THE ORGANISATION OF THE JACOBITE ARMY,

1745 - 1746.

JEAN E. MCCANN.
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A. *Ms. sources.*


Miscellaneous papers in Inverness Burgh Library, especially Miscell. papers connected with the garrison at Fort George.

Documents at H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, especially Gordon Estates Inventory and Airlie Muniments.

Mss in the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, especially Culloden Papers Mss.


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B. *Printed Sources.*

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vi.

The Loyal Clans. Audrey Cunningham. Cambridge Univ. Press 1932.


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vii.

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NOTE ON DATES.

1. During this period two calendars were in use. Until 31st December 1751, the Julian or Old style was the legal calendar in Great Britain. This was eleven days behind the Gregorian, or New style calendar used in all other European countries except Russia and Turkey. The legal beginning of the year in England, moreover, was Lady Day, 25th March, not 1st January as in the rest of Europe. It was common practice in England to date letters until 1752 using both styles. In Scotland, however, January 1st had been adopted as New Year's Day since 1600. This, the contemporary Scottish practice is adopted here, by which dates of the month accord with the Julian or Old style calendar (unless otherwise stated) but the year is held to begin on January 1st.
Any military body which is essentially an irregularly raised volunteer force presents certain peculiar problems of recruitment, discipline and organisation. The resources available to a regular army to secure enlistment, discipline and supplies, were, because of its very nature, denied to the Jacobite army of 1745/6. The methods, however, by which the problems of recruitment, discipline and finance were solved by the rebel army were often to play a decisive part in the fate of the rebellion as a whole. Problems of local recruitment, and the availability of small parties of men to enforce recruiting or levy money, were often to affect the fortunes of the rebel army operating at a distance of several counties.

In one sense such local activities remained isolated from the main strategy, for local recruitment was apparently much less affected by the varying fortunes of the main force than might have been expected. It is difficult to trace a discernible pattern between important military successes or reverses and local recruitment.

Local recruitment, for instance, was affected primarily by the presence locally of the main force rather than by the news of military actions elsewhere.

The major actions of the campaign do not appear to have had a decisive effect on recruitment, even in their own immediate neighbourhood. From, for instance, the St. Andrews district, out of a total of forty-four rebel recruits in the official "List of Persons concerned in the Rebellion," (1) only five joined after the Jacobite

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(1) "A List of Persons concerned in the Rebellion," transmitted to the Commissioners of Excise. Preface by the Earl of Rosebery, Scottish History Society Vol. VIII.1890. pages 62 et seq.
victory of Prestonpans. Again, from Haddington, an area which one would also expect to reflect the action at Prestonpans, out of fifty-nine recruits, only ten joined after that battle. (1) These statistics alone, of course, are not conclusive. The lists of named adherents are not exhaustive and precise details of time of adherence are not given in all cases. The figures do, however, serve to suggest that the factors which explain local recruitment are complex rather than simple. Such factors are examined separately in relation to each geographical area.

It should also be noted, however, that the adherence of recruits did not necessarily mean that the men would be available for anything more than local activity. (3) Because of the large number of local adherents who, for various reasons, never joined the main Jacobite force, statistics of numbers recruited often differ sharply from the size of the actual fighting body at any given time.

The total operational force of the Jacobite army never exceeded the figure of nine thousand men. Eight thousand men were in action at the battle of Falkirk (4) and a further one thousand, under the Duke of Perth, were engaged in the siege of Stirling Castle and in the transporting of the Jacobite artillery. This period saw the largest number of men in arms simultaneously.

(1) Rosebery, op. cit. p.132 et seq.
(2) Below Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(3) See below Chapters 3 and 4 particularly.
(4) Elcho, p.372. This number is also accepted by Blakie (p.96) "Itinerary of Prince Charles Edward Stuart." Walter Biggar Blakie, Edinburgh University Press, Scot. Hist. Society 1897.
(5) Lord John Drummond's Regiment, the Farquharsons, under Monaltrie, and some of Glenbuckets. See below, Chapter 3.
Blaikie estimates that only five thousand served at Culloden, while at Prestonpans the rebel force consisted of a maximum of two thousand five hundred.

On the march into England the rebel force numbered at the most five thousand five hundred, although during that march Lord John Drummond commanded a supplementary force at Perth of at least three thousand, giving an operational total available of something over eight thousand five hundred.

We are presented, from these figures, with a maximum Jacobite operational force of no more than nine thousand men. A detailed reference, however, to all contemporary accounts available would suggest that the actual number of men recruited for the Jacobite army between August 19th, 1745 and April 16th, 1746 would total between 13,140 and 11,470 men. This figure does not include the French reinforcements which arrived during the campaign. With such reinforcements included, the total would be between 14,140 and 12,470.

This force was made up in the following way.

Recruited from the counties of Aberdeen, Banff, Moray and Nairn,
and serving in the Gordon, Farquharson or Pitsligo regiments
between 2,000 and 3,230 men\(^1\)

Recruited from Perthshire and serving in the Atholl Brigade
at least 2,990 men\(^2\)

Recruited from Dundee and Angus and serving under Lord Ogilvy - 900 men\(^3\)

Recruited by the Duke of Perth - 300 men\(^4\) (included in the Perthshire totals)

From the Western Highlands,

1. Clanranalds, including Macdonalds of Kinlochmoidart and Morar - 400 or 450 men\(^5\)

2. Camerons - 1,000 or 1,200 men\(^6\)

3. Keppochs, including some Mackinnons and Macdonalds of Glencoe - 600 men\(^7\)

4. Glengarry's (including Macdonalds of Morar, Barrisdale and Scotus, Macleods of Raasay, Grants of Glenmoriston and Glenurquhart and some Mackenzies) - 860 men\(^8\)

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\(^1\) See below Chapter 3 for further details of this force.
\(^2\) See below Chapter 2.
\(^3\) See below Chapter 2.
\(^4\) See below Chapter 2, p. 37
\(^5\) Made up of about 200 (according to O'Sullivan - "1745 and After." A. & R. Tayler, p. 60) or of 300 (according to Maxwell of Kirkconnell - "Narrative of Charles, Prince of Wales' Expedition to Scotland in the Year 1745" James Maxwell of Kirkconnell, Edin. Maitland Club 1841. p. 27) who were already in arms by August 19th, 1745 plus a further 150 who joined Lord Strathallan at Perth in November, 1745 (Elcho p. 322).

\(^6\) Made up of 700 or 900 at Glenfinnan on August 19th, 1745. O'Sullivan put the figure at 700 (1745 and After" p. 60) and Blakie (p. 8) accepts this figure, but Sir John Macdonald ("1745 and After" p. 60) puts the figure at 900. A further 300 joined Strathallan at Perth in November, 1745 (Elcho p. 322).

\(^7\) Elcho p. 372.

\(^8\) Made up of 500 recruited by the beginning of November (Elcho plan inset p. 324) 100 brought to Perth by Young Glengarry (Elcho p. 322) and a further 260 raised by Barrisdale (ibid. p. 322). O'Sullivan (p. 63) confirms these figures.
5. Macdonalds of Glencoe - 180 men (1)

6. Appin Stuarts - 310 men (2)
   Cromartie Regiment - 420 or 460 (3)
   Macphersons under Cluny - 400 (4)
   Frasers - 600 (5)
   Mackintoshes - 200 (6)
   Maclachlans and Macleans - 350 (7)
   Chisholms - between 100 and 200 (8)

(1) Made up of 120 recruited about August 26th (Patullo the Muster Master's figures, Blaikie p.9) and a further 60 who reached Edinburgh on September 11th, 1745 (Lyon in Mourning," Soot. Hist. Society Vol.XX - XXII Journal of Duncan Cameron Vol.2 p.201 et seq.). A further 100 joined at Perth in November, 1745 (Elcho p.322) but served under Keppoch and are included there.

(2) Made up of 260 who joined on Aug.26th (Patullo's figure, Blaikie p.9) and 150 under Stewart of Invernahyle who joined at Perth in November (Elcho p.322).


(4) 300 Macphersons fought at Falkirk in January, 1746. (Elcho p.372) but Cluny had a force of up to 400 in Badenoch by March, 1746. (See below Chapter 2 p.55.)

(5) Made up of 300 at the Battle of Falkirk (Elcho p.372) and a further 300 recruited by the Master of Lovat by April, 1746 ("History of the Rebellion in the Year 1745," John Home, London T. Cadell and Davies, 1802 p.218).

(6) Brought by MacGillivray of Drumglass to Perth in November, 1745 (Elcho p.322). The rest of the unit, which was also known as Lady Mackintosh's Regiment seems to have been recruited from Farquharsons and others counted elsewhere.

(7) Made up of about 150 brought by Lachlan Maclachlan on September 18th to Edinburgh with Lord Nairn (Atholl Correspondence p.15) and about 200 Macleans under Maclean of Drummin raised after Falkirk (Lochgarry's Narrative. Blaikie. Postscript p.112 et seq.)

Miscellaneous troops - Roy Stuarts - about 450
Jacobite Horse - about 410 not including 150 of Pitsligo's Horse, already included in the numbers from the North Eastern counties.

The total of between ten and twelve thousand recruits, shown above to have been enrolled between July, 1745 and April, 1746, compares with an operational total of approximately nine thousand men. The difference of possibly one, and at the most three thousand between these two totals must largely be accounted for by desertions.

This gap between the two totals is not, however, as large as the frequent contemporary complaints of desertion would lead us to expect. Two conclusions are, therefore, suggested by the smallness of this gap. The first is that almost certainly the rate of desertion throughout the army was not as large as has hitherto been believed. Desertion was undoubtedly high among the Atholl Brigade, but there is little to show that it ever reached a comparable figure in other regiments. Contemporary accounts, however, tend to presume that desertion on an equal scale was common to all the Highland Regiments.

The actual numbers enlisted in many Jacobite regiments were often disappointingly smaller than the numbers expected by those

(1) Made up of those recruited by him in the area of Edinburgh during September and October, 1745, and 250 Stewarts of Grandtully.
(2) Made up of Elcho's Horse (150 men), The Perthshire Horse (150 men), The Hussars (70 men) and Balmerino's Horse (40 men). Elcho p. 324.
(3) See below, Chapter 3.
(4) Below, in Chapter 3, this point is further examined.
in command. This is the second conclusion suggested by the figures. The expectations of those in command were based on the optimistic reports of early numbers to be enlisted, or already enlisted, by local agents, but in many cases such numbers never reached the main Jacobite body at all. On September 19th, 1745, for instance, Lord Tullibardine wrote from Dunkeld to Lord Ogilvy, who was recruiting in the Corthachy area to tell him that the Jacobite High Command in Edinburgh believed "you and the Mar men were 800 strong" (1). When, however, these Mar recruits, under Farquharson of Monaltrie, reached Dunkeld on September 29th they numbered only seventy or eighty men (2), while the Ogilvy recruits who reached Edinburgh on October 3rd, under Lord Ogilvy, were estimated by Lord Elcho to consist of as few as 300 men.

While in charge of Atholl recruiting during September and October, 1745, Lord Tullibardine was frequently misled as to the actual numbers his agents had raised. He was led to believe, for instance, that Robertson of Struan had raised a further 100 between early September, 1745 and October 12th when in fact it is very doubtful whether Struan had raised any such numbers at this point. Later, in January and February of 1746, there is an even more marked disparity between the numbers apparently enlisted by local agents and the real figures. Spalding of

(1) "Jacobite Correspondence of the Atholl Family, during the Rebellion of 1745/6." Edin. Abbotsford Club. 1840 p.20.
(2) Atholl correspondence p.36. Letter from Robert Mercer of Aldie, of September 29th.
Glenkilrie had reported to Tullibardine that he had enlisted 200 men, and pay and arms for these men were sent to him by Tullibardine, but as late as February 8th, 1746 no such men had actually appeared in arms, and there is no record of their ever doing so. (1)

Such examples of inaccurate and exaggerated enlistment figures are frequent from both the Perthshire and North Eastern areas, and are discussed in more details in Chapters 2 and 3. They serve here as a reminder that, while contemporaries tended to blame desertion for disappointingly small Jacobite levies, in actual fact the totals seemed only small because of misleading preliminary information.

The totals recruited, moreover, suggest an interesting geographical pattern of recruitment. The Jacobite force of 1745/6 has generally been considered to be a predominately Highland or even West Highland levy, and it is true that the counties of Ross, Cromarty, Inverness and Argyll and the Islands produced between 43% and 46% of the total force raised (2). It should, however, be noted that two considerable smaller geographical areas produced equally important contributions to the Jacobite Levy. These areas were the North Eastern counties of Moray, Aberdeen and Banff which between them produced between 17% and 24% of the force (3) and the county of Perthshire, whose recruits numbered at least

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(1) See Chapter 2 p. 44
(2) That is between 5,400 and 5,790 men, see above p.xii et seq.
(3) See above p.xii and also Chapt. 3.
2,290\(^1\) or between 17% and 20% of the Jacobite army.

The proportion of the army enlisted from Perthshire may in fact have been considerably more than 20%. There is a manuscript list of Perthshire gentry serving in the Jacobite army as officers, among the miscellaneous papers at Blair Castle.\(^2\) It names sixty-nine Perthshire gentlemen who served in regiments other than the Atholl Brigade\(^3\). These regiments being primarily recruited outside Perthshire, are not included in the Perthshire totals above.

This known presence of Perthshire officers in non-Perthshire regiments suggests that there may be a similar over-lapping in other territorial areas, and serves as a reminder that such figures can only be at best approximations. Even however with these reservations, it is no longer possible to treat the Jacobite army of 1745/6 as "essentially a clan gathering"\(^4\), and nothing more.

Lord Rosebery in his Introduction to the "List of Persons Concerned in the Rebellion," describes the rebel army as dominated by the clans.\(^5\) In the light of these statistics, this view must be substantially modified.

Equally important modifications must be made to any generalisations about motives for Jacobite adherence. It has been

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\(^1\) See above p.xvii and also Chapter 2.
\(^2\) Charter Room Blair Castle - Miscell. Mss.
\(^3\) The Regiments were Roy Stuarts (7 Officers), Lord John Drummond's (5), Appin's (3), Strathallan's Horse (15), Ogilvy's (8), Keppoch's (1), The Life Guards (2) and the Duke of Perth's (27).
\(^5\) Ibid. Introd.p.xv et seq. "all eye witnesses of the rebel army speak of Highlanders and nothing else".
argued that Highland Jacobitism was caused by these three factors. First, the knowledge that the best interests of the Highlands had been served by the Stuarts, who had tried to curb the powers of feudal superiors; secondly, the fact that the Revolution government had shown little sympathy for Highlanders, whether Jacobite or Whig, and, lastly, the fact that "clansmen supported their chief because they knew from experience that their hereditary and natural leader had their interests nearer at heart than had any stranger". These three factors do indeed go some way to provide an explanation for Jacobite sentiment in the Highlands, though not necessarily elsewhere, but it should also be remembered that Jacobite sentiments and Jacobite actions were not always identical, and that the two were not always the products of the same factors.

A certain continuity of Jacobite sentiment did exist in the Highlands, but even such continuity tends to be broken after 1715. Atholl men, MacGregors, Appin Stuarts, Robertsons, Macdonalds of Glengarry, Clanranald, Glencoe and Keppoch, Macleans, Farquharsons, Gordons, Macnabs and Mackenzies had all served under Montrose, Dundee and Mar. However, Seaforth, Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat, Farquharson of Invercauld and Macnab did not stir in 1745, and Macdougallis who had fought under Mar in 1715 did not stir in 1745.

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(1) In, for instance "The Loyal Clans" - A. Cunningham, Cambridge Univ. Press 1932 p.5 et seq.
(2) Cunningham, op.cit. p.9.
(3) See below Chapters 1 and 3 for details of their attitudes.
Deferece to the actions or views of chief or superior does not necessarily explain Jacobite adherence. Macnabs, Mackintoshes and Grants fought in opposition to the wishes of their chiefs, and Farquharsons were led, not by Invercauld, their natural chief, but by the two Farquharsons of Monaltrie and Balmoral. Grants from Glenmoriston, in opposition to the wishes and even threats of Ludovick Grant, served under Glengarry, as did Mackenzies recruited by Barrisdale. Furthermore, descendants of MacIvors who had joined Argyll in rebellion in 1685 now renounced their Campbell loyalty to serve under Keppoch in 1745.

Gratitude for favours received from, or expected, from the administration may explain actions in some cases. On the Hanoverian side, for instance, the gratitude of Kenneth Mackenzie, titular Lord Fortrose and Seaforth to an administration which had pardoned the 5th Earl of Seaforth in 1726 may account for his Hanoverian sentiments in 1745, but this explanation does not fit the obvious cases of Lord George Murray, or of Robertson of Struan, who was pardoned in 1703, out in rebellion in 1715, pardoned in 1731 and out again in 1745.

The ambitions of Lord Lovat, and the heavy debts of other rebels, undoubtedly influenced adherence. The Duke of Perth, Lord Cromartie, Lord Kilmarnock, Lord Balmerino, Stuart of Ardsheal, Macpherson of Cluny, Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart and Macdonald of Barrisdale were all amongst those Jacobites who were heavily

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(1) See below Chapter 3.
(2) See below Chapter 3.
(3) See below Chapters 1 and 3.
(4) Rennie, op.cit. p.213.
(5) See below Chapter 2.
in debt in 1745\(^1\). The estates of Macdonald of Lochgarry and Farquharson of Monaltrie, moreover, were bankrupt. To suggest, however, that Jacobitism was merely a desperate expedient to avoid bankruptcy would be a gross over simplification. It would also go no further towards providing an explanation of the motives of many like Lord George Murray, Lord Elcho or indeed most of the prominent lowland Jacobites.

The availability of a small Jacobite force to act as a recruiting party or rudimentary Press Gang,\(^2\) the local activities of Gordon of Glenbucket or Lord Lewis Gordon, the sending north of part of Lord John Drummond's French Regiment in late November, 1745, all these played their part in determining local recruitment, as did the decisive views of figures of local eminence. Those areas where there was the least difficulty in raising men were those where the personal prestige of chiefs or superior was the highest, and where his actions were the least equivocal.\(^3\)

Economic factors, especially in the Western Highlands, were also of importance. In these areas an agricultural economy, based

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\(^1\) See Scottish Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715 and 1745. Scot. Hist. Society, Vol.LVII 1909. p.308 et seq. for further details of these debts. Their debts at forfeiture were as follows:

\(^2\) The importance attached to the presence of a "party" to aid recruitment is amply illustrated from events in the Atholl area. See Chapter 2 for such details.

\(^3\) See below Chapter 1 for significance of this point in the Western Highlands.
on the minimum necessary for subsistence, left no margin for emergencies, and the frequent bad harvests produced recurrent problems of scarcity and famine. There is ample local testimony to the bad harvests of 1744 and 1745.\textsuperscript{(1)} Such scarcity provided a certain incentive to unrest to those who had therefore little to lose. To these, also, a descent on the fertile south would appear the more attractive, and for this adherence to the Jacobite cause would provide an excuse. Equally important, however, scarcity of food hampered military organisation, slowed up movement and, as will be demonstrated,\textsuperscript{(2)} from January, 1746 onwards was a vital factor dictating the direction of marches and the dispersal of men.

In all these various ways, local or individual factors played their part. Jacobite adherence remained in fact, ultimately a matter for personal decision and was decided by personal and local factors. Its motives can only be studied individual by individual and district by district. For these reasons, therefore, the recruitment of the rebel army is studied in four separate chapters below, corresponding geographically to the four major areas of recruitment.

One other preliminary point should be noted. This is essentially a study of the recruitment and organisation of the Scottish Jacobite army. It is concerned with Jacobite activities in Scotland, in so far as these activities created, or affected,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{(1)}See below Chapters 1 and 3 especially. Such scarcity, moreover, was not confined to the more remote areas. There were meal riots in Perth in 1750 and in 1760 for instance. See George Penney, "Traditions of Perth," Dewar, Sidey, Morrison, Peat and Drummond, Perth 1836 p.47.
\item \textsuperscript{(2)}Below Chapters 7 and 8 especially.
\end{itemize}
the Jacobite military body. It is not, however, a military history of Jacobitism in the field at either Prestonpans, Falkirk or Culloden, and it treats of these encounters only in so far as they exemplify, or affect, factors of organisation or recruitment. For the same reasons no attempt is made to deal in any detail with the military history of the Jacobite march into England, except in so far as that march affected military organisation and the problems of recruitment.
CHAPTER I.

The Western Highlands, Ross and Cromarty.

The counties of Inverness, Ross, Cromarty and the northern part of Argyll produced, approximately, 46% of the Jacobite force. This north western area had certain special features which, in their turn, produced certain special characteristics in the regiments recruited there. In no other area was recruitment so affected by personal factors. In the North East recruitment was largely achieved by the use of a quota system, or pressure of some kind, imposed by the zeal of a few men like Gordon of Glenbucket, Lord Lewis Gordon and Lord Pitaligo. In Perthshire, also, the majority of recruits were forced out, while in the Lowland area of Scotland, recruitment was the result of a much greater diversity of motives.

In the Western Highlands forced recruiting by military parties, or a quota system enforced by such parties, does not seem to have existed to any considerable extent, nor, as in Perthshire, was recruiting left to the activities of only a few men. Almost every Jacobite chief or chieftain was, to some extent, a recruiting agent, but this recruiting was almost always done voluntarily. That some forced recruiting occurred in the Western Highlands cannot be denied, but those who used force, or the threat of it, were not, as in the case of Perthshire, the victims of similar force themselves.

Regiments raised in the Western Highlands were represented by six members in the Jacobite Council of war. The full council consisted of seventeen men, but included Sir Thomas Sheridan, Lord Elcho, Colonel O'Sullivan and Secretary Murray, who did not represent specific regiments. It also contained two representatives,

(1) See Introduction above for details of this figure.
(2) See Elcho p.288.
2.

in Lord Nairn and Lord George Murray, of the Atholl Brigade.
The Jacobite army consisted of 16 Regiments\(^{(1)}\), 12 of whom were represented by their commanding officers in the Council of War. The Western Highlands produced ten of these sixteen regiments and the Lochiel, Keppoch, Clanranald, Glencoe, Glengarry and Ardshiel Regiments were represented in the Council of War by their commanding officers.

The ten West Highland regiments were commanded as follows:
The Cameron Regiment -
Colonel: Donald Cameron (Young Lochiel), son of John Cameron of Lochiel.

Keppoch's Regiment -
Colonel: Alexander Macdonell of Keppoch.

The Clanranald Regiment -
Colonel: Ronald Macdonald, Younger of Clanranald.

The Glengarry Regiment -
Colonel: Angus Macdonald, 2nd son of Macdonald, 13th of Glengarry.

Lieut.Cols: Donald Macdonell of Lochgarry.
Macdonell of Barrisdale.

The Glencoe Regiment -

Ardshiel's Regiment (Appin Stewart) -
Colonel: Charles Stewart of Ardshiel.

The Cromartie Regiment -
Colonel: George Mackenzie, 3rd Earl of Cromartie.

\(^{(1)}\) For these purposes the Jacobite Horse and the Manchester Regiment, neither of which were territorially raised in Scotland, are excluded.
Lady Macintosh's Regiment -
**Colonel:** Alexander McGillvray of Drumnaglass.

The Fraser Regiment -
**Colonel:** Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat.

**Lieut.Col:** Charles Fraser, Younger of Inveralachie (in command at Culloden.)

The Maclachlan Regiment - with which the Macleans recruited largely by Maclean of Drimmie, served.
**Colonel:** Lachlan Maclachlan of Castle Lachlan.
**Lieut.Col:** Maclean of Drimmie.

Cluny's Regiment -
**Colonel:** Ewen Macpherson of Cluny.

Even a superficial study of the command of these regiments reveals the close knit and inter-related society of which West Highland Jacobitism was composed. Ronald Macdonald, Younger of Clan Ranald and Donald Macdonald of Lochgarry were brothers in law (1), while Lochgarry was a first cousin of Old Glengarry, and also of Donald Macdonald of Scoitus and of Coll Macdonald of Barrisdale, who both served in the Glengarry Regiment. Alexander Macdonald of Glencoe had married the daughter of John Stewart of Ardshiel, Ewen Macpherson of Cluny was the first cousin of Donald Cameron, the young Lochiel of the Forty-Five, and he was married to a daughter of Lord Lovat (2). Alexander Maconell of Keppoch was married to a daughter of Stewart of Appin, while Donald Maconell of Tiendrish, like Alexander Maconell of Keppoch, was a grandson of Archibald Macdonald of Keppoch. It was Tiendrish who

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(1) Both had married daughters of Gordon of Glenbucket.
(2) See Cluny Papers. West Highland Museum, Fort William.
as Major commanded the company of Keppoch's Regiment in the successful skirmish at Highbridge in August, 1745.

Glengarry's second son Angus, who commanded the Glengarry Regiment until his death in 1746, was married to a niece of Robertson of Struan, thus allying two families who both had long Jacobite traditions. Alexander Macdonald of Glenaladale, Major of Clanranalds, and Donald Macdonald of Kinclochmoidart, A.D.C. to the Prince, were both descended from younger branches of the Clanranald family, (1) as was Macdonald of Morar, another Major in the Clanranald regiment. Lochgarry had married a daughter of Cameron of Lochiel, while Old Glengarry's father had married, as his first wife, a daughter of Lord Lovat. Glengarry himself had married a daughter of John Gordon of Glenbucket - this marriage, like that of his son, Angus, formed a link with a family conspicuous for its Jacobitism. Lastly, of course, the two great families of Glengarry and Clanranald were themselves of common descent, being descended from Reginald, 8th Lord of the Isles, and because of this both claimed Chiefship of the whole of Clan Donald.

This relatively closed society, characterised by frequent intermarriage amongst the families of chiefs, preserved a tradition of Jacobite sentiment more continuous than in any other region, except possibly Perthshire. Every West Highland clan and sept who joined the Jacobite force in 1745 had served in the same cause in both 1715 and 1689, and had traditions of loyalty to the Stuarts which went back to the time of Montrose. All branches of the Clan Donald served under Montrose, including those of Keppoch, Sootus,

(1) Both were descended from John, 7th of Clanranald, see Father Charles Macdonald; "Among the Clanranalds," Oban. Duncan Cameron 1899. p.165.
Glencoe, and of course Glengarry and Clanranald, as did the
Camerons under Lochiel. All these, and the Stewarts of Appin,(1) with Maephersons under Cluny, and Macleans of Duart, were again in
arms under Dundee in 1689, while in 1715 the same clans were out
again. The force under Lochiel in 1715 numbered about 800, under
Cluny a little over a thousand, while Glengarry and Clanranald be¬
tween them brought out about 2,800 in that year. This probably
included all branches of the Clan Donald. These figures remained
constant or even increased in 1745. Young Lochiel had already
brought out 800 Camerons by August 19th, 1745, less than a month
after the arrival of the Prince, and by the end of November a total
of at least 1,000 had been raised. (2) The Glengarry and Clanranald
regiments, with other Clan Donald offshoots such as those of
Keppoch and Glencoe, in 1715 had a total of at least 2,320 recruits,
in spite of the fact that the powerful influence of Sir Alexander
Macdonald and Macleod of Macleod was now exerted on the government
side. This continuity, however, which characterised the North
West, was not maintained in other Jacobite areas. The numbers
brought out in 1745 show, almost everywhere else, a marked decrease
over those brought out in 1715 or earlier. Robertson of Strowan
brought out a force, according to Skene, of 800 in 1715. He was
able to raise far fewer in 1745. Probably at the most he raised
300 men. (3)

The fundamental reason for this constancy of sentiment in the
Western Highlands lies in the special characteristics of that
region. These same characteristics account for the differences

(2) See Introduction for the source of these figures.
(3) See below Chapter 2.
between recruiting in these areas and recruiting elsewhere. The Western Highlands were an area where ties of sentiment were at their strongest, and where material considerations played least part. Such sentimental ties, unlike more material considerations, were little affected by the vicissitudes of fortune, and the failure of the 1715 rising did not, therefore, have in this area the discouraging effects on recruitment in 1745 that it had elsewhere. Lord George Murray frequently compared the poor showing by Atholl men in 1745 with the Jacobite zeal of their fathers in 1715(1) but young Lochiel was able to bring out a larger force in 1745 than his father had raised in 1715. In both Perthshire and the North Eastern Counties ardent Jacobites, like Tullibardine or Lord Lewis Gordon, were forced to spend the largest amount of their time in enforcing recruitment, although both were representatives of families with wide territorial and local influence. There is no evidence, however, in the Western Highlands of similar difficulties being encountered by personalities of similar standing. Lochiel's hesitation before joining Charles in August, 1745 was not because of any difficulty of raising support among his clan, but because he doubted his right to embroil them in prospective disaster. He, however, took it for granted, and with justification, that where he led, they would follow. It is no coincidence that, with the exception of Barrisdale and young Glengarry (who returned North from Edinburgh to recruit in the more remote areas where there was

(1) See below Chapter 2.
no one else to act) all the chiefs from the Western Highlands were present with the main Jacobite body throughout the campaign.\(^1\)

None were forced, as were Tullibardine and Lord Lewis Gordon, to return home during the campaign to beat up further recruits.

Throughout the strongest motivating force in the North West was the desire to follow the chief. A second and also very strong force was provided by sentimental attachment to the House of Stuart. Where these two factors worked in the same direction we have the unshakeable Jacobitism of Camerons under Lochiel. Where they worked in conflict with each other we have the comparatively weaker and hesitant activities of Sir Alexander Macdonald, Macleod of Macleod, or Macdonald of Boisdale.

Macdonald of Sleat had been an ardent supporter of the House of Stuart in 1689, and had been one of those who, like Lochiel, opposed any surrender to the government after Dundee's death at Killiecrankie, but these sentiments were not upheld by his descendant, Sir Alexander Macdonald in 1745. Two official requests for help were sent to Sir Alexander by the Jacobite High Command. From Glenfinnan a formal request was sent to Sir Alexander and Macleod of Macleod,\(^2\) and later, after the retreat from Stirling, a similar request was brought to him on the orders of Cluny Macpherson. This second request was signed by all the Highland Chiefs serving with the Jacobite army.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Except for the absence of Cluny Macpherson from Culloden. This absence was caused by the fact that Cluny had left the main Jacobite army earlier on April 16th, the day of the battle, in order to meet and prepare food for the rest of his regiment which had been allowed to disperse for quarters. Cluny, with his regiment, was within 3 or 4 miles of Culloden when the battle began.


\(^3\) See Robert Forbes, "Lyon in Mourning" Vol.2 p.34. Account of Conversation with Capt. Donald Roy Macdonald.
Sir Alexander was, however, much under the influence of Macleod of Macleod and Forbes of Culloden, both prominent supporters of Hanover, and throughout the rising he remained committed to the Hanoverian interest. He had as great personal and territorial influence in the North West as any other chief, and he had the support of both Macleod of Macleod and Forbes of Culloden, yet the number of men he was able to raise for the government during the rising was far smaller than that provided on the Jacobite side by much lesser men. Two independent companies were raised by him, probably of 100 men each (1) while Keppoch was able to raise at least 600 men for the Jacobite force, and at least 220 were raised by Macdonald of Glencoe from only a small sept of Clan Donald (2). Jacobites, however, had estimated that Sir Alexander could have raised between 1,200 and 1,500 men and he himself had told Macleod of Raasay that he could raise 900 for Charles (3).

Apart from the smallness of the numbers raised by Sir Alexander there was little strength of purpose in the men, compared with those brought out by Jacobite Chiefs. Hugh Macdonald of Armadale, sent by Sir Alexander to search, with a body of militia, for Charles in the Outer Hebrides after Culloden, was Jacobite at heart and was the step-father of Flora Macdonald. Alexander Macdonald of Kingsburgh, Sir Alexander's own factor, was equally Jacobite in sentiment, and was of course committed to prison in August, 1746 for his part in the concealment of Charles on Skye.

(1) This was the optimum size of each Independent Company under Loudoun at Inverness.
(2) See Introduction for further details of these figures.
Kingsburgh’s sentiments, however, were probably known by Sir Alexander, for earlier Macleod of Macleod had written an undated letter to Kingsburgh warning him of "the danger of protecting or aiding him (the Pretender) by any of our friends".

During the time that Charles was in hiding Sir Alexander had tried to raise further men for the government from Portree, without success\(^1\) while earlier, in September, 1745, he had found difficulty in distributing commissions in the Independent Companies because of the reluctance of many of his following to accept them, and thereby fight their neighbours or relations.\(^2\) There was widespread Jacobite sympathy on Skye, and, because of this, Duncan Forbes had stressed the necessity that either Sir Alexander or Macleod of Macleod should accompany the Skye militia to prevent them from turning Jacobite.\(^3\) When Donald Roy Macdonald, of the Clanranald Regiment, returned to Skye after Falkirk to recruit he was well received and entertained by the officers of the pro Hanoverian Skye Militia, \(^4\) and earlier in the campaign Sir Alexander had not put any obstacles in his way when he determined to join Charles.\(^5\)

Sir Alexander’s own attitude was by no means simple. According to Donald Roy Macdonald he was, for the first month after the news of Charles’ arrival, undecided as to whether to raise his men for

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\(^1\) Undated letter to Kingsburgh, West Highland Museum, Fort William, Miscell. Mss.


\(^5\) "Sir Alexander not pretending in the least to hinder". ibid p.5.
the Prince, and, even after the battle of Falkirk, he wrote to Keppoch that "I assure you I will as little rise against you. If any misfortune shall happen to yourself, I desire you may leave your son Ronald to my care". (1)

In spite, however, of such mental reservations Sir Alexander's own actions were clear. He refused all Jacobite requests for help, he raised his own following for the government, and he identified himself with the pro-Hanoverian policy and actions of Forbes of Culloden. His local influence and following were considerable and, in deference to his views, although the sentiments of his people were strongly Jacobite, only two of his immediate following joined Charles. (2) When, as here, the political views of the chief were in conflict with the sentiments of his following, the views of the chief prevailed in general. But, because such a conflict had first to be resolved, the resulting military actions of such clans were far weaker and less decisive than those of clans where chief and following were united in political aims. The sentiment of reverence for Chief or Chieftain was, in fact, stronger than the sentiment of traditional attachment to the Stuarts; the attitude of Sir Alexander's following proved this, but when the two sentiments were in union instead of in conflict, Jacobitism was immeasurably strong.

The pro-Hanoverian activities and inclinations of both Macleod of Macleod and Macdonald of Boisedale prove the same point. The prestige and personal influence of Norman Macleod of Macleod was

(1) ibid p.5 et seq.
(2) They were Donald Roy Macdonald (see above) and John Macdonald of Hishir, Uist.
considerable, and he had represented the county of Inverness in Parliament since 1741. His attitude to a possible rising was also well known, (1) whatever vague promises of sympathy he might have made in 1743 or 1744 as a member of the Buck Club. Duncan Forbes had no doubt of his loyalty, and even Murray of Broughton admitted that Macleod held, in August 1744, that a Jacobite rising would be inadvisable, (2) and by the summer of 1745 his hostile attitude to a Rising was well-known. In June, 1745 he had written to Duncan Forbes to point out the lack of arms amongst clans loyal to the government, and in July he reported to Forbes that he had placed people in Ardnamuchan, Glenelg, and the islands, to send him intelligence of Charles' arrival. (3) Macdonald of Boisedale who visited Charles on his arrival in the Du Teillay warned him that Macleod would not join, a proof therefore that Macleod's attitude was well known, and on 3rd August Macleod wrote from Dunvegan to report Charles' arrival to the government, in a letter to Forbes of Culloden. (4)

Moreover, there was not, in the case of Macleod, any recent history of Jacobitism to obscure the issue. Although John Macleod of Contullich, Macleod's first cousin twice removed, who managed the estates during his infancy, had Jacobite connections, (5) he did not

(1) Both Duncan Warrand, "More Culloden Papers") and I.F. Grant, "The Macleods") point out that there is no evidence that Macleod was ever seriously committed to Jacobitism. The only promises of sympathy he made were oral, and were made after drinking. Further assertions of unconditional support depend only on the unsubstantiated word of Murray of Broughton, in his memorials written at least 12 years after 1745.

(2) See Murray - "Memorials" p.109.


(5) His son brought fifty men from Glenelg to join the abortive Jacobite rising of 1719.
involved the clan in the Fifteen Rising. Macleod himself was a close personal friend of Forbes of Culloden, to whom he had turned for help in freeing himself of suspicion of being implicated in the Bernera kidnapping case of 1739. The support Forbes gave him on that occasion was sufficient to ensure unequivocal Hanoverian sentiments from Macleod in return.

The only result, however, of such sentiments and inclinations was a total force of only four hundred pro-Hanoverian recruits.

These numbers of pro-Hanoverian levies actually raised by Macleod and Sir Alexander Macdonald are, however, far smaller than the real military potential of their following. Duncan Forbes of Culloden was probably responsible for compiling an undated report on the State of the Highlands, one copy of which is amongst the miscellaneous papers of the Episcopal Church of Scotland. (1) This report lists the military potential of all personages of importance in the Highlands as calculated by the author, and the figures, where they can be checked by the actual adherents raised, seem in general to be fairly accurate. This Report assesses the strength of the Macdonalds of Sleat, under Sir Alexander, at 700 and the Macleods at the same figure. In fact, though, as has been shown earlier, the total force raised by Sir Alexander did not exceed 200, while Macleod's Independent Companies probably consisted of not much more than 450 men.

It is somewhat difficult to assess the size of the force Macleod

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(1) Papers of Scottish Episcopal Church. Episcopal Training College, of the Diocese, Edinburgh. (Episcopal Chest). The Report is also printed by the Spalding Club, Allardyce papers, p.166 et seq.
was able to recruit. Dr. I.F. Grant quotes (1) a Memorial drawn up
by Macleod in 1763 in which he asserted that he had enlisted 1,400
men and spent £2,500 of his own money, in government service during
the rebellion, but he does not state what proportion of these men
were recruited from his own following. Certainly the backbone of
Loudoun's force of Independent companies at Inverness was provided
by the 5 Macleod companies, and in some contemporary accounts the
words "Macleods" and "Independent Companies" are used synonymously.

