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THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ALEXANDER OF HALES

by

DUNCAN S. WATSON

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
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TO TERTIA
PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study in the Christology of Alexander of Hales. I chose Alexander as a subject simply because I wanted to become acquainted with a theology not of my own tradition and there is no better period to choose for this purpose than the thirteenth century, the century of the scholastic giants. Having chosen the period the next question to be asked was "who could I study besides Thomas Aquinas"? The fact that there were good new texts available of Alexander's main works and the fact that he was a man of some stature in his own day together with the fact that most Protestants have never heard of him seemed a good reason to discover the source of his great reputation. There were problems about the text of the Summa in that there were doubts as to its genuineness but I hoped that these problems would be solved as I proceeded.

However, this was not to be so. Because of the doubts about the genuineness of the Summa this thesis has become a study in the Christology of Alexander which appears in the Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Together with this there are discussions of the views of the Quaestiones at the end of each topic in this thesis.

Is this concentration on the Glossa and to a lesser extent on the Quaestiones, and the exclusion of the Summa, justified? It would appear to be so in view of the title of the thesis "The Christology of Alexander of Hales." If there
is any considerable doubt about the genuineness of the Summa as a work of Alexander then one cannot claim that it is his Christology that is being expounded. And that doubt exists. The Summa may be interesting for comparisons and certainly is an important work in itself but that does not bring it under the scope of this thesis.

Nevertheless, some remarks about the genuineness and the controversy on this matter are necessary both to give evidence for the Summa's exclusion from consideration in this thesis and to state what the controversy is about. The appearance of the magnificent new edition of the Summa in 1924 gave impetus to a controversy which involved quite a considerable number of scholars. The reason for this was the fact that the Summa appeared dependent upon several authors, notably John of Rochelle, and the fact that certain discussions in the Summa were obviously not from the pen of Alexander. The suggestion was that possibly John of Rochelle was the author or that the Summa was a compilation with the work of John of Rochelle dominant. It could hardly be called the work of Alexander. With the publishing of the second and third volumes of the Summa in 1928 and 1930, without any comment from the editors on the genuineness of the Summa, the controversy received further stimulation. It now appeared that the genuineness of the Summa as a work of Alexander could not be sustained and this fact apparently was becoming accepted.

However, the editors were evidently biding their time. In 1947 two articles appeared in *Franciscan Studies* by
V. Doucet, an editor of the new edition of the Summa. 1 These articles had already appeared on the continent and were subsequently to appear in the Prolegomena of the Summa, which appeared in 1948, on pages LIX to LXXX. This amazing work of scholarship went to 370 foolscap, double columned pages and V. Doucet, contrary to the usual practice, personally took responsibility for the research and the conclusions of the Prolegomena. In this work there was a discussion of the text as it was restored in the first section and then the second section considered the Summa historically. First, in this section, came the article referred to above which discussed the history of the problem of the authenticity of the Summa, then the authors cited were listed, and after this followed the most important section on the sources of the Summa concluding with a listing of sources of the same period as the Summa. This section was significantly titled with the question "are they sources or are they dependent?" Amongst the most important sources and decisive for the argument were two little known and now reprinted works of Alexander: the Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and the Quaestiones. Then the editor discussed the use of these sources, and finally in three sections he considered the composition and structure of the Summa I - III (volume IV on the sacraments being accepted as the work of William of Middleton), the age of these volumes, and finally the authenticity of these volumes.

In the articles to which reference has already been made V. Doucet came to the following conclusions: 1) The Summa I-III was written before 1245 and therefore before the death of Alexander. 2) John of Rochelle and (my underlining) the Quaestiones were sources. 3) The work was a compilation, possibly by more than one writer. 4) The question in Book I "De Missione Visibili" was an addition. 5) De Corpore Humano and De Coniuncto in Book II were additions. 6) Book IV was by William of Middleton (William had been assigned the task of completing the Summa in a papal bull which recognised Alexander as the author, a few years after the death of Alexander). V. Doucet concluded here that the problem of the Summa on the whole had not been solved - certainly he repudiated those who had concluded that Alexander was not the author on all too slim evidence - but that Alexander, if there were others, surely was the chief compiler.

In his conclusion after the listing and consideration of the Quaestiones Doucet concludes:

"Haec recensio quaestionum Halensis ultra modum sane longior evasit, quae tamen omnino exigebatur ad problema Summae solvendum. Et re quippe vera paulo clarius iam discernitur quid Alexander contulerit Summae: praster nomen suum gloriosum, ultra ducentas quaestiones, quasi nucleus originalis Summae habendae sunt ac unde prout dubio primum exorta est ipsa intentio cuiusdam Summae compilandae. Utique in praxi seu in executione primae intentionis plures alii fontes adiecti fuerunt aut immo praefertur ipsis quaestionibus halesianis; sed et huiusmodi quaestiones neglectas longe pauciores esse deprehendimus quam haec tamen putabatur. Plures enim quaestiones de quibus legitur v.g. apud Henquinnet: "Differt a Summa" vel "deest in Summa", verbotenus econtra, saltam ex parte, in Summa reperiuntur. Tandem inter fontes qui quandoque praefertur quaestionibus halesianis, nonnulli utique habent extranei, ut Cancellarius et Altissiodorensis; saepius autem ubi reversa dimittitur Alexander, usu adhibetur Rupellensis
At the end of the discussion on the Commentary on the Sentences Doucet concludes that there can be no doubt that it is a work of Alexander and now not only the commentary but also not a few chapters of the *Summa* which were previously thought to be borrowed from elsewhere ought to be restored to Alexander. As a general conclusion on the sources as a whole Doucet states that the first three volumes were compiled before 1245 largely from the writings of Alexander and John of Rochelle. The greater part came from Alexander. Other sources are supplementary. It is possible to conclude that these two were the redactors but there are many difficulties in the way of this conclusion especially in regard to Alexander who is cited as an extraneous author and although many of the Quaestiones and his second volume of the Sentences' commentary are used when there are parallel questions in John and Alexander more often the former is preferred. However, the re-establishment of the Commentary showed that sections of the Summa previously attributed to Odo Rigaldus are actually the sources of Odo's work.

At the conclusion of the section on the authenticity of the Summa as a work of Alexander and at the end of the Prolegomena Doucet states after examining the external and internal evidence; "Ipse Alexander quodammodo

4. Ibid. pp. CCCVI-CCCVII.
Summam fecit (critica externa), sed collaborantibus aliis (critica interna); item, ex propriis maxime scriptis, sed etiam ex alienis. Quare et authentica et halesiana quodammodo Summa dici potest, non autem simpliciter. 

Perhaps he was "simpliciter" the author of Book II but as this is not Alexander's Christology that is not sufficient on which to found a thesis entitled "The Christology of Alexander of Hales".

It would perhaps be useful to list Doucet's rejections of certain positions held by scholars who affirmed the non-authenticity of the Summa of Alexander to see where V. Doucet has brought the discussion of the question of the Summa. These are found in an "Epilogue". The critics asserted that Alexander entered the Franciscans in the year 1231 and was regent at the latest till 1238. On the contrary he entered the order about 1236 and was still teaching and disputing in public 1240-1244. Why could he not also compile the Summa? The critics asserted that no commentary of Alexander remained. The commentary, on the contrary, not only exists but is a principal source of the Summa. The critics asserted that the Quaestiones postquam fuit frater were the work of John of Rochelle and Stephen de Poliniaco. On the contrary they belong to Alexander and the "Quaestiones antequam fuit frater" are a principal source of the Summa. The critics, following Roger Bacon, asserted that the Summa

5. Ibid. p. CCLXIX.
was attributed to Alexander only out of reverence. This assertion is false because the Summa is largely compiled from the work of Alexander. The critics asserted that the Summa was compiled about 1260 and queried the possibility of the doctrine existing in Paris before 1250. On the contrary it was written before the death of Alexander in 1245. The fact that the sections De corpore _humano_ and De _coniuncto_ were written before 1257 and not about 1270 as asserted, and therefore before William of Middleton's death, make it possible that they came from his pen since he was officially given the task of completing the Summa. The critics asserted that the Summa for the most part came from the writings of Odo Rigaldus, Albert the Great, Bonaventure etc. whereas the contrary was true. The critics asserted that the _Praelocutio_ of Bonaventure in which he cited 'Alexander in Summa' did not appear authentic and attempted to demonstrate this fact, but on the contrary this _Praelocutio_ is beyond doubt authentic. 

This is where Doucet brought the controversy. Because of the importance of the Commentary and the _Quaestiones_ the editors hastened to edit them so that the true Alexander could be known, instead of proceeding at once to the publishing of the fourth volume of the Summa on the sacraments. 

In spite of the importance of this work by Doucet in re-establishing the part of Alexander in the compilation

6. Ibid. p. CCCLXX.  
7. Ibid.
of the Summa, the fact still remains that it is the work of at least two men and that the Christological section proper, which is Volume III, was probably not under the redaction of Alexander and this renders it suspect as far as stating the "Christology of Alexander of Hales" even though the Summa might reflect the thinking of his school. Hence the Summa is omitted in the consideration of Alexander's Christology in this thesis.

The Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard forms the basis of this thesis. There are several reasons for this. First I worked on the Glossa before the Quaestiones and received the Quaestiones only after I had written an outline of the Glossa's Christology. On consideration, however, I came to the conclusion that the Quaestiones should not be integrated for a second reason, namely, that it revealed considerable differences from the Glossa and these were best set out in separation so that the thinking of the Glossa and the Quaestiones could be readily comprehended. A third reason for the lack of integration is the fact that the Quaestiones and the Glossa quite often treat of different topics which simply could not be integrated. The Glossa forms the basis of the thesis, now, simply because, as far as Christology is concerned, it has far more and in fact has one large section which develops Christology and soteriology quite thoroughly. The Quaestiones considered are also only those disputed before Alexander was a brother because I do not have an edition of those disputed after he was a brother and as far as I know (at the end of 1963 and in mid-1965 in Melbourne
not yet in a Franciscan Seminary if published) the latter are not yet published. In any case for the most part, from the list which Doucet gives in the Summa Prolegomena they appear to be more in the philosophico-speculative area than in the realm of Christology proper and except for one or two questions, which are dealt with in any case in the other works, they would have a Christological reference only in a very general way.

The editors have also rendered a considerable service in that they have investigated thoroughly evidence for the biography of Alexander. This is a great improvement on the usual few meagre lines on his biography that appear in encyclopedias and histories of various kinds. The following summary brings out the main points of Alexander's life correcting one or two errors that have been commonly repeated.

Alexander was born about 1186 in the west of England. He studied in Paris and in 1210 he became M.A. and somewhere in the period 1210-1215 he transferred to the theological faculty where he was successively "auditor, baccalareus, et magister regens", the first two being held about the years 1212-1217, 1217-1220, and the appointment as "magister regens" taking place about 1220 or 1221. It was during the twenties that he probably wrote the Glossa. He was the first to use the Sentences of Peter as a text in theology. From about the years 1226-1229 he held ecclesiastical appointment in England as canon at St. Pauls and prebendary of Holborn. He was closely involved in the student disturbances at Paris 1229-
1231 leaving the city with the students, and in August 1230, with two others, was delegated to the Roman Curia in relation to the negotiations and remained in Rome till May 1231. He then journeyed to England where he is found as canon of Lichfield and archdeacon of Coventry which offices were conferred in recognition of his work with the Curia. He returned to France in 1232 to his previous work but evidently retained his ecclesiastical posts. At the age of 50, about 1236-37, Alexander entered the order of the Franciscans becoming their best scholar and retaining his regency until the end of his life. With several others he expounded rules of the order in 1241-1242. Not long after attending the Council of Lyons the great Franciscan known as "doctor irrefragabilis" died. 8 Of the two texts which are used in this thesis the Glossa was written about the years 1223-1227. 9 It is considered quite definitely to be a genuine work of Alexander. 10 The Quaestiones disputed before he was a brother in their new edition are 68 in number and in the Prolegomena to the Summa are 120 in number because under several of the topics there are often more than two questions. In the Prolegomena they are listed and carefully discussed (pp.CLI-CLXXII) and Doucet concludes that their authenticity seems quite certain and doubts to the contrary are not reasonably held. In the Prolegomena he dates the disputation of these questions in the years 1226-1236. 11

and in the Prolegomena to the Quaestiones they are dated 1220-1236. 12

As Robert S. Franks has pointed out with regard to the work of Christ, it is not merely the doctrine that is specifically listed under the heading of the work of Christ but also the doctrine concerned with law and grace which must be considered in a consideration of the work of Christ. This involves necessarily the problems of the sacraments and merit. 13 Today in theology the involvement of all theology in its centre in Christ is fairly generally accepted but this is for the reason that theology today in all its aspects is deliberately Christocentric. With Alexander as with other scholastics this was not the case; theology was far more departmental and one doctrine was and to a large extent successfully (i.e. as far as their intention was concerned) discussed without relation to another. However as with the work of Christ, so with Christology one cannot possibly cover Alexander's thinking by sole reference to that which is placed under what I shall call the Christology proper. Those doctrines such as law and grace, sacraments and merit, although soteriologically oriented are of great significance in a discussion of Christology because it is at the point of soteriology that weaknesses in medieval, and in particular, in Alexander's Christology appear. Anselm's great work

Cur Deus Homo is famous in the history of soteriology but its importance in the history of Christology is also very great. The other possibility in the translation of Cur Deus Homo which is normally translated "why did God become man" and so understood soteriologically, is "why the God-man" and this is more Christological. Whatever the translation, whatever the emphasis on Anselm's thinking, it is still very important Christologically because in this work Anselm emphasised the necessity of the humanity from God's side, that is, the satisfier had to be both God and man, for only man should have satisfied but only God had the power to satisfy. This doctrine over against, for instance, the "Christus Victor" theory of atonement, made "necessary" the humanity of Christ; Christ's work was not merely a battle going on over the head of man.

Anselm, at a time when docetic tendencies were strong, re-asserted the humanity of Christ. This position Alexander took over with the consequent "necessity" of Christ's humanity, in spite of some considerable modifications to Anselm's position. In Alexander's Christology, on the whole, there is little doubt about his affirmation, and successful affirmation of the divinity of Christ, although in his discussion of the hypostatic union there may be some question as to his success. However, in the Christology there is some doubt as to his whole-hearted affirmation of the humanity of Christ, and it is with this side of Christology, therefore that this thesis is most interested. Although the Christology itself can be criticised, it is in the soteriology and
related subjects that Alexander's weaknesses and presuppositions are best revealed, or rather conclusively revealed. It should be noted that in regard to the humanity of Christ, Alexander takes up a position which is not far removed from that taken up by the great part of Christian history although at times he would appear to move away from tradition in that he does not seem particularly interested in affirming the humanity of Christ as much as he does the divinity. This means that criticism in this thesis of his actual Christological statements in regard, for instance, to sin, as far as the history of the church goes, is decidedly a minority view. However, more and more it is the view of contemporary theology and one would hope and believe it is also Biblical.

The main interest of this thesis, therefore, is with the doctrine of the humanity of Christ in Alexander's Christology. This will involve investigation as to the reality of the humanity, the scope of his work, its connection with the Divinity and vice versa (i.e. the question, here, is: did God become man, did the Word of God become flesh?). These questions will be raised in the Christology proper in relation to Christ's knowledge and ignorance, sin, his birth, his suffering, and the two wills; in the doctrine of satisfaction and its limited application; and in the discussion of the hypostatic union where God and man in Christ are viewed in somewhat uneasy relationship because the human creates a difficulty.

The implications of this Christology will be further investigated outside the realm of the Christology proper. The
implications are semi-Pelagian for if the humanity of Christ is limited as it is, then the humanity is provided elsewhere. This semi-Pelagianism is found in the doctrine of the sacraments and in the doctrine of grace, free will, and merit. Consequently these discussions form a major part of the thesis. However, there is another way of compensating for the lack of the humanity of Christ and that is to be found in the doctrine of grace. This discussion has already been mentioned and it is the doctrine of grace which prevents Alexander from being fully Pelagian in the discussion of actual sins. But it is the doctrine of grace which also draws attention to the limitation of the humanity of Christ in regard to sanctification, in fact, to the almost total exclusion of Christ. At this point Alexander with his doctrine of uncreated and created grace moves very strongly towards a non-Trinitarian position (which coincides nicely with various types of Pelagianism).

This non-Trinitarian position, which is completely or almost completely unChristological, in that the humanity of Christ is minimised to purely an exemplary function, is revealed not only in the doctrine of grace but above all in another "grace", the grace of predestination, which in the Glossa is completely unChristological and non-Trinitarian as a consequence. For much of his thinking the humanity of Christ plays no real part and therefore neither does true Christology in much of Alexander's theology.

A basic problem for Alexander and this type of
theology would appear to be the problem of time and eternity, or the finite and the infinite. The act of God in man becomes extraordinarily difficult conceptually when one has the philosophic presuppositions of Alexander. This is the view of God arising from the tradition of Plato and Aristotle of God as "One", the "unmoved mover", the Essence who is unchangeable and indivisible, the "One" which is everything man is not and thus by definition man and God have no real relationship. God and man are considered separately in this thinking. It is the medieval Christian theologian's task to bring them together but with such presuppositions a true account of the Biblical viewpoint is almost impossible to come by. But the Bible is incarnational, or rather, Christian than theology begins, and cannot begin elsewhere, with the incarnation, and thus with the Trinity, that is, with the God who relates Himself to man, by becoming man in the Son and revealing this to man in the Spirit, and yet the God who remains God. It is the failure to work from this beginning that creates exceptional difficulties in Alexander's thinking on predestination and also in the chapter on the Dominus Concept which forms the last chapter in the thesis.

How to approach the discussion of the Christology proper which occupies pages 11 to 262 of volume three of the Glossa was something of a problem. As it was already a commentary a summary of this section would have appeared as a commentary on a commentary. As any commentary tends to lack
system this would have been doubly unsystematic and the length of the summary would have meant that it would barely be comprehensible as a whole. The danger in dividing the section into various chapters as has been done lies in the possibility of imposing a system or a pattern of thought that does not exist in the text. However, in order to make the Christology proper more understandable and because, in fact, Alexander does on the whole treat the subject in what is best called a chronological order it was decided to divide the section into various chapters following more or less the chronological order of Alexander. This would be carried out more strictly, possibly, than he had done, simply because Alexander, like the apostle Paul, at times came upon a word and went ahead of himself and thus was taken out of the strict chronology. This "tidying up" may detract from a comparison of Peter Lombard and Alexander but it should not detract from a study of Alexander's Christology which is the interest of this thesis.

Book III which forms the main Christological section contains three codices. These are A, L, and E. In Books I and II these have also been the three codices used and in those volumes there is a large measure of agreement between them. Only Codex E contains somewhat puzzling variations and additions and it cannot be dated as the other codices to the 1220's. What has been done in the first volume in the composition of the text is as follows:

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<th>Codex</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALE</td>
<td>agreeing (even in errors)</td>
<td>= original text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>agreeing against E</td>
<td>= original text</td>
</tr>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>agreeing against L</td>
<td>= original text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>agreeing against A</td>
<td>= original text</td>
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In the introduction to the first volume the editors conclude that in AL they have the authentic text of Alexander, to a less extent in E. Where the various codices differ these differences are put at the bottom of the page, where the main text appears, in the footnotes. In the second volume this situation again prevails with E still undated and puzzling. They conclude that the genuine text of Alexander's Glossa should be sought only in AL.

In Book III A and L differ considerably from each other although A and E provide much common text. L however is a good codex and agrees substantially in sense with A but very often not in wording. Its dating and its general agreement, they conclude, would lead one to believe that it is a redaction of Alexander. E agrees often with A - again providing additions - but rarely with L in its wording. What the editors have done is to print texts A and E together (AE), and L separately, so that two main texts are provided. Then in the "footnote" (as it will be described in the thesis) they have placed E when it has affinity with AE; and as a separate text after L they have placed "E" (as it will be described in the thesis) when it has affinity with L. E again remains undated and a little puzzling. AE and L provide genuine thinking of Alexander.

In Book IV there are five codices used: A, B, E, P, and T. A is again the base of the text and is preferred unless manifestly corrupt. T agrees generally with A although it is not as good a codex; P has much in common with T; E, with codex A, is the only codex to give the whole
Glossa and in this lies its merit or value. Here again are the "same arbitrary variations, the same extraneous additions although more rarely" than in the previous three books. B which was only an aid in the first three books becomes a principal codex in Book IV. Again the dating as with the first books is put at about 1223-27.

This then is an outline of the codices and an explanation of how they are used. In Book III alone the fact that more than one text is used is evident. So then, there will be references to "AE", "L", "footnote" ("E" with affinity to "A"), and "E" ("E" with affinity to "L"). This information is found in the introductions to the various volumes.
CHAPTER 1.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE INCARNATION

The first part of Book III of Alexander's Glossa consists of an outline of the Christological section which is to follow. The Christology has three main divisions. The first division is about the assumption and continues up to distinction V; the second division is about the union of natures and occupies distinctions VI to XIV; the third division is about the passion and concludes the section on Christology at distinction XXII. 1 The first division has five parts, namely, "de assumpte", "de assumpto", "de eo ex quo assumptio", "de dispositione assumpti", and "de eo de quo assumitur". 2 The division on the union of natures has two parts: "de iis quae pertinent unionem sive proprietatem uniti", and "de donis collatis ipsi Christo in ipsa unione". 3 The third division on the passion has three parts of which the first is "de antecedentibus" to the passion, the second is on the passion itself and its effects, and the third is on what follows the passion - "in triduo". 4

This first chapter will be concerned with the background and the "beginnings" of the incarnation. This will include a section on the idea of the "fulness of time"; a section on the "reasons" for the incarnation ("reasons" used in a loose sense); the third section will include Alexander's

1. para. 2, p.1.  2. 3, pp.1-3.  3. 4, p.3.  4. 8, p.6.
affirmation of the incarnation as the work of the Trinity and thus of Christ as the Son of God, and his affirmation of Christ as the Son of Man; and the fourth and final section of this chapter will be concerned with the "congruence" of creation for the incarnation.

In the first part of distinction I Alexander notes seven uses of the idea, the "fulness of time". The time of the incarnation is so called because there was "abundantia pacis" (Ps. 71.7), "propter charismatum largitatem affluentem" (Ezek. 34.26), "figurarum adimpletionem", (Matt. 5.17), "promissarum redditionem" (Dan. 9.27), "temporis consummationem" (1Cor. 10.11), "misericordiae effusionem" (Ps. 32.5), "creaturarum adimpletionem" (Eph. 1.9-10), and "pretii solutionem". 5 There is no comment on this list of fulfilments but in the next section the idea is connected with justice in which there are two elements: "declinare a malo" and "facere bonum". Before the incarnation the better part of justice, "adhaerere bono", was lacking but after the incarnation there was a fulness as it brought in perfect justice. 6 These two aspects of justice form one of the aspects of Alexander's thinking corresponding approximately to the distinctions between law and grace, and between the time of no merit and a time of merit. As later chapters will demonstrate the quite clear distinction made here between the time before and the time after the incarnation is not altogether maintained. Another way of expressing this

5. d.I.1,p.11. 6. 2, p.11.
distinction is "quoad veritatem prophetarum" and "quoad gratiam". 7

"L", in discussing the fulness of time "in fine saeculi", describes a fulness of nature which is according to genus and species; the fulness of grace is seen in the Head in the incarnation, in effect in the passion; a fulness in the members and this will be in the consummation of the age according to number; and the fulness of glory in two ways - in the Head in the resurrection, and in the members after the fulness of beatitude. 8 Here is a process which begins with nature and ends with glory. Grace is indispensable in the process but there may be a hint of a capacity in creation which needs completion or which can be completed. (viz, the "congruence of creation" later in the chapter).

Alexander can list several "reasons" for the incarnation. These are more in the way of expositions of its meaning than "causes". It demonstrated the very great love of the Father; it occurred lest the name of the Son be transferred to the Father or the Holy Spirit; creation was in the Word of God and therefore re-creation ought to be through him; it was through "sapientia" that man fell and therefore it was right that through "sapientia" it be redeemed; since man was the image of God, only the Son, the image of the Father, could be the instrument in reforming man in that image; in redemption we are adopted as sons and this could be done only through the Son by nature; in

7. Ibid. 8. 15(L), pp.15-16.
redemption we are made co-heirs but it is given only to the Son to confer heredity.  

Without any expansion by Alexander of these reasons little comment is possible except to note that these reasons affirm the love of God, there is a suggestion of Christ's substitution for us (the restored image), there is the suggestion of the establishment of man's freedom (sons and co-heirs). It would appear also that the incarnation provides a starting point for his thinking rather than being enclosed within an alien system. This is however only apparent.

In "E" in distinction I it is noted that the Trinity "operates" the assumption but does not assume.  

This may have something in common with the second reason for the incarnation mentioned above where the Son is incarnate lest his name be transferred to the Father or the Holy Spirit. "E" also points out that the incarnation takes place in wisdom and not in goodness as "sapientia" is the formal cause and "bonitas" is the final cause. "Sapientia" is appropriated to the Son and "bonitas" to the Holy Spirit. Hence the preposition for "bonitas" in relation to the incarnation is "propter" and not "in".

Considerably later in the Christology Alexander also clearly understands the work of Christ as the work of the Trinity and develops this understanding in regard to the passion. In a paragraph without comment Alexander quotes Augustine: "Cum dicimus Filium passum, dicimus Patrem et

10. 29 (E), p. 20.  
11. 36 (E), p. 22.
Filium et Spiritum Sanctum operatum fuisse: et cum dicimus remissionem peccatorum attribui Spiritu Sancto, intelligamus Trinitatem hoc donum inseparabiliter operari". 12 The working of the Trinity in Christ, together with reasons for Christ's humanity (which will be discussed more fully below), are brought out in a comment on the mortality of Christ.

"Ad omne /opus/ rectum agendum exigitur posse, scire et velle. Ut ergo potenter liberaret, oportuit Deum liberatorem esse; et ut prudenter, oportuit Filium Dei esse, cui attribuitur sapientia; unde 26 I ob 12: Sapientia percussit superbum. Et ut benigne liberaret, oportuit ipsum liberatorem esse creaturam; et ut iustae liberaret, oportuit hominem esse; et ut misericorditer, oportuit mortalem esse." 13

The Holy Spirit is implicitly here as "bonitas" but his absence does not affect the issue at point here. Here is a fairly rounded view of the incarnation. The work of the incarnation is the work of God, the Trinity; it is done in the unity of the Trinity, and it is done in justice, mercy, and with regard to the freedom of man. Here, God is "love" and the satisfaction made by Christ is seen as the working out of that love right to death. Already the central reason for the incarnation arises but before this is discussed the remainder of Alexander's statements on the beginnings of the incarnation will be given.

In distinction I both "L" and "E" define various terms used in relation to the incarnation. "Incarnatus" refers to the Divine nature in the person of Christ; "missus" refers to the person of the Trinity in relation to the flesh,

12. d. XIX, 14, p.213; Augustine, Sermo 2 de symbolo, c.9.
and "factus" refers to the human nature of Christ. "L" concludes by stating that "descendere" refers to the Divine nature. "E" states that "missus" relates principally to existence in the union, "incarnatus" to the "medium" and "factus" to the "posterior". As far as the order of these words is concerned it is stated in "L" that "per intelligentiam" the order is "missus", "incarnatus", "factus", but "per tempus" they are simultaneous. 14 It will be seen later that the distinction between "incarnatus" and "missus" becomes quite a problem in Alexander's Christology.

In distinction XIX and XX there are snatches of the recapitulation theory and in their limited way they help to explain the "appropriateness", the order, and the "necessity" of the incarnation. Pride was at its height in the sin of the first man therefore the man who redeemed had to do so in the greatest humility: "Hoc autem erat contemnere vitam propriam effundendo sanguinem suum". 15 Anselm is quoted to demonstrate the appropriateness of the work of Christ: obedience answers disobedience; from a woman came the beginning of sin, from a woman came the author of justification; the Devil used the fruit of a tree to defeat man and in turn was defeated by the passion on the tree. 16 Original justice in Christ corresponds to the original sin in Adam. 17 (This is discussed further below, p. 266) There is the danger in the recapitulation theory of

15. d.XIX,2,p.209; also XX,3, a)p.230. 16. 3c)p.231; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo I,c.3. 17. 10,p.235.
seeing the work of Christ merely as part of an order outside of him. However, it would appear that Alexander avoids this sort of necessity here. The distinction between "appropriateness" - "conveniens, oportet" - and "necessity" is found in Anselm. Professor McIntyre describes in his book on Anselm this distinction:

"Boso resents the fact that these arguments are drawn from the realm of the "appropriate" and do not establish necessity. They assume that God has decided to save the human race and are concerned only with the manner in which that salvation may most fittingly be accomplished. Boso presses his point home and insists that St. Anselm expound his answer to the question, why it was necessary that God should become man, suffer and die, in order that mankind should be saved." 18

"Necessity" is the quality of such relations as are self-evident to, or accepted after proof as true by, believers and unbelievers. "Fittingness", on the contrary, can be applied only to such relations or situations as are seen by believers to be the case." 19/ It is with Anselm that Alexander moves nearer to the real cause of the incarnation as he sees it, and to the factor which is dominant in his thinking on Christ, that is, the necessity for satisfaction. A person such as an angel cannot help man as angels are of another genus and man has therefore to be the satisfier in the satisfaction made for man's sin. 20 Man fell, thus states Anselm, and so Alexander, therefore man must rise again. This factor is brought out in "L" when the fulness of Scripture is being discussed. In the passion Scripture was fulfilled because it was the reason why Christ came into the world to redeem mankind. The passion was the fulness of Scripture as the "per quod", the incarnation

was the "de quo". Thus the objective of the incarnation was the passion (and its satisfaction). This theme becomes dominant in Alexander's soteriology and satisfaction is seen to be the only "necessary" reason for the incarnation of Christ.

Distinction II continues the theme of the causes of the incarnation but in a narrower form, that is, the reason for the incarnation in a man as opposed to another creature. The Anselmic answer again is given, namely, that only man ought to satisfy, but only God could satisfy. "L" and "E" enlarge upon this. The angels could have been assumed but they were lacking in what could be repaired through the union and they fell through themselves so they could not rise through another. Others could not rise through them as they did not descend through propagation. The angels, in short, were not assumptible. All this adds up to the fact that an angel could satisfy for itself but that satisfaction by it was not applicable to others because there was no connection between angel and angel as there was between man and man. This was their lack and why they were not assumptible.

Earlier Christ's justice corresponding to Adam's injustice was mentioned as part of a recapitulation theory. However, Alexander expanded that discussion to show that this correspondence was more than mere recapitulation but rather

that Christ's justice was greater than Adam's injustice and hence beyond the power of man. Alexander does this when he answers the question whether the sin of Adam was as great as the prize by stating that in quantity (that is, in death) they were equal, but that in intensity they were not. Our death is the punishment for sin, the death of Christ was "hostia pro peccato". 26 Christ humbled himself "secundum voluntatem" (death) and "secundum esse" (the incarnation). Adam was proud "affectu and voluntate" only. 27 This work of Christ, Alexander implies, was not done by mere man.

This is evident when Alexander discusses the "necessity" of the passion in the concept of Christ as original justice as the response to original sin. Christ took this role upon himself voluntarily as it was necessary for redemption that there should be a man with original justice. Yet there was no such pure man so it behoved that he should be both God and man. 28 Man should be just but could not be; God could be just but ought not to be. So that justice and power should combine it was necessary that God should be "this" man - man justly, God in mercy. 29 Again Alexander is very dependent on Anselm. Earlier Anselm had also been the source to show why the Redeemer had to be Christ. The offence to God was mortal and thus beyond the power of man to recompense and so it behoved that the Redeemer be God. 30

30. d.XIX,11,p.212; Anselm, esp.II,cc.6,7.
Another reason is also given for the death of Christ. It is of a different kind to the previous reasons, which were related to justice and satisfaction. This reason concerns the liberation from the Devil, and the violence concerned with this liberation. "Dicen dum quod violentia non est ex parte tollentis, sed ex parte eius qui tollitur; quoniam homo per pondus peccati tendebat deorsum, sed Dominus eum per suam passionem sursum traxit". 31

No extended comment will be made here, for it will be made later, but it should be noted that here sin is seen as corruption, which approaches an ontological view of sin, in which the devil is the equation of being itself, creation, with corruption.

The place of the Devil as the torturer of Christ is raised in distinctions XIX and XX. Although the Devil is mentioned several times his part does not appear to be particularly central. The Devil is "torquens", sin is why man "torquetur", and punishment is the instrument. 32 The Devil does not justly torment man although man is tormented justly and justly God permits it. Man was under punishment by the decree of God. 33 This view is also found in the denial of the view that the price God paid to redeem man was given to the Devil. The guard was the Devil; the master was God the Father. 34 The power that the Devil had was only the power of punishment, because all, by reason of original

31. d.XIX,12,p.213. 32. 1,p.209.
33. d.XX,5,p.232; Anselm, I,c.7. 34. d.XIX,42(E),p.226.
sin, but not of guilt, descended "ad limbum inferni", and after the passion he was deprived also of this power. His conquest of man after the passion was not from himself but from man. It was the blood of Christ which bound the Devil. Finally, Isidore is quoted, with no comment, mentioning Christ as the bait for the Devil, and again, on the same lines, also without comment, John of Damascus is quoted. 37

Most of this is traditional thinking apparently hardly worked into Alexander's Christology. Yet he could well apply it to the idea of the corruption of man for the ideas that the Devil had no right over man, that he did not have the power over guilt, that no price was paid to him (which indicates that Jesus did not come under the power of the Devil), that man sinned from himself, all help to distinguish man as man from man as sinner. If he is used for nothing else the Devil is a useful device for maintaining theologically - the idea that the price was not paid to the Devil indicates this - that sin is real and yet man is "very good", a position which is far better maintained by a good doctrine of Christ. It would be wrong to make too much of the quotations to the effect that Christ was a bait except to note that traditionally this view tended to be docetic.

The reasons for the incarnation raise the problem of necessity. What sort of necessity was it to which Christ

was subjected? The problem of necessity arises first in regard to the fact that Christ was under the law. Alexander points out that this does not mean that Jesus was under the necessity of fear but that he was under the law of love and his subjection to the law was voluntary, not necessary. Those under the Law decline evil from fear but the just decline evil from the love of God.

Christ's subjection to the law took place as man and he was circumcised, being "made under the Law" because the effect of circumcision was not superseded until the passion. Thus there are two elements here present which are typically Alexander's: the fact that Christ was not under necessity, and the fact that Jesus was man to take man's place as satisfier. The problem of necessity will again be taken up but before this, in a glance back at the reasons for the incarnation it should be noted that Alexander places the cessation of circumcision at the passion which is described as the "propria causa" of its cessation (in contrast to the incarnation as the "causa"). This is of significance in Alexander's Christology for the pinpointing of the passion (as distinct from the whole work of Christ) as the place of satisfaction points to the severe limitation which is put on Christ's role, namely, merely that of human satisfier for original sin - he is given no role in regard to guilt and an ambiguous one in regard to sanctification. Christ is seen almost solely as the crucified; he is man because he has to

42. 19(L),p.17. 43. Ibid.
give satisfaction in the crucifixion - which is the only "necessary" cause. The incarnation, by and large, is merely the arena in which satisfaction takes place. 44

In distinction XVI the necessity of Christ's death is discussed. According to Boethius there are four states of man: innocence, sin, grace, and glory. 45 If Christ, Alexander argues, assumed his human nature from the first state, that is, from the state of innocence, he did not experience death as there is no death in that state. If, however, he assumed his human nature from the second state, that is from the state of sin, "non fuit ei necessitas moriendi". 46 The solution to this problem is that Christ took his "naturam de primo, poenalitatem de secundo". 47

For the first time there is a doubt raised here which will be constantly raised in this thesis, whether Christ took upon himself the sinful body of man. After all he assumed

44. The following quotation, in one statement, illustrates the necessity of God and man in Christ, as well as the limitation of Christ's work. "Cum enim corrupta tota humana natura esset per peccatum primi parentis, non competebat satisfactio nisi per eum qui est principium eorum qui erant in corruptione, et ipse quidem homo, sed principium incorruptum. Nam si aliorum principium esset, non satisfaceret. Nec Adam potuit satisfacere quia de suo non potuit Deo dare aliquid maius omni eo quod sub Deo est. Satisfactio autem illa est maius omni rationali creatura corrupta. Necesse est ergo ut sit satisfactor ille principium illorum hominum ut Deus, et quod solvat poenam in quantum homo. Licet ergo Dominus ex sua misericordia in circumcisione abstulerit originale peccatum quod culpam et quod reatum aeternae visionis Dei, qui necessario consequitur, non tamen ab illo reatu quod temporalem poenam absolvit. Propter quod necesse fuit, cum homo corruptus vel purus non corruptus non posset satisfacere, ut Christus Deus et homo satisfaceret, ut sic rumphaea ianuae paradisi tolleretur." Book IV, dist. I, 30, d) p. 37.

45. Boethius, Oposc. V: De persona et duabus naturis, c. 8.
46. l, a) p. 170; d. XVI, 5 (L), a) p. 172.
47. Ibid. a) p. 173.
Adam as he is, not as he was. The "new Adam" was the work of the re-creation of God as the "old Adam" was the work of the first creation. Christ was not the "new Adam" from some created state of innocence; he was the "new Adam" born into the sin of man.

Alexander then goes more deeply into the meaning of the "necessity of dying". Was Christ compelled and not free? The answer to this question is found in both "AE" and "L" and states that there are four kinds of necessities (following Aristotle); formal "ut calidum calefacere"; material "ut summe calidum fieri ignem"; efficient "ut violenter moventia"; and final "ut si inhabitare est finis domus, ad hoc inhabitetur necesse est operimentum habeat. Et hoc ultimo modo fuit necessitas moriendi in Christo, scilicet secundum ordinationem ad finem; aliae non". Thus Christ took this necessity upon himself in his freedom. Christ was thus necessary for man's salvation but did not die necessarily. In this way Alexander demonstrates the freedom of God in Christ's death, a freedom which he is anxious to maintain.

This is also seen in the answer to the question whether Christ was immortal in the same way as Adam was in the state of innocence. "fuit immortalis, non habens causam necessitatis moriendi, peccatum in se scilicet; sed fuit mortalis ex dispensatione ad homines". And so, here, Alexander maintains, as before, that Christ suffered the

penalties of sin without sinning; in other words he was not subject to the necessity of sin. A related topic raised in distinction XVII concerns the actual death of Christ. Unless eternal life had followed death neither the superior nor the inferior reason would have informed Christ that he had to die. 53 Not to have died would have been the good of nature; to have died for the redemption of mankind was the good of grace. 54 According to Anselm, Christ could have avoided death if he had wished but as the world could be redeemed only through his death, he preferred to suffer death rather than the world should not be saved. 55 John of Damascus pointed out that Christ had a natural fear of death. 56 Alexander is thus pointing out that Christ died for others a death he chose freely to undergo; he was under no necessity.

If the death of Christ was not necessary, neither was the redemption of man by Christ. Alexander states, quoting Anselm, that it is improper to use the word "necessity" in relation to God's redemption of man, in the sense that God had to save His handiwork from perishing. 57 In "I" the comment is: "Et sic, licet quodam modo necessarium, tamen simpliciter voluntarium". 58 Christ, then, submitted himself to man's necessity, that is, the necessity of redemption, not out of compulsive necessity but in freedom. This solution was found in slightly different form earlier where it is suggested that it was just that Christ should have died.

53. d.XVII,7,p.176. 54. 23(L),p.181.
55. 14,p.178; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I,c.10. 56. 12,p.178;
John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., III,c.18. 57. dist.XX,
and so he merited death. Alexander replies that there was justice in relation to man whose nature he assumed (because man was due the punishment which Christ in mercy underwent) and in relation to himself "quoniam recipit in se necessitatem moriendi ex'voluntate Patris'". Augustine then is quoted: "Maxima caritas est in hac vita, quando pro ipsa contemnitur vita". Thus Christ in love and voluntarily assumed man's necessity.

There is also a suggestion that faith demands the necessity of the passion. This is denied because faith is not concerned with the possible or necessary but with "quod sic est" nor does faith necessitate the passion although faith is not without the passion. Similarly, the faith of the patriarchs did not necessitate the passion because their faith depended upon it: "quod est verum futurum". It is also stated here that there is a necessity according to the power of God in which it was not necessary that Christ should have been incarnate; there is another necessity "secundum sapientiam" by which it was necessary that Christ should have been incarnate and suffer "secundum sapientiam ordinatissime fiunt res". This is very near the idea of final cause of Aristotle (see previous page). This cannot be interpreted in the sense that God was under compulsion because of the "ordinatissime" but must be interpreted in such a way that, if there were to be "ordinatissime", Christ as wisdom was the one to be incarnate and to suffer.

59. d.XIX, footnote, p.211. 60. 7,p.211; Augustine, De natura et gratia, c.70,n.84.
Another way to maintain the non-necessity of Christ's incarnation is found in the question whether man could have been freed another way. This question is raised in the discussion of the liberation from the power of the Devil accomplished by the death of Christ by which redemption takes place. Alexander states that man could have been freed another way but could not be redeemed another way when redemption is understood as "rem suo iusto pretio et condigno recuperare" (and not merely as "liberation"). That meant that for the debt of sin to be paid, satisfaction, that is, the death of Christ, had to be made. If man had been freed by another person, either an angel or a man, he would have been servant of that being and he would not have been restored to his former dignity. Later a similar question arises when it is asked whether it would have been possible for God to assume a man, not of Adam's kind. Anselm is again called upon and answers to the effect that if Christ were not a man of Adam's kind then we would not have been raised to the dignity which Adam would have had if he had stood fast and such an assumption would not be a complete restoration. What this means is that man would have been freed from the Devil without satisfaction made, and thus not freed from the debt of original sin which is temporal punishment. Thus satisfaction implies the restoration of man.

64. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I, c.23.  
65. d.XX,1,p.230.  
66. Footnote, p.231; 14,p.236.  
67. Anselm, op.cit.  
68. d.XII,3,p.124; Anselm,op.cit.II,8.
to a state near to the state of innocence. Thus apart from
the "appropriateness" of the way God acted, and the "necessity"
of this action, by it man is restored to dignity which is
described in the comment of Augustine "non essemus participes
divinitatis eius, nisi ipse particeps esset nostrae
mortalitatis". 69 Alexander hastens to explain that the
participation in Divinity is not on man's part, that is, on
the part of the human nature. 70 In "L" it is explained
that participation in God is to be understood in two ways:
either in Divinity "secundum se" or in Divinity existing in
our nature. Before the uniting of the two natures, there was
no possibility of liberation on man's part, although there
was on God's part; after the union both were possible. 71
Here, then, the necessity of satisfaction begins to point
to the restored man, and a little less, purely to the
satisfaction of God's justice. This aspect is rare in
Alexander.

In a similar fashion to the foregoing it is
suggested that if the patriarchs had been liberated in
another way they would have had equal glory in the vision of
God but not "in visione humanae naturae coniunctae divinae". 72
This quotation raises acutely the problem involved in the
idea of another way of liberation besides Christ. In regard
to the patriarchs Christ's lack of centrality becomes
particularly stark and wonders what the work of Christ really

69. d.XX,3,p.230; Augustine, Enarr. in Ps.118,serm.16,n.6.
70. d.XX,3,c) p.231. 71. 17(L),d,p.239.
was. To be sure, Alexander is warding off the danger of making the incarnation "necessary" when he talks of another way, in maintaining the freedom of God, but in so doing he minimises the fact and the importance of the incarnation. This is always possible in a theology which does not find its only source of revelation in Christ and, indeed, for major parts of Alexander's theology, Christ is hardly a source at all. (In the doctrine of God as one and the Trinity, Alexander does not begin from the incarnation in any real sense. As long as one talks about the possibility of another way of liberation one can be seen to be maintaining the freedom of God in Christ; but to begin to speculate on that other way, as Alexander does with the patriarchs, is to move onto entirely new ground.)

Already in distinction II Alexander begins to touch on the central problem of Christology, the union of the two natures in one person. This early discussion demonstrates that Christ was a man, not something between God and man, not both God and man in one nature, and that the possibility of God and man being in Christ lies in the person of Christ. The centre of Christology is discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis but it is as well to leave this early discussion here in the discussion of Christ as Adamic man and the Son of Mary, because it is where Alexander places it (he is discussing, in distinction II, the "nature" assumed)

73. This is in the Glossa, Book I.
and without discussing to any extent the whys and the wherefores of the central part of Christology, Alexander attempts to make clear that Christ is man. This early discussion is quite understandable in distinctions on the "reasons" and "beginnings" of the incarnation.

Alexander rejects the suggestion that Christ, in as far as he was man, was not "aliquid" but "aliquo modo se habens". This possibility was suggested by Philippians 2:7 "In similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo". 74 He also rejects the view that there was something common to the Divine and human natures "unde cum divina natura non sit ab alio et humana ab alio, nihil potest esse commune ad haec". 75 This would appear to be anti-monophysitist. In "L" the Eutychian form of monophysitism is certainly rejected. 76 Again Alexander states that, although Christ may not have been the same "homo" as Peter by reason of being a "persona", he is by reason of being an "individuum" which is "ille homo". Peter and Christ have something in common "in eisdem principiis in specie, quia in anima et corpore." 77 Thus Alexander maintains that Christ was not a man apart from the incarnation, but as "that man" he is not something other than Peter's humanity, nor a third between God and man. Then he goes a little further in stating the relationship in Christ. It is not founded in essential or substantial unity but in the unity of the person:

74. dist.II,2,p.22. 75. 5,p.23. 76. 14(L),h)p.29. 77. 14(L),e)n)o),p.29.31.
"Convenientia in persona est minima ratio conveniendi secundum modum existentiae non accidentalis, sive convenientia non accidentalis. Est enim prima convenientia in unitate essentia, secunda in unitate substantiae, tertia in unitate personae. Prima dicitur per "quod quid est", secunda per "quod est", tertia per "quis". Prima est in definitione et definito; secunda in genere et specie quid eadem est substantia generis et speciei; tertia est in individuo rationali. Sed nec prima nec secunda est in Christo; relinquitur tunc quid tertia."

What Alexander means by "persona" and personal union is discussed further in distinction V and in chapter 2 of this thesis. (Here "substantia" apparently means "natura" in that this "subiectum" speaks of "in natura" and the "quod est" is "in genere et specie, quia eadem est substantia generis et speciei", which would mean that substantial unity would be monophysite. (This is the usage of Chalcedon). Substance is used in this sense several times (dist.VI,25(L), e)p.82; dist.VII,5,91; see below). This is somewhat confusing as Alexander also used the Boethian definition of person as "an individual substance of rational nature" and equates substance and hypostasis. There may be some connection between the uses in that "substantia" for Boethius is generic, at best, when related to God, and this use of substance as the equivalent of nature is also generic. However, the Boethian definition of substance covers the two natures; this definition equates substance and nature.)

Christ's manhood is also seen by Alexander in

78. 14(L),i,p.30. 79. Ibid.
relation to Adam. Christ is materially descended from Adam but not "concupiscentialiter" which means that he assumed the punishments due to Adam but did not incur the sin involved with them. Yet he did not have all the punishments because those, such as sin and ignorance, obviously involved him in sin. 80 There are four ways man can be made: from man and woman, from man alone (Eve), from neither man nor woman (Adam), and from woman (Christ). (Anselm.) 81 Alexander makes the following comments on these various ways:

"Ut ergo monstraretur potestas et compleveretur ordo, hunc ultimum complevit. Et si initium mali fuit per feminam quae tantum de viro est, convenit ut reparatio fiat per virum qui tantum de femina est. Et si mulier per quam ortum est malum facta sit de virgine, convenit ut vir per quem ortum est bonum fiat de virgine." 82

Although, here, Alexander does demonstrate the fact that Christ was real man yet not a sinner, it is the recapitulation theory that is more in evidence here. There is also the suggestion that Christ showed his power by completing the order of the four ways of making a man. Sometimes the recapitulation theory tends to go beyond the idea of restoration or recreation to the idea that Christ fits into a pattern in a way similar to that in which grace completes nature. This view of Christ as part of a process which is outside him arises every now and then in Alexander.

The implications of the fact that Christ was born of the Virgin Mary, both in relation to Mary and to Christ, are discussed because original sin is understood to be passed

80. 4,p.23. 81. Cur Deus Homo,II,c.8. 82. 6,p.24.
on by the process of reproduction. This is the matter that distinction III takes up. "Fomes" which is present in man by original sin, according to Alexander, has two aspects, namely, "secundum comparatur ad peccatum antecedens ex quo corrupta est tota humana massa" and as such it is punishment from God for sin, but "ut autem comparatur ad id quod post est, ut scilicet apparens delectabile non observata lege Dei", ("pronitas ad peccandum, sic fomes est, et sic causa peccati." 83) it is a cause of sin and from the Devil. For those who are sanctified in the uterus "fomes" is a punishment but only a "causa potens" as far as it is a cause of sin, not a "causa operans". In Mary both these types of causes were absent. In support of this Ambrosiaster and Augustine are quoted stating that Mary was without sin. 84 After Mary was sanctified in the uterus she had neither the venial nor the mortal power to sin, and after the reception of the Word, "fomes" was altogether extinguished in her. The saints still retain a "fomes" which relates to venial sins. 85 In "L" more or less the same position is taken up. 86 However, the discussion is longer and different at points.

There were three positions in relation to the punishment for original sin. First in Adam there was no punishment, then in Christ there was "poena naturae assumpta", and in Mary there was the same punishment "et superadditum ignorantia plurium scibilium; sed non ignorantia rerum faciendarum, quae

83. Bk.II,d.XXXII,1,a)p.305. 84. III,1,p.34. Ambrosiaster, In Epist. B. Pauli Rom. 8,3. Augustine, De Baptismo Parvulorum, Lib.1,c.29,n.57. 85. 2,p.35. 86. II(L)p.39.
proprie dicitur poena peccati propinqua." There was no "fomes" in Mary after the conception as there is before our Baptism nor was it in her as "pronitas" which remains after Baptism even in the saints in regard to venial sin. 87 There is a threefold grade in "fomes". The first is according to "intensio" which exists before Baptism; the second is "materialis dispositio" which exists in the confirmed "cum sic se habet appetitus, quod per adiunctum potest in peccatum"; the third is "materia fomitis" which remains in the confirmed: "remanet autem materiae possibilitas, privata dispositione per quam materia est fomitis. Unde potest dici in beata Virgine non esse fomitem nisi secundum possibilitatem privatam ratione materiae: sed adhuc non est illa puritas quae fuit in Adam antequam peccavit." 88 This last is probably the same as that which Alexander describes as "substantia fomitis". What this is is probably explained in regard to concupiscence: "licet non in ea fomes, scilicet concupiscentia carnis militans adversus spiritum; nihilominus remansit concupiscentia, sed subiugata spiritui." 89 Thus Mary was as pure as man could be but she had the punishment of nature which Christ also had and an ignorance which did not lead her into sin. 90

If one accepts the idea that original sin is passed on from generation to generation by the reproductive process, the danger of Christ receiving "fomes" from Mary has been

89. Ibid. I,g)p.41. 90. Ibid. h)p.41.
elimated but in the process Mary is practically sanctified without Christ. In relation to Christology this position throws doubt upon the maintenance of the position that Christ became "sin for us". The sanctification of Mary raises the question as to whether this would have been necessary as men could be sanctified apart from Christ. As will be seen later, (chapters 2, 4,) Alexander's view of God militates against a God in Christ who partakes in full and fallen humanity, a view which perhaps not only coincides nicely with a doctrine of Mary's sanctification but may also demand such a view of Mary and man.

In regard to Christ himself Augustine is quoted to the effect that "in semine" there are two elements, the invisible substance and the invisible "ratio", the former Christ gained from the flesh of Mary and the latter he received from above. Alexander points out that Christ did not receive Mary's invisible "ratio" which is the power of propagation with desire. (It seems doubtful whether he could have got this anyway from Mary.) In "I" it is stated that, because there was no "fomes" in Mary, the flesh of Christ was therefore not from Mary through concupiscence which is the wound of sin. In this way Alexander affirms the purity of Christ in two ways: because he was not the product of man and woman his existence was therefore not due to desire, and because Mary's flesh was

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pure from concupiscence. Thus the invisible "ratio" and the visible substance are accounted for. The fact that Christ was completely pure, that is free from fallen human nature, was the reason why he did not undergo decimation. ("Decimatio est futurae liberationis per Christum oblatum ab originali peccato praesignatio." 94) Decimation relates to nature whereas circumcision which Christ did undergo relates to the Person. 95 This topic again is discussed in "E" where the problem of why Christ had still to undergo circumcision, which was also directed at sin, is elucidated. There it is stated that circumcision was a voluntary submission to the law to which Christ was still subject because the law had not yet been "evacuated", whereas decimation was directed at corrupt nature in regard to which there could be no "voluntas". 96

Mary was decimated because she was "materialiter" and "concupiscentialiter" in the flesh of Abraham whereas Christ was only materially according to the passive power (= visible substance?) in the flesh of Abraham. 97

In all this there must arise some doubt as to the full humanity of Christ and to the scope of his work. Christ is not understood really to have assumed man's nature (sinful nature), and, from Alexander's point of view, he obviously could not as this would have involved him necessarily in sin. In Alexander's terms, however, there was no need for Christ to have assumed this corrupt nature because its restoration was not involved in his coming as man as is made evident by

94. Footnote, p.36.  
95. 7,c)p.37.  
96. 25(E)b)pp. 47-48.  
97. Ibid. c)p.48.
the sanctification of Mary and the saints. Christ's task was to render satisfaction for original sin, in particular for the personal sin of Adam, which was answered by Christ's voluntary submission to punishment which in turn thus possibly cleared the way, as it were, for God's sanctifying grace. This view of Christ is inadequate, for Christ was not only "personally" at one with man (that is, Christ was "a" man), he was also substantially ontologically at one with man whereby he became "sin for us". In Christ, man's nature is renewed or sanctified and for this to occur he must have been of man's nature, not merely "a" man personally but man naturally. Alexander, of course, does assert that Christ was man by nature but what he hesitates at is "the nature of sin".

Thus, it would, appear, that Christ's manhood is related in reality to satisfaction only, a manhood which is personal to correspond to and to counteract Adam's personal sin in which all men are involved. His satisfactory work is the cause, if it is cause at all, of man's sanctification only indirectly in so far as he may have removed the barrier between man and grace. Grace works through the sacraments to sanctification and at the end there is the grace of perfection (which may be earned by the resurrection) which is the final grace. (The separate working of grace is discussed later). Thus, in relation to sanctification, Mary, Christ, and Adam are generally at the same level (with different quantities of grace admittedly) all dependent on grace from above. To be sure, Christ did have the grace of
union but this is directed, by and large, it would appear at satisfaction only (see chapter 3). Christ is not seen as the answer to man's corruption; his nature does not sanctify man's (e.g. Mary's) nature and thus Christ's work is greatly limited in scope.

But how could it be otherwise in the terms of Alexander? Christ could not take our sinful nature, therefore he could not be its remedy, its sanctification. In Alexander's terms there appears to be no way round this for he places the necessity of sin in man's nature. Christ must have remained less than fallen man (or more than!) to have remained sinless. He is forced into the purely passive role of satisfaction (penal), and his positive role of sanctification is denied him by the fact that he could not take man's sinful nature. Thus, in this theology, Christ's life and resurrection have little part in regard to man's present lot although they may have some place in regard to future glory. (see chapter 5). The incarnation is not seen as part of the end in itself, but is only a means to the end, Christ's satisfaction on the cross. (These assertions should become evident the further the Christological discussion goes.)

As long as sin is understood as a "state" in which man exists instead of a (and the result of a ) broken relationship between God and man, then a "new man" cannot take man's part, indeed, he cannot really be man, for to be man, in Alexander's thinking, is to be a sinner by definition (which is correct if not taken absolutely). But if, on the other hand, sin is understood to be the result of a broken
relationship which causes the corruption, then the "new man" can be a true man who is not a sinner because he has an obedient relationship with God which eliminates corruption. It was man, man with a sinful nature, that Christ became and as such he could take man's part. The difference between him and other men at this point is the fact that he was reconciled to God and was therefore without sin; man is not reconciled to God and therefore he is a sinner. For the rest Jesus is in the midst of sin, a man with alienated men. For Alexander, this kind of view undermines a system in which a substantial grace "expels" sin and in which man had something of his own - free will, created grace, virtues - and if these are not present sin rolls in. (These views should be evident as the discussion proceeds.) There is no place for Christ in our "graceless" world; he is an outsider and must remain so. The same viewpoint is seen in regard to the relation of grace and evil in men where grace cannot stand besides evil. (See chapter on grace)

Distinction IV is mainly concerned with the conception as it relates to the Holy Spirit and the Son. Although goodness, wisdom, justice, and power, are demonstrated in the assumption, they did not make the assumption. 98 Because the whole Trinity was involved in the assumption it is not conceded that Christ was conceived by the Father because the Son is eternally generated by the Father. 99

98. d. IV,2,p.49. 99. 3,p.49.
This presumably rejects an idea that the Son of God was created. Nor can it be said, states Alexander, that Christ came from love (which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit,) because love is not the name of a power nor the "ratio principii" but is the "ratio vinculi". It is the Holy Spirit who is the power by whom the conception takes place. The miraculous union of the Divine and the human natures is not within the possibilities of created power and so it must have been the uncreated power which is the Holy Spirit. This work is appropriated to the Holy Spirit as goodness for the first creation was good; since the sign of goodness is much more apparent at recreation the work of the conception will also be that of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the conception is the work of the whole Trinity where the Father is the one who says "fiat", the "factum" refers to the Son, and the "vidit Deus quod asset bonum" refers to the Holy Spirit.  

This formulation of Augustine belongs to the creation but it is appropriated by Alexander in "L" and "E" explicitly to the re-creation. The working of the Trinity is again affirmed in a reference to Ambrose that in the name "Christus" the Father is "ungens", the Son is "qui ungitur", and the Holy Spirit "ipsa unctio".  

In another paragraph Alexander states that in spite of the fact that the Holy Spirit "begets" the man, nevertheless Christ cannot be described

100. 6,p.50; 16(L),p.52. 101. 3,p.49. 102. 16(L),p.52; footnote, p.49. 103. 6,p.50. 104. 4,b)p.49; 24,b)(L),p.54; 26,a)(E),p.55; Augustine, De Civitate Dei. c.24. 105. 4,c)p.50; Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto, 1,c,3,n.44.
"simpliciter" as the son of the Holy Spirit; "dici tamen potest filius eius per creationem." 106

On the basis of a statement by Ambrose that everything is made either from substance or power, Alexander states that in Christ the substance was either essential and so the Son was from the Father, or material and so Christ was from the mother. The power in Christ was from the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit was the medial power between the essence and the matter "quoniam Spiritus Sanctus complevit hoc quod ipsa habuit incompletum quod de Spiritu Sancto concepit". 107 This should not be understood in an Adoptionist way in view of what Alexander states later and how he puts it in "L": the essence is prior altogether and precedes; the power is the medium and so the conception follows from the Holy Spirit; lastly comes the matter and so Christ is born from the Virgin. 108 Thus Alexander establishes the conception as the work of the Trinity appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and the fact that Christ was one person of the Trinity.

At the beginning of the discussion of the central section on Christology which is introduced by the question "quærít de proprietate eius quod assumitur et assumentis, utrumque persona assumpsit personam" the part of the Trinity again is mentioned. To the suggestion that the assumption is common to the whole Trinity (by reason of the Son being "God") Alexander replies "quod persona is commune secundum

106. 6,p.50. 107. 12,p.51; De Spiritu Sancto, II,c.5,n.42. 108. 25(L),p.55.
rationem, et non secundum rem; sed divina natura commune est secundum rem." 109 Here Alexander is stating the fact that the Trinity as a whole did not take the place of the Son, that is, the Trinity was not incarnate in the assumption. Later he states that some authorities concede that the Father assumed "sed Filio, et Filium sibi." 110 However, in "L" the statement "Pater assumit Filio carnem" is declared to be "impropria". 111 There is no real contradiction in these two positions because in a sense it is true that the Father assumes, that is, the Trinity is at work in the assumption, but this must be protected against a misinterpretation which would have the Father replacing the Son or making the Father and the Son interchangeable. In a later distinction it is asked whether the Father could assume the same man as the Son assumed. On the basis of a statement by Anselm that in this case many persons would make one and the same person which would not be possible, Alexander replies that the Father did not assume the same man. 112

Thus in distinctions IV and V the Divine origin of Christ as the Son of God is amply set out. His human basis is again stated but is not amplified as this was not the interest of distinction. Christ's Divinity, it may be noted, appears to be more assured by Alexander, than his humanity.

A suggestion that Alexander might have believed that there was a certain congruence in creation for the

incarnation was referred to in the discussion on the fulness of time. In distinction I where the topic was discussed Alexander showed further evidence of this belief. It arises when it is asked why the cure in Christ was so long in coming when a sickness existed from the sin of the first parents. Alexander finds the answer in the fact that because the "stimulus" of the sickness was at first small it was believed that the natural law would be sufficient for salvation. However, the sickness worsened with more sin and so the written law came to the rescue. But "cum viderent possibile non esse implere Legem, ut habetur in Actibus "Hoc est onus quod neque nos, neque patres nostri" etc. quasierunt medicum; et cum desideratur, fuit plenitudo temporis ut mitteret Filium etc." To be sure, Alexander does state that God gave the natural law and the written law, and, after the above quotation it is added that there came through the prophets an increased desire that a cure should come, yet, within creation, even fallen creation, Alexander seems to assume a capacity or a "congruence" in man which man could use with the natural and written law to prepare himself for the One who was to come. Thus not only was there a fulness which God brought about, there also appears to be a fulness which creation, even if it could not bring it about itself, at least could contribute to. One must qualify this by adding that Alexander does not see God's acts being caused

113. d.I, 16(L), p.16.
by creation. He is still free to act as He wishes. (This is particularly noticeable, for instance, in his discussion of predestination). In "E" Peter Lombard is quoted to this effect that fulness does not indicate necessity but rather God acted "sola voluntate". 114 This attitude Alexander consistently maintains in his Glossa but it does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that there may be a certain "congruence" in creation for the incarnation or man's reception of God.

Just after Alexander has discussed the reason for the incarnation taking place in a man and not in an angel (see above) in the same section in "L" he asserts that, at least, there was a "possibility" for union on part of the body in the "materia" although there was not the power (potentia). 115 This possibility for union or the problem of the "how" of union which comes to grips with the central thinking on the "congruence" of creation will now be discussed. This topic is found in the second distinction, particularly in "L". Alexander is commenting on the fact that Peter had stated that Wisdom had assumed the soul, and, through the soul the body. The soul is the medium of the Divine to the body but, states Alexander, here there are two media, namely, the spirit which is the "superior pars rationis", and the soul which is the "inferior pars rationis". The soul has three parts "spiritus", "ratio", and "sensualitas" which can be called "collectio sensuum" (after

The terminology is a little difficult but the general idea is obvious as is the case elsewhere in the Glossa, namely, that man has a mediating role which implies that he had a capacity for union. The same implication is made when it is pointed out in an objection that at the death of Christ the soul and the body were separated but the body was not separated from the Divine and Alexander replies that "anima erat medium secundum dignitatem vel naturam, sed non secundum tempus vel actus." Thus it would appear that the Divine nature was united via the spiritual part of the soul to the body, which had its connection to the soul via the sensuality in such a way that the Divine and the body were inseparable. "I" states the way of union of Divine and the body clearly: "Si conveniens fuit coniunctum extremorum per media, conveniebat uniri divinam et corporalem naturam mediante spiritu, scilicet substantia creata corporali, et sensualitate quae est corporalis." The body with the soul, states Alexander, was assumptible in two ways, namely, from "indigentia culpae et poenae", that is, it had something to be cured, and because of the "convenientia medii."

"Non fuit corpus assumptibile de indigentia culpae et poenae, sed anima indigebat utroque modo; et propter hoc, tum ratione convenientiae tum ratione principalis indigentiae, fuit corpus cum anima assumptibile. Assumptio autem ista fit per medium secundum ordinem naturae, non temporis, quia non prius assumpsit corpus, et post unionem." 119

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117. d.II,8,p.25. 118. 13(I),II,p.27.
Alexander appears here to maintain some capacity on the part of the soul in its spiritual part to unite with Divinity; it is "appropriate"; it is a "medium". If this were not so the body would be equally placed in relation to God, if God were the sole operator. But he is not; the body has to unite through the soul and it is not stated that this method is God's choosing; rather the soul appears to be in itself, "appropriate". Alexander, however, is insistent that the Divine and the body are indeed united though one may doubt how closely when the problem of suffering is discussed. 120 Of course, at this point, Alexander, like probably the most part of Christian tradition, is reflecting a philosophic objection to the idea of eternity in time (and of course, also, a theological problem), a problem which also arises in the general relation of man and God. 121 It is an interesting fact that, not only in the areas traditionally treated outside Christology such as in the doctrines of the knowledge of God and Creation, but also in Christology itself, Alexander operates within an eternity-time division, a problem in which, if the incarnation does not resolve for us, at least we assume a resolution. The overcoming of the division must be a presupposition of theological thinking. Certainly it is God who makes the resolution but since it has been made we cannot go behind this fact and attempt to find another resolution. For instance, when there is doubt as to the uniting of the two extremes, the body and

120. below, ch.4. Distinctions XV and XVI. 121. e.g. chapter on "Dominus".
and the Divine in a person, and one does not altogether make it an assumption of faith, then something must be posited which can unite these extremes and that is the spiritual part of the soul. Thus there grows up a doctrine which has been called here the "congruence of creation".

It should be noted that, at the beginning of this particular discussion on the body and soul, Alexander stated that there was a possibility on the part of the body for union but not the power (above p.52). In regard to the soul the reader is referred to the second book of the Glossa but nothing exactly corresponds to this matter. What Alexander states in the section in which he makes reference to book II is as follows:

"Ex parte vero animae, utrum remaneret potentia, determinatur in secundo libro, ubi determinatur qualiter perfectio ex parte animae quoad creationem in primis diebus. Ibi enim ostenditur quod non sunt omnes animae in una potentia quemadmodum omnia corpora. Nec est ex parte animae primae possibilitas ad unionem quemadmodum ex parte corporis." 122.

This adds little to the picture already given.

In distinctions XXI and XXII Alexander turns the discussion to the problem of Christ "in triduo". In this he raises the problems involved in the separation of the body and soul of Christ at his death and the particular interest of the latter part of this chapter, the "congruence" of man for the incarnation is again implied. The general problem of the body-soul psychology for Christology is also central here but this will be discussed at more length in chapter 4.

Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Damascus, and Pope Leo are all quoted to the effect that, although body and soul were separate at the death of Christ, the unity of the Person remained, and the body of Christ was incorruptible.\textsuperscript{123} It is then asked why the Divinity was inseparable from the body and soul and yet the soul and body were separable. The answer in regard to the inseparability Alexander finds in the fact that there was a union through grace in "esse" which was inseparable, even much more so than union through grace "quoad voluntatem" which is insoluble.\textsuperscript{124} However, the soul and body were separable because this was a temporal union; "ut per separationem temporalem uniretur ad unionem inseparabilem."\textsuperscript{125} Alexander also asks whether the Divinity "de sui natura" is separable from the body or the soul just as the body or the soul is without grace separable from Divinity. The answer to this is in the negative; "quoniam summum bonum de sui natura nulli deest."\textsuperscript{126} The body and the soul "in triduo" are not united ("unitum") with the Divinity although the unity ("unitivum" - i.e. "esse" union) remains\textsuperscript{127}, and although the unity of the Divinity with the soul and the union of the Divinity with the body did make for diversity "ratione alterius unitorum", there was only one union by reason of the "unitivi, scilicet

\textsuperscript{123} d.XXI,l,2,3,pp.245-246; Bernard, De Consideratione, V, c.10,n.22; John, De Fide Orth., III,c.28; Leo, Sermo 68,c.1.
\textsuperscript{124} 4,a)pp.246.
\textsuperscript{125} footnote, p.246.
\textsuperscript{126} 4,a)pp.246; cf. 15(L),b)e),pp.250,251. 
\textsuperscript{127} 4,b)pp.246-247.
hypostasis Verbi". Since there were these three "unions" it is now asked "quae illarum sit ordinata ad aliam, et quae duae ad tertiam?" The answer to this question is "quod unio est quae animae et corporis, est propter illam quae est corporis cum divinitate; et haec est propter unionem animae ad divinitatem." "L" states it thus: "quod unio quae est animae ad divinitatem dignior est; aliae ordinatae sunt ad illam". This means that as long as the union of the Divinity to the soul remained there was no necessity for the other unions (i.e. temporal) to remain.

A similar position is taken up in regard to the life of the body. It is argued that the body would have had more life by the union of the Divinity to it (than, by implication, through the soul). Alexander replies that the soul was united to the body in the unity of nature but the Divinity was not, so the life of the body resulted from the conjunction of the one with another, but not from the conjunction of the Divinity and the body. (This does not seem to get any further than the question but the reiteration of the position illustrates once again the soul's mediatorial role.)

