ROMAN INGARDEN'S ONTOLOGY

A thesis presented for the degree of Ph.D.

by

Arnor Hannibalsson

University of Edinburgh
1973
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I. Franz Brentano</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Franz Brentano as precursor of phenomenology</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter I</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II. Kazimierz Twardowski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Twardowski's work on Descartes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Objects and presentations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attributes and objects</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ingarden on Twardowski</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Twardowski and Husserl</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter II</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III. Lesniewski and Kotarbinski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lesniewski</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kotarbinski</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter III</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV. Reism and Realism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The question of reductionism</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Language and universals</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kotarbinski and Ingarden on ideal objects</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ingarden's critique</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Kotarbinski's theory of extraspection</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ingarden's critique of reism</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. EDITH STEIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Edith Stein's road to Thomism</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO CHAPTER V</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI. INGARDEN'S ONTOLOGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Outlines of Ingarden's ontological system</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO CHAPTER VI</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII. METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF INGARDEN'S PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The method</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The absolute theory of knowledge</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The independence of epistemology</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The a priori</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. The paradox of knowledge</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Husserl's and Ingarden's realism</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO CHAPTER VII</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VIII. INGARDEN'S DESIGN OF PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Fundamental aims and premises</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Divisions of philosophy</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. The role of language</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. The applicability of the reduction</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Intentional objects</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Ideas</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Individual objects</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Essences</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Ars combinatoria</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Pure consciousness</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. The impossibility of metaphysics</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX. ROMAN INGARDEN. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES TO APPENDIX</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. G.E. Davie and Mr. J. E. Llewelyn, for their help granted to me during my work on this dissertation.

Edinburgh
1973

Arnor Hannibalsson
FOREWORD

The teaching of the Austrian philosopher, Franz Brentano, has had a wide and lasting influence. The founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, was one of his pupils. The first chapter of this thesis takes a brief look at the original doctrine of Brentano and its development. An attempt is made to put into relief the difference between his initial positions and the views which he came to hold in his later period.

The second chapter is devoted to the philosophy of another of Brentano’s pupils, Kazimierz Twardowski, who can be said to have become the founding father of contemporary Polish philosophy. Twardowski’s and Husserl’s relations are examined in one section of this chapter.

Roman Ingarden studied both under Twardowski and Husserl. He was critical of the views held by some of Twardowski’s pupils, notably Leśniewski and Kotarbiński. The third chapter presents the views of these philosophers and in the fourth chapter the differences between Ingarden’s realism and Kotarbiński’s reism are presented.

In the fifth chapter attention is turned to the philosophy of Edith Stein. She was Husserl’s pupil and Ingarden’s close friend and colleague all her life. This chapter purports to show how phenomenology led
Edith Stein to Thomism and conversion to the Catholic faith. Her development is compared with Ingarden’s position who took a different course on the basis of his more pronounced Cartesian methodological standpoint.

Chapter VI turns attention to Ingarden and outlines the fundamental ideas of his philosophy. Chapter VII delves into methodological and epistemological problems of his philosophy and the final, eighth, chapter is devoted to Ingarden’s ontological system.

This survey of two trends in contemporary Polish philosophy should throw some light on the problem whether a spiritualist philosophy is necessary to uphold human values. Those who share Ingarden’s Cartesian methodological standpoint would be inclined to be on the side of spiritualism but those who do not would tend to think that Kotarbiński had a stronger case in the controversy.

Ingarden wrote his works both in Polish and German. As a rule, the works have been studied in the version in which they were originally published. Ingarden wrote his main works in Polish (after Husserl’s death) and the texts as published in his collected works have been basic for this dissertation. All translations (from Polish, German, French, Norwegian, Russian and Latin) are my own, unless otherwise stated.
INTRODUCTION

Although Roman Ingarden was both Twardowski’s and Husserl’s pupil and although there is a certain line of development traceable from Twardowski’s theory of objects to Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes and the problematic of constitution and although this had some influence on Ingarden’s ontological theory of objects his main concern was, nevertheless, with the idea of phenomenology as rigorous science and the creation of a philosophy of pure spirit on its basis.

Ingarden’s main point of criticism against Husserl was that the latter’s own transcendental idealism fails to fulfil the demands of this idea. Ingarden would say against Husserl that as a result of the epoché nothing has changed. The world remains as it is. Real things, real objects are not transformed into "object-poles", as Husserl would have it. They just cannot become purely intentional objects. Husserl treats objects as purely intentional objects such as those which are created in poetry. But acts of consciousness do not change objects themselves even though they make them inter-subjectively accessible by the mediation of language. In Ingarden’s view, the transcendental idealism makes "the dream of phenomenology as a rigorous science" come to an end. (1) It was therefore imperative in Ingarden’s view to introduce clarity into these matters
by creating an ontology which would establish the
differences in modes of givenness and in structure
between autonomous and heteronomous objects. If Husserl
had carried out such investigations before he opted for
transcendental idealism "he could have avoided certain
contradictions, but he could also have opened up a
different view of the problem of the real or life-world".
(2) In Ingarden's view his ontological investigations
are a necessary link in the Husserlian program and have
to be taken into account before the question of the
acceptability of transcendental idealism can be posed.
Ingarden thinks that Husserl's treatment of these problems
cannot even be duly understood without his (Ingarden's)
formal-ontological investigations. (3)

Ingarden's work on the problem of idealism versus
realism is aimed at the reinforcement of Husserl's
fundamental insights. Ingarden himself described it as
a struggle for Husserl - against him. (4)

In this struggle Ingarden availed himself of many
ideas which did not originate with Husserl. Ingarden's
formative years coincide with the period immediately
before and during the first world war. Abrupt changes
took place both in the political and intellectual history
of Europe. Ingarden wrote his doctoral dissertation on
Henri Bergson during the war years. He became very early
acquainted with Max Scheler. The questions of time and
change, of being and duration haunted him all his life.
There is in Ingarden a strong urge to overcome the curse of imperfect and changeable temporal existence and reach the realm of immutable, pure and eternal Spirit (Geist). He did not and could not accept Bergson's intuitive relativism and was much more inclined to accept Scheler's view that the acquisition of metaphysical knowledge is of prime importance for man. And this metaphysical knowledge is knowledge of Spirit and the constitution of the person as its centre. This philosophy was fostered by the intellectual atmosphere in Germany after the first world war. "It became increasingly popular to contrast culture with technical civilisation and to regard the latter as a potential menace to cultural values. There is a discernible echo of such an attitude in Scheler's and Heidegger's distinction between Spirit and technical (or, as they also sometimes call it, scientific) intelligence, and in their championing of the cause of Spirit". (5) On this background Ingarden viewed the responsibility of the philosopher.

In their fight for the cause of Spirit both Scheler and E. Stein converted to the cause of Catholicism. In these matters, Ingarden did not follow in their footsteps. This was mainly due to his steadfast and firm fidelity to the phenomenological-cartesian methodological principle that nothing may be accepted in philosophy which is not brought to an absolute obviousness (or evidence) by an analysis of immanently given data. Nevertheless,
Ingarden was deeply imbued with the spirit of scholasticism. The central ideas of his ontology are based on the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. This tradition paved the way to the philosophy of pure Spirit and it was the arsenal which provided the heaviest artillery against materialism. It is difficult to judge whether Ingarden turned to scholasticism because he was committed to the phenomenological cause or whether he was attracted to phenomenology because of his commitment to scholasticism. The fact is that in Ingarden's view these two philosophical trends were complimentary.

Husserl adopted a negative attitude to the world and considered it to be originally and essentially bad. "I had to philosophize, otherwise I could not have lived in this world". (6) Philosophy became a means to survive in this world of wars, injustice and evil. Transcendental idealism should then provide a salvation from the world. Ingarden was not very far removed from this standpoint. Phenomenology was the only means to rescue European culture from crisis. In his comments to Husserl's letters to him Ingarden quotes Jean Hering's words that "his (Husserl's) philosophy will, in its time, rescue humanity". (7) Ingarden did not spare himself in his relentless work for this cause. The beginning of his philosophical career was marked with high hopes and great ambitions.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


2. Ibid., p. 45.


7. Ibid., p. 183.
CHAPTER I
FRANZ BRENTANO

1. Franz Brentano as precursor of phenomenology

Franz Brentano was born in 1838 in a Catholic family. He obtained his doctorate in philosophy in 1862 for the thesis *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*. Brentano's father was brother of the romantic poet Clemens Brentano. They were related to Goethe's mother.

In 1864 Brentano was ordained as a priest. He entered the Dominican order. In 1866 he became a Dozent (lecturer) in philosophy in Würzburg on the basis of his book *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nus poeticos*. In 1872 he became professor. In 1873 he left the priesthood but remained in the catholic church. The reasons were mainly his disagreement with the proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope in 1870. Brentano did not, however, join the free catholics. In 1874-1880 Brentano taught philosophy as professor in the University of Vienna. He began his activity there with a lecture (Antrittsvorlesung) called *Über die Gründe der Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiet*. In 1874 he published his main work *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint).
In 1880 he declared his intention to marry Ida von Lieben. The authorities refused to grant him permission to marry as he was an ordained priest. Brentano then resigned from his post as professor and from Austrian citizenship. He became a citizen of Saxony and married there as a non-confessional person in Leipzig. Thereafter Brentano became an unsalaried Dozent in the University of Vienna (where he previously had been professor). He continued this activity for 15 years. He was promised at the beginning that he would receive the post of professor as soon as the events around his marriage were forgotten. But this promise was not kept. At last, Brentano's patience came to an end and he resigned in 1895 and moved to Florence where he lived until Italy entered the war in 1915. Brentano then settled down in neutral Switzerland and died in Zurich in 1917. He was blind during the last years of his life.

Brentano's influence on European philosophy is mainly based on his central work *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. He published relatively little during his lifetime. He was, therefore, even more influential through his pupils. Brentano can be called the fermenting force behind various schools and trends which have come to the fore in our century. Among his pupils can be mentioned: Alexius Meinong whose theory of objects shows influence from Brentano; Edmund Husserl (phenomenology); Chr. Ehrenfels (Gestalt-psychology);
K. Stumpf, A. Marty, Fr. Hillebrand and others can be mentioned among Brentano's disciples.

One of them was Kazimierz Twardowski. His main work \((\text{Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, 1894})\) was written under the impact of Brentano's theories. Twardowski devoted himself to teaching after he became professor of philosophy in the University of Lwów (Lemberg) in 1895. Twardowski can be called the father of contemporary Polish philosophy (the Lwów-Warsaw school). Twardowski created the philosophical atmosphere in Poland in the first half of this century and his influence is still strong.

Brentano sought the way to truth with an exceptional passion. He entered the Dominican order, undoubtedly, in order to find leadership in his life, to find support in his quest for truth. He did not find this leadership in the Dominicans in Graz, but he found his leader there, in another sense. Through his studies of St. Thomas Aquinas he became acquainted with Aristotle. In Aristotle Brentano found the leader of his life and Aristotle came to occupy an important place in Brentano's life and thought. But he did not accept Aristotle as an infallible authority. It can be surmised from his independent attitude towards the church and the Pope that Brentano did not accept anything on the authority of its author. He sought firmly grounded theories, knowledge, science. He wanted to found a scientific psychology and philosophy.
and this idea was taken over by many of his pupils. But despite all changes in Brentano's mode of thought Aristotle remained the background and the bedrock of his teachings.

Although the movement which Brentano launched was based on a solid tradition the doctrines of his pupils tended to show divergencies both from Brentano's own thought and among themselves. Meinong's theory of objects and Husserl's phenomenology have many traits in common but they cannot be considered to be complimentary doctrines of the same teaching. But Brentano's pupils were all of them greatly indebted to him. Husserl declared in 1932: "Without Brentano I would not have written a single word on philosophy". (1)

Although Brentano came to Aristotle through Thomism it was Aristotle himself and to a lesser extent the medieval scholasticism which became the basis of Brentano's thought. At the very outset of his career Brentano extracted from Aristotle rationalistic (even Cartesian) views. He adhered to them during his Vienna period, and it was this interpretation of Aristotle which Husserl came to know when he studied under Brentano (1881,1884-1886). This manner of thought left its mark on Husserl, although he does not quote Aristotle so much himself. But his Greek vocabulary and his preoccupation with Descartes is implanted in his works.

Philosophy as rigorous science was very early the
ideal of Brentano. This implied a radical reconstruction of philosophy. Brentano was convinced that the only way to find a sound basis for philosophy was to discard entirely the German tradition and begin anew using the methods of science. He looked on Kant and Hegel as a phase of an aberration in the history of philosophy, and this made a fresh start imperative. Brentano was not the first philosopher in Germany to look at science as an auxiliary instrument. Fechner, Wundt and Lotze propagated similar views and made important contributions to experimental psychology. But Brentano took a somewhat different view. He followed closely the development of Auguste Comte's philosophy and was the first reviewer to introduce him to the German public in 1869. He studied closely the British empiricists, Locke, Hume, Berkeley and J.S.Mill. Brentano corresponded for a time with J.S.Mill and planned to meet him personally but this plan did not materialize because of Mill's old age. This shows in what direction Brentano looked for enrichment of his own thought. He became committed to a certain kind of empiricism and convinced himself that the science of man must be based on insight and intuition. This provided some points of contact with the classics of English empirical thought.

Carl Stumpf, an early pupil of Brentano, has related how Brentano in 1868 attempted to solve the problem of circularity in epistemology. This was, in his opinion,
a necessary first step to find the point of departure. Although Brentano was far from abandoning Aristotle he was, nevertheless, dissatisfied with his categories and his theory of matter and form. On the other hand, he felt that the psychology of Mill, Wundt, Fechner and Lotze lacked a firm basis and clarification of their fundamental concepts. Brentano's aim was not to construct a psychology of his own to be added to all the other psychologies. But he looked at psychology as the fundamental science. This view was held by many investigators of the time and also, among others, by W. Dilthey. Brentano wanted to found this fundamental science once and for all and elevate it to the level of one science in the same sense as physics and chemistry are.

The epistemological paradox was formulated thus:
I cannot have blind confidence in my cognitive abilities (Erkenntnisfähigkeit) and I am unable to prove (test) them. In order to prove them I must make use of the same abilities whose reliability I want to prove. Therefore, I can never rely on my knowledge (Erkenntnis) and be certain of it.

The solution proposed by Brentano is the following.
I must rely on what I see. But to see is to have an inner sense. If a proposition is immediately self-evident (unmittelbar evident) then a proof of its knowledge is not necessary. We make use of and rely on our cognitive abilities (Erkenntniskräfte) and do not use them as
presuppositions. Thus, a vicious circle can be avoided.

Logical axioms and the facts of inner perception were in the eyes of Brentano self-evident. It is their intrinsic quality to be evident.

Brentano refutes a possible objection thus:

I could, as a matter of fact, accept something that is false. But that is the same as to say: I am not certain whether it is not false what I am certain that is true. Even God cannot make us believe that red is a tone or that 2-1=4. God would then contradict his will.

In 1866 Brentano composed 25 theses in Latin on the occasion of his inauguration as a lecturer in Würzburg.

(2)

The first thesis is as follows: "Philosophia negare oportet, scientias in speculativas et exactas dividisse; quod si non recte negaretur, esse eam ipsum jus non esset".

Speculations are not science. On the other hand, philosophy is to be science and if it is not it loses its right to existence.

This does not necessarily mean a break with the scholastic tradition but it reflects Brentano's determination to establish philosophy as an exact science.

The second thesis denies the necessity of revelation as a condition for philosophy.

The fourth thesis is as follows: "Vera philosophia
methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est".

The question arises how Brentano was to carry out this declaration. According to him this thesis was at the very basis of his philosophy. But if the method of natural science is to mean experiment and observation then Brentano did not use it in his psychology. In it he made use of the evidence of inner perception but did not take into account the accumulation of facts and data. His psychology was empirical in this sense but that does not mean that he adopted the method of the natural sciences as his own methodological principle.

Brentano was a religious person all his life in spite of his separation from the church. The next seven theses affirm the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. But he does not mention the applicability of the "methodus scientiae naturalis" to these problems.

The thirteenth thesis reaffirms empiricism by the Leibnizian proposition: "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse". The seventeenth thesis says: "Accidentia definitionem excludent, definire autem substantiam prorsus non possumus".

In these theses there is a mixture of scholastic and positivist influence. Some philosophers would welcome his handling of the notion of substance. But although Brentano finds that philosophy must borrow the method of natural
science he accepts the possibility of metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense and confesses rationalism, disregarding Kant's handling of these problems.

Brentano declares his opposition to speculative system building in accordance with his empiricist program. In his inaugural address in Vienna in 1874 he declared that philosophy has no other foundation than experience. (3)

Philosophy is the task of the future. It has not yet been founded as a scientific discipline. Brentano explains this with an example from the history of science. He names four sciences in succession: mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology. The line leads from less abstract to more abstract and complicated sciences. Mathematics existed already in Greek and Roman times, physics only from the times of Lavoisier and physiology only from Brentano's own time. And a new science is to be borne, a science that is similar in relation to physiology as physiology is to the physical sciences. This new science is psychology. But a scientific psychology is still a matter of the future. The same can be said about the social sciences in general (Gesellschaftswissenschaften). One of them is philosophy. But psychology is the fundamental science of all the social sciences.

In the same year, 1874, Brentano published his main work, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.

In this book Brentano explains the fundamental
concepts of his psychology, "experience", "outer" and "inner" perception (Mussere und innere Wahrnehmung).

"Psychology, like the natural sciences, has its basis in perception and experience". Psychology is compared with the natural sciences not on the basis of their respective objects of research. "Natural science may not be defined as the science of bodies nor may psychology be defined as the science of the soul. Rather, the former should be thought of simply as the science of physical phenomena, and the latter, analogously, as the science of mental phenomena". (4)

This supplies some clarification to the propositions of the Würzburg theses on method and experience. It foreshadows the development of psychology into phenomenology.

Brentano accepts certain "ideal intuition" which is to go hand in hand with his empiricism. This intuition is not observation of empirical data. It is, rather, such an experience which makes us aware of certain idealized types or essential features. It is an insight, although not synthetic a priori in the Kantian sense. In another work (5) Brentano speaks about the possibility of achieving ethical knowledge about goodness and badness, love and hate at one stroke and without any induction. This is much in line with the Diltheyan Verstehen and the Husserlian intuition of essences.

Brentano divides psychology in two departments:
genetic and descriptive. The genetic psychology was to use the method of natural science, induction (cf. Dilthey's *erklärende Psychologie*). It would, therefore, correspond to the ideal science described in the fourth Würzburg thesis. But this branch of psychology was never developed by Brentano. The psychology contained in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is based on other premises.

The descriptive psychology was meant to be empirical. It was, however, not based on induction but on internal experience, insight, intuition. It is an aprioristic science. Brentano was convinced that this science was empirical. One of his pupils, Hugo Bergmann, points out that Brentano himself did not realize that this psychology was neither empirical nor did it use the method of natural science. (6) The main task of descriptive psychology was to establish or describe the phenomena investigated by this branch of science. The quiddity of phenomena has preference to their causal connexions. This is taken up by Husserl and later elaborated by Ingarden.

Instead of the previous division of psychical phenomena into thought, emotions and will Brentano proposes a new classification: Presentations (*Vorstellungen*), judgments (*Urteile*) and interests. The fundamental psychic phenomenon is that of presentation.

Brentano gives no definition of these three classes
of psychical phenomena but characterizes them by giving examples.

Presentations are, e.g.: listening to a tone, seeing (a coloured object), feeling (heat and cold), phantasy.

Judgments: Remembering, conviction, belief, reasoning.

Interests: Joy, fear, hope, doubt, rage, love, hate, courage, etc.

Physical phenomena are: colour, shape, scenery, an accord (I hear), heat, cold, smell, etc.

To determine the mode of existence of these phenomena we have to consider how they are perceived. (This is reminiscent of Dilthey's position in his essay on the reality of the external world).

Natural science occupies itself with "physical phenomena" given in external perception or external experience. Phenomena given simultaneously in external and internal experience are the subject matter of metaphysics.

Things themselves are not given in perception. Natural science investigates only "signs" about material things and processes. They do not exist outside us. What is in reality does not appear and what appears is not real (wahrhaft). The truth of physical phenomena is only relative. It is, therefore, understandable why Brentano did not develop genetic psychology. It would have been unable to fulfill the demands Brentano made to the fundamental science he was trying to establish.
Brentano maintains, on the other hand, that objects of internal experience are true in themselves. They appear as they are in reality. This is guaranteed by the self-evidence of their perception. Psychology is only about psychic phenomena, not about the soul which is only a substratum or bearer (Träger) of psychic phenomena and is not given in experience. Thus, Brentano wants to free psychology from old metaphysical concepts and make it acceptable to investigators coming from various schools and trends.

Brentano revived the scholastic theory of intentionality. In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* he says:

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing (Realität)) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena
which contain an object intentionally within themselves". (7)

This is the beginning of the doctrine of intentionality which was to become an intrinsic part of phenomenology. Brentano emphasises that there are two kinds of perception, outer and inner perception. Physical phenomena are given in outer perception and psychic phenomena in inner perception. Only inner perception can yield absolute self-evidence. The mind can only be certain about what is given intentionally. Thus, outer or external perception is, strictly speaking, not a perception. (8)

In this connexion there arises the problem how subjects become conscious of intentional contents (objects). External things seem to be perceived by the creation by the subject of internal presentations which contain the thing as content. But how is it that the subject becomes conscious of the intentional objects? By forming presentations of the presentations in external perception? This seems to be what Brentano suggests. Brentano's pupil, Hugo Bergmann discusses the problem in the following terms:

"When I enjoy listening to a piece of music then the music is the intentional object of my listening but the listening is the intentional object of my enjoyment. Thus there emerges a chain of acts built one upon another. Its lower end is the "physical appearance" which as a physical appearance has no object but in the
upper end there is the theoretical possibility of an unending regress as one act builds itself on another, but certainly the law of the limits of consciousness comes in and the chain very soon breaks off". (9)

But this is no solution to the problem. There are two alternatives. Either internal perceptions never enter the field of consciousness because of this unending chain of presentations or the mind derives its consciousness from what is unconscious. Brentano rejected the notion of the unconscious and thus he had difficulties in showing how things enter consciousness.

Another problem concerns the mode of givenness of objects. In Brentano's doctrine we have an ontological hierarchy composed of things, presentations, their contents (intentional objects) and presentations of these intentional objects. Brentano's own relentless scrutiny of these matters led to a simplification of the scheme, putting stress on the distinction between realia and irrealia. A succinct expression of Brentano's later view is the sentence: "All mental references refer to things". (10) But it has to be kept in mind that "thing" in this connexion is not necessarily a physical object, but it is something real. Sphericity does not exist as such but a sphere, greatness does not exist but something great. Everything which is, is individual. Fictions do not exist but persons imagining fictitious object may exist.
"And so it holds true generally that only that which falls under the concept of a thing (\textit{Reales}), can provide an object for mental reference. Nothing else can ever be, like a thing, that to which we mentally refer as an object - neither the present, past, nor future, neither present things, past things, nor future things, not existence and non-existence, nor necessity nor non-necessity, neither possibility nor impossibility, nor the necessary nor the non-necessary, neither the possible nor the impossible, neither truth nor falsity, neither the true nor the false, nor good nor bad. Nor can the so-called actuality \ldots of Form \ldots, of which Aristotle speaks, and which we express in our language by means of such abstractions as redness, shape, human nature, and the like, ever be the objects of a mental reference, and this is true further of objects as objects as for example, the affirmed, the denied, the loved, the hated, the presented". (11)

This position which relates thinking to things and the thinker himself to his objects of thought is already far removed from the theory of intentionality as initially outlined by Brentano. In his later years he even found his former theory to be absurd. (12)

Brentano had no special sympathy for phenomenology. Husserl reproached him for being a "psychologist" by sustaining"a theory which contests the general validity of knowledge". (13) Brentano could not accept that and
fired back by pointing out that the phenomenologists "revived the error of Plato and the ultra-realists ... by ascribing a being to universals as universals". (14)

Brentano's warnings against hypostatizing abstract nouns are undoubtedly timely and actual. But it has to be emphasized that Brentano's concretism is dualistic. He accepts the distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, bodies and souls. A thinking body would be unacceptable to him although he considers the thinker as a thing in the sense that the thinker is real, not an irreal entity.

One of Twardowski's pupils, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, developed a doctrine, quite independently of Brentano, which he called reism or pansomatism. This theory is decidedly a materialistic monism.

The seeds which Brentano sowed in his lectures in Vienna bore many different fruits.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.


3. "In philosophischen Dingen keine andere Lehrmeisterin geben kann, als die Erfahrung".


8. Ibid. p. 119, English translation p. 91.

9. Hugo Bergmann in the article quoted above.


2. Twardowski's work on Descartes

Brentano's division of all phenomena into psychical and physical was commonly accepted by philosophers in the XIX century.\(^1\) In fact, this dichotomy can be retraced to the dualism of Descartes.

Twardowski's first book was devoted to Descartes. It was his doctoral thesis, published in Vienna in 1892 and called *Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes*.

In this book, written in Twardowski's clear and succinct style, he examines Descartes's theory of clear and distinct perceptions and ideas.

Twardowski's work can be seen not only as an inquiry into some central problems of the Cartesian cogito but also as an examination of the nature of presentations and ideas. His book is also a contribution to a discussion which was taking place at this time in Germany. Some authors (Koch and Natorp)(2) had used interchangeable the expressions *clara et distincta idea* and *clara et distincta perceptio*. Others considered them to have identical meaning (3). Twardowski's task is to clarify the relations between clear perceptions and clear ideas.

The Cartesian method of doubt guarantees the existence of an ego who thinks. And the ego produces with absolute certainty true judgments if they are based on clear and distinct perceptions and ideas. In this connexion several questions arise: What is a perception? What is an idea?
What is their relation to judgment? How can they come the criterion of truth?

Twardowski uses the method of elimination to show that perception can neither be an affect nor judgment nor idea. The distinction between perception and judgment is made on the basis of the following quotations from Descartes:

"When I saw that, over and above perception, which is required as a basis for judgment, there must needs be affirmation, or negation, to constitute the form of the judgment, and that it is frequently open to us to withhold our assent, even if we perceive a thing, I referred the act of judging, which consists in nothing but assent, i.e. affirmation or negation, not to the perception of the understanding, but to the determination of the will" (4).

Twardowski quotes also from the Fourth Meditation:

"Examining myself more closely, and considering what my errors are which alone bear witness to the existence of imperfection in me, I see that they depend on the concurrence of two causes, namely, the power I have of knowing things, and the power of choice, or free will, that is to say, of my understanding, and of my will. For by understanding alone I neither affirm nor deny anything, but merely conceive the ideas of things, which I can affirm or deny. Now, in considering it thus precisely, it can be said that there is never to be found any error in it provided that one takes the word: error in its proper signification". (5)

From this Twardowski concludes that perception and judgment cannot possibly be identified.
"Descartes clearly expresses the view that perception is only anterior condition (Vorbedingung) of judgment. There are four necessary components of a judgment according to Descartes: Ideas, perception, decision of the will and affirmation or negation." (6)

Twardowski points out that Descartes distinguishes between "perceptio sensu" and "perceptio ab intellectu". Only the latter comes into consideration in connexion with the criterion of truth (7). To throw a light on this he takes these quotations from Descartes:

"Our perceptions are also of two sorts, and the one have the soul as a cause and the other the body. Those which have the souls as a cause are the perceptions of our desires, and of all the imaginations or any other thoughts which depend on them. For it is certain that we cannot desire anything without perceiving by the same means that we desire it; and, although in regard to our soul it is an action to desire something, we may say that it is also one of its passions to perceive that it desires" (8)

"Those (perceptions) which we relate to the things which are without us, to wit to the objects of our senses, are caused, at least when our opinion is not false, by these objects which, exciting certain movements in the organs of the external senses, excite them also in the brain by the intermission of the nerves, which cause the soul to perceive them. Thus when we see the light of
a torch, and hear the sound of a bell, this sound and this light are two different actions which, simply by the fact that they excite two different movements in certain of our nerves, and by these means in the brain, give two different sensations to the soul, which sensations we relate to the subjects which we suppose to be their causes in such a way that we think we see the torch itself and hear the bell, and do not perceive just the movements which proceed from them". (9)

"What do I see from this window, other than hats and cloaks, which can cover ghosts or dummies who move only by means of springs? But I judge them to be really men, and thus I understand, by the sole power of judgment which resides in my mind, what I believed I saw with my eyes". (10)

From these texts Twardowski concludes that Descartes can mean by the term "perception" only "Wahrnehmung".

What is, then, the idea? The term idea has the same meaning as presentation (Vorstellung).

"Idea means, according to Descartes, presentation. He calls it "tamquam imago rei" and "res ipsa cogitata quatenus est objective in intellectu" (11)

Thus the role of ideas and perceptions in the judgment is different. Ideas are the content of presentation. "Ideas are the substratum of judgment. They are the object which is affirmed or negated. Perception is, on the other hand, what declines the will to judge. Ideas are ..., the "materia", perceptions are the "ratio" of judgment". (12)
What is a clear perception? Twardowski quotes Descartes on this point:

"I term that (perception) clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength" (13)

From this is clear that a perception can be called clear if it is present and apparent and apparent to an attentive mind. He who perceives must show attentiveness towards the perceived object and then he grasps this object completely and in all its parts. (14)

Clarity is a condition for distinctness. A perception can be clear but not distinct.

"Perception may be clear without being distinct, and cannot be distinct without being also clear". (15)

Distinct is every perception if it is at the same time distinguished from all unclear perceptions related to it. The differentiation of clear perceptions from other perceptions makes them distinct. (16)

Twardowski quotes several places where Descartes describes his criterion of truth. He says, e.g., in the Third Meditation:

"All the things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are true". (17) And in the Principles of Philosophy he says: "For the knowledge upon which a certain and incontrovertible judgment can be formed, should not alone be clear but also distinct". (18)
The clear and distinct perception is a precondition of a perfect conviction of the correctness of a judgment. This means that the clear and distinct perception means evident perception. To support this Twardowski quotes from the Fourth Meditation:

"For example, when inquiring these last few days whether anything existed in the world, and finding that, from the very fact that I was examining this question, it followed most clearly that I existed myself; ("evidenter sequi, me existere") "I could not help judging that what I conceived so clearly was true; not that I was forced to this conclusion by any external cause, but simply because the great clarity of my understanding was followed by a great inclination in my will; and I was led to believe with all the more freedom as I was the less indifferent" (19)

The knowledge acquired on the basis of the clear and distinct perception is necessarily true. Every error in a judgment based on a clear and distinct perception is excluded. But this is valid only for the sphere of inner perception. The "regula generalis" is limited to the "percipere ab intellectu". Sense perception is apt to deceive. There is no evident sense perception. (20)

But the clear and distinct perception is not a judgment but a source of the truth value of a judgment. The internal perception is directed to two kinds of objects. 1. The psychic phenomena (presenting, judging, feeling and willing), 2. the immanent objects (the presented, affirmed or
or negated, the felt and the willed). And Twardowski adds this important observation:

"Descartes's criterion is quite correctly thought. Only the precondition of the judgment, as Descartes calls perception, must be accepted as the judgment itself, and a limitation must be introduced such that the objects of the second group of perceptions must be aprioristic concepts. Only in this case are the attributes given in the concept the attributes of it; only in this case is it possible to express something with the concept, what is contained in it as an attribute, with objective validity". (21)

There are two kinds of evident judgments. The first is the perception judgment and it is explained thus:

"I perceive self-evidently my own psychic phenomena. On the basis of this perception is the existence of these phenomena affirmed. And when I assert something about a thing I reach the form of a judgment and judge: My psychic phenomena (whose whole form my personality) exist, or in short: I am!"

Analytical judgments are reached in a similar way:

"I have the concept of a triangle. In this concept the attribute of triangleness is perceived self-evidently. When I express the attribute of the concept of triangle I reach the form of a judgment: Every triangle has three sides". (22)

Self-evident judgments are thus the perception judgments in the sphere of internal perception and analytical judgments.
There is less evidence in Descartes for an explicit theory of distinct ideas. Twardowski points out that Descartes speaks about "idea distincta ab aliis" in Epistulae II,57. Twardowski also points out the following from The Principles of Philosophy:

"Our conception is not more distinct because it comprehends fewer properties, but because we distinguish accurately that which it does comprehend" (i.e. its content) "from all other notions". (23)

Presentations derived only from one of the senses (e.g. seeing) are more confused than those which are derived from a number of them (e.g. seeing and tasting).

Twardowski quotes from the Sixth Meditation:

"And because the ideas I received through the senses were much more vivid, more express and even, in their own way, more distinct than any of those which I could form for myself by meditation, or which I found imprinted in my memory, it seemed that they could not proceed from my mind, but that they had, of necessity, been caused in me by some other objects". (24)

From this Twardowski concludes that those presentations can be called distinct which are differentiated from all other presentations, or, what is the same thing, whose extension is accurately determined.

A presentation (idea) is clear if it contains its essential attribute (praecipua proprietas). In the presentation of a bodily substance it is the attribute of
extension, in the presentation of the human spirit it is
the attribute of thought, in the presentation of God it
is the attribute of the uncreated, thinking substance.

The clarity of a presentation consists in its having
in its contents its constitutive attribute (praecipua
proprietas), its distinctness consists in its differentiation
from all other presentations. Clarity and distinctness
belongs, thus, to all presentations whose extension and
intension (contents) are accurately and unambiguously
determined. The clear and distinct idea is, therefore,
what is called "concept" in logic. (25)

But the judgments, whose truth or falsity is based on
presentations, must be analytic. From the contents of a
presentation the existence of external objects cannot be
inferred. Only God has a necessary existence. "I cannot
conceive of anything other than God alone, to whose essence
existence belongs of necessity". (26)

As every clear and distinct presentation is without
contradiction then its object has a possible existence
outside the subject. But this does not mean that it has
reality or exists in reality. (27)

But the constitution of things is possible by analysing
the contents (intension) of concepts. To show this Twar-
dowski quotes principles LIII and LIV of The Principles
of Philosophy.

" But although any one attribute is sufficient to give
us a knowledge of substance, there is always one principal
property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and on which all the others depend. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. For all else that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is but a mode of this extended thing; as everything that we find in mind is but so many diverse forms of thinking. Thus, for example, we cannot conceive figure but as an extended thing, nor movement but as in an extended space; so imagination, feeling, and will, only exist in a thinking thing. But, on the other hand, we can conceive extension without figure or action, and thinking without imagination or sensation, and so on with the rest; as is quite clear to anyone who attends the matter! "We may thus easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, the one of created substance which thinks, the other of corporeal substance, provided we carefully separate all the attributes of thought from those of extension. We can also have a clear and distinct idea of an uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is to say of God." (28)

Twardowski thus finishes his work on Descartes by transcending the limits of his epistemological inquiry by pointing out a possible basis for an ontological and constitutive theory in Descartes. He himself was to work on these problems in more detail in his next work, and both Husserl and Ingarden took up the lead from Twardowski.
3. Objects and presentations

After having brought Brentanist ideas to bear on Cartesianism Twardowski analysed carefully the Brentanist method of formation of concepts. This he did in his book Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894).

In his theory of mental (or psychic) phenomena Brentano did not distinguish clearly between the object and the content of the act. He speaks about the inexistence of an object, about immanent objectivity and that every psychic phenomenon contains something as an object in itself. (29) Twardowski introduces in his work a sharp distinction between act, contents and object of a presentation.

Twardowski's point of departure is the theory that every psychic phenomenon is directed to or related to an immanent object. The word "presentation" (Vorstellung) can therefore both mean the act of presentation, the activity of presenting, or it can also mean the contents of a presentation, what is presented. Twardowski does not direct his attention to acts (to psychology proper) but investigates the relations between contents and objects. Then he turns his attention to the general theory of objects and finishes the work with an investigation into general presentations or general objects.

Judgments and presentations are different and the difference consists in the fact that judgments either affirm or reject the object but the presentations only present it.
Judgments judge about the existence of their objects whereas presentations say nothing about the existential status of objects presented.

Twardowski investigates the relation between presentations and names as the linguistic expressions of presentations. A name has to fulfil three functions: It has to name the object, it has to inform the hearer about the contents of the object's presentation and it is the instrument through which the acts of presentations can take place.

A name is equivalent to the expression categorematic sign. As an example of a name can be mentioned "The founder of ethics", "a son who has offended his father". Non-categorematic signs such as "in order to", "nevertheless" are not names.

The meaning of a name is revealed by the speaker as he expresses his presentation and arouses in the hearer a psychic content. It is this content which is called meaning (p.11). The roles which names play in language are one of the arguments for the necessity to distinguish between acts, contents and objects of presentations.

Twardowski uses an analogy to explain the difference between objects and contents:

"One can say that a painter paints a picture but it is also possible to say that he paints a landscape. The activity of the painter is directed towards two objects; but the results of this activity are one picture. When the painter has finished to paint the picture
or the landscape then he has before him both a painted picture and a painted landscape. The picture is painted ... The landscape is also painted but it is no true landscape, only a painted one. The painted picture and the painted landscape are truly only one; the picture presents a landscape, it is a painted landscape; the painted landscape is the picture of the landscape! (30)

The landscape continues to be a real landscape although it is painted.

The verb "to present" presents in a similar way a double object: an object which is presented and content which is presented. The content is the picture, the object the landscape. Just as a picture can only be painted by the activity of painting a presentation can only be presented by the activity of presentation. The object continues to be an object although it is presented but insofar as it is only presented it is the content of the presentation and inseparable from the act of presentation. The content is presented in the presentation but the object is presented through the content of the presentation. (p.18)

Twardowski maintains that there are no empty presentations that "there are no presentations which do not present something as object". (31) But there are presentations whose object does not exist either because it (the object) is contradictory and therefore cannot exist or because this object just does not exist.
But the object can also in this latter case be presented but there are no presentations which have no object, in the sense that there is no object which corresponds to it them.

There are three kinds of presentations which allegedly are objectless. 1. Those which contain negation, 2. presentations whose objects contain contradictory determinations, 3. those which have no corresponding object shown by experience to be existing.

Presentations of the form "not-something" or "non-ens" must be considered categorematic, as names. As examples Twardowski mentions the words "non-Greek" and "non-smoker". The division entailed by the word "non-Greek" is not between Greeks who are Greeks and who are not but between men some of whom are Greeks. Similarly, the expression "non-smoker" does not divide smokers in two classes but a second order concept (e.g. travellers) is divided in two: those who smoke and those who do not. Thus expressions of the form "non-ens" are categorematic and names. On the other hand, the word "nothing" does not mean any presentation and can therefore only be considered as syncategorematic.

As an example of a contradictory object Twardowski takes the expression "oblique-angled square". In this name we have both information (Kundgebung), meaning and naming. Whoever names this presentation informs that he has this presentation. The name names something
which has contradictory properties. The content of this presentation exists although the object itself does not. But this does not mean that the object exists as presented. The real existence of an object is here opposed to the phenomenal, intentional inexistence of thecontents. In order to be able to form a judgment rejecting the existence of an object the object itself must be presented.