(2) Maxwell of Kirkconnell, for instance, refers to the Hanoverian
force which attempted to surprise Charles at Moy, on February 16th,
1745, as "a force of 1,200 Macleods."

Macleod had certainly already raised one Independent Company
before the Rising began, and apparently raised four subsequent
companies, by December, 1745. In the skirmish at Inverness Macleod
had 450 men under him, and in a letter of December 24th, 1745,
Ludovick Grant (3) puts the number of Macleod Companies at five.
Possibly Macleod was able to raise some further men later, although
both he and Sir Alexander Macdonald found recruiting difficult. (4)
The final figure raised for the government by Norman Macleod would
probably not stand at much over 450 men, therefore.

In morale, however, these men were far below the quality of
the Jacobite recruits from the same area. Their undisciplined
flight after the skirmish at Inverurie, in December 1745, and the

(2) "Narrative of Charles, Prince of Wales' Expedition to Scotland
in the year 1745." James Maxwell of Kirkconnell. Maitland
(3) "Chiefs of Grant." Sir William Fraser, Edin. 1883. Vol.2. p.203,
Letter of Ludovick Grant to Lord Loudoun.
complete collapse of their morale after their dispersal, on March 20th, by a Jacobite force under the Duke of Perth, testify to this.

Their morale was undoubtedly further lowered by a division of loyalties. Many were certainly torn between loyalty to their chieftain and loyalty to the House of Stuart. The persistent legend that many Highlanders who served on the government side in the Rising actually believed they were being raised to fight on the rebel side, has certainly some basis in the attitude of many Macleods. There are several references in the "Lyon in Mourning" to Macleods joining the Independent Companies wearing white Cockades, believing they were going to fight for the Prince. A memorandum by James Mackenzie of Orkney\(^{(1)}\) points out that, after the skirmish at Inverurie, when Macleod tried to rally his men at Elgin they reminded him "that he had made them believe they were to follow Charles when he first brought them out of the Island, and afterwards to hold them together at Inverness he had dispersed with them as if he had always meant to let them follow their own inclinations".

One reason for Loudoun's hasty evacuation of Inverness on February 18th, 1746 was his unwillingness to trust the Independent Companies in any action against a Highland Jacobite force. There was no similar lack of trust on the Jacobite side.

The government force which Macleod of Macleod raised from his own following was, therefore, inferior in numbers and morale to what might have been raised on the Jacobite side.

The same picture is presented by the actions of Alexander Macdonald of Boisedale. Boisedale was the brother of Old Clanranald, and had considerable influence over him. Because of his increasing infirmity Clanranald left the management of his affairs to Boisedale.

\(^{(1)}\) "Lyon in Mourning." Vol.II. p.85.
15.

Because of this it was to Boisedale that Charles addressed his official request for help on his arrival. Clanranalds had a long tradition of loyalty to the Stuarts. They have served under Montrose, and had been present at Killiecrankie and Glenfinnan. The most important offshoots of the main branch were the Macdonals of Kinlochmoidart, Glenaladale, Morar and Borrodale, and all of these were strongly Jacobite in sentiment and in action. Ronald Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart was the brother of the banker, Aeneas Macdonald, who accompanied Charles on the Doutelle or Du Teillay. He held the rank of Colonel in the Jacobite army, and was made an aide de Camp. Alexander Macdonald of Glenaladale served as a Major in the Clanranald Regiment, and had arrived with Kinlochmoidart to meet Charles on board the Du Teillay. Angus Macdonald of Borrodale was the uncle of Glenaladale, and his son, like Macdonald of Morar, served in the Clanranald regiment. Borrodale had given Charles hospitality at Borrodale House in August 1745 and sheltered him again after Culloden.

Clanranald's influence was very considerable in the West, and in recognition of this the undated "Report on the State of the Highlands," referred to above, put the military force at Clanranald's disposal at 700 men. The maximum who served in the Jacobite force, however, did not exceed 400. Again, the explanation of this disparity lies in the attitude of one man.

Alexander Macdonald of Boisedale had no faith in Charles' chances in 1745, and was determined to give the enterprise no

support. He warned Charles that he could expect no help from him, and passed on to him the views of Sir Alexander Macdonald as well. After the setting up of the standard of Glenfinnan he "kept back all Clanranald's men that lived in South Uist and the other isles to the number of 4 or 5 hundred good men". The fact that this could be done, amongst a clan with as strong Jacobite traditions as the Clanranalds, proves yet again the immense importance of personal influence in the Western Highlands.

In one other sphere in the Western Highlands the personal, rather than the political factor, played an important part. A certain amount of destruction of property, pillage and plunder was the work of Jacobite Highlanders, a much greater amount, after Culloden, was the work of those on the Hanoverian side. However, it is almost certain that the motive on both sides for much of this was personal and local, rather than political. Camerons during the Fort William campaign of March 1746 fought Campbells, and Campbells plundered Cameron property, not merely because of the political clash between Jacobite and Hanoverian, but because of the personal and traditional clash between Cameron and Campbell. Moreover, at least in the case of the Duke of Argyll, on the government side, and Lochiel, on the Jacobite side, such plunder and violence was in opposition to the desires of the chief. The Duke of Argyll, in a

(2) ibid. p.148.
(3) In spite of his own views, Boisedale was never actively hostile to Charles, however, and he provided shelter for Aeneas Macdonald while he was in charge of the Spanish money landed at Barra in April, 1746. He was also of considerable help to Charles during his wanderings after Culloden.
(4) The Governor of Fort William reported on March 13 three sorties for instance, by the garrison, in which 2 of Lochiel's farms were burnt and cattle seized. Two days earlier, on March 10th, had occurred the plundering of Morven by a party which included twenty Campbell militia.
letter of March 17th, 1746, condemned the policy of burning and destruction, and was only prepared to countenance such actions if they were done as the result of military necessity by regular troops, not as private action by individuals. Lochiel's Manifesto, drawn up at Glennevis on March 20th, 1746, ends "we shall show that we are not to make war against women and brute creatures, but against men........ notwithstanding the malicious aspersions industriously contrived by our enemies they could never, since the commencement of the war, impeach us with any acts of hostility that had the least tendency to such cruelty as they exercise against us".

Earlier, in July, 1745, both Lochiel and his brother Dr. Archibald Cameron had thwarted a proposal to distress the homes of Campbell of Inveraray and of his tenants on the grounds "that such proceeding could be no way useful to his (the Prince's) undertaking".

The known views of both Lochiel and the Duke of Argyll were not strong enough, however, to prevail always over the instinctive and ancient enmity which both Camerons and Macdonalds felt for Campbells. Respect for a chief's views was strong, as has been shown above, but ancient enmity was even stronger.

This feeling of enmity was shared even by Lochiel himself. In a letter to Cluny Macpherson, written from Glennevis, on March 20th, 1746, describing the plundering by Campbells of Morvern, Lochiel continues by congratulating the authors of the "well conceived and well executed scheme" of surprising 70 Campbell militia and some of

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(1) See Fergusson. "Argyll in the Forty-Five." London, Faber and Faber 1951 p.120.
(3) ibid. p.274 transcript of documents written by Dr. Cameron while in prison, June, 1753.
Kingston's light house at Keith on March 19th - "but what gives me joy in a particular manner is the fate of the Campbells, the plunderers of our countries". Lochiel's manifesto from Glennevis, written on the same day and referred to earlier contained the threat "We hope to prevail with his Royal Highness to hang a Campbell for every house that shall hereinafter be burnt by them". This same feeling of deep personal hatred was shared by Campbells. Lochiel, describing the plundering of Morvern to Cluny Macpherson stated "a party of the Campbells took the opportunity, while the county of Morvine was destitute of men to burn all the farms upon the coast of it that were inhabited by either Camerons or Macleans, first plundering the houses, stript the poor women and children, killed all the horses that came in their way and even set fire to their bires without allowing them to turn out their cattle, such barbarity as was never heard of". Continually, Lochiel's letters refer to the garrison at Fort William not as the enemy, but merely as Campbells, another instance of the same personal rather than political hostility.

The entire siege of Fort William was itself largely necessitated by this traditional enmity. There were twelve further garrisons or out-posts still in government hands on the fall of Fort Augustus (3) on March 5th but the siege of Fort William was undertaken partly as a result of pressure from local men in the Jacobite force whose

(3) They were Fort William, Kilchurn, Dunstaffnage, Mingarry, Glenfalloch, the head of Loch Fyne, Portincaple, St. Catherine's ferry, Dumbarton, Inversnaid, Castle Lochlan, Inveraray and Durt. See "Argyll in the Forty-Five." Fergusson p.52.
homes and livestock were in continuous danger from the sallies of the garrison. The Jacobite force besieging Fort William consisted, apart from Irish piquets and some piquets of the French Royal Scots, of Camerons and Macdonalds of Keppoch and Glencoe, all of whom were especially interested in the success of the siege because their homes had suffered from the frequent sallies of the garrison, while the main Jacobite force was in England. The original garrison at Inverlochy had been established by General Monk in the previous century to paralyse Cameron activity by forcing Sir Ewen Cameron's men to return to defend their own homes from attack by the garrison. Nearly a century later, the garrison still fulfilled the same purpose. Sallies by the garrison continued in spite of the siege. On March 20th, 1746, Lochiel wrote to Cluny Macpherson "There are three hundred and fifty of the Campbells at Fort William, two men of war, they are daily attempting by their party to land at Corpach and other farms in Lochiel to burn and carry off cattell but prevented by our guards......we hope soon to be masters of it (the fort) coast what it will".

The two factors which played a very large part in colouring West Highland sentiment in 1745 were, as has been demonstrated above, reverential obedience to the views of one's chief and traditional enmity towards Campbells and their offshoots. However, a third factor also existed. This was a traditional and sentimental loyalty to the House of Stuart. This, though of much importance, was, never-the-less, secondary and subservient to the need to obey the

(1) See Maxwell of Kirkconnel. op. cit. p.20.
wishes and political view of each chief. This has been demonstrated in the cases of those who followed Sir Alexander Macdonald or even Macdonald of Boisdale.

However, with these reservations, traditional loyalty to the House of Stuart was a very powerful factor. With very few exceptions, each clan had a continuous history of loyalty to the Stuarts extending from service under Montrose in the mid seventeenth century to service under Prince Charles Edward a hundred years later, and including in between service under Dundee and Mar. This was true of Macdonalds of Keppoch, Glencoe, Clanranald and Glengarry, and the smaller sept's, and of Lochiel's Camerons. In no other area was there such continuity of sentiment. This continuous tradition, in the Western Highlands, of loyalty to the Stuarts has many causes. In many cases, as Miss Cunningham has pointed out "the clansmen supported their chief because they knew from experience that their hereditary and natural leader had their interests nearer at heart than any stranger". These chiefs who, like Cameron of Lochiel, felt their responsibility for the interest of their people, were not men to plunge their followers needlessly into warfare, and in many cases, as Forbes of Culloden pointed out to them, their own immediate personal interests would often have been better furthered by support of the government. Many of the chiefs who joined the

(1) This tie between clansman and chief, was a tie of tradition and sentiment, not of respect for legal rights of succession. This is demonstrated in the case of Simon Fraser of Beaufort's claim to succeed Lord Lovat, in opposition to the rights of Lovat's daughter with her powerful Atholl connections. By clan tradition Simon Fraser might be the customary heir, but parties of law were against him. The majority of the clan however stood behind Simon Fraser's claim, choosing to support clan tradition rather than legal rights. See Audrey Cunningham, "The Loyal Clans". Cambridge University Press 1932. p.432 et seq.

(2) ibid. p.9.
21.

Jacobite cause were enlightened and intelligent administrators and must have been aware of this. Lochiel and his brother, Dr. Archibald Cameron, had a long record of enlightened administration, with a marked sense of responsibility towards their clan. Young Clanranald and Boisedale were well known as agricultural improvers and were responsible for introducing potatoes to Uist. Cluny Macpherson's Watch, which he organised during the early 1740's, testified to his administrative ability, and Macleod of Bernera and Macdonald of Balshar, or Baleshare, were responsible for the introduction of kelp to Harris and Uist and were reckoned as agricultural improvers.

The motives which drew such men to support the Jacobite rising must therefore be of considerable strength.

Chief amongst these motives were the twin facts; first that the concept of the patriarchal power of the Crown, as symbolised by the Stuarts, had considerable appeal for a Highlander used to the rather similar authority of his chief. Second, that many Highlanders felt, in Miss Cunningham's words, that "the Revolution Settlement had left the Highlands to face the Parliamentary despotism of a hostile and prejudiced majority". The Highlander, moreover, had in general gained from the administration of at least the later Stuarts. Both

(1) See, for instance, an early letter of Lochiel's, written from Carendale, November 1720, to a Major Cunningham, complaining of a raid on some of his tenants on Loch Arkaig - Miscell. letters. West Highland Museum. Fort William.
(2) Balshar, though serving himself in the government militia, was Jacobite in sympathy and was of considerable help to Charles while he was in hiding on Uist.
(3) A. Cunningham op. cit. p.438.
Charles II and James VII and II, in increasing the powers of the Crown in the Highlands, had done much to safeguard the liberties of the smaller clans. They had, moreover, done nothing to interfere with Highland tradition or the wearing of Highland dress, or the use of the Gaelic language.

On the other hand, the administration since 1689 had apparently done nothing for the Highlanders, who remembered instead Glencoe, and official temporising over the dangerous question of superiorities and fresh legislation against the MacGregors. These feelings were increased by the religious grievances which were the result of the Presbyterian domination begun in 1689. In contrast, the clans remembered the attempt by James VII and II to free them from some of the irksome feudal superiorities vested in the House of Argyll, and this memory was kept alive by promises from the exiled court of the Old Pretender. In 1729 Allan Cameron wrote from the exiled court at Albano to Donald Cameron, the Young Lochiel of the Forty-Five telling him "you are to assure yourself and others that the King has determined to make Scotland happy and the Clans in particular, when it pleases God to restore him, this is consistent with my certain knowledge". The various proclamations issued by the Old Pretender, during and before the Rising of 1715, also contained, or implied, promises to deal with the powerful superiorities of the House of Argyll.

The Highland Clans had, that is, tangible and material reasons for expecting much from the Stuarts, but little from the administration since 1689. Their Jacobitism was more than the sentimental

attachment to an exiled dynasty which led English High Tories to toast the King over the water. It was the result of much more tangible and material factors, and for that reason was the more enduring. Young Lochiel's father, John Cameron, on going into exile after the Fifteen Rising, warned his clan to keep alive and foster their loyalty to the Stuarts and urged them "not to doubt that all will end to your satisfaction and mine in the happy restoration of your rightful and lawful sovereign for whom, under God, we all suffer".

After the crushing defeat of Culloden, it was only amongst the Western Highlanders that hope of a summer campaign remained alive. A conference to discuss this had been held at Muirlaggen on May 8th and a rendezvous at Achnacarry on May 15th decided upon where Clanranalds, Camerons, Glengarries and any others from that area could assemble. Lochiel wrote a letter, dated May 1746, to Cluny Macpherson to inform him of these plans. This letter is now among the Miscellaneous Cluny papers in the West Highland Museum at Fort William. It begins optimistically "I have nothing new to acquaint you of. We are preparing for a summer campaign and hope soon to join all our forces. Mr. Murray desires that if any of the pickets or of Lord John Drummond's Regiment or any other pretty fellows are straggling in your country that you conven them and keep with yourself till we join you". The summer campaign came, of course, to nothing. As Lochiel wrote in a second, unaddressed letter among the Miscellaneous Cluny Papers "our assembly was not so general nor hearty as was expected". Without sufficient numbers to gain

intelligence of enemy movements, those who did assemble at Achna-
(1) cary were nearly surprised. Even now, however, Lochiel was
directing all to "keep themselves as safe as possible, and keep
their arms as we have great expectations of the French doing some-
(2) thing for us." Such determined faith in the face of such ample
proofs of failure could only be the result of something much
stronger than mere sentimental attachment to an exiled House.

The great tenacity with which Jacobite sentiments were held is
ture of almost all the clans of the far west. It is true of Keppochs,
Clanranalds, Clengarries, Camerons and of the smaller septs like
Macdonalds, Glencoe, Scotus, Tiendrish.

It is a little less true, however, of the slightly more
sophisticated clans like Frasers of Macphersons, who were affected
by the more political and materialist atmosphere of Inverness. Ewan
Macpherson of Cluny had held a Captain's Commission in Loudoun's
Regiment since June 8th 1745. He was on terms of friendship with
(3) Norman Macleod of Macleod and had some acquaintance with the Duke
(4) of Argyll, to whom he was "much obliged" for his commission. He
had organised an efficient policing body, known as Cluny's Watch, to
protect the Inverness area, and, through this, had business connec-
tions with prominent Hanoverians like Alexander Brodie of Lethen.
He had married a daughter of Lord Lovat.

(1) The same letter of May 25th.
(2) The same letter.
(3) See Commission and covering letter from Robert Craigie, Lord
Advocate, dated June 24th, 1745, among miscell. Cluny Papers.
West Highland Museum, Fort William.
(4) viz. for instance Macleod's letter of July 30th 1745 to Cluny,
congratulating him on his Captainship under Loudoun, and
speaking of his "Sincere Friendship". Letter among miscell.
Cluny Papers. Fort William.
(5) See the same letter of July 30th.
His adherence to the Jacobite cause in 1745 was partly the result of his accidental capture by a body of Camerons on August 28th, who brought him before the Prince at Dalwhinnie. It was also partly due to the fact that General Cope, with whom he had been consulting at Ruthven, had treated him tactlessly and haughtily, and this treatment contrasted badly with his courteous and flattering reception by the Prince. These factors, however, did not produce quite the same blind tenacity which marks the Jacobites of the further West clans. Cluny himself never forswore his choice, and remained lurking in the hills after Culloden in charge of what Jacobite money was left behind by the Prince, until he escaped to France and received a Commission in the (French) Royal Scots Regiment in 1757. However, those factors which explain the tenacity of Jacobitism in the Western Highlands applied less in the Inverness area, and the Macphersons appear to have been less steadfast than most of the Clans of the West.

For instance, among the miscellaneous Cluny Papers at Fort William is a letter, signed by the Prince, giving permission for Cluny to use, against those who would not follow him, "all manner of military execution against their persons or cattle .... we empower and require you to judge .... all deserters from the regiment, whom you are to punish by death or otherwise." An anonymous suggestion of lack of steadfastness in the Macpherson Regiment is amongst the Culloden Papers, "Many of the Macphersons came before Clunie, now in Badenoch and many of them expressed Resolutions not to be further

(1) See various letters. miscell. Cluny letters of 1757 at Fort William.
(2) The area was comparatively distant, for instance, from both Glencoe, and Campbell influence.
concerned, but how far they will be steady was yet uncertain." This seems to suggest something more serious than the normal temptation amongst a Highland levy to return home, often with the booty, during the intervals of a campaign. Lastly, in the unpublished Roll of the Highland Army the number of Macphersons who surrendered themselves after Culloden is calculated at 266, a considerably higher figure than any West Highland clan provided.

Lord Lovat's tergiversations were also in contrast to the steadfastness of the clans of the far west. His private aim was almost certainly to secure a Dukedom for himself from a victorious Pretender, without endangering, until that victory, his own relations with the Hanoverian government. To this end he sent his agent William Fraser of Cortuleg to make evasive promises of support to Charles at Invergarry, on August 26th, 1745. He was enough of a realist to defer any action until the outcome of the first pitched battle was clear, and even after Prestonpans, he could still be hindered from action by Macleod of Macleod's ruse of pretending to be about to raise his own men in the Jacobite cause. Macleod, on Forbes of Culloden's instructions, visited Lovat at Castle Dounie, during October 1745, and persuaded him to delay despatching the Frasers to join the Jacobite camp at Perth, on the pretext that they could later march in one body with his own men. A less materialistic man might not have fallen for this ruse. Even as

late as November 10, when his son and three hundred Frasers were about to march to Perth, (if they had not already left) Lovat was still in correspondence with Forbes of Culloden, sending him intelligence of Jacobite movements. Lovat was experienced in political manoeuvring. He was used to the political atmosphere of the government administration at Inverness, and he had held a commission in the Independent Companies. He was a frequent visitor to Duncan Forbes at Culloden House, and a frequent correspondent of Lieut. Col. Kennedy, the Deputy Governor of Fort George at Inverness. His estate was also heavily in debt by 1745, for the annual rental of the estate was a little over £1,000 sterling, the debts on it something over £35,000. Lovat's political sophistication, plus his heavy debts in 1745, provide an explanation for his actions which is in striking contrast to the motives of such men as Lochiel, Keppoch or other chiefs of the West.

The remarkable continuity with which loyalty to the Stuarts was maintained in the West was one of the reasons why there was here no need for devices such as a quota system of forcing out men. The continuous loyalty with which Clanranalds and Glengarry's had served the Stuarts, since the time of Montrose, meant that the more recent offshoots of these two great clans also shared, with the

(1) See Miscell. Letters of Col. Kennedy's in the archives of the Public Library at Inverness.
(2) The actual figures are: rental £1,003.18s.0½d., debts discharged to creditors after the forfeiture £35,837.0s.0d. see Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715/45. Scot. Hist. Society Vol. 57 p.29/30.
(3) Though not necessarily before 1642. Both Donald, 9th of Clanranald, and the Glengarry of the time had come into conflict with James VI from 1611 onward for instance.
older stock, the same tradition. Of the older Clanranald offshoots, the most influential were the Macdonalds of Kinlochmoidart and Glenaladale, descended from John of Mortlach and Clanranald, and the Macdonalds of Morar, descended from a branch of the Glenaladale family. Of the newer Glengarry offshoots, the most influential were the Macdonalds of Scotus, descended from Donald, 1st of Scotus, the grandson of the eighth Glengarry, and the Macdonalds of Lochgarry and Barrisdale, descended from Ronald, 2nd of Scotus. In 1745, Donald Macdonald of Scotus had joined before the raising of the Standard at Glenfinnan, and was killed at Culloden while Barrisdale joined Charles on 26th or 27th August 1745. Furthermore, both Kinlochmoidart and Glenaladale joined before the raising of the standard.

Macdonald of Keppoch had an equally distinguished history of Stuart Loyalty. Coll. Macdonald or Macdonell received a Colonel's Commission from James VII and II in 1690 or 1691, and in November 1689 James wrote from Dublin to "his trusty and well beloved," expressing gratitude for his valour. In 1743 Alexander Macdonell of Keppoch was created a baronet by the Old Pretender, in recognition of his family's services, and, commanding his own regiment, was killed at Culloden. Sharing descent from Coll Macdonald of Keppoch was Donald Macdonald of Tiendrish, who held the rank of Major in the Keppoch regiment in 1745.

(1) See Lochgarry's Narrative in Blaikies "Itinerary", p.112.

(2) Commission undated, among letters, the property of Miss Alice Macdonell of Keppoch, Miscell.Papers, Fort William.

(3) He was his nephew, the son of his brother Ronald Ivor Macdonald.
The result of these strong, and long, traditions of loyalty to the Stuarts was the absence, in the Western Highlands, of the forcing out of men, in the way that this forcing out took place elsewhere. There is no reference, either amongst the Culloden Papers or amongst the miscellaneous Cameron papers at Fort William, nor in any other source, to the use of either a quota system, or the hiring out of recruits. Both these methods of raising men were, however, common in the North East, the Dundee, Angus and Perthshire areas. Amongst the "Lists of Persons Concerned in the Present Rebellion", transmitted to the Commissioners of Excise, is a reference to Alexander Stewart of Invernabyle, Captain in the Appin Stuart's who was "active in raising Appin's tenants" but with no details of the means used.

In a list of prisoners, enclosed in a letter from the Earl of Albermarle to the Duke of Newcastle, there is one reference to the taking prisoner of a Charles McCachen in South Uist for buying men for the Pretender's son. It is, however, equally possible that this is a reference to the recruiting for the French Service, which was so common in the Western Highlands before 1745.

There are equally few references in this area to forcing out, as distinct from hiring out. Miss Macdonell of Keppoch, in her

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short account of her family "The Macdonells of Keppoch and Gargavach" (1) and Sir James Fergusson in his "Argyll in the Forty-Five" both refer to 30 families called McGlasserick who alleged that they had been forced out from their homes in Lochaber into supporting the rising, though they were really Campbells. They accordingly claimed Campbell protection. Barrisdale later claimed that he also had been forced out by his chief, presumably Glengarry's second son Angus, as Glengarry himself took no part in the rising, although here Albermarle doubted the truth of the excuse. The fact that they had been forced out by a threat of violence was obviously a frequent, and tempting defence, for those who were caught. There has always been a tendency to overestimate the extent of forcing out in the West. John Marchant, in his "History of the Rebellion", published in 1746 gives one of the early examples of this tendency, saying "such as did join them (the rebels) were compelled to it; one of their Chiefs used Means that savoured of Barbarity".

Where forcing out does seem to be proved, however, it appears not to be used against West Highland clans, but to have been used by men from such clans against neighbouring districts. This occurred generally on the perimeter of the area, where other, purely emotional factors, were not strong enough to command support. It was used, that is, not against West Highlanders, but by them against others. Barrisdale, and young Glengarry used it in their

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(2) Albermarle Papers. ii 405 and i. 87.
31.

attempt to raise men from the Grants of Glenmoriston, and also in Urquhart and Assynt. Glengarry's second son, Angus threatened to plunder Urquhart unless a hundred Grants joined him, and later, threatened to burn the corn of those who opposed him.

Among the Atholl Papers is at least one reference to a recruiting raid, by Camerons, on Atholl tenants in the Rannoch area. Again, on August 15th, a party of Camerons threatened to burn the houses of any Camerons in Rannoch who would not rise. Two days later, Keppoch made similar threats in the Bunrannoch area, and this was also an Atholl barony. Keppoch later made a similar descent on the Loch Broom area, "snatching some of them out of their beds" according to the petition of James Robertson, a presbyterian clergyman of Loch Broom, in favour of fifteen forced out from his parish. All these references, however, are to the use of force outside the home district of those using the violence, and the force was used against those living outside, or on the perimeter only, of this Western Highland area.


(2) "Chiefs of Grant" Letter of Young Glengarry to Ludovick Grant's factor in Urquhart, Sept. 30th 1745, Vol. 2 p.165.


(5) Sir Bruce Seton. op.cit. p.270.
CHAPTER 2.

PERTHSHIRE.

The countryside of Perthshire proved a very fertile recruiting ground during the rebellion. Between 18\% and 20\% of the Jacobite force came from here, and the county provided illustrations of almost every facet of Jacobite recruitment. In the first place, almost all those families possessing territorial influence in Perthshire had long histories of Jacobite activity, often going back to the days of Viscount Dundee. Next, the near feudal military power of the chief is amply illustrated in this county by the Marquess of Tullibardine’s method of raising recruits. Further, Perthshire was a stronghold of Episcopacy, and this made for Jacobite sentiments. Lastly, the county provides numerous illustrations of the difficulties involved in forcing out men, and of the necessity of providing large military parties in order to achieve any success in this. The existence of forced recruiting, on a large scale, meant that this county also produced by far the largest number of deserters from the Jacobite army, and plentiful examples of the problems of desertion can be found from these parts. The county of Perth also produced, in Lord George Murray, probably the ablest soldier, and certainly the most diligent staff officer, in the Jacobite army.

Section I.

Recruitment Statistics from Perthshire.

The three men responsible, between them, for almost all the recruiting within this county were Lord George Murray, his brother

(1) See Introduction for the source of these figures.
(2) The term party is here used in its Jacobite sense of a company of men prepared, and instructed, to use military force to secure recruits.
the Marquis of Tullibardine, and the Duke of Perth. Lord George Murray joined the Prince at Dunkeld, on September 3rd, 1745, while Tullibardine and the Duke of Perth had earlier arrived with Charles from France on board the Du Teillay.

Lord George Murray was the fifth son of the first Duke of Atholl, and was fifty at the time of the Forty-Five. With his elder brother, Tullibardine, he had fought under the Earl of Mar in the rising of 1715, and had escaped from Uist to France in May, 1716. In 1719 he had sailed from Bordeaux, and had the rank of Brigadier, in the brief and disastrous rising which was routed at Glenshiel. He again escaped to the Continent, after lurking in hiding for ten months, and remained in exile, largely in the company of his brother the Marquis of Tullibardine, until he returned to Scotland in 1724, and received a formal pardon in November 1725. Although he had twice been engaged in treasonable activities, he, unlike his elder brother, had not been attainted, and his pardon was therefore easier to procure. It was achieved as a result of negotiations begun by his father, the first Duke, in 1722. After his return to Scotland, and succession to the Dukedom of his brother James, Lord George remained immersed in family and estate business, and lived largely at the family property of Tullibardine until the September of 1745.

The years from 1725 to 1745 were spent largely in the circle of his brother, the Duke, whose daughter Lord George's eldest son (1) was, by family arrangement, to marry. Twice in 1744 he ignored Jacobite feelers put out by the Duke of Perth, and as late as the 20th August, 1745 was writing to the Lord Advocate, Robert Craigie,

(1) See an undated Ms. compiled late in 1747 by Lady George Murray summarising her husbands financial relations with the Duke of Atholl, now amongst miscellaneous papers in the Charter Room at Blair Castle.
intelligence of the Prince's doings to date, ending with the orthodox and pious Hanoverian hope "that these troubles will soon be over". With his brother, and the elder Glengarry, he met Sir John Cope on August 21st to discuss action, and he was already in receipt of a Government commission as Sheriff Depute of Perth.

On September 2nd 1745 a request from the Prince for support was brought to Lord George by the younger Oliphant of Gask, and on the following day Lord George wrote to his brother, the Duke, to explain that his decision to engage "in the course I always in my heart thought just and right" was already taken when they parted after the August interview with Sir John Cope. He was given by the Prince, on the arrival at Perth, a Major General's Commission, and a day or so later was made a Lieutenant General.

Lord George Murray was a valuable adherent to the Jacobite Cause. Like his brother, Tullibardine, he represented the Atholl territorial and personal influence, which was of incalculable importance in Perthshire, but while his brother had been an exile, and remote from local politics for the last thirty years, Lord George had been consolidating his personal influence in Perthshire since 1725. He had also, alone of the Jacobite High Command in 1745, personal experience of the army they were fighting, as he had served as an officer in the Royals (First Foot or Royal Scots), until the rising of 1715. He had considerable military ability, his holding

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(2) Granted to him, August 14th by his brother the Duke of Atholl.
(4) According to Col. O'Sullivan"a day or so later, finding the Duke of Perth was Lieut. General he would be one too and so the Prince made him one", "1745 and After" A. & H. Tayler, p.69 Edin. Nelson & Sons. 1938.
of the Jacobite rear on the retreat from Derby, and his transport of the artillery and heavy baggage over exceptionally difficult terrain was a severe test of his powers, but both these tasks, and his command of the coastal division on the retreat north from Stirling, revealed his talent for organisation.

However, the Jacobite attitude of mind after the retreat from Derby gave ample opportunity for mutual recriminations over tactics, and the Prince had been encouraged by his earlier successes in the entry into Edinburgh, and the battle of Prestonpans, to believe in the necessity for bold strokes, and therefore to resent Lord George's more cautious advice.

Lord George lacked the ability to get on with either Colonel O'Sullivan or Sir John Macdonald, who had accompanied Charles from France. Both of them were closely in the Prince's confidence. Lord George quarrelled with Sir John Macdonald and O'Sullivan over the placing of the Atholl Brigade at Prestonpans, and with O'Sullivan, both over the battle of Falkirk, and the retreat from Stirling. Matters were made worse by what even Maxwell of Kirkconnell, a supporter of Lord George, called "his manner haughty and overbearing" (1) and by the attitude of John Murray of Broughton, Charles' Secretary, who saw Lord George's ability as a threat to his own influence over the Prince. Murray of Broughton, therefore, (2) (according to Maxwell of Kirkconnell) "began by representing Lord George as a traitor to the Prince; he assured him that he had joined on purpose to have an opportunity of delivering him up to

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(1) Maxwell, p. 57.
(2) Who had, however, no love for Murray of Broughton, and who may therefore over blacken the picture.
the government".

Lord George was, in part at least, the victim of the suspicions and intrigue which are too often engendered in exiled courts, and which had formed the atmosphere in which the Prince had grown up.

The second major Jacobite personality in Perthshire was William Murray, Marquis of Tullibardine. He was the eldest surviving son of the first Duke of Atholl, and the brother of Lord George Murray. With Lord George he had been out in the Fifteen, and was attainted for his rebel activity. With his brother, he was involved in the Glenshiel landing in 1719, but, unlike Lord George Murray, never received a pardon. Accordingly, on the death of his father in 1724, the Dukedom passed to the next brother, James, who was usually known in Jacobite circles as "Duke James". In such circles Tullibardine was held to be the rightful Duke, and is frequently referred to as Duke of Atholl in Jacobite correspondence. He is here referred to however, by his earlier title of Marquis of Tullibardine, though even this was only a titular rank.

On the death of his father, in 1724, a messenger was sent (with his expenses paid by the new Duke), to give Tullibardine the news. From then on, frequent sums of money were paid, by order of the new Duke, to settle his brother's debts.

In July 1745 Tullibardine returned to Scotland with the Prince,

(1) See Atholl Papers - in the Charter Room at Blair Castle. Box 42. Package I. Factor's Accounts 1699/1742.

(2) Atholl Papers, Box 42. Package I. One payment was made in 1727 three in 1729 totalling £3,444 Scots, one in 1730, two in 1732, one in 1733, two in 1734, and three in 1739, for instance. All these payments appear in the factor's accounts as payments to "Mr. Kateson" the code name in family correspondence, for Tullibardine."
on board the Du Teillay, and on August 31st arrived at Blair Castle. From there, with the formal position of Commander-in-Chief North of the Forth which was given him on September 22nd, 1745, his two chief concerns were the raising of Atholl men, and their despatch to join the main body in Edinburgh. He was also responsible for securing as much support as possible from all those with territorial or personal influence north of the Forth, and sent out accordingly formal requests for support to Lord Cromartie, Mackintosh of Mackintosh, Lord Lovat and others. On October 30th he joined the main body in Edinburgh with up to 1,000 Atholl recruits. On January 13th he set out again for Blair, and used Blair Castle as a centre to rally the Atholl men until about February 19th, when he rejoined Charles at Culloden House.

James Drummond, titular Duke of Perth, was the third Perthshire personality of importance. He was born in 1713 and was the grandson of the 4th Earl of Perth, who was created 1st Duke of Perth by James VII and II at St. Germain. He was the most important representative of Roman Catholicism in the Jacobite Council of War, and he joined Charles at Perth, bringing with him 200 recruits. He had raised these from the area round Crieff, where he began recruiting operations about August 22nd. By November, this force had grown to 300 men. The Duke served in the Jacobite army with the

(1) On September 28th 1745.
(2) On October 7th.
(3) On October 9th.
(4) See below for further details of these appeals.
(5) See infr. p.40.
(6) See below p.42 et seq.
(7) Elcho p.248.
(8) Elcho p.234 inset.
rank of Lieutenant General, until he became involved in Lord George Murray's quarrel with the Prince over the terms of surrender to be negotiated with Carlisle, on November 14th 1745. Thereupon the Duke of Perth resigned his General's commission, and served for the rest of the campaign as Colonel of his own regiment.

The Jacobite force recruited from Perthshire was raised largely because of the activities of these three men. It appears to have totalled at least 2,190 men, and was probably considerably larger. It was raised in the following manner.

On September 4th, 1745, Charles was joined at Perth by the Duke of Perth, who brought with him about 200 men. The Duke had begun recruiting about August 9th, when he had visited Lord Strathallan at Machany, Strathallan's home, to discuss action, in view of Charles' arrival. By August 22nd he was recruiting in Crieff, and the force with which he arrived at Perth on September 4th formed the nucleus of his own regiment.

On the same day, Charles was joined by Robertson of Struan, with a body which he had already raised in Western Perthshire of between 50 and 200. How many more men Struan later raised is doubtful. He certainly was believed by Tullibardine to have raised a further 100 by October 12, for on that date Tullibardine ordered him to send a party of 100 to join Farquharson of Balmoral in Braemar, but this party was never sent, and whether he had, in

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(1) Elcho p.248.
(2) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask" p.104.
(4) Elcho gives a figure of only 50, although Maxwell of Kirkconnell puts it at 200. Elcho p.284 note 2.
fact, raised as many is doubtful. Those whom he did raise served in the Atholl Brigade.

A further 240 men were raised by mid-October, largely through the efforts of MacGregor of Glengyle and MacGregor of Glencairnag. These were Drummonds, or MacGregors, who came largely from the Balquidder area, and they served in the Duke of Perth's Regiment. By the end of December MacGregor of Glengyle had raised a further force which, under Glengyle, was holding Doune Castle. These were of the force which Lord Strathallan commanded at Perth. Lord Elcho put the size of Glengyle force at 50, and it was probably composed of the same men who had gone with him in November in a recruiting raid into Cowal.

The largest number of men recruited from Perthshire served, however, in the Atholl Brigade. Here, because of the recurrent problem of desertion, statistics of the standing force at any given moment are more interesting, but much more complex.

One source of detailed figures for these and other recruits is Lord Elcho, but if we accept his figures without questioning them, we are faced with a conclusion of desertion on an unprecedented scale.

