer of the Fourth Gospel interpreted Jesus' role.
What Hippolytus reminds us of is that Jesus Christ has come in fulfillment of the Danielic prophecies, but that He has done so in advance. To Daniel there was given only part of the truth about the Coming One. When we combine with his predictions insights given to 'Isaiah' and other Old Testament prophets, we can see how Jesus of Nazareth is consistent with all the predictions, but in such a way as to embody in fullness what each prophet only caught fragmentary glimpses of. Moreover, to Hippolytus the actuality of Jesus Christ in the Incarnation makes sense of what was of necessity puzzling before the event, just because the individual pictures were fragmentary and because the time spoken of was imperfectly known. In particular, Hippolytus, as we have already noted, sees the truth of the coming Son of Man, revealed to Daniel, as eked out by the historic actuality by which, in fulfillment of other prophecies of the Coming One which did not employ this name, the Son of Man first came in humiliation. Thus, it appears that Hippolytus is forced to a view in which the Incarnation has taught him that the Son of Man has already come, while what remains to be fulfilled of Danielic prophecy instructs him that the coming of the Son of Man in glory lies ahead. This fits in, of course, with Jesus' predictions, and Early Church expectation, regarding the Parousia. In all this there is nothing novel, except in so far as Hippolytus makes more explicit than most Early Christian writers how prophetic word and Gospel actuality were related in the estimate of present and future Christian reality. It is not simply that some Old Testament prophecies have been fulfilled, while others are yet outstanding so far as fulfillment is concerned, true though this may be. The interlocking of these prophecies, fulfilled or unfulfilled, in the same Person, Jesus of Nazareth, causes each prophesied aspect to be invaded with a quality of dynamism that is only made clear through
the historical actuality. Thus, the term 'Son of Man' is given in
Daniel as the portrayal of a Figure Who comes at the end of the age
with clouds and great glory to sum up human history, but the appearing
of the Promised One in humiliation helps us to see the full meaning
even of the term 'Son of Man'. It is this sense which underlies the
tension between 'now' and 'then' in Hippolytus. Is it not this kind
of 'mentality' which underlies the thinking of the Fourth Evangelist
also? On such a view, we are not merely suggesting that in John's
Gospel realized and futurist elements remain side by side, or even
that the actuality of the Incarnation has demanded an 'inaugurated
eschatology': rather is it the thought that it is the reinterpretation
of Danielic prophecy and the Danielic concept of the Son of Man, that
is much in mind in the Fourth Gospel. Jn.5.25ff. may well have in
mind the Danielic prophecy of resurrection (Dan.12.2), in particular.
Thus understood, what is implied in this Johannine passage is not
any intention to deny the historical actuality of future resurrection
and judgment but rather a stance which is informed at once by the
unexpected early arrival of the Son of Man in humiliation and the
remaining expectation of His Coming in glory. It may be asked, however,
what relation Hippolytus has to such an interpretation of the Fourth
Gospel. The only answer that can be made to this is that he lays
bare by his own dynamic understanding of Daniel's prophecies how in
the Incarnation history had, as it were, anticipated itself. It may
be said that any view which fixes its gaze on prophecies of One who
comes in glory and then looks at the Incarnation, must reach some such
conclusion. This may be true, but the point is that Hippolytus'
dynamic understanding of future history, as portrayed in the Danielic
prophecies, gives this added force. What Hippolytus seems to assume
is that each kingdom, mentioned in Daniel chapters 2 and 7, was due
to come in a predestined order. It is precisely this stress on the
divine governance of the details of history which is lacking in most
modern interpretation. Thus, the effect of regarding Daniel's
prophecies as being in fact 'vaticinia ex eventu' is to discredit serious
belief in such a detailed ordering of history. One may doubtless
still believe that God is ultimately in control of history, but the
supposed realization that this is not genuine prophecy undermines
conviction in the apparent 'determinism', which seems bound up with
such a view of prediction, as Hippolytus and ancient commentators
espoused. Further, such a deterministic view is seen as characteristic
of 'apocalyptic pessimism'. In fact, however, this determinism is
not equated either by the writer/compiler of Daniel (whoever that may
have been, Daniel himself in 6th century B.C. or a 2nd century indivi­
dual) with pessimism. What is taught is no determinism which over­
rules or overrides genuine human decision. Rather what is taught is
the good news that in a mysterious fashion God remains in control of
history and that even the wrath of men is made to serve Him. In any
event, the modern rejection of the authenticity of the Book of Daniel
has been influential in the ignoring of the perspective of ancient
times, whereby the fifth world empire of Daniel 2 and Daniel 7 was not
anticipated when in fact it arrived. It is because these passages are
not treated as genuine prophecy that it becomes increasingly difficult
to take seriously the peculiar twist to the problem of Christ's first
advent, that was appreciated very clearly by Hippolytus. For him it
is not just that the Son of Man who was to come in glory has first come
in humiliation, however true that may be so far as it goes: it is rather
that the ordained and predicted time-series has been disturbed. This
can only mean that in Christ the End-time is already come. Does not
this perspective figure in Hippolytus? And may it not serve as
commentary upon that ancient appreciation of prophecy that probably
lies imbedded in such passages as Jn. 5.25ff?