In this connexion Twardowski cites Descartes who says in the Third Meditation that "a certain material falsity can be found in ideas, when they represent what is nothing as if it were something" (32). According to Descartes, every presentation presents something as object. If this object does not exist then the presentation is materialiter false, if it exists then the presentation is materialiter true.

In the case of names such as "Poseidon" the object is only what is named, the object as it is contained in the name ("Poseidon Genanntes") but such names have no objects as such.

The object can also be distinguished from a content when the object does not exist. Their difference is real, not only logical. Whoever pronounces a judgment which rejects the existence of an object must present this object in a rejective way. The content is there but the object is not. The object can have properties and relations which the content of its presentation has not. A golden mountain has i.a. the property of being extended in space,
to be made of gold, to be bigger or smaller than other mountains. These properties cannot be the ingredients of the content of the presentation of a golden mountain. The content is not extended in space, it is not made of gold and it is neither big nor small. The content of an oblique-angled square is neither oblique-angled nor a square. It is the oblique-angled square itself which is the object of this presentation. The object is not a part of conscious, or mental or psychic phenomena.

Presentations which have the same extension but different intension supply another argument for the difference between content and object. The city called in Roman times Juvavum and 

Twardowski defines the word "object" as something to which there belongs the totality of the categories of the presentable. Things ("Dinge oder Sachen") are only one of these categories. "Object" is a wider concept than "thing". "A deadly fall" is no thing, but it is an object and so are: experiment, murder, epileptic stroke, tranquility of feelings, sinus (in trigonometry) and so on.

Everything which is named is an object. (34)

Objects such as false tone, tree, grief,
and movement are real but such objects as lack, absence, possibility are not real. Both real and not real objects can exist. "Judgments such as: lack of money exists, or: the possibility for this or that to take place does not exist, are true or false independently of the non-reality of the object which is accepted or rejected". (35)

Objects which exist (ens habens actualum existentiam), objects which only possibly exist (ens possibile) and objects which can only be presented (ens rationis) all belong to the same category of objects. Object is everything which is not nothing but is something. Twardowski restores the view of the schoolmen that the object is unum, verum, bonum: "Sicut bonum nominat id, in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id, in quod tendit intellectus". This means that the object is true insofar as it is related to a judgment and it is good insofar as it is related to a feeling. (36) And it is one insofar as it is a unity of its attributes.

4. Attributes and objects

From the distinction between the object and content of presentations there follows that a distinction has to be made between the attributes (Merkmale) of the objects and the attributes of the content. The content of a presentation can never be coloured or extended.

"Just as the whole object is presented through
a presentation the particular parts of the object are presented through the corresponding part-presentations. The parts of a presented object become objects of presentations which are parts of the whole presentation. The parts of the content of the presentation are contents of presentations just as the parts of the object are objects. Analogously, the parts of the contents form the totality of the presentation content in which the parts of the object form the total unified object". (37)

Twardowski accuses Sigwart, Kerry and other logicians of having confused objects with their presentations and not having distinguished between their attributes.

"It is not the content of the presentation of gold, but gold itself which is the object of the presentation. To it do the determinations heavy, yellow, shining, metallic etc. belong. These determinations are presented through the presentation of gold; but the sum of these determinations does not constitute the content of the presentation of gold. This latter is composed of just as many (or more) parts as the determinations to be distinguished in gold; and these are presented through the parts of the total presentation, i.e. through presentations. The content of the presentation of gold is therefore not composed of the totality of the attributes but of the totality of the presentations of these attributes". (38)

It is worth to point out and emphasize that Twardowski looks at the parts of the object, the attributes, such as
colour, shape, size as objects in their own right capable of being presented in presentations.

The object is composed of two types of parts: matter (Stoff) which is the totality of the object's parts and form which is the totality of the relations between these parts. The types of material parts of objects can be manifold but Twardowski is not interested in explicating this theme. (39)

There are simple parts of a whole and there are those which can be split into further parts. If the material parts of an object can be divided further then we have parts of the first, second etc. order. Material parts of the first order are those which the object as a whole can be divided into. If the parts can be divided then this division yields material parts of the second order. A book can be divided into its pages and cover. These are the material parts of the first order. If in the pages distinction is made between their colour and shape and bigness and in the cover between its front and back-cover and its Rücke then these parts are of the second order. But they are at the same time of the first order of the pages and cover. (40)

Thus, a classification of the possible parts of objects is established.

By the division of wholes into parts the existence capacity of the parts can also be taken into account. Thus, some parts, divided from the whole can exist
independently. Others can exist only in connexion with other parts and the third group would be those whose existence is mutually dependent upon the other parts.

(41)

Twardowski distinguishes between material and formal parts of the object, the latter being the pattern of relation between the material parts. These latter fall into two groups: 1. The relations between the parts and the whole, 2. the relations between the parts themselves. The former are the primary formal parts the latter are the secondary formal parts. The primary formal parts can be seen from the point of view of the whole and then the whole can be said to have parts and it can be seen from the point of view of the parts and then it can be said that the parts constitute, form (bilden) the whole.

The parts can coexist with the whole (when the whole object is a thing) or they can form a string of succession (when the object is a movement or a temporal object). These are called the formal parts of the object in the oblique sense (im uns eigentlichen Sinne).

To the material parts of the first, second ... nth order there correspond the formal relation of the first, second ... nth degree (Rang). This must be supposed because only seldom does the analysis of an object come to an end by the establishment of the second order parts. This is valid both for relations between parts and whole and relations between the parts themselves.
Every complex object can be called the function of its parts. The composition of the object can be expressed thus: \( O = f(T_1, T_2, T_3, \ldots T_n) \). \( T \) signifies the \textit{parts} material parts of the first order. The type of objects and the determination of their parts determines the type of relations between them as they form the whole and can be expressed by \( f, f; F, F; \varphi, \varphi' \) etc. The sign of function means that the whole has parts, that the whole constitutes the whole. If \( T_1, T_2 \ldots T_n \) contain complex objects then the formula becomes like this: \( g_1 = T_1 = f_1(t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n) \) and analogously \( g_2 = T_2 = f_2(\tau_2, \tau_2 \ldots \tau_n) \) and so on. (42)

However ingenious this theory of objects may be it is obvious that it is endangered by an infinite regress. Twardowski himself also points out that the relations of parts to objects must be different from relations between the parts themselves. In addition to that, the formal parts of a presentation are themselves not presentations. (43) This makes it extremely difficult to see how the formal relations, reflecting the material composition of objects can form homogenous wholes called concepts or presentations (or ideas).

J.N. Findlay comments on this in his book Meinong's Theory of Objects:

"This curious doctrine leads inevitably to the most hopeless difficulties; to have an idea of \( O \), it is surely not enough to have ideas merely of \( A, R, \) and \( B \) as
three separate entities, one must also have an idea of them as bound together in the unity of the object. On Twardowski's theory, it is hard to see how we ever cognize more than a set of independent moments, which cannot possibly constitute a unitary object".(44)

Findlay goes on to say that Meinong suffers from the same difficulties.

Twardowski himself tries to find a way out by pointing out that not all relations between properties are equally important. This leads him to the concept of essence.

"The totality of property relations from which all the other property relations of the object can be deduced on the basis of their causal dependence are characterized as the essence of the object".(45)

Ingarden puts great stress on this trait of Twardowski's theory of objects and says that because of the unequal importance of parts of objects and elements of contents of presentations there emerges a certain hierarchy of elements beginning in the essential nucleus and rising to ever more complicated formal complexes of elements. But this, as Ingarden points out, leads not only to a regress but also to certain antinomies as each group of elements of a higher degree is treated as equal to the elements of the lowest degree.

These difficulties became the object of research of Twardowski’s colleague, E. Husserl, and of his pupils, Ingarden, Leśniewski and Kotarbiński.
The image theory which considers the contents of presentations to be a psychic picture (Abbild) of the object is called primitive by Twardowski. In the light of his theory of objects it becomes evident that the relations between content and object are much more complicated. To the material parts of a presented object there correspond material parts of the content of the presentation. But not all the material parts of the content have material parts of the object as objects. To these must be added some formal component parts (Bestandteile) of the object. In a presentation of a horse there is a presentation of its parts and of the relations between these parts. This presentation is not presented simply as collection of parts but as parts of a complicated, unified whole. The formal parts of a composed content are made up of the relations between the material parts of the content as parts of a unified whole. The presentations of colour, shape and size of a sphere are in the same relation to the presentation of a sphere as the colour, shape and size of the sphere are in relation to the sphere itself. On the basis of the presentations of the formal parts of the object there emerge definite relations between the material parts of the contents. This whole is the synthetic form of the presented contents. But this form is not the sum of the presentations of the relations but the sum of the relations themselves. (46)

Not all parts of an object may be presented in the
corresponding presentation. Some parts of the object may be not presented. The one and the same object can be presented by different presentations. These presentations present the object from different sides. On the other hand, there is the question whether the object can be presented adequately. Twardowski shows by examples how this can be done by paying attention to material parts of different orders and of formal parts of different degrees. Nevertheless, he is not confident that all the possible formal parts of an object can be included in one presentation of an object. (47)

Twardowski discusses two further problems which should be mentioned. The first is the question about indirect presentations and the second about the general or abstract presentations.

There are presentations which have in their contents more material parts than the parts of the objects presented. These objects are presented through relations in which they stand towards other objects. As examples Twardowski mentions: "A man's eye", "the gable-roof of the house", "a land which has no mountains", "a book without copperplate illustrations". "Man" and "house" are mentioned as parts of these presentations but nevertheless a man is not a part of his eye, a house is not a part of a gable-roof, mountains are not a part of a land without mountains.

Twardowski suggests the solution that in such presentations several objects are presented. In the
example "land without mountains" three objects would be presented: 1. a land, 2. mountains, 3. a relation between these objects according to which the second is negated. But this solution can not be accepted in view of Twardowski's definition of an object which says that an object of a presentation is what is named by a name meaning the object's presented content. An object called "a man's eye" cannot be such an object because its presentation contains two names, "an eye" and "a man". When these expressions become parts of judgments it becomes clear that what is judged is "an eye", "a land", but not "a man" or "mountains".

Twardowski finds his solution to the problem by using the concept "auxiliary presentations". The presentation of "a man" is not a part of a presentation of the human eye but an auxiliary presentation which determines the eye in a certain way. In the expression "land without mountains" there are the presentations of mountains, of a judgment which separates mountains from the land, and a presentation of the land. The first two presentations are auxiliary ones which give the land a certain determination. This is borne out by the possibility of expressing the presentation with another linguistic means such as "a flat land".

This solution was later found unsatisfactory by Husserl who came to somewhat different conclusion in his IV Logical Investigation.
Twardowski's theory of general or abstract presentations is maybe the most influential part of his treatise.

Twardowski begins his analysis by stating that there are no presentations to which a manifold (eine Mehrheit) of objects belongs. If this were the case then the objects of a such presentation would have to be enumerable. But this is just the error of those who think that a collection or a manifold of objects can belong to a presentation. What is enumerated is not the objects belonging to a general presentation but the objects of equally many presentations. If I want to count the pictures hanging on the walls in this room I must first have the presentation of "the picture hanging in this room". And before I can begin to count I must have presentations of the individual pictures. Such presentations are a necessary condition for a "higher" unity of objects.

The general presentation is different from a row of objects which are presented successively by the corresponding individual presentations. The presentation of number is not equal to the collection of all numbers. If this were the case then the characteristic determinations of individual numbers would have to be given in the general idea of number. But this is not the case and from this point of view the general idea (presentation) gives less that the individual presentations of numbers.

But from another point of view it gives more. The judgment "In a triangle is the sum of the angles 180°" has a different
logical value than the judgments: In the triangle a
the sum of its angles is 180°, in the triangle b the
sum of its angles is 180° etc. Such an induction can
never be perfect. But the general judgment "The sum of
the angles of every triangle is 180°" can be pronounced
with self-evidence although a perfect induction is
impossible. This is the best proof for the contention
that the general presentation yields more than the
collection of individual presentations. (48)

As soon as it is acknowledged that the general
presentation presents what is common (gemeinsam) in the
individual presentations it is acknowledged that they
are different. The same judgments are not valid for
both of them.

"What is presented through a general presentation
is accordingly a group of parts constituting parts
(Bestandteilen) which are common to a number of objects.
This group of constituting parts is presented as a
coherent whole. This is the object of the general pre-
sentation. It is equally impossible to identify it with
the object of the individual presentations as the
identification of the number ten with the number hundred
(taken as a presented object) although the presentation
of the number ten is contained in the number hundred" (49)

The general presentation presents its own specifically
peculiar object. It is indirect and non-intuitive and
approaches often objects with contradictory attributes.
"But that there nevertheless are such presentations must be granted by the man who sees that we can say something about their objects. This we plainly can do. No one can represent a universal triangle intuitively, a triangle neither right-angled, nor obtuse-angled nor acute-angled, which is without colour or definite size, but it is as plain that we have an indirect presentation of such triangles as that we have indirect ideas of which black-horse or of a steel cannon made of wood etc". (50)

Plato's ideas are the objects of general presentations (universal ideas). But Twardowski does not want to give these objects the status of existence as Plato did. Nowadays we do not do so. "The object of the general presentation is presented by us, but it does not exist". (51)

In his treatise Twardowski applies Brentano's methodological principle that mental phenomena can only be perceived but not observed. (52) The truth established both in Brentano's and Twardowski's investigations is based on the self-evidence of inner perception. (53) But the analysis of intentional acts did not explain why objects were perceived at all. Although Brentano assumed that some mind of a cogitatum always was included in the cogito he did not show the relations between the two because in his view the object was inherent in the act, in the intentional relation.
Twardowski's distinction between the object and the content was intended to introduce clarity into these problems. He introduces the content as the meaning of concepts which is directed to and refers to objects. The content is to explain why we perceive objects as we do in various different ways. But Twardowski was not interested in the acts themselves. Investigation into them belongs to the sphere of psychology. He was rather interested in the logical problems of reference and the structure of objects referred to. If Twardowski's treatment of these problems is to be called psychologistic then it is on the basis of his identification of content with the act which is a psychological phenomenon. And although Twardowski concentrated on the relations between object and content (and, maybe, partly because of this) he ran into difficulties in defining the ontological status of the three kinds of phenomena. The acts present no problem because they are by definition psychological. But content is not psychological or mental and how is it then possible to identify it with mental acts? This question finds no answer in Twardowski's treatise. It was on the basis of this difficulty that Husserl later distinguished between the matter (content) and quality of acts. (54) As a matter of fact, objects do not have any autonomous existence, according to Twardowski. There is an object corresponding to every presentation and this object may exist or not, it may be contradictory or not.
There is a necessary relation between the object and its presentation. At the same time, objects are definitely not mental and they seem to be given to consciousness. It has no existential autonomy and could, therefore, just as well be considered to be a product of the acts. This question troubled both Brentano and Twardowski and has continued to haunt the whole phenomenological school. From Twardowski's position the ways have parted in two directions. The phenomenological realists (Scheler, Ingarden) have made distinctions between ideal and real objects, which can exist independently of presentations, and intentional objects which are only presented and heteronomous. The phenomenological idealists, on the other hand, keep closer to Twardowski's view and contend that all presented objects are only presented (intentional). Thus, Twardowski's thesis "paved the way for Husserl's transcendental idealism". According to Twardowski the givenness of objects is just that. There are no "things in themselves".

In his theory of objects Twardowski tries to define the general concept of an object as a composite whole. He comes close to the idea of essence when he says that "the totality of property relations from which, by means of causal dependence all the other property relations of an object can be explicated (ableiten)". This theory does not suppose that there is some third sphere of being different from either the psychical or the physical.
That would mean a repudiation of the Brentanist dichotomy between the two realms of being, cogito and cogitatum. But this theory of objects, based on the evidence of inner perception, in nevertheless meant to be "eine daseinsfreie Wissenschaft" a theory neutral to all ontological commitment, as if suspending all belief in external causes and the existence of the world. (57) The being of objects is in their presentation. This, in Ingarden's view, is a prelude to Husserl's theory of reduction. But Twardowski himself never travelled the way towards the transcendental subjectivity. Although Twardowski accepts the Brentano's Cartesian dualism and and bases his investigations on inner experience he was not interested in the subjectivity of phenomena but in creating an objective theory of objects. There is, thus, in Twardowski from the very beginning a streak of anti-psychologism. He was concerned with establishing generally valid laws for logic and reason. But he did not subscribe to Husserl's contention that concepts and laws were ideal objects. In a book called "O czynnościach i wytworach" (On Actions and products) he tries to define the ontological status of these components of science and comes to the conclusion that theories, concepts and judgments are products of psychic or psychophysic activities. These products are themselves not psychic but dependent on psychic actions and can be changed by them. (58) Thus, Twardowski tried to overcome psychologism without
committing himself to transcendentalism. Later, Ingarden developed these themes in his ontology on the basis of anti-transcendentalism but the outcome was somewhat different from Twardowski's.

5. Ingarden on Twardowski

Ingarden has devoted one work to the analysis of Twardowski's treatise on the content and object of presentations. (59)

In this work Ingarden analyses exclusively Twardowski's theory of the structure of objects. He begins by pointing out that Twardowski presupposes that objects are complex wholes composed of formal and material parts. He notes that Twardowski is interested in what all kinds of parts and forms composed of parts have in common, in the type which follows every synthesis and is at the basis of the different modes in which a whole can be complex. (60)

Twardowski's theory is not about the form of the whole and it is not about the matter of objects. It is about the relation of parts. But what is this relation? What is this which parts have in common (gemeinsam)? What is the connection between parts? Is it equal to relation? Relation to what? Are relations related to other relations or to parts? What is this "kind of parts" (Arten von Teilen)? Is form only the collective concept of relations
or maybe something more? Some parts are material parts, others are formal parts. What is exactly the difference between these parts?

Ingarden then emphasizes the important point that objects in Twardowski's sense are only presented objects (Vorstellungsgegenstände) and that such objects must be something general, universal (ogólne). If they were not their qualities would have to be stated by induction and Twardowski himself did not intend this. He cites Twardowski saying that knowledge of all the elements of a whole is not necessary for the establishment of a theory of parts and wholes. (61) Object is every "something" which has a name. These objects can be real or unreal, existing or not, possible or not.

In this connexion Ingarden takes up the problem of the existence of parts. Twardowski says that a part is "everything which can be distinguished in a presentation object" ("Alles, was sich an einem Vorstellungsgegenständen unterscheiden läßt"). This must mean that the division of a whole into parts is dependent on or carried out by cognitive acts. Furthermore, Ingarden has difficulties in understanding what the "in" in the phrase "in a presentation object means". He draws attention to Twardowski's definition of a "metaphysical part" as something which is differentiated in a whole by means of the capacity of abstraction ("Abstraktionsfähigkeit") but which is in reality not to be detached from the whole. As examples Twardowski mentions size, colour, weight, everything which in ordinary language is called property (Eigenschaft)
Stumpf called these parts dependent and independent. And Ingarden asks how these properties are to be distinguishable but inseparable if the objects considered are only presented objects analysed without consideration of their existence. Thus Ingarden finds it necessary to allow for division of wholes into parts according to their mode of existence and criticizes Twardowski for not doing so.

Another problem is the definition of property (Eigenschaft). Twardowski proposes to use this word for the relation in which a whole stands in a relation to its near or farther parts. In other places he uses the word for the so-called "metaphysical parts", i.e. material parts. Are, then, all relations material parts? Ingarden finds even the fundamental concepts used by Twardowski insufficiently clear. And this is valid also for the concept of relation.

But he finds that Twardowski was directed by a certain "correct intuition" although he failed to work out his theory in clear detail. What Ingarden mainly criticizes Twardowski for is lack of explicit definition of the concepts of "wholeness" and "partness". The "partness" is considered only from the point of view of the division into material parts. Twardowski considers "partness" in its proper sense only. He passes the question of indirect relations such as similarity, differences in size (being bigger or smaller) and thus does not reach the idea or
concept of "wholeness" and "partness" as such, the concept of "being a member of a relation", the "being of relation" which, in Ingarden's view are also formal moments of objects distinguishable from their material determination. Ingarden expresses his regret that Twardowski did not reach this new concept of form, or else his theory would have been different. Are wholes only and exclusively the collection of their parts? Twardowski was conscious of the difficulty of this question and remarks that the part is already included in the whole. If so, Ingarden comments, then the difference between the two kinds of formal parts is wiped out. Ingarden's main critical point on this matter is that Twardowski did not adopt the theory of wholes as objects of a higher order in relation to the parts. These wholes have their own and different properties from their parts even when they are collected together. Ingarden blames John Locke for having had such an unfortunate influence on Twardowski that he could not take this step in his theory of objects. Twardowski could not and would not accept the idea of substance and operated therefore only with one pair of concepts: wholes and parts.

Now Twardowski uses terms such as "essence" (Wesen) determination, genus, composition (Zusammensetzung). But then the question arises: What metaphysical parts (material or formal) or a material part make up the genus or species or essence of an object? It is the determination
of material parts which determine the kind of relations which are to come out between the material part and its whole and between the material part and other material parts. What is the determining moment? The fact that the parts are parts? That is not sufficient. It must be taken into consideration how these parts are, what fills their form of partness. Qualities, properties of the material part must be taken into consideration. And that means that a new concept of matter must be introduced just as in the case of form. The partness of a part does not determine the relations in which it stands towards other parts and the whole. The determining factor is its quality standing in the form of a metaphysical part.

Ingarden's approach to Twardowski is thus from the side of a more consequent realism. Ingarden's critique is aimed at Twardowski's moderate realism, his compromise between empirical theory such as the one of John Locke and the Aristotelian-scholastic element in Brentanism to which Twardowski found himself deeply committed.

Others among Twardowski's pupils went the other way round and took up defense for the Lockean element in Twardowski's theory. Among these especially Stanisław Leśniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński must be mentioned. Their stumbling block was the infinite regress inherent in Twardowski's theory of form and the contradiction that the concept of objects as parts and wholes presupposes that there are simple.
elements but at the same time all elements must be divisible and thus the existence of simple elements is excluded.
It will be a difficult or even an impossible task to find out exactly what influence various members of the Brentanist school had on each other during their period of break-through in the last decade of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century. But a comparison between some of Twardowski's and Husserl's ideas will not be out of place here as it might help to elucidate the background for some of Husserl's (and, consequently, Ingarden's) theoretical standpoints.

It is known that Husserl wrote (in 1895) a review of Twardowski's book *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. It remains unpublished. This review shows, according to Ingarden's testimony, how exhaustively Husserl studied Twardowski's work and that around that time Husserl laid the foundations of his analysis of consciousness. (63)

Three problems come into consideration here. 1. The problem of meaning. 2. The status of general objects or the Species. 3. Twardowski's influence on the formation of Husserl's transcendentalism.

Twardowski's distinction between content and object is made on the premises of realist metaphysics which makes meaning subjective but the referent objective.
The act of presentation has the immanent object as content (meaning) but it refers to a non-immanent object whose sole property is to be independent of thought. This object may or may not exist in reality. It may have only intentional existence in the scholastic sense (cf. Ingarden's heteronomous existence) or it may even be contradictory. The main principle is that there are no objectless presentations. There is no presentation which does not present something as object.

Names are not names of presentations but of objects. The name "sun" is in the name of the sun but not of the presentation of the sun. But names have also other roles to play. When a speaker pronounces the name "sun" he intimates in the hearer the same psychic content which he himself (the speaker) had in mind. This content is the meaning of the name. The content is the presented object but this content refers to an object which is outside or independent of both act and content. The object is what can be presented (das Vorstellbare). It can be real or not real. If it is not real the reference is to the object as named. A reference to Poseidon as the king of the sea is a reference to Poseidon as determined by the content of the name ("Poseidon Genanntes"). The presented object exists only as a content or meaning of a name.

Whatever the existential status of objects, Twardowski's theory of meaning entails a double reference of acts:
to contents and to objects. This becomes more clear in his analogy of the painter and his picture. The painter's painting is an act. This act is directed towards two objects: the painting itself and the landscape whose picture he his painting. Twardowski even calls the referent of the act a "double object", the presented object and the presented content. He speaks about acts of presentation moving in these two directions. (64) The content of the presentation and the presented object fuse into one entity, the meaning. But the object referred to, in itself, continues to be an object, independent of thought.

The object is as it is. Twardowski characterizes it with the scholastic terms ens which is unum, verum, bonum and which omnia genera transcendent. (65) But the object as presented, the content of the presentations, is something mental, psychological, something created by the act of presentation. As such the object exists only in the psyche as psychic phenomenon. This is an essential feature of Twardowski's doctrine, shared by many of his fellow pupils of Brentano.

In Husserl's Logical Investigations there is a different set-up of these problems. Not only was Husserl interested in overcoming psychologism as an impediment to a genuine theory of logic but also in establishing a theory of meaning as a foundation for a theory of science. "All theoretical science consists, in its objective content,
of one homogeneous stuff: it is an ideal fabric of meanings". "If all given theoretic unity is in essence a unity of meaning, and if logic is the science of theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently is the science of meanings as such ..." (66)

This does not mean that phenomenology is solely a theory of meaning, as Husserl stressed in his Introduction to the English edition of Ideas I. But it does mean that meanings have to be liberated from the psychological acts in which they are produced. Logic had to be made independent from the kind of psychologism which he himself advocated in his Philosophy of Arithmetics and which are at the basis of Twardowski's psycho-logical analyses in his book Zur Lehre.. What is at stake is the objectivity of logical forms. If they are dissolved in the activity of the psyche then even logic becomes relative to the thought-processes of individual persons and no stable categories of science are possible. If science was to be possible its categories could no longer be purely subjective. Husserl came to the conviction that logical truths could not depend upon the sole act of judgment as acceptance or rejection of the object. This was Twardowski's point of view, based on Brentano's position in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (67) Twardowski represents the view that the essence of judgment is acceptance or rejection of the object. Objects have different mode of existence and the object which is either accepted or
rejected is a sort of Cartesian *cogitatum* with the property of being a referent. In a judgment the existence of the object is either accepted or rejected. This is the difference between judgment and presentation. The object of presentation may exist or not and this existence has nothing to do with its reality. (68)

Husserl faces the problem of reconciling the ideality of truth with the subjectivity of the meaning-giving activity. Logic, if it is to be free from psychologism and relativism, cannot resolve truth into conscious experiences. Truth which is revealed in judgment is not an acceptance or rejection by someone. Truth is an eternal idea and beyond time. "What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity..." (69)

But truth is experienced and this experience is the inner evidence of truth. "The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs, is inward evidence: The Idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity". (70)

Husserl retains the mainstays of Brentano's and Twardowski's intentionality. The subjective aspect of knowledge was even more important than the objective one. But concepts such as "act", "presentation", "content" and
"object" are of little help until they have been phenomenologically clarified (71) and this Husserl purported to do in his Logical Investigations and subsequent works.

The act of judging itself is "a transient experience: it arises and passes away". It is a "vanishing noise that can never recur identically" but we mean the expression in specie. "Each assertion ... involves a thought in which thought as its ... meaning is constituted. (72) The question is how the ideality of the universal can enter the flux of real mental states and how the adequatio rei et intellectus can be achieved. (73)

Science relinquishes individuality. It has an ideal essence. The categories of science are universals and they are immediately given in intentional acts which are mental but not psychological. They are the sources of logical entities. Science is independent of empirical, contingent facts and thereby of psychic relativity.

The objectivating, meaning-giving acts yield meaning as ideal unity against the multiplicity of possible acts. Intentional objects can be repeated unchanged at different points of time. Meaning, as ideal entity, comes about when sensory data are apprehended by intentionality. Perceptions as such are not the source of meaningfulness.

Expressions refer to objects and it is in its meaning where a relation to an object is constituted. These objects can exist, be fictitious or even impossible. This last ...
point does not differ from Twardowski but the stipulation of meaning as referring to objects entails a correction of Twardowski's standpoint that acts have a double reference, both to meaning (content) and object (referent). "An expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning". This is an important step in the direction from psychologism to phenomenology. Although meaning is constituted by meaning-giving acts, although meaning consists in the sense-giving act-character the objective reference is between the ideal unities of sense and their referents but not to the acts themselves. Word-meanings are variable, "the subjective acts which confer meaning on expressions are variable" "but the meanings themselves do not alter" (74) and cannot be relative to the acts. Thus Husserl tried to reconcile the subjectivity of knowledge and the objectivity of categories. "All theoretical science consists, in its objective contents, of one homogenous stuff: it is an ideal fabric of meanings". This entails a repudiation of Brentano's "intentional inexistence" of objects. The objects referred to are the referents of meaning-giving acts and these acts are not to be understood as psychological but in a phenomenologically purified sense.

Meanings are correlates to meaning-intentions but they constitute universal objects, species. "Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning ... just as Redness in
specie is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all 'have' the same redness!' (75) Thus, the necessity arises to explain the essence of general objects, or the species. Also in this field Husserl finds it necessary to criticize Twardowski's theories on the basis of their different theories of meaning (content and object).

Twardowski bases his theory of general presentations (Allgemeinvorstellungen) on the notion of resemblance. Through the general presentation is presented what is objects of the common to the particular presentations. The object of the general presentation is therefore different from the objects of the particular presentations. This general presentation is neither an abstract name nor a representative example of the particulars. Twardowski thus rejects both Berkeley's and Hume's theories of abstraction. He points out that what can be said of a triangle in general cannot be said about a particular triangle. The latter can have a surface of 2 square centimeters, have one right angle and two obtuse angles etc. The judgments to be pronounced about particular triangles and about the triangle in general are therefore different. The thesis of representationism cannot be accepted and the general presentation has to be declared different from the particular one.

In this connexion Twardowski speaks about the attributes of particular triangles as "variable presentations"
(Wechselvorstellungen) and this brings to mind Ingarden’s thesis about variables in the content of ideas. But Ingarden’s and Husserl’s notion of ideas are different from those of Twardowski.

According to Twardowski the general idea is indirect and non-intuitive (unanschaulich). The general triangle cannot be imagined intuitively but such indirect presentations have to be accepted. The objects of the general presentation can be presented but they do not exist, any more than Plato’s ideas, as objects of universal ideas, exist. (76)

In Husserl’s criticism of Twardowski’s general presentation the latter’s notion is compared with Locke’s general triangle. Twardowski does not mention Locke but it seems to be true that their doctrines have some traits in common. This concerns especially the mode of existence of the objects of these presentations and the presentations themselves as being merely mental or psychic. But there are also differences between the two doctrines. Especially has to be mentioned Twardowski’s clear distinction between content and object, the appearance and what appears. This has its roots in Twardowski’s realist background as different from Locke’s empiricist thesis. But although Twardowski operates with a Brentanist model of intentionality and comes very near Husserl’s distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment when he points out that the objects as referents may or may not
exist, he does not, as Husserl, posit the ideality of universals revealed in the meanings themselves. This aspect of Twardowski's doctrine, the "psychologistic" aspect, is therefore hit by Husserl's critique of the nominalist theories of abstraction. But it is noteworthy that it is just in connexion with his critique of Twardowski's rejection of the existence of universal objects that Husserl affirms not only the necessity for accepting the existence of such objects but also their intuitive givenness. (77)

It is highly improbable that Twardowski's psychologism as such prompted Husserl to abandon psychologistic methods and make clear to him the necessity to overcome psychologism in logic although his study of Twardowski coincides with his work on the *Logical Investigations*. Other influences have to be taken into account here, e.g. that of Frege and Bolzano.

It was another part of Twardowski's doctrine that is more likely to have had a lasting impact on Husserl. Twardowski claims that his theory is independent of any existing school of philosophy. The object can be called "phenomenon" or "appearance" according to the terminology or idealists or realists. Whatever standpoint is chosen, it remains valid that through every presentation something is presented, whether it exists, is perceived or created by phantasy. Objects are not things or affairs (*Sachen*). The category of object covers anything which is presentable
things or affairs are only one subcategory. By distinguishing between content and object (which Brentano did not so sharply), by stipulating that there is a necessary relation between content and object, by making the analysis of contents independent of the factual existence of the objects Twardowski paved the way for a philosophical theory which would be universally valid and constituted in intentionality by the analysis of mental acts and the contents of presentations. (78) In the Logical Investigations Husserl establishes a theory of ideal species lived through in mental acts, in conscious experiences, and which are independent of contingent facticity. These ideal objects exist genuinely and are the cornerstone of objectivity. The terms "reduction" or "transcendentalism" are not introduced in this work but their elaboration is the logical next step. This is what Husserl did in his works following the Logical Investigations and which ultimately led to his "transcendental idealism".

Twardowski himself was not an idealist and did not follow Husserl into the realm of "pure consciousness" but he can be said to have paved the way for transcendent idealism.

This does not necessarily mean that transcendentalism is a direct consequence of Twardowski’s doctrine. Ingarden, who chose not to follow Husserl into idealism, can be said to have been, in a sense, faithful to the Twardowskian approach by making the noematic (contents) the object of his philosophy (as analysis of ideas) but he combines this
with the Husserlian contention of the ideality of the species and the possibilities of their apprehension in pure intuition or immanent perception.

In Husserl's view nominalism is unable to account for generality, "the generality which belongs to the intentional content of the logical experiences themselves" which belong to our meanings and to our meaning-fulfillments. (79) The general objects, or ideas, are not reducible to the particulars to which they refer. But, at the same time, they are not Platonic ideas, and they are not constructs of the mind. Ideas do not exist outside the world. The existence of ideas does not imply that there are two worlds. Ingarden, however, interprets the Husserlian doctrine in a realist spirit. In his view, Husserl's ideal objects, essences or eidoses were held by Husserl to exist autonomously. (80) However that may be, Husserl thought that the species were fundamentally different from individuals and cannot be explained in terms of individual objects. Individuals were rather spatio-temporal examples of the universals. Universals cannot be arrived at by counting individuals or accounting for their similarities or relations. "Thus we directly apprehend the Specific Unity Redness on the basis of a singular intuition of something red. We look to its moment of red, but we perform a peculiar act, whose intention is directed to the 'Idea', the 'universal'." (81)

Husserl describes in various places the act of
apprehending the universal. In the *Logical Investigations* he says: "If we consider pure experiences and their own essential content, we form Ideas of pure species and specific situations, in this case the pure species of Sensation, Interpretation, Perception in relation to its perceptum, and the relations of essence among these". (82) In the *Ideas I* he says that the essence or the "what" of and individual can be transposed into idea. (83) In the *Logical Investigations* he explains: "We must exclude all empirical interpretations and existential affirmations, we must take what is inwardly experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure experiences, as our exemplary basis for acts of Ideation. We must ideate universal essences and essential connections in such experiences..." (84)

This leads directly to the "bracketing" of the world, to the suspension of the belief in the existence of things. But then it becomes difficult to distinguish between unicorns and chairs, Jupiter and the Cologne Cathedral. (85)

The self-evidence of immanent intuition may be sufficient for a purely formal theory, and it may even be true that adequate, categorically formed intuitions constitute the goal of true knowledge. (86) It may be asked whether Husserl’s doctrine achieved this goal. Some authors think that a pure logic is possible on the basis Husserl laid. But even the most sympathetic
investigators think that Husserl's doctrine failed to solve the crucial problem of explaining exactly categorial constitution through ideation, that Husserl's description of theoretical thought in inadequate. This was Ingarden's view and one of the main reasons why he devoted such great attention to the theory of essences and ideas. R. Sokolowski thinks that Husserl did not achieve this goal, either, in his theory of inner time consciousness which is more formal and does not operate on the basis of the matter-form schema of the Logical Investigations. (87)

Additional difficulties would have to be encountered if the formal theory of universals were to be "unbracketed" and confronted with the real world and the problem posed about the adequacy of the theory with the real thing. Some phenomenologists decided not to make use of the epoché at all (the existentialists). Husserl declared that the reduction was binding once and for all, but Ingarden, who wants the best of both worlds, makes a restricted use of the epoché but keeps the Cartesian notion of immanent certainty as a precondition for scientific philosophy in the hope of sublating the reduction later on and thus opening up the road to metaphysics. The difficulties which met him on this road will be dealt with later.

Attention should be drawn to the important role of Husserl's third Investigation in the evolution of the
phenomenological theory of ideas. In it, Husserl expounds the theory that independent objects are composed of non-independent moments and introduces the concept of foundation (Fundierung) according to which a whole is composed of contents which are mutually coexistent and foundationally connected with every content. This concept should eliminate the difficulties Twardowski met with in his formal theory of objects. The concept of foundation guarantees the unity of the whole by reference to foundational relations and by making unity a categorial predicate. "Our conception avoids these endless regresses of parts which are always splitting into further series". (88) This was exactly Twardowski's problem.

Ingarden takes Husserl's theoretical standpoint up and develops it further in several of his main works. (89) He introduces the notion of substance and characterizes the object as a subject of predicates. He platonizes Husserl's ideas and adopted a realist attitude in his attempt to reach the goal of constructing phenomenology as science.

Twardowski's other pupils went a different way. The idea of constructing objects out of ideal entities did not appeal to them as scientific, but found it too speculative and metaphysical. Kotarbiński repudiated the existence of properties as ideal entities altogether and proposed to put the category of the thing in the center of philosophers' attention. This was another attempt to
solve Twardowski's difficulties and it went in a very different direction from Husserl's and Ingarden's. The thing is known in ordinary epoché-less perception and constituted (if this is a term applicable to Kotarbiński's theory) in the human practical contact with it. The categories of logic and the human means of expression (language) help us to carry out this constitution. Thus, Kotarbiński turned his attention to the laying of the foundations of a theory of logic, language and the methodology of sciences. This foundation he called reism.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


7. Ibid., p. 10.


12. Twardowski, op.cit. p. 15.
22. Ibid., p. 27-28.
25. Twardowski, op. cit., p. 34.
27. Cf. Epistulae II, 60. "The existence of this or another thing is possible‖.
34. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, p. 37.
35. Ibid., p. 36.
40. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, p. 49.
41. Ibid., p. 51.
42. Ibid., p. 55-56.
43. Ibid., p. 93.
44. J.N.Findlay, "Meinong’s Theory of Objects", p.16-17.
47. Ibid. p. 78.
48. Ibid., p. 103-104.
49. Ibid., p. 105.
51. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, p. 106.


56. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, p. 60.


58. Ingarden, Z badań, p. 264.


60. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, p. 48.

61. Ibid., p. 48.


by J.N. Findlay. London 1970, pp. 325,323. (Hereafter abbreviated as "LI").


68. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, pp. 35-36.

69. LU, I, p. 117. LI, p. 140.


72. LU, II/1, pp. 43,44,45. LI, pp. 284, 285, 286.

73. LU, II/1, p. 8. LI, p. 254.

74. LU, II/1, p. 91. LI, p. 322.

75. LU, II/1, p. 100. LI, p. 330.

76. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, pp. 104-106.