The Atholl Brigade was composed of three battalions, commanded by Lord Nairn, Manzies of Shian, and Lord George Murray respectively. On September 18th Lord Elcho writes that Lord Nairn reached Edinburgh with a force of 1,000 men. On September 21st the battle

(1) Elcho p.322.
of Prestonpans was fought, and in this battle Elcho puts the Nairn battalion at 350, Lord George's at the same figure, and Menzies of Shian's at 300, giving a total of all Atholl recruits of 1,000 men. If we accept these two statements we must believe that no Atholl recruits had arrived before September 18th, and none subsequently, and also that the force that Lord Nairn brought on that date was divided into 3 battalions and composed the entire Atholl force at Prestonpans. Against this argument, however, is the fact that Lieut. Col. Spalding of Glenkilrie had sent off at least a few men on September 10th, under Murray of Soilary or Soilzarit, to join the main Jacobite force. We know also that the force of between 50 and 200 Robertsons, raised by Struan, had by now joined the Atholl Brigade.

Elcho's figure of a battalion under Lord Nairn totalling 1,000 men, by September 18th, is also contradicted by a letter of Lord George Murray, to his brother Tullibardine, written on October 4th, in which he says both his and the Nairn battalion contained less than 500 men each. He asks for enough Atholl recruits to bring their totals up to 500.

Lastly, we know that the main body of Atholl recruits were not brought to Edinburgh by Tullibardine until October 30th 1745. The force which he had been collecting at Blair since early September numbered between 600 and 1,000 when it reached Edinburgh.

(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.57.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.57.
(4) Blaikie p.23, accepts the smaller figure, while Tullibardine's correspondence suggests the larger one.
However, Elcho, summing up the size of the Jacobite force when it reached Carlisle nine days later, gives the Atholl Brigade as still totalling only 1,000 men. The total of 1,000 still being made up of 350 under Lord George, 350 men under Lord Nairn and 300 under Menzies of Shian. If Tullibardine had brought a force of between 600 and 1,000 to swell an existing Atholl force of about 1,000, this figure of 1,000 men still serving on November 8th implies desertions at the rate of 1,000 men in nine days. A more likely hypothesis, therefore, is that Elcho's figures for the Atholl force at Prestonpans refer, in fact, to the size of the force some weeks later, when it had been strengthened by the recruits Tullibardine brought on October 30th. Home, in his History of the Rebellion puts the Atholl force at Prestonpans at 250 Atholl men, and 100 Robertsons - a total of 350, which is a more likely figure than Elcho's. A force of this size, increased by up to 1,000 recruits under Tullibardine could well have shrunk again, after desertions, to 1,000 by November 8th.

More important than such details is, however, a major conclusion. Already it should be noted that there was either considerable

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(1) On November 8th, Elcho, plan following p.324.
(3) The theory that Lord Elcho's figures are not always accurate, and that he confuses a figure at one date with the figure at some later or earlier date is borne out by his figures for the Duke of Perth's Regiment. He tells us that on September 4th the Duke of Perth joined Charles at Perth bringing with him 200 recruits, and refers to the Perth Regiment at Prestonpans on September 21st, and at Carlisle on November 8th, as throughout totalling only 200 men, despite the fact that in the interval between, 140 and 200 MacGregors had joined the regiment.
confusion and inaccuracy over Atholl recruitment figures, or else considerable desertion. Tullibardine believed Lord Nairn to have a force of 1,000 on September 15th, yet by the end of October, in spite of the known and large reinforcements, the Atholl brigade still totalled little more than this earlier figure. Both over optimistic exaggeration of recruitment figures, and some early desertion, would explain this important and apparent deficiency.

The last major phase of Atholl recruiting occurred from January 1746 until early April. On January 13th Tullibardine left the main Jacobite body at Stirling and returned to Blair Castle to continue raising the Atholl men. He rejoined Charles at Inverness on February 19th, but on March 15th Lord George Murray left Inverness with one battalion of the Atholl brigade, and joined Cluny Macpherson with 300 Macphersons in Badenoch to begin the siege of Blair Castle. The presence of first Tullibardine and later Lord George had a revitalising effect on Atholl recruitment. No sizeable body of Atholl men had been recruited since Tullibardine marched South at the end of October. By January 19th, Tullibardine's Secretary Colville reported to him that only 200 had been raised during the two and a half months of his absence, although 700 or 800 had been expected.

Between January 19th and April 2nd, however, 40 or 50 recruits from Strathardle were raised by Robertson of Bleaton and an unknown number had been raised by Spalding of Glenkilrie, the Lieutenant Colonel in Lord George's battalion.

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(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.146-7.
(2) ibid. p.156.
Some of these were sent off on January 31st to join those already gathered at Blair, and Spalding promised, in his letter of January 31st to Tullibardine, to send more as soon as possible. A small party had also, before January 24th been gathered by Robert Stuart of Ballechin, a Captain in Lord Nairn's battalion. With these he intended to raise recruits in the Tullimet district, and by February 1st he had raised enough men from Tullimet to set out with them for Blair, to join Tullibardine.

By January 28th, Spalding of Ashintullie had raised at least some men, although his methods of so doing and especially his willingness to receive bribes to excuse those he should have been forcing out, were suspected by Robertson of Bleaton. Bleaton wrote on January 28th to Colville, Tullibardine's Secretary, that, unless he was given the power to bring up Ashintullie's men to Blair quickly "he and his mother will spoil the business by taking bribes to pass some of them".

Ferguson of Baleycuran and Robertson of Killiechangie and Robertson of Fascally had also raised at least a few further recruits by the end of January. On January 31st Tullibardine wrote to Ferguson of Baleycuran, and Robertson of Killiechangie reproving them for their dilatoriness, and instructing them to join Fascally and Bleaton, who were on their way to Perth with the recruits they had each raised.

A force of size unknown, had been raised by Killiechangie

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(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.173.
(2) ibid. p.167.
(3) ibid. p.168.
by February 5th, but a striking instance of the importance of morale is provided by the fact that the whole force could not be prevented from dispersing home when they learnt of the Jacobite retreat north from Stirling.

By February 6th, Tullibardine had decided, on Kilmarnock’s advice, to use the fire cross as a further method of encouraging recruiting. On February 7th at least 40 men raised by Stewart of Gourdie set out from Logierait to join Tullibardine at Blair. However, the morale of this party, like that of Killiechangie’s company, deteriorated rapidly, and by the following day at least some of the men had already deserted.

Meanwhile, Spalding of Glenkilrie had reported that he had now raised 200 men in Strathardle, and pay and arms had been sent for them, but by February 8th no men had as yet been sent by Glenkilrie to Blair. Stewart of Kynachan and Archibald Menzies of Shian had been recruiting during this time towards Rannoch. Stewart of Kynachan was a major in Lord Nairn’s battalion and Shian a Lieut. Col. in Tullibardine’s battalion. Under them Stewart of Fincastle, Stewart of Ballechin, Stewart of Kinnaird, Stewart of Garth and Robertson of Balnacree had each raised companies which, by February 8th, were on the road to join Kynachan.

By February 10th, Blair of Glasclune, who held the rank of

(1) See "Atholl Correspondence", p.187. Killiechangie’s letter of Feb. 5th to Tullibardine reporting their dispersal.
(2) Ibid. p.188. Letter of Tullibardine to Kilmarnock.
(3) Ibid. p.200. Letter of Blair of Glasclune to Tullibardine, from Logierait, February 8th.
(4) Ibid. the same letter.
(5) Ibid. p.194. Letter of Tullibardine to Glenkilrie.
(6) "Atholl Correspondence", p.197. Letter of Kynachan to Robertson of Drumachine at Blair.
Lieutenant Colonel in the Atholl Brigade, had recruited over 100 men. Some of these, and others already raised, must have marched North with Tullibardine on February 10th. He joined Chaires and the main Jacobite body in Inverness on February 19th. However, Robertson of Drumachine, Stewart of Kynachan and other officers of the Atholl brigade remained behind in Perthshire to continue recruiting, and to try to hold the Tummel by destroying the bridge. On February 10th Colville wrote to Tullibardine to complain that the bridge was still standing, while Kynaohan had written the previous day to Colville explaining the impossibility of the task in the absence of masons. Confusion, in fact had already set in. The last recruits came on February 20th when Colonel Robertson of Drumachine sent on from Corrybroch four Atholl recruits with the message that more were following. Large scale Atholl recruiting, however, came to an end with the occupation of Perthshire by Government troops and the dispatch of Sir Andrew Agnew, with 500 men, on February 11th to occupy Blair Castle. This occupation put virtually insurmountable obstacles in the way of further recruitment because it made impossible the sending out of armed parties to raise men and it was partly because of this fact that the Jacobite force under Lord George Murray was sent to attempt the recapture of Blair Castle on March 15th.

By April 2nd the attempted siege of Blair Castle had been abandoned, and Lord George had returned to Inverness, bringing

(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.200.
(2) ibid. p.20 Letter of Drumachine from Lude to Colville, Feb.9th.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.203 and 204. Letters of Kynachan and Colville of February 9th and 10th.
(4) ibid. p.207 and 208.
with him those Atholl recruits who had not been ready to accompany Tullibardine to the main body on February 19th. Lord George estimates them at between 400 and 500. Their number would be made up of the following and would possibly total over 500.

Under Robertson of Bleaton 50 men
Under Stewart of Gourdie under 40 men
Under Spalding of Glencilrie and Robertson of Straloch 200 men
Under Blair of Glasclune 110 men
Under Stewart of Fincastle one company each.
Under Stewart of Ballechin
Under Stewart of Kinnaird
Under Stewart of Garth
Under Robertson of Balnacree

A total of the Jacobite adherents from Perthshire, recruited as outlined above, would give a figure of at least 2,290. This figure does not include the large number of Atholl recruits known to have been enlisted who deserted rapidly. It also puts at an average of only 20 men each, the five companies enlisted by Fincastle, Ballechin, Kinnaird, Garth and Balnacree. The figure here would almost certainly be larger—the smallest party of recruits referred to elsewhere as a separate body numbered 40, and almost certainly a company of any smaller number would have been merged.

(1) In his "Marches of the Highland Army", Lord George implies that the large part of this number were previous deserters, but this seems unlikely. He writes "I got a reinforcement of from four or five hundred men in the county, of those who had been with us formerly." "Jacobite Memoirs of the Rebellion of 1745". Ed. Robert Chambers. Edinburgh. W. & R. Chambers 1824 p.108.

with another to make a larger unit.

The figure of 2,290 also ignores the Perthshire Horse, and

(1) Elcho, plan following p.324. Ollphant of Gask put them at 75 by
Feb.7th 1746. See "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". T.L. Kingston

(2) This squadron were also known as the Horse Grenadiers or
Kilmarnock's Horse, since on Strathallan's appointment to
command at Perth during the invasion of England, cavalry
command was given to Lord Kilmarnock.
for Lord George Murray and his brother or to the more general idea of lairdship and the respect it could command. The explanation is, in fact, much more complex and more varied than this. Apart from ties to the Atholl family two other motives inspired the gentry, tacksmen and tenants who formed the bulk of the Perthshire officers. The first was the religious motive of Episcopalianism, the second the financial motive arising from the nature of their land holdings.

The motives for enlistment among the men, however, were quite different from those of the officers. Those who formed the rank and file of the Perthshire regiments served, not from choice, but because they were forced out. The widespread nature of this forcing out of men led to the equally widespread problem of desertion among these recruits. Because the difficulties of disciplining an army of forced out men were not fully realised, no successful steps could be taken to check this desertion. Lord George Murray recognised the magnitude of the problem of desertion and wrote of it to his brother Tullibardine on numerous occasions (1) but, throughout the campaign, neither he nor Tullibardine seems to have realised that measures which might hold together an army of volunteers would not suffice to prevent desertion in what was virtually, amongst the Perthshire rank and file, a conscript force.

Among those, chiefly officers, who enlisted with some appearance of free choice, or at least without the presence or threat of military force to secure their adherence, three major motives can be discerned. With a few, the deciding factor was a blood or

(1) See "Atholl Correspondence" esp. letters of January 11th p.107 and 16th January p.141.
marriage relationship, or a personal tie with the Jacobite branch of the House of Atholl. For others, almost certainly the political implications of Episcopalianism were decisive. The third, and probably in numbers at least, the most important factor was, for many, the fact of their occupation, as tenants, of lands composing part of the Atholl estates. Amongst the officers of the Atholl brigade practically every man was a Ducal tenant. This, combined with Tullibardine's attitude to their position as tenants, suggests that their willingness to follow his political cause was the result of financial rather than sentimental ties.

Those Jacobite adherents who had either a blood or close personal relationship with the House of Atholl are found, not surprisingly, amongst the more senior officers of the Perthshire regiment. They include Lord Nairn and his brother, Robert Mercer of Aldie, both Colonels in the Atholl Brigade, Laurence Oliphant of Gask, Lieutenant Colonel in the Perthshire Horse, Viscount Strathallan, its Colonel, and Alexander Robertson of Strowan and Duncan Robertson of Drummachine, both Colonels in the Atholl Brigade. In all these cases there were not only close personal links with the Atholl family, and with each other, but also a long family tradition of Jacobitism as well.

Both Lord Nairn and his younger brother, Robert Mercer of Aldie, were cousins of Lord George Murray and Lord Tullibardine. (1) They were the sons of Lord William Murray and Margaret, Baroness Nairn. They came from a family noted for its Jacobite views, and Lord Nairn had been taken prisoner at Preston in 1715 although subsequently pardoned. Laurence Oliphant of Gask was married to a

(1) Son of the 1st Marquis of Atholl and brother of the 1st Duke. Lord George's father.
sister of Lord Nairn, and he was the brother-in-law of Lord Strathallan, who had also married a daughter of Lady Nairn's; Robertson of Strowan was one of the twelve trustees for the 1st Duke of Atholl in 1714, as was Laurence Oliphant of Gask, and he had served under Dundee in 1689, and under Mar in 1715, after which he had remained abroad until his pardon in 1731. Robertson of Strowan's daughter was married to Oliphant of Gask's son, who held the rank of captain in the Perthshire Horse. Duncan Robertson of Drummachine was yet another son-in-law of Lady Nairn, and had been one of a short list to receive Jacobite Commissions from Lord Nairn in 1719. Both Henry Stewart of Fincastle and Robert Stewart of Ballechin, held the rank of Captain in Lord Nairn's battalion of the Atholl brigade, and both raised companies of further recruits between January and April 1746. They were almost certainly the sons of the Stewart of Ballechin, and the Gilbert Stewart of Fincastle, who were among the twelve trustees appointed for the 1st Duke of Atholl in 1714. Stewart of Ballechin had also been included on Lord Nairn's list of those to receive Commissions in 1719.

A second major motive for Jacobitism in Perthshire was provided by membership of the Scottish Episcopal Church. The reasons for the political association between Episcopalianism and Jacobitism have been examined elsewhere. Here it should be noted that Perthshire was a stronghold of that Church. There were Episcopal parishes with strong congregations at Blair Atholl itself, at

(1) This, rather than Struan, is the more common contemporary spelling.  
(2) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p.64.  
(4) See Miscell. Mss. largely factors accounts, Box 42. Atholl Papers, Blair Castle.  
(5) At Kilmavoenig.
Muthill, south of Crieff, at Logie Almond, and in Perth itself (1) there were two separate Episcopal congregations. There were possibly other congregations as well in the county. The Episcopal Church has not preserved as detailed records of its parish organisation as the Roman Catholic Church has done, and there are few figures available amongst its records for the first half of the eighteenth century. The most detailed report of its strength, compiled in 1708 however stated that there were twelve episcopal clergy stationed in the two counties of Perth and Stirling, and more than half these would have been in Perthshire, by far the larger county of the two.

Amongst Perthshire Jacobites there were many who are known to have been members of Episcopal Congregations. They included (3) Lord George Murray, Lord Nairn, Robert Mercer of Aldie, George Robertson of Fascally who held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Atholl Brigade, Alexander Robertson of Strowan, Major David Stewart of Kynachan, (also of the Atholl brigade) Graham of Balgowan and Lord Rollo, both of whom were amongst the first names on a list of "well affected" (to the Jacobite cause) "and firm gentry of Perthshire" compiled for Lord Tullibardine on September 3rd 1745. The list also includes the Robertsons of Lude, and the family of Lord Stormont, both of whom gave hospitality to Charles at the beginning of September 1745.

(1) See the papers of the Scottish Episcopal Church at the Episcopal College, Rosebery St., Edinburgh, for letters of William Erskine, Duncan Cameron, William Abermethie, Clergy at Muthill, Perth and Logie Almond respectively.
(2) See below Chapter 6 p. 141
(3) For evidence of the Episcopalian connections of Lord George and the rest of this list, see above, Chapter 6.
(4) See "Atholl Correspondence", list of Perthshire gentry compiled by William Davidson of Auchterarder for Tullibardine p. 7.
Many Episcopalians undoubtedly felt in 1745 that the best interests of their Church could be served by active Jacobitism and ever since 1689 the hierarchy of the Episcopal Church in Scotland had maintained on behalf of their Church, far closer links with the exiled Stuarts than did, for instance the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Scotland. The two Episcopal clergymen from Perthshire who served in the Jacobite army, Robert Lyon of Perth and Duncan Cameron of Fortingall, wrote of the duty they felt to follow their congregations. To many members of that faith, quite apart from the political connection between their Church and the exiled Stuarts, active support of the Jacobite movement seemed the best means of ending the disabilities and persecution their Church had suffered since 1689.

The more highly ranking officers of the Perthshire regiments formed, as has been demonstrated, a fairly closely united group linked together by either family or personal ties with the Atholl family, or by the common faith of Episcopalianism. This was largely a voluntary link formed by a common sentiment. Amongst the most senior officers there appears to have been an equally strong, but rather different link - almost all of them were ducal tenants, and had been told clearly what actions were expected of them as tenants.

The list of the more senior officers in the Atholl brigade is as follows.

(1) See below Chapter 6.
(2) Letter of Robert Lyon to the Episcopal Bishop Alexander, from Dunblane 12th Sept. 1745 "now this affair has altered all other measures and D. Cameron and I follow my congregations". Episcopal Chest. Papers of Scot. Episcopal Church, Rosebery St., Edinburgh.
(3) Ms. list compiled from papers in the Charter Room at Blair Castle circa 1890 by the 7th Duke of Atholl.
Lord Nairn's battalion:

**Major** David Stewart of Kynachan.

**Adjutant** Charles Stewart of Bohally.

**Captains** Henry Stewart of Fincastle

Robert Stewart of Ballechin

Gilbert Stewart, younger of Garth

James Robertson of Balnacree

**Lieutenants** Malcolm Stewart, brother to Shierglas

Patrick Stewart of Easter Invervach

Charles Robertson, son of Balnacree.

Lord George Murray's Battalion:

**Lt. Cols.** Robert Mercer of Aldie

Andrew Spalding of Glenkilry

**Major** James Robertson of Blairfettie

**Captains** Alexander Murray of Soilzarit

David Robertson of Easter Bleaton

Daniel Spalding of Ashintully

Charles Spalding of Whitefield

Gregor Murray of Coinneachan.

Duncan Robertson of Auchleck

Andrew Spalding, Younger of Glenkilry

Patrick Stewart of Innerslainie

**Lieutenant** John Spalding, Younger of Whitefield

**Ensigns** Andrew Rattray of Blackraig

John Robertson of Western Bohespick

**Unknown Ranks** Charles Robertson of Trinafour and 4 others.

Tullibardine's Battalion:

**Colonels** William, Lord Tullibardine

Archibald Menzies of Shian
Lt. Cols. George Robertson of Fascally

Thomas Blair of Glasolune

Majors James Rattray of Ranagluzion

Robert Stewart of Killiechanjgie

Captain Archibald Campbell, son of Glenlyon

Lieut. Daniel Henderson of Perth

It seems almost certain that most, if not all, of these officers were Atholl tenants. In the Nairn battalion Major Stewart (2) of Kynachan was a tenant, as were Stewart of Fincastle, Robert (3) Stewart of Ballechin, the father of Gilbert Stewart of Kinnaird, (4) William Stewart of Garth, (5) and James Robertson of Balnacree. All of these held the rank of Captain. Of the three Lieutenants, Patrick Stewart of Easter Invervach, and Charles Robertson, younger of Balnacree, were a Ducal tenant and a son of a tenant respectively, while both Shierglas and Bohally were Atholl property.

Not only, therefore, was the Nairn battalion officered almost entirely by those who held their land from the Duke of Atholl, but, in its officers at least, it was entirely territorially raised. The officers all occupied land within a triangle formed by Blair

(1) This list gives a total of 38 officers but the manuscript list of Perthshire gentry who held commissions in the Atholl brigade (compiled from Mss. in the Charter Room at Blair Castle by the 7th Duke of Atholl) gives the name of a further 73 Atholl officers, but without more details of their land holdings.

(2) See maps of Atholl Estates, Charter Room, Blair Castle.

(3) Maps of Estates, Blair Castle.


(5) Kinnaird was part of Balnagard, the feu duties of which were payable to the Duke of Atholl, see Box 42. Ms. relating to Rentals 1699/1748 Charter Room, Blair Castle.

(6) ibid. Box 42 Rental Roll.

(7) ibid.
Atholl, Logierait and Glenlyon, a triangle whose sides were at the most twenty miles long.

Lastly, and equally important, Ducal tenancies were referred to as tacks, implying the consequent military obligations of service. The use of the word "tack" for a lease or tenancy is not in itself conclusive of such military obligations. The term may have been used to denote only a financial and not a military relationship, but the Nairn battalion, in fact, faithfully reproduced the model military organisation of a clan regiment raised on semi-feudal lines. The Colonel of such a regiment was always the chief or a close member of his family - in this case Lord Nairn. The remaining officers were provided by the members of the chief's family and the tacksmen, the lesser of whom are also found amongst the senior non-commissioned officers. In general, however, each tackman commanded a company raised by himself from his family and tenants. Here, in the case of the Nairn battalion, such companies were provided by Fincastle, Balnacree, Garth and Ballechin. Furthermore, a letter from Mercer of Aldie to Tullibardine of Sept. 8th refers to other "vassals" and is a further illustration of a feudal attitude to recruitment.

Duncan Forbes of Culloden's famous saying of the Atholl family "The Murray's is no Highland family" is often quoted, but in spite of what may be ethnically true, the Atholl estate in the mid-eighteenth century had all the characteristics of a Highland system of land tenure. The lands were divided amongst tacksmen, leases

(1) In the Estate Rentals, Box. 42, Blair Castle.
(2) See above p. 4b
(3) "Atholl Correspondence," p. 12.
were referred to as tacks, the tacksmen being in many cases originally the near relations of the proprietor. Further, in accordance with Highland custom, amongst these the newest cadet branches and those therefore closest to the present chief, held the positions of most importance. That position, in the case of the House of Atholl, was held by Lord Nairn and Mercer of Aldie, both nephews of the 1st Duke of Atholl. Also, and again in accordance with Highland custom, the tacks were short leases, at will, with a fairly substantial food rent in addition to a low money rent. The total rent, for instance, from the Logierait, Killiechassie, Dunkeld triangle, was £3,557.11.0. scots, 140 bolls 3 firlots bear, and 175 bolls, 1 peck, 1 lippie meal.

The money rent paid by a tacksman was normally low, in view of the fact that military service from the tacksman himself, and a company raised by him, was expected. Both Lord George Murray and Tullibardine recognised this fact, and Lord George recommended to his brother to threaten to break the tacks, and destroy the property of those who would not provide that service.

The second and third of the Atholl battalions present a similar pattern of territorial and feudal recruitment. Robert Mercer of Aldie, like Lord Nairn, was a cousin of Tullibardine and of Lord George Murray. Of the remaining officers, Spalding

(2) A new tack for Strowan, for instance, was granted and Robertson of Balnascre in 1727 surrendered the tack of Tullinet. Atholl Charter Room, Box 42.
(3) Ibid. Box 42.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p.149/50. Letter of Jan. 21st 1746, from Lord George Murray to Tullibardine.
of Glenkilrie, Robertson of Blairfettie, Robertson of Bleaton, Spalding of Ashintully, the two Spaldings of Whitefield, Murray of Coimeachan, and Rattray of Blackoraig were all occupying Atholl tacks, so also were the three Robertsons of Bohespick (Bohespie) Trinafour and Auchleeks. Probably in many of these cases, as in Lord Nairn's battalion, the tenant was in fact a sub-tenant of a tacksman. For instance, in the Nairn battalion, from the geographical position of his holding Stewart of Bohally was almost certainly a sub-tenant of Stewart of Kynachan and the position of their holdings suggests that Robertson of Auchleeks, Robertson of Trinafour and Robertson of Bohespie were all sub-tenants of Robertson of Blairfettie.

Lord George Murray's battalion also bears the mark of having been territorially raised. With the exception of Murray of Soilzarit and Stewart of Innerslainie and Gregor Murray of Coimeachan, all the officers' holdings were either within two miles of Blairfettie or within five miles of Glenkilrie. These two properties were the holdings of the Major and the Lieutenant Colonel, respectively, of the battalion.

The third Atholl battalion, nominally commanded by Tullibardine but actually commanded by Menzies of Shian, bears the same characteristics as the other two. The holdings of all the officers named, with the exception of Rattray of Ranagulzion and Menzies of Shian, figure either in the Rentals or Maps in the Atholl Charter Room as Atholl properties. Shian, on the Shian burn,

(1) See Miscell. Rentals Box 42. Charter Room Blair Castle.
(2) ibid, and estate maps in Charter Room, Blair Castle.
near the head of Loch Freuchie is not listed in the Atholl Rentals, but detailed rentals for the years between 1706 and 1748 are not preserved. Details of land holdings were only given when a tack was given up or altered in some way, and Shian is only five miles from the area known as Little Dunkeld, which was an Atholl barony, and less from Bolfracks, also Atholl property.

A further indication of the way in which the Atholl battalions were territorially raised from Atholl tenants is provided by the list of those to whom demands for support were sent out by Tullibardine from Dalnacardoch on August 30th, 1745. The list is divided into three sections - viz: Strath Tay, Strathardle and the area known as Below the Pass - a phrase occurring frequently in Atholl Rental lists, and used to describe the Atholl estate south of Killiecrankie. All three phrases, in fact, are frequently used to sub-divide the Atholl estates.

The list consists of 30 names. All those whose holdings can be traced, 19 in all, were Atholl tenants. This fact, combined with the use of subdivisions commonly found amongst Atholl rentals, is yet another indication of the territorial and feudal nature of Atholl recruiting.

Another characteristic of the traditional Highland feudal levy is the use of the Fire Cross to bring in recruits. It was sent out from Blair, on Tullibardine's orders on February 6th,

(1) Namely Duncan Stewart of Blackhill, Robert Stewart of Derghullich. John Reid of Pitnairnie (Pitnacree), James Menzies of Bolfracks (Bolfracks), Kilchassie, Ballechin, Finlay Ferguson of Baladmin (Baladmond), Henry Balnevis of Edradour, James Robertson of Strathloch (Stralloch), Patrick Small of Dirnanvar, Alex Rattray of Tullichcarron, (Tullochcarron), Donald Robertson of Culattronie, William Small of Kindruggin, James Ferguson of Wester Callie, Duncan Stewart of Miltovin (Milton near Pitlochry), David Spalding of Whitehouse, David Robertson of Easter Bleaton and Alex Rattray of Dalrulleen.

(2) See note 1 above.
1746. It was sent first to Dalnacardoch and it would have been used even as far south as the Atholl barony of Glenalmond but for the occupation by government troops of the area round Crieff. (2)

Further illustrations of the feudal nature of the Perthshire recruitment are provided by the accounts kept by Laurance Oliphant of Gask, Lieut. Col. of the Strathallan or Perthshire Horse. From October 3rd 1745 Lord Strathallan, with Gask as his deputy, commanded the Jacobite force at Perth, and Gask kept detailed accounts of Jacobite expenditure at Perth from October 11th until February 4th 1746. On October 31st Gask paid out £1 "to Capt. Reynolds' charges bringing up 78 men from Lord Nairn's estate". Later, on January 24th 1746 £3.7.0. was paid out to "Gregor Murray and his Glenalmond men as 4 days pay, and a further £1.10.0. paid to ditto for levying his men in November". This is the Gregor Murray or MacGregor of Coinneachan to whom Tullibardine wrote on September 2nd 1745 telling him to raise "the tenants and wadsetters of Glenalmond".

A final example of recruitment on feudal lines is provided by Robert Mercer of Aldie's letter of January 22nd, 1746 to Tullibardine. (6) In this letter he tells Tullibardine that all feuars had been convened and had been told that those unable to attend for hosting, hunting and warding were to send substitutes.

Section IV.

Enlistment of Other Ranks in Perthshire.

While officers were recruited from Perthshire largely as a

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(1) See "Atholl Correspondence", p.191. The use of the Fire Cross was suggested to Tullibardine by Lord Kilmarnock in a letter of Feb, 5th.
(3) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask," Kingston Oliphant p.129 et seq.
(4) Off Coinneachan, Glenalmond - and Atholl barony.
(5) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask"., p.74.
(6) "Atholl Correspondence", p.151.
result of their status as Atholl tenants, the rank and file were recruited by a mixture of threats, insults, military force and a rudimentary quota system. The chief agents in this for Tullibardine were Robert Mercer of Aldie, Menzies of Shian, Spalding of Glenkilrie and Stewart of Kynachan. Although the Duke of Perth had already raised some Stewarts of Appin before he joined Charles at Perth, about September 4th, serious recruiting in Perthshire seems to have begun about September 6th. On this date Mercer of Aldie wrote to Lord Nairn telling him he had ordered the men of the "Propertie lands to meet on Thursday (Sept. 12) to execute further orders" by which time the Strathardle men were also expected. By September 10 came the first mention, in a letter from Spalding of Glenkilrie to Tullibardine, of the need for a party to secure recruitment - "Nothing will raise them (the Glenshee men) without a party". A party i.e. a company of men prepared to use military force to secure recruits, was most useful if it consisted of strangers. Robertson of Bleaton, from the Glenshee area, for instance, wanted the service of a party of Rannoch men, the Appin Regiment was used in the Logierait area, and Blair of Glasclune, on February 8th, asked Tullibardine for "a party of strangers" to help recruiting. By September 30, Spalding of Ashintully was writing to Tullibardine of the impossibility of keeping his men together without a party, adding "how soon the party was gone, they were all unwilling".

(1) "Atholl Correspondence," p.12.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence," p.167. Letter of Bleaton to Colville, Tullibardine's Secretary, January 28th 1746.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence," p.37.
Already a system of military quotas from each area had been adopted; the first mention of it is in the letter of John Stewart of Stenton on September 15th 1745 to Tullibardine of his difficulties in recruiting in the Dunkeld district. Inwar and Little Dunkeld had delivered only 4 men as their quota to Mercer of Aldie. (1)

Already throats had been used to try to secure recruits. Oliphant of Gask had forbidden his tenants to cut corn or pasture their cattle unless they came cut, and his embargo was only broken on the request of the Prince, passing through Gask on his way South from Perth, on September 11th 1745. Later, Blair of Glasclune reported to Tullibardine, on February 8th 1746, that he had been forced to use the burning of property and of crops to execute his orders and had "succeeded tolerably" by raising 40 men from Logierait on February 7th, some of whom had already deserted by the next day. (3)

The first references to desertion among Perthshire recruits are in Lord George Murray's letter of September 26th to his brother in which he complains of Atholl desertions after the crossing of the Forth at the Frews on September 13th. (4) From this date on, Tullibardine's correspondence is full of complaints of desertion from Lord George Murray, and requests for a party to aid recruitment from those raising men on his behalf in Perthshire. (5) Stewart of Kynachan, by October 12th, for instance, writes of

(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.16.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.200.
(4) ibid. p.31.
(5) On Sept. 27th and 29th for instance, ibid. p.32 onwards.
(6) To Mercer of Aldie, "Atholl Correspondence", pp.179 and 180.
the need for a strong party to raise the men of Glenlyon and Ramnoch, while on the following day Lord Strathallan makes a similar demand for Breadalbane.

By the middle of October, however, the first phase of Perthshire recruiting had come to an end. Tullibardine had been receiving frequent requests to hasten the despatch of recruits south. He was now chiefly concerned with doing this, and with the moving from Montrose of the French arms, which arrived there on the 7th, 10th and 17th of October, rather than with further recruitment. By October 14th the Master of Strathallan had reached Edinburgh with one company, and on October 20th Tullibardine ordered Menzies of Shian and Robertson of Struan to join the main body at Edinburgh. From now on Perthshire recruits began to move south until the last, under Tullibardine himself, arrived in Edinburgh on October 30th.

At this point recruiting in Perthshire, in the absence of Tullibardine comes to a virtual stop. Between now and Tullibardine's return to the county nearly 2½ months later, only 200 further recruits were enrolled, but on January 13th Tullibardine returned to Blair Castle and the pattern of forced recruitment is resumed. During his absence Atholl recruiting seems to have been largely in the hands of Robertson of Drummachine and Robertson of Blairfettie, both of whom had been trying to round up, prevent, and intercept, deserters.

The beginning of the second phase of Atholl activity is marked

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(1) On, for instance, Oct. 9th, 14th, 19th, 21st from his brother, Lord George Murray. See "Atholl Correspondence", p. 73 onwards.
(2) See Chapter 4
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p. 116.
(4) He returned on the suggestion of Lord George Murray, made in letter of Jan. 11 see "Atholl Correspondence", p. 137.
by Tullibardine’s return to Blair Castle on January 13th. From now on, recruiting difficulties and desertions increased, and more and more severe methods had to be used to secure recruits. Already Drummachine had been trying to intercept deserters by posting parties on the Tay and Tummel, but, as he pointed out to Tullibardine on January 11th, 24 men on Loch Tay were far too few for this purpose; at least 100 were needed in Rannoch and between 300 and 400 were needed in Perthshire. The military force which Tullibardine would need, however, was only estimated at a maximum of 200 by Lord George Murray and this was apparently all he brought to Blair. By January 17th, the date of the battle of Falkirk, the Atholl brigade was reduced by desertion to 600 men. By January 19th at least 100 men were employed in seizing deserters and Colville, Tullibardine’s Secretary, reckoned that in order to raise a possible 500 or 600 men from Breadalbane, a military party of at least 400 would be needed. The problem was aggravated by a shortage of suitable officers. Drummachine had stressed the need, on January 11th, for active officers and these views were echoed by Spalding of Glenkilrie and Robertson of Bleaton. Instead, Tullibardine had to deal with shifty and untrustworthy agents like Spalding of Ashintully, whose correspondence to Tullibardine is full of self justification, demands for money and insinuations against others.

More stringent methods to ensure recruitment had now to be used. Lord George, in a letter of January 21st, recommended the

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(1) "Atholl Correspondence" p.136.
(2) See his letter of 11th Jan. to Tullibardine ibid. p.137.
(3) Elcho, plan of the battle of Falkirk following p.372.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p.135.
destruction of the tacks of those who would not come forward.

The quota system was more vigorously enforced. George Scott, who had been recruiting under Bleaton, urged Colville on February 1st to insist on the full quota from each area, adding of the Strathardle men "let them be spared no further than the list agrees with the mark lands .... for there's plenty of men in the country." Stewart of Ballechin also warned Colville to be wary of deceptions over the numbers of men available, telling him that in Tullinet, an Atholl barony, many had produced receipts for money in lieu of men when men were in fact available. Bleaton had pointed out to Colville the difficulty of applying a quota system of one man from each markland when in Strathardle, for instance, there were large uninhabited areas. He had been forced to give receipts to all those who had produced any men at all, whether the right quota had been provided or not, but he warned Colville that when a proper recruiting party arrived, its commander should not necessarily accept such receipts without query.

By February 8th, Blair of Glasclune had been forced to use burning in order to secure recruits and the urgency of the situation was making Tullibardine's language more violent. He wrote, on February 1st, to Mercer of Aldie of "such singularly refractory and chicanering people, mean spirited successors of former Atholl tenants", while George Scott referred to the Strathardle people as "a stubborn pack (that) deserves no mercy".

(1) ibid. p.149.
(2) ibid. p.175.
(3) ibid. p.175.
(5) ibid. letter of Blair to Tullibardine Feb. 8th p.200.
(6) ibid. p.179.
Desertion was increasing rapidly. By February 8th some of those enlisted by Stewart of Gourdie the day before, had already deserted, and on February 5th Robertson of Killiechangie had to report that all those recruited recently by him had dispersed, on news of the retreat north from Stirling. Tullibardine, on February 8th, had to abandon a plan to advance on the Campbells now stationed at Dunkeld because of lack of support. He had arranged that he should be joined in a movement on Dunkeld, by Menzies of Shian and Stewart of Kynachan with the recruits that they had raised, but because of lack of numbers this had to be abandoned. Perthshire recruitment was now virtually at an end. The last Perthshire recruits joined the main Jacobite body in Badenoch on February 20th. They were "four Atholl lads" sent by Robertson of Drummachine to join Tullibardine. Stewart of Kynachan, Robertson of Drummachine and Menzies of Shian had remained behind when Tullibardine went north on February 10th. They had orders to destroy the Tummel bridge at Kynachan and the passage boat at Kinloch Rannoch, but neither could be achieved because of the absence of stone masons and because of the arrival of government troops at Taybridge, Appin-Dull, and Taymouth. Formal recognition that there was no further prospect of recruitment came with Sheridan's letter of March 28th to Tullibardine that Charles was determined to "grant no more commissions, the few he has already given being at least enough to give employment for all the men he

(1) Ibid. p.187.
(2) See letter of Tullibardine to Kynachan, dated Feb. 8th, 1746 p.196.
(3) Ibid. p.207.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p.207.
can hope to raise by that method".