THE PROBLEM OF THE IMPMINENCE OF THE PAROUSIA IN THE LIGHT OF HIPPOLYTUS' 
ESCHATOLOGICAL STANCE

It is clearly unwise to assert dogmatically that Hippolytus' 
understanding, if we have set it forth faithfully, is found in the 
Fourth Gospel, since it is always so difficult to recover with certainty 
assumptions which guide writers, particularly those of so long ago. 
Nevertheless, Hippolytus has in his own right surely set out for us, by 
what we can recover of his own assumptions, a challenging perspective. 
He reminds us that, if we find ourselves able to take Danielic prophecy 
as such rather than as 'vaticinia ex eventu', we must then face up to the 
problem of how Christ not only anticipated by His Coming in humiliation, 
individual prophecies but reorganized what individual prophecies had 
revealed as the divinely ordained series of history. Even if it be 
judged that modern Biblical scholarship makes such a view impossible 
(and it is not clear that this is a necessary conclusion), it remains 
a fact that to those who accepted Daniel's prophecies as such, the 
problem of Christ's Coming must have appeared in this fashion. For 
Hippolytus Jesus Christ is the Son of Man who represents the fifth world 
empire, the fifth and final term in the ordained series of world-kingdoms. 
It is in this sense that for him the End-time has come. Modern scholarship, 
by its dissociation of Christ as Son of Man from the series of world- 
empires of which this figure was supposed to be the crown (Daniel 7), 
has in a sense used the term as a convenient, if Biblical, 'tag'. The 
consequence of this is that the view of Christ as inaugurating the End 
of the age is not quite that which follows from seeing Son of Man as 
the consummation of an ordered series. Hippolytus surely performs a
most worthwhile service by bringing to our remembrance that perspective from which Early Church commentators must have seen the matter when they were consistent with their own view of prophecy. It seems likely that we can discern more clearly in Hoppolytus what the majority of commentators up to his own day thought about the matter. This indirectly is suggestive for the perspectives which were in the minds of the Biblical writers themselves, and even in the mind of our Lord himself. Thus, Hoppolytus indirectly challenges us to ask what Jesus meant when he said that the time was fulfilled and that the Kingdom of God was at hand. We tend today, on the basis of such statements, to assume that Jesus either was saying that the Kingdom of God had arrived (C.H. Dodd), or that it was imminent (J. Weiss, A. Schweitzer and M. Werner). Is it not more likely, if we allow what was apparently Hoppolytus' stance to guide us, that what Jesus meant was that in Him and His mission the final product in the series of predestined kingdoms was already present? Such an understanding would help us to understand the difficulty of resolving the question whether Jesus intended to say that the Kingdom was present, or was only imminent. For in the sense in which Daniel foresaw the coming of the Son of Man this fifth empire was clearly not yet present, but in another sense dictated by other prophecies of Christ's humiliation and by the historical actuality of the Incarnation, this fifth empire was even then a reality in the midst of human history. The rightfulness of Christ to sum up all prophetic figures in Himself provides the common reference of all and underlies the appropriateness of Christ's being seen as Son of Man even now -- this is true surely of Jesus' own thinking, of the Evangelists who faithfully recorded His insight and Self-designation, and now of Hoppolytus. This stance spills, however, over in its significance to the question of the imminence of the Parousia. From
such a standpoint the Parousia must surely be seen as imminent, but only in the sense that the First Advent of Christ strains forward to the completion of the Second Advent. This point has, of course, frequently been made. It is often described under terms of 'prophetic fore-shortening'. When, however, Hippolytus' dynamic concept of the Danielic seriation of the five world kingdoms is retained, the perspective is significantly changed. We can no longer deduce from this that Jesus believed that the coming of the Son of Man in glory was imminent, in the modern and general sense that it might come within a few years or within a generation. Rather surely what is intended, viewed over against such a background, is the thought that, since the last of a series of predestined kingdoms has arrived, then the completion of all history, its consummation at the coming of the Son of Man in glory, cannot be far behind. If we extract the concept of 'imminence' from this Biblical framework, then indeed problems must needs arise as time moves on and that Coming of the Son of Man in glory is 'postponed'. But, if we understand in what Biblical sense the concept of 'imminence' is set, can we any longer meaningfully speak of 'postponement' or 'delay' of the Second Advent? Such a concept of imminence, derived from the concept of a series of predestined kingdoms, does surely provide a basis for an understanding of the nearness of the Parousia which could yet be combined with the belief in the possibility of quite a long 'delay', when the latter term is understood in the ordinary sense of the passing of an extended period of time. And there is at least some evidence to suggest that our Lord was not thinking of imminence in the ordinary sense of the passing of a few years only. The expectation of the preaching of the Gospel to all nations (Mk.13.10), the prediction in the Little Apocalypse (Mk.13-Matt.24) regarding the desolation of Jerusalem, which is not necessarily to be thought of in terms of supernatural agency, and some of the parables, suggest that an 'imminent' Parousia was not in the expectation of our Lord.
It follows, then, that we find in Hippolytus a perspective for understanding the tension of 'realized eschatology' and 'futurist eschatology', which is most instructive. Its central ingredient is a combination of Danielic prophecies regarding the Coming of the Son of Man, in its original dynamic setting within predestined history, with the actual Gospel events associated with the Birth, Ministry, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Hippolytus, as we have seen, appears to suggest by his own attitudes a threefold contribution to our own understanding of Biblical eschatology. First, the term 'Son of Man' must not be viewed simply as an apocalyptic 'tag' in dissociation from the four world empires, of which this Figure is in Daniel 7 the consummation. Second, the tension between 'realized' eschatology and 'futurist' eschatology has to be seen in the light of the dynamic presentation of predestined history given in Daniel 2 and Daniel 7. It is not just that Jesus as Son of Man in humiliation has anticipated the coming of the Son of Man in glory, but rather that in Him the final epoch, that of the Kingdom of God, has come, but yet not in such a way as to preclude the necessity for its consummation in the appearing of the Son of Man with clouds and great glory. Third the concept of 'imminence' has to be viewed over against this prophetic or apocalyptic outline of history, that of five world empires from Daniel's day, concerning which we are now since the Incarnation in the last. Clearly, all of these perspectives, which appear to be assumed by Hippolytus, are consistent with what we have already seen of his eschatology. It is thought out in the most definitely historical terms and is dependent upon prophecy, particularly the Book of Daniel in combination with other prophecies and the fulfilled content of Jesus of Nazareth, Who fills out all the types as their great Antitype.
DETAILS REGARDING ANTICHRIST'S VICTORIES

There are certain details of Hippolytus' eschatological teaching in the two principal works which we have so far been examining viz. the 'Treatise' and the Commentary on Daniel, which we have to this point left to one side. Both these works are very concerned with the reign of Antichrist, as we have seen. Certain rather curious details are taken over from Dan.II.40ff. Thus, Hippolytus tells us that Antichrist will master Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, though Edom, Moab, and the children of Ammon will escape from his hand. In this connection he quotes Dan.12.41 explicitly and alludes clearly to the content of vv.42-43 in the same passage. (De Christo et Antichristo Chapters LI-LII). In the Commentary on Daniel, IV.XII.4 Hippolytus makes the same point: "..... καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς (the ten horns of Dan. 7:7, 20.) ἔτερον μικρὸν κέρας ἀναβαθμέται, ὅπερ ἐστὶν τὸ τοῦ ἀντικρίστου, καὶ ἐκρίζωσει τρία τῶν ἐξαποθεών αὐτοῦ, τούτ' ἐστὶν τοὺς τρεῖς βασιλεὺς ἀνελεῖ Αἰγύπτου, Διβάδων τε καὶ Αἰθίων, βωλύμενος ἐκεῖ ἐπικοινωνεῖ τὴν πάσαν βασιλεῖαν." Great perplexity has always been found with the question how such details can be known. In like vein is the assertion that Tyre and Barytus will be the first to suffer from Antichrist's power, after his overthrow of the three powers already spoken of. This is mentioned in the 'Treatise' also, in chapter LII. It is clear, of course, that Hippolytus reaches these conclusions by dependence on Scripture. Thus, his identification of the figure in Dan.II.40ff. with Antichrist is basic to his assertions that Edom, Moab, and Ammon will be spared by Antichrist while Egypt, Libya and Ethiopia will be defeated. A conflation with Dan.7.6 is based on the judgment that Antichrist is intended in both sections. The reference to the defeat of Tyre and Berytus is not so clear, but it is dependent upon Is.23.4-5, where
future judgment upon Tyre and Sidon is predicted. One recalls that most of the prophetic books have a section which deals with the fate of the nations, as at Is.13-23. Hippolytus evidently deemed this a suitable source for discovering what has to happen to certain peoples during Antichrist's reign. Nevertheless, it is quite likely, as W. Bousset claimed at the end of last century, that details in such writers as Irenaeus and Hippolytus go back to a tradition only partly dependent upon the Old Testament. The question emerges what was originally intended by Daniel II.40ff. R.H. Charles early in this century remarked that different interpretations have been given of vv.40-45. According to one interpretation, they have been regarded as a recapitulation, and as giving a brief sketch of the course of events, from about 171 B.C. to the death of Antiochus. Charles feels, however, that the introductory reference to 'the time of the end' (v.40) excludes any recapitulation, v.35ff. may have given a resume of such events, but v.40ff deals with the events of the End-time itself. Charles here assumes that this 'End-time' was in fact imminent when the writer penned these words during the persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes. Whether this standpoint is acceptable or not, does not affect the pertinence of Charles' comment. A second possibility, mentioned by this commentator, is that the reference is to historical events, taking place after those already mentioned (Charles takes vv.35-39 to refer to events under Antiochus), "i.e. after the year 168". This latter possibility also seems ruled out, as we know nothing, as