77. LU, II/1, p. 136. LI, p. 361.

78. Cf. Twardowski, Zur Lehre, pp. 36-37.

79. LU, II/1, p. 146-147. LI, p. 371.

80. Cf. Ingarden's "Innföring i Edmund Husserls fenomenologi", (hereafter abbreviated as "Innföring"), pp.40,310.

81. LU, II/1, p. 223. LI, p. 432.

82. LU, II/1, p. 382. LI, p. 565.

83. Ideen I, pp. 13, 10 (sect.3).

84. LU, II/1, p. 398. LI, p. 577.

85. LU, II/1, p. 373. LI, p. 559.

86. LU, II/1, p. 168. LI, p. 388.


89. Cf. Ingarden's works: "Essentiale Fragen" (1925), "Der Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes" (1935), "Spór o istnienie świata" I-II.
CHAPTER III
LEŚNIEWSKI AND KOTARBIŃSKI

7.
Leśniewski

Leśniewski’s aim was not only to construct consistent formal systems but also to refute realism. Ingarden, on the contrary, wanted to show that only realism can supply a firm basis for both logic and philosophy.

Already in the beginning of his career in logic Leśniewski published a study called Is the class of classes, not subordinate to themselves, subordinate to itself (1914). In 1916 he published Foundations of the general theory of sets. These works set the tone for his future work. He was to return to these problems later in his career. In the light of what has been said here about Twardowski it is also clear from where Leśniewski took his problems: He was seeking a solution to Twardowski’s paradoxes. Neither Leśniewski nor Kotarbiński devoted a special study to Twardowski’s philosophy but their philosophical theories arose out of their endeavour to find alternative solutions to the difficulties to which Twardowski’s theory led. (1)

John T. Kearns’s statement that Leśniewski “began his work in logic because of his concern about the paradoxes” (i.e. Russell’s paradox) and the same author’s
difficulty to decide "whether his (Leśniewski's) nominalism resulted from his study of the paradoxes or whether it preceded his study" are based on ignorance of Leśniewski's background. Leśniewski began by trying to find a solution to Twardowski's paradoxes and this led him to an attack on Russell's paradox and then he found that a satisfactory solution could not be arrived at unless by adopting a kind of nominalism. (2)

Twardowski pointed out in his investigation (Zur Lehre, chapter on properties) that the object itself is not necessarily equivalent to the concepts which can be formed about him or, in his terminology that the composition of the presentation object is not always the same as the composition of the presentation content. This can be stated in other terms by saying that subjects and predicates do not belong to the same category and that the predicate (Vorstellungsinhalt) is the formal part of the same matter. (3) In spite of all connexions of Twardowski's theory with John Locke the Thomist heritage has also its voice in it. But Twardowski also showed the difficulties inherent in this tradition concerning the formal structure of objects and concepts (presentations). "The part is already contained in the whole" he notes on p. 56. These difficulties seem to be congenital to all theories based on the matter-form model.

And maybe at the root of the difficulties is the structure of the matter-form model itself. In any case,
Leśniewski directed his attention towards finding means to refute Twardowski's conception of general object as a special entity but composed of properties common to individual objects. This, in turn, led him to a critique of the classical concept of "class" and to the construction of his "formal" systems which were to be physical objects just as houses or cars.

Leśniewski reasoned that if a general object exists then it must be an object. Otherwise it would be contradictory. If the general object (or general idea) has exactly all the properties which are common to all the objects it represents it can be said that \( X \) is \( c \) if and only if all \( b \) are \( c \). Let \( a \) be a property of some \( b \). Then, it is also true to say that \( X \) is not \( a \). But, at the same time \( X \) cannot be said to be non-\( a \) because that would be the same as to say that all \( b \) are non-\( a \). This contradicts the premiss according to which some \( b \) are \( a \). This also contradicts the ontological principle of contradiction which presupposes that objects either possess a property or not.

From the same premiss \( (X \text{ is } c \text{ iff all } b \text{ are } c) \) Leśniewski and by adding the hypothesis that \( b \) exists Leśniewski showed that if the general object \( X \) representing objects \( b \) possess the property \( c \) then all the objects \( b \) have \( c \). If \( X \) represents the objects \( b \) then it cannot represent more than one \( b \) and the general object representing \( b \) is \( b \) itself. Thus, the "Platonic Ideal Bed" "is the sole bed
in the universe; and therefore exists only if there is exactly one bed, namely itself, otherwise being nonexisten
t.(4)

Leśniewski's refutation of idealism led him to the establishment of three logical systems: protothetic, ontology and mereology. Protothetic is his propositional calculus, (akin to Husserl's formal apophantic), ontology is his logic of names and mereology is his theory of parts and wholes. Historically, mereology was the first to be created and this can be explained by the fact that Leśniewski's starting point was Twardowski's difficulties in constructing a satisfactory theory of parts and wholes. Mereology is about an objects and the relations between them in the world but ontology and protothetic are the linguistic and logical expressions of these objects and relations.

Leśniewski's ontology is not a theory of predicates as in it

"expressions suitable as subjects of singular propositions are suitable also as predicates of propositions, and vice versa; ... the subjects of singular propositions and the predicates of propositions belong in this system to the same semantic category, the category of names! (5)

Sobociński and Largeault use the terms "distributive class" for Leśniewski's category of names and "collective class" for his mereological sets. But Sobociński explains

"If one takes the term"class" in this sense, the formula "A∈Kl(a)" signifies the same thing as "A is an element of the extension of objects a", which is to say, more briefly: "A is a" (6)
"Ontology needs no operators of "class abstraction\"" (.7) because the primitive term of ontology, \( \in \) (is), is not a sign of class membership.

"The \( \in \) is to be read "is" in the sense of "Socrates is white", "The current president of the United States is a Democrat", and "James is James". This sense of "is" requires that the subject of the sentence be the name of an existent individual if the sentence is a true affirmative one. It does not matter whether the term following the \( \in \) is a general term (e.g. "red" or an individual name (as above, "James")". (8)

In the two first examples, Socrates is said to be white and this means that he is one among the things which are white, the president of the U.S. is one member of the group of people called "Democrats" etc. Adjectives perform the function of names. "James is tall" means that James is one among the group of tall people.

What matters here is that names denote concrete objects, not abstract, formal constructions, "sets". A thing may be a unity in itself but a set of things is not a thing. A musical composition is composed of sounds but this collection of sounds is not a new thing, somehow related to the Platonic idea. Abstractions are creations of our thinking and it would be wrong to say that things are identical with such creations. Ideal entities and abstract constructions are eliminated entirely from Leśniewski's ontology.
Leśniewski feels that the real world contains only concrete objects; Ontology is a system which formalizes language used to talk about such objects - it is a system which does not add new objects to the world. Ontology is equivalent to the system of Principia Mathematica but lacks the commitment to abstract entities that characterizes PM. (9)

Twardowski, in his formal theory of objects, was compelled to accept structures of properties of ever higher degrees of complexity leading to an infinite regress. This is the reason why Leśniewski in his logic tries to avoid properties at all and constructs his ontology as a calculus of names. Adjectives belong to the same semantical category as names.

Husserl introduced the term "semantic category" in his IV Logical Investigation under the name of Bedeutungskategorie. He puts forward the idea of constructing a pure theory of semantic forms as "possible meaning forms" which are not logical laws but "a priori forms of complex meanings significant as wholes, whose "formal" truth or "objectivity" then depends on these pregnantly described "logical laws". (10) In this investigation Husserl uses the concepts of catagorematica and syncategorematica to form the idea of such classes of words that words or expressions belonging to these classes can be substituted for one another or exchanged without distorting the sense or meaning of the expressions.
Leśniewski was impressed by this idea but he carried it out very differently from what Husserl intended. Husserl remarks, as a matter of fact, that "the forms in a whole cannot function as its materials, nor vice-versa, and this obviously carries over into the sphere of meanings." (11) Although Husserl carried Wwardowski's theory of form and content a step further he worked inside the form-matter framework which, as Russerl's paradox clearly shows, carries within itself the possibility of a contradiction. This led Leśniewski to adopt semantic categories which eliminated the dichotomy between form and matter, which were not merely semantic but syntactic at the same time and finally it led him to adopt a formalization which was not differentiated from interpretation but formalized in order to specify the interpretation he intended. (12) He was opposed to the pure formalism of Hilbert, Husserl and Russell. (13)

Leśniewski was introduced to Russell’s paradox by Łukasiewicz who wrote in 1910:

"Most classes are not elements of themselves but, as collections, possess properties quite different from the properties characterizing their own elements. The collection of men is not a man, nor the collection of triangles a triangle, etc. Certain classes, however, such as the class of classes, apparently are exceptions to the rule. Since there are non-empty classes, having at least one element, the class of non-empty classes for example is non-empty,
and consequently is an element of itself. Now consider the class K of classes not elements of themselves: Since a class is an element of class K if and only if not an element of itself, class K is an element of itself if and only if not an element of itself. Is or is not K an element of itself? If it is, then it also is not. So it is not. Yet if it is not, then it also is. Either of the possible alternatives leads to the contradiction that it both is and is not". (14)

Łeśniewski based his solution of this paradox on his own theory of classes or, rather, on his theory of parts and wholes (mereology). The collective class of individuals is itself an individual and no individual is different from the class of individuals. "Any individual is the collective class of itself, and is an ingredient element of itself". "No individual is a collective class (of individuals) that is not an element of itself, nor a fortiori a collective class of such collective classes". (15)

By excluding the existence of formal, abstract or ideal entities in his system Łeśniewski formulates the mereological concept of class "precisely as a relation of the component fragment to the whole. Because in that case it cannot be inferred from the fact that x is an element of the M class that x is M, which passage is one of the steps in the construction of the paradox. Such a conclusion would not in fact be correct, since x’s being a fragment of a whole composed of M’s does not imply that
the whole has no other fragments. While it is true, for example, that the heart is a fragment of a whole composed of cells, the body of a creature with a heart being composed of cells, the heart itself is not a cell". (16)

Leśniewski's solution of the paradox has been criticized for being based on a different concept of class from that assumed in the formulation of the paradox. (17)

But it is possible to expect a solution on the basis of the very same premises which generate the paradox? This has, of course, been attempted. But even Russell himself was not entirely happy about his theory of types. (18) It has to be kept in mind that individuals are fundamental for Leśniewski's system. If individuals were considered to be a collection of properties in the old sense of class the old difficulties would be revived and the consistency of Leśniewski's system would be endangered. Prior has criticized Leśniewski by pointing out that names are names of classes and not of individuals. Prior point out that names are single, common or empty. Classes are similarly with one, many or without elements. From these names different other names can be generated whereas such calculus is impossible with individual variables. To this must be added that a calculus of individuals is possible in Leśniewski's system. What he denied was the existence of abstract or ideal entities. Only objects, individual objects exist. In Leśniewski the sum of individuals does not generate a new concept and this is just his original contribution to
the theory of classes. In the Russellian theory, $a$ is $b$ can denote a relation between an individual object $a$ and an abstract object $b$. In the Leśniewskian systems $a$ is $b$ can only mean that $a$ is one $b$.

It is worth noting that Leśniewski’s concept of individuals as fundamental is an answer to a difficulty in Twardowski. Twardowski suggested that there are both simple and complex objects. But in view of his theory of objects he was obliged to assert that there were no simple objects, they were endlessly divisible. (20) Leśniewski’s way out was to make the individual object $a$ fundamental to his systems.

By doing so Leśniewski constructed systems which are devoid of logical antinomies. Mereology has been proved consistent relative to an interpretation in the real number system using decimal expansions. (21) Mereology can be proved consistent relative to an interpretation in ontology and each of Leśniewski’s systems is demonstrably consistent relative to classical elementary logic. (22)

But Leśniewski’s nominalism has the defect that it is incapable of accounting for structure in the meaning of pattern or hierarchical organizations. John T.Kearns emphasizes this in his work on Leśniewski. (23)

This is probably the reason why Ingarden tries to show that his realist system is adequately equipped for giving account of systems.
100

Kotarbiński

Kotarbiński says that his philosophical theory had its beginnings in his doubts about properties. (24) What started these doubts off can only be the difficulties inherent in Twardowski’s theory of objects, leading to an infinite regress. Leśniewski, as we have seen, cut the Gordian knot by excluding properties from his system of logic. Kotarbiński came also to the conclusion that no consistent system could be based on properties or, rather, on the idea that there exist such objects called properties. Leśniewski, when he formulated the fundamental axiom of his ontology, $\text{xy}$, had in mind both the traditional and Husserl’s theory of semantical categories but the axiom states that a singular proposition can be true only if its subject is a genuine non-empty name. But it was outside Leśniewski’s "formal" system to explicate a theory of semantical categories. Here Kotarbiński steps in with a theory of names which states that only names of concrete objects can be genuine names.

What does it mean, he asks, when it is said "that properties are attributes of things or that properties inhere in things"? "What is meant when someone says ... that roundness is an attribute of spheres or that the property of roundness inhere in spheres? It is clear that nothing is meant other than that spheres are round". When we say so we are not stating a relation between two
objects, the thing and the property. When we say that "roundness" belongs to spheres we are saying that spheres are round. The term "roundness" may be a name of a property but the term "round" is not a name of a property, but a name of spheres, that is of certain things which are not properties. If this is so then there are no properties. When we speak about them we speak about things. Names of properties are onomatoids or apparent names. Thus, all categories can be reduced to the category of things. Every term which is not a name of a thing is an onomatoid. "Thus, "Whiteness is a property of snow" means the same as "Snow is white"; "Roundness is a property of this orange" means the same as "This orange is round"." Kotarbiński claims that no object is a property, that properties do not exist. "Hence it is not possible to make any true statement, with a literal use of the words involved (including the copula "is" or its equivalents), in which any singular name of a property would be the grammatical subject". 

"Concepts", "universals", "intension" and "extension" are all onomatoids. No such objects exist.

Something similar can be said about the alleged category of relations. If we say that "the relation of seniority holds between John and Peter" we only mean that John is older than Peter. The word "seniority" as a name of a relation then disappears. The words "older than" or "higher than" are no longer names of relations. They are terms applying to the subjects in the sentences where they occur, (e.g. "John is older than his son", "this orange is round").
"Mount Everest is higher than Mount Blanc"). By denying that no object is the relation of seniority the obvious truth that John is older than his son is of course not denied. (27)

Kotarbiński treats states of affairs (facts, "Sachverhalte") and kinetic facts (events) in a similar manner. The subject-predicate structure of sentences does not denote any object called state or event. If we say that Warsaw is situated on the Vistula we do nowhere find this "situatedness". We can swim in the Vistula and walk about the streets of Warsaw but we cannot do this with the proposition or with the state of affairs denoted by it. The sentence merely establishes a certain relation between Warsaw and the Vistula, namely that Warsaw lies on the Vistula, or that the city of Warsaw is built on the banks of the Vistula.

If we say that "John made a journey from London to New York" we are stating the fact that "John travelled from London to New York" or "John went from London to New York". "A journey" is an apparent name of an event and it will disappear "if we realize what is the intention of any statement that says something about an event or events". No object is an event. Events do not exist. (28)

"To sum up. Not only do properties not exist, but neither do relations, states of things, or events, and the illusion of their existence has its source in the
existence of certain nouns, which suggest the erroneous idea of the existence of such objects, in addition to things". (29)

Whatever there is, is a thing. "By things we do not mean only inorganic solids. Things are inorganic and organic, inanimate and animate, and "endowed with psychic life" - that is, they are both things in the narrower sense of the words, and persons too". (30)

Real existence is the existence of things.

"In our opinion there are no ideal objects, and only real objects exist. We do not distinguish as between these two kinds of existence. For us, "M exists" means the same as "Something is M". ... And "something" and "object" is the same, both in extension and in meaning; "object" and "real object" ("something" and "something real") have the same extension, since every object is real and not "only conceived". (31)

Kotarbiński's theory was centered on the ontological issue of what there is rather than being concerned with the problem of knowledge, of what and how we know. In Twardowski the question of reality was rather confused. According to him the act of presentation was real but the content was never real. The object of a presentation could both be real and not real, it could both exist or nor exist. The concept of existence was different from that of reality. (32) One way out of this confusion could
be a construction of a more coherent system of realities and existences. This was what Ingarden attempted to do in his ontology. But Kotarbiński found a different way out. His fundamental methodological principle was to reduce all significant entities to that of a thing by saying that only things exist. All the other entities are a kind of a hypostasis, linguistic constructions. In this, he appeals to common sense or sound reason. How can anything exist in abstracto, anything which can neither be experienced, seen, heard, tasted or touched? Kotarbiński thus turned his back on Twardowski's moderate realism and based his own theory on the reist approach. But in doing so Kotarbiński took into account a tendency which was very strong in the school of Twardowski: Clarity was to be the prime requirement of any theory. Kotarbiński himself points out in one place that Twardowski, although he was very far from reism, took part in the struggle against the hypostatic concepts by the emphasis he always put in his teaching activity on the necessity to express oneself clearly and by condemning confused speech. (33) Twardowski did very much to eliminate confusion accompanying the terms "object" and "content", to make the concept of "concept" more clear and to distinguish between the terms "imagination", "presentation" and "concept". (34) Comparing Husserl and Twardowski, Kotarbiński says that Husserl may have reached greater depth in the analysis of intentional objects than Twardowski but this depth was not
was not accompanied by clarity. Where depth and clarity collided Twardowski always decided in the favour of the latter. (25) In this respect, Kotarbiński was a faithful pupil of Twardowski. Kotarbiński’s works are a model of clear reasoning. This does not mean, however, that he shuns from attacking complicated and difficult problems. But he does not analyze a problem in order to add to its confusion but to clarify it.

Both Łeśniewski and Kotarbiński have been criticized for bypassing difficult problems by eliminating them rather than by solving them. To a certain extent this criticism is correct. But why construct a complicated theory where a simple one can do? A semantic theory must be judged from the point of view what concepts and theoretical constructs are necessary to explain that words have meaning and serve as means of expression. Kotarbiński’s theory is based on the mere essentials which have to be included in such a theory. In this connexion he stands firmly in the nominalist tradition and wields firmly Occham’s razor. In this, Kotarbiński and Ingarden are at the extreme opposites as Ingarden is a great master of subtle distinctions and multiplies his entities wherever possible.

The centerpiece of Kotarbiński’s theory of language and reality is his theory of names. It is based on a certain classification according to their types of meaning. The central idea is that names denote things. By this
Kotarbiński masters what causes some other theoreticians a great deal of trouble: Language is about reality and everything in language which does not directly refer to reality is derived from it. And reality is only one thing. This makes possible a relatively simple but comprehensive classification of names.

Kotarbiński has himself given a concise expression of his theory of names in a work called "Z zagadnień klasyfikacji nazw" (On the problems of the classification of names) (36) from which some items will be cited.

Among the expressions of a given language a distinction had to be made between those which are names and those which are not. To the first group belong substantives and adjectives and expressions which have the meaning of names such as "the one who triumphed". All other expressions are non-names. Those names which have independent meaning and can be used as a subject or a predicate are categorematic. Those which cannot stand independently and are in need of some completion (such as "liable ") are syncategorematic. This is a somewhat different usage than is usual of the terms "categorematic" and "syncategorematic".

Some expressions are terms and some are not terms. A term is an expression which can play the role of a subject or a predicate. These are not only substantives ("John", "tailor") and adjectives ("pleasant") but also verbs ("to smoke") and expressions such as "what now follows". Some terms are names and some terms are not names.
Among names (i.e. genuine names) distinction has to be made between individual names ("Paris"), common names ("town") and empty or vacuous (or objectless) names such as "son of a childless mother".

This is a distinction based on denotation. Singular or individual names denote one and only one object. Common or general names denote more than one object. But what about the empty names? Does the acceptance of such names not lead to the acceptance of the null-class? Kotarbiński's answer is that a name is a term _ex definitione_ in the nominative singular. A term can function in a false assertion and not be a term in a possible true statement. Then it is an objectless name.

In this connexion there arises the problem of the denotation of such names as "Zeus" and "centaur". They are genuine but objectless names, says Kotarbiński. "Zeus" is a genuine name with an individual intention, "centaur" - a genuine name with a general intention. The name "Zeus" has its meaning as "the only common father of the Olympic gods", "centaur" has its meaning as a name of a certain genus. But both names lack a referent and must be classified as names of fictional characters.

Thereby and with the help of the central thesis of reism Kotarbiński solves at one stroke a problem which has posed serious difficulties for phenomenological ontology. There are no such things in the world corresponding to the names of "Zeus" and "centaur" and consequently they must be relegated to the realm of fiction.

A sharp distinction is to be made between genuine and
apparent names (onomatoids). Such names are substituting-abbreviating words which lack a referent but differently from empty names can be reduced to genuine names. In the sentence "The departure of the train was delayed" "train" is a genuine name but "departure" is an apparent name. The sentence is substitutive for the expression "The train departed later than scheduled".

Onomatoids may figure meaningfully in a sentence of the structure "A is B" but only as substitutes or abbreviations. If a name is defined, as it is done by Kotarbiński, as a term which "is" to be usable as a predicate (subjective complement) in any sentence "A is B" with the primary understanding of the copula "is", then the onomatoids cannot play the role of terms. They are rather like false coins. Kotarbiński has also defined a name as "all and only those words and phrases which can be used as subjects or predicates (subjective complements) in sentences concerned with things or persons". (37)

Kotarbiński explains this by analyzing as an example the sentence "Seniority is a transitive relation". This sentence can be translated as follows: "If an object is older than some other object, and the latter is in turn older than a third one, then that first object is older than the third". In the abbreviated version the word "is" stands between words which are not terms, in spite of the fact that both "seniority" and "relation" are grammatically nouns. The word "is" appears here not
in its primary, but in a secondary, substitutive role. For whenever we ask: "What is that?" with reference to the term "N", we must answer by the phrase "N is such and such thing (or person)". But if we want to answer the question "What is seniority?", that method fails. We may answer first of all that "Seniority" is the same as "the relation holding between something which came into being earlier and something which came into being later"; but to the further question "What is a relation?" we are unable to give a correct answer of the type "It is such and such a thing", because it is not true that a relation is a thing. Hence we cannot in this way (or in any other way either) subsume "seniority" under "thing". On the contrary, when we want to answer the question "What is seniority?" we must, so to speak, define in use by saying, for instance, "Seniority holds between x and y", which is the same as "x came into being earlier than y". Thus in the sentence "Seniority is a transitive relation" we have a structure of the type "A is B", but in its secondary use, where the word "is" has the same form as the copula in the sentence "Uranus is a planet", it performs a different role and has a different meaning! (38)

Thus, if we want to speak an accurate, non-figurative language we have to eliminate apparent names which denote pseudo-objects or ideal objects which do not exist or, if they do, are contradictory.
Kotarbiński drags a considerable number of such pseudo-objects under the guillotine. Among them are facts, relations, states of affairs (Sachverhalt), properties and events.

"The reists stress the onomatoidal character of all the names of abstract objects: for them all these are onomatoids, and the names of concrete objects are for them the only genuine names". (39.)

Abstract objects do not exist. There is nothing which corresponds to them in reality. For instance, names of events are often only a hypostasis of a sentence. There is no such object as "John's recovery". The sentence means simply: "John recovered". In this interpretation names of events are onomatoids. The concept of "process" can be treated similarly. It is not an onomatoid if we, e.g., by "fire" mean the raging flames or if we name a thing which changes, develops, evolves such as e.g. "personality". But if somebody says: "Truth is a process" then he pronounces an abbreviating formulation meaning, probably, that in the search of knowledge we map things better and better. In this case the word "process" is an onomatoid.

Adjectives such as "rough", "green" and "heavy" are often called abstract names or names of abstract objects. That is because these adjectives mean a single definite property common to many things. "But the meaning of a name is not that of which that name is a name. The
adjectives quoted above are names of things, things are their designata, because things are rough, green, heavy, etc."

In Kotarbiński’s system there are no universals. "Is there then no truth in such statements as "The sum of the internal angles in a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles", "12 is divisible by 3", "A sage is free from superstitions", etc., and are these not statements about universals...?" "If so, then there must exist some general objects, whether in mind or outside mind, in things or outside things.." "Illusion: These and similar statements are abbreviations, which stand for fully expanded sentences in which general terms no longer occur in the role of full grammatical subjects." "The abbreviated form "A sage is free from superstitions" stands for the sentence "Whoever is a sage, is free from superstitions", etc." (.40) "If reference is made to the existence of general objects endowed only with those properties which are common to all the individual designata of a given name, then it would be difficult not to be a nominalist and not to deny their existence (or else an absurdity is reached)". (.41)

Either a general object is a thing (and if it is it is not a general object) or it is not a thing (and then it does not exist).

The classical concepts of "class" and "set" are treated in a similar manner. From the point of view of mereology.
and reism these terms are genuine names of concrete objects. There is no such object as the class considered as a whole. A chessboard is a class of its squared. Originally Kotarbiński accepted the concept of a class with only one member and rejected the existence of a null class. The formulation "the class of M's is included in the class of N's" was translated as "for every X, if X is an M then X is an N". This position which is in accordance with the fundamental principles of mereology made a conflict with the accepted set theory inevitable. Kotarbiński therefore tried to reconcile reism and set theory in his work "The development stages of concretism" (1958). He declared himself ready in this work to accept the concept of an empty class. The argument runs somewhat as follows. In it a new interpretation of existence emerges. "Let the formulation "There exists the class of M's" mean the same as: "Something is M or something is not M", then even if it is assumed that there are no "somethings" other than things, the existence of classes may and ought to be accepted, and, moreover, the existence of empty classes may and ought to be accepted. For if something is M and something is not-M (for example, something is a man and something is a not-man), then there exists the class of M's and there exists the class of not-M's, and neither of them is full or empty; if something is M, and if it is not true that something is not-M (for example, something is a body, and it is not true that
something is a not-body), then the class of M's exists and the class of not-M's exists, and the former is full while the latter is empty. Finally, if it is not true that something is M and it is true that something is not-M, then the class of M's exists and the class of not-M's exists (for example, if M stands for bronze wood), but the class of not-M's is full and the class of M's is empty. This might be the concretist theory of "existence" of classes which would be in agreement with set theory". (42)

But Kotarbiński does not declare victory in the struggles with classes. He notes that the problem of eliminating classes in their non-mereological interpretation remains to be solved by concretism.

A serious objection to reism was raised by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Reism formulates some of its fundamental principles by statements such as "properties do not exist", "relationships do not exist". If the terms used in these statements are onomatoids or apparent names, "words which look like terms but in fact are not terms and do not belong to that semantic category" and if the copula "is" is used in its fundamental sense (xRy) then the result is a confusion of semantic categories and yields nonsense. Reism must make use of semantic categories it rejects and from a system it rejects to formulate the fundamental principles of its own system. Thus reism's main ontological theses cannot even be expressed
legitimately in the language of reism. It can only assert that bodies exist and that every object is a body if the only sentences allowed are those which contain only genuine names and no onomatoids.

The threat of a semantic disorder had to be averted. Kotarbiński's way out was to retain the fundamental sense of the copula "is" and the word "exist" in such sentences as "Properties do not exist", "No object is a property", "No relations exist" etc. but "in those statements, which outwardly are negations, words with negative meanings are to be interpreted not as negations but as symbols of the rejection of such formulations as nonsensical. Thus inconsistence will be eliminated! (43)

But is all inconsistency eliminated? The fact remains that semantic categories alien to reism have to be discussed and ultimately rejected in order to formulate the fundamental theses of reism. It is beyond doubt that reism is a viable semantic theory. But Ajdukiewicz's incisive criticism led Kotarbiński to stress his ontological commitment more cautiously.

Whatever the difficulties in formulating the central ontological thesis of reism, Kotarbiński has shown the fruitfulness of his system in his ethics, in his theory of method and in the theory of purposeful action (praxiology). We not only do things with words, words help us to do things rationally, purposefully. Kotarbiński has shown how reism as an ontology can help us to act and
behave rationally. Kotarbiński’s works have had a lasting influence on Polish life and letters.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


6. Kearns, op.cit., p. 76.

7. Luschei, op.cit., p. 70.

8. Kearns, op.cit., p. 76.

9. Ibid., p. 84.


12. Luschei, op.cit., p. 91.


14. Quoted in Luschei, p. 66. Cf. Jan Łukasiewicz:
15. Luschei, op. cit. p. 32.
17. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 51-52.
27. Ibid., pp. 53, 84, 429.
28. Ibid., p. 52, 429-430.
29. Ibid., p. 430.
30. Ibid., p. 56.


34. Ibid., p. 734.

35. Ibid., pp. 740-741.


40. Ibid., p. 34.

41. Ibid., p. 398.

42. Ibid., pp. 435-436.

43. Ibid., p. 433.
CHAPTER IV. REISM AND REALISM

9. The question of reductionism

One of the questions ontology has to answer is whether meaningful signs we use, such as those of language, are about the world we live in or whether they refer only to the meaning itself, which the users of the sign assign to them.

In the kind of intentionalistphenomenalism as represented by Twardowski an object is anything which can be referred to, anything which can be presented to consciousness. Such objects may exist independently of mind but they may also be pure creations of the ego who carries out intentional acts. Thus Twardowski runs into trouble with objects such as "golden mountain" or "non-metal iron". Such objects can be presented but are they existing? This problem led Meinong to the confused contention that the round square does not exist but that there is, however, such an object. If this object is said to be fiction it means that the predicate "fiction" is attached to it.

Moreover, it became difficult in Twardowski's theory of the structure of objects to account for simples and to avoid infinite regress in his theory of objects as wholes constructed out of structures of attributes.

This led the Brentanist-Twardowskian school to an intensive preoccupation with existence and formal structure of objects and ultimately to the question of the relations of language and thought to reality and to the question of the essence of these.

What is the objective world and how are we to speak?
about it? Where are the boundaries to be drawn between (logical) language and the world? What belongs to the world and what belongs to language? Are classes and other logical concepts only fictions? Do facts, beliefs, wishes and wills belong to the world? Where is the proper place in the system of ontology for propositions? Do they not belong to the world? Are concepts, classes, types and categories only about symbols and not about things? Do they enable us only to use symbols in a coherent way in a system called language? Or does the usage of such symbols enable us to handle things?

The Twardowskians were deeply rooted in the Aristotelian tradition and tried to find answers to these questions on that basis. At the centre of their endeavours was, on the one hand, the Aristotelian theory of inclusion for predication and, on the other hand, the requirement for transitivity in the relation between subject and predicate.

Bertrand Russell has noted that a subject-predicate logic could not have arisen in China because the Chinese language does not allow for that distinction.¹ This is probably true. In any case, we find it difficult to repudiate the subject-predicate distinction altogether.

This never entered the intentions of the Twardowskians. On the basis of the subject-predicate framework they tried to pave the way for the idea of symmetry of predication. Only the ways were different.

Roman Ingarden went the way of constructing a
complicated system of substantival-adjectival metaphysics. Leśniewski and Kotarbiński went the way of reductionism, ultimately reducing all categories to that of the one category of things.
Language and universals

The fundamental thought of reism is that both subject and predicate must belong to the same category, or type, and that this category cannot be but the category of things. The copula indicates the transitivity of the relation. Thus, if we contend that man is white then that means that there are such things as men and that these things can be found among white things. The Aristotelian metaphor of inclusion is thus if not eliminated then at least avoided. There is no other way of averting the danger of falling into inconsistency and paradoxes.

Every attempt to include things in the hypostatic entities of another kind such as classes results in a confusion, in category mistakes, in failure. From this follows that to do things with words is to do something with things, and we have no reason to stipulate the existence of any ethereal entities which cannot be found in the world. Language and logic are in the world. They are one of the fields of practical activity of bodies called humans. Men produce fictions and express them in their language but this does not mean that there are any entities in the world corresponding to these fictions or to which these fictions refer to.

Things and properties are no worlds apart. Things have properties and by naming and describing things we state how they are. There is no need to think that there is a mysterious relation of "inherence" or "belonging" between things and properties and that properties are somehow
special objects or entities inhabiting a world of their own. Adjectives are names of things in a similar way substantives are.

"Platonic idealism tells us that we communicate in thought with some general beings (byty ogólne). The carpenter makes tables, the gardener cultivates plants, the thinker - universals... They are to be the material, the object of his work as wood is the material for the carpenter. Reism protests against this conception. The objects of its research are objective bodies just as the carpenter works on bodies. Reism liberates the theory of thought from hypostases but by this it does not prohibit expressions by abbreviations" (2)

The reason for this is that language should recreate the world, reality, as it is and to do that there is no need to stipulate the existence of things which do not exist in the world.

What about such things as "value"? Does it not exist? Kotarbiński’s answer to this question is that the meaning of a piece of paper called one pound reveals itself in the amount of goods I can get in exchange for it. This does not mean that I am buying some "value" or that things called "values" are brooding about the world, nor does it mean that the £1 note is composed of a physical thing and something called exchange value. The £1 note is a thing, composed of paper.

Similarly, words are not composed of some physical
body and meaning. Such a "bodymeaning" is nonsense. The word is a thing, either sound waves produced by the organs of speech or a piece of printing-ink, formed in a certain manner. Its meaning reveals itself in the reaction of people to it. Language is not an arbitrary system but a tool to recreate reality. The difference between conventionalism and realism is only a hair's breadth.

This reveals a feature of reism to which phenomenalism is vehemently opposed. The world of things is the optimal order to which we must adapt if we are to remain sane. The phenomenalists contend against this that the world is a chaos to which the word, logic, must bring some order. In their view, a language which adapts to reality would be a nonsensical disorder. The ideal world guarantees the coherence of language. Without it a structured consciousness would be impossible.

Kotarbiński's reism sees no need for this way out. Language is produced in the course of history as a social creation. Human communities are the work of history and not brought about by bringing down on earth the ordered ideas of the Platonic heaven.
Kotarbiński and Ingarden on ideal objects

The demonstration that there is no need for general ideas either in ontology or semantics occupies an important place in Kotarbiński's theory. He devoted to this problem a special investigation called Sprawa istnienia przedmiotów idealnych (The problem of the existence of ideal objects) (1926). (4)

If ideal objects exist only in thought then such a sequence is possible:

For every P, if P exists, then some object is P.

If there is an ideal object I. If it exists then some object is I. But if it is ideal then it cannot exist, i.e. it cannot be an object. There is, then, some object I and at the same time no object is I.

This paradox comes about only if ideal objects are supposed to exist in the same manner as things. But the opponents of that view point out that there are various modes of existence. Even what exists only in thought can have its own kind of existence. This existence is not real but it is existence. Only this existence is timeless and spaceless. Things enjoying this existence would then be changeless, they were never created and will never come to an end.

Mathematical objects are to be of this sort. But how can it be that space is composed of something which is not spatial such as lines, curves, vectors, segments and points and are nowhere? In any case, things characterized by these concepts have dimensions. This does not mean,
however, that things to which a theory applies must exist. $2 \cdot 2$ can be 4 even if no object was four or the square of two. But the symbol "4" could just as well mean the four walls of this room.

Are classes ideal objects? Not all of them, in any case. A set of things in time and space is itself in time and space. A wood is a set of its trees. Outside time and space there can only be sets of atemporal and non-spatial objects, i.e. ideal objects. When it is demanded of a definition that it indicates genus proximum and differentiam specificam it does not refer to sets but to the objects which are included in the extension of the concepts.

Concepts are only forms created by the mind to apprehend objects. But if they are created by the mind they are not ideal and atemporal and non-spatial.

Kotarbiński then proceeds to show that if a universal or a general object denoting all the objects $P$ is the object $O_p$ which has only the properties common to all the objects $P$ then such an object cannot be.

Proof I. Let $c$ be the specific property of $\phi$me of the objects $P$, such that just this object $P$ has it but none of the other objects $P$. Such a property must exist for every $P$ or else two or more $P$ were identical. Taking into account the principle of the excluded middle the object $O_p$ must have either the property $c$ or the property of the absence of this property, its negation. Whether it has the property $c$ or its negation, in both cases it has
a property not common to all P which contradicts the definition of the object Op.

Proof II. The object Op is general. As it has only properties common to the objects P then this property of generality in relation to the objects P is common to them. They are then all general in relation to the objects P and therefore identical among themselves and with the object Op. But how could this object be if it is defined as having only the property of time and space?

From this Kotarbiński comes to the conclusion that general objects do not exist as they are inevitably contradictory. Neither does there exist the class of ideal objects. This applies also to properties if they are to be atemporal and non-spatial ideal objects.

If the property of whiteness belongs to snow and the snow melts this property melts with it. The properties change with the things they belong to. There is no mystical relation between a subject of attributes and the subject itself called "inherence". In any case it is different from the relation of the nail in the wall to the wall because the property can be inherent in the opposite wall, for instance the property of being wooden. When we say that "snow has the property of whiteness" or that "the property of whiteness belongs to snow" we say nothing more or less or anything else than that snow is white. There are no properties if by properties are meant some entities called ideal objects.
12.

Ingarden's critique

1. Objects existing only in thought

If ideal objects exist only in thought they do not exist. There are no contradictory objects. An object can exist only in thought if it is experienced by intuitive imagination or through corresponding acts of meaning. But such objects are not ideal objects. Only some objects existing in thought are ideal objects. Their being in thought does not follow from their essence.

(5) 2.

2. Fictions

Fictive persons in novels are not ideal objects.

3. Objects of mathematics

Kotarbiński puts the onus probandi on the shoulders of the supporters of the existence of ideal objects. But how is it possible to prove the existence of something? It is however safe to say that if the symbol "4" of, for instance, the four walls of this room" then it will be possible to produce statements about "4" which a mathematician would never express about the objects of his knowledge. If the set of all true statements about the four walls of this room and the set of all true statements about "4" were referred to one and the same thing then this thing would be contradictory. Such an interpretation of the objects of mathematics would be useless.
4. Classes, sets

A set may be dependent in its existence upon the type of existence and the existence of its elements. But this does not prove that sets (classes) do not exist as ideal objects. To do this it has to be shown that individual ideal objects do not exist and this Kotarbiński did not do. Concerning the question whether the set of spatio-temporal things is itself spatio-temporal it can be said that if the real objects \( a_1, a_2 \ldots a_n \) do not exist then their set does not exist. But it has to be doubted that if there exist real objects then there exists also their set as a real object. Taking into account the arbitrariness of selection of properties by which classes are created a considerable part of classes are fictions created by mind. But a fictive class does not entail that its elements are fictive. This does not exclude the existence of real and ideal individual objects.

If a set of material objects is itself material then it could change according to temperature, pressure, affects of electromagnetic processes, etc. If it is spatial then the set would have its own shape. There would be triangular and square sets. A wood is more than a set of trees. A set of looooo trees planted along the road from Paris to Warsaw would not be a wood. But this, in itself, does not show the existence of ideal objects.
5. General objects

In his critique of Kotarbiński’s views on general objects Ingarden attempts to show that there are such objects, that there are ideas and that there are ideal qualities.

