MODERN EDUCATION IN THE SUDAN, 1898-1965.

by

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Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh.

1969.
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This work traces the close association between education and political events in modern Sudan from the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in 1898 to just before the end of the first decade after Independence in 1965. It examines their mutual influence, through Government policies, both colonial and national, through European Christian Missionary activities in the Southern and Northern parts of the Sudan, and through the activities and growth of an educated elite movement emanating from the Gordon College, which later on became the University of Khartoum, and the educational institutions associated with it. The thesis discusses the educational problems and ideas thrown up during this formative period.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of the preparation of this work, I travelled widely in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the United States and consequently incurred many debts, which it is difficult for me to repay or even acknowledge.

In the Sudan, I made use of the Sudan Government Central Archives, of the Archives of the Ministry of Education, the University of Khartoum, the Planning Secretariat at the Ministry of Economics and Finance and of various educational institutions as well as of discussions with former and present colleagues, pupils, students, and teachers. To all of these and to the people of the Sudan who so generously sponsored my own education, I owe a great and lasting debt.

In Cairo I owe a special debt to the staff of Dar-al-Kutub al-Misriyya, and to Rashad 'Abd-al-Muţalib of the Arab League. In Beirut to 'Abd-al-'Azîz al-Kussy the Director of the UNESCO Centre for the Arab States and in Paris I am particularly grateful to the Librarian and staff of the UNESCO Information Centre and to Mr. Lyons of the UNESCO International Institute of Educational Planning. In London I am indebted to the staff of the Public Records Office, of the British Museum and of the Institute of Education at London University. In Durham, I owe a great debt to the Keeper of the Sudan Archives at Durham University and to Mr. Richard Hill who had collected and arranged this valuable archival material.

In Edinburgh I would like to acknowledge the help given to me by the staff of the National Library of Scotland, and
the staff of the Edinburgh University Library. I have a great and lasting debt to acknowledge to the late Professor John Pilley and to the members of the Education Department at Edinburgh University. Acknowledgement is also due to Hasan Yāsīn Badawī for the production of the three maps at the end of the thesis.

Last but by no means least I wish to pay a tribute to my supervisors Professor Montgomery Watt and Mr. Duncan Campbell for their continuous help and advice as well as for their kindness and hospitality during the years of my work on this thesis.
ABBREVIATIONS

'Abd-al-Majīd 'Abd-al-'Azīz Amīn 'Abd-al-Majīd,
Ta'īkh a-t-Tarbiya fī s-Sūdān fī l-Qarn a-t-Tāsī' 'Ashār.

Badrī Bābikir Badrī, Ta'īkh Hayāṭī.

DRA Sudan Archives in the School of Oriental Studies, Durham University.

G.G. Reports Annual Reports by the Governor General on The Finance Administration and Condition of the Sudan.

MEA Ministry of Education Archives, Khartoum.


S.G. Sudan Government.

Sgd. Signed.

SNR Sudan Notes and Records.

W.P. Wingate Papers.

TRANSLITERATION

In the transliteration of Arabic names I have mainly followed Richard Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of The Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan, and the transliteration used by the Sudan Department of Survey.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When the armies of Moḥammad ‘Ali₁ conquered the Northern Sudan in 1821 nothing spectacular was added as far as education was concerned. The identification of the country with what was going on in the Moslem World was already complete. Arab culture and Moslem religion had been predominant in the Northern Sudan since the 16th century, Sufi Ṭariqas were widespread, and the caravan routes to West, North, Africa and the Red Sea formed strong links with and for peoples going to and from the Ḥaji, just as the Nile had been a permanent link with Egypt from times immemorial.²

Moḥammad ‘Ali and his successors, during the Turkiyya³ continued to give subventions in various forms⁴ to mosques and khalwas which were scattered in the country. The movement of Sudanese students to al-Azhar increased in this epoch due to the increased safety for travellers and the general movement between Egypt and the Sudan. This was indicated by the establishment of the "Sennariyya⁵ Riwaq," a student hostel set up at al-Azhar in

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1. Moḥammad ‘Ali was the ruler of Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan at the time.
3. Turkiyya in Sudanese history means the period between 1821-1885 when Sudan was under Turkish rule, through the ruler of Egypt.
5. Sennar was the capital of the Punj Kingdom which existed in Sudan before the conquest of Moḥammad ‘Ali. Sennariyya means 'of Sennar' or that Kingdom which was the equivalent of a 'modern Sudanese' as the Sudan with its present boundaries is the product of the Conquests that took place during the time of Moḥammad ‘Ali and his successors.
1846. This raised the number of Sudanese students hostels at al-Azhar to three, as there had already been one hostel for students from Dar-Fur, in the Western Sudan, and another one for the Nubians who came from the most southerly part of Egypt and the most Northerly of the Sudan.¹ It is interesting to note that before the Sennariyya Riwaq came into being there were twenty-two hostels at al-Azhar for students coming from different parts of the Moslem World.²

The Sennariyya Riwaq came into being after a certain Sudanese student Moḥammad Ḥaṭīb arrived in Cairo in the year 1253 (A.H.) to study at al-Azhar. He found six other students who had preceded him there. They presented a petition to Moḥammad Ḥaṭīb asking for the arrangement of a ration of bread to be issued to them. The approval was given five years later in 1258 A.H. Then Ḥaṭīb and his colleagues, who might have increased by then, again petitioned Moḥammad Ḥaṭīb asking this time for a hostel. Moḥammad Ḥaṭīb’s answer to his Secretary of Finance was, "My will has decided the buying of a new place and its allocation for the mujāwirīn from Sennar."³

Besides the traditional religious education, three attempts were made during the Turco-Egyptian period to introduce modern education in the Sudan. The first attempt was during the

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3. Mujāwir means a temporary neighbour.
visit of Moḥammad ‘Ali to the Sudan in 1838-39 when he advised Sudanese notables about the use of improving their agricultural knowledge.¹ He suggested that they should send to him some of their sons to be instructed in the modern agricultural techniques that were available in Egypt at the time. He assured them that he would send them to schools there and consider them as his own children.

After he had returned, six sons of Sudanese notables arrived in Cairo. Moḥammad ‘Ali ordered that they be given special treatment, and allotted a servant to attend to them, though normally there was a servant for every ten students at the school. He also ordered that the six Sudanese students should not be separated. We are not told how old these students were or what was their previous attainment. But we are told that the programme outlined by Moḥammad ‘Ali for them was that they should be well taught in reading and writing and when they had accomplished that they should be taught the science of agriculture. Moḥammad ‘Ali also ordered that he should be informed about what happened to them.²

The secondary school to which the Sudanese students were sent in 1839 had been opened in Egypt in 1825. It was meant to prepare students for medicine, engineering, the infantry, the cavalry, and the navy, as well as for further specialisation in some oriental and occidental languages.³ The school, one of two in

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² Ibid.
³ Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Karīm, Ta‘rīkh at-Talīm fī 'Asr Moḥammad 'Ali, Cairo, 1938, p. 225.
Egypt at the time, used to receive its students from amongst those who had got their initial education at the "makātib", the indigenous Egyptian Islamic Schools where they had learnt the Qur'an by heart and the reading of some elementary Azhar books on religion and Arabic grammar, besides the elementary principles of arithmetic and handwriting. The background of the students made the job of the school particularly difficult as they had to be prepared within four or five years for the specialised schools.

At the secondary school the students were given courses in Arabic, Turkish, arithmetic, algebra and geometry, together with history, geography, handwriting and drawing. The Government of Moḥammad 'Ali paid great attention to the students of the secondary schools as they were intended for his policy of modernisation. They were privileged with the facilities of sleeping on beds in their hostels and of sitting on chairs and at desks in their classrooms. They were also provided with vegetables and meat for their daily food and were fed and dressed along European lines. The enumeration of these privileges would help to reflect the austerity of life for the students at al-Azhar and the similar, though minor, indigenous centres of Moslem education.

The school of agriculture for which Moḥammad 'Ali suggested that the Sudanese students should be prepared, was one of the specialised schools to which Egyptian students who finished their secondary education were intended to go. Moḥammad 'Ali was very interested in this school and used to pay personal visits to watch its development and to solve the problems that were facing
it in its early stages. He had high hopes of modernising agriculture in Egypt, and probably in the Sudan too, through that school. The course of study at the school was three years during which the students were taught liberal subjects such as geography and history of philosophy in addition to public health, chemistry and the agricultural subjects.\(^1\)

Rifa‘a al-Ṭahtawī, who was the head of the School of Languages at Cairo, "Madrasat al Alsun", mentioned that after the school of agriculture, the group of Sudanese students were transferred to the school of languages. The purpose of that, according to Rifa‘a, was "to enable them to get the taste of the civilising knowledge so that they may spread it in their country."\(^2\) He recollected some of these students when he saw them later on at Khartoum, working as clerks in the offices of the province. There are no available sources to show that the first attempt by Mohammad ‘Ali was followed by any other similar enterprise during his lifetime and it was the lot of Rifa‘a to carry on the second attempt in the Sudan after the death of Mohammad ‘Ali.

Rifa‘a was a leading Egyptian scholar and intellectual, who studied and taught at al-Azhar before he was sent to France by Mohammad ‘Ali. After his return he was well received by Mohammad ‘Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha and assigned the task of making translations. Eventually he was permitted to establish and direct

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1. Ibid., p. 351.

the School of Languages, a higher school or college, where many European books were translated on different subjects in arts and sciences. The modernizing ideas of Rifa‘a, which impressed, and were encouraged by Muḥammad ‘Ali, were not to the taste of his son and successor the Khedive ‘Abbās the First. ‘Abbās went down into history as a reactionary and a set enemy of modernisation who started closing down the modern schools in Egypt.1

Paradoxically enough it was ‘Abbās who decided in 1850 to open the first modern school in the Sudan for which he chose no lesser a man than Rifa‘a al-Ṭaḥṭawi. It looked more of a cynical act of exile than a real concern about the welfare of the Sudan or a mark of recognition for Rifa‘a and his distinguished colleagues. However, the official reason was given in a letter from the Khedive’s Court to the Department of Schools stating that “the private council of the Khedive has decided that a school shall be established in the Sudanese territories to save the children of their inhabitants and residents from the hell of ignorance, so that they may be distinguished by their acquisition of the sciences and knowledge. Two hundred and fifty boys shall be accepted and registered at the school. The Council also preferred that Rifa‘a Bey should be appointed headmaster of the school ... ”

Eleven teachers and a physician were chosen to accompany Rifa‘a on his mission. Amongst them was Lieutenant Colonel Muḥammad Bayyūmi Afandī, one of the most senior teachers in the School of

Engineering who was also the head of the department for the translation of mathematical works in the School of Languages as well as the inspector of mathematics for the country. Bayyūmi was sent to France in 1826, at the age of seventeen, where he studied for nine years during which he specialised in hydraulics. After his return in 1835 he was appointed assistant to the chief engineer of irrigation at the Qanāṭir and besides had a teaching post and translated books on surveying, algebra, trigonometry, mechanics and weights, logarithms and coal.1 Bayyūmi died two years after his arrival in Khartoum.

Another man who was selected to go with Rifa‘a to Khartoum was Captain Ahmad Ta‘īl, who also studied for six years in France 1836-36 and after his return was appointed assistant to Bayyūmi. The others were young men of junior officer ranks, a first lieutenant and four second lieutenants who were probably Rifa‘a’s and Bayyūmi’s pupils and assistants at the schools of languages and engineering. The army titles indicate the military nature of modern education in Egypt at the time of Muḥammad ‘Alī.

Three teachers from al-Azhar were selected to accompany them, one of them, Sheikh Rajab, went into hiding immediately after he heard of his nomination to Khartoum and when he was not found a Sheikh Makkawi was chosen to replace him.2 So when Rifa‘a went to Khartoum with ten teachers and a physician, five of his colleagues, Bayyūmi, Farghali, Mursi, Othman, and the physician Salim Afandi al

1. Ibid., p. 28.
2. Ibid., pp.30-33.
Hakim, died within the first two years of their stay in Khartoum. They were replaced by five others from Cairo and Rifa'a was urged to do his best at the school.¹

Rifa'a was not keen on the school as he was clear in his mind about the purpose of his presence in Khartoum. To him it was exile because of the malicious connivance of his opponents at the Khedive's Court in Cairo. Nor did the Governor General at the time, Isma'il Abū-Jabal Pasha,² see anything in opening the school except an excess of expenditure which ought to be avoided or kept to the minimum.³ So he gave away to the army garrisons the provisions that were sent from Cairo for the school. Rifa'a who was too frustrated to take an interest in the school, agreed to this, as even his salary at Cairo was frozen during the four years of his stay in Sudan under the pretext that the inventory and checking of the Library of European books in his former school of languages at Cairo was yet not completed.

The news of the transferrence of the school provisions to the garrisons was taken up by the Schools Department in Cairo who wrote to Rifa'a rebuking him and also to the governor asking him to restore the provisions to the school. Rifa'a was also asked to report on the progress of the school as the Khedive was interested in its opening.⁴ So Rifa'a reported that "most of the

1. Rifa'a, Manshij al-'albāb, p. 265.
2. Isma'il Abū Jubal Pasha was Governor General from Ramaqān 1268 A.H. to 16th Rajab 1269 A.H.
pupils escape to the distant hills where it is difficult to get them back. Besides they are stupid and since the death of the three teachers the school became a name without any reality.  

In accordance with the frequent changes of Governor-Generals in Sudan during the Turkiyya, a new Governor General, Salîm Pasha Sa'îb was appointed to succeed Isma'îl Abû-Jabal Pasha. The new Governor General was in favour of opening the school in accordance with the instructions from Cairo. So two months after he had arrived from Egypt to take his office at Khartoum, he sent a letter to the Khedive informing him of the opening of the school and asked for some supplies including paper, European suits of clothes, kitchen utensils for 250 pupils and a ration of rice for a whole year.

According to Rifa'a the number of pupils was thirty-one at the beginning and it increased by seven more after six weeks from the opening. Rifa'a reported this to the Department of Schools in Cairo, told them that good efforts were being made towards the teaching of the pupils and that by the end of the school year in the month of Sha'bân 1270 an examination would be held at the school in the presence of the learned notables. He also ordered some books on Turkish language, Arabic grammar and

1. Ibid letter 1st Sha'bân 1268.
2. Salîm Pasha Sa'îb, Governor General 16th Rajab 1269 A.H. - Jumadâ al-'Ulâ 1270 A.H.
4. Letter dated 11th Rabi' al-'Awwal 1270 A.H.
morphology, and mathematics, which were used in the Egyptian schools. Rifa'a also saw promising signs of intelligence in ten of the pupils so he assigned them the duty of learning the Qur'an by heart, and more Arabic grammar, Turkish vocabulary and handwriting. This increased attention was to prepare them to assist in the teaching of their fellows.¹

The examination was held in Sha'bān 1270 A.H. and was attended by the Governor General, some notables, the judge, 'ulama and senior Government officials. The result of the examination was sent to Cairo and new books were ordered for the school.² But before the second year of the school had started the Khedive 'Abbās died in Cairo and was succeeded by Sa'īd Pasha³ who in the first week of his reign ordered the Governor General to close down the school and send Rifa'a to Cairo. Rifa'a returned to Cairo carrying with him from the Governor General at Khartoum to the Khedive in Cairo one thousand six hundred and twenty five pieces of gold from the treasury of Khartoum.⁴ In spite of the cancellation of the school, and for a few months after, correspondence was still going on between Government departments in Cairo about the supplies needed for the school at Khartoum. This was finally closed down by a letter from the Khedive's Court to the effect that

1. Ibid., p. 34.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., letter dated 8 Dhi-al-Hajja 1270.
"since that school did not produce any result and the mentioned Bey (Rifa‘a) had arrived in Cairo it would be better to use the supplies intended for the school in a more fruitful way."¹

A few years later Rifa‘a was delighted to record that some of the pupils who started in his school at Khartoum were able to be teachers in the five schools that were opened in the Sudan during the reign of Isma‘īl.² Rifa‘a predicted that the five schools would succeed more than his school because they were founded on well meaning motives and good intentions of the Khedive Isma‘īl. Rifa‘a thought that Sudan had all the potentialities of being the identical twin of Egypt in progress and development once it got rid of 'the causes of disease' and came under good and enlightened administration. He envisaged the dawn of this development in the five schools, in the project of the railway line to the port of Sawakin and in the expeditions for the exploration of the sources of the Nile.³

The story of the five schools goes back to the time of Sa‘īd, the predecessor of Isma‘īl. The Governor General of the Sudan Mūsa Ḥamdī Pasha⁴ wrote a memorandum to the Khedive Sa‘īd asking his permission for the training of the sons of the Sudanese inhabitants and chiefs in the offices of the Government in the Sudan. They were to be trained in the clerical, accounting and other office

¹. Ibid., letter dated 5 Șafar 1271 A.H.
². Isma‘īl grandson of Moḥammad ‘Alī Pasha was Khedive 18th Jan. 1863-26th June, 1879.
³. Rifa‘a, Manahij al-‘albab, p. 280.
⁴. Mūsa Ḥamdī Pasha Governor General 4 Șafar 1279 A.H. - 8 Shawwāl 1281.
jobs so that they would master these arts in a short time. Some of them would then be selected as Sudanese clerks instead of the Egyptian clerks as the later would cost a lot of money in their salaries and their transportation to the Sudan. Also the difference in the climate would not always agree with their health. Mūsa Ḥamdī Pasha suggested that the Sudanese boys who would be trained under this scheme should be given between thirty to seventy five piastres. The memorandum indicated the need for a certain degree of participation of the Sudanese in the bureaucratic machinery of the Turco-Egyptian administration.

Two months after the memorandum had been written Isma‘īl came to power, and a month later he wrote to Mūsa Ḥamdī Pasha, explaining his policy towards his subjects in the Sudan. Isma‘īl stated that the spread of civilisation and welfare together with good citizenship and development were amongst his greatest hopes. This, he realised, necessitated the dissemination of learning amongst the people so that they would be 'cultivated in the love of the homeland and in the eagerness to obtain distinction and progress in the sciences and the arts.' Therefore Isma‘īl thought it was important to set up a school at Khartoum where able teachers of Arabic and Turkish should be provided to teach a number of five hundred students from the inhabitants of those territories.

Isma‘īl urged his Governor General to pay his best attention towards the organisation of the school and to work out

what should be taught in it 'according to what was appropriate to the attainment of the indicated objectives'. The necessary persuasion and encouragement should be shown to the inhabitants so that they would look forward towards 'the gathering of the fruits of civilisation'. The Governor General was assured that if he did not have the required teachers at Khartoum he could order them from Cairo. He was also told that if he considered that the conditions in the Sudan needed two schools instead of one then two would be provided.¹

Muṣa Ḥamdī Pasha wrote to the Khedive saying that he would begin to train, in the offices of Khartoum and the provinces, those who had already learnt reading and writing and if possible studied the Qurʾān by heart. They would be from amongst the sons of the chiefs and inhabitants and of the Turks. Thus he found a chance to implement his earlier proposal. As for the schools he thought that as the Sudan was so vast and extensive the opening of one or two schools would mean that the people in one part were likely to enjoy "the fruits of civilisation" while their fellows in the other provinces would have no opportunity. Instead, he suggested that five schools should be opened, one in each of the provinces of Khartoum, Berber, Dongola, Kordofan, and Taka. The total number of students could still be five hundred. Should this be done, the Governor General assured the Khedive, all the inhabitants would wish to educate their sons and 'reap the harvests of civilisation and progress'.²

The Khedive gave his approval to the scheme of the Governor General\(^1\) and the latter embarked on carrying it out. He arranged for two hundred students at the Khartoum School and for seventy-five pupils at each of the other four schools. He managed to recruit locally the masters needed for the teaching of Arabic and the Qur'ān, what he needed from Cairo was five teachers of Turkish, one for each school. He preferred them to be knowledgeable, besides Turkish, in Arabic Grammar and the two types of Arabic calligraphy "Thulth" and "Riq'a". He also asked for 351 copies from 13 Arabic textbooks on grammar. The budget for the five schools was estimated to be 19906 piastres per month.\(^2\)

The Department of Schools in Cairo was asked to provide the teachers and the books required for the Sudan.\(^3\) Some of the books were found in stock and the rest were bought from the bookshops in Cairo.\(^4\) The five teachers were also appointed\(^5\) at the salary of one thousand piastres per month.\(^6\) The Treasury was notified, by the Khedive's office, of the appointment of the teachers and their salaries and was asked to arrange for their transportation accompanied by the books and to charge the expenses against the budget of the Sudan.\(^7\)

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1. Ibid., letter dated 10th Dhu al-Qa'ida 1279 A.H.
3. Ibid., letter dated 9th Rabi'-al-Thanī 1280 A.H.
4. Ibid., letter dated 23rd Rabi'-al-Thanī 1280 A.H.
5. Ibid., letter dated 5th Rabi'-al-Thanī 1280 A.H.
6. Ibid., letter dated 23rd Rabi'-al-Thanī 1280 A.H.
Two years later two of the Turkish teachers were reported to the Khedive by the Governor of Berber and Dongola to be negligent of their duties. The teacher of Turkish at Dongola, who was also the headmaster of the school, was described as inattentive to teaching his subject and busy with fishing. The other one at Berber, "though paid one thousand piastres a month" produced no result at all. Although he was reminded several times to give more attention to his work, that, the Governor said, was to no avail. The Governor recommended that both of them be dismissed. He thought it was sufficient to keep the teachers of Arabic and the Qur'ān at the two schools. The Khedive concurred with the Governor and thought it was sufficient to teach the rudiments of Arabic grammar and of mathematics to the pupils at the two schools.

Whether the harsh recommendation of the Governor was due to the persistent negligence on the part of the teachers or to some other reason is hazardous to guess. However it made it clear that the inspection of the schools was the prerogative of the Governor of the Province who communicated directly with the Khedive. The Governor in his letter complained that when he visited the school at Dongola he found some of the students were at the ages of twenty to thirty yet they did not know 'anything' in Arabic grammar or Turkish and they could only understand some Arabic. He chose fifty-five of these and recruited them for a

1. Ibid., Letter dated 27th Ramaḍān, Vol. II, p. 84.
2. Ibid.
special battalion he wanted to form.¹ The linguistic difficulties of the students at Dongola could be due to the fact that the mother tongue of the original inhabitants, the Dongolawis, was not Arabic.² If Turkish was also explained to them in Arabic, as it possibly was, then they were likely to find it much more difficult. The situation seemed to be different in the other schools as a few years later favourable reports were received.

On the 13th June 1870 the Governor General, Ja'far Pasha Maqhar, reported to the Khedive Isma'il that the pupils at the Government schools that were founded seven years before had made remarkable progress. Some of them were selected to train for future posts in the telegraph service, some were appointed to clerical jobs at various departments and others were training in engineering.³ The Khedive was delighted with the news which meant to him that 'knowledge was spreading in the Sudanese territories and that the inhabitants were being ushered into the threshold of civilisation and that was amongst his greatest hopes.' He considered it an achievement and a result of the good endeavours of the teachers, the excellent supervision of the headmasters and the much appreciated help of the Governor General.⁴

So the Khedive approved the Governor General's

recommendations of increasing the payments of each of the headmasters by a hundred piastres, and of adjusting the salaries of the teachers from three hundred to five hundred piastres according to status and ability. An Ardab$^1$ of dhura$^2$ was also sanctioned as a monthly allowance for each of the former and the latter. The Governor General was asked to convey to them the delight of the Khedive at their work and that if they continued their good efforts towards the execution of his instructions he would continue to bestow his rewards and his good attention upon them.

The good gestures and keen interest of Isma‘Il encouraged the Governor General to send a further report five months later. The pupils who had been selected for the telegraph school finished their training in three months time and were posted at the stations that needed them. The Governor General also intimated his intention to select about twenty students to be taught mathematics and engineering for some time before they were attached to the Government steamers. There they would be trained for the jobs of future steamer engineers. Furthermore the country needed physicians as the few who were there grew old and almost disabled. Ten doctors had been asked for from Cairo but the Council of Health there did not even agree to approve that small number.

1. 198 litres
2. Dhura is Sorghum, a crop, which is used as a staple diet in Sudan.
So to solve his problem the Governor General selected twenty students to study the sciences of medicine and pharmacy. The job was made easier, he told the Khedive, because of the presence of Lieutenant Muhammad Sukkari, the physician of the General Hospital at Khartoum. He had undertaken to teach the students daily, using European and Arabic textbooks of medicine, and would do his best so that they could be prepared in a short time. Sukkari himself had studied medicine in France and the physicians at Khartoum confirmed that he was fully qualified to undertake the job.

The Khedive, though he appreciated the enthusiasm of his Governor General, drew his attention to the fact that the physicians and the pharmacists who would be entrusted with health matters should be skilful and proficient in their profession. As he assumed the Governor General realised it would not be possible to prepare such qualified people in a short time, the Khedive decided that the doctors needed for the Sudan should be selected and sent soon. The Governor General was satisfied with the Khedive’s idea and arrangement and hoped that the physicians he was about to receive would be proficient and sufficient. As for the Sudanese students, who had already started their studies, two months before the reply of the Khedive, the Governor General hoped that they would be able to learn the basic principles of medicine and how to administer vaccination in a short period which would not be more than one year.

2. Ibid., Letter dated Ghayat Dhīl-Hajja 1267 A.H.
When in 1871 the Khedive Isma‘īl recalled Ja‘far Pasha Maghar to Cairo and suppressed the office of Governor General, he appointed Mūmtāz Pasha over the combined governorates of Khartoum, Sennar, The White Nile and Fazūghli.¹

Mūmtāz Pasha was well known for his enthusiasm for the cultivation of cotton in the Sudan. Large quantities of cotton were badly needed by the Khedive to offset the repercussions of lower prices for the Egyptian cotton after the end of the American Civil War.² Immediately Mūmtāz Pasha succeeded his rival, he suggested to the Khedive that a hundred young men should be selected from amongst the students at the Khartoum School and others so that they might be sent to Cairo to be trained at the schools of mechanical and agricultural engineering. Afterwards they could be distributed to work at the cotton ginning and compressing machines in the different parts of the Sudan.³

The Khedive Isma‘īl was impressed by the idea of Mūmtāz. He gave him his approval and hoped that the young men would be brilliant and capable enough to benefit from the training.⁴ The Khedive also gave his orders to the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt to make the necessary arrangements for the Sudanese students when they had arrived.⁵ The orders were carried out through the

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2. R. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881, p. 115.
5. Ibid., Letter dated as above.
Department of Schools which made the required allocation of the students to the appropriate schools in Cairo and Alexandria.1

The need for more staff increased with the expansion of the territories under Government control. It was during the reign of the Khedive Isma‘īl that the conquest of Dar-Fur and Equatoria was completed.2 The Governor Generals in the Sudan realised the expanding needs of their administration and for local recruits. The need for telegraph communication was felt necessary both by the Khedive Isma‘īl in Cairo and the Governor Generals at Khartoum.3 So when two schools were asked for, one at Khartoum and the other at Kassala, to train telegraphists for the developing services,4 the Khedive gave his approval.5 Besides telegraphists, the need was also felt for clerks and accountants as most of those brought from Egypt and sent to the outposts in the Sudan found out that it did not agree with them.

To solve the problem of the shortage of clerks and accountants the Governor General suggested to the Khedive that four or five capable clerks who were also well versed in accountancy should be sent to Khartoum to undertake the task of training Sudanese students. When the latter were trained they would be

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posted to the various districts of the country. The proposal was endorsed and the required clerks were sent to the Sudan. The same need was felt in the field of medicine. During the two weeks when Isma'il was deposed as Khedive and replaced by his son Tawfiq, Al-Waqa'il'al-Misriyya published a report that a pharmacist, whom it described as fully knowledgeable in the field was appointed to teach his subject at a medical school that was opened at Khartoum. He was also appointed senior pharmacologist of the whole Sudan. The medical school referred to was probably a continuation of the former project started by Ja'far Pasha Maqrizi which was intended at first for the training of local doctors who were eventually reduced, after the intervention of the Khedive, to train as medical assistants.

The deposition of Isma'il, after what was considered an extravagant policy that involved Egypt in huge debts, had its effect on Sudan. After the reign of Isma'il the heavy taxation imposed on the Sudanese and the accompanying ruthlessness in its collection that had characterised the Turco-Egyptian period continued as before. No schools were opened after Isma'il, but none of the already existing schools was reported to have been

1. Ibid., Letter dated 7 Shawwa 1293 A.H., p. 88.
2. Ibid., Letter dated 12 Shawwa 1293 A.H. (30th October 1876).
3. Ibid., Tawfiq was officially inaugurated 18th August 1880, p. 90.
closed. Schools were reported to be functioning at Khartoum, El Obeid, Sennar, Berber, and Sawakin.

At the Khartoum school, where the headmaster was once a former chief qa'iq of Dar-Fur province, French was taught besides Arabic and Turkish. The students were between eighteen to twenty years of age and the fees were sixteen piastres monthly if the student was a day student. Nothing is said of how much a boarding student cost but it was reported that boarding students were treated along military lines. The annual examination at the Khartoum school was a ceremonial occasion attended by the Governor General, Ra'uf Pasha at the time, in whose praise and that of the Khedive specially composed poems were recited and the royal anthem was played. Senior Government officials took part in examining the students while coffee, refreshments and rich food were served to the examiners during the examination days,1 reminiscent of the examination procedure at the ephemeral school started by Rifā's al-Ṭahṭāwī twenty-seven years before.

A similar examination ceremony was reported to have taken place at the Berber School where the headmaster was also the teacher of Arabic. Recitation, composition of Arabic poetry, arithmetic, theology and handwriting were amongst the subjects of the oral and written examinations.2 The result of the examination was sent to the Governor General at Khartoum, who

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1. Al-Waqa‘ī‘-al-Miṣrīyya No. 931 dated 24 Shawwāl 1297, A.H.
nominated the best ten students to be trained for clerical jobs in the Government offices. Their former colleagues at Berber school who had also spent three years at the school had been appointed by that time to the telegraph department.

The schools continued until the outbreak of the Mahdist revolution and the fall of their towns into the hands of the rebels. Some of the teachers were killed in the fighting and some fled the country during the disturbances. The schools were either destroyed or fell into disuse together with the Turkish administration they were intended to serve. However, some of the telegraphists were made use of by the Mahdist state to operate what remained of the telegraph system, namely the line between Khartoum and Omdurman. Some of the accountants, the clerks and the artisans were given some relevant work to do for the Khalifa and his administration. So while the products of those schools and the training they had received during the Turkiyya was made of some use during the Mahdiyya, the schools themselves were discontinued and fell into oblivion.

Those government schools, and for that matter the much less well-known schools which were attached to the Catholic Christian missions in the Sudan, did not play a major part in the life of the Sudan. Their only role might have been in helping to introduce a limited degree of modernization such as in the use of

the telegraph, or in providing a number of artisans for cotton-ginning, steamers, the medical service and in providing for a certain degree of Sudanisation in the civil service particularly in the lower echelons under the Turkish or Egyptian overlords.

The smallness of their number, the shortness of the period of their stay at the schools where they came fully grown from longer periods at the Khalwas, their scattered stations after training or perhaps the very nature of what was taught to them might account for the inconspicuousness of their place in the history of that era. One might seek an explanation in the nature of the society in which they lived. The most important roles were played at that time by those who had received traditional Islamic education either at al-Azhar, or in the Sufi Tariqas, or at the Khalwa, that indigenous Sudanese Islamic school that escaped the vicissitudes of all the other institutions during the Mahdiyya.¹ Modern schools had to wait to be started at the outset of the condominium period beginning with the Gordon Memorial College and with missionary schools both in the Northern and Southern parts of the Sudan.

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CHAPTER II

EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN

Education in the Southern Sudan has had a different story from that in the North. This was partly because of the inaccessibility of the country due to the swamps on the White Nile and the heavy rainfall and tsetse fly that kept the animal rearing Arab tribes, which were responsible for the spread of Arabic and Islamic Culture in the North, from penetrating the South, and limited their movements to the fringes during the dry season. Hence the South remained predominantly pagan. Relationship with the North existed, however, through traders and slave raiders till the conquest of Mohammad 'Ali. During the reign of Isma'Il in 1863 the whole South was brought under his rule and that was inherited by the Mahdist State which effected some degree of Islamicization.

At the beginning of the Condominium when Cromer, on 4th January 1899, gave his speech at Omdurman to Moslem notables in the North announcing the establishment of the Condominium and assuring them against the proselytization of their children by Christianity, he had already tried with Kitchener to convince the Christian Missionary Societies to concentrate their missionary

efforts to the South. The 22nd parallel of latitude was fixed as the northern frontier of the new state, while on the other hand, the Southern frontier was left undefined. 1 Cromer thought that any danger from religious fanaticism in the Sudan could be mitigated and perhaps altogether averted, by imposing some reasonable and salutary checks on the freedom of action of missionary bodies. 2

At the early stage of the Condominium the educational policy of the Sudan Government towards the South was not clear to all of the responsible people. But soon the issue came to be raised. This happened when the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl wrote to the Director of Education telling him that they had opened a school for the sons of soldiers and civilians of the province and had charged one of the employees of the Mudiriyya to teach them. So the Governor asked the Director to sanction the sum of 300 milliemes per month to be paid to that employee against the budget of the Department of Education, and requested him to send 23 books for elementary reading. 3 The answer was an unexpected refusal from the Director of Education who gave a sharp "no" 4 and explained that he could not approve of that as a charge against his budget as he knew nothing of what the Mudir was doing or of the efficiency of

1. Ibid., p. 117.
2. Ibid., p. 545.
3. Letter from W.A. Boulnois, Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazāl. This letter is undated but from subsequent correspondence it seems to have been written early Jan. 1904 or late in Dec. 1903. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
4. Letter from James Currie, to the Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazāl, dated 3.1.04, Khtm. Box 103/7/2DRA.
the teacher or of what the children were taught. The Mudir of Bahr-al-Ghazāl felt very strongly about the reply he got. He attached the letter with a complaint to the Secretary General describing the answer as "anything but encouraging and almost wanting in civility". He asked the Secretary General if he could see his way to getting any encouragement given to educating boys in the Bahr-al-Ghazāl.

The Secretary General sent Boulnois' complaint to Currie under a private cover and intimated that his sympathy was with Boulnois, as he thought that Currie's reply, though not intending to hurt, was somewhat wanting in fuller explanation. He reminded Currie that it was the Director of Education that Mudirs would look to for advice and assistance, and being unacquainted with the Director's view on the subject, it was only natural they should think that a school of any kind was better than none at all. Currie asked the Secretary General to convey to the Mudir his very great regret that his letter should appear to him discourteous.

Currie affirmed that nothing was further from his thoughts than to express any want of confidence in the Mudir of

1. Letter from W.A. Boulnois Kaim, to the Secretary General dated 3.1.04. Wau, Box 103/7/2 DRA. It should be noted that both Currie's letter (2) above and this letter are dated 3.1.04. The distance between Wau and Khartoum is too long to be covered within one day. Both are copies of the original found in Wingate Papers. The dating may be due to a typing error on the part of the person who was typing the copies for Wingate.

2. Letter sgd. Nason, to Currie, The Grove Khartoum. Date struck off on copy. Box 103/7/2 DRA.

3. Ibid.

4. Letter from James Currie to the Secretary General, Khartoum, el.1.04. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
Bahr-al-Ghazāl or put any obstacle in his way. But he considered education in the South was a very large question and till the Government as a whole decided what its general policy was going to be it was far better to do nothing. Currie also added that he had only £1,000 per annum for the vernacular education of the whole Sudan. He doubted whether any portion of that should be spent at the time in Bahr-al-Ghazāl. The Secretary General though willing to convey the message as requested, was not satisfied about the decision. To him the point at issue was; was it not better to teach a little than nothing at all?²

To the Secretary General the answer was clear. Provided a Mudir could produce a man whom he considered capable of carrying on, what in the Bahr-al-Ghazāl would be the most elementary class of teaching, surely that ought to be better than letting children run wild doing nothing and he could hardly imagine that the expenditure of £5 per annum including books could be wasted. As to their being non-Moslems, the Secretary General argued that the Mudir had stated that they were the sons of soldiers and civilians, presumably employees, who in most cases did profess Islam and were liable to come down to Khartoum where they would hope to carry on their education at the Gordon College or other schools. These arguments, rational and plausible as they appeared to the Secretary

1. Ibid.
2. Letter from Secretary General, F.J. Nason, Lewa to the Director of Education, Khartoum, 31.1.04. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter from Boulnois to Secretary General, 3.1.04. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
General, were not in harmony with the higher policy of the Government towards education in the South, a policy which only Currie and the Governor General seemed to know about.

The Secretary General was not to be kept in the dark any longer. Currie intimated to him that the Governor General was preparing a note on the matter. Currie also justified his stand on the ground that as a matter of principle he did not like giving educational grants-in-aid in places that he could not inspect and knew nothing about. This was not because he distrusted Mudirs but because educational organisation had not been in their line and he could get better value for his money in places that he could keep under inspection. He also emphasised that the Sudan Government as a whole had not till then made up its mind what it was to do in the matter of education in the South. Till they had done so he did not want to be committed to any line of policy. He rather doubted if all the considerations had occurred to the Mudir in the case of the Bahr-al-Ghazāl school. For if the teacher he was employing was a Moslem, Currie explained, the net result of his teaching would tend towards Islam. But as he was aware of the views that were held by the Governor General on the subject he wanted them to be well understood before anything was done. The Secretary General was briefed by the Governor General as well and consequently he wrote a brief letter to the Governor of Bahr al

1. Letter from Currie to the Secretary General 2.2.04, Khartoum, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter Sgd. F.J. Nason Lewa, S.G. to the Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazāl 3.2.04, Khartoum, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
Ghazāl that the Governor General had expressed his intention of writing to him on the subject as it was a most important one.

Boulnois, the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl, got a private letter from Wingate, the Governor General.¹ The letter was ample, revealing and heartening. It was heartening to learn that Currie had been told by the Governor General, who saw their correspondence over the school, that a little more courtesy in his wording would not be amiss. On the other hand Currie was defended because of considerable financial difficulties and for his strong but reasonable views over not starting an educational system in Bahr-al-Ghazāl without more fully understanding the requirements. The Governor General had, however, compromised matters by arranging that Currie should give Boulnois the sum of £E10 for the current year for experimental purposes.

The most revealing part of the letter was in the part where the Governor General confided to Boulnois that the question of education in the Southern Provinces presented certain difficulties. For instance all preliminary class books in Arabic contained plentiful references to the Prophet, and the Governor General was not at all keen to propagate Islam in countries in which it was not the religion of the inhabitants. As a Governor General, Wingate asserted that he did not intend interfering with religious beliefs and preferred to leave all that in the hands of the Missionaries. Boulnois was told that he would shortly have the

¹ Letter marked Private agd. R. Wingate, G.G. Office, Khartoum to Boulnois 3.2.04, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
Roman Catholic Bishop of the Austrian Mission with him. Another point revealed to Boulnois was that of the language question. The language of Bahr-al-Ghasāl, Wingate told him, was not really Arabic and therefore if any foreign language was to be taught, it ought to be English. These were the reasons why Wingate was inclined to deal with the question of the school in a very tentative manner at first.

The Governor General suggested to Boulnois to get one of his Syrian Christian translators form a class and teach the boys simple reading, writing and arithmetic, without using the usual Arabic class books and see how it was going to work. Wingate promised that within a year's time he could send up Currie to establish a school on special lines, with the object of eventually developing an industrial school. While allowing Boulnois to run this experiment, Wingate reminded him also that the views he had expressed on education in the Southern Provinces were entirely private and should not be made known.

In November that year Wingate went on a tour of inspection to Bahr-al-Ghasāl where he inquired about the school at Wau. But he seemed to have been worried by what he found. The headmaster who was also the translator of Bahr-al-Ghasāl District Office was named Ahmad 'Izzat which meant he was a Moslem and so, judging by the names, were all the twenty-nine boys at the school.²

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1. See Return of Boys Bahr-al-Ghasāl Grammar School 18.11.04, Wau, Wingate Papers, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Ibid.
Wingate conveyed this in a memorandum to the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl reiterating his former views. Although he admitted that much credit was due to the Governor and the two masters in charge of the Wau School for the instructional progress that had been made, he was inclined to think that in view of the exceptional situation in the Bahr-al-Ghazāl, and the variety of nationalities and religions of the Province, the education question ought to be considered most carefully. "A false step in the early stages may involve the Government subsequently in much trouble and difficulty". This remark proved to be, for more than half a century, one of the most prophetic ironies in the history of the Sudan.

In the return of boys attending the school, furnished by the headmaster, the Governor General observed the following numbers of nationalities represented: 1 Ga‘alī, 5 Dinkas, 11 Gebelawis, 3 Nubians, 5 Karachawis, 1 Furawi, 1 Gorawi, 1 Niam Niam, 1 Nubawi. He classified them as 14 speaking Arabic as their mother tongue and the remainder spoke some Arabic but their mother tongue was one of the many languages peculiar to the Bahr-al-Ghazāl.

1. See letter from Wingate to Boulnois Governor Bahr-al-Ghazāl, dated 3.2.04, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Memo, from G.G. Jur River to Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazāl 21st Nov. 1904, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Wingate used the term 'nationality' as it was used in the returns of the headmaster which stood for the tribal origin of the pupil.
5. The actual number on the headmaster's 'Return' was 15. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
He also noticed that they were all reported as being Moslems but he thought it was doubtful whether, before they went to school, more than half of them belonged to the faith of Islam. If the Governor General had looked at the names of the childrens' parents he could have found that the parents too had Moslem names which they, most likely, had acquired before their children went to school a few months prior to his visit.

Wingate thought that if the existing system continued and the school increased largely - which in all probability would have been the case, he thought there was no doubt that every boy would eventually become an Arabic-speaking Moslem with a smattering of English. This was so very evidently undesirable to him that he did not need to go into the objectives in detail. He found it sufficient to say that to the majority of the inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazāl Arabic was just as much a foreign language as English and considerably more difficult, and it was not the object of the Sudan Government to "Moslemise" all its subjects. This argument came to be used later on in reverse after the end of the condominium. Such being the general lines and apprehensions, Wingate then turned to the application as regards the requirements of Bahr-al-Ghazāl.

He thought that from an educational point of view it did not appear to be necessary to strive for a high standard for the actual inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazāl. For though it was the object of the Government to fill many of the minor posts with actual inhabitants of the province, he had no doubt that the Khartoum and other schools would eventually turn out a sufficient
number of moderately educated inhabitants who would be fitted to take such posts, but in his opinion the system in Bahr-al-Ghazal should be to provide a certain number of trained artisans, carpenters, blacksmiths, etc., who in addition to a knowledge of their trade should also have a moderate knowledge of reading, writing and very simple arithmetic.

As far as he had been able to judge from what he described as a very cursory inspection of the Province, the educational requirements appeared to him to divide themselves up into two distinct divisions.

1. To design a system of education for the children of the Moslem officers, soldiers, employees and merchants collected at Wau. These were those who came to be called later on Northerners.

2. To provide a sound industrial education for the children of non-Moslem parents, i.e. local inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazal. These were representing the group that came later on to be called Southerners.

In order to deal with (1) which he evidently regarded of some urgency, Wingate proposed to transfer as soon as possible to Wau a regimental school for the Battalion quartered in the province, supplementing its teaching capacity by transferring the existing local masters to the regimental school as well as such boys of the local school whose parents desired them to continue their studies on regimental school lines. By so doing he thought the immediate requirements of the parents would be satisfied and a useful class would be formed from which boys could be drawn for the
appointment of **Wakil-Buluk-Amin**\(^1\) and some of the minor clerical appointments. An amalgamation of the regimental school system with the system which was then in vogue in the local school would, he thought, provide a sufficiently flexible system and one which would continue to provide the limited requirements for some years. The existing school somehow disappeared and the regimental school was not transferred as we shall see later.\(^2\)

As regards (2) Wingate was of the opinion that the development of an industrial education was the thing that would satisfy the requirements of Bahr-al-Ghazāl more fully than any other system. The fact that there were some workshops at Wau in which various trades could be taught, allowed him to think the initial organisation would be greatly simplified.

He proposed therefore that such local boys as were then serving as apprentices in the shops, with the addition of such boys from the local school who desired to take up an industrial education, should be formed into classes (about two to begin with) and whilst one class was in the shops the other would be receiving the simplest elements of an entirely non-sectarian education (i.e. reading, writing and simple arithmetic only) under the direction of a non-Moslem instructor. This Wingate promised to endeavour to procure.\(^3\) The medium of instruction he thought should be if

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1. A soldier to whom a clerical job is assigned.
2. Draft telegram to A.G. from Wingate dated 21.11.1904, asking for transference of school to Battalion Wau, Box 103/7/2 DRA. Also later correspondence between Hill and Civil Secretary, letter BGP 336/06 Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Draft telegram to Lord Cromer from Wingate dated 20.11.1904 "ref. Wau School does Lord Cromer approve project for procuring teacher for Industrial Side". Box 103/7/2 DRA.
possible the mother tongue of the boys but as this might not at first be feasible probably a lingua-franca, in which the technical expressions would be in English, would eventually be evolved. This would necessitate very simple instruction in English during school hours.

As regards religious instruction, Wingate proposed that so far as the industrial school training was concerned, the Government should not initiate religious instruction of any sort. He had no doubt that such instruction would eventually be undertaken by the various missionaries who were establishing themselves in the country. Thus Wingate was paving the way in Wau for the Missionaries before they went there.

Within two years of Wingate's visit the Industrial School had been started at Wau under Roman Catholic priests. In the meantime Boulnois died and various changes took place amongst the governors of the Province in a short period. Hill who became Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl towards the end of 1906 noticed that there were a quantity of children in Wau belonging to the Battalion, (Jehadiyya) and civilian population settled in Wau and there was no school at Wau except the Mission School, which as far as he could make out taught a few boys a little English. Hill complained to the Civil Secretary that the Imam of the Battalion at Wau remained

1. Memo. from G.G. Jur River to Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazāl, 21st Nov. 1904, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Wingate letter to Hill, dated 21st Feb. 07, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter from H. Hill, Miralai, Governor Bahr-al-Ghazāl B.G.P. 1336/06 Wau 19.12.06 to the Civil Secretary, Khartoum, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
4. Ibid.
at Khartoum or Omdurman and so there was no Battalion School at Wau. He thought, like Boulnois and Mason before him, that it was a pity that a number of children should be loafing about all day, when they might advantageously be taught something. Hill asked if the Director of Education could do something such as supplying a teacher and the necessary books, slates etc. for Hill could supply the pupils to the number of 20 to 30 or possibly more, and could put up a school hut. The education would have to be free.

It seemed that it was not only the new Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl who was not acquainted with the Governor General's views on education in the South but also other senior officials in Khartoum to whom he was applying for help. The assistant Civil Secretary asked the Adjutant General for information if there was any intention of a Battalion School being opened at Wau. The Acting Adjutant General answered that it was quite possible that a Battalion School would be opened at Wau, but even if this was done the Imam would have enough to do to instruct the boys of the Battalion, and would not be able to give any other instruction.

The Civil Secretary, who also seemed to be in the dark about the Government policy, asked Currie if he were in a position to offer any assistance to Bahr-al-Ghazāl.

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1. Letter II, Sgd. H.H. Wilson, Kaim, Asst. Civil Sec. for C.S. Khtm. 28.1.07. Adjutant General Egyptian Army, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter III Sgd. C.H. Townsend, Kaim, A.A.G. for A.G. Khtm. 30.1.07. to the Civil Secretary, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter C.S./Ann./19 Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum, 31st January 1907. To Director of Education, Khartoum, Sgd. P.R. Phipps, Civil Secretary, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
Currie apologised that he was not in a position to help in the education of the Southern Provinces. But he asked Phipps to inform the Governor that any eligible boy of decent parents that he wished to send he would accept with pleasure. Currie knowing the Governor General's views on the subject suggested that he should be informed of the matter.¹ This was readily done,² and Wingate had once more to clarify his views to the new governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal and to the Civil Secretary.³

Wingate felt that as the subject was of such far reaching importance, it was best to write to Hill semi-officially in explanation.⁴ He told Hill that when he inspected the Province in November 1907 he carefully went into the system of education to be devised with Boulnois and as a result of their deliberations he wrote out a memorandum a copy of which he enclosed to Hill.⁵ Moreover, Wingate thought that for various reasons the policy he laid down in that memorandum had not been carried out in its entirety. But as affairs became more settled he hoped it would be possible to work steadily along the lines which were laid down.

Wingate pointed out that the school to which Hill

1. Letter A.D.M.19. Education Office, Khartoum, 2nd Feb. 1907 to Civil Sec. sgd. J. Currie Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Note to Private Secretary, forward for the information of H.E. The G.G., Khtm. 5.2.07 sgd. H.H. Wilson, Kaim, A.C.C. for C.S. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. See note at foot of letter A.D.M.19 above opp. cit. The note (sgd. R. Wingate, Khtm. 21.2.07. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
4. Letter from R. Wingate Khartoum 21st Feb. 1907 to Sir H. Hill, Bart., Gov. Bahr-al-Ghazal Province, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
5. Copy letter marked Private Sgd. R. Wingate G.G. Office, Khartoum to Boulnois 3.2.04. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
referred in his memorandum was the Technical School to which Wingate referred in his, and the teachers whom Wingate had promised to obtain for it were the Roman Catholic Missionaries. Those priests, he revealed, were paid by the Government, and the school was really a Government School and not a purely Missionary establishment. He saw no reason why that system should not continue and be further developed, but he fully realised the importance of the points that Hill brought to notice, namely that children of Moslem parents had no opportunity of obtaining instruction.

