SOME NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF THE SELF

by

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PART I

CHAPTER I

For nearly all people the most important, interesting, and consequential beings in the universe are people. But for philosophers other realms of Being often take precedence, at least in what they write. Regrettably, it seems to me, since whatever is claimed to be the ultimate ontological entity or epistemological principle, there must be room for people, for what is qualitatively and quantitatively predicable of persons.

Part I of this thesis is concerned with arguing for the necessity of some conditions of the self. Part II presents certain philosophers' theories of the self and appraises them in terms of the conditions claimed to be necessary in Part I.

This thesis is not directed to solipsists. It will not try to show that there is more than one person, oneself, in the world. Rather it takes as fact—more certain than which there is not—the "going concern" of persons. What it attempts to do is rationalize (in the sense of making consistent the concepts used) what we believe to be true of persons or selves. (I shall use "self" and "person" interchangeably, and "selves", "persons", and "people" interchangeably. Neither "person" nor "self" is to be taken as equivalent to "soul".)

I take then as given certain facts about persons and try
to see what are some of the necessary conditions of being a person. To help in the analysis of what persons must minimally be I shall sometimes refer to laws or legal writings. I shall also make use of a few works of fiction. These works may be either folk stories or works composed by a well-known author. The fact that I will be citing in these cases is that such-and-such a story is widely understood, and therefore though what is presented to us in the story is not fact, still it must be consistent with and perhaps reveal what is believed to be necessary to persons because it is widely understood.

Before turning to the analysis I should like to do some groundwork, making clear my position regarding certain points where fundamental objections might be brought.

First. It would be well to make it clear that what is asserted as necessary to persons in this thesis is based on people as we now have them. There is in this context no point to the question: are persons as we know them really persons? Persons as we know them are paradigms of persons although there may very well be a point in asking whether a particular individual is a person. To ask whether persons as we know them are really persons implies that we might have a definition or criterion of personness from some other source besides our actual experience of persons. Persons different in certain respects from the people we know are conceivable,
and considering such possibilities may illuminate what we think being a person involves but imagined persons will not be more real or more authentic than ones we know, and our knowledge of what is involved in being a person will be understood to be based on our common experiences of persons. So if the facts about persons were to change in some radical way, then the characteristics of persons I shall assert to be necessary now might not then be necessary. New facts could require other conditions for selfhood. But so long as the facts cited are the facts, the conditions of the self which I shall present are, I assert, necessary.

Second. Perhaps it might be argued that facts concerning people have been different in former times so that theories of the self written to make those facts intelligible cannot fairly be expected to likewise satisfactorily rationalize present-day facts. I would reply: if the facts were different, then either the differences can be specified or they cannot. I am not aware of any reports which describe how in significant ways persons were different then from now, or there from here. But if such specified differences were presented, we could always adjust the analysis and the criticism of the philosophical theories to accommodate the now-known-to-be-different facts. If on the other hand, the ways in which persons were different were not specified because supposedly the differences could not be exactly known, then whatever those people left us must be unintelligible to us, because anything could have some other
meaning from what it has for us. Concerning persons in the past then, we may say either that they were enough like us (admittedly different in ways negligible for our purposes) that philosophical theories of the self would apply to them as to us, or that the differences between them and us can be specified in which case the analysis designed to cover those facts can be adjusted, or that there are fundamental but un-specifiable differences so that nothing valid can be said about them as people. The first alternative is the one under which I shall proceed (leaving open the possibility of the second) so that the statement of my position on this point is: so long as that facts cited are the facts, and are believed to have been the facts, the conditions to be given for being a person are necessary. In other words, the conditions hold wherever and whenever the facts are as cited.

A further objection may be brought. A critic could say: theories of the self are a new vogue in philosophy so you have no right to criticize older philosophies for not doing what they were never intended to do. My reply would take the following form. It was always a person among persons writing philosophy and therefore there were the facts about persons to be made intelligible. So even if a philosophical theory was not called a theory of the self, it was doing the same job, i.e., rationalizing the phenomena of selves (perhaps among other phenomena), and could have been called a theory of the self.
Now to proceed to the analysis.

Perhaps it will be thought that there is a carelessness or philosophical naiveté in my writing of characteristics as necessary to persons instead of saying that so long as the facts are what they are, we must think about persons as having these characteristics. The distinction being drawn is between what we think a thing is and what that thing is in itself, briefly, between phenomenalism and epistemological realism. In the case of persons there is no difference between what is known or knowable and what really is, or more cautiously, the argument for there being a difference between what an object is and what we know about it does not apply in the case of persons. As I understand the phenomenalist position it is based on two premisses pertinent to the matter at hand: 1) that the objects we know have or may have existed before being known by people, i.e., that we have not created the objects, and 2) that what we know about these objects is limited by our faculties. If the objects have existed before being known, then they have had characteristics before we have known any of these characteristics. This would apply also to articles manufactured by and for us, for even though these objects have not had such a sophisticated form in their natural state, still they have had some form, and even the manufactured items depend upon their material. The object in its natural state is an object with some characteristics. A manufactured object
with different characteristics does not become more than an object. And, going to the second point, how this object is known depends on our faculties for sensing it, which faculties may or may not - we cannot know - be suited to sensing what is most characteristic in the object. Our knowledge of these objects and therefore what these objects are for us would be different if we had e.g. no vision or x-ray vision. The purpose of my outlining the phenomenalist's position is not to make us doubt whether what we know about an object is contributed by us, but rather to emphasize that it is conceivable and intelligible to us that objects in themselves are really something more and/or different from what we know about them.

The case is otherwise with persons. For the two above-stated points which give us some reason to believe that objects may be different from what we know about them do not apply to persons. First, persons do not exist prior to being known by persons. Certain animals, members of the species Homo sapiens, (as it happens) become persons only in relation to persons. Without socialization infants would not become persons. This is an assertion of what might be called necessary fact, not an assertion of logical necessity, though it is problematical whether we can understand the statement that a person could occur spontaneously, like Athena full-blown from the head of Zeus (which becomes unintelligible when we try to understand how she could understand other per-
sons), or through some means other than development by another person or persons. My evidence for this factual but not merely contingent statement is of two kinds: the ordinary experience of people who have never (I warrant) known or even met a person who has not been reared and associated with persons, and the statements of social scientists who inquire more systematically into social phenomena.

... it has become increasingly clear that social interaction is absolutely essential to the development of personality. We are not at the outset isolated individuals with drives, habits, attitudes, and ideas, who are later socialized. Rather, from birth on, the individual operates within a social matrix. (Kimball Young. Handbook of Social Psychology. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1946.)

The ... thesis is that apart from his group a man is a mere potentiality. He is developed in a milieu that fosters, modifies his capacities. (A. Myerson. Social Psychology, 1934.)

The body is not a self, as such; it becomes a self only when it has developed a mind within the context of social experience. (George H. Mead. Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago, Ill. The University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 50.)

The social scientists hold as incontrovertible the proposition that animals (of the appropriate species) become persons only in relation to persons. This point is of such central and radical importance that I hope that I may be excused for insisting perhaps beyond necessity concerning what is self-evident or at least unarguable for some.

Statements like those of the social scientists' above could be multiplied; the increase in the number of such con-
sidered opinions of competent people might still not persuade some. To him who believes that a person is not actualized only in relation to other persons the following challenge is directed: if you doubt that infants become persons only in relation to other persons, let your child be raised in isolation, without contact with people, cared for by mechanical means.

It takes little imagination to picture what the response would be.

If animals of the appropriate species become persons only in relation to persons, then what they become is adapted to the persons for whom they become persons. One obvious example: children come to speak the language of those around them. So that, and this is the second way in which persons differ from objects which may be something more or different from what our faculties can sense, selfhood is acquired in relation to other selves and what is learned is suited to the faculties of persons so there is not the lag between the being and the knownness of a person as there can be in the case of an object.

The first very general assertion concerning persons then which I wish to make relates to their ontogeny: they come to be in relation to and for other persons, so whatever they are, they are products of persons and knowable - in their real nature - by people. People are made, not born.

The suppressed major premiss of this argument: that
whatever is made by us can be understood in its essential nature by us, might be questioned. Counter instances might be brought forth: man has made the atomic bomb, but he doesn't understand it. Now I believe that this proposition is slightly but significantly incorrect. Man has made the atomic bomb, but he doesn't understand (fully) the nature of the atom. Granted that he doesn't understand the atom, but clearly this is no counter instance to the above principle because he has not made the atom. We understand the bomb in a way better than we understand its constituent atoms. To whatever extent we do not understand the raw materials, objects, from which manufactured objects are made, to this same extent we shall not understand the finished object. (What we add, we understand.) For it is still an object. We have not changed its fundamental category.

An examination of differences ordinarily believed to hold between the widest classes of things may clarify what has just been written and may advance the matter at hand.

In our normal practice we distinguish between four classes of particulars: 1) objects, 2) plants, 3) animals, and 4) persons. One question this thesis may be understood as trying to answer is how we distinguish between persons and other kinds of particulars, i.e., if anything is to be labelled or treated as a person, what must it minimally be?

Objects are those things which are locatable in space,
extended, perceptible. Plants are locatable in space, extended, perceptible, and alive. Zoologists distinguish live from non-live things by the characteristics of irritability (responsiveness to environment) and growth by metabolic change. (This kind of growth is distinguished from growth by accretion, the way in which e.g. crystals grow.) On the level of one-celled organisms it is a less than obvious matter distinguishing between plants and animals. But most of us deal with organisms rather larger than unicellular organisms and have no difficulty separating the plants from the animals. For in addition to being locatable in space, extended, perceptible, alive, animals are (mostly) animated, that is, able to move themselves in space.

These three classes are comparatively easy to demarcate and recognize. There is between the classes an observable difference, between objects and plants - liveness - evidenced by irritability and growth by metabolic change, between plants and animals - self-locomotion. With each step up in the hierarchy there is something added: a plant is an object plus life; an animal is a plant plus self-movement.

The plus which is thought to be added to animal to give person is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a necessary condition of being a person, and the necessity here is logical necessity. What "self-consciousness" means, and which facts require our attributing it only to persons will
be treated below.

There have been many philosophers who claimed that man is only spirit, non-body, that he would be his real, essential self even if he were disembodied. I can conceive more easily of a person's being disembodied than his being a person without benefit of association with others. Why a person cannot be bodiless will be considered in order to pay due heed to those who have claimed that a person can be bodiless. Here as elsewhere my method of displaying the unacceptability of a position will be to show what actual facts the position being considered, in this case the inessentialness of animal body to a person, would make impossible.

Actually there are two different, interesting claims that could be made: 1) that persons need not be animals, members of the species Homo sapiens, 2) that persons need not be extended in space, including being sensuously perceptible. (That which is perceptible is either extended in space or dependent on what is extended in space. Visual and tactile objects are clearly extended. What is tasted must have volume. Smells and sounds are both, we believe, necessarily connected with, because produced by, an extended object.)

The first assertion is true, I think; the second, false, or so indeterminable as to be vacuous.

Showing why membership in the species Homo sapiens is not a necessary characteristic will give me an opportunity to distinguish between a characteristic always obtaining in fact and
a necessary characteristic. It might have been thought that a characteristic present in all the persons that we have any actual dealings with as persons is a universal characteristic in fact, and therefore just what I intended by 'necessary characteristic'. But it is something different from 'actually always obtaining' which I mean by 'necessary' condition. What I want to emphasize in this necessity is the requirement of intelligibility. To say that a characteristic is a necessary condition of the self is to say that we cannot think of a person doing what persons do without his having this characteristic, that it makes no sense to talk of a certain thing as a person unless it has this characteristic, that we cannot think of treating an x without this characteristic as a person.

A little reflection on the problem will reveal that membership in the species Homo sapiens is patently not such a necessary condition of the self because we can understand talk about things - in all significant respects treated as persons - that are not members of this species. Fairy tales abound in which there are individuals who carry on as persons though they are not members of the species Homo sapiens. Examples are: "Little Red Riding Hood", "The Three Little Pigs", "Puss in Boots", "The Three Bears", "The Little Gingerbread Boy". These are fairy tales in which non-homonoid animals and even objects act like persons, though so far as we are given information in the stories, the animals of these stories never had human bodies. There are also fairy tales and myths in which persons are turned into animals, flowers, stars, trees.
We have no trouble understanding stories in which things which we should not in real life treat as persons play the roles of persons. That we can understand these admittedly fanciful stories in which non-homonoid things are treated as persons indicates that the content of our concept 'person' does not require that a person be a member of the species *Homo sapiens*. Even children understand these stories of non-homonoid things which behave like persons. It may be easier for a child to understand that things (objects, plants, animals) are persons than that some things are not persons. Animism may be a more "natural" attitude than objectivism (if one may use that word to mean non-animism). If certain facts are true about the child to himself, why shouldn't he think that these facts are true of what he sees around him? If he feels stubborn and unco-operative when his mother wants him to wash his hands, why shouldn't he think that his shoes feel stubborn and unco-operative when he wants to take them off? Perhaps the child is aware that he can and does make an object of himself — his mother is always reminding him to be careful, to pay attention to what he is doing — that it would not be strange to him as a child if an object could likewise "see" what it is doing and mean to do what it does.

Stories of persons in non-human forms are not limited to fairy tales and myths which may be thought to be unsophisticated literary forms. A story intended for adults, I feel sure, of a person no longer in human form which is interesting
for our purposes if it is agreed that fiction can give us insight into our concepts is Franz Kafka's "Metamorphosis". The story begins:

As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect. He was lying on his hard, as it were armour-plated, back and when he lifted his head a little he could see his dome-like brown belly divided into stiff arched segments on top of which the bed-quilt could hardly keep in position and was about to slide off completely. His numerous legs, which were pitifully thin compared to the rest of his bulk, waved helplessly before his eyes.

What has happened to me? he thought. It was no dream. (Franz Kafka. Metamorphosis and other stories. Translated by Willa and Edwin Muir. Penguin Books. P. 9.)

It may be just the matter-of-factness of the style which allows us to go along with the story. It is an unusual happening, to say the least, but the reader does not balk at what Kafka tells about Gregor.

His family and immediate superior at work (who has come to find out why Gregor is late to work) are wanting an explanation of why he is not out of his room. He speaks.

Gregor has a shock as he heard his own voice answering hers, unmistakably his own voice, it was true, but with a persistent horrible twittering squeak behind it like an undertone, that left the words in their clear shape only for the first moment and then rose up reverberating round them to destroy their sense, so that one could not be sure one had heard them rightly. (Ibid. P. 11.)

They cannot understand what he says, and the chief clerk observes, "That was no human voice". When Gregor appears, they are all horrified. The clerk backs away "as if driven by some invisible steady pressure", and will not wait to hear Gregor's
explanations. Nor does anyone understand Gregor's good intentions; his father only tries to drive Gregor into his room instead of helping to mollify the chief clerk.

No entreaty of Gregor's availed, indeed no entreaty was even understood, however humbly he bent his head his father only stamped on the floor the more loudly. (Ibid. P. 21.)

His parents and sister cannot understand his speech or his gestures. They know about him only what one can know about an animal, e.g., what food it prefers by observing what it eats and what it leaves. Such knowledge depends upon behavior only and not upon the use of intentional symbols - gestures, either vocal or non-vocal. In the case of Gregor there is no expressing his thought because they cannot understand his speech or bodily gestures. They see him as being only the present animal there before them, as being only in the present, not as remembering his past nor as having attitudes toward the future. They cannot know that he remembers his former condition, feels "great pride in the fact that he had been able to provide such a life for his parents and sister in such a fine flat," and goes on to think, "But what if all the quiet, the comfort, the contentment were to end in horror?" This thought is not to be endured. "To keep himself from being lost in such thoughts Gregor took refuge in movement and crawled up and down the room." (Ibid. P. 27.)

After a time he is no longer a member of the family but "a creature". The family consults concerning what is to be
done.

'If he could understand us,' said the father, half questioningly; Grete, still sobbing, vehemently waved a hand to show how unthinkable that was.

'If he could understand us,' repeated the old man, shutting his eyes to consider his daughter's conviction that understanding was impossible, 'then perhaps we might come to some agreement with him. But as it is -'

'He must go,' cried Gregor's sister, 'that's the only solution, Father. You must just try to get rid of the idea that this is Gregor. The fact that we've believed it for so long is the root of all our trouble. But how can it be Gregor? If this were Gregor, he would have realized long ago that human beings can't live with such a creature, and he'd have gone away of his own accord. Then we wouldn't have any brother, but we'd be able to go on living and keep his memory in honour. As it is, this creature persecutes us, drives away our lodgers, obviously wants the whole apartment to himself, and would have us all sleep in the gutter.'  

(Ibid. P. 56-7.)

This is far from Gregor's intention but what can he do?

Shortly the problem is resolved. Gregor, who has been much weakened by an inability to eat,

thought of his family with tenderness and love. The decision that he must disappear was one that he held to even more strongly that his sister - if that were possible. In this state of vacant and peaceful meditation he remained until the tower clock struck three in the morning. The first broadening of light in the world outside the window entered his consciousness once more. Then his head sank to the floor of its own accord and from his nostrils came the last faint flicker of breath.  

(Ibid. P. 58.)

To himself Gregor remained a person who remembered his former experiences and compared them to his present state. But for his family he lost personality, not because he has been transformed into an insect since for the reader too his physical form is that of an insect but still a person because we know what he is thinking. If for the reader he were not a
person, there would be no pathos; who finds a mere insect pathetic? Gregor lost personality for his family because communication stopped. They did not know that he thought, felt, remembered his past and realized what the present situation meant to them. They did not try to communicate with him believing that he could no longer understand them. The reader knows Gregor's states of consciousness because we have access to them through the omniscient author. Having lost the ability to communicate he is for them only a creature, but for himself as for us he is still a person because his past and present experience belong to the same subject who is self-conscious. Gregor's having self-consciousness and therefore being a person to himself and being unable to communicate and therefore lacking personality for those around him point up relationships between self-consciousness, communication, and selfhood. To be a person (for oneself) one must be self-conscious; to be a person for others one must communicate. Our understanding Gregor's being a person for himself and our viewing him as a person though he is no longer a member of the species Homo sapiens makes it quite clear that membership in the species Homo sapiens is not a necessary condition of the self in the sense given above. (P. 16)

The first of the two possible claims given above (p. 15) has been settled, it seems to me. The "Metamorphosis" shows that a person need not be a member of the species Homo sapiens
because we find intelligible a story in which a person is not homonoid.

Next we shall consider the second possibility: whether a person must have a body of some sort or other.

Suppose we imagine a bodiless, unextended person, i.e., an intangible, invisible, inaudible self-consciousness. Two problems occur to me. First, how did this person become a person? The people we know were born, in extended form, and through these extended forms their consciousnesses were 'gotten at', and developed until the person was self-conscious. But how is the unextended person to be 'gotten at' or 'gotten to'? How does one get across to a disembodied person? It is logically possible that a spirit would come into being and from the time of its incursion into spirit society would develop, including self-consciousness. The newly-arrived spirit might have only a flow of experience without being able to categorize or reflect upon that experience, which abilities are learned. But what this uncategorized experience would consist of I cannot even conjecture; the possibilities which have occurred to me, e.g., sensory experience or pure formulas such as '2 + 2 = 4', seem unlikely upon reflection. Sensory experience hardly seems possible if one has no senses, and a bodiless spirit would certainly have no sense organs as we know them. Formulas are hardly possible without categories, and cannot be mere unknowing recitation, of the sort which is not uncommon to children who repeat television advertisements, say, like par-
rots without knowing what they are saying. Parrots and children can hear. How is a spirit to hear? That which seems logically possible at first glance: that a pure spirit could arrive on the scene and develop into a self-conscious spirit does not with thought turn out to be logically impossible. There is rather simply a blank when one tries to conceive of the details. What could we imagine the content of this young consciousness to be? And how is one to communicate to a pure spirit?

The second question immediately suggests itself: how does one get any communications from a pure spirit? Let us allow that somehow a spirit might have experiences and ideas. The question then is: how do we learn what these experiences and ideas are? If we cannot learn about them, then they are for us as good as non-existent.

There is one means of bilateral communication possible to spirits, that is, telepathy. Telepathy is communication between one mind and another mind otherwise than through the known channels of the senses. There are problems with telepathy as a kind of communication, not the least of which is how one knows from whom the communication comes. Suppose one spirit, Angelica, gets an idea (in her mind). How is she (does gender apply to spirits?) to know that this idea is from another spirit, Damon. She experiences it. Is her experience of it different from her experiences of her own ideas? Does it come to her with "Damon's" stamped on it? Would all
ideas for spirits be monogrammed? With ordinary embodied people when telepathy is claimed to have taken place, one can check by asking aloud (or writing): "I thought you were thinking such and such. Were you really?" And confirmation or disconfirmation is directly available. But what can a pure spirit do? There is no further distinct way of corroborating the impression that the idea is another spirit's, such as, asking aloud. There are only more of one's own impressions.

This may be why people do not rely on telepathy: because in itself it isn't self-guaranteeing. Were telepathy, guaranteed or even testable, really possible, bodiless persons might be possible. But I find the actual possibility remote.

I conclude regarding the two questions relating to animal species and extendedness that a person need not be a member of the species Homo sapiens (which will allow us to greet Martians civilly) but that persons must be extended and sensuously perceptible if we are to communicate with them until such time as some other means of communication is actually possible, e.g., telepathy.

Now what is meant by self-consciousness will be made more explicit.

'Self-consciousness' in the philosophical sense differs from 'self-consciousness' in the ordinary sense. When people ordinarily speak of self-consciousness, they are thinking of an embarrassed awareness of oneself. A self-conscious person - in this ordinary sense - is someone painfully aware of what
(s)he is doing, saying, and/or how (s)he looks. The philosophical meaning of self-consciousness includes the awareness of oneself, but not, necessarily, the embarrassment.

One difference then is the subtraction of embarrassment from ordinary self-consciousness to leave philosophical self-consciousness. One kind of object is however to be explicitly included in philosophical self-consciousness; this object is one's own thoughts (in the broad, Cartesian sense of 'experiences'). Although one would or could be attentive to more than just private experiences when self-conscious in the philosophical sense (which is henceforth the sense I shall intend by "self-conscious" unless otherwise noted), the addition of private experiences as object is philosophically crucial.

By self-consciousness in a philosophical sense I mean then one's looking at that of oneself which others look at and one's looking at that of oneself which others do not and - we mostly believe - cannot look at. In other words, self-consciousness takes as object behavioral, extended aspects and private, experiential aspects of the self. To say that what is experienced is private in its occurrence is not to say that what is privately experienced cannot be shared. Whether an experience can be lived through without being made an object of consciousness, and whether an experience can be made an object of consciousness without being put into public terms are two further questions which would have to be examined before the question: to what extent is the private, experiential aspect of the self
shareable could be answered. Why what is privately experienced can be shared at all is intelligible in terms of how an individual becomes a person: if the categories by means of which self-consciousness comes to be and the means of expressing the content of self-consciousness are gotten from the communication with persons, that these expressions of self-consciousness are understood by others is not surprising since these categories and expressions are from the very beginning interpersonal and not unique to individuals though the consciousness is experienced privately. If one denies that persons are actualized by persons, the fact that a person could communicate private experiences to others who would be able to understand becomes a mystery.

What evidence can be offered for the assertion that self-consciousness is necessary to differentiate persons from other particulars? What phenomena can be understood better on the presupposition that persons have this characteristic of self-consciousness which no other objects have?

1. Though it is true that animals other than people learn to do things, it is also true that animals other than man cannot correct themselves but must wait upon correction from the environment. Sheep dogs learn to herd sheep by running with an already-trained dog. Cats - big and domestic - can be taught to do tricks. But when an animal makes a mistake, punishment must be forthcoming from the environment to make him cognizant of the error; the animal does not spontaneously, of himself, "back up", and do it over in order to do it right.
The child likely has to be taught to play the piano. For quite some time he must be told that he has made a mistake. But the day comes when he hears his own mistakes, and corrects them, repeating the phrase to set it right. This shows that persons are not only corrigeable, as are other animals, but they are able to correct themselves. This is explicable only if one assumes that they are able to listen to themselves, to hear what they have produced in comparison with what it should sound like, i.e., to take themselves as objects.

2. The trained dog and cat make mistakes. If they are regularly punished for making mistakes, they may show fear when they are made aware of having made a mistake. A child is likely not punished corporally when he plays the wrong note, though he may be reprimanded. Later when he hears himself make a mistake, he does not cower, but evidences embarrassment. Embarrassment is the sign of one's being aware that in some way one's performance falls short of what it should be. Only people are embarrassed because only people can be aware of their own inadequacies and be ashamed of them.

3. A dog being trained to herd sheep may learn to herd, but he cannot improve his performance by practicing on his own. The actual situation must present itself for a dog to perform. A pianist who wants to give a performance does not wait for the actual audience to begin playing; the pianist rehearses in advance, listening to himself as if he were the audience. Only persons can practice doing a task in advance of its actually being needed by circumstances, providing himself as object and
critic. (One related fact is that for animals there is no future. The means of acquiring awareness of a future is simultaneously the means of being self-conscious.)

4. People learn from each other to an extent beyond which any other animals learn from one another. (Songbirds may learn songs and cats in psychologists’ traps may learn how to release the exit spring from one another but this is insignificant compared with the quantity of skills and abilities which persons learn from one another.) Young children not yet self-conscious imitate like songbirds do and this is the means by which they learn their first words and gestures through which they develop self-consciousness. Once self-consciousness is actualized the learning methods are proliferated: one learns how to do something not only by copying a procedure but also from a verbal description of that act. This is possible because the teacher can watch himself perform, and tell another what is done. The learner understands the description to mean the aspects of the act, and on the basis of the description knows what to do. Both what the teacher does and what the learner does require self-consciousness.

5. Wittgenstein asks in the Philosophical Investigations why dogs don’t lie. The answer is that they do not mean anything by their movements; there is no intention, no intended message. To lie one must be self-conscious; one must know what one’s gestures mean to the one with whom one is communicating. This is possible because one 'looks at' one’s expressions, has a more or less correct idea of what these expressions mean to
the other. The lie consists in one's intending the other to learn from one's expressions what one does not believe to be the case. (One may unintentionally mislead another if the received meaning is not equivalent to the intended meaning, though the intended meaning is believed by the intender to be true.) Lies are common enough; one cannot deny their actuality. They are possible because persons are self-conscious and can intend to deceive their interlocutors.

These five phenomena peculiar to persons: self-correction, embarrassment, practicing, learning from one another, and lying, are all evidence that persons are self-conscious, since only on the assumption that persons are self-conscious are these phenomena intelligible.

There are some concluding remarks I must make before summarizing.

Being a person for oneself is not the same as being a person for others. Once the person has acquired through interaction with other persons an actualized self-consciousness, he is no longer dependent on them in the same way. By himself he may carry on quite well, acting, correcting himself, practicing, describing his behavior for his own benefit, thinking on what he is doing and experiencing. He might be a kind of Robinson Crusoe. (We shall not consider the empirical question whether a person isolated in this way for so long a period as twenty years would go mad.) The self-consciousness is a logically necessary condition for being a person. But if a person is to be a person for others, he must, as argued above, communicate
the fact that he is a self-conscious person to others. That is, communicating is a logically necessary condition of being a person for others. And in order to communicate with others he must have some controllable form which occupies space. Some kind of controllable, space-occupying form is necessary because telepathy, though conceivable in the sense of not being self-contradictory, is not actual and not even imaginable in detail, it being impossible to conceive of criteria of accuracy. This kind of necessity, really depending on what we can conceive, we could call conceptual necessity.

Because of our situation — sine telepathy cum bodies — we reflect our decision concerning whether \( x \) is a person not merely by the label we attach but also by the treatment we accord \( x \). One may call a child or a lunatic or an idiot or a prisoner a person, but the treatment of a child (or lunatic or idiot or prisoner) is markedly different from treatment of an adult person who is considered a full-fledged person.

There seem to be degrees of being a person. Nice distinctions are made, less in the explicit labels assigned them than in the treatment accorded them. Most disputants are quick to resent the labelling of a child as a 'non-person', but they do not hesitate to tell the child what to eat, when to go to bed, whether he may speak in adult company or not, with whom he may associate, etc. none of which they would dream of telling an adult person. Probably there are more shades and subtleties of behavior recognizing or denying degrees of selfhood than there are labels.
If someone wants to apply the label 'person' to all members of the species Homo sapiens, I shall not quibble. I only insist that he observe that there are differences in the way we treat different component classes of this species, allowing that in practice (if not in name) there are degrees of selfhood and that if non-homonoid things could behave like persons in all essential ways, we would treat them as persons.

Summary of Chapter 1.

1. Persons are real, no less real than anything else.

2. On the basis of our universal practice of socializing children and the social psychologists' claim that socialization is necessary, I have asserted that infants become persons only in relation to other persons, so that it is necessarily true that all persons developed what it takes to be persons in relation to and because of other persons.

3. The claims I make concerning what is necessary in persons are based primarily on the actual ordinary practice of persons.

4. Persons must be self-conscious. This is a logically necessary condition.

5. If a self-conscious person is to be a person for other people, he must communicate his self-consciousness. That is, communicating is a logically necessary condition of being a person for others.

6. A controllable body extended in space is a conceptually necessary condition of communicating as things stand now.
CHAPTER 2

Thus far we have dealt with three necessary conditions of the self; they are: self-consciousness, some kind of body, and the becoming of persons in relation to other persons. As may be seen, no one condition nor combination of given conditions is claimed to be sufficient.

This chapter will have five sections. There will be one section primarily but not exclusively devoted to each of the following logically necessary conditions: identity, change, self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and responsibility. Another logically necessary condition, content, will be discussed in several of these sections.

Identity, change, self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and responsibility have more logical affinity with each other than they — disjunctively or conjunctively — have to consciousness, content, and body. These latter three have more affinity with each other.
A. Identity

The first of these conditions which will be considered is identity.

There is an ambiguity in 'identity' as applied to persons. It is commonly used in a non-philosophical way to mean "who one is", e.g., in mystery story cases of 'mistaken identity'. Here part of the meaning is reflected in the cognate "identifiability". 'Identity' as used about persons includes the distinctive nature of each person which allows him to be distinguished from all other persons. "Individuality" expresses the same notion.

The more common philosophical problem discussed under the heading of 'personal identity' is the problem of personal enduringness. The cognate of "identity" expressing this notion is "identicalness". Philosophers from Plato on have concerned themselves with the question: how is the endurance through time of a person to be explained?

Why both of these notions of identifiability and identicalness are included in the concept of identity is easily seen is one considers the philosophical requirements of identifying. A thing must be what it is and not another thing for a duration in order to be known as the thing. To have an identity a person must endure for some time. And on the other hand, in order for a person to be the same person for some time, he must have a certain identifiable character.

A note as to my usage. 'Identity' will include both 'enduringness' and 'individuality' or 'unique character'. To draw attention to one aspect over the other, I shall say that
a self-identical person endures, or that a person has a unique identity. The meaning will, I think, be clear in the context.

Certain facts of ordinary life which I propose to use as raw material for analysis and as evidence for assertions will be presented first.

1. A person can remember (some of) his own (long or not-so-long) past experiences but not another person's experiences unless he has been told about them.

2. A person is thought to be the same person from birth to death, though not the same (without alteration) since his mannerisms, attitudes, tastes, interests, beliefs, etc. may change and the stored experiences will change. His physical appearance will almost certainly change.

3. A person is recognized after a short lapse of time.

4. A person is recognized after a lapse of years.

We may begin our analysis of identity with the uncontroversial observation that in non-problematical instances we rely on a person's body to identify him. The people that we see every day or frequently have each a certain 'look' which we can recognize though we could not necessarily describe it. We know what their physical features are (though we cannot describe) and can identify them even in death. But we do not consider corpses persons.

I mention that we can recognize people even in death because then some of the personal traits that we clearly use to
identify people no longer obtain, e.g., the ways of moving and speaking. We can recognize a person by his walk at a distance too great to make out his features. We recognize someone's voice over the telephone. We mistake one person for another in only a tiny percentage of the cases of identification and these mistakes are usually quickly corrected.

These non-problematical cases of identification are likely in the majority. But there are other kinds of identification in ordinary life not far-fetched which bring out additional factors contained in our concept of personal identity.

A friend whom we have not seen for years telephones to invite us to dinner. We do not immediately recognize the voice but when the voice identifies itself, we say, "Oh, yes." At the appointed time the friend appears, older, fatter, balding, dressed as he never would have formerly, so that except for the expectation that he will appear then, we would not at first glance know him. His gestures are slowed. The face is so different. But then gradually the vestiges of the old friend emerge, the habit of chewing his lower lip, the rhythm and inflection of his speech, the angle at which he holds his head while he reflects. As the conversation progresses, even more of the old friend reappears: the attitudes, interests, beliefs, preferences, tastes, etc. are there, in short, what — close to ordinary usage — I shall call the personality.

If there were any lingering doubts about whether this is our old friend, they would be entirely laid to rest when the reminiscing begins. The recalling of shared experiences, some
of which only he besides oneself knows about, is sufficient to convince us that this person is the one we knew long ago.

The long-unseen friend is identified (though his body has changed markedly) by means of patterns of moving and speaking, personality traits, and the (recalled) past experiences; I shall lump these three together under the single term "content".

Though the case for my general assertions will be more firmly and perspicuously established with the presentation of less common phenomena, I think that already I may reasonably make several claims subject to elaboration and refinement.

1. A person has an identity - a peculiar and recognizable nature - which allows him to be distinguished from all other persons.

2. This identity endures not merely from one day to the next but for a period of years.

3. That which is most obviously and probably most commonly used to identify a person is his body.

4. The disposition of a person's body is idiosyncratic in some respects. These mannerisms are also used to identify a person.

5. The habitual interests, attitudes, beliefs, preferences, tastes, etc. expressed in what a person says and does constitute a person's personality, thought to be peculiar to him.

6. Stored experiences which a person recalls serve to
establish the rememberer as identical with the experiencer, that is, he who remembers is identical with him who had the experience.

Now to go on to a less common phenomenon but one yet found in ordinary life - identical twins.

Identical twins are so startling because they look alike. The biological account of their alikeness is that they were at first one - a single fertilized ovum - which in the early stages of cell division divided completely and became two complete organisms having the same gene pattern. It is then no wonder that these two look like repeats of one form, one individual seen twice. They are said to be mirror images of one another, in that what (e.g., a mole) occurs on the left-hand side of one would occur on the right-hand side of the other. And indeed each twin looks like a reflection of the other.

At first glance such twins cannot be told apart; one knows there are two but there are no differences to be seen. One feels uneasy and immediately sets about looking for differences, and finds them. The twins who had - at first stare - appeared to be replicas of one another come to look different from one another; one twin has curlier hair or a thinner face than the other. But we find fewer and less obvious differences between identical twins than between two stages of one individual's appearance.

There are between these two twins few differences we should remark were they dead. Motionless and mute they would
be nearly indistinguishable. But animated, they are distinguishable, for the ways of speaking (including voice quality), smiling, gesturing, sitting, moving, etc. are different and it is mostly these mannerisms of body action that we employ to identify them. And these mannerisms indicate and constitute personality differences, differences in attitudes, interests, beliefs, preferences, tastes, etc. Presented with two bodies and two personalities, we do not doubt that there are two persons.

Suppose now that there were two identical twins. Finding two bodies we expected differences, however slight, of body but found none, no physical trait in one not matched perfectly in the other. And even more, no difference in habitual disposition of these bodies. Whether talking, smiling, frowning, inquiring, laughing, each comported himself exactly like the other. Further, the personalities (attitudes, interests, preferences, beliefs) and memories of each (as determined by what they said and did) were in every case indistinguishable from the other's. Would we allow that the personalities were the same? I think that we would.

For most of us the idea that two people might have the same interests, attitudes, habits, beliefs, and memories does not seem impossible, unlikely perhaps, but not impossible.

We can suppose that these two imaginary twins are indistinguishable in body, personality, and memories. Could we then go on to suppose that the two are one person?

It is certainly true that we expect each personality to be unique, that is, to have an unduplicated collection of beliefs,
habits, interests, preferences, and almost as certainly true that we have never in real life found any two (or more) people who were indistinguishable. In *Brave New World* Aldous Huxley gives us a fictional picture of "Bokanovsky twins" - as many as 96 - produced from a single fertilized ovum and identically conditioned to result in uniform individuals; these Bokanovsky twins are so revolting to the outsider, Mr. Savage, because they seem to have no unique personalities. We can probably go along with Huxley's device which is like our imaginary indiscernibles above. To give up the expectation that two distinct bodies present distinct personalities would cost us less of a wrench than to give up the belief that two distinct bodies will result in two separate persons.

What is it that requires the two bodies: two persons principle?

Consider again the indiscernibles. So long as we were questioning even separately our indiscernibles about something which both of them had witnessed or talked about, they could conceivably (within our ordinary way of thinking about people) give the same answers, even if they were questioned apart. But now suppose that we tell only one twin something, the other will not know it, until he also is told. This fact we explain by saying that they do not have a single shared faculty of experiencing between them; there are two consciousnesses so it is always possible, not merely logically but in actuality also, for one to have an experience that the other does not have.

The reason why we would not allow that there might be two
or more bodies constituting a person is that we believe that each body has its own consciousness (whether the belief is sophisticated enough to associate consciousness with a nervous system or not does not matter) so that (and as evidence for which) the experienced content can always be made dissimilar by presenting the two bodies-cum-consciousnesses with dissimilar events.

However some groups give an impression of such unity and togetherness-feeling, the question may well arise whether a group like this could not be viewed as one person. One might take as examples Plato's guardians, a monastic order, a team, or a choir, i.e., some group made up of individuals who have no private interests and no individuality apart from the group while they are members of the group. But even if such a group could give for shorter or longer periods of time the appearance of co-operative effort, we would not want to stress this unified action to the extent of making this a sufficient condition for being a (single) person, or we might have to call a motor with well-regulated parts or a hive of bees a person. The separate experiencing of each member is necessary to our concept of person. And this separateness is part of our understanding of 'consciousness'. (Cf. discussion of Descartes' cogito, Chapter 5.)

I know of no actual cases where a single consciousness was shared by two or more bodies, so in this sense the members of even a tightly organized, cohesive group are always separable, like our indiscernibles. By presenting one with an event
which will make his series of experiences different from the series of any other member of the group shows that each member does have a separate consciousness. In some circumstances this fact might be thought unimportant; the importance would attach to actions and responses, all of which would be on the part of the group and directed toward the group, not by or toward members of the group. One member might be considered no more separate not acting separately than one now considers his left hand separate because it cannot act separately. All the same, it would remain true that each member could be separate (so long as a single consciousness is not shared by two or more bodies) in a way one's hand could not be separate.

An experience, we believe, is universally and necessarily limited to one experiencer, so that two persons cannot have exactly the same experience. Even if we were to expose both of the indiscernibles to the same events, we would not and could not believe that their experience was the same one. Experience is necessarily private, for although the objects of experience can be public, the consciousness which has and connects experiences is necessarily private.

Consciousness is a sine qua non of experience, that in virtue of which an event becomes an experience. Experiences had by a consciousness are recallable by that same consciousness as memories; an experience is immediately accessible as experience only to the same consciousness, though we can of course be told about the present and past experiences of another. A memory or experience recalled is recognized by the
consciousness; that is, the recalling consciousness knows it has lived through the recalled experience (at least) once before, that the way in which it (the consciousness) is now aware of the memory (of the past experience) is the same way in which it was originally aware of the experience. A recalled experience feels "warm", as William James describes it.

Without such a consciousness of its own, we would not say that an extended body (of appropriate sort) was a person. If we encounter a body of appropriate form, in order for us to consider it a person, it must have at least one consciousness. I say "at least one" because there seems to be evidence for multiple consciousnesses in one body; cf. Morton Prince's **The Dissociation of a Personality** and Thigpen and Cleckley's **The Three Faces of Eve**. The same kind of evidence which would convince us that there were two consciousnesses in the case of our indiscernibles would require us to conclude that there were two or more consciousnesses in the case of Miss Beauchamp and two consciousnesses in the case of Eve, the kind of evidence's being that what is experienced by one consciousness may not be accessible to nor reportable by another consciousness (in the same body in the case of what is called "multiple personalities").

If it is consciousness which separates and makes distinct persons including those who might in other ways be indistinguishable, is it then consciousness which we identify?

Consciousness is characterized, as asserted above, by being the necessarily private aspect of experience. What is necessarily private cannot be known by another, so consciousness, being in
no way publicizable, is useless for identifying others since we have no access to their consciousnesses. What we identify is the body, personality, and recalled experiences of a person. These experiences must be connected; the connecting and recalling are done by consciousness. We have to learn by means of a person's body what the connected experiences are and that they are recalled, but it is not a body itself which connects a series of experiences since two such series have occurred within a single body, and the body may change, even radically as in the case of Gregor, while the series of experiences remains intact.

The next question I should like to consider is: is it consciousness which makes a person the same person from birth to death?

Regarding consciousness it has already been said that it is consciousness which connects the experiences of one person and necessarily separates him from others persons so that the experiences of one person who has lived fifty years do not get connected to the series of experiences belonging to a person who has lived twenty years.

This consciousness is numerically identical from the birth to the death of a person, connecting all experiences so that earlier experiences recur as memories. But for the experiences to be connected is not enough. They must be known to be connected by him whose experiences they are before the consciousness and the experiences connected by it and the communicating body are thought to be a person. More succinctly, it is self-consciousness which makes a person the same person from birth
to death. What is meant in this context by "self-consciousness" can perhaps be made clearer with an example. Suppose a human body which is familiar to us comes and begins to relate experiences which we know to be its own without indicating that it knows them to be its own. The consciousness is connecting the experiences; the experiences are communicated. But we would not look on this as a person; it would be something else, a zombie or "parrot". If one knew of the experiences which were one's own without knowing that they were one's own, an essential requirement for being a person would be lacking. If this were a human body, we would probably view it as a possible person (e.g., a child), or a deprived person (e.g., a congenital idiot), or a damaged person (e.g., a person who was complete but is now injured in a drastic way). That is, we would not treat a non-self-conscious being as responsible (the relation between self-consciousness and responsibility will be discussed below) and therefore not as a full-fledged person. Consciousness suffices to make its possessor an animal; self-consciousness is required to make its possessor a person.

Summary of identity

1. A self-identical person endures.

2. That which is numerically identical and endures from birth to death in a person is his consciousness; it separates each person's experiences from every other's, being necessarily private.

3. The consciousness connects the experiences of one person,
and defines thereby what counts as one person, so that a group of individuals having separate consciousnesses cannot count as one person.

4. One person's consciousness is not in itself identifiable by others.

5. That experiences are connected by a single consciousness is shown by earlier experiences being accessible as memories later. The rememberer must know that he was the original experiencer; this is part of what is meant by saying that a person must be self-conscious.

6. A person has an identity which allows him to be distinguished from all other persons. Each person is unique.

7. The content of a person (mannerisms, beliefs, interests, attitudes, preferences, tastes, etc. making up the personality, and the stored experiences) is another logically necessary condition of the self. The content of a person is expressed in and through a body.