In defence of Alexander it must be stated that if Christ was man it is evident that at death he still had to be

128. 4,c)p.247: cf. footnote, p.247. "Dicendum quod non omnis unio est aliquorum in uno, sed ad unum; unde hic facta est unio (God and soul) ad hypostasim unam, sed unio Dei et hominis facta est in una hypostasis. Aliter tamen dictur omnis unio in uno; et sic dicit Damascenus quid anima fuit unita divinitati in hypostasi, ut sit sensus: hypostasis humanata habet animam." 129. 4,d)p.247. 130. 15(L), f)p.251. 131. 4,d)p.247; 15(L),f)p.251. 132. 6,pp.247-248.
like man, and, in medieval terms, this demands the separation of soul and body at death. It is pointed out in "L" that it was necessary for our salvation that the union of body and soul in Christ should not remain for otherwise he could not die. 133 In other words, the reason for Christ's humanity was satisfaction which could be achieved only in death and so for the man to give that satisfaction Christ had to die in the same way as men, namely, by the separation of body and soul. Thus Alexander is maintaining the humanity of Christ. However, this psychology, which will again be questioned, can hardly bear the weight put upon it. If the union of the body with the Divinity is by means of the soul, it would appear that, with the separation of the body and soul at death, the union of the body and Divinity would be very difficult to maintain. To be sure, Alexander points out that the unity is in the hypostasis of the Word, and not in the one nature of man (body and soul), but it is still difficult to see how the body is not separated from the hypostasis when the soul separates from the body, if the soul is the medium between the Divinity and the body. (Doubt still arises from the statement "quod anima erat medium secundum dignitatem vel naturam, sed non secundum tempus et actum", 134 not only as to how the unity of Divinity and body remains but especially here in the general implication that the soul is somehow nearer to God by nature.)

The foregoing discussion in which the soul is seen as the medium between the body and Divinity and therefore the unity of the body and the Divinity is seen as, in a sense, dependent on the soul (although Alexander by asserting the "essential" unity of body and Divinity tries to avoid this conclusion) implies that the soul, being of greater dignity than the body or "nearer" to God, (there is no suggestion that it is chosen by God so to act; it is higher by nature) is "congruent" for the incarnation. This implication, as well as the belief that man has some ability to please God, should become clearer in the chapters to follow.

On the "congruence" of human nature for the incarnation the Quaestiones has very much the same outlook as the Glossa. It is cautious, as the Glossa is, but it does maintain some sort of capacity. The human nature is said "posse suscipere unionem". 135 Human nature "et ratione naturae et ratione indigentiae congruit ad unionem" for man is in the similitude and image of God. The similitude relates to "potentia" and to "sapientia" "quia in anima sunt rationes cognitivae et operativae omnium in genere, ad similitudinem rationum in Deo, quae cognitivae et operativae", and to "bonitas" because grace is given to men. Therefore the image as power, wisdom, and goodness is appropriate for union. 136 (This discussion was in the context of the comparative suitability of angels and men in

135. Q.XV, De Incarnatione, Disp.I, Memb.2,18,p.198.
136. d.II,m.1,34,p.203.
regard to the incarnation. It somewhat expands the Glossa's arguments). Although, in the context, this next conclusion is probably an attempt to avoid something similar to an infralapsarian view of the incarnation, it also maintains the appropriateness of man uniting to God. The union completes human nature.

"In philosophia naturali dicitur quomodo elementa habeant concatenationem inter se /et/ cum superioribus corporalibus; sic etiam in terra nascentibus est quiddam quod communem naturam habet cum minerariis et ceteris re nascentibus. Ergo conveniet in illam unionem esse, sine qua omnes istae concatenationes essent imperfectae; et ita oportuit unionem deitatis cum creatura esse, et hoc cum creatura illa cum qua magis conveniret; et haec est humana natura. Ergo utilitatem haberet incarnatio etiam non existente passione." 137

This assertion is true, of course, only from the side of God and in the context of His freedom.

Alexander further states that in contrast to the spirit of an angel the soul in its inferior part is "unibilis" to the body, and thus there is a greater "compositio" in the soul than in an angel. This composition is not repugnant to the union but congruent with it: "Se enim peccavit homo in corpore et in anima, congruum fuit quod in utroque fieret reparatio". 138 The soul, this implies, is thus specially congruent (the spirit of the angel would be "unitable" too but it lacks the link to the body) because it can act as a medium between the body and God. Again, in the Quaestiones Alexander wants to deny the dependence of the union of the body and God on the soul but in so doing he still asserts

137. m.4,48,pp.208-209. 138. m.1,35,pp.203-204.
a congruence in the soul: "Unita fuit deitas carni per intellectum medium: non quod anima sit medium coniungens hanc cum hac, sed medium secundum ordinis congruentiam. Inter enim spiritualem increatam naturam et corporalem creatam, medium est spiritualis creatae." 139 The soul is both a medium and above the body in "congruence", and thus it is, by implication "nearer" God. This is made evident, it would appear, by the statement that the union of body and soul is less close than the union of Divine and human nature in spiritual forms, though not in material forms. 140 By this statement the spiritual side of man almost ceases to be part of creation. Certainly such formulations and the general idea of the "congruence of creation" through the soul for the incarnation puts limits on the extent necessary for man of the incarnation and the scope of the Person and work of Christ.

Summary

In this first chapter, broadly, there are four main topics: first, "reasons" for the incarnation are discussed; second, the humanity of Christ is discussed; third, Alexander affirms the working of Trinity in the incarnation; fourth, the problem of what has been called the "congruence" of creation for incarnation is discussed. It now remains to summarise the main trends in these four topics.

139. m.3,42,p.206. 140. Disp.IV,m.3,91,p.222.
Alexander states that it was "appropriate" that the Son should become incarnate, as it was "appropriate" that the Father and Spirit should have played their respective roles. There are snatches also of the recapitulation theory and the "appropriateness" of the various recapitulations. These recapitulations, however, do not provide a "necessary" cause for the incarnation and Alexander follows Anselm in finding this cause in the theory of satisfaction in which it is argued that only man should satisfy but only God could. It should be pointed out that the theory of satisfaction, as will become clearer as the thesis progresses, is modified in two ways: first, it is a theory of penal satisfaction, and second it is limited to the satisfaction for the temporal punishment of original sin which was Anselm's central but not only concern. Alexander, however, limits Christ's satisfaction to that and thus limits him in his "necessity" to that. When Alexander discusses the matter of necessity he does make one of his few hints at a broader (and more Anselmic) view of satisfaction in that, in discussing the importance of the way taken by God in Christ and quoting Augustine, he possibly points towards man's restoration by Christ. This, however, is not at all central in his thinking.

Alexander is most anxious not to compromise in any way the freedom of God by talk about "necessity" and one way he does this is to maintain the possibility of another way of freeing man. The "necessity" which is involved is seen
in terms of final cause, that is, in order that man should be freed from the punishment of original sin it was necessary that Christ should have come. In other words, the incarnation was necessary for man, but was not a necessity laid upon God. There was no necessity laid upon Christ. When Alexander speaks of "another way" in discussing the patriarchs there seems to be implied another starting point from Christ, and although, at this point, he is trying to maintain the freedom of God, he does reveal a tendency which becomes considerably more obvious at times, namely, the tendency to know God apart from Jesus Christ.

The second topic is the matter of Christ's humanity. When Alexander was discussing the possibility of Christ being made under the necessity of sin there was some doubt thrown on Christ's humanity being "like us in all respects only without sin" because he was said to have taken his human nature from the state of innocence and his punishment from the state of guilt. This is, of course, a way of trying to be true to the "without sin" but it does raise doubts about whether it is an adequate way of being true to "like us in all respects." The fact that Alexander is not particularly concerned to maintain this, however, is seen when he comes to discuss the Virgin Mary and Christ. Mary's proneness to sin is reduced to a minimum; Christ did not receive his "invisible reason" from Joseph (or Mary) but from God and so he was free from desire; he received his visible and almost pure "visible substance" from Mary.
Here three questions are raised. The first is about his humanity; did Christ really become one of us? The second is: if Mary and the saints can be sanctified apart from Christ what is Christ's role, if any, in sanctification? The third is: is there a suggestion that corruptibility is inevitably attached to matter, that is, is creation "very good" for Alexander? This possibility had earlier been raised when Alexander had briefly discussed the liberation from the Devil by Christ. These questions recur frequently in the thesis, in fact, the first question may be described as the question.

The third topic is Alexander's affirmation of the work of the Trinity in the incarnation. This is mentioned as a major topic simply because it fades into the background in the Christology, and one feels that if it had not been allowed to do so, some aspects of Alexander's thinking would have been more satisfactory. The incarnation, states Alexander, was the work of the Trinity and took place in the power of the Holy Spirit. The union of the two natures is here clearly the work of God. In this kind of context the problem of the personal union which arises in Alexander may have been resolved, at least, to some extent. Further, in this context the doctrine of the grace of union which Alexander sees as the grace which makes Christ unique might be more easily accepted. Without a determinedly Trinitarian background doctrine of the grace of union may not be an adequate way of stating Christ's uniqueness in view of Alexander's doctrine
of grace.

When he states that all things are made either by substance or power and that substantially the Son was essentially from the Father and Christ was materially from the mother one finds, on the side of the Divinity, a strong affirmation of the being of God in Christ, and apparently a statement of the two natures doctrine. The Divinity seems assured in this chapter but later there does rise some doubt as to whether Alexander is insistent enough at all times on the fact that the very being of God was in Christ in the Person of the Son. The statement on the division of natures also raises a question. Here the word substance seems to mean nature, the essential refers to the Divine and the material to the human. However, the use of the "materia" might suggest that in fact this is a Spirit-flesh distinction or even a soul-body distinction. This suspicion gains weight when one considers how Alexander understands the uniting of the Divine to the body, and the role of the soul in this unity.

One finds hints of later problems when Alexander describes the Spirit as the medial power between essence and matter and some confirmation of the suspicion raised above that essence and matter refer to the distinction of Spirit and flesh rather than to the natures. The problem raised here, however, is: does Alexander really escape Adoptionism; or to put this another way (this is asked later of the grace of union theory): does Alexander adequately affirm the uniqueness of the incarnation by his description of the Spirit as the
medial power? Is not this description equally applicable to the relation of God with any man? Should not the Spirit as medial power be understood rather to refer to the relation of Father and Son in the essence (after Augustine's way of thinking) than between the essence and matter? Is not the uniqueness of the incarnation found in the fact that the Son was the mediator, that is, God was in Christ as Son and not only as Spirit?

The final topic introduced by this chapter is the matter of the capacity of man to know God. There was possibly some hint of this capacity when the fulness of time was mentioned and also in the recapitulation theory. Later, however, man's capacity for God is assumed in the discussion on the various laws which came to man to help him in his sickness. In particular regard to Christology man does appear to be credited with a capacity for union with God and in this the soul is given a mediatorial role in some sense. The capacity of man for God is a constant element of the thinking of Alexander, and the assumption of an almost Divine like nature of the soul is also well in evidence.

Thus this first chapter raises matters which become themes of Alexander's Christology as the thesis will demonstrate in its progress. It would be useful, now, to enumerate these themes. First, Alexander finds that satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to original sin was Christ's central and only necessary work. By and large he limits Christ's work to this role of satisfaction, Second,
there constantly arises doubts about the full humanity of Christ in relation both to man's finiteness and to his sin. As a corollary of this there is a suggestion that creation as such is corrupt and thus Christ could not be part of it. Third, there is quite evidently a capacity in man to know God and to please God. This compensates, as it were, for the lack of Christ's humanity and this capacity is paralleled in the fact that the soul is seen to be almost Divine. Creation's corruption and man's capacity in his soul for God contribute to what can only be called an Apollinarian view of Christ. This is seen especially in regard to his merit, passions, and in the matter of the two wills (where they are not the human and Divine but the sensual and the rational). Fourth, man is sanctified by grace apart from Christ, that is, man's sanctification has only an accidental connection with Christ's humanity, not a necessary one. Fifth, there is a suggestion of Adoptionism, that is, in calling the Spirit medial power one has to ask how Christ differs from other men. This problem will again arise with the doctrine of the grace of the Head in which Christ's role is merely that of a channel or source for sanctifying grace. With Alexander's close identification of the Spirit and grace and with his substantial view of grace one wonders whether in the grace of union, by which he affirms the uniqueness of Christ's relation to God, Alexander finds an adequate way of expressing that uniqueness or whether he is merely restating the idea of the Spirit as medial power in
another form. Sixth, Alexander in this chapter does affirm the role of the Trinity in the incarnation. There is some doubt as to whether he maintains this as a constant basis of his Christology and whether he affirms, particularly in the next chapter, that, in the Person of the Son, the being or essence of God is present in humanity. Further, does he see the Son in the Trinity as the only basis there could be for the personal union? Except for the first and last of these points Alexander's failing could be said to be a failure to give proper place to the humanity of Christ. This is ultimately due to his failure to base his theology and Christology in the incarnation and in the doctrine of the Trinity. In fact, that there are other presuppositions at work than these is already evident in Alexander's suggestion that God could have freed man another way. His failure to emphasise the centrality of Christ's humanity and his failure to begin consistently from the incarnation are the two themes that permeate this thesis.
CHAPTER 2

NICAEA AND CHALCEDON.

This chapter could, broadly speaking, be said to be dealing with the problems of the Councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon. The fact that God was incarnate in Christ is first discussed, that is, the way Alexander understands the assumption of human nature by God. Then the union of the two natures in Christ and how that union is to be understood is discussed. As the discussions of these two problems cannot, strictly speaking, be separated, and the fact that what is said in relation to one has implications for the other, the following discussion will not follow with any real strictness the neat order "Nicaea - Chalcedon". As in the history of the church when theologians discussed the matters involved in both councils right through the period of the councils, so in this chapter the understanding of both the doctrines of the assumption and the union as stated by Alexander will be present throughout the chapter. However, the emphasis of the first part of the chapter, as in the Church's history, will be "Post Nicaea", the emphasis of the latter part will be "Post Chalcedon".

"Post - Nicaea".

Alexander insists that it is not the Divine nature that assumes. He admits that it might appear to be correct to say that just as God is said to be incarnate, so too one might say that the Divine nature was incarnate. However, he
goes on to say, although "Deus" and "Divine nature" are the same "secundum rem", yet they differ "in modo intelligendi". "Deus" has "Divine nature" and so "Deus" is "conveniens" to a Person but "Divine nature" itself "non dicit appropriationem vel comparisonem ad aliquam personam". The "L" equivalent explains this when it is stated "Natura autem dicit, sive essentia, ut in abstractione". Divine nature, Alexander is stating, is thus God as "One" in His essence and as such He cannot be related to the accidents of the created world. God in Himself does not belong to this world.

Yet one cannot help feeling, at this point and especially as the discussion of Christological doctrines continues, that in spite of Alexander's stated Trinitarian basis there may be two ideas of "God" at work in his thinking - the "One" and the "Trinity". When he states that the Divine nature, that is, "all God" was not incarnate, one can see his point, namely, that it was the Trinitarian God in the incarnation - in fact, he may almost be saying that "Divine nature" is "Trinity". (Certainly one would imagine it against tripassianism and implied ideas of God becoming man or created). Nevertheless, the very fact that it was the Word of God who was incarnate would seem to lead one to state fairly clearly that the Divine nature, the very being of God, was present on earth through the Word, that is, God Himself was among men, or the Word which was God became flesh. This would mean that the idea of God as "Divine nature is

1. d. V,2,p.58. 2. 22(L),p.65.
Trinity" is not defined by the idea of God as the "One." If this is not so there must be some doubt thrown on the authenticity of the man Jesus as the very Word of God. And yet this doubt increases when Alexander distinguishes between the Person and the Divine nature, or when he emphasises the difference between assuming and uniting: "Per 'assumere' designatur quod aliquid sit in quod unio fit; per 'unire' vero designatur quod non in termino aliquo fiat unio, sed solum potentia activa. Unde bene dicitur: 'persona assumpsit naturam' et 'divina natura univit sibi humanam' or when he quotes John of Damascus: "Aliud est unitio et aliud incarnatio; quoniam unitio solum demonstrat copulationem, sed incarnatio dicit ad quem facta est copulatio, sicut ignitio." This is quoted without comment in "AE" but the context and the question in "L" before this same statement, as to whether uniting and incarnation are the same, make it evident that the interest is in the difference rather than in the complementary nature of the union of natures and the incarnation of the Word as is the case with John of Damascus, that is, through, in and by the Word the union of God and man was made. In "L" the same general point is made: "Item, dicit pro regula in libro De hebdomadibus:

"Assumens non est assumptum", uniens tamen est unitum. Et ratio est, quia "assumere" respicit principia compositionis quasi secundum naturam, 'unire' vero communiter et secundum naturam et secundum rationem. Unde, (ut) improprie loquamur, 'assumere' dicit ut praecedens unitionem, unitio unionem. Haec tamen omnia simul tempore sunt; ergo, secundum quod assumitur

3. 23(L),p.65 perhaps makes this point. See below p. 72.
4. viz. 16,c)p.63. 5. 12,p.61. 6.13,14,pp.61-62; 36(L), p.68; De Fide Orth.,III,c.11. 7. Alanus ab Insulis, Regulæ theolog.
This point is valid enough; Alexander is avoiding any suggestion that the Divine nature is made or becomes human which incarnation or assumption may suggest but in defending oneself against heresy, one should be careful also to emphasise the point of the distinction, namely, that through this assumption the Divine nature is united to the human. To be sure, at the end of the above quotation this latter point is made but this only emphasises the fact that he was more interested in the distinction between assumption and uniting. The above quotation would be more satisfactory if one felt that the last statement was the object of the quotation and this is not so. "L" provides the kind of thing that would be expected (but not "AE"): "assumendo coniunxit et coniungendo assumpsit coniuncta, ut terminus sit assumptionis ipsa coniunctio" but even this is qualified for the interest here is in avoiding Adoptionism by stating that the humanity of Christ did not exist apart from the assumption so that the human nature is seen as participating in the union through the assumption. From the Divine side the operative element is the Person, not the nature. Possibly at this stage the distinction between assumption and uniting would be valid if at the later stage in distinction VI Alexander made clear that in the Person of the Son of God, God, the Divine nature came right into the

8. 35(L), p.68. 9. 23(L), p.65.
midst of humanity but there is a further doubt at this point also. (This will become clear in the rest of the chapter.)

Another way of viewing the assumption or the incarnation is in terms of the "mediator". Alexander, however, does not throw much light here because of his heavy dependence on tradition. It is in distinction XIX that he discusses Christ as "mediator" and, at considerable length, Christ as "head". (This interesting section will be discussed in chapter 3).

Alexander states that mediation occurs in two ways - substantially, in the diverse natures in which one "habet communem" with the Father, and the other "communem cum homine"; accidentally, "consideratur secundum proprietates Dei et hominis." 10 There is a quotation from Ambrose in which it is stated that the mediator as God is greater than man, and as man less than God, and Augustine is quoted to the effect that Christ is put in between the immortal and the mortal "miser" so that from death the mortal might be made immortal. 11 Isidore is quoted to the effect that both natures are one person and that "manente incommutabili essentia, assumpsit carnem, in qua impassibilis patiet immortalis mori /et/ aeternus temporalis possit ostendi". 12 Unfortunately Alexander does not enlarge on this statement. Again Augustine is quoted, this time to the effect that Christ is the way, and Alexander comments that it is as man that he is the way. 13 Another quotation from Augustine states that

the mediator has something "simile" to man and something "simile" to God. 14 Finally, states Alexander, there are three ways of mediation - "quoad naturam", one of which is a composition of both natures, another in which there is one person of two natures; there is a third mediation in which the human nature has the properties of God and man. In this last way, states Alexander "verum est" 15 ("quod est mediator secundum quod homo" 16). In "L" the second type of mediation is described as "una person pro duabus naturis, mediatrix inter Deum et hominem." 17 Thus it appears that the first two types of mediation are eliminated because the mediation means confusion or interchangeability. This is stated in "E" where the medium is not a "natura media" between the Divine and human but "quoad proprietates quae erant in Christo homine. Habuit enim omnium scientiam et plenitudinem donorum sive virtutum, in quo cum Deo conveniebat; et passibilitatem in anima secundum sensualitatem et in corpore, in quo cum hominibus conveniebat." 18 Thus Christ as man is not to be divinised or as God he is not to be humanised. Because this topic is so heavily dependent on authorities it is very difficult to make anything of it. There is not much interest in the question "what was Christ mediator for?" The interest seems to lie merely in the statement of the fact that God was mediator between God and man and little help is given to the discussion on the incarnation and union which establishes Christ as God and man.

15. 20,p.215.
17. 38(L),p.219.
18. 45(E),pp.226-227.
Back in distinction V, however, the centre of Alexander's discussion on the assumption is found. Previously the interest has centred on the Divine nature and the assumption. Now the place of the human nature is discussed. The human nature which the Son of God assumes, states Alexander, cannot refer to "essentia" because "'natura' respicit rem in fieri, et 'essentia' secundum esse." 19 Alexander is making a point similar to the one made above where essence is seen as a self-contained unit, as "One". Human essence could not be assumed for this would indicate that the human element had being apart from the incarnation (Adoptionism) or that there were two separate entities in the union (Nestorianism). It may be noted that the terminology is not the same here as above for, there, "essentia" and (Divine) "natura" were equated which made it impossible for Divine nature to assume. Thus by equating nature and essence in God and stating that nature did not assume, and by distinguishing between nature and essence in man so that man as essence is not assumed some doubt may be had whether this terminology and its use sufficiently guarantees the affirmation of the real involvement either of God or man in the incarnation. However, as it is stated that essence does not apply to "rem in fieri", essence cannot be seen as taking part in the assumption. Yet, in some way, it must be affirmed that the essence of man is involved for Christ to be man. The essence must rest in the incarnation itself, that is, humanity in the

man Christ Jesus. Perhaps, however, there is no more than a different use of terminology here so that "essentia" is used only in relation to the possibility of Adoptionism and Nestorianism and their rejection, and for the rest "natura" is the essence of man or real man, to take in both the idea of "humanity" and "a man" which is the same usage the word nature has when it refers to the Divine nature in the union. 20

That Alexander is protecting himself against any sort of Nestorianism or Adoptionism is also seen in the next section where human nature is said not to be "homo". He states that it is true that Divine nature is God because in Him "quod est" and "quo est" are the same but in man they differ 21 which means that "humanity" can be assumed or united to Divine nature without first being individuated. It is to be admitted that Alexander is correct when he implies that the "union" of man and man (in particular of Christ and man) and the union of the Persons of the Trinity (whereby the Person of Christ is indissolubly linked with the nature, a position which Alexander, in fact, does not make the most of in relation to the incarnation) are not really comparable yet in tradition they have been compared and Alexander's division between "man" and "human nature" may raise doubts as to whether Christ is a man like other human beings, that is, is humanity or a man really hypostasised in the Person of the Son? Is Christ man? (viz. Karl Barth: "if we allow ourselves to say that He /the Word/ became flesh, we must

20. 9,p.59 indeed gives a list of the different uses of the word "natura". 21. 6,p.59.
note that primarily and of itself "flesh" does not imply a man, but human essence and existence, human kind and nature, humanity, humanitas, that which makes a man man as opposed to God, angel, or animal." 22 Likewise, it would seem true that in the Person incarnate the divine nature is primarily implied.) Perhaps, however, it would be fairer to Alexander to presume that he is thinking, at this point, more of what is assumed, to repudiate any idea of a prior humanity, rather than of the actual union and the involvement of humanity in it. (This question arises later.) He, at least, is definitely stating that the humanity of Christ does not exist apart from the incarnation. This is brought out in "I" where he comments on the suggestion that the human nature assumed was a person: "natura humana ponitur ibi pro materia" which is body and soul, not for a person as an "individuum" "cum sit in alis hominibus in ratione formae dicta, ut humanitas: et quia assumendo coniunxiter coniungendo assumpsit coniuncta, ut terminus sit assumptionis ipsa coniunctio." 24 Thus Nestorianism or Adoptionism is rejected but the question remains whether the point of Adoptionism, i.e. Christ was a man, has been sufficiently taken into account.

This quotation may weaken a former assertion that the inter-relation of the union and assumption (that is, the Divine Nature was fully involved in the incarnation through the Son) is not brought out strongly by Alexander. However,

even here, the intent is to understand the relation in regard to Christ's humanity. He leaves at one side the issue of the Divine nature's involvement in the incarnation. The statement that the "end of the assumption is the conjunction" certainly would imply the activity of the Divine nature in the incarnation but whether Alexander wishes by this to affirm that the Divine nature is involved or whether he still would be more interested in the distinction remains in doubt. On the whole, it would appear the distinction "once removes" the Divine nature from the union as later the Person is "once removed" in the hypostatic union. (distinction VI) In other words, Alexander, here, has no problem about the Person's involvement but he has about the Divine nature's involvement, and contrariwise he has no doubt about human nature's involvement, but has doubts about man's (i.e. perhaps by implication sinful man's) involvement in the union. In "E", assumption and union are related again but again the interest, as above, lies in the distinction.

Adoptionism is quite clearly refuted in distinction VI when it is suggested that by the grace of adoption Christ was made "that man". Alexander replies that it was not the grace of adoption but the grace of union. 25 Alexander also refutes Nestorianism and its charge against orthodoxy, namely, the suggestion there was no man involved in the union. It is suggested that "iste homo" posits either "person" or "human nature". If it is "person", it is argued,

25. d.VI,9,p.76, with footnote b).
then there must have been two persons and if it was "human nature" then there was never a person made. Alexander replies that "iste homo" posits "individuum quod est medium inter naturam et personam".\(^{26}\) He is not saying, I think, that Christ is a third being between man and God but that his human nature is personal yet not personal apart from its hypostasis in the Son of God. However, his fear of Adoptionism and Nestorianism (i.e. the "manness" involved in these positions) prevents him from clearly stating this position. Many of the fathers are quoted to maintain, especially in "L" and "E", the traditional view of Christ but there is no substantial addition to what has already been stated. Adoptionism and Nestorianism are refuted. In distinction X the question whether Christ was a man again arises and so the problem of Nestorianism. This is raised by Anselm's statement that in Christ God is "persona" and man is "persona". The answer to this problem is found in "L" where Anselm's comment is referred to, and Alexander states that if the "individuae hypostases" were separated there would have been a personal man, but they were not in the conjunction because in that there were the same individual and collection of accidents.\(^{27}\) Another suggestion that the "aliquid" of Christ as man was an "individua substantia" and therefore a person\(^{28}\) is answered by the statement that not every individuum is a person.\(^{29}\) Once again these answers would hardly satisfy a Nestorian and his doubts.

\(^{26}\)d.X,2,p.114; Anselm De Incarn. Verbi,c.6; 9(L),c,p.117.  
\(^{27}\)2,b)pp.114-115; 9(L),b)p.117.  
\(^{28}\)Ibid. d)p.117.
In the same distinction the problem of Adoptionism again is raised. The statement of Hilary "Potestatis dignitas non amittitur, dum carnis humanitas adoptatur" might have suggested that the man in Christ was an adoptive son. This possibility is denied by the statement of Ambrose: "Volvi et revolvi Scripturas divinas, et Filium Dei nunquam adoptivum inveni." Then it is asked why, if Christ as man was a creature, he was not similarly called adoptive as man. Alexander rejects this conclusion because "adoptio respicit alterationem (Adoptivus enim est qui quandoque non fuit filius) et creatura respicit generationem." Augustine had stated, further, that it was the same grace at work in making the faith of man and by which Christ was made man. Alexander protects this against an adoptionist interpretation by commenting that the grace mentioned is the "virtus" of the Holy Spirit by which Christ was conceived of the Virgin. In "L" and "E" in a statement of Peter Lombard, it is made clear that the grace in Christ was not the grace of adoption but the grace of union. From the above it is evident that Alexander has little of significance to add in relation to Adoptionism beyond denying it. The answer that adoption relates to alteration and generation to the creature does not answer, however, the Adoptionist suspicion of monophysitism; in fact, it may strengthen it. Adoptionism destroys the unity of Christ but it is not answered by a hint that the human

30. 64 a)p.115; Hilary, De Trin., Lib.II,n.27. 31. The quotation is attributed to Ambrose by Peter Lombard; footnote p.115 and 14(L),p.118. 32. footnote, p.116. 33. 6,b)p.116. 34. 6,c)p.116; Augustine, De Praedest. sanctorum, c.15,n.31. 35. 12(L),pp.117-118; 19(E),pp.119-120.
nature is very similar to the Divine.

In distinction XI Alexander takes up an anti-Arian position. The line from a medieval hymn, "potestate, non natura, fit Creator creatura" might suggest that Christ was a creature. Alexander, in reply, allows that God was man but that does not mean that the Creator was a creature because "sic opponitur oppositio in eadem." 36 In "E" it is stated that the hymn is alright "in se" but it is generally unacceptable due to its similarity to the Arian heresy. 37 Arianism is further attacked because it stated that the Divine nature was a creature 38 and for stating that Christ was a creature absolutely just as he may be called Creator absolutely. 39 (In sympathy with Arianism one would also like to question this latter statement). Again, the description of Christ as "divinum" is not conceded because "minus est divinum quam Deus." 40 In the footnote there is this statement: "unde supra (dist.VII,15) non conceditur 'homo dominicus', ita nec hic 'divinum'." 41 This guards against "backdoor" Arianism which only apparently concedes deity to Christ.

In distinction IX Alexander apparently moves in a contrary direction to the foregoing. It is concerned with "latria" and "dulia" in relation to Christ. "Latria" is worship and "dulia" is something akin to honour and their use in relation to Christ by Alexander throws some light on

36. dist.XI,1,p.120; also 8(I),p.122; hymn in F.I.Mone, Hymni latini medii aevi, II,n.389. 37. 11(E),p.123.
38. 3,p.121 and footnote. 39. 6,p.122. 40. 7,p.122.
41. footnote, p.122.
his Christological position. Alexander finds the Biblical basis for the distinction in Psalm 7:1 - "Domine, Deus meus" where "Dominus" is temporal and where "Deus" is eternal: "Est ergo latria cultus Deo debitus; dulia vero est cultus creaturae debitus et creaturae exhibitus." 42 In the former "cognitio, dilectio, et sacrificii exhibitio" are required but for the latter the last of these requirements is omitted. 43 Much of the distinction is taken up with a discussion of what "latria" and "dulia" are in themselves, and with the love of God and the love of neighbour, and this is not directly concerned with Christology.

The question arises, however, whether "caro Christi" is to be adored by "latria" or "dulia". Alexander replies "quod caro aliquando dicitur ipse homo; et sic caro Christi est adoranda latria. Dicitur etiam caro pars corporis; sed dupliciter potest considerari: aut enim ut in se est, et sic hyperdulia adoranda est; vel prout unitur divinae naturae, et sic latria adoranda est." 44 In "L" the division between the man and God is more stark. When "caro" is thought of as "corpus" Christ can be viewed in a two fold way: "unitum vel in se. Si sumatur ut homo, adoratur hypostasis et latria. Similiter si sumatur ut unitum, quia terminus est Filius Dei in hac unione. In se autem adoratur dulia, illa scilicet specie qua dicitur hyperdulia; non tamen adoratur, quia non ponitur ut terminus,

42. d.IX,1,p.104. 43. 21(E),p.133. 44. 3,pp.105-106.
sed honoratur ut materia redemptionis.⁴⁵ The same division is seen in the question whether "Creator" is to receive "latria" or "dulia" or not. The answer is that as God he should receive "latria" but the Son of God is "Dominus" in so far as he is man and so in this capacity should receive "dulia". Christ is God from eternity, "Dominus" with time. (Phil.2:9 is the basis of this). ⁴⁶

Apart from the division thus implied between God in himself and God in revelation, that is, apart from the lack of a Trinitarian basis for Christ as "Dominus" (see also in a later chapter), the division which the use of "latria" and "dulia" implies raises serious problems for Christology. (Of course these matters are closely related). It has to be admitted that the relation of man and God in Christ has always been extraordinarily difficult to express, nevertheless, Alexander's position does appear to be inadequate. First, it offends against the biblical evidence where Christ is seen as one person, to be sure, God and man, but with complete cohesion and united wills in one purpose and who is worshipped as Lord. (Phil.2:10) He cannot be thought of as only man, "in se" (which is the only possibility open to non-believers), by a believer for his manhood is based only in the Son of God, and God is known only by the man. The Godness is revealed in the manness. We cannot go behind this man, that is, by separating the man from the God, to "God". - "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet

⁴⁵. 12(L),p.110. ⁴⁶. 4,p.106; also 15(L),pp.110-111.
now henceforth know we him no more." (2 Cor. 5:16) To be sure, one can say, "this is the man", for example, when Christ prays in the garden of Gethsemane, but one then cannot go on to say that this man at this point is not the Son of God and is not to be worshipped, which the "latria-dulia" distinction implies, far less to go on to make a principle of division from the fact that one can detect the man. Secondly, as has been implied, this distinction is a division and offends against the "without division" of Chalcedon. Thirdly, this division does not take the "communicatio idiomatum" (admittedly a doctrine not without its difficulties) seriously enough - a doctrine which points in a direction contrary to the division or the dividing out of the human and the Divine.

Here, surprisingly perhaps (because at other times Alexander appears to have monophysite tendencies), there is a move towards Nestorianism. This tendency, however, also coincides with the pre-suppositions of Alexander, for Nestorianism (like monophysitism) throws doubt on the reality of the incarnation which is the fact that God became man in the person of Jesus Christ. The heresy raises doubts on the incarnation of God because in it that man Jesus is not seen to be made the complete man from God's side (because God, by definition, is incapable of incarnation). Consequently if one wishes to maintain the manness of Christ (with which most monophysites are not particularly concerned) as the Nestorian does, in some way one has to maintain a man who is not at the same time the Person of Christ and hence some form
of Nestorianism is necessary (or Ebionitism or Adoptionism). This means that, in Jesus Christ, the human is not fully "met by the Divine", or to put it another way, as it has been put before, the Divine keeps the human "at arm's length". This tendency derives from a docetic view of God as the "One" or "Essence" who is unable to communicate with man. This inability of such a God is demonstrated in relation to the humanity of Christ when Alexander credits it, as has been seen, with some "capacity" for uniting with the Divine and as such is to be honoured as the "materia redemptionis". (Monophysitism works also from a docetic standpoint but unlike Nestorianism is happy, in effect, to eliminate man - the latter to solve the problem makes two persons, the former to solve it eliminates one of them.)

There may be another reason why Alexander is able to make a division between the man and God in Christ and it lies in the fact that his doctrine of the knowledge of God is not indissolubly bound to the revelation of God in the Man Jesus Christ. That means that even before he comes to the doctrine of Christ there is a presupposed separation of God from man. The purpose of the incarnation, for instance, is limited almost entirely to the work of satisfaction (the only necessary reason for the incarnation is penal satisfaction), in short, Jesus Christ is regarded merely as a helper - certainly a decisive one. He, that is, the God and man, is not central to his thinking and it is thus that in Christ it is the Son of God, the Divine, who is worshipped because he is central and not God in the man Jesus. This could be put another way. For Alexander's theology Jesus Christ is not the complete revelation of God to man or of man to man,
rather he is the one who renders satisfaction to God. There is little "manward" direction about Christ the man; the manhood in Christ "looks back" to God and though this whole action between man and God in Christ is necessary for man's salvation, nevertheless, the man in Christ does not come between us and God who is the object of our worship with or without Christ. Thus a division in Christ is possible for Alexander both because the Divine keeps the human at "arm's length" and because the necessity of satisfaction does not prevent us communicating with God directly without the human mediation. This means, by implication, that in Christ, man can be distinguished from God. Both these reasons for division presuppose a knowledge of God outside Christ but incarnational theology, if it had been adequate, could have acted as a corrective to these docetic tendencies.

Something of the same problem as the "latria-dulia" one arises in distinction X which begins by discussing Peter Lombard's enquiry "utrum Christus secundum quod homo sit persona."

Alexander's comment is:

"Haec dictio "secundum" aliquando notat uimitatem personae, ut 'Christus secundum quod homo dimittit peccata.' Aliquando conditionem divinae naturae, ut 'Christus secundum quod Deus est misericors.' Aliquando notat causam efficientem, ut 'Christus secundum quod Deus resurrexit.' (id est ex virtute divinitatis) 47 Aliquando causam materialem, ut 'Christus secundum quod homo redemit nos.' (Id est humanitate sua fecit opera nostrae redemptionis meritoria.) 48 Aliquando causam formalem, ut 'Christus secundum quod est homo est aliquid.' Aliquando notat conditionem humanae naturae, ut 'Christus secundum quod homo mortuus est.'" 50

It is true that the humanity and the Divinity must receive sufficient recognition in any doctrine of Christ but some of these divisions appear very doubtful, notably in regard to the material cause and the human nature. To be sure a material cause is not a sufficient cause and implies efficient, formal and final causes in which God would be the main agent; yet, in the above case the fourfold cause is not applied to man's redemption as such. Alexander sees the humanity especially at work here in the material cause. It would be wrong to claim that Alexander excludes the work of God for it is in the framework of His work that the material cause operates. Yet no part of Christ can be seen as human for the most part, because Jesus Christ must always be understood as God in Christ, that is, as he is, full man and full God in the unity of the Person of the Son, in all his works. That is how he worked. He is always God in man, and a man in whom we see God, and in any aspect of Christ's work God and man must be understood in their unity. The same point applies to the last example of the quotation which claims that to state that Christ as man is dead denotes the condition of the human nature.

Similarly, there must also be some doubt as to whether in regard to the efficient cause Alexander states the position satisfactorily. Certainly the power of the resurrection was of God but whether it can be put as simply as the above is a matter of some doubt. A substantial Biblical view is that the Son was raised by the Father, this being the completion of the Son's obedience, and the man is
raised by virtue of the hypostatic union. This is basically a Trinitarian problem but unless the Trinity is seen to be at work in the resurrection (and elsewhere of course, in Christ's life) there may be some doubt as to the second person's unity with man in Christ, that is, God may appear to be working outside Jesus Christ. If this is so, there is doubt on the achievement of salvation for God would not then have taken man's side, (cf. Anselm; only man should, only God could) a position which Chalcedon's "without separation, without division" would defend. It is in the first application of "secundum" that a more satisfactory statement is found. There "secundum" denotes the personal unity as in the sentence "Christus secundum quod homo dimittit peccata." No suspicion of Nestorianism arises here.

Alexander is naturally anti-Arian, anti-Adoptionist, and anti-Nestorian although some Nestorian tendencies perhaps have been detected. He, of course, is also anti-Monophysite. Here, also, he reveals his tendency to regard God as the "One". In distinction V it is stated that all creatures were created either "in se", "in sua specie", or "in sua materia." The union of the human nature to the Divine nature is creaturely, and therefore, it is suggested, it is of a "genus" but of none of the above types. In reply Alexander states that just as the composition of one substance to another makes a substance not of the one kind or the other, similarly the union of the Divine and human natures is not reducible "ad aliquod genus rerum" because one of the substances, namely, the Divine, is beyond all "genus". 51

Thus the suggestion that there may be one nature (by implication in a creaturely "genus") is rejected. Monophysitism is again rejected in relation to the suffering of Christ. Alexander states that it does not follow that the Divine nature suffers when the Person receives the "idiomata" of human nature because human nature is not united "in divinam naturam" but "in divinam personam." 52 (The subject of suffering arises in chapter 4) Further, Peter Lombard had said that the Divine nature is not said to be made flesh because it might be thought that nature was changed into nature. Alexander in support of this writes: "Quod secus est de Verbo et de divina natura, quoniam Verbum concernens personam et humana natura non opponuntur: ideo dicetur Verbum caro factum: sed divina natura et humana opponuntur: non dicetur ideo divinam naturam carnem factam." 53

Two things should be noted in this rejection of monophysitism: there is the fear of humanisation (not of divinisation), and once again there is hesitation at asserting the action of the Divine nature in the assumption - indeed "human nature and Divine nature are opposed", a problem which surely must also arise with the Person of the Son of God. It should also be noted that when the "communicatio idiomatum" is mentioned, it is not to affirm it but to deny it in the case of the suffering of the Divine nature. (In distinction VII, however, Alexander states: "est autem unio convenientia naturarum in personam et communicatio proprietatum ad invicem." 54

The topic of distinction VIII as a "footnote" to the above discussion shows the same tendencies. It deals with the double "nativity" of Christ. The term "natus" but not the term "incarnatus" speaks of a distinction in Christ and so, states Alexander, it cannot be said that the Divine nature is born as the Divine nature is said to be incarnate. The rule (only found in the Summa II:2,n.87) is stated as follows: "Nihil significans proprietatem creatam vel proprietatem personalem increatam dicitur de divina essentia."\(^{55}\) And so it is false to say "divina essentia est nata vel genita" because this changes the essential into the personal.\(^{56}\) Again the fact that there was a "nunc" of time and a "nunc" of eternity in Christ does not permit the expression, which Peter Lombard used, that Christ was "bis natus" because Christ was born Son of Man in time and Son of God in eternity.\(^{57}\) The above distinction sets out to assert the real distinction of the natures, and to assert that in no way should the Divine nature be humanised, nor should it have the stigma of createdness on it.

Both these objectives are perfectly legitimate, in fact, they are imperative in Christology and yet here, as in distinction V and elsewhere in the work, Alexander's fear is the humanisation of God which parallels a tendency in his work not to attribute a full humanity to Christ. The identification of Christ with mankind is not emphasised (the interest is on the Divine side) and in fact appears only

\(^{55}\) d.VIII,1,p.102.  \(^{56}\) footnote,p.102.  \(^{57}\) 2,p.102.
in "L" and "E" to any extent; the monophysitism feared, it should be noted, is not the traditional form of divinisation (the Nestorian fear) but the contrary form of humanisation. Once again there seems to be some idea of God as the "One" or "essentia" lurking behind his thought, a "One" who is unable to become involved in any real sense with man (a conclusion which Alexander, of course, does not reach; the incarnation is too powerful); in fact, even in Alexander, man, because he has accidents, seems to be at a greater advantage. No doubt the quite justified fear of Patripassianism (which, however, can be taken to inordinate lengths) is associated with these views and lends support to them. However, the idea of God as the "changeless One" is probably more truly the background of Alexander's thought.

In distinction VI Alexander comes to the "how" of the hypostatic union and the relations of the natures, and these matters are fully discussed. Of course Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and also Nihilianism are also discussed but now the interest lies more in a positive statement about the union than in the refutation of heresies although it is hard to distinguish the two. At the beginning of the distinction a number of ways are suggested in which Christ might have been two. (The danger here is Nestorianism.) No comments are made on this list in "AE" but there are comments in "L". There are two "quids" in Christ. If "quid" is equivalent to "suppositum" (or "subiectum") two natures are understood and therefore Christ can be described as two in this way. If "quid" refers to essence Christ is not two in
this way as there are not many "entes" in Christ. 58 Again Christ is one "unitate increata" and one "unitate creata" and so it is argued, two diverse unities. This does not follow as two unities cannot be united in one person. 59 One nature in God is one in essence, therefore, it is argued, two natures in Christ should make two in essence. Alexander replies that there were neither two essences nor one essence in Christ because essence is "quo res est" (nature is "ut quae fit") and essence is not in Christ in this way for there is a man God and a God man, one "ens". 60 Another argument is that substantial forms differ substantially, and as there are two substantial forms in Christ, there then are two substantially different ("things"?, "persons"?). This does not mean, however, that there are two "masculine" ("persons"?) but, rather, that Christ as man differs substantially from the Father, and as God he differs substantially from the mother. 61 Again, body and soul are in one person but the body is not the soul and vice versa; similarly God is not man, nor is man God. There is, however, a difference between these two unities in that soul and body are in one nature, whereas in Christ two natures are in one person. 62

These comments should give some idea of how Alexander sees the unity in Christ: essences cannot exist together; the soul and body analogy is unsuitable in that

58. d.VI,1,p.74; 25(L),f)p.83. 59. Ibid.c)p.82. 60. 1,p.74; 25(L),d)p.82. 61. Ibid.e)p.82. 62. 27(L) p.83.
the unity is too close. God and man are distinct but not separated or divided as Nestorianism saw them. (Above, when the assumption was discussed a distinction was made between the Person of the Son of God and the nature of God so that "nature" then approximated to "essence". Now in this discussion on union the distinction is between nature and essence, a distinction which was held in respect to the humanity of Christ. Alexander, as it has been noted, is aware of the change in the meaning of terms and therefore perhaps one cannot argue too much from this change. However, the direction is once again away from the "involvement" of God with humanity.) A somewhat different idea arises in distinction VII in regard to the idea that Christ may be partly man and partly God. This is denied by way of a quotation from Augustine who also denies the idea that Christ was not totally God from the beginning but grew into Divinity. 63 An allegorical interpretation by Hesychius that the tenth part of the ephah refers to the humanity of Christ and a quotation from John of Damascus that the hypostasis is "ex humana et divina natura" suggest that perhaps the human and the Divine are parts. In reply, Alexander gives five definitions of "part" and says that properly speaking the human is not a part but if the word "part" is used it can be only as part of the definition "Christum esse Deum et hominem". 64 Christ is also described as "totus" only in the sense that nothing is outside him which should be inside and not in the

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63. d.VII,7,p.92; Augustine, Contra Maximunum, II, c.10, n.2.
64. ll, pp.93-94; Hesychius, Glossa on Lev.6.20; John of Damascus, De Fide Orth. III.3.
sense that he is a composition of parts. Then a statement by Peter (at dist. XXII, c. 3) that "totus fuit in sepulcro, sed non totum" suggests a "part" outside. 65 The answer to this is in "I": "'totum' sumiter materialiter, id est partes unitae, et sic dicitur Christus 'totum'; vel formaliter, compositio partium, et sic non." 66 (This will have more light thrown upon it in chapter four.) Christ's soul was not dead and therefore the 'totum' of human nature was not in the tomb although the Person was by reason of his continuing unity to the body. 67

The second topic of distinction VI is the matter of the unity of Christ which is the implicate of the previous topic. (The danger here is monophysitism) Alexander quotes a list of unities which Bernard of Clairvaux has enumerated. There is a collective unity as in a pile of rocks; a constitutive unity as in one body with many limbs; the unity of man and wife in one flesh; the natural unity of body and soul in a man; a unity of power "qua homo virtutis non instabilis semper sibi unus nititur inveniri"; a unity of consent where there is a unity in heart through love; a votive unity when the soul adhering to God is of one spirit; a unity of dignity by which our filth is assumed into one person by the Word. Alexander adds to this list a sacramental unity in which, from a visible sign and invisible grace or character, there is made one sacrament. 68 No great light seems to be thrown by these types of unities, although one

65. 12,94. 66. 24(L),b)p.98. 67. also d.VII,34(E),p.101. 68. De consideratione, V,c.8,n.18; 8,p.76.
can see that the unity in Christ is not the same as the
unity of body and soul, of believers with God, and of the
believers in one body (the closer unities). It certainly
is not monophysite unity for though it may be true that
the Son of Man is Divine nature yet the Son of God is not
human nature because in the Son of God the "quod est" and
the "quo est" are the same but this is not so with the Son
of Man. 69 This is similar to what "L" states: that man
does not begin to be God by the fact that God begins to be
man, nor does God begin to be human nature. 70 Here, once
again, Alexander is defending the Godness of the Son of God
more than the humanity of Christ, in that Christ is quite
clearly of Divine nature but is it as clear that he is of
human nature? Although the comparison is not exact, and in
fact should be avoided, nevertheless, just as the Son of God
is of divine nature it is also necessary to maintain that the
Son of Man is of human nature. What Alexander is avoiding is
Nestorianism or Adoptionism but does he really save the
humanity of Christ?

Alexander's interest in maintaining the Godness of
the Son of God is seen again when it is suggested that the
man assumed is God or God is "that man" : "Dicendum quod
Deus non assumpsit 'aliquem hominem'; et tamen 'aliquis
homo' est assumptus, ut patet in rege capiente non liberum,
et tamen liber est assumptus. Dicendum (ergo) assumens
secundum rem non est assumptum, sed tamen secundum rationem

69. 2.4,p.75. 70. 23(L),24(L),p.81.
idem est." 71 Once again in the comments on Augustine's statement "talis fuit suscepsio illa, ut faceret Deum hominem et hominem Deum" and the conclusion "ergo aliquis homo factus est", although quite clearly Alexander is mainly concerned with the refutation of Adoptionism or Nestorianism, yet in the comments it is also evident that he does not see any danger of Monophystism in the conclusion but wishes to prevent any possibility of the idea of the createdness of the Son of God. 72

In distinction VII the possibility that the union may consist of three natures is raised. This would be because there were three substances in Christ, namely, the Divine nature, the spiritual and the bodily. Alexander replies as follows: "quod substantia est nomen naturae, sed natura est nomen compositum ex substantiis." 73 This merely points out the different usages of the word "substance" already noted. In the same distinction there are two quotations from Alanus ab Insulis, the first to the effect that in the union there was a diversity of substances in one and that the property of the natures remained in the union, the second is a long one on various types of unity which includes refutation of Nestorian and Eutychian types of unity. He defines the incarnation as follows: "non fit una natura, sed (uniuntur) in persona praeeexsistenti alteri unitorum et manent naturae distinctae." 74 Alexander also gives two Aristotelian definitions of "unum": "ens indivisum" and so...

71. 5, p. 75. 72. 3, p. 75; Augustine, De Trin. I, c. 13, n. 28: 20(L), pp. 80-81; 44(E), p. 89. 73. d. VII, 5, p. 91. 74. 6, pp. 91-92; Alanus ab Insulis, Reg. theol., reg. 100; also at VI, 42(E), p. 88.
Christ as man and as God would be "unum et unum" yet not two; "ens indivisum et ab aliis divisum" and as such it is the beginning of number and so "bene sequitur" that Christ is "unum et unum" and therefore two "sed primum falsum est." Further on in the distinction any suggestion that the Divine nature is created is denied when it is stated that when it unites it does not become the union which is a created thing. All this helps to build up a picture of the union without very much depth.

"Post-Chalcedon"

The centre of Christology is the problem of the personal union. What or who is the person; how are the human and Divine related to the personal? These are questions which might be asked. Definitions of twoness and oneness are not satisfactory until it is stated how two "persons", i.e. man and the Son of God are, in fact, one person in Christ. Unless there is some resolution of this problem one will always be swinging between Monophysitism and Nestorianism. Distinction VI does try to come to terms with this problem. However, earlier, there have been already references to the personal union.

In distinction IV there is a reference to the fact that Christ is "unus" from the "unitas personae humanatae" and not, it would appear, one from the unity of nature or

75. 10, p.93; Aristotle, Metaph. IX, t.9 and t.2.
76. 13, p.94.
one from the unity of the Person of the Trinity which is eternal. 77 (The union is of creation) In "L" this is clarified when it is stated: "ex utraque natura est iste homo; non natura vel persona, sed hypostasis Dei et hominis." It is incidentally noted that the "ex" (at the beginning of the sentence) is not univocal "nec concedendum est quod genuit ex utraque vel ex altera." 78 At this early stage there appears to be a distinction between person and hypostasis and the suggestion that the hypostatic union is "human" and therefore, in a sense at least, it is not from eternity. This throws some doubt on the doctrine of the Trinity and suggests once again that God cannot be involved in His own creation.

In distinction VI this problem of the contrast of person and the hypostasis again arises. It is suggested that there were two persons in Christ, one of eternal origin and one individuated by his temporal origin in Mary and by his properties, thus making a "individuitas hypostasis" which is a person and therefore a person, it is argued, was assumed. This suggestion is rejected by Alexander for although there was a "individuitas hypostaseos" yet this is not a person for "non omnis individuitas hypostaseos facit personam, sed excellens proprietas." 79 This is anti-Nestorian but what is of especial interest here is the fact that "person" is distinguished from "hypostasis" by its "excellens proprietas". This distinction is again made later:

"Substantia in qua est proprietas et sic dicitur hypostasis; sed substantia in qua est proprietas excellens est persona". 80 The Son of God and the man assumed have the same collection of properties 81 and these properties derive from the Son of God because "proprietas originis est dignior" 82 and whatever the Son of God has through nature the Son of Man has through grace. 83 The fact that the Son of Man's properties are founded in the Son of God's does not take away his personality but founds it in a more worthy one. 84 "et ita homo ille secundum divinae personae proprietatem est persona". 85

(Later some idea of how Alexander views the "communicatio idiomatum" is stated. He begins with the rule "quidquid dicitur de Filio Dei, et de isto homine". In "AE" the comment is: "quod illa praedicta quae conveniunt per gratiam, dicuntur de isto homine simpliciter, non tamen de Filio Dei, ut praedestinatus, adoptivus; sed illa praedicta quae insunt per naturam, simpliciter conveniunt Filio Dei, ut passus, natus". 86 In "L" it is pointed out that the rule is appropriate to those properties predicated through nature. Predicates through grace such as "adoptivus" and "praedestinatus" are not appropriate to the Son of God because they are related to created grace and are convenient to the Son of Man: those related to uncreated grace such as "praedestinatio dicit ut datio" are convenient to the Son of God. 87 In distinction V Alexander points out that it does not follow that the Divine

80. 20, p.64. 81. Anselm, De Incarnatione Verbi, cap.6. 82. 24(L), p.66. See also 47(E), pp.71-72. 83. 44(L), p.70. 84. d.V, 47(E), c)p.72; 45(L), p.71. In distinction V, 14, p.62 in a quotation from John of Damascus enhypostasia is present but as Alexander does not appear to use it for this purpose and because of Alexander's view of hypostasis very little can be made of the Damascens's statement. 85. Ibid.(L). 86. d.X, 2, c)p.115. 87. 10(L), p.117.
nature suffers because the Person receives the "idiomata" of the human nature because human nature is not united "in divinam naturam" but "in divinam personam". 88 This of course avoids patripassion but Alexander has doubts also about the Person suffering too.)

The doctrine of enhypostasia bases the humanity of Christ in the Person of the Son of God as the ground of the union (although Alexander does this only in regard to properties and from the parenthesis above it is clear that not all human properties are included which would suggest that properties are not a very good basis for the personal union - they suggest two persons not one person). Yet one cannot be quite as happy about Alexander's distinction between person and hypostasis nor about the possibly implied absorption of the properties of the Son of Man in the excellent properties of the Son of God. What is the hypostasis in Alexander? Does hypostasis find its basis in the Divine hypostasis? If this is so, as the doctrine of enhypostasia maintains, why has a distinction been made between the person and the hypostasis? No light is thrown on this problem in distinction V and clarification is found in distinction VI. All that can be noted at this point is that, when it is suggested that by the fact of Christ's birth from Mary and by his peculiar properties, the hypostasised individual was a person, Alexander did not actually answer this by stating that the person was founded in the Person

88. d.V,16,b)p.62.
of the Son of God, but stated rather that person and hypostasis were different and that the latter was not a person. This leaves open the question as to what the hypostasis is and what the relation between the person and the hypostasis is. It may be noted that "L" and "E" do not make use of this distinction in distinction V. The suggestion that the human element, that is, the body and soul with its properties, is a "quaedam personalitas", and the conclusion that because the Son of God assumed this, a person assumed a person, are rejected in "L" because the "personalitas" with its more excellent properties is not founded in man but in the Son of God. 89 In "E" person and hypostasis appear to be regarded as interchangeable when the union and assumption are discussed: "Assumptio propter reciprocationem et actum, personae attribuitur: unitio vero est naturae ad naturam in persona sive hypostasi, et definitur sic; unio est duarum naturarum in unam conceptio. Item, assumptio notat ordinem, unio non." 90 This separation of "L" and "E" from "AE" does not apply in distinction VI where there is the main discussion on the hypostatic union. With this discussion the centre of Christology is reached and the conclusion of the chapter which began with the assumption.

In distinction VI in relation to the hypostatic union the problem of composition arises. Peter Lombard had mentioned that the union was in one composite hypostasis of the Son of God (following John of Damascus) but John had

89. 24(L),p.66. 90. 51(E),p.73.
refuted the idea that there then would be one composed will for the "idiomata" such as the creatable and uncreatable would then be interchangeable and Christ's will would be separated from the Father's will: "Reliquitur igitur dicere solam hypostasim Christi compositam et communem naturarum et naturalium eius." 91 For John, in the Latin "hypostasis" and "persona" appear interchangeable, and in the Greek "hypostasis" is the word constantly used and occasionally the word "prosopon" to mean "person". 92 However, in Alexander, "hypostasis" and "persona" are distinguished, for example: "persona est hypostasis distincta per proprietatem dignitatis; hypostasis est existentia incommunicabilis ex quibuscumque individuantibus, supposita essentia. Unde omnis persona est hypostasis, et non convertitur." 93 (Thus hypostasis is substance (existentia); person is substance plus properties. This definition of hypostasis is from Richard of St. Victor rather than from Boethius. The comment of Alexander came after a quotation from Richard of St. Victor to the effect that in God there are a plurality of persons in one substance; in Christ a plurality of substances in one person. 94 Here Alexander follows Richard in the use of "existentia" where Boethius had used "substantia" more

91. John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., c.14; d.VI,12,pp.77-78. 92. K.Rozemond, La Christologie de Saint Jean Damascene, makes this clear. 93. 13,p.78. 94. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit.,LV,c.25. In dist. IV,18,p.63 Richard's definition of person with the substitution of "existentia" for "substantia" had already appeared (without comment from Alexander). This substitution was significant but does not appear to affect Alexander much e.g. in 41(L),pp.69-70 the definition is seen in Boethian terms of singularity, incommunicability, and dignity.
or less as the equivalent of "hypostasis". (This usage escapes the generic overtones of "substantia" which are found in Boethius.) The fact that the "person" of Christ is the "person" of the Godhead means for Alexander that the person cannot be composed with anything else and therefore the composition must be based in the hypostasis (whatever it is). How does Alexander develop this? Twice Jerome is quoted to the effect that Christ as Son of God cannot be thought of as changeable, temporal or able to suffer (passible). These are the basic reasons Alexander has against the composition in the person of the Son of God but in "AE" there is no discussion of the statements. However in "L" and "E" there is extensive comment on the idea of composition.

"Compositio ista intelligitur de hypostasi, non de persona; et de hypostasi humanae naturae, quod est composita divinae personae, id est in eamdem personam unita. Nam compositum dicitur duplicetur; vel ex aliis constitutum, vel aliis unitum praeexistenti. Divina autem persona simplex est... Est igitur compositio praedicta ex parte humanae hypostasis. Cum enim hypostasis sit persona et non convertitur, quia persona est nomen dignitatis, ut patet per definitionem: "Persona est hypostasis distincta per proprietatem dignitatis"; 'hypostasis est existentia incommunicabilis ex quibuscumque individuantibus supposita essentiae." Persona namque plus se habet ad supernexcellentem formam, hypostasis prout dicit comparationem ad omnes proprietates aggregatas. Unde Hieronymous..."

This seems to indicate that the composition (which presumably is the union) is based on the human nature which would then mean that the possibility of the incarnation lies in humanity

95. Jerome, Epist.9,nn.10-12; 11,p.77.
96. d. VI,32(L),pp.84-85.
and not in the Trinity, the creation being at the advantage in that it can change. Yet that is not a deduction that Alexander would want to make, at least, in "E". It is stated there that because components are "prior" to the composition it cannot be concluded that humanity is then prior to the Person of Christ since one is temporal and the other is eternal. Therefore the composition is not from humanity. The comment on this is: "non est hypostasis composita ex humanitate simpliciter, sed quoad hoc, quod habet proprietates individuantes hypostasim humanam. Fuit enim ante perfecta hypostasis et non ut possibilis ad ulteriorem individuatem." 97 One still wants to know where the "original" hypostasis came from. (This is not unsimilar to the question J.N.D.Kelly would ask of Nestorius.)

It is extraordinarily difficult to understand the above argument. If there is a consistency in this intricate argument this writer has not been able to find the clue but in broad outline it does appear that Alexander sees Christ in some way as three: a hypostasis, a person of which the hypostasis is the basis, and the human nature. What this "hypostasis" is (apart from the person) is almost impossible to define or conceive; it is not human for that would give priority to the human; it is not Divine (and yet with the added properties it is - or with composition made, the unity is in the Person) because the Divine cannot be subject to

97. 48(E), pp.89-90.  
composition; it may be something created at the incarnation in which there can be composition which implies change (this one would tend to favour from the fact that union is stated to be created - which creates difficulties in basing the union in the Person of the Son of God by whom the humanity is made real man i.e. the doctrine of enhypostasis); it may be a somewhat clumsy device to get round the impossible solution of the "tertium quid". There is indeed a very serious problem here. If hypostasis plus properties make up a person, then hypostasis plus human properties would make up a person and the hypostasis plus Divine properties would make up a person. The fact that the created nature of the hypostasis would then apparently base the Son of God (and the union, which Alexander nevertheless denies) in the person of man would make for Nestorianism. Alexander, however, avoids affirming two persons based on the one hypostasis by stating (as has been seen earlier) that the human properties are taken up by the "excellent properties" of the Person of the Son of God (i.e. the person of Christ is the Person of the Son of God). How one avoids stating, then, that the man and the Son are the one and the same is difficult to see. Of course, Alexander does maintain certain human properties are not to be attributed to the Son of God but then one is faced with more problems - once again a Nestorianism, even if a pale copy, (because the hypostasis remains created), and a pale "sort of" man with "left over" properties but with some human ones apparently absorbed into
the Divine - otherwise why bother about the idea of "excellent properties?"

In John of Damascus the composition of the Divine and the human in the person of Christ did not involve a change in the Divine; he maintained the "without confusion, change, separation, or division" of Chalcedon. It was the Person of the Son of God who made the composition as well as being the base of the humanity, that is, the union was the work of God completely. Nevertheless the Godhead was protected, in his teaching, against humanisation. But by Alexander's time it appears that "composition" has won out in its implications of change so that the Person could not be composed with the human as this inevitably would have involved humanisation, making the uncreated created. The possibilities are then Nestorianism, Adoptionism, and Monophysitism of either kind, that is, divinisation or humanisation (which is Alexander's bête noir). These, however, are not real possibilities as they are heresies. As has been noted, Alexander greatly fears humanisation, and with this there is also some doubt as to Christ's link with humanity in general (this will become even more marked as the discussion proceeds). There is a strong emphasis on the fact that the person of Christ is the Divine Person so that the human properties tend to be absorbed in to the "more worthy" Divine properties. In the discussion on the hypostasis, as a result of the fear of composition in relation to the Divine Person there arises a serious doubt whether the possibility of the union has been placed in the Word of God. Alexander's solution appears to be
to put forward a rather shadowy "hypostasis" as the basis of both the Son of God and the Son of Man. He does this basically on Boethius' presupposition and definition of "person-hypostasis" and substance which must be separated from God.

Perhaps Alexander should be allowed to sum up himself. He states that "esse" is "naturale, et morale, et rationale." Christ as person is "morale"; as human nature he is "naturale"; as essence he is "rationale". Christ is one as man and God and as such he is "morale"; "naturale" he is two as there are two natures; and "rationale" he is not "quid" but "quale". 99 The parallel in "L" relates "individuum" to "ratio", "suppositum" or "subiectum" to human nature. In relation to "esse rationis" Christ is "enus" and not "unum cum essentia qua est homo." 100 That means that Christ had his being as man only in the event of the incarnation. As is usual, Alexander is eager to establish this fact (against Nestorianism or Adoptionism) but he may lose sight of the fact that the "Word became flesh", that is, man and humanity. Another parallel in "L" puts it more satisfactorily: "Secundum esse rationale, quaecumque adiciuntur hypostasi Filii Dei, quae est quasi socies, individuantia sunt. Sic et humanitas et eius accidentia sunt accidentalia hypostasis divinae." This however, is not to be interpreted in an Adoptionist sense, Alexander warns. 101 This gives a definite place to the humanity, and incidentally the use of "hypostasis" here is

99. d.VI,18,p.80. 100. 25(L),b)p.82. 101.38(L),p.87.
apparently in the orthodox tradition. However, there is
the qualification that there is still a distinction between
the person as "morale" and essence as "rationale". In the
same section as the above quotation Alexander still makes the
threefold distinction about Christ, "naturale, morale,
rationale" and in relation to the person and essence which
correspond to the last two he states: "Persona res moris est,
quia dicit proprietatem dignitatem; personaliter loqui de
ipso, est loqui moraliter. Quando autem loquimur secundum
essentiam quae est homo, cum sit communis forma rationis,
rationaliter loquimur." Yet another parallel passage is
found in distinction VII:

"ita quasi tria principia inveniuntur in
Christo: suppositum vel subiectum, substantia prima
et persona. Moraliter persona primum est in
sustinendo; naturaliter, subiectum, id est anima et
corpus: deitas namque non est in ratione subiecti;
secundum vero rationem, substantia prima sive iste
homo; est namque medium per communicantem inter
praedicta duo." 102

This "substantia prima" here must be identical to Alexander's
hypostasis which indeed is elsewhere described as
"substantia" 103 an identification which Boethius had made.
The fact that Christ can also be viewed "rationale" ("prima
substantia" or "iste homo") as well as morally-personally, indicates
that it is in this element that there is communication between
the Son of God and humanity, indeed, the word "medium" is
used. This quotation seems to sum up succinctly and
adequately Alexander's position and consequently also reveals

102. d.VII,25(L),p.98. 103. dist.V,20,p.64. (See above
note 80).
its basic lack of orthodoxy. It is not enhypostatic in the traditional sense of that doctrine. One cannot help feeling that a type of Nestorianism is the result.

There must be doubts here in two ways: firstly, how far did the Word take on our humanity, and become "sin for us"; and secondly, did the humanity have any real basis in the Divine condescension, that is, can Alexander really say "the Word became flesh", man like man. If there is any doubt on this basis, which is the Divine creativity, there must be doubt in another way: whether full humanity in Christ is established in a system which avoids Nestorianism and Adoptionism which do attribute full humanity to Christ. Further one wonders whether the "more excellent" properties of the Son of God, which are also man's, are any more than a "quasi" in relation to man, that is, to be regarded as man's but not really his for it would appear (as will be clearer) that the Person can have very little to do with human nature in Alexander's system. Altogether, the discussion of properties is quite inadequate in establishing Christ's humanity. In this system, the humanity may be only a humanity of convenience. This means that it was required to act for and towards God in satisfaction for original sin but it was not required to act for and towards man in justification and sanctification for which end Christ must be in every way man, except for his sin. It is Alexander's failure to accept the "humanity of God" (that is, God as Trinity in revelation, and the consequent full humanity of Jesus Christ based in this creative revelation)
which is really the weakness of his Christology. This fact will become more evident in the following chapters.

Summary

One of the problems of Alexander's discussion of the incarnation is the meaning of the word 'natura'. This is seen particularly in the first part of the discussion, "Post Nicaea". A summary of that part perhaps can best be given by a discussion of the usages of 'natura', particularly in relation to 'essentia'. In understanding the discussion a cursory account of the period 'Nicaea-post Nicaea' might be of help.

The controversy of Nicaea revolved around the homoousios but even after Nicaea there was doubt about the meaning of ousia in spite of the fact that Arianism was repudiated. According to J.D.N. Kelly 104 ousia meant substance, fundamental significance, being, essence, or reality. It was sometimes understood in a generic sense, that is, it stood for the universal, the class to which a number of individuals belonged. This was Aristotle's secondary substance. Thus if one did not hold to the belief in one God, Nicaea could be interpreted tritheistically. However, sometimes the dominant meaning of ousia was "individual", that is, it referred to a particular entity regarded as the subject of qualities (a numeric sense).

104. J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp.243-244.
This was Aristotle's primary substance. And finally, ousia could mean just matter or stuff (in stoic thinking). The second understanding of ousia was very prominent in the patristic period and was often, for all practical purposes, the equivalent of hypostasis, i.e. 'object' or 'person' in discussions of the Trinity. Thus in discussions it could carry the idea of person (three ousiai) and also the idea of substance or essence.

When physis was to come into use it often carried with it the generic sense of ousia. However, physis did not become prominent till later in the fourth century. At Nicaea homoousios was certainly understood by many in a generic sense and for others ousia may have been related to the idea of one individual thing. Certainly before Nicaea in both secular Greek and theology ousia was commonly used in a generic sense and the probability is that it continued in this sense in the homoousios. Nicaea, however, could not be interpreted tritheistically simply because the presupposition of both Arians and anti-Arians was one God. Therefore, it would appear that the latter meaning of homoousios as "identical in essence", that is, the numeric understanding, was practically inevitable. At the Council of Sardica (343) it was given a numeric understanding.

This numeric understanding of ousia (best translated in Latin as essentia - Alexander's usage - but customarily translated substantia) persisted for a long time afterwards and persisted probably beyond the time of Chalcedon. The word physis (Latin, natura) which was frequently associated with it,
particularly in the latter part of the fourth century, never seemed to gain a fixed meaning and even when approximated to ousia it seemed to retain the generic sense.

The word appears to have gained prominence in the latter part of the fourth century and became notorious at least with Apollinarius. However, the Cappadocians and Didymus (d. 398) used ousia and physis apparently identically. It seems unlikely that this usage was consciously generic for Gregory of Nyssa then could well be accused of tritheism which would be grossly unfair, as this was far from his intention.