He explained that it was the delay in the despatch of the Battalion School to Wau, which had delayed the execution of this portion of the project. Wingate reminded Hill that the Battalion School was meant (in addition to its Battalion functions) merely to provide instruction for the children of those Moslem parents who had scruples about allowing their children to attend the technical school in which the Roman Catholic priests gave instruction.

However, Wingate suggested another way of dealing with the Moslem children if their parents wished. This was based on the Missionary Schools system in Khartoum which Wingate thought could successfully apply to Wau if Hill thought it was desirable to do so. He asked Hill to consider the Wau Technical School as a Missionary School, in so far as the attendance of Moslem children was concerned, and he could if he wished apply to it the rules that were applied to the Missionary Schools in Khartoum. A copy of those rules was enclosed from which Hill could see that attendance at religious instruction of children attending the school was not
obligatory. Hill was told that the adoption of this principle might overcome any qualms of conscience which parents of Moslem children might have, and might enable him to temporarily overcome his difficulties pending the arrival of the Battalion School at Wau.

Wingate reminded Hill that the question of devising a system of education in the provinces of the Sudan which were more pagan than Moslem was a very delicate one, and required most careful treatment. He also asked him to understand that the memorandum of 21st November, 1901, as well as the letter, were for his entirely confidential information, and he should hand them over, when the time came, to his successor as secret documents, as the time was not ripe then for a formal disclosure of the policy it was intended to pursue.¹

Hill replied² that although he had not seen the former memorandum before, he thought he had suggested much the same as regards the Moslems. He explained that in his application for a school he had never meant to include the inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazāl. He thought the only thing to do was to wait for the Battalion School. Thus he was not inclined to try the Khartoum experiment with the Missionary school. Of the latter he thought that the technical instruction was decidedly good but as regards the other department of the Missionary school, teaching English etc., he was privately of the opinion that very little was done.

¹ Wingate letter of 21st Feb. 1907, and enclosure to Hill. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
² Letter from H. Hill, M.R. Governor Bahr-al-Ghazāl, Lau Post 30th March 1907 to H.E.G.G., Khartoum. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
What struck Hill was that technical education was what the Mission devoted themselves to. He felt that the method of training which the Governor General had laid down should have been carried out, but he felt quite sure in his own mind that the boys in the technical school were not taught anything else, i.e. one day writing etc., and the next day technical work. He intimated that just as he left Wau the Mission had been severely reduced by deaths and a new party of priests and lay brothers had arrived, so things were no doubt unsettled.

Hill thought that none of the missionaries he met up in Wau were capable of teaching English, as he found it very difficult to understand the "Head Priest" there. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that the Roman Catholic missions were staffed by Austrians, Germans and Italians. To remedy the situation Hill suggested that the Superior at Wau should be told to furnish a report as to hours of work, study and attendances at both schools. This would show whether the terms of the memorandum were being carried out. If that was done through the Roman Catholic Bishop at Khartoum, then Hill could be informed to see that it was carried out in the School at Wau.

He explained that he fully understood the situation\footnote{Wingate letter to Hill, 21st Feb. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DHA.} which he took briefly to be, the Government did not want to make more Moslems, it wished to give technical instruction to the inhabitants, through the medium of their own language, while
teaching them a certain amount of English, reading and writing and a little arithmetic. Religious instruction could be given to those whose parents desired it in the Missionary School. Children of Moslem parents would be taught in the Battalion School when it arrived in Wau.

The next stage came about three years later in 1910 when the Bishops of the different missionary bodies met to discuss the problems of teaching English in their schools whereas government work was done in Arabic. The result of their deliberations was communicated to the Governor General by Bishop Gwynne\(^1\) of the C.M.S. Gwynne told Wingate that Bishop Geyer of the Roman Catholic Mission, Mr. Shaw of the American Mission and he himself had had an important consultation a fortnight before about the question of teaching the natives in the pagan Provinces of the Sudan Arabic or English.\(^2\) Bishop Geyer stated that as long as the Government business was transacted in Arabic there was no desire for English. Mr. Shaw's idea was that if the natives were taught Arabic, it would bring in a strong Islamic influence.

Bishop Geyer\(^3\) agreed, but stated that unless the Governors of the Provinces in the pagan part would encourage the employment of English speaking natives, it would not be worthwhile for his missionaries to teach English nor would there be any demand for this from the natives themselves. So Gwynne suggested to the

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2. Ibid.
Governor General that if the Governors would, as far as possible, encourage the use of English as the medium through which business with the natives was to be transacted, it would be an inducement on the part of the natives "to learn our language and would give Christian Missionaries some slight chance against the overwhelming advantages which Islam seems to have at present in the Southern Sudan."¹

One day after Gwynne had written his letter,² Wingate wrote another private letter to the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghasāl³ with a copy to the Governor of the other Southern Province at the time, Upper Nile.⁴ To both of them copies of Gwynne's letter were enclosed. Wingate told his Governors of the South that he did not need to recapitulate the reasons which induced him to suggest in the first instance that Arabic should not be taught to the natives in the mission schools and his opinion in that respect was unchanged.

On the other hand, Wingate told his Governors, that he fully recognized the difficulties pointed out by the missionaries themselves as to the obstacles to obtaining Government employment on the part of the pupils without a knowledge of Arabic as long as Arabic was the official language. What Wingate wished the Governors to do was to consider very carefully whether any such method as that

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¹. Letter from Gwynne to Wingate 26.12.1910 Box 103/7/2 DRA.
². Ibid.
³. Wingate letter, Khartoum 27th Dec. 1910 (private) to El Miralai Feilden Bey, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
⁴. Wingate letter Khartoum 27th Dec. 1910 (private) to El Miralai Owen Bey, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
suggested by Bishop Geyer and Bishop Gwynne, as to making English
the official language, was feasible. His own view was that if
the new system was started very quietly and tentatively - without
any fuss and without putting the dots on the i's too prominently -
the desideratum could become a fait accompli almost before anyone
had realised that a change had taken place. He thought it was very
much easier to deal with an accomplished fact should opposition be
eventually raised.

Another point which Wingate considered even more
private and confidential was also raised by the Bishops. They
asked for the recognition of Sunday as the day of rest and holiday
in the Southern districts.¹ Owen, the Governor of Upper Nile, was
emphatic as to the danger of doing anything of the sort at any
stations along the river, though he thought that in the interior
of the Enclave a very tentative effort might be made in that
direction on the grounds that during the Belgian occupation of the
country Sunday and not Friday was the recognised holiday. Wingate
asked Feilden, Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazāl at the time, whether he
thought that a similar system might be very gradually introduced
into some of the very remote districts of his province, especially
in the South.

Wingate fully understood that it was a big and
important departure which might lay the Government open to severe
criticism as well as an attack on the part of the extreme Pan-
Islamists, but, after all, he told his Governors, they ought to

¹. Ibid.
remember that the bulk of the inhabitants of both provinces were not Moslems at all, that the whole of Uganda had accepted Christianity almost without a murmur, and that furthermore English was a very much easier language to learn than Arabic for those people. This was the beginning of what came to be known in the 1920s as the Southern Policy.

The Bishops though united in seeking a chance against the overwhelming advantages that Islam seemed to have had in the Southern Sudan, were not without their differences and strife over what would replace it. In 1912 while Wingate was taking his summer holiday in Britain, he had an interview with the C.M.S. representatives who wanted to open missionary stations at Yambio and at Meridi; so he had to cable to Khartoum that he was unable to accede to a former request made to him by Bishop Geyer to take over the Azande country in exchange for the Southern Enclave. This was within the Government policy of trying to divide the region into spheres of influence between the churches.

The 1914 War brought this strife into the surface. The Government of Sudan set up a committee to investigate the position of the Austrian Mission in Sudan during the war. The committee recommended that the members of the mission should be allowed to stay in Sudan. When Wingate passed the report to Bishop Gwynne who spent the War period in England and France,

1. Letter from Wingate 22nd July 1912 to Crawford. Box 103/7/2DRA.
2. S.O. Report by the Aliens Committee as to the Austrian Mission, Cairo, 1916.
3. Ibid., p.5.
Gwynne's reply was: "I must confess that I should rather have preferred to see the German and Austrian Missionaries turned wholesale out of the country. They are all under the thumb of Berlin, and, moreover, it has to be remembered that in the case of the Roman Catholics they cannot help being influenced by the Vatican, which is notoriously pro-German". The remark about the Roman Catholics and the Vatican was directed against the Italians who came to be in full charge of the Roman Catholic missionary work in the Southern Sudan in 1913, and continued to be so.

In the same year 1916 Wingate left the Sudan but the policy he had initiated towards the South continued during the War years and in the aftermath. What came to be known in the 1920s and after, up to 1947, as the "Southern Policy" was no more than an effective implementation of the guidelines given by Wingate during the early years of the Condominium. Paradoxically enough it was during this period that the Government Department of Education came to be more actively involved in the educational work that was carried by the Missionaries in the South. This was the time when the Sudan Government started to be worried about the political development in Egypt and its impact on the educated Sudanese in the North. In the North the policy came to be "Native Administration", and subsidised Khalwas instead of schools. In the South the policy was subsidised missionary education and effective

1. Gwynne's letter, Ardgowan, Greenock, 2nd Sept. 1916, to "My dear Wingate", Box 103/7/2 DRA.
measures to isolate the South from the North; by the erasing of Islamic and Arabic Culture.

It was in 1926 that the Director of Education submitted to the Governor General a comprehensive memorandum on education in the South¹ namely Bahr-al-Ghazal and Mongalla Provinces. The proposed policy of co-operation between the missionaries themselves and the Government seems to be also in response to the general policy of the British Government towards missionary education in East and Tropical Africa after the Phelps-Stokes Commission Report of 1922.² The proposals put forward by the Director were for:

1. A Government school at Wau in close connexion with the Italian (Roman Catholic) Mission School which should educate boys for Government Service up to a standard equivalent to the Second Year of the Gordon College Secondary Course.

2. A subvention for a school belonging to the C.M.S. at Juba, which aimed at the same standard.

3. A subvention to ten central schools in the Italian (Roman Catholic) sphere, to seven in the C.M.S. sphere and to five in the open sphere.

¹. D.E.S./29-24A, Khartoum, 10th January 1926, Secret, to Civil Secretary, S.G., Khtm., for submission to his excellency the Governor General. Sgd. J.W. Crowfoot, Director of Ed. Copies to P.S. & C.S. Box 103/7/2 DRA.

4. Subventions in respect of Technical training and Publications.

The Director also explained that hitherto great difficulties had hindered the Government from doing much towards the spread of education in the South, not least among them the multiplicity of languages spoken there and the absence of any native script. During the few years that had passed, progress had been made in all directions and in educational matters, in particular, a new situation was created by the labours of devoted missionaries, English and Italian, who had reduced many of the native languages to printed form. He also observed that there were two types of education in the South at the time and he thought it was the business of the Government to make both types more effective.

There were two types because the two provinces of Bahr-al-Ghazāl and Equatoria, with the exception of a relatively small area, had been parcelled out in two exclusive spheres between the C.M.S. and the Italian Catholic Mission.1 The educational methods and ideals of the two societies were very different, there was the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism plus the difference between English and Italian traditions. The Director of Education, and the Sudan Government, saw that there was nothing to prevent co-operation with both major

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1. Other relatively smaller missions were the American United Presbyterian Mission in Upper Nile, Sudan, Interior Mission in Upper Nile, Sudan United Mission in the Nuba Hills Area in Southern Kordofan. See Map (1).
missions. His recommendations were the outcome of his deliberations with the heads of the two missions after visiting some of their schools. Each of the two spheres had two needs in common, they both wanted technical guidance by an educational expert and they both wanted financial help.

The Director of Education also reported that Arabic was still the vernacular in Wau, and he proposed that it should be retained as the medium of instruction so long as necessary but written in the Latin Script, the Arabic script should be taught only in the highest classes to those who would need it for Government work. This change he thought would in itself save much time and energy, and it was advocated independently both by Father Benetti and Archdeacon Shaw. The staff should be recruited from Syria until a native staff was available. Similar views were advocated by Wingate in 1904, 1907 and 1910. For them to be suggested again indicates the difficulty of eradicating Arabic encountered over more than 20 years, so at last a compromise was suggested of writing it in Latin alphabet with the use of a Syrian, presumably Christian, teacher.

Towards the end of the year 1926 the first Inspector of Southern Education was appointed. The new inspector, Mr. N.B. Hunter was first sent to Uganda to study the methods adopted there, under Mr. E.R.J. Hussey who was seconded from the Sudan Department of Education in 1924 to take up the post of

Director of Education in Uganda. In December Mr. Hussey accompanied the new inspector on his return to the Sudan and made a tour in Mongalla and Bahr-al-Ghazāl Provinces preparatory to presenting further recommendations on the questions involved. The major problem that presented itself was the infinite variety of local languages and their orthography so preparation for a language conference were started.

The language conference was held at Rejaf in April 1928 and was attended by Sudan Government officials, the Director of Education, Uganda, the Provincial Commissioner Northern Province Uganda, and a representative of the Belgian Congo Administration. Many representatives of mission schools in the Sudan, the Belgian Congo and Uganda were also present. The Conference was greatly helped by Professor Westermann, the Director of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. The Director of the Sudan Department of Education gave the opening address on behalf of the Governor General and in his address he asked the participants to confine themselves to the use of Latin alphabet to the exclusion of Arabic both for political reasons and for a practical reason since the teachers being European missionaries would not know it anyway.

A uniform orthography was adopted, and useful resolutions

passed on the selection and compilation of text-books and the provision of vernacular grammars. Amongst the resolutions was one pertaining to the appointment of a linguist. In August 1929 a linguistic expert Dr. A.N. Tucker was appointed. He was of considerable help in the selection of vocabularies and grammar in the group languages and in settling certain difficulties arising from the adoption of the new orthography. This facilitated the selection and compilation of text-books which were used in the Southern schools. By 1930 four school text-books were in the press, and the publication of some others was awaiting the decisions of a special committee set up by the Education Department on which mission authorities were represented.

The decade that followed the Rejaf Linguistic Conference was a decade of implementation, through the production of more text-books in the language groups that had been selected. The Bush School which is sometimes called the Village School where these text-books were of greatest use came to be well established as the basis of school education in the south. The Bush School was a school where the Southern child spent the first two years of his schooling learning in the vernacular. This was, and still is a most important missionary contribution to education in the

3. G.G. Reports, 1929, p. 90; 1930, p. 95; 1931, p. 76; 1932, p. 80; 1933, p. 71; 1934, p. 72; 1935, p. 78; 1936, pp. 80-9; 1937, pp. 82-3.
Southern Sudan. Apart from the increase in the number of the "Bush Schools", and some elementary girls schools no substantial increase was made in the education in the South during this decade. Three intermediate schools that were there before the Rejaf Linguistic Conference\(^1\) were not added to and they were about the highest a Southern child could reach. Indeed in some years in the thirties attendance of pupils in both intermediate and elementary vernacular schools decreased.\(^2\) This could be explained by the missionaries chief interest in proselytization hence their concern with the Bush School rather than upper higher forms of education, and by the Economic Depression which meant that there was much less money to be spent on education by both government and missionary societies. Last but not least it could also be explained by the corresponding "Native Administration" policy which was rigorously pursued by the Sudan Government at the time in the North. Having lost confidence in the educated elite in the North the Government was unlikely to have better hopes of creating a Southern counterpart. All that it needed was a sufficient, though less qualified, number of Southerners to replace the Northern employees who were to be "gradually but effectively weeded out of the South",\(^3\) as an implementation of the "Southern Policy".

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In 1937 the Director of Education carried out an extensive tour of the schools in the Southern Provinces where he discussed with the missionary societies personnel in charge of the schools and with the administrative officials plans for the improvement and expansion of the Southern School System.\(^{}1\) This no doubt influenced the 1938 Government programme for the South as the Government decided to start opening its own schools in the South, at the same time increasing the subventions to the missionary schools. The latter meant an increase in Government supervision and control. The outbreak of the World War hampered the execution of the programme but deliberations continued. In 1942 a Southern education conference was held at Malakal. The discussions covered a wide range of subjects and helped to provide a clear picture both of the existing position and of the lines of future development.\(^{}2\)

After the War the situation improved for both missionaries and Government though staffing difficulties continued but the position eased in 1944 with the return of four fathers and three sisters to the teaching cadre of the Verona Mission, and the new arrival of four other fathers who were followed in a year by those who were detained in Europe during the war. The Government also started its programme by opening in 1944, two Government schools, a central school under a British headmaster at Abwong in the Upper

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Nile Province, and a village school at Tonj. In 1945 the Government effected more direct control of Southern education by the creation of a new post of an Assistant Director of Education, South. This was matched by increased grants to the missions totalling over £2,000 to cover 75 per cent of the cost of the new salaries.

The year 1946 was a peak for the nationalist movement in the North. The pressure of this movement together with the Post-War Colonial policy led the administration to think of educational expansion in the South which up to that time did not go further than the three intermediate schools that were there since the 1920s. In 1945 there had been only 16 boys at Primary teacher training courses and secondary schools in Uganda and 8 more were added at the end of the year. As for higher education there was only one student at Makerere College in Uganda. This was felt by the Government to be an unsatisfactory position and that 'steps ought to be taken to provide local institutions'. The nationalist movement was increasingly aware and critical of the Government's policy in the South and blaming it for its backwardness as well as accusing it of planning to sever it from the North so that it would be linked with the British East African territories. The Graduates Congress in 1939 asked for more education in the South and the integration of the education in the South with that in the

2. Ibid., p. 126.
In 1942 the Graduates Congress Memorandum to the Government included amongst other things, "The abolition of the ordinances on 'closed areas' and the lifting of restrictions placed on trade and on the movements of the Sudanese within the Sudan and the cancellation of subventions to missionary schools."

Thus in 1946 while the Sudan Government was still discussing the future of the South, a Sudanisation Committee was set up in March 1946 a sub-committee of which was authorised to visit the South. The Civil Secretary informed the Governor of Equatoria on this occasion that "the progressive Sudanisation of our governmental machinery is today a matter of the greatest political and administrative importance." Thus a Five Year Plan for the development of education in the South was approved in 1946 together with a Ten Year Plan for Education in the North. The Southern Plan was to provide for a large extension of education at all levels and was planned to be effected both through the agency of the missions and by the establishment of government schools.

Under the new Development Plan, it was agreed that as qualified teachers became available, all the old 4-year elementary schools would be developed into 6-year primary schools. The teachers for these schools were to be provided by the two new primary teachers training centres which were opened during 1946.

by the Church Missionary Society at Yambio and by the Verona Fathers Mission at Bussere. The whole development of primary schools in the South was to hinge on the progress made by those two centres which were to be self-governing bodies managed by boards of governors with both mission and government representation. ¹

The idea of expanding the elementary school to a six year primary school seems to have been influenced by the Brown Plan² which was suggested primarily, at the time, though never implemented, for the system in the North. It was to cream off the intermediate school pupils at the end of their second year so that the most able amongst them be given a six year course of academic secondary education comparable to the English sixth form.

A reform that was effected in the South was the arrival towards the end of 1946 of the new headmaster of Bussere Intermediate School and of an additional assistant master. Both laymen and trained and experienced teachers. Their arrival was in accordance with the new agreement made with the Verona Fathers Mission that the school should in future have three British masters. This was to ensure that the standard of English as well as other subjects in the Roman Catholic School was on a par with the other two intermediate schools in the South which were run by the Church Missionary Society.³

In this year the Government also opened the

1. Ibid., pp.132.
2. Mr. Brown was the Deputy Head of Bakht er Ruda Institute for education and later on Headmaster of Hantoub Secondary School up to 1955.
new building of Atar Boys Intermediate School, the first Government intermediate school to be opened in the South in about half a century of Condominium rule. The official report describing this stated jubilantly that with the admission of the new class of 26 "the first intermediate class proper was started."\(^2\)

While these educational developments were occurring, some major political developments were taking place both internally and externally: Labour Government in Britain, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Sudan and an increasing worry among the nationalist movement in the North about the future of the Sudan both North and South. The Sudan Government was revising the Southern policy and this culminated in a Circular\(^3\) to the Governors of the Provinces as well as the Directors and Heads of Government Departments.

The Civil Secretary referred to a former Despatch of 4th August 1945\(^4\) where in paragraph 2 three possible political futures for the Southern Sudan were discussed. The crucial sentence is: "It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CS/GCR/I.C.I., Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum, 16 December 1946 (Sgd. J.W. Robertson, Civil Secretary). Copies were also sent to Sudan Agent, Cairo, and Sudan Agent, London. Subject: Southern Sudan Policy. Marked Secret. Archives Khartoum, cyclostyled for limited circulation in Fourteen Documents on The Problem of the Southern Sudan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Khartoum and N.Y., 1965.
the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa or partly with each." Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary, explained that since the despatch was written in 1945 and since the decisions on policy which it recorded were taken, not only had further decisions on policy for the South been taken but great changes had taken place in the political outlook for the Country as a whole. He stated that whatever might be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the treaty negotiations which were taking place at the time between the Condominium Governments, it was certain that the advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive reduction of British Executive authority, and public canvassing of the Southern Sudan question, would be accelerated. He argued that it was therefore essential that policy for the Southern Sudan should be crystallized as soon as possible and that it should be crystallized in a form which could be publicly explained and supported and which should therefore be based on sound and constructive social and economic principles. These principles should not only bear defence against fastidious opposition, but should also command the support of Northern Sudanese who were prepared to take logical and liberal points of view; while the relief of doubts in the minds of British political and departmental staff who had the interests of the South at heart was also pressing and important.

The Civil Secretary persuaded his colleagues that he did not suggest that the future of the two million inhabitants of the South should be influenced by "appeasement of the as yet immature
and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. But it is the Sudanese, Northern and Southern, who will live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this Country. \(^1\) He thought that the British efforts should therefore be concentrated on initiating a policy which would not be only sound in itself, but which could be made acceptable to and eventually workable by patriots and reasonable Sudanese, Northern and Southern alike.

He said that apart from the recent rapid political development in the North some other conclusions had further emerged since the Governor General's 1945 despatch and enclosures were written. The East Africa's plans regarding better communications with the Southern Sudan had been found to be nebulous, and contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. The Civil Secretary remarked that whatever the possibilities, there was no reason to hesitate between development of trade between the South and East Africa and development of trade between the Southern and the Northern Sudan. The chance of succeeding depended, he thought, upon confining themselves to the one aim of developing trade in the South, and between the North and South.

In education, he believed that "while the South may hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary education", which he thought that Southerners should get at the Gordon Memorial College. Arabic was not essential there, but he thought it should be taught to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards. As for the distinctions in rates of

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pay and other conditions of government service, the artificial rules about employment of Southerners in the North, attempts at economic separation, and all similar distinctions, they were becoming more and more anomalous as the growing demand for Northerners to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the rapidly growing communication and travel between North and South, and the very application of the policy of pushing forward in the South, broke down the previous isolation of the Southern Provinces and strained those distinctions further.¹

Thus the Civil Secretary attempted to indicate the reasons which had led him to think that an important decision on Southern Policy should then be taken. As the biennial report to the British Government was due early in 1947 he proposed, subject to the comments on his circular, to ask the Governor General that in his report he should ask the British Government to approve that two of the alternatives mentioned before² should be ruled out as practical politics at the time. He thought that it might in future be proved that it would be to the advantage of certain of the most southerly tribes, e.g. of Opari or Kajo Kaji, to join up with their relatives in Uganda. He also surmised that it might be that the feeling which then existed among a few, of what he described as "the wisest Northern Sudanese", that they should not, when self-governing, be asked to shoulder the financial and communal burden which they believed the South would always prove

¹. Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945.
². Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945.
to be, may become an important political policy among them. But he advised his colleagues, that they should work on the assumption that the Sudan, as it was constituted, with possibly minor adjustments, would remain one.

The Civil Secretary concluded that they should therefore re-state their Southern Policy and do so publicly, as follows:

"The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle-eastern and Arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future."¹ He thought that certain changes of detail, in each sphere of Government activity in the South, would have to follow the approval of a policy so defined. He asked his colleagues to suggest briefly the major points. He asked them to consider the matter carefully, consult the senior members of their staffs upon it, particularly those who had experience in the South and forward their views to him as briefly as possible. The views of any individual member of the staff which a Governor or a Director wished to forward separately with his comments were welcome. They were permitted to ask for

¹ Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of 4th August 1945.
the views of Senior Sudanese in whose judgement and discretion they had confidence.

Finally the Civil Secretary asked his colleagues to bear in mind that urgency was the essence of the problem. "We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances".\(^1\)

After some discussions the policy advocated by the Civil Secretary was finally endorsed by an Administration Conference that put forward some proposals for the implementation of the new policy. After this the celebrated Juba Conference was held on 12th and 13th June 1947 under the Chairmanship of the Civil Secretary. It was attended by the Governors of the Southern Provinces, the Director of Establishment, seventeen Southern Chiefs and mission-educated men and six Northerners, who were Gordon College educated. This was the first time that Northern and Southern Sudanese participated in a Conference to discuss the future of the Sudan and the relationship between the North and the South.

The terms of reference of the Conference were:

"(1) To consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference about the Southern Sudan.

(2) To discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being represented in the proposed assembly, and if decided to be advisable, to decide how such representation can best be

\(^1\) Ibid.
obtained in the present circumstances; and whether the representation proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference was suitable.

(3) To discuss whether safeguards can be introduced into the forthcoming legislation setting up the new Assembly, to ensure that the Southern Sudan with its differences in race, tradition, language, customs and outlook is not hindered in its social and political advancement.

(4) To discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan should be set up to deal with Southern affairs from which representatives might be appointed to sit on the assembly as representatives of the Southern Sudan.

(5) To consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference in paragraph 13 of their report which deal with matters not strictly relevant to the political development of the Sudan, which the Conference recommended as essential if the unification of the Sudanese people is to be achieved.¹

The Juba Conference concluded that it was the wish of the Southern Sudanese to be united with the Northern Sudanese in a united Sudan, that the South should therefore be represented in the proposed Legislative Assembly; that the number of Southern representatives should be more than thirteen as had been recommended by the Sudan Administration Conference, that they

should be elected by Province Councils in the South and not by an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan; that trade and communications should be improved between the two regions and that steps should be taken towards the unification of the educational policy in the North and South.¹

The creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1946 was accompanied by the appointment of the first Sudanese Minister of Education² whose policy towards the South was partly outlined by the Juba Conference and the preceding Civil Secretary's Circular. In 1949 the Legislative Assembly passed a decision that Arabic should ultimately become the common language of the Sudan. This decision focussed public attention on the problem of Southern education, and a comprehensive plan to cover the five years 1951-56 came under preparation.³

Again a main feature of that plan was a further substantial increase in mission subventions which was also accompanied by a tightening of control and the appointment of more Ministry of Education officials to ensure direct supervision of mission schools and the proper spending of subventions.⁴ Under this plan the missionary societies were required to consolidate

their educational work already in hand rather than to embark on new schemes of expansion. The plan had thus reversed the roles of Government and Missionary Societies in the field of education by establishing the position of the former as the major partner. Relatively larger sums of money were made available under the plan for the construction of Government schools at the elementary, intermediate and secondary levels. Another major and significant feature of the Five Year Plan was the new language policy which stipulated the teaching of Arabic as a main subject in all schools in the Southern Provinces. This policy was received with a mixed feeling of apprehension and hope.¹

Before the plan was finished events were accelerated by the political development that took place outside and inside the country. The 1952 Coup d'état in Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953, the Parliamentary election in November and December 1954, the setting up of the Sudanisation Committee as part of the preparation for self determination and the incident of August 1955 when the Equatoria troops at Torit broke out in mutiny killing 250 Northerners including many teachers and Government officials.

The educated Southerners felt that they benefited very little from the results of the Sudanisation of administrative posts. The deep disappointment fostered amongst them² could not be

1. Ibid.
explained away by the traditional Civil Service criterion that was used; as promotion was based on the qualifications of the person and his standing at the time in the Civil Service, and not on any regional, provincial or tribal considerations. This contributed to arousing Southern fear and suspicion of Northern domination which was deepened by the fact that the two parts had been ruled almost separately under the British Administration for about half a century. The fears and disappointments exploded in the Southern incident of August 1955 when the Southern troops at Torit broke out in mutiny that led to serious loss of lives. Southern politicians in Parliament announced that they were aiming to establish an autonomous South linked only in a federation with the North. This was unacceptable to Northern public opinion which identified it with the only too recent British Southern policy and labelled its advocates as products of "missionary schools" who used "federation" as a disguise for "separation".

In the elections held in 1958 the new Federal Party was able to return forty members out of the 46 seats allocated to the South. The triumph was a clear indication that the more extreme points of view were gaining ground and finding ardent advocates amongst the Southern educated elite. The mutineers who escaped to the bush after the 1955 incident were continuing their activities in the South. Southern Federalists were pressing for a Federal Constitution rather than a unitary one and the Northern politicians were deeply involved in manoeuvres over holding power in Khartoum. During this turmoil of events the army took over in November 1958
and put an end to the Parliamentary and democratic dialogue between the Southern and Northern educated and elected representatives.

During these eventful years in the field of politics some basic developments were taking place in the field of education as well. The teaching of Arabic as a main subject in Southern schools was accompanied by a Government decision to retain the vernacular in the syllabuses but that they should be written in Arabic characters instead of the Latin Alphabet. For this purpose a linguist from Cairo University was appointed by the Sudan Ministry of Education to do for Arabic what Professor Westerman and Dr. Tucker and the Christian missionaries did for English after the Rejaf Linguistic Conference in 1928. Dr. Asaker appointed some of his former Sudanese pupils to help in his work and to carry it on after him. Dr. Asaker and his colleagues faced linguistic problems similar to those faced by their predecessors. They found out that modifying some Arabic symbols to represent the non-Arabic sounds would work satisfactorily. The problem was the lack of teachers who would be able to teach the vernacular by using Arabic as a medium of instruction. The teachers training centres


2. Ibid., p. 120.
at Meridi and Dilling for elementary school teachers hoped to provide towards this.¹

But the whole question of the medium of instruction and the use of the vernacular in the Village or Bush schools came under consideration in the report of the International Commission on Secondary Education in the Sudan in 1955.² The Commission after scrutinizing the educational situation in the South and the future of Arabic in the country concluded that "there can be little argument in favour of English being particularly suitable as the medium of instruction in the South. In fact, Arabic speaking teachers from the North will be more capable of teaching Arabic to the young children of the South than Italians, for instance in teaching English, and they will be as good as English teachers are in teaching English."³

On the question of the vernacular the Commission also noted that the missionaries had decided that the medium of instruction, at the elementary level should be the vernacular, and at the post-elementary should be English, while Arabic was the lingua franca of the people. The Commission thought that it was the responsibility of all schools whether Government or missionary, to provide teachers of Arabic and it should not be difficult to do so since the Dilling and Meridi training schools were training for that

2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
purpose. They also thought that with a little effort some of the Bakht er Ruda students could learn Dinka in order to be able to teach Arabic in Dinka schools and use it for conversational purposes in the lower classes.¹ They thought "it would be a waste of time and energy to try to teach the children of the south in their own vernacular, in which they would not be able to pursue any reading after they leave school."² They tried to equate the situation with that in the Red Sea Hills, the Nuba Mountains and the Egyptian children in the region of Nubia from Aswan Southwards where the people have their own vernacular.

This is where the Committee had failed to note the difference in the political background between the North and the South and the impact of over half a century of European Christian missionaries and the problem posed by the anxiety felt by former missionary school pupils who would naturally fear, though perhaps with no valid reasons, that they would be rendered useless in their own country. This feeling was probably one of the main reasons behind the political tension between the North and the South. It was not a question of what would happen to those who were to go to school but what would be felt towards this change by those who had already left, few as they were?

The Commission drafted a programme for the Arabization of the Curricula and medium of instruction in the South.³ They suggested that the change from vernacular to Arabic in the elementary

². Ibid.
³. Ibid., p. 52.
schools did not need to be abrupt. It could be effected in the course of two or three years, during which it would be possible to devise a number of appropriate methods of teaching Arabic as a foreign language in the first two years, and to use it as a medium of instruction in the remaining years. They noted that this had already begun. As regards the intermediate school they thought it did not need to wait to begin the teaching of Arabic till it had been taught and used as a medium of instruction in elementary schools. Since all government intermediate schools had already begun teaching Arabic, this should continue for two or three years till the elementary school leavers had had their education in Arabic. These could be taught the intermediate syllabuses in Arabic. After another four years, leavers from intermediate schools would have had their education in Arabic, and could, therefore, start having their secondary education in Arabic. In this way, the secondary schools of the South would be able to begin using Arabic as a medium of education after a maximum period of seven years. Intermediate schools would be able to use Arabic in teaching after three years, while elementary schools, where this had already begun at the time, would be able to teach all classes in Arabic after three years.

The Commission described this scheme as simple and natural, avoiding all unnecessary complications resulting from trying to give life to vernaculars which could not develop as fully fledged languages. They concluded that "If the children of the South are to be Sudanese citizens, every barrier in the way of putting them on a par with their compatriots should be removed
as soon as possible."¹

Two years after the submission of the report and one year after independence the Sudan Government decided to take over the missionary schools in the South, as it had taken charge of the Ahlia Schools in the North. The news of the take-over was given by the Minister of Education to a Conference of representatives of the missionary societies which he had invited to Khartoum in February 1957. The Minister thanked the missionary societies for their former efforts in the field of education² and wished that they would co-operate with the Ministry in the process of handing over. He intimated that, as the missionaries were aware, it was the Government's considered policy to take direct and full charge of education in the Southern provinces. The minister then spelt out the process of the implementation of this policy. He said it was his decided policy to take immediate steps as from the beginning of the academic year for taking full charge of all village schools in the three provinces as well as all the boys' elementary education. As regards the girls' elementary schools, though it was the Government's intention to be ultimately in charge of them, the minister realising the difficulties, particularly of the staffing problems, expressed his intention of a gradual plan for taking them over.

The six mission vernacular teacher training centres also came under the proposed plan but he thought the majority of them had become redundant and should therefore be put to other educational use. As for the three mission intermediate schools they were to continue until such a time as it would be practicable for the Government to take them over. He hoped that this would be possible within one or two years. The same would be the case with the three technical schools until they were visited by the staff of the Khartoum Technical Institute and reported upon. The Minister described the policy as consistent with the right of every sovereign state to educate its children, and announced his decision to open three Government intermediate schools in the South that year. On religious instruction he assured the representatives of the missions that, "Every facility will be given in all schools for religious instruction according to the boys' and girls' beliefs and the Church will continue, in agreement with headmasters and Province Education Officers, to advise on the spiritual needs of boys and girls in schools. In other words the taking over of the schools by Government has nothing to do with the missions' efforts in the field of religion."\(^1\)

The Minister's address gave rise to a number of comments and questions to which explanations were given by the Minister and the senior civil servants who attended with him.\(^2\) Then the

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1. Ibid., p. 188.
2. Text of deliberations of the Minister of Education conference with the representatives of the Christian missionary societies, Said, pp. 93-98.
representatives of the Church Missionary Society, the American Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission welcomed the policy after the clarifications made by the Minister and his staff and promised full co-operation in the process of transference. This was acknowledged by the Minister in the debate on the subject in the House of Representatives.\(^1\) The representatives of the Roman Catholic Mission, which was to be affected more than the others, took a different stand. They were more reluctant to accept the new policy and asked for a separate meeting the following morning. In that meeting the Roman Catholic Mission representatives put forward a memorandum and explained their point of view as regards the Government policy.\(^2\) Bishop Baroni spoke first, giving the bishops' views on the scheme in general. He raised the question of whether the take-over was meant to include the ownership of school buildings and property? The Minister replied that he did not intend to go deep into that question at that stage, but if the mission's representatives liked it the figures of subventions paid since 1927 could be produced and in the light of this fact it might not be difficult to argue where the ownership lay.

After that Bishop Baroni brought forward the question of lease terms and said that he and his colleagues were only trustees and were not therefore in a position to give away the buildings and

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2. Minutes of the meeting between the Minister of Education and representatives of the Roman Catholic Mission held at Khartoum 10 a.m. 14th February 1957, *Said*, p. 98.
property without reference to the Holy See, but the Government could rent them in legal terms. The Minister pointed out that there was no need to question the ownership of the buildings. The important point was whether the church would allow the Ministry of Education to use the schools for the education of Sudanese boys without prejudice to the rights of either Government or Church.

Bishop Baroni agreed that that was a good and satisfactory arrangement and that they were ready to discuss the details of handing over the schools. He added that they had already prepared proposals as a basis for discussion and he produced a written note which was distributed to the members. The note opened with the following words "In the three Southern provinces the management and administration of Catholic schools (but not the property of them) could be transferred to the Government Education Authority, by agreement with the Holy See, under suitable guarantees, through an Act of the Sudan Parliament."

The Minister suggested that this passage be deleted as the question of ownership could only be decided by the Sudan Government and with the party that signed the lease contract. The Holy See, he added, was no party to the contract. This was followed by a rather long Legal discussion about the bishops' right to negotiate on behalf of the Holy See and the legality or otherwise of the Minister of Education negotiating with His Holiness the Pope on such matters. The Director of Education intervened by saying that he expected the meeting to discuss the details of handing over, but he thought this first proposal undermined the whole scheme.
The Minister asked whether it could be agreed that the administration of the schools was an individual affair for the Minister and not a bilateral one? He stressed the point that the Holy See was not a party in any lease contract.

Bishop Baroni replied that it was not a question of contract but a basic right under international law. The Minister answered that it did not come under the laws of the Sudan and that international law was not binding. To this Bishop Mason said that international law should be binding in so far as it affected freedom of religion. Here the Director of Education referred to Section 5(1) of the Constitution which was quoted in the Minister's speech as guaranteeing the freedom of religion. The Director added that the Minister's speech was quite considerate when it stated that "The question of ownership of property is left in abeyance"; 'the bishops accept in principle the policy declared'; and 'it is for the bishops to put up matters discussed at the meeting to the Holy See'.

In the light of these points and of the Government statement that the administration and management of schools was an individual responsibility of the Minister of Education and not a bilateral one, the meeting proceeded to discuss the individual items of the note.

(a) 'A reasonable rent should be paid from year to year by the Government Education Authority to the Church Authority for the school buildings of the transferred schools.'

The Minister suggested that the Government could enter
the premises as a 'tenant at will' until the question of ownership was settled. The representatives of the Church demanded an explanation of the term before they could give their agreement. This was explained as meaning that the Government enters the premises without paying rent but it can be removed at the will of the Church provided the question of ownership is settled in its favour. After some discussion it was agreed that the Government would for the time being occupy the buildings with the consent of the Church as a 'tenant at will'. If the ownership was determined in favour of the Church, the Government might be asked to pay rent or vacate the premises.

(b) 'All the schools so transferred should be held, maintained, kept in repair and managed by the Government Education Authority.'

(c) 'A Church Representative should be included in the National Education Council, in each Province Education Committee, and in each District Education Committee on the same basis as any other member of the said Council or Committee.'

The Assistant Director of Education for the Southern Provinces explained that education committees in provinces and districts did not exist yet and the question of forming them would not arise before the councils were warranted by the Ministry of Local Government. The 'National Education Council' also was as yet not constituted. The present practice, he added was that the Province Education Officer and the Mission Education Secretary agreed on all points of how religious instruction should be catered for. He assured them that in point of fact the Province
Education Officer never ignored Church representation in the matter.

Bishop Mason said that when they referred to Committees they meant that they might be formed from the Province Education Officers and the Education Secretaries, and that it was not only religious instruction they were thinking of, but the general atmosphere of the school. The Government side agreed that should a "National Educational Council" or province and district committees come into being, representation of the Church would be welcomed to give the Church's point of view with regard to religious instruction.

(d) 'Catholic teachers in their training courses should be given full religious training and, before graduation, should pass an examination set by the Church representative.'

The Assistant Director of Education for the Southern Provinces pointed out that in practice such a proposal would not work well. He explained that a teacher might one day say that though he was a devoted Catholic he did not like to teach religion. A discussion followed in which some amendments were suggested. Finally it was agreed that the proposal should be as follows:

"Teachers eligible for appointment to the transferred Catholic schools should be given full religious training; and if they have to teach religion, they should pass an examination set by the Church representatives in the training centre before graduation." Then they moved to the following item.

(e) 'Before appointing the teachers of religion to the transferred Catholic schools the Government Education Authority should
submit their names to the Church Authority for approval.'
It was agreed that proposal (d) in its amended form covered this.

(f) 'To avoid conflicting ideologies or friction within the schools, the Church Authority should be able to request the withdrawal of those teachers whose character, conduct, or outlook should prove offensive.'

The meeting agreed to this provided the charge could be proved.

(g) 'The Headmasters of the transferred Catholic schools should be Catholic.'

After a short discussion this was amended to read:

"The headmasters of the transferred elementary Catholic schools should be Catholic for the next three years and whenever possible in future."

(h) 'The majority of the teachers of the Catholic transferred schools should be Catholic.'

It was agreed that this be accepted with the insertion of "whenever possible" at the end.

(i) 'In these schools priority should be given to Catholics and adherents, although others should be accepted too.'

It was pointed out that this contradicted the principle of equal rights for all children and indicated that there was discrimination on the part of the Church and the Government. In practice the great majority of pupils in Catholic areas would continue to be Catholics; but the door should be open for competition. The meeting decided that this proposal should be omitted.
(j) "The time set apart for religious instruction, for religious services and for school holidays in Catholic transferred schools should not be less than that so set apart according to the use and tradition of the former management of the schools. The curriculum and text-books for religious instruction should (continue to) be fixed by the Catholic Church Authority. A priest appointed by the Church Authority should be allowed to enter the schools at all times set apart for religious instruction or observance, for the purpose of supervising (and assisting in teaching) and for prayers (through contacting the headmaster). The Government Education Authority should give facilities for the holding of religious examinations in every such school (which is the present practice)."

This was accepted with the insertion of the phrases between brackets.

(k) "Only Catholic religion should be taught in Catholic transferred schools."

After a short discussion it was agreed that, at the time, there was no need for this proposal as non-Catholics did not present a problem. Should such a situation arise in future, the "Church Authority" should agree with the Assistant Director of Education for the Southern Provinces to provide facilities for teaching religion to non-Catholics.

(l) "Parents should have the opportunity of choosing the school they prefer for their children."

This item was accepted.

(m) "Where there is a sufficient number of pupils who ask for a
Catholic school, as may be certified by the Catholic Church Authority and ascertained by the Government Education Authority, the latter should provide for them a new school, to be held, maintained and managed by them subject to the conditions applicable to Catholic transferred schools, except for property and rent.'

This was amended to read:

'Newly-opened schools which are attended by Catholic children should be subject to the conditions applicable to transferred schools wherever possible.'

(n) 'Provision should be made for some Catholic transferred schools to be headed and staffed by religious personnel, while being run and administered as Government owned schools.'

This was discussed at some length and amended to read:

'Religious personnel qualified for teaching may be employed by the Government Education Authority, taking into consideration that they should live as a community whenever possible.'

Other demands on the Catholic bishops memorandum were:

2. 'Provision should be made for some private (fee-paying) Catholic schools to be established in due course.'

This was accepted after deleting "in due course" and substituting "After the lapse of three to four years."

3. 'The management of transferred schools should pay scrupulous attention to the behaviour of pupils and teachers to eliminate the possibility of interference with the running of the mission.'
It was agreed that the Government would observe this strictly.

4. 'Any complications which might arise in any of the Catholic transferred schools, especially those which are in the Church compound, should be considered and solved by a board of representatives from both sides.'

This was accepted.

It should be noted that the medium of instruction and the nationality of the teachers were not referred to in the Catholic bishops memorandum or in the discussions. The Government attitude seems to have been to try to allay the fears of the Church over the issue of religious freedom and to give the guarantees required towards that end. It is also evident that the Government was interested to emphasise its rights to be in charge of the education of all the children in the country. To the Government this was the practice of sovereignty and the duty of unifying the country through the unification of the system of education.

The attitude of the missionaries in the field was expressed by The Messenger, a Roman Catholic newspaper published in the South. In an article published on February 15, 1957, the day after the Ministers meeting with the Catholic representatives in Khartoum, the Messenger wrote.1 "Our Catholic schools have been founded at the cost of great sacrifice to give these children a good Catholic education. Parents are under a grave obligation

to send their children to Catholic Schools, and the law of the Church insists that they may not send them to non-Catholic schools without permission from the Bishop. In these days when the state is endeavouring to claim complete control of education, we wish to make it clear that no Catholic can ever admit such a claim. The Church has been given a special mandate and right by Christ to share in teaching mankind. Parents have the right as well as the duty to educate the children given them by God. These rights of the Church and the parents must therefore be respected by the state. This was a manifestation of the conflict between the administration and the missions in the Southern Sudan. The Government was basing its argument on its rights as an independent sovereign state, while the Church was relying on theological arguments, each of the two arguments started from a completely different premises and was right in relation to its own system of logic though unacceptable to the other side.

The implementation of the new policy was not an easy task and had naturally created a number of problems. The main problem was the language problem. With the introduction of Arabic the children had to learn the Arabic script, which is different from the Roman script, and to grapple with new problems of pronunciation. The position was particularly difficult at the transitional stage because in some schools the child was expected to learn three languages, his own vernacular, English and Arabic.

1. Sir al Khatim al Khalifa, "Education in the Southern Provinces".
It was also found out that the Village School should be retained as the base of education in the South. The Village School was started by the Christian missionaries as a school teaching a two year course of reading, writing, arithmetic and scripture using the local vernacular, written in Latin alphabet, as a medium of instruction. The reason for this was that when the missionary societies appeared on the scene in the Southern Provinces, they had to find a way of getting at the scattered population, and a simple mud and grass building where catechists could meet was the solution and it was these catechumenates that gradually developed into what came to be known as the Village School.

Thus it was found that the village school was the most practical and inexpensive way of teaching reading and writing in an area of scattered population such as the Southern Provinces. It also had the other advantage of not taking the children away from their homes and local environment for at least the first two years of their schooling, after which they could go on to a central elementary boarding school to complete their four years of education. So it was found that the village school would fit into the proposed new plan for education in the Sudan which was supposed to provide for six years of schooling in the first stage instead of four.¹

Maridi Teacher Training Institute came to do for elementary education in the South what Bakht er Ruda was doing in the North and drew extensively on the experience of the latter.²

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2. Majallat-Bakht er Ruda, October, 1959, Khas bil‘İd al-fīdāt, "Bakht er Ruda waj-jannb", Sir al Khatim al Khalifa pp.32,33; "Ma‘had Maridi" by Hassan Abbas pp. 76,77; Ahmed Hamid al Faki, p. 15.
The same was done in relation to the intermediate schools. Paradoxically enough it was secondary education that posed the least problem as the only secondary school was established by the Government and hence run on the same lines as the secondary schools in the North. This was made all the more easier because English was the medium of instruction in the Northern secondary schools at the time.  

In June 1957 the Minister of Education gave a speech in Parliament explaining his policy as a natural development of the grants-in-aid that were increasingly given to the missionary schools since 1927 and as a result of the recommendations of the Ministerial Commission for the South and of his personal satisfaction after visiting the South. He paid special tribute to the Church Mission Societies, the American Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission as "having displayed particularly good spirits in the taking-over procedure." It could be noticed that he left out the Catholic Mission from any particular reference. He reiterated the advantages of a nationally controlled and unified system of education and the immediate advantages for the people of the South in terms of number of schools and jobs. The latter were summarized as:

1. The existing 51 boys' elementary schools, which were

1. English continued to be the medium of instruction in the Secondary Schools until 1965 when it was decided to change over, gradually, into Arabic.

being taken over, would eventually be run as schools with double third and double fourth years and consequently their output would be doubled. This meant that the experience in the North with "al-madrasa-dhat-ar-ra'sīn" which was used to promote sub-grade school children to elementary schools, this experience was transferred to the South to promote village school children to elementary schools.

2. The number of elementary teachers serving in them would be increased by the same proportion and they would all be Southerners.

3. A great number of the existing mission teachers would have the chance of promotion to headmaster posts open to them.

4. It was not intended to make any transfer of staff except where necessitated by reason of promotion. The schools would therefore retain their character and atmosphere.

5. Nine intermediate schools would be opened within three years time. It was decided to open three of those in January 1958.

6. The number of supervisors, teachers in charge of village schools, would be increased and they would all be Southerners.

7. Normal expansion would also proceed according to the plan which would be drawn for the South as an underdeveloped region on the recommendations of the Ministerial Commission for the South.