Ingarden tries to show that general objects can have their specific qualities and at the same time comprise individuals. He complains that Kotarbiński never showed clearly what an individual is. The object P which falls under Op and is allsidedly determined and has its own specific properties is not necessarily an individual. Ingarden interprets Kotarbiński as saying that the object Op has only common properties to all the objects P and that means that Op has no properties except those which are common to the objects P. Op has, therefore, no specific properties as they would not be common to the objects P. From this the conclusion must be drawn that anything which has specific properties cannot be a general object.

The difference between the objects P and Op is a disjunction between having and not having specific properties.

But general objects such as Op cannot have generality as a property, says Ingarden. Kotarbiński’s proof II is possible only if it is assumed that the generality of Op is a property of the same kind as the other properties this object may have. Two meanings have to be distinguished in the word "property". We can say that equilaterality is a
is a property of squares and we can say that the generality of this object in relation to individual squares is one of its properties. But the two meanings have to be kept apart. Ingarden proposes not to use the word "property" in the latter sense. Generality is just not a property and by correcting that category mistake Kotarbiński's proofs are made impossible. It is, in addition, Ingarden says, not true that the object Op has the common properties of the objects P and that it has only such properties.

Ingarden does not avail himself of the argument that it is difficult to decide upon the resemblance of properties. He takes into use a part of his formal theory of objects which says that there are objects of different degrees of abstractness and that there are abstract concepts corresponding to these different levels of abstract things, or, as he calls them, general and particular ideas.

The expression "common properties" is absurd, he says. An individual or non-individual object can have no property in common with another object, real or ideal. There cannot be such two objects \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) of which \( P_1 \) had a property \( C \) identical with a property of \( P_2 \). But it is possible to say that \( P_1 \) is a part of the whole \( P_2 \) if at least one absolute property \( \forall x \) of the "object" \( P_1 \) is identically the same as the absolute property \( c(P)_2 \) of the whole \( P_2 \) and if \( P_2 \) has such absolute material properties which are not the properties of \( P_1 \). Let the word "property" mean absolute and relative
formal and material properties and also relative quasi-properties. Then the part cannot have all properties identical with the whole. But this difference in relation to holds \textit{exactly} absolute formal properties and relative material and formal properties and relative quasi-properties. Let there be two objects of which one is not a part of the other and each has the property $c_n$. $P_1$ has $c_1$, $P_2$ has $c_2$ and $c_1$ and $c_2$ are individuals corresponding to one and the same constant of the idea $I$. Then we say that $c_1(P_1)$ is the same as $c_2(P_2)$.

If the direct morph $M$ of the contents of a certain idea $I$ is such that each of the elements of a certain set of individual objects $Z$ has the same dependent moment of its nature corresponding to $M$ and if to each of the remaining constants of the contents of $I$ there corresponds in \textit{exactly} every element of the set $Z$ a certain property and an identical one and if all the properties of genus or the specific properties of each of the elements which fall under the extension of the definition of the variables of the contents of $I$ then the idea $I$ is a general idea in relation to the elements of the set $Z$, or, in other words, it is the genus of these elements.

What all this boils down to is Ingarden's conviction that reality is more than meets the eye and in order to carry out an adequate description of that reality by means of language there must be at hand categories capable of
reflecting different entities belonging to what reality. He is vehemently opposed to every kind of reductionism whether it is of Kotarbiński's type which reduces all categories to that of things or of the Husserlian type which reduces all types of things to the one of an intentional object. In Ingarden’s view we need as many categories as there are types of reality and from this insight springs his complicated and confused ontology. Whereas Kotarbiński is inclined to take into use Occam’s Razor Ingarden’s slogan would rather be: "Entia semper sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem".

There are many things in the world beside the real. There are the ideal, intentional, temporal, atemporal, eternal, and so on and each type of objects needs its own formal theory. Without a formal theory of their structure we shall be unable to speak about them meaningfully. This is the core of the critique Ingarden addresses to Kotarbiński’s concretism. There are ideas, he says, and ideas have their own specific qualities different from the qualities of individual objects. And in the contents of ideas there are not only constants (corresponding to the "common properties") but also variables. If this is accepted then Kotarbiński’s proof I becomes impossible.

It is also, says Ingarden, completely impermissible not to distinguish between a concrete property of an object and an ideal quality or the constant of the content of the idea. This leads Kotarbiński, says Ingarden, to
to the denial of ideal qualities and even the concrete properties of real objects.

This last point of criticism is untrue. What Kotarbiński says is that if we have word such as "whiteness" then there is no entity in the world corresponding to this word. What is meant when we say that whiteness belongs to snow is that snow is white. It is snow which is white and not "whiteness" which somehow as an entity unites itself with snow or makes snow as an individual example of this entity. But, says Ingarden, if there are no properties then every attributive judgment is devoid of any understandable sense. We need ideas, ideal qualities etc. as types or categories if we are to be able to speak meaningfully about the different kind of objects in the world. Kotarbiński endeavours to connect language and reality as closely as possible in order to make language an instrument which depicts the world truthfully. In the name of the same idea Ingarden posits the existence of various entities but thereby he makes matter only one of the component parts of form and the world is irretrievably lost. We speak, then, not about things but about various entities created by language. The question arises whether his complicated way of showing how to create the correct semantical categories and how to avoid category mistakes is better or more viable than the way Kotarbiński has chosen.
13.
Kotarbiński's theory of extraspection

It would seem obvious that if we have an evidence for something it cannot be judged as such unless it is expressed by some means. If it is raining now it is hard for me to find evidence for this matter of fact unless I put it into words and say: "It is raining now". However, there are such philosophers who think that some immanent or inner feeling is the high court of truth and falsity. In this case a true thought is not a mapping of reality it is the examination of immanent images, of phenomena given in internal experience. If we see a green leaf we are unaware of this fact until the voice of internal experience tells us: Yes, you have an immanent image of a green leaf.

This, says Kotarbiński, is nonsense. If a psychic content is to be valid as evidence it must take the form of a sensory description or of a part of the external world (6)

This description or mapping of reality can be interpreted so:

"I am looking at a fresh leaf of lilac, it is green, ovate, shining. And I so experience that to the question how I experience I answer: "I feel so: there is before me a thing which is green, ovate, shining". I cannot introspectively describe myself at the moment of observation otherwise than by describing the external object as such.
as it seemed to me at the moment of observation. And if I observed it carefully, I shall have described it as it was in fact". (7)

The general form for such a description can look like this: "X experiences as follows: A is B". This could yield: "John sees so: this is black". Or the general formula could look like this: "x experiences as follows: p", where p stands for an arbitrary sentence. Instead of the term "experiences" there could be such words as "sees", "wishes", "desires", "doubts", "wills" etc. Other examples of psychological statements would be: "John thinks so: \(2 \cdot 2 = 4\)", "John feels so: they are playing sadly", "John doubts so: do angels exist?", "John desires so: be happy", "John experiences so: Oh:")

In this kind of description it does not matter whether the matters of fact which are described are things of the external world or emotional states. The same formula can be used for descriptions of a repugnant face and a mountain shaped like a cap. But it has to be noted that extraspective descriptions are never direct descriptions of things. If somebody says that the planet Venus goes through phases like the moon, it is a direct description of something taking place in this planet. But if it is said that Galilei observed that the planet Venus goes through phases like the moon, then this is a description of a psychological fact, of Galilei's observation.

If two men, Peter and Paul, are climbing mountains
and Peter observes a mountain with steep contours and shaped like a cap and if Paul asks him to describe what he was thinking about Peter would say: I was thinking about a mountain with steep contours and formed like a cap. If Paul then insists and asks: Is it this that took place in your soul? Peter would reply: I cannot describe it otherwise. - This was the psychological state he was in when he observed the mountain.

It can be expressed otherwise by saying that there was such a process in his nerves which prompted Peter to give such a description of his psychic state.

It has to be noted also that the material and formal sides of bodies are fused into one. Matter is formed. You cannot point at this and say that this is form and that that is matter. The mountain is described as it is: a cap-formed mountain. We do not have a substance (mountain) and an attribute (cap-formed) and, linking the two together we have the cap-formed mountain. There is only one substance, the body, the thing. And man is not formed out of a material substance plus spirit. The spirited substance is the body living psychic life, the psychic body.

Attributes belong to the same world as things. If we see boiling water we see how water reacts to heat. It becomes warm, then hot and when it reaches 100° it boils. This thing can be described adequately by saying: "X sees so: boiling water!"
There is no need to posit the existence of the process of boiling as a special entity. A Platonist would probably do that. He would say that there is the substance of water and the process of boiling. By linking these two entities together we get the composite phenomenon: boiling water. The description of it would have to depend upon the immanent experience or intuition in the essence of the two ideas. The essence of water and the essence (or idea) of the boiling process combined together yield the essence of boiling water. Or maybe the idea of a process in this case is not necessarily linked to the particular concretisation of boiling. The process which comes into account here is the essence of the effect of heat. Iron, when heated, becomes glowing. Water boils. The effects of the general essence are different according to the nature of the substances it is combined with. In any case it is clear that such a Platonist would be inclined to relegate substantives to a different realm than adjectives, to make out of the latter a world apart and this is to be a precondition for a meaningful description for the formation of meaningful judgments. And, in Ingarden's case, this description is the work of the pure immanency describing pure immanent (or psychic) contents.
Ingarden’s critique of reism

Ingarden’s critique of Kotarbiński’s reism is based on the central thesis that a thing is composed of or constructed by its properties. If there are no properties then there are also no things. (8)

Ingarden quotes from *Gnosiology* the definition of existence:

$$\text{IIA (} \exists x (x \text{ est } A) \text{)}$$

which is read: for any $A$, there exists an $A$ is the same as: for some $x$, $x$ is $A$. And Ingarden quotes further: "The point is that we may choose a singular term $(x)$ such that we may truly predicate about its designatum that it is $A$. Thus the sentence "There exists an $A" informs that it may truly be predicated about something that it is $A". (1).

Ingarden casts doubt on the ontological commitment of this definition by trying to show that it moves in a vicious circle.

The existence of something is independent of the existence of names. It is possible to grasp an individual thing intuitively without having a name for it. When is it possible to choose a name? When such a name exists. Then the df. $\exists x A$ would be: For every $A$, $\exists A = \text{there exists an individual name "X" such that it is possible to predicate truly about its designatum that it is A.}$ If this is valid for the existence of all $A$ and for the
existence of the appropriate individual name then this definition would go in circle. A consequence of this definition would also be that the existence of an A was dependent upon its name and then it would be valid only for d®signata of names.

By combining Kotarbi®ski's definition of an object and sol A ("there exists at most one A") Ingarden gets this result:

A is an object if and only if it can be truly predicated about a certain thing that it is A and if it is valid for any two things X and Y that X is Y if X is A and Y is A. This, says Ingarden, is a trivium tautology. On this point he agrees with Ajdukiewicz. Reism's negative statements, such as no object is an event, no body is a property, are truisms. They mean only that no properties, events, processes or relations are bodies and nobody has ever doubted this.

It is not only true, says Ingarden, that no properties are things but it is also true that properties have their own mode of existence. If they do not then there are also according to no things. If the definition of ðexA; A is to be identical with a thing and if this definition is not to be a tautology then it must be defined through something different from A. But as nothing such exists according to Kotarbi®ski, then neither does A exist. The predicate "is A" in the expression "X is A" must mean the A-being of X. A is a constituted thing by the qualitative determination A'.
The sentence "X is A" presupposes that the A has the property A'. The A' makes the X an A. But if there are no properties then the X cannot be constituted as an A. There is no A. Again the conclusion: if there are no properties then there are no things.

What Ingarden proposes to do is to find the formal structure of objects and properties. Only on this foundation is it possible to determine the relation between various meaning contents and the objects meant by them. Kotarbiński does not even try to do this. His fundamental concept of res remains unanalysed.

Ingarden's work "Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes" shows clearly that his own philosophy was meant to be a better alternative to reism. He dislikes everything about reism and feels the need for a philosophy of a different kind. What he dislikes most is probably that the heist did not feel the slightest urge to seek absolute truth. The weapons he uses to refute reism are borrowed from the arsenal he had in common with the members of the Lwów-Warsaw school - Brentanist Aristotelianism. Ingarden seems confident that on this basis and with the help of Husserl he will be able to construct an (onto)-logical (or semantical) system which will be both consistent and absolutely true. But his critique of reism is somewhat unfair. In his eagerness to refute the heresy he does not even bother to look at the underlying reasons behind
Leśniewski's and Kotarbiński's ontological and semantical theory. Ingarden seems to think that it is enough to look into the essence of substances and predicates to produce a perfect theory of semantic categories. He speaks as if there was no foreseeable danger on the road, no antinomies or paradoxes which would rise up and fight stubbornly against their own defeat. Leśniewski succeeded in constructing a system free from Russell's paradox. And Kotarbiński created his reism on that basis. The central idea is that the same semantic category can be used both for the subject and the predicate. This is what Ingarden does not want to accept and postulates that the categories of the subject must be different from the categories of the predicate. But even in the Aufbau-essay Ingarden discovered difficulties which reism either had overcome or did not have to encounter.

Reism does not deny that there are properties. It only says that there are no ideal entities called properties. Things are coloured, heavy, rough and so on. It is therefore easy for Ingarden to bring in his own concept of the subject of properties and show that these two theories clash. But this does not refute reism as such. The most vulnerable point in reism is without doubt its difficulties to formulate its ontological commitment. Ajdukiewicz's critique was up to the point on this matter. It is maybe outside the scope of any semantical system to prove that there are things. In any case,
Ingarden met with no more success. He never could prove that his system of substances and ideal entities was about anything else than substances and ideal entities.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


CHAPTER V

EDITH STEIN

15.

Edith Stein's road to Thomism

The starting-point of Edith Stein's work in philosophy was her search for the methodological foundations of psychology. From these origins she developed her philosophy of man.

Edith Stein began her study of psychology in the University of Breslau (Wrocław) under Professor William Stern. Professor Stern was occupied with experimental psychology and was famous for his books *The Language of Children* and *Psychology of Early Childhood*. He also worked in the field of intelligence tests. This relatively new trend in psychology did not appeal to Edith Stein. In Göttingen (where she came in 1913) Stein became acquainted with the work of Professor Georg Elias Müller who applied the methods of natural science to psychology and gave lectures on the psychophysics of colour sensations. (2) In Müller's Psychological Institute he and his assistants carried out experiments in this field, in complete isolation one of another in order to achieve unbiased results which could then be compared after their completion.

This acquaintance with psychology led Edith Stein to
the conclusion that psychology was still a science in its childhood, that it lacked a foundation of clarified basic concepts and that it was itself unable to work out these basic concepts. She expected that she would find this foundation in phenomenology. (3)

Edith Stein belonged to Husserl’s Göttingen pupils who, as a group, interpreted phenomenology in the spirit of realism. They did not follow Husserl into transcendental idealism and saw in it a return to Kantism. This entailed a repudiation of what Edith Stein saw as Husserl’s greatest achievement, the turning towards objects (Wende zum Objekt) as seen in direct intuition, of philosophy as ontology, i.e. as an investigation of the essential structure of the objective world. (4)

In this attitude towards Husserl’s philosophical development the Göttingen circle was influenced by Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach.

Edith Stein took over from Husserl the method of research as he expounded it in the first edition of the Logical Investigations and was still prone to call by the name of descriptive psychology. But the central categories of the first period of Edith Stein’s work in philosophy were more pronouncedly Schelerian: Life-Drive (Lebenskraft), person, soul, spirit.

But this does not mean that Edith Stein confined herself to the development of Schelerian ideas. From the very start she was an independent thinker and never
published anything but the results of her own investigations.

In her first period she seems to have adhered to the phenomenological principle that nothing should be accepted in philosophy which was not elucidated by direct intuition into the subject-matter. But she seems to have differed from Scheler in her attitude and use of the reduction. In accordance with the views of the Göttingen circle she looked at noemata as ego-alien (ichfremd) and apprehended by immediate intuition. She never accepted Husserl's later view of the constitution. She seems also to have differed from Scheler concerning the place of the reduction in the science of man. For Scheler there was only a difference in degree between technical intelligence and animal adaptation to the environment. But there is an abyss between animal and man and this is because man has access to Spirit. The phenomenological reduction is put into an anthropological context bringing about man's transcendence towards nature and animality. "The principle which makes Man the kind of being he is does not represent a new stage of life ... it is a principle which stands in opposition to all life, even to the life in Man". (5) This idea of man as elevated above the living and dead nature by his participation in Spirit was overtaken by Ingarden and is at the very core of his spiritualism. His (Ingarden's) aim was to create a philosophy of pure spirit and he drops altogether the notion of life-drive. It is only in the final stage of his ontology that he
realizes that he has to take into account the possibility of a relation between soul and body.

Edith Stein seems never to have understood the reduction as radically as Scheler and this is valid for both the main periods of her creative activity. For her, Spirit was never wholly disconnected from soul and body (Leib) nor from the central category of person. For her, the epoché is exactly as it was characterized in the early phenomenological literature: a suspension of belief in any subject matter until this belief can make room for intuitive knowledge of it. She establishes a difference between the sensual and the spiritual spheres of life. The former is subjected to causality, the latter to motivation. Spirituality is the field of intentionality, of immanent data, of acts. This is the field of spiritual life, of meaningful discourse, of reason. (6)

What makes the clockwork of life tick, what generates energy for it is the force of life or the life-drive. But this life-drive is of two different kinds. On the one hand there is the life-drive of the sensual body (Leib, physis) and on the other hand there is the spiritual life-drive. Natural life is not the spiritual life. "But both are connected. The spiritual life-force seems to be conditioned by the sensual one". (7) But the spiritual life-force achieves things that the sensual one in unable to achieve. The spiritual forces draw upon two sources for upholding their strength and functions: what
streams in from outer objects and from the internal life of psychic individuals. Body, soul and spirit are united in the person and the soul characterizes its individuality. (8) From this structure of the person, which has been outlined here, E. Stein goes on to characterize the community (Gemeinschaft) as a superstructure of the life-drive of individuals and this leads to her work on the ontological structure of the State. (9)

Edith Stein seeks the sources for the foundations of psychology and the humanities in the early works of Husserl and Scheler. But Husserl was a mathematician and human problems did not interest him very much. In his Logas article, Philosophy as rigorous science, he criticizes his mentor and supporter, Wilhelm Dilthey, for his historicism. Husserl's scientific philosophy was to be exact to such an extent that it could nearly be carried out more geometrico. But in the course of Husserl's development a change was brought about such that Ingarden, in his discussion of Husserl's last work, the Crisis, detects "a certain similarity" with Dilthey's "historico-philosophical world-view". And Ingarden adds: "After a philosophical evening with Husserl in October 1927, Oskar Becker said to Heidegger in my presence: "Actually, we are Dilthey-people". (lo) If this is so then it is first and foremost the work of Edith Stein to have brought together so ostensibly different philosophical trends as are Husserl's phenomenology and Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie.
In Dilthey’s philosophy the natural sciences and the humanities were kept wide apart. The natural sciences used the method of explanation (Erklären) but the humanities relied on understanding (Verstehen). "We explain nature but understand the life of the soul", he wrote. (11) The concept of verstehen can be understood as insight or empathy. He had no sympathy with experimental psychology (erklärende Psychologie) and thought that it applied with no justification the methods of natural science to psychology. (12) His own psychology was based on the key concept of life (Leben) and the results of what we become aware of in inner experience. Psychology describes the evidence of this inner life. He called this discipline either descriptive psychology or understanding psychology (verstehende Psychologie). On this background arouse his famous dictum: "Here is life itself. It is constantly its own demonstration". (13) The task of this descriptive psychology is to describe the connexions of the experiences of the soul, of its structural relations. The connective between experiences is the meaning-giving activity of the soul, extracted from life itself. This gives rise to the dynamic unity of the understanding (Verstehen). The totality of these instances is Spirit (Geist). The science of the spirit received the name of Geisteswissenschaften. These sciences had the task of constituting the totality of the Spirit, not only in intellectual experiences but also in
emotional and volitional ones. He stresses the last named elements when he says: "The whole meaning of the words self and other, ego and world, the distinction between self and external world is in the experience of our will and the emotions connected with it". (14)

There were thus many affinities between Dilthey's and Edith Stein's disposition towards psychology. Both shared an attitude of distrust towards experimental psychology and E. Stein found it unable to contribute anything valuable to her central problem, that of the human person. Husserl had written relatively little on these problems. (15) Her attempt to find a phenomenological grounding for the humanities in her doctoral dissertation was therefore highly original and a result of her independent ingenuity of mind. It was entitled On the Problem of Empathy (1916). A part of it has been published in an English translation. (16)

In the centre of this dissertation is the concept of person which is always conceived by Edith Stein as a psycho-physical individual. The attention is directed to the structure of the person and the nature of empathy (Einfühlung) as a condition for knowledge of the Other, for the constitution of the community.

E. Stein takes over from Husserl the fundamental principle of originary intuition into ideal essences. She adheres to this principle even in her later creative period and never discusses it at any length. But this
intuition itself is not empathy. To reach that a comprehensive analysis of the person is needed.

There are in the person several elements: the pure ego, consciousness, body (Leib), soul, spirit.

Among the constituents of consciousness we find sensations. The sensations of pressure or pain or cold are just as absolutely given as the experience of judging, willing, perceiving etc. They cannot be suspended or doubted any more than the cogito can. But sensation does not issue from the pure I (as acts of judging etc.) and it never takes on the form of cogito. Sensation is always spatially localized at a distance from the I and this entails that the I is never found in it by reflection. Sensations become the bridge between pure I and the living body. They are amalgamated into the unity of the body (Leib). This notion of body has to be distinguished from Körper. The difference is not exactly that between the living and the dead body. The Körper is only an object of external observation but the Leib is the center for my own life and experience which enables me to live, to feel, to think as a person and individual.

This life is a constant stream of experiences and the identical "conveyor" of them is the soul. It is a substantial unity and the content of the stream of experiences depends upon the structure of the soul. This soul is necessarily a soul in a body (leibbedingt). Body and soul influence each other mutually. The sensations
of the soul take place in the body. The cumulative process of these experiences in time is a constituent factor of the structuring of the person. Past experience reaches into the present, into each "now" but the past experience has not fallen into forgottenness, only out of the mode of actuality into non-actuality, out of activity into passivity. They form the background of the experiences of the ego and to be grasped they must pass through the form of the cogito. (17)

The ego is not imprisoned within the boundaries of its own individuality. The foreign living body is a conveyer of fields of sensations and center of orientation of the spatial world. The world is not only the world as it appears to me. If this were so the independent existence of the world were indemonstrable. It is the Other who corroborates and verifies my standpoint and makes the world objective and shows that it is. (18)

Edith Stein introduces empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience, as a condition of a possible knowledge of the existing outer world. But there is more to it than that. Empathy is a sort of acts of experience sui generis and it is linked with rememberance of the past and expectation of the future. It is linked up with an ability to "see" more than one actually sees. A certain person is given to me in external perception. But this person's mood and psychic state are as if co-given as the other side of the medal. The mood is not given immediately as the
person's body. But the person's mood is given itself, it is present in empathy as a certain kind of experience.

My own person is constituted in the primordial mental acts and the foreign person in emphatically experienced acts. But to reach a fulness of the description of the person one dimension has to be added: that of Spirit (Geist). The spirit is different from the soul and the person is undoubtedly the center of spirit. But Edith Stein does not make quite clear the difference between these concepts.

The concept of Spirit is of crucial significance for Edith Stein's attempt at grounding of the humanities because if not for the Spirit these sciences would be left merely with psychological explanations. Supra-personal and eternal Spirit is imperative for the type of self-consciousness in which the humanities are to be anchored according to Stein's ideal of rational lawfulness of mental life. (And in this connexion Stein mentions Dilthey again). (19)

It has to be stressed, in connexion with E. Stein's doctoral dissertation that she was the first phenomenologist to take up the problem of empathy. Husserl did not tackle the problem until much later, in his Cartesian Meditations, when he, as an idealist, had painted himself into a solipsist corner. Husserl thus approaches the problem from a different angle. Edith Stein was never committed to transcendental idealism and her use made of the reduction
was much more in the spirit of Max Scheler (although not identical with it). Husserl's idealism was not, in her view, inducive to a solution of the central problems of her philosophical enterprise. In a letter to Ingarden (1917) she declares that she thinks she has come to a certain understanding of what is meant by constitution - but idealism she could not accept. (.. aber unter Bruch mit dem Idealismus). She finds it imperative to accept the existence of an absolutely existing Nature, on the one hand, and a subjectivity with a determined structure on the other. (20)

And Ingarden, in his essay on Edith Stein, asserts that she already at this time foresaw the future course of the whole Husserlian problematic. (21)

Stein's rejection of idealism entails her rejection of the transcendental reduction. Man himself is both the investigator and what is investigated. Edith Stein fore¬shadows therefore the problematic of the phenomenologists who saw that the reduction was irreversible and constructed an epoché-less philosophy of human Dasein (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty).

What led Edith Stein beyond the boundaries of pheno¬menology as outlined by Husserl in his Logical Investigations was the problem of Spirit. Husserl postulated in his work the existence of ideas, timeless and eternal, but gave an unsatisfactory account of their mode of existence and role in human discourse. We have, on the one hand, the
final, the changeable, the mortal being, and on the other hand we have the eternal and immutable. As Edith Stein was not hampered by the fetters of Cartesian cogito she had no difficulties in accepting the realm of ideas as the eternal Spirit, the Divine, as God Creator of Heaven and Earth. This Spirit could easily be established by her as the ultimate source of everything constituted, created. (Ingarden was barred from this solution by his Cartesianism). Edith Stein began to put the objective essences, so familiar to the Göttingen circle, in a scholastic context, and this led her ultimately to the lived experience of the lived, the revealed truth. Constitution of things by reference to a subject, however purified, became an aberration of egocentrism. She returned, not to Brentano, but to St. Thomas Aquinas and adopted Catholicism. This was her way to find access to the things themselves.

In her contribution to the Husserl Festschrift (1929) she points out that phenomenology has led to a situation where everything is made relative to the subject. "The world which is constructed in the acts of the subject always remains a world for the subject". By making the sphere of immanence the starting point it becomes impossible to regain the objectivity which was the initial aim, and this objectivity included truth and reality free from all subjective relativity. In this criticism Stein is in accord with Ingarden but the
solution she offers is somewhat different; St. Thomas endeavours not to constitute a possible world but to reach as perfect as possible picture of our world. His aim was not a pure theory but an understanding of the world (Weltverständnis). (22)

The aim of St. Thomas, says E. Stein, was to reach the essence of things but this truth of essences is unattainable unless it is acknowledged that God Himself is the first and fundamental Truth. (23)

Edith Stein's main work from her Catholic period is a book called Endliches und Ewiges Sein (Finite and Eternal Being). The problematic of this book is much the same; the human person, soul, body and Spirit. The difference in her handling of the problems stems from her Catholic faith. She looks at them from a theological point of view but remains to a certain extent a phenomenologist in the sense that she is not merely expounding the official Thomist doctrine but examines the subject-matter from the point of view of a devout Catholic. It is described very much in a phenomenological manner, whether it is the temporal and mortal side of human life or the person, the Spirit, angels or God.

Edith Stein found that the Cartesian platform and the domain of subjectivity did not meet the demands which she made for the firm grounding of psychology and the humanities. She may have been right in thinking so. But her conversion to Catholicism as a final solution must be
more controversial. Ingarden reproaches her for abandoning the fundamental principle of phenomenological research that nothing can be accepted in philosophy unless the problem in question is pushed to absolute obviousness by an analysis of it. (24) This may be true about her apologetic work about another Jewish convert to Catholicism, St. John of the Cross. But it would also be true to say that she was led to Thomism by the force of the phenomenological logic and that she never wrote anything which she was not led to by a scrupulous and honest analysis of the problems to the solution of which she devoted her life. She found the final wisdom in the grace of God which descends to the soul of man. This was her message to her fellow men in turbulent times. Other people in other places living in other turbulent times may prefer a different message. But Edith Stein deserves attention for her ardent search for truth and for her pure sincerity.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


7. Ibid., p. 73.

8. Ibid., pp. 211-212.


12. Ibid., p. 195.

13. Ibid., p. 131.

17. E. Stein, op. cit., p. 68 (83)
18. Ibid., pp. 59 (72), 61 (74).
19. Ibid., pp. 86 (105-106), 102 (126).
22. This endeavour to reach an understanding of the world is echoed in Ingarden's foreword to "Spór o istnienie świata" (Controversy about the existence of the world), vol. I, p. 7.
CHAPTER V I

INGARDEN'S ONTOLOGY

16. Outlines of Ingarden's ontological system

Ingarden's ontology is based on three fundamental ideas:

1. Nature is the deadly enemy of man.
2. The world of man is spirit.
3. There is a method by which it is possible to reach absolute truth, absolute certainty about the stable world of spirit, the world of ideas.

There is an unbridgeable gap, an abyss, between nature and the world of spirit. This is the central idea of Ingarden's philosophy. It is man's tragic fate that he is forced to retain some links with nature that he cannot be freed from the deadly forces of matter. Philosophy is the embodiment of spirit. It liberates man from mortifying matter without ever being able to succeed completely. Without philosophy man would be an animal, a mere part of nature and thus incapable of leading a civilized life, of creating culture. The natural sciences can never become a science in the proper sense of the word because they are mixed up with the arch-enemy of man, nature. Only philosophy is capable of raising man above the animal level and introduce the values of eternal ideas into his life.
Ingarden describes these fundamental insights in a series of essays written both before and after the war and collected in the book *Książeczka o człowieku* (A Book on Man) (1972). (1)

"Man stands at the edge of two areas of existence": Nature and spirit. It does not matter how we understand Nature. Nature existed before man, it changes independently of man’s activity and existence. Everything in Nature is alien to man. He is incapable of feeling any close bounds with Nature. Whenever he discovers some primitive traits of nature in himself (animality) he feels utterly humiliated, alien towards himself and becomes incomprehensible to himself. Man cannot recognize himself in his own animal nature. Man becomes profoundly unhappy when he feels himself "reduced to the level of an animal". The more so when he feels "that despite his powers and his effort he cannot transcend the boundaries staked out by Nature".

If man is to become man he must "overcome Nature", "triumph over Nature", kill Nature. This leads man to the domain proper to him which is a higher reality than the world of Nature alone. Happily, man has in himself a creative ability which expresses itself in three basic forms: "doing Good", "the shaping of Beauty" and what could be expected to be called the True but Ingarden calls "the recognition of what is real". These ideal and eternal values are accessible to man and that is why he
finds strength in himself to wage his lonely battle against his enemies: Nature and animality which lead him to death. Man "creates works which differ completely and essentially from everything that is created in the world of Nature". These are the works of his spirit. These works look as if they were something real in the world. But, alas, these works are submitted to the destructive forces of time. Man has himself to keep them in being, or else "they sink back into oblivion as soon as man loses his will to transcend his simple innate nature". The products of culture are given a fresh layer of sense by man but they lack the real autonomy of natural objects. "The products of culture created by man are nothing more than a kind of shadow of reality, for they are purely intentional creations". All works of culture must conform to this unhappy state of affairs. But because spiritual values are available to man he is capable of acting with responsibility. Thus he creates works of art, literature and music, science philosophy and religion, the state and a code of law. But this law "is absolutely distinct from the laws that govern Nature". Man's spirit gives him purpose and goal. Human life becomes responsible. Man becomes a person who "plays a role in the human world". "Living in this manner man may be happy and good" because he comes in touch with something which is larger and better than himself, something which transcends the noblest ideas of man and "all perfection
of finite existence as a whole" and "this something is God". Man's life and existence is his duty to God. In his dedication to God man finds the strength to endure in a hostile world of Nature, of things. Nature in man, his animality, constantly drags him down in the opposite direction, to Satan. Man falls in between these two realms but is not "at home" in either of them. It is the nature of man to be engaged in a constant battle to cross the boundaries of his animality to be able to play the role of a creator of values. God gives hope. Nature arouses brutality, anguish and desperation.

In these essays Ingarden says very little about God and his relation to man. But it seems clear that in his opinion man is born into a world which is all evil and from which man can never liberate himself. Death has no place in life. It is purely negative. Man is both a divine and a devilish creature. That is to say: man is born in original sin. Does that mean that man lives at the mercy of God? That Hell is a place of punishment for his evil deeds? Ingarden does not address himself to these questions. But it is clear that he has a gnostic view on the antagonism between heaven and earth, the spiritual and the material worlds. Did God create the world out of nothing? Is matter eternal or temporal? Such questions do not belong to Ingarden's initial intuitions. But it is
clear that he believes in changeless ideas and values over and above the evil bodily things, that there is a sharp difference between the natural and the supernatural, that ideas are eternal and man's participation in them makes it possible for him to reach the level of humanity, - and all this reminds of St. Augustine and neoplatonism. Whether things acquire their being by participation in ideas, whether the platonic theory of anamnesis can be accepted are questions Ingarden addresses himself to later but does not answer definitely.

One conclusion to be drawn from Ingarden's initial position is that philosophy has no history. The spirit does not change and therefore all philosophers, ancient or modern, are speaking about the same things. Philosophy "is an ideal, extratemporal product" and "can have no kind of history". (2) Nature can have history because it is not a closed system and contains chaotic elements. But this history is not a genuine history. It is a chronicle of contingent facts and events in a realm inimical to man. There is no natural history of man, no "natural reason". There is no interaction between spirit and man. If man turns away from **him** the eternal spiritual values God makes accessible to him then he succumbs to the animal element and is no longer a man. "Progress" is a concept completely excluded from Ingarden's philosophy. The achievements in the struggle for the suppression of animality in man may be recorded. This would be the story of the transition
from animality to civilization, but this story is, apparently, outside philosophy. "Material progress" may be a necessary development for man as a prisoner of nature, but completely unworthy of consideration for a philosopher.

According to these premises Ingarden's system of philosophy is formed. Ontology and logic are the mapping of the realm of spirit. They show what and how spirit is. Aesthetics and the theory of art and literature show the eternal values of the beautiful, ethics shows the what and how of the ideas of human conduct. (Ingarden wrote and lectured on ethics but these writings remain unpublished). In these works spirit manifests itself. Ingarden concentrated exclusively on the higher values of culture and civilization. He never wrote anything on history or any history of philosophy. Neither did he pay any attention to the philosophy of history.

Ingarden defines his spiritualist model of philosophy as "a certain ideal system of well-founded questions and of exact and logically demonstrated affirmations relative to the objects of a certain domain". (3)

Although Ingarden bases his system on certain ideas of the Roman-Catholic faith he cannot be called a Catholic philosopher in the same sense as e.g. Jacques Maritain. Ingarden is not an apologist of any readymade doctrine. But Ingarden had a Messianistic vision before his eyes: To show once and for all what and how the world of spirit
is. That is why he defines philosophy as an "ideal system". But he wants to do this in a "scientific" way, with logically impeccable methods. It does not do, therefore, to explicate already established truths. That is why theology proper remains outside the scope of the system.

The definite description of the world of spirit was possible only by beginning without any presuppositions. And that is why the phenomenological method came to him as godsend. He found in it not only the key to the gates of the spirit but the only correct way and method to prove with absolute certainty and logical consequence that the spirit must be as he describes it. The evidence for some religious truths (Augustinian or Thomist) comes as a by-product in the course of the erection of the system.

It can be concluded from the essay *Czlowiek i czas* (Man and time), published in the above-mentioned book *Book on Man* that no religious considerations prompted Ingarden to adopt a realist attitude but the horror of facticity, the horror of contingency and, above all, the incurable horror of temporal existence.

The problem of time runs through the whole of Ingarden's work in philosophy. Behind it is a deep yearning and longing for finding somewhere in being something stable, something changeless, some cure for the nauseating disease of life in the bonds of temporal matter.
"Can we be something which exists permanently ..?"
he asks. This is difficult because man realizes the
destructive force of time for his existence. Every real
being is fragile. Everything real, which is, can at any
instant cease to exist. And that is because the existence
of what is real does not emanate from its essence and is
not necessary. The existence of a real being is some gift
of grace. We are not masters of time. Time dominates over
us. It is the essence of time that it limits everything
temporal to the instant and does not allow anything which
is in the present to persist because every new instant
shoves it from being into non-being.

This Augustinian thought is somewhat modified in a
Ingarden says there that the past and the future have
essentially different modes of existence from what
exists in a "now" but it is impossible to say that the one
and the other, do not exist. (4) Something which is now
in actu esse must, when it has passed into the past,
exist and then in actu fuisset.

However that is, man lives in constant anguish of the
emptiness behind him and before him. When he has to take
a decision on his own he feels a vacuum all around, he
feels as a child, awkward and stupid. (5) Man feels that
he moves on the border of two non-beings and then he creates
the illusion that the world exists, persists. But behind
this is the yearning for a permanent being.
Everything man does is transient and temporary. There is no refuge from the destructiveness of time.

What is time? Time is not a constant movement on the border of two non-beings. In the concrete experience of time there is no precise "now". Time is constituted by the free acts of the human person who preserves his identity and constitutes his identical person in every "now". Time is not a continuum of points but of acts carried out not by a transcendental ego but by a personal ego who thus finds his permanence. Time is something dependent and derivative of the mode of behaviour of the human person. It is this person who defends himself against time and cannot at the same time defend himself against it. The constitution of time moves into the vicinity of moral decisions. If man wastes his time on valueless matters, if he runs after illusions, if he is a coward and idler who does not exert himself, who does not take risks and is ready to suffer and experience anguish – such a man betrays himself and he disintegrates in time.

The person's participation in spiritual values, in ideas and ideals is the foundation of permanence in human life.

Different kinds of temporalities have therefore to be accepted. Not only has the world its time but psychic subjects have different modes of duration. And these different modes are the expression of different degrees of participation in the spirit by the different persons. The person, as a system of various functions, is a force
which constitutes itself in its acts, which is thrown into an alien world, which persists in joys and sorrows, which is endowed with creativity and creates works which are good, beautiful and true. Only by so doing can it endure and be free.

These are Ingarden's original intuitions. Phenomenology was for him the way and the method to create a new philosophy of spirit, of ideas and ideal values. On the basis of this philosophy the phenomena of the world could be defined. Ingarden's aim was to create a true system of metaphysics which would bring the final solutions to all metaphysical - or even philosophical - problems.

The system was based on a hierarchy of values. On the top there were ideas (not belonging to the real world). Then there are ideal qualities and on the bottom there are individualizations or concretisations of the general objects, the ideas. A similar hierarchy is in the more particularized ideas. If we take values then at the top there are the general ideas of values. Then there come ideal value-qualities (Wertwesenheiten) and at the downward end there are concretisations of values which are anchored in real things. Material things are, of course, valueless in themselves. Their worth is determined by the values which are incorporated or incarnated in them. It is this incarnation of values and ideas which is
the fundamentum in re which is to make metaphysics possible.