Charles reminds us, of an expedition against Egypt after this date.
It remains a possibility that what we are confronted with here is a
genuine prediction of events due to take place at the end of the age.
If this be so, then Hippolytus' alignment with the concept of
Antichrist is not improbable, even if it be true that his interpretation
may have been shaped in part by a conviction with a very long pedigree.

THE MILLENNIUM NOT STRESSED

It is rather remarkable that Hippolytus has no very distinct
reference to the concept of a millennial reign of Christ on earth. It
seems remarkable in view of the way in which he relies so heavily upon
the prophecy of Daniel and the Book of Revelation, insisting throughout
on interpreting each symbol as referring to future (or in some cases,
past) historical events. Basically, it is true, Hippolytus relies on
the Book of Daniel and brings in the 'Little Apocalypse' (Matt.24; Mk.13;
Lk.21), Paul's reference to 'the man of sin' in II Thess.2, and the
Book of Revelation rather to fill out the picture of the future that he
gets from 'Daniel'. Nevertheless, the Revelation does loom quite
large as a source, and it seems surprising that no explicit reference
to a millennium occurs. Perhaps the only reason for this fact is that in
the 'Treatise' Hippolytus' subject is Antichrist. From this point of
view, it would not be necessary for Hippolytus to go on to speak of
the millennium, which is referred to a further period beyond the
Second Advent.

What evidence there is, suggests that Hippolytus believed in a
millennial reign of Christ. Thus, the reference in the Commentary on
Daniel, (IV.XXIII: noted above page 755) to the scheme of six
millennia in which Christ's birth is suggested to have occurred in
the year 5500 from the creation, suggests that Hippolytus assumed that
the 'Sabbath rest' would also be of 1000 years' duration, i.e. that, since the first six millennia had relevance to life on earth, this would also be true of the seventh, and that 'eternity' had reference only to what lay beyond that 'Sabbath rest'. The interpretation of Rev.17.10 in this passage suggests again that he understood 'John' as referring to a seventh 'millennium' rather than anything else: "Ἐν τούτῳ ἡμέρας ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα, δεῦ τὰ ἑξακοσιόκλια ἡ ἡμέρα ἡμῶν. οὐδὲν γὰρ πεπλήρωμαι, ὡς Ἰουδαίοι λέγειν ὅτι κέντρα ἐκκένων ὥσπερ ἐστιν ὁ ἐκτός. ὁ ἄλλος ὁ ἄλλοις ἔλθεν, ὁ λέγω τὸν ἀνθρώπον διηγεῖται, ἐν τῷ ἔστων ἐκτάσεως." (para.6)

Again, in the De Christo et Antichristo, LXV, Hippolytus has an explicit reference to the 'first resurrection' in terms of Rev.20.6. He aligns this with Dan.12.2; Is.26:19; and John 5.25, among other passages of Scripture and in the first and third of these citations it seems very likely that he sees significance in the reference to 'some' (οὕτωι) as hearing the voice of the Son of God. It may seem curious that Hippolytus could use the Danielic reference in this way, since 'some' of the good and some of the evil are in view, but with the presuppositions of Hippolytus he would surely simply assume that our Lord had now given further light to the effect that 'saints' and 'sinners' were to be raised at different times. It seems reasonably clear, on the whole, that Hippolytus did believe in millennial teaching, but did not consider it germane to his purpose to develop this theme at any length in his extant works. The fact that he only hints at his belief means that he has nothing distinctive to say on this subject.
We turn briefly to take some notice of the eschatological implications of Hippolytus' views on issues that are not directly concerned with eschatology. When we think of Hippolytus, one is immediately reminded of what he championed in his own day in Rome, namely, his stress on the Church as the pure community of believers. Hippolytus was also an exponent of the Logos Christology, but it is in what we know of his view of the Church that the influence of his eschatology can be most clearly discerned. Adolf Hamel sums up the contribution of Hippolytus to the doctrine of the Church in these words:

"Hippolytus Anschauung von der Kirche entfaltet sich in Auseinandersetzung mit den die Kirche von außer bedrängenden oder aus ihr selbst aufbrechenden Gefahren und Gewalten. Es lassen sich vier große, teilweise sich überschneidende, aufeinander bezogene Funktionen aufzeigen, in denen die Kirche sich in ihrem Auftrag und in Blick auf die Reflexion der Welt und konkret auf Kallists disziplinäre Maßnahmen als die Versammlung der Heiligen; im Blick auf die Häresien als die Trägerin der Wahrheit; gegenüber der Anfeindung der Welt als die rettende Arche der Gläubigen.

In das geehrte Personen und priesterliche Ämter geben ihr die festen Organe, um diese mehrfache Beanspruchung und Gefährdung zu ertragen und zu überwinden."

We may extract for the sake of clarity and emphasis the four phrases which describe the functions or roles of the Church:

--- as the true Israel;
--- as the assemblage of the holy;
--- as the bearer of the truth;
--- as the saving Ark of the believing.

Hamel builds up his book around these four headings, though on the last point his emphasis falls upon the structure of the Church, and

1 Kirche bei Hippolyt von Rom. C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1951, p. 3.
has special relevance to the question of the place of the bishop, presbyters and deacons, in regard to the Church as a whole.

We may ask how Hippolytus' conception of the Church, as set out under these four headings can be related to eschatological themes. In reality, however, there is a close connection in each case. We may set this out in summary fashion first, and then set the matter out under each heading in a little more detail. In saying that the Church is the true Israel Hippolytus is making the Church the true inheritor of Old Testament promise and thus sets her within his theology of history; in thinking of her as the assemblage of the holy, Hippolytus views the Church as the precursor of the New Heaven and Earth, to be revealed at Christ's Parousia; in that the Church bears the truth — in opposition to heresy and paganism — Hippolytus relates her backwards in time to Jesus Christ and forward again to Christ's Appearing, the stress falling this time not merely on her destiny but on the publication of her present hidden correspondence with divine Truth revealed; and in seeing the Church as the saving Ark of the believing, Hippolytus sees the true Church as the divinely ordained place of salvation, both now and in the final eschatological woes. In all of these points Hippolytus is as much interested in the conformity of the Church in her being and functions with the Incarnate Christ, as he is in her relationship to the Coming Christ. This is because he thinks primarily in terms of a whole theology of history, as we have already observed in the earlier part of our study, and because he sees the Church as spanning the 'gap' between the two Advents. Thus, the Church must have a close relationship both with the Incarnate and the Coming Lord, because from the Incarnation until now and beyond to the Second Advent we are living in the final Age, and those who are obedient to Christ, that is, His Church, recognize the presence of the final 'fifth world
empire' of Daniel's visions. In the Church this reign of Christ is not only a reality, hidden as it is, but is recognized as a reality. Primarily, inaugurated eschatology has to do with the Presence and Work of Christ, but since the Church represents the achievement of Christ in His redemptive Work, she has a specially close relationship with eschatology, understood in this dynamic way as the pressing of Christ's achievement towards its completion at the Parousia.