8. Southern Sudanese Fathers and Brothers would be eligible for employment as teachers.

The execution of the take-over was estimated to cost

1. Ibid.
£2,070,036. Capital expenditure on new schools and replacement of some unsuitable mission schools was estimated at £1,208,077. On the personnel side over 850 masters in the elementary and village schools were taken over into Government service which meant a substantial increase in their salaries. It was obvious that the decision was a political and not an economic one.

In October 1959 Education in the South was dealt with in the Minister of Education's long address at the 25th Anniversary of Bakht er Ruda. 1 The Minister said that although he talked about the educational situation and policy for the whole Sudan, the increased attention paid to education in the South necessitated a special place in his address for the elucidation of the Government policy towards education and its development in the Southern Provinces. This was almost one year after the military had replaced parliamentary Government in Sudan. But the person and office of the Minister of Education was not changed, nor was there a change of policy. So it was rather an account of what had been done since February 1957. The Minister said that two years or more had passed since the beginning of the taking over of schools from the missionary societies in the Southern Provinces. The taking over of those schools and the consolidation of work in them and its organisation along new lines was the most important activity the

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1. It is interesting to note the change of tone in this address with the addresses of the same minister when he was addressing the Bishops or Parliament in 1957 with recognised Southern representation. With the Missionary representatives the emphasis was on religious freedom, in Parliament it was on the benefits and chances open for Southern teachers and children, in Bakht er Ruda Address, the emphasis was on Arabicization and unification.
offices of the Ministry in those provinces had undertaken during the past two years. He stated that it was possible to say then that the policy which was drawn up by the Ministry in February 1957 as regards the missionary schools had been fully carried out and that the Ministry was, at the time of his address, fully and directly supervising those schools.

On the expansion, the Minister said that though the execution of the policy on the taking over had absorbed most of the efforts of the education offices in the South during the past three years, this did not deprive the Southern Provinces from their share in expansion. For boys in intermediate schools, technical education included, the chances had almost doubled while the number of places in elementary schools had increased to a considerable extent, so that more chances were provided for increasing numbers of village school pupils to follow up their education. The Ministry, he told the audience, was exerting great efforts in encouraging girls' education to catch up with boys' and he hoped that Meridi Intermediate Girls' School would play an important role in that respect.

The implementation of that policy, the Minister was glad to tell his audience, "led to remarkable progress in the field of education and spread in it a new spirit that enabled him to hope that the young generation would be brought up in a true national spirit and would be given the education that would enable them to contribute in the building of a happier future for the country."¹

¹ Ibid., p. 22.
So the education offices in the South continued their efforts and worked relentlessly towards the achievement of two important aims which he specified as (1) the Arabization of the syllabuses until Arabic became the language of instruction in all the subjects and (2) the unification of the curricula until it became similar to what was being taught in the North through the introduction of the Bakht er Ruda Syllabi in the Schools of the South.

Towards the first aim, he thought, a good distance had been covered as Arabic was then taught in all the elementary, intermediate and secondary schools as a main subject included in the entrance examination to the latter two. It was also used as a medium of instruction in an increasing number of schools especially in Upper Nile Province where the number of the elementary Arabic schools reached twenty-three out of a total of thirty-four. The Minister also told his audience that the progress of Arabization was satisfactory as there were boys’ intermediate schools teaching "the Northern Syllabus and in Arabic" in each of Malakal, Bor, Rank, Wau, Juba and Meridi. There was also an intermediate technical school temporarily opened at Kosti. Some progress was also made in this direction in girls’ schools as there were elementary Arabic girls schools in each of Juba, Torit, Wau, Rumbek, Tonj, Khor Shamam, Malakal (two schools), Kadok and Kaiker.

The Minister expressed his hope that the coming few years

1. Arabic schools means schools run on Northern lines.
would witness speedy progress in the spread of Arabic language in
the village schools as the Ministry had made great efforts at the
Institutes of Tonj and Malakal in the training of village school
teachers so that they would be able to teach Arabic and to teach
part of the Bakht er Ruda elementary school syllabus. There were
at the time over a hundred teachers at Tonj and Malakal training
for this purpose and also an equal number of Southern teachers were
attached to the schools of the Northern provinces, in the past two
years, for a period of a whole year. When they returned to the
South they had a sufficient knowledge of Arabic with which they
were able to teach in all the classes of the elementary school.

The second main aim towards the achievement of which
the ministry was diligently working, was the unification of the
curricula through the introduction of the Bakht er Ruda syllabuses
in the South until the system of education in the South would be
unified with that in the North. So that there would be one school
atmosphere and one educational environment for all the children in
the Sudan with no difference whether they were in its Southern or
Northern part.

The Minister emphasised the role of Bakht er Ruda and
its valuable effects in the field of education in the Southern
provinces. These had led to the introduction of many improvements
in the system in both the administrative and pedagogical aspects.
"The tours of inspection arranged by the staff of Bakht er Ruda had
the greatest and best results in raising and improving the standard
of work in many ways." "The training courses that were provided
at Bakht er Ruda and Dilling for some headmasters and teachers from the South had a profound meaning as it had strengthened their spirits, renewed their vitality and broadened their horizons in a way that enabled them to turn to their work a fuller grasp and greater zeal to cope with their responsibilities."

This policy outlined in the Minister's address at Bakht er Ruda's anniversary showed how education came to be viewed as an important vehicle for the creation of national unity. The confusion of unity with uniformity had led to the adoption of the use of the Bakht er Ruda Curricula in the South in spite of environmental differences. This uniformity is one of the problems for other parts of the country in the East and in the West as well. The policy did not tackle the problem of the former educated Southerners. Though nothing was done to hamper their careers, nothing was said or done to allay their fears. Such a policy in trying to save the future led almost to the losing of the present. The old educated Southerners came to think that "The old southern elite is now considered 'illiterate' by Sudanese standards."¹

The existence at the time of a military regime which suppressed recognised opposition aggravated the situation in the South particularly among the educated Southerners who came to view the stepping up of Arabicization in education and Islamicisation among the pagan chiefs as attempts to assimilate the South and alienate them, while handing over the leadership to traditional chiefs. Some of them left the country and started to organize

¹ Oduhu and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, p. 47.
opposition from outside. The activities of the self-exiled Southern leaders and the internal troubles in the South came to be viewed by the military government as sponsored by church organisations abroad, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, and instigated by the foreign missionaries in the South. Thus a series of restrictions came to be imposed on missionary activities in the South. This culminated in the military Government announcing on February 27, 1962, the expulsion of all Christian missionaries from the Southern Sudan.\footnote{Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict. London, 1968, pp. 81-82.} At the time there were 617 Christian missionaries working in the Sudan, 503 Catholics and 114 Protestants belonging to Church Missionary Society, American Presbyterian, African Inland and Sudan Interior Missions. Those affected by the expulsion were 272 Verona Fathers and 29 Protestants. Those working in the North were allowed to continue their educational and other activities. The expulsion of the missionaries resulted in the Government getting bad publicity abroad and the Southern leaders of opposition getting more support.

In the meantime, political events in the Southern Sudan were taking a new turn. The Army's repressive measures in the South drove thousands of Southerners outside the Sudan into Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Central African Republic. The leading educated Southerners and former Parliamentarians who fled the country formed into organisations, the "Sudan Christian Association" and the "Sudan African Closed Districts National Union". The latter, in a
petition addressed to the United Nations in 1963, declared that its policy was independence for the Southern Sudan. Independence was demanded, according to this petition, because they had failed to obtain federation. SCANNU changed its name in 1963 to SANU, but there was no change in aims. Its headquarters were established at Leopoldville in the Congo. Its activities consisted mainly of petitioning the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, supplying information on events in the Southern Sudan to journalists and organisations and helping the refugees.

Inside the Southern Sudan the troubles which were conspicuous in the schools, spread into the countryside. In 1963 the Anya-nya terrorist organisation appeared on the scene. The Anya-nya was composed mainly of ex-soldiers of the Equatoria Corps who fled to the bush after the mutiny of 1955 and others who were released from prisons on completion of sentence or as a gesture of good will by the military regime from time to time. The formation of the Anya-nya resulted from discontent with the 'more peaceful attempts by the leaders of the Sudan African National Union to reach a settlement'. Its activities were directed against Northerners as well as Southerners who co-operated with the Government. This resulted in many innocents being killed either by army operations or Anya-nya activities. Hence the exodus of thousands of refugees from the South to neighbouring countries. Northern public opinion was becoming restless over the

1. Ibid., p. 83.
situation in the South. Even members of the Central Council which General Abboud had established early in the year, questioned the wisdom of the policy which was followed by the military Government in the South. The government at last decided to investigate the problem on a wider basis. A Commission of Enquiry was appointed in September 1964 consisting of nineteen Southerners and thirteen Northerners. The Commission was asked to study the factors which hindered harmony between the Northern and Southern parts of the country and to make recommendations with a view to consolidate confidence and achieve internal stability without infringing the Constitutional structure or the principle of a Unitary Government.

SANU criticism of the Commission was that "In the first place, half of the Southern representation is selected from among illiterate and semi-illiterate chiefs, thus showing no genuine attempt to include the Southern intelligentsia. Secondly, under the terms of reference, the Commission is officially prohibited to suggest or recommend anything infringing the present constitutional structure, on the principle of a Unitary Government. Thirdly, the Government pretends to find the root cause of political conflict while deliberately ignoring the Southern political leaders!"¹

It was not only Southern political leaders who felt themselves ignored but also Northern political leaders felt the same towards the military Government. The intelligentsia in the

¹ SANU, "Memorandum presented by SANU to the Commission of the O.A.U. for refugees." Published in M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan, p. 86.
North was also resentful of the army rule. This was particularly clear in the University of Khartoum where opposition to the Government repressive policy in the South came not only from the annually increasing numbers of Southern students but also, and no less vehemently, from their Northern colleagues. Statements of denunciation were issued by various student political groups and in the session that began in July 1964, the South became the dominant issue in the students political activities. Serious discussions on the subject started to emerge inside and outside the University. This took the form of leaflets, wallpapers, articles in the press, or pamphlets by individuals or groups.

The Government's general invitation to the people to contribute ideas towards a political solution for the Southern problem was immediately taken up by the University of Khartoum students who organised a public seminar on the South. Amongst the participants were some of the University lecturers one of whom summed up the spirit of the meeting by saying that the existence of a military dictatorship was incompatible with the search for and attainment of a political solution. This alarmed the Government and public discussions were prevented. The students decided to defy the Government and called for another seminar on the South despite repeated warnings by the military government. The students gathered for the discussion on the eve of the 21st October 1964, clashed with the police and one of the students died as the result of the police shooting during the riots. This set off violent demonstrations in Khartoum which culminated in
a general strike throughout the country. Within a week's time
the military regime was overthrown.

The selection as Prime Minister of Sir al Khatim al
Khalifa, a former Assistant Director of Education in the South,
known for his wide knowledge of Southern affairs and problems,
the appointment of Clement Mboro, a Catholic Southerner, as Minister
of the Interior in charge of security all over the Sudan, was an
indication of a genuine desire on the part of the North to reach
a peaceful solution. The overthrow of the military regime was
welcomed by SANU, and no time was lost by its leaders to renew
their contacts with the new Government. In a memorandum addressed
to the Prime Minister, the Southern political leaders in exile
expressed their desire to return to the Sudan on the following
conditions.¹

"(a) That a General Amnesty be declared by the
Government for all the refugees most of whom may choose to return.
(SANU) would be prepared to encourage the return to the Sudan.

(b) That SANU be recognised as a political party to
fight the coming general elections on the policy of a Federal
Sudan. Since SANU do not differ with the Southern Liberal Party
on the issue of federation, the two may merge into one party
representing the Southern Sudanese.

(c) That a written guarantee by your Government that
none of the refugees and SANU leaders will be victimised, be

¹ Letter from Sudan African National Union (SANU) to Prime Minister
of the Sudan on political relations between North and South,
Nove. 1964, published in M.O. Beshir The Southern Sudan, Appendix
10, pp. 154-158.
deposited with the Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in Addis-Ababa and with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York.

(d) That a round-table Conference between all Sudanese Political Parties with representatives from the Judiciary,¹ the University² and the Trade Union³ leaders be convened to discuss the general lines of a working constitutional relationship between North and South. In the capacity of observers and advisors, the Secretariat-General of O.A.U. and the neighbouring African countries including U.A.R. should be represented at the Conference.

(e) That Colonial laws, such as the 'Closed Districts Ordinance' which restricts freedom of entry into the South by non-Southerners and foreigners be repealed. While we agree that entrance into the Sudan be controlled through the normal laws of immigration, we do not agree that the Closed District's Ordinance and the 'Missionary Societies Act, 1962' are necessary. The Act restricts religious freedom for Christians, contrary to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is not religious freedom to require anyone to obtain a permit of baptism from a secular Government as it is the case under the Act.

(f) Accept the fact that the Sudan is an Afro-Arab State with two distinct personalities, cultures and temperament, Negroid and Arab, quite apart from the religious and language question. Neither Islam nor Christianity can unite the Sudan, nor

¹,²,³. In recognition of their role in overthrowing the military regime.
can the Arabic language, all of which have been given considerable stress in recent years. Unity in diversity is the answer to the Southern problem and this can be found in a federal constitution. The Southern struggle which is essentially political embraces Southerners of all creeds - Christians, Muslims, Pagans, etc.

There should be no fear for the federation which has helped to keep together different peoples in many parts of the world. Two thirds of the world is in fact federated. The two greatest world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are federations. In Africa we have the example of Nigeria. Forced control of the South using the old abandoned Colonial tactics of delay or assimilation is the surest way of breaking up the country.

(g) Accept the fact that both North and South have inherited bad historical relations of which nothing has been done in recent years to prove that history cannot repeat itself. The Sudan is so vast a country (nearly 1 million square miles) that no power in the world can unite it by force. Only full equality, equal opportunities and mutual trust can keep the Sudan United, not by involuntary merger of cultures but by giving those different cultures full and free expression. This is necessary for self realisation, self fulfilment and satisfaction which are vital for loyalty and good citizenship. Those who can best guard the Northern borders of Sudan with other Arab countries such as U.A.R., Libya and Saudi Arabia are Sudan Arabs themselves. For the

1. This memorandum was written in November 1964, when Nigeria was still a Democratic Federal State.
Southern Borders, only the Southern negroes if satisfied of their citizenship can best guard the Southern frontiers with other negro countries. It is therefore useless to transfer educated Southerners to the North for political reasons and bring Northerners in their places. Worst still is the question of nominating Arab merchant settlers into Southern councils and to represent the Southerners in Parliament as was the case before the Army take-over in November 1958.

Nominating a Southern puppet to a high ministerial post or to a Governorship does not solve the problem either. What the Southerners want is to satisfy the needs of the few who have chosen to serve their own interests, but a general constitutional guarantee which makes good positions in Government or business a matter of right and not privilege. It is important that a Southern Minister must have the confidence of the Southerners as well. Without a constitutional guarantee any Southerner holding any post can easily find himself reduced to the status of a messenger once he fails to fulfil the superficial unconstitutional interest of his employer.

(h) Another Colonial practice which should be abandoned is the policy of 'divide and rule'. Many educated Southerners are called by the Northerners half-educated 'mission boys', and the local Southern tribal chiefs who do not even possess half education are preferred by the Government to do jobs for which they are not qualified. For example, the Committee of 25 recently set up by the Government of General Abboud to investigate the Southern problem
consists of 13 well educated Northerners while of the 12 Southern members, half are tribal chiefs who can hardly write their names and cannot be expected to follow complicated proceedings. Is this not cheating? Even Britain which is a Colonial power has recently condemned the abuse of tribal chiefs in Southern Rhodesia for political reasons.

The above points are made with the full knowledge that we too are human beings and can make mistakes, but they are made with a sincere desire to find a lasting solution in the North-South political conflict. We are not racialists because we are aware that races have been mixing over the centuries with the result that few can really trace their original blood. It is mainly constitutional justice that can create nations.

The Northerners must realise too that the South has never been given the right to self-determination in their relation with the North, a right which the North fully exercised in their relation with Egypt. The South was not represented at the Cairo Agreement of February 1953 where all the Northern parties were represented and gave their approval for the signing of the transitional Constitution by Britain and Egypt. This constitution, then called Self-government Statute led to the declaration of independence 1956.

As if to compensate the Southerners for having denied them representation at the Cairo Agreement, the Northern Political Parties unanimously passed a resolution in Parliament on December 19, 1955, expressing that the question of federation would be given
'full consideration' by the Constituent Assembly which was to draft a permanent constitution. The Northern Political Parties failed to keep their promise in the Constituent Assembly. They could not make up their minds about the federation and after much confusion and delay, General Abboud seized power in the bloodless coup d'etat of November 17, 1958. Some political parties were understood to have connived with the Army for the take-over to deal with the South but we are now disillusioned through bitter experience.¹

We have forced the Army to climb down and we are back to where we stopped in 1958. We now have the transitional constitution of 1956 and we are going to elect a Constituent Assembly to enact a permanent constitution. So far so good, but are we going to have enough courage to break the vicious circle? Surely the North can do without the South, and vice versa for the South, but this extreme may be avoided by thinking straight and more honestly. A Central Government should be set up to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Currency Control while State Governments will exercise the powers not assigned to Central Government. In this way Northern merchants in the South who consider themselves as little governors under the existing system will stop politics and concentrate on economic development. Under a federal system they will know their bosses are in the South and not in Khartoum.

The argument that the South could not federate because it lacked economy and education can no longer apply, judging by the present standards elsewhere in Africa. Authoritative reports by economic experts known to some of us have ranked the South among the best economic potentially rich countries in Africa. It first needs development which cannot be had fully without settling the political questions. The Southerners can no longer be told whether they have the wealth or not because they know it. However, there is a good saying that 'freedom has no price'. We are convinced beyond doubt that the Southerners would prefer freedom in poverty to slavery in wealth. During the last Parliament closed by the military coup, it was most discouraging to see Southern Members of Parliament being put under Police Supervision when they returned to the South during recess. The same thing did not happen to their colleagues in the North.

Finally, we would like to add that our attitude is absolutely without prejudice to African Unity and close co-operation between African and Arabs. None of us can doubt the great amount of good being done at the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Block. It is because of our desire for Unity that we want to eliminate mistakes which may endanger unity. As we have seen unity can also be federal."

The memorandum of SANU concluded that "If however our humble presentations are disregarded by the new civilian Government that has long been awaited, and now that we have made our position clear to the world, we are prepared to tighten our belts and to
continue the struggle. We will continue to draw the attention of African and Arab countries to the problem in the Sudan and we will go to the United Nations. Refusal to grant our demands for full participation in the Government of our country will render us powerless to prevent extremists from resorting to armed resistance when driven to despair. The resulting situation could harm political relations and economic progress in the African countries particularly our nearest neighbours."

The new Government lost no time in accepting the idea of a Round Table Conference between Northern and Southern political parties. The Government was in close touch with the Southern Front, a new political organisation which was formed mainly by educated Southerners in Khartoum as representative of the Southern opinion and was invited to join the National Government. The two Southern ministers in the Cabinet and the Southern member on the State Council spoke in its names. The Southern Front was considered SANU's representative inside the Sudan but later on it became a separate political party.

On December 10, the Prime Minister made his awaited bid, and responded to SANU's memorandum by declaring a general amnesty to all Sudanese who had fled the country since January 1955 and to those who were tried in Absentia or wanted for trial on any political charge. He appealed to the refugees and the leaders in exile to return to the Sudan.

The months that followed were spent on the difficult task of bringing the more militant groups in SANU and the SOUTHERN
FRONT to the Conference table with the Northern political parties inside the Sudan.¹ This was done in March 16-29, 1965, when the Southern educated political leaders met their counterparts from the North in Khartoum at the Round Table Conference held on March 16-29, 1965. Whatever the assessment of the Round Table Conference might be and whoever might be responsible for its failure to reach a final solution for the problem of the South and its relationship with the North, yet it certainly succeeded in starting a dialogue between the Northern and Southern political leaders. A glance at the list of participants in this dialogue² reveals its underlying feature. It was not only a dialogue between two regions of the country but also a dialogue between different systems of education.

¹ M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict, p. 89.
² Ibid., Appendix 14, pp. 165-66.
CHAPTER III

MISSIONARY EDUCATION IN THE NORTH

After the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, the Christian Missionary Societies thought that the way was open to forge new links and achieve the old missionary dream of a chain of missionary stations (from the Cape to Cairo) which had been advocated by J. Krapf, the pioneer C.M.S. Missionary in East Africa. The Church Missionary Society and the American Presbyterian Mission, both of whom had long experience of work in Moslem lands, were ready with plans for advance.

On Lord Kitchener's return to England in 1898 after the reconquest and while he was advocating his plan for the Gordon Memorial College, a deputation from the C.M.S. waited on him to bring before him their plans for the Sudan. They were met with a refusal of permission to undertake missionary work in the Moslem Sudan "on the ground that nothing must be done to arouse Moslem fanaticism", especially as the country had just been reconquered from the Mahdists who had come to power in 1885 on a wave of Moslem religious revolt. However Lord Kitchener, as well as Lord Cromer, raised no objections to missionary work in the southern pagan Sudan.2

At the C.M.S. Centenary meeting on 2nd May 1899 the Secretary of the C.M.S. thrilled his audience when he declared:

"The Committee are preparing to send pioneer parties into the vast Sudan by the two routes through which it is most accessible. At Tripoli a small band are studying Hausa, and will, God willing, shortly proceed up the Niger for the Hausa States; and from Cairo in the autumn of the year it is hoped a party will go up the Nile to occupy some places in the equatorial provinces of the Eastern Sudan. The Committee anticipate that, in answer to many prayers, the existing interdict on missionary work among the Mohammedans of the Upper Nile will shortly be removed."\(^1\)

The Rev. Llewellyn H. Gwynne was the first C.M.S. missionary to be sent to the Sudan. He sailed on 3rd November, 1899. When he arrived in Cairo the British authorities would not allow him to proceed further until the country was pacified; but on the Khalifa's death\(^2\) he and Dr. Harpur, the head of the C.M.S. Hospital in Old Cairo, were allowed to go, on the strict understanding that they were not to speak to Moslems about Christianity. Since Missionary work was ruled out and it was impossible at the time to proceed south, Lord Kitchener asked Mr. Gwynne to act as chaplain to the troops, there being then no Anglican civilians in the country. In this way Mr. Gwynne succeeded in gaining the confidence of the administrative authorities and it was to this

\(^1\) Quoted by Tringham, Ibid., pp. 12-13. I was unable to make use of the C.M.S. Archives, London, as it was closed for a long period.

\(^2\) The Khalifa was killed on November 24, 1899. See Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol. II, London, 1908, p. 105.
early anomalous position as a missionary of the C.M.S. and chaplain to the administration that he was praised for the happy relationship between the two branches of the Church of England in the Sudan - the English Civil population and the work of the C.M.S.

This anomalous and seemingly influential position continued to be held by Gwynne for forty-seven years till his retirement in 1916. But this same position must have made possible close identification of the Christian missionary work and British political domination in the eyes of the Moslems of the Sudan. His long stay, his single-mindedness, his conservative temperament and his isolation from simple contact with the Sudanese, as he was surrounded by the British Community in Khartoum, must have made it difficult for him and consequently for the C.M.S. activities in the Sudan to cast off nineteenth century Christian missionary attitudes toward Islam of hostility and outright condemnation and to replace them with the increasingly understanding and sympathetic attitudes towards Islam and other religions which developed in the Christian missionary movement in the twentieth century.

However, Dr. Harpur, who arrived with Gwynne in 1899, was allowed to do a little medical work in a mud hut on the edge of

1. When Gwynne retired in 1916 he had become Anglican Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan.
Omdurman, but was hampered by the reputation of 'poisoner' amongst the local Moslem inhabitants who refused to respond to his work. He returned to his work in Cairo after less than a year's stay and was succeeded by Dr. Charley Hall.

The United Presbyterian Mission went through a similar experience. The Rev. Kelly Giffen was their pioneer missionary. He and Dr. Andrew Watson took a preliminary tour in the Sudan in 1899 to survey the field. In Omdurman they found Mr. Gwynne and Dr. Harpur, with whom they lodged, thus beginning the era of cooperation between the C.M.S. and the American Society which came to be an important feature of Christian mission work in the Sudan. On their return to Cairo they reported on the need for an immediate forward move, and suggested that the Arabic-Speaking Injīlī (Evangelical) Church of Egypt might adopt the Moslem Sudan as its sphere of missionary enterprise. In 1900 the Rev. Kelly Giffen and Dr. H.T. McLaughlin, with an Injīlī pastor, the Rev. Jabrā Hannā, were appointed to the Sudan. As they were about to leave, the administration, as with the C.M.S., refused them permission to work in the North, but promised to grant them all facilities for work beyond, in the pagan parts of the Sudan.2

1. Ibid., p. 13, p. 15.
2. This included the Nuba Mountains area which though lying administratively in Southern Kordofan, which is Northern Province, they are also lying south of Line 12° latitude which was defined as the technical boundary between the North and the South. See L.M. Sanderson, "Educational Development and Administrative Control in the Nuba Mountains Region of the Sudan" Article in Journal of African History IV, 2 (1963).
They proceeded, however, with their wives to Omdurman, where they began to gather the members of the Injīli Church who were working in the Sudan into congregations. Leaving Mr. Hannā to organize the Injīlis they pressed up the White Nile for a survey which resulted in the recommendation that work should be started amongst the Shiluks on the Sobat River, and eventually in 1902 they set sail to found the station at Doleib Hill. Soon the Government began to relax their restrictions on the missionary activities in the North. The prohibition against conversation with Moslems about religion was withdrawn in 1903.1

The relationship of the Catholic Church with the Sudan was older than that of the Protestant missions. The first Catholic girls' school in the Sudan was opened at El Obeid in Kordofan in 1871 by the Catholic Missionary Society which was headed by Monsignor Daniel Comboni. The next one was opened at Khartoum in 1873 by Monsignor Daniel Comboni, too, in the Church compound. Both schools worked until they were destroyed in the Mahdist revolt after the fall of El Obeid and that of Khartoum.2 After the reconquest the Catholic missionary work restarted in 1889 and in 1900 the start was given to two Catholic girls' schools, one in Khartoum, under the name of St. Ann's School, and the other at Omdurman under the name of St. Joseph School. Both

of them had a boarding section but most of the girls were day-pupils. Both included kindergarten and elementary classes at the start, and later added the intermediate course. The Catholic schools were allowed at such an early period as they were intended to provide education for the Catholic community in the Sudan and not for evangelical missionary purposes.

It seemed that with Catholic schools being opened and the Gordon College started in the North, the C.M.S. and the American Mission could not help exerting pressure to get permission for educational work in the Northern Sudan. Especially so, as the Gordon College, in order to attract Sudanese students, introduced the teaching of Moslem religion, and to dispel the reluctance of Moslem parents to send their sons to the College, the Sudan Government at the time sent to Cairo a delegation of members of the Education Department, Mr. Currie, the Director of Education and Principal of the College, and Mr. Crowfoot, the Deputy to the Director of Education, to persuade Sudanese students at al-Azhar to come to Sudan and enter the College. Having succeeded in persuading some from al-Azhar they also attracted some of those who had been studying in the mosques in Sudan.¹

This policy which was followed in the establishment of the Gordon College was resented by the missionary societies who thought that "Gordon College, though launched as a memorial to

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a great Christian with the money of those who wished to honour him as such, became the chief Government and Moslem training institution, Moslem festivals were honoured, Friday was made the weekly holiday, so that Christian officials had to work on Sunday, and missionary work was forbidden.\(^1\) Lord Cromer summed up his reasons for the Government policy towards missionary activities in the Northern Sudan in his Annual Report for 1904:

"In the Northern portion of the Sudan ... it would not for the present, be possible, without incurring great danger, to adopt so liberal and tolerant a policy as that pursued in Egypt. The population of the Sudan generally is as yet far too ignorant and uncivilised to be able to distinguish between the action of the British Government in their corporate capacity, and that of an individual European, whether of British or any other nationality. If free scope were allowed to missionary enterprise, it would not only be wholly unproductive of results but would also create a feeling of resentment, culminating possibly in actual disturbance, which far from advancing would almost certainly throw back the work of civilisation, which all connected with the country, whether or not connected with missionary enterprise, have so much at heart.

Under these circumstances, I stated in my annual report for 1902 that both Sir Reginald Wingate and myself were of opinion that 'the time was still distant when mission work could, with safety and advantage, be permitted amongst the Moslem population

\(^1\) Trimingham, \textit{The Missionary Approach}, p. 16.
of the Sudan.' We both remain of that opinion. It is impossible at present to assign any precise limit to the duration of the existing restrictions. From the point of view of British missionary enterprise, these restrictions are so far practically unimportant in that a large field of activity, which they have as yet, owing to want of funds, been unable to occupy has been opened out to them in the Southern portions of the Sudan.

To a certain very limited extent, an exception to the application of the principle above enunciated has been made, within the second zone, in the case of Khartoum. The population of that town is not wholly Moslem. There are many Christian residents of various denominations. Moreover, being the seat of Government, the action of any missionary bodies can be carefully supervised; whilst the Moslem population, being in immediate touch with the governing authorities, can more readily comprehend the policy adopted than those residing in the outlying provinces. Further, an active demand for education, which the Government is unable to meet adequately from its own resources, exists, on the part of both Moslems and Christians. Under these circumstances, permission has been given for the establishment of mission schools at Khartoum. It is for the heads of those schools to decide on the amount of religious instruction which shall be afforded to the pupils. The duty of the Government is limited to providing that any Moslem parent - or parent of some Christian denomination other than under whose auspices the school has been instituted - shall clearly understand the conditions under which secular instruction
is imparted, before he sends his child to the school. Regulations having this object in view have accordingly been framed.¹

In 1905 the Church Missionary Society opened a girls' school in Khartoum, and the American Mission opened a school for boys in Omdurman. The Sudan Government, aware of the difficulties that might arise from the establishment of missionary schools in the predominantly Moslem North had already laid down "the conditions under which Mission Schools ought to be conducted in the Sudan":²

"(1) Before Mohamedan children are permitted to attend a Mission school the Director or Head of the School will satisfy himself that the parents or guardians understand that the school is a Christian school.

(2) The full consent of parents or guardians must be obtained by the Director or Head of the school before any pupil is given religious instruction, no matter of what nationality or religion the pupil may be.

(3) When religious instruction is being carried out no other children, except those whose parents have given the necessary consent must be present.

(4) The school shall be open at all times to the inspection of the Governor General or his representative.

(5) The Director or Head of the school will be held accountable for the administration of the school."

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2. S.G. "Conditions Under Which Mission Schools Must Be Conducted in the Sudan." Wingate papers, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
responsible that the above regulations are strictly adhered to. It must be clearly understood that the permission to carry on the school is dependent on the regulations being observed."

However, these regulations turned out to be an anticipation of what might take place rather than a prevention of it. Many Moslem parents particularly in Khartoum were keen to send their daughters to school. The Government with its limited financial resources thought it fit to concentrate on boys education in the newly established Gordon College, and to leave the field of girls' education to the private enterprise of the missionary societies after having laid down the regulations for them. But Moslem parents had no option or alternative schools for their daughters and they had a feeling of embarrassment and sensitivity towards the missionary schools and fears of their proselytizing their daughters, as we shall see later.

Representations were made to the Government regarding the opening of a girls' school and some complaints were lodged alleging the teaching of Christian beliefs to Moslem girls in missionary schools. Dissatisfaction with this seems to have filtered to the Government through both the personal and the official channels. By 1906 the Sudan Government started discussing the possibility of official inspection of missionary schools by the Director of Education. The Governor General had the right to do this as was stated in the Conditions. But Lord Cromer in Egypt, who was also the superior of the Governor General of Sudan, thought it was unwise to do so. So Wingate with a new situation
arising thought it fit to convince Cromer before he started exercising his right of inspection. He wrote a letter to Cromer on 16th December 1906 saying:

"My dear Lord Cromer,

You will remember some time ago that we discussed this question and that you wrote that in your opinion it was undesirable that Mission Schools should be subject to Government inspection unless they were pecuniarily supported by Government.

"The number of Mission Schools in the Sudan has increased considerably since the matter was previously considered and I think rightly the Director of Education is somewhat perturbed. In consequence of his representations I summoned a Committee consisting of Messrs. Sterry, Currie and Bonus to report on the question, and I now forward the result of their deliberations. I think their suggestions are sound, but I do not like to carry them into effect without previous consultation with you. Would you therefore kindly let me have your views."

The views of Cromer on this subject were disposed to concur with those of Dunlop his Director of Education in Cairo. A memorandum prepared by Dunlop was enclosed in Cromer's reply to Wingate.

They thought that the fourth paragraph of the Conditions

1. Sir Reginald Wingate letter to Cromer 16th Dec. 1906, W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Extract from letter by Cromer to Wingate, 7.1.1907, W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Dunlop letter to Cromer, 4th Jan. 1907, Ministry of Education, Cairo, W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
meant that inspection should only be utilized with a view to seeing that the first three conditions, relative to religious instructions, were carefully carried out. It was placing a strained construction on it to use that inspection in order to be satisfied of the efficiency or otherwise of the private school. They also thought that once the Government got on to those lines of inspection the schools would almost certainly ask for grants-in-aid, which Cromer could not see how they could well be refused. Yet Cromer was worried about the Moslem critics and urged Wingate on the importance of a limited inspection for that particular purpose. "... I hope the inspection is carried out, or if this has not been done, that it will be carried out in time for me to deal with it in my Report - with a view to ascertaining that in each individual case the first three of the conditions are rigorously complied with. If this is done, it will be a conclusive answer to the Moslem critics." While Cromer was anxious to get an answer to the Moslem critics with the minimum of inspection, Dunlop in his more elaborate memorandum was anxious that the Sudan Government should not involve itself in regularly inspecting the missionary schools because if the Mission schools were compulsorily brought under Government inspection, the inhabitants might come to regard them as in some sense Government schools and hostile critics would not be slow to misrepresent Government as having directly associated itself with proselytizing agencies.

Dunlop further thought that the time was singularly inopportune for the Sudan Government to assume responsibility for
the work of the Mission schools. The Sudan Government would not for many years be itself able to meet all educational needs and in the days of small things there might be something to be said in favour of the policy of not despising the humble services which even inefficient schools might render to the cause of education. Dunlop thought that it was possible that Government inspection would ban many of the mission schools in Egypt as inefficient but it should be recognized that they had supplied some elements of education to thousands of lads who would possibly otherwise have received no education at all. He thought that even in countries, e.g. England, India and Egypt - where Government inspection of Private schools was not compulsory, inspection to test efficiency was indissolubly associated with some system of grants-in-aid. So Dunlop concluded that if the mission schools did not apply voluntarily for inspection, he doubted whether any real or permanent advantage could be derived from enforcing it.

Wingate, however, passed Dunlop's memorandum to Sterry, Currie and Bonus as his Committee in charge of the question of missionary schools inspection. He asked them to reconsider their decision in the light of the further views submitted to them.¹ In his reply to Cromer Wingate thought that the Committee had considered the question in all its bearings and with special reference to the conditions prevailing in the Sudan which - both politically and educationally were so entirely different from those

¹ Wingate to Cromer letter 26th Jan. 1907 (W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA)
prevailing in Egypt. He also thought that the members of the Committee had had the advantage of a matured independent opinion on the purely educational aspect in Sir Henry Craik (former Secretary to the Scottish Education Department) who was in Khartoum at the time and was recently in South Africa. Wingate thought that valuable hints could be drawn from the results of allowing private and missionary schools in South Africa to grow up entirely uncontrolled by Government.

The reply of Sterry, Currie and Bonus to Dunlop memorandum was, however, more elaborate than that of Wingate. They said it was true that the policy of imposing Government inspection with a view to testing educational efficiency was considered three years before1 and discarded but they argued that conditions in Sudan had changed much in three years. Also when that policy was discarded it was not, they believed, on account of its intrinsic demerits, but because it was not considered opportune to introduce it. They also believed that it was not perhaps clear to Mr. Dunlop that at that time the Mission schools would offer no objection whatever to educational inspection, provided that Government intimated its intention of imposing it.

The Director had on more than one occasion been asked to inspect in a private capacity, but had always declined because he felt that he would be putting himself in a false position if the schools could say that they were subject to inspection of the Director of

Education but at the same time there was no obligation on them to meet his views or remove causes of criticism. With Government inspection it would be otherwise.

They also could not admit that compulsory inspection to test efficiency could bestow any kind of right to financial subsidy or grant. The argument, they contended, was only valid in England because the place of the schools subsidised would otherwise have to be supplied by the Government. The Educational programme of the Sudan Government did not involve assent to the proposition that all its subjects must be compulsorily educated.

Mr. Dunlop's statement of the policy pursued in Britain, they thought, was not quite convincing. In England, they argued, no doubt a child's parents could send it to any school they pleased, and in theory anyone could open a school. But the Education Department was charged with the duty of seeing that each child's attainments were on a level with the general compulsory standard obligatory on all, and the onus of showing that this was so rested with the child's parents, and in default they were open to prosecution.

As regards his contention that at home inspection implied a grant in aid, they said it was not uniformly so and provided an illustration within their knowledge, that every secondary school in Scotland was state inspected and of these schools only a small proportion were state aided and that the inspection was much appreciated. On this particular point, they said, they applied to Sir Henry Craik, late Secretary to the
Scottish Education Department, who was at the time in Khartoum. So they were quite clear as regards the facts.

Further, they stated, they were by no means sure that a system of subsidies in one direction at least might not be a proper policy for the Government to adopt.

They could conceive the foreign population in Khartoum, who did not occupy the same position as in Egypt as regards taxation and rates, demanding educational facilities for their children with considerable insistence, and so they did not see that it might not be sound policy on both administrative and financial grounds to ask for instance, the Austrian Fathers or the C.M.S. to undertake the task.

Their answer to Mr. Dunlop's question, whether it was not a singularly inopportune time for the Government to assume the responsibility for the work of the mission schools was, that the responsibility in any case did already lie on the Government by virtue of its very existence. Surely, they thought, it was because the Government had recognised this responsibility that three years before it insisted on controlling the religious teaching.

They assured the Governor General that it was far from their intention to advocate a policy in any degree unfriendly or hostile to the mission schools, nor had they any intention of disparaging the efforts of any mission school however modest. Their only desire was to promote educational proficiency and to put the Education Department into a position in which it could be possible for it to assist in that direction. They saw no reason
to suppose that that Department would be unreasonable in its demands as in any case it was fully controlled by the Governor General.

They argued that it might be, as Dunlop had stated, that a poor education was better than none at all, and that it would be a mistake to despise the day of small things, but with the teaching of one body at least they were by no means sure that there was not a danger of wrong teaching as distinct from weak teaching.

They considered that in view of what had taken place and was taking place, at the time, in South Africa, that the effects on Blacks of American missionary school teaching coupled with an ultra democratic outlook on things social, ought to be very carefully watched, and, if necessary, firmly controlled. "Ethiopianism" in South Africa derived, they understood, from an American Presbyterian Missionary body. They warned that that movement had been the driving force behind the late rebellion in Natal and that American commercial enterprise, influence and teaching were certain in the near future, to be present in force in the Sudan. They understood that the Governor of Natal had written a special report to the Colonial Office on this subject, and they asked the Governor General to consider the advisability of obtaining a copy of it and noting its conclusions.

They thought that if it was not made plain that the Sudan Government intended to have the supreme control in all schools,
there was a very distinct danger that such schools might become centres of influence and intrigues of a kind calculated to raise extremely awkward questions of jurisdiction. They recalled that immediately after the reoccupation of the Sudan a proposal was made to establish French schools at Khartoum. This they feared might be repeated by applications for the foundation of schools by various European nationalities.

Then again, they brilliantly forewarned that, if Egyptian Nationalist schools of the type that was only too common in Egypt, were to be established in the Sudan, the Government ought to be armed with powers that would enable it to exercise a close observation over what was being taught, and the text books that were being used.

They believed that it was of great importance that no undue distinction with regard to Government inspection between different classes of schools should be allowed to arise. They also regarded the questions they raised were all of immediate practical importance. The Greek Community in Port Sudan had already petitioned the Governor General for leave to establish a school. The terms of the permission granted in this case, thought the Committee, would practically tie the hands of the Government so far as other applications were concerned.

While this dialogue was going on between Cairo and Khartoum, Moslem opposition to what was being taught had reached the Arabic press in Cairo when on December 17th a fiery article
was published in Al-Mu‘ayyad, under the title "What is Behind the Hill". The author, who signed his name as "Arrival from the Sudan" vehemently attacked Lord Cromer and Sir Reginald Wingate for deceiving the Egyptians in their reports of 1904 about the missionary schools in Khartoum. He described their words as "ointment for the wounds of the Muslims in Khartoum which facilitated to them the admission of their girls into the Missionary Schools deceived by the mirage of promises given to them ... that the girl will not attend in the place of prayer nor be taught any of the Christian religion like her comrades the Christians but when the girl leaves the bosom of her parents and enters the school, she becomes in the hands of the priests and nuns like the dead in the hands of the washer who turns him as he wishes." He then proceeded to mention a story of what had happened while he was in Khartoum on Bairam last. 'A party of Moslem notables discussed the matter of the girls schools in the presence of Mr. Currie the Director of Education and requested him to start a school for the Moslem girls in Khartoum in which they can learn what is good and necessary for them. In his answer to that he expressed his confidence in the Missionary schools and especially of that school under the direction of Mr. Gwynne (the official Chaplain of the Government Palace). When he was answered that that school teaches the Moslem girls the Christian religion and make them attend the Christian prayer without parental consent in spite of the guarantee

given to them, Mr. Currie was suspicious about the truth of that and asked for proof. In evidence a daughter of the owner of the house which goes to Mr. Gwynne's school was brought in and the Director asked her about going to the prayer and she stated that she and all the girls in the school attend the prayer without exception and that they learn the religious studies. He asked her to say to him the prayer and she began by saying "Our Father, which art in heaven" up to the end, without making the least mistake in a letter of it while she was totally ignorant of "Bismillahi el Rahman el Rahim" and did not know any word of the "Kuran Fatiha".

The author concluded that the shadow of good relations between the missionary schools and the Moslem people which appeared to the Governor General had in those days begun to shrink for the schools began changing the girls' religious dye and thus deviated from the guarantees given to the parents. The result of this was that many Moslem parents in Khartoum had kept their daughters in the houses and prevented them from going in to those schools preferring that their girls remain ignorant rather than have an education which would convert them from the religion of their fathers and mothers and become sharpest weapon for severing the relation between the girl and her kinsfolk as well as between her and the sons of her kind and the result would be evil and misery on her near relations. The author warned that "this was little of much of what was hidden and pledged that time would guarantee its publication."
This fiery article was received with great concern in the official circles. Wingate thought that it was a severe attack and might be an opening of a campaign. The intelligence service in Khartoum, started the search for the author and various people were accused at first, the Grand Kadi was accused by some, another employee at the Works Department called Hassan effendi was accused by another report. But it did not take long before Wingate could establish that "it was the late qaḍī of Khartoum whom he described as "has been behaving in a very unsatisfactory manner for some time" and whose resignation had been accepted by the Governor General and had returned to Cairo a few days before the article was published. He gave his name as Sheikh Ismail and asked that perhaps Boyle might keep his eye on him. The article was also shown by the Governor General to both Currie and Gwynne. Gwynne thought that the article was part of the agitation against British influence introduced into the Sudan from Egypt which aimed not so much at the education of the girls as the weakening of British prestige amongst the people of the Sudan. He also added that he had proof that Hassan Effendi of the Works Department had written a letter to a Cairo paper agitating for Government Moslem Schools. Gwynne also thought that the inevitable consequence if the Government yielded to this

1. Letter from Wingate to Cromer dated 29th Dec. 1906. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter from Llewellyn H. Gwynne to Wingate dated Dec. 29th 1906, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter from Gwynne to Wingate, dated Dec. 29th 1906, W.P. Box 103/7/2 ERA.
agitation, would be to lose from his influence in the school all the Mohamedan Sudanese girls under pressure from local Mohamedan opinion. He suggested that it would be sufficient to answer the attack on the Government by stating "We have no funds for the education of girls at present", and "asking as you are dissatisfied with the education given in the English School why not open a Mohammedan School for your own girls? If Europeans can provide money and ladies for Khartoum surely you who value the education of girls so highly can provide the necessary funds and teachers."

Currie had a different attitude on this issue. He stated that in October last a petition, very influentially supported, was presented asking that a Government Girls' School be opened in Khartoum. The majority of the signatories were no doubt Egyptian officials anxious that means of education for their daughters should be brought within their reach, and at the same time preferring the non-Sectarian atmosphere of a Government School to that conducted by missionary managers. Since then, Currie, at the direction of the Governor General instituted some enquiries as to how far that feeling extended, and had to report that in his opinion it represented a demand that would every year become persistent and to which the Government should inevitably give very sympathetic consideration. Currie indicated that personally he would prefer that the Government should not undertake this task

1. Extract from Annual Report of Education Department, 1906, W.P. Box 103/7/2, DRA.
for some little time, but a good deal depended - he thought - on the attitude adopted by the managers of the missionary schools.

Currie thought that if the recommendations of the Committee which was formed of the Acting Legal Secretary, Mr. Sterry, himself and Mr. Bonus were accepted by the Governor General and the managers would evince willingness to adopt what had been suggested, then Moslem public opinion would be satisfied for some little time, and a breathing space would be afforded in which the Government could study the question. If this was not possible, i.e. the inspection of missionary schools by Government, then he saw that the Government had no other option than to open a large Kuttab for girls in Khartoum, and he was prepared if directed to make a beginning in a few months, though this would be in his opinion the second best course, and rather adopted on compulsion. He also suggested that if it were desired, it would also, as an experiment, be possible to begin at Ruffa‘a, where the very efficient local Kuttab was in Currie’s own words "under an extremely competent and interesting local man who is very anxious to be allowed to try the experiment. The inhabitants of the place too have petitioned repeatedly to the same effect." Currie couldn’t see that any possible harm could accrue from starting something at Ruffa‘a. The local man referred to by Currie was undoubtedly Sheikh Babikir Badri the leading Sudanese educator especially renowned for his pioneering work in the field of women’s education. Sheikh Babikir was at the time in charge of
the boys elementary school at Ruffa‘a and was requesting the Government to help him open a girls school as well. He wrote in his autobiography on this period.¹ "That on the 4th of February 1906 I was visited by Mr. Crowfoot the Deputy Director of the Department of Education. I told him that I asked the Director to open a girls' school in 1901 and he patted on my shoulder and said 'You are mad'. Then I asked him again in 1905 and he did not answer me and today I repeat my request telling your excellency that I have eleven girls in my own house who deserve to be educated and I am the son of the Department of Education and if the Department does not help in this I feel it has done me injustice." Then Sheikh Babikir Badrī asked to be given ten pounds by the Department to build a room for the school. Mr. Crowfoot told him that this would be done after his return to Khartoum. Crowfoot left for Khartoum but Sheikh Babikir received a personal letter from Currie saying that he could not help in opening the school in spite of Sheikh Babikir's insistence. But if Sheikh Babikir was going to open the school in his own house under his own name and accounts then Currie had no objection to that. Sheikh Babikir took the burden and the responsibility of starting the school which Currie in his report recommended to be started or subsidized as an experiment.

Wingate, however, seemed to be more inclined towards Gwynne's side, so he stressed in his report that when money was

so urgently required in other directions they could not do anything at the time. Though he saw that something should be done when they could afford it. He also mentioned that he had just been obliged to refuse Currie funds for the expansion of his secondary school which ranked in comparative importance much higher than the girls school. He therefore thought that there was a good deal in Gwynne’s suggested reply and asked Cromer if he could agree so that something could be drafted for the papers in that sense. Wingate considered the matter to be a very delicate one on which he hesitated to embark on any independent action without the concurrence of Cromer.

Something were drafted for the papers. These were in the form of articles defending Government policy in the Sudan and refuting what had been published in Al-Mu’ayyad. One of them put a case for a review of the situation as regards girls education. This was a mild article which although it did not attack the Government yet it expected it to do something. A statement was published in Cairo in Al-Muqatṭam newspaper stating that "were the opposers to look, even a little at the conditions which the Sudan Government made for the admission of the students into the missionaries schools they will see that she has taken all the necessary means so that no place would be left for complaint." Then all the five conditions governing missionary schools in Sudan were stated. In Khartoum articles were published in El Sudan Times.  

1. Al-Muqatṭam, No. 5404, 7.1.1907.  
2. Jarīdat as-Sūdān, 10.1.1907., El Sudan Times, 10.1.1907.
signed by unnamed authors. One under the name of an Egyptian Moslem, which attacked the author of Al-Mu'ayyad article and accused him of "betraying his own people for when he published his much regretted tirade he knew that a few enlightened members of the Moslem community in Khartoum were in communication with the education authorities with a view to establishing a Moslem female school under the auspices of the Government. And so instead of encouraging this praiseworthy move, the correspondent of Al-Mu'ayyad did everything in his power to thwart it." Not satisfied with what he had done so far, he ascribed the article in Al-Mu'ayyad "to one of the members of the Committee who had been, as previously stated, with the Education Authorities." This statement gained credence among those interested in the matter although it was void of any foundation.