8. That which we identify is the body itself and the content of the person expressed in and through the body. A person must have such content and a body in and through which to communicate it in order to be identifiable.
B. Change

By 'change' I mean 'alteration within a person either by replacement, addition, or subtraction'. Clearly not included in change is one person's becoming a numerically different person. Logically change goes hand in hand with identity; unless something self-identical endures, one cannot say it has changed. It is therefore in relation to the condition of identity that we discuss the condition of change.

The facts of ordinary life given as material for analysis and evidence for assertions are:

1. People come to exhibit abilities, skills, and knowledge of facts and theories they earlier did not have.

2. Because of various sanctions people desist from morally disapproved of actions which they formerly were guilty of.

3. People communicate with one another, making appropriate responses, giving and receiving information, and affecting one another's actions.

4. People at least while awake are always experiencing, that is, there is always something in awareness, and the material of awareness is steadily changing.

5. Some people's personalities change markedly through time.

These facts and others which could be added show that in ordinary life people are taken to change.

It has been asserted above that persons are composed of
consciousness, body, and content. Which of these cannot change? Which do change? Which must change?

To answer the first question: the consciousness cannot change but must remain numerically identical, or the person cannot be the same person. If the person is not the same person, it cannot be he who changes. It is surely true in ordinary life that a given, self-identical person changes.

In reply to the second question we may answer quickly that the body and content of a person change. People get older, fatter, thinner, balder, stiffer, etc. Their attitudes, skills, tastes, preferences, stored experiences, behavior, etc. which we have labeled 'content' change.

Having denied that the consciousness may change and having asserted that the body and content do change, we may discuss the third question. The body and content of a person do change, but must they change? That is, is change a necessary condition of being a person?

To clarify the question of body change, we may distinguish three kinds: 1) change in appearance, 2) metabolic changes within the organism, and 3) changes of the body as expressive vehicle of attitudes, habits, tastes, knowledge, etc. It is not possible to consider this last kind of body change separate from content change. Because it has already been said that content is expressed in and through a body, the changes of body which are constitutive of and expressive of content will be subsumed under content changes and dealt with below.

The incidental changes of appearance - slimming, tanning,
etc. - do not seem to be necessary. People might never gain or lose weight and yet be full-fledged persons. Such changes seem to be brought about, sometimes at least, by choice, and there is no serious penalty if one does not choose to make such changes in one's appearance.

But the changes in one's appearance which are due to aging are not similarly amenable to one's desires. People get more wrinkled and stiffer, more bald if their genes are so inclined, willy-nilly. Are these changes in appearance due to aging necessary then, if everyone who lives long enough undergoes such changes. I think not, for untold quantities of money and effort are spent by people to retain their youthfulness, and rewards rather than penalties are their lot if they succeed in minimizing if not altogether arresting the changes (more commonly called the ravages) due to growing old.

Statistics showing how much money is spent on cosmetics and keeping one's figure would however be less interesting and less convincing than citing the central theme of Oscar Wilde's "The Picture of Dorian Gray". As a young man Dorian Gray has his portrait painted and he wishes that the portrait might age instead of him. And indeed this is what happens. The figure in the painting shows the effects of age and immorality while Dorian Gray himself is unaltered in appearance. Far from this changelessness being a handicap it is a positive advantage. So it would likely be for us if we could somehow arrest the changes in the appearances of our bodies.

One may conclude from this evidence that although the ap-
pearances of bodies do change, an individual might very well continue to be treated as a person even if his physical appearance did not change.

Concerning the second kind of body change: the metabolic changes within the organism. If a person must have a body which is animate (or at least movable), and if to be animate an organism must have metabolic processes going on, then there must be metabolic processes going on in the person. Metabolic processes entail changes. So persons, if they are to be animate organisms, must have changes going on within them.

We may now move on to consider whether change of content is necessary. Included under change of content are the changes of body constitutive of and expressive of change of content.

There are four phenomena which entail change of content. To deny that change of content is possible (or, as it would more likely be done, to deny that change in a person is possible) is to make impossible at least these four phenomena: 1) learning, 2) moral improvement, 3) communication, and 4) the continuous flux of experience.

Each one of these means that there is some change in the content of the person involved. If these four phenomena are necessarily parts of the going concern of persons, then change of content is necessary to persons.

First, we shall consider learning. People come to know what they did not know previously. This knowledge may be knowledge of facts, theories, skills, or abilities (such as the ability to 'manage' a touchy friend). That one learns new things
seems to me entirely uncontroversial; that learning entails adding (one kind of change) to the content of a person seems likewise uncontroversial.

Not so uncontroversial however is a species of learning I should like to discuss here, namely, arriving at new solutions to intellectual, practical, and artistic problems. This learning of new solutions is being contrasted with the learning which consists in acquiring knowledge which others have had and taught to one, so that one's own getting of the knowledge cannot be thought to be a mark of originality or inventiveness.

The position as I am asserting it is likely to be offensive even to those who grant that there is originality exhibited by some few great minds because I mean to say that there is some originality displayed by every person, granted that in some cases it may be markedly less than in others.

But none of us has everything in life taught to him. The housewife combines foods which she has never been told to combine. The traveler learns tricks to get along in a strange language and land. The pipe-smoking man devises a way to mend his favorite pipe which has been broken. The woman wears color and clothes ensembles which she has never seen before, not even in magazines. The farmer works out a machine made of scrap parts to mow a field.

I do not insist on a high degree of creativity in everyone, but some degree in all people, as well as an extraordinary amount in some people. At the very least, we all use sentences which we have never heard before. Even the making of a simple,
before-unheard sentence requires some degree of originality.

One who denies novelty altogether or that these low degrees of novelty are novelty may say that the elements have already been known, only the re-arrangement or whole has not existed before. Even this degree of novelty is sufficient for my purpose. All that I need and wish to say is that not all that an individual produces or does has been taught to this individual at some previous time.

What difference does such originality make in our discussion of persons? It makes this difference. If changes of this sort are necessary to persons, then whatever is to be a person must evidence the ability not only to learn what others present to it, but also to arrive at what another has not taught it. This requirement is pertinent when one is trying to decide whether a machine could be a person. If it is granted that such originality is a necessary condition of being a person, then a machine could be a person only if it could show such originality. Whether a machine presently can or ever will be able to is a question for the machine experts — and time — to answer.

The second phenomenon requiring change of content is moral change. Within a social system some acts are thought better than others; the better acts are encouraged, the worse one is discouraged. It is generally supposed that any normal person who has been guilty of a disapproved of action may refrain from such actions, because some persons do refrain. There are many methods used to influence the wrongdoer, e.g., scolding, ridicule, teasing, shaming, ostracism, corporal punishment, incarceration. It
need not be maintained that the only purpose of these sanctions is correction (retribution, deterrence, protection of society may also figure in) but it is clearly part of the intent in some cases. Such sanctions presuppose that the person against whom they are directed is able to change. Why would we scold or exhort if such efforts to alter the behavior of a person were foredoomed to failure by his unchangeability?

The evidence that I shall offer to show that punishment is intended to produce change (among other things) is the law.

In various states of the United States there are laws similar to the Indiana law which states:

Every person who, after having been twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution for felony, whether committed heretofore or hereafter, and whether committed in this state or elsewhere within the limits of the United States of America, shall be convicted in any circuit or criminal court in this state for a felony hereafter committed, shall be deemed and taken to be an habitual criminal, and he or she shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for and during his or her life.

To authorize a sentence of imprisonment for life under this act, the indictment or affidavit shall allege that the defendant has been previously twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution, for felonies, describing each separately. If the trial jury, in their verdict, find these facts to be true, and convict such defendant of the third felony, the trial court, after passing sentence of imprisonment for a specific term, as prescribed by the statute, shall proceed to sentence the defendant to imprisonment for his or her life. (Burns Indiana Statutes, 1956 Repl., paragraphs 9-2207 and 9-2208 quoted in Criminal Law by Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein, and Richard D. Schwartz, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., p. 483.)

What are we to understand the significance of this law as being? It seems that the rationale of this law is that when a person has been twice previously convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, upon the third conviction he may be deemed to be an
habitual criminal because he has shown no improvement as a result of earlier sanctions which should have produced a change. The first two imprisonments were supposed to change the person; if he has not changed, the belief is that he will not change. And if he will not, then he is punished for being incorrigibly (i.e., unchangeably) bad. The penalty is for his unchangingness. There is no more expectation of changing him so he is given no further chances. Protection of society becomes the primary concern; he is removed from their midst.

If one is sufficiently bad (i.e., bad enough to run afoul of the law), he is required by law to improve, to change his evil ways. And many do. But not only criminals are less than perfect. Everyone is liable to occasional correction, by spouse, by friends, by offspring, by teachers, by superiors, by oneself. No one is so good that there are never any sanctions — however mild — imposed, at least not anyone involved, in the thick of things.

If sanctions are employed only on the presupposition that people can change their behavior, and if people actually do change their behavior, then to deny that persons can change is to run counter to the actual practices we have. Behavior is, as said above, included under content, so that it is change of content which is necessary.

The third kind of activity entailing change of content is communication. When two or more people communicate, what one person says is intended to affect the other, however trite or simple the communication is. One intends when talking to another
person to make a difference in that person even if what one says is ceremonial, conventionally fixed. Acquaintances who have seen each other for years may still greet each other with "Good morning" intending to show the other his good humor, good breeding, or conformity to custom.

In dialogues which are more than ceremonies, the intent to alter the other is even clearer. One gives another a piece of information, to add to that person's store of knowledge. Or one gives a command and thereby intends to alter the actions of another person or persons. One argues and means for the listener to come to the same conclusion.

Would communication be possible if change in persons were impossible? No. Communication would be ruled out. There could be nothing like the message, nor anything like the response. There would be no saying or writing (only two of the possible kinds of communication) because these entail change. There would be no learning what another says for learning, adding to one's store of knowledge, is obviously change. There would be no replying, nor compliance to a command, if the obedience required that one do other than what one was doing.

It seems indubitable to me that communication would be entirely impossible, were change impossible.

Fourth and last, it appears that what we know as experiencing would itself be impossible if change were impossible. The material of one's experience is steadily changing. ("Content" would probably be the more natural word to use here instead of "material" but I hoped to avoid ambiguity by not using
"content" here in the sense of 'what the experience is about' as well as in the broader sense which "content" already has.) If the material were static, there might be some object of awareness, but experience as we know it, essentially changing, with contrasts, variety, would be impossible. And the material of one's experience would have to be static if it were denied that people change.

Now that the questions of what does and must change have been discussed, one might want to ask whether a person in isolation (an adult hermit) must change even if he has no contact whatsoever with people. It seems to me that he must, since his body must be undergoing metabolic changes; he must arrive at solutions to changing problems presented him by his ever-changing environment; he may require moral improvement of himself; and the material of his awareness must be changing. Learning from others, the use of sanctions by others, and communication (with others) are activities involving a community of persons which require change.

So whether a person is alone or with others, he must change. That a person must change is not likely to be denied (except by some philosophers - see Chapter 3 on Plato). Rather the difficulty might arise on the other side. The question might be, not, can an individual not change and still be a person? but rather, how much can an individual change and still be a person? Or in other words, are there any limits to the extent which a person may change?
Imagine an individual who is unquestionably the same person for the period of time under consideration. We know that he is the same person because he looks the same and relates as his own, upon demand and voluntarily, experiences which we know to have been his which no one else could know about. But throughout the period of time under consideration the personality of the person changes continuously. Yesterday he drank coffee; today he will not drink it. Last week he was social; this week he is a recluse. What irritated him previously leaves him presently unruffled. Different and even contradictory predicates correctly describe his behavior within a short period of time, say, a week.

The question might very well arise: what about such a case?

Before I discuss the question, I would like to point out again that my assertions about these concepts are principally the bringing to light what I believe to be contained in ordinary practice.

In the case given above, I think that we would hold that the individual is the same person, since he fulfills our stringent requirement of being a self-identical person, namely, that he can relate earlier experiences of his which could only have happened to that consciousness. But our responses to a person are not only to his consciousness but also to his content, including his modes of behavior, so that if his modes of behavior are different, we treat him differently even though we believe the consciousness to be the same.

Just the distinction between consciousness which remains
self-identical but inaccessible and personality which is accessible to others but varying seems to fit what takes place in ordinary life when we believe a person to be the same person but believe him to be markedly different in personality, i.e., to be a different kind of person.

That we view persons as constituted of both consciousness and content which allows a person to be self-identical while changing radically in personality is evident in our attitudes and treatment of non-hypothetical old people who are greatly though perhaps not suddenly altered by time. There are many old people who become infirm though they were previously active and lively, who are foolish and senile though they were acute and of sound judgment before, who were even-tempered and cheerful and are now irascible and complaining. Did these present, unprecedented characteristics not belong to the same person who was formerly so different, there would be no pathos in the phenomena of aging. The old altered person is thought to be numerically the same; his consciousness connects the series of experiences and predicates belonging to him, but he is qualitatively much different from what he was. The same may be said about individuals who become insane. Though they are what they were, they no longer are what they were; their content is too much changed.

What we do about the self-identical person who is now a different kind of person depends upon the degree and significance of his change. There are some areas in which persons change to which we attach little weight, e.g., which foods one
prefers; a person may eat chocolate ice cream today, strawberry tomorrow, tutti-frutti the day after; it does not matter. The realms in which one must be consistent (or have a reason for inconsistency) are those to which we attach importance, usually moral. Clearly, if one has committed oneself to some mode of behavior by a promise or contract, one cannot simply change one's mind with impunity. Not all of the kinds of behavior or personality traits which are thought important can be designated here because groups differ in their assigning import. Here one may say briefly that a person may change to any extent provided that these changes do not result in his being labeled insane or incorrigibly immoral or irresponsible. If he comes to be thought of as immoral (and unalterably so), insane, or irresponsible, our treatment of and attitudes toward him will be based on and express our thinking that although he is the same person (in having the same consciousness which connects all his experiences), his content including his modes of behavior are so much changed that we treat him differently, i.e., as a different kind of person. We will not because we cannot treat insane persons as if they were not insane, irresponsible individuals as if they were responsible, incorrigibly immoral individuals as if they were moral. But our feelings are different toward these different groups though they all fail to be normal persons. If the now irresponsible person is aged and senile, our feelings are those of sadness and compassion; toward the incorrigibly immoral person we are likely to feel indignant.

Summary of change

1. Change cannot occur except in relation to what is un-
changing or self-identical. It is self-consciousness which provides self-identity for persons, therefore if change occurs with a person, self-consciousness must endure. If self-consciousness becomes numerically different, then we have a different person and the problem is changed.

2. The appearance of a person's body need not change.

3. If a person is alive, his body must be undergoing metabolic changes.

4. Growth, moral improvement, communication, and experiencing different things are the ordinary life phenomena requiring that persons change. What must change if these phenomena are to be possible is the content of a person.

5. No limits are put on the extent to which an individual's personality or modes of behavior may change unless because of such changes an individual must be viewed as insane, immoral, or irresponsible.
C. Self-knowledge

It is clearly the case that the ordinary belief is that we have knowledge of persons, and what is more, that knowledge of persons is necessary to what we know as persons. It would be far less troublesome if I could say that all of our knowledge of persons is gotten in the same way, that the knowledge we have of ourselves is gotten in exactly the same way as knowledge of other persons is gotten. But - the worse for ease of analysis - I do not think that this singleness of method really obtains.

Rather than a single way of getting knowledge of persons, there are three methods: experiencing, (which obtains only in one's own case), symbolic expression, and behavior. The extent that each means of knowledge contributes to a kind of knowledge determines where on a private-public scale the kind of knowledge under discussion should go.

At the private end of the scale is the kind of knowledge each person can have only in his own case which depends wholly upon his experience. This knowledge cannot be exhaustively communicated in a way which will distinguish it. Because this kind of knowledge must be limited to each person's having it only of himself, I call it logically private.

At the other extreme - the public end - we have knowledge depending upon behavior. With these kinds of knowledge what is experienced by the person to whom the knowledge pertains is beside the point. This kind of knowledge can be had only if others besides the person to whom it pertains have it (too). I call
In between these two limits there are kinds of knowledge which have some experiential part and are communicable but differ in the extent to which behavioral enactment is possible or necessary. The less behavioral enactment necessary: the more private the knowledge, so that toward the private end we have kinds of knowledge which have no behavioral component and toward the public end kinds of knowledge which almost must and usually do have behavioral components. I call these intermediate kinds of knowledge contingently public kinds of knowledge.

In this section we shall discuss the logically private kind of knowledge and the contingently public kinds of knowledge as well as the reasons for asserting that some knowledge of persons does not have to be public.

These facts constitute the material for analysis and the evidence for assertions.

1. One knows some things about persons as well as anything at all which is known.

2. One recognizes oneself without having to look at oneself or observe one's behavior or remember any specific facts or events.

3. Some things that one knows one may or may not tell other persons; that is, not all that one knows (about oneself) is known by another to be known (by oneself), but another could be told and then he would know too.

4. In reporting or expressing in behavior what one knows,
one may lie and be believed.

5. Some people sometimes dream, know that they dreamed and what they dreamed, before they tell others and even if they do not tell others.

6. People remember past experiences; many of these memories are not reported to others at the time that they are remembered.

7. A person knows when he has a pain, or an itch, or a tickle. Another person besides the person having the pain (itch, tickle) may not know. Malingering is a not-uncommon occurrence.

8. Some emotions are feelings of the person concerning which he is the final authority.

9. One knows one's own sensations of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, though one may label them mistakenly.

10. One knows at least sometimes what one means by one's words and also what one intends to do. What one means or intends can be misunderstood by another person. Such misunderstandings are not rare.

11. People's choices indicate what gives them pleasure. The consistent or habitual choices we call tastes or preferences. People may also report their preferences to us.

What counts as knowledge will not be discussed here. It is assumed that persons have knowledge. Granted even this much, one may go on to make the Cartesian point that the knowing of anything whatsoever gives the knower knowledge about at least
one person, himself. This knowledge would consist in knowing that one is the kind of thing that can have that kind of information and that one does in fact have it.

Secondly, everyone has the conceptual knowledge that each person is separate from all other persons. According to our present ways of thinking if two things had shared experiences, they could not count as two separate full-fledged persons.

At once an objection may be made to saying that everyone knows that each person is separate from all other persons. A critic may say that by far the majority of persons do not think about the concept 'person' and therefore they do not know that 'person' entails 'the separateness of each series of experiences'. Indeed, I would allow that most people do not know this entailment explicitly. But this connection underlies what they say and do regarding persons. Some of our knowledge is implicit, "goes without saying". It is one task of philosophy to say explicitly what for most people goes without saying.

There is one kind of knowledge which all people have, but which I should think very few people consider explicitly, that is the knowledge of who they are. In the section on identity we said that in order to identify others, we make use of their physical characteristics, mannerisms, personality, recalled experiences. These are used in the case of others but none of these are necessary for identifying ourselves. And as regards each person for himself, probably even the word "identify" is inappropriate, for there is not period of doubt before knowing who the person (in this case oneself) is as seems to be implied
in the word "identify". In one's own case one simply knows who one is. If one were to say, "I identified myself," he would probably be understood to mean that he identified himself to some other person by giving his name, occupation, place and date of birth, education, associations, or perhaps some anecdotal material about his past. But none of this is needed for oneself.

When I wake up in the morning, I 'come to myself', for I suppose that it is more or less accurate to say that while one is asleep, he is 'away from himself', so that if there were going to be any time at which I should not know who I am, it ought to be upon awakening. But when I awaken, I do not need to look at myself, or remember my name, or recall particular events or facts which pertain to me; I just carry on as myself without doubt that I am myself.

And if there were any doubt or hesitation, I cannot see that looking at myself, or remembering my name, or recalling any specific events in my life would make or even help me recognize myself. When people have lost their minds and do not know who they are, letting them see themselves, telling them their names or giving them facts about themselves does nothing to improve their condition.

In what does this knowing oneself consist?

It consists in part of knowing that one is unique, a logical particular, separate from every other thing and just oneself. This knowing that one is unique makes intelligible one's not needing to look at one's body, or observe one's behavior, or
remember any personal facts, experiences or traits belonging to oneself. For it could not be one's body which is logically unique; another person's body might be a perfect duplicate of it. Nor could it be any fact, experience or trait that was unique because any fact could logically be true of another person, and any experience or trait could logically also be had by another person. Nor could it be the series of experiences or set of traits as a whole which was unique, because it is logically possible that a set descriptively identical could belong to another person.

Only that which experiences in the person, that is, the consciousness, could be that person's alone, and nobody else's. From the uniqueness of consciousness follows the fact that it cannot be described. For descriptions are necessarily in terms of universals which apply actually or possibly to more than one thing. A universal stands for a quality or class of objects. Each particular to which the universal applies exhibits the quality, or the qualities defining the class. Each instance of the quality is identical or similar to every other instance of the quality and could be (logically though perhaps not actually) substituted for any other instance. Demonstratives can refer uniquely but all of the demonstratives are based on "I", and this is just what needs to be given meaning. Now what each person knows is that he - his consciousness - could not even logically be substituted for any other instance of consciousness (though he believes that there are other consciousnesses) and be the same, that is, his. This is what I mean by saying that
each consciousness is a logical particular. "I" refers to my consciousness, a logical particular.

It might be well to forestall a likely criticism at this point. "I" has more meaning than the bare consciousness. It would be absurd to say "My consciousness went to the party". But it would be sensible, meaningful, and for some of us sometimes true to say, "I went because they asked me, but I wasn't really there." A philosopher who says "I" cannot refer to consciousness because "I" sometimes does not refer to only consciousness dogmatizes in the face of contrary facts.

"I" cannot be only a linguistic device nor can "I" refer to a merely logical device or intentional entity. For if there were not some real thing to which the "I" of "I think" refers, the "I think" when used by anyone would hover, possibly attaching to any one of the billions of persons who can say or think it. I am certain that the "I" when I use "I think" does not so hover, because I know that it refers to something both real and unique: my consciousness. One either allows consciousness as the ground for uniqueness or denies that a person is unique since there is no other candidate for grounding uniqueness.

Because each person's consciousness is unique and therefore indescribable, it is incommunicable (in this sense). There is no telling another person what this experience of one's own consciousness is like; it must be like nothing else. We have no possibility at all of making it public because 1) there is no describing it, 2) there is no behavioral way of expressing the quality of consciousness, 3) there is no public means of
producing the experience as in the case of pain to be discussed below, and 4) there is no public object of the experience as in the case of sense experience (also to be discussed below). The experience of one's own consciousness is logically private. (See Chapter 5, the discussion of the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian 'I think'.)

Moving now to contingently public knowledge.

Asserting that all experiences occur privately but that almost all are communicable, that is that there is knowledge we have of persons (other than ourselves) which is contingently public, leaves me open to attack from two sides. There are those who want to say that there is no private arena of the self which only the person himself has access to. And on the other hand, there are those who say that each self is entirely restricted to his own sphere without even being able to send a surreptitious signal through an open window to another self because there are no windows.

The contention that some of what people know about people (themselves in this case) is private knowledge (which can but does not have to be shared) will be supported by two facts of everyday life: 1) that other people do not always know what one knows for oneself (in Chapter 1 this point was made using Kafka's Metamorphosis), and 2) that one may lie, that is, purposely pass off for true what one does not himself believe to be true, and be believed. If persons had complete knowledge of one another, every attempt to lie would be abortive. Successful lying depends on ignorance on the part of the deceived. (how it is
possible that what occurs privately can be made public will be discussed in the section on knowledge of others, following this section.)

The reason why others can sometimes be ignorant of what one has knowledge of, namely, one's own experiences, is that some experiences have no behavioral equivalents, no necessary behavioral expressions, nor any related behavior sometimes, besides intentional gestures (symbols). As behavioral expression becomes possible, and even obligatory, we are less dependent on intentional gestures for knowledge of another, and consequently less subject to being deceived by him. If one were to deny as the extreme behaviorists do that there are these three sources of knowledge about persons (experience - in one's own case, reporting, and behavior), he will have to either deny such ignorance and the lying that depends on it or give some other account of it. In this section one of the primary aims is to argue for and draw attention to kinds of private experience.

Some uses of intentional gestures (for short we may say talking and writing though there are more kinds) are plainly to be included in behavior so that not all kinds of talking and writing count as reporting of private experience. When the use of intentional symbols constitutes part or all of what is attributed to the person (on the basis of what is said or written), I shall call this use verbal behavior. E.g., when a child recites the alphabet correctly (consistently), nothing further is needed for us to say that he knows the alphabet
since part of what we mean by saying that someone knows the alphabet is that he can recite it. When a person gives fine lectures, nothing more is wanted for us to say that he is a fine lecturer, by which we mean that he gives fine lectures. These uses of intentional gestures count as behavior or verbal acts. Contrasted with verbal acts or behavior is reporting as when a man reports that he has a slight head-ache, which we may believe but may doubt, since the reporting is not the same nor even a part of what is attributed on the basis of the report, viz., having a head-ache.

One example of experiences lacking a behavioral equivalent is dreams which constitute the first kind of contingently public knowledge to be considered. Concerning the discussion which follows: I do not claim that the list of kinds of knowledge ranging from the more private to the more public is complete, nor that the discussion of each kind mentioned is exhaustive. I only intend to point out some salient characteristics of the kinds of experiences I do mention, relating ignorance, lying, behavioral expression, and privateness or publicness of object or content.

Dreams are peculiar experiences. They duplicate experiences of real things, most often producing complete conviction in the dreamer. Young children have to learn that dream objects are not real, that no one else could have seen the bear that the child has dreamed of. A child of my acquaintance began discussing with her father her dreamed wolf, assuming that he knew about it too. But after a few more months, when she was three
years old, she realized that dreams occurred privately, and that the content was private, so that if she wanted her father to know about her dreams, she had to tell him what she had dreamed.

Dreams are peculiar in a number of ways. One of these peculiarities is that dreams (excluding daydreams) occur while we are sleeping unlike our other experiences which occur while we are awake. Our being asleep may account for dreams' being so disorganized, inconsecutive, shifting, fuzzy; perhaps this is the way the sleeping mind works. But at any rate when we dream, we know at the time what we are dreaming even though we probably do not know that we are dreaming. The dream may be muddled but vivid. Remembering later what we have dreamed may be difficult or impossible, even though we may be certain that we dreamed.

And if we can remember the dream, telling someone else about it is another difficulty because dreams may be about such weird things, and our dream feelings and thoughts so jumbled and irregular. There may be no real object or event one can point to and say, "My dream was like that". And further he who had the dream cannot invite or compel anyone else to have the same dream, because there is no known way of producing dream content to order.

So one's knowledge of the dream may dissipate with the dawn, and even if one remembers the dream, the labels may not fit exactly. But knowing what one dreamed does not depend on telling what one dreamed. If anyone else is to know what is
dreamed, it has to be by means of labels for there are no behavioral expressions of dream content.

Humans, like dogs or cats, may twitch or jerk while they are asleep and we assume in these cases that dreaming is going on. But in the case of dogs or cats we never know for sure, and in the case of humans, we know only post facto, and only sometimes. What the person is dreaming, we do not know from watching him, nor from an electroencephalogram which will tell us, at best and in an a posteriori manner (from correlating reports from awake subjects and the pattern of brain activity while they were previously asleep) that the person had a dream. If we want to know what a person dreamed, he must tell us. Our understanding of what he dreamed will be no better than his memory and his ability to describe what he dreamed.

Concerning the limits of successful lying about dreams. There seem to be no limits, so long as the person does not both assert and deny that he had a particular dream. So long as he consistently asserts the same content to his dream, he may say whatever he likes, and we have no grounds for doubting him, for in a dream anything goes. The regular laws of the universe are suspended, so we cannot use these to check his story.

There is nothing at all public about a dream in its occurring; it becomes public in a limited way if and only if it is described afterward. We who did not have the dream cannot know about it unless we are told. But the dreamer's having the dream does not depend on his telling the dream. There are no behavioral expressions of the dream content. There are no limits to
what a person may say he dreamed. Little if anything hinges on whether a person is telling the truth about his dream, but even if we cared, there seems to be no way of catching someone who has lied about what he dreamed. If it is denied that a person has a private experiential knowledge of his dreams, either a person does not know at all what he has dreamed or he learns what he dreamed from what he tells others. Both of these assertions seem contrary to the facts. We do know what we have dreamed and know even if we spare our families and friends the recital thereof.

The next kind of experiences we shall consider is memories. They are like dreams in that what a person says he remembers, we must believe he remembers. But we may doubt - if his memory is of a public fact or event which we have independent knowledge of and not of a private experience - the correctness of his memory. Even if he agrees to our correction of the fact or event which he is remembering, we have not established thereby that his memory was not in the first instance what he claimed it was. If he refuses to accept our version of the past event, and vehemently maintains that his own version is the right one, we may come to doubt our own memory, or we may think that he is being stubborn, though cognizant of his error, he simply persists in asserting it. But we can never be sure because we - as outsiders - have no access to his memory, the object of his present experience.

Here as in the case of dreams, there is no necessary behavioral correlate. One cannot tell by merely looking at a
There is however one difference between dreams and memories already mentioned above. A dream as an occurrence is private, and if we are to know about it at all, the person who had the dream must tell us about it. He is our only source of information about the dream. But memories are often, or claim to be, of past events or public facts which others do, or could logically, have knowledge of too, so that not all of our knowledge of the event depends upon the one rememberer’s memory. And, another check, if the event remembered was supposed to have taken place in the real world (as contrasted with a dream world), it must conform to the regular laws of the universe, so these laws may be used to criticize his story.

Memories then are still private in that they have no necessary behavioral correlates so that if an outsider is to know what is remembered, when what is remembered is a fact or event or scene, he must be informed by him who remembers. What a person says is the content of his memory, we must believe to be the content of his memory. But, and here one moves toward publicness, what one claims the memory to be of may be a public fact or event in which case our knowledge does not logically depend on the one reporter. I suppose that the extreme behaviorist would deny that there is any idle reminiscence, any recalling to mind of past scenes and situations not told to anyone.

The third kind of knowledge we can have is knowledge of a person’s emotions. The word "emotion" covers a great many
things, not all of which in the degree of privacy-publicness belong here. So I should like to restrict "emotion" to episodic emotions, i.e., emotions which occur and are felt at certain distinct though not necessarily datable times. Included are feelings which can be linked with some kind of occurrence word, e.g., pangs of conscience, thrills of delight, tremors of fear, shivers of horror, swells of pride, fits of annoyance, surges of anger, resentment, passion.

Excluded from "emotion" in this sense are character traits, motives, moods, e.g., vanity, good-naturedness, greed, joviality, irascibility. The person described as 'vain' has no feeling arising in him which he could label 'vanity'; if any feeling is felt by him that relates to his being labeled vain, it is probably something like self-satisfaction. It would seem that in ordinary English "vanity" is not an emotion word at all, but rather a word describing a person's character. My use of "emotion" to mean something felt by the person is probably not unfaithful to ordinary language.

These kinds of private experiences are often named or described by analogies with the physical feelings one has. A stab of emotional pain is like a stab of physical pain and vice versa, nicely illustrated by the observation of a four-year old acquaintance, who upon taking a good-sized gulp of whisky (by mistake), said, "That hurt my feelings."

Felt emotions of the episodic sort may spread out into mood emotions, so the distinction is not sharp. But here the claims are only to be applied to feelings which are felt as
Episodic emotions can and often do give rise to behavior, but do not have to. That is, we would not normally refuse to allow that a person might be feeling angry, annoyed, resentful, slighted, hurt, though he gives no behavioral sign of it.

These kinds of emotions are the sorts concerning which the person whose feelings they are is the final authority. There are situations which customarily produce certain feelings, e.g., embarrassment, but there is no necessity that these emotions actually be felt by a particular person. The person may consequently cover up or lie with complete success, in some cases at least.

In the case of the fourth kind of contingently public experiences, we have no access to what one claims to be presently aware of (which is also true of memories and emotions) but we have some public control, and in this sense, knowledge, of experiences of this sort in that we have the means of producing them. Included in this group are pains, itches, tickles, and other like experiences. If a child pinches another child, we may pinch the first child to show him what the effect of his pinch is. We believe, deeply, implicitly, without question, that we are sufficiently alike so that what, e.g., a pinch, produces pain for one person also produces pain for another person. The means of producing pains or tickles are agreed upon, known, by the community, to apply generally to members of the community. So that a person having a pain does not always have to describe it to give another person knowledge of it, he can - if he is
thoroughgoing in his intent - sometimes produce it in another. Clearly, pains, tickles, etc. differ in this way from dreams and memories which cannot be produced at will in another.

In addition - another push toward publicness - are the generally accepted behavioral expressions of these experiences. A person in pain groans, writhes, has a pained expression on his face, and/or gives some other evidence of his discomfort usually. A person with an itch scratches. A person tickled with a feather rubs, tickled in the ribs, laughs and/or squirms. So we sometimes have behavioral indications when a person is having a pain or an itch or a tickle and then a report of what he is experiencing can be dispensed with.

But such behavioral expressions are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the person's having experiences of this group. People have a mild to moderate pain and give no behavioral sign of it. One does not feel well but has a meeting he must go to; he covers up his discomfort: no groans allowed, a cheerful face put on. On the other hand, one may act as if one were sick though one feels quite well. And assuredly not scratching does not mean no itch; it may be that one politely restrains himself. Or a person may scratch not because of an itch, but from habit or nervousness.

So self-control may repress the expressions of genuine pains and itches, and posing - and false reports - may convince an onlooker of non-existent pains. There is no knowing for sure whether a person is lying when he tells us he has or hasn't a pain, and if he has good self-control, we may be alto-
gether in the dark about a pain or itch he is experiencing, if our knowing depends upon what he can control. If, as the supporters of the "expression theory" say, there were no reports of pain but only expressions of pain, how could one ever lie about it (either malingering or covering up)? In those cases where lying is possible, doubt is possible.

The possibility of doubt does not exist in cases of sufficient bodily disorder or damage. In cases of obvious somatic damage, e.g., a bad cut, broken bones, symptoms of body disorder, our conviction that the person is suffering (or about to suffer as soon as the shock or anaesthetic wears off) is complete. But the conviction does not rest on his report or controllable behavior but on the evidence that he is hurt, and the knowledge that a higher animal damaged in that way necessarily suffers.

That higher animals damaged to such an extent hurt is not a contingent fact, at least not contingent in the sense that one must find out each time whether a damaged organism is hurting. It is a universal truth of higher animals, a necessary truth based on what is needed for the organism to survive. Organisms which could undergo any amount of damage without pain would be destroyed, not having a spur to move them away from further damage.

A person badly hurt does not need to persuade us that he is hurting. We are convinced. Perhaps in the cases of anaesthetic persons who feel no pain we help and sympathize because their organisms are out-of-order and must be repaired if they are to carry on.
The fact remains that there are cases where we have perfect assurance that someone is hurting. But where our conviction lacks no degree of perfection it will not be based solely on what the person says or does which he can control, but upon the condition of the organism and the circumstances.

Sense experiences constitute the fifth kind of experiences which can be communicated. Experiences coming through our five senses make up this group, and these experiences are characterized by being of or having as object a public entity. If I say that I see a red ball, another person (of normal vision) should be able to look and see the red ball also. For what I mean by saying "I see a red ball", is that there is a red ball 'out there', not only in my experience. Since when I make a claim about an object which I have sensed, I claim that others should be able to sense it too, most emphatically others should not be ignorant of the object of my experience.

If one made a claim about an object one was sensing, and no other persons around could sense that object, one might modify the claim from being an assertion about public objects to being a description only about one's own sense experience. E.g., if one says he hears a high-pitched noise and others say they do not hear it, one may say, "My ears must be ringing." One thereby allows that in this case one's senses are not giving information about the public world as they normally do.

Sense experiences or sense data, in themselves, are hardly ever mentioned except by philosophers. Ordinary people do not say, "I am having an experience of round redness"; they would
say that they were seeing a red ball. But there is an ordinary language locution which stresses the private side of the claim. Suppose someone says, "I see a red ball." The emphasis is then on the public object. But other persons around him may insist that the ball is not red at all. He may then say, "Well, it looks red to me." This expression is then intended to stress the private experiential quality present to him.

The sense experience however is normally important primarily as it gives information about the world. When one sense is failing to give accurate information about the world, then attention is drawn to the failing organ, and the inaccurate experience is used to give information about the wayward body.

Because of the possibility of a sense organ's failing to give a correct picture of the world, when a person gives a report of a sense experience which is incorrect as compared to the world, we do not necessarily believe right away that the person is lying. His sense equipment may be 'off', or he may be attaching labels differently from us. We might check for the latter possibility and if we agreed on labels, but still disagreed on the appropriate labels in this instance, go on to test the possibility that someone's sense equipment was faulty. But we could never come to the conclusion that the other person was definitely lying in reporting his experience as he did so long as he maintained it consistently.

Because there are so many and diverse kinds of sense experiences, no one requirement for accepted behavioral expression can be given for all of them. If one makes an affirmative as-
sertion, that he sees or hears something, he should be able to point to the seen object or the direction from which the sound comes at least. Failure to be able to point to the object or the direction from which the sound is supposedly coming, once doubt of his veracity has arisen, would make us mistrust the person's claim. We could not be sure that he was lying. But if he couldn't give us some behavioral evidence or a detailed report, we might suspect that he was lying or simply ignore his report.

Denying that he sensed something which we believed that he should be able to sense might leave us uncertain. If he denied seeing something, say, a chair, we might lead him to it to see whether he would avoid it. If he did, we would likely disbelieve his assertion that he did not see it.

But often our sense experiences are not expressed in behavior. One hears pigeons, sees flowers outside the window, feels a breeze, tastes the toothpaste flavor left in one's mouth, smells soap scent of one's hands, but no action follows from these sense experiences. However when we do act, our behavior is based on our sense experiences, and consequently all behavior gives us some information about what the actor is sensing. I might add that I am not asserting that all one's sensations are explicitly known.

These casual remarks may serve to illustrate that the behavioral requirements vary from one kind of sense experience to another and between affirmations and denials. But testing a person who makes certain claims about sense experiences is
is more feasible than in the case of the other kinds of experiences so far discussed because the sense experience almost always claims to have as its object a public entity so that we can compare others' assertions with our own experiences.

We cannot however compare our experiences to others' experiences. The experiences are in their occurrence ineluctably private. That sense experiences are private is further evidenced by the not-nonsenseical question: do you see red the way I see red? and its indeterminableness, though we both stop at red lights, i.e., behave similarly. For some kinds of situations, the appropriate responding behavior is all that matters. But even in these situations the behavior—however appropriate, like stopping for a red light—is not what we mean by saying, "I saw the red light."

Coming to the next kind of experiences, we find that behavior is usually entailed. This fifth group includes intentions and meanings. Fulfilling or embodying behavior is required in some cases. For example, if on a summer day in Texas when the temperature stands at 107 degrees a person says, "It's hot today", and then proceeds to put on an overcoat to go outdoors, we would want some justification or think that he did not know the meaning of "It's hot".

As an example of an intention's requiring fulfilling behavior we might consider the following. A friend say, "I intend to take a trip tomorrow", but has done nothing to prepare himself (and it seems to us that the kind of trip he is intending to take would require a great deal of preparation, planning an
itinerary, looking at maps, getting clothes and supplies, buying tickets, etc.). Would we think that he intended to go? And when tomorrow comes and goes and he has not left on his trip, would we then believe that he really had intended to go at all? Or consider a farmer who says for three years that he intends to fix a tractor standing immobile in the yard. Would we think he really intends to?

My opinion is that we are all likely to take a person at his word *prima facie* but to expect the appropriate fulfilling behavior which is part of the meaning. And then if the occasion for the appropriate behavior comes and goes without the action's coming to pass, we doubt that the person meant what he said. Further evidence may be needed before we can decide whether he was confused about the meaning of what he said, or whether he is of infirm resolve, or whether he intentionally lied.

The behavioral component of meaning and intention - when there is such a component - carries us further toward publicness, for we in these cases do not have to rely on a person's report of his own understanding of what he intended or meant (as we must wait in the case of dreams or memories). We can observe and thereby infer his unreported intentions, and test for confirmation his announced intentions. We listen to his words and then watch for behavior to fulfill his meaning.

It would simplify our task appreciably if we could go so far as to say that intentions and meanings must always be expressed behaviorally, which would amount to making them logically public. We could then say: no fulfilling behavior, no
intention or meaning. But two facts keep us from this dictum.

First, in a conversation, a person may claim to be misunder-
derstood, to have been misinterpreted though he has not had an
opportunity to act on what he has said. Neither he nor his in-
terlocutor(s) could have learned his meaning from his behavior.
So the most plausible way of accounting for such misunderstand-
ing is to say that this person had a meaning in mind (or an en-
tertained meaning), that from the verbal responses of his inter-
locutor(s) he could tell that the meaning grasped by them was
not the meaning entertained by him. If he says that what they
understood him to have meant was not what he meant, and if what
he first said might possibly be taken to mean that which he later
claims to have meant, his interlocutors cannot dispute his re-
port (though they might think he had expressed himself badly).
The interlocutors would believe that he had a meaning, in mind,
non-behavioral. In the absence of confirming or disconfirming
behavior we do not in practice deny meaning to a person's signi-
ficant gestures.

The second objection, this one to making intentions wholly
behavioral, is that there are intentions not only made or arrived
at privately, but also fulfilled privately. One may intend to
count sheep until one goes to sleep, and no one else, not even
one's bedpartner, will know. If one has lost something, he may
intend to review in his mind the places where he was, in an ef-
fort to recall the place where he might have left it. One may
thus intend, and fulfill one's intention, privately, without
any one else having any knowledge of it at all, for there is
nothing public to it, neither what is intended nor the means of fulfilling the intention. The person with such a private intention may, of course, report it but whether he tells the truth or not, we cannot know.

It is true that some intentions are never explicitly entertained; one may simply set about the (intended) task. That there is no explicit intention does not mean that there is no end or purpose. It only means that people sometimes act purposively without explicitly symbolizing the end.

The conclusion concerning meanings and intentions is that they are two-sided, with a private, entertained aspect and a public, behavioral aspect. Sometimes one aspect may be lacking or unimportant. But its occasional absence gives us no right to deny it completely.

Like intendings and meanings in having two aspects—private and behavioral—are tastes and preferences, our next kind of private/public knowledge. We observe how a person dresses, to which music he listens, what food he eats, whether he goes to art galleries, which books he reads, what colors he uses in his house and on his person, etc. to determine what his tastes are, or, in other words, what gives him pleasure. His verbal reports provide information, but probably if there is a discrepancy between his behavior and his report, we put more stock in our opinion based on his behavior than his report, which is likely influenced by what he thinks he ought to prefer. (How much credence is put in the report of a person claiming to greatly enjoy serious music who never listens to it on the radio, does not
have a record-player, never goes to concerts, not even free ones?) We may ascertain a person's tastes, even our own, by watching behavior. But we know that there are cases of and reasons for pretence, for it is thought better to like some things than to like other things, so we do not claim to have certain knowledge even from observing behavior regarding somebody's tastes.