Hippolytus, then, views the Church as the true Israel, among other aspects of her reality. This statement has to be understood over against the whole Old Testament background which records the faithlessness of the Jewish people.

"Die Heiden sind die Erben des Volkes Israel. Die Vorbedingung hierzu ist die Verwerfung der Juden, welche verschwuldet ist, da Israel seine Berufung nicht wahrgenommen hat."

The thought of the section, from which the above quotation is taken, is that Israel has not recognized God's summons to her and so the Call is issued to the Gentiles. In the following section which deals with 'The Two Calls: to Israel and to the Heathen', Hamel brings out the point that Hippolytus understands that the displacement of Israel and the summons to the Heathen is already foreshadowed in the blessings given by the dying to Esau and / Just as Esau lost the blessing to the younger Jacob, so Israel loses out to those more recently summoned to the knowledge of the true God, namely the Gentiles. That Hippolytus does so view the matter is obvious from a Fragment on these Blessings. This is taken from Hippolytus' Commentary on Genesis, and is cited for us by Jerome:

"Isaac portat imaginom Dei patris, Rebecca spiritus sancti, Esau populi prioris et diaboli, Jacob ecclesiae sive Christi — Quomodo itaque fratis dolos fugiens, Mesopotamiam tendit Jacob, ita et Christus Judaeorum incredulitate compulsus profiscitur in Galilaeam, inde sibi ex gentibus sponsam sumpturus ecclesiam."

1 C.S., p.22
2 G.C.S., Hippolytus, 1 Band, Hippolyt's Kleine E hgische und Homiletische Schriften, herausgegeben von Hans Achelis, pp.54-55.
Hippolytus' conception is not of any vindictive exclusion, however, of Israelites. It is rather, as Hamel reminds us, that in the divine purpose the Calling of the Gentiles follows upon the rejections of Christ by Israel as a whole. Paul's discussion of God's purpose for his own people 'after the flesh' is surely very much in Hippolytus' mind (Rom. 9-11) but when expounding such an Old Testament work as Genesis he does not find it necessary to allude to Paul. He finds all that was to eventuate foreshadowed under the Old Covenant. What he means, however, is surely what Paul clearly states, namely, that the rejection of Christ by the Jews was a 'hinge' in history on which rested the turning to the Gentiles. We may find it hard to understand why God should wait for Israel's rejection of Christ in this way. To Paul — and surely to Hippolytus — this was the way in which God had in fact moved in history, so they conceived themselves as interpreting Old Testament scripture in the light of New Covenant happening.

One or two aspects of this matter are worthy of note. First, Hippolytus, in line with St. Paul to whom he does not at this point allude, views the Church as a creation of the End-time, as an event which could not take place until Christ had come and Israel had rejected Him as such. Second, he views the creation of the Church as an historical event in a most serious light. He does not mean that since Christ's time Gentiles have, through Christian preaching, realized that the God of the universe loves them and is calling them also to Himself. This may be true so far as it goes but it rests on the fact that through the coming of Christ in the humiliation of the Incarnation and His rejection by Israel, a New Covenant has been inaugurated. For Hippolytus there are two actual Callings - 'Berufen', as Hamel calls them. Hippolytus in true biblical fashion thinks in this matter in terms of an actual change in the relationship between God and the Gentiles. This is
objective fact, not subjective interpretation. Thus, the Church in
the full New Covenant and New Testament sense belongs only to the
End-time and is in this sense an eschatological creation. Third,
the Church as 'true Israel' includes persons both from Israel and from
the heathen nations. There is no question of the exclusion of persons
of Jewish race. Apart from the fact that God is not vindictive in
character, the reason for this, as Hippolytus clearly sees, is that from
the beginning 'true Israel' as the creation of God has not been planned
as of one nation only. This remains true despite the puzzling fact that
the Gentiles were not at first summoned by God. The term 'Israel' may
be borrowed historically from the people of that name, but in reality
the race, who received that name from God, were only an anticipation
of the whole people of God. The standpoint is that of John the Baptist
when He said that God was able from the very stones to raise up children
unto Abraham, and Paul again takes seriously, in his Epistle to the
Galatians, the thought that Abraham's children were those who have faith
in Jesus (Matt.3.9, Lk.3.8; Gal.3.7ff). Neither Paul nor Hippolytus would
have considered that they were borrowing terms or concepts which
properly belonged to the nation Israel and were extending their sphere
or area of reference. Rather from the perspective of divine purpose
Israel after the flesh did but anticipate, through the mechanics of
that purpose, what was afterwards to belong to all who believe in
Jesus. It is significant that in Galatians, chapter 3, where Paul
sets forth his understanding that "it is men of faith who are the sons
of Abraham" (v.7, R.S.V.), he clearly takes most seriously the
historical changes which were brought about by the issuing of the divine
covenants.
In regard to the last point made above there is evidence that Hippolytus did not leave his thinking on the Book of Daniel to one side, when he was reflecting upon the Church. Despite the charge of Hans Lietzmann that "the remains (of the works of Hippolytus) do not reflect a mind of the first quality" and that "he was a dry compiler of an unpretentious kind, with a narrow range of thought". There is evidence that Hippolytus had the ability at least to be consistent in his thinking and of having a total scheme of thought. What is true is that he was not speculative in outlook, but wished to be faithful to Scripture. Thus, in the Commentary on Daniel (IV.xxvii. 5) as Hamel notes¹, the figure spoken of at Dan.10.6 is interpreted of the Lord (Christ) and it is thought significant that his arms and his feet are spoken of as being of polished brass. The twofold reference to arms and legs suggests the twofoldness of God's summons first to Jews and then to Gentiles. However, immoderate this use of allegory may seem to us, Hippolytus was acting as did most ancient commentators in seeing significance in such details. What is most important is that he probably views this figure in Dan.10 as the 'Son of Man', or one like unto a son of man, of Dan.7. Thus, the universal character of the figure in Dan.7 is perceived, and it is this which is carried over into the interpretation of Dan.10.6. How could Hippolytus fail to see that the Kingdom which corresponded in some way to this figure of Dan.7.13ff was a 'world empire' like the other four before it? To the extent that the Book of Daniel loomed large in Hippolytus' thinking, it is likely that the balance of that Book between the privileged place of the Jews and the universal purposes of God, would permeate all his theology. Thus, it is evident that for Hippolytus Jew and Gentile had to be made one in Jesus Christ, if Christ were to fulfil the pattern set forth

¹ op. cit., p.25.
in the Book of Daniel. This meant that the ingathering of the Gentiles was no 'afterthought' on God's part, but that the very being of the Church corresponds to the decrees or covenants of God enacted in history. Hamel aptly concludes:

"In diesen Beispielen (he has been thinking of the references to Dan. 10.6, etc.) versteht Hippolyt dabei unter den zwei Völkern nicht mehr die ungläubige Judenschaft und gläubige Heidenschaft, sondern die gläubige Auswahl aus Israel und Heiden."