The occupation of Blair Castle by Government forces, under Sir Andrew Agnew, since February, had cut off the main Jacobite body from Perthshire. The passes also were in government hands, and this ensured enemy communications with the south, and also effectively extinguished any hope of further Perthshire recruitment. According to Colonel Kerr of Gradyne, it also prevented any Jacobite descent into Perthshire to secure food for the army. For these reasons Lord George Murray's assault on Blair Castle was decided on, and on March 15th Lord George, with a force of 700, met Cluny who had between 300 and 400 men in Badenoch. During the night of March 16th they were able to seize the government outposts round Blair. The siege of the castle lasted until it was abandoned on April 2nd because of the arrival of four battalions of Hessians from Perth. Lord George on his return, however, brought back with him 200 recruits to join the main body. Some of these men were, according to Lord George, deserters whom he had been able to recover, but from now on, as long as there was no Jacobite military force in Perthshire, no further recruits, whether former deserters or not, could be obtained.

From now on Perthshire's role was at an end. The marked deterioration of recruiting, since late January 1746, had been due to lack of military strength. At a time when all of Tullibardine's correspondents stressed the need for a party to secure any hope of recruits, his total military strength consisted of only 200 men.

The only realistic measures which might have checked desertion; namely the holding of the Rannoch area and the Rivers Tay and Tummel would, have needed at least 500 men. The deterioration was completed by the news of the Jacobite retreat from Stirling in February. A body of men, raised by forced recruiting, threats and feudal pressure, lacking sufficient able officers and tight enough discipline, was bound to so deteriorate. That it had held together so long is a tribute both to the personality and efficiency of Lord George Murray and to the industriousness of Tullibardine.
CHAPTER 3.

THE NORTH EASTERN AREA.

The Counties of Moray, Banff and Aberdeen.

Although it is usual to consider the Jacobite force of 1745/6 as a predominately Highland, or even West Highland force, it should be noted that a relatively much smaller geographical area produced between 17% and 24% of the entire force raised. This area consisted of the three counties of Moray, Banff and Aberdeen.

This large proportion was made up in the following manner.

From the Braemar area Francis Farquharson of Monaltrie had brought (2) 400 men to Cortachy by September 19, 1745 while a further 200 under Monaltrie reached Perth by late December 1745. These numbers may also include some men already brought to Edinburgh by James Farquharson of Balmoral, before he left Edinburgh on October 5 to bring in the Balmoral Farquharsons. He then brought a further (4) 200 of these men to Perth by late November.

Meanwhile, Lord Pitsligo had raised 300 horsemen by September (5) 29th, and these became a total force of between 180 and 500 Horse and Foot arriving in Edinburgh on October 9th 1745. Of these, 150 Horse were still serving as a separate body by November 8th 1745, while the foot had apparently been merged with those raised by the Duke of Perth.(7)

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(1) As shown in the Introduction.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p.20. The figure is given by Tullibardine in a letter of Sept. 19th to Lord Ogilvy.
(3) Elcho p.319.
(5) "Atholl Correspondence", p.36. Letter of James Scott to Mercer of Aldie.
(6) There are 2 estimates of his force. - The Gentleman's Magazine, November 1745, gives a figure of 500 and Elcho gives a figure of 180. (Lord Elcho p.283).
(7) Elcho p.324 inset.
The last group of recruits came from the Gordon areas of the North West of Aberdeenshire and Banff. They were raised by John Gordon of Avachie, James Moir of Stoneywood, William Moir of Lonmay (the Countess of Errol's factor), John Gordon of Glenbucket and John Hamilton, factor to the Duke of Gordon. All these men, however, were in fact acting as agents for Lord Lewis Gordon, brother of the Duke of Gordon.

The nucleus of these recruits were 130 raised by Glenbucket in the Strathdon and Glenlivet districts. These had been raised by September 7th 1745, and had been increased to a force of at least 300 under Glenbucket and Avachie by September 11th. These men reached Edinburgh on October 4th, 1745. Apparently, however, a further force may have arrived under John Hamilton on the same day. The Gentleman's Magazine, using the Caledonian Mercury as its source of information, states that two separate bodies of 400 and 480 men, under Glenbucket and Hamilton respectively, reached Edinburgh on October 4th. On the other hand a letter from Thomas Grant of Arndillie to Ludovick Grant suggests that Hamilton and Glenbucket were raising a joint force, so there may be some duplication of figures here. Of the above men, 200 remained in arms by November 8th.

A further 60 were recruited by Stoneywood, and were assembled at Aberdeen by October 1st. This force had risen to 300 by late December 1745. Sixty more men were assembled under Avachie at

(2) Ibid. p.158. Letter of Hugh Rose of Kilravock to Ludovick Grant.
(3) Blaikie, p.19 and Elcho p.282.
(4) November, 1745.
(5) Elcho, p.324 inset.
(6) Elcho, p.319.
Keith by December 10th 1745. Six days later the force consisted of 180, and on its arrival at Perth at the end of the month it had grown to 300 men.

Lord Lewis Gordon returned north from Edinburgh to recruit, some time before October 20th, and a number of additional recruits may have been raised by him, apart from the men forming the Stoneywood and Avochie contingents. According to the Burgh Records of Aberdeen a Jacobite force of between 1,800 and 2,000 was occupying Aberdeen by December 7th 1745, and it contained the two Stoneywood and Avochie battalions, totalling 600, a force of about 400 raised by Farquharson of Balmoral and Farquharson of Monaltrie, and a maximum of 400 of Lord John Drummond's French Regiment. This, if we accept the figures in the Burgh Records, leaves a potential 400 or 600 further recruits in Aberdeen, which may have been those raised by Lord Lewis Gordon.

The total apparently raised from these areas would, therefore, be as follows:

Under Farquharson of Monaltrie: 600 men
Under Farquharson of Balmoral: 200 men
Under Lord Pitsligo: 300/500 men
From the Gordon Areas: 900/1,380 men

plus a possible further 400/600 raised by Lord Lewis Gordon.

This would give a maximum raised of 3,280 men, a minimum of 2,000 men.

Three factors are largely responsible for the high level of

(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.191 Letter of Thomas Grant of Achoinany to Ludovick Grant, Dec.10th 1745.
(2) ibid, p.197. Letter of Sir Harry Innes to Ludovick Grant.
(3) Elcho, p.319.
recruitment in these areas.

Firstly, the district was under large scale Jacobite military occupation for a considerable time. By early September 1745 Glenbucket was in the Glenlivet area with a force of 300 men, and from this period until the final Jacobite retreat across the Spey on April 12th 1746 the area was under more or less continual occupation, with corresponding opportunities for recruitment.

Secondly, the chances of recruitment were greatly enhanced by the support and local influence of Lord Lewis Gordon, Lord Pitsligo, and the two Farquharsons of Balmoral and Monaltrie. These four men between them possessed great local influence. The force of nearly 300 horse men which Pitsligo was able to raise rapidly from his friends and tenants in Banff and Aberdeen testifies to this influence.

Thirdly, this area contained strongholds of both Episcopacy and Roman Catholicism, both factors of considerable, though differing importance in recruitment. Further details, however, of these religious factors are discussed elsewhere, in the separate chapters concerned.

Although these north eastern counties produced an apparently large number of Jacobite recruits, the number of such men who in fact served in action with the main Jacobite body is very much smaller.

At the Battle of Prestonpans, September 21st, 1745, no recruits from these areas served, as the earliest of them had not yet reached the main body. On the march South from Edinburgh, on November 1st, 1745, the actual serving force from these parts was small. It consisted of about 150 of Pitsligo's Horse, an unknown number of Pitsligo's foot (but not more than 350) now merged with
the Duke of Perth's Regiment, and 200 men of Glenbucket's. This would give a total of only 900. Furthermore, the total serving in arms at the Battle of Falkirk would not reach much more than 1,000, though this was the point at which, swollen by the force gathered under Strathallan at Perth, the Jacobite army was at its maximum strength.

The apparent explanation of the smallness of these numbers would be the existence of large scale wastage through desertion. But here an important, and relatively new, factor emerges. The existence of desertion on a large scale from the Jacobite forces has always been recognised. But those desertions have been generally accepted both by contemporaries and by later writers as coming at least after the Battle of Prestonpans and chiefly after the departure into England at the beginning of November, reaching a maximum during and after the occupation of Falkirk and Stirling in January 1746. Lord George Murray refers frequently, both in his "Marches of the Highland Army" and in his letters to his brother the Marquis of Tullibardine, to the problem of desertion again after the Jacobite forces' occupation of Edinburgh. Lord Elcho in his "Affairs of Scotland" paints a similar picture. He estimates the Jacobite army, at the last review in October before leaving

(1) Elcho p.324 inset.
(2) Made up as follows:
   Under Farquharson of Balmoral 200
   Monaltrie 200
   Avochie and Stoneywood 400
   Glenbucket (but engaged in the siege of Stirling Castle) 200

Pituligo's foot (merged with Perth's (unknown numbers). Horse - an unknown figure which by March had dwindled to nothing.

The figures here are Elcho's figures, pp.372 (inset) and 423.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", Letters of Lord George Murray to his brother of Jan.11th (p.137), Jan.16th (p.141), Jan.27th (p.160) and Feb. 5th (p.186).
Edinburgh, to consist of 5,000 foot and 500 horse but to have dwindled to 4,500 in all, by the arrival at Carlisle on November 8th. Furthermore, the widespread desertion by the end of January was the main reason for the decision to retreat North from Stirling. However, it seems possible that both contemporary and later writers have focussed too much attention on the undoubtedly widespread Atholl desertions, assuming that desertions from other sections of the army were similar in point of time. Lord Elcho, almost alone among contemporary writers suggests, but does not follow up, something different. He remarks that the review held at Glasgow about December 27th showed that there had been in fact only inconsiderable general losses while the force had been in England.

Lord Elcho does not attempt to reconcile the apparently undisputed fact of the smallness of the Jacobite force in late December, with this last observation, which in itself implies the absence of widespread recent desertions. The two facts can however be reconciled if we consider two possibilities. First, that as great wastage of recruits took place before the smaller groups reached the main force. This was certainly true of the Atholl recruits. The second possibility is that there was much optimistic exaggeration by local recruiting agents of the numbers first recruited. When a much smaller force than was justifiably expected, did actually arrive, the discrepancy was put down to desertions. Some figures of recruiting from the North Eastern area will

(1) Elcho, p.310.
(2) Elcho, p.355.
bear this out. Between them, Gordon of Glenbucket, Avochie, Stoneywood, Lonmey and John Hamilton were believed by Lord Elcho and others to have enlisted at least 480 and possibly 880 men by October 4th. Of these only 200 were actually serving by November 8th 1745. Almost certainly the original figure of 880 was optimistically over exaggerated. Furthermore, from the Braemar area, Farquharson of Monaltrie was believed by Tullibardine to have raised a force of 400 with which he had reached Cortachy by September 19th 1745. But a letter of September 29th from Dunkeld to Mercer of Aldie refers to Monaltrie's force which had now reached Dunkeld as totalling only 70 or 80 men. It is extremely unlikely that desertions could have reduced a force of 400 to less than 80 men in ten days. Almost certainly Tullibardine's figure of 400 was the result of previous optimistic inaccuracy. Blaikie, who usually includes the highest contemporary estimates, puts the number reaching Edinburgh under Monaltrie on October 3rd at 30, suggesting, however, that here again considerable desertion took place before the body of men reached the main Jacobite force. In this case a force of at least 70 at Dunkeld on September 29th had dwindled to only 30 at Edinburgh on October 3rd. To sum up, some, at least of the wastage from this area seems to have occurred before local recruits joined the main force. More important still, however, much of the apparent wastage was almost certainly caused by inaccuracy or exaggeration over numbers actually recruited.

(1) As shown earlier in this chapter.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p.20. The total force numbered 800 but of these a separate 400 had been enlisted by Lord Ogilvy.
(3) ibid. p.36.
(4) Blaikie, p.19, citing Allardyce Papers VII. p.480.
Section II.

The Social Strata of Recruits from these Areas.

Much of the available information on this comes from the Excise Officers' "Lists of Persons Concerned in the Recent Rebellion". In this area occupations may be sub-divided as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Area and total of named occupations</th>
<th>Profess-</th>
<th>Tacks-</th>
<th>Fishers Men-</th>
<th>Cottars</th>
<th>Labourers</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<td>Gentry.</td>
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<td>Crafts-</td>
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<td>Gardener</td>
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| Aberdeen 207 | 20 | 10 | 22 | 66 | 11 | 78 | 13 |
| Banff 203    | 31 | 7  | 31 | 68 | 4  | 54 | 8  |
| Old Meldrum 112 | 8  | 10 | 21 | 9  | 48 | 11 |
| Elgin 183    | 51 | 8  | 46 | 32 | 18 | 28 |

There are some characteristics common to all these figures. Gentry and tacksmen together account for exactly 1/3 of the total recruited from Elgin, 1/4 of those from Old Meldrum, and slightly less, about 1/5, of those from Aberdeen. Of the 110 gentry from these areas many were probably among the 120 horsed gentry brought to Edinburgh.


(2) The actual total of adherents was 220, but in the case of 13 no occupation was given.

(3) Here 388 rebels were listed, but only in 183 cases were occupations given. The details are therefore incomplete.
on October 9th by Lord Pitsligo.

Another major group, that of cottars and labourers, servants and gardeners was also relatively stable. In Aberdeen it produced 17.7\%, in Banff, 26.6\%, in Old Meldrum, the only entirely inland area listed, it was larger, 42.8\% while the incomplete Elgin figure, reached 15.3\%.

A large group among the Aberdeen men listed seem to have been active only locally, not serving with the main force at all. Forty three are given as concerned only in local activities or merely involved in demonstrations. There are no precise details given of Jacobite service from Banff, but the number of those active only locally in the Elgin area is 7 and in the Old Meldrum district 16.

The Burgh Records of Aberdeen lists 69 persons from the town (as distinct from the Excise district) who were concerned with the rebellion. This list also shows two characteristics common to the Excise figures. Firstly a high proportion of the men were engaged in trade or crafts. All 69 are either tradesmen, craftsmen, merchants, fishermen or labourers, except for 2 writers, 1 surgeon and 8 whose occupations are not given. Secondly there is a high proportion of only local activity. Out of the 69, only 27 were in regular service with the Jacobite force and 35 were engaged only locally. The presence of a considerable rebel force


(2) Of the Excise figures, 66 were engaged in trade or fishing. See above.

(3) 2 served under Stoneywood, 9 in other unspecified corps. 3 served from before the march into England, 2 joined in Oct. 1745 and one before the battle of Falkirk.

(4) 9 of these were asked to find cautions for their behaviour, which suggests activities of minor importance, 13 helped to transport and guard the arms landed at Peterhead and a further 13 were engaged only in local disturbances.
over a long period in the area was very bad for trade. In Aberdeen there was almost a complete stoppage and the consequent lack of money and work would encourage the sufferers to seek occupation and pay from the rebels.

One other interesting conclusion can be drawn from the Exercise, (Rosebery) statistics. The number of those claiming to have been forced or hired out is as follows:

- From Aberdeen: 9 forced out, 29 hired out
- From Banff: 2 forced out, 29 hired out
- From Old Meldrum: 1
- From Elgin: 69

The size of the number forced or hired out from Banff and Elgin is probably due to the recruiting activities of Lord Lewis Gordon in these parts from November 1745 onwards. By the end of December, he was holding Banff and Aberdeen with a force of 500. This was largely raised by sending out parties to bring in one man or five pounds sterling from every £100 Scots of valued rent. By December 6th he was sending out similar parties from Huntly, and on December 7th Moir of Lonmay, who was occupying the town of Aberdeen with a force of between 1,800 and 2,000, was demanding also one recruit from every £100 Scots of valued land there. Any man so recruited would presumably claim to have been forced

(1) This is illustrated in a letter to Sir Everard Fawkeker, on behalf of the town of Aberdeen, 9th April, 1746. "There has been a total interruption of the trade of this place, ever since the commencement of this wicked unnatural rebellion, whereby all trading people have suffered greatly, and unless Trade be allowed to go on many of their families will be reduced to straits, particularly those who deal in manufactures of cloth and stockings" Allardyce op. cit. Vol. I. p. 240.
(2) National Library of Scotland, Culloden Papers, Ms. 2969, paper 35.
(3) See below Chapter 3 p. 33
(4) Allardyce, p. XXXVIII.
out. Of course, such methods of raising men are only possible when a large enough number, for use as forcing out parties, has already been raised. Such a number was probably available even earlier, for Gordon of Glenbucket had already enlisted three hundred men by September 11th, while later in the campaign Lord Pitsligo with his own troop of horse occupied Elgin from February 19th to April 12th. During that time his forces were joined by those of Lord John Drummond, Stoneywood, Avochie and eventually by all Jacobite troops on Speyside - a final force of 2,500. During this occupation of Elgin, orders for forced levying of meal and money were issued by Pitsligo and he had sufficient military force to obtain more men, in this same fashion. That such methods were employed locally is suggested by a letter of Lord George Murray, writing from Nairn on February 22nd, in which Lord Pitsligo is instructed not to offer the alternative of one man per £100 valued rent, but to accept only the fixed sum, as the offering of an alternative had been abused, probably by immediate desertion, in other areas. Some further confirmation of this method of levying is provided by a letter to Ludovick Grant of December 12th 1745; "a great many of them (Lord Lewis Gordon's force) are press'd, and want but an excuse to get away. They are mostly herds and byre men in and about Strathbogie". The letter continues that, although "Avochie is

(1) "Chiefs of Grant" Vol. II p.158.
(2) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo 1745/6". Edited A. & H. Tayler, Milne and Hutchison. Aberdeen 1930, p.69 and 70.
(3) Pitsligo p.68.
(4) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.190, Letter of Thomas Grant of Achoinany to Ludovick Grant.
playing the devil with Findlater and Glengarrick's tenants, many of them are praying and wishing they were young men, and if you would send down a hundred men, they would all join and rather dye than be used in the way they are".

Such forcing out seems to occur frequently in those areas whose remoteness made it difficult to provide protection for those loyal to the government. The Grant tenants in Urquhart were very vulnerable to such threats, both because of their distance from Castle Grant and because they were surrounded by disaffected Frasers, and Glengarry Macdonalds. Early in September, Glenbucket was reported to be threatening with plunder, those who would not join. Ludovick Grant, in order to counter such threats, sent to his factor in Urquhart an open letter for general publication emphasising the large size of the government force and the great danger of opposing it. This apparently had some success as Grant's factor in Urquhart reported by September 12th that some of those who had set off to join the rebels had been induced to stay at home. In areas like Strathdon and Glenlivet, even more vulnerable to Glenbucket pressure, evasion was less easy, unless the loyalists left their home area, and Ludovick Grant refers to the arrival into Grant country of many residents of Strathdon and Glenlivet. They brought with them their cattle and intended to remain there till Glenbucket had gone.

The Excise List (Rosebery) states that Charles Gordon of Blelock forced men out of the Earl of Aboyne's estate in

(2) ibid. p.153.
(3) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.156.
(4) ibid p.155, letter of Ludovick Grant to Sir John Cope 12th Sept.
(5) "List of Persons Concerned". p.95 et seq.
Aberdeenshire, and that John Gordon of Avochie in Banff, forced on the inhabitants the hiring out of men to serve. William Moir of Lonnay, factor to the Countess of Errol, and the Countess herself were both active in the forcing out of men. A farmer, William Nisbet of Waterside, Slaine, Aberdeen was threatened with being turned off his land by Moir and the Countess unless he would serve. He was given by them a horse and money, when he agreed to enlist. Adam Hay of Cairnbanno, Aberdeen, "joined the rebels at Edinburgh and levied several men for their service on the retreat North". John Calder, Francis Farquharson and Robert Calder, all servants from the Aberdeen area, fought at Culloden but all claimed to have been forced out.

Section III.

The local Conduct and Discipline of these men.

Jacobite sources make only one open reference to serious plundering to this area. This occurred about 19th March, 1746 at the home of the Earl of Findlater at Cullen, as a result of the Earl's refusal to pay his contribution to the levy money. More important, something of the same kind may also be implied by the order of Lachlan MacLachlan, commissary General, to the commander of the party quartered on the land of Alexander Tulloch of Tannachie, that he should remove his party, as Tulloch had now satisfied the demands made on him. There are few references to plundering in government sources, though occasionally they occur

(1) "List of Persons Concerned", p.95.
(2) ibid. p.92 et seq.
(3) ibid. p.5, p.10.
(4) Pitsligo. p.27.
in the correspondence of Ludovick Grant. On September 19th, Thomas Grant of Arndillie wrote to him that Gordon of Glenbucket had been seizing horses and arms at Gordon Castle and in the Fochabers area on the previous day and was also in the Afflunkart district on the 10th. On October 10th 1745, some arms were stolen from the town house at Nairn by a party of Clan Chattan. These are the only references to any plundering in this correspondence. Rosebery’s List, accuses only five persons of plundering, three of whom came from near Aberdeen. They were John Garvich, servant of Buckholy Aberdeen “a private man but very oppressive”, James Anderson, gardener of Drum near Aberdeen, present at the Battle of Falkirk “from which he carried off a good deal of plunder”, Robert Easson, labourer of Aboyne “very active in plundering also William Taylor, a farmer’s son of Banff, who with William Gray, a salmon fisher from Fochabers, was at the plundering of the Earl of Findlater’s house”.

When plundering is mentioned it appears, not unnaturally, to come from the poorest elements of the rebels. Some credit for the absence of extensive plundering in this area may be due to Lord Pitsligo who exercised control from Elgin, from February 19th onwards, over the forced levying of meal and money in these parts. There seems to have been some official sanction for the plundering of the Earl of Findlater, and the threat of it may have been used

(2) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.172 letter of Rev.Patrick Grant of Calder to Ludovick Grant.
(3) "List of Persons Concerned", p.30.
(4) ibid. p.2.
(5) ibid. p.6.
in other cases to enforce payment, but there is little actual evidence to prove this. There may be an implication of the existence of plundering or risk of it, in the report of John Gordon of Minmore, Elgin that "he behaved discreetly and protected the houses of Sir Henry Innes and several ministers." Quartering, however, as distinct from plundering, was used as a common punishment for non-payment of cess in the Elgin and Speymouth districts.

Section IV.

Money Raised by the Rebels from This Area.

The lengthy military occupation of this North Eastern area gave the Jacobite force very considerable opportunities for using this military force to raise money. A general account of the financial resources of the rebel army is given elsewhere, in a separate chapter. Here further details are given of the particular methods used in this area. The rebels found particularly useful the co-operation of at least the lower ranks of local government officials. Collection of local levies, however, only took place after the formal appointment of an officer of higher rank to act as receiver of these monies. Ludovick Grant reports to Loudoun that the cess from the Gordon Castle area was being collected by a Captain Gordon, to intercept whom Grant had sent a party of 30 men. Lord Lewis Gordon, by late October 1745, was investigating the levying of the cess in Aberdeen, and reported to the Duke of Perth that £1,700 cess, unpaid at the last (Government) collection was due from Aberdeen. During

(1) "List of Persons Concerned", p.28 and 38.
(2) ibid. p.108.
October Lord Lewis Gordon had been appointed by Charles, to be Lord Lieutenant of the county of Aberdeen, and William Moir of Lonmay to be Governor of Aberdeen, and Lord Lewis Gordon had arrived in Aberdeen on November 1st to supervise the collection of public money from the town. On December 6th the first of a series of special demands was made to the City of Aberdeen by Moir of Lonmay. The sum demanded was £2,647.16s.10d, this being one year's subsidy. On December 12th, Lord Lewis Gordon issued another order to Aberdeen for the payment of the sum by December 18th, either to Moir of Lonmay or to Alexander Dixon, appointed as collectors. Coupled with this was a demand for the furnishing of one armed man for each £100 rent, to be delivered to James Moir of Stoneywood by the same date. Failing the delivery of each man, a further levy of £5 in lieu of each man was to be paid to Moir of Lonmay. These monies were to be paid under threat of military execution, but they were still unpaid by December 26th, when Moir made a further demand to the Town Clerk of Aberdeen for the £1,000 now due in lieu of men. By December 31st, after bargaining by the special committee appointed, the demand had been reduced to £500, to be paid at once, and a further £500 at Candlemass. Bills were drawn up on January 2nd for this payment. By January 20th the government forces were also attempting to raise the cess from Aberdeenshire, to pay government forces in Inverness, and they found understandable reluctance to pay without proper receipts.

(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.183. Letter of Forbes of Culloden, to Ludovick Grant Nov. 5th 1745.
(3) ibid. p.209.
(5) ibid. p.213.
(6) ibid. p.226.
(7) "Chiefs of Grant". Vol.2 p.216. Letter of Lord Lyon to Ludovick Grant, Jan. 20, 1746.
On February 21st, Lord George Murray, from Nairn, wrote to Lord Pitsligo in Elgin, authorising Pitsligo and Lord Strathallan (who were to command jointly in Elgin) to raise from Moray and Nairn the cess due on March 1st, and any cess previously unpaid. On the following day, February 22nd, formal orders for this were sent, signed by Lord George and the levy money of 100 marks Scots, per £100 sterling of valued land, from all who had not joined, was also to be collected. After some contradictory orders, Murray of Broughton, in an undated letter of about February 26th, authorised Pitsligo to use the collected cess for payment of meal collected in the area, and to accept meal in lieu of levy money. Similar payment in kind was also accepted in the Gordon area. John Goodwillie, Secretary to Murray of Broughton, wrote from Elgin to a Captain Ramsay, authorising him to accept the levy money of Sir Robert Gordon at Gordonstown in wheat, oats, and barley, but not to accept any commutation of the £132.16s.7d. due from Sir Robert as cess.

It is not clear how much money was actually raised from cess and levy in this area. The willingness to accept payment of levy in kind implies increasing difficulty in collecting it in cash. Possibly payment of cess had often been in arrears in the past. Lord Lewis Gordon states that this was true of Aberdeen at the last government collection, and on February 26th Lord Pitsligo complained that no cess or levy money had yet been paid in Elgin, though it had been formally demanded four days before. The

(1) Pitsligo, p.64.
(2) Ibid. p.68.
(3) Pitsligo p.79.
(4) Ibid. p.102.
(5) Pitsligo p.76.
£1,000 levy money required of Aberdeen was apparently paid in full, the money was to be 'uplifted from any persons that were debtors to the town and failing thereof....borrowed for making up the same'. In July, 1746, a special tax was imposed to pay back this sum to those who had lent money. By late March, however, there was much confusion over the raising of money. Lord John Drummond, writing on March 25th, 1746, to Lord Pitsligo, refers to the confusion caused by John Goodwillie (Secretary to Murray of Broughton), who sent parties to quarter for non-payment of cess, in houses already full of troops.

The cost of meal and of fodder for horses was one of the chief expenses faced by the rebels in these parts. This had to be collected and distributed to the force which, under Lord Pitsligo and Lord Strathallan, was by late February 1746 building up in Banff and Moray. Pitsligo reached Elgin on February 19th, and from then on was responsible for collecting and forwarding meal from Elgin to Forres and Inverness. Meal had already been ordered at Elgin by Lord George, who arrived there February 17th, leaving for Forres two days later, on his way to join the main body at Inverness. On February 19th he wrote from Forres to Lord Pitsligo, telling him to forward to Forres the ordered meal when it came in. On February 21st, Lord George Murray sent instructions that the meal, already ordered, should be sent on to Inverness. Further orders from Lord George on February 23rd said that, in view of

(2) Pitsligo, p.99/100.
(3) Pitsligo, p.62.
(4) ibid. p.64.
(5) ibid. p.72.
the shortage of granary space, part of the meal was to be stored at Elgin, and part at Forres. This meal was to be paid for, when delivered, out of cess or levy money. Next day, however, orders from Murray of Broughton contradicted this, and ruled that although receipts were to be given, no such money was to be used as payment. But, in reply, Lord Pitsligo, on February 26th, pointed out that such non-payment would greatly hinder future collections of meal, and he was authorised by Murray of Broughton to use cess money to pay for meal and barley. On March 1st, Pitsligo was ordered to send, at once, all meal stored at Elgin and Forres, to Nairn for Inverness. These orders were repeated the following day by Lord John Drummond, who took over Gordon Castle as headquarters from Murray of Broughton. By March 25th meal was becoming desperately short, and Lord John Drummond asks for another 60 bolls of meal immediately, and more as soon as possible.

The confusion caused by this desperate scarcity is shown by a letter of Lord John Drummond of March 26th, 1746 from Speymouth to Lord Pitsligo, in which he laments the sending of orders by a Mr. Comry "for the carrying off of corn and hay from homes where we live when we ourselves are in great want of both".

There seems, on the part of the Jacobite High Command, to have been some ignorance of the real state of supplies. On March 30th, 1746, Tullibardine wrote from Inverness to Lord George Murray, who commanded the siege of Fort William, that it was understood in

(1) Pitsligo, p. 73.
(2) ibid. p. 76. Letter of Pitsligo to Murray of Broughton.
(3) ibid. p. 79. Murray of Broughton's reply to the above.
(4) ibid. p. 79.
(5) ibid. p. 81.
(6) Pitsligo, p. 97.
(7) ibid. p. 99.
Inverness that plenty of provisions were available for his siege party from below the Pass of Killiecrankie. Again, Maxwell of Kirkconnell states that as late as April 15th, 1746, there was still a fortnight's supply of meal in Inverness, at a time when, in fact, many of the foodless rebel army had already dispersed in search of provisions. These men were refusing to return, when officers were sent to bring them back to the main body for the night march on Cumberland's army, which preceded the battle of Culloden. There is no doubt that the disastrous scarcity of provisions with which the Jacobite force were faced by April 1746 was largely inevitable, since it was caused chiefly by the absence both of money and of local sources of supply. However, it seems likely that an already disastrous situation was made even worse, as Maxwell of Kirkconnell suggests both by official over-optimistic assessment of local supplies available and by confusion in gathering these supplies in.

Section V.

Financial and other Motives for adherence in this area.

The financial position of the chief adherents in this area was not such as to enable them to bring important money contributions to the rebel cause. The only local adherent of importance who held estates known to be unencumbered with heavy debts is Gordon of Terpersie of Aberdeen. His estates brought in a gross annual rent of £648,13,10. Scots on which £121,10.0. Scots was payable in public taxes. The estate of Farquharson of Monaltrie valued at

(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.218/9.
(2) Maxwell. p.142.
(3) "Forfeited Estates Papers". p.145.
88.

£1,613.0.9. Scots was bankrupt, the debts representing between 34 and 35 years purchase of the estate. Gordon of Glenbucket’s lands were leased from the Duke of Gordon, and brought in a gross annual rental to Glenbucket of £510.4.7. Scots, exclusive of all public burdens due from the lands, but they were already mortgaged for £20,000 Scots. Part, at least, of all the rents due to Glenbucket were paid in kind. Very possibly the debts encumbering these estates may have been an important factor determining Jacobite adherence. The financial position of at least one of the rebels in this area, reveals a further factor which may have influenced adherence. George Abernethy, a merchant of Aberdeen, convicted of high treason for his support of the rebels, was in debt to John Hamilton, factor to the Duke of Gordon, an active Jacobite.

The financial position of the other adherents from this area is uncertain. The annual income of the estates of Farquharson of Monaltrie is difficult to ascertain accurately. A letter of 1784, among the Forfeited Estates Papers, refers to the estate “being worth little more than £40 a year” and regards the debts as standing at £1,492.12.0. while a valuation of 1762 puts the yearly rental at £54.18.11. and a third figure of £61.15.4. is quoted

(5) ibid. valuation figure of Thomas Miller, Advocate, in his petition to the Lords of Session p.160.
as the rent roll on a report dated December 25th, 1752. The debts are apparently equal to a sum between 24 times and 37 times the annual income of the estate. The lands themselves had until their forfeiture in 1715, formed part of the estates of the Earl of Mar and had thus a continuous Jacobite association. It may fairly be here assumed that, as in the case of Gordon of Glenbucket and others, the debts encumbering the estates were an important additional factor influencing Jacobite adherence.

Of those who, on the rebel side, had territorial and personal influence in this area, the Gordon and Farquharson interests were the most important, and their long and continuous Jacobite connections must be noted. In 1745, it is true the last Roman Catholic Duke of Gordon was dead and the new Duke took no action, although his was a powerful name in the North East with extensive superiorities and jurisdictions in Badenoch and Lochaber as well. Farquharson of Invercauld, the superior of Farquharson of Balmoral, and of Farquharson of Monaltrie also remained inactive. On the other hand, the Duke of Gordon, despite appeals from Craigie, the Lord Advocate made no move to support the government. Like many others he was conveniently away from home in the early stages of the rising. When he returned later, he entered into no correspondence with the government or its representatives, leaving his wife to reply to official letters. He, himself, ignored all letters from Forbes of Culloden and Brodie of Brodie until his decision to join Cumberland at Aberdeen in March 1746.

(1) ibid. p.150.
(3) His departure from Gordon Castle secretly on March 9, 1746, to join Cumberland in Aberdeen was his only official indication of his attitude.
Gordons had fought in the Stuart interest in the days of Montrose, under Dundee, and in 1715 under Mar. John Gordon of Glenbucket had himself served under Mar, and was connected, through his daughter's marriage, with the important Jacobite families of Macdonald of Lochgarry, and Macdonald of Glengarry. He was a former factor of the Duke of Gordon and was probably aged 72 in 1745, and had been given a Major General's Commission by the Old Pretender in 1738.

The Farquharsons of Invercauld had a similar history of loyalty to the Stuarts. They were a sept of Clan Chattan, and Colonel Anne Macintosh, who acted as chief of those Macintoshes who joined the rebels, was a daughter of James Farquharson of Invercauld. Her father was an old man by 1745, and remained inactive. Those Farquharsons who joined the rebels served under Farquharson of Monaltrie or of Balmoral. Farquharson of Invercauld had close financial relations with Cluny Macpherson, an important Jacobite, through the latter's system of private watch. Invercauld contributed annually to this, in return for protection, and there are several letters from Invercauld to Cluny, about protection and the charges due, amongst the papers at the West Highland Museum at Fort William.

The report, cited earlier referred to above (p.89, note 2) and probably compiled by Forbes of Culloden, on the State of the Highlands, assessed the potential fighting power of the Gordon

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(1) One of his 3 daughters married the elder Lochgarry. Another married the elder Glengarry and was the mother of Angus Og, who was accidentally shot in Falkirk in 1746.

(2) The most recent being a letter of May 23rd 1745 from Invercauld to Cluny written on behalf of Old Farquharson by his son, protesting against Cluny's proposal to increase his charges. Ms. letter. Miscellaneous Cluny Papers, West Highland Museum.
interest at 300 men from Stathaven and Glenlivet, plus a large posse of gentlemen in Enzie and Strathbogie. The fighting power of the Farquharsons was estimated in the same report as 500 men. Lochgarry in a report on the Highlands after his visit with Dr. Archibald Cameron, to Scotland 1749-50, assesses the Gordon manpower at 500. These figures imply a fighting force of considerable importance.

While, however, the titular heads of both the Gordon and Farquharson families remained aloof in 1745, the important family interest of both these connections was mobilised for the Jacobite side by Lord Lewis Gordon and the two Farquharsons of Balmoral and Monaltrie.

The Gordon area remained, like the Atholl area in Perthshire, a sphere where personal influence was of great importance. The force raised by Lord Lewis Gordon was, in origin at least, a force recruited and officered by family tenants. The Gordon estates consisted at this period of the Lordships of Huntly, Enzie, Strathaven, and Urquhart, with some lands in Fochabers, Lochaber, Aberdeenshire and Inverness. These areas were the recruiting grounds for the Gordon regiments. The two battalions raised by John Hamilton and John Gordon of Avochie, named after two of the four family Lordships, were commonly known as the Strathbogie (or Huntly) and the Enzie battalions. The first moves towards recruitment were made by Lord Lewis Gordon, Gordon of Glenbucket

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(a former ducal factor and occupier of Gordon land) and John Gordon of Avochie, who was also a Gordon tenant. Gordon of Glenbucket began to raise men on September 7th in the Strathdon and Glenlivet areas, and these formed part of the Gordon Lordship of Strathavon. Two days later he was recruiting in Fochabers another Gordon property, and on September 11th in Strathbogie, part of the Gordon Lordship of Huntly. The part played by Gordon tenants in providing officers for the force is illustrated by the roles of David Tulloch of Dunbennan, John Gordon of Avochie and Charles Gordon of Glastirum. Tulloch of Dunbennan was a Gordon tenant in the lordship of Huntly and he held joint command of the Enzie Battalion with John Hamilton, the former factor to the Duke of Gordon. John Gordon of Avochie, who raised the Strathbogie Battalion, was a tenant in the Lordship of Huntly, while Gordon of Glastirum, who raised one Gordon company, was a tenant in the Lordship of Enzie.

A further proof of the strength of Gordon influence lies in the location of Roman Catholic chapels at this date. There were 8 Roman Catholic congregations in this area. Their priests had chapels, or celebrated Mass regularly, at Kortlach, Preshome, Robistown, Ruthven, Huntly, Scalan and in two places in Glenlivet.

(1) "Chiefs of Grant" Vol.2. p.155. Letter of Ludovick Grant to Sir John Cope.
(2) Ibid. p.157, letter of Thomas Grant of Arndillie to Ludovick Grant.
(3) Ibid. p.157.
(5) Ibid. Vol.3.
(6) Ibid. Vol.3. See also above, Chapter 5.
(7) See Chapter 5.
(8) See Chapter 5.
Mortlach and Rathven were Gordon properties in the lordship of Huntly, as of course was Huntly itself; Preshome formed part of the lordship of the Enzie, while Scalan and Glenlivet formed part of
the Lordship of Strathavon. Seven of these eight congregations were sited, in other words, on land belonging to the House of Gordon, and this is a powerful testimony to the protective power of that family's influence.

Gordon family influence was obviously of very great importance at this date, and was wielded in the Jacobite interest by Lord Lewis Gordon. However, as the frequency of both hiring and forcing out proves, attachment to the Gordon family was not in itself sufficient to secure recruitment on a large scale, unless this attachment was reinforced by pressure, in the form of military occupation and a quota system of enforced recruiting.

(1) See the Inventory of Gordon Titles, 3 and 4.
CHAPTER 4.