The Alexandrian school, with which Apollinarius had some affinity, used physis in another sense in which it approximated to the meaning of hypostasis which had been detached from ousia in 363. Thus Cyril of Alexandria is found using the word physis in much the same sense as hypostasis in his Christological thinking. However, after about 430 hypostasis was equated with prosopon whilst physis referred to the divinity and the humanity of Christ (viz. Theodoret of Cyrus). Thus by the time of Chalcedon physis had a relationship with ousia without possessing its more precise meaning. In other words, it could be either numeric or generic with the latter sense evidently predominating.

In the meantime, of course, Latin theology developed a parallel vocabulary. Tertullian created unending problems for subsequent Latin theology when, instead of translating ousia with essentia, he translated it with substantia which was the exact equivalent of hypostasis which was eventually
distinguished from ousia in Greek theology. Tertullian understood substantia both numerically and generically. Augustine and Leo's Tome later, however, referred to natures as substances and thus did not seem to distinguish them. (Augustine also used substantia to mean person, a usage which Boethius followed approximately. Both usages are found in Alexander). So it would appear that the Latins may have approached Chalcedon identifying substantia and natura, whereas the Greeks distinguished, at least to some extent, ousia and physis. The Definition of Chalcedon identified prosopon and hypostasis (persona and hypostasis) and distinguished them from physis (natura).

The different approaches of the Greeks and Latins makes it difficult to come to a firm conclusion on the precise meaning of the terms "of one substance" (with Godhead and manhood) and "in two natures". Possibly the Latins thought in generic terms and G.L.Prestige thinks that from Cyril of Alexandria onwards the Greeks thought also in generic terms of homoousios. One would imagine that the "in two natures" would be susceptible to generic understanding but, at least from the Greek side, it is difficult to believe that homoousios became simply generic. One would suspect that, as at the Council of Nicaea, different people put different interpretations on the terms. The Latins identified the terms and Greeks like John of Damascus

and Leontius of Byzantium later were apparently equating ousia and physis. There does not seem to be any reason why either word should have been interpreted exclusively either generically or numerically although the tendency of physis (and natura) to be generic would mean that view would be retained (as presumably the tendency of ousia to be numeric would be retained). Boethius, whose work influenced later scholars, declared that essentia (or natura) equalled ousia, which is a usage Alexander takes over.

When one comes to Alexander of Hales we find that he uses essentia as the equivalent of ousia in the numeric sense; he uses natura as the equivalent of essentia but he also uses it with the generic patristic meaning of physis e.g. man is of human nature but he is not human essence, that is, all humanity. He may even use natura like Cyril when he sees it encompassing body and soul. This latter usage is unimportant.

To review Alexander's usage in more detail. Twice Alexander equates natura and essentia, the first time when he is discussing the assumption and denies that nature assumes, and the second time when he states that one cannot say the Divine nature is "born" as it can be said to be "incarnate". In the latter case he seems implicitly to admit that one can say that the Divine nature is incarnate which he denies in the first instance. However, the direction in both cases is the same - away from any possibility that God might be changed or created. It is right and proper that he should avoid this possibility in order to maintain
the integrity of God, the essence of God; that is one of
the intentions of Trinitarian theology. Yet there is another
reason for his hesitation at stating that the nature is
incarnate or the nature assumes the human nature and it is
seen in the fact that he distinguishes between assuming and
uniting and is eager to bring out this difference. He does
not state what should be stated, that the very nature of
God is involved in the incarnation through the Person of the
Son. It is necessary to state that the nature of God is
united to the human nature in the Person in order to avoid
the humanisation of God or the absorption of human nature
in divine. However, Alexander need not have hesitated to
state that through the Person the nature and essence of God
is involved in man's history, that is, God came right into
history in the man Jesus. Alexander, here with a numeric
understanding of essentia and natura allows God as the "One",
infinite and immutable, to dominate his thinking. This is
seen particularly in his anti-monophysitism.

When the human nature, as opposed to the divine
nature, is discussed, a change takes place in the definition
of natura. Here essentia and natura are differentiated.
Essentia is "secundum esse" and "natura respicit rem in fieri".
This would correspond roughly to the difference between the
numeric and the generic views. He makes this distinction in
order to avoid Nestorianism and Adoptionism which might be
supported if one were to say that human essence were assumed,
that is, if something already created, already "there",
humanity, was brought into unity with the human nature, or
performed some independent role in the hypostatic union after the fashion of Nestorianism. Alexander makes a "break" between God and Christ when he distinguishes between nature and Person. Now he makes a "break" between Christ and men or humanity by distinguishing between nature and essence.

Of this he is fully aware and states clearly when refuting the suggestion that divine nature was a person and human nature was a person. His answer, referred to above, will now be given in full as it is revealing. "In Deo idem est 'quod est' et 'quo est'; unde haec vera: 'divina natura est Deus'. Sed in homine differt 'quod est' et 'quo est'; unde human natura non est homo." 106 Admittedly the community between Christ and man (generic) is different from the community of Christ and God (numeric) but the formula of Chalcedon was not concerned to state this and in fact came up with precisely the opposite conclusion to that of Alexander immediately above. It was concerned to state the involvement of both God and man to the full in Jesus Christ. Later in the Glossa, as has been noted, Alexander makes the same distinction to guard against Monophysitism.

Another interesting occurrence of natura is found when Alexander both from the side of God and from the side of man distinguishes between essence and nature: essence is "quo res est" and nature is "ut quae fit". In other words he uses the generic meaning of nature in both cases. Previously in one case at least he had appeared willing to understand nature as essence in the union if not to see them

106. d.V,6,p.59. He also gives a number of different uses of "natura" without expanding on the various usages. 9,p.60.
in the uniting. In this case, however, when it is suggested that because there are two natures there then are two essences, he replies that there are neither two essences nor one essence. If one said one or the other the accusation of either Nestorianism or Monophysitism could immediately arise. Here he is not even prepared to state what he had previously implied (although he had hesitated to state) that the essence of God is found in the hypostatic union as one of the two natures in the Person of the Son. One can still see his presuppositions at work: Christ must be kept at arm's length from humanity, and the essence of God must not be too closely involved in Christ. In short behind his lies the presupposition of God as the "One".

This most important presupposition is also seen at work in other sections of the first part of the chapter, notably in the discussion on latria and dulia, and in the discussion on the question which Peter Lombard asked whether Christ as a man was a person. In both discussions the "God" is separated from the "man".

Whatever Alexander opposes he fails to state what the definition of Chalcedon set out to state, namely, that Christ was "complete in Godhead and complete in manhood", that he was "truly man and truly God". The "of one substance" and "in two natures" are ways of adding force to this belief. To be sure, in patristic thought ousia: substance (essence), physis: natura, had different meanings and Alexander reflects these meanings in his usage. But, and this is the significant thing, the Definition of Chalcedon did not point out
differences, and most importantly, did not distinguish between the relation of the divine nature to the divine substance or essence and the relation between the human nature to the human substance or essence. This is true whether or not there was a distinction of nature and substance, and even if the Fathers, as seems likely, were aware that the community of God and divine nature, and man and human nature were different. What the Definition of Chalcedon did do was to say that Christ was fully and really God, and fully and really man. Both man and God, divinity and humanity, the essences of both were involved in Jesus Christ. That Alexander fails to state this fully and satisfactorily is due not only to difficulty in terminology but also to a presupposition which, if present at Chalcedon, was suppressed, namely, God as the "incommunicable One".

Towards the end of his Treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius Boethius (480-524) asked this question: "What we have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two natures were combined into one substance." 107 Unfortunately the answer, which Boethius' position has not made clear, is not given. And the answer would have been important in view of his understanding of his definition of person as "naturae rationabilis individua substantia." "Person cannot in any case be applied to universals, but only to particulars and individuals; for there is no person of a man if animal or general: only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other

single individuals are termed persons." 108 This does not sound very near to the patristic understanding of the person of Christ which was described as "of one substance" with the Father. But Boethius' use of "substantia" removes his definition of person from the patristic view of the person of Christ. "Since subsistences are present in universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly give the name hypostasis to subsistences which acquired substance through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any care will substance and subsistence appear identical." 109 Thus a division is driven between the universal subsistence and the hypostasis - one would think directly opposite in intention to the Greek Fathers at least. It is not altogether clear whether Boethius equates person with hypostasis or substance with hypostasis; he seems to vary somewhat. What is clear, however, is the fact that in the way that Boethius sees individuality in the person or the hypostasis, one will be inevitably forced to define person in terms of that individuality and not in terms of subsistence or relationship. (He seems, in fact, almost to have come to a numeric understanding of "person" when, actually, neither a numeric nor a generic understanding can be had of "person". It appears that substance = nature has possibly been confused with substance = person (both western usages) so that the generic understanding of substance = nature is transferred to the understanding of substance =

person (an Augustinian usage). Beyond this there appears to be more emphasis on the singular than on the genus with the result that an almost numeric understanding is given to substance = person. This understanding in the Greek and Latin fathers had been previously given to the substance = essence in which the three Persons of the Trinity participated.) This will mean that the person of Christ will not be defined in terms of the Trinity but in terms of himself, one might almost say in terms of self-consciousness. From Boethius then comes a concentration on this individuated substance, as well as a possible distinction between person and hypostasis (although, in Boethius, this does not appear to be very important.)

With the concentration on the individuated substance he was not able, apparently, to get beyond stating the fact that there were two natures in one person. For instance: "For how great and unprecedented a thing it is... that the nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by conjunction a single person." 110 This sounds very much as if the person is the result of the union. This impression is given support when he likens the union to a crown or gold and gems. The crown consists in and of the gold and the gems. Then in explanation of this he states that Christ consists "in the two natures because both continue, of the two because the one person of Christ is formed by the union of the two continuing natures." 111 It seems

almost contradictory when he says this person completes the number of the Trinity. 112 So it is not without reason that one would wish to ask the question of Boethius which was given at the beginning of this particular section.

Before the development of this viewpoint is discussed the patristic - the fourth century - view of hypostasis-person should be given to put the discussion in greater perspective. This will be done by means of three quotations from historians of early Church doctrine, all of whom give substantially the same viewpoint. The Council of Alexandria (362) understood hypostasis as "the separate subsistence of the three Persons in the consubstantial Triad." 113 The word person always distinguishes "status, or character, or part or function" and the attention is not fixed on the subject or agent. "It is always a person looked at from some distinctive point of view, a person in particular circumstances; that is, it conveys the notion much more of environment than of the subjective." 114 In a view of hypostasis "the emphasis lay not on content, but on externally concrete independence; objectivity, that is to say, in relation to other objects. Thus when the doctrine of the Trinity finally came to be formulated as one ousia in three hypostaseis, it implied that God, regarded from the point of view of internal analysis, is one object, but that, regarded from the point of view of external presentation, He is three objects; His unity being safeguarded by the doctrine that these three objects of

presentation are not precisely similar, as the semi-Arians
were early willing to admit, but in a true sense, identically
one." 115 Thus with the Boethian definition the middle ages
had to try to be true to this view of God which, in effect,
in one way, said precisely the opposite to that definition.

When one approaches the time of Alexander a significant
figure in view of his influence was Richard of St. Victor
(died 1173) in his De Trinitate. In the definition of
person by Boethius Richard substituted the word "exsistentia"
for the word "substantia" for, he argued, nothing in God (as Person)
could be conceived as a substance. 116 This was because,
according to Boethius, substance could belong only to
individuals and not to genus or species. Thus Richard was
returning to a more patristic view of person by repudiating
the division which Boethius had made between subsistence and
substance, between genus and individual.

Duns Scotus (1266-1308) took up Richard's lead.
He accepted Richard's substitution of existence for
substance and defined person with Richard as "intellectualis
naturae incommunicabilis existentia" and said that through
this definition Richard expounded "vel corrigitur definitio
Boetii dicentis quod "Persona est rationalis naturae individua
substantia" "because then the soul could be called a person
and Deity also: "et etiam non conveniet propre Deo, quia
individuum non est nisi ubi est dividuum." 117 Earlier Duns
Scotus had indicated his precise meaning and clearly

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117. Synthesis Theologica II, BK,12,q.33,p.604.
distinguished his view from that of Boethius when he said "persona nihil est nisi essentia cum proprietate incommunicabili." 118 Thus the distinction between substance and subsistence (or "personalitas" which Duns uses as its equivalent - a word Alexander uses) is minimal and in his thought: "la subsistence est concue comme ne se distinguant pas reellement de la nature concrete, à laquelle elle ajoute simplement la negation de dependance vis-à-vis d'une realite". 119 Thus the union of natures can be founded in the Person of the Trinity who is a person because he is independent or incommunicable vis-à-vis the other Persons. For this same reason the human nature is not a person because it is dependent upon the Divine Person: "Dependentia naturae creatae ad personam divinam, quae citra omnem imperfectionem, dat subsistentiam naturae creatae carenti propria personalitate et subsistentia, et ideo est dependens ad alienam personalitatem, qua subsistit, perinde ac si propriam personalitatem haberet." 120

It is into this context, that is between Richard of St. Victor and Duns Scotus, that Alexander (and incidentally Thomas Aquinas 121) comes. Alexander uses certain language, indeed a great deal of language, found in the Richard of St. Victor - Duns Scotus stream of thought. He uses Richard's definition of person (and indeed adds "supposita essentia"); he uses the word "personalitas"

which Duns Scotus equated to "subsistentia", and like the later Franciscan he finds the subsistence of man not in man but in the Son of God (and thus uses the doctrine of enhypostasia); he quotes, at least in passing, John of Damascus' doctrine of enhypostasia; and he also, rather unsatisfactorily, understands the human properties as being founded in the more excellent properties of the Son of God.

When all this has been stated, however, it must be said that, by and large, Alexander is more influenced by Boethius' definition of person. He is able, so it would appear, to combine this latter definition and the view of Richard - Duns Scotus, by making a great deal of the distinction between "persona" and "hypostasis", a distinction which can be traced in the thought of Boethius. Thus he retains the Boethian idea of "substantia" in the word "hypostasis". This is seen when he states that "iste homo" is not based in the nature or person but in the "hypostasis of God and man"; again he is under Boethian influence when he states that "composition is understood in relation to hypostasis, not in relation to person" and he goes beyond Boethius (but perhaps not his implication) when he states that composition is understood "in relation to the hypostasis of the human nature" - although he does not want to say what this appears to say; and finally, when he speaks of the "substantia prima" - (a significant Aristotelianism with a numeric sense) - ("secundum rationem") as the "medium per communicantem" between the "suppositum vel subiectum" ("naturaliter") and the "persona" ("moraliter").
When Alexander understands hypostasis or substance in this way one comes back to Boethius' question posed at the beginning of this section: "What we have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two natures were combined into one substance." This question takes one further back to Nestorius and the doubt that J.N.D. Kelly raises about that theologian's view that the two natures were found in the common "prosopon" of the historical Christ. He questions whether this view was "really adequate. All that it in fact amounted to was the truism that Jesus Christ, the historical figure, was a single object of presentation, a concrete psychological unity. The real problem, however, especially for one who set the independence and completeness of the natures so much in the foreground, was to explain what constituted His Person, the metaphysical subject of His being, and this Nestorius's theory hardly touched." 122

This is an important problem to answer for basically it involves the question "is man saved by grace alone or by his own works?" If grace is not seen as the lone factor in the incarnation then one seems impelled towards Arianism, Pelagianism, and Adoptionism, as well as Nestorianism. Alexander was working within inadequate concepts which forced him into unsatisfactory solutions but he does, at least, avoid stating that union is based in the capacity of humanity although he comes close to doing so. He was nearer the point when he came to the word "persona" itself, but even here, when

he unites the properties too closely, he comes near to Monophysitism. He had to bring the properties together for, if he had admitted two sets of properties, then, according to the Boethian definition of person as "an individual substance of rational nature" he would have posited two persons for there is nothing to exclude the possibility of a common substance in the definition. This position would be close to the actual position of Nestorius.

The Boethian definition, because it inevitably tends to disassociate the historical Christ from the Trinity, also tends to move towards the heresies already mentioned. The doctrine of the Trinity is the basic doctrine of Christianity and therefore also the basic doctrine for Christology. This is so simply because it defends the position that God is a God of grace, and that this God reveals his grace in his Son Jesus Christ who, in this grace, assumed humanity and so formed one person with two natures. Unless one links the doctrine of the Person of Christ closely with the doctrine of the Trinity, that is, unless one regards them as inseparable and complementary, one moves away from the concept of a God, full of grace and mercy. The Boethian definition begins this separation, and Alexander in using its presuppositions moves away from the concept of the God of grace.

In this chapter criticism has been made of Alexander's failure to state that in the Person of the Son the very essence or nature of God came into our humanity, that is, the failure to link the doctrine of the Trinity
with Christology. Perhaps, however, there has not been sufficient said of the importance of the distinction between nature and person which Alexander does make. Although the early church was at pains to state that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were of the one substance or essence (and this is why one can say that in the Son the being of God was present in our humanity), this does not mean that the Son was the substance, or the Father or the Spirit was the substance. This would have been a form of Sabellianism. It is in regard to this error that the distinction of nature and person is important. In Trinitarian theology the distinction helps one avoid this error of Sabellianism. (Presumably "Jesus worship" in our modern era makes this error.)

In Christology the distinction protects one against patripassianism and more importantly Monophysitism or apparent Monophysitism. When one states that when God assumed human nature in the Person of the Son the natures of God and man were united in an unique way, perhaps one is not saying anything particularly intelligible because it is extraordinarily hard to pinpoint the difference between nature and person. But that way of saying it does seem to have some point if the assumption is described in terms of nature, that is, divine nature assumed human nature so that two natures were united in an unique way. This has its problems. First, is "all" God in Christ; that is, can we say anything beyond his person, for instance, on creation? Second, what makes the union unique? Third, and in connection with the second question, if it is the divine nature (or even if it is not)
how can one say that two natures are united in one nature (or one "something") without apparently being Monophysite?

To emphasise the distinction between nature and person, difficult as it is to conceive when one gets down to considering in relation to the Person of Christ, seemingly is a necessity, in order to avoid the above dilemmas. To make such a distinction is the way of Chalcedon (which did not explain it at all). The distinction enables one to state, in a better way than if the distinction is not emphasised, that Jesus Christ is one without stating that the two natures became one. The doctrine of enhypostasia would then appear to be necessary to avoid a modified Nestorianism (the position evidently held by Nestorius himself).

Alexander, for reasons already given, was unable to use this doctrine.

At the Reformation and after, this dilemma arose again between the Lutherans ("Monophysites") and the Calvinists ("Nestorians"). One can sympathise with the Lutherans when one reads the work of Alexander of Hales but it has also to be admitted that Alexander has a considerable point in his fear of Monophysitism (even if it is the fear of humanisation).
CHAPTER 3

GRACE AND JESUS CHRIST

i) The three graces and the fulness of grace.

Fairly early in the Christological discussion Alexander touches on the grace in Christ. There were three types of grace in Christ: one which is in every man through presence, power, and essence; inhabiting grace; and the grace of union. 1 In "L" it is stated that the grace of union is "quodam modi naturalis ratione inseparabilitatis" which makes the union a reality. There was also a grace "ad opus post unionem" which is that "qua nullum possit admittere peccatum." 2 This could be the inhabiting grace which was mentioned above in "AE".

It is in distinctions XII and XIII, that the first major discussion of the grace in Jesus Christ is found. On the question as to the greatest grace in Christ Alexander replies "quod ad unionem Dei cum anima sequitur beatitudine; et talis unio: maxima gratia est, quoniam non potest participare a quocumque." 3 However, in the footnote on the same page, the grace of union is said to be greater than "fruitio" or "beatitudo" because the latter is related only to the soul, not to the body, and the former relates to a pure creature whereas union does not. 4 In "L" the graces of "fruitio" and "beatitudo" are compared. It is stated that there was a union of the soul to Divinity from which comes

1. d.IV,10,p.51. 2. 22(L),pp.53-54. 3. d,XIII,1,p.124. 4. Footnote, p.124.
"fruitio" and by the merit of this union Christ had all the "dotes". This he had in common with all saintly souls. There was also a union of Divinity to the body which was "propria" to Christ and this was the cause of "beatitudo" and so it is called the highest grace. ⁵ There are inconsistencies here and "L" appears to contradict "AE" and the footnote which themselves do not seem to be in harmony. It is difficult to come to any definite conclusion except that the footnote appears to imply that the grace of union in Christ is the greatest and unique with the graces of "beatitudo" and "fruitio" the lesser whatever they relate to.

Distinction XIII contains a fuller discussion. Following Augustine Alexander states that Christ's grace is said to be universal, and not particular, "in toto", and not in subdivisions. To understand grace universally is not to see it in relation to one thing alone but in relation to everything. This can be put another way: saints are pre-eminent in one gift; Christ is pre-eminent in all gifts. And in another way: all that the Son of God has through nature the Son of Man has through grace and thus the fulness received through nature was also received through grace. ⁶ So far, then, Christ's grace is seen as different in degree but not in quality from the grace of other men, that is, here is a perfect man but not necessarily Jesus Christ. The next question suggests that because the grace of Christ was creaturely, it was finite and therefore created "ad mensuram".

⁵. 9(L), pp.125-126. ⁶. d,XIII,1, pp.127-128; Augustine, Glossa ordin. on John 3:34.
In commenting Alexander states that there is a twofold measure of grace: either according to the quantity of substance or the quantity of virtue "quae est anima Christi finita secundum substantiam, infinita tamen secundum ea ad quae est. Et similiter gratia quae est in eo secundum divinam naturam est infinita." 7 This would be true of the grace in God and the grace in any man (accepting Alexander's way of viewing grace). It does not say anything in particular on the union. The quantity of virtue, states Alexander, is either according to "species" or "genus"; in Christ all grace was general and so universal. 8 Every creature has grace in finitude and measure; "secundum substantiam mensuram habuit". 9

As yet, although Alexander affirms a great difference between Christ and man, there is only a difference in degree. All men, in Christ, will eventually have his grace but not his uniqueness from which all their grace derives and which will always remain. Alexander, however, is aware of this uniqueness and asserts it when he notes the three types of grace in Christ: "gratia generalis", "gratia inhabitans", and "gratia unionis". 10 These are the same three graces which are mentioned at the beginning of this chapter from an earlier part of the Glossa. By the grace of union Christ is distinguished from other men. This grace by its very name is unique.

The difference between the grace in Christ and the

7. 2,p.128.  8. Footnote,p.128; 21(L),p.135.  9. 21(L), p.135.  10. 3,p.129. In "L" this is the first section.
grace in other men is described in the comparison of the grace and knowledge of Christ with a circle "quod nihil est ibi principium, nihil finis" and the grace and knowledge of other men to angular figures in which there is "aliquid finis et aliquid principium." 11 Again the contrast between Christ's grace and other grace is brought out when it is denied that all graces and the grace of Christ are equal except that they are divided and Christ's is united. Further, it is stated, Christ had the grace which no men could have, namely, the grace of union. 12 In the footnote attached to the end of that section yet another grace is added, namely, the grace of human redemption "per quantitatem maximam" which no creature could ever have. 13 The parallel in "L" seems to combine the grace of union and the grace of redemption for after it has been stated that the sum total of man's graces do not equal the grace of Christ there is added "praeterea, Christus quamdam gratiam habuit, quam nullus habuit, quae summa est gratia redemptionis." 14 This would indicate that the grace of redemption was the same as the grace of union. This coincides with Alexander's position, that is, the incarnation is the means to satisfaction with which redemption would be equated. (There is no indication that "redemption" has any broad meaning.) Of course, there is the possibility that the grace of redemption could be yet another grace besides the grace of union and this would not be incompatible with Alexander's position which allows for

many graces, but it might leave the grace of union a little up in the air, that is, it had no particular task as a grace which would throw doubt on the value of the union as such—of course presumably two different graces could operate in the union and at satisfaction but the two are so closely bound that this would present problems.

At this point it should be asked whether in fact a qualitative distinction between Christ and other men can best be made on the basis of "grace". Certainly Christ, it is stated, had the grace of union which no other man has, but the real distinction between Christ and other men is that in Christ the second Person of the Trinity is present with humanity without separation, division, confusion or change in the one hypostasis which is the second Person himself (and of course this is evidence of the "grace" of God). In other men the Son is present through the Spirit, that is, in Alexander's terms, by grace. In Alexander the implication may be, if grace and the Spirit are approximately the same, that the Son is present in Christ and men merely by the Spirit, the difference being one of degree, not of kind. This is certainly not the intention but the terminology points that way. This problem comes out more clearly in the Quaestiones.

That the union in Christ was unique and had a unique task is affirmed by Alexander but in the affirmation itself there is a severe limitation to the task of the union. "Grace" operates, as it were, besides Christ. It is asked "utrum de plenitudine Christi in eo quod homo accepmus."
It is argued "quod non, videtur, quoniam secundum quod homo
non potest dare gratiam." Alexander concludes "quod non ab
eo effective sumpsimus gratiam in eo quod homo est, sed in
eo quod Deus est solum." 15 The fact that grace comes from
God alone cannot be denied but this answer is unsatisfactory
in that it does not answer the question as to the place and
importance of the humanity of Christ, and, as it stands,
eliminates any need for an incarnation positing, in effect,
a docetic Christ. 16 There is a more careful statement in
"L" which is in line with Alexander's general position:
"effective accipere ab aliquo est dupliciter; vel effective,
et sic solus Creator dat; vel materialiter et quodam modo
effective, et sic a Christo accepimus quia in humana natura
redemit nos; et sic ab ipso accipimus tamquam materialiter." 17
Here it would appear that the grace of union is associated
with the grace of redemption and so Christ has a unique task,
but the task is restricted to that of redemption (which by
implication seems to relate to satisfaction) and effects
full justification and sanctification only indirectly. In
"E"'s parallel it is stated that Christ, as man, communicates
another grace as well as that of redemption, and that is the
grace of the sacraments. 18 This latter may be an all-
inclusive grace or a grace related only to satisfaction.
This problem is discussed in the chapters on the sacraments.
In the discussion on the sacraments the limitation to Christ's
and work is seen more clearly. At this point the inference

15. d.XIII,7,p.130. 16. cf. discussion in this chapter on
Christ as "caput". 17. 23(L),p.136. 18. 42(E),p.141.
would appear to be that the grace of God which works outside the union is beyond the sphere of redemption which demands the humanity of Christ. The "fulness" is received both through the union of man and God and from God alone as the Son of God. This fact is also made clear in the discussion of the sacraments in regard to guilt and forgiveness. That grace works outside the union is also implied in the question whether the angels receive of the fulness of Christ. In "AE" the angels are said not to receive the "gratia in assistendo" from Christ, but they do receive the "gratia in ministrando". In "L" it is stated that they have a twofold grace: one they have "quoad unitatem Trinitatis" which is not changed, and another they have "ex conversatione nobiscum" which comes to them through Christ. Grace thus works independently of Christ except insofar as he brings redemption and then he is the "helper" of grace. Grace, in short, is not completely in Christ. He is, to a great extent, purely a medium of it if anything.

One final element of the grace of Christ already referred to by name is its fulness. It is argued that Christ did not have faith and hope and therefore lacked all the virtues (which are dependent on grace). There are various "fulnesses": of number, perfection, sufficiency, and consummation: "Christus autem non habuit fidem nec spem, quoniam ipsa sunt ad consummationem et eorum quae nondum habentur." Faith and hope speak of a "not yet", an imperfection, as does fear, but Christ was "in via

19. 9, p.130. 20. 25(L), p.136. 21. 4, p.129.
comprehensor", a phrase which now occurs constantly in Alexander. 22 This may arouse some doubt again on the full humanity of Christ because the Bible does speak of - or at the least implies - the faith of Christ, but when faith and hope are seen as signs of imperfection Alexander has little alternative but to reject them as Christ was "in via comprehensor", that is, perfect and sinless man. Alexander's error lies in the fact that for him perfection is associated with timelessness or changelessness, and faith and hope, speaking of time, a "not yet", are therefore imperfections. But in that case nothing in time could be perfect, that is, time and change themselves would be imperfection. In "Ε" there is some kind of faith and hope admitted of Christ but in faith it is "visio cum assensu" with the "per speculum" omitted; in hope it is "adhaerentia ad summum cum exspectatione praemii futuri" omitted. 23 Possibly this illustrates even more clearly the elimination of the element of time and finitude from Christ, that human element necessary to make his "grace" effective for us. Christ's fulness of grace is also questioned in regard to his giving of grace to men; if he could have given more than he did, it is argued, he did not give grace "non ad mensuram" (John 3:34) and if he could have given more he was finite. Alexander replies that the finiteness is in the receiver. 24 What place then, it must be asked, has his humanity? Once again there is a Christ who is only Son of God. This last discussion parallels that on the knowledge of Christ (next

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chapter) and the implications of a "perfect" Christ are drawn out in that chapter.

ii) The grace of the Head.

In distinction XIX in "L" and "E", but not in "AE", another grace in Christ, previously unmentioned, is discussed: the grace of the Head. This may have something in common with the foregoing discussion in that there grace was said to come from the Son of God only. The discussion in "E" appears after the discussion of the "Mediator" where "E" continues on from "AE". In "L" it is also placed after the discussion on the "Mediator". However, at the beginning of the "L" discussion, the reader is referred back to distinction XIII and distinction XVII where in the former it is said that Christ had the fulness of Deity and in the latter where Christ is said to be our Head in whom are all the spiritual senses and from whom all these flow to the members; and to distinction XIX (the one in which the discussion of the Head appears) where the question is "de capite et membris secundum se acceptis". (In Peter Lombard's work, to which these references are made, in distinction XIII, the only reference to Christ as Head like this is that Christ is our Head "quo sunt omnes sensus" with no development in regard to the members; Christ is merely mentioned as Head in distinction XVII; and in XIX the question of Christ as Head is not discussed although he is seen as Mediator.) Thus it

appears that this discussion, at the least, is not in its right place (for instance, in the Quaestiones and in the Summa it appears under the discussion of the grace of Christ) and indeed the author is aware of the fact for he refers the reader back to previous distinctions and the immediately preceding discussion. It is also a thorough cross reference which is most unusual in the Glossa. Further, there is no mention of the discussion in the fairly complete "division of the text" at the beginning of Book III. All this would indicate that this section is a conscious addition to the work (i.e. as opposed to a variant reading or text.)

Further, there is only one other extended discussion of Christ as Head in the rest of the Glossa and that is in Book I 26 although the concept is used in the sacramental teaching of Book IV. This is all the more surprising for this particular discussion is most extensive and far more thorough than any presented in the Glossa on a particular topic. One would expect the concept therefore to be more pervasive in the work. Another fact is that the Lombard is used as an authority almost to the exclusion of all others which is not the custom Alexander follows elsewhere in the Glossa's Christology. Finally this is one of the few elements in the whole of the Christology which clearly relates to sanctification and possibly to Christ's positive obedience and satisfaction, and, although it is not necessarily incompatible with the Glossa's soteriology and Christology up to date, it does appear as a new element - and not,

significantly, in distinction XIII on the grace in Christ. The fact that it appears in both "L" and "E" (in different forms) and that Alexander's sacramental theology tends to coincide with this type of thinking (although not using the "caput" concept to any great extent) would lead one to conclude that it belongs to the thinking of Alexander although it may be later at a time when he may have been moving in a new direction. That the concept was present in the Alexandrine school, at least, can be concluded from the discussion in the Quaestiones and the Summa and the number of writers who touched upon this subject. 27

The first question asked is "quod est caput?"

From Peter's commentary on Ephesians comes this statement: "Caput dedit, in quo sunt omnes sensus spirituales Ecclesiae, scilicet dona gratiae" as a comment on "the Church which is his body". (Eph. 1:22,23). Alexander comments "sicut corpus habuit vitam in capite, ita Ecclesia vitam spiritualem." Peter again is quoted in commenting on Colossians 1:18: "He is the Head of the Body, the Church." "Sicut anima totum corpus nostrum animat et vivificat, sed in capite omnibus sensibus sentit, ideoque capite omnia subjicta sunt ad operandum, illud autem supra locatum ad consulendum: sic homo excellens assumptus qui est Christus 'quasi personam sapientiae Dei gerit, ut caput in quo sunt omnes sensus.'" Alexander then comments: "Ergo dicitur caput ratione qua effluunt sensus a capite ad membra Ecclesiae." 28

The next question is "an tribus personis conveniat esse caput." It is suggested that, as Peter had stated, because of the use of "caput" for the Trinity as the Head of Christ, because the Divinity is the Head of our assumed nature, and because Christ is one with the Father and the Holy Spirit, "caput" could be applied to the three Persons. However, Peter had pointed out that the uses of "caput" of the Father as the Head of Christ, Christ as the Head of Man, and man as the head of woman, are different. The Father as the Head of Christ, the Son of God, is Head by generation; the Father is the Head of Christ as the Son of Man by creation as with other men, that is, he is the "principium" of man; "Christus autem secundum quod homo est caput aliorum hominum, id est principium communicans in natura, per quod effluunt spirituales sensus ad membra. Esse autem "caput" differt ab eo quod est esse "principium", quia caput est principium non separatum; principium separatum esse potest." The explanations of the differences are the comments of Alexander.

The next section distinguishes between the other properties attributed to Christ: "templum" speaks of Christ's Divine nature "secundum quod homo"; "caput"; "mediator" speaks of God and man in two natures; he is "ostium"; for those partaking in the sacraments, into the Church militant and triumphant; as "sacerdos" he gives the sacraments to the Church; he is "pastor" in the conserving of life through the food of the word of doctrine; he is

29. Peter, on Eph. 1:22. 30. Peter on 1 Cor.11:3. 31. 41(L),II,p.221.
"redemptor" from the punishment of sin /this is equivalent to "satisfier"/; he is "via" through grace; and he is "salvator" through glory. The reason for this order is that it begins in Divinity and ends in glory. The words "Christus" and "Iesus" incorporate all these words. "Christ" means anointed one, and denotes the anointing of the humanity by the Trinity, that is, Christ's consecration in the temple for our instruction in the flesh, to be the Way and the Entrance to him in glory. This last denotes him as "Jesus," that is, Saviour. 32

The next question is "an ratione utriusque naturae possit dici caput." The answer is from Peter's commentary on Ephesians 1:22,23:

"Ab ipso factis sunt secundum divinitatem, et ita secundum divinitatem est caput, secundum quam dedit ei esse caput, illum ante omnia gignendo. Proprie autem est caput secundum humanitatem, secundum quam coniungitur ei Ecclesia natura et gratia. Nam in eo plenitudo gratiae fuit de cuius plenitudine omnes accepimus, ut in 1 Ioan. 16; nullumque maius donum praestare posset Deus hominibus, quam quod Verbum suum per quod omnia condidit, faceret illis caput, et illos tamquam membra sibi coaptaret." 33

Then Alexander asks "an sit caput secundum tropum quo sensus effluunt a capite." Augustine is quoted in support of the affirmative to the effect that all the senses are in Christ. 34 Then it is asked why the Holy Spirit, who quickens the body of the Church, from whom flow the gifts, and from whom the Church has its unity, is not called "caput". This contention is supported on the

grounds that the quickener is the mover and it is argued that as the movement is prior to the senses that the refore movement from the Head points to the Holy Spirit.

Alexander's reply will be given in full:

"Respondeo ad primum: Filio Dei attribuitur sapientia, Spiritui Sancto bonitas. Bonitas est ratio movendi, sapientia cognoscendi. Unde, cum sensus sit vis cognoscitiva, appropriatur Filio caput secundum modum effluendi sensum spiritualium a capite; Spiritui Sancto secundum modum movendi. Item, Spiritus Sanctus dicitur caput tamquam principium separatum, a quo fluunt motus spirituales; Christus vero tamquam principium unitum, a quo fluunt sensus spirituales. - Sed hoc utroque modo caput secundum duas naturas. Est enim caput per fidem, non quae in ipso sit, sed in membris est fides, in ipso visio; et hoc secundum humanam naturam, in qua nobiscum communicat. Est etiam caput per caritatem, quia in ipso manet plenitude caritatis, de qua non omnes acceptimus. In quantum est principium et caput per fidem, fluunt ab eo sensus spirituales; u. caput per caritatem, effluunt ab eo motus spirituales. Et sic fuit mediator in fide redemptoris et caritate salvatoris." 35

This division appears also markedly in the discussion of the sacraments. It need only be noted now that justification and sanctification refer to love, that is, the union really is not necessary for these, as they are the work of the Holy Spirit.

In the next section it is said that Christ is Head only of the good, and not of angels as he does not communicate with them in nature. Peter Lombard is again quoted to give the reason. Those divided from the unity of peace may retain the sacrament as form "sed spiritu praeter unitatem non vivit." 36

Then the question arises "an sit caput bonorum

35. 41(L),v,p.223. 36. 41(L),VI,p.224. Peter on Eph.4:4.
secundum praesentum iustitiam et praedestinationem." Again Alexander's answer will be given in full:

"Quod non utrorumque, videtur per praemissam auctoritatem. Insuper, potest esse membrorum, sed non est iam membrorum: praedestinationo enim nihil ponit in re. Item Col.1:18: Ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae, Glossa: 'Virtute divinitatis et misericordiae suae dono, omnes justos illuminavit'; et ita est caput secundum divinatatem. Et 'secundum humanitatem autem, quia super fidem humanitatis est fundata Ecclesia.' Unde non est concedendum simpliciter quod sunt membra, sed cum hac determinatione: 'per praedestinationem.'" 37

The matter of predestination and the division of the predestined and the presently just will be discussed in the chapter on predestination. For the moment it is necessary only to note from this somewhat difficult answer that Christ's humanity pertains to the faith of the Church and his Divinity to the illumination of the just but that not all members of the Church, i.e. the presently just, are members of Christ's body unless they are predestined (which takes place apart from Christ - "enim nihil ponit in re"). And so both the illumination of the presently just and their predestination take place apart from the humanity of Christ, although the former are illumined according to his Divinity.

The next question is "an sit caput praecedentium Patrum." It is argued that it would appear unlikely that he was in that, as the philosophers have said, the principal member is the first formed. However, Augustine is quoted to show how Jacob who came after Esau was still head in dignity and power, and in this way Christ was the Head of the patriarchs. 38 Peter had also called Christ the "fundator altissimus" although he was born from Mary. 39

That the Church began from Abel and not from Adam is the next point that Alexander makes. This is so because in Adam there was both the state of sin and the state of grace. Therefore the city of the bad and the city of the good were not distinguished from each other in him. The state of good was in Abel and the state of bad was in Cain, and from these two arose the distinctive cities. 40

Finally, Alexander states, the members do not confer something on the Head who is Christ. The way Alexander explains this fact is of interest: "unumquodque membrum habet aliquid de materia et aliquid de forma corporis. Ratione eius quod habet de materia, confert ei aliud membrum; in quantum habet de forma, e contrario; et ideo membrum confert membro. Sed in spirituali capite et membris nihil est de materia, sed totum forma; et ideo non est ibi collatio mutua." 41 One wonders how the latter part of this statement measures up to the claims and breadth of Colossians 1:15-18.

At the beginning of this particular discussion it was maintained that the above viewpoints appeared to be a new element in Alexander's soteriology and Christology. The newness lies in the fact that these viewpoints are not found generally in Alexander's thought on Christ's life and work, in which Christ is seen largely in terms of the one who makes penal satisfaction. Here, however, Christ is seen as the source of the spiritual senses and, in some sense,

40. 41(L), IX, p.225.  
41. 41(L), X, p.225.
also a source of the spiritual movements. In other words, it might appear that Christ is given some kind of sanctifying role which he is not given elsewhere in the Christology proper, notably in the discussion on grace, except indirectly in that he may be seen as the remover of the barrier which stood between God and man, namely, God's requirement of temporal satisfaction.

Before it is assumed that this section is part of Alexander's Christology and an attempt is made to integrate it - as it can be - with the rest of his thinking, there are doubts whether this is really part of the Glossa's Christology and soteriology.

Firstly, the only discussion of Christ as "caput" appears in Book I where the discussion is on the phrase of Peter Lombard "caput principium omnium". Here two things are evident: i) As Head of the Church, that is, in his two natures, Christ is not seen as the Head of creation, that is, he is not the Mediator between God and man. (In fact a relationship of being is implied between God and man.) This element has its parallel in the discussion in Book III which relates to the good and the bad, Abel and Adam. Jesus Christ is not seen as the new Adam. ii) The suggestion of a very close tie, an ontological one, between Jesus Christ and the members, a tie in the common substance of the human nature is loosened almost completely by the modification that this tie is "in idem voluntatem consensus" (which is the tie of the Holy Spirit, or of man). This position is perfectly

42. Bk.I,d.XXI,20,c)e)pp.307-308.
compatible with the general Christological and soteriological position of Alexander, namely, that Christ suffered and merited only. However, it does not appear to coincide with the section under consideration in which the spiritual senses, at least, are said to be communicated according to the human nature, that is, because Christ took on the same nature as man. In Book I, a statement by Peter Lombard (also in Book III: 43) makes it clear that Christ is joined to the members by nature and by grace but does not necessarily suggest communication of the senses. Peter's statement is used in Book I to show that Christ was Head in dignity and power but there is no more than this suggested. The "one will of consent" gives no substitutionary place to Christ which the doctrine of satisfaction does give.

Other uses of "caput" in the Glossa are sparse. Adam is seen as "head" in the sense of "principium" of all men – without the word "caput" being used, in Book II, d.XVI, 4,p.148, and in d.XVIII,l,p.157. He is described as the "caput" of woman on pages 157 and 158 in the sense of the relation of a ruler to a subject. One further use of the word "caput" is in the three "capita malorum omnium, ut diabolus cadens, et homo lapsus, et Antichristus." 44 The "home lapsus" involves all men and communicates evil to all men, but, as it has been seen, Christ as Head does not have a similar relationship to men. Adam as the "principium" of all men, thus is not the equivalent (or the parallel) of Christ in his

humanity as the Head of the Church, although in some sense he is the equivalent to the Son of God as the principium of being. Thus the word "caput" is rarely used by Alexander and when it is used, except in the case of the "homo lapsus", it is not used in the sense that there is a communication from one to the other. Rather, all that is indicated is the holding of something in common or that one has more dignity and power than the other.

Secondly, the whole of Alexander's Christology has been in terms of satisfaction and to a lesser extent merit (which is barely distinguished from it). Satisfaction and merit are seen as things which may "earn" grace for man but there is little to suggest that it flows from Christ to man (apart from the grace of the satisfaction itself in the sacraments). One of the extraordinary elements of this "caput" section is that satisfaction has no real place and Christ is mentioned only in passing as "Redemptor". Redemption by satisfaction has been such an important element in the soteriology that Alexander was able to state that the incarnation took place really for satisfaction. Christ was thus "full of grace" in order to make satisfaction. That was the object of the incarnation. Here, however, a new element comes in, namely, that from the fulness of his grace the spiritual senses flow out from Christ through his humanity, and the spiritual movements flow out either through his Divinity or humanity or by his Divinity only. One would have thought that, if this end was in view, in an integrated theology it would have been discussed in the reasons
for the incarnation. The power of the keys may be a similar concept but this is not mentioned at all here.

Thirdly, when the resurrection is spoken of as an "efficient cause of our resurrection" 45, it is a quotation from Peter that is used (and therefore not necessarily used with its apparent significance). It is pointed out in "E" that as efficient cause the resurrection is not "motus" but "exemplaris". 46 Then again, the resurrection is discussed in the same context as the passion as the sign, figure, and cause of the destruction of sin, and therefore presumably with the same intent, that is, the direction is towards God and not towards man. Finally the resurrection of Christ is said not to be meritorious. 48 These, in themselves (especially the last), except for the specific denial that the resurrection is a "motus", do not constitute a contradiction of the fact that Christ may be the source of outflowing grace. However, the fact that the resurrection is discussed without any reference to this topic, which one would think was a suitable place to do so especially in order to enlighten the reader as to what Alexander means by cause, and the other fact that the matter of outflowing grace in Christ has no reference to the resurrection in spite of the proximity of the discussions, would lead one to suppose that there has not been a proper integration because one topic is a new subject.

Fourthly, a consideration of the doctrine of the
sacraments and of grace itself will make it clear that grace does not flow simply from Christ to the members. In the sacramental theology, the sacraments form the tie between Christ and the members (certainly in regard to satisfaction). There does not appear to be any necessary connection made between "gratia gratum faciens" in the sacramental theology and Christ and if there is (as outflowing grace) there is no real part for the humanity of Christ. It is the grace of the Son of God, not the grace of Jesus Christ. At best Jesus Christ is seen as a medium.

Fifthly, the tie between Christ and the members is not quite as simple as one might believe, not only because the sacraments come between, but also because the priesthood is the link between Christ and the ordinary member via the sacraments. These intermediaries may not be completely necessary but they are very nearly so.

Finally, forgiveness of guilt and eternal satisfaction are bestowed apart from Christ, not in Christ, and thus his centrality as the bestower of grace is greatly weakened.

However, if one does assume that the "caput" section is a part of Alexander's Christology, it is not altogether incompatible with this Christology as it lends support to trends already noted. The Christology of Alexander has hesitated at the sentence "the Word became flesh". Christ cannot be understood to have participated in full humanity because its corruption has been viewed almost as necessary corruption, that is, corruption comes with time.
Because of this presupposition, Christ as Head of the Church, as man, is not presented as Christ as the Head of humanity, not even of unfallen humanity. The concept of Christ as "caput" is by no means the equivalent of the concept of Christ as the "new Adam". Perhaps one should not expect this either of Alexander or of the Bible where, however, the concept of Christ as Head of the Church does imply the headship of all things (Eph.1:22,23). However, there is the possibility that Alexander in viewing Christ as Head may have understood this as a description of Christ not merely as satisfier but as the sanctifier, the mediator, the new Creation and the like. Yet, in Alexander's work, Christ as Head is Head only of the members, the Church, and as such his headship does not extend to all of Adam's progeny because in Adam there were the two cities or two states of good and bad. So the possibility arises that, in fact, far from extending the scope of the humanity of Christ, the "caput" concept limits it only to the good. As satisfier Christ is the sufficient (even if not the efficient) cause for all men, but in this concept Christ is limited to the good only. His humanity is thus limited to "good" humanity, Christ cannot be described as becoming "sin for us", and the implication of this is that either sinful man must save himself to some extent or that salvation is achieved apart from Jesus Christ.

When this tendency occurs there must be a corresponding tendency in man, that is, if God does not come to man, man must go to God. This tendency is seen in the concept of the soul to which is attributed some kind of
capacity for uniting with the Divine, but at this point it is seen in the fact that Christ is Head only of the good, and that Abel was the first member of the Church. It is only the "good" that partake of the benefits of Christ and Christ has apparently little to give to the "bad". Thus, to be saved, man must be good which by implication he is apart from Christ. (Predestination brings in a further element entirely divorced from Christ and with little connection with present grace.) Man's salvation lies, then, to a considerable extent, in man, and not completely in Christ. This fact can also be seen in the ideas of the perfection of Mary and of the possibility of the perfection of the saints. Christ is by no means unique in this thinking; he is seen as a helper and in the case of Mary he is almost unnecessary. With the saints he is the source of grace which men use but he is not the substitute; "grace" is the important factor. This tendency belongs to Alexander's theology with or without the "caput" section. The "caput" section transfers the gifts of grace from being simply the gifts of the Spirit to a derivation from the grace in Christ but the end effect is the same: Christ is left behind, he is not the substitute, he does not die and rise for man, he is not man's justification and sanctification, he only brings the grace to enable man to achieve them. His humanity, in short, is not man's humanity. The doctrine of satisfaction expounded in Alexander certainly puts a limit to the possibilities but with the scope of satisfaction so limited in Alexander's theology - to the temporal punishment for
original sin - it is possible also to have, without too much strain, a doctrine of outflowing grace from Christ. This was the combination in Peter Lombard. Yet, it does appear that Alexander has previously avoided this combination. In the doctrine of satisfaction Alexander at least understands Christ's work to be sufficient for all (and so he avoided implying that salvation is just as much man's work as is the case when it is limited to the good) in that he sees Christ taking all men's humanity. This is true however limited his doctrine here may be. Again, in his use of the concept "caput" in Book I where it is stated that the bond between Christ and the Church is in the same will of consent, (although this is unsatisfactory; the bond is far more than this; it is Christ taking on our sinful humanity and making it anew) he does lessen the impression that inflowing grace flows of necessity into the good more or less as they wish, a grace which Christ as Head of the Church brings to those who are "good", who are in the fold of Abel etc., that is, in Book I perhaps there is a greater distinction between Christ and the "good" than in this section.

There is one final point to be made and it is about the fact that there appears to be some confusion as to Christ's place in relation to the "spirituales motus" and "spirituales sensus". In V e), (top of page 142), especially, there is some doubt as to whether both flow out from Christ or just the spiritual senses flow out from him. The first part of the answer seems to indicate that the spiritual movements come from the Holy Spirit whereas in the second part of the answer
there is this: "ut caput per caritatem effluunt ab eo /Christ/ motus spirituales." The real question, however, is whether the spiritual movements come to man (if they do come from Christ) according to the human nature, as it is explicitly stated in relation to the spiritual senses, or only from Christ as Son of God. The latter would appear to be the case.

This discussion raises four problems. Firstly, if indeed the spiritual senses (faith) and the spiritual movements (love) are divided between Christ and the Holy Spirit, then the person and work of Christ are greatly restricted and the important elements of man's justification and sanctification are left purely to the Holy Spirit. This then puts a question mark against the Gospel as good news for then man is uncertain of his justification and sanctification. (This seems generally to be the solution of the sacramental theology which, of course, raises questions as to the soundness of Alexander's Trinitarian thinking.)

Secondly, even if the senses and movements are not separated so that instead both do relate to Christ or, indeed, if only faith is related to Christ, then in either both faith and love or in faith only, the Holy Spirit is replaced by the Son of God, (or, on the other hand, it is the Spirit which is incarnate). This would mean either that the spiritual senses (and movements) flow from Christ as man to man by the very fact of the common humanity (which is practically to say "every man his own Christ") or that the capacity to accept the senses (and movements) is given to man,
a capacity formerly residing in the Holy Spirit. This latter is Pelagianism; the former is a kind of pantheism. Either way God's freedom is impaired and there can be no concept, really, of Divine election. Once again the doctrine of the Trinity suffers greatly.

Thirdly, if the spiritual senses only and not the spiritual movements are communicated by the human nature of Christ (accepting for the moment the way of putting it - as under point two), the faith which results is not "saving knowledge", the kind of point made very strongly in the Scot's Confession. This faith, in Alexander, is related to the "true" \(^49\) and the intellectual and is a deeper form of the knowledge which the philosophers have: "Ad auctoritatem Philosophi respondeo quod duplex est cognitio per intellectum; una habet ortum a sensu, et de hac loquitur Philosophus: alia est per inspirationem et sine sensu, quae est fidei, et sic habet nomen." \(^50\) Although the terminology here is apparently in contradiction to that which Alexander uses in the "caput" section (namely the "sine sensu" of faith) so that faith and the senses operate on different planes, it is evident that the "spiritual senses" of the "caput" section are approximately equivalent to the inspiration "sine sensu" (non-philosophic knowledge) mentioned above. It must also be pointed out that the spiritual senses have a relation to faith, hope and love, but only so far as their "habilitation", \(^51\) which is not their "movement" or

\(^{49}\) e.g. Bk. I, d. XXXVI, 11, p. 361.  \(^{50}\) Ibid. d. III, 3, i) p. 39.  
\(^{51}\) Bk. IV, d. VI, 15, e) pp. 121-122.
"act". It is somewhat unsound to give any particular
definition of faith for Alexander as the definitions or types
of faith vary considerably, but generally it could be described
as intellectual, as concerned with the articles of faith,
and it seems closest to the meaning "assent" or "believing
that". 52 In short it does not have the content of meaning
which faith has in Paul, Luther or Calvin. The knowledge
so gained differs from that gained through philosophy only
in the method of gaining the knowledge (probably more can be
gained through faith) as the knowledge from painting and the
knowledge from physics differ from each other. That means
that "saving knowledge" lies outside Christ if "intellectual"
faith is the only thing communicated through the human nature
of Christ. Intellectual assent is based in the double nature
of Christ, but not the love, which, in Alexander, leads to
merit, sanctification, and justification. This position
would not be far removed from Alexander's general position
in which Christ makes satisfaction for original sin and the
Spirit (or grace) moves.

Fourthly, and perhaps most seriously, there is the
question as to how much connection Christ has with our
humanity as "caput", and whether, indeed, he does communicate
through his humanity. Suspicion is raised by the following
statement: "Sed in spirituali capite et membris nihil est de
materia, sed totum forma." 53 This suspicion is aroused not
only in regard to the spiritual movements and love, but also

52. Bk.III,ds. XXII-XXIV.pp.262-295. 53. Bk.III,d.XIX(L),41,
X,p.225.
in regard to the spiritual senses and faith. Is the
communication of the spiritual senses based on our common
humanity with Christ and established by and in him, or is it
based on "goodness" or on "consent"? Why does Christ need to
be of our humanity if the good, as seems to be implied,
already exists apart from him? Against this kind of position
it must be stated that our goodness depends upon the goodness
of Christ and finds its basis in Christ alone. With or
without sin Christ is man for this end. But when sin is
present, Christ's humanity is doubly necessary for man's
possession of faith and love, that is, not only is Christ the
actively obedient man in whom there is the "new creation", he
is also the passively obedient man in whom our "old man
perishes."

To sum up. The "caput" section does appear to show
the influence of a different tradition from that expressed
in the satisfaction theory. This different tradition may be
distinguished as the Abelardian. Peter Lombard had already
brought together the Anselmic and the Abelardian traditions so
that it is nothing new to put the two side by side,
although a greatly qualified Anselmic tradition. The use of
the Abelardian "moral influence" tradition certainly
coincides with the Christological tendencies or presuppositions
of Alexander, that is, of a God as "essence" behind Christ
and men with God-inclined souls, apart from Christ. Yet the
doctrine of satisfaction, certainly in its Anselmic form,

moves in a contrary direction to these tendencies, although, because it is so restricted in Alexander's theology, there is no need for a clash and the two theories can become complementary.

The "caput" section may be seen as an attempt to balance the lack of interest in sanctification in the satisfaction theory (at least in Alexander's thought), but the attempt is somewhat lacking. It does not have the universal scope which the doctrine of satisfaction has because it applies to the good and the Church alone, which is not inclusive of our humanity, Adamic humanity - the idea that he is Head of Adamic humanity is specifically denied; Christ is head of Abelic humanity, the "previously" good. This teaching does not present a full view of the fact that the Word became flesh. It minimises the offence of sin, and therefore it limits God's reply to sin in Jesus Christ. Further, because Christ is seen as merely Spirit or grace filled at this point, and not as Son of Man and Son of God, the substitutionary element in Christ's humanity is lacking. Yet it is only as the Son of God is the basis of the Son of Man, or the man is hypostasised in the Son of God that the place of the humanity of Christ is peculiar and substitutionary. The fact that, in Alexander's doctrine of Christ as Head, the humanity plays no essentially different role from the preacher through whose words the Word of God is conveyed to the hearer makes one wonder whether it is indeed the Son of God who is the basis of the union in this discussion. Further one must ask whether the doctrine of grace, certainly the view of grace as held in the "caput"
section, is sufficient to maintain the uniqueness of the union, and indeed, whether it may work against a satisfactory Christology. And even if it is the Son of God and Son of Man who is understood to be at work, the power which is attributed to Christ in conferring grace is hardly human even if it is attributed to the humanity. Here, in short, the humanity is of minor importance.

Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments generally takes this position except that the "body of Christ" in the bread and the wine and not Christ immediately is the source of love and grace. In this, too, his humanity is unimportant. Anselm in his teaching may not have emphasised the relation of Christ to sanctification and justification although, by implication, they followed on to satisfaction, but the right emphasis is not found in the Abelardian tradition. The two theories are ultimately incompatible for one presupposes man's sin, the other man's potential goodness; the one "necessitates" Christ's humanity, the other does not. Peter Lombard attempted to hold the two together; Alexander in his doctrine of Christ proper, I believe, did not, and left many questions unanswered. The only way the two elements, satisfaction and sanctification, were brought together and are brought together, was in Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, in whom sin is judged, and good is triumphant.

The Quaestiones

In the doctrine of the grace of Christ in the
Quaestiones there is a difference from the Glossa, at least, from the text in the Glossa which is considered the main text ("AE"). The "L" text of the Glossa with its "caput" section coincides more closely with the views of the Quaestiones not only where the latter has comments on the grace of Christ but also elsewhere where the grace of Christ as Head is an accepted doctrine.

According to the Quaestiones there was a threefold grace in Christ: as a "quidam homo singularis"; as "caput Ecclesiae"; and that by which "divina natura unita est cum humana in eo." 55 Other names for the first and the last obviously would be inhabiting grace and the grace of union. (Compare this with the general grace, the inhabiting grace, and the grace of union of the Glossa, the first obviously being the grace which had been defined earlier as "una quae inest cuilibet creaturae, scilicet per praesentiam, potentiam et essentiam." 56) Each of these graces in Christ as the Holy Spirit who is given to Christ "non ad mensuram" (John 3:34), is "gratia increata", and as a gift is "gratia creata". 57

The relation of these graces particularly that of the Head to that of union is important. It had been suggested that the fulness of grace in Christ was due to the fact that he was the Head of the Church because of a statement attributed (wrongly) to Augustine 58 "datus est ei spiritus non ad mensuram, de cuius plenitudine accepimus," 59 and this grace

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is described as "gratiam secundum quam est caput Ecclesiae et ab hac influit sensus et motus super membra." 60 The comment on the suggestion is: "dico quod gratia quae est data 'non ad mensuram', est gratia quae est caput nostrum in ratione fluentis, et non recipientis. /Tamen, gratia, unionis simul fuit cum hac prout est recipiens, /licet/ ratione differant haec et illa, quia uniens est simul cum unito: sed gratia secundum quod est caput, dicitur secundum quod iam unitum est." 61 Both graces, therefore, are "sine mensura", that of the Head "ut de qua sine mensure ipse dat nobis, et illa/grace of union/ ut de qua recipere sine mensura potest ipse." 62 Inhabiting grace is that by which Christ is the Son of the Trinity, and the grace of union is that by which "iste homo per gratiam unionis est Filius Patris per natum." 63

The grace of union made it possible, as has been seen, that Christ could make satisfaction for the sin of Adam in regard to temporal punishment. This is the unique grace, or the grace which makes Christ unique. However, one would conclude from what is immediately above, that the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church is apparently the same grace, except that it faces Christ towards men and not towards God. Does this grace (which is the grace of sanctification - or the grace of virtues as the Quaestiones will term it in discussing the sacraments - and the grace by which guilt is remitted) convey the same uniqueness to the humanity of

Christ as the grace of union has done, or is said to have done? Are the recipients of this grace dependent on the humanity of Christ as a substitute, as they are in the satisfaction for original sin? It would appear not. The remission of punishment, states the quaestiones is dependent on two things, the mercy of God and the satisfaction made by Christ: "quoad remissionem culpae, accepimus de plenitudine eius secundum quod Deus: quoad remissionem poenae, in quantum Deus et homo. Unde poena eius universalis satisfactoria fuit." 64 Thus Christ's humanity is unnecessary in the grace of sanctification (which relates to guilt) and further more that humanity is not related to Adam's kind; it is merely a "humanity" which does not involve all men. Christ is Head of those who were before him and those who come after "secundum humanitatem" before he was a man "quia non est caput dependens nisi a fide humanitatis, et non ab humanitate eius." Thus he is Head to them and to us according to his human nature "in quantum est creditum et sub ratione crediti." 65 The humanity of Christ is purely incidental here; Christ could have been anything else but man for that belief - unlike the doctrine of satisfaction; it does not really matter whether he was man - "caput fuit quoad hoc, quod fuit creditus homo, non quoad temporale." 66 There is point in this, of course, in that Christ's humanity does apply to all time, that is, all men are sanctified in him, but that is not what is being said.

Faith, like love, comes from grace and these go from Christ into those who preceded him and who come after by the spiritual senses and movements. Yet, this is not "ab humanitate"; it is from the fulness of grace in Christ; this grace which remits guilt is from Christ as God, not from him as the God-man. This becomes clear when it is pointed out that those who follow the life and death of Christ in time gain an extra effect, namely sacramental grace (i.e. from satisfaction). Why does this extra grace come to man? The reason is found in the humanity of Christ which does make a difference. It is unique; there is a time without and a time with this humanity, but this is not true of the grace which flows from the Head as the grace of sanctification; the humanity does not make any difference to it. The satisfaction of Christ was for humanity; the grace from the Head as sanctification was for those who believed - not for humanity; it was for the "good" before and after Christ i.e. the "engraced". If the humanity of Christ bore the same relation to men for both satisfaction and sanctification, then the satisfaction would also have applied, e.g. to circumcision, before Christ in exactly the same way as sanctification applied to faith before Christ. In fact the Quaestiones does relate both the grace of the sacraments (satisfaction) and the grace of virtues (sanctification) to those who preceded Christ. The grace of

67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. pp. 747-748. See chapter on "Sacraments in General". Sacramental grace derives from the satisfaction made by the God-man.
the Head includes both the grace of the sacraments and the grace of virtues. 69 However, the distinction of graces speaks of a significant difference between the graces, the one conveying the benefit of the substitutionary satisfaction made by the God-man, the other not relating to the man at all except as a channel.

"Concede quod per gratiam sacramentorum et virtutum recepimus de ista gratia. Sed tunc primo fuit completio fidei, quando futurum transiit in praesens, quia etiam tunc fuit veritas donum; /sed/ gratia fidei prius non fuit in tanta plenitudine quam est nunc. Similiter est /de/ gratia in sacramentis. Unde opitiatio haec fuit in fide ad tollendam culpam, in sanguine ad tollendam poenam. Illi tamen qui praccesserunt de utroque /acceperunt, scilicet de sanguine/ et de fide, quantum ad remissionem poenae." 70

Here, the "greater fulness" of the grace of faith makes no basic difference in the effect of faith, as the blood does. Faith is in man; the blood is Christ's. It should be noted that sanctifying grace and grace which remits guilt are the same grace, differing from the strictly sacramental grace which is directed at temporal punishment. In the discussion on the sacrament these graces are more clearly distinguished than they are here.

There is one more revealing statement. The implication of what has already been discussed is that the grace of the Head can become the possession of the Church of which Christ is Head in such a way that the Church is practically put on a level with Christ. It should be remembered also that the grace of the Head is hardly different

69. In the discussion of the sacraments the Glossa evidently intends by grace the inclusive grace which would be equivalent to the above grace of the Head; the Quaestiones distinguishes between the grace of virtues working apart from the sacraments and sacramental grace which is in the sacraments. Here, it appears that perhaps the grace of union (of sacraments approximately) and inhabiting grace (of virtues) are brought together under the grace of the Head. 70. Memb.5,54,p.749.
apparently from the grace of union. It is asked whether men receive from Christ's fulness "ad mensuram" or not. The answer states that just as in the soul each member does not have fulness of operation so it is with the individual members of the Church; yet the whole body has full operability:

"Similiter in capite Christo est plenitudo donorum, et similiter in toto corpore Ecclesiae; non tamen in quo libet membro. Unde omnibus omnia dantur propter plenitudinem effluentem quae est in toto corpore... Ista ergo plenitudo, quae est in toto corpore Ecclesiae, dicitur 'sine mensura' in comparatione ad membra, 'in mensura' autem in comparatione ad Christum, caput suum." 71

The one difference between Christ and the Church is that Christ received grace without measure but this seems merely a difference in degree not in kind. No doubt, a distinction between Christ and the Church is intended in relation to sanctification but there does not appear to be any substitutionary role here assigned to Christ. Again in relation to sanctification it is grace which sanctifies both the Church and Christ.

If the grace of the Head is created and is passed onto the members they would then be brought into the same relation to the Father as Christ the man by this grace. This would be a reasonably satisfactory position under the categories by which Alexander is operating (i.e. grace), that is, men would be made heirs by adoption and dependent on the humanity of Christ for that adoption through the unique

71. Memb.4,51,pp.748-749.
grace of union. But the close relation of the grace of union to the grace of the Head and the fact that the latter is "created" as well as the former would actually make it appear that the whole Church not only becomes a son by adoption but a son by nature - if the grace of union is accepted as asserting the sonship by nature of Christ. This suggestion is given further credence by the fact that the Church gives grace "without measure" to its members. This would mean that the Church does not find its sanctification in Christ but in grace. However, what actually seems to be the case is that the Spirit or grace in effect takes the place of the Son of God in the incarnation and it is man himself who has to sanctify himself. What this means is that grace or the Spirit is seen as an "alter Christus" in as far as Christ is the Son of God. The fact that the concept of the grace of the Head does not imply sanctification in Christ at all, in short, that the concept is not incarnational (unless one wants to identify the mystical body with Christ which is not entirely out of the question) is proved by the use of the concept of outflowing grace, by the non-necessity of the man Jesus for the remission of guilt, by the fact that this grace is attributed to the Spirit, and by the fact that Christ's life and resurrection have no real part to play in man's sanctification or his "second" justification (that is from all sin). Of course all these could be seen as part of the incarnation by the fact that the Church becomes the extension of the incarnation. To sum up. Because there is no substitution by Christ (because Christ's humanity has no
real basis in the grace of union, it being identified with
the grace of the Head) there is no sanctification of man in
him either. Christ did not take on the humanity of man for
sanctification.

These affirmations are supported by Alexander's
limited view of Christ's incarnation, as has already been
seen, and the limited view of his passibility (chapter 4);
there is doubt here also as to his full humanity. It would
appear that the incarnation and Christ's passibility apply
only to "engraced" man. Further to this, the doctrine of
satisfaction is lacking in the universal element (although,
of course it is there potentially) which is supplied, it
would appear, in fact, by the sacraments. In the Quaestiones
the tendency to restrict satisfaction to the good is more
marked than in the Glossa. In the Quaestiones the doctrine
of the grace of the Head is introduced as a major factor and,
as a result, the doctrine of satisfaction which emphasises
the humanity of Christ tends to take a less important place.
This can be expected for, as has already been stated, the
two views are ultimately incompatible, not complementary. 71a
As they stand, especially in the Quaestiones, the doctrine
of satisfaction and the doctrine of sanctification hold
different views of Christ and man. The former emphasises
the humanity and Divinity together with the sin of man, the
latter the Divinity without the humanity together with the
potential goodness of man.

The doctrine of outflowing grace, or infused
grace (as the chapter on grace will further demonstrate) is a

71a Above p.158.
substitute for incarnational theology or plays havoc with it. The mediation between God and man under these terms is made by uncreated grace which becomes an "alter Christus" and becomes created within man by man's aid. The mediation is not made by the fullness of Godhead and the fullness of humanity in Christ, the Holy Spirit then bringing man into participation in that mediation by faith. Possibly, a little unkindly perhaps, it may be said that grace is the "demi-God" or the emanation which mediates between the Unmoved Mover and man with his divine inclined soul. This view of grace can exist only most uneasily beside the Anselmic view of satisfaction. If that view does not see grace as an emanation, at least the concept has a similar background to the theories of emanation and the divinely inclined soul of man.

One final point. If the grace of union is the same as the grace of the Head (even with different effects) then it has not been demonstrated that there is a difference in kind between the grace in Christ (as there is in the Glossa where the grace of the Head is generally absent) and the grace in man. This must bring into consideration again in the whole preliminary discussion of the doctrine of satisfaction.

iii.) The grace of predestination.

One other topic may be touched upon. Its brevity alone is significant. Peter Lombard is quoted to the effect that the Son of God is not predestined as the Word of God
because that would indicate that he was with beginning.
What is predestined has a beginning and is made in time.\textsuperscript{72}
Later Alexander states that predestination is appropriate
to the Person of Christ as man.\textsuperscript{73} Similarly Augustine
had called Christ "dominicus homo" but had retracted this
because "dominicus" is a possessive name and indicates that
human nature is the possession of God which is not true.\textsuperscript{74}
These comments and the comment in the "L" parallel "plus
enim est esse Deum quam possideri"\textsuperscript{75} are possibly not
as Trinitarian as they might be as there may be some doubt
thrown on the relation of God in revelation to God in
Himself and, in Christology, if it is argued that Christ is
not predestined in the Son of God (the Trinitarian basis)
what is his uniqueness as the Son of Man? However
predestination will be more fully discussed in a later
chapter where the significance of the doctrine of predestination
for Christology is discussed.