Again Hippolytus thinks of the Church as the 'assemblage of the holy'. A number of elements enter into his presentation of this concept. It is evident that, although Hippolytus penned these words in the context of his struggle against what he viewed as a lack of moral rigour on the part of Zephyrinus and Callistus in Rome early in the third century, his was no one sided emphasis on the individual at the expense of the Christian community. Rather was he concerned that the individual should be found to belong to the 'true Church'. As we have noted above, this community, as 'true Israel', resulted from decisive divine intervention in history, and Hippolytus is aware that the initiative in forming the true Church lies with God. Nevertheless, for Hippolytus, what God does is to form a community of believing persons, and the failure of Zephyrinus and Callistus to insist on proof of belonging to the faithful is an indication that they were not led by God, at least in regard to the leadership in the Roman Church that they were accorded and in the course of action advocated by them.

The eschatological note again enters into our understanding of Hippolytus at this point in that the Church is made to be holy

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1 ep. cit., pp. 25-26
and to consist of persons, whose lives reflect their union with Christ the Holy One, not only through what Christ Jesus has done in His first advent, but also in that the Church anticipates now on earth the reign of Christ with His people in a renewed earth at His Parousia. Hippolytus clearly sees that, though the Church may now be despised by many, the future lies with her in the divine purpose. It is in this sense that she is 'holy'. She belongs to God in Christ. Therefore the Church must reflect her destiny in her behaviour now. 

THE CHURCH AS THE ASSEMBLY OF THE HOLY.

In order to give biblical foundation to his view of the Church as the community of the holy, whose lives reflect their calling, Hippolytus makes use of two Old Covenant images in particular. One is taken from the story concerning Susannah, which appears in the Apocrypha in our Bibles and which stood in the Septuagint version of the Book of Daniel. This is the story of how Susannah, the wife of Joakim, a wealthy Jew in Babylon, was tempted to commit adultery with two wicked Jewish judges, refused, was accused of performing the same act with another imaginary young man, was found guilty and condemned to death, but was delivered through the perspicacity of Daniel, who was able to demonstrate that the stories of her two accusers did not agree and were therefore false. The other image is taken from the Genesis story of the condition of Paradise. In the one case it is Susannah who is a picture of the Church; in the other it is Paradise itself. "Schon diese Eigenschaften des typisch verstandenen Paradieses zeigen, daß die Kirche einer himmlischen, überweltlichen Sphäre entstammt und daher der Sphäre des Irdischen nicht angehört."

1 op.cit., p.43.
Underlying both of these pictures of the Church is a view of it which sets it as a stranger within this present evil world. Thus, Susannah and her husband significantly have their dwelling in Babylon, which stands for the world, while Paradise is a condition which has passed away, a sphere which is no more in the world at large. So far, however, these types seem perhaps to have no reference to eschatology. This is not, however, the reality of the matter. This becomes clearer when we examine some of Hippolytus' references to the Church, and when we remember some of the common suppositions of Early Christian thinking. Thus, convinced as the Christians were in the first few centuries after Christ concerning the coming Kingdom of God, one could hardly refer back to the Paradise story of Genesis without indirectly suggesting something concerning the coming restoration of the same. In viewing the Church as a 'sphere' where God's will prevails, there is already a presumption that in the Church the Kingdom of God has been inaugurated. We shall see that the parallel with Susannah has similar eschatological implications for Hippolytus.

Significant for Hippolytus' thought is the fact that Susannah is not only a stranger in Babylon, but she comes under persecution in that setting. Haney reminds us that for Hippolytus the Church is represented by the figure of a Woman in childbirth in Revelation, chapter 12. This Woman is endangered by a 'great red dragon', which at chapter LXI of the De Christo et Antichristo, Hippolytus understands of the coming figure of Antichrist. There the omen is expressly identified with the Church. From this it surely follows that in the
persecutions of the Church in Hippolytus' own day he saw anticipations of the final persecution under Antichrist. The point is that the Church as a persecuted community has her types in the past, as in the story of Susannah, and is especially to be revealed in this light in the coming days under Antichrist. Thus, the Church is eschatologically oriented throughout. It was from this present anticipation of prophetic prediction that Hippolytus drew the conclusion that the Spirit of God was with the Church. He distrusted measures which would make the Church have a greater appeal to his age, or which in any way entailed a lowering of ethical and theological standards. This does not imply, of course, any lack of concern for evangelism. Indeed, it is significant that in the figure of childbirth in Rev. 12 Hippolytus sees the striving of the Church to bring Christ to birth in the world through the preaching of the Gospel:

"και ἔτεκεν, φασίν «εἷν ἁρσέαν, ὡς μέλλει ποιμαίνειν πάντα τὰ έθνη τὸν ἁρσεαν καὶ τέλειον Χριστόν, παιὰ θεοῦ, θεον καὶ λυθρότατον. ὡν κατήγγειλαν οἱ προφήται, ὃν ἃς τίκτωτα ἡ ἐκκλησία διασκεῖ πάντα τὰ έθνη." (De Christo et Antichristo LXXI.)

What is significant in context is that Hippolytus sees the Church as performing her work under persecution, and her contribution to the world's future is not by conforming to worldly standards but by proclamation of a message against which evil forces are ranged. In the parallel with Susannah, Hippolytus sees significance in the fact that it was when Susannah bathed that she came under temptation and persecution. When the Church witnesses to Christ as she does in baptism, to which Susannah's bath points forward, and when she is consistent with her own manner of life, refusing to be diverted into
unworthy ways, then persecution will be her lot. Hippolytus' understanding is that the Church is intended to be the 'community, or assemblage, of the holy', to be different from the world, and yet at the same time, just by being true to her own nature and to her Lord, to help bring in the coming Kingdom. The parallel with Susannah allows him to draw tacitly on the wealth of Old Testament prophetic teaching regarding Jehovah as husband of Israel (as in Hosea). Just as Susannah could not be untrue to Joakim, her husband, so the Church cannot be untrue to her Lord, to Christ.