THE LOWLANDS.

In the Lowlands the towns of chief strategic importance to the Jacobite army were those of Montrose, Stonehaven, Dundee, Stirling, Alloa and Edinburgh. The importance of the first three is due to the fact that they were ports, and so were vital for the Jacobite communications with France. These were not the only ports in Jacobite hands, but they were of considerable importance in view of their comparative nearness to the Jacobite headquarters at Edinburgh and Perth. Even so, the transport of the French arms and equipment landed at Montrose and Stonehaven was to present considerable difficulties. This was largely because of the presence of a Government garrison at Stirling, and of Government ships at Alloa.

The lowland area, as a whole, is strategically important for two quite different reasons. The counties of Angus and Kincardine provided valuable and fertile recruiting grounds for Lord Ogilvy, while the remaining counties were important for financial and economic reasons rather than merely as sources of recruits.

The type of recruiting in Angus and the Mearns district of Kincardine has much in common with recruitment in the Aberdeen area under Lord Lewis Gordon. Under Lord Ogilvy, eldest son of the earl of Airlie, pressure was brought to bear on his family's tenants. Forcing out and hiring out were common, and the recruits acquired were enlisted in Lord Ogilvy's own regiment in the same way as the Gordon recruits were enlisted in Lord Lewis Gordon's regiment.

(1) See below, Chapter 7.
The Ogilvy Regiment was largely raised from Angus and the Mearns. It consisted of 300 men brought by Ogilvy to Edinburgh on October 3rd, 1745, and a further 2nd Battalion, raised by Sir James Kinloch with which he held Angus during November and December, 1745. According to Lord Elcho, this battalion numbered 600 at that time and although there may be some exaggeration here, for Elcho himself was with the Jacobite force in England at this point, Kinloch certainly brought between four and five hundred to join the main body before the battle of Falkirk. These men were almost all raised, as will be shown later, as the result of either economic pressure or forcing or hiring out.

Recruiting in the remaining Lowland areas had, however, little in common with recruiting elsewhere. Followings, in the Highland sense, did not exist in the Lowlands. Lord Elcho, for instance, brought with him to join the Prince at Edinburgh his personal servants, Lord Traquair brought his factor and three servants, and Murray of Broughton provided two servants, but this probably exhausted the contribution of such men. Among the recruits from Lowland counties very few tenant farmers are found, and there is no evidence that any pressure was brought to bear on such classes in the Lowlands. Few men complained of being forced or hired out, and in these areas, although quite a high proportion of those who

(1) Elcho gives this figure p.282 - Blaikie puts Ogilvy's force in October at 600 but he is almost certainly including here the second Battalion under Sir James Kinloch, which was not raised until later. Certainly the regiment did not exceed 700 by January, when it had been joined by Kinloch's battalion.

(2) By this point the 2 battalions numbered 700, according to Elcho, but the first battalion had fallen to only 200 by the siege of Carlisle in the previous November. See Elcho p.324 and p. 372, plans inset.
joined the rebels were classified as gentry, they did not bring with them anything in the nature of the followings which would have been provided by men of similar standing north of the Highland line. From Edinburgh, Haddington, Dunfermline and Stirling a large proportion of those joining were either tradesmen, craftsmen or workmen. These men came from classes upon whom no economic pressure, of the kind found in the Highlands, could be exerted, and joined presumably for personal or private financial reasons. Their adherence was apparently voluntary - few complained of being forced out and none of being hired out.

Much of the information available of the social structure of the Lowland force comes from the Government lists of Persons Concerned in the Recent Rebellion (Rosebery). These reveal an interesting pattern of recruitment. In the Excise districts of Dundee and Montrose the pattern is alike. 490 persons are cited as involved in rebellion in Dundee, and 335 in Montrose. Both these numbers are far in excess of any other Lowland areas here considered. In Dundee 89, and in Montrose 110, of these persons can be classified as either craftsmen or tradesmen, forming in Dundee about 1/5 and in Montrose about 1/3 of the recruits. A further 231 in Dundee, and 53 in Montrose, were classified as servants or workingmen, while 17 in Dundee, and 28 in Montrose, were stated to be either farmers or tenant farmers. These last

(1) Aberdeenshire and the adjacent areas are for these purposes considered separately.
may have been, and in all probability were, tenants of the Earl of Airlie, Lord Ogilvy's father, and therefore susceptible to pressure from him. While the Jacobite force was at Perth in early September 1745, Lord Ogilvy was made Lord Lieutenant of Angus and ordered to go there to raise men. By September 10th he was initiating recruiting in Glenisla, and by September 26th had reached Coupar with his recruits. This was the force of about six hundred men with which he reached Edinburgh on October 3rd, and it had been raised largely in Dundee, Montrose and Angus. A Manuscript List of "Gentlemen and common people in the parish of Tannadice, in the shire of Angus, who bore arms or went along with the Rebels" gives a list of 33 names of "Common people, for the most part first threatened or imprisoned by the rebels and afterwards hired by fees by the threatened Tenants", again suggesting the use of pressure on Airlie tenants. Seven gentry are also named in the list and all were Airlie tenants. A further manuscript, headed "Examinations in Glenesk (Glenesk) area, 26th May 1746", states that "Thomas Low in the parish of Edzell declared that orders to convene the tenants of the barony of Edzell to meet Lord Ogilvy came to Alexander Dulcaston and William Watt".

The large numbers of servants, working men or tradesmen in the two Ogilvy battalions is significant. It is borne out by

(1) Elcho p.249.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p.14. letter of Spalding of Glenkilrie to Tullibardine.
(3) ibid, p.34. letter of George Stirling from Perth to Tullibardine.
(4) National Library of Scotland, Albemarle Papers, 3730,Ms,66.
(5) National Library, Albemarle Papers 3730,Ms,4.
two further manuscript lists, numbers 99 and 101 in the Albemarle Papers. The first gives a list of Brechin rebels and their occupations. Of twenty-two named rebels, five were servants or workingmen and eleven trades or craftsmen. The second lists the occupations of nineteen men of Ogilvy's second Battalion who surrendered in June 1746. Of these, ten were servants or working men, eight were trades or craftsmen.

Amongst those who were classified as servants or working men in Dundee, Angus and Montrose, were large numbers who were either forced or hired out. In the Dundee Excise district, according to Rosebery's list, fifty claimed to be forced out and thirty-seven to have been hired out. In the Montrose district seven claimed to have been forced out and fourteen to have been hired. From the parish of Tannachie in Angus out of thirty-three common people, three claimed to have been pressed or forced out and twenty-one to have been hired out. These recruits included five workmen and seventeen servants. From the Glenesk area Charles Ego or Eque of Little Bridge of Glenlee gave a list of twenty-four persons hired by the inhabitants of Glenesk to join Lord Ogilvy, and gave also the names of two persons forced out. The list of those hired out was confirmed by Robert Clark of Glenesk in examination, and two more names added to it, and the name of one other man forced out was added by Alexander Duncan of Midtown.

Midtown was itself Airlie property, as was Tannadice, Edzell and Alyth, and at least the lower part of Glenisla, where Lord Ogilvy

(1) See Albemarle Papers. Ms.66. cited above.
(2) ibid. Ms.4.
began his recruiting. The family also owned property in Brechin, and these facts suggest that Lord Ogilvy seems to have relied on his family's property to provide the main recruiting ground for his force.

The available statistics for the remaining Lowland areas provide, however, a completely different picture. These consist of the Excise districts of Stirling, Fife and St. Andrews, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, Linlithgow, Haddington, Edinburgh Glasgow, Lanark, Kelso and Dumfries.

All these areas, both according to Rosebery's list and to all other statistics produced only a small number of recruits each. The largest number of recruits, totalling 133 according to Rosebery, came from Edinburgh. Haddington produced 59 and the other numbers ranged from 46 from Stirling to 5 from Kelso. Almost all, however, produced a proportionately very high number of gentry among their recruits, the highest proportion being ten gentlemen out of a total of nineteen recruits from Dumfries.

In an area north of the Highland line, such a number of adherents classified as gentry, would have produced a much more substantial force of recruits from amongst their followings. The contrasting social structure of the Lowlands is amply demonstrated,

(1) The other figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of gentry</th>
<th>Total named</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dumfries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelso</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunfermline</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirling</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Andrews</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linlithgow</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkcaldy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haddington</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
however, by the actual paucity of recruits from these areas. A further instance of the independence of these areas is provided by the fact that out of 406 persons named as concerned in the rebellion from these areas, only 6 claimed to have been forced out. Five of these were from Stirling and one from Edinburgh and none claimed to have been hired out.

Apart from the preponderance of gentry from these Lowland areas it is not possible to make any other important generalisations about the social structure of recruitment. From Edinburgh and Haddington there was a fairly large number of craftsmen and tradesmen, sixty-seven from Edinburgh and seventeen from Haddington, and the largest number, thirteen of those engaged in the professions, came from Edinburgh. Edinburgh also produced seven recruits classified as merchants and this was a larger number than any of the other areas, except Dundee and Montrose, produced. Haddington also produced seventeen salt or Excise officials. The only other area to provide such recruits was Dunfermline which produced one. For the rest, the recruits from these parts were almost equally divided between craftsmen, tradesmen, servants and working men, with a sprinkling of merchants and tenant farmers. These figures, in fact, like the presence of twenty-one merchants from Dundee or twenty-seven from Montrose, provide us with a reflection or cross section of local occupations in these areas, but do not suggest that recruitment came from, or affected solely, or even particularly, one social class rather than another.

A more useful conclusion can be drawn, however, from the
numbers who, in Rosebery's list, were stated to have been engaged in only local Jacobite activities. Large numbers of such persons are mentioned in Montrose, Haddington, Stirling and Kirkcaldy where the respective proportions are $\frac{1}{5}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ of the recruits. The large number involved in local Jacobite activities in these areas is explained by the need, in Montrose, to transport from there the French arms landed in October and November, and the need in Edinburgh, Stirling and Haddington to raise money and seize horses for the main Jacobite force in Edinburgh.

The rebel occupation of Edinburgh for six weeks, during September and October of 1745, afforded a considerable and much needed opportunity to raise both money and goods in kind from the area, as has been shown below in Chapter 7. During the stay in Edinburgh proclamations were issued to call in horses for the use of the rebels, and to secure payment of the excise and other local levies. There was also, apparently, considerable activity in the way of seizing of horses for the use of the rebels. In Rosebery's lists ten persons from the Edinburgh and Linlithgow areas are stated to have been active in seizing horses for the rebels, and several others were either active in stealing fodder for the rebel horse regiments, or assisted in driving waggons for the rebels. Similar activity was also to be found in the districts round Montrose, Brechin and Forfar, where for instance, John Struan, wright of Montrose "was active in oppressing the county for horses and carts". These districts

(1) See below, Chapter 7.
(2) Rosebery p.186.
and the Edinburgh area are the only places where large scale seizing of horses, carts and fodder are mentioned. In the case of Edinburgh the reason was the needs of the Horse Regiments, and also for the transport, on the march into England, of the rebel artillery which they had now acquired, partly from France in October, and partly through the capture of Cope's artillery after the battle of Prestonpans.

The need for horses in the Angus area was again the result of these French landings in October. The artillery landed at Montrose and Stonehaven between October 7th and 17th had to be transported to Edinburgh to join the main Jacobite force there. This was no easy task, in view of the need to carry it across the Forth, and also in view of the presence of government ships at Alloa. A government garrison at Stirling Castle prevented a crossing of the river at Stirling itself. The result was that this artillery did not reach Edinburgh until October 30th, and two hundred and fifty carts were needed to transport it to Alloa. Here it was to be met on October 23rd by two hundred carts, after the passage of the Forth.

In order to achieve this passage for the artillery, a small battery of the Swedish cannon, which had arrived with the French arms, had to be erected to protect the passage from the Government sloop "Happy Janet" which was at Alloa.

Later, in early January, the passage for the transport of

(1) Namely Elcho's and Balmerino's Life Guards, Kilmarnock's Horse and Pitsligo's Horse.
(2) See below Chapter 7.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", Letter of Tullibardine to Menzies of Shian of October 20th, 1745. p.116.
(4) ibid. p.130. Letter of Lord George Murray from Alloa to Tullibardine.
(5) Elcho, p.296.
Lord John Drummond's artillery, which had arrived with him the previous November, was even more difficult to secure. The natural crossing point of the Forth at Stirling was still blocked because of the government garrison holding the Castle, and to cross further up river would involve even more of a detour for a force marching from Perth to join the main Jacobite body between Stirling and Falkirk. To increase the difficulties of the situation, Hawley had now some twenty small ships off Airth from January 8th onwards, the date when the cannon, escorted by Lord John Drummond's and Lord Cromartie's regiments arrived at Alloa. By January 10th, Hawley had twelve foot regiments and two of dragoons at Edinburgh, and was able to land a small force between Clackmannan and Kincardine on January 10th to menace the Jacobite position at Alloa, which was held by Cromartie's and Lochiel's regiments. The result of these government activities was that much of the artillery which arrived at Alloa on January 8th did not reach the main Jacobite body until after the battle of Falkirk, on January 17th.

The delays and difficulties in transport experienced here and in the previous October, and also experienced by Lord George Murray in negotiating Shap, are ample proofs of the importance of the waggons, carts and horses which the Jacobite army so frequently lacked. This explains, therefore, the demands served on Leith and Edinburgh to provide horses and carts during October 1745. (2) Orders on pain of military execution for the provision of these by the 15th and 23rd October, were issued, and apparently some one hundred waggons and between six and seven hundred working

(1) See Elcho p.367.
horses were gained from East Lothian farmers alone.

The Lowlands, moreover, played an important part in producing Jacobite cavalry. The Jacobite Horse consisted of four regiments commanded by Lord Elcho (The Jacobite Life Guards), Lord Balmerino, Lord Kilmarnock (The Strathallan or Perthshire Horse) and Lord Pitsligo, and a troop of Hussars raised by Murray of Broughton. Elcho's Horse, according to himself numbered one hundred and fifty with the inclusion of officers' servants and others, or one hundred without such men. Balmerino's Horse numbered apparently much less, Blaikie puts the figure at forty on the departure South from Edinburgh on November 1st, 1745, and by November 8th at the siege of Carlisle Elcho omits them entirely from his enumeration of the cavalry. Kilmarnock's Horse, more usually known as the Perthshire Squadron probably numbered at least one hundred and thirty on the march south from Edinburgh. Pitsligo's Horse was apparently somewhat larger. Elcho, who by reason of his own cavalry command is likely to be reasonably accurate over cavalry figures puts Pitsligo's Horse at one hundred and eighty on their arrival at Edinburgh and one hundred and fifty by the siege of Carlisle. (1) With the exception of Pitsligo's Horse which was raised in Aberdeenshire and Banff, the majority of the Jacobite Cavalry was recruited in the Lowlands. Elcho's and Balmerino's Horse were entirely raised during the occupation of Edinburgh, as were Murray's eighty Hussars, though the command of

(1) Elcho, plan of the Prince's Army, following p.324.
(2) This is the figure Elcho gives the Squadron by November 8th at the siege of Carlisle. Elcho, plan following p.324.
(3) ibid. p.283.
them was given, before the march into England, to Bagot, an Irish officer arrived from France during October. This change of command was the result of Murray's other more important duties as the Prince's Secretary. The remaining Horse, the Perthshire Squadron, also contained a large number of Lowland recruits. According to Elcho, the squadron on the crossing of the Forth at the Frews, on September 13th, numbered only thirty-six and almost certainly it only reached its larger figure by November 1st because of the introduction of Edinburgh and Lowland recruits. The value of Lowland recruits for the Horse regiments is also suggested by Rosebery's lists. Out of twenty-seven named adherents, from the Linlithgow district, ten served with the Jacobite Horse.

Recruits for Horse regiments did not exhaust the contribution, however, of the Edinburgh area. Lord Elcho's condemnation of the backwardness of this area in providing recruits is familiar. Apart, however, from those joining the Jacobite Cavalry, Murray of Broughton pointed out that a good many Edinburgh recruits were drafted into the Duke of Perth's regiment, while John Roy Stuart's Regiment was intended as an Edinburgh Regiment and was so entitled officially. Here, however, as in the case of Perth's regiment, it is impossible to assess accurately Edinburgh's contribution as various Perthshire recruits, including the Stewarts of Grantully and others, were also drafted into the Regiment, which numbered two hundred on the departure south from Edinburgh. Enough, however, is

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(1) Elcho, p.253.
(2) Rosebery, p.264-269.
(3) Elcho, p.261 "not one of the mob who were so fond of seeing him ever asked to enlist in his service".
known to suggest that the contribution of the Edinburgh area was not as slight as Elcho and other writers following him would seem to imply. That there was not a larger still contribution was probably caused by two factors. First the predominantly Highland character, at least superficially, of the force when it arrived in Edinburgh. This may have antagonised some. Secondly, and much more important, probably, the social structure of the area played its part. Followings, as Murray of Broughton pointed out, did not exist in the Lowlands. The personal servants brought by Elcho or Murray of Broughton were no substitute for this, while the more mercantile and commercial structure of society in this area made it also difficult or impossible to effect recruitment by pressure from landlord on tenant. It was in the absence of these features that recruitment in this area differed from recruitment in Perthshire, Aberdeenshire, Angus or the Western Highlands.

For these reasons, the role of gentry and landowners differed here from their role elsewhere. The gentry, merchants and professional classes from Edinburgh, Dundee and the Lowlands, in general provided staff officers rather than regimental commanders for the rebel army. With the exception of Lord Ogilvy and Sir James Kinloch, the gentry of the Lowlands could not bring to the rebel army the large body of recruits which would justify their appointment as regimental commanders except in the cavalry regiments. Amongst staff officers and administrative officials, however, provided by this class, were the Prince's Secretary, John Murray of Broughton, the Assistant Quarter Master General, Robert Anderson of Whitburgh and the Muster Master, Henry Patullo, merchant of Dundee. The Secretaries of both Murray of
Broughton and Tullibardine came from this area, they were John Goodwillie, the Edinburgh W.S. and Mungo Murray of Kincardine. Patullo's clerk was Thomas Williamson, a clerk of Edinburgh, and one of the Prince's aide-de-camps was Sir David Murray of Stanhope, a nephew of Murray of Broughton. Sir Alexander Bannerman of Elsick was appointed as Lord Lieutenant of the Mearns, David Fotheringham, a Dundee merchant, as governor of that town, and Lord Elcho as Lord Lieutenant of Fife, while the Earl of Kilmarnock, Lord Balmerino, Lord Elcho, David Hunter of Burnside, and James Maxwell of Kirkconnell were all Lowlanders holding cavalry commands.

Amongst many of these men there seems a certain common tradition of both Episcopacy, and family Jacobitism. Lord Balmerino, Lord Ogilvy, Lord Elcho, Maxwell of Kirkconnell and Murray of Broughton, for instance, were all Episcopalians. Lord Ogilvy's uncle had been attainted in 1715, the Earl of Kilmarnock married the daughter of a Jacobite attainted after 1715 while Sir Alexander Bannerman of Elsick was descended, through his mother, from the Macdonalds of Sleat.

In spite, however, of the positions of administrative importance occupied by these men, their presence in the Jacobite army did little to change it from a force still predominantly Highland in organisation. The Council of War remained Highland in character, dominated by the views of the clans, whose wishes on all matters of strategic importance prevailed. The composition of the Jacobite

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(1) See below, Chapter 6 p. 143 et seq.
(2) O'Sullivan, p. 67.
(3) ibid. p. 71.
(4) Elcho, p. 283.
(5) See above, Introduction.
Privy Council, in contrast to the Jacobite Council of War, provided an interesting illustration of this factor. The Privy Council contained the names of at least eleven Lowlanders, out of a full council of eighteen. The Council of War, at this point the more vital body, however, contained a total of only three Lowlanders out of a full body of seventeen men. Highlanders who were qualified by the size of their followings to dominate the Council of War were not necessarily equally qualified to dominate the purely political or administrative Privy Council.

Because Lowland support was not, however, negligible in amount, the Jacobite army of 1745 was able to avoid some of the disasters that had previously faced similar forces. It was able to surmount the obstacle of the Forth, to finance itself more efficiently than any earlier Jacobite force and to enjoy more efficient staff organisation. But because the Lowlanders who brought the force these administrative benefits were not also able to bring in the large numbers of recruits brought by their opposite numbers north of the Highland line, the force as a whole did not lose its predominantly Highland character, nor did it lose the defects consequent on that character.

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(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.25, Letter of Lord George Murray to Tullibardine. The 11 Lowlanders were the Earl of Wemyss, Viscount Arbuthnot, Lord Kenmure, Lord Ogilvy, Lord Elcho, Lord Cardross, Sir James Stewart of Goodtrees, Mr. Wanchope of Niddery (Niddrie), John Stirling of Keir, James Graham of Airth and John Murray of Broughton.

(2) Elcho, p.288.
CHAPTER 5.

The Part Played by Roman Catholics and the Roman Catholic Church in the Rising.

SECTION 1.

It is not easy to assess with any exactness the number of Roman Catholics in the Jacobite force, nor to isolate the importance of this religion as a motive for adherence. Some indications of its importance, however, can be gained, first from examination of recruitment statistics in areas where Catholicism predominated, second from the attitude to the rebellion implied in official Catholic correspondence, and third, from the part played in recruitment of the Jacobite force by Catholic priests.

These sources will show that the Roman Catholic Church was of considerable strength in those areas where Jacobite recruitment was most successful. They will also provide us with the names of many prominent Jacobite personalities who were Roman Catholic. Amongst Lowland recruits, for instance, was James Maxwell of Kirkconnell, and in the Jacobite Council of War, Catholicism was represented by the Duke of Perth, Macdonald of Kepoch, Macdonald of Glengarry, Macdonald of Clanranald, Macdonald of Glencoe, Sir Thomas Sheridan and Colonel O'Sullivan. At least nine Catholic priests, furthermore, were intimately connected with the movement.

However, further reference to Roman Catholic archives, particularly the Historical Papers of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland at Columba House, suggests that the association between Catholicism and Jacobitism is partly coincidental and that Roman Catholicism as a primary motive for enrolment in, or association with, the rebel army is of less importance than has hitherto been accepted.
It must first be stated, however, that many prominent Jacobites were Roman Catholic; of those Catholics with territorial influence, who were closely connected with Jacobitism, the most important in the West were the Clanranald and Glengarry Macdonalds. Both the Clanranald and the Glengarry regiments in 1745 were accompanied by Roman Catholic priests when they joined the main rebel army.

The Glengarry family were devout Catholics. John Macdonald, known as Old Glengarry, was not out in the Forty Five but the Glengarry regiment was commanded by his younger son Angus because of the absence of his eldest son in France at the beginning of the rising. Other prominent Jacobite Roman Catholics included young Glengarry's cousin, Donald Macdonald of Scotus. He was amongst the first to join the Prince at Borrodale in Arisaig. (1)

Macdonald of Morar, who joined Charles on August 16th, 1745, was a brother of the Roman Catholic bishop Hugh Macdonald. Both Donald Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, who joined Charles on July 26th, 1745, and Donald Macdonell of Tiendrish, who attacked two companies of the Royal Scots at Highbridge on August 16th 1745, were Roman Catholics and both requested the services of a Roman Catholic priest while in Carlisle gaol.

The Macdonells of Keppoch had always had long Catholic traditions and Alexander Macdonnell of Keppoch, who took prisoner Captain Swetenham on August 14th 1745, and brought 300 recruits to Glenfinnan on August 19th, was a Roman Catholic. So, too, were the Macdonalds of Barrisdale, including Alexander or Old Barrisdale,

(1) See Lochgarry's Memorial to Glengarry. Blaikie p.112.
(2) Sir John Macdonald's Narrative, "1745 and After" p.56.
and his son Coll. Barrisdale had been sent from Edinburgh, in September, with Charles' instructions and requests for aid to Lord Lovat, and had raised 200 recruits for the Prince, while the main Jacobite body was in England. The Macdonalds of Glenaladale were also Roman Catholic, as were those of Glencoe and of Boisedale. John Macdonald of Glenaladale joined Charles at Arisaig, in July 1745, and Allan Macdonald of the same family was the priest who accompanied the Clanranald Regiment. Alexander Macdonald of Boisedale was Clanranald's brother and although he advised Charles to return home, when he visited him on July 24th, he afforded him shelter in his wanderings after Culloden and was imprisoned for his Jacobite sympathies.

It may be noticed that not only was almost every branch of the Macdonald confederation of clans, Roman Catholic, but in most cases the heads of each clan had extremely close personal links with the Catholic clergy.

The Clanranald family had imported Catholic priests from Ireland in the earlier part of the century. Macdonald of Scotus' brother was a Benedictine monk and his son was ordained as a priest in 1751. Macdonald of Morar's brother was a Roman Catholic bishop, and was educated at the Roman Catholic Seminary on Loch Morar.

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(1) Eicho, p.320.
(3) Blaikie, p.2.
(5) Blundell. "Roman Catholic Highlands of Scotland". Edin. p.86 et seq. and page 118.
(6) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart was a cousin of this bishop. Young Glengarry spent some time in the Scots College at Paris. Old Barrisdale, the father of Coll, had given hospitality to the Catholic Bishop Nicholson in his diocesan tour of 1700, while the Glenaladale family had produced at least three members who served as Roman Catholic priests. This close association with the Catholic clergy does not, however, testify only to the devoutness of the families concerned but also to the lack of opportunity for education or employment for their sons.

The Camerons of Lochiel also had strong Roman Catholic connections. Although the Young Lochiel of the Forty Five was an Episcopalian, his uncle, Hugh Macdonald was a Roman Catholic bishop and his brother Alexander was a Jesuit priest.

Amongst important Jacobites in the North East who were Roman Catholics were Gordon of Glastirum, who joined Charles at Edinburgh with a body of about 50 recruits about October 12th, 1745, and Charles Gordon, of Miln of Smithston, who was held in Carlisle gaol with Kinlochmoidart and Macdonell of Tiendrish. In Braemar the Farquhersons had important Catholic connections. An uncle of Farquharson of Inverey was a Jesuit who arrived in Braemar during 1746.

Throughout this period, moreover, the Lovat and Gordon

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(1) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
(2) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
(3) They were Angus, eldest son of Ranald of Glenaladale, ordained in 1682 or 3, and Allan Macdonald, Chaplain to the Clanranald Regiment and probably a great nephew of John of Glenaladale. (See Columba House Miscell. Mss. Clapperton Mss. No. 72). The third member was an Alexander Macdonald of the same family who entered the Scots College in Rome in 1743.
(4) For evidence of their Catholicism see Miscellaneous papers at Columba House.
(5) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
Influence for Catholicism remained strong. Amongst the Forfeited Estates Papers is a petition of March 1758 from Alexander MacKay, minister in Strathglass, in which he states that of the Strathglass inhabitants, "more than half are bigotted Papists and always one and sometimes two Popish missionaries among them". In 1709 the Roman Catholic Bishop Gordon had calculated the Catholic laity in Strathglass as between 640 and 700. Of Strathfarrar, the Survey of the Forfeited Estate of Lovat asserts "The people are grossly ignorant and among them a great number of Papists". The priest in Strathglass, a Jesuit, was John Farquharson who surrendered himself to the government forces after Culloden and was sentenced to banishment.

Further East, in the Gordon country, although the second Duke of Gordon, now dead, was the last Roman Catholic duke, the Gordon family interest was still exerted on the side of Roman Catholicism through his sister Lady Jean Gordon. She had married the Duke of Perth and was the chief support of Scottish Catholics until her death in 1773. Lady Jean Gordon was the aunt of Lord Lewis Gordon of the '45. By 1736 there were between 500 and 600 Catholics in Strathavon and 1,000 in Glenlivet. The priests in charge of these two areas in 1745, were John Tyrie and Alexander Grant and they drew lots as to which of them should accompany the

(1) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p.98.
(2) Bishop Gordon's Report to Propaganda 1709, Columba House Miscell. Ms.
(3) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p.82.
(6) Clepperton Ms. Columba House. A letter of Father George Gordon of Soalan, 24 Oct. 1736, gives the Strathavon figure and a memoir, Ms. No.74, gives the Glenlivet figure.
Glenbucket Regiment to join Charles.

There were strong links with the Catholic priesthood amongst the various branches of the Gordon family. There were 42 Catholic priests ministering in Scotland in 1745 and seven were surnamed Gordon. Before 1730 there were eleven secular priests with Gordon connections. The seven priests, in 1745 were Bishop James Gordon, the Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic, Father George Gordon, priest at Aberdeen or at Mortlach, who was arrested after Culloden but soon released, another Father George Gordon at Drummond Castle, Father John Gordon at Preshome, and Father John Gordon of Robistown, near Huntly, who preached a sermon in the parish of Rathven near Fochabers, exhorting enlistment in the Jacobite army. This priest afterwards accompanied to Edinburgh the recruits raised by Gordon of Glastirum, and he was hunted and in hiding for twelve months after Culloden. The remaining two priests were a third George Gordon, probably stationed near Huntly, and Father Alexander Gordon, of the Gordons of the Glencairn family, stationed at Glencairn. He was seized after Culloden and died in Inverness prison.

There were eight Roman Catholic chapels in the Gordon area, and the Vicar Apostolic, Bishop James Gordon of the Gordons of Glastirum family, prided himself on his relationship to the Dukes of Gordon. This relationship almost certainly explains his close personal links with that equally prominent Jacobite family, the

(1) See infra, p.137.
(3) ibid. undated Ms. compiled by John Geddes, afterwards consecrated Bishop in 1780, who was a boy in the Enzie in 1745.
(4) See Scottish Catholics After Culloden. Bishop John Geddes, Ms. in Columba House.
Drummonds of Perth. This connection came about through the marriage of Lady Jean Gordon to the Duke of Perth. Bishop Gordon's relationship to the powerful Dukes of Gordon probably explains his relative freedom from government interference in both 1715 and 1745. The importance of the Gordon connection is even further emphasised by the fact that seven of the eight chapels in this area were built on land owned by the House of Gordon.

SECTION II.

Numerical strength of Catholicism in Scotland in 1745, examined geographically.

The manuscripts and letters amongst the archives at Columba House are the chief source of the following figures.

Roman Catholicism was the dominant faith in the Clanranald areas of Knoydart, North and South Morar, Arisaig and Moidart, from, that is, the north of Loch Shiel to Loch Houra. Knoydart contained one of the largest Roman Catholic congregations in the Highlands and Moidart and Arisaig together contained, according to one source, a Roman Catholic congregation of 2,000 in 1763.

In 1709 Report to Propaganda (the official body in Rome responsible for all Catholic Missions abroad) from Bishop Gordon gives the following figures of Catholic laity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moidart</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arisaig</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) He died in 1746 at Drummond Castle. See below.
(2) These were the chapels at Mortlach, Huntly, Preshome, Rathven, Sca
dan and two meeting places in Glenlivet. See Chapter 3 p.192.
(3) Blundell, "Catholic Highlands of Scotland" Vol.2 p.162, but the figure is unconfirmed by any figures at Columba House.
Morar 450
Knossart 640
Total 1820

(1) Webster gives a total population for the parish of Ardnamurchan of 5,000 which included Sunart, Arisaig and Morar.

Lochaber also provided an extremely large Roman Catholic congregation. Aeneas MacGillis, priest resident in Glengarry, in a report on his mission, prepared for Rome in 1764, states that in the Lochaber Mission there were 3,000 Catholics but at that date no resident priest. There is always some danger of optimistic exaggeration of the size of congregations from such Catholic sources but the figure is somewhat borne out by an undated anonymous paper headed "Notes to the S.P.C.K. (on) Papists in the Highlands" which is among the archives of the Scottish Episcopal Church. This paper says of the Lochaber area, near Inverlochy, "there are few who are not Papists". Roman Catholicism in both Lochaber and the west was undoubtedly strengthened by the influence of the island seminary established by Bishop Hugh Macdonald on Loch Morar in 1732. There was also a separate priest in charge of Arisaig by 1731.

To the north of the Clanranald areas of Moidart and the two Morars was the equally strongly Catholic Glengarry country. There was a series of resident Catholic priests in Glengarry from the

(3) Written from internal evidence probably in 1712 or 1713.
(4) A collection of Papers, known as the Episcopal Chest, at the Episcopal College, Rosebery Crescent, Edinburgh.
(5) See Father Charles Macdonald, "Moidart - Among the Clanranalds".
seventeenth century and Blundell estimates the Catholic population of the area as 1,500 in the eighteenth century. Bishop Gordon gives a figure of 1,200 Catholics in Glengarry in 1709 and Aeneas MacGillis in his Report of 1764 gives the figure as 1,500.

Further west, the islands of south Uist, Benbecula, Barra, Eigg and Canna were almost entirely Roman Catholic. There were only 60 Protestant families on South Uist in 1700. Benbecula and South Uist, according to Captain Barlow, writing in 1753, were "all Papists". Here the influence of both the Clanranald - Boisedale families and of MacNeil of Barra was a powerful support to Catholicism. Bishop Gordon, in his report to Propaganda in 1709, gives the following figures for Roman Catholics in the Islands. In brackets beside each are Alexander Webster's figures for the year 1755 which establish some kind of impartial check on Gordon's figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Webster's Figure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigg</td>
<td>400 (316)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canna</td>
<td>200 (323)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uist</td>
<td>2200 (2040 including Benbecula)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barra</td>
<td>1100 (1100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3900 (3779)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Later, in an extensive visit in 1723, Bishop Gordon confirmed

(1) Blundell - op. cit. Vol. 2 p. 160 et seq.
(2) ibid. Vol. 2 p. 178.
(3) Report to Propaganda, cited above.
(5) ibid. p. 510. Account of Martin Martin of Skye.
(6) ibid. appendix p. 598 et seq.
900 in the Islands. There was a series of priests on Barra from the 17th century onwards with only one short gap in 1762 and at least one priest and sometimes two resident on Uist.

On the mainland there was a strong Roman Catholic element in the Lovat Fraser areas of Strath Farrar and Strath Glass. There was one Jesuit priest in that area in 1743. He was Lochiel's brother, Alexander Cameron and in 1746 a second priest, Father John Farquharson, arrived in Strathglass. Both these priests were arrested after Culloden. Father Cameron died at sea in the prison ship taking him to the Thames, Father Farquharson was sentenced to banishment. Bishop Gordon's 1709 Report referred to above gives a Roman Catholic population of at least 640 in Strathglass. A Report on Schools on the Forfeited Estates of Lovat, dated 1761, gives some indication of the surviving strength of Roman Catholicism in the Lovat areas by 1761, although this was after the renewed persecution which followed the suppression of the 1745 Rising. There are no corresponding figures at Columba House for the area before the outbreak of the rising, but by analogy with other areas the 1745 figures may be assumed to be no smaller and probably larger.

The figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Papists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parish of Kilmorack</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Kiltarlity</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Boleskin and Abertarf</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss, No.40.
(2) Blundell Vol.2 op.cit. p.1 et seq.
(3) The priest in 1745 was Alexander Forester, who was arrested on the Island in 1745 and sentenced to banishment. Columba House Miscell. Mss.
(4) Columba House, Miscell. Mss.
(5) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p.93 et seq.
Further south, in the western area of Badenoch, there was a strong Roman Catholic pocket north of Loch Laggan, from Aberarder to Garvebeg and Dalchully. This dated from the occupation of the lands of Gellovy, Tullochrom, Aberarder, Garvemore and Garvebeg, by offshoots of the Macdonell's of Keppoch from 1602. The MacNabs of Dalchully were also Roman Catholic. The area was apparently served by priests from Lochaber.

In the East the area from the Enzie to Glenlivet and Strathavon, as well as the Strathbogie district was a stronghold of Catholicism. Bishop Geddes mentions five chapels in the Keith - Dufftown - Huntly triangle, two of which were destroyed by government troops after Culloden. In the Glenlivet and Strathavon area, where a seminary existed at Scalan from 1717-1799 there were at least two priests from 1727 onwards and in 1745 two priests, John Tyrie and Alexander Grant, in Glenlivet alone. A letter from George Gordon, priest at Scalan in 1736, gives the number of Catholics in Strathavon as between 500 and 600 and in Glenlivet as 1,000. The two priests in Glenlivet, John Tyrie and Alexander Grant, drew lots as to which of them should join the Jacobite army, and which should remain behind to serve as a priest in Glenlivet. The lot fell to Tyrie who joined the main

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(3) A small hamlet 3 miles from Fochaber but used in Catholic Mss. to denote the parishes of Bellie and Rathven.
(5) At Robentown (Robertstown) and Tulloch. Geddes, op.cit. p.8.
body, probably in Edinburgh and marched with them into England as far as Carlisle.

South of Strathavon, in the Braemar district the priest, Father Peter Gordon, drew up an account of his mission in 1740, (1) which is among the manuscripts at Columba House. It gives the number of his communicants at 500. There were at least three priests in the area, Peter Gordon at Braemar, Alexander Gordon S.J. at Glengairn and another Jesuit, Charles Farquharson, who arrived at Braemar early in 1746. The presence of three priests in the area and possibly a fourth, a William Reid at Mortlach (probably Mortlich, about five miles from Aboyne) argues a substantial Catholic population. Of these three priests, Alexander Gordon and Farquharson were arrested after Culloden. Gordon died in prison and Farquharson was sentenced to banishment along with his brother John. William Reid went into hiding on the arrival of Major General Bland, with government troops, in his area but was arrested and held in prison for some months in Edinburgh until he was released on bail in August 1746. (3)

There were at least three Catholic priests in Aberdeen and district. They were Robert or Patrick Leith, George Gordon and Andrew Hackett. Again the presence of three priest argues considerable lay support. Of these priests George Gordon was arrested after Culloden but "released by giving the serjeant a guinea privately" (4) while Leith joined the Jacobite force at some date.