If it were not for the possibility of pretence, we could say that tastes and preferences are expressed necessarily in behavior. But part of the meaning of taste or preference is the enjoyed pleasure from the thing preferred and there is no inviolable connection between this enjoyed pleasure and fulfilling behavior. The connection is rather only a frequent and customary one. So the behavior may be dissembled, the appropriate pleasure reported, and conviction in the onlooker may be complete.

Summary of self-knowledge

1. Experiences in their occurrence are private.

2. Each person recognizes himself and knows himself to be unique. It is his consciousness which he recognizes because nothing else about him is logically unique. Because of its uniqueness, each consciousness is indescribably, therefore incommunicable, and consequently the knowledge of it is logically private.

3. Ignorance of other's experiences and successful lying are evidence for the privacy of experience. Not all experi-
ences require or even admit of behavioral expression.

4. We know about the content of another person's dream only what he tells us. He may know about his dream though he doesn't tell anyone.

5. What another person remembers we know only if he tells us. But if the memory is of a public fact or event, there are some checks on his story.

6. Emotions, e.g., fear, horror, annoyance, are felt as episodes of experience. There are customary connections between situations and feelings.

7. Behavioral expression as well as reports of pains, itches, tickles are possible. But concerning these experiences one may lie and feign the suitable actions to convince another of what is not the case. Public means exist of producing these experiences. Given sufficient evidence of somatic damage, no doubt concerning pain is possible.

8. The objects of sense experiences are ordinarily public entities. But disagreement over labels and the possibility of a disordered sense organ would make us hesitate before we asserted that a report differing from our own experience was a lie. All behavior is based on sense experience, but not all sense experiences are behaviorally expressed.

9. Meanings and intentions are two-sided, with a private, entertained aspect and a public, behavioral aspect. If an intention (or meaning) admits of or requires behavioral fulfilling, we may demand such behavior before we are convinced.

10. Tastes and preferences are similarly two-sided. The
enjoyed pleasure and fulfilling behavior are not inviolably connected.
D. Knowledge of others

In the last section we discussed the kinds of knowledge of persons in each of which what is privately experienced plays some part. There were certain facts (lying, malingering, ignorance) cited which seem to me to be sufficient evidence for there being a private aspect to some kinds of things that we know about persons.

In this section I should like to consider kinds of knowledge in which what is known about a person is not what he privately experiences. That is, what is experienced by the person is not the basis for the knowledge that we have of that person. Behavior and verbal performances constitute the grounds of these kinds of knowledge, so these kinds of knowledge are public. Of these actions and the abilities attributed on the basis of actions may be kept secret, i.e., never be done publicly, and in this sense be contingently public. The other kinds of knowledge treated in this section are logically public, meaning that the person to whom this knowledge pertains cannot know it unless at least one other person knows it too.

Then I shall consider how it is possible that we have knowledge of other persons at all.

These are the facts to be used:

1. We have knowledge of people's actions.

2. We attribute skills, competences, abilities, knowledge to people on the basis of what they do, though sometimes we will allow prima facie that someone has an ability on the basis
of what they report to us.

3. That people have certain roles is known by other persons and is possible only in relation to other persons.

4. People have ranks or statuses within a group. These ranks or statuses consist in the estimations of members of the group.

5. Infants imitate sounds, gestures, and actions.

6. We understand what people mean when they tell us about what has no behavioral expression, e.g., dreams, reminiscences, intentions to be fulfilled at some future time or privately. We also understand descriptive reports of pains and emotions which can have some behavioral expression sometimes.

7. People believe themselves to be sometimes understood, sometimes not understood.

8. Co-operative effort among two or more persons is an everyday occurrence.

9. Human society in one form or another has endured for thousands of years. Culture is cumulative, i.e., it is not the case that each person must himself discover all the knowledge he will accumulate.

What we shall concern ourselves with first are the remaining kinds of things we know about persons which I want to discuss. The first of these remaining kinds of knowledge is the actions of persons. By "act" or "action" is meant "behavior requiring some sort of bodily movement or position". "Position" is included so that sitting, standing, lying down, etc. will
count as acts. Verbal acts will count as behavior when the
use of symbols is part or the whole of what is attributed on
the basis of the language use. (Cf. above pp. 68-9)

Now the proposition that an act requires bodily movement
or position entails that an act cannot be logically private in
the way a thought can be since an act of a body is observable
if there are other persons present. Our bodies are perceptible
in the way any extended object is perceptible. A person's act,
necessarily requiring a body, is therefore perceptible in the
way that any object is perceptible.

Part of what we mean by saying an act is public is that
other people can get into a position to witness it. No matter
how close and how attentive another person may be, he can never
perceive or witness my dream. But if another person does not
(by chance) witness my action, he can if he chooses come within
range and observe me the next time. I cannot assert that he is
logically unable to perceive my act, as I plainly can in the
case of a dream.

It is of course possible that one might act without there
being any other persons present so that one might be the only
person who had knowledge of this act, and in this sense, the
knowledge of the act and the act could be private. Not all of
our acts are public, but they are then only contingently private,
because they are able to be public. Acts are contingently
private-public but in an even stronger sense than reportable
experiences are contingently private-public, since if the act
can be repeated, one can witnesses of its occurrence in a way
one can never have witnesses of the occurrence of one's own experiences.

Actions cannot then be kept completely secret or successfully lied about in the way that experiences such as dreams or memories can be.

Even though I think and assert that experiences occur privately, I do not think that abilities are something which occur privately, nor do we attribute knowledge to someone on the sole basis of what he experiences. If we want to know what a person's abilities are, we observe his actions. We may for convenience's sake ask him for a verbal statement of what he can do, but this is not a verbal report of what he privately experiences and alone has access to. Instead, if he is not merely reporting what he wishes he could do, he tells what he has on occasion done (behaviorally) which he likely can tell because he has heard others give the appraisal he now gives.

There is more than a single meaning to "ability" which plurality of meanings perhaps has caused the confusion. We say a person has an ability, e.g., the ability to swim, when he is actually swimming. What a person is doing, we are willing to say he knows how to do. So one meaning of "ability" is knowledge or competence. Though we would allow that a person has an ability (in this sense) if and only if he (when challenged) gives actual behavioral evidence of this ability, we would not want to say that he has the ability only when (for the period of time that) he is actually giving us an example of this ability. During the time between the behavioral instances of his ability
he also has the ability, but the meaning is now what he could do if circumstances arose appropriate to his actualizing this dormant ability or disposition. What the ontological status of a dormant ability or disposition is seems to be usually some kind of logical or intentional status. Its status is not that of a private experience, so behaviorists are quite right in insisting that an ability is not something privately experienced. In the first sense of competence, an ability is something behavioral; in the second sense of disposition, an ability is not something actually behavioral, but no more is it something experiential. One's ability to swim or knit between occasions of actually swimming or knitting does not consist in one's entertaining the awareness of how to swim or knit or in an awareness of anything whatsoever.

The third meaning of "ability" is closer to the second than the first. It can be understood best perhaps by means of an example. A normal man who has never swum still has the ability to swim, we say. Being a normal member of a class whose members can swim, if they learn how, he would be able to swim if he learned how. The ability to swim in a person who has never swum is a latent ability, depending on his actual physical characteristics which in the case of others are the means of their swimming.

These last two meanings of "ability" include something not at this moment or not yet actual. An ability in the first sense is an actual competence (consisting in the behavioral performance). An ability in the second and third senses is something potential,
a potentiality, we could say, which may be actualized.

Having seen these three distinguishable meanings of "ability", we can now see why a compound confusion about the status of abilities may occur. One plausible account of how such confusion arises is this. The words "act" and "actual" look as if they are logically related (they are etymologically related). From saying "act" and "actual" are related it is only a (mis-taken) step to saying acts - and only acts - are actual. So that what is not an act is not actual. In the sense that "act" has been defined here as requiring bodily movement or position, this is clearly not true. Experiences are actual too. Ignoring or denying that they are is the first mistake. The next mistake consists in saying that if dispositions and latent abilities are not actual, then they must somehow be experiential, because experiences also are not actual. So abilities are experiential, that is, something experienced by the person to whom the abilities are attributed.

These confusions can be eliminated by laying out the pairs of terms we want to contrast and making clear which equivalences are not asserted.

Terms are often contrasted in the following ways:

1. Mental - physical
2. Experiential - behavioral
3. Private - public

I think that 1. is the only confusing or positively erroneous one. Though the contrasts in 2, 3, and 4 are all right,
it would be a mistake to go on to assert the equivalences between all the first column words and all the second column words. What is experiential is private but not potential, rather actual. What is behavioral is public. Dispositions though often part of a behavioristic analysis of persons are not actual but potential.

But the behaviorists are right in saying that when it comes to knowing the abilities — either mental or physical — that a person has, what he does behaviorally is what decides the question.

The next kind of knowledge that we have of persons is of the roles (or functions) they have. This word, "role", is used in the sense social scientists not theatre people would give it. Examples of roles are: parent, friend, teacher, president, guest, hostess, spouse, correspondent, tourist. "Role" will be defined as "the set of actions and duties that a person is expected to perform with regard to other persons in a particular kind of social situation".

Roles are even more public than actions, in that one cannot have a role and know that one has that role without at least one other person knowing about it too. One cannot be a spouse without at least one's spouse knowing it. One cannot be a teacher without one or more students knowing it.

In this sense roles are logically public, at the opposite pole from what is logically private (which can be known only by oneself). How one thinks about the role or, said differently, one's feeling, affects how one plays the role but neither the
feeling nor anything else experienced privately constitutes the role.

It should not be thought that the roles we play are only of interest to others, not to ourselves. For what we know about ourselves depends largely on the roles we have, and what we do and must do depend on the demands and possibilities of our roles. A woman who has no husband cannot be a devoted wife. A person cannot be a brilliant lecturer if he has no audience.

The numerous roles we play describe us not only for others but for ourselves. The roles we play inform us as well as others of our place in the scheme of things, at least the social scheme of things.

But we want to know not only what we are to do, which sets of duties and problems are ours, but we also want to know how this ranks us in respect to others, which brings us to the last sort of knowledge had of persons to be considered, status. "Status" is here defined as "standing or prestige of a person within a group". Roles may be compared and rank-ordered, e.g., the role of doctor has more status than the role of garbage-collector. A doctor can know he has more prestige qua doctor than a garbage-collector has qua garbage-collector. Also there is ranking within an occupation, i.e., among doctors as a class and among garbage-collectors as a class. Doctors and garbage-collectors can be better or worse at what they are supposed to do and they can be esteemed by others to a greater or lesser degree.
About a person's status something rather surprising (at first, at least) is true: that others very likely know more about one's status (or statuses, if one prefers to say that one has a status in each group of which he is a member) than one knows oneself. Or more accurately, others probably know more precisely how Everyman is rated than Everyman himself. Everyman's status is a fact about Everyman, yet others have better knowledge of it than he.

Everyman's opinion of himself does not, of course, constitute his status, since status is something ascribed by others. Status does something to and for persons which one's own opinion cannot do. This is why status within a group is important to us, and why knowing a person's status conveys solid and useful information to us.

We may certainly want to have a person's opinion of what he thinks his status is. But if we want to know how good a doctor a man is, we would place far less weight on his self-appraisal than on the evaluations of others. Some people underrate themselves and some people over-rate themselves and we cannot know which in a particular instance. So we rely more on the opinions of others which are likely to be more just. Now it is not Everyman telling about his experiences (of self-appraisal) to others, but others relating Everyman's status to whomever it may concern. Indeed there are other ways than a straight-forward verbal statement to indicate how a person is ranked; there are behavioral ways, subtle gestures of deference and disdain, which we also understand.
Knowledge of persons' roles and statuses is probably the most informative kind of knowledge that we can have of persons for roles are summaries of the relations into which one enters and statuses are summaries of one's success in those relations.

To summarize. There are many kinds of things that we can know about persons, ranging from each person's knowledge of his own identity through dreams, memories, emotions, sense experiences, intentions, tastes, acts, abilities, roles, and statuses. There is no way, no single way, of acquiring these differing kinds of knowledge, but rather three, experiencing (in one's own case), verbal reports, and observing of behavior.

Having disposed of the various kinds of knowledge, I shall move on then to consider how it is possible that we have knowledge of other persons.

One source of answers (at least answers that would be thought consistent, complete, and exact) to a philosophical question such as this can be ruled out, namely, what ordinary people say in reply to such a question. To be sure of getting adequate answers from ordinary people, one should have to teach them how to make fine distinctions, how to put the label that they really mean on an act, object, or quality, and how to fit their replies together so that they do not contradict themselves. They would then no longer be ordinary people.

Normally persons exhibit more varied, consistent, and adequate behavior than they have language for. The excess of behavioral subtlety and adequacy over verbal subtlety and adequacy
is what influences me to rely less upon the language (some would say metalanguage) that ordinary persons use than upon the behavioral practices of ordinary persons to determine what is and must be true of persons. The wife who circumvents a long-standing point of disagreement with her husband, the mother who distracts a child from naughtiness, the hostess who interrupts an increasingly-warming discussion between antagonistic guests, the person who teases a reactionary friend out of his prejudices, the psychiatrist who prods and puts through paces Mongolian idiots during a demonstration for medical students — to mention only an infinitesimal number of actions out of the range of possible ones — might all be able to give some description of what they were doing. But their descriptions would not very likely match their performances in insight, subtlety, and "on the mark-ness". That they could 'see' and state the significance or implications of their acts is extremely improbable. If ordinary persons' language were consistently adequate to their behavior, the honor given to and admiration felt for those who make explicit in symbolized form what is going on would be supererogatory.

But to say that persons' behavior is more adequate than their descriptions of their behavior is not to say that their language is insignificant. It is not. For, as Descartes pointed out, the language of a person differs from a parrot's by its consistency, variety, flexibility, and appropriateness to many different kinds of questions and situations, which a parrot's is not.
The first answer then to our question: how do we know that (other) persons are persons? is by the consistency, variety, flexibility, and appropriateness of their language.

To further answer the question we might again mention the five phenomena discussed in Chapter 1 which we said there could be best understood by attributing self-consciousness to the beings displaying such behavior and traits. They are: 1) self-correction, 2) embarrassment, 3) practicing, 4) learning many and many different kinds of things from one another and from verbal descriptions, and 5) lying. When we see beings displaying such traits, we believe that such beings are self-conscious persons.

Also we believe that persons respond not only according to some totally predetermined impressed pattern but in some cases spontaneously, not by rote. This has been discussed above under Change. Probably if we felt that only a rote, unoriginal response could be gotten from an entity, this entity would be a machine or a psychotic.

The requirement that a person's behavior be at least in part non-rote might rule out machines. But I do not think that another condition would be necessary and therefore result in machines' being ruled out from being persons, namely, that a person be born of persons. I think that this condition is not necessary for we do not in fact know this about many of the persons around us and asserting it as a necessary condition does not lead us to anything illuminating about persons. With such a necessary condition only persons present at an individual's
birth would be really entitled to treat that individual as a person. We could always doubt the legitimacy to our own claim not having witnessed our birth. There is nothing in the overt behavior of a person which would prove that he was born of persons though there is a great deal in his behavior to show that he was personified by persons. Whatever might be told me about my own or some other person's origin, my conviction that we are persons would remain unshakeable, so long as we can behave and speak with the requisite consistency, variety, appropriateness, and originality.

There is a necessary condition, a corollary of what has been said above, of interest for its implications for relations with God. It is a necessary condition of being a person that another person have or have had some knowledge of this kind of entity but not complete knowledge. There must be some knowledge because another person must have known Everyman in order for Everyman to have become a person. The knowledge must be incomplete because in order for knowledge of Everyman to be complete, Everyman's awareness would have to be shared by this Compleat Knower. And then there would not be two separate persons but only one, the coalescence of the two.

And separate we must be. By group or community we do not mean one large-size or super person but the collection (more or less cohesive) of separate persons.

But if we are separate, how is it that we can form communities, i.e., communicate, with others separate from oneself?

The problem of connecting separate individuals with others
is the same problem as connecting the three ways of knowing persons, since the problem is that of connecting what is private with what is public. The problem is to link private experience (which needs to be made accessible, knowable to others, public) with behavior which is public, knowable to and by others (which needs to be connected with what is not knowable simply through behavior or which may be quite different from what is indicated in behavior).

That which connects behavior with experience are words or symbols. For convenience I shall consider mostly spoken words, though what is said could and does apply to sign language, a touch language such as Anne Sullivan used at first with Helen Keller, and could apply (though I do not know that such a language has been actually used with children first learning a language) to some kind of visual representation like hieroglyphics or sand painting.

What is needed and is present in the word or any similar symbol is: first, a public, behaviorally producible and controllable aspect. The word (as it occurs first to the child and for a long period of history before there was a written language) has a sound which strikes the ear like any noise does and which can be produced by the organism employing diaphragm, larynx, mouth, tongue, etc. Sign language entails an arrangement and movement of hands, arms, face, etc. which are public objects just like any other extended objects; hands, arms, face, etc. can be controlled, moved at will. A pictorial representation could be put onto any extended surface, one would see it in the
way one sees any arrangement of colored areas or lines on an extended surface, and one would produce these 'pictures' by arranging with hands, feet, or mouth (as armless painters hold a paintbrush) varieties of extended substances, twigs, sand, pens, pencils, etc. It is logically possible that a language depending on smell or taste (which includes smell) could be used. One would have to learn ways of controlling particular odors or tastes which would come to have definite, delimited, interrelated, public (interpersonal) meanings. But I do not know that there are any such languages. There might be certain practical problems militating against their development and use.

A second characteristic of a word is its being able to stand for or refer to something besides its own perceptible properties. A spoken word must be not only a sound, but also stand for, point to something beyond it. With practice our attention does not catch on the sound but moves to something further. This something further may be public or private; in temporal order the first referents intended by the child with his early words are public.

The third characteristic of the symbol is its having an entertained or experienced aspect. To use a word (as contrasted with parroting it), one must know or be aware of, have a concept of, what it refers to, or means. A parrot merely produces the sounds without intending anything thereby. A person using words intends to affect another person, to communicate to him what he (the first) is thinking of.

The fourth characteristic of words that are the means of
linking public and private is the connectedness among words and concepts. The concepts expressed by these words have conceptual entailments. Words can be defined in terms of other words.

That these four aspects of words do in fact obtain would, I think, be generally granted. That they must obtain in any going concern of persons is my further assertion. For if any one of them were absent, words would not be the means of communicating, of establishing community among separate persons, and could not be the means of socializing children. Words play an indispensable function in personifying individuals.

Giving a description of how the child comes to use words, how he comes to be a person, if successful, should be sufficient to show how the ways of getting knowledge of persons are connected, how the private is connected with the public. This is not merely a possibly interesting addition but of the very essence since I have claimed that persons are made. To describe their ontogeny is to describe their beings. However much of them is produced by socialization is rendered intelligible, by the description of the formation process.

Persons must have both private and public aspects connected by words. So persons must have some use of language in order to be persons. The account of acquiring language follows.

What appears first in the temporal order is an animal of the species Homo sapiens. All the persons that we know are members of the same animal species which makes their personification much easier to understand, though I do not think that all
persons must be members of *Homo sapiens*. It may be that they must be socialized by members of their own species.

But let us consider our species of animals and concern ourselves with accounting for the personification of other physical types when persons of these types appear.

The animal arrives with body and consciousness, not self-consciousness though. With few exceptions we believe that higher animals feel pain, enjoy some foods and activities, have sense experiences, dream, etc.

The infant like calves, lambs, kittens, baby birds, and other young animals, makes noises; it cries, gurgles, coos, etc. And like other animals, it imitates.

But infants can imitate far more varied acts and sounds than other animals. (I was surprised to learn from Charles Hartshorne, the expert on songbirds, that the mockingbird can imitate as many as 75 different songs.) This instinct to imitate is clearly present in an exemplary way in birds and porpoises as well as in homonoid animals. If this instinct to imitate were not granted, some other account of the acts which appear to be imitations must be given. One alternative given is that these behavior patterns are innate. I find it so implausible that innumerable behavior patterns could be innate, lying in wait, ready to be activated, that I reject this possibility. My own experience with children would disconfirm the innateness of behavior patterns which look like imitations (to me); the acts which can be imitated are so disparate, so unnecessed in the young animal. Once moved by a lively and elegant Brandenberg
Concerto of Bach's playing on the phonograph, I began to "conduct" the music, waving my arms in imitation of the conductors I had seen. A young child, seven months old, also enjoying the music, waved his arms in a somewhat less faithful (I fancy) imitation of me. To hypothesize an innate readiness to "conduct" likely useless (to the organism) music seems to me to violate egregiously Occam's Razor. Imitation is plainly a more parsimonious explanation. The imitation instinct postulated is a general one: to imitate as well as it can those beings around it with which it identifies. The usefulness of such an instinct is obvious.

In order to imitate, an animal must be conscious because it must see or hear what it will imitate.

So far in this account we have then a conscious animal imitating an unlimited variety of acts and sounds of those around him.

When even so much as the ability to imitate is allowed in the infant, there is already something 'inner' granted. How is that? a sceptical interlocutor might ask. My reply is as follows. If one observes the act of imitation closely, one sees that something is needed to translate the perception of the act to be imitated into the performance of the imitating act. Consider an imitated word. It is heard as a sound. But to produce it the proper innervation of diaphragm, throat, and mouth muscles is needed. There is a something interposing itself between public sound produced by him who is imitated and public sound produced by him who imitates. This (which is interposed)
is not perceived by persons around and is in that sense 'in' the imitator, but is not equivalent to what I have been calling 'private' since what I have been calling 'private' is known consciously by him 'in' whom it is. The inner something which connects a perception of the act to be imitated with the doing of the imitating act is surely not known by the lower animal which imitates and probably not even (in many cases) by the adult person. But there is already something not public to the animal.

Among the array of acts and sounds the child imitates are words, which may be to the child at first like any sound that he makes. But the sounds which constitute the public perceptible aspects of words have effects in the environment that some other sounds do not have. "Mama" spoken has the effect of bringing mama, the purveyor of pleasure, which another sound produced consciously by the child does not have. The power that pronouncing words gives a child must seem miraculous to him.

Referents of these first words are public: persons, objects, qualities. How are words learned for what is not public? Here I think the fact that the teaching persons and the learning child belong to the same animal species is of crucial importance. The adults around the infant believe that the child is like them, that his organism functions like theirs, that he feels cold if it is cold, that he feels hungry when he has not eaten for some time, that he feels pain if he gets stuck with a pin or bumps his head or skins his knee. They would supply a word for the child (to learn) at the appropriate time when the circumstances
are such that the adults would believe that the child not only is but must be feeling what the same situation would produce in them. In addition to the situation (cold, period of time without food, prick, bump) the child gives behavioral evidence such as shivering, 'fussing', crying. The situation, the behavior, and the organism's processes are all public, perceptible to more than one person. To a mother whose child is shivering, the idea that an 'outsider' cannot know what the child is feeling and that the child may be feeling something different from cold would be incredible and absurd. To her the suggestion that the child may feel what she would call "pleasure" rather than what she calls "pain" when he bumps his head is ridiculous. At the time when words are being learned, convincingly dissembling behavior is not possible to the child. The behavior is on the animal level, reflexive.

The adults do not hesitate in their labeling, though what they are labeling is not something public. They give the label to something which they cannot perceive that they believe occurs within the child. For them the hunger is not the eagerness with which the child eats. Nor is the pain his crying. There is for them other than the action and body of the child, though the aspect of the child which the adults believe exists and is private (to the child) is not yet known to be private by the child.

The child can now use some words like "hurt", "hungry", "thirsty"; he can use them about himself, at the least, since these words serve as request words which get something done for him.
There are two further questions to be answered: 1) how does the child learn to use these words about others? and 2) how does he learn to think using words to himself without expressing them aloud to others?

Learning to apply words with private referents to other persons comes about in situations where such words are applied to others (than the learning child) by adults. The child hears someone describe himself or some third person as "hungry", "thirsty", or "hurt". The person applying the label may do so to himself on the basis of what he experiences or to another on the basis of what he (the label-user) perceives in the situation or in the individual to whom the label is applied, in just the way that the adult applied the label to the child. And again the common membership in the species Homo Sapiens (which the child must realize very early in order to imitate) is crucial. If the young child hears the same word being applied to another person, he would have no reason to believe that what he feels is not felt by another when the word is used about some individual other than himself. Why should he balk? He has learned to use the word about himself by imitating others; the same imitating would bring him to use the word univocally applying to others as to himself. The method of learning self-descriptive and other-descriptive words is the same, and provides the link between felt and behavioral sides of the meaning of a word like "pain", the link between the different methods of gaining knowledge of persons.

The physical and controllable ground of some private experi-
ences mentioned above in the section on self-knowledge can also be used. A child who pinches another child may be pinched in turn and told, "You see, that hurts." (We believe that pinches feel the same to everyone.) Most children seem to get the connection between pinching and pain quickly, and to understand that this connection does not hold only in one's own case but also for others. There is no logical or temporal priority of the self-use over the other-use; the point is that the process is the same for learning to use the words about oneself and others.

The first private referents will be then experiences dependent on the animal organism, e.g., pain, hunger, thirst, cold, warmth, etc.

Granted now that the child can use words like "hurt" and "hungry". How does he learn to think using words without expressing them aloud to others? How can he sever the public perceptible aspect of the word from its entertained aspect? The question already reveals that I think that the non-expressing of these inner experiences is learned, though the experience itself in its occurrence is always, consistently, unalterably private. For the child the seemingly necessary connection between the entertaining of the meaning of a word and the producing of its public perceptible aspect (sound, in the case of the spoken words we have been considering) is severed only through training.

At this point a further consideration enters: the requirements of social living. There are plainly situations where one
may not say whatever comes to mind. What comes to mind is hurtful, disruptive, or perhaps only unwanted. (Whoever has been around children and has had to endure their ceaseless prattle will have a vivid grasp of the meaning of "unwanted"). The child is asked not to talk so much, or not to say what hurts other people's feelings, and may be punished for speaking 'out-of-turn'. With the spur of such sanctions, everyone comes to realize that he can think without speaking, since he must. Because it is demanded that the individual censor his speech, he does.

The necessary connection felt to exist between speech and thought is perfectly illustrated by something actually said by a youthful acquaintance of mine. Upon being scolded for something or other, and clearly resenting the slight to her amour-propre, the pre-schooler said, "I've got eyes, I can see. I've got ears, I can hear. I've got a mouth, I can think."

The fact is that we demand reticence and reserve; without them groups could not function. So the spoken aspect of the word is held back. No doubt such repression impairs the flow and liveliness of some people's thought.

Once language has been acquired, the most natural state is for the child to say whatever comes to mind for which he has or can devise words. But in order for an individual to be thought responsible for what he says, he must be able not to say it. Until he can not say things, he is not held responsible for what he does say. And until he is responsible for what he says, he is not a full-fledged person and not given the privileges of
full-fledged persons. His utterances cannot be treated with the gravity and respect that a person's intentional statements are. When a young child says something uncomplimentary, he cannot be thought malicious, as is a person who is supposed to have loosed the tie between thought and tongue.

It is very important to realize that pretence with words and behavior arises after the non-pretending use of words has been learned. The words are learned by pre-lying children who in paradigm cases could not be fooling. At the stage when children are learning words they are animals and cannot dissemble pains (etc.) as adults can. They do not learn these words in situations where they can deceive. Rather they can deceive only when they have learned the words.

With the child there are certain conditions and kinds of behavior which are sufficient to convince an onlooker that the child is feeling pain, though then as later, the pain cannot be seen by the onlooker.

The child cannot lie until he has learned to make a distinction between inner or private and outer or public. But he cannot make this distinction between private and public until he has learned language. So there is no feigning behavior until he has learned the language which provides him with the means of distinguishing private and public. Lying and pretence can only occur after thought and behavior have been disconnected, and language is needed to make that disconnection.

Suppose an objection were raised to the private character of experience as I have given it, which objection might at this
point be directed to the non-expression of experience, since that is where our discussion is now. My critic might say that this non-expression is learned and therefore not natural to persons. Not giving verbal expression to thoughts (in the broadest sense) is the result of a special effort and so privacy of experiences is derivative not original, and perhaps he would go so far as to say, not real.

I would answer. Clearly there is a stage in the development of an individual when he naturally says out loud most of what he thinks before he learns to censor his speech. So much my critic and I agree upon. But my disagreement with my critic would be over the justification of picking that stage (when thinking is done largely with one's mouth) as the most authentic or real stage of personhood. It seems to me clear that so long as the child says whatever he thinks, he is not viewed as responsible, and so long as he is not viewed as responsible, he is not a full-fledged person. So that the state where such thinking is necessarily and naturally accompanied by verbal expression is not yet a state of full-fledged personhood.

But it is true that the think-speak stage is earlier than the censored stage, and the behaviorist who would likely be my critic may want to stress this, using the temporal priority to establish logical or ontological priority. Then I would point out that privacy belongs to a yet earlier stage than the think-speak stage. The pre-verbal infant has experiences. He does not begin to have experiences, e.g., dreams, sense perceptions, only after he has learned language. We believe that infants
like other higher animals dream and our evidence for their dreaming is their twitchings in their sleep, awakening with a start, etc. The child does not learn to dream upon learning the word for dreaming. This experience which no one else besides the dreamer has access to is private. There is however no intrinsic difference which marks off dreaming from sense experience; the child has to learn that the dreamed wolf is not a sensed wolf. The child's treating both experiences as alike at first as well as our feeling of complete conviction in the reality of what we are dreaming while we are dreaming are sufficient to persuade me that there is an identical private character to all experience, sense experience as well as dreaming for the pre-verbal child. Dreams are one kind of experience had by the pre-verbal infant, the think-speak child, and the adult person alike. At the first stage the infant cannot tell us what he dreams or dreamed. At the second stage the child — even if he must (in some sense) report his dream — tells of what he dreamed, not of what he is dreaming, so there is no necessary public expression accompanying the experience, and yet the experience occurs. So even at this stage experience has a private aspect. The animal in order to imitate must perceive, a kind of experience, what it is going to imitate.

I conclude that experience in the infant begins as private. When the child has learned to use words, much of its thinking occurs in terms of words which have a seemingly necessarily-connected sounded aspect. He then learns to disconnect the sound from the entertained meaning and enjoy the thoughts — even those
for which he has words — privately in the way he lived through experiences prior to having words and lives through experiences (like dreams) which cannot be expressed while they are occurring.

If my critic were to say that learning to repress the vocal expressing of thought words is artificial, an imposition on what is natural to the person, I should reply that language is similarly artificial and imposed on the person. He neither speaks nor keeps himself from speaking naturally. Both abilities are learned from association with persons. To pick one state as more authentic, original, or real is arbitrary.

We have so far been concerned with the description of how the child learns language and the non-expressing of thought words as well as denying that privacy of experience is inauthentic.

Now I should like to go on to show more explicitly how self-consciousness is gotten, how private experience is connected to what is public, and how one private consciousness is connected to another private consciousness.

At the beginning the consciousness of the child is not of anything; its consciousness simply is a feeling, comfort, discomfort, warmth, etc. Whatever is present in his consciousness fills it entirely and becomes thereby the totality of being. The experience of animals must mostly if not entirely be like this.

To be conscious of something, to have an object of consciousness or for requires a certain objectivity. It is not merely a play on words to say that objectivity is needed if there is to be
an object. When objectivity is lacking, there is no distance between consciousness and what fills consciousness. Consciousness is utterly absorbed in the properties of the experience.

But soon the child has sufficient waking time and equanimity to look at, listen to, touch, taste, smell what is there for him. These sensed things are objects of consciousness. Among these objects may be his toes and fingers, though he does not yet know that they are his, which knowledge of ownership (of a very close sort) probably comes only through learning to control them, the coincidence between effort and success.

What he controls are appendages and vocal equipment. He becomes aware of himself not only as a thing occupying space, but as a doer and word-producer. As said above it is by means of imitation of others that he produces words and some actions.

When he has learned language, he must learn to say not all that he thinks, and he is forced thereby to become aware of himself as the haver of specific thoughts some of which may be expressed and others of which may not. The child must learn to judge which experience may be expressed and which may not, and in so doing learns that he has various particular thoughts. By learning that any experience may be kept to himself he is brought to the realization that experiencing is in its occurrence logically private. The realization might be stated as, "They don't know what I'm thinking unless I tell them."

It is at this point, upon realizing that experience - in all its occurrences - is private, which he has had to realize in order to understand the general rule to repress any future
publicly undersirable thought, that he becomes aware of himself not only as thing, doer, speaker, haver of present and past specific thoughts, but as self-identical experiencer, a continuing possibility of having as yet undetermined thoughts which will be connected to past determinate thoughts. This awareness of oneself as private, continuing, self-identical experiencing is awareness of oneself as consciousness. The person is now self-conscious.

In this way language is a necessary condition of acquiring of self-consciousness, which is in turn a necessary condition of being a person.

Language also provides much of the material of consciousness. Without language we would have no jokes, no abstract concepts like 'democracy', 'delicacy', 'holiness', 'paradigm', etc., no literature, no verbal instructions. Words give us the means of achieving concepts which pre-verbal imaging and wordless consciousness could never provide.

Words have their public side which can be used to produce corresponding concepts in others.

Could the words ever be misunderstood and provoke the wrong concept in another person? Clearly they sometimes do. We often misunderstand or fail to understand what particular words or groups of words mean. But there are many checks on word usage, and there are entailments among words and concepts which correct errors of a part. This is the fourth characteristic of words given above. The only way for misunderstanding or non-comprehension between persons to be complete would be
for the language as a whole to be misunderstood; a part of the whole would be corrigible. To say, for example, that some other person sees red as I see lavender (so that he would say "red" when I say "red" before an object called "red" by everybody, but he would be having an experience of what I call "lavender") would require that his other sense modalities be appropriately skewed. His lavender (called "red" by him) experience would have to be like the blare of a trumpet, and like a slap instead of a caress. There are analogies between sense qualities of one modality and sense qualities of other modalities which analogies are agreed upon to an extraordinary extent.

The words of a language are interrelated and form a system. Some of the words are connected, directly or by analogy, with our animal, unlearned natures, making our common animal nature a ground and check for our communication. Out of our common animal nature came the ground for understanding the child who had to learn language and to out common animal nature we return to check our understanding of words.

But if a person were to express doubt that others understood his words as he understood them, we would ask why he expresses these words without a belief that others understand him. If he were able to see that using words to express to others his doubt that others could understand his words was incoherent, and refrained from stating his misgivings aloud but kept on thinking them, we could (if we were aware of his uneasiness) try to allay his doubts by pointing out to him that the very material of his thought is constituted of concepts given to him through the
words taught to him by others. He may not remember learning all of the words he knows, but he surely will remember learning some words - from others. He would have no such miserable thought unless the means were given to him by others (who must have understood him) whose understanding he now doubts.

Such an answer is not guaranteed to satisfy him. Some people are willfully in anguish, forlornness, and despair, too much so to heed reasonable assurances. But fortunately simple people (which includes most of us) do not doubt that other persons understand words in a common shared way. Those who have fallen from the grace of believing in other persons' understanding of words being like their own should ask themselves how it is possible that they can doubt it. Where do the means of their formulating such a doubt come from? It seems to me that the means - words - plainly come from the very source being made inscrutable.

Those who give us the matter for our own thoughts and the means to self-consciousness providing total conviction each of his own personhood can hardly have their personhood and similarity to oneself impugned or one's own personhood is simultaneously impugned or made problematical. Our thoughts are full of the contributions of others present and past. We understand them; they made us what we are. Our understanding extends to whoever contributed to our ontogeny.
Summary

1. A person's behavior is observable in the way objects are observable.

2. We attribute competences and knowledge to persons on the basis of their actions.

3. Roles and statuses are logically public kinds of knowledge that we have of persons.

4. That which makes us attribute to persons personness is the consistency, variety, appropriateness, and originality of their behavior and language, including the five phenomena (self-correction, embarrassment, practicing, learning many diverse kinds of things from one another and from verbal descriptions, and lying) indicative of self-consciousness.

5. One learns about other persons through their behavior and/or from their reports.

6. Words have four characteristics which are significant for linking kinds of knowledge of persons: a) their having a public aspect, b) their referring to things besides themselves, c) their having an experienced aspect, and d) their systematic interconnectedness.

7. A conscious infant of the species Homo sapiens imitates the actions and sounds of those persons around it.

8. Some of the sounds the child imitates are words, which are distinguished from other sounds (produced by the child) by the effect on the persons around it.

9. Words learned first have public referents. That words can be learned for what is private depends on the learner's and
teachers* being members of the same animal species since these first private referents will be experiences depending on the animal organism.

10) The child learns to not express what it thinks from persons as it learned language in the first place from persons.

11) The child becomes aware of himself as doer, speaker, thinker of particular thoughts, and then consciousness.

12) Language is necessary as a means to self-consciousness and also provides much of the material of experience.
E. Responsibility

The necessary condition, responsibility, which I shall deal with in this section is a concept *sui generis*, that is, it cannot be reduced to any other concept without remainder. Though a strictly equivalent definition cannot be offered, some explanatory terms will be given, along with an analysis of what a person must be or be able to do in order to be responsible.

These are the facts to be used.

1. Sometimes approval or further rewards are given for behavior thought good.

2. Sanctions are imposable always and sometimes actually imposed for behavior thought bad.

3. Rewards are effective in encouraging people to choose the better action; sanctions are effective in deterring people from choosing the worse action.

4. The kinds of rewards and sanctions which can be effective with people are numerous and varied, e.g., teasing, hinting, shaming, persuasion, ridicule, scolding, snubbing, ostracism, isolation, threats, physical force.

5. People feel guilt and remorse for what they have said and done wrong; they apply sanctions to themselves for wrongdoing.

6. At least some of the acts thought bad are antisocial, that is, not conducive to the viability of society.
Others might have been used but I have chosen to elucidate responsibility with two related concepts, 1) agency, and 2) answerability, accountability, desert. Answerability and accountability have only the negative side of responsibility; that is, if someone has done something wrong, he is answerable or accountable for it. 'Desert' can be used when a man is to expect and receive (possibly) the deserved consequences - either reward or punishment - for his actions. The presupposition underlying both the giving of rewards and the imposing of sanctions is that people could have done otherwise than they did; and so for doing what is right they are rewarded, for doing what is wrong they are punished. If there was no alternative (for a normal person), no sanction will be imposed. Sanctions are supposed to influence persons to choose the better act between at least two alternatives.

The first, 'agency', may be understood by noting that we are thinking of this meaning when we ask, "Who did it?" The person responsible is the agent or doer of the deed.

The first sense is logically prior since it is only because people do things in this sense that we hold them deserving of punishment and reward. Responsibility in this sense is ascribed only to persons, not to objects, vegetables, or lower animals.

There is a broader sense of "responsible" which can be applied to objects, plants, and lower animals but this is not the same sense that it has when applied in the sense which it is often given in ordinary practice concerning persons.

A rug can be responsible for someone's tripping; a virus is responsible for colds; a cat is responsible for a victim-
mouse's death (in the broader sense of "responsible"). Obvious and, I think, uncontroversial is the fact that objects and plants are different from persons in that plants and objects do not have even the semblance of doing something. Sanctions cannot be applied to get them to do differently. Or if "sanction" is used in a broader sense so that pulling up a plant will count as a sanction, we may say that threats of sanctions will not get objects and plants to do differently. But in the case of animals, they do seem to do things and sanctions can be applied. In fact some thinkers would claim that there is no significant difference between the responsibility of persons and the responsibility of animals because animals can be trained, taught, conditioned (whatever term one chooses must be applied to persons too) in the same ways that persons are. They trade on the sanctions and rewards (for convenience I shall mostly limit the discussion to sanctions) being used to affect the behavior of both animals and persons. I agree that the possibility of using sanctions is crucial to responsibility and that the questions clustering around responsibility can often be illuminated by considering uses of sanctions. So since I want to claim that there is a distinctive meaning of "responsible" as applied to persons, I must show that there are differences in the use of sanctions as applied to animals and persons. I think that there are at least five differences: 1) the kinds of sanctions that can be used, 2) the ends to which such sanctions are directed, 3) who imposes the sanctions on whom, 4) the possibility of thinking about not yet actualized sanctions and of exercising
self-control to avoid such sanctions, and 5) the possibility of learning from the sanctions applied to others.

First, we should freely admit that sanctions are used on both persons and animals, and that some of the sanctions are identical. E.g., physical blows (slaps, whippings, etc.) and loud, sharply-spoken words can be used on both animals and persons. A dog may be struck or told emphatically, "Get down!" if it gets on the best chair. Similarly a person may be struck (a common form of legal punishment until recent times) or be spoken to in harsh tones.

There are more sanctions that can be directed toward both animals and persons. But however many we might find that can be, the fact remains that many can be found that can be used on persons but not on animals, e.g., logical arguments, persuasion, ridicule, ostracism, gossip, publicizing, shaming. (We could include sanctions such as imprisonment and economic sanctions. But these are not so interesting as psychological sanctions except insofar as they are psychological sanctions.) The very reasons why such sanctions cannot be used on animals are the reasons why animals cannot be responsible in the sense that persons can be.

Second. We may look at what can be achieved by means of sanctions. In the case of the dog we expect to set up such immediate connections between a particular act (in this case, sitting on the best chair) and discomfort (caused by the punishment) that the act will lapse, but we can only expect that particular act to lapse. We do not and cannot expect the dog to infer a
general rule, "Do not get on sofas, chairs, beds, etc., which you may spoil." We cannot teach a dog, or other animal, general principles of behavior. Yet this is the end to which sanctions are directed in the case of persons. There are so many intricacies to social life that teaching by applying sanctions to discourage each particular act could not cover enough ground to make the person efficient in the social realm. Persons learn general rules. One learns not to speak out and say what will hurt someone's feelings - a general rule. There is no finite list of hurtful sayings which one is given to memorize in order to avoid them. The list would have to include other ways that people can be slighted or offended, like facial expressions, exclusions or inclusions in social affairs, placing at table. A list of ways to hurt people's feelings could never be finished because there are always different situations in which hitherto unmet with ways of hurting someone's feelings appear.

A person is expected in the same manner as an animal to avoid the very act for which he was punished. But the person can generalize the point of being punished so that more acts than one will be forgone. If a person is punished for robbing a department store, he is expected to realize that the prohibition against stealing applies to robbing department stores, banks, filling stations, restaurants, etc. The importance of that "etc." cannot be over-estimated; the person is expected to extend the rule to all applicable situations even though not all are or could be mentioned explicitly in the law.

Another difference is that we expect a person to be able to
apply sanctions to himself, so that right-doing does not depend on sanctions' being imposed by some other person. One cannot expect an animal to apply any sanctions to himself in the absence of an external sanction-imposer. I knew a cat that was not allowed to get on the beds; when found on a bed it would be scolded and possibly, if the cat was too slow, slapped. The cat learned. What did it learn? Never to get on a bed if someone were present, and more, to get off a bed (as betrayed by a pussy-footed thud) when someone approached. But the cat suffered no apparent discomfort while lying undetected on the forbidden bed, nor so far as I could tell, pangs of conscience afterwards.