The writer then referred to the educational work of the missionary societies for which he had unstinted praise. To them, he said, "We owe a great deal and, although we endeavour to have our own schools for the education of our children, we have great pleasure in recording the valuable aid the missionaries render to the cause of knowledge." The writer closed his article by expressing a hope that those interested in the matter would realise that the educated and enlightened classes of Moslems were far from desiring a conflict with other creeds. They appreciated the efforts of the Government to spread knowledge in the country which they hoped would be crowned with success.

The long article was published with a lengthy
introduction by the editor and in a later number of *El Sudan Times* a week later\(^1\) the former article by an Egyptian Moslem was again praised as "having met the highest esteem of the wise persons and all who love the peace and the good." The editor replied to the admirers of the unknown author that his name could not be revealed because this was the author's wish. It was also emphasised in the same number\(^2\) that "We have seen the conditions of the Government with the Missionaries' Schools in this country for the acceptance of the students, boys or girls, and in these conditions the Government have taken the necessary arrangement in order not to leave a place for complaint, we have also learnt that the conditions are in force and that the Government representatives are visiting those schools and assuring that they are carrying the conditions out."

Again on the 21st of January - four days later,\(^3\) a summary of a message was published described as having been written by "a polite and well educated Christian" in which he said that the missionaries never failed to make every father and mother understand thoroughly what was taught in their schools to avoid the possibility of any doubt or mistake. The rest of the summary was a defence and praise of the missionaries particularly the lady who was the head of the British School for Girls in Omdurman for whom the author and the editor expressed their special regards.

\(^1\) *El Sudan Times*, 17.1.1907.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) *El Sudan Times*, 21.1.07.
While this press campaign was going on, Cromer asked for investigations\(^1\) and a report. The Governor General asked Archdeacon Gwynne\(^2\) to submit a report on the C.M.S. schools and also asked Major Phipps,\(^3\) the Civil Secretary, whom he described as independent of the Department of Education indicating that the question of "Inspection of Missionary Schools" discussed earlier was not yet settled. The Sudan Government indicated that it wanted to be very tactful to avoid being regarded as taking a unilateral course of action without the concurrence of Cromer. Gwynne had already stated in his note that the C.M.S. school curriculum included - religious instruction, reading, writing in Arabic and English, geography, arithmetic, sewing, and if necessary music. He had also stated that religious instruction was not compulsory and that "At the express wish of the parents the children of the Moslems retire into a separate room during the teaching of the Gospel and prayers."\(^4\)

But according to Gwynne "such confidence have the parents of the girls placed in the teachers that out of 66 only four are not allowed by their parents to attend prayers."\(^5\) As for the Omdurman Girls' School which was opened on November 15th

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1. Cromer Letter to Wingate, 7th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Gwynne till this time was Archdeacon, he was made Bishop on 11th October 1908. See letter to Gwynne by W.E. George Francis Popham, Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem, and the East. Box 420/3 DRA.
3. G.G. (Wingate letter to) Cromer 26th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
4. Note by Rev. L. Gwynne entitled "The Work of British Missions in Sudan" marked "C" enclosed in Wingate letter to Cromer, see 3 above. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
1906 at the request of the inhabitants "in less than two months the school has twenty scholars; individually each parent has been visited by Mrs. Hall who has carefully explained the conditions and work of the school. So far not one has objected to their children attending religious instruction and prayers, showing that they have every confidence in the teachers."\(^1\)

Whether it was a matter of confidence in the teachers or a yearning for the education of their children and a lack of alternative schools was a matter for reflection, some of which was done by Lord Cromer when he read Gwynne's note and compared it with Phipps' figures. Phipps reported that in the inspection at Khartoum of the various schools of the missionary bodies working in Sudan, he found that 'in each case the conditions under which those schools were permitted to be carried on by the Sudan Government were not only thoroughly understood but were carefully adhered to by those in charge.' Major Phipps also said "I was given to understand that owing to the recent publicity given to certain views on the management of Mission schools, special visits had been made to impress on parents their ability to forbid religious teaching, but these visits seem to have produced only reiterated expressions of gratitude to the school superintendents for the much appreciated opportunities of education, as well as the strongly asserted belief that nothing but what was best for the children had ever been or would ever be taught."\(^2\)

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1. Ibid., p. 3.
2. Letter dated 19th Jan. 1907, headed "Inspection of Mission Schools in Khartoum", addressed to "His Excellency the Governor General" (Enclosure A) see Wingate letter to Cromer 26th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
Major Phipps also had letters from the managers of the various mission schools assuring him that the conditions were fully adhered to and carried out. \(^1\) Phipps however seems to have done some inspection of the schools but he had not undertaken thorough investigation of the matter, instead he relied in this report on what he had seen at the schools and what had been written to him or what he had been "given to understand" through his interviews with the school staff and children. He did not interview parents or complainants. Wingate in his letter to Cromer expressed his belief that "the majority of the managers would welcome such inspection as they now realized that in so far as the present agitation in regard to religious instruction is concerned, they have the support of the Government. They are only too ready to appreciate the fact that their position in the country is immensely strengthened as long as they retain the goodwill and support of the Government."\(^2\)

Cromer compared the note of Gwynne with that of Phipps, particularly the table provided by Phipps giving the numbers of Moslem children in each school and those who did not attend

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2. Wingate to Cromer 20th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
religious instruction amongst them. 1 Cromer seemed to be perturbed by the figures provided, and was not satisfied by the accompanying notes, so he telegrammed Wingate 2 noting that from the report of the Civil Secretary of January 19th there were thirteen Moslem children educated in Austrian schools none of whom received religious instruction. On the other hand out of the 74 Moslems in American and Church Missionary Society schools all but three received religious instruction. The contrast of the figures was remarkable, and he asked if there was any explanation? The explanation as Wingate remarked was too lengthy to telegraph 3 and had to go by mail.

But before Wingate's telegram reached Cairo Cromer sent another telegram 4 pointing out that Gwynne in his memorandum said that four Moslem children did not receive Christian religious instruction while the figure given by Phipps was two. The next

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>No. of children</th>
<th>No. of Mohammedans not attending religious instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th Jan. 1907</td>
<td>American Boys</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Jan. 1907</td>
<td>Austrian Boys</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Jan. 1907</td>
<td>Austrian Girls</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Jan. 1907</td>
<td>C.M.S. Girls</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.

2. Tel. from Lord Cromer, Cairo, to Sirdar Khartoum, No. 14. dated 30th Jan. 1907. W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.

3. Telegraph No. 15 from Sirdar to Lord Cromer. 2nd Feb. 1907 (Copy of both this and Cromer's above were given to Currie) W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.

4. Tel. No. 16 2nd Feb. 1907. from Lord Cromer to Sirdar. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
day Wingate cabled Cromer telling him that Phipps' figure was correct as two children left subsequent to Gwynne's Memorandum. Lord Cromer was also reassured that a full report in reply to his former telegram of January 30th was leaving by the day's mail.

Cromer got in the mail a brief note from Phipps and a considerably longer one from Gwynne with a covering letter from Wingate. Phipps' explanation was that the Austrians never had cared for Moslem children as they had plenty of Catholic children. The children of Moslems who had gone there were of parents very superior socially and wanting a European education, and consequently more particular about the non-attendance at religious teaching. On the other hand Phipps explained, the C.M.S. for Girls and American for Boys represented the private Moslem school. The latter being a rival of Gordon College and other Government schools, although it had a lower standard and was practically the Coptic school at Khartoum. At the C.M.S. and American Schools where no European children went the religious question never assumed any importance as the Moslem parents were socially inferior. This Phipps thought might be the real reason.

Gwynne, however, had some explanations of his own.

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1. Tel. No. 16 3rd Feb. 1907, from Sirdar to Lord Cromer. W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter from Wingate to Cromer dated 2 Feb. 1907, enclosed letter from Phipps dated 2 Feb. 1907 addressed to Wingate, enclosed letter from Gwynne Feb. 2 1907 addressed to the Governor General (this last one is in Gwynne's handwriting and seems to be the rough note of the letter). W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Gwynne's letter to the Governor General, Khartoum. Feb. 2, 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
He explained that the Roman Catholic school was opened for European children of whom there was a large number, particularly Italians and of Catholic Syrians who were also numerous in Khartoum. He also thought there was a diffidence on the part of European parents to have their children taught side by side with Moslems. This Gwynne professed to know from the fact that when they first opened the C.M.S. Girls' School at Khartoum nearly all were Christians, children of Europeans and Copts and when the Roman Catholics opened their girls school all the Europeans were withdrawn from the C.M.S. School and sent to them. Since then from time to time European parents had sent their children to the C.M.S. School and had invariably withdrawn them not wishing to be taught in the same classes with the Moslem children. He went on to say that the Church Missionary School was opened for the children of the Sudan. They made no special provision for Europeans. If any cared to come they had to attend the ordinary classes and learn Arabic and sit at the same desk with children of the Egyptian officer or the little negro free scholars. It did not occur to the Archdeacon to think that probably the reason that prompted the Roman Catholics to set up their own school was the nature of the religious instruction given at the C.M.S. School and they tended to withdraw their children whenever they found vacancies in the Roman Catholic School which was in accordance with their faith.

Gwynne reiterated his conviction that there could be
no possible misunderstanding on the part of all the Moslem parents that although the C.M.S. School was Christian their girls were exempt from religious instruction if they so wished it. In support of this conviction of his he thought that "The fact that in the Roman Catholic School all the Moslems withdraw from religious teaching is a sign to my mind that Moslem parents in the C.M.S. Schools are for the most part perfectly contented with the religious instruction given to their children. For they send their children to a school where nearly all the Moslems attend religious teaching when they might if they so wished, easily send them to the Austrian school where all Moslems do not attend Christian teaching". The weakness of this argument was evident because when the only option it left for Moslem parents was to take their children to the Roman Catholic School in which places would not be easy to find for all the children, or else they had to suppress their genuine wishes and express their acquiescence towards the religious instruction given to their children at the C.M.S. schools.

Gwynne also mentioned an episode that happened to him a week before when he went to Atbara to hold a service for the British community. He was asked by the Egyptian officers to meet them at their club to talk over with them the possibility of starting a school for their girls. There were ten or twelve present all of them Egyptian officers - officials of the Government and parents of about fifteen children. They said they wished him to start a school like the C.M.S. School at Khartoum.
They wanted an English lady to superintend. They would guarantee £25 a month. They wished it to be a school for the better class children. Gwynne said, "I asked them did they understand that, if the C.M.S. supplied a teacher, Christian teaching and prayers for half an hour every day would be one of the rules?" "They said, they did." It should be noted that neither did Gwynne say nor did the officers understand that this was optional. One of the Bimbashis who spoke said, "for six years he studied in a Jesuit School in Egypt, was as much a Moslem now as ever he was though he attended every day prayers." Gwynne, however, did not wish this to be published for it "might bring upon the petitioners the disapproval, perhaps the enmity of their fellow Moslems."\footnote{1}

Cromer having gone through all this, realised that the situation in Sudan had grown so serious that something ought to be done about it. His earlier notions about "Missionary School Inspection" had to be modified to meet with those of the Sudan Government. He also had to go a step further to meet the demand of Moslem parents. So he gave the green light to Wingate\footnote{2} to enter into negotiations with the school managers with a view to establishing compulsory inspection on the lines suggested by Wingate and his colleagues.\footnote{3} But he strongly recommended Wingate

\footnote{1}{Gwynne's letter to the Governor General, Khartoum, Feb. 2. 1907, Box 103/7/2 DRA.}

\footnote{2}{Tel. from Lord Cromer, Cairo to Sirdar Khartoum 6th Feb. 1907, Box 103/7/2 DRA.}
not to force inspection on the missionary schools for there was much opposition. Cromer went on to say that on political grounds he thought that the establishment of a Government Girls' School at Khartoum was very necessary and should even take precedence over a Secondary school as it would close the mouth of Moslem criticism.

Wingate found the approval of inspection to his taste and he had little doubt that the Church Missionary Society and Austrians would gladly accept and he could endeavour to obtain the concurrence of the American Presbyterians, without forcing it on them. But he was somewhat alarmed by the idea of opening a Government Girls' School at Khartoum. So he conveyed to Cromer that for this part he would be bringing Currie with him to Cairo to talk over future educational requirements including the Girls' School which he also hoped to see started as soon as they could raise the funds required for it.

While delaying the one serious question of a Government Girls' School until the proposed meeting in Cairo, Wingate embarked upon tackling the question of inspection which he thought might solve the whole problem. He passed the telegrams to Currie and asked him to give his views on the scope of Government

1. Tel. from Sirdar Khartoum to Lord Cromer, Cairo, 7th Feb. 1907. No. 22. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Ibid.
3. Letter, Wingate to Currie, 8.2.1907, marked private. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
inspection and the method of applying it so that they would be with him as he intended to be shortly interviewing the managers of the mission schools. He impressed upon Currie to keep the matter strictly confidential pending the result of their negotiations with the management and the trip to Cairo.

Currie thought\(^1\) that the inducement which could be held out to the managers of the missionary schools to make them accept Government Inspection was to point out to them that the alternative to no inspection was competition with Government Schools and that the Governor General was finding considerable difficulty in resisting the forces that urged him to that course, and without submission on their part he had no other course open to him. Currie thought it was impossible to lay down the scope of inspection at the moment. But his idea was that every school ought to undergo formal inspection once a year. Due notice ought to be given to the managers as to the inspection, i.e. no inspections were to be made without notice.

The managers, as Currie suggested, would also be liable to be called upon to furnish necessary statistics as to the number of pupils in attendance, timetables, the number of their teaching staff, etc. On the completion of the inspection, the Government Education Office would pass a report on the school to the managers for their consideration, and a copy of the report would be sent to the Governor General. If the managers wished

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\(^1\) Letter from James Currie to Sirdar, S.G., Education Office, Khartoum, 9th Feb. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
any points raised to be further elucidated, the inspecting officer would be directed to meet them in conference, and offer such friendly advice as he might think desirable.

Currie also advised for the emphasis of the fact that the Government had no desire whatsoever to impose any cast iron syllabus of instruction on anybody; but they wanted to do what they could to ascertain that such uniformity was ensured, so as to make it possible for pupils who desired to enter on a course of higher instruction profitably to do so.

In addition, Currie suggested that if the reports to the Department of Education were of a favourable nature, it would be possible in the future for the Government to leave certain spheres of work to particular bodies, rather than become confronted with the necessity of establishing institutions which would virtually do the same work. He concluded that his Department would of course deal in all cases with the managers of the schools and not with individual headmasters and headmistresses.

Gwynne, seems to have been kept in the dark about Cromer's suggestion to establish a Government Girls' School, but his advice was sought by Wingate on how the Americans were to be approached. They had been his main obstacle up till then.

Gwynne suggested that the best way to approach the Americans was to show goodwill and give certain guarantees. This was by asking their co-operation in the education of the Sudanese, and explaining

1. Letter from MacInnes to Sir Reginald Wingate dated March 19, 1907, Box 103/7/1, DRA.

2. Gwynne's letter to Sirdar, Feb. 28 (1907) year not written but suggested by text and sequence of events. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
clearly that the Governor General wished to help them as far as possible. He was also to assure them that the regulations were not made to harass or hinder the work of mission schools but to make use of them for the well being of the Sudan. They were to be reminded that the Government had given proof of their willingness to help mission schools by dropping the old regulation requiring written consent of parents before a child could receive religious instruction when it was reported by the missionaries to be found unworkable.

Gwynne suggested that the Americans should also be assured that the inspection was to be of the highest and easiest description not with a view to criticise or hinder but as far as possible to help with advice and suggestion. In addition they were to be told that the inspection would give the Government a handle to silence the Egyptian nationalist movement that was crying out for the closure of all mission schools if it could. Moreover they should be assured that the inspection would be carried out by an Englishman and no 'native' would be allowed to inspect a mission school. The benefit of inspection was to be shown in that it would do away with competitive cramming examinations for Government employment, and scholars in mission schools would have equal chances with scholars in Government schools if the teaching in the mission schools came up to the standard required. Some agreement seemed to have been reached between Wingate and the managers before Wingate and Currie left for Cairo.
to discuss the situation with Cromer.

Cromer was convinced that a Government girls' school should be established for political reasons if not for anything else. He communicated this to MacInnes of the Church Missionary Society, Cairo\(^1\) who lost no time in writing to Gwynne\(^2\) in Khartoum. MacInnes also tried to get in touch with Wingate in Cairo to ascertain if a matter such as this might have some bearing on a plan made by the Church Missionary Society to erect a boarding school at Khartoum.\(^3\) Gwynne's response was much sharper than MacInnes as he wrote a strong letter to Wingate. He said he had been rather upset for a couple of days by the news sent to him by MacInnes that the Government intended to open a school for girls at Khartoum. This he considered to be a breach of former Government assurances that they would not touch the education of girls in Khartoum especially as the conversations over the Government regulations for mission schools had given the Government authorities the right of inspection at any time. Gwynne confessed that he was under the impression that the education of girls would be left to private enterprise. This he thought would be a test of Islam to attempt to do for herself what Christian bodies were doing without any Government assistance.

Gwynne did not hide his fears that the Government by so

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1. Letter from MacInnes to Sir Reginald Wingate dated March 19, 1907, Box 103/7/1 DRA.
2. Gwynne's letter to Sirdar dated March 13th 1907, BOX 103/7/1 DRA.
doing would knock out of existence his girls' school as he was told by a Moslem parent a couple of months before that if the Government were to open a Moslem school he would not send his girls there, but Moslem opinion would not allow him to keep his girls in the C.M.S. school. Gwynne also complained that the Government would be taking this step even contrary to the wishes of the Egyptians in the Sudan. To prove this he reminded Wingate that he had shown him a written request signed by leading Egyptian officers at Atbara asking him to open a C.M.S. school there. Gwynne argued that they didn't ask for a Government school. He remarked rather disdainfully that he could not help but rather feel that because one man shouted and raved in the press in Egypt they were forced to lose touch with the Sudanese girls whose parents he submitted were perfectly contented with the teaching in their schools. Gwynne summed up his opposition to the proposed school by saying to Wingate "If the Government opens a school for girls in Khartoum our own school will be rendered useless ... if you bring English teachers to teach in your schools, ours must be closed."¹

Wingate who was keen not to upset Gwynne or the C.M.S. in Britain conveyed Gwynne's feelings to Cromer.² Wingate also conveyed to Cromer that he anticipated that the missionaries would

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¹ Letter from Gwynne to Wingate dated March 13th 1907. Clergy House, Khartoum. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
² Letter from Wingate to Cromer, Gov. General's Office, Cairo, 19th March, 1907, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
begin to make difficulties about Government inspection, and worse than that he expected the "C.M.S. people at Home will begin to agitate again". ¹ So Wingate proposed the postponement of the girls' school for a time. That evening Wingate had a committee meeting with Cromer to discuss the matter.² Gwynne's letter was read before the committee which considered that letter to be "the most convincing argument for the establishment of a Government School for Girls".³ The plan was to provide accommodation for boarders and day scholars and to impose payment of fees, which, though not large, would tend to limit the scope of Government education to the better classes. It was conceivable to the committee that there would always be a certain number of parents who were not in a position to pay the fees and who would gladly avail themselves of the free education provided for their girls by the mission schools. The plan for a girls' Government school ended at that and for a long time to come the only contribution the Government made towards girls' education was the decision of Currie in December to pay the expenses of the small girls' school in Ruffa‘a⁴ which had been started by the personal initiative of Sheikh Babikir Badrī.

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
³. Wingate letter to Findlay, Gov. Gen's Office, Cairo, 20.3.07. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
It was not until 1921 that a Government Girls' Training College for Elementary School Teachers was opened in Omdurman, and it was not until 1939 that the first Government Intermediate School for Girls was opened too, in Omdurman. It was in 1945 that a small secondary class was added to the primary school.¹

Bishop Gwynne remained in the Sudan as head of the Anglican Church and custodian of the C.M.S. schools until 1946 when he retired as Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan.² The ability he displayed in the early years of the Condominium in manipulating the educational policy in the Sudan, both in the North and in the South and with men like Wingate and Cromer must have increased with time and widened into fields other than those of missionary and educational work.³ He was the Englishman of high position who stayed longest in the Sudan and he lived very close to the Governor General's palace which was only a few hundred yards from the Anglican Cathedral. His services in the Sudan earned him when

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2. From 1st October 1945, as Gwynne was due to retire, the Sudan was constituted as a separate diocese with the Rt. Rev. A.M. Galsthorpe as its first Bishop. Trimingham, The Missionary Approach, p. 19.
3. Letter from Gwynne to the Emperor of Ethiopia Heille Selassie, dated 10th Jan. 1947, Box 419, DRA.
he retired a special contribution towards his pension from the Sudan Government and a letter of thanks from Mr. Bevin the British Foreign Secretary at the time, to whom Gwynne replied:

"Dear Mr. Bevin,

It is extremely kind of you on Christmas Eve in spite of your crowded life to give time to write such an encouraging letter to me after 47 years service as missionary and a missionary Bishop in Egypt and the Sudan.

It did seem strange after 47 years out there to come home. I loved the Sudanese and Egyptians and know their language, and am sorry to leave them.

The dangers ahead of these two countries, as I see them, are: A too abrupt break with the past achievements accomplished from the days of Cromer in Egypt and General Gordon in the Sudan with the close collaboration of the best of the natives themselves. I have traced the Hand of God from the early days raising up and using these two great Englishmen and later many others, administrators, missionaries, soldiers, inspired by them to bring great benefits on those they govern, and;

The other danger is the sacrificing of the future welfare and development of millions of peoples for immediate political expediency.

We have made many mistakes by altering our policy from time to time, the reason for this being outside opinion from sources which have no knowledge of the needs of the people of these countries, and by listening to a vociferous minority led on by ambitious leaders for their own selfish aims.

I do believe God has a plan for Africa and we have been entrusted by Him to develop His children by lifting them to work for that great Continent, with nothing to thwart His plan ultimately but we can hold up that plan indefinitely if we mishandle the situation at the present time.

I have always kept clear of the native politicians feeling it would hinder any spiritual vision but after all these years of service I am well aware of the weaknesses of this undeveloped stage.

Although I am 83 I have been braced up by this climate and, thank God, I am still at work. Any knowledge I possess (which is of any value) after these many years of experience in Egypt and the Sudan, I gladly place at the service of the Foreign Office."

It seems that the Foreign Secretary did not respond as Gwynne was ageing and the political situation in the Sudan had been taking a different turn for which the knowledge and ideas of Gwynne could hardly be very useful, particularly as the native

1. Typed copy of letter from Gwynne, to Right Hon. E. Bevin, Foreign Secretary, dated 6th January 1947. Box 419 DRA.
2. Letter from Gwynne to Morris dated 24th Jan. 1947, Box 419 DRA.
politicians from whom Gwynne, as he admitted, had always kept away were now coming to the centre of the scene. A few weeks later Gwynne was very disturbed when he heard that the Governor General had stated that the Sudan might be independent in twenty years time. He wrote to Bishop Gelsthorpe that it was hasty as it had taken generations of British to develop a genius for administration and that in "a Moslem country with a religion that is a brake and not an urge," seventy-five years of Colonial rule were not enough so he intended to pray with all his powers "that it may not be so." However Sudan became independent in less than ten years and it is in the field of education, and particularly the education of women that greater progress could be claimed under National Rule.

Northern Sudanese parents accepted the Missionary Schools as a second choice for their sons and daughters if they failed to gain entrance to the Government Schools. Eruptions of resentment took place from time to time and in different forms against what was taught or alleged to be taught to Moslem children at some of the missionary schools, particularly in regard to the teaching of Christian doctrines or attendance at prayers. In 1927 the Omdurman Ahlia School, the first Boys' Intermediate Ahlia School to be opened in the country, was set up as a reaction against the Omdurman American Mission School, which was ordered by

1. Letter from Gwynne to the Right Rev. A. Morris Gelsthorpe, dated 5th March, 1947, Box 419 DRA.
the Government Department of Education in that same year to make public its conditions that Moslem pupils who joined it would have to attend classes in Christian religion as well as prayers. Circulars to that effect were handed to the schoolboys to give to their fathers and guardians and soon copies were stuck to the doors of shopping places, offices and mosques. A wave of resentment spread amongst the Moslems and the notables, and the educated Sudanese began to think of the foundation of publicly supported Ahlia schools for the Moslem children whose parents would not accept the conditions of the mission schools.

The movement for the first Ahlia school was headed by the Mufti of the time, Sheikh Isma'il al-Azhari, the grandfather of the later Azhari, and by Sheikh Ahmad Hasan Abdal Moneim, a wealthy Sudanese, who gave up his own house for the opening of the school. The subscription list was headed by the two religious leaders Sayed Ali al-Mirghani the leader of the Khatmiyya and Sayed Abdal Rahman al Mahdi the leader of the An sar, and it was soon complete with subscribers from all over the country. Soon a complete intermediate school from first to fourth year was started and staffed by educated Sudanese. This was just after the 1924 revolt, when the Government was pursuing an unsympathetic policy towards the education of the Sudanese.

At this time the Government issued "The Education (non-Government Schools) Ordinance 1927\(^2\) the purpose of which was

\(^1\) Badri, Vol. 3, p. 85.
\(^2\) "1927, Ord. No. 7" (15.8.1927), File 918/65 MEA.
described as "to regulate education in other than Government schools". It stipulated that "The Director of Education with the approval of the Governor General may by order in writing exclude any school or class of school from any or all of the provisions of this ordinance or of any regulations made thereunder."¹ This was apparently to allay the fears of the missionary schools, or some of them, and to give a wider scope for manoeuvre on the part of the Government. But at the same time the new ordinance put the Government in full control of the situation as regards the opening of new schools which, according to the new law, could not be opened save with the approval of the Governor General. The same applied to the registration of teachers, inspection of schools, the giving or withholding of religious instruction or even the change of foreign staff. It should be remembered that the staff of the missionary schools at this time were predominantly non-Sudanese.

The Director of Education was empowered by the new law to close down any school if after inspection he found that it was being conducted in a manner which he regarded as contrary to the interests of the pupils or the community. Whether the law was meant to apply to the missionary schools or to the new Ahlia school and its like was not specified.

However the missionary schools continued to receive subventions from the Government, a patronage from which the Ahlia

¹ "Ibid" Section 2(2).
Schools and the Ma‘had ‘ilmis continued to be excluded for a long time. This special treatment for the missionary schools was criticised by the Sudanese in the North and the criticism began to grow as more Ahlia Schools came into being. In 1939 the first memorandum of the Graduates Congress asked for Government Schools in the South and the second memorandum of Congress in 1942 asked for the cancellation of subventions to the missionary schools. This would undoubtedly affect the missionary schools in the North as they belonged to the missionary societies which ran the other schools in the South.

When the Constituent Assembly was formed in 1948 and the first Sudanese Minister of Education under Condominium rule was appointed, one of his first tasks in office was to attempt to assume the powers assigned to the Governor General in regard to the opening of non-Government schools. He raised this point with the Civil Secretary who replied that he had ascertained that in principle the Governor General would not be averse to devolving his personal consent to the Minister in all ordinary applications arising in the Northern Sudan. But the Civil Secretary pointed out that there were two types of cases where he would be averse to the consent being abolished if it meant that the Civil Secretary would not be consulted on (a) the opening of Mission Schools and (b) the opening of non-Government Mohammedan schools in the Southern provinces.¹

¹ Letter SCO/17.A.13 Civil Secretary’s Office, Khartoum dated 27th November, 1949. Sgd. E.W. Thomas, Deputy Civil Secretary, drafted by Sir James Robertson, 9/8/65, MBA.
The Civil Secretary argued that Missionary bodies in the Sudan, whether Christian like the C.M.S., Verona Fathers, American Mission etc. or Moslem like the Ahmadiyya people, had external affiliations and their proposals could not be considered as purely local educational matters. Under Administrative Regulations, the Civil Secretary said he was responsible to the Governor General for general policy regarding Missions, and he did not see how he could properly discharge his responsibility unless he was allowed the opportunity of considering applications for the opening of new Mission Schools, and of making his views known, and if necessary opposing 'consent' on political grounds. The Civil Secretary also wrote that the opening of Moslem non-Government schools in the Southern Sudan must also be referred back to him for some time to come as, he argued, there was still feeling about this among Southern Sudanese and Moslem non-Government schools in pagan areas might raise administrative problems.

He suggested to the Minister that they should take legal advice as to whether the Governor General could devolve his responsibility under Section 8(1) of the Education (Non-Government Schools) Ordinance 1927, or whether the Ordinance should be amended. When they obtained the answer they should work out a formula whereby the Minister would give consent to the opening of all non-Government schools, except those proposed by Missions or other

1. Though the Civil Secretary said in his letter that the Ahmadiyya "wished to start here a year or two ago" yet no school had ever been opened by the Ahmadiyya in the Sudan nor did they have any known activity in the country.
foreign agencies (e.g. the Egyptian Government) and except non-
Government Moslem schools in the Southern provinces. Applications
for these schools, the Civil Secretary thought, should continue
to be submitted through him to the Governor-General. He suggested
to the Minister that they could perhaps talk about this when the
Civil Secretary returned from a tour but meanwhile the existing
system should continue.

After two attempts on the part of the Minister of
Education Sayed Abdel Rahman Ali Taha,¹ the Civil Secretary suggested
a meeting on the 14th February.² They agreed that the Civil
Secretary should consult the Advocate General on the point whether
the Governor General could delegate his powers concerning the
missionary schools to the Minister, but in the meantime the Minister
should proceed with the preparation of his proposed amendment to
the 1927 (non-Government Schools) Ordinance. A week later the
Civil Secretary wrote to the Minister that in the opinion of the
Advocate General - who was British at the time - the Governor
General could not delegate his powers concerning the missionary
schools to the Minister. So the Civil Secretary advised the
Minister to include this point in the production of the amended
ordinance.³

2. Letters dated 30th January, 1950; and 7th February, 1950,
   File 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Letter from Civil Secretary's Office (Sgd. Hawesworth for Civil
   Secretary) to Sayed Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, Minister of Education,
   dated 21st February, 1950. 9/8/65, MEA.
When the draft amendment was completed the Minister sent it to the Civil Secretary for his comments and told him that a certain section was designed to safeguard the Civil Secretary's interests where Mission schools were concerned but another section was designed to bring village schools in the Southern provinces within the scope of the regulations.¹

In the draft, which was an amplification of the 1927 Ordinance, the authority of the Minister replaced that of the Governor General in all matters regarding the opening or closing of schools or approval of the appointment of staff. The draft however contained a clear restatement of the conscience clause, which was present in the regulations that had been issued at the beginning of the Century under Wingate, Currie and Cromer,² and was restated in 1927 when the Ordinance was first made. But in the words of a later Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in Northern Sudan, "As Government officials came more in contact with missionaries and realized that the methods they use in Muslim lands are no danger to public security, their attitude changed and restrictions were relaxed".

Missionary work in the Northern Sudan had been mainly based on the Protestant Churches, the C.M.S. and the American Mission which had from the beginning worked closely together and avoided duplicating their activities in the educational as well as other fields. Thus in Omdurman medical work had been left to

¹ Letter dated 8th April, 1950. 9/8/65, MEA.
the C.M.S. and boys' education to the American Mission. The C.M.S.
educational work for girls had three centres, Omdurman, Atbara
(1908) and Wad Medani (1912). The total number of girls in the
various schools in 1911 was 1,205. The educational work of the
American United Presbyterian Mission consisted in 1911 of a Boys'
School in Omdurman, giving elementary and intermediate education,
a girls' school in Khartoum North giving intermediate and
secondary education, and a village agricultural technical school
at Jeraif, on The Blue Nile five miles from Khartoum.¹ The Roman
Catholic Mission in the North Sudan, which had recommenced in 1900,
worked mainly amongst Christians in towns where there was a
Catholic minority. Unlike the Protestant Missions they
considered evangelization amongst the Muslims as unattractive
and subsidiary to other work.² This may explain the exemption
of Moslem children at Roman Catholic schools from attendance at
classes in Christian Religion and prayer which had been noticed
by Cromer early in the century when the first crisis took place.
In the end the Roman Catholic schools in the Northern Sudan came
to be more numerous than those of any other Christian missionary
society.³

The Civil Secretary's reply to the amendments presented
by the Minister of Education was that the Governor General had

¹ Ibid., pp. 19-23.
² Trimingham, Christian Approach to Islam in The Sudan, p. 23.
³ S.G. Ministry of Education, Education Statistics 1960-1961,
Khartoum, 1961, pp. 53-61.
agreed that his personal consent to the opening of new non-Government schools could be devolved upon the Minister and that the amendments proposed in the Ordinance appeared to cover that satisfactorily. But the Civil Secretary had important reservations to make. Regarding Mission Schools, the Civil Secretary said that he had two responsibilities, one to see that nothing was done which might prejudice public security and the other to see that nothing was done which might bring Sudan Government policy under external criticism. He thought it was necessary for him if he was to exercise this responsibility to have some say in "(i) whether Christian schools should or should not be established in the Northern Sudan, (ii) decisions regarding reasonable expansion of Christian Mission Schools in the South, and (iii) in deciding the advisability or otherwise of the opening of Moslem schools in juxtaposition to Christian schools in the South."¹

The Civil Secretary thought that regarding these latter points, the proposed amendment did not entirely meet him, but he was quite confident that under the existing conditions he had nothing to fear in this respect though he realised that in a few years time under a different ministry the position might be changed. Furthermore, he thought there should be provision for resolving a disagreement between the Minister and the Civil Secretary. In practice, he said, such a disagreement could be settled easily at the time by discussion at an informal council

¹ Letter from J.W. Robertson, Civil Secretary to Director of Education CS/SCR/17.A.13 dated 13th April 1950.
9/8/65 MEA.
meeting but he feared this might not always be the case: and he thought that the Governor General should be the arbiter in the event of a deadlock.

By this time the missionary societies had also been anxiously assessing the prospects of their institutions. Trimingham, the then Secretary to the Church Missionary Society, Northern Sudan, wrote "Mission institutions will have an increasing importance in the future. The Government has instituted a twenty-year policy for the Sudanization of its services. It is inevitable that Government services will steadily deteriorate for the Sudanese have not the mental background to maintain western standards, nor the spiritual background to hold positions of trust with the integrity that has been shown by British officials. This Sudanization will mean that Mission institutions will stand out very vividly from those of the Sudan Government and will offer a means of service, and standard of efficiency and moral integrity not offered by theirs.

The challenge of the Southerners has also led to a great change of attitude towards direct Muslim evangelism. The missionaries looked upon their Muslim friends with new eyes. All kinds of indexes showed them that the work of the past had not been unfruitful and had had a deeper influence than they realized. They no longer took it for granted that the Sudanese were too deeply entrenched in Islam ever to be changed. They saw those who had received a western education dissatisfied by Islam as a spiritual basis for life, leaving it for a humanist basis, only to find that
empty too, yet clinging to Islam as the social environment outside which they would even be more at sea. These challenges shocked the missionaries to a realization that the greater the challenge the greater opportunity presented. The work of the past has shown Muslims that the missionary's interest in them is genuine; but if that is so, then the missionary cannot restrain himself from desiring to share with them the fuller riches that are in Jesus Christ."¹

The tragedy of the relationship was that while the Moslems wanted modern education for their children they did not want evangelization from which, they feared, "the missionary cannot restrain himself"² and as it was in missionary schools, more than in missionary hospitals, that the possibilities of evangelization were greater, it was the missionary schools which were viewed with more than guarded suspicion. What kept the schools going was the need for education and a realization on the part of the parents of what the missionaries recognized as "The stubbornness of Islam to Christian influence."³ The old history of contacts, rivalries, and conflicts between Christianity and Islam was underlying these attitudes on all sides, and more recent history saw a closer association between tabshīr (evangelization) and isti'mār (colonization and foreign rule),

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 43-45.
as the modern European Christian movement was historically an aspect of the Western penetration "which forced Islam to a state of defensive consolidation."¹ In this confrontation Islam came to be a national and political force to promote the nationalist ends.

The missionaries were far from being satisfied with the results of their educational work as "absorption in institutional work, has led to Christian social service and education becoming too much an end in itself, and evangelistic work has been almost a by-product. It has become so, on the one hand, because of its conditioning by Government policy and, on the other, because of the frustration and malaise felt by the missionary as a result of the apparent ineffectiveness of the direct approach, assisted by the pragmatist emphasis of Protestant missions. This was the state of deadlock reached at the beginning of the war. The effort to maintain institutions under war conditions forced missionaries to reconsider their place in a country where the Government is going ahead in a policy of social welfare and education. They found that it is not enough to teach and heal, which still leave the Westerner separate from the people. That led to a realization that the whole missionary policy must be re-oriented in the light of the primary aim of Christian missions - the establishment of the visible Church."²

¹. Ibid., p. 45.
In the reappraisal it was found out that the Northern Sudan, unlike the South, was "almost completely untouched by any missionary activity." Mission work was confined to a few of the larger towns, some Christians (Greek, Syrians and Copts) lived in all other towns and were visited from time to time by priests of their respective congregations, but they assumed the aspect of national congregations with no missionary activities.

The post-war policy of the C.M.S. and the American Mission was that where, for instance, in a town one school was the only missionary activity, it was far more important that it should be developed into a full mission station with its varied activities touching all sides of life than to occupy a new country. Thus the C.M.S., not seeing its way to develop its work in Atbara handed over its girls' school to the American Mission in 1947; whilst in Wad Medani, where also it had one girls' school, it proposed to extend its work with fresh activities in collaboration with the diocese so that it could become a really Church-centred work.

On the other hand, it was thought that such limitation did not apply to a newly opened mission or a mission that was

2. Greek schools were opened in the Sudan exclusively for the children of the Greek community. They, together with the schools which were exclusively for foreign communities, Armenians, and Indians, fall outside the scope of this thesis. According to the Educational Statistics of the Year 1961-62 there were 747 Greek pupils at all levels in 7 Greek schools, and 424 pupils in 7 Indian schools, and 58 pupils in one Armenian School.
3. Coptic schools are run along Egyptian lines, and Sudanese pupils are admitted to Coptic schools. The Coptic Church, like the Greek Orthodox had no missionary activities.
sufficiently staffed to integrate its existing work and pioneer in new areas. The American Mission was able to open up new centres in 1948 by sending missionaries to Gedaref and El Obeid, both towns in which no evangelistic work had formerly been attempted. El Obeid was considered especially important because of the need for someone to care for the Nuba Christians who went there to work from the Nuba Mountains. A club had been opened which provided regular classes in basic Arabic and Christian instruction. No Christian work existed in the Province of Darfur, and as there was a number of Christian Syrian traders in al-Fasher, the capital, they had asked one mission at least to start a Christian school, but owing to more pressing commitments, the mission was not able to respond. It was thought reasonable that work should be undertaken there by a mission which also worked in the neighbouring northern region of French Equatorial Africa. ¹

While reappraisal, reorientation and reorganisation were taking place, political events moved much faster than had been expected and soon the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1952 introduced the Sudan to the transitional period which culminated in the declaration of Independence in January, 1956. About a year after Independence the Government decided to take over the missionary schools in the South² and the Ahlia schools in the North.³ The Government however agreed to leave the missionary

² Above, Ch. II, p.
³ Below, Ch. V, p.
schools in the North to operate as private schools charging economic fees, similar to the Egyptian schools, the Community schools and a few of the Ahlia schools. The Government made one condition in sparing the missionary schools in the North from take-over, and that was to allow Moslem children in the missionary schools to receive instruction in the Islamic religion. The Ministry of Education agreed to provide the teachers for this purpose, and when the missionary schools objected to the teaching of Islamic religion in the premises of their schools the Ministry met their objection by proposing to give the instruction classes in Islamic religion in neighbouring premises, most of them schools, which were not owned by the missionary schools or missionary societies. This was agreed upon. Classes in Christian religion continued to be taught to Christian children in the schools.

The decision to teach Islamic religion to Moslem children in the missionary schools in the North resolved the problem of antipathy to Christian missionary educational efforts in the Northern Sudan and the missionary schools came to be viewed as similar to the other private schools which provided a second chance for some of the children who were not able to get into the Government schools, particularly at the Intermediate and the Secondary levels. They also came to be viewed as providing Sudanese boys and girls with chances of studying in international communities, as some of these schools, particularly the Roman

1. Personal Communication from Sayed Ziada Arbab, former Minister of Education.
Catholic schools, contained a substantial proportion of pupils other than Sudanese who were of different nationalities and religions such as Hindus, Jews and Christians. Where there was a sufficient number of English speaking pupils a special class was usually formed for them.  

By the academic year 1961-1962 there were nine Catholic missionary schools, nine American Mission schools and nine other missionary schools, including one C.M.S., out of a total of 183 schools classified as private schools. Four of the missionary schools as well as twelve of the ninety-nine Sudanese schools were in receipt of Government grant-in-aid. The Christian missionary schools were from the beginning organised along Sudanese lines and followed the Sudanese syllabus so when the Government decided in 1965 that Arabic was to be used as a medium of instruction in the secondary schools, missionary secondary schools, few as they were, had no greater difficulty in conforming than had the Sudanese schools. Thus, after resolving the problem of religious instruction, Christian missionary schools had virtually become much more akin to Sudanese Ahlia schools.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:
FROM THE RECONQUEST TO THE DE LA WARR COMMISSION

On the 29th November 1898, less than three months after the reconquest of the Sudan, Lord Kitchener was in Edinburgh receiving an honorary doctorate in Law from Edinburgh University in the morning and the Freedom of the City in a yet greater gathering in the afternoon of that ceremonial day. 1 It was Lord Rosebery who said to the audience that the Sirdar (Kitchener) had no sooner gained his historic victory than he turned over in his mind the thought that, if the British were to prevail against other contending European powers who would be too happy to take their place 2 or if they were not once more to be overcome by a dark cloud of "barbarism", then a beginning should be made in the way of a centre of education, simple at first, technical in the main, but also giving those people what they wanted, namely, to take some part in their own administration. 3 Lord Rosebery urged his audience "what a disgrace, what a reflection it will be on our enthusiasm for Lord Kitchener, from the palace to the peasant, if this great and wealthy nation, grateful for the undoing of the past, and glorying in what he has done at the present does not give her obol and more than her obol to her more than Belisarius." 4 When Kitchener's

1. The Scotsman and The Times of 30.11.1898.
2. Allusion to the Fashoda Incident, the claims of France, the Marchand mission and the French application, immediately after the Reconquest, to open a French School in Khartoum which was turned down.
3. The Scotsman 30.11.1898.
4. Referring to the Latin proverb, "Date obolum Belisario"
turn came to reply to the toast he seized the opportunity to
launch his appeal and explained his project. He reminded his
audience that as a result of his campaign in the Sudan the British
and the Egyptian flags were flying at Khartoum, never, he hoped,
to be taken down. In consequence of that he asked his audience
to go a step further to see what remained to be done in the Sudan.
Kitchener stated that the first task was to civilise the
inhabitants of those vast districts in the Valley of the Nile. He
hoped to introduce and facilitate trade which he considered in some
of its aspects as a very large civilising element. Other things
they had to introduce or establish were, government administration,
the giving of justice to the people, and the organisation of a
police force since public security on the frontiers and internally
would have to be safeguarded.

Kitchener also said that they would have to teach the
inhabitants that they should develop their industrial habits in
order to help to pay for the administration. The inhabitants
would also have to attend to sanitary regulations and they would
also be taught that they were not allowed to rob or commit acts of
violence amongst each other. Should they follow guidance on these
matters they could rest assured that the Government would leave
them alone in undisturbed possession of their properties and their
ancient rights. Kitchener told his audience that it was there
that he wished the English race to step in, and give what the
Government could not afford to provide - namely, education to the
children of those poor people whom he described as an intelligent
race, entirely uneducated. He told them that "The Mahdi, like every other Oriental despot, put his face firmly against any form of instruction that might enlighten his people." But Kitchener assured his audience that the people would take advantage if the means were placed at their disposal and highly appreciate the education if it were given to their children.

He reminded them that he did not mean to be understood to advocate that education should always be free in the Sudan. He thought that as the country prospered, as he felt it would prosper, the people would be able to pay for the education of their children. What Kitchener proposed was that, by the formation of a Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum, conducted on English lines by English masters, they should give to those people the education round which future development might grow. By this, the audience were told, they would in some way be able to pay a debt that they owed. Kitchener added that much might be said of how Gordon would have rejoiced had he known that by his death the blessing of education would be given to the people that he loved, and amongst whom he died. Much might be said of what this gift would do to abolish fanaticism and slavery, but he stressed that, as he was speaking to a hard-headed Scottish audience, he thought he could only say that if they had been left a fertile property that had been for thirteen years uncultivated, they would have to spend something on tilling the ground before they could reap the harvest.

To those who spent large sums in advertising their goods, Kitchener remarked, surely it should occur that it would be a
benefit to them if they spent something on teaching the inhabitants of that new market which had been opened to read their advertisements. He also asked them to remember that if they did not educate those people somebody else would, and would implant upon their minds other thoughts and other influences, which might lead to the greatest difficulties that they might have to overcome in that country.

To form a college such as he proposed, Kitchener considered that £100,000 would be necessary. He did not think it could be well done for less, and if it were not well done he should not care to have a hand in its formation. Out of that sum he proposed that £90,000 should be invested in order to provide permanently for the salaries of those English masters that it would be necessary to maintain. Kitchener said if the college were not started on some such firm foundation as that, he felt sure it could not successfully do the work that was before it and also he did not think that the college should come year by year to ask for aid at their hands.

At the beginning the college, Kitchener thought, would have to be a school for almost elementary education, but as the country progressed the college would develop towards a higher form of instruction, and would enable the pupils to take positions as clerks in the Government departments and posts in the telegraphs, as tax-collectors, and many other positions in their own country. He hoped that the college would develop technical schools of agriculture and irrigation and engineering, and perhaps, last of
all, of medicine, and would thus form a worthy memorial of Gordon and a centre of English education in the heart of Africa. Regarding the prosperity of the country, he felt sure that his audience would like to know of the very successful results that were obtained lately in the Dongola Province. That province was rated, the previous year, at half its taxes, but without the least complaint coming to his ears, they had paid in money into the treasury the entire cost of the administration of the Province.

Kitchener told his audience that it was with the greatest doubt and hesitation that he came to the determination to make his appeal for so large a sum as £100,000. But what made up his mind in the first instance was the great interest and the considerable pecuniary support he received from Lord Rosebery, as well as from Her Majesty's Government and Lord Cromer. He told his audience that he went down to the City to seek advice and help. Some said it would be easy to get the money; others looking at the largeness of the sum, thought it might be difficult; but they all agreed that the money would not be forthcoming unless he asked for it. Kitchener concluded his appeal by saying, "Now I do ask for it. I ask the people of this United Kingdom, I ask the people in our colonies, I ask the people in that great English-speaking sister nation of America to help me to form a worthy Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum."¹

Turning to his Scottish audience Kitchener said, "To you Scotsmen I can appeal with confidence. There is no one that has

¹ The Scotsman, 30.11.1898.
done so much for the civilisation of Africa as Scotsmen, and if you help in this great work you will be only following in the footsteps of those who have gone before. Remember Livingstone! Remember Moffat! Remember Gordon!" This was received with loud cheers from the audience. When the Lord Provost of Edinburgh gave the final speech of the banquet he said he could not sit down without referring in a single word to what was said by Lord Kitchener with regard to the proposal to found a college at Khartoum. The Lord Provost said if Great Britain was to follow up what she had done in restoring good Government in Egypt and in the Sudan, it was absolutely necessary that she should educate the people. He said that he knew from his friend the Lord Provost of Glasgow, who was sitting at the end of one of the tables, that there had already been written two letters, addressed to Lord Kitchener, which would be appearing in the papers of the following day. He finally assured Kitchener that the country would rise to the occasion and would with readiness provide the funds to found the Gordon College in Khartoum.

The response was immediate so that by the second week in January or in less than two months, the sum of one hundred thousand pounds which had been asked for was subscribed. This sum with the addition of various legacies and accumulations of interests, eventually reached the amount of over £135,000.¹

Queen Victoria expressed her interest and approval and consented

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to become the Patron of the College, a position which her successors continued to hold. Lord Salisbury, on behalf of the Government, expressed approval of the scheme and recommended the policy of which it formed a part. A General Council was formed and at its first meeting at the Bank of England, on January 18, 1899, an "Executive Committee" was elected with full power to give effect to Kitchener's proposals with such modifications as might be deemed necessary.

The plans of a suitable building were at once drawn up and after considerable discussion it was finally agreed that an expenditure of £23,000 on the building and £7,000 for laying out the grounds, providing school furniture, fittings, and educational equipment, should be incurred, the remainder to be formed into an "Endowment Fund". Soon after his return to Khartoum early in 1899, Kitchener was anxious to make the start. The interest on the endowment fund was utilized to support four different schools which had already been organized and were destined to form the nucleus of the coming college at Khartoum when the building was sufficiently advanced to admit of it.