(1) Columba House. Clapperton Mss. No.68.
(3) Various papers relating to him and the certificate of his release are at Columba House.
before Prestonpans, where he was present ministering to the wounded. He marched into England with the main body and possibly fled from England after the collapse of the Rising. There is no further reference to him among the Columba House manuscripts. He does not appear on the Clergy Lists for 1746 and in the list for 1747 he is said to be in Rome. He eventually became Abbot of Ratisbon.

Exact numbers of Roman Catholic congregations are difficult to assess, as can be seen. The statistics at Columba House are very scanty. John Geddes, later consecrated Bishop in 1780, writing as a contemporary, who lived through the renewed persecution which followed the failure of the Rising, had probably the best opportunity for assessing the strength of Roman Catholicism but his figures may be prejudiced. Moreover, he is more interested in the numbers and personal histories of priests than in their congregations. His Manuscript "History of the Catholic Religion in Scotland" at Columba House and the manuscript lists of Scottish missionary priests compiled in 1760 by George Gordon (a priest in Aberdeen) are the main sources for what statistics there are. These figures, however, come after the apostasies and deaths which followed the reprisals of 1746 onwards.

From these figures we have the following totals of Catholic congregations:

- Moidart, Arisaig: 1620
- Morar, Knoydart: 1620
- Lochaber: 3000
- Glengarry: 1500

(1) Geddes, "The Position of Scottish Catholics After Culloden" p.5.
The Outer Islands 3900
Strathglass 640
Lovat areas 1150
Glenlivet and Strathavon 1500

A total of 13,510 excluding the Braemar, Strathbogie, Huntly and Argyll areas for which there are no Catholic statistics.

From Alexander Webster's "Account of the Number of People in Scotland in 1755" we have the following totals of Catholics:

The Outer Islands 3779
Ross and Cromarty 29
Inverness-shire 5664
Elgin, Moray, Banff and Aberdeen 5528
Argyll (without islands) 4329

Total 19,329

Excluding the islands of Argyll and the counties of Perth and Angus.

The considerable omissions among the Catholic figures would explain the difference of just under 6000 in the two totals, for Braemar, Strathbogie, Huntly and Aberdeen itself are without statistics and there are no figures for Argyll which according to Webster contained 4329 Catholics.

SECTION III.
Catholicism and Recruitment.

Having gained some kind of picture of the numerical strength of Catholicism at the outbreak of the Rising, the next and more important questions to be answered are, first what proportion of the Jacobite force was actually recruited from predominantly Catholic areas, and second, to what extent Roman Catholicism was a motive

(1) The difference is 5,819.
inspiring enlistment in the Jacobite army.

The following regiments may be presumed to have had a large Roman Catholic element amongst their men. Beside each regiment are the numbers probably recruited, though not always remaining for any length of time under arms. The method by which these totals of recruits have been arrived at is explained in the Introduction above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment or Area of Recruiting</th>
<th>Number Recruited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glenbucket's Regiment, Lord Lewis</td>
<td>1000/1480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon's and others from the Gordon area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovat's</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glengarry's, including recruits brought by Macdonald of Barrieadale and Macdonald of Lochgarry and Macheil of Raasay and some Grants of Glenmoriston</td>
<td>between 900 and 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keppoch's, including men brought by Macdonald of Glencoe</td>
<td>between 520 and 720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clanranald's</td>
<td>between 350 and 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Braemar under Farquharson of Monaltrie and Farquharson of Balmoral</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>between 4370 and 5300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This forms a substantial percentage of the total Jacobite force recruited, a total of between 12,230 and 14,148 men.

This substantial percentage points at least superficially to a very strong connection between Roman Catholicism and Jacobite sentiments. To what extent this was a real connection and in how far Roman Catholicism actually provided the motive for Jacobite

(1) See above, Introduction.
activity must now be examined.

The first point to be noticed is that though predominantly Roman Catholic areas produced over 32% of the Jacobite levy, Perthshire and other predominantly Episcopalian areas produced a larger proportion viz: 40% at the minimum.

The second is that in the case of prominent Roman Catholic Jacobites, there were often family and personal links with the Stuarts to explain their Jacobitism. For example, the Macdonalds of Clanranald, of Glengarry and of Keppoch had long links, both personal and through correspondence, with the exiled courts.

Next, the official attitude of the Roman Catholic Church and its hierarchy in Scotland to the arrival and activities of Prince Charles Edward must be considered.

The Vicar Apostolic for the Lowland district until 1746 was Bishop James Gordon. His Diocesan correspondence is preserved among the archives of the Catholic Church in Scotland. He was eighty in 1745 and died on 18th February 1746, at Drummond Castle aged eighty-one. He had spent the last weeks of his life there, in failing health, and the last letters written by him to be preserved are dated July 1745. The state of his health probably explains the absence of further letters.

Bishop Gordon made no open declaration of Jacobitism, and his correspondence contains no reference to the Rising. So no official Jacobite lead was given by him, though his attitude may have been the result of increasing infirmity as well as lack of inclination. His earlier letters contain no reference to the possibility of a

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(1) See Correspondence of Bishop Gordon. Columba House Mss.
rising, however. The only references to the exiled House in Rome are passing references to the Old Pretender’s part in the nomination of bishops and the influence he possessed in Rome over the granting of dispensations. In these references Bishop Gordon, like most of the Roman Catholic clergy in Scotland, shows his disapproval of the Pretender’s interference in the nomination of bishops, as this, he believed, tended to label the Roman Catholic clergy and hierarchy as Jacobite agents. In his younger days, however, he had been considerably more partisan. In 1714 he had written to the Old Pretender urging his coming to Scotland and assuring him “you may be sure I and his other relations and friends would not be backward on such an occasion”. This declaration was probably caused by the renewed persecution and priest-hunting which broke out after Anne’s death. Bishop Gordon, however, was never arrested after the ’15 Rising, probably partly because of his powerful connections with the Duke of Gordon and also partly because he had never openly committed himself, as his colleague Bishop Nicholson had done, by regular correspondence with Colonel Hooke and other Jacobite agents.

By 1745, however, there is no evidence of any treasonable correspondence with Jacobite agents by either of the two Catholic Bishops, Bishop Gordon or his colleague in the Highland division, Bishop Hugh Macdonald. Amongst the clerical correspondence after July 1745 there are few references to the Rising by clergy in Scotland. The chief burden of the correspondence is the problem

(2) Nicholson was arrested in 1715 but released shortly afterwards, see Columba House Miscell. Mss.
caused by the increasing infirmity and approaching death of Bishop Gordon himself. Bishop Gordon's colleague was Bishop Hugh Macdonald of the Morar family. He came from a prominent Jacobite family and might be expected to have played a more decisively Jacobite part. According to later Catholic tradition he is said to have visited Charles on board the "Du Teilley" and to have tried to persuade him to return to France, and also to have blessed his Royal banner secretly. There is, however, no written contemporary confirmation of this and according to a source nearer to his own time, Bishop John Geddes, who was consecrated as Coadjutor of the Lowland District in 1780, Bishop Macdonald only learnt of Charles' arrival from Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, whom he met accidentally, when Kinlochmoidart was on his way to inform the Duke of Perth. As Kinlochmoidart's message did not reach the Duke of Perth until August 9th, and Charles had left the "Du Teilley" on August 4th or 5th, there would seem to be little truth in the story of the Blessing.

Bishop Macdonald took no active part whatsoever in the rising, but was too conspicuous a figure to remain safely in Scotland during the renewed priest hunting which followed Culloden, and he escaped to France in August 1746. After his return to Scotland he was arrested in 1754, solely on the grounds of infringing the recusancy laws, and at his arrest and trial no mention was made of any implication in the Rising nor of his supposed blessing of the Standard. Had any evidence of such treasonable activity existed,

(1) Ms. Memoir of Bishop Hugh Macdonald, Columba House, Clapperton Mss.
It would not have been ignored.

It is only in the correspondence of the clergy serving in Rome or Paris that we find any open statements of Jacobite sentiments. The letters of George Innes, Principal of the Scots College at Paris, from September 1745 onwards contain many examples of a partisan Jacobite spirit. Such sentiments are not found among the correspondence of the clergy in Scotland, however. Their letters contain cryptic references to the difficulties encountered by priests from 1746 onwards in their missions, code names being used. News is given of the many priests arrested on government orders but no reference made to Jacobite sentiment. William Harrison, for instance, Catholic priest in North Morar since 1737, visited the Sheriff of Argyleshire after Culloden, admitted his priesthood, but denied any "political medling" and was given "an ample passport requiring of everybody to allow him to go about his lawful business unmolested". (2) A similar pass was given, on August 2nd 1746, to Alexander Godsman, priest at Achanacy in Huntly, "to pass south or north where his business requires". George Gordon, priest in Aberdeen and William Reid, priest of Mortlach, were both arrested but later released. (4) Robert Grant of Glenlivet, brother of the Scots Agent in Rome, left the Scots College in Paris, where he

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(1) For example, his letter of 2nd September 1745 to the Abbé Grant, the Scots Agent at Rome, "We are all ... taken up with the thoughts of our Prince's doings for which, that God may give a blessing thereunto, we don't fail to offer our most ardent prayers". Columba House. Miscell. Mss.


(3) The pass, issued by Major William MacKenzie of Loudoun's, is amongst the papers at Columba House.

(4) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
had been since 1739, to return to Scotland at some time after Charles’ landing. However, the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy to activities such as his seems to be represented by the Principal of the Scots College, who wrote to the Abbé Grant in September 1746, "Robert Grant came back to us again, he had never been in the army but had seen so much to disgust him of that employment that I believe he will remain henceforth unshaken in his vocation".

To sum up, among the letters of the Catholic hierarchy there is no evidence of sympathy, or approval, for Jacobite activity by the clergy. The only written expressions of sympathy with the movement came from clergy resident on the Continent. The Catholic hierarchy were concerned solely with the increasing burden and difficulty of missionary work because of renewed government persecution, and with the scarcity of priests.

Among the lower ranks of the clergy of the Catholic Church, however, the picture may at first appear different. There were thirty-three priests (excluding the two bishops), two Jesuits and four clerics in Regular orders, and three priests abroad in 1745. These forty-four included eighteen against whom some suspicion of Jacobite association can be advanced, though in the

(2) It must obviously be remembered here that such open reference would be completely safe only in continental correspondence, but even so the use of code names and the frankness of the tone of letters written in Scotland, make such references possible, and therefore makes their absence significant. It should also be noted that the dangers of such references did not deter Episcopalian clergy. See Chapter 6, below.
(3) 3 Benedictines and 1 Franciscan, Ms. List of Scottish Priest 1742/1800 Columba House.
case of eight of them, the only evidence is the fact that they were arrested or held in custody, for varying periods after (1) Culloden. Of those eight, two were released after being held for a matter of days only and may therefore be discounted. The remaining sixteen clergy divide into the following groups - (a) those whose implication in the rising can be proved; (b) those against whom the only evidence is subsequent arrest. Group (a) 1. Allan Macdonald, of the Glenaladale family who accompanied the Clanranald regiment as Chaplain.  
2. Aeneas McGillis, Chaplain to the Glengarry regiment.  
3. James Leslie of Traquair, who was known to have attended the wounded after Prestonpans, and who visited rebel prisoners in London in 1746.  
4. John Tyrie, priest at Glenlivet, who accompanied Glenbucket's men as chaplain.  
5. John Gordon, priest in Enzie, who preached a sermon exhorting recruitment and accompanied Gordon recruits as far as Edinburgh, thereafter being in hiding for a year.  
6. Robert or Patrick Leith, who accompanied the army to England.  
7. Alexander Cameron S.J., Lochiel's brother who had been Groom to the Old Pretender in Rome and died at sea in a government prison ship after Culloden.  
8. Alexander Grant, priest in Glenlivet, who drew lots with John Tyrie to decide which of them should accompany Glenbucket's force.  
9. Bishop Hugh Macdonald of the Morar family, said to have blessed privately Charles' standard.  

(1) Alexander Godsman, held for a few days at Huntly, and George Gordon of Aberdeen. Passes issued to them among Columba House Miscell. Mss.
10. Colin Campbell, killed in action at Culloden.

Group (b). 1. Alexander Forester, priest on Uist who was banished.
2. James Grant, priest on Barra, held a prisoner until 1747.
3. John Farquharson, priest in Strathglass who surrendered after Culloden and was banished.
4. Charles Farquharson, Jesuit and brother of the above, who surrendered with his brother after Culloden and was banished.
5. Alexander Gordon, Jesuit, preaching in Glengairn, arrested after Culloden, dying in prison.
6. William Reid, priest at Mortlach, Huntly, held under arrest in Edinburgh for some months but released on bail August 174-

A closer examination of the above clergy, however, seems to suggest various motives, other than religious to which their Jacobitism may be attributed. Of these sixteen, five were members of families with long Jacobite traditions. It may also be significant that three of these were Jesuits. More significant, again, five of them were associated with the dissentient Catholic group known as the Pilgrims and had been continually reprimanded by those in authority since before 1740. Even more significant still, all these five belonged to the first group - those most deeply

(1) Namely Allan Macdonald of the Glenaladale family, Bishop Hugh Macdonald of the Morar family, John and Charles Farquharson of the Farquharsons of Inverey and Alexander Cameron, Lochiel's brother.
(2) Alexander Cameron, Charles Farquharson and Alexander Gordon.
(3) Namely Aeneas McGillis, James Leslie, John Tyrie, Colin Campbell and Alexander Grant.
involved, while a further three of that group, Alexander Cameron S.J. Allan Macdonald and Bishop Hugh Macdonald came from prominent Jacobite families.

The Pilgrims were a dissatisfied group of clergy, totalling six in all. Of this number only one, William Harrison, priest in North Morar, was not known to be involved in Jacobite activity. His only connection with it is that he is said, according to a legend recorded in the Columba House manuscripts to have been the priest to whom the man who stole part of the Jacobite money forming the Arkaig treasure confessed his theft.

The founder and most prominent member of the Pilgrims was Colin Campbell. He was a brother of Sir Duncan Campbell of Lochnell, who had fought on the government side both at Sheriffmuir and Culloden, and was related to the Duke of Argyll. He was fifty-six at the time of his death at Culloden, and had been engaged in recruiting for French service since 1737. He had been a trouble maker and critic of authority from 1733 onwards, and his hostile attitude had grown even more marked from 1737 onwards, when Hugh Macdonald was given the episcopal appointment that Campbell hoped to gain. From that date he had been insubordinate and hostile to his bishop, and had fabricated and sent to Rome numerous complaints against his superior. At some point between 1735 and 1738 he and Father John Tyrie had visited Rome to carry there, personally, their complaints against Bishop Gordon, thereafter giving themselves and their clique the title of Pilgrims. Colin Campbell served for an unspecified length of

(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss. paper 398.
time with the Rebel force and died, either on the field of Culloden, or the day after from wounds received in the battle.

Closely associated with him was John Tyrie, priest in Glenlivet. Tyrie had gone to Rome with Campbell, and joined him in his continued opposition to Bishop Gordon on their return. Along with a neighbouring priest Alexander Grant (also a Pilgrim) who had himself been frequently reprimanded for idleness, he became fired with an enthusiasm for Jacobite views. He and Grant were the two priests who drew lots to decide who should accompany the army. Grant lost, but Tyrie appears to have returned north after reaching Carlisle. He was, however, present at Culloden where he was wounded. He was never arrested, but remained in hiding in the Glenlivet area until 1750 or 51 when he moved, without permission from his superior, to Garroch near his birthplace of Dunnidear in Aberdeenshire, thus again earning episcopal censure.

The third Pilgrim was the Alexander Grant referred to above. He was described in his bishop's correspondence as "of an idle and grumbling disposition" and had received frequent reprimands from Bishop Gordon.

The remaining Pilgrims were Aeneas MacGillis and James Leslie. MacGillis had studied at the Scots College in Rome, and had been in Rome from 1735-8 when Colin Campbell and John Tyrie arrived there on their self-styled pilgrimage to complain about their Bishop, when they had accused him and other Scots clergy of

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(1) Columba House, Miscell, Mss.
(2) ibid, Ms, No. 68.
(3) Columba House, Miscell, Mss. Clapperton Mss. No. 76.
(4) Columba House, Clapperton Mss. No. 94.
Jansenist heresy. MacGillis had fallen under the influence of Colin Campbell in Rome. He had returned to Scotland in February 1741, and little is known of his clerical duties except that in 1759 he was serving as a priest in the Glengarry area and he is listed as a priest in Glengarry on subsequent lists of priests. The earlier lists of Highland priests do not give locations of missions so he may well have been serving in the Glengarry area much earlier, since his part in the Rising was to accompany the Glengarry force as chaplain, and he served with the Glengarry force until after Culloden.

James Leslie, the last Pilgrim, had also served in the Glengarry area, but by April, 1745, he was at Traquair. He had been involved in a clerical scandal in 1740, when he had been forced to face an episcopal enquiry and there make a full apology for writing, and circulating, a set of verses with a Jansenist tinge. From that date on he appears to have become an associate of the Pilgrims, sharing in their resentment against Bishop Gordon. He appears to have been in the field at Prestonpans, giving assistance to the wounded. Later he appears in London, attempting to gain access to imprisoned priests in 1745. By 1747 or 8 he had retired to France where ironically he was again in trouble, this time being asked to answer a charge of having acted as a spy for the British Government.

The apparently strong personality of Colin Campbell and his continued Jacobite and pro French activity since 1737, possibly the result of bad relations with his superiors, appears to explain the Jacobite activities of his four fellow Pilgrims, Tyrie, Grant, (1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss. No. 79.
MacGillis and Leslie.

The strong family associations with Jacobitism of Allan Macdonald of Glenaladale, Alexander Cameron, Lochiel's brother, and Bishop Hugh Macdonald of Morar would provide at least as convincing an explanation of their activities. Of the ten priests most deeply implicated in Jacobitism, all but two, Robert Leith and John Gordon were members of prominent Jacobite families or were associated with the Pilgrims. Of the six priests less convincingly associated with the Rising, two were Jesuits and one the brother of a Jesuit. Their membership of an order with direct links with the continent may also be of significance. In fact the theory that Roman Catholicism in itself provided any widespread motive for adherence to the Jacobite cause is difficult to uphold.

Informed Catholics in 1745 knew that their religion could hope for little material advantage even if there were a successful Stuart restoration. No Stuart monarch in 1745 would have either the power, or the political ineptitude, to grant to Roman Catholics the kind of concessions which had lost James II his throne in the previous century. Any Stuart Restoration in the mid-eighteenth century would inevitably be accompanied by such guarantees for the Church of England and the religious status quo as to ensure that the Catholic Church, as a corporate body, would make no material gains whatsoever. Informed Catholic opinion in England knew this and reacted accordingly. There were no demonstrations of support from the major Catholic laymen of England for this reason. They had little to gain and, in the event of failure, much to lose.

(1) See Eardley Simpson, "Derbyshire and the Forty Five" (Philip Allan London, 1933) for various instances of the reaction of English Catholics to the Rising.
There is a further reason for official Catholic disapproval of any rebel activity, at least among the priesthood. From 1730 onwards the enforcement of penal legislation against Roman Catholics had been relaxed. The church was therefore deeply concerned with the problem of grasping the opportunity for expansion which was presented to it and was unwilling to risk imperilling this opportunity by political meddling.

In its lay following, the Church was stronger than it had been at the beginning of the century. Bishop Gordon, in his "Report to Propaganda of 1709", estimates the total Roman Catholic population of the Highlands to be only somewhat over 8,000, and by the Highlands Bishop Gordon apparently means the areas later taken to form the Highland division when the Bishopric was divided in 1731, viz. Braemar, Glengarry, Glenmoriston, Strathglass, Lochaber, Arisaig, Morar, Moidart, Knoydart and the Islands and excluding the Gordon area. The figure in 1745 was at least 13,510, an increase of over 5,000.

In the numbers of its priests, however, the Catholic Church had made little progress. Bishop Gordon's Report to Propaganda of 1709 gives the number of Roman Catholic priests in Scotland in 1702 as forty, including nine Jesuits and four Benedictines. In 1745 there were forty-two priests. This lack of increase in the number of clergy made the Church very conscious of the needs of the rising numbers among the laity. Bishop Gordon, in his Report to Propaganda of 1730, states after a further Highland visit "The increase in the number of Catholics was very great ....

(1) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
(2) See above p.122
reckoning from the year 1706 where there were in one place, about 20 there were now 700, in another 150 had risen to 800 with a resident priest."

There had been a corresponding improvement and expansion in the organisation of the Scottish mission. In 1694, the first Roman Catholic Bishop of Scotland had been appointed. In 1705, the first Bishop was given a coadjutor and in 1737 the single diocese was divided into two, a Highland and a Lowland Diocese. In 1717, a seminary was established at Scalan in Glenlivet and in 1732 the seminary at Morar was set up. In numbers of priests, however, the Church was exceptionally weak. The Episcopal Church in Scotland had, by 1745, a priesthood of probably 130, but the total number of Roman Catholic priests in Scotland in 1745 was 42. A church so weak in priests could afford to lose no more, nor could it afford to lose the services of its priesthood even temporarily. The Roman Catholic priests of Scotland were desperately overworked at this time so that any priest who meddled, even locally, in Jacobitism was forced to neglect his duties to do so, while any priest who joined the Jacobite army in any capacity was forced to abandon entirely his mission. He, and his superiors, knew that there could be no one to replace him. This knowledge must have been the most potent of all reasons for the aloof sentiments and lack of active support in the Catholic hierarchy towards the Rising of 1745.

(1) See separate Chapter on the Episcopal Church and the Rebellion, Chapter 6, below.
CHAPTER 6.

THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND THE REBELLION

In spite of the ecclesiastical changes brought by the Revolution of 1688/89, Episcopacy in 1745 was still a factor of considerable importance. It remained a strong influence in the Appin and Lochaber areas, where it was protected by Donald Cameron of Lochiel. He was himself a non-juror, in spite of the Roman Catholic connections of his family. The Stewarts of Appin were also an Episcopalian clan, and, in the islands of Harris and Uist, Protestantism, until the 18th century was generally equivalent to Episcopalianism. There was an Episcopalian parish at Ardnamurchan whose incumbent, nominally replaced at the Revolution, in fact continued to preach to the same congregation until his death. He was the Rev. Alexander Macdonald, both of whose sons served with the Clanranald regiment in 1745, and one of whose grandsons was Alexander Macdonald the banker. (2)

Episcopacy and Roman Catholicism in Ardnamurchan, as in the Cameron country, were closely mingled. One of this cleric's sons became a Roman Catholic, from whom the Catholic Kinlochmoidart family are descended, while in Lochaber, the Episcopalian Lochiel had a Jesuit brother.

There was a strong Episcopalian element in the more remote areas of Rannoch, where some parts were twenty miles from the nearest Presbyterian Church. The factor of Strowan's report to

(2) "Moidart - among the Clanranalds" p.138 and p.151.
the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates (December 1755) refers, for instance, to a non-juring cleric, who was baptising in that area, and staying in the house of Stewart of Kynachan.

There was, and had been since covenanting days, a strong Episcopalian tradition in Aberdeenshire. The Synod of Aberdeen sent an address in favour of Episcopacy to the Scottish Parliament in 1661, while a petition from Aberdeen in 1691 called for a meeting of a "Free General Assembly" in which Episcopalian delegates would have a majority. The chapel of King's College, Aberdeen was closed in 1714, because of continued use of the Book of Common Prayer, and there had been much Jacobite activity in 1715 among the Episcopalian clergy of Aberdeen. From the same area there were large-scale transportations to the Barbadoes of both Episcopalian clergy and laity in 1746.

The counties of Aberdeen, Banff, Perth, Angus, Ross, Cromartie, Caithness and the Dundee area contained Episcopalian strongholds throughout this period. In 1711 and 1716 militia and dragoons had to be used against Episcopalian congregations at Deer, Pitligo, Cruden, and St. Fergus. Stonehaven remained strongly Episcopalian from 1689 onwards, and a writer in 1843 was able to assert that

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(1) "Forfeited Estates Papers" page 215.
(2) Goldie "Short History of Episcopal Church in Scotland" p.29.
(3) Goldie, p.59.
there were "not a dozen Presbyterians in the old town at this period".

In Perthshire, Drummond of Logie Almond, Lord Nairn and Graham of Balgowan maintained Episcopalian clergy as private chaplains, and the Robertsons of Lude maintained an Episcopalian chapel on their property. Lord Rollo provided, after 1745, facilities for secret Episcopalian worship, as did Lord Airlie in Angus. In Banffshire, in the parish of Rathven, in 1745, there was an Episcopalian congregation continuous since 1689, and no Presbyterian minister was appointed and no attempt made to upset the sitting Episcopalian cleric until 1731. In the county of Ross only two parishes (Alness and Kiltearn) contained any substantial number of Presbyterians at the Revolution. In Lochcarron, Gairloch, Kintail and Loch Broom it was impossible to dislodge the Episcopal incumbents until their death. In 1725 a deputation from the Presbyterian Synod of Glenelg asked for the help of General Wade in "strengthening our hands in the Lord's work" and no Presbyterian minister had been able to celebrate communion in the parish of Sneddie by 1742.

There had already been much Jacobite activity in 1715 among the Aberdeen Episcopal clergy, thirty-six of whom were deprived in 1716. From the same area there were large scale transportations, to the Barbadoes, of both clergy and laity in 1746. The Episcopal Church as a body, however, did not make avowals of

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(2) M.E.M. Donaldson, op.cit. p.300.  
(3) ibid. p.301.  
(4) Goldie, op.cit. p.44.  
(5) ibid. p.59.
Jacobitism in 1745, as openly as had been done in 1715 when, for instance, the Old Pretender had received an Episcopal coronation at Perth. For this reason the importance of the part played by this Church has often been underestimated. Though there was no open declaration of Jacobitism by the Episcopal hierarchy, the last speech of Robert Lyon - one of the two Episcopal clergymen who marched with the Jacobites, makes his reasons for joining the Rebellion quite clear. He did so because he believed its support was in the best interest of his church "as the best way of relieving it from its long persecution". But Lyon's Jacobite adherence shows the complexity of motives for such action. Since Easter 1740 there had been a schism within the Episcopalian congregation at Perth, a rival congregation to Robert Lyon's existing from that date. Lyon's congregation was reported to General Hawley as "a noted nursery of Jacobitism and rebellion", but it is possible that the difficulties Lyon encountered in his work at Perth from 1740 affected his decision to join the rebel army, in much the same way as the Pilgrims - malcontents amongst the Catholic priesthood in Scotland, also turned to Jacobitism.

The strength of the Episcopal priesthood in 1745 is difficult to assess. No detailed lists of priests have survived among the archives of the Scottish Episcopal Church in Edinburgh. However, three separate lists purport to give the number of

(1) For this reason government retaliatory Acts of 1746, and 1748 had to be based on their religious rather than their political activities.
(2) J.P. Lawson, op.cit. p.517 et seq. p.288 et seq.
Forbes "Lyon in Mourning" p.10. et seq.
Episcopal clergy preaching in Scotland in the first decade of the century. The first list dated April 1707 gives a total of 116 Episcopal clergy still preaching, with 97 parishes vacant. The second list, dated April 1708 gives 133 clergy with 79 vacancies, whilst an analysis of parishes of the same date gives a total of 112 Episcopal clergy, 656 Presbyterian incumbents, and 95 vacancies.

About thirty years later three pastoral Episcopal letters give somewhat similar figures. Bishop Freebairn, Primus of the Scots Episcopal Church, refers to 126 clergy, exclusive of Bishops, preaching in 1734 while Bishop Keith, Episcopal Bishop of Edinburgh, refers to 125 clergy preaching in 1743, and Bishop Alexander writes of 130 or so clergy.

Thus the Episcopal Church, in the number of its clergy, was in a much stronger position than was the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland at the same date. The total number of Catholic priests operating here in 1742 was 42, while the Episcopal Church had at least three times that number.

The enforcement of the Abjuration Act of 1719 had been relaxed since there was no longer immediate danger of a Jacobite invasion. This, coupled with the issue in 1743 of new canons for the first time since 1636, seemed to indicate that the Episcopal

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(1) "Account of Episcopal Clergy still preaching in their parishes 1708" reprinted in Appendix II. J.P.Lawson "History of Scots Episcopal Church" Edinburgh 1843. p.515, 516.
(3) Unaddressed letter, 14th August 1746, of Bishop Alexander, amongst papers of Episcopal Church, Training College of the Diocese, Edinburgh.
(4) This had required any Episcopal clergyman officiating to a congregation of nine or more to pray for the Hanoverian family and to take the oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration.
Church in 1745 was about to enter a period of renewed strength. This new stability may be compared with the more stable position similarly reached by the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland on the eve of the '45.

But, this stability was to be shattered by the Episcopal association with Jacobitism, which dates from the flight of James VII or II. From that time onwards the Scottish Episcopate had been anxious to do nothing which would interfere with the prerogatives of the exiled king, or of his son the Old Pretender. While the Catholic hierarchy attempted to minimise the connection between their church and the exiled House, the Episcopal hierarchy did just the opposite. Because of the absence of one whom they considered the rightful king there had been no attempt until 1705 to fill vacancies in the Episcopate, caused by death. By that year, however, with the survival of only five bishops, the Episcopal succession faced the possibility of extinction, unless steps were taken to fill the vacancies. In 1743 the bishops, in issuing the Canons of that year, were very reluctant to abrogate to themselves any functions which they considered rightly belonged to the Old Pretender. An agent of the Old Pretender had attended meetings of the Episcopal College in 1722 and 1724, as the representative of the rightful Head of the Church, and only five Scots Episcopal clergy were willing to qualify, in 1746, by taking the Abjuration oaths laid down by the new Act of that year. Though there were only two Scottish Episcopal clergy in arms with Charles, the government belief in the association between Scottish Episcopacy and Jacobitism is shown by the

(1) See p. 143 following.
wholesale destruction by Cumberland of all Episcopalian chapels on his march from the Tay to Speyside.

It has already been stated that the Episcopal Church as a body did not make any avowals of Jacobitism as openly as they had done in 1715, and that only two of their clergy accompanied the Jacobite army as chaplains. From this it might appear that the Jacobite associations of the Episcopal Church were less strong in 1745. Several important factors, however, suggest a very different picture.

The first of these factors is the number of prominent Jacobites who were Episcopalians. These included Lord Elcho, Lord Ogilvie, and his father Lord Airlie, Lord Nairn, Lord Balmerino, Lord Pitsligo, Robertson of Strowan, Murray of Broughton, the Oliphants of Gask, the family of the Earl Marischal, Stewart of Invernahyle, Hay of Rannes, Stewart of Kynachan, Drummond of Logie - Almond and Graham of Balgowan.

Lord George Murray's children were all baptised at Tullibardine by the Episcopal cleric William Erskine. Sir Stewart Thriepland joined the Jacobite army on September 15th 1745, and his parents had been secretly married by the Episcopal priest at Perth and Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat, and his wife (later instrumental in the hiding of Prince Charles Edward in Skye), were

(1) For this reason the government retaliatory Acts of 1746 and 1748 had to be based on religious, rather than political activities of the Church.
(3) On March 26th, 1734, May 9th, 1735, and Aug. 23rd 1741, see Register of Baptisms in parish of Muthill. Transcribed by A.W. Hallen. Edin. 1887. Episcopal College Library.
(4) Elcho, p. 254.
married and their son was baptised by an Episcopal cleric in Edinburgh. Among letters written to Bishop Alexander and preserved in the Theological College of the Diocese in Edinburgh, Mercer of Aldie and Murray of Taymount are referred to as Episcopalians. Robertson of Fascally, who also served in the Atholl Brigade, was an Episcopalian. There was too, traditionally, a strong Episcopalian element among the Glencoe Macdonalds, and probably the majority of the Appin Stewarts were Episcopalian, as were many of Lochiel's Camerons.

The second factor to be remembered is the sudden closure of Episcopalian correspondence from August 1745 onwards. The archives of the Scottish Episcopl Church are preserved at the Episcopal Theological College in Edinburgh and from August 1745 the voluminous diocesan correspondence virtually comes to an end. For instance, from August to December 1745, only eight letters written to Bishop Alexander remain. Up to that date a very large number of such letters survive. Two of these eight letters refer to Jacobitism. The first is from Robert Lyon, the Perthshire Episcopal cleric,
executed for his Jacobite activities in 1746 at Carlisle. He
ends his letter to his Bishop with "now this affair has altered
all other measures, and D. Cameron (the other Episcopal cleric
with the rebel army) and I follow my congregations". The
second letter, written in September 1745 by Bishop Keith of
Edinburgh, refers to the close political links between the
Episcopal Church and the exiled Stuart who was, to that Church,
it's legitimate head, entitled to consultation before episcopal
appointments were made. Bishop Keith writes "D. entertains
scruples whether we should proceed in the election of a bishop,
now that a certain person is in the country. I had returned answer
that the delaying of consecration might be sufficient to take off
that scruple."

A further indication of the effects of the Rising on the
daily life of the Church is seen in the very full Register of
Baptisms of the parish of Muthill, Perth, for this ceases en-
tirely on December 23, 1745, and is not resumed until October 9,
1749. This interruption of such routine correspondence is not
characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church at the same period.
Catholic correspondence, concerned almost entirely with theological
matters continues much as usual from 1745 to 1750.

(1) Written from Dunblane, 12th Sept., 1745, among papers of Scots
   Episcopal College.
(2) D. is possibly Bishop William Dunbar of Moray and Ross.
(3) Letter dated Edinburgh 17th Oct., 1745. Scots Episcopal College
   Papers.
(4) Register of Baptisms in the Parish of Muthill transcribed by
   A.W.C. Hallen, privately printed in Edinburgh 1887 (in the
   Library at Scots Episcopal College).
(5) Numerous instances, and plentiful evidence for this is found in the
   Catholic Archives, Columba House. Though no letters have been
   preserved of the Roman Catholic Bishop Gordon after June 1745,
   this is almost certainly due to his failing health, since he
died aged eighty-one in February, 1745.
The third factor to be noted is the strength of Episcopacy in those areas where large Jacobite enlistment occurred. Two points should be borne in mind. First, that it is easy to play tricks with statistics, and secondly that completely accurate figures for either Episcopal congregations or for Jacobite enlistment are impossible to obtain. But such figures as are available do suggest the conclusion that where Episcopacy was strongest, Jacobite recruitment found a very strong response. It has often been said that the '45 was in one aspect a Roman Catholic Movement. It could be said with equal, if not greater truth, that it was an Episcopalian Movement.

Among the records of the Episcopal Church of the mid-eighteenth century, there are no detailed figures for either clergy or congregations. But an anonymously compiled list of clergy still ministering in their parishes, and of vacant parishes is in existence, compiled in 1708, and these are the numbers given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synod</th>
<th>Episcopal Clergy</th>
<th>Vacancies</th>
<th>Presbyterian Clergy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus &amp; Mearns</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth &amp; Stirling</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caithness</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merse &amp; Teviotdale</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lothian &amp; Tweedale</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argyll</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This gives a total of 118 Episcopal clergy, somewhat less than the figure of about 130 given by Bishop Alexander in 1746. It should also be remembered that vacancy of a parish was often the result of a continued refusal by the congregation to accept a non-Episcopal cleric. These figures almost certainly underestimate Episcopacy as all vacant parishes are treated as non-Episcopal.

Statistics of Jacobite recruitment are even more open to dispute. The accuracy with which such figures can be established is discussed elsewhere. Two sets of figures are used here. First the list of named suspected persons, compiled by officers of each Excise district for government use and printed by the Scottish History Society, with the title "List of Persons concerned in the Recent Rebellion. This gives a total of 2379 but omits Inverness, and the Western Isles, and only includes those known to the government to have been under arms.

The second set of figures are those arrived at above in the Introduction, from examination of all available material. They give a maximum recruited (but not necessarily all under arms at the same time) of 12,280 and a minimum of 10,650. These were

(1) The above figures would give a percentage of Episcopal clergy to the total clergy in each synod as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synod of Ross</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Aberdeen</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Moray</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Angus &amp; Mearns</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Caithness</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Argyll</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Perth &amp; Stirling</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Merse &amp; Teviotdale</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Lothian &amp; Tweedale</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) See the Introduction.

(3) Referred to here as Rosebery.
recruited geographically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Rosebery's figures</th>
<th>Figures in Introduction.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum.</td>
<td>Maximum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross and Cromarty</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moray</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>From Moray and E. Inverness. 10% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus &amp; Dundee</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth &amp; Stirling</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argyll</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>Including Isles &amp; W. Inverness. 30% 32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Rosebery's calculations, Ross & Cromarty, Moray, Aberdeen, Dundee, Angus and Perthshire provided 79.5% of the Jacobite force, the same areas on my calculations provided a minimum of 65.5% and a maximum of 72.8%. Of these areas, only the Gordon corner of Inverness and Banff, a small pocket round Braemar, could be described as Catholic.

On these figures, therefore, a proportion of the total force, varying between 65.5% and 79.5% was recruited from districts with strong, important and long standing Episcopal associations. This should be compared with a proportion varying between 39.6% and 40% from the important Roman Catholic areas of Argyll, the Western Isles and West Inverness. These figures, together with the strong Episcopal connections of so many leaders of the rebels, and the deference paid to the exiled House of Stuart by the Scots Episcopal Hierarchy - all emphasise the clear connection between Episcopacy and Jacobitism. There seems a far stronger link here, than the one usually assumed between Jacobitism and the Roman Catholic faith.

The correspondence of the Episcopal Church suggests an official
attitude of sympathy with, or approval of, the Jacobite rebellion. There is no official censure for the clergy involved in the Rising, nor any attempt to disassociate the hierarchy or the Church from its connection with the exiled court. On the other hand there is no official Roman Catholic approval for the aims of the rebellion, but instead condemnation by the Catholic hierarchy of priests meddling in Jacobitism and neglecting their priestly duties. The Catholic Bishop Gordon strove always to disassociate his Church from the exiled court, and to resist interference from the Pretender, and this is in sharp contrast to the attitude of the Episcopal hierarchy, as clergy like Robert Lyon were well aware.