A person however internalizes some of the rules of behavior taught him, in the sense that he requires conformity to it from and by himself, and feels uncomfortable, deserving of punishment, if he does what he has learned is wrong, even if never found out by another person. The significance of this self-imposed sanction for the viability of society is very great; if there were not such self-imposed sanctions (we might say, internal to the person), society would have to provide external sanction-imposers at all places where it is possible to do so. There are moreover innumerable points at which deterrence from wrong-doing is needed but external sanction-imposers cannot be present, e.g., within the family, solitary occupations such as university teaching, etc. In these cases policing must be left largely to the person himself, as it actually is in the majority of situations now, even in those that could be publicly policed. If society had to rely on external sanction-imposers, society as we know it would be
impossible.

A fourth difference in the use of sanctions is that if sanctions have been used to deter an animal from an act, it refrains, if at all, automatically; a person does not have to refrain from the act automatically in order to refrain. A person can 'run through' an act (including speech acts) in his head to see what the results, outcome, consequences will be. The person can stop himself before he says aloud the sentence occurring to him which if said, would hurt someone's feelings, instead of standing by, as it were, while it comes out, and then having to heap reproaches upon himself and profuse apologies and explanations upon the injured. One has likely endured some punishment for having said what one shouldn't. So afterwards one can look ahead, even though one may not in all cases, and see that sanctions would have to be imposed again if the proposed act were actualized.

The thrust of the point I am making can perhaps be shown more clearly by drawing attention to the difference between actions refrained from automatically (which are more like animals' not doing) and actions refrained from after thought and perhaps some effort of self-control. Having been taught to eat not with one's hands in one's food but with a fork, one simply does eat with a fork, reflexively, without conscious thought, of concentration of self-discipline. But a person may meet with situations in which he does not act reflexively. A man away from home in a place where he is anonymous may have to reflect and exercise some effort if offered a tantalizing possibility of extra-marital sex (which he thinks wrong). If a sanction has not made the 'right'
course of action automatic to an animal, and it is tempted to do 'wrong', and the 'wrong' is pleasant to the animal, chances are it will do it. Animals do not and we believe cannot take thought of what they should do, nor do they exercise self-control to keep themselves from doing what will meet with sanctions.

Lastly, persons can be influenced by sanctions being applied to other persons; animals cannot learn from sanctions being applied to other animals. For persons punishment directed to one person effectively deters that person but also other persons from that action. Persons can say, "He was punished for doing that; I shall likewise be punished if I do that." Deterring others from crimes is given as a principal purpose of legal punishments for criminals. If each person had to be punished at least one time for each kind of crime before he could be deterred from it, society as we know it would again be impossible.

These five differences in the use of and results from sanctions seem obvious. Pointing out these differences was intended to show that persons are responsible in a way that animals are not. (That persons are responsible in ways that objects and plants are not was assumed to be too obvious to argue at length.) The laying-out of these differences was directed most especially to those who might want to say that persons are conditioned in just the ways that animals are conditioned, and that therefore persons are responsible only in the sense that animals are. My answer is that there are points which might indeed be said to be identical but there are significant differences between the two processes reflecting important differences between animal
and personal responsibility.

Now I should like to move on to an analysis of responsibility as it applies to persons only, making use from time to time of what has already been argued.

First. In order for punishment or rewards to be meted out for an act, that is, in order to answer for what one has done, a person must be self-identical through time. This is not often if ever explicitly stated, yet it is presupposed by what is explicitly said and also done in respect to rewards and punishments. It surely would be thought unjust, and even logically queer, if we punished a person yet said he was not the same person who committed the crime.

Because it is so fundamental this belief is one that 'goes without saying'. Since persons do with rare exceptions remain self-identical throughout a lifetime, there is no need in ordinary life for making the belief explicit. If persons were to become non-identical more frequently, such a turn of events might bring forth widespread discussion. If many or all persons became somehow discontinuous with themselves, our attributing of responsibility and giving of rewards and imposing of sanctions would undoubtedly change.

A person believes that he is the same with his past self who acted, and also that this present self shall be the same self in the future. Refraining from present (punishable) pleasures would be pointless unless one believed that the person who refrains is the same as he who will not be punished.
The way in which this self-identity is provided is important also since we not only want the person to be punished or rewarded to be the same person, but we want the person to know himself to be the same person. If it were claimed that, say, the body alone provides self-identity, then if it were known that the body of the criminal remained the same, there should be no hesitation in the inflicting of a penalty upon the body.

Suppose though that a person is apprehended who confesses to committing a crime. He is convicted, kept in custody (so we can be quite certain that the body is the same body), and while in prison loses his memory completely. Would we punish the amnesiac person for the pre-amnesiac person's crime? We would certainly want to make sure that the person was not faking his amnesia, but if we could be sure that the amnesia was not feigned but genuine, then it seems to me that we would think it improper to punish the amnesiac person, at least with any respect for desert. In the case of our hypothetical amnesiac, punishing him for the pre-amnesiac's crime could be justified only by some notion that whenever there is an offense against society, someone must be punished, and since the amnesiac is in a peculiar way more closely connected than anyone else, he must be punished. This is a strict retributive theory of punishment which we claim not to hold. Punishing the amnesiac seems to me as little justifiable as punishing the relative of a criminal which has been the practice in some societies.

In Britain and the United States the procedure in the case of other mental disorders is to have the patient treated until
he is again answerable for his behavior. For example, an insane person cannot be executed though convicted and sentenced to death.

"... for nothing is more certain in Law, than that a person who falls mad after a Crime suppos'd to be committed, shall not be try'd for it; and if he fall mad after Judgment he shall not be executed ..."  "Remarks on the Tryal of Charles Bateman" by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General in the reign of King William III, 3 State-Tryals 651, 652-53 (1719).

However quaint some of these ancient authorities of our law may sound to our ears, the Twentieth Century has not so far progressed as to outmode their reasoning. We should not be less humane than were Englishmen in the centuries that preceded this Republic. And the practical considerations are not less relevant today than they were when urged by Sir John Hawles and Hale and Hawkins and Blackstone in writings which nurtured so many founders of the Republic.


It would be in accordance with British and American law that the amnesiac be treated as a mental patient until he regain his memory and then be punished for the crime he committed earlier, since when he is suffering from amnesia he is hardly himself, since he is not aware of his being self-identical. What we want in addition to an identical body is the awareness of self-identity in the person being held responsible, the knowledge that the one being punished knows himself to be identical with the one who behaved wrongly.

This must not be construed to mean though that if one claims to be changed that his responsibility for former deeds and commitments lapses. One does not get out of keeping a promise by saying boldly, "I am not the person I was when I made the promise."
We may absolve someone from keeping a promise but he must give us more contentful reasons that will persuade us than to deny his being unaltered. His personality may be altered without his becoming a different person. And if he is the same person, and knows himself to be, he must keep the promises made by that person.

As asserted above in the section on knowledge of others, self-consciousness is achieved through responsibility for one's utterances. The two, responsibility and self-consciousness, go hand-in-hand. One cannot be held responsible for an act unless one is aware of oneself as self-identical; self-consciousness is acquired by having responsibility ascribed to oneself.

To move on to a second prerequisite of responsibility. In the section on change above we have already said something about responsibility, namely, that a person may not change in such ways and/or so much that he will be labeled immoral or irresponsible. The limits of change allowed cannot be set prior to observing the groups in which the person is to function. Limits of permitted change and areas of behavior in which one may change vary from one society to another. One can safely say that there will be limits but where they will be drawn cannot be said a priori.

On the other hand, given usual circumstances some changes are required if one is to be responsible. He must learn from the admonitions and other sanctions directed to him. He must not fall into the category 'incorrigible', because then non-changing is itself penalized.

Let us however try another thought experiment to see whether
change is unconditionally necessary in order to be responsible.

Suppose we have an ordinary (not divine) person who does not need correction. What he does, though not perfect, is adequate. Perhaps he lives alone so that small personal failings never grievously offend anyone. Would he in order to be responsible have to change? If one takes a large enough unit of time, and considers rather general modes of doing things, I think one could say that it is possible that he would not have to change. Each morning he gets up and drinks his 2½ cups of coffee; each day he goes to work and files the orders received by his department; each week he sends his clothes to the laundry; each month he goes to a concert; in the spring he plants his garden; in the fall he prunes the rose bushes. He never fails in the performance of the minimum expected of him, and so is never admonished, chidden, scolded, berated, snubbed, ostracized, arrested, etc.

For this person who is conceivable though inconceivably dull-sounding, it is possible that he could be responsible without changing his mode of life, though looking at smaller units of time, he changes, in respect to the flow of his experience, his physiological functions, and his particular actions and communications, as said above.

With most real-life people though such an even existence is impossible. Not only does the material of experience change (over which one seems to have no control), not only must he move and reply appropriately, but he must adapt himself in responsible ways to changing life conditions. (Changes in one's situation are for most people sure as death and taxes.)
One gets a job, learns how to discharge the attendant obligations responsibly, and then the job's obligations are changed or one gets a new job and has to learn to discharge the new responsibilities. If a person in the changed circumstances acts in ways appropriate to the first position, he will be judged to be not responsible.

A non-employed woman who has no occupational changes to adapt herself to must modify her character to the persons that she lives with. Married people change their ways in order to live together peaceably. People accommodate themselves to the arrival of offspring.

Changing circumstances and commitments require change from us if we are to be responsible.

It was asserted above that responsibility meant something different in the case of persons from what it meant in the case of objects, plants, or animals. Objects and plants cannot do anything, so it seems obvious that they could not be responsible in the sense that persons are. Doing something seems minimally necessary to responsibility. But since animals might be said to do things (animals are mostly self-moving), some further distinction needed to be made between animals and persons. It was allowed that sanctions can affect what animals do as sanctions affect what persons do. But there are differences between the uses and results of sanctions with respect to animals and persons. Five differences were given.

The claim is that these uses and results of sanctions which obtain only with persons indicate important aspects of responsi-
bility as applied to persons.

The question to be considered now is: what characteristics or abilities must persons have to make these facts concerning sanctions possible?

What characteristics must a person have in order to be susceptible to the range of sanctions which can be sued on persons?

He must have a body, like other animals, if physical sanctions are to be used on him. It is impossible to beat what is bodiless. The fact that the same physical sanctions can be used on persons and lower animals is based upon their being the same in respect to having bodies. This is a way in which persons and animals can be affected by the same kind of sanctions, physical ones; the similarity should not be completely ignored. Physical sanctions are likely most frequently used on children who are presumably closer to animals than adults are.

But here we are not so interested in the points of similarity as in the differences. The difference to be noted here is that more kinds of sanctions can be used on persons than animals. Persons are susceptible to what are called psychological sanctions, e.g., withdrawal of approval, taunting, ridicule, shaming, reproaching, snubbing, gossip, ostracism.

In order for persons to be susceptible to these psychological sanctions they must care about the opinions of and treatment accorded by at least some other persons. They must be gregarious or social beings, dependent on other like beings for feelings of comfort and well-being. However much of this feeling for and dependence on other persons is innate, it is surely forwarded by the
socialization process.

Persons are not islands. They are created and sustained by persons; their dependence on others never lapses. People have learned and never seriously doubt that some kinds of behavior are rewardable, and some are punishable.

What abilities must a person have to form general rules from sanctions directed against particular acts? A person must be able to generalize from a particular act to a class of acts to be avoided, to pick out what is disapproved of and see how the offense can appear in different forms.

The same kind of ability is needed to learn from the sanctions applied to others. To be restrained by a sanction applied to some other person, one has to be able to judge that the act is the same kind of act whether done by another person or oneself. One must judge that the acts and persons can be grouped in classes. That I do it must be seen to be immaterial from the standpoint of deserving punishment or reward. It is the character of the act - as possibly performed by any number of people - which makes it rewardable or punishable. (Some disapproved actions may be overlooked if the agent is highly esteemed, but the way he got to be esteemed is by doing rewardable acts and/or by avoiding disapproved acts.)

Part of this classifying ability includes the ability to go from the act to consequences. Consequences here are both natural effects in the environment as well as responses from persons. Without this classifying as to consequences, one cannot know what one is doing, i.e., one cannot behave in response to
sanctions as persons in fact behave.

And plainly the explicit awareness of not yet actual consequences which affect one's present behavior depends upon one's having the ability to think about what is future. Animals we believe cannot think about what is future; they are affected only by what is past.

For persons the ability to think about future consequences is logically separate from but logically prior to self-control which is the ability to do other, more or less, than what comes automatically. We are able to weigh the future consequences against present pleasure and to exert some pressure on ourselves to do what is desirable in terms of future effects. Persons do not act only automatically; they can envisage the future and choose among present possibilities the course of action that will make the future closer to their hearts' desire. Atomata, and in this respect animals are automata, cannot. If there is no choice among alternatives for persons, e.g., in a deterministic system (whether material, environmental, metaphysical) persons are automata. Personal responsibility is reduced to animal or material responsibility. A person contributes as a part to the event, but does not do anything.

The consideration of these various abilities brings us to the need to assert some private aspect to the person.

When sanctions are applied by others to a person, an onlooker does not have to see any effects in order for there to be some. One can feel snubbed, hurt, reproached, etc. without giving any behavioral sign of it.
When a person considers what he might do and what the consequences would be, the onlooker probably sees (and hears) nothing. Adults mostly think without speaking; their calculations go on privately.

When a person makes a firm resolve and intends to act in a way that will net him the least discomfort, only he need know about his resolution and intention. He may grit his teeth, but even if he does not, and gives no other behavioral sign, he may still have formed the intention.

If a person acts in a way that is disapproved of, either on purpose or unawares, and chastises himself, no one else need know. He may suffer secret pain for his shortcomings which no one else is cognizant of. If one denies that this private aspect exists, one denies that unpublicized self-reproach exists. Or if it is denied that this private aspect is important, one denies that applying sanctions privately to oneself is important, contrary to what is thought in ordinary life.

For all of these a person must be self-conscious, aware not only of his acts which others can observe, but also of what is private to him, which need not be given an expression, and which others will not know about unless it is given expression.

To say that there must be this private aspect to persons in order for them to be responsible (in the way that persons are responsible) is not to say that a person having only this private aspect (covering here his classifying, projecting into the future, intending to do a certain act, imposing sanctions upon himself)
and having no body could be responsible. If a person had never had a body, he would not have learned language in terms of which most of his classifying, projecting, intending, self-punishment, and self-rewarding are done. As said in Chapter 1, there is seemingly no way of getting hold of a bodiless consciousness, so there would be no way of applying sanctions to such an entity. Even the self-imposed sanctions are learned from others.

Factually it is the case that most of what persons are responsible for is the behavior of their bodies. So one needs a body to behave responsibly.

A body is necessary to learn the sanction-imposing process in the first place. But even when one has learned that and how sanctions are imposed, and generally what acts, say, incest, stealing, are punishable, one must still learn what counts as incest or stealing. If one stays in one’s native setting and there are no changes in that environment, further learning may be unnecessary; because while getting the general understanding that acts can be crimes, and that incest, e.g., is a crime, one will have learned which specific acts count as crimes, e.g., that sexual relations with one’s parent, sibling, first and second cousins but not third cousins count as incest. But if one changes one’s environment or if the environment changes, one must learn which particular acts will fall under the general heading (already understood to be punishable). It may be too that one has to learn new general headings which are thought wrong by the new group to which one now belongs or new attitudes of the original group. So one must be able to learn from others.
in order to keep up-to-date. I see no way of getting such information without a body. Lacking specific, up-to-date information the best-intentioned person may be acting brutally. If he were to realize the inapplicability of his knowledge or the possibility of his total ignorance of the persons around him, and wished not to hurt or offend them, he could only be completely stymied, unless he were able to communicate with those persons who are presently around him, which communication requires a body.

Responsibility as we understand it to apply to persons arises in a social setting; because of what is learned from persons, an individual comes to be responsible and could not acquire the abilities and characteristics needed for responsibility by himself. But once a person has what it takes to be responsible, could he, either embodied or disembodied, be responsible apart from any other persons? I think that classifying, projecting, refraining, controlling oneself, punishing oneself could go on whether or not one had a body. The self-control would be directed to controlling one's thoughts; like a saint one might say, "I must think on the glory of God." One could be answerable, not to others, but to oneself alone, knowing that some future stage (however near or far) of oneself can impose sanctions. So it seems to me an isolated person even disembodied could be responsible, but only to himself. An isolated person with a body presents no particular problem. A greater range of possible acts and sanctions would be available to him, but again, he could be responsible only to himself.
It would, I conclude, be possible for an isolated person either embodied or bodiless to be responsible once he has learned what it takes to be responsible.

The characteristics and abilities that persons normally have which allow them to be responsible in quite a different sense from other entities have been laid out. It has been asserted that a person is able to classify acts, to consider their consequences, to decide and intend to do something, to exercise self-control. To say that these abilities which only persons have are needed in order for them to be responsible is not to say that a person is responsible for only those acts which he has reflected upon and consciously intended. A person must be able to reflect upon and intentionally do some acts, but plainly many acts are done without such reflection and conscious intending. Such unreflectiveness is quicker and quite satisfactory until something goes wrong. Then if a normal person could have thought about what he was doing, he should have in order to avoid such undesirable results. The ability is enough to make the agent responsible. Actually not every act for which a person is responsible will be reflected on and consciously intended. But this actual non-reflection on every act is not sufficient to nullify his responsibility, though it may serve to lessen the punishment.

Summary

1. The use of sanctions is based on the presupposition that alternative courses are possible and that persons can be
influenced in their choice by imposable sanctions.

2. The range of sanctions which can be used on persons is greater than the range of sanctions which can be used on animals.

3. Persons learn general rules from the sanctions applied to particular acts.

4. A person can apply sanctions to himself.

5. A person can exercise self-discipline to keep himself from doing what he knows is punishable.

6. Persons can be influenced by sanctions being applied to other persons.

7. To be responsible a person must be self-identical.

8. To be responsible one must not change in ways that are judged immoral. If one is sanctioned, one must change so as to slow that one has learned from the imposition of the sanction. If one's circumstances change, one must change one's behavior accordingly.

9. Persons are affected by psychological sanctions because they are fundamentally social beings.

10. To form general rules, to learn from sanctions applied to others, to go from act to consequences requires the ability to classify acts and entities.

11. In order to be affected in one's behavior by the thought of future sanctions, i.e., to act non-automatically, alternative choices must be available and one must be able to exercise self-control.

12. Learning from sanctions, calculating, intending, sanctioning oneself require a private aspect to a person of which
he is aware.

13. The calculating, intending, self-sanctioning are done mostly in terms of language which he could not have learned if he had not had a body.

14. Lacking a body a person could not be punished by some person other than himself.

15. Most of what persons are held responsible for is bodily behavior. Without bodies this sphere of responsibility would be non-existent.

16. One needs a body to be kept informed of the attitudes of persons presently around one. Such current information is needed in order to act responsibly toward one's contemporaries.

17. An isolated person (already socialized) could be responsible to himself with or without a body.

18. A person is able to classify, to intend to act, and to exercise self-control. These abilities are necessary to responsibility but this is not to say that persons are responsible for only those acts which they have reflected upon and consciously intended.
PART II

CHAPTER 3

Part II is devoted to presenting theories of the self offered by various philosophers and an evaluation of these theories in terms of necessary conditions given in Part I.

I begin Part II with Plato because I admire his suggestiveness and breadth of concerns. His philosophy is not carefully systematic, at least not in respect to a theory of persons. There is no unified position, elaborated from one angle and then another in successive dialogues. It is rather as if he vaguely remembered what he had said before, but not being entirely satisfied with that might as well begin all over. The theory of the self was in the background; the theory of the Forms was in the foreground.

There is a single theme which does reappear, viz., the person's real nature being some kind of soul-substance. This theory seems to be an appealing one, taken over and popularized equivocally in Christian doctrine, or at least in some sects.

Plato's theory seemed to me worth considering because of its historical significance, suggestiveness, and intractability.
Plato is a difficult philosopher, not only because of the intricacy of his thought but also because of the lack of definiteness in his position. The form which he employs - the dialogue - allows him a certain looseness; his characters can change the meanings of their terms, or the argument may go off the central point, with such smoothness that the reader can be beguiled, and unless he is suspicious, not detect what is not quite right. Another advantage (for Plato) of the dialogue is that the answer given to the interrogator is often an unqualified agreement with the position offered and this agreement has a persuasive effect, so that only after one arrives at something unsatisfactory, does one go back to these affirmations to see how they should be qualified.

But in the straight-forward discussion, a definite statement is more or less discernible at least; the situation is quite different when Plato makes use of myth. Then exactly what he means is at best difficult to make out. There are undoubtedly advantages to this indefiniteness: with the myth "Plato escapes the danger of a metaphysical dogmatism, just as the artistic form of the dialogue avoids the fixity of the written word". (Paul Friedlaender. *Plato: An Introduction*. Translated from the German by Hans Meyerhoff. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 210.)

As someone wanting to expose Plato's position on a particular issue, I should like just such dogmatism and fixity. With matters as they are, I must make certain conjectures concerning what Plato was wanting to say, and since Plato did not run the
risk of seeming dogmatic, by giving fixed positions, I fear that I must often seem dogmatic in my interpretation of his writings.

Such dogmatism is all the more deplorable in my case since I have no knowledge of Greek, and am therefore at the mercy of translators and commentators for my understanding of Plato. But having owned up to my incapacities, I shall henceforth carry on as if I had no serious doubts about the interpretations I shall offer. I think Plato would have encouraged such boldness.

There is at least one matter about which there is no doubt, namely, Plato's insistence on the existence of the Forms. "The theory of Forms is commonly regarded as the centre, if not the sum, of Plato's philosophy ..." (W. F. Hardie. A Study in Plato. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1936, p. 9.) Plato offers several arguments for the existence of the Forms; I shall present only those pertinent to our problem.

First. There is the argument from recollection which Plato uses to establish both the existence of the Forms and the immortality of the soul. Plato makes two assertions of fact: 1) that through being questioned a man can evince knowledge of matters which he was never taught in this life (Meno 82-6), and 2) that some ideas, e.g., equality, are had though they could not have been produced by material objects even if they might have been brought to awareness by sensing material objects (Phaedo 74 ff.). Plato accounts for both of these phenomena with the doctrine of recollection or reminiscence. Cf. Phaedrus 249. Plato goes on
to argue from the first fact that if this knowledge displayed by a man was not acquired in this life, then it must have been learned before he was a man, and therefore the soul must have existed before it was in the man, and therefore must be immortal. (Meno 85-6) This leg of the argument is here a bit short; Plato does not go on to assert that the knowledge of all things which the immortal soul has gotten before this life must be in terms of the Forms, but in the Phaedo the mutual dependence of the immortality of the soul and the Forms is explicitly asserted. There Plato argues that when one makes use of a concept of equality, the example of the Ideas he uses, different from the imperfect equality contained in the material objects (one observes that the imperfect equality contained in the material objects aims at - as Plato puts it - absolute equality), one must conclude that he had previous knowledge of absolute equality or he could not have referred to that standard equals which are derived from the senses. The knowledge of the absolutes must therefore be prior to sense experience which began at birth. Therefore the knowledge of the standards must have been acquired before birth, so our souls must have existed without bodies.

Then Plato states explicitly the relation between the Forms and the pre-existence of the soul. Socrates says:

"Then may we not say, Simias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession - then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were"
Simias replies:

Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof. (Phaedo 76-7 I 461)

This argument establishes only existence of the soul before its life as a man, but Plato is not content with just pre-existence. He also builds an argument for immortality by combining the conclusion of the last argument (that the soul exists before birth) with the proposition that birth and coming to life can only come from death, because she has to be born again. (Phaedo 77) That the soul must continue to exist after death is a conclusion from a preceding argument in which it was asserted that all concrete things that have opposites are generated out of their opposites. Death and life are opposites. Therefore, they are generated out of one another. For if the living sprang from anything besides the dead, and if all living things must die, then all would at last be dead.

The argument from recollection may be summarized as follows: because in response to questioning one displays knowledge not acquired in this life and because one uses in relation to sense
experience absolute standards not gotten from sense experience, the soul must have had a previous existence in which it gained this knowledge of the Forms which provide the standards and the remembered knowledge.

The second argument for the Forms is based on the need for patterns at the time of creation.

... what is that which is always real and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming and is never real? That which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that becomes and passes away, but never has real being ... Now whenever the maker looks to that which is always unchanging and uses a model of that description in fashioning the form and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something that has come to be and uses a generated model, it will not be good. (All quotations from the Timaeus will be from Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato translated with a running commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1937, 29A, p. 22.)

The world is apprehensible by the senses. All that which is sensible is in a process of creation. Therefore the world was created. That which has been created will be imperfect and not fair if modelled after a created pattern and will be fair and perfect if modelled after an unchangeable pattern. But the world is fair and the creator good, therefore he must have looked to the eternal and unchanging pattern.

The consideration of the Forms as patterns has brought us to the cosmology in the Timaeus. By considering how the Demiurge made the world it may be possible to learn which other things besides the Forms Plato thought existent, and also to learn something about souls and bodies, which will be of special importance in working out Plato's theory of the self.

Plato's protects himself against a possible charge of in-
consistency by ruling out the possibility of an entirely consistent account of creation; 'we must remember that we are only human and consequently it is fitting that we should accept the likely story and look for nothing further'.

The Timaeus tells us how the Demiurge formed the body of the world from earth, air, fire, and water (31-2), and "in the centre he set a soul and caused it to extend throughout the whole and further wrapped its body round with soul on the outside". (34B, p. 58) But the soul is not younger than the body, but "prior to body and more venerable in birth and excellence", made "to be the body's mistress and governor." (34C, p. 59)

The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its composition were as follows: (1) Between the indivisible Existence that is ever in the same state and the divisible Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third form of Existence composed of both. (2) Again, in the case of Sameness and in that of Difference, he also on the same principle made a compound intermediate between that kind of them which is indivisible and the kind that is divisible in bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he blended them all into a unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it was to mingle, into union with Sameness, and mixing them together with Existence. (35A, pp. 59-60.)

My interpretation of this is like Cornford's (pp. 60-66). Bodies have divisible Existence, divisible Sameness, divisible Difference. Souls (the World-Soul and individual souls which are compounded from the same ingredients but not so "pure" as we shall see) have intermediate Existence, intermediate Sameness, intermediate Difference, and "belong to both worlds and partake of both being and becoming." (P. 63) There are four species contained in the ideal living creature; these species are: gods, winged things, watery species, and land creatures. The Demiurge himself makes only the gods, and turns over the task of making
the others to the gods, since if he himself "gave them birth and life, they would be equal to gods." (41C, p. 140) The Demiurge will provide the divine seed.

... he turned once more to the same mixing bowl wherein he had mixed and blended the soul of the universe, and poured into it what was left of the former ingredients, blending them this time in somewhat the same way, only no longer so pure as before, but second or third in degree of purity. And when he had compounded the whole, he divided it into souls equal in number with the stars, and distributed them, each soul to its several star. (41 D-E, p. 142)

We must know what the World-Soul is made of to know what individual souls are made of since the ingredients are the same. We can see from this passage that what is to become human souls is mixed all together in one bowl, one mixture, which is uniform throughout, and divided up into separate souls equal in number to the stars. (42A) In the first incarnation each soul would be a man. If he lives well for "his due span of time" (42B, p. 144), he goes back to his star, but "failing this, he should shift at his second birth into a woman", and can be further demoted to various beasts (appropriate to his failings), until he control irrationality, and return "once more to the form of his first and best condition". (42B, p. 144)

Souls must "be implanted in bodies". It is quite clear that in the Timaeus souls and bodies are created separately, the soul existing on a star before embodiment.

Plato occasionally writes of a man as being a composite, e.g., "... is not one part of us body, another part soul?" (Phaedo 79 I 463) Or he may relate body and soul in an intimate dependent way:
... not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. (Republic 403 I 667)

... but to see her (the soul) as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity ... (Republic 611 I 869)

... the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. (Theaetetus 185 II 188)

There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains. (Philebus 46 II 381)

It might be thought that the tripartite division offered in the Republic is a description bridging body and soul, the reasoning faculty (only) being the soul, and the spirited and appetitive elements belong to the body. But there are at least four places in the Republic where these three aspects of a person are aspects of the soul, namely, 435, 436, 442, and 580.

Though there are these statements treating man as a composite of body and soul, much more often Plato seems to want to draw a distinction between body and soul, not merely to distinguish them but to make them independent and self-sufficient.

If you were going to commit your body to someone, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of you all, — about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with anyone of us who are your companions. (Protagoras 313 I 85)

... our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelli
... the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and ... the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. (Phaedo 80 I 465)

The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body ... (Phaedo 82 I 468)

Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in life. (Gorgias 524 I 584)

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also in degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him... (Republic 469 I 733)

There are more places where Plato makes body and soul independent; see also: Charmides 156-7, Lysis 218, Phaedrus 250, 270, 271, Crito 47-8, Phaedo 65-6, 70, Gorgias 512, Republic 591.

There can hardly be any doubt that Plato treats body and soul as each independent of the other.

But which did he think was the real self? Fortunately, one does not have to rely on interpretation only for he says:

... you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you... I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument: he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body... you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only... (Phaedo 115-6 I 499)

Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are
is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our shades or images; for the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods. (Laws 959 II 693)

In the following bit of dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades, I omit the acquiescent replies of Alcibiades which do not forward the argument.

Soc. And does not a man use the whole body? ... And that which uses is different from that which is used? ... Then a man is not the same as his own body?
Al. That is the inference.
Soc. What is he, then? ... You can say that he is the user of the body. ... And the user of the body is the soul? ...
Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally granted. ... That man is one of three things. ... Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. ... But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man? ...
... And does the body rule over itself? ... It is subject, as we were saying? ... Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
Al. It would seem not.
Soc. But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body and that consequently that this is man?
Al. Very likely.
Soc. The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. ...
... But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? ... Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? ... now instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?
Al. There is nothing.
Soc. Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul? ... And that is just what I was saying before - that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. ... He who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul? ...
He whose knowledge only extends to the body knows the things of man, and not the man himself? (Alcibiades I 129-31 II 765-6)

Here are explicit statements and a long argument asserting that the real self is the soul, that to know anyone really, one must
know his soul, and that knowing the body is knowing the tool or possession of the soul.

If one wants to say that the soul is between the Forms and particulars, one still needs to give an account of how it can be known. Someone else might be more insightful or more ingenious, but I do not find any clear indications of how we could know something falling between the Forms and particulars.

But suppose someone were to argue that quotations given above also indicate (perhaps not quite so definitely) that Plato wanted the self to be an irreducible composite of body and soul, and that with quotations to support both positions one may choose either as being Plato with as much justification. My reply would be that if one of two mutually exclusive positions must be chosen, the one having the support of systematic considerations should be chosen.

That which is most Platonic in Plato's philosophy is, I would contend, the Forms. So that if there is a choice between a position consistent with the statements concerning the Forms, and a position inconsistent with such statements, the former should be preferred. This is the situation with the two possible theories of the self: the self's being really soul is consistent with the Forms, while the self's being an irreducible composite of body and soul is not. Plato gives the reason why:

... this composition of the soul and body is called a living and mortal creature ... immortal no such union can reasonably be believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. (Phaedrus 246 I 251)

The composition that consists of body and soul then cannot be "reasonably" believed to be immortal. How is immortality related
to the Forms? Immortality, or at least existence of the soul prior to its union with the body, is required in order to make knowledge which must be in terms of the Forms possible. The Forms cannot be brought to mind de novo by objects of sense,
therefore the soul must have known these Forms (which it recol-
lects) in a previous existence. The necessary connection be-
tween Immortality and the existence of the Forms has been con-
sidered above (pp. 147-8). The Phaedo 76-7 quotations given there show that Plato himself thought that there was a neces-
sary connection between the pre-existence of the soul and the existence of the Forms. The first reason then for requiring the real self to be soul is so that we can have knowledge of the Forms.

The second reason for retaining the kind of self that may be immortal may be a less telling one, depending on what one thinks most fundamental in Platonic philosophy. It is: immor-
tality must be a characteristic of the self or there will be no guarantee that a person will get the just deserts of his life. This is an ethical consideration, as over against the metaphysical-epistemological one relating to the Forms. But if one thinks that Plato's earliest and most earnest effort was spent on questions of valuation, then the making possible of judgment in the after-life would be accorded a high rank in the selection of what to keep.

In at least five dialogues, Phaedo 81-2, 107-8, Gorgias 472-3, 523-7, Republic 614-21, Phaedrus 249, Timaeus 42, Plato asserts that a man is judged after death for the life he has lived, so that virtue is rewarded and evil is punished even if if hasn't been in this life.

These are the two systematic reasons which can be given for maintaining that immortality must be able to be attributed
to the real self, which requires in turn that the soul alone be taken to be the real self.

What characteristics can be attributed to the soul? "Self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul..." (Phaedrus 245 I 250). "The soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable" and "invisible". (Phaedo 80 I 465) "We cannot believe - reason will not allow us - the soul in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity." (Republic 611 I 869)

This is the way Plato describes the soul when giving an explicit statement about what the soul is. But I think Plato was ambivalent in that he presents a quite different conception of the metaphysical nature of the soul when what it must be is only implicit. Plato was, among other things, a moralist, and therefore must have believed that the soul was amenable to improvement. How could one exhort men to be virtuous (e.g., Gorgias 527) unless one believed that men could change voluntarily? His ambivalence on this matter of changeability is indicated by his doubts and contradictions relating to the question whether men could become more virtuous. There are several discussions concerning whether virtue can be learned or not. In the Laches, Meno, and Protagoras he expresses doubt that virtue can be learned. Yet in the Sophist (228-9) and Phaedo (107), he asserts that virtue can be learned. If, as he concludes in the Meno (99-100 I 380) "virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous", then it hardly
seems fair to judge a man for his being virtuous or not, if success or failure is predetermined by the gods. So if Plato repeatedly urges men to live better lives, and if, as he frequently asserts, men will be rewarded in the after-life for the virtue or vice they achieve, then it seems inescapable that Plato would have to hold that the soul must be able to acquire characteristics voluntarily.

Besides the voluntary changing of the soul's characteristics, another kind of alteration must be allowed for. In the myths concerning the after-life (Phaedrus 248-50, Phaedo 113-4, Gorgias 524-5, Republic 614-21, Timaeus 41-2), the souls are judged for their lives on earth, and spend a certain amount of time receiving the rewards of their earthly lives during which time the soul is cleansed of its evil. Then the soul chooses another lot, and drinks from the river which causes it to forget its former life. These changes happen to the soul willy-nilly. Since these changes in the underworld occur when the soul is not longer attached to a body, the changeability of the soul cannot be attributed solely to the body. The soul, in and of itself, must change. The soul must change also if it is to forget and remember the Forms.

So there are three reasons internal to the system giving rise to dissatisfaction with Plato's description of the soul as unchangeable. The first is that voluntary alterability must be allowed if moral discourse is to be taken seriously and if moral judgment is to be fair. The second reason is that Plato describes changes which the soul undergoes in the after-life.
Third: the soul must change as it forgets and remembers the Forms. These changes which the soul undergoes are not of course possible if the soul is unchangeable.

The question of changeability of the soul is closely related to the next problem: the soul's immortality. When Socrates in the Phaedo wishes to comfort the people with him who are saddened by his approaching death, he assures them that the soul is immortal and that he - as soul - would exist after the body was dead. But how long would he be himself? It may be that he would, as himself, a philosopher who sought after the Forms and lived righteously, go to dwell on a star forever. But for the rest, they remain the persons they are for approximately 1100 years (Republic Book X) and then draw lots for a new life and new identity, either human or animal. How much comfort would it be to be assured that the soul as someone or some creature will be immortal? In Plato's account no one stays himself forever, since the former identity is forgotten when one sets out on the new life conforming to the lot one has chosen. To say that the soul who makes a unique individual alive is immortal does not seem to be the same as saying that the unique individual is immortal. The consequences of saying that the soul chooses a new life is that no recognizable individual is immortal. A person doesn't have a soul to call his own.

Now the relation between changeability and immortality can be seen. If the soul is immortal, it must be changeable, becoming different persons in turn. If the soul is unchangeable to the extent of remaining the same person (though still having to
allow for moral alteration within the identity), and if one calls this identity unchangeability, then the soul must be mortal, since it gives up this identity after a span of years here on earth and in the underworld.

The meaning that Plato gives to "soul" seems to alternate between "the liveness present in each animal which leaves the animal upon death and goes to the underworld" and "consciousness including its abilities and what has been learned". The liveness is unchanging, and being liveness is immortal. But if one considers the soul to be only liveness, then the soul cannot be itself aware since bare liveness does not seem to be the sort of thing that can be aware. Undifferentiated liveness clearly is not the whole of a person.

If by "soul" we take Plato to mean "consciousness, its abilities and what has been learned", then a soul-person has more content but could not be either unchangeable or immortal. Its content is still extremely limited since no way of connecting the soul has been given, and even the necessity of this connection has been denied, so none of the content of the soul can be dependent on the body. This has far-reaching implications. True, the soul has perceived the Forms, but it has also forgotten them and has to be reminded. The means of being reminded can be neither sense-perception of particular instances of the Forms (because sense perception depends on the body) nor dialectic with other persons because knowledge of or communication with other persons is impossible. (This is to be shown immediately below.)

Consciousness can think but it would seem that all it can
think about is its ability to think and that there are many other things to think about, if only it could remember. There is no means of its coming to realize that it is unique.

What can a soul-person know about other individual and unique soul-persons? Nothing.

Adhering strictly to Platonic terminology, we cannot have knowledge of any particular soul because one have knowledge only of the unchangeable Forms. There are no Forms for individual souls (Parmenides 130; David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1951, pp. 79, 141), but only a Form "Soul" which includes what is common to all souls, and after which the mixture, afterwards divided into separate souls, was patterned. So there would not be Forms for individuals. By thinking on the Form "Soul", if we can get so far as to remember any Forms at all, we can know the characteristics that belong to all souls as portions of the original mixture. We can know the Forms of Justice, Temperance, Courage, etc. but we cannot know the degree of these virtues in any one soul, and so cannot identify a soul, or have any knowledge of any soul as unique via the Forms.

If Plato had not insisted so strenuously on the separate-ness and self-sufficiency of body and soul (see quotations pp. 152-3), he could have allowed for opinion which needs the help of sense (Timaeus 27-8 is one place where Plato characterizes opinion in this way) concerning the soul. But as it is, the soul is required for the life of the body but the soul does not need the body for anything. One must not rely on the body to
express the soul (Alcibiades I 130). The body seems to be the case or wrapping required "by necessity" but why the body should express the soul or how the body could express the soul if each is different from the other and self-sufficient is no where said.

So if it is the case that there are no Forms of individual souls, one cannot have knowledge (in the strict sense) of an individual. And if body does not reflect soul and is not required for judging the soul (bodiless after death), then one cannot rely on the body for learning about the invisible soul, so one cannot have opinions about the soul.

Of course, Plato thought about how one could learn about the soul. In the Phaedo (255 I 259) he suggests, "the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself ...", but unless he tells us how to behold the lover (beholding his body will not do) the loved one still cannot behold his own soul.

Plato is not content with such cryptic statements; he offers a longer discussion in the Alcibiades I. I quote the whole discussion since I would not want it to appear that I am treating Plato in a cavalier fashion on such an important point. (I shall again omit Alcibiades answers which add no clarification to the problem.)

Soc. But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul? - For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
Al. What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose. ... Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, "See thyself" what is the nature and meaning of this
precept? Would not his meaning be: That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself? ... And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

Al. Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. Soc. Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes? ... Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking? ... Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? ... And if the soul ... is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? ... And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? ... Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself? ... And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil? ... You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his? ... Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves? ... And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings? ... And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

Al. Very true. (Alcibiades I 132-3 II 768-70)

At first glance this seems to offer some promising suggestions. The analogy of knowing the soul with seeing leads one on in the hope that the eye of the soul and what is supposed to be 'seen' will be explained or elaborated. But this hope is disappointed; one only learns that one must look at the divine part of the soul and the whole class of things divine, and one cannot but be more discouraged by the observation that without knowing the soul, one cannot know his own or others' possessions. To look at the class of divine things means, I take it, to look at the Forms which as has already been determined will give us
knowledge about the soulness common to all men but not knowledge about individual souls.

The analogy of 'seeing' with seeing is one of Plato's favorites. He had used it before in the Republic:

... But to see her (the soul) as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body, and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity. (Republic 611 I 869)

What is one to 'see'? Contemplating a Form of soul has been found to be inapplicable to individual souls, and 'seeing' the soul by using one's bodily eyes has been ruled out also.

It seems that one must conclude that it is not possible to learn about individual souls. Plato fails in his efforts to explain how one may have knowledge or opinion about the soul.

There is evidence that Plato thought the concern with individualities undesirable and unphilosophical:

For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer from any other. (Theaetetus 174 II 176-7)

Here Plato is at the least deprecating a philosopher's interest in his neighbours, and asserting that the essence of Man - that common to all men - is the philosopher's business. His attitude toward the plurality of individuals comes out in another place:

The true lover of knowledge is always striving after being. He will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only. (Republic 490 I 750-1)

If one views the multiplicity of individuals as appearances, i.e., as something not really real, one denies the real unique-
ness of himself and others.

As for knowledge - the philosopher contemplates the Form, Soulness, and knows this is real and necessarily present in all men. The appearing individualities he has no way of apprehending, since there is no way for the soul's appearances to appear, either directly or through the body.

Changeability is explicitly denied as well as assumed. But though there are reasons for requiring both changeability and changelessness, no means of allowing real change are described.

One can only conclude that changeable, knowable individualities are intellectually unaccounted for; they are simply relegated to an inferior status.

Frankly I should like some other conclusion, as I feel sure many students and admirers of Plato would. But I do not see how any other alternative is possible, while keeping the Forms and the epistemology following from and required by the theory of the Forms and Plato's ethics. My exposition and criticism of Plato's theory of the self seems excessively simple-minded, but whatever subtleties and sophistications I try to introduce always incorporate unfaithfulness to a central doctrine. I have no alternative but to wait to see this view of Plato shown wrong making way for another view which does not have to retain these objectionable elements, or failing this to have this view accepted but incorporated into a more adequate theory of the self in a way I have not been able to do. I am encouraged in my attempts by Plato's urging Theaetetus to be bold, counseling not caution but courage.
Summary

1. Plato’s first concern was to account for knowledge which he does by means of the theory of the Forms.
2. In order to know the Forms, the soul must be immortal.
3. All souls come from a single uniform mixture; they are therefore identical one with another and there is no distinguishing between any two souls.
4. According to Plato the person is really his soul.
5. The person must really be soul in order that a) the person can know the Forms which could be known only by an immortal soul, and b) the person in the afterlife can get the just deserts for his deeds.

6. The soul is defined as unchangeable, but must change a) if moral discourse is to be taken seriously, b) if the soul is to undergo the changes in the underworld, and c) if it is to forget and remember the Forms in the way that Plato describes.

7. If the soul is unchangeable, "soul" seems to mean "liveness" in which case any individual identity or consciousness is impossible.

8. If "soul" means "consciousness with its abilities and learned content", then it is changeable but not immortal. How the mind unconnected to the body remembers the Forms is not given and would seem to be impossible within the system.