In this philosophy there are no things, only systems. For example, man (or man creating himself as a person) is a system relatively isolated, a hierarchy of many subsystems. The components of these systems are, of course, no lumps or chunks of matter (which is probably inert, if it exists) but forces, functions and processes. This system metaphysics links man with God and makes him capable of acting independently of the external world. This makes a definition (or at least description) of both freedom and responsibility.

The difficulty about this philosophy is that it is inevitably very hard to find out how to apply the principium individuationis to the general ideas so that the result will be a concrete system in the world. This proved to be very difficult for Ingarden himself and it is doubtful whether anybody else can do any better than he could. The only metaphysics Ingarden succeeded in putting together was based on an argument showing that Ludwig von Bertalanffy's general system theory conformed with his (Ingarden's) theory of ideas. This may well be so. But there are many other things in the world than those composed of cells. It remains to be shown that the world of science is a concretisation of Ingarden's general theory of ideas. But even if this could be done it would remain to be shown that this metaphysics applied to
things in the world. And this cannot be done inside Ingarden's system as his "transcendental" or immanent method forbids all talk about such things.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI


3. Ibid. p. 111.
"Książeczka o człowieku", p. 179.
CHAPTER VII
METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF
INGARDEN’S PHILOSOPHY

17. The method

Ingarden’s aim was to find an absolute philosophy, absolutely true and absolutely free of errors. Such a philosophy was inevitably opposed to many trends prevailing in Europe. The main enemy of the absolute philosophy was materialism but also many other trends such as positivism, scientism, relativism, naturalism, empiricism, scepticism, pragmatism and existentialism.

There was, however, one trend in European philosophy which had some tangent points with the kind of philosophy Ingarden proposed. That was Bergsonism, and especially Bergson’s ideas on time (duration) and intuition. If it was to be possible to find and sew the suitable clothes for his absolute philosophy of spirit Ingarden had to find the appropriate method. He took the first step in this direction by examining Bergson’s theories of the intellect and intuition. Ingarden never devoted a special study to Bergson’s theory of time but he was undoubtedly deeply influenced by it. Ingarden played his role in introducing Bergson’s duration theory to Husserl. (1)

What Ingarden wanted to do in his thesis on Bergson by contrasting his own ideas with those of Bergson was to establish the necessity and possibility of an absolute theory of knowledge.
Ingarden purports to show that Bergson's theory of knowledge is a sceptical and relativist one. He fights against the anti-rationalist streak in Bergson and plants himself firmly on the side of reason. In all this, Ingarden follows faithfully refutation of scepticism and relativism in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*.(2)

There is in Bergson a feeling of disillusionment with the development of science and technology in the 19th century, a reaction to the optimism and belief in progress prevalent at that time. Bergson's sermon was imbued with spiritualism, but of the kind which seeks to humanize nature and identify consciousness and world. These two can be experienced by direct intuition and in their constant flow of change and duration.

Ingarden's frame of mind is somewhat different. He is a spiritualist who has no reverence for nature and looks at it merely as an alien and evil force. Spirit transcends nature completely and man, although partly rooted in nature, must turn his back on it if he is to keep his humanity. Ingarden's intuition is purely logical, formal and intellectual. Ingarden wanted a scientific philosophy but that had nothing to do with science which was about things of a limited value. A scientific philosophy, in Ingarden's view was the absolutely true science of the spirit which, unlike the natural sciences, provided itself its absolutely certain starting point.
The argument is based on the central idea that Bergson affirms the necessity for certainty (or absolute knowledge) but that his philosophy makes the achievement of such knowledge impossible. Bergson's philosophy is thus a philosophy which makes all philosophy impossible. This procedure is based on adherence to the principle that a true theory cannot contain contradictory statements and that contradictory objects cannot exist.

"I agree completely with Bergson that dialectic is incapable of reaching real positive knowledge" (3) says Ingarden in his book on Bergson. Ingarden was always to remain a staunch anti-Hegelian and behind this attitude is without doubt Hegel's identification of being and spirit. This amounts to putting the right hand in the jaws of the devil while attempting to keep a hold on God by the left one. Such acrobatics were doomed to failure. Nothing can bridge the hiatus, the gap of transcendence between spirit and matter.

But this applies also to Bergson in so far as he spiritualizes the world and tries to identify consciousness and the act of cognition with reality. This reality is, according to Bergson, in a constant flux and cannot be known except by a non-discursive and disinterested intuition. This intuition is a private matter of each person, it is his union with nature in its psychical duration and is, really, not communicable.

Practical reason is, on the other hand, and according to
Bergson always tied up with utilitarian needs and grasps the constantly moving reality in static cross-sections. Man classifies and describes objects by means of language according to what suits him in practical life. Intuition knows the concrete, the world, but concepts and classes differentiate sides of this indivisible world artificially and abstractly. The categories of intellect are relative to human action. Bergson thinks that the categories are only certain schemes of action and that it is an illusion that they reflect the real structure of objects.

There are several points in Bergson's ontology and theory of two kinds of knowledge which Ingarden agrees to and others which he criticizes.

Ingarden criticizes Bergson's identification of intuitive knowledge with its object. Intuition is to be a part of matter in Bergson's theory. (4) But pure intuition does not allow such additions. Intuition gives us only information on immediately given data, says Ingarden. Matter lies outside the boundaries of the immediately given. Intuition gives us direct access to the objects and a knowledge of them. This is the corner-stone of all knowledge and makes absolute knowledge possible. (5) Back to immediate data, says Ingarden in accord with Husserl's device: "Zurück zu den Sachen:"

Ingarden defends intellectual intuition and the necessity of formal and static categories for every true cognition.
Ingarden explains that in pre-philosophical knowledge there must be units structured formally in a definite way. The first thing to do is to make clear what this formal structure of an object is. In it has to be found a system of elementary formal structures which are to be called "categories". When we have established their real sense we can take the next step and investigate whether they are "contained" in objects (if they are immanent to them) or imposed upon them by the subject or relative to something else. In case the formal structures are really contained in objects and are a condition of their existence and in case these structures are elemental, i.e. cannot be reduced to more simple structures then we call them "categories" of these objects. Categories that are valid for every object as such, for any "something" apprehended in its form we call analytical-formal categories of the object and the science about them formal ontology.

Now, Ingarden turns his attention to Bergson and asks whether these structures, or "categories" can be relativized. Relativization means that these structures exist only in relation to the subject, or the subject's actions, that they are creations of the subject and imposed on reality.

Ingarden reveals a petitio principii in any such attempt. Any theory tending to affirm the relativity of categories would have to presuppose their absolute
existence in order to be able to carry out the relativity. This is sufficient, Ingarden thinks, to reject the theory of the relativity of formal categories.

According to Bergson the logical categories are schemes of action. The use of a whole system of these schemes in relation to reality is the essence of the "cinematographical mechanism of intellect". These schemes - according to Bergson - do not exist in reality. They are different from matter. Bergson characterizes reality as an infinitely manifold stream of coming-into-being, of changes. In this stream a distinction must be made between the stream of matter and the stream of spirit (consciousness). They are different continua of changes. Matter is different from spirit by forming a system of necessarily connected and repeated changes. In the realm of spirit there is no repetition and necessary determination. Ingarden asks: How is reality to be structured if it is to be based on repeated and determined changes? If such a reality is to be "possible" then there must exist in it a structure which creates a certain segment in the continuum of changes that forms an individual. Without separate individuals repetition is impossible because it presupposes a multiplicity of individuals. What is then the meaning of repetition? We must have not only "categorical" forms but also a material fulfilment of these forms which is everywhere the same. That means that the repeated changes have a quality which makes individuals
comparable. Form and quality must be incorporated in matter. Ingarden concludes, therefore, that the schemes of action are inherent in matter.

How can they then be relative in relation to a certain kind of cognition (practical cognition)? This is Ingarden’s next question. How can they be considered as something foreign to matter?

He says there are three possible answers.

1. They are not inherent in matter and can be relativized; but then Bergson’s definition of matter is invalidated.

2. Bergson’s definition is valid and then the schemes are inherent in matter and cannot be relativized.

3. The premises which lead to this dilemma are wrong, namely that "categories" and (identical with them) "schemes of action" are a condition for the possibility of matter.

In all these three cases the Bergsonian theories have to be modified.

Ingarden imagines that Bergson would answer these critical points by pointing out that it is impossible to express intuitional data in the language of intellect. Intellect thinks in categories and does not recognize the assertion that something can to a certain extent be both A and non-A at the same time. Intuition can. Bergson would say that the schemes of action are partly not realized in matter and according to this they cannot be
relativized but as far as they are relative in relation to action they are relative and without fundamentum in re.

Ingarden comments to this that a certain theory of intellect cannot be proved to be true by using arguments based on this theory when it has still to be proved.

Ingarden explains that if categories are incorporated in matter only to a certain extent it cannot be determined as a continuum of changes in which repetition takes place and order reigns, but only as a reality which is in the process of approaching gradually the structure of repetitive and determined changes. From this point of view there is no difference between matter and consciousness. Both are realities in the perpetual process of becoming themselves, only the directions of these processes are different. Consciousness approaches gradually freedom and simplicity, matter approaches passivity and spatiality. Reality swings between these two poles in different modes. On the one side there is pure duration, on the other the monumentality of pure space.

Ingarden asks: Upon the premise that the schemes of action mean "categories" which are to be relativized is there, then, a reality free from these categories?

Ingarden reasons thus: Let us try to grasp directly the real stream of consciousness as Bergson describes it. In this realm there are no schemes, the static aspect is completely eliminated. As Bergson identifies categories with schemes there are no forms, no qualities, no states.
of affairs; in general, nothing which is to be constant. Everything streams, there is only the perpetual streaming, a constantly self-renewing continuum. However, it is not so. Even the streaming is not real because this would be something constant and this cannot be if we are to grasp consciousness absolutely and in pure duration. It is an ever changing stream with different elements. But also this is not true. There is no distinction made between streaming and the ever changing "contents" of the stream of consciousness. Everything is melted. But not even this is true. This something "melted" becomes something constant, and so cannot be real, according to Bergson. It can be compared with a river which streams along with its banks.

From this Ingarden formulates a paradox: We are to grasp something but by grasping it we are to prove that this something does not exist.

In this manner, nothing can be actually established. Thought must deny itself.

Ingarden says: If there is to be some structure of consciousness that can be grasped then this structure must be incorporated in consciousness itself. It must be constantly given in every possible apprehension.

On the important point of matter and form Ingarden states that, according to Bergson, there is to be no difference between form and material contents because form is only an outer appearance not included in reality. Does duration, then, possess no form, no structure? Can anything
exist without any "form", any permanent structure? Is this property of "not possessing any structure" possible without some permanent essence, some structure?

Ingarden suggests that the Bergsonian view can be supported by arguing that consciousness changes its structure constantly, that it is always changing itself into something new. But Ingarden asks: How is it possible that we understand consciousness always as consciousness; that is, nevertheless, consciousness? Is not it necessary that there be some structure of consciousness, that it have some form, "substance", owing to which it is consciousness, something?

Does formlessness have some form? Ingarden contends that it is impossible to consider any "form", any structure as relative to the activities of the static aspect. Consciousness in pure duration must have some structure, some form. It is imperative to make a distinction between the ever-running stream of material contents of consciousness and its form. This form is something final which is absolutely impossible to do without. Bergson's statement about the relativity of any form cannot, therefore, be accepted.

Consciousness is either undistinguishable from the stream of reality or it is something different from it. Bergson wants to have the best of both worlds and contradicts himself.
After having shown that consciousness must have a form Ingarden attempts to show that this form embodies in consciousness the categories of "separate individual", "quality", etc.

Ingarden rejects forthwith John Locke's "simple ideas" as constant and separate elements of consciousness. Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the category "separate individual" (homogenous whole) is a static aspect relative in relation to action. Bergson denies the existence of "states" as separate individuals and at the same time - in order to show their apparent existence - assumes that there are "series of acts of interrupted attention". This assumption is necessary to carry out the attempt to relativize the category "separate individual" in relation to interest. If we assume that the scheme of action "separate individual" is identical with the category "separate individual", which is the basic assumption of the whole argument, then we run into the vicious circle to be found in every sceptical-relativistic theory.

Ingarden applies similar argument to Bergson's relativization of the category "quality". In Bergson's view the concept of quality is a scheme relative to action and appears under pressure from the motives of action. In the stream of reality we carry out instantaneous cross-sections, we do many qualitative
movements and bring them inside the narrow limits of our duration, where it appears as one motionless "quality". The concept or category of quality springs from the difference of rhythms of two durations: the subjective one and the one belonging to the duration of matter. Both matter, qualitative changes and consciousness possess specific qualities and when they establish contact with each other the multiplicity of qualitative changes concentrate and form the concept quality.

The existence of specific qualities and the formal structure of the category quality are presupposed. Bergson cannot define matter without tacitly assuming that the categories or schemes are immanent in it. The category quality is also, somehow inherent in matter and at the same time it is a scheme of action. Bergson performs, therefore, in Ingarden's view, a petitio principii.

Ingarden mentions the following possibilities:

1. Bergson's theory of reality is false. What he calls by this name is only relative in relation to action as a moment of reality.

2. Bergson's concept of reality is sound. In this case there is no possibility of the relativization of the schemes or categories.

3. The assumption that the categories are identical with the schemes of action has to be denied. (6)

Ingarden accepts the third possibility. He accepts the second possibility only if the word
"category" means exclusively analytical-formal category of anything existing, in the sense of a necessary formal structure of an object.

If what Bergson calls "schemes of action" is to be identified with analytical-formal categories then it will be impossible to relativize them. That is the reason why Ingarden rejects Bergson’s theory of the intellect.

Ingarden finds it necessary to accept a realm of final forms, the analytical-formal categories. Research on these categories cannot begin from the question why and for what purpose they exist or what is their origin, but only from the question what they are, what is their sense. The establishment of this sense and the discovery of the different relations between the categories should become the task of the theory of the analytical-formal categories, or ontology. The next step would be to establish the validity of their appearance in objects and substantiate their "objectivity" in a special constitutive investigation.

In order to carry out such an investigation a theory of knowledge is imperative, such a theory of knowledge that would begin before the discussed investigation of Bergson. Bergson’s theory is only an explanation of certain illusions, not a theory of intellect. Bergson’s theory of intellect is not about the origin (constitution) of categories but really only a comparison of qualities of one type with qualities of another type. As the concept of quality is presupposed it contains a petitio principii and Ingarden rejects it.
Bergson is of the opinion that the essence of things escapes us necessarily and that essence is a creation of the cinematographic mechanism of intellect, a scheme relative to action. There is nothing that corresponds to it in reality.

Ingarden rejects this notion because the existence of essence is presupposed.

According to Ingarden there is a kind of essence in Bergson's philosophy, as an individual or concrete essence. But Bergson's relativization of this notion leads to a negative petitio principii, says Ingarden. Although essence is, in Bergson's view, a special kind of illusion it can appear only because reality and "forms" and intellect (which bears these forms) possess a sample of attributes constituting them, their "what". Bergson, therefore, denies the existence of individual essence by presupposing its existence in reality.

In a similar way Ingarden proceeds to show that the identity of objects is a formal category which cannot be relativized. In this latter case any philosophy which is to acquire absolute cognition of reality is impossible. Even if philosophy was to survive as an intuitive stream parallel to the stream of consciousness then it can be called "philosophy" only if in this along-with-streaming (Mitschwimmen) there was obtained an absolute or at least some kind of "knowledge". And
in order to have knowledge it is not enough to "look", we must also "see", i.e. we must grasp and also know what we grasp. What we grasp by seeing must be constituted by some "what" ("ťf") and this "what" (the nature of the object) must be retained in the whole process of cognition.

Ingarden writes: "Even if philosophy was reduced to direct looking and grasping of the stream of consciousness and if we refrain from assuming the possibility of communicating the seen to others, even then we would have to recognize the existence of different "whats" immanent to consciousness, of their categorial form, etc". (7)

Even if the form of consciousness is ever changing there must be forms corresponding to each phase of change. The forms of consciousness must have their necessary attributes which in spite of all changes become the identical whole of consciousness or, in other words, become the essence of consciousness. This essence is a condition for the existence of consciousness. To call some "average form" of manifold changes of an object its individual essence is, of course, an error in Ingarden's opinion. If this"average form" is existing it is known in considering and comparing series of concrete cases, whereas the essence of individual consciousness can be grasped absolutely and adequately in one act of conscious experience.
18. The absolute theory of knowledge

It should have become clear from these extracts of Ingarden's Bergson thesis that his fundamental insight is that thought cannot be identified with being, at least if by "being" is understood temporal and changeable being. What he is looking for is the absolute. And in this thesis he puts forward some ideas about what an absolute theory of knowledge should look like.

The absolute theory of knowledge is to pave the way to the cognition of the world of values and ideas. And "an absolute knowledge can only be that which has absolute being as its object - and it is in the very act of knowing that the absoluteness of its object is revealed", as Quentin Lauer remarks in his Introduction to Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. (8) An absolute being is, as he also points out, ultimately God.

In his Bergson thesis Ingarden has this to say about the possibility of an absolute theory of knowledge:

"Theory of knowledge as final, absolute knowledge about knowledge is only then possible if there is a pure essence of all beings (istnosti) in question and if there is an absolute cognition of these essences (Wesenserkenntnis). If both do not exist then theory of knowledge and, in general, any philosophy which does not want to be limited to absolute knowledge about what is individual is impossible. But philosophy which on the one side
attacks the task of grounding absolute knowledge and its possibility on the other side denies the existence of pure essence (of consciousness, cognition) — then this philosophy is contradictory and cannot be true. This applies to Bergson's philosophy. It states and substantiates the possibility of absolute knowledge but denies the existence of the pure essence of consciousness.' (9)

This statement describes Ingarden's epistemological program rather succinctly and shows his confidence in the possibility of finding a way to the realm of absolute spirit. Theory of knowledge must begin with knowledge which is absolutely beyond doubt and must not be a consequence of a dogmatically founded theory. It must be independent from any theory and come before any theory which is based on uncertain knowledge if the error of petitio principii is to be avoided. The initial knowledge as a basis of scientific inquiry must itself be cognition of itself as it is. There must be a possibility of its absolute cognition in itself (immanently). Problematic knowledge is not satisfactory. Then the basic assumption would need grounding etc. Absolute knowledge is grasped in absolute cognition.

Another quotation from Ingarden's Bergson thesis may help to clarify what he expects from his absolute theory of knowledge:

"If in general any knowledge is to be absolutely valid, so that any doubt is excluded, then this applies
only to knowledge which supplies exclusively absolutely directly given data, i.e. knowledge whose "object" (in the widest sense of the word) meant in its meaning covers completely the known object as to all its components in absolutely direct givenness and is, accordingly, present "personally", "originally" and in its body. Such a knowledge I want to call immanent and adequate" (10)

It might be added that by ""object" in the widest sense of the word" Ingarden means probably something like Twardowski who uses the word "object" in the meaning of any possible referent to an intentional act.

Ingarden believes steadfastly in the possibility of direct knowledge. What is the object of this knowledge in epistemology? Ingarden makes these distinctions:
1. Cognition as an act of consciousness. 2. Real or ideal objects, independent of consciousness. 3. The known "content" (Twardowski's "Inhalt") which makes the object consciously known and 4. the relation between the object existing in itself and the cognized content.

Further investigations on these matters are later to form an important part of Ingarden's theory of knowledge. This concerns primarily where the line is to be drawn between the independent object and the known content. But in the work under discussion Ingarden makes some points which indicate his future interests. He declares his support for the phenomenological standpoint that
things can become known as phenomena without losing their "ownness", that things can be known as they are. But how do things become correlates of consciousness? Does it depend on what they are? Science investigates things from the point of view of their "having" of qualities, of their determination. Epistemology does not occupy itself with the analysis of "whatness". Ingarden was later to do this in his ontology. Epistemology, he says, is interested in the relation of knowledge to the object. When an epistemologist asks whether the knowledge $X$ of an object $Y$ is really knowledge (or an illusion) he tries to find an answer to the question whether the "contents" of the knowledge $X$ corresponds to the sense of the object $Y$ or not. It is this sense and the modes of givenness which is the source of cognition of objects. But this sense is never identical with the object as such.

Absolute knowledge is reached in the immanent and adequate givenness of the elements of an object. Epistemology has as its aim to reach the pure essence of knowledge in general. Epistemology is therefore not about human knowledge. It is an independent theory which aims at discovering the essence of knowledge through immanent and aprioristic cognition.
19.

The independence of epistemology

Ingarden's main argument for an independent theory of knowledge is that otherwise it would be dogmatic and contradictory. (11)

First of all, theory of knowledge must be independent of psychology. Psychology investigates real states and structure of the human psyche but phenomenology is an eidetic science of conscious phenomena. Psychology is an empirical science but phenomenology investigates the general idea of conscious acts. It does not investigate the real processes of thought in psychophysical individuals but the essence of thought itself. Psychology is based on inner perception which yields dubitable knowledge. The absolute theory of knowledge cannot presuppose such theories. Neither can it presuppose that the process of cognition is the activity of psychophysical individuals without imposing on itself the danger of contradictions. The same applies to the results of the physical sciences. The existence of the real world is not a condition for the existence of conscious acts.

The same applies to metaphysics. Metaphysical theories assert the existence of certain beings and contain assertions about their factual qualities. But this is immaterial to the theory of knowledge. It investigates the idea of cognition and says nothing about the existence of real or ideal objects.
The independence of theory of knowledge from ontology must also be upheld. The ontologist asks: What belongs to the contents of the idea of the object \( X \) and what relations \( \text{relations} \) can be revealed between the components of these contents. The epistemologist asks: What conditions must the cognitive act fulfill and its contents if it is to be known as an object falling under a certain idea with a certain structure of its contents. A theory of knowledge based on some ontology would cease to be science and become dogmatic. But ontology is not without importance for theory of knowledge. Ontology defines the types of objects which can become the objects of knowledge.

Concerning the importance of the theory of knowledge for the positive sciences Ingarden maintains that the latter may not take over any presuppositions from the theory of knowledge. Epistemological theories are not conditions for any theories of the positive sciences.

Ingarden thus defines epistemology as a completely independent science which must be free from dogmatism and must itself show the truth value of its theories on the basis of its own cognitive instruments.
Ingarden maintains that a priori knowledge is possible, both in the formal and material respect. To substantiate this claim Ingarden refers to the results of Husserl's examination of psychologism and especially of English empiricism. The objects of logic, concepts, judgments, proofs, theories, are ideal objects. The existence of these objects cannot be avoided. Thus, Ingarden really implies that as this is so there must be a special way of knowing these objects. Their existence cannot be established in ordinary outer experience. (12)

Ingarden takes as an example the perception of an orange lying on the table. A detailed analysis of this kind of perception leads him to the conclusion that outer perception is in its essence always dubitable. Such a perception has to be corroborated or doubted by other perceptions of the same kind and therefore its certainty cannot be guaranteed. (13)

The perception of ideal qualities opens up new possibilities. If attention is turned on the colour of the orange it can be "seen" that this colour lies between red and yellow. This makes a judgment possible a judgment on the affinities of red and yellow with the colour of the orange. This affinity between the colours is grasped, is given directly. This gives direct knowledge, different from what is given in outer experience (Erfahrung).
Ingarden puts forward some theses on the object, act and content of the direct a priori cognition.

First of all, this kind of intuition makes it possible to achieve knowledge which is not dependent upon temporal and transient objects. It paves the way for cognition of ideal objects and the relation between them. This is absolutely vital for the possibility of philosophy itself according to Ingarden's fundamental intuitions on time and beings in time. Ideal objects are independent of these and, conversely, ideas do not entail the existence of real objects.

The acts of outer experience yield knowledge which always has to be supplemented or completed and are never self-sufficient or self-supporting. But the direct a priori knowledge is produced by acts which always yield self-sufficient and cover the subject-matter completely. This could be seen in the direct apprehension of the affinity of colours and of the independence of colours in relation to extension.

Ingarden accepts all the Husserlian theses on a priori acts of direct cognition, acts which are immediate "vision" and originary dator consciousness. There is no problem about the objects of such cognition: the existence of ideal objects have to be accepted. But difficulties arise when the contents of the acts are analysed.

Ingarden does not doubt that ideal objects are given in direct cognition and that real things are cognized in.
that way too, as far as they are the embodiment of ideas. (16). He does not doubt that this type of cognition gives absolute knowledge. Neither does he doubt that this cognition includes acts which show the truth of general judgments (of the type "Every S...") (17) He does not doubt that the back side and interior of objects is given directly. (18)

Difficulties arise when questions are asked about the ideal objects themselves. These questions concern both their existential status and formal structure.

Ingarden feels that Husserl has not substantiated conclusively enough the latter's claim of a final victory over Hume. Ingarden accepts Husserl's theory that naturalism defeats itself and that ideal objects have to exist if there is to be any truth. But the problem is: How are ideal objects constituted? Direct knowledge informs about individual qualities and there must be a transition from them to ideal qualities in specie. But how is this transition, called ideation, to be performed? Ingarden says that Husserl has not given a sufficient explanation of this transition. He makes this reproach in his first work on phenomenology, Dążenia fenomenologów ("The aspirations of the phenomenologists") in 1920 and it is repeated in many places in his works, including his lectures in Oslo in 1967. (19)

If it is true that reflection is cut off from the given and that metaphysics can only assert rational and
necessary truths but without reference to sensory perception and if sense perception cannot become the ground for metaphysics then the whole enterprise of phenomenology depends upon the proof of the existence of an a priori intuition of essences, of ideas in their material and formal respects. In other words, the success of phenomenology depends upon a successful strategy against Hume.

The problem can also be said to be about the dividing line between the content and the object (in Twardowski's terminology) or between the given and the constituted. It is also about the existential status of the entities on the both sides of the line.

The solution of these problems becomes the watershed between Husserl's idealism and Ingarden's realism.

To find out the background it will be useful to look back to the set-up in Twardowski's theory of contents and objects. The dividing line between them was that the contents (Inhalte) belonged to the subjective realm whereas objects did not. But objects could be anything referent of a name. Twardowski had, therefore, no difficulties about the existential status of contents (he was a "psychologist"). But the existential status of objects caused him difficulties, especially contradictory objects such as "a land without mountains" or "golden mountain". Such objects could be named as contents but did they exist as objects? If so, then how? Or were they
non-existent? How could they then be named?

Husserl's difficulties were somewhat different. It was easy for him to show that contradictory ideal objects did not exist. But it was not as easy for him to show how ideal objects were constituted in or by intentional acts and what was the existential status of objects of different kinds thus constituted (e.g. "a table" or "a chair" or "Jupiter" or "a centaur").

The problem did not come up in this form in Twardowski's treatise because the concepts produced by acts had, so to speak, a "psychological" mode of being.

Husserl's difficulties with his ideal objects led him ultimately to transcendental idealism but they became the starting point for Ingarden's realism.

In his work from 1920 Ingarden considers the Husserlian concepts of perception by perspective views (Abschattungen) and sense-data (Empfindungsdaten). The latter are the ground or foundation of the perspective views. He comes to the conclusion that direct a priori cognition (the intuition of essences) is not achieved by the experience of perspective views. (20) Ideal objects are known directly. Ideal qualities or the qualities of such objects as equilateral triangles are cognized directly. The perspective views are no intermittent stages in this cognition. But this means that they are given directly but not constituted in immediate a priori cognition.

But the question arises then about the place of the
sense-data in the system of cognition. Do they belong to acts or contents, or are they given, as Ingarden suggests?

Ingarden discusses this question in his reminiscences published in a book containing Husserl's letters to Ingarden. (21)

Ingarden begins by quoting several passages from the Logical Investigations which seem to indicate that Husserl had not found a secured place for sense-data (or sensations). Here are some of these quotations: "I find nothing more plain that the distinction here apparent between contents and acts, between perceptual contents in the sense of presentative sensations, and perceptual acts in the sense of interpretative intentions overlaid with various additional characters. Such intentions, united with the sensations they interpret, make up the full concrete act of perception". "But within this widest sphere of what can be experienced, we believe we have found an evident difference between intentional experiences, in whose case objective intentions arise through immanent characters of the experiences in question, and experiences in whose case this does not occur, contents that may serve as the building stones of acts without being acts themselves" (22) "Sensations, and the acts "interpreting" them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they do not appear as objects; they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense. Objects on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are ont experienced". (23)
"Here as elsewhere I identify the pain-sensation with its "content", since I do not recognize peculiar sensing acts". "... of experiences really lacking intentional reference, and so also remote in kind from the essential character of intentional desire". (24)

Ingarden comments that acts as intentions are distinguished from sense-data as contents and lack intention. On the other hand sensations are in a unity with intentions in the full act of perception. The apprehended sensations are included in the act of perception. Thus sensations and acts are the real (real) contents of the acts. How is this unity to be conceived in spite of the difference between intentions and sensations? In the terminology of the Ideas I the pure intentional Erlebnis is split up into Noesis and noema. Where do the sensations belong? Certainly not to the noema as it is not the meant (das Vermeinte) as such. Then they must belong to the noesis. This is also asserted in Ideas I. But there are two kinds of noesis. It is meaning-giving and it is the concrete noetic Erlebnis. Sensations do not belong to the noesis in the first sense. They are united with the noetic components in the second sense. The noema is not a part of the Erlebnis. The sense-data and the components of the noetic Erlebnis are in unity although they are different. The sense-data are the constituents of this Erlebnis but not perceived, not grasped objectively.
But Ingarden says it is difficult to see on what basis this unity stands. The hyletic data are "stuff" ("stoffliche Inhalte"), qualitative substances (Gehalte). The noetic components are, on the other hand, intentions, meaning-giving acts and they perform the "animation" (Beseelung). Where are the sense-data to be found? In the full noesis and not in the lowest level (letaten Unterbau) of the noema? The noema is a superstructure of the Sinn (meaning). It is different from the streaming of sense-data but contains them in its lowest level. These data are different from the objective qualities contained in the constituted noema but appear in these qualities through the meaning given to them by the noesis. The intentions, the essence of the noetic components, give them this meaning. But what determines these intentions, the noetic components? The sense-data or something else? There are three possibilities: The meaning-giving is fully determined by the sense-data, or it is not determined by them at all or only partly.

In the first case the sense-data would be the only source of meaning-giving. The noetic components would then be something secondary and the noemata as well. But then the difference, emphasized by Husserl, between sense-data and the constituted noema would be quite incomprehensible.

In the second case, if the noetic components and the sense-data were independent of each other their unity would be incomprehensible.

In the third case, if they are only partly dependent
the question arises what is the supplementary determining factor. In all three cases the sense-data as real parts (reelle Bestandstücke) of the concrete noetic experience seem to Ingarden to be something completely mysterious ("etwas völlig Geheimnisvolles").

Ingarden says that in his discussions with Husserl in 1916 and 1917 he stressed the necessity to acknowledge that the sense-data are existentially independent from the noetic components of the Erlebnisse. But Husserl did not want to change the standpoint of the Ideas I. The only concessions he made was to agree that sense-data were ego-alien (ichfremd) and not a component of the ego (ichlich). That means that the sense-data are not a component of the source of the acts (Quellpunkt der Akte). If he had agreed to Ingarden’s point of view his idealism would have been in danger.

Ingarden did not believe in the viability of idealism. His solution to the difficulties described above was to remove the sense-data, ideal qualities and ideas out of the realm of the constituting subjectivity and consider them as a specific mode of being. All these entities are therefore given to the subject. Thus a theory of constitution, different from the Husserlian one, emerged. In Ingarden’s theory philosophy becomes the analysis of ideas. This analysis reveals the constitution or structure of objects enjoying different modes of existence. The first step towards this was to combine sense-data with Gestalt-psychology to form the notion of the nature of an object.
Ingarden says about the difference between him and Husserl: "I portrayed the logical and linguistic formations as creations of subjective operations of consciousness in order to show their existential heteronomy and to contrast them with the existential autonomy of the real world and thus to open the way for, so to speak, to a "realist" attempt at the solution of the controversy about the existence of the world. Husserl used the same problem and the same understanding of the logical formations to reach a transcendental idealism which was much more radical than and consequent than there was the case in Ideas I". (25)
The paradox of knowledge

Ingarden thinks that he has found a methodological device opening up direct access to ideas and essences. This is his theory of the living through of acts. It was formed in connexion with the theory of direct intuitive knowledge and his elaboration of Husserl's reduction. It was also formed as an answer to Leonard Nelson's proof of the impossibility of the theory of knowledge.

Nelson thinks that contradictions and infinite regress haunt the theory of knowledge because it is preassumed that every knowledge is contained in judgments. The judgment to be verified must be verified by some other judgment etc. The way out has therefore been to posit some kinds of judgments without any verification or by appealing to intuition. Both solutions are unacceptable, according to Nelson. The theory of knowledge must be based on a nonintuitive immediate knowledge which he finds in psychology. In spite of the terminology this description has the air of transcendental subjectivity. In any case, the ultimate basis of knowledge must be in the original data of consciousness, data which cannot be reduced any further. "If every cognition were possible only on the ground of another, we should have to execute an infinite regression in order to reach any true cognition, and hence no verification of cognitions would be possible. (26)
Nelson stresses that if reflection and intuition are assumed as the only sources of knowledge then the result can only be either metaphysical logicism or metaphysical mysticism or, if both are rejected, empirical scepticism. The third way, nonintuitive immediate knowledge, must exist if knowledge is to be possible. But this does not mean that any "theory of knowledge" is possible. In the work mentioned he does not explain how the immediate data of knowledge are associated. He only mentions that the Humean hypothesis, that the difference between problematic and assertoric notions is only one of degree, contradicts the facts of self-observation.

A theory of knowledge cannot test the truth or objective validity of our knowledge, says Nelson, and he offers the following proof:

"In order to solve this problem, we should have to have a criterion by the application of which we could decide whether or not a cognition is true; I shall call it briefly the "validity criterion". This criterion would itself either be or not be a cognition. If it be a cognition, it would fall within the area of what is problematic, the validity of which is first to be solved with the aid of our criterion. Accordingly, it cannot itself be a cognition. But if the criterion be not a cognition, it would nevertheless, in order to be applicable, have to be known, i.e., we should have to know that it is a criterion of the truth. But in order to gain this
knowledge of the criterion, we should already have had to apply it. In both cases, therefore, we encounter a contradiction. A "validity criterion" is consequently impossible, and hence there can be no "theory of knowledge" (27).

Nelson illuminates the paradox of knowledge from another angle when he says that any knowledge, if it is to be knowledge, must assume knowledge as given. But this is also based on the assumption that knowledge is based on concepts and judgments. The solution is therefore in the abandonment of the point of view that all knowledge or every cognition is a judgment. "The possibility then opens up of satisfying the postulate of the verification of all judgments without falling victim to the infinite regress of the "theory of knowledge". (28)

Nelson's proof of the impossibility of the theory of knowledge influenced Husserl's theory of the reductions. To reach the ultimate ground of knowledge and logic not only the world had to be bracketed but such a kind of universal self-examination "which leads me to the grasping of my absolute self, my transcendental ego". "I reflect upon what I can find purely "in" myself, ... I separate that which is primordially my own ... and that which is constituted in me at different levels ... as something alien". "Evidence"must" somehow be an absolute grasping of being and truth. ... There must be an absolute experience; and that we have in the case of internal experience" (29).
Ingarden points out some contradictions in this theory. First, the aims and goals of the reductions must be known beforehand, the nature of transcendental consciousness must be assumed so that the reductions can be carried out. Second, the transcendental ego has to constitute itself in the same stream of time-consciousness which it constitutes. Third, to bring a datum to consciousness an act of consciousness is needed and to bring the latter to consciousness a third one is needed etc.

The first paradox will be discussed later. The second is the Bergsonian problem of an adequate intuition of pure duration. If Bergson was right then no categorical apprehension of the pure time flow was possible. Husserl tried to show that we reach at least some formal knowledge interaction in the continuous flow of retention and protention.

Ingarden quotes Husserl as having said: "Yes, there threatens to be a devil of a circle here. The primary time-constituting experience (Erlebnisse) is itself is time". (30) "But how to get out of this circle, says Ingarden, or avoid it I never learnt either then or later". (31)

Ingarden notes that the third paradox appears both in Brentano and Husserl. Husserl encountered this problem after he asserted that it is possible to apprehend the pure ego without robbing it of its own function and position. But how can one know?
"We can of course say that there is a so-called 'internal consciousness' which can come to the rescue in this case. This was Brentano's proposal too. But it is not altogether clear what Brentano understood by this concept. And as long as it is unclear there is the problem as to how I know that I am living a double life in which I carry out an act and perceive a thing and at the same time reflect on it. How do I know? The answer is that I carry out a new immanent perception which apprehends the situation as a whole. And if I doubt that I really carry out such a perception then I appeal for help to an immanent perception which is directed to the perception of the perception of the perception etc. The result is an infinite regress". (32)

These paradoxes have to be solved in an absolute theory of knowledge, a theory which is to reach absolute knowledge of knowledge in general and is absolutely indubitable and complete (vollkommen). Ingarden does this by his theory of Durchleben, or the living-through of acts.

To throw some light on this theory several quotations from Ingarden's works will be collected here.

"If we are to avoid the complications introduced by Brentano into the structure of conscious acts, we must agree: 1. that not all mental phenomena are "felt" in some way or another, 2. that perception is not a combination of representation and judgment built upon
it, but that judgment is either a separate moment of perception or, more clearly said, a special way of carrying out the act of perceptual representation, different from simple imagination, 3. we have to abandon the supposition tacitly accepted by Brentano that any mental phenomenon (act) is conscious only because it is represented (although it is to be a so-called "secondary" object of itself). We have to accept that consciousness, especially an act of consciousness, e.g. perception, is a living-through (Durchleben), a special type of self-knowledge which does not need any "reflection", "representation", "judgment" etc. ...