To the Episcopal Church a successful Jacobite rebellion offered the best hope of ending the persecution and disabilities which that church had suffered in Scotland since the flight of James VII and II. To the Roman Catholic Church, as has been shown in Chapter 5, a successful Stuart restoration would not necessarily provide relief from disabilities. In these two facts lies the explanation of the contrasting attitudes of the two Churches to the Jacobite Movement.
CHAPTER 7.

THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE JACOBITE ARMY.

The financial resources available to the Jacobite army were both numerous and varied, although not necessarily in themselves extensive. In order to give as full as possible a picture of these resources, resources in kind, such as arms, food or quarters, as well as monetary sources, are here considered.

These resources may be divided into six major categories. In the first are foreign resources, which consisted largely of money and arms provided by France and Spain. The second category consists of money grants from supporters, largely from Scottish Jacobites. The third source consists of the money grants levied from various large towns, especially Glasgow and Aberdeen, which were extorted by the use, or threat, of military force. Next come the levy and collection of public monies, such as excise, cess or crown rents, from areas under Jacobite occupation. Fifthly come the various extortions in kind, the seizure of meal, horses, bread, plaids and other necessities, again from areas under military occupation. Lastly, there is a miscellaneous group of minor resources, such as the attempted collection by Tullibardine of Atholl rents, the plunder and loot after battle, or the official seizure of government baggage and stores after, for instance, Prestonpans. Probably the largest single source of money in this category was the levy, in lieu of military service, imposed on parts of Angus and Aberdeenshire, a form of scutage, in fact, made possible only by military occupation of these areas by Jacobite forces.

There is a dangerous tendency, however, to overestimate the
part played by financial factors in determining the success or failure of the Jacobite enterprise. Since most of its sources of money depended upon either success in the field, or the possession of superior military force to extort contributions, the Jacobite army was in its best financial position from early September 1745 until February 1746. During this period the victories of Prestonpans and Falkirk and the opportunity to overawe Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Perth, Aberdeen and the surrounding areas, with considerable military force, facilitated the extortion of money and supplies, and ensured a certain amount of foreign help. In both the earlier and the last stages of the campaign, however, the position was less favourable. Without a considerable body of men, forced levies could not be extorted, and little foreign help expected. Moreover, the extreme west, where the rising had its beginnings, and the Inverness area where it ended, were not naturally fertile, and had suffered a series of bad harvests. Little in the way of meal was therefore available for the army, and there were no large towns from which to extort contributions, nor, in the early stages, was there the military force available to do so. The result was that Charles arrived in Perth on September 4th, 1745 with, according to legend, only one guinea with which to defray expenses, and regular pay of the army had not begun until August 28th. At the end of the campaign, with a military treasury again virtually exhausted, part, at least, of the Jacobite army had

been unpaid since February 16th or even earlier. The army's food supplies were also exhausted before Culloden, for the same reasons.

Financial factors did not, however, effect as directly the fortunes of the Jacobite army as might be expected. The army was at its most successful during the period when it was best financed, but it was well financed because it was successful rather than successful because it was well financed. Correspondingly, its lack of success after February 1746 was not solely or even largely the result of lack of money. Lack of money did not necessarily mean immediate military disaster. The successful seizure of Inverness, Cromartie's expedition in pursuit of Loudoun, and the successful siege of Fort Augustus all took place after the army pay had apparently come to an end, and among the factors which brought about the Jacobite defeat at Culloden lack of money played only a small part. This should be borne in mind, for it would be unwise to overestimate the importance of financial factors.

Bearing in mind, therefore, that the better financial position of the army between September 1745 and early February 1746 was the result and not the cause, of its military successes, the way in which this improved financial position was reached should now be examined.

Aid from abroad composes the first section of Jacobite resources. This foreign aid consisted, firstly, of those stores

(1) There was a proposal to pay some men up to March 10th or even later, see below, but Lord George Murray in his "Marches of the Highland Army" states that the men had received no pay for a month before the battle of Culloden - "Marches of Highland Army", Memoir of the Rebellion, p.110 while John Cameron, a Presbyterian clergyman from Fort William asserts in his Journal ("Lyon in Mourning" p.84) that no pay had been received since the army (Lord George's column, presumably) left Tay Bridge, which was on February 4th 1746.
and money which Charles brought with him on board the "Du Teilley"—namely 4,000 Louis d'or or 1,000 guns, and 1,800 broad swords. Kinlochmoidart was sent with this French money to get it changed soon after landing. He had arrived to visit Charles on board the "Du Teilly" at Lochnamuamb on July 25th or 26th and left again to change the money and to carry letters to Murray of Broughton, Lochiel and the Duke of Perth. The arms remained on board the "Du Teilly" until July 29th, when they were unloaded at night about a mile from Kinlochmoidart's house for transport through Lochshiel to Glencfinnan. The money was largely spent on army pay, which began on August 28th, and the provision of food for the army. Until August 28th payment of the troops had been in kind, but no bread could be procured until the arrival at Blair Atholl on August 30th when it was procured and probably paid for. Certainly there are no references among the Atholl papers to complaints from Atholl tenants that they were not paid for supplies provided for the Jacobite army while it was encamped at Blair, and it was always Charles' intention "that the country should suffer as little as possible by the march of my troops". Among the Atholl Estate papers the payment of money to the Jacobite army, forced service in the army or destruction of crops by the army occur as quite frequent excuses for later non-payment of rent by Atholl tenants so the presumption is that any large scale extortion

(1) Echo p.239.
(2) ibid. p.55 note 5 and also Murray of Broughton, "Memorials" p.159.
(3) Murray of Broughton, p.158.
(4) O'Sullivan, p.59.
(5) Largely in the form of freshly killed beef - see below Chapt.8 p.182.
(7) See Box 42. p.95 and p.93. Atholl Charter Room.
of supplies without payment would also figure as an excuse, if it had taken place.

The money brought by Charles from France was, however, all but exhausted on his arrival at Perth on September 4th, 1745. The next instalment of foreign aid did not arrive until October. In the meantime Charles had been responsible for sending back to the Continent deliberately glowing reports of the success of his campaign, in order to encourage support.

On October 7th or 15th the first French supplies arrived at Stonehaven, on board the "Crowned Herring", and were followed by a second French ship on either October 16th or 17th. Lord Elcho refers to these French supplies as having arrived in three ships not two, but Elcho was with the main Jacobite body in Edinburgh when the ships arrived and is not always entirely accurate over events at which he was not present. These French supplies consisted of six Swedish cannon, twelve smaller guns, 2,500 stands of arms and between £2,000 and £5,000 sterling.

Further reinforcements arrived from France in February 1746. These were the detachments of Berwick's Regiment and of FitzJames Horse which arrived at Peterhead and Aberdeen on February 21st and 22nd. They brought with them sufficient money for their own pay for some months but a more significant sum from France was sent but never reached Jacobite hands. This was the money being brought

(1) Atholl Correspondence. The letters of Oct. 15th and 17th from Tullibardine give the 15th and 17th as the arrival dates of the 2 ships, but Lord Elcho, p.294 gives Oct. 7th as the date of the arrival of the first ship and the Chevalier Johnstone puts the arrival of both ships as Oct. 11th.

(2) Elcho, p.295.

(3) Ibid, p.295, and also Colville's letter of Oct. 17th to Tullibardine referred to above.


(5) O'Sullivan, p.146.
by the "Hazard" sloop, a former government vessel which had been taken in Montrose in November. This had been sent to France to bring back money and stores. The "Hazard", however, ran aground at Tongue and the cargo was seized by Lord Rea. Apart from stores and 120 men, it carried 100,000 French crowns or between £12,000 and £13,000 sterling on board. It was the attempt to recover this money that led to Lord Cromartie's capture at Dunrobin Castle on April 15th.

There is a possibility that there was a further consignment of foreign supplies between the October landings at Stonehaven and the February ones at Peterhead and Aberdeen. Lord George Murray in his "Marches of the Highland Army" refers to "a vast many carriages of arms and military stores (that) had come in a Spanish ship to Peterhead". These, he states, were on their way to join the Jacobite force at Falkirk before the retreat further north and had reached Brechin by February 6th when Lord George arrived. He then took charge of them and brought them with him on the retreat north. These stores could not have been the earlier supplies which had arrived in the previous October. These had been brought from Stonehaven to Perth, and from there to Falkirk, reaching Alloa in the charge of Lord MacLeod with the Cromartie Regiment by January 15th. Nor could they have been the later Peterhead supplies, which did not arrive until February 21st, fifteen days later. The arrival of a third ship with

(1) Maxwell of Kirkconnell, p.134.
(2) ibid. p.134.
(3) p.101.
(4) "The Earls of Cromartie, Their Kindred, Country and Correspondence," Sir William Fraser. Edin. 1876. Cited hereafter as "Cromartie Correspondence."
foreign stores is not referred to in any other contemporary account, but is possibly borne out by Lord Elcho's reference to three not two ships with stores arriving during October. (1)

Almost the last money from the continent arrived in late March at Barra. It consisted of a small sum brought in a Spanish ship, and valued according to one source at about £380 sterling (2) There was also, apparently, a consignment of coins on board. Aeneas Macdonald, the banker brother of Kinlochmoidart, was sent to Barra to fetch this money at the beginning of April, but the disaster of Culloden and the Prince's subsequent wanderings meant that this money was never put to use.

The last foreign financial aid was, of course, the famous Loch Arkaig treasure, the money brought on board the two French frigates which arrived in Loch nanuamh on May 3rd. These frigates would have been able to rescue Charles, had he not already left the mainland for the Outer Isles. This money, like the Barra money, never reached the hands for which it was destined. Between 800 and 1,000 louis d'or were seized by the Younger Barrisdale, and the remainder buried to form the lost Loch Arkaig treasure.

Historians have quite frequently pointed out the paucity of foreign aid for the rebels, a paucity surprising when we remember that both France and Spain had certain natural pro-Jacobite proclivities, that with both countries the Old Pretender had.

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(1) See above Chapter 4.  
(3) Aeneas Macdonald valued it at "between 6 and 7 hundred livres French". See O'Sullivan p.2.  
(4) O'Sullivan in his narrative refers to "Five hundred Spanish pistolles" which Aeneas Macdonald was ordered to send after Culloden "to Badenoch and distribute among the gents who may want money". ibid. p.171.
engaged in lengthy and determined diplomatic bargaining since 1715, and that, lastly, both countries were at war with Britain and therefore had apparently every motive to try to distract that country and force her to withdraw her troops from the Continent. In spite, however, of these seemingly overwhelming arguments in favour of more active support for the rebels, France and Spain provided between them less than £17,500 sterling, and about 5,000 louis d’or. France also provided less than 1,000 troops approximately 2,500 stands of arms and some eighteen guns. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is not difficult to find. For this small expenditure, Britain’s enemies had secured the withdrawal from the Continent of almost all her continental military forces. Nothing any more to their advantage could be achieved, and the military resources and money of both powers would be far more advantageously deployed on the continent, by using the opportunity afforded by the absence of British troops. In this case, therefore, the general conclusion that military success was a necessary preliminary to financial support does not quite apply. Here, in fact, the considerable success which the Rising enjoyed in its earlier stages meant that the objects of Britain’s enemies had in fact been achieved already, and that, therefore, no further expenditure was necessary. Military success, in fact, instead of increasing the military expectations of the rebels, actually decreased

(1) See Hilton Jones, p.122 et seq.
(2) These were Lord John Drummond's French Regiment and piquets of six Irish Regiments and of Brigadier Stapleton's (totalling about 800 in all) which reached Montrose on Nov. 22nd 1745, and detachments of Berwick's Regiment and FitzJames' Horse, which arrived at Peterhead and Aberdeen on February 21st and 22nd 1746.
them in this case.

A second source of financial support for the Jacobite army came in the form of money grants from supporters or sympathisers. Several attempts had been made by Murray of Broughton to raise money before the Prince's arrival, but they had not been attended with much success. In 1741 he had been asked by MacGregor of Balhaldie to take over the raising of a £1,000 loan at 6% on the Old Pretender's security, but after raising only £200 the project was abandoned, because of the evasiveness of Lowland Jacobites. He had also experienced great difficulty in raising money for his own visit to France in 1743 on behalf of the Jacobite Associators and had been able to raise little more than a worthless note of hand for £100 from Lord Lovat. Traquair, another of the Jacobite Associators, who had in 1741 written to ask for French help for a Scottish rising, had tried to raise money from English Jacobites, but according to Murray of Broughton, though he had been offered £10,000 by Lord Barrymore, he had done nothing to follow this up. Murray had, however, apparently secured some provisional promises of gifts of money, and before leaving Fairntoun, the home of Lord John Drummond, where Murray learnt the news of Charles' arrival in Scotland, he wrote to all those who had made promises to have their money ready. Whether any of this money was in fact produced, Murray does not tell us.

The two ships, the "Elizabeth" and the "Doutelle" or "Du Teillay" were provided for Charles by their owners. The "Elizabeth" was owned by Walter Rutledge - an Irish merchant of Dunkirk, and the "Du Teillay" by Antony Walsh, a ship owner of Nantes. Before

(1) The second is the correct spelling. The first is a frequent contemporary mis-spelling.
his return to France, early in August 1745, Walsh seized, off the coast of Skye, three sloops loaded with barley and oatmeal, which were sent as prizes to Charles at Kinlochmoidart's house. Even here, however, the cargoes of meal were paid for by Charles, presumably out of the Louis d'ors he brought from France with him.

The largest single gift or loan of money was, however, that of Lord Elcho, who provided Charles with 1,500 guineas on joining him in Edinburgh. Elcho later held that this sum was a loan, not a gift, and his failure to recover it from Charles much embittered him later. The Duke of Perth provided between £200 and £300, and smaller sums in cash were provided by various Perthshire gentry and by the Dowager Duchess of Gordon, the mother of Lord Lewis Gordon. Gifts in kind were provided by Lady Mackintosh, the Duchess of Perth and Lady Mary Menzies who each "complimented" the Prince with supper for himself and his household for one night each. Similar accommodation was also provided at Callendar House on September 14th and at Perth, where Charles stayed from September 4th to 11th. There were also, almost certainly, other and often smaller gifts in kind as well. James Gibb, in his Household accounts, for instance, refers to gifts of table napkins, table cloths and sheets provided by ladies in and about Edinburgh.

A further and more important, because more lucrative, source of money was provided by levies on those large towns over which the rebel army was able to hold the threat of force. This expedient was

(1) O'Sullivan, p. 58.
(2) Elcho p. 255.
(3) O'Sullivan, p. 67.
(4) ibid. p. 67.
(6) At Moy Hall, Drummond Castle and Castle Weem respectively, see Household Accounts of James Gibb, "Lyon in Mourning" Vol. 2 p. 115 et seq.
(7) ibid. Vol. 2 p. 115 et seq.
only possible from September 1745, until early February 1746, for during both the early and the late stages of the rising, the Jacobite army was occupying those sparsely populated North and West areas where no towns of sufficient wealth existed. Furthermore, it was only possible to extort such levies from those towns which were within close enough range of the rebel army to feel military pressure, while again, however, such methods were only possible when a sufficiently large military force had first been raised. Here again, therefore, military success did not depend upon success in raising money, it was on the contrary a necessary preliminary to that ability to raise money.

From early September 1745 until February 1746, however, the necessary prerequisites existed which enabled forced levies by the Jacobite armies from various large towns. On September 4th the rebel army entered Perth, and for the first time were in a town populous and wealthy enough to supply them with money. With a military force of about 2,000 the rebels were in a position to extort by force and £500 was demanded from Perth as a forced levy. This money formed the first sum of any substantial size to be received during the rebellion. The magistrates agreed to pay the money in return for a promise that nothing further should be demanded. This money was much needed, for the Prince's funds were entirely exhausted on his arrival in Perth. The army were

(1) Elcho puts the force which crossed the Forth on Sept. 13th at 2,000 (Elcho p.253). This is supported by Patullo's figure of 2,500 at Prestonpans, by which time the force of Sept. 13th had been augmented by 250 Athollmen, 150 Maclachlans and about 100 Grants. See above. Chapter 2.
(3) According to his own account he only had one guinea in his pocket by Sept. 4th but O'Sullivan (p.67) puts the sum at ten guineas.
from now on, however, in country where money was available, if they had the necessary military force to levy it. A formal demand was sent to Glasgow on September 13th from Leckie House, on the march to Edinburgh. It was addressed to the Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow and asked for a "sum not exceeding 15,000 pounds sterling and whatever arms can be found in your city". It added that "all the privileges of your town are in my declaration and what I have promised I will never depart from... but) if not complied with I shall take other measures and you shall be answerable for the consequences". This was followed by a second letter, again demanding £15,000, but on the 4th October 1745, by promising to pay immediately, the magistrates got the sum reduced to £5,500. Lord Elcho who is not, as noted above, entirely accurate over figures put the original demand to Glasgow at £10,000 not £15,000, but confirms the final sum which was actually paid.

On the arrival of the rebel army in Edinburgh various demands could be made on that city. In the cases of both Edinburgh and Glasgow supplies in kind as well as money were demanded. Glasgow's levy included, according to Lord Elcho "some merchandise" and Edinburgh was asked to provide 1,000 tents, 2,000 targets, 6,000 pairs of shoes and 6,000 canteens. Edinburgh was under Jacobite occupation for some six weeks. During this time the size of the occupying force increased by approximately 3,000 men, and the rebels were encouraged by their victory at Prestonpans. Edinburgh

(2) Ibid. p. 556.
(3) Elcho, p. 221.
(4) Ibid. p. 282.
(5) From September 17th until Nov. 1st 1745.
(6) It consisted of about 2,500 men on Sept. 21st, and of approx. 5,500 on the departure south from Edinburgh on Nov. 1st. See above, Introduction.
also, was the wealthiest city they had encountered. For all these reasons they were able to make larger demands on Edinburgh than on any other occupied town. In addition to this forced levy in merchandise, the rebels imposed a special tax of half a crown in the pound-sterling, of all house rents. All public monies, ordinarily payable to the government from Edinburgh were collected by the rebels. These included cess, excise and rents of forfeited estates. Forced levies of both horses and corn were also made, and there was a proposal "to get in all the pleat (plate) we can and coin shillings, for besides the want of cash in general, there is a great want of silver", as Lord George Murray wrote to his brother Tullibardine on October 2nd 1745.

The longer stay in Edinburgh, of six weeks, also enabled the sending of parties to levy money in Fife. Hitherto the longest stay in one place had been the week's stay in Perth earlier in the month, but the six weeks stay in Edinburgh afforded wider opportunities of money raising. Military parties were sent through Fife and Angus to proclaim the Prince's father and to raise money. John Scott, merchant of Montrose sent letters to several of the inhabitants, and to some gentlemen of the county, demanding money by way of loan for the Pretender's service, and quartered rebel soldiers on such as refused while James Adamson, farmer of Glamis also extorted money.

In the case of Fife, the military pressure was brought to bear by parties from Edinburgh, but in the case of Angus it was the

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(1) This levy was imposed on October 7th. See Gentleman's Magazine. Vol. XV. p.556. Historical Chronicle for October.
(2) See above Chapter 4.
(3) See above Chapter 4.
(5) Rosebery, p.188.
(6) Ibid., p.196.
presence of the Jacobite reinforcements collected at Perth under Lord Strathallan which enabled pressure to be exerted. An unsigned letter among the Atholl Papers refers to "whole parties in Angus (which) are distressed by pressing (or forcing men) or, which they love better, a composition in money which falls heavy on the poor tenants". (1)

The same means were used to extort a heavy fine from Dundee. All householders were ordered to illuminate their window, as a token rejoicing at the landing of the French arms at Montrose, and a fine of £20 Scots was taken from those who did not comply. A forced levy of from £50 to £200 sterling was imposed on all gentry, and fifteen merchants were ordered to pay £100 sterling each. (2)

Meanwhile the main Jacobite body, which had marched south from Edinburgh on November 1st, had reached Derby. Here, apart from again demanding all Excise due locally, they also demanded £100 from the Post Office, and demanded the payment to them of the money raised by the town of Derby to equip 600 local Hanoverian gentry for the town’s defence. Here, however, the fact that the rebels had passed the peak of their military success was already beginning to show. Although they were able to secure the subscription money of between £500 and £600, the sum demanded from the Post Office had to be commuted to £50 before it was paid.

One further demand was made for money before the rebel army reached Glasgow, at the end of December 1745. This was for £2,000 from Dumfries, of which again the full sum was not forthcoming.

(1) Atholl Correspondence, p.233.
(2) ibid. p.233, and 234.
This time a little over half (£1,100) was paid, again a sign of declining military fortunes. The rebel army occupied Glasgow in its march north on December 27th, and the magistrates were ordered to provide 12,000 shirts, and 6,000 bonnets, stockings, shoes and waistcoats and, as in the case of Dumfries, hostages were taken to ensure payment. Meanwhile, however, £1,000 had been successfully extorted from Aberdeen, because of the presence in that area of the large Jacobite military force under Lord Lewis Gordon and Lord John Drummond. A sum of £1,000 was demanded on December 26th by William Moir of Lonmay, and in spite of successive bargaining, the original sum was paid on January 2nd, 1746. Again the demand was backed up by the threat of military execution, this time the burning and pillaging of effects, and again the sum was only payable because the rebels had in the area sufficient troops (somewhere in the region of two thousand men) to enforce their threat. The size of their military force in Aberdeenshire also enabled the rebels to collect the cess and excise and similar public monies from the area. The Aberdeen levy was, however, the last sums of money the rebels were able to extort by these methods. In spite of the rebels' victory at Falkirk, in January 1746, no attempts seem to have been made to impose a levy on either Falkirk or Stirling. This may have been partly because of the decline in morale caused by the fresh desertions from Stirling and perhaps

(2) Elcho, p.355.
(3) See above, Chapter 3.
(4) Allardyce Papers, New Spalding Club. p.201 et seq.
(5) See above, Chapter 3.
because of the distraction of the siege of Stirling Castle, or because of the comparatively sudden decision to retire North from Stirling on February 1st. Again, no attempt was made to impose a levy on the town of Inverness, which the rebels entered on February 18th. Inverness was the next town of any size which the full rebel force occupied after the departure from Stirling. On the retreat north from there the rebel army had divided into two divisions. The Highland division, marching through Badenoch and Rothiemurchus marched through a sparsely inhabited area, while the coastal division, under Lord George Murray, marched through towns like Dundee, Montrose, and Aberdeen which had already been forced to contribute what could be extorted. However, when the two divisions reunited at Inverness, no attempt, beyond searching the captured Fort George, was made to procure money. O'Sullivan states that Inverness Castle (i.e. Fort George) was found to contain no government money when it surrendered on February 21st, but no attempt was made to impose a levy, however small, on the town, in spite of the fact that Maxwell of Kirkconnell estimated the Jacobite force occupying Inverness to number 8,000. Again, declining military morale may provide part of the reason for this omission. In the view of Murray of Broughton, there was no money to be had in the town. Furthermore, the great scarcity of grain of any kind in the area meant, firstly, that most of the energies of such men as Lord George Murray and Lord Pitsligo were taken up with trying

(1) O'Sullivan, p.134.
(2) A Mackenzie, "The Camerons", p.231. Letter of Murray of Broughton to Lochiel, of 14th March 1746, in which he urges the necessity of a general advance to Perth to obtain money, in view of the lack of money in Inverness.
(3) See below, Chapter 8 p. 187.
to provide meal rather than in attending to money matters. Secondly, the shortage of grain meant that there was little point in extorting money to pay the men, if the necessary food on which to spend the money was not also available. Further north, however, some attempts were made by the Earl of Cromartie, commanding Jacobite troops north of the Beauly Firth, to extort such sums. On February 23rd the Chamberlains of Ferintosh were ordered by him to pay £1,500 sterling, on pain of military execution.

Military occupation of large or prosperous areas, however, also enabled the rebel army to extort the various public monies, payable to the government. It was largely with this end in view that the Prince was careful to appoint officials in areas under occupation and authorise their Lords Lieutenants to enforce such levies.

The principal public monies which could be extorted by the rebels were the Excise, Customs Duties and Cess. The levying of the first two was made possible by two factors, first the possession of military force and secondly the co-operation of local officials, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In Brechin, for instance, "Adam Hunter, Inspectant in Excise, surveyed the district of Brechin for the rebels". John Hogg and James Strachan, extra-ordinary Tidesmen of Aberdeen, acted as Tidesmen for the rebels in Aberdeen. John Murray, former clerk to the collector of Customs at Alloa, assisted in the collecting of Excise in Clackmannan, and William Strachan, former Clerk to the Comptroller of Customs, acted as

(3) Hosebery, p.10 and p.20.
(4) ibid, 148.
Collector of both Customs and Excise in Aberdeen. Samuel Douglas, a former Supervisor of Excise in Forres, collected Excise in Forres, Thomas Moncrieffe, a former Excise Officer of Perth, did the same at Perth, as did William Ferguson, the discharged Excise Officer of Arbroath, at Arbroath. Excise was collected by the rebels from Aberdeen, Perth, Keith, Drum, Arbroath, Forres, Elgin, Dalkeith, Forfar, Edinburgh, and Musselburgh, Clackmannan, Kin- cardine and Fife and Angus, and probably from all other towns under military occupation, including Derby. Here a Proclamation was issued demanding the payment to the rebel army of all local Excise duty. Though only part of the money due locally was actually paid, the rebel army gained a sum of a little over £665 Sterling.

Customs duty was also taken in Aberdeen with the assistance of minor Customs officials such as tideamen and landwaiters, and from Edinburgh and Keith where the goods of the Custom House were sold by rebel orders. In areas under Jacobite military occupation the cess could also be collected. This was done in the counties of Moray, Nairn, Aberdeen, Banff, Fife, Stirling, Angus and the Mearns. In Edinburgh it was taken under the authority of John Goodwillie W.S. Cess was also collected at Wick and Thurso, and Cess and Excise were collected in Perthshire by Blair of Glasclune and others

(1) ibid. p.20.
(2) ibid. p.164.
(3) See Rosebery, op.cit. p.2 et seq. for details of the persons concerned in the collection of Excise.
(4) See Allardyce Papers, New Spalding Club p.293.
(5) Rosebery, p.8 et seq.
(6) Elcho, p.282.
(8) ibid. p.248.
(9) by Lord Cromartie.
under the general authority of Lord Strathallan and Lord Tullibardine.

In general there seems to be a contrast between the personnel involved in extorting excise and similar duties and those employed in taking Cess or Levy money. Those employed in the latter task tended to be of a higher social standing and to have greater authority than those involved in collecting either Excise or Customs revenue. Levy money also seems often to be used loosely as a synonym for Cess. In Banff, it was taken by Sir William Gordon of Park, in Fochabers by Alexander Gordon, Gentleman, in Aberdeen, under the authority of William Moir of Lonmay (the Jacobite Governor of Aberdeen) it was collected by David Tulloch, farmer, of Dunbennan. In Old Meldrum it was collected by Charles Anderson, a local merchant and in Brechin by another local merchant. It was collected in Coupar by Robert Douglas, gentleman, and in Crail by Peter Lindsay, also styled as gentleman in the Excise Officers returns. In Perth it was collected by David Stuart of Ballshallan, and in the Elgin area by Macdonald of Scotus, and in Dundee by the Jacobite Deputy Governor of the town, John Goodwillie, partly responsible for levying the revenues in Edinburgh, was also of some social standing. In Caithness and Sutherland the "public Burdens" were levied by Lord Cromartie. Among those who levied Excise and Customs revenues we find craftsmen, such as Alexander Deveron and Robert Marr, both wrights of Aberdeen, or those in the lower ranks of the Excise or Customs service, such as extraordinary tidesmen, landwaiters, and Excise Pupils.

(1) "Marches of Highland Army" p.123.
(2) Such as John Henryson, Excise Pupil of Edinburgh, Henry Elphinston, discharged landwaiter or John Hogg - extraordinary tidesman, and others.
Various minor public monies were also collected by the rebels. In Haddington, Robert Angus, salt watchman, acted as salt officer and with others levied the salt duty for the rebels while in Brechin, Aberdeen and Edinburgh, the rents of Forfeited Estates were collected for the rebels. Crown rents were also taken by the rebels in Alness, during March, by Lord Cromartie, for instance.

A further source of wealth for the Jacobite army was in the form of extortions in kind. These were chiefly of meal, horses, and fodder, but military quarters were also requisitioned without payment. Silver plate, plaid, shoes, cattle and bread were also seized on occasions. A little oatmeal was secretly bought on Charles' orders in Fort William but apart from this, and the barley and oatmeal found on board the three sloops which Captain Walsh forced to land near Arisaig, the Jacobite army was not able to secure, either by force or by payment, any meal until their arrival at Blair Atholl on August 30th and 31st. This was because of local shortages in the areas through which they passed.

O'Sullivan says of the Arisaig area "the poor people had not a scrap of meal for about six months before". This scarcity was common throughout the Highlands. Maxwell of Kirkconnell and Lord Lovat refer frequently to the scarcity of meal and previous bad harvests in the Eastern part of Inverness, and Cope found on his march north in August 1745 that "the country could not afford subsistence ... it was absolutely necessary to carry a stock of bread along with us".

(1) Rosebery, p.32.
(2) ibid. p.86, by Thomas Arbuthnot, Merchant of Peterhead.
(4) O'Sullivan, p.58.
(5) O'Sullivan, p.581.
(6) ibid. p.58.
The only areas from which meal could be secured were the south of Cromarty, Moray and the Strathspey areas and, in the early stages of the campaign, the government garrisons at Fort Augustus and Inverness could prevent the transit of meal, while the presence of Cope's army on its march northwards prevented the people of the Strathspey area from committing themselves by supplying the rebels. The army therefore subsisted almost entirely, according to Murray of Broughton, on beef freshly slaughtered from local cattle, and roasted on the open heath. Cope on his march north had also been dependent to a large extent on freshly slaughtered cattle, from a herd which was driven to accompany his force.

From the arrival at Blair Atholl until the siege of Stirling in January 1746 all provisions supplied to the army were apparently paid for, however, and therefore fall outside the scope of this section. Charles' proclamation from Edinburgh to his friends in England referred to on page 53 above asks that "the country may suffer as little as possible from the march of my troops". Lord George Murray's memoirs imply that the thirty-five bolls of meal ordered in Perth, in September 1745, were paid for, as were the bread, beer and cheese supplied by Stirling in the same month.

By January 1746, however, this admirable honesty over payment had broken down. There are suggestions that during the siege of Stirling in January 1746 Charles was forced to authorise the sending out of parties to seize what corn and meal they could

(1) Murray of Broughton, p.6. At Garvemore, for instance the Prince "ordered some cattle to be killed for the men". ibid. p.178.
(3) Lord George's "Marches of the Highland Army" p.30 et seq. for further details of commissariat arrangements.
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(1) By the time the army arrived north again, in the Inverness area, in February 1746, all pretence of taking provisions only in return for payment was abandoned. On February 24th Murray of Broughton wrote to Lord Pitsligo, who was in charge of the collecting of grain and meal to the east of Inverness, instructing him to give receipts for all meal collected, but not to hand over any money in payment for it. Lord Pitsligo, in obeying these instructions, pointed out that the want of payment for meal seized would make even more difficult the collection of it in the future.

Such meal as Pitsligo, using Elgin as his headquarters, was able to commandeer, came largely from three sources. Some was seized from local granaries, such as those belonging to Lord Braco, Lord Elchies and the Duke of Gordon, though here the amount of meal found was usually disappointingly small, because of the previous bad harvest. Lord John Drummond's A.D.C. wrote, for instance, on February 25th, to say that the granaries of Lord Braco contained little or no meal. Secondly, wheat, oats and barley were accepted in lieu of payment of levy money. Here the payment of levy, whether in cash or kind, was imposed by the threat of quartering troops on those who refused. Thirdly, meal was extorted by threats of military force, from any who were believed to possess it. Similar threats were used to

(1) See "Ascanius or the Young Adventurer" published anon. London John Johnson 1746 p.59.
(2) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo". p.73.
(3) ibid. p.76. Letter of Pitsligo to Murray Feb.26th 1746.
(4) See above Chapter 3 p. 85 et seq.
(5) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo". p.96/7.
(7) See letter of Lord John Drummond from Elgin to Lord Pitslig March 26th 1746: ibid. p.98, 99.
try to extort meal from Inverness on the eve of the battle of Culloden. Charles, on the morning of April 16th, ordered the Colonel of each regiment to send officers into Inverness to try to buy meal with any money they possessed and to force the inhabitants, by threats of burning the town, to send meal and provisions to the rebel army on Culloden moor. These details are from the Journal of John Cameron, reprinted in the "Lyon in Mourning".

While Pitsligo had been collecting meal and corn to the East of Inverness, Lord Cromartie, with headquarters at Dingwall, had been doing the same in Ross and the areas to the North of Inverness, again by the use of military parties.

While the rebel army was occupying the Inverness area from February 1746 onwards military force, or the threat of it was also used to extort sheep for the feeding of the army, oats and straw for what was left of the Jacobite horse, and horses for the use of the army. Amongst the Culloden Papers in the National Library of Scotland are miscellaneous accounts of food and other valuables extorted by the rebels. These lists refer to goods seized from ten farms in the immediate neighbourhood of Culloden House, during March and April 1746. They show that in this neighbourhood alone the rebels seized meal to the value of £7.18.1½d., sterling, and food to the value of £2.13.10½d. The rebels, between March 4th 1746 and April 15th, seized fodder to the value of £6.10.1d., sheep

(1) Ibid., Vol. 1. p.85.
(2) "Cromartie Correspondence", Vol. 2 p.199. letter of Sir Thomas Sheridan of March 3, 1746 to Cromartie.
and lambs to the value of 14/6d., and commandeered horses to
the value of £4.2.10d. Only in one case - a mare worth £1.10.0.,
was the horse retained by the rebels. In the other cases the
horses (19 in all) were returned after they had been used for
various purposes.

Earlier, while in Edinburgh, horses were also commandeered for
the use of the rebel army. Various proclamations were issued from
Edinburgh ordering the surrender of horses to the rebel army,
largely to be used to draw wagons. The reports to Collectors of
Excise of Persons concerned in rebel activity give frequent re-
ferences to persons active in seizing horses in or near Edinburgh. (1)
Horses were also seized in Perthshire, and various letters among
the Atholl Papers, both published and unpublished refer to the
seizure of horses in that county and request Tullibardine's inter-
cession for their return. Horses were also seized in Brechin
and also, presumably, from most other areas under Jacobite occupa-
tion. In spite of such efforts, however, the army was always
desperately deficient in horses, both for transport of baggage and
as cavalry. The Highlander was not a horseman by nature or custom,
nor was fodder for horses ever easy to procure, and it was the lack
of horses for transport which accounted largely for Lord George
Murray's difficulties in transporting the cannon and heavy baggage
north over Shap after the retreat from Derby. It also accounted for
his difficulties in transporting heavy baggage north from Stirling
to Inverness by the coast route. In the last stages of the campaign,

(2) For instance Sir David Murray of Leith and William Bain, Inn-
keeper of Fountainbridge.
(3) In the Charter Room, Blair Castle.
(4) By David Ferier, Merchant of the town, for instance.
Rosebery, p.164.
while Cumberland was advancing from Aberdeen, Jacobite movement and intelligence was also hampered by the absence of horses.

Various other gifts in kind were also extorted by the rebel army. In Edinburgh, as shown earlier, shoes, tents, targets and canteens were extorted. Glasgow also had to provide merchandise, and Lord George Murray wrote to his brother, Tullibardine, of a proposal to collect silver or plate in Edinburgh for use in coining. The Frasers were empowered by Simon Fraser, Lovat's son and their commanding officer, to "uplift plaid, arms and all kinds of necessaries for your company".

Lastly, quarters were also commandeered and, in the last stages at least, unpaid for. The accounts of money and goods extorted by the Jacobites from the Culloden area alone refer several times to meal to be provided "when the camp was about my house" and twice to sums expended on the maintenance of servants attached to the rebel army. Quartering, or the threat of it, was also used to enforce payment of both cess and levy money, especially in the Inverness and Aberdeen areas, during their Jacobite occupations of February to April 1746 and November to December 1745 respectively. It was also used by Lord Cromartie in enforcing payment of the cess in Sutherland.

Various other minor sources of money remain to be considered. In this miscellaneous group of sources of revenue comes first the seizure after a Jacobite military victory, of enemy stores or money.

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(2) Fort William Mss. West Highland Museum.
(3) See above p.172.
(5) See above Chapter 3.
Very early in the campaign, on August 28th 1745, one of the motives for the attack on Ruthven barracks by Camerons under Dr. Archibald Cameron was the hope of securing the quantity of meal that might be stored there. After Prestonpans, General Cope's military chest, to the value of about £2,500 sterling fell into rebel hands.

After the battle of Falkirk on February 17th 1746 the rebel army were able to occupy General Hawley's Camp at Falkirk and gained a considerable amount of his baggage. According to O'Sullivan the enemy "abandoned likewise their Camp and baggage, a great quantity of the officers equipage was found in the Town, a great many hampers of good wines and liquors and other provisions were found in the Town". The rebels did not, however, have similar good fortune when they entered Fort George. At Inverness on February 20th, according to O'Sullivan, "we found no money but a good quantity of Gunes and ammunition; a great quantity for such a garrission, of meal, salt beef, cheas, bear wine, tea, but there was a very ill acct. given of it for the most of it was plundered, not withstanding all the precautions yt could be taken".