But the outbreak of the Boer War, coinciding as it did with the final defeat and death of the Khalifa on November 24, 1899, caused the transference of Kitchener to South Africa as Chief of Staff there. On December 22, 1899, Kitchener left for South Africa leaving Sir Reginald Wingate in his place at Khartoum. Mr. (later Sir Edgar) Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary of the Sudan assumed the responsibility of starting the educational system
in the Sudan early in 1900, and later in the same year

Mr. (later Sir James) Currie was transferred to the Sudan through the recommendation of Lord Cramer and Dr. Douglas Dunlop, the Advisor of Education to the Egyptian Government. Currie was appointed as Director of Education and Principal of the Gordon College. Both jobs he continued to hold for the following fourteen years.

Currie, like Dunlop, was a Scotsman, with a background of a Scottish education and training. His father was the principal of the Church of Scotland Training College in Edinburgh, and he sent his boy, who was born on May 31, 1868, to Fettes College, where he was an open scholar and where he played in the first Rugby XV and the first Cricket XI. Gaining an exhibition to Edinburgh University, he was elected a scholar of Lincoln College, Oxford, in 1888. On leaving Oxford he took the somewhat unusual course at that time of teaching in one of the Scottish Education Board’s schools in his native city. He gained his experience by working in Scottish State-aided schools, and in helping, as an officer of a local authority, to lay the foundations of the expansion of Scottish secondary education when the task was largely undertaken by the Scottish Education Department in 1895. He continued in that field until Dunlop, who was in search of young educationalists for his staff, selected him in 1899 to join the Egyptian service as an officer in the Egyptian Ministry of Public Instruction.

As a result of Lord Cromer's Indian experience, he was particularly impressed with the failure of English educational effort in India, which he was fond of ascribing to the unrestricted dominance of the Indian Civil Service over other departments. In conversation with Currie he likened that service to the Upas tree under which nothing could live. ¹ Both Cromer and Wingate were of the opinion that the British masters of the educational staff should take a share in the normal administration of the country. Currie related that he was afforded every possible opportunity of familiarising himself with it, including short periods as Governor of one of the smaller Sudan Provinces. From the beginning an elaborate scheme was set on foot by which it was made possible for members of the educational service to do a tour/service on the administrative side to acquire first-hand knowledge of the machinery of government. Also their payments and promotions for the first years of service were identical with that of the administrative service.

For Currie, after an interlude of eighteen months for observation, and considerable travel all round the country, the immediate aims of the government educational policy were visualised. The objects of that policy were defined as:-

1. The creation of a competent artisan class which was entirely lacking at the time.

¹. Ibid., p. 364.
(2) The diffusion among the masses of the people of education sufficient to enable them to understand the machinery of government, particularly with reference to the equitable and impartial administration of justice.

(3) The creation of a small administrative class, capable of filling many government posts, some of an administrative, others of a technical nature.

While the first and the third were feasible and necessary objectives for the new colonial government the third was financially difficult as it would require an amount of money and a number of teachers and schools beyond the resources of the government and so had to be regarded as a long term objective if it was to be sought at all within the formal framework of the educational system.

To give effect to this programme, in so far as the very meagre funds at his disposal admitted, Currie recommended:

(1) The institution of a small industrial school at the most suitable point that could be founded in Khartoum or Omdurman.

(2) The establishment of "Kuttabs" or elementary vernacular schools in the capital towns of the various provinces.

(3) The creation of two good primary schools in Omdurman and Khartoum.

With regard to the industrial school, with the collaboration of Commander Bond, R.N., the Director of Water Transport, a small industrial school was initiated at the Dockyard in Omdurman. Some

sixty apprentices were divided into two shifts of thirty each, who alternately received a day's schooling in reading, writing, arithmetic, and drawing, and a day's practical work at their separate trades. This experiment was later on transferred to the South when an industrial school was opened in Wau under the supervision of Catholic priests.¹

Qur'ān Khalwas formed an integral part of the already existing religious education and were scattered in hundreds throughout the country. The government was apprehensive of what it saw as the "fanatical spirit which was such a serious menace to peace and order."² So elementary vernacular education was considered by the government as the best weapon for the purpose of exorcising the 'fanatical spirit'³ which had led through the influence of the Fekis⁴ to the rise of Mahdiism and it would also, at the same time, assist towards local recruitment for the government service, while through the diffusion of technical and agricultural knowledge, vernacular education would have an important effect upon economic development.

With these objects in view the government educational scheme was so drawn according to the later account by Currie as to give the first place in importance to elementary vernacular schools,

¹. Above Ch.II, p.35.
³. S.G. Memorandum to Mudirs, dated 1899 W.P. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
⁴. Feki, is the Islamic religious teacher in the Sudan; generally one who teaches in the Khalwa.
and the second to the technical and vocational instruction supplied by the Upper School of the Gordon College. In addition there were to be instituted primary schools to serve as feeders to the Upper School of the Gordon College and to provide recruits for junior posts in government service. The vernacular elementary schools were so arranged as to be the means of spreading sufficient general knowledge among an agricultural population. Any idea that the education given in them was in any way a qualification for government service was to be deliberately and actively discouraged. If parents desired their children to enter government service, they had to realise that the educational avenue into such service was neither cheap nor easy and that special aptitude and special funds were essential.

It was essential, therefore, to establish, without delay, a few elementary vernacular schools in certain localities in the provinces in charge of trained teachers, maintained at as high a standard as possible, in order to serve as models for imitation and to serve as the base for the new educational pyramid. The creation, however, of these elementary vernacular schools presented a very immediate difficulty, for teachers were non-existent. They might, perhaps, have been obtained from Egypt but this was discarded as both expensive and politically unwise. It was therefore decided to create a small training college in connection with the primary school at Omdurman.

The aims of the training college were simple instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, and very elementary teaching, to
be given to a few Sudanese Sheikhs, who were then to be drafted off to the provincial vernacular schools. It was also decided that a few of those Sheikhs should be handed over to the Legal Secretary, who would eventually find work for them in connection with the newly-formed Native Courts. In imitation of King's Scholars in England each Sheikh received an allowance of one pound ten shillings a month, and they were all carefully selected from good Arab families of the country.¹

With regard to the third point - the creation of one or two good primary schools - this was perhaps the most immediately urgent need. Government required as soon as possible educated young Sudanese for the army, for many branches of the civil service, post, railways, telegraphs, and provincial services. Hitherto, these minor appointments had of necessity to be filled from Egyptian and Syrian sources, and the latter class in their turn required educational facilities for their children. As a beginning, a primary school, under competent Egyptian teachers, was established at Omdurman, and later a second at Khartoum. The curriculum followed was that of an Egyptian primary school simplified to meet Sudanese requirements under the oversight of a capable Egyptian inspector, Ahmed Effendi Hedayat, who had finished his professional training as a schoolmaster with three years attendance at the Brough Road Training College at Isleworth. The pupils of these schools were for the most part sons of former Dervish Emirs and

important tribal Sheikhs - in the proportion of about seven Sudanese to two Egyptians.

Thus were laid the foundations of a system of education strictly limited to only the most urgent requirements of the new administration. Besides the financial stringency, the limitation on the system was due to a definite line of government policy which determined the number of places in the schools by the number of jobs available in the government service without allowing the former ever to exceed the latter.¹ This principle was firmly adhered to and for the government this necessitated extreme slowness and caution which they considered essential as they were apprehensive that if educational progress outstripped economic development the result upon the contentment of the country would be disastrous. So a complete understanding prevailed between the educational and administrative authorities as to the number of civil servants, from engineers to judges in the Mohammedan courts, that were likely to be required, and numbers were adjusted accordingly.² Such was the system that prevailed up to 1918.

The attitude of the inhabitants to these schools was such that the government soon found it difficult to keep pace with the number of applicants to both "Kuttab" and school. This might be due to the assurances given by the government to the Moslems that the religion of the children would not be interfered with and no

proselytization to Christianity would take place in government schools. It was also probably due to their awareness of lucrative future careers for their sons and to the fact that there were fewer places provided. At the end of the year 1901 the Director of Education reported that the educational institutions supported by the College consisted of:-

(1) An industrial school near Omdurman with 60 pupils.
(2) A Higher Primary School at Omdurman with 162 pupils.
(3) A Higher Primary School at Khartoum with 72 pupils.
(4) A small Training College at Omdurman with 6 students.

Meanwhile, the building of the College was making progress, but it was not yet possible to house these institutions until sufficient accommodation was available; room, however, was found for a general Sudan reference library, a small economic museum to assist in the commercial development of the country, and a small laboratory.

With regard to the laboratories, their creation and inception were to Mr. Henry S. Wellcome, head of the firm of Burroughs Wellcome and Co., manufacturing chemists, and founder of the Wellcome Bureau of Scientific Research, London, who was one of the earliest visitors to Sudan after its reconquest. As a contribution to the call for setting up the Gordon Memorial College, Mr. Wellcome offered a fully equipped up-to-date Tropical Research Laboratory with complete bacteriological and chemical sections. The offer was accepted by the Governing Body of the College on condition that the Sudan Government contributed to its upkeep, and
a bacteriologist Dr. (later Sir) Andrew Balfour was chosen as director. Thus a beginning was made on bacteriological and medical research in the Sudan that helped in examining the problems of tropical vegetation, germ life and disease. In a remarkably short time, Dr. Balfour, as Director of Laboratories and Medical Officer of Health, eliminated the dread of malaria from Khartoum, the capital and the seat of government and rendered it, according to Wingate,\(^1\) "the healthiest city in Africa". The elimination of malaria from the rest of the country and the rest of the population, had to wait for a long time - indeed, it is not yet achieved. The functions of the Wellcome Research Laboratory, which was housed in the Gordon College, could be briefly summarised as follows:

\(^{(a)}\) The study of tropical hygiene and tropical diseases both of man and beast, especially the communicable diseases peculiar to the Sudan, and to co-operate and to render assistance to military and civil medical officers, officers of health, and the clinics of the civil and military hospital.

\(^{(b)}\) The study of plant diseases, both those due to fungi and other vegetable parasites and those caused by insects, the study of harmful and beneficial insects, and especially of insects in their relation to tropical medicine.

\(^{(c)}\) To carry out investigations in connection with cases of poisoning, and to develop methods for the detection of toxic agents which may be employed by the natives.

\(^1\) Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 17.
(d) To carry out chemical and bacteriological tests in connection with water, foodstuffs, and other sanitary questions.

(e) To make analysis of soils, minerals, ores, fuels, etc.

(f) Finally, to carry out investigations in connection with agricultural and forest products of operations, and, generally speaking, of any material which may be of practical interest in the economic development of the Sudan.¹

Another gift to the College followed close on the heels of that of Mr. Wellcome. That was a Department of Manual Training and Technical Instruction, together with complete apparatus for the establishment of practical workshops in the College. This was offered to the College by Sir William Mather who was an eminent engineer and exponent of technical education. He visited the Sudan in 1902 and later on in 1909 in connection with the cultivation of cotton in the Gezira. His conception of the educational value of his gift was admirably summarised in the letter to Lord Cromer which accompanied his present.² More important than his valuable gift were the admirable educational ideas he expounded in his letter. They compare favourably with what has been recently recommended in England by the Newsom Report,³ and in Scotland by the Brunton Report.⁴ Unfortunately, and to the

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¹ "Ibid."
detriment of technical education in the Sudan, the Gordon College later on lost sight of the advanced educational principles which had been recommended by Sir William Mather at the turn of the century.

Sir William said that he desired to avail himself of the opportunity presented by the formal opening of the Gordon College at Khartoum by Lord Kitchener, which, he was informed, would take place on the 8th November, to ask for the acceptance on behalf of the trustees, of the equipment for a department of manual training and technical instruction, together with complete apparatus for the establishment of practical workshops in the College. All of this had already been despatched and was en route for Khartoum. A catalogue, detailing what the equipment consisted of, including steam boiler, steam engines, electric dynamos and motors, pumps and accessories for raising water from the Nile for the use of the College, machines and hand tools for wood and metal work, and sundry appliances for experimental illustration, together with plans showing the disposition and arrangement of these in the buildings and workshops, had already been furnished to Mr. Currie, the Principal of the College.

In view of the opening ceremony, Sir William said, it might be opportune for him to state the educational purposes which he hoped under proper direction would be achieved through his gift. The object and purpose of establishing the department of manual and technical training was to assist the education of the Sudanese boys and youths by combining work of the hand with the
mental instruction given in the classroom. He amplified the educational ideas underlying his gift by saying:

"It is now a generally-accepted principle of education that young people learn more readily, and retain what they learn more thoroughly, when constructive occupations, which employ their hands and eyes and reflective faculties are associated with their school life and teaching.

"In dealing with real things and actual processes, and in using tools, machines and materials responsive to their will and applied to purposes which they can see and appreciate, they unconsciously acquire habits of observation, carefulness, precision and logical thought and a sense of reality, proportion, form, and strength. Thus, mental and physical activities are combined in education, the result of which is the development of creative faculties. An appeal is made to the senses, and through the senses the brain is reached more easily and best furnished and made active. This is practical education.

"Nature and nature-study ought to form the most impressive means of education with a people so keenly sensitive to external phenomena as the Egyptians and the Sudanese. The laws of nature, embodied in and illustrated by concrete things produced, under suitable instruction, by the boys themselves in the workshops of the College, will become familiar to them. Work done by and through the natural sciences, even in their elementary stages, will prepare the young people of the Sudan to adapt and use the laws of nature in whatever occupation they may follow in after life."
"The effect of manual training as an educational force, bringing into co-operation the hands, the eyes, and the mental faculties, first in drawing objects by freehand or to scale, then in forming those objects in material - whether of wood or metal - by the hand, using suitable tools and appliances, is to cause the mind unconsciously to reason at every step as the hands and eyes are working. Thus the manual operation interests the senses and brightens the intellect at the same time, while it also trains the hand to dexterity. The result is educational in the best sense of the word, for the faculties of observation and reasoning are quickened, and produce an intelligence applicable to every study and occupation. Moreover, the dullness of school life is avoided by this method of instruction, which is full of interest and pleasure for young people, and its results are consequently more thorough and enduring. By it the mind is not filled, but fed, and therefore, grows and develops into healthy activity and strength.

"For those boys who have benefited by the process of manual training I have described, and who are able to prolong their studies beyond the school age, the equipment will supply a course of technical instruction which will educationally prepare them to become apt skilful men suitable for various mechanical and agricultural pursuits, and irrigation works, etc., and thus enable them to contribute to the development of the material resources of the country in which my visit last winter led me to take so great an interest ..."
The inauguration of the College actually took place on November 8, 1902, when Lord Kitchener, back from the South African campaign and on his way to assume his new appointment as Commander-in-Chief in India, passed through Khartoum and presided at the formal opening of the building. He spoke at some length on the subject of the need of education in the Sudan, expressed himself fully satisfied with the foundations that had been laid, remarking that he "could not expect quicker progress - but was content to wait patiently for the future." Ten years later he was to become once again closely and officially connected with the institution when he became British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt where he remained till the outbreak of the First World War, when he was succeeded again by Wingate who was his successor as Governor General of the Sudan.

Sir Reginald Wingate described his policy in the administration of the Sudan by saying that it had been his persistent endeavour to make every official feel that his own individual share in the work of administration was known to him and that the credit should be due to that official. This was the spirit, he said, which he strove to instil into the minds of those who were collaborating with him in his government of the country. Not only would he commend that method to his successors, but would urge them - as the educational system developed and the natives of the country began to fill positions of responsibility - to treat the latter also with that confidence and goodwill which would engender in their minds a feeling of trust and dependence on their
British leaders. But to achieve this, he suggested, a system of moral instruction should be developed whereby the student was to be brought to realise that truthfulness, courage, fair play, respect for authority, honesty, self-control, industry, good manners, the duties and privileges of citizenship, were essential to successful administration, and should therefore be cultivated assiduously.

Wingate stressed that their efforts in that direction would only succeed if they insisted on the vital importance of such character-training, thus engendering the English Public School code of honour amongst the youth of the country. This, he suggested, could best be achieved by example and personal contact between the students and the very best type of men the British race could produce, for upon the influence exerted by those carefully selected instructors would depend the co-operation and loyalty, or the estrangement, of the rising generation of educated Africans, on whom would devolve in an increasing degree the conduct of municipal affairs, and a responsible share in the work of government. He referred to Sir Frederick Lugard,1 in his work, "The Dual Mandate2 in British Tropical Africa" who dealt at length with this vitally important subject and commended its careful study to his successors in the Sudan and to all those interested in the education

1. Sir Frederick Lugard retired as Governor General of Nigeria in 1919 and published his book the "Dual Mandate" in 1922. See "Introduction to the Fifth Edition" of the "Dual Mandate by Margery Perham, pp. XXVII-XLIX.
of the African.¹

It was the pursuit of the policy of "Native Administration" allegedly based on Lugard and his Dual Mandate that led to the destruction of the more benevolent principles of character training which Wingate said he had advocated to the British teachers and officials for the educated Sudanese. That relationship, when Wingate wrote The Story of the Gordon College in 1923, was already beginning to be dominated by fear and mistrust.²

Lord Cromer, just before his departure from Egypt in 1907, when a programme of irrigation, railway extension, and agricultural development had definitely been decided on after a study of the economic position, at the instigation of Sir Reginald Wingate sanctioned a special grant of £100,000 for capital expenditure on education, payable out of an impending loan. This was to enable the Sudan government to staff itself in many of its lower and intermediate grades with indigenous civil service. This meant less cost to the government and, since the importation of the Indian element to East Africa had proved a disturbing factor, it was to be avoided in the Sudan,³ especially as an Egyptian civil service in the Sudan would be the equivalent of the Indian counterpart in East Africa. Some of the Egyptians were already beginning to be articulate and critical about the British policy

both in Egypt and in the Sudan.¹

From 1906 until the outbreak of the First World War the economic development projects such as the extension of the railway to El Obeid, the beginning of the Gezira Scheme, and the necessary huge preliminary surveys, all emphasised the need for the creation of a Sudanese professional class without whose aid the cost of these schemes would have been prohibitive. So a system of technical training had by then been started by means of the Mather workshop, and a small engineering school was being created in which overseers of works and land surveyors could be trained.²

Lord Kitchener returned to Egypt in 1911 as Agent and Consul-General in succession to Sir Eldon Gorst, who had succeeded Lord Cromer after his resignation in 1907 and had followed the same policy of his predecessor towards education in the Sudan. In reviewing the educational position thirteen years after the reconquest, Kitchener found that the government elementary schools were gradually superseding the indigenous schools or Khalwas. In most of the towns and the large villages first-class "kuttabs" or elementary schools had been established, and in other parts second-class Kuttabs staffed by teachers from the training college of the Gordon College.³

¹. Above, Chapter III on "Missionary Education in The North", pp.121-125.
As a rule those elementary schools were supported by the funds raised by the local education rate, which was levied at varying amounts throughout the country on land, crops, or date trees as was arranged between the governors of the provinces and the central government. Admission was for four years from the age of seven to twelve years and incidentally this system has continued to the present day without alteration. Though the government insisted that elementary schools were not intended to be avenues of entrance to the government services, but rather a means of spreading enlightenment amongst the agricultural and trading classes, parents were under no illusion that they wanted their children to go to them as avenues to government service however narrow the chances were. At this period there were twenty-eight first-class and twenty-one second class elementary schools which had about four thousand boys.

Primary schools which were intended mainly for the education of the sons of government employees and of the better-off classes of the country, were by this time established at Khartoum, Omdurman, Atbara, El Obeid, Suakin, Wadi Halfa and Wad Medani. A boarding-house had been initiated at the College, in which a number of pupils were housed at a fee of fifteen pounds per annum, day boys paying six pounds per annum. The subjects of instruction were Arabic, English, geography, geometry, drawing, elementary land measuring, Islamic religion, drill and gymnastics, and, in addition,

1. "Ibid.", p. 25, Primary schools later on came to be more known as Intermediate schools for four years duration after the fourth year of the elementary school.
manual instruction was taught in the College and Wad Medani primary schools.

The Upper School of the College was recruited mainly from boys who had satisfactorily completed their four years primary course. The training in the college had been subdivided into two sections:

(1) A four years' course for engineers, overseers and surveyors with a view to their employment in the departments of Public Works, Irrigation, Surveys, and Railways. These students were taught civil engineering and surveying, elementary mechanical engineering, English, penmanship, Arabic, translation, and mathematics.

(2) A four years' course for those destined to be teachers in primary schools, translators, etc.

This was essentially the literary section, and the subjects taught were Arabic, English, translation, elementary science, and general knowledge, arithmetic, geometry, algebra, trigonometry, geography, history, penmanship, drawing, manual instruction, and the theory and practice of teaching. Since this early time the form-master and monitor systems had been introduced in the College.

A military school, affiliated to the Gordon College, for the training of Sudanese cadets - prospective officers in the black battalions - had been established. The boys received their education in the primary school of the College and their military education in the military school.

In the college the training section for Sheikhs was still in existence. Candidates for this were expected to be of out-
standing families and those selected were required to pass through a primary school in order to qualify for posts in the Department of Justice (Islamic Shari‘a Courts). A preparatory junior Sheikhs' section had been founded, the age of admission to which was about twelve years. In the senior section bursaries were granted and in the junior section fees were not required. Thus the College was taking over the responsibility for Islamic education.

At this time the nucleus for an Islamic school parallel to the Gordon College had started in 1901 in the houses of the 'Ulama', Moslem learned men, who took permission from the Government to teach Arabic and Islamic studies in their houses and in the mosques of Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North. By 1912 these were joined together and formed the Ma'had 'Ilmi of Omdurman which adopted the system and the syllabus of al-Azhar since that time. Unlike the Graduates of the Gordon College very few of the graduates of this school found chances of Government service, except in the Shari‘a Courts and these were mostly obtained by getting into the Shari‘a qādis section of the Gordon College.¹

In the Gordon College, a training section had been established for the training of teachers for the elementary vernacular schools, but subsequently it was decided this section should disappear as a separate body, and should be confined to the classes of the qādis or religious Judges.² In the instructional workshops


upwards of a hundred and fifty boys were undergoing a five years' course on the lines indicated in Sir William Mather's letter already referred to. They were admitted at the age of fourteen, after having previously attended a Government "Kuttab". Food and lodgings were provided free for those boys who had no relatives in Khartoum with whom they could stay. In addition to the workshops in the College, arrangements were made for some apprentices to undergo instruction at Omdurman in stone-cutting, building, and masonry work, and instruction in pottery under a skilled Egyptian artisan from Kenna. Also several cotton gins had been erected in the workshops and instruction was given in this branch which was closely related to the cotton growing schemes that were planned for the Gezira and the Gash and Baraka deltas.

For training in agriculture a central agricultural experimental station had been established for some years at Khartoum North, and this was later transferred to the Education Department. It consisted of a farm of some one hundred and eighty acres in extent, with a pumping station, and irrigation by a system of raised canals. Here essential instruction was given to students in agricultural methods, field experiments, drainage, etc., and water was offered to neighbouring landowners at little more than cost price, subject to the condition that all their farming operations were conducted in accordance with the instructions of the director. It is interesting to note that the

1. "Kuttab", elementary school.
The present Agricultural Institute of Shambat which is run by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the faculties of Agriculture and Veterinary medicine of the University of Khartoum are on the same site.

The factors under immediate consideration included times of planting, quantities of seed and distance of planting, quantities of water and intervals of irrigation, the effect of organic manures and artificial fertilizers, methods of preliminary and inter-row cultivation, market gardening enquiries, horticultural and experimental forestry, live stock experiments, including a small ostrich farm, and most important of all - experiments in cotton-growing with every variety of seed. A field laboratory under the direction of a British botanist had also been established, which admitted of the chemical examination of soils from various parts of the Sudan to provide guidance in the work of soil improvement and maintenance of fertility, whilst the laboratory determination of the character of the cotton derived in local conditions from different varieties and methods of cultivation, was expected to be of the greatest value in connection with the great cotton-planting scheme in the Gezira which was slowly taking shape.\footnote{Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 27.}

It may not be inappropriate, at this stage, to refer very briefly to the all-important question of cotton planting in the Sudan as it had great influence on the scope of education especially
at this early period. The vast possibilities of the country as a cotton-growing area had commanded continuous attention amongst users of raw cotton for many years, and all steps taken to develop this industry by improvement of railway communications and irrigation methods had invariably received the enthusiastic support of the trade in Britain and especially of the British Cotton-Growing Association. This body had frequently urged that the preliminary steps taken by the Sudan Government in the great Gezira plain should be pressed on and encouraged.

After prolonged examination of the results obtained in the experimental plantations in the Gezira, it was found out that technical irrigation problems were of a comparatively simple kind and that it was an ideal region in which to begin development. The size of the Gezira, were it all put under cultivation, was estimated at about three million acres most of which was suitable for cotton cultivation. To achieve this object, the construction of a dam on the Blue Nile and a canalization system were necessary. Prior to his departure from the Sudan in 1913 Currie took no small share in the plans and negotiations towards securing a loan from the British Treasury to the Sudan for the purpose of the Sennar Dam and the Gezira Scheme. As Currie was at the same time the Principal of the College and the Director of Education he was

1. Ibid., p. 98.
undoubtedly aware of the relationship between economic and educational development, a relationship in which he was an ardent believer for he thought that technical education should be run on production basis and that the number of students in institutes of education should not exceed the number of the careers open before them.

When Currie left the Sudan in 1913 with these economic possibilities envisaged and with the Sudan Government still interested in training a sufficient number of local and less costly employees for the lower and intermediary echelons of the hierarchy there were some plans for development in the Gordon College. Schools of law, agriculture, medicine and veterinary medicine were all planned.1 But with the outbreak of the First World War all development plans, educational and economic, had to stop in the Sudan as in many other parts of the world.

The outbreak of the War brought about the termination of Kitchener's appointment in Egypt as he was called to London to be Secretary of State for War till his death on June 5, 1916. As he was both president and founder of the College an appeal for funds was issued for the erection of a medical school building to be attached to the College. The War had forced this question before the Sudan Government in an unexpected way by shutting off absolutely the supply of doctors from the Syrian schools of medicine and compelling the authorities to take steps to replace them from

local sources. Lord Cromer, who had laid the foundation stone of the College in 1899, and succeeded Kitchener as President died within a few months of his predecessor. Wingate had already been transferred from the Sudan to Egypt to succeed Kitchener in Egypt. In 1919, Sir Reginald Wingate ceased to be High Commissioner in Egypt, and this brought to an end the line of British High Commissioners in Cairo with actual Sudan experience. In Sudan Sir Lee Stack was appointed Governor General in succession to Wingate, an office which Stack held from 1914 till his assassination in Cairo in 1924.

After 1918 a new era opened in the Sudan, and in common with the rest of the world a legacy of trouble had to be faced. It soon became apparent that the old arithmetic of the Gezira Development Scheme had been fatally upset both by world inflation and considerable local mismanagement, and that more money would be needed to complete the large irrigation scheme to which the country had committed itself in 1913. After a considerable period of confusion and doubt, Lord Balfour, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, received a representative deputation of British cotton trade interests on July 5th 1922. Lord Balfour assured the deputation that the temporary difficulties of the Sudan Government which had necessitated a momentary cessation of work on the Blue Nile Dam at Sennar had been surmounted, and that work would be completed.

resumed as soon as the fall in the flood made active operations possible.

All this meant the provision of considerable further funds, which took the shape of additional British Guaranteed Loans, raised at a stiff rate of interest.\(^1\) The British Treasury's interest in the country, therefore, became considerable. The amount of Sudan 5\(\frac{1}{2}\) per cent, Guaranteed Bonds issued at that time was £6,380,000, of which £3,500,000 was issued at 95\(\frac{1}{2}\) and the balance of £2,880,000 at 92. The total interest payable by the Sudan in 1933 amounted to £976,160 on £14,821,000 actually raised (6\(\cdot\)6 per cent). And this did not include a considerable, if dormant, Egyptian claim for money lent, on which no interest had ever been paid, to say nothing of the large contribution which Egypt had made and was still making to Sudan current expenditure. The comparison between the financial relationship of the two condominiums to the Sudan raised considerable criticism of the British policy in the Sudan later on.\(^2\) Fears were expressed of the Sudanese recalling their Islamic teachings against usury and quoting the Qur’ān against the financial arrangement made in the British loans.

In the field of education the only development in the post-war period was the opening of the Kitchener School of Medicine.

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2. Currie, op.cit., pp. 43-44.
The particular functions of the school were (i) to train students, carefully selected from the Gordon College, in medicine, midwifery, and hygiene, (ii) as the need arose, to provide post-graduate classes for doctors who had received their training at the school, and (iii) by working in close co-operation with the Medical Research Laboratories, to inculcate the spirit of clinical research, and to afford facilities for such research.

The scheme for the school as approved by the Governor General in Council provided that the Trustees of the Gordon College be appointed Trustees of the school and that the Executive Committee of the College should co-operate with the Trustees and with a General Board of the School in an advisory capacity in connection with the general interests of the school. The General Board comprised certain ex officio members, i.e. the Principal of the College, the Financial Secretary, the Director of the Medical Department and the Director of Intelligence as Honorary Secretary.¹

The success that attended the Kitchener School of Medicine was striking. It came to be regarded as the most ambitious and the most successful educational venture in Africa. A random extract from the Inspectors' Report for 1931 could be taken as typical:

"It is unnecessary in this report to refer again in detail to the satisfactory nature of the course of study. We are glad to

¹ Letter signed Norton Ros & Co. to Henry A. Van de Linde, Esq., Hon. Sec. Gordon Memorial College, dated 22nd March 1926, DRA.
note that it is founded on a really well balanced biological basis. We are satisfied, too, that throughout the course every effort is being made to deal with the problem that besets all medical teaching in the East - the problem of encouraging students to understand instead of indulging a mindless facility for learning by heart and to acquire facts themselves by actual physical examination, instead of as mere listeners and spectators.\textsuperscript{1}

Similar progress failed to be recorded in all other directions, from the small vernacular schools in remote districts to the School of Engineering at the Gordon College. In 1918 the Director of Education, while trying to meet the rising needs of the Sudan Government for Gordon College graduates, was of the opinion that provision for the civil service should be made without materially increasing the number of primary schools. He saw no reason for expanding these schools beyond the demand for their 'exotic' products. They were 'schools ... decidedly for the few, not for the multitude' and a marked improvement in their standard would make it possible for the same or even smaller number of entrants to yield a larger supply for the Upper School and for Government service.\textsuperscript{2}

This policy of a smaller number of entrants to primary schools which was shortly extended to the elementary schools and the Gordon College was not only a temporary measure dictated by the conditions of the war but was also, and more important, an

\textsuperscript{1} Currie: op.cit., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{2} G.M.C. Report and Accounts to 31.12.1918, p. 8, University of Khartoum Archives.
indication of a growing suspicion amongst the British Administration in the Sudan towards the educated Sudanese.

By this time, almost twenty years since the Gordon College had been founded, the number of its students and graduates formed a new elite in the Sudanese society. They became acquainted with what was going on in the Western World through their ability to read in English and with what was going on in the Arab World and the East chiefly through the Egyptian press and publications. This elite came to be known as the "Afandīyyat", a word of Turkish origin and Egyptian usage, which roughly meant in the Sudanese context those who went to schools, learned English, obtained white collar jobs and put on European dress which they generally put off after office hours revealing the deeper ties that bound them to their own people and culture, and the dichotomy that existed in their lives.

The financial contribution the "Affandīyyat" made to their families out of their salaries enhanced their position in a predominantly poor country and the comparatively more sophisticated and luxurious standard of living coupled with their official status in the government machinery added further prestige and social elevation. Their feeling of responsibility towards their own families contributed to their gradual awareness of their responsibility towards the welfare of their countrymen in general.

The Government was keeping an open eye on the development of this elite and their response to what was taking place in Egypt
especially in the turbulent years of the war and its aftermath. The British rulers classified them as a special category of the population which could be traced back to the younger generation who had been children in 1898, and were throughout this period absorbing political ideas, but who were sufficiently under the restraint of their hard-bitten elders to retain a touch of diffidence. To most of this elite Egypt was an Islamic Eldorado of wealth and civilisation and the British started to suspect them during the war of nursing vague hopes of plenty and promotion in government employment through the Egyptian connection. They also suspected them during the War of an instinctive sentimental sympathy with the enemy powers, a sympathy which was reported as 'tempered by an appreciation of present benefits'.

By the end of the war the Egyptian nationalists were vocal in claiming the Sudan to be an integral part of Egypt. At this time the Sudan made its debut on the stage of international politics. Locally an awakening was beginning to take place. Though little was changed in the provinces, a generation was growing up in the towns to whom events in Egypt and elsewhere were an enthralling subject for speculation. Early in 1919 a campaign of political uprisings had broken out in Egypt which came to be known in modern Egyptian history as the 1919 Revolution. This was led by the newly formed Wafd Party rallying around Sa‘d Zaghlul Pasha and supported by a vehement press. Public opinion

2. Ibid., p.5.
in Egypt was mobilised against the British and the Egyptian press was read in the Sudan. The educated Sudanese had a chance of discussing it amongst themselves and with some of their Egyptian friends and colleagues.

Towards the close of the same year 1919 the Milner Commission was formed in London and sent out to enquire into the causes of the late disturbances in Egypt and to make recommendations for the future. Two of its members visited the Sudan early in 1920. The Commission left on record their view that "No change in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb the further development of the Sudan on a system which has been productive of such good results."¹ They outlined the general line of policy which commended itself to them for application in the Sudan, and the gist of it was expressed in the following.

"Though it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision."² This was the thin end of the wedge and it meant that the British and the educated Sudanese were drifting apart. As the latter were not to be trusted the former had to look for

1. Ibid., p. 8.
2. Ibid.
native authorities as their allies and aides in the government of the country.

By 1921 the 'Arifs (Teachers section in the Gordon College) was reduced by one class as there was no intention of immediate expansion in the sphere of elementary vernacular education.\(^1\) By 1922 another class of the same section had been reduced bringing down the number of teacher trainees in one year from 58 to 36. This was done in spite of the fact that the statistics of attendance in the elementary vernacular schools showed that there had been no falling off in the demand for instruction.\(^2\) To meet this demand and at the same time to avoid opening avenues for further higher education the Sudan Government resorted to a system of giving small subventions to controlled village Khalwas.\(^3\) The reorganised Khalwas was a system adopted a few years before in Rufa‘at District, Blue Nile Province and it had been extended since to Dongola, Halfa and later on to the other provinces with most satisfactory results to the British administration.\(^4\) The Khalwa which was feared at the beginning to be a cradle for fanaticism began to be looked for as a refuge from political upheaval amongst the educated Sudanese. To the government a prerequisite for "Native Administration" was controlled native education that would

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1. G.G. Report, 1922, p. 44.
2. Ibid. 1921 1922
   Attendance 8,728 8,815
3. The term Controlled native Koran schools or Khalwas was used in G.G. Report 1922; p. 40.
give no chances of office jobs or interest in political or international affairs.

The beginning of the curtailment of educational opportunities could be also noticed in the primary schools. The primary division of the Gordon College had been divided into two parts, the boarders remaining in the College and the day-boys being transferred to a building in the centre of the town, probably to isolate the boarders, who would normally come from outside Khartoum, from the influence of the political ideas in the town. This arrangement which had set free several rooms in the college had not resulted in any increase in the total number of boys receiving primary education.1 In the Upper School of the Gordon College it was decided by 1922 to effect some reduction in the number of classes. The qādis' section was to consist in future of two classes only and fees were to be imposed in both the Upper School and the primary schools. The reason given by the government for the imposition of fees was that a larger proportion of the boys had parents or relatives who because of their own education, were "both able and willing" to pay for the schooling of the new generation. Such measures would not be expected to please the students or their educated parents or relatives who had to pay the fees.

In February 1922 the British Government issued a declaration

1. G.G. Report, 1922, p. 44. By this time there were six government primary schools in the country with a total attendance in 1922 of 1,196 pupils.
terminating the protectorate in Egypt and reserving the question of the Sudan. This year and the next were marked, in Egypt, by a series of political uprisings and assassination, which had its echoes in the Sudan. By May 1922 a young Sudanese officer achieved prominence by his conviction for publishing a document entitled "The Claims of the Sudanese Nation". The young officer was Ali Abdel Latif, who had been trained in the Military School at Khartoum, and the fact that he was of Dinka origin, a Nilotic Tribe from the South, indicated the embryo of a wide nationalist movement. On his release in 1923 he found himself a hero among the educated class.¹

By the end of the same year the government went further in its policy of limiting the number of teachers and pupils. The teachers section in the College was reduced from the already low figure of 36 to 15, a cut of more than half in one year. This and the former reduction were reflected in a drop of more than four hundred in the number of pupils attending elementary vernacular schools from 8,815 in 1922 to 8,410 in 1923. The reduction in the total of primary pupils was explained by greater strictness in regard to free places.² The arrangements which were made to open primary classes in Halfa and Rufa‘a probably to meet long standing local pressures, were made at the expense of reducing the school

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² G.G. Report, 1923, p. 40. Primary pupils

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>1922</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>1,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
at Suakin and the boarding house at Atbara. The government report was gleeful that by so doing it extended the area of recruitment without additional liabilities. Even in girls education the number of pupils was kept stationary in this new field which the government entered only in 1921 by opening the long awaited elementary girls training college.

The slight increase in the Upper School of the Gordon College was due to the fact that a third class was added in the first year to meet the high demand for subordinate officials from the second year of the Upper School. From this time the first and second years of the College came to supply a greater percentage of recruits than the third and fourth years, an indication that the period of stay in the College was being progressively cut shorter. On the technical side the slight increase was due to the fact that this was a period of constructional schemes on the Sennar Dam and railway extension where local and less expensive labour was needed. In this year it was also decided that the turners, fitters and blacksmiths should be

2. The Girls Training College opened in 1921, 1922, 1923
   Girls Elementary Schools 1922 1923
   359 360
3. Ibid., Gordon College Upper School 1922 1923
   191 283
4. Ibid., Instructional Workshops 1922 1923
   255 283
transferred from the Gordon College workshops at Khartoum to Atbara where these trades were to be taught in close connection with the railway workshops. The carpentry section had already been moved from the College to Omdurman, thus making them more vocational and at the same time removing them from the more suspected intellectual atmosphere of the College students.

In 1924 abortive negotiations took place in London with Sa'd Zghuhl Pasha who was asking for complete independence for Egypt with the Sudan, and the evacuation of British troops. The period of political turmoil was intensified in Egypt, and in the Sudan the White Flag League was formed to work for the Unity of the Nile Valley. Its president was Ali Abdel Latif and the members were chiefly ex-cadets of the Military School and ex-students of the Gordon College. In June Ali Abdel Latif led a demonstration and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The cadets at the military school demonstrated in protest and there were similar demonstrations in other towns of the Sudan. On the same day (9 August) the Egyptian Railway Battalion, which was composed of Sudanese and Egyptian officers and soldiers, mutinied at Atbara. The mutiny was suppressed and the battalion was sent back to Egypt. The cadets and the ringleaders of the White Flag League were imprisoned.

All this provoked protests and counter-protests between London and Cairo. In November Sir Lee Stack, the Governor General of the Sudan, was assassinated in the streets of Cairo. Immediately the British delivered an ultimatum to Egypt which included a demand for the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and units. The enforcement of this measure was resisted on 27th November when two platoons of the 11th Sudanese Battalion led by Sudanese officers mutinied and marched on the Palace in Khartoum, where they intended to join up with the unit on guard duty and, in conjunction with Egyptian artillerymen in Khartoum North, bring off a coup d'état. The palace guard were marched off in another direction and the Egyptian artillery remained quiet, thus sowing deep and bitter feelings towards Egypt on the part of some of the educated Sudanese and affecting their late political development. However the Sudanese moved off towards the Blue Nile Bridge, next to the Gordon College, and were fired on by the British troops. They then broke into the military hospital alongside the road and went to ground there resisting to the last man. This incident marked the climax of the political events of the year which came to be known in the history of the Sudan as the Revolt of 1924.

The reply to the Stack murder and the events in the Sudan of 1924 was not only the summary eviction of the Egyptian Army, and the expulsion of all Egyptian officers in Civil employment, but a

similar policy was applied to the Sudan Education Department, which thus lost its best trained teachers.\(^1\) The Khartoum Military School in which prospective Sudanese officers had received their military education, receiving their instruction in civil subjects at the Gordon College, was abolished. The Defence Force was modelled on the West African Field Force, with all new appointments of officers to be made from the ranks. The Gordon College had a portion of its building used for military occupation till the beginning of 1926 when the higher school had been able to come back into possession of its share of the building.\(^2\)

The economic development of the country consequent on Gezira irrigation was met by the importation of a large number of additional British officials of all grades, thus curtailing further opportunities for the educated Sudanese. Elementary vernacular schools continued to decrease in number and in attendance, giving way to controlled Khalwas\(^3\) while attendance decreased in primary schools from 1,146 in 1924 to 1,101 in 1925. This was in accordance with a three year programme formulated in 1925 which provided for the reduction in the number of the elementary vernacular schools by closing some of them and extending the number of subsidised or controlled Khalwas which would teach secular subjects and would be under regular inspection. Such an attempt would be viewed by the educated Sudanese as undermining

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the existing system of education from the base. By 1926 the number of elementary vernacular schools dropped from 94 in 1925 with an attendance of 7,852 to 88 schools. On the other hand the number of subsidised controlled Khalwas rose from 161 in 1925 with an attendance of 5,444 to 293 Khalwas with a total attendance of 8,422. The increase in controlled Khalwas and the decrease in elementary vernacular schools charted the road towards the full launching of the policy of "Native Administration".

Economically, this period, which was witnessing the closing down of elementary schools and decreasing the number in the primary schools, was a period of relative material and financial prosperity due to high cotton prices and good yields. Hence it was a case of political decisions hampering educational development in spite of favourable economic conditions.

Sir James Currie, who, on the invitation of the Sudan Government, was present at the formal opening of the Blue Nile Dam in 1926, had a chance of taking stock of the situation. In spite of considerable material prosperity, he noted a change of attitude towards education among many of the higher grade English officials. Enthusiasm for education had largely evaporated, and "Indirect Rule" was the prevalent administrative slogan. This slogan of "Indirect Rule" or "Native Administration", which had

exercised considerable influence in the Sudan\textsuperscript{1} and in many other parts of Africa, was associated with the name of Lord Lugard.

It began early in the century, 1903, when Nigeria was in process of coming within the British sphere of influence. Lord Lugard (then Sir Frederick) found himself in charge of a very large tract of country, and he decided on grounds both of economy and high policy to use the native chiefs, who were in control, in the administration of the country. Paradoxically enough it was Lugard who wrote at that early time to Currie enquiring as to Sudan procedure in education and arranged for the seconding from the Sudan of several trained vernacular schoolmasters to help to lay educational foundations in Northern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{2} Currie noted that "After the troubles that culminated in Stack's murder, the British local administration took fright, and in spite of the loyalty of the educated Sudanese to the Government that had given them opportunity, the spectacle could be beheld of young administrators diligently searching for lost tribes and vanished chiefs,\textsuperscript{3} and trying to resurrect a social system that had passed away for ever."\textsuperscript{4}

Tribalism had been blotted out in the Sudan for a long time. The Sufi orders and Turkish rule were unifying forces and Mahdiism which succeeded them was a further unifying influence of

\begin{itemize}
\item[2.] G.G. Report, 1927, p. 79.
\item[4.] G.G. Report, 1927, p. 49.
\end{itemize}
a most potent character, and in addition to all that there was the first twenty-five years of condominium rule. But the Sudan Government went ahead with its policy, by a series of laws. By 1927 the "Powers of Sheikh Ordinance" was issued empowering the Sheikhs of big courts for the first time to imprison up to two years and to fine up to a hundred pounds. In 1928 further amendments were made to this law with a view to strengthening it. While increasing the powers of the tribal chiefs the Government was continuously undermining the position of the educated Sudanese.

In 1927, too, the training courses for junior administrative officers were closed down. Since 1918, these courses had been planned to take annually educated Sudanese, selected from men who were regarded competent during several years of experience in any part of the Government service and who were to be given, on the civil administrative side, openings as junior magistrates, junior administrators, and police officers in the provinces, comparable to those for commissioned Sudanese officers on the army side. These opportunities which were formerly designed for the older generation of the educated Sudanese as distinct from the younger one, were now closed for all. Elementary schools continued to be reduced in number as more controlled Khalwas came to be in vogue.

2. al-Sunni Bannaga, Adwā 'alān niẓām al-qabalī wa-l-idāra fl-s-Sūdān, Khartoum, 1960, p. 35.
Primary schools were reduced from 11 to 10 by 1929 and the Gordon College, despite the increase in the number of attendance due to the greater need of government department for junior local employees, could only provide about half of the numbers required in those economically prosperous years.¹

The College itself became rigid in outlook with more emphasis on discipline in its annual reports and though it had had a Commission of Inspection from outside the Sudan for the first time since its inception at the beginning of the century, there was no indication that the recommendations of the Commission were effected. The Commission provided several recommendations regarding the chief defects connected with the teaching of English and History and the desirability for regular future inspection.² They stated that they "believed it right to apply to the College the somewhat stringent standards of attainment which are set by the Technical and Secondary Schools and Teacher's Training Colleges in England at the present day."

In spite of the high standard set, Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, was able to report in his

1. Gordon Memorial College, Annual Reports and Accounts, DRA, The position of supply and demand was as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidates supplied by College</th>
<th>No. required by Govt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
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<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

covering letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that "The Commission's report was generally favourable, and the College emerged from the test with credit especially as it lost, as recently as 1924, the services of the Senior Egyptian teaching staff who had of necessity to be replaced by teachers of far less experience."¹ Lord Lloyd's view of the first aim of the College, with which the Secretary of State agreed,² was that "The first aim of Gordon College should be to train loyal servants of the Sudan Government (The staff of the College from the Warden downwards have this object always before them.)" Where that policy had led the College could be described by Dr. W.H. McLean, the founder of the School of Engineering in a letter he wrote to Sir James Currie in the early thirties.³ "They seem to have gone completely 'off the rails'; the training, both in quality and in quantity, appears to have dwindled so that today there is no higher technical education worthy of the name; the School of Engineering has been described officially as only a secondary school with an engineering bias in the third and fourth years, and the opportunities of employment in the Departments have been curtailed. Had they continued on the practical and economic method instituted in 1906, there ought by now to have been in the country a sufficient number of Sudanese engineers, quite as useful as the expensively trained

1. Ibid., p.4.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
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Egyptian engineers, and capable of doing most of the ordinary engineering routine work now being done by European engineers.

This would have resulted today in a great and much needed economy. The Government has laid itself open to the charge of retarding higher technical education."

The terrific economic crisis of 1930, the World Depression, aggravated the situation and rendered considerable quantitative reduction a necessity for reasons of economy. For the Sudan it was a double disaster. At the very time when the bottom fell out of the American economy and prices slumped all over the world the twin diseases of blackarm and leaf-curl struck at the Gezira Crop. In 1931 the yield fell to 1·4 kantars to the acre (against 4·8 in 1926) and the price from eighteenpence to sevenpence half-penny.¹ The suspicion which had been building up between the Sudan Government and the educated class for more than a decade was revealed in 1931 in an episode that came to be regarded later on as a landmark.

Among its economies to meet the economic crisis the government had reduced the starting salaries of Sudanese officials newly appointed from Gordon College by a cut of over 30 per cent (from £8.000 m/m to 5.500 m/m). Although some reductions were made on the salaries of the British Staff they were not so heavy nor had they been imposed on their starting rates.² Since the

College students were there to be government employees they felt that their future was being threatened. They all went on a strike and to strengthen their unanimity they resorted to a deeply rooted Moslem tradition in the Sudan for collective action, of ablution followed by a collective oath on the Qur'ān that they would abide by their decision to stay away from classes until the Government repealed the cut in the starting rates. The strike continued regardless of the attempts of parents and religious notables to intervene. The graduates (former pupils of the College) selected a committee to mediate with the Government which refused at first to change its decision. Later on the students decided to go back to work and twelve days after their return the Governor General told a delegation of notables and officials that he decided to raise the starting pay for Gordon College Graduates from £5.500 m/m to £6.500 m/m.

The strike led to some internal reforms in the administration of the College such as providing the Sudanese and other teachers with comparable authority to that of their British colleagues and to the reduction of the powers which the prefects had been given over their fellow pupils. New insight had forced the Government to think that changes were necessary in the structure of the curricula so that it should not, as it could not, be the sole employee of the College graduates. The graduates themselves having withdrawn considerably from collective activities.

since the abortive attempts of 1924 and their harsh suppression, started now to revive their intellectual activities in a cautious movement of emerging literary societies, an embryo of a social and political movement which began to take shape later in the decade. However in this period, the severity of the Depression, far outweighing that of the policy of "Indirect Rule", became a major factor in further depleting the flow of government sponsored education.

Thus in 1932 in the Gordon College four classes instead of five were accepted in the first year which resulted in a decrease of sixty-four on the total attendance in 1931. Financial stringency necessitated the closing of the Dueim Primary School and the withdrawal of boarding house facilities at the Rufa‘a School. The numbers of free and reduced-fee places were further restricted and this coupled with the fact that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the majority of primary school boys to find remunerative employment, and for parents to pay school fees, resulted in reduced attendance in the Primary Schools. In short education at all levels suffered from the axe of reductions including the government favoured schools in this period, the subsidised Khalwas.