In this case we have to resist the temptation to set the act and object of the living-through in opposition to each other". (33)

This lived intuition of acts is the experience of as distinct from "primary sense-data and objective meanings" ("Erleben der ursprünglichen Empfindungsdaten"). (34)

To avoid petitio principii and infinite regress there must be such a sort of "cognition whose cognitive value can be established without making use of new cognitive acts but doing so by the very performance of this sort of cognition whose cognitive results would be absolutely indubitable and adequate". (35)

"We can easily have a certain "knowledge" about immanent perception which is not subjected to reflection, and even knowledge, in other words: cognition which in
many aspects shows a considerable superiority compared with immanent perception. We call this cognition "lived intuition" (Durchleben)". "This living-through is not an act in the phenomenological sense of the word". (36)

"Cognition and what is cognized create then a unified whole in which they are distinguished, exclusively by abstraction and outside the actual performance of the corresponding cognition, as dependent (abstract) moments". (37)

"But how can I know that it is really an immanent perception which takes place in me? Husserl says that one can seek help in the immanent perception of the immanent perception. There arises the possibility of an infinite regress as I have then to perform an immanent perception of the immanent perception of the immanent perception, etc. Usually the chain ends somewhere. One has simply to come to an end and say: We cannot go any further, this n-th immanent perception is correct. As a result one has either an infinite regress ... or a petitio principii ... This is impossible, I thought. It is not in order from the standpoint of science. ... I said to myself: I do not have to perform the immanent perception of the immanent perception. It is sufficient that I quite simply live through the immanent perception and the outer perception. ... If I have this lived intuition I do not have to presuppose anything, nor have I to do any petitio. The danger of a regress and a petitio can be averted. ... When I live
my thought through then it is there is no experience (opplevelse, Erlebnis) number two but an experience, a thought which in itself is self-consciousness". (38)

"The conscious life in itself is no "experience" (opplevelse) but a lived intuition (Durchleben). In this itself-intuiting life there is no duplicity, this life is in its real meaning consciousness. To live consciously is not the same as to "reflect" but quite simply to live knowing. It is remarkable that there is in German an expression for this, an expression which Kant used in the meaning in question. Kant ... uses the word "Selbst-bewusstsein". This word names what I have called lived intuition (Durchleben). In connexion with the transcendental deduction of categories of reason Kant says in the second edition (of the Critique of Pure Reason): "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations". The 'I think' corresponds to the cartesian 'cogito'. 'Cogito' does not mean that I reflect, that I put forward some assertions about myself, it means that I have selfconsciousness, nothing else. And this 'self-consciousness' is the original mode of being of the conscious life, what is to impregnate oneself with knowledge". (39)

"What am I to do with the objective senses (Gegenstands-sinne)? They are, according to my comprehension, not consciousness. Consciousness is, according to my analysis, the field of the acts and the ego". (40)
These quotations show how Ingarden explains his theory of Durchleben. There are some parallels with L. Nelson but Ingarden does not draw the conclusion that theory of knowledge is impossible. On the contrary, his theory purports to show not only that theory of knowledge is possible but also how it is possible.

An important point remains to be stressed. Ingarden asserts that in lived intuition the cognized is identical with the cognition and the possibility of any error is therefore excluded. Lived intuition is an absolutely indubitable cognition.

If this is so then intuition becomes a kind of high court which always can judge infallibly on truth and falsity of any thought. Ingarden argues for his conception by pointing out that intuitions can be confused in the beginning and gradually become clearer until they reach their utmost clarity. Some people are good, others are bad "seers". But this does not decide upon the acceptance of his theory. It has either to be believed or not.

For Ingarden the Durchleben theory is of utmost importance because if there is no such thing then the gates to the world of ideas, of spirit, are closed, and philosophy thereby impossible. And in Ingarden's view philosophy is the highest value of culture. Without it civilized man cannot live. There must be a way to absolute knowledge and this is the way to the only absolutely true philosophy.

It may be true that what is experienced is experienced
as it is experienced and that the given comes thus to
be lived through by the mind. But this does not imply
any infallibility or indubitability. This part of the
theory can be accepted only by those who share Ingarden’s
view that absolute truth and absolutely true theories are
possible and desirable. In his view Husserl never succeeded
in overcoming relativism. Ingarden was convinced that
the field of philosophy had to be cleaned of such weeds.
To achieve his aim Ingarden had to disagree with Husserl
on the boundaries between the given and the constituted.
The objective senses are not constituted in Ingarden’s
view, the noematic contents are given. What appears is
given but the appearance is lived through. Self-examina-
tion is needed but it does not necessarily lead to the
transcendental reduction. Ideas and values are not
constructed in a manifold of acts. They are out there
already, timeless and immutable. They are not invented
but described, depicted, intuited. The dichotomy is not
between what is known and what is to be known. It is
not between the constitutive "just now" which is
constantly moving to another, or new, point in time
with retention in the background and protention pointing
forward to new intuitions to an actualized knowledge.
The dichotomy is between the given as such and the
given which has not yet been described. In Ingarden’s
theory there is no movement. Everything is static and
frozen.
The Durchleben theory has also another role. It is intended to reinforce a point mentioned earlier, namely that theory of knowledge is a completely independent discipline and no other branch of knowledge is dependent upon it. Theory of knowledge says nothing about the existence of the world or about the existence of ideas, it only shows that absolute knowledge is possible. In his Bergson thesis Ingarden said that theory of knowledge is not about human knowledge and he always remained faithful to this view. If this is so then Husserl was wrong in linking ontological questions with the performances (Leistung) of intentional activity of humans or even with transcendental subjectivity. The absolute truth of philosophy is in no way the product of humans, it is a matter of a true description of ideas and essences. Therefore, Ingarden could declare that he could "with a clear scientific conscience" (41) direct his attention to ontological problems.
Can any knowledge be self-justifying? Has Ingarden solved the problem of knowledge by referring to intellectual, categorial intuition? Has this appeal enabled him to lay the foundations of a philosophy which could both be called *prima* and *ultima*?

There is no reason to assume that he has solved the paradox of knowledge, even though experience is called inner perception which provides its own self-evidence. He holds that immediate eidetic knowledge yields absolute cognition. But this can be known only on the basis of the alleged absolute knowledge. The absolute knowledge must be presupposed if it is to be asserted as absolute knowledge. It is therefore far from certain that such knowledge, if it exists, is self-substantiating. (42)

Bergson seems to have here, in a sense, a stronger case than Ingarden. Behind Bergson's distinction between intuition and intellect is the view that you do not ask intellectual knowledge itself about its objective validity or whether it reflects reality faithfully. This kind of knowledge deforms reality but it cannot itself give the reasons for it. This problem falls away in the case of intuition where there is only pure duration and there is no division into subject and object. But the disadvantage of this kind of cognition is that it is, alas, both speechless and mute. Such an intuition cannot become the basis of an absolute philosophy of spirit. However empathically Ingarden affirms the absoluteness of his intellectual
intuition he must confront the fact knowledge itself cannot inform the knower that it is knowledge and still less that it is an absolute knowledge. It is the knower who knows and the reason why he knows is not the fact that he knows but the results of his practical activity in the world of things and persons.

Logical self-evidence may be sufficient for a formal theory of logic. But this is not what Ingarden is aiming at. His a priori is both formal and material. He aims at a metaphysical theory based on the bracketing of the world and the data of pure consciousness.
Husserl's and Ingarden's realism

One of the corner-stones of Ingarden's ontological system is Husserl's work, Logical Investigations. Ingarden firmly believed that this work was based on a realist philosophy and elaborated his own realist position on the basis of this interpretation of this work.

Not all investigators agree that Husserl was a "realist" in the period of the Logical Investigations. Prof. H. L. Van Breda, for example, thinks that Husserl's later period was only a consequence of the initial positions and that the "realism" of the beginning was "in no way less subjectivist than the later"idealism"". (43)

It is beyond doubt that in the Logical Investigations Husserl held that logical laws were apriori and ideal although they were grounded in the meaning of concepts. Truth is an eternal idea, beyond time. It is given in an act of Ideation and based upon an intuition. Husserl speaks about the ideal being of truth. He also says that the ideality of the idea of truth is its objectivity. (44) Husserl distinguishes sharply between the domain of the ideal and the real, between laws of logic and the laws of things, between truth and the social-historical activities in which empirical knowledge is acquired. He speaks about the necessity to reject the "mythology of activities". (45),
These distinctions lead undoubtedly to the difficulties and contradictions which the reductions and the theory of transcendental subjectivity were meant to solve. The psychologism of the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" haunted Husserl to the end of his days. If such concepts as "number" are constituted in psychological experiences then the logical is reduced to the psychological and the objectivity of logical forms is destroyed. Husserl himself was fully aware of this and concentrated his efforts on a solution which would guarantee the ideality and objectivity of truth irrespective of empirical facts or psychological relativities. In his late work he says:

"...A certain ideality lies in the sense of every experienceable object, including every physical object, over against the manifold "psychic" processes separated from each other by individuation in immanent time..." 
"The war against logical psychologism was in fact meant to serve no other end than the supremely important one of making the specific province of analytic logic visible in its purity and ideal peculiarity". (46)

There are, therefore, strong arguments for the point of view that Husserl's central aims, as they were set forth in the Logical Investigations, did not change, that in his later works he tries to find solutions to problems which were either unsatisfactorily solved or not at all in the Logical Investigations.
There are also strong arguments for the point of view that it is inappropriate to pin the label of a "realist" on the early Husserl just because he was interested (both then and later) in the grounding of logic and not at all in the mode of being of ideal entities.

Ingarden acknowledges that there is no direct evidence in Husserl's works before *Ideas I* about his "realism": "There are no clearly formulated assertions about the real world which could be interpreted in the spirit of a realism of one type or another". (47) But he thinks that there is a circumstantial or indirect evidence for the thesis that Husserl was a realist concerning the question of the mode of existence of the world in relation to acts of consciousness. Ingarden points out that ideal objects (the species), and logical formations especially, (propositions, theories) exist as transcendent and independent of conscious experience in which they are cognized. (48) It is excluded, says Ingarden, that Husserl considered them to be merely the products of conscious experience. Ingarden also seizes upon a passage in the *Logical Investigations* (49) where Husserl expresses the view that the interconnection of things is different from the interconnection of truths. From this Ingarden concludes that Husserl understands any being, real or ideal, as something which contains its determination in itself, and what is true corresponds to this being and is determined in itself". (50) This, Ingarden thinks, is an
evidence for Husserl’s realist attitude. Having added a reference to an expression contained in a letter from Husserl to Ingarden (where Husserl says that he feels the positions of Prolegomena to be incorrect) (51) and Husserl’s expression of dissatisfaction with these views in a conversation with Ingarden, the latter comes to the conclusion that "in the period of the Logical Investigations Husserl took the "realist" view in relation to real objects ... and that he later abandoned it as being false". (52)

Whether or not it will be possible to find a definite answer to the question about Husserl’s alleged realism it acquires great importance for Ingarden because he thinks that the true aims of phenomenology can only be achieved on the basis of realism. The Logical Investigations are therefore not only the starting point but the model for further investigations. In Ingarden’s view Husserl went too rapidly forward and came to his idealistic results without elaborating or clarifying many problems which have to be solved before any such conclusions can be drawn. Ingarden thinks that Husserl has taken his decisions on an insufficient evidence. And he thinks that if the problems are analysed carefully enough then transcendental idealism does not follow from the basis as laid down in the Logical Investigations. (53) This concerns, first of all, the problem of the existence of the world, the existential status of ideal, real and intentional objects.
Ingarden’s main point of criticism is that Husserl makes unjustified ontological conclusions from epistemological premises. Behind this is really a different approach of the two men to philosophy. Ingarden’s aim is a system of scientific metaphysics whereas Husserl seeks the absolute grounding of formal logic and cognition. Ingarden is therefore demanding from Husserl answers to questions which are not posed in the Husserlian system of phenomenology. But this does not mean that Ingarden cannot be right in accusing Husserl of drawing unwarranted inferences from the analysis of cognitive experience about the existence of the world.

Ingarden tries to show that the purely formal system of transcendental idealism is unable to constitute a world. This can only be done in an ontological investigation. Husserl’s theses in Ideas I about the impossibility of an absolute reality and in Formal and transcendental Logic that every existent is constituted in the subjectivity of consciousness have to be clarified and analysed before the solution of transcendental idealism can be acknowledged as correct.

Some of Ingarden’s critical points will be taken up here. Ingarden points out that according to Husserl the determination of real objects can take place in the contents of the acts of cognition. At the same time the object cannot be fully determined in a finite set of data. Thus Husserl abandons the fundamental methodological
principle of immediate intuition as the source of all knowledge. Unnoticeably, Husserl accepts the metaphysical assertion that the object itself is determined by the acts of experience, that the object obtains only those attributes which experiential data ascribe to it. (54)

Husserl identifies the real thing as it is in itself with the objective sense as it appears after the phenomenological reduction, as it is constituted in the course of experience. The noematic meaning is identified with the real thing. Only phenomena thus constituted are taken into account. In this connexion Ingarden often quotes the final sentences of sect. 49 of Ideas I where Husserl states that the spatio-temporal world is merely an intentional being for a consciousness and beyond that it is a nothing. (55) This is completely unacceptable to Ingarden until it has been shown in a special analysis based on immediate intuition that this is so. And when Husserl says that reality has no independence, no absolute essence, that its only ideal quality is its intentional, conscious being; adding that immanent being nulla re indiget ad existendum, then Ingarden comments that this independence has to be examined in a special existential-ontological investigation to see whether these assertions can be accepted or rejected. (56)

Ingarden asks the classical question of Twardowski and his school: What does he mean? Husserl never explained what he meant by the terms "absolute essence" (Wesen).
or the term "absolute existence". But it is without doubt that Husserl reduces every existent to a heteronomous being and speaks about ideal objects as irrealia. On this background Ingarden began his investigations into the ontological problems, raised by Husserl, by analysing the structure of the works of literature as being typically heteronomous. (57)

But not only heteronomous objects should be taken into account in such investigation but also real, temporal objects; persons; ideal objects, logical formations and ideas; cultural objects: works of art literature and music; ethical values and, finally, pure fictions such as the golden mountain. (58)
Ingarden's divergence with Husserl comes most clearly to the fore in the former's comments to Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*.

The line of attack is again on the frontier between the given and the constituted.

He begins by finding a paradox in Husserl's methodological procedure. The idea of philosophy as an absolute science cannot be presupposed but only intended (bloss vermeint). But it is accepted as a provisional presumption (vorläufige Präsumption). Ingarden points out that the idea of the value of the absolute foundation must either be accepted naively, uncritically, as a dogma or as a result of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In the latter case the reduction has to be carried out in order to see the possibility and necessity for this reduction. The fact that the idea of science is experienced in concrete experiences says nothing about whether this idea is justified. The whole project of the *Meditations* is therefore based on experiences of insufficiently clarified ideas and of ideas whose justification is in question. Ingarden concludes that the whole methodological procedure of the *Meditations* must be doubted. (59)

Another critical point concerns the existential status of the reduced, pure Ego and the world. Husserl says on p. 65 that the reduced Ego is not a part of the world and the world is not a part of the ego, either as
a complex of sense-data or acts. This transcendence belongs to the genuine sense of everything mundane. To this Ingarden comments that there is no apodictic evidence for this assertion. We have, on the one hand, what is constituted in sets of experiences of the constitutive consciousness. Much of what is constituted belongs to the world. But is the world only what is constituted? This leads to a division between the constitutive consciousness, given in apodictic self-evidence, and the constituted leading to an existential difference between the world and consciousness. This is a metaphysical stipulation which is not sufficiently underpinned at this stage of the investigation. Ingarden's own methodological prescription is this: "From the content of the experiences of experience (Erfahrungserlebnisse) and from those experiences alone ... is it possible and permissible to draw any knowledge and any assertion about the experiences themselves and about everything which is before it is given and is itself not an experience..." (60)

Ingarden is here appealing to direct intuition which constitutes things (Sachen) by revealing their structure. That means that the transcendental reduction is rejected. This principle, which is the core of the psychological description of the Logical Investigations, provides, according to Ingarden the apodictic self-evidence Husserl is seeking for. Neither does it prejudge the question of the existence of the world. Data are described as they are given.
It also follows from this methodological principle which Ingarden here puts forward that the difficulty about the relations between the transcendental I and the transcendent I disappears. The former is constitutive, it is the subject of the transcendental investigation. The latter is constituted, the object of the investigation. How can they then coexist in the same unity or even be identical, as Husserl asserts, when their attributes exclude each other? (61)

Ingarden calls for acceptance of both matter and quality in the constitutive experiences. This makes also the Durchleben of such acts imperative. Now Husserl does not recognize such living through of acts. But then the question arises whether a purely formal constitution (taking place in internal time consciousness) satisfies the principle of transcendental constitution that only those extants which are shown to be so and so qualitatively determined through constitutive analysis of contents of experiences. Ingarden takes this question up in connexion with the constitution of "abiding properties" (Habitualitäten) of the ego. He thinks that Husserl has not explained sufficiently the constitution of these properties because of a confusion of these two kinds of constitution.

Ingarden's last point concerns the existential status of ideal entities. He protests against the understanding
that ideal properties; ideas, ideal concepts and qualities are "products" or "intentional formations", created in subjective operations. This is not only because it runs against his intuition but because in this case phenomenology as an eidetic science would become impossible. It would become impossible to cognize anything eidetically. Sentences, meanings and relations between sentences are, as a matter of fact, not ideal, as was declared in the Logical Investigations (Ingarden argued for this in his book Das Literarische Kunstwerk). But this does not imply that everything which was formerly declared to exist ideally has lost its ideality. (62)

It is on this ground that Ingarden declares in one of his works on Husserlian philosophy that Husserl did not overcome relativism and approached in his later years the very position of Dilthey and his concept of Geisteswissenschaften which Husserl so severely criticized in his article in Logos, Philosophy as rigorous science. (63)
By establishing his own principle of direct eidetic intuition Ingarden liberated himself from the problem of the constitution of intersubjective objectivity which Husserl elaborates in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. Ingarden therefore wrote no comment on it.

There is, in his view, no danger at all for arbitrariness in the case of direct intuition. Its results are compelling for any possible ego. In an essay devoted to the problem "The Cognition of the Psychological States of Others" Ingarden rejects both associationism and theories based on empathy or appresentation. We cognize the psychological states of others directly and intuitively. For example, the sadness of the other is given directly in the expression of his face, his look, in the lowering of his shoulders. The same can be said about alien fright or pain. (6.4) Thus, a very difficult problem of the Husserlian phenomenology is solved in a simple manner.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Roman Ingarden: "Z badań nad filozofią współczesną" Warszawa 1963, pp. 536-537. (Hereafter abbreviated as "Z badań").


4. Ibid., p. 177.

5. Ibid., pp. 122 and 180.


7. Ibid., p. 143.

8. Quentin Lauer, op. cit. pp. 44, 47.


10. Ibid., p. 155.


13. Ibid., p. 327. Ingarden considers this theme repeatedly in his works.


16. Ibid., p. 356.
17. Ibid., p. 292.
18. Ibid., p. 323.
22. LU, II/1, p. 383. LI, p. 566.
23. LU, II/1, p. 385. LI, p. 567.
28. Ibid., p. 196.
31. Innföring, pp. 300-301.
32. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
33. Z badoń, pp. 238-239.
34. Briefe, p. 131.
36. Ibid., p. 368.
37. Ibid., p. 365.
39. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
40. Ibid., p. 281.
43. "Problèmes actuels de la phenomenologie". H.L. van Breda (ed), Louvain 1952, p. 68.
44. LU, I, pp. 128, 130, 191. LI, pp. 148, 149, 195.
45. LU, II/1, p. 379. LI, p. 563.
46. FTL, p. (165 (148), 172 (154).
47. Z badań, p. 553. Quotation taken from an unpublished translation of Ingarden's work: "On the motives which led Husserl to transcendental idealism" by A. Hannibals-son and J.E. Llewelyn.
51. Briefe, p. 10.
52. Z badań, p. 557.
53. Innföring, p. 248.
   Innförring, pp. 351, 357.
57. Ibid., p. 482.
58. Ibid., p. 423.
59. Edmund Husserl: "Cartesianische Meditationen und 
60. Ibid., pp. 210-211.
61. Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 213.
63. Z badań, pp. 491, 446.
64. Ingarden: "U podstaw teorii poznania", pp. 420, 424.
CHAPTER VIII

INGARDEN'S DESIGN OF PHILOSOPHY

23. Fundamental aims and premises

After having clarified the methodological differences between himself and Husserl, Ingarden was ready for constructing his own system of philosophy. His system-building had at least three aims:

1. To create an absolutely true and error-free system of metaphysics. This system was to come before and over and above the other (special) sciences and to be a true model of the world. The system was to be based on an absolute self-evidence of the given as lived through by the intuitive intentional subjectivity.

2. Thus Husserl's ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science would be implemented according to his true and original intentions.

3. As a result, materialism would be refuted finally, irrevocably and ultimately.

The whole enterprise is based on a firm belief in the assumption that direct intuitive knowledge is absolutely true and infallible. This knowledge is produced in the immanent perception or cogitations of the philosopher, in the pure consciousness of his ego. This Cartesian starting point guarantees maximal certainty of the results. The acts of pure consciousness are experiential acts. Individual, transcendent objects are given to the subject in experience.
The data of experience cannot be doubted and this is the ultimate basis for the solution of the problem of the existence of the world. (1)

It belongs also to the presuppositions of Ingarden's philosophy that real objects and the whole world is transcendent in relation to the experience of pure consciousness. That means that no element of the real world is a part of pure consciousness. The existence of pure consciousness cannot be doubted whereas the existence of the real world can be doubted. This invites the application of epoché in the sense that the existence of the real world may not be presupposed in the course of the investigation. This leads to Husserl's ultimate aim of producing the existence of the world from the existence and essence of pure consciousness. This is a second reason why Ingarden calls his method "transcendental". It shows the way to the grounding on non-immanent objects through the analysis of the region of pure experience. (2)

Already these initial presuppositions seem at variance with the expressed aims of the philosophy. How is it to be possible to reproduce the world in its factual existence from the immanent, "transcendental" positions? It is, of course, possible to create a system of speculative metaphysics by analysing pure consciousness. This is what Ingarden did. But he seems curiously unaware in the initial stages of the building of his ontological system
of the impossibility of building a metaphysical system (even if it were not to be absolutely true) on these premises. In the end, when he realized that his plan had failed he seems to be surprised that his initial promises could not be kept.

Ingarden clearly states that the transcendentalist cannot refer to the existence or property of any non-immanent object in order to substantiate the existence of the real world. This would be to repeat the fundamental error of the dogmatism of traditional metaphysics. (3) The transcendence of the real world creates a sharp division between the real world and pure consciousness. They are altogether unrelated. In spite of this Ingarden wants to deduce not only the existence but the factual existence of the real world from the data given to the philosopher in immediate intuition. The world is then reduced to phenomena and the only thing which can be done is to describe phenomena.

The choice of these premises is dictated by Ingarden's initial intuition that nature is alien to man and that there has to be found a method to open up the world of spirit, or else man would be reduced to something utterly disgusting, namely an animal. Those who subscribe to such views may feel compelled to accept the "transcendentalist" point of view, but they must also be prepared to accept the results to which Ingarden is ultimately led by his investigation.
24.
Divisions of philosophy

Ingarden divides philosophy into three departments: ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Ontology is also divided in three parts: existential, formal, and material ontology. His main work *Spór o istnienie świata* ("Controversy about the existence of the world") covers the two first parts of ontology. He never wrote the metaphysics.

Ontology is defined as being about pure possibilities and pure necessary connexions. (4) It is also defined as an a priori analysis of the contents of ideas. (5)

It is therefore more general than any of the other sciences and provides the theoretical foundation of the special aprioristic sciences by providing them with their axioms. It does not say anything about the real existence of things (that belongs to metaphysics) but analyses the pure qualities and relations between them. It also analyses the contents of ideas. Ideas are general objects which have twofold structure: They have the form of an idea and in the contents pure ideal qualities are concretised or realized. Some of them are even realizable in individual objects. Besides, ideas are immutable and atemporal.

There are variables in ideas and Ingarden thinks that this is one of his greatest discoveries and most important contribution to philosophy. This makes the theory of ideas tenable, for the first time since Parmenides. (6)

This structure of the idea makes it possible to produce
assertions about possible and necessary states of affairs in individual objects. This is one of the impasses of Ingarden's system. It is very difficult to accommodate individuals in it. Although it is impossible to deduce the factual existence of individuals from the contents of ideas there is a way, called "individualization" (ujednostkowienie, Vereinzelung) which shows both the numerical individuality of objects and is their source of plurality. Ingarden is unable to describe this process although without it there would be no individuals. (7)

But in the beginning of his enterprise Ingarden seems confident that by describing ontology as coming before all the other sciences and being more general than any of them and by solving the age-old problem of ideas as prototypes he has firmly established ontology as the first science and fundamental science for all the others.

Metaphysics is a complementary part of the project and is a direct continuation of ontology. Metaphysics analyses the real factual world as a whole and the factual essence of what ontology has shown to exist. Metaphysics does not analyse general ideas but individual objects in their factual (not pure) possibilities. A precondition for this is that the necessary connexions between the elements of the contents of the idea under which each individual is subsumed is known. Metaphysics thus presupposes ontology.
Metaphysics is also over and above the special sciences because the latter are always naive and produce uncertain knowledge. Metaphysics, on the other hand, produces absolute knowledge about the factual essence of the objects investigated. The special sciences never grasp the essence. The objects and the knowledge of the special sciences are always contingent. They aim at practical domination over nature, whereas metaphysical knowledge is "disinterested". It is in no way connected with the needs of practical activity. (8)

Ingarden postulates the existence of a special metaphysical experience which yields different data than the special sciences. Without it metaphysics would be impossible. (9) Without it the application of the results of ontology to the "usual" experience would be impossible. The immediate intuition, applied to metaphysics, yields absolutely certain knowledge. In spite of this, Ingarden concedes, it is not excluded that the results of the special sciences were of some importance to metaphysics. But he adds that the knowledge of the special sciences serves metaphysics as raw material. Metaphysics determines the essence of the investigated object. (10)

It must be kept in mind what Ingarden said in his Bergson thesis: Philosophical knowledge is not human, it is superhuman.
Ingarden's aim was not only to find his own solutions to philosophical problems but to find the solutions to them, to settle philosophical disputes once and for all by propounding his *philosophia prima et ultima*.

But the success of the whole enterprise depends upon the acceptability of the Cartesian point of departure. There is no reason at all to believe that a description of noemata gives a privileged access to absolutely indubitable knowledge, over and above the experience of ordinary humans. However reliable the method of doubt may be, it gives only access to the cogitations of the ego. It says nothing about what is. Ingarden's pure consciousness is not Husserl's transcendental ego. It is somehow linked with the personality of the philosopher and is therefore not "pure". It is difficult to accept the claim that such a consciousness is free of all errors and speaks only the truth. The alleged Archimedean point is not as certain as Ingarden wants it to be. By his method of analysing "pure possibilities" Ingarden can prove anything he wants, "whether it be the God or the devil", as Z.A. Jordan so aptly comments. (11) The Cartesian principle was devised by its author as an instrument in the battle for secularisation, against religion and authority. Although Ingarden praises human creativity, these are not his aims. Intellect is only an instrument of the spirit, through which eternal truths are revealed. In Ingarden's hands the Cartesian
principle becomes a subterfuge for his claim to have access to absolutely certain knowledge.

It is worth pointing out that the knowledge that the absolute knowledge of immediate intuition cannot possibly be obtained but in immediate intuition. Thus at the very core of Ingarden’s infallible method and unerring philosophy there is an antinomy which makes the claim of absolute self-evidence dubitable. (64)
25. The role of language

Ingarden does not subscribe to the Husserlian view that language (judgments) create the reality of the world and ideal objects. Language is the medium for the description of ideas. According to the commands of the epoché this description cannot assume in the beginning that there is such an idea or what it is. The description must begin at the zero point.

Language is the vehicle of intuition, the a priori material and formal knowledge. But this does not necessarily mean that the analysis of language is analysis of the world. The structure of language is not the structure of the world. This can only be revealed in immediate intuition which seems to be pre-linguistic. But the world cannot be described unless there are appropriate linguistic forms for it. Time does not exist because there are verbal tenses but it cannot be described without them. This is, however, not always clear in Ingarden. He criticized the reists for not having analysed the term "thing". Such an analysis is, evidently, not only a precondition for a philosophical discussion about things but also a precondition for their existence or, at any rate, for the demonstration that they exist. (12) This neglect by the reists shows that their theory is not "science".

The structure of experience, providing itself its own self-evidence, is revealed in language. This experience
shows that there are both processes and things. The corresponding linguistic entities are verbs and nouns. If the Bergsonian view is to be accepted that there are only processes and things are fictions of language then the optimal language would contain only verbs. Ingarden does not accept this view (which also approaches the Husserlian internal time-consciousness) but he things that the dynamic aspect of reality appears in verbs, its static aspect in nouns. (13) Because in Ingarden's view temporal existence is degrading and connected with nature all his formal categories are composed of nouns and adjectives. Only such categories convey the eternal and unchangeable, and, consequently, also truth.

But such categories are not a necessary condition for an intelligible talk about the world (of ideas). It is forbidden in phenomenological research to define terms. This is a centrally important methodological principle. It is directed against the logicians of the Lwów-Warsaw school who learnt from Twardowski to operate only with meaningful and precise terms. Ingarden calls this a nonsensical postulate. A phenomenologist cannot and may not begin by a definition. In the beginning plain words are to be used and technical terms are then introduced step by step. This is because the phenomenologist is not making a report about the results of his investigation. The process is the process of his investigation. A certain fluidity of the text is inevitable
because the reader is granted access to the process of transition from the less clear intuitions to the crystallized ones. If the reader is puzzled tant pire for him. Phenomenology does not need non-intelligent, lazy, disinclined or reluctant readers unable to reach the immediate data of experience. (14)

In his works, Ingarden usually sticks to these prescriptions about the use of language. The reader must painfully work himself through hundreds upon hundreds of muddled text hoping to reach the promised "intuition". But Ingarden frequently defines his terms, especially the central categories of the system, such as, e.g. modes of existence, and he does so without any preceding phenomenological demonstration. Perhaps the word "definition" is not the appropriate expression: The contents of the ideas appear in these terms.

In a correctly conducted phenomenological investigation the definition can only come at the end. This is another way of saying that ontology and metaphysics provide the other sciences with their axioms. Ingarden criticizes A. Tarski's work Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen for using the method of deduction from a definition and for failing to show the essence of veracity (prawdziwość) but in the narrow domain of an artificial language. (15)(Besides, the correspondence theory of truth is a piece of nonsense in Ingarden's view).
It is implicit in Ingarden's formulae for the uses of language that the length of the text contributes to the force of the argument. If an idea is described in every conceivable detail then in the end the reader must agree that things are as the author describes them. This is all good and well if the argument is sound. But it can also be a cover for thought which badly tolerates the light.
The applicability of the reduction

The reduction is the centerpiece of phenomenology. Its aim is not only to defeat scepticism. It is a necessary step towards "scientific" philosophy. Phenomenology, which is to "unravel for us the riddles of the world and of life", must be consistent and non-contradictory. (16) But the epoche does more than that. It is a certain metaphysical principle which makes out of phenomenology not only a certain type of a methodological theory but transforms it into a certain philosophical doctrine.

It is based on the metaphysical assumption that nature is indifferent and alien to man, opposed and inimical to man. Man can never form a homogenous whole with nature. For philosophic knowledge, if it is to exist, it is imperative that nature be excluded. But knowledge must be about things. The question is how knowledge is then possible. Husserl states this clearly in the beginning of his lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie. How can cognition accord with things as they are ("an sich seienenden"), how can it get at them, when things take no care of our movements of thought. (17) It is worth noting that Husserl uses the word "die Sache" (which is here translated as "thing") but not das Ding. This is a foreboding of things to come.

The epoche is not only a method by which we "rid
ourselves of our prejudices" and tells us "to set aside all the opinions which we formerly accepted, until, on applying to them further examination, we discover them to be true", as Descartes says in his 75th Principle of Philosophy. (18) By adopting the epoche we leave once and for all the ground of natural thinking (scepticism, (the scepticism of) the natural sciences, psychology).

But why is it necessary? What is so bad about scepticism? Phenomenology and scepticism agree that the object of knowledge is transcendent in relation to knowledge. What went awry in (Hume's) sceptical theory was that he could not take care of the objectivity of knowledge. The solution is not to remove the world of knowledge into the realm of objects, as Leśniewski and Kotarbiński tried to do. In order that knowledge may have objectivity it has to be removed into the realm of subjectivity. Nature, the natural world, the realm of things (Dinge) has to be phased out, bracketed, destroyed. The discovery which makes this possible is Brentano's idea that consciousness is always consciousness of (something). Thus cognition can get at things without presupposing their existence, without the danger of categorial mistakes and being involved in paradoxes (of the Russelian type).

The epoche is a condition for the possibility of knowledge and thus also for the possibility of philosophy. The extramental world cannot be mixed up with the mental
world. (This provides consistency). But the mind is so structured that it can, nevertheless, produce objective knowledge. It is the task of the philosophy of thought and the theory of meaning how this is possible.

There we find that the cogito is always accompanied by a cogitatum. The percipiens cannot but have a perceptum. Immanent perception becomes indubitable. (19) This is the answer to the sceptic who says that knowledge is given but that the known object is not given. He cannot explain how knowledge can have relation to an object. (20) By applying the epoche the phenomenologist can say that knowledge has a relation to the object, that knowledge is possible. The objects of knowledge are given in pure givenness, in genuine immanence. Consciousness is given in its existence and essence. (21)

The object becomes the noematic correlate of the act of cognition.

But from maintaining that all non-immanent objects are only possible objects of knowledge there is a short step to the assertion that objects have no being unless they become the object of knowledge. The object constitutes itself in cognition. "Being a cognizable object" comes to mean "being an object at all". (22) This leads forward to transcendental idealism and there is no way back unless phenomenology is repudiated as philosophy.

That is why philosophers who think that phenomenology can be carried out either without the epoche or
or by sublating it at one stage or another return inevitable to the natural attitude and cease to be phenomenologists. (23)

The existentialists (Sartre) begin from "impure" consciousness and do not employ the epoché. This means, from the Husserlian point of view, that they never reach the philosophic, scientific level. But Sartre begins by constructing an ontology because he does not want to pay the price of idealism. In his view "not only does pure subjectivity, if initially given, fail to transcend itself to posit the objective; a "pure" subjectivity disappears". (24) Sartre renounces essentialism and remains on the level of phenomenological description. Is he then a sceptic? That would be the only alternative according to Husserl's logic. "To begin with ontology is to presuppose the objectivity that is subsequently to be guaranteed by one's epistemology". (25)

Is there no way to get around this hard logic? Ingarden accepts the reduction as an inevitable device to avoid question begging in epistemology. It is necessary to use this instrument as key to the world of ideas and essences. But he does not accept Husserl's view that objects are constituted in cognition. They are given in direct intuition, as noemata, i.e. reduced. The task is to describe these objects, not as they are in their real being but as possible objects of a possible
being. Thus ontology becomes possible as science, as eidetic analysis of the contents of ideas. By taking these measures not only ontology but phenomenology as such becomes possible as science. Because, as Ingarden sees it, the theory of constitution in cognition leads to inconsistencies which invalidate the claim of phenomenology being a rigorous science.

Ingarden accepts the eidetic reduction (epoché) but rejects the phenomenological or transcendental reduction.

The general thesis of the natural attitude is to be bracketed and all the positive sciences. But the noematic sense (Gegenstandssinn) is to be considered as given, not constituted. Not to be included in the reduction is the pure ego of the philosopher. The stream of consciousness becomes an ontological object. Logic is not to be bracketed and general categories such as essence and existence, matter and form are considered as given. Ingarden thinks that he has thus solved the problem of the beginning.

Ingarden thinks that the transcendental reduction does not obtain what it set out to obtain: a region of absolute existence. What belongs to the world? What belongs to pure consciousness? How is pure consciousness to be gained as a phenomenological residuum? These questions can be answered only after the reduction has been carried out. Everything which is said before the reduction is said on the basis of the reduction. (26)
The essence of the pure consciousness is to be discovered through the transcendental reduction but the transcendental reduction is formulated from the standpoint of pure consciousness. This is an unacceptable paradox in Ingarden's view. Ingarden is unable to follow Husserl when all formal and material ontologies are to be bracketed, logic and the pure ego of the philosopher. Everything transcendent is to fall under the reduction, including God. There is no longer any distinction between the thing-noema (cogitatum) and the thing itself. It becomes a correlate of consciousness.

Ingarden thinks that this leads to an unsatisfactory situation. "The whole thing has to be taken up for a new consideration". (27) The program of phenomenology as scientific philosophy results in a "spiritualistic monadology" where the ego of the philosopher is dissolved as an object which constitutes itself in conscious experiences and transcendental subjectivity, which was to be an absolutely certain region of existence, evaporates in the thin air. "All our efforts have been wasted", he concludes. (28)

Ingarden is here reviving the Twardowskian distinction between act, contents and object and defending the possibility of describing objects from the point of view of contents, thus creating ontology as science of possible existence.

Husserl thought that the transcendental reduction
made metaphysics unnecessary. But Ingarden wants to make metaphysics possible. He accepts the applicability of the reduction to the critique of knowledge.

"It is a method for avoiding the error of petitio principii ... By suspending ... the belief in the existence and determination of the objects of knowledge of a certain investigated kind ... it is to prevent prejudging ... the cognitive validity of the investigated cognition at the moment when this validity is still to be disclosed:..." "When the question is the problem of the cognitive value of ideal objects ... the reduction must be extended to all prejudices of the existence and qualification of ideas or essences..." "The application of the phenomenological reduction ... in the field of the critique of knowledge ... is not only useful but also necessary! But philosophical investigations are not to be limited to epistemology. If this were so then it would be impossible to reach any solution in the dispute between idealism and realism. Therefore, it must be possible to carry out a non-reductive metaphysical analysis "of "the essence of this world" and "of "its possible mode of existence and ... its nature".(29)

Ingarden agrees that in the sphere of epistemology no metaphysics is possible. But he accuses Husserl of making unjustifiable metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premises in favour of idealism. But metaphysics must be possible if the problem of the
existence of the world is to be solved. But this implies that such metaphysics must be dismissed from service under the banner of reduction. But is it possible to sublate the reduction once it has been introduced? At this point Ingarden's philosophy reaches its climax. The possibility of a final judgment will be discussed later.
Husserl says in *Ideas* I that the reality of the whole world is in its essence devoid of independence ("entbehrt wesensmässig der Selbständigkeit"). The natural world is a correlate of consciousness. He also says that the spatial thing is nothing but an intentional entity. (30)

Ingarden thinks that these theses are not demonstrated to be true by Husserl. Before they can be accepted an analysis of the modes of existence of things and in of the whatness of things has to be carried out.

If the result is that things exist as Husserl says then idealism is proved right. If not - then realism is right. This is the task of Ingarden's ontology. The first thing to do is to make distinctions in two areas: 1. Existence of things. (What does Husserl mean by "dependence"?) 2. Structure of things.

Real things cannot be determined by cognition. Phenomenology can be a science only if it describes the eidos as it is revealed in eidetic insight. This is a type of cognition which cannot be false, or at least the truth of the insight is proved by the structural analysis of the eidos.

Ingarden does not take up a regional ontology but a comprehensive one covering the totality of being. But the totality is not analysed as such. Distinctions have to be made, especially between the real (contingent), the ideal,
and the intentional. The analysis of the structure of intentional being is to reveal the difference between it and the contingent real being. If this can be done then transcendental idealism is wrong in supposing that all being is intentional and heteronomous.