\textbf{Summary}

Scholars have seen in the work of Augustine a
decisive transformation in the conception of grace for the
West. Reinhold Seeberg describes his view in contrast to an
earlier view as follows: "He has in view primarily, not the
establishment of personal communion, but a creative act.
Grace is effectual as the almighty, creative will, which
infuses into man a new subsistence, the moral will."\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{72} Peter Lombard, on Roms.1:4; Glossa, Bk.III, d.VII, 2, pp. 90-91.
\textsuperscript{73} 16(L), p. 95. \textsuperscript{74} Augustine, Quaest. 36, 2, Retract. 1, 19, 8; 15, p. 95.
Perhaps he may be reading into the thought of Augustine a little too much later substantial thinking but what is of significance was that a figure of Augustine's importance should have seen grace as "something" detached from God, yet not constantly, as later, unrelated to Jesus Christ. However, Augustine is not the only "culprit". Professor Torrance has detected a similar move in the Apostolic Fathers. He says, for instance, of 1 Clement: "the general meaning of charis in this Epistle appears to be that of enabling power granted to those who are worthy. This is the commonest usage in the whole of the literature of this period; its frequency indicates fairly well the measure of the change of emphasis from the personal character of charis to that of imparted dynamic quality." 77 Then, later, commenting on the work of Ignatius Professor Torrance makes a statement which could equally well be made of Alexander: "this principle /love/ is imparted to the Christian and works within him as a power such that it practically becomes identified with his own nature." 78

The detachment of grace from the idea of personal communion is the decisive element which distinguishes medieval thinking from Biblical thinking and indeed the thinking of the Greek fathers. It would seem that the almost inevitable result of this detachment is the concentration on the working of grace in man himself and only a deterministic view of grace as irresistible is the one sure way of avoiding

77. T.F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers, p.54. 78. Ibid. p.70.
some form of Pelagianism. Reinold Seeberg comments on the view of Bonaventure (1221-1274) who was a Franciscan, a pupil of Alexander's, and whose views often coincided with his teacher's: "Bonaventura... represents the impartation of grace as having for its end to make men capable of merit..., which can be attained however only through the free will... Under this practical view of the matter, despite all emphasizing of the agency of grace, the personal agency of man himself constantly presses to the front." 79 Bernard of Clairvaux, (1090-1153) whose thought will be mentioned later on the chapter on grace, apparently kept the balance and indeed understood merit and free will only in terms of grace, and succeeded where Bonaventure and Alexander, who used his works, failed. It would seem that Bernard was an exception in an age which had presuppositions which pushed theologians towards Pelagianism of some kind.

Alexander's doctrine of grace, free will, and merit, is given more detailed treatment in a chapter devoted to those matters. However, it would be useful to sketch his view of grace here as the background to his view of grace in Christ. Alexander, in general, believes that there are three "graces": "gratia gratis data", "gratia gratum faciens", and "gratia perfectionis". The last is given only at the end. The second might be called "saving grace", and the first might be loosely called "prevenient grace". This "gratia gratis data" at times may even be called "man in

creation" for it is sometimes associated with man's "naturalia". This fact is revealing because it demonstrates how "grace" can be conceived almost as part of creation. However, it is "gratia gratum faciens" which is the most important grace. It, like the first grace, can have different effects, but it is still the one grace. The first thing that should be noticed about it is the fact that it is detached from Christ and has no necessary relation to him; at best, it is "in" him. Grace is now attached to the Holy Spirit but the view of the Holy Spirit is hardly personal; he could be as well described as "it". This is well demonstrated in the thinking on the sacraments where grace, or power, is very "substantial". However, one need not go to the sacramental thinking for confirmation of this viewpoint; it is quite clear that grace is often viewed as a substance, or very nearly such, which can be "infused". This detached-substantial view of grace is given particular confirmation in the newly developing doctrine of "uncreated" and "created" grace. (Indeed some scholars would attribute the development of this view to Alexander himself.) "Uncreated" grace is the Holy Spirit; "created" grace is to be found in man's soul. This is as far as one can go in several directions. First, grace is quite obviously "something" in the soul (it is substantial); it is well away from the idea of personal communion. Second, it is even detached to some extent from God - there is separation made by the "uncreated" and "created"; this is a move beyond Augustine. Third, and as a corollary of this, one would think that it was
extraordinarily difficult to distinguish this grace from the work of man himself; the very word "created", although it may not mean quite what it appears to, indicates this fact. Certainly, the concept of created grace impels one to concentrate on man himself, and this, in itself, is unbiblical. It should be noted that C. Moeller and G. Philips of the University of Louvain understand the doctrine of created grace in a way contrary to that stated immediately above. They understand it as an attempt to make grace effective in all the workings of man, in fact, to insure that the free will of man is not given the credit for something that only grace can effect (i.e. it is the secret working of the Spirit). This may well be true, and in a way Alexander could be described as a "theologian of grace", but one feels that this solution, when he presupposes a detached-substantial grace, merely transfers the interplay of grace and free will from the relation of God and man's soul, to a relation within the soul of man himself, between created grace and free will: "and the last state of that man becomes worse than the first."

It is in this context that one should understand the grace of union. This grace appears very similar, in its effects at least, to "gratia gratum faciens" and one wonders whether it is an adequate way of affirming Christ's uniqueness. This doubt is particularly strong when one

81. e.g. At one point it is suggested that the grace of union is either "gratia gratis data" or "gratia gratum faciens". It is argued: if the union entails the latter this would lead to virtue which would make some act of merit and therefore "per gratiam illam meruit uniri vel fieri Filius Dei." Alexander answers this form of Adoptionism as follows: "Quod haec gratia est gratum faciens, sed tamen non est virtus; quoniam virtus dicit gratiam ut ad aliquem actum determinatur, et haec gratia ita plena erat, quod ad omne bonum se habebat." Bk.III,d.VII,14, p. 94-95.
remembers that Alexander holds a substantialist view of grace and, if this is so, the distinction between Christ and other men would appear to be only one of degree. On the other hand there is the fact that grace in Alexander does have different effects and to say that Christ has the grace of union or the grace of redemption may be merely a way of stating that only Christ could satisfy, that only he is the Son of God by nature and that man and God are one uniquely in him. Nevertheless Christ is said to have "had" the grace of union. As grace is to be identified with the Holy Spirit does grace sufficiently distinguish Christ from other men? The incarnation, to be sure, is the work of grace, but is it not made in the Son rather than in the Spirit so that what Jesus "has" is not grace but the Father? If it is grace that effects the union, in terms of Alexander's understanding of grace, where is really the place of the Son? The man Jesus is grace filled; all men eventually will be grace filled.

These questions are not pressing and perhaps are not pertinent until one comes to the relation of the grace of union to the grace of the Head. The latter has to be related, in some way, to the grace of union simply because they were both in Christ. In regard to satisfaction, the grace of union performs a unique role but with the grace of the Head there are problems — apart from the question whether love and faith or only faith derive from Christ. The first problem is the fact that Christ appears to be only a channel of grace, that is, he is not substitutionary. Secondly, and related to this, if he is not a channel, he is still only
a source and unique only in the sense that he is the first of a series. Men can make use of grace in the same way as Christ did, e.g. in the sacraments. To avoid determinism Alexander posits the independent working of the free will, and because, according to Alexander, this grace comes only to the good, grace, in effect ceases to be grace; it becomes something of which man can make use.

Grace has been detached from Jesus Christ; in fact he has become subject to it and he is limited in his scope to the good. The fact that the quaestiones relates the grace of the Head to the grace of the union undermines the uniqueness associated with the grace of union and makes it difficult to establish any sort of uniqueness with the presuppositions that Alexander holds in his doctrine of grace.

Alexander has travelled far from the early church; grace has been systematised and substantialised particularly under the influence of Aristotelian categories. This tendency becomes more marked after Alexander. (Karl Heim has detected in the Summa of Alexander an Aristotelian causal pattern in the doctrine of grace. Even if his analysis is perhaps too neat, at least, he has considerable backing for his views in the Summa. 82) Grace has become almost completely detached from Christ and given over to a "substantial" Holy Spirit; it has even become earthed in created grace. His view is far from the Greek fathers, whose synergism, unlike the semi-Pelagianism of an Alexander, did not point to

82. K.Heim, Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den naturalichen Functionem des Menschen bei Alexander Halensis.
grace in man, but pointed to man being taken up by grace into God in personal communion. This becomes evident in quotations from two great fathers. "The Son of God became Son of Man so that the sons of men, that is, of Adam, might become sons of God ... partakers of the life of God ... Thus He is Son of God by nature, and we by grace." 83 "We are made partakers of the divine nature and are said to be sons of God, nay we are actually called divine, not only because we are exalted by grace to supernatural glory, but also because we have God dwelling in us." 84

Even though the Greek fathers may have had a less than biblical view of grace this evidently did not have the effect of concentrating man on himself. Grace was still something that drew man to God. Thus the Greek synergism would appear to be of different derivation from later medieval Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism which concentrated on man and his merits and was helped in this by the idea of created grace. Here God was in the background as a helper. Greek synergism did not leave God in the background; here, free man was brought into full communion with him. That was how they saw the working of grace. This is evident in a quotation from Macarius the Great (ca. 390), the emphasis and tone of which is far removed from the semi-Pelagianism of Alexander. Although grace is not mentioned it is obvious that this closely parallels the thinking of Athanasius and

Cyril, who were speaking of grace:

"And it is not the case, as some, misled by false doctrines, say, that man is totally dead and utterly unable to do anything good. For even a child, although it is not able to accomplish anything, nor to walk upon its feet to its mother, yet rolls upon the ground and calls and cries because it yearns for its mother. And this moves the mother's heart to pity, and she is pleased that her child, with struggle and with outcry, seeks to come to her. And although the child cannot come to her, yet the mother, in view of this great yearning of the child, goes to it, constrained by love for the child, takes it up and cherishes and feeds it with great love: this does also the man-loving God for the soul that approaches and yearns for him." 85

Between this kind of thinking and the thinking of Alexander comes Augustine (with the western tradition behind him). Augustine, with a neo-Platonic view of sin, according to Seeberg, affecting his view of grace 86, sees grace as something moving the will of man to bring about merits. After him the pattern is grace: merits rather than that found in the Greek fathers of grace: God. His view of grace is deterministic or nearly so in its thorough going predestinationism, and when those who followed him, possessing a view of grace similar to this, reacted against determinism as Alexander does, they could find the freedom in one place alone, in man's soul, for that is where grace pointed. The thought of Aristotle lent itself to this enterprise. This detached-substantial view of grace and the medieval view of man led to an inevitable minimising of the place of Christ and creates doubts as to the adequacy of the doctrine of the grace of union in maintaining the uniqueness of Christ.

86. Ibid. p.341.
CHAPTER 4

THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

i) The Knowledge and Ignorance of Christ

In distinction XIII two subjects closely related to the doctrine of grace and the union of two natures are discussed, namely, the knowledge and ignorance of Christ. The problem of the knowledge of Christ tends to receive monophysite solutions, either by the elimination of a human knowledge, or by the elimination of the Divine knowledge (kenoticism). Alexander’s tendency as will be seen, and as would be expected, is the former.

It is stated in this distinction that knowledge in Christ as man and knowledge in Christ as God differed because there was a diversity of natures. There were five "knowledges" in Christ; the Divine knowledge coinciding with the Divine nature, and four human "knowledges". These are the knowledge of the secrets of the incarnation by the grace of union; the knowledge of those things pertaining to beatitude by the grace of comprehension because he was a "comprehensor in via", that is, Christ was a partaker of glory on earth; the knowledge of those things made for him through an integrity of nature which he received from Adam; the knowledge of "natura poenalis" which he had and by which, through experience, he knew what he did not know previously. 1 This last knowledge underlines the true

1 d. XIII,10,pp;131•132.
humanity, our humanity, which some of the other knowledges do not.

In several ways Alexander is anxious to protect the Divine knowledge of Christ. In reply to the Nestorians who, according to Alexander, said that Christ was a mere man, with the aid of quotations from John of Damascus, Alexander states that Christ not only had "naturalia" and inhabiting grace, but he also had the grace of union. Thus his knowledge went beyond that of the natural abilities or that of the grace all Christians have. Pope Leo is quoted to the effect that in no way was Christ, the boy, dissimilar to other boys. It is then suggested that because of this Christ grew in knowledge but Alexander denies this. Further it is suggested that Christ should have had immediate perfection in his body just as he did in his soul. "L" adds to this discussion. It states that growing in knowledge for people apart from Christ is the result of sin and would not have been in Christ even if he had not been a "comprehensor" and even if he did not have the grace of union. This answer relates to the first suggestion in "AE". To the second and unanswered suggestion in "AE" which in "L" is related to the defects of the body and not merely to its growth, the answer is: "Christus venit ut solveret poenalitates pro nobis, quae solum sunt ex parte corporis; et ideo dotes corporis non habuit. Sed corpus fuit divinitate mediante anima vel virtute

2. 28(L), p.138; see also 11,p.132; John of Damascus, De Fide Orth. III, 22. 3. 12, p.132; Leo, Sermo 34, 3. 4. 29(L), p.138.
intellectuali ...; et ideo anima quoad intellectum et affectum plenitudinem scientiae et virtutis recepit." 5

The implication that the soul of Christ was almost non-human one would wish to question.

The question of the knowledge of Christ is also taken up in regard to ignorance. Anselm is quoted to refute the suggestion that Christ was ignorant because he was mortal.6

As part of Christ's knowledge it is also suggested that he would have known evil. In the comment in "AE" it is stated that evil is known ("cognoscitur") either through experience or through "per absentiam sui oppositi." In the latter way Christ had cognition of evil. 7 This cannot be what Alexander meant. As is often the case "L" is clearer.

"Dupliciter malum, sive culpae, sive poenae; vel per experientiam, vel per suum oppositum. Christus autem malum culpae per suum oppositum cognovit; malum autem poenae utroque modo." 8 In other words Christ was not guilty of himself, although he knew sin's punishment by experience. Further on it is stated that learning through experience did not preclude a foreknowledge of suffering by Christ, and such knowledge was not opposed to ignorance but rather to inexperience, that is, he had not experienced suffering in fact. This is in explanation of Hebrews 5:8, 2 Corinthians 5:21, Peter Lombard's comment "didicit per experientiam", and Anselm's comment "quod per scientiam ignorant, experimento

5. 30(L),p.138. 6. 13,pp.132-133; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 11,c.13. 7. 13,p.133. 8. 31(L),pp.138-139.
This knowledge of the experience of suffering did not remain in the state of comprehension as it is proper only to a "viator". And so *quando venerit perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est* (1 Cor. 13:10)  

Distinction XIV also treats of the matter of the knowledge of Christ. Much of the same ground is covered but there is also a comparison between Christ's knowledge and the knowledge of God. It is again stated that Christ increased in knowledge by experience.  

This differs from the "habitus" of "donum gratis datum" (presumably the "naturalia") by which Christ knows everything because the knowledge from experience is "ex multiplici dispositione praecedente" and the other is made "subito". Questions relating to Christ and the angels are also raised; they did not teach him and it seems that he did not teach them as man. Augustine is quoted stating that Christ knew everything at the same time and it is argued that since he was a "comprehensor" he knew everything at one glance. A different question is raised, but with similar implications to those in distinction XIII, as to whether Christ's knowledge was deliberative or elective both of which could indicate a limitation in Christ. John of Damascus provides the starting point for the answer: "In anima Christi non inquam consilium vel electionem. Non enim habuit

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9. 35(L), p.139; see also 16, p.133; Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, I, c.9.  
ignorantiam, etsi ignorantis naturae haec erat, sed tamen
secundum hypostasim unitam Deo Verbo habuit omnium cognitionem:
non gratia, sed, ut dictum est, propter eam quae secundum
hypostasim unitioneum." 16 In "L" this is taken as a denial
that Christ had deliberative knowledge but there is a comment
only on elective knowledge, that is, the knowledge which
separates good and evil: "Electio fuit in eo, non est ut in
via, sed ut in termino. Et Damascenus loquitur secundum quod
electio sumitur ut in via." 17 In "AE" the reply states that
deliberative knowledge is two-fold: "prout est in termino"
and so it was in Christ, and "prout est in via ad terminum"
and so it was not in Christ. 18 This is more or less the
same as saying that Christ was "comprehensor in via".

Thus it would appear, combining the thought of "L"
and "AE", that as man Christ did not grow in knowledge, nor
does it seem that he had to make real experimental decisions,
or make the choice between good and evil. This seems to
remove real choice and it has to be said that, although
Christ did choose good or was obedient, that does not mean
that his choice was not a real one. In other words, to use
Alexander's terminology, the choice had to be "in via" not
merely "in termino". The latter phrase may not be intended
to do so but it does seem to imply that for Christ as man
the choice was imposed from outside and did not derive from
himself at the moment of decision. Christ in fact, could not
sin because of what he was, or because he was obedient "in

16. John of Damascus, De Fide Orth.II,c.22. 17. 21(L),b)c)
pp.148-149. 18. 8,p.144.
via", and not because of some outside pattern. Certainly Alexander is trying to state in static terms the dynamic "has been tested every way only without sin." (Heb. 4:15) and his discussion does have a certain eschatological dimension, yet the terms in which he expresses this dynamic element, that is, in static terms and in the categories of time and timelessness, of finitude and the infinite, lend an air of unreality to the real deliberations, the real elections Christ had to make. He finds it hard to accept the fact that Christ became "sin for us". (2 Cor. 5:21).

Arising out of the use of phrase "naturae ignorantis" of John of Damascus there came a suggestion that the soul of Christ was ignorant. The reply to this suggestion is: "non sequitur de natura animae, sed natura humana; non tamen de ea ut in se consideratur." 19 Again the possibility of human limitations to Christ's knowledge has been removed. The phrase "non gratia" (that Christ had all cognition) in John also raised a problem but the grace, in solution of this problem, is taken to refer to general or adoptive grace, not to the grace of union. 20 But once again, it must be asked, if this grace is to do away with any characteristic of human knowledge, of finitude, how similar was Christ to man? In making certain of the Divinity of Christ in this way, is not Alexander in danger of losing the humanity? This is almost the reverse of kenoticism.

19. 21(L),d)p.149. 20. Footnote,p.144: 21(L),e)p.149.
It is also asked whether Christ had "limpidissimum scientiam" which, it is argued, would seem likely as his knowledge had no inter-mixture with its opposite, ignorance. Alexander comments that "perspicuitas scientiae" is either "impermixta" with its opposite and this is either its "privatio" which is ignorance or "negatio" which is "nescientia". 21 In "L" "limpidissimum" is defined as follows: "limpidissimum dicitur non habet de suo contrario sibi permixtum. Sed hoc potest esse quatuor modis quia impermixtum potest dicere remotionem oppositi quod est nescientia, vel quod est ignorantia, vel impermixtionem passibilitatis ex parte recepturi, vel (in) permixtionem unionis ex parte receptivae potentiae." 22 In the state of innocence for Adam and the angels there was no ignorance, in the state of glory there will be no possibility or ignorance, but some "nescientia" will exist till judgement day. None of these three, states Alexander, were in the knowledge of Christ "permixta tamen erat secundum quod unita erat principio sciendi, scilicet extra." 22 Although there may be a suggestion in the footnote of pp.133-134 that Christ had "nescientia" (and perhaps this is the implication of the comment from "AE"), yet the general tenor of these arguments is the same as before: Christ as man had full and perfect knowledge, a knowledge of which it might be asked whether it had the mark of finitude. Christ knew everything at the same time and all at the one glance and with the utmost clarity.

In a similar vein there is a comment in distinction XVI on the contemplation of God by Christ. It is noted that there was a contemplation in the identity of nature and so Christ did perfectly contemplate God as the Son of God; in the identity of person and so Christ, the man, contemplated God perfectly; there is a contemplation of God by a person in the identity of a "specialis natura" and so a pure man in paradise perfectly contemplates God; there is a contemplation in its own nature, not through identity but through glory only, and so only the angels contemplate God perfectly. 23 The possibility that Christ's contemplation did not pertain to the state of glory because it was "in via" is denied because his contemplation was not "de via". 24

The argument here is somewhat like the fundamentalist argument on the Bible: it is the Word of God therefore it is infallible in all respects and in all things. This is not to judge the Bible on its own ground. Similarly to argue: Christ is the Son of God, therefore he knows all things is not to argue from God in Christ as revealed in Scriptures but is to argue from a preconceived idea of a God who cannot take the form of a servant although he was in the form of God; it is a God who cannot have anything to do with finitude or its marks.

In spite of all this, there is an attempt by Alexander to state the human limitations of knowledge in Christ — although a statement that the soul of Christ "ita

tot scit, quot ipse Deus vel Filius Dei" through grace and not by nature 25 does cast doubt even upon the following attempt. Hugo of St. Victor had made a similar statement when he said the soul of Christ was "aeque sapiens non tamen aequalis in sapientia." Alexander's comment on this is as follows: "ad quod scienendum quod 'aeque' dictur sapiens, quoniam tot scit; sed non 'aequalis' dicitur, quia Deus clarius et limpidius scit quam anima Christi, quoniam 'Filius Dei habet per naturam hoc quod anima Christi habet per gratiam". 26 In the footnote it is explained that the "'aeque' sapiens" refers to the number of things known according to theoretical knowledge. 27 "L" explains why there is not "aequalis scientia". ('Sapientia' and 'scientia' are used interchangeably here). "Aequalis enim respicit non numerum scitorum, sed modum scientiae et unitatem scientiae." 28 Thus what is known is equal but not the knower or the knowing. A similar distinction is made when it is asked whether the soul of Christ had knowledge of creation. The soul of Christ, it is answered, had a "cognitiva" knowledge of everything but it did not have an "operativa" knowledge of everything. 29 There is the suggestion raised in a footnote that such knowledge would not be knowable by a pure creature, but there is the answer: "Unde contulit animae Christi quantum potuit purae creaturae conferre" as Christ had the fulness of knowledge "sine mensura". 30 In kenoticism this is the sort of language used of the Divine knowledge in Christ;

here it is meant to refer to his human knowledge. As the one does not go far enough in asserting the Divinity, the other has gone too far in denying the humanness. It does seem to remove Christ a great deal from the human and sinful situation in which man lives.

In regard to both "voluntas" and "potentia" a similar distinction is made between the cognitive and the operative so that Christ's soul is said not to have had the operative "voluntas" nor did he receive omnipotence as he received omniscience (omniscience does not posit causality.)

In both of these aspects Alexander's solution seems more compatible with Christ's humanity simply because the operative element is absent. In regard to knowledge, however, the cognitive element appears to be the essence of the knowledge and the cognitive-operative distinction has its limitations except as a way of affirming that the soul of Christ was not equal in knowledge to the knowledge of God.

The problem of the knowledge of Christ is always a most difficult subject and criticism of a point of view is far easier than a positive affirmation about it. There are, however, several problems in the foregoing discussion. Firstly, the possibility that Christ was limited in his human knowledge is not admitted in spite of Pope Leo's statement that the boy Christ was in no way different from other boys. Allied with this, is the hint that any growth, even of the body, is a sign of corruption. This position of Alexander

31. 14,p.146.
cannot be regarded as satisfactory and raises doubts as to the real humanity of Christ. Ignorance is equated with imperfection and yet it is part of finitude to be lacking in full knowledge; it is a part of humanity and it was Adam's sin not to accept this limitation. Behind this position of Alexander, besides the attempt to maintain the Divinity of Christ, there lies the idea that the movement of time and change are corrupt or at least incompatible with God who is timeless and changeless. A negative theology too rigorously applied may limit the concept of God and makes incarnational theology difficult at best. The second problem is that the body but not the soul of Christ had experimental knowledge of punishment. There was no sign of "corruption" in the soul of Christ at all. (A side question here is, if the soul could not suffer penalties which the body had to for man, why was Christ's body not also exempted as that was equally Divine, equally human ) The serious problem is the possibility that, if Christ's soul did not suffer, - temptations, the anguish of Gethsemane, surely belong to the rational part of the soul - then Christ was not tested as we are, in fact, he was not really man as far as his soul was concerned. Again, behind this thinking is the idea that merely to step into this corrupt world is to be corrupt. (This is seen, for instance, in the result of original sin; to be born is to incur "fomes" which is propensity to sin and a cause of sin, a "macula" which is "carentia debitae iustitiae." 32 ) This kind of concept

approaches actual dualism rather than Christian dualism which
maintains that evil is not part of creation as such and
therefore the finite is not imperfect as such. The problems
involved in the division of soul and body (or a similar
division) are discussed especially in the following sections
of this chapter. The third problem which is closely connected
with the second, is the fact that Christ is said to have
"evacuated" his knowledge of the experience of his suffering
when he left this world. This raises two questions: i) can
it be claimed then that he was more than just the appearance
of man, not really taking humanity up into himself. Not only
in regard to the experience of suffering must one ask this
question but also one must ask whether Christ's elective and
deliberative knowledge being "in termino" really involved the
taking of our humanity into his or is the humanity so removed
from ours as to be irrelevant or even not humanity at all? ;
ii) a related question is: what of the eternal intercession
and advocacy of Christ on our behalf? Can he intercede if
he has "forgotten", that is, if he is no longer one of us or
if he is "in termino" and not "in via"? (cf. Heb. 4:4-16)
The biblical position would appear to be that our humanity,
finite humanity, is taken up in Christ to the Father for ever
and that it is by this that humanity is justified and sanctified.
(Perhaps it is significant that, according to Alexander, once
Christ has performed his task of satisfaction he can then
discard his humanity i.e. grace does the rest.) The
humanness of humanity, that is, finite knowledge and experience,
is not something to be left behind. This position, again,
involves great difficulties but some concession has to be made
towards it or a purely monophysite position is taken up.

There have been two errors made by Alexander here. If he noted these he would not have solved his problems but he would have been prevented in going too far towards the deification of Christ's humanity. First, he has not worked within the formula of Chalcedon but rather has been very much nearer to an Apollinarian position. For instance, what he means by "anima" is rarely clear but here as elsewhere the "without division, separation, change, or confusion" should operate. "Anima Christi" and "Christus" are used interchangeably 33, and as "anima" is creaturely 34 the result then should be that when one reads "anima Christi" then it can be taken to mean Christ with certainly a human reference. But then the "anima Christi" cannot be simply identified with "God" as seems almost to be the case. The soul of Christ is related to "God" - or the Father - in the Son, that is, in the Person in whom the humanity is hypostasised and in whom a real twoness, that is, of full man and full God, is possible. This means that in the soul there is also full God and full man. This leads to the second and more fundamental error that Alexander has made, the fact that he does not work within the Trinitarian framework so that the God he sees in the union is not only the second Person but God in toto (i.e. God in three persons or God in himself). To ally this conception with the idea of God as the One who cannot become flesh, the God defined in terms of omnipotence and omniscience

apart from Christ, and not in terms of the Son who became the servant, means that the humanity of Christ understood in the context of a God so conceived must tend to become absorbed into the Divinity to have any contact at all. Alexander has not adhered to a distinction which he had made previously (to ensure the honour of God, it should be noted, not to state the possibility within God of the incarnation i.e. for the same reason as he equates the terms here) that "God" refers both to "nature" and to "Person" but this must not mean the simple equation of "nature" and "Person" (an equation which he tended to make however when he moved from the uniting to the union). Here, in this discussion, "God" has been thought of interchangeably as "nature" and "Person". This "nature" of God is defined in terms of the One, and not in terms of the self-expressing Creator God. Thus the "humanity of God" becomes very nearly conceptually impossible. In spite of this Alexander and a great part of the history of Christian doctrine have steadfastly tried to maintain, within these terms, the incarnation of the Son of God, and, it must be admitted, have succeeded to such an extent in taking it seriously that the theology of the twentieth century can cut directly across the same presuppositions and yet maintain that it is perfectly orthodox, simply because, like its predecessors, it had to take the incarnation seriously.

ii) Possibility.
In distinction XV Alexander is on solidly traditional ground in regard to the passion of Christ. According to John of Damascus, who is quoted without comment, Christ assumed "omnes naturales et indetractibles passiones", taking upon himself all those things which are of man "praeter peccatum" which comes from the Devil and not from God. 36 But this is as far as Alexander or tradition goes and the reason for this is simple when one considers various definitions of "passiones": "Passio est motus irrationalis animae suspicionem boni et mali," 37 or "Motus... secundum... quod immoderato et praeter naturam, passiones sunt," 38 or the comment of "L" on this, quoting Aristotle, "passiones involuntariae sunt," 39 and so Alexander can state simply "Christus non habuit passiones" as a comment on Dionysius' statement: "Qui enim sunt veritatis amatores, a passione recedunt materialium." 40 Consequently, having described "passiones" as irrational, immoderate, and involuntary so that the word approaches the meaning of the modern English word passion as commonly used, and although it is also in Latin applied to Christ's suffering (as the "Passion of Christ" in modern English), it can be applied to Christ only with utmost caution.

The fact that the idea of passion spills over into the idea of suffering means that the latter is tarred with the same brush which raises considerable problems. Quotations

37. 5,p.152; John of Damascus, Ibid.II,c.22. 38. 11,p.154; Nemesius, De Natura Hominis,c.16. 39. 32(L),p.161; Aristotle, Ethica Nicom.II,c.5. 40. 8,p.153; Dionysius, Epist.10 (ad Ioan.Evang.)
from Seneca \textsuperscript{41} John of Damascus \textsuperscript{42}, and Hilary particularly demonstrate the interchangeability of meaning. For instance in Hilary:

"Cum haec passionum genera infirmitatem carnis afficiant, Deus, cum Verbum caro factum est, non potuit a se demutabilis esse patiendo. Verbum enim, quoniam caro factum est, licet passioni se subverterit, non tamen demutatum est passibilitate patiendi. Nam pati potuit, passibile esse non potuit; quoniam passibilitas naturae infirmae significatio est, passio autem est eorum quae sunt illata perpassio." \textsuperscript{43}

Hilary obviously is referring to Christ's suffering but equally obviously the meaning "passion" is included in the thinking on suffering. The fact that Alexander sees fit to quote this where he is discussing "passions" is evidence that he did not see any difference in meaning between the words "passion" and "suffering". However, as the quotation from Hilary makes evident, Christ did suffer in some way, a fact which obviously could not be avoided in a biblically based cross-centred Christology. It is true that Christ did not suffer for himself, that is, for his own faults, as is beautifully stated by Ambrose in a quotation used by Alexander:

"Confidenter tristitiam nomino, qui crucem praedico. Ut homo habuit tristitiam, quam meo suscepit affectu: mihi compatitur, mihi tristis est, mihi dolet. Ergo pro me et in me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit quod doleret. Doles igitur, Domine Iesu, mea vulnera, non tua; quia tu non pro te, sed pro me doles." \textsuperscript{44} The fact that the cause of Christ's

\textsuperscript{41} 14, pp.155-156; Seneca, \textit{De Constantia sapientis}, c.3.
\textsuperscript{42} 16, p.156; John of Damascus, \textit{De Fide Orth.} III, c.26.
\textsuperscript{43} 20, p.157; Hilary, \textit{De Synodis}, n.49.
\textsuperscript{44} Ambrose, \textit{De Trinitate}, Lib.II, c.7, n.53; 30(L), p.160.
suffering lay outside himself nobody could or would deny. Christ suffered for others. This fact Peter Lombard also expressed when he said "oravit pro nobis et totum fecit, et non pro se, quoniam non timore mortis, sed causa nostrae salutis oravit." However, it is one thing to state that Christ suffered on our behalf and it is another thing to talk about Christ's "propassions", or to throw doubt on the extent of Christ's suffering.

The basis of the idea of propassion and similar ideas is found in the traditional objection to passion (in the modern sense) so that Christ is said not to have suffered passion (which implies culpability) but only from its results. This we see in the following quotation:

"Nota quod est infirmitas movens illecebras, ut voluptatem. Est etiam infirmitas movens angustias culpabiles. Est etiam infirmitas movens angustias poenales et non culpabiles; et talis dividitur in passionem et propassionem. Prima autem non erat in Christo; secunda autem erat in Christo. Unde propassio in Christo erat, quoniam illa surgit in nobis volentibus. Passio est autem illa inclinatio, quae est inordinatio, ad consensum." 46

The first distinction between an infirmity which is culpable and an infirmity which leads to punishment and non-culpability is compatible with the position of Ambrose, as stated, and is perfectly acceptable, but the division within the non-culpable infirmities (the penal infirmities) between passion and propassion is more questionable. It has been admitted that passion in the modern sense is unacceptable

46. 5, p.152.
in relation to Christ but the problem lies in the fact that the Latin word "passio" covers both the meaning "passion" and the meaning "suffering". Thus Christ is said not to have suffered but to have "prosuffered". Further, if the word "passio" does mean only passion, there must be some doubt as to whether the concept "propassio" needs to be used because, according to the quotation, "passio" is non culpable, that is, no sin arises, only an inclination. If this "passio" is excluded it may be wondered whether Christ was "tempted like as we are, except without sin."

However, it is the element of suffering in "passio" that is now of interest and this is probably more decisive in the understanding of Christology in regard to the humanity of Christ. It is in the marginal notes of Codex "A" that the clearest statements appear but these are in the same tenor as the other parts: "Nihil repentinum ex parte superioris rationis; ex parte vero sensualitatis aliquid fuit subitum, et hoc modo propassio." 47 This was the answer to the suggestion that there could have been nothing sudden or unforeseen in Christ. In the same section there is this note after the answer to the question whether Christ could have suffered in the superior part of the reason or not: "In Christo ratio superior ut ratio, prout ordinatur ad corpus, passibilis fuit et patiebatur; non autem prout uniebatur divinitati." 48 This distinction between the superior (Godward) and the inferior (bodyward) part of reason is also

47. 54,e,p.169. 48. 54,g,p.170.
found in another statement commenting on a passage attributed to Jerome in which propassion was seen as a venial sin. 49 It was stated that this passion was not in Christ, "est autem passio secundum integram naturam sensualitatis et haec fuit in Christo." 50 The distinction within the soul is described most clearly when Alexander replies to the question whether Christ was "passibilis... secundum corpus" in which answer the place of the soul in this regard is discussed:

"potest sumi anima ut anima, et sic dicit comparationem ad corpus cui unita est; vel anima ut spiritus in quantum coniuncta est divinitat. Primo modo passibilis est, secundo modo non, scilicet secundum rationem. Praeterea 'pati' dicit actum, 'passibilis' dicit naturam; inde, cum natura patiendi non sit in Deo, non potest dicit passibilis tamen dicitur 'passus' propter coniunctionem in quantum homo." 51

The distinction of act and nature is expressed in another way in Codex "A" in the solution to the question whether Christ suffered according to the superior part of reason or not: "Concede quod secundum quod comprehensor nullam sustinuit passionem, sed in quantum viator fuit." 52 Thus there have been several ways of expressing the Godward and the bodyward elements in Christ. The relation of these various statements is not clear but if the main distinctions or points are listed the pattern becomes clear. a) In the superior part of the reason there is no suffering but there is in the sensuality; b) in the superior part of the reason

as reason united to divinity there is no suffering but the superior part of reason as reason in relation to the body was sufferable and suffered; c) when it is suggested that propassion is venial it is stated that suffering existed in the sensuality (cf. a); d) the soul as soul in its relation to the body, to which it is united, is sufferable but the soul as spirit, that is, according to reason, is not (this is similar to but not the same as b); e) Christ "suffered" in act but he was not subject to suffering by nature, i.e. he was not "sufferable"; f) he did not suffer in the superior part of reason as a "comprehensor" but did as a "viator". This last could be applied to all the preceding points. 53

The problem here is very similar to the problem of the knowledge of Christ. Once again the Divine man seems to have been unable to have much contact with the manness, in this case, the suffering of man. In all these contrasts there is essentially an Apollinarian viewpoint expressed and even a hint of doceticism, namely, that Christ appeared to be man (in act) but was not actually man (not sufferable). The accusation of Apollinarianism is surely not extravagant for there seems to be nothing human at all in the spiritual part of the soul (the Godward element), an accusation which might be supported by the fact that Alexander maintains there was something which suffered in Christ, the inferior part of the

53. See p. 217f. below. The same kind of divisions are made in relation to merit. In that discussion it does appear that the body and God have a very similar relation to the soul in Christ. Thus, is the soul the mediator?
reason related to the body, the sensuality. If the spiritual part of the soul was not liable to suffering, then it seems wrong to admit suffering of any description in Christ, who was, after all, totally the full man and full God. If, however, any part of Christ was not subject to suffering and the other part was, then there appears to be an Apollinarian division in Christ. One can see the dangers that Alexander is guarding against and the point he is making. The dangers are the possibility of sin being attributed to Christ and of patriformism. (In the rejection of suffering, however, as seen in the quotation on the bottom of page Alexander has the same presupposition as the patriformists, namely, that "God" (either as "Father" or "all" God) was in the incarnation. Alexander concludes, however, going further, that antipatriformism requires that Christ as "God" was not "passibilis".) The point Alexander is making is that Christ was buffeted by suffering and passions and yet withstood their temptations. Nevertheless, the way of expressing this point is inadequate for Christ was not only buffeted from without or bodily but also from within or in the superior (Godward) part of the soul, to use the language of Alexander; he was not only buffeted in a part of his soul but he was also buffeted totally by temptation and suffering, that is, he took them upon himself, he was a man of men. There can be no doubt that he consented to suffering and so used the total mind. It would be truer to the biblical picture possibly, in drawing upon the daring words of Paul that Christ became "sin for us", 
to reverse Alexander's position to state that Christ was
"passibilis", that is, fallen or by nature subject to
suffering and passion, but that he did not fall in "act".
Christ took original sin upon himself. Such was the
condescension of the Father in the Son to man. Yet Christ
did not incur guilt himself; through his obedience to God
Christ did not sin himself.

Alexander could not have possibly said this because
to partake of full manhood, to partake of finitude, to
partake of change and corruption, in themselves tend to
corruption, to sin. Under such terms a full incarnation
would be impossible — God and man could have no point of
contact in the Son because creation by its present nature
excludes God. If sin is creation's breaking away from God,
and God is seen as the "One" unable to come into contact with
accidents and not as the Trinity who makes the "nevertheless"
in the Son, who is obedient amidst disobedience, then it
would appear that creation itself is sinful. If belonging
to creation is sinful inevitably, so too would the Son (of
the "One") have been if he became sufferable, that is, if he
became really part of creation by becoming man. However,
finitude, change, creation of themselves, that is, as part of
God's creation, are not sinful; only the disobedience of the
finite and the changing is, and this disobedience the Son of
Man overcame by his own obedience to the Father in the finite.
The circle of sin was thus broken. To put it another way. The
Reconciler does not by his incarnation partake of the separation
of creation; rather separated creation is reconciled by the Reconciler only because he has crossed the gap between God and separated creation. Alexander does not begin completely from this fact of the "Word made flesh" to state the possibilities of God in suffering, but rather from a God apart from Christ. Hence his Apollinarian or even docetic position arises.

This is essentially Alexander's position for all practical purposes. The affirmation "and behold it was very good" affirmed in Christ, is not taken with complete seriousness. A practical dualism is the result. The fact that all men are sinners begins to become an assertion of the sinfulness of creation.

This sinfulness in Alexander's view, however, does not necessarily exclude some element of goodness; it means merely that there is nothing perfectly good. Consequently there is a complementary position which arises in part out of the belief in the incompatibility of Creator and creation because of the Creator's inability to make contact, and that is for the creation to make contact. Creation makes contact by the superior part of reason which is the "Divine" part. In man it is subject to sin but has an ability for God and can be purified; in Christ the soul practically becomes Divine - at worst an Apollinarian view, at best a Eutychean view of the soul. Creation's ability to make contact in a more obviously human form than in Christ as presented by Alexander is found in the concepts of the free will and created grace. These doctrines are discussed in a separate chapter.
Before this particular discussion is brought to a close the way Alexander sees fear, grief, and sadness, the concrete "passions" in Christ should be investigated as this bears on the problem. As passion they are excluded but there is also, therefore, a tendency to exclude the human.

At the beginning of distinction XV Alexander states that if "timor" and "dolor" were in Christ "secundum aliquam vim animae" it was in the "vim sensibile." 54 Then there arises the problem of the relationship of fear to the body. Fear, says Alexander, is not in the soul through the body but something is made in the body from fear "ut pallor et huiusmodi." 55 This is not particularly significant but of more significance is the statement which follows a little later: "Est unus timor in quo non compatitur corpus, et alius in quo compatitur corpus /scilicet timor materialis et timor rei novicae 56/; ut timens Deum timore filiali vel timore obedientiae, non patitur secundum corpus; sed quando timet gladium vel aliquid terrible extrinsecum, tunc compatitur corpus." 57 (Potest tamen dici facilius quod timor non sentitur per corpus, licet, passionem efficiat in corpore." 58) The parallel passage in "L" points out that the body does not suffer in filial fear because filial fear exists "in patria." 59 If one looks for a sign of humanity in this fear then this search would apparently be in vain for it has little if anything to do with sinful humanity and would

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54. 1, p.150. 55. Ibid. 56. Footnote, p.150. 57. 1, pp.150-151. 58. Footnote, p.151. 59. 22(L), p.158.
be better classed as a virtue, certainly not as a "passion". 60
Natural fear or the fear of material punishment (as it is in "I") gets nearer to humanity but still it has little to do with our sinful humanity and its problems.

The problem of fear is again discussed at some length later in the distinction. Several fears are listed: natural fear by which the soul does not wish to separate from the body; reverential fear which is "secundum rationem" and will remain in paradise; initial fear which is the doubt as to whether one can satisfy for one's sin or not; servile fear which is the fear of eternal punishment; worldly fear in which we fear the loss of worldly goods; human fear in which we fear wounds and the like; sensual fear which is twofold: that common to men and animals, or that in man only and this is twofold also: "aut est ut fuit ille quem habuit ante peccatum, aut est ut est corruptae naturae per peccatum. Primo modo dicitur timor irrationalis impetus ex terribili apprehenso; secundo modo est timor propassio." And so Jerome said "subitus motus cui non consentitur propassio est; accedente autem consensu, passio est, et tunc more in domo." 61

This passage attributed to Jerome has been referred to before and raised a difficulty, which is referred to in "I", because the propassion of this passage is described as venial and therefore was not in Christ at all. (The usage appears to be different from what Alexander on other occasions has in mind.)

60. See chapter on grace. 61. 9, pp.153-154. 62. See page 195.
Then in this same section of "L" in which the various fears are also listed the following comment is made: "Est autem passio secundum integram naturam sensualitatis, et haec fuit in Christo. Timor reverentiae fuit in Christo secundum superiorem partem rationis. Timor naturalis fuit in eo secundum inferiorem naturam; timor mundanus, humanus, vel initialis, vel servilis, non." 63 Reverential fear is obviously the same or almost the same as filial fear; certainly it is in the same category. Natural fear, here the fear of death, does come nearer our sinful humanity but it is in the inferior part of the reason or the soul and as such could not be the fear which gripped the whole Christ in the garden of Gethsemane or particularly in the cry of dereliction. It is not the fear that humanity has and Christ had and this is made abundantly clear in the statement "Christus autem amore naturali mori timuit; appetitur autem rationali voluit mori." 64 One feels that there is something of a suggestion of a fraud in this statement; Christ would have escaped from the real fear of death and the fear of separation from God. To be sure, it cannot be said that Christ did not have a certainty but it was a certainty held against uncertainty. In Christ the assurance and the fear were held together, the "No" and "Yes" of God were held together, at the same level and in the total man. It was the obedience, not the rational, which was decisive. Alexander does not see it this way; the "No" is in the

63. 31(L),b)p.161. 64. 31(L),a)p.161; see also 12,p.155.
background, inferior to the "Yes", and is not part of the total Christ. Yet it is only when man sees Christ taking God's "No" upon himself, in its full force, in all its aspects, that man is also certain of God's "Yes" to him. A Christ who had only reverential fear in his whole person makes one ask whether the Eternal has taken our time to Himself. In Alexander's view of Christ the Eternal merely exists along side our time in an Apollinarian way.

The reason for Alexander's position on fear is stated clearly: "Christus non habuit timorem, quoniam non habuit causam timoris, id est peccatum; et quoniam non ex necessitate, ut nos, sed ipse quia voluit, timuit; et quoniam non timorem habuit passionem, sed propassionem; et quoniam non eo fine quo nos. Et sic patet qualiter per omnes causas timoris removetur timor ab ipso." 65 For the same reason "ira cum perturbatione" could not be present 66; "ira per zelum" as act but not as "passio" could have been in Christ 67; "tristitia" and "dolor" could have been only in the inferior part of reason 68, or as a propassion 69; and it is explained that Christ was sad not for his own condition but for the corruption of our infirmity (Peter Lombard). 70 Thus Alexander effectively excludes any possibility of conceiving Christ as a sinner but he also limits drastically the possibility of conceiving his co-

humanity with us, that is, as one who accepted the

65. 10, p.154. 66. 3, p.151; 28(L), a)p.159. 67. 6, pp.152-153; 28(L), b)c)pp.159-160. 68. 4, pp.151-152. 69. 26(L), p.159. 70. 17, p.156; Glossa in Ps.30.
consequences of our sin, its inevitable corruption. Behind this failure once again lie the twin presuppositions: the idea of God as the "One" and immutable; and the idea that the temporal and changing as such are corrupt, that is, are evidence of passion. His presupposition that passions (as sin) are impossible in Christ must be accepted, but his extension of the meaning of "passio" to include suffering or the results of sin, and, in fact, "humanity" or "temporality" is not acceptable. In the company of much theology he has excluded one Greek element of gods with passions and defended himself against Patrīpassianism only to include another basically Greek element of God as immutable, and immutability as the "good" which excludes far more than passions.

There are finally two matters raised on the subject of the defects or passions in relation to Christ and these are important to demonstrate that "passio" does mean "suffering" and also to demonstrate what has already been stated on the limited Christology of Alexander. The question arises as to why Christ assumed defects. Peter Lombard's answer had been that Christ thus showed a true humanity, fulfilled the work for which he had come, and had given us hope. Alexander states that the first reason refers to the "naturam susceptam", the second "ad medicamentum vulneris", and the third "ad spem meriti. Plures non possunt esse gradus; vel ratione naturae sumptae, vel liberando a malo, vel erigendo ad bonum." 71 "E" is similar but adds after

71. 25(L), b)p.159.
the second reason "scilicet solutionem poenae". 72

Obviously the defects include the suffering of Christ and so "passio" must be understood to mean both "passion" and "suffering". This presupposition leads, as has been seen, to a limitation of the humanity of Christ; and the "ad ostensionem verae humanitatis" is lacking in that a full bodied view of Christ, who rendered not only passive obedience but also active obedience, is not fully developed. The person and work of Christ is limited practically to satisfaction (that is, to passive obedience) for his defects were "ad speam meriti"; that is, they are merely an example of what can be done. Consequently, from this direction there is no movement towards a broader and fuller view of the humanity of Christ to combat any Apollinarian tendencies. Satisfaction in Alexander demands only "a man", not a man who renews our sinful humanity by including in himself the whole of sinful humanity. To Alexander satisfaction is basically a transaction just between Christ and God to make amends for original sin. Man's restoration from sin hardly finds a place in Alexander's view of Christ.

iii) The two wills

In distinction XVII the matter of the two wills in Christ is discussed. Significantly, it is not the human will and the Divine will, but the sensual will and the rational will.

72. 47(E), p.165.
Peter Lombard is claimed to have said "spiritus movetur sursum, caro autem deorsum." 73 Alexander comments that sometimes the sensual will wishes something, but the reason will not; sometimes the sensual will wishes something and the reason wills to wish that; sometimes the sensual will wishes something and the reason wills its opposite. Augustine is quoted to have said "omnia pacificata in Christo", 74 and therefore in him the flesh does not will against the spirit. 75

At this point there are these bare comments and there are no solutions given. The footnote (L), going on from where "AE" left off, states, however, that the sensual will in Christ was not contrary to the rational. 76 And in "L": "motu sensualitatis nihil voluit quin ratio voluerit ipsam hoc velle; nec sequitur contrarietas in voluntatibus, nisi sit ex parte volitorum et iudicis, id est materiae et primi moventis." 77 This movement in Christ was meritorious because all his movements were under reason and so every movement was ordained. 78 The Divine will, as stated in another section, according to John of Damascus, permitted Christ to suffer what was "propria" naturally, for instance, in the death of Christ where both as God and as man Christ handed himself over to death. 79 There is no comment on the quotation from John in "AE" but in "L" after the quotation it is suggested that Christ's prayer, "Pater, si possibile est", was not in the sensual. The reply is: "Ista conditio (the prayer) /cadit/

73. Not found in Peter. 74. Probably Alanus ab Insulis, Sententiae, n.23. 75. 4,p.175. 76. Footnote,p.175. 77. 16(L),p.179. 78. 3,p.175. 79. 6,p.176; John of Damascus, De Fide Orth.III,c.18.
Thus Christ's prayer was subjected to the superior reason and the prayer itself (as indicated elsewhere) was not from the higher rational man. The discussion, it should be noted, is transferred from the problem of the Divine and human wills (as it is in John of Damascus) to a problem of the rational and sensual wills. Alexander further states that these wills, two according to number, are so ordered that one is subject to the other in Christ, but in us one always tends downwards, the other tends upwards. Then again, Alexander states, if it is admitted that there was a sensual movement in Christ it was either ordered or not. If it was ordered he did not repel it; if it was not ordered he did not approve it. The solution to this is that Christ approved the movement arising but did not approve it proceeding. The sensual movement was ordained "quoniam debitus erat, et quoniam indicativus suae humanitatis, et quoniam rectus."

The division of Christ into rational and sensual parts has already been discussed in section ii) of this chapter. It is significant (and it maintains an assertion that has been made in this chapter that Alexander is Apollinarian) that the wills discussed are not the Divine and human wills but the rational and sensual wills. Here, however, an aspect which was hardly touched upon in section ii) must now be raised. In Alexander's terms, is it really possible that

80. 18(L), p.179.  81. d.XV,31(L),a)p.161.  82. d.XVII,10, p.177.  83. 11,p.177.
Christ could have had a sensual part? If it is wrong for him to have had passion in his rational part, then it would appear to be wrong for him to have had something at least like it in his sensual part, for that was as much a part of the Son of God or the Son of Man as the rational. Can there be any suggestion at all of "caro autem deorsum?" If this was so, then in Alexander's terms God can have nothing to do with the fleshly or sensual at all. Alexander states that Christ had this "surge" which is described as a downward trend, and which is controlled by the rational - but this must mean that the downward trend, that is, the move towards sin, was also part of the Son of God which would appear to be an impossibility.

The footnote "et ita voluntas sensualitatis in ipso non fuit contraria voluntate rationis" 84 is an attempt to get around the problem but, in fact, it just points up the fact that there is a suggestion that the sensuality, unlike other parts of Christ, needed controlling. The idea of an upward and downward trend may have something to it if it was a matter of the Divine and human wills, and even then it would be very doubtful, but to have it as a division within the Son of God (or the Son of Man) of itself practically admits a sinful tendency in Christ in his sensuality, to be sure, controlled, yet not as categorical as the "yet without sin" of Hebrews. In Alexander Christ's sinlessness is maintained because the temptation and the power of sin are minimised. It is accepted

84. Footnote, p.175.
that Christ is in some way man - Chalcedon had stated that - but the God in Christ is not understood to be capable of union, and humanity (in Christ), qua humanity and over against a God who hesitated at incarnation, was prone to sin. Consequently this humanity and this God are to be kept apart in the sensual and the rational. However, this is not the view of the Bible where Christ's sinlessness is an amazing 'in spite of'. There the Word is not "almost man"; he is man and yet sinless.

Alexander does not understand the division into the rational and sensual to be within the Son of God or within the Son of Man; the division is between the "man" element and the "God" element in Christ. The dualism in which the flesh tends downwards and the spirit upwards pushes Alexander very near to Apollinarianism. The division of Christ in this way and the use of the division at this point are evidence of the fact that Alexander, in spite of the incarnation, draws back from the idea of the Son of God stepping into a sinful world. It should be noted that the problem of the Son of God coming into the world, as it is found in Alexander, arises only when it is believed that the flesh bears downwards, that is, if the temporal and the changing are thought to be corrupt as such; if this is held not to be so, that in Christ it is seen that this need not be so, then the problem of the incarnation at this point is resolved for dualism is rejected.

In this distinction Alexander has been discussing two wills. There have been two usages already - the Divine will and the human will (to which John of Damascus refers) and
the rational will and the sensual will. However, Alexander is quite aware of the different usages of the word "voluntas" for he lists a number. a) Christ has one will for himself and another for the members; b) the will for himself was either natural as the Son of God or natural as the Son of Man (the human declined death, the Divine wished to die); c) the natural human will was either natural in itself or "ex ordine ad divinam naturam" and so "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak"; d) the natural will in itself was either rational or sensual; e) the rational element was also twofold as it was moved either by the sensual or the Divine; f) there is a will of man (of the "ratio") in itself, and another of the same as it is united to the Divine. Of these only the second (b) has anything really to do with the doctrine of two natures in the one Person in Christ and consequently with the early Church's debate on the wills of Christ. It is not the distinction with which Alexander has been concerned.

iv) **Humbling and exaltation.**

The tension between mutability and immutability, time and eternity, in Alexander as applied to his thinking on Christ is seen again in his discussion of the incarnation and resurrection. Following the thinking of Anselm and Peter Lombard, Alexander quotes another statement of Peter Lombard

on the exaltation of Christ in the resurrection: "divina natura dicitur exaltata per ostensionem, quoniam coepit sciri quod erat; sicut in assumptione carnis exinanita, quoniam apparuit quod non erat." 89 Thus it might seem that the Son's coming was only an appearance. This same element is seen again in Alexander's answer to the question why the Divine nature was said not to be humbled in the union, just as the human was said to be exalted: "Dicendum quod in illa unione non mutatur divina in aliqua, sed humana." 90

If Alexander is saying that God did not change into man (on one interpretation of this passage) then by inference he is also saying that in the exaltation the human nature must have become something very near God, in other words, here is a form of monophysitism. But if, on the other hand, Alexander is not saying that God did not change, but rather is saying that He was not humbled, then he also seems to be saying that the Word did not become flesh yet all the same the human nature was exalted to be with God. Alexander would not admit a difference between "changed" and "humbled" but if he does not then the incarnation, in his terms, is an impossibility and man's exaltation, which depends absolutely upon the humbling of the Son of God, is also an impossibility. In "L" the answer is different but no less unsatisfactory: "dicendum aliud quod unio, quae erat medium inter divinam et humanam naturam, tantum transmutavit humanam. Non enim alterum illorum extremorum erat

89. 3,p.190; Peter, loc.cit. 90. 3,b)p.191.
transmutabile." 91 This attempts to avoid the inference that either the Divine nature or the human nature changed but Alexander seems to arrive at a "tertium quid" which still is hardly human. If anything the possibility of union appears to lie in the humanity. Alexander's position seems to be in flat contradiction to Philippians 2:5-11 upon which Peter was commenting.

To be fair to Alexander, he is trying to be true to the humiliation and the exaltation of Christ and in so doing to protect the Deity of Christ - a very difficult problem. However, he is attempting to do this with apparently the unbiblical presupposition of God as the "immutable One" and not with the Trinitarian presupposition that God in the Son humbled himself in the incarnation, a humbling which was founded in the nature of the Trinity itself.

The tendency towards what must be called docetic Christology in Alexander is seen again in the question as to whether the soul was made "impassibilis" or not after Christ's death. The answer is: "Dicendum quod post separationem ipsius a corpore facta est impassibilis, quoniam ipsa coniuncta corpori, habuit propassionem a corpore; sed cum separata est et coniuncta divinitati, ex illa parte facta est impassibilis." 92 Christ's soul thus passed through the world subject only to propassion and at death escaped its taint. There is a significant footnote to the parallel

91. 25(L),c)p.200. 92. 5,p.192.
passage in "L" in which it is argued that the souls of the saints are impassible at death and therefore the soul of Christ was "multo fortius." Here again appears the strong implication, already mentioned, that, if God cannot become man, then man becomes something very near to God - or at least a part of man does - partaking of the immutability of God almost by right. Christ's soul is also understood to be of the same type, a Divine soul. The implications of this position have already been sufficiently discussed.

v) "In triduo".

In distinction XXII the doubts as to whether Alexander carries out the "very God, very man" of the early Church consistently in his thinking on all the life and actions of Christ again arise in relation to Christ's death and descent into hell. Alexander again appears to understand Christ in such a way that one part, the soul, is more Godlike, the other part, the body, is more human.

It is suggested that "in triduo", because he was a priest and, as such, man, and because he was "rationalis ratione creatae", Christ was a man in that period. However, Alexander comments that Christ was by habit, not by act, a priest "in triduo," and he was a priest in act only in the passion and when the sacraments flowed from his side.

93. Footnote, p.200. 94. d.XXII,1,2,a)pp.252-253.
(which he gave only as God, not as man). Further, although the Son of God had a rational soul conjoined to himself "in triduo" he was not thereby a man "quoniam oportuit ad hoc quod esse homo, ut haberet animam rationalem tamquam principium; sed sic habuit Filius Dei animam sibi coniunctam in triduo." 96

Now Alexander turns to the place of the soul and the "in inferno." After the warning of Augustine that "ne ita divinitatem astruamus hominis, ut veritatem corporis auferamus," 97 and that, because God is everywhere, it does not mean that man is everywhere, Alexander seeks to explain what is meant by Christ's ubiquity. As Creator he is everywhere, as man he was in a particular place, and as a creature conjoined to the Creator "in pluribus locis simul esse potest." 98 That is how it can be said that Christ was in many places and, by implication, "in inferno". Peter Lombard, however, had stated that Christ according to his soul only was "in inferno" 99. To justify this use of "Christ" (in contrast to distinction VII where it had been stated that "Christ" was the name of the two natures) Alexander states that "Christ" sometimes means "personam unitivam et sic in his singulis", and sometimes means "unitum ex divina et humana natura". 100 It would appear, then, that Christ did not go into hell as full man (only as soul) just as also in the tomb he was not full man (only body).

The former position then raises the problem whether Christ "apud inferos" could be called "redemptor" which in distinction XIX is applied to him in his human nature. Alexander responds "quod 'redemptor' dicitur vel usu, vel potentestate, vel exhibitione motus humilitatis vel obedientiae." 101 "L" has a clearer answer (but the one which must have been intended in "AE"): "'redemptor' dicitur vel habitu, vel actu, ut ibi dicitur /that is, "redemptor" in his nature/; vel usu potentestatis, exhibitione motus obedientiae vel humilitatis. Fuit ergo ibi redemptor usu potentestatis." 102

In a similar way it is asked whether Christ was "Jesus" during the three days. It appears that he could not have been as he was not man, and "Jesus" is the name "hominis individui." The various texts give different answers to this. "AE" states that "Jesus" was either "nomen vocis" or "nomen rei". As the latter he was "nomen" in habit or "nomen" in act. Of these, in the first way, "Jesus" was "nomen ipsius in triduo"; in the second way he was not. 103 "L" states that "Jesus" was "in triduo" in act because he was Saviour. 104 "E" in the footnote states that "Jesus" as "vox" was not "in triduo" but as "res": "Nomen secundum vocem inditum fuit individuo homini. Fuit autem persona illa in triduo salvator actu." 105 There is a plain contradiction, it seems, between "AE" in the one hand and "L" and "E" on the other. In spite of this, there can be no doubt that, according

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to Alexander, Christ was dead only bodily during the three days whatever the relation of Divinity and soul to this dead body, and that in hell the body was absent.

When Alexander denies that Christ as "homo" was "in triduo" he is maintaining that the body was really dead but that the Divinity and the soul did not die with it. As it is pointed out in distinction XXI, this does not mean that the body escaped from the union for this union brought about salvation; the Divinity remained inseparable from the body in spite of one being alive and the other dead. (This is what "L" and "E" were trying to maintain immediately above.) Yet it would appear that this link was somewhat tenuous as the Divinity and the soul went into hell without the body. Thus, through a division of labour, as it were, the "dead and buried" and the "descended into hell" are accomplished but one wonders at what cost. Two questions must be asked: first, was it really the Son of God too, that was "dead and buried"; did the Son of God really take our punishment upon his own shoulders and suffer our corruption? Second, was Christ man in hell; if hell could be redeemed by power and not by act and habit did this redemption have anything to do with man or with Christ's work for man? If Christ went into hell, as the Creed states, it was surely to overcome the powers as man and for man. What Professor George Hendry has said of the Christus Victor theory in part can be applied to this thinking: "the theory conceives of the work of Christ in an extremely objective manner as a transformation of the human situation, but it gives no direct bearing on the (subjective)
human condition. The battle takes place over man's head; he is, at most, a spectator of it, but he is not involved in it." In Alexander's thinking the battle might be said to be taking place "under man's feet." Another pair of questions should be asked, questions which have been asked of Alexander's Christology all along: does the Word become flesh in anything more than in an Apollinarian way; and, is there not posited in the soul a possibility for God which thus renders unnecessary a full incarnation?

vi) The merit of Christ.

In distinction XVIII the problem of merit is discussed at length. As merit, in some sense must indicate an unachieved goal, it is evident that because Christ is a "comprehensor" (a "comprehensor" is one who is in the state of glory, who has arrived at the goal and consequently is perfect) and immutable as the Son of God, both of which indicate that no achievement was necessary (or possible) some considerable difficulties must arise. Essentially this, too, is the problem of eternity and time. The lines for the solution have already been laid in the distinction within the soul of Christ. Alexander now develops this thinking in relation to merit.

The first problem raised is as follows: Christ as far as his soul was concerned was in a state of comprehension.

which meant "fruebatur." Joy is however the result of merit, not simultaneous to it. (This implies that at one time Jesus was not a "comprehensor"). In reply Alexander states that some have said that this apparent contradiction was possible for Christ because he was both a "viator" and a "comprehensor" in the soul and so he could have merited and enjoyed God at the same time. However, Alexander's main answer is as follows:

"Dicendum quod in Christo sunt duae substantiae, scilicet anima et corpus. Sed animam est accipere secundum intellectivam partem vel secundum sensitivam. Secundum autem intellectivam dupliciter; aut enim in comparatione ad divinam naturam, cui adiungitur mediantem rationem, id est superiori parte; aut in comparatione ad corpus cui adiungitur mediente sensualitate. Primo modo autem comprehensor erat Christus; secundo modo viator, et sic meruit, quoniam ibi fuerunt propassiones."

This quotation summarises much of what has been stated in earlier distinctions (See above in this chapter ii). It brings out the "Godlikeness" of the soul which can be seen in either an Apollinarian way or as an element in man with a capacity for God.

A particular instance of the problem of merit is the fact that as a "comprehensor" Christ had perfect love which, as such, could not gain merit. Alexander finds the solution in the fact that merit was not in Christ as a "comprehensor" but as a "viator". It is also objected that because Christ had the highest love the prize had already been won for "quanta est caritas, tantum est praemium." Although

Alexander admits that this is so he still answers
"nihilominus supra condignum praemiatur, quoniam meritum
est temporale et praemium aeternum; ideo supra condignum
praemiatur, conferens aeternum pro temporali." 109  Thus
Christ could bring about some advance as a "viator", temporally
by merit, although as a "comprehensor" he did not bring about
any advance. This matter of "more" involved in merit is
raised twice again. The phrase "virtus in infirmitate
perficitur" (2 Cor. 12:9) is interpreted as meaning "perfecta
ostanditur". 110 ("non quod prius non esset perfecta." 111)
In "L" it is explained that "plus" does not mean "maius" and
the merits increased only "secundum numerum." 112  Again,
beatitude, it is suggested, cannot be mixed with misery
("miseria") and therefore after the misery of the cross
Christ was more blessed than before. Alexander replies that
beatitude does not refer to the temporal state as felicity
does and thus, although it can be said that Christ was
"felicior", he was not, however "beatior". 113

Christ is said to have merited by conserving what
he had, but in this, neither by acquiring what he did not have,
nor by increasing what he had. 114  In the same section
Alexander, following Alanus ab Insulis, gives several definitions
of "mereri." "Aut enim dicitur idem quod de non debito facere
debitum. Vel dicitur uti virtute meritoria. Vel dicitur de
debito habitus facere debitum usus; vel sicut Sancti merentur

109. 4,a)p.191. 110. 4,b)p.191. 111. Footnote,p.191.
112. 30(L),p.201; also 6,p.192. 113. 7,pp.192-193.
114. 15,p.196.
nobis impetrando aliquid per preces ex meritis." Christ
merited in the second and third ways. In "L" prior to all
these there is added another merit - "de congruo impetrare."
(This is probably a different type of merit - from "gratia
data gratis - and is not strictly speaking merit in the
medieval sense, i.e. a something done for which something
is owed) In "L" the last merit - prayers of the saints -
is omitted and in relation to the third definition "actus"
replaces "usus." Thus Christ did not go from good or
bad to better but from good to "more goods".

If it is asserted that Christ merited then how did
he? Christ, it is said, merited from the beginning of his
conception because he had the use of virtue. This would
imply, it is objected, that he had the use of free will from
the beginning of his conception which would not be possible
because "esse" is prior to "movere". In reply to this
objection Alexander states "ab instanti potest dicere
terminum extra sumptum, et sic vera est; vel terminum
intra sumptum, et sic falsa est. Unde dico quod anima in
aliqua sui operatione est sicut extra tempus." As this
stands, it appears that this is "soul" Christology going to
extraordinary lengths for what would be described as "man"
is not man at all. Christ, however, must be man to fulfil
his work. Up to this point Alexander has always maintained
this in some way. That this is not the original wording or

115. 15, pp. 196-197; Alanus ab Insulis, Reg.Theol. reg.106.
that Alexander or a redactor saw the ambiguity of this position is evident from both the "E" footnote and the parallel in "L". In "E" it is maintained that there was a movement of the free will in the uterus before birth,\textsuperscript{119} and "L", after stating the same position as "AE", adds, "vel ut proprius dicatur, agere poterat, quia quaedam actio animae est praeter tempus."\textsuperscript{120} This is very much the same position as "AE" but the qualification of "E" and the different wording of "L" do indicate that probably free-willing ("movere") did not take place outside the conception but only the "esse" was existent. If this is so the first interpretation of the "AE" statement, namely, that Alexander was placing both "esse" and "movere" before time in the soul was not what was intended. To place "esse" before time is to be expected - but merit had still to take place in time.

Christ, however, is made out to be so unlike men of this world that there is the possibility that he did not merit at all, in other words he was not at all involved really in the decisions of the world. For instance, it is suggested that if the man in Christ were not united to the Word he could have sinned. This, however, Alexander replies, was not possible because the flesh itself was confirmed and that confirmation would remain. It would have been possible for the man to sin only if he were never united to the Word.\textsuperscript{121} It was by the grace of God and not by nature that he could not sin.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119} Footnote, p.196.n  \textsuperscript{120} 37(L),p.204.  \textsuperscript{121} d.XIII,6, p.125; 14(L),p.126.  \textsuperscript{122}
In "E" it is suggested that there was nothing praiseworthy in not sinning necessarily. The reply to this is that Christ was "liberate a se iustus" and so he deserved praise: "nam si humana natura habeat hoc a Deo, nihilominus a se habet, quia Deus et homo est una persona." At another place it is again suggested that as Christ had the grace of union which was "quodam modo" natural it might appear that he was unable to merit because he would have done so necessarily. This raises the problem what the grace of union was. It does seem to be very like "gratia gratum faciens" although Alexander replies to suggestions that Christ did not merit by stating that he could not sin by a grace after union. To the suggestions raised here Alexander replied that Christ did not have the merit "condigni" but the merit "congruitatis". The merit "condigni" is that to which something is owed because the meriter has gone beyond that which is required. The merit "congruitatis" is that in which man has done something fitting before God. This is the merit of "gratia gratis data" incidentally but the grace of union and a grace after union could not possibly be thought by Alexander to be such a grace. It would be too lowly. Here Alexander means, one would imagine, merely that Christ cannot "add" anything to his perfection which the merit "condigni" would indicate. Merit "congruitatis" would be entirely fitting for Christ. (One wonders how it could be

transferred to other men, however, as the equivalent of merit "condigni". In these cases Alexander does make an attempt to maintain Christ's humanity for, in Alexander's terms, merit is a part of the human life.

In his doctrine of the merit of Christ, as in the doctrine of his knowledge, his passibility and the two wills, Alexander has made what would appear to be an unwarranted distinction between the rational and the sensual (or the superior part of reason and the inferior part of reason) in Christ, between Christ as "comprehensor" and "viator", and between Christ in his immutability and Christ in his accidental aspects. It is unwarranted for three reasons; i) As it has been stated before, Christ cannot be so divided because it is ultimately Apollinarian. ii) The distinction means that the whole Christ did not merit because the soul in its superior part had no real part to play and so men's souls are thereby not made whole entirely by Christ "for what is not assumed is not healed." This view leads to iii) There is a difficulty in seeing where the grace of God is at work uniquely in Christ as man, that is, by the grace of union. For how can God, as Alexander sees the situation and accepting the idea that Christ had to merit, by grace working in the Godwards part of the soul, effect the working of merit which is in the sensual part of the soul? (Following the Anselmic requirement that only God could, only man should gain merit.) If the
answer is that there was one soul in Christ and therefore by this God and man are united in one person this is a most peculiar Christology for then the union is based in the human soul - and nowhere does Alexander really attempt to affirm this. The answer which is given, that the union is personal, seems to become a fiction when the actual workings of merit are described. In fact, at this point, Alexander would appear to be not very far from Adoptionism in that Christ is seen as man given a particular task to carry out by God, but having done this job, he is then discarded for all intents and purposes. His only real difference from other men lies in his sinlessness, a state which presumably many will eventually reach.