9. If the soul is consciousness, its abilities and what it has learned, the person can be aware of himself as thinking.

10. If a person's soul is not connected in any necessary way with his body, he has no way of knowing, or being known by, any other soul.
In this chapter I shall present and evaluate the theories of Hume, Whitehead, and Leibniz. I treat these three together because all of them claimed that a person was really experience, or made up of some entity or entities constituted of experience. I use these three together also because Whitehead shares with each of the other two a striking similarity so a certain economy is affected by pairing up two philosophers, showing that their views on a particular issue are the same, and criticizing this view. One thereby reveals the weakness in two philosophers' views with one expose.

Hume's theory is in fact presented as a theory of persons. Whitehead's and Leibniz's theories are parts of general metaphysical systems. Hume's theory is more compactly presented, less piecing together and constructing has to be done, at least if one takes him at his word. In the sections of the Treatise of Human Nature in which Hume discusses the problems related to persons, he makes certain explicit claims. In other places where what he would say the person is remains implicit, markedly different beliefs seem to appear. But mostly these implicit views would not fit with his explicit statements. I restrict
myself therefore to the explicit theory.

Whitehead, at first glance and long afterward, has an apparently inscrutable metaphysical system. His theory is spread out and needs to be constructed. (Much of what I say about Whitehead is taken from my M.A. thesis, The Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead in Relation to Certain Experiences of the Self, written under the direction of Arthur E. Murphy at The University of Texas in 1959.)

Leibniz's theory of persons too needs some, but far less, making explicit. I rely on his Monadology.

For Hume a person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."

(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, p. 252. Since all the references will be to this Selby-Bigge Edition of the Treatise, I shall give only page numbers.)

All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. (252)

He is denying any consciousness (which is what he most often means by "self" though sometimes he uses "self" as if he meant it to be equivalent to "person") to which particular perceptions belong. The reason he denies a self is that he never observes it, but rather when he enters most intimately into what he calls himself, he always stumbles on some particular perception or other. Hume means by "perception" "experience".
Hume does not mention body at all as part of a person but I shall not make much of this because in this place where he writes most explicitly of what persons are, he is trying to give an account of personal identity, especially to deny that it is the self which provides identity. He does not take the trouble to deny that it is the body which provides personal identity.

So when he writes throughout this section, "Of Personal Identity", about perceptions, it is perceptions experienced by the person privately of his own that are connected so as to provide for his endurance through time not one person's, A's, perceptions of another person, B, providing B's identicalness.

The perceptions are logically separate. How are they connected? By relations of "resemblance and causation".

To begin with resemblance; suppose that we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; 'tis evident that nothing could more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations. For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among perceptions. The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others. (260-1)

We could ask whether Hume is entitled to 'memory' any more than another philosopher is entitled to 'self'. There is no impression of 'memory', only remembered experiences. But there is no need to force Hume on the basis of his avowed sensation-
alism to give up 'memory' as the means of connecting perceptions so as to produce identity because Hume gives it up himself.

As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the first of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3d of August 1733? Or will he affirm, that because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most establish'd notions of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. "*Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory." (261-2)

Memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our perceptions. Now the real connector among experiences is cause and effect.

Only a little examination of our intimate selves will show perceptions occurring which are not connected causally to the preceding perceptions, at least not in the sense that Hume needs. I sit here writing. Suddenly the atmosphere is split by a sonic boom produced by a jet plane breaking the sound barrier. The experience of the boom is not produced by or an effect of the experiences which went before. If it were, I would not be so startled. How could an experience of comparatively orderly thinking of Hume's philosophy be the cause of the experience of
The sonic boom? The sonic boom is classifiable because of concepts learned earlier, but to count any concept learned at some earlier time as a remembered concept, therefore connected to other experiences by memory even if one cannot remember learning the concept, i.e., has no impression of learning the concept, would be to give up both Hume's sensationalism and atomism which he did not want to do.

Nor can one say that one has a concept gotten from no experience in particular. If Hume were to allow this, the philosophers wanting to claim a self would say the concept of self is gotten from all of the experiencedness which accompanies every experience.

To say that causation is the connection among perceptions is to be forced to allow that whatever experiences are not causally related to preceding experiences of which one retains the impressions are not part of the same person. Hume has pointed out the absurdity of such a result in his objection to memory's providing identity. This would, as he says, "overturn all the most establish'd notions of personal identity".

Hume's account is defective. He says so himself in the appendix to the Treatise. (His extraordinary candour is to be lauded.) He shows us just what is wrong.

First he gives us the sensationalist principle: "every idea is derived from preceding impressions." But "we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense." (633)
Next the atomistic principle and its application to perceptions.

Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceiv'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity. (634)

Coming to himself.

When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self. (634)

This principle I shall call the experientialist principle. It may be stated as: the self is made up only of experiences.

So far then Hume has all ideas coming only from impressions, all perceptions existent as separate entities, no impression of a unitary self, and the self constituted wholly of separate perceptions, the composition of which make up the self.

But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions are ever discoverable by human understanding. (635)

He concludes:

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend
not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflexsions, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions. (636)

His reasoning is valid and so far as I know Hume found no way of resolving these difficulties. And if one maintains the facts and principles that he does, I cannot see that one can account for personal identity, the enduringness of the same person from birth to death.

The defectiveness of Hume's account becomes more patent if one tries to say anything further about a person.

If there is no enduring identity to a person, it cannot be that a person changes. All one has are perceptions changing. An experiential atomistic account of persons will always suffer from this defect unless the separate perceptions can be connected.

The fundamentalness of personal identity can be seen too if one attempts to say how a person could have self-knowledge or knowledge of others. The present perception is known, and (let us grant) some past perceptions are remembered and/or causally related to the present one. Can one say about this broken chain of experiences all one wants to say about oneself? Can this broken chain of experiences be known by others? Hume would to all appearances have the mind-body problem.

But even in those areas where what is experienced privately would be enough for the kind of knowledge, say, intentions to think such-and-such, how could one get the right hold on future perceptions? One cannot know that the present perception
will cause any subsequent perception nor that the present perception will be remembered. The relation between perceptions are so chancy. We cannot know other people will have specific characteristics just because they had or have them. There is no thrust into the future.

When it comes to responsibility, such contingency would cancel much of what we require. If I cannot be sure of being able to continue so as to carry out what I intend, how can I require any effort from myself? The present self may be replaced by a new self. What difference would it make to me whether that new self is punished or rewarded?

Summary

1. Hume's theory of persons is sensationalistic (that is, all ideas, including that of self, must come from impressions), atomistic (all perceptions are logically separate), and experiential (the self is made up of perceptions).

2. Hume denies that he has any impression of a continuing self, so he must connect in some other way the separate impressions to give an identity to the self.

3. He suggests causation or resemblance (provided by memory) but himself decides that these are defective.

4. No principle to provide identity can be given within the Humeian system.

5. Without identity, neither change, self-knowledge, knowledge of others nor responsibility can be accounted for.
Whitehead's account is likewise atomistic and experientialist but not sensationalist. His theory must be deduced from his general metaphysical system.

All of reality is constituted of actual occasions. The "actual entities - also termed 'actual occasions' - are the final real things of which the world is made up." There is nothing more real or more fundamental. Even "God is an actual entity". What are these actual entities? They are "drops of experience, complex and interdependent." (Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, New York, The Humanities Press, 1957, p. 28. Henceforth I shall refer to this book as PR.) This is Whitehead's atomism and experientialism.

With his 'ontological principle', Whitehead insists that "everything in the world is referable to some actual entity" (PR 373) or stated another way that "actual occasions form the ground from which all other types of existence are derivative and abstracted" (PR 116). This principle together with the definition of actual entities as "drops of experience" indicates that if we understand what the experience of actual occasions is, we can understand the entire universe.

In Whiteheadian language, experience is prehension, a broader term than (sense) perception or conscious apprehension. Every actual entity is some group of prehensions.

The becoming or concrescence of an actual entity is termed its formal existence; this is what it is for itself. The having become or concrete is termed the objective existence; this is what it is for others. All actual entities have both
All actual entities besides God are limited in time. They endure for a period of time and then perish. This period of time cannot be more than one half second. How are the actual occasions connected to form a self-identical enduring person? Whitehead certainly wanted to allow for personal identity.

Yet personal unity is an inescapable fact. ... Any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity. In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man, from birth to death. The two modern philosophers who most consistently reject the notion of a self-identical Soul-Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem remains for them, as it does for the philosophy of organism, to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance. ... This personal identity is the thing which receives all occasions of the man's existence. (Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, New York, Mentor Books, 1958, pp. 188-9. Henceforth I shall refer to this book as AI.)

But can he make room for personal identity within his system?

To give an answer we can begin by giving the kinds of perception allowed. There are for Whitehead two modes of perception: Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy and Perception in the Mode of Presentational Immediacy. The two are not of equal importance; Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy is the more important and is the basis for Perception in the Mode of Presentation Immediacy, which is mainly a characteristic of more advanced organisms.

Whitehead characterizes perception in the mode of causal efficacy in this way:

This direct perception, characterized by mere subjective responsiveness and by lack of origination in the higher phases, exhibits the constitution of an actual entity under the guise of receptivity. In the language of causation, it describes the efficient causation operative
in the actual world. In the language of epistemology, as framed by Locke, it describes how the ideas of particular existents are absorbed into the subjectivity of the percipient and are the datum for its experience of the external world. In the language of science, it describes how the quantitative intensity of localized energy bears in itself the vector marks of its origin, and the specialities of its specific forms; it also gives a reason for the atomic quanta to be discerned in the building up of a quantity of energy. (PR 178-9)

Two uses of the concept of causal efficacy are pertinent here; they are causality and receptivity. The efficient causality within the self, i.e., subjective causality, is entirely included within receptivity.

According to this account, perception in its consciousness of the causal efficacy of the external world by reason of which the percipient is a concrescence from a definitely constituted datum. The vector character of the datum is this causal efficacy.

Thus perception, in this primary sense, is perception of the settled world in the past as constituted by its feeling-tones, and as efficacious by reason of those feeling tones. Perception, in this sense of the term, will be called 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy.' Memory is an example of perception in this mode. For memory is perception relating to the data from some historic route of ultimate percipient subjects $M_1$, $M_2$, $M_3$, etc., leading up to $M$ which is the memorizing percipient. (PR 184)

From these two passages concerning causal efficacy we see that the datum is given in the mode of causal efficacy and that this datum is the "raw material" for the concrescence.

This datum, which is the primary phase in the process constituting the actual entity, is nothing else than the actual world itself in its character of a possibility for the process of being felt. (PR 101)

Perception in this mode is causal because of the vector character to a feeling, the indicating of direction. The vector quality of the feelings show where the feelings have come from. That this mode of perception includes memory is consonant with causal ef-
ficacy's being the mode in which the datum is perceived by the actual entity in its formal constitution. This may be understood intuitively if one thinks of remembering past instants that make up one's present self.

The other mode of perception, presentational immediacy is not entirely separate.

Presentational immediacy is an outgrowth from the complex datum implanted by causal efficacy. ... The supplemental phase lifts the presented duration into vivid distinctness, so that the vague efficacity of the indistinct external world in the immediate past is precipitated upon the representative regions in the contemporary present. (PR 262)

If there can be no new datum perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy but only the same datum (of the past) perceived in the mode of causal efficacy, there can be no prehension of contemporary concrescent actual occasions.

But if it is not contemporary actual entities which are perceived, what is it that is perceived in this mode? The answer is extensive relations. These extensive relations which are prehended make up the extensive continuum, Whitehead's alternative to Newton's absolute space. The extensive continuum is derived or abstracted from the ordered world, and has no reality apart from actual entities. Presentational immediacy gives us information about extensive relations of the contemporary world but not about the actual feelings of actual entities as individual.

From what has been given concerning perception in the mode of causal efficacy and perception in the mode of presentational immediacy, one conclusion may be drawn here, namely,
that there can be no mutual prehension by actual entities, or in other words, that prehension is an asymmetrical relation. The reasons for this can be reviewed. Causal efficacy gives data about past actual entities; presentational immediacy gives only bare extensive regions so that perception of concrescent contemporaries is ruled out. Only contemporaries, that is, actual entities enjoying formal existence in the same duration, could prehend each other, but prehension of actual entities must always be of past actual entities.

The analysis of the formal constitution, or concrescence, is called "genetic analysis"; the analysis of the concrete, or what has become, is called the "morphological or coordinate analysis". "The four stages constitutive of an actual entity ... can be named, datum, process, satisfaction, decision." (PR 227) The datum is given in the mode of causal efficacy and is made up of earlier actual entities. The initial datum includes the whole of the antecedent world. Some past actual entities are more relevant than others. Some actual past entities are positively prehended, that is, go to make up the objective datum. Other actual entities are negatively prehended, that is, excluded from contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. The subjective aim determines which actual occasions will be included and which excluded. The initial datum minus what is negatively prehended (excluded) is the objective datum. The subjective form is how the actual occasion feels about the objective datum.

If the subjective aim controls the entire concrescence
including the subjective form the subjective aim must be novel because each concrescence must be novel. The same aim cannot be held by any two actual occasions. (PR 354)

The subjective aim must always be sized to one actual entity, not to several of them since the aim must be satisfied at the end of one concrescence.

Thus the notion of 'order' is bound up with the notion of an actual entity as involving an attainment which is a specific satisfaction. This satisfaction is the attainment of something individual to the entity in question. (PR 129)

The problem which the concrescence solves is, how the many components of the objective content are to be unified in one felt content with its complex subjective form. This one felt content is the 'satisfaction,' whereby the actual entity is its particular individual self; ... In the conception of the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its individual separation from other things. (PR 233)

The importance of this requirement will be seen when the attempt is made to connect actual occasions in such a way as to provide for an enduring person.

A person is a society which is one kind of nexus (plural nexus). A nexus is a set of actual occasions unified by prehensions which can be qualified by one or more eternal objects. Eternal objects are ideas (rather like Platonic Forms) prehended by the antecedent nature of God. (Eternal objects could not be self-subsistent, independent of all experiencers, as Platonic Forms can be because this would violate Whitehead's ontological principle. Cf. above p. 175.)

A 'society,' in the sense in which that term is here used, is a nexus with social order; and an 'enduring object,' or 'enduring creature,' is a society whose social order has
taken the special form of 'personal order.' ... A nexus enjoys 'person order' when (α) it is a 'society,' and (β) when the genetic relatedness of its members orders these members 'serially.' ... Thus the nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining characteristic. (PR 50-1)

A society is not a kind of entity which exists independent of actual entities. A society or nexus is made up of actual entities and the description of 'societies' and 'nexuses' cannot be contrary to or independent of what can be said about actual occasions. Whitehead explicitly says: "the society is only efficient through its individual members." (PR 139) A society has no formal existence as a society, but has only objective existence. A society after the satisfactions of its members (after their perishing) has existence as one, but has formal existence only as a plurality. Providing the order of a society from the plurality of its members is another way of stating the problem of the enduring identity of the self.

The society-self has an identity because of 1) a complex eternal object inherited by all the members, and 2) the genetic relatedness of its members. The actual occasions forming the society must share a common character.

The members of the society are alike because, by reason of their common character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness. (PR 137)

This statement says that the common character may be "imposed" on the members of the society. But Whitehead does not want to always maintain that the character can be imposed on the members, in the sense that their own present subjective form is determined by the antecedent members of the society. He some-tim
says that the given is "imposed" (AI 204, 205) on the concrescent actual occasion, and sometimes says that the given "energizes" the present (AI 184), and also says that the given "allows" (PR 127) the concrescent actual occasion to become what it does. If the complex form providing unity can be imposed on the members of the society so the response is pre-determined, there cannot be a novel subjective form as required (PR 131, 159, 355, 354). The subjective form is always given with a 'vector' quality as coming from 'there'. An earlier subjective form does not have to be positively prehended, it may be negatively prehended. If it is positively prehended, it is prehended first as another's feeling and only is ordered into the present subject's objective datum (i.e., made its own) "by introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end." (PR 127) The subjective form for the concrescent actual entity can only be determined in relation to its own subjective aim, so the the identical form (which violates the requirement that the subjective form be novel) can be present within a society only if the appropriate aims are present within each member of the society.

The subjective aim for each actual occasion comes from God (this will be shown below in relation to responsibility), so to the extent that the identity of the self (society) is possible, it rests on God's giving the same subjective aim to successive actual occasions.

This identity of subjective form depending upon God's giving the proper subjective aim throughout the society is, however, as has been pointed out, inconsistent with his (Whitehead's) require-
ment that the subjective form be novel. It will be recalled that the order of a society was to depend on two factors: 1) the complex eternal object inherited by all of the members (which has been criticized) and 2) the genetic relatedness among the members. This second factor then might be offered as a basis for order among the actual occasions constituting a society, since the first requires that some part of Whitehead's system be repudiated. Can the process of inheritance then provide order? To point up the meaning of this possibility one may ask the question: if there can be no aspect of the actual entity, the inheritance of which can provide for endurance, could inheritance itself be the basis of order? Whitehead gives an unequivocal answer: "'Order' means more than 'givenness,' although it presupposes 'givenness,' 'disorder' is also 'given.'" (PR 127) I take this to mean that the givenness of any datum would connect it to the past, but would not insure continuation of an ordered nexus. Societies disintegrate though there is inheritance. If there is disorder in the universe, it has to be the result of inheritance from the past which indicates that what is to be inherited rather than the process whereby it is inherited must account for endurance.

The process of inheritance as such cannot give identity. To achieve identity within a society, one must suspend Whitehead's requirement that the subjective form of every actual occasion be novel, and allow God to give successive actual occasions the same subjective aim which will determine them to feel the same subjective form.
To allow for this experience of life-long identity, it would hardly help to stretch the duration of actual occasions unless one stretched the duration to a human lifetime. Any period less than that would offer no solution whatever just because this identity of a person lasts a lifetime. Unless one actual occasion endures for the lifetime of a person, the problem of more than one actual occasion's having the same subjective form arises.

To get enduring identity one must depend on God to provide the same subjective aim to successive actual occasions. If one is content to rely on God to provide this ad hoc identity, I think that much of what is required for self-knowledge is possible.

The situation is curious when it comes to knowledge of others since there is no direct perception or prehension of contemporaries. Experience is made up of past entities.

The process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process, into the complex fact which is that process itself. ... Two conditions must be fulfilled in order that an entity may function as an object in a process of experiencing: (1) the entity must be antecedent, and (2) the entity must be experienced in virtue of its antecedence; it must be given. (AI 180)

One knows something about one's contemporaries because one knows something about their ancestors. Whitehead calls this indirect prehension.

There is an indirect prehension of contemporary occasions, via the efficient causation, from which they arise. For the immediate future of the immediate past constitutes the set of contemporary occasions for the percipient. ... Thus the prehension of contemporary occasions is the prehension of those occasions in so far as they are conditioned by the
occasions in the immediate past of the prehending subject. (AI 219)

The conclusion is that the contemporary world is not perceived in virtue of its own proper activity, but in virtue of activities derived from the past, the past which conditions the contemporary percipient. (AI 220)

But the concrescent actual occasion selects from what is given (the whole of the past) that which will satisfy its own subjective aim. How can an actual occasion know that its contemporaries are concrescing in accordance with its expectations based on the past? Perhaps for their experience they select from the past what we do not anticipate. The impossibility of prehending one's contemporaries makes one's knowledge of them uncertain and the actual occasion's own concrescence lonely. One needs to rely on God to give aims that will seem natural outgrowths of the past so that contemporaries cannot be too far off.

The part that God plays is seen to be quite overwhelming when we consider the possibility of human responsibility within the Whiteheadian system.

The subjective aim determines the concrescence. The question to ask if we want to decide how responsibility is to be fixed is: what determines the subjective aim? Everything follows from it so how is it gotten? I contend that the subjective aim is given by God. Whitehead's statements supporting this position will be given, and then the systematic considerations which make only this position tenable will be given.

Each temporal entity ... derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. (PR 343)

God ... is that actual entity from which each temporal
concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. (PR 374)

The quantum is that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original derivation from God. (PR 434)

Suppose that some one, foreseeing difficulty, were to protest God's determining the subjective aim, could he find another responsible agent, remembering that actual entities are the only reasons?

The past actual entities could not give the aim, because which actual entities will form its past is not known until the subjective aim has selected the actual entities which are to constitute its objective (determining) datum, in accordance with its subjective aim. The past actual entities determine what may be included, but not that they will be included.

Future occasions are only hypothetical and are themselves based on the completed present subjective aim so they could not be the source of the present subjective aim.

If it is said that an actual entity chooses its own subjective aim, we must ask what there is to an actual entity independent of its subjective aim. There can be no subjective form or objective datum, which are both dependent on the subjective aim. It might be argued that the region which is going to be occupied by an actual entity determines its subjective aim. This is, of course, contrary to the system, for the region antecedent to its concrescence is "nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness" since only an actual entity can be a reason, and an actual entity without a feeling (i.e., a bare region) is nothing. If one wants to make the region something
in its own right apart from actual entities, one repudiates Whitehead's stand against absolute space. If the region antedates the process of concrescence, the extensive continuum cannot be an abstraction from the satisfaction, and must rather be viewed as absolute and independent of what is in it for its existence. I believe that Whitehead would rather allow the subjective aim to give rise to the concrescence and region than accept absolute space.

But if the region of an actual entity cannot choose the subjective aim, then there is no aspect of the actual entity which could choose its own subjective aim. Past and future entities have already been ruled out, so God is not only a source offered within the system but is the only possible source allowed by the system.

It seems that there is no escape from God's determining the subjective aim, but now the question might be asked: in what form is the subjective aim gotten from God? It might be argued that the subjective aim as derived from God is indeterminate, so that the concrescent actual entity is allowed a great deal of "freedom" in making determinate the indeterminate subjective aim. But one must keep in mind the requirement that the subjective aim determine the datum which constitutes the actual entity, and with this in mind it can easily be seen that the aim cannot be entirely indeterminate (e.g., "to be" as opposed to "to not be" or "to be satisfied" as opposed to "to not be satisfied") since with such a vague aim, there would be no criterion for selecting or rejecting past feelings which are
to make up the objective datum which constitutes the actual entity. Rather the aim must be something specific which will in itself provide a basis for including or excluding feelings.

How specific must the subjective aim be?

In the becoming and completion of an actual entity, the subjective aim is the guide.

In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the 'subjective aim' by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process. (PR 130)

The satisfaction is determinate as regards every feeling of the antecedent universe.

The final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting the actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling. This final phase is termed the 'satisfaction.' It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as to its prehension - positive or negative - of every item in its universe. (PR 38)

Since the satisfaction is entirely determinate and is determined by the subjective aim, the aim must be determinate. If Whitehead supporters contend that the datum and the working out of it affects the subjective aim, we must counter that this effect can be of little extent or significance since the datum which is effecting the modification of the aim has been selected with a view to contributing to just that subjective aim.

The aim, as given by God, must be fully determinate in order to include and exclude just those feelings which will contribute to its goal.

The aim cannot be modified or thwarted. The actual occasion cannot perish before satisfaction has been reached. Nor can an
actual occasion refuse to be satisfied, for then "not be be satisfied" would have been the aim, and would have been satisfied. What the requirement of satisfaction amounts to is whatever satisfaction is reached, that was the aim really given to be satisfied. So that the actual occasion may rebel, reject, object as it will, satisfaction of the aim is inevitable. The aim must always have been that which is fulfilled by the satisfaction reached. The mechanism is non the less deterministic for being teleological, since the process must proceed and the satisfaction be reached.

Clearly no alternatives are possible. There are no choices, nor can there be any effort to do or failure to do. The only kind of responsibility there can be is the kind that we attribute to objects and plants that are parts of an events but do not do anything.

The difficulties of providing for responsibility within the limits of an atomistic theory have been considered in the criticism of Hume, and need not be repeated here. If endurance of a person cannot be provided, neither can much of what we need for responsibility. Endurance depends on God's giving the appropriate subjective aims to successive actual occasions which make up the person, so responsibility is dependent on God indirectly as well as directly, through his giving the determining aim.

Summary

1. Whitehead's metaphysics is atomistic and experientialist.

2. All reality including persons is constituted of actual
occasions.

3. The concrescence of an actual occasion is determined by a completely specified subjective aim given by God.

4. A person is a temporally extended nexus of actual occasions.

5. The life-long identity of a person depends on God's giving appropriate subjective aims to the successive actual occasions constituting that person.

6. Contemporaries are not directly perceived. Knowledge of contemporaries depends on God's giving aims to one's contemporaries which will seem outgrowths of the past, so that the percipient actual occasion can correctly infer what his contemporaries are.

7. Choice among alternatives is impossible because the determining subjective aim is given by God.

8. Satisfaction of the given aim is required and certain so effort and self-control have no place in the system.
The next philosopher we consider in our trio of experientialists is not an atomist. So for him, Leibniz, self-identicalness is no problem because his ultimate constituents of the universe, monads, are characterized as enduring for at least as long as a person's lifetime. The monad is in fact immortal, can be destroyed only by an act of God. Rather the problem is that monads last too long, so that the successive persons which 'have', 'own', or 'are' that monad, like the successive persons that 'own' a Platonic soul, haven't a monad to call their own. The monad like the Platonic soul belongs to a serial community.

The monad is a "simple substance". "By 'simple' is meant 'without parts.'" (Leibniz: The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings translated by Robert Latta, Oxford University Press, paragraph 1, p. 217. Since this Latta edition of the Monadology is the only source I shall refer to in this section on Leibniz, I shall indicate it by M with the paragraph number preceding and the page number following, thus, 1 M 217.) "These Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things." (3 M 218)

Leibniz's theory is experientialist in that the monads are all experiencers.

If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created monads might be called souls; but as feeling is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory. (19 M 230)
Persons must be made up entirely of perceptions, because everything is. One monad (and therefore the soul or dominant monad of a person) differs from another in its perceptions, or more exactly, in its viewpoint, since what is perceived, the universe is the same for all monads.

Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.

And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad. (56-7 M 248)

Not all this universe is perceived equally clearly though. Different monads perceive different parts of the universe more clearly, or more confusedly.

Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality. (9 M 222)

To assure that the perspective of each monad be unique, it might be necessary to stipulate that the universe not be symmetrical (like a chess board, sphere, or cube) but asymmetrical (like a right or left hand) so that there would be no description of one position which would perfectly match the description of another position. The uniqueness of each viewpoint would be guaranteed by the creator of the universe. (Cf. the discussion of individuating descriptions in Leibniz's system in Chapter 4 of P. F. Strawson's Individuals.)

I think it fair to allow that Leibniz has provided for the
self-identicalness of a monad-person, and by providing that each monad must have a unique point of view allowed for an identifiable nature.

Further, the monad must change.

I assume also as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each. (10 M 222)

The changes of the Monads come from "an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being." (11 M 223) And now we begin to see where the difficulty will arise, viz., in the communication with other monads. The monads could not be affected by an external cause because "the monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out." (7 M 219)

Though every monad feels more or less clearly what goes on in every other monad, it feels their feelings not because it is affected directly by them directly but only via God.

But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have the effect only through the mediation of God. ... For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (51 M 246)

The perceptions had by each monad are just what they would be if the monads were actually interacting. But what is really happening is that each monad unfolds what was put into it by God. Everything fits together because of the pre-established harmony, guaranteed by God.

To the extent that one is content with interaction and communication being illusory, one will be content with the
windowlessness of the monads. Such windowlessness is clearly not what we take to be really the case in ordinary life.

And what about responsibility? The situation here with Leibniz is the same as with Whitehead. If I read Leibniz correctly, there can be no possibility of alternative choices, which I have argued is necessary to what we call personal responsibility. Why hold a monad responsible if it can do no other than what God has determined it to do?

Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (38 M 238)

Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (47 M 243-4)

Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it. (52 M 246)

God must make sure that one monad adapts itself (seemingly) to the rest. Otherwise harmony could not be guaranteed.

Another systematic consideration. Suppose somehow the choices of the monads could really affect something, and the harmony still obtained. But the course of events might take a turn for the worse and steadily deteriorate, all the while things fitting together. If limited monads are controlling affairs, there is no guarantee that this is the best of all possible worlds, which Leibniz wants it to be. Only the control of God can guarantee that the universe be as good as it can be.
If my interpretation of Leibniz is correct, everything must be pre-determined down to the last detail. There is no room for responsibility, as we know it.

Summary

1. Monads are self-identical, identifiable experiencers whose perceptions change.

2. Monads constitute everything that there is so persons are monads.

3. Though there is an unfolding within the monad of the whole of the universe, there is no real interaction between one monad and another.

4. The perceptions of the monads which constitute the whole of these entities are entirely pre-determined by God. Responsibility is impossible.
CHAPTER 5

This chapter is primarily about Descartes' theory of the self though it has also a rather lengthy discussion of Kant's 'I think'.

Why Descartes? I might be asked. Because I admire his work. And secondly, because of his enormous effect on the history of philosophy. Much of the response to Descartes has been reaction against him. The modern reaction against Descartes has been strong and polemical. There are few contemporary writers who are sympathetic to him. (One exception might be Jaako Hintikka. See his "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Perfomance?", The Philosophical Review, 1962, pp. 3-32. It looks to me as if Hintikka is trying to understand rather than refute or ridicule what Descartes is saying.)

I should like to show what Descartes was trying to do as well as his successes and failures, emphasizing those parts of his system which relate to his theory of the self. I should also like to point out the mistakenness of some of the charges brought by Kant and others who are similarly misinformed or uninformed concerning Descartes' position.
Perhaps I should add a cautionary note here anticipating what I shall say later but perhaps allaying the fears of some who will think my enthusiasm for Descartes excessive. I do not think that Descartes' emphasis on the private experiencing aspects of self at the expense of the public behavioral aspects of self well-advised. A person is not equivalent to his consciousness. But all the same it is worthwhile to consider and give proper due to this aspect of a person. To overlook it is as serious a failing as overlooking the public, behavioral aspects of persons.

Descartes was wanting to build a system of knowledge on sure foundations. His intellectual world must have seemed precarious because of the ferment due among other things to the rising sciences and religious disturbances. To describe the intellectual milieu then commentators point out that the attitude of curiosity and challenge contrasted with one of greater acquiescence and submission to authority which had characterized the Middle Ages in large part. Even if original Descartes could be read with comprehension by his peers when he begins his Meditations on First Philosophy.
It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences. (The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross in two volumes. Cambridge University Press, 1911. Volume I, p. 144. Henceforth I shall refer to this edition as HR, giving volume and page number thus, I 144.)

The doubt which Descartes felt concerning many of his beliefs was limited to no particular subject. The question was not only whether the beliefs were consistent with one another but also whether they were about real things. Demonstrations in any branch of knowledge might be described in the way Descartes describes mathematical demonstrations:

... having noticed that this great certainty which everyone attributes to these demonstrations is founded solely on the fact that they are conceived with clearness, ...

I also noticed that there was nothing at all in them to assure me of the existence of their object. (HR I 103)

For these demonstrations there was no lack of clearness. Some other science might lack the mathematical certainty even. But in addition, any corpus of knowledge could be merely logical possibilities, internally consistent but not existentially grounded.

Satisfying the doubts attaching to opinions "conflicting ... regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people" (HR I 86) and existentially grounding certain demonstrations - both these tasks could be accomplished, Descartes thought, by such a metaphysical inquiry as he sets about.

What does Descartes think must be done to bring about "the
general upheaval of all former opinions"?

... it is not necessary that I should show that all of these are false. ... But inasmuch as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. ... I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested. (HR I 145)

No knowledge is to be acceptable to Descartes unless it is certain and indubitable; if there is the slightest doubt regarding any matter, it must be treated just as if it were false. Not only will beliefs be doubted, but to facilitate the inquiry, the bases of these beliefs will be attacked.

What can be doubted and must therefore be rejected as a basis of knowledge? First, the senses; "because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be". (HR I 101) To cast doubt on all things of the senses may seem unreasonable and extravagant, unless we remember that we sleep and dream, and in our dreams have "all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake ... without any of them being at that time true." (HR I 101)

So ordinary experience cannot guarantee its truthfulness either, because it is always possible that one could be dreaming.

Cannot reason itself withstand doubt? Though our reasonings seem quite certain, still we cannot know whether these things actually exist or not. It may be too that God - or an evil genius - has caused deception in the very things seemingly
best known. Examples abound of people who are deceived in judging that things really exist in the way they think.

... at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered. (HR I 147-8)

What can be said about the Cartesian doubt? It seems that Descartes doubts four things, generally stated. They are: whether anything can be known with unimpugnable certainty, whether anything exists, whether there exists an actual thing such that its nature can be truly known, and how anything can be known.

Since doubt has undermined all of Descartes' beliefs, nothing is left to him: no God, no people other than himself; no method of arriving at truth; not the senses, not ordinary experience, not rational demonstration.

In attempting to appraise the Cartesian doubt, I think it likely that most thoughtful people, including philosophers, would say that beliefs which are tested are more reliable than unexamined beliefs. An unexamined belief may not be worth holding.

But how complete can the doubt be? Can one "start from scratch"? Does Descartes hold no unexamined beliefs, as he claims? Plainly not. He uses the laws of thought, certain argument forms, and even in the depths of doubt does not cease framing and answering questions put in symbolized form. We can concentrate on this last unexamined tool. Words do not fail to have meaning for him. But the use of language itself does not earn the label 'knowledge' nor does he recognize language
as any kind of presupposition or basis of knowledge, nor as implying any knowledge of other persons. He carries on as if language never fails to be meaningful, and yet he has no beliefs concerning others. Descartes is not compelled to grant that language proves the existence of others. He could say that God gives language; that would be systematically permissible. But his systematic doubt is not so thorough or complete as he claims.

But we can go along with him in his doubting to see where it leads.

But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking. (HR I 101)

For even if there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me, then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well, and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it. (HR I 150)

Now Descartes has certain knowledge of an existent thing, i.e., he knows that there is at least one really existent thing, himself, which he cannot doubt because by the very doubting the certainty of his existence is established. But what of the nature of this existent thing?

... I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am
certain that I am; and hence I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself, and thus that I do not go astray in respect of this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and most evident of all that I have formerly learned. (HR I 150)

Whatever can be doubted cannot be asserted to belong to the nature of the self, nor can it be denied; no judgment is possible.

... perhaps it is true that these same things which I supposed were non-existent because they are unknown to me, are really not different from the self which I know. I am not sure about this, I shall not dispute about it now; I can only give judgment on things that are known to me. (HR I 152)

What experience the self has gives the self knowledge of itself, so that Descartes says "nothing is easier for me to know than my own mind." (HR I 157) So far he knows that

I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before, although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perception and imaginations, inasmuch only as they are modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me. (HR I 157)

This is certain knowledge of the nature of an existent thing.

But what guarantees the truth of this knowledge?

Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true. (HR I 158)

It is through doubting that Descartes arrives at cogito ergo sum, the first principle of his philosophy. For that he
must exist while he doubts, he cannot doubt. The existence of
the thinking self is immediately intuited.

What does Descartes do by means of cogito ergo sum? He
succeeds in establishing four things: an indubitable proposi-
tion, the actual existence of some thing, knowledge of the true
nature of that existent thing, and a method of arriving at
truth.

To my knowledge no one says that the Cartesian cogito ergo
sum (which I shall call the cogito for short) is self-contradic-
tory or false. Yet it does not meet with universal acclaim,
though even now its philosophical interest has not died. A. J.
Ayer's treatment of the cogito in The Problem of Knowledge is
worth considering because he agrees that the cogito is certain
but charges that it does not come to very much.

Descartes used the cogito to establish a certainty in the
midst of and from doubt. To have established a certain truth
from that very doubt seems an achievement to me. As Professor
Ayer says:

... neither 'I think' nor 'I exist' is a truth of logic;
the logical truth is only that I exist if I think... What
makes them indubitable is their satisfying a condition
which Descartes himself does not make explicit, though his
argument turns upon it. It is that their truth follows
from their being doubted by the person who expresses them.
The sense in which I cannot doubt the statement that I
think is just that my doubting entails its truth; and in
the same sense I cannot doubt that I exist. There was
therefore no need for Descartes to derive 'sum' from 'cogito';
for its certainty could be independently established by the

If he means that there is no need to phrase the cogito "dubito
ergo cogito ergo sum", he is entirely right, since doubting is
is for Descartes one kind of thinking so that one may move directly from dubito to sum. But as Professor Ayer has said, the doubting is necessary to establish the sum; by itself it is not a logical truth. "Cogito" may be dispensed with because it is just another way, here, of saying "dubito", but not both "dubito" and "cogito" may be dispensed with if the proposition is to be both true and indubitable. One great merit of the cogito is that doubting - the sceptic's method - is the means of achieving certainty. Dubito ergo sum is self-validating.

If I understand Professor Ayer's position, he would be willing to agree that "dubito ergo sum" establishes with certainty an existent thing.

"But this certainty does not come to very much", Professor Ayer says.

It is conceivable that I should not have been self-conscious, which is to say that I should not know that I existed; but it would not follow that I could not know many other statements to be true. In theory, I could know any of the innumerable facts which are logically independent of the fact of my existing. I should indeed know them without knowing that I knew them, though not necessarily without knowing that they were known: my whole conception of knowledge would be impersonal. (Ibid. P. 47.)

For Descartes, of course, with his doubt, there were not innumerable other facts. All the other facts, "independent of the fact of existing" had been rejected as dubitable. Only indubitable facts, "I doubt" or "I think", could be admitted, and it turned out that these facts were not logically independent of the fact of his existing, and that he could not know them without knowing that he knew them.

What may be included under thinking is made explicit in
the Arguments ... in Geometrical Form following Reply to

Objections II:

Definition I. Thought is a word that covers everything that exists in us in such a way that we immediately conscious of it. Thus all the operations of will, intellect, imagination, and of the senses are thoughts. (HR II 52)

And again in The Principles of Philosophy:

By the word thought I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imaging, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought. For if I say I see, or I walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my body, my conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it may be that, as often happens in sleep, I think I see or I walk, although I never open my eyes or move from my place, and the same thing perhaps might occur if I had not a body at all. But if I mean only to talk of my sensation, or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, it becomes quite true, because my assertion now refers only to my mind, which alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk. (HR I 222)

The last portion of this principle makes it clear why

Gassendi's criticism of the cogito in the Objections V is not well-taken. For as Descartes replies:

When you say that I could have inferred the same conclusion from any of my other actions, you wander far from the truth, because there is none of my activities of which I am wholly certain (in the sense of having metaphysical certitude, which alone is here involved), save thinking alone. For example, you have no right to make the inference: I walk, hence I exist, except in so far as our awareness of walking is a thought; it is of this alone that the inference holds good, not of the motion of the body, which sometimes does not exist, as in dreams, when nevertheless I appear to walk. Hence from the fact that I think that I walk I can very well infer the existence of the mind which so thinks, but not that of the body which walks. (HR II 207)

What it takes to establish the cogito is an indubitable, known activity.
Professor Ayer suggests that something might be known without its known to be known. "Strange, but not self-contradictory". Descartes would likely argue that impersonal knowledge for persons is self-contradictory, that for selves knowledge must be known (or knowable) to be knowledge. Without self-consciousness persons would lose their personality, and be impersonal. This is the third point of the cogito, a statement of what it is to be a person or self, which might be formulated as: a person is that which knows it thinks.

To say that a thing could know without knowing that it knows would not be to deny what Descartes says in the cogito, since he would say that it is not a person which knows without knowing that it knows, and every one may know this for himself by direct inspection. If this is a correct account of Descartes' cogito, then I take it Professor Ayer's contention that knowledge may be held impersonally would not be opposed to Descartes' position.

It seems then that Professor Ayer does not deny that the cogito establishes an existent thing and that this existent thing, a person, is such that when it knows, it knows or can know that it knows.

But what he argues, I think, is 1) that the cogito is like any other proposition embodying a demonstrative, and 2) that there is no such thing as having an experience of oneself in the way that Descartes claimed.

Because of Descartes' initial doubt, there is not a variety of propositions which he could begin with, though he might have
been willing to concede that any indubitable proposition using any demonstrative could have the same effect of establishing the existence of something, but that this is not to agree entirely with Professor Ayer and give up the cogito as unique. It is the 'I' which might alone serve in the first principle of philosophy because demonstratives besides "I" are all logically dependent on "I"; i.e., that "this", "these", "that", "those", "here", "there", "now", "then", etc. are only meaningful in relation to "I". E.g., "this" means "whatever is near(er) me", "that" means "whatever is further from me", "here" - "close to me", "now" - "in the moment I am experiencing", "then" - "at a point in time away from now", etc. "I" cannot be given meaning with some other phrase, because no proper name expresses what "I" expresses, and because no descriptive phrase can be equivalent to "I" unless it contains a demonstrative which is itself dependent on "I" for meaning, which means that the terms can be freely substituted but that we stay in the realm of words without being able to ground our circle existentially. To ground the words we must be able to have a point at which existence and understanding intersect, namely, in the self. To get this point experience of the self is required.

This position is argued very well by S. V. Keeling in his lecture "Descartes", and I should like to call on him to elaborate this answer to Professor Ayer's contention that even if there is self-conscious experience for selves, there is no such thing as experience of self.
For he who denies he is directly aware of himself makes numerous statements intelligible and true in which the pronoun "I" occurs, and he uses this pronoun intending his hearer to understand it to refer to himself. Therefore he must know himself in some way. Now it is impossible that all the statements he makes about 'I' should express only descriptive knowledge. In a masterly refutation, (i. J. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, ii, pp. 62-70; and Philosophical Studies, pp. 69-96.) McTaggart has, I believe, conclusively demonstrated that unless we were directly aware of ourself, we never could tell in the end whom these descriptions do describe, nor ever be justified in using the first personal pronoun. For even if two descriptions could be known to describe one and the same person, and not each a different person, it would remain quite unknown who that person is. Those descriptions, and the information that some 'one and the same person' is described by them, would not enable me to identify that 'one and the same person' with myself. I can know that 'one person' to be the very person he in fact is, if and only if, I perceive myself to be that person; i.e. only if I know myself otherwise than by description. Where Descartes was content to assert that the self is directly known, McTaggart demonstrated that it must be so known. The initial proposition of the metaphysic, then, is one the certainty of whose truth is intuitively certified. (S. V. Keeling, "Descartes". From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. xxxiv. London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, p. 15.)

If one attends to the word "identify" and takes it to mean "to pick out a particular or individual", the Keeling-McTaggart view can be expanded by reference to a conclusion in Individuals by P. F. Strawson. Mr. Strawson is considering the assertion that there is no uniquely referring description because all time may be cyclical and all events may be exactly repeated. He thinks illusory, the belief that however elaborate a description we produce of a network of spatially and temporally related things and incidents, we can never be sure of producing an individuating description of a single particular item, for we can never rule out the possibility of another exactly similar network. To experience this theoretical anxiety is ... to overlook the fact that we, the speakers, the users of the dating and placing systems, have our own place in that system and know that place; that we ourselves, therefore,
and our own immediate environment, provide a point of reference which individuates the network and hence helps to individuate the particulars located in the network. (P. F. Strawson. Individuals. London, Methuen & Co. 1959. P. 30.)