In 1933 in the Gordon College a further decrease of 34 students took place in the intake and a large proportion of the

boys who completed the secondary course had no hope of Government service and posts in commercial firms were limited. This decrease in the number of students attending the Gordon College continued to be registered until 1936 when it reached its lowest ebb of 291 which meant that the College was reduced to about half its size (of 555) in the beginning of the decade. The only blessing for education which took place during these bleak years was the foundation at Bakht er Ruda of the boys Elementary Teachers Training College in 1934. This was the result of one of the recommendations of the Winter Committee which was set up by the Governor General soon after the strike at the College to report not so much on the causes of the strike as on the rapid change from under-production to over-production of educated whose only prospects lay in Government employment.

At this point the chief inspector of education, G.C. Scott, with passionate insistence succeeded in widening the Committee's terms of reference to include a survey of lower education. A well-written memorandum gained the approval of the Committee and the Government who decided that the teachers section in the Gordon College should be transferred to a rural site outside Khartoum.

where an elementary teachers training College was to be started. V.L. Griffiths who was inspector of education and secretary of the Winter Committee was appointed head of the Training College and he chose the site at Bakhter Ruda in a rural area near Dueim on the White Nile. The College came to bear the name of the place and the mark of the founder who continued to be its principal for almost two decades when he retired in 1950. When Griffiths was entrusted with the task he said

"I found myself very much in agreement with the climate of British opinion in wanting education - particularly the village elementary education - to be directed more towards rural activities. I had had three and a half years of teaching academic subjects to anxious village students in an Indian College, and it had been a very disquieting experience. But visits to Tagore's Shantiniketan and to an American School, Ushagram, built on the lines of a Bengal village, had been inspiring, and I hoped to profit now by what I had seen. I was also, of course, very much in agreement with the view that rote-learning without understanding was a bad thing and must be got rid of. Griffiths had progressive and liberal educational ideas some of which were ahead of the common practice in the United Kingdom today. He was aware of the significance, the advance and the difficulties in the face of what he was going to try out at Bakhter Ruda.


2. For a violent attack on similar attitudes of innovation in educational matters in Britain today see, C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson, eds. Fight for Education: A Black Paper, London, 1969. Also see heated discussion raised over the pamphlet in the British Press and mass media when the Pamphlet was denounced on April 8th by Mr. Short, Secretary of State for Education and Science. The Times, The Guardian, The Scotsman, all of April 9th, 1969.
as he said in his account, "... I was also full of other ideas, some of which would not have gone down very well had they been broadcast. I disliked corporal punishment - almost the only punishment in Sudan Schools of those days. I wanted to abolish exams., but keep reports, lessen competition, give up prizes, introduce projects (where the pupils choose their own subjects of study) and develop camps and school journeys. In fact, I was infected, or perhaps inspired - it depends how you look at it - by the wave of distrust of old methods and the desire for new ways which was a feature of the period immediately after the 1914-1918 war. The credit for whatever proved good in these ideas is due to the Boy Scouts and to the London Day Training College in the stimulating days of Nunn and Fairgrieve.

"Were these ideas suited to Sudanese traditions - especially the political traditions which it was now the policy to foster? This was doubtful: it depended on how fast the Sudan was likely to change. I had come from the exciting political atmosphere of India in the days of the Simon Commission to a Sudan which was patriarchal and Public School. It felt like stepping back twenty or fifty years in history. But I could not help believing that, whatever the appearances of the moment, the educated Sudanese would eventually come to dominate affairs and to want our sort of education. In the event this happened more quickly than we expected."

While Griffiths was trying to reform elementary education in Bakht er Ruda away from the attention of the Government
administrators and public opinion, the educated Sudanese were coming forth to play a greater role and to demand advances in education both in quantity and quality. The literary societies that flourished in the early thirties and the press which started at the same period began to discuss not only literary subjects but also social and political questions. The period of the financial depression came to be a period of intellectual revival amongst the educated Sudanese. An editorial published on the 16th of June 1935 in the fortnightly Al-Fajr was an indication of the concern of the educated Sudanese for education.

The editorial with the title "Give Us Education" considered the year 1932 as marking the start of an epoch of decadence in education. It lamented that the number of students in the Gordon Memorial College had been decreasing and decreasing since then and that the practice of sending selected Sudanese teachers to the American University of Beirut had been discontinued, thus bringing the source that gave higher education to some Sudanese to an end. Al-Fajr also stated that the Comboni and the Coptic Secondary Schools, the only two besides the Gordon

5. The Coptic College: A Secondary School opened by the Coptic Community in Khartoum in 1929 and followed the curricular of the Egyptian Schools.
College, were governed by laws which debarred the Sudanese from being students in either of them. It noted that although the staff of the two schools were not of better standard than those of the Gordon College their Curricula were far better, and, although they were merely secondary schools, they equipped their students for University study either in Cairo or abroad. It demanded that both schools should be opened for the Sudanese as well as the other communities.

For the Gordon College Al-Fajr called for the curriculum to be developed considerably to prepare the students for University education, and at the same time to be sufficient in itself as a last resort. It criticised the educational policy which was limited to "the view of training some men to become officers and civil servants in the Government offices." It asked "Should not the policy of education take another direction? Should not the curriculum be developed to produce men for the world and not with local limitations? And should in any case the number of students be reduced, because the Government demand for such men has been diminishing?"

The editorial continued "Education ... should be given to us at this stage. Thanks to God, the difficulties with which educationalists are confronted in other African countries do not exist in our country. The Arabic language is spoken all over the country and Islam is the prevailing religion. The minds of the people are fit for understanding and receiving any kind of
education whether literary or scientific, technical or manual. The time has gone for those who were saying that lack of educational tradition in the country does not allow of introducing higher technical and University education. The younger generation is the offspring of educated men and thus the educational background, the enlightened environment has become possible."

The editorial went on to say "Our aim in life is to be given higher education. A school of Law, an Agricultural School and a Higher School of Engineering, both Civil and Mechanical have become essential for the future of this country. It is time that the Sudanese should have better chances in the Government of his country, and the only way for the realisation of those chances is higher education." It continued, "We were given some sort of education, which some of us have been developing and some were contented with their lot. We have realised the value of education and have come to believe that it is the key to our progress. The Government has embarked on giving us education, but does not seem to aim at any further steps. The danger in this lies in the fact that once education is started in a country it must be continued and developed; failing this the people will cry and ask for more education, because it becomes to them as essential as food, water and light."

It concluded by saying "Mr. J.H. Oldham, as quoted by Professor Julian Huxley in his book "Africa View", says that "The fundamental business of Government in Africa is education" ...

"The New Scales, Transport Regulations and Leave Regulations are
only complications, but lack of education is the mortal disease. 'Give us education and leave us alone' is our slogan." This concern amongst the educated Sudanese for the improvement of education both in quantity and quality continued to rise until it found expression in the formation of the Graduates Congress in 1937 which played a major role in the political and educational life of the country.

The educated Sudanese concern was no doubt enhanced by the negotiations which were taking place between the British and the Egyptian Governments with the future of the Sudan as a main issue, and sometimes the stumbling block, although the Sudanese were not at the negotiation table. Opinions varied as to what extent Egypt would help in their salvation but they were all agreed that without education nothing could be achieved. The invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini in 1935 and the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which recognised Egypt as a fully sovereign state without prejudice to the question of sovereignty over the Sudan introduced a new factor to the situation.\(^1\) The two contracting parties to the Treaty of 1936 agreed that their aim was the welfare of the Sudanese. By this time individual Sudanese students began to find their way to Egypt in search for higher education, some of whom finished their university education in Egypt and a few others


\(^2\) Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 78-79.
were sent on Egyptian scholarships to study in British or French Universities. ¹

By the end of 1936 the Government reported that the establishment in the near future of three schools for professional training in Engineering, agriculture and veterinary science had been approved in principle while training in Government departments continued. ² The press was demanding that training should not be confined to Government departments and that, for instance, the training undertaken by the Legal Department for Sudanese legal assistants from amongst its officials should be extended to setting up a school of Law in the College where advocates as well could be trained. Al-Fajr asked for the appointment of DirDîrî Ahmed Ismaîl, who had obtained a master's degree in laws from Leeds University through an Egyptian Scholarship, as a teacher in the law school it proposed. This, Al-Fajr said, would prove the good intentions of the Government towards those who took the initiative and risked going abroad to get an education that was not available at home. ³

This inter-departmental training, limited as it was, and falling short of the ambitions of the educated Sudanese, was probably brought about by the article in the 1936 treaty which stated that when "making new appointments for which qualified Sudanese are not

available, the Governor General will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.\(^1\) But as the Sudan government was not prepared to restore to the Egyptians the position they held in 1924, Sudanisation was the alternative and this necessitated improvement in the available facilities for education and increased the urge of the educated Sudanese for higher education.

The De la Warr Commission\(^2\) was in East Africa in 1937 to report on higher education there. This Commission was invited by the Governor General to pay, on its homeward journey, a visit to the Sudan to enquire into and report on the curriculum, staff and organisation of the Gordon Memorial College, and to review the method and organisation of the elementary teachers' training school at Bakht er Ruda and one or two selected schools. The Commission accordingly visited the Sudan in February.\(^3\) Two months later Ali Bey El Garem, joint senior inspector of Arabic in Egypt, arrived in Khartoum by invitation from the Sudan Government through the Egyptian Ministry of Education, to inspect and report on the Arabic teaching in the Gordon Memorial College, and to advise on the best method of training future Arabic teachers.\(^4\)

The Government view on these reports was that "taken together these two reports touch on almost every aspect of education

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1. "Article 11(2) of 1936 Treaty".
4. Ibid.
in the Sudan, and it must be some time before final decisions to implement them are taken. In the meantime, these valuable reports have been published for the general information of the public on a subject which vitally concerns the future progress and welfare of the country."¹ The publication of the reports was a token recognition of the concern of the educated Sudanese which was beginning to assert itself. It was also an indication of a change in the attitude which was prevalent only three or four years before when Bakht er Ruda was being established. Griffiths wrote "Hadn't we consulted the educated Sudanese? Not very much. In those days they were mostly in subordinate positions; few as yet had any width of experience on which to form helpful opinions. Most members of the administration thought they were out of touch with the main body of tribesmen, and had different interests. We did not cultivate their appreciation, we used reason and firmness. This was usually the method even with the very unsophisticated."²

The De la Warr Commission reported that they were able to visit and inspect the Gordon Memorial College, the Elementary Teachers Training College at Bakht er Ruda, the Kitchener School of Medicine, and a number of the intermediate, elementary and Qur'ān schools, including some schools for girls.³ From the evidence received the commission gained the impression that there

¹. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
was a danger of the bifurcation of the Sudan, at that early stage in its growth, into native administrations in the countryside and the relatively small but influential groups of Afandiyya in the towns and the Government Departments. This appeared to the Commission to be the greatest danger in the developments of the previous ten years. The government recognised this, and the Commission hoped that there would be an immediate and rapid movement towards the adoption of the principle that only those who received at least an elementary schooling would be appointed chiefs, sub-chiefs and even village heads. The Commission thought it was worth considering whether chiefs might not be encouraged to send their sons forward beyond the elementary stage. They also noted that the expansion of education on the scale they envisaged would involve a substantial increase in the vote of the Education Department, and they urged that in view of the importance of the subject the needs of education should receive the most sympathetic consideration in the preparation of the Budget estimates.

The Commission reported that the results achieved by the G.M.C., by the Kitchener School of Medicine, and by the recently established Teachers' Training Centre at Bakhter Ruda made it unnecessary to justify the education of the Sudanese upon principles inspired by those adopted in Europe. But it also noted that the impact of western ideas upon the 'Mohammedan' life of the Sudan naturally created problems, and a wise system
of education was necessary to direct into beneficial channels the movement set up by that impact. Unassimilated, these modes of thought imported from a different environment must jar, and it was the function of education to harmonise what was best in European civilisation with the Sudanese environment. "Schools and Colleges", the De la Warr Commission recommended, "must therefore be in close contact with the needs of a community which is predominantly rural. Not least among these needs is the training of leaders, who must be both superior to the mass of their countrymen and in sympathy with them."¹

The great fault pervading Sudanese Schools was the tendency to memorise without understanding. The result, the Committee noted, was a failure not only to produce qualities of initiative, foresight, judgement and adaptation to circumstances, but even to reach an adequate standard in the knowledge of the subjects themselves. The aim was too often a mere teaching of facts without regard to the environment of the pupils, whose mental background was the Qur'anic tradition, and to whom Western civilisation and education necessarily appeared as foreign products.² They noted, however, that admirable work was done at Bakht er Ruda to devise methods fitted to the students' environment and capable of correcting the faults of the existing schools.

The De la Warr Commission thought it was regrettable that

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
Bakht er Ruda was the only modern institution in the Sudan concerned with boys' primary education. They thought the time for experiment was over, and the moment had arrived for advance upon the knowledge gained. The aim, they recommended, should be the creation of a Bakht er Ruda in every province and they recommended the immediate establishment of at least one other such institution. Only by such measures, they thought, could teachers be trained to staff the new schools which were urgently needed.\(^1\) However Bakht er Ruda was to remain the only teachers training college of its kind for eleven more years until the Elementary Teachers Training School at Dilling was opened in 1948.\(^2\)

The De la Warr Commission considered all stages of education as inter-dependent and consequently that efforts towards improvement should be spread over every grade of school. They recommended that efforts should be made, in co-operation with the religious authorities, to improve the Khalwas; and that, since more and better elementary vernacular schools were needed, the schools at Bakht er Ruda should be extended and similar schools should be founded elsewhere. Similarly an extension and improvement of the Intermediate School was necessary. The headmaster of each intermediate school should be advised by a British supervisor. There were only eleven Government intermediate schools at the time but nevertheless this recommendation was never implemented possibly for financial, administrative and political reasons.

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1. Ibid., p. 10.
Another recommendation which, if properly implemented, could have served a similar purpose to the intermediate schools, was that every province should have a full time education officer.¹ They also recommended that girls' education should be greatly expanded.

The Commission thought that the time was ripe for making those beginnings out of which a university would eventually develop. An intermediate step in the development of the university should be the establishment of a university college, and the elements of the future university college should be centres in the Gordon College building. An important stage towards this goal was that the Government secondary school, which the Gordon College was, should be graded up to a standard equivalent to that of the British School Leaving Examinations even if this necessitated the extension of the course from four to five years for a temporary period. This would require the number of British masters at the secondary school to be increased from five to eight and also that the Sudanese who were to teach English or in English, should take courses in England.² The secondary school itself should be located on another site to give room for the developing college.

The Gordon College, so proposed, was to comprise the Kitchener School of Medicine, besides the other schools and departments which were to be developed. An arts department was to be developed with the teachers' training course as its nucleus. This was a course designed for intermediate school teachers at the

² Ibid., p. 49.
time. The teaching of pre-professional science to students who had previously completed a secondary course in natural science should also be carried out in the new Gordon College. The agriculture course should be located at Khartoum North and should not be confined to candidates for Government employment and a satisfactory system of pupillage should be evolved for engineering students. The Commission was of the opinion that the advanced courses in professional subjects should, from the first, aim at a standard not lower than that required for a British professional qualification.

The Commission recommended that the recognition of Sudan diplomas by examining authorities in England and elsewhere should be sought and, when an adequate standard was reached, selected students should be entered for external degrees; while refresher courses and post-diploma work should be encouraged in the Gordon College, outstanding students should be sent to study abroad.

Lord De la Warr was more vehement in his criticism in a letter he sent later on in the same year to the Governor General Sir Stewart Symes where he said, "A general and impartial view of education in the Sudan leads to the conclusion that the schools are inadequate in number and unsatisfactory in quality. This is clearest in the case of the elementary and intermediate schools but it applies also to the Gordon Memorial College which appears to have been pursuing for many years a comfortable rut at an easy amble ... The

1. Ibid., p. 50.
Gordon College which should have achieved a continuously rising standard throughout the thirty years of its existence, has failed not only to attain the complete University standard which its founders envisaged, but even to reach the stage of University entrance."

Lord De la Warr, drawing on his knowledge of education in East Africa, told the Governor General in the same letter that expenditure on education in proportion to total expenditure was considerably less in the Sudan than in most of those territories. Complaints had of late been frequent that Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika spent too little on education, yet the proportion of their expenditure devoted to this service was "from one-and-a-half to twice the proportion of compressible expenditure devoted to education in the Sudan." Lord De la Warr was no doubt referring to the Sudan Government's ten year educational plan which was approved in 1936 when he said, "Under the present approved rate of expansion of education in the Sudan, expenditure is likely to increase by about £50,000 per annum. While we welcome this increase, we cannot feel that it can meet the real needs of the situation. The Sudan with its 6,000,000 people and a budget of four and a half million pounds, spends £149,051 (net) on education from central and local funds. Uganda, with little more than half the population and less than half the revenue, spends £119,872". Lord De la Warr expressed his anxiety that

"the Sudan should now make up the accumulated arrears of many years of stagnation."¹

The criticism made by Lord De la Warr was, in its general tone, similar in many ways to that made by Sir James Currie in the early thirties² and to the criticism which increasingly had been made by the educated Sudanese for a long time. However, the reaction of the Government, this time, was a revision of the 1936 ten year educational plan. The new programme³ which was to spread over the next eight years envisaged capital expenditure of approximately half a million pounds by 1946 and raised the total recurrent expenditure on education which was approximately £E150,000 in 1936 to approximately £E300,000 in eight years time. However modest these changes were, their arithmetic was rendered obsolete by the outbreak of the Second World War. The principal achievement of the De la Warr Report was that a year later the Gordon College could claim for the first time that some of its best pupils attained the standard of an English secondary school. In 1938 the best fourth-year class of twenty-two boys sat for the Cambridge School Certificate Examination; twenty secured certificates and sixteen exemptions from the Cambridge Previous Examination.⁴ The total number of students at the College in

this year was 357.

Secondary qualification or no secondary qualification the urge and need for higher education were long overdue and the beginnings had to be made. So in the same year 1938 the School of Veterinary Studies commenced the first year of a three-year course in January and in September the School of Agriculture opened in buildings at Shambat, a rural suburb of Khartoum. At the same time final plans were made for the establishment of the new School of Science, which was intended to provide the pre-professional training required by students going on to the School of Medicine, Agriculture, Engineering and Veterinary Studies, and in a simplified form, by those under training to be science teachers in the intermediate schools. The School of Engineering, too, vacated the Gordon College building in November and was housed in premises of its own.¹ So the professional training that was carried out in Government departments² came to be pursued in the Gordon College which was still officially maintaining the close links with the departments concerned. For the Gordon College to develop a step further towards University status it had to wait until 1946³ after the Asquith Commission's report had been published when, with the rest of similar colonial institutes, arrangements were being made for some of the students to qualify for external degrees of London University.⁴

CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:
FROM THE GRADUATES CONGRESS TO 1965

The literary societies that began to flourish in the early thirties and the concern about social and political problems that ensued out of that and increased after the Anglo Egyptian Treaty of 1936 crystallized in the formation of the General Graduates Congress. The Congress came as an expression of a growing desire among the educated Sudanese to work together. This feeling was enhanced by the realisation that the Sudan was not represented by Sudanese at the Treaty which was dealing with their future and that of the country. Though the spectre of the Congress Party in India could not fail to be discernible to the authorities in the name, the Graduates Congress - yet the latter did not start with an articulated political programme or an express political aim. It sufficed itself in the beginning with the general purpose, "to promote the general welfare of the country and its graduates," a statement reminiscent of the phrase used to define the aim of the two contracting powers in their administration of the Sudan as laid down in the Treaty of 1936. Most of the members were employees of the Government with memories of 1924 and its aftermath still alive; moderation and caution were recognisable counsel. The Government recognised the Congress only in so far as it was representing its

own views and those of its members. The new organisation, being itself formed of educated members, paid great attention to the question of education and played a significant role in this field. Interest displayed in these early years formed the basis of future policy when this generation came to power.

**Congress First Memorandum**

Two months after the inauguration of the Congress, with branches in different parts of the country and a central Committee of sixty and a Council of fifteen in Omdurman, a special committee was formed, in April 1938, to study the problems of education in the country so that the Congress might submit its views on this subject to the authorities. This was at the time when the De la Warr Commission's reports on Sudan and East Africa had just been published. In July 1939 Congress presented its views in a comprehensive memorandum to the Government.¹

The note traced the work of education in the Sudan to the arrival of the Arabs in the country. It described the main aim of that education as religious, "hence the great number of Khalwas throughout the country which played a very good part in the way of education and general enlightenment. These Khalwas were run by the people themselves until recently when some of them were subsidised by the Government." It seemed that this tradition of the people running their 'khalwas' was underlying the Congress-led

movement of 'National or Ahlia Schools'. The Congress was critical of the position of education in the country as it believed that the number of the literate was not more than 1% of the total population. It estimated that there were about 300,000 boys of six to twelve years of age in the country of whom 19,000 only received elementary or intermediate education in Government or other schools or about 6% while in Uganda it said, over 33% of boys of the same age actually received similar education. Girls' education was described as so backward that it could not be compared with that of any other country. The number of girls receiving education was not more than 6,000 in both Government and other schools, while girls in the country, the note stated, were "more numerous than boys."¹

The memorandum went on to say that even if the existing number of elementary and intermediate schools was doubled in a few years time, which was what the revised ten years plan was hoping to do, "it will still fall short of our aspirations, and far from being comparable to other Arab countries it will not reach the stage achieved by the neighbouring countries." On educational outlook the Congress said that in numerous aspects of their life the Sudanese had much in common with the Arab countries of Islamic Orient and they therefore considered that education in the country should take "an Islamic Oriental character and not a pagan African one, or that in other words the Arabic language and Religious Instruction should receive the greatest possible care in all stages of education."

¹. Ibid.
Critical of education in the Sudan as being mainly designed to supply the various Government offices with suitable staff, Congress thought that it was high time that a new and more general policy had been laid. The aims of the new policy should be:

'(a) Total removal of illiteracy and
(b) expansion and improvement in all stages of education with a view to maintaining a high cultural standard to ensure:

'(i) Creating spiritual happiness for the individual in community life.

'(ii) Inculcating public and co-operative spirit in the individual so that he may take an active interest in the welfare of his community, and

'(iii) Equipping the individual with the qualities which make for success in his struggle for existence.'

They expressed the view that modern educational theories did not stop at teaching reading, writing and arithmetic and that they did not think that education would serve its purpose if it failed to prepare the educated for a life more productive than that of the uneducated and to induce them to impart the advantages so gained to their community. As with the aims, they found the structure of the educational system, too, unsatisfactory and in need of reform. They criticised it as being designed to prepare the pupil for the next higher stage, while neglecting the needs of the majority who would not go any higher. To achieve both purposes they suggested that a special system be introduced, in both

1. Ibid.
elementary and intermediate schools, whereby the pupils would receive a common syllabus after which those who desired to continue their education would proceed, while the rest who wished to qualify for their life work would be given two years of further training. What types of training they did not explain. For the fulfilment of this suggestion they advocated a certain degree of decentralization owing to the vastness of the country and the geographical differences. But they emphasised that those differences should not affect the common spirit that should in the first place predominate education in all its stages. And though they attached great hopes to the efforts made at Bakht er Ruda on elementary education they felt it was likewise of vital important that similar work should be done for the intermediate schools.

On school age, they noted that children began their elementary schooling at the age of eight and finished secondary education at the age of twenty, which they regarded as a comparatively high average age for entering higher schools that required from four to six years of study. They suggested that boys should start elementary education at the age of six and that girls should start at the age of five so that women teachers could have more working years before they got married. On Khalwas, they felt that Government subsidies to them were not serving the purpose for which they were intended because the Fikis, Khalwa teachers, absented themselves from their Khalwas for a good part of the year in pursuit of their living. This they attributed to two reasons: (1) The reward given to them

1. Fikis, Khalwa teachers.
was scanty and did not cover their necessities, (2) The parents of the pupils ceased to offer the small contributions or fees they used to give in the past to the Fikis on the understanding that they were now in receipt of regular pay from the Government.

The Education Department, they thought, had apparently discovered these defects and had therefore (1) re-introduced the preparatory class in the elementary schools which boys could join from their homes without any direct instruction at Khalwas and (2) devised a new system of half elementary schools (sub-grade) in places where elementary schools did not exist. Congress, while accepting sub-grade schools, thought that Khalwas were still necessary for religious purposes and as an additional means of combating illiteracy. To remove the defects described they suggested that no direct payments be made to the Fikis but that a lump sum grant be placed at the disposal of the Omdurman Ma'had Board or a special committee appointed by the Ma'had who would be authorised to distribute the money at their discretion in consultation with the local authorities. From this proposal Congress appeared to be looking for the support of the Fikis and Ma'had, i.e. the religious educated and the public.

They fully supported the Lord De la Warr Report and urged expansion and the representation of Graduates on the proposed Council for the College and not that of notables as was the case with other Councils. On education in the Southern Sudan, they said it was left entirely in the hands of missionaries who were subsidised by the Government. This in their opinion was responsible for the
backwardness of education in the South. They did not wish to underestimate the contribution which the Missions had made and were making to education in the South, but as the main object of the Missions was religious, the educational value of Missionary schools was consequently low and therefore so far had very little effect on the life of the Southerners. They regretted that in the South tribes still lived in such a primitive and inhuman condition that did not befit the twentieth century.

They suggested that improvement of education in the South could not be attained by expanding and improving the existing missionary schools at Government expense but by opening entirely new schools on the lines of those in the Northern Sudan. The Arabic language, they submitted, would provide a suitable lingua franca as it was already spoken by most of the tribesmen and would thus solve the difficulties expressed by the Director of Education in his report for 1936. Quicker results could be achieved, they added, if restrictions were removed and the South was opened unconditionally to the Northerners. Apart from the educational value of the continuous contact between the peoples of the North and South, the economic conditions would be improved by promoting trade and agricultural activities.

On Ahlia Schools or National Education, Congress said that in spite of their limited resources, the people of the country, prompted by their desire to provide additional facilities for educating as many of their children as possible at a reasonable cost and to enable the poorer classes to receive free education, had, by
combined efforts, established a few elementary and intermediate schools which they continued to maintain at their own expense. Some of the schools received some help from the Education Department in the form of a free issue of scholastic materials. Though these grants were much appreciated, it was felt that these schools deserved more substantial subsidies from the Government. Their greatest difficulty was in the lack of qualified teachers. This was partly due to the absence of capable teachers locally and partly to the inability of the schools to offer suitable terms of service for such teachers from within or without the country. They suggested that it would greatly alleviate these difficulties and help towards raising the standards in the National schools, if the Government would extend its subsidies to all the National Schools to cover the pay of the headmaster or one teacher at least in each as was done to the Missionary Schools. Congress maintained that this would not only help to preserve the existing schools but would also enable some of the funds collected to be utilised in expanding the schools to take a greater number of boys which would in turn relieve the pressure on Government schools.

The memorandum was acknowledged by the Government in a letter sent to the Secretary of the Congress by the Civil Secretary and described as a constructive contribution to a problem vitally affecting the welfare of the Sudanese,¹ with a promise that he would bring it to the notice of the Governor General on his return from

¹. Letter dated 16th July 1939, 9/8/65 MEA, p. 9.
leave. The wide discussion the memorandum received before its submission and the recognition it got from the Government prepared the way for Congress to be the champion of 'National Education', a term used for citizens' sponsored schools. Though the Government did not do anything more about the memorandum, the already existing schools of that type did. At the time the schools in existence were the Ahlia Intermediate School\(^1\) at Omdurman which had been set up in 1927 by the citizens and the educated in response to the Government policy towards education at the time, and as a protest against attempts at proselytizing of Moslem boys in the American Mission School at Omdurman. The other school was the Ahfad\(^2\) school, elementary and intermediate, established by Sheikh Babiker Badri, with the active support of some of the authors of the Congress memorandum in 1933.\(^3\) A third one was an elementary school established in 1937 at Wad Medani\(^4\) where the Graduates' movement was the leading in the country and where the idea of the Congress is believed to have originated.

Ahlia Schools Movement

Within two weeks of the Government reply to the Congress memorandum the Director of Education was reading all the relevant

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1. Note by Chief Inspector, 1.5.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. The boys elementary section was established in Rufa‘a in 1930 then moved later to Omdurman. The Intermediate section was established in 1933.
4. p. 16, 9/8/65, MEA.
papers\(^1\) as regards petitions from the Ahfad\(^2\) and the Omdurman Ahlia schools for increased Government subsidies and, more important still, for the opening of a secondary school along the lines of the Gordon Memorial College in the Ahfad. But the Director thought the whole question of Government subsidies to non-Government schools required investigation and a defined policy. As it was connected to some extent with major issues such as the opening of an Egyptian Secondary School in Khartoum which was then in the air, he wished to delay a final reply until he had discussed the matter in England with Mr. Newbold, the designated Civil Secretary, and with Mr. Roseveare his successor as director of education, who were both on leave at the time.

In the meantime the press was bringing the issue of secondary education into the open. In an editorial *El Nile* wrote:\(^3\) "Our need of secondary schools needs no proof. A great number of those who complete the intermediate schools are turned down by the G.M.C. yearly. Some of them are disappointed and others seek education in the foreign and missionary schools. Although it has come to light that an Egyptian secondary school will be established yet the deficit in secondary education will not thoroughly be made up. The two hundred students who can find no chance in G.M.C. exceed the number required by the Egyptian Secondary School." Within a week after this editorial the Director

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1. Dated 1.8.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
of Education, Mr. Cox, was having dinner with Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi who, bringing the conversation to its goal of the secondary schools said "if the Government could not itself provide sufficient accommodation, let it be Sheikh Babikr Badri and not the Egyptians."¹ The playing off of the Egyptians and the British was now taking shape.

The Sudan Government found that it had to define its policy towards this impending movement towards secondary schools and towards the renewed demands for substantial subsidies to the intermediate schools. A note prepared by Mr. Jamieson at the Department of Education outlined this policy.² On Secondary education the Government was to confirm that it was their intention to provide secondary education for three classes of boys (a) those who were exceptionally clever and were likely to prove of value to the Government, (b) those who through inherited position were likely to play a leading part in Local Government,³ (c) the sons of those who were prepared to pay for their education. The Government, it was also suggested, should reaffirm that it was their intention to limit secondary and post-secondary to those who could usefully profit by it, i.e. to the absorptive capacity of the country.

The Government, it was also maintained, should state that education in the Sudan had been or was being adapted to suit

¹ Note of conversation with Sir Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi Pasha; 29.7.39 (Sgd.) C.W.M. Cox 7.10.39. 9/8/65 MEA.
² Note by Mr. Jamieson for Reading by Director of Education before Discussion on National Schools, 1.8.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
³ Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 72.
the needs of the country and only those boys who had had a course in intermediate schools following the Sudan Government syllabus should be accepted into the secondary schools and only those who had had a course in secondary schools following the Sudan Government syllabus should be accepted into higher schools. In employing Sudanese in Government service preference should be given to those who had received their training in the Sudan schools. But before the Government gave its approval to the opening of non-Government Secondary Schools wholly or largely for Sudanese it should be convinced that there was a need not supplied by the Government, that the education was on the lines laid down by the Government for secondary schools and that the schools were supplementary to Government education and not competitive with it. This meant that fees would be charged at the same rate as for Government schools.

It was anticipated that the two cases where secondary education would be asked for during the coming few years were at the Egyptian Secondary School and at the National Schools. The Egyptian Secondary School was to be told that it should be designed from the start to cater for Egyptians only and that permission to accept Sudanese would be limited to a very low figure, comprising those who had no intention of seeking Government employment, who desired a further education in Egypt and who were prepared to pay for it. In the meantime stricter control was to be exercised on the Coptic College, Comboni College and similar community schools and intake of Sudanese was to be limited. The National Schools were
to be told that only if they could employ staff fully equipped to teach the Sudan secondary syllabus would permission be given and then only if there was a need for another secondary school. At that stage the application for a secondary section at Babikir Badri was to be turned down.

The two schools, the Ahfad and the Ahlia, were to be toned up by rigid inspection at their intermediate schools and an increase of books and materials of up to £19 per class. The Government was to open the Omdurman Junior Secondary School, a two year secondary school for commercial subjects, in the following year. This it was hoped would stem the tide but if for political reasons the Government found that the demand for secondary education became too strong to resist and it was not prepared to meet it by opening another class at its existing secondary schools, then permission to run a secondary section would be given to the better of the two schools on the lines of a paying concern but it was hoped that this would not take place for many years. The Sudan Government saw to it that persistent applications were rejected or deferred and consequently the Ahfad secondary section was not given permission to open until 1943, the Ahlia until 1944 and the Egyptian (Farouk) Secondary School was not formally opened till 1946 the same year as the Omdurman Secondary School, which had been moved during the

1. 7.10.39. 9/8/65 MEA.
war period from the Gordon College buildings, was divided into two schools, one of them occupying the Wadi Seidna buildings in January while the other opened in Hantoub in September.¹

**Egyptian Education**

The Egyptian Secondary School and Egyptian education were a growing concern of the Sudan Government and this was clearly indicated by the outgoing Director of Education, Mr. Cox, in a letter to his successor, Mr. Roseveare,² just after the outbreak of the war. Cox, who gave his full support to the memorandum prepared for him before his departure, gave further amplification of that memorandum and suggested to his successor ways and means of putting it into effect. He stated that he was afraid that the likely developments of Egyptian education were: that the Farouk Secondary School could be tempted to sidetrack the second Government Secondary School by insisting on the Government increasing the Wadi Seidna school to 500 and letting the surplus go to the Egyptian School. Even if this did not occur a growing number of Sudanese would go to the Egyptian school and the Government, Cox thought, would be faced with a surplus of ex-secondary school boys with no jobs. Furthermore Cox feared that the situation at Gordon College would be complicated by a growing number of applicants whose secondary education had been on the Egyptian syllabus. He also feared that if the Sudanese who passed through the Egyptian secondary schools

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². 7.10.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
either in Khartoum or in Egypt went on to Egyptian Universities, there would be a danger, owing to the superior prestige of a "proper" degree, either of the sidetracking of the Gordon College or of a surplus of University graduates with no jobs.

To minimise these dangers the former Director of Education suggested a firm implementation of the suggestion of giving preference for Government posts not only to those who had been trained in Sudan Government schools but also in Sudan Government higher education as well, and also by fixing economic fees which would restrain parents from paying for an expensive education for their sons if they were likely to waste their money by having them unemployed in the end.

The other side of the Egyptian problem was, to the Director of Education, whether similar control could be exercised over the annual exodus of Sudanese boys to secondary schools in Egypt as over an annual entry to an Egyptian School in Khartoum. Besides the publicity in advance of the deterrents he proposed earlier, of no guarantee of jobs and preference for those following the Sudan Government syllabus, Cox suggested that this should be explained to the Egyptian representatives and an effort made to persuade them to keep their "political philanthropy" down to a minimum. He knew this would not be easy for them, exposing them to Sudanese criticism, unless they could quote an understanding with the Sudan Government. The number of thirty that year seemed moderate at the time, but in fact it applied, not as he thought to Sudanese boys already domiciled in Egypt, but to a fresh influx from
the Sudan. The trickle to Egypt of earlier years, Cox warned, had only in the last three or four years become a stream and until the products began to flow back as they soon would, the complications involved could not be fully realised. He thought it most important to watch that stream and check its numbers and subsequent fortunes. Though this was the Civil Secretary's business, he personally would like to see the Sudan Agent in Cairo given a standing instruction to watch and report on this. Inside the country he recommended that headmasters should be circulated to annually and instructed to send in returns to the Education Department of boys leaving their schools to seek instruction outside the Sudan.

As regards those Sudanese proceeding from Sudanese, British or Egyptian secondary schools to universities in Britain, Egypt or elsewhere outside the Sudan, the declaration of the principle laid down should do a good deal to act as a deterrent. Mr. Cox thought that so far there had hardly been any test cases. One Sudanese doctor with a British (Edinburgh) Degree, had recently applied for admission to the Medical Service; he was admitted provided he finished his training with the Kitchener School of Medicine students, but Cox thought he was right in saying that Pridie, the Director of Health, was reluctant to admit him, or at least would have preferred him to have been trained in the Kitchener School of Medicine, and would dislike a stream of Sudanese applicants from Great Britain, though that applicant was a good man. A Sudanese with an Egyptian Agricultural Degree applied to become a lecturer at the School of Agriculture and they had to turn him down.
In spite of the reasons given that not everyone with a degree was qualified to become a don or that if he had applied to the Agricultural Department's general cadre they would no doubt have taken him, such similar instances later on led holders of Egyptian degrees to believe that there was deliberate discrimination against them.

Cox was of the opinion that when trying to regulate and check a stream which had been already flowing for some years, if men who left the Sudan before the date when the Sudan Government formulated its policy presently returned with British or Egyptian or Beirut Degrees, it would be most unfair not to take them if they were in general suitable. But once the policy was formulated and made known, those who then chose to start university courses outside the country would know that preference would normally, not invariably, be given to those with the local Diplomas. He assured his successor that in such a policy he would certainly have the convinced support of all the employing Departments.

Much trickier, the former Director thought, was the attitude of the Sudanese themselves, to whom the glamour of a recognised Degree "even an Egyptian Degree" was a lure and they could easily - unless great care were taken - become suspicious (and even hostile) towards the Khartoum Diploma as a low standard makeshift depriving them of opportunity. This was a serious danger and it would not, the former Director thought, be averted unless the raising of the Khartoum academic standards to the equivalent of a recognised British counterpart was kept always in
mind as the constant aim of the Director of Education, as Chairman, the Committees and the Principals of the various schools.

This, Cox told his successor, had been done, in the face of much criticism, by successive directors of the Medical Service, with the result that as regards the Kitchener School of Medicine the danger had been averted. The Kitchener School of Medicine was to be the model for the other schools but the Director of Education was advised to throw his weight more heavily in the scales as regards the other schools, including the Teachers' School, than he would otherwise have wished to do, if he were to counterbalance the strong braking action of educational idealists on the one hand and Departments sceptical of Sudanese capacities on the other. The two key-points, for some time to come were, as Cox thought, qualifications of staff, and external examiners; the Sudanese were suspicious about the former and the Departments were not keen on the latter.

Lastly, Cox thought that in practice, when all was said and done about preference, it would be unlikely that Sudanese with British Degrees — too few to constitute a problem — or with Egyptian Degrees (except for certain Departments like Education and Medicine) would be refused posts as being not good enough compared with holders of Khartoum Diplomas. It was consequently possible that, especially if the Khartoum Diploma standards were to rise too slowly and the College became unpopular with the Sudanese, the Egyptian Government would be tempted for political reasons to give many facilities leading Sudanese directly or ultimately to Egyptian
universities. If that did occur, the former director thought, it would either, if in practice the government gave preference to Khartoum Diplomates, flood the Government with Sudanese graduates from Egypt without jobs, or sidetrack and stultify the University College plan, for the sake of which all that money in moving out the Secondary School had been sunk. Such a situation would be the concern of the Civil Secretary and if ever there were danger of it arising he imagined action would be taken through the British Embassy in Cairo.

Under these circumstances of concern for education from all sides the Graduates Congress concentrated its efforts in this field. It began the collection of donations from different parts of the country and for this purpose it organised what Congress called "Yawm al-Ta‘līm" or "Education Day". This was a special day on which, in each town, a festival was held during which articles donated for the purpose of financing "National Education" would be sold and contributions collected to be sent to the Graduates Congress Central Committee in Omdurman. How the money was to be spent by Congress on education was a topic of deliberations between representatives of the Congress and the Sudan Government.¹

Government and Congress on Ahlia Schools

When the Director of Education met the representatives of Congress, Ismail El Azhari, later first Prime Minister after Independence, Mohamed Saleh El Shingeti, later Speaker of Parliament,

¹. Note on Meeting with Representatives of Graduate’s General Congress 10.11.41. 9/6/65, MEA.
and Ahmed Mutwali El Atabani, later Attorney General, the Congress representatives, who were minor Government officials at the time, stated that they were not themselves proposing to open schools, but were going to use the money which they had then, about £6,000, to help existing schools, and to encourage and help the opening of new schools in the villages and towns by local Committees. Though the Government realised that Congress were eager to encourage local initiative its representatives had stated that they were anxious to act fully in agreement and harmony with Government development by helping local schools to start at places where the Government agreed that a proper demand existed.

Given the conditions of the war, the infancy of Congress and the fact that most of its members were employed by the Government, in addition to the fact that Government approval was essential, the attitude of the Congress representatives was that of compromise and understanding. They appreciated the Government view on avoiding the danger of giving a capital grant for schools which might subsequently prove unable to run efficiently without financial help from outside. The Government may have been apprehensive of being asked for that or of Egyptian help coming in for these schools. Congress representatives proposed to keep a fund in hand to help such schools with running expenses where necessary.

The Director of Education, expressing the general policy, said he was only too anxious to co-operate in a plan which aimed at spreading literacy and also at improving facilities which already existed. The important thing, he thought, was to avoid spending
money on schools which might subsequently become inefficient, or on schools for which there was not really an honest demand and for which parents were not prepared to pay fees. Congress representatives said that their main difficulty was in the provision of teachers and they asked to what extent the Government could help in their training. Could boys be taken into Bakht er Ruda or the Higher Schools? From these arguments it seems that while Congress was aiming at starting some schools at elementary, intermediate and secondary levels, the Government was planning to canalize the efforts of Congress and limit its activities to sub-grade schools as more secondary and intermediate schools may bring the potential political danger of unemployed educated Sudanese.

The Director also told the representatives that, at the time, the numbers being taken into both Bakht er Ruda and the Higher Schools were a maximum, having regard to accommodation and to practice classes available, and the output was still not enough to fill the Government cadres which were consequent on the 1938 submissions. He also raised the point that, at the moment, in contrast to England, all trained boys would prefer posts at Government schools, and that it was unreasonable to tell any of them, unless they were turned down as failures, that they could not be given such posts but should go to non-government schools instead. But he stated that more boys could be given some training for sub-grade school teaching, as soon as the Department were informed of any new schools of this type whose opening was being made possible by Congress help. Full training as elementary school-masters could not be offered, the Director said, for about three
years by which time the Bakht er Ruda intake could be increased.\textsuperscript{1}

The Congress representatives replied that for local village schools they had in mind the employment of reliable Ma'had graduates, perhaps with a former intermediate schoolboy assistant. The Director of Education, though he expressed no view for or against this, questioned whether the teaching capacities of the Ma'had graduates would be as good for the purpose as those of reliable former intermediate schoolboys. The Ma'had, which had been established by local initiative as a school of Islamic studies since 1912, continued to provide chances for some of its graduates to proceed to al-Azhar or teach religion in the country,\textsuperscript{2} but with very limited chances of entering into the Government service. The Congress proposal to employ Ma'had graduates indicated its intention to widen its support in the country by rallying this group who received their education in the Ma'had and not in the Gordon College and its related schools.

At the end of that meeting, both sides agreed that such meetings should be periodic, at least annual. However, after this meeting Congress seems to have decided to concentrate its efforts on intermediate schools rather than elementary schools or sub-grade schools as the Government had proposed. The political advantages of intermediate schools were greater and more obvious. Boys who finished intermediate schools were more assured of

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{2} Kamil el-Baghir, "Religious Education: Present and Future Development", in Philosophical Society of the Sudan, 11th Annual Conference 1963 on Education in the Sudan, pp. 76-89.
Government office jobs so the lure for parents to contribute and appreciate were greater than in the case of elementary schools for which the Government was not prepared to provide teachers and the sub-grade schools whose value was questioned. The difficulties facing the starting of non-government secondary schools were no doubt apparent to Congress. Since the membership of Congress was predominantly from former secondary and intermediate school boys more intermediate schools would provide Congress in a few years time with increasing membership of its own efforts.

The question of non-Government Sudanese intermediate schools was discussed in a meeting attended by the Assistant Civil Secretary and the senior members of the Department of Education early in the year.\(^1\) The Province Education Officer felt there was a danger of increasing the existing difficulty of finding employment for ex-intermediate schoolboys, and of producing a dissatisfied class of boys if such schools were permitted. The meeting recognised this danger and felt that expansion should be watched carefully with this in mind, but that the danger was not urgent. It was agreed that it was difficult to refuse such a request if the people were prepared to put up the necessary money. Until this time the only intermediate school that was set up, besides the Ahfad and the Ahlia Omdurman, was the Ahlia Intermediate School at Wad Medani,\(^2\) the nucleus of which was the elementary school started there in 1937.

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1. Record of meeting held in the Assistant Director's Office on 31st March, 1941. 9/8/65 MEA.
2. Letter dated 22nd December 1941. 9/8/65, MEA.
In April 1942, the President of the Graduates Congress intimated to the Director of Education that his Committee had included in their budget for that year funds for starting three intermediate schools by the beginning of 1943. One of the schools was to be at Dongola District, in the Northern Province. This was later located at El Golid, another at El Obeid, in the Western part of the Sudan and the third one at Omdurman. The President stated that the Graduates Congress was starting those schools in places where demand was high and in collaboration with local committees and that it would continue to give the necessary financial support till such time when the local committees could finally take over the full responsibility. After submissions of detailed plans by Congress and the local committees to the Director of Education and consultations between the latter, the Civil Secretary and the governors of the provinces concerned, approval was given by the Government for the proposed Ahlia Intermediate Schools to be started. To solve the staffing problems, some of the members of Congress volunteered and resigned their government jobs to teach in the Ahlia schools.

1. Letter dated 11th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Letter dated 13th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Letter dated 13th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
4. Letter dated 20th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
Congress Petition of 1942 Rejected by Government

In April 1942, Congress, influenced by the promise of the right of self-determination stipulated in the Atlantic Charter,\(^1\) presented the Sudan Government with a petition\(^2\) asking for

1. The issue, on the first possible opportunity, by the British and Egyptian Governments, of a joint declaration granting the Sudan, in its geographical boundaries, the right of self-determination, directly after this war, this right to be safeguarded by guarantees assuring full liberty of expression in connection therewith; as well as guarantees assuring the Sudanese the right of determining their natural rights with Egypt in a special agreement between the Egyptian and Sudanese nations.

2. The formation of a representative body of Sudanese to approve the Budget and the Ordinances.

3. The formation of a Higher Educational Council, composed of a Sudanese majority, and the devoting of a minimum of 12% of the Budget to education.

4. The separation of the Judiciary from the Executive.

5. The abolition of ordinances on 'closed areas' and the lifting of restrictions placed on trade and on the movements of the Sudanese within the Sudan.

6. The promulgation of legislation defining Sudanese nationality.

7. The stopping of immigration, except within limits agreed upon in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty.

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2. Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 82-83.
(8) The termination of the Sudan Plantations syndicate contract at its expiration.

(9) The carrying out of the principle of welfare of the Sudanese and their priority to government posts as follows:

(a) By giving the Sudanese an opportunity to share effectively in ruling the country; this is to be attained by the appointment of Sudanese in posts of political responsibility in all the main branches of government.

(b) By limiting the appointments to government posts to Sudanese.

(10) The Sudanese to be enabled to exploit the commercial, agricultural and industrial resources of the country.

(11) The promulgation of an ordinance imposing on companies and commercial firms the obligation of reserving a reasonable proportion of their posts for the Sudanese.

(12) The cancellation of subventions to missionary schools and the unification of the syllabuses in the northern and southern Sudan.

The forthright rejection of the petition by the Governor-General, who did not admit that Congress was entitled to speak for the nation, and the contrasting private assurances given by the Civil Secretary Douglas Newbold to Ibrahim Ahmed, the 1942 President, and some members of the Congress, led to the polarisation of rivalries inside Congress along political lines and the emergence of right wing or moderates on the one hand with Mahdist support and British patronage which continued when they became later on the Umma Party and on the other hand a left, led by
Azhari with the tacit support of the Khatmiyya following and later on with Egyptian patronage. But the two groups remained within Congress competing for its leadership. The demands included in the petition, though rejected by the Government, enhanced the demand for education as they pointed the way for the future value of education. This contributed to the popular support for the Ahlia Schools movement led by Congress.

In October 1942, six months after the petition of Congress, the Government, in reviewing the educational situation at the halfway stage of the educational programme of 1938, which provided for three more intermediate schools by 1946, affirmed that it was still government policy to provide intermediate education for the clever boys, the sons of chiefs and those who were able to pay for it. But realising that the number of boys in the last category was too large to be met by Government provision and recognising the enthusiasm apparent in the country for education at all levels, the Government adopted the policy of giving some encouragement to the opening of non-Government schools of the type of the Ahlias at Omdurman and Wad Medani, and the Ahfad at Omdurman, subject to certain conditions, chief amongst which were evidence of financial stability, administration of the school's affairs by an efficient representative committee and the existence of a strong local demand. The Government recognised

2. Note on non-Government intermediate schools to form the basis of discussion with representatives of the various schools and committees concerned, 6.10.1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
that three schools of this type, the attendance of which would shortly equal in number the normal attendance at eight full Government schools, had already been founded, and the opening of a fourth at Port Sudan had been approved, while permission had also been granted to the Graduates' Congress to prepare plans in concert with the local people for the opening of several more.