But Christ is far more than a sinless man who merits; he is the one through whom creation is reconciled to God by his obedience as man to God, an obedience which was possible only because God made a new creation in Christ in whom God and man were reconciled. It is only within this framework that merits and satisfaction have their place, namely, not as something which earns rewards from God, but rather as a way of describing God's grace towards man in the obedience of Christ. Sin is more than a heinous offence seen as a substance (or lack of substance) which can be removed by satisfaction of punishment or merit (which could be made by a pure man "engraced" by God to parallel Adam's sin); sin, rather, results in a separation between God and man which only God could bridge to bring man into obedience again.
The fact that the merits of Christ are the unique working of God's grace in the person of Jesus Christ is not emphasised enough by Alexander. The fact that grace also works apart from Christ in this thinking further detracts from Christ's uniqueness and brings him more to the level of man — that is in his bodily aspect. Christ does not take our place completely because Christ the man who is body is not unequivocally God and man.

Behind this thinking is not basically the concept of God as Trinity, but God as the one immutable being. This presupposition prevents the development of a full and proper Christology because, under these terms, God cannot at all be conceived as incarnate; he stays above the world in the superior part of the soul of Christ, which is the immutable timeless part of Our Lord. The doctrine of grace is the attempt to overcome the impasse of God's immutability but this attempt is unsatisfactory because it minimises Christ as God and man. Further it implies, certainly in the substantial terms that it is expressed, a form of semi-Pelagianism for if an immutable God cannot be incarnate, man must reach to God — assisted by created grace — and the instrument of this reaching is the superior part of the soul. If one's doctrine of Christ is such that God is not fully incarnate (a tendency towards docetism) or that Christ is not fully man (Apollinarianism), both of which tendencies are in Alexander, or Christ is seen as only man (Adoptionism), then a form of Pelagianism must be the result. Either way, that is, if God has not come to man in Christ, or man has not come to God in Christ, man has to get
to God. That conclusion is Pelagian.

In this chapter a grave doubt has been raised as to the adequacy of Alexander's view of Christ's humanity. This has been raised mainly because of a distinction between the body and soul or of a distinction between the superior part of the soul and the inferior part of the soul by which Alexander detects a "Godward" part of Christ and a "manward" part of Christ. The doubt as to his view of Christ's humanity has not been resolved for Alexander fails to maintain Christ's full humanity and his unique humanity. This has been pointed out frequently in this chapter and there is no further need for exposition of this point.

Quaestiones

On the problem of suffering the Quaestiones is probably clearer than, and adds something to, the Glossa. It states that Christ assumed a soul with passibility because redemption was obtained through the passion. 126 This means that as satisfaction was to be made in the God-man for greater satisfaction it had to be in both the body and the soul. Thus on the part of the soul there was the will to suffer, on the part of the body there was the suffering. Unless there was the union of the soul to God it could not be said that God wished to suffer, and unless the body was united

to God, it could not be said that God suffered. 127 Further, there was a similarity between the suffering in the soul of Christ and that in demons, and there was dissimilarity. Christ's soul as created spirit had passibility "sicut habet vertibilitatem in quantum est creatura", and besides this, from the union of soul and body, it had compassibility whence Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 2:8 said the body suffered and died, the soul did not die but "consuffered", and the Deity neither suffered nor died. But there was dissimilarity. Although the soul of Christ had compassibility, it did not have the necessity of suffering from guilt: "ex culpa contracta in se sicut parvuli, sed ex culpa contracta in alio." Unlike the demons Christ did not suffer by a necessity derived from guilty acts. 128 Thus Christ's suffering was not due to his own guilt but there is some doubt as to whether he suffered as much as all men, or for all men. For instance, the damned were passible in both the superior and inferior parts of reason; 129 Adam was passible according to every portion of reason because in the superior part "fuit receptibilis formarum intelligibilium, quae passiones dicitur." 130 As far as he was "receptibilis passionum" he was "compassibilis" in the superior part of reason "id est receptiva mediante corpore: sed tantum ex illa parte qua coniungitur commutabili, non autem ex part superioris partis qua dicitur illuminari a Deo." 131 Thus Christ's suffering does not apply to the

damned (which seems the relevant group) although it is similar to Adam's. In regard to "propassiones" the Quaestiones states that if it is understood as a sudden movement which was not foreseen in any way, then this was not in Christ. If it is seen as a sudden movement which was not seen in the inferior part of reason, then Christ had propassion. 132 Again, as in the Glossa, the division between the superior and inferior parts of the soul is made but perhaps with a shade more emphasis on the fact that the Son of God did participate, if at a distance, in human suffering.

There is an addition to the Glossa in that another view of passibility is found. The superior part of reason as "natura", that is, as the power of the soul to unite to the body, in Christ was "compassibilis" as "ratio" which "apprendit cum electione et deliberatione" "disposita fuit ad passibilitatem quae est gaudium". Thus insofar as the "ratio" is united to the Deity, it is not "compassibilis" with the grief of death "sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium. Aliter enim non congrue satisfaceret Christus, nisi esset in eo summum gaudium de summa poenalitate." 133 Once again there must be doubt as to the satisfying value of this joy because it is a joy which is found in a part of the reason which was not assailed by the woes of man. How could Christ make satisfaction for all men if he did not suffer what all men, including the damned, suffer?

CHAPTER 5

THE EFFECTS OF THE PASSION AND THE RESURRECTION;

MERIT AND SATISFACTION

In Alexander's thought the satisfaction made by Christ relates to the temporal punishment for original sin and only to that. The quotation which follows gives some idea of the "division of labour" in the removal of sin.

Satisfaction: (temporal) punishment for original sin; Passion and Baptism: guilt of original sin; glory: removal of the remainder of sin (i.e. actual sin) and corruption. This division is perhaps neater than all of Alexander's thinking but it does give a correct general outline of the place of satisfaction (and therefore of the place of the whole "necessary" life and work of Christ).

"Quandoque causa simul est cum effectu, quandoque effectus sequitur. Passio Christi cum Baptismo delevit culpam, remittendo scilicet originale cum poena prima respondente el secundum quid; sed poenae particulares et secundae manent usque ad statum gloriae, et quoad hoc causa non est coniuncta cum effectu. Unde potest poni triplex gradus: in passione causa non erat coniuncta cum effectu; in Baptismo coniuncta quoad communia; in gloria sequitur effectus utriusque."

It is important to note before proceeding that there is another way that Alexander sees Christ's work and that is see it as "merit". "Merit" in Alexander appears to have an ambiguous meaning. It could mean what Christ merited for us by his satisfaction for original sin, that is, satisfaction

1. d.XV,23(L),p.158.
relates particularly to Christ's work in regard to God, merit relates to the same work in regard to man, both merit and satisfaction then being different ways of viewing the same thing. (This would be Anselm's meaning.) However, merit could also relate not to satisfaction for original sin, but to satisfaction for actual sins (which are also post-Baptismal). This may well be what Alexander has in mind when Christ's merits are compared with other men's and when other men's merits are also mentioned in the discussion. Thus Christ's merits then are not the unique merit of satisfaction. More probably, however, when Alexander writes of the "merit" of Christ he refers to both the unique merit of satisfaction and the merit all men can earn. That Alexander does use "merit" in this broad sense would appear to be confirmed by the fact that nowhere does he define a "merit" relating to original sin, and a "merit" relating to post-Baptismal actual sins. The distinction can be found, rather, in the distinction between those sins for which only Christ could make satisfaction (original sin) and those sins for which all men can satisfy (actual sins). Thus with this usage of the word "merit" Alexander, in effect, does not distinguish between Christ as the unique man, Son of God and Son of Man, and Christ as a great man among many men. This leads to some confusion as it might be thought, because of this loose usage of the word "merit", that all men can merit or make satisfaction for original sin. This implication definitely cannot be made in Alexander's thought in which Anselm's position on the satisfaction for the punishment of original sin, in as far as only God could satisfy, only man should, is clearly taken.
The peculiarity of Christ's merit, according to Alexander, is seen in its comparison with the merit of the martyrs: "Christus voluntarie subit mortem et non merito peccati, merito tamen obedientiae; alii autem merito peccati." In this way Christ could gain a surplus of merit, not needed for himself. This is a manward aspect of Christ's obedience (as opposed to the Godward aspect of satisfaction). In both merit and satisfaction, however, sanctifying grace works apart from Christ; he is still only a helper. This view of the obedience of Christ (if it is "active") is lacking because the merit is not sanctifying. "Grace" is the necessary sanctifying element. Even if the merit Christ were unambiguously unique in its relation to actual sins the sanctification of man takes place, according to Alexander, outside Christ.

Not only the broad use of "merit" but also the equation of merit and satisfaction can be seen in the question "what did Christ merit apart from what he already had?" Principally, replies Alexander, he merited for us through his passion but he also merited for himself. In this latter case he merited "accelerationem gloriosiae resurrectionis", "declarationem nominis", and "iudiciarum potestatem." For man he merited "gratiam patiendi pro Christo", "sufficientem satisfactionem pro peccatis" (this is sufficient "ex sua parte" but not "ex nostra parte") and lastly Christ merited for man "quod figurata est nostra vita

2. d.XVIII,41(L),p.205; also 18,p.198.
in eius passione", this prefiguration of our lives being in the death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at the right hand of God the Father by Christ. 3 (This last casts Christ in an exemplary role).

In this case satisfaction and merit are practically equivalent in Alexander's thought. Christ "merits" "sufficient satisfaction" for sins. Does "sins" mean original sin only (and actual sins before Baptism) or both original and actual sins (before and after Baptism)? Alexander does not tell us here. However, a distinction has to be made between satisfaction related to original sin and actual sin before Baptism on the one hand, and merit related to actual sins after Baptism on the other hand. The satisfaction "ex sua parte" and "ex nostrra parte" might relate to original sin's punishment, and Baptism, or possibly to original sin's punishment, and man's need to make satisfaction himself for actual sin. On the other hand they could refer to the need for man to accept (apart from Baptism) what is given and in particular in regard to his own (actual) sin to make some satisfaction himself which would appear to be required (this comes out in the chapters on the sacraments). Further, Alexander makes a connection between Christ's work (as removing a barrier?) and the bestowal of the grace of suffering. (In this case it probably is the connection of various aspects of Christ's sufferings with various graces in the various sacraments - "sacramental grace" - which doctrine is expounded

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3. 17, pp.197-198.
particularly in the Quaestiones.) Never, in the Glossa, is there a clear exposition of the connection of Christ's work and the bestowal of grace (which in the Glossa would also, apparently, be sanctifying grace). One feels that it is there, but there is no statement such as "the work of Christ in satisfaction leads to the bestowing of grace which removes guilt and sanctifies". The "grace of suffering for Christ" is not necessarily sanctifying grace but it could be. The connection of Christ and grace could be, either that Christ enables grace to come, or that grace comes, after satisfaction, from Christ. This latter position Alexander apparently does not generally hold, and the former position, that is, Christ's satisfaction seen as the necessary prelude to grace from the Holy Spirit (removing the barrier to it) is not consistently maintained.

What other effects have and how effective are, Christ's merits? Man is freed, states Alexander, from the Devil "attrahente nos ad limbum inferni" but not from his flagellations. 4 Again, Christ merited sufficiently and efficiently for glory for us but free will can contradict this. 5 Does this latter statement include grace - as the result of merit or transferred in the merit - or does it mean merely that Christ merited sufficiently and effectively for sins only? The latter, on the basis of Alexander's general thought, would appear to be the case. Of course "free will" inserts another ambiguous element. It involves more than the simple

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4. 1, p.189. 5. Footnote, p.195.
rejection of grace (see the chapter of Grace, Merit and Freewill.) Here again, in both references immediately above, both original and actual sins apparently are included in the references.

In another question the limits put upon Christ's life and work are again evident. In this question the idea of eternal life is not satisfactorily integrated into Christ's life and work. According to Alexander the question whether the death of Christ or eternal life is the greater is determined by the way one looks at them: "ex parte eius cui datur" the gift of eternal life is greater; "ex parte eius quod datur" the gift of Christ is the greater. 6 The answer in the parallel passage in "L" is clearer:

"(hoc) maius illo esse dicitur dupliciter: vel comparatione dati ad datum, et sic Filium Dei mori maius est quia vita aeterna est per Filium humanatum cum sit creatum. Vel comparatione ad illum cui datur, et sic minus, quia mors Christi est propter hoc. Sic enim mors non sumitur ut concreta cum Filio Dei, sed potius ut in abstractione; prius autem cum Filio Dei conceperatur, qui maius est quam vita aeterna." 7

Here eternal life is seen as something distinct from Christ's work (as is the working of grace) - this is less true of "L" - although the death is seen as contributing something to eternal life. In other words Christ's work (as the Son of Man as well as the Son of God inseparably connected in the one Person) is, in reality, limited to his death and this death which makes satisfaction is the only ultimately necessary reason for the incarnation. If Christology were completely central in Alexander's theology this question would never have been asked.

as one then could never look upon the death of Christ as a mere means or aid to eternal life. It was an inseparable part of the work of Christ in whom there is eternal life. His death is our death and so the threshold of eternal life. How can one separate Christ's death from eternal life for the believer? For him they go integrally together. And yet this separation, as in the separation of satisfaction and grace, Alexander makes.

Another effect of the work of Christ is opening "ianua paradisi". Bede had stated "per Baptismum aperta est ianua." Alexander's comment on this is: "per Baptismum aperta est causaliter, per passionem tamquam per praemium, per ascensionem tamquam per effectum." ⁸ The meaning of the first two parts should be evident - Baptism makes effective in men's lives the satisfaction of Christ - but unfortunately the meaning of the third is not and the topic is not developed. In "L" it is stated that the "virtus" in the Law in itself was sufficient to open the door of paradise but there was an external impediment which was removed by Christ as "general man" who made satisfaction for punishment. ⁹ Like the freeing from the Devil the opening of the door of paradise is mentioned several times but its significance as an integral part of the theology is difficult to ascertain in Alexander's thinking. Is he saying that in opening the door of paradise the barrier to grace, is removed, the door being opened when satisfaction is made?

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There are here, finally, several points to note in regard to the relation of Christ and men. The fact that Christ's merit was sufficient on his part but not on our part (and free will can contradict) points to a semi-Pelagian doctrine of merit which will be discussed elsewhere. But here there are indications of this position. Martyrs, according to Alexander, by their extra suffering earn a special glory. The object of man's suffering is to conform to the passion of Christ which man does voluntarily and so merits the crown of gold. Here man's merits are mentioned in the context of Christ's merits thus demonstrating the fact that Christ's are not the merits of the Son of Man and the Son of God but of a man full of grace. Again, according to Alexander, children come to glory without merit. Christ merited sufficiently and efficiently for all unless free will contradicts that merit and so by the merit of Christ in Baptism children are made worthy of eternal life. Here the semi-Pelagian note (except for the semi-Pelagian view of Baptism) is excluded. It is a semi-Pelagian note because the part of the free will is more than contradiction. In regard to children, however, there is a happy paradox in Alexander's thinking. Here the theology is far more a "theology of grace".

In distinction XIX there are one or two fairly significant references to the sacraments which indicate the limited scope of Christ's satisfaction. It is asked, if God punished man with mortality and "carentia visionis Dei", why

the Lord should free man from the lack of the vision of God but not from mortality. The answer is quite surprising in the context of Christ's satisfaction and resurrection, for Augustine is called upon in the statement "quod si sacramenta Ecclesiae immortalitatem conferrent, omnem spem in illa, et nullam in beatitudine." 16 (Alexander's paraphrase). If Alexander meant to use this here (and it would appear that he did because the part of the Sentences he comments on is on "poena" in distinction XIX) it is revealing in two ways. First, the sacraments by implication are placed between the benefits of Christ and man, that is, they form an extension of the incarnation. Second, the hope is not placed in Christ but in beatitude which may mean that Christ and beatitude are two different things or that Christ's past and future are so divided that man can come between; that is semi-Pelagianism. It should be noted that in Augustine this implied division does not exist because what would be actually annulled, according to Augustine, is not hope but faith which is "expectation of things unseen". The context in Augustine makes clear that it is faith in Christ which leads us on to those things unseen and this is a truly eschatological outlook - from faith through faith to Christ. In Augustine it is Christ all the way; in Alexander this is not so, nor could it be. Christ the Son of Man and the Son of God is, as it were, left behind. This fact is perfectly compatible with his soteriology where the work of Christ is seen mainly as having a backward reference, that is, to satisfy for past sin. It will be seen that grace

and the sacraments provide the forward elements.

Alexander makes another reference to a "sacrament" in this soteriological section. This is to circumcision and in the discussion of this the place of Christ is clarified. The discussion is raised by Peter Lombard's statement: "Et a poena redemit... relaxando debitum... a temporali nos penitus liberavit." It is asked how the patriarchs were "debitores poenae" when they were freed from original guilt by circumcision. The answer to this is that original guilt was deleted but punishment could not be except in the way previously stated. (Obviously that punishment would be deleted by Christ's satisfaction.) Then the question arises as to how the patriarchs had grace and merited eternal life, and so had the vision of God, but were obliged to undergo the punishment of "carentia". The answer to this is that the actual sins of the patriarchs led to actual punishment which personal grace could bear, but the "poena generis" from "generalis culpa" remained and this punishment could be removed only by the "homo generalis." "Et sic exigebatur adhuc alia gratia per Salvatorem." 17 Here again Christ is not completely central but his place is seen quite clearly - to bring "alia gratia" - that is, Christ was one of many ways (certainly a necessary element) to man's beatitude. He was a help. Further, the sharp distinction between original and actual sin (= general and personal) which emerges so strongly in the doctrine of the sacraments is also demonstrated here. The fact

17. 34(L), p.218.
that Christ satisfies for general sin still leaves the whole field of actual sin and over this Christ has little necessary influence. His reference is essentially backwards to original sin. Lastly, it should be noted that the guilt of original sin is forgiven but the punishment for it is still necessary. Thus guilt is also forgiven apart from Christ and this teaching is also seen in Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments.

An unsatisfactory element of Alexander's soteriology is related to the resurrection and this is seen when he comes to discuss what the passion and resurrection signify, figure, and cause. The question is raised as to the relation of the death and resurrection of Christ to the destruction of sin and the newness of the life of man. "L" gives a fuller answer than "AE" but the two are in line with one another: "Mors Christi est causa destructionis peccati et signum et figura; sed novitatis vitae non est figura et signum, licet sit causa. E contra resurrectio novitatis vitae est causa, signum et figura; destructionis peccati solum causa." 18 (It should be noted that the death of Christ satisfied for original sin, not for all actual sins. 19 This will come out more clearly in the discussion on the sacraments. 20)

At this point the death and resurrection of Christ appear to be given the same relation to man, that is, they appear, at the least, to "earn" the destruction of sin and the rising to newness of life. However, in a footnote, it is stated

18. 21(L), pp.215-216; also 8, pp.211-212. 19. e.g. 24(L), p.216. 20. See also footnote above, pp.31
that because Christ in his resurrection was not in a position to merit as he was not then mortal, the relation could not be the same and "ergo eius resurrectio non fuit causa nostrae resurrectionis meritoria". 21 This view is repeated in "L" where it is stated that Christ did not merit our resurrection "quia in statu patriae". 22 One would think that this was an authentic position of Alexander. In the next distinction there is again a drastic modification of the view that Christ's resurrection was the cause of man's resurrection. In a discussion of the necessity of the passion and resurrection where Peter Lombard had stated that the resurrection of Christ "est causa efficiens nostrae resurrectionis" it is suggested in "AE" that, because our resurrection is necessary for our salvation, Christ's passion and resurrection were necessary. Alexander would deny any such necessity but in "AE" there is no reply nor any comment on the idea of cause. However in the "E" footnote there is this answer: "Efficiens dicitur multipliciter: quae est unde est motus vel esse primo, et sic non est; vel exemplaris". 23 Thus once again the resurrection as "cause" in any sort of modern sense is repudiated.

There does appear to be some hesitancy here. This may be due to the fact that Peter had stated that the resurrection was the cause of our resurrection and Alexander was trying to make this statement compatible with his thinking in which Christ's work is more limited. However, the fact

that it really is not a cause is seen by the three qualifications which appear, admittedly not in "AE", in "L" immediately after the statement that Christ's resurrection was the cause of our resurrection, and in "E" as deliberate qualifications, one of which was not a direct answer but was obviously stated to guard against misinterpretation. "AE" at times and almost certainly in one case seems incomplete.

Even if these statements were not present a similar conclusion, that is, that "cause" (at least in translation) is hardly the right word for the resurrection of Christ as it relates to our resurrection, would have to be reached from the rest of Alexander's thinking on the subject. He argues that the incarnation was "necessary" for satisfaction; the passions of Christ gained merit which can be passed onto men, but because merit is associated with the suffering of Christ, the resurrection because it was "in patria" could not be meritorious. Further, satisfaction for original sin is the dominant element of Alexander's soteriology; the resurrection, as distinct from the death, is rarely mentioned. Again, since the concept of Christ's general humanity or the idea that our humanity is included in Christ's is barely present in Alexander's Christology, Christ's resurrection can hardly be seen as the cause of man's resurrection in the sense that man is raised with Christ. It could be causal of man's resurrection only as something that merited man's resurrection. The resurrection of man would then be something quite apart from Christ's resurrection and not
included in it. Lastly, as Christ's resurrection was "in patria" it could hardly be related to man's resurrection from a "viator" to a "comprehensor" - as Christ's resurrection did not merit.

There is another possibility. Christ's resurrection may have been understood as a cause in the way the incarnation was seen as a cause, namely, as the area in which the satisfaction took place. The resurrection would be seen somehow as the completion of the process and as such a cause. However, it would add nothing to Christ's work and would not be necessary in the way the incarnation was. There is no suggestion of this view in Alexander in any case. Then, the resurrection as an example, and therefore as a cause in some sense, may act as an assurance of man's resurrection and show him the possibilities opened to him in Baptism and through grace but, again, as such, it would hardly be necessary.

What these last paragraphs have been seeking to discover is a position in which Christ's resurrection is seen as relevant to man now, as satisfaction is relevant to man now because the punishment for original sin has been removed. If the resurrection is not relevant to man's "now", it is not part of the finished work of Christ for us, and part of our dying and rising. If our new life, now, is not based in Christ's rising, then it must be based elsewhere (e.g. in grace, free will, and their virtues). Indeed Alexander appears to see our resurrection only at the last "in patria" as in some sense a reward (earned by Christ's resurrection) for our life in this world, and does not see us already raised in Christ, not
even in a way similar to the way he sees satisfaction applied to man for the beginning of his justification. Alexander sees satisfaction having effect now but the effect of resurrection is delayed till the end after man has gained justification. Meanwhile it appears that man's present "resurrection" is based in grace, the sacraments, and free will. Some instances from other volumes should make this point clear.

On Romans 4:25: "Mortuus est propter delicta nostra, et resurrectio propter justificationem; in quo datur intelligi quod passio in remissionem peccatorum fuit, et resurrectio propter introitum gloriae. Baptismus... virtutem habet a resurrectione quoad effectum introitus ianuae paradisi." 24
"Est alia res circumcisionis, scilicet ablatio ab omni corruptione; et haec iterum non est impleta in Baptismo, sed in ipsa resurrectionis Christi." 25
"Baptismus aperuit ianuam quantum ad causam ex parte baptizati; passio quoad pretium et deletionem poenae originalis peccati quae fuit carentia visionis Dei; sed resurrectio quoad perfectionem gloriae in secunda stola." 26

All these place the resurrection's effect at the end of the road in glory where all corruption is removed. There is one statement which does appear to go beyond this for it states that "remissio vero quantum ad debitum aeternae mortalitatis fit in Baptismo virtute resurrectionis." 27 Yet here the resurrection has no present effect as Christ's passion has; it is a promise of a future reward if all goes well, (although the debt i.e. the punishment as required by God - is removed). This is much the same position as the previous quotations especially the first of the three. As a promise the resurrection cannot be much more than the assurance (or example) that immortality is man's if he makes satisfaction for actual

sins as Christ has done for original sin (unless Baptism effects this process forthwith which it does not). In short it is difficult to see the resurrection as causal in any real and consistent sense and therefore this part of Christ's work is not necessary for man's salvation.

The doctrine of satisfaction and the doctrine of merit, however, with all their limitations, form the more satisfactory elements of the Christology of Alexander. The doctrine of satisfaction is based firmly in the work of the Trinity and in the love of God so that Christ is seen as truly God and truly man; only God could satisfy, only man should. The humanity of Christ is assured. Again, the freedom of the grace of God is maintained and there is no necessity that God should redeem man; the choice and "necessity" reside in the wisdom of God. Satisfaction is necessary only for man.

Further, there is no suggestion that Christ placated God purely as man; he was fulfilling the will of the Father who was at work. This is "voluntary" work; there is no suggestion that Christ was submitting to the will of a tyrant. Christ "receptit in se necessitatem moriendi." 28 This is the God-man at work.

Yet when this has been said there must be reservations. The doctrine of satisfaction apparently is not integrated into his Christology. There is one place where his Christology would have found a kindred element, and that is where Alexander states that violence is caused in the

incarnation by the fact that the weight of man's sin tends downwards but the "Dominus" through his passion tends upwards.\textsuperscript{29} This downward trend is the corruption of man\textsuperscript{30} and it is for this reason that in Alexander's Christology the Word is not permitted to become fully flesh (another reason, of course, is his view of God which, however, corresponds to the view of the corruption of man); God tends to stand at arm's length. The doctrine of satisfaction is worked into this view of the incarnation under the discussion of the passions or defects assumed by Christ which discussion lacks the doctrine of satisfaction's Trinitarian basis. However, when the actual discussion of satisfaction takes place it is stated, following Anselm, that only God could satisfy, only man should. There is no doubt of God's part here; the Word does - must - become flesh; the Trinitarian basis is stated, that is, the possibility of God to assume flesh is affirmed. And in these sections there is a different view of sin; it is an offence, or injustice; it is pride; it is not essentially "corruption" except in the above instance. It is man or mankind acting against God; it is man's attitude rather than his nature. In the Christology and in the discussion of the passions of Christ a view, which, in this instance, depends greatly on John of Damascus, is held in which it is stated that God is immutable and mutability indicates sinfulness. (Alexander goes far further than John in his Christology which is very much more Chalcedonian and acceptable; but he inherits John's and traditions of fear of passions, mutability, and the idea that

\textsuperscript{29} 12, p. 213. \textsuperscript{30} cf. Bk.II, d.XL,f) p. 382: "fomes est declinans deorsum a natura corrupta." Men have "fomes"; Christ did not.
the Son of God might have been a servant.) Alexander, at times, is very close to saying that the "esse" (i.e. the nature of man as "creature") of man is to be a sinner. In such a situation a real incarnation would be impossible. (The Virgin is purged of "fomes" to make it possible.)

What Alexander tends to do is to confuse corruption as a fact of man's situation with corruption as a necessity of man's situation, that is, as part of his creatureliness. The possible, if not probable reason, for this is the fact that he has a view of God as the "immutable One" which nicely coincides with the fact that man, who is subject to time and changeable, is a sinner, but does not coincide with the fact that creation is redeemed in time by the Son of God, and is "very good". The fact that man's present state is corrupt does not necessarily mean that it will always be that way; in fact the present state of sin is the less real being neither created nor eternal; the new present creation in Christ is the "ultimate reality". The doctrine of satisfaction says precisely this for it is the satisfaction by Christ, God and man, which bears away the fact of sin, the fact of corruption. That this might occur God had to become man because the fact of sin is the pride, the injustice, the disobedience, and the consequent guilt of man, which must be eliminated and replaced by man. Elimination is especially associated with satisfaction (in a narrower sense) and the cross, replacement is especially associated with the life and resurrection of Christ replacing the corruption. Only God, however, has power to do this. Satisfaction (in a wider sense) then means that
God came right into the midst of our humanity to eliminate sin and guilt and to sanctify man (the latter two, in Alexander, are not attributed to the work of Christ.) There is no question in the doctrine of satisfaction whether the Son of God did or did not come into our humanity because satisfaction presupposes the incarnation, the doctrine takes it for a fact. Anselm, in this doctrine, "saved" the humanity of Christ, and Alexander to some extent follows this line.

But satisfaction in Alexander is restricted to the temporal punishment for original and actual sins and this does not include all actual sins nor necessarily any actual sins. To this extent Alexander's Christological tendency towards doceticism influences his soteriology. For eternal punishment of original sin, guilt, actual sins, and sanctification the humanity of Christ is not seen as a necessity. This is demonstrated by Alexander's failure to emphasise the resurrection and by his essentially cross centred theology. The resurrection is not seen as a necessary part of Christ's work although it may contribute something rather indirectly to the salvation of man. Likewise, the life of Christ is neglected and the merits of Christ are not, in fact, necessary although they do merit grace. The result of this is that sanctification can hardly be regarded as part of Christ's work and it must be found elsewhere. This sanctification also leads to justification which is not achieved in Christ.

The real source of this limited view of the atonement cannot be sought out in this thesis but there are at least
two traditions which could contribute - that of the
penitential system, and that of the philosophical view of
the immutable God. The Church's instinct on atonement
originally led to the full doctrine of Christ at Chalcedon
(that is, by implication, both God and man, fully, were
necessary for man's salvation), but it is possibly not so
ture that the limited view of atonement led to a limited view
of Christ by the time of Alexander. Perhaps the views of
atonement and God may have coincided in such a way that a
limited Christology gave theological sanction to a limited
view of the atonement in the penitential system. This in
turn encouraged a limited Christology. By this stage, however,
unlike, for example, in the work of John of Damascus,
Christology is not bound up with soteriology. Alexander's
Christology is a matter of repeating traditional positions
and refuting traditional heresies. In this context the
Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction can be seen as a check
both on docetic Christology and on Pelagian views of
atonement. It certainly so acts in the theology of Alexander.

Quaestiones

The question of satisfaction is naturally taken up
in the Quaestiones. There is interest, firstly, in the
greatness of the satisfaction in the question "an passio
Christi fuerit maxima poena". It is stated that the
punishment which Christ underwent for man was the greatest
"in genere poenae satisfactoriae." Because it was voluntary
it was also satisfactory, and it is the voluntary nature which makes it the greatest punishment "in genere satisfactionis." (The fact that satisfaction is voluntary means that it is something not required by God and not owed to him, which means, further, that its effect (or merit) can be applied elsewhere, in this instance in the elimination of (satisfaction for) original sin.) However, "in genere poenae" Christ's punishment was not the greatest punishment and that is to be separated from the Deity. 31

Later the question is asked "an passio Christi satisfactoria pro omni poena." In the response to this question it is stated that there are two things in satisfactory punishment, the "voluntas" and the "poena", and that it was not right that the punishment of Christ should be greater than that for which he made satisfaction. "Fuit enim in Christo separatio animae a carne, et compassio separationis, et praeterea dolor pro peccato humani generis, sine quo non esset satisfactum etiam cum aliis duobus, sicut patet in vera contritione." And although the punishment of Christ was not greater than that for which he made satisfaction "tamen voluntas Christi excellebat poenam originalis peccati, quae fuit in separatione a Deo." This "voluntas" was satisfactory because it was the result of the conjunction of the human and Divine natures and thus was the most noble. 32 The satisfaction made by Christ was sufficient as far as causality for the deletion of all punishments was

31. Q.XVI, Disp.IV, Memb.1, 92, pp. 266-267.  
concerned but not all were deleted in the present because death, concupiscence, ignorance and infirmity remained to help in the gaining of merit. 33

In the question on the resurrection in the Quaestiones there appears to be a different view to that held above and that in the Glossa. Christ is said to have died on behalf of human nature but, because he was not involved in personal guilt he did not suffer "dissolubilitas", which is defined as the dissolution of the soul from the body. 34 This meant that concupiscence was diminished but not removed in the present so that it could help in the gaining of merit. Dissolubility was the punishment for concupiscence. In all the descendants of Adam except some who had the fulness of grace dissolubility came through concupiscence. In the satisfaction made by Christ there was full satisfaction according to justice "licet non assumpsit dissolubilitatem, quia secundum iustitiam non fuit omnino tollenda concupiscentia, sed tantum pronitas concupiscentiae. Haec autem tollitur, quia ipse, in quo fuit plenitudo gratiae, venit ad impartiendam gratiam, per quam tollitur concupiscientiae superfluitas." 35 Here three things are evident. Firstly Christ's passion did not have causality as far as concupiscence was concerned; secondly Christ did not suffer the separation of the soul from the body; thirdly it is grace which effects the elimination of concupiscence and

33. 108,p.273-274. 34. Q.LXIII,Disp.II,Memb.1,61,p.1271-72. 35. 64,pp.1273-74.
this grace is not peculiarly attached to Christ (cf. Christ as Head) and in fact can prevent the dissolubility of the saints and is used by man or in man, apart from Christ, to bear away the excess of concupiscence.

From these facts it is evident that the scope of Christ's satisfaction is restricted further than in the previous question in limiting the universality of the passion, and thus the docetic tendency also increases. Christ did not suffer, it is implied, the separation from God which at least the damned suffered - and are not all men damned except Christ step in? - and which is evidenced in the cry "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" This implication demonstrates the further fact that sin is not taken particularly seriously because the presupposition is that man does not sin to the point of alienation. Christ, in the question on the resurrection, is said not even to have suffered dissolubility which, in spite of the assertion to the opposite, must throw doubts on whether he died at all. In fact it appears that grace would have been sufficient to have cured the wound without the God and man. This whole discussion of the incarnation and the previous one on the passibility of Christ must raise doubts as to the universality of the satisfaction of Christ, in spite of assertions to the contrary. Firstly it would appear that he died, and could die, for the good only. Of course it may be assumed that all men are good, but that surely is not the position of either the Glossa or the Quaestiones. No doubt it would be argued that the damned could avail themselves of the satisfaction of Christ but what
good would that be to them if they could not avail themselves of the grace of the Holy Spirit whereby they made themselves good? Then they must be damned because they remained guilty. With the separation of sacramental grace and the grace of virtues, which will be seen later in the doctrine of the sacraments of the Quaestiones, the work of Christ in satisfaction (channelled through the sacraments) becomes even remoter to the hard-hearted. Secondly, and the first point depends on this because there the argument that the punishment of Christ brings about results of a different kind from his punishment is not accepted, if Christ's punishment is not of the same kind as a descendant of Adam receives how can what is not assumed be healed? Was Christ then of the same nature as man, fallen man, or was he of another nature, unfallen man, and if he was the latter is he not irrelevant to man's present situation? The Anselmic argument must be taken seriously; only man should satisfy; only God can. The satisfaction is for sinning man. If it is stated that Christ's will to suffer made the satisfaction, could not this argument eventually eliminate any need for the incarnation at all? Is not this basically a docetic argument?

If God did not become incarnate at the level of man's existence then man will have to cure himself. This may eventually be the answer both of the Glossa and the Quaestiones but especially of the latter for in availing themselves of grace, men cure themselves partly and avail themselves of the work of Christ. It is man's use of grace which is the preliminary to any possibility of his availing himself in any
real sense of the satisfaction made by Christ. And it is grace which reconciles man to God, it is grace which overcomes his concupiscence; without reconciliation he is damned and obviously he can be practically reconciled with God without Christ because Alexander informs us that there are men who are not dissoluble because they are full of grace, just like Christ.

The resurrection receives more attention in the Quaestiones than in the Glossa. There is a separate question devoted to it but in spite of this it finds a relatively unimportant place in the Christology. Peter in his Glossa on Psalm 29:6 had said that Christ's resurrection was the cause of man's resurrection and that it was also the figure of man's resurrection in the soul. On this the comment is that there were three days between the passion and the resurrection which figured the resurrection of those living in the three times. These are the period before the law, the period under the law, and the period after the law, the time of grace. The resurrection did not take place quickly so that it might be realized that the resurrection prefigured all three periods and so that the passion did not have effect only in the period that followed it. 36 It should be noted that here the resurrection is only a prefigurement and the delay relates causally to the passion and not to the resurrection.

The question is then raised as to the significance of the statement that Christ was the cause of man's resurrection in that Christ's resurrection is not "ab incineratione" whereas man's resurrection is. (This is related

36. Q.IXIII,De Resurrectione, Disp.II, Memb.2, 74, p.1277.)
to the idea that Christ did not merit in the resurrection.)
The fact that there should have been a proportion between
the cause and the effect raises doubts as to whether
Christ's resurrection could have been a cause. The answer
is that it is not necessarily so that the cause and the
effect should be proportionate because the cause, in this
case, was of greater dignity than the effect. The reason
for the lack of proportion is that men are descended from
Adam according to bodily substance and "seminalem
rationem"; this latter leads to dissolubility for concup-
iscence. This latter Christ did not have, hence he rose
only in relation to the bodily substance, not from
dissolubility. 37

The next question asks whether Christ was the cause
of the resurrection of the soul and body or of the body
only. The reply is that there is a double resurrection of
the soul: from guilt and from punishment and the soul rises
from the latter through Christ's resurrection. Hence, when
his resurrection is said to be the cause of man's
resurrection in the soul in the present "intelligendum est
a morte illius poenae, qua obligati essent omnes nisi
Christus venisset." 38 It is then suggested, not
surprisingly, that, since the passion liberated from punishment,
the resurrection was superfluous and it is asked how it can
be said that Christ rose for our justification (Roms.4.25). 39

The answer reveals very well why in the thought of Alexander

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39. 80,p.1279.
the resurrection of Christ plays very little part in man's resurrection because the conferring of grace and the dimission of guilt take place outside Christ.

"Ibi fuit detentio in morte, et ab illa fuit liberatio per mortem. In iustificatione autem plus est quam liberatio a morte, quia est dimissio culpae, et collatio gratiae et virtutum; similiter in secunda iustificatione est liberatio a poena, et collatio gloriae cum virtutibus, id est cum dotibus. Resurrectio autem Christi est principium illius secundae iustificationis, quia gloria immutatio in corpore Christi, et pleña felicitas animae Christi habentis dotes animae et corporis, est causa felicitas animarum nostrarum quantum ad dotes corporis nostri. Unde, præter illam iustificationem quae est a morte poenae, est resurrectio Christi causa iustificationis nostræ quoad completionem animarum in dotibus corporis. Item, alium modo est causa, id est figura, resurrectionis animae per gratiam; non quod simpliciter sit causa, sed quod quid, secundum quod est figura illius scilicet, secundum quod dicitur 4 ad Rom., 25: Mortuus est propter delicta nostra etc. Passio enim eius mediante fide passionis est causa dimissionis peccatorum; resurrectio autem eius mediante fide resurrectionis est causa iustificationis. Credentibus enim resurrectionem prodest ad iustificationem; 40 credentibus passionem prodest ad peccatorum dimissionem."

The "dotes" are clarity, subtlety, agility, and impassibility. They are the ornament of the soul. 42

It should be noted in regard to this long quotation, that the relation of the passion to sin is far more direct than the relation of the resurrection to justification. The resurrection can be only a figure of justification; it is not causal; it is grace which effects justification. These relations may be the same in one area, however, because the dimission of sin could equally well include guilt and of that the passion does not cause its dimission, for it is God

alone who remits guilt. Christ's resurrection as a cause of man's rising, of his sanctification and justification, is, by and large, merely a figure, or an example in the theology of the Glossa and the Quaestiones. Alexander could not say, in the Biblical sense, that we have risen with Christ - faith in the fact of the resurrection is a purely accidental relationship requiring no Son of Man - as the answer to the question on Christ as a "cause" of the resurrection of the good and the bad illustrates. The very division already makes this clear, that is, the good are considered apart from Christ. Christ is an "exemplum" of the resurrection of both. With both groups there is a similarity in that neither will lack their bodies. Christ, however, will not have the "ignobilitas" and the "infirmitas" of the bad. "Boni autem, in hoc quod abundant a malis in virtute et nobilitate, habent resurrectionem Christi exemplum; unde magis et resurrectio Christi exemplum resurrectionis bonorum quam malorum." 43

**Summary**

According to Alexander, Christ's necessary work was to undergo the temporal punishment due to man for original sin. In this he gained merit for man. The fact that, in Alexander, he gained merit for man for other things besides that relating to temporal punishment for original sin, in apparently a way similar to (and not distinguished from)

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43. Q.LXIII,Disp.II.Memb.4,84,pp.1281-82.
the way he gained merit for the satisfaction of the punishment for original sin, does not mean that Christ's work was necessary outside that area. It is clear that all men, with the aid of grace, can merit (or satisfy) in these matters especially in regard to actual sin. Further, the bestowal of grace is not attributed to Christ as part of his necessary work. In this connection, that is, in relation to man's rising again to sanctification, the resurrection is given a very small part to play. Again, "beatitude" and "eternal life" are considered apart from Christ; guilt for original sin and actual sins is forgiven by grace apart from him. In all this work apart from Christ, Christ may be given some place in removing a barrier to the bestowal of grace, and in opening the door of paradise. The relation of these matters to Christ, and their implications, however, remain quite uncertain.

Since the Quaestiones has given attention to the matter more than the Glossa one perhaps should look forward for a moment to the matter of the sufficient and the efficacious work of Christ, a problem in post-Reformation theology. Certainly, in relation both to guilt and grace, Christ, according to Alexander, is not even sufficient, let alone efficacious. It would appear that in regard to the temporal satisfaction for original sin he is understood to be certainly sufficient (except possibly in the doctrine of the Head and in the Quaestiones), and not quite so certainly efficacious. This latter uncertainty is due to the prominent place of Baptism and the part man plays. It would appear that
Baptism is another "moment" in the progress and adds efficacy to the sufficient work of Christ. Man, also, seems to be able to accept or reject satisfaction in Baptism, and therefore he adds efficacy to the sufficiency of Christ. Of course man can also merit, and Christ's sufficiency, according to the Quaestiones, did not eliminate all punishments in order that man could merit.

These views are somewhat different from the post-Reformation thinking on the matter. In this "God" was both sufficient and efficient; Christ was only sufficient. In other words, Christ made sufficient satisfaction for all men but that was not necessarily efficacious for all men, that is, it was not necessarily applied (but it could be) to all men by God in his wisdom. The holders of this kind of position and Alexander may have had something in common in that both attributed to Christ's work of satisfaction a sufficiency but reserved to God on the one hand, or grace and Baptism on the other hand, the application of this sufficiency. When it comes to the matter of the sufficiency of all the punishments of Christ, in the Quaestiones this sufficiency is never "tested" (except for original sin's punishment) as it is man who is efficacious in grace and merit, so it is a rather pointless sufficiency. In post-Reformation theologians the sufficiency is "tested" when God predestines man to salvation. Having been brought up in the strict predestinarian tradition the post-Reformation theologians could not establish an efficacy in man. However, in Pietism a return was made to the medieval position, as the stern predestinarian (Deist?) God was rejected.
CHAPTER 6.

SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

The following discussion of the sacraments is by no means complete. It is aimed only at stating their position generally in regard to Christology and much of what follows will therefore be selective. For that reason, Confirmation, Matrimony and Extreme Unction will not be treated separately because they add little in the understanding of Christology.

At the beginning of Book IV Alexander outlines the discussion of the previous three books and then states:

"In hoc quarto libro, quia nondum est in iis sufficientia ad salutem, agit de sacramentis et gratiis sacramentorum: quae gratiae sacramentorum non respicient solum quod immediate influit a Deo, sed quod per Mediatore, et de beatitudine et poena opposita. Tangitur primum per hoc quod dicitur in principio auctoritatis, per quod dicit: Vade et lavare septies in Iordane; secundum autem tangitur per hoc quod dicitur: Recipiet sanitatem caro tua etc." 1

This statement will be referred to again, but at this point what is demonstrated is the fact that Christ's work is not seen as complete in itself, but as being moved towards completion by the sacraments. Thus the sacraments add something to Christ's work. The fact of this addition is also seen in the comparison of Baptism and preaching. Alexander states that the work of preaching and the work of Baptism are not similar because the latter is a sacrament of necessity but this is not true of preaching. A similar understanding of the Eucharist is held for by virtue of the words said transubstantiation is made from the institution of the Lord. 2 Preaching thus lacks something which Baptism

1. Bk.IV,Introitus, 3, p.2. 2. d.VI,5,(d)p.113.
and the Eucharist have and this cannot be the setting forth of Christ. By implication then, these sacraments contain something beyond the finished work of Christ conveyed to man through preaching.

At the beginning of the first distinction Alexander defines the sacraments. The word "sacramentum" refers to several things:

"Large more Christi et resurrectio sacramenta dicuntur, ut ad Rom.6.4: Consepulti in Baptismo etc. Et dicuntur propter hoc sacramenta, quia 'sacra signata sive secreta'; vel effective dicuntur sacramenta, quia ex virtute mortis et resurrectionis habeant sacramenta virtutem. - Stricte dicuntur quae fuerunt Veteris Legis, ut agnus paschalis et sanguis vitulae rufae et alia. Et dicuntur 'signa futurorum' et transeunt; unde minus proprie. Sunt enim prognostica et imperfecta; et non efficiebant quod figurabant. - Strictissime, sacramenta Novae Legis, quae efficient quod figurant; quae sunt signa et causa gratiae invisibilis". 3

It is the sign, not the signified, which is properly the sacrament. 4 The broad use of the word sacrament is also brought out when Alexander gives three definitions of "sacrament". It can be defined "sacramentum est sacrae rei signum" and so is common to all signs signifying a sacred thing. "Proprie", however, sacraments of the Old Law which used to signify those of the New Law fall under this definition. The definition "sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma" applied both to the sacraments of the New Law and the Old Law "sed illis mediate, istis autem immediate." The third definition is "sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et

causa exsistat." (Peter Lombard). The first definition is "communissima", the second is "communis", and the third "propria" to the sacraments of the New Law which are a sign and a cause. 5 Thus the distinctiveness of the New Testament sacrament is that the sign effects what it signifies.

The sacraments thus "cause" grace but not without qualification of the concept of cause. "Deus sanctificat ut causa efficiens prima; gratia ut causa efficiens proxima et necessaria, quia semper est coniuncta haec causa cum causato; sacramentum ut causa materialis in qua gratia, et non necessaria". 6 The distinction of grace and sacrament is seen in another context where it is suggested that the sacrament is the sign and cause of our salvation (that is, it is meritorious). Alexander answers that the good life is the meritorious cause of salvation, that the sacraments are not meritorious, and merit exists only through grace "sed sunt causa materialis in qua, ut vasa medicinalia, gratia ut medicina". 7 A similar view is expressed in another codex; "sacramentum non est efficiens causa gratiae, sed Deus. Non enim est causa in quantum exit a Deo, sed est concausa". 8

This view of the sacrament as a "not necessary" cause appears to contradict the view previously stated that Baptism (and probably the Eucharist) is a "sacrament of necessity without which no one is saved." This may be the difference between theory ("not necessary") and practice ("necessary") or possibly

the necessity refers to a different matter from these quotations immediately above. Where the sacrament is stated to be "not necessary" the discussion is on sanctification; where Baptism is stated to be necessary it may refer (but this is not stated) to the application of the satisfaction made by Christ through Baptism. This kind of division is seen when it is stated that Penance is not necessary for the "dimissionem culpae, sed ut non imputetur ad poenam". 9 Alexander also states that he does not wish to say that grace is not in the sacraments but only that it could be otherwise conferred. 10 For all intents and purposes then, the sacraments would appear to be necessary (especially in relation to sin) although God and His grace are recognised as free. The close connection of grace and the sacraments is also maintained in reply to the suggestion that the sacraments do not effect what they figure, namely, the remission of sin: "Sacramenta Novae Legis efficiunt quod figurant quantum in se est, sed impedimentum potest esse ex parte eius qui suscipit, ut de solis illuminatione accidit." 11 This is an "ex opere operato" view which would lead to the practical necessity or at least desirability of the sacraments and their consequent elevation above the freedom of God. Certainly they would be seen as a "concausa", although they may not have an absolute necessity. This parallels the discussion of the necessity of the death of Christ: another way was conceivable but not really practicable. The parallel might point up the importance of the sacrament.

That the grace of the sacraments is aimed at both sin and towards sanctification would seem evident from the first quotation of this chapter given above which refers to the washing and cleansing of Naaman. Thus "sacramental grace" would be aimed both at sin and the good life. Dr. Kilian Lynch, however, has seen here a distinction of graces, the first, which is aimed at sin, is called "sacramental grace" and the second the "grace of virtues". Unlike the virtues "the sacraments... as such do not exist for meriting or the attainment of reward, but rather constitute an aid against the difference (Latin "differentiam") of sin or the defects arising from sin." 12 This distinction is found in a section referred to earlier where it is asked "utrum... requiratur uniuicue fidelis adulto integritas sacramentorum, sicut integritas virtutum." The answer is in the negative; the virtues lead to merit and eternal life, but the sacraments are done away with as they are in part. 13 What is to be questioned is not the fact that this distinction is made here, but whether this quotation (from the doctrine of Penance) can be said to be true of Alexander's general practice in the Glossa or the most typical of his views, and whether this section should be used in such a way - and not statements where Alexander lays down general principles. That the distinction between a grace "ex parte" against the defects of sin and a grace not "ex parte" leading to sanctification ("gratia gratum faciens") is valid is not disputed. What is is the assertion that in the Glossa

they are two graces and that the former is clearly "sacramental grace". It would appear that the grace of the sacraments in the Glossa includes the remedy for particular sins or the defects of sin, and the grace which remits guilt and leads to merit ("gratia gratum faciens"). In fact both aspects are included under "gratia gratum faciens". The fact that the former has particular effects in some of the sacraments does not seem to a source of concern to Alexander who has stated that "gratia gratum faciens" is not "ex parte". Indeed "gratia gratum faciens" even appears to effect particular virtues in particular sacraments. This may be made possible both in regard to sins and to merit by a distinction between the cause (not "ex parte") and the caused ("ex parte"). Kilian Lynch does not dispute the fact that the grace of virtues is found in the sacraments but this, he maintains, is not sacramental grace "as such". My contention is that, in the Glossa, Alexander makes no such rigid distinction between "graces", and, in fact, sees the sacraments' second task, which is, as it were, on the reverse side of the coin to the first task of remitting sin, to be the conferring of sanctifying grace. This fact has already been made clear by Alexander's general statement on the contents of the fourth book (see first page of this chapter), and in the relation of the good life of merit to the sacrament where the sacrament is the medicine bottle of the grace which leads to merit. (See above note 7, of this chapter). There is no reason to

believe, further, that the grace which could be conferred another way is only the grace of virtues.

Dr. Kilian Lynch is again somewhat arbitrary in selecting distinction VIII, n. 7, p. 137 as of particular importance "towards the elucidation of his entire theory of sacramental grace". This distinction discusses the Eucharist in particular and the particular question is "quare haec duo sacramenta quoad formam instituit proximo ad passionem, scilicet Baptismum et Eucharistiam: Eucharistiam ante, et Baptismum post." Alexander's reply is given in full:

"haec duo sacramenta sunt principalium virtutum significativa: fidei quae est ianua salutis, et caritatis quae est complementum virtutum. Ut ergo notaretur principalis virtus aut dignitas eorum, coniuncta sunt passioni, a qua omnia sacramenta habent virtutem. Quod enim Baptismus / a passione / habeat virtutem, habetur in tertio libro, distinctione XIX, cap. Peccata quoque etc., ubi dicitur de Baptismo quod "per ipsius poenam, quam sustinuit in cruce, omnis poena temporalis pro peccato debita in Baptismo relaxatur, ut nulla exigitur". Similiter ibidem de Poenitentia dicitur: "In Poenitentia vero minoratur: non enim sufficeret illa qua poenitentes ligat Ecclesia, nisi Christi poena cooperaretur". In Eucharistia similiter datur virtus, quia quantum est de caritate passionis, maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis mystici ad caput. Passio autem sua pro fratribus dat nobis confirmationem ampliorum in Ecclesia cum fratribus ad patiendum pro eis. Similiter eius unio per caritatem ad Ecclesiam dat in Matrimonio effectum unionis ampliorum sponsi ad sponsam per consensum, in iis qui digni sunt iuncti matrimonio. Quia vero perfecta obedientia et discreta fuit in eo respectu patris in passione, collata est ei auctoritas et potestas, quam contulit praelatis ratione discretionis obedientiae quoad auctoritatem discernendi inter lepram et lepram respectu subditorum et potestatem ligandi fuit contra poenam concupiscientiae, ex qua accidunt venialia, et ut toleretur infirmitas corporis: est enim effectiva incorruptionis ex parte corporis": 17

Kilian Lynch wants to maintain that sacramental grace from particular virtues of the passion is applied in the sacraments to the reparation of the particular wounds of sin 18 and this is the task of the sacraments. He certainly provides evidence for this view but admits that the application is developed most only in regard to Baptism and Penance although maintaining that that is sufficient with the others to see that Alexander's sacramental theology has cohesion and unity. 19 One would expect this view to be supported by Baptism and Penance as they are primarily aimed at original and actual sin at which the passion of Christ was aimed in satisfaction and merit. The connection of Christ's humanity - or passion - to the other sacraments is, in the Glossa at least, at best vague. Even if one accepts that Alexander here has a worked out a theory of the sacraments in regard to sin the fact still remains that this aspect is not the whole story of his view of grace and the sacraments. In fact, Alexander is far from clear as to the working of grace in the sacraments or their particular functions. There is certainly no cut and dried theory of "sacramental grace". Even this "most important" quotation hardly supports beyond all doubt the idea that sacramental grace in the Glossa is applicable only in relation to sin. It would be less arbitrary to begin the discussion of Alexander's theory of the sacraments from the position where Alexander begins - in the statement of general principles at the beginning.

The first task of the sacraments is to eliminate sin and its effects. The seven sacraments are figured in the seven washings of Naaman. The source of the washings is in the virtue of the passion. 20 There are seven infections to be washed away. Original sin is washed away by Baptism which, because it has more grace, succeeds circumcision. It destroys original and actual sin as far as guilt and punishment, if received worthily. Actual sins are washed away by Penance which is repeatable because man fails often. Extreme Unction is aimed at venial sin. Orders are given because of the difficulty "discernendi". Because of the difficulty in progressing in good Confirmation is given; Matrimony helps to resist concupiscence and the Eucharist is given because of the difficulty in withstanding temptation. 21 Even here the distinction between the washing away of sin (in which guilt is included - that is, "gratia gratum faciens") and sanctification is not altogether clear. Later, however, Alexander refers to this sevenfold division of the sacraments "ratione peccati originalis, actualis mortalis et venialis, et ratione poenarum" and then states "acciπi potest divisio sacramentorum secundum quod quaedam sacramenta habilitant ad usus virtutum, tum cardinalium, tum theologicarum". Baptism habilitates to the use of faith, Confirmation to fortitude, Eucharist to love, Penance to "iustitia", Matrimony to temperance, Orders to prudence, and Extreme Unction to hope. 22

22. d.III,2,p.47.
(One should remember here the distinction made above - note 7 - between the sacraments, grace and the good life, the latter not being included in the sacrament.) Having stated the reasons for this appropriation Alexander then proceeds to give the reason for the order of discussion of the sacraments in the Glossa. First, there is the conferring of spiritual life, just as at first in nature man lived by natural life. This is made through a Baptism which is worthily received. Secondly, there is conservation in grace which is given in Confirmation. Thirdly, there is the augmenting in grace which is made in the Eucharist. Then there are four sacraments which repair grace since the grace conferred is still destructible. Penance corresponds to Baptism repairing the grace given in Baptism destroyed by sin; Extreme Unction corresponds to Confirmation; Orders and Matrimony which ward off adversaries and temptation correspond to the Eucharist. Orders are given as an aid and an augment of grace against temptations of the spirit, and Matrimony is against the temptations of the flesh. 23 This statement can hardly be considered to be referring only to the so-called "sacramental grace". Earlier the two tasks of the sacraments are placed side by side where the sacraments are seen as medicines. Baptism is a curative medicine, totally and simultaneously purging both from guilt /"gratia gratum faciens"/ and punishment and not successively and little by little as in

the contrition and satisfaction of Penance. Conserving medicine is at work in Confirmation giving "robur spirituale"; ameliorative medicine is in the Orders in which grace is increased in those who receive worthily; Matrimony contains a preservative medicine; and Extreme Unction is "mitigiva". The Eucharist is conserving, ameliorative and "confortativa" - conserving in diminishing venial sins, ameliorative because grace is increased, and "confortativa" as food of the soul. 24 Earlier Alexander has stated that there are two effects of the sacraments in the grace of operation and the grace of cognition. 25 Later in the discussion on Baptism, the grace of operation is said to be the work of the Holy Spirit and they alone have the Spirit who have sanctification of life. 26

This is by no means complete evidence but it is sufficient to demonstrate that when Alexander speaks of grace and the sacraments he is not merely referring to the destruction of sin although this may be the primary and particular task. Quite plainly Alexander sees the sacraments conferring "gratia gratum faciens". One of the distinguishing features of the New Law sacrament as distinct from the Old Law sacrament is the fact that those of the Old Law did not have the ability "facere bonum". "Unde sacramenta Veteris Legis faciebant solum declinare a malo, non facere bonum". 27 (This however is not a rigid distinction, at least, between the Old and the New Law). The reason for this above discussion is the

fact that if "gratia gratum faciens" is not the sacramental grace "as such" then Alexander in the Glossa has removed this grace further from Christ than it would be if it were attached to the sacraments, which, at least, are founded on Christ as God and man and which have their virtue from the passion of Christ. This still does not make the doctrine of sanctifying grace satisfactory however; Christ is either merely the occasion of its occurrence or its source only.

Before discussing Kilian Lynch's view of the Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments there should be some reference to the sacraments of the Old Law and what they conveyed, and of the New Law and the establishment of the sacraments for these reveal the limitations of Alexander's Christology.

Previously (p. 31 footnote of the Christology) in an extended quotation it was stated clearly what Christ added to what could be obtained in circumcision. God in his mercy in circumcision "abstulerit originale peccatum quoad culpam et quoad reatum aeternae carentiae visionis Dei", but man was not yet absolved from temporal punishment. This Christ did by his satisfaction and so opened the door of paradise. Baptism deletes the punishment of original sin which is "carentia visionis Dei" which was not deleted in circumcision. In Baptism "fomes" was diminished more than in circumcision. Universal incorruption, however, is signified only in Baptism and not caused because all sacramental grace is given according

to part "quoad causandum" and thus universal incorruption is
given neither by virtue of circumcision nor by virtue of
Baptism. These have particular effects. "Soli autem
Christo convenit, qui habet plenitudinem gratiarum,
universalem incorruptionem dare". 30 (This "sanctifying"
element in Christ is modified by the idea that he is a
channel).

A variation of, or perhaps another way of expressing,
the fact that through circumcision guilt and the "reatus
aeternae carentiae" were eliminated but not the "reatus
temporalis carentiae", is seen in another codex which expresses
clearly the difference between the Old and the New sacraments:

"Dicendum quod est quaedam curatio secundum
satisfactionem personalem, vel secundum satisfactionem
naturae. Primo modo erant / sacraments of the Old Law /
illa curativa, quantum in fide tamen; secundo modo sola
sacramenta Novae Legis, quae virtutem sortiuntur ab ipsa
morte Christi". 31

This is not the same distinction as that made between the
eternal and temporal "reatus" for original sin as an answer
relating to actual sins and Baptism demonstrates: "est reatus
quoad carentiam aeternae visionis Dei. Cum ergo remittitur
originale peccatum, dimittitur reatus aeternae carentiae, non
temporalis. Et est exemplum in contritione de poena aeterna
et temporali". 32 In both original and actual sins there is a

30. 31,p.38. There is threefold punishment, the "carentia
visionis Dei et haec retorquetur ad cognitivam vim animae",
and there is "fomes peccati quae retorquetur ad vim motivam",
and the debt of dying. The passion deletes the first, "fomes"
is diminished by virtue of the passion and Baptism; "remissio
vero quantum ad debitum aeternae mortalitatis fit in Baptismo
virtute resurrectionis". d.IV.17,c)pp.86-87. 31. Codex "B",
footnote,p.41. 32. d.I,21,c)pp.27.
temporal satisfaction necessary, that for original sin being
the satisfaction of nature made by Christ, that for actual sin
being personal satisfaction. In both original and actual sins
the guilt and the "reatus aeternae carentiae" are beyond man.
In these cases and in the matter of personal satisfaction of
actual sin Christ has no necessary part to play although he
does contribute to the latter.

There is another difference between the sacraments
of the Old Law and the New Law, a difference which is less
rigidly defined, and that is the fact that the Old Law
sacraments were carnal, the New Law sacraments are spiritual.
This division is implied in the statement "non imprimitur in
circumcisione character spiritualis sed carnalis". 33 This has
a parallel in the contrast between the ability to good and the
inability to do good or the presence of grace and the lack of
it, or of love and fear. It is suggested for instance that
the sacraments of the Old Law justify. As part of the reply
Alexander says "iustificare dicitur duplicitur: vel quoad
'declinare a malo', vel quoad hoc 'et facere bonum'; et idem
est ac si dicatur: iustificare dicitur quoad plenam iustitiam
/quae est in apertione paradisi 34 / vel non plenam. Primo
modo non iustificabant / the Old Law sacraments /, sed secundo
modo". 35 That the distinction between carnal and spiritual is
not rigid can be seen from the following quotation which yet
demonstrates very clearly the difference between the Old Law
and the New Law. The question is whether grace is given in
circumcision:

33. d.I,29,f)p.34. 34. Codex "P", footnote,p.16. 35.d.I,8,
g)p.16.
"Gratia duplicem habet effectum. Unus effectus est gratiae quoad remissionem culpae, alius quod non faciendum malum: uterque est respectu mali. Quoad bonum est unus effectus conferre vitam spiritualem animae; alius est habitare potentiam ad opus; tertius, bonum opus elicere a potentia. Dicimus ergo quod in circumcisione spirituali quae fuit sacramenti in Veteri Legae, conferebatur gratia quae est in remissione culpae et ad non faciendum malum; sed nullus de aliis tribus / effectibus / sequentibus. Quod patet ex hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro Contra Adimantum / c.17, n.2/, quod haec est differentia inter Veterem et Novam Legem, quod in illa fuit timor, in ista vero fuit amor principium. Quia ergo ex amore est conferre vitam et habilitare potentiam et opus meritorium elicere, non facere vero malum provenit ex timore, gratia prima tollit culpam, gratia cum timore facit cessare a malo. Ex parte amoris primo conferit vitam. Inde gratia cum timore dat gratiam quoad primos effectus, non quoad alios sequentes". 36

It should be noted incidentally that this grace is identified with the working of the sacraments, that is, it can be called a "sacramental grace". "Gratia gratum faciens" is also capable of parts as far as the effects are concerned with guilt on one side and the doing of good on the other. The various aspects of grace will be clarified in the chapter on "grace". In this quotation however Alexander is again stating that the Old Law sacraments enable one to decline from evil but not to do good. (See also the chapter on the Old Law and the New Law.)

A final factor in the relation of the Old and the New Law is the fact that although the sacraments are "properly" of the New Law nevertheless their working or task is somewhat loosely connected to Christ. In other words there is a process going on between God and man in which man (and the

sacraments) has a definite part and the satisfaction rendered by Christ is merely an aid on the way - to be sure, a necessary aid. This is seen in the following question and answer. It is asked why it was that before the Law faith alone was sufficient to salvation, then with the Law faith with circumcision, and then faith with Baptism. The answer is "quod morbus tunc erat recens, et oportuit leviorem adhiberi medicinam, ne aegrotus respueret. Et propter hoc in Lege naturali sufficiebat fides; in Lege Veteri requirebatur fides cum circumcisione, quae habet poenam; sed in Nova Lege, quit fuit lex suavitatis, adicitur fidei sacramentum sine poena, scilicet Baptismus". 37

The on-going process, in the following case against sin, is seen in another way on the question of the institution of the sacraments, which is found in the discussion on Matrimony. All sacraments were in some way instituted in the New Law 38 yet there were "sacraments" in both nature and under the Law. Only Confirmation and Extreme Unction are appropriated to the Law of grace for Confirmation signifies "robur gratiae" and Extreme Unction signifies the full grace which is to be had in the reception "utriusque stolae. Quae duo sunt consecuta per redemptionem in Nova Lege". Thus "viatores" are strengthened by the Holy Spirit not invisibly but visibly through the sacraments. The other five sacraments, however, were necessary in the Old Law, circumcision to delete

37. 23,c)p.29. 38. d.XXVI,2,c)p.446.
original sin; Penance as a remedy for actual sin; marriage to remedy the punishment of original sin which is concupiscence warring against the members; the paschal lamb in memory of the liberation from Egypt; Orders for these and for the offices in the tabernacle and the temple; "in quibus significatur Ecclesia militans hic, in qua sunt officia constituta ordinata ad sacramentum Eucharistiae". 39

If these were more pointedly aimed at the revelation in Christ (in fact sin here seems the determining factor) this kind of statement might be more acceptable but the fact is that the whole process is continued under the New Law, notably in regard to the Orders. Christ's task is to add to them.

(If the sacraments were aimed entirely at sin - as the idea of "sacramental grace" suggests - this view would lend support to a strong infralapsarian view of Christ.) Two sacraments, indeed, were instituted in paradise originally, Penance and Matrimony, one to preserve from evil, the other for the multiplying of the good and as a sign of the union of the members of the church triumphant. 40 Christ's relation to these last two sacraments, as instituted, is loose. Because sins increased after the Fall sacraments were established to combat them. 41 With no pointing to the New Creation these views tend to eliminate Christ from creation and all its aspects.

One must, however, make a modification to this because it would be wrong to state without more ado that Alexander

saw Christ as a "mere" help. He was a decisive help, although a help only. This is seen clearly in Alexander's reply to the question as to why Baptism replaced circumcision, and the Eucharist replaced the paschal lamb whereas the others remained: "haec duo sacramenta per se significant redemptionem per passionem Christi, in qua est virtus omnis sacramenti". Christ is given an honoured place in spite of the "process" sacramental theology which leads and will lead to his practical dethronement in a debased theology to which the Reformers objected. The Old Law sacraments are not properly sacraments so that Alexander can state that the sacraments "non fuerunt instituta ante adventum Christ, ut tunc esset plena consumptio morbi". He also states "non est ex institutione significans; non enim ad hoc instituta. Quamvis enim per eam comprehendi possit, non fuit instituta a Domino; omnia enim sacramenta ab eo sunt". This last statement, of course, cannot be understood in a Reformed sense as has been sufficiently seen and will be seen particularly in regard to Penance, Orders, and Grace. Kilian Lynch maintains that Alexander goes further than this in the Glossa by restricting the idea of "sacramental grace" to that aimed at sin. Certainly, as had just been seen, and is seen elsewhere, Alexander oftentimes understands the sacraments (and perhaps predominantly) to be aimed at sin, and in fact does use the term "gratia sacramentalis".

42. 4, p. 450. 43. d.II,2, p. 41. 44. d.I,6,0,p.12.
primarily in this way. Kilian Lynch allows that "gratia gratum faciens" is at work in the sacraments but does not call it "sacramental grace". This reading is not supported by the evidence. When Alexander refers to "gratia" or "grace of the sacraments" there is no reason to suppose he used it only in regard to sin. Sacramental grace for Alexander is also the grace to do good, "gratia gratum faciens". In the discussion on Matrimony he could not be clearer: "alia sacramenta, quantum est de se, conferunt gratium spiritualem vel augmentum gratiae, dico autem gratiae gratum facientis, si digne suscipiantur; hoc autem sacramentum non confert gratiam gratum facientem, etiam digne suscipienti". Here sacramental grace "as such" is "gratia gratum faciens". (Kilian Lynch, further, argues with some cogency that this grace is also present in Matrimony. Kilian Lynch, I believe, interprets Alexander too tidily. Alexander does not have that tidiness. In Alexander Christ's work is satisfaction for sin and logically when the sacraments are said to have their virtue from Christ's passion, then, presumably, that would indicate that they were aimed at sin. But so great is the emphasis in the Glossa on sanctifying grace in the sacraments that one must conclude that Alexander in some way saw it as a result of the life and work of Christ. To be sure, it would be only an indirect result because Christ only removes the barrier and institutes

the sacraments but by being so closely associated with Christ and his death in the sacraments, this grace comes nearer to being Christocentric than a grace which operates outside the sacraments (even if Christ, the man, is the channel of that grace for as such he is not unique cf. Christ as Head.) Alexander's sacramental theology in the Glossa may eventually detract from Christ's uniqueness but insofar as Alexander connects the sacraments to Christ and grace to the sacraments - and possibly the coming of grace to the event of Christ - it tends to place the emphasis here on Christ, the man necessary for us.

Once this is said, however, there are drawbacks in Alexander's sacramental theology. Sacraments are a sign and cause of a grace loosely connected, in part at least, with Christ; Christ's peculiar work is limited strictly to satisfaction and forgiveness takes place apart from him; Christ is seen not as Alpha and Omega but only as a decisive aid in a process which begins in nature; the sacraments appear to add something to Christ (or to continue something); there is a suggestion that man takes a hand in the process. These elements will now be investigated in the consideration of some of the sacraments individually.
CHAPTER 7

BAPTISM

In the following pages the teaching of the Glossa on Baptism, the Eucharist, Penance, and Orders, as it relates to Christology will be discussed. This will mean that the sacraments themselves will not be discussed as fully as they deserve, a task which would be of considerable interest as the doctrine of the sacraments was still in a very fluid state at the time as Alexander himself evidences all through his sacramental work and particularly in relation to the sacraments of Penance and Matrimony. Because the following will not give a full and balanced view of the sacraments, that does not mean that this discussion in relation to Christology will necessarily be inaccurate for although Alexander is not as consistent as one would wish (that is, he is not as easy to pin down), nevertheless, the main lines in relation to Christology are fairly clear.