To sum up what is entailed in this figure, a few points should be clearly disentangled from Hippolytus' total understanding and set forth schematically. First, although the Church lives in Babylon (the world), it is assumed that it is God's purpose to bring her to her Promised Land, and it is for this reason fundamentally that she must not lower her standards. Her ethics are eschatologically oriented. This is implicit surely in Hippolytus' interpretation of Babylon as the world. We can only miss this by failing to take seriously the eschatological orientation of all that the prophets had to say about Israel and her destiny. Second, the prophecies regarding the future persecution of the Church should make us wary of any degree of conformity to the world or compromise with her standards. In both the above points, it is not simply a matter of the inherent rightness of the maintenance of certain standards of conduct. An eschatological orientation of thinking is clearly discernible. Thirdly, it is surely not without significance that Hippolytus should see significance for the nature and role of the Church in a story attached to the Book of Daniel, that most prophetic work upon which Hippolytus relied so much in the outworking. This fact underlines that for Hippolytus the Church was an 'eschatological community', in the sense that she
had been called into being late in time to witness to the lateness of the times and to endure, under divine protection, until Christ's Parousia in glory. Fourthly, there is latent in the story of Susannah's faithfulness to her husband, Joakim, the thought of the preservation or reserve of her body for him. In the Early Church this concept was applied sometimes, in a symbolic manner, to the Church's preservation of her life from entanglements with a view to being undefiled at the Parousia of her Bridegroom. The Parable of the Ten Virgins, told by our Lord Himself, probably was the initiating factor in this development. One work which, as we have already seen, stresses the thought of the Church as an 'eschatological community' is the Shepherd of Hermas (early 2nd century), and there the physical character of the Church, as Bride of Christ and Body of Christ, is closely bound up with the coming redemption of God's people at the Parousia. It seems probable that a similar understanding informs Hippolytus' thinking, as he reflects on the story of Susannah's faithfulness to Joakim, whom he expressly views as a figure of Christ.

The view of the Church as prefigured in the Paradise described in Genesis and as anticipating the final Paradise of God again reminds us that, though the Church is in this present world, she is not of it. Jean Danielou has reminded us forcibly of the provenance of a 'Paradise-motif' in Early Christian thinking regarding the Church. Significance in this regard is the term 'neophyte', which thinks of a newly baptized person as 'newly planted', as the Greek suggests, in the Garden of Paradise of God. St. Paul used the term at I. Tim.3.6. The important thing, however, for our present purpose is that this is not a static or timeless parallel. Rather does this new Paradise pour out refreshing streams into the world. This at any rate is how Hippolytus understands the figure and the reality to which it points.
Thus, he says:

"Car Éden est le nom du nouveau Jardin de volupté planté à l'Orient, orné de toutes sortes de bons arbres, ce qu'il faut comprendre de la réunion des justes -------- La concorde, qui est le chemin des saints vers la communauté, voilà ce qu'est l'Eglise, jardin spirituel de Dieu, planté sur le Christ, comme à l'Orient, où l'on voit toutes sortes d'arbres : la lignée des patriarches --------, les œuvres des prophètes --------, le chœur des Apôtres, -------- le chœur des Martyrs, -------- la théorie des Vierges -------- le chœur des Docteurs, l'ordre des Evêques, des Prêtres et des Lévites.--------

Il coule dans ce jardin un fleuve d'une eau inépuisable.

Quatre fleuves en découlent, arrosant toute la terre. Il en est de même dans l'Eglise : le Christ, qui est le fléau, est annoncé dans le monde entier par le quadruple évangile."

What is especially significant is the way in which Hipponlytus sees the Church as watered and nourished by that Living Water, which is destined to give life to the world. Here the emphasis falls on the Church's partnership with her Lord. It is by her agency that the Gospels have been written, under the direction doubtless of the Holy Spirit, and the thought is that by faithfulness to the One Who is the centre and source of her own life, the Church foreshadows the final refreshment of the whole earth.

It follows from all of this that, in thinking of the Church as 'the assemblage of the holy', as Hamel puts it, he is instructed by such biblical symbols, as implicit in his view in the figure of Susannah and in the Paradise spoken of in Genesis. While he insisted on purity, this was because only a pure community was living in holiness, that is, in reserve for her coming Lord. The underlying reasoning is largely, thought not wholly, eschatological in character.

Hamel well sums the matter up under his final point on the 'holiness of the Church' when he says: "Die in der Kirche erworbenen und

1 Comm. In. Dom. I.XVII.
bewahrte Heiligkeit verleiht den Gläubigen die Anwartschaft auf die letzte Vollendung des Heils im Reiche Gottes.

THE CHURCH AS THE BEARER OF THE TRUTH AND SAVING ARK OF THE BELIEVING.

Hippolytus views the Church as a bearer of the truth, to take up Hamel's third point. This should perhaps be viewed as a particular instance or aspect of the truth seen under the last heading. The thought is that, in a world which is ruined through man's sin and is in darkness, the Church alone possesses the truth, which is contained in the Gospel. As we saw above, in the illustration concerning Paradise, the Church shares first in the blessings of Christ, the River of God, but she is seen as cooperating in bringing the life-giving streams to the world through her witness in the Four Gospels — and doubtless in all her witness.

It is in contradistinction from the true teaching committed to the Church that heresy is to be understood. There seems indeed to be tacit parallelism in his thinking between the contrast of Christ and Antichrist and that between the Gospel, faithfully handed down within the community of the Holy Spirit and heresy. Thus, the conflict with heresy is a proleptic anticipation of the final conflict between Christ and Antichrist. We have already noted, in our study of Irenaeus' eschatology, that Irenaeus appears to assume that the heresies against which he wrote revealed the presence of the 'spirit of error' already at work in the world. This, it would seem, is also the standpoint of Hippolytus, so that in his 'Refutio omnium Haeresium' he is not just concerned to refute error: he is conscious of opposing a spirit of error which is destined to grow greater in the world until it reaches its consummation in deceitfulness of Antichrist. When, in the opening

1 op. cit., p. 59.
sections of the 'Refutation', Hippolytus goes out of his way to point out how in a covert manner the heretics rely upon pagan philosophic tenets, the basic thought is that heresy apes the truth, but is inwardly something else in disguise. Heresy is an anticipation of the 'deceivableness' of Antichrist. Thus, even the rejection of heresy, and the corresponding acceptance of the Church as the bearer of the truth, is eschatologically conditioned.

Hippolytus' thinking on this matter merges imperceptibly with the last point, to which we had promised to give our attention. In Hamel's elucidation of the nature of the Church, as understood by Hippolytus, he saw the Church as being 'the saving Ark of the believing', but we saw that Hamel deals with the structure of the Church as portrayed in Hippolytus. This is because for Hippolytus structure is an important aspect of the nature of the true Church. It is important briefly to elucidate the outlines of Hippolytus' thought on the structure of the Church, especially in its relationship to the Holy Spirit and the question of apostolic succession. The truth is that Hippolytus sees the Church always as a community, which is the beginning of the New Creation in Christ. Though he emphasises the need for purity in church membership, he lays emphasis on the Church not as a conglomerate of individual believers, but as a corporate community, which is, Bride of Christ. This community is set over against the wickedness and the darkness of the world, like the Jews in Babylon, but it is already an anticipation of the coming Kingdom of God. Amongst other things the Church is the bearer of truth in the midst of pagan darkness and has to be especially on its guard against heresy, which is paganism acting from with the Church herself. Hippolytus sees the Church as a unity in her corporate character and this unity not only transcends geographical, but also historical, boundaries. It is this
that preserves the Church as the Church, and clearly such a doctrine must have a special significance for any theology that sees the Church as that community which spans the 'gap' between the two Advents. We have already seen that for Hippolytus Christ has inaugurated 'the fifth world empire' of Daniel's visions. One of the features of this Kingdom was that it was enduring and carried everything before it. Undoubtedly Hippolytus understood the Church in terms of a realization of this Kingdom, which would be fully and publicly unveiled before the eyes of the world only at the Parousia. With such a background of thought, Hippolytus must have had deep convictions regarding the imperishability of the Church which would be reinforced by the words of our Lord as reported at Matt.16.18. The question, however, narrows itself down to the manner in which Hippolytus saw this preservation as taking place.