In the book *Innårspring i Edmund Husserls fenomenologi* Ingarden says that the reason why he was occupied with works of art and literature was that he wanted to understand what it meant that real objects had no "absolute essence", and cannot be autonomous but only heteronomous which means that they have only those determinations which are attributed to them but no effective determinations. The result of these analyses was that intentional objects have gaps in their determination, that they are only partly determined. Real objects have no such gaps and are allsidedly determined.(31)
27.

**Intentional objects**

In one of his works on literature Ingarden writes:

"I occupied myself with these intentional, non-real objects in order to find means to fight Husserl's transcendental idealism. I understand, however, that some are of the opinion that there are no beings but material things and psychic facts are to be accepted. But I demand from persons confessing this standpoint that they cease occupying themselves with literature or any linguistic formations; since there are neither among material things nor among psychic facts anything such which can be called literary works or linguistic formation". (32)

Ingarden's purpose was not primarily to refute the Husserlian transcendentalism but to find some better means to achieve its aims. The second, and maybe not less important task was to refute materialism and positivism.

The theory of intentional objects was the first step to achieve that aim. It is set forth in the book *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* (1931) ("The work of literature"). In it, Ingarden said later, "I investigated, platonically speaking, the general idea of the work of literature". (33)

This general idea is not a human product. The concrete work of literature (a novel, a poem) is a concrete embodiment of that idea. This is based on Ingarden's fundamental intuition that man is neither master nor spirit, neither animal nor the Holy Ghost but situated
somewhere in between them. The results of man's creative activity are a special reality but, nevertheless, only a shadow of the real reality.

The idea of literature has its structure and this structure has its elements. They are embodied in language and linguistic structures. The main theme of the book is therefore an analysis of linguistic structures as they are concretized in literature.

The idea of the literary work is divided into two main kinds of structure. The first is its (the literary work's) phases and parts which are composed of sentences connected together from the beginning to the end. The sentences are composed by words which have their meaning. Meaning refers to "objects", i.e. clusters of qualities and substances. Meanings are not ideal, as Husserl thought, neither are they anything psychological as Twardowski held. They are created by man and have their history. Languages as a whole are human products. But once created they have their own mode of existence independent of mind.

The second kind of structure is the structure of literary work as such. This structure is created by the system of meanings of words and sentences. In this system there are several strata. Ingarden distinguishes four such strata. The first is the sound stratum, the words as they are pronounced. The second is the stratum of meanings which is basic. The third is the stratum of
schemes of appearances which shows things and persons as described in a literary work. The fourth is the stratum of presented objects and these are described by the purely intentional states of affairs created by the meanings of sentences.

The work of literature is a pure intentional object although it has some physical foundation for its being. It is completely independent of all psychic experiences including those of the author and the readers.

The purely intentional objects created in literary works have their own special mode of existence, the intentional or heteronomous mode. This means that heros of fiction do not live in the imagination of the readers. They do not live in the books or other works of literary fiction which describes them. They have their own life which is neither ideal nor real. This is an important point in Ingarden's ontology. Shakespeare put the last dot after the last sentence of Hamlet, this hero began his own life in a sphere of existence specially intended for this kind of beings where they live independently of their creator.

The second aspect of these beings is their schematism. Real individual objects are fully determined. This means that their essence, form, matter, substance and mode of situation existence can be described univocally. The is different in the case of fictitious beings. They have gaps in their determination and these are revealed in
in the third and fourth strata, those of schemes of appearances and of presented objects. The real beings have all the necessary elements for their own structure. The intentional beings may lack some elements necessary to carry out their full characterization. For example, we do not know whether Hamlet was blond or whether he had black hair. He might have been bald. As we know that there never was a Danish prince called Hamlet we cannot point to him and assert: This prince, Hamlet, was bald. Hamlet was created by acts of consciousness of his author and cannot be fully determined as a real being can because the sheer amount of sentences needed for a full description even of a fictitious hero would be so great that it would have to be extended into infinity. Each work of fiction has a finite quantity of sentences and therefore there are bound to occur gaps in the determination of objects appearing and presented in it.

By thus showing the different structure of fictitious heros and real objects Ingarden thinks that he has refuted Husserl's theory of constitution. If everything is constituted, as Husserl came to think, then everything is constituted as fiction. Now, Ingarden showed that there is an essential difference between the structure and mode of existence between real things and intentional, fictitious objects and from that follows that their constitution must be different. When constituting objects their structure and mode of existence have to be taken into account.
Real objects are autonomous. Fictitious objects are heteronomous.

The theory of the constitution of intentional objects occupies an important place in Ingarden's ontology. It is based on the theory that there is a difference between objective and intentional states of affairs. In the case of a scientific description of an object the object is posited as real and described as such. The real (or ideal) existence of the object is asserted. The counterpart of the sentences composing such a description is an objective state of affairs (stan rzeczy, Sachverhalt). The state of affairs corresponding to the sentence "A car passes by" is "the-passing-by-of-the-car". This is an objective state of affairs. If we take another example: "This ball is red", then the objective state of affairs is "the-being-red-of-the-ball". This objective state of affairs is composed of the predicative quality which characterized the subject as a substance or, in Ingarden's parlance, as a "constitutive nature".

In works of fiction the same form is used. But sentences composing a literary work are deprived of the sign of assertion. They do not posit the existence of the states of affairs referred to. They are "as if" sentences referring to purely intentional states of affairs. These sentences are not judgments but quasi-judgments. This state of affairs belongs to the sentence but is at the same time transcendent in relation to it.
The intentional state of affairs as if "hovers in the air" it lacks roots in a sphere of being independent of the sentence. (34) The meanings of sentences in literary works do not refer to any human or real or ideal reality but to a special reality, a special sphere of existence which hovers somewhere in the air but is nevertheless a kind of existence. The work itself, the sentences themselves belong to this purely intentional mode of existence. (35)

But this does not mean that a literary work has its foundation of being in the subjective operations creating meaningful sentences. The work of literature is an idea and if it were not could not maintain any identity. If the foundation of the being of literary work were not in ideas then there would appear the danger that psychologicistic or the physicalistic opinion on this matter could be considered as correct. But then the work of art would be identified with the materials in which it is embodied. There could be as many Hamlets as there are concretisations of the drama (either by readers or theatrical directors). There could then be as many Fausts as there are copies of the book. And if the work of fiction were not rooted in ideas then no sentences would be possible and their intersubjectivity would be impossible.

The same must be said about the types of pronunciation of words. They must have their prototypes in the world of
ideas if they are to maintain their identity. (36) This must be so if intersubjective knowledge is to be possible in general and thereby science.

As a result of all these distinctions we have a host of elements, all composing different realities. There are ideas and concretisations of them, e.g. in mathematical sentences. There are intentional objects with their structure and elements. There are sentences with their structures. There are meanings creating special structures. There are objective states of affairs and purely intentional states of affairs and they have their own peculiar matter, formal structure and existential characteristics. There are real individual things composed of substances and properties and correlates of sentences such as e.g. "Cracow is situated on the Vistula". But one thing is missing in all this crowd of entities: the category of a real thing. Things do not exist in Ingarden's ontology, only combinations of matters, qualities and modes of existence; linguistic entities and their correlates. The correlate to the sentence "Cracow is situated on the Vistula" is not the fact that if we were in Cracow we could see the city on the banks of the river. The referent of the sentence is a special mode of existence which is called reality.

The beginning of the system is at the top, in the general objects called ideas. These general entities are
then concretized in subjective operations of men and expressed in linguistic forms or in forms of art.

Ideas are the guarantee of the identity of things, of the objectivity of knowledge and the meaningfulness of language. Nevertheless, ideas are not in things. Universalia non sunt in rebus, says Ingarden and this is one of his aberrations from the Aristotelian model. But how can they then carry out their function of keeping all the different realities together and provide the basis of all that is? Ideas are simply entities which have to be postulated in order to make the Platonic system tenable. There are several questions in connexion with them which may not be asked: Why should it be that they existed from the beginning of time and will continue to exist as timeless entities without any beginning and end? How do they exist outside time and space? Why are they objective and a guarantee of the objectivity of human thoughts?

These questions do not get any answers in Ingarden's system of ontic beings. The explanation of the intersubjectivity of language by referring to such metaphysical entities is only a subterfuge which carries no force of persuasion. His distinctions, creating "realities" and "beings" and "entities" and systems are construed with great virtuosity but they are marred by the fact that they are themselves a work of fiction of a very similar kind as the fiction which is to be explained by the theory.
It is doubtful whether the refined structures of various entities and beings which Ingarden describes contribute anything to a better understanding of literature. He says nothing about literature as such. His only matter of concern is the intentional beings created by meanings. This formalism is maybe self-explanatory but it adds nothing to our understanding of the creative acuity of poets and novelists, what literature is about, how it is really structured or what social role it may play.

It is also doubtful whether the main objective, the refutation of Husserl’s idealism, has been achieved. Husserl was concerned with the constitution of objects in cognitive experience. Ingarden identifies this with the constitution of intentional objects. This implies that Husserl’s procedure was in a way similar to that of the novelist. But Husserl was not engaged in the constitution of intentional objects by the means of quasi-judgments. His judgments belong to science. They are taken in their assertive function. But even so, Ingarden claims that his description of intentional objects as having gaps in their determination applies to every intentional object as such and, by implication, to Husserl’s intentional objects, too. By showing that these intentional objects are different from real objects Husserl’s transcendental idealism is said to be refuted. But this is not necessarily so. Ingarden is doing ontology. Husserl
is seeking the type of experience which produces scientific concepts. The difference between the two theories is so great that it is doubtful whether Ingarden's description of his ideas is applicable to the type of theory Husserl explicates. Although Ingarden removes objects out of the sphere of human subjectivity and stipulates for them different kinds of existences outside the human mind it does not follow that Husserl's epistemological constitution or his transcendental idealism is proved to be untenable.
Ingarden claims that he has solved the problem of universals and the problem of participation by discovering the existence of variables in ideas. Thereby ideas are also established as ontological principles of the structure of the world instead of being abstract epistemological concepts.

"As far as I know, I was the first to turn attention to the appearance of "constants" and "variables" in the contents of ideas and thus running against the traditional Platonic concept and at the same time I made it possible to affirm the theory of ideas free from objections which have been put forward against ideas from the times of Aristotle or rather from the time of Plato's Parmenides". (37)

"It is typical that through the ages — alas, one has to say — not until my Essentiale Fragen was published, the existence of variables in the contents of ideas was not taken into account and the so-called "general objects" were taken to be exclusively nothing but collections of so-called "common properties" (cf. e.g. Locke, in Poland Twardowski)". (38)

The most important thing about ideas is that they have a two-sided or bilateral structure. In this lies the novelty of Ingarden's discovery. First of all, they are universals or "general objects". They are not a
general name for common properties of objects but a special kind of being, the ideal being. The idea is not real. It is transcendent in relation to mind. It does not take part in the existence of real or ideal concretized entities. It is different from objects, essences, ideal qualities and concepts. The two-sidedness of the structure of the idea means that the idea has its structure qua idea but also a content in which ideal concretisations of pure ideal qualities appear. (39)

"In the idea there is a remarkable bilaterality of structure. On the one hand we have the structure of the idea qua idea, on the other hand we have the content of the idea, i.e. in this is founded the relation to possible individual objects and in this the determination and the structure of the object in question is reflected. This bilaterality is itself a moment of the structure of the idea". (40)

There are constants and variables in the content of the idea. Ingarden explains this by taking the idea of "man in general". The elements of the contents of this idea are "being alive", "being vertebrate", "having two feet", "endowed with reason", "being a psycho-physical individual". These are properties of every man. To the variables belong to have some height, some temperature of the body, some or other skin-colour. Whenever & the functor "some" (jakiś) appears in the contents of a name.
then the element which comes after it is called variable.
(41) The constants of the contents of ideas are ideal concretisations of a determined ideal quality. For example, in the idea "quadrangle in general" the constants are: "quadrangleness", "foursidedness", "parallelogramness", "rectangularity" etc. The variable in the contents of an idea is a concretisation of a pure possibility of concretisation (or realisation) in a corresponding individual object of a certain ideal quality which is signified by the constant factor of the given variable or the constant of the contents of the idea. For example "a colour of the skin" is a constant factor in the variable "some or other skin-colour" which belongs to the contents of the idea "man in general". The variable factor of the variable is signified by the word "some". (42)

The variable has a different meaning from what it has in mathematics. The variable is a potential, possible being (Sein). It exists ideally and may be exemplified. The variables in the content of an idea differentiate the idea from all other objects. Above all, the variables make a distinction between an idea and an individual object which has no variables. The individual object is a direct exemplification of a particular idea. In such an idea there is no variable.

In the general ideas the system of qualitative constants never exhausts the whole qualification of
the individual object. The constants are ideal correlates of many moments of the qualification of the individual object. In the contents of a general idea there is at least one qualitative variable univocally determined. In addition to qualitative constants there are formal constants which are ideal correlates of the form of the object. Qualitative variables are related to a moment of the qualification of the individual object as a type of properties (Eigenschaftstypus) but are not related to special cases of this type. The more general the idea is the greater is the number of qualitative variables in the contents of the idea. If we go from a general idea to an individual object we have to go to a particular idea. The individual object is an indirect (mittelbar) exemplification of a general idea. (43)

In the idea there coexist both necessary relations between its constants and pure possibilities. These relations can be transformed into propositions which are valid about individual objects. In the idea there is nothing arbitrarily created by man, nothing in it depends upon human will. (44)

This theory of ideas solves many problems. Among them is the problem of participation. Formerly it was held that objects (individuals) were doubles or copies of ideas. This means that the world of ideas and the world of individuals are identical. Ingarden shows that this is
not so. Each of these worlds have their different form, mode of existence and contents. But ideas are "to a certain extent" prototypes of individuals. (45) Individuals participate in the idea through being concretisations of ideal qualities which compose the content of the idea. The type of the idea under which the individual in question is subordinated decides the mode of existence of the individual in question. These special types of ideas are called essences.

But it is an obscure point how individuals are to be produced by combining ideal qualities. There must be some momentum individuationis, says Ingarden, but this operation cannot produce any numerical identity of individuals in time and space. This cannot be accepted because then it would be difficult to produce ideal individuals which are neither in space nor time. (46) Ingarden is led to think that individualization (Ver-einzelung, ujednostkowienie) concerns all qualitative moments in a given individual and that this is a certain mode of existence which is the source of the numerical plurality of individuals. Ingarden concedes that he is unable to describe this more accurately and the operation of individualization remains unclear. (47) Ontology meets here with metaphysics (in the Ingardenian sense). At this point unsurmountable difficulties arise when the system of ideas as structural principles of the world(s) is to be put on the metaphysical scales.
Another problem to be solved by this theory of ideas is concerning the difficulties entailed by the representationalist theory of abstract or general ideas. This does not so much concern the difficulty of comparing the originals with ideas although also this difficulty is removed by the epoché and the ontologization of ideas.

John Locke thought that by comparing ideas, by testing their agreement and disagreement it should be possible to collect common properties into concepts which could be called general. But he had difficulties in finding the general in the singular and the singular in the general. For any individual triangle has only the properties that belong to it as an individual. It is not abstract. And, conversely, if there is an abstract triangle composed out of common properties of triangles then it cannot be any individual triangle.

"For example: Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle? ... for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon: but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist". (48)

Twardowski was of the opinion that the "general presentation" (Allgemeinvorstellung), or abstract concepts, were a group of elements common to a number of objects. But he adds that the general concept cannot be identified.
with the singular individual. The object of the general concept is a part of the object subordinated under the general concept. It is impossible, says Twardowski, to imagine a "general" triangle which were neither oblique nor rectangle nor sharp-angled. But it is possible to form such an indirect presentation of a general triangle.

(49) Twardowski accepts thus the Lockean principle but tries to eliminate the difficulties inherent in it. This attempt was the precursor of Husserl's theory of objects (parts and wholes) and influenced the creation of the so-called Gestalt-psychology.

Ingarden's theory of ideas is thus an answer both to representationism and Twardowski in particular.

Twardowski was a "psychologist" in the sense that he thought that concepts were created by the mind.

Ingarden removes the sphere of ideas completely from the area of the subjective and makes out of them a special mode of being. Ingarden does this in agreement with his model of the Logical Investigations which, according to him, were rooted in realism. Ingarden's theory thus becomes ontological.

Ingarden's theory of the contents and the variables in the general idea is meant to solve the paradox in Locke's theory of general ideas. The singular is included in the general, not by identifying both, but by including the singular as variables of the content. The idea is not a collection of common traits but a special being with its own structure.
The third and most important task to be achieved by the theory of ideas is the refutation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Ingarden is led to think that atemporal ideas are immutable, changeless, motionless and stable. This is because if they were not, then they were nothing but intentional, heteronomous objects as those constituted in Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity. In that case relativism would have to be accepted and, maybe, psychologism and scepticism as well. The whole argument of phenomenology as ontology hinges on the idea of immutability of ideas. If ideas can be created then they would lose all importance "they might have in the system of knowledge about being". (50)

Ingarden’s theory is also directed against Bergson whose "relativization of categories" he criticized in his thesis on Bergson. Ideas must be outside time and change if scientific knowledge is to be possible. Ideas which were relative to humans or to contingent things would be worthless as the basis of absolute and eternal truth. Philosophy as ontology would become impossible as a science preceding all the other sciences and producing a true model of the world.

Ideas which were created in meaning-giving acts are ipso facto intentional. This is what Husserl did in Formal and Transcendental Logic (according to Ingarden). And this theory was also taken up by Herbert Spiegelberg in his work Das Wesen der Ideen (The essence of ideas)
(51) where he speaks about the creation of ideas. This is a most fatal distortion and regress in comparison with "my concept of ideas as presented in *Essentiale Fragen*, says Ingarden. (52)

Ingarden thinks that he has showed conclusively the difference between the structures of intentional and ideal objects. They have both bilateral structure but these structures are different. The intentional object has gaps in its determination but this cannot be compared with the occurrence of variables in the content of ideas. The variable is not a simple lack of constitutive moments as can be said about the gaps in determination of intentional objects. The variable is a supplement of the content of the idea, a concretisation of the possibility of material, formal and existential moments. Between the constants and the variables there is the relation of necessary subordination. The idea is autonomous and has to be analysed and accepted as it is. The intentional object is, on the other hand, sensitive to the conscious acts in which it is created. The transcendence of ideas in relation to our human existence is more radical than the transcendence of the real world because ideas are outside time. The intentional object is heteronomous because all its attributes do not belong to it immanently but are only ascribed to it. That is why it has a different mode of existence, different qualities and structure than autonomous objects.
Ideas are not in the world. They are radically transcendent in relation to individual autonomous objects. This entails that real objects can have no influence on ideas, and, conversely, ideas have no influence on things in the real world. And this entails also that ontology cannot say whether the real world exists. Ontology is the analysis of ideas.

The third problem to be solved by the theory of ideas is the problem of Husserl's ideation. Ingarden's ideas are, of course, a hypostatized form of Husserl's species. But Husserl had difficulties in explaining the relations between the experience of truth and truth itself as an ideal, eternal entity. Ingarden is probably right when he says that Husserl's concept of categorial intuition does not solve the problem. He adds that it remained unsolved until he discovered variables in the content of ideas. The concept of ideation is then moved out of the field of theory of knowledge and becomes an operation which makes it possible to go from individuals (real or ideal) to the apprehension of ideas in their structure, in their contents and variables. The difficulty is thus overcome and at the same time Husserl's contention that the generality of ideas (species) is something different from the individuality of individuals. (53)

Is this a solution of the problem? Ingarden is probably right in pointing out this difficult problem.
in Husserl's theory. This problem can be called the central paradox of the **Logical Investigations**. The sharp distinction between the ideal and the real is behind the problems which Husserl tried to solve with his transcendental idealism. He tries to describe the pure experience of truth and tries to find means to separate this experience from the empirical, psychic experience. Hence the difficulties in overcoming descriptive psychology. Truth is an absolute idea and it is to be valid both for men and non-men, angels and gods. But the evidence of truth is nothing but the experience of truth. (55)

Instead of obeying the voice of sound reason and agree that our theories and laws are hypotheses and conjectures which can be falsified and rejected at any time, Ingarden chooses to sharpen still more than Husserl did the gulf between the ideal and the real. He detaches completely the idea of truth (the *species*) from the experience of truth and elevates them into a special sphere of being over and above everything real and claims for the apprehension of these ideas in direct *a priori* intuition absolute infallibility and veracity.

Ingarden has shown that it is possible to construct a philosophical system on these premises. But he has to pay the prize of making it a purely hypothetical analysis of pure possibilities. It has no reference to real things or to a knowledge of such things.
Individual objects

The totality of being is divided by Ingarden not only in intentional and ideal objects. Two further regions have to be considered: those of the absolute being (God) and of individual objects. The question of God in Ingarden's doctrine will be considered later. In this section an attempt will be made to describe Ingarden's theory of the structure of individual objects.

The central formula for this kind of objects is that it is a subject of qualities with all these qualities taken together. (56)

The individual object is characterized by its simple structure which has only one layer or one side. This makes it unlike ideas which have a two-sided structure (constants and variables which have their counterparts in individual objects falling under the idea). This fact makes it also different from intentional objects which also have a two-sided structure: the contents created in an intentional act and the structure (with gaps in determinability).

The individual object has no such bilaterality in its structure. It is determined fully by its qualities. There is no lack or gap in its determination. It is characterized by its perfect immanence of its determining moments. It is therefore autonomous or independent of consciousness because this is the definition of autonomy. (57)

The individual autonomous object has both form and
matter. It is what it is by means of its matter or its qualitative determination. Form is not constitutive for individuality. It is entailed by matter. The quiddity of the individual object is determined by matter but it is this determined what thanks to the form. The copula grasps the object in its whatness which is an element of its matter. This element is its constitutive nature (direct morphe).

The formal elements "subject of qualities" and the "qualities of ..." complement each other mutually and form the basic form of the autonomous individual object. (58) There is no subject of properties without properties and there are no properties without subject of properties. The individual object is autonomous by means of the whole complex of its properties. Properties are fused together (concrescere) both among themselves (extension and colour) and by being the qualities of one and the same object. The direct qualitative determination of the subject of properties is the constitutive nature of the object. This nature is different from the whole complex of the qualities and from the particular qualities themselves. This nature constitutes the object as a whole. This is the Aristotelian \( \text{ti eιnai} \). The \( \text{poion eιnai} \) would be the whole complex of the determining qualities.

The essence is the total complex of qualities.

The existence (esse) is defined as a combination of quality and quiddity. To be something is to be determined
by a complex of qualities. This is *tī einai*. To be somehow (qualitas) is to participate in a quality which belongs to the object in question. This is *poion einai*. The essence is the combination of both.

The fusion of the properties in the subject of properties means that each object has only one nature. This means (as in Avicenna and Duns Scotus) that nature distinguishes the object from objects of other kind. But Ingarden has difficulties with *haecceitas* because numerical identity of things has no place in his doctrine. This is connected with the problem of individuation (*Vereinzelung*) (59) which was never solved by Ingarden. He cannot say whether there exist constitutive natures which comprise only one concrete thing nor can he give criteria for distinguishing among objects of the same kind.

The qualities which determine the subjects of qualities are all descendants of certain inhabitants of the Platonic heaven called ideal qualities. But these ideal qualities do not determine subjects of qualities adequately except in the case of exact mathematical ideas. In order to define a table the ideal quality of "tablehood" has to be concretised so as to fit the object it is to define. Ideal qualities are independent and closed in themselves. They seem to be the ultimate simples of each description. They are, of course, ideal and general. But they are able to descend down to earth and thereby they change mode of existence and become *individual* components of the determination...
of individual objects and then they are dependent upon the subject of properties they define. But the ideal qualities themselves do not need a "bearer" or a subject of properties to exist. Constitutive natures are concretisations of ideal qualities. For example, in the qualitative moment of a concrete red colour there appears the concretisation of the pure ideal quality "redness". The qualitative moment of the concrete colour and the extension of the colour are mutually dependent, i.e. they need each other mutually in order to exist.

Ingarden seems to offer a cross-breed between a theory of types and a theory of names when he analyses the following three sentences:

1. This table is brown. 2. This (here) is Mont Blanc. 3. This here is a table.

In the case of (2) Ingarden used to say (in Essentiale Fragen) that the copula denotes identity. In Spör he has changed his mind and asserts that in this case the individual object is named or called by its constitutive nature. The name "Mont Blanc" denotes the whole complex of properties which has the name "Mont Blanc". A name only denotes it does not connote. And it denotes the nature, the whole of the object, not its properties. A description is used instead of a name only when we do not know the name. When we do not know a thing we may say: "This is something red, round, smooth and hard". But after the object has appeared in a cognitive act we say: This is a
red ball" and these terms denote the nature of the thing.

In the case of (3) a table can only be a member of the class of tables because it is a table. And it is a table only because it participates in the quality "tablehood". "Tablehood" is its constitutive moment but it has also in it a set of properties which are characteristic for this table. "Tablehood" is a general quality common to all individuals of the same kind or genus. But as such "tablehood" is not its constitutive nature. For these purposed it is too abstract. The constitutive nature is such a matter (quality) which can be the "lowest type" (najniższa odmiana, niederste Differenz) which cannot be differentiated. It is possible to use "tablehood" to include the table in a class but this is not the constitutive nature. The constitutive nature determines the subject of qualities adequately and completely.

In the case of sentence (1) the table takes part in the ideal quality "brownness" which now changes its mode of being and becomes exactly this brown colour which qualifies this table. It takes on a specified form and loses its independence and becomes dependent upon the subject of properties it qualifies. This means that no qualitative matter can exist except in a certain form and this form is the "having" of properties or the qualitative determination. This is another way of saying that accidens non est ens, sed entis.

This theory states how attributes come to belong to
substances. An important point is that the accidents fuse or melt together to form a substance. Ingarden brings in the concept of *Gestalt* to bring this to intuition. A distinction has then to be made between original ideal quality (*Ur-Wesenheit*) and derived ideal quality (*abgeleitete Wesenheit*). The latter is a mixture of original ideal qualities. The *Gestalt* can be of both kinds. The *Gestalt* is something new and specific. The qualities which make up the *Gestalt* can only be seen in it, abstracted from it. It is not composed of simple qualities by adding one to another. They are fused or melted together. The object is then constituted as a *Gestalt* which then corresponds to the constitutive nature. But this does not mean that they are equivalent.

The individual object is not composed of *maxima* parts but the parts can be discerned in it. The object as a whole can be divided into parts. This concept is undoubtedly meant as an answer to Twardowski and his doctrine of the object as a whole composed of parts.

It has to be stressed that Ingarden's reconstruction of the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of being and essence is neither semantic nor linguistic. It is meant to show the real, essential structure of objects and is, therefore, a part of metaphysics (although he calls it ontological. The purpose is to show that transcendental idealism is wrong in supposing that all constituted
individuals are heteronomous or subjective products. By showing that individuals have their perfect immanence of qualities and a one-sided structure and that they are, hence, different from both ideas and intentional objects transcendental idealism cannot maintain that they are constituted in subjectivity out of elements of knowledge. Ingarden thinks that objects are as he describes them. Their structure has to be apprehended in their idea. But this does not mean that the doctrine describes individuals as they exist (in their ontic dimension). Ingarden is concerned with the eidos of individuals, the essence of individuality which cannot be defined. (60) Localisation in time and space does not belong to the essence of individuality because not all individuals are in time and space (and maybe none). Some of them are, in any case, ideal. Ingarden is concerned with the essence of possible entities whose existence need not be posited in reality. "Essence must signify something common to all natures" (61) and existence is not a real predicate. (That is why it is possible for substances to have dependent attributes).

It is noteworthy that the role of simples in Ingarden's doctrine is not played by facts or states of affairs. Such entities belong to the world down here, the world of contingencies in time and space. A doctrine accepting such entities as basic would repudiate itself. Ingarden's
simples are up there, far above the changeable earthly existence. His simples are ideal qualities, unchangeable and immovable. (62) Being and essence belongs to simple substances, to composite ones only in a qualified sense. "Essence is present in both, but it exists more truly and in a nobler way in simple substances, inasmuch as they have their acts of existing in a nobler way. For simple substances are the cause of composite ones - at least the first substance, God, is". (63)

These are St. Thomas Aquinas's words, and he also says that essence can be understood without the things which are its parts and that the cohesion of substances are caused by the principles of their nature. This is not far removed from Ingarden.

On this background Ingarden's critique of classification theory becomes more comprehensible. His main point of criticism is that set theory is about "elements" and not about objects (i.e. substances and constitutive natures). It does not matter whether these "elements" are so-called "simple ideas" or "impressions" (derived from experience) or some "physicalist" entities. For Ingarden this choice of simples is equally absurd. This is because set theory thus becomes either un-metaphysical or a wrong metaphysic. The first error committed by set-theorists (positivists, idealists, Machists et al.) is to take properties as simple elements of objects (individuals) and treat them all
equally. No element has a privileged role to play in the formal structure of the object. They are simply elements of a class. Matter (quality) is taken into account, but form and existence are excluded from the connotation of an element. The object becomes a "bundle" of elements, in other words, a "class". And Ingarden complains that his own concept of subject of properties is rejected by the positivists as "medieval metaphysics" (which, of course, it is).

Ingarden capitalizes on the difference between the thing and the concept, the element and the class. The element is not the class it belongs to. But it must have some properties which distinguish it from other elements. If so, then it is a "subject of properties". If not, then it is a class, and an infinite regress is inevitable. The class itself must have properties which distinguish it from other classes. If so, it is a "subject of properties". If not then it is again a class.

The first question to be answered is what kind of a theory class theory is. Does it belong to logic, semantics, ontology or metaphysics? Ingarden measures it with his Platonic metaphysical yardstick and finds that it does not come up to measure. A purely semantic theory can be interpreted in the metaphysical sense but its primary concern is to find rules to define symbols, not things. As such it can tell us how to avoid category mistakes.
At the basis of such a theory is the homogeneity of its elements. Ingarden's idea is, in that respect, not very different, the main difference being that he attaches a metaphysical significance to his concepts. In his system material things do not participate in ideas, but only ideal entities. Universals are particularized so that they can suit the content of names of different generality (or abstractness). But this leads to difficulties with "haecceitas" or the differences between elements of the same class. He takes qualities (not facts) as simples, lumps them together and constructs the concept of "constitutive nature" which is the nucleus of the object and achieved compactness by virtue of the qualities themselves. Ingarden thinks that he has thus solved the problem of participation (or inclusion). He may have avoided the antinomies of class theory but, nevertheless, the contents of the categories he thus arrives at is nothing but clusters of elements which refer to nothing but the universals which are intuited as essences. His fundamental concepts such as constitutive nature and subject of qualities explain nothing better than class theory does. Objects are composed of qualities and form classes. It is possible to add to this that classes (ideas) are special metaphysical entities, enjoying a special mode of existence, and that they are the ultimate prescriptions for the
structure of objects and that this structure not only can but must be intuited a priori. If Mach's elements are fictions then Ingarden's elements are no less fictitious. It is possible to use the Machian elements to form "subject of properties" and constitutive natures but does that solve the problems. In Mach's case there is also the question whether elements of conceptual knowledge can have metaphysical significance. Ingarden thinks he has solved that problem by positing ideas as "objective".

Ingarden thinks that he has solved the problem of the qualities of qualities by referring to the solidity or compactness of the constitutive nature. But how does this come about if the qualities do not have such qualities or inclinations which bind them together in this "constitutive nature"? The attribute has the attribute of forming the substance. The problem remains how the element can form a class which is not equivalent to the element but which includes the element, nevertheless. It is immaterial whether the class is called a class or an object.

There is a reason to believe that all class theories which operate with concepts such as "elements" and "qualities" will have difficulties in explaining how or why elements cling together to form classes. It is inevitable to refer to some properties of the qualities (elements) (either as they are "objectively" or subjectively reflected
in mind) or to posit the being of entities which do nowhere exist but in the imagination. Either the principles of cohesion of elements have to be relegated to the "nature" of the elements or to the subjective operations of the mind and both methods invite difficulties both of metaphysical and logical (semantic) kind.

The simplest theory and the one which does most justice to reality bluntly denies that there are classes and properties existing somehow differently from things. The sentence: 'This table is brown' would then mean, simply, that this table is one thing among brown things. When an attribute is linked with a substance, as when roundness is attributed to spheres, nothing is said but that spheres are round. Names are names of things. Properties and classes are not objects. This is Kotarbiński's view (64) and it has the advantage of eliminating (or, at least avoiding) antinomies in the theory of classes. But it has some difficulties concerning formal concepts such as that of the null-class. Kotarbiński never solved this deficiency satisfactorily. But it would be quite wrong to say that reism is unable to account for processes, events and such things. (65) Reism only denies that these things exist as entities separate from the things in which they take place. It places great confidence in language and opens up new possibilites for fruitful studies in logic and semantics different from the Sisyphean toil of harmonizing categories with objects.
Ingarden's criticism of classification theory has not the aim of reconstructing it as a consistent logical theory. His main point of criticism is that according to the theory of classes all the elements of a class are equally important for the constitution of an object. Ingarden takes classification theory as a metaphysical theory and criticizes it as such. He links this concept with nominalism, empiricism, positivism, relativism, materialism, scepticism and pragmatism. None of these can be refuted unless it is accepted that there are in objects essences based on elements of different importance for the constitution of the object. This implies the acceptance of the existence of ideas and the possibility of their cognition, i.e. a priori cognition.

It is of primary importance for Ingarden to refute nominalism because some of Twardowski's pupils adopted a position of this kind and considered an essence to be fictions created by names. And, Ingarden adds disdainfully, they thought this conception to be very "scientific". (66)

This is not altogether correct rendering of Kotarbiński's views. In his essay, "The concept of "essence of things", Kotarbiński states clearly that "the inquiry into the essence of things is not to be an inquiry into the meaning and connotation of general terms". It is rather to be an inquiry into the "class of the designata of a general
term - in other words, its extension”. “Thus the inquiry into the essence of things would consist of disclosing those properties specifically common to all the elements of that extension, which determine the totality of their specifically common properties”. (67) Kotarbiński does not, of course, accept the existence of universals, "horsenesses" and the like. He sees in the search for essence a need for probing deeper into the causes of things, to ever"greater essentiality" in that sense. Kotarbiński sees in this the search for an ever greater reliability of our knowledge but no search for an "absolute essence". As our knowledge "about the class of designata of given terms" moves forward we must always be ready to modify our theories and definitions in accordance with the results of studies which reveal more reliable (or "essential" knowledge of the subject.

Ingarden's theory of essences has nothing of this kind as its aim. His purpose by reviving the Aristotelian-Thomist theory of essences is not to make them useful or applicable to scientific research, but to formulate the idea of the supreme essence, God, and to descend from there to more concrete essences which can be said to constitute a sphere of being called the world.

Ingarden's treatment of the problem of essences is based on the scholastic tradition (Aristotle-St.Thomas, Suarez) but takes also into account seventeenth century rationalism (Chr.Wolff). The aim is purely metaphysical
to construct a general a priori model (or system) of the world.

The fundamental distinction which Ingarden makes is that essence belongs not only to real objects but also to ideal and other kinds of individual objects. (68) From this follows that Ingarden cannot accept that essence is the primary intelligible being of a thing, as Thomism asserts, if by a thing is to be understood a real thing only. This leads Ingarden to draw a parallel between his constitutive nature and the Thomist essence. But this is also in good accord with the Thomist parlance because essence, "the what a thing was to be" (quod quid erat esse) is also called by the them "nature" as the quiddity of a thing is the result of the operations which made the thing come into being. The thing has then been borne (res nata est).

This identification of the Thomist quiddity with constitutive nature makes it possible for Ingarden to use the term "essence" for every being which can be conceived according to their ideas. Ingarden considers three realms of being as being of prime importance: The Absolute, the most perfect, the optimum and maximum of being, the first rate being: God. The second rate being is the ideal, or the objects of mathematics. The third rate being is the real and temporal. Ingarden does not, in this connexion, consider the essence of intentional being, probably because it is only a shadow of reality.
Ingarden discusses at length the problem of the embodiment of essences and whether they can exist outside individuals or only inside them. He comes to the conclusion that essences are equally individual as the individuals themselves. This leads to a discussion with St. Thomas on the principle of individuation and on the question whether essences can be destroyed, as autonomous individuals are, in their essence, perishable.

The thesis that essence is intrinsic for individuals of each realm of being seems to be at variance with the Thomist thesis that essence is neither universal nor individual but individuated in the particular thing in order to exist and universalised in order to be known. For Ingarden essences are either universals or particulars and he opts for the latter possibility.

St. Thomas says that the principle of individuation is matter or, more accurately, designated matter. "By designated matter I mean matter considered under determinate dimensions. This matter, however, is not included in the definition of a man insofar as he is a man, but would be included in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition". (69) But a definition of a singular thing can never be reached, according to St. Thomas as the universal essence can never become a singular thing. To know the singular direct experience is needed. Such an experience is excluded in Ingarden's formal ontology which is an analysis of given ideas and pure possibilities.
Ingarden maintains that individuals have in their essence both form, matter and mode of existence. But it is the matter which designates the quiddity and quality of a given thing and differentiates among essences. He declares himself to be in accord with St. Thomas on this matter. But the individuation is different in each of the three realms of being. God, of course, cannot be individuated. He is one only. But exact ideas can be individuated. The idea of "quadrangleness" can be individuated in more than one copies (the particular quadrangles). But the same cannot be said about inexact ideas such as "dishness". The individuation of such ideas depends upon the possibility of their adding to constitutive nature their acquired properties which, along with the essence form a conglomerate called a definite object.

No object can be without necessary connexions among its elements. Empiricism is thus refuted. The nucleus of these connexions is the constitutive nature designated by its material determination. In the case of real objects to this nature there can be added acquired properties and externally conditioned ones and all this together makes up the essence of the object. All these elements of the object make up a synthetic unity which is a certain Gestalt (postać). This syntheticity is made up of the harmonic unity of its elements but it is also something new and indivisible. But this simplicity is different from the simplicity of qualities and that is because it is
synthetic. (70) The formal, material and existential moments create the essence of the object constituted by the given nature. The essence is the what without which the object would not be itself and to designate this the constitutive nature by itself is insufficient as it denotes only the gestalt-quality and the harmonic unity of the elements of the object. But the being itself of the object adds nothing to the material qualification. This is what St. Thomas said in these words: "Being can be attributed to anything concerning which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if it posits nothing in reality". Kant expressed this later by saying that existence is no real predicate of the object.(71)

This means that Ingarden is conscious of the limitations of the ontological argument and the fallacy of Descartes's attempt to use it to prove the existence of God. But this has, in turn, fateful consequences for Ingarden's own grounding of metaphysics.

After having laid down the rules for the general structure of essences Ingarden can describe in more detail the essential structure of the three main realms of being. First and highest on the list is the Absolute, God. To the essence of God belongs the trinity of matter, form and existence. Ingarden has some qualms about this, as St. Thomas calls god *actus purus* and Ingarden is afraid to deviate from St. Thomas in case this means that God is
deprived of material determination. And Ingarden asserts that no being, no existence is possible without formed matter, without being the existence of something. Even God, in all His exceptionality, has to obey this law.