It has already been stated that the sacraments have their "virtus" from the passion of Christ. This is, in particular, in relation to sin. The passion was the "pretium et deletionem poenae originalis peccati, quae fuit carentia visionis Dei" for opening the door of paradise and Baptism opened the door "quantum ad causam ex parte baptizati". ¹ This causality in Baptism did not exist "nisi ex passione iam existente". ² Baptism has a special effect of grace,

¹ d.III,24,e)p.69. ² f)p.69.
that is, "gratiam 'ad bene operandum'"; "praeter hoc quod circumcisio confert et passio Christi", "quam etiam habuit ante passionem Christi; iste autem effectus non habebatur ex virtute circumcisionis". Thus the causality of the sacrament is from the passion in opening the door of paradise and after Christ in giving the grace to do well. Baptism has its two parts: from the death of Christ, and from grace.

In Baptism there is a threefold "potestas: "auctoritatis, excellentiae et ministerii". The authority is from God to demit guilt and is "a se et per se"; the excellence was of Christ "ut sine clave media remitteret peccata, scilicet quoad poenam, sicut aliquis aperit ostium digito". This is not "a se, sed per se". The ministry is "puri hominis, cui conferuntur claves et Ordo sacerdotalis; et ista nec a se nec per se". Guilt and forgiveness are thus reserved to God alone apart from Jesus Christ and some sort of power is conveyed to the priestly order. So the work of God, Christ, and the priest is divided in the sacraments; (and the division between Christ and the priest is greater than is possibly evident here although even here the human role of Christ seems to be taken over by the keys in the priestly order; the priest, however, can never replace Christ, the man, in satisfaction;) a fourth element, the grace to do well, maybe hidden behind the third power but is not explicit.

There are a number of effects of Baptism. Guilt and forgiveness belong to God alone. The following quotation which has already been used in part succinctly states the effects in regard to punishment.

"Est enim poena quae est carentia visionis Dei, et haec retorquetur ad cognitivam vim animae. Est iterum poena al ipsius fomitis peccati, quae retorquetur ad vim motivam. Est tertia poena ipsius corporis coniuncti cum anima, scilicet debitum moriendi. Prima poena deletur virtute passionis et ipsius Baptismi; remissio vero quantum ad debitum aeternae mortalitatis fit in Baptismo virtute resurrectionis". 5

The matter of the resurrection has already been discussed (See above pp. 239 ff) but here it should be noted that the passion of Christ and Baptism have two effects, the first in relation to the cognitive ("carentia"), the second in relation to the motive ("fomes"), the latter relating to the ability to do well. As Baptism is "typus mortis Christi" 6 it has its closest relation to the first effect, namely the cognitive, because the death of Christ was the price paid for the punishment which was "carentia visionis Dei" and this "retorquetur ad cognitivam vim animae". Thus the impression of "character" (which relates to the cognition 7 ) "proprie...dicitur Baptismus". 8

"Character. Hic est enim specialis effectus sacramenti". 9

Character is impressed in some sacraments but not all. It is:

"signum spirituale in anima indelebile...cuius duae sunt principales proprietates, scilicet quod sit discretivus et quod sit indelebilis. Maxime autem convenit hoc signum imprimi in illo sacramento quod est typus principalis redemptionis factae per

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5. d.IV,17,c)pp.86-87. 6. d.III,24,f)p.69. 7. d,IV,8,p.78. 8. d.III,6,f)p.53. 9. d.IV,14,b)p.84.
sanguinem Christi. Et propter hoc convenit ut in Baptismo imprimatur character, quia in eo primo fit discretio fidelis ab infidelis". 10
"Character est figura intelligibilis, configurans trinitatem creatam increatae, facta per verbum sacramentale fidei Trinitatis, ad discernendum fidelem in statu suo". 11

Thus character as concerned with faith and the cognitive effect (which has its "carentia visionis Dei" removed in Baptism) relates to the belief in the suffering Christ and the Trinity. This impression of character is the work of God and is not received by man simply when he takes the sacrament which may have been an interpretation put upon a sentence of Peter Lombard in distinction VI when he maintained that the worthy reception of Baptism was the beginning of salvation. The beginning is with God, maintains Alexander, in the spiritual character "facta per aquam sanctificatam invocatione Trinitatis". 12 It is not, however, quite as simple as this statement makes it appear. Alexander, in fact, is not excluding the part of man, he is merely making sure that the beginning is with God in the impression of character. This becomes evident in a section already briefly referred to in which Alexander had stated "proprie tamen character dicitur Baptismus". 13 The question essentially is "what is Baptism?" He begins the answer by quoting John of Damascus: "Per Baptisma primitias Sancti Spiritus accipimus, et principium alterius vitae: fit enim nobis regeneratio, sigillum, custodia et illuminatio". "Regeneration", Alexander comments, refers to the water having regenerative

power from the word and the touch of the flesh; "sigillum" refers to character; "illuminatio" and "custodia" to grace. "Gratia enim habet effectum illuminandi in bono et custodiendi a malo". Thus Baptism sometimes refers to the water sanctified by the word, sometimes to character, sometimes to grace. By the water the faithful are discerned from the unfaithful, by character it is said that no one can lose his Baptism. When John 1:33 states "Super quem videris Spiritum descendentem et manentem, hic est qui baptizat" the Baptism of grace in which guilt and punishment are washed away is understood. Then Alexander states that character "properly" is Baptism but

"non character simpliciter, sed secundum quod recipit rationem signi ab aqua sanctificata per verbum. Est ergo aqua sanctificata per verbum, sacramentum secundum quod dicitur 'invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma'; sed/Character autem est sacramentum non in quantum accedens non recipit gratiam 14 / character in quantum recipit rationem signi, sed non in quantum recipit rationem causandi si digne susciptatur. Quod autem indigne accedens non recepit gratiam, non est ex parte characteris, sed propter defectum suscipientis, qui proponit abicere eius gratiam". 15

Thus not only is there a distinction between the action of baptising and the bestowing as the distinction between sign and caused (character) but also between this cause and the worthy reception in which grace is received. 16 It is somewhat difficult to see here whether it is grace that causes character or not although it does appear to accompany character

on worthy reception of the sacrament. Later, however, it seems clear that God the Father operates through uncreated character, namely, the Son, to impress character, and he operates through the Holy Spirit who is uncreated grace to impress grace which leads to merit. So man is conformed to the uncreated character, the image of God, in the Son, and to uncreated grace in the Holy Spirit. "Et sicut cognitio communior est quam virtus, nam extenditur ad bonos et malos, ita character, qui est ad cognoscendum, communior est quam gratia, quae determinatur tantum in bonis". 17

Thus it would appear as indicated above by the footnote from page 283 included in the text (note 14), that, although character is the special effect of Baptism, and appropriate to it, being indelible, it is not the whole of Baptism for there is also the work of grace against guilt and punishment which requires worthy reception by the good. This has been stated clearly before as part of Baptism. 18 The section referred to above also makes it clear that this grace leads to merit. 19 Thus it all depends what one includes under "Baptism" as to what its effects are. This is clear when Baptism is compared with martyrdom: "sicut ergo Baptismus non efficit gratiam, sed disponit ad eam; ita martyrium non efficit augmentum, sed ad ipsum disponit: in hoc nobilius quia non potest suscipi sine gratia; quod potest Baptismum". 20 Here "Baptism" is used, as the

context shows, to indicate the Baptism of water. This obviously cannot be preceded by grace as it is the first sacrament. It is the "beginning of salvation". Grace, however, does most definitely have a part in Baptism both in relation to guilt and punishment (the reception of which is outwith the impression of character) and to the doing of good. There is, as stated earlier, both a cognitive and motive effect in Baptism.

A broad view of the sacrament is seen when the use of the various sacramentals is discussed. First, the power of the devil is expelled; then there is the habilitation of the spiritual senses for faith, hope, and love; there is the habilitation of "gratia gratis data" preparing the person to receive the work of God. "Post habilitatem gratiae gratis datae ad effectum, sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis remittentis culpam et poenam; quod significatur in Baptismo".

22 It would appear the impressed character is included under this operation somewhere. The narrow view of Baptism is not upheld by this statement for it includes under Baptism "gratia gratum faciens" remitting guilt and punishment which is signified in Baptism. However the tendency towards the narrower view seems to be confirmed by the next statement (actually it is a limitation on the effect of grace only, not on grace, as such): "Sed quia Baptismus, quantum est de se, non significat gratiam ut ordinat ad opus meritorium, sequitur inunctio chrismatis in vertice ad designandum

22 d.VI,15,e)pp.121-122.
infusionem gratiae ordinantis in bonum datae in Baptismate: non quod conferatur ipsa inunctione chrismatis, sed quod chrisma figurat eam". 23 (This brings out the distinction between the "sacramental grace" and "grace of virtues" but no more than as aspects of the one grace. Guilt is still associated with punishment.) However, the very name "gratia gratum faciens", the fact that it is the grace which leads to merit, and the fact that it cannot be given in part (as a cause if not in effect), means that with Baptism the grace to do good is given. The last quotation really is an admission of the fact; all it is pointing out is what has already been noted, namely, that Baptism, as the type of Christ's passion, is not mainly concerned with the grace to do good. It maybe noted that the impression of character does not include, in itself, "sacramental grace" (grace against sin). And all grace for its effect depends on worthy reception.

The view that the grace to do well is part of Baptism is confirmed elsewhere. It is hinted at in the answer to the question as to whether people who take the sacrament insincerely "put on" Christ.

"Respondemus quod non. Non enim induunt nisi quoad habitum characteris, in quo habitu non habetur Christus; sed in habitu gratiae, quae est res sacramenti. Est tamen alterum 'habere Christum' et 'habere Spiritum Sanctum'. Ilii enim soli habent Spiritum Sanctum, qui habent vitae sancticationem. Habere autem Christum dicitur secundum quid et simpliciter: quorum unum pertinet ad cognitionem, reliquum ad affectum, ut patet in discretione characteris et infusione gratiae. Discretio characteris ad cognitionem, infusion gratiae ad informationem affectus". 24

23. Ibid. 24. d.IV,8,p.78.
Here "habit of character" appears to relate only to the action of Baptism whereas the grace of "putting on" Christ refers to the "act" of character or something similar, that is, to Baptism sincerely received. However, it is difficult to reach a conclusion as to whether this grace is what is "proprie dicitur Baptismus" and how it is connected to the grace of the Holy Spirit in sanctification of life. (Is it something like "sacramental grace?") This quotation together with the previous quotation (above page 283 from Glossa page 53) would indicate that in the first part of Baptism there is the action as sign, the grace causing spiritual character (or the impression of character), and the reception of the person partaking. This all relates to the cognitive which relates to Christ. (But does it include the remission of punishment and guilt?) The second part of Baptism is the grace of the Holy Spirit which includes the grace to do well and the fact that it is included in the quotation immediately above indicates that this grace is also present with Baptism. 25

The effects of Baptism which Alexander enumerates and discusses make it evident that Baptism is or can be seen in a very broad way and to limit it to the impression of character or even to that and the reception of forgiveness for guilt and satisfaction for punishment is not really warranted

25. On page 103 of the Glossa (above page, 284, footnote 17) "grace" is used only in relation to the Holy Spirit, not in relation to character. The confusion may be due to the fact that the grace of character is "gratia gratis data" which is a disposing grace and the grace of the Holy Spirit is
(and one would think impossible once "gratia gratum faciens"
has entered in). For the contrite adult there are many effects:

"augmentum virtutis ad agendum, debilitatio fomitis, impressio characteris, communitas supernae societatis, immunitas exterioris satisfactionis, remissio venialis post contritionem et ante Baptismum commissi, robur ad resistendum, plena remissio, absolutio ab obligatione quo prius homo tenebatur baptizari. In parvulo vero plena remissio originalis peccati, collatio virtutum quibus est in habitu potens, non operans, debilitatio fomitis, impressio characteris, remissio venialis si aliquud in illa aetate contrahitur, incorporatio Christo".  

John of Damascus had numbered five effects: "unus est remissio peccati, alter regeneratio, tertius sigillum, quartus custodia, quintus illuminatio".  It is then queried whether the last four "qui ad bonum pertinent" have the same or different cause in Baptism. Alexander replies that the water disposes to regeneration through the regenerative virtue "quam contulit ei tactu suae carnis qui venit ad regenerandum, scilicet Christus". In regard to "sigillum" the water disposes to spiritual impression by the invocation of the Trinity. "Custodia" is from evil and to good "ad quam disponit sanctificatio aquae". Illumination is to good "ad

"gratia gratum faciens", a grace in which giver and receiver take part. This distinction is doubtful for two reasons, first, because the cognitive relates to faith, which is a theological virtue, it is as such from "gratia gratum faciens" (the possibility that the faith is unformed faith, that is, from "gratia gratis data" is eliminated by the fact that Christ is "put on" in it and that it has all the marks of formed faith), and secondly, that this grace in its reception depends on the recipient (Glossa p.53) would indicate that "gratia gratis data" has already preceded. This latter objection is not absolute because in a sense there is always a preceding "gratia gratis data" going back to the "naturalia" of man, that is, to man as created. What one can conclude, which is already the conclusion of the general discussion on the sacraments, is that one is never sure how Alexander is using the word "gratia". He knows its various effects but what effects he intends - and being "gratia gratum faciens" whether he really can limit the effects is doubtful - is often not clear.  26. d.IV,19,p.88.  27. De Fide Orth. IV,c.9; d.IV,20,a)p.88.
quam lux spiritualis in transparentia aquae". Regeneration pertains to the substance of the soul of the receiver, "sigillum", refers to him as the image of the Trinity, illumination pertains to his cognitive element, "custodia" to his motive element. Regeneration is appropriated to the Father, illumination to the Son, and "custodia" to the Holy Spirit. "Sigillatio" is appropriate to the whole Trinity. 28

Finally, the three major elements of Baptism, the cognitive, the motivating, and the part of the recipient, are all present in the section which follows the one just referred to. Once again there is the same order - the cognitive is first, but grace (the motivating) is also there, and two of the effects depend to a great extent on the recipient. John of Damascus is quoted: "Peccatorum remissio omnibus similiter per Baptisma datur; gratia autem Spiritus secundum proportionem fidei et praepurgationis". 29 Alexander's reply is in answer to questions, raised by this statement, as to whether the effects in the recipients are the same. This answer will be given in full because, not only are the effects of grace seen more clearly, but the preceding of faith in the recipient and the recipient's part are also demonstrated.

"Respondemus quod gratia plures habet effectus: unus contra malum culpae; alterum contra malum poenae quod est fomes; tertium quoad ordinem in bonum respectu meriti. Quantum ad primum aequalitas est: omnium enim peccatorum fit similis remissio. Non enim lux spiritualis secum conpatitur aliquam partem tenebrarum. Quantum autem ad alia duo, licet sit aequalis effectus quantum

28. 20,b)pp.88-89. 29. De Fide Orth. IV,c.9; d.IV,21,a) pp. 89-90.
The general lines of Alexander's Baptismal teaching are clear. Baptism goes beyond the impression of character and the elimination of the "carentia visionis Dei" to involve the grace which is against the "malum culpae", "malum poenae quod est fomes", and "in bonum respectu meriti". The "carentia" is eliminated by virtue of the passion's satisfaction, the "fomes" by virtue of the passion and Baptism, the forgiveness of guilt (and eternal satisfaction) were present already in circumcision from God, and through Baptism (instituted in the descent of the Holy Spirit at Christ's Baptism) comes the grace to do good - which is associated with the grace of forgiveness. Christ's passion is irrelevant with regard to guilt, necessary and causal in regard to "carentia" (temporal punishment), and with Baptism diminishes "fomes" (which is the result of temporal punishment for which satisfaction is made). However, Christ and his Baptism is merely the dividing point between the time of no grace to do good, and the time of the grace to do good, (that is, he may be, at most, a channel of grace). However as he in some way "earns" the grace ("gratia gratum faciens") diminishing "fomes",

he may also be understood to "earn" the grace to do good indirectly because that is "gratia gratum faciens" which is not "ex parte" and therefore accompanies the grace against "fomes". This latter is also an indirect result, not a direct result, of Christ's work because it derives from the Holy Spirit (even with Christ as a channel of grace). Christ is the channel of grace - or spiritual power - in bestowing this power upon the priestly orders.

When this association with Christ of grace (of forgiveness and for merit) is noted the division between the work of Christ (cognitive) and the work of the Holy Spirit should be noted also. The Holy Spirit does not convey the satisfaction and sanctification already achieved in Christ to men, but, instead, he is seen as an "alter Christus" whose work relates to grace (especially that of sanctification) in which Christ as full man and full God has no necessary part to play except to contribute the satisfaction for original sin which accompanies the work of grace. (He may as a member of the Trinity but that is apart from the Son of Man.) Christ makes his satisfaction, eliminates the "carentia visionis Dei", and thus his positive work is limited to the cognitive (as stated in the "Caput" section of the Christology proper this is not "saving knowledge"). The somewhat uncertain doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Glossa is better discussed under "Orders".

Then beyond the work of Christ there appears to an
additional power in Baptism. Baptism added to the passion, diminishes "fomes"; it opens the door "quantum ad causam ex parte baptizati" (in terms referred to before, it adds the efficient to the sufficient cause in Christ); and there is a "potestas ministerii" distinct from Christ although originating in him. In all these the sacrament provides the anhypostatic element (Christ's consubstantiality with mankind) in satisfaction. This is related to the above question on the Holy Spirit, spiritual power and the Orders which will be discussed under the Orders.

Finally, and this also raises the question as to whether there is really a doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Glossa, the Holy Spirit has the same relation to the believer as Christ; He is "alter Christus", that is, both Christ and the Holy Spirit in their work are seen as "objective" (uncreated) and the subjective element (which is traditionally described as the work of the Holy Spirit) is in man himself or in "created grace". The very term "created grace" speaks of semi-Pelagianism even without consideration of the free will which is man's alone. Created grace resides in the soul and with free will leads to merit. Thus Christ's person and work is limited by his absence in forgiveness, by the power of the sacraments, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and by the consent of man.
Perhaps the best starting point for a discussion of the Eucharist is a comparison which is made between it and Baptism in the first distinction where the definition "Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat" ¹ is discussed. It has been objected that, although there is a sign in Baptism, yet there is not a visible form. Alexander replies that water, visible "secundum se", is firstly a sign of character, which in turn is a sign of the remission of sin. The latter is the signified only, character is both sign and the signified, and the water is sign only. And so character is said to be visible "in quantum habet rationem signi ab aqua ipsa". Alexander then adds: "Eadem obiectio de Corpore Christi: ibi panis, et corpus Christi, et corpus mysticum. Panis enim et corpus Christi sacramentum est". ² Thus the bread is the pure sign, the body of Christ the signified and the sign, and the mystical body is the signified only. The sacrament, in itself, is the bread and the body of Christ, but the definition of a sacrament and Alexander's usage in his doctrine of Baptism where the water and character are the sacrament properly but not all that the sacrament involves, make it clear that the whole point about a New Testament sacrament is that it is not

¹ d.I,5,p.11. ² 6,f)p.14.
only a sign but also a cause - in Baptism a cause of the
remission of sin, and of grace to do good, and in the
Eucharist already it would seem in some way a cause of the
mystical body. (The narrower idea of sacrament "secundum se"
and "proprie" probably derives from the meaning of the word
sacrament as "sign"). But, as with Baptism, where there is
something more than the character, namely the satisfaction
made by Christ in his passion, so also there is something
more in the Eucharist than the bread and the body of Christ,
the sign. In the section where Alexander states the fact that
all sacraments have their virtue from the passion of Christ he
makes this comment on the Eucharist: "In Eucharistia
similiter datur virtus, quia quantum est de caritate
passionis, maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis
mystici ad caput". 3 Love or the love of Christ is what
is ultimately signified. It is not so much the passion which
is the virtue (as in satisfaction) as the love of the
sufferer, and it is love which binds the mystical body to
the Head. This point is also made in the following pages.
Baptism is "typus sepulturae Christi in passione...Sed hoc
sacramentum gerit typum Christi passi, non passionis. Ipse
enim cibus est spiritualis nobis, ut panis cibus corporalis". 4
And again: "Christus passus in quantum est panis vitae
significatur in sacramento altaris; in Baptismo vero in
quantum per passionem poenam originalis peccati delevit". 5

3. d.VIII,7,b) p.137. 4. 9,d) p.141. 5. 7,c) p.138.
This emphasis, that it is Christ in love which is important, is again brought out when it is asked why the Eucharist is the greatest sacrament: "Dicitur enim maius ratione contenti et quia significat gratiam unionis, quae maxima est inter gratias". 6 (Love and grace are very closely connected for they both proceed from the Holy Spirit). It is the love of Christ as such which is important here. The detachment of the Eucharist from the passion itself is well illustrated when Alexander states that the Eucharist was complete "quoad materiam et quoad formam, scilicet in coena", but the sacrament of Baptism lacked its form before the passion. The Eucharist had full effect before the passion unlike Baptism. 7 Thus, the passion and its satisfaction, which formed the necessity of the incarnation for man, has no central place in the Eucharist. Immediately, then, there is doubt as to the substitutionary role of Christ's humanity in the sacrament of love.

The main signification of the Eucharist has been established - the love which binds the mystical body together. Where is the causality of the sacrament? "Causalitas enim est ab ipsa vera carne Christi sub specie panis et vini, quae scilicet existens sacramentum, efficit quod figurat in corpore mystico". The body of Christ is signified by the bread and wine; "Species enim panis significat corpus Christi, species vero vini significat sanguinem, in quo anima

intelligitur". 8 The "ratio" "signi ex eo quod est visible bread and wine/; ratio causae ex corpore Christi invisibile sub sacramento. Et ideo dicitur hoc sacramentum constare ex iis, quia ab uno habet primo rationem signi, ab altero primo rationem causae respectu gratiae conferendae". 9 Codex "Pa" had earlier stated succinctly "ex similitudine exteriori signum, ex re sacramentum /et/ causa; et hoc est corpus Christi". 10 The same codex gives a whole causal process: "Causa efficiens, Verbum increatum; media, verbum genus creatum; deinde minister in illo verbo, habita intentione consecrandi. - Causa materialis est species panis et vini; formalis vero corpus Christi genitum et sanctificatum; finalis vero unitio corporis et animae". 11 The comment on the final cause is not in the main line of Alexander's thinking. Although this quotation may or may not be the writing of Alexander it does give his intent fairly clearly.

The peculiarity of the sacrament's cause, as distinct from Baptism, is that the "res", the Body of Christ, is under the species of bread and wine, so that the sign and the cause are in the one thing, that is, there is transubstantiation. Alexander asks "quare in hoc sacramento est res contenta quae est significata et non in alio". 12

"Respondemus... sicut caritas in virtutibus est complementum, eo quod idem sit in quod transit actus et finis, quia idem est in caritate quod diligitur et propter quod diligatur: quia caritate diligo summum bonum propter summum bonum - non sic est in aliis, sicut in fide,

Further, in common with the other sacraments the Eucharist effects the grace it figures, which grace is in the unity of the mystical body, and besides this "quia est finis sacramentorum, habet in se illum qui est finis et principium et medium omnis sacramenti." 14 And so the suffering Christ whose passion gives virtue to every sacrament is the same as the Body of Christ under the species of bread and wine, and so the Eucharist is the complement of all sacraments. As for the Eucharist itself, it is the love of Christ, present in the Body of Christ being the type of the suffering Christ, which is the significant thing. This fact the next paragraph makes clear in its comparison with Baptism. (above, note 4, page 294). Since, however, the Christ who underwent the suffering for satisfaction is the same as the Body of Christ (in the sacrament), and love is also the complement of faith, then clearly, the Eucharist must be the complement of, for instance, the sacrament of the passion and of faith, which is Baptism. But in each sacrament the suffering Christ and the

13. d.VIII,9,b)pp.139,140. 14. 9,c)p.140.
passion of Christ play different roles, namely the former
signifying love and effecting the unity of the mystical
body, the latter signifying and effecting the remission of
sin. Only for the latter role has Alexander established
the necessity of the humanity of Christ.

How is transubstantiation effected? The simplest
answer is "virtute enim verborum fit illa transubstantiatio,
ex institutione Domini." 15 The words are: "Accipite et
comedite ex eo omnes: Hoc est corpus meum, et iterum:
Accipite et bibite". The transubstantiation takes place
with the words "this is my body". 16 Thus transubstantiation
is in the power of the priest by virtue of the words spoken
by Christ who, at the Last Supper, first transubstantiated
the bread and the wine into his own body, the Body of Christ.
These words and this power continue within the priesthood.
Thus there is a power beyond the actual Christ. Christ and
the Body of Christ, though the one depends on the other,
are different or apart. This difference is seen in the
question as to whether Christ himself partook of the Body of
Christ in the sacrament. The answer is that he did not as
the highest love, but his disciples did — even with Christ
present. 17 This distinction is the equivalent of the idea
of extension of the incarnation which means that there is
a Christ-like power, distinct (if continuous with) from the
actual Christ, in the Church or in the sacraments or in even

15. d.VI,5,(d)p.113.  16. d.VIII,5,(b)p.135.  17. d.XI,18,
pp.181-183.
the people. In transubstantiation, the priest, the sacrament and the people tend to assume the place of the humanity of Christ and the "Christ" present in the Body of Christ under the species of bread and wine tends to be the Son of God alone. For Alexander, to make a positive assertion or even to consider that the Body of Christ was Christ present only as Son of God, of course, was an impossibility. It is not orthodox. Thus it is only in a question like the matter of ubiquity that such a tendency can be noted, not in a direct question. This becomes evident in the question where it is asked whether the Body of Christ is in many places. The first response shows the tendency to diminish the humanity in Christ.

"Respondemus quod duo concurrunt: unum ex parte termini, et alterum ex parte principii. Ex parte principii, Christus mediate suo verbo ad hoc instituto, cui collato est virtus spiritualis non tantum significandi, sed faciendi. Ex parte vero termini est ipsum corpus Christi, hoc est humanum unitum divinae naturae, quae est ubique. Non enim omne corpus habet possibilitatem ut sit in pluribus locis, sed solum illud quod per unionem accedit ad participandum proprietatem convenientem divinae naturae per unionem secundum divinitatem. Divina enim natura est ubique; corpus unitum ei possibile est esse in pluribus locis; corpus vero non unitum determinatum est in uno loco". 18

At this point Alexander is attempting to answer a question in terms of space similar to today's "How is the man Jesus, relevant to me, two thousand years later?" The answer must lie in the fact that he was a man of men, in other words in terms of enhypostasia and anhypostasia, and that this Christ is

present today by the Spirit. Alexander in his reply
avoids the real problem by tending to overthrow the "a" man
in that the man takes on the characteristic of ubiquity, a
ubiquity which is founded not on Christ's identification with
all men but in his Divinity. Such a Christ requires a new
humanity - in the Church. After the above response there
follow explanations of transubstantiation but for the
response to a second question "utrum Christus sit ubique
homo" is significant: "'iste homo' potest nominare personam
cui unitur humana natura; et secundum hoc verum est: 'iste
homo est ubique', non tamen est ubique homo. Si vero nominet
individuum suppositum huius speciei 'homo', tunc est verum
quod 'iste homo est in caelo' per circumscriptionem
 CORPORALEM". 19 (This incidentally appears to make Christ, the
Son of God, play the role of the Spirit.) The humanity of the
"Body of Christ" is virtually eliminated (into heaven) and
the formulation offends against the "without change" of
Chalcedon. The human cannot be represented by the Divine.
One must be able to say: "wherever the Son of God is, there
is the Son of Man; and wherever the Son of Man is, there is
the Son of God."

The humanity for Alexander, in as far as there is
humanity, resides, in the first place in the spiritual power
of the priesthood and the created word. On the spiritual
power which is in this word Alexander states "quod haec virtus
per Verbum increatum descendit in verbum creatum: Verbum dico

19. Ibid. h) p.156.
increatum humanatum. Ut autem sit completa circulatio, fit conversio carnem unitam Verbo increato". 20 Thus so far as there is humanity in the Body of Christ it comes immediately from the spiritual power in the Church. Alexander, of course, is not saying that the created word by reason of its spiritual power makes the Body of Christ "sed panis transubstantiatur in corpus Christi iam existens". 21 Here then, by the spiritual power the priest can make available the Body of Christ (make "relevant"?) which is said to be human but might as well be purely divine. To be sure, the power is derivative but nevertheless it is a power in the Church – as the chapter on the orders will demonstrate. It is this "making available" of Christ by the spiritual power that is the human element which rightly resides in Christ alone as the Word becomes flesh, and in his Spirit.

Here, Alexander realises that this power resembles the power of God in the Holy Spirit which operated in the conception of Christ. He states that "licet operatione Spiritus Sancti immediate fuerit conceptio, non tamen ipsa transsubstantiatio fit praeter virtutem creaturae; quia minus est alterum mutare in ipsum, quam ipsum creando divinae naturae unire". 22 Thus at this point, as one would suspect, it seems that that not only does the created word replace Christ's humanity, but also it replaces the work of

20. f)p.155. 21. g)p.156. 22. Ibid.
the Spirit. The spiritual power of the priest is again emphasised as a power in itself by Alexander's separation of the conception of Christ from the "making" of the Body of Christ. There are the two acts, not the one in Christ.

In the second place, the humanity resides in the mystical body. The Body of Christ is the sign and cause of the unity of the mystical body which is "membra congregationis fidelium" 23 or the Church. 24 The Body of Christ is "cibus animae ratione delectationis spiritualis quae est in cibo". There is a conjunction "et re et affectu et intellectu", the first is "in sensu", the second is in the soul "secundum voluntatem informatam caritate uniente", and the third is in the intellect recalling to memory the passion. 25 The food, comes from the Head himself from whom it flows into the members and this takes place in the mystical body which is the union of incorporeal things through love to Christ. 26 The incorporation is principally of the soul in the church militant - in the church triumphant the body through the soul will be incorporated - and the incorporation is made to the Head. Because he is Head both according to his Divinity and humanity the union with him is in both ways.

"Sed differenter; quia ab ipso secundum quod Deus effluit gratia et virtus in membris corporis mystici; ab ipso vero secundum quod homo materialiter trahitur gratia, et in quodam modo effective, quoad effectum gratiae. Creaturae enim non est dare gratiam; sed

Thus the man Christ contributes under grace (the same grace which leads to virtue and sanctification) satisfaction for original sin, the effect of which satisfaction accompanies (and possibly removes the barrier to that grace - is the man "efficient" in this way?) the grace flowing into the mystical body. This "effective" work of Christ, as has been pointed out previously, points primarily back towards God and not towards man. The "materialiter" in relation to sanctifying grace, as has just been seen, denotes little more than a divinised man, a channel, certainly not a unique man.

Here, grace and the virtues actually do derive from Christ as the Son of God (which seems to be the case in the "Caput" section of the Christology proper). This view must, to some extent, be modified. First, it is the spiritual power in the Church which enables this to happen, which makes available love and grace. Secondly, the love and grace are present in Christ as a vessel and not necessarily as the Son of Man, as a result of his conception by the Holy Spirit or the descent by the dove, and he passes on this power to the Church. Thirdly, there is an indication that, in fact, the grace and love in the Body of Christ come directly from the Spirit. This indication is a comment on a statement by Prosper Aquitanus: "Caro Christi fidelium est vita, si

27. 1)p.163.
corpus Christi esse non negligant. Sint corpus Christi si volunt vivere de spiri tu e ius, de quo non vivit nisi corpus eius". 28 The comment is: "Ex quo denotatur quod non tantum corpus Christi verum vivit de spiri tu e ius, sed etiam corpus mysticum. Sed aliter vivit spiri tu increato, et aliter spiri tu creato". 29 Perhaps the Spirit is not so bound as the earlier statement on transubstantiation might have indicated (see above page 301, note 21) although his work coincides with the work of the priest. The later statement, however, does appear to detract from the Body of Christ, or rather, the actual Christ, as the source of grace. Nevertheless, whatever way the matter is viewed, Christ on earth or the Body of Christ are both subject to the Spirit in the matter of grace. It is the Spirit who ultimately sanctifies man; Christ or the Body of Christ is merely the channel of grace. Christ is not our sanctification.

In spite of this division of Christ and the Spirit (the Spirit is seen as preceding Christ, not as proceeding from him) both are involved in the process of transubstantiation, that is, both to some degree are subject to the uncreated word. The Body of Christ and the vivification of the mystical body may be different parts of the sacrament (as are character and grace in Baptism) but as the priest "brings about" the Body of Christ, as "sacramenta Novae Legis efficiunt quod figurant quantum in se est, sed impedimentum potest esse ex parte eius qui suscipit" 30, and as the Body of

Christ figures the union to Christ of the members through love, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that both the Body of Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit (together or apart) are to some extent subject not only to the uncreated word, the spiritual power of the priest but are also "humanised" by the mystical body which stands over against Christ and the Spirit.

In the third place the humanity resides in man or in the individual members of the mystical body. Where the incorporation into Christ was discussed it was asked "quomodo fiat illa unio?" The answer differs for children and adults. The union in adults takes place "ratione voluntatis actualis unitae per caritatem". Later Alexander comments: "licet corpus Christi aequaliter sumatur ab omnibus, non tamen aequalis unio est in omnibus in corpore mystico. Quidam enim dignius sumunt et quidam minus digne". And earlier he states "Si vero quaeritur quod dicitur ibi esse proprie sacramentum, dicendum quod vera caro Christi sub specie panis et vini existens. Haec enim, digne suscepta, efficit quod figurat". In the first two quotations "three humanities" are evident, the mystical body, the Body of Christ (which is "made") and the worthy reception. In the last statement two parts of the Eucharist are evident, the sacrament as sign, and the worthy reception. The sacrament is complete, however, only when the sign and the effect (the inflow of grace and love

31 d.XI,7,1)p.163. 32. d.XI,7,g)p.175. 33. d.VIII,11,p.143.
forming the mystical body), in which the priest plays his part and the individual member determines the inflow of grace by his worthiness, occur. The priest permits the inflow, the mystical body receives, the individual members determine the amount. Thus the humanity is provided.

The Eucharist in Alexander's teaching is best described as the sacrament of love. Love is its heart, and not really Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man. To be sure, he is the instrument of that love and the Holy Spirit but he is not the one in whom the sanctification of man has already taken place, in other words he is not our substitute as he is in satisfaction. Because this is so the humanity of Christ has no necessary role (except in its satisfactory role) and drops into the background. The humanity, for all intents and purposes is replaced by the Church, in which resides the spiritual power and the created word, which derives from Christ, but which is nevertheless a real power. The Orders pass grace onto the mystical body of which they are the higher part and it also supplies part of the humanity. Within this mystical body the consent of the members in the reception of grace replaces the work of the Holy Spirit because the consent of the members also supplies the lacking humanity of the Body of Christ. The Divine on the one side and the human on the other side are denoted, in effect, by the three separate titles, titles which should not be separated; Christ suffered, the Body of Christ, and the Mystical Body.
In all this, the Holy Spirit actually appears to be the major operative element, rather than Christ the Son of God, for grace and love are in the province of the Holy Spirit. He vivifies the Body of Christ and the mystical body, and in fact may precede Christ rather than proceed from him. This view is not completely substantiated in the Glossa. In fact, there is a possibility that the Spirit in a way is made subject to the spiritual power of the priest which derives from Christ by reason of the fact that his work would occur whenever the priest operates. If this were the case, the Church sacraments replace the Holy Spirit, in effect, as the one who brings the benefits of Christ to the members. It would not be quite as blatant if the Spirit channelled his grace through Christ, but nonetheless the Spirit would still be replaced by the Church. Whatever the case, whether Christ is seen as the channel of grace, or whether the work of Christ and the Spirit merely coincide in the sacrament when the priest operates, the Spirit still comes to man as "alter Christus". This means that the Church and man not only supply Christ's humanity but also replace the work of the Spirit; in the Church as he comes objectively to the member, in the member subjectively in his reception of the sacrament. As "alter Christus" the Spirit must have his humanity and this is found in the church, in the same way as Alexander finds the humanity of Christ in the Church. The two "Christs", that is, "Sons of God" thus both receive their
humanity in the Church and the members. The freedom 
of God then lies in man's consent and not in the Spirit. 
The priesthood and the sacraments have a dual role; towards 
the Son of God and the Spirit they are human; towards the 
member they are Divine. (This is evident in the "Orders".) 
In short, they are the mediator.

In satisfaction Christ's manhood is unique but 
lacks efficacy. This efficacy is supplied by Baptism and 
man. Here Christ's manhood is not unique; it is merely 
the channel of spiritual power to the Church which provides 
the humanity towards the grace of God and towards man becomes 
God. The individual man has to provide his own response. 
Hence in both situations Pelagianism of some kind is the 
result.
CHAPTER 9

PENANCE

There are several things which are significant about Alexander's doctrine of Penance. First, it occupies the most space, 179 pages of Book IV. (cf. 148 for Matrimony, 82 for Baptism, 74 for the Eucharist, 46 for Orders, 14 for Extreme Unction, and 4 for Confirmation). This may be due, of course, not to its importance, but to the fact that the doctrine was in a state of flux. Secondly, as Christ made satisfaction for original sin, Penance parallels this work to some extent (although the sacrament must be preceded by Baptism) for actual sins. The space occupied may also be due to this for actual sins are man's immediate and pressing problem. Thirdly, there are two distinct aspects; there is the sacrament itself, contrition, which takes place simply between man and God, and there is the sacrament of the Church which is mainly confession and satisfaction. Absolution is barely mentioned. Fourthly, and it has this in common with Matrimony, consent is central. These two sacraments are not in line with the other sacraments and are difficult to fit into the concept of the sacrament as a sign and cause of grace.

Alexander begins his doctrine of Penance by a general discussion on penitence. It is stated to be the first virtue in adults who have fallen through sin, and Baptism for adults is of no value unless there is contrition present.
It is the first virtue in adults who decline evil. At Baptism it figures liberation "a peccato actuali in passo recidivum. Prior ergo est illa gratia quae est in Baptismo ea quae est in Poenitentia". ¹ Penitence, the virtue, at Baptism is for past actual sin, and thus Penance as a sacrament is for post-Baptismal actual sins. There is a two fold conception of penitence; intellectually the virtue of penitence is conceived by faith, in the affections it is conceived "a timore primo". This fear is initial fear which relates to both "poena" and "praemium" whereas servile fear relates only to "poena", and filial fear only to "praemium". ² There is a twofold punishment for past errors, one enjoined by the priest, the other "continuus dolor cum detestatione peccati". ³

There are two effects in penitence, the remission of guilt and the remission of punishment. Guilt is remitted in contrition and thus penitence is grace, and punishment is remitted in confession and satisfaction and in this penitence is a virtue: "tunc enim homo existens in caritate satisfacit, et ita reddit Deo quod ei debitur, quod scilicet est iustitiae. Est ergo opus illud ex caritate et iustitia procedens". ⁴ (Penance as a sign and cause of grace is the sacrament but at this point penitence in general is being discussed. Alexander enumerates a number of meanings of the word "poenitentia". ⁵) Post Baptismal satisfaction

¹ d.XIV,1,b)pp.206-207.  ² d.XIV, 2,c)p.207.  ³ 3,p.208.  ⁴ 6,f)pp.210-211.  ⁵ g)p.211.
is only from love - Esau's tears would not have been satisfactory if they were not in love 6 - as the following quotation illustrates: "Est enim quaedam poenitentia, cuius poena satisfactoria est ex virtute passionis Christi et virtute Baptismi habentis virtutem ex ipsa; et haec set prima poenitentia. Est poenitentia secunda, cuius poena satisfactoria est ex caritate informante dolorem poenitentialem et alia opera poenitentiae". 7 This demonstrates how closely the virtue of post Baptismal satisfaction parallels the work of Christ - it is in love and in justice, and, instead of for original sin, for actual sins. It is "gratia gratum faciens" which prevenes the work of merit, by deleting guilt and informing the free will. 8 ("Gratia gratis data" prevenes while the person is in sin habilitating him to "gratia gratum faciens" 9.) Thus the inference is that the guilt removing grace, informs the free will, and creates the virtue which is the fear of punishment and the expectation of the prize by which meritorious satisfaction is made. This twofold effect of Penance towards guilt and punishment is seen in terms of merit in relation to "misericordia". "Misericordia" is twofold; in the remission of guilt and in the remission of punishment. The first nobody merits "ex condigno" although it is "congruous" the Lord should pity the contrite. The second can be merited and is made after the demission of guilt and the "reatus" of eternal punishment. 10 Thus in

Penance there is the remission of guilt and penitence as a virtue informed by love. The contrast between Baptism and Penance highlights the place of voluntary love in the latter. If Baptism "quod tantum trahit virtutem effectus a passione Christi" is undergone insincerely "recedente fictione, elicitur effectus". But Penance has its virtue from the passion of Christ "et praeter hoc ex opere nostro, quod est satisfactorium poenae". Thus if penitence is made in mortal sin it is not pleasing to God in as far as it is "ex opere nostro". "Causa autem huius est, quia peccatum quod debet per poenitentiam deleri, ex propria voluntate contrahitur; et ideo satisfactorium illius debet esse voluntarium quod Deo placet cum fit. Hoc autem non est praeter caritatem". The sin deleted by Baptism was contracted from the "voluntas" of the first parents, and thus being contracted through another, satisfaction is made through another. 11 In Penance, or penitence, the penitent is of foremost importance which he is not in Baptism. If there is no "voluntas" at work in love part of the whole point of penitence is lacking.

So far it has been penitence generally that has been considered and in particular the centrality of man's part, that is, the virtue. However within Penance itself the sacrament, there are several divisions. On the one side there is a man's contrition, which in itself can include the deletion of guilt and the satisfaction of punishment. On the

other side there is that related to the church, confession and satisfaction, which include the relaxation of punishment and the satisfaction of punishment. On the side of man in contrition the work of "voluntas" is required, but also on the side of confession and satisfaction, the "voluntas" is necessary, as well as the power of the church which derives from Christ. This sacrament is different from the others "non enim iustificatur homo a peccato mortali sine voluntate eius...Quia ergo dolor voluntarius requiritur in contritione, formatus a gratia, necesse est adesse poenitentiam virtutem". (This statement is made in the context of the three parts of Penance.) "Penance" covers the three parts - contrition, confession and satisfaction - but it could refer only to contrition. Alexander does not integrate completely contrition on the one side, and confession and satisfaction on the other to give one rounded view of the sacrament. The problem is created by the fact that contrition appears to be able to render the sacrament of the church unnecessary, or nearly so, and this would undermine the authority of the spiritual power of the keys of the orders through which the virtue of Christ's passion works.

Alexander is aware of this problem when he asks "utrum sint illa tria partes subjectivae vel integrales poenitentiae". He answers that "aliter est loqui de poenitentia secundum quod est satisfactoria, et aliter de

ipsa ut est virtus, aliter ut est sacramentum". As a sacrament it can be looked at from the point of view of what it is as sign and cause, or from the point of view of the institution, or as to what is the sign and what the cause. The institution of the power of the keys is found in James 5:16 "Confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra" which is first signified by Luke 17:14 "Ite, ostendite vos sacerdotibus". The sacrament signifies the grace of the deletion of sin. As sign it is divisible; there is something in contrition, something in confession and something in satisfaction. Contrition is a sign of the remission of guilt; undertaking penitence in confession signifies the deletion of purgatorial punishment into which the eternal punishment is commuted; in satisfaction there is the sign of the deletion of temporal punishment. For the completion of the sign all these parts are required. There is a part which is of the "esse" (contrition) and parts which are of the "bene esse" (confession with satisfaction "prout satisfactio est praeter contritionem"). This is so because in contrition itself is the "esse" of Penance as it is the cause of the deletion of sin. However, as sign, both confession and satisfaction are of the "esse" of Penance and principally confession by reason of the "poenitentiae susceptae". "Dico autem de poenitentia secundum quod est satisfactivum Ecclesiae. Aliter enim est loqui de poenitentia ut est satisfactivum Ecclesiae, et aliter ut est sacramentum". As a sacrament Penance is completed in contrition; as "satisfactivum Ecclesiae, non fit sine
suscepta poenitentia a sacerdote ex vi clavium in confessione". 13 Here the part of the Church is small, in fact contrition can be the complete sacrament. But before the Church man still can be a debtor in relation to punishment. The Church also has a role in relation to guilt: "deletio quoad culpam fit duobus modis: vel respectu Dei, et sic in contritione; vel respectu Ecclesiae, et sic in confessione, quoad forum poenitentiale". 14 The two aspects of confession may also be expressed in the following statement: "confessio duo importat: ostensionem peccati et susceptionem poenae, taxatae secundum iudicium sacerdotis, relaxatae ex vi clavium, quae vim habent ex passione Christi". 15 Whether this is more than a sign is doubtful but the one real power that the church has is to relax purgatorial punishment: "Sed sacramentum illud, prout est Ecclesiae, cuius virtus consistit in virtute clavium, necessarium est non ad dimissionem culpae, sed non imputetur ad poenam". 16

A division between the parts of the sacrament similar to that stated at length above is found earlier in the Glossa where "Poenitentia-sacramentum" as a sign and cause of grace is discussed. With contrition preceding, Penance received from a priest is a sign but not a cause of the remission of guilt in contrition in which grace is infused; spiritual grief in the soul without tears etc. is a cause but not a sign; and it is "causa et signum, cum dolor ille

spiritualis in signum corporale prorumpit, et significat gratiam remissionis poenae aeternae virtute passionis Christi et virtue clavium". 17 The problem of how the three parts make up one sacrament arises again at the end of the discussion on Penance. Alexander ties the parts together in the first part of the response. In "perfecta Poenitentia quae est sacramentum Ecclesae" there are not three sacraments but one: "non enim a signatione perficitur sacramentum, sed a causalitate, quae ex institutione et sanctificatione procedit". The remission of guilt and punishment is what is caused and is what perfect Penance figures. "Unde tam confessio, ratione susceptionis poenitentiae, quam satisfactio confert ad remissionem poenae; et ita non tantum est principium cognoscendi, sed etiam causandi exterior Poenitentia est principium". 18 But in the next answer to the question what is the "res" only, and what are the "res" and the "sacramentum", this tie appears to be loosened somewhat. The exterior penitence, which is in satisfaction, is the sacrament only, the interior penitence, which is in contrition, is both "res" and sacrament, and the remission of sin as far as guilt and punishment is "res" only. Then it is suggested that some lack the benefits of Penance since they do not fulfil the exterior penitence. Because of this Alexander states that "videtur potius esse dicendum" that the "esse" of the sacrament is principally

17. d.XIV,6,g)p.211. 18. d.XXII,2,d)p.383o
in contrition. Exterior contrition is a sacrament only; interior contrition is both the sacrament and "res"; and "res" is the remission of sin. "Et consistit similitudo in annihilatione. In contritione enim annihilat se homo: in remissione peccati Deus annihilet culpam". In confession there is an exterior (sacrament only) and an interior (sacrament and "res") obligation, the latter being the interior consent to satisfaction; "deobligatio" on the part of punishment "quandam cum obligatione ciusdam poenae sensibilis, est res tantum". In satisfaction there is an exterior (sacrament) and an interior (sacrament and "res") "impletio" the latter consisting in the will to satisfy; "impletio poenae dimissae" is the "res" only. 19 Thus even more there appears to be a division between the penitent and the church so that contrition can almost stand by itself and even in confession and satisfaction which relate to punishment the interior element appears almost self-sufficient.

A further attempt, not so much to integrate the parts of the sacrament but to justify the church side of it, is found under the discussion of the sacrament of Matrimony in which there arises exactly the same position. The problem arises because the other sacraments have sensible signs (oil, water, etc.) but Penance and Matrimony do not. The answer to this problem is first, that these two sacraments were instituted in paradise, "dum adhuc homo spirituali mente praeditus erat, nec per conversionem ad sensibilia subjectus

peccato". Then, also, the nature of these sacraments differ: "Coniugium enim consistit in consensu expresso per verba de praesenti. Quid enim habet maiorem convenientiam cum verbo interior quam verbum exterius, quod ab ipso generatur". A similar situation exists in Penance. "Recte ergo haec duo sacramenta, quoniam signa generantur ab affectione animi, sunt universalia sacramenta Legem naturae concomitantia". As man was seduced by sensible things separate from him so the other sacraments instituted after the Fall have exterior matter.

Then, again, in these two sacraments "est homo sicut cooperans Deo; dico autem de homine qui recipit effectum sacramenti. Deus non iustificat hominem, nisi homo faciat quod in ipso est" and similarly in Matrimony consent is necessary. This is not so in the other sacraments "immo actiones sacramentales ad alias pertinent personas, quam ad eas quae suscipiunt sacramentum". Before the Fall man could stand and progress with no other help than God, but after it he needed another aid to rise again. And so these two sacraments,

quae ante peccatum erant instituta, materiam acceperunt ex ipso qui suscepit sacramentum, per ipsius operationem. - Secus tamen est de sacramento Poenitentiae et de sacramento Coniugii. Nam sacramentum Poenitentiae quoad partes suas non habuit effectum antequam lapsus esset homo in peccato; et propter hoc in parte dependet effectus eius a ministris Ecclesiae, prout de virtute clavium fit in parte relaxatio poenae aut commutatio. Coniugium vero est inter omnia quoad hoc spiritualius; eius enim effectus melius permansisset, sic homo in statu innocentiae perstitisset". 20

Thus the church has the power of relaxation "ut non imputetur ad poenam". (In Matrimony the church's part is practically just an outward form.) This power of the church may be almost necessary (and very helpful) for the purpose of relaxation but it is questionable whether it is absolutely necessary. Certainly, Alexander has not been able to integrate the parts very successfully and indeed comes down heavily on the side of what might be described as "individualistic pietism" rather on the side of the institutional church. Of course, the Church in its role as the relaxer of punishment has very considerable practical power. It is certain, over against the uncertainty of an individual's contrition.

The last part of this discussion will centre firstly on contrition (and justification) by itself, and then on the Church side and the power of the keys by itself. Contrition is a "dolor voluntarius... formatus gratia", 21 for the remission of sin. 22 In contrition there is a deletion of guilt, and of punishment in part. The deletion of guilt is the effect of grace through itself in as far as it purges the free will from sin. As far as the deletion of punishment in part, the movement of faith referring to the articles on the remission of sin, eternal life, and eternal punishment, is first. Punishment arouses fear and life impresses the movement of hope and between these two movements is that of contrition "quo se homo annihilat pro peccato quo erga Deum deliquit". That is the movement of

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"iustitia". 23 (Not all punishment is deleted because there is a certain punishment "quae debetur omni mortali in quantum tale, et haec est dolor continuus usque ad finem vitae. Nam, quia mortale est debitum poenae aeternae, oportet quod poenitentia obliget ad vinculum detestationis perpetuae. Sed est alia quae debetur mortali secundum proprium genus: alia enim debetur fornicationi, alia adulterio; et hanc poenam delebit contritio, tanta potest esse". 24 The discussion on the resurrection also made clear that corruption and death, which is a punishment, is not deleted till the final resurrection.) The form of contrition is grace and voluntary grief; the sensual and spiritual are the matter. For the effects of these Alexander refers the reader to the following distinction. 25

This distinction begins with a discussion of contrition and in the response of the first section the effects are enumerated. Grace has the effect of the penitent wishing to grieve for sin. Other effects are enumerated as well as the effect of grace in grief. Then this passage follows: "Effectus autem gratiae secundum se est delere culpam. Secundum quod adiungitur / ei voluntas / habitualis vel actualis detestandi peccatum, delet reatum poenae aeternae. Secundum adiungitur ei dolor sensibilis, delet poenam purgatoriam sub conditione. Secundum quod coniungitur operibus misericordiae et

Satisfaction is, quae in tribus praedictis consistat, delet poenam temporalem". Spiritual grief is finite in its dimension, but infinite in its power, namely, in the deletion of eternal punishment. "Sed hoc non habet ex se, sed ex gratia; meritum enim quodam modo congruentia ei attribuitur". Thus contrition in itself can complete Penance as far as it is possible in this life. There would be some doubt as to the amount of satisfaction necessary, however. It should also be noted that spiritual grief on the part of man plays a part in the deletion of eternal punishment for actual sins, something which was reserved to God alone in the actual Christology in relation to the punishment for original sin. It is not a full-fledged semi-Pelagianism which occurs in relation to eternal punishment. It is a half-way house to it, that is, God does not owe man anything for this grief (which he does when temporal satisfaction has been made, namely, the remission of sin) but there is a certain "congruence" of man's grief with the grace of God.

Penance leads to justification. It is when this word is used that one realises the full semi-Pelagianism that is involved. Justification comes at the end of a process in which man plays a real and necessary part. Justification for Alexander is not in Christ as far as actual sins are concerned but in grace and man. "De quatuor

26. d.XVIII,1,II,d)pp.310-311. 27. l,IV,c)pp.312-313.
quae exiguntur ad justificationem", the first is the infusion of grace, the second is the movement of the free will towards God, the third is the movement of contrition of the detestation of sin, and the fourth is the remission of sin. "Duo istorum sunt Dei, et duo hominis". 28 Remission of sins thus depend greatly on man. In relation to original sin there is the infusion of grace and the remission of sin for justification and this is common to both children and adults. For actual sins, however, adults must have the movement of the free will. 29 In as far as the remission of sin as guilt is concerned the infusion of "gratia gratum faciens" occurs at the same time as the remission of sin although there is a "before and after" by nature for the four parts of justification. In relation to punishment there can be a "before and after " both in time and in nature. 30 This doctrine pushes Christ very much into the background in relation to actual sins (although Penance in some way is said to have virtue from the passion of Christ) and more than ever man comes to the forefront, something which had not happened in Baptism and the Eucharist where grace and the Church were more prominent. 31 Thus for contrition tremendous claims are made.

What of the sacrament of the Church? For this Alexander

28. d.XVIII,5,a)pp.275-76. 29. f)p.277. 30. i)p.278. 31. It is stated later that the penitent must have faith in the passion of Christ but this is in relation to the power of the keys. Logically it would seem that only the Church has this virtue; the virtue does not altogether cover Alexander's view of contrition - at least here.
makes considerable claims also. His position is reasonably summed up in the following statement:

"Non negatur hic solam contritionem posse delere peccatum quod culpam et poenam quod Deum, sed non in foro Ecclesiae. Praeterea, unitas caritatis, qua unitur corpus mysticum, iuvat ad remissionem peccati, virtute cuius supplicationes sacerdotum obtinent peccati indulgentiam a Deo; et ita, licet possit remitti, non tamen de facili praeter supplicationes sacerdotum virtute unitatis Ecclesiae". 32

This statement does not mention the power of the keys, but does mention the fact that one can be a debtor before the Church, and that the Church by her love has a certain power. However the words "iuvat" and particularly "de facili" are significant (and this would apply to the keys also) for in helping and making things easy the Church, by its very stature, was of great importance.

"Poenitentia... prout est sacramentum Ecclesiae consistit in suscepta poenitentia post confessionem a sacerdote iniungente". 33 This is the "second" sacrament of Penance, contrition being the "first" and "real" sacrament. Confession has two elements: "ostensio" of sin and the undertaking of punishment which is determined by the priest and relaxed from the power of the keys. 34 If "ostensio" is accompanied by grace it deletes some punishment; "poenitentia suscepta" from the power of the keys again relaxes some punishment but not totally for this is related to satisfaction in the sacrament. 35

32. d.XVII,15,p.296. 33. d.XVI,14,g)p.263. 34. See above, note 15. d.XVII,9,e)p.284. 35. d.XVII,9,f)p.284.
The power of relaxation is not complete for there must be
"aliquam sensibilem poenam" beyond the contrition in
confession. 36

The articles of faith which move the penitent to
confession are: "the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of
Saints, and the Remission of Sins". In confession "convenit"
to have faith that the Catholic Church has the power
"solvendi et relaxandi de poena". The Church has the power
by reason of its Head "quod influit principalioribus membris
Ecclesiae hanc potestatem. Praeterea, oportet habere fidem
quod merita Ecclesiae, non solum militantis, sed etiam
triumphantis valent ad remissionem peccati". 37 The merit
of the Church triumphant is of value because "prius solverit,
dum fuit in Ecclesia militante" just as the passion of Christ
and the passion of the Apostles are of value. ("Adimpleo ea
quae desunt passioni Christi in carne mea pro corpore eius quod
est Ecclesia". Col.1:24) 38 In a similar way a penitent
who is within the Church's bounds but not within the mystical
body can be revivified by inflowing love or grace which is in
the principal members and especially the Head. 39

It should be noted that the merit which comes from
Christ is dependent on the love in him just as satisfaction
depends on love in relation to original sin. Although
Alexander does speak of the merit and satisfaction of Christ
interchangeably in the Christology proper there is an important
distinction as has already been noted. Christ could make

Satisfaction for original sin only as the Son of God and the Son of Man; his merit which was work beyond what was needed for satisfaction was incidental to his incarnation. The distinction is the same as the one between the passion of Christ in Baptism and "Christ suffered" in the Eucharist. This merit differs in no way, except possibly in quantity, from the merit of the Church which like Christ's merit is something which has been earned personally beyond what was necessary as satisfaction for actual sin which satisfaction must be personal - although transferable. Satisfaction may be described as negative satisfaction returning to normal (for sin only remedied by the "Other" because committed by "another"), merit as positive satisfaction going beyond what was required (and transferable because it is personal). The important point is that Christ's humanity is, in no way, in merit, as it is in satisfaction, peculiar or necessary because it was personal. Mere inspiration, not incarnation, is necessary. Such inspiration can be found in Moses or Elijah or the Apostles.

The merits of the Church militant or triumphant (for actual sins) can be another's satisfaction for they take the same form as the work of individual satisfaction for actual sins but are surplus. It is thus that the Church can relax the punishment for the actual sins of its members: "Sicut dolor proprius pro peccato est satisfactorius, ita dolor communis Ecclesiae universalis... est adiutorius in satisfactione: non quod per se plene satisfaciat, sed /quod/ cum poena penitentis iuvet ad satisfactionem, sicut ex ratione
However, the more important power in the Church is the power of the keys from Christ. Deriving from Christ (see also the chapter on Orders) there is a "substantial" power which consists in the commutation of the purgatorial punishment into temporal punishment, and in the conferring on the penitent relaxation of this. Besides this, there is an "accidental" power in which the principal dignity of the Orders consists and that is the power of binding and loosing through excommunication. On this latter power Alexander is cautious as to its effect. It certainly is not absolute and the excommunicated person should not despair but it should be noted that when a person is wrongly punished in this way by the Church, the punishment holds good in heaven, not as punishment but as merit for patient endurance. This points up the fact that the Church has power in itself, subsidiary to God but, nevertheless, a power and this fact is brought out by Alexander's frequent mentions of the forum of God, the Church and the individual ("Dei, Ecclesiae et propriae rationis"). A person may be a debtor in the forum of God and not in the forum of the Church and vice versa. Similarly he can be a debtor to himself but not to God and the Church. The last two ways describe what is often the situation but the first is more disturbing. The

40. d.XX,8,p.354. 41. d.XIX,3,c)p.339. 42. d.XVIII,12, pp.329-336 demonstrates this caution. 43. d.XVIII,8,p.328. 44. d.XVI,6,c)pp.256-257.
conclusion may be that the Church can be more loving than God. To be a debtor before the Church and not before God (the second way) occurs in any Church situation but here there is probably something more as the above reference (note 43) made clear.

Apart from this, there is the considerable authority in the Church in the substantial power of the keys which commutes purgatorial punishment into temporal and relaxes some of the latter. ("Relaxatio est temporalis poenae debita permissa diminutio". 45) Alexander in reply to a series of questions on demitting "macula peccati" and "reatus poenae" and as to whether the priest remits "reatus poenae aeternae" from the virtue of the keys states that there are many "vincula" of sin. 46 "Est enim quoddam vinculum culpa, et est quoddam vinculum poenae". First, there is the "vinculum capivitatis" from which the prisoner cannot escape; second, there is the "vinculum servitutis" which is paid to the devil, which is loosed completely when the Lord dimits guilt in contrition; third, there is the "vinculum aeternae damnationis" from which the penitent is completely absolved on worthy confession; but he is held to the fourth, the "vinculum expiationis" in purgatorial punishment: "in hoc autem quod sacerdos solvit, obligat ipsum ad vinculum expiationis per poenam sibi iniunctam". The penitent is held to the fifth which is the "vinculum perpetuae detestationis";

45. d.XX,14,1,a) p.357. 46. Richard of St. Victor: De potestate ligandi et solvendi, cc.2-3.
but he is freed from the sixth, "vinculum pronitatis" to evil works or difficulty in doing good through the exercise of the work of grace, in which is conferred "virtus consuetudinalis". - "Per iam dicta patet quod dimissio reatus poenae aeternae est a Deo; sed propter vinculum expiationis ad quod tenetur, sive confessionis, a quo absolvitur suscepita poenitentia ex vi clavium a sacerdote, dicitur dimitti a Domino per ministrum. Et haec est causa quare quidam dixerunt quod Dominus per sacerdotes dimittit reatum poenae aeternae non quin reatus poenae aeternae esset simpliciter a Domino dimissus".

In the next paragraph there is a significant statement. It had been objected that in contrition the "reatus poenae aeternae ex gratia coniuncta dolori spirituali" was demitted (as has been seen above on note 26. 48) In spite of this Alexander replies: "ratione vinculo confessionis, a quo si non absolvitur, potest redire vinculum damnationis aeternae, propter hoc exigitur quod salvatur homo a vinculo damnationis per vinculum expiationis susceptum". In regard to purgatorial punishment which is dimitted in contrition Alexander states that it is only when there is sufficient contrition that satisfaction is complete in regard to God. But it always diminishes this punishment. 49 In spite of this attempt to integrate, what is seen here is in fact a plain contradiction. (Alexander is aware that he holds both positions). Either the first is true or not, either contrition is the sacrament in itself or not. The fact that contrition is the sacrament does not exclude the power of the confession and the fact that

47. d.XVIII, 4, IV, 1) pp. 322-323. 48. m) p. 323. 49. n) p. 323.
contrition might not be sufficient, but there is a considerable difference between being an important aid and a necessity. On the whole Alexander prefers it as an important aid; here, however, it is moving towards the position of being necessary — certainly only in retrospect — as both a sign and a cause, where indeed the "voluntas" of the penitent must act but instead of being faced only by God he is now faced by the Church. This move would seem to be inevitable to bring Penance into line with the other sacraments and within the Glossa one sees the move in process.

On the commutation of purgatorial punishment to temporal punishment, it is stated that the Church has power in that, in a certain way, purgatory belongs to the area of the Church militant because purgatory is "in between" and so it is subject to the power of the priest from the keys. This is so because satisfaction was enjoined on the penitents when they were on earth.\(^50\) This commutation of purgatorial punishment occurs "per gratiam mediandi vi" for it is not only the work of man but also of God. The priest cannot commute all purgatorial punishment as this would be unjust for no sin is unpunished by God or man.\(^51\)

Finally, on the power of the keys, there is the priestly power in "relaxation" which is the permitted diminution of temporal punishment. Relaxations are efficacious and the quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of sin. "Deus enim remittit peccatum delendo culpam, et commutat

\(^{50}\) op.324. \(^{51}\) r) p.325.
poenam aeternam in aeternam. Sacerdos vero de temporali relaxat". If a penitent desires relaxation he must have "fides vel intentio dantis" for he must believe that such relaxation can be made by the Church; and "recta aestimatio" so that he might be absolved from satisfaction, and such being the case, with love present, relaxation is made. 52

In dying for Christ or for fighting the foes of the faith satisfaction is made as far as God is concerned but not "quoad forum Ecclesiae". 53 The Church by reason of its perfect members can be a help but cannot make a full emendation. 54 There must always be some "poena sensibilis" which cannot be relaxed. 55 Confession and satisfaction lead to the remission of sin. 56

Thus the Church has very considerable practical and possibly decisive powers. The part the penitent plays is still important but the priestly power extends to the commutation of purgatorial punishment, the relaxation of temporal punishment, the allotment of satisfaction, and it would appear it has some part to play in the commutation of eternal punishment. There is also a move towards making confession necessary, at least, in confirmation of contrition. It might be noted that in the concluding responses on commutation and relaxation of punishment, some punishment is always required. This gives a fearful view of the grace of God, an awful uncertainty and leads the penitent to a

52. d.XX,14,IV,p.359. 53. r)p.360. 54. q)p.360. 55. s)p.361. 56. d.XVII,9,f)p.284.
desperate urgency to make his satisfaction. Because purgatorial punishment was unknown and unknowable it must have presented an awful prospect to the believer and thus, doubtless, the great need to be freed of purgatorial punishment arose more and more. In Alexander however more emphasis is placed on immediate temporal relaxation. The fact, however, that the Church, in its perfection, was known to have a considerable authority over Purgatory, whereas the believer, however contrite he may have been, must have had grave doubts as to his own satisfaction, would lead him inevitably to lean on the Church. The doctrine of satisfaction developed by Anselm is beginning to run amok when applied to the penitential system. In the Christology the appeasement of an angry God was an idea which was hardly present; here, in the doctrine of Penance, the justice of an angry God becomes paramount and the forgiveness of guilt, and the merit of Christ begin to drop into the background as signs of the "true" God. Christ's merits are those of a good man helping placate the just God. Here, because of this view of God's "gracelessness", the grace of Christ, God's amazing condescension in the incarnation is lacking. In its place a full semi-Pelagianism is erected with the Church doing its best for the believers in an effort in which the love of Christ is merely the best of many.

To sum up the doctrine of Penance in the Glossa. Firstly in contrition as a sacrament, apart from the sacrament of the Church, man plays a vital part in his own
salvation. The work of Christ peculiarly as man in this is negligible. The meaning of the phrase "from the virtue of the passion of Christ" is difficult to assess in regard to this sacrament. At best it would appear that Christ by his satisfaction made way for the full working of grace which works in contrition, and that Christ as man but not as the substitute is the channel of the love necessary for contrition. Except in regard to the sacraments of Baptism and Penance as Church sacrament, the part of the passion or its virtue is difficult to assess. This is not a worked-out doctrine. In the sacrament of Penance it would appear, at least in considerable parts of the doctrine, that the Church (and therefore the power from Christ) is unnecessary, although most helpful and sure.

Secondly, the connection of Christ particularly to the sacrament of the Church in one regard is merely that of one among many. His merit is earned in loving suffering over and above what was required for satisfaction. Christ, like the Church could gain a "debt" from God. There is, however, a more concrete expression of this overflow from Christ, and peculiar to him, and it is the power of the keys. This power is put into the hands of the Orders, and becomes a real power within the Church, ceasing practically to be the power of Christ who gave it. With this power Christ is not a unique, although a most honoured man, for the Church shares the power with Christ - even displacing him - as it shares the merit of any of its saints. Because this element is lacking so too is any true incarnational doctrine for actual
sins. They are not on the same level as original sin in which only the Son of Man should satisfy, only the Son of God could. The fact that the Church has its own power is emphasised by the use of the idea of the forum of God and the forum of the Church in a way which suggests more than a difference. It is a difference between two which have similar powers. Further, the faith of the penitent is also put in the Church and, in particular, in the articles on the Church, the Communion of Saints, and the Remission of Sins. The Church, through the keys has the power of purgatorial commutation and possibly even some power in the commutation of eternal punishment. Grace is necessary in this aspect and once again it is loosely and vaguely connected to the sacrament of the Church (and by implication to Christ). However, grace's working in general does coincide, in confession, with the power of the keys; there is no absolute coincidence but it is close. Here, it does not work, apparently, through the sacrament of the Church as in Baptism. In relaxation the power of the keys seems more certain and greater and the teaching is clearer on the whole than on commutation either of eternal or purgatorial punishment. Here also the Church's power is not absolute but it is very nearly so. Over against individual contrition the sacrament of the Church has great advantages although it may not be "esse". It is certain; the Church is the mystical body; the commutation and relaxation present an easier way for the individual than through his own contrition and satisfaction;
the Church provides an insurance "so that punishment is not imputed" and indeed confession may be necessary so that the penitent does not slide back into eternal damnation.

Thirdly, in the sacrament of the Church, in contrition the part of the believer is still equally necessary in the virtue which must be present in this contrition for satisfaction or relaxation. Grace (the "grace of virtues") must therefore be present.

Fourthly, the Church's part in relaxation and the allotment of satisfaction is ultimately saving as it enables the believer to make a step towards remission and eternal life. Man must justify himself as far as in him possible to gain eternal life.