It would seem that Hippolytus views the Church as bridging the two Advents in that she possessed the Holy Spirit, as gift of God, and because her physical structure conforms to that laid down by Christ through His apostles. Hippolytus views the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost as an historical event that cannot be reversed, and he sees the succession of bishops from the apostles as linking the Church in her various generations with her historical genesis. It is only when we lay stress on the individual generations that Hippolytus' doctrine of apostolic succession becomes 'mechanical'. For him the overarching truth is that of the eternal character of the fifth world empire of Daniel, inaugurated by Christ in the Church. Hippolytus begins with this corporate reality, and is in this way able to view the succession not in a mechanical fashion, but as the physical reality corresponding to the inner reality of the presence of the Holy Spirit with the Church. Just as commitment to Christ was expressed in water baptism, and as
ordination was effected through the laying on of hands and the use of unguents, so it seemed appropriate that to the spiritual reality of the Church, which consists not in our right attitudes but in the objective presence of the Holy Spirit, there should correspond that which on the outward side guarantees the Church's continuity.

What is the significance of all this for Hippolytus' eschatology? Its relevance consists in the way in which his thought of the Presence of the Spirit and of the outward effective symbolism of apostolic succession, reflect the 'interim' character of the Church, as existing between the 'two Advents'. The question is not simply that of the continuance of the Church, but of her continuance until the Parousia of Christ. We recall how on the Day of Pentecost Peter associated the gift of the Holy Spirit, that fell on the Church, with the prophecy of Joel 2.28, which implies that this Gift was seen as the peculiar possession of God's people in the End-time. It was in this context that Hippolytus appears also to have thought of apostolic tradition and apostolic succession. Just as the Gift of the Holy Spirit was once given to the Church and remains with her until the Parousia, so the Gospel and its normative explication has once been given by the apostles, and in like fashion her structure has been instituted by Christ. Again, the explication of the full meaning of this structure was worked out, it was thought, by the apostles. The perspective adopted by Hippolytus may well be expressed in the understanding of 'tradition', which Cullmann discovers in the New Testament documents themselves. Cullmann holds that in such a passage as I Cor.II.23ff. Paul can say that he had received 'from the Lord' what in fact he had received through the apostles, i.e. those were 'eye witnesses' of Christ's glory, because the understanding is that "transmission by the apostles is
not affected by men, but by Christ the Lord himself, who thereby imparts this revelation."¹

Cullmann holds further that the gifts both of the Spirit and of the Tradition were of such a character that they must be historically understood. This means that it was a mistaken understanding of the gift of the Spirit which allows any branch of the Church to assume that the Spirit will make fresh revelations after the close of the 'apostolic age'. It is for the Spirit to take of the things of Christ, i.e. that relate to the Gospel facts, and to make them real to men.

"The Holy Spirit interprets Scripture, but is at the same time controlled by it."² In similar fashion the institutions of Christ are energised by the Holy Spirit, Who has once been given to the Church and remains with her. What is significant in this account of New Testament thinking, as given by Cullmann, is that he gives an account of the developing thinking and functioning of the Church which corresponds to her position between the two Advents. It is eschatologically oriented throughout, not only so, but it takes seriously the elements of realized and inaugurated eschatology. In the Church, which is the community of the End-time, the Holy Spirit and the Gospel tradition have been given once-for-all. Nevertheless, the Church as the community that presses forward, with the Spirit within her, towards the Parousia of Christ, is competent to apply the Gospel and manifest her functions in each succeeding time and circumstance. Her centre of gravity is in the Incarnation, her goal is the Parousia.

It is one thing, of course, to agree with Cullmann's interpretation of the New Testament understanding of Tradition, in its application both to doctrine and to Church offices; it is quite another to show that Hippolytus' understanding is identical, or even similar. However, it is this kind of understanding which Hamel appears to ascribe to Hippolytus. Thus he says:

"Die Kirche ist im Besitz des Heiligen Geistes, des apostolischen Amtes und dadurch der "richtigen Lehr.""

Hamel goes on to quote an instructive passage from the Refutation of all Heresies in its introductory section in Rockl.

"Ταύτα δὲ ἑτέρος οὐκ ἐλέγξει ἢ τὸ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἁρματοθεῖν ζύγιον πνεύμα, ὥστε πρότερον οἱ ἀπόστολοι μετέχοντες τοῖς ὑπὸθέσεις τοῖς ὑπερτησεύσις ἔκκλησίας, ἀν δὲμεὶς διδάσκωμεν τοὺς ἑν τῇ τῆς ἀγίας ἅγιας ἐκκλησίας τῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ τῆς ἐκκλησίας λειτουργοὶ οὐκ ὄρθολοι νωτᾶξικαν, οὐδὲ λόγον ὑπὸθον σωπᾶμεν." (Ref. omn.Haer.1, Foreword, para.6).

Here Hippolytus' chief concern is with doctrine, but it is instructive to observe the close relationship posited between the Holy Spirit and the apostolic office. In principle, Hippolytus does indeed appear to stand with that interpretation of the Church which sees her offices as belonging to the structure laid down by Christ and energised by the Spirit but as determined in regard to doctrine, office, and function by what has been given once-for-all in the Gospel or apostolic age. The desire to guard the Church and to ward off heresy is in line

1 cf. crit., p.99.
with the wish that the Church should be preserved intact until Christ's Coming in glory. And this eschatological note is the more to the fore when we remember the general Early Christian belief (expressed at 1 Tim. 4.1ff.; 2 Tim. 3.1ff.; 2 Pet. 2.1ff; etc. are New Testament expressions of it) that heresy would increase prior to the Parousia.

A similar attitude to the Gift of the Spirit and to the Tradition, as laid down once-for-all in the apostolic age, appears to underlie 'The Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition,' one of the most prized documents of the Early Church. Although this book is cast in the form of a manual of piety and liturgy, the actual intention of Hippolytus appears to have been to set forth, in opposition to the Roman Church, what in his view constituted the true Church. It has always seemed strange that Hippolytus who believes so strongly in the catholicity of the Church, should establish a 'schismatic' community or sect. The fact is, of course, that in protesting against "recent apostasy or error and ignorant men"¹, Hippolytus is asserting the true catholicity of his followers. He thereby implies that he has no mechanical doctrine of 'apostolic succession' of bishops from the apostles. The linkage between apostles and bishops is determined for Hippolytus by the conformity of the bishops with Scripture and dominical or apostolic institution. This being so, Hippolytus is not afraid to reject the authority of bishops whose views do not seem to him too be reconcilable with Scripture and the apostolic tradition.