But this is not necessarily a great revision of Thomism. Although St. Thomas says that God’s essence is His very act of existing, he adds to this that "this does not necessitate that He be deficient in other perfections and excellences". "God possesses all perfections in His very act of existing". (72) The difference between Ingarden and St. Thomas lies in Aquinas’s contention that existence is a limitation to the pure act of existence, whereas Ingarden asserts that all existence, including God’s, must accept that limitation.

Ingarden thinks that God is exceptional in all his determinations. Everything in Him has its source in his nature. No other being can have influence on Him. He is above and over all other beings. He has a unique mode of existence (He cannot be called an ideal object) and He has a unique form. There is only one single God. (73) God is therefore different from mathematical objects which can be issued in several copies. God has the optimal compactness of structure and the maximal perfection of His determination.

The most serious limitations which Ingarden imposes on God follow from the nature of his formal ontological investigation. God is a certain idea, established in the
givenness of human consciousness. God has exclusively qualities emanating from His own nature and is therefore unconditionally immutable. From this follows that this God is not the *primus motor*. He is incapable of action. He cannot be the creator of the world. He is impotent. This is a consequence of the Cartesian element in Ingarden's ontology (although Ingarden's cogito is limited to direct givenness and analysis of ideas. It is not experience of things). This closes the way for Ingarden to theistic metaphysics, and it can be opened only upon the *condition* that he discards his pure constitutive consciousness as belonging to humans and accepts God as the creator of Heaven and Earth and that his creation is accessible to man by an unreduced, natural consciousness. But this would mean that the whole system had to be built anew from different premises. This is probably the reason why Edith Stein did not try, as Ingarden did, to mix up Cartesian phenomenology with Platonized Aristotelian-Thomism, but accepted pure Thomism and made it the basis of her metaphysics.

Below God we find the second rate reality, that of mathematical ideas. They are inferior to God as they can be concretised in many copies but above the third rate reality as their determination springs from their essence thus differentiating themselves from the third rate (real and temporal) essences which possess acquired
and externally conditioned properties. God has thus also the name of the radical essence but ideal objects are also called exact essences. The third rate, changeable essences have the name of moderately exact essences or purely material essences.

The demarcation line between the ideal realm and the real realm is that objects of the former are wholly designated by their matter and form but the latter can acquire new qualities.

The third rate objects are burdened with more imperfections. Not only can they grow but they are always liable to disintegration and their own destruction and death. This means also that the ominous presence of irrationality is omnipresent in the real world. God is, of course, the optimal rationality. Ideal objects retain a rational essence. But the changeability of the real makes it irrational. Thus, the choice is for Ingarden as for the Thomists between the true God or radical irrationality.

"Everywhere, where there appears in the structure of an object some moment which is not fixed by necessity by its nature or essence of the object or whose necessary relation can be understood by analysis of the idea under which the object falls there we find irrationality in being". (74)

This irrationality of the real world makes it "chaotic" and is at the same time the basis of its history. (75)
If the real world were not derived from God all being would be doomed to hopeless irrationality. (76)

As the third rate objects have an essence they are not purely irrational. Their essence makes it possible to comprise them in a system called "the real world".

On the next level below God we find ideal objects. These objects possess only their absolutely own properties emanating from their essence. Causality does not apply to them. They form a not compact system and do not constitute a world. (77)

On the third level we enter the region of empirical possibility, chance and temporality. The elements of this region acquire a different mode of existence and because these elements have the moderately exact essence they cannot be ideal and must be real. The essence of these elements allows them to acquire externally conditioned properties. This region is therefore not compact. It is therefore the real world. All not-compact regions are worlds, compact regions all are non-worlds. In worlds the connective between its elements is causality, in non-worlds it is affinity. (78) The real world is thus composed of substances and their accidents. Both exist autonomously. But this autonomy is different from that of ideal objects because it is embodied in temporal being. The world is therefore defined by Ingarden as an individual of a higher order, composed of a set of autonomous, first order individuals. (79)
The region of intentional objects is composed of objects with gaps in their determinability and cannot, therefore, form a world. Each of the four regions of being is closed or isolated from all the others. They never mix. This leads to a difficult question about the unity of the totality of being. Ingarden is unable to find the basis of this unity in God or in ideas because both God and the Holy Trinity (universals) are radically transcendent and are not (in the formal-ontological framework) the foundation of being. Ingarden makes only the short remark that if there was a region of regions then this would constitute the totality of being. (80)
What is the mode of existence of the real world? A part of this question has already been answered by showing that the real world is autonomous and temporal and constitutes a closed whole, a certain region of being. But it remains to be shown whether this world was created by pure consciousness (or God) and if so whether this was done in one act of creation or whether the world is constantly being created in the course of time.

The background for this investigation is Husserl's contention that all reality is devoid of independence (Selbständigheit) (61) According to Ingarden Husserl attributed to the real world both temporality and heteronomy and the starting point of Ingarden's ontology was an effort to find out whether this view can be sustained or not.

The ground on which Ingarden bases his inquiry is partly traditional and partly Husserlian. It deviates from Husserlianism only on one major point.

The basic assumption is the epistemological and ontological transcendence of the perceived in relation to perception, of the world in relation to pure consciousness. The existence of the real world is dubitable in principle. This is the ultimate basis of the problem of the existence of the real world.
On the other hand, the existence of pure consciousness is indubitable and absolute. This has to be accepted as a fundamental premise for an attempt to solve the controversy between idealism and realism. (82) This transcendence, this gap or hiatus between world and consciousness has to be accepted "to avoid the dogmatism of traditional metaphysics". (83) It is impermissible to refer to the existence or property of any non-immanent object in order to substantiate the existence of the real world. Ingarden goes so far as to state that this radical transcendence is a fact which cannot be bypassed. (84) No element of the real world, a thing, a determination of a thing or a process, is a genuine (real) part of the conscious act in which it is given.

There is a contradiction in this which becomes serious when the question is raised about the possibility of metaphysics.

Despite the radical transcendence the objects of the world are given directly in their eidos to the cognitive possible subject. This makes ontology as an analysis of ideas. Ideas are not intentional objects. They are given directly in immediate experience. Thus Husserl's intentionality is not accepted as he portrays it in his doctrine of transcendental subjectivity.

There are four regions of being: The absolute (God), the ideal, the real and the heteronomous. The mode of
existence of the objects belonging to each region is designated by their essence. But the existential relation of these modes of existence to pure consciousness is designated by existential moments which, in various combinations, constitute the given mode of existence. These moments of existence are four pairs of concepts arrived at by making distinctions in the Husserlian concept of dependence but with the help of some scholastic notions.

These four pairs are:

1. Autonomy and heteronomy.
2. Originality and derivation.
3. Separateness and inseparateness.
4. Self-dependence and contingency. (85)

a) Autonomy and heteronomy

This is a variation on the scholastic term per se. A substance is said to exist per se "when it is brought into existence in virtue of itself, or of its own nature" (86) (ens per se existens per suam essentiam). The opposite is ens per alium existens.

Ingarden defines his autonomy by saying that something exists autonomously if it has in itself its foundation of being. This implies immanency of its determining properties. Pure ideal qualities, such as "redness in itself", are autonomous. Substances possessing immanently concretisations of ideal qualities are also autonomous although they exist in time.
Something exists heteronomously if it has its existential foundation in something other than itself. Such are all intentional objects. They are created by acts of consciousness. As examples can be mentioned: the hero in a novel, a social order, law, a piece of music. The intentional act of creation is unable to create autonomous objects.

b) Originality and derivation

This pair of concepts connotes the way of God's existence and the existence of His creation. (The corresponding scholastic terms are esse a se and esse ab alio). Nothing was before God. God is supra-temporal and eternal. But Ingarden suspends judgment on whether He is the first cause of the world. In any case, in Ingarden's view Spinoza's causa sui is self-contradictory. Ingarden defines originality as the existence of something which is got created by anything else. Derivative is something which is created and exists only as created. Original objects are also autonomous. Created objects can be autonomous or heteronomous. The original being (whether it is the Creator or something else) is perfect. The creation is imperfect. Ingarden, just as the Thomists, finds it heretical to ascribe aseity to nature, to every substance as Spinoza did. Everything created is fragile. A created being might just as well not exist. If it exists it is defective and fragile and can cease to exist, disintegrate, die. It is imbued with existential inertia.
All beings in time have these defects. They come into being and pass away, vanish. They pass from the present actuality into the oblivion and the non-actuality of the past. Changes in time and history itself are a destructive force. (87) Objects in time cannot overcome their fragility. They transcend, as it were, the sphere of their actuality into a continually new present. They exist thus throughout their lives, but, according the essence of time, each actual existence is always confined to a single present beyond whose limits none can reach in any specific instant of their existence. The actuality of their existence is always like a narrow fissure. Beyond its compass there lies the retrogressively derivative existence of their past, and their future existence is only foreshadowed. This "fissurated" (szczelinowy) mode of existence is characteristic for all temporal being. It is unable to surmount the fissuration of its existence. This includes conscious individuals. Neither can they overcome their fragility, mortality. This belongs to the essence of created being. And every object is either the Creator (the original being) or created (derivative).

Several questions impose themselves in connexion with this view of the world which Ingarden paints here. Why should there be a Creator? Why is he supra-temporal? Why does He exist in secula seculorum? Similar questions can also be asked about ideas. Why should they be atemporal and
eternal? All such questions are improper because they do not fit into the system. Ingarden could also point out that he is not positing the existence of God, only his existence has to be taken into account as it belongs to the fundamental methodological procedure not to leave out any possible possibility if reliable results are to be obtained from the inquiry. But this pretense that he is writing an "as if" philosophy, a philosophy of pure possibilities only is a ruse de guerre. It is to become evident that his ontology is really his metaphysics.

c) Separateness and inseparateness

According to Ingarden, an object is existentially separate if its essence does not demand any other object with which it must coexist in the framework of one and the same whole. The corresponding scholastic term is in se.

An object is inseparate if it necessarily coexists with another in the same whole.

d) Self-dependence and contingency

An object is non-independent when it demands a separate object to be sustained in being. When an object does not need any separate object for its existence then it is self-dependent.

Behind this terminological cloak is the question whether God created the world once and for all and does
not have to interfere with His creation or sustain it in being after the act of creation. Otherwise put it is the question whether the creation by God of the world has ended or whether it continues. This used to be a hotly debated question between the Catholics and Protestants. The Catholic Church insists upon the absolute transcendence of the Holy Trinity (as does Ingarden) and fights against modernism which is inclined to think that the creation of the world has not ended, that humanity takes part in the divine creation of the world, that the Holy Spirit is immanent in the world and reveals itself in creative and morally good actions. But if this latter view is adopted then it follows that God is not omnipotent. His creation would be so fragile that it could not exist without constant help from the Creator. This could also be connected with the view that the world is heteronomous, which is, of course anathema to Ingarden. (88) His concepts of self-dependence and contingency do not imply acceptance of creatico continua.

Ingarden now embarks upon a curious experiment in philosophical reasoning. After having defined his four pairs of existential moments he arranges them in eight possible (i.e. non-contradictory) combinations. To these eight possible combinations of the existential moments of the real world there are paired eight possible combinations for pure consciousness. The result is 64
possible solutions. From these 64 solutions all those are eliminated which are either self-contradictory or incompatible with Ingarden’s own premises. The final result is to be one and only one undoubtedly true and binding solution. This combinatory procedure, based on an anti-Hegelian non-contradiction, is at the foundation of Ingarden’s entire ontological enterprise. He does not succeed to find the final and only one solution, but in the end of Spór he is able to eliminate all combinations except two. To distinguish between them a metaphysic is necessary, but, as it turns out, this metaphysic is impossible upon Ingarden’s premises.

The result of the existential-ontological inquiry into the possible combinations of existential moments in each region of being (mode of existence) is as follows:

A. The absolute, supra-temporal being, God:
Autonomy, originality, actuality, non-fissuration, endurance, separateness, self-dependence.

B. Ideal, extra-temporal being:
Autonomy, originality, non-actuality, potentiality, separateness, self-dependence.

This is the mode of existence of ideal objects, mathematical objects, logical formations, ideas, ideal qualities.

C. The temporal, real being, the world:
Autonomy, derivation, actuality, fissuration, fragility,
separateness, independence.

This is valid for objects in the present. Modifications are introduced for objects in the past and in the future and also for processes and events.

D. The purely intentional being.

Heteronomy, derivation, non-actuality, separateness, dependence. (89)

Ingarden’s findings on the correct combinations of existential moments for pure consciousness are rather more obscure. The next section will be devoted to an attempt to find out Ingarden’s views on that matter.

It must be noted that Ingarden’s combinatory technique is a modified version of Ramon Lull’s *Ars Combinatoria*. Lull was a 14th century Franciscan who had the idea to combine Plato’s ideas in such a way as to form a *clavis universalis*, a key to all knowledge. He considered the Dignities (the Platonic ideas) to be instruments of God’s creative activity and archetypes of all created perfection. All created things could be reduced to the nine Dignities, or absolute principles.

"Through the right combinations of letters the right solution to any problem can be found, for the principles which compose the Figures are the general principles of all sciences and whatever is can be reduced to them ..." (90)

The aims of Lull’s combinatory art are, of course,
not Ingarden's, but the idea behind the procedure is the same: That it is possible to reach absolutely true solutions and settle philosophical questions by subjecting philosophical concepts to arithmetical calculations. (91)

It is probably this method which Danuta Gierulanka, Ingarden's long-time collaborator, calls the "fundamental leading thought" of Ingarden's ontology. (92)
It is one of the main aims of Ingarden’s ontology to determine unequivocally the existential relation between pure consciousness and the real world.

Only pure consciousness exists absolutely and it is not comprised in the epoche. It is cognized absolutely by immanent, a priori cognition. (93) This pure consciousness is purified from all relative contents springing from sense perception. It grasps the essence, the eidos, the objective sense of objects. Pure experiences are absolutely indubitable and are the Archimedean point from which Ingarden carries on the construction of his philosophical edifice. (94)

It is presupposed that these pure experiences are individual and belong to one stream of consciousness, namely to that of the philosopher. It is also presupposed that the pure experiences are autonomous and that the stream of consciousness which constitutes itself in them is separate from the real world. But pure consciousness can, of course, not be original because that would be the same as to say that it is God’s consciousness. But both pure consciousness and the world can be derived from God. (95) Ingarden presupposes that pure consciousness belongs to humans but at the same time it is independent and not derived from the world. But the world is, according to Ingarden’s realism, derivative from pure consciousness. (96)
In its essence, pure consciousness is an individual and does not form a region of objects. This is because it is not composed of separate objects which is necessary for the existence of a region. The pure experiences are constantly fused one into another and this is another reason why pure consciousness cannot be considered to be a region.

Pure consciousness is an individual also because "consciousness in general" cannot be the source of the existence of the world. This general consciousness can only be an idea and ideas are outside time, deprived of activity and creativity. Ideas cannot possibly be the original being which creates the world.

Pure consciousness must be inseparate, i.e. it must be a self-contained whole and cannot coexist with another individual in the confines of a whole. But it becomes very difficult for Ingarden to show that this is so because it is not excluded that consciousness forms a whole with the body or that it is a part of, or somehow connected with the divine consciousness. A judgment on these two possibilities cannot be pronounced inside the framework of Ingarden's ontology.

Ingarden thinks that the elements of pure consciousness (pure experiences) are so ingeniously contrived that some of knowledge of these elements can produce knowledge of the other elements. The stream of consciousness itself produces knowledge of its elements and knowledge of what
belongs to it and what not. In any case, Ingarden does not posit the existence of a super-ego from whose vantage point the stream of consciousness is investigated.

Thus, immediate intuition shows that consciousness is a process and not only the stream of consciousness itself but the experiences, too. The stream of consciousness is one object, one organic whole. (97) That is because experiences are so intimately woven together that there are no intervals or gaps between them. Because experiences are actual in any instant of time (any "now") they are autonomous.

But because the stream of consciousness is a process it must have its existential basis in something other. This something other is the pure ego. The pure ego is the basis of the unity of the stream of consciousness. The experiences are experiences of the ego and are inseparable in relation to the stream of consciousness and other experiences with which they appear together. The pure ego is separate in relation to the experiences and transcendent in relation to the stream of consciousness. The subject is the source of the conscious acts. There is no dividing line between them although the subject is an object enduring in time whereas the experiences are processes and this lends them a different structure. The conscious subject has always a "first person" structure.

Some experiences have their own specific characteristics. These are the passions and what characterizes the human
person. The subject of the stream of consciousness is not a different whole from the soul. It is accrued to it as its axis. It is a Gestalt necessary for the soul to reach self-knowledge and for the discharge of the states of the soul in experiences. (98) The subject of conscious experiences is inseparable in relation to the soul.

Thus the subject (the pure ego), the stream of consciousness, the soul (person) are mutually interdependent and form different sides of a unity, called a monad.

After having thus described the monadic structure of pure consciousness a problem crops up which, in Ingarden's original design should have been excluded from consideration. This is the problem of the relation of spirit to matter or, particularly, the psycho-physical problem, the mind-body problem. This problem was to belong to material ontology or metaphysics and the solution of the problem of the existence of the world was to be independent of it. This independence was dictated by the radical difference between pure consciousness and the human psyche and the circumstance that the "real world" included not only the material world but also all psycho-physical individuals. The investigation into the general essence of physical and psychical objects was to have no role to play in the solution of the controversy between idealism and realism about the existence of the world. (99)

In Ingarden's original intuition spirit was radically
transcendent from matter. It was to some extent embodied in man and this made man capable of creating philosophy, culture and civilization. The exact nature of this embodiment was not to be considered because philosophy was concerned with man only as a spiritual being, not as an animal. But now it appears that if materialism is to be refuted the problem has to be looked into whether the res cogitans can be in some way or another related to res extensa or even coextensive with it. If ontology as a study of pure possibilities could exclude any such relation then the starting point of a radical transcendence between the thing and its perception could be sustained and the danger of materialism averted.

This investigation is limited to the question whether the ego, as a part of the monad, has some foundation in the body according to the evidence of immediate a priori intuition. Ingarden finds some evidence for a kind of solidarity or even unity between the ego as the subject of conscious experiences and the body and for a feeling of coextensiveness between ego and the body. (1oo) Nevertheless, the ego is a pole apart which forms one whole along with a completely non-bodily soul and the body itself. This whole is the basis of man’s activity and influence. (1ol) But this activity is the grasping of formal and material essences and has nothing to do with pragmatic activity or behaviour in the sense of behaviourism.
It has to be borne in mind that the body, although it is called the body in which we live, is conceived as a certain "relatively isolated system constructed from many subsystems" and these systems can be described only on the basis of the evidence of immediate intuition. But by being such a system of systems man is able to carry out activity independently of the world. (lo2)

Although there is some evidence which suggests that the soul has effects upon the body and the body upon the soul it is important for Ingarden to assert that this cannot be asserted as an established fact. In any case the pure subject and its pure experiences are closely connected with the immaterial soul. It is also given in pure intuition that the acts of consciousness are completely non-extensive. This can be stated although a man carrying out these acts feels himself within his body and not outside it. It is completely unacceptable to Ingarden that there can be any dependence (or inseparateness) between conscious acts and bodily (physiological) states. Neither can pure intuition find any evidence for the view that conscious phenomena are derived from bodily processes. But Ingarden does not exclude altogether some possibility of this kind. In the ontological framework a final judgment on this has to be suspended but he promises to produce a final solution in his so-called material ontology. (lo3)

Until this solution is forthcoming the spectre of
materialism will continue to roam about the scene. But the materialists are not only interested in reducing consciousness to material processes. Their main concern is to annihilate God, says Ingarden. (104) The existence of the world has, therefore, not only to be considered in relation to pure consciousness as being essentially human but also in relation to the divine consciousness. If pure consciousness must have the attributes of the divine then possibilities have to be opened up for a theistic or even theological metaphysic.
The impossibility of metaphysics

When Ingarden sums up his ontological investigation he finds that two solutions (of the originally 64) of the possible mode of existence of the real world are possible. The first is called absolute creationism. According to it the real world is autonomous, separate and self-dependent but derivative from pure consciousness. The world would then be created by pure consciousness. The second possible solution is called realistic contingent creationism and according to it the real world is to be autonomous and separate, derivative and contingent (dependent) on pure consciousness.

The difference between the two is the question of contingency (dependence) which cannot be solved until the exact nature of pure consciousness has been established and whether it created the world once and for all or whether it is constantly creating it and keeping it in existence (creatio continua).

Pure consciousness is in this context said to be autonomous and separate but non-derivative and non-dependent of the real world. If this consciousness is considered to be human it cannot be original because that is the mode of God's existence.

The difficulty about this solution is that pure consciousness can hardly be considered to be endowed
with such a creative force that it creates the real world. When Ingarden introduces this possibility in the 1st volume of Spór he says that nobody accepts this seriously "if by consciousness we mean really what is lived by us (people)". (105)

But Ingarden is, nevertheless, compelled to accept this as the main result of his investigation. The main reason for this is his belief that everything temporal is so imperfect that it has to be created by some force standing outside the world. But from his ontological perspective temporal things can be actual and autonomous and on these grounds Husserl's "idealist creationism" is excluded. If it was accepted that temporal things could be original then Spinozism or even materialism could take the floor unopposed and the central aim of Ingarden's enterprise would be unobtainable. He must, therefore, accept the creation of the world by some force standing outside it.

It has to be noted that these results can be accepted solely inside the confines of a priori immediate intuition. This intuition is unable to assert the existence of real objects of experience. (106) In the end of the ontological inquiry we do not know whether the world given in experience exists or whether the world as described in ontology is really the world. It is even impossible to decide what is eventually the mode of existence of individual objects, temporal, intentional or ideal.
The solution of these problems depends upon the possibility of transforming Ingarden’s formal system into a material one in which it can be shown that the order of things conforms with the order of ideas. In the beginning of his ontology Ingarden was confident that this was possible but in the final chapter some ominous clouds begin to gather on the horizon. Ingarden’s ultimate aim was not to construct the formal system alone, a logic of mere non-contradiction or a logic of mere consequence although traditional logic is at the basis of his ontological doctrine. His aim was to create a material logic, a model of the world to which actually existing things would agree. A step in this direction was his rejection of the Husserlian thesis that real objects are constituted in subjectivity and his limited acceptance of the reduction as a method to open up the field of the eidetic, of the essence of objects. His ego, from whose standpoint the inquiry is conducted, is not transcendental in the Husserlian sense. It is the ego of the philosopher but purified in such a way that it takes into account the pure essences of objects. His objectivity is therefore not a product of the subjective activity but of the description of the eidetic phenomena themselves. Ingarden’s method is therefore Cartesian and "transcendental" in a sense but really not very far removed from descriptive psychology of the type Husserl employs in the Logical Investigations. It is different
from empirical "psychologism" in that it constructs out of impressions and ideas several types of possible objects but it is unable, just as "psychologism", to say anything about the actual existence of these objects. It is possible to describe the idea of autonomy as a structural principle of the immanence of properties and thus to repudiate the Husserlian all-embracing intentionality but the principle as such says nothing about actual existence of such objects.

The constitution of the real world cannot take place in a purely formal system, at least if it is an ontological one and not epistemological, as e.g. the Husserlian. The reason for this is the Cartesian starting point. Even if the cogitatum is given along with the cogito the sum does not follow from it. The existence of bodies does not follow from the existence of thought. The cogito proves only the existence of itself. But even this is a wrong, or at least un-sided posing of the problem. Nobody can think unless he acts. Ago ergo sum would be a more acceptable formula. But Ingarden would never agree that the theoretical is secondary. He speaks about the absolutely certain starting point: pure consciousness and immanent perception which guarantees the absolute certainty and indubitability of the results. A paradoxical situation arises. In order to achieve its aim the theory must repudiate itself. The Cartesian method bars the way to the very metaphysics which was to be. Ingarden's crowning.
achievement. The *epoché* is not a methodological device which can be sublated or retracted at a certain stage in the inquiry. It is an irreversible step and an intrinsic part of any phenomenological theory. Ingarden's assertions in the beginning of *Spór* about an absolutely true metaphysics free from the errors and dogmatism of traditional metaphysics turn out to be empty pretensions. His ontology is his only possible metaphysics. His hope that he can save the "transcendental" procedure in a material ontology, describing the essence of conscious subjects, can only succeed if it can be shown that spirit is independent of matter and that souls are not connected with bodies. But Ingarden himself seems to realize the futility of such an enterprise. He has himself shown that souls are in all probability in one way or another connected with bodies.

The failure to make statements about non-immanent objects from the "transcendental" viewpoint should come as no surprise. It should be even more surprising how Ingarden could expect to be able to create a metaphysic which was to be on an equal footing or even superior to the special sciences (because it was to pronounce itself about the "factual essence" of the world). This can be explained only by Ingarden's fervent belief in the wide possibilities of the immediate insight. This insight, stripped of all its verbal disguise, is nothing but the conjectures of its performers. There is no evidence for
an absolutely indubitable insight. (107) The a priori insight is probably applicable in the framework of formal logic but quickly shows its limitations when it is to be the cornerstone of a theory of the world.

Equally unsubstantiated is the claim that philosophy yields absolute, ultimate and non-relative truths. But this claim is based on the equally unsubstantiated contention that the power of the reduction is such that all subjective distortion and relative contingencies can be thrown out of consciousness which, thus cleansed and purified, puts into our hands scientific objectivity, the Truth. For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction was a prerequisite for reaching these heights. It was not a provisional suspension of belief concerning the existence of the world. The phenomenologist accepts it willingly as perpetual and obligatory once and for all. And Husserl adds: "If the sense of the reduction fails, which is the only entrance into the new state, then everything fails". (108)

Ingarden realizes that sublation of the epoché is a return to the relativism and situational truths of the sciences. This, of course, cannot carry the cause even one step forward. This would be a defeat in the battle for his initial plan and design in philosophy. But the way of the reduction also closes his way to metaphysics. "It seems that exactly the absolutely certain viewpoint of the whole controversy about the existence of the world,
by starting from the immanently accessible pure consciousness and by carrying out the analyses in the sphere of immanence, is the reason for the failure which we reach at the end of our inquiry". (lo9) But Ingarden stubbornly refuses to sublate the reduction and clings to the transcendental method.

"The indubitability of the immanent apprehension of our own experiences and the possibility to inquire into these experiences in an essence analysis seem to be too precious achievements ... to be abandoned prematurely as an instrument of the whole inquiry. ... The phenomenological reduction ... should not be swept away".(lo)

Thus, Ingarden confirms that the phenomenological reduction is not only a methodological device. It is a metaphysical principle which is essential for every inquiry which is to be called phenomenological. The scope of its use can be with some variations, as Ingarden has shown, but no phenomenologist can repudiate it altogether.

But even it, on these premises, the way to a metaphysic of the world is closed it not the way to a spiritualist metaphysic still open? To Ingarden's great chagrin there are paradoxical obstacles on this way, too.

Pure consciousness, as Ingarden describes it, is essentially human in spite of all purifications and artificial modifications. This consciousness must be temporal. It can therefore not be original but must be
derivative. The world itself cannot be original (it is not God) it must be derivative. (lll) The human consciousness is too weak to carry out the feat of creating the world and keep it in existence. Such a consciousness must have an absolute existence, it must be transcendent and outside the world, it must have enough creative force to create not only intentional objects but autonomous objects and the whole world. This consciousness must be itself original and autonomous and timeless, eternal, capable of overcoming the fissuration of time. This is the Absolute, the Divine Being, God. This Absolute being would be the materially determined highest genus, from which both pure consciousness and the world were derived. (ll2)

But even if this Absolute is accepted as necessary for the system there are no means inside the framework of Cartesian phenomenology to establish Him as the Creator of the world. The idea of this supreme Being can be formed and described but the way to theistic or theological metaphysics is closed unless the whole ontological enterprise is discarded and begun anew from that viewpoint. (ll3) This standpoint would not be "transcendental" but would probably have to presuppose the existence of God. This was the alternative Edith Stein opted for when she accepted Thomism. The whole logic of Ingarden’s ontology leads up to the acceptance of this kind of metaphysics. But he hesitates, probably
out of fear of abandoning phenomenology as a "science". The battle is, in Ingarden's view, between materialism and spiritualism. If it can be shown that souls are dependent on bodies or derived from them then all the solutions of Ingarden's ontology would be impossible and intrinsically contradictory. Radical materialism (such as that of Kotarbiński) would then gain the upper hand. Acceptance of the thesis that the world is composed solely of physical objects would not only mean the end of Ingarden's ontology and its invalidation. It would be the liquidation and denial of philosophy itself.

(114) The consolidation of spiritualism is, therefore, the task to which Ingarden attaches prime importance. Philosophy is about spirit and the spiritual in man. But because of the limits of the method, because of the limits of the ontological argument (and Ingarden was very well aware of Kant's critique of it) Ingarden has difficulties in proving that spirit is incarnated in bodies and that it is the basis of culture and civilization.

Theism, materialism and existentialism are all incompatible with Ingarden's doctrine. (Heidegger was a catastrophe for phenomenology in his view. (115) His only attempt at doing metaphysics is contained in a short essay called Über die Verantwortung (1970) where the idea of the living organism is described as a system of systems. The aim is to show that the results of the natural sciences can be fed into his ontological system.
Thus it is to be borne out that his ontology is not a pure speculative construction ("blose gedankliche Konstruktionen"), but is *cum fundamento in re*. This should be the opening up of a way to metaphysics. (116)

But this is something altogether different from the grand design of absolute metaphysics announced in the opening chapters of the *Spór*. Even if it can be shown that man is composed of a skeleton, a system of muscles, metabolic systems etc. and that these systems are included in a wider context of time and causality it says very little about the factual essence of the world whose explication was to be the task of metaphysics. The essay on responsibility does not show in any detail how spiritual values are incorporated in the life of man and thus brings really nothing new. The data borrowed from anatomy can stand for themselves and prove nothing about the relevance of speculative ontology (metaphysics) to the physical world. Ingarden failed to show that his formal ontological system could be brought to bear as a science relevant to the world outside the system itself. It is even doubtful whether he succeeded in demonstrating that the formal system itself could be counted among the sciences.

"Today we are more than ever removed from a philosophy which could be called "rigorous science" (117) he said in 1959. But his ontology retains its value, inside its limits, as an analysis of the Husserlian concepts
regarding the relation of consciousness and world.
1. Roman Ingarden: "Spór o istnienie świata" (Controversy about the existence of the world), pp. 22, 150. (Hereafter abbreviated as "Spór").
2. Spór I, pp. 24-25.
4. Ibid., p. 40.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
10. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
13. Ibid., p. 77.
15. Ingarden: "Z teorii języka ...", pp. 239-305.
21. Ideen I, p. 107 (85)
23. This point has been argued for by M.M. Van De Pitte in his article: "On Bracketing the Epoché", Dialogue, vol. XI, 1972, pp. 535-545.
27. Ibid., p. 270.
29. Ibid., pp. 590, 591.
34. "Szkice z filozofii literatury", p. 185.
36. Ibid., p. 443.
37. Ibid., pp. 441-450 (sect. 66).
38. Spór II, p. 80.
42. Spór I, p. 54.
43. Essentiale Fragen, passim.
44. Spór I, pp. 55-56. Spór II, p. 94.
46. Ibid., p. 83.
47. Ibid., pp. 100, 256-257.
50. Spór II, p. 67.
52. Spór II, p. 67n.
53. Spór II, p. 81.
56. Ingarden: "Vom Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes",
Studia Philosophica. Leopoli 1935, p. 54 (26)

58. Ibid., p. 259. "Vom Aufbau..." p. 56 (28).
60. Ingarden: "Vom Aufbau...", p. 80.
63. St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit. p. 36.
64. Kotarbiński: Gnosiology, p. 429.
66. Spór II, 204.
68. Spór II, p. 206.
70. Spór II, pp. 215-216.
73. Spór II, 228, 245.
74. Ibid., p. 231.
75. Ibid., p. 570.
76. Spór I, p. 213.
77. Spór II, p. 428.
78. Ibid., p. 437.
79. Spór I, p. 441.
80. Spór II, p. 470.

82. These premises were first proclaimed by Ingarden in "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus", Husserl Festschrift, JPPF, Halle, 1929, and enlarged upon in Spór I. Cf. Spór I, p. 150.

83. Spór I, p. 25.

84. Ibid., p. 29.

85. The Polish terms are:
1. Samoistność - niesamoistność
2. Pierwotność - pochodność
3. Samodzielność - niesamodzielność

The German terms are:
1. Autonomie - Heteronomie
2. Ursprünglichkeit - Abgeleitetheit
3. Selbständigkeit - Unselbständigkeit
4. Unabhängigkeit - Abhängigkeit.

The choice of English terms is not altogether satisfactory, especially the translation of "Unabhängigkeit" by "self-dependence" and of "Abhängigkeit" by "contingency". The last term may even be misleading. The reason for this choice is that they were used in an English translation of selected passages from Spór I ("Time and Modes of Being", by Roman Ingarden, transl. by Helen R. Michejda, Springfield, Ill. 1964) and have been used by other authors (e.g. Knut Hanneborg: New Concepts


87. Spór I, pp. 256,279.

88. Spór I, pp. 130,139.


92. Ibid., p. 80n.


95. Spór I, pp. 94, 290.

96. Ibid., p. 212.


98. Spór II, pp. 520, 574.


100. Ibid., pp. 525-526.


103. Spór II, 559-560.
104. Spór II, p. 563.
111. Streit II/2, p. 393.
APPENDIX

ROMAN INGARDEN

Biographical notes

Roman Ingarden was born in Cracow in 1893. His father, Roman senior, was a hydrological engineer. In independent Poland after the first world war he became the director of the Polish State Water Board. Roman senior was the author of a general project of the regulation of the river Vistula.

Ingarden junior went to school in the Galician town of Lwów (Lemberg). In 1911 he took up studies in the University of Lwów. His main subject was philosophy (under Kazimierz Twardowski). His secondary subjects were mathematics and physics.

In April 1912 Ingarden went to study at the University of Göttingen, Germany. The reason for this was probably that Ingarden was already at that time interested in a philosophy of the maximalist and absolute kind professed by Edmund Husserl, Twardowski’s friend and colleague. Ingarden studied philosophy with Professor Husserl and psychology with Professor Georg Elias Müller. Müller was an empirical psychologist and asserted that experience was the only source of psychological knowledge. He "was a rabid enemy of phenomenology as in his opinion there was no science outside experience". (1)

Ingarden also studied mathematics under Professor Hilbert.
In the autumn of 1913 Ingarden began preparing a doctoral thesis on the theme of the human person. But in agreement with Husserl he changed his theme and in 1918 he produced a thesis under the title "Intuition and Intellect in H. Bergson". It was published in Husserl's Jahrbuch in 1921.

Husserl's pupils in Göttingen established their philosophical society which had weekly meetings. Husserl himself could not come to these meetings, and his only collaborator in the University, Adolf Reinach, the founder of the society, could not attend since he became Dozent and was married. (2) At the meetings of this society there were vivid discussions on phenomenological themes, mainly around Husserl's Logical Investigations and Max Scheler's works. He came annually to give a lecture to the society.

In the eyes of these young phenomenologists the Logical Investigations were remarkable mainly for their departure from the neo-kantian idealism. (3) The subject itself was no longer the centre of analysis but the things themselves ("die Sachen"). Cognition became again reception ("Empfangen") but not, as in Kantianism, determination which imposed its laws on things. On the contrary, things were to give to knowledge their law. "All the young phenomenologists were determined realists", - says Edith Stein. (4)

In 1916 Husserl succeeded Rickert as professor of
philosophy in the University of Freiburg im Breisgau. Ingarden was his only pupil to follow him there. E. Stein joined their company later the same year. The members of the Göttingen phenomenological group scattered about the world. A. Reinach was killed in action in 1917.

At this time a deep and personal friendship developed between Ingarden and his teacher, Professor Husserl. Husserl considered Ingarden to be one of his most serious and talented pupils. (5)

In 1918 Ingarden returned to Poland and settled down in Lublin and later in the capital, Warsaw. In September 1921 he moved from Warsaw to Toruń and became a teacher of mathematics in a secondary high school. At this time he wrote his book Essentiale Fragen which he sent in 1923 to Prof. Twardowski in Lwów as a Habilitationschrift. In 1924 Ingarden was "habilitated" in the Lwów University.

In September 1925 Ingarden moved to Lwów where he, just as in Toruń, became a teacher of mathematics in a high school. He also gave lectures at the university as an unsalaried Dozent. In 1933 he was appointed professor and remained in this capacity in Lwów until the end of the second world war was in sight.

In 1919 Ingarden married Miss Maria Pol who was an ophtalmologist and worked later as a doctor in the school health service. They had three sons. Roman Jr. is
professor of physics. Janusz is an architect in Cracow. Jerzy served as a pilot in the RAF during the second world war. His health was damaged in action and he died in 1949.

During the first period of the second world war Ingarden continued to teach at the university. But he had to change his subject and lecture on the history of German literature. Later, he taught in Polish underground schools. During the war he wrote his *magnum opus*, *Spór o istnienie świata* (The Controversy about the Existence of the World), a work of more than one thousand densely printed pages.

Towards the end of the war Ingarden moved with his family to a locality called Pieskowa Skala, not far from Cracow. He stayed there until he was appointed professor of philosophy in the Jagiellonian University of Cracow in 1945. In 1951 the department of philosophy of the Cracow University was liquidated. Professor Ingarden was relieved of his duties as professor and teacher. (6) In 1952 Ingarden was appointed professor of Warsaw University but he remained in Cracow and devoted his time to a new Polish translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. He also wrote a book in German called *Uber die kausale Struktur der Welt*, hitherto unpublished.

In 1956 there was a "reorganisation of departments" in the Jagiellonian University. (7) In 1957 Ingarden was appointed professor and director of the department of
philosophy. In 1963 Ingarden retired from his post at the university.

Roman Ingarden died on the 14th of July 1970.

His collected works are being published. So far, nine volumes have appeared.
NOTES TO APPENDIX

2. Ibid., p. 177.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
   Ruch Filozoficzny (journal), tom XXIX, nr. 1, Toruń 1971, str. 1-6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in the text are put in brackets before the title of the relevant book.

I. Works of Roman Ingarden


II. Works of Edmund Husserl


III. Works by other authors

Kotarbiński Tadeusz: Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach


IV. JOURNAL PAPERS


Gierulanka Danuta: "Teoria poznania bez kompromisów", Życie i myśl, nr. 1, 1968, str. 47-64.

Ingarden, Roman: "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus", Husserl Festschrift, Halle 1929, S. 159-190.


Ingarden, Roman: "Uwagi o niektórych twierdzeniach ontologicznych w książce Kazimierza Twardowskiego pt. Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der


Tymieniecka, A.-T.: "Eidos, idea and participation: The phenomenological approach", Kantstudien