This is, I think, another way of saying that descriptions are uniquely referring only because the users know their own environments, and that this knowledge cannot be in terms of a further description expressed without demonstratives, and therefore, as McTaggart and Keeling would say, must rest upon direct knowledge of oneself. By direct knowledge of the self we are able to give meaning to "I", other demonstratives dependent on "I", and individuating descriptions.

If this analysis is correct, the reason why the description of intuition by which one knows oneself is not more descriptive and why no evidence of the sort Professor Ayer wants (which he does not characterize but which I expect would have to be like evidence for an object) is forthcoming for self-consciousness will be clearer. The reason is that self-consciousness or consciousness (intuition) of self or consciousness of consciousness is the basis of all description and evidence. All description if it is to individuate must presuppose our knowing our own place in the spatio-temporal network. And evidence (of the sort that seems to be wanted) can only be in terms of individuated particulars, knowledge of which depends on individuating descriptions which depend on knowledge of oneself, one's own unique consciousness.

Though it may not be possible to give a thorough description of this knowledge of the self (at least not like descrip-
of objects), what can be said about it?

Descartes describes what happens when we consider the cogito:

But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I think, hence I am, or exist,' does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known per se. (HR II 38)

Here the knowing experience is called a "primitive act of knowledge" and "a simple act of mental vision". These are not meant as definitions of the experience, and he explains why he does not offer definitions of simple terms in The Search After Truth by the Light of Nature:

... we must know what doubt is, what thought is, before being fully convinced of the truth of this reasoning I doubt therefore I am; or what comes to the same, I think therefore I am. But do not go and imagine that in order to know this we must do violence to our mind and put it to torture in order to ascertain the proximate species and the essential difference, and form from it a definition by rule. ... But whoever desires to examine things by himself and judge of them as he conceives them, cannot be so devoid of mental power not to see clearly whenever he is willing to give attention to it, what doubt is, or thought or existence, and to be required to learn their distinctions. Further I declare that there are certain things which we render more obscure by trying to define them, because, since they are very simple and clear, we cannot know and perceive them better than by themselves. Nay, we must place in the number of those chief errors that can be committed in the sciences, the mistakes committed by those who would try to define what ought only to be conceived, and who cannot distinguish the clear from the obscure, nor discriminate between what, in order to be known, requires and deserves to be defined, from what can be best known by itself. And in the number of the things which are clear in the way above explained and which can be known by themselves, we must place doubt, thought, and existence. ... Indeed, I add that one learns those things in no other way than by one's self and that nothing else persuade us of them except our own experience and this knowledge and inter-
nal testimony that each one finds within himself when he examines things ... in order to know what doubt is, or thought, it is only requisite to doubt and think. (HR I 324-5)

What it seems Descartes is here saying is that some things cannot be defined because then they are mediated by words and other words make no clearer what we are to understand, that instead, to understand what things like thought, doubt, existence are, we must know them immediately. So in order to know what is contained in the cogito, one has only to think, and by thinking, what is contained in the cogito will be immediately experienced.

Thinking cannot be the whole of a person (given that the facts are what they are) but this is not the same as saying that thinking is no part of a person. Descartes was probably right in saying that thinking is a necessary condition of being a person (and Ayer is failing to understand that Descartes is referring to how persons know when he (Ayer) says that knowledge might be impersonal). If an \( x \) does not think and know what it is to think, i.e., self-consciously, that \( x \) is not a person, Descartes is saying.

Descartes also seems to be saying in the cogito that thinking is a sufficient condition of being a person, which is probably not false, properly understood. The difficulty with giving a sufficient condition is that one does not include with the sufficient condition its necessary and/or sufficient conditions. [To say that a protuberant heel (the kind we have) is a sufficient condition of being a member of the species *Homo sapiens* is all right when one understands what the necessary conditions of having a protuberant heel are.] Concerning the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of self-conscious thinking Descartes made errors of
commission and omission. He denied (and asserted) that having a body is a necessary condition of having the kind of thinking that we have. He says that mind could be what it is "absolutely distinct from body" (HR I 190) (which is enough to make an admirer of Descartes weep) and he seems to say in Meditation VI that the mind is dependent on extended substance. He also says that mind and body are each "incomplete substances viewed in relation to the man who is the unity which together they form (HR II 99). His ambivalence on this question encapsulates our major difficulties with the Cartesian theory of persons. Most contemporary philosophers want to assert that body is necessary to thinking, or at least not assert that body is not necessary to thinking.

He does not explicitly deny the necessity of other persons to the development of his mind, but so far as I know he no where asserts it, as most contemporary philosophers.

So Descartes makes mistakes when it comes to the necessary conditions of thinking, but to my mind he is right in claiming that thinking is both a necessary and sufficient condition of being a person. Of course, one wants to have more said.

But because Descartes either does not say more or is wrong about what more he does say, Peter Geach seems to be altogether dissatisfied with the cogito in Chapter 26 of Mental Acts, saying that since 'I' serves to mark off one person from another, it is improper to mark off one aspect of the person from another aspect, the intangible from the tangible, by means of 'I'.

The word "I", spoken by P.T.G., serves to draw people's attention to P.T.G.; and if it is not at one clear who is
speaking, there is a genuine question "Who said that?" or "Who is 'I'?" Now consider Descartes brooding over his poële and saying: "I'm getting into an awful muddle - but who then is this 'I' who is getting into a muddle?" When "I'm getting into a muddle" is a soliloquy, "I" certainly does not derive to direct Descartes's attention to Descartes, or to show that it is Descartes, none other, who is getting into a muddle. We are not to argue, though, that since "I" does not refer to the man René Descartes it has some other, more intangible, thing to refer to. Rather, in this context the word "I" is idle, superfluous; it is used only because Descartes is habituated to the use of "I" (or rather, of "je" and "moi") in expressing his thoughts and feelings to other people. In soliloquy he could quite well have expressed himself without using the first-person pronoun at all; he could have said: "This is really a dreadful muddle!", where "This" would refer back to his previous meditations. (We have here an example of the puzzling demonstratio ad intellectum which I mentioned in §15.) (Peter Geach. Mental Acts. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 118.)

As I understand this, Geach is saying what Strawson also claims, namely, that the concept of a person is logically prior to the concept of a person's consciousness and that 'I' should not be used equivocally to mean 1) the whole person, and 2) the person's consciousness. I agree that 'person' is logically prior to 'consciousness' but the priority of 'person' does not make 'consciousness' superfluous. Strawson allows that 'consciousness' might have a "logically secondary existence, if one thinks, or finds, it desirable." (Individuals. P. 103) (Some questions I have concerning the relations between 'person' and 'consciousness' are presented below when I am discussing Individuals in Chapter 6.)

The demonstratio ad intellectum which Geach relies on to label the meditating does not seem different, except in name, from Descartes' drawing attention to the thinking going on in him. That this thinking going on in him is not the whole of his personness, and not, in this sense, the whole meaning of 'I', I
would readily grant. Perhaps both Geach and Strawson would say: Don't use 'I' to refer to the meditating or thinking aspect of a person, even if you are not confused, because it may confuse others."

To avoid confusion one might state Descartes' claim a little differently; in a person thinking is known immediately, and this knowing what thinking is is a necessary condition of being a person.

We may go on to consider the relations between consciousness, particular kinds of thinking activities, and particular thoughts. Consciousness underlies particular activities and particular thoughts, or as Descartes states
it in a (now old-fashioned sounding) metaphysical way: "It is certain that ... no activity, no accident can be without a substance in which to exist." (HR II 64) Descartes goes on to say in this Reply to Hobbes:

Further, there are other activities, which we call thinking activities, e.g., understanding, willing, imagining, feeling, etc., which agree in falling under the description of thought, perception, or consciousness. (HR II 64)

Because I am not certain of what Descartes means always, there is likely more than a little interpretation in what I shall say these remarks on thinking thing, substance, and consciousness come to, namely, that the self which is directly experienced in the cogito is consciousness, that this is the substance which holds all the thoughts together, that this consciousness or substantial self is what accompanies all one's thoughts and makes them all one's own and private to oneself, makes each person's thoughts separate from everyone else's thoughts, and makes each person unique.

Étienne Gilson approvingly quotes Lévy-Bruhl as offering a view like the one I am presenting.

M. Lévy-Bruhl observait justement (Descartes, Cours inédit): «Le Cogito est la première vérité d'existence par ordre, en ce sens que les autres viennent après; ... (cf. à Mersenne, juillet 1641 ...: «il est impossible que nous puissions jamais penser à aucune chose, que nous n'ayons en même temps l'idée de notre âme, comme d'une chose capable de penser à tout ce que nous pensons»). Si donc on veut rapprocher ici, Descartes de Kant, la seule analogie que l'on puisse légitimement établir est celle du cogito avec le: Je pense, accompagne toutes mes représentations. (Étienne Gilson. René Descartes: Discours de la Methode. Paris, Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1947. P. 301.)

It seems to me that looking at the similarities and dissimilarities between the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian "I
think" can be fruitful.

I have claimed that the Cartesian thinking substance can provide for persons what I have asserted in Part I was necessary to persons, namely, the connectedness of experiences or enduring self-identity, the logically private occurrence of each person's experiences, the separateness of each person, and the uniqueness of each person.

In order to see whether the Kantian 'I think' can do what the Cartesian thinking substance can do, we should point out a distinction in Kant's theory which might be thought to affect this issue.

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness.


As I understand Kant's position it would be the original or pure unity of apperception which would correspond to the Cartesian
substance (or consciousness) which underlies particular thoughts or thinking activities. Pure apperception not empirical apperception is described as identical, i.e., as accompanying all one's experiences.

This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. (KS 153 B 133)

An important question to consider is whether we can be conscious of this pure apperception. Sometimes Kant seems to allow consciousness of the unifying or pure apperception.

This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily repreducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules. (KS 136-7 A 108)

Nor is it merely empirical consciousness of which one is conscious since Kant also allows consciousness of the original apperception.

All representations have a necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness. For if they did not have this, and if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of them, this would practically amount to the admission of their non-existence. But all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness which precedes all
special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception. (K§ 142n A 117n)

One might be inclined to think that Kant and Descartes were not differing on this point, each allowing a consciousness of the fundamental consciousness, were it not for Kant’s insistence that the existence of the pure apperception is only formal, i.e., logical. His alternative label ‘transcendental’ unity also seems to require that the existence of this apperception is merely posited to account for what is actual, namely, the unity of a person’s experiences, rather than experienced as something real. Then the difference between Kant and Descartes could be expressed in a simple formula: Cartesian consciousness has real existence; Kantian pure apperception has only logical existence. That this is Kant’s view may be seen from the following:
... since the one condition which accompanies all thought is the 'I' in the universal proposition 'I think', reason has to deal with this condition in so far as it is itself unconditioned. It is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects; but nevertheless it is represented as an object which I think, namely, I myself and its unconditioned unity. (KS 362 A 398)

This much, then, is certain, that through the 'I', I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject. (KS 337-8 A 356)

Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found; but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts. (KS 334 A 350)

Kant's view is that 'the representation 'I'' is "mere thought" so that the 'I' has only logical status and no real existence.

Throughout the Paralogisms Kant is discussing "the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, 'I think'." (KS 329 A 341 B 399) But it is not clear that the rational psychology which Kant attacks is Descartes' philosophy, though he does mention Descartes and the cogito explicitly several times, but at least some of these times with incomplete understanding or distortion as I shall show below. Whether or not Kant meant to criticize the cogito does no matter. We can look at what he says to see to what extent the objections to rational psychology apply to the cogito, and then to what extent the 'I think' will do what substance can do which needs to be done, if what is true of persons is to be covered by the Kantian view.

We can begin with an obvious case of Kant's inadequate understanding of the Cartesian cogito.
The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposition and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'. But I cannot say 'Everything which thinks, exists'. For in that case the property of thought would render all beings which possess it necessary beings. My existence cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inference from the proposition 'I think', as Descartes sought to contend - for it would then have to be preceded by the major premiss 'Everything which thinks, exists' - but is identical with it. (KS 378n B 422-3n)

But Descartes had written in the Replies which Kant may not have been familiar with:

But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I think, hence I am, or exist,' does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known per se. (HR II 38)

Clearly Descartes does not contend what Kant claims.

It seems rather that Kant and Descartes agree that a person's existence is immediately seen in his thinking.

The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. (KS 169n B 157n)

In the Paralogisms Kant attacks rational psychology, asking in the First Paralogism:

But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in any natural manner either arise or perish, can by no means be deduced from it. Yet there is no other use to which I can put the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, and apart from such use I could very well dispense with it. (KS 333-4 A 349)

Now if substance's not being able to give immortality would necessitate giving up substance, Descartes would have to give up substance too since he admitted that he could not establish the immortality of the soul:

But I admit that I cannot refuse your further contention, viz. that the immortality of the soul does not follow
from its distinctness from the body, because that does not prevent its being said that God in creating it has given the soul a nature such that its period of existence must terminate simultaneously with that of the corporeal life. (HR II 47)

Descartes then does not think that the concept of substance will guarantee immortality. Yet he continues to describe the self as substantial for other reasons.

The point of the second paralogism is that through the 'I', I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity). It does not, however, follow that I thereby know the actual simplicity of my subject. ... It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of inherence only transcendentally, without noting in it any quality whatsoever - in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise. (KS 337-8 A 355-6)

Kant concludes:

Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and so can exempt it from the dissolution to which matter is always liable. (KS 338 A 356)

Descartes certainly must be understood to be denying that the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as this will exempt it from dissolution. Kant wants immortality from the soul and if he cannot get that, the concept of soul is of no value.

Is it the case though that by means of the cogito Descartes asserts the separateness of consciousness from matter?

Firstly, you warn me to remember that it was not actually but merely by a mental fiction that I rejected the claim of bodies to be more than phantasms, in order to draw the conclusion that I was merely a thinking being, so as to avoid thinking that it was a consequence of this that I was really nothing more than mind. But in the Second Meditation I have already shown that I bore this
in mind sufficiently; here are the words: - But perhaps it is the case that these very things, which I thus suppose to be non-existent because they are unknown to me, do not in very truth differ from that self which I know. I cannot tell; this is not the subject I am now discussing, etc. By these words I meant expressly to warn the reader that in that passage I did not as yet ask whether the mind was distinct from the body, but was merely investigating these properties of mind of which I able to attain to sure and evident knowledge. (HR II 30)

Descartes is not using the simplicity of the soul to distinguish it from matter.

There is a point that Kant makes which I think is well-taken. He argues:

I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self ...

(KS 380 B 426-7)

Probably Kant is really denying the possibility of any knowledge of a substantial self, in which I think he is wrong. But one look at the passage given immediately above and interpret it to mean a denial of the possibility of consciousness of one's existence apart from any actual experience. In this I think he is right.

Descartes might be understood to be asserting that our experience of experiencing, our consciousness of consciousness, is logically independent of all actual experience. That is, we might have nothing and never have had anything to think about but thinking itself. His sceptical starting point might give rise to this view by seeming to start from nothing, no setting to his thoughts, language, mental abilities. But even
in his scepticism he suspends belief only in the real existence of the thought objects, not in the real existence of his thoughts. But he has the advantages of his sceptical starting point; he must be willing to accept the disadvantages of being understood (or misunderstood) to have claimed that this thinking, consciousness, or self, might have existed pure, not only conceivable per se, distinguished from particular experiences, but conceivable without particular experiences, at all, ever.

Why does Kant deny knowledge of any substantial self? Because knowledge must have two parts, and we can have neither of consciousness.

First, his statement concerning what we must have for knowledge:

To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. (KS 161-2 B 146)

Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of an object in general (in the category), an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for knowledge of myself, I require besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought. (KS 169 B 158)

He asserts that we can have no concept of the self or 'I', which he calls "the simple and in itself completely empty re-presentation 'I'; and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts." (KS 331 A 345-6 B 404)
At the beginning of the Paralogisms paralogisms are described as "syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality." (KS 327 A 339 B 397 Underlining mine.)

He goes on to further describe this kind of syllogism.

In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains nothing manifold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which, however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever. (KS 328 A 340 B 397-8)

I do not find any equivocation on this point; Kant says quite consistently that one has no concept of 'I' but only an empty representation.

One reason why we could not have a concept of 'I' is perhaps the same reason that 'space' could not be a concept, namely that there is only one. (Vide the third argument for space being an a priori intuition rather than a concept A 24-5 B 39) There are not spaces any more than there are 'I's'; both are necessarily one. For Kant apparently there can be no such thing as a uniquely referring concept. He defines "concept" as that which "refers to it (the object) by means of a feature which several things may have in common." (KS 314 A 320 B 377) So there could not be a concept which refers to an object by means of a feature which only that thing has. All concepts are class concepts, Kant seems to say.

This requirement alone makes it clear why there could be no concept of 'I', because Descartes' claim is that 'I' has as
object something unique which other persons might also know, but each person only immediately in his own case, which unique thing is unitary, not manifold, his own consciousness. Probably for Descartes 'I' would be some kind of rule concept, which could be general but still necessarily uniquely referring.

The lack of a manifold united by the concept 'I' (taken in this substantial sense) would also keep 'I' from being a concept. For, according to Kant, as well as referring to a class, a concept must unite a manifold. (A 68 B 93) A concept must bring together by means of a unitary act various representations; 'I' cannot be a concept "for through the 'I', a simple representation, nothing manifold is given." (KS 155 B 135)

The thinking which constitutes the substantial self for Descartes has particular thoughts as its accidents and also modes, e.g., degrees of intensity. But thinking itself is just that, thinking, and has no manifold.

The second requirement for knowledge besides concepts is an intuition (of a manifold). Descartes would, I think, say that we have separate intuitions of thinking and intuitions of different modes of thinking but there is no manifold. Kant might deny the possibility of having a unitary (non-manifold) intuition just as he denies the possibility of a uniquely referring concept.

There are many places where he denies that we have an intuition of the 'I'.

The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts but there is not in this
representation the least trace of intuition distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition. (KS 334 A 350)

This is his more common position but sometimes it seems as if he allows some intuition of the self.

... the supposed substance - the thing, the permanence of which has not yet been proved - may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elan-guescence. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which always allows of diminution, and the same must also hold of the faculty of being conscious of the self, and likewise of all the other faculties. (KS 373 B 414-5)

Which consciousness - the pure or empirical - is Kant referring to here? Could a merely formal unity admit of degrees?

Another place where there seems to be a puzzling admission is B 422-3.

The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'. ...

The 'I think' expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e. perception ... And indeterminate perception here signifies only something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and which in the proposition, 'I think', is denoted as such. (KS 378 B 422-3)

I cannot see how Kant can say both that something real is given in the 'I think' and that pure apperception has only formal or logical existence as established above.

Kant seems to disallow an experience of pure consciousness because he thinks that then it would follow that one could have knowledge of things in themselves and this would undermine the whole of the Critical Philosophy. I think that he is entirely right in denying that we can know that our souls are immortal or that thinking substance is entirely separate and different from extended substance or that thinking substance needs nothing besides itself in order to think, merely from the examination of
thinking itself. And if acceding so much to Kant means that we have no knowledge of noumenal thinking substance, I am entirely willing to allow that we have no knowledge of noumenal thinking substance. My inquiry is concerned with knowledge of persons, and all I require is some knowledge of substance which will make possible what we believe to be true of persons. I have given statements of Kant's which seem to allow and even assert some kind of experience of consciousness though it is difficult to know definitely whether he means pure or empirical consciousness. I have given these statements because I think that Kant had certain insights which slipped through perhaps in spite of his system. The concept of thinking substance (albeit a moderate and modified variety) is both natural and necessary to what is needed for persons. It sometimes looks as if even Kant, ignoring systematic considerations, lapses into it.

Above it was argued that the facts of ordinary life require that persons be first separate from one another, second, that they endure (in most cases for a lifetime), third, that each per-
son's experiences occur privately, known in their occurring by only the one person whose experiences they are, and 4) that each person be unique (or stated in logical terms, that universals be grounded by means of demonstratives themselves grounded in the person's self-knowledge).

Substance is the natural kind of ultimate entity to call on. It is, so to speak, made to order since substance is traditionally that which connects and holds together accidents and modes, substances are logically separate from one another (like Plato's souls), and no one substance is identical with another. That Descartes should have called the thinker or consciousness 'substance' is not surprising, since substance for centuries had had at least some of the properties he wanted consciousness to have. I see no reason why he must give up the label 'substance' for the sake of what someone else disallows to consciousness if he himself does not mean to attribute these disallowed properties.

Kant disallows thinking substance and says that nothing can be known about consciousness as it is, one can only express consciousness in the 'I think'. But he does agree that consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found, but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I', as it does all thoughts."

(KS 334 A 350)

This is the thoughtness of all thoughts; they are all connected, and this 'logical meaning' of 'I' is allowed.

But I ask: how much is this logical meaning of 'I' worth?
It may be that this logical meaning is all that we can express of substance but if logical meaning were all there were to the substratum, how could this logical meaning do what we know is done? Something real must hold things together. Kant may not be naming what holds things together so much as naming the fact that experiences are held together with his transcendental unity of apperception.

In sum my objection is that a transcendental unity of apperception is not the kind of thing that can hold together experiences.

Second. Kant wants to allow that the 'I' is self-identical subject.

That the 'I' of apperception, and therefore the 'I' in every act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition. (KS 369 B 407)

We certainly want a self-identical subject. But Kant gives us too little or too much. If he claims that the 'I' which experiences every act of thought cannot be experienced to be the same, then he may have thoughts occurring separately, with nothing to connect them. This would be like Hume's or Whitehead's bits of experience. What makes the experiences of a person get connected? It is not analytic for Hume, Whitehead, or (possibly) Ayer that thoughts are had by a simple subject.

In the third paralogism Kant denies that one can know "the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its states." (KS 369 B 408) He argues as follows:

The identity of the consciousness of myself at dif-
ferent times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the 'I', such a change may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding 'I', which in every state, even in one involving change of the (thinking) subject, might still retain the thought of the preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject. (KS 342 A 363)

He seems to be thinking that the subject could be serial bits, and in this sense not numerically identical. That he is thinking of such bits is made clearer in the footnote to the passage.

An elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion, and therefore its whole state (that is, if we take account only of the positions in space). If, then, in analogy with such bodies, we postulate substances such that the one communicates to the other representations together with the consciousness of them, we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second; the second its own state with that of the preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the states of all the preceding substances together with its own consciousness and with their consciousness to another. The last substance would then be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances, as being its own states, because they would have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. And yet it would not have been one and the same person in all these states. (KS 342 A 363-4)

The similarity to Whitehead is obvious. One could call the substances which communicate their representations together with the consciousness of them to other substances actual occasions. (Whitehead would have been appalled at calling his actual occasions "substances"). The question in this kind of arrangement is though, as we have seen, what transmits the representations with consciousness of them? Can we say anything about it? Shall we even recognize it? Whitehead recognizes
it and calls it 'inheritance'. Descartes calls it thinking and because it continues and is the same, thinking substance.

Kant does not talk about the force which would transmit the representations probably thinking that this is indulging in speculative metaphysics. Instead of talking about the force which would be self-identical if it transmits the representations and consciousness of them in the same way from one bit of substance to the next, he gives us the name again. This time the transcendental unity of apperception names the fact that all one's thoughts are had by one subject.

Surprisingly, Kant has recourse to quite another ground for identity or permanence at one point, namely, the body. He says:

> Its (the soul's) permanence during life is, of course, evident per se, since the thinking being (as man) is itself likewise an object of the outer senses. (K5 373 B 415)

We know the soul is the same throughout life because we sense its identity through the outerness, or what is public, is what I understand Kant to mean. The truth of the matter seems just the opposite of that, as I have argued above. We judge the public person to be the same on the basis of his judging his private self to be the same. A person's body may change to such a degree that it is not recognizable as the same body. And yet we may be willing to call it the same person. For we count an individual as the same person (and I assume by "man" in the above quotation, Kant means "person") when and in difficult cases only because he gives us evidence of recognizing himself
earlier and later as the same. He remembers now as present subject what he experienced then as the same subject. If it were the case that he could remember only that someone experienced it, that the memory of the experience which occurred in the past is now preceded by 'I think' not by 'I think now the memory which the same 'I' thought then as first-time-round-experience', we would not count him as the same person, though we might (because of finger prints, etc.) count him as the same organism. In brief, we may say that an identical body is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of saying that the person is the same, or more cautiously, a body which can be recognized to be the same is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of saying that the person is the same.

Now to return to the KS 369 B 407 statement given above on page 223 in order to make the other alternative criticism. Suppose that Kant has the experiences connected by means of 'I'. In Kant's account all we get is one 'I'. He has said, "The 'I' in every act of thought is one". In the A 350 quote given above (page 222) he has said, "Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found ..." (Underlining mine.) He speaks of consciousness in the singular as that which connects all our perceptions. Is this supposed to mean that there is only one logical subject, no plurality of persons?

The defender of Kant will say: but you push Kant unfairly; he means that each person's 'I' connects all his experiences,
not that there is one super-subject which connects all experiences.

My reply. How on the Kantian analysis can plural subjects be allowed? From his statements one gets either solipsism or a super-subject; either all thoughts are my thoughts or all thoughts are thought in common by some Total Thinker.

If we allow that the Kantian 'I' can connect experiences, the next problem in logical order is to pluralize the subjects, since we certainly want to say that there are more persons than one. Then after pluralizing, we must make independent (so as to give privacy to each person), and then we must individuate, that is, give uniqueness to each person.

There seems to be no sign that Kant was concerned with the problem of pluralizing subjects, though, of course, he knew that there are persons in the world. He however was not concerned to make room for them in his system. At one place he says what is either false or culpably misleading:

... the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself, for we abstract altogether from its properties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject. (KS 337 A 355)

It is not the case that I can apply 'I' to every thinking subject, and mean what we mean by 'I'. Kant here treats 'I' as a class concept. It is certainly true that I know that each person is a thinking subject who can apply 'I' to himself. This notion of the concept 'I' is general but it does not take 'I' to mean or refer to a class but rather to mean a rule though
referring to an individual. The way in which the concept 'I' is general cannot be expressed without incorporating this demonstrative element; one says to explain the generality of 'I' that 'I' is to me as 'I' when used by some other person is to that same other person.

The 'I' of Kant cannot separate one person from another because there is nothing determinate in it and when a person uses it he does not mean anything plural. For Kant 'I' seems to be a class term; he makes no systematic provision for separating the class into individuals.

Kant might try to separate the class of subjects into separate individuals by means of bodies. This would not work because there is no one to one ratio between bodies and subjects. The cases of multiple personalities (within one body) make that clear.

And if Kant cannot give us plural persons, he cannot give us separate persons who are independent in the sense that they have private experiences. The 'I' experiences all experiences. 'I' is all there is: either one person, regular size with automatata all around, or one person, giant size. Your experiences and his experiences and her experiences are never mentioned.

To give uniqueness (to pass over separateness and privacy and go on to the next problem) Kant might rely upon a person's being a unique collection of universals. But this uniqueness would be only contingently unique and this is not what we mean in ordinary practice. Even if every true description of some other person were also true of me, I should never think that f
was that other person, though there would be nothing I could say about myself that the other person could not say about herself. Normally we would have recourse to demonstratives and say that the referents of these demonstratives are not the same when I use them as when she uses them even though the words are the same. If the uniqueness is to be logical uniqueness but still in terms of non-demonstrative universals, we are back with Leibniz who had to rely on God to guarantee the uniqueness of each monad's viewpoint.

The case would be the same if Kant were to want to use the body (with its behavior and mannerisms) to individuate. If another body appeared exactly like mine and recited experiences that sounded like mine and acted like me, I should never be confused into thinking that that "object of the outer senses" was me. I should know - in the strongest possible sense - that that person is different from me, but there would be no concept that I could give Kant which would express this difference. And since I would lack a concept, he would deny that I knew.

Kant cannot individuate by means of an 'I' that he has insisted is empty. And if he cannot individuate by means of 'I', he cannot individuate at all. This is what I take Descartes, McTaggart, Keeling, and Strawson to be saying.

I suspect that Kant really wanted consciousness, or conscious substance, to be an object like the objects of the outer senses.

Now it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is
distinguished from the self that is to be determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished from its object. (KS 365 A 402)

Consciousness, or the thinking subject, is like objects of the outer senses in some ways, e.g., we experience it. We have no right to assert the logical or ontological independence of consciousness (though we may entertain the possibility) but consciousness is also different from matter. And why not? The only reason is a systematic one, so if one rejects that system, there is no reason. Why sacrifice persons to epistemology?

Rather we might claim that I also know myself in a way different from the way I know objects and just this difference, self-consciousness, is one of the attributes that makes me different from objects. One can refuse to reduce consciousness to an "object of the outer sense" while allowing that it may be related though we cannot say from an examination of consciousness how. And since we cannot know the ground of this relatedness nor how consciousness gives rise to our ways of thinking, categories, if you like, Kant may be justified in claiming that we do not know noumenal consciousness. But we do know what it is to think, this knowledge we have first-hand; we know the categories and connections natural to minds like ours, though we cannot say from the categories alone why we should have just these. Granted: we do not know all about consciousness. But to say that we do not know all about consciousness is not to say that we know consciousness not at all.

Many persons will want to insist that in addition to the logical meaning which can be given to consciousness to provide
a real (not merely formal) ground to the continuity, privacy, and uniqueness of persons, we also have an intuition of our own thinking per se. Some people would simply deny that "The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition." (KS 334 A 350) Those who would deny Kant's assertion might try to describe consciousness analogically, or poetically, as the "searchlight" or "the turned-out-ness which I always find in myself when I look". Comparisons are difficult because each person experiences only one consciousness, his own, and it is exactly like nothing else. Its character among his experiences is unique.

The cogito then tells us part of what it is to be a person: it is to be self-conscious, to intuit one's existence in one's thinking, to intuit one's consciousness which 1) provides the continuity of oneself, 2) separates each person from every other person, 3) accounts for the privacy of all our thoughts, and 4) provides the ground of each person's uniqueness.

Descartes, having met with such success in achieving certain, if limited, knowledge of the substantial self, is prepared to assert that whatever renders the cogito certain must render any proposition that has the same property similarly certain. It is the clearness and distinctness with which the cogito is grasped which guarantees its truth. So any proposition which is clear and distinct in the same way must also be true.
The criterion of clear and distinct perception applies to two spheres (or the same sphere seen in two ways): 1) the understanding of concepts, and 2) self-evident propositions.

When a person clearly and distinctly perceives the meaning or content of a concept, that is the meaning or content of that concept. There is no possibility that the concept could be otherwise, since with concepts the formal existence (what the concept is) and the object existence (what the concept appears to be) coincide. So with all experiences; they are what they appear to be.

Secondly, self-evident propositions are necessarily true just because they have this property of being clearly and distinctly perceived. There must be certain propositions for which no evidence can be given nor proof constructed; they must simply be 'seen' to be true, e.g., the laws of thought, the validity of fundamental argument forms. What else could guarantee the truth of such propositions?

Descartes could not have meant that the way to determine the truth of all propositions was just to sit and try to think clearly. In some cases empirical research is needed before one can decide whether a proposition is true. I think that Descartes would have limited the criterion of clear and distinct perception so that it would not have been a sufficient criterion of truth for contingent propositions.

The evidence for saying that he would have limited the criterion of clear and distinct perception is indirect.

First. Descartes was extremely interested in biological
research.

For almost twenty years, as the Anatomica records, he had been making observations on the order in which this and that organ makes its first appearance, and on the modifications through which it passes in the course of its development. ... His observations were chiefly on chicks taken from the egg in the first and following days of their hatching, and on the embryos of calves taken from the womb two months, three months, after conception. (Norman Kemp Smith. New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes. London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1952. P. 355.)

If he had thought that any proposition could bear the marks of truth within it, he would not have needed to make organized experiments; he could just have conceived of rival hypotheses and whichever one was more clearly and distinctly perceived would have been true. But he did not rely solely on the clearness and distinctness with which propositions were conceived, which fact I take to be evidence for the assertion that Descartes did not intend for this criterion to apply to contingent factual propositions about the world.

Second. In the passage where he is considering what in the cogito gives him truth he asserts that this would not be sufficient to assure him of its truth if it could ever be false.

Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true. (HR I 158)

Because of this passage I interpret Descartes' intention to be to limit the method of clear and distinct perception to what could never turn out to be false, since if he applied this method to ascertain a 'truth' which was later disqualified as
a truth, nothing at all could be known to be true any more, not even the cogito itself; reason itself would be untrustworthy, since the clear and distinct perception making the cogito (the first truth to come out of doubt) true would have been invalidated as a criterion of truth by having even once given falsity.

This clear and distinct perception (having proved itself in the cogito) may be applied to other matters so long as falsity is not possible. Limiting the method does not make it vacuous because it is the means of knowing concepts as immediate experience and self-evident truths.

What I have interpreted Descartes as achieving in the cogito is: 1) an indubitable proposition, 2) certainty that at least one thing, his self, exists; 3) some certain knowledge concerning the nature of this self, and 4) certainty that clear and distinct perception is an adequate method of acquiring truth in respect to certain kinds of ideas.

The rest of Descartes' system depends on God. It has only as much force as one gives credence to the three arguments for the existence of God. Almost no one is persuaded by them, I am not, so I shall omit them entirely, and continue the exposition of Descartes' theory of the self, his dividing it into extended and thinking substance, his account of our knowledge of things outside us (including persons), and the attempt to join mind and body into an interacting whole.

Because whatever is clearly and distinctly apprehended can be created by God just as it is apprehended,
it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other... and, therefore, just because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I..., is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (HR I 190)

Descartes fundamental error is claiming that thinking is known to be unextended, a gratuitous error - from our point of view.

The argument intended to get one to knowledge of objects begins with the claim that the faculty of perception is passive. This receiving and recognizing faculty would be useless if there were not an active faculty which produces the ideas. This cause must be outside the self because the active faculty does not presuppose thought and because the ideas occur in him willy-nilly. This cause must reside in a substance outside of him and must contain actually what is represented in his ideas of it. This substance might be extended or it might be God or some other more noble creature. But it cannot be either God or another nobler creature because God has given no faculty able to recognize that these ideas are not conveyed from corporeal objects and if the ideas came from other than corporeal objects God who is responsible for our faculties would be deceitful. Therefore corporeal objects exist as we judge them to
be, if our faculties all agree after careful consideration since God is able to produce whatever is distinctly perceived.

Included among these particulars must be other people since there is no other provision made for knowing them. God has to guarantee our knowledge of other persons.

The crux of the argument is that the ideas of sensible things must be guaranteed by a non-deceiving God. The knowledge of sensible things can be no more certain that the arguments for God's existence and for His trustworthiness since He is the "sole ground" of their truth. I believe that none of Descartes' three arguments for the existence of God is sound. God cannot be known to exist. And even if one believed that there is a God, yet it would be "presumption to desire to determine and understand that which God can and ought to do" (HR I 138) so that one could not rely on attributes foisted on to God for knowledge of what objects are.

Going on to the second matter completed by the end of the Meditations we find the rest of his theory of the self. There seem to be inconsistencies in his claims concerning what a person is.

The first position seems to appear when he says things like "my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing" (HR I 190) which thinking does not include "the faculties of imagination and feeling, without which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being." (HR I 190) And when the two substances, thinking substance and extended substance, are described as "en-
tirely different", and he is, of course, thinking substance. Though Descartes might sometimes want, or seem to want, to make his real self consist of pure intellect, this would leave certain admitted experiences unexplained, e.g., imagining, sensing, voluntary motion. Then the definition of thinking as including imagining, feeling, willing, would have to be modified.

The second and most common interpretation of what Descartes was offering as his real self is a contingent interaction between mind and body. On this interpretation, Descartes arrives at the association of mind with body by examining certain faculties he finds "in him", imagination, feeling, change of position, which would be what they are only if mind is associated with body. If one is willing to say that these faculties imply the association of body and mind and goes on to try to understand the interaction of mind and body, one is stymied. Thinking substance is unextended; extended substance is unthinking. If they are entirely different, how can they act on one another?

The Princess Elizabeth, one of Descartes' correspondents, puts the question pointedly:

... I beg of you to tell me how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts - being as it is merely a conscious substance. For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body's being propelled - to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing's surface. Now the first two conditions involve contact, and the third involves that the compelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with a thing's being immaterial. (Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Translated by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach. Edinburgh, Nelson. 1954. Pp. 274-5.)
When Descartes gives an answer, it is in effect to say that no philosophical answer is possible.

... it is just by means of ordinary life and conversation, by abstaining from meditating and from studying things that exercise the imagination, that one learns to conceive the union of soul and body. (Ibid. P. 280.)

So on this two-substances-interacting view, reason and philosophy must abdicate in favor of "ordinary life and conversation". Here Descartes has a name, "interaction", for the fact instead of an accounting for the fact. He asks us to accept what he has made impossible.

There is a third possibility: a substantial union of body and soul. This view is implied in two passages from the Sixth Meditation:

... I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. (HR I 192)

... myself in my entirety, inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul ... (HR I 192)

There is also a passage in the IV Reply which states that body and mind are each incomplete when viewed as parts of man's total essence.

I do not ignore the fact that certain substances are popularly called incomplete substances. But if they are said to be incomplete, because they cannot exist by themselves and unsupported by other things, I confess it seems to me to be a contradiction for them to be substances; i.e. for them to be things subsisting by themselves and at the same time incomplete, i.e. not capable of subsisting by themselves. But it is true that in another sense they can be called incomplete substances; viz, in a sense which allows that, insofar as they are substances, they have no lack of completeness, and merely asserts that they are incomplete insofar as they are referred to some other substance, in unison with which they form a single
self-subsistent thing distinct from everything else. Thus, the hand is an incomplete substance, when taken in relation with the body, of which it is a part; but, regarded alone, it is a complete substance. Quite in the same way mind and body are incomplete substances viewed in relation to the man who is the unity which together they form; but taken alone, they are complete. (HR II 99)

This can only mean that man would consist of body and mind united in a new substance, more real - when united in this way in man - than either substance.

The advantage of this view is that it could account for all the facts and could carry on from the cogito, such a good beginning. If the self is thinking substance, and if thought includes intellecting, imagining, feeling, willing, then only a substantial union can allow consistently all of these activities to be part of the real self.

But Descartes gives us no systematic way to connect the two substances, so the evaluation must be directed to the two substance view, a task quickly done.

The difficulties standing in the way of having public knowledge of persons seem insuperable. If thinking substance is not connected to extended substance in some necessary way, one cannot be sure of expressing one's thoughts by means of the body, nor that one is learning what another thinks by observing the behavior of his body. Unless one can be sure of the responsiveness of his body to his decisions and choices, a person cannot be held responsible for the behavior of his body.

Dualism will not do for either public knowledge of persons or responsibility.
Summary

1. Descartes' starting point is doubt but several unexamined beliefs are actually part of his system, e.g., the laws of thought, certain argument forms, the meaningfulness of language.

2. With *cogito ergo sum* Descartes establishes a) an indubitable proposition, b) certainty that at least one thing, his self, exists, c) certainty concerning the nature of his self, which is to think, and d) certainty that clear and distinct perception is an adequate method of acquiring truth in respect to certain kinds of ideas.

3. For persons knowledge cannot be impersonal, i.e., known without being known to be known.

4. All demonstratives besides "I" are meaningful only in relation to "I".

5. "I" is meaningful only because one directly intuits oneself. This immediate knowledge of oneself gives "I" meaning, thereby grounds demonstratives and other universals. "I" cannot be translated without remainder into some description not incorporating a demonstrative.

6. 'I' in the cogito stands for thinking, thinking substance, consciousness, which terms are equivalent.

7. Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception, expressed by 'I think', has only logical or formal existence.

8. Kant and Descartes (at the point of the cogito) agree that the examination of consciousness cannot provide knowledge of its (consciousness') immortality, nor knowledge that con-
sciousness is independent of matter.

9. It is not possible to be conscious of consciousness without having had particular thoughts.

10. Kant denies that we have knowledge of the substantial self because we do not have either a concept of 'I' or an intuition of this consciousness.

11. Descartes or his supporters would not only agree that we do not have a (class) concept of 'I', they would deny that it is either possible or desirable to have such a concept. They would assert that we do have an intuition of consciousness.

12. The Transcendental Unity of Apperception cannot provide continuity, separateness, privacy, or uniqueness of persons. It can at best name the fact that persons' experiences are connected.

13. God is needed to guarantee that outer things including persons are as we know them. Our knowledge of other persons then is only as well-founded as our knowledge of His existence and nature.

14. If mind and body are strongly separated, a way is needed to connect them. No means is provided by Descartes.

15. Descartes' system provides what is required for identity and knowledge of one's private self.

16. At least change of thoughts is allowed within the Cartesian system since a self-identical thinker who thinks particular changing thoughts is provided.

17. Neither public knowledge of persons nor responsibi-
lity can be accommodated within a strongly dualistic system.
Many of the views I am espousing in this thesis are not currently fashionable in Britain or America (though there are signs that fashions may be changing). It might be well therefore to compare my position with some contemporary writers who have attracted widespread attention to show similarities and differences, and where there are differences to show either the shortcomings of their views which would remove that and like views as rivals to my own, or alternatively, to show the superiority of my view over theirs in its adequacy to the facts of ordinary goings-on among people.

Before examining the particular philosophers I shall consider in this chapter, I should like to make some prefatory remarks.

Much of the philosophy of mind (or philosophical psychology, or metaphysics of persons, or theory of the self - whatever one chooses to call it) since Descartes has been directed to overcoming dualism. If one moves from the assertion that mind is known in a way different from (as well as like) the way of knowing matter to the assertion that mind is totally different from and independent of matter, then there is knowledge of only one mind,
one's own. Knowledge of matter or knowledge of another's mind becomes philosophically ungrounded. How is extended matter to affect unextended mind? How is unextended mind to move extended body, e.g., in voluntary motion? The expression of one's experiences by means of and in one's body and knowing another's experiences via his body become problematical. Solipsism seems to be the logical and inescapable consequence. That mind and matter interact is not denied by Descartes, as we have seen above, but the fact is not philosophically explicable, and is indeed mysterious on Descartes' principles.

Objections are raised and rightly so to this abandonment of philosophy and cleaving to common sense (as we have seen Descartes did) when philosophy which is supposed to be superior to common sense has led to a dead end. Better it is thought, to have different principles which do not have to be forsaken or ignored to accommodate the facts, such as, that I can tell others what I think, that we have knowledge of the persons around us via bodies they control.

The presently fashionable way to avoid the difficulties of dualism is behaviorism. There are varieties of behaviorism though so I should like to make some distinctions within behaviorism which may facilitate our discussion of the specific philosophers below.

Since the dualism between private experience and the behavior of the body is what gives rise to solipsism, the existence of private experience may be denied. All that there is to persons - including oneself - is what is public: body, its behavior, and something further (with a status which is apparently different),
the possible ways of behaving. This view could be labelled 'metaphysical behaviorism' since the claim is that only behavior (and possible behavior) can be real. Or instead of explicitly denying private experience (which sounds pretty crude) the position may be disguised by saying that everything that is known about any person including oneself is learned in the same way. (This way of stating it puts into sharp relief one difference between this presently 'in' position and my own: I have claimed that one gains some kinds of knowledge of oneself in a way different from the ways used in the case of other persons which are also used for some kinds of knowledge about oneself.) That the disguise is not really a change is unquestionable, because if there is only one way of finding out about persons, it must be public and all that is true of a person must be public. There can't be anything private left over. (There is a refinement or equivocation about keeping things to oneself which may seem to modify this form of crudity but I do not think it helps or helps enough to relieve the inadequacy of the position.)