The Ahlia schools were asking for the same assistance from the Government as was granted to the missionary schools or the cancellation of grants to the latter as stated in the petition of Congress. The Government considered that though it preferred the Ahlia schools to charge economic fees yet in cases of need it thought of giving some assistance either in paying a proportion of each teacher's salary in accordance with the teacher's qualifications or in the shape of a small grant per head of the number of boys in the school.¹ Regarding the training of teachers for the Ahlias, the Government, though aware of their problem, found that it would be difficult to do very much in the next few years as the teacher trainees who were already in the Higher Schools or who were to be admitted in the course of the next two or three years, would be required for staffing the Government intermediate schools. To solve this problem the alternative proposals were; increasing the numbers in training classes in the Higher Schools of the Gordon College; the attachment of ex-secondary school boys to Government intermediate schools as apprentices, with a course at Bakht er Ruda to follow later; or as an additional possibility,

¹ Ibid., p.2.
the secondment to private schools of specialised Government teachers, e.g. of science and Arabic, in exchange for teachers of general subjects.

Another proposal to solve the teacher-training problem was the continuation of the practice which began that year of granting a limited number of scholarships at the Higher Schools in order to provide free tuition for the training of students intending to seek posts as teachers in non-Government school. As a corollary of this it was suggested that bursaries to cover their maintenance during the training period should be granted to those same students either by the school committees themselves or by the Committee of the Graduates' Congress or by other philanthropically disposed individuals or bodies. At the time three extra students had been taken into the School of Arts in 1942. The Government were providing their tuition free while the Graduates' Congress was paying for their maintenance. The Government warned a meeting with representatives of the Ahlia Schools and Congress, at which the latter was represented by Azhari, that in the next few years Government requirements would be high and that it would be impossible to give up many places for future non-Government school teachers.

The meeting of the Government with the representatives of Congress and the Ahlia schools did not arrive at specific

1. Ibid., p.3.
2. Record of Discussion on non-Government Intermediate Education. p.3. dated 18.11.42. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Ibid.
recommendations as to the form of the assistance the Government was to give to the Ahlia schools. The matter was raised again at a similar meeting two years later, in 1944. As the schools were growing and their liabilities were increasing it was agreed that representation should be made to the Government with regard to the payment of grants. The Government agreed to the appointment of a Sub-Committee "to prepare a case for presentation to the Director of Education for the giving of grants, both capital and recurrent, in order to assist Ahlia Intermediate and Secondary schools." The latter were just starting.

The Committee reported that the capital cost of a school building and initial equipment ranged between £2000 and £3000 on the basis of existing costs of material and this was raised by the school board locally. Any difference was covered by a grant from the "Education Fund" at the disposal of the Congress. Temporary buildings were in certain cases hired to house the school until the necessary funds were collected for the erection of permanent buildings. Teachers employed, the Committee reported, were partly unqualified for the job in view of the shortage of qualified teachers in the country. Great efforts were however being made to facilitate training of such teachers by providing refresher courses at Bakht or Ruda at their schools' expense.

1. Record of a Discussion on non-Government Intermediate Education, held in the Education Department on 12th May, 1944. 9/8/65, MBA.
2. Ibid., p.3.
3. Report by the Special Committee appointed by the Ahlia Schools Conference held in May, 1944. Dated 15th Nov., 1944. 9/8/65, MBA.
The recurrent expenditure, particularly on salaries, was considered by the Committee to be comparatively high and the deficit during the first four years amounted to about £E800 or about 35% of the teaching staff salaries, which deficit increased every year as the salaries were raised. The deficit was covered by local donations or grants from the Congress Education Fund. The maximum fees collected at the time were £E10 per boy per annum. Some schools had to raise their fees to £E12, which resulted in hardship causing many absences and uncollected arrears. Other schools reduced the free tuition percentage from 20 to 10% in an effort to reduce the deficit, thus depriving the poor of the chances of receiving education. So the Committee concluded that Government subsidies for Ahlia schools were needed and recommended rates of between one third to one half of the salaries of the teachers provided certain conditions were met by the schools.¹

In 1942 the Government told the Ahlia Schools that it would not be able to help them substantially in the training of teachers until 1945.² In 1945 the Director of Education wrote that it would not be until about 1948 that any real effort could be made to supply non-Government schools with fully qualified teachers. Meanwhile, he told the Civil Secretary, if the Government insisted on a new school opening with qualified and experienced teachers, the result could only be that these would be attracted

1. Ibid., p.2.
away from existing Government or non-Government schools, with consequent loss of efficiency to them, as teachers could not be replaced, and raw recruits had to be engaged without any training.\footnote{To obviate this difficulty he laid it down that when new schools were permitted to open, they should be able to find in their first year adequate staff, perhaps from retired officials, without drawing from existing schools; and that thereafter they should appoint staff in advance for a year's training as supernumeraries, attached to government schools. The Government insisted on the Ahlia schools charging economic fees with no Government subsidies in the first four years of the school and having sound financial guarantees before permission was to be given for their establishment.} To obviate this difficulty he laid it down that when new schools were permitted to open, they should be able to find in their first year adequate staff, perhaps from retired officials, without drawing from existing schools; and that thereafter they should appoint staff in advance for a year's training as supernumeraries, attached to government schools. The Government insisted on the Ahlia schools charging economic fees with no Government subsidies in the first four years of the school and having sound financial guarantees before permission was to be given for their establishment.\footnote{The Landmark 1946 was a year of political activities concerning the Sudan both inside the country and abroad and these had their impact on education as well. The Labour Government in Britain was at the time involved in a series of negotiations with the Egyptian Government over Anglo-Egyptian relations, chief amongst them the question of the Sudan. By this time Sudanese political parties had been formed and a combined delegation\footnote{Henderson, *Sudan Republic*, p. 94.} representing all shades of opinion was sent to Cairo headed by Azhari, who was 1. Policy to be adopted in regard to the opening of non-Government intermediate schools, dated 11th February, 1945. 9/8/65, MEA. 2. 27th February, 1946, 3rd March, 1946. 9/8/65, MEA. 3. Henderson, *Sudan Republic*, p. 94.}
by this time head of the Ashiqqa Party and the Graduates' General Congress. The two main points of view were that of the Umma Party, standing for complete independence and favouring co-operation with the British in a gradual development towards self-government, and that of the more militant Ashiqqa and other smaller groups who believed in some form of association with Egypt, ranging from complete unity to loose federation, with greater antipathy and distrust of the British. Soon after arriving in Cairo the delegation split again with the result that the Umma delegates were recalled back to Sudan and Azhari and the pro-Egypt members remained there.

Post-War Student Militancy

As militancy grew in the Graduates Congress after the petition of 1942 so it was the case with the students body after 1946. From the Gordon College and its higher schools to the secondary schools militancy became widespread and the occasion of the departure of the delegation witnessed huge popular as well as student demonstrations in the Sudan. Since then the involvement of Sudanese students in politics has not ceased and not a single year had passed without a strike or a demonstration taking place in one secondary school or post-secondary institution in the country. If in the late 1960s European and American students began to be widely involved in political and social questions because,

partly, there were so many of them; in the Sudan students became involved, partly, because there were so few of them in comparison to the total number of the population. By 1946, with only one post-secondary College, the Gordon College, which had not yet started awarding University degrees and with only two Government secondary schools that could lead to that College, the students identified themselves as an intelligentsia which had a social and political responsibility. The example of the role played by the Egyptian students in politics at the time was not too far to emulate.

With more and more students leaving the Sudan to study in Egyptian Universities either because they were dissatisfied with the standard of the Gordon College, as was anticipated by the former Director of Education in 1939, or because they could not secure places for themselves in the Sudan and were offered chances of education in Egypt, some of these students coming back home during their holidays participated in disseminating the ideologies of the Communist and Moslem Brotherhood organisations, which were rife amongst the Egyptian students in the late forties and early fifties, and this dissemination which began at the Gordon College in Khartoum found its way to the secondary schools. The fact that Sudanese secondary school pupils were, and still are, between sixteen to twenty years old, an age comparable to that of British undergraduates, made them more susceptible to political involvement. Ever since that time life in the secondary schools and institutions of higher education has come to be polarised between normal class
and school work and ideological involvement and political participation or affiliation of one sort or another. This early involvement led to the Students' Union of the Gordon College and later on of the University of Khartoum coming to be a national political forum for the varying political parties with a general tendency of opposition to the Government of the day.

Gordon College and Asquith Report

Thus 1946 witnessed the inauguration of the post-war political strife in the Sudan, and on the educational plane it saw the involvement of the post-war generation of students in politics and the first steps towards the affiliation of the Higher Schools of the Gordon College to London University. It was not until the end of 1944 that the Gordon Memorial College ceased to be a Government secondary school and became the home of the post-secondary higher schools, under the direct and independent control of a council with a statutory constitution. The decision to enter into association with the University of London for the purpose of entering the best students of the College for the London external general B.A. and B.Sc. degrees was taken in December 1945. The Sudan Government and the College authorities were greatly helped at this critical time by arrangements made for similar African Colleges as a result of the Asquith Report that year. The year 1946 was one of planning and preparation for the implementation of this plan in 1947.

At the beginning of the year 1945 there were 207 students in the College distributed among the various schools, with 106 in the School of Arts, 65 in the School of Science, 17 in the School of Engineering, 11 in the School of Administration, 5 in the School of Agriculture and 3 in Khartoum Veterinary School. During the course of that year, however, the College authorities reported that there was a drift of students away to Fu'ād I University, Cairo, owing to the attractions of the very favourable financial terms offered to Sudanese students there and of the chance of gaining a degree.¹

Post-War Educational Programme

1946 seems to have been a year of first occasions in the post-war period in more than one way: Hantoub and Wadi Seidna Secondary Schools moved to their new premises; the King Farouk Secondary School was opened in its own buildings in Khartoum by the Egyptian Minister of Education, indicating the rivalry at school level between the British and the Egyptians in the Sudan; secondary education for girls became a definite part of the Sudan Government system of education with the acceptance of twelve fourth year intermediate girls in the recently formed secondary class at the Omdurman Girls Intermediate School.² And the first post-war educational programme was approved to cover the period 1945-56.

The programme was estimated to involve a capital expenditure of more than £E2,500,000 spread over the next ten years, which would raise the total recurrent expenditure on education from £E4,50,000 in 1946 to £E1,000,000 in 1956. This programme was revised later on subsequent to political developments. An outstanding reform in the programme, which was later on discarded,\(^1\) was the Brown plan, named after its author who was the headmaster of Hantoub Secondary School till 1955. It aimed at the creaming off of the intermediate school at the end of the second year to give those who were intended for academic education six years of secondary education ending in a class comparable to the English Sixth form.\(^2\) This reform was not, however, carried out and the three stages of four years each continued to characterise the school system in the Sudan as since its inception early in the century.

The Ahlia schools were more fortunate under the new programme which was prepared while the leaders of Congress, the Champions of Ahlia schools, were in Cairo intensifying the agitation against the Sudan Government and increasing the latter's speculations about Egyptian money being poured into the country for political reasons.\(^3\) A report sent from the British District Commissioner of Wadi Halfa, the closest Sudanese town to Egypt, aroused considerable concern in Khartoum over possible Egyptian subventions to Ahlia schools in the Sudan. The District Commissioner

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reported\(^1\) that he had been shown a letter from the Union of the Northern Sudan (Education Section). It stated they wished to open an Ahlia Intermediate School in Haifa for boys. They quoted the Sudan press as saying that there were 168 applications for forty places in the Haifa Intermediate School in 1946, which was true, and stated that Ismaïl El Azhari, leader of the Sudan delegation in Cairo whom they consulted, advised them that much money would be required and that they should have the Sudan Government's permission. They claimed that provision of the necessary money was easy and relied on people on the spot to obtain the Sudan Government's permission for the school.

The letter also mentioned that Suleiman Gasim, a member of the Union which comprised Sudanese of Haifa district working in Egypt, made himself entirely responsible for school building. Here was the rub of the matter. Suleiman Gasim was personal attendant to King Farouk at Abdin Palace in Cairo. The Commissioner had no doubt that Gasim would adopt the same tactics in this matter as he had adopted over the Abri Mosque in 1943, by obtaining an initial subscription and patronage from the King and then collecting the rest of the money from the Pashas. The Commissioner was asking to be informed how he should reply to the application as he had already mentioned, when approached, the difficulties about staff for the school, though he had no doubt that reasonably adequate staff could be recruited from retired masters in the district. The Haifa Education Committee, a local one, were

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1. Letter dated May 30th, 1946. 9/8/65, MEA.
themselves on the point of starting a drive for an Ahlia Intermediate School but also required a new building for their sub-grade school.

The Governor of the Northern Province immediately sent the report to the Civil Secretary who consulted the Intelligence Department, the Department of Education and then sent his reply.\textsuperscript{1} He thought that the best way of minimising the undesirable effects to the Sudan Government of having Egyptian, and particularly palace, backing behind the proposed Ahlia School at Wadi Halfa would be for the district commissioner to stimulate as soon as possible the Halfa Education Committee into definite action, and to allow them to start the work for an Intermediate School. Should the Union of the Northern Sudan subsequently apply for permission to open a school, they could be told that a proposal to start an Ahlia School had already been given provisional approval, and it could be suggested that they place whatever funds they might have at the disposal of the Committee already set up.

The Director of Education was in agreement with the action and was prepared to approve the establishment of an Ahlia school at Wadi Halfa. The Sudan Government most definitely did not want a "King Farouk School" at Wadi Halfa and were determined to do what they could to prevent one being established there. At the same time they could not afford politically to refuse Egyptian money, so the best line of defence was a local committee which,

\textsuperscript{1} 18th June, 1946. 9/8/65, MEA.
they realised, would require prodding and support if it was to withstand the lure and pressure of Egyptian rivalry. Other Ahlia schools also needed support, which meant substantial subsidies to existing ones and closer scrutiny of applications for new Ahlia schools if a similar danger was to be averted. The number of Ahlia Intermediate Schools by 1946 was 14 schools with an enrolment of 3,787 boys as compared to 13 Government Intermediate Schools with 2,027. Congress was priding itself that it had helped to found more intermediate schools in a few years than the Sudan Government had been able to do in almost half a century.

With the increase in number of Ahlia schools, the need arose for a Union of the Ahlia Schools, or an educational board to arrange the relationship between the teachers, the schools and the Government. This proposal appeared first in the vernacular press and was endorsed by the Education Department, which asked the Ahlia schools to discuss it. The Government was beginning to think that "these schools would have started up even had the Education Day Fund not been in existence." Up till 1945 the Omdurman Ahlia School, the Ahfad School and the Wad Medani Ahlia Schools, the three 1. Letter dated 22nd June, 1946. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Record of Meeting, 12th November, 1946, p. l. 9/8/65, MEA.
4. Ibid., p. 124.
5. Al-Ra'i al-'Am Newspaper 17.12.46.
oldest, received small subventions towards books and materials. By 1946 the Wad Medani Ahlia was granted £2,500 by the Governor-General as a mark of recognition of the committee’s good work.

The Government also became committed to assist all Ahlia schools to the extent of up to 33% of their staff salary bills after the first four years of their establishment, with eligibility for subsidies of up to half their budget or all of their deficits.¹

With more agitation by the militant nationalists for the immediate termination of colonial rule and more promises by the Sudan Government to the moderates of increasing Sudanisation in the Civil Service at all levels up to 62% by 1962,² rapid increase in the number of Ahlia schools was effected so that by 1949 their number rose to 21 intermediate schools, with 4,332 pupils, nine elementary schools with 1,520 pupils and three secondary schools with 315 pupils.³ Needless to say improved economic conditions in the post-war period enabled many parents to send their children to schools and meet the required fees.

By 1952 the number of Ahlia schools rose to a total of forty, thirty of which were boys’ intermediate, two were girls’ intermediate. The latter were the first Ahlia schools opened for girls at the intermediate level.⁴ During the period of transition

to independence which began with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1953, Ahlia schools continued to grow in number and to provide common ground for people belonging to different political parties yet serving together on the voluntary work of founding Ahlia schools in their own areas.

After Independence the Government decided that education was a national responsibility of the Ministry of Education and the boards of the Ahlia schools were to be thanked for their efforts and for taking that responsibility during the period of colonial rule. The Government decided to take over the Ahlia schools in the North just before it announced the takeover of the missionary schools in the South. Very few Ahlia schools resisted the government decision and were permitted to remain as private schools, depending on their own revenues by charging economic fees. The Ahfad was one of the few schools which decided to opt for this. A similar agreement was reached with the Christian Missionary Schools in the North.

By July 1957 the decision to take over the Ahlia schools had been implemented and the school boards handed their responsibilities to the Ministry of Education. Fifty-one intermediate schools and 4 secondary streams were thus incorporated into the Government system. This step was recognised by the Ministry as having made "a big demand on the time and means of the Ministry."

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Intense Last Ten Years of Condominium

The last ten years of the condominium had been most intense and active on both the political and the educational planes. After the split in the delegation in Cairo and the recalling of the independence group, negotiations continued between the Egyptian and the British governments. In October, 1946, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Isma‘il Şidky, went to London in search of a settlement or a compromise. Tension in the Sudan was high. When the news came that Britain would be brought to recognise Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, the Umma Party and its patron Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi were very disturbed by what came to be known as the Şidky-Bevin Protocol, though the British and the Egyptian sides each had their own interpretation of the sovereignty envisaged. The Condominium Government in Khartoum was also unhappy about the protocol which it resisted in its own way, and the Governor General, Sir Hubert Hudleston, had behind him in opposing it the support of every British Civil Servant in the Sudan. Thus the draft agreement came to nothing.³

After fruitless attempts at negotiation the successor of Şidky Pasha, Naqrashî Pasha, lodged, on 13 July 1947, an official complaint to the Security Council, saying that the continued presence of British troops in Egypt and British administration in the Sudan was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations. The complaint was duly debated by the Security Council in August.

³ Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 94-95.
Three delegations from the Sudan were at Lake Success to attend the debate, representing the Government and the two rival groups. The Security Council did not reach a solution and the three delegations returned to the Sudan.

**Political Development**

The Sudan Government in 1946 set up a special committee to work out a new constitution and a more representative body which might be more acceptable to the educated Sudanese, who in general regarded the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, formed in 1943, as a continuation of the policy of Native Administration. Congress was not represented on it and the educated Sudanese were mainly ignored, 1 except for a very few individuals. It was composed mainly of traditional religious and tribal chiefs with no real power. 2 The South, too, was not represented as the Government till that time had not decided that the South should join with the North. The meetings of the Commission which was to discuss what should replace the Advisory Council came to be known as the Sudan Administration Conference. This resulted in the constitution of the Legislative Assembly which met in 1948. The Legislative Assembly was boycotted by the militant parties which were pro-Egyptian, but was accepted by the Umma party.

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The Constituent Assembly

The militants, backed by Egypt, regarded the Legislative Assembly as a British design to prolong their stay in the Sudan, while the Umma, the tribal chiefs, and the Southerners, who decided to join after the Juba Conference in 1947, justified it as a step towards self-government. The boycott was effective after violent riots in the towns by the militant political movement, trade unions and the students. The Assembly chose a Sudanese Speaker, and as Leader of the House, the Secretary of the Umma Party, Abdalla Khalīl, who then appointed a Minister of Health, a Minister of Education, and ten Parliamentary Under-Secretaries all of whom were ex-officio members of the Assembly. All of these were founders and ex-members of the Graduates Congress who had ceased to participate in it after it had been completely taken over by their militant rivals in 1945.¹

The ministers, three under secretaries and the senior British officials formed what was called the Executive Council.

Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations

Meanwhile negotiations between Britain and Egypt had petered out in 1948, been resumed in 1950 and continued in a desultory fashion. In 1951 a proposal was adumbrated for a Middle East Defence Pact between Egypt, Turkey, France, Britain and the U.S.A. This could not be discussed as practical politics until the Sudan question had been solved. On the night of 8 October 1951

the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa El Nahās Pasha, announced the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the Condominium Agreement declaring Farouk as King of Egypt and the Sudan.¹ This was interpreted by the anti-British militant movement as destroying the juridical basis of the Condominium Government in the Sudan. Agitation followed in the schools with further demonstrations and strikes by students and workers.

The Umma, the British and the Militants

Inside the Assembly the Umma party started to urge the Government to hasten steps towards self-government, to the extent that in December 1950 they forced a motion through the Assembly in favour of immediate independence. The motion was opposed mainly by Southern representatives and tribal chiefs whom the Umma accused of being lobbied by Senior British officials.² The Umma were confirmed in their suspicions when later on the Republican Socialist Party came into existence, comprising tribal notables in the Assembly who summed up their policy as one of full co-operation with the existing government "Until such a time as the country is in a position to decide its own future."³ They were regarded by the Umma as an attempt by the British to undermine their rural following. It looked as though the British were trying to make use of their connections during the period of

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1. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 100.
2. Duncan, Sudan's Path to Independence, p. 137.
3. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 100.
'Indirect Rule', \(^1\) and of the Southern Policy, to provide a balancing force to the Umma and to those of the Khatmiyya who might be persuaded to join the next parliament, which was supposed to succeed the Legislative Assembly after its expiry in 1952 as another stage in Self-Government.\(^2\) The militant movement, though weakened by schisms within itself during this period, was bent on boycotting the constitution for the proposed parliament as it had done with the Legislative Assembly.

1952 Coup d'etat in Egypt

The political unrest which was rife in Egypt culminated on the 23rd July 1952 in a coup d'état. General Najīb, who emerged as the head of the new regime, was born in the Sudan and went to school there with leading politicians. The new regime in Egypt took a more realistic approach to the question of the Sudan and formally abandoned Egypt's claim to sovereignty in an attempt to reach an agreement with the Sudanese political parties over the evacuation of the British from the Sudan within three years, to be followed by self-determination either for complete independence or some form of union with Egypt. The Ashiqqā and the smaller unionist parties merged and formed the National Unionist Party headed by Azhari. They then signed the Agreement with the Umma Party. The Socialist Republicans signed too. With all the Northern parties signing the agreement the British Government "had no real choice

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2. Duncan, Sudan's Path to Independence, p. 140.
about doing the same. It fought hard for the inclusion of safeguards for the South, and incurred northern hostility by so doing, but had to give way and sign an agreement in its turn in February 1953." Only the communists opposed the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement and tried to stage strikes and demonstrations in the trade unions and the schools but later on they retracted their opposition.

**Agreement and Independence**

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement provided for a Special Commission (instituted April 1953) to review arrangements for elections and ensure that they were conducted in a free and neutral atmosphere. It consisted of two Sudanese, one Egyptian and one British member under a Chairman from Pakistan. The elections themselves were supervised by a separate international commission with an Indian expert, Dr. Sukumar Sen, in the chair. The various parties settled down to an election campaign and in January 1954 a new Government took over, with Isma'īl El Azhari as Prime Minister. In February a Sudanisation Committee started to get rid of the British officials and in April 1955 its work was completed. By November the British and Egyptian troops had gone. In December Parliament resolved unanimously for independence. On the first of January, 1956, the flags of England and Egypt were hauled down and the new tricolour hoisted in their place.

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Impact of Tense Ten Years before Independence

These political developments had their impact on the ten-year educational plan which had been prepared to cover the period 1945-1956. During 1946 the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan set up a special committee to study the plan. The committee's report, which was published in April 1947, recommended the postponement of the scheme for the re-organisation of secondary education, the Brown plan, and also called for a more rapid rate of expansion at all levels than had previously been envisaged. Discussions on these points were held between the Department and the Committee in November that year, and a modified plan was formulated which was described by the Government as "modified to meet the Committee's wishes so far as was possible."\(^2\)

1. Outline of Original Education Plan 1946-1956,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Schools</th>
<th>Position in 1946</th>
<th>Target in 1956 Number of schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOYS SCHOOLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-grade schools</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
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<td>(for the year 1945)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary schools</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate and preparatory schools</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Secondary Schools</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Secondary Schools</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRLS SCHOOLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary schools</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate schools</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schools</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bakht er Ruda and Intermediate Education

When the Constituent Assembly came into being the first Sudanese Minister of Education was Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, who had been for the previous twelve years Vice-principal of Bakht er Ruda. ¹ Bakht er Ruda came to play another role in the plan by opening, in August 1949, the two-year Intermediate Teachers Training Course for former secondary school boys, to meet the needs of intermediate schools for trained teachers. Formerly intermediate schools used to recruit Gordon College diplomates, who by this time with opportunities of Sudanisation in administrative jobs had become more attracted by other departments. The course was designed to turn out 45 teachers yearly to meet the requirements. At the same time it was feared that the absorption of this number of young and inexperienced teachers into the cadre would naturally raise problems in the schools, and arrangements were made at the end of 1949 for more regular inspection of intermediate schools. ² This put Bakht er Ruda in full charge of intermediate education, inspection, books and training, besides its long established responsibility for elementary education and with the South coming into the picture further revisions in the plan were made by the Minister ³ so that the responsibilities of Bakht er Ruda came to be countrywide for the eventual unification of the two systems which had hitherto existed in the North and the South.

¹. Griffiths, p. v.
Technical Education

A major contribution of the 1946 plan and its subsequent revisions was in the field of technical education, the development of which was overdue and was made all the more necessary by post-war economic development. When the Brown Plan was discarded in 1948 the technical educational requirements were assessed and plans were framed for the development of this branch of education. It was proposed to set up pre-apprenticeship schools at El Obeid, Wad Medani, Omdurman and Port Sudan. The object of these schools was to recruit boys direct from the elementary schools and to provide facilities for their further education in general and technical subjects. The course was originally planned to be of three years' duration to give a background to those who were required as artisans in industrial occupations.

Concurrently with the setting up of these schools, a Technical Institute was decided on, to be established in the Khartoum area. This was the origin of what came to be known as the Khartoum Technical Institute (K.T.I.).¹ A senior technical school was designed, to be accommodated within the Institute, with the object of continuing the education of selected boys from the pre-apprenticeship schools for a further three years course. The curriculum for this section was meant to give to the boys the knowledge demanded of those who aimed to qualify for higher technical posts in industry. It was decided that facilities should be provided in the Technical Institute to enable workers to attend

¹ G.G. Report, 1948, p. 149.
continuation classes, and also accommodation for departments of commerce, industrial art, and adult education.

Technical education remained a second best to academic education. It was also influenced by the latter and soon the three year courses became four year courses, like the intermediate and the general secondary in duration. With shortage of artisans and technically qualified people, boys began to find their way from general intermediate or secondary schools to the upper stages of the Khartoum Technical Institute. The Institute itself began to increase the number of years of its course in its post secondary section from two to three and then to four years. When it reached the latter stage its graduates began to ask for equal status with that of university graduates. This led to friction over salary scales and status between two types of engineers in the country, those with university degrees local or foreign, and those with K.T.I. diplomas.

By the end of 1963 the K.T.I. stood at the apex of the pyramid of technical education with two branches of a secondary school, twenty-five intermediate technical schools, ten trade schools for the training of skilled foremen and one senior trade school in Khartoum to produce skilled supervisors of works.¹

The K.T.I. was one of the beneficiaries of the technical aid particularly American given to the country after independence, and many of its graduates found their way to American Universities

and Colleges and returned to teach in the Institute. By 1964 the Institute graduates were recognised by the Government, which was engaged on big constructional programmes, as equal as regards pay to those who completed four years of University studies, to the great resentment of the University engineering students and graduates, who interpreted this as an attempt by the military government, then in power, to win over the Institute against the opposition to military rule which was rife among the students and was centred around and led by the students of the University of Khartoum. Later that year, with the overthrow of the military government after popular uprisings in the country, the Prime Minister of the civil caretaker government was the Principal of the K.T.I. and deputy under-secretary of the Ministry of Education. In 1965 the Institute staff and students campaigned vigorously and after a series of strikes and resignations managed to gain recognition as an autonomous body independent of the Ministry of Education and governed by a council similar to that of the University of Khartoum.

The Ten Year Plan\(^1\) for economic and social development covering the years 1961/62 - 1970/71 put more emphasis on technical education than had been the case before. The plan stipulated that industrial output should be increased by no less than 500%, from £86 million to £536 million. It was realised in the plan that this development would result in increases in the demand for

technical skills of all types and at all levels.\textsuperscript{1} Over the total period of the plan it was estimated that the expected output for technical jobs was only 3,350 persons against the stated requirements of the plan of 9,000. One of the implications of this was that the national educational institutions, especially the technical ones, needed to be expanded and supplemented as fast as possible in order that they might eventually be able to meet the requirements\textsuperscript{2} of economic development. A Unesco mission that was called upon to investigate the situation in January and February 1963\textsuperscript{3} found that for the purposes of the plan the number of intermediate technical schools was very small by comparison with academic schools and the number of the students in the former was less than one twentieth of those in the latter. The disparity was less, though still great, at the secondary stage where the enrollment in secondary technical schools was only 14\% of that in secondary academic schools.\textsuperscript{4}

The Unesco mission noted that the school system in the Sudan appeared to be based on the principle that all pupils of the age of 11-15 years were capable of pursuing academic education. This meant to the mission that there was "an actual insistent demand for a particular type of education rather than one based

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\item \textit{Unesco Educational Investment Programming Mission, Khartoum, July 1963}, p. 15.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.5.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.149.
\end{enumerate}
on educational theories or principles or indeed, on the real needs of the economy.\footnote{Ibid., p.150.} There was consequently a neglect of preparation for future trade practice, specially in the field of skilled and semi-skilled artisans and craftsmen." It seemed that the mission did not realise that it was partly the needs for white collar officials in the lower echelons of the civil service, and later on at the higher ones, that popularised the system they were criticizing. The mission however realised that the problem was partly due to the fact that only one third of the boys leaving the elementary schools found places in the intermediate schools, government or private, and the other two thirds had to find employment as unskilled workers. Those leaving intermediate schools (of whom 96\% would have been in academic schools) could also be classified as completely unskilled despite a higher level of general education. These were to a great extent the causes of the great shortage of skilled and competent workers in the Sudan, and the contribution of the intermediate schools to solving the problems in the plan of lack of manpower was very small. If it was to be increased more emphasis would need to be placed upon technical education. The total amount for technical education in the ten year development plan was £34,130,000 out of the total £834,150,166 which was estimated for new schemes in the educational field.\footnote{Ibid., p.153.}
The Crosby report dated April 1960 on manpower indicated that 90% of the skilled tradesmen in the Sudan at the outset of the plan were expatriates and when new projects required more expert workmen, they were usually recruited from abroad. The Sudanese Government, hoping to replace this large number of expatriates, embarked on an intensive programme of technical and vocational training and apprenticeship. By 1964/65 the Khartoum technical institute was providing training in engineering, art, commercial subjects, and building construction. Some other post-secondary courses were also offered but not at a level that would enable students to qualify for the higher certificate. Entry requirements specified a secondary academic or technical school certificate. Though the K.T.I. operated its own secondary school from which it drew students, generally only 30% of K.T.I. entrants had had technical training prior to enrolment.

There were about 500 students enrolled for 1964-65 at the institute's higher level. The Institute expected to graduate 120 engineering students in 1964/65. This was more than the total number of 83 engineers who graduated from the University of Khartoum in the period 1956/1962 and while the Institute was scheduled to maintain that number of graduates annually till the

1. Education and World Affairs, p. 3.
2. Education and World Affairs, pp.15-16.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
end of the period of the plan there were 207 students in all the four years of the Faculty of Engineering and Architecture in the year 1964/65. ¹

From University College to University of Khartoum

However, the arrangements with London University which were made in 1946 for the Gordon College were further developed in 1951 when the Kitchener School of Medicine joined with the Gordon College in one body to form the University College of Khartoum which continued to grant its local diplomas as well as to prepare the better students for the external degrees of London University. ² As the College since its foundation was closely related to the needs of the Government service, the Sudanisation of posts, which took place in a hurricane manner in the transitional period after the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, had greatly enhanced the position of the College and its graduates. When independence was declared on the first of January 1956 the Civil Service was a fully Sudanese service - senior and junior posts in every branch of the service came to be held by Sudanese. According to the recommendations of the 1948 Sudanisation Committee 62.2% of Division I and II posts were to be Sudanised by 1962. ³ Things did move fast, much faster than could be contemplated before.

1. University of Khartoum, "Number of Students 1955-1968".
2. Dafa’Allah, p. 4, op. cit.
3. Mohammad Abd el Halim Mahgoub, "The Sudan Civil Service" given in a seminar arranged by the University of Khartoum and the Conference for Cultural Freedom, Khartoum, 1962, p. 6.
Since development became the main aim of the governments after independence the Civil Service became the main instrument for development and the College was its main source of professional supply; other sources came to be scholarships abroad,¹ sponsored by Government or semi-governmental departments or by other governments or international organisations. The total of scholarships abroad was estimated as 459 in the year 1962/63². Still the local supply was the main source. The University College of Khartoum became the University of Khartoum in July 1956 and thus became the first of the African Colleges affiliated to London University, after the Asquith report, to reach the status of an independent university,³ granting its own degrees. But the University of Khartoum remained in close contact with the British Universities in the fields of external examiners, recruitment of staff, and scholarships for its future staff.⁴ Besides trying to supply for the needs of the country from its eight faculties,⁵ the University of Khartoum's other concerns were the maintenance of a high academic standard and the training of its future Sudanese scholars⁶ abroad, mainly in Britain and in the United States.

2. Ibid.
5. The Faculty of Pharmacy, the ninth faculty was opened in 1964.
Higher Education

The growth of the Egyptian type of education in the post-war period culminated in the establishment of the Khartoum Branch of the Cairo University in October 1955. This provided a further opportunity for higher education in the country and, as its classes were conducted in the evenings, it also provided chances for government employees who possessed the necessary qualifications to get further qualifications in its faculties of Arts, Law and Commerce. The opportunities provided created further problems in higher education a few years later when the graduates of the humanities, particularly in law, from both universities began to compete for certain government jobs such as the judiciary. With the graduates of the Egyptian universities accusing the Government of preferring Khartoum University graduates, an old complaint since the colonial days, some departments, the Judiciary, the Attorney General and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced their own selection examinations instead of the usual practice of interviewing the applicants. This problem was to be further complicated with the return of the great but unrecorded numbers of secondary school leavers who found their own way for various courses of higher and university education abroad, particularly in East European countries.

The development and expansion of higher education is a remarkable feature of the post-independence period. The Ma‘had al-‘Ilmi which started as a parallel Islamic School to the
Gordon College, developed also into the Islamic University of Omdurman in 1965 thus bringing a third University to the country, besides the Higher Teachers Training Institute, which was established in 1961\(^1\) for the training of future secondary school teachers in a four year course which would lead to a diploma. The latter was resented by the students as their entrance qualifications were similar to those of the University of Khartoum and consequently they wanted a recognised university degree and not a diploma. Both students and staff came to be desirous of an affiliation with the University of Khartoum and of autonomy from the Ministry of Education. Other Ministries created their own post-secondary training courses, such as the two year Agricultural Institute at Shambat in Khartoum North, which was started by the Ministry of Agriculture and began to face similar problems of discontent with existing status and demands for a more recognised qualification. The creation of a National Council for Higher Education or even a Ministry of Higher Education could be the most satisfactory way of meeting the problems of assessment of standards, distribution of students and the co-ordination with the needs and requirements of the country in a more planned way. Since about one half of secondary school leavers get post-secondary training in one form or another,\(^2\) with expansion in secondary education the need for co-ordination becomes imperative instead of the present unco-ordinated set up.

1. Al-‘Arq a-th-Thālith, p. 23.
2. Ibid., p. 44.
The proposition for co-ordination does not mean that the needs of the country were exceeded or even met by the development of these institutions. The Ten Year Plan for development, which was described by its critics as conservative and unambitious and by its protagonists as realistic, calculated that the total output of the University of Khartoum over the ten year period ending in 1970-71 would be 4,400, and if it was assumed that approximately 150 students would return annually from overseas study, high-level personnel among these would total 1,500 by 1970-71. Consequently, the total number of Sudanese University graduates over the plan period would be about 5,900 - only about 45 per cent of the additional needs. If the approximately 1,000 persons to be upgraded over the plan period through training at the University of Cairo's Khartoum branch, and the 2,545 graduates anticipated by the plan itself from the Khartoum Technical Institute and similar Institutions are included in the output estimate, the need for additional trained manpower will be reduced to 3,300 and almost 74 per cent of the additional personnel required will have been supplied.¹

These figures, however great the efforts made in their projection, should be taken as guidelines and not as very reliable as the plan itself indicated.² Co-ordination might lead to better results and at less cost. Though the supply of high-

level man-power was expected to be better (74%) than that of middle-level man-power, only 12% the cost of training per head would also be much higher at the higher level. The student in the University of Khartoum was estimated in 1962/63 to cost £3727 per annum, both in direct and indirect expenses, while the expenses for a secondary school pupil would be half that amount.

International Commission on Secondary Education 1955.

Unlike higher education, secondary schools and the lower stages of education had been under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Concern over secondary education and its problems grew with its deteriorating results in the years just before independence for which various explanations were offered but the most common in the headmasters reports was the frequent interruptions to school work through student strikes over political issues in the country.¹ However, in November 1954, about a year before independence, the Governor General of the Sudan invited an international commission of British, Egyptian and Indian educationalists with a Sudanese as a Secretary, to investigate and advise the Sudan Government on the improvement and development of secondary education.² The Commission met from January the 15th to 28th February 1955. When the report was published in 1957 the Sudan had already become independent.

The terms of reference of the Commission were:

"To enquire into and make recommendations to improve secondary education in the Sudan with particular reference to:

(a) The low standard of secondary schools and the problem of producing adequate numbers of young men with the pre-requisite qualifications to enter the University College of Khartoum.

(b) Inter-relationship of different types of secondary schools.

(c) The content and method of selection at the lower stages and how they affected this standard.  

In interpreting these terms the Commission had taken into consideration the fact that no stage of education could be treated in isolation and that all stages were inter-related and inter-dependent. They regarded, rightly, that the standard of secondary education, for instance, was bound to be affected not only by the standard of elementary and intermediate schools from which their pupils were drawn, but also by the standard of the college from which their teachers were recruited. The function of secondary education in the Sudan, in relation to the future development and needs of the country, was seen by the Commission as much wider and more far reaching than "producing adequate numbers of young men with pre-requisite qualifications to enter the University College". They recognised, however, that this

1. Ibid., p. 1.
was an important function of secondary schools, and that, in the special circumstances obtaining in the country at the time, due partly to the policy of "Sudanisation" of services, this function had acquired special urgency. But basically, the Commission thought, secondary education, like education at other stages, should be an end in itself. It should provide an intellectual and social training for the child of secondary school age suitable to his abilities and interests at that age, and it should aim at making this of the highest possible quality.

The Commission did not forget that many secondary pupils would have particular aims in mind, such as the University, or Training College. But the secondary schools should not be led by this consideration to concentrate too much on the mere aim of preparing for University or College. In principle, if they saw to it that they gave their pupils a true and well balanced education the rest would follow automatically.¹

It seemed to the Commission that the secondary schools were not able to live up to this high ideal. In actual practice, almost every student went to the secondary school with the fixed aim of passing the final examination in order to be able to join the College, and the whole work of the schools was dominated by the pressure and the demands of the examinations. As some of the witnesses who were working in secondary schools had put it, the whole success of the school was apt to be measured in terms of the pass percentage.

¹ Ibid., p.2.
At the time, in 1955, over the whole Sudan there were nine government secondary schools including one in the South, one girls' secondary and one secondary technical, with a total enrolment of 2,311. There were also 9 non-government secondary schools, Ahlia, Egyptian and Missionary with a total enrolment of 2,279 pupils. It is interesting to note that by 1964/65 the number of the Government boys' secondary schools streams had risen to 277 and the enrolment to a total of 10,490 and the Government girls' secondary schools rose to 62 streams with a total enrolment of 2,360 girls. All of these, apart from one technical, were academic secondary schools, an indication of the prevalence of academic education despite the recommendations of the 1955 Commission for diversification of the curricula to include a variety of technical subjects, resulting in a form of a comprehensive school.

In their assessment of the secondary schools the Commission found that the causes of the drop in examination successes were "insufficient talent coming up through the Ahlia schools where the drop was most marked; political unrest; insufficient stability of staff." Sudanisation of jobs had been depriving secondary schools and the Ministry of Education of many of the best teachers who had either been promoted or taken up administrative jobs in the Ministry or left their teaching jobs for better

opportunities in other government departments or left the country as many expatriates had been doing during that period.

A major cause of the drop, the Commission found, was the English language, important both as a medium of instruction in the secondary schools, and as a compulsory subject, failure in which would, up to that time, entail failure to obtain a school certificate.¹ A steady increase was noted in the percentage of failures in English from 38% in 1946 to 50% in 1953. It was also found that "it cannot be denied that a considerable number of candidates who failed this year (1953) might have passed, but for their failure in English." The country was in the mood for this. With the British departure, English was going down in both standard and standing and a change was effected in the following year. Although English language would remain a compulsory subject, failure in it would not automatically entail failure to secure a certificate. A pass in Arabic would compensate for that.

Closely linked with this recommendation of the Commission was another major one concerning the use of Arabic to replace English as a medium of instruction for all subjects in the secondary schools. The Commission argued strongly in favour of this, stating that it was the normal practice all over the world that people should be taught in their own language and whenever there was a deviation from that general norm, there should be some very strong justification for it and care should be taken

¹. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
to see that the deviation did not continue for more than the minimum necessary period of time.\textsuperscript{1} The Commission summarised the main reasons why English had been used as the medium of instruction in secondary schools as:-

(a) English was the official language of the Sudan Government after the Anglo-Egyptian Conquest.

(b) Most secondary school teachers, especially during recent decades, had been English.

(c) Education generally and secondary education in particular was conceived at the outset as a means of preparing minor employees in Government offices, and, later, as a gateway to the University College.

Subsequently, the Commission found that close relations had been established between secondary and higher education and institutions like the Cambridge Overseas Syndicate and London University, with the result that the Sudan education system came to be tied up to the English system. The effect of this was that secondary school curricula and standards also became linked up with the Cambridge Overseas Certificate requirements. This resulted in the first place in an increasing dependence on English teachers and the consequent postponement of the task of preparing Sudanese secondary school teachers, and in the second place, in the need for developing a national system of education not being recognised till recently and no effort was made to prepare Arabic text books.

\textsuperscript{1. Ibid., p. 48.}
Again, the Southern Sudan had been treated as a separate territory, where education was left entirely to foreign missionary societies, in whose missionary schools the medium of instruction had been invariably English.

All these factors, in the opinion of the Commission, created a tendency to consider English as the natural medium of instruction and it almost came to be assumed that Arabic was not a suitable medium of instruction at the secondary level, since it lacked the necessary technical terms in science and suitable text books could not be produced in Arabic for secondary schools. It had also been claimed that Arabic books for reference and general reading were too few to form an adequate library for general reading in secondary schools.

The answers of the Commission were: that it was clear the argument based upon English being the official language was becoming hardly applicable, for the official language in future would in all probability be Arabic. The experience of other countries, whose official language was Arabic, showed that there was no justification for the assumption that the Arabic language lacked technical terms or text books. Teaching was done in Arabic in most of the Arab countries, at all levels below the University, and even at University level in many faculties. It was true that books of reference and general reading were fewer in Arabic than in English or many other European languages, but it could be said that even a limited library in the national language was far more useful than a much developed library in a foreign tongue.
The circulating library at Bakhter Ruda Institute had shown that the greatest demand on the part even of elementary and intermediate teachers was for Arabic books.

The Commission thought that the strongest argument for teaching in English in secondary schools seemed to be that University education was given in English. But this same argument was used in other countries about half a century before and had since proved untenable. Even if they accepted the assumption that secondary education was merely a preparation for University education, they still thought teaching in a foreign language would always defeat its own purpose. One of their witnesses, reporting on technical education, expressed the view that the pupils were often learning only English language when they were being taught science and technology in English! A secondary school master made a plea for teaching in Arabic because the minds of the pupils did not benefit by their studies through English. The same view had been expressed by many other witnesses who gave their evidence before the Commission, and by many others who expressed their views in newspapers. The Teachers' Association was also of the opinion that teaching in a foreign language in secondary schools presented a serious obstacle in the way of effective education and instruction.

As examination papers were set and answers were required in English, this doubled the difficulty and tended to make instruction largely a matter of word learning. There was not enough concentration by the pupils upon the subject matter, and

1. Ibid., p. 49.
their main concern was to learn their notes, so as to be able to pass in the examination. It could be said that even some of the brilliant boys were hampered by the language difficulty both at secondary and university levels. There was also a great deal of exaggeration in the argument that it was necessary to teach in English in secondary schools as University studies were carried on in English. Secondary school leavers, the Commission thought, should be able to follow lectures in English at the University, and read English reference books after they had been taught English with reasonable efficiency as a foreign language for eight years. They would also attain a higher standard of knowledge in the various subjects because the language difficulty would have been removed. With a better grasp of the subject matter, they would be more capable of understanding advanced matter. A high standard in the English language could never compensate for shortcomings in knowledge and it would not help a student who had a poor grasp of the subject matter.

The Commission also noted that it had also been asserted that teaching in English in secondary schools would greatly facilitate learning at the University, because the students would be familiar with English "technical terms" in the various subjects. This argument, they submitted, forgot that studies in secondary schools covered only a small proportion of the terms necessary for university studies. It seemed to them that the limited number of technical terms could easily be picked up in the course of university studies, when the students had a clearer understanding of the facts
themselves. English terms could, if necessary, be put beside the Arabic terms in Arabic text books, so that the students could be familiar with both. When the medium of instruction became Arabic, the Commission expected that the four years of secondary education would allow secondary school pupils to attain a much higher standard of knowledge in the various subjects. In this case, they should be able to attain a standard in science for example, equal to that of the English Sixth Form, and thus would give a much better account of themselves in the University.

Moreover teaching in Arabic in secondary schools would ultimately solve the problem of the final secondary examination, which at the time hindered even some of the brilliant pupils from reaching the standard of University admission, because they could not adequately express themselves in English in the examination. But it should be clear, the Commission added, that teaching in Arabic in secondary schools should not lead to neglecting the English language. Far from this, every possible effort, they recommended, should be made to raise its standard as a foreign language. The principal aims in teaching a foreign language, they said, were comprehension and expression and these could be attained without English being the medium of instruction, and without sacrificing the principal aim of education, which was the all-round development of the individual himself.\(^1\)

The change in the medium of instruction from English to

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1. Ibid., p. 50.
Arabic, the Commission noted, would depend on the availability of staff, for which they recommended the establishment of a School of Education in the University.¹ For this reason the change could not be introduced abruptly, and possibly not even simultaneously. They thought it might possibly be necessary to introduce the Arabic medium at different dates for different subjects, depending on the strength of the qualified staff available, (both Sudanese and expatriate Arab-speaking). The matter of text books was secondary to that of teachers who, if well trained, qualified and competent, would be able to teach their subject in Arabic, and many of them might be willing to enter into a healthy competition to produce suitable text books from which a choice could be made by the Ministry. The Commission hoped that the Ministry of Education would prepare a suitable scheme for facilitating and expediting the preparation of qualified secondary school teachers and suitable text books, and thus would be able to bring about the change of the medium of instruction as quickly as it was administratively possible. They stressed that "there should be no avoidable delay in this matter."²

As a response to the International Commission's recommendations, the Minister of Education appointed in 1957 two

1. Ibid., p. 146. The Council of the University of Khartoum decided in 1956 to set up an Institute of Education, in 1961 the Ministry of Education started its own Higher Teachers Training Institute, in 1963 The University of Khartoum started the Department of Education. Discussions have been recently conducted to affiliate the Institute to the University.

committees to study and advise on:
a) The creation of a Secondary Teachers Training College,
b) The use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in secondary schools.
Both these Committees finished their work and submitted their recom¬

commendations early in 1958.1 Pressure was building up in the press, with more discussion on the purpose Arabicisation would serve in the integration of the Ma’had ‘ilmis, Islamic schools, into the general system, thus ending the dualities in the system not only of Northern and Southern but also of an Islamic and a general system.2

The military coup which brought an end to democratic government in slightly less than two years after Independence, on the 17th of November, 1958, did not change the position as far as educational policy was concerned. The Minister of Education Ziada Arbab kept his portfolio in the new government and continued to be Minister of Education till November, 1962. There were more frequent changes in the senior Civil Service jobs in the Ministry during this period. However, 'Secondary education was not the only concern of the ministry which felt that other stages of education needed some reorganisation'.3

The Ominous Prophecy After Independence

By this time the Ministry must have known the ominous prophecies of Mr. Krótki the man who conducted the First Population Census in the Sudan on the eve of Independence 1955/56. Krótki wrote in 1958 "... to ensure that all children of school going ages have a place in school, the school capacity should be

2. 'amal wa-‘amal, Khartoum, undated but probably 1962, pp.103-113.
increased 15 times. The net 1955/56 budget expenditure of the Ministry of Education added up to £83.5 million. To cater for a complete school system it would have to be increased by something like £84.9 million. And this expenditure would have to be repeated annually. Thus the budget of the Ministry of Education alone would have to be equal to \(1\frac{1}{3}\) times the present budget of the whole Government of the Republic of the Sudan. To undertake a programme of education for all would require the building of schools. If the present value of school installation is taken as £822 million (Education, 1956), to provide space for 15 times more pupils, presumably buildings and installations to the extent of over £8300 million would have to be built. This is equal to 24 times the assumed annual net capital investment in the Sudan, on which - as we shall see later - the continued progress of this country depends. It is not possible, yet, to say with any accuracy what the annual output of the building industry is, but if it is taken, only as an indication of the order of magnitude, somewhat around £83 million it would take the whole building industry of the whole country 100 years to build these schools. The raw materials required for those schools would seriously tax the source of supply, 40 years of the output of the Atbara Cement Factory (Commerce, 1958) would be required to provide the 2.5 million tons of cement for all these schools, or alternatively Port Sudan would have to import for seven years (Farquharson, 1957) nothing else but cement in order to build the schools required. All this assumes £81,000 worth building needs 7.5 tons
of cement. This admittedly very rough exercise assumed a static population. If it grows the task will be correspondingly greater.