What is important for our present purpose is not any detailed investigation of Hippolytus' view either of Tradition or of the Spirit, but the fact that both express an understanding of the nature of the Church, which is thoroughly eschatological in character. We may now summarize thus. First, the Church spans the two Advents as the fifth world empire of Daniel's visions. In that she does span this 'gap', she must be seen as a unity which transcends the historical process and yet is imbedded in it. From this it follows that neither the gift of the Spirit nor that of the Tradition can be repeated. They have been given one-for-all. This is an insight which derives its full meaning at least only from an understanding of this framework derived from salvation-history, i.e. that which sees the End-time as having arrived in Christ but as still pressing on towards its consummation at the Parousia. Second, in the details of his treatment of the functioning of the Spirit within the Church and the manner in which doctrine and office have to be expressed in each succeeding generation, Hippolytus reveals a grasp of both 'realized' and 'futurist' elements of eschatology. The unwillingness to go beyond or to criticize that which has been laid down once-for-all in the Gospel is bound up with the realization that in Christ Jesus and the facts of the Gospel, the events of Cross, Resurrection, and Ascension, the End-time has arrived. The realization of the necessity for the consummation of Christ's victory at his Second Advent is everywhere assumed, and Hippolytus sees the Church as pressing towards this goal through her preaching, teaching, and worship. There is nothing static about Hippolytus' view of the Church. Third, in his concern to keep the Church pure in doctrine and true in form to what has been laid down by Christ, Hippolytus is tacitly conscious of the increase of heresy within the Church that was anticipated and that, it was thought,
would match the persecution from the outside. The Antichrist-motif is not absent even here. It is true that not much of this is made explicit, but such an interpretation of Hippolytus' thought makes sense, is consistent with what is stated in the 'Refutation' and the 'Treatise on Apostolic Tradition', and has the merit of fitting in with his outlook on eschatology set forth at length in his works directly dealing with that subject. It cannot be said that a study of such works as the 'Refutation' or the 'Apostolic Tradition' add to our knowledge of Hippolytus' eschatology to any great extent, but it does underline his recognition of the fact that in Christ the End-time has already begun. Not only so, but we see in these works something more of Hippolytus' recognition that this period between the two Advents is not merely one in which we await the Parousia, or even one in which certain predictions (such as the emergence of Antichrist) have to be fulfilled. Rather does Hippolytus see the Church as caught up through the Holy Spirit and her life, in so far as it is based on the Gospel tradition, in the dynamic movement of the Gospel events themselves towards their consummation. One might gain the impression from the directly eschatological books that everything was so predestined beforehand that there is nothing anyone can do about it. Here we see that, though history must needs take a certain predestined and foreseen course, this does not alter the fact that the Church, in possession of the freedom that Christ gives, has a cooperative part to act in the pressing of the Age towards its completion. The only stipulation is that the Church can only truly do this when she allows herself to be determined by the Holy Spirit and by the Gospel.
Hippolytus' thinking marks a significant point in the views noted in this thesis. He reveals a mentality which may seem at first strange to our modern concepts, but one which is very revealing of more general Early Church attitudes and which deserves respect for its own sake.

The eschatology of Hippolytus is markedly futurist as is revealed by the *De Christo et Antichristo*. It could be argued that this impression is heightened by the particular choice of material from Hippolytus' pen which we have made. It does seem clear, however, that, whatever other facets Hippolytus' thinking may have, this futurism is of the essence of his thinking. It is, however, proper to stress that there are elements of 'realized' eschatology also in Hippolytus' approach, and these have been brought out more fully in connection with his views of the Church, as set out on pages 843ff.

The significant feature is that Hippolytus again shows the same attitude to eschatology that we have found in most of the literature of the period before us: it is representative of the view that the End-time has been inaugurated in Christ but presses towards its goal.

The particular contribution of Hippolytus lies in the stress which he places upon the Biblical-prophetic background to the Christian Hope. The Parousia of Christ in glory is to be thought out in terms of the fulfilment of such passages as Daniel, chapters 2 and 7. This implies, as we have endeavoured to show, that Hippolytus did not anticipate the Coming of Christ 'at any moment'. Neither did the Early Church generally, but Hippolytus makes most explicit the thought that Christ will only return to the earth after Antichrist has emerged, and Antichrist will appear on the scene only after Rome (conceived as the fourth world-empire of Danielic prophecy) has been divided into ten kingdoms. It seems inappropriate to view this as an adjustment on the part of Hippolytus to the fact that the Lord has not in fact come in glory for His Church. There is no hint whatsoever in Hippolytus' writings of embarrassment over the delay in the Parousia.

This Biblical-prophetic background stressed by Hippolytus (though, indeed, it does not seem to him to be any new teaching or outlook) helps us to judge what the Early Church in general understood by 'imminence' in regard to the Parousia of Christ. In Hippolytus' terms the implication is that Christ is imminent in the sense that in Him the fifth world empire of Daniel 7 (and 2) has arrived in advance: this surely suggests that the Coming of the Son of Man in glory, mentioned in
that work and applied by Hippolytus (and the Early Church generally) to Christ, cannot be far behind. Nevertheless, the seriousness with which the details of the Danielic prophecy are taken shows that Hippolytus does not think that Christ's Coming is immediate. Rome first has to lose her power and be dissolved into ten kingdoms: only then will Antichrist emerge and only thereafter will Christ appear. The passage noted on page 763 concerning Christ's having come in 5500 years from the Creation and His return being planned for the 6000th year has given Warner opportunity, as we have noted, to see in this an accommodation on Hippolytus' part to the delay in the Parousia. Doubtless this is how Warner sees the matter. At the same time one feels that the treatment meted out to writers such as Hippolytus is often hardly fair. If they say that Christ will come at any time or, at least, within a very few years, they are said to be gripped by apocalyptic fanaticism. If, on the other hand, they say or imply that Christ may not return in glory for quite some time, then they are held to be disappointed in the delay in that event. One suspects that imbedded in such an approach to these writers is a subtle begging of the question. If, however, we allow Hippolytus' evidence to be taken as it presents itself (without apologies for the delay in the Parousia or anything of this kind) then it raises a fresh possibility of understanding the Early Church's approach to the question of Christ's imminent Return.

A further significant feature in Hippolytus' writing is the way in which his attitude to the Church reflects the eschatological presuppositions already noted in our study of the De Christo et Antichristo and the Commentary on Daniel. The treatment accorded the Church, when examined, reveals the assumption, that She lives in an End-time which has already been inaugurated but not consummated. Thus, the thought of the Church as 'true Israel', to take only one example, suggests Hippolytus' latent assumption concerning a schematization of history whereby Israel's rejection of her Messiah is a part of a predestined scheme of history: it is the hinge on which rests the expansion of the People of God among the Gentiles. Hippolytus develops this thought in his own way, but it is present in Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and other Early Christian writers, as we have seen in our own investigation. This means that the Church occupies a particular point in the divine historical plan, and for Hippolytus (as for the Early Church generally), this means that She not only follows a period of restriction of the People of God to those of Israelitish stock but She anticipates the coming Kingdom of God.

Hippolytus' eschatology is, therefore, most significant, and gives no ground to the assumption of Dodd and Werner that the delay in the Parousia of Christ in glory led to a process of 'de-eschatologizing' in the Early Church.