Fifthly, in the sacrament of Penance, the work of man very closely parallels the work of Christ in relation to actual sin. The penitent in the sacrament must possess love in a way similar to that in which Christ's satisfaction (and merit for actual sins) required him to be love-filled. Christ was filled with love; the penitent is filled with love - either from Christ or the Church or both. This love pours into the penitent so that he can be truly contrite (again the "grace of virtues"). Further, the Church can store up a treasury of merit for actual sins which like the use of Christ's merit through the keys, can be used for believers who are lacking. The doctrine of Penance, then, in contrition practically eliminates Christ, and in the Church's part, with its love and the power of the keys, pushes him well
into the background for everyday matters - the main condition is that the penitent should undergo Baptism by which original sin and its debilitating effects are removed.
CHAPTER 10

ORDERS

In the chapters on the Eucharist and Penance the power of the priest was particularly evident in regard to the power of transubstantiation and the power of the keys. In the discussion of Penance it was stated "annexae autem sunt claves principaliter Ordini sacerdotali". ¹ Under the doctrine of Penance indeed there is a lengthy discussion of the keys to which reference will be made in the following pages.

First, however, the definition of Orders in Alexander's discussion of the sacrament of Orders will be given. Peter's definition was "Ordo est signaculum quoddam, quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato et officium". ² By this definition Orders are distinguished from the other sacraments. "Signaculum" denotes character /Baptism and Confirmation also confer character/; "in quo spiritualis potestas traditur" distinguishes the sacrament from the sacraments in which character is impressed for spiritual power is not given to the members of the Church; "et officium" denotes the exercise of the power from the virtue of "Ordo". ³ In this sacrament there is the "character excellentiae; unde debent ii esse sicut mediatores inter Trinitatem increatam et inter eos qui generaliter homines dicuntur". ⁴ (There are three states of faith: the first

1. d.XVIII,3,1,d)p.315. 2. d.XXIV,2,a)p.399. 3. e)p.400. 4. h)p.400.
in Baptism illuminates the intellectual soul; the second in Confirmation is, on worthy reception, "robur fidei"; the third in Orders, principally for the priest, is "excellentia fidei". 5).

Alexander then gives another definition of Orders from which one can deduce who belongs and who does not belong to the Orders: "Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis potestatis ad aliquod officium ordinatum in Ecclesia ad sacramentum communionis". He points out that the latter sacrament is the most worthy of sacraments because the total Christ from whom every sacrament derives is contained in it (this is not the whole divinity because it cannot be contained). For this sacrament it is right that all spiritual power, founded in the faith in the Trinity, should be ordained. In this faith spiritual character is given.

"Ex quo perpenditur: cum potestas Ordinis sacramentalis sit ad sacramentum communionis, et hoc pertineat ad Ordinem sacerdotalem, in eo debet stare omnis Ordo. Dignitas vero episcopalis, quae superadditur, est ratione causarum, et quia ibi suppletur potestas Domini in conferendo Ordinem sacerdotalem. Sicut Moyses, licet non esset summus sacerdos simpliciter, tamen erat summus quoad hoc, quod consecravit Aaron". 6

Two things should be noted; first, the priestly power separates the priest from the laity; in other words there is a real power involved here not open to all by faith in Christ; (they are also "mediatores" of "gratia gratum faciens" 7); secondly, because transubstantiation performs a miracle

5. d.XXIII,7,g)pp.396-397. 6. d.XXIV,2,k)p.401.
7. 9,IV,o)p.424.
of containing Christ in the elements, a special power, almost if not "totally" divine and surely one which replaces the Spirit whose function it is to bring God to man, is necessary to perform it. The bishop has a special part to play in the conferring of this power. This part will now be investigated.

The objection is raised that the handing on of the power is purely of man. This is denied because the handing on is not of man as man but in as far he is spiritual having the spiritual power conferred by God. "Christus enim contulit Petro potestatem, et in eo ceteris Apostolis et eorum successoribus. Ab iis autem potestas spiritualis in Ecclesia. Ratione ergo huius potestatis conferetur potestas spiritualis in minoribus Ordinis; a plenitudine enim potestatis descendit potest secundum magis et minus". 8 The imposition of hands and the words signify the conferring of power. The bishop from whom power descends to the others alone ordains. In the matter of conferring there is not an equality, but the superior confers on the inferior. 9 An archbishop consecrates a bishop, not as archbishop but with power from the pope. The pope is consecrated in as far as he is pontifex from another pontifex, but he receives the fulness of power from the conferment on Peter of whom he is the vicar. 10

In the doctrine of Penance it was asked why the power of binding and loosing was conferred by the highest

order only. Alexander replied: "cum sit ordinata potestas Ecclesiae militantis ad triumphantem, quod est supremum in militanti suscipit potestatem ab eo qui est caput in triumphante. Et propter hoc potestas clavium confertur summo Ordine a Christo in persona Petri". 11 (The power of the keys is only one power of the spiritual power 12.) Later it is asked whether Christ had the power of the keys which he appears to have had as Peter was given the power by Christ. Alexander replies:

"Clavium potestas dupliciter dicitur; vel quae est per claves, vel quae est ab ipsis clavibus. Habuit ergo et habet Christus, secundum quod homo, potestatem per claves solvendi et ligandi, ita quod "per" notat causam instrumentalem. Et secundum hoc est potestas in ipso excellentiae, in sacerdote vero potestas ministerii. Christus ergo solvit et ligat per ministrum habentem illos qui recte ligati et soluti. - Si vero dicatur potestas quae est a clavibus vel in clavibus, secundum hoc, cum huiusmodi potestas sit ministerialis, non competit Christo, qui, ex quo factus est homo, factus est rex super omnem creaturam. Sicut ergo potestas ministerialis clavis non competit regi terreno, sic nec potestas clavis spiritualis regi spirituali". 13

Alexander, in the first part of this quotation, does attempt to state that Christ is at work, but in the second part of the quotation it is clear that the power has been passed on to the ministers on earth. Christ is not the minister there; the priest is. (This may mean in effect that the humanity of Christ is assumed by the priesthood.) This fact is made clear by the division between Christ as the Head of the Church triumphant and Peter as the head of the Church militant, and especially in the description of how Alexander sees the

"spiritual" not "human" power conferred. It is handed from pope to pope "in Ecclesia". It is significant that in all this discussion, the Holy Spirit is barely mentioned. (Only in quotation of the words at the ordination "Accipe Spiritum Sanctum". 14) In fact, he need not be for the "spiritual" power, in fact, handed on to the Church is divine (or spiritual) and the Church supplies the humanity. If the Spirit were seen to play his proper part in bringing the whole Christ to the Church (and not as an "alter Christus" working through Christ), then the humanity of Christ would not be "left behind" either on earth, or in heaven, nor would the Church assume the freedom of God in the "ex opere operato". To describe Christ as being the "causa instrumentalis", in spite of the fact that Alexander probably intended far more than this, in these circumstances, is to state that Christ was merely the instrument of this power. He no longer directly is the source of this power.

The spiritual power also is the ministerial, the earthly, the not entirely human, power of the priesthood (in regard to the members) which effects the working of the sacraments as in the power of the keys. It is a new mediation. The virtue of transubstantiation is "in ipsis verbis Iesu Christi". 15 In the Eucharist the deacon's task is "ministerium", that of the priest is "consecratio" 16. Does this signify the human and the divine elements? The sacrament

of Orders is the key, in fact, to the whole sacramental theology. It, in fact, not the Eucharist, is the "beginning" and the "end" of all the sacraments.

One last matter is significant. It is the relation of the priest of the Old Law to the priest of the New Law. They are both priests; the difference lies in the greater power of the latter. The host is figured in the Old Law but there is no identity of sacrament and the figured as there was a different virtue conferred. In virtue of the words of Christ, however, the priests of the New Law can transubstantiate the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. This power was not conferred on the priests of the Old Law. And because the faith of ancient and modern priests is in the one Head that does not make them the same: "Nam per caput ministerii in Nova Lege transfunditur gratia in membra, dico per verborum ipsius virtutem, licet ipse sit indignus... Non sic autem fuit in Veteri Lege, sed ad invocationem eorum dabatur aliquibus gratia a Spiritu Sancto". The difference between the priests of the Old and the New Law, then, is that the latter abound more in grace. (And it would appear "grace of virtues" and "sacramental grace" indifferently. This is to be expected as the "gratia gratum faciens" relates to guilt, punishment, and merit.)

These are revealing and clarifying statements. The priests of the New Law possess some thing which is grace. This they possess by the use of the words of Jesus. What is

17. d.XXIV,12,c)p.430. 18. 13,a)pp.430-433.
very significant is that the priests in the Old Law received the Holy Spirit by invocation. In the New Law the situation changes. Through Christ filled with grace from the Holy Spirit, grace, or spiritual power, flows into the priesthood. (This will include the transfer of satisfaction for original sin and merit for actual sins of which Christ is the source). Thus the priests of the New Testament practically possess the Holy Spirit - or replace him - as well as performing the function of Christ. Christ does not eliminate the priesthood; he is merely the channel of grace from the Holy Spirit to the new priesthood and as such enhances its power. He is another and greater Moses but he is not here the substitute, the great High Priest, who is both the Son of God and Son of Man, man's justification and sanctification. And at this point, unlike his role in satisfaction, Christ has no peculiar role to play; there is no substitutionary element.

This comparison practically sums up the whole discussion of Orders. The priest is the mediator between God and man; he has power apart from Christ although derivative from him. This power is "in Ecclesia" so that the freedom of God, that is, the work of the Holy Spirit, is bound by the priesthood. 19 Alexander would have hesitated to state this and indeed in one or two occasions grace sits rather loosely with the power of the priesthood although apparently coincident with it. If the Holy Spirit is

19. cf. Bk.II,d.XLIII,9,pp.415–416 where the sin against the Holy Spirit is to offend against the unity of the Church in which there is remission of sins.
eliminated, or becomes an "alter Christus", the freedom of God is transferred to the disposition of the priest or to the consent of the believer. Further the priesthood then becomes identifiable with the person and work of Christ because the Holy Spirit is not present to be the freedom of God in Jesus Christ, and grace flows, on consent, necessarily, from Head to priest with all Christ's benefits. In this way the priest becomes the second mediator; Christ is no longer unique. Thus the true incarnational element is lacking. With the freedom of God absent the power of relaxation would tend to lead to presumption and laxity because of the "ex opere operato" element. This "downgrading" of the costliness of sin is contrary to, and possibly because of, the harsh view of God and punishment that was also held.

There is, however, one thing that should be noted about Alexander's sacramental thinking. In spite of serious weaknesses in his Christology Alexander does make Christ, in a sense, central, for not only is he the satisfaction to God for original sin, but also through him comes the forgiveness of guilt in grace with its many other effects. Before Christ, guilt and grace were loosely tied to him if at all. After Christ everything flows through him even if not necessarily. It is this point that I would want to make against Kilian Lynch when he wishes to divide between sacramental grace and the grace of virtues (or "gratia gratum faciens"). The fact that, as Lynch admits when he states that Alexander was vague on how they were connected, Alexander puts
the two into the one grace, although distinguishing the parts of the sacrament against sin and to good, is of great importance, for it means that Alexander is far more Christ-centred than Lynch's position would admit. My impression is, in fact, that when Alexander spoke of "grace", on the whole, if not always, he thought of either "gratia gratis data" - and then he would state the fact - or "gratia gratum faciens" with no idea of divisions, divisions which in Book III are stated to be impossible. (As Lynch points out). This does not exclude divisions in what is caused - against sin, to good, faith, hope, love etc. 20 For Alexander, in his sacramental theology, an all-inclusive grace flowed from Christ as it is pictured more simply in the "caput" section of the Christology proper. This section does not feature the sacraments and thus one would suspect is not firmly integrated, a fact which is true of much of Alexander's theology. One might suspect that the "caput" section may have been an attempt to correct a one-sidedness in the Christology proper, after the work on the sacraments was done. It is this broad view of Christ's work and his centrality that Robert S. Franks drew attention to in his comments on the Summa which is Alexandrine, at least, in its environment and in a great part of its source material. He stated:

"He has, in fact drawn firmly the lines of a comprehensive theory of the work of Christ of a much wider scope than the Anselmic theory of satisfaction. Here for the first time in the history of the Latin

20. See Bk.II,d.XXVI,6,b)p.242, lines 14-20.
Church do we contain a unified view of Christ's work that is anything like as comprehensive as that of the Greek Fathers. Hugo and Lombard have certainly prepared the way for this wider view; but it was Alexander who achieved it. His merit in this regard has by no means been sufficiently recognised... The dominating principle of Alexander's whole doctrine of the work of Christ is the Augustinian doctrine of the constitution of Christ as the God-man with a view to the salvation of man by divine grace". 21.

In the Glossa this wider view has not been achieved but it is distinctly there. What is faulty is the lack of the enhypostatic element in regard to actual sins and, in regard to satisfaction for original sin, the fact that "grace" also takes over the anhypostatic role of Christ and that Christ is merely a channel of sanctifying grace. These faults are perhaps not so much due to this developing Christology but to defective doctrines of the Church, ministry, the sacraments, of grace and the Holy Spirit. Only the Word of God in Scriptures could rectify these defects as the Word did to a considerable degree at the Reformation. Unless they were rectified they would always stand in the way of a good Christology no matter how good one's instinct was.

In Book III under the Christological discussion, an interesting parallel to the above is found. In what follows there may be a suggestion that the Church is detached from its historical roots. It is asked whether those who kill Christ in his members sin more than those who killed him while he was on earth. The quantity of sin is measured by the contempt. 22 This is an interesting answer for three reasons. Firstly, it separates Christ in heaven and Christ

on earth; does this mean, then, that Alexander detaches
his theology from the historical Christ in favour of the
"existential" Christ? (This separation also appeared when it
was stated that Christ left his suffering behind.) Secondly,
there is an identification of the heavenly Christ and his
members and here by implication the connection to the
heavenly Christ is not made through the earthly Christ.
Thirdly, with doubt thrown on the present need of the earthly
Christ and with the identification of the heavenly Christ
and his members so that to kill them is worse than killing
Christ (it is bad only because the earthly Christ, now
ascended, identified himself with the members) there appears
to emerge a straight forward doctrine of the extension of the
incarnation in the Church of such a kind that the word
"extension" is hardly applicable for the connection to the
earthly Christ has been cut. Rather the word might be
"replacement". This conclusion is somewhat but not completely
modified in "L". "Quoad alias tamen circumstancias, est alius
maius. Simpliciter tamen maior dicitur maioritatem
plurimarum circumstiantiarum". The objections to the suggestion
that it was greater to kill Christ in the members had been
that Christ was greater "in se" than "in membris" and it was
greater to be united in the Person in one hypostasis than
through voluntas and love as the members were. 23 The
separation of the heavenly and the earthly Christ still exists,
as well as that of the members and the earthly Christ. The

23. dist. XX,19(L),III,p.240.
answer is still in favour of the "in membris", in spite of the earthly Christ being more "God" or "godly" than the members.
CHAPTER 11

QUAESTIONES

Sacraments in General

In the Questiones there is one considerable difference from the Glossa in the doctrine of the sacraments and there is also some "tidying up" and a greater clarity. Whether this greater clarity is altogether necessary or better is in some doubt as the very vagueness of the Glossa was at times more true in the end to the doctrine of Christ than a clarity which makes points unambiguous but less sound. For instance the clarity emphasises the "ex opere operato" element in the sacraments, thus enhancing the power of the Church, because sacramental grace and the Spirit as he is involved here become clearly attached to the sacrament in contrast to the grace of virtues which is freer to move as it wills in accordance with faith. In the Glossa, because there was only one grace, the freedom of the "gratia gratum faciens" extended to the grace against punishments and sin which it included, and the Spirit remained freer because of this. The relation of grace and the Spirit and the sacraments remained somewhat uncertain and because of this one felt that the power of the Church in the sacraments was less automatic. Without doubt, that power is expressed in the Glossa and possibly the vagueness is no more than a passing phase and with the presuppositions present could not be anything more than that, but the fact remains that the clarity did not lead necessarily to a sounder or happier position but in the
opposite direction.

This clarity or desire for clarity may have been the cause of the one considerable difference between the Glossa and the Quaestiones. This has already been mentioned; the quite clear distinction in the Quaestiones between sacramental grace and the grace of virtues and the fact that the latter is not involved in the sacraments. The clarifying, if it is that, adds up to a new theology of the sacraments, new implications for Christology, and a new doctrine of grace, there being further evidence elsewhere, in regard to the latter, that there is somewhat different thinking on grace from the Glossa in general. Part of the greater clarity of the Quaestiones is that it has a question "De sacramentis in genere" (Q. XLVIII). One can discover the principles with more certainty than in the Glossa. Sacraments, through themselves, are stated to be given properly for the reparation of wounds. ¹ This the Glossa also holds. However, the Quaestiones follows this out with rigor. The exposition is found in a query on the number of the sacraments. In the argument that precedes the responses it is noted that "quidam" concede that there are seven sacraments according to the seven virtues; Baptism and faith, Confirmation and fortitude, the Eucharist and love, Orders and prudence, Penitence and justice, Matrimony and temperance, Extreme Unction and hope. ² This enumeration which the Glossa accepts and practises, as has been seen, is rejected by the Quaestiones because, as it is

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1. Memb. 2,6,p.845.  
2. 10,p.847.
stated, although the grace in reparation can be divided, that for merit cannot be, but is totally given. One who has one virtue has every virtue. 3 "Gratia gratum faciens" is not given by virtue of the sacraments, although it may well be its consequence, because "accedenti digne ad sacramenta" is necessary for "gratia gratum faciens". 4 Sacramental grace on the other hand comes from the universal grace of Christ in the passion "a qua virtute sumunt sacramenta, et particularis descendit ab hac; et haec particularis est vel contra istam laesionem vel contra illam". 5 One would admit the force of the idea of the indivisibility of the grace of virtues but why there should be any difference in regard to sacramental grace is not altogether clear. Certainly it does make more sense of the idea of the "virtue of the passion" when it is applied to various sacraments but that one should not also divide out the virtues, as the effects of the grace of the virtues, amongst the sacraments, as the Glossa does, does not seem altogether logical except for the reason that this grace is not divided.

The relation of Christ to punishment is stated clearly in another question "De passibilitate Christi et Adae" (Q.XVI). As far as causality Christ satisfied for all punishments. He deleted all which were not ordained to merit but those which did help in merit such as "mores, concupiscencia, ignorantia, infirmitas" remained, "unde, licet passio Christi

3. 28, p. 860. 4. 31, pp. 861-862. 5. Ibid.
sit sufficiens causa delendi omnes poenas, non tamen delentur omnes in praesenti, quia hoc non esset nobis utile". 6 This explains why punishments are left and explains how Christ's satisfaction for original sin applies to the punishments of original sin but it does not explain why these punishments should not be all tempered in the one sacrament. It also does not explain Penance; nor really indeed why Christ should be "contained" in the Eucharist which the Glossa does in describing it as the sacrament of love - it explains not so much why the Body of Christ should be contained but it at least explains the sacrament's great importance.

It remains only to give in outline the reason for the number of the sacraments and what they signify and what they cause. There is a threefold assimilation of human nature to God; in nature, grace and glory. The similitude of grace is twofold "secundum duplicem gratiam". There is a grace to good works which is multiplied through virtues, gifts, and beatitudes; there is another grace which is for the reparation of wounds proceeding from the evil of guilt or sin. "Una similitudo est ad Deum, scilicet illa quae est in virtutibus, donis et beatitudinibus. Altera, illa scilicet quae est in sacramentis, respicit Mediatorem, qui est Deus et homo". The former would have existed with or without sin. The former grace is discussed in Books II and III of the Sentences, the latter in Book IV. This latter grace, the sacramental grace, relates to the Mediator because, through

the sacraments, man is reformed in the similitude of Christ who came to redeem man, "Christus enim, pugnans pro nobis fortiter contra diabolum, in ara crucis consecratus sacerdos pro nobis satisfaciens, sponsus Ecclesiae resurrexit oleo gratiae plenae delibitus". In Baptism man is conformed to "Christus passus"; in Confirmation man is reformed in the similitude of Christ fighting the enemies; in the Eucharist man is reformed in the similitude of Christ the sacrifice; through the Orders to his priesthood; through Penance man is conformed to Christ as he is satisfier; through Extreme Unction man is conformed to Christ "secundum quod resurrexit oleo plenae gratiae delibitus, qui stolam corporis et animae habuit". In the sacraments there is a cause relating to the Son as the Father operates through him. The Son, as God, operates "per se hominem"; as man, he is the universal dispenser through ministers, and the ministers through the sacraments; "sacramenta autem per gratiam efficiunt ulterius". 7 The sacraments can be divided as signs of grace - freeing from evil which relates to three sacraments, enabling to good which also relates to three sacraments, and one sacrament relates to both aspects. The first three are Baptism, Penance and Extreme Unction, the latter three are Matrimony, Confirmation, and the Eucharist, and Orders relate to the last. 8 This division relates, it should be noted, only to signification, not to causality. The next paragraph expounds the divisions according to causality. Matrimony repairs the

faithful carnally and Orders repair the faithful spiritually; Baptism deletes the original injustice and the punishment corresponding to it, and diminishes "pronitas"; to counter the proneness to actual sin Confirmation helps in resistance; when man falls into sin there is Penance in which actual guilt, either mortal or venial, is remitted and this can be repeated; and there is an obligation to punishment in purgatory if satisfaction is not made; still there is debility while "in via" and this is the reason for the Eucharist. A guiltless infirmity, on the part of the body, which is venial is alleviated by Extreme Unction. Thus there are seven lacks, and seven sacraments.  

The distinction between the grace of sacraments and the grace of virtues has the effect of dividing Christ, something which was already present in embryo in the Glossa but in practice was not present. There sacramental grace included the grace of virtues so that when man put on Christ, he also had sanctification of life. As is seen in the Glossa these two aspects were not properly grounded in Christ but at least when Christ's work was applied man was sanctified. In the Quaestiones, on the other hand, sanctification of life takes place apart from the sacraments under the grace of virtues, so that the Spirit very obviously, in this regard, is seen to be using Christ merely as a channel for sanctification. Sanctification is now completely disassociated from Christ's satisfaction which was not conclusively the case in the Glossa.

Christ is not seen as removing an otherwise insuperable barrier but rather as getting rid of a nuisance. He is not necessary at all for sanctification (although he is the channel of the grace of virtues as Head) as the distinction between the graces made quite clear when the grace of virtues was related to "God" and the sacramental grace was related to the "Mediator". This was made clear, also, by the fact that it is pointed out that grace of sanctification would have existed without sin. This is correct in its intention, but the implication, then, is that Christ, as man, as Mediator, would have been unnecessary.

This fact is demonstrated in the comparison the Quaestiones makes between the Old Law and the New Law where there is no doubt, as there is in the Glossa, that the grace of virtues is fully operative to all intents and purposes under the Old Law. When Christ makes satisfaction the ancients cross into the beatitude which they have already merited. 10 This distinction between satisfaction and sanctification is also demonstrated in relation to the Spirit where the power of the keys is described as "without the Spirit" and dimission which requires love is described "with the Spirit". The former is associated with Christ giving the Spirit through the sacrament, the latter is simply in the Church. 11 Thus in satisfaction, the sacraments of the Church replace the Spirit; in the grace of virtues the Spirit is active but apart from Christ. In both cases the Spirit -

10. Q.XX De Iustitia Legis Veteris, Disp.I,Memb.1,6-8,pp.361-363. 11. Q.LXI. De Clavibus, Disp.I,Memb.6,43,p.1222.
or the Church's sacraments in the former case - plays the part of an "alter Christus". In satisfaction, Christ at least performs an objective function but in sanctification he has neither an objective nor a subjective role.

In regard to the "virtue of the passion" the Quaestiones is far clearer than the Glossa and in this respect probably interprets it correctly. The passion counters the punishments of original sin. However both in the Glossa and the Quaestiones this is of some doubt in regard to Penance. In all the other sacraments Christ is necessary in the reducing or resisting of these punishments, that is, they are the result of original sin. This does not apply to actual sin, however. It is not due to original sin in the same way; it is due to the failing of personal "voluntas". Christ can satisfy for original sin because that was due to another and thus another (Christ) can satisfy for man. Original sin corrupts man's nature. Actual sin is personal and thus can only be satisfied personally, that is, by man himself voluntarily or by another's personal satisfaction. This satisfaction Christ can make - and hence the power of the keys - but also any other man can contribute to another's merit and satisfaction. Here Christ is as other men. It is only for original sin, not actual sin, that God alone can, but man alone should make satisfaction. This analysis applies equally well to the Glossa but arises here also because the virtue of the passion is clearer in the Quaestiones.

It is not only in regard to Penance that one must have doubts as to the adequacy of the Quaestiones' teaching.
This teaching relegates the Eucharist to a minor place, although the relation of it to the sacrifice of Christ is ominous, and the actual function of Orders is far more than merely the diminishing of an infirmity. Marriage fits rather awkwardly into the pattern although the view held is persistent in the Church and contributes to a low view of marriage. In spite of these differences the part of man is still as important as ever, especially in Penance, and the part of the sacraments greater in regard to sin and punishment, although the sacraments as such become more specifically Christocentric but in a more limited area than the Glossa.

Quaestiones - Baptism.

In the doctrine of Baptism in the Quaestiones the question on the sacraments in general has covered the general situation. However the close association of the sacramental grace and Baptism, the "ex opere operato" element, is demonstrated in relation to circumcision. In circumcision original sin in relation to both guilt and poena was deleted "ex vi gratiae fidei credentium" but Baptism "habet in se gratiam, quia vas gratiae est; circumcisio vero fuit signum gratiae futurae per Christum, sed Baptismus gratiae iam factae per Christum". 12 Under Baptism guilt is deleted in the soul through the Spirit, and punishment in the body through the water, and so the spiritual cleansing takes place spiritually,

the bodily by the bodily. 13 Here again there is the distinction of the grace of virtues and sacramental grace although the association is close. Yet the distinction is pointless unless sacramental (Baptismal) grace is "ex opere operato". The dilemma of this distinction is pointed up here because Baptism is the sacrament which brings people into the Church and people in the Church have faith (from the grace of virtues) and how can they have faith if the sacrament of itself brings only sacramental grace? Another way of putting this is how can the Baptised have Christ and yet not have faith, that is, sanctification? The answer is found by associating the two graces without making them the one grace but this answer is unsatisfactory for, then one must say, in effect, either that Baptism does convey faith if one wishes to state that entrance into the Church marks the beginning of faith (or faith marks the entrance into the Church), or, if one does not wish to state this, then one can be in the Church without faith as sacramental grace is "ex opere operato", or that one can be in the Church by faith and without the benefits of Christ conveyed by Baptism. It is this sort of dilemma which makes the vagueness of the Glossa more attractive and in the long run sounder. It, at least, recognises that the two (sacramental grace and the grace of virtues) go inevitably together. There is the further consideration that the sacramental grace relates to "carentia" which relates to the cognition and faith, and the fact that

sacramental grace removes this "carentia" and if this leads to something less than formed faith (in which the grace of virtues is involved) then the work of Christ is relegated to being something very much on the level of "gratia gratis data". It is difficult to see how the faith which Christ helps to clarify by removing the "carentia" can be anything else than formed faith, that is, from the grace of virtues ("gratia gratum faciens"). Christ's work must lead to something more than unformed faith, or implicit faith, because that is already present to the philosophers and to those living carnally under the Law. If it does then faith would be impossible without Christ, that is, satisfaction at least removes a barrier to faith. Under the Old Law it seems that faith and the deletion of punishment were united under the "gratia fidei credentium". In the New Law under the sacraments, they are divided which is far less satisfactory. This problem of the relation of punishment and faith or "carentia" and faith is merely a narrower consideration of the wider problem of how one can have Christ and yet not have the Spirit.

Quaestiones - Eucharist.

The result of the division of graces in the Quaestiones is most marked in the doctrine "De Sacramento Altaris" for it changes the whole direction of the doctrine of the sacrament. The first effect of the Sacrament of the Altar is "reparatio debilitatis ab originali" and "quod est contra venialia, hoc
est ex consequenti". 14 The first effect is not clearly mentioned in the Glossa unless it is hidden under "ratione difficultatis standi contra tentationes datur sacramentum Eucharistiae". 15 This reason does not play any great part in the doctrine of the Eucharist in the Glossa however. The diminution of venial sin is mentioned several times in the Glossa and it would appear that this is the effect of the sacrament in relation to sin. "Nec sequitur, si est maius, quod quoad hunc effectum sit maius". 16 This is in the context of the Eucharist's effects against sin. In the Glossa the Eucharist is the sacrament of love, the sacrament of the mystical body, the sacrament by which there is a greater incorporation into the mystical body by love. It is the sacrament of the suffering love of Christ. The Sacrament of the Altar in the Quaestiones signifies by the bread the union of the divine and human nature in the incarnation upon which follows the conjunction of the members with the Head; and by the wine redemption is signified. This is the sacrament as far as its signification. 17 When it is asked why the Eucharist is so small in its effect - as was asked in the Glossa also - the reply is "Sacramentum autem Eucharistiae dignius est ratione eius quod significat, non racione effectus". 18 The Glossa was not content with this answer for it gave a considerable number of effects, and effects related to the love of God and man, of Christ and the members. In the Quaestiones the perfection of the sacrament is the union

of body and soul to deity. Only a man of our kind should satisfy, but only God could satisfy,

"unde oportuit quod Deus et homo esset. Sacramentum ergo quod est nostrae redemptionis, perfectionem habet ab hoc, quod Filius Dei in humana natura passus est; unde ratione illius quod supereminet humanae naturae, et hoc est unio animae et corporis cum deitate, habet /esse/ hoc sacramentum. Unde oportet quod hoc habeat hoc sacramentum, quod scilicet supereminet naturae humanae, et ab hoc habet esse hoc sacramentum".

The causality of the sacrament comes from the union of deity to the body and soul. The effect of this causality appears quite out of keeping with the causality, its perfection and its signification. The signification really has not much to do either with the satisfaction or the redemption; the sign is the Body of Christ in the sacrament which signifies the mystical body and yet the mystical body is the "unio in caritate fidelium" and this existed before and after the advent of Christ and they were united in the faith of Christ.

It would appear that the mystical body in its union in faith and love has more to do with the grace of virtues. And yet this great signification effects "reparatio debilitatis ab originali" which is the result of a sacramental grace.

The reason for this is somewhat difficult to see. The result, however, is to give a good example of being able to have the "Body of Christ" but not sanctification of life bestowed in the putting on of Christ. The Glossa is very much to be preferred when it talks of this sacrament as a sacrament of love and incorporation in the mystical body. In fact, an actual displacement of the importance of sin and punishment

takes place in the sacrament. This way, with its faults, it at least tends to exalt Christ far more and to put him at the centre of things. Satisfaction and sanctification are put into close proximity at least.

The virtue of transubstantiation according to the Quaestiones is in the words "quia verbum Christi est potestate plenum. Ex eo enim quod verbum est, ad significandum est; eo quod Christi est, est ad faciendum". The power of transubstantiation was a special superadded power for any of Christ's words were full in power: "Hoc autem verbum habuit complementum potestatis, ad quod omnia mirabilia quae sunt in illo sacramento ordinata sunt". This power is "supermirabile" of all the miracles in the Bible "scilicet potestas haec in verbo creato, et ad hoc ordinantur. Et hoc fuit conveniens, ut in hoc verbo creato esset complementum potestatis; et hoc ruit quia nobilissima creatura inter omnes creaturas est humana natura in Christo". 21 The work of transubstantiation is attributed to the Word because the sacrament is attributed to Christ, the Word incarnate, whereas the conception of Christ is attributed to the Holy Spirit to whom grace is appropriated. 22 The sanctification of these words is a sign and a cause "non autem est causa ad dandum gratiam, sed ad convertendum panem in corpus Christi". 23 In these quotations and references two things are plain: first, it is demonstrated what considerable power is encased in the created word which is handed onto the priest in which

power, like the power of the keys, the Spirit of Christ is
displaced by the priest; second, Christ is once again divided
so that from him comes the grace of virtues apart from the
sacrament, transubstantiation which is an extraordinary
miracle which has little effect, and sacramental grace which
diminishes the debility of man. The latter two elements
enhance the power of the priesthood both in regard to the
people and in displacing Christ so that they, in fact, become
the mediators. Once Christ is divided in such a way that the
people become dependent on the priest for the whole Christ,
the place and the power of the priest must keep on increasing
at the expense of the One to whom they are ministers.

**Quaestiones - Penance.**

In the Quaestiones an anomaly, namely the uncertain
place of the Church, which was present in the Glossa, is
removed in a far clearer treatment of the doctrine of Penance.
In the Glossa some confusion arose because the virtue in
contrition, by reason of the fact that contrition had virtue
and was therefore the sacrament, was hard to distinguish from
the sacrament itself. This meant that the Church element
could be practically eliminated although it was not the
Glossa's intention. The Glossa's intention was that the
sacrament should convey grace which meant that sacrament
and virtue (not necessarily sacrament and the grace of virtues,
however,) had to be distinguished. If this was not done,
Penance did not fit into the definition of the sacraments,
and indeed was not a Church sacrament. The Quaestiones
carefully distinguishes the various elements. Here sacramental grace is said to be twofold, that signified in the sacrament, and that caused by the sacrament. The sacramental grace (which it is improperly called) which is signified, signifies the remission of sin as far as guilt and punishment, and is the same in essence as the virtue of penitence, but it is "virtus" in moving the free will to grieving for guilt and satisfying for punishment, "gratia" as it remits guilt. The grace, however, which is caused "ex vi sacramenti poenitentiae" is not the same as the virtue of penitence "quia haec gratia est remissio peccati quoad aliquam partem de virtute clavium. Virtus enim clavium habet ex passione Christi virtutem, qua dimittitur aliquota poena. Unde virtus clavium habet potentiam ad deletionem totius poenae, ex passione Christi, qui pro omnibus satisfecit; tamen requiritur aliquid ex parte poenitentis sicut postea dicetur". This grace is "iniunctae a discreto sacerdote", the virtue is given in contrition. 24

One of the later paragraphs to which the reader is referred is evidently that which discusses the "res" of the sacrament. This "res" can be either signified or signified and caused. The sign of the remission of guilt and punishment "est susceptio poenitentiae iniunctae in confessione virtue clavium, cum proposito poenitendi et cum absolutione". So that this sign might also be a cause contrition is demanded on the part of the penitent; "coexigitur enim contritio ad

hoc praedicta susceptio sit causa dimissionis peccati quoad culpam et poenam... sed propinquius causatur et significatur remissio poenae, et per hoc remissio culpae". And the reason for this is obvious because in Christ "erat gratia et poena sufficiens ad deletionem omnis culpae et poenae. Clavis ergo non tantum habet virtudem a poena, sed etiam a gratia universalis quae fuit in anima Christi. Quoad hoc ergo quod clavis habet virtudem a gratia quae fuit in Christo, respicit culpam; quoad hoc vero quod habet virtudem a poena quam sustinuit, repicit poenam". Universal grace corresponds to guilt and is sufficient but particular grace is infused into the penitent for deletion; it is not divisible. Universal punishment corresponds to the penitent's punishments and is sufficient but punishment of the penitent must be added and this punishment is in contrition, confession, and satisfaction. It is interesting to note that evidently the grace of virtues is infused, here, via the keys and the confession is the cause of guilt's remission as well as the remission of punishment. This is not altogether consistent although in the same paragraph Baptism is given as a parallel in which, it is stated, if it is taken insincerely, only character is impressed and what is signified, the remission of original guilt and punishment, is not effected. In these cases, there is a recognition of the impossibility of dividing the graces in fact (although character still is impressed - there was some hesitation in the Glossa on this). This admission would

make the rigid distinction between the grace of virtues and the grace of the sacrament pointless. If it is argued that the former needs the consent of the recipient, the same has to be said about the latter where consent is also needed. If this were not so, the mere act, the ritual or the sacrament would be the sum total and such an extreme "ex opere operato" position can hardly be contemplated by the _Questiones_. Of course, the grace of virtues leads to action and merit whereas sacramental grace does not, but inaction and lack of merit can only be after the grace is received, not before it. If the latter were the case this would lead to a real distinction between the two graces on the grounds of consent. Otherwise the relation of grace and receiver would appear to be the same in both the grace of virtues and sacramental grace. The distinction between Baptism and Penance, and this is the most significant distinction, is the fact that what is given in Baptism is purely objective, consent only being necessary, whereas in Penance the grace of the virtues must lead to virtue before the sacrament can be causal and thus complete. 26 Thus man must play his real part just as the Glossa holds. On satisfaction by the penitent he is fully absolved. 27

The reason for the necessity of man's part is that actual sin arises from the free will and therefore it is right that the free will should take part in the remission. This does not apply in regard to original sin and Baptism because

that sin was not contracted by the free will but from Adam.\textsuperscript{28}

As that is the case, this will mean that the virtue from the passion of Christ must come from his work as singular man, not as the new Adam, or rather the work he thus performs for man is not peculiarly that of the Son of God, and the Son of Man. It is only original sin for which only the Son of God can and only the Son of Man should make satisfaction; actual sins require personal or actual satisfaction. Here Christ may be the greatest help but he is only one among many. This is evident from the fact that the merit of the life of the priest can help to relax punishment and this is from grace; the power of the keys comes from a universal cause, from the passion of Christ.\textsuperscript{29} This is meant to distinguish the priest and the keys but actually the fact that merit of life can relax puts them on the same level. This is made very clear by a distinction made concerning Christ in regard to actual and original sin.

"In Christo fuit poena actualis, et in eo fuit poena originalis peccati. Potest Christus considerari in quantum fuit singularis homo; et sic poena ipsius actualis fuit, quia fuit ab actuali voluntate huius singularis hominis. Item potest considerari Christus in quantum est caput; et sic poena eius originalis dicitur. Poena ergo actualis Christi est contra actualem delectationem quae est in peccato; unde haec, cum poena quae est in poenitente, deletiva est actualis peccati. Poena autem originalis Christi tantum deletiva est originalis peccati parvuli ipsius in Baptismo, sine aliqua poena ex parte baptizati, quia poena in parvulo fuit totaliter aliunde contracta. Patet ergo quod causalitas quae est in Baptismo et Poenitentia sumuntur secundum aliud et aliud." \textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} Disp.II,Memb.5,47,p.996. \textsuperscript{29} Q.LXI,De Clavibus,Disp. I,Memb.6,41,pp.1221-1222. \textsuperscript{30} Q.LII,Disp.III,Memb.3,p.1006.
Even without such a statement, the fact that man must make his own satisfaction, at least in part, is sufficient evidence that his satisfaction and the satisfaction of Christ for actual sins are on the same level. This statement also raises some doubt as to the universality of the satisfaction of Christ made for original sin. Christ as Head is Head of the good only; does this mean that in fact the satisfaction does not apply to all men? This matter is also raised in the Quaestiones in relation to the grace in Christ, and on the discussion of the kind of satisfaction Christ made.

Two final matters remain to be mentioned. Firstly, the idea of an angry God and a merciful Christ, a form of Sabellianism, is made rather clear by one or two statements in the Quaestiones. There is a dissimilarity between eternal and purgatorial punishment on the one hand and present punishment on the other hand. In the present man expects the mercy of the Lord because the Lord in the present is more merciful than just; as far as future punishment is concerned he is more just than merciful although he is both in both times. In the time of mercy he diminishes punishment, but in the time of justice the sinner will be punished, and in the forum of God, where there is eternal and purgatorial punishment, punishment is neither diminished nor taken by another. The reason for this is that the keys have their virtue from Christ's passion which relates principally to mercy where mercy is greater than justice. 31 This view

31. Q.LXII, De Relaxationibus, Memb.1,4, pp.1233-34.
must, and did, create a fearful uncertainty, and a greater emphasis on the justice of God which had to be satisfied. Consequently the place of the keys and the Church, and the place of the individual's contrition would assume overwhelming importance. Secondly, the fact that the grace of virtues is required in this sacrament demonstrates how far the "ex opere operato" character of the other sacraments has gone, how really "graceless" they are, how really "Spiritless" and how far, as a result, the Church has gained control over these "virtues of the passion". The sacrament required a minimum of involvement - a disposition which in the case of Baptism would appear Pelagian - and the effect in the life of the receiver follows automatically on the right reception of it. The freedom of grace, the freedom of the Spirit of Christ disappears. Freedom is maintained in Penance only by the grace of virtues and man's free will.
CHAPTER 12

GRACE, FREE WILL, AND MERIT.

Alexander, like many theologians, saw creation proceeding from innocence to glory through the intermediate stage of grace. There are two sides of this process, on one side was grace, on the other side was man. From the time of creation there were always these two sides, but sin on man's side complicated the process as it introduced guilt, punishment and the need for satisfaction. Most of the previous discussion has been concerned with the elimination of sin. In spite of this sin the basic pattern of grace on the one side, and man on the other, remains with modifications. Alexander states this basic pattern in a series of questions which sets out to show that the beginning of grace was in the will of God, but the beginning of evil and damnation were not. "Quare Deus dat gloriam? Quia iste meruit. Quare meruit? Quia Deus dedit gratiam. Quare dedit gratiam? Quia voluit. Quare voluit? Quia voluit. Ex altera parte: quare homo damnatur? Quia fecit malum. Quare fecit? Quia voluit. Quare voluit? Quia voluit". ¹ That the merit has more content than merely grace and that man's will to sin did not exclude his capacity for it, will be seen later. (Alexander goes far beyond, for instance, Bernard of Clairvaux, who stated "God, therefore is the author of merit, who both applieth the will to the work,

¹ Bk.I, d.III, 53, 1 p. 71.
and supplieth to the will the fulfilment of the work", in spite of the fact that Alexander quotes this in Book II without comment in the discussion of grace which appears in the general discussion on free will. The two sided process from innocence to glory can be more clearly seen in the following quotation and in this is included what might be called the "interruption" of sin.

"Ante lapsum potuit malis resistere, sed non sine gratia proficere. Procedit Spiritus Sanctus in creaturas ad ipsas sanandas, quoniam illuminat animam ad cognitionem veri habendam, purgans ignorantiam, accendens ad Dei amorem, purgans malam concupiscientiam, dat robur ad operis perfectionem. Tripliiter ergo in bonis iuvat: monet enim ut bonum cogitet, contra desidiam; docet rationem qualiter faciendum, contra imprudentiam; excitat voluntatem ut bonum facere velit, contra negligentiam. In declinando a malo, primo facit detestationem peccati in compunctione; secundo cor contritum facit supplicare pro venia; tertio remittit peccatum". 

Apart from the Pelagian implications, this might be reasonably satisfactory if this process under the Holy Spirit led up to Christ and centred in him. However, as has already been noted, except in relation to faith, there does not appear to be any necessary connection between the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, except that both form part of a whole. In his sacramental teaching Alexander brings the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit more or less together although they still appear to operate side by side rather than in the way of the Trinity. Outside that teaching the separation is most marked. (And therefore, also, the work of Christ and the working of grace which is attributed to the Holy Spirit.) It is significant that the doctrine of the Holy

2. Bernard, Concerning Grace and Free Will, pp. 90-91; Sk. II, d.XXVI,17,p.249
Spirit is not discussed after the incarnation but purely within a Trinitarian - or so-called-Trinitarian context. Side by side the "mission" of the Son and the "mission" of the Spirit are discussed. The two missions are pointedly distinguished: "Per missionem Filii in carnum unitur Creator creaturae ... Sed ex missione Spiritus Sancti non sequitur unio Creatoris et creaturae in unam personam". 4 This means, quite rightly, that the Holy Spirit was not incarnate, but it also implies that the mission of the Holy Spirit (a temporal mission) is something besides that achieved in the mission of the Son (something "besides" rather than as a continuation of the work of the Son). There are, in fact, five missions but the first two only need concern us here: "Quintuplex est missio, scilicet in carnum, quae ad Filium pertinet; secunda in corda fidelium, quae etiam Filio convenit ratione sapientiae; tertia est missio ad praedicandum; quarta in sacramento; quinta in iudicio futuro, quia sub forma servi iudicabit. In hoc autem capitulo determinat de missione in carnum et in corda fidelium, scilicet de corporali et spirituali missione". 5 Here, again, the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit coincide in faith or in wisdom in the hearts of the faithful but also again there is a separation between them made in the last sentence. This separation is clear at the beginning of the next distinction. "Dictum est supra de missione Filii. Nunc agitur de missione sive processione

Spiritus Sancti temporali, quae duplex est, scilicet corporalis, quando mititur in specie columbae, et spiritualis in corda fidelium". 6 This division is more simply (and perhaps too simply) stated in a quotation from Bernard: "Venit a Patre missus Dei Filius et dedit fidel; post Filium missus est Spiritus Sanctus et dedit et docuit caritatem". 7 This division was also found in the "caput" section of the Christology proper. To be sure, in the Glossa faith is not without the Holy Spirit, nor is love without faith, but the coincidence of these aspects in the Glossa is not Trinitarian, that is, the Spirit is not the Spirit of Christ in faith and love, but the Son contributes mainly to faith, the Spirit mainly to love. With it established that Christ and the Spirit are separated in an untrinitarian way by Alexander and that the Holy Spirit is hardly connected with Christ, the two sided progress to glory can hardly be Christological. It is now time to return to a discussion of that process.

In his discussion on the mission of the Spirit Alexander quotes Rabanus who gives three "times" of the Holy Spirit. "Datus est Spiritus Sanctus bis in terra, semel in caelo a Domino". The first is before the passion, the second between the resurrection and the ascension, the third between the ascension and the second advent. Alexander's comment is:

6. d.XVI,1,p.162. 7. d.XVIII,7,p.184; Bernard, Sermones de diversis, serm.45,n.4.
"primo dedit Spiritum Sanctum in terra passibilis; secundo in terra impassibilis; tertio in caelo impassibilis. Primo ad gratiam gratis datam quoad corpus secundum sanitatem; quoad intellectum secundum doctrinam, qui est primus modus quem Rabanus innuit. Secundo ad gratiam gratum facientem secundum affectum et quoad apparitionem in linguis, ut affectus efficaciam haberet movendi intellectum. Tertio quoad gratiam perfectionis in gloria. Et quia non pluribus modis gratia, solum est divisio trimembris". 8

This last statement is generally true but Alexander himself is able to see many types of grace and many effects of grace. All of them, however, in some way come under these three categories. It is with the first two graces, or with the field they cover that the present interest lies. The first of these "disposes" man (and indeed, at times, might almost mean "creates" him); the second is grace proper which is subsequent to the effects of the previous grace ("saving" grace covers the second type) and with the free will leads onto the works of merit. The end of the process then is the grace of perfection in glory. This process in its first two parts is stated by Alexander as follows: "Est ordo in natura et est ordo in gratia. Qui in natura, est a gratia gratis data; qui in gratia, a gratia gratum faciente". 9

The main discussion of grace is found in distinction XXVI in Book II. In this distinction Alexander amplifies his ideas on the various workings of grace and in so doing implies the many uses of prevenient and subsequent grace. This discussion fits generally into the pattern just stated above. Sometimes prevenient grace is that which bestows the natural gifts (this is almost creation), and subsequent grace

then refers to the "dona bona superaddita". These then would be the prevenient grace to the grace "quae facit gratum". Sometimes prevenient grace is that through which man is liberated from sin, and subsequent grace by which he is just. This would be prevenient grace to the subsequent grace "qua bene operamur". This would be prevenient grace to the grace by which temptation is resisted. Sometimes prevenient grace is "in via" and subsequent grace is "in patria". Thus it is obvious that grace is present from beginning to end for Alexander. The last grace is the grace of glory, all those "graces" from the grace "quae facit gratum" are "gratia gratum faciens" and the two before these are "gratia gratis data". At the most this latter grace disposes man to "gratia gratum faciens" which is defined by Alexander as follows: "Gratia est forma a Deo data gratis, sine merito, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius Deo reddens gratum". This is the most comprehensive and clearest definition given of this grace. The usages of the word grace are many, however, and these usages denote its scope. Sometimes it denotes "gratia materialiter" which is Christ. Sometimes it refers to a virtue, like faith / this is a very broad use of the word/. Sometimes it denotes "donum naturale nobis datum" or grace freely superadded. Then it can be "gratia gratum faciens" through the infusion of which all the virtues are present, and thus grace is either uncreated, namely, the Holy Spirit, or created /"quae est causa efficiens

10. d.XXVI,1,b)pp.239-240. 11. 6,c)p.243.
coniuncta cum virtutibus". 12/ This grace is either general by which sins are remitted or special so that it is said "divisiones gratiarum multae sunt". (1 Cor. 12:4) / Are these the two sides of "sacramental grace" : for guilt and for sins? The correspondence does not appear to be exact./ Finally there is the grace "quae est consummata" which is eternal life. 13 Again the pattern of nature, grace, and glory comes out. It should be noted that grace, either as the holy spirit as uncreated grace or as created grace, does not lead up to Christ's work nor is it necessarily derivative from him. It apparently works along side or above. Christ is "grace filled", that is, in regard to grace he has more grace than man but he is not unique. (This is apart from satisfaction). It is grace that remits the guilt of sin and sanctifies man. "Gratia gratum faciens" is one but its effects are many.

There is one "grace", however, which does not fit into this general pattern of the three graces, nor of the idea of uncreated and created grace. In the same distinction Alexander lists a fourfold division of grace "silicet praedestinationis et vocationis et iustificationis et magnificationis". (Roms. 8:30) The grace of predestination is prepared from eternity "et talis non est in creatura, sed in Creator tantum". 14 This is hardly grace in the common use of the term and, although it has some connection with the grace of glory and perhaps present grace, it will not be

discussed here but in a separate chapter on predestination. The other three "graces" mentioned free from evil (vocation), and confer good (justification) /these are "gratia gratum faciens"/ and complete the good (magnification). /This approximates to the grace of glory/. 15

Within the grace to do well (of "proficiendi ad bonum") which is the other part of the grace which resists evil, there are two types of grace: "gratia proficiendi ad beatitudinem" and "perseverandi". Adam had the first, but not the second. 16 The latter leads to merit 17 which is the reason Adam could not have had it as he had no incentive to sin and so his persistence was not meritorious. 18

Sufficient has been given to show the general outlines and scope of grace. There is a process from innocence to glory and within "gratia gratum faciens" there is an answer to the situation of sin, by remission of guilt, sanctification and justification. Alexander is at pains (although the process seems to imply intervals in which man must do something) to demonstrate that grace of the Holy Spirit is the beginning and at least the end of all man's efforts. (This is quite apart from the problem of its relation to satisfaction and Christ). Indeed, in distinction XXVIII Alexander sets out to refute the Pelagian heresy "quae dicebat quod liberum arbitrium operatur bonum et ad vitam aeternam". 19 This objective is also stated in the following way: "Alius non potest mereri alii primam gratiam nisi habeat gratiam; unde,

si aliquis meretur sibi primam gratiam, sequetur quod illam haberet". 20 This is the relation of prevenient grace to subsequent grace. However, Alexander does not cover all Pelagianism by his definition. He omits semi-Pelagianism in which grace prevenes but to which man of himself consents. It is this position which Alexander takes up.

Before going on to discuss the nature of man and his free will, there are indications that "grace", as Alexander sees it, or the Holy Spirit at work, is not the Biblical (or Reformed) view of the work of the Holy Spirit as expressed for instance in the Scots Confession:

"for of nature we are so dead, so blind, and so perverse, that neither can we feill when we are pricked, see the licht when it shines, nor assent to the will of God when it is reveiled, unles the Spirit of the Lord Jesus quicken that quhilk is dead, removes the darkness from our myndes, and bowe our stubborn hearts to the obedience of his blessed will". 21

Firstly, grace can be taken away "per indignitatem subiecti habentis illam; unde per defectum separatur". 22 Thus, although grace is not taken away to cause sin, sin does cause the removal of grace. This leads one to doubt whether this is really the grace of the Spirit of Christ without whom there is no regeneration of will or works. If sin can eject grace, who then can be saved? Surely the grace of Christ is present in spite of sin. That makes the "good news". Sin is the "impossible" contradiction. Alexander's "grace" implies man's goodness. Secondly, this grace is less extensive than that described above, as the sentence "nos sumus

coadiutores Dei, id est consentimus Domino adiutori", indicates. Statements similar to this are scattered throughout the discussion of grace and free will.

Possibly most revealing in this regard is Alexander's conception of the working of grace in love. This serves to demonstrate the limitations of grace, the two sides of the process to glory, and as an introduction to the next aspect of this discussion, the part of man. "Per donum caritatis homo assimilatur Spiritu Sancto, qui est amor". Uncreated love is in God, created love is in man and this love forms the bond between man and God: "Deus et homo uniuntur in caritate, id est sunt unum, id est in una voluntate, scilicet in volendo unum, quod est Deus. Caritas autem increata unit tantum sicut finis; tantum creata unit sicut forma et accidens ex parte nostra; ex parte Dei substantia. Et creatum fertur ad increatam sicut accidens ad substantiam". Grace and love are intimately connected and with grace "quantum est de se" illuminating in the "intellectus agens", love, awake or asleep, is moved as there is nothing of time in love as with believing and hoping. This does not remove the need for consent to uncreated grace or love. Grace moves "quantum est de se", that is, on its part, it is its own mover. However, the close relation of (and the almost mediatorial role of) uncreated grace or love and created grace or love, the two-sided operation - of God and man - is well demonstrated by

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the following quotations: "Spiritus Sanctus est fons sicut persona inhabitans per gratiam, separata secundum substantiam a nobis; sed caritas est fons sicut forma comparata ad finem". 27 "L" has a similar but fuller statement: "Spiritus Sanctus est fons sicut principium effectivum separativum a nobis secundum substantiam; caritas est fons sicut formaliter, ut manens in subiecto; gratia est fons sicut effectivum non separatum secundum substantiam, per modum formae comparatae ad finem". 28 On the one side is the Spirit (uncreated grace and love); on the other is created grace and love. These quotations are attempts to explain the secret working of the Spirit in sanctification but they are defective because grace is almost transferable "stuff", because the sin of man can remove the presence of grace and his consent is needed for the infusion of grace, and because, as soon as uncreated grace or love becomes created grace or love then it becomes a part of man himself. He then becomes the centre of sanctification instead of the Holy Spirit, or better, the Spirit of Jesus Christ. Substantial love from grace becomes the common ground of, and the mediation between, God and man, man sanctifying himself by it. The workings of man, his virtue and his merit, become his works for which he can take credit as they are part of him. They are

not then the secret workings of the Holy Spirit. 29

There is, moreover, in Alexander more evidence of semi-Pelagianism than this limited view of grace. There is also his view of man. The process to glory can also be viewed from the side of man. There is a good of nature, grace, and of glory. 30 Nature precedes grace just as the evening precedes the day in creation. 31 Man is said to be in the similitude of God "quoad naturalia", and in the image of God "quoad gratuita". 32 It is the image which is of particular interest. There is a trinity in the soul; memory, which is "conservatio similitudinis Dei", is related to the Father; intelligence, which is "potentia per similitudinem Dei in veritatem /se/ convertendi", is related to the Son; and "voluntas", which is "vis per quam inclinamur in summan bonitatem", is related to the Holy Spirit. 33 In the soul of man there is "duplex intellectiva, una cuius est cognitio veri, altera cuius est dilectio boni". 34 (The separation of cognition and the good-faith and love - is not as rigid as this would make it appear for both faith and love are of grace and it is with love that faith becomes "formed". 35 Prior to that it is "unformed" faith.) There is

29. Cf.Bk.II,d.XXVI,12,p.247. "Nota quod iustitia increata iustificat sicut causa separata; et gratia creata iustificat sicut causa primo coniuncta; et fides sicut causa per modum fundamenti; et caritas per modum formae comparatae ad finem: unde sic movens est ut finis; et iustitia iustificat per modum causae formalis.
both a natural cognition ("gratia gratis data") and a
cognition from grace ("gratia gratum faciens"). The point
is that, although faith, cognition, and wisdom are related to
the Son - and there is something of this prior to "gratia
gratum faciens" - faith which leads to eternal life, is
from "gratia gratum faciens" and therefore, together with
love, is from the Holy Spirit. Thus, insofar as the Holy
Spirit is separated from Christ so too is faith, although
the articles about Christ are the object of that faith. The
connection would appear incidental rather than
necessary. When man sins it is not really the image (as
described here) on man's side that is damaged or lost,
rather grace is withdrawn. Man thus retains his "capacity"
if not his "activity".

"Homo est imago secundum animam, et hoc secundum
superiorem partem rationis, secundum habitum; sed per
reformationem gratiae vel per gratiam reformantem dicitur
homo imago secundum actum. Unde dicendum est quod
imago creationis non potest amitti, deformari tamen
potest; et per imaginem recreationis potest illa prius
deformata reformari. Unde illa actu fit amissibilis". 39
("non habitu" 40). "Ut imago est, non diminuitur;
sed ut bonitas est, diminui potest". 41

Sin however, cannot be ignored and thus there are now four
states of man: innocence, grace, glory and guilt. 42 As has
already been seen, guilt and eternal punishment are deleted
by grace alone but satisfaction for the sin of Adam is made
by Christ. This is the blot that has to be removed before
grace can lead finally onto merit and glory. Thus the basic

p.268. 38. 9,I,p.266. 39. Bk.II,d.XVI,5,b)149-150.
40. Footnote,p.150. 41. 5,c)p.150. 42. d.XIX,1,p.165.
pattern is retained.

In this process the "voluntas" in the free will of man plays an important part. The process is affected but not basically changed by sin for "voluntas" is still in man. Angels, once they sin, cannot do right again "sed homo post peccatum habet iterum voluntatem convertibilem ad bonum; ideo non oportet huiusmodi duplex genus hominum creare, quoniam in eodem successive potest esse bonum et malum". This is the reason why Christ is necessary only for satisfaction. Once that is made, the process can be resumed. And in that process it is of the "voluntas" of man "praeparare materialiter, sed gratiae est praeparare formaliter". The "voluntas" can also be described as "efficiens sub efficiente, ut in bonis". Free will is primarily of the "voluntas" and "secundum voluntatem est omnium actuum aliorum". It is "habitum naturalem, et talis est habitus potentialis vel potentia habitualis. Et in eo quod 'liber' est ipsius voluntatis; et in eo quod 'arbitrium', est ipsius rationis. Unde voluntas et ratio nominant eamdem vim ad diversos actus, ut ad bonum et verum". Free will "prout liberum est, non est ad malum; sed prout est arbitrium, magis mali quam boni". Thus in man there is a possibility of evil, an evil which is not from God for the free will has a double relation, "a Deo" and "ad Deum per suos actus". The cause of evil is in its deficiency.

not in the relation "a Deo" but in the relation "ad Deum". "Potens autem est in malum, non de suo ordine, sed de sua potentia: non in quantum potentia vel voluntas, vel a Deo vel ad Deum, quia sic malum esset a Deo, sed in quantum ex nihilo". 49 "Malum est ex voluntate in quantum est ex nihilo". 50 Before the fall, the free will helped man to resist evil, but after the fall it tended toward evil. 51 This does not mean, as has been noted, that the "voluntas" or the free will has lost its ability for grace and good. The reason for its inability lies in the withdrawal of grace. Grace is needed for man to progress in good but because the will sins, grace had to be withdrawn. However when grace deletes guilt and eternal punishment and Christ makes satisfaction for original sin, grace does actually return and the "voluntas", although there still is "pronitas" to sin remaining as the discussion on the sacraments demonstrated, can co-operate with grace to good: "sola voluntate peccatur, non tamen sola voluntate recte vivitur, sed cum gratia". 52

The aspects of "voluntas", as natural, as co-operating with grace, and as sinning, are demonstrated in the following quotation concerning the various laws. "Lex naturae est regula voluntatis naturalis;

et lex gratiae est regula voluntatis secundum superiorem partem rationis; et lex Moysi est regula voluntatis secundum inferiorem partem rationis; et lex carnis secundum

voluntatem sensualitatis se habet". 53 Thus voluntas has been adapted into a new pattern but not a basically new one. Sin is encased in a lower part of the reason. This pattern was stated at the beginning of the discussion from man's side as the good of nature, the good of grace, and the good of glory. Here, too, the law of Moses has its place as a step. That pattern is now stated more comprehensively in relation to free will with the fact of sin brought into the pattern.

"liberum arbitrium, ut est natura, potens est in bonum naturae; sed ut est liberum arbitrium potens est in bonum in genere; et ut est liberum arbitrium habens gratiam gratis datam, potens est in bonum ex circumstantiis; et ut est liberum arbitrium habens gratiam superadditam, potens est in bonum difficile. Deinde est habens gratiam qua liberamur a malo; deinde sequitur gratia qua bene operamur; deinde sequitur gratia qua possit stare; postea sequitur gratia unde proficere possit". 54

It is evident from all this that from the beginning only the good or the meriting (whether it was merit or not from the beginning is largely a matter of terminology - merit from "gratia gratis data" does not win a debt from God but something close to it) could be saved. At first this included all men (Adam) but on his sin there arose the division, which was potentially present from the creation, of those who would will good and those who would will evil. With the absence of grace through the guilt of sin, man could do only evil but, with the forgiveness of guilt and with the satisfaction made by Christ, grace returned (how far it

hinges on the satisfaction is never entirely clear in the Glossa; there is some relation undoubtedly) and man could return to the pattern of creation. Now, however, there is "pronis" (which is not an obstacle to grace) and people who have the ability to good and a tendency towards evil. Christ did not overcome the tendency towards evil, the badness (although he did reduce its effects), for he could not assume that without being bad himself. This has been seen in the Christology proper. However, he did clear the way completely as far as penal satisfaction for original sin. Thus, ultimately, in Alexander's theology, it would appear that one's salvation depends on the use one makes of grace, that is, it is a fully semi-Pelagian theology. (This may not be so in the doctrine of predestination.) Thus from creation as far as the "bad" are concerned they are too bad to save, or as far as the "good" are concerned, sin does no greater damage than that which Christ's satisfaction can repair, and apart from this man can save himself by the use he makes of grace. This limitation of the scope of Christ's work reduces the goodness of the news considerably because far more than satisfaction, made for all men, is required of man; it concentrates the individual on his own goodness; and seriously affects for the worse one's whole attitude to creation and to all men. The separation of the work of Christ from the work of grace is really a problem in Trinitarian theology but insofar as Christ's work of satisfaction by implication was only for the good and his work in sanctification minimal - certainly as man - it is
evident that Christ's humanity need not be unreservedly (except "without sin") man and mankind. This view of grace, and man, explains Alexander's - and many others' - Christological position.

It only remains to see how grace leads to merit and to see how merit operates. "Anima est proprium subjectum gratiae, et potentia animae est subjectum virtutis. Unde gratia facit bonitatem voluntatis, quae bonitas est virtus". 55 Thus grace with "voluntas" makes the virtue. Grace is always one in the soul because there is one substance of the soul but as there are many powers of the soul so there can be many virtues. 56 For the movement of any virtue the movement of love is necessary "et non convertitur". Love, is "sicut motor communis" and any other virtue is "motor specialis" as the sun is to man or plants. Although faith is the "fundamentum", it is not the "motor universalis" because the work of faith is not the basis of the work of virtues. 57 All acts of virtue tend to beatitude with love mediating, but love is immediate. 58 Thus faith is bound up in love, as has been maintained previously. Formed faith, the virtue, is a sign that love is present and therefore also that "gratia gratum faciens" is present. Baptism in bringing faith, therefore, must convey this grace of the Holy Spirit, and with it, potentially, at least, all the other virtues and necessarily faith. Alexander, in short, when he talks of

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sacramental grace, includes within it the deletion of guilt and punishment (that is, the deletion of eternal punishment and of Christ's satisfaction for temporal punishment), faith which is cognitive and love which is operative. A rigid division between faith and love cannot be maintained although faith is by no means the comprehensive element which it is in the Bible and the Reformed tradition. The limitation of faith to the cognitive or the intellectual, as faith "about" Christ and other articles, which in Alexander is its peculiar role, and the suggestion that it is separated from the sanctifying love, must have led the authors of the Scots Confession to state "blasphemy it is to say, that Christ abydes in the hearts of sik, as in whome there is no spirite of sanctification". 59 Certainly, at times, in Alexander, for instance in the "caput" section, and in relation to uncreated character and uncreated grace, and in the contrast "having Christ" and "having the Spirit", there have been strong suggestions of this, but over all it would appear that basically this is not Alexander's position. The distinction between faith and love can be made (but it really is within faith between cognition and affection and faith as a virtue has both) but it is probably "without separation" and "without division". The application of rigid distinctions noted in the Scots Confession has not yet been made. Faith and love coincide and, as a faith which merits, the source is in grace and the Holy Spirit.

The virtue which consists of grace and the "voluntas" working together in good does not necessarily lead to action. "Gratia est habitus semper cum suo actu; ideo nunquam exit ab otio in actum. Sed virtus est habitus aliquando cum suo actu, aliquando non; ideo aliquando otiosa". It is difficult to give any real meaning to this statement on grace in light of the second statement on virtue but it obviously is intended to maintain the priority of grace and, indeed, the fact that grace is grace, that is, it is made no better or worse by man; its effect, or act, lies within itself. This is a Biblical tendency and one feels that Alexander was eager to maintain it all along against a Pelagian tendency, but, in fact, for him the "act" of grace lies in the virtue or the act of the virtue (which takes the irresistibility out of grace and lends it its freedom as consent does in the sacraments) and in this the "voluntas" of man is necessary as a contributing factor: "solus Deus tamquam causa effectiva operatur virtutem, sed homo tamquam causa receptiva; unde est tamquam consentiens". Whether the consent leads to "otiosa" or active virtue is of little importance for consent is needed both for the entry of grace to create virtue (as in Baptism) and for the activity of grace in active virtue. This distinction between active virtue and inactive virtue does eliminate the idea of irresistible grace for if grace were to create active virtue with its own working, then there could be no merit as far as

60. Bk.II.d.XXVII,5,pp.256-257. 61. 8,d)p.258.
Alexander is concerned, nor could there by any human freedom either for merit or within the sphere of grace because grace would not allow or create freedom but would altogether eliminate it. Man would be swallowed up in God. The doctrine of merit recognises, at least, that grace and freedom are not incompatible. What is wrong in the doctrine is the fact that freedom is not based in grace (in Jesus Christ) but is based in man himself.

That Alexander was attempting to repudiate the possibility of irresistible grace becomes evident in statements a few pages later when he discusses grace, virtue, and free will. Also evident, here, is the fact that free will is necessary for virtue or merit, and the fact that the free will can resist or consent to the grace which is present. The grace of God, for Alexander, reveals the true and the good, it makes the good, but it does not create the will to good. Man has to decide that. This is just the position of much modern Protestant pietism. In Alexander, neither the knowledge of God in Christ, nor the goodness of God in the Holy Spirit lead to the service of God. A separate step is necessary. In the section in question, Peter is quoted as stating that virtue moves the free will. In Peter there is a quite distinct division between virtue and the free will. Virtue is an intermediate stage between grace and free will. In Alexander the distinction is not clear because "voluntas" helps create virtue and is also the principal part of the free will. In this section
Alexander demonstrates this connection, the fact that this discussion parallels that on the inactive and active virtue, and the fact that the relations of grace, virtue, and the free will were not agreed upon generally. It is argued, then, that the movement of virtue, mentioned by Peter, because it is "gratuitus", would also be meritorious. But against this is the fact that all meritorious movement is from the free will and this movement is not. "Quidam" solve this problem by stating "quod virtus movet liberum arbitrium, id est informat". But against this is the fact that virtue always informs the free will. It is in it and therefore always moves it. "Quidam" solve this problem by stating that this is not "inconveniens" since grace is a spiritual light and so always is in its act. "Unde licet gratia semper movet, non tam liberum arbitrium semper movetur, quoniam aliquando non obedit. Aliter enim semper meretur liberum arbitrium". 62

62. ll,p.261. This quotation is in fact, the explanation of the problem of grace, the good life and merit in the sacraments. (p.13 of Glossa IV) The grace of the sacrament (which is the "vase") leads to the good life but the good life needs the participation of man. The reception of grace in Baptism (which operates of itself) does not necessarily make merit. Free will has continually to be used. In the above passage, the reception of grace does not necessarily make merit; man has to use it for that purpose in his free will. The grace of Baptism is thus not "sacramental grace" as Kilian Lynch would call it but is "gratia gratum faciens" which has many effects - one operated in the reception of Baptism, another being the creation of a virtue, which is made active by the use of the free will. There are only three graces in the Glossa and "sacramental grace" is not one.
It is evident that "virtus" lies somewhere between being "gratia" and being meritorious. Its place, however, is not fixed.