Another, and more profitable, souce of money was from the levy of a kind of scutage, or money payment in lieu of service. This was levied chiefly from Angus, Perthshire, Aberdeenshire and its neighbouring counties. In Perthshire such levies were under the authority of Tullibardine and were taken almost entirely from Atholl tenants, while in the Aberdeenshire areas they were taken under

(1) Murray of Broughton p.184.
(3) O'Sullivan p.119.
(4) ibid. p.134.
(5) See Chapter 4, 2 and 3. infra. for further details of these levies.
the supervision of Lord Lewis Gordon, Jacobite Lord Lieutenants of the County. In Angus under the authority of Lord Ogilvy and David Fotheringham, rebel governor of Dundee, extortion of money in lieu of service commonly took place, often by officers and sergeants of the Ogilvy Regiment. An anonymous letter among the Atholl Papers ends by stating "The whole parishes in Angus are distressed by pressing (or forcing men) or, which they love better, a composition in money that falls heavy on the poor tenants". In the county of Aberdeen Lord Lewis Gordon, in his capacity as Lord Lieutenant ordered, on December 12th, the delivery to James Moir of Stoneywood by December 18th of one armed man per £100 of valued rent, or the payment of £5 sterling in lieu of each man.

Similar attempts to raise money in lieu of men were made in Perthshire from Atholl tenants. Further details of such attempts and of their military significance are given in Chapter 2. These attempts were made by officers of the Atholl Brigade on the authority of the Marquis of Tullibardine, Commander in Chief North of the Forth. Probably, however, little money was actually gathered in by such means in Perthshire. A letter from the officer in command of the party trying to raise money in the Glenalmond area reported to Tullibardine on February 1st, 1746, "They have not been able to raise a farthing", while Blair of Glasclune was able

(1) David Fenton, farmer of Angus and a Lieutenant of Ogilvy's, for instance, "extorted money from the county to raise men for the rebels" Rosebery p.211. This was also done by Patrick Grant, Thomas Ogilvy, John Ogilvy and others. ibid. pp.214, 226, 228.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence". Appendix p.233.
to raise only £4 sterling and twelve oxen at the end of January
1746. The smallness of the amount raised was due here, as in
the rest of the area, to lack of men to act as military parties,
as Blair pointed out. He himself had only thirty men on this
occasion.

Another expected source of revenue in the Atholl area did not
materialise at all. Tullibardine, before going south from Blair
Atholl in late October 1745, left behind factors authorised to
collect the Atholl rents on behalf of the Jacobite army. Apparently
he hoped these rents would produce between £600 and £700, but on
January 19th, 1746, Colville, Tullibardine’s Secretary, reported to
Murray of Broughton that during Tullibardine’s absence with the
main Jacobite army, no rents at all had been paid.

This exhausts the channels for money raising, open to the
rebel army. By these methods, and especially because he was able
to levy the public monies in the areas under Jacobite occupation,
the Prince was able to do, for much of the campaign, what no
previous leader of a Highland army had been able to do. He had
been able to give his men regular pay and regular provisions. Be-
cause the extortion of such public monies was in the hands of senior
Jacobite officers it seems to have been done with a certain degree
of fairness.

Three facts, however, should be borne in mind. The extortion
was in general accompanied by the threat of military execution,
forced quartering of troops or burning of effects. It also often
followed, or was followed by, legitimate government extortion of

(1) “Atholl Correspondence” p.181. Letter of Thomas Blair of
Glasclune from Perth, February 1st to Tullibardine.
(2) ibid. p.146-7.
the same levy, so that in many cases individuals must have been faced with the possibility of being forced to pay the same sum twice, to different sides. This was, for instance, the case with Atholl rents. The Duke of Atholl, on his return to the estates in 1746 attempted the collection of rents not paid since September 1745.

Lastly, this comparatively efficient and fair levying of public money had degenerated considerably by the last stages of the campaign. Military strength was essential in order to raise money. When, from February 1746 onwards, the rebel army was in fact on the defensive, this military strength was not available, and the disastrous collapse, illustrated above, of both financial and supply organisation followed.

1. See above Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 8.

THE EXPENDITURE OF THE JACOBITE ARMY

There are few sources which provide much detailed information on the expenditure of the rebel army. Both Lord George Murray and John O'Sullivan, the Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the rebel army, make fairly frequent but undetailed references to expenditure, especially on food and forage of various kinds. The Correspondence of Lord Cromartie and Lord Pitsligo also contain many such references, while the memoirs of Maxwell of Kirkconnell and of Lord Elcho provide more fleeting references. In none of these instances, however, is the information given in any detail, nor is expenditure itemised.

(1) The Household accounts of James Gibb, the Master of the Prince's Household do provide, in general, such detailed and itemised information, but his accounts, which only begin in regular form on October 30th, 1745, deal only with the expenses of the seventy or so members of the Prince's household, and not with the general expenditure of the army as a whole. His accounts form, in fact, only a very small fragment of the general picture.

More useful are the accounts kept by Laurence Oliphant of Gask of the expenditure of that part of the Jacobite army which remained at Perth, under the command of Lord Strathallan and Lord John Drummond, while the main Jacobite army was advancing into England. (2) Here again, however, the accounts do not begin until October, (3) and they refer only to the expenditure of a portion of

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(1) "Lyon in Mourning", Vol. II p.115 - 152.
(2) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask", p.129 et seq.
(3) In this case the 11th of the month.
the rebel army. They do provide, however, an indication of the general level of pay within the rebel force and of the major sources of expenditure.

For further details of expenditure we are forced to rely on miscellaneous itemised accounts, such as the rough regimental accounts of Cluny Macpherson, for instance, which are among the miscellaneous manuscripts in the West Highland Museum at Fort William. Such sources help to fill in what is, at best, however, an incomplete picture.

The Jacobite officials chiefly concerned with expenditure were the Quarter Master General, Colonel O'Sullivan, his deputy, Robert (1) Anderson (younger of Whitburgh), the Commissary General, Lachlan MacLachlan of Castle Lachlan, the Paymaster, Charles Stewart of Maryburgh, the Prince's Secretary, John Murray of Broughton, his Treasurer, John Hay of Restalrig, and the Vice Chamberlain of the Prince's Household, William Murray of Taymount. The Household accounts were kept by James Gibb and he was accountable for these accounts to Colonel Francis Strickland, and after news of Strickland's death in January 1746 to James Hay of Restalrig, who was also Murray of Broughton's successor as Secretary. Also concerned with expenditure was John Goodwillie of Edinburgh who was Secretary to Murray of Broughton. After the defeat at Culloden, and the subsequent dispersal of the army, Ewen Macpherson of Cluny remained in charge of what little money remained and of its expenditure. The expenditure by the Jacobite force at Perth from October 1745 until January 1746 was controlled by Laurence Oliphant of Gask.

(1) apparently appointed with other deputies at Edinburgh on Lord George Murray's insistence, so as to counterbalance the influence of O'Sullivan, of whom Lord George strongly disapproved. See O'Sullivan, p.38/9 note 1.
Gask was deputy commander, under Lord Strathallan, at Perth, until the force collected at Perth joined the main body at Stirling on or about January 6th 1746. From then on Gask was apparently responsible still for the expenses connected with the transport of the artillery from Perth, and for the pay of those troops of the Cromartie regiment engaged in this work. He apparently remained at Perth until the general retreat north at the beginning of February, and at Perth was responsible for the pay of Raasay's men and the Perthshire recruits enlisted as a result of the activities of Lord Tullibardine at Blair.

The chief item of expenditure amongst all these accounts was, of course, the soldiers' pay. Of a total sum of over £5,500 Sterling handled by Gask, over £3,800 was expended on army pay. The provision of shoes and weapons accounted for further expenditure, and in the Gask accounts these items accounted for £186.6.0. and £190.11.1½d. respectively. The first item would undoubtedly have been larger but for the compulsory provision of shoes and clothing by Edinburgh and Glasgow in September and December 1745.

Payments to those who brought out their men also accounted for expenditure. Oliphant of Gask paid out £89.14.6. for this purpose, while the provision of fodder and food only accounted for £77.15.4. £27.0.3½d. was spent on the sending of expresses and £28.11.9. on pay or compensation to the killed or wounded of the rebel army.

The remaining items of expenditure were all in themselves small. They included expenses in connection with raising the cess or other public monies, the housing of servants, the giving of drink money, expenses connected with the housing of enemy prisoners, or the celebrations of the victories of Prestonpans or Falkirk. In the

(1) The actual figure is £5,553.16.10. of which £3380.7.11. was spent on pay. See "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". n.129 at sec.
case of the Gask accounts these miscellaneous expenses led to a total expenditure of £39.16.11.

The last major expenditure which the rebel army had to face would consist of payments for the quartering of troops. These quarters, both on the march to and retreat from Derby were carefully ordered and the provisions provided seem to have been paid for. Later, on the retreat from Stirling, quarters for the force which took the coastal route North were carefully ordered by Lord George Murray. No reference to the cost of quarters occurs however in the Gask accounts, and this suggests that the expenses of quarters, like the provision of their men’s food, were matters to be met either by the men themselves or by the individual regimental commanders who served at Perth under Gask and Strathallan.

The rate of pay given to the men seems to have varied during the campaign. The regular pay of the army did not begin until August 28th. Until this date the men were paid only in kind, by the distribution of food, usually in the form of sheep and cattle slaughtered in the open. From then on a fairly regular scale of pay seems to have been adhered to, until February 1746. The accounts of Oliphant of Gask show a fixed rate of 6d. per day for each private throughout the period from November 1st until the beginning of February, when Gask rejoined his own regiment, the Perthshire Horse. During the previous month, however, from October 11th onwards, the payment per man does not seem to have been standardised. On October 28th Gask paid out twelve shillings to "12 men of Nairne", while on the following day he paid out fourteen shillings as two days pay to 14 Nairn men, and on October 31st only

(1) See O'Sullivan, p.91 et seq.
(2) See above, Chapter 7, p.153 et seq.
five shillings to "8 Nairne men and Mr. Cochran".

From November 1st onwards the Nairn men and all further recruits were paid 6d. per day and sergeants pay was also fixed at 9d. daily. Among the officers, Ensigns received 1/6d. per day, Lieutenants 2/-, Captains 2/6d., Lieutenant Colonels 4/-, and Colonels 6/-. These figures were also fairly constant throughout the campaign. Gregor or Grigor Murray, who brought in 17 Atholl men on October 31st 1745, was paid 2/6d. per day from then onwards, and Colonel Cameron (of Torcastle) was paid at the rate of 6/- daily from November 20th onwards, as were all other officers of similar rank. By the end of January, however, the payments, like those for the early days up to November 1st, become less uniform. On January 27th the payment to McLeod of Raasay, who held the rank of Colonel, for himself and one man for seven days was £2.6.1. not £2.5.6. as might be expected, while on February 3rd their pay for the following seven days was £2.10.0.

From early February onwards standards of pay seem to have declined rapidly. Among the miscellaneous papers of Ewen Macpherson of Cluny (2) is a rough account in Cluny's handwriting of his expenditure between February 6th and March 24th, 1746. It begins "32 days pay is £34.8.0." and then after a series of miscellaneous sums end with "16 days pay £19.8.0." At this period the Macpherson regiment numbered three hundred and on March 15 Cluny left Ruthven with the full regiment for the siege of Blair Castle. The number of men for whom pay had to be provided should therefore be 300, but pay at the earlier rate of 6d. a day for 32 days for 300 men

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(1) ibid. p.129. This is possibly a mistaken entry. The same days account also shows payment of 3/6d. to "3 Nairne men and Mr. Cochran" bringing a total of 8/6d. to twelve men.
(2) West Highland Museum, Fort William.
would total £240.0.0. without allowing for officers pay at all. The sum allowed, £34.8.0., only provides for a daily expenditure of £1.1.6. or pay for forty-three men, while the last entry of £19.8.0. provides for a daily expenditure of £1.4.6. for a further 16 days, in other words pay for 49 men. As the accounts seem to be regimental and not company accounts this may suggest a considerable decline in the rate of pay too. In this case a decline to a rate of about 1d. per day per man. Furthermore, pay was already in arrears. Cluny's accounts were made up on March 25th but he is calculating the account due to his men since February 15th.

This fall in the rate of pay is confirmed from other sources. Maxwell of Kirkconnell writes that by March 1746 "the common men were reduced to a weekly allowance of oatmeal instead of their pay, which had formerly been very punctual". Lord George Murray affirms that the army had had no pay for a month before Culloden, and, as has been pointed out earlier, no money had been found in or received from Inverness itself.

Apart from army pay, the second and only other major item of expenditure seems to have been the provisioning and quartering of the army. Here it is not easy to discover how the expenditure on provisions was controlled. Lord Strathallan, the commander in chief at Perth, seems to have controlled the quartermaster General's department there himself, for in Gask's accounts there are only incidental and minor references to expenditure on food or forage and these only account for a total expenditure of £77.15.4. during the entire period from October 11, 1745 to April 15th 1746. These few references are to such items as

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(1) Maxwell, p.131 and 132.
"bill for dinner to Lord Lewis Drummond and his officers", suppers to celebrate the battle of Falkirk and similar items and obviously have no bearing on the provisioning of the army as a whole. Only six items suggest any such general provisioning. They are as follows:

1746. Jan. 8th To fifteen men for baking bread for the army £. s. d. 25. 10. 0.

Jan. 22nd To a mair sent through the Cars (Carse to order in wheat on D. Perth’s letter.) 4. 6.

Jan. 23rd ½ chalder of coals 1. 7. 6.

Feb. 8th For forage to 32 horses of Perthshyre Squadron for 2 days at 6d. per day by rect. of John McNaughten, Quartermaster. 1. 12. 0.

Ditto for the 8th & 9th at O. Aberdeen 1. 6. 2.

Feb. 28th To corn for 5 horses different times 1. 6.

Feb. (or March?) 18th. To a boll oats at Fochabers for the horses of the squadron. 9. 4.

Of the first three entries only the first seems to belong properly to the province of the Quartermaster, while the last entries refer to the time after the retreat north on February 1st. On February 6th Gask rejoined his own regiment, the Perthshire horse, and as Lieutenant Colonel in command of one of the two troops of the Horse Gask was now apparently responsible for the provision and fodder of his own troop.

These entries suggest therefore that the providing of food and fodder was the responsibility of the respective commanding officers and that at Perth such expenditure was the province of a separate department under Strathallan, whose accounts did not pass through Gask’s hands. The cost of such provisions may explain the

(1) On January 11th 1746.
transference of comparatively large sums of money at intervals, to Strathallan. These transfers were of £15.0.0. on November 30th 1745, £31.10.0. on December 9th and £61.3.4. on February 4th.

The suggestion that individual commanders were responsible for buying forage is also borne out by Cluny's accounts. His full account is as follows:-

Feb. 6th from that to ye 25 March included

32 days pay is
at Gaskmhor 17. 12. 6.
at Milwhinage 17. 0.
To Angus 17. 0.
To Finlayson 17. 0.
at Ruthven 8. 13. 0.
To Sandie Macewan 6. 0. 0.
To Garva at Ruthven 18. 5. 0.

32 days pay 34. 8. 0.
Remainder 18. 14. 0.
10 days pay 19. 8. 0.

The second, third, sixth and eighth items may suggest expenditure on food at these places, while Cluny's regiment were in Badenoch, holding the passes in the Ruthven area until they joined Lord George Murray for the siege of Blair Castle. Again, the responsibility of commanding officers for the provisioning of their men is suggested by the Journal of John Cameron of Fort William. After the night attack of 15th April 1746 "the provisions being all spent, the Prince ordered each Colonel to send some of their officers to Inverness with money to buy such as could be got". (1)

By the last stages of the campaign, however, there was an

(1) "Lyon in Mourning". Vol. I. p.65.
inevitable overlapping of spheres, caused by the fact that the men were now being paid not in cash but in kind. Both Lord George Murray and Maxwell of Kirkconnel refer to this development, which had taken place by the 18th March 1746, if not earlier. The Duke of Perth, writing from Tain on that date to Lord Cromartie, states that "Lochgarry had been here on his way to Inverness to seek his pay. I stoped him from going there and told him that I was to order him meal in the meantime, telling him Sullivan should come".

Those responsible for the distribution of meal were faced, however, with an almost impossible task. Under Lord Pitsligo and Lord Cromartie meal was to be collected from, and stored in, granaries such as those of Lord Braco, or at Foulis House or in Elgin itself, but this area and indeed the whole of the North was in the midst of a great famine and scarcity, caused by successive bad harvests. This scarcity was felt by government commanders as well. The letters of Major General Campbell are full of references to the scarcity of meal and cattle in Argyll. On January 28th he says, for instance "this country and the whole west of Scotland is faced with famine and with great scarcity of money". The correspondence of Sir Everard Fawkenener from Aberdeen, from February 1746 onwards, also testifies to the scarcity of meal which he encountered in supplying the Scottish garrisons in government hands.

(2) See Chapter 3, and also Lord Pitsligo's and Lord Cromartie's correspondence during March and April 1746.
(3) See Fergusson. "Argyll in the Forty Five" p.64 at seq.
(4) Fergusson - p.88. op.cit.
The effect of such natural scarcity was intensified, for the rebel army, by the lack of money from February 1746 onwards with which to buy what food was available. The result was that the army, by April 16th, the day of the battle of Culloden, was nearing starvation point. Lochiel's regiment, on April 14th, were given a "few sacks of meal, of which some baked bread". By the following day, according to Maxwell of Kirkconnell, "few of the common men had had anything to eat for a day or so". In order to halt the dispersal of men in search of food each man was given one biscuit, but those without servants to bring them in food "were in a downright starving condition. The small pittance given the men only made them want more and desertion continued in spite of all efforts to stop it". It was equally impossible to stop the dispersal in search of food when the army returned to Culloden Moor at six a.m. the following day, exhausted after the fiasco of the night march to Cumberland's camp. These men had had no further distribution of food since the one biscuit each of the previous morning.

Maxwell of Kirkconnell blames the shortage of food on deficiencies in the organisation of supply, and argued that there was at that time enough meal in Inverness to last the whole army a fortnight, but for mismanagement. Even Maxwell, however, is forced to admit that "There was at that time a greater scarcity than usual in the Highlands, which of themselves offer nothing in that

(2) Maxwell, p. 141.
(3) ibid. p. 142.
(4) ibid. p. 142.
season. It would have been impossible for a considerable body of men to subsist together.

With regard to the problem of quartering the army, there is some evidence as to how these quarters were obtained, but none as to whether they were paid for. In the absence of any references to money paid out for quarters the presumption is that they were not paid for however. The provision of quarters seems to have been the responsibility of operational commanders. A letter of Cluny Macpherson, dated March 23, 1746, in the West Highland Museum orders the provision of quarters in Ruthven for the 1,500 men under his command in that area. In general the supervision of quarters was in the hands of Lord George Murray. His "Marches of the Highland Army" refers to his general plan of keeping the men under his command in two sections, one marching a day behind the other, so that the second detachment could occupy the quarters of the first. This was done on the march south into England, on the retreat north from Derby and on the retreat north from Stirling. When the whole army was encamped at any one place for any period of time it had to be dispersed for quarters in the surrounding villages. This happened at Carlisle during its blockade in November 1745, and before the battle of Falkirk, when the men "were in so many cantonments for several miles around that it was always mid day before they could be assembled where as the enemy had only to strike tents for which they had carriages and could march at daybreak".

(1) Ibid, p.158.
(2) Though on the march south from Edinburgh Lord Kilmarnock was sent ahead to secure quarters in the Kelso district. See Sullivan, p.91.
(3) "Marches of Highland Army", p.80, "Jacobite Memoirs".
The rebel army, having neither the horse nor the carriages for the transport of tents, nor the money to provide them, were always faced with this disadvantage in assembling their men quickly.

The remaining expenses incurred by the army were not large. The two chief items remaining to be catalogued were, first, the cost of repairing and transporting weapons and providing ammunition, and secondly of hiring horses for use by expresses and guides.

The expenditure on the first item was not in fact large. In Gask's lists it only accounts for £190.11.1½, less than a twenty-fifth of the total expenditure. The reason for the smallness of this item lies in the fact that the rebel army possessed little artillery and few stands of arms. What artillery they possessed in the early stages of the campaign had to be left behind at Shap on the retreat north from Derby. From now on the rebel artillery consisted largely of the guns landed in October from France, and brought via Alloa to the main Jacobite army after its return to Scotland in January 1746. The transporting of this cannon accounts for a large proportion of Gask's expenditure on arms. Apart from the small arms brought by Charles from France on the "Du Teillay", and those landed later at Montrose and Peterhead, a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition fell into the rebel hands from the government garrison at Inverness, and the repair of an ammunition for these arms accounted for the rest of this expenditure. On March 2nd, for instance, O'Sullivan, from

(1) It consisted of that gained from Cope after Prestonpans.
(2) See Chapter 7 p.154.
(3) See Chapter 7, p.154.
(4) O'Sullivan, p.134.
Inverness, wrote to Lord Cromartie "I would have sent as your Lordship desired the 100 stand of arms by the troops that parted this morning but do assure you there are not two in order or condition to be made use of. We'll get gunsmith's to work tomorrow to get as many as possibly we can in order". (1)

The last item, the provision of horses for expresses and such purposes, was a frequent item of expenditure. The rebel army was always deficient in cavalry, and by the last stages of the campaign the horse had dwindled to two troops only, with the remnants of Pitsligo's and Strathallan's horse in reserve. Most of the original Jacobite horse, such as Kilmarnock's troop, now became Foot Guards and those of their horses which remained were given to complete the horse of FitzJames' troop. Accordingly, horses for the carrying of expresses had to be hired or, later, commandeered. Gask's accounts show that £27.0.3² was spent on hiring for this purpose, and 90 separate items of expenditure on expresses are listed. Later, when the army reached Inverness in February, 1746, and the financial situation had further deteriorated, local horses were frequently commandeered, without payment, as is shown in the area accounts of local farmers from the Culloden area.

Almost every aspect of expenditure, however, shows the same deterioration by the last two months of the campaign. The Gask accounts show that Gask was forced to transfer large sums of money to other commanders from last January 1746 onwards. On January 22nd he handed over £515.0.0. to Murray of Broughton. On January 23rd Gask wrote to Lord Nairne from Perth in reply, apparently, to a letter asking for money to pay the Atholl men,

(1) "Cromartie Correspondence". Vol.2 n.197.
(2) See above, Chapter 7.
and told him that £15.0.0. was all that could be spared. This money, Gask's accounts show, was handed over on January 29th. On February 4th, £61.3.4. was handed over to Lord Strathallan, and on 31st March a further sum was transferred. Finally on 12th April £126.0.0. was handed over to Prince Charles. Altogether, between October and the end of December 1745, Gask transferred £176.10.0. to individual commanders, while between 22nd January and 12th April 1746 a sum of £857.3.4. was transferred.

Furthermore, the system of making payments, probably in lieu of expenses, to those bringing out men, collapsed by the beginning of 1746. Such payments seem to have been made from very early in the Campaign. O'Sullivan writes that at Lochnamuamh a hundred or fifty guineas each was paid out to Lochiel, Keppoch and others, "some more or lesse according to the following they had, so they all set about raising their men"; and Gask's accounts show that a total of £69.14.6. was spent on similar payments. However, apart from two payments of ten shillings and £2.10.0. to Macleod of Raasay on January 10th and February 3rd, such payments end on December 27th 1745, with the payment of £1.0.0. to Macleod of Bernera for "charges endeavouring to raise 100 men in ye Hylands".

The accounting system as a whole seems very rough and

(1) "Atholl Correspondence" p.153.
(2) Made up as follows:
   3rd Nov. to Col. Robertson of Drumachine £15.0.0.
   9th " " Lovat's Secretary 100.0.0.
   30th " " Lord Strathallan 15.0.0.
   9th " " Lord Strathallan 31.0.0.
(3) O'Sullivan, p.57.
193.

unsystematic. The accounts kept by Gask, Cluny Macpherson and James Gibb apparently consist of items hastily jotted down as they occur. There is no attempt to summarise or classify expenditure, and, though large payments to individuals are made, no details are given of what items are included in the sum. In James Gibb’s Household accounts there are frequent large gaps, where only the place and name of a supplier of food is inserted, but no details of amounts paid. The blank would be filled by the “discharged account” provided by the supplier, presumably.

Cluny’s accounts again provide no details of expenditure, such large items as £17.12.6. figure only under the heading “At Gaskmhor” although here this may be explained by the fact that the account is possibly only part of a rough calculation, rather than a regular detailed statement. It is written on the back of a letter dated March 23rd about the provision of quarters for the men under his command.

The accounts kept by Gask and James Gibb are, however, intended as permanent accounts and they are neither detailed nor systematic. No system seems to have been employed, moreover, in the distribution of pay to the men. The pay was handed over by Gask to the Colonels concerned, but usually with no details of the number of ranks of the men involved. In 118 entries dealing with pay, only 23 make any attempt at details of the number of men involved. Even here the details are often only of numbers of companies involved and none give any details of the ranks and rate of pay. Also, pay was not given at regular or systematic intervals. Some regiments received their pay at seven day intervals for most of the time for which Gask was responsible, but the rest
received it at varying intervals of between one and twenty-one days throughout the period.

Men belonging to ten regiments were at times paid at seven day intervals. They were the recruits gathering at Perth for Macleod of Raasay, the Earl of Cromartie, Cluny Macpherson, Lochiel, the Frasers, MacGregor of Glengyle, Macleod of Bernera, the Maclachlans, and one company under a Captain Anderson. Even in these cases, however, the men were not always paid at such intervals. Until December 21st 1745 for instance the Cameron recruits had been paid at varying intervals of 2, 3, 4, and 5 days, and Macpherson recruits had been paid in the early part of November at both 4 and 8 day intervals. A separate company of Frasers were paid at varying intervals of 6, 14, 16 and 21 days throughout Gask's stay at Perth.

The men belonging to the other regiments at Perth, were paid irregularly throughout the campaign. The Atholl recruits were paid at varying intervals of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 days, Glengarry recruits at intervals of 2, 3, 4, and 6 days, but usually at intervals of 2 days, Appin Stuarts at intervals of either 5 or 10 days, Barrisdale's at intervals of 4, 5, 6, or 9 days and Glencoe men at intervals of either 6, 8, or 10 days.

Furthermore, though in general the men were paid in advance, some companies were paid sometimes in advance and sometimes in arrears. This is true of the Mackintosh companies during November, and of Fraser companies at times during November and December and January.

Again, although those who were paid at seven day intervals normally got their pay in advance, and were paid seven days in
advance, quite frequently their pay was given midway through a seven day period, to cover three or four days in arrears and three or four days in advance.

To sum up, the systems of accounting and of payment employed by the rebel army seems considerably more rudimentary than the means employed to raise the money spent. There are frequent complaints by, for instance, Maxwell of Kirkconnell, of the way in which food and fodder was bought in and distributed, and much duplication of officers responsible for the buying of food, and also, as shown, of officers responsible for the commandeering of it.

As a whole, therefore, an army well served by those responsible for providing money and provisions was less served by those responsible for expenditure and accounting.
CONCLUSION.

The Jacobite Movement is not one which lends itself to easy generalisations. The commonly held view that it was a predominantly Highland movement much influenced by Roman Catholic sentiment, has been demonstrated above to be in need of considerable modification. Similarly modifications must be made in any theory which ignores the importance of economic pressure, and of the forcing out of recruits. To imply, for instance, that Jacobite enlistment was largely the product of a sentimental, blind loyalty to the House of Stuart, is to be guilty of considerable over-simplification. Similar criticisms must be made of any consideration of the motives for Jacobite activity, which neglects the importance of Episcopalian sentiment, while over estimating the significance of Roman Catholicism in the rebellion.

There were far closer links between the Episcopal Church and the Jacobite movement, than between that movement and Roman Catholicism. The whole administrative organisation of the Episcopal Church depended on the headship of that church by the Stuarts. The Roman Catholic hierarchy in both England and Scotland found, by 1745, that association with the exiled House was a great disadvantage. They were, therefore, anxious to minimise this association wherever possible. But many Scottish Episcopalians, on the other hand, believed that active support of Jacobitism was their best hope of ending the persecution and disabilities which

(1) See above, Chapter 6, and see also M.A. Thesis, "The Working of the Recusant Laws against Roman Catholics" by J.M. Price, University of Wales 1924, p.71. et seq. for the attitude of English Catholics to Jacobitism.
they suffered. Roman Catholics, both in England and Scotland, had little hope that a successful Stuart Restoration would in any material way improve their lot. They knew that the predominant Anglicanism of any Parliament would effectively obstruct any legislation designed to remove their disabilities. But Scottish Episcopalians and English Non Jurors could hope for much improvement in their legal position if a Jacobite rebellion was successful.

A further important characteristic of Scottish Jacobitism was the close-knit society to which its most important adherents belonged. There were links, not only by marriage, but also through blood kinship in both Perthshire and West Highland Jacobite circles. Even in the Lowlands, Jacobitism in 1745 was nearly always the product of a family history of loyalty to the Stuarts very often strengthened by Episcopal adherence. Few of rank whose families had no associations with either Jacobitism or Episcopacy came out in 1745. Jacobitism gained few new converts in 1745, although the army which the movement put in the field then was, in general, larger than in previous risings. This increase was due, not to an expanding movement, but to greater success in tapping all available sources of support, and in mobilising the recruits.

This ability to tap all possible sources was the reason that so much success was achieved. Three factors account for the long duration and wide range of Jacobite military activity in 1745/6. First the highly organised system of hiring out and forcing out men, practised largely in Perthshire, Angus and the North East Counties. Next - the fact that through their temporary possession
of the wealth of the Lowlands the rebel army was able to levy cess, land-tax, excise and other monies, and to seize goods in kind for military use. The last factor was the administrative ability of such men as Lord George Murray, Lord Pitsligo, and in some measure, John Murray of Broughton. These men, with the help of Oliphant of Gask, and of town governors like David Fotheringham, and collectors of revenue like Sir John Wedderburn, were largely responsible for the finance, supply and movement of men and baggage, for the entire rebel army. The administrative paper work which all this involved, was in the hands of officials like Hay of Restalrig, John Goodwillie, and John Colville. These were men drawn mostly from the ranks of the Lowland professions and commerce, and the Lowlands thus made a very important contribution to the success of rebel military administration.

As, however, the rebel army lost its control over the fertile and wealthy Lowlands, and was forced to retire Northwards, so its administration deteriorated. There were few public revenues to collect from February 1746 onwards, and supply difficulties became increasingly desperate, the inevitable consequence of the military decision to retire North from Stirling. The declining military strength implied by this retreat was the cause of the difficulties over finance and supply which followed. The collapse of the

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(1) The bulk of the income handled by Strathallan as Governor of Perth, for example, came from the revenues of the Land-Tax, Excise and cess of Fife, Kinross and Perth. Jacobite Lairds of Gask. p.14 et seq.
(2) See Gask Accounts, "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p.118 et seq.
(3) See above Chapter 4.
hitherto commendably capable Jacobite administration was the result, not the cause, of military disintegration, but in the vicious circle of cause and effect, that collapse was itself the cause of future military decline, as well as the product of earlier military failure.

The rigours of climate in a Northern winter campaign increased the need for an efficient administration. With no available facilities for barracking troops, with no money for tents, the Jacobite army had to depend on billeting for the quartering of its troops. The army was, however, operating chiefly in areas where there were no villages large enough to accommodate the whole army. Those responsible for quartering were forced therefore, to scatter their forces over a wide area so as to secure food and quarters. This was the case both before the skirmish at Inverurie and before the battles of Falkirk and Culloden. This presented, of course an obvious military advantage to the enemy.

Furthermore, although the Jacobite High Command showed considerable skill in exploiting all financial resources available, these resources were never sufficient to provide enough horses for efficient army movement. This lack of horses was responsible for continual difficulties in transporting artillery and heavy baggage. It also made difficult both scouting and rapid movement.

Finally, desertion as a cause of the Jacobite military collapse after December 1745, although of some importance, was

(1) As at Alloa in January, 1746, or over Shap in November and December 1745. See above Chapters 4 and 8.
exaggerated by contemporary opinion. As has been suggested above, desertion, although extensive among the Atholl brigade, was not so large elsewhere. The apparent decline in numbers among the men was very probably the result of optimistic over-exaggeration of the numbers recruited in the first place, combined with a failure to anticipate the practical difficulties involved. In the West Highlands, an area whose recruits have been most often charged with desertion, recruitment itself was comparatively easy, and desertion relatively slight.

(1) Chapters 2 and 3 especially.
(2) See above, Chapter 1.
Brief Chronological Summary of Movements 1745/6.

1745.
July 23  Du Teillay arrives off Eriskay
July 25  Du Teillay reaches Loch Namlllemph
July 26 - Aug. 19 Charles joined by Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, Young Clanranald, Glenaladale, Scotus, Keppoch, Lochiel and others.
August 14  Skirmish in which Captain Swetenham is seized by Lochgarrys.
August 16  Skirmish at Highbridge.
August 19  Raising of the standard at Glenfinnan.
August 21  Army leaves Glenfinnan for head of Loch Eil and (eventually) Edinburgh.
August 27  Cope turns aside at Corryarrick.
August 29  Cope arrives at Inverness.
September 1  Jacobite army reaches Blair Atholl.
September 4 - 11 Jacobite army occupies Perth.
September 17  Jacobite army enters Edinburgh.
Cope arrives at Dunbar.
September 21  Battle of Prestonpans.
October 7  French arms etc. reach Montrose and are stored at Perth in charge of Strathallan.
October 15  
October 17  
November 1  Main Jacobite force marches South from Edinburgh.
November 8  Main force reaches Carlisle.
November 14  Surrender of Carlisle.

(1) For further details of all these movements, see Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4.
Main body reaches Lancaster.

The Hazard seized at Montrose.

Main body reaches Preston, thence
via Manchester, Macclesfield.

Leek to Derby.

Main body retires from Derby to Ashbourne,
thence via Macclesfield, Preston,
Manchester, Kendal, Penrith to
Carlisle

Main body occupies Annan and Ecclefechan

Lord Lewis Gordon recruiting in Banff and
Aberdeen, routs Macleods at Inverurie.

Main body occupies Glasgow.

Main body leaves Glasgow for Cumbernauld
and Kilsyth.

Charles at Bannockburn House, main body
occupy surrounding villages. The
Cromartie and Cameron Regiments occupied
in escorting French artillery from Perth
across the Forth at Alloa.

Main Body joined by reinforcements
gathered during November and December at
Perth under Strathallan.

Stirling town surrenders.

Siege of Stirling Castle begins.

Last of Hawley's troops reach Edinburgh
(total now 12 Regiments of foot and 2 of
dragoons and Glasgow militia).
January 13
Hawley's advance guard enters Linlithgow. Tullibardine sets out for Blair to recruit men.

January 17
Battle of Falkirk, after which Falkirk occupied by Jacobite force. Highland Regiments encamped at Falkirk, rest at Stirling.

January 30
Cumberland reaches Edinburgh.

January 31
Cumberland marches to Linlithgow.

February 1
Jacobite retreat north begins - army spends night at Dunblane, Doune and neighbouring villages, thence retreats north in two bodies. I Charles and Clan Regiments to Perth
Dunkeld
Blair Atholl
Aviemore
Inverness

II Lord George and Atholl Brigade, Lowland Regiments, etc. to Perth
Forfar
Brechin
Aberdeen
Old Meldrum
Strathbogie
Inverness

February 9
Cumberland enters Perth

February 11
Sir Andrew Agnew with government force of 500 reaches Blair Atholl.
February 18  
Charles' contingent enters Inverness.

February 19  
Lord George's contingent enters Inverness.  
Loudoun and government troops at Inverness retreat across the Firth.  
Jacobite army in detachments between Aberdeen and Inverness.

February 20  
Cumberland begins advance from Perth to Aberdeen, via Dundee and Montrose.

Feb.21 - 22nd  
Arrival of detachments of Berwick's French Regiment at Peterhead.

February 23  
Jacobite force evacuates Aberdeen.

February 25  
Cumberland's van reaches Aberdeen.  
Cromartie sent in pursuit of Loudoun.

March 3  
Jacobite siege of Fort Augustus begins under Brigadier Stapleton.

March 5  
Surrender of Fort Augustus. Stapleton begins the siege of Fort William.

March 15  
Lord George leaves Inverness for attack on Blair Castle, joining Cluny Macpherson in Badenoch.

March 16  
Cumberland orders Bland to advance to Strathbogie.

March 17  
Main Jacobite army under Lord John Drummond withdrew from Strathbogie in view of Bland's advance. Jacobite detachments placed at Elgin, Gordon Castle, Fochabers, Cullen, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 20</td>
<td>Duke of Perth with Lord Cromartie disperses Loudoun's force near Dornoch.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Skirmish at Keith with Kingston's Horse.</td>
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<td>March 25</td>
<td>Hazard sloop runs ashore and is seized by Lord Reay at Tongue.</td>
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<td>March 26</td>
<td>Six battalions and two cavalry regiments of Cumberland's occupy Strathbogie.</td>
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<td>March 31</td>
<td>Lord George Murray abandons siege of Blair Castle on orders to return to Inverness.</td>
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<td>April 2 - 3</td>
<td>Jacobite force returns to Inverness from siege of Blair Castle, Macphersons remaining in Badenoch to hold the passes.</td>
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<td>April 3</td>
<td>Siege of Fort William abandoned.</td>
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<td>April 8</td>
<td>Cumberland with rest of his force leaves Aberdeen.</td>
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<td>April 11</td>
<td>Cumberland occupies Cullen.</td>
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<td>April 12</td>
<td>Duke of Perth retires across Spey.</td>
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<td>April 13</td>
<td>Duke of Perth and Lord John Drummond retire to Nairn. Cumberland encamped between Elgin and Forres.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 14</td>
<td>Cumberland advances to Nairn. Duke of Perth retires to Culloden, orders sent out to recall outlying troops from Badenoch, etc. Lochiel and Camerons return from siege of Fort William.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>Night attack on Cumberland fails. Lord Cromartie and others seized at Dunrobin Castle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 16</td>
<td>Battle of Culloden.</td>
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