In a way all efforts at expansion after Independence particularly at the first stage of the ladder are consciously or unconsciously made to forestall all this ominous prophesy, by low cost school buildings, or by spending more on education or by attempts at reorganization by subsequent reports.

Akrawi and Kadhim Reports

On the twenty-second of November, 1958, the Minister of Education appointed a Committee of eleven educationalists from the Sudan, comprising the Vice-Chancellor of Khartoum University who was the former Director of Education, the Director of Education and nine other senior educational officers under the chairmanship of a Unesco expert, Dr. Matta Akrawi, who had arrived in Sudan for this purpose a week before the coup. Akrawi had been told by the Minister in Paris that his mission was to include not only the five-year plan of expansion but also the re-organisation of the whole educational system.

Akrawi's first task, since he was an Iraqi, was to get acquainted with the educational situation in the Sudan, to know

4. Ibid., p. 1.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
something about its recent development and about the problems it was facing. Four methods of collecting information seemed open to him and he decided to use the four of them (1) studying the published and unpublished documentation, including the documentation supplied to him by the Education Clearing House, (2) collecting statistical and other data by issuing special forms for the purpose, (3) interviewing important persons working in the field of education or having views about Sudanese education, (4) touring the country, visiting schools, seeing town, village and tribal life and discussing educational problems with as many competent people as possible.

After a meeting with M. Maes, the Unesco expert in educational statistics in Sudan, who was there at the time to help in training and establishing an office in the Ministry, Akrawi realised that till that time precise statistical information about schools for his purpose was hard to compile. The total number of elementary, intermediate and secondary schools was known precisely, the number of sub-grade schools (the incomplete three-year elementary schools run by local councils) seemed to be approximate. Figures of enrolment were for the most part approximate and there was no distribution of enrolment by grades or ages. Maes had issued in mid-October a simple form for gathering precise enrolment figures to be filled on the 15th of November. That form was designed to give attendance for the past two years broken down according to grades. Akrawi's work required, he expected, much more complicated information than annual school attendance, which
had been available since the early days of the Condominium. He asked for certain information which would give a complete picture of the school, enrolment statistics by grades since 1953, the qualifications and experience of the teaching staff, the existence or absence of other staff in the school, failure or promotion in the last two years, school buildings, the library, school hygiene, feeding and aid to students.

The Educational Planning Committee was established by a memorandum of the Minister of Education which stated, "Since education in every nation must be closely related to the culture of the country and to its national, social, economic and health needs, it has become necessary, after the rise of the national government and the enjoyment of independent life by the Sudanese people, to review the existing system of education for the purpose of establishing a system which will ensure national unity and the bringing up of a generation of citizens which would know its rights and duties and would be ready for practical life, for production and for the development of the wealth and economic resources of the country."1 The Minister continued that such a system must necessarily be in two stages, a first stage attended by all children of the country, most of whom would go forthwith to life after having received a sufficient theoretical and practical education; and a second stage attended by the selected and more gifted of those children who would finish the first stage in order

to continue their education and prepare themselves for the assumption of the great responsibilities and requirements of the various aspects of Sudanese life.

The terms of reference of the Committee were specified in the report of the Committee as: 1) "First, to study the aims of education in the Sudan and the direction in which it is advisable to orient it.

"Second, to study the present educational organisation in its three stages and the extent to which it meets or does not meet the needs of the country, particularly whether the length of the first stage is sufficient to educate a good citizen ready for life; and to recommend the needed modification to the present system or lay down a new organisation based on new foundations;

"Third, to recommend a plan for the next five years which would ensure the orderly transition from the old to the new organisation without disturbing the running of the schools, and which would ensure the necessary expansion of education to all the children of the people within a reasonable period of time and within the limits of the possibilities of the country." 2 It is interesting to note that Akrawi, in his interim report to Unesco after his first six weeks in Sudan, described these terms of reference as having been agreed upon between the Minister, the Acting Director and Akrawi whom the Minister asked to draft them,

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
introducing later a few minor modifications to the draft. Later, in 1962, the Minister when giving account to the President of the Supreme Council of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Prime Minister of what he had asked the Akrawi Committee to do, added to "proposing a new plan for education in the Sudan compatible with our independence," the phrase "and the aims of the revolutionary government" which was neither in Akrawi's Interim report or in his Committee's report. The Minister in his later account also left out reference to the five year plan as this came to be modified during that period to a seven year plan and then to a ten year plan of economic and social development; and instead of stating the three terms of reference he gave a broad summary of them as two.

Akrawi in his interim report to Unesco was very happy about the formation of the committee as he thought it would ensure that any recommendations, ideas and plans he would propose would be thoroughly discussed by what really was a competent committee whose members had the experience of Sudanese education and who should know what was and what was not feasible. Instead of an

1. Akrawi's Interim Report, p. 3.
3. Akrawi Interim Report, p. 3.
5. A New Plan, Pb.
extraneous plan thrown in by an outsider, this arrangement, he thought, ensured that the plan would be really Sudanese. Moreover, he optimistically reported that since the Committee was made up of senior education officials the chances of the execution of the plans were immeasurably increased. This later proved to be over-optimistic. The fact that the committee was made up almost exclusively of senior serving educational officials of the Minister under a military government could have been regarded as a point of weakness as well.

The first session of the Committee was inaugurated by the Minister of Education on Wednesday, the 10th of December, 1958, at six p.m. In his speech, which was delivered in Arabic, the Minister, besides restating the terms of reference of the Committee raised three issues. The first was the changing of the existing 4-4-4 plan of the educational ladder into a 6-6 plan, thus increasing the period of the elementary school to six years, eliminating the intermediate school and substituting for it a secondary school of six years. He argued that the elementary school of four years was too short and sent the children to face life too early. The second issue was the problem of the education of the nomadic population, a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of the country, estimated at a million and a half in various stages of nomadism out of a total population of about ten and a half millions at the time. The third issue was education in the Southern Provinces and here he emphasised the problems of

1. Akrawi, Interim Report, p. 3.
national unity and the propagation of Arabic as the national language. Besides these he emphasised religious and physical education as a means to the formation of character. He made it clear though, that these were his own opinions and were meant in no way to tie the Committee's hands.¹

These opinions were, however, comfortably accommodated in the thirteen principles which Akrawi's Committee formulated as the "Aims of Education in the Sudan."² These aims were summarised as "(1) To transmit the national and human heritage to the new generation in a spirit of continuous revision and in such a way as to make it thought-provoking and produce a thinking citizen with an open mind and a scientific outlook.

(2) To produce a patriotic Sudanese citizen conscious of the Unity of his nation, knowing his rights and duties, democratic and co-operative in outlook and imbued with the spirit of international understanding and co-operation.

(3) To help children grow, to develop their abilities, aptitudes and interests to the full and in such a way as to produce emotionally stable and happy individuals who can fit easily into society.

(4) To inculcate sound moral character.

(5) To imbue children with a deep religious and spiritual outlook, to teach them the tenets of their religion, and the ideals of religious tolerance.

¹ Ibid., p. 7.
² Akrawi Report, Ch. 1, pp. 7-28.
(6) To help all children acquire sufficient mastery of the national language, Arabic, and as advanced a level of expression, understanding and appreciation in it as their level of schooling permits.

(7) To impart the basic mental skills and the basic knowledge necessary for living.

(8) To develop the manual skills of children, break down any prejudices against manual work and as far as possible make of them productive persons able to earn their living and contribute to the economic development of the country.

(9) (a) To produce healthy and physically strong citizens.
    (b) To develop the spirit of sportsmanship and a sound character through games and sports.

(10) To develop the hobbies and interests of children so that they can make healthy use of their leisure time and have sound ways of recreation.

(11) To prepare the children for second family life.

(12) To encourage creative self-expression in children and individuals.

(13) To develop in children qualities of initiative, leadership and responsibility.\(^1\)

These aims and their amplifications, were accepted by Dr. Kadhim\(^2\) who came a year later as an assessor for Akrawi Committee's report, and they were also crudely incorporated in the

four principles of the Ministry of Education's "A new plan for Education in the Sudan 1962". In fact most of the latter plan could be considered as a crude restatement of the finer report of the Akrawi Committee.

The most important contribution of the Akrawi Committee's report was its proposition of a new educational ladder. This was preceded by an analysis of the existing school system where they found out that at the time of the report only about 35 per cent of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls finishing the four-year elementary schools would have access to any higher schooling that year. Also about 34 per cent of the boys and 33.5 per cent of the girls finishing the intermediate schools would have access to secondary schools or other equivalent education at the time.

They also found that about one fourth of the students sitting for the School Certificate Examination succeeded in getting to the University of Khartoum in the preceding year, a further small number got into the Khartoum Technical Institute and most of the remainder went to work. So they concluded that of every 100 boys finishing the elementary school, 22 would get into the public intermediate schools, 10 would reach the secondary schools and 2 would succeed in entering the University. Of every hundred girls finishing the elementary school 12 would enter the public intermediate schools, 4 would enter the secondary or similar schools.

and less than one per cent would get into the University.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 145-147.} Needless to say this was a static picture of the position at the time of the report which was submitted in June 1959.

Three criteria were used in the Akrawi Committee's report to evaluate the sub-grade and elementary schools:

(a) Can they serve as a basis for universal education?

(b) Do they provide a sufficient standard of education to produce a literate citizen ready to face life and do his duty as a citizen?

(c) Is age eleven at which the child leaves the elementary school the right age to judge whether he deserves to continue his education or not?\footnote{Ibid., pp. 35-37.}

It was found that the total number of children enrolled in Southern village and Northern sub-grade schools of two or three years was 107, 460 (23,784 girls) in 1958-59. This represented forty per cent of the enrolment in the first stage of education. A substantial proportion of these might drop out after the first or second years thus receiving only one or two years of education. At the time less than 20,000 children were enrolled in the third year of sub-grade. The Committee concluded that the sub-grade school appeared to be an inefficient school. As it was taught largely by unqualified teachers and the period of education in it was very short, there was a serious question of...
its usefulness. Its only merit was in preparing the small fraction of children who succeeded in transferring to an elementary school. Kadhim in his report endorsed the Akrawi report's criticism of the sub-grade school which was predominant in the rural areas of the country. With local governments and rural councils which were elected bodies in charge of the first stage of education and more cries from rural areas to have just as good schools as the urban areas the movement towards the upgrading of the sub-grade schools culminated in the Sudan Government, Unicef and Unesco agreeing on a project for in-service training courses during the 1964, '65 and '66 summer vacations as a first phase of upgrading, with a second phase to be organised in 1967, '68 and '69. This would end in the upgrading of the teachers and the schools to elementary school level.

By contrast, the elementary school was considered by the Akrawi Committee to be a much more efficient school. It held "all" its children for the full four years course and on the whole succeeded in attaining a good standard of education corresponding to the age of the children. However, they regarded its period of study as too short and the pupils were too immature and childish to permit it to do more than lay a foundation and provide a skeleton. It did not permit it to provide sufficient

content to produce good and productive citizens ready to face life. Moreover they regarded the age of eleven as too early for deciding on the basis of tests which of the children deserved to go to the next stage of education and which did not. Such an early selection might deprive too many meritorious children of the chance of a further school education.¹

The criticism of the length of the elementary period was not written in Akrawi’s interim report to Unesco;² he was more concerned about another striking feature which raised a big problem and that was the very large provision of boarding facilities in the elementary schools and some of the sub-grade schools. He found that one quarter of the children enrolled in elementary schools in the district of Wadi Halfa were boarders. Their ages were usually between 7 and 11. Quite apart from the harmful social, psychological and educational effects of such a procedure as regards children of such a tender age, the system, he thought, was quite expensive. The estimated cost of building some village elementary boarding schools for 160 boys could go up to £328,000 (eighty-four thousand dollars). This was exclusive of the running expenses of the boarding departments which seemed to average about £825 (seventy dollars) a year per child. He described this as prohibitive from the standpoint of the Sudanese economy and if persisted in it would make the application of free and compulsory education very remote.

¹ Ibid., pp. 148-9.
The policy that had led to this was that no new elementary school class was opened unless 50 children were available. Since few villages were large enough to supply 50 boys of the same group, the remainder was brought as boarding students from other villages in the district. So the Committee was "actively studying" with two or three education officers a possible redistribution of the schools and the children in their districts according to the principal of one and two teacher schools. Incidentally this principal which Akrawi and his Committee were "actively studying" was the basis on which the Khalwa had operated for centuries in the Sudan and which people were still using to provide education for their children, especially the rural and nomadic sections of the population. This Akrawi and his Committee never considered for a moment in all their report as a possible solution for the education of the nomads. An exciting experiment in the education of the nomads' children through a one-teacher mobile school was run in the early thirties amongst the Kababish, and admirably described by that teacher himself, Ḥasan Najila in his memoirs. This was also not considered when the Akrawi Committee reported on the education of the nomadic children. Co-education in the elementary stage should also have been considered as a possible solution as in rural life, unlike in the towns, boys and girls are close relatives and play together.

1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. Ḥasan Najila Zikrayatī fi l-bādiya.
When discussing the problem of the nomadic children, the Akrawi Committee stated from the outset that the real and ultimate solution of the education of the children of the nomads was the solution of the problem of nomadic life itself, by solving the two problems of water and grazing in such a way as to make them settle in permanent dwelling places. In the meantime the Committee suggested three methods which could be experimented with in the education of those children.

1. In those tribes which spent a substantial part of the year in one place, about seven or eight months, schools should be opened in the localities where there was a congregation of the largest number of the people. This they recommended should be done with an eye on smaller congregations being within a walking distance of two or three miles from the larger one in which the school would be located. In case the sedentary life was seven months or shorter the Committee recommended that it might be possible to erect a temporary shed for the school in the summer quarters of the tribe.

2. For the children of full nomads, the Committee thought that the use of boarding schools seemed to be inevitable. However it was amongst the Kababish whom the Committee classified as full nomads that Najila had his mobile school for four years in the early thirties.

3. The third recommendation was the addition of vocational classes in cattle raising or mixed farming to some of the schools of the nomads in order to introduce modern methods and new ways of economic support.¹

Kadhim was in agreement with these proposals for the education of the nomads but he did not agree with Akrawi Committee's proposals on the new educational ladder or with all that they said about the elementary, the intermediate and the secondary schools.²

The intermediate school was described by the Akrawi Committee's report as seeming to have no purpose of its own other than being preparatory to the secondary school.³ It was criticized as giving a largely academic kind of education which was dominated by the study of languages, English and Arabic, while giving little or no place to science, the arts or any practical work and consequently it did not prepare the majority of its students who would not go to the secondary schools for a career in life. The secondary school was likewise described as largely preparatory to higher education and was therefore academic and because it taught in a foreign tongue its students seemed to lose a good deal of time on trying to understand the language rather than the content of education. They regarded the standard it attained as good but not sufficient to prepare the students for their University work and thus forcing the University to have a

2. Kadhim, p. 32.
special preparatory class. It reported a feeling that teaching in Arabic would make for greater progress in their studies by the students with the possibility of economising one year. At the same time it might free the teachers of English of any danger that some of their work might be undone by other teachers teaching the school subjects in their imperfect English. Like the intermediate school it was described as failing to prepare for life the majority of its students who would not proceed to any higher education. ¹

Following their analysis of the elementary, the intermediate and the secondary schools the Akrawi Committee was pointing the way towards a new educational ladder. The new suggested ladder was to be preceded in special cases in the beginning by a Kindergarten of two years covering ages six and seven to be opened in very limited numbers. ² The ladder itself was to consist of a primary school of six years covering the period from the end of the seventh year to the end of the thirteenth year of age. A practical bias was recommended for education at this school and as far as possible activity methods were to be used in order to prepare the children for life. ³ The next stage of the ladder was to be a secondary school for six years to follow the primary school. This was to be divided into two stages: a general secondary school and a higher secondary school each of

¹ Ibid., pp. 48-50, p. 149.
² Ibid., p. 51.
³ Ibid., pp. 51-54.
three years. Each school was to be one of the two types, one predominantly academic and the other predominantly vocational. A year later Kadhim, the Unesco expert of educational planning in his report of "Account, Appraisal and Implementation" on the Akrawi report had some valuable criticism to make. Kadhim showed that in various countries various kinds of educational ladders were to be found, and that success in life was not, so it seemed, dependent on this or that kind of ladder. The length of schooling below University level, the co-ordination of educational action, the kind of teacher, text-books and curricula, were the real factors involved. Kadhim also pointed to another factor which probably had influenced the Akrawi Committee in recommending that ladder and this was the fact that in a number of Arab countries, such as the United Arabic Republic and Iraq the suggested educational ladder was in use. Kadhim himself was from Iraq and had been in the Ministry of Education there for some time. Other Arab countries seemed to be moving in that same direction as the Arab League, through its cultural Committee, was trying to have uniformity in the duration of schooling below University level as well as in content, in examinations and in the educational ladder.

1. Ibid., pp. 54-60.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
4. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
Though Kadim thought that uniformity was not without its merits yet he also forewarned that the existing ladder of education should not be dismissed so lightly as changing from one ladder to another would involve difficulties. While agreeing with the Akrawi report that education in the elementary school ceased too early and that there were a number of weaknesses in the existing syllabus, yet he was of the opinion that a worthwhile educational superstructure could be built over it. He thought there was some exaggeration and generalisation in the Akrawi report about the elementary school child and was more inclined towards the upgrading of the sub-grade school to elementary than of the latter to primary.  

On the Akrawi report view that the intermediate and the secondary schools had no purpose of their own except preparation, Kadhim thought that this again was a resort to exaggeration. He said he was not unaware of the weakness in those schools. Excluding English and mathematics, he thought there was much repetition in the syllabuses of these schools and there was not the desired co-ordination, especially in history and geography. Though he agreed that there was much to be done to improve conditions in the three stages, they were not as bad as the Akrawi report seemed to suggest. The intermediate school prepared for the secondary and the latter for the University. This was true but was not that one of their functions? In fact each of them did more than mere preparation. The first fed the Elementary Teachers

1. Kadhim, pp.84-87.
Training Colleges while the second fed the government offices, the army, the police and the teaching profession. The other graduates went out "to meet life". The weakness of these schools as Kadhim saw it, was not due to the fact they were organised on the 4-4-4 pattern. It was rather due to other factors, notably the prevalence of theoretical studies and untrained teachers.

In the case of the secondary school, the fact that instruction was in a foreign language, Kadhim thought, had added another source of weakness.1

On analysis of expenditure on education in Kadhim's report it was found out that two thirds of the total cost of school buildings went on boarding accommodation.2 Furthermore, that boarding expenditure on education amounted to 19.5 per cent of total expenditure on education. School building itself was a major problem as about 40 per cent of the estimated cost of the five year plan was on school buildings and teachers' houses.3 So unless boarding accommodation for pupils was to be kept to a bare minimum and buildings were to be constructed according to modest patterns to bring down the cost considerably, expansion in education would be seriously hampered. This aspect had been dealt with by another Unesco expert L.B.H. Cremer.4

1. Ibid., p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 112.
3. Ibid., p. 115.
The other point raised by Kadhim, while basically related to technical curriculum questions had some bearing on economy in expenditure. In the intermediate and secondary schools the number of periods per week, as Kadhim noted, was large. In the intermediate it ranged from 36 to 40, in the secondary it was 42. Comparing this number of weekly periods with practices elsewhere it was found to be larger than the average. Besides, either seven or eight periods in one morning would not be without its negative influence on students. So Kadhim suggested that economy could be achieved through the reduction of the number of weekly periods and this would effect a saving on staff and accommodation. The third point related to the use of school buildings, as the general practice was, and still is, to have instruction in the morning, a number of school buildings could easily be used by two schools. These points were later on taken up and expanded upon in the report of the Unesco Investment Programming Mission in 1963.

For the achievement of universal education Kadhim presented two schemes, one over 20 years in case the authorities decided to keep the existing system and the other 25 years on the assumption that it was decided to keep the system but gradually achieve six years of universal education. The main difference between his scheme and that of Akrawi as regards this point was over girls' education. While Akrawi considered that girls'

1. Kadhim, p. 113.
education was lagging behind and so would need 35 years, Kadhim thought that 30 years would be enough to achieve universal education for girls. With more African countries gaining their independence these problems came to be discussed in a special conference in Addis Ababa which recommended that education at the first level be considered to cover broadly six years.

Addis Ababa and African Affiliations

As the Sudan was coming to be more and more involved on the African as well as on the Arab planes, it looked as though the Akrawi report was going to be implemented in one form or another. In the Paris meeting of Ministers of Education of African countries participating in the implementation of the Addis Ababa plan, a summary was given of projects foreseen for the 1961/62 and 1962/63 budget years. In that summary it was reported on the Sudan that "the major part of the budget is allotted to the upgrading of junior and elementary schools to full primary schools offering a six-year course of education." This was in accordance with the Addis Ababa Unesco Conferences' recommendations for education in Africa.

A New Plan Defeated

Further amplification to the summary of the proceedings of the African Ministers of Education in Paris was given in the Ten Year

1. Akrawi Report, p. 158.
Plan for the whole country which was presented a few weeks later by the Minister of Economics and Finance. The Ten Year Plan section on education stated that "the proposed investment of £332,896,110 is related to the introduction of the new educational policy in the Sudan. This educational re-organisation will raise our academic and technical standards to those enjoyed in most advanced countries, without sacrificing the conventional and traditional qualities of our country. The new educational ladder will consist of three stages ..."\(^1\) These were explained further by the Ministry of Education in "A New Plan for Education in the Sudan"\(^2\) which was issued shortly after the Ten Year Plan had been presented.

The "New Plan" borrowed freely from the Akrawi report, which together with Kadhim's had not been published, and copies of either were not to be found in the Ministry by 1965 even for the use of a new Minister.\(^3\) The new plan stipulated that the existing educational ladder should be abolished and replaced by a new one consisting of three stages; a primary school of six

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1. The Ten-Year Plan, pp. 146-147.
3. Letters were sent to Unesco in Paris and seen by the author asking for the supply of copies though both reports were typed in Khartoum. Since then an Educational Documentation Centre has been established in the Ministry of Education. The author is grateful to Unesco Research Centre in Paris for supplying him with original typescripts of both reports and for allowing him to freely consult their other documents.
years followed first by a general secondary stage of four years and then by a senior secondary of four years also.\(^1\) Akrawi proposed three years for each of the two secondary stages.\(^2\) The senior secondary stage according to the new plan would fall into two stages, the Secondary School Certificate Ordinary Level stage and the Advanced Level stage, for those who successfully completed the Ordinary Level stage. The Advanced Level stage was to conform to the practised (sixth form) stage of the Grammar Schools of the United Kingdom. The projected senior secondary school was to occupy the buildings of the existing secondary schools.

Thus the period of school education would be thirteen or fourteen years, starting at the age of six, with technical general secondary leading to senior technical secondary and higher technical education, and vocational academic general secondary leading to senior agricultural, senior commercial, senior primary teachers' training and senior academic secondary.\(^3\) The last year of the senior secondary school was to be given to the higher studies leading to the Senior Secondary School Certificate, Advanced Level. When experience revealed the possibility of reshaping the syllabuses of the last phase of the general secondary school and the first two years of the senior secondary school in such a way that it would be feasible for the senior secondary school pupils to take the Ordinary Level examination at the end

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of their second year in the senior secondary school, then the last two years of that stage would be devoted to higher studies leading to the Advanced Level Certificate and further to the Intermediate, after the 'sixth form' style in the Grammar Schools of the United Kingdom. This, the new plan concluded, would result in considerable savings in state expenditure on the preparatory stages of University and higher education.¹

However, it was at the University of Khartoum that the new plan met its end. The plan proposed changes in the secondary school structure that would affect the preliminary year in the University of Khartoum where post-Ordinary Level work was done and it also proposed further future changes up to the Intermediate Level. The University had not been consulted about the plan when it was being formulated and felt completely and deliberately ignored and perhaps undermined as well. The plan came under severe criticism from the University and in a ministerial re-shuffle the Minister of Education was removed to the Ministry of Works in November 1962 after being Minister of Education since 1956 under both democratic and military governments.

In a few weeks' time his successor, Major General Ṭalaʻat Farīd, the second man in the military regime, had the chance of attending the Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan in the University of Khartoum. The Conference had been arranged under the broad title "Education in the Sudan"² but the

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paper on the "New Plan" stimulated more keen discussion than any of the rest of the contributions. The new plan was criticised on the starting age of six years as too early for Sudanese children, it was criticised on the fourteen years of schooling instead of twelve years, on the lack of reference to what medium of instruction would be used in the secondary schools and on the absence of representation of the University on the suggested boards of the Ministry of Education as well as on the formulation of the plan which if implemented would necessitate major changes in the structure of the university.

The plan remained undefended in that Conference against the criticism arrayed against it and from that time the new Minister concentrated on the more urgent task of expansion on the existing ladder. His main concerns were the expansion of secondary education and the continuation of the policy which had been government principle since Independence, that fees should not stand as an obstacle in the face of an intellectually able child who managed to pass his examinations and so got within the number admitted to the higher stage in the government schools. This led to difficulties in the collection of fees by the headmasters in the secondary and intermediate schools. The headmaster of an

1. Ibrahim Nour, "Educational Planning in The Sudan", pp.6-18, Ibid.
intermediate school wrote a letter to the Minister suggesting the abolition of fees in the intermediate schools; instead the pupils would be asked to buy their school books and equipment the cost of which was calculated to be almost equal to the amount of the fees collected, at least in that headmaster’s own school. By 1965 intermediate education became free and so fees came to be charged, if at all, only in the secondary schools and the university where the guardian’s financial ability would be taken in consideration.

The withdrawal of the "New Plan" had been made public to the "International Conference on Public Education" in Geneva in a report by the Ministry of Education in July, 1964, which stated "There has been no modification in the structure of the levels of education. Indeed the trend now is not to introduce such reforms until after the junior elementary schools normally referred to as "sub-grade" schools or village schools have been brought to the level of the 4-year elementary school." This was being done through the scheme of in-service-training with the assistance of Unicef and Unesco. The year 1963/1964 was described as having witnessed the greatest expansion in the history of education till that time. At all levels 390 new educational units were opened. Much of the attention and efforts of the Ministry were devoted to

4. Ibid.
solving the practical problems of accommodation, supplies and recruitment to meet the requirements of expansion. Under such circumstances the question of reforms of syllabus and curricula failed to get adequate attention and therefore no important changes were recorded in this field apart from ephemeral experimentation on the two shifts school system.\(^1\) This was brought about by the pressure of the shortage of accommodation and furniture, despite enthusiastic response in many areas by the local population in providing temporary premises for whole schools and in offering free housing for teachers and even contributing the building of full schools.\(^2\)

Within two years the number of boys' Government secondary school classes rose from 186 streams with a total number of 6,837 pupils in the year 1962/63 to a number of 277 secondary classes with an attendance of 10,490 boys. For girls the number rose from 14 secondary classes with an attendance of 1,170 girls to 62 classes with an attendance of 2,360 girls. This provided the chance for 62\% of the intermediate schools boys and 73\% of the intermediate schools girls to get places in the Government secondary schools that year, an increase of 101\% in secondary provision for girls. There was also an increase of 53\% in the total provision of education for boys. The increases were all at academic secondary schools; the ten streams of technical secondary education did not increase\(^3\) but the Department of Labour had already started

\(^2\) S.G. Ministry of Education, Educational Progress 1963/64, p. 7.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 4.
vocational training courses for former intermediate schoolboys while other Government departments and the new industries continued the training of their own artisans. A major accompaniment of the expansion in the secondary schools was an acute shortage of secondary school teachers despite the recruitment of expatriate staff. This shortage was particularly felt in the fields of English for the senior classes and in mathematics and science.¹

This race for expansion was going on to meet the targets of the Ten Year Plan and to avert the ominous prophesies² by the man who after conducting the first population census in 1955/1956 indicated that the Sudan could easily find itself going backwards if provision of education did not exceed the increase in population.³ It was also going on to meet the quantitative provisions suggested for the African countries in the Addis Ababa Plan.⁴ While all this was happening, with the increasing pressures and demands on the Ministry of Education from the people inside the country, another important event took place outside the country.

That event was the second conference of the Arab Ministers of Education which was held in Baghdad in February 1964. The

¹ Ibid., p. 7.
conference was held in a period of detente among the Arab governments after the "summit" of Arab Kings and Presidents in Cairo. The Ministers of Education conference discussed and approved a "Charter of Arab Cultural Unity" and a constitution of an "Arab Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organisation", a miniature Unesco affiliated to the international Unesco through the Arab League. The council of the Arab League on 21st of May 1964 endorsed the decisions of the Ministers of Education.¹

Arab Cultural Unity

The Charter of Arab Cultural Unity and the recommendations of the Ministers aimed at both cultural unity and uniformity of organisation. An educational ladder of 6 years of primary followed by two stages of three years each and similar organisation patterns for the Ministries of Education,² were all recommended. Chief among the principles of the charter was the use of Arabic as the language of instruction, studies, and research in all the stages of education, and at least in the primary and the secondary stages. But at the same time the Arab states were to make endeavours towards the strengthening of their students in the modern literary, scientific and technological cultures and to provide the students with the linguistic facilities that would enable them to comprehend these cultures.³

¹ League of Arab States, Qararät al-mu’tamar a-th-thänî li wuzarah’ al-ma’arif wa-tarbiya wa-ta’lIm, Cairo, 1964.
² Ibid., pp. 37-43.
³ Ibid., pp. 11-17.
The question of Arabicization was a recurrent theme in the history of education in the Sudan, expressed in various ways and with different degrees and places of emphasis in the Graduates Congress memorandum of 1939, in the report of the International Commission of 1955, in the Akrawi and Kadhim reports, in the "new plan" and in the eleventh conference of the Philosophical Society as well as in the popular press and the more specialised journals. However the overthrow of the military regime towards the end of October that year, 1964, brought about, amongst many other things, the long advocated reform of the use of Arabic as a language of instruction in the secondary schools.

The October Revolution 1964.

Opposition to the military regime throughout the six years of its lifetime was widespread amongst the students in the secondary schools and in the higher institutes. The centre of the opposition was the students of the University of Khartoum, who gathered a growing sympathy towards them from the graduates, the educated Sudanese and the general public as years went by and the failures of the regime became more manifest. The expansion which had taken place in education since Independence and the consequent increase in the number of those who joined the Civil Service in various professions, played a significant role in the overthrow of the military regime. An average of a 25 per cent per annum increase in classified officials, (from 9,540 in 1957

to 33,800 in 1967)\(^1\) meant that the vast majority of the members of this most important section in the running of the affairs of the government belonged to the generation who were used to participating in the school strikes that came to be epidemic after 1946.

The overthrow of the military regime and the restoration of democratic government to the country were the main aims of the students' movement. This made them in those days ready allies for the banned political parties, especially the major ones, Azhari's National Unionist Party and the Umma Party. The latter two did not have a large following amongst the students as had the communists and the Moslem Brotherhood. The students, and particularly their more militant leaders, belonged to either the Islamic movement or the communists and left wing groups of socialists or Arab nationalists. These were the ideological groups that had started to infiltrate student life since the late forties and by the early fifties came to dominate the scene of the students' politics and to some extent that of the graduates. The rivalries between the ideological groups, and schisms within them, led to more cross-fertilization of ideas; the Islamic movement came to adopt the more effective communist techniques of organisation such as competition for the leadership of the students' unions and later on of the trade unions,\(^2\) and the communists came

\(^1\) John B. Seal, Jr., High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources 1968-1972, Khartoum, May, 1967, Preface. This report was withdrawn from circulation after it had been criticised by a panel of economists from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. The criticism mainly concerning the predictions made in the report. See Memorandum dated 28th August 1967, Sgd. Sayed Ahmed et al.

to adopt some Islamic slogans which would appeal to the public at large and defend them against accusations of atheism in a strongly Moslem society. For instance, they advocated respect for Arabic and Islamic culture as a main basis of the national heritage and described Islam as "A strength for the working masses in their struggle for dignity, national liberty and socialism."\(^1\) This was despite the orthodox Marxist attitude towards religion\(^2\) as "the opium of the people."\(^3\) A further synthesis was the adoption by the major political parties in the country of the slogans of socialism and Islam and an Islamic constitution which are the basis of the ideological parties.

In 1964 the opposition to the repressive measures of the army in the South was the rallying point for all the student groups in the University of Khartoum and a direct issue for confrontation with the military government.\(^4\) When the government tried to intervene and ban a student meeting to discuss the problem of the South, the students clashed with the police who fired on them, killed one and wounded many. This took place on Thursday night, the 22nd of October. The following day, Friday, thousands of people gathered in a main square in Khartoum for the funeral of

\(^4\) Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 203-230.
the shot student and demonstrations followed. The Sudanese members of the staff of the University of Khartoum in a general staff meeting decided to resign and not to resume work as long as the military rule remained in the country. Soon professional organisations followed their lead and a general strike was declared all over the country. The workers and farmers organisations joined in and the country was brought to a standstill. The young officers in the army declared their sympathy with the students and the other professional organisations.

Soon the Supreme Military Council and the cabinet were declared dissolved by their President and marathon negotiations with representatives of the professional groups and the political parties ended at the end of the week in the formation of a caretaker government whose duty was the restoration of democratic government by the country by holding a general election within six months. The new government was headed by Sir al Khatim al Khalifa who after being in the South for about nine years as Inspector of Arabic and Assistant Director of Education for the Southern Provinces, came to be the Principal of the Khartoum Technical Institute and the Deputy Under Secretary for the Ministry of Education. In this Government the representation of the professional groups outnumbered that of the traditional major political parties, the Umma, the National Unionist, and the People's Democratic Party. The latter represented the Khatmiyya following, whose leadership had disagreed with Azhari during the transitional period and immediately after Independence in 1956 formed their own
party which, after overthrowing a national coalition government headed by Azhari in 1956, ruled the country in coalition with the Umma Party till 1958 when the army took over. The two Southern parties, which emerged during the events of the October days, were also represented by two Ministers on the new Government.

The ideological parties, the communists, and the Moslem Brotherhood (The Islamic Charter) were, for the first time ever in Sudan, represented by one Minister each on equal par with the major political parties. When some of the representatives of the professional groups in the cabinet were discovered to be communists or communist supporters complaints soon developed amongst the Islamic parties, the Umma and the National Unionist Parties. By the end of February, 1965, a reshuffle was imposed under the same Prime Minister. Professional representation was eliminated, the South and each of the three major political parties were represented by three ministers for each, while the communist party and the Islamic Charter were represented by one each.

At Last Arabicization in the Secondary Schools

In March the Minister of Education Bedawī Mustafa, who belonged to the People's Democratic Party, took office. The Minister and his party were known for their Pan-Arabist leanings and their pro-Egypt policies. Shortly after, in April, the school year ended and the long vacation of three months started in most schools. The country was in the hubbub of a civilians' revolution that succeeded in overthrowing a military regime by
civil disobedience. The teacher's association was actively working and preparing to advance the interests of its members and to contest the general elections in the graduates' seats.

The whole country was preparing for the elections, the differences being on the time they should be held. At this time the Government took a decision on the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction in the secondary schools. Many people claimed the credit for it.

The teacher's association said they had already decided to start teaching in Arabic in the secondary schools from the beginning of the session. Whoever initiated the decision, whether it was the Minister, his secretary or the teacher's association, the decision found ready support and publicity.

For the implementation of the decision the Ministry as a whole was caught unprepared. Till that time the only subjects that had been taught in Arabic for the School Certificate were Arabic, Islamic Religion, and History. The History paper was set in both Arabic and English and candidates were asked to answer all the paper in one of the two languages.¹ To avert the possible hazards of an overnight change in all the classes of the secondary school, the Ministry decided to begin by using Arabic in the first year for all the subjects and to continue the same process till its completion in four years time in March 1969. On the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction the Ministry of Education made great use of the experiences of other Arab countries, particularly

the United Arab Republic as Egypt had been teaching in Arabic for many years.

Arabicization of the syllabuses in the secondary schools was meant to solve some problems but it also created others. One of the problems it was meant to solve, besides those indicated by the 1955 International Commission on Secondary Education and the subsequent reports, was the problem of the duality of education in the North namely in regard to the Ma‘had ‘ilmīs the numbers of which at the secondary stage had increased after Independence when a Department of Islamic Religious Affairs was created to look after them. Between the years 1962/63 and 1963/64 they increased from 66 secondary streams to 88 streams. Instruction in these schools had always been in Arabic since the first Ma‘had of Omdurman was started in 1901 in the different houses of the ‘Ulamā‘, and it continued to be so in 1912 when the Ma‘had took shape in the Mosque of Omdurman and started to follow the system of al-Azhar. Despite various reforms in the Ma‘had and the fact that it had reached the level of higher education since 1924, yet its students were unable to sit for the Sudan School Certificate as it was in English.

Thus Arabicization enabled these increasing numbers of students to sit for the School Certificate Examination and certain modifications were made by the addition of more subjects in Islamic studies and Arabic to compensate them for their deficiencies

1. Majallat Ma‘had Omdurman, Khartoum 1963, pp. 31-38.
in higher mathematics, physical sciences and English. The creation of the Islamic University in the same year out of the higher section of the Omdurman Ma‘had provided a further chance of a university degree for this group of students. The Islamic University was influenced by the al-Azhar Reform Bill of 1960, as was the Ma‘had since 1912. The Ma‘had graduates were deprived of government posts particularly during the period of the Condominium rule. Their only chances were in teaching religion and Arabic in other schools or Ma‘hads or joining the Shari‘a Courts, or going to al-Azhar and later on to the Arabic department of the Khartoum Branch of Cairo University. The creation of the Islamic University and Arabicization could be considered in some respects as a vindication of this long deprived group; but whether they will solve the chronic problem of unemployment for this section of society will depend on the alternative subjects provided.

Amongst the problems created by Arabicization, at least in the initial stages, will be the disadvantage at which students from the Southern Provinces will find themselves when and if they are to take the same papers in Arabic. The standard of the Southern students in Arabic until now is decidedly inferior to that of their Northern colleagues. They have been saved until now from this disadvantage by regional examinations in the pre-secondary stages and by the special Arabic papers in the School Certificate Examinations. This was considered to be a temporary

arrangement but it should continue until such time as it is fair for Southern candidates to take the same examination as the Northern candidate. The use of more sophisticated linguistic techniques in the teaching of Arabic in places where Arabic is not the mother tongue becomes more urgent as Arabicization proceeds. The general notion that the spread of Arabic by itself will solve the problem of national unity should be critically viewed. Arabic can also be a unifying language for the South against the North as other languages such as English or French have been in other countries. Tolerance and understanding of the growing regional aspirations in the South must not be forgotten in the quest for a peaceful and equitable solution for the problem of national unity.

The greatest problem created by Arabicization in the secondary schools will be that which the University of Khartoum will face in July 1969, when the first students who have had all their secondary education in Arabic in the Sudanese secondary schools will be admitted. Previously the University of Khartoum used to accept every year a few students who had finished their secondary education in the Egyptian secondary schools where all subjects had been taught in Arabic. These students were accepted on condition that they should pass a qualifying entrance examination in English. English was, and still is, the language of instruction in the University of Khartoum in all faculties and for all subjects except Arabic, Islamic Law (Shari‘a) and some courses in history. However students from Egyptian schools were
exceptional cases and they were mostly restricted to the science faculties. But in July 1969 the problem will be that of the vast majority.

The University at The Cross-Roads

The University of Khartoum is not so far fully prepared to solve this problem. To change into teaching in Arabic is not easy even if the University wanted to. In spite of the progressive increase in the number of Sudanese on the teaching staff of the University since Independence, from 35%\(^1\) in 1962 to 55%\(^2\) in 1968, still, the rest are expatriates most of whom can only teach in English, particularly in the science faculties where at least 60% of the students are normally admitted\(^3\) and where secondment from other Arab countries would be difficult because of their own needs. Many of the Sudanese will still need to go abroad for further qualifications and their replacements may be English speaking. Besides, there is the fact that most of the Sudanese lecturers had their training in English either in Khartoum, or in British and American Universities, so a change to the use of Arabic would require a certain degree of retraining and some exchange of ideas with other Arab Universities such as those in Egypt, Syria or Iraq, and this would mean that the University of Khartoum may have to look more towards the Middle East.

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1. Da'ālah Allah, a-t-Ta'īm a-j-jāmī'ī fī s-Sūdān, p. 13.
2. Letter from the Academic Secretary dated 4th June, 1968.
The University of Khartoum has another problem - that of recognition and standards. It managed to get recognition from British Universities through the system of external examiners as the examinations are in English, though this was at the expense of a high failure rate. A fear of losing this recognition by changing to Arabic is creating a genuine problem for many Sudanese on the University staff who are apprehensive of academic isolation.

The use of English in the University had already created problems even before Arabic came to be used in the secondary schools, indicated by a high failure rate ranging from 16% to 26% on the average in the Faculty of Economics,\(^1\) to 112 having to sit supplementary subjects in the first year of the Faculty of Arts out of a total of 239 candidates in 1967.\(^2\) A preliminary research on the University students' habits of study showed that above 90% of students in the University of Khartoum in 1964/65 were slow readers, while only 25.2% of American university students suffered from this problem.\(^3\) "The slow reader in this case must study about three times as much as the good reader to reach the same standard."\(^4\) Remedial English language teaching could have been a solution, as was suggested by Dr. Hamdani in 1965, but

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1. March 1967 Examination results.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
after 1969 this can only be done at the expense of the already full timetables.

To meet the expected difficulties with English after Arabicization in the secondary schools, a change in the methods of teaching may be required, such as the use of Arabic in explaining some points during lectures which are normally given in English, and for this probably Sudanese tutors and demonstrators may be required for additional use, more than the normal practice in class or laboratory work. Also the system of examination may have to be altered. Instead of the prevalent essay type questions, multiple choice papers may help to overcome the difficulties of expression experienced by students whose proficiency in English may not be adequate to enable them to write the correct answers they may otherwise be able to give.

The University, Road Ahead

Arabicization, properly carried out and without prejudice to the fostering of the abilities of the students to consult foreign references, is, however, the more logical answer for the University of Khartoum, if the present standard is to be maintained or indeed enhanced without undue sacrifices through a very high failure rate. The present annual return from abroad of about thirty Sudanese scholars to join the teaching staff will help the University to embark upon it in a few years time, if it

plans ahead, despite the present rate of expansion in admission of about a thousand students each year\(^1\) since 1966/7.

The Arabicization in the secondary schools will bring increasing pressure on the University each year, as the pressure, unlike at present, will grow from within. The students in Sudan, and particularly at the University of Khartoum, have been an important instrument of change and reform in the country as well as in the University at its various stages of development. It is difficult to conceive them as being silent in the coming few years on an issue such as this which will be directly affecting them. So far the problem has been pushed under the carpet. It cannot remain there for long. If it does, the students of the University of Khartoum, and indeed those of the secondary schools as well, may not have to look to the French students of 1968\(^2\) for an example. Their more successful experience of 1964 against the military government will still be alive. To avert an impending crisis, serious discussion, experiments, research and planning are all urgently needed. Arabicization may not take place in all faculties or all departments or even all courses within the same department all at once; parallel courses in English on the same subject may also have to be run for some time.

A real challenge is facing the University of Khartoum and a difficult choice. But reviewing the adaptability of this

1. "University of Khartoum accepted Students Classified According to Sex and Faculties 1956/57 - 1966/67".
institution and its ability to digest and incorporate into its modern systems the Sudanese cultural and educational heritage which existed before Kitchener advocated the Gordon Memorial College and reviewing its ability to remain at the apex of the system of education since the early years of this century when it was started under Currie, one is hopeful of the outcome.

For many years the students and graduates of this institution and its ramifications managed to remain as the avant-garde of their people and continued to be so, amidst different challenges and crises, in the difficult days of "Native Administration", in the years of the depression, in the intellectual renaissance of the thirties, in the era of political struggle of the forties and early fifties, in the critical period of taking over the responsibilities from the colonial government during the short transitional period towards independence, as well as in the restoration of democracy. Reviewing all this, one would not be too optimistic if one thought that the challenge will be adequately met.
CONCLUSION

Educational development in the Sudan since 1896 in all its stages and at high or low ebbs has been closely associated with the political development of the country. In this association they had considerable influence on each other, to the extent that at certain times it is difficult to say whether education was politically determined or that political developments were determined by the impact of education upon them. There is no need to suppose that this process of interaction will not continue to be so, particularly when the issues of national unity, economic and educational development are becoming increasingly interdependent resulting in an expanding system of education.

However, the developments, the reactions and the reforms which have taken place so far have produced many educational problems that open vast possibilities for educational research: linguistic problems as in the South or at the University of Khartoum, as well as in the secondary and the intermediate schools; economic problems such as those of manpower needs and supply at various levels; problems of organization such as the use of one-teacher schools or co-education which may help to bridge the widening gap between the urbanized and the less urbanized regions of the country; and the problem of fostering a national unity based on freedom, respect and understanding.

Last but by no means least in the way of examples is the problem of participation, both in education and for education -
participation by the people themselves in the building and maintaining of their own schools, participation by the teachers in the discussion and formulation of educational policies and solutions regarding their own problems and those of the system in general, and participation by the pupils and students themselves in determining the process by which they may become more humane, knowledgeable and thinking human beings and in the running of their own institutions and schools as well as in the literacy and social campaigns outside the schools. These problems, though they have their Sudanese origins and characteristics which in the end will require Sudanese solutions, are not all peculiar to the Sudan. Many of them are problems common to other developing countries of the world; others are problems of the whole world; hence the contribution from each may help towards the solution of all.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Bibliography is arranged in Sections A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H.

A: Published Bibliographical Sources.

B: Archival Material.

C: Governor General Annual Reports which are given under "Reports on The Finance, Administration and Condition of the Sudan" with the number of the Command for use of Parliamentary Papers.

D: Sudan Government and Ministry of Education Reports.

E: United States Government Reports.

F: United Kingdom Government Reports.

G: United Nations - UNESCO and Other International Agencies' Reports.

H: Published Works, Articles and Theses.
A

Published Bibliographical Sources


B

Archival Material

Archival Material is available in The Sudan Archives, Durham University, in the Sudan Government Central Archives, Khartoum, the Ministry of Education Archives Khartoum, The Archives of the University of Khartoum, The UNESCO Information Centre Paris, the Public Records Office London, The C.M.S. Archives London. In the writing of this thesis some use has been made of the Ministry of Education Archives, Khartoum, abbreviated as MEA, particularly of
the Files on General Policy in the Pre- and Post-Second World War periods under 8/9/65. Also some use of Sudan Government Central Archives Khartoum, C.S./I.C.I., and CS/GCR/I.C.I. The wealth of material in these places is tremendous for research workers in the Sudan. The UNESCO material is given here under UNESCO. Abundant archival material is found at Durham, the collection there being the largest outside the Sudan. Below is given the number of Boxes in which material relevant to the subject of this work is found. Where actual archival material is used detailed reference is given in the text of the thesis.

Relevant material is to be found in Box DRA, 103/17/1; 101/30; 101/33; 103; 103/1; 103/7/1; 103/7/2; 104/13; 104/13-17; 107/15; 107/17; 109/8; 109/9; 134/3; 134/7; 135/2; 152/1; 170/3; 171/1; 194/4; 212; 212/8/2; 212/10/1; 214/4; 237/11; 243/1; 245/9/1; 248/15; 248/24; 248/37; 251/8; 268/10; 273/1; 292/1; 294/4; 294/6; 300/5; 304/12; 402/12; 403; 403/1; 403/7; 403/7/1; 403/7/3; 403/9; 418/1; 419/1; 419/3; 419/4; 419/6; 420/3; 420/4; 420/5; 422/13/1-2; 425/1; 431; 466/1/1; 466/9/8; 466/10; 466/10/1; 466/19; 475/2/1; 475/2/2; 478/8/8/6; 479/7; 485; 493/4; 493/6.

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This Map shows the location of the Missionary Stations.

This Map is based upon a Map published in
MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL PROVISION IN THE SUDAN BY PROVINCE IN 1961-1962

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