But in spite of the inadequacies (which I shall try to show below) there are attractions in the position. It does, of course, entirely evade the bog of solipsism. It stays on the high public road of behavior and does not wander into private path which may lead to a solipsistic solitude.

Though it is no doubt clear that for me the cost - the loss of private experience - is too high for the result - the assurance of a community of like minds (which result can be gotten in a less costly way) - I yet want to admit some advantages of this kind of
metaphysical behavioristic analysis to another position. The behavioristic analysis of the means of coming to know persons is illuminating, useful, and true, I think.

One can incorporate some of what the metaphysical behaviorists assert without going all the way with them. That is, one can say that the only basis for what we know about other persons is their speech and behavior without saying 1) that these exhaust what is true of persons, or 2) that everything that we find out about ourselves is found out in the same ways that we find out about other persons. This modified behaviorism could be labeled 'epistemological behaviorism' meaning that the observation of behavior (here including verbal acts and reports) is one way of getting knowledge of people and the only way of getting reliable knowledge of other persons besides oneself. (Believers in extra-sensory perception will disagree but even they must rely on behavior to get knowledge of other persons most of the time.) Epistemological behaviorism then allows the existence of private experiences.

My position would count as one kind of epistemological behaviorism.

Within epistemological behaviorism differing stands may be taken. All of them grant that private experiences occur and are real. But A) one can grant that persons can know what they experience, or B) one may say that private experiences are not known, only had. C) One may deprecate the importance of private experiences, or D) one may allow the highest value and significance to be put on private experience.

Regarding A and B. There may very well be reasons for not
using 'know' to apply to private experiences, reasons having to do with requirements of publicness and corrigibility for knowledge. If knowledge must be public and corrigible, then an incorrigible awareness which occurs privately and may not be publicized cannot count as knowing. But I think that there is nothing more certain nor anything about which one can speak with greater authority than one's private experience; and if this certainty and authoritative-ness suffice to give knowledge, then private experience is known. Perhaps a motive for saying that private experiences are only had not known is a desire to depreciate the importance of private experiences.

If the importance of private experiences is depreciated, one may ask: for what is private experience unimportant? I presume that the answer would be: for social life, what I have called the viability of society. It is true that most of what makes society 'go' viewed at a more obvious level is what is public in persons, their actions, abilities, roles, statuses. But I can think of at least one telling counter-example, namely, what is required for responsibility. If persons are to be responsible, they must be able to exercise self-control and must be able to apply sanctions to themselves (whether anyone else knows about it or not). Take away these two phenomena, and responsibility, and consequently society are changed. So some private experiences are necessary to society's on-goingness.

And surely to our private lives private aspects of persons are of the utmost importance. What an intimate can tell us about his experiences which we can get in no other way is what makes
him more special than non-intimates. We can, almost, live through his experiences.

Leaving out or trying to minimize the importance of this private aspect of persons truncates and distorts what we mean by 'person'.

We cultivate people to deserve their confidence and confidences. Why do we take the trouble? Because we want our own lives expanded through another's Erlebnis. How is it possible that we can know that others are persons like oneself, that this particular being before one is a person like oneself, that one can understand his expressions of what he experiences privately and still make mistakes or be deceived sometimes?

Behaviorism arises from concern with such questions.

We may now move to the consideration of the first book to be treated in this chapter, Norman Malcolm's Dreaming.

We have at least two purposes in considering Dreaming. One is to determine exactly what he says about dreaming; I think this book is sometimes misrepresented. Another purpose is to see how his view differs from my view given in Chapter 2 above. He does not explicitly claim that his is the commonly-accepted view though he seems to suggest with the Latin quotation from Descartes on the title page that he is with the rustics in not ignoring self-evident matters and unlike the lettered persons who find ways of being blinded. In the original Descartes with whom he is in disagreement on the matter of dreams was probably aligning himself with the rustics against the lettered persons too. And I claimed that my view of dreams given in Chapter 2 is the ordinary view.
I should have preferred to present only the points in *Dreaming* which clearly and immediately could be seen to contribute to the accomplishment of one of our purposes but this is not possible because there is too much interconnection (what is argued for in one chapter is used to establish a further point later) and so it would be only fair to give as much of the chain of argumentation as is needed. Also the exact point Malcolm is making is often elusive so it is helpful to give the views he offers as opposed to his own. One can see from the views that he disagrees with where he stands.

Chapter One, Introduction, gives views of dreaming held by Descartes (Mind's essence is consciousness and so long as a mind exists there must exist 'modes' of that essence; a dream is part of that mental life, consisting of thoughts, feelings and impressions that one has when asleep), Aristotle (the soul makes assertions in sleep), Kant (the mind's greatest perfection might be exercised in sleep), Moore ('We cease to perform them [mental acts] only while we are asleep, without dreaming; and even in sleep, so long as we dream, we are performing acts of consciousness') Norman Malcolm *Dreaming*, N.Y., Humanities Press, 1959, 1962, p. 3. I feel it is necessary to add here a bibliographical note. The second Impression with some corrections appeared in 1962. The copy I am using is from the third impression, 1964. Hereafter when referring to *Dreaming* in this discussion of it I shall give only the page number.), Russell ('What, in dreams we see and hear, we do in fact see and hear, though, owing to the unusual context, what we see and hear gives rise to false beliefs. Similarly, what
we remember in dreams we do really remember; that is to say, the experience called "remembering" does occur!" p. 3), Freud ("'Obviously, the dream is the life of the mind during sleep!'" p. 3), Hadfield, a contemporary psychologist ("'Dreams are a form, probably the most primitive form, of ideation in which experiences and situations of the day and of life are reproduced on the screen of the mind during sleep as images, usually in visual form!'" pp. 3-4), and Yost and Kalish ("'Dreaming is a real experience. And since dreams can be remembered, they must be conscious experiences.'" p. 4). I might add that these views of men incontrovertably litterati are not markedly different from the "dream" entry given in The American College Dictionary which says: "dream ... -n. a succession of images or ideas present in the mind during sleep. 2. the sleeping state in which this occurs..." But perhaps the lexicographers who compiled The American College Dictionary consulted only the litterati and the rustics do have a different understanding of dreams.

It is useful to offer the views of these various thinkers which Malcolm gives in his first chapter because it provides the backdrop for his argumentation. It isn't until Chapter 16 that he makes clear his opposition to these views and his underlying aim in opposing them. He aims to undercut the scepticism arising from the belief that "dreaming and waking might be 'exact counterparts!'" (p. 120). When he first gives these statements in Chapter 1, he says he wants to "examine" them. The thrust of his argumentation can, I think, be better understood if his opposition to these views is kept in mind.
Chapter Two argues that it is impossible to make the assertion 'I am asleep' because it is absurd that a sleeping person could claim that he is asleep. Nor can a man judge that he is asleep, according to Chapter Three. Malcolm argues that if a man can make judgments during sleep, then it ought to be possible for him to judge that he is asleep. The premiss only if one understands the sentence 'I am asleep' can one judge himself to be asleep is left implicit, but if it were to be made explicit and defended it would be at this point since Malcolm goes on to argue:

... I will raise the question of whether it can be verified that someone understands how to use the sentence 'I am asleep' to describe his own state. If there is that use of the sentence it ought to make sense to verify that someone has or has not mastered it. An indication that someone understands the use of a sentence to describe some state of affairs might be the fact that he utters the sentence sometimes when, and only when, that state of affairs does exist and utters the negation of the sentence sometimes when, and only when, that state of affairs does not exist: for example, he says "The wind is blowing hard" sometimes when and only when the wind is blowing hard; and he says "the wind is not blowing hard" sometimes when and only when the wind is not blowing hard. In general such a correlation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for understanding the use of a sentence: it is possible that a particular sentence should be understood and yet each time it is uttered the description it expresses should be false, just as it is possible that a particular order ('Put your hand in this fire!!') should always be disobeyed, even though it is impossible that all orders should always be disobeyed Wittgenstein §345). Still the correlation would, in some circumstances, provide evidence of understanding. Could we obtain evidence of this sort in the case of the sentence 'I am asleep'? (Pp. 9-10. This quotation does not appear in this form in the first edition.)

At this point it might be well to consider what kinds of connections Malcolm is claiming. He says that "it ought to make sense to verify that someone understands the use of the sentence 'I am asleep' to describe his own state. But the exact signifi-
cance of this way of expressing it is unclear to me especially in light of the argumentation which follows.

Perhaps he means only that we normally expect to be able to verify that someone understands how to use a sentence. But if this is what means, then showing that we cannot verify that someone knows how to use a sentence is not sufficient to establish that we will not allow that he knows how to use the sentence. It might simply be a queer sentence not allowing us to verify that someone knows how to use it, but such that we are willing to grant that he knows how to use it anyhow.

Or does Malcolm mean something as strong as 'it must make sense to verify that someone understands the use of the sentence etc.', i.e., that verifying that one has mastered the use of a sentence is a necessary condition of our allowing that he knows how to use this sentence? Malcolm admits explicitly (if I understand correctly "such a correlation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for understanding the use of a sentence") that verifying (correlation is the only method of verifying he has mentioned) that someone understands the use of a sentence is not a necessary condition of allowing that he understands the use of that sentence, but the argumentation which follows seems to consist in trying to establish that because one cannot correlate the use of 'I am asleep' with the proper state of affairs, one cannot verify that someone understands the sentence, and that therefore one cannot know that a person knows how to rightly use that sentence. It looks as if verification is treated as necessary (in the course of his argument) and that correlation is the only
possible method of verifying that someone understands the use of 'I am asleep'.

To restate this point. Only if Malcolm claims that verification of understanding a sentence is necessary to our allowing that a person using the sentence understands it is Malcolm justified in concluding that we will not allow that a person using a sentence understands it if we lack verification. He seems to deny that verification is a necessary condition. Therefore he is not entitled to the conclusion that we will not allow that understanding exists if we lack verification. If I am correct, it is consequently superfluous for him to show that such verification is impossible.

The strong claim: that verifying that someone knows the use of a sentence is necessary in order for us to allow that he knows how to use that sentence, is what Malcolm might like (if I understand the subsequent argumentation) but this strong claim is probably false, as I have suggested above. We rarely if ever require verifying that someone knows how to use a sentence in order for us to allow that he does. We simply allow that an adult user of his native language does know the use of the sentences he uses. And even if somehow we come to doubt, we would hardly ask for verification that he knows the use of a sentence in the form of correlation of the sentence with the 'correct' state of affairs. If we suspected that he didn't know the use of the sentence, we would probably question him about the component words, to see if he understood them.

Leonard Linsky argues that it isn't correct to speak of the use- of a sentence but only of the use- of words.
Surely, there are other things about a person's verbal behavior, besides his saying what is true in saying a sentence, which would justify my belief that this person understands the sentence.

On Malcolm's view, a sentence which has never been uttered in the course of making a true statement is one that we can never know that another person can use significantly, i.e., with understanding. But this is plainly false. Take for example the sentence 'I see a ghost'. No one has ever uttered it making a true assertion; there are no ghosts. But this certainly does not alter the fact that many people know what it means, and that we know they know what it means. (Leonard Linsky. "Malcolm and the use of words", Analysis, December 1965. P. 61.)

This seems to me sufficient to impair the force of Malcolm's argument if he is claiming that verifying in the form of correlating that someone knows the use of a sentence is necessary in order for us to allow that he knows how to use the sentence.

He thinks that he does show that such verification of understanding of 'I am asleep' is impossible.

Now how could one verify that a man says, 'I am asleep' to himself when he is asleep? How could one find out that he did this even once? If he talked in his sleep, saying aloud 'I am asleep', this would not count either for or against his understanding of that sentence, since a man who is talking in his sleep is not aware of what he is saying. Here I am merely commenting on the idiomatic use of the expression 'talking in his sleep'. We do not affirm it of someone who is aware that he is talking. (P. 10)

The error or confusion I should like to comment on here is Malcolm's use of "is aware of". It is quite true that in one sense a person who talks in his sleep is not aware that he is talking. That is, he is not aware of where his body is and who is really hearing him (probably); he has in his sleeping mind another setting and interlocutor (most likely). But to say that he is not aware at all is surely mistaken since if one wakes a sleep-talking person and asks, "What were you dreaming? You were talking," the awakened person will normally be able to describe his dream and explain why he was
saying what he said. The sleep-talker will say something like: "Oh, I said that because such-and-such was happening in my dream." And in that sense he was aware, aware of what was happening in his dream, and aware of what he said. It would be thought self-contradictory to say, "I know what was happening in my dream just when you woke me, and I know that I said p because of what was happening but I wasn't in any sense aware of it." Granted that dreaming awareness is not waking awareness. But Malcolm cannot assume at this point that dreaming awareness is no awareness at all, since this argument about talking in one's sleep is one in a chain which is supposed to establish that dreaming awareness is no awareness at all.

It may be thought that we could appeal to the sleeper's testimony after he awakened. Suppose he told us that he had said 'I am asleep' while he was asleep. But this report would presuppose that he already knew when to say 'I am asleep', and so it could not be used to establish the point at issue without begging the question. That is to say, his claim that he said certain words while asleep, implies that he was aware of being asleep and so implies that he knows how to apply the sentence 'I am asleep'. If he does not, his report is worthless. If we have no way of establishing that he knows how to use the sentence other than by appeal to his testimony, then we cannot appeal to his testimony. (P. 11)

If I understand Malcolm correctly, he is saying here that we cannot, not only in the case of 'I am asleep' but in the case of any sentence, rely on a person's testimony alone to find out whether he knows how to use a sentence. This is of special interest because later Malcolm not merely allows but insists that we rely solely on another person's testimony to know that he uses the sentence (or an equivalent) 'I had a dream' correctly.

It may be thought that from the fact that a person could be taught and learn how to use the third person sentence, 'he is asleep' we could safely conclude that he would know how to
use the first person sentence. This conclusion would have no justification at all. The use of the sentence 'He is asleep' is governed by criteria of the following sort: that the body of the person is question is relaxed, his eyes closed, his breathing steady; and that he is unresponsive to moderate sounds and happenings in his vicinity. It cannot be supposed that these criteria are to govern the use of the first person sentence. How absurd it would be for someone to judge that he himself if asleep from the fact that his eyes are closed and that he does not react to various sounds! If 'I am asleep' were used to make a judgment, this use would differ so greatly from that of 'He is asleep' that an understanding of the latter would not argue an understanding of the former. (Pp. 11-12)

Malcolm's point here is, I take it, that the use of a third person sentence is governed by behavioral criteria which cannot be applied in the case of first person sentences. (The criteria must be the same for first person sentences as for third person sentences.) So the first person sentence cannot be used to make a judgment.

Now if the criteria governing 'He is asleep' are behavioral, must the criteria governing 'He was asleep' also be behavioral? I presume Malcolm would say that they must be. If not, how is it that a new criterion can be employed when one changes tenses? And if the criteria governing 'He was asleep' are behavioral, then must not the criteria governing 'I was asleep' be behavioral? Unlike 'I am asleep', 'I was asleep' is often used in ordinary language. What criteria do we employ? Is it any less absurd to say that 'I was asleep' is governed by behavioral criteria than to say 'I am asleep' is governed by behavioral criteria?

Malcolm will not allow that one describe himself as "being asleep" on the basis of some conscious experience, because "having some conscious experience or other, no matter what, is not what is meant by being asleep, i.e., the statement 'Jones is asleep' is not false because there is some experience or other that Jones does not
There is no need to say that there is a conscious experience of sleeping, or what it is if there is such a thing. We can say what it must not be: sleeping experience must not be a clear and distinct perception of what is actually going on around the sleeping person. Consider the case Malcolm offers. A person's body is relaxed, his eyes are closed, he is snoring, he does not react to various movements and voices close by, and he does not stir when some possessions he greatly values are noisily destroyed near his bed but later were "able to relate what was said and done in his presence while he was in bed, without either inferring it or being informed of it". (P. 26) Most people, unlike Malcolm, would simply agree with the man who claims that he was only pretending to sleep. Since most of us have probably succeeded in fooling other people into believing that we were asleep when we weren't, we wouldn't be surprised if we ourselves were fooled by someone else. People who have no theory to save had rather believe what is surely possible, that the man was pretending to sleep, and be perplexed about the man's motive in allowing his possessions to be destroyed than give up one criterion of being asleep (namely, the inability to relate what is said and done in one's presence, or putting it more exactly, being able to relate what is said and done in one's presence sufficing to show that the person is not asleep) and call the pseudo-sleeping state "an extraordinary phenomenon that escapes classification". (P. 26)

But we can let rest the discussion of whether the judgment 'I am asleep' is possible. (I do not want to assert that this judgment is possible. So far my efforts have been directed to
pointing out shortcomings in Malcolm's argument which is intended
to show that the judgment is impossible.) Malcolm wants to say
that the judgment is impossible and goes on to say that any judg-
ment made while a man is asleep is absurd in the same way that the
judgment 'I am asleep' is absurd. Judgments made in dreams [and
they are usually not like the ones Malcolm offers, such as, 'My
wife is jealous' but rather judgments about something happening
(perhaps accompanied by character analyses) like, 'I saw this old
friend and thought to myself, "My, how long her hair is!" and then
she turned around and I saw that she wasn't really my friend but
this person that I met yesterday and then ...'] are not usually
accompanied by the judgment 'I am asleep'.

The point here is that one who holds views like those given
in Malcolm's Chapter One does not have to argue that the judgment
'I am asleep' is a necessary precondition of making dream judg-
ments. Malcolm wanted to show that to make the judgment 'I am
asleep' is impossible and consequently so are all judgments while
asleep by the same schema of proof. I believe that my view is
like the views in Malcolm's Chapter One, which is also the common
sense view: namely, that when one dreams, one makes judgments
(dream judgments) but one does not always judge at the same time
that one is asleep. Far from this judgment (that one is asleep)
being logically fundamental or even like dream judgments, it would
actually change our concept of dreaming radically if dreaming al-
ways were or could be accompanied by the judgment 'I am asleep'.
Dreaming would not be the non-veridical or hallucinatory experi-
ence that it is (i.e., an experience which makes us believe what
is not the case) if one could consistently judge that one is sleeping.

Arguing from the impossibility of judging that one is asleep we arrive at an important result, namely, that it is nonsensical to suppose that while a person is asleep he could make any judgment. Remember that the logical absurdity detected in the sentence 'I am asleep' amounts to this: that in order for the sentence to have a correct use one would sometimes have to say it when the thing one said was true. (Pp. 35-6)

Here is one place where Malcolm seems to assert that a correlation between the use of a sentence and the fact that it asserts (i.e., its truth) is a necessary condition of having a correct use; I believe that he denied this on pp. 9-10, quoted above p. 251.

One more quotation to show that Malcolm is asserting (what I believe to be false and inconsistent with our present concept of dreaming) that the impossibility of the judgment 'I am asleep' proves that it is nonsensical to suppose that any judgment could be made while asleep. (The following quotation also provides the next point I want to object to.)

We noticed that it would be self-contradictory to verify that a man was both asleep and judging that he was, because whatever in his behavior showed he was making the judgment would equally show that he was not asleep. Now this would be so whatever the judgment was. In order to know that he had made any judgment one would have to know that he had said certain words and that he had been aware of saying them. But whatever it was in his demeanour that revealed his awareness of saying them would also establish that he was both aware and not aware of saying certain words. ... It would be self-contradictory to verify that he made any judgment while asleep. It is not that there is something unique about the fact of being asleep that keeps one from taking note of that fact while asleep. If a sleeping person could note that it is raining or judge that his wife is jealous, then why could he not judge that he is asleep? The absurdity of the latter proves the absurdity of the former. (P. 36)

Here the impossibility of making any judgment is clearly claimed to be connected to the impossibility of making the judg-
ment that one is asleep. "The absurdity of the latter proves the absurdity of the former."

Next. Malcolm insists on a univocal meaning for "aware". R. M. Yost, Jr. in his review of Dreaming (Philosophical Review, October 1960, p. 535) gives away Malcolm's meaning; "mentally alert (conscious)" are the words he uses for Malcolm's "aware". Malcolm uses "alert" as equivalent to "awake" on p. 15 of Dreaming. Of course, no one would want to say that one can be mentally alert (in the sense that one is mentally alert while one is awake) while one is asleep; but this is not the same as granting that one cannot be aware in any sense. As I argued above: if one talks in one's sleep, if awakened, one knows usually why one said what one said. To say that one knows what one was dreaming and why one said what one said but that one was not aware at all of the dream or of what one said, is to use the word "aware" in a non-standard way, to narrow its meaning for the sake of one's theory.

But the argument is not solely about the word "aware". The question is whether dreaming is sufficiently like what goes on while one is awake to warrant describing the mind with at least some of the same predicates, e.g., 'experiencing', 'judging', etc. And if not, why not?

So far the argument against using such predicates seems to consist in asserting that in order to judge one needs to be able to use the appropriate sentences, but nothing could show that a sleeping person knows how to use sentences while he is sleeping, because to use any sentence, he must be able to use 'I am asleep'. To know that a person uses 'I am asleep' correctly, we should have
to observe him judging that he is asleep while he is asleep which is "absurd", "impossible", "nonsensical".

As I have already argued above, 'I am asleep' is (contrary to what Malcolm says) a peculiar judgment, which far from being on all fours with other judgments is peculiar and which if it could occur, would radically alter the phenomenon of dreaming.

Second, our knowing that a person knows how to use a sentence correctly does not depend on his using the sentence to make a true assertion since we can know that he knows the use of a sentence which could never be truly asserted (Linsky's example, given above, was 'I see a ghost').

After arguing that judging, thinking, reasoning, imagining in sleep are "all unintelligible notions", Malcolm gets to dreams in Chapter Eleven.

There is a use of the word 'dream', and it is the basic sense of the word, in which a person cannot dream unless he is asleep. The criterion of someone's having had a dream, in this sense, is that upon awaking he tells a dream. It is possible for a person to fall asleep and to sleep soundly for an hour, and then, after being suddenly awakened, to tell a dream. The various criteria of sleep that were previously mentioned could be perfectly satisfied, so that there would be no question that he had been sound asleep during that hour. But the criterion of his having dreamt would also be satisfied. It makes sense, therefore, to say of someone both that he was sound asleep for an hour and that he dreamt during that sleep. (P. 49)

As I argued above in Chapter 2, Section C, I too want to say that we can only know what some other person dreamed if he tells us. I might be willing to allow that twitches, etc. occurring while a person slept might indicate that the person was dreaming which Malcolm wants to put no stock in at all apparently. The only indication of dreaming for Malcolm is to be the waking report. I could argue this since Malcolm takes several scientific investiga-
tors to task for wanting to use rapid eye movements as an indication of dreaming. But it is unlikely that they will pay any mind to Dreaming (and consequently feel the need of any defense) so I shall limit my discussion to what can better be considered by persons lacking an expert's extensive empirical knowledge.

But there is an obvious objection to saying that the only way to know that a person had a dream is to hear him tell his dream, namely, the knowledge in one's own case. My knowledge that I had a dream is in no way dependent on my hearing myself tell a dream. And Malcolm agrees.

Perhaps the greatest cause of perplexity about the telling of a dream as the criterion of the occurrence of a dream is the fact that one cannot apply this criterion to oneself. One does not find out that oneself had a dream by applying that criterion. One uses it only for 'He had a dream, not for 'I had a dream'. This asymmetry may lead one to deny that the third person sentence is governed by this criterion. 'I do not determine that I had a dream on the basis of my telling a dream. I use "I had a dream" and "He had a dream" in the same sense. Therefore, that another person tells a dream cannot be the thing that determines for me that he had a dream'. The trouble with this fallacious argument lies in the phrase 'the same sense'. ... But what is 'the same sense' here? To use the sentences of this asymmetrical pair in the same sense (in so far as they can be used in the same sense) is to use them in the normal way, where telling a dream serves as a criterion of verification for the one but not the other. ...

From the fact that one does not use the above criterion for deciding that one dreamt does it follow that there is not such a thing as knowing one dreamt? No. One has grounds sometimes for concluding that one dreamt, and this is knowledge in a proper sense of the word. (Pp. 63-4)

Malcolm and I are agreed then on two important points: 1) that there is an asymmetry between the way of coming to know that I had a dream and the way of coming to know that he had a dream; and 2) that one knows in a proper sense of the word that one had a dream oneself without using the criterion used in the case of other
people. One uses a criterion in the case of other persons' dreams which one does not use in the case of one's own dreams. This is another, perhaps better, way of saying what I said in Chapter 2: that there are more ways than one of acquiring knowledge of persons; the way one gets some kinds of knowledge in the case of other persons is not the way one has of coming by those kinds of knowledge in one's own case.

Knowing what one has oneself dreamed does not depend upon one's telling (see p. 71 above). We know about the contents of another person's dream only what he tells us (see p. 86 above). And, a further point of agreement, there is no way to check on his report, no comparing it to his dream to see whether it corresponds.

How is it possible that there are two ways of getting knowledge of persons? The reason I have given above is that in the case of other persons one has only their behavior and their reports (in the case of dreams, their reports) whereas in one's own case one also has knowledge based on one's own experience (which is in its occurrence private). Malcolm and others of like views will say the question and the answer are improper. (Cf. Dreaming pp. 86-7) One must know when to stop asking questions and the time to stop is before this question has been asked because the only answer to it could be: that's the way things are, or, that's the language game we play. And I am resisting stopping with dream-telling as a "proto-phenomenon" before we give full weight to what is private in persons which private aspect is necessary to our ordinary concept of person.
But we can investigate what Malcolm says our knowledge of our own dreams consists in to see whether there is anything 'inner' in this knowledge. Malcolm says about one's knowledge of one's own dreams:

From the fact that one does not use the above criterion for deciding that one dreamt does it follow that there is not such a thing as knowing one dreamt? No. One has grounds sometimes for concluding that one dreamt, and this is knowledge in a proper sense of the word. An example would be to wake up with the impression that one has just painted the bedroom walls blue, and then to note that the walls are still yesterday's yellow: 'So it was a dream'. To find out one dreamt the incident is to find out that the impression one had on waking is false. As one can know one dreamt, so can one be mistaken. You wake up, for example, with the impression that a policeman came into your room during the night; other people in the house say this did not occur; you conclude you dreamt it: but the event really happened and the others conspired to deceive you. ...

I am inclined to believe that statements of the form 'I dreamt so and so' are always inferential in nature. I do not mean that one always arrives at them by explicit processes of inference but rather that one might always defend them as conclusions from certain facts or supposed facts. If someone were to ask you how you knew that you dreamt so and so, you could always mention something that you supposed proved or made probable that the thing in question did not occur and that therefore you dreamt it.

What can have no justification and requires none is your statement that you have the impression that so and so occurred. (You may or may not believe that it did occur.) In this sense you cannot find out that you dreamt, although you can find out that someone else dreamt. What it does make sense to find out is whether your impression corresponds with reality, and to discover that it does is to discover that you had a dream. (Pp. 64-5)

One's knowledge of his dreams is than supposed to be inferential. One has an impression. One finds out that the impression is false. One concludes that one dreamt it. I take it that the conclusion counts as knowledge because it is an inference.

There are two questions I should like to ask at this point.

First. Does one have knowledge of the impression that one has on awakening? Malcolm would probably say no, because it can
have no justification and requires none. I presume this impression is like an impression (sensation) of pain which is had, not known. As I have already said, there may be good enough reasons for reserving 'knowledge' for what is public and corrigible to warrant limiting the application of the term in this way. But whether one knows that one has the impression or not, one has an impression. And this impression must be a private experience. So the (necessarily private) impression is an essential part of one's knowledge that he dreamed whether or not the whole of such knowledge is private.

Second. Is it true that we can know that we dreamed only as a result of an inference?

Suppose, as often happens, one wakes up with the impression that one dreamed but can't remember what one dreamed. One has the impression of some mental activity during the night but cannot remember it. Lacking a specific impression which is found to be false, does one then have no right to say 'I had a dream'? If Malcolm would say 'no, one has no right', his divergence from the ordinary view would be obvious. "I know I had a dream but I can't remember what it was" makes perfectly good ordinary sense.

To summarize this section concerning the way one comes to know one dreamed. Malcolm claims that it is by means of an inference. One has an impression upon awakening which is found to be false so one concludes that one dreamt. I have suggested this may be true for some cases, but that even where this is the correct account, an impression which must be a private experience is a necessary part of such knowledge. And I submit that this is not the
only way one comes to know that one had a dream; one may sometimes wake up with the impression (which is not here an inference) that one dreamt though one does not know what one dreamt. Then one's knowledge that one dreamt consists entirely of an impression. So one's knowledge of one's dream life consists in part or entirely of an impression which must be a kind of private experience.

And also, since Malcolm has granted that one can have knowledge in a proper sense of one's own dreams, which is inferential, I take it that one can know (by means of such an inference) that one had a dream without this knowledge being necessarily public, though admittedly communicable. That is, one infers from a falsified impression that one dreamed and knows this even if one doesn't tell anyone. This knowledge one has for oneself though others are ignorant and may be (mercifully if one's dreams are dull) kept ignorant. Or one may lie, knowing what one dreamed and intentionally mislead one's interlocutor.

This possibility of private knowledge of oneself which entails the possibility of never-ended ignorance on the part of other persons and their being successfully deceived without the possibility of their proving that one has lied (so long as one is consistent in the story) is the minimum concession I need.

I should like to be able to show that the ordinary view that dreams are "a succession of images or ideas present in the mind during sleep" is correct. But to do this one would have to establish that one can be aware while asleep, aware in the sense of dream-awareness. Having a dream does not mean, for Malcolm, that one was aware of anything.
When he says 'I dreamt so and so' he implies, first, that it seemed to him on waking up as if the so and so had occurred, and second, that the so and so did not occur. There is simply no place here for an implication or assumption that he was aware of anything at all while asleep. His testimony that he had a dream does not involve that nonsensical consequence. (P. 66)

Malcolm has asserted that being asleep and being aware are contradictory, and I have disagreed above. But since it is true that dream-awareness is not the same in every respect with waking-awareness, e.g., in the possibility of offering behavioral evidence to another person to show that one is aware, and since the attempt to show that in dreams one is aware - in the dream sense - has been forestalled by Malcolm's asserting that any evidence of awareness establishes that one is not asleep, it would not be useful for me to try to merely insist that dream-awareness is a kind of awareness.

One might say that we remember our dreams, and that a necessary condition of remembering something is having been aware of it, and that therefore we must have been aware of a dream which is later remembered. In reply, Malcolm says that one does not remember a dream in the paradigmatic sense of "remember"; we 'remember' dreams "because there is nothing outside of my account of the dream ... to determine that my account is right or wrong." (P. 57)

I wonder whether remembering and 'remembering' are clearly distinguishable in their occurrence. That is, when one remembers, can he tell right off that he is not 'remembering' or does he have to find out from another person in order to know whether there was something which he was aware of or whether it was a dream of which he was not aware? If one 'remembered' dreams but remembered con-
scious experiences, one should be able to distinguish these kinds of remembering. But if we could distinguish these kinds of remembering, we could never be in doubt whether what we are remembering really was a waking experience or a dream. At least some people do remember (or 'remember') what they are unable to definitely label either 'dream' or 'waking experience'.

One could further proliferate senses of remembering by pointing out that one remembers (should we write it "'remembers'"?) in another sense a twinge of pain that one had yesterday but told no one about. This must be a further sense (beyond plain remembering and 'remembering') because though there is nothing outside of one's account of yesterday's pain to determine that the account is right or wrong, still yesterday another person could have been told about the pain while one had it; no similar report could have been given of the dream while one was having it. Still another sense of "remember" ("'remember'"?) could be developed for feelings which could but need not have behavioral expression, differing from dreams in being reportable when they occur, differing from pains in lacking a necessary connection - at least sometimes - with a bodily state. No great ingenuity is required to provide senses of "remember" which are still different for images, intentions, memories, solitary actions.

But however many senses of "remember" we devise, is it not the case that a necessary condition of remembering something is having been aware of it? This condition applies to all the senses of "remember". If so, we are brought to the conclusion that we are aware of dreams.
One final point. Malcolm throughout *Dreaming* requires that there be outward criteria for certainty. He makes this claim explicitly about judging, awareness, and remembering. I have been denying this claim throughout this thesis and especially in this discussion of Malcolm. V. C. Chappell in his critical study of *Dreaming* (*Philosophical Quarterly*, April 1962) also denies that there must be outward criteria, saying, "Nor do I see, as Malcolm seems to hold, that it is only external, objective things that can settle a question with certainty." *(Op. cit., p. 184)*

In this discussion Chappell argues that one can revise a report "often ... on the basis of having remembered, or of having remembered better or rightly, what [was] dreamed." *(Ibid., p. 182)* Malcolm has claimed that

We speak of 'remembering' dreams, and if we consider this expression it can appear to us to be a misuse of language. When we think philosophically about memory the following sort of paradigm comes most naturally to our minds: I spoke certain words to you yesterday. Today I am requested to give an account of what those words were. The account I give is right or wrong. This is determined by whether it agrees with your account and that of other witnesses, perhaps also by whether it is plausible in the light of what is known about you and me and the circumstances yesterday, and perhaps by still other things. But when I speak of 'remembering' a dream there is nothing outside of my account of the dream (provided that I understand the words that compose it) to determine that my account is right or wrong. I may amend it slightly on a second telling - but only slightly. If I changed it very much or many times it would no longer be said that I was 'telling a dream'. My verbal behaviour would be too unlike the behaviour on which the concept of dreaming is founded. That something is implausible or impossible does not go to show that I did not dream it. In a dream I can do the impossible in every sense of the word. ... Since nothing counts as determining that my memory of my dream is right or wrong, what sense can the word 'memory' have here?

But of course it is no misuse of language to speak of 'remembering a dream'. We are taught this expression. Only we must be mindful of its actual use and of how sharply this differs from the use of 'remembering' that appeared in our paradigm. *(Dreaming, pp. 56-7)*
Chappell replies that we ordinarily would allow that one can correct or fill in his first account of his dream, and that if in telling a dream one first says that he can't be sure what happened at a certain point but tries to say something about what it was like, and then later is reminded by a later event in the dream what was supposed to have happened earlier and confidently says: "I told it wrong before",

Surely in this case we would grant that the dream-teller remembers later and that he didn't earlier. We must also grant, I think, that, insofar as his later account conflicted with the earlier and doesn't merely supplement it or fill it out, he misremembered or remembered wrong before and now remembers right. Not only he but we, I think, would treat his later account as a correction of the earlier. As for the criterion of correctness here, it is true that we have only the dream-teller's word. But he has, if not a criterion at least an indication of correctness, namely his present assurance as against his former uncertainty. (Chappell, op.cit., p. 183)

Since Chappell has reminded us that dream accounts can be corrected (we would properly say), Malcolm might allow that one remembers (not 'remembers') a dream. But before granting what I have further claimed, namely, that dreams are one kind of experiences, he might fall back to the next line of defence, suggested by the last, and say that even if what is ordinarily remembered is experiences and dreams are remembered, yet dream 'experiences' are not experiences in the normal sense. He says almost as much.

One tells a dream under the influence of an impression - as if one was faithfully recalling events that one witnessed. ... 'This "queer phenomenon" requires an explanation', we are inclined to protest: "The most likely explanation of our seeming to recall certain experiences from sleep is that we did have those experiences while we slept'. But an explanation explains nothing if it involves an unintelligible hypothesis. Nothing can count for or against the truth of this hypothesis. We can say either that there were experiences during sleep or that there were not, as we like. (Dreaming, p. 86)
I think that further argument about "experience" would not be profitable, because Malcolm has already granted the concession I am most intent on, namely, that there are two different ways of coming to know that someone had a dream, one way in the case of other persons, another in one's own case. It seems to me that he must allow that one's knowledge of one's own dream could be private. This is, I think, sufficient.

When one reads Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*, one is struck by the richness and provocativeness of the language. The subtlety and evocativeness of the style are hardly typical of philosophical writing. But this book has made a great stir in philosophical circles since it first appeared in 1949.

Because of the style (Ryle admits that it is polemical), one may not always know exactly what is being asserted or denied. What phenomena he wants to re-allocate or how he means to re-allocate them in his "logical geography" is not always clear to me, and it may be that he is not entirely consistent in his denials and admissions. Indeed since I cannot decide whether Ryle's general position in *The Concept of Mind* is epistemological behaviorism or metaphysical behaviorism, I shall almost always be directing an objection to a particular passage which I would willingly grant may not constitute Ryle's real or overall view.

One way of stating my position (which diverges from fashionable contemporary philosophy of mind) is that I, along with all the ordinary people I know insist on private experience as part of what we mean by 'person'. Does Ryle allow private experience or
not? (The sole basis for my remarks about Ryle's position is The Concept of Mind though I realize he may have expanded or modified his position in his other published works.)

Sometimes I think that almost all that I have said about persons, including privacy, could be fitted in with what Ryle says some place or other. But in some places it seems that Ryle is denying private experience. In these places he goes beyond the epistemological behaviorism (to which I have expressed my adherence) to a metaphysical behaviorism, and denies - seemingly - the privacy which he admits elsewhere.

To give some content to this rather vague charge and to provide a set of passages with the apparently inconsistent stands, I offer a list of pages with pro-private-experience passages, and a list of pages with anti-privacy passages. I give these in one place because I shall not discuss all of them and they should be mentioned, at least, as defence against the defenders of Ryle who might say (if I didn't even list a certain passage) that I had overlooked a pertinent statement.

Passages allowing private experience are to be found on pp. 27, 34, 35, 40, 46-7, 58, 61, 167, 176, 182, 192, 270, 275, 307; passages which seem to disallow private experience are found on pp. 54, 63, 64, 155, 161, 164, 179, 180, 251, 265 (Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1949). To give some idea of the content of these passages I shall here quote three, one allowing private experience: "We speak of 'mental arithmetic', of 'mind-reading' and of debates going on 'in the mind', and it certainly is the case that what is in this sense
mental is unwitnessable." (p. 34); and two apparent denials of privacy:

... the differences [between speaker and listener] are differences of degree, not of kind. The superiority of the speaker's knowledge of what he is doing over that of the listener does not indicate that he has Privileged Access to facts of a type inevitably inaccessible to the listener, but only that he is in a very good position to know what the listener is often in a very poor position to know. (P. 179)

On the view for which I am arguing consciousness and introspection cannot be what they are officially described as being since their supposed objects are myths. (P. 155)

Even after considering particular passages carefully a residual perplexity remains; I cannot decide whether Ryle really does slide back and forth between epistemological behaviorism and metaphysical behaviorism or whether his position remains constant and only seems (to me?) to vary because of his language which is calculated as much to arouse as to pinpoint the property or phenomenon that he is denying. Looking at the above passages, we might ask:

1) Is Privileged Access denied?

2) Is Privileged Access allowed, but the inaccessibility to another person under any circumstances (the meaning of "inevitably"?) of the facts found out by means of Privileged Access denied?

3) If Privileged Access is denied, how is one to explain the fact (admitted in the first passage) that the speaker is in a very good position to know what the listener is often in a very poor position to know?

If I were to venture an overall interpretation of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind, I'd say with complete assurance that he is denying mind-body dualism, with moderate assurance that he is denying mental states and processes as causes of bodily state and processes which are then effects. I would also say that Ryle is
denying that to describe something as 'mental' is identical with saying that it is 'private' but on the contrary is asserting that 'mental' may also apply to behavior. But I would be less assured about saying that Ryle is allowing experiences to be private, and that the person whose experiences they are has an advantage in knowing facts revealed in this way, but that such facts are not logically private, i.e., incommunicable. The incommunicability of private experience would be what Ryle's provocative denials are directed to, on this interpretation.

I shall not defend the accuracy of this interpretation. Rather I shall leave it and turn to discuss particular positions at least some of which are not in agreement with positions I have offered as parts of Ryle's general view. If I am mistaken in the meaning I give to certain passages, the possibility of Ryle's having a different view (more congenial to mine) is at least here acknowledged.

To bring the differences between Ryle's view and mine into as sharp focus as possible, I should like to concentrate on two related but separable phenomena, ignorance of another person's states of mind and lying. What I mean by ignorance and lying will be made explicit, the actuality of the phenomena will be asserted, and then the adequacy of the means Ryle has at his disposal will be evaluated. The argumentation will consist in showing that my way of allowing for ignorance and lying: consciousness, awareness or whatever one wants to call it, is not sufficiently discredited by Ryle, though what we are prepared to say about it may be modified as a result of his criticism. I shall further argue that what Ryle himself
allows (unwitnessable mental acts and silent soliloquy) cannot be covered by his behavioristic means, nor is his account of lying adequate.

It seems to me an indubitable fact that not all that one knows is known by another person to be known by oneself. Or, to say it differently, there is ignorance on the part of other persons regarding what one knows oneself.

There are several places where Ryle agrees and I shall quote four. Four is rather many but I should not want to seem to be profiting from a single slip. It will be only fair to show that Ryle holds as a considered opinion that others may not know what is going on 'in one's head'.

We speak of 'mental arithmetic', and of 'mind-reading' and of debates going on 'in the mind', and it certainly is the case that what is in this sense mental is unwitnessable. A boy is said to be doing 'mental arithmetic' when instead of writing down, or reciting aloud, the numerical symbols with which he is operating, he says them to himself, performing his calculations in silent soliloquy. Similarly a person is said to be reading the mind of another when he describes truly what the other is saying or picturing to himself in auditory images. (P. 34)

Boswell described Johnson's mind when he described how he wrote, talked, ate, fidgeted and fumed. His description was, of course, incomplete, since there were notoriously some thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to himself... (P. 58)

If you do not divulge the contents of your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no other sure way of finding out what you have been saying or picturing to yourself. (P. 61)

The objects of my retrospections are items in my autobiography. But although personal, they need not be, though they can be, private or silent items of that autobiography. (P. 167)

A second equally certain fact is that people lie, and at least sometimes are successful in deceiving their interlocutors. There are various ways of deceiving people: verbal reports and behavior,
as well as feigning. Ryle acknowledges the existence of charlatans and hypocrites, "persons who simulate qualities which they lack and dissimulate qualities which they possess." (P. 172) I do not find a place where he explicitly recognizes lying as such. But successful shamming entails some kind of deception and he has recognized successful shamming; he says it is only a tautology to say that "successful shamming is undetected". (P. 174)

In Section C of Chapter 2 above, I argued that there was a logical dependence of lying on ignorance; that is, successful lying depends on ignorance of the liar's real thoughts on the part of the deceived. I accounted for the ignorance by saying that not all one's experiences have behavioral equivalents, or necessary behavioral expressions. That is, one may have something in mind or before the mind, and give out with something quite different, verbally and/or behaviorally.