Sufficient has been said to fulfil the purpose of this chapter, namely, to demonstrate the place of grace whereby the Holy Spirit works alongside and apart from Christ, and to demonstrate the place of man in the process to glory, or his place in the plan of salvation. To sum up, three quotations will be given, the first on the "principium" of merit. "Unde triplex est principium merendi, scilicet gratia quae reddit subiectum gratum, et virtus disponens potentiam, et caritas disponens opus illius potentiae in finem, unde reddit opus Deo carum. Et sic patet qualiter intelligendo gratia ante virtutem est, et virtus ante caritatem, licet simul sint secundum esse". 63 The second quotation demonstrates the place of free will in relation to the theological virtues, faith and love, and the "vis merendi". "Ad rationem merendi exigitur fides fundamentum et caritas complementum. Est enim caritas forma omnium virtutum. Unde vis merendi habet unam rationem secundum quam inclinabilis est per fidem, et sic arbitrium est; et aliam rationem secundum quam inclinabilis est per caritatem; et ideo composita est sua intentio. Unde liberum arbitrium dicit intentionem compositam ex voluntate et iudicio". 64 The final quotation demonstrates grace's "reaction" to sin. It is evident from this quotation that once Christ has made

63. d.XXVII,3,p.255. 64. d.XXV,4,pp.225-226.
satisfaction for man, it is grace which gives faith and love in Baptism. It is also evident that, apart from the satisfaction which only Christ could make, that man has to co-operate in the reception of Baptism and that free will is active in Penance, or penitence. This means that the Holy Spirit is indeed an "alter Christus" and not really the Spirit of Christ who brings man in faith to Christ with all his benefits. The objective part of salvation is divided between Christ and the Holy Spirit; the subjective part of salvation is shared by the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, and man (because grace is not irresistible). It is love in God and man which forms the bond between God and man, not essentially, (although perhaps "materially") the man Jesus Christ. The relevant quotation is as follows:

"Nota quod est gratia innocentiae; et hanc habuit Adam ante peccatum, dum nihil nocuit vel in se vel in sui natura. Et etiam gratia fidei sive generalis iustitiae; et haec datur in Baptismo, nisi fictus accedat. Est etiam gratia purgans a peccato per cooperationem liberi arbitrii, et talis est gratia poenitentiae. Istit autem tribus generibus gratiarum respondent tria genera peccatorum per oppositum. Nam peccatum originale abstulit gratiam innocentiae, et per gratiam fidei liberatur ab originali peccato, licet remaneat fomes. Et huic gratiae opponitur actuale peccatum, sed ab actuale peccato liberatur per gratiam poenitentiae. Et huic gratiae opponitur peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, ad quod non sequitur gratia liberans".

It is evident from the last sentence that it is the free will that ultimately saves for it is free will that chooses to commit or not to commit the sin against the Holy Spirit. Unless God becomes man, and this grace does not do because

65. d.XLIII,7,p.414.
it is not of the Holy Spirit to become incarnate as Alexander states, and because grace is not irresistible, man must make his own response to God for there is no one else to make it. It is this view of the role of Christ, both in regard to man's subjective response to the satisfaction of Christ and in regard to man's objective and subjective sanctification, which are given in the Holy Spirit and man, which makes for a defective Christology in Alexander's theology.

Quaestiones

The Quaestiones introduces a new grace, "gratia sacramentalis", as has been seen in its sacramental teaching. This grace is distinguished from the grace of virtues of "gratia gratum faciens" which in the Glossa conveyed the effects of what is now called in the Quaestiones "sacramental grace". This division removes Christ further as a necessary cause of sanctification in his satisfaction because there is now no close association between satisfaction and sanctification and because the sacramental grace is aimed only at punishment. Although the grace of virtues derives from Christ it does not have, as has been affirmed, both in the Christology and the sacramental theology, a necessary relation to the Son of Man as the sacramental grace in its satisfaction of original sin has. Grace is multiple according to the Quaestiones, that is, universal and particular. The universal is the passion of Christ from which the sacraments assume
virtue, and the particular derives from this. The particular grace is against this or that wound. Then there is "gratia gratum faciens", and this is in virtues and gifts. Then there is also "gratia gratis data" given for the perfect ordering of the Church, and these are nine as listed in 1 Cor.12:8-10. It is not "gratia gratum faciens" in the sacraments because this is required in every member. "Ad hoc ergo quod quaeritur, estne gratia gratum faciens in omni sacramento, dico quod hoc accidit, quia ibi deletur originale cum poena sua et actuale; sed ibi est gratia ex consequenti, et non ex virtute sacramenti, quia accedenti digne ad sacramenta necessaria gratia gratum faciens". 66

It should be noted that the Glossa has included the universal and special graces under "gratia gratum faciens". Here the "ex opere operato" character of sacramental grace is very marked. The justification of the division of these two graces, that is, the division of the grace of virtues, and sacramental grace, which are both present in Christ, still is not very convincing especially as the grace of virtues is divided up into virtues and gifts, much as sacramental grace is. The number "7" (the sacraments) may have some mystical significance which demands a division of sacramental grace. This number appears the only real reason for the division.

Justification is "nihil aliud... quam liberi

arbitrii rectitudo". This rectitude is "a Deo movente in Deum finem". From God to man grace proceeds in order; as predestination in the counsel of the most high, vocation through fear, justification through the revelation of this counsel through love. "Unde justificatio est amoris gratuiti infusio". In regard to the "principium a quo" this is called gratification, in regard to "illud in quod" as it relates to the "a quo" it is called "infusio amoris gratuiti"; in regard to the "dispositio ad finem" it is called justification: "Dictur enim iustitia, in quantum perficit animam ad recte agendum". 67 This may appear less Pelagian than the Glossa although justification does follow sanctification but the quaestiones does not differ much from the Glossa in its semi-Pelagianism. There may be more emphasis on grace and less on the free will as, for instance, when it is stated that something is demanded from man in justification but not as "co-operans, sed ut non repugnans" 68 but then in justification, it is stated, two things are from God's side, two from ours, namely, movement of the free will and contrition after which there is remission of sin, God's second act. 69 To be sure, virtue may occur without man moving (here the Glossa was not quite clear), but it is not without man's consent. 70 To be sure, the capacity for "gratia gratum faciens" is made in man by "gratia gratis data" as it is beyond nature for man to have the capacity for the first

grace, 71 but then the latter grace is part of man by this time and it had to be accepted by man originally. Then again, as in the Glossa, Bernard is reinterpreted. Bernard's "immutando malam voluntatem, sibi per consensum iungit" becomes "liberum ergo arbitrium tantum consentit divinae voluntati mutanti nostram voluntatem". 72 There is a world of difference between these two statements. Perhaps the Quaestiones does diminish the part of the free will; yet, in reality, the difference exists more in the words used than in fact.

CHAPTER 13

OLD LAW AND NEW LAW

The role of grace and love, and the relation of Christ to grace and love is illustrated, to some extent, by the question as to whether the ten commandments, the "moralia" justify or not, and by the comparison of the Old Law and the New Law. Both these questions appear in Book III. To the first question Alexander replies that "iustificare" has more than one meaning. Either it means "facere/ ut habeatur iustitia" and in this case only grace or virtue, but no precept or work, justifies, or it means "exercitio bonorum operum facere iustum" and so the "moralia", not only in the Old Law, but also in the New, justify. They do so in different ways, however, for there are two parts of justice, "declinare a malo" which is related to fear, and "facere bonum" which is related to love. The ten precepts of the Old Law, observed carnally, justified in relation to declining from evil in that they induced the act of fear. If they were observed spiritually they justified in relation to the doing of good. This had two aspects, in freeing either from guilt or from punishment. "Si ergo gratia adiungatur intelligentibus spiritualiter et in fide Venturi et operantibus in caritate, non adhuc iustificant quoad poenam perfecte, sed quoad culpam solum. Sed gratia adiuncta praecptis evangelicis iustificabat perfecte quoad poenam et quoad culpam". 1 Thus love and

1. d.XXXVII,7,1,c)pp.469-470.
therefore grace operated under the Old Law but there had to be faith in the One who was to come. Christ's work was to make satisfaction and, once this was made, grace joined to the precepts of the Gospel worked faith, love, and the remittance of guilt fully. Faith under the Old Law is associated with Christ as it is under the Gospel but love is not, at least, explicitly. However, faith and love work together and so in that sense they are both related to Christ.

Nevertheless, under the Old Law, it would appear that grace, from the Holy Spirit, working faith and love, works apart from Christ whereas, in the sacraments, under the Gospel, Christ is the channel of grace. This view is by no means universal in the Glossa. It is however still grace joined to the precepts of the Gospel that justifies perfectly. In other words, before and after Christ, the Spirit is an "alter Christus" in sanctification (sanctification preceding justification) but after Christ he channels grace through Christ, and in that grace is contained the benefit Christ himself bestows, namely, the elimination of temporal punishment.

Although this seems to be Alexander's real position, namely, that both the laws of the Old Testament and the New Testament can be spiritual (which would be sound if the Spirit was the Spirit of Christ and not an "alter Christus"), nevertheless, in effect, he does often make the distinction between the Old Law and the New Law, the one between declining from evil and doing good. This view would mean that Christ removes the barrier so that grace can bestow faith and love.
This has a certain basis in the fact that the temporal punishment which Christ removes is "carentia visionis Dei" which is related to the cognition to which faith relates in turn (or one part of faith, the non-operative). If this "carentia" is not removed by satisfaction, then, faith cannot exist and therefore neither could love whose basis is faith and which enables one to do good. This is good in that it makes Christ more decisive, wrong in that Christ's work has no retrospective reference in time. This limitation made to Christ's work is quite in keeping with much of Alexander's thinking; in the first quotation (p.397) on justification his work applied only to punishment. Alexander several times makes the distinction between declining evil and the doing of good as the difference between the Old Law and the New Law. The ceremonial laws justified in neither way but the moral laws in the Old Testament justified in declining evil and in the New Law in doing good. 2 When Alexander actually discusses the matter of the differences between the two laws there are similar distinctions. The most correct title for the two laws are "Lex Vetus" because "law" denotes "terminum a quo, scilicet malum", and "Testamentum Novum" because "testament" denotes "terminum ad quem, scilicet bonum". 3 The two laws are also distinguished in regard to the efficient cause. Moses is the efficient cause of the Old Law, Christ is the efficient cause of the New Law. "Unde in Ioan. 17: Lex per Moysen data est, gratia per Iesum Christum". 4 This

2. 7,1,d) p.470. 3. d.XL,2,1,a) p.540. 4. b) p.540.
is to see Christ as the dividing line between the Law (fear) and grace (love). Another difference is in the material causes, those of the Old Law are the carnal precepts and promises, those of the New Law being the same spiritually. 5

Again there is a difference "secundum terminos": the justice of the Old Law freed from punishment, the justice of Christ saves; "secundum fines": the end of the Old Law was an imperfect obedience, the end of the New Law was a perfect obedience to death: "quasi causa formalis": in the Old Law it was fear, in the New Law it is love. 6 This is sufficient evidence to indicate that, at least, Christ was a dividing line in this type of thinking. This does not mean that he was more than that. The logic of Christ's satisfaction would mean that faith could result only after the "carentia divinae visionis" is removed "per gratiam crucifixi" 7 and thus the working of grace in love would come fully after the satisfaction was made. However, guilt was removed under the Old Law and this is the result of grace 8 which is "gratia gratum faciens", the grace to do well. Thus love could come under the Old Law. So there may have been a possibility of doing well under the Old Law, but the effect was imperfect because man still suffered under "carentia" whose removal was signified but not caused under circumcision. Then again, there may be an indication of the concept of Christ as "caput"

5. c)p.540. 6. d)p.541. 7. Phrases from d.XXXVII,12(L),I, c)p.477 which parallels the text used above, "AB".
8. eg. Bk.I,d.XLVI,19,p.468; Bk.II,d.XXVI,6,b)p.242.
from whom flows faith, and possibly love. But just as this section was not an integral part of the Christology, it would seem that this thinking is not altogether characteristic of the Glossa's outlook on the Old Law.

**Quaestiones**

In a comparison of the Old Law and the New Law in the Quaestiones there does not appear to be any hesitation at all in affirming the full working of the grace of virtues ("gratia gratum faciens") under the Old Law. It is correct to affirm that grace is at work under the Old Law, and in the Quaestiones this grace is derived from the believer's faith in Christ. Where one begins to have doubts, however, is on the view of the Quaestiones (as opposed to the Glossa) in which it does not associate this grace with Christ, the man. In fact, Christ, the man, is downgraded as compared with the Glossa's hesitant views. The Glossa does, to its credit, associate the satisfaction of Christ, satisfaction made by the man and him only, with the sanctification of man, firstly, and with some reason, by giving the impression sometimes that Christ's satisfaction removed a barrier to grace, and secondly, by making Christ the dividing line between a time of no grace and a time of grace. These views are closely associated.

The second view is imperfect in that it is chronological, which also was the case with the application of Christ's satisfaction. However, a basic problem with both the Quaestiones and the Glossa is their substantial view of the grace of God and the fact that with this view they see
sanctification taking place outside Christ (this is the theology of Christ as Head, the channel of outflowing sanctifying grace). There are then only two alternatives, one being to admit that sanctification takes place in men before Christ which entails the subsequent downgrading of Christ as critical in man's history, that is, as the One in whom God is revealed and man is justified and sanctified (which applies to men before (and after) Christ); or attempting to see Christ as critical in the history of man which entails the impossible division between a graceless law and a law of grace with the implication that Christ really applies only to those who come after. Possibly it is the fact that neither alternative is attractive to the piety of the Glossa which causes its equivocation. The Quaestiones finds a solution in the grace of the Head by which Christ is made source of grace to the believer. This may appear more satisfactory superficially, but one must doubt whether it is in fact for the reasons already stated in that the decisive critical element of Christ's ministry is practically eliminated.

This fact is seen in a few paragraphs of the Quaestiones. The moral precepts of the Old Law, it is stated, were meritorious of eternal life "sed habebant impedimentum, quia omnes erant rei poenae aeternae. Unde oportuit quod fieret solutio illius impedimenti ad hoc ut statim esset transitus in vitam aeternam". 9 The impediment exists "quia nondum pretium originalis culpae per Christum fuit solutum". 10

9. Q.XX, De Iustitia Legis Veteris, Disp.1, Memb.1, 6, p. 362.
10. 8, p. 363.
The precepts of the New Law justify without any impediment. 11 The Old Law justified without "plenum lumen" because under the Law there was a veil. 12 Justification in the Old Law relates to a "terminus a quo" whereas the justification of the New Law relates to a "terminus in quem" and thus there was a greater prize under the New Law but in spite of these facts "tamen ratione obedientiae potuit aliquis in Veteri Lege magis mereri quam in Nova". 13 In spite of the fact that the New Law was lighter than the Old, that it was clearer, and that it headed towards a greater prize, there does not seem to be any great difference before and after Christ, not even grace is really affected. Christ removes an impediment so that without further ado those meriting under the Old Law can cross over into eternal life. In fact the substance of the Law is found in the Law of Nature. 14 Christ does not add anything basically new to the situation of sanctification. He fulfils the moral laws by addition, the judicial laws have their justice tempered with mercy, the sacraments become causal, the ceremonial laws signified something under a veil and with the veil removed it is manifest; the promises which were imperfect being indefinite about life, now are perfect with definite promises on eternal life. 15 This view of the Old and New Law emphasises very strongly the process from innocence to glory and limits the place of Christ in that process to the removing of an "impediment".

CHAPTER 14

PREDESTINATION

The "scientia" and the "praescientia" of God in Alexander provide interesting and somewhat intricate subjects. Although these topics are lacking in Christocentricity and would be greatly enriched by a Christological basis, nevertheless they are rather remote from the central purpose of this thesis. This, however, is not true of what might be the best example of a non-Christological treatment of a doctrine which should be markedly Christological, and that is another "scientia", namely, predestination. This doctrine, as presented by Alexander, speaks of a God behind Christ, not revealed in Christ, nor yet in the Holy Spirit. In fact, so lacking in a Christological basis is it (which is not true altogether of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit) that it appears to cut completely across the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and the grace of the Holy Spirit even as Alexander, himself, presents them.

Predestination is "respectu salvandorum sive bonorum finaliter". ¹ Augustine had defined it as "preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future", ² a definition which Alexander accepts but does not work out at all clearly in relating the two parts of the definition. However, when he is discussing predestination and prescience he does use both parts and states "Praedestinatio... tam respectu gratiae, quam respectu gloriae, determinat

¹ Bk.I,d.XXXV,3,p.349. ² Augustine De Praedest, sanctorum, c.10,n.19.
Naturally, with predestination, the subject of reprobation always arises. According to Alexander, whereas predestination tells of the "pietas" of God, reprobation tells of the "maiestas" of God but they are not of the same "genus", although both are a prescience. Reprobation is the preparation of eternal punishment; predestination is defined (at this point at least) as predestination of grace in the present. The former pertains to justice, the latter to mercy. The distinction between predestination and reprobation is founded upon the fact that the prescience of God does not cause reprobation whereas in predestination it adds "proprium effectum". And here the cause relates to final grace: "Sic enim Deus praeparat alicui gratiam finalem praedestinando, praescit illam finalem et est illi ut causa".

So far the discussion falls under the general discussion of prescience (which relates more to cause than effect, and hence, possibly has no particular interest in the relation of present and final grace). Predestination and reprobation in general are later discussed on their own. Here again the same distinction between the two is made. Predestination is the prescience of the good with causality whereas reprobation contains only precognition "causalitas enim residet penes liberum arbitirum". It might be significant that, here, Augustine's use of the word "preparation" is not used. This word would appear to indicate some process.

3. d.XXXV,6,p.351. 4. d.XXXV,5,p.351. 5. 6,p.351. 6. d.XL,1,p.400.
through grace to glory. The reason, however, for Alexander not attributing to God the causality of reprobation is obvious: "Deus enim neminem vult peccare". But then the possibility arises of God being the cause of reprobation in that he took away grace, and eternal reprobation is "Deus reprobans". In reply Alexander states that God certainly is the cause of punishment but it does not follow that reprobation is the cause of obduracy. The proper cause of the "non apponere gratiam" is the evil will and God, in His justice, causes grace not to be bestowed on the sinner. This is just. To the suggestion that the "subtracta /gratia/" is the cause of evil since the "apposita gratia" is a cause Alexander replies: "In bonis gratia est prior et bona sequitur voluntas; in malis vero e converso, mala voluntas est prior et non apposita gratiae sequitur".  

The distinction between predestination and reprobation, except insofar as the suggestion that God takes away his grace from the sinner which has been questioned in the chapter on grace, is at present valid. Alexander makes the point well that God wishes man to be saved but does not wish reprobation or obduracy on man; that is the work of man. "'Subtracta gratia' non notatur causa, sed concomitantia". However, then the question must arise, and, indeed, does arise, since all men have sinned in Adam, and God is the highest justice, why are not all "digni obtusione et non omnes damnantur"? Alexander replies with Anselm "Si punis, iuste punis... Si

parcis, iuste parcis". 12 The use of this answer would suggest that there is more in the cause than the evil will of man. If all men are evil, then the justice of God must cause him to withdraw grace. Why should some be saved then? Alexander would reply that that lies in the mercy of God. But then the reply would be that God, in fact, by not exercising his mercy to restore grace was a cause, if only an indirect cause, of reprobation. Certainly this does not fit into a picture of God who wishes to save all for obviously he could have but did not decide to have mercy in relation to the reprobate. He had mercy only on those he predestinated.

The question of predestination raises another query about reprobation. Works, writes Alexander, are not the cause of man's election; this lies in the will of God "cuius nulla causa quaerenda est". 13 In other words predestination lies "in eternity"; God determines to save some from eternity. This he does by the grace of predestination. The question then is, if the reprobate never had this grace, how can it be subtracted from the reprobate? If it was present grace that was subtracted, as it is obvious it must have been, this still does not alter the picture for God never gave the reprobate the grace to be saved so how could he be other than reprobate? Thus God would cause reprobation. The force of this latter argument, however, rests on the presupposition that the grace of predestination has little if any relation to present grace, that is, the grace of predestination does not work through

present grace but beyond it. If the two were related essentially, then there would be force in Alexander's statement that the reprobates deserve their reward because they would then be rejecting the grace of predestination in present grace. However, it will be seen that the relation between the two graces in the Glossa, if there is one, is not worked out and indeed seems purely accidental.

The way predestination is viewed would appear to exclude this possibility. Alexander states that the number of the saved and who is to be saved is certain. There can be no changing of this number not even for unworthiness. The punishment which is bestowed on the elect by which they cross over to the damned (Matt. 25) does not concern final grace for just as glory is determined for the predestinate so too is final grace. 14 The predestinate will not be damned even if they sin for sin speaks of accidents and when it is said "Iste est praedestinatus', accidit huic esse praedestinatum". 15 There is absolutely no possibility of damnation just as white cannot finally be black. "Si praedestinatus est, salvabitur vel futurus est salvari; si vero damnabitur, futurus damnari. Sed impossibile est alterum illorum alteri succedere, quod futurus damnari futurus sit salvari vel e converso". 16 This is very near pure determinism, that is, creation is ignored and ceases to be creation and present grace is a fiction.

There are three possibilities which might temper this somewhat. First, in some way, free will which is so

14. d.XL,6,d)p.403. 15. 7,p.404. 16. 9,404.
important in the other three books and apparently helping to effect man's salvation, may enter into this process of predestination and man then could really deserve his reprobation. Secondly, the grace of predestination could work through temporal grace to effect salvation thus making room also for the free will as Alexander sees it. Thirdly, and one would suspect, the least likely possibility for Alexander, predestination and reprobation could take place in Christ, or at least have some relation to Christ. These are the possibilities which might provide some evidence of a real creation.

First, then, the free will. It is suggested that, although, for instance, a hundred were predestined, yet through good works some more not confirmed in final evil could be saved. Alexander concedes that when the free will operates to good or evil, theoretically it is possible to be damned or saved:

"Cum autem sit commutandum id quod est praedestinatum aut praescitum, quae important aeternam praefinitionem, cum gratia et malitia finali et salvatione et damnatione, concedenda est locutio cum verbo necessitatis; cum verbo autem possibilitatis non est concedenda nisi cum determinatione, ut sit sensus; praedestinatum possibile est damnari, ut huic insit potestas ad damnationem et eidem potest inesse praedestinatio. Haec ergo concedenda est: 'possibile est istum salvari', demonstrato reprobo secundum omnem modum: non enim repugnantia est inter ipsum liberum arbitrium et salvationem et poenam. Et non sequitur: 'possibile est plures praedestinari quam praedestinantur'; non enim hic respicitur possibilitas liberi arbitrii in praesenti, sed quid futurum est, sicilicet utrum salvabitur vel damnabitur. Et quia haec non conceditur: 'possibile est quod futurus salvari damnetur' vel a converso, non conceditur quod plures possint praedestinari quam praedestinantur vel reprobari quam reprobantur". 17

17. d.XL,12,b)pp.407-408.
Predestination is necessary in itself and there is no contingency in God but there is in the effect or in "liberto arbitrio possibili ad effectum". 18 When one is wedded to such a doctrine of predestination in all its determinism - how can one distinguish between cause and effect here? - free will, as Alexander conceives it in Book II and elsewhere is merely play acting. Such free will and this type of predestination are simply incompatible. Both cannot be true. And this makes a mockery of free will as a cause of reprobation. In fact, in the same section as the quotation immediately above, Alexander all but admits this when there is posited a "duplex ratio" of reprobation, one which relates to justice and the other "non propositum misericordiae" or "non miserendi". 19 "Ratio" is not equivalent to "causa" in Alexander's thinking but in spite of this it very nearly is. Before this can be ascertained finally, the relation of predestination and present grace must be investigated.

Already, however, enough has been stated to bring against this view of predestination very serious charges which will have fuel added to them in the discussion on present grace, and Christ and predestination. The first charge is that the situation of the sinful creation is not changed at all by predestination, that regardless of what happens some are to be saved, some are to be damned. It does not really matter, further, whether man is converted or not; this will not change their destiny. The second, and at this stage the possibly more

serious charge because, as yet there is still an element of
doubt as to the relation of the grace of predestination and
present grace and therefore the possibility that predestination
may affect the situation, is that sin is not taken seriously.
It is taken seriously in relation to the reprobate who are
damned for their rejection of grace but it is not taken
seriously in regard to the predestined. The predestined
can will what he likes, it appears, they can even cross over
to the side of the damned, but they cannot reject their
predestination. Certainly Alexander is attempting to maintain
the fact that free will does not control God or affect him
(which has not been particularly well maintained elsewhere),
that, in fact, God chooses man and not vice versa. But in so
doing he has claimed too much. In the process he has eliminated
the possibility of man's freedom and his responsibility of
obedience to God. With such a doctrine of predestination, a
real conversion, a real change in man, must mean a change in
God if free will is what Alexander has maintained that it is.
If, however, free will is established by God in grace or in
Jesus Christ (which, if the latter were so, would mean that
there has been a misreading of the other books of the Glossa)
then the change in man does not mean that God is changed or
controlled by man but that God in grace, or in Christ, effects
the change in man, or works out his predestination in man.
This, however, is not the case, either in grace or in Christ
according to Alexander.

Secondly, present grace and the grace of predestination.
No doubt because Augustine had connected present grace and the grace of predestination, and because it would seem that there must be some connection between the graces as they are from God, Alexander does make some attempt to coincide the two graces. The fact that he distinguishes between an eternal election and a temporal election does not necessarily divide the graces - the former is nothing else than "praevision ad gratiam et gloriam", the latter is "collatio gratiae in presenti". In fact eternal election would appear to lead through grace to glory. This link has already been mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. It is also made in the distinctions on predestination itself where God is said to foreknow grace and prepare it, and to foreknow glory and prepare it. (There is no question here of predestination being merely foreknowledge). But this is about as far as he goes. In fact it is at the point of the denial of foresight as the cause of predestination that one begins to suspect the flimsy connection of present grace and predestination. The question is whether the foresight of works is the cause of the prevision of grace. Alexander replies that "praevision operum et gratiae eadem est in substantia; et licet gratia detur ad operandum, nec praevision gratiae vel operum est causa electionis ipsius personae, sed sola Dei voluntas, cuius nulla causa quaerenda est." The last sentence would find support in any good reformer. However, there is a suggestion of a difference - or lack of coincidence - between eternal election and the conferring

of present grace. God, here, appears to be put into the position of his right hand not knowing what his left hand is doing. This may be only appearance; there is no positive affirmation of this suspicion and silence does not mean consent although it is surprising that the connection between grace and election is not mentioned here if there is a connection. But there are more positive signs of a distinction. On the subject of whether the number of the elect could be increased, Deuteronomy 1:11 is given as a proof that the number can be increased, - "Dominus Deus addat ad hunc numerum". To this Alexander replies that this is the number of those having present grace but does not refer to the final grace of the predestined: "novit enim Deus non tantum istum numerum, sed ad hunc". 23 Then again Peter Lombard had suggested in his commentary on Malachi 1:2 that the "dilectio" of God was either from foreknowledge or works. This, Alexander states, refers to temporal election and not eternal. Then it is asked whether temporal "dilectio" is from works in the conferring of grace and the reply is "quod non, immo quoad gloriam praeparatam, quam oportet praecedere merita in adultis". 24 Here, the first reply makes the distinction between the graces, but, in the second, it appears that temporal grace is given for works of merit as the suitable prelude to a glory already prepared. This would mean that temporal grace is not the means to glory, nor does it express the will of God from eternity, that is, it is good to have

temporal grace to merit, but it is not necessarily the reflection of God's ultimate will. The separation of temporal grace and the grace of predestination is again evident in reply to the question as to whether one can pray that one should be predestined as one can pray for the first grace which is the first effect of predestination. The answer is in the negative: "Gratia enim temporalis est, quam possunt praecedere orationes sanctorum; praedestinatio vero est aeterna, quam nihil potest praecedere; unde non potest impetrari". 25 Does this mean that with temporal grace bestowed through prayer one cannot be certain that one is predestined? (Presumably Alexander does not see the prayer as a fiction; that is, it is of no point with the non-predestined). That would appear to be the case. Or does it mean that more grace can be asked for the already predestined? Then, however, one has to ask, how does one know one is predestined to see whether prayer should be made? To this there appears to be no answer for as was stated in the discussion of predestination and free will, unworthiness, or even the crossing over to the damned - which would presumably be signs of a lack of temporal grace - do not upset one's predestination. That will also mean, perhaps not logically but practically, that those who do have temporal grace must have doubts as to their predestination. In other words, to the believer and unbeliever alike, God will appear to be divided in regard to temporal and eternal grace.

25. 11, d) p. 419.
There is the possibility, however, that all those who have temporal grace are predestined, that is, although God does not work through present grace to predestination, he does bestow present grace only on the predestined. This possibility seems to be ruled out by answers in Book III. The first answer is to the question whether the "praedestinatus malus" is more loved than the "praescitus bonus" by God. There can be two answers: "'ad minus' diligatur, vel 'ad maius' diligatur". The predestined bad are loved more in the latter sense, the preknown good are loved more in the former sense: "Vel magis diligatur secundum praescientiam praesentis effectus, et sic praescitus bonus magis diligatur". 26 The implication of this answer is that the preknown good could possibly be one of the reprobate. If this were not so, there is no point in asking the question because then the preknown good would be the more loved on both scores. However, there is a possibility that Alexander is merely comparing present grace and the grace of predestination. This comparison again appears pointless if present grace is absorbed by the grace of predestination which would be the case if all those who had present grace were the predestinate. The doubt is cleared up in the answer to the next question whether God can love and hate at the same time which appears possible because he can hate the predestined as presently bad, but love him because he is predestined. The answer is: "odio haberi potest aliquid secundum nunc temporis, sed diligi secundum nunc

aeternitatis; et sic unum et idem diligere potest et odio haberi vel e converso". 27 Thus present grace (as the "e converso" indicates) is no necessary indication of eternal predestination. The third answer is again interesting because it qualifies beyond recognition a position apparently held in Book I. The question is whether it can be said about the preknown good in the present that God "praeparavit gratiam in praesenti". The answer is "praeparatio sonat in stabilitatem; ideo non proprie dicendum est quod, 'praeparavit gratiam in praesenti', sed potius 'praeadidit', quoniam praevision sonat cum temporis mutatione". 28 This answer, if it is by the same author, and there is no reason to suspect it is not for such qualifications in the Glossa are reasonably common, confirms a suspicion that Alexander in Book I was more interested in the preparation of final grace than in present grace and that his inclusion of the latter was possibly little more than deference to authority. (Another example of this is found in his doctrine of the sacraments where there is a loose connection with a traditional definition).

These three quotations confirm the suspicion that present grace and the grace of predestination have no necessary connection; in other words, the believer has no ultimate certainty even in the grace bestowed by the sacrament of the Church. This grace was loosely connected to Christ in the sacraments. Here not even such a connection of predestination with Christ is possible through grace. Also, as has already

been maintained, there would be no certainty of election for the present bad even if only those with temporal grace were the elect. However, it is the third of these answers in the previous paragraph which is most significant for the reprobate for it indicates that they could never have been offered the grace of predestination, not even in present grace for prevision does not include causality. If this is so the fact of the free will's rejection of grace is definitely not the only cause of reprobation because, according to Alexander, the predestined bad also rejected present grace. There must be another causal element and that is found in the non-bestowal of the grace of predestination by God. In short, it is implied that God is the cause of the reprobates being reprobates not merely of their punishment.

There is another interesting answer by Alexander to the question on "occultissima merita". In this answer there may be an attempt to coincide present or temporal grace and the grace of predestination. The question is whether "voluntas Dei venit de meritis". Alexander replies that the "de" does not denote a cause of the divine will,
dicit opus procedens a gratia prout temporaliter fit; sed occultissimum dicit modum per quem est in scientia beneplaciti. Nec sequitur quod si venit de meritis, quod venit de operibus, nam opera, secundum se dicta, non determinant gratiam et rem temporalem supponunt". 29

It is also asked how a sinner can, by his works, "precede" justification. Alexander replies that the "praecessio" does not relate to the sinner "sed, cum iam est peccator et facit quod potest ad gratiam habendam, quod in ipso est voluntas obedientiae, respectu cuius est convenientia ut detur gratia; et haec voluntas obedientiae est illud quod dicitur praecedere in peccatoribus". To this it is better to give the name "congruitatis" than "dignitatis et meriti". 30 The first of these answers seems to deal with predestination, the second with present grace and possibly by implication with predestination. Both illustrate the same point, one being the relation of God to grace, the other being the relation of God in that grace to the disposition of man. It would appear from the first quotation that God is pictured as taking a side-long glance at his prevision to see the hidden merits ("congruity"), in other words to see how man would use his grace. According to this foresight, it is congruent that God should predestine. In the second case present grace is related to the voluntas of man in a similar way; it is congruent that God should bestow grace. This appears to be a matter of definition. Merit, which has "dignity", by definition, consists of grace and free will; this makes merit "congruent" for predestination. Before grace there is no merit but the free will still can be disposed

with the help of "gratis gratis data"; this makes it "congruent" for present grace. Both "congruencies" are merit in the generally accepted Reformed view of merit. If God is determined, or influenced, by this disposition of congruence, his predestination is foreknowledge. If however, the merit is merely a "congruency" with predestination then there is no necessary connection between the bestowal of the grace of predestination, and present grace and free will. There is no possibility of knowing whether one is predestined by the right use of grace and so the uncertainty already mentioned must still arise. There does seem to be a possibility that those who have present grace are the predestined but it already has been seen that this identification cannot be absolute. Further, if predestination is merely foreknowledge the injustice to the reprobate is removed but then predestination ceases to be what Alexander has defined it.

There is yet another possibility here and it is that Alexander is not discussing at all the problem of predestination. The section is begun from that point of view: *Nulla merita praecedunt voluntatem praedestinationis: voluntas enim talis aeterna est; omne autem meritum temporale est; quare non praecedit*. 31 He may be discussing, in fact, the problem of the will of God being determined for present grace by merit because the discussion of predestination may have been concluded with the opening statement just quoted and the next problem is concerned with the "voluntas" of God and hidden merits: *Adhuc, si haec aliquo modo vera est: 'voluntas Dei venit de

occultissimis meritis', utrum venit de occultissimis operibus? nam omne meritum opus est". 32 This is certainly the question answered; it may have no connection, and if one, only one of a parallel problem, with the first statement of the section on predestination. The second answer certainly is not discussing predestination. The question, then, may be more concerned with God's "voluntas" in relation to present grace and not to predestination. This would coincide nicely with the fact that previously in Book I predestination has been so rigidly defined, that the section of Book III quoted is in apparent contradiction to the first of these answers, and that Alexander goes on to discuss "praedestinatio, electio, vocatio, dilectio" the latter three all having their temporal aspects. 33 This later discussion indicates some connection between the four but it is still a very loose connection.

The question of the "voluntas" of God arises some distinctions later after discussion of his omnipotence, about possibilities and impossibilities, and whether what was made could have been made better. There is a "voluntas ex consideratione naturae" which pertains to beatitude if man wished to be fully obedient; and there is a "voluntas ex consideratione meriti". By the first God wishes all men to be saved but not by the latter because certain men merit damnation. 34 In relation to damnation and salvation the "voluntas" of God is alone the efficient cause but there is a certain disposition on the part of the recipient

32. Ibid. 33. 19,p.423. 34. d.XLVI,1,pp.458-459.
according to the goodness or the badness of the free will. Then there is an antecedent will of God "ex causa nostra" which is the "voluntas bene faciendi" in which the well doing derives from grace and free will. But still "Deus est operatur et homo cooperat". 35 This may be called consequent not because man is the efficient cause of salvation but because salvation and damnation are consequent to the meritorious or non-meritorious movement of the free will. 36 The bad are in the "voluntas permissionis" of God only. 37 Here, Alexander obviously holds a position which he had in the doctrine of grace and merit. It is in relation to this grace (present grace) and free will that he appears to have no difficulty. He is not nearly as determined to assert the absolute priority, although he is at pains to assert the priority, of God's will. This, no doubt, is because he is dealing with the immediate relation of God and man and temporal grace so-called, and not with the far more difficult problem, as far as he is concerned, of God's eternal decree and foreknowledge in relation to man who is finite and temporal.

There is a third place in time besides in free will and grace where the grace of predestination could make contact. It is in Jesus Christ. This is the most important and yet it can be dealt with very briefly. If the predestination from eternity is made in Jesus Christ, then the problem of the knowledge and the certainty of election are resolved (the problem of grace) as is also the problem of the free will. If,

35. 3,g)p.460. 36. i)p.461. 37. h)pp.460-461.
in Christ, man is predestined, then God is not acting above man's head but right down with him, then God's will is sure, then man's free will is established and real in Christ, (then sin is taken completely seriously because then it is not possible to reject God's grace without disastrous consequences), and then because Christ is the one towards whom creation strains, creation is given its honoured place before God, as creation. Man would be making the impossible contradiction by rejecting his election because man's will is free only in Christ. If man is free and rejects God's grace but is still predestined, that is inevitably finally saved, as Alexander appears to hold, then sin is not taken seriously; nor, for that matter, is man's freedom very important; it is not something new, even if he accepts God's grace; he is still elect. Alexander, however, as one would suspect, does not attach predestination to Christ. This was seen also in the Christology proper.

"Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus. Non ergo attribuendum est esse praedestinatum Filio Dei simpliciter, sed Filio Dei secundum humanam naturam". 38 Christ is thus seen as predestined like any other man, but he is not the elect one by whom, in whom, and through whom we are elect. Predestination, for Alexander, is not a Trinitarian concept in which God in his Son predestines man to salvation. Predestination, for Alexander, is between "God" simply and man. It takes place beyond Christ in eternity. There is no mediator.

The problem for Alexander in the doctrine of

38. d.XL,3,d)p.401.
predestination is the problem of time and eternity. To put this another way; it is a problem because predestination is not seen to be in Jesus Christ. In Alexander it is a totally non-Christological doctrine. In fact it is a doctrine very slightly related to creation. If predestination as foreknowledge, in which man is the real predestinator, is ruled out, and it would appear that it is, and predestination is seen as something done (the very word of action is out of place) irrevocably in a still moment of eternity in which time has no real place, then one cannot conceive predestination as being other than unrelated to creation. Free will, grace and most importantly Christ, are ignored and overrun. What takes place in time is unimportant and sin ceases to be a problem at all. If Christ has no part, then, free will can have no real part. There was a possibility that for Alexander the grace of predestination and present grace might be understood to work together but their workings are basically different in the Glossa, the latter needing the free will to work salvation, the former needing nothing. Either one or the other must go. Alexander does make some attempts to integrate the two graces but his attempts must fall apart because they are as incompatible as determinism and freedom. His attempt, besides being in deference to the great authority of Augustine, may have been due also to some sense of uneasiness at the lack of integration. But there can be no integration between temporal grace and the grace of predestination until there is an integration between time and eternity. Only, in Christ, is
that problem resolved from the side of God, or rather, in Christocentric theology, the problem never becomes serious enough to disintegrate a theology. The other resolution is simply to call foreknowledge predestination. This puts the solution into the hands of man. This solution Alexander, because of his emphasis on the priority of grace, and because, no doubt, he stood in the Christian tradition, could not accept in the Glossa.

Quaestiones

There are two quite distinct differences in the doctrine of predestination as it is contained in the Quaestiones. First, the connection between the grace of predestination and present grace is made clear; second, the doctrine of predestination equates predestination with foreknowledge. This does not mean that there still are not tensions in the doctrine between the eternal decree and the temporal working but these, by and large, are reduced to the minimum. Then, there are two almost entirely new subjects introduced, related closely to the doctrine, which are worked out in general agreement with the doctrine of predestination in the Quaestiones. These are the questions "De Praedestinatione Christi" (q.XII) and "De Libro Vitae" (q.XLI).

The Augustinian definition "praedestinatio est preparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro" is stated and practised (certainly, in a way different from Augustine). "Et ponitur hoc totum in definitione, quia
praedestination respicit aeternitatem ut ante et aeternitatem ut post, et illud quod tempus comitatur in medio. Quoad hoc autem quod est post, dicitur 'gloriae in futuro'; quoad hoc autem quod est ante, dicitur 'praeparatio'; quoad medium, dicitur 'gratiae in prae senti'. 39 The preparation has two aspects; one which is "temporalis" "cum est scientia quod iste bene usurus est gratia finaliter" and eternal "cum est voluntas dandi ei". "Importat enim voluntatem ab aeterno dandi isti gratiam, cum prae scientia, quod scilicet usurus est gratia finaliter". 40 From this it would appear that man is the cause of predestination. However, the relation of man and predestination is put more subtly. Predestination is the cause of grace. It is not necessary as a compulsive cause but is necessary as an "indeficiens causa est ut habitus, aliquando tamen non est causatum, quia non semper est susceptibile". This susceptibility is "congruent" to the receiving of grace "quae est effectus praedestinationis. Susceptibile enim gratiae finalis est voluntas indeficienter Deo adherens". This susceptibility "simul est cum gratia, ita quod gratia non sit prius tempore". Not on account of this is susceptibility a contingent cause for a contingent cause is "ubi deest aliquid ex parte sui, et requiritur aliquid ad hoc ut exeat effectus in esse, quod est de esse causae...Sic non est ex parte praedestinationis, quia ex parte eius est tota causa". 41 This statement would be reasonably acceptable, apart from the suggestion that man's acceptance exists outside

the grace of God, for it is true that grace does not work without man, without his freedom. This was a criticism of the doctrine in the Glossa, that man and creation were completely overrun. But in the section on the Glossa it was pointed out that the alternative to this, with the presupposition of predestination from a still point of eternity which was quite inflexible, was to see predestination as foreknowledge. The Quaestiones does not escape this alternative. To a query on what type of cause predestination is, the answer is that it is efficient in one way and exemplary in another. God has in himself prescience and "voluntas": "ratione ergo voluntatis ponetur in genere causae efficientis; ratione praescientiae, in genere causae exemplaris, respectu gratiae in quantum est verum. Et in utroque genere est causa propria, sed non talis qua existente semper sit causatum, quia requiritur quaedam ratio ex parte suscipientis". The causality does not come from the voluntas of man but there is "congruentia secundum rationem". 42 "Ratio" is not "causa" but the fact remains that the "causa" only exists when there is also this "ratio" there. The "ratio" does not make the cause necessary but predestination occurs only with the "ratio". "Ratio" could almost be translated here as "compelling reason". It is a word which can mean "method", "logic", "system", "reason", and "cause" according to its context - earlier it was used almost to mean "definition" with the idea of "working" or "method" - and the

42. 44, pp.118-119.
use of it here over against "causa" looks very much like the act of a person who believes he has found the solution to a problem when he has found a word to describe it. Certainly here "causa" is direct and "ratio" is indirect, that is, there is a difference, but ultimately they are both causes. This view of "ratio" is repeated several times and in various contexts. There is no cause in the receiving of grace although there is "ratio" on part of the receiver. 43 There is no causality outside predestination although there is a "ratio" required in regard to it. 44 There is not a temporal cause of predestination but there is a "ratio" "ex parte scientiae Dei, quod iste usurus est gratia bene, ille autem non bene". 45 "Voluntas" on God's part is equal for all; but "voluntas quoad connotatum non similiter se habet ad omnes: non quod dependeat a libero arbitrio, sed e contrario". Hidden merits in the prescience of God are not merits although they are the "ratio" of God's "voluntas". 47 There is a dignity of congruity in the desire of man for justification although that does not mean that God must justly give grace. 48 The subject of prescience does bring out the tension between eternity and time a little more but does not alter the picture.

One may pray for adding to present grace but not for adding to the predestined. 49 In this context this statement merely means that one may pray that predestination may take effect; it does not say how that predestination is formed or that the two "graces" are contrary. Once

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foreknowledge is allowed the inevitability of predestination does not contradict the reality of present grace and freedom.

On the predestination of Christ the Quaestiones brings Christ far more into the centre of the picture as it does with the doctrine of Christ as the Head as the source to men of outflowing grace. The teaching on the predestination of Christ is in keeping with the doctrine of predestination. Christ is the means or channel, in keeping with his being filled with grace, of the grace of predestination to man by present grace. It should be noted, first, that it is the Holy Spirit who is the predestiner because it is he with whom the "voluntas" of God and grace are associated. Christ as man is predestined and as God he is "destinans". (This has possibilities). Principally he was destined as "viator", but both as "viator" and "comprehensor" he was predestined. It is pointed out however in the actual question on the predestination of Christ that it was as man that the Son of God was predestined. It is this fact that makes the doctrine of the predestination of Christ deficient because Christ's complete centrality and necessity for predestination is maintained only when the predestination of men takes place from eternity in the Son, that is, if it is understood in a Trinitarian manner. If this is not so, men are not predestined in Christ, but only through him. He is merely the channel of grace for the Holy Spirit. Man's conversion to God and his freedom then are not founded in Christ but

in man's own response to grace. Men are not predestined then for Christ's sake but because of the "voluntas" of God and the "ratio" (or purely in the still moment of eternity). Hence the hidden merits of Christ can be taken into account in predestination "quia nostra merita non sunt expedita sine suis". This probably refers to the satisfaction which Christ made which would expedite man's predestination but would not be the reason for predestination; it could also refer to the general merits of Christ which like the merits of any man can be transferred to other men. The fact that the enhypostatic element is lacking in predestination as it is in the doctrine of grace in Christ is seen by the following statement: "secundum quod prae destinatio est 'praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro', sicut gratia communis est Christo et aliis hominibus, et similiter gloria, ita et prae destinatio. Secundum vero quod prae destinatio est 'propositum miserendi', sicut miseria dicitur aequivoce de Christo et de nobis, ita et prae destinatio." 55

The view of Christ as a channel of grace is reasonably well seen when it is stated that the grace by which Christ is Head is not only uncreated grace, that is, the Holy Spirit, but also created grace as a "donum" just as there is in us love which is the Holy Spirit and grace which is a "donum", "unde prae destinatio respicit hanc triplicem gratiam in

Christo, et haec gratia triplex creat est". The threefold grace is the grace as a single man, grace as Head of the Church, and the grace of union. The grace which is prior "ratione intelligendi" in regard to predestination is the grace of the Head as Peter Lombard stated in his Glossa on Ephesians 1:23 "Nullum maius donum posset Deus praestare hominibus, quam ut Verbum suum, per quod omnia condidit, faceret illis caput et ipsos tamquam membra illi coaptaret". The fact that the grace of union is not prior as suggested is significant, surely, because that, if any, is the enhypostatic element. The grace of the Head looks beyond this to the members; it points to the fact that grace flows through Christ. It is in this way that Christ must be seen as the cause and example, that is, as a source of a channel of grace; this is not to see the humanity of Christ as enhypostatic. The assertion that Christ is a cause is made in a statement on order in predestination. The order is in the "connotatum" which is temporal and so order is in predestination. "Secundum vero quod loquimur de /praedestinatione in mente Dei/, simul natura et duratione sunt omnes rationes aeternae. Ordo tamen est secundum quod praedestinatio respicit praedestinatum, quod est temporale, ratione gratiae vel gloriae connotatae, secundum causalitatem scilicet". This points up the lack of a real Trinitarian basis. Christ, as Son of God and Son of Man, is cause only in time,
that is, in act, not in the being of God. Unless there is an order in predestination in God, that is, unless there is a Trinitarian basis, there is no basis for the enhypostatic causality of Christ in which Christ the man is mediator between God and man. In a broader view, without predestination being "earthed" from within the being of God, there can be no real incarnation (i.e. Christ would not be a cause). And unless predestination is linked by means of the incarnation to the Trinity, it cannot be founded in Christ; he can be used only as a channel at the best. No doubt the Quaestiones understood Christ as a real cause, but the doctrine given does not insure this causality of Christ as the one in whom we are predestined. This is made abundantly clear by the answer to the question as to whether predestinations would be frustrated if there were no incarnation; "dico quod non frustrarentur; tamen non esset convenientissimus finis. Quicumque enim esset modus liberationis, ille esset finis; sed non esset ita conveniens". 61 Like the question as to whether there could be another way of liberation, this is right in denying the necessity of predestination if that were suggested, wrong in stating that there could be another way besides Christ. The knowledge and the fact of predestination depend upon the fact that Christ is the Son of God and we are predestined in him. If they do not depend on this fact then Christ is purely coincidental to predestination.

61. Memb. 4, 35, p. 159.
The question "de Libro Vitae" assumes the same position. The Book of Life is "praedestinatio praedestinantis tantum, et non praedestinati". It is the "notitia" of God, and of the Son of God through appropriation. "Cognitio enim est totius Trinitatis, sed sapientia est per appropriationem Filii". Christ according to the Divine nature is the Book of Life in as far as he is the highest wisdom in which those to be saved are written down: according to the human nature "quia ex parte humanae naturae fuit forma vivendi omnibus, perfectis et imperfectis; quia ad formam vitae Christi potuit quilibet suam corrigere, sicut liber ad librum; unde competenter dicitur sic liber". According to both natures he is the Book of Life because in him was the separation of the sheep from the goats. For all descended into the inferno before the advent of Christ; but he was the "principium distinguendi qua fuit ipse Deus et homo, / et qua Deus et homo / voluit pati pro nobis". This is significant in that a necessary connection of the Son of God and the Son of Man is made only in regard to satisfaction. The separation of functions in the first two cases is equally significant in that the former is not made through the latter. The "Son of God" is little more than an attribute of "God". The human nature is nothing more than an example here of perfection, and it could as well have been Moses or another inspired by the wisdom of God. The Quaestiones further states that the Book of Life as "liber" denotes precognition of merit or

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62. 7,p.702. 63. 6,p.701. 64. 9,pp.702-703.
demerit; as "vita" it denotes "notitia beneplaciti" /which is causal/ not of the evil but of the good; as "Liber Vitae" it denotes predestination. 65 This is the same position as the view of the Quaestiones on the cause of predestination. Then, the cause of life can be efficient, final, formal, and "quasi" material. Predestination is the efficient cause, Christ in his human nature is the formal cause "quia Christus in humana natura fuit nobis forma vivendi iuste, forma dico exemplaris", the final cause is "ut 'liber vitae', id est ad vitam". The "quasi" material cause is the fact that the Book "continet in se similitudines viventium secundum merita". 66 This reflects the same thinking as before and now the material cause adds its contribution in that Christ is not the material cause either. It is noted, however, that Christ is the "liber" of himself, in human nature, and of others. He is predestined to glory and others through him, and so he is "liber" first in regard to himself and then in regard to those "qui salvandi sunt per ipsum". 67 This is as far as the Quaestiones will go. It is a pity this last topic was not developed more. On the whole, however, predestination is not "in Christ". In the one section in the Glossa where the Book of Life is referred to its distinctive view is evident. In the Book of Life, unless it is understood "simpliciter" there is precognition of all "communicantium in gratia, sive transeunte sive permanente". 68 Certain are written down through predestination, certain through present justice.

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The evil, as far as their punishment is concerned, also are written down through Divine prescience. 69 The Son of God is the Book also. "Convenit autem ei librum vitae esse, qui est Dei sapientia et per quem facta est redemptio et qui est nobis forma vivendi". 70 Deletions are on the part of those who are written, not on the part of the Book for that is immutable. 71 Whether foreknowledge or determinism is the better is hard to tell; both have the same wrong presupposition. The Quaestiones does, however, make an advance in that, in so far as it has the doctrine of Christ as Head, the connection made between predestinational grace and present grace to work the free will, means that the grace of predestination is channelled through Christ even if on the whole he is only the channel and source of grace to men. There was, moreover, one indication of something better but that was not expanded.

CHAPTER 15.

THE CONCEPT "DOMINUS"

A good example of the difficulty Alexander had in relating time and eternity is found in his discussion of God as "Dominus". The solutions he comes to are of no particular interest for our purpose but the discussion itself is in that it demonstrates Alexander's fear of any suggestion that God could change or be caused. This fear is very strong because he presupposes the basic incompatibility of time and eternity, and because he does not begin from, nor indeed, continue and end with Christ.

God began to be "Dominus" "cum tempore" because he could not be understood as "Dominus" except in relation to that over which he has dominion, namely every creature. A creature necessarily posits change from non-being to being which indicates time and so to be "servus" and time are coeval. Thus with time there is also dominion. ¹ This does not mean that time is a cause of God as "Dominus" for "causalitas non notatur respectu Domini, sed servi; ex tempore enim habet quod sit servus, ad quod consequitur esse Dominum". ² "Dominus" can be understood in two senses: as the power to coerce a subject creature and thus God was "Dominus" before time, or "pro eo qui dominatur" and in this way he was not "Dominus" before time. ³

How much of the scope of the "Dominus" concept is

thought to be of the essence of God must be more exactly determined, and this Alexander attempts to decide in the question "quid praedicetur in hac 'Deus est Dominus'?" The answer is:

"praedicatur essentia divina sub respectu in dictione; non quod respectus sit in ipsa essentia secundum esse, sed in creatura quae dependet ab essentia divina. Quod est videre in ista 'Deus est creator' si resolvatur. Est enim sensus: Deus est essentia a qua est haec creatura vel illa; nec sequitur: si coepit esse Dominus, ergo aliqua forma est in eo quae prius non fuit. Differt enim dicere 'formam' et 'relationem'. Forma enim dicitur absolute; cum autem dicitur relatio, cointelligitur creatura. Propter quod est dicere quod coepit relatio esse et non coepit forma". 4

A little later Alexander states that there are not two predicates in the sentence "Deus est Dominus", namely, divine essence, and a "compraedicatum", the creature. 5 It is a mark of Alexander's lack of Christocentricity, and his rigid adherence to the presupposition of the unchangeability of God, that the next question is aimed at making clear that this "relatio" indicated by the word "Dominus" (which indicates some sort of change) does not indicate a change in God, and yet he does not attempt to show how God could relate. Alexander states that, although relation does indicate createdness, it is not "in rectitudine quoad esse, sed secundum modum dicendi. Et ideo, licet ibi praedicatur relatio in rectitudine, non ideo praedicatur creatura de Deo. Relatio enim quae datur intelligi ex parte rei, ponitur in creatura respectu Dei et non e converso". 6

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"Dominus" does not indicate a new composition in God "non enim compositio est in Deo, sed compositiones accidunt creaturae. Propter ergo respectum creaturae ad ipsum coaccidit respectus quidam ipsius essentiae, non in se, sed essentiae ut comprehenditur a nobis". 7 To conclude this distinction Alexander again emphasises that if "Dominus dicatur ad servum" it does not follow "quod sit rei dependentia, sed modi intelligendi; quae dependentia non in ipso ponitur, sed in nobis". 8

At the beginning of the next distinction Alexander again states that the power of dominion is in God from eternity: "dominium non est creatura, sed ipsa Dei substantia". 9 To be sure, dominion is not eternal "ut creatura est habens respectum ad ipsum, non autem ut Deo attribuitur. Unde ab aeterno Deus esset Dominus, si non esset creaturae defectus, sicut sol semper illuminat, si sit res illuminabilis". 10

Alexander also states that the relation of creature to Creator is not

"aluid secundum essentiam quam ipsa creatura. Ipsa enim se ipsa dependent a Creatore, et non aliqua proprietate accidentalis; nam sic oportert in infinitum abire... Per quod potest esse manifestum, si respectus creaturae ad Creatorem sit substantialis creaturae, multo fortius significatum in hoc nomine 'Dominus', cum dicitur 'Deus est Dominus', est substantia divina, licet non significetur; ut substantia enim absolute dicitur, 'Dominus' autem ad aliquid". 11

The interesting element about this discussion is not so much the fact that Alexander maintains the fact that the sentence "Deus est Dominus" does not indicate a change in God, or a
causality on part of the creature, and that the power of
dominion is always with God, but it is the difficulty he has
in relating God's dominion to the creature. Indeed, there
are indications in distinction XXX that, in some way, the
relation is due to the creature, a position which he sets out
to reject in the next distinction when he states "dominium
accidit homini, non Deo; sed accidit creaturae ut ei
Dominus dominetur, in eo quod accidit eam esse. Non enim
primo est creatura et consequenter ei dominatur, sed simul
sunt tempore et necessario, licet non secundum rationem
intelligendi". 12 This recalls much of Alexander's theology;
God puts something in man so that God can have a relationship
with man. Alexander has the problem of getting from a position
in which God has dominion and man is servant (considered
separately) to a position in which God is Lord of the servant
without positing a change in God (which the relationship
would indicate) and without positing causality in man.

He cannot surely succeed so long as he has the
presupposition that God cannot relate himself to man without
changing, so long as he presupposes God as the "unchangeable
One". Even if, in becoming Lord and in becoming a creature
happens at the same point of time, and at the moment of
creation, it is still the creature, even in "ratio" only, who
has what is called "relationship" to God. It is the creature
who makes the relationship. If it is argued that it is God
who puts this "relationship" in man, that could be said of

12. d.xxxi,d)p.296.
anything in man simply because he is created. Pelagians, for instance, cannot deny that free will, as they see it, if they believe in a Creator God, is ultimately from God, but that is not the point at issue in Pelagianism. The point is whether man, once created, has free will over against God which inclines him towards God, and if he has it, he is considered capable to a considerable extent of saving himself. Similarly, if "relationship" is in man over against God, making for the relation with God, even if it occurs at the same moment as creation, then that relationship is man's and the relation of God and man depends on man. Alexander denies this but this ultimately must be his position if he does not attribute the "becoming related" to God. This goes beyond the power of dominion.

In the Christology proper the idea of God as the "One" and not as the Trinity revealed in Jesus Christ meant that God could not be understood as becoming fully man in Jesus Christ because that would involve him in change. Therefore a soul is posited in man which contains his "godly" part, or in the doctrine of grace, grace becomes created grace with which free will co-operates. Similarly, in the discussion of "Dominus" it is the "servus" who is the created element so that "the relation is placed in the creature in regard to God and not vice versa". Just as God makes grace available which man may use, so, in a similar way, God, who in his dominion is "Dominus", creates the servant in whom relationship is present. The inability of this God to come into a relationship with time in any real
sense, was demonstrated also in the doctrine of predestination. In Alexander God is not really conceived as Lord of time and he cannot be conceived as such for his presupposition at this point is the changeless, timeless God and not God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, revealed in Jesus Christ. It is only in Jesus Christ that God can be seen as Lord of time, and not bound by timelessness, for it is only in Jesus Christ that one can see that it is God who makes the relationship to his creation through the Word. God is not bound by the creation, not even by its concept of timelessness.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been quite simple. It has been to discover the role which Alexander of Hales assigns to Jesus Christ in God's work of salvation. This has in fact meant that the question constantly being asked was "how does Alexander view the humanity of Christ?" It is in this aspect of his Christology that most doubts are raised. If the humanity of Christ is not seen as playing a unique role then the place of the Church - the priesthood and sacraments in particular - is enlarged to take on functions which in the Bible are reserved purely for Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity is considerably weakened; if the humanity of Christ plays no role at all then the doctrine of the Trinity ceases to be of real interest and in effect a Unitarian position must be the end result. Then men apart from Christ are exalted into the position of being their own saviours to accept or not to accept substantial grace and with it to gain one's own sanctification. It has been the contention of this thesis that both in the work and in the person of Christ Alexander has either failed to give a sufficient place to the humanity of Christ or has eliminated it completely or almost completely in some areas.

The one place where Alexander seems to give sufficient place to the humanity of Christ is in his soteriology. In his doctrine of penal satisfaction he follows Anselm insofar as he gives a necessary and unique role to Christ, who is
fully man and fully God. Here Alexander takes up something like a Biblical position when he sees Christ as the sole satisfier for the temporal punishment of original sin. However even here in regard to the eternal punishment of temporal sin Christ as man and God has no role - this factor however is not prominent.

However, very prominent is the fact that Jesus Christ has no role in the forgiveness of sins as far as guilt is concerned. To be sure it is of God to forgive sins but in Alexander this forgiveness is not mediated through Jesus Christ but through the grace which is called "gratia gratum faciens". This grace also brings sanctification to man - in which man plays his part - and again this grace can and does work, according to Alexander, quite apart from the sanctification in Christ. A modification of this position is found in Alexander's doctrine of Christ as Head, but here Jesus Christ is merely seen as the channel of grace and not in any way as unique. Mary and the saints can avail themselves of grace in the same way. Their merits, like Christ's, can be transferred to the members of the Church. Of course, Christ is completely sinless but this does not change the fact that, even if Jesus was the sole source of grace (which he is not according to Alexander), all members of the Church, all the good, can sanctify themselves with the grace "gratia gratum faciens". In other words grace brings God to man, and man plays the role that Biblically is played solely by Christ. In Alexander Christ is the first among many. As far as
sanctification is concerned, then, according to Alexander, Jesus Christ has no essential or unique role to play in his humanity. In the long run the doctrine of the grace of the Head undermines all Christology. It should be noted, however, that in the Glossa, at least, it would appear that the coming of grace depends to some extent on the satisfaction made by Christ, and that when grace comes to man through the sacraments the effect of satisfaction and sanctifying grace seem to be bound together in coming from Christ the Head. However, within this grace it is only the satisfaction made by Christ to which Alexander gives the humanity of Christ any real role.

In regard to this satisfaction one must also have hesitations about how man receives it through the sacrament of Baptism according to Alexander. It seems probable that the subjective acceptance of satisfaction is partly in the Baptismal act whose power derives from the priestly power, and partly in the acceptance by the person receiving Baptism. There is no doubt, however, about the fact that the priesthood has a power which it demonstrates in the sacraments, in particular in the Eucharist in which it has the power of transubstantiation. To be sure, this is a derivative power but it is a power that the priesthood contains in itself. This power sets it on a level with Christ and indeed seems to exclude the Holy Spirit, by and large, from the sacraments so far as the peculiar work of the sacraments is concerned. Thus it would appear that the
priesthood assumes the humanity of Christ and acts on behalf of man to accept his power, and, towards man, acts in the place of the Son of God - a place delegated to them by the Son of God - in bringing his benefits to them. It is man who then is the receiver, who takes the role which Christ alone can have in his Spirit. This fact is demonstrated particularly in the sacraments of the Lord's Supper and Penance where the priest has a distinctive power in regard to the satisfaction for actual sins.

It is in regard to actual sins that Alexander's soteriology is again deficient. Three areas where Christ has no unique role are those of guilt, sanctification, and now actual or personal sins. Here it is man with the aid of "gratia gratum faciens" who has to make satisfaction for his own personal sins. To be sure, the merits of Christ can be an immense help and they are conveyed through grace and the sacraments of the Church. But the merits of the saints and the Church can also help and the most important merits, of course, are found in the person of the contrite penitent. In the doctrine of Penance we have what can and must be described as semi-Pelagianism. Here man with grace must save himself. Christ, man and God, is really not necessary.

With guilt, sanctification, and the satisfaction for actual sins (which is made by sanctified man and therefore can be regarded as part of sanctification) being accomplished apart from the unique Christ, it is evident that the doctrine
of the person of Christ need not be thorough-going in regard to Christ's humanity. However, in the doctrine of the person of Christ in Alexander's theology, other contributory factors to a deficient doctrine become evident. These factors may have contributed to a deficient soteriology or a deficient soteriology may have contributed to the acceptance of these factors in regard to the person of Christ. The truth probably lies in both.

Christ's humanity is established in regard to the satisfaction for the temporal punishment of original sin. Here too Alexander is with Anselm in asserting the absolute necessity of the presence of God, or rather the Son of God. However there are doubts about the person of Christ in another direction, firstly the humanity of Christ in relation to the sin of man, and secondly the humanity in relation to more ontological problems.

Firstly, the humanity of Christ and sin. There are grave doubts whether Alexander can really say that Christ became "sin for us". This is particularly demonstrated in the first chapter on "beginnings" where it is stated that the new Adam took on the flesh of the old Adam in his innocence. One again has doubts about Alexander's thinking here in the doctrine of Christ as the Head - only of the good, or of those descended from Abel. All proneness to sin is eliminated from Christ and one feels that this man can hardly stand in our place. Of course in Alexander's terms he need not except to provide satisfaction for original sin;
he does not sanctify man; grace and man do that and therefore our old Adam does not need to be sanctified in Christ. The sanctification of Mary and the saints amply demonstrates that. Mary is made practically completely sanctified by grace - and this fact further increases the doubt as to Christ's participation in sinful humanity.

However, there is another factor at work here and it is seen in regard to the passions of Christ - or the lack of passion. Passions are regarded as sinful essentially, it would appear, because they indicate change. Fear is included amongst the passions. In Christ passion is by and large removed from the superior part of the soul. Because passions are part of time it is very difficult for Alexander to conceive how Christ the Son of God and Son of Man could participate fully in humanity because by so doing he would necessarily be involved in mutability and passions and then he would be sinful himself. Alexander's presuppositions that finite things like fear and change are sinful and that God is immutable have made it difficult for him to assert a full involvement of Christ in the fears and tensions and temptations of man. Thus for Alexander it is only Christ's body that is involved really and his soul in its superior or spiritual part takes on the aspect of God. This thinking is seen particularly in chapter 4 in which the merits of Christ, his two wills (not of man and God but of lower and superior reason), the passibility of Christ, his humbling and exaltation, and the time "in triduo" are discussed. Here Alexander avoids any suggestion that
Christ might have been involved in sin in the superior part of the soul. This, surely, is basically because he has a less than Biblical view of time coinciding with an unBiblical view of God - not, to be sure, taken to extreme but there all the same - as the "Unmoved Mover".

At this point it is convenient to discuss Alexander's view of Christ's humanity in relation to ontology. In chapter 2 it was seen that in the "uniting" of God and man Alexander had no hesitations about asserting the full deity of Christ but there were doubts about the humanity especially when he discussed the fact that the Son of God is of the essence of deity but the Son of man is not of the essence of man. One can see what Alexander is trying to avoid, namely Adoptionism or Nestorianism, but one cannot be satisfied that he has given sufficient answers to these heresies by failing to state that Jesus Christ was not only a man but belonged to mankind as well. One feels that when talking of the assumption Alexander keeps the Son of God one step removed, as it were, from mankind.

This is seen even more clearly when he discusses the actual union of God and man in Christ. Whereas in discussing the uniting and assumption Christ was kept near to God and away from man, in the discussion of the hypostatic union the Person of God is distinguished from the Godhead to a greater extent so that God would not be involved in that "created" thing which is the hypostatic union. Here Alexander arrives at a rather extraordinary solution. He does not base the union in a Trinitarian doctrine, that is,
that the possibility for union existed in the Son of God and that the man Jesus Christ is enhypostasised in the person of the Son of God. If he had done this then Alexander would have asserted completely the involvement of God in the person of the Son (the nature of God would be involved) in the union of the natures. Instead, Alexander seems to establish the possibility of union in a created hypostasis which is the subsistence of the person of God and the person of man and this is not meant to be Nestorian. Further, the way he describes the manhood of Christ does not sufficiently answer Nestorian charges of Monophysitism for it would appear that the attributes of the Son are also the attributes of the man and one wonders whether Alexander has sufficiently established the man in the union as full man as one wonders whether in the union the Trinitarian God is involved in his nature through the Son.

The mention of the attributes of the manhood of Christ leads onto an extraordinarily difficult subject in the history of Christology, the knowledge of Christ. Just as the kenotic theory errs in taking too much away from the Son of God, so it would seem Alexander errs, with much of Christian history, in the opposite direction. Admitting the great difficulty of the subject one cannot help thinking that Alexander has practically eliminated man here (chapter 4). It would seem that he does not begin at the place where a solution if any will be found - at the incarnation itself.

What are the factors present in Alexander's deficient
view of Christ's person and work? One can list five. The first is his view of God as the "One" and the "Unmoved mover". This of course is not his only presupposition but it is there and prevents him from assuming Biblical positions. Closely allied to this is the second factor, a suspicion that Alexander regards time and finitude as such as sinful, or at least, prone to sin. A third factor is Alexander's view of man as a person with a divinely inclined soul and therefore with a capacity for God. A fourth factor is his doctrine of grace in which grace is seen as a substance (like "medicine") which apart from Christ can be absorbed by man so that it becomes "created" grace and therefore to all intents and purposes man. A corollary of this is his view of man with a capacity for God. A fifth and vitally important factor is his view of the priesthood and the sacraments and in particular the doctrine of Penance. This last factor had already had a long history in the Church.

The relationships of these factors and how they arose is outside the scope of this thesis. One thing, however, can be said. Such presuppositions creep in because of a failure to centre on the revelation of God in Christ, to begin one's theology from that, to continue on that, and to end on that, and that alone. Perhaps this failure is best demonstrated in Alexander's doctrine of predestination which, at least in the Glossa, can be described as totally non-Christological and which also demonstrates his inability to view time and eternity together in such a way that time and
creation remain time and creation. This trouble is seen also when he discussed God as "Dominus". No where better can be seen the necessity to return to the incarnation.

Alexander, by and large, lacks a full doctrine of the humanity of Christ and in many instances it is not unfair to state that he holds an Apollinarian view of Christ. In the doctrine of Christ as the Head, especially where the grace of the Head and the grace of union were equated in the Quaestiones, the humanity, one suspects, is not essentially different from the humanity of other men in so far as all men would have the same relationship to God as the man Christ. This factor would indicate that Alexander has not sufficiently established the doctrine of the incarnation in a Trinitarian view of God by which alone one can assert the full participation of God through the Son of God in humanity, and therefore also assert the full humanity of Christ as both a man and a man among men in all respects like man except without sin. And this Trinitarian view of God, in turn, is established only by the fact of the incarnation, where it is seen, in fact, that God did become man, and that that man Jesus Christ, being Son of God and Son of Man, was and is the justification and sanctification of man. Here, it can be seen that the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the incarnation walk hand in hand. One begins with the incarnation and in Christ one sees the Trinitarian God at work uniting himself uniquely to man who is established as man in the Person of the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity. Because this man is enhypostasised in the Son
of God he is also unique and therefore our justification and sanctification.

Alexander fails consistently to begin at the incarnation and consequently created grace, the priesthood and the sacraments, and man himself, provide the humanity which can only be provided by Christ. Whether he did this because he inherited a poor Christology or because other factors made for a poor Christology is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. What can be said is that only a Christology which was centred on the incarnation could rescue him, or anyone, from the directions which were being taken.
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