The concept 'lying' requires that one knowingly express in word or deed what one does not believe with the intention of deceiving other persons. Clearly, lying depends on communicating. If we never put across any thoughts or gave others information about ourselves, false, deceptive reports and information would be impossible. And even in the case of a lie, a thought or intention is communicated. What makes it a lie is that the real intention of the liar (namely, the intention to deceive) is not the one understood by those who are deceived. That intention remains contingently private. I say contingently private because he may confess his duplicity and then the intention to deceive will be made public. Though we grant that lying requires that an intention be understood by the deceived (i.e., the one that the liar wants to put across),
still lying requires that there be another private intention which is known only to the liar, an intention of which he is aware but which the deceived do(es) not know about. This private aspect of persons has been called consciousness, and so I have called it. There may be serious disadvantages to this label but 'consciousness' seemed a reasonable, not non-standard way to philosophically allow for lying and ignorance.

Ryle however objects to 'consciousness' so we shall examine his objections to see the force of them and to answer them, if possible. And then we can see how he accounts for lying.

In Chapter VI of *The Concept of Mind*, "Self-Knowledge", he intends to show among other things that the official theories of consciousness and introspection are logical muddles. But I am not, of course, trying to establish that we do not or cannot know what there is to know about ourselves. On the contrary, I shall try to show how we attain such knowledge, but only after I have proved that this knowledge is not attained by consciousness or introspection, as these supposed Privileged Accesses are normally described. (P. 155)

Ryle offers four arguments against knowledge of ourselves being attained by consciousness or introspection.

First, and this is not intended to be more than a persuasive argument, no one who is uncommitted to a philosophical theory ever tries to vindicate any of his assertions of fact by saying that he found it out 'from consciousness', or 'as a direct deliverance of consciousness', or 'from immediate awareness'. He will back up some of his assertions of fact by saying that he himself sees, hears, feels, smells or tastes so and so; he will back up other such statements, somewhat more tentatively, by saying that he remembers seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling or tasting it. But if asked whether he really knows, believes, infers, fears, remembers or smells something, he never replies 'Oh yes, certainly I do, for I am conscious and even vividly conscious of doing so'. Yet just such a reply should, according to the doctrine, be his final appeal. (P. 161)

There are circumstances where a person would have recourse to
'consciousness', but the word "consciousness" might not be used explicitly but would all the same be relied upon. It would 'go without saying' that the reason why he knows that he smells something is because he is conscious of his smelling it. Even allowing that no one ever backed up his assertions of fact by saying explicitly that he found it out 'from immediate awareness' or 'from consciousness', still that this would amount to proof that knowledge of ourselves is never attained by consciousness or introspection is dubious. Suppose we imagine the conversation with the person uncommitted to a philosophical theory. He is asked: "How do you know the tea is hot?" He answers (reasonably): "I tasted it." He and I would be astonished and perplexed if it was then concluded "Knowledge of ourselves consequently is not attained by means of consciousness or introspection". Or would the conclusion be put in the form: "Therefore you (the uncommitted man) are not conscious of your tasting the tea." What precisely is the conclusion to be?

If a person is challenged, "Do you really know (believe, infer, fear, remember, smell) what you've just stated?", he cannot use his consciousness of his knowing (believing, etc.) because this consciousness accompanies and is a necessary condition of all his assertions of knowledge (belief, etc.), so that consciousness is not a special guarantee which is what seems to be asked for with such a challenge. After a belief has been asserted and challenged, there is a superfluousness in saying, "I am conscious of it," to defend his statement because he thinks he had to be conscious of it in the first place in order to assert it. Why add his consciousness of his asserted belief which for him 'goes without saying'?
Only a man committed to a philosophical theory would even consider the possibility that a man might state a belief without being conscious of that belief. The uncommitted man may not assert that he is conscious of his beliefs. This however is not equivalent to the assertion that he is not conscious of them.

Ryle's second argument.

Next, it is supposed that my being conscious of my mental states and operations either is my knowing them, or is the necessary and sufficient ground for my doing so. But to say this is to abuse the logic and even the grammar of the verb 'to know'. It is nonsense to speak of knowing, or not knowing, this clap of thunder or that twinge of pain, this coloured surface or that act of drawing a conclusion or seeing a joke; these are accusative of the wrong type to follow the verb 'to know'. To know and to be ignorant are to know and not to know that something is the case, for example that that rumble is a clap of thunder or that that coloured surface is a cheese-rind. And this is just the point where the metaphor of light is unhelpful. Good illumination helps us to see cheese-rinds, but we could not say 'the light was too bad for me to know the cheese-rind', since knowing is not the same sort of thing as looking at, and what is known is not the same sort of thing as what is illuminated. True, we can say 'owing to the darkness I could not recognise what I saw for a cheese-rind', but again recognizing what I see is not another optical performance. We do not ask for one torch to help us to see and another to help us to recognise what we see. So even if there were some analogy between a thing's being illuminated and a mental process's being conscious, it would not follow that the owner of the process would recognise that process for what it was. It might conceivably explain how mental processes were discernible but it could not possibly explain how we ascertain truths and avoid or correct mistakes about them.

(P. 162)

There are several issues here, some of which Ryle is plainly right about.

First. Good English usage does not - as he says - allow us to say "know claps of thunder", "know coloured surfaces".

Secondly, Ryle is right about there being difficulties with describing consciousness as analogous to light.

Thirdly. Being conscious of a judgment is not always a suffi-
cient condition of that judgment's being true. I am not too sure that this is the meaning of the last two sentences of the quoted argument above but if that is its meaning, I agree. I too would want to say, and I think most people would, that my being conscious of my judging that what I saw was a cheese-rind is not tout court a sufficient condition of its being a cheese-rind.

Suppose we even grant that we may not say in ordinary English that we know mental processes. Is this a sufficient reason for concluding that we are not conscious of mental processes? No, I would say. There are differences between "knowing" and "being conscious of" such that we may not use these phrases interchangeably. But we can re-phrase English sentences in such a way that we can say that we know what we are conscious of, at least in some cases. E.g., "I am conscious of a twinge of pain" can be translated into "I know that I am feeling a twinge of pain" said perhaps to someone trying to get us over our complaint by pooh-poohing it.

The third argument.

Next, there is no contradiction in asserting that someone might fail to recognise his frame of mind for what it is; indeed, it is notorious that people constantly do so. They mistakenly suppose themselves to know things which are actually false; they deceive themselves about their own motives; they are surprised to notice the clock stopped ticking, without their having, as they think, been aware that it had been ticking; they do not know that they are dreaming, when they are dreaming, and sometimes they are not sure that they are not dreaming, when they are awake; and they deny, in good faith, that they are irritated or excited when they are flustered in one or other of those ways. If consciousness were what it is described as being, it would be logically impossible for such failures and mistakes in recognition to take place. (P. 162)

There are several important warnings here. Not only is consciousness of a fact or judgment not always a sufficient condition
of its truth but being conscious of something is not a necessary condition of that something's being in the mind or being appropriately (i.e., truly) ascribed to the mind. That is, there may be things taken into the mind unconsciously, like the clock's ticking. Or it may be that there are mental predicates like 'excited' or 'greedy' (a motive word?) which can appropriately be ascribed sometimes to a person though that person to whom the predicate is ascribed may deny feeling excited or greedy. It is not the case that 'excited' is ascribable solely on the basis of a feeling or solely on the basis of a report of a feeling; 'excited' is also applied to a person on the basis of his behavior. So it will not come as any surprise that we are sometimes ready to label a person 'excited' who does not himself feel excited. Helpful as these reminders may be they do not constitute a reason for saying that we are never conscious of our mental processes.

The fourth and last argument against consciousness.

Finally, even though the self-intimation supposed to be inherent in any mental state or process is not described as requiring a separate act of attention, or as constituting a separate cognitive operation, still what I am conscious of in a process of inferring, say, is different from what the inferring is an apprehension of. My consciousness is of a process of inferring, but my inferring is, perhaps, of a geometrical conclusion from geometrical premisses. The verbal expression of my inference might be, 'because this is an equilateral triangle, therefore each angle is 60 degrees', but the verbal expression of what I am conscious of might be 'Here I am deducing such and such from so and so'. But, if so, then it would seem to make sense to ask whether, according to the doctrine, I am not also conscious of being conscious of being conscious of inferring, that is, in a position to say 'Here I am spotting the fact that here I am deducing such and such from so and so'. And then there would be no stopping-place; there would have to be an infinite number of onion-skins of consciousness embedding any mental state or process whatsoever. If this conclusion is rejected, then it will have to be allowed that some elements in mental processes are not themselves things we can be conscious of, namely those elements which constitute the supposed outermost self-intimation of
mental processes; and then 'conscious' could no longer be retained as part of the definition of 'mental'. (P. 162-3)

As I see the argument it consists in saying: if any conscious state or process can be made the object of consciousness (though not "requiring", line 3 above, to be made an object of a further act of consciousness to be conscious), then if any mental process, \( c \), is not made the object of a further conscious process, that process, \( c \), is not conscious. Therefore 'conscious' is no part of the meaning of 'mental'.

There is one major error in this argument, as I have interpreted it. To say that an \( x \) has a property is not equivalent to saying that the property mentioned is a necessary condition of the \( x \) being an \( x \). In the case before us: to say that a conscious process may be made the object of a further conscious process is not to say that a necessary condition of a conscious act's being conscious is that it be made the object of a further conscious process. Looking at Ryle's example: if one makes an inference, that inference is already a conscious process, as 'conscious' is commonly used and as I have used it. It is true that one could be conscious at another time of the process of inferring. But this second conscious act is not required to make the first process of inferring conscious. The conclusion that 'conscious' is not part of the definition of 'mental' fails, though Ryle may mean that 'conscious' is not a necessary part of everything mental; with this I agree, as I have already indicated in Chapter 2.

Ryle summarizes the result of the four arguments:

The argument, then, that mental events are authentic, because the deliverances of consciousness are direct and unimpeachable testimony to their existence, must be rejected. (P. 163)
The net results of these four arguments seem to me to be three (important) ones: 1) consciousness may not give unimpeachable testimony concerning the exact nature of the conscious process or its genesis or object; 2) there may be mental processes and states in addition to those which are testified to by consciousness (e.g., unconscious mental processes), and 3) 'conscious' is not a necessary part of 'mental', or to say it differently, not everything described as 'mental' must be described as 'conscious'. No one of these alone nor any combination of them is equivalent to saying that 4) it is false that the deliverances of consciousness are direct and unimpeachable testimony to the existence of mental events. 4) cannot be gotten from 1) and 2) because even though there may be mis-labelings and mistakes by consciousness, still there must be something about which one is mistaken, and that there are more things in the mind than one is conscious of is not to say that what one is conscious of is non-existent. Nor can 4) be got from any combination of 1) and 2) with three because to say that some mental things are not conscious is not equivalent to saying that no mental things are conscious.

The upshot of all this is, as I see it, that Ryle has not given us here any good reason to reject the common belief that some knowledge of ourselves is attained by means of consciousness, nor has he here (nor elsewhere in The Concept of Mind so far as I can tell) disproved that we have privileged access to our conscious states and processes, nor has he shown that conscious mental processes do not exist.

Next Ryle turns to a consideration of introspection. If I am correct, Ryle wants to discredit consciousness and introspection in
order to deny privileged access. The reason why he wants to deny privileged access is to restore "knowledge of what there is to be known about other people ... to approximate parity with self-knowledge." (P. 155) And he wants to have this guaranteed in order to avoid solipsism. "To drop the hope of Privileged Access is also to drop the fear of epistemological isolationism; we lose the bitters with the sweets of Solipsism." (P. 156)

It is in this chapter on self-knowledge that Ryle's being a metaphysical behaviorist seems least questionable. He says: "On the view for which I am arguing consciousness and introspection cannot be what they are officially described as being, since their supposed objects are myths ..." (P. 155) And "it is the negative object of this book to deny ... that there exist events of the postulated ghostly status". (P. 164) These "ghostly events" are what we would normally call experiences. It seems that he intends to show that there are no such things by denying both consciousness and introspection, i.e., "'regarding', in a non-optical sense, some current mental state or process". (P. 163)

One argument against introspection that Ryle gives is:

Even if it is claimed that in introspecting we are attending twice at once, it will be allowed that there is some limit to the number of possible synchronous acts of attention, and from this it follows that there must be some mental processes which are unintrospective, namely, those introspections which incorporate the maximum possible number of synchronous acts of attention. The question would then arise for the holders of the theory how these acts would be found occurring, since if this knowledge was not introspectively got, it would follow that a person's knowledge of his own mental processes could not always be based on introspection. But if this knowledge does not always rest on introspection, it is open to question whether it ever does. This objection might be countered by appeal to the other form of Privileged Access; we know that we introspect not by introspecting on our introspections, but from the direct deliverances of consciousness. (P. 165)
This argument is like the fourth one against consciousness. If a regress of introspections is possible, and the last mental process in the series is not introspected, then some knowledge of oneself is not based on introspection. "But if this knowledge does not always rest on introspection, it is open to question whether it ever does."

My answer might be to paraphrase the latter with a homelier example: if some apples are not red, it is open to question whether any are.

Less flippantly my answer would, predictably, be the one Ryle expects to be appealed to: we know that we introspect not by introspecting on our introspections, but from the direct deliverances of consciousness. If consciousness has not been discredited as a means of getting knowledge of one's mental processes (and I have tried to show that it has not been), then it seems to be a respectable rejoinder.

The next objection is worded rather colorfully.

When psychologists were less cautious than they have since become, they used to maintain that introspection was the main source of empirical information about the workings of minds. They were not unnaturally embarrassed to discover that the empirical facts reported by one psychologist sometimes conflicted with those reported by another. They reproached one another, often justly, with having professed to find by introspection just those mental phenomena which their preconceived theories had led them to expect to find. There still occur disputes which should be finally soluble by introspection, if the joint theories of the inner life and inner perception were true. Theorists dispute, for example, whether there are activities of conscience distinct from those of intellect and distinct from habitual deferences to taboos. Why do they not look and see? Or, if they do so, why do their reports not tally? Again, many people who theorise about human conduct declare that there occur certain processes sui generis answering to the description of 'volitions'; I have argued that there are no such processes. Why do we argue about the existence of these processes, when the
question ought to be as easily decidable as the question whether or not there is a smell of onions in the larder? (P. 165-6)

I think that this amounts to saying that introspection as a means of getting knowledge of one's mental states and processes is discredited because if introspection were what it is claimed to be, we should always be able to label our mental states correctly and give a final and accurate account of their genesis. This is, I believe, an implausible argument. Who would claim that introspection - to have any status at all as a means of getting knowledge about one's mental states and processes - must be infallible in the labels it attaches to mental states? Who would claim that by introspectively regarding a moral feeling one can judge whether it is the product of intellect or was produced by habitual deference to taboo? I see no reason why someone who holds that there is a non-optical 'regarding' of current mental states must claim that this regarding must provide labels unfailingly accurate any more than some one claiming that there is an optical regarding of objects is obliged to assert that vision always can tell whether an orange is real or wax, or whether it came from Texas or Florida.

The last objection offered against the claims for introspection is that some states of mind, such as panic or fury, cannot be "coolly scrutinised". Yet we do not lack information about these states of mind.

If retrospection can give us the data we need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why it should not do so for all. And this is just what seems to be suggested by the popular phrase 'to catch oneself doing so and so'. We catch, as we pursue and overtake, what is already running away from us. I catch myself daydreaming about a mountain walk after, perhaps very shortly after, I have begun the daydream; or I catch myself humming a particular air only when the first few notes have already been hummed. Retrospection, prompt or de-
layed, is a genuine process and one which is exempt from the troubles ensuing from the assumption of multiply divided attention; it is also exempt from the troubles ensuing from the assumption that violent agitations could be the objects of cool, contemporary scrutiny.

Part, then, of what people have in mind, when they speak familiarly of introspecting, is this authentic process of retrospection. But there is nothing intrinsically ghostly about the objects of retrospection. In the same way that I can catch myself daydreaming, I can catch myself scratching; in the same way that I can catch myself engaged in a piece of silent soliloquy, I can catch myself saying something aloud. (P. 166)

Retrospection is Ryle's alternative to introspection. I shall not argue the merits of introspection over retrospection. I do not refuse to accept 'retrospection' because (contrary to what Ryle seems to think) it seems to me that retrospection can provide privacy for those objects which would have been introspected if retrospection had not been substituted, i.e., for objects like day-dreams, silent soliloquies, memories, episodic feelings, etc. It seems that Ryle thinks that if he can show that some things that are retrospected are public, he is entitled to assert that none of the retrospected objects are "ghostly".

That not all of the retrospected objects are public can be seen from considering a few questions.

Do I really catch myself daydreaming in exactly the same way that I catch myself scratching? Does the daydream have the same status as the scratching? No. Another person could catch me scratching and have quite as much information about the scratching as I would have. But if another person caught me daydreaming, his information would be significantly different from and inferior in completeness regarding the contents of the daydream to my own. Even if I were willing to admit that he was right, that I was daydreaming, I would know the contents of my daydream before telling
and without telling him; he would know only if I told, and only what I told, though I could tell. The retrospected object, the daydream, is private. The publicness of scratching does not rub off on it.

It is true and important that what I recall is always something expressible in the form 'myself doing so and so'. I recall not a clap of thunder but hearing the clap of thunder; or I catch myself swearing, but I do not, in the same sense, catch you swearing. The objects of my retrospections are items in my autobiography. But although personal, they need not be, though they can be, private or silent items of that autobiography. ... The fact that retrospection is autobiographical does not imply that it gives us a Privileged Access to facts of a special status. (P. 167)

There are several admissions which I should like to draw particular attention to.

1) What is retrospected is always expressible in the form "myself doing so and so".

2) I do not catch - in the same sense - another person doing something.

3) The items retrospected can be private.

Retrospection then is a means of getting knowledge about oneself only. It is a method of catching myself doing something, not a way of catching other people doing something. It is not a method which one uses to get knowledge of other persons. And some of the items are private. The discussion above and elsewhere gives what I understand by 'private'. I do not think that Ryle's meaning is different. So retrospection delivers to oneself information which others cannot get in the same way. I do not see that anything more is needed for Privileged Access.

We may recapitulate what we have done so far. I pointed out that Ryle and I are agreed that ignorance of another's mental states
and processes, and lying are actual phenomena. What is meant by this ignorance and lying was discussed and I claimed that lying is logically dependent on ignorance. I repeated what I had asserted in Chapter 2, namely, that consciousness is the ordinary way to allow for the private aspect of persons that ignorance and lying require. Then I examined Ryle's arguments against consciousness and introspection to see how telling his objections were. And now we are to see what positive account Ryle gives of private mental processes and states and of lying.

What positive account does he give of the private objects of retrospection (p. 167) or unspoken soliloquies or silent behaviour (p. 169)? He denies Privileged Access but does not give any clear answer to questions like: what is silent behaviour? How does one know his unspoken soliloquies before they are retrospected which allows them to be retrospected? We are only told how others come to know such things, namely, through reports and behavior.

But the inadequacy of the positive account can be seen most clearly as regards lying so I shall concentrate on showing that inadequacy in detail.

Ryle has acknowledged the existence of successful shamming (pp. 102, 133, 172). I cannot find any place where he discusses lying.

Let us begin by considering the notion of pretending, a notion which is partly constitutive of such notions as those of cheating, acting a part, playing bears, shamming sick and hypochondria. It will be noticed that in some varieties of make-believe, the pretender is deliberately simulating or dissimulating, in some varieties he may not be quite sure to what extent, if any, he is simulating or dissimulating, and in other varieties he is completely taken in by his own acting. (P. 258)

Shamming, cheating, malingering, and, I believe, lying,
will all be subsumed under pretending.

There are lots of different sorts of pretending, different motives from which people pretend and different criteria by which pretences are assessed as skilful or unskilful. The child pretends for fun, the hypocrite for profit, the hypochondriac from morbid egotism, the spy, sometimes, from patriotism, the actor, sometimes, for art's sake, and the cooking instructress for demonstration purposes. (P. 260)

He discusses a case of sham-fighting and then goes on:

The central point illustrated by these cases is that a mock-performance may be unitary as an action though there is an intrinsic duality in its description. Only one thing is done, yet to say what is done requires a sentence containing, at the least, both a main clause and a subordinate clause. To recognise this is to see why there is no more than a verbal appearance of a contradiction in saying of an actor, playing the part of an idiot, that he is grimacing in an idiotic manner; or of a clown that he is deftly clumsy and brilliantly inane. The scathing adjective attaches to the conduct mentioned in the subordinate clause of the description and the flattering adjective or adverb to the activity mentioned in the main clause, yet only one set of motions is executed. (P. 261)

I take it that it is important for him to deny that there is an intrinsic duality in the action (a pretending something) because if he allows a duality, it will consist in private thought(s) and public behavior. Such private thought known by the pretender but not in the same way by the onlookers is what Ryle has been at pains to deny throughout the book. So he will not admit it here if he can keep from it.

His means of avoiding it here is the notion of 'higher order actions' defined as "those the descriptions of which involve the oblique mention of other actions." (P. 191) Pretending is one kind of higher order action because to describe the pretence one must mention the act which is being simulated.

Now let us consider a case of lying. You ask me a direct question: "Did you read this letter?" The fact is that I did and
that I know I did, but wanting you to believe that I did not, I say, with the intention of deceiving you, "No, I didn't." You then say, "Read it. I want to hear what you think about it." So I read it in front of you as if I had never read it before which will make subsequent detection all the more difficult because now I have a right to know what is in the letter and cannot give away my having deceived you by inadvertently revealing knowledge of the letter's contents. I have lied to you, succeeded in deceiving you. To me my action was a 'higher order action' because I know that I am pretending not to have read the letter. To you the action is not a higher order action. I know something that you don't and won't, if I can help it.

How is Ryle to account for my intention to deceive which I am as careful as I can be not to reveal? Acting and some other kings of pretending are not lies because both actor and onlooker know that the actor is acting. Ryle grants that acting is not the same as lying.

It is, moreover, always possible for a person to take others or himself in by acting a part (as the spectators are not taken in at the theatre, since they have paid to see people who advertise themselves as actors). (P. 172-3)

We may not need any private aspect of mind to which the actor has privileged access to understand acting (though if we keep in mind that the actor may be remembering cues and other stage business even this may be doubtful) as we do for lying because otherwise we alter our concept of lying which requires an intention expressed verbally or behaviorally and a secret intention 'behind' the behavior or report. We cannot do away with what is 'behind' the behavior altogether because if everything is reduced to behavior
or a disposition to behave, the contemporaneous existence of the intention to deceive and the report or action intended to deceive disappears, and with it what we mean by 'lying'.

Therefore I conclude that a behaviorism which denies private aspects of mind to which each person has privileged access cannot account for lying.

I want to require a private aspect to persons not only to allow for lying but for other facts about persons too. I have concentrated on lying here because it seems to me that with this phenomenon as we know it the need for a private aspect to persons is most obvious.

But I should not like the differences between Ryle's views on persons and mine to seem greater than they really are so in summary I shall give a list of propositions that I think Ryle holds and believes important which I am in agreement with.

1. Cartesian mind-body dualism is inadequate as a theory of persons.

2. Not everything that can be described as 'mental' can be described as 'conscious'.

3. What we know about other persons is known on the basis of hearing their reports and observing their behavior.

4. Character and competence predicates are ascribed largely on the basis of performance in one's own case as well as in the case of other persons.

These four propositions would also be agreed to by P. F. Strawson who wrote the last book we are to consider in this chapter. His book, *Individuals*, the sole source for the views I call his in
this chapter, is a very important one on the contemporary philosophical scene.

As I have already referred approvingly to this book, it will probably be apparent that there is far less disagreement between Strawson's view and mine than between my views and the views of either Malcolm or Ryle. (Of course, this is my opinion; Strawson may disagree.)

Since I am in agreement with many of Strawson's views on persons, the procedure I shall follow is to give his views and then show that my position is like or at least consistent with his, or I shall raise a question.

[I]t is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself. ... It means, for example, that the ascribing phrases are used in just the same sense when the subject is another as when the subject is oneself. ... One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience. And one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors of states of conscious-ness. (P. F. Strawson. Individuals. Pp. 99-100)

I have been saying that we can and do communicate our experiences, states of consciousness, using words and phrases (and communally understood kinds of behavior) which mean the same in the case of others and in my own case. But in order to know another's experience, he must communicate it via his body because we cannot get pure states of consciousness in other ways, say, telepathy, with any high degree of reliability. And if we could and did, there would seem to be the logical problem of knowing whose experiences they are.

Strawson claims that the concept 'person' is logically prior
to 'body' or 'consciousness'.

What we have to acknowledge, ... is the primitiveness of the concept of a person. What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of the single type. (P. 102)

There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates. The condition, in turn, of this being possible, is that one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or identify, different subjects of such predicates, i.e., different individuals of the type concerned. The condition, in turn, of this being possible is that the individuals concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. (P. 104)

Since I have spent more space and effort insisting on consciousness, perhaps someone might think that I mean for 'consciousness' to be logically fundamental, not 'person' including both 'consciousness' and 'body'. But I would remind him of my insistence on the need for bodies to communicate experiences and the need for bodies if we are to be "personified", i.e., made into persons. My requirements emphasize communication and the genesis of persons, taking as given the community of persons as we have them. If there is any disagreement on this point between my view and Strawson's, it consists in my reluctance to require that could never be any method of identifying subjects of experience who lacked bodies, which Strawson may be requiring. It is to me conceivable that disembodied subjects, e.g., angels, could be identifiable to each other, though I can not provide in detail methods of identification.
Perhaps it might be like an overall aesthetic 'feel' to each subject which would be distinguishable and unique to each subject, like, in some ways, the master-sound each individual has in Strawson's chapter, "Sounds". But I would not press this possibility, and would readily grant that with what we actually have, subjects of experience are identifiable only by means of their bodies.

There are, according to Strawson, two kinds of predicates which properly apply to persons.

The first kind of predicate consists of those which are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness. I will call this first kind M-predicates and they include things like 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing-room' and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predicates we apply to persons. These I shall call P-predicates. P-predicates, of course, will be very various. They will include things like 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', as well as things like 'is in pain', 'is thinking hard', 'believes in God' and so on. (P. 104)

Strawson in elaborating on these predicates says that the 'I' to which M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed is not to be understood as ambiguous, meaning a consciousness sometimes and a particular human body sometimes.

That is, if we are to avoid the general form of this error, we must not think of 'I' or 'Smith' as suffering from type-ambiguity. Indeed, if we want to locate type-ambiguity somewhere, we would do better to locate it in certain predicates like 'is in the drawing-room' 'was hit by a stone' &c., and say they mean one thing when applied to material objects and another when applied to persons. (P. 105)

P-predicates can be ascribed to persons but perhaps another kind of ambiguity must be located in them since they imply consciousness but lower animals can also be conscious.

For though not all P-predicates are what we should call 'predicates ascribing states of consciousness' (e.g., 'going for a walk' is not), they may be said to have this in common, that they imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed. (P. 105)
It can easily be seen that what appears to be a P-predicate may be ascribed to lower animals, which Strawson does not mention. One might say, "My dog is going for a walk" or ascribe to a lower animal some other predicate which is not an M-predicate but rather one of "all the others we apply to persons" or a P-predicate. It would seem that some P-predicates can be applied and are applied to lower animals, but we would not want to say then that we say the same things about animals and persons, that if P-predicates "imply consciousness", they imply consciousness in the same sense in both persons and animals.

Following the model given above we might conclude that 'is taking a walk' and other P-predicates which can be applied to animals too are ambiguous (like 'is in the drawing room' was said to be ambiguous) meaning one thing when applied to conscious animals other than man and another when applied to persons. It seems at least as clear that 'is going for a walk' means something different when applied to animals from what it means when applied to persons as 'is in the drawing room' means something different when applied to objects from what it means when applied to persons.

This might be a good place to bring up two questions related to the matter of the logical priority of 'person' and the logically secondary status of 'consciousness'. I have argued above (p. 105ff.) that a young child learns language and behavior by imitating persons around him, and that imitating requires something not-public in the child, so that there is something not-public given in and not learned by the child.

This not-public something in the child is the animal consciousness, I am prepared to say. By 'animal consciousness' I mean 'that
consciousness which we attribute to non-person animals'. Before a child is self-conscious or using language at all, he experiences; he smells things, feels warm or cold, sees, etc., or we ordinarily believe that he does as we believe that the higher animals also do. And we further believe that consciousness (though not self-consciousness) is necessary in order for any animal to see, hear, etc. I hardly think that Strawson, who seems so sensible and so sensitive to what ordinary practices presuppose, would take the Cartesian position that animals are only machines and do not feel or have any sort of conscious experience.

I should have liked Strawson to answer two questions in order to clarify certain issues.

First. Is there an animal consciousness given which is necessary to that animal's becoming a self-conscious person? If one says that a person is conscious, one should make clear whether 'consciousness' could be applied univocally to other animals. I would say that it cannot, because a person can be conscious of himself or self-conscious in a way that we think animals can not be.

Second. If we say that 'person' is logically prior, and that 'consciousness' is logically secondary, are we committed to saying that a person is temporally prior to his consciousness? I do not think that Strawson would want to say so. I myself would say that consciousness (in the sense of animal consciousness) is temporally prior to person and self-consciousness (which is a necessary condition of being a person). But Strawson has not discussed the difference between animal consciousness and self-consciousness, so I cannot be sure what he would say.
Indeed, a criticism that I have of *Individuals* is that certain issues are not discussed, perhaps not even mentioned. In this case, I should have liked to see a discussion of the differences between animal consciousness and the consciousness of persons. But a reasonable reply to my criticism might be: you want a discussion of that problem and someone else feels the need of a discussion of some other problem; in a single book one cannot discuss everything.

Strawson next goes on to consider how P-predicates are ascribed.

Clearly there is no sense in talking of identifiable individuals of a special type, a type, namely, such that they possess both M-predicates and P-predicates, unless there is in principle some way of telling, with regard to any individual of that type, and any P-predicate, whether that individual possesses that P-predicate. And, in the case of at least some P-predicates, the ways of telling must constitute in some sense logically adequate kinds of criteria for the ascription of the P-predicate. ... One ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour; and the behaviour-criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate. (Pp. 105-6)

So far this is not different from Malcolm's criteriological view but Strawson goes on to insist on what Malcolm seems to allow only grudgingly and what some readers (perhaps careless ones) do not see at all, namely, that we have a different basis for ascribing some predicates to ourselves from the criteria we use in the case of other persons.

But this is only one half of the picture about P-predicates. For of course it is true of some important classes of P-predicates, that when one ascribes them to oneself, one does not do so on the strength of observation of those behaviour criteria on the strength of which one ascribes them to others. This is not true of all P-predicates. It is not, in general, true of those which carry assessments of character or capability: these, when self-ascribed, are in general ascribed on the same basis as that on which they are ascribed
to others. Even of those P-predicates of which it is true that one does not generally ascribe them to oneself on the basis of the criteria on the strength of which one ascribes them to others, there are many of which it is also true that their ascription is liable to correction by the self-ascriber on this basis. But there remain many cases in which one has an entirely adequate basis for ascribing a P-predicate to oneself, and yet in which this basis is quite distinct from those on which one ascribes the predicate to another. Thus one says, reporting a present state of mind or feeling: 'I feel tired, am depressed, am in pain'. (P. 107)

Strawson realizes that there may be an objection raised at this point.

How can this fact be reconciled with the doctrine that the criteria on the strength of which one ascribes P-predicates to others are criteria of a logically adequate kind for this ascription?

The apparent difficulty of bringing about this reconciliation may tempt us in many directions. It may tempt us, for example, to deny that these self-ascriptions are really ascriptive at all, to assimilate first-person ascriptions of states of consciousness to those other forms of behaviour which constitute criteria on the basis of which one person ascribes P-predicates to another. This device seems to avoid the difficulty; it is not, in all cases, entirely inappropriate. But it obscures the facts; and is needless. (P. 107)

This device is one Ryle seems to use, one form of what I have called metaphysical behaviorism. I am gratified that Strawson rejects it.

It is merely a sophisticated form of failure to recognize the special character of P-predicates, or, rather, of a crucial class of P-predicates. For just as there is not in general one primary process of learning, or teaching oneself, an inner private meaning for predicates of this class, then another process of learning to apply such predicates to others on the strength of a correlation, noted in one's own case, with certain forms of behaviour, so - and equally - there is not in general one primary process of learning to apply such predicates to others on the strength of behaviour criteria, and then another process of acquiring the secondary technique of exhibiting a new form of behaviour, viz., first-person P-utterances. Both these pictures are refusals to acknowledge the unique logical character of the predicates concerned. ... [I]t is essential to the character of these predicates that they have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses, that they are both self-ascriptible otherwise than on the basis of
observation of the behaviour of the subject of them, and other-ascribable on the basis of behaviour criteria. To learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber. In order to understand this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject. If there were no concepts answering to the characterization I have just given, we should indeed have no philosophical problem of the soul; but equally we should not have our concept of a person. (Pp. 107-8)

The denial that all P-predicates are ascribable on the same basis is one which I have been insisting on (likely with less coolness, clarity, and directedness). Strawson has said that there are not two processes by means of which we learn to apply P-predicates, one process for learning to apply P-predicates to others on the basis of behavior and another process of acquiring the technique of exhibiting a new form of behavior, viz. first person P-utterances. I have tried to show in Section D of Chapter 2 what the process of learning to apply P-predicates to others and to oneself is, namely, the process of learning language.

What is given which makes possible the process of learning P-predicates? Strawson only mentions, at one place, what seems to me to ground our being able to see others as persons like oneself and to understand them.

What I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature. (P. 112)

The fact that we have a common nature seems to me of great importance. As I have said in Chapter 2, the mother caring for her child does not wonder whether the child's cry means that the child feels
pain, or whether shivering means the child is cold. What she knows about the child does not depend on her learning in this instance what crying means; she knows what crying means in any child. All infants share certain common traits which give us a base for understanding and a base to go on from. It is also because of unlearned class characteristics that individuals can begin to learn what they must, if they are to become full-fledged persons. One such class characteristic which is needed to become a person is the instinct to imitate. By means of imitating a person, an infant learns words, predicates, which have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses. What is being denied is that there is one way of learning the word as applied to others and another way of learning the word as applied to oneself. The method of learning words is likely complex but the same method is used whether the predicate is to be ascribed to oneself or others. The sameness of the method of learning words serves as the means of connecting the different methods of ascribing P-predicates to oneself and to others.

Now I should like to say something about why in practice solipsism is no problem, and here I leave the discussion of Individuals.

I learn words in a social setting, from family, friends, teachers, writers, etc. The learned words constitute part of my own content, and largely determine how my experience is to be gotten, viewed, stored, recalled. These words are gotten from other persons, directly or indirectly (e.g., from books people have written). If I were to deny that the words came from other persons,
I would have to deny the 'personishness' of what they gave me, and therewith my own personness. So I cannot doubt the personness of others any more than I can doubt my own. I became a person only in relation to other persons.

The knowledge that other persons are persons like me has a logical and temporal priority to the possibility of my entertaining solipsism. My certainty of my likeness to other persons was secure before I could pose the question: are they persons like me? The identifying with them (perhaps at the very beginning only with their like physical forms) in order to imitate them was not learned. The likeness of me to them was further assured by their making me like them with their words and ways of behaving. I do not ever have to construct an argument by means of which I am only then persuaded that there are persons besides myself like myself.

The question - a very general one - how is it possible that we can know that others are persons like oneself? is answered by saying that it was not possible to doubt that there are persons like me until I had been made a person by them. To doubt that there are other persons besides oneself, one has to have language. By the time that one has language the conviction that one is a person among persons has been built into his very being. So solipsism is impossible. Persons are persons because they use language as I was taught to use language and behave as I was taught to behave.

The belief in my being among persons like me is the most general belief. From it we may move to the question of a particular individual's being a (normal) person or not. This question
can be and is decided on the basis of his language use and behavior, but language use referring almost certainly to public objects in one way or another. A stranger (of the species *Homo sapiens*) is *prima facie* viewed as a person, and it is interesting to observe how doubts arise. The doubt as to a stranger's being one of us (normal people) is not usual but unusual and is brought about by some irregularity. The doubt will come from irregular behavior and/or language about public objects and events, not likely from reports of his private experiences. It could hardly happen that everything about an individual could strike us as entirely normal except his use of dream, reminiscence, emotion, sensation words. The decision as to a man's normality does not depend solely on whether we can know that he uses words for private experiences in the way we do. He speaks, makes sense, strikes us as a normal user of the language. We grant that a person knows how to use a sentence because he knows the language. We do not normally verify that he knows how to use a sentence before we allow that he does.

The question of whether we can understand a man's use of words referring to private experiences is settled indirectly, by settling whether he is a normal person like oneself. This question is settled largely by relying on what is public. When he is labeled 'normal person', he gets virtually a blank check; he may fill in as he likes. We are willing to give credence to what he claims (limited by our *a priori* knowledge of what we take to be possible) unless we are given some reason not to. So we do not move from doubt through reports of private experience to belief in his personness but rather (if doubt arises) from doubt through
behavior and language use referring to what is public to belief in his personness to belief in his meaning by words referring to private experiences what we mean by words referring to private experiences. We may say quite baldly that our understanding of his words referring to what is private follows from our belief that he is a person like us. It is patently true that we do not go to a stranger with doubt in his personness which he must overcome but rather belief in his personness which he through what he does shakes. Belief not doubt is the normal state.

It is the case though that we can doubt his words. But what do we doubt? Not that he does not mean by his words what we mean by our words so that total doubt and solipsism might overwhelm us. What we doubt is that he means what he says, i.e., that he is telling the truth. Our belief is that the meanings of the words are correctly understood by him and us, and that he is trading on this common understanding itself to deceive us. No common understanding; no lies.

Or another case. A person with whom we have been communicating reveals that he is color-blind. Having normal color vision we are certain that color words do not have the same private, experiential meanings for him that they have for us. There is no way of knowing from his behavior or reports exactly what his experience is. Our ignorance and non-comprehension are almost complete on this point.

The consideration of different ways of seeing colors is possible in a way that considering the possibility of a person's not feeling pain when his body is hurt before us is not. When a person is hurt, there is then no real possibility of reflecting on
whether he is feeling pain as we feel pain. We must help.

It is quite different to contemplate what color-blind people experience. They are not asking us to do something. We think, calmly, that their experience must be different from the experience of people with color vision. But we cannot say exactly what the difference is.

But we do not move from this belief in a localized incommunicability to the belief that we cannot understand any of a color-blind person's reports. Much less do we move to the even more general belief that we cannot understand any person's reports of any of his private experiences.

The faint-hearted will say: "Let's ignore (or even deny) the private experience and just pay attention to whether he stops at red lights and behaves as we do." This is a simple-minded, practical solution. (I am not saying that we should pay no attention to practical considerations.) Paying attention to the private experience of someone else which we cannot share does not move the traffic down the road to its destination but it does make us aware of what it is to be a person, of what our concept of 'person' includes, a not-useless and rewarding outcome, I should have thought.

The question of 1) how we can know that what a person means (to himself) by his report is the same as what it means to us in particular cases is a different question from 2) how we can know that what a person means by his report is the same as what it means to us ever.

The first question can arise only because we have a setting of understanding in which particular cases of misunderstanding and
lying can occur. Doubt arises because of something peculiar.

The methods of answering the questions are different. We have to rely upon our accumulated knowledge of the world and of the individual to answer the first question. We will be only as good at spotting misunderstanding and lies as we are acute, perceptive, experienced. The question must be answered in each particular case.

Not so with the second question. The question cannot arise from circumstances or as a result of what happens. It arises academically. It is settled generally, if at all, not only one case at a time.

In ordinary practice we are neither solipsists, sceptics, dualists, nor metaphysical behaviorists; we are epistemological behaviorists regarding private experience as necessary, important, and valuable. Some details of the ordinary view could be given briefly as: 1) each person knows that there are other persons who have private experiences (a denial of metaphysical behaviorism), 2) each person is directly acquainted with his own experiences only, 3) the content of experience can be expressed truly or falsely in word and deed, 4) in general persons understand these expressions, 5) in particular cases virtual ignorance may exist, 6) all predicates are assigned to others on the basis of the observation of behavior (only believers in telepathy and Extra-Sensory Perception will disagree), and 7) some predicates, e.g., character, competence, role, and status predicates, are assigned to oneself as well as others on the basis of behavioral criteria.

The overwhelming preponderance of understanding allows pockets
of deception, misunderstanding, and mystery, which the ordinary person faces with equanimity. Such enclaves can occur only because persons have so much communal understanding. If all were mystery (misunderstanding, deception), we would never be forced by (understood) words to wonder (protest, suspect). The gaps serve to give piquancy and a greater awareness of everyone's essential separateness which meets with and mixes with the other so gratifyingly. Solipsism and total scepticism are out of the question.

Summary

1. Metaphysical behaviorism is the position denying the existence of private experiences and asserting that persons are constituted entirely of actual behavior plus dispositions to behave in certain ways.

2. Epistemological behaviorism is the position that private experiences occur and that all we can know of other persons comes from reports and observation of behavior.

3. The importance of private experiences cannot be denied. A private realm is needed for self-discipline and self-imposed sanctions, both needed for responsibility as we know it. If a behavioristic account denies the importance of private experience, such an account must consequently be judged inadequate.

Malcolm

4. In *Dreaming* Malcolm argues that there are two ways of coming to know that a person had a dream: a report in the case of another person; an inference from an impression which turns out to be mis-
taken in one's own case. I agree that we come to know what other people dreamed from their reports. But in our own case it may be either an inference or an impression of having dreamt, without knowing what one dreamt. That there are two methods of coming to get knowledge of what persons dreamed is the important concession needed for the view of persons which I have been advocating.

Ryle

5. Ryle allows that there are private mental goings-on and lies.
6. His arguments intended to show that knowledge of ourselves is not attained by consciousness or introspection seem to be inconclusive.
7. Ryle, to avoid privileged access, substitutes retrospection for introspection. But on his own admission a) what is retrospected is always myself doing so and so, b) I do not catch - in the same sense - another person doing something, and c) the items that are retrospected can be private. Nothing more than these three is needed for privileged access.
8. Ryle's means of allowing for lying is to call it a 'higher order action'. This will do only if a private aspect of mind may entertain one intention while another intention is expressed to and accepted by the deceived person(s). Metaphysical behaviorism is not adequate to account for lying.

Strawson

9. Strawson asserts that it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness to oneself that one should also be prepared to ascribe them univocally to other persons.
10. In order to identify subjects of experience, these subjects must have bodies.
11. The concept 'person' is logically prior to 'body' or 'consciousness'.

12. P-predicates imply consciousness but are ascribable only to persons. Strawson offers no discussion of animal consciousness.

13. P-predicates are ascribed to others on the basis of observation of their behavior, and oneself not on this basis.

Summary of concluding remarks

14. The knowledge that other persons are persons like oneself has a logical and temporal priority to the possibility of asking whether other persons are like oneself.

15. Doubts regarding the normality of some individual arise through some irregularity of behavior or language about public objects and events.

16. Ordinary persons are neither solipsists, sceptics, dualists, nor metaphysical behaviorists but rather epistemological behaviorists, regarding private experience as necessary, important and valuable.
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